Constitutionalism and judicial appointment as a means of safeguarding judicial independence in selected African jurisdictions

Abstract

The beginning of the 1990s saw many African countries embarking on the process of drafting new constitutions as they abandoned independence constitutions. Most of the independence constitutions were perceived as constitutions without constitutionalism and they were generally blamed for failure of democracy and the rule of law in Africa. The study analyses the state of democracy and constitutionalism and the impact that colonialism had on the African continent. Apart from the spurt of new constitutions adopted, democracy is growing very slowly in most African states with widespread human rights violations and disregard for the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers, still holding the centre stage. Judicial independence is an important component of democracy in the modern state. The study therefore scrutinizes how the principle of judicial independence can be promoted and protected to enhance democracy. One important mechanism which plays a crucial role in safeguarding judicial independence is the way judicial officers are appointed. The study selects four countries – Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa and analyses how judicial officers are appointed in these countries in an effort to find an effective and optimal approach.The premise of the study is centred on the role of constitutionalism and the process of appointing judges as a means of promoting and safeguarding democracy in these selected countries.