PASTORAL COUNSELLORS' VALUE SYSTEMS AND MORAL JUDGEMENT DEVELOPMENT:
A PRACTICAL THEOLOGICAL STUDY

by

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I declare that PASTORAL COUNSELLORS' VALUE SYSTEMS AND MORAL
JUDGEMENT DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL THEOLOGICAL STUDY is my own
work and that all the sources that I have used have been
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i

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SUMMARY

Recent literature by several eminent psychotherapists such as Bergin and Beutler argues that counsellors' personal values are probably the greatest influence on the success and outcome of therapy and that the counsellor tends to convert the client to the counsellor's values. This literature provided strong support for this researcher's contention of the need for similar studies in pastoral counselling. The researcher was particularly concerned about the role of pastoral counsellors' value systems and moral judgement development in counselling situations. The researcher selected the Rokeach Value Survey and the Rest Defining Issues Test as instruments to test a sample of South African pastoral counsellors in this regard.

The research questions addressed were as follows.

Firstly, what are the value systems of a sample of pastoral counsellors in the South African context?
Secondly, what are the moral judgement development levels of the pastoral counsellors?
Thirdly, what is the relationship between the rank ordering of values and pastoral counsellors' levels of moral judgement development?
Fourthly, what implications could these variables have for pastoral-client pairing in pastoral counselling?

The chief findings were as follows.

Firstly, the pastoral counsellors were shown to have conservative value systems with a preference for introspective terminal values over social terminal values.
Secondly, the pastoral counsellors had a P score of 39.6 on the Defining Issues Test. This compares favourably with Asian university students who score between 36-40 as opposed to American university students who have a mean P score of 42.6. The researcher concluded that the conservative religious ideology of

the sample helped to explain the low P scores somewhat.

Thirdly, the Spearman correlational coefficient indicated little correlation between the Rokeach Value Survey and the Rest Defining Issues Test.

Fourthly, both instruments indicated that the conservative nature of the pastoral counsellors would no doubt make them very effective counsellors in most denominations. They would tend to counsel in support of the status quo in the church. A major recommendation of the study was the need for further pastoral counsellor education in dealing with moral values issues.

KEY WORDS

Defining Issues Test; Moral development judgement; Practical theological study; Rokeach Value Survey; South African pastoral counsellors; Value Systems.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 3

VALUES AND MORAL JUDGEMENT DEVELOPMENT TESTING: A CRITICAL   98
DISCUSSION

CHAPTER 4

THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS   144
FOR PASTORAL COUNSELLING

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Orientation

Empirical research has shown that counsellors' values play an important role in counselling and therapy (Bergin 1980; Beutler, Clarkin, Crago and Bergan 1991; Kelly 1991; Tjeltveit 1986). After decades of therapy training focusing on the process and goals of therapy, recent literature suggests a return to a concern for the personality and values of the counsellor (Bergin and Garfield 1994:825; Beutler 1981:79). Evidence suggests that counsellors' values are probably the greatest influence on the success and outcome of therapy and that counsellors tend to convert clients to counsellors' values (Arizmendi et al; 1985; Bergin and Jensen 1989; Beutler 1981; Frank and Frank 1991; Kelly 1991; Tjeltveit 1992; Worthington 1988).

It has generally been conceded that pastoral counselling tends to follow the trends of secular counselling and therapy to a large extent. Holifield's (1983) classic, A History of Pastoral Care in America and Heitink's (1977) book, Pastoraat als hulpverlening: Inleiding in de pastorale teologie en psychologie, exemplify this trend. The recent increased interest in the theoretical and empirical research surrounding counsellor values thus suggests an important field of study for pastoral counselling as well.

In some ways this echoes the original debate between Hiltner (1949; 1958; 1959) and Campbell (1967; 1981) in the early days of pastoral counselling. Hiltner stressed shepherding while Campbell stressed the person of the shepherd. Hiltner focused on the eductive method and process of counselling while Campbell was concerned with

the personality of the pastoral counsellor. Thus Campbell (1981:11) was highly critical of Hiltner's appropriation of the Rogerian non-directive method with its emphasis upon the primacy of human relationships. Campbell stressed instead the personality and personal integrity of the pastoral counsellor. He states: "It is out of the consistence and depth of the caring person's own character that help is given to another" (Campbell 1981:15). Campbell thus emphasised "being" while Hiltner stressed "doing".

The researcher has followed this debate with immense interest for several years. When he was first ordained and entered the ministry in the Lutheran Church, he, like most of the parish pastors, was expected to be available for pastoral counselling. Together with most of his colleagues he was taught a Rogerian (1987) style of counselling which he attempted to use in all counselling situations. Some of his colleagues with even less training than the researcher stuck to intuitive common sense mixed with loving expression and legalistic advice giving.

As the researcher continued to reflect on his pastoral counselling function, he realised that he was caught in a difficult marriage between a Rogerian style reflective listening and the church's tradition of a moral disciplined approach to care and counselling. In embarking on an extensive study of both the strengths and weaknesses of Rogerian and Hiltnerian eductive methods of counselling he learned to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of Roger's approach as found in critiques by a variety of writers including Browning (1980:195), Gerkin (1984:12), Noyce (1989:16) and Oden (1969:77). Capps (1993:7) has recently come out in support of some of Roger's basic tenets which may suggest a reassessment of Rogers in future by pastoral counsellors which is beyond the scope of this study. The current researcher was also impressed with the writings of O'Brien (1984)

and Egan (1990) regarding the use of the Rogerian style of establishing relationships as being only the first stage of any counselling endeavour. This strikes the researcher as reasonable considering the tendency to dismiss Rogers in a wholesale and summary fashion by some pastoral counsellors. This thesis thus arises from problems of practical experience which have bothered this researcher for close on a decade.

In his wide ranging reading program of pastoral care and counselling the researcher noted the emphasis of early pastoral care and counselling writers on the person of the counsellor. Oates' work includes such titles as Christ and Selfhood (1961) and Campbell, Rediscovering Pastoral Care (1981) with his emphasis on the person of the shepherd. Hiltner also followed upon his classical Pastoral Counseling (1949) with a book entitled, The Counselor in Counseling (1950). This latter mentioned book again stresses more the eductive method than the personality of the counsellor except for one chapter entitled Convictions in Counselling. In this researcher's opinion subsequent literature seems to have developed a stronger concern for the process and goals of counselling rather than a concern for the person and values of the counsellor. In some ways this is not surprising as a more relationship centered counselling suggests an interest in dynamic interaction between counsellor and client with the client influencing the counsellor as well as vice-versa.

Another feature of major pastoral counselling writers is the rise of concern for the moral and ethical dimensions of pastoral care and counselling. While Hiltner (1949; 1958) and Clinebell (1984) have dealt with these issues as a relatively minor part of their theories, Browning (1976; 1983a; 1991), Noyce (1989), Fowler (1987), Capps (1979; 1983) and Gerkin (1991) have brought the moral and ethical dimensions of pastoral counselling back into the foreground of pastoral

concern. Browning (1983a:102), Fowler (1987:25) Noyce (1989:73) and Capps (1979:129) have integrated the moral development perspective of Erikson and Kohlberg directly into their theories. An interesting feature of these writings is that all contain implicit information regarding the person and values of the counsellor, for example that the counsellor should be a generative person (Browning 1973:27; Capps 1983:14) or practice an ethic of equal regard (Browning 1991:105) but no explicit ideal of what counsellor's values should be are spelt out in the view of this researcher.

Finally, however important this democratic stage is in understanding the counselling relationship, it seems to this researcher that the counsellor retains a degree of expertise, training and therapeutic skills which sets him or her apart in any counselling situation. While individual counsellors may differ in active or passive counselling styles, all exert a great deal of influence regardless of the counselling method which they claim to use. The researcher agrees with Beutler and his associates (1985) regarding the powerful and persuasive influence of counselling. Beutler has pointed out that clients who seek counsellors' help are implicitly requesting to be influenced. In their endevours to provide counselling, therapists strive to influence the person. Notwithstanding the counsellor's style of communication or the way in which the counselling is offered, the therapist retains a degree of specialisation that influences the person with regard to what the therapist in particular and the client regard as important and valued (London 1964 revised 1986; Lowe 1969 revised 1976). This results in giving the counsellor a great deal of persuasive power to influence values, attitudes or change of behaviour in the client (Beutler 1979; Strupp 1980). There is evidence to suggest that the persuasive procedure which takes place in counselling is powerful enough to encourage persons to undertake a

radical change of values and attitudes in the direction advanced by the counsellor. This conclusion contrasts with the normal view of the counselling process which argues that the client merely moves in the direction of a more mature set of attitudes and values (Beutler 1979; Arizmendi et al 1985). Such a significant conclusion underlines the need for counsellors to become fully conscious of their personal values and how they influence their clients. Empirical evidence also suggests that therapist values, unlike client values, do not change significantly during therapy (Bleyel 1973; Haase 1968; Holtzmann 1962; Worthington 1988). This finding leads to the conclusion that therapists generally have fairly stable value systems which do not change radically from client to client.

Within the discipline of psychotherapy, countless pleas have been made since the late 1950's (Patterson 1958:216; Samler 1960:34) for therapists to make conscious studies of their own value systems. The position asserted is that all therapists need to become aware of their personal and professional biases. This is particularly important for therapists dealing with clients who have radically different value systems from their own. Some counselling training books such as Van Hoose and Kottler (1977) and Corey and Callahan (1988) exemplify this concern.

In 1977 Van Hoose and Kottler (1977:172-182) stressed that therapists must realise that they have a powerful and persuasive influence over their clients. They argued that it was better to employ this powerful and persuasive influence in a self-conscious and controlled way rather than allowing unconscious influence to develop. Van Hoose and Kottler recommend the use of value-clarification exercises in order for therapists to become more aware of their value systems.

Corey and Callahan (1988:25-65) begin their standard book on counsellor training with two chapters on

The Counsellor as a Person and Professional and on Values
and the Helping Relationship. Beside critiquing the
issues of value influence as evidenced through various
schools of psychotherapy, Corey and Callahan argue that
the counsellor should clarify his or her personal values
in order to be aware of their possible influence upon his
or her work. They mention for example the situation where
a liberal counsellor finds himself or herself working
with a client who has more traditional values. Many
counsellors also have strong commitments to certain
values which they probably rarely question and these
values will no doubt be promoted in therapy either
consciously or unconsciously.

Recently, Beutler, Machado and Neufeld have
developed a diagram concerning counsellor characteristics
which is in support of the direction in which the
researcher has been arguing his thesis. The diagram
divides therapist variables into two chief dimensions.
The first are observable qualities and the second are the
subjective qualities of therapists.

(Beutler, L. Machado, P. Neufeldt, S. 1994:231)

The diagram is particularly suggestive in terms of what this researcher has surmised from reading both therapeutic literature and pastoral counselling literature in particular. Clearly, Campbell, for example, was dealing with the left hand side of the diagram and Hiltner with the right hand side. Campbell's doctoral thesis is a clear example of this concern (Campbell 1967). The title of the thesis is lengthy and revealing, "The Influence of Counsellor variables on methods of pastoral counselling. A study of the effect of the personality, age, experience level, religious denomination, attitudes and beliefs of pastoral counsellors on their responses to counselling". In this researcher's opinion, the Hiltnerian trend has largely continued to dominate in pastoral care and counselling literature as evidenced by Browning (1983a), Capps (1983), Fowler (1987), Gerkin (1984) and Noyce (1989). Noyce (1989:15-17) and Capps (1993:7-38) have recently included more material specifically on the person of the counsellor. The focus on values in this project is also clearly pictured in the diagram as well. This thesis is concerned primarily with the variables and characteristics on the left hand side of the diagram. Worthington (1988:422) has argued in line with this thesis that it is useful to distinquish finally between therapist values and therapy values. Therapist values are the personal values of the therapist. Therapy values are the inherent form of therapy used.

Values research has thus become a broad field with a great deal of research being done on the role of religious values (Bergin 1980;1989), moral values (Tjeltveit 1986;1992), mental health values (Buhler 1962; Strupp 1980), political values (Szasz 1965; Corey and Callahan 1988), social values (Hollingshead and Redlich 1958; Van Hoose and Kottler 1977) as well as professional (Corey and Callahan 1988) and therapeutic values (Worthington 1988) concerning the counselling process.

Given this body of growing literature and research, particularly in the personal and professional and therapeutic value systems of counsellors, this researcher desires to undertake a parallel study of such a concern regarding pastoral counsellors in the South African context.

1.2 Value systems and moral judgement development

The need for research in values and value systems of pastoral counsellors is closely linked in the mind of this researcher with a particular interest in the role of moral values in counselling. One of the seminal figures in values research, Rokeach, (1973:5) distinguishes between "means" and "ends" values. He calls the first "instrumental values" and the second "terminal values." He then goes on to distinguish between two groupings of "instrumental values." The first grouping are "moral values" and the second are "competency values". He argues that the concept of moral values is narrower than the concept of values in general. Moral values remain modes of conduct and are never end-states of existence. According to Rokeach (1973:13) moral values are interpersonal in nature and result in feelings of guilt when breached. Moral values assist as ideals both to guide action and to assess the action of other people. Competency values are intrapersonal in nature and produce feelings of shame when transgressed. He thus concludes that moral values are a specific form of "instrumental value" or "means value" which aim towards certain "terminal values" or "end values."

Rokeach (1973:14) argues that Kohlberg's (1976) and by implication Rest's (1979;1986) moral judgement development theory is focusing on a special kind of moral value, that of the moral instrumental value of justice or fairness. Kohlberg is thus concerned with idealised or preferable modes of conduct. In the view of this

researcher, it is useful to move from a more general theory and empirical study of value systems towards a more specific study of moral judgement development as a sequence to better understanding pastoral counsellors' values. It is this researcher's working hypothesis that the rank ordering of values in a value system will probably be reflected in the level of moral judgement development chosen by the counsellor.

The researcher's interest in the relationship between the empirical measurement of value systems of pastoral counsellors and the counsellors levels of moral judgement development will thus hopefully provide two important perspectives for obtaining information regarding pastoral counsellor value systems. This information should in turn enable us to begin to understand the broader ramifications which such value systems and moral judgement development can have for pastoral counselling.

The research questions to be addressed in this thesis are as follows:

Firstly, what are the value systems of a sample of pastoral counsellors in the South African context?
Secondly, what are the moral judgement development levels of the pastoral counsellors?
Thirdly, what is the relationship between the rank ordering of values and pastoral counsellors' levels of moral judgement development?
Fourthly, what implications could these variables have for pastoral-client pairing in pastoral counselling?

There are also two working hypotheses which the researcher has developed in an attempt to anticipate the research findings of the thesis. These are as follows:

Firstly, the rank ordering of values in a value system
will probably be reflected in the level of moral
judgement development of the counsellor.

Secondly, the three sub-groups of pastoral counsellors
(white males, white females and black males) will exhibit
common value systems and levels of moral judgement
development.

1.3   Research method

A theoretical and empirical analysis of the value systems
and moral judgement development levels of a sample of
pastoral counsellors will be undertaken. The research
will be done from the perspective of practical theology
as a theological operational science.

Two standardised instruments will be used to
operationalise these variables. They are the Rokeach
Value Survey and the Rest Defining Issues Test (a moral
judgement development test). These tests will be used as
a means of obtaining information concerning pastoral
counsellor values and moral judgement development.

The research will be qualitative in approach. In the
course of the research project there will also be some
quantitative aspects. Quantitative research is often
linked with hypothesis testing. In this study a major
working hypothesis concerns the anticipated relationship
between the Rokeach Value Survey and Rest Defining Issues
Test.

The thesis will also be exploratory and descriptive.
As Mouton and Marais (1988:43) note, exploratory studies
desire to explore a relatively unknown research area.
This will include a review of pertinent literature and an
attempt to gain new insights into the phenomenon of the
values of pastoral counsellors in the South Africa
context. The study will also be descriptive (Mouton and
Marais 1988:43-44) as the researcher desires to measure

the frequencies of counsellor values and levels of moral judgement development.

1.4 Practical theology as a critical theological operational science

1.4.1 Practical theology as a scientific discipline

The very name practical theology draws attention to the fact that this discipline is vitally concerned with both theology and practice. Yet for the two hundred years of its academic existence, it has struggled to rid itself of the label of being simply practical instruction, technology, a discipline teaching fledgeling pastors how to put their knowledge of theology into practice, the application of insights gained in systematic theology to church life.

As a result of this long standing misconception, practical theology is constantly engaged in reaching a clearer understanding of its task which is to formulate a critical theory of the church's actions in society. If, as stated by Heyns and Pieterse (1990:49), it is a critical communicative theory of gospel orientated acts by Christians, it is clear that the relationship between theological theory and church praxis is a crucially important issue for practical theology.

1.4.2 Practical theology and theology and praxis

Practical theology lays claim to its own critical theory, field of study and structures. They are dialectical. The field of study and structures draw theological significance from its theory. Practical theology desires to move out of the university ivory tower into the dynamics of God coming to humanity in the world through the church. Practical theology desires a critical faith theory which propagates a constant dialogue, God and humankind, church and world to be mediated.

It is not a simple movement from one area of
activity or thought to another that constitutes the
relationship of theological theory and church praxis, but
integrated thought and action involving event, encounter
and operation along with critical distancing each to the
other, as a creative bi-polar tension which spirals into
the future.

It is a hermeneutical circle relating not only past
and present, but particularly theological theory and
church praxis in the dialectical pull and thrust of the
transmission of the cause of Jesus and his kingdom by the
ecumenical church concretised in the world.

1.4.3   Practical theology as critical theological theory and critical church praxis

The current researcher has always been impressed by
Greinacher's and Heyns's attempt to explore and explicate
the theory-praxis problem in practical theology.

Greinacher's position (Heyns 1990:23) that the
relationship between theological theory and
ecclesiastical praxis is governed neither by complete
differentiation nor by identification but by bi-polar
stress, has been an important insight. Greinacher further
asserts that the transition from theory to praxis
involves qualitative change. His concern for the
development of a critical theory and critical praxis
suggests a dynamic relationship which underlies a dynamic
discipline called practical theology. The optimal
position of bi-polar tension suggests that theological
theory and church praxis are in constant dialogical
tension and while they remain in contact with each other,
neither is overwhelmed by the other. Consequently both
theory and praxis are open to change and growth.

The word "transition" indicates a sense of movement
and change. While retaining their own relative values,
theory and praxis come together in creative tension to

form something new and different from what they were
before. Moreover "transition" indicates something vital
and non-static. The church is pictured as a pilgrim
church, on the move, constantly being renewed by God's
own action and our faith action responses. These faith
action responses should also be transformative and
emancipatory and must be constantly held under critical
appraisal.

The word "transformation" is the word then which
best describes the church's and Christian pilgrimage on
earth. Christians should also live lives of qualitative
change and transformation. God comes in Christ to
transform the world so that the world might be changed.
By this process of transformation, we not only interpret
what happens in church and world, but we must become
involved in transformation for the sake of God. Hence the
transition from theory to praxis involves qualitative,
transformative change.

1.4.4   Practical theology and empirical methodology

Practical theology has attempted to enter into the
broader scientific debate of our times through dynamic
critical reflection on the theory and praxis of the
church in society. An important ingredient of scientific
research is the development of empirical evidence and
data of practical reality. Scientific research desires to
solve problems scientifically and systematically.

Heyns and Pieterse (1990:69) sum up this position
succinctly as follows:

> Every theological subject has its own field of
> study and its own methodological access to
> that field. The exegetical subjects study a
> book, the Bible... We deal with the gospel and
> communicative actions. Communicative actions
> in our own time can only be studied by means
> of empirical methodology. Just as exegesis
> seeks to probe scientifically the meaning and
> ambience of a biblical text, so practical

> theology seeks to fathom the facts, processes
> and structures that determine and facilitate
> communicative actions in present-day
> ecclesiastic and religious praxis.

This empirical methodology is thus a distinctive feature of all operational sciences and also of practical theology. Practical theology is therefore an evolving and dynamic science which finds a place for itself in a university setting through its scientific rigour and its unique contribution to theological knowledge.

1.4.5 Practical theology and Christian ethics

Practical theology's relationship with Christian ethics is complex with the two disciplines having once been seen as one (Forrester 1990:7; Wolfaardt 1980:137). In the opinion of the current researcher the relationship can best be described in two ways. Firstly, a clear and precise distinction between the two disciplines is maintained. Hiltner (1958) distinguished between them by calling Christian ethics a logic-centered discipline and pastoral theology an operational-centered discipline. Wolfaardt (1980:137) maintains that ethics is concerned with regulating normative-determined actions and relationships. Practical theology is, however, concerned with all forms of communication that are of importance to Christianity with a view towards social action. Practical theology is thus concerned with communicative action while Christian ethics is concerned with normative action. In this position ethics thus remains in the background of practical theology.

Secondly, there are the views of systematic theologians like Pannenberg (1976) and Tracy (1983), ethicists like Gustafson (1970) and McCann (1985) and practical theologians like Donald Browning (1983). This position views practical theology as a discipline under Christian ethics. Practical theology focuses on communicative moral praxis with the church described as

a community of moral discourse (Browning 1976; Gustafson 1970). The church is also seen as a sub-system of society and concerned with wider public norms and values. This ethical practical theology (my own term) is particularly characterised by the liberal public school of theology advocated by the University of Chicago. Theologians and the church are advised to give philosophical reasons for their norms and values and attempt to influence the ethical and public norms of society. This position intends to develop a liberal democratic theology which mirrors liberation theology as espoused in Latin America. In this model of practical theology, ethics moves from the background to the foreground of the discipline.

The current researcher is sympathetic with both points of view. In this researcher's view he feels that ethics and morals should be held in the middle ground. For example, major advances in psychology as developed by Kohlberg resulted from his attempt to move beyond a narrow scientific view of psychology which stressed observation and testability through small dense positivistic studies. His broader moral developmental psychology sought to marry experimental psychology with ethics and moral philosophy with profound results for the disciplines of psychology, psychotherapy, educational psychology, nursing, social work, philosophy, Christian education and pastoral counselling. However, as important as Kohlberg's contribution is, not all psychology is moral psychology. Yet moral psychology may enter much psychological and related literature as an important and often essential component for research which was not there sufficiently in the past. In the view of this researcher the same is true for practical theology. If practical theology is to be truly inter-disciplinary, it must dialogue not only with the communication sciences and social sciences such as psychology and sociology but also with Christian ethics.

1.4.6   Practical theology in South Africa

Burger (1991) and Wolfaardt (1992) have provided useful overviews of the various "schools" of practical theology in South Africa. The researcher will outline the key elements of their views. The researcher will also give critical thought to the personal commitments of the chief theorists of each school and particularly their alliance with what this writer senses is a commitment to a conservative, liberal or liberation theology perspective which operates as a meta-theory behind these schools.

Burger's study begins with the problem of finding a norm for practical theology in the South African context. In his sampling of respondents he discovered that "scripture" was the norm most often appealed to for laying down operational guidelines. He also identifies three approaches to practical theology in South Africa. These approaches he calls the confessional approach, the correlative approach and the contextual approach.

1.4.6.1   The confessional approach

This group of predominantly Dutch Reformed academics supports W.D Jonker's conception of the discipline with its appeal to scripture as the norm for the subject. Jonker (1981:5) defines practical theology as the study of God's Word from the point of view of the church's ministry. Wolfaardt (1992:6) notes that the use of the "scriptural" norm here suggests a certain hermeneutical presupposition concerning the use of the bible. This results in a Reformed view of the bible becoming the "scriptural norm" which is largely applied deductively to various contexts.

The following characteristics are apparent in the confessional approach according to Wolfaardt (1992:7). The bible is regarded as the source and norm of practical theology. Guidelines for ministry are arrived at

deductively through a selective use of scripture and Calvinistic confessional resources. The training of clergy and the ministry of the church are the pivotal focus of this discipline.

The supporters of this approach include many Reformed lecturers at seminaries and faculties largely affiliated to specific denominations and most of their ministerial offspring.

1.4.6.2 The correlative approach

This group subscribes to the operational science approach which is associated with Zerfass (1974) and Van der Ven (1993) among others. The University of South Africa and Rhodes faculties can be seen as falling into this category. Pieterse's definition would be largely representative of this group. "We have defined practical theology as the theological theory about communicative actions which mediate God's coming to people in the world through God's word " (Heyns and Pieterse 1990:51). This group traces it's lineage back to Tillich (1951), Berkhof (1979) and Firet (1986).

Burger (1991:60) includes the following general characteristics of the group which are worth repeating as a whole.

> They believe that practical theology is primarily a study of action(s) rather than of a book. The actions that are studied are the church's or Christians', endeavours to communicate the gospel... Scripture is respected as a source of knowledge, but it functions indirectly rather than directly. There is considerable scope for the expansion and enrichment of theological insight by way of religious experience and the secular human sciences... As a result, this group, in principle at any rate, inclines toward an inductive rather than a deductive method of doing practical theology.

Burger concludes that although the church and its work remain important, the general orientation is considerably broader than that of the confessional group.

Wolfaardt (1992:10) adds further information about the approach. He notes that the teaching of the subject in principle is not aimed solely at clergy and focuses on educating the whole people of God. The approach occurs mainly among academics not linked to a specific denominational faculty. The proponents are thus more ecumenical than denominational in tone. The term "theological theory" rather than the phrase "the Word of God" is used more frequently. Well known practical theologians of this correlative group include Roman Catholics like Van der Ven (1993) and Protestants like Browning (1991).

1.4.6.3   The contextual approach

Burger includes the University of Cape Town, Natal and the University of Durban-Westville in this group. Cochrane et al (1992:2) define the discipline in the following way: "... by practical theology we mean that disciplined, reflective theological activity which seeks to relate the faith of the Christian community to its life, mission and social praxis". Wolfaardt (1992:11) notes that this approach does not differ significantly from that of the correlational group. The subtitle of their textbook, "Towards a practical theology of social transformation" indicates a more radical assessment of the South African context than that implied by the other two approaches.

Burger (1991:62) assesses this group by describing the following characteristics:

> Context plays a dominant role and in-depth knowledge of the situation in which practical theology is done is a prerequisite. The subject is practised with a view to changing the situation or society... The role of Scripture and tradition

varies from selective utilisation-with a view to transformation-to a more fundamental one.

Wolfaardt (1992:12) again adds additional information. He notes that both the religious and secular communities assume great importance in this approach. The communal emphasis is stressed in sharp contrast to the excessive individualism found in the other approaches. The prime aim is not clergy training but community empowerment. There is also a strong ecumenical slant which moves beyond the Christian community and seeks alliances with social groupings such as social and welfare agencies. Clearly this approach is the most radical and secularised among the three. Theologians representing this approach include Tracy (1983), McCann (1985) and Holland and Henriot (1984).

1.4.6.4   Critique

The current researcher would like to make some additional critical observations about these approaches. Behind each approach the researcher senses a personal commitment to a conservative, liberal or liberation theology perspective. The confessional approach is conservative in its theological and social perspective and unconsciously aims at the maintenance of the church as an institution under some perceived threat as evidenced in a rapidly changing environment. It tends towards upholding church tradition as the "scriptural norm" and the status quo of the church as far as possible. The liberal approach is concerned with democratic reform in the church's theology and congregational praxis. It desires to reform the church and to some extent society in line with certain liberal democratic notions of a rational church and society. Among its most powerful adherents are the liberal public school of practical theology as advocated by the University of Chicago in the United States. The theologians involved there include Tracy (1983), McCann

(1985) and Browning (1983b). The empirical theology espoused by Van der Ven (1993) also stresses a liberal Roman Catholic line. Liberation theology includes a theological and political commitment toward a more communal and socialistic society. The church is perceived to be a "site of struggle" toward a more radical prophetic egalitarian church and society. Praxis is really orthopraxis and communal praxis rather than purely individual praxis. The reading of the context is also determined by certain theological, social and political commitments which lead towards a certain type of social analysis. This social analysis is particularly concerned with oppressors and the oppressed.

The current researcher associates himself primarily with the correlational view of practical theology. Although he has great empathy for the contextual view which is closely associated with the correlational view, his perspective remains left-liberal rather than radical in orientation. This grouping of correlational practical theologians should also not be conceived of too narrowly. For example, in this researcher's opinion, the liberal public practical theology as practiced by Browning is not quite the same as the liberal empirical theology practiced by Van der Ven. While both show a great deal of interest in the moral aspects of practical theology, Browning's qualitative-descriptive style contrasts markedly with Van der Ven harder empirical approach. A detailed study comparing their two approaches would benefit the correlational approach to practical theology immensely at some future date. The major point, however, remains that Burger and Wolfaard's comparisons are more suggestive and tentative than final in this researcher's opinion. They are ideal types and subject to a great deal more variation than is possible to deal with exhaustively in this current research project. A critical study of possible mixtures between the three "schools" also needs to be undertaken.

1.5 Definitions

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the value systems and moral judgment development levels of a sample of pastoral counsellors in the South African context. Certain key terms in this thesis need to be operationalised. These include the terms "values" and "value systems", "moral judgement development", "pastoral counselling" and "pastoral counsellor".

Mouton and Marais (1988:60) point out that many concepts and definitions derive their meaning and precise definition from theories and frameworks within which they are used. Operational definitions attempt to describe operations under which these definitions are valid and testable. This thesis is a clear example of these comments as all concepts and testability are based on standardised tests.

1.5.1 Values

Theologians, philosophers, social scientists, economists, lawyers and psychologists all have their own perceptions of the term "values." In this study, we will follow a definition of the term as found in psychology. This research project has a strong psychological perspective as its underlying basis.

Despite its comparative age, perhaps the most widely used and authoritative study of the subject remains that of Milton Rokeach in the Nature of Human Values (1973) and Understanding Human Values (1979). Rokeach (1973:5) defines a "value" as: "A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence". Several characteristics of values are worthy of comment here.

22

Firstly, values have both a dynamic quality which accedes to change and a persevering quality which allows for stability. According to Rokeach (1973:6) values are both stable and dynamic. He remarks that if values were completely stable, change would be impossible. However if they did alter continuously, one would also live in anarchy.

Secondly, Rokeach makes the crucial distinction between two types of values. He distinguishes between "modes of conduct" and "end-states of existence". He dsignates the first as "instrumental values" and the second as "terminal values".

1.5.2   Values systems

Rokeach draws a distinction between "values" and "value systems". Rokeach (1973:7) states that, "A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum, of relative importance." Rokeach has operationalised his value system into a widely used standardised instrument called the Rokeach Value Survey. The test continues to be used widely internationally and its relevance does not appear to have waned much over recent years (Beutler et al 1994:240).

In 1989 a researcher Kelly (1991:171-186) in his doctoral thesis presented at the prestigious Vanderbilt University in the United States has defended the survey as the best values instrument still in existence. Kelly concludes that;

> In light of the above discussion it is hard to argue against Rokeach's well defined, well researched, and psychometrically sound work at providing the definition and instrument of choice... Rokeach's definition of values should be given prime consideration for future research, since it is clear, comprehensive, well established and fully operationalized in a reliable instrument.
>
> (Kelly 1991:183)

1.5.3   Moral judgement development

Perhaps the most widely used instrument for studying moral reasoning, judgement and development has been Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview (1976). The reformulation of this test by Rest into the Defining Issues Test (1974 revised in 1979) has led to extensive research being done concerning moral judgement development. The current researcher believes that the combination of the words "moral judgment development" better describes and defines what is being conceptualised and tested here than the plethora of other terms often used to describe this research such as moral reasoning, moral judgement and moral development. Further it is useful to think of Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT for short) as attempting to determine moral judgement development or what could be called "moral justice development" or "moral fairness development".

Rest's Defining Issues Test is widely used and like the Rokeach test is currently in use by numerous researchers throughout the world. In South Africa it has been used at least once (Heyns P M, Niekerk and Rouk, J A, 1981:139-151). This study of the moral judgement development of juvenile offenders is unfortunately not particularly relevant to this research project.

Rest concludes with the following important distinctions concerning what amounts to a restricted concept of moral judgement:

> In summary, moral judgement is concerned with how the benefits and burdens of social cooperation are to be distributed and the rules of a social system that assigns people's rights and responsibilities... Contrary to some philosophers who use "moral" to include concepts of the good or worthwhile life, the use of "moral" in this account is restricted to concepts of justice and fairness. Perhaps it would have been clearer if this research had been labelled "fairness judgement".
>
> (Rest 1979:20)

1.5.4   Pastoral care and counselling

The distinctions and relationship between pastoral care and pastoral counselling can be quite intricate. This researcher understands pastoral care to be a broad inclusive ministry which people need throughout their lives. It is practiced by both clergy and laity. Pastoral counselling is more specialised and is practised by pastors and laity with advanced degrees and training in counselling. In contrast to pastoral care, people usually do not require pastoral counselling on an ongoing basis. Pastoral counselling is required only at specific times of great need or crises. This includes both situational and developmental crises.

1.5.5   Pastoral counsellor

A pastor with an advanced degree in pastoral counselling. In this study this means a person with an Honours degree in pastoral care and counselling and some ongoing counselling practice.

1.5.6   Personality

Contemporary reflections about the concept of person and personality are very complex indeed (Ricoeur 1992:27-55). A cursory glance through a psychological or pastoral counselling dictionary highlights this complexity. The researcher finds the following general definition useful as a basis for this study. "Personality is the organized and distinctive pattern of behaviour, thought, and feelings which characterize a persons's adaptations to various situations, and which endure over time and set persons apart from each other...Although personality endures over time, most persons experience some changes in attitudes and actions over the years" (Holstein 1990:899).

1.5.7   Overview of the thesis

This thesis will now proceed through four further
chapters. These chapters highlight the following major
issues.

Chapter 2. This chapter will undertake a literature
review regarding values from a pastoral and therapeutic
perspective. The pastoral literature will begin with a
brief historical perspective concerning values and moral
values as presented by Mc'Neill (1951) and Holifield
(1983). The modern debate will be dealt with through a
selection of writers including Hiltner (1950;1958),
Clinebell (1984), Browning (1976;1983a;1991) and various
authors from the Journal of Psychology and Theology
(1981;1984;1990). The literature review from the
therapeutic perspective will begin with Freud (1916-1917)
and include Buhler (1962), London (1964 revised in 1986)
and Lowe (1969 revised in 1976). The seminal research
done by Beutler et al (1991) and Bergin et al (1994)
entitled "persuasive influence theory" will also be a
major part of this review.

Chapter 3. This chapter will undertake a critical
discussion of values and moral judgement development
testing. Values and moral development testing are
strongly advocated in the social sciences and to some
extent in religious testing. Both the Rokeach Value
Survey and the Rest Defining Issues Test have been widely
used in the United States and internationally since the
1970's. Theories and tests which have such longevity and
popularity over a twenty year period must have developed
great reliability and researchers continue to use them
confidently for various types of research projects. This
chapter will critique, justify and defend the use of the
two instruments for this thesis.

Chapter 4. This chapter will report, analyse and interpret the empirical research results. A demographic survey and the Rokeach Value Survey and Rest Defining Issues Test will provide the empirical data. The results of the 25 participants will be studied as a group with some comments on specific individual scores which stand out from the norm.

Chapter 5. This chapter will include a summary, conclusions and recommendations of the results of this thesis. Guidelines and suggestions for further research will be advanced. The possibility of developing or adapting additional instruments for studying value systems and moral judgement development in the South African context will be explored. The possibility of creating more specifically Christian instruments for testing pastoral counsellors' value systems and moral judgement development levels will also be investigated.

CHAPTER 2

COUNSELLOR VALUES

> Counsellors' values are an integral
> part of the counselling process and
> they do influence both the process
> and outcome... Values influence
> goals, techniques and the justifying
> of theory; in short they influence
> everything.

(O'Brien 1984:14)

2.1 Introduction

O'Brien's sweeping statement on the role of values in the
therapeutic process has taken a long time to come to
fruition in the discipline of psychotherapy. Despite a
general acknowledgement of the importance of values for
psychotherapy, it has until recently been a fundamental
ruling principle that the therapist avoids disclosing his
or her own values and avoids shaping the values of the
client as far as possible (Bergin 1987:53). This
objective professional attitude is clearly challenged by
such statements as those mentioned above. Whether such a
scientific, value-free discipline can and should exist
has been a major debate in psychotherapy since the time
of Freud.

In order to give this thesis a clear focus it is
noted at the outset that the major concern will be to
explore the domain of values and psychotherapy as a broad
theoretical background to a more specific question of
counsellor values and the related question of therapist-
client pairing in psychotherapy and pastoral counselling.
In recent years there has been a rapid rise of research
into the question of the role of values in psychotherapy.
A major discovery has been the fact that therapist-client
pairing and similarity can have a powerful effect on the
results of therapy. This evidence is reinforced by other
empirical research results which indicate that the values

of the counsellor influence the client in the direction of counsellor values (Beutler 1981; Beutler and Bergan 1991; Kelly 1991; Kessel and McBrearty 1967; Kilman 1981; Tjeltveit 1986).

These research results challenge psychotherapists and pastoral counsellors to move away from any notion of scientific, value-free psychotherapy and pastoral counselling. Since the counsellor influences (converts) the client in the direction of the counsellor's values, counsellors should become aware of their values and the value-laden theories, methods and goals which they employ. Counsellors should also be aware of the possibility that they are being influenced by the client's values as well.

An interesting feature of pastoral counselling in recent years has been its strong alliance with the therapy of Carl Rogers. Rogers concern for client-centered therapy with a non-directive, non-judgemental philosophy, has led to the charge of him being responsible for propagation of a largely "value-free" discipline. Rogers' (1987:19-26) credo has stressed the role of therapist as one who does not make value judgements concerning the client's values. This acceptance often of the unacceptable is believed to be beneficial to the process and outcome of therapy.

Considering theologians' espoused concern for eternal values, it is surprising that pastoral counsellors have not shown as strong an interest in the work of Ellis, Frankl, May and Mowrer as in the work of Rogers (Ellis 1967:671, 1980:636; Frankl 1969:50-97; May 1967:8-43; Mowrer 1961:103-129). These writers all acknowledge the centrality of value orientation and philosophy of life as vital to the understanding of therapy. It is argued that serious problems and crises in life are often the result of a person choosing to negate one or more of their important values. The role of psychotherapist is then seen to be that of helping the

client to articulate and clarify his or her values and then to reintegrate them into a more workable or harmonious system. It goes almost without saying that such therapy requires a more directive and judgemental approach on the part of the therapist than that advocated by Rogers.

Complicating this understanding of therapy a good deal further is the growing awareness of the fact that we live in a world of rapidly changing values Lowe (1969 revised 1976), Browning (1973:1980:1983a), Gerkin (1984:1986) and Fowler (1987). In South Africa this factor of change is exacerbated by the extremely rapid political, social and economic transformation of society. The search for common values is both exciting and perplexing. If one accepts the thesis that common values are necessary in order to have a stable society, this period is indeed a crucial time of nation building in this regard. South Africa is also the ultimate pluralistic society. In this thesis one needs to openly acknowledge the above mentioned societal forces which create value confusion in this society. One needs to keep these in mind as one tries to bring the theory and research on counsellor values into an encounter with our context.

The researcher closes this introduction by affirming that in order to be a fully functioning, effective and responsible counsellor, a counsellor should become self-consciously aware of his or her values (personal, professional and therapeutic values). In this research project the researcher will focus primarily on the first dimension, the personal values of the counsellor as a delimitation of this study. The larger global issues of values will need to be studied in subsequent research. Of particular interest would be studies which attempt to integrate the personal, professional and therapeutic values into a coherent system for practicing counsellors.

2.2   Values and psychotherapy

In this section the researcher will endeavour to make an exploratory review of the relevant literature. It is undoubtedly a vast field and he will have to be selective. He will build on several of the major reviews of the literature as undertaken by Kessel and McBrearty (1967), Kelly (1991), Beutler (1981) and Beutler and Bergan (1991). These reviewers, however, do not deal specifically with the Freudian background to the question except in passing, nor sufficiently with the meta-theoretical questions posed by their work with values. This latter issue only receives some attention in the work of Tjeltveit (1986), to which this research will refer.

2.2.1   The Freudian background

Freud regarded psychoanalysis as a technical procedure applied to mental disorders. He compared it to surgery in that it was meant to be an objective procedure that did not involve the values or beliefs of the practitioner in a direct way (Bergin 1987:53). Freud thus pictured the therapist as being someone who employed a scientific method. The therapist had to be able to distinguish between understanding what he or she observed and making value judgements about that observation. The therapist was to show a scientific disinterest in the values of the client. The principle of non-disclosure of the therapist's values was stressed. Freud argued that for the therapist to facilitate transference, the therapist had to remain as veiled as possible for the client's sake.

The struggle of Freud to retain such doctrinal "purity" in the literature is interesting to observe. In Freud's Introductory Lecture on Psycho-Analysis (1916-1917) he wrote:

> Moreover, I can assure you that you are
> misinformed if you suppose that advice and
> guidance in the affairs of life play an
> integral part in analytic influence. On the
> contrary, so far as possible we avoid the role
> of mentor such as this, and there is nothing we
> would rather bring about than the patient make
> decisions for himself."
>
> (Freud 1917:434)

Freud however notes that there are exceptions to this
premise. He writes:

> Only in the case of some very youthful or quite
> helpless or unstable individuals are we unable
> to put the desired limitations of our role into
> effect. With them we have to combine the
> functions of doctor and an educator.
>
> (Freud 1917:434)

Freud's professed disinterest in the ultimate values of
the client are clearly stated. It is interesting to note,
however, the explicit influences which are implied
concerning his views of sexuality. He asserts:

> It is true that we are not reformers but merely
> observors: nevertheless, we cannot help
> observing with a critical eye and we have found
> it impossible to side with conventional sexual
> morality... We do not keep our criticisms from
> our patient's ears, we accustom them to giving
> unprejudiced consideration to sexual matters in
> no less than to any other.
>
> (Freud 1917:435)

This is a clear example of the confusion of affirming so
strongly the notion of professional objectivity. Freud's
work is complex and there is a danger of being overly
selective in this argument and distorting his intention.
One appreciates the comment of Buhler (1962:7) at this
point. She writes, "Freud himself and some of his earlier
disciples (F. Alexander) speak of pedagogic measures that
have to be used to press the patient into a new

direction". Buhler appears to support this researcher's contention that Freud used a degree of pedagogic guidance despite his many statements to the contrary. One wonders how this form of education could take place without some sort of exchange of values between the therapist and the client? The researcher suspects that his therapy was highly charged with value interaction and value conversion.

2.2.2   Counsellor values

> The counselor's values must be held in
> awareness... Logic compels us to say that
> the counselor who manifests no values is to
> require that he have no feelings and
> whatever great drama this may be it is not
> counseling.
>
> (Samler 1960:34)

During the 1950's the doctrine of scientific impartiality which governed psychotherapy was challenged from many sides. In 1958 Patterson (1958:216) made one of the first systematic reviews of the literature on values and psychotherapy. He concluded that there were four main categories of studies. These studies were (1) Values and the criteria for mental health, (2) Values and therapeutic methods, (3) Values and the selection of clients, and (4) the influence of the counsellor's values on the client. This research project will focus primarily on the effect of the counsellor's values on the client.

The realisation that the therapist does not function outside the therapist's own value system and that he or she knowingly or unknowingly communicates his or her values to the client soon became apparent. Alexander (1967:672) made a detailed study of observing the therapist-patient interaction in several cases. He surmised that the traditional view that the patient was interacting with the therapist soley in terms of "transference" with a parental figure was inadequate. He concluded that the therapist's values were conveyed to

the patient (consciously or unconsciously) and that the patient reacted to the therapist as a whole person and not merely as a parental representative.

Some therapists followed this line of thought to its logical end and emphasised the fact that therapy should aim to affect a change in the patient's value system and philosophy of life. Perhaps the most obvious example of this line of argument is found in Ellis's Rational Emotive Therapy. Ellis (1967:671) argues that most emotional disturbances are caused by faulty, self-defeating value systems. The therapeutic goal then becomes that of "educing the patient to internalize a rational philosophy of life" (Ellis 1967:671). The therapist thus becomes a teacher. The therapist teaches the client that values which have been held for some years are irrational and should be rejected in preference of a new set of values. One of the major functions of the counsellor then becomes that of teaching values to the client.

The tremendous influence of Carl Rogers on psychology and pastoral counselling has been noted. As mentioned earlier, Rogers' concern for client-centered, non-directive, non-judgemental therapy has led to the charge that he was propagating a passive and laissez faire form of counselling. Although Rogers (1987:27) has denied this, there remains a permissiveness about certain key tenets of Rogers' technique and theory which seems to support this impression.

Three key concepts appear to form the core of Rogers therapy and these are the notions of congruence, unconditional positive regard (or acceptance) and accurate empathetic understanding. For Rogers (1987:3-63) these "therapeutic conditions" are antecedents for constructive growth on the part of the client. Rogers argues that these "conditions" are primarily attitudinal in nature and are offered in a non-selective fashion to all clients. Rogers believes that this accepting attitude

stimulates the inherent growth forces embodied in all
people.

Rogers theory and technique have sometimes given the
impression that their influence on clients' values is
fairly benign. In recent years however, Rogers has
admitted that this therapy is much more powerful medicine
than people often realise. He has stated:

> Yes, it is true, psychotherapy is subversive.
> I don't really mean it to be, but some people
> get involved with me who don't really know
> what they are getting into. Therapy theories
> and techniques promote a new model of man
> contrary to that which has been traditionally
> acceptable.

(Bergen 1980:96)

2.2.3   Empirical research

A pioneering study intended to examine the effect of
value communication in psychotherapy was that of
Rosenthal (1955:431-436). He studied the possibility of
change in moral values of neurotic patients being
counselled by psychiatric interns. He concluded that
improved patients tended to revise their moral values in
the direction of the therapists' values. The converse was
true with unimproved patients.

In 1958 Hollingshead and Redlich (1958:3-10)
investigated the relationship between psychotherapy and
social class in New Haven, USA. They found that the
upper-class patients were most frequently treated by
psycho-analysis, the middle-class patients were treated
by psychotherapy and the lower-class patients were
usually sent for custodial care. They argued that social
class was the predominant determinant of the type of
therapy the patient received. This fact was even more
important than diagnosis. The results of their study
indicated that most psychotherapy takes place when the
therapist and client had similar social backgrounds.

Patients from the lower social classes usually have value systems quite discrepant from the therapists and this leads to ineffective communication. Hence psychotherapy has tended to be an upper-class and middle-class phenomenon.

In 1963 Mendelsohn and Geller (1963:71-77) attempted to measure counsellor-client similarity by showing special interest in the number of sessions clients attended. They found that when the counsellor and client were similar in their cognitive-perceptive orientation, the client attended more sessions.

In 1966 Petoney (1966:39) discovered that there was a tendency for the values of clients to resemble the values of client-centered therapists as they proceeded in therapy. Hence some sort of value conversion and value transformation was clearly taking place. He offered two possible interpretations of this finding. Firstly, therapists appear to communicate their values to the clients and the clients adopt aspects of the therapists' value systems. Secondly, one of the outcomes of psychotherapy is probably that a client develops a more healthy and mature outlook on life which tends to approximate those of the client-centered therapist.

In 1967 Cook (1967:77-81) set out to measure the effect of patient-therapist similarity and outcome on therapy. He divided the clients into high, medium and low degrees of similarity between the patients and therapists. He concluded that the greatest change occurred in the medium group.

In 1966 Traux (1966:1-9) undertook research regarding the ideological position of Rogerian analysis of avoiding leading the client in a specific direction. He concluded that Rogers systematically rewarded or punished verbal or physical behaviour that he did or did not approve of in his clients. His study of Rogers' own cases showed that certain types of behaviour and responses were rewarded and encouraged while other behaviour was ignored or discouraged.

In 1967 Welkowitz, Ortmeyer and Cohen (1967:48-55) argued that changes of values in psychotherapy are a function of the patient's internalisation of the therapist's values. They reported the following results that (1) therapists and their patients had more similar value systems than randomly paired combinations and that (2) patients rated as most improved by their therapists had values more similar to those of their therapists than patients who were less improved.

2.2.4   The psychotherapist as secular priest

In 1964 London wrote a seminal book entitled, The Modes and Morals of Psychotherapy (1964 revised edition 1986). He argued that psychotherapy was both a scientific and moralistic discipline. In his opinion, psychotherapy was a moral force and psychotherapists were moral agents as well as being healing technicians. London went on to discuss the moral implications of "insight" versus "action" therapies. One of his significant conclusions was that psychotherapists had become a saving guild and professional union who now occupy a prominent position in society, much like the clergy and rabbis did in past ages. Psychotherapists have become a scientific priesthood who offer moral advice on the goals of life and ultimately a secular form of salvation. London remarks:

> People's ultimate reference for morals once was God. For many this is no longer true, for it does not easily translate to concrete propositions for the religious conduct of one's business, or career or love affairs. The absence of compelling religious belief does not leave people indifferent to salvation, but only more aware of lacking clear ideals of what it is and how to get it... In much of their work, psychotherapists are finally like priests and rabbis, wonder workers and gurus and their like.

(London 1986:160)

Lowe's book, Value Orientations in Counselling and
Psychotherapy: The Meanings of Mental Health (1969
revised edition 1976) expands and deepens the arguments
presented by London concerning the proposition that
values and particularly moral values permeate the entire
therapy process. Lowe's opening chapter entitled, The
Therapist as Contemporary Moralist, leaves one in little
doubt as to his thrust. He is concerned with the
problems facing the therapist and client in a world of
changing values. He asserts that the therapist in the
modern age has taken on the role of a moral guide. The
central theme of his book is the question of value
orientations of psychotherapists and particularly the
moral notions of mental health which they derive from
the various psychotherapies which they use.

Lowe pictures the therapist as being in a
priviledged position to offer moral counsel and values
guidance to a client. He however cautions that this
moral guidance should not be carried out in a legalistic
manner. For Lowe (1976:16) the therapist should provide
moral counsel not by demanding allegiance to the moral
position of the therapist, but rather by guiding the
client to find his or her own moral values. He does so
"by stimulating the individual to become his own source
of morality" (Lowe 1976:17). This book continues to
depict the struggle that theorists and practitioners
have had for so long in trying to locate the source of
moral values within the client and not within the
therapist.

2.2.5 The persuasive influence of the psychotherapist

2.2.5.1   Persuasive influence theory

Beutler (1971:298-301; 1972:362-367; 1979:432-440) and
his associates Arizmendi, Shanfield, Crago and Hagaman
(1985:16-21) have argued that psychotherapy is logically

and empirically an attitude and moral value persuasion process. Beutler argues that it is illogical to advocate that therapy should induce change and then to discount its persuasive element. By its very nature, psychotherapy is intended to persuade individuals to change significant attitudes and values about themselves and their world. However, it is one thing to consider changing attitudes, values and even religious beliefs in psychotherapy and it is quite another to consider the therapy process as being that which systematically induces either directly or indirectly the patient to develop new beliefs which approximate those of their therapist.

Arizmendi, Beutler and his associates (1985:16-21) have attempted to theorise and empirically test their perception that changes in psychotherapy really reflect a persuasive process rather than a simple maturation or values clarification process. This is a crucial distinction. Clearly persuasion is different from a maturational or value clarification process as persuasion leads to the position of accepting either implicitly or explicitly the views advocated by another person. In this case it would be the views of the psychotherapist. However, before psychotherapy can be considered to be a persuasive rather than simply a maturational process, it must be demonstrated that the client adopts the therapist's attitudes and values. Many therapists do believe that patient's moral beliefs and attitudes come to resemble their own in the course of therapy. Empirical evidence for this persuasive proposition was initially given by Rosenthal (1955) and subsequently reaffirmed by Beutler (1971) and Beutler et al (1978). These studies have suggested that successful outcome in psychotherapy is strongly related to the amount of attitude or value change experienced by the client. Perhaps of greater significance than simply the presence of change, is the question of whose attitudes and values are being acquired in therapy.

The critical question that remains is whether clients acquire more "mature" attitudes or simply those of their therapists? Beutler et al (1978) suggest that the attitudes of the average therapist and patient are equally heterogeneous. The issue of persuasion shows through in several studies where simple maturation views are not convincing. Firstly, it has been discovered that successful patients learn to evaluate the success of psychotherapy on the basis of their therapists' goals rather than on the basis of their own assessments (Parloff et al 1960). Secondly, successful patients acquire the interest patterns of their therapist (Welkowitz et al 1967). Thirdly, successful patients acquire the particular values of their own therapists and not the values of therapists in general (Beutler 1971).

Evidence thus suggests that patients' values and attitudes change in successful psychotherapy and that they frequently acquire the particular value systems of their specific therapists. This leads to a discussion of the possible variables which can lead to this kind of persuasion and radical change. Beutler (1979:435-437) highlights three persuader variables.

2.2.5.2   Persuader variables

Firstly, there is the persuader variable of credibility. The persuasive power of the credible therapist is well known in psychological and social psychological literature. Experts are known and believed to produce greater influence than non-experts. The interpretations of therapists represented as experts are more easily accepted than those of non-experts. Beutler et al (1975) suggest that a patient's initial perception of his or her therapist's credibility significantly influences the patients self-assessment and hope for therapeutic results. Perceived expertness increases the therapist's

attractiveness to the client and encourages trust in the therapist.

Secondly, there is the persuader variable of expectancy. The persuader's initial expectations significantly affect all subsequent persuasion and change. Therapists appear to prefer treating those with whom they have the greatest expectation of success. Therapist's expectations thus appear to determine the resultant investment of the patient in the process. In fact, the role of the client's initial expectations seems so powerful that many have suggested that much of what is psychotherapy is nothing more than a placebo treatment which capitalises upon clients' expectations of their outcomes.

Thirdly, there is the persuader variable of compatibility. Interpersonal similarity and attractiveness are believed to be important. The attractiveness of the persuader must be taken into account together with his perceived values and therapist-client similarity of values. Attractiveness appears to be an important catalyst for therapy. Beutler suggests further that the degree of unattractiveness found in the patient-therapist relationship is also predictive of resistance to change in a manner similar to that predicted by major theories of interpersonal persuasion.

2.2.5.3   Persuasion theory

One of the most comprehensive and systematically studied theories on persuasion is Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory. He argues that confusion in value systems has motivational properties that move the organism to reconstruct its cognitive experience in a way that promotes consonance or balance. Dissonance is believed to be disruptive and all human behaviour is viewed as desiring to restore consonance. Hence, maximal

attitude discrepancy between a credible communicator (therapist) and a listener (patient) will induce proportionate opinion change in a desire to restore balance. The cognitive dissonance which the interaction will produce should lead towards a desire for consonance and thus value change to restore harmony. If, as has been maintained here, psychotherapy can be accepted as a value persuasion process, then it is clear that therapists need to take greater cognisance of their own personal values and how they may be beneficial for enabling therapeutic gain to take place.

2.2.5.4 Empirical research on counsellor values and persuasion

In subsequent articles Beutler and his colleagues have attempted to operationalise and review the relevant empirical research concerning counsellor values and counsellor-client pairing and convergence. In 1983 Beutler et al (1983:242-243) surmised that based on empirical testing :

> Therapy tends to produce a degree of persuasion in which clients come to value the same goals and means of achieving these goals as do their therapists... This finding tends to suggest that therapists come to like those patients who are persuaded to adopt the therapist's point of view. One must conclude, therefore, that the process of convergence itself affects the therapist's judgement and that therapist's ratings of improvement are partly based upon the degree to which they perceive patients as coming to acquire their own personal values and belief systems.

In 1991 Beutler et al (1991:17-18) argued that the tendency of researchers to investigate similarity between therapist and client value systems rather than individual values was a possible problem. It appeared unlikely that all values of a value system would be affected in the same way in psychotherapy. Using the

42

Rokeach Value Scale at the beginning and end of therapy
Beutler and colleagues discovered that large amounts of
dissimilarity between therapists and clients concerning
terminal or ends values could lead towards improvement
in therapy. Also pre-treatment similarity of
instrumental values could lead towards improvement. This
suggests that different values rather than complete
value systems needed to be studied as to which
facilitate change and improvement.

In further support of this conclusion, Beutler has
discovered that when therapists and clients hold similar
views of humanistic, abstract or philosophical values
then there is often improvement. When therapists and
clients differ initially in relation to social
attachment, sexual attachments and social threats, then
there may also be improvement. It thus appears that a
therapist with an alternative value system serves as a
contrasting model to the patient's view of a successful
life. Hence, discrepancies between the therapist's and
client's emphasis upon intellectual pursuits and social
attachments may lend motivation via cognitive dissonance
for the patient to change these attitudes and values in
a way which subsequently relates to therapeutic
improvements. However, it is important to notice that
the patient appears to finally assimilate the
therapist's values.

In 1991 Beutler and Bergan affirmed the previous
empirical hypothesis that certain specific values and
not all values change in therapy. Research suggested
that counsellors who value intellectual pursuits and
hard work in pursuit of goals, such as self-definitional
values that emphasise doing and a temporal focus on
future success, tend to be more successful than those
who place relatively greater value on maintaining
dependent or dominant social relationship structures.
Distinctions made between dealing with people's problems
surrounding philosophies of life and intellectual goals

and more interpersonal and intimate relationships concerns also appears promising. Hence the empirical results of therapist-client pairing are complex but suggestive of certain patterns which may guide further research.

2.2.6   Psychotherapy, axiology and religious values

The question regarding the place of religious values in psychotherapy has had a long history. In 1959 a special conference was held concerning the question of axiology and the handling of religious material in therapy. The consultation concluded that therapists should learn to deal with religious material in the same manner as anything else. Meehl (1959:255-259) noted that it was not really the therapist's business to convert or unconvert people with regard to religion and philosophy of life. He felt that therapists who were consciously or unconsciously carrying out a missionary activity would be ineffective and unprofessional.

In 1980 a debate concerning the role of religious values in therapy and particularly the question of counsellor values came to the fore. The debate ranged in the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (1980:48:95-105; 49:645-639) between Bergin, Ellis and Strupp. This debate is a seminal one in that a great deal of research has developed from it. The chief concern of this review of the debate will be to focus on the way in which the interchange resulted in reflection on counsellor values and their possible role in therapy. Bergin (1980:102), Ellis (1980:636) and Strupp (1980:398) for example, each came up with critical reflection concerning what they perceived to be counsellor values and what counsellor values should be for effective counselling.

Bergin (1980:95) argued that "until the theistic belief systems of a large percentage of the population are sincerely considered and conceptually integrated into our work, we are unlikely to be fully effective professionals." Bergin proposed that values are an inevitable and pervasive part of psychotherapy. Bergin's argument also implied that religious values are directly or indirectly among the values that affect therapy and should be taken into account.

Bergin (1980:96) stated that two value systems, humanism and clinical pragmatism, are dominant in the mental health professions. Both value systems exclude religious values. Ellis (1980:636) responded with an alternative list of values. He felt that Bergin was downgrading humanism. Ellis argued that most therapists were humanistic and probabilistic atheists and generally supported the view of Fromm that traditional religion was authoritarian and promoted powerlessness and a prevailing mood of sorrow and guilt. He felt that Bergin's conservative description of the idealised values of religion were not proven. Ellis wrote:

> Devout, orthodox, or dogmatic religion (or what might be called religiosity) is significantly correlated with emotional disturbance. People largely disturb themselves by believing strongly in absolutist shoulds, oughts, and musts, and most people who dogmatically believe in religion believe in these health-sabotaging absolutes... Religiosity, therefore is in many respects equivalent to irrational thinking and emotional disturbances.

(Ellis 1980:637)

He argued that the less religious you are, the more emotionally healthy you will be. Hence the more emotionally integrated a person is, the more likely the person is to regard dogmatic religion lightly. Ellis concludes that the therapist must therefore downplay the

role of religion in therapy and be quite unreligious. Ellis developed a diagram to highlight the differences between Bergen and himself. In the diagram he contrasted the differences between the theistic values espoused by Bergin and Bergin's view of clinical-humanistic values with his own view of clinical-humanistic-atheistic values. The differences are quite startling to say the least.

Table 1
Theistic, Clinical-Humanistic, and Clinical-Humanistic-Atheistic Values

Theistic (Bergin, 1980)	Clinical-humanistic (Bergin, 1980)	Clinical-humanistic-atheistic
God is supreme. Humility, acceptance of (divine) authority, and obedience (to the will of God) are virtues.	Humans are supreme. The self is aggrandized. Autonomy and rejection of external authority are virtues.	No one and nothing is supreme. To aggrandize or rate the self is to be disturbed. A balance between autonomy and living cooperatively with others and a balance between rejecting and overconforming to external authority are virtues.
Personal identity is eternal and derived from the divine. Relationship with God defines self-worth.	Identity is ephemeral and mortal. Relationships with others define self-worth.	Personal identity is ephemeral and mortal. Relationships with others often provide increased happiness but never define self-worth. Nothing does. Self-worth, self-esteem, or rating one's "self" globally is a (theological) mistake, leading to disturbance. Self-acceptance can be had for the asking, independent of any god or human law.
Self-control in terms of absolute values. Strict morality. Universal ethics.	Self-expression in terms of relative values. Flexible morality. Situation ethics.	Basically the same as clinical-humanistic.
Love, affection, and self-transcendence are primary. Service and self-sacrifice are central to personal growth.	Personal needs and self-actualization are primary. Self-satisfaction is central to personal growth.	Personal desires and self-actualization are to be sought within a social context. Increasing self-satisfaction, including social satisfaction and love, is central to personal growth.
Committed to marriage, fidelity, and loyalty. Emphasis on procreation and family life as integrative factors	Open marriage or no marriage. Emphasis on self-gratification or recreational sex without long-term responsibilities.	Choice of no marriage, conventional marriage, or open marriage. Emphasis on sex gratification with mutually chosen partners, with or without long-term responsibilities. Family life optional; often desirable but not necessary for health and happiness.
Personal responsibility for own harmful actions and changes in them. Acceptance of guilt, suffering, and contrition as keys to change. Restitution for harmful effects.	Others are responsible for our problems and changes. Minimizing guilt and relieving suffering before experiencing its meaning. Apology for harmful effects.	Personal responsibility for own harmful actions and changes in them. Maximizing responsibility for harmful and immoral acts and minimizing guilt (self-damnation in addition to denouncing one's acts). No apology or "cop-out" for effects of one's unethical behavior. Restitution for harmful effects.
Forgiveness of others who cause distress (including parents) completes the therapeutic restoration of self.	Acceptance and expression of accusatory feelings are sufficient.	Forgiveness of others who cause needless distress (including parents) but no condonation of their acts. Unconditional acceptance or positive regard for all humans at all times, but clear-cut condemnation of their immoral behavior. Acceptance of self helped by unconditional acceptance of others.

Knowledge by faith and self-effort. Meaning and purpose derived from spiritual insight. Intellectual knowledge inseparable from the emotional and spiritual. Ecology of knowledge.	Knowledge by self-effort alone. Meaning and purpose derived from reason and intellect. Intellectual knowledge for itself. Isolation of the mind from the rest of life.	Knowledge by self-effort and the efforts of others. Meaning derived largely from personal desire, validated for results by empiricism, reason, and intellect. Intellectual knowledge mainly for the purpose of survival and enjoyment but also enjoyable in its own right. Intellectual knowledge inseparable from emotional and behavioral. Ecology of knowledge.

(Ellis 1980:636-637)

Bergin argued that there was a problem concerning the fact that mental health professionals have values which contrast with the population in general. For example 90 per cent of Americans believe in God, whereas only 50 per cent of therapists do. The impact of this information on the treatment goals for clients should be taken into account. The question of whether therapists' values are superior to those of the general public was also noted. It is fairly obvious that the placement of the therapist's values above the client's values and society's values may result in outcome problems. Bergin suggested that therapists should be open about what values they hold and called for the open acknowledgement of the role of the values of the therapist as a basis for therapist-client matching.

Bergin's final challenge was to argue that the intuitive value systems which therapists claim that they have should be tested empirically. They should be transformed into hypothesis for further study and evaluation. This scientific approach has opened the door for a great deal more research in journals such as the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology and the Journal of Psychology and Theology.

Ellis's response to Bergin's argument includes several interesting observations concerning the values of probable clinical-humanistic-atheists. He agrees with Bergin that clinical-humanistic-atheists are probably the dominant group of therapists practicing therapy in

the United States. As noted above, Ellis' list on the right hand side of the diagram is quite revealing. Ellis pictures therapists as applying a clinical-humanistic-atheistic philosophy to their work. God and religion are regarded negatively and inherently unhealthy. Religion, and particularly unhealthy religion, is seen as a major problem in people's lives. Psychotherapists are largely ideological relativists who are cautious of attributing supreme value to anything or anyone. In terms of identity and humanity they desire for themselves and their clients a balance between autonomy and cooperation with human community while rejecting overconforming external authority. Self-acceptance and self-satisfaction can be sought for their own ends. Self-expression is in terms of relative values and therapists and their clients are encouraged to develop a flexible morality and situational ethics. Therapists accept the choice of non-marriage, conventional marriage or open marriage. Emphasis on sex gratification with short or long term relationships is acceptable. Knowledge is obtained by self-effort and meaning is derived largely from personal desire. Atheistic communities rather than church communities provide a balanced, undogmatic belief structure and a cooperative, forgiving community without absolutist commandments.

Bergin's and Ellis' lists of possible therapist values are very interesting. If one accepts the persuasion thesis of Beutler, it appears that Christians who hold to a certain set of values may find their values changing in the direction of those of an atheistic counsellor during the course of therapy. This is one of Bergin's underlying concerns and reasons for a reassessment of taking the religious material of clients more positively and their values more seriously in this regard. It also suggests that in counsellor-client pairing on this dimension of religious values, compatibility might be very beneficial.

The current researcher is uneasy about the sharp distinctions between the two positions. There are no doubt a variety of humanists and Christians (radicals, liberals and conservatives) and Christian humanism is probably a dominant persuasion (consciously or unconsciously) of many Christians. This mediating position should be acknowledged so as to not end up discussing these two extreme positions as if they were the only options.

Strupp (1980:396-400) has joined the debate through adding his own list of a therapist's essential values or humanistic values which are less counter-culture than those of Ellis. Strupp (1980:397) argues that there is a consensus of values which is shared by many therapists which influence the client deeply if and when the client makes them his or her own. He calls these essential therapeutic values. He argues in support of Szasz (1965:17) that the essence of the therapeutic enterprise is an education in autonomy and individual freedom. He then lists his own views largely in agreement with Szasz with regard to the essential therapeutic values of therapists.

Firstly, psychotherapy is understood as a form of education and not just medical treatment. Its aim is to free the client's capacity for autonomy and to enable the client to become confident in the making of personal choices. Secondly, the therapist is the patient's agent and not just society's or the family's. The therapist thus unqualifiedly supports the client in the direction of freedom. The therapeutic relationship provides for both an educational experience and a model of an autonomous and healthy relationship. Thirdly, the therapist must be an expert at decoding the patient's communications regarding his or her mental illness. The therapist must treat the client as a person and he or she does not merely rely on techniques or methods for success in therapy. As Szasz (1965:40) notes, "In other

words, psychotherapeutic technique issues from the
personality of the therapist or becomes part of it".
Fourthly, the therapist attempts to understand ·the
client and not control the person. All actions should
augment the client's autonomy and self-responsibility.

Strupp (1980:398) adds to Szasz's view that the
therapist needs to move beyond knowledge and reduction
of suffering to a concern for brotherly love and human
relatedness. The therapist should provide the model of
a human relationship which faithfully reflects the
above-mentioned values of autonomy, freedom, love and
human relatedness.

In 1990 Bergin and Jensen (1990:3-7) undertook a
national empirical study regarding therapists' attitudes
toward religion. They noted that a study of 400
therapists and clients in Australia (Cross and Khan
1983) showed that therapists emphasise values in favour
of a freer life, freer sexual relations, flexible growth
orientated philosophies and had less religious
commitments than their clients. Empirical results in
the United States of America were comparable in that 59
per cent of therapists were non-attenders of traditional
religions and 41 per cent attenders. These results
confirm other estimates which show that less than 50 per
cent of American psychotherapists are believers or
practice any traditional religion. Bergin (1990:6)
argued that according to the Gallup surveys about two-
thirds of the American population have a religious
commitment and might thereby find secular approaches to
psychotherapy an alien values framework. He noted that
most people who suffer from emotional disorders still
prefer the clergy to the mental health professional. The
importance of religiosity for many clients thus requires
the careful re-education of therapists whose conceptual
framework are open to such important constructs. To
ignore such an critical component of most people's lives
must ultimately lead to less than competent therapy.

Jensen and Bergin have included some interesting general characteristics common to most psychotherapist values which they have summarised as follows:

> These values concern one's sense of being a free agent; having a sense of identity and feelings of worth; being skilled in interpersonal communication, sensitivity and nurturance; being genuine and honest; having self-control and personal responsibility; being committed in marriage family, and other relationships; having orienting values and meaningful purposes; having deepened self-awareness and motivation for growth; having adaptive coping strategies for handling stresses and crises; finding fulfilment in work; and practising good habits of physical health.

(Jensen and Bergin 1988:295)

These findings are consistent with other assessments of practitioner values and mental health values (Cross and Khan 1983). The similarity of these therapists' values exhibited in different geographic locations is also revealing of an implicit values code for this profession.

Bergin's arguments have received a great deal of attention. Research and interest in religious counselling has been evidenced by Quackenbos, Privette and Klentz 1985 and Worthington in 1986 to mention but two examples. Lovinger has also produced an important book entitled, Working with Religious Issues in Therapy (1984). In it he highlighted the role of religion, ethics, morals and values for psychotherapy.

Worthington's (1986:428-429) article is also particularly interesting in that it provides a psychotherapist's view of religious counselling. His assessment concerns the counselling efforts which have been done mostly by pastors and clergy. He also concludes suggestively that no support has yet been found for the view that religious counselling has any more beneficial effects than does secular counselling

with religious clients. His position has been moderated to some extent by researchers such as Propst. Propst (1980) conducted empirical studies concerning religious counselling. In her earlier study she assigned depressed religious females to religiously orientated therapists. One group practised religious cognitive therapy, while the other practised secular cognitive therapy. The results of the religious cognitive therapy were regarded as being superior in this case. In the second study (1992) religious cognitive therapy was practised by both religious and non-religious therapists and both were shown to be equally effective. This suggests among other things that the therapist's ability to emphathise with the client remains a vital factor in effective therapy. The empathetic person may thus be as important as the type of therapy used.

2.2.7 The therapist as ethicist-scientist-practitioner

In 1984 a series of articles were published in the Counseling Psychologist (1984:12;3) concerning the relationship between counsellors' values and ethical dilemmas. In 1986 and 1992 Tjeltveit argued in some widely quoted articles for a new image of the counsellor or therapist as an ethicist-scientist-practitioner. The researcher finds the image insightful and full of further implications regarding the personal values of therapists.

2.2.7.1 Kitchener

In her introduction to the article Kitchener (1984:43) remarks that counsellors are good at identifying ethical issues in their counselling practice but are not good at thinking through the methods of how to resolve them. She noted that the current training books of Van Hoose and Kottler (1977) and Corey and Callahan (1979) enumerate

lists of complex ethical cases which arise in practice, but give little clear guidance of how to think through these cases other than in a relativist way.

Kitchener (1984:43-55) argues that counsellors need to become more aware and better trained in the methods of ethical reasoning to begin to deal professionally with many of the problems they face. She notes that the current therapeutic ideology is that when faced with complex ethical problems, counsellors are told to fall back on their own personal values or consult the professional codes of the discipline. The advice is limited because of the difficulty of justifying behaviour ethically and legally. The line between acting in an ethically competent way and unethical behaviour is less easy to distinguish than might appear to be the case. A rising number of legal cases in this regard in the United States has also led to the American Psychological Association rewriting their professional code of conduct five times in recent years.

Kitchener argues that therapists' should become skilled and trained in ethical reasoning so as to be able to justify their decision making before clients, fellow professionals and society. Kitchener adapts the well known model of moral reasoning from the bio-ethical field as developed by Beauchamp and Childress (1979) to illustrate how a therapist should learn to become an ethical-scientific-practitioner. Although Kitchener does not use this term ethical-scientific-practitioner herself she anticipates this new model in all her writings. This revised image (O'Donohue 1989:1460) of the therapist builds on the classical model of therapy training in the United States which developed after the Second World War called the Boulder model. Boulder is a city in Colorado where the consultation took place. The Boulder model stressed that therapists were scientist-practitioners. O'Donohue argues for the expansion of this image to that of a metaphysician-scientist-

practitioner. Following on this insightful lead
Tjeltveit (1992:89) advocates a further revision of the
image of the therapist by designating him or her as an
ethical-scientific-practitioner.

Figure 1. A model of ethical justification.

(Kitchener 1984:45)

Kitchener distinguishes between two levels of moral
reasoning, the immediate intuitive level and the
critical evaluative level. The intuitive level includes
an immediate response to most ethical situations which
is based on the sum total of one's previous ethical
knowledge and experience. These moral feelings are the
basis for our ordinary moral judgements. Immediate moral
feelings are vital to everyday ethical decisions for
therapists. Therapists are often called into crisis
situations which allow little time for conscious
reflection. In such situations, "Firm moral dispositions
have great utility" (Hare 1981:34). Thus we should not
feel apologetic about having a firm set of ethical
values which allow us to take immediate decisions in
such situations.

Kitchener believes that it is to this ordinary
level of moral judgment that many are referring when

counsellors are urged to fall back on their own moral
values. However, it is not difficult to see that moral
intuition may not always be enough or an adequate
argument for justifying one's actions. Some cases are so
unusual and complex that one has no ordinary moral sense
to draw upon.

The second level of moral reasoning is necessary to
guide, refine and evaluate ordinary intuitive moral
judgement. This critical-evaluative level of moral
reasoning includes appeals to professional codes,
ethical principles and ethical theory. When the
intuitive moral sense fails or when the therapist is
forced to justify moral decisions, it is necessary to
turn to codes, principles and theories.

In a complex ethical situation, the therapist may
have to reread the professional code as well as study
cases to which it has been applied. Such published cases
are, however, guidelines which offer an interpretation
of the professional code and its application. The
assumption is that similar cases should be treated in a
similar way. However, professional codes have their
limitations and may offer ambiguous guidelines in
specific cases. Professional codes are conservative by
nature and were developed in a defensive manner to
prevent outside regulation of a professions affairs.
This conservative negative bias does not then stress
sufficiently, the ideal behaviour which the profession
desires from its practitioners.

Therapists should be encouraged to move beyond
professional codes to resolve ethical problems through
reference to higher ethical norms or principles.
Principles are more general and serve as a foundation
for professional codes. Thus professional codes may be
narrow, but principles provide broader application than
codes. Kitchener suggests that therapists identify
important principles on which to base their practices.
These include the principles of autonomy, beneficence,
nonmaleficence, justice and fidelity.

Kitchener then goes on to discuss whether these principles are absolutely valid or partially valid. She concludes that it is best to view these principles as prima facie valid. This legal concept means that something (for example a contract) establishes an obligation unless there are special circumstances or conflicting or stronger obligations. In other words, moral principles are neither absolute nor relative, but they are always ethically relevant and can be overturned when there are stronger ethical obligations.

The final appeal in ethical reasoning turns to ethical theory. In a situation of conflicting principles there are still better ways to decide a course of action. Utilitarian or deontological theories are then referred to for justifying an action or decision. Kitchener appears to favour a mixed deontological theory which stresses both a practice of the golden rule (love your neighbour as you love yourself) and yet takes account of the need to balance out the possible benefits and harm of any moral decision. This mixed position appears to be in line with that of the philosopher Frankena (1973) whose work is widely read and supported by many ethicists and professionals of many disciplines.

2.2.7.2   Tjeltveit

In two important articles (1986) and (1992) Tjeltveit has underlined the need to consider a new image of the counsellor or therapist as an ethical-practitioner-scientist. This researcher finds this advance on previous images of the counsellor extremely promising and full of important implications for counselling.

In his 1986 article Tjeltveit (1986:515) argued that empirical evidence had shown beyond any reasonable doubt that therapists unconsciously or sometimes consciously converted clients to their values. He however agrees with Beutler that it does not mean that

this value change includes all the client's values. Tjeltveit distinguishes between a variety of values such as mental health values, moral values, religious values and political values. He then goes on to state that the finding of Rosenthal's 1955 study that clients' moral values changed towards those of the therapist and subsequent research confirming this trend, raises serious ethical problems for therapists. Tjeltveit questions whether it is really the obligation of psychotherapy to change people's moral values?

Tjeltveit (1986:518) draws a crucial distinction between mental health values and moral values. He asserts that there is no doubt in the minds of the profession or public as to the right of therapists to be involved in mental health value changes. This is their professional duty. However, whether these same professionals have the right and duty to change their clients extra-therapeutic values such as moral values, political values or religious values is clearly a complex problem. He quotes research which indicates that both mental health values and moral values of therapists and clients have been shown to converge. For example Rosenthal (1955) and Beutler et al (1975) found that mental health values and moral values changed during the course of therapy. Tjeltveit argues that mental health value conversion is appropriate because psychotherapists are trained in this area. Non-health values (moral or religious values) conversion which may occur concomitantly with mental health changes remains problematic.

Tjeltveit's solution to this dilemma is mentioned briefly in his 1986 article and expanded upon in his 1992 article. He argues that therapists should possess professional competence and ethical competence as mental health specialists. Professional competence means being aware of their own values and knowing a full spectrum of viable ethical, religious and political positions of

people coming to therapy. Therapists should inform
clients of their values. They should identify themselves
as being liberals, agnostics and holding certain types
of political opinions. Professionals should hold dual
competence of expertise in psychotherapy and expertise
in understanding moral values, or religious values. For
such professionals, role switches in therapy are
possible.

In his subsequent article, Tjeltveit expands upon
this ethicist-practitioner-scientist model of a
professional who can hold dual competencies. In
arguments reminiscent of London (1986) and Lowe (1976),
Tjeltveit (1992:91) argues that when facing ethical
dilemmas many therapists appeal to science or ethical
naturalism which itself is a mixture of science and
philosophy. Another proposed solution is for mental
health professionals to focus on a consensus of values
which they hold in common. Bergin (1980) and Strupp
(1980) have proposed such a set of professional values.
In general these values refer less to science and more
to the humanistic values espoused by these therapists.
Others appeal to professional codes.

Tjeltveit argues in language reminiscent of
Kitchener that therapists should learn to ground their
discussions of moral values in a formal understanding of
ethics. He asserts that an active dialogue between
psychotherapy and formal ethics should take place to
place psychotherapists on a better footing when dealing
with ethical dilemmas. Psychotherapists need to be able
to move from merely speaking of moral values, to
understanding the normative values behind them and the
meta-theoretical theories behind these normative values.
Psychotherapy training should thus supplement its
training by teaching clear thinking about ethical
dilemmas and ethical reasoning and ethical ideals.

Tjeltveit's arguments re-echo those of Kitchener
and also have affinity with the work of the eminent

practical theologian Donald Browning. Browning's (1987:94) argument is that psychotherapy is not a narrow science but a metaphorical, ethical and psychological discipline. Browning argues that pastoral counsellors should become more or less the equivalent of Tjeltveit's ethicist-scientist-practitioner is noted with interest. Browning's pastoral counsellor would be a metaphysician-ethicist-scientist-practitioner.

2.2.7.3 Empirical research concerning the ethical behaviour of counsellors

The incidence of unethical practice in therapy is not often well documented. Questions of confidentiality and sexual intimacy between therapists and clients have been the consistent and most reported problems (Weifel and Lipsitz 1984:31). It appears that approximately 10 per cent of therapists are substantially insensitive to their professional ethical responsibilities. While there is unanimous consensus as to the importance of confidentiality in counselling, there is evidence to suggest that between 30 to 50 per cent of counsellors are not certain of the limits of such confidentiality (Weifel and Lipsitz 1984:32). The other widely reported problem is that of sexual promiscuity in therapy. Sexual intimacy between therapists and clients is apparently more common than admitted. Information available suggests that 5 per cent of therapists admit to engaging in sexual intercourse with their clients (Weifel and Lipsitz 1984:33). This may be an underestimate. Other reported ethical problems include setting proper professional fees, improper utilisation of assessment techniques and inappropriate public statements by members of the profession. The general confusion of ethical norms in a pluralistic society has no doubt been one source of problems. However the lack of professional and ethical certainty remains perplexing.

In recent years there has developed an increased awareness of the fact that the profession of psychotherapy's familiarity with codes and heavy sanctions against offending psychotherapists is not sufficient in itself to guarantee adequate ethical practice. Van Hoose and Paradise (1979) point out that professional codes cannot be revised sufficiently rapidly to address every problem of current practice. They also contend that many ethical dilemmas are difficult to categorise according to the tenets of the code. This confusing situation has led to a call (Weifel and Lipshitz 1984:32) for research to be undertaken into the actual ethical behaviour of professional psychologists. This research has also led to questions regarding the possible effect of formal ethics education on ethical behaviour.

A study of the role and practices of psychological teachers and supervisors concerning ethical behaviour has also highlighted the moral confusion that surrounds the profession. A survey by the American Psychological Association in 1979 (Weifel and Lipshitz 1984:38) concerning issues such as sexual intimacy between teachers and students was very revealing. Over 16 per cent of the women students reported sexually intimate behaviour between themselves and their teachers or supervisors. The pattern was very clear and almost always showed that an older, higher status teacher or supervisor would become sexually active with a younger subordinate women student. In general, those women or students who had sexual contact with their teachers were also very likely to have sexual contact with their clients once they entered therapy practice. A clear conclusion of this finding is to realise that educators also need to be better educated in the theory and practice of their profession and particularly when dealing with controversial issues. Many of them are thus poor role models for their students, as well as being

almost ethically illiterate and a danger to themselves
and their profession.

Given this controversial situation, testing ·and
training of psychotherapists and counsellors in ethical
and moral matters and legal limits has become
imperative. Some studies of such training courses have
been undertaken, although unevenly. Instruments such as
the Ethical Judgement Scale of Van Hoose and Paradise
(1979:10) have been used to assess therapists' ability
in making ethical judgements. Kohlberg's (1976:3) and
Rest's (1979:5) moral development stage findings have
also been used to encourage the therapist to move up to
higher levels of moral reasoning. Hogan's (1970:205)
various instruments, including his Survey of Ethical
Attitudes, can give additional evidence of therapist
trends in ethical decision making.

Formal ethical training courses as found in
classroom training centres and at clinical training
centres have been subject to systematic study. Weifel
and Lipsitz (1984:37) note that since 1979 an increased
number of ethics courses for psychotherapists have been
introduced into degree training programs. Polls taken of
professional psychotherapists indicated that 67 per cent
had taken separate ethics courses in training and
recommended further such courses. A clear consensus
appears to be growing concerning the need for
professional ethical and additional ethics courses in
therapist training. Course content for such courses as
suggested by Corey and Callahan (1988:2-24) included
instruction in moral philosophy, student involvement in
discovering their current values and principles and an
explicit process of highlighting the place of values in
therapy situations. The use of the Kohlberg-Rest
(1986:19) moral educational program has also been
advocated for further training in moral judgement
development.

2.3   Pastoral counsellor values

The theoretical and empirical evidence indicating that clients tend to adopt therapists' values during the course of counselling should be of great interest to pastoral counsellors. The themes of counsellor values and value convergence (Beutler 1979:432) or conversion (Tjeltveit 1986:516) and counsellor-client pairing raise interesting questions regarding parallels in the pastoral counselling field. Are pastoral counsellors aware of their value systems and how they might affect their counselling ability? What are the value systems of pastoral counsellors in the South African context?

In order to proceed with this topic of pastoral values the researcher will attempt a literature review from a pastoral perspective. In contrast to the previous literature review, the researcher will not follow a strictly chronological format. After a brief historical introduction he will present his own typology of the literature of pastoral care concerning pastoral counsellor values. During his reading the researcher has found it useful to classify the modern pastoral counselling literature according to the following fourfold typology.

Firstly, there is literature regarding the Christian shepherd as typified by Hiltner (1950:134), Oates (1961:15) and Campbell (1986:26). Secondly, there is literature focusing on the Christian axiotherapist as developed by Oden (1969:23), Clinebell (1984:138) and Orlo Strunk Jnr (1990:64). Thirdly, there is literature focusing on the moral counsellor as found in Browning (1983a:10), Capps (1983:33), Noyce (1989:21) and Poling (1984:106). Fourthly, there is literature from the evangelical Christian perspective which is called Christian counselling. This literature is typified by Narramore (1984:10), Collins (1981:12) and the Journal of

Psychology and Theology. Clearly any reading of the
literature of modern pastoral care and counselling will
note that the typologies overlap to some extent. However,
for the purposes of this study, this typology helps us to
get an understanding of various dominant perspectives
concerning the topic of pastoral counsellor values.

2.3.1   A brief historical perspective

The Judeo-Christian foundations of pastoral counsellor
values are apparent in biblical and historical
perspective. Various surveys of the history of pastoral
care and counselling give various perspectives. Clebsch
and Jaeckle's classic study, Pastoral Care in Historical
Perspective (1975) stresses the healing, guiding,
sustaining and reconciling roles of pastoral care and
counselling. McNeill's, The History of the Cure of the
Souls (1951) is concerned with the question of discipline
in pastoral care. Finally, Holifield's (1983) study of
the rise of modern pastoral care and counselling is a
useful guide through the labyrinthine ways of modern
pastoral care.

The role of the rabbi, prophet and priest concerning
helping the individual and families and communities with
problems of conscience is a consistent theme throughout
the ages. In their historical overview Clebsch and
Jaeckle (1975:9) identify eight periods of church history
which they feel were dominated by one or another theme,
such as healing, guiding, sustaining and reconciling.
According to these writers there has always been a
tension in the guiding function which has dominated much
pastoral care and counselling throughout the ages. This
is the tension between directive methods of "inductive"
guidance and non-directive methods of "eductive"
guidance. Underlying the former is the view that the
counsellor should guide the individual to adopt a set of
values which are largely consistent with the church's

traditions found in scripture or doctrine or common practice which gives direction to a parishioner's life. The role of the pastoral counsellor is to help the person to discern the precise principles which can be applied to particular cases of decision making. This view was typical of both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism until the middle of this century (McNeill 1951:295). The Catholic priest followed a highly directive and "prescriptive" form of counselling. The priest as the authoritative "father" figure directed the "child" to follow the moral teachings of the church as a guide to the right way of life. The priest was portrayed as holding a superior understanding of values and moral actions. His authority came from his ordination and he encouraged the parishioner to put complete trust in such advice giving. This method (McNeill 1951:296) of advice giving provided a comprehendable and clear and above all else, a firm set of values for the parishioner to live by. The parishioner could be relieved of the ambiguity of finding his own values and was also given a method of developing what values he had.

The "eductive" approach (McNeill 1951:9) reflects a more non-directive form of guidance. In this approach, the counsellor aims to guide people to make their own decisions by "drawing out" their personal values. In this form of guidance the pastoral counsellor assumes that the parishioner has the intuition or insight to arrive at his or her own value decisions. This approach has appealed particularly to liberal Protestant ministers since the middle of this century and has only been tempered in the recent two decades. The emphasis (McNeill 1951:14) was not on persuading the parishioner to accept the implicit and explicit values of the Christian faith. Rather the focus moved to drawing from the person his or her own values and helping him or her to make decisions for themselves as mature Christians in a modern world.

64

Some interesting features of pastoral counsellors'
authority and values show through in the following quote
from McNeill :

> One of the frequently recurring differences in
> the method observed was in the relationship
> between the guide and the guided person. To what
> degree should the relationship involve the
> authority of the former over the latter? In
> ancient Israel the consultant seemed to retain
> more choice and self-direction. Wide variation
> has been exhibited in Christianity. A firm
> control by the confessor was assumed in medieval
> penance and has been characterized by modern
> Roman Catholic practice in the confessional...
> Protestantism has favoured a less intimate
> supervision, and has left consultation involving
> the secrets of the conscience to the free choice
> of those who felt a need of it.

(McNeill 1951:325)

McNeill, however, notes that this distinction between
Catholics and Protestants can be overdrawn. Many
Protestant churches have also stressed "clearly defined
and exacting codes of behaviour, and devised measures to
secure their maintenance" (McNeill 1951:325). These
included rigorous questioning regarding fitness to
participate in communion as well as systematic home
visitation.

Holifield's (1983:305-312) study of the rise of
modern pastoral care and counselling since the middle of
this century indicates that the alliance of pastoral
counselling with Rogerian client-centered therapy
developed because of the hostility of liberal Christians
towards excessive moral advice giving in counselling. The
"human potentials" movement with its positive view of
self-acceptance and human growth was embraced by pastoral
counsellors. The "eductive" style of pastoral counselling
became the norm which still influences much pastoral
counselling to the present. Changes toward a more
interactive view of counselling and renewed authority of

the counsellor in counselling is again in the ascendency. A renewed desire for a clearer theological theory and more specific values has developed within the pastoral counselling movement as evidenced by Clinebell (1984:25), Capps (1983:99), Browning (1983:18) and Gerkin (1991:25).

2.3.2   The Christian shepherd

The researcher has selected one representative of this perspective, that being Hiltner. Other representatives include Oates (1961) and Campbell (1981). In the view of this researcher, these writers stress more clearly the pastoral or shepherding dimension of pastoral counsellor values than the axiological or moral aspects.

Hiltner's essential understanding of pastoral counselling is best described by the word he chose, "eductive". This style of counselling draws out "the creative potentialities of the person needing help" (Holified 1990:508). To this term one would also add the shepherding metaphor and shepherding perspective which he developed together with the "eductive approach." The current researcher would call it the "eductive shepherd approach."

Hiltner's alliance with Rogers' client-centered therapy is well known. In his Pastoral Counseling (1949:30) Hiltner argues against the danger of moralism and coercive values in the counselling process. He (1949:31) states that, "In counseling, moral judgements in place of understanding and clarification are especially likely to be disastrous... The problem arises when the minister's moral commitments get in the way of understanding." Hiltner (Browning 1983:36) suggests that pastoral counsellors should attempt to set aside their moral convictions in counselling as far as possible. He believes that people should gain maturity through becoming autonomous in their ethics and values. His position is clearly in a problematic direction in that

the pastor is encouraged to set aside his or her moral values and attempt to stay within the values framework of the parishioner in need. This suggests an orientation toward ethical relativism or situation ethics.

In The Counselor in Counseling he writes further concerning the convictions of counselling that:

> If counselling is to be an "eductive" or leading-out process, invoking the strengths and resources which can emerge only through the parishioner, then any attempt to concentrate attention on the views of the pastor is wrong, because it distracts from placing exclusive attention upon the parishioner. It is plainly wrong if done exploitatively or coercively, because such action would ignore the dignity of the person. But even if the views are right, and the attempt to convert is done without protest from the parishioner, it is still poor counselling because it diverts from what requires concentration in counseling.
>
> (Hiltner 1950:134)

In this quote one encounters very clearly the Rogerian doctrine of non-conversion and non-manipulation of values. Hiltner stresses that the counsellor should not coerce the client into adopting any specific values which the client does not have within him or her. Counselling for Hiltner involves clarification of values, but not manipulation. Thus pastoral counselling should stop short of manipulation or coercion and encourage the client to freely clarify his or her values without fear of undue influence or judgement.

Hiltner, however, does not naively suggest total neutrality of the influence of values. Hiltner (1950:130) argues that counsellors' convictions may appear briefly in counselling and that the counsellor should make no apology for his or her convictions, either social, ethical or theological. However, any regular exposition of counsellor values and views either to himself or the

client suggests that the situation has at least
temporarily ceased to be a counselling relationship. Thus
according to Hiltner, the pastoral counsellor should
clearly establish the difference between the counsellors
values and those of the client and concern himself or
herself almost exclusively with the latter's values. He
thus discouraged advice giving and exhortation and
advocated his own kind of client-centered counselling or
shepherding.

Hiltner's shepherding perspective as developed in
Preface to Pastoral Theology (1958) and The Christian
Shepherd (1959) is an important addition to the
"eductive" method and suggests some advances on Rogerian
therapy. Hiltner (1958:46) argued that within the work of
the pastor, one perspective of the pastor's work might
stand out at any one time, either shepherding, organising
or communicating. Shepherding includes healing, guiding
and sustaining. The shepherding perspective was based on
"the shepherd's attitude of tender and solicitous
concern" (1958:47). In The Christian Shepherd (1959:87)
he described the "basic principles of shepherding as
concern, acceptance, clarification, judgement, humility
and self-understanding." His chief argument was that a
study of the operation-centered field of shepherding
could lead to the development of a theological theory for
dealing with the church's activities. This shepherding
perspective enabled Hiltner to clarify what he meant by
pastoral care. He later broadened the shepherding concept
to include both care in the broader sense and counselling
in the narrower sense (Holifield 1990:508). In The
Context of Pastoral Counseling (1960) Hiltner focused on
the Christian identity of the counsellor and the
centrality of the community of faith. Pastoral
counselling acknowledged a theological context in which
the counsellor operated. In this theological context, the
religious resources of the bible, prayer and devotional
material were advocated. These resources were, however,

to be used only in a selective and therapeutic manner. The principle was not whether to pray or read the bible but for what reason and under what conditions this should be undertaken.

Hiltner used various metaphors to describe the kind of guidance which he felt was required in his style of counselling. He used the metaphor of the guide in the North Woods, who has knowledge of the territory not possessed by the traveller who needs guidance (Mitchell 1990:486). The traveller however also knows what his or her goal is which is not immediately known to the guide. Given this situation it is important for the guide to respect the traveller's aims and goals. It is also advisable for the traveller to accept the guide's knowledge about the way in which the destination may be reached. One senses here that Hiltner has suggested a more active form of guidance than the non-directive, client-centered counselling advocated by Rogers.

Clearly in hindsight there are many interesting paradoxes which surround Hiltner's vast corpus. The basic image of the pastoral counsellor as a guide who does not coerce or manipulate remains an interesting principle in practice. An important question which remains unanswered however, is how to distinquish between guidance and manipulation and coercion? Hiltner suggested that the distinction was very clear cut. However, how does one draw the line between active and passive guidance and manipulation and non-manipulation and coercion and non-coercion?

Other criticisms which can be made include the concerns of Browning. Browning (1983a:36) believes that Hiltner does not take the pluralistic nature of society and the church sufficiently into account. This pluralistic situation contributes considerably to the values confusion of counsellors, clients, church and society in general. He also believes that Hiltner tends to exaggerate the ethical resources of the individual.

Most parishioners are not high moral achievers and need to be guided towards moral maturation. He feels then that Hiltner's "eductive" counsellor is too relativistic to properly address modernity and the pluralistic context of society.

2.3.3   Research

A major doctoral thesis produced in 1952 was that of Seward Hiltner. Hiltner's thesis attempted to clarify the relationship between Christian ethics and psychotherapy. The title was revealing, "Psychotherapy and Christian Ethics: An Evaluation of the Ethical Thought of A.E.Taylor and Paul Tillich in the Light of Psychotherapeutic Contributions to Ethics by J.C.Flugel and Erich Fromm." He was particularly interested in ethical and psychological character formation and the correlation of Christian ethics and psychotherapy.

Another thesis concerned with the personality of pastoral counsellors was Rader's doctoral thesis presented in 1968. It is entitled, "Identification of Selected Personality Characteristics which make for Effectiveness in Pastoral Care". In his research the author used standardised personality tests as well as developing his own instrument called a Pastoral Care Index and tested 140 Methodist and Evangelical United Bretheran in the United States. The major finding was that pastoral counselling's effectiveness was clearly predictable from certain personality measures.

Also of interest was Biersdorf's doctoral thesis written in 1968 entitled, "Appraising the Presuppositions of the Pastoral Counsellor". The chief concern of the researcher was to investigate the phenomenon of counter-transference in pastoral counselling. The psychoanalytic studies of counter-transference indicate that the therapist's reaction to the client consciously or unconsciously may be destructive or constructive. Various

presuppositions of the counsellor are believed to affect the ability of the counsellor to deal with counter-transference. These presuppositions include the personality structure, beliefs and values of the counsellor. The researcher argued that by understanding his or her own value presuppositions the pastoral counsellor would be in a better position to interpret the place of values in counselling. This gain in understanding of the phenomenon of counter-transference should result in improved pastoral counselling.

As already noted Campbell (1967) wrote a thesis primarily concerned with the personality of pastoral counsellors. Empirical research concerning the personality of counsellors and their impact on counselling thus became a major focus of research among pastoral theologians during the 1960's but less so in the 1970's. The recent rise of psychological research in this area suggests a need for a renewal of interest of pastoral counsellors in this field.

2.3.4   The Christian axiotherapist

Oden (1969:38), Clinebell (1984:138) and Orlo Strunk Jnr (1990:64) are three representatives of this important dimension of counselling. Orlo Strunk Jnr provides us with a useful definition of axiotherapy when he writes:

> Axiotherapy. A form of counseling which focuses on clarifying the specific values at stake in any troublesome situation, asking how these values are functioning or disfunctioning in relation to long-range fulfilment of the self, and how they might be open to review and change.
>
> (Orlo Strunk Jnr 1990:64)

Clinebell's "revised growth model" suggests several advances over Hiltner's "eductive" shepherding perspective. The model affirms to some extent the "client-centered" insights of Rogers, but moves beyond

these to a more directive, eclectic method which draws in a great variety of psychotherapeutic material towards his central growth-hope orientation. He also integrates into this human potentials approach biblical and theological insights which highlight the uniqueness of growth counselling.

In his classic book, <u>Basic Types of Pastoral Care and Counseling</u> (1984), Clinebell includes a chapter on ethical, value and meaning issues. Clinebell writes :

> People need sound values and meanings to be healthy... The epidemic of moral confusion and value-distortions in our society is the seedbed within which are bred many of the psychological, psychosomatic, interpersonal, and spiritual problems which bring people to counseling and therapy... In our society, ministers need to develop effective skills as guides to their people on their journey through complex and confusing ethical and value issues... Helping persons evaluate and revise their values and their life-styles is, in many situations, the heart of the process of helping them cope with their crises and dilemmas in living growthfully.

> (Clinebell 1984:138)

Clinebell (1984:139) argues that underlying all pastoral counselling are ethical, value and meaning issues. Hence all human dilemmas at their deepest level are related to value and meaning issues. For Clinebell this perspective becomes obvious to any values-sensitive counsellor. Clinebell focuses particularly on the problems of conscience which afflict people and the counselling strategies for dealing with these problems. Clinebell does not offer a specific definition of the conscience but he would no doubt agree with Oden that:

> Conscience is the accumulation of internalized, stored concepts of value. While conscience does indeed have a judging function as it reflects backward toward past time, it also has an imaginative function which motivates and prods the self towards future value actualization.

> (Oden 1969:139)

Hence the conscience is defined as a place, a reservoir
of values which forms the core of the self. Each person
has a special value orientation and hierarchy of values
even if vague and inarticulate. Throughout one's life one
is continually creating and receiving values. These value
constellations help lead the person towards making
choices.

Clinebell (1984:149-158) argues that the counsellor
encounters six types of conscience problems. These
conscience problems largely have to do with existential
guilt and its ramifications (Oden 1969:46-62). The
problems include dealing with appropriate guilt and
neurotic guilt, issues surrounding self-righteous
consciences, underdeveloped consciences which lack
sensitivity to appropriate guilt, underdeveloped
consciences which lack any sense of social responsibility
and consciences with value and meaning vacuums. His
concern with conscience problems also moves beyond mere
healing of unhealthy consciences, to a focus on the
growth and maturity of consciences. This goal intends to
enable people to commit themselves to values which will
enhance life and make for the survival of all on a
growth-enabling planet.

Clinebell offers an eclectic approach for the
healing of varied conscience problems. Clinebell's
(1984:160) formulae for dealing with guilt suggest a more
directive approach than that of Hiltner. He also echoes
church tradition which portrays counselling as comparable
to that which happens in a confessional. In dealing with
appropriate guilt Clinebell (1984:145-147) offers a five
step approach of confrontation, confession, forgiveness,
restitution and reconciliation. Clinebell's (1984:150)
pastoral counselling theory also emphasises the
importance of value clarification and revision as
necessary for growth.

Clinebell's (1984:160-164) willingness to use
confrontational methods is tempered by an awareness of

using them selectively. He cautions that confrontation
should be viewed as equivalent to powerful medicine. A
crucial variable in this regard is the counsellor's own
ethical integrity, maturity and wholeness. Confrontation
should take place in an open atmosphere of love and
acceptance. The biblical injunction of speaking the truth
in love should be kept in the forefront of the
confrontation. The counsellee must be offered the space
to disagree with the counsellor. Clinebell is opposed to
the rigid and judgemental moralism of Adams and
psychologists like Mowrer and some practitioners of
evangelical Christian counselling. He feels that such
therapy lacks grace and the necessary caring and
accepting attitude of the parishioner by the counsellor.
He feels that such therapists stress behaviour
modification at all costs. Clinebell argues that this
moral confrontation approach is based on an
oversimplified view of people and their problems.
People's problems are usually diagnosed and reduced down
to the problem of disobeying one's conscience or the
bible's dictates of how things should be done. This
blanket approach assumes that all guilt is appropriate
guilt and that behaviour and not feelings have to be
changed. This oversimplification of the counselling
procedure also often refuses to accept the standard
counselling demand of addressing both feelings and
behaviour and not just behaviour. There is also no
attempt to distinguish between various types of guilt,
including inappropriate guilt, distorted and immature
consciences and neurotic consciences.

Clinebell (1984:416) offers a variety of optimal
values which the counsellor should represent in this or
that context. Clinebell mentions that probably the key to
all counselling is the personality of the pastor. He
argues that empirical studies have shown that three
critical counsellor characteristics are necessary for an
effective counsellor. These are congruence, non-

possessive warmth (caring and respect) and empathetic understanding. To these characteristics, Clinebell (1984:418) adds a concern for the identity of the pastor and an awareness of the common sinfulness that the counsellor and the parishioner share which results in the counsellor becoming a wounded healer.

The pastoral counsellor should also be a model of a growth orientated person, a growth enabler, guide and liberator. Hence, "The counsellor-therapist is seen as a skilled guide and coach for one's growth journey, a person who also needs to continue growing" (Clinebell 1984:184). The growth counsellor's concern with self-actualisation should, however, be expanded to include a concern for persons, institutions and the environment.

The similarities and contrasts between Hiltner's eductive shepherd and Clinebell's growth counsellor are interesting to note. Clearly, both Hiltner and Clinebell are concerned with the dangers of moralism and legalism in counselling. Hiltner's counsellor would draw a distinction between value clarification and value coercion in counselling. Clinebell is more directive and willing to confront the client ethically and psychologically concerning his or her value confusion, value and conscience underdevelopment and the need to develop mature consciences. Unlike Hiltner, Clinebell does not exaggerate the ethical and values resources of the individual seeking counselling. This is why he is willing to confront. Both Hiltner and Clinebell focus on the healing-restorative task of pastoral counselling and particularly the guiding task. Clinebell, however, is also concerned with the care and educational task of nurturing healthy consciences towards the formation of a community of healthy moral consciences. Such healthy moral communities should be the basis for the church's moral actions. Clinebell is thus interested in educative counselling. In nurturing healthy consciences Clinebell (1984:164-166) quotes Erikson, Kohlberg and Gilligan

· positively and integrates their insights into his growth counselling paradigm. This combination of educator and counsellor also helps many ministers to overcome a conflict which they have in their minds concerning the relationship between their teaching and preaching roles and their roles as counsellors. Hence Clinebell (1984:324) concludes that, "The concept of educative counseling is the bridge that links pastoral counseling and the entire growth-nurturing educational programme of the church."

Browning (1983a:38-39) acknowledges his appreciation for Clinebell's model and his willingness to address conscience problems and value and moral issues in counselling. He however feels that Clinebell does not deal adequately with the pluralistic nature of the society and church and people who attend counselling. He applauds Clinebell's concern for the pastoral counsellor to be willing to use confrontational methods without becoming moralistic. The question, however, remains as to where the minister gets the authority to make such moral and value judgements. He feels that Clinebell's appeal to the moral authority of his confessional tradition (broadly conceived) is inadequate. Assuming that the legacy of the Christian heritage can be conceived of as an absolute given, then Christians have the comfort of appealing to an absolute norm in all contexts. However, in a pluralistic world and pluralistic church, while such appeals to church tradition can be made, the tradition is often only partially able to deal with the problems of modern living. Church tradition thus appears to be in need of constant renewal and critical appraisal. The normative function of the ethical tradition and values of church tradition thus require constant renewal. In Browning's (1983a:40) opinion, Clinebell would need to move beyond confessionalism in defending his appeals for the use of moral confrontation to developing a critical moral theory. One source of the normative moral theory

could be the church's tradition, but other sources would have to be integrated to develop an ethic of critical depth. Browning acknowledges that Clinebell has already begun to develop such an ethical theory in advocating his growth and ecological ethic. He would however have to go further in expanding this part of his thinking in order to develop a more profound normative ethical theory.

2.3.5   Research

As noted in the previous section, the research concerning pastoral counsellors' values occurs primarily in the 1960's with a waning of interest apparent in the 1970's. This is particularly true of the mainline Protestant denominations. Interestingly enough, the most direct response to the recent debate concerning psychotherapy values has emerged from evangelical Christian counsellors in the 1980's and 1990's. This latter group will be dealt with in a separate section of this thesis. Two theses which are good examples of this period are the following.

In 1971 Peropat wrote a doctoral thesis entitled, "Value Change Orientation and Its Relationship to Attitude Change Subsequent to Pastoral Counselling Training". The researcher drew a distinction between value change and attitude change. His chief hypothesis was that value change would be influenced by attitude change and vice versa. By the use of standardised questionnaires he tested 192 priests, rabbis and women religious workers. These participants had all been involved in a three year pastoral counselling course at Iona College in the United States. The researcher discovered that attitudes and values changed most in the first year of training and very little in the second and third years of training. He felt that there was a need for a more adequate theory of attitude and value change in pastoral counselling training.

In 1976 Moore wrote a doctoral thesis entitled,
"Mental health consultation and the clergy. The place of
values and other factors". In his research he used
various standardised instruments including the Rokeach
Value Survey and hypothesised that clergy who scored
highest on the salvation and equality values would be the
most compassionate and thus most likely to refer
parishioners to other mental health professionals. His
research concluded that two patterns emerged from his
group of Methodist clergy which were more complex than
the hypothesis suggested. One group ranked salvation and
happiness as the highest values and another group ranked
an exciting life and equality as the highest values.
Despite their varied values systems, both groups would be
equally open to making referrals to other mental health
professionals. Hence a significant difference in values
showed little difference in a desire to make referrals.

2.3.6   The moral counsellor

As already mentioned, Hiltner's doctoral thesis was
completed in 1952 and is one of the few theses or
extensive works ever written about the relationship
between Christian ethics and psychotherapy. After a gap
of twenty-four years Browning produced his seminal book
entitled, The Moral Context of Pastoral Care (1976). This
book opened a floodgate of writing and debate concerning
the relationship between pastoral care and Christian
ethics. Browning (1976; 1983a; 1987; 1991) has written
several additional volumes concerning this general theme
and Capps (1983), Poling (1984), Gerkin (1991) and Noyce
(1989) have added their voices to this growing body of
literature. In this thesis the researcher will focus on
the work of Browning who has been a pioneer in the
renaissance of this concern.

Browning's writings can be described as being a
response to modernity. He writes :

> The most pervasive social fact of contemporary
> life, at least for Western people, is the
> relentless march of the forces of modernity. The
> definition of modernity will be a central concern .
> of this study. For the moment, however, we can say
> that modernity seems to be the social impact of
> that conglomeration of forces associated with
> industrialization, technology, structural
> differentiation of basic social institutions,
> occupational specialization and urbanization.

(Browning 1973:11)

Browning stresses in his writings that modernity is an
ambiguous phenomenon. The positive results of economic
and technological advancement need to be weighed against
the negative forces of possible ecological extinction of
the human race and the incredible confused choices that
face mankind in the modern era. Life is characterised by
ambiguity, pluralistic values, rapid social change and
moral confusion.

At the outset of his suggestive book, The Moral
Context of Pastoral Care (1976:16), Browning argues with
Weber that in times of social uncertainty, care-givers
like priests, doctors and psychotherapists take on a role
of enlarged influence for organised religion and society.
Care-givers become spiritual and moral guides who not
only influence those visiting them with some need, but
impact on the wider society through their cultural
vision. In Browning's interpretation of the Freudian and
Eriksonian traditions, those trained in using these
therapies are not merely orthodox specialists of the
mind, but cadres of disciples who create a therapeutic
and moral culture. Hence Browning (1973:12) would agree
with Reiff that the triumph of the therapeutic mentality
is one of the important new components of Western
culture. In his view therapeutic culture is also
primarily a response to the corrosive values confusion
caused by modernity.

Browning has a specific sensitivity for the moral
and ethical dimensions of pastoral counselling and
psychotherapy. Browning views practical theology and his

speciality, which he calls a practical theology of care, as arising from and leading back into a therapeutic and moral community. This therapeutic and moral community can be either Christian or secular. He feels that much pastoral counselling lacks an ecclesiastical community. In his latest book (1991:209-276) he attempts to redress this imbalance by focusing throughout the book on three contrasting but living ecclesiastical communities. He attempts to show how these three communities needed to develop a practical ethical theory to deal with the various challenges which they faced. However his general criticism of most church communities remains pertinent. Hence he stresses that:

> The Christian community should be precisely the community that will attempt to order the world into a just society through practical ethical principles and yet live out of a sense of participating in the life giving spirit of God... Pastoral care should never be understood as simply a matter of "loosening people up"... Pastoral care must first be concerned to give a person a structure, a character, an identity, a religio-cultural value system by which to live.

> (Browning 1976:86)

Browning also sees a close link between the moral context of care and the moral community from which it arises. Browning stresses that all pastoral counsellors and even secular therapists assume a moral context through which they view their therapy. Each discipline has a shared moral world which is closely connected to their moral professional communities. This moral context provides a background for all counselling. He writes :

> Secular counsellors or psychotherapists generally try not to become moralistic or advocate their own ethical standards in the process of working with clients. Yet it is becoming increasingly acknowledged that secular therapists assume a moral context, a more or less mutually recognisable and shared moral universe that extends beyond the therapeutic situation and provides a moral horizon to the therapy even

though it may not be directly invoked by
therapists in the process of counseling.

(Browning 1976:11).

Browning concludes that pastoral care and counselling
should participate in building a community's values and
shaping the identity of its people. The church and
pastoral counsellors remain above all else bearers of
moral sensitivity and propagators of a normative moral
universe. Moral and therapeutic discourse should thus
provide people with character and identity. Browning
contends further that accurate moral discourse combined
with therpeutic acumen should provide potent medicine for
contributing to people's health.

In his later book, Religious Ethics and Pastoral
Care (1983a) Browning introduces his well known method of
practical moral reasoning as his distinctive contribution
to the revised correlation method. At the outset of this
book Browning stresses that:

> The minister doing pastoral care must be an ethical
> thinker and understand the methods of ethical
> thinking. In every act of care, the minister must
> also be able to relate judgements about how people
> should live with judgements about where people
> actually are. And finally, the minister should have
> both the skills and judgement to help people
> gradually move through the long journey of closing
> the gap between ethical ideal and reality.

(Browning 1983a:10)

Browning notes that in our modern world, care is a
complex activity. His method is intended to aid one in
better caring for the church and for society. In this
book he makes a great deal of the church as being a
community of moral discourse. The church is both a moral
guide and a servant to the world.

Browning pictures the church as founded in praxis
and whose activities are interrupted by problems which
force the community to reflect on current praxis. He has

devised a flexible model for drawing together practical moral thinking with the intention of being able to develop some kind of moral-psychological theory to guide people in their pastoral care. When faced with a problem, Browning (1983a:57) states that a probing critical analysis needs to be undertaken which includes a detailed reflection of four steps of practical action related to five levels of practical moral reasoning.

Browning has developed the following diagram to help clarify his method of practical moral reasoning and action.

Figure C

The Four Steps of Practical Action
Related to
The Five Levels of Practical Reason

1. Experiencing and defining the problem
2. Attention, listening, and understanding
3. Critical analysis and comparison
4. Decision and strategy

Special Relevance

The Five Levels

1. Metaphorical
2. Obligational
3. Tendency-Need
4. Contextual-Predictive
5. Rule-Role

(Browning 1983a:100)

Firstly, the problem encountered must be immediately experienced and defined. Secondly, an attempt is made to get a clearer and deeper understanding of the problem. Thirdly, a creative step of critical reflection is

undertaken by using the five levels of practical moral reasoning as a guide. Fourthly, a decisive strategy and step of decision making is then taken.

Browning's five levels of practical moral reasoning (step three above) attempt to guide the individual and community towards the development of a practical moral-psychological theory aimed at improving praxis. The five levels are described briefly as follows.

The metaphorical level attempts to tell people about the ultimate context of actions, the moral level indicates what people are obligated to do, the tendency-need level tells people which human needs they are justified in satisfying, the contextual-predictive (ecological) level focuses on the immediate context of people's action and the role/rule level tells people how they are justified in meeting their ends and looks at their behaviour in terms of their position in the social structure. The driving force behind this five level analysis is the moral level. Browning (1983a:105) stresses his desire for all people to aim at the highest stage possible in Kohlberg's moral justice reasoning paradigm. He affirms that this ideal of the Kantian-Rawls ethic of equal-regard and deontological reversible and impartial justice is worth emulating.

Browning's argument concludes that the moral counsellor thus becomes an active moral guide in any counselling situation. This indicates a position several steps beyond clarification of values towards a more directive and educational form of pastoral counselling. The pastoral counsellor is encouraged to be a shaper of values and accepts the backdrop of a moral universe as a context for his moral guidance. The moral counsellor is a bearer of moral sensitivity and helps to articulate and create normative values. The moral counsellor is thus a critical moral philosopher who by using the method of practical moral reasoning can articulate critical ethical-psychological theories of a normative nature for

dealing with diverse situations. The moral counsellor is thus concerned with norming, forming and transforming (my own words) of individuals, church, community and society.

Despite this directive and educative style of counselling, Browning like Clinebell is cautious of moralism in counselling. He feels, for example, that Hoffman's <u>Ethical Confrontation in Counseling</u> (1979) which argues for ethical confrontation (both affirmation and criticism) should be used with care. Ethical confrontation is only advocated for people who have reasonably strong ego's, a strong sense of self and whose personalities are relatively well-differentiated (Browning 1983a:118). In Browning's view, people who profit most from ethical confrontation usually need to simply have their guilt named and to feel the guilt and this leads to restoration and healing. According to Browning this is finally the position advocated by Mowrer and Hoffmann, whose approach should be limited to people like those mentioned above. However, Browning argues that it would be a mistake to assume that everyone needs to be approached in such a confrontational way. For most counsellees, ethical dialogue comes first and ethical confrontation comes much later, if at all. Such moral dialogue skilfully initiated, would be better for many people who are not at the point of connecting clearly with their guilt and moral confusion.

Since the personal values of the moral counsellor are not systematically laid out by Browning, it is useful to offer one's own interpretation on what values a counsellor should reflect. Browning (1983a:63-68) suggests that the moral counsellor should be a highly rational and an ethically and psychologically sensitive person. The optimal counsellor would be a mature, generative person who would score high on Kohlberg's moral reasoning scale. The optimal moral counsellor would exemplify an ethic of mutual reciprocity and equal regard (the highest stage of Kohlberg's scheme) and exhibit a

disciplined, just and loving attitude and lifestyle. The moral counsellor should be willing to live a strenuous life and show a willingness towards self-sacrifice (Browning 1980:255). The moral counsellor should not be overly concerned with self-actualisation but with developing a generative attitude towards present and future generations. Finally, the moral counsellor should realise that the moral life is often the tragic life. Throughout life choices have to be made. There is a costliness to the moral life which needs to be understood. Self-sacrifice for current and future generations and for the good of the community have not been dominant themes in modern psychotherapy. The capacity for sacrifice and inner rigor is essential for a morally strenuous life. Hence Browning includes within his moral vision a view of the place of tragedy and fragmentation. For Browning, the moral life is truly a rigorous and costly business. Browning thus concludes with these poetic words:

> The world is "essentially a theatre for heroism. In heroism, we feel life's supreme mystery is hidden." The individual who is willing to "risk death and still more if he suffer it heroically in the service he has chosen" is consecrated forever.

> (Browning 1980:256)

Browning's ethical preoccupation has received both support and criticism. Systematic theologians like Tracy (1983), ethicists like Gustafson (1981) and practical theologians like Oden (1983) have given unqualified support for Browning's project. Capps (1983), Poling (1984), Fowler (1987), Gerkin (1991), and Noyce (1989) have been more critical and disagree with the view that practical theology should be conceived of as a discipline under Christian ethics. They have, however all expanded their writings in recent years to include major sections regarding the moral and ethical dimensions of pastoral counselling which were absent in the past.

2.3.7   Research

As already mentioned, an interesting point of discovery for this researcher was that since Hiltner's 1952 thesis concerning Christian ethics and psychotherapy, there had been little comparable research until the 1980's. Browning's (1983a:18-30) argument about the estrangement of ethics and pastoral care seems to be supported by the lack of such research. In recent years there has, however, been an increase of research in this area. One notes the following four examples.

In 1984 Knight wrote a doctoral thesis entitled, "Attitudes of a selected sample of Pastoral Counselors toward influencing the moral values of their clients." The researcher explored the ways in which pastoral counsellors dealt with clients who supported moral values which were in conflict with those of the counsellor. A case study questionnaire was developed which aimed at testing pastoral counsellors tendencies to influence a client's moral values. The instrument indicated that pastoral counsellors were confused by the degree of influence which might be required to resolve controversial counselling cases. In general pastoral counsellors tended to shy away from strong directive guidance and moral confrontation and appeared to be trapped in the Rogerian non-directive counselling ideology.

In 1986 Johnson wrote a thesis entitled, "Theories of Moral Development and a Christian Ethic of Character." In his research he compared the work of Lawrence Kohlberg with Stanley Hauerwas through the mediating position of James Fowler. The researcher charted the movement from the importance of making discrete moral decisions to the question of the character of the moral agent who makes those decisions.

In 1989 Smith wrote a doctoral thesis on the topic, "The Moral Treatment of Psychological Disorder: A historical and conceptual study of selected twentieth century pastoral psychologists." The tradition of moral care and moral treatment was stated as originating with Boisen and continuing through Mowrer. Moral treatment was regarded as an education and transformation of consciousness and the growth of character and virtue.

An important work for the South African context is that of Eyber's thesis (1987) entitled, "Responsibility and Generativity: A study of the relationship between H. Richard Niebuhr's ethics of responsibility and Erik Erikson's psycho-social theory with implications for pastoral care to Black adults in South Africa." Eyber's thesis correlates Niebuhr's Ethic of Responsibility with Erikson's Concept of Generativity and then applies his disclosive ethical-psychological model to pastoral care and counselling in the South African situation. This thesis is clearly of great significance to pastoral counselling in the South African context and it would be useful for others to use his model for encouraging research into the ethical-psychological domain.

An interesting feature of all the above-mentioned research is the rising concern for empirical data. The desire for harder empirical evidence to understand more about the moral and values dilemmas which pastoral counsellors face is very important. The current researcher will attempt to add to this growing body of evidence through his empirical research results.

2.3.8   The evangelical Christian counsellor

Hiltner, Clinebell and Browning are aware of the dangers of confrontational positions in dealing with parishioners which they regard as neo-moralistic if not handled in a highly skilled and sophisticated way. Empirical evidence (Beech:1970) comparing Protestant counsellors and

evangelical Christian counsellors suggests that the former (Methodists in this study) were more non-directive, more permissive and more liberal than their evangelical counterparts. Recent writings from evangelical circles particularly with the development of a form of counselling called Christian counselling, suggests a softening of this moralistic approach. Indeed, the Journal of Psychology and Theology is full of studies of values and counselling options which are very creative, to say the least.

Writers like J Adams (1972), Narramore (1984) and G Collins (1981) are directive and confrontational in varying degrees. Each thinker proposes that the Christian counsellor should take a highly active and commanding role in shaping the parishioner's moral universe. Jay Adams is the most radical proponent of confrontational counselling. He argues that impartiality is impossible in counselling because evangelical pastors cannot finally drop their moral and values convictions. He asserts that, "Christian counselors must offer advice and moral judgement if they are to be called Christian" (Adams 1972:84). His assessment focuses on what he believes to be the danger of moral ambiguity and impartiality flowing from Rogerian therapy.

> How can the Christian pastor "accept" sinful behaviour? He is pledged to give a proper Christian response to such behaviour. How can he fail to offer known Biblical solutions to problems? He is pledged to declare and monitor God's word. Shall he sit back non-committally watching the client struggle?
>
> (Adams 1972:85)

Adams nouthetic counselling perceives itself to be biblical counselling and is rational, problem-centered and behaviour orientated. It focuses on confrontation of biblical principles in order to convict the sinner and correct the problem by training the counsellee to take up a new way of life.

In the 1960's Narramore (Collins 1990:373), a clinically trained psychologist began to quietly train pastors and missionaries in a more biblically based style of counselling. In the 1970's Gary Collins (1990:374), another clinical psychologist, began to develop evangelical integration models for integrating psychology and theology and developing a network of christian counsellors. Two evangelical journals full of evangelical theology integrated with various types of therapy theory such as Rogerian, Freudian and Rational Emotive Therapy have emerged. The Journal of Psychology and Theology is of particular interest to this thesis as it has a wealth of empirical studies concerning values issues and therapy.

In 1981 Collins and Tornquist (1981:69-80) wrote a general article which focused on the training of Christian counsellors. They noted that the Boulder model (1949) and Vail model (1973) affirmed that clinical psychologists should be scientist-professionals. The later model stressed the relevance of values for counselling which was not dealt with adequately in the earlier model. In their assessment of specific training models, the authors concluded that the traditional view of therapist and client as found in the medical model, had been superseded. The experiential model of Roger's (1981) and Egan (1975) with its stress upon warmth, empathy and genuineness of therapists was also in need of revision. They advocated microcounseling as developed by Ivey (1978), which encourages students to build on one skill at a time and the psychoeducational model that has developed from it. This movement beyond the medical model to a psychoeducational model assumes that counselling is really a particular form of psychological education. Instead of focusing on diagnostic assessment and the treating of mental illness, the counsellor teaches attitudes, ideas and skills which counsellees apply to their own lives in order to solve present psychological

problems. This psychoeducational model believes that the best way to treat people is to train them. This pscyhoeducational model has even proposed that the terms "therapy" or "counselling" be replaced by more descriptive terminology.

Given the previous general comments on evangelical preferences for directive models, it is not surprising that the psychoeducational model should be advocated. Although this echoes the thought of Clinebell and Browning, these major Protestant thinkers ultimately remain more cautious and exploratory in this regard. Whether Egan can be so easily classified with Rogers is also debatable. Egan's use of Roger's method as stage one in his counselling model and the strong educational cognitive components of stage two and three suggest something similar to what evangelical counsellors are advocating here. For some reason, Collins and his colleagues desire to develop their theory and training with less borrowing from Egan than from Ivey and company. This may be because the evangelical interest in marrying cognitive therapy models with a cognitive interpretation of scripture is easier to do with Ivey. The result however is the enunciation of a very clear counselling program which Christian counsellors are currently undertaking.

Several articles in the Journal of Psychology and Theology highlight the issue of values and the Christian counsellor's views of it.

In 1984 McMinn (1984:24-33) wrote an article entitled, "Religious Values and Client-Therapist matching in Psychotherapy." In his suggestive article he proposed that one way of matching counsellor and clients was according to their perceptions of guilt. His analysis hypothesised the scenario in which a client with powerful guilt feelings which coexist with controversial or socially problematic behaviour comes for therapy. He highlights four types of therapist-client matching.

Category one (McMinn 1984:29-31) would place the therapist and client with similar orientations regarding the role of guilt together. Thus therapist and client would work together to change the guilt-producing behaviour. Therapist and client would no doubt consider the therapy successful as the client's feelings of guilt gave way to feelings of catharsis and increased behavioural responsibility. Category two places a therapist with a view that guilt and behaviour change go together with a client who desires to feel less guilt but does not want to go through behavioural change. The therapist would attempt to reduce the client's guilt by changing behaviour, but should the client be unwilling to change, a stalemate would be reached. If the client was willing to change, but saw no connection between behaviour change and current guilt feelings, behaviour change would be slow or absent. Hence little progress towards guilt resolution via behavioural change would be apparent. The possibility, however, remains that the client may slowly be converted to the therapist's value system and thus induced change may result. Category three places a therapist who believes that guilt and behaviour are separate with a client who is plagued by guilt feelings which the client believes to be a direct result of behaviour patterns. The therapist may conclude that guilt feelings can be reduced while the behaviour may or may not be a problem. In this situation it is also possible that the client's value system will be transformed to become like that of the therapist. The client's "irrational" connection of guilt and behaviour would probably be eroded. By changing the client's values regarding the causes of guilt, cognitive confusion may result. The problem of all this from a religious point of view is that guilt is basic to most religions and such a change in client values may create religious dissonance. The therapist may view this therapy as successful while the client does not. Should the client refuse to accept

the values of the therapist, then one major possible outcome would be a stalemate as in category two. Category four is where the therapist and client together do. not see a necessary connection between guilt feelings and behaviour. The therapist would attempt to reduce the client's guilt feelings by emphasising their common values of the irrationality and non-productivity of guilt. From the therapist's perspective, the outcome will be favourable as the client reduces self-imposed guilt-feelings. From the client's perspective, the therapy will be successful since the guilt feelings have been reduced.

In conclusion, the outcome that is the most favourable is when the therapist and client are of the same guilt orientation. The logic of this argument is interesting when applied to religious matching of therapist and clients. McMinn argues that therapists should openly discuss their values in treatment with clients, especially if there is significant discrepancy between therapist and client values. Value transfusion does occur in therapy and to suggest otherwise is to deny a basic element of counselling. As religious values are revealed the client's choice to continue or be referred should be openly discussed.

McMinn's argument is an interesting example of the position taken in evangelical Christian counsellor circles regarding counsellor-client value matching. He argues that in general counsellor and client should have similar values and that early disclosure of religious values could enhance therapy outcome.

Another good example of this type of research is that of Wyatt and Johnson (1990:158-165). In 1990 they wrote an article entitled, "The Influence of Counselor Religious Values on Clients' Perceptions of the Counselor". This article attempts to test empirically potential client perceptions of the religious values of various types of counsellors.

Wyatt and Johnson note that valuing is an integral part of counselling and that some counsellors have suggested that they make their values known to clients before therapy. Religionists like Bergin (1980) and McMinn (1984) and feminists like Gilbert (1980) argue for early values clarification by the therapist. Wyatt and Johnson (1990:160-165) argue that pre-therapy information concerning counsellors' religious values may lead to an interesting selection process by prospective clients. Their study focused on the reaction of 125 male and 125 female undergraduates to the religious profiles of the value systems of five counsellors. The first counsellor was married with children, a middle-class suburbanite and politically moderate. Each of the four other counsellors had these characteristics in common. The second profile added that the counsellor was an agnostic and believed that religious values were not significant for therapy. The third profile stated that the counsellor was a religious person who believed that religious values were vital issues in counselling. The fourth profile pictured a religious person who did not believe that religious issues were key issues in counselling. The fifth counsellor was portrayed as a committed Christian who uses the bible and scripture in counselling. Subjects were asked to rate the extent to which they perceived themselves to be similar to these counsellors and believed in the potential helpfulness of such a counsellor. Finally they needed to indicate whether they would be willing to see such a counsellor.

Results suggested that subjects were willing to be seen by all of these counsellors and that they believed in the potential helpfulness of all of the counsellors (Wyatt and Johnson 1990:163-164). Although most rated themselves as different from the agnostic counsellor, this difference would not limit their view of the potential helpfulness of the counsellor or willingness to be seen by the counsellor. This general finding would

suggest that the need for religiously orientated counsellors is not as great as some have claimed. However, further interpretation of the results suggest that there is modest support for the middle ground view that some clients will prefer counsellors with religious convictions. Very religious clients do show a preference for counsellors who would allow them to freely discuss religious issues in counselling.

The general results obtained in this study indicate that the announcement of a therapist's religious values would not generally affect client perceptions and expectations of the counsellor. It might, however, be important for some highly committed religious persons. It is important to note finally that these were only potential clients and that persons suffering from conditions requiring therapy might respond differently than a group of university students to the scripts used here. Despite these results, the researchers (Wyatt and Johnson 1990:164) suspect that the announcement of a strong anti-religious bias could lead to counsellor-client conflict. This in turn would reduce the likelihood of such a counsellor being selected by even a marginally religious client. In "real life" as the feminist counsellor Gilbert (1980) has noted, people have a range of therapists to choose from of many persuasions. In this research, the subjects had access to information about only one type of counsellor. A more complex range of counsellors would probably lead to a more complex range of results.

2.3.9   Conclusion

2.3.9.1   The therapeutic perspective

The literature review from a therapeutic pespective indicated an interesting development of thought regarding the role of values in therapy and particularly the question of the personal value systems of the therapists.

The Freudian background to the problem of counsellor values was sketched out as the "orthodox" position which stressed the ideal of scientific objectivity in therapy analogous to that of a medical surgeon taking part in surgery. The therapist's values were to be kept out of the interaction. The non-directive position of Rogers with its orientation of "acceptance" and "empathy" and "unconditional positive regard" continued this ideology of non-disclosure of therapist values. The subsequent challenges to this position by Buhler (1962), London (1964 revised edition 1986) and Lowe (1969 revised edition 1976) were sketched out. It is clear to them that the therapist needed to acknowledge the role of values in therapy. The seminal research undertaken by Beutler et al (1991) and Bergin et al (1994) entitled "persuasive influence" theory was outlined. These therapists argued that therapy is fundamentally a persuasion and value conversion exercise and that the psychotherapist covertly or overtly persuades the client towards values which happen to mirror his or her own. The positions of Kitchener (1984) and Tjeltveit (1986;1992) in support of the new image of the therapist as ethicist-scientific-practioner was also noted with interest.

The literature review confirms this researcher's long held perception that therapy is largely a value exchange exercise. The researcher has suspected for some time that therapy is powerful medicine which is not orientated simply toward "mature mental health", but rather towards a more radical end of transforming a person's basic value system. The discovery of therapeutic literature which confirms his perception and perspective is very encouraging indeed. The researcher would, however, accept the critique that his position may not be totally normative within the counselling profession. Most therapeutic literature remains cautious of the wholesale imposition, either overtly or covertly of the therapist's value system upon the client. The researcher accepts this

note of caution and hopes that further clarity will emerge in the "mental health" professions so as to guard against outright unethical behaviour and endangering vulnerable clients. The call for greater training and courses in values and ethics and their role in therapy appears to be gaining ground and is a worthwhile development in this researcher's opinion.

2.3.9.2   The pastoral counselling perspective

The review of pastoral counsellor values literature began with a brief historical introduction on the issue of values and moral values as presented by McNeill (1951), Clebsch and Jaeckle (1964) and Holifield (1983). The biblical literature suggested that there was some clarity in ages past on the role and values of prophet and priest and rabbi which is less clear to the pastor in the modern era.

The modern debate was dealt with through a selection of writers including Hiltner (1950;1958), Clinebell (1984), Browning (1976;1983a;1991) and authors such as Adams (1972) and Collins (1981) from the evangelical tradition. The movement from a less directive form of counselling in Hiltner to a more directive form of counselling in Clinebell, Browning and in evangelical circles was outlined. The evolution of the concern for the value systems of pastoral counsellors and their ability to deal with moral values and moral dilemmas was highlighted. The questions of "moral coercion" and "moral clarification" of values was noted, as well as the more radical role of the counsellor as a moral philosopher who is a shaper of moral and cultural values in individuals, church and society.

Again, the current researcher finds these trends encouraging of his own inclinations as a counsellor. The researcher has already mentioned that his formative counselling experience in the Rogerian school was

problematic for him. He attempted to eliminate moral advice giving from his counselling program with disastrous results. The discovery of Browning's broad philosophical and ethical counselling theory was a profound experience for this researcher. Browning's wide ranging project has changed this researcher's view of counselling as well as the counselling ministry of many churches. The desire to develop "ethical-therapeutic" .theories for dealing with a wide range of challenges facing the church and individual counsellors appears to be a future step for this researcher.

2.3.9.3   Convergence between perspectives

As mentioned at the outset of this thesis, this researcher supports the view that pastoral counselling tends to follow the trends of psychotherapy to a large extent. This following pattern is largely confirmed by the literature reviews laid out above. More specifically, in the early days of pastoral counselling roughly up to the 1960's, the movement largely aligned itself to a Freudian and Rogerian mixture of counselling. This is particularly evident in Hiltner and still exerts influence over the discipline to the present day. The more balanced examples of using Rogers as found in O'Brien and Egan remains a constructive part of this legacy in the current era.

A notable gap in this following pattern has to do with the rise of concern for values and moral issues in psychotherapy which is largely absent from pastoral counselling literature. In this researcher's opinion this absence is quite extraordinary. For a twenty-four year period while several important books appeared in psychotherapy including Buhler (1962), London (1964) and Lowe (1969) and their various revised editions, these books and their issues were largely ignored in pastoral counselling literature. This omission is so obvious that

it cries out for explanation. Clearly pastoral counselling as a discipline has largely been captive to the Freudian and Rogerian heritage and the fear of "moralism". Since so many leaders in the field of pastoral counselling were liberal Protestants, this controlling ideology of freedom and autonomy and fear of moralism was hard to break down. It remains an astonishing oversight. If there is anything one might reasonably expect from a religious person is that he or she might have an ability to think, talk and act morally. This inability to give clear and unambiguous moral advice has led to indequate moral counsel in pastoral counselling. Hence the value of the analysis of Donald Browning is again affirmed.

Finally, the convergence in the work of Tjeltveit and Browning is quite apparent. It would be easy to picture Browning's moral counsellor as an ethicist-scientific-practitioner and Tjeltveit's therapist as being comfortable with Browning's assertions concerning the moral and therapeutic contexts in which secular therapists work. There is also a parallel between the thought of Bergin and Worthington, who are secular counsellors who work closely with Christian counsellors. Both groups show a great deal in common regarding the perplexing questions of the role of values and religious values in counselling, as well as the personal values of counsellors.

CHAPTER 3

VALUES AND MORAL JUDGEMENT
DEVELOPMENT TESTING:
A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

3.1 Introduction

At the outset of this chapter, it is necessary to discuss
the relationship between values and moral judgement
development from a theoretical and operationalising
perspective. The chapter will begin by focusing on values
in general and then move on to Rokeach's specific
conceptualisation and operationalisation of values and
value systems in psychology. This will be followed by a
presentation of Kohlberg and Rest's theories and tests
regarding moral judgement development.

Values and moral judgement development theory and
testing are strongly advocated in the social sciences and
to some extent in religious studies. Both the Rokeach
Value Survey and the Rest Defining Issues Test have been
widely used in the United States and internationally
since their inception in the 1970's. The current volumes
of Dissertation Abstracts International mentions frequent
use of the tests. Theories and tests which have such
longevity and popularity over a twenty year period must
have developed great reliability and researchers continue
to use them confidently for various types of research
projects.

Pastoral counsellors such as Browning (1983:104),
Capps (1983:48), Noyce (1989:73) and Fowler (1987:45) all
advocate the use of Kohlberg's theory for pastoral
counsellors and their parishioners. Christian educators
have been more divided in the use of Kohlberg's theory,
with Fowler (1987:45) and Hennessey (1976:23) in favour
of it and Dykstra (1980:10) questioning its validity and
universality. Values research has been dealt with by

Fowler's (1987:12) faith development project and the Christian counselling movement, but Rokeach's specific theory and testing is not a dominant feature- of mainstream pastoral counselling literature. Kelly's doctoral thesis (1989) and article (1991) argue that the Rokeach Value Survey remains the best instrument available for the study of value systems. Arizmendi (1985) has advocated the use of selected values of the means and ends value hierarchy as useful for studying stability and change in the values of counsellors and clients. This plethora of concern for values research in psychotherapy underlines the need for values research in pastoral counselling. It is interesting to note that the major theorists in pastoral counselling do not include much of an empirical nature in their books or articles. Some of their students are however currently showing more interest in hard scientific data. Hopefully this study will add to the empirical trend now emerging in this discipline. There is undoubtedly much to be gained for the discipline of pastoral counselling by learning more about pastoral counsellors' values systems and moral judgement development.

3.2 Values and value systems

"Values" is a loosely defined concept in the social sciences and pastoral counselling and requires careful delimitation. Let us look carefully at a selection of definitions which are mentioned in the literature.

Almost all studies in psychology make mention of the pioneering work of the anthropologist Kluckhohn (1952) in his pioneering study of values. Kluckhohn (1952:359) defines a value as "a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action." A value then is a formulation of the desirable, the "ought" and

"should" standards which influence actions. Several key words in this definition recur in subsequent literature. The stress of a value as being a conception of the desirable, as well as the distinction between modes, means and ends of action needs to be underlined.

In psychology, the work of Allport has been foundational to this field. Allport's well known Study of Values (1960 edition) is based on the six-value model proposed by the philosopher Spranger. The six values stressed are theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political and religious. In the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey scale, the six values are paired an equal number of times with each other and subjects are forced to make a choice between pairs of values to produce an individual value-hierarchy. Allport (1960:45) defined a value as being "a belief upon which a man acts by preference". Allport thus stresses the notion of preference and raises the question of the relationship between value and belief.

In a major review of the literature Kessel and McBrearty (1967) attempted to summarise the variety of these conceptions of value into another definition. They wrote that "Values are standards of desirability involving the cognitive, affective and directive elements of the evaluative process. Such standards are good-bad, right-wrong, appropriate-inappropriate, pretty-ugly, pleasant-unpleasant" (Kessel and McBrearty 1967:670). Here the cognitive, affective and directive elements of values are linked together, which gives a clearer understanding of a dynamic nature of the term.

It is clear that values are regarded by all three of these theorists as central and integral to the personality. A value is understood to be that which motivates and co-ordinates actions. Each person's conduct are motivated and co-ordinated by numerous values, many of which may be contradictory. Hence, some kind of preference and integration into a hierarchical system of importance is envisioned. Serious difficulties and life

crises are understood to arise when life circumstances compel a person to nullify one or more of their pivotal values. The role of the counsellor or psychotherapist is often viewed as that of enabling the client to vocalise and explore these values and then to reintegrate them into a more harmonious system. Alterations in value systems effect wide ranging changes in the direction and purpose of conduct.

Finally, explicit and implicit in the writings of most of these scholars is the belief that some value systems are better than others. The logical possibility of an ideal value system which is unsurpassed by all other value systems is not agreed upon by these major theorists. The question of optimal behaviour and an optimal and ideal system of values suggested by a higher order priority of values would be useful. Which values are most important in the ideal person's higher-order value systems and what would constitute such an ideal value system? The possibility of such an ideal value system should be theoretically advantageous in understanding the goals towards which behaviour is directed in any given situation.

3.3 Rokeach's theory of human values

A seminal figure in psychology who draws together many of the above themes and clarifies much of the confusion surrounding them is that of Milton Rokeach. Rokeach's theory includes precise definitions of the term "value" and "value system", an explication of the distinction between "values", "attitudes" and "social norms", identification of the way in which values function and transcend situations, distinctions between instrumental and terminal values, operationalisation of the value system and differences between lower and higher order values.

Like Kluckhohn and Kessel and McBrearty, Rokeach (1973:5) locates values in the conceptions of the preferable. He stresses that the core phenomenon of the value notion is the presence of standards of preference. To put it another way, the beginning point or substrata of values is the concept and affect of preference. Values merge concept and affect and give direction to action.

Rokeach outlines four suppositions that underlie his theory of human values. They are that;

(1) the total number of values that a person possesses is relatively small,
(2) all men everywhere posses the same values to different degrees,
(3) values are organized into value systems,
(4) the antecedents of human values can be traced to culture, society and its institutions and personality.

(Rokeach 1973:3)

Rokeach's theory is based on the assumption that value systems are finite or closed systems comprising a relatively small number of universally meaningful values. The only variation in value systems from person to person is the rank ordering of these values. It is important to realise that the theory is primarily a theory of value organisation rather than value development or value appropriation. Hence the theory stresses the study of organised value systems and not value development.

What then are the chief functions of values? Rokeach (1973:13) outlines three primary functions of values.

Firstly, values provide us with standards for conduct. Values enable us to appraise and adjudicate between ourselves and others. Values encourage us to take up positions on personal and social matters. Values finally tell us which attitudes, beliefs and activities are worth defending or changing.

Secondly, values may be employed to resolve dissension and enable decision making to take place. When conflicts stimulates several values, it is doubtful that the person will be able to behave in a manner appropriate

to all these values. As a result of the person's priority
of values, that person will select between the choices to
meet the challenge.

Thirdly, values play an important role by providing
expression for human needs. Values have a strong
motivating function. Rokeach (1973:14) notes that, "If we
behave in all the ways prescribed by our instrumental
values, we will be rewarded by all the end-states
specified by our terminal values". Another feature of
values prowess is that values are "in the final analysis
the conceptual tools and weapons that we all employ to
maintain and enhance self-esteem" (Rokeach 1973:14).

In common with Kluckhohn, Rokeach distinguishes
between instrumental (means) and terminal (ends) values.
In Rokeach's (1973:7) opinion, Allport's (1960 edition)
work is primarily concerned with end-state values while
the work of Kohlberg (1969) is concerned with idealised
modes of conduct or preferable means of behaviour.

Rokeach (1973:8) divides the instrumental values
into two types of values. These are moral values and
competence or self-actualisation values. He argues that
the concept of moral values is narrower than the concept
of values in general. Moral values refer to modes of
conduct and not end-states of existence. Moral values
also refer to only certain kinds of instrumental conduct.
Moral values are of an interpersonal nature and when
violated lead to feelings of guilt or pangs of
conscience. Competence values have a personal focus
rather than an interpersonal emphasis. Violation of
competence values leads to feelings of shame and personal
inadequacy. Thus, behaving honestly and responsibly is a
moral value while behaving imaginatively and logically is
a competence value. A person may also experience conflict
between two moral values, between moral and competence
values and between two competence values.

He also divides terminal values into two types of
values. These are personal and social values. In his

opinion, terminal values can be either personal (salvation) or social (world peace). Terminal values may be self-centered or society centered, interpersonal or intrapersonal. Thus, such end-states as salvation and peace of mind are intrapersonal while world peace and brotherhood are interpersonal. It seems reasonable to assume that people will vary in their attitudes towards personal or social value priorities. Rokeach (1973:9) concludes that an increase in personal values will probably lead to a decrease in social values and an increase in social values will probably lead to a decrease in personal values.

The possibility of distinguishing between higher and lower order values is also made by Rokeach (1973:16). While cautious of labelling certain values as higher than others, he suggests that someone who is preoccupied with self-actualising values may be operating at a lower level of values than another person with a different set of values. By implication a person with a deeper concern for social values may be operating at a higher level of values organisation than a self-centered person.

Rokeach's theory is also based on a clear distinction between his concept of values and similar concepts such as attitudes and social norms. An important innovation of Rokeach's work (1973:17) is that he distinguishes so precisely between values, attitudes and social norms. Rokeach has stated the following:

> An attitude differs from a value in that an attitude refers to an organization of several beliefs around a specific object or situation. A value on the other hand, refers to a single belief of a very specific kind. It concerns a desirable mode of behaviour or end-state that has a transcendental quality to it, guiding actions, attitudes, judgements and comparisons across specific objects and situations and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate goals. So defined, values and attitudes differ in a number of important respects.
>
> (Rokeach 1973:18)

Rokeach thus highlights several key differences
between values and attitudes. Four differences appear
worthy of comment. Firstly, a value transcends objects
and situations while an attitude is focused on some
specific object or situation. Rokeach thus suggests that
attitudes are situational, while values transcend
situations. Secondly, a value is a standard but an
attitude is not. Attitudes concern a more general
orientation towards life than standards. Thirdly, there
are estimated to be a limited number of values while
attitudes may number in the thousands. Fourthly, values
occupy a more central position than attitudes within the
person's personality and cognitive system and they
therefore determine attitudes as well as conduct. This
last mentioned difference requires further exploration.
Here Rokeach is arguing that values are more central to
personality than beliefs and attitudes and less subject
to change and more stable. Hence it is easier to change
attitudes than values. When one speaks of changes of
values then one is speaking of major changes in the
personality of a person. Values are closer to the core of
personality. The value construct is therefore restricted
to the special class of enduring beliefs which guide
modes of conduct and end-states of existence. In common
with Allport (1961), values in this definition are
prescriptive beliefs. These beliefs help us to judge that
some means or ends are preferable to others.

Another important distinction is between values and
social norms. According to Rokeach (1973:19) they differ
in three ways. Firstly, values refer to modes of conduct
and end states of existence while social norms refer only
to modes of conduct. Secondly, values transcend specific
situations whereas social norms are prescriptive of how
to behave in a specific situation. Thirdly, values are
more personal and internal, while a norm is consensual
and external to a person. Hence values are standards of
what is preferable and provide the grounds for accepting
or rejecting particular social norms.

With these clear delimitations of values and value systems in mind Rokeach then devised his instrument. The 18 terminal values were selected from large lists of values compiled by searching through relevant literature from the United States and other countries. There were also personal interviews with a broad variety of people regarding their terminal values. Rokeach's own personal terminal values were included in the list. This resulted in a list of several hundred terminal values. The numbers were reduced down to 18 primarily through the deleting of synonymous values and overlapping values and other values which were not precisely end values.

The 18 instrumental values came mostly from a list of 555 personality-trait words developed by Anderson (1968). This vast total of traits was reduced down to eighteen instrumental values. This selection process was made by using the following criteria. Only one synonym or near synonym of any trait would be kept. Values were retained when they were felt to be important for all cultures. Many were retained when judged to be maximally able to discriminate across age, sex, race, social status, religion and politics (Rokeach 1973:29-30).

Although Rokeach has operationalised his priority of values into a system, it is often useful to see them as two value systems, a means system and an ends value system. In his view they represent two separate yet functionally connected value systems. He (1973:12) states that the values concerning modes of behaviour are instrumental to the attainment of the values regarding end-states of existence. However, it is not a simple one to one correlation between one instrumental value and one terminal value. Rather one mode of behaviour may be instrumental in attaining several terminal values. The opposite may also occur where several modes of instrumental values may be needed to attain one terminal value.

3.4 Rokeach on values and counselling

Milton Rokeach and John Regan (1980:576-582) have written an important article where they advocate and describe how Rokeach's theory and questionnaire may be used in counselling. The article is important validation of the need to study values in counselling and the values of various participants in the process.

Rokeach notes that psychologists and counsellors have long tended to conceive of human personality as an organisation of traits. The problem with the trait concept of personality is that it pictures people as rigid and does not take into account the question of dynamic personality change. By focusing on people's values theorists and practitioners are better able to understand stability and change in human personalities. Value systems are pictured as relatively enduring and account for much continuity and sameness of personality. At the same time they are pictured as undergoing change and development, thus allowing for an account of change.

Rokeach argues that values play an all pervasive role in counselling. Every counselling situation is a social situation and can be viewed as a situation requiring values education or significant values re-education. Time spent in counselling will depend on the compatibility of the counsellor and client's values systems. Every counsellor can be viewed as administering value therapy. Successful outcome of therapy involves clarification of values or change in specific value priorities.

Despite this ubiquitous way of understanding how values influence every counselling situation, much vagueness concerning the concept of values exists. Rokeach and Regan (1980:577) then argue in favour of Rokeach's theory that the number of values that humans possess is relatively small. There are just so many end-states and just so many instrumental values and modes of

conduct necessary for their realisation. The small number
of values can be seen as arranged into more of less an
enduring pattern of priority systems. They serve as
pervasive standards and guide virtually all aspects of
human behaviour. This includes the way we judge ourselves
and other people, conduct ourselves and interact with
others, the way we compare ourselves to all people and
finally these values guide us in our occupations and lead
us to take up personal positions on social issues,
religion and politics.

Rokeach asserts that the value concept can serve as
a bridge between individual and social processes.
Individual values, corporate, organisational values and
cultural values are seen to be largely in convergence.
From the moment of birth, society demands from the
individual certain socialised behaviour in order to
conform and this behaviour is internalised. Each of us
develops a prioritised value system that is the end
result of such individual needs and societal and
institutional demands that are made upon us.

Individual value systems may vary from person to
person. Persons in need of counselling tend to suffer
from a lack of differentiation of values or lack of
clarity of value priorities. Rokeach sees the aim of
counselling as being the clarifying of value priorities,
or identifying specific values that are in conflict and
then changing them or rearranging them.

With this background in mind, Rokeach and Bergan
(1980:579-581) give a detailed overview of their
understanding of values therapy. Since value systems
underlie attitudes and determine behaviour, a change in
values should lead to changes in attitudes and conduct.
Values therapy tries to bring about change through
changing the underlying values of a person which is
ultimately a cognitive approach to behaviour
modification. The basic argument is that by administering
the value survey to an individual or group leads to self-

confrontation and the arousal of a state of dissatisfaction. The state of self-dissatisfaction is very specific. While the general malaise which brings the person to counselling is confusing and all embracing, there is often something quite specific concerning competence or moral values or end values which may emerge from using the questionnaire. This specific awareness may help to lead to a resolution of the conflict. To reduce self-dissatisfaction, the person will be encouraged to change values, attitudes or behaviour. The result will hopefully be to enable the values, attitude and behaviour to become more harmonious and more integrated with the person's self-concept. This in turn should affirm the person as being a moral and competent individual.

The authors also highlight some of the more practical issues which need to be taken into account when administering the questionnaire. At the beginning of therapy the client is asked to complete the Rokeach Value Survey. The counsellor should indicate how prioritising the preferred end values and the desired modes of conduct may help the client in clarifying his or her value confusion and goals. The client should be informed of the importance of the view that values determine behaviour. Clients may also be asked to rank the values of significant others with whom they interact or have unresolved conflict. The counsellor needs to know a great deal about national and ethnic sub-groups and professional and religious value systems of the country. He or she also needs to be able to compare the client's values with similar sub-groups, professions or individuals. The results of the client's value priorities and their comparisons with such groups, should be openly discussed with the client. The counsellor should then be able to highlight any specific conflicts and inconsistencies which might be relevant to the presenting problem. Why marry someone whose religious values are so different from one's own? What inconsistencies are there

in the values of the person and the values of the
organisation within which he or she works? Researchers
have discovered that virtually everyone wants to know
more about themselves and desires to find out how they
compare to others. This also brings up various
possibilities including participation in a group setting
with engagement in self-confrontation through use of the
Rokeach Value Survey in such a setting as well.

Empirical research undertaken by Rokeach and Regan
(1980:580) indicates support for their view of the use of
the questionnaire in inducing change in people. They
report that significant changes in values have followed
the self-confrontational use of the Rokeach Value Survey.
Their studies also show that great changes in behaviour
were found to exist for as long as 21 months after the
administration of the test. For example, experimentally
induced changes in the values underlying smoking (the
instrumental value of self-control) have lead some heavy
smokers to reduce the amount of their smoking
drastically. This group's results contrasted markedly
with a control group of heavy smokers who were not given
the Rokeach Value Survey.

3.5 Kelly on values therapy

A prominent researcher T A Kelly of Vanderbilt University
in the United States, has produced a widely read article
(1991:171-186) concerning values therapy. Kelly's article
is an interesting defence of using the Rokeach Value
Survey in psychotherapy which echoes Rokeach's view as
described above. The significance of his article is his
expansion of Rokeach's concern for the personal values of
the client to a focus on the personal values of the
therapist rather than the client. This gives his study
major relevance for this thesis.

Kelly outlines and critiques over 100 of the major
reported values studies to determine those with

psychometrically superior findings. He concludes that the best studies used the Rokeach Value Survey as part of their projects. He argues that with the aid of the Rokeach Value Survey several major conclusions can now confidently be made regarding values and psychotherapy (Kelly 1991:182).

Firstly, therapist and client values convergence does occur in psychotherapy. Several hundred studies now confirm this significant finding. Secondly, therapist and client convergence is associated with the therapist's rating of improvement in counselling and not necessarily the patient's rating. Thirdly, the relationship between the therapist and client initial value similarity and dissimilarity and improvement in counselling is very complex. Arizmendi et al (1985) found that the initial similarity of some values and initial dissimilarity of others may be associated with the therapist's rating of the client's improvement in therapy. Arizmendi found significant results of this similarity-dissimilarity trend with 13 of Rokeach's 36 individual values.

Kelly (1991:183) surmised that these results suggest that certain problems are more susceptible to certain types of treatment and therapist variables than other problems. For example, a client struggling with a phobia could complete therapy with therapist-client matching having little affect. A patient dealing with interpersonal, values relevant issues such as marriage difficulties, sexual problems, or isolation and meaninglessness may however be significantly influenced by the combination of therapist-client values. Types of therapy may also play a role here. It seems likely that relational therapies may be more values sensitive than strict behavioural therapies.

Kelly (1991:184) advocates further use of the Rokeach Value Survey in research along the following lines. Firstly, he argues that Rokeach's definition and instrument should be given prime consideration in future

research as it is a reliable instrument and the best instrument currently available for such research. Secondly, further studies of specific values and their measurable outcomes need to be done. Use of Rokeach's 36 individual values as separate variables as Arizmendi has done could be useful in this regard. Another important option would be to devise a Rokeach type instrument which is specifically used for therapy research. Thirdly, careful research showing the therapist's and client's perspectives on the success or failure of therapy outcome needs to be undertaken. Fourthly, the possibility of interaction between the type of therapy and the role of the values of the therapist on outcome should be addressed. Fifthly, researchers interested in the differentiation between religious and secular value orientations may desire to use the Rokeach Value Survey for discriminating between secular and religious patterns of specific values as well as value systems. The studying of specific values may lead towards more specific results than merely generalising about global value systems, as has been popular in the past.

Kelly's argument together with the powerful research undertaken under Beutler's influence suggests a current defence and advocacy of the use of the Rokeach Value Survey regarding values research. It also supports the use of this instrument in pre-counselling and post-counselling situations. It underlines the importance of studying the values of both the therapist and the client. In this thesis the researcher will focus on the value systems of pastoral counsellors through the use of the Rokeach Value Survey. The researcher acknowledges the need for further studies to do work along the lines which Kelly advocates. Such future studies would add to the burgeoning tradition that is now developing concerning values therapy research.

3.6   The measurement of human values

It is important to lay out the key features of how to administer the Rokeach Value Survey in practice. The Rokeach Value Survey contains two sets of 18 alphabetically classified values along with brief, defining statements in parentheses. The first set consists of terminal values or end-states of existence and the second set consists of instrumental values or modes of behaviour. The participant is asked to rank each set separately "in order of importance to you as guiding principles in your life" (Rokeach and Regan 1980:579). Respondents can also be asked to rank the values of others such as a marriage partner or work colleagues or the values of a religion or political party. A number of versions of the value scale have been developed. The version used for this project is represented by the following list of 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values.

TERMINAL VALUES

A COMFORTABLE LIFE
(a prosperous life)
AN EXCITING LIFE
(a stimulating, active life)
A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
(lasting contribution)
A WORLD AT PEACE
(free of war and conflict)
A WORLD OF BEAUTY
(beauty of nature and the arts)
EQUALITY
(brotherhood, equal opportunity
 for all)
FAMILY SECURITY
(taking care of loved ones)

INSTRUMENTAL VALUES

AMBITIOUS
(hardworking,aspiring)
BROADMINDED
(open-minded)
CAPABLE
(competent, effective)
CLEAN
(neat, tidy)
COURAGEOUS
(standing up for your beliefs)
FORGIVING
(willingness to pardon others)

HELPFUL
(working for the welfare of
others)

FREEDOM	HONEST
(independence, free choice)	(sincere, truthful)
HEALTH	IMAGINATION
(physical and mental wellbeing)	(daring, creative)
INNER HARMONY	INDEPENDENT
(freedom from inner conflict)	(self-reliant,self-sufficient)
MATURE LOVE	INTELLECTUAL
(sexual and spiritual intimacy)	(intelligent, reflective)
NATIONAL SECURITY	LOGICAL
(protection from attack)	(consistent, rational)
PLEASURE	LOVING
(an enjoyable, leisurely life)	(affectionate, tender)
SALVATION	LOYAL
(saved,eternal life)	(faithful to friends or the group)
SELF-RESPECT	OBEDIENT
(self-esteem)	(dutiful, respectful)
SOCIAL RECOGNITION	POLITE
(respect, admiration)	(courteous, well-mannered)
TRUE FRIENDSHIP	RESPONSIBLE
(close companionship)	(dependable, reliable)
WISDOM	SELF-CONTROLLED
(a mature understanding of life)	(restrained, self-disciplined)

Rokeach regards his questionnaire as being both an objective and projective test of values. It is objective because the participant is asked to simply rank a value from 1 to 18. Hence the respondent ranks the terminal values and instrumental values or 36 values in all. It is at the same time a projective test because the respondent only has his or her own internalised value system with which to guide the responses. All the values are socially desirable and the ranking can be said to be based strongly on the respondent's understanding of the values given.

The Rokeach Value Survey has been used both in the United States and cross-culturally. The use of the

instrument in nations outside the United States is of particular relevance for this thesis. The instrument has been used in a wide diversity of countries including Canada, Australia, Israel, South Vietnam, Japan and West Germany. These results are particularly interesting in illustrating cultural similarities and differences. Rokeach (1973:91) for example compared university students from four different countries. Israeli students ranked a world at peace first and national security second while American, Canadian and Australian students ranked these values between ninth and seventeenth. American students care relatively more for a comfortable life, social recognition and being ambitious and care less about being helpful and capable than Canadian, Australian and Israeli university men. The achievement orientation in American society which is preoccupied with materialism and success appears to be apparent here. Other nationalities appear to place a greater priority on personal competence such as being helpful and capable.

3.7 Criticism of the Rokeach Value Survey

While the Rokeach Value Survey has been widely used it is not without its critics. Braithwaite and Law (1985:250-263) have summarised a number of these criticisms into the following major points. Firstly, claims that the values were selected on the basis of their universal significance and explicit definition have been questioned. As already noted earlier in this thesis, the radically different ways in which the terminal value scale and instrumental value scale were developed indicate that subjective decisions had to be made and that universality would be hard to achieve. Also it is not clear that all people everywhere will attach the same understanding to this rank ordering procedure. Secondly, Rokeach has argued that his 36 values are reasonably comprehensive of the most important human values that do

exist in world literature. This is another form of the universal argument and has been challenged by many critics. They claim that restricting all human values to 36 is reductionistic and arrogant. Thirdly, while the relative importance of the ranking of values is clear, the relative strength or weakness of these values is not apparent. Two people might have the same rank ordering of values, but one may be more motivated to practice the values than another. Also certain values may occupy equal positions in some value systems which is not allowed for in the test. Fourthly, some people feel that their terminal values and instrumental values are exactly the reverse of these lists. This leads to some respondents expressing resistance at the way the questionnaire is laid out. They argue that insufficient place for differences and variations beyond those given in the hierarchy of the questionnaire is given. The forced choice nature of the test appears to exacerbate this sense of resistance.

Despite these criticisms, the Rokeach Value Survey appears to be a very dependable, flexible and internationally acceptable instrument for obtaining data regarding human values. The clarity of its conceptualisation and operationalisation ability and the ease of administering the Rokeach Value Survey make it a very valuable instrument indeed. The multiple ways in which the Rokeach Value Survey may be administered to individuals as well as in group and institutional settings and the ability to canvass great numbers through postal surveys is noted with appreciation. Its popularity as an instrument of choice for a wide range of research projects adds weight to this researcher's desire to use it as one of two instruments for obtaining data regarding value systems of a sample of pastoral counsellors in the South African context.

3.8 Moral judgement development

3.8.1   Psychological theories of morality

The term "morality" like the term "values" is a multifaceted concept which requires careful description and delimitation. The term "moral" will be used primarily within the limits of psychological conceptualisation in this thesis. Wright in his important book The Psychology of Moral Behaviour (1971:24-48) argues that there are four major theories regarding morality in psychology. These are the sociological theory, the learning or modelling theory, the psychological or emotive theory and the cognitive development theory.

The sociological theory of morality stresses that moral behaviour is largely determined by the norms of a society. The individual's morality is understood within a group context. The two chief concepts in social group theory are those of norm and role. The term "norm" is used dynamically and describes a way of thinking, feeling or behaving which is relatively uniform within the group. The social forces which pressure a person to conform are frequently underestimated by people. Norms develop naturally in a group and are related to the purposes of the group. All norms are rules. The word "role" refers to the norms associated with a person's position within a group. A role is the person's part played within the group. A person's moral thinking and behaviour may be strongly shaped by his or her social roles.

Learning theory stresses that moral behaviour is learned behaviour. For example, parents teach their children moral behaviour in three ways. They punish them, reward them or set them an example. Parents reinforce certain types of moral behaviour. Parents praise or smile or rebuke or isolate. Modelling theory argues for the importance of parental or peer modelling. Young people are believed to model their behaviour on the example of significant others.

Psychoanalytic theory argues that the morality of the child develops in the personality with the emergence of the super-ego. The super-ego is formed through the internalisation of the standards of the parents and particularly the father. The conscience develops out of the super-ego. The conscience suppresses and neutralises those instincts which if let loose would violate the moral rules of society. Guilt and resistance to temptation become a function of the conscience. Those who are consistently good at resisting temptation will feel intensely guilty when they fall into temptation.

The cognitive developmental theory pictures an individual as progressing through life with great potential for adaptation through achieving successive states of development. Morality is seen as a growing and changing function within the personality which plays an integrative role in the life of a person. Cognitive development theories argue against the view that morality is largely socially determined. While accepting that social influence does play a role in morality at the earlier stages of development, they however assert that as individuals move to the postconventional phases of moral judgement development, autonomous moral judgement taking supercedes the moral influence of the society.

3.8.2   The cognitive developmental theory of moral judgement

Rest (1994:1-25) has argued that the history of moral judgement development can be divided into three consecutive periods. The first phase has to do with Piaget who developed a three stage progression of moral judgement development. He called the first stage heteronomy and associated it with the hypothesis that children develop an intuitive understanding that "good" and "bad" are delineated by parents or significant others. The second phase represents transitional logical

reasoning with an increased sense of awareness of equality and reciprocity between the child and his or her peers. The third phase focuses on justice, fairness and equality, and depends upon autonomous reasoning in which the individual learns to make moral decisions with little reference to his or her parents or peers.

The second phase is the more complicated theory and empirical research associated with Kohlberg. Kohlberg developed and expanded upon Piaget's moral cognitive judgement theory. According to Kohlberg's basic theory he suggested that moral judgement development takes place through three levels of six distinct phases. The first level he called preconventional stages 1 and 2. He associated this level primarily with children under the age of ten and some immature teenagers and adults. The second level he called conventional stages 3 and 4. This level includes most adolescents and adults in any society. The third level he termed principled or postconventional stage 5 and stage 6. This level is reached by a minority of perhaps 13 per cent of the population usually after they have reached 25 years of age.

Kohlberg's theory stresses that the stages are invariant and universal and the sequence is such that no stages are ever skipped. The aim of the stage progression is to gain a more complex and inclusive vision of justice. Kohlberg has stressed that justice is the fundamental feature of morality. Moral dilemmas suggest a state of moral imbalance and justice precepts are the means required to resolve such strife. In his view the most essential attributes of justice are the allocation of rights and duties governed by the notions of equality and reciprocity.

Kohlberg's concern for a person's moral growth later expanded to include the formation of a person's social perspective. Viewed from a social perspective the preconventional level depicts the position that social

roles and rules are externally imposed upon the person. The conventional level refers to the person who has internalised the rules of others or identified with their social preferences and rigidly conforms to the opinions of significant authority figures. The principled or postconventional person can distinquish himself or herself from the social preferences of others and explain his or her values on the basis of precepts which are chosen by the individuals themselves. According to Kohlberg, these "universal" principles can even be viewed as transcending culture and religious teaching.

The third stage of moral judgement development research began with Rest's studies in the late 1970's. Rest's research has reformulated that of Kohlberg with interesting results. Rest has kept the basic scheme of six specific stages of moral judgement development. Rest (1979:18) echoes Kohlberg's revised way of viewing the stages of moral judgement development with a particular interest in the social cooperative ability of people. He enlists the aid of the philosopher Rawls (1971) to clarify his concept of social cooperation and argues that the chief function of moral judgement development is to adjudicate between the burdens and benefits of social cooperation in a collaborative system. Relationships between people are governed by moral rules and precepts which detail the duties and priviledges of individual people towards one another and towards collective groups. The aim is to establish a secure and trustworthy scheme of social collaboration. However such social collaboration depends upon having a strong and reliable enough system of cooperation so that people will be willing to fulfil their duties. Each person in society thus needs to be concerned with recognising a society's norms and accepting and preserving the societal system. Rest's conceptualisation of moral judgement development thus ties together moral thinking and social thinking.

With the above link between moral judgement reasoning and social reasoning in mind, Rest (1986:3) concludes that when the term "morality" is used in his theory and research, he is referring to a particular type of social value. Morality is that which has to do with how human beings cooperate and adjudicate among individual interests. "Moral" in his account is restricted to and could have better been termed justice or fairness judgement (Rest 1986:3).

In general then, Kohlberg and Rest conclude that the moral judgement of people who have reached the higher levels of development should be more constant and reliable than those who operate at lower levels. The higher levels of moral development should indicate a person with a broader world view. The theory also argues that it is highlighting a particular cognitive attribute of notable moral people. Moral judgement development and cognitive development are viewed as developing together.

3.8.3   The six stages of moral judgement development

Kohlberg and Rest argue that individuals may progress through three levels of moral development with two stage structures in each level. Rest (1979:21-39) prefers to see the six stages as six conceptions of how to organise social cooperation. He outlines these stages with the aid of the following diagram.

TABLE 1.2
Six Stages in the Concept of Cooperation

Stage 1	The morality of obedience: Do what you're told.
Stage 2	The morality of instrumental egoism and simple exchange: Let's make a deal.
Stage 3	The morality of interpersonal concordance: Be considerate, nice, and kind: you'll make friends.
Stage 4	The morality of law and duty to the social order: Everyone in society is obligated to and protected by the law.
Stage 5	The morality of consensus-building procedures: You are obligated by the arrangements that are agreed to by due process procedures.
Stage 6	The morality of nonarbitrary social cooperation: Morality is defined by how rational and impartial people would ideally organize cooperation.

(Rest 1994:5)

The preconventional level includes stages 1 and 2. The key theme of stage 1 is the morality of obedience. "Do what you are told". Being moral means being submissive to the authority of the parent or guardian. Such authorities are viewed as making the rulings about what is "right" and "wrong". The child does not comprehend any objective or plan behind the rules and they are simply there like physical laws and disobedience means punishment. Morality is blind obedience. Stage one offers a social scheme which is not equal nor mutual.

The theme of stage 2 is the morality of instrumental egoism and simple exchange. "Let's make a deal". The child becomes conscious of the plans and aspirations of other people. Trading of favours instead of blind obedience occurs. Each person may want to cooperate and do the other a favour if it is in the person's self-centered or egoistic interests to do. This is normally an exchange of one favour for another. Morality is no longer blind, but serves an instrumental or egoistical purpose. The rudimentary notions of social equality and reciprocity are first established in this concept of simple exchange.

The conventional level includes stages 3 and 4. The theme of stage 3 is the morality of interpersonal conformity. "Be considerate, nice and kind: you'll make friends". In this stage individuals become conscious that they are thinking and reacting to one another. The new concept developed in this stage is that of mutual role-taking. Awareness of others in stage 2 was simply of their desires and intentions. In stage 3 this awareness deepens and the individual develops an appreciation and anticipation for other people's feelings and thoughts. There is no longer a simple reward system, but a desire to sustain and have enduring relationships. The focus of stage 3 is on the cooperation of friends and natural allies.

Stage 4 stresses the morality of law and order with a particular interest in the maintenance of the social order. "Everyone in society is obligated and protected by the law". Stage 3 moral judgement thinking is limited to small primary groups and does not concern the larger social order. Stage 3 does not provide guidelines for moral interaction with strangers, competitors and enemies. Stage 4 offers a solution for such wider cooperation between all people in the concept of law. The law is public and known and applied to everyone equally. Stable social systems are built on this mutual understanding and loyalty to laws that govern the social order.

The postconventional level includes stages 5 and 6. The theme of stage 5 is the morality of consensus-building. "The laws the people want to make are what ought to be". Stage 4 reasoning provides a rationale for supporting social arrangements but does not provide a rationale for choosing between different social arrangements. There are a variety of ways of establishing a social system. Cooperative planning and consensus building becomes important. The process of law making should reflect the general will of all societal members. If the society has fair procedures for choosing its laws, then those laws should be viewed as representing the desired social arrangements of the society. The view of minimum safeguards or "basic human rights" is also necessary to make cooperation worthwhile. Stage 5 reasoning thus begins to provide principles for setting up a cooperative system.

Rest also distinguishes between stages 5A and stages 5B of moral judgement development. Stage 5A stresses consensual cooperation procedures which have the general support of the community. Stage 5B emphasises organising relationships with appeals to intuitive ideals which may lack the general support of all in the community. Stage 5A focuses more on institutional settings and Stage 5B on

individuals who may be less institution bound and in some ways have moved beyond most instituional settings preferred by Stage 5A thinking.

The climax of the hierarchical stages is stage 6. The theme here is the morality of nonarbitrary social cooperation. Morality is defined by universal ethical principles. Stage 6 reasoning follows the same procedures as stage 5 reasoning with the hypothesis of what the rational person would anticipate as the principles of an ideal cooperative society. A major feature of the movement from stage 5 to stage 6 justice reasoning is however a movement from a concern with ideal lawmaking to a concern with higher abstract principles. The distinguishing feature of stage 6 justice reasoning is the appeal to abstract principles such as Rawl's principles of justice, or Kant's categorical imperative as the basis for governing the social cooperative. Hence the stages of moral maturity develop through the requirements of searching for an ideal system of social cooperation.

In conclusion it is important to note that in contrast to Piaget and Kohlberg, Rest has shown a particular interest in adult moral conflict and the specific transition between conventional and postconventional moral judgement development levels. Rest's subjects are generally older than those typically studied by Piaget and Kohlberg. This selection of adults stems from Rest's particular interest in the conventional and postconventional shift in people. He hypothesised that adults are the group most likely to span this particular stage transformation. As noted above the conventional person is concerned with the maintenance of and loyalty to the social system and social institutions and with the upholding of law. The move to principled thinking leads to an appreciation that societies can be arranged in many possible ways and that in each way, they maximise certain values and minimise certain others.

Principled moral judgement goes beyond conventional thinking in appealing to higher order principles as the basis of moral obligation and rights. Principled thinking sees not only the need for social structure, but views institutions and social arrangements as embodiments and implementations of specific human values and principles.

3.8.4   Moral judgement development testing and trends in age and education, liberal and conservative orientations and cross-cultural variables

A developmental theory implies that people are dynamic and ever changing and that they change in ways expected by the theory. Rest (1994:13) asserts that a major finding in moral judgement development testing is that age and education trends are particularly powerful indicators of change in the direction expected by the theory. Hence the higher the age and education, the higher the stage of moral judgement development. Rest (1994:14) reports that his key moral indicator, the "P" score for principled reasoning, indicates that high school students average in the 30's, university students in the 40's and graduate students in the 50's and graduate students specialising in moral thinking in the 60's. Formal education appears to have a particularly strong influence on moral judgement development because these people choose to invest specifically in their own development and the university environment appears to stimulate their moral development. When age and education are split, education remains the most important variable. Subjects who have not experienced tertiary level education usually are unable to reach principled thinking.

Conservative people score lower than liberals on the Rest's Defining Issues Test. This appears to indicate that conservative persons are more closed to certain types of moral reasoning and have a restricted view of

the moral life. Rest (1986:125) concludes that conservative people usually resist change and support the status quo. Institutional bodies can also affirm a type of conservative thought and behaviour of people who have a preference for merely fitting into a system.

Kohlberg has made several bold claims concerning the cross-cultural applicability of his theory and testing. He has stated that, "Almost all individuals in all cultures go through the same order of sequence of gross stages of moral development, though varying in rate and terminal point of development" (Kohlberg 1971:176). This claim of universality of stage and sequence has been a major challange to many of his critics. Is it possible that all people on earth base their judgements of right and wrong on similar concepts of cooperation and justice? Do they develop those concepts in the same order of stages and sequence throughout the world? Rest (1986:110) emphasises that cognitive developmentalists support a theory of general cultural universals. Cognitive developmentalists are not unaware of cultural or social differences, but these are regarded as superficial in comparison to their commonalities. The world of the New Yorker and the Amazon jungle may appear quite different from one another. There are however certain basic conceptions of people which are common throughout the world. There are the fundamental structures which structure all people's understanding of the social world. Awareness of self, awareness of individual differences in social power, awareness of social norms, customs and laws and group expectations are universal. Hence the cognitive-developmentalist would argue that while cultures may differ for example in people's bonds of affection for one another, bonds of affection are found in all cultures. Both Kohlberg and Rest argue that their tests are pitched at this underlying level of cognition. They are the deep structures rather than the superficial structures of any culture.

3.8.5   Moral development judgement and counselling

Both Kohlberg (1980:559-567) and Rest (1980:602-605) have written articles regarding the use of their tests in training counsellors and encouraging better ongoing therapy practice. Kohlberg has noted that the general aims of counselling are remedial, preventative and developmental. The new emphasis on developmental and life cycle issues in counselling is a welcome additional perspective to the tasks of counselling. The authors see the developmental emphasis as a paradigm change in reflecting about counselling. The change towards a developmental perspective moves towards an understanding of counselling though the stages of the life cycle rather than merely stressing episodic remedial counselling or preventative counselling. Among those who have provided the foundation for this movement in counselling are Erikson (1963), Kohlberg (1969) and Kegan (1982). The theories of these and other developmental psychologists have been integrated into a discipline called developmental therapy with Ivy (1986) as one of its chief proponents.

Kohlberg's theory starts from the perspective that many problems that arise in life are the result of blocked moral growth. Moral health needs to be adequately dealt with as a component of mental health. The chief counselling function is primarily an educative and caring function of enabling people to develop and grow toward their full potentials. The new role of the counsellor is that of a developmental-educator (my own terms). The chief goal is to intervene to enable the client to move toward higher levels of moral judgement development. A key element in this type of moral guidance and counsel is Kohlberg and Rest's theory of change and transformation. Kohlberg (1969) emphasises such issues as inducing cognitive dissonance and altered role taking ability through educational interventions. Rest (1986:33)

stresses more the power of formal education in promoting moral judgement development.

One major method for inducing moral judgement development change in clients is found in the theory of cognitive dissonance. Rest (1979:219) outlines the argument as follows. The theory of cognitive dissonance asserts that when new experiences cannot be assimilated into existing structures, current cognitive structures are forced to change. These new experiences induce a state of cognitive disequilibrium and lead to the desire for change in cognitive structures so that the new structures can assimilate the experience. The new structures are then regarded as a reintegration of past structures into a more complex cognitive organisation. Hence, for example, Rest's Defining Issues Test is administered in such a way that it may provoke cognitive dissonance which leads towards a desire for cognitive consonance. This is believed to happen by moving to a higher stage of moral reasoning. Other options are to present the subjects with moral arguments at different stages of development with a particular emphasis upon the stage directly above the subjects preferred stage. This type of intervention leads to intense self-reflection and possible solutions are found in a search for cognitive stability.

Another key issue in changing moral judgement reasoning is the ability of persons to take on new roles in their social worlds. Kohlberg (1969:397-404) has suggested that new role taking experiences are conducive to development in moral reasoning. All individuals are social animals and they discover that there are role expectations placed upon them by the community. These role expectations place stringent demands upon the individual and are often in conflict with the role desires of the individual. This type of tension can produce cognitive dissonance and disequilibrium. The individual is then forced to reflect on his or her own role taking

responsibilities and opportunities. The life of a child through adulthood can be understood as a constant process of examining and modifying roles in the light of these opportunities. Frequent practice in role taking may encourage moral judgement development as it leads to constantly maturing perspectives on life and relationships in the social world.

Rest (1986:33) argues that moral transformation is most clearly evidenced as a result of the power of formal education on a person. The current researcher agrees with Rest (1986:35) that perhaps a major reason for this moral transformation in individuals who seek tertiary education is because they choose to further their education and are more disposed to changing cognitive and moral patterns. In the counselling situation the educational levels of the client should be noted. As already mentioned, clients who have not experienced tertiary level education are usually unable to reach the level of principled reasoning. Moral discussions between counsellor and client should thus be pitched at one level above the client's normal moral reasoning level to induce possible moral judgement development.

Kohlberg and Rest's theories are full of implications for both counselling and counsellor and client pairing. The following two examples highlight the variety of possible uses.

Donald Capps is a prolific writer in the field of pastoral counselling who illustrates another possible use of Kohlberg's theory for counselling. Capps (1981:131) remarks that pastoral counsellors primarily use Kohlberg's theory for diagnostic assessment. He desires to extend this diagnostic usefulness to more general counselling situations.

Capps begins by noting that the counsellor is most likely to encounter individuals and couples who represent combinations of stages 2, 3 and 4 levels of moral reasoning. Since only a small percentage of young adults

and adults reach stages 5 and 6, the counsellor should familiarise himself or herself more particularly with the characteristics of the earlier stages. Capps encourages the counsellor to explore the individual or couple's levels of moral judgement development through the way they interpret and resolve their own moral dilemmas. This follows a three step procedure. Firstly, the individual or couple are encouraged to describe a past or current moral dilemma and clarify the decision or anticipated decision that they would take to solve the dilemma. Secondly, the individual or couple are asked to support their moral decision through spontaneous application of a "norm" which they feel justifies their decision. Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgement development themes could then be used as assessment of the chosen norm. They are the themes of obedience to authority, expectation of fairness, conformity to social expectations, support for social laws and universal ethical principles. For example, "I knew my mother would approve" suggests stage 2 moral reasoning or "I wanted to conform to what was socially expected of me" would suggest stage 3 and 4 conformity to social expectations (Capps 1981:134). Thirdly, the individual or couple then need to ask how the moral decision will be interpreted in their social world. The emphasis here is on their role taking ability. Does the couple reflect on their roles in a wider world? How would their moral decisions affect the couple's families, friends, occupational groups and religious communities? If the couple's role taking ability is immature and they are totally self-centered, then more specific counselling needs to take place regarding the implications of their proposed moral decisions for their wider world.

Another important possibility for using Kohlberg or Rest's theory and testing in counselling regards the issue of counsellor and client pairing. Clearly, the administration of the Defining Issues Test may be useful

in showing the relative moral judgement levels of counsellors and clients. If a counsellor operates at a lower stage of moral development than the client, then the counsellor will probably experience a great deal of difficulty in understanding the viewpoint of the client. The counsellor may even become so defensive that the whole therapeutic process could be threatened.

It appears vital that the counsellor should at least be at the conventional level of moral judgement development with an understanding and openness toward postconventional reasoning. Rest's theory implies that the counsellor should try to educate himself or herself to postconventinal moral reasoning in order to be able to be a more adequate guide in situations of moral conflict. The counsellor should aim to encourage a client to move beyond mere conformity to social norms to being more innovative and creative in looking at various options for his or her moral decision making procedures. The goal of positive moral reasoning and health is to learn to view all people as ends in themselves and not as means. Thus Rest's theory implies that the principled counsellor should be preferable to the more conventional therapist as a guide through moral dilemmas. Producing such a mature moral counsellor should become the goal of therapy training.

3.8.6   The measurement of moral judgement development

The measurement of moral judgement development is based on the method originally developed by Piaget and adapted by Kohlberg and Rest. Piaget (1932) provoked discussion with children through episodes or stories and listened to the deeper level of cognitive structures by which the children explained their reaction to these dilemmas. Kohlberg and Rest have continued this tradition by presenting a series of moral dilemmas to participants and attempting to score their reasoning about such cases.

Rest's (1986:197) Defining Issues Test was developed as an advanced and improved scoring device over and against that of the Kohlberg Moral Judgement Interview. While acknowledging that the Defining Issues Test is derived from Kohlberg's instrument, there are several key differences between the two tests. These include the following points (Rest 1986:196).

Firstly, the Defining Issues Test follows a multiple-choice format while the Kohlberg instrument follows an interview procedure. The Rest questionnaire asks for ranking of statements and the Kohlberg test sets the task of spontaneous verbalisation. The recognition task of Rest's questionnaire has been found to be easier than the production task of Kohlberg's questionnaire and this is probably one reason for the higher stage results obtained by the Defining Issues Test. In general individuals score one stage higher on the Rest questionnaire than on the Kohlberg test.

Secondly, another major difference is in the way the six stages are defined. While both tests focus on changing concepts of justice, Kohlberg's test uses ethically formalistic thought such as universality, reversibility, deontology and teleology in a manner foreign to Rest's test. Rest is less concerned with philosophical abstraction than with the more simple question of how a person thinks about social cooperation and social organisation. Kohlberg's test draws a distinction between the structure and content of moral cognition. Kohlberg is predominantly preoccupied by cognitive structures and not with content. In contrast to this the Defining Issues Test is less concerned with the form and content distinction and freely mixes the two.

The task which the Defining Issues Test sets for the participant is the following. A participant is presented with six moral dilemmas and then with twelve accompanying questions regarding possible reflections concerning the moral dilemma. The items are designed to represent

different stages of moral judgement development. The
participant is then asked to select out of the top four
options and rank them in the questionnaire from one to
four. By this selection process the participant indicates
his or her preferential moral judgement development
level. If a subject consistently selects stage 4 "law and
order" statements across the six dilemmas, then the
inference is that is the concept of justice which is
dominant in that person's moral reasoning.

In order to clarify this manner of scoring moral
judgement development, it is useful to illustrate the
method by means of one of the set dilemmas. Perhaps the
most famous dilemma of the Kohlberg and Rest tests is the
Heinz dilemma. It reads as follows;

HEINZ AND THE DRUG

In Europe a woman was near death from a special
kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors
thought might save her. It was a form of radium
that a druggist in the same town had recently
discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but
the druggist was charging ten times what the drug
cost to make. He paid $200 for radium and charged
$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The Sick
woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew
to borrow the money, but he could only get
together about $1,000, which is half what it
cost. He told the druggist that his wife was
dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let
him pay later. But the druggist said, "No. I
discovered the drug and I'm going to make money
from it". So Heinz got desperate and began to
think about breaking into the man's store to
steal the drug for his wife.

(Rest 1986:187)

Rest (1979:87) provides the following twelve responses to
the Heinz dilemma together with the stage scoring in
brackets. The Likert style selection of the left
indicates the participants' preferences and the strength
of their choices. The four most important choices are
chosen and placed at the bottom of the page. Clearly the

134

bracketed stage scoring is not included in the formal
questionnaire given to the participant.

Table 4.1. Defining Issues Test Format

On the left hand side of the page, check one of the spaces by each question to indicate its
importance.

Great Importance | Much Importance | Some Importance | Little Importance | No Importance

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld. (Stage 4, page 29)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd steal? (Stage 3, page 28)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help? (Stage 2, page 26)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has considerable influence with professional wrestlers. (Non-stage item — serves as a check on random responding)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else. (Stage 3, page 28)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have to be respected. (Stage 4, page 29)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination dying, socially and individually. (Meaningless item used as a check on tendency to endorse complex items blindly)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 8. What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act toward each other? (Stage 6, page 37)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide behind a worthless law which only protects the rich anyhow. (Stage 4½, antiauthoritarian rejection of the conventional order)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 10.Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society. (Stage 5A, page 34)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 11.Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy and cruel. (Stage 3, page 28)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 12.Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole society or not? (Stage 5A, page 34)

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important____ Second Most Important____ Third Most Important____

Fourth Most Important____

(Rest 1979:87)

A participant's tendencies to pick a certain moral judgement development level thus becomes immediately apparent. If for example the participant chose as their priorities 2,5,9 and 11 one could easily surmise that he or she favours stage 3 moral judgement reasoning. If however the participant chose 8,9,10 and 12 he or she would favour postconventional moral judgement reasoning. A participant will usually favour a mixture of stage scores. This is in accordance with Rest's perception that a person is not in one stage, but shows a preference for a mixture of stages in which one stage is more dominant than another.

Finally, the scoring obtained from the Defining Issues Test is calculated into a P score. The P index stands for principled morality, stages 5 and 6. The P score is interpreted as the relative importance that subjects attribute to stages 5 and 6. The score is usually reported as a percentage which can range from 0-95%. There is also an internal validity test, the M score and the A score. As the test is a multiple-choice questionnaire there is the danger of the participant simply marking choices at random. The questionnaire contains a variety of meaningless statements such as "Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination of dying, socially and individually" (Rest 1986:187). The M score highlights these meaningless statements and a participant who has too many M items is eliminated from the study. The M score also picks up individuals who chose statements for their pretentiousness rather than because they make sense. Participants are warned in advance in this regard and if so to rank them low. The A score represents items that indicate an angry, anti-authoritarian, anti-establishment and basically unconstructive social viewpoint. An example of such an attitude would be the question, "Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the oppression of our legal system?" (Rest 1986:188).

3.8.7   Critiques of Kohlberg and Rest

Kohlberg and Rest have many critics. Their research
projects have been criticised from every imaginable
direction. Criticisms have been made about their
conceptualisations, their operationalisation of their
questionnaires, their conclusions and their fairly
extravagent research result claims. Four examples of such
criticism include the following. Firstly, there is the
question of gender bias. Kohlberg's research began with
teenage boys and since Kohlberg is also a male, the
question has been raised as to whether his theory is
biased toward men's moral judgement developmental levels
which does not take sufficient account of women. Gilligan
(1982) has been the most critical in this regard when she
discovered that women tend to score primarily at stage 3
thinking, while men move more easily to the higher levels
of moral judgement development. She has advocated the
development of an ethics of care research instrument
which she believes will counterbalance Kohlberg's ethics
of principle instrument. She has found that women favour
concrete relational thinking, while men are more
preoccupied by abstract rights issues. Women and men thus
communicate with different voices. In her opinion
Kohlberg's developmental theory is based on abstract
justice and rights thinking. Despite Kohlberg's argument
that women will move up to higher levels of moral
development as their roles change, feminists remain
unconvinced by this point of view.

Secondly, there is criticism of the utilisation of
justice as the most important principle of morality. Some
psychologists and religionists argue that there may be
other human principles of equal or higher value than
justice. Gilligan favours the principle of care as an
equal principle to justice. Erik Erikson argues that
there are a variety of moral virtues like hope, fidelity,
love, care and wisdom which are also important human

principles for guiding life's endeavours (Capps 1983:38).
Fowler (1987:6) argues that faith is the most important
religious principle. Donald Joy (1983:33) stresses the
centrality of steadfast love as the supreme principle of
life.

Thirdly, there is the strong challenge of R Hogan
(1978:478) and his students Kurtenis and Greif (1974:453)
who have criticised Kohlberg's basic assumptions and
research and have offered their own alternative models.
Hogan argues that the psychological line from Freud to
Kohlberg is concerned about people who conform to social
expectations or conventional morality. Hogan argues
against Kohlberg's contention that conformists are not
very bright, well-adjusted or moral people. He questions
Kohlberg's hypothesis that conventional morality is
finally only a developmental holding pattern before
moving to a higher level of moral reasoning.

In Hogan's view the hidden agenda of these theorists
is their desire to defend autonomy in an age of ethical
relativity. Developmental psychologists who are concerned
with morality tend to elevate themselves to the status of
moral maturity and critique negatively the more
conventional figures who inhabit the rest of society.
Hogan argues that conventional people who respect
societal rules and conventions are found in the "real
world", while investigative and artistic types of people
who are uncomfortable with rules and are nonconformists
by nature tend to dominate academic environments. Hogan
asserts that the conventional types of people may in fact
be more mature than academics because they show a balance
between the requirements of convention and the needs of
the individual. The artistic types are hostile to rules
and concerned rather with abstract principles and are
onesidedly in favour of autonomy. Hence the moral
orientation of psychologists like Kohlberg and Rest and
their vision of moral maturity is thus a form of self-
interpretation. Hogan remarks that while it is comforting

to think that people like psychologists are the best and most moral people in the world, such a conclusion seems a bit self-serving and not entirely credible. Thus he concludes that there is a moral orientation that typifies most psychologists and these psychologists seem disposed to call this orientation mature. This elitist position which includes a sense of scientific certainty that psychologists know precisely what moral maturity looks like, is highly questionable and finally strongly subjective.

Fourthly, there is criticism that Kohlberg offers only a limited view of the psychology of morality. These critics argue that Kohlberg's six stages are not the final or complete word in the psychology of morality. Rest and his colleagues agree with this criticism. There is more to the psychology of morality than moral judgement development. Rest (1994:22-25) and his colleagues have responded to this criticism by developing a four component model of the psychology of morality. This model attempts to integrate the perspectives of all the psychologist's who are dealing with the psychology of morality into one paradigm. Component 1 concerns moral sensitivity and interpretation. This component highlights people's awareness of how their actions may affect others. Component 2 concerns moral judgement where the possible lines of action arising from moral sensitivity are adjudicated as morally justifiable. This is the level of Kohlberg and Rest's theories and instruments. Component 3 concerns moral motivation and discerning the will of a person to put these moral judgements into effect. Component 4 concerns moral character and behaviour. A person may be morally sensitive, make good moral judgements, be motivated, but finally fail to behave morally in a given situation. Moral character and toughness and courage is needed to pursue justice in the world. This four component model thus attempts to address the criticism of moral narrowness and also desires to

provide guidelines for further research in the psychology of morality.

Despite these criticisms, the current researcher believes that the Defining Issues Test is a well conceptualised and flexible instrument. The ease of administering the test to individuals or groups or through the mail provides for various ways of obtaining data concerning moral judgement development. The focus of results primarily on one score, the P index, enables researchers to do an extraordinary variety of comparisons across countless situations and settings. The Defining Issues Test has proven its reliability as an instrument of choice for thousands of researchers throughout the world. The current researcher is confident that it will enable him to gain important data regarding the moral judgement development levels of pastoral counsellors in South Africa.

3.8.8   Conclusion

The Rokeach Value Survey and the Rest Defining Issues Test appear to be very dependable and flexible and internationally acceptable instruments for obtaining data regarding human values and assessing moral judgement development. The clarity of their conceptualisations and operationalisation and the ease of administering the two instruments makes them very valuable instruments indeed. The multiple ways in which the two instruments may be administered to individuals and groups in all sorts of formal and informal settings is noted with appreciation. The possibility of administration the two questionnaires by mail thus enables a researcher to receive data from a wide geographic area which is ideal for this project. The popularity of the two instruments as a choice for a wide range of research projects adds weight to the desire to use the instruments to obtain data regarding the value systems and moral judgement development levels of pastoral counsellors in the South African context.

Both theories have other important features in
common which should be noted. Both Rokeach and Rest
accept the idea of cultural universals with Rokeach
claiming that his 36 values are found in some form in
every society on earth. Kohlberg makes a similar claim
with his theory that the essence of morality worldwide is
found in the concept of justice and that every individual
has the underlying cognitive structures to reason morally
about individual and social decisions. All people in the
world go through the same stage in the same sequence in
order to reach their optimal level of moral maturity.
Operationalisation of their theories suggests some
support for their claims of cultural universality, but
the evidence is by no means totally conclusive.

Both theories have interesting views of value
stability and transformation. Rokeach stresses that
values create stability but are also open to change.
Changes in values and value systems occur through age
development and life experience and are strongly
influenced by culture. Interventions which lead to change
are usually believed to come about through cognitive
conflict. Kohlberg also uses the theory of cognitive
dissonance as an explanation of how a person moves from
one moral stage to another. Other factors which lead
towards higher moral development stages are social role
taking and age development and formal education. Again it
is not too difficult to see how these factors could also
lead to a change of values and value systems as
conceptualised by Rokeach.

Both theories have an interest in the differences
between open and closed thinking. Rokeach has edited a
volume entitled, The Open and Closed Mind (1960) which
highlights some of the key differences between dogmatism
and less dogmatic thinking. His favouring of open
mindedness is apparent in the way in which he presents
his issues and his interpretations of dogmatic thinking.
Kohlberg and Rest are also preoccupied with conservative

and liberal thinking. Both desire that people move to higher moral levels with a broader view of moral life and moral principles. They view conventional moral thinking as too limited and closed to finally lead towards personal and social transformation. Hence both Rokeach and Rest are deeply concerned about the differences between open and closed mindedness.

Closely linked to the conceptualisation of openmindedness is the implicit and explicit support of a liberal democratic value system by the three researchers. For example, Kohlberg's indebtedness to the philosopher Kant and Rest's indebtedness to the philosopher Rawls has enabled them to promote a purified form of liberal democracy as a social ideal. The liberal democracy implicitely promoted by Rokeach and Kohlberg and Rest may seem radical in the United States but less so in South Africa. While South Africa is in the process of nation building and marrying liberal democracy with a more radical socialist democracy, the dominance of the latter model in the minds of the political elite and masses of workers and unemployed makes the former seem conservative in this context. One of the many question marks for people who do not share Kohlberg and Rest's view of an ideal democracy must be to question their vision of stages five and six morality. Rest (1994:7) argues that Kohlberg's definitions of stages 5 and 6 indicate partisanship towards Western Liberalism while his less stringent distinctions do not. He believes his description of stage 5 which defines morality as consensus building and stage 6 as representing an ideal social cooperative, would be largely accepted universally. He feels his stage 6 is more open to extremely differing moral philosophies than Kohlberg's work. While this may be true to some extent, the current researcher still finds the Defining Issues Test imbued with a liberal spirit with its concern for moral openness, progressive stage structures and social

justice. Despite these reservations this researcher does not believe that the Rokeach Value Survey or the Defining Issues Test can be reduced down to merely measuring a participant's liberal or conservative attitudes. The researcher agrees with Rest (1986:152) when he states that liberal and conservative attitudes are not unrelated to his test, but that they are not identical constructs which can be reduced down to one another.

Finally, both tests have been used for counselling training and counselling purposes. The practioners suggest that they may be administered before counselling, during counselling or after counselling in order to see if any significant changes of values and moral judgement development have taken place. The theory of values therapy and its assertion that therapy is ultimately a values conversion exercise provides a counsellor with various possibilities. The counsellor should study his or her own value system in depth and realise that he or she may consciously or unconsciously lead the client in a certain direction. The counsellor should also have knowledge of various national or cultural or professional sub-groups' value systems for purposes of comparison. The counsellor should also become aware of his or her own moral judgement development level. If the level is only conventional, the counsellor should attempt to take further training and educational opportunities to broaden his or her reasoning ability and learn to understand postconventional judgement development. A better and more precise understanding of the client's moral judgement developmental level may also help in diagnosing and administering effective counselling aid to that person.

With the features of the two theories and tests in mind, we now move to a study of the results of the Rokeach Value Survey and the Defining Issues Test on a selected sample of South African pastoral counsellors. Many of the key issues raised regarding the two chief variables of value systems and moral judgement

development levels will be highlighted again in a fresh way through analysing and interpreting the empirical evidence.

CHAPTER   4

THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH RESULTS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PASTORAL
COUNSELLING

4.1   Introduction

In this chapter the researcher will report on the
empirical research results. The chapter will begin with
a description of the characteristics of the sample,
followed by studying the results of the Rokeach Value
Survey and the Defining Issues Test. The results of the
two instruments will be compared by the use of the
Spearman's (Chase 1967:93) correlation coefficient to see
to what degree the results overlap. Finally the
implications of the research results for pastoral
counselling will be discussed.

The research questions to be addressed by the values
and moral judgement development questionnaires are as
follows:

Firstly, what are the value systems of a sample of
pastoral counsellors in the South African context?
Secondly, what are the moral judgement development levels
of the pastoral counsellors?
Thirdly, what is the relationship between the rank
ordering of values and pastoral counsellors' levels of
moral judgement development?
Fourthly, what implications could these variables have on
pastoral-client pairing in pastoral counselling?

The two working hypotheses were as follows:

Firstly, the rank ordering of values in a value system will probably be reflected in the level of moral judgement development of the counsellor.

Secondly, the three sub-groups of pastoral counsellors (white male, white females and black males) will exhibit common values systems and levels of moral judgement development.

4.2   The research sample

The researcher selected 25 candidates from the list of students who had completed the Department of Practical Theology's Honours course entitled, "Pastoral Psychology and Christian Ethics". The criteria for selection were threefold. Preference was given to recent graduates who had taken the course within the past five years. This selection was done so as to obtain students with some recent familiarity of the literature of the thesis. The second criterion was a preference for stronger students who had obtained at least a lower second or B pass in the American system. The third criterion was a desire to obtain as many women and black students as possible. This turned out to be difficult as only a small number of women and black students have taken this course in recent years. The low number of participants from these two groups in this study is a result of this trend. The researcher attempted to contact all participants through letters, but the deteriorating postal service in South Africa made this unreliable. Subsequently, all participants were contacted by telephone and all agreed to participate. A demographic questionnaire, the Rokeach Value Test and the Defining Issues Test were sent to each participant. This resulted in 23 of the participants returning the questionnaires.

All of the questionnaires were in the English
language. One of the three Afrikaans partipants did not
complete the task correctly and his questionnaires and
answers contained gaps and inconsistencies and he was
eliminated from the sample. A second Afrikaans
participant was eliminated through the internal
consistency check administered during the scoring of the
Defining Issues Test. Although completing the
questionnaire, the data suggests that the participant did
not sufficiently understand the questions and respond
accordingly. The researcher decided to eliminate the
third Afrikaans participant since no meaningful group of
Afrikaans participants now existed in the study. This
left the study with 20 participants divided into three
sub-groups. There are white, male, English speaking;
white, female, English speaking and black, male, English
speaking.

The rationale for the division of this study into
these three sub-groups is to test the working hypothesis
of the researcher that each sub-group will exhibit common
value systems and moral development judgement when
arranged according to gender and race. It is this
researcher's opinion that women and black people
experience the social world in a manner which is not
common to white men. The researcher is of the opinion
that the power relations and oppression of women and
black people in South African society will contribute to
differences being evidenced in the testing. The research
done by Rokeach (1973:37-67) and Rest (1995:12-19)
suggests similar assumptions in American and
international studies of race and gender differences. The
chief distinguishing factor of Rest's research findings
is that education is closely allied to moral development
reasoning. The higher the educational level, the higher
one's level of moral reasoning. The research sample of
this thesis are all post-graduates of roughly equal
educational standing and the results should be

interesting in this regard. Rest also stresses the importance of age in his test. The younger you are, the lower your score. Again this sample are mature adults, which is suggestive in that the Defining Issues Test was originally designed to score just such a group. Hence, the Defining Issues Test has a particular focus of studying the changes between conventional and postconventional moral development which would primarily concern adult groups.

The twenty respondents are thus divided up numerically into the three sub-groups as follows. Thirteen are white, male pastoral counsellors, four are white, female pastoral counsellors and three are black, male pastoral counsellors. The size of the two smaller sub-groups leads one to be cautious of making too many broad generalisations about the features of such a group beyond the immediate sample. The three sub-groups exhibit several significant demographic characteristics which are important to highlight and describe.

4.2.1   White, male pastoral counsellors

The thirteen white, male respondents include ten full-time ministers of religion and one full-time teacher (a former minister of religion), one clinical psychologist and one part-time minister who is also a part-time religious television producer. The sub-group includes four Baptists, three Methodists, two Anglicans, two Presbyterians, one Congregationalist and one Pentecostal participant. Educationally all hold the Bachelor of Theology Honours degree in practical theology at the University of South Africa. In addition, three hold Masters degrees in practical theology, one participant holds a Masters degree in English literature and one holds a Masters degree in psychology (a clinical psychologist). The average age of the group is 41 years old. Two of the ministers were previously school

teachers. One participant taught for 16 year and another for 9 years. The clinical psychologist has practiced for 10 years. The average number of years in the ministry is 12.

4.2.2   White, female pastoral counsellors

The four women participants include one full-time minister and three part-time ministers. The sub-group includes one Methodist, one Presbyterian, one Baptist and one Assemblies of God member. Educationally, all hold the Bachelor of Theology Honours degree in practical theology at the University of South Africa. In addition two are fully qualified nurses and two hold Master of Theology degrees in practical theology. The average age of the group is 45 years. One of the nurses has practised her profession for 22 years and the other for 8 years. The average number of years in the ministry is 5.

4.2.3   Black, male pastoral counsellors

The three black participants include two full-time ministers and one part-time minister who is also a part-time university lecturer. Denominationally they include one Anglican, one Lutheran and one Congregationalist. All hold the Bachelor of Theology Honours degree in practical theology from the University of South Africa and all three are currently completing Master of Theology degree dissertations with the same university. The average age of the participants is 42 years. The average number of years in the ministry is 12.

4.3 Pastoral counsellor value systems

All studies using the Rokeach Value Survey report their research findings by dealing first with the terminal value systems of the samples and then moving to the

instrumental value systems. This researcher will follow
this preferred order in reporting his research results.
Rokeach stresses that the relationship between the two
value systems is flexible. It is possible to see them as
closely aligned or as two separate value systems.

The researcher has also decided to add his own
designation in order to clarify the division of the two
value systems further. Since there are eighteen values,
the top six values will be called priority-values, the
next six will be called middle-range values and the final
six values will be called low-range values. Thus when the
term priority values, middle-range values and low-range
values occur the above division is intended.

4.3.1   The end or terminal value systems

In dealing with the empirical data the researcher will
begin by discussing the characteristics of the group as
a whole. He will then move to a study of the three sub-
groups selected above. He will follow Rokeach's lead and
discuss all comparisons primarily through the use of
calculated medians which highlight the central tendencies
of the various sub-groups. The results of this sample
will then be compared with the value systems of a sample
of conservative Roman Catholic priests (Rokeach 1973:153)
and a group of liberal Methodist ministers (Rokeach
1973:112). The latter mentioned comparisons give insight
into understanding the common and unique characteristics
of this specific sample of pastoral counsellors compared
to similar professional groups. The choice of two
radically different Christian denominational value
systems should also help to place this sample more
clearly within a broader Christian perspective.

TABLE 1

The Terminal Values of the Entire Sample   (N=20)

RATINGS

End Values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	Me
1.Comfortable life			1			1			1			1	2		1	4	4	5	16
2.Exciting life		1		1					1	1	3		4		2	5	1	1	12
3.Accomplishment			1	1	2	3	2	2	2		1	1	1	3	1				8
4.World of peace	1		2		1	1		2		1	4	1	1	3		1	1	1	11
5.World of beauty								1		1			3	5	2	2	5	1	13
6.Equality		1	2	3	1		1		2	3	1	1	2	1	2				9
7.Family security	5	7		3	1	1	1		1				1						2
8.Freedom			2		3		1	1	3	3	4					1	1	1	9
9.Health		2	5	1	1	2	2	1	3			1	2						6
10.Inner-harmony	1	1	1	4	1	3	1	3	2	1					1	1			6
11.Mature love		1	1	2	2	2	1	1	3		3	2		1		1			8
12.National sec.				1				2		2		1	2	1	1	4	3	3	15
13.Pleasure								1			1		1	1	3		5	8	17
14.Salvation	10	1	1		1		1	1			1		1	1			1	1	1
15.Self-respect	1	2	2	2	4	1	2		3		1	1	1						5
16.Social recog.			1	1					2		1	1	1	3	3	3	3	1	14
17.True friendsh.			1	2	1	3	4	2	1		3	2	1						7
18.Wisdom	2	4	1	1		4	2	1		3		1		1					6

The first most important choice for 12 of the 20 was salvation (median 1). The second priority was family security (median 2) and the third most important choice was that of self-respect (median 5.5). The fourth and fifth choices were wisdom (median 6) and inner-harmony (median 6), with the sixth being that of health (median 6.5). An immediate response to such a value system is to note its self-centered nature. The more socially

orientated values such as equality (median 9.5), freedom (median 9.5) and a world at peace (median 13.5) were middle-range values. The least popular choice was pleasure with 10 of the 20 placing it last (median 17). The seventeenth choice was that of a comfortable life (median 16) followed by social recognition (14.5) and national security (median 14.5). The lower choices suggest a dislike for hedonism and overt materialism.

Table 2

The Terminal Values of the three sub-groups

A comparison between the medians of the three sub-groups reveals the following. Abbreviations for each sub-group are as follows; white males (W-M) white females (W-F) and black males (B-M).

	W-M N=13	W-F N=4	B-M N=3
1.Comfortable life	16	16.5	13
2.Exciting life	12	13.5	15
3.Accomplishment	8	6.5	9
4.World of Peace	12	9	6
5.World of beauty	13	14	15
6.Equality	10.5	5.5	4
7.Family security	2	5	1
8.Freedom	10	7	5
9.Health	6.5	4	2
10.Inner harmony	4.5	12.5	8
11.Mature love	5.5	11.5	11
12.National security	16	9	12
13.Pleasure	15	18	18
14.Salvation	1.5	1	11
15.Self-respect	5	8	5
16.Social recognition	13.5	15	15
17.True friendship	7	10	7
18.Wisdom	6	2.5	10

4.3.1.1   White, male pastoral counsellors   (Table 2)

This sub-group of 13 constituted the majority of the respondents. Their results echo clearly those of the group which they dominate numerically. Their priorities were salvation (median 1.5), family security (median 2), inner-harmony (median 4.5), self-respect (median 5), mature love (median 5.5) and wisdom (median 6). Again the self-centered concerns of the sub-group are obvious. The more socially orientated values such as freedom (median 10), equality (median 10.5) and a world at peace (median 12) remain middle-range values. Given the rapidly changing South African context this result is surprising. Their lowest choices include a comfortable life (median 16), pleasure (median 15), social recognition (median 13.5), a world of beauty (median 13) and an exciting life (median 12). Again the low priorities of a comfortable life and pleasure suggest almost an ascetic value system. Worldly comforts and pleasures are less important than salvation.

4.3.1.2   White, female pastoral counsellors   (Table 2)

This sub-group numbered four participants. Their priorities were salvation (median 1), wisdom (median 2.5), health (median 4), family security (median 5), equality (median 5.5) and accomplishment (median 6.5). The differences from the group of white males are interesting in the increased concern for health, equality and accomplishment. The introduction of the value of equality suggests that this group is aware of the oppression which women often experience in society and in their professions. It indicates further that this is probably a more liberal group than their male counterparts as equality is also a characteristic of liberal ideology. Interestingly enough, the concerns of true-friendship (median 10) and mature love (median 11.5)

did not score as high as one might have expected from arguments that abound concerning gender differences and that women tend to be more relationship centered and nurturing than men. The men showed more concern for these "feminine" values and rated friendship at a median of 7 and mature love at a median of 5.5. This may also highlight the changing role of women in South African society. The more professional women clearly encounter a world where gender equality is not immediately evident. The relationship centered concerns are thus middle-range values rather than priorities for this sub-group. The lowest choices were pleasure (median 18), a comfortable life (median 16.5), social recognition (median 15), a world of beauty (median 14), an exciting life (median 13.5) and inner-harmony (median 12.5). This is largely comparable to the dominant group with the exception of the demotion of inner-harmony (median 12.5) to a much lower choice than among the men where it is a priority value (median 4.5). Again this difference suggests a movement away from self-centered introspection toward other priorities.

4.3.1.3   Black, male pastoral counsellors   (Table 2)

This sub-group numbered three participants. They showed the greatest variance in terminal value systems from the dominant group. Their priorities were family security (median 1), health (median 2), equality (median 4), freedom (median 5), self-respect (median 5) and a world of peace (median 6). The socially orientated issues come to the fore here. Equality, freedom and a world of peace become important. This sub-group's value system suggests a greater priority for what is happening in the social world. Of particular significance is the lower position of salvation. Salvation was the first choice for the other two sub-groups. Salvation is only a middle-range value with a median of 11. This sharp contrast suggests

quite a different view of Christian priorities. Other middle-range values include wisdom (median 10), mature love (median 11) and a comfortable life (median 13). The first two values are priority values for the the white males and thus are given much lower status here. The lowest choices include pleasure (median 18), an exciting life (median 15), and social recognition (median 15). These values echo those of the numerically dominant group of white males.

4.4 Comparisons, analysis and interpretation

Rokeach has made numerous studies among religious and non-religious people. He (1978:82) remarks that all religious groups are similar in considering a world of peace, family security and freedom as the most important terminal values. An exciting life, pleasure, social recognition and a world of beauty are the least important. The group of pastoral counsellors has little in common with them except for the importance of family values and uneasiness with pleasure and social recognition.

The pastoral counsellors have more in common with studies which relate specifically to Christian samples. Rokeach (1974:82) notes that the terminal value salvation and the instrumental value forgiving stand out above all other values as the most distinctively Christian values. Christians who attend church every week, normally rank the end value of salvation first and the mean value of forgiving first. This ranking can vary slightly from denomination to denomination with conservative Baptist Christians closest to this value system and more liberal Christian groups often prioritising family security first or equality before salvation (Rokeach 1974:128).

The pastoral counsellors also have much in common with studies which Rokeach reports of conservative Roman Catholic priests (Rokeach 1973:153) and liberal Methodist ministers (Rokeach 1973:113). A comparison between the pastoral counsellors and two ideologically varied Christian professional groups should help to place this study's results in some perspective. The similarities and differences between the three groups should enable us to see how similar and different Christians can be in their value systems.

Table 3

Terminal values of Roman Catholic Priests and Methodist Ministers

The following are two tables as found in Rokeach 1973:153 and 1973:114. They are adapted for this thesis by dividing up the terminal values from the instrumental values.

TABLE 5.17 TERMINAL VALUE MEANS AND COMPOSITE RANKS FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS, SEMINARIANS, COLLEGE STUDENTS, AND LAYMEN

	Priests	*Seminarians*	*College*	*Laymen*	
N =	80	80	68	41	p*
A comfortable life	15.9 (18)	15.5 (17)	12.6 (15)	12.8 (14)	.01
An exciting life	11.6 (13)	12.9 (14)	11.4 (13)	11.9 (13)	—
A sense of accomplishment	6.3 (4)	8.9 (10)	6.1 (2)	7.9 (9)	.01
A world at peace	9.0 (10)	9.1 (11)	9.7 (12)	7.9 (8)	—
A world of beauty	12.3 (15)	12.9 (15)	13.5 (16)	13.1 (15)	—
Equality	8.8 (9)	8.0 (7)	9.2 (11)	7.6 (5)	—
Family security	11.2 (12)	10.1 (12)	8.5 (9)	4.3 (1)	.01
Freedom	8.1 (7)	8.4 (8)	8.2 (8)	7.7 (6)	—
Happiness	6.3 (3)	6.5 (5)	7.3 (5)	9.9 (12)	.01
Inner harmony	7.0 (6)	6.1 (4)	8.5 (10)	7.3 (4)	.01
Mature love	10.5 (11)	7.6 (6)	6.7 (4)	7.7 (7)	.01
National security	12.8 (16)	14.4 (16)	14.9 (18)	13.9 (16)	.01
Pleasure	15.7 (17)	15.6 (18)	14.0 (17)	15.2 (18)	.01
Salvation	3.7 (1)	3.1 (1)	6.7 (3)	5.5 (2)	.01
Self-respect	8.8 (8)	8.9 (9)	7.7 (7)	9.0 (10)	—
Social recognition	11.9 (14)	12.3 (13)	12.6 (14)	14.1 (17)	.05
True friendship	6.5 (5)	6.0 (3)	7.6 (6)	9.1 (11)	.01
Wisdom	4.4 (2)	4.8 (2)	5.7 (1)	6.0 (3)	—

(Rokeach 1973:153)

TABLE A. Value Ranking by Ministers

TERMINAL	All Ministers n = 50		Intrinsic Ministers n = 27		Extrinsic Ministers n = 7		Ind. Pro. Ministers n = 8		Ind. Anti. Ministers n = 8	
	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank
A Comfortable life*	16.38	18	16.40	17	16.50	18	17.50	18	15.00	16
An Exciting Life*	9.50	11	8.75	10	11.50	12	13.00	14	3.00	1
A Sense of Accomplishment	5.00	3	4.33	2	3.50	3	6.17	4	4.50	3
A World at Peace	7.70	7	7.00	6	3.00	2	8.17	8	12.50	12
A World of Beauty	12.25	13	11.33	13	12.50	14	14.50	16	15.00	15
Equality†	4.50	1	3.38	1	3.00	1	7.50	6	5.00	4
Family Security	7.30	6	7.25	8	6.50	7	6.50	5	11.50	11
Freedom	7.93	9	7.00	7	10.50	9	8.50	10	9.00	9
Happiness	13.50	15	13.60	14	11.00	11	14.00	15	12.50	13
Inner Harmony	8.83	10	9.33	11	7.50	8	6.00	3	10.50	10
Mature Love*	6.33	5	6.33	4	11.00	10	8.50	11	3.50	2
National Security	15.30	16	15.25	16	16.00	17	10.50	12	15.50	17
Pleasure*	16.11	17	16.44	18	14.50	15	16.75	17	13.00	14
Salvation*	12.00	12	11.25	12	15.50	12	1.50	1	17.70	18
Self Respect	6.00	4	6.80	5	5.00	5	8.00	7	5.50	5
Social Recognition	12.67	14	13.75	15	12.50	13	12.50	13	6.50	6
True Friendship*	7.90	8	8.00	9	6.50	6	8.50	9	8.17	8
Wisdom*	4.67	2	4.75	3	4.50	4	3.50	2	8.00	7

(Rokeach 1973:114)

A major difference between the two groups comes in the position of salvation which is ranked first for the Roman Catholic priests and twelfth by the Methodist ministers, equality which is ranked first by the Methodist ministers and ninth by the Roman Catholic priests and family security which is ranked sixth by the Methodist ministers and twelfth by the Roman Catholic priests.

The Roman Catholic priests thus placed salvation first. The pastoral counsellors' choice of salvation first is similar to the Roman Catholic priests. Rokeach would view this result as comparable to the chief values of fundamentalist Protestant denominations such as the Baptists (Rokeach 1973:155). It is also comparable to the chief value given by frequent church attendance (Rokeach 1973:128). The choice of family security second is not comparable to the Roman Catholic priests who placed it as their twelfth choice. One can speculate as to the reasons for this difference including the possibility that celibacy and married life play a role here. Priests however also come out of families (often very large such as Italian and Spanish and Irish and Third World extended families), so this difference remains puzzling. The choices of wisdom, inner-harmony and health are however

largely comparable with the Roman Catholic priests.
Finally, the pastoral counsellors chose self-respect
third and the Roman Catholic priests eighth. This
difference suggests that perhaps the pastoral counsellors
are slightly more self-orientated than the priests.
Possibly their focus on pastoral counselling as a major
component of their ministries makes them more concerned
with positive identity issues such as self-respect than
do their priestly colleagues.

The major similarity between the pastoral
counsellors and Methodist ministers is found in the
importance both placed on wisdom and self-respect and
family security as priority values. Both groups thus
stress intellectual, personal identity issues and family
values as priorities concerns. The major difference
between the pastoral counsellors and the Methodist
ministers is found most clearly in the values of
salvation, equality and a world at peace. The pastoral
counsellors chose salvation as their most important
value. The Methodist ministers chose salvation as their
twelfth choice. This is a significant difference which is
echoed by other differences between the two groups. The
Methodist ministers chose equality as their first choice
and a world of peace as their seventh choice. The
pastoral counsellors chose equality as their tenth choice
and a world of peace as their twelfth choice. Clearly
there is a major difference between parts of the value
systems of the pastoral counsellors and the liberal
Methodist ministers. The women counsellors and black
counsellors have more in common with the liberal
Methodists than do the white pastoral counsellors as
their concern for equality and a world of peace is
roughly comparable. This affirms the view of the
researcher that the two sub-groups are more liberal than
the dominant group of counsellors.

The least popular choices of values is also
revealing. The Roman Catholic priests placed a

comfortable life last, followed by pleasure, national security, a world of beauty, social recognition and an exciting life. The Methodist ministers and pastoral counsellors' lists are almost identical. The Methodist ministers included health as a low priority whereas the other two groups made it a middle-range value. The similarity of the three groups lower range values is striking.

The terminal value systems of the pastoral counsellors suggest that the group is fairly conservative and conforming in line with Rokeach's original studies of the values of religious peoples and religious professions. Despite the remarkable challenges of the South African context, the group appears to be more introverted than socially conscious. Although it is possible to interpret salvation and family security as social concepts, the stress here appears to be individualistic and introspective. The lower values of pleasure, a comfortable life and social recognition suggest traditional values which echo those of the Protestant ethos and work ethic. The value systems of the female and black participants, however, suggest a more liberal value system, though not fully comparable with the more secularised Methodist ministers reported above.

4.5   Means or instrumental value systems

In this section the research results will be presented in a manner similar to those already reported concerning the terminal value systems. Firstly, the characteristics of the group as a whole will be described followed by a study of the characteristics of the three sub-groups. Comparisons with the two groups of conservative Roman Catholic priests and liberal Methodist ministers will then be made. Trends concerning the pastoral counsellors' instrumental value systems will be analysed.

TABLE 4

The Entire Sample (N=20)

RATINGS

Mean Values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	Me
1. Ambitious		1	1							3		2	1	3	2	1	1	5	14
2. Broadminded		1	1	1	1		2	1	2	1	2				1	1	4	2	10
3. Capable				2		2	2	4		1	1	2	2	2	1	1			8
4. Clean						1	1		2	2		2	1		1	2	6	2	15
5. Courageous	2		2	4		2	1	2	2	1		1		2	1				6
6. Forgiving	2	4	3	1	3	2				1	1	1	2						4
7. Helpful		3	1	1	2	2	3	4	2	1						1			7
8. Honest	6	2	4	1	4	1		1						1					3
9. Imaginative			1			2	1	2	2	1			4	1	1	2		3	13
10. Independent						1		2	2		2	2	1		5	1	1	3	13
11. Intellectual				1	3		2	1	2	2	2			3	1		3		10
12. Logical				1	2		1			1	5		1	3		3	2	1	11
13. Loving	7	5	2	1		1	1		1		1				1				2
14. Loyal		3	2	1	4	3			1	2		1		1	1			1	5
15. Obedient							2			2	1	4	2		2	4		3	13
16. Polite	1					1	1			3	1	3	2	2	3	3			13
17. Responsible	2	1	3	4		2	3	1	2			1		1					4
18. Self-control			1		1	1	1		1	2	1	3	3	3	1	1	1		11

The most important choice for 9 of the 20 was loving
(median 2). The second choice was honest (median 3),
third was forgiving (median 4.5) and responsible (median
4.5) followed by loyal (median 5.5) and helpful (median
6.5). The centrality of loving and forgiving for the
Christian belief system is thus affirmed here. The middle
range values included capable (median 9), broadminded
(median 10.5), intellectual (median 10) and self-
controlled (median 11). The priority of the heart-values

of loving and forgiving over the mind-values broadminded and intellectual suggests that the group favours emotive instrumental values as more important than cognitive head values. The preference for moral values such as loving, honest, forgiving and responsible are also placed above the competence values of capable, broadminded and intellectual.

The least important instrumental values were clean (median 15.5), independent (median 15), ambitious (median 14), obedient (median 13), polite (median 13) and logical (median 12). This group does not then accept the middle-class dictum that stresses that cleanliness is next to Godliness.

TABLE 5

Instrumental Value Systems of the three sub-groups

The three sub-groups will now be compared in relation to their instrumental value systems with their calculated medians. They are designated as white males (W-M), white females(W-F) and black males (B-M).

	W-M N=13	W-F N=4	B-M N=3
1.Ambitious	13.5	14	16
2.Broadminded	10.5	13	7
3.Capable	8	11.5	8
4.Clean	15.5	16.5	10
5.Courageous	6.5	6.5	4
6.Forgiving	5	2.5	2
7.Helpful	7	7	4
8.Honest	2.5	2.5	6
9.Imaginative	9.5	15.5	13
10.Independent	14	10.5	15
11.Intellectual	9	9	17
12.Logical	13.5	12.5	11

13.Loving	2	6.5	1
14.Loyal	6	4	15
15.Obedient	13	12.5	11
16.Polite	15	15	12
17.Responsible	6.5	4	6
18.Self-controlled	11.5	7.5	13

4.5.1 White, male pastoral counsellors (Table 5)

As the dominant group one would expect that the values of this sub-group would be similar to the group as a whole. The priorities were loving (median 2), honesty (median 2.5), forgiving (median 5), loyal (median 6), responsible (median 6.5), courageous (median 6.5) and helpful (median 7). Again the centrality of loving and forgiving is apparent here. The importance of loving also parallels the end value of mature love which this sub-group prioritised in their end value systems. The middle range choices were capable (median 8), intellectual (median 9), imaginative (median 9.5) and broadminded (median 10.5). The mind-values of intellectual and broadminded are thus of lower importance than the more emotive heart-values of loving and forgiving. The preference for moral values as opposed to competence values is also reaffirmed. The lowest choices include clean (median 15.5), obedient (median 15), independent (median 14), ambitious (median 13.5) and logical (median 13.5).

4.5.2 White, female,pastoral counsellors (Table 5)

This sub-group of four chose forgiving (median 2.5), honesty (median 2.5), responsible (median 4), loyal (median 4), courageous (median 6.5), loving (median 6.5) and helpful (median 7) as the most important values. These choices parallel those of the dominant group with the exception of the lower position of loving. Interestingly enough the position of loving appears to

parallel the terminal value of this sub-group of mature love. The white women pastoral counsellors consistently rank anything to do with love towards a middle-range value and not a priority value. The middle-range values include intellectual (median 9), independent (median 10.5), logical (median 12.5) and obedient (median 12.5). Again the dominance of head values such as intellectual and logical emerge as middle-range values. The least chosen values include clean (median 16.5), ambitious (median 14), obedient (median 12.5) and logical (median 12.5). The middle-range values and least chosen values are quite similar to those of the dominant group. Both chose clean as their least important value.

4.5.3 Black, male, pastoral counsellors (Table 5)

This sub-group of three all chose loving as their first choice (median 1). Then followed forgiving (median 2), courageous (median 4), helpful (median 4), honest (median 6) and responsible (median 6). This is strikingly comparable to the dominant group of white pastoral counsellors. The middle-range values include broadminded (median 7), clean (median 10), logical (median 11) and obedient (median 11). The major difference from the dominant group concerns the position of the value clean. This value is a middle-range value for this group and the lowest value for the two other sub-groups. The lesser values were intellectual (median 17), ambitious (median 16), independent (median 15) and self-control (median 13). The other two groups rank intellectual as a middle-range value while the black pastoral counsellors ranked it as a low-range value. This demotion of the value intellectual suggests that these pastoral counsellors also prefer moral values to competency values. In this trend they echo the other two sub-groups as well.

4.6 Comparisons, analysis and interpretation

As already noted Rokeach has made numerous studies of religious people as have others using the Rokeach Value Survey. Rokeach (1976:128) remarks on the instrumental value systems of university students who are weekly church attenders. They prioritise honest and loving as their most important values with forgiving and helpful being their seventh and eighth choices. The pastoral counsellors are similar with their emphasis upon loving and honest. The pastoral counsellors however regard forgiving as a higher priority than do university students. The current researcher wonders if this is not partially age and environment related. The older you are the more aware you are of the need to forgive. Also in the special and privileged world of the university ethos the relative neatness and idealism of academic life appears to make forgiveness less important. The instrumental value systems of Roman Catholic priests and liberal Methodist ministers are more insightful in this regard. As in the case of the terminal value systems the contrast between the two different groups is very suggestive of different Christian value systems. The comparisons of these two groups with this research sample should help to place our group more clearly within a spectrum of Christian professional groups.

TABLE 6

The Instrumental Value Systems of the Roman Catholic Priests and Methodist Ministers

Rokeach (1973: 113:154) includes two tables of the instrumental value systems of Roman Catholic clergy and Methodist ministers.

TABLE 5.18   INSTRUMENTAL VALUE MEANS AND COMPOSITE RANKS
FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS, SEMINARIANS, COLLEGE STUDENTS, AND LAYMEN

	Priests	*Seminarians*	*College*	*Laymen*	
N =	80	80	68	41	.p*
Ambitious	13.2 (17)	11.1 (12)	8.3 (8)	10.5 (12)	.01
Broadminded	8.6 (8)	8.4 (8)	7.9 (5)	9.4 (8)	—
Capable	9.0 (9)	9.9 (10)	10.2 (14)	9.3 (7)	—
Cheerful	8.3 (7)	9.4 (9)	9.8 (11)	9.9 (10)	—
Clean	14.3 (18)	14.8 (18)	14.3 (18)	13.2 (18)	—
Courageous	7.6 (5)	8.4 (7)	9.2 (9)	7.0 (4)	—
Forgiving	6.6 (4)	6.3 (3)	8.0 (6)	7.0 (5)	—
Helpful	6.1 (3)	6.6 (4)	8.3 (7)	7.2 (6)	.05
Honest	5.0 (1)	5.4 (1)	5.7 (2)	5.2 (1)	—
Imaginative	12.7 (16)	12.8 (17)	12.4 (15)	11.2 (14)	—
Independent	12.3 (15)	12.4 (16)	10.0 (12)	10.4 (11)	.05
Intellectual	10.7 (12)	11.3 (13)	10.1 (13)	11.3 (15)	—
Logical	10.3 (11)	12.4 (15)	9.7 (10)	10.8 (13)	.01
Loving	8.1 (6)	6.8 (5)	7.2 (4)	7.0 (3)	—
Obedient	11.0 (13)	10.0 (11)	13.3 (17)	13.2 (17)	.01
Polite	12.2 (14)	12.0 (14)	13.2 (16)	12.2 (16)	—
Responsible	5.4 (2)	5.9 (2)	5.1 (1)	5.9 (2)	—
Self-controlled	9.1 (10)	7.8 (6)	7.2 (3)	9.7 (9)	.05

(Rokeach 1973:154)

TABLE A.   Value Ranking by Ministers

	All Ministers n = 50		Intrinsic Ministers n = 27		Extrinsic Ministers n = 7		Ind. Pro. Ministers n = 8		Ind. Anti. Ministers n = 8	
	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank
INSTRUMENTAL										
Ambitious*	12.83	14	13.00	14	12.50	13	15.00	18	11.50	13
Broadminded	8.00	7	7.75	8	4.50	4	11.50	11	11.00	12
Capable*	8.50	9	8.60	9	9.00	8	8.00	6	5.17	3
Cheerful	13.00	15	13.33	15	13.50	15	13.00	15	9.50	11
Clean*	15.85	18	16.58	18	15.83	18	10.00	9	14.50	16
Courageous*	5.10	4	4.38	2	10.00	9	6.00	4	4.00	2
Forgiving*	5.90	5	5.75	5	8.00	7	5.50	3	6.00	4
Helpful*	7.50	6	6.00	6	6.00	5	13.00	14	9.00	10
Honest	4.75	3	4.88	3	4.50	3	4.00	2	8.50	8
Imaginative*	8.50	8	7.33	7	7.00	6	11.50	12	7.50	6
Independent*	10.50	11	10.00	10	14.00	16	14.50	16	9.00	9
Intellectual	12.50	13	12.13	13	10.50	10	15.00	17	14.50	15
Logical	11.83	12	11.33	12	11.00	11	8.50	7	13.50	14
Loving	4.50	2	4.13	1	4.50	2	9.00	8	6.50	5
Obedient*	14.75	17	15.33	17	11.50	12	10.00	10	16.50	18
Polite	14.50	16	15.33	16	13.00	14	12.00	13	16.50	17
Responsible	3.50	1	5.67	4	4.00	1	3.50	1	2.50	1
Self Controlled	10.10	10	10.33	11	15.50	17	6.00	4	8.50	7

(Rokeach 1973:113)

The Roman Catholic priests placed honest first, followed by responsible, helpful, forgiving, courageous and then loving. They are thus strikingly similar to the pastoral counsellors who chose almost identical priority-values. The chief difference between the two is the relative position of loving. For the pastoral counsellors it is the first choice and for the Roman Catholic priests it is the sixth choice. This echoes the earlier difference between the two groups regarding the end-value of mature love as well. The pastoral counsellors placed mature love seventh and the Roman Catholic priests eleventh. Perhaps the pastoral counsellors see love and compassion as more central to their work as counsellors than do their Roman Catholic colleagues.

The Methodist ministers priority-values are almost identical to those of the pastoral counsellors with a small difference in the positions of loving and forgiving. For the pastoral counsellors loving came first and honest second and forgiving third. For the Methodist ministers responsible came first, loving second and forgiving fourth. One might have expected the classical Christian virtue or value of loving to score highest with all groups. Rokeach (1973:83) remarks suggestively that despite Christianity's teaching regarding charity and love, his national survey of religious values does not support the view that Christians place greater emphasis on this value than do non-Christians. The importance of forgiving as a classical Christian value is also supported by the pastoral counsellors, Roman Catholic priests and Methodist ministers. The priority of the values of honest and responsible for all three groups also suggests a desire for a certain kind of deontological behaviour for committed christians in all circumstances.

The middle-range choices for the pastoral counsellors were capable, broadminded, intellectual and self-controlled. The middle range choices for the Roman

Catholic priests and the Methodist ministers were almost exactly the same with only a slight variation in their order. The lowest choices for the pastoral counsellors were clean, independent, ambitious, obedient, polite and logical. The Roman Catholic priests' and Methodist ministers' choices were virtually identical with the pastoral counsellors. The unanimous choice of clean, ambitious, polite and obedient as low-range values for all three groups is quite remarkable.

It appears that the three value systems are largely comparable at the higher, middle and lower levels. This leads one to wonder if there is not possibly a Christian instrumental value system which is largely universal to all Christian priests and ministers? This result lends itself towards such an interpretation and further research in this regard could be revealing.

The overall impression that the researcher receives from the instrumental value systems is that these pastoral counsellors are not very materialist, reject hedonism and stress the classical Christian virtues of loving and forgiving. Despite their high educational qualifications, they rank head values such as intellectual and broadminded and logical as middel-range to low-range values, which is quite surprising. Given their pursuit of higher degrees one might have expected these mind-values to score much higher up in their value systems. Rather they have stressed their unqualified support for strong deontological values such as loving, forgiving, honest, responsible and courageous. Their desire to live and support a specific kind of Christian behaviour comes through with this near unanimous choice of a compatible instrumental value system. The similarity of the pastoral counsellors and the Roman Catholic priests and Methodist ministers regarding their instrumental values is striking. They differ more in their terminal or end values.

4.7 Pastoral counsellors' moral judgement development

In dealing with the results of the Defining Issues Test
(DIT for short) the researcher will begin by discussing
the characteristics of the group as a whole followed by
the three sub-groups. The results of the sample will be
compared to other gender and cross-cultural studies as
well as a group of conservative Roman Catholic priests
and a group of liberal Methodist ministers. The chief
index of comparison will be the P score which enables an
extraordinary variety of comparisons to be made. As
already mentioned in the previous section, these
comparisons will help to place the scores of the pastoral
counsellors in a wider framework.

4.7.1 The stage scores of the participants

As already noted in the previous chapter, the most
important figure for analysis is the P score or
principled score. The overwhelming majority of studies
using the Defining Issues Test simply use this one score.
Through this one score they report individual and group
means and differences and correlations. The multiple
stage scoring of each subject and group is also always
given. Hence stages 2, 3, 4, 5a, 5b and 6 appear on all
test results. Rest prefers to deal with the spread of the
stages which are exhibited by a person or group rather
than with focusing only on the preferred stage of moral
judgement development. He (1979:63) states that it is
incorrect to think that a person or group "has" a stage.
People are not just single track thinkers who operate
with only one moral organisational perspective at a time.
Rather a person usually exhibits a variety of moral
organisational perspectives. Rest (1978:63) thus supports
a more complex developmental model than the simple
developmental model advocated by Kohlberg. The more
complex model deals with mixtures of stages rather than

arguing emphatically that a person or group "has" a stage. Finally, in general as the lower stage scores decrease the higher stage scores increase.

TABLE 7

The Entire Sample

Descriptive statistics for total sample and subsamples : DIT Scores

Group		Stage2	Stage3	Stage4	Stage5A	Stage5B	Stage6	Pscore
Subgroup 1	Mean	2.769	10.239	19.539	16.230	4.461	4.609	42.569
(n=13)	SD							12.370
Subgroup 2	Mean	2.250	4.500	28.000	13.000	5.500	4.450	38.750
(n=4)	SD							4.594
Subgroup 3	Mean	3.333	14.333	24.000	10.667	3.000	3.000	27.800
(n=3)	SD							5.351
Total	Mean	2.250	9.700	21.900	14.750	4.450	4.450	39.590
(n=20)	SD							11.453

(Research results obtained and adapted from the Centre for Ethical Development, University of Minnesota, USA   July 1996)

The entire sample had a P score of 39.59. Hence the entire group chose postconventional thinking 39.6 per cent of the time. The choices were largely spread between stage 3 (9.700), stage 4 (21.900), stage 5A (14.750) and stage 5B (4.450). As already noted Stage 3 morality is a matter of establishing and maintaining personal relationships in a primary group. Stage 4 judgement development is preoccupied with maintaining law and order

in the public sphere. Since stages 3 and 4 represent the conventional stages, one can safely conclude that the group is predominantly a holder of conventional moral judgement development levels.

There is also some recognition of postconventional thinking at Stage 5A (14.750) and Stage 5B (4.450). The choice of Stage 5A moral judgment development indicates that some of the sample desire to move beyond a law and order mentality to a realisation that there are many ways of arranging a stable social order. The preference for Stage 5A moral reflection again stresses institutional settings rather than an individual who has moved beyond most institutional settings as preferred by Stage 5B.

4.7.2 White, male pastoral counsellors

The white, male pastoral counsellors had a P score of 42.6. There is a small interest in stage 3 moral reasoning (10.239). However the particular sensitivity of the sub-group is for stage 4 (19.539) and stage 5A (16.230) and stage 5B (4.461) moral judgement development. The law and order mentality is thus affirmed together with some recognition of postconventional moral judgement reasoning. It appears then that these pastoral counsellors favour a mixture of conventional and postconventional moral judgement development levels.

Some individual scores in this sub-group are worthy of comment. The highest individual P score was 68.3 with one other participant scoring 60.0 and the lowest being a score of 25.0. The standard deviation of 12.370 underlines this broad spread of responses. The spectrum suggests that this is a fairly heterogenious group of pastoral counsellors. The highest scorer (68.3) chose postconventional stage 5A 27 per cent of the time and chose stage 5B 7 per cent of the time and stage 6 8 per cent of the time. As already noted stage 6 moral judgement reasoning deals with the question of the

principles which rational and impartial people would use to organise social cooperation and the social system. This individual tends to view dilemmas in a manner close to that of a moral philosopher.

In analysing further characteristics of the two higher scorers, it is interesting to note that both are Methodist ministers. The Methodist church is known to be a fairly liberal church in the South African context. Both have completed Masters of Theology degrees. Both have also had long periods in the ministry, one of 16 years and one of 10 years. Their ages are also quite comparable with one being 44 years old and the other being 43 years old. They are thus liberal, well educated, mature age adults with a great deal of professional experience in the ministry.

4.7.3 White, female, pastoral counsellors

The white women pastoral counsellors had a P score of 38.75. They largely overlooked stage 3 reasoning (4.500). They had a strong preference for stage 4 moral reasoning (28.000). Thus the law and order theme is favoured. They also showed some sensitivity for stage 5A moral judgement statements (13.000) as well as stage 5B (5.500). As with their white, male counterparts it appears that these counsellors favour a mixture of conventional and postconventional moral judgement development levels.

The highest P score was 43.3 and the lowest 33.3. The standard deviation is small at 4.594. The four women thus reason in remarkably similar ways. Interestingly enough the highest score here was also a part-time Methodist minister with a completed Master of Theology degree.

4.7.4 Black, male, pastoral counsellors

The P score for the sub-group was 27.8. The prominence of P scores at the stage 3 level was greater than the other two sub-groups (14.333). The participants however preferred stage 4 moral judgement development (24.00). Stage 5A reasoning was recognised 10.7 per cent of the time and Stage 5B 3.0 per cent of the time. Hence there is some openness to postconventional moral judgement development levels. As individuals, the highest P score was 30.00 and the lowest 21.7. The standard deviation is small at 5.351. The three pastoral counsellors thus appear to have largely the same way of reasoning about moral dilemmas.

This sub-group is more concerned than the previous two sub-groups with stage 3 reasoning and its focus on primary group cooperation and inter-relationships. The researcher finds this preference for stage 3 thinking quite understandable as the major violence of the Apartheid era and transformative period occurs in the social world of this sub-group. Primary group life has been deeply influenced by the divisions of the past. More positively one may also stress how this sub-group has much in common with Gilligan's (1982) emphasis upon an ethic of care versus an ethic of justice. The sub-group is thus particularly sensitive to the desire for small group harmony and positive personal relationships. Stage 4 thinking clearly remains the dominant moral reasoning preference for the sub-group as with the other two sub-groups. However the desire for a greater respect for the rule of law and a more stable social order takes on a special meaning for this group. Unlike the previous two sub-groups this sub-group has experienced an extremely arbitrary legal system for several generations. The desire for law and order is thus a particular concern for people from communities who have been suffering from a history of legal victimisation and endemic violence and

social unrest. The legacy of the past inequalities live on despite the arrival of a new political order.

4.7.5 Comparisons, analysis and interpretation

4.7.5.1   Age, education, cross-cultural and gender comparisons

The DIT statistical report for this sample of pastoral counsellors includes norms (Rest 1993:19) which highlight some P scores within the American context. The chief focus of these P scores is on the variables of education and age. The norms range from high school students through university students to post-graduate students. Previous samples show that a group of junior high school students (Standard 7 and 8) had a P score of 22, senior high school pupils (Standard 9 and 10) had a P score of 32.0 and a group of university students a P score of 42.3. A group of post-graduate students had a P score of 44.8 and a group of philosophy doctoral students and seminarians a P score of 65.1. Rest (1979:111) has remarked that a P score of 40 appears to be a major divide between people taking his test.

He notes further that adults in general in the United States tend to score around 40. The statistics presented regarding male and female scores are particularly interesting. Starting at university level the women students consistantly outscore the male students on the DIT. At undergraduate level the male students scored 44.1 and the female students 45.9. At a post-graduate level the male students scored 61.0 and the female students 63. In terms of these results the pastoral counsellors score of 39.6 places them somewhere between American high school students and American university students in comparing moral judgement development levels. Since the pastoral counsellors are post-graduate students, these results raise all sorts of questions.

Table 3.1

Age/Education Norms for P Score by Age/Education Groups

AGE/EDUCATION GROUPS

	Jr. high school	High School	College	Grad School	Adults
1979 Secondary Analysis					
$\overline{X}$	21.9	31.8	42.3	53.3	40.0
SD	8.5	13.5	13.2	10.9	16.7
n	1,322	581	2,479	183	1,149
1986 Secondary Analysis (males)					
$\overline{X}$	19.1	28.7	44.1	61.0	42.8
SD	6.3	11.8	12.2	14.0	11.8
n	528	424	449	52	90
1986 Secondary Analysis (females)					
$\overline{X}$	19.8	30.4	45.9	63.0	46.0
SD	6.3	10.9	12.2	10.9	12.9
n	519	436	436	42	183

(Rest 1993:19)

Given the previous data concerning the educational level of the pastoral counsellors, their life experience and their value systems, these results are very surprising indeed. There are a number of possible interpretations which may help to explain these low results.

Firstly, Rest (1979:115) has stressed that a conservative belief system may lower your P score. The lowest P scores relating to university education have come from the Southern part of the United States which is an area notable for a conservative outlook on life. For example two of the university samples from Georgia and

Virginia had P scores of 24.5 and 34.0 respectively. This result is well below the expected university mean of 41.6 for the United States.

Secondly, Rest (1986:126) argues that there is a similar effect which results from a conservative religious ideology. Various studies of different churches and their religious ideologies indicate the lowering or raising of the P index in relation to conservative or liberal religious ideology. For example, despite a high number of years of formal education, very low P scores have been obtained at a fundamentalist seminary (22.5). These seminarians (Rest 1986:126) obtained the highest stage 4 scores ever seen on the DIT. Although they appeared to understand the higher stages of moral judgement reasoning, the seminarians believed that their own intuitions needed to be suppressed about what was fair and just. The key question was whether the DIT statements resonated with some biblical passages or part of church doctrine which they could remember. The high stage 4 result comes then from relying on an external authority such as their fundamentalist view of the bible or church dogma for the solution of moral problems.

In contrast to these studies are other results obtained concerning liberal religious ideology. Results indicate that liberal religious thinking is associated with higher P scores than conservative religious thinking. Cady (1982) for example, found that liberal clergy had higher P scores than conservative clergy. Ernsberger's (1976) study of religious ideology concludes with similar radical differences in scores between various demoninations. Conservative Baptist members scored 30.1, conservative Lutheran members 34.9 and liberal United Methodist members 46.6. In a subsequent study Ernsberger (1981) discovered that conservative clergy actually had lower P scores than conservative church members while liberal clergy had higher P scores than their members. This suggests that church leaders

tend to be more radical or dogmatic in their opinions than their members. Hence liberal religious ideology seems to stress the role of individual responsibility with less reliance on outside authority, as opposed to conservative religious ideology which tends to highlight adherence to church doctrine and external religious authority.

Thirdly, cross-cultural studies indicate some interesting trends (Rest 1978:115). Doctors for example have a fairly high level of education and fairly high P scores. A group of 157 practising physicians in the Northeast of the United States, which is regarded as a liberal geographical area, had a P score of 49.5. Paediatric registrars who had been trained in India has a P score of 32.3 while American paediatric residents had a P score of 57.2. Foreign students from Saudi Arabia at Oklahoma State University had a P score of 28.3 while the average American with comparable education averaged 41.6.

Despite these radical P score differences, Rest argues that there are however other results which indicate greater similarities of P scores cross-culturally. He is sensitive to the charge of American ego-centricism and the danger of American moral imperialism and notes with satisfaction that the highest P scores per nation tested at the moment are not American (Rest 1994:19).

The highest scores of six countries compared were in descending order, Iceland, Australia, United States, Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Of particular interest for this study is that the Asian university students peaked with a P score of between 36 to 40. This is roughly comparable to our sample. With regard to the educational variable though, one could also have expected our sample to have been more comparable to those in Australia. South Africans and Australians have very similar educational institutions. According to Rest (1994:20), forty studies of this nature suggest that the DIT is transportable and

that these countries' cultural similarities are greater
than their differences. In further support of this
argument one could probably argue that Iceland is more
ideologically liberal than the Asian countries mentioned
above which are all known to be ideologically
conservative. Despite these general conclusions, this
researcher views these results and arguments with
caution. While he too accepts a general theory of
cultural universals he views these results as very
tentative support for this theory. One does not have to
come out of a racially sensitive society like South
Africa to note how white, Anglo-Saxon cultures score
higher than Asian cultures above. What about African and
Latin American Third World societies? More information is
needed in this regard. The researcher concurs with Rest
(1986:132) that perhaps some concept other than justice
of an implicit liberal democratic variety may be useful
in certain cultures.

Fourthly, the issue of gender may also have a
bearing on the P score. Rest (1986:111) however questions
the significance of this supposed gender difference. He
notes that empirical results obtained from various
studies indicate that men and women's moral judgement
reasoning is remarkably similar and that women often
outscore men on the Defining Issues Test. He (1994:11)
thus questions Gilligan's argument that women reason
differently from men and favour an ethic of care as
typified by stage 3 moral reasoning rather than an ethic
of abstract justice as found in postconventional
thinking. Our tentative results of only four women
pastoral counsellors suggests some support for Gilligan's
view. The women pastoral counsellors generally scored one
stage below the white, male pastoral counsellors. The
women pastoral counsellors showed a preference for stages
4 moral judgement which would probably convert to a stage
3 score if using Kohlberg's instrument. The fact that
they scored higher than the black, male pastoral

counsellors does however complicate the picture somewhat.
Perhaps a study of black, women pastoral counsellors
would have been useful here as well. Given the small size
of the sample though, further research would be needed to
show definite support for or against this trend.

4.7.5.2 Comparison of pastoral counsellors and other
clergy

While discussing the Rokeach Value Scale, the researcher
undertook a comparison of the pastoral counsellor's value
systems with a group of conservative Roman Catholic
priests and liberal Methodist ministers. Results of
similar groups of Roman Catholic priests and liberal
Methodist ministers are available using the Defining
Issues Test. In order to gain a better perspective of
these comparisons, the researcher has developed his own
table of significant Christian P scores which he has
gleaned from the material. This list is particularly
helpful in highlighting how conservative and liberal
ideology show up among Christian groups, as well as the
way in which Christian leaders tend to feature in
relation to their geographical locations and fellow
professionals and congregational members. The results are
quite revealing and help to explain some of the anomalies
which the P score raises beyond the issue of educational
levels. In general the results appear to confirm the role
and influence of religious ideology upon Christian P
scores as already noted by Rest. The higher your P score
the more liberal your religious ideology and the lower
your P score the more conservative your religious
ideology.

Table 8

Comparison of P Scores with other Denominational Studies

Mean P %	N	Study and Sample Description
22.5	16	Seminarians in a fundamentalist seminary
30.1	41	Conservative Baptist church members
34.9	38	Missouri Synod Lutheran church members
39.6	20	South African Pastoral Counsellors
42.0	47	Roman Catholic priests in rural South
46.6	49	United Methodist Church members
62.5	4	United Methodist ministers in Minnesota
65.2	15	Ph D students in moral philosophy and political science, U of Minnesota.

(Adapted from personal correspondence and select bibliography sent to the researcher from Professor James Rest of the University of Minnesota.)

With reference to the above table one notes that Roman Catholic priests (Mullen:1975) in rural and small dioceses in the more conservative South of the United States had a P score of 42.0. United Methodist clergy (Ernsberger:1976) in Minneapolis, Minnesota had a P score of 62.5. The pastoral counsellors' P score of 39.6 thus appears to be more similar to the conservative Roman Catholic priests than the more liberal Methodist clergy. The white, male pastoral counsellors' P score of 42.6 is

almost identical to that of the conservative Roman
Catholic priests. Interestingly enough, the two highest
P scores of the pastoral counsellors sample at 68.3 and
60.0 are white, Methodist clergy. This again lends some
support for the role of liberal religious ideology dealt
with in the previous section of this chapter.

As already noted in the results of the Rokeach Value
Survey, the pastoral counsellors appear to exhibit fairly
conservative value systems. With this conservative
tendency in mind it becomes important to assess the
denominational ideologies which operate behind these
participants. There are five Baptists, two Pentecostals,
one Lutheran, four Presbyterians, three Anglicans, three
Methodists and two Congregationalists. As an observer of
South African churches, the researcher would conclude
that the Baptists, Pentecostals, Lutheran and
Presbyterians are probably more conservative than the
more acknowledged liberal traditions apparent in the
latter mentioned churches. Hence at least twelve out of
the twenty could possibly be classified as clergy and
members of conservative denominations and possible
conservative religious ideologies. It must however be
admitted that individual ministers from all these
denominations could exhibit more liberal thinking than
their churches as the South African situation has been
extremely polarised politically in this regard. This
general interpretation of religious ideology would also
go some way towards helping to explain the low P score
level of such a well educated and mature adult group. The
researcher also feels that more clarity of the cross-
cultural application of the test would be helpful. The
foreign nature of the test might have a bearing on the P
scores in this study. Larger samples would be useful to
see if this is indeed the case. Some qualitative
interviews in this regard might also be important.

values rather than a focus on one moral value as found in the Defining Issues Test. This means that the broader Rokeach Value System is harder to compare with the narrower focus of primarily the one moral value of justice than at first seems possible when reading about the two tests.

The researcher surmises that the Rokeach Value Survey and the Defining Issues Test are not fully compatible and are testing different psychological characteristics of the participants. It is also probable that the Rokeach Value Survey is testing the emotions more than the cognitive reasoning focus of the Defining Issues Test. Rokeach's definition of a value as combining affect and conceptualisation to direct action underlines this emotive element. Hence the values of love and forgiveness appear to this researcher to have a greater emotive dimension than the more abstract concept of justice.

These conclusions are further underlined by the use of the Spearman correlation coefficient which was used to compare the results of the two tests. In statistical terms (Chase 1967:92), correlation refers to techniques which indicate in numerical terms the extent of the relationship between two variables. These numerical units range from zero to 1.00. If the two variables overlap in magnitude in the same direction, the relationship is positive and the correlation coefficient will be a positive number between zero and 1.00. If the two variables change in magnitude in opposite directions in that one increases and the other decreases, then the relationship is negative and the number will be from zero to -1.00. The correlation coefficient comparing these two test results suggests little relationship between them.

Two previous studies (Rest 1978:198) have correlated the DIT and the Rokeach Value Survey. The correlation of the DIT and the terminal value systems of the two studies led to the following results.

Table 6.17. DIT Correlations with Rokeach Value Survey

Value Word	Study Standring, 1976	Lockley, 1976
Comfortable life	.05	−.17
Exciting	.38	NS
Sense of accomplishment	.23	NS
World at peace	.30	NS
World of beauty	.16	NS
Equality	.36	NS
Family security	−.37	NS
Freedom	.50	NS
Happiness	−.24	NS
Inner harmony	.34	.18
Mature love	−.05	NS
National security	−.52	NS
Pleasure	.63	NS
Salvation	−.60	−.29
Self-respect	.18	NS
Social recognition	−.13	NS
True friendship	.04	NS
Wisdom	.12	NS
Sample	33 college students in New Zealand	190 college students in New Jersey

The Standring study of New Zealand college students obtained much higher correlations than did the Lockley study of New Jersey college students. Rest (1978:197) surmises that the different sample sizes and different geographical locations may have played a part in this inconsistency. The Lockley study found only two values with significant correlations in the direction of Standring and these were the values of "inner-harmony" and "salvation."

The current researcher's results are more comparable to the Lockley study than the Standring study. There was little correlation found to exist between the two tests in the South African sample. Two values did however evidence some correlation. A significant correlation between the P score and the terminal values of pleasure (-0.3889) and wisdom (-0.5657) was discovered. In these two values alone there is some comparison with the trend in Standring's study. The Lockley study also correlated the Defining Issues Test with Rokeach's instrumental values system and only the value of "broadminded" showed

a correlation of 0.20. The South African study also showed little correlation between the DIT and the instrumental value system. A significant correlation between the P score and three instrumental values was however obtained. These were the instrumental values of clean (0.4493), forgiving (0.4692) and intellectual (0.5184). Again the difference with the Lockley study is obvious. The two instruments appear to be testing different psychological constructs which exhibit so little significant correlational ability.

4.9 Implications for pastoral counselling

In this section of the chapter, the researcher will discuss the implications of the research results for these specific pastoral counsellors in the South African context. In doing so the thesis will be guided by the answers to the research questions which have now become available. These answers are suggestive of several major trends which have become evident and may influence pastoral counsellor and parishioner pairing.

4.9.1 The value systems of the pastoral counsellors

The entire sample of pastoral counsellors indicated a concern for introverted end values of salvation, family security, inner-harmony and self-respect with the women and black pastoral counsellors showing a greater concern for broader social values such as equality, freedom and a world at peace. The instrumental value system of the entire sample focused on loving, honest, forgiving, responsible, loyal and helpful. The priority of choosing moral values is stressed by the group. The centrality of loving and forgiving for the Christian value system is affirmed. The middle-range means values of broadminded and intellectual suggests that the group favours emotive instrumental values over cognitive head values.

The women pastoral counsellors chose forgiving, honesty, responsible, loyal and courageous mean values above loving and being helpful. As with their end values, loving is seen to be a middle-range value and not a priority. The black pastoral counsellors chose forgiving, courageous, helpful, loving and responsible as priority values. They highlighted the value of cleanliness far above the two other sub-groups.

The results of locating the priority of these counsellors' value systems suggest that they would be very comfortable with the more conservative Protestant value systems which probably remain dominant in many of our mainline denominations and parishes. If one accepts the idea of pairing according to comparable value systems, it would appear that the more conservative members would be most comfortable with the value systems and value-conversion possibilities which they would gain from interaction with the white, male pastoral counsellors. The more liberal members of these denominations would probably find the value systems of the women and black pastoral counsellors more compatible. Their common religious concerns for equality, freedom and a world at peace would no doubt facilitate communication between counsellor and client. Since the major difference between the sub-groups is with their end values, the mean values commonality suggests the possibility that all these pastoral counsellors have much in common with all Christians, particularly with regard to the instrumental values of loving and forgiving. The difficulties of pastoral counsellors counselling across gender and race suggests that there may be more problems inherent in such counselling than is generally conceded in our South African churches. Although change is underway, the white, male clergy continue to dominate most churches and most pastoral counselling situations.

4.9.2 The moral judgement development levels of the pastoral counsellors

The pastoral counsellors as a group are particularly sensitive to stage 4 moral judgement development or the law and order stage of moral reasoning. This indicates a group of people who are largely comfortable with institutional settings as is found in churches. There is some openness to stage 5 moral judgement reasoning with an interest in arranging different social orders. There is also a concern of the black pastoral counsellors for the ethics of care orientation of stage 3. There is a strong desire for care and cooperation between families and the primary societal groupings.

In the pastoral counselling situation this sample would tend to counsel in line with their conforming values towards the norms found in church institutions and society in general. They would conceive of justice primarily as conformity to set laws and norms. Pastoral counselling would tend to support a conventional morality rather than a more innovative postconventional morality. There would be a stress on duty and doing the responsible thing in support of general group conformity. The counsellor might become like a moral policeman with a concern for rules that guide behaviour. Clarity and unambiguity of just norms would probably be emphasised with a tendency to support the status quo in the church and society. The acceptance of a largely common moral context compatible with church and societal institutions could give the pastoral counsellors considerable authority in their relationship with their clients. They and most of the leadership in the church would probably be at the same moral judgement level. They could find themselves to be in very powerful positions as counsellors and in Browning's (1991:278) terminology, more maintainers rather than creators of a religio-moral cultural vision.

The entire sample also shows some openness and recognition of postconventional moral judgement development levels. This should be further encouraged. To hold a law and order mentality and morality has its limitations with its tendency to comfort like minded people and a tendency towards uncritical support of the status quo. The stated goal for these participants in general should be to become more creative and innovative. Further training and education is clearly needed in this regard. Pastoral counsellors who are at more advanced stages of moral judgement development should be particularly well equipped to take a broad view of life and set a developmental example which others would seek to emulate.

Rest's theory of moral development also enables the pastoral counsellor to realise that various people will approach the pastoral counsellors at various levels of moral judgement development. This realisation should enable the pastoral counsellor to assess and reflect on possible avenues for such persons. Much of the material written by Capps (1981:131) and Browning (1983:63) is concerned with the use of Kohlberg and other developmental theorists for counselling purposes. The current researcher would like to suggest some of his own thoughts in this regard.

Parishioners who come for counselling who favour stage 1 moral reasoning would be looking for security through the authority of the pastoral counsellor. They would feel that obedience to the directives of others is a prime virtue. Their level of moral immaturity would lead them to hold on to whatever authority they find persuasive. Parishioners who favour stage 2 moral reasoning are looking for role models with whom to interact in supporting their moral deals. They will be likely to bargain a great deal with themselves and the pastoral counsellor.

Parishioners who are particularly sensitive to stage 3 moral judgement development are looking for affirmation and praise from their peer groups. They invariably want an intimate personal relationship with pastoral counsellors and others in authority. People in this stage should be particularly open to growth groups and support groups. They could be encouraged to move beyond personal counselling to growth groups such as those advocated by Howard Clinebell (1984:349).

Persons who feel comfortable with stage 4 moral reasoning are searching for clearcut moral and social rules for the ordering of personal and social life. Parishioners with a law and order mentality feel particularly responsible and duty bound to support institutions such as the church. These people are often church leaders and active members of church groups. When individuals of this sort approach the counsellor, the counsellor should be aware of the needs of such leaders or potential leaders. The sample of South African pastoral counsellors would have much in common with such persons.

Parishioners with a preference for stage 5 moral judgement reasoning are probably questioning and even doubting their faith and morality and the social organisations of society such as the church. They are the parishioners who have a reputation for creativity and new ideas. They are imaginative and willing to take risks. They can become angry with tradition bound institutions like the church. Should counsellors not have reached this stage they may have difficulty understanding and caring for such people who may eventually leave the church. This highlights the importance of these pastoral counsellors being open to postconventional moral reasoning ability.

The distinction between stage 5A and 5B thinking stressed in the Defining Issues Test also needs to be noted. Stage 5A tends to relate to groups of people within institutional settings and stage 5B focuses on

individuals who may tend to move beyond the limits of institutional life. The institutional preference of the pastoral counsellors is again clear here with a preference for institutional authority rather than individual non-conformity. As already mentioned, these pastoral counsellors would do well with established groups and institutions. They have a strong sense of loyalty and duty to their organisations. It would be useful to build on the postconventional reasoning ability of these pastoral counsellors through some sort of intervention and monitor their possible growth.

Parishioners and counsellors at stage 6 are an extreme minority. They favour principles above conventional rules and tend to come across as non-conformists. Their vision of life may be so different from the majority of parishioners that they may be perceived as a threat to the standard way of life accepted by most church groups. These high moral achievers can be significant church leaders if the church members are tolerant enough. Pastoral counsellors dealing with such a moral reasoning elite should be cautious of too much direction towards conventional moral reasoning. Pastoral counsellors will have to recognise such reasoning and learn to understand the importance of such individuals for the church and wider society. They should not be threatened by them.

4.10 Conclusion

The empirical results show many interesting trends about the sample of pastoral counsellors. The hypothesis concerning the similarity of the value systems of the three sub-groups was proved to be largely correct. The sub-groups exhibited very similar value systems and moral judgement development levels. Turning more specifically to the individual instruments reveals the following trends.

The Rokeach Value Survey results showed that the majority of the sample were predominantly preoccupied with introspective, self-actualising values with a minority showing more concern for broader social values. This minority turned out to be mostly the women and black pastoral counsellors. The results highlight the diverse tendencies between the three sub-groups and suggest that the predominant group of white, male pastoral counsellors have more conservative value systems than their women and black counterparts. Comparisons of this sample of pastoral counsellors with a group of conservative Roman Catholic priets and liberal Methodist ministers was also revealing. In general the pastoral counsellors had more in common with the conservative Roman Catholic priests than the liberal Methodist ministers. The similarities between the sample of pastoral counsellors' instrumental values and those of the priests and ministers were striking. This result suggests the possibility that most Christian leaders, priests and pastoral counsellors exhibit a largely common instrumental value system. Also striking were the major differences that emerged when comparing the terminal values of the various sub-groups and the priests and ministers. Here the differences between personal and social values already alluded to came to the fore.

The Defining Issues Test revealed that despite the very high educational qualifications of the group, the sample scored only 39.6 on the P score. A search for factors which might explain this score led to the question of religious ideology. The conservative nature of the sample was again confirmed as a major reason for the P score. The cross-cultural factor was also cited as a possible explanation as this sample's results largely parallel those of university students in Asian countries like Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan who have P scores between 36 and 40. Comparisons with other groups of clergy gave additional support to the contention of the

conservative nature of the pastoral counsellors. The pastoral counsellors had a P score closer to that of the conservative Roman Catholic priests than the liberal Methodist ministers.

The empirical results of the Rokeach Value Survey and Defining Issues Test are also full of implications for the discipline of pastoral counselling and counsellor-client pairing. Although not fully compatible the two tests imply that the pastoral counsellors would tend to counsel in support of conservative and conforming value systems and moral judgement development levels. This trend suggests that the pastoral counsellors and most parishioners would be largely compatible as they exhibit support for a Protestant value system and world view. The danger of such conservative counselling and influence towards conforming values is that it is likely to stunt the development of higher moral maturity and any movement away from an introspective value system. The pastoral counsellors should thus become more consciously aware of their value systems and levels of moral judgement development and their possible implications for their current counselling practices. The need for further education in counselling and a broader and greater sensitivity for post conventional moral judgement development is apparent.

The ambiguous nature of the empirical results also needs to be noted. The manner in which the Rokeach Value Survey picked up one seemingly liberal trend and the Defining Issues Test the exact opposite liberal trend is an intriguing result. One possibility would be that the group be retested within a year or so to see if their results are still the same. It would also be useful to administer another questionnaire which distinguishes more clearly between liberal and conservative value systems and orientations in order to try to gain greater clarity about this paradoxical result. Perhaps an in-depth interview of a qualitative nature might also help to clarify these confusing trends.

Finally, the paradoxical trends of these two instruments raise questions about their limitations. A serious question in the mind of this researcher is the efficacy of the Defining Issues Test. A major anomaly for this researcher remains the P scores of the black pastoral counsellors. The researcher knows them all personally and is aware that they are all deeply involved in the current project of nation building in South Africa. They are politically aware people who are particularly concerned with the transformative prospects of their lives and this society. The omission of a high P score leads this researcher to wonder how the instrument failed to pick up this tendency among this sub-group. Regardless of the P score results, in this researcher's opinion, they remain the most radical and liberal sub-group of the entire sample.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1   Introduction

This chapter will focus on the conclusions and
recommendations of this thesis. The chapter will begin
with a summary of the research results and respond to the
research questions and working hypotheses of the research
project. The chapter will attempt to develop guidelines
and suggestions for further research projects regarding
values and moral development issues. Various alternative
instruments and methods of research will be explored.

5.2   Research questions and working hypotheses

The research questions to be addressed were the
following.
        Firstly, what are the value systems of a sample of
pastoral counsellors in the South African context? The
Rokeach Value Survey gave concrete evidence of certain
significant trends among the pastoral counsellors as a
whole and as members of three sub-groups. In general the
group had conservative value systems typical of
conservative Christians. The terminal values systems were
largely introspective and aimed at self-actualisation.
The priority of the terminal value of salvation was
evidence of this fact. The liberal minority of the group
were the women and black pastoral counsellors who showed
more interest in the social values of equality, a world
of peace and freedom than in the introspective values of
self-actualisation. The entire sample however showed
remarkably uniform instrumental value systems. The
priorities of the Christian values of loving, forgiving,

honesty and fidelity were affirmed. The fact that these pastoral counsellors place moral values above competence values in their personal value systems is an interesting finding. Given the group's passion for higher education this finding suggests that their formation in the Christian world view takes precedence over their educational value priorities. Further it suggests that the group favours a specific kind of deontological behaviour and value system.

Secondly, what are the moral judgement development levels of the pastoral counsellors? The sample as a whole showed a preference for conventional moral reasoning with an openness to postconventional moral reasoning. The three sub-groups varied in their view of social cooperation. The white, male counsellors showing greater interest in the principled justice issues than the other two sub-groups. The women pastoral counsellors were strongly motivated by law and order reasoning and the black male pastoral counsellors by a concern for primary group relationships.

Thirdly, what is the relationship between the rank ordering of values and pastoral counsellors' levels of moral judgement development? The conservative tendency of the entire sample was affirmed by both instruments. However the paradoxical result obtained by the two instruments should also be noted. The terminal value systems of the three sub-groups indicated that the white, male pastoral counsellors were probably more conservative than the women and black pastoral counsellors. The Defining Issues Test however picked up exactly the opposite trend, which suggested that the white, male pastoral counsellors were more liberal than their colleagues. This lead the researcher to a particular interest in the religious ideological background of all the participants as an attempt to explain this contradictory result. The conservative religious ideological background of at least 12 of the 20

participants was affirmed. The use of the Spearman correlational coefficient confirmed the impression of the research results that the two instruments are not as compatible as one might have expected.

Fourthly, what implications could these variables have for pastoral-client pairing in pastoral counselling? Both instruments indicate that the conservative nature of the pastoral counsellors would no doubt make them very effective counsellors in most denominations. The fact that the three sub-groups of pastoral counsellors had common instrumental value systems is a significant finding. This result suggests that the pastoral counsellors could probably relate to almost all Christians at this level of instrumental value systems. It seems likely that almost all Christians affirm the priority of the values of loving and forgiving and these common instrumental values could provide a significant starting point for much pastoral counselling. The greater diversity of end values would suggest that more liberal Christian parishioners might relate better to the women and black pastoral counsellors with their greater concern for social values than with the white males. The Defining Issues Test underlines the impression of the Rokeach Value Survey that these pastoral counsellors would tend to fit into the institutional setting of the church very comfortably. Their preference for stages 3 and 4 moral judgement development levels makes them interested in maintaining the status quo within communities. Clearly their alliance with the leadership of the church would place them in a powerful position to advocate certain moral norms and values in pastoral counselling. More than likely these moral norms and values would aim at supporting and conforming to the status quo in church and society.

The above conclusions however need to take account of the danger which the two questionnaires' results indicate about the pastoral counsellors. Their tendency

to support the status quo and advocate conforming moral justice reasoning is a limitation. Clearly the postconventional level of moral justice reasoning needs to be developed by this group in order to enhance the prospect of greater moral insight and moral health. A major recommendation of this thesis would be that the pastoral counsellors become better educated in dealing with moral and values issues in pastoral counselling. The pastoral counsellors should be encouraged to develop a greater social consciousness as well as higher postconventional judgement levels through means including educational and experiential interventions. The possibility of pastoral counsellors receiving specific training in values therapy should also be considered.

The two working hypotheses were found to be partially valid. The conclusions reached were the following.

Firstly, the rank ordering of values in a value system was only partially reflected in the level of moral judgement development of the counsellors. Apart from the strong conservative trend which the two instruments picked up, their general lack of compatibility left the researcher with ambiguous results. The rank ordering of values and the level of moral judgement development were not well correlated. The researcher concluded that the two instruments were most probably testing different psychological constructs with the Rokeach instrument more orientated toward emotions and the Defining Issues Test more orientated towards thinking and cognition. The Spearman's correlational coefficient and the two comparable studies of Lockley and Standring using the instruments confirmed the incompatible tendencies of the instruments.

Secondly, the hypothesis that the three sub-groups would exhibit common value systems and similar levels of moral judgement development was proved to be largely correct. The two sub-groups of the women and black

counsellors again showed more homogeneous value systems and levels of moral judgment development than the white male pastoral counsellors. The limited number of participants in these two sub-groups however leads one to state this conclusion with some caution. The variety of scores of the white, male pastoral counsellors produced by the Defining Issues Test for example, suggests that a similar trend could have been evidenced by a greater number of women and black pastoral counsellors had they been available for this thesis. The white, male pastoral counsellors varied with P scores ranging from 21.7 to 68.3 which does not indicate a homogeneous result. Despite this criticism of the trends, the three sub-group scores did however exhibit many common characteristics. In the Rokeach Value Survey the women and black pastoral counsellors had distinctly different terminal value systems from the white male pastoral counsellors. In the Defining Issues Test the white male pastoral counsellors had a P score of 42.6, the white females 38.75 and the black male pastoral counsellors 27.8. These differences were distinctive and revealed largely common ways of reflecting about moral dilemmas.

5.3   Recommendations

The research project has unearthed some interesting trends which should be explored in greater depth in future studies. The current researcher would include the following recommendations for further research.

In future studies a larger sample should be selected. In this study, the delimitation of the sample to 20 ultimately gave the researcher limited results. The decision to break down the sample into three small subgroups also proved difficult. A sample of 40 or 50 of the students who had taken the Honours course in Pastoral Counselling and Christian Ethics would have been a considerable improvement.

A future study should be made solely of women pastoral counsellors or black pastoral counsellors. It seems to the current researcher that more detailed studies of a larger number of women pastoral counsellors or black pastoral counsellors would be beneficial to the entire white male dominated profession. Do the implicit trends of gender and race picked up in the study continue when the numbers are increased or not? Are the Rokeach Value Survey and Defining Issues Test in fact gender and racially blind or not? Is the possibility of culturally universal testing really convincing or not?

Closely related to this theme would be to make a more detailed cross-cultural study of pastoral counsellors' personal value systems and moral reasoning trends. David Augsburger in his book entitled, Pastoral Counseling across Cultures (1986), raises significant questions about the theory of cultural universality supported by this study and the instruments used in it. We note two small examples in this regard which should be taken up in future studies.

Firstly, Augsburger (1986:152) stresses that some cultures affirm "doing" rather than "being". Cultures which are shaped by activism often show a preference for technology, progress, success, production and invention. This is typical of the American culture which produced Hiltner and his emphasis upon "doing" or as Oden describes it, "unvarnished pragmatism" (Oden 1984:26). American and much of Western culture stresses that individual goals are more important than group goals. Other cultures like those in Africa and parts of Asia admire the perspective of "being." This affirmation of "being" stresses that individual goals are subordinated to group goals (Augsburger 1986:153).

Secondly, some societies emphasise equality, while others emphasise hierarchy (Augsburger 1986:158). Augsburger argues that the priority of the Western value of equality is comparable to the value of hierarchy for

most non-Western cultures. This radical distinction could
have a great bearing on understanding the cultural
differences in P scores already mentioned. According to
Augsburger equality is not a universal priority which
must lead one to ask questions about what the other
priorities are in Asian and African cultures.

The possibility of adapting other instruments to
test value systems and moral judgement development levels
should also be considered. The development of an ethics
of care instrument as advocated by Gilligan could lead
towards better results being obtained regarding the
caring dimension of moral reasoning of a group such as
this sample. Other instruments of interest include
Hogan's Survey of Ethical Attitudes (1970) instrument and
Van Hoose and Paradise's Ethical Judgement Scale. Both of
these instruments have been developed specifically for
testing therapists and counsellors, which would be a
considerable advantage in future studies. Hogan developed
his instrument to assess counsellors' differences along
a continuum of ethical orientations. He called the
orientations the "ethics of personal conscience" and the
"ethics of social responsibility." He placed these
orientations at the opposite ends of the continuum with
participants tending to favour one or the other
orientation. He described the ethics of personal
conscience as placing a heavy emphasis upon personal and
intuitive notions of right and wrong. The ethics of
social responsibility stressed criteria for evaluating
the existing legal system and general welfare of society
in the search for a settled society. He compared the
ethics of personal conscience to Kohlberg's stage 3 and
the ethics of social responsibility to Kohlberg's stage
4. Unlike Kohlberg however, he does not feel that either
is superior to the other.

Van Hoose and Paradise's (1979) Ethical Judgement
Scale postulates five stages of ethical orientation in
counsellors. These range along a continuum from ethical

judgement relying totally on external variables to internally defined principles of an ethically responsible counsellor. It has been found that counsellors tend to favour a specific stage of ethical orientation along this continuum. The Ethical Judgement Scale presents the counsellor with 25 paragraph-length examples of ethically sensitive counselling situations with a five choice response coded to represent one of the five stages. The results are generally comparable to those of Kohlberg's test.

Besides these general psychological questionnaires there is clearly the need to adapt or develop a more specifically Christian instrument to test pastoral counsellors' value systems and moral judgement development levels. The researcher originally considered using Fowler's faith development instrument with its narrative or story approach to ascertain the faith maturity level of counsellors. Fowler's instrument (1987:129) does not however deal specifically with moral values or moral issues. Eyber's disclosive model of an ethic of responsibility correlated with the psychoanalytic concept of generativity and narrative interview method shows promise of parallel studies. The Religious and Moral Values questionnaire (1995) developed by the Department of Practical Theology at the University of South Africa to test the moral and religious values of young people in the new South Africa could also be adapted for subsequent research. The questionnaire is lengthy and includes a variety of issues such as view of God, moral issues such as abortion and euthanasia, ecological and social and political preferences.

The above examples of varied instruments lead the researcher to suggest developing an instrument which should ideally do the following. The instrument should be a unique instrument aimed at testing pastoral counsellors' values and moral reasoning ability. It should include pastoral counselling incidents and

controversies which challenge a Christian counsellor most specifically. It should be clearly conceptualised and operationalised and have an appealing format. A pilot study in this regard would be useful. A more qualitative style of study with in-depth interviews might also be important in trying to obtain greater understanding of these profound variables of values and moral reasoning.

There is also the possibility and necessity of studying ongoing counselling situations with pastoral counsellors and their parishioners. The use of volunteers and precounselling and postcounselling assessments should be undertaken. Actual counselling sessions should be made, subject to rigorous scientific conditions, and the place and role of values and particularly moral values assessed. The possibility of taping or video taping sessions should be investigated. This type of study could be complemented by other instruments such as those mentioned above as well.

Another recommendation would be to broaden the scope of the research projects beyond that of the personal values of the therapist or pastoral counsellor. Future studies should attempt to test and integrate the personal, professional and therapeutic values of the pastoral counsellors. What professional value systems and therapeutic orientations do pastoral counsellor's actually prefer in practice? Do the personal value systems and moral judgement developmental levels of the pastoral counsellors lead them towards a preference for a certain kind of counselling practice? Also, do pastoral counsellors regard themselves as neo-Rogerian, neo-Freudian, growth counsellors, rational-emotive pastoral counsellors or do they ultimately favour an eclectic method? Do their personal and professional values lead them towards taking an active or passive approach to pastoral counselling? While the current researcher agrees with Beutler and Bergin that the personal values of the counsellor are probably the major factor leading towards

the success and failure of therapy, there remain countless other key variables which need to be understood and studied.

In conclusion, the researcher has been personally challenged by the evidence of what he has discovered. He has experienced ongoing cognitive dissonance while attempting to understand the value systems and moral judgment development levels of his colleagues. He has also understood some of his own priorities for the first time. Some cognitive consonance has emerged with the completion of the thesis.

APPENDIX 1

8 November,1995

Dear Colleague,

Greetings from UNISA.

As mentioned in our telephone conversation I am currently undertaking research toward my Ph D degree entitled, "Pastoral Counsellors' Value Systems and Moral Judgement Development: A Practical Theological Study." I have been bothered for several years by questions of values and moral values in pastoral counselling. Enclosed are two questionnaires, the Rokeach Value Survey and The Defining Issues Test which attempt to address these two themes.

1. The Rokeach Value Survey.

The Rokeach Value survey consists of two sets of alphabetically arranged values (along with a brief, defining phrase in parenthesis). The first set consists of end-states (terminal values) and the other set consists of modes of behaviour (instrumental or means values). The questionnaire requires you to rank your preference of end and mean values in a hierarchy of importance. These should indicate "the order of importance to you as guiding principles in your life."

2. The Rest Defining Issues Test.

The Defining Issues Test has been developed by James Rest who was a colleague of Lawrence Kohlberg at Harvard University. Rest's test is basically a version of Kohlberg's well known moral development test. The Defining Issues Test asks respondents to define the critical "issues" which a person might consider in making a decision about a set "dilemma". Six dilemmas are used accompanied by a list of key issues. The respondent is asked to decide by way of prioritising which issue they see as most important through to the least important issue.

Both of the above tests are American instruments but have been used widely in many countries. For example the Rest test has been used in forty countries. Both are thus standardised tests with cross-cultural possibilities.

Kindly read through the instructions carefully and fill in the questionnaires and return them to me as soon as possible. As a guideline, try to fill them out within 5 days of your receipt of them. Return them to me in the addressed letter with the enclosed stamp. There is no time limit on the questionnaires although many participants take about 45-60 minutes to complete each test.

KINDLY SEAL THE ENVELOPE WITH STAPLES OR VERY STRONG TAPE (SUCH AS MASKING TAPE) TO ENSURE THAT THE CONTENTS DOES NOT FALL OUT.
TAKE CARE NOT TO BEND THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST ANSWER SHEET AS THIS IS BASICALLY A COMPUTER CARD AND BENT OR FOLDED CARDS WILL BE REJECTED FOR SCORING PURPOSES. KINDLY USE AN HB PENCIL (A STANDARD PENCIL) AND MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE DATA IS CLEARLY MARKED IN A DARK PENCIL MARK.

I would hope to have all the questionnaires back to me by 4 DECEMBER so that I can send them to the United States for scoring. Thanks for your participation.

Your's sincerely,
REV. MARK HESTENES.

APPENDIX 2

Thesis Demographic Questionnaire

```
NAME                        .........................................
SURNAME                     .........................................
AGE                         .........................................
SEX                         .........................................
MARITAL STATUS              .........................................
DENOMINATION                .........................................
PROVINCE OF RESIDENCE.......................................
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PROFESSION (Kindly tick)  1.  FULL-TIME MINISTER/PRIEST........
                          2.  PART-TIME MINISTER/PRIEST........
                          3.  TEACHER             ........
                          4.  NURSE               ........
                          5.  PSYCHOLOGIST         ........
                          6.  SOCIAL WORKER        ........
                          7.  SECRETARY            ........
                          8.  ACCOUNTANT           ........
                          9.  HOUSEWIFE            ........
                         10.  ADMINISTRATOR        ........
                         11.  BUSINESSMAN OR BUSINESSWOMAN.....
                         12.  OTHER-KINDLY STATE    ........
                              ...............................
                              ...............................
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YEARS IN PROFESSION       1.FULL-TIME MINISTER/PRIEST   ........
      (Kindly state)      2.PART-TIME MINISTER/PRIEST   ........
                          3.TEACHER               ........
                          4.NURSE                 ........
                          5.PSYCHOLOGIST           ........
                          6.SOCIAL WORKER          ........
                          7.SECRETARY              ........
                          8.ACCOUNTANT             ........
                          9.HOUSEWIFE              ........
                         10.ADMINISTRATOR          ........
                         11.BUSINESSMAN OR BUSINESSWOMAN.......
                         12.OTHER-KINDLY STATE      ........
                              ...............................
                              ...............................
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EDUCATION(Kindly state)1.  B.A degree, B.Sc.degree.    ........
                           B.Comm.B.Admin,B.Nursing,B.Ed......
                       .........................................
                       2.  B.TH.HONS.DEGREE.           ........
                       .........................................
                       3.  MASTERS DEGREE in theology
                           or another discipline.     ........
                       .........................................
                       .........................................
                       4.  DOCTORS DEGREE in theology
                           or another discipline.     ........
                       .........................................
                       5.  Other qualifications.       ........
                       .........................................
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204

APPENDIX 3

TERMINAL VALUES OF WHITE, MALE PASTORAL COUNSELLORS

End Values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	Me
1.Comfortable life								1				1	1		1	3	2	4	16
2.Exciting life		1		1				1	2			3		2	2		1		12
3.Accomplishment			1	1	2		1	2	1		1	1	1	1	1				8
4.World of peace			2					1			2	1	1	3		1	1	1	12
5.World of beauty								1		1		2	3	2		3	1		13
6.Equality			1	1	1				1	2	1	1	2	1	2				10.5
7.Family security	3	6				1	1	1		1									2
8.Freedom		1		1		1		2	2	4			1		1				10
9.Health			3	1	1	1	1	1	3		1		1						6.5
10.Inner-harmony	1	1	1	3	1	3		2	1										4.5
11.Mature love		1	1	2	2	1	2	1	2					1					5.5
12.National sec.										1			2		1	4	2	3	16
13.Pleasure								1			1		1	1	3		3	3	15
14.Salvation	6	1			1		1	1						1		1	1		1.5
15.Self-respect	1	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	1		1								5
16.Social recog.			1							2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	13.5
17.True friendsh.			1	1	1	2	3	2			2	1							7
18.Wisdom	2	2		1	4	1		2		1									6

APPENDIX 4

TERMINAL VALUES OF WHITE, FEMALE PASTORAL COUNSELLORS

End Values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	Me
1.Comfortable life			1													1	1	1	16.5
2.Exciting life								1				1		2					13.5
3.Accomplishment					2	1							1						6.5
4.World of peace					1		1		1	1									9
5.World of beauty												2		1	1				14
6.Equality			1	1		1		1											5.5
7.Family security			1				2		1										5
8.Freedom					1	1		1	1										7
9.Health			2			1					1								4
10.Inner-harmony			1					1					1	1					12.5
11.Mature love										2	2								11.5
12.National sec.					1			1	1							1			9
13.Pleasure																1	3		18
14.Salvation		4																	1
15.Self-respect		1				1		1				1							8
16.Social recog.														2		1	1		15
17.True friendsh.						1		1		1	1								10
18.Wisdom		2	1				1												2.5

APPENDIX 5

TERMINAL VALUES OF BLACK, MALE PASTORAL COUNSELLORS

End Values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	Me
1.Comfortable life						1							1				1		13
2.Exciting life									1						1		1		15
3.Accomplishment						1		1					1						9
4.World of peace						1					1				1				6
5.World of beauty												1			1	1			15
6.Equality	1		1						1										4
7.Family security	2							1											1
8.Freedom		1		1												1			5
9.Health	2	1																	2
10.Inner-harmony								1	1	1									8
11.Mature love									1		1				1				11
12.National sec.								1				1		1					12
13.Pleasure																	1	2	18
14.Salvation			1								1		1						11
15.Self-respect				1	1							1							5
16.Social recog.			1												1		1		15
17.True friendsh.			1		1								1						7
18.Wisdom								1	1				1						10

APPENDIX 6

INSTRUMENTAL VALUES OF WHITE, MALE PASTORAL COUNSELLORS

Mean Values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	Me
1. Ambitious		1							2		2	1	1	1		1		4	13.5
2. Broadminded			1	1	1		1	1	1	2				1	1	2	1		10.5
3. Capable				2		1	1	3		1		1	1	1	1	1			8
4. Clean							1		1			2	1		1	1	5	1	15.5
5. Courageous	1		2	1		2	1	2	1					2		1			6.5
6. Forgiving	1	1	2	1	2	2				1	1	1	1						5
7. Helpful		2	1		1		3	3	2	1									7
8. Honest	5	1	3	1	3														2.5
9. Imaginative				1		2	1	1	1	1			2	1		2		1	9.5
10. Independent						1		1			2	1	1		4		1	2	14
11. Intellectual			1	3		1		2		2			2	1		1			9
12. Logical				1	2				2				1	2		2	2	1	13.5
13. Loving	3	5	2	1				1		1									2
14. Loyal		2	1	1	1	3			1	2		1		1					6
15. Obedient							1				2	1	1		2	3		3	13
16. Polite	1						1				2		3	2		3	1		15
17. Responsible	2		2	1		1	3	1	2			1							6.5
18. Self-control				1		1		1	1		2	3	2	1	1				11.5

APPENDIX 7

INSTRUMENTAL VALUES OF BLACK, MALE PASTORAL COUNSELLORS

Mean Values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	Me
1. Ambitious		1														1		1	16
2. Broadminded		1				1											1		7
3. Capable						1	1						1						8
4. Clean								1	2										10
5. Courageous			2									1							4
6. Forgiving	2		1																2
7. Helpful	1		1	1															4
8. Honest				1	1								1						6
9. Imaginative								1				1	1						13
10. Independent							1							1	1				15
11. Intellectual									1							2			17
12. Logical													3						11
13. Loving	3																		1
14. Loyal				1												1		1	15
15. Obedient						1						1	1						11
16. Polite							1					1				1			12
17. Responsible		1		1									1						6
18. Self-control									1			1			1				13

APPENDIX 8

INSTRUMENTAL VALUES OF WHITE, FEMALE PASTORAL COUNSELLORS

Mean Values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	Me
1. Ambitious									1				2	1					14
2. Broadminded						1		1								2			13
3. Capable						1					1	1	1						11.5
4. Clean						1									1	1	1		16.5
5. Courageous	1		1					1	1										6.5
6. Forgiving	1	1	1										1						2.5
7. Helpful					1	1		1								1			7
8. Honest	1	1	1					1											2.5
9. Imaginative								1					1					2	15.5
10. Independent							2			1							1		10.5
11. Intellectual						1	1		1								1		9
12. Logical					1					1			1		1				12.5
13. Loving	1				1	1								1					6.5
14. Loyal		1	1	2															4
15. Obedient											2	1			1				12.5
16. Polite										1			2		1				15
17. Responsible	1	3																	4
18. Self-control		1		1					1	1									7.5

PPENDIX 9

EFINING ISSUES TEST: GROUP STATISTICS

MPIRICAL RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE CENTRE FOR ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT,
NIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA. JULY 1996.

Descriptive Statistics for Total Sample, Subsamples, and Norm Groups

GROUP		Stage2	Stage3	Stage4	Stage5A	Stage5B	Stage6	A	M	P	D	U
Sub 1	MEAN	2.750	9.667	20.167	15.500	4.667	4.500	2.000	0.750	41.117	25.105	0.223
(n= 12)	SD	2.301	4.849	7.744	5.452	2.605	2.541	1.537	0.965	11.705	5.622	0.133
Sub 3	MEAN	2.250	4.500	28.000	13.000	5.500	4.750	1.250	0.750	38.750	22.993	0.125
(n= 4)	SD	2.062	3.317	2.000	2.944	3.000	4.031	1.893	1.500	4.594	6.704	0.055
Sub 4	MEAN	3.333	14.333	24.000	10.667	3.000	3.000	1.667	0.000	27.800	18.912	0.095
(n= 3)	SD	2.517	0.577	3.606	2.082	2.646	1.000	1.528	0.000	5.351	2.161	0.155
TOTAL	MEAN	2.750	9.200	22.450	14.250	4.350	4.500	1.900	0.600	38.505	23.583	0.186
(N= 20)	SD	2.124	4.959	6.848	4.734	2.777	2.724	1.585	0.995	10.396	5.573	0.131

Norms from Previous Samples -- see GUIDE

GROUP		Stage2	Stage3	Stage4	Stage5A	Stage5B	Stage6	A	M	P	D	U
Jr Hi	MEAN	6.300	15.000	20.240	8.010	2.530	1.410	3.760	2.680	20.000	10.340	0.103
(n= 270)	SD	3.100	5.310	5.740	4.610	2.490	1.890	2.890	2.210	9.040	5.830	0.039
Sr Hi	MEAN	5.150	11.840	19.170	13.100	3.090	2.420	2.720	2.510	31.030	19.480	0.195
(n= 270)	SD	3.440	5.630	7.280	6.460	2.780	2.450	2.640	2.050	13.900	7.230	0.031
College	MEAN	3.050	8.600	17.010	15.810	5.200	4.890	2.540	2.890	43.190	25.410	0.106
(n= 270)	SD	2.810	5.140	8.070	6.310	3.400	3.340	2.610	2.240	14.320	7.800	0.029
Grad Stu	MEAN	2.240	7.960	17.970	15.090	5.260	6.560	1.860	3.040	44.850	28.260	0.094
(n= 270)	SD	2.510	5.660	8.670	6.110	3.520	3.350	2.430	2.350	15.060	8.030	0.025
Phil/Sem	MEAN	2.000	7.800	11.400	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	65.100		
(n= 40)	SD	2.700	6.400	4.700	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	11.700		

NOTE: Missing data is indicated by 0.000. The TOTAL group is your whole sample
before breaking it down by subsample.

PENDIX 10

EFINING ISSUES TEST: INDIVIDUAL STATISTICS

MPIRICAL RESEARCH RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE CENTRE OF ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT,
NIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, JULY 1996.

REST-DAVISON SCORING SYSTEM
VERSION 1.2
(8/16/90)

NUMBER OF STORIES TO BE SCORED = 6
ORDER OF STORIES =HEINZ PRIS. PAPER DOCTOR WEB. STUD.
INPUT FORMAT = (A5,6X,3(X,I1,12I1,4I2),/,11X,3(X,I1,12I1,4I2))

NOTE: A VALUE OF 99.9 INDICATES THAT THE SCORE CAN NOT
BE COMPUTED BECAUSE OF MISSING DATA.

****

JBJECT ID	2	3	4	STAGE SCORES 5A	5B	6	A	M	P SCORE	D SCORE	U SCORE
)100	4.0	3.0	22.0	18.0	2.0	8.0	3.0	0.0	46.7	34.707	0.470
)200	2.0	12.0	18.0	15.0	6.0	4.0	3.0	0.0	41.7	17.294	0.013
)300	8.0	15.0	11.0	22.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	41.7	28.615	0.163
)400	3.0	7.0	22.0	15.0	6.0	5.0	2.0	0.0	43.3	24.740	0.351
)500	0.0	6.0	30.0	12.0	6.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	35.0	23.323	0.144
)600	1.0	4.0	28.0	14.0	3.0	5.0	3.0	2.0	36.7	22.784	0.438
)700	1.0	10.0	18.0	19.0	3.0	5.0	4.0	0.0	45.0	26.253	0.243
)800	2.0	12.0	27.0	11.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	25.0	19.449	0.221
)900	3.0	14.0	20.0	8.0	9.0	1.0	3.0	2.0	30.0	24.308	0.262
.000	5.0	18.0	19.0	9.0	6.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	28.3	17.218	0.112
.100	3.0	7.0	12.0	25.0	4.0	7.0	2.0	0.0	60.0	35.620	0.137
.200	0.0	4.0	25.0	16.0	7.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	51.7	31.994	0.144
.300	4.0	11.0	2.0	27.0	6.0	8.0	0.0	2.0	68.3	30.570	0.111
.000	3.0	7.0	23.0	15.0	0.0	8.0	4.0	0.0	38.3	21.693	0.261
?000	7.0	13.0	8.0	23.0	5.0	1.0	3.0	0.0	48.3	22.949	-0.010
3000	4.0	6.0	21.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	11.0	15.0	8.772	9.990
.000	0.0	9.0	29.0	14.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	36.7	17.365	0.102
?000	4.0	4.0	25.0	13.0	4.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	33.3	21.088	0.164
3000	1.0	4.0	29.0	16.0	2.0	7.0	1.0	0.0	41.7	32.725	0.176
1000	4.0	1.0	29.0	9.0	8.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	43.3	20.793	0.057
.000	1.0	14.0	25.0	13.0	1.0	4.0	2.0	0.0	30.0	21.149	-0.076
?000	6.0	15.0	20.0	10.0	6.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	31.7	18.752	0.143
3000	3.0	14.0	27.0	9.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	0.0	21.7	16.835	0.223

NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WITH M SCORE GREATER THAN 8:   1

SUBJECT IDS:

)00

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214

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223

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