Chapter One

Introduction and Overview

1.0   Introduction

One of the most perceptible features of the post-Cold War era has been the increase in the number and significance of intra-state conflicts.[1] As a response to such conflicts, there has been an increase in the efforts of (sub)regional and global interest organizations to respond, contain, mitigate and resolve such violent conflicts. Yet, until 1990, such efforts, customarily though not entirely were carried out by the United Nations (UN)[2]. During the last decade, these actions have usually included a blueprint for the implementation of challenging peace agreements, as well as direct engagement in on-going conflicts. Outside intervention in such intra-state conflicts in the absence of peace agreements with clearly identifiable partners have assumed disparate frameworks. In most cases, however, the over-riding objective of outside involvement in intra-state conflicts has been presented in operationally similar terms: to lay the foundation for lasting peace,[3] or to restore peace and order[4]. More often than not, distance between the rhetoric of peace and

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[1]In this thesis, I will use 'conflicts' in the main, except, where 'crises' is operationally necessary.

[2]Olonisakin, Funmi. 'The Role of Nigeria in ECOWAS Peace Support Operations and Some Lessons for South Africa', *ISSUP Bulletin*, 6/98.

[3]Decision A/DEC. 9/5/90 Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee, and Decision A/DEC. 1/8/90 on the Cease-fire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia.

[4]'Liberia', *OAU Conflict Management Review*, 1996, p. 4.

eliciting compliance from competing groups are difficult to bridge.

Useful as such aims are, the schism between rhetoric and achievement is often vast. The potential dilemmas usually experienced by outside interveners in such intra-state conflicts must be found in the conflicts particular environment. Since Liberia and Sierra Leone are the empirical cases, it is useful to apply and include an analysis, which examines the following issues: First, the political economy of the civil conflicts, and (b) the diversity of functions violence accomplishes in such instances. Such approaches contribute to appreciating conflicts that are occurring most particularly in politically fragile, ethnically divided and economically weak states like Liberia and Sierra Leone[5]. Such an approach, also, contributes to engaging with the overriding international perception of irrationality, barbarity, and senseless violence surrounding the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts and the popular conclusion that both conflicts evade rational explanation.[6]

1.1   Purpose and Objectives.

The objective of this thesis is to analyse Nigeria's leadership role through ECOWAS in intervening in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts.

Apart from this main objective, there are subsidiary issues and questions that are

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[5]Although Cote d'Ivoire is not part of the empirical study, its recent crisis starting from 19 September 2002 has in a way demonstrated the challenges facing such states.

[6]'Horror Story', *The Economist*, 21 November 1992. Recently, the Economist has continued its negative reporting on Africa and its conflicts. See The Hopeless Continent, *The Economist*, May 13 - 19 2000, pp. 23 - 25, 41 - 42.

of interest to this thesis:

!   What correlations, if any, are there between Liberia and Sierra Leone's settler histories, development and eventual collapse as functional states?

!   What informed the transformation of ECOWAS from an economic to a security organization?

!   What accounts for the sub-regional dimensions of these conflicts?

!   What contributions, if any, has ECOWAS's policies in Liberia and Sierra Leone contributed to our understanding regional organization intervention in conflicts?

The thesis discusses how Liberia and Sierra Leone's conflicts, popularly characterised as the worlds forgotten countr(ies)[7], and their wars seen variously as a poor mans war[8], a forgotten war[9] and the worlds forgotten emergenc(ies)[10] influenced decisions by Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene through ECOWAS's cease-fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, who were both signatory member states of the organization.

There are several reasons why such a study is necessary. First, there is the need to explain and understand why a sub-regional organization intervened in its own sphere of influence. Not only that, taken into consideration the legalities and complexities of intervention, these case studies are critical for understanding the changing dynamics of

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[7]*West Africa,* 4-10 February 1991. Editorial, Liberia, in *OAU Conflict Management Review,* p.3.

[8]Adebanjo, Adekeye 1996. Rich Mans War, Poor Man's War', *The World Today,* August/September.

[9]*National Concord*, (Nigeria) 4 September 1992, p.6.

[10]*West Africa,* 4-10 December 1995.

ECOWAS. Added to this is the fact that the international community was reluctant to get

involved in wars that occur within minor states. In the case of Liberia, Helman and Ratner

posited that the lack of international concern was justified because Liberia's disintegration

only minimally imperilled *international security*.[11] Stedman, also, argued that some civil

wars are more threatening to *international security* than others. [T]he war in the Balkans

is a greater danger to *international security* than civil war in Liberia'[12].

As a result of these perceptions to African conflicts, ECOWAS's initial efforts at

peacemaking and the subsequent intervention strategies by ECOMOG did not receive

international support. The argument was that *threats* arising from Liberia and Sierra

Leone's collapse neither undermined nor threatened *international security.*

As a response to what has generally been characterised as Africa's post-Cold

War marginalisation, ECOWAS that had become no more than a talking shop, for the first

time, responded to conflicts it perceived as a threat to *its* conception and perception of

international stability and security[13]. It is purely on this experience that this organization,

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[11]Helman, Gerald B & Stephan R. Ratner 1992/3. Saving Failed States, *Foreign Policy*. No.89. The rationalisation for this argument was that due to the Liberian crisis modest impact of refugee flows. It is arguable the extent to which the refugee and displaced persons figures' cited by this time (1.25 million) could be described as modest. See *African Recovery*, June 1993 and *West Africa,* 5 - 11 June 2000 on Sierra Leone: The Human Rights Agenda, p. 21.

[12]Stedman, Stephan J. 1993. The New Interventionists', *Foreign Policy*, May. Stedman justified this superficial outline of what constituted threatening civil strife on the sole reason that Balkan destabilisation could overwhelm Europe's political stability and economic productivity, which according to him are prerequisites for Third World development, pp.1-16. Both authors' haphazard delineation of what constitutes *international security* and *threats* are very worrying.

[13]Interview with Abbas Bundu, former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, London 9.1.98. ECOWAS perception of this conflict as threatening international security were presented to the UN Security Council in UNSC documents S/21485, 9.8.90 and S/21485, 10.8.90. Walden, Chris. 1997. United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa: Lessons for the OAU and SADC, *ACCORD Occasional Paper*, no. 1, p.1.

ECOWAS and, indeed, Nigeria, the leading state in the decision-making process overcame the perception of Africa, and especially the ECOWAS sub-region as a cradle of afro-pessimism[14] and new nihilism[15]. Through these interventions, ECOWAS became the first sub-regional organization to initiate a sub-regional effort at resolving conflicts that were within the ambit of its authority.

ECOWAS's interventions have, also, contributed to peacekeeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone and challenged the all too popular perception that black African lives were of less value than white European ones.[16] Not only that, part of the challenge in this thesis is to understand the dynamics behind the decision by ECOWAS to include security related Protocols to the original Treaty which established the organization in 1975 and was subsequently revised in 1993.

Thus, the thesis also evaluates the principles guiding the initial decision to add security protocols by expanding the 1975 Treaty and, the subsequent resolve to actively intervene in West African states of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thus, the intervention process has contributed to what we characterize as the feeble but unmistakable efforts towards the embeddedness of certain norms and values in ECOWAS's codes of conduct, practice and

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[14]Kaplan, Richard D. 1994. The Coming Anarchy, *The Atlantic Monthly,* February, pp. 44-76. Without applying an afro-pessimistic perspective, the UN Secretary-General at the OAU summit in Lome, Togo in July 2000, criticised African leaders for having brought their troubles unto themselves. See UN Press Release SG/SM/7485/Rev.1AFR/253/Rev. 1.

[15]Williams, Zack Tunde. 1998. Conflicts in Africa: Need for A Viable African Response, *Africa World Review*, November-March, p.10ff.

[16]Cleaver, C. & R. May. 1995. Peacekeeping: The African Dimension, *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 66, December. Pp. 485 - 489.

state behaviour. These are the norms and values, which will, hopefully, in the future guide ECOWAS's responses to intra-state and possibly inter-state conflicts on the sub-region. Thus my discussion will be placed within the theoretical framework of international and security regimes in chapter two.

1.2   Motivation for the Thesis

The motivation for this work is based on my fundamental hypothesis that ECOWAS's actions in Liberia and Sierra Leone represent a new detour for ECOWAS. It shifted ECOWAS from the passivity, which characterised its actions and surprised its critics who in the late 1980s evaluated the organization's ability to respond to the sub-region's conflicts as minimal.[17] ECOWAS has successfully brought one of the most contentious intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War Africa to a successful end. Not only that, it has contributed and is still contributing to finding a permanent resolution to the Sierra Leone conflict.

The organization has through its co-operation with the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in both the Liberian and Sierra Leone operations interjected crucial lessons in multi-track peacekeeping, disarmament and, not least, conflict resolution in the continent. ECOWAS's strategy of intervention and eventual co-operation

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[17]Three of these critics were William Zartman and Carol Lancaster, see Chapter 5. John Ravenhill 1985, The Future of EurAfrica in T.M. Shaw & O. Aluko eds., *Africa Projected: From Recession to Renaissance by the Year 2000* London: Macmillan, pp. 112-130.

with the UN and OAU[18] (now African Union) under Nigerian leadership has demonstrated the value of multi-track conflict resolution of internal conflicts on three interrelated levels:

International - UN;

Regional - OAU; and the

Sub-regional - ECOWAS and ECOMOG

There are several intriguing issues concerning these interventions that will be examined. What is critical about ECOWAS and Nigeria's motivation was the ability to successfully bring this occasionally difficult and complex co-operative venture to an end by resolving Liberia and Sierra Leone's conflicts. Despite the hitches and problems faced throughout the eight-year Liberian conflict and the Sierra Leonean intervention, the experiences gained may probably contain ideas and strategies, which can contribute to resolving some of the issues and discussions surrounding collective defense and security mechanisms[19] by African states.

The aim, therefore, is that through the analysis of Nigeria and ECOWAS's effort to bring peace to Liberia and Sierra Leone, the thesis will contribute to the fascinating and challenging body of work on sub-regional security as a whole. Not only that, the empirical focus of this thesis will contribute to the specific case of sub-regional security arrangements engaging in active peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. The specific features

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[18]For consistency, I will still stick to OAU although I am aware of its transformation into the AU.

[19]General Abdulsalaam Abubakar (former Nigerian Chief of Defence and later Head of State) and Salim A. Salim (former OAU Scribe) agreed with me at various times between 1997-1999 that efficient sub-regional defence mechanisms (security building blocks) could facilitate the establishment of an African Rapid Deployment Force.

of sub-regionality that I find important to the aims of this thesis is the fact that because of the close proximity of states, there is the tendency for conflicts in one state to affect contiguous states.

1.3 Scope of the Thesis

The study focuses on Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS's engagements in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. These studies will serve as a basis for examining the feasibility for the development of norms, decision-making processes and values of what can be characterised as the formative stage of ECOWAS's emerging security regime. Engaging in such an analysis contributes to understanding and appreciating the extent to which Nigeria and ECOWAS's actions in these two states can lay the foundation for a sub-regional defence and peacekeeping force.

To adequately discuss the topic, the time limit of this thesis has been extended to the immediate post-independence period in the early 1960s. The rationale is that, the major issues under discussion: collective defense and security, territoriality, sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of states were the central themes in African international relations discourse. Such an historical analysis will place Nigeria and ECOWAS's own radical political detour in their proper perspective. It demonstrates that the inclusion of security-related protocols, which were not added at the original negotiation processes, were not just an off- handed appendage to the original ECOWAS Treaty.[20]

[20]McGowan, Pat & Thomas H. Johnson 1984. African Military Coup's d'ètat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis. *Journal of Modern African History*. Vol. 22, no. 4.

Rather, the argument in this thesis will be that, they were a necessary and in some ways a rather logical addendum to the original Treaty.

Several reasons account for this argument. First, was inability of the OAU to take the issues of security seriously. For example, it was unable to play any key role in preventing the disintegration of Congo[21] (now Democratic Republic of the Congo - DRC) in the immediate post-independence period. Neither was the OAU able to respond to the menace of mercenaries. Not only that, the restrictive agreements and provisions of the Charters made it impossible for any serious efforts on Africa-generated initiatives. Second, were the incidences of increasing instability in West Africa, which were undermining any realistic prospect for the attainment of the economic integration scheme, which was the real aim of the ECOWAS project. Several of the incidents that took place on the sub-region comprised instances of mercenary attacks in Guinea (1970) and Benin (1977) and the preponderance of *coup d'etats.*

The challenges posed to the ECOWAS scheme by instances of instability, according to Abbas Bundu, the former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS was that:

> You cannot talk meaningfully about economic integration by
> itself without also relating [it] to the underpinning [...] political
> instability within the sub-region. The two are inseparable and
> therefore have to be discussed *inter alia* .... Regional solidarity
> and commitment to integration will be considerably enhanced where
> political stability becomes a *common identity* and is also perceived

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[21]Nigeria contributed an infantry battalion to the United Nations Operation in Congo (UNUC) from 1960-1964 under the command of the first indigenous GOC of the Nigerian Army - Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi. He later became Head of State of Nigeria in January 1966 after quelling a mutiny.

as a *shared responsibility* (my emphasis).[22]

It is within this context that Nigeria's leadership role in manipulating its collaborative partners and ECOWAS's decision, eventually to intervene, should be placed. Due to the importance of the issues involved — refugees, displaced persons, and sovereignty — the scope of the empirical study for the Liberian part is situated from the period of the outbreak of the crisis in 1989 to July 1997. This was when the conflict was successfully brought to an end through the holding of elections, which were conducted by ECOWAS and concluded by international observers to be free and fair. As much as possible, the Liberian analysis will follow a logical continuum. It starts with an examination of the Liberian state through the support patterns extended to faction groups and the specific strategies adopted by ECOWAS and later supported by the UN and OAU leading to disarmament, encampment, demobilisation and eventually election.

For the empirical study on Sierra Leone, the analysis will deal with a similar approach, evaluating where possible, the nexus between the two fighting groups and the changes that occurred in their relationship. The conclusion of that part of the empirical study will be 1999. Part of the rationale for this decision is that the conflict is still on-going and there are interesting conceptual and operational issues that can be observed at this stage.

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[22]*West Africa*, 1-7 July 1991, p. 1085.

1.4   Theoretical, Conceptual and Methodological Explanations

Though my major theoretical framework is on intervention and security regimes, this thesis is not wholly theoretical work. Rather, we seek to use some of the pertinent aspects of the discussions on these theories to inform our analysis of what we consider as the emerging outlines of ECOWAS security regime. Despite this injunction, the thesis will attempt to agree on a definition of intervention and security regimes, which can be analytically employed as a guide for understanding state actors, non-state sub-group actors and their attitudes, behaviour and ambitions. Such a definition, should, hopefully encompass within it the ECOWAS framework with regards to the formulation of and actual implementation of a security mechanism within their sub-region.

Because the West African sub-region is a part of the international system, the thesis will seek to place the sub-region within the purview of the politics guiding international relations. Thus a conflict in one of the component states of the region has a tendency to affect several members of the system.[23]

1.5   Approaches and Methodology

The methodological approach has been guided by three major strategies: the use of secondary printed material, primary sources in terms of printed official material and hitherto unpublished material and finally written and oral interviews. This triangulation of source materials has enabled me to check and crosscheck information acquired through

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[23]This is evidenced in *Cote d'Ivoire* which as earlier indicated is not part of my empirical study.

the different processes. The most obvious procedure for the assessment of information is the classical one of the study of documents in addition to interviewing the central players in the decision to intervene in Liberia and later Sierra Leone. Access was gained to people who had to undertake the more practical dangerous work, that is the soldiers, whose recollections enlivened and coloured the narratives from its dour official presentations. The aim of such a procedure was to find out what positions were taken before the negotiation processes that resulted in the consensus documents representing community decisions. Access to documents, which recorded internal discussions between major decision-makers and actors preceding relevant decisions created a crucial insight into decision-making and negotiation processes. Such insights allowed me to gauge the preferences, if any, of some of the major actors and consequently allowed me to explain and better appreciate some of the outcomes of the negotiations. The presence of such documents did not, however, remove my interpretational freedom regarding contradictory and often ambiguous statements given by actors.

To resolve the thesis' assessment preferences as a result of the interpretational exercise resulting from using primary documents and interview appraisals, the thesis sought to identify the general interests and goals of the major actors (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal) concerning how issues should be in the specific areas under investigation. In this sense, what ECOWAS and ECOMOG should do. This gave an interest profile, which enabled me determine state preferences in a given situation and then analysed state responses to specific ECOWAS-ECOMOG policy.

In the endeavour to reduce the spectre of bias in evaluating documents, the thesis,

also used a more formalised method, which maintained the advantages of historical methodological process and reduced some of the weaknesses of subjective judgement. The major weakness of the above, however, is that the documents should be first available. Given the penchant for controlling information and scores of sources in that environment, this, indeed, became a serious handicap. Overcoming the deficiencies of using document research, the thesis presented a standardized questionnaire specifically designed for experts in their area, that is, one was for the military and another for the political leaders in ECOMOG and ECOWAS respectively. The advantage with the third procedure for getting information, was that asking different experts substituted my likely subjective judgement with that of the experts and decision makers, who are neutral to the ideas guiding the research interest. Though this does not depend on the availability of materials, one is always confounded by the stringent demand for anonymity from central experts who are afraid for their positions, and as one of them humorously told me, I am too young to be retired, sacked or re-deployed and too old to look for a new job.[24]

There was yet another methodological hurdle, the fear that experts respond to questionnaires as if it were a normal policy statement-response so as to reduce the spectre of criticism. Promising anonymity, and asking different experts with knowledge in the area to furnish me with answers reduced this. Having different expert answers not only reduced the problem of unreliability, but the validity of answers was in reality increased. A combination of these methods contributed to generating the information needed to assess

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[24]Interview, ECOWAS Headquarters with A.J. Arije, former Head of Administration, January 1998.

what the thesis needed to know.

Despite the above, and in the search for a balanced account, I also made clear my own biases in my search for information; that was in the secondary material. There was an overwhelming preponderance of excessive Nigeranisms, analyses and statements by Nigerian scholars whose positions have been to overlook the important though minimal roles of other significant actors, namely Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. Therefore, instead of seeing the Yamoussoukro process for what it was, most Nigerian analysis saw it as part of the struggles for power on the sub-region. To counter-balance this, the thesis attempted to present a more detailed analysis than most published works by examining in some detail the interests and roles played by these three minor actors. This attempt, however, did not seek to denigrate the realistically decisive role that Nigeria has played. It only sought to demonstrate that Nigeria's structural problems does not give it the clout and respect from its allies that she falsely perceives herself to have. In classical international relations theory, this approach, even though unfortunate, stands unchallenged by national interest.

Another issue not directly related to methodology is that of ethics in social science research. In the specific Liberian and Sierra Leone discussions, this primarily dealt with people known to have committed atrocities of various kinds.

The importance of the two-country study is that a partially successful international intervention (Liberia) is examined alongside a failed mission (Sierra Leone). The rationale is that the successful mission serves as an experimental control to be examined for the existence, or rather the absence, of the weaknesses postulated to be common to failed

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missions. If these weaknesses are absent from the successful mission but present in the failed mission, and if certain aspects of the civil wars are common to the failed mission but absent from the successful mission, then it will validate the contention of this project that the failure of multilateral missions can be attributable to common structural weaknesses that are especially vulnerable to the dynamics of complex political emergencies and, of course, vice versa.

Two methodological approaches were applied. These comprised two major categories (i) primary, and (ii) secondary sources. The first was the use of the primary sources, which included structured and semi-structured interviews and the selection of respondents through both purposive and random sampling. Due to the nature of the focus, the thesis adopted a non-argumentative participant-observation approach to obtain information. However, wholly unforeseen occurrences did happen and occasioned changes in some interview approach to suit the situation. To deal adequately with the issues raised here, there was need for fieldwork in Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone. First, Nigeria houses the ECOWAS secretariat from where the major political decisions and sub-regional strategies are designed. Nigeria is, also, the base of major actors in these wars. It was anticipated, and actors from ECOWAS and the international community were met easily in Nigeria during the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government meetings and extraordinary sessions at Abuja in 1997, 1998 and 1999. As a result, fieldwork interviews were scheduled to coincide with these summits and extraordinary sessions when the major actors were in Nigeria. With the abating of the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone, former

and present members of diverse faction groups and victims were, also, available for interviews.

It is critical to point-out that I had concluded arrangements, elsewhere, for my doctoral programme, beginning September 1998, before my re-assignment to Pretoria. The requirements of the two universities, targeted, included (i) a minimum of twenty-years professional experience in the field of study; (ii) a Masters degree in the relevant field; and (iii) a minimum of one year to complete the programme. The tentative topic was "Africanisation of Peace Keeping: Nigeria's role in ECOWAS - 1990 to 1999. I have gone to all this length for the express purpose of indicating that the materials, especially interviews and discussions, were collected over the years with a view to the aforementioned programme before "Assignment Pretoria" and subsequent registration at UNISA.

As a Career Diplomat, my field exposure did afford numerous occasions for discussions, over the years, with some Nigerian and foreign political actors on behind-the-scenes decisions. These discussions did enrich my knowledge and some need not necessarily be quoted for obvious reasons of the Nigerian Official Secrets Act of 1962[25]

1.6 Chapterization

In this thesis, the chapters seek to produce a study, which shows a continuous

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[25]Where necessary, application for usage is considered ten years after leaving the Service.

analysis of discussions concerning the endeavours by post-independence African countries at devising a security framework capable of responding to their security related issues and the problems that they have been confronted with in this process. This continuum begins with discussions from the pre-independence Pan African meetings through the confusion and struggles among newly free states for domination and prominence in the immediate independence period. The establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with its conservative emphasis on state equality and unwillingness to make security a decisive issue-area in its discussions undermined the continental organization, sub-regional groupings and individual state ability to effectively respond to African conflicts. Paradoxically, West Africa, perhaps the most politically and militarily unstable African sub-region, managed to include security protocols but refrained from establishing any institutional processes and guidelines for response mechanisms. These weaknesses not withstanding, ECOWAS took the bull by the horns when two of its constituent member states, Liberia and Sierra Leone, collapsed and posed threats both to sub-regional and international security and the organization had to intervene. It is the dynamics and challenges of this continuum from idealistic rhetoric to realistic discussion, of choices and preferences and eventual implementation with its weaknesses, problems, successes and possibilities for cognitive absorption that this thesis seeks to analyse.

Chapter Two

In Chapter Two, the thesis presents a theoretical analysis within which to seek to

locate the investigation of Nigeria's use of ECOWAS's security framework for its roles in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The thrust of the thesis is that discussions surrounding security in post-independence Africa, and eventually West Africa, is not a one-off phenomenon, but will continue to engage the minds and time of African leaders and administrators. The thesis has therefore chosen international regimes as having the most appropriate theoretical and analytical utility for my analysis of the ECOWAS's ECOMOG scheme. Chapter Two, therefore, makes a general discussion of the tenets of international regimes, how they are established, the potential for their transformation, and also how this concept can be applied to understanding the changes that have taken place within ECOWAS. Security regimes are looked at and its major distinctive attributes discussed.

Chapter Three

The politics around the establishment of ECOWAS and the role of Nigeria in getting this done is analysed. What makes this chapter, which takes a historical approach critical, is that it places the politics of the intervention phases in both Liberia and Sierra Leone squarely within the politics and machinations for power on the sub-region. As a result, such an approach will enable us to understand and appreciate the addition of security protocols much better.

Chapter Four

Here the discussion deals with some of the issues surrounding Liberia and Sierra Leone. The aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the collapse of Liberia and

Sierra Leone. It is important to appreciate the framework within which state collapse takes place. This is important because since in collapsed states authoritative patterns are uncertain; it has an impact on the potential successes of interveners. Within this framework, a detailed historical analysis of the origins of the Settler State is presented. The aim is to examine the extent to which the developmental processes of non-colonised settler states are in any way divergent from the experiences of African states, which underwent colonisation. The themes will take-in issues of the nascent upsurge in ethnic consciousness as a critical factor in national politics.

Chapter Five

In this Chapter, the analysis seeks to evaluate the challenges posed to a sub-regional security system in which ECOWAS is taken as an example and its endeavours through negotiation, conflict and compromise to resolve the first major conflict, which this security system has had to respond to. The examination pursues a strategy, which looks at the initial discussions and negotiation processes for a security component to the economic integration scheme. Subsequently, the thesis tracks the discussions leading to eventual consensus and the controversies surrounding ECOWAS's decision to respond to the Liberian conflict. The interest here, is to demonstrate that despite the emphasis in the extant literature on the language divide in West Africa, there was a consensus among sub-regional actors to resolve both conflict harmoniously despite whatever national interests were prevalent at the beginning of the conflicts.

Chapter Six

Part of the argument here is that the nature of the Sierra Leone conflict was technically and operationally different from the Liberian conflict. As a result, the interventionist strategies employed by Nigeria (whose role in the intervention process will be given key emphasis) and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone differed from Liberia. Here, a more detailed study of the immediate causal factors leading to the outbreak of the initial incursion into Sierra Leone is presented. Added to this are discussions of the diverse sources of funding, the role of mercenaries and not least the dynamics of the start of the proliferation of factions in Sierra Leone. Subsequently, the thesis presents an analysis of Nigeria and ECOWAS's uncertain responses to the engulfing conflicts and the diverse stages of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Chapter Seven

The critical questions that the concluding chapter seeks to answer are basically two:

(a)   what does the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrate in terms of Nigeria's power on the sub-region and the institutional transformations taking place in ECOWAS?

(b) What cognitive processes have been established to make the ECOMOG experience a permanent security framework with the requisite capacity to respond to future flash points?