THE MODERNITY / TRADITION INTERFACE
AMONGST URBAN BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS -
AN INVESTIGATION OF SELECTED CURRENT THEMES

by

FRANCO BONORA

submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the subject

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

SUPERVISOR: PROF PDS STEWART

DECEMBER 2001

I hereby declare that

***"The modernity / tradition interface amongst urban black South Africans - an investigation of selected current themes"***

is my own work and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

_____   _____

F. Bonora   Date

20 AUGUST 2002

Abstract

Since the 1950s modernization theory predicted within the Third World a trajectory for social evolution and development mirroring perceived social and developmental evolution in Western societies since the 17th Century. Despite this theory being much discredited in both Western societies and the developing world; this theory still forms the basis for much analysis and policy formulation within post-1990 South Africa. This thesis looks at various aspects of urban black South Africans' existence and concludes that African tradition has found a place within an urban existence due to it's flexibility in dealing with peoples' daily challenges. An urban existence can thus no-longer be thought of as supplanting tradition in favour of western influences, but rather as bringing about a mixture of western and traditional influences - with positive and negative theoretical and practical developmental consequences.

Key terms: Tradition; Modernity; Urban existence; Communalism; Modernization Theory; Stokvels; African Cosmological and witchcraft beliefs; Traditional African Medicine; Hostel War; African National Congress; Inkatha Freedom Party; Insider versus outsider social dynamics.

Acknowledgements

Despite the length of this thesis, it took a relatively brief time to complete. From initial conceptualization, to proposal, to final thesis, this work took less than two years to complete. I would like to take this opportunity to thank a number of persons without whose assistance this work would not have reached completion in such a short time.

To begin with, I would like to thank the supervisor of this thesis, Prof. Peter Stewart for his guidance throughout the whole process that led to the creation of this extensive work. I would also like to thank my parents, Mirko and Rina Bonora, without whose assistance in many ways, not least financial, this thesis would not have been possible.

Many other people, within the Department of Development Administration at Unisa, the Unisa Library and Unisa Administration, also helped to make this work possible. I would like to thank Prof. Linda Cornwell of Development Administration for having rushed through my initial Masters late registration in April 2000, together with Mr G.O. Waldeck of Administration, who also helped me in my many moments of personal doubt that unfortunately accompanies the Masters conceptualization and research process. A big thank you must go to Leanne Tracy Brown, the Subject Librarian for Development Administration, who helped me find the various sources used here. I would also like to thank the administrative personnel of the Unisa Library, who went out of their way to find and send me the needed literature, much of which was procured from outside the Unisa Library.

Finally. During my research for this thesis, much of which was conducted within the Unisa Library, I had the pleasure of living for fourteen months in the Pretoria and Centurion areas. I therefore would like to take this last opportunity to thank the people of Pretoria and Centurion for the kindness they showed me during my stay in these most beautiful surroundings.

F.B.

The modernity / tradition interface amongst urban black South Africans - an investigation of selected current themes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 3

Stokvels, causality and witchcraft beliefs within the tradition/ modernity interaction

Chapter 4

Further aspects of the tradition/ modernity interaction in urban South Africa: traditional medicine and the Hostel War of the early 1990s

Chapter 5

Towards a different non-dichotomized conception of the tradition/ modernity interaction and its effect on development.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Annexure A
Annexure B
Annexure C
Annexure D

1 *Chapter 1 Introduction*

1.1 *Background To The Research Problem*

The modernization model of socioeconomic and political development assumes the progressive disappearance of tradition. Other literature (see for example Agonjo-Okawe 1990; Adande 1990; Gross 1992; Gyekye 1996 and 1997; Lawuyi 1998; Hyden 1983) demonstrates the endurance of tradition, but this literature tends variously to romanticize or systematically denigrate tradition.

This literature, and the literature of early modernization theory, form the background to the research problem.

The research problem itself is to examine the tradition-modernity interaction and the literature above through the literature concerning specific South African cases, and thus to arrive at new synthetic concepts.

The inspiration behind this thesis lay within literature pointing to a path to a modern reality within all societies throughout the world that is markedly different to the path to modernity and the end point of modernity prescribed by modernization theorists in the 1950s. Moreover there are signs that even non-European societies that successfully undertook the journey to Western-defined modernity, such as certain societies in South-East Asia, including Japan, undertook this journey not by destroying or otherwise abandoning Confucian social and cultural tradition prevalent within these societies

since before contact with the Western world; but by integrating Western influences into that tradition, and thus updating tradition to make it relevant for today's world. And in fact this merger of Confucian tradition and Western influences contributed to those societies reaching the high levels of Western-defined modernity they are enjoying now (Lee and Lee 1992:107-123; Robertson 1985:93-103).

Within Africa, as with the Far East, there are signs that today's modernity on the continent is not only the result of foreign (colonial and postcolonial) influences; but rather it is a product of the merger of these external influences with certain traditional cultural, historical and social tendencies endemic to, and still present in the continent which, like the still present Confucian work ethic in Japan, have played an important role behind the politics, economics and society of the African continent.

As regards development, these are two extremes in the application of modernization theory as defined in the 1950s: extremes in that the Far East is a relative success in the application of 1950s modernization theory to that society; whilst Africa, measured along the same Westerncentric modernizational criteria, is a relative developmental failure in that regard. What is becoming obvious is the contribution of indigenous social and cultural dynamics to Western-originating influences; and that therefore contrary to Western perceptions about development along Western-defined lines, as was popular in the 1950s, development and even the

achievement of Westerncentric definitions of development was not the product of moving away from, or destroying the preceding local tradition in any non-Western society. But instead Western-defined development, and how far each given society got in terms of development level as defined by Westemcentric developmental criteria, was the product of the important interaction between Western influences and local traditional influences.

Sometimes these local influences helped to spur on the process of Westerncentric-defined modernization in a given society, as was the case with Japan; or whilst not necessarily stopping Westerncentrically-defined modern development in any given society, tradition could also play a role in retarding the process, as was the case with Africa. Hence contrary to conceptions of development contained in modernization theory in the 1950s (and its Enlightenment predecessors) regarding development in any society, it can be argued that even Westerncentric development is not the result of a break away from the past, but is instead dependent upon indigenous local historical, cultural and social influences (the past of any given society), which could either spur on, or retard the process of development - even development Westerncentrically-conceived. These indigenous historical, social and cultural influences are able to intermesh or fuse with Western influences; and I put them under the title here of tradition, or traditional. Yet, as highlighted above, these influences, traditional as they are, are influences that are

F.B.   P.T.O.

present in each, any and every given society, hence tradition cannot be seen as applying only to Africa, or as being an exclusively African thing only. Tradition is found in all societies throughout the world, for example in Japanese society, and in European society, making tradition not the exclusive preserve of the African continent.

Hence, in a nutshell: despite 1950s modernization theory's assumptions of western-defined modernity being the product of the destruction of the preceeding social order (tradition) in any given society, the above conceptions suggest that development, even Western-defined applications of development in any given society, are heavily dependent on the fusion or intermeshing of Western values with the tradition in any given society. Therefore tradition plays an important role in bringing about modernization.

Despite the above, according to Coetzee (1989:9-11) by far the most popular way of representing the development path for the solution of Third World underdevelopment centred around the modernization approach (popular in the 1950s, yet based on precedents already emerging in the 1600s and 1700s in Europe and North America), generally seeing development as a movement on the continuum with traditionality representing underdevelopment, and modernity representing development. All societies were seen as being somewhere on this continuum, on their way to the end goal of modernity: defined in a Westerncentric way - the idea of the

diffusion of Western values (seen as optimal, modern values necessary for development) from the developed societies to the underdeveloped societies. The diffusion and adoption of these values were seen as hinging on the deletion or destruction of preceding traditional beliefs in any given society, and were thought of to take place in the following manner:

- On a psychological level, it is accepted that modern values, ideals, striving for liberation, democratic principles, subordination to superimposed powers (such as the state) as well as individualism play a part.
- On the so-called social structures level they distinguish a modern political structure, modern education and economic structures in which markets, division of labour, free entrepreneurship and so on play important roles.
- On the cultural level provision must be made for the influence of advanced technology, secularization, bureaucratic structures and the broad principles of rationality. (Coetzee 1989:9-11).

Of particular concern to us here are the points highlighted by Coetzee (1989:11) on the provision for the "broad principles of rationality", "secularization", "subordination to superimposed powers" and "individualism", as well as the fact that according to modernization theory possibilities for fusion between the traditional and the modern sectors are ignored.

In the chapters below, I attempt to draw on an alternative literature to bring together a different account of modernization. Here I outline the broad thrust of this literature.

As Smolicz (1988:38-39) and Lutz and El-Shaikhs (1982:1-2) point out, modernity is not the product of wiping out or destroying tradition, but rather modernity is the product of how the past interacts and fuses with the present. Hence, getting back to the idea stated within modernization theory about the destruction of tradition as being one of the benchmarks of modernization, and that there is no possibility for fusion between modern and traditional, Comaroff and Comaroff (1999a:279-295) have noted an increase in "irrational" religious beliefs and practices throughout the world, and within Africa. Chabal and Daloz (1999:45) have noted that there is a re-emergence of tradition in African society today, confounding expectations of modernization. According to Chabal and Daloz, within Africa - even more so than elsewhere in the world - this process can be seen in the growing importance of African religions, the continued significance of witchcraft, and traditional African medicine on the continent (Chabal and Daloz 1999:45; Larson 1987:131). Other important aspects of African tradition have still remained with us as well, and are in fact also gaining in strength, not weakening.

Chabal and Daloz (141-163) for example mention

communalism - the strengthening of largely reciprocal, community-based, communal ties, and continued popular loyalty to traditional leaders (van Rouweroy van Nieuwaal 1996:23-32), running against 1950s modernization theory's beliefs regarding greater rationality, individualism and subordination to superimposed powers. And such beliefs and social institutions do not merely stay in a social and/ or religious background either, as they also affect politics, administration and economics in these countries.

For example politicians and other elites are in a sense held accountable by the communities they serve, and are forced to share their wealth and influence with the respective communities surrounding them out of fear of accusation of witchcraft. Witchcraft and traditional beliefs in causality (the belief that misfortune happens because of some evil force) thus act as a force for preventing excessive economic differentials and for encouraging redistribution of what is seen as excessive wealth within communities (See Chabal and Daloz 1999:45; 73-76, Parish 1999:426-433; Rowlands and Warnier 1988:120-130 and Douglas 1999:177-191). Such beliefs in causality and witchcraft, as well as beliefs in the effectiveness of traditional herbal medicine are also found amongst beliefs dealing with sickness and ways to heal sickness (Agonjo-Okawe 1990.58; Dauskart 1990:351-356; Varga and Veale 1997:911-924).

Furthermore, the power of traditional leaders in Africa extends

further than mere ceremonial cultural/ religious chiefly titles, as with chiefdom (or chiefly status) comes vast networks of personal contacts that enable the chief to mobilize a wide variety of resources and instruments of power to attain certain goals that may be in his own interest or that of the people he represents. In some countries chiefs rank among the most powerful men in the land who often have direct access to the complex network of compliant authorities extending into the public administration, the army command, the clergy and the business world. Through these contacts, gained through his chiefly status, the chief gains access to economic resources and politico-legal means of power with many advantages for himself and the group he represents, varying from academic titles, to engaging in many economic activities (van Rouweroy van Nieuwaal 1996:23-26).

In this respect Bates (1974:470-471) notes how traditional ethnic identity is an instrument often used as a means to gain economic and political advantage (*inter-alia* jobs, rights to land, control over markets, political influence).

The main argument up to now is that tradition continues to play an important role in peoples' daily existence. This occurred not only in Africa, but in every society in the world - hence tradition is not something limited to Africa, but rather it is a worldwide tendency. Modernization theory in the 1950s (and its precessors since the 17th and 18th Century period of Enlightenment) saw tradition in any given society (and initially

within Europe) as an inflexible, rigid entity which precisely because of its rigidity, was seen as being unable to continue to persist into the future. This contributed to the idea of tradition being eventually destroyed by (Western defined) modernity. And after the destruction of tradition, a proverbial clean slate would be created on which the values of *inter-alia* rationality and secularization could - and would - flourish. Yet, as was noted above especially by Smolicz (1988 and 1992), tradition is a flexible entity, as opposed to a rigid entity as conceptualized by modernization theorists in the 1950s that is able to persist precisely because of its flexibility in accommodating new changes, including the changes to society, politics and the economy brought about by Western influences; and thus it is able to survive precisely because of its instrumental relevance in society.

And indeed, as noted above, this was the experience throughout the world. In Japan and the societies of South East Asia, the Confucian work ethic and other social prescriptions by Confucius continued to this day, showing in the process how these ideas were able to encompass and accommodate within themselves Western influences, especially since the 19th Century. In Africa too there are signs not only that tradition has persisted up until today, but an important reason why it has done so is precisely because it managed to accommodate within itself other influences, especially Western influences. Thus ethnicity continued to today not just because of a blind, uncritical following of

tradition; but because the communal ethic found in tribalism, ethnicity, and group formation and adherence to the group in general have proven themselves as effective ways of gaining aspects of Western-defined modernity. Again, in this respect Bates (1974:470-471) notes how traditional ethnic identity (and group formation) is an instrument often used as a means to gain economic and political advantage (*inter-alia* jobs, rights to land, control over markets, political influence) - the fruits of Westerncentrically-defined modernity.

In South Africa too, despite Western-based modernization and urbanization, Stadler (1996:88-89) and Ashforth (1988:505-506) have noted that there is at least a perception that witchcraft is increasing and that it is not merely a rural phenomenon, but also an urban phenomenon, increasing in frequency in both rural and urban black communities (in the late 1990s). Furthermore, such beliefs did not merely vanish with education, as modern people - teachers, civil servants and others involved in modern occupations, including the youth are increasingly involved in witchcraft and witchcraft accusations and other traditional religious beliefs, and they themselves subscribe to causality (Ashforth 1996:1200-1216; Gugushe 1984:106-108; Barendse 1993:22-25; Barendse and Best 1992:87; Elliott 1984:110; Stadler 1996:87, 108-109) - "irrational" beliefs according to 1950s modernization theorists, concerning what lies behind death and misfortune, beliefs which according to modernization theorists, were supposed to vanish with the advance of modernity.

Not only is modernization not destorying traditional beliefs, as was originally believed by modernization theorists in the 1950s, but also traditional beliefs are changing to fit social change - the advancement of modernity; such traditional beliefs thus fusing with (Western-defined) modemity. Niehaus (1995:533-537) for example noted how witchcraft beliefs in Green Valley, Lebowa did not disappear with the advancement of modernization as per the entry of Western influences in the area (the movement from subsistence agriculture to the dependence on income from farm labour and labour in the industrial urban areas on the Witwatersrand). Rather witchcraft and occult beliefs in the area merely changed and were heightened as a result of these socio-economic changes, and continue (in their changed format) as ways to conceptualize and make sense of reality; in ways which nevertheless continue pre-colonially conceptualized African Cosmological beliefs, to today.

On possibly a more positive note, the same is essentially happening in terms of beliefs in traditional herbs and medicines amongst for example pregnant, clinic-attending urban Zulu women (Varga and Veale 1997:911-924) who for a number of reasons (the cost of modern Western medicines, inferior quality of clinic care), as well as a means of adapting to urbanization-related stress and socio-cultural transition, make use of both Western medicine and traditional herbal medicine for their neonatal treatments. As mentioned above by van Rouweroy van Nieuwaal (1996:23-26) the role of

traditional leaders is more than just cultural/ ceremonial, as traditional leaders engage also in practical political, administrative and economic activities, also here in South Africa (Ewing 1995; Nkosi et. al. 1994:282-286).

And despite the modernizationist emphasis on the evolution of individuality in contrast to communalism, communalism and the community spirit is still present and strong in today's South Africa and has evolved to serve very practical personal and community ends in a modern era. This can be illustrated by Stokvels, operational in rural, peri-urban and urban areas in South Africa. Here family/ kinship/ neighbour based groupings (the former two forms found especially in the rural areas, whilst the latter form is found especially in the urban areas) would come together to pool together their resources in order to save, to acquire goods/ services in bulk, to pay for funerals, and even just to entertain - thereby fulfilling communalism's basic function of using the local community in order to address a family's needs (Dia 1996:177-193; Smets 1996:173-181; Vermaak 2000:38-46; Moodley 1995:361-366; Molefe 1991:14-16; Financial Mail, Vol. 109, no. 13, 30 September 1988, pp. 32-33).

The sense of community and communalism is also pervasive in a number of political and religious communities currently present in peri-urban and urban black society. Kiernan (1984:219-233) for example noted this sense of community, which excluded the rest of urban society - seen as carrying

witchcraft and evil - amongst Zionist groupings in Kwa Mashu township near Durban. This sense of community is also found in youth groupings active in rural, urban and peri-urban environments who, through lynchings and mob justice try to protect the community from perceived threats to the community, building on and maintaining negative community feelings and suspicions towards outsiders , and thereby trying to gain the respect of the community (Lawuyi 1998:88-96).

This thesis will highlight the fact that in South Africa, as elsewhere on the African continent and the world, modernization has neither led to the destruction of African traditional beliefs; nor to a strict division between traditional and modern as tradition is affected by and has an effect on the modern, and the modern has an effect on and is affected by tradition; and thus traditional beliefs are increasingly used by modernized (including, and with special focus on urbanized) Africans as a means of dealing with the stresses, strains and challenges offered by today's environment, influenced and largely determined as it is by Westerncentric definitions of modernization, as manifested in the 1950s.

Therefore in this thesis I would like to investigate beliefs in causality, witchcraft beliefs, traditional healing beliefs, communalism and communal loyalties, and traditional leadership - not only as manifestations that counter the Westerncentric assumptions of 1950s modernization beliefs that modernization leads to an end to tradition and adherence

to such beliefs; but that fusion between traditional and modern beliefs is occurring among urban and peri-urban black South African communities (again, contrary to modernization theories). Furthermore, the point will be made that the reason why traditional beliefs and institutions among black urban and peri-urban South African communities survive is because they adapt to modernity, and so are means to understand and deal with modernity; and are also means used (at least by some) to gain at least some of the elements contained in Westerncentric definitions and assumptions of 1950s definitions of modernity. We will also see how this theoretical point, which I think is important, impacts on theoretical and practical developmental debates and practices, and on human welfare.

Finally, before moving on to the important Research Problem, it is appropriate to take note as to why I want to re-open the whole debate on modernization theory, and the relationship between modern and tradition. After all, since the mid-1960s, modernization theory has come under attack, and has fallen out of academic favour in many circles. Two particular themes were used to criticize 1950s modernization theory. The first concerned the fact that factors essentially resident outside the Third World, such as the international markets and the Third World's subordinate position in the international markets, and more broadly within the capitalist economic system, have an important, if negative effect, on development. Linked to this is the second main criticism of 1950s

modernization theory, namely the desire to let the peoples of the developing world determine and follow their own paths to development. This idea became even more popular within certain circles when it became clear that African governments, despite following Western-originating management techniques, were inefficient and generally incapable of bringing about development. It became clear that this Westerncentrically-defined development, as described above by Coetzee (1989), was neither really happening on the ground, nor were the results of Westerncentrically-defined development desired, nor desirable in at least certain important respects.

These above two general criticisms of modernization theory in the 1950s, as well as other criticisms, led to a number of new theories and perspectives with developmental implications - *inter-alia* dependency, post-development, sustainable development, alternative development. Although most, if not all of these theories were critical of, and generally negative about modernization theory as conceptualized in the 1950s, at least inherent within some of these perspectives is a positive, often uncritical, if not romanticized evaluation of tradition. Tradition in at least some quarters is in fact seen as the golden key to development; a useful instrument for development overlooked by 1950s modernization theory-inspired zealous efforts in eradicating tradition, again based on 1950s modernization theory's views of tradition being a rigid element, and a general impediment to development and

progress that could indeed be destroyed through some form of a concerted effort, *inter-alia* through urbanization.

In the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank tried to reverse the negative economic performance of African governments, and particularly African bureaucracies, through the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes, and accompaning efforts to instill so-called good governance through various programmes which injected into African bureaucracies updated Western management techniques; a re-think of African states' extensive involvement in the broad economies of African countries, and the reorganization of vast tracts of Western-originating African bureaucratic regulations and structures. And the same as on the eve of independence, these efforts included the retraining of African bureaucracies, in terms of instilling these renewed Western values, management techniques and bureaucratic structures into African bureaucrats.

By the late 1990s however, despite these extensive efforts, it became clear that these Western-originating programmes only had limited success, in that African governments, despite the new (Western-inspired) orthodoxies, did not necessarily perform any better in their functions than before the imposition of these (Western-inspired) programmes (see Hibbou 1999:69-116). The point that must be noted is that for as much as 1950s modernization theory has, together with other Western-originating approaches, failed to bring about growth

and development in Africa; much of the blame for this failure (and the state's bad performance in bringing about development) must be pinned on the negative role played by much of African tradition (through for example informal networks, often linked to clan interests), which nevertheless forms part of the same tradition advocated by some as holding the key for Africa's development.

Hence, there is a need to re-engage with a particular strand of the modernization debate, namely the tradition versus modernity debate because a look at why 1950s modernization theory and the African state - the product of such Westernization - failed, reveals mechanisms and practices inherent within tradition, practices which managed to find practical use within a Westernized environment, including the urban areas. These traditional influences influenced the internal dynamics of the Western-originating state in Africa, helping to destroy dreams of social, economic and political change according to modernization theory prescriptions in the 1950s. This debate is still very relevant today because the same practices, rooted within tradition, could inhibit development by any other model, including through a return to the roots of African tradition (this will be further looked at in Chapter 5).

In this respect, the insider versus outsider dynamic, inherent within African tradition, and its continuing influence within, for example, the South African urban environment (see chapters

4 and 5), is another example of the negative effects of tradition, which occur at the same time as the more researched positive aspects of tradition such as Stokvels (see Chapter 3). And this warrants, in my opinion, a re-look at how tradition relates to modernity. This is an important strand within the modernity debate, concerning what constitutes modernity and what constitutes tradition - and how they are linked - which is what this thesis is concerned with.

The above continuing positive and negative influences of African tradition, now also within an urban environment, in my view warrants a critical re-look at the relationship between tradition and modernity, within an urban South African environment, amongst black urbanites, and the theoretical debates surrounding it. This is because a re-analysis of the important relationship between tradition and modernity does hold some important consequences for development in practice, and the consequences thereof. This theme, although it has aged somewhat from the 1950s, and before, is in my opinion still as valid today as in the 1960s when modernization theory started to fall out of favour due to its lack of performance in bringing about development, because subsequent approaches also contained failures, as shown above by the wide divergence between the hopes behind World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa and the practical results of these programmes.

1.2 *Research Problem*

A literature exists that shows that contrary to the broad expectations of modernization theorists, traditional cultural institutions, beliefs and practices have survived to the modern era throughout the world, including among modern urban black South Africans. With reference to selected aspects (communalism, causality and witchcraft, traditional leadership and traditional medicine) how do such beliefs manifest themselves; how do they interact and fuse with modernity (in other words how do these aspects of tradition affect modernity, and how are these aspects of tradition influenced by modernity); and how will these traditional cultural aspects (communalism, causality and witchcraft, traditional leadership and traditional medicine) affect urban black South Africans and South Africa's present pursuit of modernization, development and human welfare?

As a by-product of the main line of argument of this thesis, linked in particular with the developmental effects of my arguments, I will also show that there is a pro-tradition developmental (and post-development) literature which this thesis will show in a critical light, given the negative sides of tradition shown in this thesis.

1.3   *Reasons for selecting this problem*

To counter the idea that modernization leads to an end of traditional beliefs, in this thesis, within a South African context, I would like to investigate traditional beliefs in communalism, causality and witchcraft, traditional leadership and traditional healing not only as manifestations that counter 1950s modernization beliefs that modernization leads to an end to traditional beliefs and adherence to such beliefs; but that fusion between traditional and modern beliefs is occurring among black South African communities (again, contrary to modernization theories). The reason why traditional beliefs among black South African communities survive is because they adapt to modernity, and so they are means used to understand and deal with modernity. Traditional beliefs and practices are also means used (at least by some) to gain modernity; with impacts on development and human welfare among black South Africans, with particular reference to urban and peri-urban black South Africans.

1.4   *Aim of the study*

The aim of this study is

A   To investigate contemporary communal practices, causality and witchcraft beliefs, adherence to traditional leadership and traditional healing - aspects of tradition among black urban and peri-urban South Africans - not only as manifestations that counter modernization

beliefs that modernization leads to an end to irrationality and adherence to such beliefs, but

B   That, with particular reference to communal practices, causality and witchcraft beliefs, adherence to traditional leadership and traditional healing among black urban and peri-urban South Africans, fusion between what were previously thought of as being separate traditional and modern beliefs is occurring (again, contrary to modernization theories). The reason why traditional beliefs and loyalties among black South African peri-urban and urban communities survive is because they adapt to modernity. So tradition is a means used to understand and deal with modernity; and its also a means used (at least by some) to gain modernity.

C   We will also look at how, with particular reference to the above four aspects of tradition under investigation (see points A and B above), tradition impacts on development and human welfare in South Africa.

1.5   *Broad Hypothesis*

The hypothesis of this proposed thesis is as follows:

That contrary to the ideas of 1950s modernization theorists about tradition being replaced by Westerncentric definitions of modernity (as described above) within the developing world, including a black South African urban environment, modernization and an urban existence among black South Africans has not destroyed their traditional beliefs, institutions

and practices. Instead these beliefs (in causality, witchcraft and bewitchment, in various forms of communalism including tribalism, traditional leadership and traditional African herbal medicine) are still important components of their modern urban existence; but have also adapted (and continue to adapt) in various forms as a response to the stresses and strains of a Westernized urban environment, and today's modern world. Such adaptations however do not occur in ways that fulfill Westerncentric social, political and economic definitions of modernity, as prevalent in the 1950s; but rather these adaptations lead to the continuation of these traditional African - indeed communal - beliefs and practices within an urban environment, through the flexible accommodation of Western influences into these traditional beliefs and practices (the concept of fusion between traditional and Western practices). This point has great implications for development and human welfare, particularly in South Africa today.

1.6 *Methodology*

In the previous sections of this chapter, I have given the reader an idea of what I intend doing with this thesis. Now the question is the method; in other words how I intend achieving that which I have set out to do.

As regards the method, this thesis will focus on trying to re-organise, re-conceptualize and connect various examples of research, opinions and analyzing frameworks currently available within the literature; making this thesis largely a

literature-based review and re-interpretation, that will hopefully give new light and new perspectives, within the South African context, to the relationship between modernity and tradition.

Now the more specific question is how, through the use of existing literature, does this thesis try to re-conceptualize the relationship between tradition and modernity, a relationship which until recently was (and still is to an extent) conceptualized as a dichotomy between two opposing sides marked as tradition and modernity respectively. The answer to this is that this thesis will try and reconceptualize tradition as a flexible entity, as opposed to a relatively rigid entity (Smolicz 1988 and 1992). Therefore because of this flexibility by tradition, also in accommodating Western and other modern influences within itself, there is a great amount of cross-pollination, or fusion as I would like to call it within this thesis, between the categories of tradition and modernity. This reconceptualization, although not entirely new, will be based on a study of various aspects of black urbanites' daily existence. I will look at this in this thesis precisely because in my opinion these aspects not only show that tradition, in various guises, has survived, entered and made a home for itself within an urban environment. It is surviving (and flourishing in various guises) precisely because of tradition's ability to be relevant to peoples' daily urban Western-influenced existence.

Precisely because tradition, due to its flexibility, is able to

accommodate within itself Western (and other) influences that are relevant in peoples' daily lives, tradition is in many instances able to emerge as a means used by people to conceptualize reality, including the Western influences that have an effect on their reality. This will become apparent in this investigation of black urbanites' existence (Stokvels, beliefs in bewitchment and causality, traditional African medicine, and the Hostel War). Within these various aspects of communal African tradition within an urban South African environment, the following elements of fusion between Western-defined modernity, and African tradition manifest themselves:

- How these individual practices contain within themselves manifestations of tradition.

- How these manifestations of tradition managed to encompass and integrate within themselves modern (Western) influences, and

- How these aspects of tradition are used by people as a means of dealing with Western-influenced reality, in particular within an urban environment.

Resulting from the investigation of these various areas within different aspects of black urbanites' existence, tradition as a flexible entity will be highlighted as an important tool in conceptualising black urbanites' existence. The developmental consequences of this point, positive and negative, on more theoretical and more practical levels, will be highlighted.

Before moving further however, I would like to clear up a point regarding African communalism in the light of the above point concerning the ability of tradition to flexibly adapt itself to Western influences, as found especially in the urban areas. The point I would like to make is that communalism largely consists of the use of the local community to address a family's needs. In the rural areas this process mostly takes the form of the use of kinship networks, whilst in the urban areas this process has been adapted, and now typically involves the use of a network of friends and/ or neighbours (as with Stokvels).

1.7 *Classification into chapters*

Chapter 1 In this current introductory chapter, we have broadly introduced the argument of this thesis, namely that tradition has survived into modernity (regardless of the assumptions underlying Westerncentric definitions of modernity such as that which was popular in the 1950s). Tradition and modernity are not strictly separated compartments and that, with particular reference to present-day South Africa, what was previously thought of as traditional, and what was thought of as modern are in fact fusing or merging together. A number of brief examples have also been made throughout this chapter, illustrating manifestations of such fusion within a present-day South African context, with important developmental consequences. We have also introduced here the research problem being

investigated, the aims of this study, hypothesis, the method to be used, and now the structure of the thesis - how it all hangs together, and reasons why this particular structure was chosen.

Chapter 2 To start, in this chapter I describe the Westerncentric definitions of modernity contained in 1950s definitions of modernization theory, and focus in particular on the belief that with modernization there is supposed to be a movement to so-called modern rationality, secularization, individualism and subordination to superimposed powers (such as the state); away from so-called traditional beliefs in what is supposed to be superstition; community-based loyalty (communalism) and loyalty to traditional (chiefly) authorities. To illustrate the limitations of modernization theory's views on irrationality, community and traditional loyalties, beliefs and linkages, I highlight arguments and literature that point to the fact that despite Africa modernizing, belief in the traditional was not destroyed.

Chapter 3 In this chapter I focus on traditional communal networks and their role in the acquisition and distribution of social and economic resources. Particular attention will be given to the role of communal savings and distribution networks (specifically Stokvels) as signs of adherence to the traditional principles of communalism and their adaption for the personal, social, financial and developmental needs of urban black communities.

In the second part of this chapter I want to concentrate on black urban and peri-urban beliefs in causality and witchcraft, relevant to the above focus on communalism in that persons who fall foul of the traditional sense of community and communalism tend to be prone to witchcraft accusation (Ashforth 1998:1202-1203). Also tradition-based beliefs in witchcraft and beliefs in causality are used as a means to interpret and explain modernity, also with an impact on development and human welfare (Ashforth 1998:1202-1203; Mafokane 1998:230-235; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a:17-25).

Chapter 4 This chapter deals with two further issues. Firstly, urban support for traditional leaders, primarily in terms of urban support for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), linked to communal insider versus communal outsider attitudes and dynamics as practiced both by hostel dwellers and township residents supporting opposing political ideologies within the context of the Hostel War of the early 1990s. Secondly it deals with the phenomenon of African traditional medicine, and related to it faith healing, as practiced in urban areas.

Chapter 5 This chapter re-conceptualises the important influence and effect of tradition within modernity. This chapter will also critically look at tradition, and will make critical conclusions on the effects of tradition on modernization and development. On a more theoretical and practical level of development, this chapter will end with a plea for a critical,

honest and objective-as-possible analysis of the effects of tradition in today's South Africa, and the challenges and effects this puts on developmental efforts.

Chapter 6 In this concluding chapter I intend to link together the argument in each chapter, and finally link these up to, and re-iterate, theoretical conclusions on how one should characterize tradition in modernity, thus highlighting the main argument of this thesis.

As regards the reasons why I chose the above chapter classification, the following must be noted. Moving on from Chapter 1, which merely introduced the thesis, Chapter 2 roots the discussion within a general important theoretical background. Within Chapter 3, largely concerned with the sense of communalism pervasive in African society, the point will be to show how positive aspects of African communal tradition - Stokvels, as well as more negative aspects of the same communal African tradition - beliefs in causality, witchcraft and bewitchment, have adapted to Western influences and persisted within a rural and an urban environment.

Chapter 4 acts as an extension to the communal theme within African tradition highlighted in the previous chapter by showing within the context of the Hostel War of the early 1990s how the negative aspects of communal relations played an important role within urban black politics. As an

extension of the theme of witchcraft and African Cosmological beliefs highlighted in the previous chapter, traditional African medicine within an urban township environment is also looked at in Chapter 4 - focusing on how African traditional medicine interacts and deals with other modern, Western influences as found in an urban environment.

Chapter 5 largely rounds off the discussion by offering a non-dichotomized explanation of the relationship between tradition and modernity. Reasons as to why African tradition still plays an important role within an urban environment will be offered. Conclusions will be given about the positive and negative influences of African tradition within a modern Westerncentric environment. Based on this, it will be noted that both Western-based solutions to developmental problems, and a return to tradition as the key to development, the latter being advocated in some quarters, hold serious problems; which require a much more sophisticated, and critical, debate of developmental issues.

Chapter 6 will summarise the argument of this thesis, linking it up to the evidence offered, and the general assumptions and hypothesis as set out in the first chapter, as a means of rounding off and giving the thesis finality.

Chapter 2

From modernization to different conceptualizations of modernity

2.1 Introduction

In order to critically evaluate modemization theory in the 1950s, and its predecessors from the 17th and 18th centuries, this chapter will first describe modernization theory - its foundations and application to Africa in the period between World War II and the late 1960s.

Secondly this chapter will look at literature that counters modernization theory in terms of its assumptions, implementation and effects throughout the world and end results within Africa, and response to it by Africans themselves, by pointing out to the fact that despite Africa modernizing by bringing in certain institutions and practices that were Western in origin, tradition still plays an important role in the African continent's daily existence, even in the cities.

In fact traditional institutions and practices are indeed merging and/ or fusing with modern institutions and practices, largely colonial, foreign or non-African in origin. This fusion has created a type of modernity that is different from modernity as conceptualized by 1950s modernization theorists (and their Enlightenment-influenced predecessors) in that it integrates both Western and traditional influences.

F.B. P.T.O.

In the last part of this chapter we will be looking at evidence and literature which indicate that a similar process of fusion is occurring within today's South Africa too, with particular focus on the country's peri-urban and urban areas, largely as a response to current, modern social, political and economic stresses of Western-defined modernity.

Within the broad context of this thesis, this chapter introduces the reader to the general ideas held by modernization theory in the 1950s, as well as its link to its theoretical predecessors, based within theoretical debates reigning within Europe and North America since the 17th and 18th Century period of Enlightenment.   The reader will also be shown here that nowhere in the world was modernization theory fully implemented *as-per* prescriptions of its theorists. And even where it was more fully implemented, it did not lead to the total destruction of tradition; nor were modernization theory's end results and effects totally desirable.

As regards the end results of modernization theory, what happened throughout the world was that tradition, as a flexible entity, both in the developed countries of Europe and North America, the Far East; and in the developing societies of Africa, managed to enmesh itself into the practices and institutions associated with Western definitions of modernity. Again, this led to a type of modernity which manifests some, but not all of the prescriptions of modernization theorists of the 1950s.

2.2 *Modernization theory - the continuation of a long-standing tradition in Western thought*

Although the term modernization brings up connotations of newness and a somewhat recent origin, the idea of modernity, and Westerncentric definitions of such modernity is not new at all. In fact, for as much as modernity is supposed to be a move away from tradition, the idea of modernity brings together a number of traditions that preceded it. Gyekye (1997:225-232) for example points out that although a tradition can be transformed over time, its central (or core) features may persist over many generations and constitute the basis for its identity and recognition. Western traditions of democratic thought and practice and ideas or beliefs about national (human) rights (which, as we will see below, form part of modernity as defined in the period between World War II and the late 1960s, and afterwards through to the 1980s and 1990s and the new millennium) in fact made their debut in Classical Greece in the 6th century BC, forming the basis of the works of Plato, Socrates, Aristotle and other Greek, and later Roman philosophers. Such thought was continued during the Middle Ages by philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas, and in the 17th century, during the period of Enlightenment. These theories formed the basis of theories that held that human beings are endowed with certain eternal and unalienable rights. According to Gyekye (1997:225-232) these ideas, based as they were in the Classical Greek tradition dating back from the 6th century BC, nevertheless continue to this very day through current conceptions of human rights.

Underlying thoughts on democracy however were not the only tradition which can be traced back to Classical Greece. Linked to it were conceptualizations of reality through rationality and deduction based on observation. Hippocrates, the father of modern biomedicine, for example, first taught his students the techniques of observation, examination, record-taking and deduction. He claimed that "to every disease there is a natural cause and for every disease a natural remedy" (Mills 1983:1-2).

Before Hippocrates, disease and misfortune were perceived to be caused by the vexation of the gods or sheer bad luck, due to the position of the heavenly bodies. Hippocrates' above conceptualization of disease continues today through medical doctors making use of pharmaceuticals to control physical disease, seen by these biomedical professionals as being caused by physical (natural) factors related to the functioning of the human body (Mills 1983:1-2).

Gyekye (1997:225-232) mentioned above that thoughts on democracy and human rights, and certain unalienable rights of individuals in terms of democracy and human rights, based as they were on tradition going back as far as Classical Greece, made their re-appearance, in force, during the 17th century's period of Enlightenment. Indeed, both Classical-Greece-based thoughts on democracy and rationality as illustrated by Greek philosophers including Aristotle and Hippocrates, re-emerged strongly during the 17th and 18th century period of Enlightenment, with the following basic tenets (Gross 1992:23-28):

A   *Empiricism* - the notion that only what can be directly confirmed by observation and sense experience can be true.

B   *Rationalism* - the notion that the things we can know with the greatest certainty are discernible not through sense experiences, but through the exercise of reason. Though the origins of this point of view go back to Greek philosophy, the claims that began to be made for rationalism became much more assertive by the 17th century.

C   *The idea of beginning again* - With empiricism and rationalism, in fact linked to these two concepts, the third so-called mode of thinking to emerge in the 17th century period of Enlightenment, is the idea of a new beginning. In the 17th century, the idea emerged, (which as we will see further on, influenced more recent versions of modernization) that it was both desirable and possible to literally begin again, or alternatively put, engage in a new start or a new beginning which could and would be able to nullify and destroy the continuing effects of everything (ie: all tradition) that preceded it (Gross 1992:23-26).

Once the concept of a new beginning was adopted in the 17th century, it came to be thought of both in a temporal and a spatial sense. In other words, the idea of starting over began to be seen as something that can occur not only at a certain point in time, but also as a result of a certain way of occupying space. The more recently discovered continents of the Americas and Africa exemplified this new spirit. For the

European imagination saw these continents as virgin land: wild, natural and uninhabited. The American Indians and indigenous African populations somehow did not seem to count. It was thought that the indigenous populations could somehow internalise these new Western values and dispose of their so-called heathen ways (Gross 1992:26-28). This could be seen as the Enlightenment-based predecessor of 1950s modernization theory's basic assumptions that indigenous populations would, in reaction to these Western influences, merely drop or abandon their traditional beliefs; and would then simply adopt Western throughts and practices.

Before concentrating on post-World War II modernization theory however, one must note that such conceptions of empiricism and rationality as they (re-)emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries (and again in the 1950s) went hand-in-hand with huge, tumultuous changes in Western (European and North American) society. It was linked to the socio-economic changes brought about by mechanisation and the Industrial Revolution, which led to large-scale urbanization (Gross 1992:37-39). Indeed these tumultuous social changes, as described as happening in Europe, as we will see below, were assumed to be re-creatable in any society, on whatever continent, although social evolution in other societies did not follow the Western route.

According to Coetzee (1989:18-20) a number of philosophers and social theorists who lived through these changes in the 17th, 18th,

and especially the 19th and early 20th centuries, influenced by the above tenets of Enlightenment, saw these economic and political changes as reflecting and causing evolutionary social changes, linked to what they saw as the rationalisation of society, only through which according to these theorists, progress was seen to be possible.

Some of these theorists were the 19th century founding fathers of sociology. For example (Coetzee 1989:17-22):

- *Auguste Comte* viewed social evolution as the unavoidable product of the intellectual progress inherent in the rationalization of human thought.

- *Herbert Spencer* thought that the transition from a pre-modern to a modern society is, in fact, a transition from a militant society based on external warfare and internal coercion to an industrial society in which contractual relationships, individual initiative, industry, cooperation, the protection of individual rights and permanent peace can be found.

- *Karl Marx* - the father of Communism and Marxism - maintained a global evolutionary perspective in regard to the overall development of society. According to Marx society's moving through different evolutionary stages: from communal ownership to private ownership, to a feudal system, to the emergence of modern capitalism, and finally to the emergence of comprehensive communism.

- *Emile Durkheim* saw a movement from a simple society with minimal division of labour and differentiation as far as roles

are concerned (a mechanical solidarity), towards a modern society with a complex division of labour and an emphasis on individuality. In modern society, an organic solidarity is based on the interdependence constituted by the division of labour.

- *__Max Weber__* - who first conceptualized the ideal modern bureaucracy - held the view that the distinction between traditional and modern Western society lies in the fact that, in the latter, rationality figured strongly. Rationality encompasses the ability to adapt in order to achieve certain goals, a movement in the direction of a more systematic organization of reality and a decline in the role of myths and magic as a result of society's new reliance on reason. (Coetzee 1989:19).

The way in which the evolution of ideas and conceptions of reality were seen (Comte), the way in which a multiplicity of internal and external factors were identified as part of the evolutionary process (Spencer), the changes in individual roles (Durkheim) and the way in which the establishment of the capitalist structure was viewed (Marx and Weber), based on Western social evolution, all represent aspects of the nature of a Western conception of modernization, which helped to establish it in the 1950s (Coetzee 1989:19-21), hence the term 1950s modernization theory, which will be widely used in this thesis to refer to it.

By highlighting the theoretical predecessors of 1950s style modernization theory, and beginning to link modernization theory to its predecessors which we will continue with in the following section,

the point of this description thus far is to show that 1950s modernization theory itself must be understood as the continuation of a number of themes or traditions in human thought in Western society dating back centuries, if not millennia. These themes eventually found renewed interest and expression as a result of 17th and 18th century Enlightenment, which is the basis for modernization theory, to which we will now refer to.

2.3 *Modernization theory. Its historical basis, basic tenets, assumptions and shortcomings*

The above now brings us to odernization as defined in the first half of the 20th century, and as espoused particularly during its heights in the 1950s. According to Coetzee (1989-11) after World War II, the most popular way of representing the development path for the solution of Third World underdevelopment centred around the modernization approach, based on the work of a number of 19th and 20th century scholars, a great number of which were the above mentioned sociologists (Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Marx, Weber and others). Modemization, as described by these theorists, was in line with the underlying thoughts of 17th and 18th century Enlightenment which preceded it. For example, the same as the Enlightenment's conceptualization of modern progress, modernization saw development as a movement on a continuum, moving from the pole of tradition to the pole of modernity; with traditionality representing underdevelopment, and modernity representing development. Not only, but as a continuation of the beliefs grounded in the Enlightenment (Gross 1992:26-28),

modernization theory thought that modernization to the levels of modernity found in Europe and North America was possible, desirable and could be achieved basically anywhere and in any society in the world (Coetzee 1989:9-11).

Above Gross (1992:26-28) noted that since the start of Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries, the thought came about that it was indeed possible to start over, regardless of what preceded, and then move to modernity. The more recently discovered continents of the Americas and Africa exemplified this new spirit, for the European imagination saw these continents as virgin land: wild, natural and uninhabited (the local indigenous inhabitants were somehow ignored or were thought of as being able to somehow fall in with the new order of things) (Gross 1992:26-28), perfect territory for modernization as then prevalent in European intellectual circles. The social, political and economic power of the United States, situated in the previously "wild and uninhabited" North American continent, particularly after World War II, indeed in a sense proved that modernization from scratch was possible.

And so, with the coming of independence to Africa and a number of Asian countries in the 1960s, it was thought by modernization theorists and their supporters that Africa could and would develop along Western lines. According to Coetzee (1989:9-11) this process of modernization in Africa, as conceived by modernization theorists, was based on the assumption of general social, political and economic acceptance and implementation of a package containing a number of Western values, reflecting the basic tenets of

modernization theory and social evolution as occurring (only) along Western lines, within African society; namely:

-   On a psychological level, the acceptance of modern values and ideals, in which striving for liberation, democratic principles, subordination to superimposed powers (such as the state) as well as individualism play a part.

-   On the so-called social structures level, the implementation and acceptance of a modern political structure, modern education and economic structures in which markets, division of labour, free entrepreneurship and so on play important roles.

-   On the cultural level, advanced technology, secularization, bureaucratic structures and the "broad principles of rationality" are accepted (Coetzee 1989:9-11).

Underlying these conceptions of 1950s style modernization theory-based prescriptions which were believed to lead to Third World, and in particular African development, were a number of basic assumptions.

A   The first assumption of modernization theory in the 1950s (and early 1960s) was contained in its Westerncentric bias - the belief that social evolution - and development - in Africa had until then followed Western lines, and that it would have been possible in the future to merely implement in Africa the Western route of social evolution and development. Precisely because it was modelled on social development in Europe and North America from the 17th century (the period of the

F.B.   P.T.O.

Enlightenment) to the early 20th century onwards; and especially the great social, economic and political changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution; it was explicitly expected by modernization theorists in the 1950s and early 1960s that Third world countries would (and indeed could) follow the Western experience to political, economic and social modernity (Etzioni-Halevy 1981:50-51; Emmett 1983:24-26).

From the above, one could say therefore that the socio-political and economic experience of the West - Europe and North America, formed the basis of modernization theory in the 1950s. The problem however is that because the Western route to development is such an integral part of the underlying assumptions of 1950s modernization theory; the strict adherence to the principles of 1950s modernization theory makes it however difficult to neatly separate the whole concept of modernity as assumed in the 1950s from its Western roots and assumptions - formed within the Western experience of development, and then customizing it for societies whose socio-economic and political development differed from that undergone by Western societies (Coetzee 1989:9-11). Thus, unlike what modernization theorists had assumed, societies brought to modernity through colonial conquest did not follow the same historical socio-economic and political development route as the route undertaken by Western societies.

Interestingly, both modernization theory in the 1950s and

marxist theory, long seen as opposing theories in development studies, both share this same assumption, namely that societies in the Third World (in marxist and especially in dependency theory terms the so-called periphery of the world economy) can form a "mirror-like reflection" of that of the West (Europe and North America, seen in marxist/ dependency theory terms as the core or centre of the world economy). Precisely because of this assumption, it was assumed by many marxist and dependency writers in the 1960s and 1970s especially that, since countries in the periphery were undergoing the same social evolution as countries in the centre, underdevelopment in the periphery was the result of capitalism, and the way that capitalism (based in the centre - Europe and North America) extracted resources from the periphery, leaving the latter underdeveloped (Blomstrom and Hettne 1984:79-97). However, according to marxist thinker Ernesto Laclau, what complicated what was then the strictly economic analysis of underdevelopment (first under marxism and then under dependency theory) was the fact that unlike what was previously assumed, the periphery in reality did not socially develop to be a "mirror-like reflection" of the social reality of the centre. The capitalist penetration of the periphery did not cause the disintegration of the pre-capitalist (traditional) social formations. The latter not only survived, but were periodically strengthened. Thus, to blame underdevelopment on the capitalist penetration was to misunderstand the whole problem of underdevelopment, in that the important role of

F.B. P.T.O.

pre-capitalist - traditional - social formations in these countries behind underdevelopment in these societies was ignored - interestingly by both modernization theorists in the 1950s, and marxist writers in general since Marx, to the 1970s when certain marxist theorists in fact made this point regarding social evolution in the periphery which differed from social evolution in the centre. This point was made particularly by the above-noted marxist thinker Ernesto Laclau, who based his writings and critique in Latin America (Blomstrom and Hettne 1984:79-97). Directly or indirectly, his writings would influence marxist writers in Africa, who for long had also thought of underdevelopment in Africa strictly in economic terms and core-periphery relations. One of these writers was Goran Hyden (1983:4-29) who, with regard to Africa, similar to Laclau with regard to Latin America, also identified "pre-capitalist social formations" on the African continent as not having followed Western lines, and as also being largely responsible for underdevelopment in Africa.

B   Secondly, as already mentioned above by Coetzee (1989:9-11), and as an extension of similar beliefs held since the period of the Enlightenment, the post-World-War II to early 1960s version of modernization theory saw social evolution as essentially moving in only one direction - from what was conceived as tradition, to what was conceived to be modernity, designed upon the above-mentioned Westerncentric lines (Etzioni-Halevy 1981:51-53; Emmett 1983:24-26). As highlighted above, and as Chabal and Daloz

(1999:51-52) further elaborate on and point to, because of this Westerncentric assumption the concepts of development, modernization and Westernization were increasingly put together under the term modernity. Yet according to Chabal and Daloz (1999:51-52), precisely because of this Westerncentric bias in the definition of modernity, no-one (or at least very few people) could conceive of a non-Western path to modernity, as found today in the Far East and in Africa. Somehow this brings together certain aspects of Western-defined modernity with local traditions and social evolution which, as pointed out above, may hold some elements, but is not a mere copy of European and North American social evolution - the concept of fusion.

C   Thirdly, linked to the above two points, post-World War II modernization theory, in line with post-17th century, Enlightenment-based theory, saw tradition as an obstacle to modernization and modernity; and therefore tradition was seen as something that had to be, and could be subdued if not destroyed before modernization with all the above-mentioned Westerncentric tenets can proceed (Etzioni-Halevy 1981:53-55). Yet in practice, as Chabal and Daloz (1999:51-52) point out above, throughout the non-Western world, including Japan, the rest of the Far East and Africa, what happened after the granting of political independence (early 1960s and onwards) was the acclimatization of Western influences to local conditions. This happened for example through the rooting of politics, economics and society to the historical,

sociological and cultural realities present in these societies, a process present to this very day. In Africa for example there was the Africanization of politics and society - this happened through the tribalization or ethnic-centred delineation of politics.

D   Modernization theory in the 1950s also emphasises that development and modernity are determined by internal factors and internal dynamics inherent in each given society. External factors which might influence development within the borders of a country, such as foreign economic influences including fluctuations in international commodity prices, were not taken much into account by modernization theorists (Etzioni-Halevy 1981:53-55). This particular assumption of modernization theory, or rather a shortcoming of it, laid the basis for dependency theory in the late 1960s and 1970s and its emphasis on external factors inherent in international markets. Linked to it were different countries' position in the world economic order, as the blame for underdevelopment in the Third World, including Africa. Yet as pointed out above, particularly by Ernesto Laclau, too much of a focus on external dynamics, especially combined with a lack of recognition of the fact that local or internal dynamics might differ from society to society, could be at least partially responsible for underdevelopment. This is not conducive to a complete understanding of underdevelopment in the Third World either. Hence the problem with dependency theory was the fact that it concentrated too much on external

(international) dynamics behind underdevelopment, and not enough on the internal dynamics. And yet, as pointed out above, despite their differences, both modernization and dependency theories, in their own ways, both shared the same, erroneous, Westerncentric assumptions about social evolution and possibilities for its recreation in the Third World.

E   Coetzee (1989:9-11) highlights another important limitation of 1950s modernization theory, linked to the above-mentioned conceptions of modernity destroying or subjugating tradition; namely the fact that it sees modernity and tradition as compartmentalized into two separate, counteropposing boxes or categories. Indeed, as highlighted by Coetzee (1989:9-11) possibilities for mixing or fusion between the boxes of tradition and modernity were largely ignored by modernization theorists in the 1950s and early 1960s.

F   So far in this critique of modernization theory, we have assumed that Western society (Europe and North America) did indeed reach the pinnacle of modernity as stipulated by modernization theorists in the 1950s and Enlightenment-influenced theorists since the 17th century. The fact however is that in reality European, North American and Japanese societies might be a few notches higher on the scale of modernity as defined by modernization theorists in the 1950s, along Western lines, in comparison to Third World societies. But by no means have Europeans and North Americans (and white South Africans) themselves reached all the lofty

requirements and expectations of modernity as defined by modernization theorists in the 1950s, and Enlightenment-based theorists before them. This raises the question as to whether indeed it is at all possible to reach the lofty heights of modernity as per the definition of 1950s modernization theory and 17th and 18th Century Enlightenment. Corruption and unethical behaviour, contrary to the assumptions of modernization theorists, is found in Europe and North America too; as can be seen by corruption scandals which emanate from time to time amongst the political elites of European governments; prominent amongst them being Italy in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and the interlinking between the Mafia, the political elite and the Italian state. Corruption is thus also found even in the Western societies, seen as perfectly modern by Modernization theorists in the 1950s, and thus somehow immune to corruption.

Tradition, in its positive and negative manifestations, still plays an important part in European and North American societies today, making Africa not the only continent in the world to be affected by tradition, and its positive and negative consequences. And neither are European and North American societies as rationalistic or strictly scientifically-based as regards popular beliefs and religious practices as presumed by 1950s modernization theorists. According to Comaroff and Comaroff (1999a:279-295) for example, many beliefs in religion and the supernatural - seen as part of tradition by modernization theorists, are still found in these societies today. In today's very urban, very modern London

for example, astrology, tarot card reading, fortune-telling and various good luck charms and potions are still prevalent (Davies 1997). And in many Latin societies today, beliefs in Patron Saints (and the magical powers attributed to many of them) for different days of the year and for different villages, towns and cities, are extremely prevalent today, and are frankly in the realm of tradition if one was to follow 1950s modernization theory to the letter. More recently, a number of serial killings in Tuscany, Italy have been linked to a prominent group of people, who used body parts of their victims in black magic rituals (Mail and Guardian, 31 August 2001, p. 18).

Not only have such traditional beliefs and pursuits persisted to today despite the widespread influence of Enlightenment and 1950s modernization theory, even within Europe and North America, but throughout the world today, including Europe and North America, there seems to be a return to much of tradition and what modernization theorists and their Enlightenment predecessors would call the "irrational". One sees this in the growth of the New Age movement, astrology, the herbs, lotions and potions of alternative medicine, and the activities of, and increasing growth of charismatic churches and cults, and faith healers operating within them, not only in Africa, but also in Europe and North America. Regardless of which continent, the interesting aspect of this resurgence of religion and belief in the supernatural within today's society (defined by 1950s modernization theorists as elements of

tradition) is that these beliefs are increasingly looked at by people as a means of bringing sense to, and dealing with the modern world surrounding them. Recently for example, with the Millennium change, there were a number of Millennium (also called Millenarian) and End of the world movements and cults active in Africa, Europe and North America, leading to a number of mass suicides. The same as in the first Millennium change, in the year 1000, the second Millennium change, namely the year 2000, was marked by many people throughout the world cowering in fear of a much prophesized end to the world.

The fact I want to point out here, in brief, is that the model of social, political and economic modernity presented by 1950s modernization theorists is only an ideal theoretical model which is in practice idealistic, and full adherence to which is largely unreachable even by Western societies themselves. Furthermore, 1950s modernization theory only sees social evolution as being from the pole of tradition to the pole of modernity. Nowhere in the theory is provision made for a return down the ladder (or continuum) back towards tradition. This would be needed to explain the movement towards a return to religion and other aspects of tradition currently occurring in the world, including the developed world.

Thus 1950s modernization theory also does not make provision for a move away from the pole of modernity back towards the pole of tradition, and hence the continued persistence of traditional rites, rituals and beliefs, as is seen

now with the Millennium change, and in Africa and urban South Africa in particular, as will be seen further on in this thesis.

G   Finally, the question which must also be raised about 1950s modernization theory and its Enlightenment predecessors relates to the desirability of all aspects of modernity as defined by 1950s modernization theorists and their predecessors. The same as various aspects of tradition are looked upon by various authors in a positive or a negative light, so various aspects of a modern existence *as per* 1950s modernization theory definition are looked upon by many in a positive light, especially by its supporters. The problem of 1950s modernization theory and its Enlightenment predecessors is that, in my opinion, it comes up with a romanticised, almost exclusively positive view of modernity, whilst it looks at tradition in an almost exclusively bad light. The fact is that although, as will be argued elsewhere in this thesis, particularly in chapter 5, much of what is classified as modern in reality acts as a continuation of tradition in various forms, limiting arguments of a new start away from tradition; the fact is that a modern existence *as per* 1950s modernization theory definition is not reachable in all respects, and it also has negative aspects and consequences which makes it not so desirable.

Despite the existence of capitalist markets, poverty persisted and increased in the developed world, particularly the United States. And poverty was, and still is increasing throughout the

world, particularly the developing world, despite the latter's adoption of Westerncentric modernity as defined by modernization theorists resident in the West. Wars and revolutions continually erupted outside Europe and North America - in the developing world, seemingly caused by modernization itself. Dictatorship, not democracy, was emerging in the Third World, dictatorship often seen as the only means of imposing modernity onto societies that were somehow seen as unwilling to adopt modernity (Alexander 1995:71-80). Despite the focus on rationality and secularisation within modernization theory, as mentioned above by Comaroff and Comaroff (1999a:279-295), new religions spread throughout the world, with a new emphasis on religion and ideology (in particular ideologies with anti-Capitalist and anti-Western orientations) from left-wing ideologies to Islamic fundamentalism gaining ground over secularization, science and technology (Alexander 1995:71-80).

Partially coming from these critiques contained in Alexander (1995) and Comaroff and Comaroff (1999[a]), are other problems or at least side-effects associated with modernity. The gap between rich and poor is widening, increasingly so. An urban environment, precisely because of many aspects of modernity, is an alienating environment for many. Pollution and environmental degradation play a role in this increasing sense of alienation, and can also be seen largely as a product of 1950s modernity - as a by-product of industrialization, the desire for technology and a consumer society - following

Western lines.

To this, one can add other even less ideological problems and difficulties caused by Western-defined modernity, even if possibly inadvertent problems, some of which have been already mentioned above by Alexander. For example particularly in urban societies there is an over-reliance on technology in peoples' daily lives, contributing to problems varying from environmental degradation, through to eternal daily traffic jams, and other social and personal problems - spreading a personal sense of isolation and alienation. Already, depression and other mental diseases related to a psychologically alienating modern urban environment have been declared by some as the disease of the 21st century. Indeed Brzezinski (1993:65) makes the general point that today's Western society, the model generally held up by modernization theorists for progress and development, is in fact increasingly dominated by spiritual emptiness, excessive permissiveness, avarice, greed and extreme materialism. These inherent problems which arose within modernity are in fact sabotaging Western definitions of modernity. This is all linked up to an extreme version of individualism that sees the gaining of resources for the satisfaction of personal permissiveness and greed (at other peoples' expense) as being acceptable, and indeed as the acceptable "way to do things". Brzezinski (1993) calls this negative, undesirable element of Western society "*Permissive Cornucopia*". Brzezinski (1993:65) briefly notes that this term is derived

F.B.   P.T.O.

from the mythological horn sucked by the Greek god Zeus. It had the miraculous capacity to become full with whatever the owner desired, whenever desired. "The term Permissive Cornucopia can hence be applied to a society (including Western society today) in which everything is permitted and everything can be had" (Brzezinski 1993:65). According to Brzezinski (1993:65-66):

> "There are some grounds for serious and legitimate concern that in the advanced, rich and politically democratic societies cornucopian permissiveness is increasingly dominating and defining both the content and the goals of individual existence. The notion of Permissive Cornucopia involves essentially a society in which the progressive decline of the centrality of moral criteria is matched by heightened preoccupation with material and self-gratification....The combination of the erosion of moral criteria in defining personal conduct with the emphasis on material goods results both in permissiveness on the level of action and in material of greed on the level of motivation. 'Greed is good' - the battle cry of the American Yuppies of the late 1980s - is a fitting motto for permissive cornucopia".

The interesting thing about Permissive Cornucopia, which according to Brzezinski is the trademark of Western modernity and could be seen as the possibly unforeseen end result of the hopes and desires expressed by 1950s modernization theorists, is the fact that it takes all the aspects of modernity as defined by 1950s modernization theorists, contained in Coetzee's (1989:9-11) definition and turns each aspect against each other, in such a way that modernity as-per 1950s definition is in fact blocked and hindered. Hence Western modernity in a sense stumbles upon itself. For example individualism and democratic values (both taken too far

according to Brzezinski), both seen as positive aspects of modernity by modernization theorists in the 1950s, is today clashing with nationalism, civic duty and other social values needed for the maintenance of the Western-defined state, and the somewhat conservative (Protestant) work ethic hinging upon delayed gratification that formed an important foundation for Western-defined modernity and Enlightenment since the 17th and 18th centuries. Brzezinski (1993:69) expresses this social move towards consumption, self-gratification and excessive individualism, and its consequences, as follows:

> "Within such conditions, in a society that culturally emphasizes the minimization of individual satisfactions and the maximization of moral restraints (the product of Permissive Cornucopia), civic freedom tends to be elevated into a self-validating absolute. In other words, civic freedom is divorced from the notion of civic responsibility....Sacrifice and self-restraint was the definition of patriotic citizenship, the definition of civic freedom within a democratic society. This definition is in jeopardy, as increasingly freedom is defined as the accumulation of rights and entitlements as well as a licence for any form of self-expression and gratification".

And technological advancement - another trademark of Western modernity as defined above by Coetzee (1989), maybe even inadvertently so, nevertheless contributes to this process of Permissive Cornucopia, and helps to spread it throughout the world.

> "It is no exaggeration to say that Hollywood movie and TV producers have become cultural subverters who - cynically exploiting the shield offered by the First Amendment (ensuring freedom of expression) - have been propagating a self-destructive social ethic".

(Brzezinski 1993:71-72).

"The most important political effect of technological innovation (such as television) has been to create a social intimacy on the global scale - overcoming time and distance. But that new intimacy both combines and collides at the same time. In much of the world, the daily struggle for survival by the acutely impoverished masses now occurs in the context of an intense awareness of a totally contrasting lifestyle on the part of its own élites as well as of the cornucopian West (with which the élites of the poor countries identify themselves and which they aspire to imitate). As a result, for mankind the gap between enhanced expectations and actual capabilities may have never been as great as it is today".

(Brzezinski 1993:76).

Linking this discussion to Africa and the Third World, Brzezinski also makes the important point that today, after an ideologically-delineated Cold War era, the Third World and the former Communist Bloc countries are increasingly emulating or following the Cornucopian Western example in the restructuring of their societies in the new Millennium, leading to a sense of frustration within the former Third World and the Communist Bloc countries, at their seeming inability to reach the levels of Western society as they perceive that society to be.

"The corruption inherent in Permissive Cornucopia is not only the consequence of existential abundance. It can also be the result of the absence or denial of such abundance in the eyes of the growing number of those who are aware (by television or sheer proximity) of its existence but feel personally deprived of its privileges. The economic travails of the West, with the growing number of unemployed and even of the permanently excluded (eg: a significant portion of blacks in the United States), create the condition of militant desire for the fruits of Cornucopia as well as of a more pervasive inclination to reject moral constraints on any - even violent - 'get rich quick schemes'. The advanced (Permissive Cornucopian) West today is the model for the social aspirations of the

shipwrecks of Communism and the deprived masses of the Third World."

(Brzezinski 1993:66)

Hence as noted above, not only has 1950s style modernity not been achieved in practice within Third World, so-called developing societies, but frankly it is only an ideal model or a dream which in practice is unachievable at any rate, even within the even more advanced European and North American societies themselves, and whose results, maybe even in ways that were not foreseen or expected by modernization theorists in the 1950s, are in certain aspects undesirable, both in the developed and the developing world.

2.4 *Different conceptualizations of the relationship between the interrelated categories of tradition and modernity*

To me the point by Coetzee (1989:9-11) indicating possible fusion between (Western) modernity and tradition within a general conception of modernity leaves room for new possibilities as regards the definition of the term modernity, in relation to tradition. This includes the important possibility for modernity not as being based on a move away or a new start away from tradition - seen as the past - but rather as a continuation of the same tradition. In other words, the conception of modernity that will be advocated in this thesis, as a continuation of the point by Coetzee (1989), will conceptualise modernity, even Westerncentric definitions of modernity, as being based on, indeed as being the product of, the tradition - the past - that preceded it. This is the major critique of 1950s modernization theory and its 17th and 18th century Enlightenment predecessors which, as will be seen further on in this thesis, acts as the basis of this thesis, even though where applicable other critiques of modernization theory and the Enlightenment as highlighted above, will be brought into the discussion.

The background of 1950s and early 1960s style modernization theory as being based on traditions that preceded it, the precedents or traditions of which emerging already within Classical Greece, and re-emerging in the 17th and 18th centuries, through to the 20th century, as we noted above, is in itself a case in point of modern thought and institutions being based on tradition and traditional thoughts, practices and institutions.

Many criticisms of modernization theory as conceptualized in the 1950s led to a desire to create a more so-called people-centred development path with an emphasis on the Basic Needs of peoples in the developing world (Wisner 1988:13-52; Islam and Henault 1979:253-267), and much of the debate to this effect became rooted in dependency theory. Yet even in the early 1960s it became clear that modern institutions transplanted into the developing world were not immune from factors inherent in these societies, and thus affecting their operation, often negatively.

An important contributor to these new conceptualizations was Riggs (1964). He made the point that corruption and inefficiency in Western-conceptualized and designed state bureaucracies in the developing world could be linked to social influences from the societies surrounding these bureaucracies, affecting civil servants' motivations and thus their general operations. Ethnic and kin (traditional) affiliation for example were seen as affecting the civil servants in terms of the decisions they make and their motivations, thus affecting the operations and the performance of the state (see Riggs 1964: chapters 1, 8 and 9), regardless of the fact that the state, in terms of its institutional structures and modes of operation was itself modern in that as an institution, the state was brought into the developing world from Europe by colonialism.

This in itself countered assertions that Western-defined modernity had deleted the social traditional structures present in the developing world since what was conceived of as being tradition and traditional according to early modernization theorists, was affecting

the modern institution of the state itself, including its internal functioning. It also countered assertions contained in 1950s and 1960's style modernization theory and it's predecessors that there was no or little chance of the two categories of modern and tradition somehow mixing or fusing together. It also countered ideas that modernity based on the Western experience could somehow merely be (easily) replicated in other societies, without consideration of the social experience of the local society which might have differed, or might not yet have reached the same type or level of evolution as Western society, in a sense making it unsuitable for the type of modern institution (such as the state) and the type of modernity prescribed by modernization theorists of the 1950s and early 1960s.

In the 1980s and 1990s , to an extent based on the above criticisms by Riggs (1964) and others, a different type of critique of 1950s and 1960s modernization theory started to emerge, although possibly not labelled as such. These latter critiques were less based on economics, and based more on sociology and anthropology as present in Western and non-Western societies. In essence, this new type of critique (Turbin 1988:474-478; Fogel-Chance 1993:94-106; Smolicz 1988:387-403; 1992:345-350) said that the modernity that the developed and the developing world were entering into did not represent a move away from tradition as defined by 1950s modernization. Rather tradition was alive and well, and in fact what was perceived to be happening, according to these new conceptions, was that traditional and modern influences were somehow intertwining, integrating, merging or fusing to create a type of modernity that was different from conceptualizations of modernity

according to 1950s style modernization, in that in some respects the modernity that various societies were entering into acts as a continuation of tradition, whilst not outright rejecting, indeed even being flexible in accepting (at least within limits) modern - Western - institutions and practices - foreign in that, in the case of societies located outside Europe and North America, these institutions and practices originated from the West and were brought into these societies through colonialism and contact with the West (Turbin 1988:474-478; Fogel-Chance 1993:94-106; Smolicz 1988:387-403; 1992:345-350).

Indeed, as Chabal and Daloz (1999:51-52) highlighted above, Western models of politics, economics and society were not rejected outright within societies outside Europe and North America, but were adjusted to the historical, sociological and cultural realities present in these strictly non-Western societies, as in Africa. This was thanks to the flexibility of tradition to accommodate essentially Westerncentric ideas (Smolicz 1988:387-403; 1992:345-350), which counters conceptions of tradition that emerged since the Enlightenment, that saw tradition as being rigid or inflexible and thus needing to be changed for progress (defined as Westerncentric modernity) to come about.

Moreover, as an extension of these new, different conceptualizations, newer conceptualizations have emerged in the 1980s and 1990s which aimed at explaining development and Western-defined modernity in the Far East's Newly Industrialising Countries (NIC) "Tigers" in terms of social values inherent within these societies - identifying their Western-defined modernity as

being based on, indeed rooted in, the tradition within these societies, eg: Japan, that preceded the arrival of these Western values. Thus the tradition of Confucianism in its various manifestations from its emphasis on hard work, saving, delayed gratification, to popular support, recognition of and support for the State and a tradition putting a strong emphasis on national strength _vis-a-vis_ foreign powers is being identified as forming the basis of the great modern success (in Western terms) of these countries in their developmental efforts (Robertson 1985: 93-103; Lee and Lee 1992:107-123).

Applying this approach seeing tradition as an important contributor to modernity, to progress in Europe, it is noted that developments such as the Industrial Revolution were not merely rooted in 17th and 18th century Enlightenment (which as we saw above was itself based on influences dating back from Classical Greece), but also other popular traditions that preceded it. Thus for example the traditional Protestant work ethic, with its emphasis on hard work, continued saving and delayed gratification is seen as an important influence which helped to bring about the Industrial Revolution (Etzioni-Halevy 1981:52-53).

Also, it must be noted that for example the veneration of learning, traditionally admired within the Jewish community, and emphasized by that community in order to study the Scriptures for religious purposes (in other words Jewish tradition), played an important role in the Jewish community's modem success as defined by Modernization theorists in the 1950s (Etzioni-Halevy 1981:52-53; Mazrui 1978:23-34). Hence these success stories, even within the

backyard from which originated 1950s and 1960s style modernization - Europe and North America, were linked not to these societies turning away from tradition, but rather to the continuation of such tradition within these societies.

Indeed, modernity and modernization as conceptualized in the 1950s and early 1960s is hereby countered since the whole idea of moving away from tradition, contained in 1950s and early 1960s modernization theory is challenged by the above evidence, emerging from modernizational success stories, and even from new conceptualizations of the development path to modernity taken within Europe. Furthermore, tradition in this respect need not be all bad for development and progress, and the type of tradition present in any given society can help along, or impede efforts to modernize along Western lines.

2.5   *Modernization theory - the postcolonial African experience*

As mentioned above, modernity as conceptualized by 1950s and early 1960s modernization theory in Europe and North America was applied to postcolonial Africa.

There were in fact many hopes expressed for Africa at independence - that the continent would develop and modernize along Western lines, backed by what was seen as positive modern developments on the continent such as independent states, manned by modern bureaucracies, copying rationalist-based, scientific management theories as practiced in the Western world. They were under the political leadership of democratically-elected presidents who had publically declared that they had wanted to bring Africa to the same (1950s Western-defined) developmental level of Europe; and whose actions were guided by modern legislatures operating under constitutions. These were themselves largely copies of the constitutions in force in the countries of origin of the former colonial masters. This experiment in the application of 1950s modernization theory to Africa - and other countries in the Third World - somehow did not lead to the envisaged Western social, political and economic modernity merely copying itself in all key respects onto post-colonial Africa.

As we will see below, 1950s and early 1960s style modernization assumed that modernity would destroy tradition. Instead, tradition and traditional practices and attitudes pre-dating the advent of

colonialism in these countries re-emerged and made their influence felt in these countries in the lead-up to and after independence. As highlighted by Chabal and Daloz (1999:51-52) modern, Western-inspired institutions such as the multiparty democratic system (at least for a short period after independence) and especially the state bureaucracy, colonially-based and thus foreign to Africa in origin, were not necessarily rejected in these countries by the emergence or re-emergence of tradition. Instead, these institutions and practices were re-interpreted along traditional lines.

In other words there was a certain amount of fusion between what was considered to be modern and what was considered to be tradition. This theme of fusion between what is considered to be modern, and what is considered to be tradition through the re-interpretation of modern institutions via the lens of tradition - in order to bring about a certain congruency between these modern institutions and traditional social values (Chabal and Daloz 1999:51-52) - will be seen more clearly in the descriptions of post-colonial occurrences in Africa, continuing to this very day, briefly described below.

A   Western style multi-party, parliamentary democratic systems as applied to Africa did not necessarily lead to the formation of class-based groupings. Instead multi-party democratic systems often gave rise to an increase in ethnic tensions, as different political parties became strongholds for different, often belligerent, ethnic groupings (Flint 1983:407-411). Political leaders in these countries, such as Julius Nyerere in

Tanzania and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, often used this "ethnic divisiveness factor" within inter-party politics as rationale to impose one-party states (Potholm 1979:50-68; 69-72; Chazan et. al. 1992:37-68). Where one-party states were not imposed, military regimes often emerged. Furthermore, the leaders of many post-colonial governments, in response to what they perceived to be the ethnic divisiveness of multiparty electoral systems, based their advocation of one-party states on a conceived return to a political system modelled on the conception of a somewhat placid consensus-based type of politics as practiced, so it was maintained by these leaders, under chiefly administration in the villages of pre-colonial - traditional - Africa before the advent of colonialism, capitalism and Western-based conceptions of multiparty democracy (Potholm 1979:50-68; 69-72; Chazan et. al. 1992:37-68).

B   At independence, the new bureaucracies in the new African countries were supposed to function in largely rational ways, in accordance with the dictates of scientific management theories originating in Europe and North America in the 19th and 20th centuries (Dwivedi 1990:91-98) based on *inter-alia* the sense of rationality seen as emerging in society - after the Enlightenment. Despite these Western (seen as modern) influences however, nepotism and patronage, often reflecting the personal interests of politicians and bureaucrats, these interests often running along seemingly traditional kinship and ethnic lines;   affected these states' administrations;

hampering the effective functioning of these state structures (Dwivedi 1990:91-98; Illy 1986:29-41; Islam and Henault 1979:253-259).

C Despite efforts by the new independent states to assert their power over tribal chiefs by trying to officially eradicate their influence over the state administration and subordinate chiefs to the state, the chiefs largely retained their powers, if only on an informal basis, continuing to have an important behind the scenes influence in government, business, the security forces and the clergy (Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996:23-26).

Many state leaders throughout Africa in fact often tried to copy and integrate within their rule much of the symbolism of power, and much of the administrative-political structures and traditions of tribal chiefs, in order to boost their own standing amongst the people (Sandbrook 1985:83-111). And much of what they copied from tradition and traditions associated with chiefs included beliefs in magic and witchcraft associated with these chiefs; which were used by these new leaders to ensure their political survival. This was the case in strife-torn Congo-Brazzaville in the mid-1990s (Sandberg 1998:14-16) for example, where political élites, in desperation, even dabbled in occult belief as ways to safeguard their continued rule. Decalo (1985:223-225) points to evidence that some of Africa's worst despots in the 1960s and 1970s such as Idi Amin in Uganda, Jean Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Republic and Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea were

themselves dabbling in witchcraft and the occult as means of boosting their own power in order to stay in political power in the face of adversity. More recently Levy Mwanawasa, who was recently elected to power in Zambia as successor to Frederick Chiluba, as the ruling MMD party's presidential candidate, is rumoured to regularly use African traditional medicine and diviners to sanitize his office of evil spirits and witchcraft against him (Mail and Guardian, 31 August 2001, p. 17).

2.6 *Today's Africa: indications that social evolution on the African continent did not quite follow Western modernizational lines*

There are indications however that the above reactions to modernity within the state, the state bureaucracy, the state leadership and the political system as described above, particularly within an African context, were however mere reflections of similar reactions to 50s and 60s style modernity rooted within broader society, including urban society. In other words there are indications African society did not follow the path to modernity prescribed by the original modernization theorists. Instead of being destroyed by Western modernity, African tradition continued to play a very important role within the modernity of post-colonial and today's Africa; even within an urban environment (an urban existence believed to be supposedly the height of Western-defined modernity). Again, there are signs that modernity and tradition are fusing together as Africans pursue a very African type of modernity congruent with African tradition (Chabal and Daloz 1999:51-52).

To begin with, Bates (1974:457-475) points out that ethnic affiliation is an important means of distributing the so-called fruits of modernity among local inhabitants in Africa. Land, markets for goods and services in African urban and rural areas, and even who gets education, is often determined by ethnic affiliation. Politics too, as pointed out above, is influenced by ethnicity or tribalism. According to Bates (1974:457-475) this is because politics is an important factor which often determines how government services, and

government-backed distribution of modern amenities such as schools, roads, housing and electricity, is conducted. Not only, but according to Sithole (1985:189) the voters themselves vote according to ethnic-tribal lines precisely because they expect the politician of their own ethnic group, which they themselves subsequently elected into office - which Sithole calls "the ethnic homeboy", to be the best to deliver the goods of Western modernity to them. In other words the voters themselves, the population itself, both rural and urban, is largely responsible for the coming into power of the tribal politician and the ethnic bias of the policies which government undertakes under his administration (Sithole 1985:189).

And these expectations that the ethnic "Homeboy" will be the best to look after the ethnic and/ or kin community's interests at central government level is a great contributor to rampant corruption - the phenomenon described by Joseph (1983:21-33) in his study of maladministration in Nigeria as "Prebendalism", defined by him as:

> "....patterns of political behaviour which reflect as their justifying principle that the offices of the existing state may be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office-holders, as well as that of their reference or support group. To a significant extent the state in such a context is perceived as a _Congeries_ of offices susceptible to individual cum communal appropriation. The statutory purposes of such offices become a matter of secondary concern however much that purpose might have been codified in law or other regulations or even periodically cited during competitions to fill them."

> (Joseph 1983:30-31).

The so-called move to multiparty democracy in African countries in the late 1980s and the 1990s further illustrates these linkages between politicians and populace. As Chabal and Daloz (1999:93-

109) points out, despite the re-introduction of multiparty politics throughout Africa, voters themselves often voted back into office the same politicians or their political parties that ruled (or misruled) these countries since independence. The same politicians and/ or their parties that previously put their respective countries under one-party rule, now still rule under multiparty democracies (Chabal and Daloz 1999:93-109). For example Daniel Arap Moi, who ruled Kenya under a one-party regime under the ruling KANU party which he inherited after the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, is still ruling the country today under a multiparty electoral system introduced into the country in 1992. Interestingly those groups which campaigned and demonstrated on the streets of Nairobi for democracy in the early 1990s, were groups which were previously advantaged under Jomo Kenyatta's patronage network which advantaged ethnic Kikuyu's - the tribe of which Kenyatta himself was a member. But under Moi - an ethnic Kalenjin - these previously advantaged groups felt left out of the clientistic networks of Moi's regime, and so the pro-multi-party democracy movement in Kenya was born - not necessarily out of a burning desire for democracy - but rather democracy as a means of gaining greater access to state coffers (Ogachi 1999:83-105).

There is also evidence pointing to corruption in Africa not being merely the result of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats, who were merely greedily preying over the societies over which they were ruling. Despite often radical interventions by international financial institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) there were very modest improvements brought on by such intervention. Even within the new

F.B.   P.T.O.

political leaderships that emerged in African countries since the 1980s and early 1990s, corruption seems to be a continuing problem within these countries' bureaucracies (Olivier de Sardan 1999:32-33). Corrupt functionaries and politicians find creative ways and means of getting around the IMF and World-Bank prescribed anti-corruption policies. Hibbou 1999 (contained in Bayart, Ellis and Hibbou 1999:69-116) shows us how these proverbial dirty tricks were used by African bureaucrats and politicians to circumvent IMF and World Bank prescribed good governance policies. Note must be taken herein of tradition-based informal networks' compliance in these technically criminal activities, and how this in fact countered the assumptions of IMF and World Bank policies.

Note must also be taken that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank tried to reverse the negative economic performance of African governments, and particularly African bureaucracies, through the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes, and accompaning efforts to instill so-called good governance through various programmes which injected into African bureaucracies updated Western management techniques; a re-think of African states' extensive involvement in the broad economies of African countries, following new Western economic orthodoxy, and the reorganization of vast tracts of Western-originating African bureaucratic regulations and structures.

And the same as on the eve of independence, these efforts included the retraining of African bureaucracies, in terms of instilling these renewed Western values, management techniques and bureaucratic

structures into African bureaucrats. All in all, this represents a new injection of Western bureaucratic rationality. By the late 1990s however, despite these extensive efforts, it became clear that these programmes only had limited success, in that African governments, despite the new (Western-inspired) orthodoxies, did not necessarily perform any better in their functions than before the imposition of these (Western-inspired) programmes, the results thus falling below the initial expectations expressed at the start of the implementation of these programmes. Hibbou (Contained in Bayart, Ellis and Hibbou 1999:69-116) summarizes World Bank and Structural Adjustment policies in terms of six postulates; the results of which are summarized below as follows:

1   *To reduce corruption, it's necessary to reduce the opportunities for discretionary intervention by the government.*   The problem here is that although according to standard Western economic theories discretionary interventions in the economy (by the state) are conducive to corruption, experience shows that corruption may also permit the introduction of discretionary interventions and flexibility when these qualities are absent. The attempt to suppress discretionary state interventions appears thus to be not only utopian and unlikely to succeed, but state intervention is also needed to fight corruption and criminalization. In passing, donor-imposed privatization policies throughout Africa, aimed at diminishing state intervention in the economies, led to various examples of corruption for those state officials involved in selling off state assets; corruption which can be linked to practices such as tribute-giving, well-rooted within African tradition.

2   *In order to counter the scale of embezzlement and lack of rigour in the administration of funds, aid donors should apply more pressure and more detailed conditionality.*   These efforts unfortunately led to state leaders strengthening informal ties with criminal networks, many of which are linked to traditional groupings such as Muoride Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal, many of which are the same networks that had previously been involved (in a more limited scale) in the same embezzlement and corrupt practices which aid conditionality

policies are trying to prevent. Interestingly, many of the privatized companies, bought by these criminal networks, acted as fronts for the same criminal activities

3   *Faced with the persistance of (bad practices) of African actors, the important thing is to reach consensus (with and between African actors).* Suppliers of aid credits are obsessed with securing repayment. This explains why it is that aid donors are often willing to accept unorthodox arrangements, half-baked measures and stopgaps. Thus they neglect to penalize sub-standard performances and sometimes ally themselves to people and (often tradition-based) networks (such as the above-mentioned Senegalese Muoride Islamic Brotherhood-based criminal networks) who are at the heart of illicit practice. In this way too donors also develop informal relations with African states; with the maybe unintended yet very negative consequence of strengthening the tradition-based criminal networks which caused many of the state's problems and linkages to criminality.

4   *To discourage the growth of the Informal sector and of illegality, the tendency of the public authorities or of the government to intervene in the economy in any form should be reduced.* Again according to standard (Western) economic theory, too much government intervention leads to the creation and strengthening of illegal parallel markets, thus stimulating crime. However a closer look reveals that the informal sector is not the outward expression of market forces, in opposition to the state. In fact the interconnection of the formal and informal is a deeply embedded feature of the way in which African economies are organized. This is illustrated again by criminal networks linked to the traditional Muoride Islamic Brotherhoods in Senegal. The Muoride holy city of Touba, in Senegal, known as a centre for contraband and illegal activities in Senegal, is the most economically dynamic city of Senegal. Yet Touba cannot be seen as the centre of opposition to the Senegalese state. It actually forms part of the informal state structure via a web of informal concessions, carefully negotiated privileges - including impunity for economic offences - and personal and political relationships - in which Senegalese politicians rely on for support   All over Africa, the state participates actively in the informal economy. Hence despite the active involvement of the African state in the economy, its not as if this happened at the expense of the informal economy, since the informal economy indeed benefitted from the state, and in fact took part in many of the illegal practices that in fact hampered the state. The formal and the informal economy are thus linked. Hence, informal and illegal economic behaviour cannot be considered only as the consequence of insufficient

liberalization, since the real reason is more complicated, in that there are also many reasons why people prefer using the more socially embedded (ie: rooted within tradition) informal structures in their business activity. Incentives to enter the formal market structures, such as the lowering of formal restrictions and fiscal changes are outweighed by incentives to stay in the informal sector, for example beliefs that recent improvements in formal regulations are short-term and precarious, the deterioration of public administration and more confidence in informal, traditional networks.

5 *To reinforce the effectiveness of government and encourage the development of the rule of law, new measures and legal reforms are required.* This however ignores the fact that people ignore it. Its therefore not the inadequacy of the law that's the point at issue, but the fact that people systematically flout it. Both old and new laws meet the same fate.

6 *While waiting for reforms to take full effect, donors should strengthen whatever core of effectiveness there is, even if it is isolated, within the government.* In reality, this strategy contributed to the further erosion of government.

A   It demoralizes still further other parts of government, which are often on levels of the administration which are higher than the so-called more effective departments being isolated from the rest of the bureaucracy.

B   It isolates the technocrats identified by the donors as partners from the concrete difficulties encountered in applying the new measures, and notably the political conflicts which they will cause.

C   This strategy hastens the loss of legitimacy of the civil service.

D   It encourages the creation of shadow economic and administrative structures - linked to the above informal networks - often rooted within African tradition. All in all, these worsen administrative capability in these countries; and disassociated those who apply economic policy from those who are formally held responsible to society as a whole.

An analysis of these basic six postulates of Structural Adjustment Programmes, and efforts aimed at bringing about good governance; their interpretation, and what went wrong in the implementation and practical results of each postulate, by Hibbou, is the following, and must be noted by supporters of African tradition as an important

F.B.   P.T.O.

means of stimulating economic development in Africa. The point that must be noted is that for as much as 1950s modernization theory has, together with other Western-originating approaches, failed to bring about growth and development in Africa; much of the blame for this failure (and the state's bad performance in bringing about development) must be pinned on the negative role played by much of African tradition (through informal networks, often linked to traditional clan interests), which nevertheless forms part of the same tradition advocated by some as holding the key for Africa's development.

Hence, there is a need to re-engage with a particular strand of the modernization debate, namely the tradition versus modernity debate because an investigation of why 1950s modernization theory and the African state - the product of such Westernization - failed, reveals mechanisms and practices inherent within tradition, practices which managed to find practical use within a Westernized environment, including the urban areas. It has influenced the internal dynamics of the Western-originating state in Africa, and has destroyed dreams of social, economic and political change according to modernization theory prescriptions in the 1950s, which are still very relevant today because the same practices, rooted within tradition, could inhibit development by any other model, including through a return to the roots of African tradition (this will be further looked at in chapter 5). And this warrants a re-look at how tradition relates to modernity - an important strand within the modernity debate, concerning what constitutes modernity and what constitutes tradition - which is what this thesis is concerned with.

The above important point, already made in chapter 1, must be linked to and explained by more recent conceptualizations of the reasons behind corruption, which point to broader social factors rooted within African tradition. These were not deleted with the arrival of Western-defined modernity, but instead found new expression within and through modernity. There is evidence that the modern multiparty democratic system can increase such corruption, and that in the very least multiparty democracy *per-se* does not have a better track record against corruption than one-party and military governments (Joseph 1983:21-33).

Indeed Jeffries (1993:20-34) points out that the few African success stories against corruption presented by the IMF and the World Bank, despite linkages made by the World Bank and others especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s between Western-style multiparty democracy and good governance (also prescribed by certain modernization theorists in the 1950s and early 1960s) as necessary for development, were not under multiparty democracies, but were in fact under more undemocratic or less democratic one-party states, single-party dominated systems and military regimes. Yoweri Museveni's government in Uganda is theoretically a so-called no party government as no political parties are allowed to be represented either in parliament or anywhere in government, but in practice is dominated by Museveni's own ruling party; Ghana was under the military rule of Jerry Rawlings, and Botswana's political system is dominated, as it has been since independence, by the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). According to Jeffries (1993:20-34), these success stories against corruption and bad

governance, as limited as most of them may have been, were due to the fact that these countries' governments were able to use their dominant positions in politics to effectively insulate their administration from the clamour for redistribution of governmental resources emanating from broader society (in other words they were able to insulate themselves from the above-described Prebendalism).

Indeed Leftwich (1993:605-623; 1995:400-422) makes the point that regardless of whether these regimes were democratic, single-party, one-party dominated, or run under military regimes (indeed regardless of positive or negative human rights records), Leftwich (1993:605-623; 1995:400-422) identified this ability by political élites within developmentally successful states to "insulate" bureaucracies and political regimes from social clamours, regardless of whether or not this role was carried out under modern Western definitions of democracy and respect for human rights, as an important factor behind the growth of effective Developmental States such as Botswana and South-East Asia's NIC "tigers"; a strong role for the state *vis-a-vis* society being traditionally accepted within the latter South-East Asian societies thanks to Confucianism (Lee and Lee 1992:107-123). Indeed Leftwich's point delinks democracy and human rights as necessary components for developmental success, which in passing goes against conceptions of a supposed link between democracy, human rights and developmental success which are somewhat popular in much academic debate today *inter-alia* within South Africa (see for example Du Plessis 2001:61-77).

Thus developmental experience in Africa and other places outside Europe and North America counters thoughts and assumptions present in 1950s style modernization theory, and which continue to this day in certain academic circles that Western-style democracy is the key to good governance, and hence development, since the governments that led growth and development were often technically undemocratic, for example military regimes (Leftwich 1993:605-623; 1995:400-422; Jeffries 1993:20-34).

Other aspects of African society run counter to the prescriptions of 1950s modernization theory. Ferguson (1999:82-111) in his study of mineworkers living and working in Zambia's urban centres on the Copperbelt noted that urbanized Africans did not necessarily just shrug off African tradition once they settle down in an urban environment. Instead, many urbanites, despite even being born in the urban areas, still prefer African home-brewed beer, many prefer speaking local "tribal" languages and adhering to traditional customs such as the payment of bridewealth (_Lobola_), despite the effects of Western modernization. Many also keep up strong kinship relations with their rural kin which, especially now during Zambia's continuing economic crisis, comes in very handy as retired and retrenched mineworkers make use of these rural linkages to settle in the rural areas - when dire economic conditions in the urban areas make a continued urban existence impossible for them (Ferguson 1999:82-111).

In this respect Ferguson (1999:173-177) noted that anthropologists who directly observed Zambian Copperbelt domestic groups in the

1950s already then found a range of living arrangements that confounded the nuclear family model - associated with 1950s modernization. Thus for example, anthropologists noted that in Ndola, the major urban centre on the Zambian Copperbelt, almost every household included some kinsman of the householder or his wife amongst inmates, while the children residing in the house were often not the householders' own, but belonged to a relative either of his own or his wife. The household was not an independent unit, as portrayed in modern Western society - following the prescriptions of 1950s and early 1960s style modernity, but rather a unit that was immediately tied into a wider set of ties and obligations to rural communities.

Anthropologists also noted that the picture of family life and marriage on the mine township of the urban centres of the Copperbelt was different from the views of family and marriage which seemed appropriate for modern couples - as defined in Western society in the 1950s in line with the teachings of mainline churches, and as taught in the urban areas of the Zambian Copperbelt by missionaries. According to one anthropologist, the missionaries' teachings concerning monogamy, fidelity and other Christian values, "did not appear to have taken deep root among most Africans in this area". Indeed, according to Ferguson (1999:173-177) "the model of 'modern family life' advocated in the past never fit 'reality' on the ground both during and after colonialism".

What complicates this picture of African urban modernity further is

F.B. P.T.O.

the continued and now even stronger belief within an urban environment, even among educated people, in the occult, bewitchment and the supernatural. In particular beliefs regarding witchcraft, the ability to be bewitched by an evil enemy, beliefs in the continued influence of the ancestors or shades, and beliefs in all kinds of diviner-prepared lotions, potions and amulets' efficacy in preventing the negative effects of witchcraft (Chabal and Daloz 1999:63-76), beliefs previously thought by Enlightenment and 1950s modernization-inspired theoreticians to have been left behind in the rural areas, are now present within the cities.

One curious if somewhat gory relatively brief example illustrates this. In Lagos, the economic capital of Nigeria, a rumour (defined by Goldstuck 1993 as an "urban legend") spread rampantly in October 1990. The rumour was that doctors of witchcraft found a way of making mens' genitalia disappear by mere touch (Goldstuck 1993:75-78). Despite Lagos police being able to trace the source of the rumours, and disproving these rumours completely, these rumours continued nevertheless, and resulted in vigilante mobs hunting down alleged witches in Lagos, killing a number of people in the process. These witch-hunts and subsequent deaths spread to other urban centres in Nigeria as well (Goldstuck 1993:75-78), and occasionally these exact rumours reappear in Nigerian cities to this very day (Sunday Times, 15 April 2001).

Indeed, Chabal and Daloz (1999:63-76) make the point that the religious dimension of African culture, with its continued beliefs in the ancestors as continuing to live in community with the living,

F.B.   P.T.O.

affecting peoples' everyday lives; continued beliefs in the possibility of being bewitched by an evil witch or sorcerer; and beliefs that sickness and misfortune could be the result of such bewitchment as well as the adoption of various means to protect oneself from such bewitchment such as sacrifices, amulets and the redistribution of personal financial resources within one's own community, are found within African cities as well.

The avoidance of bewitchment by a jealous member of one's own community make an important part of urban and rural Africans' daily existence. And as such, these manifestations of tradition, as according to 1950s modernization theory definition, in terms of belief in witchcraft and belief that other heavenly beings can have an important influence on a person's daily life - beliefs increasingly found in African urban environments too, counter perceptions of the effect of modernity and so-called modern "rationality" on urban society in today's Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999:63-76). These are reactions which can be increasingly linked to problems encountered by people of all walks of life in the real world; and indeed these are popular reactions to modernity in terms of foreign (Western) influences entering Africa, including modern politics.

Furthermore, precisely because these beliefs offer a means of explanation and countering of modern problems, there is evidence that the religious aspect of African culture affects other spheres of what would otherwise be defined as secular fields. Thus for example, fears of being bewitched by a jealous member of the community, and/or accusations of being a witch and bewitching

someone is a means used by the community to get a wealthier member of society to distribute his or her wealth within his community or communal grouping (Chabal and Daloz 1999:63-76; Parish 1999:426-433). There is evidence that educated, wealthy urban individuals largely willingly distribute a fair size of their income to surrounding community members (Dia 1996:180-19), showing their ties to communal, as opposed to individual interests.

These obligations put onto people, including politicians, to avoid "bewitchment" are even used to pressurize politicians to ensure that they are accountable to their (ethnic and kin) communities for their actions - indeed a different type of checks and balances of the democratic political system. If anything goes wrong, politicians blame the problem encountered on witchcraft, and engage in all kinds of activities, lotions and potions, and even what is perceived by local inhabitants as witchcraft. This in order to prevent bewitchment by others, including opposition politicians, which is seen as being able to influence even the political scene, and thus their own political futures, especially during times of trouble (Chabal and Daloz 1999:63-76).

It is interesting to note that with the current socio-economic and political problems in Zimbabwe, a very worried President Robert Mugabe is rumoured to be obsessed with the supernatural in the form of a constant vision of Josiah Tongurara, an ex-leader of Mugabe's ruling Zanu party. He was killed shortly before independence in 1980, in a car accident rumoured to have been arranged by Mugabe in order to dispose of Tongurara, thus enabling

Mugabe to become the President of Zimbabwe after independence. These repeated visions are reportedly making Mugabe consult a number of Western psychiatrists and African traditional healers, but reportedly to no avail (Parker 2001:7-8).

This also explains why Congolese politicians engaged in occult practices during the civil strife in Congo-Brazzaville in the early-to-mid-1990s (Sandberg 1998:14-16). In passing, during the malaise in Lagos (Goldstuck 1993:75-78) caused by the above-mentioned rumours that doctors of witchcraft (or sorcerers) were able to make mens genitalia disappear by mere touch, another rumour linked to this spread throughout the city, that the sorcerers engaging in these supposed practices were working for certain politicians. These men wanted to use the concoctions made by the sorcerers involving the use of human body parts, to strengthen themselves and to ensure that they would win the forthcoming Nigerian elections. Apparently, so the rumour went, the sorcerers opted for such drastic measures because they could no longer get fresh human body parts from graveyards due to the fact that dead people's coffins were increasingly being buried under a thick layer of concrete, making access to the body and the body parts of the deceased impossible (Goldstuck 1993:75-78). People were encasing the graves of their dead in concrete precisely because they believed that the dead were being taken out of their graves in the middle of the night by witches for body parts, or to become zombies; the belief in zombies being a common belief throughout urban and rural Africa today (Goldstuck 1993:75-78). Interestingly, in South Africa today there is a growing tendency for the families of deceased black people to cover the

coffins of dead family members in concrete within the graves. This is to prevent grave-robbers from stealing the coffin and the dead person in the night after the funeral, whether for zombification, or for body parts for muti purposes. This often leads to the curious sight of bags of cement and concrete mixers often at the graveside during the funeral for the departed.

And ignoring such beliefs by not prosecuting alleged witches leads to the state being popularly seen as being in cahoots with witches, diminishing the state's popular legitimacy (Rowlands and Warnier 1988:120-135). In fact the continued practice of witch-hunting in African society today is linked to a continued belief in the power of witches and sorcerers to bring evil into a person's and a community's life today as in the past. And since the state is not seen as acting against supposed "witches", members of the community are taking justice into their own hands (Geschiere 1996:308-318; Douglas 1999:177-191; Colson 2000:333-354 ; Rowlands and Warnier 1988:120-135).

The basic point of Chabal and Daloz's (1999) book is that Africa today, in its positive and negative points, is the result of tradition on the continent itself as it evolved throughout the precolonial period and throughout colonialism, and continues to currently evolve and manifest itself. Indeed, Chabal and Daloz's (1999:51) general point is that "tradition" in Africa did not "stop" with the arrival of Western influences on the continent. Rather, the same as in other societies in the formerly colonized world and even in the Western world, tradition not only survived into today, but forms an important part of

today's existence. This creates a type of modernity in any given society which brings into consideration the sociological factors and hence the tradition present in that society. Hence modernity must be seperated from the Westerncentric bias given to it by modernization theory in the 1950s and its precedents; to see how tradition in any given society shapes that modernity (Chabal and Daloz 1999:51).

2.7   *The tradition versus modernity dichotomy in South Africa:- Evidence which challenges Westerncentric views of social development, the assumptions within earlier versions of modernization theory, and a dichotomized view of tradition and modernity*

What makes the above discussion of 1950s modernization theory and its limitations throughout the world, and throughout Africa relevant to South Africa today, is the fact that inherent within African National Congress (ANC) policies, and ANC government policies after 1994, is 1950s modernization theory and its Westerncentric origins, and subsequent Westerncentric biases. As will be seen in the next few pages there is also an accompanying inherent tendency within the ANC to think of South African society, particularly black society, as a society whose social development followed or mirrored western social development, a concept which, as shown above, is controversial even as regards social development in Europe since the 17th century. Accompanying this there's also the belief that African society is now at the same level of receptiveness to Westerncentric government development programmes as what European societies were to "modern" influences in the 19th and 20th

centuries following the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries.

The basis of ANC policy is contained in its 1955 Freedom Charter. Even though the charter has a socialist tendency to it (today's ANC policy has swung towards a more capitalist basis), it nevertheless expresses the desire for much which is present today in Western societies. An inherent assumption within the charter is that somehow African society is ready for the prompt implementation of these Westerncentric tendencies, and that therefore these tendencies could thus - almost too easily - be bestowable onto South Africa's African population, seen as ready for development along Western lines. To show this, let me quickly and briefly highlight and summarise the contents of the Freedom Charter, before discussing it.

In the document's preamble, it is pointed out that under Colonialism and Apartheid people have been robbed of land. Equality and peaceful co-operation between all the peoples is promised, which would only come about through a democratic state, based on the will of the people, which can secure their birthright without distinction between colour, race, sex or belief. The contents of the document I have highlighted and summarised as follows:

> ***The people shall govern***! Every man and woman has the right to vote for and stand as a candidate for all bodies that make laws and the administration of the country, with equal rights regardless of race, colour or sex. Also, all bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities would be replaced by democratic organs of self-government.
>
> ***All national groups have equal rights***! Equal status of all people in the bodies of state, the courts and the school for all national groups and races; the protection by law of all national groups against insults to their race and national pride; the preaching and practice of national, race or colour discrimination and contempt to be made a punishable crime; and all people to be given equal rights

to use their own language and to develop their own folk culture and customs.

The people shall share in the country's wealth! The national wealth of the country to be restored to the people. The mineral wealth, banks and monopoly industry to be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; and all other industries and trade to be controlled in order to assist the people. People also have the right to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.

The land shall be shared among those who work it! Restriction of land ownership on a racial basis to be ended, and all land to be re-divided amongst those who work it; freedom of movement, freedom of occupation is guaranteed, and the state is to help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil and to till the land.

All shall be equal before the law No-one would be imprisoned, deported or restricted without fair trial. The police force and army to be open to all on an equal basis and are to be helpers and protectors of the people. All laws discriminating on the grounds of race, colour or belief to be repealed.

All shall enjoy human rights! People are guaranteed the freedom of expression, freedom of movement and rights to protection against arbitrary police raids.

There shall be work and security! Child labour and compound labour is to be abolished. Minimum wages, sick leave, maternity leave and working conditions are to be guaranteed; as well as access to unemployment benefits.

The doors of learning and culture shall be opened! The government is to discover, develop and encourage national talent; education is to be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children; higher education and technical training to be opened to all by means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit. The aim of education to be to teach the youth to love their people and their culture, to honour human brotherhood, liberty and peace.

There shall be houses, security and comfort! All people have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security. Unused housing space to be made available to the people, rent and prices to be lowered, food made plentiful, and no-one is to go hungry. Preventitive health to be run by the state; and free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young children. Slums shall be demolished and new suburbs built where all have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, creches and social centres. The aged,

orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state. Rest, leisure
and recreation to be the right of all. Fenced locations and ghettoes to be
abolished and laws which break up families to be repealed.

There shall be peace and friendship! South Africa to be a fully independent,
sovereign state, striving to maintain world peace and the settlement of all
international disputes by negotiation, not war. The right of all the people of Africa
to independence and self-government to be recognised, and to be the basis of
close co-operation. (African National Congress, Freedom Charter, 1990:19-20).

As pointed out above, the Freedom Charter expresses the desire for
much which is present today in Western societies, as expressed by
many European thinkers since the 18th Century's period of
Enlightenment - democracy, equality, human rights;   some
socialistic, if not communist-inspired desires for land redistribution
and popular ownership of mineral rights and industry, various rights
for workers including welfare, leave and maternity leave, "houses,
security and comfort" and within it an inherent assumption within the
charter is that somehow African society is ready for the prompt
implementation of these Westerncentric ideas and tendencies.
Therefore these ideas and tendencies could thus - almost too easily
- be bestowable onto South Africa's African population, seen itself
as ready for development along Western lines. For example within
the document, the ANC has expressed the desire for a democratic
state along Western lines, based on such things as equality before
the law, and no discrimination along the Western-centric categories
of gender, race or belief. What is also assumed under the label of
non-racialism is that blacks are equal to whites even in outlook, and
that through government action and elected local government
structures Western-based education, housing, tarred roads and
other infrastructure, as present in Western societies, can be simply

delivered or bestowed onto black South Africans through state programmes, allowances and bursaries to previously disadvantaged South Africans, to get them to the level of - previously advantaged - whites. In this respect, the document likes to refer to Africans along Eurocentric class categories - the word class being widely used throughout the original document from which I have made the shortened summary.

What I would also like to point out is that the Freedom Charter was released in 1955, about a decade before the ANC's banning, during an era when 1950s modernization theory and its Westerncentric assumptions and biases, and assumptions of transferability of these values onto any other society - for example within Africa - as described above in this chapter, was prevalent within general academic and political thinking. It thus affected the Freedom Charter and its content; even though, in passing, it must be noted that the version of modernization theory pursued within the Freedom Charter does tend to follow European-style social democracy, with a strong role for state involvement in *inter-alia* health, education and welfare.

After the ANC's unbanning in 1990, the Freedom Charter, with its 1950s-style modernization-based, Westerncentric assumptions, made up the foundations on which post-1990 ANC policy was built. Even though post-1990 ANC policy laid less emphasis on socialism as an economic policy (so far, few blacks "share in the country's wealth", and little emphasis and haste has yet to be put in the "sharing of the land among those who work it"). Nevertheless much of the Freedom Charter laid the foundation of post-1990 ANC policy.

After the ANC's unbanning in 1990, ANC policy guidelines largely, with few exceptions, followed the basic assumptions of the Freedom Charter. It desired a democratic constitution for South Africa, aspiring to such Western-originating ideals as non-racialism and non-sexism:-

> "Our constitution shall not only guarantee an accountable non-racial, non-sexist and democratic structure of government, but shall also empower all citizens to shape and share in the many aspects of life outside government. Our constitution shall guarantee the space for civic bodies, trade unions and the numerous other organizations which people create to deal with their every day problems and aspirations. These are the institutions of civil society which are crucial if we are to have a deep and thorough democratic order.... We want a country that is unified, open, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and free. We must abolish all forms of discrimination, domination, privilege or abuse. We must ensure that the basic rights and freedoms of all are respected. We must see to it that the religious, linguistic and cultural variety of our land is fully acknowledged, and that no person shall be subjected to any forms of oppression or abuse. We do not want new forms of tyranny to replace the old" (Ready to Govern - ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa. 1992:4)

Generally, in brief, thinking in the ANC in the quoted policy document was that different Western-originating structures of government such as the executive, and a bill of rights would be used to achieve the above. There would also be a new, more democratic system of local government. The environment, housing, health, social welfare, education, training and scientific development, the development of human resources (especially gender and the disabled) would be concentrated upon. Arts and culture, the youth and media freedom, sport and recreation and peace and security would be encouraged (Ready to Govern - ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa 1992:4)

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which resulted from the general post-unbanning policy debates of the ANC, is similar to the Freedom Charter in that it also puts an emphasis on democracy, democratic participation, and the eradication of the consequences of Apartheid. "The RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework, seeking to mobilise the country, it's people and resources towards the final eradication of Apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future". (ANC Reconstruction and Development Programme 1994:1).

The key programmes of the RDP (which I have summarized here as briefly as possible) are as follows:

- Meeting basic needs;
- Developing our human resources;
- Building the economy;
- Democratizing the state and society, and
- Implementing the RDP.

Meeting Basic Needs of people - jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a healthy environment, nutrition, health care and social welfare; with popular participation therein.

Developing our Human Resources Underlying these programmes is that education and training should be available to all from cradle to grave.

Building the economy Weaknesses in the economy such as skewed gender and racial employment and ownership trends must be addressed.

Democratising the state and society. Democratization is an important element of the RDP. The Constitution, Bill of Rights, national, provincial and local government, the administration of justice, the public sector, parastatals, the police and security forces, social movements, NGO's and a democratic information system in facilitating socio-economic development and democratization, linked to this, is important.

Implementing the RDP The implementation of the RDP will occur through RDP government structures at national, provincial and local government process. (ANC

Reconstruction and Development Programme 1994:10-12).

Much of the desire for Westernization and that which is present in Western society, as manifested in the Freedom Charter, is apparent in the RDP document too. In the section regarding the "Meeting of Basic Needs" for example, there is a desire (or a wish list as some put it) expressed for jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a healthy environment, nutrition, health care and social welfare. This is linked to an emphasis on (Western) education and training - seen as necessary to achieve these points. Government structures would make policy and implement development programmes (linked to the RDP).

Much of the aims and objectives of the Freedom Charter and the wishes expressed in post-unbanning ANC policy and the RDP document, are again expressed in South Africa's new constitution, completed in 1996, described as one of the most liberal, advanced constitutions in the world, bringing forth within it many of the above Western ideas and concepts, originating again from the 18th Century's Enlightenment. A general reading of it shows that the constitution provides for a Bill of Rights, ensuring *inter-alia* equality, human dignity, the right to life, the banishment of slavery, servitude and forced labour, privacy, freedom of religion, belief and opinion, freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, picket and petition; freedom of association, political rights, labour relations, property rights, housing, health care, food, water and social security, justice, access to court, and gender equality. It also forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation - one of the first constitutions in the world to do so.

F.B.   P.T.O.

All of this is policed and adhered to by a number of democratically-based organs provided for, and the activities of which are circumscribed by the constitution, *inter-alia* Parliament, composed of a General Assembly (Lower House) and a National Council of Provinces (Upper House), a President, Provinces with Provincial Administrations and regional legislatures (The Final Constitution. Tutorial Letter PWSALL-H/ 304/ 1996, Unisa). These are all ideas, policy-making and policy-implementing institutions which are generally Western in origin and which, generally speaking, assume a populace, as was the case elsewhere in Africa in the early 1960s, that was Westernized (or Westernizable) and in the very least easily amenable to, and for, the implementation of these Western ideals within African society.

As Ashforth (1996:1186-1190) points out, this general language spoken by the ANC and as expressed in its policies - and as mirrored in the 1996 Constitution - is the Westerncentric language of class, and the idea that African tradition was used as something of an excuse by the previous Apartheid government to keep blacks, and women, oppressed and thus under continued white (male) rule (whites seen as the domineering class, and blacks as the underclass). The ANC in its policies somehow assumes that through its policies - for example an emphasis on Western education, tradition - seen as the result of Apartheid, inter-alia through the Bantu Administration System - would be destroyed by Westernization and a new division of the population not according to African tribal lines, but rather Western class lines - ie: 1950s style modernity, which ANC policy again, wanted to achieve *inter-alia*

through education and the provision of so-called basic needs.

Thus for example any mention of tradition was looked upon with a certain amount of suspicion by the new ANC-aligned and inspired African elites not merely because it countered their neat view of a Westernized, Westernizing or Westernizable black society moving away from an Apartheid-inspired African tradition, as postulated by modernization theorists in the 1950s, but also because tradition - and especially an African tradition among black South Africans which differed from a European tradition among white South Africans (particularly in terms of the negative aspects of African tradition), was used in the past as rationale behind the Apartheid system (Ashforth 1996:1186-1190).

And reminders of the negative aspects of African tradition - on which the Apartheid policy was largely founded (Ashforth 1996:1186-1190), and from which the Apartheid state wanted to protect the white populace - such as witch-hunts in the Northern Province which, as will be highlighted in Chapter 3, is a continuing, and a worsening problem today, does unfortunately raise a certain amount of irritation and sensitivity amongst the seemingly Westernized black elite and certain circles within the ANC, precisely because of the above-mentioned reasons.

In the early months of 1999 for example, interest in the media raised by the increasing problem of witch-hunts in the Northern Province led to acclaimed journalist Max Du Preez to investigate the problem of witchcraft and witch-hunts in the Northern Province, on which Du

Preez, the then producer of "Special Assignment", one of the government-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation's (SABC) flagship television news investigation programmes, made a programme which would have been broadcast, to much expectation. Yet the programme was never broadcast because, at the last minute, the programme was "pulled off the air" under order of Du Preez's SABC bosses.   Subsequent to this, Du Preez was suspended and his contract at the SABC was not renewed. According to newspaper reports at the time, the so-called canning of the programme, and Du Preez's subsequent suspension and firing were due to the displeasure shown by certain elites within the ANC and certain members of the SABC's board, displeased about the subject matter of the documentary concerned (Mail and Guardian 23 April 1999, p. 10).

Interestingly, this move did remind one of the various examples of political interference by National Party elites in the editorial judgement of the SABC, particularly in the 1980s (City Press 25 April 1999, p. 6; Sunday Independent, 25 April 1999, p. 10). Maybe similar to modernization theorists in the 1950s and Enlightenment-based theorists before them, ANC leaders (and the top brass of the SABC, many of whom are linked to the ANC, the "Freedom Struggle" and the aims and objectives of the ANC) somehow assumed that tradition would end with the 1994 elections. Subsequent to that momentous moment in South Africa's history, with the Western education and modern Western values that the ANC would bestow onto the African populace, through this emphasis on education (with focus on mathematics and science, seen as

crucial for South Africa's continued global competitiveness), the negative aspects of African tradition - associated with Apartheid - would somehow disappear, or become meaningless. And somehow they wanted no reminder of the negative aspects of tradition, as was the case with Max Du Preez's television programme on witch-hunts in the Northern Province.

Yet despite Westerncentric ANC policy and underlying assumptions to these policies, especially as regards the populace, and the black populace in particular, in South Africa today, not only in the rural areas, but also in the urban areas, many manifestations of what could be termed tradition as classified by modernization theorists in the 1950s manifest themselves in today's modern era, among black South Africans.

This is so to the point that a conceptual division between modern and tradition, particularly _a-la_ 1950s and 1960s modernization theory becomes problematic, greatly because not only has African tradition survived, but as elsewhere in Africa, there is evidence of a certain linkage and fusion occurring between the categories of modern and tradition. Linked to this trend, tradition has become an urban South African phenomenon that's just as urban as modern Western influences. From the payment of bridewealth, to belief in the supernatural, to beliefs regarding the burial of the dead and other beliefs, once resident in the countryside, Becker (1974) throughout his book on his observation of tribal rural life and urban life in South African black townships, generally notes how these above-mentioned and other beliefs have migrated from the countryside to

form an important part of peoples' existence in the urban townships. Simply put, South African society is not as Westernized or as moved away from tradition as the ANC had assumed, and still at least implicitly assumes today. This point is beautifully illustrated in a newspaper political cartoon by renowned South African cartoonist Jonathan Shapiro (pen name Zapiro), contained in *Annexure D* of this thesis. This cartoon notes that public perception (amongst blacks) sees the Northern Province as a "Witchcraft Zone" (reflecting traditional African Cosmological beliefs in witchcraft and bewitchment - see chapter 3), contrary to the "New South Africa Official Version" map held in "Tour Guide" Nelson Mandela's hand - to Mandela's annoyance. The latter map signifies the Westerncentric, 1950s modernization theory-inspired view of South Africa which the ANC would like to show the world.

This point regarding South African society not having moved away from tradition as the ANC had assumed, is the case within the black community. Yet even within the white community, the most Westernized community in South Africa, which supposedly makes it the closest to modernity on the modernization (Westernization) scale explicit within 1950s definitions of modernity, as far as South Africa is concerned; there are signs that even this community has not reached and does not fully adhere to the lofty ideals of modernity *as per* 1950s modernization theory definition. Thus the former Apartheid government made itself guilty of corrupt and unethical practices, just the same as corrupt and unethical practices are found in the white-dominated private sector in the past and today (see for example Preston 2001). Just looking at the classified section of

newspapers such as The Star, The Pretoria News and The Citizen, one would find adverts by clairvoyants, tarot card readers and fortune tellers, similar to what one would find in urban London today (Davies 1997:597-612), clearly aimed at a white audience. Alternative medicine is also widely adhered to by many whites in this country. And there is also the New Age movement, the lurid activities associated with Satanism - conceivably all manifestations of so-called "irrationality" according to 1950s modernization theorists.

Indeed, even the activities of many churches frequented by white South Africans, particularly the Charismatic Churches, often tend to at least border on the "irrational" as per 1950s modernization theory definition - for example beliefs in faith healing and certain beliefs regarding the continuous presence of the Holy Spirit and God in peoples' daily lives, subscribed to by at least some of the Charismatic churches, I find to be somewhat "irrational" *as per* 1950s modernization theory definition. The activities of some of these Charismatic Churches are in many ways similar to those of the African Independent Churches (AIC's), frequented mostly by black South Africans. As we will see in Chapter 3, the latter, through its so-called prophets and pastors, also adhere to a somewhat direct involvement of both God and Satan in peoples' daily lives. Similar to the AIC's, what is interesting to note is the increased presence of Charismatic Christian Churches in the white communities, and increasing numbers of their followers, mostly whites, particularly within economically depressed areas such as the East Rand - possibly a manifestation of increased religious belief fervour

throughout the world as a response to economic and financial pressures as previously described by Comaroff and Comaroff 1999 (a: 279-303; and b:17-21), also amongst whites.

Annexure C contains two adverts of a Charismatic Church operating congregations in two mostly white communities, and what it offers. The Church concerned is entirely newly established, situated in the economically depressed East Rand. Take note of inter-alia the dream and vision interpretation "in peoples' daily lives" and prophesising services. The other congregation of the same church, although situated in the mining community of Primrose, a poorer yet largely white area, is even more similar to the AIC's, as it even offers "prophetic counselling" for those who are "sick in the body, emotionally unstable, spiritually oppressed by demon spirits, marriage/ business/ family curse/ witchcraft/ black magic/ satanism/ evil contract/ mind control/ homosexualism/ lesbianism/ alcohol/ drugs/ poverty problems".

Especially since about 1990 I would say, this tendency also within the black community has, advertently or inadvertently, been picked up especially in the media, as was the case above with witch-hunts in the Northern Province, creating interest - and a certain amount of sensationalism - in the media. For example bouts of hysteria, according to local inhabitants caused by witchcraft, break out from time-to-time in high schools among black students in urban Umtata (Engelbrecht 1999:92-93) and more rural Harrismith (Khumalo 1995:42-44), apparently linked to stresses emanating from exams. Immediately one could say that such beliefs are linked to less

educated people, and thus with education and the personal Westernization or modernization that such education brings, such beliefs will be destroyed. Indeed, the ironic thing about the above statement is the fact that the Kwa-Zulu Natal MEC for education, Faith Gasa, recently complained that she stayed away from her office in fear of her office being bewitched by her predecessor, and some employees still faithful to her predecessor (Sunday Times, 15 October 2000, p. 1).

But what about the following? Since 1994, South Africa had a number of black Miss South Africa's. One of them, Peggy Sue Khumalo raised a storm of criticism, as well as the withdrawal of the sponsorship of the Animal Anti-Cruelty League for having expressed her desire to slaughter a cow in order to thank her ancestors for having bestowed on her the Miss South Africa title (Drum Oct 3, 1996). In other words, she wanted to thank her traditional ancestors for her Western-defined modern success.

Many educated, successful blacks have, since the end of Apartheid, moved into formerly exclusively white neighbourhoods. Many have slaughtered cows as a housewarming gesture to thank their ancestors for the success which allowed them to move up and out of the Townships, and as a means of asking the same ancestors to protect them from evil in their new homes, again tradition and modern going hand-in-hand with no seeming conflict (Mkhize 1991:13).

Basetsane Makgalemele, another former black Miss South Africa -

educated, successful (she runs a production company responsible for a number of television programmes broadcast on the SABC) recently got married to Romeo Khumalo, the eloquent highly educated and flamboyant head of Radio Metro, one of the South African Broadcasting Corporation's (SABC) flagship radio stations, aimed at up-and-coming, educated urban black youth. She and her husband-to-be voluntarily first underwent a traditional wedding with the obligatory cattle slaughter and the payment of bridewealth (**_Lobola_**) to her parents, before undergoing the Christian white wedding. Award-winning, university graduate SABC journalist Florence Masebe recently underwent a similar African traditional followed by modern Christian wedding rites (City Press, 25 February 2001). Again tradition was going hand-in-hand with modernity. Indeed courtship and marriage rites involving modern and traditional elements according to Ashforth (1999:52-58) is a common occurrence in South African townships today.

Staying with the new black elite, but this time within the ruling ANC, there are allegations that whilst imprisoned on Robben Island, a number of today's ANC leaders voluntarily underwent traditional Xhosa circumcision rites (Sunday Sun, 16 June 2002). There are also allegations that a year before his death, a terminally ill Peter Mokaba, the former leader of the ANC's Youth League in the early 1990s consulted a traditional Sangoma and took muti for his illness (City Press, 16 June 2002).

There is also the presence of traditional healers such as diviners (**_Sangomas_** and **_Inyangas_**) within rural and increasingly within

urban South Africa indicating a strong urban following for this type of medicine and general Cosmological beliefs (Mills 1983; Farrand 1980), with countless lurid examples of muti murders not only in the rural areas, but also in the urban areas (The Natal Witness 11 August 1997, p. 7; The Citizen 7 July 1999, p. 7; Sowetan 14 July 1999, p. 9; The Daily News 30 November 2000, p. 1), even for the purposes of business promotion (Mail and Guardian 9 October 1998, p. 7). According to reports, following a similar general trend, a prominent black businessman bought and used muti containing human body parts as a means of ensuring a strengthening of his business undertaking (Mail and Guardian 9 October 1998, p. 7)

Furthermore in the 1990s there has been an increase in witch-hunts mostly in the rural areas of South Africa where communities, through similar mob justice to that happening in Peoples' Courts and more recent urban cases of vigilanteism (a growing phenomenon) against criminals, chased out of their communities, if not killed alledged witches (Crais 1998:50-64; Minnaar, Wentzel and Payze 1997:25-29). And, there are strong indications that these witch-hunts are linked to modernity in that stresses and strains experienced by people in today's modern world, be these pressures economic or political, are often translated in peoples' minds according to traditional African Cosmological beliefs, and eventually lead to such witch-hunts (Stadler 1996:90-93; Niehaus 1995:514-533), with increases in such witchcraft accusations, witch- hunts and *muti killings* in the period shortly before South Africa's first fully democratic elections in 1994. Anthropologists throughout South Africa were reporting, in the months before the elections, a great

increase in witch-hunts and _muti_ murders, as well as the circulation of rumours in black communities about _inter-alia_ vampire-like blood-suckers turning people into zombies or changing their blood into cash (Goldstuck 1994:175). Hence the arrival of full Western-style, modern multiparty democracy in South Africa did not lead to the demise of traditional conceptualizations of happenings in the country and the world. Rather, traditional African conceptualizations were used to interpret these socio-political happenings, spurring on a traditional response to enemies (perceived witches), running contrary to ideas that modern influences would delete traditional influences.

The term communalism in an African environment, includes the deceased whose spirits are widely believed by black South Africans to continue living with them (Turaki 1999:40-41; Pell 1993:85-88; 101-102). These are the ancestors, generally believed to represent good. Equally important heavenly beings, however, are witches, believed to represent evil. Witches however are believed to also play an important role behind misfortune and sickness in peoples' daily lives. And these conceptions, particularly in a black South African urban environment, are also found within the African Independent Church (AIC) movement which, as elsewhere in Africa, draws strong support from black urban-dwellers, precisely because it is seen as being able to effectively preach Christianity in terms of traditional African Cosmological conceptualizations of good and evil, and the effect of witches and ancestors in peoples' daily lives (Oosthuizen 1992:Preface; 38-41; Kunnie 1992:9). All this raises the question of why it is that tradition is very much alive in urban

South Africa, amongst its black inhabitants, despite the relative modernity that this world and this country in particular has achieved now, in the new millennium.

2.8 *Conclusion*

Thus despite the hopes expressed for modernization theory by its supporters in the 1950s (and thereafter), the fact is that the prescriptions of modernization theory were not fully adhered to, nor stuck to even within Europe and North America, societies whose supposed social evolution during and after the 17th and 18th centuries, supposedly made up the foundations of modernization theory. Nor is the end product of 1950s Westerncentric definitions of modernity necessarily desirable in all respects, as even within Europe and North America, this has led to a number of negative consequences: stress, strain, environmental degradation and an extreme form of materialism - Permissive Cornucopia - that even counters many of the conceptions and institutions underlying, and necessary for, modernization as defined in the 1950s. For example the Western-conceptualized state, seen as necessary for the implementation of 1950s definitions of modernity, whether through this extreme sense of entitlement inherent in Cornucopia, and/ or because of the various other negative consequences of modernity, such as environmental degradation and globalization, the institution of the Western State is critically looked at by many. Nationalism, the basis of the nation-state is similarly held up with a certain amount of disdain by many, precisely for the above reasons. And many of these reactions and criticisms originate from Europe and

North America.

Corruption and incompetence, somehow thought by many to be somehow exclusively the preserve of developing countries, occurs in the state and private sectors of economies in Europe and North America too, again showing that these societies are not as immune to such practices as 1950s modernization theories might have thought or assumed these societies to have been.

Despite this however, to merely say that corruption "occurs in Europe as well" as a reaction to corruption in Africa still does not help one conceptualize the problem of corruption fully, since the fact still remains that although corruption occurs in all societies throughout the world; corruption still remains a much more widespread problem in Africa than in many other societies, particularly Europe (Chabal and Daloz 1999:93-109). Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999), Chabal and Daloz (1999:93-109) and Olivier De Sardan (1999: 25-52), noticeably French academics, have noted that tradition in Africa is influencing Western-originating institutions on the continent such as the state and the private sectors; showing how influences that might be conceived as traditional along 1950s modernization theory lines - the sense of communalism and practices such as tribute-giving - have adapted to and merged with Western influences and practices such as Western bureaucratic practices, to explain the prevalence of corruption, nepotism and other developmentally negative practices within the African state today. The relevance of these conceptions behind corruption lies in their recognition of Smolicz's points of the flexibility of tradition in

F.B.   P.T.O.

accommodating within itself external (including Western) influences in order to remain relevant - and practiced, within today's environment, even with consequences that are not necessarily positive - implying that tradition need not necessarily only have positive impacts. Indeed tradition, as it continues to play a role in today's world, can also have negative impacts as well.

These arguments apply to South Africa today as well. Similar to whites in Europe and North America, whites and white administrators in South Africa, both under Apartheid and thereafter, both in the state and private sectors, have engaged in corruption, unethical behaviour and other irrational practices, inter-alia religious practices and other practices that could be defined as magical: tarot card readings, fortune-telling, and so on.

And neither did the sense of communalism die among white South Africans either, if one was to strictly follow the prescriptions of modernization theorists in the 1950s and their predecessors, as one could in passing see especially amongst Afrikaners, where community relations and ties are still quite strong.

Nevertheless, the same as tradition as defined by 1950s modernization theorists still plays a role amongst white South Africans, merging with the Western influences found within an urban environment, so too various aspects of rural tradition amongst black South Africans have survived, adapted to Western influences within urban environments within South African cities, and in fact continue to manifest themselves within these urban environments, and indeed

thrive in these environments, often as reactions to pressures that one could define as Western - whether social, economic and/ or political, within Westernized urban environments, as found today in South African cities.

This process of merging or fusion as I would like to call between western and traditional elements - indeed not well or clearly foreseen by modernization theorists in the 1950s, is the argument of the following chapters, focusing on various positive and negative aspects of African tradition within an urban environment, with both positive and negative developmental consequences.

Particular attention will be given to the fact that Stokvels, continued beliefs in witchcraft, bewitchment and causality, African traditional medicinal beliefs, and the communal insider versus outsider dynamic displayed by all sides in the Hostel War in the early 1990s, are all manifestations of the fact that African tradition is capable of integrating within itself Western influences, whilst still continuing certain basic or core elements, as reactions to the pressures of a Western-defined urban environment within South Africa. In other words Western-defined 1950s-style modernity has not led to the demise of tradition, including African tradition in all its respects. Rather African tradition has been accentuated, as a response to the same Western-defined modernity.

Chapter 3

Stokvels, causality and witchcraft beliefs within the tradition / modernity interaction

3.1 Introduction

Many postcolonial African leaders, including Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda (Potholm 1979:67-107) wrote about the communal nature of African (rural) society to which, after independence, they tried to somehow return to. Many saw and thus implemented African Socialism as the best means of returning to this, somewhat utopian ideal.

In the 1980s, as a critical reaction to the above views of the suitability of African Socialism to this communal task, Goran Hyden (1983:4-29) put a name to the communal-based spirit prevalent in Africa. This he called "Economy of Affection", which Hyden (1983:4-29) blamed for Africa's economic stagnation. Essentially Hyden (1983:4-29) identified the Economy of Affection as hinging upon the type of production techniques present in rural African societies - "The Peasant Mode of Production". Modernize, through capitalism, the production techniques used by the peasants, and even let the peasants urbanize, and by so doing the economy of affection would somehow die due to the destruction of communal linkages and other modern (Western) influences (Hyden 1983:4-29). This would be brought about by the process of modernization, the height of which supposedly lay in the cities - the cities seen by many as the heart

and the epitome of modernity (Davies 1997:597-600). This would, over time, supposedly lead to a proverbial break from the past.

Urbanization was thus perceptually always linked to the disruption of communal linkages, and the emergence of individualism - an idea adopted by a number of writers in the 18th and 19th century period of Enlightenment (Gross 1992:20-39). This was based on their interpretation of social changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution and the rapid urbanization that took place during this time.

By looking at what may at first glance be completely different matters - Stokvels, and continued beliefs in causality, witchcraft and traditional (pre-colonial) African religious beliefs in good and evil, all within a present-day urban environment among black South Africans; the focus of this chapter will be on how these various seemingly unrelated aspects are in fact manifestations of adherence to strong communal values; manifestations of what were initially rural-based communal practices and beliefs, which have changed and adapted themselves to meet conditions prevailing in a largely Westerncentric urban environment; whilst keeping alive certain core values of (communal) tradition which act as a strong link with the past.

Here two important points must be noted. The first point is that although communalism largely consists of the use of the local community to address a family's needs; in rural areas this process mostly occurs through the use of kinship networks, whilst in urban

areas this concept has evolved, in that in the urban areas instead, this process typically involves the use of a network of neighbours. This will clearly be seen in Stokvels.

The second point that must be noted is that the term community, and communalism, as will be seen and used in this chapter, is much wider than just a collection of people physically living on earth, in close proximity. Community, in African terms, also includes the spirit world. Spiritual divinities, the ancestors or shades, witches and/ or sorcerers are believed to have an active involvement in peoples' daily lives (Turaki 1999:85-88; 101-102).

As will be shown in this chapter, such beliefs are still very prominent amongst black South Africans, not only blacks living in the rural areas, but also amongst blacks living in an urban environment. It will also be shown how such values are used as a means to interpret and deal with reality in the modern world, and how this role as a framework for interpreting reality is manifesting its presence in an urban environment. It has been adapted to explain occurrences, particularly sickness and misfortune, as well as community tensions within an urban environment. Thus one could say that Stokvels are a more physical manifestation, and witchcraft and causality are a more spiritual manifestation, of the same thing: the traditional African sense of communalism.

These two manifestations of tradition in an urban environment show a number of important things:

A   Tradition has continued to survive, even manifesting itself

within a somewhat Westernized urban environment; and

B   Importantly, this survival is because, as will be highlighted in this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis, tradition is a flexible entity, that managed to acclimatize itself to an urban environment and to therefore meet many of the challenges posed by the Western influences found in such an environment; as can be seen at least within this chapter in the growing activities of African traditional diviners and African traditional medicine in the cities; the activities of African Independent Churches in the urban areas, and manifestations of causality and other similar African Cosmological-based beliefs in an urban environment.

Apart from this chapter, these two points will be further elaborated upon further in Chapters 4 and 5.

3.2   *Stokvels - Communal means for financial, social and moral support, and individual advancement*

3.2.1 *What is a Stokvel?*

Stokvels, also known under the name "*gooi-gooi*" and "*estokini*" in South African black townships, have been given various titles, descriptions and definitions.   Vermaak (2000:38) calls them Indigenous Financial Efforts (IFE's) dealing with informal savings and informal credit provision. Others (Smets 1996:173-175) have called them "self-help" societies or institutions. Based on this description, Zuinones (1967), contained in Smets (1996:175) defined Stokvels as "Self-help groups of individuals/ families who join forces together to initiate and develop the activities necessary to secure their survival".

Brandel-Syrier (1962:17) contained in Molefe (1991:14), defines a Stokvel as "a form of organized mutual assistance based on the rule of reciprocity". Andrew Lukhele (1990:1), the director of the National Stokvels' Association of South Africa (NASASA), an entity representing and serving the interests of a number of Stokvels, many of them urban, defines a Stokvel as: "A type of credit union in which a group of people enter into an agreement to contribute a fixed amount of money to a common pool weekly, fortnightly, or monthly. Then, depending on the rules governing a particular stokvel, the money or a portion of it may be drawn by members either in rotation or in a time of need. This mutual financial assistance is the main purpose of Stokvels, but they also have valuable social and

F.B.   P.T.O.

entertainment functions".

Through their activities, and the funds gathered through their collective pooling of resources, these largely informal institutions have gained considerable financial power - with Stokvel contributions totalling about R 52 million a month; and great prominence within many black peoples' lives (Lukhele 1990:2-3). According to Macdonald (1992:92-96) there are over 900 000 Stokvels in South Africa, involving over 10 million black South Africans. Schulze (1996:26) and Lukhele (1990:2-3) estimate the amount of Stokvels operating in South African urban areas at approximately 24 000, representing about 28% of urban black South Africans.

3.2.2 *Stokvels - the financial "self-help" dimension*

Much literature on Stokvels in fact concentrate on the financial dimension of these institutions. It is pointed out for example that Stokvels have emerged to prominence largely as a means of filling in the vacuum left by the fact that banks and other large financial institutions are not really interested in providing small loans and financial services on a flexible, small enough scale to serve the needs of poorer, black communities (The South African Banker 1996:46-47). This problem according to Dia (1996:177-193) reflects a general disconnect, as he calls it, between formal institutions, brought into Africa by colonialism and contact with the West, such as large banks and other financial institutions, versus institutions based in African society such as poorer community groupings.

Stokvels are increasingly filling in this gap; a manifestation of self-help within black communities as a means of dealing with and improving living conditions within these communities. This is in line with a number of similar, largely informal community-based organizations found in a number of other developing countries, especially in Asia and elsewhere in Africa which deal with poverty on the same communal basis (Smets 1996:173-179). On the whole, these organizations operate on the basis of the following three general financial and operational models (Smets 1996:173-179) which can appropriate features from each other:

A   Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCA's), made up of a group of participants who make regular contributions to a fund given in whole or in part onto each member in turn, on a rotational basis. Many such Stokvels also provide credit to members, as highlighted in the above-mentioned definitions of Stokvels.

B   In Savings Associations (SAVA's) people pay regular contributions of a fixed or variable size to a common fund, from which no credit is provided. The created fund accumulates for a predetermined period, after which all participants get their deposits back. In other savings associations, savings are continuously accumulated, and/ or paid out when needed.

C   The Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCRA's) (also known as non-rotating savings and credit

associations). Just as in a Savings Association the pooled savings are not directly distributed, but accumulate in a fund for a specific time. The difference is that the fund created in an ASCRA can be used partly or completely to give loans to members, and/ or can be put in an emergency fund (Smets 1996:173-179).

Apart from Savings Associations (or *gooi-gooi* as such institutions have become known in South Africa), Schulze (1996:26-29) also identifies three more types of Stokvels which, in some ways, could share at least some of the features of the above-described types of Stokvels:

A   The Investment Club. Here the entire pool is banked after each rotational sitting. The aim of these clubs is not to merely accumulate savings; but to accumulate such savings in order to buy a specific asset such as a plot of land or a taxi for investment purposes. Contributions of members are often invested in formal financial institutions such as banks and life assurance companies.

B   The high-budget association which consists of 100 members or more whose background and status are important factors in gaining entrance into the association. The most distinctive feature of this type of Stokvel is the fact that the officials involved are no longer simply members. They are referred to as the "board", and they enjoy special privileges.

C The burial society, also referred to by the Tswana word _Lekgotla_. The word describes any social meeting with a good moral purpose, for example a birthday or a burial society meeting. As a type of Stokvel, burial societies had their origin in the financial problems experienced by blacks when they were expected to provide a decent funeral, irrespective of the fact that the deceased has died destitute. The surviving family was usually financially crippled by the high costs accompanying the traditional indigenous funerals (due to customary rituals such as the slaughter of cows for the appeasement of the ancestors), a tradition that continues to this day in rural and urban areas. To help deal with these financial and other obligations associated with funerals, these special types of Stokvels were formed within black rural and urban communities (Schulze 1996:26-29).

Stokvels and other similar community-based organizations are seen by some as excellent possibilities for helping poor people and Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMME's) to gain capital; either to start up, or as a means of dealing with emergencies. Similarly, social kinship and extended family networks based on perceived social obligations are also seen as good sources of capital for such purposes. Yet as Dia (1996:177-193) points out, Stokvels, although based on the traditional sense of communalism, can act as a means of countering the negative effects of extended family networks' demands on personal income, a demand still largely adhered to, as Dia (1996:180-193) notes, in his study of present-day Senegal, by rural and urban dwellers alike, regardless of level of education. He

_F.B._   P.T.O.

sees Stokvels (or Tontines as they are known in Senegal) as effective means of countering the negative effects of extended family networks' extreme monetary demands posed on personal income.

The strength of Stokvels in this regard is that, especially savings associations that do not provide credit, are able to effectively keep investments locked up, away from such distributive pressures, thus encouraging saving. Dia (1996:180-193) also notes that Stokvels' ability to safeguard investments from such distributive pressures is further helped by the fact that Stokvels, and the communal obligations they place on members (to for example repay loans, and in fact to just invest savings in Stokvels) are so strong that they are able to counter social and communal distributive pressures.

3.2.3 *The Stokvel concepts' adoption and adaptation by the well-off*

The discussion thus far has largely concentrated on Stokvels as a means used by more impoverished rural and urban people in many developing countries, including black South Africans living in urban areas to make money in order to improve their lives. As such, the discussion has concentrated on Stokvels as an important means to get by in the face of poverty. To this one could link Smets' (1996:175) above-mentioned definition of Stokvels as "Self-help groups of individuals/ families (and/ or friends) who join forces together to initiate and develop the activities necessary to secure survival".

Yet the acquisition of wealth, and the education necessary to acquire such wealth, does not mean that once wealth is acquired, Stokvels simply fall by the wayside. Schulze (1996:127-129) gives a clue to this effect through the "high budget association" in his classification of Stokvels. This type of Stokvel consists of 100 members or more whose background and status are important factors in gaining entrance into the association. Personal contributions to such Stokvels vary from R 7 000 to a hefty R 150 000 per person; figures which fall way above what poor urban and rural black South Africans could imaginably afford as Stokvel contributions. This is an indication that even wealthier urban black South Africans are also adopting the Stokvel concept for their own financial purposes, not just for survival.

Stokvels are becoming more popular with young, upper income blacks, while their Stokvel clubs are fashion-oriented, and named after famous fashion brand-names such as Benetton and Kappa Sport. Many such clubs formed among mobile, upper income blacks are set up with a specific aim in mind, for example to make large purchases in the formal economy such as unit trusts and other large investments in financial investment companies, as well as cars and houses, thereby avoiding many of the problems of hire purchase, and as a means of getting larger discounts for these purchases (Lukhele 1990:27-34; Sunday Times - Business Times, October 8, 2000:1).

Thus there are signs that the Stokvel concept is being converted, or is in the process of being converted to organizations that not only serve the financial survival needs of the poor; but also as

organizations that are instrumental for the financial gain of wealthier black South Africans. That will be dealt with towards the end of this section on Stokvels.

3.2.4 *Stokvels - the important social, moral and communal dimension*

Yet as highlighted in Lukhele's (1990:1) above definition of Stokvels, such institutions serve other, non-financial purposes as well, purposes which to Stokvel members, as we will see below, are in the least as important as the financial benefits of membership. Lukhele put it this way in his above-mentioned definition of Stokvels as: "....mutual financial assistance...., but they also have valuable social and entertainment functions". Vermaak (2000:45-46) in this respect, highlights the fact that the advantages offered by Stokvels to members are not only quantifiable in financial terms; but are also non-quantifiable in non-financial terms as well. These latter advantages are social and moral in character. Lukhele (1990:16-19) for example points out that burial societies do not only give financial support to bereaved families, but also important social and moral support to these families, as well as helping with the funeral arrangements.

Stokvel parties and other social activities offered by Stokvels such as visits to places of interest (Molefe 1991:16) also offer important avenues of social interaction within black communities, in which more than just the financial performance of Stokvels is discussed. A number of more personal and community-related issues are

discussed in these events (Vermaak 2000:45) such as the empowerment of women, fertility, and the community support of micro-entrepreneurs. Stokvel parties, despite their rowdiness often caused by the liquor served at such events (Molefe 1991:14) offer their members enhanced social standing, as well as the opportunity to expand social networks in the community - and entertainment (Vermaak 2000:46).

These social and other non-financial benefits are very important dimensions behind black urban support for Stokvels as well, which should not be underestimated in judging the importance of Stokvels. Chadford (1995:56-58) notes that most of the Stokvel members she interviewed as part of her research, ranked the social aspect of Stokvels as being more important to them than the financial aspect. The rest of the respondents she interviewed wanted to benefit both financially and socially from Stokvel membership. In her research, Chadford (1995:82-83) came to the conclusion that Stokvels are an integral part of township life. They are unique models of self-sufficiency where the various social and human needs are met, and at the same time individual and economic needs are met.

There is a strong respect for the well-being and development of the community and the individual generally within Stokvels, not only in specific Stokvels, but also between Stokvels themselves, evidenced by the hosting of intra-Stokvel gatherings and sporting events. According to Chadford (1995:82-83) the tensions between the various seemingly conflicting orientations that exist within Stokvels are drawn into effective balance by an extraordinarily strong ethic of

trust and a deep level of commitment. The key to the success of the Stokvel movement is the centrality of the African traditional communal concept which ensures inclusiveness and common purpose, resulting in a unique blend of motivation, commitment and team work - which, according to Chadford, many South African companies could benefit from (Chadford:1995:82-83). As such financially, socially and even more personally, and in many other ways Stokvels are a manifestation of the present-day continuation of the pre-colonial communal tradition of people helping one-another (Lukhele 1990:introduction).

3.2.5 *The Stokvel concept's merging of tradition and modernity - conclusions about Stokvels*

In conclusion regarding Stokvels. These institutions serve not only financial but also social and other individual and group interests and needs. This is a sign that the sense of community which prevailed in pre-colonial Africa has not only survived into the present era, but also within an urban environment. And such communal linkages within Stokvels need not be exclusively rural-urban, but can also be urban-urban. In other words, one need not have rural linkages in order to have the communal linkages necessary for the successful operation of Stokvels. It seems that the necessary communal or communitarian linkages can be entirely urban: the Stokvels researched by Chadford (1995) were entirely based in urban Soweto, Johannesburg.

Furthermore, if present-day financial needs are seen as modern as

per 1950s modernization theory definition, and financial advancement is seen as modern as well, then it seems that Stokvel members see no clash between the African communal tradition that Stokvels represent, and the modern financial and other social objectives followed by Stokvels. This is despite the fact that today's urban Stokvels are more neighbour-based manifestations of communalism; whilst rural-based groupings tend to be more kinship-based manifestations of communalism. In fact Stokvel members see the communal tradition (in its urban manifestations) represented by Stokvels, and modern financial and other social objectives followed by (the same) Stokvels as being complementary, as shown by Chadford's (1995:55-58) above interviews of Stokvel members who listed these financial and social aspects of Stokvel membership as being important.

This fusion or complementarity of tradition and modern can be further seen by the relative comfort and ease with which Stokvels are operated also within an urban environment (again, through communalism's more neighbour-based urban manifestations). The fact that they seem to have no problem in proliferating in such an urban environment, as seen by the 24000 Stokvels operating in the urban areas of South Africa (Lukhele 1990:2-3), and the ease with which these institutions are able to change to suit the very current needs of members - financial, welfare, social and even more psychological needs. In fact Lukhele (1990: introduction) has also argued above that the financial and the social dimension of Stokvels both form important dimensions, and manifestations of the spirit of community - or communalism in a present-day environment, both in

the rural and in the urban areas.

The extent of Stokvel support in the urban areas, and the expansion of the Stokvel concept to include not only poorer, but also higher income groups is illustrated by the limited, yet interesting figures contained in Verhoef (1999:42-46), quoted from research undertaken by market research group Integrated Marketing Information Group in 1996 and 1998 amongst a sample of urban Stokvels. As will be noted by these figures, the storage of savings in communal Stokvels structures does not preclude other modern savings means and institutions, such as bank accounts. In other words, there's a tendency for a number of more financially well-off black urbanites -ie: with higher incomes, making them not necessarily poor - who take part in Stokvels. A number of Stokvel members simultaneously also have bank accounts.

This research by the marketing research group Integrated Marketing Information Group in 1996 and 1998 uses categories based on a Living Standards Measure (LSM) compiled by the researchers, based on living standards, income levels, employment and stokvel participation. The LSM is an indicator compiled from twenty two candidate factors, including inter-alia household size, ownership of durables, level of education, work status, occupation, household facilities and shopping habits. The 1996 survey is not identical to the 1998 survey, but merely updates it.

Living Standards measure, 1996

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
LSM1	99.8	4358	20	43/57	-	19	0.2	15	3
LSM2	98	2875	13	41/59	-	33	1.3	14	10
LSM3	93	2993	12	52/48	-	40	5	24	23
LSM4	89	3343	13	53/47	-	44	9	18	36
LSM5	81	3314	14	51/49	-	41	13	26	44
LSM6	55	3247	13	48/52	-	46	21	14	64
LSM7	12	2987	11	51/49	-	55	26	3	93
LSM8	2	1423	5	41/59	-	62	26	3	97

1   % of blacks.
2   Number of adults.
3   % of total population
4   % men, % women
5   % no personal income.
6   % working (full time, part time)
7   % members of burial societies (or other funeral arrangements)
8   % members of stokvels (collective terms)
9   % using any bank account.

Income of people in LSM1 to LSM3 varied from nothing to a maximum of R 1500 a month. LSM3 to LSM4 up to a maximum of R 3900; LSM5 up to a maximum of R 5900; LSM6 up to R 8000 and LSM 7 and LSM 8 more than R 8000 per month.

Living Standards Measure, 1998

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
LSM1	99.7	2808	13	39/61	32	22	21	1	0
LSM2	97	2621	11	45/55	23	29	25	4	16
LSM3	96.3	3208	13	44/56	25	40	25	5	18
LSM4	93	3147	12	51/49	21	38	27	7	30
LSM5	88	3831	15	51/49	19	41	33	4	34
LSM6	77	3572	13	52/48	24	41	37	6	44
LSM7	35	3274	11	49/51	17	54	31	3	74
LSM8	7	3259	11	50/50	11	63.4	24	1	94

1	Number of blacks %
2	Number of adults, 16+, ('000)
3	% of total population
4	% men, % women
5	% no personal income
6	working (full time, part time, making and selling things)
7	% member of burial societies
8	% member of stokvel
9	% using any bank account

People in LSM1 to LSM3 earn between nothing and R 2000 per month; people in LSM3 between R 200 and R 3000; LSM5 and LSM6 between R 500 and R 4000; LSM7 and LSM8 between R 2000 and R 20 000 per month.

The 1996 and 1998 surveys quoted in Verhoef (1999:42-46) do however contain some limitations, namely the limited size of sample, the fact that they were centred in the urban areas, and the fact that the LSM compartments used, particularly in the 1998 survey are not watertight. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, these surveys do show the emergence of fusion between the communal Stokvel concept and Western influences. This fusion of the communal Stokvel concept with Western influences can best be seen by looking for example at categories LSM3 and LSM4 in the 1996 survey. Here persons in these categories earn a maximum of R 3 900 a month. Yet they are members of Stokvels, whilst simultaneously 23% and 36% of persons surveyed in these categories simultaneously hold bank accounts.

Furthermore, although Stokvels are the biggest generator of informal funds in South Africa, with most urban and rural Stokivel members

are defined as poor; nevertheless Stokvels are not the exclusive preserve of the poor as more educated persons, earning higher incomes, also participate in Stokvels, making Stokvels organizations not merely for the poor. And neither does membership in traditional savings mechanisms such as Stokvels preclude membership in other modern savings techniques, for example banks, in that many Stokvel members, particularly the wealthier Stokvel members, simultaneously hold bank accounts. This further supports the contention that Stokvels are flexible institutions, fulfilling the needs of all members, yet not precluding other (Western-originating) savings mechanisms. And finally, unemployed people, despite their obvious lack of financial means, still continue Stokvel membership during times of unemployment, showing their continued adherence to the Stokvel concept.

Linking Stokvels' operations to 1950s modernization theory's prescription of seperate modern and traditional categories, one can say that contrary to 1950s modernization theory's prescriptions, there is a definite interlinking or fusion between modern and traditional categories; running contrary to the assumptions and prescriptions of 1950s modernization theorists and their predecessors.

3.3 *Spirits, causality and witchcraft amongst urban black South Africans*

In the introduction to this chapter, it was mentioned that the African conception of community differs from the Western conception thereof in that the African idea of community includes within it the ancestors and other non-physical beings operating in the spiritual world as well (Turaki 1999:85-88; 101-102); the spirit world and the entities within it playing an important, active role in peoples' everyday lives, and are in fact seen within African religion as an extension of the earthly community (Pell 1993:40-41).

So far this chapter has concentrated on the earthly dimension of communalism - community relations within urban black South African communities, as manifested in and expressed by Stokvels. This section will focus instead on the more spiritual dimension of communal relations, as contained in traditional African religious conceptualizations, and how these conceptualizations are still adhered to in various manifestations, in changed yet continuous ways, by modern-day black South Africans, not only in a rural but also in an urban environment.   We will see how such conceptualizations play an active role in how rural dwellers and urbanites interpret present-day, very modern phenomena and problems, and how these traditional conceptualizations act as manifestations of communal tensions reflecting present problems.

3.3.1. *African Cosmological beliefs*

To understand continued beliefs in the presence and effect of the spirit world in peoples' daily lives among black South Africans, however, it is important to take a general note of the African world view or theory of the universe, labelled under the term African Cosmology, how this differs from Western conceptualizations (as influenced by the Enlightenment) and how African Cosmology acts as the basis of these beliefs.

Briefly, the African conceptualization of the universe recognizes the existence of God as the Supreme Being, the Creator who made the world. But unlike Western conceptualizations of a Supreme Being (God), which sees God as playing an active role in peoples' daily lives, African conceptualizations essentially see the Creator as merely presiding over a host of heavenly entities (spirits and the ancestors) sitting below him (Pell 1993:40-41; Turaki 1999:85-88; 101-102). God is not believed to have a direct effect on and interaction with people in their daily lives. Instead the Creator is believed to largely delegate this function, for lack of a better word, to a series of heavenly spirits below him. Of particular importance in this respect are the ancestors (also called forefathers or shades), the so-called "living dead" who are believed to interact with people on a daily basis (Pell 1993;40-41; Turaki 1999:85-88; 101-102). They are seen as representing good, but Africans believe that the ancestors can get displeased, and they can send sickness to certain people. If the ancestors are pleased, they are believed to bring good fortune and well-being to a person; as well as protection from evil. If the ancestors are displeased or angry, they would lower their

protection over a person, thereby heightening the risk of sickness and other misfortune befalling one (Pell 1993:40-41; Turaki 1999:85-88; 101-102).

As for sickness and misfortune, these are believed to be caused either by ancestral displeasure, as mentioned above, or by witches or sorcerers, seen as representing evil (Pell 1993:40-41; Turaki 1999:895-88). Such witches however are resident within the community. They are seen to cast their evil spells on people, as a reflection of their ill-will towards the person or household to whom the sickness and/ or other misfortune occurs, mainly due to jealousy. This brings us to causality, the belief that no misfortune of any kind happens by chance. Thus for example, if the crops fail due to insufficient or no rainfall, witches believed to be resident within the community, are blamed for this misfortune. Taking a more current example, quoted by a number of authors (for example Ashforth 1996:191-1193), will give one insight into how causality operates in more Westernized circumstances, and of course under modernity defined along Western lines. Thus, if a drunk driver rides over a child in a township street, instantly killing the child, then the driver is blamed for physically causing the accident. However, not only is the drunk driver blamed for physically causing the accident (the how), but other Cosmological causes (seen as the why) for the accident are sought by the child's family in order to explain why the misfortune befell that household. In compliance with African Cosmological beliefs that nothing happens by chance; in order to explain which evil force sent the drunk driver to cause the accident, therefore, a certain witch, resident within the community, is blamed

for the accident. She is identified as such by a diviner (*Sangoma*), the same entity who would seek the why in terms of Cosmological forces, and identify the source of evil therein, in for example droughts and pestilence in pre-colonial days (Ashforth 1990:1191-1193).

Precisely because the diviner in his or her practice does not limit the causes of physical disease to physical factors only; but is willing to seek explanations for disease in other spheres of medicine and healing in general as well, for example in how more psychological factors cause and worsen physical ailments, and just how such psychological factors are influenced by African Cosmological factors (by both the spiritual and earthly community); diviners have been praised by a number of authors for the holistic way he (although generally it is almost always a she) looks at disease (Fenyves 1994:13-41; Brookbanks 1990:1-8). Indeed, the importance of the diviner lies in the fact that she can explain disease in terms which accommodate African Cosmology, with the accompanying beliefs in causality and how good and evil and the ancestors interact within their own lives (Mills 1983:109-110), providing in the process a support network for communities.

3.3.2 *African Cosmological beliefs versus Western conceptualizations of Christianity - the "Missing Middle"*

Less accommodating or at least less sensitive towards African Cosmological beliefs however was Western Christianity as brought into Africa and as explained to Africans by European missionaries. The problem according to Hiebert (1994), contained in Turaki (1999:41-43) is that the Christianity taught by the missionaries to Africans was a type of Christianity influenced by the Enlightenment of the 1700s and 1800s. This type of reasoning, first found amongst scientists, but then also found amongst state élites and eventually also theologians in Europe; put essentially any and all arguments accepted up to about the 1700s to the test of rationalistic, scientifically-based logical thinking. As a result of this, many of the religious beliefs which had dominated Christian thought such as many beliefs associated with witchcraft accusations, essentially fell by the wayside (Klaits 1985:159-163). This had led to a decrease not necessarily in beliefs in witchcraft and bewitchment *per-se* in Europe - especially not amongst the lower classes - but rather the juridical standard of proof for witchcraft allegations was heightened or tightened in accordance with the new rational guidelines. Witch-hunts and public witchcraft allegations therefore dwindled (Klaits 1985:159-163), and reflecting the new thinking, theological views changed too: changes reflected in the type of theology taught by missionaries to Africans.

The type of Christianity therefore taught by missionaries largely contradicted African Cosmology, as believed by generations of

Africans in that whilst the type of Christianity taught by the missionaries sees salvation as coming from God - seen as the Supreme Being - and therefore saw no role for the spirits (the spiritual community), the African conception sees salvation as being mediated by a number of spirits, including the ancestors, sitting in the middle, interacting between God and man (Turaki 1999:41-43). In the 17th and 18th century Christianity taught by the Missionaries, influenced as it was by the Enlightenment, this middle was missing, reflecting instead a more direct relationship between God and man.

According to these new Western conceptions of the relationship between religion and science, as taught by European missionaries to Africans, science dealt with the natural, empirical world using scientifically-based, mechanistic analogies; and religion handled other worldly matters - God in Cosmic history - in the creation, redemption, purpose and destiny of all things. Because of this missing middle, there was no way of seeing how - namely with what mechanisms God acted in human history - in the affairs of nations, peoples and individuals, and this would include how God would use these various mechanisms to provide divine guidance, provide healing, and how spirits and invisible powers of this world would be dealt with, and how they would be used in this respect.

Furthermore, linked to death, the missionary-taught theology provided no guidelines or explanations acceptable along African Cosmological lines for suffering, misfortune and death, ie: for causality (Turaki 1999:41-43). Paul G. Hiebert in his book *"Anthropological Reflections on Missiological Issues"* (1994)

illustrates the problem of the missing middle in terms of a diagram (contained in Turaki 1999:41-43).

Western 2-tiered view of reality

RELIGION	faith miracles other-worldly problems sacred

(Excluded Middle)

SCIENCE	sight and experience natural order this-worldly problems secular

Source: Hiebert (1994), contained in Turaki (1999:42).

This conceptualization and explanation of the missing middle is very important, since it gives a new way of looking at and into African conceptualizations of good and evil, versus Western conceptualizations of good and evil. The fact is that Western missionaries, according to Conco (1991:9) saw the African diviner as representing evil, hence the term witchdoctor. These Western conceptions according to Langewerf (1992:5-8) ignored the distinction made in African Cosmology, and thus recognized within African society, between a white magician such as a diviner

_F.B._   P.T.O.

(Sangoma), representing good and a black magician [1] such as a witch or sorcerer, representing evil.

A sorcerer (black magician) is seen as a lazy, unsuccessful and somehow emotionally imbalanced person. He is seen as being against social stability and progress. Death, illness and misfortune are thus often considered the outcome of the evil intent of mostly close relatives (members of the earthly community). And this evil intent is believed to find practical expression in the black magic activities of the sorcerer (Langewerf 1992:5-8). A medicine-man (white magician) on the other hand, is generally seen as a morally upright person, keeping his (her) hands clean from evil and wielding his (her) great power in the interests of the health and welfare of society (Langewerf 1992:5-8).

As such the diviner (seen as a white magician) carried out a number of functions within African society, many of which are still carried out by diviners (Langewerf 1992:5-8):

A   Doctor

B   A seer

C   A priest, and

D   A judicial prosecutor in serious public crimes.

Hence African beliefs in evil and witchcraft do not mean that Africans are evil *per-se*. Rather, African beliefs in evil and witchcraft, based on causality - the idea that nothing happens by chance and that some evil force, represented by a witch, sits behind each or at least many misfortune(s), is representative of a conceptualization of what

---

[1]   No racial references or meanings inferred, referred to or intended.

constitutes good and evil. This is different from the Western conceptualization of the mechanisms that transmit evil. Even within Europe, before the Enlightenment, these beliefs were in general adhered to within Europe as well. Yet as pointed out above, these different conceptualizations came about in the 17th and 18th centuries In European and North American society due to the influence of Enlightenment on European culture, which also affected Christian theology (the missing middle pointed to above), leading to conceptions of evil and the mechanisms behind evil which differed from African Cosmological conceptions.

In other words, whilst European conceptions of evil have largely changed (even though cases of black magic are still, from time-to-time, reported within Europe, and there seems to be an increase in superstitious religious beliefs especially now with the Millennium change), African conceptions of evil largely did not change much, but instead, as will be argued below, these basic African Cosmological conceptions of evil and what brings about this evil, were found by Africans to be so flexible that they were used to conceptualize and bring sense to Western modernity, and today's world.

3.3.3 *Current manifestations of African Cosmology in a rural environment - rural responses to Western modernity*

Despite the arrival of Western Christianity, the traditional African conceptualization of good and evil, and how it is linked up to African Cosmology, particularly in the perceived behaviours of ancestors, witches and other entities in the spirit world, and how this affects people on earth, find expression today in continued beliefs in causality - the belief that all incidents which one would otherwise normally dismiss as coincidence or bad luck, are seen by many Africans in this Westernized modern world, both in a rural and an urban environment, as being caused by other, supernatural factors, such as a witch, representing jealousy and communal tensions, and / or other spiritual entities and factors. Evidence of this continued belief comes from various quarters.

Before delving into exclusively urban examples of this however, I would like to start with more recent, rural-based examples, the reason for which will unfold with its explanation.   Izak Niehaus (1995:514-528), in research he carried out in Green Valley, Lebowa, noted that socio-economic pressures brought about by Apartheid removals, commercial agriculture and the movement to the cities of a large part of the economically active male adult population through the migrant labour system, affected the community of Green Valley, Lebowa.

Yet what we could call here the arrival of Western-defined modernity did not lead to a destruction of local beliefs related to witchcraft and the activities of familiars (entities believed to be used by witches to

transmit evil spells onto their victims). Instead, these pressures, Western in origin, were and still are interpreted and internalized amongst the locals in terms of traditional explanations for good and evil, and the transmission of evil, based on traditional African Cosmology. Not only, but such beliefs actually changed, but still in line with traditional Cosmological beliefs.

Thus a whole host of new familiars were believed to be used by witches to transmit evil to their victims. Means traditionally believed to transmit evil such as owls and baboons were replaced with new familiars such as the _Tokolose_ (a hairy, small man, believed to cause infertility) and the _Mamlambo_ (a snake, which is believed to come in the form of a translucent root or bulb out of which the snake grows, believed to represent greed for money). These familiars, although in line with traditional African Cosmological beliefs, were originally not part of the culture of the area. They were believed by the Green Valley locals to have been purchased for use in witchcraft from doctors of witchcraft in Durban. Niehaus notes that the _Tokolose_ and the _Mamlambo_ are in fact familiars that form part of Xhosa culture, and these beliefs, according to Niehaus (1995:528-537) were in fact brought in by Green Valley locals who worked on the Witwatersrand. They had contact with Xhosa migrant labourers on the Witwatersrand, and through this contact, they appropriated these Xhosa-based identities, and used them as a means of ensuring that their spouses back in Green Valley, would not stray off in search for other partners. Hence these identities were used as a means of ensuring that migrant labourers' wives resident in Green Valley, would remain faithful to their husbands during their absence.

_F.B._   P.T.O.

Witchcraft allegations, with use of the above-mentioned familiars, were in fact often aimed at poor, unemployed men who remained resident in Green Valley whilst male spouses went to the cities for work. Such witchcraft allegations (especially with reference to the *Mamlambo*) were however also aimed at preventing excessive economic differentiation within society (Niehaus 1995:514-533).

Jonathan Stadler (1996:87-93), in research he carried out into witchcraft allegations in the Northern Province in the 1980s, and the subsequent witch-hunts that these allegations gave rise to, also noted how modern-day political and socio-economic tensions and rivalries in the Northern Province in the 1980s were translated by some via African Cosmological terms. Subsequently this gave rise to such witch-hunts, especially after some sickness, death or other kind of misfortune occurred, for example in the case of lightning striking a hut, killing its occupants. Stadler (1996:87-93) furthermore notes that it was the supposedly Westernized, Westerncentrically modernized members of society - young students, teachers and civil servants who generally were the ringleaders of mobs who sought and often injured and/ or killed alleged witches. If the victims were lucky, they would only have been chased out of their villages, thus creating new villages of generally elderly refugees who were chased out of their home villages by angry mobs. These villages, called by some of the locals "witches' villages" were, and still are, generally situated next to a number of police stations (Mafokane 1990:230-231).

Often however the more political reasons behind the witchcraft

allegations (for example rivalries between the United Democratic Front and traditional leaders) inter-meshed with more modern-day economic reasons. Thus according to Stadler (1996:90-93) the younger members of society often based their witchcraft allegations on their beliefs that the elders, feeling envious of the financial success of the younger members of society, would impose on the youth various demands for financial support, based on communal practices emphasising support of the elders. If the youth however refused to honour such obligations, the elders were believed by the youth to use witchcraft on the younger members of society as revenge (Stadler 1996:90-93). It is interesting to note that after 1990 there seems to be an increase in witchcraft-related incidents such as witch-hunts and witch-killings, particularly in the Northern Province (Minnaar, Wentzel, and Payze 1997:25-29, Maluleke and Horler. 1995:14-16).

Quoting from Hulme and Ntsewa (1996 - full bibliographical details not given), Minnaar, Wentzel and Payze (1997:25) note that during the period 1990 to April 1995, 455 witchcraft related cases were reported to the South African Police Services (SAPS) in the Northern Province. According to a SAPS report quoted by Minnaar, Wentzel and Payze, 45% of these cases were reported between 1990 and 1993, while the remaining 55% were reported in the twelve-month period between April 1994 and April 1995. In the period January to May 1996 alone, 104 cases of witchcraft related incidents were reported and 11 arrests made. The report also states that 164 people were removed from their homes to places of safety after having been accused of witchcraft practices. While all the victims

were 50 years or older, the majority of perpetrators varied in age between 16 and 25 years. Furthermore, the report states that suspects usually co-operated with the investigating officer because they did not believe that they had done anything wrong, and that the fines imposed by the courts usually ranged from R 200 to R 250 (Minnaar, Wentzel and Payze 1997:25).

The problem reached such dimensions that in May 1994 the South African Police Service (SAPS) set up a special flying squad unit to deal with witchcraft-related incidents in the Northern Province. Based at Potgietersrus, its specific task was to clamp down on witchcraft-related attacks, educate the communities involved concerning these activities and provide protection to people accused of being witches. One of the biggest problems faced by the unit however was that often they would not arrive at the scene of a witch-hunt in time to save the already killed - and often burnt - victim(s) (Minnaar, Wentzel and Payze 1997:27).

These occurrences, in particular the large sudden increase of witchcraft-related episodes and accompanying violence, led to a Commission of Inquiry into such witchcraft-related incidents, commissioned by the Northern Province government (Ralushai et. al. 1996).

This commission, containing a number of academics and senior police personnel highlighted a drastic increase in withcraft accusations and witch-hunts in the Northern Province in the 1990s, as reported to Northern Province police and courts. The report's

compilers note that:

> "....the continued frequency of witchcraft murders, if not their increase deserves special mention. Moreover belief in witchcraft remains as prevalent as ever. Belief in witchcraft and related practices form part of a basic cultural, traditional and customary principle of Africans in South Africa, and Africa as a whole.... It is quite clear that witchcraft as a phenomenon is still a factor to be reckoned with in other regions of South Africa. It is clear that witchcraft beliefs occur among people of all levels. Although in urban areas many Africans still believe in witchcraft, there are fewer cases of witchcraft-related or ritual killings than in rural areas". (Ralushai et. al. 1996:57-58).

The basic point that must be taken from this quote supports and re-iterates that which has been written above, and is namely the following: witchcraft beliefs, and extreme reactions to "witches" are still very much prevalent in South Africa today. Not only, but according to the report, such beliefs are found "among people of all levels" - regardless of amount of formal Western-centric education, and even though there are fewer cases of witch-hunts in the urban areas than in the rural areas, such beliefs are still found today not only in the rural areas of for example the Northern Province, but also in the urban areas. This urban dimension to witchcraft beliefs will be investigated in the following section of this chapter.

Furthermore, although recognizing the widespread prevalence of witchcraft beliefs and accusation practices, much of the report (Ralushai et.al. 1996) emphasises the need for education of residents, and using traditional healers belonging to recognised formal traditional healers' organisations to educate people. In my opinion, much of this emphasis on education assumes, in line with modernization theory in the 1950s, that essentially Western-style

education will solve this perennial problem.

Yet nowhere in the report is the widespread scale and increase of witchcraft accusation practices linked to modernity and Western influences, as was made so far in this thesis. Somehow it is as if the report assumes that the problem of witchcraft accusation is merely a tradition that will vanish, if the people are given enough education and Western-defined modernity. Yet despite that, the irony is that the government wants to use more education - read Western modernity - as a means of countering this problem, regardless of the fact that it is in fact the more educated (and Westernized) members of these societies that engage in witchcraft accusation, witch-hunts and witch killings. Westernization in fact increases, as opposed to decreases, these problems. This suggests that the report's proposed solution to the problem of witch hunts will probably not have the desired consequences.

Yet the point of this description and discussion of witchcraft allegations and witch-hunts in the rural areas of Northern Province and Mpumalanga province was in fact to show that such witch-hunts are affected by Westernization and modernity, and that modernity has not necessarily led to a decline in African Cosmological beliefs. Rather, current practices and modern Western, global social, economic and political influences; and the social/ communal effects thereof are instead interpreted by people along African Cosmological lines. In fact these old beliefs and practices (such as witch-hunts) can in fact be spurred on by problems and social, economic and political changes brought on by the arrival of practices

and institutions brought in by the Western world.

In the case of Green Valley, Lebowa, for example, commercial agriculture and the migrant labour system linked to mining and industry in South Africa's metropolitan areas (Niehaus 1995:514-533) increased witchcraft allegations. This is similar to the way a misfortune such as an accident in a rural area or a township street, caused by a drunk driver; a very current phenomenon, involving excessive consumption of liquor and a car, are being quite easily interpreted as being caused by an evil spell put on the household by a (jealous) witch resident in the community.

Furthermore, level of education does not necessarily lead to a decline in the prevalence of African Cosmological beliefs either, as noted above by Ralushai et. al. (1996:57-58). The persons who spurred on witchcraft accusations in the Northern Province, as pointed out by Stadler (1996:90-93), and Ralushai et. al. (1996:13-15) were the younger, more educated members of these societies, who engaged in witch-hunts, despite their higher level of Western education and Western ways, the same as their (less educated) elders did in witch-hunts in the 1960s and 1970s (Stadler 1996:90-93). And in fact the young peoples' better-paying jobs, brought about by their Western education were believed by them to spur on jealousy by their elders, which according to the younger members of society, led to the elders resorting to witchcraft against them (Stadler 1996:90-93; Lawuyi 1998: 88-93).

This contention about the level of Western education not necessarily

destroying traditional African Cosmological beliefs is further supported by a survey carried out by Elliott (1984:10) amongst first year medical and dental students at the Medical University of South Africa (Medunsa), gauging their beliefs regarding disease and what causes disease. According to Elliott (1984:110), from an analysis of student essays, three broad points emerged.

A   Two-thirds to three-quarters of the students had strongly retained their traditional supernatural beliefs, this despite their Western scientific education throughout their High School careers, and exposure to Western science at Medunsa.

B   There is a high level of acceptance among students that witchcraft is a very real power in the world.

C   Amongst the respondents, the belief that the primary causes and origins of most diseases are evil spirits, is widely held.

Elliott (1984:10) quotes a number of responses of students in the survey, a reading of which is very interesting. These are some of the answers:

*   "An African whose car capsized will not consider the puncture that caused the accident but will go to his family _Inyanga_ to know why the wheel punctured and who caused it to puncture - traditional factors always have answers regarding the 'why' and the 'who'".

*   "When a man is bitten by a snake there is someone who is envying him".

*   "As an African I know from birth that there is nothing sorrowful and miserable that is not caused by evil spirits. These spirits are believed to have been sent by our enemies and those who are jealous of us".

The following two quotes are very interesting:

"Diseases are caused by germs but there is someone behind the germs".

"Traditional healing gets at the causation. The notion has not been extinguished even in educated people. The medical and traditional treatment correlates in certain ways for after the traditional healer has blocked the causation of the illness then a medical doctor can take over to treat the psychological functioning of the body" (Elliott 1984:110).

The interesting aspect of these latter two quotes is that their authors seem to see no clash between Western-based biomedicine and traditional African medicine, based on African Cosmological views. In fact they see them as being complementary; a point that will be highlighted again in the discussion of African traditional medicine in chapter 4.

3.3.4 *Conclusions on the effect of Western-defined modernity on African traditional views of witchcraft*

Again, similar to what we saw in our discussion of Stokvels, Western modernity seems not to have destroyed tradition, rather it seems to have spurred on tradition in the form of modern-day witchcraft accusations, and beliefs in disease and misfortune rooted in causality; both interlinked and both based on traditional beliefs regarding good and evil, reflecting tensions within the earthly community, often spilling over into tensions within the spiritual community. Current events, associated with Western-defined modernity and everyday living are therefore merely translated along

traditional lines, and neither is the relationship between modern and traditional seen as being necessarily conflicting. As shown in the above responses of Medunsa medical and dental students, similar to what we saw in our discussion of Stokvels, modern and traditional can be complementary, and can go hand-in-hand. This shows the flexibility of tradition, even within a changing environment, to adjust to, and integrate within itself Western influences. We will now see how a similar process is occurring in an urban environment; in terms of how African Cosmological beliefs are surviving quite well within an urban environment, thanks to tradition's ability to integrate Western influences within itself.

3.4 *African Cosmology in urban South Africa*

The fact that tradition need not be destroyed by the advancement of Western-defined modernity, as can be seen by continued beliefs even among more educated blacks in African Cosmology, and the fact that such modernity can be interpreted along traditional lines, ie: in terms of lines which are congruent with, and act in continuation of African Cosmological beliefs, raises some interesting possibilities.

A   If reality, including Western definitions of modernity in the rural areas can be interpreted in such a way, what about an urban existence? Let's rephrase the question as follows: could it be possible that social, political and economic stresses amongst and upon blacks in the urban areas could be interpreted by urbanized blacks themselves along African Cosmological lines as well?

B   Since communal linkages need not be exclusively rural, or urban/ rural, but could also be an ingrained part of urban life, as we saw above in terms of Stokvels as active manifestations of an entirely urban communal existence, what about the following: If Cosmological beliefs are used to signify communal tensions in the communities in the rural areas; couldn't these same Cosmological beliefs, and beliefs regarding how all of this links up to witchcraft, be used by urban blacks themselves to signify tensions within the urban community or communities, tensions which arise from economic, social and political influences?

3.4.1 *Continued African belief in causality in South Africa's urban environment*

Any answer to these questions will depend on the piecing together of a number of pieces in a puzzle. One piece of the puzzle has already been mentioned in the previous section: the fact that a current misfortune such as a boy being killed in the street by a drunk driver can be interpreted by the boy's family members as an indication that a spell of misfortune has been put on the victim's household by a witch. Adam Ashforth (1996:1196-1197), from whom the example is quoted, got this example through observations he made of residents of urban Soweto during his stay there in the early 1990s.

3.4.2 *The urban presence of diviners and other traditional healers*

Another piece of the puzzle concerns the urban presence of diviners (Sangoma), mediators between man on earth and the ancestors in the spirit world. These are also the persons to which people who share the same African Cosmological views go to in order to find if and what evil force caused a sickness or other misfortune to occur.

Farrand (1980) and Mills (1983) in their research found a strong presence of these structures within an urban environment - Suburban Johannesburg and Guguletu Township near Cape Town respectively. Thus within these urban environments one could find the following:

- **_Diviners_** (also called Sangoma in Zulu, Amagqira in Xhosa and Dingaka in Sotho) are persons (usually women, although often also men) who act within a traditional (African Cosmological) context as a medium with the ancestors (Freeman and Motsei 1992:1183-1184; Mills 1983:6).

- **_Iixwele_**. These are powerful sorcerers (seen as being more powerful than Sangoma's), seen as representing evil as they are capable of doing both good and evil (Mills 1983:6).

- **_Inyanga_**. These are traditional herbalists (even called traditional pharmacists) who use herbal and other medicinal preparations for treating disease (Mills 1983:6; Freeman and Motsei 1992:1183-1184). Dauskardt (1990:277-280) notes that in 1986 approximately 10 000 **_Inyanga's_** were in operation in Soweto.

- **_The Umpropheti or Umthandazi (faith healer)_** who integrates Christian ritual and traditional practices. This latter group is linked to the Independent African Church (AIC) movement, which include the Zion Christian Church (ZCC); which broke away from the more Western-oriented missionary churches. Strictly speaking these churches are not traditional in that they did not exist before colonialization and the coming of Western biomedicine. But they share with the rest, in broad terms, a common theory of health, disease, good and evil, witchcraft and causality (reflecting traditional African Cosmological views of health, disease and their link to good

and evil), divine in a similar manner to diviners and treat various diseases with traditional herbs and medicines (Mills 1983:6; Freeman and Motsei 1992:1183-1184; Kunnie 1992:1-9).

More evidence of the urban presence of African Cosmological views lies in the huge traditional medicine (*Muti* or *Muthi*) trade found in urban South Africa - with medicines dealing with both so-called natural diseases (colds and headaches) and so-called unnatural diseases caused by witchcraft-related curses and ancestral displeasure. Dauskart (1990:277-280) notes that on the Witwatersrand, several activities under the umbrella category of traditional African herbalism (or *Muti Trade*) may be identified; including traditional African herbalists, herbal hawkers, herbal pharmacists, herbal wholesalers, herb processing and packaging factories, distributors and commercial herb gatherers.

Quoting figures by Mander (1997), Botha (1998:623) estimates the entire South African traditional medicinal trade at R 2,3 billion per annum. *Annexure A* shows a number of diagrams detailing the presence, size and distribution of the urban traditional medicine trade on the Witwatersrand, as well as the workings of the traditional medicine trade (Sources: Dauskardt 1990, and Williams, Balkwill and Witkowski, 1997). Although these figures are limited in that they were based exclusively on trading licences and company registrations of traditional African herbal shops, as well as the counting of traditional African herbal shops contained in the phone directory, they nevertheless are the proverbial tip of the iceberg as

regards the presence and activities of the traditonal African herbal (*muti*) trade in the Witwatersrand and urban South Africa.

3.4.3 *Popular beliefs in African Cosmological forces amongst urban black South Africans*

This brings us to another point. For such a great number of traditional healers (*Sangomas* and *Inyiangas*) to be present in Soweto and elsewhere in urban South Africa; and for such a large traditional herbal medicine (*muti*) trade to be present within this urban environment, there has to be great demand for such services among black urbanites. Dauskardt (1990:279) notes that the rural/ urban movement of people under the migrant labour system enhanced the introduction of a range of traditional activities in the city which frequently became sources of informal employment. African women thus found urban uses for their traditional beer-brewing capacities as a means of earning an extra income for their households - thus spawning what would become an illegal beer brewing and liquor smuggling problem and *Shebeen* culture in South African townships (La Hausse 1984:1-60; 269-315). And miners in the compounds, for example, frequently utilized (and still utilize) the services of traditional herbalists to come up with mixtures that give the miners courage both underground under dangerous working conditions, and in faction fighting in the hostels (Dauskardt 1990:279; Munk 1996:7-12), which Zulu hostel dwellers even used for protection during the Hostel War with ANC supporters on the Witwatersrand in the early 1990s (Munk 1996:7-12). And this also gave rise to the urban traditional medicine trade, through formal

commercial outlets treating patients and selling medicine appearing as far back as the 1920s and 1930s in Johannesburg townships, and Johannesburg CBD (Dauskardt 1990:279). A 1983 survey in Kwa-Zulu Natal (Edwards et. al. 1983b:1-8) indicates that 40% of urban blacks utilize traditional medicines, alone or in combination with Western medicine.

And an important reason why urban blacks use traditional medicines is not just because of their (real or perceived) ability to cure physical diseases such as colds and even fertility problems, particularly within the context of a lack of medical facilities amongst the poor (Dauskardt 1990:277-280). Wealthy black South Africans, despite their urban sophistication, financial resources and higher levels of education, also visit diviners both for physical diseases and for ailments they themselves blame on ancestral displeasure and witchcraft (Fenyves 1994:55-82). Furthermore, another important finding by Fenyves is that even if patients have access to top Western biomedical practitioners, patients often consult both Western and traditional medical practitioners simultaneously (Fenyves 1994:55-82).

Ashforth (1996:1191-1193) notes that an important reason why urban blacks, regardless of level of education (or income), use traditional medicines, is precisely in order to be able to protect themselves and their families from evil forces in the spirit world, believed to have an effect on their daily, Western-influenced existence. Based on his observations of residents of Soweto, Ashforth (1996:1191-1193) noted that in Soweto, what a Western

observer might define as rational and irrational, or respectively objective, and subjective, as per Western definition, live side-by-side; the latter, to Soweto inhabitants being as real as the former. In addition to human social forms operative in the present, in reality, the African urban world is inhabited and shaped by beings with significant powers which dwell in an invisible realm.

For example, these beings (ancestors, witches and sorcerers) are no less real for the fact that they cannot be seen (in terms of Western objective, rational observation and conceptualization) in the ordinary course of events. Every person is engaged in relationships with these beings, and every community incorporates living and dead persons. These relations are mediated in different ways, by chiefs, clan leaders, community leaders, civil associations, family heads, priests, prophets, healers, witches, sorcerers and others in the community - both on earth and in the afterlife. Such relationships according to Ashforth (1996:1191-1193) are generally kept secret to the Western observer, especially beliefs regarding witchcraft. Yet, according to him, it might perhaps best be seen as a public secret of black South Africa. It is something that everyone knows about, yet few care to speak of, mostly not in a public fora, and at most only to trusted close family and friends (Ashforth 1996:1191-1193). Thus, bringing the discussion back to Ashforth's description of witchcraft beliefs and accusations following a misfortune, such as the killing of a child in the family by a drunk driver on the street, and the family of the deceased's consultation of a diviner to find out which evil power was behind the misfortune, the following must be noted. These continued inter-related beliefs in causality and

witchcraft, and continued use of traditional potions bought on the recommendations of the diviner concerned, are a manifestation of the fact that African Cosmological views, described at the beginning of this chapter by Turaki (1999:40-43) as already pre-dating the arrival of colonialism, present in a rural environment, have found a home presently in an urban environment, among urbanized black South Africans.

And present-day tensions in an urban society reflecting social, political and economic pressures and changes, just like tensions in a rural society, lead urban blacks to conceptualize such pressures and problems encountered in terms of African Cosmology. Thus for example strife between workers and a series of unexplained deaths amongst workers employed within a Nelspruit supermarket led to a mass consultation by workers of a **Sangoma** who pointed out witches amongst the workers (Barendse, Best and Dederen, 1993:22-25; 40-41). This led to a worker strike, with the somewhat unusual demand to the management of the supermarket for the firing of the alleged witches. Its interesting to note that the workers identified as witches by the **Sangoma** had worked within the Supermarket in relatively senior supervisory positions; and the witch-pointing is believed to reflect tensions between more junior workers and these supervisors (Barendse and Best, 1992:87).

3.4.4 *Witchcraft and witchcraft-related beliefs regarding the* *State*

Yet if witchcraft can be used as a means to explain rivalries within a modern commercial organization, affecting the operation of these modern organizations (by modern we mean Western, hence foreign in design and conceptualization), what about the state? Can't stresses and strains within the state amongst political and bureaucratic beliefs find expression through accusations of witchcraft? Maybe even more importantly, can't witchcraft and African Cosmological beliefs be used as a means of conceptualising the State, therefore affecting popular black conceptions of the (Western-originating and designed) state, and thus affecting black loyalty to the South African state?

Like post-colonial states all over Africa, the South African state has been largely inherited from colonially-based Western-originating geographical and organizational designs. Indeed, the colonial state in South Africa had, similar to colonial administrations throughout Africa, defeated hostile chiefs and taken over many of the functions formerly rendered by these chiefs. As Redding (1996:254-257) pointed out in a study he carried out in the former Transkei region, the precolonial African states, under chiefly rule, had collected various levies from commoners: death duties, labour levies, judicial fines, gifts and tributes to the chiefs. In return, chiefs had responsibilities common to all forms of government. They had to provide justice and security and a number of religious functions which at a societal level, helped to ensure harmony. Unlike other

post-Enlightenment Western states, these functions in the case of pre-colonial state structures in the Transkeian region (common too to the rest of South Africa and Africa as well) included the prevention of sorcery and witchcraft, though consultations with priest-diviners, and loan to subjects of cattle and food, as needed. Religious power and reciprocity were thus important because chiefs had relatively few methods of coercive enforcement at their disposal (Redding 1996:249-255).

With the imposition of colonialism and non-African state models through the colonial state and administration, the postcolonial state demoted chiefs and banned witchcraft. This step seemed logical to colonial officials, since they did not believe in witchcraft. But this backfired in that, by ignoring African Cosmological worldviews, with the accompanying beliefs in witchcraft, colonial officials, by outlawing accusations, were instead preventing people from what Africans themselves saw as protecting themselves against witches and sorcerers. For Africans who believed in witchcraft (and more precisely that they could be bewitched), this banning by the colonial state of witchcraft represented an indication that the Western-defined state itself was in league with witches and sorcerers, and thus that the (colonial) state itself was a manifestation of witchcraft (Redding 1996:249-257). Such conceptions were further strengthened by the fact that the colonial state had defeated and subdued chiefs, despite the fact that the chiefs were under the constant protection of the forces of good, through the intermediary of the diviner.

Such beliefs were a strong driving force behind the boycott of colonially-imposed hut tax in the Transkeian region, leading to the 1880 Transkeian rebellion. The rebellion was however crushed by the colonial state. In victory, Cape officials began appropriating some of the symbols and methods of African chiefs to underpin their claims to rule. For example, the colonial state confiscated the rebels' livestock and land, forcing many to leave the Transkei temporarily in search of wage labour (Redding 1996:257-261). Supporters of the British were given paid positions as headmen and livestock was confiscated from rebels. The colonial state, following African precedents, had eaten up the property of its enemies and distributed it to friends (Redding 1996:261-262). Blacks thus paid hut tax since they now understood the connection between paying hut tax and being allowed to farm in peace. Peace here however meant more than just not being harassed by government officials however. Payment also meant freedom from the witchcraft that locals believed the colonial state as being capable of doing. And precisely because of this, moneys collected and compliance levels increased substantially during years of drought, despite the fact that during such periods household incomes were much lower, and ability to pay much decreased (Redding 1996:261-269) - droughts believed to have been caused by the colonial state's witchcraft, and thus the only way to bring an end to it was to appease the colonial state so that it could have lifted its powerful witchcraft on the elements.

Redding's (1996:268-269) point regarding this however is that the payment of tax was a public acknowledgement of the power of the

colonial, Western state, but at the same time it was a way of fending off that power, and neither did people enjoy paying the tax. People simply wanted to get the state off their backs, for it was believed that if whites had won partly because the supernatural power they wielded was stronger than that of the chiefs, then it was wise to pay the taxes to avoid having that power turned against oneself. This belief in the supernatural potency of the state may have been further reinforced by the co-optation of some chiefs and headmen, people widely reputed to have supernatural powers, into the regime.

In contrast white officials saw high tax compliance rates in a different light. High rates of payment were for them indicators not only that Africans were not about to rebel, but more strongly as evidence that Africans actively agreed to colonial rule, and accepted white definitions of civilization and progress. Africans, on the other hand, may have agreed that their tax payments signified that they were not about to rebel, but beyond that the payments were not evidence of any African consensus on the propriety of white rule (Redding 1996:268-269).

And these beliefs that the state represents witches has re-emerged within more current circumstances too. In the 1980s for example, youths belonging to the United Democratic Front (UDF) carried out witch-hunts in the Northern Province against perceived enemies - defined as witches - precisely because they perceived the South African state as siding with witches because they banned witchcraft and witchcraft accusation by legislation (The Suppression of Witchcraft Act of 1957) and to them freedom included liberation from

the presence of evil witches. These beliefs were further strengthened by the fact that villages containing alleged witches chased out of their own communities, were themselves situated next to police stations; the police, as representative of the government, seen as being in cahoots with witches (Mafokane 1998:230-234; Stadler 1996:87-109).

Ashforth (1998:505-531) noted that similar attitudes towards the state are emerging in today's post-Apartheid, urban Soweto. Ashforth notes that people such as F.W. De Klerk and his predecessors were seen as evil precisely because they were seen as representing and protecting the interests of witches through their laws and actions by the police. Today's misfortunes, such as the lady mayor of Soweto dying during childbirth in 1998 for example were, according to Ashforth (1998:507-509), seen by many Sowetans as being the work of witches. And these beliefs in witches seem to have proliferated in the modern urban environment as a means of explaining current problems (for example children being ridden over by drunk drivers, and death at childbirth); particularly among the new, educated, Westernized black elite who believe themselves and their families to be under the threat of witchcraft brought about by jealous neighbours envious of their modern success (Ashforth 1998:507-511).

And since the state, following these laws, is not prosecuting witches, township and rural vigilantes are themselves claiming this task or responsibility on themselves (Ashforth 1996:527-531); contributing to the increasing problem of township vigilantism (Sowetan Sunday World, 4 March 2001, p. 16) - even though the occurrence of witch-

hunts is much higher in the rural areas than in the urban areas (Ralushai 1996:57-58).

These witches are seen as being criminals; hence they are seen as criminals and punished as criminals - hunted down by these mobs. Many members of these lynch mobs do not see witch-pointing and witch-hunting as crimes as such activities, based on African Cosmological views, are seen as representing good (Minnaar, Wentzel and Payze 1997:25), to the point that persons suspected of taking part in witchcraft accusation-related mob violence themselves freely and openly co-operate with the police as they perceive their actions as not being wrong. In fact according to Lawuyi (1998:84) these youths engaged in witch-hunting see this role of theirs as making them "purveyors and defenders of truth and justice", guardians of their communities, within their communities; and by doing so they try to build support for themselves in their communities. Precisely because of these conceptualizations of good and evil, prevalent both in rural and in urban black society, Ashforth (1998:527-531) makes the point that there could be pressure coming from people on the ground itself, even in urban Soweto, onto the new government, the inheritor of the colonially created and Apartheid reinforced South African state to do something to get rid of witches. In this respect Niehaus (1998:93-114) noted that after the ANC's unbanning in 1990, and subsequent coming to power of the ANC in 1994, provincial leaders of the organization, particularly in the Northern Province and Mpumalanga, were faced with a dilemma. On the one side, the National Executive of the ANC pressurised them to bring an end to witch-hunts, and in particular

ANC-supporting young Comrades' perpetual involvement in instigating witch-hunts which, as we saw above, emerged in the 1980s as part of these youth organizations' attempts to protect the community from evil, and thus gain support from the community.

Again, this proverbial order from the top is a reflection of the ANC's adherence to 1950s modernization theory, as pointed out in Chapter 2, and the idea that the negative aspects of tradition could (and would) be made to disappear through concerted action from the party and from government. On the other hand the same provincial ANC party leaders who were pressured by ANC National Executive leaders to bring an end to witch-hunts, were feeling constant pressure from communities on the ground not to banish witch-hunts (through better enforcement of the Witchcraft Suppression Act). These provincial party leaders in fact feared that the ANC could lose support on the ground if people felt that the ANC in its policies, and in its actions as a governing party, was seen as being lenient towards witches, and left witchcraft unpunished, whilst punishing witch-hunters (Niehaus 1998:93-114).

3.4.5 *African Cosmological beliefs and modern-day urban pressures and problems - the link of the African Independent Churches*

Other examples of present-day black urbanites making sense of the modern socio-economic pressures around them through their use of African Cosmological beliefs, are offered by the African Independent Churches (AIC's). As was noted above, these churches broke away

from mainline churches brought into South Africa by European Missionaries. Strictly speaking the AIC's are not traditional in that they did not exist before colonialization and the coming of Western biomedicine. But they do largely adhere to African Cosmological beliefs regarding health, disease, good and evil, witchcraft and causality, and the effect of these spiritual forces on peoples' daily lives (Kunnie 1992:1-9; Oosthuizen 1992:38-41). The Prophets of these churches divine in a similar manner to diviners (*Sangomas*) and also treat various diseases and witchcraft-related ailments and misfortunes with traditional herbs and medicines (Mills 1983:6; Freeman and Motsei 1992:1183-1184; Kunnie 1992:1-9).

Despite the above-mentioned missing middle found in post 17th and 18th century Western conceptualizations of Christianity (see Hiebert 1994, contained in Turaki 1999:42), African Indigenous Churches (AIC's) - made up of the Zionist, Ethiopian, Apostolic, Pentecostal, and a number of other smaller churches, have been able to fill in the missing middle by providing African Cosmological explanations rooted in good and evil, witches, ancestors and other spiritual deities for day-to-day problems and misfortunes encountered by rural and urban blacks, all within the context of Christianity and the Bible (Ashforth 1996:1198-1199; Kiernan 1984:219-233). And based on this, the AIC movement has become an important church movement in modern-day South Africa. According to Oosthuizen (1992:1) the entire African Independent Church Movement in South Africa, with all its various denominations, grew out of three main denominations: the Ethiopian Churches, the Apostolics and the Zionist Churches. By 1913 there were altogether 32 denominations; in 1948 there

were 800 denominations with 800 000 adherents - 9% of the estimated African population of South Africa. In 1960 there were 2000 denominations, with 2 100 000 adherents, 29,3% of the then African population. In 1990 there were over 4000 denominations, with 8 million members; representing about 35% of the black population of South Africa. The AIC's make up the fastest growing church movement in South Africa (Oosthuizen 1992:1).

Oosthuizen (1992:preface) also makes the point that in the Southern African context, components of the urbanization process, such as the tremendous disruption it brings to practically every family, living alongside strangers, the breaking up of family life, and the daily struggle to survive have given rise to the type of Christianity presented by the AIC's, with their emphasis on traditional African Cosmological beliefs, and the popular support shown for them. According to Oosthuizen (1992:preface) the teachings of these churches, with the African Cosmological views inherent in them, have and are being used by black people as an important means of making personal sense of the present-day above-mentioned difficulties encountered by people on a daily basis - in their modern existence, influenced by modern-day political, social and economic influences; hence their growth and popularity amongst rural and urban blacks today.

3.4.6 *African Cosmological beliefs and witchcraft - is a link to globalization possible?*

In 1999 John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff published two curious, if controversial articles which linked up continued witch-hunts and mob killings of witches in Northern Province and Mpumalanga, based on the belief that those alleged witches created and harboured Zombies; as well as xenophobia towards, and the mob-killings of illegal immigrants in urban South Africa, to the effects of globalisation on the country.

As explained by Comaroff and Comaroff (1999a:279-295; 1999b:17-21) globalisation, with its economic move from physical, industrial-based production, to information technology and services, has created in South African black communities, as elsewhere in the developed and the developing world, a new group of wealthy élites, the origin of whose wealth, being based on their provision of services as opposed to physical production, causing suspicion about these élites within the societies in which they live. Another by-product of globalisation is the fact that the well-being and relatively luxurious lifestyles of these rich élites counters the increasing poverty faced by the majority of the population. In the case of South Africa, a third by-product of globalisation is the constant bombardment of media-inspired images of the good life that could be achieved through consumption. However, although desired, such lifestyles are inaccessible, leading to people trying all kinds of ways to get to such a lifestyle, and once achieved, to keep that lifestyle; from organized crime to the practice of witchcraft, the occult and zombification (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b:17-21).

According to Comaroff and Comaroff (1999b:17-21) these three dynamics caused by globalisation interact, in the form of witchcraft allegations made by unemployed blacks who suspect this new wealthy elite of creating, and making use of the services of, Zombies - dead people who, once buried, are believed by these accusers to be taken out of their graves and are given new life as slaves for these witches. Zombies are created, as the folklore goes, to work at night for the witch, without payment - as part time slave labour, making redundant the need to have others for the purposes of labour. Hence witches, the creators of Zombies, are hunted precisely because their Zombies make the hiring of extra labour unnecessary, continuing and worsening unemployment among the youth. The youth themselves want to join this consumption, they themselves want to start a family; but because of the Zombies and the witches that create them who take away their work, they cannot proceed with their lives. Hence, at a witch-killing the following words were reported as being muttered by the angry mob of youths: "Die, die you witch. We can't get work because of you" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b:21). A similar deadly fate awaited illegal immigrants in Johannesburg, also believed by locals to take away work from them (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b:21-25).

As curious and as possibly far-fetched as zombies and modern capitalist globalisation might sound, the point I would like to make here is that if, as indicated thus far in this chapter, present-day , economic, social and political and other occurrences can and are interpreted by rural and urban black South Africans along traditional African Cosmological lines, the same way as occurrences have been interpreted in the past, including the arrival of Western modern

influences such as the capitalist economy, industry and mining, both directly and/or indirectly (Niehaus 514-537; Stadler 1996:87-93; Ashforth 1996:1196-1197); it indeed makes sense that new changes in the world economy and its effect on peoples' lives would be interpreted in such "traditional" ways, as described above by Comaroff and Comaroff (1999b:17-21). And indeed could it be possible that occurrences in the future and peoples' future modernity could well be interpreted by urban and rural black South Africans alike, regardless of level of education, along the same African Cosmological lines as well?

3.5 *Conclusion*

This chapter dealt with two sides of communalism in present-day South Africa: Stokvels in urban South African townships, and continued beliefs in causality and witchcraft, based on African Cosmological beliefs among black urban (and rural) residents in South Africa. The sense of community or communalism amongst blacks finds expression both in terms of a community of physical people (mostly through kinship networks in rural areas, and mostly networks of friends/ neighbours in urban areas); as well as in terms of union with an array of spiritual beings - ancestors, witches and other spirits. The two worlds - earthly and spiritual are in continuous contact, and the spiritual world is seen as a mere extension of the community on earth (Pell 1993:40-41; Turaki 1999:85-88; 101-102). Stokvels are an expression of communalism within the community on earth, serving various needs of the community which makes up its membership. Stokvels are thus a useful means of

keeping and gaining financial, social and moral contact within the community. Stokvels thus serve a wider purpose than just personal financial acquisition. And as such, Stokvels act as an extension within an urban South African environment, of the sense of communalism prevalent in pre-colonial Africa (Lukhele 1990:Introduction).

Our discussion of witchcraft and causality; as well as beliefs in good and evil, following the guidelines set by African Cosmological beliefs; concerns the heavenly or spiritual dimension of communalism. As indicated above, blacks perceive that they co-exist here on earth with the spirits in the supernatural world, the latter believed by the former to play an active role in peoples' lives. These are African Cosmological beliefs. Such beliefs however did not die with the coming of Western influences, brought into South Africa by colonialism. Instead, such beliefs were used by black South Africans as a means of bringing sense to their current existence, both in the present and in the past, and in particular in terms of any misfortune or illness they might encounter, as well as any other happening in their lives brought about by the influence of the Western world onto their lives (Niehaus 1995:514-533; Stadler 1996:90-93; Lawuyi 1998: 88-93). Such beliefs however did not merely stay in the countryside when the process of change caused by Western-inspired modernization finally brought people into the urban areas. Instead, such beliefs now serve within urban environments to make sense of peoples' lives. Furthermore, such beliefs did not "die" because of Western education either. Instead, even more educated blacks seem to be engaging in such beliefs, and they seem to see no conflict between such beliefs and today's

modern world either.

Finally, as shown by the article by Comaroff and Comaroff (1999b:17-21), there are signs that such conceptualizations based on traditional African Cosmology will be used in the future to make sense of the world, as is the case now, as a means of dealing with new economic, political and social changes which form the basis of the future.

The explicit implication of this is that a line between what is traditional and modern disappears, and in fact the two concepts merge or fuse, tradition forming an important part of Africans' daily existence, as highlighted by Chabal and Daloz (1999:141-163) elsewhere in Africa. Furthermore, as much as an emphasis on the more positive aspects of tradition is becoming very popular in academic and public debate, the link proposed in this chapter between beliefs in causality and witchcraft on the one hand and more positive aspects of tradition such as Stokvels as being both manifestations of communalism, raises questions as to whether one can really concentrate on some aspects of tradition whilst ignoring other aspects thereof (or, alternatively stated, draw lines between various aspects of tradition, concentrating on only the more positive aspects of tradition), as these various aspects of the same tradition are present in today's world and are interlinked, and they both form part of the same spirit of communalism, and are both rooted in tradition.

Furthermore, if as pointed out by Redding (1996:261-269), colonial officials in the Eastern Cape made the mistake of thinking that greater popular payment and adherence levels to hut tax signified a

move to Western-defined modernity - in the form of such actions perceived by these officials as symbolizing the acceptance of the colonial state; instead of recognizing the fact that the locals only paid tax in fear of being bewitched by the witchcraft to which the colonial state was believed to have access to; then another question is raised. The question raised concerns to what extent are modern tendencies in reality the mere current perpetuation of tradition. Thus couldn't some apparently modern tendencies in reality be based on traditional motivations and tendencies, rooted in tradition? In which case, should some aspects of modernity be mere continuations of tradition, where does it leave us in the relationship between the two supposedly separated yet interlinked categories of tradition and modernity? Are these two concepts not merely conceptually linked as two separate categories, but indeed inseparably fused together, to essentially form two faces of the same phenomenon? And if this is the case, isn't the present - modernity - therefore not the product of moving away from tradition, but rather largely the product of the type of interaction with the same tradition?

Chapter 4

Further aspects of the tradition - modernity interaction in urban South Africa: traditional medicine and the Hostel War of the early 1990s

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapters of this thesis have highlighted a conceptualisation of the inter-relation of the categories of tradition and (Western-defined) modernity which differed from conceptions espoused in modemization theory in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the inter-relationship between tradition and modernity will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 5, it will suffice to say for now that in Africa, and today's South Africa, even in the urban areas, tradition was not destroyed by urbanization and the arrival of Western-based values, attitudes and institutions because, as pointed out in chapter 3, two interesting tendencies are present:

A   The arrival of modernity - by means of idealized Western attitudes and institutions - even globalization, did not lead to a destruction of tradition, but rather an intensification of tradition.   Thus for example, current political and socio-economic stresses and strains have been, and are still, interpreted by many rural and urban-dwelling black South Africans along traditional conceptualizations of causation for misfortune and sickness in terms of African Cosmological beliefs (Oosthuizen 1992:38-41; Comaroff and Comaroff

F.B.   P.T.O.

1999b:17-25). Furthermore this tendency has been noted not only in older residents who, one could argue, believe in the power of witchcraft, bewitchment and ancestorship as regards their daily lives because of their rural roots and lack of education; but indeed such tendencies have also been noted amongst more educated youths in the socio-politically tumultuous 1980s and 1990s (Niehaus 1995:514-528; Stadler 1996:87-93), and also generally amongst black urban-dwelling South Africans (Ashforth 1996:1191-1193). In a nutshell, tradition is being used as a means of reacting to Western modernity and the problems of daily life (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b:17-25).

B   Related to the above point, is the idea that tradition is not a rigid, inflexible, undynamic entity - as portrayed by modernization theorists in the 1950s and 1960s - hence their idea that tradition had to be destroyed in order for modernity to come about. Instead, newer conceptualisations, as will be covered in more detail in chapter 5, see tradition as a somewhat flexible entity that can adjust itself to, and be relevant in, other, often Western influences (Smolicz 1992:345-350). Again, in chapter 3 we saw how current trends, including Western trends, since the arrival of colonialism on the African continent, have been re-interpreted along traditional lines, showing the flexibility of tradition in interpreting current events (Stadler 1996:87-93; Niehaus 1995:514-528), even the socio-economic effects of globalization (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b:17-25).

Because of this flexibility of tradition, tradition is very much present in the urban areas, as can be seen for example by the current presence and size of the _Muthi_ (traditional medicine) trade in the urban Witwatersrand (Dauskardt 1990:277-280; Williams, Balkwill and Witlowski 1997:378-380).

As regards this particular chapter, following the guidelines discussed above, I will look at traditional African medicine and conceptualizations of health and illness, which acts as an extension of African Cosmological beliefs as set out in chapter 3. The focus of this discussion will be on a general description of African traditional medicine, its place within African Cosmological beliefs, and to show how this manifestation of tradition has flexibly accommodated modern trends and influences, including Western biomedicine within itself, to make traditional African medicine relevant to today, and thus making it much in demand among urban black South Africans.   As such, this discussion of traditional medicine will act as an extension of chapter 3, particularly as regards its connection to African Cosmological beliefs.

Apart from traditional African medicine, this chapter will also discuss another important manifestation of tradition within a South African urban environment. This other aspect is the so-called Hostel War between Zulu, Inkatha-supporting residents of hostels and township residents on the Reef from 1990 to the 1994 elections. The focus of the discussion will be on hostel and township residents' interpretation of everyday communal stresses and tensions among and between themselves, to which Apartheid and the migrant labour system contributed to, and how these tensions were re-interpreted

along traditional lines within an urban township environment, making the Hostel War a somewhat ethnic-centred affair within an urban environment. As such this will once again show the flexibility of tradition in giving a basis to people on the ground to interpret and act upon their daily realities. It will also show that attitudes and reactions towards perceived outsiders as enemies, rooted within African tradition, have found practical expression within the Hostel War amongst both township and hostel residents.

4.2   *African traditional beliefs and conceptions of disease*

As noted above, African conceptions of disease are linked to African Cosmological beliefs (see also Gumede 1990:17-21; 38-41). As highlighted in chapter 3, Africans generally believe that African Cosmological bodies - especially ancestors and witches (the latter representing bad/ evil) can and do have an important influence on peoples' daily lives. Thus anything good or bad happening to a person, any misfortune and any illness, sickness or disease can be attributed either to a blessing coming from the ancestors (in the case of something good happening in a person's life) or displeasure from the ancestors or the evil machinations of witches resident in one's surrounding community (the latter two in the case of any bad action or misfortune affecting one's life) (Pell 1993:40-41; Turaki 1999:85-88; 1010-102).

Explicit in all of this of course is holism - the idea that one's health consists of one's mind, body and soul (Brookbanks 1990:1-5); and that a physical disease could therefore be the result of psychological factors, and *vice-versa* (Brookbanks 1990:1-5). As noted above, an

important tenet of African Cosmological beliefs is the idea that sickness and misfortune could be the result of ancestor displeasure, or the activities of witches. And this is where African traditional medicine comes in, as it explains to the African patient not only "how" a certain disease came about, but also "why" that disease came about (for example through witchcraft or ancestor displeasure). Although this is something of a departure from rationalistic, scientific Western biomedicine with its focus on physical causes for physical disturbances (Brookbanks 1990:1-8), and psychological explanations for psychological disturbances. It does not mean that African traditional medicine does not display some similarities with Western biomedicine as regards identification and causation of disease. In fact, as will be pointed out below there are similarities, as well as differences between the two medical systems, as well as cross-influencing between the two systems, showing that traditional African medicine is capable of responding to current social, economic (and even political) trends. Even Western biomedical diseases that patients might have been diagnosed with by Western biomedical practitioners, are also explained by African traditional medicine by giving patients a framework with which to understand these occurrences and physical/ psychological ailments in their lives, ie: why it happens to them (Gumede 1990:38-41; Elliott 1984:10).

African traditional medicine is showing its capacity of flexibility and change also by integrating within traditional African medicine influences, thoughts, conceptions and methods of organization emanating from Western biomedicine; thus showing a certain

amount of fusion between the modern and traditional systems of healing (Fenyves 1994:57-82).

The above general African religious-Cosmological belief system is clearly displayed in general African conceptions of disease. As regards conceptions of disease, Edwards et.al. (1983 b:4-10) and Gumede (1990:38-41) point out that in general Africans believe that disease occurs either by natural causation, or unnatural (supranatural) causation. Diseases which are seen to be caused by natural causation in African traditional medicine are the same as diseases recognized by modern biomedical science with its empirical traditions - namely through infection, stress and organic deterioration (old age), thus in this respect showing a certain congruency between the modern Western biomedical and traditional African medical systems.

Where the two medical belief systems do diverge is on the matter of unnatural or supranatural causation. This is because some illnesses, and sudden death in the prime of one's life is believed within the African traditional belief system to be caused by African Cosmological factors - linked to ancestors, good and evil and witchcraft (representing evil), which are believed to be supranatural in origin - hence the term supranatural causation (Edwards et.al. 1983b:1-10). Modern biomedical science however does not subscribe to the idea of a hidden spiritual force behind such diseases, or cases of sudden death.

In short, traditional supranatural theories of causation can generally be summarized as follows (Edwards et.al. 1983b:1-10; Gumede

F.B.   P.T.O.

1990:38-41).

A   **_Animistic theories_**, which ascribe the disorder to the behaviour of some personalized supernatural agent such as a spirit, god or ancestor, through one of the following:

-    Withdrawal of protection of the ancestors, mostly caused by disharmony within the home;

-    Failure to perform the necessary rituals such as sacrifices to the ancestors;

-    Illness seen as being caused by the calling of the ancestors to become a diviner (**_Sangoma_**).

B   **_Magical theories_** which attribute the disorder to the actions of witches and sorcerers onto victims, namely through the following:

-    Spirit possession attributed to sorcery;

-    Disorder attributed to coming into contact with the harmful concoction of a sorcerer;

-    Witchcraft through a familiar - the supernatural agent of a witch;

-    Poisoning attributed to sorcery.

C   **_Mystical theories_** which explain disorders in terms of an automatic consequence of some act or experience of the afflicted person. For example:

-    Pollution - experiencing illness or adversity because of contact with places or people intimately associated with major life events;   for example death, birth and

menstruation.

-    A dangerous track, or ecological health hazard such as lightning (Edwards et.al. 1983b:1-10; Gumede 1990:38-41).

Many of these supranatural conceptions of what causes disease and death have been seen in chapter 3. These conceptions in practice often end up in witch-hunts (Langewerf 1992:16-21; Gumede 1990:38-41). But witch-hunts, and the fact that people that part-take in them identify alleged witches and blame them for evil, sickness and misfortune in their lives also show the fact that the traditional African conceptualisation of causation, especially with regard to supranatural causation, gives an important framework to people for interpreting causation for the reality which is surrounding them. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this use of a traditional mental framework as a means of making sense of reality (whether in an urban or a rural environment) has been recognized and used as such by many black South Africans in urban or rural settings, regardless of level of education.

Again, the responses of first year Medical students at Medunsa with regard to what they perceive as causing disease, noted in chapter 3, come to mind (Elliott 1984:110). According to Elliott (1984:110), from an analysis of student essays, three broad points emerged.

A   Two-thirds to three-quarters of the students had strongly retained their traditional supernatural beliefs, this despite their scientific education throughout their High School careers, and exposure to Western science at Medunsa.

B   There is a high level of acceptance among students that witchcraft is a very real power in the world.

C   Amongst the respondents, the belief that the primary causes and origins of most diseases are evil spirits, is widely held.

Elliott (1984:10) quotes a number of responses of students in the survey, a reading of which is very interesting. These are some of the answers:

*   "An African whose car capsized will not consider the puncture that caused the accident but will go to his family *Inyanga* to know why the wheel punctured and who caused it to puncture - traditional factors always have answers regarding the 'why' and the 'who'".

*   "When a man is bitten by a snake there is someone who is envying him".

*   "As an African I know from birth that there is nothing sorrowful and miserable that is not caused by evil spirits. These spirits are believed to have been sent by our enemies and those who are jealous of us".

The following two quotes are very interesting:

"Diseases are caused by germs but there is someone behind the germs".

"Traditional healing gets at the causation. The notion has not been extinguished even in educated people. The medical and traditional treatment correlates in certain ways for after the traditional healer has blocked the causation of the illness then a medical doctor can take over to treat the psychological functioning of the body" (Elliott 1984:110).

The interesting aspect of these latter two quotes is that their authors (future African Western biomedical practitioners) seem to see no clash between Western-based biomedicine and traditional African medicine, based on African Cosmological views. In fact they see them as being complementary.

This complementarity has also been recognized by many African patients who, despite making use of Western biomedicine in the treatment of physical and psychological disorders, nevertheless simultaneously make use of traditional African medicine; explaining this seeming contradiction in terms of Western biomedicine treating the physical symptoms of the disease, and traditional medicine treating the root cause of the disease, resting with ancestor dissatisfaction or bewitchment by a jealous member of the community; if not "just to make sure" that the Western biomedical treatment will achieve good results (Gumede 1990:38-41).

In this respect it is interesting to note the survey findings of Edwards et.al. (1983b:6-7) which noted that even though Western medical treatment was the preferred method of treatment among rural and urban groups interviewed in the survey, a large proportion of persons interviewed used modern biomedical treatment in combination or conjunction with traditional African treatment methods, reflecting popular eclectic beliefs that one should strengthen oneself with all the available treatment options, this regardless of age or level of education (Edwards et.al. 1983b:6-7). Edwards et. al. (1983b:4-10) bases his findings on data emanating from a sample undertaken in and around the University of Zululand, the findings and results of which is tabulated as follows:

Reactions to illness

	Group A (#)	Group B (#)	Group C (#)
Traditional/ Cultural reactions (-)	3 (7%)	6 (11%)	11 (13%)
Modern medically orientated reactions (-)	30 (73%)	33 (60%)	38 (45%)
Combined traditional/ modern reactions (-)	8 (20%)	16 (29%)	35 (42%)

(#)   **Group A** -   Non-psychology students at the University of Zululand. Psychology students were excluded as they might furnish biased answers on account of their knowledge of psychology (Number of respondents = 42).

Group B -   Urban residents of Esikhawheni township, some 5 Km from the University of Zululand (Number of respondents = 55).

Group C -   Rural residents in the kwa Dlangezwa and Ngoya areas adjacent to the University of Zululand (Number of respondents = 86).

(Total number of respondents in sample = 183).

(-)   **Traditional/ cultural reactions**   -   ie: ancestral rituals, consultation of an inyanga, isangoma or umthandazi, and visits to a muthi shop.

Modern medically orientated reactions   -   ie: visits to a modern Western-style doctor, hospital or clinic, registered chemist or patent medicine store.

Combined traditional/ modern reactions.   -   Any combinations of reactions in the above categories.

Rural / urban life history of sample

	Group A (#)	Group B (#)	Group C (#)
Subjects with mainly rural history	12 (29%)	35 (64%)	82 (95%)
Subjects with mainly urban history	30 (71%)	20 (36%)	4 (5%)

Age and education of sample

	Group A (#)	Group B (#)	Group C (#)
Average age	22.9	34.16	38.7
Average years of formal education	14.69	6.19	4.44

Traditional religious theories of mental illness

	Group A (#)	Group B (#)	Group C (#)
Some mental illnesses are brought about by the ancestors	27 (64%)	35 (64%)	65 (77%)
Mental illnesses are not brought about by the ancestors	15 (36%)	20 (36%)	19 (23%)

Magical theories of mental illness

	Group A (#)	Group B (#)	Group C (#)
Some mental illnesses are the result of sorcery	32 (69%)	45 (78%)	69 (82%)
Mental illnesses are not the result of sorcery	10 (31%)	10 (22%)	15 (18%)

(Source: Edwards et. al. 1983b:4-10).

Even though one could argue that the sample taken was small (only 183 persons in total), and that the University of Zululand and surrounding areas are not situated in a large metropolitan area such as Durban or Pietermaritzburg, hence raising questions about the level of Western-defined urban modernity of the respondents identified as urban in this sample, nevertheless the point remains that beliefs in and use of traditional African medicine does not necessarily decline, nor disappear as a result of age (for example many young people still adhere to these beliefs), nor level of education (for example even people undergoing university education after a lengthy primary and secondary education still adhere to beliefs in traditional medicine, and African traditional Cosmology - ancestors and witchcraft). By no means did these beliefs vanish completely as a result of modern - Westerncentric education. Furthermore, even though such traditional beliefs are still prevalent,

despite age or level of education, its not that modern Westerncentric medical care is rejected. Rather they are seen as capable of going hand-in-hand, indicating flexibility within their traditional beliefs to accommodate Western biomedical treatment and influences. Furthermore, even though one could speculate that the high prevalence of use of traditional medicine is as a result of the high costs and shortages of patent Western medicine (Dauskardt 1997:277-280), this does not explain the large number of respondents, especially among educated university students who linked disease either to the ancestors, or to sorcery (witchcraft).

Similar results to these, showing that an urban existence did not necessarily mean an end to traditional African medicine beliefs, but rather the emergence of a type of co-existence and fusion of traditional and modern medicine were also found by a survey carried out by Varga and Veale (1997:911-924) amongst 218 pregnant Zulu black women in Durban and surrounding areas, as regards their choice of neonatal care. Their research findings are tabulated as follows:

__Acceptability of mixing traditional and Western antenatal care regimens: rural vs. urban respondents (Sample size: 218 women)__:

	Rural	*Urban*	*Overall sample*
Yes	81.0%	93.0%	87.0%
No	19.0%	7.0%	13.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Reaction if told to stop using traditional antenatal medicine: rural vs urban respondents

	Rural	*Urban*	*Overall sample*
Yes	59.7%	57.2%	58.5%
No	36.8%	37.9%	37.3%
Don't know	3.5%	4.9%	4.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Most effective antenatal care regimen: rural versus urban respondents

	Rural	*Urban*	*Overall Sample*
Western	46.0%	27.0%	37.0%
Traditional	5.3%	10.7%	7.8%
Both types	36.3%	57.4%	46.4%
No opinion	12.4%	4.9%	8.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

What the discussion so far shows is that with the arrival of modern Western biomedicine, it was not as if the South African black population automatically rejected African traditional medicine; nor did people outright reject Western biomedicine either, in favour of traditional African medicine. Instead, from the above figures one can say that many urban black South Africans themselves make use of both systems simultaneously, and in fact they see them as not clashing, and as being complementary for the treatment of their illnesses. This opens the possibility of fusion or interconnectedness emerging between what is seemingly traditional and what is seemingly modern - Western in origin at least as regards medicine, and that the two systems can and do co-exist. In fact, as far as the users of such diverse medical services are concerned, again put, they see no clash between the two systems, and in fact they see

them as complementary; highlighting the fact that (their) traditional beliefs are flexible enough to accommodate Western modern biomedicine.

Finally, as regards the African urban population, one must also take note again of the presence and size of the muthi trade within the urban areas of South Africa, which was noted in chapter 3. In Annexure A and B, based on surveys carried out by Dauskardt (1990:277-280) and Williams, Balkwill and Witlowski (1997:378-380), the presence of outlets selling African traditional medicine (so-called *muthi* shops) on the Witwatersrand is noted, based on company registration and phone book analyses. What makes this important is that it is presumably African urban people themselves who buy the *muthi*. Dauskardt (1990:277-280) also notes that in 1986 approximately 10 000 *Inyangas* were in operation in Soweto. One could argue that if there was not an urban demand for the services of traditional healers and traditional medicine, neither would have been present in the urban areas, even if such healers are often consulted in conjunction with Western biomedical practitioners, and a large amount of the traditional medicine is taken in conjunction with patent pharmaceutical products.

4.3 *African traditional healers and their healing practices*

As was seen in chapter 3, there are various types of African traditional healers. Briefly, African traditional healers can be separated into the following categories: diviners (or Sangomas), the lixwele (powerful sorcerers), Inyangas (traditional herbalists), and the umpropheti (or faith healers).

This is however only a general classification. Often, for example, Sangomas can also be Inyangas, and an AIC "Prophet" can also be a Sangoma (Mills 1983:6; Freeman and Motsei 1992:1183-1184). As noted above, illnesses that traditional healers treat, regardless of their classification, using traditional herbal *muthi* and African Cosmology are natural and supranatural in origin. One traditional healer, "Doctor" K.S. Sankala, a member of the African National Healers' Association is for example practising as "an astrologer - herbalist - healer" from an office in Germiston CBD. In a flyer promoting his practice, he promises prospective patients help for the following conditions - reflecting natural and supranatural causation (see Annexure B):

"1 Insanity, 2 Diarrhoea, 3 Bewitched people, 4 One with bad luck, 5 Mens' penis which cannot erect powerfully, 6 Woman with pregnancy problems, 7 Vomiting all the time, 8 Asthma, 9 Women who cannot reproduce, 10 Gonorrhoea, 11 Lack of strength in the body, 12 To be liked at work, 13 Prevent thieves from attacking homes, shops and cars, 14 Education, 15 Promotion, 16 Stress, 17 Diabetes, 18 Customers' attraction, 19

Court Cases, 20 Tuberculosis, 21 Demands for debt repayment, 22 Removal of misunderstandings with anybody, 23 To bring back a lost lover, 24 Cancer, 25, Misfortunes, 26, Swollen body, etc." What must be noted from this description of diseases for which a traditional herbalist can assist is the fact that not all these diseases are "traditional" in origin. Asthma, gonorrhoea, stress, diabetes, tuberculosis and cancer are diseases identified as such under Western biomedicine. These are not traditionally African diseases; yet these diseases are recognized by African traditional healers, and herbal cures for them are found and prescribed by traditional healers. In this respect its interesting to note that a comparison of Zulu muthi as used at the end of the 19th century, and the current era shows differences both in terms of the muthi used, and the type of diseases treated, in that muthi is also used for treatment of diseases such as high blood pressure, a disease that was unheard of in the past as far as traditional African medicine is concerned (Jolles and Jolles 2000:235-237).

More recently, Sangomas and Nyangas have been trying to look for cures for HIV/ Aids. Munk (1996:7-12) notes that some Sangomas are even linking the disease to a continuation of certain diseases which affected especially Zulu warriors and their partners. Yet whilst African traditional medicine and its cures have moved on from the past, certain aspects of it has not changed, particularly as regards diseases with supernatural causation. In the above example, bewitchment, bad luck, being disliked at work, protection of one's property (with _muthi_) from theft are all conditions for which help is promised by the traditional healer concerned. These are conditions

reflecting problems which African urban people experience everyday in their urban existence, and for which traditional medicine has found a use.

4.4   *Traditional healing - its interrelationship with modern Western biomedicine*

Despite the important fact that Western biomedicine is more empirical in its approach, whilst traditional African medicine accepts more supranatural, strictly speaking less-empirical approaches in its diagnosis of and explanations for disease (Mills 1983:1-2); nevertheless a certain interconnectedness, or fusion as I would like to call it in this thesis between these traditional and modern approaches is coming about.

And for such interconnectedness to come about, and for traditional medicine to be seen as being truly flexible to accommodate modern biomedical diagnosis and treatment methods within traditional medical diagnosis and treatment patterns, it is also important to take note of the practitioners of traditional African medicine, especially with regard to their mode of operation, their belief system, and whether they, within their belief systems and mode of operation, are willing to be wanting to openly accept Western biomedical influences, and integrate these modern - Western-originating influences within their belief systems and the way they practice traditional medicine.

Even though I was not able to find figures to prove this point as

regards traditional healers, apart from the above figures regarding the popular use of traditional medicine, nevertheless research from a number of authors, particularly Fenyves (1994) in which traditional medical practitioners were interviewed and their modes of operation were investigated, show that traditional medicine as practised by them is open to, and does not necessarily reject influences coming from Western biomedicine (Fenyves 1994:47-82; 114-117; Bodibe 1988:78-81). In fact, not only do these practitioners see the two systems as not necessarily clashing, but as being able to co-exist and co-operate. Furthermore, many South African traditional practitioners have expressed a desire to learn more about Western biomedicine and its treatment methods and medicines, which traditional medical practitioners themselves find to be superior to traditional medical practice in various ways; and because of that they want to integrate various aspects of Western biomedicine in their own belief systems and treatment methods (Fenyves 1994:47-82; 114-117; Bodibe 1988:78-81). This also applies to the use of modern management systems for the handling of administrative matters within traditional healers' practices. In this respect it is interesting to note that many traditional healers' offices look similar to the offices of Western biomedical practitioners - with chairs in the waiting room, computers, modern filing systems for patient records, and in the case of many practitioners membership of different professional healers' associations and the codes of conduct these associations prescribe (see Annexure B). Traditional healers themselves even wear stethoscopes around their necks, wear white medical coats, write out prescriptions (for *Inyanga*'s - traditional herbalists) on their own letterheads, and now also claim from many

of their patients' medical aid funds for their services. They drive around in expensive cars and live in expensive houses. This is all a far cry from traditional healers wearing traditional attire, practising their craft from a hut, yet it operates along the same principles as its rural predecessors, using the same belief system - yet now its within an urban environment, taking in influences from Western biomedicine professionals, with whom African traditional healers desire to make contact with, and operate with on a referral basis (Fenyves 1994:47-82; 114-117).

The point of this discussion of traditional African medicine in urban South Africa is to show not only that it has survived into an urban society (urban society seen as the height of modernity as defined by modernization theorists in the 1950s and early 1960s, and before them writers from the 17th and 18th century period of Enlightenment), but its also used by African peoples themselves as a way of dealing with their urban existence, and the day-to-day problems they encounter within their urban existence. This discussion has also shown that tradition as espoused in traditional African medicine is not a rigid, inflexible, unyielding entity, as there is evidence that traditional African medicine is flexible as regards its relationship towards other influences, in that it has drawn from modern Western biomedicine in many ways, and practitioners of traditional African medicine in fact recognize the advantages of, and desire co-operation and learning from, Western biomedicine.

4.5 *Regarding integration between modern Western biomedicine and traditional African healing*

As regards this important topic, one final note. Much of the literature, for example Fenyves (1994:47-82; 114-117), apart from seeing this flexibility on the part of tradition as regards modern Western biomedical influences, nevertheless has a tendency to, almost uncritically, support increased co-operation between Western biomedicine and traditional African medicine, at least partially based on the willingness of traditional African healers to learn from Western biomedicine. Yet, even though some form of co-operation between the two medical belief and practice systems could be desirable (for example some traditional herbs do form the basis of modern patented pharmaceuticals [Agonjo-Okawe 1980:44-58]), I do think that great circumspection and care should be taken in this process. Green (1994:33-37) summarizes and points out important advantages of such integration or collaboration between these two forms of medicine:

As regards points in favour of collaboration between traditional medicine (TM) and traditional healing (TH), Green (1994:33-37) points to the following:

 —   Whatever biomedical health professionals think of traditional medicine, it is largely to traditional healers that people turn to in time of illness. Traditional healers are respected health care providers in their communities.

 —   National health services in developing countries, including South Africa, lack adequate numbers of personnel, with most

doctors being in the cities, hence there's a poor rural outreach of medicinal personnel.

— Traditional healers provide client-centred personalized health care that's culturally appropriate, holistic and tailored to meet the needs and expectations of the patient. Traditional African medicine shares the cognitive understandings and cultural values of those they treat.

— If traditional healers engage in harmful practices, there's a public health responsibility to try to change those practices for safer substitute practices. This can only be accomplished if there's dialogue and co-operation with traditional healers. There's also evidence that healers will modify or abandon practices if they are shown that such practices are harmful.

— At the local or village level, traditional healers do not compete directly with physicians, but with village level workers or assistant nurses, whose training and competence may well amount to less than the traditional healer. The traditional healer also enjoys greater prestige and credibility in health and spiritual matters.

— Traditional healing occupies a critically important role in African societies. Healers perform a function that's broader and more complex than that of their medical counterparts in the modern sector. Traditional healers are priests, religious ritual specialists, family and community therapists, moral and social philosophers, teachers, missionaries, empirical scientists, and political leaders in addition to being healers in the more restricted, Western sense. Their existence and durability signify that they meet important social needs, and

these needs are in no way diminished as the clients they serve urbanize and undergo rapid sociocultural change. If anything, the needs increase. Rapid sociocultural change has been shown to lead to a variety of psychosocial problems, and healers who have experienced these problems themselves may be especially adept at helping people who are torn by the conflicting expectations of their changing worlds.

– Experience in Africa has shown that traditional healers are highly motivated to learn about Western medicine, to attend training workshops, and to cooperate with modern health sector personnel. Thus traditional medical systems are open, not closed, to techniques and concepts characteristic of cosmopolitan, Western medicine.

– Since healers have been organizing themselves in recent years, governments and the donor organizations can now communicate with healer organizations through professional associations of traditional healers. Healers that belong to these associations are especially open to new ideas and practices.

– Any efforts towards co-operation seem to improve relations between the two health sectors, which result in earlier and more frequent referrals from traditional healers to clinics.

– Any efforts that promote co-operation between the two health sectors, result in more creative, culturally appropriate and effective health education strategies.

– An efficient, cost-effective training of trainers approach is possible by focusing public health training efforts on leaders.

Their members are especially open to new ideas. A great opportunity now exists for adding public health ideas and methods into the traditional curriculum of healer training. (Green 1994:33-37).

Yet Green (1994:33-37) also points out to certain medically-related problems as seen from a Western biomedical outlook onto traditional African medicine, resulting from the practices of certain traditional African healers and the types of herbal medicines they use:

- Some traditional practices are harmful (eg: giving enemas for child diarrhoea; or making incisions with unsterilized razors).

- Traditional treatment may be ineffective and prevents/ delays patients from getting appropriate treatment.

- Some Africans charge that outsiders advocate a double standard of health care, with second class medicines for rural masses while Western medicines are reserved for urban elite.

- Many of those who favour collaboration with African healers have a pessimistic, defeatist attitude that the masses cannot be educated to change their tradition-bound thinking and behaviour. They are said to advocate giving up on the problems of modern sector health manpower and service delivery.

- Traditional healing is a hindrance to progress, development and enlightenment as it impedes acceptance of scientific thinking and perpetuates magical thinking.

- Traditional medicine and its practitioners reinforce and perpetuate superstitions and belief in witchcraft, along with

unnecessary fears and anxieties - causing reprisals against the innocent victims of such accusations (ie: witch-hunts).

– Patients may undergo traditional and modern treatment simultaneously, posing risks of overdosing or at least counteracting the effects of Western medicine.

– Traditional medical thinking and behaviour holds little or no place for error. Healers must project and protect their image of omnipotence, and therefore make exaggerated and unrealistic claims. Healers seldom admit failure or an inability to understand or treat any problem.

– Dosages of herbal medicines are seldom standardized. Such medicines may be of widely varying potencies due to differences in storage and other factors.

– Traditional psychotherapy does not increase patients' self-awareness or lead to personality maturation, as it often blames problems on other people (who for example bewitch the patient, and are thus seen to be the guilty party, not the bewitched patient).

– Extending recognition to traditional healers and initiating any kind of collaboration or training raises expectations and demands among healers. Its a kind of Pandora's Box. Today its oral rehydration salts, tomorrow its antibiotics, and a wing of the government hospital. At the very least demand to participate in government sponsored training sessions will outstrip governments' willingness to provide training. Since the government and local medical associations are not prepared to go very far, does it make sense to go down the collaboration path at all?

– Extending recognition and initiating any sort of collaboration also extends at least tacit legitimacy and a measure of government approval to traditional healing practitioners - which doctors and nurses by their training generally do not approve of and do not want to legitimize. Collaboration may also increase patient confidence in traditional healers, causing patients to make even more useless expenditure on ineffective medicines and therapies.

– One reason modern medicine seems to be losing in its competition with traditional medicine is that patients often consult traditional healers first. By the time the healer or patient gives up on traditional therapies, the patient may be beyond help.

– Traditional healers tend to be nonliterate and therefore do not keep writtten patient records, making collaboration difficult. Traditional healers who join professional associations may be better educated, hence they could get around this problem, but many traditional healers who join such associations, according to skeptics are more likely to lack traditional legitimacy in their communities. Others assert that traditional healers' competitiveness prevents their associations from functioning effectively.

– There are some priority areas of promotive health care that African healers, by their training, beliefs and orientation, could never promote, eg: child spacing or contraception. This is due to beliefs regarding having as many children as possible (Green 1994:33-37).

F.B.   P.T.O.

To me, it would be unwise to merely integrate the systems without taking note of these problems. Instead, they will have to be dealt with. Possible solutions will not be dealt with in this thesis. Instead, more research on these issues should be undertaken as regards the bridging of these problems, and the proposed solutions will have to stand the test of critical analysis coming from experts with a medical-scientific background. In summary, this discussion of traditional African medicine in urban South Africa has shown that urbanization has not led to the demise of support for traditional medicine; rather support for traditional African medicine has continued through to today. Why? It is postulated here that an important reason why traditional African medicine has remained relevant in urban South Africans' lives is because it has flexibly positioned itself, and the African Cosmological beliefs on which it is based, to deal with peoples' current everyday problems. Furthermore, traditional African medicine and its practitioners have flexibly adopted within their own medicinal and management practices, many aspects of modern Western biomedicine. In many respects African urbanites and traditional African medical practitioners not seeing any clash, but rather complementarity (or fusion) between the two forms of medicine.

Finally, on the issue of complementarity and integration between the two forms of medicine, both positive and negative points which have to be considered on this issue, have been pointed out.

4.6 *The Hostel War as a manifestation of tradition in an urban environment*

The latter part of this chapter will deal with the Hostel War which raged between hostel and township communities on the Witwatersrand from 1990 to the eve of the 1994 elections. To me, the Hostel War is an important dimension to the major topic covered in this thesis, namely the urban manifestation of the tradition/ modernity interaction amongst black South Africans because of the fact that within the Hostel War and the dead, injured and maimed which resulted from it, perpetrators emerging both on the hostel and the township side of the violence, various manifestations of tradition can be ascertained, within an urban environment. Furthermore, what is interesting to note within this discussion of various manifestations of tradition in an urban environment is the changing nature of tradition for, whilst keeping certain important linkages with the past, tradition shows within this example how it is able to re-generate itself in various guises, to serve an important role in this very urban example of group formation, group identification and reactions to other groupings. This chapter will cover this topic in the following way:

1   We will first look at the history of hostels in South Africa. Here, special note will be taken of the fact that the hostel system and the migrant labour system it is closely linked to, is a product of British Indirect rule, a system that tended to heighten tradition and tribal awareness, and strengthen the traditional power of the chiefs (Mamdani 1996:218-263).

The point will be made here that hostels in South African

urban areas acted as the urban extension of the rural-based Indirect Rule system in various ways, contributing to the Zulu tribal awareness of Inkatha-supporting hostel dwellers on the Reef in the early 1990s, and as such colonial policy must carry at least part of the blame for the Hostel War (Mamdani 1996:218-263).

2   After the above sketch of the background to the hostel system, and how it contributed to tribalism, other reasons which also aided in re-awakening these problems in the 1980s and 1990s, some of which (eg: political factors) have sparked off the violence, will be looked at (Segal 1992:190-231; Minnaar 1993:10-35).

3   Based on the above two points, an important focus will be placed on the flexibility of tradition in providing a framework to hostel and township residents alike, to regard and treat each other largely in terms of an insider versus outsider or community versus communal outsider dynamic (Turaki 1999:132-133) which found expression in an ethnic (Zulu/ Xhosa) rivalry (especially amongst hostel residents), as well as a more ideologically-based rivalry, even within an urban township environment. The point will also be made that although Inkatha Freedom Party-supporting Zulu hostel dwellers were engaged in this process, and were thus responsible for much of the violence; they were not alone in doing so in that township and squatter camp dwellers surrounding the hostels were also engaged in similar

processes. So they themselves must also carry much of the blame for the violence and the provocation of the violence, together with the above-mentioned hostel-dwellers and colonial and Apartheid administration and labour policy.

Here I will point out to certain shortcomings of blaming the Hostel War exclusively on Indirect Rule, the Bantu Administration system and the migrant labour systems, opting instead for an explanation that takes into account the fact that an urban existence can give birth to new types of group formation in the urban areas with new expressions and versions of the same traditional insider versus outsider dynamic that is found in the rural areas, within tradition; bringing about a re-manifestation of old tribally-based forms of group formation, and an interesting interaction and rivalry between old forms and new forms of group identity - representing hostel and township groupings respectively; yet functioning off the same insider-outsider dynamic, as manifested in the Hostel War.

Through the above three points, I would like to position the Hostel War as a result of the interaction of the above points, briefly summarized as follows:

- Colonial Indirect Rule policies, continued under Apartheid, which contributed to the deepening of ethnic rivalries between hostel and township residents, from the side of the hostel dwellers, and which contributed to the creation of two disparate and opposing groupings: hostel-dwellers and township residents.

-       A number of factors, emerging in the 1980s and early 1990s, which led to a re-awakening of these splits already exaccerbated by colonial Indirect Rule.

-       Similar, yet different processes of group identification, group formation and identification of insiders and enemies, within an urban context, as found in similar tribal processes based in the rural areas.   In other words, township residents themselves have evolved institutions to serve their needs which, although not always necessarily working on the membership criteria of ethnicity, nevertheless contain many of the principles and modes of operation found in traditional ethnic and tribal groupings - such as loyalty to a defined community of insiders;   and the insider versus outsider identification and inter-relationship traditionally found in African societies.

4.6.1 *The hostel system - its basis in colonial Indirect Rule, its application in hostels, and its contribution to the Hostel War*

Much literature concentrates on the disruption caused by colonialism on traditional African culture, based on a view that colonialism represented a break from the past, a disruption and destruction of the tradition that reigned in Africa until the arrival and spread of colonialism. Much of Africa's current problems are blamed on this break from the past; and a return to the past is thus advocated by many as the road forward for Africa (Adande 1990:23-28).

Despite this however, colonial administrators - British, French and Portuguese, found ways of incorporating the past by way of traditional tribal institutions within colonial governing structures. Generally, this was done at the local level of government, as a way of lessening the cost of setting up and maintaining colonial administrations particularly in the vast rural expanses of Africa. Of all the colonial administrations however, it was the British colonial administrators in particular who implemented this system of rule by the chiefs with most vigour, particularly in the rural areas, even though in the process many groupings were integrated into so-called tribes by colonial administrators, whilst often people with little or no traditional chiefly legitimacy became appointed tribal chiefs by colonial administrators merely on the basis of being seen as being friendly loyal natives towards the colonial masters (Geschiere 1996:310-318). This system of colonial rule through the institution of tribal chiefdom, was given the name of Indirect Rule. The

practical application of Indirect Rule, according to Mamdani (1996:16-21) led to the formation of a type of legal dualism, in that the colonial state contained a duality: two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority, thus forming what he calls the "Bifurcated state". In the urban areas, according to Mamdani, modern laws with a racial demarcation of rights prevailed and ruled over Africans. In the rural areas, customarily organized tribal authority prevailed under the leadership of colonially-appointed chiefs, under the auspices of the colonial administration; making this a deracialized but decentralized form of despotism over Africans. "In sum, the world of the 'savages' is barricaded, in deed and in word, from the world of the 'civilized'". (Mamdani 1996:16-21; 61).

South Africa, due to its past as a British colonial possession, underwent a similar process of Indirect Rule, seen as a means of stabilizing colonial rule over an overwhelmingly native population within South Africa, as was the case in other British colonial possessions elsewhere on the continent. Thus according to Van Kessel and Van Oomen (1997:561), thanks to Indirect Rule and the Apartheid system, traditional chiefs control 17% of South Africa's territory; ruling over 17 million subjects, representing about 40% of South Africans. Contained at the beginning of Mamdani's work (Mamdani 1996:3-7) are a number of quotes from the eminent South African politician, Jan Smuts who, like British administrators elsewhere on the continent, as regards the "native question", saw the African as "a good soul", "like a child" in his own words. The African was perceived to be different to the European, with a

different outlook in life. Hence to develop the Africans what was needed according to Smuts was not a policy that would "de-Africanize the African and turn him either into a beast of the field or into a pseudo-European", but rather a policy that would respect the general tribal nature of the African. In this respect, as the South African economy became more industrialized, particularly after World War II, the "colour question" emerged in the urban areas, as Africans who migrated from the rural areas into the urban areas were seen by politicians and administrators alike as being engaged in all kinds of social ills due to the fact that being in the city they were de-tribalized, out of the disciplinary control of the rural tribe and tribal chief (Mamdani 1996:3-7; Posel 1994:12-14).

It was thus seen as important, both in terms of native policy under colonial rule, and after 1948 Bantu administration within the Apartheid policy, that Africans were to be governed in such a way that, whilst contributing labour to the industrial and mining expansion of the South African economy within the urban areas, they would not break the important rural tribal link needed to keep discipline. Thus, black workers were seen as being only temporary residents in the urban areas whilst working in the mines and factories. After the termination of their contracts, they would be sent back to the rural areas, under the control of their government-recognized or appointed tribal chief. The aim of this system, as mentioned above, was the prevention of the supposed ill-discipline and moral degradation that was seen as associated with urbanization, that was seen as being best prevented by not allowing Africans to become permanent urbanites, but only temporary urban residents who, by returning to

the rural areas periodically, and after serving out their contracts, would maintain their rural tribal links under their tribal chiefs. In so doing, whilst providing cheap labour in the urban areas, they would remain in the rural areas, and they would not fall for the evil temptations of urban life, and thus fall into what was perceived as moral decay seen as a problem associated with the move away from tradition, seen as inherent within urbanization (Mamdani 1996:3-8).

Within the urban areas, black labourers were thus seen only as temporary migrants to the city, and the hostel system of temporary accommodation for their sojourn in the urban areas was designed with this temporary nature of their urban stay in mind, with only really a bed and a very small space for personal effects being awarded to each migrant in the hostel - indeed "A Bed Called Home", as Ramphele's book on the hostels in Cape Town is entitled. Yet by 1948, when the National Party came to power and used hostels as part of its Apartheid policy, hostels were not a new invention. In fact by that time, migrant labour had been part of the South African economy for many years.

According to Wentzel (1993:1-2) by the 1860s farmers in the Western Cape solved their periodic labour shortages with contract workers from the present-day areas of Ciskei, Transkei, Namibia and Mozambique. However the discovery and mining of diamonds in the Kimberley area in the late 1860s created a great demand for labour. By 1874 there were approximately 10 000 black mineworkers on the Kimberley mines of whom most were migrant workers who would periodically work on the mines for periods of

three to six months. Initially, housing for the black labourers was provided by the mining companies, enabling workers to come and go freely. But rampant diamond smuggling and drunkenness led to the mining companies opting for closed compounds - the concept interestingly being originally used to house prisoner-workers used on the Kimberley mines, to prevent communication between mineworkers and the outside world (Wentzel 1993:1-2).

With the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886, there was a renewed, even greater demand for cheap labour, for which the compound or hostel system was proven to be well-suited. Yet there was an important difference from the Kimberley hostels. As a means of keeping control, security and discipline amongst the workers in the urban hostels, the mine companies had created within the hostel system a hierarchical, somewhat paternalistic control system which to an extent re-created the rural tribal system and the sense of discipline which was seen as resulting from it. Thus although off-shift workers could leave the compounds (so-called open compounds), this movement of people (also underground in the mines) was monitored by black compound police (later on also called Black Jacks). The chief black constable was given the traditional tribal title of _Induna_, and he was answerable to the white hostel manager. This control system, originating as it did in the late 19th century, suited well the needs of colonial administrators, and later on Apartheid policy-makers, in that it separated and isolated hostel-dwellers from township residents, thus subordinating hostel dwellers to a regime of Indirect Rule and the discipline this would supposedly give these workers (Wentzel 1993:2-3; Mamdani

1996:220-222; 260-263).

As such therefore, hostels and the hostel system served as the urban extension of the rural-based Indirect Rule system into an urban mining and industrial environment, originally designed and implemented as Indirect Rule originally was meant to be for the colonial governance of rural areas (Mamdani 1996:220-222; 260-263).

Mamdani (1996:260-263) also notes that the general result of this emphasis put on tradition in the rural areas under colonial administration, seen especially after African independence, was an emphasis put on tribalism by Africans themselves before and after independence. Since Indirect Rule operated through the institution of the tribe, and an exaggerated emphasis on tribalism, based on colonial government policy in this regard; the result was that Indirect Rule became a major contributing factor to a post-colonial emphasis on the tribe and tribalism by African people themselves, and the social and political problems this caused (Mamdani 1996:260-263).

As regards South Africa and urban hostels, the result of policies aimed at re-creating the essence of Indirect Rule within these hostels was the exacerbation of tribalism and group formation amongst its inhabitants - the general effect of Indirect Rule. This was brought about by the somewhat reclusive nature of hostels _vis-a-vis_ surrounding townships, resulting from this emphasis on keeping hostels enclaved from surrounding townships, which created a tense relationship with the surrounding townships (Mamdani

1996:260-263). This was a negative relationship to which a number of factors emerging in the 1980s contributed to and further deepened.

And it was this excessive colonial emphasis on tradition and tribalism within the hostels, as an extension of Indirect Rule in the rural areas, which served as the background to a situation in which urban hostel dwellers, championing the cause of tradition and the rights of tribal chiefs (in the rural areas), resorted to violence against neighbouring communities in the 1990s that they perceived to be hostile towards them and their cause (Mamdani 1996:260-263). The so-called "rural tribal chief" Mamdani talks about is Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and the cause is that of the protection of various Zulu rights as defined by Buthelezi and his Inkatha movement (Berkeley 1996:74-75; Dlamini 1998:473-497).

This discussion so far shows that tradition need not always only be an organic, self-generating and self-perpetuating force; but it can be further artificially stimulated - further helped along - even within an urban environment by inter-alia government policies (for example the Apartheid system) originally designated for use in the rural areas, thus strengthening the effect of tradition further into the future not only in the rural areas (where Indirect Rule with its accentuation of rurality and tradition was originally supposed to work), but also in the urban areas.

Now that we have dealt with the background and rationale behind the hostel system, we will now see how a number of other factors have also emerged and manifested themselves, particularly in the

1980s and early 1990s, contributing to re-awaken this slumbering, yet present fault line of ethnic and group formation, now within an urban environment, as manifested in the Hostel War, to which we will now refer in the next section.

4.6.2 _Factors that further contributed to violent conflict on the Reef in the early 1990s_

The above discussion which linked the hostel system to colonial Indirect Rule policies, and the exaggerated sense of tribalism and rurality it brought about, forms an important element which must be joined to the following discussion of other factors which emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s that contributed to trigger the Hostel War.

The initial, ironic thing that must be noted about the Hostel War, particularly on the East Rand where it raged however, is the fact that just a few years earlier, in the early to mid- 1980s, East Rand hostel dwellers, particularly those employed in the mining and steel industry, were joining the emerging ANC-aligned Cosatu trade union movement. These workers had taken part in the trade union movement-organized strikes, involving people from various, often traditionally belligerent ethnic groupings: Sotho, Xhosa, Zulu, and so on. By 1990, hostel dwellers in support of the cause of so-called "Zuluness" (Dlamini 1998:473-497) and surrounding township residents were killing each other off. In 1990 alone, 2271 people were killed in the violence; of which 1274 came from the townships surrounding the hostels (Sitas 1996:235). Why did things change so drastically and so quickly?

A number of developments in the 1980s and early 1990s have worsened the tension already present within hostels and between hostels and surrounding townships, already created by the type of colonial Indirect Rule based policies implemented. These other developments which deepened the existing splits already present within and between hostel and township society can, for the sake of convenience, be summarised into four broad categories (Segal 1992:204):

- Changes in the style and operation of the union movement;

- At least partially linked to the above, there were new political developments which likewise further isolated hostel dwellers from surrounding communities;

- Changes in the ethnic make-up of the hostels in the 1970s and 1980s, and

- The abolition of Influx Control, which likewise led to a new period of crisis in hostel life.

We will now investigate each of the above general points in more detail.

4.6.2.1   *Changes in the style and operation of the trade union movement, and the effects of the strikes in the early 1980s*

We will start here with the issue of trade union membership amongst East Rand hostel residents. Changes in the style and operation of trade unions, which made hostel residents feel that the trade unions (Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU] affiliated) were only concerned with their work environment and were not concerned

with bettering life in the hostels, alienated a number of hostel-dwelling trade union members (Segal 1992:202-206). Furthermore, as a result of the strikes, industrial action and unionization movement of the early 1980s on the East Rand, employers began to hire more Zulu migrant labourers. Seen as more rural and traditional, and thus not having been spoilt by an urban existence, they were seen as less troublesome and less prone to unionize and to strike. Coming from the rural areas of Kwa-Zulu Natal, their presence on the East Rand further increased Zulu presence in the East Rand hostels, where the violence broke out in the early 1990s (Elder 1995:97-119).

4.6.2.2 *Political factors which led to further tension between hostel dwellers and township residents*

The hostel dwellers' feelings of alienation from the unions described above were mirrored by their sense of alienation from urban politics. In the 1930s, 40s, 50s and 60s, the ANC itself used tribal, including Zulu, chiefs and traditional tribal imagery and identity as a campaigning and support-gathering tool in Kwa-Zulu Natal (Dlamini 1998:275-283; Van Kessel and Oomen 1997:561-565; Mare 2000:63-69). In contrast to the above, the politics of the early 1980s was a largely different, urban-centred affair, led by ANC-aligned organizations concentrating on town councillors, black local authorities and other issues relating to so-called "permanent urban residents" under the Apartheid system. This urban focus however shifted aside hostel dwellers and their concerns, regarding badly maintained and serviced hostels and rural politics. Hostel residents

also largely did not want to join township residents' rent boycotts organized largely by ANC-aligned civics, and they also did not want to join the stayaways from work, also largely run by township-based ANC-aligned civics , because they wanted to go to work. These refusals by hostel-dwellers often led to intimidation and harassment of hostel-dwellers by ANC-supporting township youths belonging to the township Civics organizations (Segal 1992:206-208).

In 1990, with the scrapping of the State of Emergency, the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and the general freer environment for campaigning in the townships that this was the result of, the Inkatha cultural Zulu movement became a political party called the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and began campaigning for political support in the townships. Of particular interest for the IFP of course were many of the hostels on the Witwatersrand, due to the presence in many of these hostels, of a large number of Zulu migrant workers. Because of the non-violent stance taken by Chief Buthelezi as regards opposition to the Apartheid government in 1975, and his rejection of especially economic sanctions against South Africa in the mid-1980s, as well as the fact that Inkatha and ANC-aligned supporters and chiefs were fighting each other in Kwa-Zulu Natal since the mid-1980s, there was political tension, with a number of pro-ANC organizations such as the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) declaring Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha as "Enemies of the People", leading to attacks on many Inkatha officials in the townships of what was then the Transvaal province. These attacks, as well as harassment and intimidation of Inkatha supporters by

F.B.   P.T.O.

township dwellers on their way to rallies of the IFP, on 22 July 1990, and subsequent reprisals that afternoon are in fact seen as having sparked off the Hostel War, in Sebokeng township, near Vereeniging; the fighting quickly spreading to other Zulu-dominated hostels on the Reef (Minnaar 1993:10-11). The Hostel War is being seen as the urban extension of fighting between ANC and Inkatha supporters in the Kwa-Zulu Natal Midlands already raging since the mid-1980s; even though to a certain extent the ex Nationalist government did involve itself in the conflict by means of various examples of support for Inkatha.

4.6.2.3   *Changes in the ethnic make-up of the hostels in the 1970s and 1980s*

Tensions between hostel and township residents also worsened as a result of changes in the ethnic make-up of hostels in the 1970s and 1980s. During the late 1970s and onwards, due to a number of South Africa's neighbouring states gaining independence, the number of migrant workers hired from outside South Africa dwindled, and recruiting became concentrated again in traditional recruiting areas such as the former Transkei (especially Pondoland), Ciskei and the Kwa-Zulu areas of what is known today as Kwa-Zulu Natal. However as a result of the great agricultural degradation in the Transkei in the 1970s and 1980s, many Transkeians found that they could no longer sustain themselves on the plot of agricultural land allocated to them by their chief. Many Transkeian (Xhosa and Pondo) workers thus began leaving Transkei for good, especially after the scrapping of Influx Control legislation in the mid-1980s,

bringing their wives and families with them. Furthermore, Minnaar (1993:25-26) states that after independence traditional leaders in the Transkei began to expropriate traditional communal land and turning it into private farms for themselves, forcing more people off their land and out of the former Transkei (Minnaar 1993:25-26).

As noted above, as a result of the strikes, industrial unrest and unionization movements on the East Rand in the early 1980s, many employers started recruiting rural Zulu workers from what is known today as Kwa-Zulu Natal, seeing them as more reliable and less likely to strike because of their stronger rural roots (Elder 1995:97-119). At the same time of the above-noted great migration of mostly ethnic Xhosa and Pondo workers onto the Witwatersrand in the 1980s, many ethnic Zulu workers thus also started coming in greater numbers to the Hostels. And after the scrapping of Influx Control in 1986, the younger family relatives of Zulu hostel dwellers also started coming to the hostels on the Reef in search of work, further cramping and overfilling already cramped and full hostels (Segal 1992:211).

4.6.2.4   *The abolition of Influx Control, which likewise led to a new period of crisis in hostel life*

The above-mentioned cramped conditions in hostels caused by increased migration from the rural areas, was made even more unpleasant by the slump in the efficacy of bureaucratic control in the hostels, which accompanied the scrapping of Influx Control (Segal 1992:211). This affected hostel dwellers' lives in many aspects from

a lack of security in the hostels, to perpetual lengthy cuts in water and electricity, and increasing dilapidation of hostel buildings due to lack of maintenance. In this respect one must also take note of the actions (or inactions) of the new black town councils that, since their formation in the early 1980s, did very little to ameliorate living conditions in the hostels.

Despite allocating large sums to upgrade the hostels, these funds often never arrived at their intended targets, drawing out the bureaucratic/ administrative vacuum surrounding the hostels, worsening the misery in which hostel residents were living in. By 1990, in the light of this administrative vacuum left behind by the end of Influx Control a few years earlier, control over many hostels rested _**de-facto**_ in the hands of hostel committees, many of which were dominated by, and were sympathetic to, the Inkatha movement (Minnaar 1993:26-27).

And these hostels, increasingly dominated by Inkatha-sympathetic Zulu hostel-dwellers' organizations, often became surrounded by ever-growing squatter camps such as Phola Park near Thokoza on the East Rand, themselves the product of the demise of Apartheid legislation such as Influx Control. These camps contained mostly people who for many years used to live in the back yards of properties in the townships; but increasingly also many Xhosa and Pondo migrants from the Eastern Cape who, in search of work in the urban areas, settled down permanently in these urban squatter camps together with their spouses and children. Hostels on the one side, and townships and squatter camps on the other side, came to

form two communities, already belligerent and tense towards each other because of the influences of colonial policies, followed by Apartheid policies, and the various above-mentioned developments in the 1980s. In the next sections, we will see how tradition manifested itself in the war which reigned between these two communities for about five years in the early 1990s.

4.6.3 Inkatha's use of Zulu tradition, and hostel dwellers' support of Inkatha and Zulu tradition

Above we saw the various long-term and shorter-term influences which led to the conflagration of violence in and around the hostels in the 1990s. Yet we have not yet fully and satisfactorily answered why it was exactly in the 1990s that these influences and tensions boilt over into great violence. Picking up from the section dealing with political influences in the early 1990s, some aspects need to be looked at in order to figure out why there was this violence at that particular time, and why Zulu tradition and allegiance to the IFP played such an important role within group formation in the hostels, and the violence carried out by Zulu-speaking IFP-aligned hostel dwellers onto surrounding township and squatter communities. In the next section however, the point will also be made that the same tradition that hostel dwellers are accused of can also be seen in the behaviour of township communities as well, and that therefore tradition can be seen in various forms and in various guises in the behaviour of both sides in the Hostel War towards each other. Based on this, the point will be made that he Hostel War showed not so much a clash between rural tradition amongst hostel dwellers

versus urban Western modernity amongst township residents; but rather the Hostel War represented a clash between old ethnic, rural-based forms of tradition (in terms of group formation, the identification and labelling of outsiders as enemies, and the motivation to protect the community - insiders - versus outside forces and influences), as exemplified by hostel dwellers, versus newer urban-based forms of the same traditional elements (again, in terms of group formation, the identification and labelling of outsiders as enemies, and the motivation to protect the community - insiders - versus outside forces and influences), as it evolved in the urban areas, in particular within township politics during the unrest of the 1980s.

For now within this section however we will concentrate on the hostels and hostel residents, the first part of this equation, by concentrating on how these traditional elements and dynamics operated within the hostels, amongst the hostel residents and the IFP, and their link to Zulu tradition, and why they linked themselves to Zulu tradition. To answer this however, the route I will take consists of posing two important inter-related questions.

1   Why did the hostel dwellers see the solution to their problems as lying within adherence to Zulu tradition? In other words why did Zulu hostel dwellers express their problems and frustrations about their urban problems along Zulu traditional lines?

2   Linked to the above question, what is the link between the IFP and Zulu tradition?

To answer these two questions however, the route I propose is to

invert the order of the questions, by answering the second question first, and the first question second.

Thus, what is the link between the IFP and Zulu tradition, and why did the IFP pursue the cause of Zulu tradition? It must first be noted, as was pointed out in chapter 2, that in Africa political parties are notorious for following ethnic agendas, and to interpret their agendas along lines which favour one ethnic group over another - and for voters to at least give tacit support to these practices by willingly voting for these politicians, as noted by Sithole (1985:189) in Zimbabwe, and as noted by Nugent (1999:287-319) in the general elections within Ghana in 1992 and 1996. One of the places on the continent where this process is best seen is Kenya (Ogachi 1999:83-105). The ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party was always known as a party which favoured the interests of the Kikuyu ethnic grouping of that country. And the African National agenda which that party always supported, as indicated within its name, although African Nationalist, it was done from a Kikuyu angle, and favoured the Kikuyu tribe. Jomo Kenyatta, the party's creator, ruler, and leader of Kenya was himself an ethnic Kikuyu (Ogachi 1999:83-105). Interestingly, as a reflection of its Kikuyu roots, KANU's predecessor was previously known as the Kikuyu African Union, also led by Jomo Kenyatta. During Kenyatta's rule, KANU was known to prefer and advantage Kikuyu ethnic interests.

After his death in 1978, a non-Kikuyu, Daniel Arap Moi, took over the reigns of power of the party. Moi was an ethnic Kalenjin. Before being a member of KANU, Moi held a senior position within the

F.B.   P.T.O.

Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) party, known to have been supported by non-Kikuyu groups living along Kenya's coast, who were afraid of Kikuyu hegemony at governmental level after independence in the mid-1960s. Despite these fears however, shortly after independence, the KADU leadership allowed itself and the KADU party to be co-opted into the KANU party.

After coming to the helm of the ruling KANU party in 1978 Daniel Arap Moi changed government policies in ways that would advantage Moi's Kalenjin tribe - *inter-alia* in resource allocation, education and civil service hirings, positions and policies which had previously favoured Kikuyus (Ogachi 1999:83-105). A more ominous version of political-tribal favouritism towards certain tribal interests however occurred in Rwanda in the few years preceding the infamous 1994 genocide. The ruling ethnic Hutu-dominated government, fearing victory by the ethnic Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels, carried out their electoral campaign in 1993 by means of stirring up Hutu ethnic fervour, jealousy towards, fear and hatred of the Tutsi population. And suspecting RPF involvement behind the killing of the then Hutu president of Rwanda, the Rwandan government capitalised on Hutu ethnic loyalties and called onto Hutus to kill Tutsis - leading to the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Hintjiens 1999:241-286).

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) did not take it to the extent of a genocide (even though some would call the role of IFP supporters in the Hostel War and the violence on the Natal Midlands in the 1980s to be reminiscent of the Rwanda genocide). Nevertheless,

ethnicity did play an important role in Inkatha's origins and politics. One must remember here that the IFP's predecessor was the Inkatha Zulu cultural movement. According to Dlamini (1998:475-483), the version of so-called "Zuluness" which Inkatha (originally formed in the 1920s) created and its current leader, Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi subscribed to and championed, mirrored certain traditional views of what a real Zulu and Zuluness entailed. This somewhat idealistic, rural-bound view of what Zuluness and being a Zulu meant subscribed to by the IFP, and the Inkatha Zulu cultural movement before it, was built around the following general criteria: History, language, birthplace and descent. As regards history, the Zulu nation was defined around the symbol of Shaka and his conquest of neighbouring tribes to form the Zulu nation, and support for what Shaka did. The Zulu language was another important point around which the Zulu nation was defined. People who were heard speaking a more pure form of Zulu, with a rural accent, were seen as being genuine Zulus. People who could trace and place their ancestry to the Zulu Kingdom before the British take-over of Zululand of 1879, were seen as being more real or true Zulus (Dlamini 1998:475-483).

Of course, it was politically expedient for Buthelezi and his social/ cultural, and later more political movement to root themselves around a certain form of Zulu tradition that in practice excluded many people who, although Zulu-speaking and seeing themselves as Zulu, nevertheless did not fully - or even partially - comply to the requirements of Zuluness as defined above. Yet this traditional, cultural basis did fit well with the tradition-based Indirect Rule

policies that formed the basis of Apartheid and the Bantustan (Homeland) system. And this was expedient for Buthelezi because the reliance on Zulu cultural symbolism - as defined above - gave Buthelezi and the Inkatha movement a political basis, especially in rural Kwa-Zulu (and served as the basis for the Kwa-Zulu homeland or Bantustan, of which Buthelezi was the leader in the 1980s).

Yet Buthelezi alone should not be blamed for this proverbial pandering to and abuse of tradition, because before the famous split between Buthelezi and the ANC as regards the nature of the anti-Apartheid Struggle prior to the 1976 riots (Buthelezi favoured non-violence whilst the ANC, then led by Oliver Tambo, preferred a violent Armed Struggle), and linked to it Buthelezi's participation in the homeland system; even the ANC, despite its somewhat urban-centred and modern image it portrays today, before 1976, itself made use of Zulu cultural symbols (in opposition to colonialism) largely as defined above, and traditional chiefs as a means of campaigning and gaining support in what is known today as Kwa-Zulu Natal (Mare 2000:63-69).

What is interesting to note about Buthelezi and the Inkatha movement however is that whilst keeping one foot in Zulu tradition as a means of gaining support in Kwa-Zulu, nevertheless, and despite the split with the ANC as regards strategy in 1975, Buthelezi at the same time kept a foot in the more Western-inspired and delineated modern African Nationalist discourse, himself supporting within the Inkatha movement an African Nationalist strain similar to the "Old ANC" as he put it, which he had claimed to represent

through his Zulu culture-centred Inkatha movement. After all, in essence the split with the ANC was not concerned as much with objective, but rather method (as mentioned above, Buthelezi preferred non-violence and change through participation within the homeland system; and in the 1980s he opposed the international disinvestment and sanctions campaigns against South Africa, called for by the ANC). Buthelezi and Inkatha, in brief, in its ideological discourse, claimed that it represented the "true" ANC, and that the ANC that existed during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was an impostor off-shoot that had outgrown the limited purpose, set for itself in the 1960s, said by Buthelezi to have been that of maintaining an exile presence for the banned internal movement, not a liberation movement engaged in an armed struggle. The Inkatha discourse, as explicated by Buthelezi, explained the socio-political situation, the "what exists", to a predominantly regional (Kwa-Zulu Natal) population. It also gave specific content to the "true" traditon of the "founding fathers" of the ANC (thus explainining "what is good"). Inkatha also interpreted history and its contents in such a way as to justify its own strategies of "negotiation politics" as it itemed it, and "working within the system" (explaining "what is possible" through its ideological call on people to rally behind the practical solutions offered by the internally-located movement), while simultaneously rejecting the ANC strategy of armed struggle and isolation of the Apartheid state as being impractical and doomed to failure because of the power of the Apartheid state to crush such violent confrontation ("What is possible") (Dlamini 1998:475-483; Mare 2000:63-69).

Hence, and this is the point of this description, Buthelezi was a politician that kept his feet both in the traditional world of Zulu politics - by emphasizing Zulu tradition and identity as defined above, and simultaneously linking it (and himself) to the modern world contained within the aims and objectives of African Nationalist politics (by claiming to represent a pre-banning version of the ANC - which conceivably would mean that he was a supporter of the aims and objectives of the Freedom Charter which, as we noted in chapter 2, is rooted within the Westerncentric assumptions of 1950s style modernization theory). He also pressed for the release from prison of Nelson Mandela, the leader of the ANC, and the scrapping first of Pass Laws, and then of Influx Control legislation (Mare 2000:63-69).

Now that we've learnt the link between Zulu tradition, Buthelezi and Inkatha, and the IFP, now for the second question: why did hostel dwellers adhere to tradition as the solution to their problems with surrounding township communities within the urban areas?   As noted above, Inkatha and Buthelezi managed to link themselves up to Zulu tradition, as narrowly as it might have been defined above. As noted in previous parts of this chapter, in the 1980s employers in the East Rand started to recruit more Zulu workers from the rural areas of Kwa-Zulu - the rural-based constituency of Inkatha, as counterweights to the trade union movement then emerging on the Reef. Being rural, they were seen as being less troublesome by employers. The Hostel system was a dehumanising system itself - "A Bed Called Home", far away from family and spouses (Ramphele 1993:1-55). This was made worse by worsening physical conditions

in the hostels and worsening relations between hostel dwellers (many of whom were Zulus from the rural areas of Kwa-Zulu), versus township residents, especially in the 1980s. Part of the problem as mentioned above lay in the vacuum left behind by the scrapping of Influx Control legislation in 1986 which led to a great increase of migration of Xhosa workers and their families from rural Transkei, to the cities. Many of these other Xhosa migrants would settle in squatter camps surrounding the hostels; which simply meant that many hostels became dominated by Zulu inmates, whilst often being almost surrounded by squatter camps containing a number of Xhosa and Pondo migrants, the latter being traditional rivals of the former and **_vice-versa_**.

At the same time, more Zulus from Kwa-Zulu would seek work in the urban areas, especially after the scrapping of Influx Control in the mid-1980s, and would settle with their relatives already in the hostels. Many of the Hostels were seen as Zulu enclaves by surrounding township and squatter camp communities; whilst the mostly Zulu inmates within many hostels - particularly on the East Rand where there was a great influx of Zulu workers from rural Kwa-Zulu in the 1980s - saw neighbouring township and squatter communities as being increasingly dominated by traditionally hostile Xhosas and Pondos (thanks to migrations of Xhosas and Pondos from the Transkei during the same time period). Under such conditions, Zulu hostel dwellers started seeing their problems and miseries as being linked to the Xhosa and Pondo-dominated townships. In this case its interesting to note that under such extreme conditions, tradition (what Ramphele calls selective

tradition) is often seen as a solution to these problems (Ramphele 1993:7-10). Degradation in the hostels in comparison to better infrastructure being built in surrounding townships was seen as pro-Xhosa (anti-Zulu) bias by the black authorities governing the townships and the hostels from the mid-1980s to 1994 (Minnaar 1993:25-27).

And constant intimidation of Zulu hostel dwellers by ANC-supporting township youths was seen by hostel-dwellers not only as disrespect towards the elders, but as a Xhosa ploy by township dwellers (the latter perceived as being mostly of Xhosa origin) against Zulu tradition (Minnaar 1993:25-27). After the ANC's unbanning in 1990, the intimidation continued. Because of the Xhosa ethnic background of many ANC leaders, and the fact that many of the youths and other township residents which intimidated and attacked township residents were ANC supporters, and many of them were of Xhosa and Pondo extraction, the ANC was in the eyes of Zulu hostel-dwellers almost interchangeably linked to the Xhosa tribe, and of serving Xhosa interests (Minnaar 1993:25-27).

As noted above, extreme (miserable) living conditions have a nasty tendency to let people reinvoke tradition (with the accompanying intolerance towards other groupings) - seen in the minds of these somewhat wretched people as a means of dealing with their miserable existence. Interestingly, there are similarities here to the point made by Franz Fanon (1990:40-46), who saw an excessive emphasis on tradition by colonized peoples (including beliefs in witchcraft and bewitchment) - and the black-on-black violence it

generates - as being a reaction to the current miserable physical and psychological conditions imposed onto peoples' lives by colonialism. As also noted above, the Inkatha movement, which later became the Inkatha Freedom Party marketed itself as, and was consequently seen as, the preserver and purveyor of the Zulu tradition (as tight and limiting as the IFP definition thereof may be), the Zulu tradition that the Zulu hostel dwellers saw as the basis of their survival against perceived hostile, pro-Xhosa, ANC supporting township communities; whilst possibly ignoring the above-mentioned African Nationalist strand which the IFP and Buthelezi shared with the ANC. To mobilise hostels, Inkatha leaders in the urban areas, and traditional authorities in the rural areas, were activated to get popular support behind their plight. Crucial in this process of group formation was the definition of the other - the outsider, in stereotyping of such others in the township as anti-migrant and as aiming to destroy hostels and hostel communities (ie: as enemies). Hierarchical authoritarian structures, kinship loyalties, and appeals to Zulu ethnic nationalism have played an important part in the political mobilization of hostel dwellers on the Reef. In such frenzied mobilisations the threat of action is often physical; large groups of men move and gather people, ask questions, chastise cowards, use all forms of symbolic capital available to them from rhetoric, Zulu customs and symbols, songs and chants, to weave together a new solidarity (a common solidarity being the basis of group formation). Those identified as cowards are chased out of the hostels, or they are killed (Sitas 1996:245-246).

The effects of the violence were disturbing: many hostels on the

Reef were turned into paramilitary barracks (reminiscent of Zulu military campaigns under Shaka), whose inhabitants were engaged in war with surrounding urban township and squatter camp communities. Whether or not Inkatha capitalised on, rarther than created the conflict, is still a controversial point. But that Inkatha was militarily strengthened by it is undisputable. These Zulus, as they were called by surrounding squatter and township communities, came to be seen by surrounding squatter camp and township communities as those who were at the source of their miseries and as being behind the massacres of township and squatter camp residents. As hostel-dwellers seen as enemies and cowards by fellow Zulu hostel dwellers fled the violence in the hostels to settle in squatter camps, open fields and other hostels, their places in the hostels were taken up by newly bused-in unemployed young men from Natal recruited by Zulu IFP-aligned warlords (Sitas 1996:245-246).

Hence it came to be that township communities (except for areas near the IFP-supporting hostels - which became IFP strongholds) largely supported the ANC, and Zulu hostel communities (and only in those hostels whose occupants were predominantly Zulu) supported the IFP. The latter perceived the IFP as representing the Zulu tradition which they perceived to be under threat by township residents. In so doing, traditional rivalries were not only used as a means to conceptualise and explain what lay behind hostel residents' daily miserable existences, but Zulu tradition and traditional rivalries against Pondos and Xhosas thus also accompanied current social and political divisions, within an urban

environment. As such traditional, old ethnically-based conceptions of stresses and tensions with other communities found a home within an urban environment. As such, this shows the strength and flexibility of tradition to form, conceptualize and give meaning to stresses and strains amongst urban communities, and particularly of more rural (ethnically/ tribally) based forms of such tradition to find a home within an urban environment.

4.6.4 *The manifestations of tradition in the Hostel War*

Now that we saw the various influences that raised rivalry between the two communities, we will now pick up on the above discussion and have a look at how tradition manifests itself within this belligerence, yet simultaneously changing itself to suit the current needs of this environment whilst maintaining an important link with the past, amongst both hostel dwellers and township dwellers.

Especially in the first part of this discussion of the Hostel War, the point was made that the violence of the Hostel War must be linked to an artificial emphasis on tradition and the tribe within hostels, which must be linked to attempts by first the Colonial government, and then the Apartheid government to prevent hostel-dwellers from permanently settling in the urban areas; by artificially trying to keep them in an isolated environment that would try and mimic and re-create their rural environment as much as possible (Mamdani 1996:218-263).

The general line taken by Mamdani, and others, therefore is that the

violence of the Hostel War is to be blamed on the rural nature of the hostel dwellers who, because they were not allowed to urbanize, they began to look at the urban environment surrounding the hostels along rural, tribal lines, and thus began to identify neighbouring squatter camp and township residents as Xhosa tribal enemies who because of their Xhosa ancestry, were hostile to hostel dwellers' Zulu cause (Sitas 1996:245-246). With this focus on the role of the hostels and hostel dwellers behind the violence, the violence is thus blamed on hostel residents supporting the IFP.

Yet whilst the above explanation elaborated on especially by Mamdani (1996) explains the role of Colonial and Apartheid policy in its focus on Zulu tradition by IFP-supporting Zulu hostel residents, and the extreme violence they perpetrated onto surrounding squatter and township communities; in my view it still does not explain the violence and intimidation of hostel residents often instigated and perpetrated by township residents, and ANC-aligned youths. If tradition is held up as the cause of the violence by hostel dwellers towards squatters and township dwellers, then can't tradition also explain the intimidation of, and equally vicious violence against hostel dwellers by township youths and residents which contributed to spark off the violence in 1990, and contributed to the death toll thereafter?

To me it is problematic to merely pin tradition on one side in the war, whilst the violence and intimidation by the other side in the conflict is somehow ignored, and hence tradition is not used to explain that violence by the opposing group.

For the violence in the Hostel War, based on the opposing group being seen as an outsider and thus hostile to the "community", did not only go one-way, ie: from hostel residents who identified township residents as outsiders and enemies onto what is perceived by many commentators to be relatively innocent and defenceless township victims. The township residents, and groupings resident and operating within the township also carried out much intimidation and instigated much of the violence themselves, as opposed to just reacting to such violence, and perpetrated much violence onto hostel residents, and IFP office-holders and supporters living in the townships.   Not only were IFP-supporting hostel dwellers responsible for indiscriminately identifying certain fellow hostel-dwellers and neighbouring township residents as Xhosas and enemies, and thereby indiscriminately killing them (Sitas 1996:145); but township residents engaged in similar processes of indiscriminately identifying people as hostel residents - without necessarily any proof of that - and indiscriminately, and viciously, killing them (Marinovich and Silva 2000:4-34). If the hatred came only from the hostel dwellers, than what about the hatred shown by township dwellers and ANC-aligned youth? (Marinovich and Silva 2000:4-34).

Based on research carried out amongst ANC-aligned youths in Diepkloof, Soweto; the scene of anti-government unrest in the mid-1980s, and anti-Inkatha and anti-hostel violence in the 1990s by very much the same youths as in the mid-1980s, Marks (1995:16-22) takes note of a similar process of group formation, identification of enemies of the (township) community - often treated violently, and

the desire to protect communal (township community) interests, amongst township youths aligned to the ANC, similar activities and processes to what was noted above amongst Zulu IFP-aligned hostel residents.

In fact these politicised, ANC-aligned youths saw themselves as protectors of their community. Based on this motivation, they acted against individuals and entities associated with the Apartheid state, Inkatha members and certain gangsters harassing these communities in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the Jackrollers (specialising in the "recreational" kidnap and gang rape of young township girls and women) (Marks 1995:16-22); very much the same motivation under which United Democratic Front (UDF) and later ANC-aligned youths in the Northern Province undertook to "defend" their communities by organizing witch-hunts against alleged enemies in the mid-1980s and early 1990s (Lawuyi 1996:85-88).

Above, we saw that IFP-aligned Zulu hostel-dwellers identified surrounding township and squatter camp communities as enemies, and dealt with these enemies in cruel ways. The hostel residents however used traditional ethnic/ tribal conceptions and imagery to describe and frame the problem, thus conceptualising surrounding squatter and township communities as enemies - conceptualising them as extensions of traditional Xhosa and Pondo rivalry against and hatred towards Zulus.

Yet as Inkatha generally points out in its commentary to the Goldstone Commission's findings (Inkatha 1992:1-27) on hostel

violence, and other cases of Inkatha versus ANC violence still sporadically occurring, for example on the Natal Midlands, whatever Inkatha is accused of within Hostel violence and the war with the ANC in the Natal Midlands in the 1980s, the ANC and ANC supporters are at least equally as guilty of. Again, as noted above, similar to IFP-aligned Hostel dwellers, ANC-aligned township youths wanted to defend their communal grouping and identity from enemy outsiders (identified as inter-alia Inkatha members), and treated these enemies quite roughly; engaging themselves inter-alia in the intimidation of enemies (for example hostel-dwellers) and the infamous burning tyre necklacing of enemies identified with the Apartheid state (Marks 1995:16-22).

Marks' research links up to the above description of how political factors in 1990 contributed to the Hostel War, where we saw how township youths, supportive of the ANC repeatedly harassed and intimidated hostel dwellers for refusing to join rent boycotts and stayaways (for example after the 1976 Soweto uprisings). And after the unbanning of the ANC, it was township youth - many of them associated with the killing of black policemen and councillors in the townships in the mid-1980s, as well as other township residents who were also identified as so-called "enemies of the people" - who had harassed and intimidated hostel-dwellers who wanted to attend IFP-meetings in 1990, when the war officially began (Minnaar 1993:10-23).

Hostel-dwelling supporters of the IFP have indeed over-reacted to this intimidation by township dwellers and township youths by

indiscriminately killing off township residents in revenge attacks. But township dwellers must take much of the blame themselves for many intimidated, harassed and even killed hostel residents.

And neither does it explain the absolute hatred and extreme viciousness of the violence between these two general groupings, as seen in the ritual mutilations carried out onto victims, committed by both groupings onto each other and perceived supporters of enemy groupings (Marinovich and Silva 2000:4-34), and even the use of African traditional medicine (*Muti*) by both groupings in the battles against each other; as described by some authors and other observers of the violence - both in the violence between ANC and Inkatha supporters in the Kwa-Zulu Natal Midlands, and the violence in the Hostel War on the Reef - aspects that are more typical of communal conflicts than national conflicts (Adam and Moodley 1992:506-508).

As pointed out by Adam and Moodley, these horrendous, and unnecessary practices of mutilation of already dead members of the enemy groupings (by both township and hostel dwellers), which must still be completely and satisfactorily explained by psychologists, are nevertheless often ignored in favour of explanations that focus on national - as opposed to communal explanation. "Mutilation robs the enemy not only of his/ her life but of valued qualities which the victor symbolically appropriates: potency, eyesight and brains. By possessing vital organs of the enemy, the victor invokes the magic of invincibility and immortality" (Adam and Moodley 1992:506-508).

Although psychologists might not have come up with convincing explanations for the above tendencies, there are some interesting insights, provided by Turaki and Lawuyi - a theologian and an anthropologist respectively, which link the discussion to tradition, and thereby provide some interesting - if different - perspectives.

To begin with Kasfir (1983:3-13) notes the fluid nature of group (which he terms as class) formation in Africa. He notes that in Africa, groups are fluid, ever-changing, and likely to continue changing in an African context, affecting state policies and practices, as well as State Patronage and Prebendalism in the state, and the groups which it favours. Thus, within the Hostel War we for example had hostel inhabitant groupings largely based on an ethnic-based classification; whilst township residents and the largely ANC-aligned, often youth-based groupings in particular amongst them; were on the whole more ideologically inclined, their demands being more urban-centred.

Although as noted, group formation in Africa is continuously ever-changing and in flux, and the rural and tribal nature of the demands of the hostel dwellers, contrasted the more urban and class basis of the demands by groups within the township residents involved in the war; Lawuyi (1988:85-88) notes certain tendencies within this process of group formation and constant negotiation between groupings. Whether one deals with witch-hunts in the Northern Province (the village community, versus another evil grouping of witches), or the crude ritual circumcision of a rival grouping of taxi drivers in Soweto (again, two opposing groups), or hostel and

F.B.   P.T.O.

township residents' groupings fighting and killing each other off on the East Rand; and other political campaign-related violence in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, (and elsewhere on the African continent); practices between opposing groupings somehow remain the same as in the traditional past when, according to Turaki (1999:132-133) the law of Kinship is, as it always was, the most powerful and persuasive of all moral laws, creating two types of morality and ethics between various groupings:

A   A code of morality and ethics for insiders (the in-group); the community and,

B   Another code of morality and ethics for the outsiders (strangers). Those who belong within the group are treated equally and preferentially, but outsiders and strangers are treated differentially. Generally the basis for this type of morality and ethics is kinship, having a common ancestor, descent and blood affinity. Morality and ethics are thus founded and rooted in blood-ancestry and blood-community; the "seed" of an ancestor. Outsiders do not belong, and on the basis of this they are not entitled to

A-equal treatment,

B-ownership,

C-affinity, loyalty and obligations;

D-community rights and protection; and

E- "they're not a people, they're strangers".

Anything outside of the kinship system is labelled as the outside world, where no rules of kinship, nor the kinship system apply. The outside world is characterised by war, rivalry, competition, intrigues, manipulations, wits and

stratagem. When people are labelled as coming from the outside, they're treated accordingly with disdain, and are shown that the insiders wield the power, power shown in all its violence to the outsider through the bad treatment received by the outsider. (Turaki 1999:132-133).

These tendencies, as noted above by Turaki and Lawuyi, manifest themselves within urban South Africa, as was the case of the Hostel War, noted above by Adam and Moodley (1992:506-508). And as Lawuyi (1998:85-88) sums it up "...what's consistent in all of this is that the enemy should be taught some shared lessons about where power lies, about superiority, about the malevolence or benevolence of the victor".

Hence, despite the conceptualized idea mentioned in previous sections of this discussion that hostels represent tribal, rural interests, as opposed to surrounding townships who represented more modern urban-based and ideologically-inclined interests, what remains consistant between these two traditional versus modern groupings is each groupings' basic tradition-based conceptualizations of how to treat the enemy; this conception finding use and expression within an urban environment in terms of the way in which both tribal and rural-traditional inclined hostel dwellers and more ANC-supporting, more urban, class and ideologically-based township residents and self-appointed Self-Defence Unit comrades affect and treat each other; the Hostel War being a practical manifestation of this tendency.

Interestingly, within township and squatter camp communities in the 1980s, there were numerous cases of similar treatment of "enemies". For example, there were the murders and maiming of supposed supporters of the Apartheid regime - black councillors, black policemen and others. Within these killing methods of victims by ANC-aligned township youths, one can find links to older tribe-based purificatory movements, against those who are perceived to betray the community (Beinart 1992:483-484). Within the Witwatersrand's squatter settlements, especially after the repeal of Influx Control when the camps burgeoned, there were similar, deadly fights between various groupings (not necessarily always ethnically-based) over scarce resources such as access to water.

Already by the outbreak of the Hostel war in 1990, therefore, violence had by then already become a means of defence or an instrument of attaining specific social and political ends, and as such it had already attained a type of legitimacy. Indeed, "the attention given to overtly political violence has largely obscured the extent to which shack areas have both incubated and attracted violent activity" (Sapire 1992:694-697). Thus the violence and rough treatment of identified "enemies" carried out by some township and squatter camp dwellers over their outsider enemies was merely expanded to hostel-dwellers particularly after 1990 (Sapire 1992:694-697). In this respect, the findings of Straker (1992), based on research carried out amongst ANC-aligned youths in Leandra's township in what is known today as Mpumalanga Province in the late 1980s , are very interesting in that not only does her findings support Marks' 1995 findings about politicised youths and their motivations for

political activity (the desire to protect the community); but show how such traditional motivations can find practical application within a changed, modern environment. In her findings with regard to the Leandra youth, as she likes to call her research subjects, Straker (1992:104-105) notes the following:

"The majority of the Leandra group reported a sense of heightened empathy to those who they would define as insiders and a lessening of it in relation to outsiders. Thus their exposure to political violence, while it inhibited empathy in one context, enhanced it in others. Given the relationship between empathy and violence, namely that empathy acts to inhibit violence, it would be fair to conclude that there was not a general disinhibition in the majority of these youth. There was rather disinhibition of agggression in particular contexts and a reciprocal inhibition of it in others." (Straker 1992:104)

"In sum, there's little evidence of the Leandra youth having become a brutalised generation in the sense that their capacity for empathy and guilt as such had been impaired. There was similarly little to indicate that they would engage in indiscriminate and arbitrary violence, although there was much to indicate that violence would be their response to particular sets of circumstances. For the majority, although expressions of violence could be stimulated by particular contexts, these expressions still seemed to be contained within strict boundaries and governed by a system of morality which could be observed and articulated. Nevertheless, there was a minority whose behaviour was not bound in this way and who were given to violent outbursts of an indiscriminate and violent nature" (Straker 1992:104-105).

Straker (1992:19-64) also makes the general observation throughout the interviews with her subjects that amongst the young Leandra activists, there was a general belief that groups opposing them in the township (seen as having ties to the police) got their fighting power at least partly as a result of witchcraft and *muti* created by a powerful *inyanga*, through which they were able to bewitch the ANC-supporting township activists. Munk (1997:7) notes that Zulu

IFP supporters, within the Hostel War, also made use of _muti_ preparations by _inyangas_ and _sangomas_, similar to _muti_ preparations used by Zulu warriors before going to battle against their enemies in the rural past, in the belief that such preparations would strengthen them physically, and even on a more spiritual field. Hence both ANC-supporting township youths and hostel dwellers believed in the efficacy of _muti_, taking the communal fight on the ground to a fight which spilt over into an African Cosmological level. Indeed since, as previously indicated, the spiritual world is seen by Africans as an extension of the community and the world on earth, and urban Africans still believe in rural-originating African Cosmology, it is not surprising therefore that the Hostel War, and township groupings' perceptions of enemies and how to deal with them, are influenced by African Cosmology.

What must be noted from Straker's (1992) above findings, as an extension of Marks (1995) is that the African traditional sense of empathy towards insiders and hatred towards outsiders, and even beliefs in the communal outsider enemy practising witchcraft and the occult is found among the radicalised ANC-supporting township youth. Also that they apply one set of rules (empathy) towards persons within the group, versus another set of morality (often leading to death) in terms of communal outsiders, for example persons associated with the Apartheid state, from which the youths concerned wanted to protect their township community. Another interesting finding by Straker, showing the flexibility of these communal insider and outsider tendencies to flexibly adjust to and carry on within whole new environments concerns the fact that the

youths she had interviewed, then located at the Wilgespruit
Community Centre of the South African Council of Churches (SACC)
after fleeing Leandra in the late 1980s, was the fact that the youths
concerned, whilst at Wilgespruit, were able to act in a group
(communal) fashion against perceived enemy outsiders within the
centre. Thus Straker (1992:87-107) for example notes incidents of
how groups of youths assaulted cooks working at the centre, in
displeasure of the quality of the food they were receiving, as well as
a youth counsellor, who was violently assaulted by a group of youths
who had accused the counsellor concerned of being a police
informant (an enemy). This example, in my view, shows the
flexibility of this insider versus outsider group dynamic to be adapted
and adopted to suit an urban environment.

And in the 1990s, the idea of an enemy was, in the case of
Diepkloof, Soweto - situated near to a hostel - spread to include
Inkatha and Inkatha supporters (Marks 1995:26-29).

Thus, the same as the hostel system showing that traditional tribal
group references and rivalries can and have been kept alive within
an urban environment amongst Zulu IFP-supporting hostel-dwellers;
so the Hostel War shows not only that traditional group identities
(along tribal lines) can manifest themselves within an urban
environment, among many hostel residents; but that newer, more
urbanized types of group classifications (eg: urban versus rural
amongst squatter and township residents) can nevertheless still
operate along very much the same principles of group-based social
organization (identification of groups of insiders and outsiders -
friends and enemies respectively) and reaction to the enemy

(absolute hatred, even viciousness) displayed by the more traditional (Zulu-based) group classification, linked to the hostels as well; showing that even township residents, despite being exposed to more Westernized, modern influences, can still operate along the same lines of reaction to outsiders as the more rural, tribal and traditional hostel residents.

Hence, the general distinction made among many (for example within the work of Mamdani [1996]), between the more rural and tribal hostel dwellers on the one hand, versus the more urbanized and modern township dwellers who, although also affected by the Apartheid system, were nevertheless less affected by the tradition and emphasis put on tribe inherent in the migrant labour and hostel system; although recognized, it has it's limitations. This distinction should thus not be taken too far in explaining the violence of the Hostel War because the snag of this general explanation, as pointed out above, is that this explanation, although explaining the causes and rationale behind the violence of hostel dwellers, it nevertheless does not explain why township dwellers, and in particular the youth-based and ideologically-orientated Comrade and Self-Defence Unit groupings instigated much of the hatred for and isolation of hostel-dwellers; as well as the violence, and extreme violence at that, carried out onto hostel-dwelling and township-based members of Inkatha and suspected Inkatha supporters.

In my view the Hostel War shows the continuation of various manifestations of tradition in an urban environment in various guises. For example there were the processes of grouping according to Zulu

tribal affinity of which IFP-supporting Zulu hostel dwellers were guilty of. And there were also processes of group formation and identification, and differential treatment of enemies among class-based urban-based and ideologically-versed ANC-supporting township youths. Yet in my view these cannot be seen as entirely separate entities, the former being traditional and the latter at least non-traditional. This is because both sides do share some forms of tradition, in the way both these groups treat each other (group formation and identification of communal outsiders as enemies, with the accompanying bad treatment of such enemies).

This shows the importance of linking tradition within explanations of ongoing cases of violence between township groupings; because whilst it shows that hostel residents did not move away from tradition, it makes me question the extent to which squatter and township residents moved away from tradition in conceptualising and reacting to group-related problems encountered on a daily basis. In doing so, whilst recognizing the importance of hostel-dwellers in the violence, and in advocating tradition; I am opting here for a broader explanation of the role of tradition and the violence it resulted in.

And here in my opinion, the Hostel War which raged on the Witwatersrand in the 1990s, was not merely an indication of how a grouping of people (Zulu hostel dwellers) used tradition as ways and means of explaining and dealing with their urban existence; but, even more broadly than just the hostels and their inmates, the Hostel War shows the clash of urban forms of tradition (group formation

_F.B._

and the identification of communal outsiders as enemies, with the accompanying bad treatment); versus old, tribal/ ethnic forms of tradition, working along the above same principles (of group formation, identification of communal outsiders as enemies, with accompanying bad treatment), but with a tribal/ ethnic tendency. The latter format of tradition had adjusted itself, in its ethnic/ tribal format within the urban areas amongst hostel residents; whilst the former category or format was practised amongst ANC- supporting township residents, but with possibly less emphasis on tribalism and ethnicity. Nevertheless, whether newer or older, hostel and township residents' reactions to each other on the Reef in the early 1990s nevertheless shows different adaptations of an insider versus outsider dynamic within an urban environment, showing that this dynamic is very much alive and well within an urban environment and is even capable of adapting itself in ways whereby it can occur without a tribal/ ethnic dimension. This counters notions of a new start away from tradition, supporting instead the creation of a modernity with a very important, indeed key element of tradition within a Westernized South African urban environment.

And times of social, political and/ or economic stress can reawaken, if not intensify this traditional behaviour towards outsiders, even within an urban environment. More recently for example, we saw this dynamic in practice in the increasing acts of xenophobia and violence towards outsiders - people coming into the country from elsewhere on the African continent, identified by underpaid and unemployed South Africans as an economic threat. And it is especially successful "outsiders" who are under threat by jealous

insiders.

Recently for example, only two days after the recent World Conference against Racism ended in Durban (September 2001), an estimated 1000 residents of Kwanobuhlwe township, near Port Elizabeth, went on the rampage, looting shops belonging to foreign Muslim Somali businessmen, stealing goods worth millions of rands. According to a police spokesperson, this was the "worst xenophobic incident ever in the Eastern Cape" which, according to the same police spokesman, could be linked to the dismissals of striking workers at the local Volkswagen car manufacturing plant, leading to a heightening of community frustration against wealthy foreigners, in that whilst they, as locals, had no jobs and were struggling to support their families, foreigners in their midst prospered (Mail and Guardian, 14 September 2001, p. 15).

It is my intention to point out that witch-hunts in the rural areas and the destruction of the property of alledged witches (many of whom were outsiders, and/ or marginalised members of the community - a number of whom had in fact managed to nevertheless prosper within the community), the burning tyre necklacing of people perceived to be symbols (and supporters) of the state and the burning of their property in the townships in the 1980s, deadly attacks between hostel and township residents in the 1990s leading to the looting and destruction of the property of the enemy, and acts of communal xenophobia against successful businessmen from other outsider communities, all examples found in South African rural and urban areas in the 1980s and 1990s, show a continuity in

F.B.   P.T.O.

the progression of the traditional insider (friend) versus outsider (enemy) dynamic, with a different set of ethics applying to the outsider, from the rural areas right into the urban areas; showing that this traditional African dynamic has, unfortunately, not vanished with modernity and urbanization, but has adapted itself, both with and without a tribal/ ethnic element, to serve as a reaction to the strains and stresses of today within an urban environment.

4.7 *Conclusion*

To a great extent, this discussion of traditional medicine and the Hostel War within urban South Africa within this chapter also applies to Europe as well (take for example continued beliefs in superstition and the occult in today's London, and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia) in that tradition in terms of the above manifestations of reactions to enemy groupings, was present there as well, as one could see in terms of the hatred and viciousness with which even civilians belonging to opposing groupings were treated. But, and this is my point, the fact that such reactions are present in Europe itself, does not mean that their presence in urban South Africa should be ignored or discounted by saying that "it happens in Europe as well". Rather, tradition should be considered in analysing why such things happen, instead of merely thinking that because it happens in an urban South African environment, it cannot be linked to a tradition linked to a rural environment. I'm not saying that Africa and urban black South Africans have not moved on from rural tradition, because they have. Today's urban black South Africans wear Western-style clothing (with great pride and style!), speak English

quite well and are well acquainted with Western urban ways. But the point is that certain aspects of tradition have nevertheless remained, and some aspects of tradition have even been integrated into the daily existence of black South Africans; just the same as for example the principles of Confucianism have integrated themselves into the daily life of the average Japanese person, pointed out in chapter 2 of this thesis, contributing to the work ethic and subsequently economic development that country has become famous for. And these aspects of tradition that have embedded themselves into the daily existence of urban black South Africans, effect the type of current existence lived by urban black South Africans, their outlook and, as mentioned above, their attitude towards other groupings and the world surrounding them; playing an important role in understanding the influences that are at work to shape South Africa's future, both positively and negatively.

In the next chapter conclusions will be reached on why tradition still manifests itself within modernity, and a critical commentary will be made about the positive and negative effects of modernity within a modern South African environment.

Chapter 5

Towards a different non-dichotomized conception of the tradition - modernity interaction and its effect on development

5.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to synthesize the preceding arguments and to advance a new concept of interaction between modernity and tradition. This new concept is then linked to development.

In this chapter we will indicate problems with a dichotomized view of modernity and tradition, and based on this, we will indicate a different conception of the relationship between tradition and modernity - a conception that recognizes the fact that modernity and traditional influences can and do to a great extent go together - precisely because tradition is not a rigid entity, but it is rather an often flexible entity that can accommodate foreign influences, thus making integration or fusion possible between that which is considered to be tradition and that which is considered to be modern (Smolicz 1988:387-388; 1992:345-346). In doing so conceptual barriers that seperate tradition and modernity, contained within much literature (for example within modernization theory [Coetzee 1989:9-11]), will be knocked down. This will allow us to work from the premise that traditional influences can and do influence modern influences; and thus modern influences can contain within themselves influences rooted within tradition.

This point regarding the flexibility of tradition to accommodate other influences, and thereby make itself relevant for current conditions prevailing at any time, is important. It will be used here to explain why certain aspects of tradition from the rural past emigrated to the urban areas and continue to exist to this very day, as practical ways to interpret and deal with urban reality. An urban existence cannot thus be classified as necessarily a break from the past, but rather an urban existence can contain within itself the continuation of many aspects of the tradition that preceded urbanization.

Finally, based on this point, the point will be made that tradition continues to play an important role in today's Africa and South Africa, both positively and negatively, not least because of its flexibility in accommodating other non-African (including Western) influences. Implications of this point will be dealt with in terms of some of the various ways in which tradition will impact positively and negatively on the development of South Africa, and how this impacts on theoretical and practical thinking about development.

5.2 *Tradition and modernity: past dichotomized conceptualisations, more recent conceptualizations and a different conceptualisation of their interaction*

As we saw in Chapter 2, theories on tradition and modernity that emerged during the Enlightenment saw modernity as something new, something different from the past. Indeed, modernity was seen as a break away from tradition (Gross 1992:21-28). The Enlightenment, the period when the idea of a break from the past became popular, occurred after the Middle Ages, during the 17th and the 18th centuries. Intellectual thought in the 19th and at least the first half of the 20th centuries were heavily influenced by the Enlightenment's focus on modernity, seen as a new beginning away from tradition - the past - that preceded it. Roughly between World War II and the mid-1960s, these Enlightenment-based ideas were integrated in modernization theory, as conceptualized during that period, reflecting broader conceptualizations of social, political and economic evolution as generally conceptualized by the academic community in North America and Europe, based on their conceptions of social, political and economic evolution in North America and Europe after the Enlightenment. Hence these conceptions of modernization theory were Westerncentric in that they reflected development as it was conceptualised to have occurred in Western society (Etzioni-Halevy 1981:50-51).

The late 1950s and early 1960s, was also the time when African colonial possessions were granted political independence. And so, as we also saw in Chapter 2, it was thought by many, from

F.B.   P.T.O.

academics to the departing colonial administrators, and by many of the African politicians and administrators that took over the new African post-independent states, that Africa would, almost naturally, follow the Western route to modernity, as conceptualized during that era by modernization theorists - on somewhat idealized views of social evolution in Europe and North America.

Based on these conceptions of what constituted modernity and social, political and economic development, it was thought that Africa (and the newly independent countries of Asia) was on its way to Western-defined modernity as conceptualized in the 1950s and early 1960s. Such ideas that Africa would somehow follow the above-mentioned Western route to modernity were further strengthened by what was seen as the emergence of a Western-style urbanized African elite, well-versed in English/ French/ Portuguese; the products of Western education, well-versed in the language of democracy and politics, Western rationality and Western-based scientific management theories; particularly as regards the operation of government bureaucracies; and desiring to bring Africa to independence in order to be able to emulate and develop their respective African countries to the levels of modernity found in European and North American societies. They were thus thought of as being modern according to 1950s and early 1960s modernization theorists' general Westerncentric definition of modernity. Thus they were deemed to be able and willing to lead their newly independent countries to independence and development thereafter (Illy 1986:29-41).

Yet as also pointed out in Chapter 2, political evolution in post-independent African countries started going wrong as regards the following of this Western modernizational vision of the road to modernity. Modern political parties contained in Western multiparty democracies before and after independence generally did not reflect class-based groupings; and instead reflected traditional ethnically-based divisions in their respective societies (Flint 1983:407-411). Ethnic, clan and kinship affiliation, and not competence, also determined hiring into the modem, Western-designed post-colonial African bureaucracies (Okoli 1980:1-15), and it also played an important role in the way these bureaucracies would function, and their developmental performance - both generally throughout the Third World and more specifically within Africa.

A number of African political leaders also evoked a desire to recreate and return to a perceived tranquil "traditional" pre-colonial, pre-capitalist village-based existence guided by rule of consensus. They saw multiparty Western democracies as being ethnically divisive (despite themselves often coming to power through the same problematic Western-based multiparty democratic system) and thus they saw one-partyism as the solution to the supposed divisiveness of multiparty democracy (Chazan et. al. 1992:37-68; Potholm 1979:50-68). Thus despite the fact that African countries entered independence under multiparty democratic systems and leaders that initially, at least before independence, campaigned for multiparty democracy, and modem state bureaucracies following Western scientific management theories; many African countries were, by the early 1980s, governed by one-party or military regimes.

Economically too, ethnicity played a role in determining the distribution of the fruits of modernity - land, markets and the distribution of government services in African countries both in the rural and the urban areas (Bates 1974:457-475; Okoli 1980:1-15).

On a broader social level too, as we also saw in chapter 2, there is evidence that Africa did not follow the Western-based road to modernity as prescribed by modernization theorists in the 1950s and early 1960s. Ethnicity, and not class, is still an important cleavage within African society, and in fact there is evidence that the ethnically divisive policies of African politicians are a reflection of this. It is in fact expected of politicians by their voters, the populace, to be serving the needs of the ethnic community that elect them into office, to the detriment of other communities - ethnic groups - inhabiting the geographical territory of the state (Sithole 1985:189), thus forming the social basis of Prebendalism and the waste of state resources associated with it (Joseph 1983:21-33).

We saw in chapter 2 that there is evidence that the sense of communalism and a number of traditions emanating from the rural past such as the consultation of diviners and the payment of bridewealth (_Lobola_) migrated to, and continue to be practiced in, the urban areas. Furthermore we saw in chapter 3 that African Cosmological beliefs regarding the role of ancestors in the daily lives of people, and the power of witches and sorcerers in bringing sickness and misfortune onto one's life are not only being practiced by people in an urban environment (through the urban presence of traditional divining and healing practitioners), but have also been

integrated into the teachings of the Christian Bible through the activities of the African Independent Churches (AIC's) (Oosthuizen 1992: Preface; 38-41; Kunnie 1992:9).

Furthermore, both in a rural environment, and within an urban environment, this worldview, despite being traditional, has been found to be flexible and innovative enough to be used as a framework to explain problems found in today's world.

In other words, there is evidence that Western-defined modernity in African societies is being interpreted by Africans themselves, including urbanized Africans that underwent a Western education, according to traditional African Cosmological lines. This is just the same as with ethnic affiliation which, as described above, has been interpreted as being flexible enough, by African politicians and administrators themselves, to use it as a means of gaining support within the modem, Western-originating multiparty political and state administrative systems. Otherwise put, the modem multiparty democratic system and state bureaucracy has been interpreted along traditional lines.

In South Africa too, particularly on a more social level, as we saw in chapter 3, tradition, in particular with reference to the traditional spirit of communalism, has, with a few changes (for example largely neighbour-based as opposed to kinship-based groupings), been used as a means of gaining both financially and socially in the urban townships, through the Stokvel movement (Lukhele 1990). In the same townships, tradition and its flexibility (as opposed to the supposed rigidity afforded to it by Western intellectuals since the

Enlightenment, including modernization theorists in the 1950s and early 1960s) has also been seen in terms of beliefs in the ancestors and witchcraft which continue to be widely adhered to this day in South African rural (Stadler 1995:514-533; Niehaus 1995:514-533) and urban areas (Ashforth 1996:1191-1221). In the urban areas, especially through the activities of diviners and the African Independent Churches, as a means of explaining, conceptualising and understanding happenings in peoples' daily lives, Western modern influences including Apartheid (Oosthuizen 1992: Preface) and even the economic effects of globalisation (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b:17-25) are being interpreted through conceptualizations rooted in tradition. This all indicates two things:

1   A great amount of fusion or intermingling is occurring between what is supposedly tradition and what is modern according to the dictates and definitions of the two categories by modernization theorists in the 1950s and early 1960s; and

2   The above point indicates the existence of flexibility within tradition with regard to the accommodation of Western influences, as opposed to the supposed rigidity afforded to tradition by modernization theorists in the 1950s and early 1960s (reflecting beliefs which had already emerged in the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries), for which according to the latter, there was often a need to destroy tradition.

This raises the following question: If traditional affiliation and traditional belief systems have been seen by Africans themselves as being flexible enough to incorporate (and to deal with) Western-

based present-day social, political and economic influences; what does this tell us of conceptions of tradition and modernity which see tradition and modernity as clashing and as being incompatible; tradition as necessarily rigid, inflexible, and thus having to be destroyed for modernity to come about?

Such dichotomised views of two different, separate categories named tradition and modernity respectively are indeed problematic. Smolicz (1988:387-403 and 1992:345-346) recognized this dilemma, and points out that supposedly dichotomised or compartmentalized views of tradition and modernity (as contained for example in 1950s and 1960s modernization theory) in fact suppose what is in reality a false dichotomy. Thus the term modernity, according to Smolicz, is in fact a value-laden term which has the implication of positive evaluation of virtually any innovation, as opposed to tradition which, within this context, acquires a negative connotation of backwardness and unthinking conservatism, and inflexibility about accommodating new (for example Western) influences (Smolicz 1992:345-346).

In reality however, according to Smolicz (1988:387-388 ; 1992:345-346) tradition cannot be seen as invariably hindering social change since the continued influence of, and adherence to tradition, in fact depends on new - modern - developments being incorporated into traditional values. At the same time, a tradition can only survive and continue to flourish if it accommodates itself to the present (for example Western influences); and tradition, or at least large parts of it are flexible, and thus can accommodate such other influences. Through its flexibility, tradition thus manages to remain relevant in

peoples' lives; and this relevance, linked to tradition's flexibility, plays an important role in explaining why people continue to practice various traditions (Smolicz 1988:387-388 ; 1992:345-346) in today's world, including modern urban environments.

Thus, interpreted from this non-dichotomized perspective of the relationship between tradition and modernity, and view of tradition as being able to be flexible enough to accommodate other influences, then the above-mentioned findings in the previous chapters of this thesis (for example highly educated - Westernized individuals - continuing their beliefs in witchcraft despite their modernity defined in terms of Westernization) do make sense.

And precisely because of this, I have begun applying this perspective of flexibility within tradition, making possible fusion or intermingling between traditional and Western (or Westerncentrically-defined modern) influences according to Western modernizational perspectives in the 1950s and early 1960s as influenced by 17th and 18th century Enlightenment, and as manifested within 1950s and early 1960s style modernization theory, to the analysis of South Africa. Through this, I would like to contribute a different perspective to current general social, political and economic analysis of South Africa - a perspective that does recognize that tradition is flexible enough to accommodate modern influences, thus making fusion possible between the two formerly mutually exclusive concepts, within an urban environment. Finally, at the end of this chapter, I will link this debate, and thus make it relevant to, the developmental debate within South Africa.

5.3   _Conceptualizations of a flexible type of tradition, leading to different conceptions of a modern urban existence_

The idea that tradition is not necessarily a rigid entity, but rather an entity that can accommodate within itself other - foreign - influences and thus continue to make itself relevant in the present, and beyond some specified point, into the future, for example through the accommodation of Western influences, counters ideas that the influence of tradition can end at a certain point in time, beyond which there is indeed a new start.

Indeed, whenever there is a new start, elements of tradition that preceded the new start continue beyond the new start, contributing to the socio-political and economic results - success or failure - that supposedly result from the new start (Gross 1992:25-28). This opens up the possibility that tradition, or elements thereof can be present in important ways throughout the ages through to the present (Gross 1992:25-28).

For example in Chapter 2, a number of authors have indicated that the Confucian tradition has continued to manifest itself to this very day within South-East Asian societies, and has played an important role in the developmental success of those countries (Lee and Lee 1992:107-123; Robertson 1985:93-103). This continued influence of Confucianism happened despite the fact that these countries have moved from a largely agrarian society to, in the case of for example Japan, a largely urban society. Hence, the Confucian tradition continues to manifest itself for example in highly urbanized Japan.

Yet as mentioned above by Gross (1992:21-28) there is an idea, emerging from the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th century, an idea which affected modernization theory in the 1950s and early 1960s, that it is indeed possible to "break away" from tradition and come up with a "new beginning" away from the tradition that preceded the big break. These conceptions for example saw the coming of "rationality" in the 17th and 18th centuries as a new start, a complete break from that which preceded from it. The Industrial Revolution, and the urbanization that came along with it, was also seen by many as a break from the past that, together with the focus on "rationality" that accompanied the Enlightenment, would destroy the old rural-based worldviews among people (Gross 1992:21-28).

Based on this idea, an urban existence - seen as the height of modernity as defined along Westerncentric lines, was seen, within Europe's post-Enlightenment history, as a new start for the urban migrant, destroying rural worldviews and practices that he/ she was physically leaving behind, and somehow instilling in the mind of the urbanite the so-called broad principles of rationality (Davies 1997:597-612). Again, this was an idea which began in the Enlightenment, and which was taken up within the principles of modernization theory in the 1950s and early 1960s; despite the fact that even in Europe, so-called "irrational" beliefs such as superstitions continue in urban environments such as today's London (Davies 1997:597-611).

As we've seen in this thesis up to now, however, these so-called rural beliefs emanating from a rural worldview inherent in the rural

past did not die in the case of South Africa either. Witchcraft, traditional medicine and different manifestations of communalism are found today in urban South Africa too. And they are thriving precisely because, as mentioned by Smolicz above, tradition is flexible, hence it is able to accommodate other influences, and precisely because of this it is able to continue, and not just fade away with time.

In the case of communalism, it applied itself to an urban environment because of its instrumentality - flexibility to the accommodation of current circumstances - as a means of collecting funds, through Stokvels; and beliefs in causality and witchcraft became instrumental in explaining sickness and misfortune in an urban environment.

Despite changes, to suit urban conditions, however, core values of these traditions remained relatively intact. For example the core value of communalism - the use of the local community to address a family's needs, has remained intact. And African Cosmological beliefs have retained their core values, even in an urban environment - for example beliefs that ancestors and witches can influence peoples daily lives. These core principles remained the same despite the fact that in the practical application of these principles in an urban environment, there were some changes from practice in the rural areas. Thus for example the pursuit of communalism (as seen in Stokvels) in urban areas occurred through neighbour and/ or friend-based groupings, as opposed to kinship networks, as found mostly in rural areas. And although the core

values of African Cosmology, a part of communalism, remained largely the same within an urban environment, the urban application thereof differed in that African Cosmology is increasingly used to explain peoples problems in a Westernized urban environment, and the fact that, as pointed out by Fenyves (1994) today's traditional African healers increasingly resemble Western biomedical practitioners in the way they practice;   whilst nevertheless maintaining their core links to African Cosmology.

Despite the above-mentioned problems with the idea of a new start, this concept was nevertheless associated since the Enlightenment with urbanization. And so the somewhat romanticised idea that it is indeed possible to break away from tradition, and that urbanization could act as the agent for this rupture from the past (Gross 1992:21-28;   Davies 1997:597-600) influenced, and still continues to influence, social research up to now. To me, the problem with this dichotomized view of reality which this tendency causes, is that only events that came after the break are considered as relevant to the analysis of current social tendencies. Somehow rural tradition - seen as occurring before the break - is often ignored, or the focus is so much on urban influences onto a certain tradition, that the role of tradition before urbanization in a certain urban trend, is not deeply concentrated upon in the study of the urban phenomenon(s) concerned. The traditional basis for "urban" problems and tendencies has become a focus in anthropological research only in the past few years; and this throws a different, and interesting light on phenomena found in the urban areas. It shows the absolute flexibility and instrumentality of tradition in practice, and shows that

tradition can form a deep foundation for, and is therefore an important contributor to, a number of urban township tendencies - and problems - developmental problems included, resulting in a wider vision of the problem(s) concerned, and a deeper understanding of the problem(s) in question.

5.4 *The tradition-modernity conceptualization and development*

So far, this chapter has indicated that tradition can be flexible, and can accommodate and adapt to other influences. Thus for example, tradition can accommodate influences that are Western in origin (Smolicz 1988:387-388; 1992:345-346), regardless of whether one is in a rural environment or an urban environment. Hence it is not surprising that African Cosmological beliefs are very much alive, and indeed thriving within an urban environment, in today's world, including a South African urban township environment (Davies 1997:597-612; Ashforth 1996:1191-1221).

The question that we must answer here however is the following: Why should this point of the survival and adaptation of tradition into an urban environment be of any importance in developmental debate in South Africa? In answering this question, it must be noted first that much of the argument so far is not entirely new. If one looks at the recent, somewhat politically correct debates surrounding the spirit of Ubuntu which, according to its ardent supporters, can be used as a means of stimulating socio-economic and political development in South Africa today and in the future, it is at least

implicit within this debate that tradition can influence (urban-based) Western-conceptualized and designed bureaucratic state and business administrations (Chadford 1995:1-18; Clapper 1996:27-29; Teffo 1998:3-5; Tusenius 1998:16-21).

Of course, the management gurus and other supporters of Ubuntu who tend to see adherence to Ubuntu as a means of bettering the efficiency of an organization, tend to give it a positive spin - which we will deal with more critically below. But the point remains that general academic and public debate has moved away from Enlightenment-based discussions about social transition from the poles of tradition to modernity in that unlike previous conceptions associated with 1950s and early 1960s style modernization, and other Enlightenment-based predecessors to it; over the past thirty years or so general attitudes regarding the relationship between the general categories of tradition and modernity have evolved and changed. Whilst about forty years ago, Western-defined modernity was seen as something positive, progressive, capable of keeping up with changes and indeed desirable - whilst tradition was seen as antiquated, outdated and inflexible in terms of being incapable of keeping up with current occurrences; conceptions have changed somewhat. Now, modernity and its effects are no-longer completely seen in such a positive light, whilst certain positive attributes are given to tradition (Gross 1992:3-16).

Yet, and with application to current general debates on tradition and modernity in South Africa, and its application to development, Lawuyi (1998:84-89) makes the note that despite all the positive

aspects ascribed to tradition - much of which is linked to the spirit of Ubuntu; relatively less attention is given in public and academic developmental debate on other not-so-wholesome activities which form part of tradition as well; such activities being generally reserved for communal outsiders. For example, in chapter 3 we saw that persons who, for some known or unknown reason have been identified by the community, or some members of the community as witches, are hounded out of the community, often killed in the most gruesome of ways, and their property is destroyed. And unfortunately, since the mid-1990s, this tendency has been increasing (Minnaar, Wentzel and Payze 1997:25-29). Lawuyi (1998:84-89) points out that in urban Soweto, there have been cases of taxi drivers, either working independently, or for rival taxi associations, being captured by members of a rival taxi association and, following traditional circumcision rites, being ritually circumcised in somewhat crude ways. During the Hostel war on the Reef in the early 1990s, people were being killed merely for being perceived to be members of opposing groupings.

The point is that these maybe less fashionable or less politically correct manifestations of tradition in urban and rural environments nevertheless remained manifestations of tradition; yet many of the supporters of tradition - who see tradition in a positive light, simply did not say much about these incidents, choosing instead to merely concentrate on the positive aspects of tradition, and how these positive manifestations could positively manifest and contribute to development (see for instance Chadford 1995:1-18; Clapper 1996:27-29; Teffo 1998:3-5; Tusenius 1998:16-21; Burger 1996 -

see especially the declaration of support for Ubuntu, pp. 115-127).

This discussion highlights, in my opinion, a few problems with current debates on the modernity-tradition interaction and their effect on development.

A   In my view we seem to have moved from a somewhat romanticised view of modernity - modernity seen in a positive light, to a somewhat romanticised view of tradition - tradition seen in a somewhat positive light. This in my view, warrants a critical re-assessment of both tradition and modernity in terms of positive and negative effects, particularly on development.

B   Also, despite the changes in opinion about the merits of tradition and modernity, what has not changed, in my opinion, is the attempt by some to draw some form of a line separating the categories of tradition and modernity. However, as was highlighted so far in this thesis, in terms of the analysis of different parts of tradition within an urban township environment in the previous chapters, a dichotomized view of tradition and modernity - inherent in modernization in the 1950s and early 1960s - does present problems in that it does not explain why seemingly modern elements (as conceptualized by modernization theorists) somehow manage(d) to co-exist, and thrive, and intertwine with traditional elements (again as conceptualized by modernization theorists). For example why is it that Western educated professionals still adhere to ancestor worship and fear being bewitched?

F.B.   P.T.O.

C   Also, linking up point A and point B, a third concern emerges. Just like modernization theory in the 1950s and early 1960s which tried to both form separate categories of tradition and modernity, and attribute negative attributes to the former and positive attributes to the latter; much current general and academic debates on these issues nowadays tend to make the same erroneous assumptions behind 1950s modernization theory - namely a division between modern and traditional - which as we saw, is somewhat problematic; and secondly much of the current debate tends to attribute good qualities to one category, and bad qualities to the other category. Only this time, this is being done the other way around. Largely good qualities are attributed to tradition and largely bad qualities are attributed to modernity.

Yet according to Gyekye (1997:235-241), African tradition holds both positive and negative effects on development. And furthermore, because tradition is somewhat flexible, as we've seen so far in this thesis, it can react and integrate outside influences, and thus it can integrate itself within an urban environment, and it can thus continue to have an effect on the worldview of black South Africans, and thus impact on development and progress in South Africa both positively and negatively. Hence the following remarks by Gyekye about African tradition in general are applicable to an urban environment in South Africa as much as it is applicable to a rural environment; and his points will be extended where needed to make the discussion more relevant to South Africa.

As we've seen in this thesis, the sense of community (with some changes in its practical implementation to accommodate urban conditions) is the one aspect of tradition which has found resonance within an urban township environment within Africa and South Africa. According to Hyden (1983:11-16) the sense of community has certain advantages. This Economy of Affection as Hyden calls it, comes in handy to communities for basic survival purposes in the forms of loans and Stokvels, as was seen in Chapter 3 of this thesis, contributing to lighten the load of functions in fulfillment of social customs and maintenance such as weddings and funerals (Burial Societies form important parts of Stokvels), and helping to provide finance for development purposes - for example Stokvels can help as a backup mechanism for the creation, support, expansion and insurance of business undertakings. The social activities related to Stokvels and other groupings based on the communal spirit do help people against the sense of loneliness, isolation and alienation that is associated with an urban environment, one of the negative effects of a Western-defined modern existence.

According to Gyekye, another positive aspect of African communal tradition is the pursuit of Humanism with respect to persons within the communal grouping - the idea that the human being is a worthy creature that ought to be treated with respect and dignity (Gyekye 1997:258-260). Within the context of South Africa, this debate on the supposed humanity of African traditional values, linked to the supposed sense of brotherhood that is also a product of the general sense of community and communalism inherent within African culture, has occurred under the above-mentioned Ubuntu label. This

whole idea has in fact spawned something of a highly profitable local industry of academics and management gurus who seek and somehow see within the concept of Ubuntu (and associated with it a type of return to African traditional values), the basis for "cradles of peace and development", and enhanced profitability for companies who heed these principles; and enhanced, better service-rendering by those civil servants who are somehow imbued with the sense of brotherhood and humanity engendered in Ubuntu (Mnyandu 1997:77-91; Deacon 1998:5-9; Clapper 1996:27-29). Yet Ubuntu and the general tradition of communalism has drawn a number of important criticisms as well.

It has for example been criticised for becoming something of a money-making venture for certain corporate management gurus and certain other academics (Deacon 1998:59; Maluleke 1999:12-13). It has also been criticized for being irrelevant for today's highly competitive international economic environment, not least because of the fact that whilst South Africa, conceivably following the assumedly ethical principles of Ubuntu, might be acting more ethically; other role players in the international economy might not act as ethically, to the disadvantage of South Africa. In this respect therefore, supporters of Ubuntu are criticised for visualizing the world along rather ethical terms which the world, in practice, does not really follow (Maluleke 1999:12-13).

To these criticisms one must add another criticism or disadvantage of Ubuntu tradition, which will re-emerge below in Gyekye's discussion of the negative aspects of African tradition. Despite the supposed sense of humanity and brotherhood supposedly inherent

in African tradition, the fact is that these more positive aspects of tradition somehow only   apply to members of a community - community insiders. The same cordial treatment is not afforded to people from outside the communal grouping - community outsiders, as could be seen by constant conflict between different ethnic and clan groupings in Africa before, during and after colonialism (Gyekye 1996:29-32). In fact the treatment dished out by community insiders to community outsiders is often everything but humane, human, brotherly or even just cordial in that, plainly put, communal outsiders are often perceived as mortal enemies who, by the mere fact of being outsiders are often seen as deserving rather rough treatment - often leading to death for witches and death for other enemies of the community (Turaki 1999:132-135). Within South Africa, this finds expression in the behaviour of opposing taxi operator groupings in townships, as well as witch-hunts and other forms of mob justice (Lawuyi 1998:83-93). And as we've seen in chapter 4, the behaviour of different groupings in townships, for example hostel-dwellers versus township residents, are influenced by the same dynamics. Not only was (and is) behaviour towards outsiders in traditional and today's Africa not cordial in practice, but behaviour by tribal chiefs towards their own subjects, within their own communities, was often not cordial either.   Often tribal chiefs killed many of their own subjects (community members) at whim (Gyekye 1996:29-32). Especially after the death of a chief, for example, many innocent members of the tribe would be put to death, so that these victims could follow (and serve) the departed chief in the afterlife (Gyekye 1996:29-32).

This macabre note brings us to the negative aspects of tradition, in which much of the above debate is repeated. Gyekye (1997:248-258) points out a number of negative aspects of African tradition as well, with implications for development:

A   In Africa there is excessive reverence for the ancestors and other African Cosmological figures - including the despisement of so-called witches. Not only does it lead to witch-hunts with its negative consequences for suspected witches, but such beliefs that almost any happening can be attributed to changes of favour among the ancestors and the activities of suspected witches, according to Gyekye (1997:248-258), counters the rationalistic scientific reasoning necessary for the study and understanding of science and technology, necessary for Africa's (and South Africa's) development. Although this does act as a constraint, negatively affecting black students especially, according to Gyekye (1997:248-258), because of this negative aspect of African tradition, an emphasis must be put witin education on Western physical sciences in order to encourage the scientific thinking, needed to counter these beliefs in causality, witchcraft and ancestorship that, by affecting Africans' thinking, are counterproductive for the acquisition and undersanding of science and technology necessary for development (Gyekye 1997:248-28). As a reflection of this belief in the need to emphasize science and technology, the South African government is currently putting great emphasis on science and technology in education; seen as being of

vital importance for South Africa's future development in a global economy (Sunday Times, 5 August 2001:19; Pretoria News, 7 December 2000:4).

B   The often excessive emphasis on the maintenance of good communal values which, although it has positive points such as the maintenance of the above-mentioned sense of Humanism, and the positive activities of Stokvels within black township communities, this sense of good communal relations nevertheless does present problems in that it can breed corruption as resources are used as a means for enrichment of the self and one's followers (kin, friends, and so on) as a means of maintaining one's position within that communal grouping. And unfortunately, as Gyekye (1997:248-258), Chabal and Daloz (1999:96-101) and Hyden (1983:1-29) point out, a general social tendency emerges from this which condones and indeed accepts such negative practices as corruption merely because it is seen as acceptable based on the fact that the surrounding community somehow benefits - even if it is illegally - from such behaviour.

C   The ethnically plural character of the African nation-state has led to a plurality of cultures (read communities, each community practicing its own communalism) that led to excessive group loyalties - used as a means of defining behaviour towards others from within the group itself, versus a different type of behaviour towards people who are outsiders to the group. A variant to this is the ethnic loyalty

and support enjoyed by politicians who are known to be corrupt, but who are nevertheless supported for being big men in the group. The problem of corruption and Prebendalism must be seen as another manifestation of this tendency. The perceived rising problem of corruption within the South African state could be however, at least partially, linked to this, as noted above (Gyekye 1997:248-258).

D   These attitudes towards communal insiders versus outsiders have an impact on the state - colonial in design, which, because of the fact that in Africa the state is not deeply rooted in society - due to colonial and post-colonial practices, falls victim to various types of corrupt practices - for example Prebendalism (Joseph 1983:31-33) - draining away resources for development (Gyekye 1997:248-258). And frankly the state becomes more discredited in the eyes of the populace if it somehow, implicitly or explicitly, associates itself with communal outsiders, such as people perceived by the community to be witches (Geschiere 1996:308-318; Rowlands and Warnier 1988:120-135; Niehaus 1998:93-114; Ashforth 1998:527-531).

E   Finally, Gyekye (1997:248-258) points out that in Africa every child, whether born in or out of wedlock, is considered a human being who should be received in the human family. Although its a great example of human love - a manifestation of the traditional sense of community and humanity noted above, that ought to be cherished, this principle has given

free rein to irresponsible young and unmarried couples to produce children - even if the mother sometimes cannot identify the father - a responsibility which, more often than not, ends up falling on the shoulders of the state, as the South African state is experiencing now. Again, this tendency is negative for development.

Based on the above description of the positive and negative aspects of tradition, and a few examples of how this point can impact on development efforts in practice; there are two inter-related theoretical points concerning the exact relationship and interaction between tradition and modernity which I think should now be mentioned, precisely because of its implications for development theory and practice.

The first theoretical point that I would like to highlight concerns the fact that implicit within this discussion among many quarters (for example post-development theories) is the implicit and explicit idea that somehow the positive aspects of tradition can, through some well-planned, concerted efforts, be emphasized. Furthermore, it is also assumed in the same quarters that, again through education and some concerted efforts, that the negative parts of tradition could (and would) somehow disappear, or just fall by the wayside.

Yet tradition can have ingrained within itself some aspects which can be negative for development, despite efforts to give tradition a pro-developmental aspect. Briefly moving our focus towards Islamic Fundamentalism (also called Islamism) for example, it is clear that,

without going too deeply into a theological debate, certain aspects of Islam, and efforts aimed at keeping up the Islamic nature of a society can be negative for development. An example of this is shown by the role of the Muslim woman within the Islamic Fundamentalist movement. Ironically, Islamic Fundamentalism did bring about a certain increased, if limited, freedom for certain professional Islamic women. Thus within political debates surrounding Islamic Fundamentalism, for example, female Muslim writers, journalists, academics and other professional women, again pursuing their careers within the context of their fervent support of Islamism, have found within their careers, linked as these careers were to their personal support for Islamic Fundamentalism, a new fulfillment, a new aspect to their lives, and a new voice for women within Islamic society; which started to change their outlooks as regards the socially-imposed traditional life cycles generally imposed on women within Islamic societies (Nilufer 2000:93-101).

These social outlooks on expected life-cycles for women (women seen only as spouses and mothers, subordinate and obedient to their husbands and male relatives, often leaving women with few rights as opposed to men) are becoming less appealing to these professional Muslim women who, through the pursuit of their respective careers, found, and continue to find, fulfillment outside of this socially-imposed life-cycle for women (Nilufer 2000:93-101).

Paradoxically at the same time however, professional Muslim womens' ambitions to find fulfillment within their careers, outside of the socially dictated life-cycle and social role expected of them, is

however curtailed to a great extent by many of the moral codes applied within society by the same Islamic Fundamentalist movement which gave these women new voices and support for their careers, leading directly or indirectly to the limiting of their new freedom within their societies. These strict moral codes tend to limit their freedom from the traditional socially-accepted and imposed life-cycle, and thus limit their developmental capacity. Indeed, this paradox is neatly encapsulated in the phrase "paradox of the forbidden modern" (Nilufer 2000:93-101).

Hence, as this brief discussion of Islam shows, despite romanticized notions regarding the exclusively positive aspects of tradition contained in certain theories, tradition, and a return to such tradition, can hold negative aspects too, and these aspects can negatively influence on human development.

Back in Southern Africa, and with focus on this thesis, in Chapter 3, we saw that the positive aspects of African Communal tradition, as manifested in Stokvels, co-existed with the negative aspects of the same African Communal tradition: beliefs in witchcraft, bewitchment and the witch-hunts which such beliefs often lead to. In Chapter 4 we saw another negative aspect of African tradition as present within an urban environment - namely the insider versus outsider dynamic, and the injury, destruction and death this causes. To me, all these above examples indicate that tradition is an entity with both positive and negative aspects as well. This is precisely because the positive and negative aspects of tradition make up the organic whole of tradition. Hence the positive and negative aspects of tradition cannot

be neatly separated, neither in theory nor in practice, precisely because, at least in practice, the positive and negative aspects of tradition make up an inseparable, organic whole.

Tradition will thus continuously manifest itself in its positive and negative aspects as well not least because, as we've seen in this thesis, tradition can flexibly change itself to suit different prevailing circumstances, precisely because of the same organic, and yet also flexible nature of tradition. This flexibility holds for both the positive and the negative aspects of tradition. This, in my opinion, explains why, despite Western education, beliefs in witchcraft and bewitchment remained, and were strengthened. This also explains why the traditional communal tendency towards group formation, group dynamics and the insider versus outsider dynamics form very important elements of African politics, and politics (and social interaction) within urban and rural black communities of South Africa. This is so particularly during times of extreme social, political and economic stress.

Again, precisely because of the ability of negative aspects of tradition to persist and accompany the positive aspects of tradition, both the positive and negative aspects of tradition can flexibly acclimatise themselves within different environments. This was the case in a Western-influenced urban environment, as the Hostel War and the community dynamics surrounding the belligerence shows us. One therefore cannot merely try to separate the negative from the positive, since the positive and negative aspects of tradition in general, including African tradition, persist, co-exist and are always

present, even within an urban environment, within our global, highly technological era.

Based on the above theoretical observation about the positive and negative aspects of tradition, and the undichotomised, interlinked, organic interaction of these positive and negative aspects of tradition with Western influences through tradition's general ability, both in its positive and negative aspects, to interact with other, including Western, influences; the following second theoretical point must be made, with practical implications for development theory and practice.

The second theoretical point, with practical implications, is that when it comes to development theory, policy and practice, one should therefore try to avoid two extremes. The one extreme is the uncritical application of Western-originating ideas, theories and practices, even within a black urban environment; since the Westerncentric assumptions behind these Western-originating ideas and practices might not be the same as conceptions present in practice within an African context. The other extreme is an uncritical application of tradition seen almost as a golden key to solving developmental problems. This is because tradition has positive and negative aspects to it that will simultaneously positively and negatively impact on development. This is because within tradition's flexibility in accommodating within itself Western influences, it shows this flexibility both within tradition's positive aspects and negative aspects. In other words both the positive aspects of tradition, and the negative aspects of the same tradition

are flexible in accommodating within themselves Western (and other) influences.

And this is indeed a weakness of some of the post-development literature and theories (such as Ubuntu) which sees tradition as a golden panacea for development. For much of it does not recognize the limitations and problems inherent within tradition. Instead, whatever developmental theory or policy is adhered to, and eventually put into practice, will have to be based and designed around an honest, critical assessment of both Western-originating theories and programmes, and tradition-based programmes. This critical assessment of both Western-originating theories and programmes, and tradition-based theories and programmes, will have to be itself based on an honest, critical assessment of social reality present in the country at any given time: based on the realization that tradition in its positive and negative aspects, through its flexibility, plays a definite role within social reality, even within an urban environment; and will therefore have positive and negative developmental consequences.

Such an honest conceptualization of developmental problems, itself based on an honest interpretation of what is happening on the ground, within social reality, taking into account the flexibility of tradition to manifest itself in various forms within society, is in my view more likely to be developmentally successful than theories based on an idealistic conception of developmental problems and developmental solutions, themselves often based on somewhat limited conceptions of reality on the ground.

Thus whatever may be the true path to development, will in my

opinion be guided by an objective and honest appraisal of circumstances on the ground, and the positive and negative role of tradition in the formation of that reality, and the possibilities and limitations set by tradition on developmental reality.

5.5 *Conclusion*

This chapter has tried to first come up with a more undichotomized way of dealing with the interaction between tradition and modernity: a way of dealing with the interaction between the categories of tradition and modernity that somehow makes sense of and gives reasoning to the survival of traditional elements in an urban environment. The point has been made, in this regard, that tradition is not an inflexible entity; but instead it is a somewhat flexible entity that is able to accommodate other influences, and because of that, tradition has found practical application in an urban environment as a means of conceptualizing, explaining and dealing with the stresses and strains of an urban environment. Precisely because of this, tradition plays an important role both in a rural and an urban environment, and because of this, we looked at a number of possible effects of tradition on development. Some effects are positive and some effects are negative for development. There are also problems in trying to emphasize just the positive aspects of tradition over the negative aspects; in that the positive and negative aspects form the inseparable organic whole of tradition. A plea was finally made to come up with an objective analysis of the tradition and modernity interaction, both in terms of how this interaction is occurring on a societal level on the ground; and how this interaction

can impact positively and negatively on development. Although no solution was offered for solving the problems offered by both Western and African tradition-based approaches to development, it is the contention here that wherever the solution may lie, an analysis of the modernity and tradition interaction as conceptualised here is necessary in order to build proper, successful developmental theories and insights that could work in the future.

Chapter 6   Conclusion

Briefly, the argument and findings of each chapter can be highlighted as follows:

Chapter 1 sketched the background of the thesis, and described the research problem, hypothesis and structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2 described modernization theory, and highlighted its shortcomings. Essentially modernization theory is only an idealized model (also containing certain undesirable elements), to which all societies to various extents, even Western society, do not meet up to. South African social reality does not meet up to the social expectations of modernization either. Yet, as pointed out in this chapter, ANC government policy is based on an inherent assumption of South African social conditions emulating modernization expectations.

Chapter 3 concentrated on Stokvel and African Cosmological beliefs. The point was made that these institutions and beliefs rooted in African tradition have evolved and flexibly integrated certain Western elements into them in order to meet the challenges presented by a Westernized socio-economic environment.

Chapter 4 found that traditional African medicine has, similar to Stokvels and African Cosmological beliefs, evolved and flexibly integrated certain Western elements in order to meet the challenges presented by a Westernized socio-economic environment. The Hostel War however shows that negative aspects of African tradition such as the traditional insider versus outsider communal ethic has also evolved in various guises to meet the challenges presented by a Westernized urban environment.

F.B.   P.T.O.

Chapter 5. Based on the arguments in the previous chapters, this chapter highlighted the problems presented by a dichotomized view of the relationship between modernity and tradition. A non-dichotomized view of their relationship was presented, the positive and negative aspects of African tradition were highlighted, and the theoretical and practical developmental implications of their appearance within a Westernized environment were analyzed.

This concluding chapter aims at rounding off this thesis, by summarizing the basic argument of each chapter, and formally linking up the first chapter, in particular the research problem and the general hypothesis as set out within the first chapter, to the arguments presented in the thesis.

In more detail, the argument in each chapter was as follows:

Chapter 1 was an introduction to the thesis, laying out the research problem, hypothesis, and the structure of the thesis.

In *Chapter 2* we examined modernization theory in the 1950s, linking it up to theories of social evolution in the 17th and 18th century which, like modernization theory in the 1950s, assumed the possibility of a sweeping change in society, after which a new start or a new society was possible (Coetzee 1989:5-36; Gross 1992:20-39). We pointed out here that a basic assumption within modernization theory is that there essentially is only one route within social evolution - the Western route, based on perceptions of the social changes that Europe underwent after the Middle Ages, and as implemented in North America from the 17th century through to the

20th century (Coetzee 1989:5-36).

After the Second World War, indeed especially during the 1950s, maybe as a manifestation of the sudden euphoria that engulfed post-war societies, the general thinking within academia and colonial administrators was that Africa (and the rest of the colonized world) was able and almost destined to follow social evolution and development along Western lines after independence, which was then looming (Coetzee 1989:5-36). Yet postcolonial experience in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world show, as Chabal and Daloz (1999:50-53) points out, that in all non-Western societies from Africa through to Japan and the Far East, Western influences did not replace traditional influences. Instead on the whole the Western influences left behind by the departing colonial powers were merely acclimatized to suit the prevailing cultural and social reality within each society. In the case of Africa for example, the tribal/ ethnic nature of the postcolonial state meant that tribalism became an important element in Africa. Within Japan and the Far East on the other hand, politics, economics, and society acclimatized itself to the prevailing teachings and work ethic of Confucius - and herein lay an important element behind the relative social stability and economic success of those societies. Within South Africa too, within certain academic circles, and especially within the ruling ANC, modernization theory in the 1950s is still widely adhered to, in the very least assumed, despite evidence showing that both white and black urban society in South Africa did not follow social evolution according to the expectations of the modernization model, leading to curious deviations from what was, until recently, the expected,

modernization theory-inspired route to social development (Chabal and Daloz 1999:5-36). From beliefs in witchcraft, to cattle slaughter for the ancestors amongst the new black elite moving into the formerly exclusively white areas of South African society, to the religious beliefs held by certain whites, are signs that social evolution in South Africa have not followed the lofty expectations of 1950s modernization theorists, expectations to which even white South Africans, Europeans and North Americans themselves do not always meet up to.

In *Chapter 3*, we firstly looked at Stokvels - community based savings efforts practised by many urban and rural South Africans (the former largely through neighbour-based organizations, and the latter generally through kinship-based organizations), regardless of income level and level of Western education. The fact that many black urbanites support such institutions, is an indication of the fact that black urbanites did not necessarily move towards greater individualism as per 1950s modernization theory prescriptions, but even on an individual basis, black urbanites long for community-based organizations. In the case of Stokvels, these organizations serve the purposes of communal or group financial and social enrichment (Lukhele 1990). The second part of chapter 3 deals with beliefs in causality, witchcraft and bewitchment amongst black urbanites.

This offered a different, and possibly unconventional angle on the communal ethic we saw above in Stokvels in that not only does the discussion show that mostly spiritual beings such as the ancestors and witches (the latter representing evil within the community) play

an important part in both rural and urban inhabitants daily lives, and perceptions related to the explanation of problems and hardships in peoples daily lives (including contact with the Western world), but it also shows the negative side of African tradition - the fact that communal outsiders are afforded very bad treatment which, in the case of witchcraft allegations, often leads to witch-hunts of alledged witches and the violence and deaths related thereto (Turaki 1999:131-135).

Chapter 4 served as a continuation of the general discussion of Chapter 3, in that this chapter dealt with the 1950s modernization theory-defined irrational beliefs of many black urbanites, again regardless of level of Western education, regarding the fact that African Cosmological figures such as the ancestors, and even more so witches, can negatively effect one's daily existence. The point has been made here that African traditional medicine has been proven to be so flexible in today's Westernized world that even sicknesses with a perfectly simple cause attributed to physiological and psychological conditions by Western biomedicine are often also given African Cosmology-based explanations as well (Western biomedicine gives the "how", African traditional medicine the "why" behind the occurrence of a disease). Apart from this, the flexibility of African traditional medicine in accommodating Western biomedical influences could also be seen by various practices of traditional African medical practitioners, running successful practices in urban South Africa, supporting an ever-growing traditional African herbal medicine trade (or muti trade in short) (Fenyves 1994; Dauskardt 1990, Williams, Balkwill and Witkowski 1997).

The second part of this fourth chapter looks at the Hostel War, which reigned between hostel and township residents on the Witwatersrand in the early 1990s. The essential point made here is that the Hostel War cannot be simplistically described as a war between hostel residents supporting Zulu tribal tradition (or Zuluness) as defined by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), versus a modernized, indeed Westernized group of township residents supporting the class-based ideology of the ANC (as opposed to the tribally-based ideology of the IFP); as a result of the tradition imposed upon hostel residents first by colonialism, and then under Apartheid (Mamdani 1996).

Instead, both in the hostel grouping and in the township grouping, regardless of ideology or party supported, one can clearly see the negative aspects of the communal spirit described in Chapter 3, in the case of ANC youths even without an overtly ethnic/ tribal basis. One can nevertheless clearly see group formation, as found in traditional rural Africa, within a South African urban environment, in both the hostel and township groupings (Marks 1995: 16-22; Straker 1992:87-105). One can also see on both sides of the conflict how one set of ethics (eg: good neighbourliness and kindness) is afforded to members of the same group (insiders), whilst another ethic or set of rules is afforded to outsider groupings, defined as enemies. In the latter case, extremely bad treatment, even death is carried out against the enemy. And it was not just hostel dwellers that engaged in such practices, but also township residents, especially the ANC-aligned township youth who, for the defence of the township community, have a nasty habit to treat enemies - outsiders - with disdain, often leading to death. This was also seen

in the way they treated persons and property associated with the state in the 1980s (often leading to the infamous necklace murder of those seen as enemies of the community). These practices were merely extended to Inkatha-supporting hostel residents in the 1990s (Marks 1995: 16-22; Straker 1992:87-105), and can now also be seen in the current problem of xenophobia.

Chapter 5 re-looked at the dichotomized relationship posited throughout much literature, including modernization theory. A new non-dichotomized conception of the relationship between modernity and tradition was advanced in this chapter. Within Chapter 5, we also critically looked at tradition, and consequences of African tradition's interaction and fusion with Western influences (which we will discuss below in our discussion of the Research Problem). Within this discussion the point was made that there are positive and negative aspects within African tradition, respectively with positive and negative consequences for development.

Yet the positive and negative aspects of tradition tend to form an organic whole, which cannot be neatly separated by simply emphasizing the developmentally positive aspects of tradition, whilst de-emphasizing the negative aspects of tradition. For no matter how one tries to de-emphasize the negative aspects of African tradition (or tradition in any society), the negative aspects tend to survive and adapt within and towards different environments (as shown by the negative aspects of tradition, as manifested in the Hostel War), with negative consequences for development and performance in the achievement of developmental goals. Although no magical solution

was offered for countering the negative aspects of tradition, nevertheless a plea was made for an objective, honest and critical analysis, both on a theoretical and on a practical level of development; of both Westerncentric and African tradition-based approaches to development, and their implications for development theory and development practice. This in itself will have to be based on an objective analysis of society at any given time. Yet this analysis of society will have to take into account the flexibility of tradition, hence its ability to be present in any given environment, even an urban one, at any given time. And based on this, both the positive and negative aspects of tradition are flexible enough to manifest themselves in different environments, even Westernized environments, at any given time, and in various manifestations. These points have an impact on developmental debates, and development in practice.

Now that we have summarised the main argument of each chapter, we must now link up the discussion to the hypothesis and the research problem, as both set out in Chapter 1.

The Hypothesis, as set out in Chapter 1, is as follows:

> "That contrary to the ideas of 1950s modernization theorists about tradition being replaced by Westerncentric definitions of modernity (as described above) within the developing world, including a black South African urban environment, modernization and an urban existence among black South Africans has not destroyed their traditional beliefs, institutions and practices. Instead these beliefs (in causality, witchcraft

and bewitchment, in various forms of communalism including tribalism, traditional leadership and traditional African herbal medicine) are still important components of their modern urban existence; but have also adapted (and continue to adapt) in various forms as a response to the stresses and strains of a Westernized urban environment, and today's modern world. Such adaptations however do not occur in ways that fulfill Westerncentric social, political and economic definitions of modernity, as prevalent in the 1950s; but rather these adaptations lead to the continuation of these traditional African - indeed communal - beliefs and practices within an urban environment, through the flexible accommodation of Western influences into these traditional beliefs and practices (the concept of fusion between traditional and Western practices). This point has great implications for development and human welfare, particularly in South Africa today".

As regards the hypothesis, the important point must be made that, contrary to the expectations of 1950s modernization theorists, African tradition has survived into today's world, and has also settled in various guises within an urban environment. As pointed out in Chapter 3, the communal concept lies behind today's strength of the Stokvel movement, both in the countryside and in the urban areas (with some changes, in order to accommodate urban circumstances); communal interaction for personal financial and social gain. Also in Chapter 3, we saw that traditional African Cosmological beliefs in the ancestors and bewitchment, have survived into today's urban environment - it is in fact used today to

explain many of the stresses and strains experienced by people within both a rural and an urban environment (Ashforth 1996 and 1998; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a and b).

In Chapter 4 we saw that traditional African medicine (and the accompanying trade in traditional African medicines) is very active in the urban areas, involving black South Africans of many walks of life, and all levels of Western education, even the highest. We also saw a "fusion" or a merger occurring between traditional African and Western biomedical medicine practice; showing how traditional African medicine, through taking in Western influences, has made itself relevant to today, and in the future, in an urban environment within South Africa (Fenyves 1994). In the second part of Chapter 4, we saw not only that tribal-based group identification (and bad treatment of enemies) can find a home within an urban environment, among Zulu hostel residents; but that similar processes of how to treat an outsider, identified and defined as an enemy, need not necessarily only occur under a tribal label and demarcation; but can also occur in the class-based politics practiced by township youths (Marks 1995: 16-22; Straker 1992:87-105). In other words, the insider versus outsider, which alternatively translates to a friend versus enemy dynamic can occur in many urban conditions, without necessarily gaining a tribal/ ethnic label; again showing the existence of tradition within an urban environment, and the flexibility of tradition to adapt to many circumstances within an urban environment.

Based on this insider-outsider group dynamic, Chapter 5 gave a

critical appraisal of Ubuntu, as preached by many in South Africa, especially after 1990; pointing out that the negative aspects of the insider-outsider group dynamic, as pointed out above, is not portrayed within the somewhat romanticised views of Ubuntu and African tradition portrayed within some academic circles. Positive and negative aspects of African tradition, and its effects on an urban black environment, with implications for development, were also looked at in this chapter.

Hence in a nutshell as regards the hypothesis of this thesis, as set out above, one could say that different aspects of rural pre-colonial tradition as discussed above have become part of an urban environment, and have evolved, with certain basic continuations of tradition, to become an instrumental part of an urban environment. And the fact that they have evolved, for example the insider-outsider dynamic has become an important element of political protest (and practice) in the townships in the 1980s and 1990s, and the fact that African Cosmological beliefs seem to be becoming more apparent as a result of the stresses and strains of an urbanized environment, without its believers necessarily seeing any clash between their beliefs and the Westernized world they are living in, is proof that tradition is a flexible entity that is capable of adapting to several environments, in different forms, and is able to play an instrumental role within peoples' lives.

The Research Problem, as set out in Chapter 1, is as follows:

> "A literature exists that shows that contrary to the broad expectations of modernization theorists, traditional cultural institutions, beliefs and practices have survived to the modern

era throughout the world, including among modern urban black South Africans. With reference to selected aspects (communalism, causality and witchcraft, traditional leadership and traditional medicine) how do such beliefs manifest themselves; how do they interact and fuse with modernity (in other words how do these aspects of tradition affect modernity, and how are these aspects of tradition influenced by modernity); and how will these traditional cultural aspects (communalism, causality and witchcraft, traditional leadership and traditional medicine) affect urban black South Africans and South Africa's present pursuit of modernization, development and human welfare?

As a by-product of the main line of argument of this thesis, linked in particular with the developmental effects of my arguments, I will also show that there is a pro-tradition developmental (and post-development) literature which this thesis will show in a critical light, given the negative sides of tradition shown in this thesis".

Above, both within the summary of each chapter's main argument, and within the application of the findings to the hypothesis of the thesis, the point has been made that tradition is still proverbially alive and well within an urban environment, and is indeed merging, or fusing, with Western influences. In Chapter 5 especially, the argument was made that tradition is a flexible (as opposed to an inflexible) entity, able to accommodate and merge within itself, and indeed adapting within itself, Western influences. By making itself

more relevant to the present, by adapting within itself Western influences, tradition makes itself more relevant for the future, thus ensuring its survival.

From this point, what becomes clear is the instrumental nature of tradition. In other words, tradition, in order to continue to survive into the future, it has to prove some instrumental quality within peoples' current lives, in order for people to continue to believe in tradition. Looking at the aspects of tradition investigated in this thesis, one can see within each aspect of tradition, some form of an instrumental means with an effect on peoples' daily existence. Stokvels' communal concept fulfills peoples' need for companionship and financial gain; beliefs in witchcraft, bewitchment and causality satisfies peoples' need for a framework to understand why things happen and why things go wrong. Tribal/ ethnic tradition has been used to explain what lay behind the daily miseries faced by hostel inmates especially since the tumultuous changes of the 1980s. And tradition - in terms of how outsider enemies are treated, lay behind both hostel and township residents' treatment of each other. In the case of township youth, the community and the protection of the community, gave them a sense of purpose in the light of factors such as unemployment and a stark township existence. Hence tradition's ability to merge current influences, and give meaning to current influences, make it seen as relevant for the present, giving tradition an instrumental role within today's world, both in a rural and an urban environment.

Yet all of the above have positive and negative developmental

implications. Tradition does have some positive aspects. For example Stokvels are manifestations of the traditional African communal ethic, as it moved from a more strictly kinship basis in the rural areas, to a broader social basis in the urban areas, involving friends and neighbours for still the same purpose of the use of the local community to address a family's needs; offering savings and community interaction mechanisms important for development both materially and psychologically. Adherence to African Cosmological beliefs however, on the whole, have negative consequences for development. Not only does such thinking contribute to witch-hunts and the death, misery and destruction this causes for victims; but African Cosmological beliefs, and the unscientific thinking these beliefs encourage, counter the rationalistic, scientific modes of thinking which Africans need to adopt in order to understand and implement Western science and technology, seen as necessary for Africa's (and South Africa's) development. A call is thus made to African governments to put an emphasis on Western scientific and technological education in order to counter these problems caused by African Cosmological beliefs, and the excessive beliefs in causality these beliefs create (Gyekye 1997). In this respect, it must be noted that the South African government is currently putting great emphasis on science and technology within education.

African Cosmological beliefs and the misery it produces for alleged witches, manifests itself in other ways within an urban environment and broader African society as well. This is because witches are seen as communal outsiders - hence the accusations of witchcraft against them. The same bad treatment is reserved for other

communal outsiders as well. And this was shown in the way both hostel and township communities treated each other during the infamous Hostel War of the early 1990s. Hence this negative insider versus outsider dynamic manifests itself within other social and political contexts, negative for development. This ethic is also corruptive in that persons are encouraged to engage in corrupt and unethical practices merely because they are members of the same community, and fellow insiders stand to benefit from such corruption (Gyekye 1997).

As for traditional African medicine, adhered to by many black urbanites, it is important to note that due to various negative medical consequences of it, African traditional medicinal practices must be taken with a great amount of circumspection and scientific investigation before becoming officially accepted. This must also be noted in developmental debates about the use of traditional African medicine for South Africans' medical needs.

As such therefore, for as much as Westerncentric approaches to development have not performed well, tradition does not necessarily hold the key to development, contrary to the writings of some post-development writers. And since the positive and negative aspects of tradition form an organic whole, and thus go largely hand-in-hand; it does not help to merely emphasise the positive aspects of tradition, for the negative aspects of tradition, for as much as these are ignored by many, will still manifest themselves. Hence, as pointed out in Chapter 5, a critical, objective and honest appraisal will have to be made of both Western-defined modernity and

tradition, and respectively Western-originating developmental approaches, and developmental approaches rooted within African tradition. Although no magic solution has been offered here, a plea has been made for the adoption of an open-minded, critical attitude towards developmental models. Reality as it is on the ground, as opposed to reality as what one would like it to be must be seeked. For only through such a realistic analysis, as well as an analysis of how tradition manifests itself within this reality, can practical working developmental approaches be built.

7   *Sources Consulted*

Newspapers consulted
(Bibliographical details contained in the text of the thesis)

City Press

The Daily News

Germiston City News

Mail and Guardian

The Natal Witness

Pretoria News

Rapport

Sowetan

Sowetan Sunday World

The Star

Sunday Sun

Sunday Times

Books, Journal Articles and other sources consulted:

- Adam, H. and Moodley, K. 1992. Political violence, "tribalism" and Inkatha. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 30, no. 3, 1992, pp. 485-510.

- Adande, A.S. 1990. Tradition and development in Benin. Contained in *Development in Africa today*. 1990. Paris: Unesco.

- Agonjo-Okawe, P.L. 1990. Tradition, Law, Health and Development. Contained in *Tradition and Development in Africa today*. 1990. Paris: Unesco.

- Albrow, M. 1996. *The Global Age - State and Society Beyond Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Alexander, J. 1995. Modern, anti, post and neo. *New Left Review*. No. 210, 1995.

- Ashforth, A. 1996. Of secrecy and the commonplace: Witchcraft and power in Soweto. *Social Research*. Vol. 63, No. 4 (Winter 1996).

- Ashforth, A. 1998. Witchcraft, Violence and Democracy in the New South Africa. *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, 150-152, 1998, 2-4.

F.B.

- Ashforth, A. 1999. Weighing manhood in Soweto. _Codesria Bulletin_ 3 and 4, 1999.

- Barendse, E. and Best, L. 1992. A nightmare in Nelspruit - Witchcraft in the Workplace. _Indicator SA_. Vol. 9, No. 2, Autumn 1992.

- Barendse, E. ; Best, L. ; Dederen, G. 1993. Witchcraft in the workplace. _Productivity S.A._ November/ December 1993.

- Bates, R.H. 1974: Ethnic competition and modernization in contemporary Africa. _Comparative Political Studies_, January 1974, Vol. 6 No. 4:457-484

- Bayart, J.F. ; Ellis, S. ; Hibbou, B. 1999. _The Criminalization of the State in Africa_. Oxford: James Currey; Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Becker, P. 1974. _Tribe to Township_. Frogmore, Herts: Panther Books.

- Beinart, W. 1992. Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography. _Journal of Southern African Studies_. Vol. 18, no. 3, September 1992, pp. 455-487.

- Berkeley, B. 1996. The "new" South Africa: violence works.

World Policy Journal. Vol. 13, no. 73-80. Winter 1996/7.

- Bester, C.W. 1994. The Consequences of Urbanization and Westernization on Black Family Life in South Africa. *Maatskaplike Werk/ Social Work.* Vol. 30, no. 2 (June). 1994. pp. 101-106.

- Blomstrom, M. and Hettne, B. 1984. *Development Theory in Transition - The Dependency Debate and Beyond: Third World Responses.* London: Zed.

- Bodibe, W.J.M. 1988. *The Inclusion of Traditional Healers in a Mental Health Team - A Social Work Perspective.* M.A. Thesis in the Dept. of Social Work, Unisa.

- Botha, J. 1998 Developing an understanding of problems being experienced by traditional healers living on the Western border of the Kruger National Park: foundations for an integrated conservation and development programme. *Development Southern Africa.* Vol. 15, No. 4, Summer 1998

- Brookbanks, C.A. 1990. *Holistic Approaches to Psychotherapy and the Traditional healer.* M.A. Thesis, Department of Psychology, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg.

- Brzezinski, Z. 1993. *Out of Control - Global Turmoil on*

the Eve of the 21st Century. New York: Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing Company.

- Burger, A.P. (ed.). 1996. *Ubuntu - Cradles of Peace and Development*. Pretoria: Kagiso Publishers.

- Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.P. 1999. *Africa Works - Disorder as Political Instrument*. Oxford: James Currey, and Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Chadford, K. 1995. *South African Management Principles Within Stokvels*. M.B.A. Thesis. Johannesburg: Wits Business School; University of the Witwatersrand .

- Chazan, N. ; Mortimer, R. ; Ravenhill, J. ; Rothchild, D. . 1992. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*. Second Edition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

- Clapper, V.A. 1996. Ubuntu and the Public Official. *Publico*. Vol. 16, no. 6, Dec. 1996.

- Coetzee, J.K. (ed.) 1989: *Development is for People*. Halfway House: Southern Book Publishers.

- Colson, E. 2000. The Father as Witch. *Africa* 70(3) 2000.

- Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. 1999a. Occult economies and the violence of abstraction: notes from the South African

postcolony. *American Ethnologist*. No. 2, May 1999, pp. 279-303.

- Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. 1999b. Alien Nation: Zombies, Immigrants and Millennial Capitalism. *Codesria Bulletin*, 3 and 4, 1999.

- Conco, W.Z. 1991. Zulu traditional medicine: It's role in traditional society. *Community Health in Southern Africa*. Vol. 6, no. 3, Oct. 1991, pp. 8-13.

- Crais, C. 1998. Of men, magic and the law: popular justice and the political imagination in South Africa. *Journal of Social History*. Vol. 32, no. 1, 1998.

- Dauskardt, R.P.A. 1990. The changing geography of Traditional Medicine: Urban Herbalism on the Witwatersrand, South Africa. *Geo-Journal*. 22.3. pp. 275-283.

- Davies, O. 1997. Urbanization and the decline of witchcraft: an examination of London. *Journal of Social History*. Vol. 30, no. 3, Spring 1997.

- Deacon, M. 1998. The Ethics of Ubuntu. *Word and Action*. Vol. 38, no. 365. Spring 1998. pp. 5-9.

- Decalo, S. 1985. African Personal Dictatorships. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 23, 2 (1985), pp. 209-

237.

- Dia, M. 1996. *Africa's Management in the 1990's and Beyond - Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions*. Washington: World Bank.

- Dlamini, S.N. 1998. The Construction, Meaning and Negotiation of Ethnic Identities in Kwa-Zulu Natal. *Social Identities*. Vol. 4, no. 3, October 1998 (473-497).

- Douglas, M. 1999. Sorcery accusations unleashed: The Lele revisited, 1987. *Africa* 69(2) 1999.

- *Drum*, No. 213, Oct. 3, 1996. No author mentioned. Slaughter of the cows: Storm over Miss S.A and ritual killings.

- Du Plessis, N. 2001. Socio-economic and political development and human rights. *Africanus* 31(2) 2001.

- Dwivedi, O.P. 1990. Development Administration: it's heritage, culture and challenges. *Canadian Public Administration*. Vol. 33, no. 1, 1990.

- Edwards, S.D.; Grobbelaar, P.W.; Nene, L.M.; Makunga, N.V.; Kunene, S.T.; Sibaya, P.T. 1983a. *Indigenous African Healers and Western Trained Psychologists, a Comparative Study of Interview Methods*. Kwa

Dlangezwa: University of Zululand. Publication Series B. No. 38.

- Edwards, S.D. ; Grobbelaar, P.W. ; Nene, L.M. ; Makunga, N.V. ; Kunene, S.T. ; Sibaya, P.T. 1983b. *Reaction to Illness and Concepts of Mental Illness Among Representative Samples of Rural, Urban and University Educated Black People*. Kwa-Dlangezwa: University of Zululand. Publication series B, no. 26.

- Elder, G.S. 1995; *Apartheid, Geography and Gender: Transforming South Africa's Migrant Worker Hostels*. PhD Thesis. Clarke University, 1995. UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, MI.

- Elliott, J. 1984. Black medical students and African Cosmological beliefs. *Africa Insight*. Vol. 14, no. 2, 1984.

- Emmett, A.B. , 1983. Underdevelopment and dependency. Contained in Kotze, D.A. (ed.) *Development Policies and approaches in Southern Africa*. 1983. Pretoria: Academica.

- Engelbrecht, K. 1999. Curse of the demons: priests called in to drive evil spirits from schoolgirl. *Drum*. No. 256, July 1, 1999. pp. 92-93.

- Etzioni-Halevy, E. 1981. *Social Change - the Advent and*

Maturation of Modern Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

- Ewing, D. 1995. The Cause of the King. *Leadership*. 1995, Vol. 14, no. 2.

− Fanon, F. 1990. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

- Farrand, D. 1980. *An Analysis of Indigenous Healing in Suburban Johannesburg*. MA Thesis, Dept. of Psychology. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

- Fenyves, K. 1994. *South African Traditional Healers' Organizations in the context of Traditionalism and Modernism*. M.A. Thesis. Department of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

- Ferguson, J. 1999. *Expectations of Modernity - Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- *The Final Constitution* 1996. Tutorial letter PWSALL-H/304/1996. Department of Political Sciences. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

- *Financial Mail*, Vol. 109, no. 13, 30 September 1988, pp. 32-33. Informal credit: Buddy, can you spare me a dime? (No

author given).

- Flint, J. 1983. Planned Decolonization and it's failure in British Africa. *African Affairs*. Vol. 82, No. 328, 1983, pp. 389-411

- Fogel-Chance, N. 1993. Living in both worlds: "Modernity" and "Tradition" among North Slope Inupiaq women in Anchorage. *Arctic Anthropology*. Vol. 30, no. 1, 1993.

- *The Freedom Charter*. 1990. Johannesburg: African National Congress (Published by the Release Mandela Campaign).

- Freeman, M. and Motsei, M.; 1992. Planning healthcare in South Africa. Is there a role for traditional healers? *Social Science and Medicine*. Vol. 34, no. 11, pp. 1183-1190.

- Geschiere, P. 1996. Chiefs and the problem of witchcraft - varying patterns in South and West Cameroon. *Journal of Legal Pluralism*. 1996 - nr. 37-38.

- Goldstuck, A. 1993. *The Leopard in the Luggage - Urban Legends from Southern Africa*. London: Penguin Books.

- Goldstuck, A. 1994. *Ink in the Porridge - Urban legends of the South African elections*. London: Penguin Books.

- Green, E.C. 1994. *Aids and STD's in Africa - Bridging the Gap Between Traditional Healing and Modern Medicine*. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.

- Gross, D. 1992. *The Past in Ruins*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

- Gugushe, R.N. 1984. The urban black in Western society. *Africa Insight*, Vol. 14, no. 2, 1984.

- Gumede, M.V. 1990. *Traditional Healers - A medical doctors' perspective*. Braamfontein: Skotaville Publishers.

- Gyekye, K. 1996. *African Cultural Values - An Introduction*. Philadelphia: Sankofa Publishing Company.

- Gyekye, K. 1997. *Tradition and Modernity - Philosophical Reflections on the African experience*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Hibbou, B. 1999. The "Social Capital" of the State as an Agent of Deception - or the Ruses of Economic Intelligence. Contained in Bayart, J.F. ; Ellis, S. ; Hibbou, B. 1999. *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey; Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Hintjiens, H.M. 1999. Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37, 2

(1999).

- Hyden, G. 1983. *No Shortcuts to Progress*. London: Heinemann.

- Illy, H.F. 1986. Myth and reality of public administration in Africa. *Education*. Vol. 34, no. 2, 1986.

- Inkatha Freedom Party (1993). *Inkatha Freedom Party: Comments on the Third Interim Report of the Goldstone Commission*.

- Islam, N. and Henault, G.M. 1979. From GNP to Basic Needs: A critical review of development and development administration. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. No. 45, 1979; pp. 253-267.

- Jeffries, R. 1993. The State, Structural Adjustment and Good Government in Africa. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. Vol. 31, no. 1, 1993, pp. 20-35.

- Jolles, F. and Jolles, S. 2000. Zulu ritual immunization in perspective. *Africa* 70(2) 2000.

- Joseph, R.A. 1983. Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. Vol. XXI, November 1983, No. 3.

- Kasfir, N. 1983. Relating Class to State in Africa. *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. Vol. XXI, November 1993. No. 3.

- Khumalo, E. 1995. Tokoloshe Haunts Free State School. *Pace*. November 1995, pp. 42-44.

- Kiernan, J.P. 1984. A cesspool of sorcery: How Zionists Visualize and Respond to the City. *Urban Anthropology*. Vol. 13 (2-3), 1984.

- Klaits, S. 1985. *Servants of Satan - The Age of the Witch Hunts*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Kunnie, J. 1992. *Indigenous African Churches and Religio-Cultural Liberation: the Practice of Traditional Healing*. Paper presented at the 35th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Seattle, Washington, 20-23 November 1992. No. 1992:141.

- La Hausse, P. 1984. *The struggle for the city: alcohol, the ematseni and popular culture in Durban, 1902-1936*. M.A. Thesis, University of Cape Town.

- Langewerf, L. 1992. *Witchcraft, Sorcery and Spirit Possession - Pastoral Responses in Africa*. Gweru: Mambo Press.

- Larson, T.J. 1989. Sorcery and witchcraft with the Bayeyi and Hambukushu: A cross-cultural comparison. *South African Journal of Ethnology*. 1989, 12(4).

- Lawrence, M. 1992. Chiefs, Tribal Authority and Village Education. *Matlhasedi*, Vol. 11, No. 1, July 1992. pp.19-23.

- Lawuyi, O.B. ; Acts of persecution in the name of tradition in contemporary South Africa. *Dialectical Anthropology*, 23:83-95, 1998.

- Lee, K. and Lee, H.J. 1992. States, Markets and Economic Development in East Asian Capitalism and Socialism. *Development Policy Review*. Vol. 10 (1992), 107-130.

- Leftwich, A. 1993. Governance, democracy and development in the Third World. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1993.

- Leftwich, A. 1995. Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State. *The Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, February 1995. pp. 400-427.

- Lukhele, A.K. 1990. *Stokvels in South Africa - Informal Savings Schemes By Blacks for the Black Community*. Randburg: Amagi Books.

- Lutz, J.G. and El-Shaikhs, S. 1982: *Tradition and Modernity - The Role of Traditionalism in the Modernization Process*. Washington: University Press of America.

- Macdonald, K. 1992. Making cents. *Fair Lady*. August 12, 1992, pp. 92-96.

- Mafokane, M.S. 1990. Belief systems as an obstacle to the development of rural women and the implications for social work practice. *Social Work*. Vol. 34, no. 2, June 1998.

- Maluleke, T. 1999. The Misuse of "Ubuntu". *Challenge*. No. 53, 1999.

- Maluleke, J. and Horler, A. 1995. The Zombie Hunter. *Drum*, July 1995

- Mamdani, M. 1996. *Citizen and Subject - contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers; Cape Town: David Philip; London: James Currey.

- Marinovich, G. and Silva, J. 2000. *The Bang-Bang Club - Snapshots from a Hidden War*. London: William Heinemann.

- Mare, G. 2000. Versions of Resistance History in South

Africa: the ANC Strand in Inkatha in the 1970's and 1980's. *Review of African Political Economy*. No. 83:63-79.

- Marks, M. 1995. *"We are Fighting for the Liberation of our People": Justifications of Violence by Activist Youth in Diepkloof, Soweto*. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Institute for Advanced Social Research. Seminar Paper (No. 385) presented in Richard Ward Building, Seventh Floor, Seminar Room 7003 on the 28th August 1995.

- Mazrui, A.A. 1978. Negritude, the Talmudic Tradition and the Intellectual Performance of Blacks and Jews. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 1, no. 1, January 1978.

- Mills, J. 1983. *Health, Healing and Dis-ease in a South African Township*. M.A. Thesis. University of Cape Town.

- Minnaar, A. 1993. Hostels and violent conflict on the Reef. Contained in Minnaar, A. (Ed.) 1993. *Communities in Isolation: Perspectives on hostels in South Africa*. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

- Minnaar, Wentzel and Payze 1997. Witch-purging in the Northern Province. *In Focus Forum*, Vol. 4, no. 5. March 1991, pp. 25-29.

- Mkhize, K. 1991. Animal Slaughter is a Rite. *Reality*. Vol.

23, No. 6, October 1991.

- Mnyandu, M. 1997. Ubuntu as the basis of authentic humanity: an African Christian Perspective. *Journal of Constructive Theology*. Vol. 3, no. 1, 1997.

- Molefe, S.P. 1991. Utilisation of the traditional system in population development with particular reference to Stokvels and burial societies. *Social Work Practice*. Vol. 4, no. 3, 1991, pp. 14-16.

- Moodley, L. 1995. Three Stokvel clubs in the urban black township of Kwandangezi, Natal. *Development Southern Africa*. Vol. 12, no. 3, June 1995.

- Munk, K. 1996. Traditional Disease Aetiologies and HIV/Aids among urban Zulu. *Aids Analysis Africa: Southern Africa Edition*. Vol. 7, no. 2, Aug-Sept. 1996, pp. 7-12.

- Niehaus, I.A. 1995. Witches of the Transvaal Lowveld and their Familiars: Conceptions of Duality, Power and Desire. *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, 138-139, XXXV -2-3 1995, pp. 513-540.

- Niehaus, I.A. 1998. The ANC's Dilemma: The Symbolic Politics of Three Witch-Hunts in the South African Lowveld, 1990-1995. *African Studies Review*. Vol. 41, no. 3, December 1998.

- Nilufer, G. 2000. Snapshots of Islamic Modernities. *Daedalus*. Vol. 129, no. 1, 2000.

- Nkosi, S.A. ; Kirsten, J.F. ; Bhembe, S.M. ; Sartorius von Bach, H.J. 1994: The Role of Traditional Institutions in Rural Development: The Case Bogosi (Chieftainship). *Agrekon*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1994).

- Nugent, P. 1999. Living in the past: urban, rural and ethnic themes in the 1992 and 1996 elections in Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37, 2 (1999).

- Ogachi, O. 1999. Economic reform, political liberation and economic ethnic conflict in Kenya. *African Development*, Vol. XXIV, Nos. 1 & 2, 1999.

- Okoli, F.C. 1980. The Dilemma of Premature Bureaucratization in the New States of Africa: The Case of Nigeria. *African Studies Review*. Vol. 23, no. 2, 1980.

- Olivier de Sardan, J.P. 1999. A social economy of corruption in Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 37,1 (1999), pp. 25-52.

- Oosthuizen, G.C. 1992. *The Healer-Prophet in Afro-Christian Churches*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

- Parish, J. 1999. The dynamics of witchcraft and indigenous

shrines among the Akan. *Africa* 69(3), 1999.

- Parker, A. 2001. The haunting of Mugabe. *Aida Parker Newsletter*. Issue No. 253, 2001.

- Pell, R.G. 1993. *Relevant patterns for urban baptist churches in Zambia: A Missiological exploration*. M.A. Thesis. Unisa, Pretoria.

- Posel, D. 1994. *Traditions of Power and the Power of Tradition: The State and African Customary Marriage in South Africa*. Paper Delivered at the Democracy - Popular Precedents, Practice, Culture History Workshop, held at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 13-15 July 1994.

- Potholm, C.R. 1979. *The Theory and Practice of African Politics*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. Prentice-Hall.

- Preston, C. 2001. *Overcoming Hostility Towards Change in a Large Bureaucratic Company by Means of Identifying and Diffusing Idiogroupings*. MBA dissertation, De Montfort University.

- Ralushai, N.V. ; Masingi, M.G. ; Madiba, D.M.M. ; Van Den Heever, J.A. ; Mathiba, T.J. ; Mphaphuli, M.E. ; Mokwena, M.W. ; Ndou, V. ; Matabane, D. ; 1996. *Report*

of the Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province of the Republic of South Africa (to His Excellency the Honourable Member of the Executive Council for Safety and Security, Northern Province).

- Rampele, M. 1993. *A Bed Called Home - Life in the Migrant Labour Hostels in Cape Town*. Cape Town: David Philip.

- Redding, S. 1996. Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Witchcraft and Political Symbols in the 1880 Transkeian Rebellion. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 22, no. 2, June 1996.

- *Ready to Govern. ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa. Adopted at the National Conference 28-31 May 1992*. Johannesburg: African National Congress.

- *The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)*. 1994. Johannesburg: African National Congress.

- Riggs, F.W. 1964. *Administration in Developing Countries - The Theory of Prismatic Society*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

- Robertson, R.T. 1986. *The Making of the Modern World -*

An Introductory History. London: Zed.

- Rowlands, M. and Warnier, P. 1988. Sorcery, Power and the Modern State in Cameroon. *Man (N.S.)*, 23, 118-132, 1988.

- Sandberg, A. 1998. Class and ethnicity in the struggle for power - the failure of democratisation in the Congo-Brazzaville. *Africa Development*, Vol. XXIII, Nos. 1-4, 1998.

- Sandbrook, R. 1985. *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sapire, H. 1992. Politics and Protest in Shack Settlements in the P.W.V. Region, South Africa, 1980-90. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Vol. 18, no. 3, 1992, pp. 670-697.

- Schulze, W.G. 1996. The origin and Legal Nature of the Stokvel (Part I). *S.A. Mercantile Law Journal*. Vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 18-29.

- Segal, L. 1992. The Human Face of Violence: Hostel Dwellers Speak. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Vol. 18, no. 1, 1992, pp. 190-213.

- Sitas, A. 1996. The New Tribalism: Hostels and Violence. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Vol. 22, no. 2, June

1996.

- Sithole, M. 1985. The Salience of Ethnicity in African Politics: The case of Zimbabwe. *Journal of Asian and African studies*, XX, 3-4 (1985):181-192.

- Smets, P. 1996. Community-based finance systems and their potential for urban self-help in a new South Africa. *Development Southern Africa*. Vol. 13, no. 2, April 1996.

- Smolicz, J.J. 1988: Tradition, core values and intercultural development in plural societies. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 11, no. 4, November 1988.

- Smolicz, J.J. 1992. The essential tension between modernity and tradition: Asian cultural heritage and scientific development. *Indian Journal of Social Science*. Vol. 5, no. 4, (Oct-Dec) 1992, pp. 345-359.

- *The South African Banker*, Vol. 93, no. 2. 1996. pp. 46-47. No author mentioned. Title: The development of Stokvels.

- Stadler, J. 1996. Witches and Witch-Hunters - Witchcraft, Generational Relations and the Life Cycle in a Lowveld Village. *African Studies*, 55 1 1996.

- Straker, G. 1992. *Faces in the Revolution - the*

Psychological Effects of Violence on Township Youth in South Africa. Cape Town: David Philip, and Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

- Teffo, J. 1998. Botho/ Ubuntu as a way forward for contemporary South Africa. *Word and Action*. Vol. 38, no. 365, Spring 1998.

- Turaki, Y. 1999. *Christianity and African Gods - A method in theology*. Potchefstroom University.

- Turbin, C. 1988. New approaches to understanding tradition and modernity. *Sociological Forum*. Vol. 3, no. 3, 1988.

- Tusenius, R. 1998. Africa and South Africa: Ready for a Renaissance. *Management Today*. Vol. 14, no. 5, June 1998.

- Van Kessel, I. and Oomen, B. 1997. "One chief, one vote": The revival of traditional authorities in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *African Affairs*. 1997, no. 96.

- Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, E.A.B. 1996. The new relevance of Traditional Authorities in Africa - the conference; major themes; reflections on chieftancy in Africa; future directions. *Journal of Legal Pluralism* 1996 -nr. 37-38.

- Varga, C.A., Veale, D.J.H. 1997. Isihlambezo: Utilization

patterns and potential health effects of pregnancy-related traditional herbal medicine. *Social Science and Medicine*. Vol. 44, no. 7, 1997. pp. 911-924.

- Verhoef, G. 1999. Stokvels and economic empowerment: the case of African women in South Africa, Ca. 1930-1998. *New Contree*. Iss 46, November 1999.

- Vermaak, N.J. Indicators for indigenous financial efforts: theory, evidence and prospects. *Africanus* 30(2) 2000.

- Wentzel, M. 1993. Historical origins of hostels in South Africa: Migrant Labour and Compounds. Contained in Minnaar, A. (Ed.) *Communities in Isolation: Perspectives on hostels in South Africa*. 1993. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

- Williams, V.L; Balkwill, K.; Witkowski, E.T.F. 1997. Muthi traders on the Witwatersrand, South Africa - an urban mosaic. *South African Journal of Botany*. 1997. 63(6).

- Wisner, B. 1988. *Power and Need in Africa*. London: Earthscan Publications.

ANNEXURE A

(Source: Dauskardt 1990, and Williams, V.L; Balkwill, K.; Witkowski, E.T.F. 1997).

SOURCE: DAUSKARDT 1990:279

Fig 1   The distribution of stores occupied by African herbalists in Johannesburg, 1960

SOURCE: DAUSKARDT 1990:280

Fig 2   Herbal stores in white and African municipal areas on the Witwatersrand, 1990

P.T.O.

SOURCE: WILLIAMS, BALKWILL & WITKOWSKI; 1997: 379

Table 1 The total number of herb-traders, their proportional distribution and the number of herb-traders selected to survey the Witwatersrand commercial medicinal plant trade, as established from telephone directories and municipal licence records (June 1994). The figures in bold are the regional totals

Region and municipality	No. of herb-traders listed in the trade licence applications	No. of additional herb-traders found in the telephone directories	% of herb-traders in each region and town
East Rand	**33**	**5**	**20.1**
Alberton	1	0	0.5
Bedfordview	0	0	0
Benoni	8	1	4.7
Boksburg	2	0	1.1
Brakpan	2	0	1.1
Edenvale	0	0	0
Germiston	11	3	7.4
Kempton Park	2	0	1.1
Nigel	4	1	2.6
Springs	3	0	1.6
West Rand	**18**	**6**	**9.5**
Krugersdorp	7	0	3.7
Randfontein	2	0	1.1
Roodepoort	5	0	2.6
Westonaria	4	0	2.1
Johannesburg	**115**	**18**	**70.4**
Johannesburg	109	16	66.1
Midrand	0	0	0
Randburg	2	1	1.6
Sandton	4	1	2.7
Total	**166**	**23**	**100**

SOURCE: WILLIAMS, BALKWILL & WITKOWSKI 1997:380

Table 3 The percentage of herb-traders from the different ethnic groups in the three regions of the Witwatersrand (June 1994) (n = 166)

| Ethnicity | Region | | |
	East Rand	Johannesburg	West Rand
Black	1.8	48.2	2.4
Indian	7.8	15.1	1.8
White	7.2	3.1	6.0
Coloured	0	0	0.6
Not Determined	3.3	4.0	0

Figure 3 Flow diagram indicating the plant trade network from gatherers to consumers.

SOURCE: WILLIAMS, BALKWILL AND WITKOWSKI 1997:380.

ANNEXURE B

(Apart from "Dr. Sankala" advertisement, the source of the other
contents of this annexure is as follows : Fenyves 1994:

Appendix)

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT
AN ASTROLOGER - HERBALIST- HEALER
DOCTOR K.S.SANKALA
FROM CENTRAL AFRICA
A MEMBER OF AFRICAN NATIONAL HEALERS ASSOCIATION

He is here to treat, heal and pay attention to whoever has problems using African herbs and spiritual powers. You will be told about your problems before you can mention anything to him. Consultation fee payable is R20-00 only. He treat (heal) over 30 diseases at a reasonable rate. Some of the problems he can solve are:

(1) Insanity (2) Diarrhoea (3) Bewitched people (4) One with bad luck (5) Men's penis which cannot erect powerfully (6) Woman with pregancy problems (7) Vomiting all the time (8) Asthma (9) Woman who cannot produce (10) Gonorrhea (11) Lack of strenght in the body (12) To be liked at work (13) Prevent theves from attacking homes, shops and cars (14) Education (15) Promotion (16) Pressure (17) Diabetes (18) Customers attraction (19) Court Cases (20) Tuberculosis (21) Demand debts (22) Removal of misunderstandings with anybody (23) To bring back a lost lover (24) Cancer (25) Misfortues (26) Swollen body etc.

THIS IS THE TIME TO CHANGE YOUR DOCTOR FOR PROPER TREATMENT

Nagoke uDokotela olapha izifo noma ukuyiphi inkathazo noma ingxaki. Usebenzisa amandla obungoma nemithi yesintu ehlanganiswe namakhambi ama - Arabi. Futhi, lo Dokotela ukutshela nesimo sakho senkathazo wena ungakamutsheli lutho. Ulapha izifo ezingamashumi ayisikhombisa nanhlanu (40) yena uhlahluba ngetela engamashumi amabili nje kuphela (R20-00). Nazoke ezinye zezifo azilaphayo:

(1) Ubuhlanya (2) Diarrhoea (uhudo) (3) Uma uthakathiye (4) Ishwa noma ibhadi (5) Inkingu ugobudoda bakho (6) Omama abazithwele abanekinga (7) i-Asma (8) Izinyumba (ebangenayo inzalo) (9) Ukusiza njalo (10) Gonorea (11) Uma uphelelwa amandla (12) Ufuna ukuthandwa emsebenzini (13) Ukuvikela amasela esirolo sakho, ekhaya noma emotweni yakho (14) Ukusiza ingane ngemafundo esikolweni uma ithatha kancane (education) (15) Ukukhushulwa emesbenzini (Promotion) (16) Pressure (Ukukhatazeka) (17) Diabeates (18) Ukukhanga abathengi (19) Ukuphuma pahambili uma unecala (Court cases) (2) Tuberculosis (21) Uma ufuna izikweledu zakho (Demand debts) (22) Ukususa imibandela phakathi kwabanye abantu nokungezwani (23) Ukubuyelana nesithandwa sakho (24) Cancer (25) Uma ungenayo inhlanhla (26) Ukuvuvuka Komzim ba nezinye futhi eziningi.

ISIKHATHI SESIFIKLE SIKUTHI USHINTSHE UDOKOTELA WAKHO UTHOLE UKULASHWA
OPUPHAMBILI NOKUNGCONO EKUNEMPUMELELO.

O tite mo go alafa le go thusa le mang o a nang le .nathata mo go diriseng matla a semowa le mesunkwane ya Afrika le Arabia. A ka go bolelea mathata a gago otlhe pelee o mmolella one. O duela fela R20-00. A ka alafa A mauga a malwetsi a kgonang go a alafa ke a:

(1) Bogafi (2) Letshollo (3) Go loiwa (4) Go tlhoka lesego (5) Mathata ka bonna jwa gaga (6) Mathata a boimana (7) Go tlhatsa ka nako yohle (8) Asma (9) Basadi ba go palelwa ke pelego (10) Gonorea (11) Go tlhoka matla nimeleng (12) Go ratiwa tirong (13) Go thibela magodu dintlong, mabenkeleng le a dikoloi (14) Thuto (15) Go tlhatlosiwa (16) Kgatelo (17) Bolwetsi jwa sukiri (18) Go bitsa bareki (19) Melato (20) tB (21) Go batla dikoloto (22) Go tlosa diphapano (23) Go busa yo mo ratang (24) Kankere (25) Madimabe (26) Mmele wa go rurage.

KE NAKO YA GO FETOLA NGAKA YA GAGO KA KALAFO E TSHWANETSENG.

ARGOSY HOUSE
CNR PRESIDENT & SPILSBURY STREET
4TH FLOOR OFFICE NO 415
GERMISTON
CELL: 082 705-4371
(OPPOSITE COURT HOTEL)   CELL: 082 705-4371

VISITING HOURS
Mon - Sat. 8:00am - 6:00pm
WHY NOT TRY HIM
WELCOME

AFRICAN NATIONAL HEALERS ASSOCIATION

(ASS. INCORPORATED UNDER SECTION 21 ACT 61/73) REG. NO. 89/05294/08

HEALTH THROUGH CULTURAL HERITAGE

This is to Certify that

_____

has completed a Study Course in and
acquainted him/herself with

a. *The application and uses of Tradional Healing
with Traditional Medicine*

b. *Elementary Human Anatomy*

and has been awarded this
Certificate of Competence

Certificate

Given this .... day of .... 19.......

Registrar: ....

S. MAHLABA T/DR S.A. M.D.

Traditional Healers Organisation of South Africa: (Thosa)

We certify that _____

having subscribed to the objects and aims of the Thosa and having complied with requirements of this organisation's ethical and qualifications committee to perform the function of healer has been issued with the final certificate to practice certified at the congregation of the organisation.

on the _____ day of _____ 19____

President _____

Chairman of
Ethical and
Qualification
Committee

ETHICAL CODE GOVERNING &
CONTROLLING ALL MEMBERS OF

T.H.O.S.A.

THE ETHICAL & QUALIFICATIONS COMMITTEE FOR TRADITIONAL HEALERS ORGANISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA STIPULATES AS FOLLOWS:

=================

1. RENDER DUE RESPECT TO ALL THOSE IN AUTHORITY.

2. TREAT ALL PEOPLE COMING TO YOU WITH HERBS IRRESPECTIVE OF RACE, CREED OR COLOUR.

3. THE USE OF MAGIC AND HARMFUL HERBS WHICH CAN CAUSE ANY FORM OF INJURY TO THE PARTS OF THE BODY OF OTHER HUMAN BEINGS ARE NOT PERMITTED, AS THEY ARE ASSOCIATED WITH SORCERY.

4. WHEN A PATIENT IS NOT SATISFIED WITH TREATMENT GIVEN TO HIM/HER, MONEY PAID BY THAT PATIENT MUST BE REFUNDED ON HUMANITARIAN REASONS.

5. PRACTICE OF DECEIT AND RIPPING OFF PATIENTS IS FORBIDDEN. IF FOUND GUILTY OF OFFENCE, IT IS PUNISHABLE BY PAYING BACK TO THE PATIENT TWICE AS MUCH.

6. TREAT GRATIS THOSE WHO DESERVE GRATIS SERVICE.

7. WHEN THERE ARE LIMITATIONS REFER PATIENT TO THOSE WHO ARE IN A BETTER POSITION FOR CONTINUED CARE OF THE PATIENT.

8. BE HONEST IN EVERYTHING YOU DO.

9. NEVER USE ONE RAZOR BLADE TO MORE THAN ONE PERSON. INSTEAD ADVISE YOUR PATIENTS TO BRING THEIR OWN RAZOR BLADES FOR FINAL TREATMENT.

10. CO-OPERATE WITH ALL HEALTH WORKERS FOR NEW FACTS OF LIFE.

CODE OF ETHICS.

I, SOLOMON MAHLABA, a traditional practitioner, dully registered with the African National Healers Association, subscribe to the code of ethics or standards set out by the said association below:

1. I shall be religiously dedicated to the practice of my profession above all else, and shall meet all its demands.

2. I shall act in the interest of all patients in all respects, irrespective of class, race, colour or creed.

3. I shall treat all my patients with utmost respect, and shall observe their basic humaan dignity and worth.

4. In my practice, I shall do nothing else, but promote health by way of uplifting the physical, mental, social and spiritual well-being of mankind.

5. I shall refrain from attempting to cure ailments for which I have not been properly trained to cure.

6. I shall acknowlegde my limitations in my practice and shall refer patients to whoever may have demonstrated the know-how or is quali-fied to cure the ailment which I am not able to cure.

7. I shall give advice to patients.

8. I shall allow a patient or any person acting lawfully on his behalf to choose whoever he/she may consider professionally capable to

   he/she wishes to consult such person for his opinion or treatment.

9. I shall play a reconciliatory role in families or communities which I shall serve.

10. I shall play the educative role in the community on health matters.

11. I shall share knowledge and information with my colleagues.

12. I shall embark on continued learning or training in order to improve my standard of qualification as a traditional practitioner so as to improve my efficiency of consultation, diagnosing and treatment.

13. I shall keep my place of practice in a clean, orderly and sanitary condition.

14. I shall refrain from all forms of evil, particularly witchcraft.

15. I shall not allow any person to induce me to indulge in practices which may lead to hurting any person or practices which may be

detrimental to any institution, organisation or the society at large and the image of my profession.

16. I shall not misrepresent my patients, the entire society, my profession and the African National Healers Association.

17. I shall observe the principle of confidentiality, and shall divulge information which came to my attention as a result of my practice on explicit permission given to me by the patient, if he/she is a major, the parent or guardian of a minor patient, the surviving spouse or minor of the deceased patient, when instructed by the court of law or where I am legally compelled to do so or in the explicit interest of the patient who is not able or is unfit to grant permission himself/herself.

18. I shall not express myself in public regarding matters of traditional healing without permission granted to me by the African National Healers Association.

19. I shall not advertise.

20. I shall not permit my name to be used in a professional capacity in connection with advertisements of medicinal products or instruments, and in connection with advertisements or appeals to the public on behalf of a sick benefit society or any commercial organisation.

21. I may not tout or canvass, either personally or through an agent or in any other manner, for a patient or for myself or for another practitioner.

22. I shall not accept or insist on any commission or remuneration, pecuniary or otherwise, from manufacturers or dealers in medicinal products, remedies or any equipment, apparatus, instrument appliance or material used in the course of my practice or prescribed for patients.

23. I shall not pay or give any commission or remuneration, pecuniary or otherwise, to any person for the recommendation of patients.

24. I shall not accept any commission or remuneration, pecuniary or otherwise, from any person for the recommendation of patients.

25. I shall not share any fees charged for a service with any other person other than a partner, unless such sharing is commensurate with the scope of such other person's participation in the rendering of such service.

26. I shall not have financial interest, whether by way of a fixed salary or otherwise, in sick benefit clubs, institutions or associations which canvass members by way of advertisements.

27. I shall not use any form of treatment, apparatus or process which is secret or is claimed to be secret in my practice.

28. I shall not use any form of treatment, apparatus or process which proves upon investigation by the African National Healers Association to be incapable of fulfilling the claims made in regard to it.

29. I shall not use any diagnostic and treatment methods which do not comply with the accepted standards of my profession as determined by the African National Healers Assicication from time to time.

I shall not perform any act which is an unacceptable act, standard or method, as from time to time may be determined by the African National Association and which is brought to the attention of the practitioners.

31. I shall enter into a partnership or maintain a partnership with a person who is:
    31.1. registered as a practitioner with the African National Healers Association;
    31.2. registered as a medical practitioner in term of the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act, 1974; or
    31.3. registered in terms of the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act, 1974, in respect of a supplementary health service profession which is approved by the African National Healers Association as an acceptable profession for the purposes of a partnership

32. I shall not co-operate or enter into or maintain a service contract with a person who is:
    32.1. not registered as a practitioner with the African National Healers Association;
    32.2. not registered as a medical practitioner in terms of the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act, 1974; or
    32.3. not registered in terms of the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act, in respect of a supplementary health service profession which is approved by the African National Healers Association as an acceptable profession for the purpose of a service contract;
    32.4. not practising in terms of the Medicine Control Act;
    32.5. not practising in terms of the Pharmacy Act, 1974; or
    32.6. not practising in terms of the Nursing Act, 1978

33. I shall recognise the Medical and Dental Councils, Department of National Health and Population Development, the World Health Organisation, Department of Law and Order and other professional bodies.

34. My professional stationery shall bear the following information:
    34.1. My initials and surname and/or that of my partner(s);
    34.2. my registered profession and abbreviations in respect of Association;
    34.3. my practice address and telephone numbers;
    34.5. my consulting hours, where applicable;
    34.6. my other professional associations to which I am affiliated; and
    34.7. my practice number.

35. In my consulting room, I shall display:
    35.1. Those certificates, diplomas and degrees relevant to the profession for which I am registered;
    35.2. membership certificates of professional associations to which I am affiliated; and
    35.3. the registration certificate issued to me by the African National Healers Association.

36. I shall promote the image of my profession and shall lead an exemplary life.

I, SOLOMON MAHLABA, the undersigned, hereby declare that I understand

the abovementioned CODE OF ETHICS, as set out by the AFRICAN NATIONAL HEALERS ASSOCIATION (Association not incorporated for gain, registered under Section 21 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973), and consider such to be binding upon my conscience.

SIGNED AT.........................ON....OF....................199...

WITNESS:..........................WITNESS:..........................

ANNEXURE C

ANNEXURE D

Source: *The Sowetan*, 9 July 1997.