Great captains and the challenge of second order technology: operational strategy and the motorisation of the British Army before 1940

Abstract

No one worked harder on his own image t han Bernard Montgomery, but he is rightly ranked among the most notable British Second World War commanders. Less well-known is Richard O'Connor, largely because of his own disregard for publicity. They were two very different types of personality. Both, however, demonstrated command skills and operational strategic insights which enabled them to c ompensate for the British Army's shortcomings in a r mour in 1940. They were able to use what they had - simple motorization - and adapt it away from stereotyped concepts of logistical employment, which they r e placed with beneficial operational strategic utilization; Montgomery during the Flanders Campaign (1940) and O'Connor in h i s Libyan Campaign (1940-41). The two cases indicate that advantage in warfare does not merely rely on numbers or on supe rior or inferior armaments. It may have to rely as much - if not more - on the personalities of the commanders.