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A naturalized theory of immediate justification

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dc.contributor.advisor Prinsloo, E. D. (Erasmus Daniël), 1934-
dc.contributor.author Malherbe, Jeanette Grillion en
dc.date.accessioned 2015-01-23T04:25:01Z
dc.date.available 2015-01-23T04:25:01Z
dc.date.issued 1994-04 en
dc.identifier.citation Malherbe, Jeanette Grillion (1994) A naturalized theory of immediate justification, University of South Africa, Pretoria, <http://hdl.handle.net/10500/18099> en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10500/18099
dc.description.abstract The starting point of the thesis is an acceptance of the principles of a moderately naturalized epistemology which allow for the traditional questions of epistemology, especially that of empirical justification, to be addressed in a recognizable way. It is argued that naturalism construed in this way is not compatible with scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at least as far as the justification condition goes. Five general consequences of a moderately naturalistic position are deduced. It is shown how these general conclusions lead to a modest foundationalism, that is, they imply the corrigibility of all empirical beliefs and the basic status of some. The sensory character of basic beliefs is argued for, as is the claim that basic beliefs are not about the character of experience but about physical facts in the subject's immediate environment. The way in which an empirical belief is brought about (its 'dependence relations') is then examined. The important conclusion, for a theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, is that sensory beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their empirical justification. This points to the fact that, if they are justified for their subjects, they must be self-evident and prima facie justified. Before explicating the nature of prima facie justification, the general requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic justification are set out. Such a theory must account for the reasonableness of the agent in believing as she does; it must accommodate deontological aspects and explain how justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified belief; and it must provide some objective link between the justified belief and its likely truth. It is shown that the theory of prima facie justification of sensory beliefs which emerges from a naturalized epistemology, satisfies these requirements, and that a conception of prima facie justification which ignores naturalistic constraints cannot explain immediate justification.
dc.format.extent 1 online resource (249 leaves) en
dc.language.iso en
dc.subject.ddc 121
dc.subject.lcsh Belief and doubt en
dc.subject.lcsh Justification (Theory of knowledge) en
dc.subject.lcsh Knowledge en
dc.title A naturalized theory of immediate justification en
dc.type Thesis
dc.description.department Philosophy and Systematic Theology
dc.description.degree D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy) en


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