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One more time : Plato's conception of the immortality of the soul

Show simple item record Ladikos, Anatasios 2012-03-08T11:55:54Z 2012-03-08T11:55:54Z 2008
dc.identifier.citation Ladikos, A. 2008, 'One more time : Plato's conception of the immortality of the soul', Phronimon : Journal of the SA Society for Greek Philosophy and the Humanities, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 93-109.
dc.description.abstract This article discusses the immortality of the soul as Plato demonstrates it mainly in the final argument of his dialogue “Phaedo”. Plato raises four different arguments for the immortality of the soul: The Argument from Opposites, the Theory of Recollection, the Argument from Affinity, and the Final Argument, given as a response to Cebes’ objection. He does not seem to place equal weight on all four of these arguments. For instance, it is suggested that the Argument from Affinity by no means proves the immortality of the soul, but only shows that it is quite likely. The Theory of Recollection and the Final Argument seem to be given the greatest importance, as both of them follow directly from the Theory of Forms. But while the Theory of Recollection can only show that the soul existed before birth, and not that it will also exist after death, the Final Argument purports to fully establish the immortality of the soul, and is considered by Plato to be unobjectionable and certain. Like his third argument Plato’s Final Argument addresses the question of what the relation is between the seemingly divine and immortal ideas and the soul. With reference to the Final argument’s successful conclusion the soul must be shown to be immortal and indestructible as highlighted by the discussion of certain elements such a the distinction between partial immortality and full immortality, the redefinition of death, the promise to consider “coming-into-being and passing-away” and the alternative “withdraw or perish”. The argument from opposite forms succeeds only in showing that the soul is immortal. The soul is characterized by life and the opposite of life is death. The soul therefore is immortal, in just the way in which fire is notcold and three is not-even. Plato supposes that the only time when the soul could perish would be at the time of separation from the body. The argument from opposite forms and the distinction of accidental and essential predication shows that the soul always survives separation from the body. The soul therefore is being always immortal and indestructible. Socrates argues that the soul is not merely similar to the immortal ideas but that the soul always possesses within itself the immortal idea of life. Consequently, he concludes that the soul is not merely “completely” or “almost so” but that “the soul is immortal”. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.subject Immortality en
dc.subject Soul en
dc.subject Plato en
dc.title One more time : Plato's conception of the immortality of the soul en
dc.type Thesis en

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