INTERTEXTUALITY REINTERPRETED: A COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS APPROACH WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CONCEPTUAL BLENDING

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WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE
TO CONCEPTUAL BLENDING

by
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30 JUNE 2008
I declare that *INTERTEXTUALITY REINTERPRETED: A COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC APPROACH WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CONCEPTUAL BLENDING* is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

SIGNATURE
(C van Heerden)

DATE: June 2008
The work we do is a work of love, comparable to the work of love that can take place between two human beings. To understand the other, it is necessary to go in their language, to make the journey through the other’s imaginary. For you are strange to me. In the effort to understand, I bring you back to me, compare you to me. I translate you in me. And what I note is your difference, your strangeness. At that moment, perhaps, through recognition of my own differences, I might perceive something of you.

Hélène Cixous (in Newton 1997)
Language is, in my estimation, a divine gift, which aids us in our connections with people, and though it sometimes seems that language fails me at its most basic level of communication, I am mindful of the fact that what fails me is not the inadequacy of language, but my inability to know language intimately. This, once again, makes me stand in awe of this singularity we call language, and urges me to learn about it with childlike wonder.

I would like to thank my mentor, Dr Zawada, who shares and inspires this childlike wonder, and my husband who shares me with my work.
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Abstract

In this dissertation, I investigate the cognitive processes integral to intertextual readings by referring to the cognitive linguistics framework known as conceptual blending. I refer to different genres of intertextual texts and then explain these intertexts in terms of cognitive principles and processes, such as conceptual blending networks. By applying the framework of conceptual blending to intertexts within different genres, I suggest that the underlying cognitive processes are universal for the interpretation of any type of intertextual text.

My findings indicate that conceptual blending underpins intertextuality which is cognitive, creative and dynamic in nature. This means that the meaning we construct from intertexts is dependent on the context in which they appear and cannot be studied in isolation. Investigating intertextual texts from a cognitive linguistics perspective reveals new inferences (such as the influence of implicit knowledge as a type of intertext) and the creativity involved in the meaning-making process.

Key terms: cognition, cognitive poetics, conceptual blending, conceptual blending network, conceptual integration, embodiment, expository text, fairytales, intertextuality, mental space, poetry, possible worlds, schema, Vital Relations
Chapter 1

Introduction

Cognitive linguistics forms part of a larger field of study known as cognitive science. Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field concerned with the nature of the mind. Stillings et al. (1995: 1) writes that “cognitive science is the science of mind” and explains that cognitive scientists “seek to understand perceiving, thinking, remembering, understanding language, learning, and other mental phenomena.” Besides understanding these cognitive functions, cognitive science also investigates our awareness (at a meta-level) of our knowledge, beliefs, ambitions and so forth, and aims to explain these in very general and fundamental terms. This also applies to language. Cognitive linguistics aims to explain language in terms of its relation to the mind and other cognitive functions. Language is, in fact, considered to be congruous (rather than a separate or modular structure as proposed by Chomsky) to other cognitive processes and is explained in terms of conceptual structures or frameworks and cognitive operations not explicitly related to language, such as the principles that guide human categorisation (Croft & Cruse 2004). One of the frameworks used in cognitive linguistics is known as conceptual blending. This framework was introduced by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2002) and is concerned with the process of constructing meaning.

The term intertextuality was first coined by Julia Kristeva in the late 1960s, but the concept stems from the works of Mikhail Bakhtin and Roland Barthes. The introduction of intertextuality as a concept is often referred to as the death of the author as postulated in Barthes’s essay (“Death of the Author”) in 1967. The implication is that meaning is now constructed by the reader of texts rather than from relying on the meaning construed by the author alone.
A further implication is that texts are no longer read as autonomous works of imaginative creation. All works are seen as the products of previous works, whether by direct or indirect inferences. Intertextuality therefore shifted the focus from concrete authored text to the meaning-making process in the reader, but only on a surface textual (or linguistic) level, without explaining the complex underlying cognitive processes in either the reading (understanding) or the writing (production) of texts.

The central focus of both the study of cognitive linguistics and of intertextuality is therefore the meaning-making process, even though intertextuality has previously been regarded almost exclusively as a literary term. In this dissertation, I will explain intertextuality not only on the linguistic level, but also in terms of the underlying cognitive processes by referring to the framework known as conceptual blending within cognitive linguistics. I aim to show that conceptual blending underpins intertextuality and that by examining intertextuality from a cognitive perspective, more inferences pertaining to the nature of the mind (and as a result, of language as a reflection of thought) become apparent, and the meaning-making process is explained as being based on conceptual structures and processes rather than purely linguistic structures and processes.

1.1 Context of the research problem

The research problem relates to the cognitive processes inherent in intertextual readings and can be formulated as follows:

- What are the underlying cognitive processes at work in the interpretation of intertexts, i.e. how do readers interpret intertexts?
In order to answer this question, I will use cognitive linguistics as a framework of investigation.

1.1.1 Cognitive linguistics

Cognitive linguistics is a comparatively recent approach to the study of language and dates back to the early 1970s. It was born from a dissatisfaction with the more formal linguistic approaches and developed in correspondence with advances made in cognitive sciences and other related fields such as psychology (particularly categorisation and Gestalt theory), neuroscience, artificial intelligence and so forth. Evans and Green (2006: 3) describe cognitive linguistics as

a ‘movement’ or an ‘enterprise’ because it is not a specific theory. Instead, it is an approach that has adopted a common set of guiding principles, assumptions and perspectives which have led to a diverse range of complementary, overlapping (and sometimes competing) theories.

Like other linguistic approaches, cognitive linguistics also attempts to describe and explain language in terms of “its systematicity, its structure [and] the functions it serves” (Evans & Green 2006: 5). However, rather than viewing language as a modular function, cognitive linguists believe that language is congruous to other cognitive functions, and as such reflects thought patterns or our conceptualisations of the world, as well as the way in which the world works. Language thus “encodes and externalises our thoughts” (Evans & Green 2006: 6) through symbols. Evans and Green (2006: 6, 21) write that

These symbols consist of forms, which may be spoken, written or signed, and meanings with which the forms are conventionally paired. In fact, a symbol is better referred to as a symbolic assembly, as it consists of two parts that are conventionally associated (Langacker 1987). In other words, this symbolic assembly consists of a
form-meaning pairing ... The meaning associated with a linguistic symbol relates to a mental representation termed a concept. Concepts derive from percepts; the range of perceptual information deriving from the world is integrated into a mental image. The meanings encoded by linguistic symbols refer to our projected reality: a mental representation of reality as construed by the human mind.

It is important to clarify that although certain meanings are conventionally paired with certain forms or symbols, these meanings have been found to be highly contextual. This suggests that the meanings of words are “protean in nature. That is, the semantic values associated with words are flexible, open-ended and highly dependent on the utterance context in which they are embedded” (Evans 2007). I aim to show that intertextuality, as a cognitive function, aids this contextual meaning-making process in that our construction of meaning is derived from personal knowledge and experience in specific contexts and may change over time.

Language, as illustrated above, has a symbolic function, but it also has an interactive function. In other words, these form-meaning pairings need to be understood and used by whole communities. If language does not fulfil these criteria, it becomes impossible to share factual and/or emotive information, or to put it in another way, language “allows us to perform speech acts, or to exhibit expressivity and affect. Language can also be used to create scenes or contexts; hence, language has the ability to invoke experiential frames” (Evans & Green 2006: 21). Intertextual knowledge is also based on form-meaning pairings shared by certain communities and may lead to the formation of frames based on societal awareness rather than on mere personal experience which make up the background knowledge of language users.

Cognitive linguistics, as an enterprise, has two key commitments, namely the Generalisation Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment as first described by George Lakoff. The Generalisation Commitment proposes that “it may often
be useful, for practical purposes, to treat areas such as syntax, semantics and phonology as being notionally distinct ... However ... cognitive linguists disagree that the ‘modules’ or ‘subsystems’ of language are organised in significantly divergent ways, or indeed that distinct modules or subsystems even exist” (Evans & Green 2006: 28). It also proposes, as I mentioned earlier, that language is not a separate or modular cognitive function, but is congruous to and overlaps with other cognitive functions such as memory, perception, judging, categorising and so on. The Cognitive Commitment, on the other hand, holds that “principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition from other disciplines, particularly the other cognitive sciences ... In other words ... language and linguistic organisation should reflect general cognitive principles rather than cognitive principles that are specific to language” (Evans & Green 2006: 41).

The principles of cognitive semantics, as the framework I am referring to within cognitive linguistics, is summarised by Evans and Green (2006: 153) as follows:

1. Conceptual structure is embodied.
2. Semantic structure is conceptual structure.
3. Meaning representation is encyclopaedic.
4. Meaning-construction is conceptualisation.

This suggests that intertextuality, as a meaning-making process, is embodied, has conceptual structure, and is encyclopaedic, i.e. there is “no principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics” (Green & Evans 2006: 215). Also, our knowledge is structured (according to conventions, for example), dynamic in nature, and is derived from our conceptualisation of the world through language use which comprises all genres, including literary genres.
Besides the symbolic and interactive functions of language, it also has a creative function. This is reflected by our ability, for example, to construct **possible worlds**, which is discussed in more detail later in this dissertation.

Cognitive linguistics is made up of various approaches and theories such as the *Conceptual Metaphor Theory* and the *Mental Spaces Theory* (amongst others) that form the basis of *Conceptual Integration* or *Conceptual Blending Theory* which I will discuss in the next section.

### 1.1.2 Conceptual blending

Modern science is based on the objective and “systematic manipulation of forms” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 3). Form manipulation is very useful in the formal sciences, such as mathematics, but is problematic in the study of imaginative cognitive functions, such as conceptual categorisation, in that it simply captures regular patterns but does not extract meaning in any way. The reason is that form manipulation cannot capture identities or link roles to values (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 11). Connectionist models first recognised that “identity, sameness, and difference, far from being easy primitives, are the major and perhaps least tractable problems involved in modelling the mind” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 11-12). Fauconnier and Turner call this the *binding problem* which refers to the human capacity to correlate elements from different domains creatively and to find the common schematic structure that prompts parallels between them. Conceptual blending was formulated to fill this gap.

Conceptual blending is mainly concerned with the “dynamic aspects of meaning construction and its dependence upon mental spaces and mental space construction as part of its architecture” (Evans & Green 2006: 400). This makes it convincing to use Conceptual Blending Theory (which is described in
more detail in Chapter 2) to reinterpret intertextuality, which, as I suggested earlier, has conceptual structure and is dynamic in nature. Cognitive linguistics has been used successfully to describe the conceptual nature of metaphors in a similar way.

1.1.3 Intertextuality

Intertextuality, as mentioned earlier, was first coined by Julia Kristeva in 1969 in her essay translated as “Word, Dialogue and Novel” (Moi 1986). According to Bullock and Trombley (1999), intertextuality describes the “interdependence that any literary text has with a mass of others which preceded it. A literary text is not an isolated phenomenon, it is ‘constructed from a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another’”.

Kristeva’s exposition of the concept of intertextuality draws from the works of Roland Barthes and Mikhail Bakhtin. In the post-structuralist tradition, Barthes and Bakhtin questioned the structuralist semiotics of Ferdinand de Saussure which studies texts solely as autonomous entities. The internal structures of texts, such as the morphology and syntax, are the focus of study, and the meaning of the text is derived exclusively from these factors. Human experience is not accounted for in this model and for Saussure, the sign (language is considered an abstract system of signs) reigns supreme.

“Abstract objectivism treats language as a pure system of laws governing all phonetic, grammatical, and lexical forms that confront individual speakers as inviolable norms over which they have no control” (Holquist 1990: 42).

Theorists such as Bakhtin and Barthes questioned this formalist view of the use of language, and in doing so, lay the groundwork for Kristeva’s theory of intertextuality. In order to understand the concept of intertextuality more
clearly, the works of Bakhtin, Barthes and Kristeva will be examined and explained.

Intertextuality is, however, not explained from a cognitive perspective by these theorists, which leaves a gap in our knowledge. My intention is to examine intertextuality from a cognitive point of view in order to fill this gap. The working hypotheses used as a basis for this work are:

- Conceptual blending underpins intertextuality. Intertextuality is not merely reliant on the linguistic interpretation of texts, but relies on cognitive processes such as conceptual blending which enable the interpretation (meaning-making process) of intertextual texts.

- Investigating intertextual texts from a cognitive perspective reveals new inferences, as mentioned earlier, and the creativity involved in the meaning-making processes of the authors, readers and researchers.

- The meaning-making processes involved in the interpretation of intertexts are explained as being based on conceptual structures and processes rather than on purely linguistic structures and processes.

- Intertextuality and the cognitive processes at work remain the same irrespective of genre.

The result of these analyses therefore suggests that intertextuality, which was initially conceived as a purely literary and linguistic device, can be explained as a cognitive process, i.e. (literary) intertextuality can be reinterpreted as a cognitive process that not only relies on cognitive functions, but is in fact an essential part of our conceptual structure, i.e. we think intertextually in the same way as we think metaphorically.
2. **Research method**

In order to reinterpret intertextuality from a cognitive point of view, I will refer to specific intertextual material and explain the intertexts in terms of conceptual blending networks. The data I intend to use are authentic texts from a variety of genres, such as an expository text, a fairy tale written from two different perspectives, and a poem with an intertextual reference.

The genres were chosen for their respective extremities, i.e. expository texts are factual and realistic, fairytales are imaginative and fantastical, and poetry is structurally loaded and often metaphorical in nature. Also, poems often make use of more subtle intertexts than, for example, prose. By looking at intertexts within different genres, I propose that, irrespective of the genre, the cognitive processes that support and underpin the meaning-making processes intrinsic to intertexts remain the same.

3. **The structure of the dissertation**

The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 1 covers an overview of my intention, as well as the theoretical frameworks and data I will use. In other words, I explain the underlying principles of cognitive linguistics, what conceptual blending is and how it works, and what intertextuality means. This chapter also includes my research problem and hypotheses. Chapter 2 constitutes a literature review of the various frameworks and approaches relevant to intertextuality and conceptual blending. In Chapter 3, I will analyse an article written by Maluleke, titled “Of collapsible coffins and ways of dying: the search for catholic contextuality in African perspective” (2002), to explain intertextuality from the traditional linguistic perspective as well as from a cognitive perspective. Though there are a number of overt intertexts in Maluleke’s paper, I will refer only to those related to “Ways of Dying” by Zakes
Mda (1995), “Out of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa” by Keith B. Richburg (1997) and two intertexts related to the national anthems (one which is unofficial) of South Africa and the United States of America. Chapter 4 will deal with a traditional fairytale and its reinterpretation by Roald Dahl (in his book titled “Revolting Rhymes”). Roald Dahl’s rewritten text is in the form of a poem, but relies heavily on the traditional story for its content. Certain elements in the traditional fairytale (the intertext) are then reinterpreted and changed by Dahl in order to create a new version of the original text with a different outcome. In Chapter 5, I will look at a poem with an intertext and explain how we are able to interpret the use of the intertext by means of cognitive processes. Finally, in Chapter 6, I will draw specific conclusions relating to cognitive linguistics, conceptual blending and intertextuality. I will also explain the role of the different genres and how they relate to and differ from each other, as well as suggested future research.
Chapter 2

An overview of the roles of cognitive science, conceptual blending and intertextuality in language

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field and claims that disciplines such as artificial intelligence, philosophy, linguistics, psychology, neurophysiology, and so forth, are “basically identical, and differ merely in surface aspects like the methodology each employs, the special, limited part of the unified field each examines, and so on” (Johnson & Erneling 1997: 4). For many years, however, the study of language and the study of cognition were viewed as separate studies, rather than an integrated study with language as a type of fundamental cognitive function, in the same way that categorisation and understanding can be seen as fundamental cognitive functions. Cognitive science has merged these two studies so that we are no longer studying language as an isolated phenomenon on its surface level, but rather, we are studying the brain and its functions. Within cognitive linguistics, language is simply one of the manifestations of brain function and as such I will look at language, and specifically the mental mappings that occur in language, to explain the cognitive functions of the brain, rather than the functions of language itself. This is in accordance with the two pivotal commitments of cognitive linguistics known as the Generalisation Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment as mentioned in Chapter 1. The Generalisation Commitment is a “commitment to the characterisation of general principles that are responsible for all aspects of human language” and the Cognitive Commitment holds that “principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition” (Evans & Green 2006: 27, 40).
2.1 Cognitive science and language

Cognitive linguistics combines the study of language and the study of cognition. This means that language is considered to be congruous to other cognitive processes, rather than a modular structure as proposed by Chomsky. The mental mappings in language can thus be viewed as a property of the brain “described at a certain level of abstraction from mechanisms that we assume to exist” (Johnson & Erneling 1997: 18). Chomsky (Johnson & Erneling 1997: 119) postulates “the existence of a subcomponent of the brain ... the human language faculty.” The language faculty is thus seen as an independent or modular entity by Chomsky that should be studied separately from other cognitive mechanisms and functions. As a result, language was studied as a mechanism or form in itself, rather than at a level of abstraction and as a cognitive function of the brain, which operates in the same way as any other cognitive function. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 4, 7) write that

Formal approaches lead us not only to reconceive hard problems but also to ask new questions previously inconceivable or inexpressible. Systematic study by Zelig Harris, Noam Chomsky, and their students revealed that linguistic form is astonishingly complex and difficult to account for, thereby compelling psychologists to abandon simple associative methods of explanation ... The spectacular success of form approaches in many domains ... naturally encouraged people to develop these approaches as far as they would go in fields like artificial intelligence, linguistics, cybernetics, and psychology. Yet, invariably, form ran up against the mysteries of meaning.

In other words, language was explained mostly in terms of grammar, and regarding semantics and pragmatics, only in terms of the surface structure. The reason why language exists in the first place, and why we use it specifically in the way we do, for example why we speak in metaphors, could not be explained previously at the cognitive level. In cognitive linguistics, the
view is taken that “language is not an autonomous cognitive faculty” (Croft &
Cruse 2004: 1). This is an important distinction as it introduces the notion of
embodied language, amongst others, which I will discuss in more detail later in
this chapter. It also addresses three elements that mere form manipulation
cannot capture or explain namely identity, integration and imagination
(Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 6). This became apparent when the simulation of
seemingly effortless operations, such as machine translation and speech
synthesis, proved to be significantly more difficult than the simulation of
ostensibly complicated mathematical problems and algorithms. Form
manipulation can capture regular patterns but cannot extract meaning, capture
identities or link roles to values (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 11). This is what is
meant by identity, integration and imagination. Fauconnier and Turner (2002:
6) explain identity as the “recognition of identity, sameness and equivalence”
which is basically the ability to look at a flower and recognise it as a flower, or
in other words, to link the concept flower with an actual concrete flower. In
the same passage, Fauconnier and Turner explain integration as “finding
identities and opposites” and show that identity and integration “cannot
account for meaning and its development without the third / of the human
mind – imagination”. Consequently, integration allows us to understand
metaphorical expressions such as he is a lion in battle where the characteristics
(or identities) and opposites of a human being is equated with that of a lion.
This, in turn, takes imagination to construct which is also reflected in our
ability, for example, to create fairytales.

Languages can be studied computationally in the sense that they are systems
of signs. These signs “represent information in symbolic form” which can be
“manipulated and transformed to create new representations” (Stillings et al.
1995: 215). However, this embodies only the surface structure and surface
meaning of language. When we look at language from a cognitive point of
view, so as to understand how “linguistic knowledge is represented in the
mind, how it is acquired, how it is perceived and used, and how it relates to components of cognition” (Stillings et al. 1995: 215), we find the many ways in which meaning is constructed not only in terms of formal symbols, but also cognitively and contextually. This enables us to understand the thought patterns of cultures, social groups, nations and so forth. In other words, we are now able not only to describe linguistic knowledge as a form representation, but we also have insight into the actual nature of linguistic meaning and knowledge representation.

2.2 Intertextuality

Intertextuality, on the surface level, could be explained as texts talking to each other. It is “the name given by critical theory to inter- and intracultural dynamics and their operations” (Orr 2003: 1). Most sources dealing with intertextuality describe it within the theoretical frameworks of semiotics and post-structuralism, and refer specifically to the works of Saussure, Barthes and Kristeva. The last two sources give it a distinct French authority, though the Russian influence of Bakhtin is acknowledged in most contemporary sources and will be described here. Orr (2003: 9) addresses the French influence as follows:

... French semiotic theories, such as Kristeva’s, are integral to the debate, but in counter-distinction to developments in structuralist poetics, such as the more formalist Jenny (1976), or post-structuralist Genette of Palimpsestes (1982). These French theories are, however, of equal significance to the rich, German contribution to Central European and Slavist theories of ‘intertextuality’. These issue from Russian Formalism and the Bakhtin circle, where socio-critical dimensions and considerations are paramount.

It is important to mention here that I will simply be describing the canon of intertextual references to introduce this framework to readers. I will not be
evaluating the sources as the aim of this dissertation is not intertextuality in itself, but intertextual texts as a discourse phenomenon and how they relate to conceptual blending specifically, and to the broader theory of cognitive linguistics generally.

Intertextuality refers to the fact that texts cannot be seen as autonomous works that exist and function in isolation of other texts. The reason for this is two-fold as described by Worton and Still (1990: 1-2):

Firstly, the writer is a reader of texts (in the broadest sense) before s/he is a creator of texts, and therefore the work of art is inevitably shot through with references, quotations and influences of every kind ... Secondly, a text is available only through some process of reading; what is produced at the moment of reading is due to the cross-fertilisation of the packaged textual material (say, a book) by all the texts which the reader bring to it. A delicate allusion to a work unknown to the reader, which therefore goes unnoticed, will have a dormant existence in that reading. On the other hand, the reader's experience of some practice or theory unknown to the author may lead to a fresh interpretation ... Both axes of intertextuality, texts entering via authors (who are, first, readers) and texts entering via readers (co-producers), are, we would argue, emotionally and politically charged ...

We can surmise then, that every text is layered with social, cultural, racial, emotional, and many other tensions that are not necessarily the same for authors and various readers. As such, the author writes with all the knowledge s/he possesses and the reader interprets the text with all the knowledge s/he possesses, creating a *mosaic of meanings*. Intertextuality is thus very closely linked to the meaning-making process and though it reveals the linguistic intricacies of texts and the interpretation of texts, it does not actually reveal the fundamental unconscious mental activity that takes place to interpret all the meanings perceived by the reader and embedded in the text by the author. This is a complex phenomenon as a number of meanings may be shared by
different readers of the text, whereas others may be individual interpretations that are not even recognised by some readers of the same text. Thus, every reading of a text supplements, and as such changes, the original in some way. Worton and Still (1990: 11) write that “every quotation distorts and redefines the ‘primary’ utterance by relocating it within another linguistic and cultural context”. It is important to understand that these changes do not occur spontaneously, but are the results of an enormous amount of underlying cognitive and imaginative work which is then manifested in the texts. The creativity of the interpretations by individual readers should not be regarded lightly as it reflects the ingrained thought patterns of not only individuals, but also the socio-economic, cultural, political, religious and other views of specific societies, time periods and countries.

To summarise, Worton and Still (1990: 45-46) propose some (there are many more) of the following important notions concerning intertextuality:

- The notion of intertextuality should be understood as “differential and historical”, rather than as an autonomous construction. As a result, texts are fashioned by the interplay of opposing temporal realities.
- Texts are thus “not structures of presence but traces and tracings of otherness” which means that they are created by the duplication (for example, the many versions of the fairytale Cinderella) and reinterpretation of other texts.
- Consequently, these other texts (or intertexts) inform and limit the new texts in specific ways, for example, in terms of the framework or the content.
- Intertextual texts range from “the explicit to the implicit“ and may be specific or general in terms of certain customs and conventions which may vary according to different cultures and societies.
• The recognition of an intertext is “an act of interpretation” and as such, a reconstruction of meaning.
• The actual recognition of an intertext is less important than the recognition of the “more general discursive structure (genre, discursive formation, ideology) to which it belongs” because academic capability is less important than the ability to understand and reinterpret the cultural symbolism which is contained, and often disputed, in these texts.

The fourth claim is particularly important here as I will refer to explicit intertextual texts specifically (but not exclusively). In other words, I will apply conceptual blending to texts that specifically site other texts (intertexts) and make comments on those texts or reinterpret them in some way in the new text. There will be some implicit intertexts also (thus, references that do not specifically site another text but play on words or sentences in those texts and consequently assume that readers are familiar with the reference/references). I will state in each case whether the intertext is explicit or implicit. This leads us to the question of whether or not intertextuality still works if the reader of a text is unfamiliar with the intertext concerned. According to Worton and Still (1990: 75) “intertextuality exists only when two texts interact ... There cannot be an intertext without our awareness of it.” I would argue that the intertext does in fact exist as it is physically present within a specific text but that it fails to function as an intertext and that a level of meaning is lost. Related to this is the fact that some readers may have awareness of an intertext only as an existing piece of text and may not actually have any real knowledge or experience of it (as readers who previously read or studied the intertext would have). The type of knowledge a reader has of the intertext will, as a result, also influence the meaning-making processes. Another significant contribution to the meaning-making process is the readers’ background knowledge of the social, cultural and historical conditions of the text(s) as this greatly influences the way in which we construct and ascribe meaning to texts.
A further important point is that many of the sources on intertextuality refer to the *textual* (or surface) level of the intertexts, but I will refer to this level as the *linguistic* level. This is the level of the text (thus, the first level) which is then interpreted and given meaning by readers through meaning-making processes which rely on cognitive structures (the second level). Worton and Still (1990: 47) note that intertextuality, in its early version by theorists such as Kristeva and Barthes (among others) “was not restricted to particular textual manifestations of signifying systems but was used, rather, to designate the way in which a culture is structured as a complex network of codes with heterogeneous and dispersed forms of textual realisation.” In other words, these theorists started looking beyond the first level to the second level, but failed to describe these processes as cognitive functions.

In the following sections, I will discuss the theorists that contributed to the concept of intertextuality. Thereafter, I will discuss conceptual blending and subsequently I will draw parallels between intertextuality and conceptual blending to show why conceptual blending is a useful framework for reinterpreting intertextuality from a cognitive perspective.

### 2.2.1 Ferdinand de Saussure

Ferdinand de Saussure was born in Geneva (Switzerland) in 1857 and is often referred to as the father of linguistics. He specifically contributed to the field of semiotics (the study of signs), which is of importance to intertextuality. Barthes’s early work draws particularly on the principles of Saussure’s semiotics (Gordon 1996: 1-6).

Saussure investigated signs and sign systems, and described words as a type of sign. Signs are “anything that tells us about something other than itself” (Gordon 1996: 14). Words are referred to as linguistic signs. Saussure believed
the nomenclature view of language to be inadequate and an “oversimplification of the process of interaction between mind, world, and words” (Gordon 1996: 18). As a result he started studying language as a system of signs. This made an enormous contribution to the understanding of language, and specifically language as a system of signs, but failed in that it treated texts as autonomous entities.

Saussure’s definition of the linguistic sign ascribes two components to it, namely a concept and an acoustic image. The concept and acoustic image are linked to each other to form the linguistic sign. He later changed the words concept and acoustic image to signified and signifier respectively (Gordon 1996: 22). Another important aspect of this theory is that the linguistic sign is arbitrary, thus the connection between the signified and the signifier is random, but once it has been chosen, it cannot be changed randomly (Gordon 1996: 25). Over time, however, the signifier-signified links may change according to new technology or new discoveries.

Saussure’s work on language as a system of signs lay the groundwork for structuralism, which is “the study of language in its systematic aspects” (Gordon 1996: 83). Structuralism started recognising the influence of signs on each other but still studied texts as autonomous entities and thus only studied the influence of signs on each other within closed-off bodies of work. Also, it studied the sign only on the linguistic level and did not take into account the meaning-making processes that occur on the second level which I described earlier. Jakobson, the father of structuralism, writes that (Gordon 1996: 85)

Any sign is made up of constituent signs and/or occurs only in combination with other signs ... Any actual grouping of linguistic units binds them into a superior unit: combination and contexture are two faces of the same operation. A selection between alternatives implies the possibility of substituting one for the other, equivalent to the
former in one respect and different from it in another. Actually, selection and substitution are two faces of the same operation.

In the post-structuralist tradition, Barthes and Bakhtin questioned the structuralist semiotics of Ferdinand de Saussure which studies texts solely as autonomous entities. The internal structures of texts, such as morphology and syntax, are the focus of study, and meaning or semantics is derived exclusively from these factors. Human experience is not accounted for in this model and for Saussure, the sign (language is considered an abstract system of signs) is the most important element. To reiterate, this kind of abstract objectivism (i.e. studying language as a mere system of signs) “treats language as a pure system of laws governing all phonetic, grammatical, and lexical forms that confront individual speakers as inviolable norms over which they have no control” (Holquist 1990: 42). Barthes and Bakhtin do not oppose Saussure’s theory or deem it incorrect, but find it limiting in that it focuses only on the linguistic structure of texts. Their works (along with that of Kristeva) aim to fill this gap. I will now look at the works of Bakhtin, Barthes and Kristeva individually to explicate what they contributed to the concept of intertextuality.

2.2.2 Mikhail Bakhtin

Mikhail Bakhtin was a Russian theorist most notably recognised for his work translated as “Rabelais and His World” (Bakhtin 1984) in which he describes the medieval carnival. His notions of dialogism and the carnival (carnivalism or carnivalesque) were two of the major influences on Kristeva’s theory of intertextuality (Moi 1986: 34). Bakhtin formed part of the Russian Formalist movement, a “science of signs” (Orr 2003: 12) that was expressly concerned with socio-critical considerations. In other words, they did not view the world as “a text”, but as “a referent to which texts can point and are affiliated” (Orr 2003: 9). Dialogism, and much of Bakhtin's other works, are not discussed in
much detail in most sources, with the exception of Michael Holquist (1990) who is considered an authority on Bakhtin and dialogism, and is thus significantly relied on in this section.

Dialogism, a term never used by Bakhtin himself, refers to “the interconnected set of concerns that dominate Bakhtin’s thinking” (Holquist 1990: 15). Bakhtin viewed the dialogue as an important part of existence, language and the novel. He argued against the abstract objectivism introduced by Saussure and proposed a theory of individualistic subjectivism. According to this theory, dialogism “begins by visualizing existence as an event” (Holquist 1990: 47) in which we create the particular conditions of this reality. Existence is viewed as a variety of amorphous potential messages, which exist at a level of abstraction, and which is then interpreted to become meaningful expressions.

Bakhtin’s idea of dialogism is significant because the most important element of language is no longer the sign, but meaning. The idea of dialogism, or interconnectedness (both Bakhtin and Kristeva (Worton & Still 1990: 4) view all discourse as “inherently dialogical/intertextual”), lay some of the groundwork for the concept of intertextuality as later described by Kristeva. Here again we see some of the differences between Saussure and Bakhtin. Saussure sees the literary text as “a self-contained object because words … belonged to a unitary, impersonal language code. And so far as it was a code, it belonged to no one” (Holquist 1990: 68). Bakhtin, on the other hand, considered literary texts as “utterances, words that cannot be divorced from particular subjects in specific situations” (Holquist 1990: 68). For Bakhtin, literature is simply another form of communication or dialogue influenced by social, cultural and historical contexts.

A term very closely linked to dialogism is heteroglossia. This concept relates specifically to Bakhtin’s ideas of intertextuality (Holquist 1990: 69):
The simultaneity of these dialogues is merely a particular instance of the larger polyphony of social and discursive forces which Bakhtin calls “heteroglossia.” Heteroglossia is a situation, the situation of a subject surrounded by the myriad responses he or she might make at any particular point, but any one of which must be framed in a specific discourse selected from the teeming thousands available.

Dialogism thus assumes that all texts must be interrelated and that language has a dual role, “therefore that otherness is at work …” (Holquist 1990: 89). This otherness refers to the duality of language; the fact that meaning is derived not only from what is read objectively, but also from interpreting the message(s) subjectively. Worton and Still (1990: 15) note that what “interests us here is the theory of language (everyday dialogism) and the two poles of literature (the monologic and the dialogic)”. Bakhtin proposes that people use a specific blend of dialogues when they speak which they have acquired through previous attempts to communicate, but inevitably experience interference, firstly from the pre-existing meanings of words, and secondly, from the unknown intentions of other interlocutors. Authors may, as a result, endeavour to remove the “language of others’ intentions” superficially, “a unifying project which Bakhtin calls monologism … On the other hand, at certain historical moments, writers have artistically elaborated and intensified this heteroglossia, creating what Bakhtin calls the (dialogic) novel” (Worton and Still 1990: 15).

Heteroglossia may be loosely described as “many-languagedness” (Holquist 1990: 1). This many-languagedness refers to both the literal interpretation, meaning more than one language, and the transference of one language onto another, as well as the idea that every person has a unique language. A writer’s language (way of thinking and expressing) may therefore be different than that of a reader.
Bakhtin grew up speaking Russian and German and then studied Latin and Greek at the St Petersburg University. This was the beginning of his interest in the “heterogeneous ... mix of cultures and languages” (Holquist 1990: 1). It was also during this period that his older brother Nikolai “inspired Mikhail’s lifelong love affair with the Hellenistic age” (Holquist 1990: 2). Bakhtin was particularly influenced by Kant’s philosophy of the necessary interaction between mind and world. It was this interaction that Bakhtin eventually described as dialogism (Holquist 1990: 3-4). There were two particular aspects of Marburg Neo-Kantianism that influenced Bakhtin’s early work, the first of which is the “desire to relate traditional problems in philosophy to the great new discoveries about the world and nature being made in the exact and biological sciences on the cusp of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”. Dialogism strived to incorporate issues such as relativity and quantum theory to explain “traditional issues of how mind relates to body, and how physical matter connects with such apparently immaterial entities as relations between things”. The second aspect that influenced Bakhtin’s ideas and was expressed in his work, was the prominence of “unity and oneness” in the Marburg school’s ideologies (Holquist 1990: 5-6).

This preoccupation with the relation between things, led to Bakhtin’s search for the answer to the complex dialogic question “How can I know if it is I or another who is talking?” (Holquist 1990: 13). This is related to the otherness of language that I mentioned earlier. It is this otherness that is captured in his idea of the carnival, but before I describe Bakhtin’s theory of carnivalesque, there are three aspects that need to be covered first, namely existence as dialogue, language as dialogue and newness as dialogue.
2.2.2.1 Existence as dialogue

Bakhtin sought to “grasp human behaviour through the use humans make of language” (Holquist 1990: 15) and the parallels between art (in the broader sense) and existence (Lane 2006: 10). He was strongly influenced by the philosophical tradition of systematic metaphysics, a theory that is hardly recognised currently. By using this framework, he attempted to bridge the gap between “matter” and “spirit” through his theory of dialogism. Holquist (1990: 17-18) explains that “Bakhtin’s thought is a meditation on how we know, a meditation based on dialogue precisely because, unlike many other theories of knowing, the site of knowledge it posits is never unitary”. The idea is that all meaning is relative as it is constructed as a result of the “relation between two bodies occupying simultaneous but different space, where bodies may be thought of as ranging from the immediacy of our physical bodies, to political bodies and to bodies of ideas in general” (Holquist 1990: 20-21). In other words, meaning is constructed in a specific time and place with at least two different bodies (i.e. humans, schools of thought, etc.) in relation to each other, making this construction of meaning dialogical.

Closely related to these ideas, are those of authoring and authority, which Bakhtin addressed in a manuscript called “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” in which he introduces dialogic terminology such as “architectonics (a dynamic mode of construction or building a complex object, such as a literary text), and consummation (the way in which parts of a text get organized into an aesthetic, fictive whole)” to illustrate the dual modes inherent in texts (Lane 2006: 10). Barthes later commented on these notions in his essay “Death of the Author”. There are two important aspects that concern dialogism, namely “authority as authorship; and authority as power” (Holquist 1990: 33). I will not discuss these ideas here, however, as I describe them in detail later in this chapter when I address the works of Barthes.
2.2.2.2 Language as dialogue

Dialogue is not only an inherent part of existence, but is also intrinsically linked to language. Dialogue is not a vague notion to Bakhtin, but specifically refers to the ideas of speaking and exchange. One of the reasons that dialogue plays such a central role in dialogism, is because of “the kind of relation conversations manifest, the conditions that must be met if any exchange between different speakers is to occur at all” (Holquist 1990: 40). In other words, dialogue does not take place randomly, and the two (or more) speakers involved differ from each other, as do (the meaning(s) of) their utterances, “yet all these differences - and many more - are held together in the relation of dialogue” (Holquist 1990: 40). In addition to these differences, there is also the fact that there are always multiple meanings involved, hence dialogism. Holquist (1990: 49) explains that language (or expression) exists to construct meaning through signs. Thus, “something exists only if it means. There are, of course, things not known to anyone, but the mode of their existence is to be in dialogue with what is known: knowing requires unknowing”. Consequently, the fact that things exist because they inherently have meaning, also implies that both the known and the unknown have potential meaning.

Thus, language is dialogue because it gives meaning (or a sign) to something, and it is dialogical because these meanings are constructed by (at least) two different people (in relation to each other in a specific time and place), who are speaking and/or exchanging ideas. The ideas they are exchanging, and the meanings they ascribe to and construct from these signs may not be the same at any given time because of differences in culture, socio-economic background, intelligence and many other factors.
2.2.2.3 Novelness as dialogue

Bakhtin’s concern with literary studies, and more specifically with literary figures such as Dostoevsky and Rabelais, relates to the influence these figures had not only on literature, but also on the western culture in total. In his view, these figures “modified the nature of perception itself” (Holquist 1990: 67). To Bakhtin, literariness, “(or, what Bakhtin calls “novelness”) is the study of any cultural activity that has treated language as dialogic” (Holquist 1990: 68). One of these cultural activities that I will discuss in detail after this section is the medieval carnival.

Bakhtin sees literature as another form of dialogue or communication. These literary texts or utterances are not dependent only on the author, but on the “place they hold in the social and historical forces at work when the text is produced and when it is consumed” (Holquist 1990: 68). Thus, texts are dialogic in that the meaning-making process is dependent on the author, the time and space in which it is written, and the meaning constructed by the reader. Holquist (1990: 69) explains that dialogism “assumes that at any given time, in any given place, there is a set of powerful but highly unstable conditions at work that will give a word uttered then and there a meaning that is different from what it would be at other times and in other places.”

Bakhtin prefers the genre of novel above other forms of literariness because it “has been most at pains to establish its generic identity not only relative to other literary genres, but as it relates to the norms of everyday speech, which are the bases of genre formation itself” (Holquist 1990: 72). Because of this, the novel (or novelness) as dialogue, is closely related to Bakhtin’s views on existence as dialogue and language as dialogue.
Dialogism is particularly important to literature because novelness gives “a form of knowledge that can most powerfully put different orders of experience - each of whose languages claims authority on the basis of its ability to exclude others - into dialogue with each other” (Holquist 1990: 87). In other words, there is a relation between novels in the same way as there would be a relation between two people in conversation. As with the people, these novels exist in a different time and space, each with its own meaning, but at the same time, exchanging ideas. It is this attempt to understand the relation between novels (and novelness) that is referred to as intertextuality.

Holquist (1990: 88) distinguishes between intertextuality and inter-textuality by writing that intertextuality refers to “other texts which can be discerned within the internal composition of a specific individual text” whereas inter-textuality refers to “the social organization of the relation between texts within specific conditions of reading.” This distinction is important in understanding Bakhtin’s fascination with the carnival, because in the same way that intertextuality and inter-textuality form the heart of the novel, the otherness that they imply is at the heart of the carnival (Holquist 1990: 89).

### 2.2.2.4 Carnival as novelness

The medieval carnival was characterised by the brief (but sanctioned) deferral of customary moral concerns, and plays on the duality of life. It must be understood, though, that this carnival is unlike our concept of a holiday or festival. These carnivals were often rife with abusive and other subversive forms of language (and behaviour), which is closely linked to Kristeva’s post-structuralist ideas of

the other side of language: the irreverent, mocking and subversive tradition of carnival

... In this context Kristeva’s insistence on the importance of the speaking subject as the
principal object for linguistic analysis would seem to have its roots in her own reading of Bakhtinian “dialogism” as an open-ended play between the text of the subject and the text of the addressee, an analysis which also gives rise to the Kristevan concept of “intertextuality” (Moi 1986: 34).

The carnival, like the novel, embodies relations and highlights “the fact that social roles determined by class relations are made not given, culturally produced rather than naturally mandated” (Holquist 1990: 89). In the Rabelais book, the grotesque body (a common concept in literary circles) is an important notion which becomes metaphorised in dialogism. Holquist (1990: 90) explains that in dialogism, life is equated with a novel because it “celebrates the grotesque body of the world” and both of these notions deviate from monadism which is the illusion of isolated concepts, thoughts and individuals. The subversion or otherness of the novel and its relations are thus reflected in the carnival and specifically in the Rabelais book.

Bakhtin’s ideas of meaning-making and how it is constructed in terms of social and historical contexts, and that it is not a fixed reality, but rather always shifting, are closely related to the ideas of Roland Barthes who suggested that meaning is constructed not by the authors of texts, but by the readers of texts. These ideas will now be discussed.

2.2.3 Roland Barthes

According to Rivkin and Ryan (2004: 81), Barthes’s essay “Death of the Author” is sometimes referred to as “a Post-Structuralist manifesto”. In it, Barthes argues against the idea of the author as the creator of meaning or the authority on the meaning of a text. He argues that meaning is originated every time a text is re-read. The author exists only to create the text, whereas the reader exists to interpret it and give meaning to it (Newton 1997: 120-123).
These ideas are strongly influenced by the French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault (Rivkin & Ryan 2004: 81) and focus on the precept that texts rely heavily on other texts. Barthes emphasises the importance of the **plurality** of texts. Plural in this context does not mean simply that the text or language has numerous meanings, but rather that “it accomplishes the very plural of meaning: an irreducible (and not merely an acceptable) plural. This plurality always involves an interaction of reader with author and of texts with other texts” (Becker-Leckrone 2005: 13). The central issue of intertextuality is therefore, regardless of specific interpretations and modifications, about “the authority of quotations and citations” (Orr 2003: 33). But this is not the only issue anymore. “It is not only who signs them, but also who circulates them” (Orr 2003: 33). In other words, the authority of texts is not only about the interpretation of these texts or the meaning created by the author anymore, but also about the status of the author or “authority as authorship; and authority as power” as I mentioned before. Orr (2003: 33-34) writes that

Aside from the availability or not of translations as contributory factor, it is the power of a certain authority (even though authors are ‘dead’ according to Barthes) as cult figure or familiar brand name that is the issue in the ensuing reassessment of Barthes’s contribution to ‘intertextuality’, in both its semiotics and non-semiotics contexts.

For Barthes, the reader is therefore of utmost importance. The reader’s construction of meaning is even more significant than the contribution made by the author. They are not both seen to have an equal contribution in a different time and space as Bakhtin explains. Nor is the reader “the absent mediator-translator as in Kristeva, but body of mediation or medium for the text’s effect or, more important for Barthes, affect to come into play.” (Orr 2003: 33). Barthes’s idea that the author is dead does not, however, only shift the spotlight to the reader, but is in fact a “rejection of authority” (Worton and
Still 1990: 20). This implicates a further responsibility for the reader in that authority is now vested in the interpretation and construction of meaning of the reader. The reader’s opinion has now become invaluable. Barthes states that an author and his/her book are divided into a timeline, with the author positioned at before and the book at after: the author thus exists before the book as a creation and the book exists after the author with the reader giving meaning to it. As a result, “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author” (Newton 1997: 123).

Unlike Saussure’s idea that the signified and signifier have an arbitrary relationship, Barthes claims that they actually have a necessary relationship (Barthes 1967). In other words, the labels that we attach to things and concepts are not arbitrary as their meanings are based on our experience of the world. They are not abstract conceptualisations. This is closely related to Bakhtin’s ideas that language is dialogue because it gives meaning (or a sign) to things, and that these things exist because they have meaning.

2.2.4 Julia Kristeva

Bakhtin and Barthes both emphasised the importance of the meaning of texts. This meaning is not simply derived arbitrarily from language (a system of signs), but is given new meaning each time it is read within specific contexts. The reader and his/her specific context thus influence the meaning that is constructed. The texts themselves are in dialogue with other texts which also influences the construction of meaning. This was called dialogism by Bakhtin and plurality by Barthes. Kristeva was the first theorist to explain this duality explicitly. In her essay “Word, Dialogue and Novel” she proposes three dimensions or coordinates of dialogue. Moi (1986: 36-37) describes these three dimensions as “writing subject, addressee and exterior texts”. The word’s status is defined horizontally (“the word in the text belongs to both writing
subject and addressee”) and vertically (“the word in the text is oriented towards an anterior or synchronic literary corpus”). These dimensions overlap at times, which reveals that “each word (text) is an intersection of words (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read”.

Intertextuality, therefore, does not merely refer to texts having other embedded texts as is often assumed, but “denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign-system(s) into another” (Moi 1986: 111). This, in turn, may lead to what Kristeva calls the “relationship between two different forms of unity: conjunctive and disjunctive unity” (Lechte & Zournazi 2003: 215). This idea links with Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism which is best described in his theory of carnivalism (or carnivalesque) explained earlier in this chapter. Kristeva’s explanation of intertextuality thus incorporates many preceding works and can be illustrated as follows:

![Figure 1: The Word's Status](image)

Figure 1   THE WORD’S STATUS
In this diagram we can see that the horizontal axis represents the space of both writing subject and addressee, and that the word (or language) and its interpretation (or meaning) thus belong to both also. Meaning, however, is not interpreted in a vacuum but within contexts. The vertical axis thus represents the contexts of construal as well as the literary corpus (both implicit and explicit) that influences the writing of any given text.

Moi (1986: 38-39) explains that Bakhtin contributed much to Kristeva’s exposition of intertextuality by insisting on the dialogical nature of language, though he never explained these dialogical relationships explicitly. Kristeva, on the other hand, identified numerous dialogical relationships that take place on several levels of language, particularly expanding on Bakhtin’s “notion of polyphonic utterances, that is to say, a free play of at times contesting voices in a single text, such as a novel” (Lane 2006: 189).

2.3 Conceptual blending or integration

Three of the major hypotheses that underlie cognitive linguistics (Croft & Cruse 2004: 1) are that language is not an independent cognitive ability, conceptual structures cannot be explained only in terms of truth-conditional correspondence with the world, and our conceptualisation of our linguistic knowledge is based on our experience, and often our physical experience. These are important principles to keep in mind, especially in light of the fact that modern science is based on the “systematic manipulation of forms” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 3). As I also explained previously, form manipulation is especially useful in the formal sciences but does not capture or explain imaginative cognitive functions. The reason for this is that form manipulation cannot capture identities or link roles to values. In other words, it cannot explain how we “can perceptually apprehend one integrated thing” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 11). Connectionist models first recognised that
“identity, sameness, and difference, far from being easy primitives, are the
major and perhaps least tractable problems involved in modelling the mind”
(Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 11-12). Fauconnier and Turner (2002) termed this
conceptual blending, or the human capacity to correlate elements from
different domains and find the common schematic structure that prompts
parallels between them. One of the earliest examples cited by Fauconnier and
Turner (2002: 39) is a riddle involving a Buddhist Monk:

A Buddhist Monk begins at dawn one day walking up a mountain, reaches the top at
sunset, meditates at the top for several days until one dawn when he begins to walk
back to the foot of the mountain, which he reaches at sunset. Make no assumptions
about his starting or stopping or about his pace during the trips. Riddle: Is there a place
on the path that the monk occupies at the same hour of the day on the two separate
journeys?

In order to solve this riddle, it is necessary to imagine the Buddhist Monk
walking up and down the hill simultaneously, rather than on separate days.
When doing this, the monk will meet himself somewhere along the way, which,
in turn, solves the problem. Explaining this cognitively is slightly more
complicated. In order to do so we need to understand the elements of the
conceptual blending network model first. One of the fundamental concepts of
the network model is that of mental spaces. Fauconnier and Turner (2002:
40) explain mental spaces as “conceptual packets constructed as we think and
talk, for the purposes of local understanding and action”. In the network for
the Buddhist Monk riddle, we will thus have a mental space for the ascending
walk and another mental space for the descending walk of the monk. These
mental spaces, in turn, are linked to “long-term schematic knowledge” known
as frames, like the frame for climbing a mountain. Mental spaces are
incomplete and are characteristically informed by frames. They are also
dynamic and can be modified as ideas unfold. These mental spaces can be
activated in various ways which will be discussed as each example is
illustrated. Frames (sometimes called domains) are “schematisation of experience (a knowledge structure), which is represented at the conceptual level and held in long-term memory” (Evans & Green 2006: 211). They are thus related to specific individual and socio-cultural knowledge, like the frame for cooking pasta. The mental spaces involved in making the sauce for the pasta will differ according to different and especially new recipes, and will be constructed on-line as the situation unfolds, but will rely on the long-term knowledge embedded in the frame for cooking pasta.

In the network model designed by Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 40), mental spaces are signified by circles, elements are signified by points (or sometimes icons) in the circles, and the connections between elements in different mental spaces are represented by lines. These circles and points, in turn, signify real-life neural and cognitive processes, with the lines between elements analogous to coactivation-bindings. The frames relevant to these networks are represented in a rectangle or as icons in the circles.

The following elements are found in the Buddhist Monk network (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 40-42):

- input mental spaces
- cross-space mappings
- a generic space
- a blended space.

In any network, there are at least two input spaces. The Buddhist Monk network also has two input spaces, each of which represents a partial structure analogous to one of the two journeys. The cross-space mapping is partial also and connects counterparts in the two input (mental) spaces. This means that the “mountain, moving individual, day of travel and motion in one mental
space” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 41) are connected to those same elements in the other mental space. A generic space contains the elements that the input spaces have in common and thus maps onto each of the input spaces. Its function is therefore to provide information on the elements that are abstract enough to be contained in all the input spaces. The last mental space found in this network is called the blended space or the blend, which contains the integrated conceptualisation of a specific situation or notion.

In the Buddhist Monk network, Input Space 1 represents the ascending journey, while Input Space 2 represents the descending journey. The two mountain slopes in each input space is projected as one mountain slope in the blended space. The two different days (d₁ and d₂) are also mapped as a single day (d') in the blend. The two individuals or journeys (ascending individual/journey and descending individual/journey) are, however, not fused and the direction of the motion remains as is so that the two journeys cross each other at a particular point. The projection into the blended space preserves the time and position of each journey so that each of them has a counterpoint (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 41-42).

The blend develops what Fauconnier and Turner call emergent structure that is not present in either of the input spaces. Whereas the two input spaces each have a single moving individual, the blended space has two individuals moving in opposite directions. This is a result of the composition of elements from the input mental spaces. Completion adds further structure to the blend which means that the blend recruits familiar structure into the blend, in this case a familiar frame, “the frame of two people walking on a path in opposite directions” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 43-44). The last element that changes the blend is the “running of the blend” which is called elaboration. Elaboration means to run the blend dynamically. “Running the blend modifies it imaginatively, delivering the actual encounter of the two people” (Fauconnier &
This does not, however, mean that meaning is only constructed in the blend. Meaning is contained in all the mental input spaces (including the generic space and the blend), and in the background frames, i.e. in the entire network.

The conceptual blending network will look as follows (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 45-46):

![Diagram of the Conceptual Blending Network](image)

Figure 2 THE BUDDHIST MONK NETWORK

Any basic conceptual network diagram represents a static illustration of conceptual blending, but it is important to keep in mind that this is a complex dynamic imaginative process. Also, we do not process one input space separately from another. The input spaces and the blend are processed simultaneously. The following elements are represented in this conceptual blending network:
1. The big circles represent the mental spaces in our minds. Mental spaces, as mentioned earlier, are “small conceptual packets” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 40) that we construct in real time for immediate understanding. These mental spaces rely heavily on frames (or background frames which are represented by blocks outside the mental spaces) which are our long-term conceptual (schematic) knowledge.

2. The lines in the diagram represent the “conceptual projections and mappings” that correspond to “neural coactivations and bindings” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 46). The solid lines represent connections that are produced by matching. There are many kinds of these connections, such as connections of identity, metaphoric connections and analogical connections to name a few. These connections are known as Vital Relations and will be discussed in Section 2.3.1.

3. In conceptual blending, the structure from different (at least two) input spaces is projected to a new mental space known as the blended space. The input spaces represent the information we have at hand, whereas the blended space, or the blend, represents how we interpret the information we have available to us at a specific time.

4. The dots represent the elements which correlate in the different input spaces and the little circles in the blended space represent what is known as emergent structure. Blends contain structure from the input spaces as well as structure that is not contained in the input spaces. The structure not contained in the input mental spaces is called emergent structure and it is “generated in three ways: through composition of projections from the inputs, through completion based on independently recruited frames and
scenarios, and through elaboration” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 48).

5. The generic space is a mental space that maps onto the different input spaces and contains the elements that the input spaces share or have in common. I will not illustrate the generic space in my conceptual blending networks for ease of reference. This is common practice in blending work as the compressions and emergent structure all take place in the blended space. This does not, however, mean that the generic space is absent from the blend, it is simply not represented iconically.

The basic diagram of a conceptual blending network is represented as follows:
2.3.1 Vital Relations

Another important aspect of conceptual blending is that of Vital Relations. During the blending process, many detailed operations take place that need to be explained. These details influence the way in which certain blends are interpreted and given meaning. They are phenomena which may or may not be observable, but they can be seen as products of the blending process. There are a number of types and subtypes of Vital Relations. The most salient Vital Relations are:

1. Change

Change is a general Vital Relation. There are many things that may cause this change such as age, translation, seasonal changes, and so on. An occurrence such as a birthday is an example of Change because even though a person remains the same (i.e. a person’s identity does not change), his/her age changes.

2. Identity

Fauconnier and Turner (2002) call this the most basic Vital Relation. This will occur in a blend that, for example, refers to the same person as a baby, then as a child, an adolescent and finally, as an adult (i.e. the identity of the person remains the same); or a bottle of wine that is drunk on one night and is used the next evening as a candle holder (i.e. the bottle is still the same bottle with different roles).
3. **Time**

This Vital Relation is associated with memory, transformation, permanence, synchronisation, causation and so on. In the Buddhist Monk example, the input spaces are separated in *time*, but in the blend, those times are brought together.

4. **Space**

Space works much the same as Time and could, amongst others, refer to physical space. For example, I could compare three Comrades Marathons run by Bruce Fordyce in three different years to compare his times at different points (Space) in the three marathons (the finishing line in this case). I would then be able to make a statement such as *Bruce reached the finishing line in 5 hours, 27 minutes and 42 seconds in 1988; in 5 hours, 27 minutes and 18 seconds in 1984; and in a record 5 hours, 24 minutes and 7 seconds in 1986.*

5. **Cause-Effect**

This Vital Relation not only allows, but actually requires us to see the connections of causality. For example, fire would *cause* logs to change into ashes (*effect*), or cutting down trees for logs and burning them *cause* carbon dioxide (*effect*).

6. **Part-Whole**

This is a commonly occurring Vital Relation and takes place, for example, when I point to a photo of a face and say “That's my brother, John”, rather than “That's the face of my brother, John.” In this case, I have constructed a
network mapping between the individual and the most salient part of that person in the photo, namely his face.

7. Representation

This kind of Vital Relation refers to counterparts in one input space that is represented by counterparts in another input space which may be of a different kind (Evans & Green 2006: 421), for example, the earth which is represented on a globe. When describing the relation of America to Australia, a teacher may point to a specific section on the globe which represents America and another section which represents Australia. It is thus similar to Identity, but differs in that the counterparts in the input spaces are of a different kind in Representation (such as a caricature of a person), but the same in Identity (such as a photo of a person, whether as a baby, a teenager or an adult).

8. Role

This Vital Relation is ever-present and found easily in everyday life. An example of this is when we say something like Mandela was president. President is a role. Roles, as mentioned earlier, are linked to values. Thus, president is a role for the value Mandela, but it is also a value for the role head of state.

9. Analogy

Analogy is a Vital Relation that is dependent on Role-Value compression. For example, when we say Charlize Theron is South Africa’s Angelina Jolie, we are drawing on parallels between Charlize Theron and Angelina Jolie. One input space contains Charlize Theron, a beautiful actress (now living in the U.S.), and the darling of South Africans. The other input space contains Angelina
Jolie, also a beautiful actress (who lives in the U.S.) and the darling of Americans.

10. Disanalogy

Disanalogy is based on Analogy, and is also closely linked to Change. Psychological experiments have revealed that people are thwarted when asked to point out the differences between two things that differ tremendously, but answer immediately when the two things are very similar. Thus, disanalogy occurs when two things are similar but differ in some aspect(s). The example used as an analogy, namely *Charlize Theron is South Africa’s Angelina Jolie*, can be said to rely on both Analogy and Disanalogy, as Charlize Theron and Angelina Jolie are different people, with different lives (Disanalogy) who share certain attributes (Analogy).

11. Property

This Vital Relation is easy to spot as it is obvious, for example, a yellow flower has the property *yellow*.

12. Similarity

This Vital Relation links elements that share certain properties, for example, when we look at two colours next to each other on the colour wheel, we will notice certain similarities in the colours between yellow and orange, and also between orange and red, and so forth.
13. Intentionality

Intentionality involves mental states and convictions such as hopes, fears, desires, values, memories and so on. This is important because these states and convictions influence the way in which we construct meaning. Intentionality also involves religious thoughts. Death, for example, is perceived differently by people with different religious beliefs. If you are an atheist, you probably believe that death ends it all, whereas a Christian believes that it is simply the ending of one life, but the beginning of another (the hereafter).

2.4 Embodied language

One of the fundamental theories of cognitive linguistics is that conceptual structure is embodied. This means that conceptual structures are not universal and that language is not simply based on arbitrary abstract symbols, but rather that it is based on our experience, and especially our physical (or bodily) experience of the world (Evans & Green 2006: 157). This means that our perception of the world is, for example, influenced by the fact that we walk on two feet, and not four. We are thus spatially aware of an up and a down. We also walk forward and not sideways or backwards which influences our experience of space and time, i.e. when things move forward they also move on in time. This gives rise to image schemas, as was first explained by Mark Johnson and was further explored by him and George Lakoff in “Metaphors We Live By”. Evans and Green (2006: 178) explain that

Image schemas derive from sensory and perceptual experience as we interact with and move about in the world. For example, given that humans walk upright, and because we have a head at the top of our bodies and feet at the bottom, and given the presence of gravity which attracts unsupported objects, the vertical axis of the human body is functionally asymmetrical. This means that the vertical axis is characterised by an up-down or top-bottom asymmetry ... According to Johnson, this aspect of our experience
gives rise to an image schema: the UP-DOWN schema ... Moreover, as shown by the developmental psychologist Jean Mandler, image schemas are emergent. This means that because this experience is a function of our bodies and of our interaction in the world, this type of experience arises in conjunction with our physical and psychological development during early childhood. In other words, image schemas are not claimed to be innate knowledge structures.

This last sentence is especially important as it emphasises the difference between cognitive and generative theory. It also illustrates why and how embodied meaning construction would vary from the traditional view. Image schemas form the long-term background information on which mental spaces are based. As such, it is important to our understanding of how conceptual blending works. Embodied semantics is also important to our understanding of how we are able to create possible worlds, such as fantasies, or the worlds in fairy tales. I will discuss this in detail in Chapter 4.

Embodiment has recently been expanded to include socio-cultural aspects alongside the physical aspects. The implications are that embodied cognition does not only pertain to our physical experiences of the world (and as such, of language), but also involves cultural-specific knowledge and social interactions which shape our perceptions pre-cognitively and cognitively (Sinha 2007).

This theory is important not only from a cognitive point of view, but also in terms of intertextuality which states explicitly that meaning is not universal (though influenced universally), but constructed by individuals in specific contexts. This meaning construction, however, is not exclusively intellectual or psychological, but is influenced by the physical and socio-cultural experiences of the writers and readers. Thus, another dimension is added to intertextuality, as meaning is not only added through the text and within specific contexts, but also relates directly to the bodily experience (rather than the purely intellectual
experience as previously thought) of the writers and readers. In other words, the diagram of the word’s status would be altered to look as follows:

![Diagram of the Word’s Cognitive Status]

Figure 4  THE WORD’S COGNITIVE STATUS

### 2.5 Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, I gave an overview of cognitive science, explaining that it merges linguistics, as the study of language, with other cognitive sciences so that language is no longer studied as an isolated cognitive phenomenon, but as one of the many cognitive manifestations of the brain. As a result, cognitive linguistics relies on data from the other cognitive sciences to verify claims made about language and what we know about the mind. Cognitive linguistics thus studies language as a reflection of thought and other cognitive activities, rather than as an end in itself. This is in accordance with what George Lakoff terms the *Generalisation Commitment* and the *Cognitive Commitment*. 
Studying language from a cognitive perspective revealed that mere form manipulation cannot account for the creative underlying cognitive processes at work when producing language, because though form manipulation can capture regular patterns, it cannot extract meaning or context (i.e. human experience) from these patterns, nor can it capture identities or link roles to values. In order to find a way to show how these creative cognitive processes work, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2002) developed Conceptual Blending Theory, which shows how linguistic knowledge, as a form representation, can be mapped iconically as conceptual blending networks to reveal the creativity and cognitive processes at work at the conceptual level.

Next, I explained the role of intertextuality as a literary or discourse phenomenon. I stated that intertextuality is a complex process that was refined in, amongst others, the works of Mikhail Bakhtin, Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva, who shifted the meaning-making process from the author to the reader. It also became clear that texts are not autonomous works, but rely heavily on other texts which sometimes become embedded in our socio-cultural backgrounds as implicit knowledge structures. This is an important point as meaning is no longer seen as universal, but as highly contextual and open-ended. Consequently, texts are reinterpreted and given new meaning each time they are read.

Intertextuality has previously only been explained in terms of its surface or linguistic structure, and has not been investigated from a cognitive perspective. From the readings, it became clear that there are many parallels and commonalities between intertextuality and conceptual blending, and that the possibility exists that intertextuality is not merely a literary phenomenon, but a cognitive process, i.e. that we think intertextually. The reason I chose Conceptual Blending Theory within cognitive linguistics as a framework of
The parallels between intertextuality and conceptual blending can be summarised as follows:

- Intertextuality (as a *theory*) does not view texts as autonomous entities in the same way as cognitive linguistics does not view language as an autonomous cognitive function.

- Intertextuality (specifically in the works of Bakhtin) investigates *how we know* in the same way as cognitive linguistics investigates language as a reflection of our thought processes (or *how we know*).

- Intertextuality and cognitive linguistics view meaning as highly contextual and based on human experience, rather than as objective and universal.

- Intertextuality and cognitive linguistics both view meaning as based on human experience which is embodied and situated within specific socio-cultural settings, rather than based on arbitrary symbols.

- Intertextuality studies found that the meaning constructed from texts cannot merely be explained in terms of a system of signs in the same way that conceptual blending shows that language cannot merely be explained in terms of form manipulation.

- Intertextuality and conceptual blending show that constructing meaning is a dynamic process, rather than a fixed reality.
• Intertextuality and conceptual blending show that language and meaning are dialogic, i.e. the meaning-making process is layered and involves more than what is known since meaning does not only rely on texts, but also on the physical and socio-cultural knowledge and experiences of people.

Intertextuality can be found in all genres. As explained in Chapter 1, I will apply conceptual blending to intertexts in an expository text, two versions of the same fairytale (*Cinderella*) and a poem. These three genres were chosen for their extremities which range from factual and academic, through imaginative and fantastical, to being structurally loaded and frequently metaphorical. By applying conceptual blending to intertexts from different genres, I suggest that the cognitive processes that support and underpin the meaning-making processes intrinsic to intertexts remain the same, regardless of genre.
Chapter 3

Intertextuality in theological texts

In the previous chapter, I stated that cognitive linguistics marries the study of the mind with the study of language. Consequently, cognitive linguistics endeavours to describe conceptual processes by observing its manifestation through language use, in order to explain how people construct meaning. In the same way, intertextuality as a literary phenomenon, aims to explain the meaning-making process, though it has done so only from linguistic and literary perspectives.

Studies in cognitive linguistics demonstrated that form manipulation could not account for, or capture creative mental activity accurately. As a result, Conceptual Blending Theory was developed as a way to represent the underlying cognitive processes at work when we think and speak.

Intertextuality and conceptual blending share many comparable premises, for example that meaning is highly contextual and is derived from human experience, which make it compelling to study and reinterpret intertextuality from a cognitive perspective to determine whether conceptual blending underpins intertextuality.

In this chapter, I will refer to an article written by Maluleke (2002), titled “Of collapsible coffins and ways of dying: the search for catholic contextuality in African perspective” (Appendix A) to explain intertextuality from the traditional linguistic and literary perspectives, as well as from a cognitive perspective. I will use conceptual blending networks to illustrate how intertextual texts may be interpreted cognitively. In Section 3.1, I will describe Maluleke’s article and
its intertexts which are to be found in “Ways of Dying” (Mda 1995), “Out of America” (Richburg 1998) and from two national anthems, namely the unofficial God Bless America and the official God Bless Africa. In Section 3.2, I apply the framework of conceptual blending to the intertexts cited above to determine whether conceptual blending does in fact underpin intertextuality and what this means for the theories of intertextuality and conceptual blending. In Section 3.3, I summarise my findings and draw conclusions about how we are able to understand and give meaning to intertextual texts.

3.1 Of collapsible coffins and ways of dying: the search for catholic contextuality in African perspective

There are a number of explicit (overt) intertexts in Maluleke’s paper, such as quotes from the Bible, but I will refer only to those related to “Ways of Dying” by Zakes Mda (1995) and “Out of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa” by Keith B. Richburg (1997), as well as a comparison of the American (unofficial) national anthem (Irving Berlin’s God Bless America) and the South African (official) national anthem (God Bless Africa). In the last conceptual blending network, I will also look at some implicit intertextual references.

In this article, Maluleke (2002) examines the myth of self-reinvention by looking at the phenomenon of globalisation and its effects on human relationships. In his opinion, globalisation has contributed nothing to improve a sense of community between nations, but has in fact increased feelings of xenophobia amongst peoples of the world. To illustrate this point, Maluleke refers to America, and specifically to the events now known as 9/11 (the bombing of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001). He compares the suffering of America to that of Africa and illustrates the Western monopoly on world politics and sympathy. The American Dream once again is idealised as
the only dream for all nations. Consequently, the suffering of the U.S. is the suffering of all nations, whereas the suffering of Africa often goes unnoticed.

Maluleke makes use of explicit intertexts in this article by referring to the works of Zakes Mda (“Ways of Dying”) and Keith B. Richburg (“Out of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa”). Explicit in this context means that the author refers to the texts overtly; the texts are thus not embedded in the article without acknowledgement, but are used as intertexts for the specific purpose of invoking images in the minds of readers from those texts in order to elucidate the rest of the text.

In “Ways of Dying”, Mda tells the story of an informal settlement in South Africa. This settlement is purely fictional and satirises the rituals of mourning. For Maluleke, the many ways of dying in this squatter camp is analogous to the ways of dying in the world; there is a constant battle for the most spectacular way of dying, and in this sense, 9/11 has been portrayed as the embodiment of the most spectacular way of dying, albeit from a Western point of view. The funerals in Mda’s book are represented as important rituals that include the services of a professional mourner, called Toloki.

Keith Richburg’s work is not a direct analogy, but serves as a type of framework for imagining a parallel situation. Richburg, a journalist stationed in Rwanda, describes his feelings as he leaves to return to America. Maluleke takes a paragraph from Richburg’s book and substitutes it with words and phrases of his own to illustrate his views on globalisation and the Western monopoly on world politics.

The two national anthems, God Bless America and God Bless Africa, are used by Maluleke to highlight what he calls the globalisation of misery and demonstrate that the two nations have very different views and expectations
of God. These two prayer-songs will be compared to show these differences and how we understand them in the light of globalisation, particularly global suffering and tragedy.

There are many other examples of conceptual blending in this article, but I will refer specifically to those related to the intertexts of Mda and Richburg, and the two national anthems, as mentioned earlier.

3.1.1 Ways of Dying

In “Ways of Dying” (Mda 1995), we meet Toloki, a self-appointed Professional Mourner. Death comes easily and often to the inhabitants of his village, an informal settlement somewhere in South Africa, and Toloki decides to deal with it candidly. Another important character is Nefolovhodwe, a coffin maker, who invents a collapsible coffin that is carried like a suitcase and can be assembled within minutes. It is also amazingly durable and can carry a person of any weight. This story is very funny at times, but the seriousness of the casualty rate does not go unnoticed. Maluleke recognises the commonplace of death in Africa, and strongly contrasts this with the way in which death was dealt with after the events of 9/11. For Africans, death, disease, hunger and war are common occurrences that have gone unnoticed by the rest of the world, yet the events of 9/11 were globally recognised and the deaths of the Americans were mourned by all.

The title of Zakes Mda’s book “Ways of Dying” is used by Maluleke in the title of his article also. The motivation for this is to evoke (intertextual) images from Mda’s book in the minds of readers. Readers who have not read Mda’s book will not call to mind the same types of images as those readers who have read the book. The reason for this is that the intertext serves as a specific reference point. Maluleke’s intent is for readers to recall the many ways of dying
experienced by the *squatter camp* (informal settlement) community in Mda’s book. On further reading of Maluleke’s article, it becomes apparent that the ways of dying in Mda’s book are analogous to the ways of dying encountered in the world, and the idea of the *ways-of-dying competition* (which is unspoken for the most part) comes to the fore.

### 3.1.2 Out of America

Keith Richburg, a black American journalist, who was posted in Africa as foreign correspondent (Nairobi bureau chief) for the Washington Post, wrote this book as a record of his experiences in Africa between 1991 and 1994. He recalls events in Somalia and Rwanda, but far from being objective, this book not only criticises Africans, but also strips them of all humanity. Richburg’s title “Out of America” seems to have two distinct meanings: firstly, that he was physically *out of America* and *in Africa*, and secondly, that he is *out* of America in the sense that he is *from* America, not Africa. In other words, Richburg bluntly rejects his ancestry (the fact that he is *out of Africa* or *from Africa*). He states that he is *terrified* of Africa and writes (Richburg 1998: 248)

> So am I a coldhearted cynic? An African hater? A racist, maybe, or perhaps a lost and lonely self-hating black man who has forgotten his African roots? Maybe I am, all that and more. But by an accident of birth, I am a black man born in America, and everything I am today - my culture and attitudes, my sensibilities, loves, and desires - derives from that one simple and irrefutable truth.

Maluleke does not question the fact that the African atrocities Richburg witnessed in Somalia and Rwanda were terrible and violent, or that they are the worst display of inhumanity. What he does question and address, is the fact that Richburg makes all of Africa inhumane, and that Africa and Africans have been marginalised for centuries. Over and above this, America, as a
superpower, is idealised as a type of Utopia, though Richburg’s blatant racism and rejection of his own kind reflects a different reality. The racism is not blatant white vs. black anymore, but American vs. African (and the rest of the world). The idea of a competition is taken further here, as it involves not only the most spectacular way of dying, but the idea of identity: being American is equivalent to first prize.

3.1.3 Two national anthems

Maluleke looks at the two national anthems, the unofficial *God Bless America* and the official *God Bless Africa*, with the idea of the rituals of mourning in mind. In his article he writes:

> Having noted the place of Berlin’s “God Bless America” in the rituals of mourning and national reinvention in the USA, I now wish to explore its significance further by comparing it to the song “God Bless Africa” … As I listened to Americans singing “God Bless America” I could not help thinking that the national anthem of my own country, and that of several East and Southern African countries, is called “God Bless Africa”. During times of despair, I have wondered if Americans would fare better than Africans in their prayerful request before God. Do they sing it like people who are used to being blessed by God – or do they sing it because, as Africans sing their song, they often feel abandoned and forgotten by God?

Again, the idea of the competition comes to the fore. *Who will win God’s affection? Who will God choose to bless?* Maluleke explores this idea further in terms of catholicity or globalisation.

3.2 Applying conceptual blending to intertexts

In the previous sections, I discussed Maluleke’s article (2002) which examines the effects of globalisation on human relationships and questions the idea that
we have evolved in terms of our morals, values and social obligations. Maluleke refers to specific intertexts in his article with the aim of drawing parallels between Africa and America, and to analyse the idea of universal human suffering and transcendence.

In the following sections, I will apply the framework of conceptual blending to the intertexts in order to reinterpret intertextuality from a cognitive perspective and determine whether the meaning-making processes intrinsic to intertexts are underpinned by conceptual blending. In doing so, I will continue the undertaking of Fauconnier and Turner, amongst others, “toward the rehabilitation of imagination as a fundamental scientific topic, since it is the central engine of meaning behind the most ordinary mental events” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 15). I will do this by representing the analogous data in the article, as well as the different intertexts, in conceptual blending networks. This will reveal whether new inferences become apparent during the construction of meaning in the blend through processes such as completion (the merging of new and familiar structure in the blend to construct meaning) and elaboration (the dynamic on-line running of the blend which alters it imaginatively).

3.2.1 The ways of dying conceptual blending network

The first conceptual blending network I will discuss, relates to the ways of dying in Mda’s book and Maluleke’s article. It has the following fundamentals:

Input Space 1: Ways of dying from Mda’s book, e.g. dying from a disease or being killed.
Background Frame: Knowledge of Mda’s novel (“Ways of Dying”) and familiarity with a funeral procession. Knowledge of Toloki, a professional mourner in “Ways of Dying” and what his profession entails.

Input Space 2: Other ways of dying encountered in the world, e.g. dying in a car accident or committing suicide.

Background Frame: Knowledge of other ways of dying and familiarity with a funeral procession.

Vital Relations: Analogy based on Identity relations. According to Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 95), identity relations “may be the most basic Vital Relation”. In these two input spaces, we understand that any way of dying is the same basic concept (i.e. a way of dying), but that there are different ways of dying (in a car accident, from a disease, etc.). These elements thus prompt cross-space mappings in that they share a commonality (a way of dying), even though there are many different ways of dying.

Blended Space: In the blended space it becomes clear that there is a competition for the most spectacular way of dying (this idea is presented in Mda’s book) and that 9/11 is now seen as the victor of this competition.

Background Frame: The nature of a competition, i.e. there is only one winner (either an individual or a team) who receives a prize and/or glory for winning.

Emergent Structure: The emergent structure here is the idea of the competition with 9/11 as the winner. As winner of this ways-of-dying competition, America is rewarded with a mass funeral with the world as professional mourners. (The idea of a professional mourner is presented in Mda’s book, as mentioned earlier.)
In this network, an analogy is drawn between the ways of dying in Mda’s book and the ways of dying encountered everyday in the world around us. Though Maluleke never says it overtly, it is implied that 9/11 is comparable to a mass funeral with the world looking on as professional mourners (which becomes apparent through **elaboration**). In this blend, it is understood that 9/11 is now seen as the most spectacular way of dying. This becomes clearer when we understand that there is a ways-of-dying competition inherent in (the **composition of**) this network. The idea of the competition is not present in the input spaces but becomes apparent in the blend. In the blended space, we have the result of the competition: a winner, which in this case is the 9/11 incident. As the victor of this ways-of-dying competition, America (the U.S.) also wins the empathy of the world; the idea of the mass funeral with the world as professional mourners.

The network will look as follows:

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**Figure 5**  **THE WAYS OF DYING NETWORK**
3.2.2 The portable collapsible coffins conceptual blending network

The second intertextual reference we will look at is also encountered in Maluleke’s title. It is in actual fact read before the ways of dying reference, but it is better understood after the second part is read. The reference I am alluding to is that of collapsible coffins. Reading ways of dying in the title immediately evokes the idea of collapsible coffins (if the reader has read Mda’s book). In “Ways of Dying”, we meet a coffin-maker who has designed a portable collapsible coffin. Maluleke uses this idea of portable collapsible coffins as an analogy for the many types of possible collapsible coffins we may find ourselves in everyday (which becomes apparent through elaboration), such as an airplane (the 9/11 portable collapsible coffin). This network has the following fundamentals:

**Input Space 1:** Mda’s coffins that are portable and collapsible, as well as the idea (in the composition) that these coffins carry one on a journey from this life to the next (afterlife).

**Background Frame:** Mda’s portable, collapsible coffins (thus, awareness of this idea in Mda’s book).

**Input Space 2:** Airplanes (the 9/11 airplane) that can transport people (portable) on a journey from A to B. These airplanes are fragile (collapsible) and consequently may become a way of dying.

**Background Frame:** Properties of an airplane, namely that it serves as a form of transportation, but also the idea that airplanes are fragile.
Vital Relations: Analogy based on Identity relations. Here the properties of a coffin (portable, collapsible) correspond with the properties of an airplane (transportation, fragile). We understand that even though a coffin and an airplane are two very different concepts, they share identity relations or similar properties that map onto each other. The coffin carries a dead person and the airplane carries people who are still alive (which means that Disanalogy plays a role here), but the fact that these people are on a journey (either from this life to the afterlife or from point A to B) maps onto each other.

Blended Space: In the blend, we understand that any form of transportation (the idea of portable) that takes people on a journey from point A to B is fragile (can collapse) and that this journey is representative of the journey of life. Thus, any person using any form of transport on any given day (on the journey of life) to travel from point A to B, may find himself/herself in a coffin that represents the journey from this life to the afterlife if the transportation collapses in any way.

Emergent Structure: The emergent structure in this blend is the idea that the coffin and the airplane do not only share properties, but an airplane (or any other form of transportation) may actually become one's coffin.

The network looks as follows:
3.2.3 The Richburg/ Maluleke conceptual blending network

The third intertextual reference works slightly different from the first two as it does not rely on Analogy based on Identity relations. Instead, it runs as two parallel texts, the one serving as a type of framework for the other. When seen next to each other, we see that only certain words and phrases in Text A (from “Out of America” by Keith Richburg) have been replaced by other words and phrases in Text B (Maluleke’s rephrasing of Richburg’s text), but that the basic framework of Text A is preserved in Text B. These two passages are quoted directly from Maluleke’s article, though he never places the two texts alongside each other, nor does he highlight the parallel sections or put in the break-lines which were done for ease of reading, as done here. It looks as follows with the replaced words and phrases in red:
**Text A (Richburg)**

I open the little plastic bag with my headset and plug the earphones into the armrest in time for the start of the BBC news just coming across the television screen in front of the cabin. The story is about Rwanda; something about a new outbreak of violence at the border and worries about fresh incursions from Hutu rebels based over the border of Zaire who are plotting their return.

I close my eyes and switch channels to a music station. I’m leaving Africa now, so I don’t care any more about the turmoil in Rwanda and have no interest in this latest tragic development. I have seen it all before, and I’m sure I’ll see it again. But from now on, I will see it from afar, maybe watching it on television, like millions of other Americans. I’ll watch the latest footage of refugees crossing a border some place, soldiers looting, kids with grenade launchers blasting apart yet another quaint but run-down African capital.

I will watch with more than passing interest, since I have been here. I will

**Text B (Maluleke)**

I open the little plastic bag with my headset and plug the earphones into the armrest in time for the start of the CNN news just coming across the television screen in front of the cabin. The story is about September 11th; something about a new outbreak of anthrax in Philadelphia and worries about another plane hijack in Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina.

I close my eyes and switch channels to a music station. I’m leaving the USA now, so I don’t care any more about the turmoil in the USA and have no interest in this latest tragic development. I have seen it all before, and I’m sure I’ll see it again. But from now on, I will see it from afar, maybe watching it on television, like millions of other Africans. I’ll watch the latest footage of Americans with bloated stomachs and charred lips after another chemical warfare attack by unknown terrorists. I will watch, on TV, in the comfort of my middle-class home in Pretoria’s elite suburb of Centurion, as fire fighters tear limbs off rotting bodies of crushed Americans as they desperately try to account for the dead after yet another terrorist attack on yet another doomed American city.

Sure, I will watch with more than passing interest, since I have been here. I will
understand now the complexities behind the conflicts. I will also know that the problems are too intractable, that the outside world can do nothing, until Africa is ready to save itself. I’ll also know that none of it affects me, because I feel no attachment to the place or the people. And why should I feel anything more? Because my skin is black? Because some ancestor of mine, four centuries ago, was wrenched from this place and sent to America, and because I now look like those others whose ancestors were left behind? Does that make me still a part of this place? Should their suffering now somehow still be mine?

understand now the complexities behind the conflicts. I will also know that the problems are too intractable, that the outside world can do nothing, until the USA is ready to save itself. I’ll also know that none of it affects me, because I feel no attachment to the place or the people. And why should I feel anything more? Because I am a human being? Because some ancestor of mine, several million years ago gave birth to other ancestors of mine that might have given birth to Americans and that now I look like some Americans? Does that make me still a part of this place? Should their suffering now somehow still be mine?

| Understand now the complexities behind the conflicts. I will also know that the problems are too intractable, that the outside world can do nothing, until Africa is ready to save itself. I’ll also know that none of it affects me, because I feel no attachment to the place or the people. And why should I feel anything more? Because my skin is black? Because some ancestor of mine, four centuries ago, was wrenched from this place and sent to America, and because I now look like those others whose ancestors were left behind? Does that make me still a part of this place? Should their suffering now somehow still be mine? |
| Understand now the complexities behind the conflicts. I will also know that the problems are too intractable, that the outside world can do nothing, until the USA is ready to save itself. I’ll also know that none of it affects me, because I feel no attachment to the place or the people. And why should I feel anything more? Because I am a human being? Because some ancestor of mine, several million years ago gave birth to other ancestors of mine that might have given birth to Americans and that now I look like some Americans? Does that make me still a part of this place? Should their suffering now somehow still be mine? |

In this network, Input Space 1 will have elements from Richburg’s text and Input Space 2 will have elements from Maluleke’s rephrased interpretation of Richburg’s text. In the blend, however, these texts are not understood as parallel texts only, but as analogies and disanalogies. This will be explained under the *Vital Relations* heading. It is important to note here that there is a blend within this blend as the *ways of dying* element (refer to Figure 5) in Input Space 1 is already a blend. Figure 7 has the following fundamentals:

**Input Space 1:** Richburg’s text from “Out of America”.

**Background Frame:** Knowledge of violence on the African continent and specifically the Rwanda genocide. The idea of the Western world’s ignorance of this violence in Africa is thus a part of our long-term schematic knowledge that is activated when reading Richburg’s text.
Input Space 2: Maluleke’s reworking of Richburg’s text.

Background Frame: Knowledge of 9/11 and the consequences thereof.

Vital Relations: There are two Vital Relations in this blend, namely Analogy and Disanalogy. There is interplay between these two Vital Relations so that the basic frameworks of the two texts stand as an Analogy, whereas the words and phrases that are replaced work as Disanalogy.

Blended Space: In the blended space, these texts are not only understood as parallel texts, as mentioned earlier, but the idea of leaving Africa/America is also understood as leaving any situation for which one does not want to take responsibility, the BBC/CNN news represents any bad news, the Rwanda/9 September (9/11) analogy/disanalogy is equated with ways of dying (already a blend as represented in Figure 5), the African-American/human being (specific human being here, namely the author) allusion is understood as any human being (non-specific) and the outbreak of violence in Africa (war)/outbreak of anthrax in America (chemical war) is understood in terms of universal suffering and responsibility.

The Disanalogy in every instance can only be understood in terms of the Analogy that is set up between the text and the intertext(s) during elaboration which enables us to imaginatively connect the ideas presented in these texts so as to construct meaning from them. All the previous blends also rely on Analogy/Disanalogy (even though the main Vital Relations are Analogy based on Identity relations) as all intertexts are used, sighted, or alluded to for the specific purpose of setting up an analogous (Analogy) text which can then be used to highlight the Disanalogy between them. It would seem from this that Analogy and Disanalogy are the most important Vital Relations in intertextual readings as they are intrinsic to any text/intertext construction. This will be
tested in the other two genres (fairytales and poetry) in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively to see if this holds true for any intertextual reading, regardless of genre.

**Emergent Structure:** In the emergent structure it becomes clear that Maluleke is using Richburg's text to set up a contextual reference which he uses to address the universal, catholic suffering and responsibility of all human beings. (This *catholic contextuality* is referred to in Maluleke's title.)

The network is represented as follows:

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**Figure 7** *The Richburg/Maluleke Network*
3.2.4 The national anthems conceptual blending network and the parable conceptual blending network

The fourth and fifth intertextual conceptual blending networks, involve the two national anthems discussed earlier. As background information, the two national anthems are presented below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>God Bless America</th>
<th>God Bless Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>God Bless America</td>
<td>God bless Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While the storm clouds gather far across the sea</td>
<td>Lord bless Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let us swear allegiance to a land that’s free</td>
<td>May her spirit rise up high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let us all be grateful for a land so fair</td>
<td>Hear thou our prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As we raise our voices in solemn prayer:</td>
<td>Lord bless us your children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God bless America</td>
<td>Descend, Oh Spirit. Descend, Oh Holy Spirit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land that I love</td>
<td>Lord bless us your children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand beside her and guide her</td>
<td>Lord bless us your peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through the night with a light from above</td>
<td>Put an end to wars and suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the mountains, to the prairies</td>
<td>Oh Lord, do bless our peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the oceans, white with foam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God bless America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My sweet home</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These two national anthems are used in an analogous way to show the differences between the prayers (or requests) of Americans and Africans. Maluleke, a theologian, seems to be basing his critique on the parable of the Pharisee's prayer and the tax collector's prayer in the Bible (Luke 18: 9-14) and another reference where Jesus talks about our attitude towards prayer (Matthew 6: 5-15). There is no explicit reference to this parable, and the
references that are made are done so in a very subtle way. The evidence in his article is contained in the following lines:

During times of despair, I have wondered if Americans would fare better than Africans in their prayerful request before God. Do they sing it like people who are used to being blessed by God - or do they sing it because, as Africans sing their song, they often feel abandoned and forgotten by God?

The idea of a competition, which is threaded throughout Maluleke’s article (and is implicit in the Mda novel), comes to the fore here again. This time, it concerns God’s blessing: *Who is heard by God?* In the Bible, there are (at least) two excerpts that deal with this. We will first look at a parable, and then at an excerpt from Matthew.

The parable (Luke 18: 9-13) reads as follows:

Lk 18:9  To some who were confident of their own righteousness and looked down on everybody else, Jesus told this parable:

Lk 18:10  “Two men went up to the temple to pray, one a Pharisee and the other a tax collector.

Lk 18:11  The Pharisee stood up and prayed about himself: ‘God, I thank you that I am not like other men — robbers, evildoers, adulterers — or even like this tax collector.

Lk 18:12  I fast twice a week and give a tenth of all I get.’

Lk 18:13  “But the tax collector stood at a distance. He would not even look up to heaven, but beat his breast and said, ‘God, have mercy on me, a sinner.’”

Lk 18:14  “I tell you that this man, rather than the other, went home justified before God. For everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and he who humbles himself will be exalted.”

In Matthew 6: 5-15, Jesus also says the following on prayer and praying:
Mt 6:5 “And when you pray, do not be like the hypocrites, for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and on the street corners to be seen by men. I tell you the truth, they have received their reward in full.

Mt 6:6 But when you pray, go into your room, close the door and pray to your Father, who is unseen. Then your Father, who sees what is done in secret, will reward you.

Mt 6:7 And when you pray, do not keep on babbling like pagans, for they think they will be heard because of their many words.

Mt 6:8 Do not be like them, for your Father knows what you need before you ask him.

Mt 6:9 “This, then, is how you should pray: "Our Father in heaven, hallowed be your name,

Mt 6:10 your kingdom come, your will be done on earth as it is in heaven.

Mt 6:11 Give us today our daily bread.

Mt 6:12 Forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors.

Mt 6:13 And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one.

Mt 6:14 For if you forgive men when they sin against you, your heavenly Father will also forgive you.

Mt 6:15 But if you do not forgive men their sins, your Father will not forgive your sins.”

Maluleke seems to be comparing the American (unofficial) national anthem (or prayer-song) to the prayer of the Pharisee and the African (official) national anthem to the prayer of the tax collector. Like the Pharisees of the day, the Americans pray like people who are used to being blessed by God, whereas Africans, like the tax collectors in biblical times, are seen as the outcasts of society, but their humble prayers are heard by God.

It is unclear whether Maluleke referred to this parable intentionally or whether it was done subconsciously. This raises an interesting question concerning intertextuality, namely What subtleties influence our understanding of intertextual texts, and as such, our meaning construction? I have already described image schemas and how they constitute our long-term knowledge. This long-term knowledge, in turn, influences our mental spaces (or on-line
mental constructions for local understanding). It is clear, from this example, that some intertextual knowledge is unconscious long-term knowledge. We may not always be consciously aware of this knowledge at all times. In this case, Maluleke may have been conscious of the fact that he was subtly comparing the American and African prayers to the prayers cited in the parable. On the other hand, being a theologian and preacher, these images may be so embedded in his consciousness that he was not aware of the subtle references and comparisons he was making. This shows the understated influence of intertexts and our ability to cognitively construct meaning from situations, with both conscious and unconscious knowledge. This unconscious knowledge may at some point again become conscious knowledge if, for example, a person suddenly remembers something in a specific context. But the interesting thing that is shown by this conceptual blending network is that unconscious knowledge (in other words, knowledge that we are not consciously aware of at a specific time) still influences our meaning construction. Note that subconscious and unconscious (knowledge) is used interchangeably here.

This could be tested by interviewing authors. When I interviewed Maluleke, he said that there is a basic distinction between European and African theology. Whereas European theology investigates the question Does God exist?, African theology asks Why does God allow? I asked him if he intentionally referred to the two texts in the Bible that I cited earlier, and his response was that even though these texts work as an answer to his rhetorical question (“I have wondered if Americans would fare better than Africans in their prayerful request before God ...”), he was not consciously referring to it. In this case, my own background knowledge has influenced my reading and understanding of Maluleke’s text. This does not mean that Maluleke was not referring to these texts subconsciously. He agreed with me that it would be entirely possible as this is embedded knowledge.
There are two blends that arise from the national anthems. The first blend serves as a type of **megablend** (a conceptual blending network that contains at least one other conceptual blending network), and thus contains the other blend implicitly or explicitly (implicitly in this case). In the megablend, the two national anthems are compared, whereas the embedded blend looks at the national anthems in terms of the parable shown above (according to my own reading and understanding of the text). As a result, we understand the embedded blend in terms of the megablend. It is important to note that the megablend could be understood and constructed cognitively without knowledge of the embedded blend, which in this case is an implicit intertext. This intertext (or knowledge of the biblical parable) may not be common knowledge to **all** readers of this article, though presumably most of them would be familiar with the parable, as Maluleke’s audience is most likely fellow theologians. If there is knowledge of the intertext, it will add significance (or another layer of meaning) to the meaning-making process. The megablend contains the following fundamentals:

**Input Space 1: God Bless America.**

**Background Frame:** Knowledge of the politics and (unofficial) anthem of America (the U.S.), as well as the fact that the U.S. is the only superpower left, and as a result, enjoys monopoly on world politics and sympathy. Background knowledge of the parable cited earlier is not essential, but will influence the reader’s understanding of Maluleke’s article. The subtle parallel drawn between America’s prayer (anthem) and the Pharisee’s prayer (which is not pleasing to God) will influence the reader’s construction of meaning.

**Input Space 2: God Bless Africa.**
**Background Frame:** Knowledge of the politics (particularly the wars and genocides) and the anthem of Africa (South Africa and some other African countries). Again, knowledge of the parable and the parallels between Africa’s prayer and the tax collector’s prayer (which is acceptable and pleasing to God) will influence the reader’s meaning construction.

**Vital Relations:** There are two Vital Relations in this blend, namely Analogy and Disanalogy. There is an interplay between these two Vital Relations (in the same way as in the previous conceptual blending network) so that the basic frameworks of the two texts work as Analogy (both are prayer-songs), but the differences in attitude explained by Maluleke work as Disanalogy.

**Blended Space:** In the blended space, these texts are not only understood as prayer-songs and national anthems of two different countries (and continents), but also as a universal prayer for God’s blessing on humanity. It is understood that God loves His people and blesses them, and that in His eyes we are not different nations, but are regarded in the same way (we are one) and stand before him equally. The *American Dream* is not replaced by the *African Dream* but by *God’s Dream* which is the same for all of humanity. Thus, in this context, the idea that *being American is equivalent to first prize* is dispelled in this conceptual blending network.

Also embedded in the blend is the implicit intertext of the parable which carries with it a strong sense that God honours and listens to the humble prayer, which in this case is the African prayer, not the American prayer as assumed.
Emergent Structure: In the emergent structure it becomes clear that Maluleke refers to the two national anthems to show not only that the American Dream has faltered and that America stands before God as a proud (not humble) nation, but also that in the bigger scheme of things (or in God’s eyes), no single nation is better than another. His dream is the same for all nations. In his article, Maluleke writes:

Thus the most profound song that both Americans and South Africans can sing is “God Bless Humanity and All of Creation!” Unless we all can sing such a song over and above our own anthems – official and unofficial – then we are not yet ready ... for the practice of genuine catholicity and genuine contextuality.

The idea that the American Dream is the best dream for all nations is further dispelled by knowledge of the embedded blend. This will be discussed when we look at the embedded blend.

The network of the megablend is represented as follows:

![Diagram of the national anthems network](image)

**Figure 8**  THE NATIONAL ANTHEMS NETWORK
Inherent in this blend, as explained earlier, is the blend of the parable. Knowledge of this parable will influence the way in which the *National Anthems Network* is understood and will be discussed shortly. Maluleke (2002) sets up these blends when he writes:

I do not presume to know enough about either the larger context, or the state of mind, in which the Siberian immigrant Irving Berlin wrote "God Bless America" in praise of his new adopted land. All I know is that I have been touched profoundly as I watched Americans of various races and genders sing this, their own prayer-song. As was the case in South Africa many years ago, this song has the ability to summon the nation to an imagining of an alternate community. While Irving Berlin was keenly aware of the war clouds gathering over Europe in 1938, he nevertheless proposed his revised version as a peace song and a prayer, rather than a call to arms. Thus both songs carry the same prayerful simplicity, while eschewing the temptation of the patriotic excesses noted in the national anthem above. (A song which carries the same kind of prayerfulness, though not blessed with the same simplicity, is that which has sometimes been called the African American national anthem, namely "Lift Every Voice").

What is interesting in the megablend, is that Maluleke is comparing White (Apartheid) South Africa to America, and Black South Africans to African Americans which sets up his article in a strange relation to Richburg’s book, though this notion is beyond the scope of this dissertation. I will now discuss the embedded blend (*The Parable Network*) which contains the following fundamentals:

**Input Space 1:** The two national anthems.

**Background Frame:** Knowledge of the tone of the two national anthems. In other words, the fact that (based on Maluleke’s article quoted above) Americans pray as a nation used to being blessed by God, whereas Africans pray as a nation pleading for God’s mercy.
Input Space 2: The parable of the two prayers.

Background Frame: Knowledge of the status of Pharisees and tax collectors during biblical times. Pharisees were the learned preachers of the day and enjoyed high status. They attained holiness by keeping the law. The tax collectors, on the other hand, were regarded as *unholy*. Other important background knowledge relates to what Jesus said in Matthew 6: 5-15 (quoted above). This emphasises the idea that God blesses the humble and that America is not favoured by Him above other nations.

Vital Relations: The most obvious Vital Relation is that of Identity. Americans are given the *identity* of the Pharisees, and Africans are given the *identity* of tax collectors. Property also comes into play here. Pharisees have certain *properties* (e.g. they are proud) which then becomes a *property* of Americans. The same goes for Africans and tax collectors in terms of humility. Note, however, that Analogy/Disanalogy also plays a role in this network with regards to the text/intertext construction. That is, the identities and properties of Americans and Africans are analogous to the identities and properties of Pharisees and tax collectors respectively, while the identities and properties of Americans and Africans are disanalogous to each other, in the same way that the identities and properties of Pharisees and tax collectors are disanalogous.

Blended Space: In the blended space, it is understood that the American prayer is equated to the Pharisee's prayer which was unacceptable to God. The African prayer, which is a humble prayer like the tax collector's prayer, is accepted by God and pleases Him. Once again, we are able to construct meaning in this way through the process of elaboration.

Emergent Structure: In the emergent structure it becomes clear that even though America is a superpower and has high status compared to Africa, which
is seen as a poor and *unholy* continent, God does not favour America as the best and most progressive nation (as the rest of the world does), but also listens to the humble requests of Africans.

The network is represented as follows:

![The Parable Network](image)

Figure 9  **The Parable Network**

### 3.3 Summary and conclusions

Cognitive studies, and especially cognitive linguistic studies, can and have made great contributions to the field of religion. There have been a number of studies dealing with ritual in religion, studies exploring the conceptualisation of nonnatural entities and even studies on metaphor, specifically “Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible”, edited by Pierre van Hecke (2005). These studies have greatly contributed to our understanding of the way in which we interpret religion, theological ideas and God concepts.
In this chapter, I examined intertextuality and conceptual blending in theological texts and contexts which revealed how intertextual readings, both explicit and implicit, influence our construction of meaning. I did so by referring to an article written by Maluleke (2002) entitled “Of collapsible coffins and ways of dying: the search for catholic contextuality in African perspective” (Appendix A), in which he explores the notion of globalisation and its effects on the human condition. He does so by referring to the works of Zakes Mda (1995) and Keith Richburg (1997), as well as by comparing two national anthems (one official and one unofficial), which serve as the intertexts.

In Mda’s “Ways of Dying”, the ways of dying in an informal settlement somewhere in South Africa are analogous to all the ways of dying in the world, and the idea of a competition (for the most spectacular way of dying) comes to the fore when conceptual blending is applied to this text in The Ways of Dying Network (Figure 5). The process of elaboration reveals that 9/11 (the winner of the ways-of-dying competition) is equivalent to a mass funeral with the world as professional mourners.

A second conceptual blending network that originates from Mda’s novel is The Portable Collapsible Coffins Network (Figure 6), which explores the idea that the collapsible coffins in Mda’s narrative is analogous to all forms of transport (including the 9/11 airplanes). In this network, the properties of a coffin (which is portable and collapsible) correspond with the properties of an airplane (which is a form of transport and is fragile) through Identity relations. We thus understand, through elaboration, that any person using any form of transport on any given day to travel from one point to another, may find himself/herself in a coffin (that represents the journey from this life to the next life) if the transport collapses (e.g. in an accident).
The third conceptual blending network (Figure 7) originates from Richburg’s “Out of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa”. Maluleke quotes a passage from this text and uses it as a framework which he partly paraphrases to show how the American Dream is idealised for all nations. The idea of a competition is taken further in this blend in the notion that being American is equivalent to first prize, and the importance of Analogy and Disanalogy, are shown.

The fourth and fifth conceptual blending networks (Figures 8 and 9 respectively) involve two national anthems, namely the unofficial God Bless America and the official God Bless Africa. The first of these, namely The National Anthems Network (Figure 8), serves as a megablend in which these two anthems are not only read and understood as national anthems, but also as universal prayer-songs requesting God’s blessing for all mankind. The Parable Network (Figure 9) is embedded in The National Anthems Network and both of these networks have implicit intertexts (Luke 18: 9-13 and Matthew 6: 5-15) which reveal (in the blends) that meaning is constructed from both conscious and unconscious knowledge.

Hence, applying the framework of conceptual blending to intertextuality in theological texts reveals that:

- Intertextuality (at least in theological texts) is, in fact, underpinned by conceptual blending.

- Meaning is highly contextual and the meaning-making process is influenced and structured by both conscious and unconscious knowledge (i.e. it is dialogic).

- The Vital Relations identified as Analogy and Disanalogy are integral to the intertextual texts in this section, as all the text/intertext constructions
in this section rely on the interplay between Analogy and Disanalogy. Analogy pertains to the frameworks of the texts and intertexts, while Disanalogy pertains to the content as can be seen most clearly in *The Richburg/Maluleke Network*, but is also perceptible in the other conceptual blending networks.

In the next chapter, I will apply conceptual blending to intertexts in fairytales to determine whether those intertexts are interpreted in the same way cognitively as the intertexts in theological texts.
Chapter 4

Intertextuality in fairytales

In the previous chapter, conceptual blending was applied to theological texts in order to establish whether intertextuality is underpinned by conceptual blending. The conceptual blending networks in Chapter 3 revealed that intertextuality, at least in theological texts, is in fact underpinned by conceptual blending, and that the Vital Relations identified as Analogy and Disanalogy, play significant roles in intertextuality and will be further explored in this chapter.

Chapter 4 deals with intertextuality in fairytales and specifically the well-known fairytale Cinderella as compiled and written by the Brothers Grimm, and later reinterpreted by Roald Dahl. Most fairytales are already based on folk tales and are therefore implicitly intertextual. In this context, however, Dahl intentionally reinterprets Cinderella; the intertext is thus explicit.

Cinderella represents an archetypal tale of rags to riches. The original tale (this is a problematic term when referring to the origins of fairytales and is used here in the sense that it was one of the earliest written versions) was written as prose by the Brothers Grimm and contains offensive language and scenes. More modern versions have changed the original language to make it more suitable for children. Roald Dahl's interpretation is written in the form of rhyme and highlights the censoring of the more gruesome original tale as represented in other modern versions. He does this by setting up a counterfactual world that lies between our idea of the real world and the fantasy world created by the Brothers Grimm in the lines (Dahl 2001: 5) “I guess you think you know the story. You don't. The real one's much more gory. They phony one, the one
you know, was cooked up years and years ago, and made to sound all soft and sappy, just to keep the children happy.” Dahl’s version too has been subjected to censoring and will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The issue of censorship will be examined as it links with the notions of authoring and authority which are central to intertextuality (refer to Section 2.2.3).

An important aspect of cognition that has not previously been dealt with is raised in this chapter. It concerns counterfactual (possible or fictional) worlds and how we are able to construct them cognitively. This will be discussed first in Section 4.1, after which I will describe fairytales (looking specifically at Cinderella through the ages) in Section 4.2, “Cinderella” by the Brothers Grimm in Section 4.2.1, which also deals with censorship, and “Cinderella” by Roald Dahl in Section 4.2.2. Thereafter, I will apply conceptual blending to the intertexts in this chapter. Consequently, Section 4.3 examines what I termed The Three Worlds Network (Figure 10) and Section 4.4 examines The Cinderellas Network (Figure 11) which both contain elements from both the abovementioned versions of Cinderella. In Section 4.5, I summarise the fundamentals of this chapter and draw conclusions pertaining to the conceptual blending networks and what they reveal about intertextuality in fairytales. Thereafter I briefly discuss how intertextuality in fairytales compares with or differs from intertextuality in theological texts.

### 4.1 Possible or counterfactual worlds in literature

Possible (or counterfactual) worlds is not a new phenomenon in literature. The term possible worlds was first named so by Liebnitz (Ronen 1994: 5). It was initially discussed in terms of basic logic and semantics (Ronen 1994: 11):

Once the label “fiction” has been attributed, conventions dictating the status and proper interpretation of fictional propositions are activated. When a text is considered to be
fictional, its set of propositions are read according to fictional world-constructing conventions and it is made to signify by observing the set of fictional world-reconstructing conventions ...

This set of *fictional world-reconstructing conventions* is described as follows (Ronen 1994: 89-91):

- Fictional *propositions* (or *worlds* in the case of fairytales) take on distinctive fictional positions relative to the actual world. This means that a fictional proposition (or world) embodies fictional states which have no direct links with the actual world, e.g. a fictional world is not necessarily controlled by the laws of gravity.
- Fictional propositions are logically constrained by its fictional *properties*. As such, these properties also constrain the inferences that can be drawn, e.g. people may be able to fly in fictional worlds.
- Fictional propositions or worlds may embody contradictory conditions. Thus, the fictional properties of a specific text may not necessarily be logically consistent, e.g. people may be able to fly in a fictional world even though that world is governed by the laws of gravity (as it is in the real world where people are not able to fly).
- Fictional objects (governed by the fictional propositions set out in a specific fictional text) are undefined and open-ended. They are thus subject to change at any time and are not confined to definite and/or permanent attributes.
- Fictional propositions signify both *existents* and *non-existents*. Consequently, the characteristics of *fictional* beings and/or creatures are intermingled with *real* beings and/or creatures. Note that this is a blend in itself, as properties from the real world are projected (through partial *cross-space mappings*) onto properties from the fictional world. These may fluctuate in degree as some blends may rely more on
properties from the real world, whereas others may rely more on fictional properties.

- All the properties of a fictional world (or object or creature or being) are equally vital to it as they are structurally bound to it. Thus, the fact that a fictional world has a property of the real world, such as gravity, is no less or more important than the fact that one (or more) of its beings (people) can fly, which is a property of the fictional world.

From this discussion we can see what fiction is, how it relates to the world and how it conforms to or discards (or even transcends) real-world logic, boundaries and semantics. But in essence, this only gives us a definition of fiction and what possible worlds are. It explains how these worlds are constructed linguistically, but does not explain how it is possible for us to create these worlds cognitively. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 217) write that people “pretend, imitate, lie, fantasize, deceive, delude, consider alternatives, simulate, make models, and propose hypotheses”. Human beings therefore have the ability to “operate mentally on the unreal, and this ability depends on our capacity for advanced conceptual integration”.

In other words, it is part of our cognitive make-up to be able to operate cognitively on the level of the unreal. This means that much of our meaning-making is based on counterfactual reasoning. At first glance, it would seem that this simply means making changes in the actual or real world and monitoring the consequences of those changes in the counterfactual world, but Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 218) counter this argument by pointing out that changing any one element opens up complicated questions of what else would need to be changed in order for that one element to differ. Counterfactual scenarios are assembled mentally not by taking full representations of the world and making discrete, finite, known changes to deliver full possible worlds but, instead, by conceptual
integration, which can compose schematic blends that suit the conceptual process at hand.

This means that counterfactual reasoning is not based on cause-effect relations as previously thought. For example, in Cinderella, the consideration is not the causal correlation between the real world and the counterfactual world, but is in fact an integration network in which certain elements from both worlds are specified. Reality is not simply the opposite of unreality (or the counterfactual) and as a result, counterfactual or possible worlds may have very authentic and substantial effects on our conceptualisation of the real world, for example in anosognosia patients (a condition that causes patients to believe that they are able to move their paralysed limbs) as described by Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 232).

This can also be seen in the way in which children read and understand fairytales. Most children believe in the existence of the magical creatures and elements found in fairytales and the possible worlds constructed in these stories. This, in turn, influences the way in which they construct meaning and affects the behaviour and expectations of a child. For example, a child who believes in the tooth fairy will behave differently when losing a tooth than a child who does not believe in the tooth fairy. The former child might expect a monetary reward for his/her tooth, whereas the latter child will not expect a reward. It is important to understand that the blends in this chapter are not constructed from the perspective of a child, but from the perspective of an adult. This means that the blends show an understanding (at a meta-level) of the different laws governing the real or actual world and those governing possible or fictional worlds. Be this as it may, it is worth remembering that even though children do believe in many of these magical creatures and events, they do have some sense that these creatures and events belong to a magical world and not to the real world.
There are three important elements to consider when looking at how we construct possible worlds: language, meaning, and the unconscious conceptual work that constructs meaning from language. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 178) express the view that very little of the rich meanings we construct is inherent in the forms of language itself. This does not, however, mean that language or grammar is worthless, but rather that language is not an end in itself. It points to something else. Our words merely reflect our thought and meaning constructions, but language is not, in fact, the tool we use to construct those thoughts or meanings. That tool is a cognitive ability. Language or grammar prompts us to construct dynamic on-line mental spaces (based on long-term schematic knowledge) that map onto each other in a number of ways (as has been shown earlier) to form blends and provide a structure from which we extricate meaning in a number of ways. It is important to emphasise again that this meaning is available to us immediately through unconscious underlying cognitive processes. Blends are not constructed afterwards, but take place in conjunction with, for example, a conversation or whilst reading.

4.2 Cinderella through the ages

*Cinderella* is one of the best-known and loved fairytales. There are about three hundred and forty-five different versions of this story around the world. It tells the tale of a young girl who has to face many trials, which she overcomes with the help of magical creatures. In doing so, she ascends from a low status to a higher one. This story, now considered a fairytale suitable for children, was originally told “by adults for all members in the community” (Sierra 1992). As is the case with all fairytales, this one too is based on an oral tradition of folktales. The first written record of a Cinderella-story is known as “Yehhsien”, a Chinese version of the tale we know so well. The first European written version is known as “Of a Young Girl Nickamed ‘Ass Hide’ and How She Got
Married with the Help of Little Ants”. The best-known version of *Cinderella*, however, is the one by Charles Perrault, known as “Cinderella, or the Little Glass Slipper” which was first published in 1697 and is the one on which the Disney film is based (Sierra 1992: 162-163). It is considerably less gruesome than the version compiled and written by the Brothers Grimm.

I have not based my investigation on the Perrault version, but instead chose to use the version written by the Brothers Grimm. One of the reasons for this is that many fairytales have been censored by adults to be written in language thought to be suitable for children. The Grimm brothers, however, have kept the original, albeit more gruesome form. They were scholars who collected German folktale and tried to “record the tales exactly as they were told by traditional storytellers” (Sierra 1992: 151), though Wilhelm Grimm did eliminate material he thought unsuitable for children in the second edition. The other version I use (that of Roald Dahl) was chosen for its subversive mode. It relates well to the Grimm version in terms of censorship, but differs somewhat in the rendering of the tale. I will now discuss the two versions of *Cinderella* in more detail.

4.2.1 Cinderella by the Brothers Grimm

The Grimm brothers, together with Hans Christian Anderson, are important literary figures because they developed the genre we now know as the *international fairytale* (Dollerup 1999: ix). The brothers displayed an interest in both history (which was very typical of Romanticism) and Danish, and this influenced their work in significant ways (Dollerup 1999: 10-12). As mentioned earlier, they were both scholars who collected especially oral traditions of folk tales. Wilhelm Grimm wrote that the “oral tradition has been our only source, and has proved fruitful, as we have brought together sixty rather fine pieces from various sources; in so doing we shall present much that is unknown”
(Dollerup 1999: 21). As these oral stories were the basis of the fairytales we now know, they are regarded as very important and it is assumed that there probably existed some accurate written renditions of these oral stories (the Brothers Grimm version of Cinderella can be found in Appendix B), but Dollerup (1999: 29-31) mentions that the original manuscripts were destroyed when the fairytales were first printed and as a result, there is no evidence of the original works collected by the Brothers Grimm.

Dollerup claims that there were probably two stages in the early collection of the fairytales (1807-1810). He writes (1999: 33):

In the first phase, the brothers Grimm found tales in literature; in the second, they had the opportunity to listen to stories told by young women. This latter procedure was less dusty and more agreeable; understandably enough, Jacob and Wilhelm preferred to tap ‘natural repertories’ among their acquaintance. I suggest, furthermore, that the brothers’ great interest in recording tales also prompted these informants, as they visited family or friends in the countryside, to collect tales by listening to ‘ideal tales’ told by narrators from the lower classes: it is always gratifying to be the object of interest and study.

Although the brothers looked for oral tales among the common folk, they also accepted oral tales from higher classes which “unwittingly permitted the exertion of sociological censorship in the tales” (Dollerup 1999: 35). There are two aspects of censorship that affected the rendering of the tales. The first aspect relates to the fact that censorship “is inevitably operative in any retelling” (Dollerup 1999: 35). In other words, the retelling of a story will follow the moral and ethical values of a society. Common folk may regard certain language as acceptable whereas that same language use would be regarded as unacceptable by higher classes. Dollerup (1999: 248) calls this cultural incompatibility. The second aspect of censorship is related, but not exactly the same. Whereas the first aspect often happens unconsciously, the
second aspect relates to the conscious censorship of the tales. Dollerup (1999: 248) calls this *suppression*. Suppression ties up with what Barthes called the relationship between author and authority which, in turn, directly influences the meaning-making process. If authors have the authority to censor certain versions of, for example fairytales, the meaning interpreted by readers will be significantly influenced by it, which, once again, places meaning-making with the authors, rather than the readers of texts. This goes directly against the ideology of the *theory of intertextuality* as expounded by Bakhtin, Barthes and Kristeva (refer to Chapter 2).

One of the first aspects that was censored is the cruelty found in the original tales (Dollerup 1999: 245). The result of this suppression is that fundamental parts of the original tales have been changed. Many of the original tales contain features like “cannibalism (‘Hansel and Gretel’, ‘Snow White’), being eaten by animals (‘Little Red Riding Hood’), [and] rejection by parents (‘Hansel and Gretel’, ‘Cinderella’ ... ‘Snow White’ ...”)”, as Dollerup (1999: 146) describes. A specific example of cruelty from *Cinderella* is the self-mutilation of the stepsisters. In the original Grimm edition of this fairytale, the one sister cuts off her toe to allow the golden slipper to fit, whereas the other sister cuts off her heel to the same end (Grimm 2002: 102). These details are not included in the more modern versions of the story, and as a result, the meaning-making process is altered considerably. Also, meaning-making becomes the right of the author, as he/she decides which aspects to use, modify, or leave out altogether. The reader, once again, plays a secondary role in the meaning-making process.

As mentioned earlier, Roald Dahl’s version of *Cinderella* has also been subjected to censorship, but in this case it was suppressed, not in terms of the retelling (*cultural incompatibility*) or rewriting (*suppression*), but in that it was banned from certain public places such as libraries.
Here the authority no longer lies with the author, but with other factions of authority, who not only influence the meaning-making process, but disallow it from taking place at all. I will now discuss this version in detail.

**4.2.2 Cinderella by Roald Dahl**

In “Revolting Rhymes”, Roald Dahl takes six of the best known fairytales and reinterprets them in rhyme. He preserves the basic elements of the tales, but makes certain changes to the stories, such as changing the ending of Cinderella (Appendix C). In his version, the first stepsister tries on the slipper and it actually fits. The Prince is so disgusted by the idea that he might have to marry her that he chops off her head (exclaiming “Off with her head!” (Dahl 2001: 11) which is an implicit reference to “Alice in Wonderland”, though I will not discuss this in more detail here) and then says “She’s prettier without her head” (Dahl 2001: 11). He subsequently chops off the second stepsister’s head. Cinderella (or Cindy, as Dahl calls her) is horrified that the Prince is a murderer and says to the Magic Fairy, “No more Princes, no more money. I have had my taste of honey. I’m wishing for a decent man. They’re hard to find. D’you think you can?” (Dahl 2001: 12). The Magic Fairy finds a jam-maker for Cindy and as fairytales go, they live happily ever after.

A number of Dahl’s books have been “accused of being vulgar, excessively violent, and disrespectful towards authority figures” (West 1997: 109). In “Cinderella”, there are a number of problematic aspects. The most obvious problematic areas relate to the violence. Another example is a sentence such as “Who’s that dirty slut?” (Dahl 2001: 12) uttered by the Prince. Roald Dahl has the following to say about the reaction of adults to the violence (especially) and crudity in his books (West 1997: 112, 113):
I think they may be unsettled because they are not quite as aware as I am that children are different from adults. Children are much more vulgar than grown-ups. They have a coarser sense of humor. They are basically more cruel. So often, though, adults judge a children's book by their own standards rather than by the child's standards ... I do include some violence in my books, but I always undercut it with humor. It's never straight violence, and it's never meant to horrify. I include it because it makes children laugh. Children know that the violence in my stories is only make-believe. It's much like the violence in the old fairy tales, especially the Grimms' tales. These tales are pretty rough, but the violence is confined to a magical time and place. When violence is tied to fantasy and humor, children find it more amusing than threatening.

It seems then that adults, rather than children, find these texts problematic. Yet adults are responsible for the upbringing of their children, and as such, have a vested interest. So why is censorship such a problem? In his book “Trust Your Children: Voices Against Censorship in Children’s Literature”, Mark West (1997: viii-ix) writes that children's literature “has always been subjected to censorship, but prior to the 1970s most censorship activity took place in an author's study or an editor's office. Authors ... knew that if they wanted to write for children they needed to uphold a whole gamut of taboos”. Authors were thus their own censors when they endorsed these principles. Most of the concerns in those days were related to sexual content, but the focus has recently shifted to swear words. Of late, religious activists have tried to censor a number of books by calling them *Satanic* if they make reference to magic, witches, ghosts or equivalent concepts. The 1990s, in particular, saw an onslaught from conservative activists who tried to censor books that raised the issue of non-traditional families, and in recent times, political left wing activists have tried to ban children’s books that are considered *politically incorrect*.

From this discussion it becomes clear that adults have *ulterior motives* when censoring children’s literature. In most cases, the censorship is not done to protect the child, but rather to further the cause of the adult. The meaning-
making process, once more, is shifted from authors and readers to other factions of authority (who, again, actually disallow the meaning-making process). If we remember that these tales were first told by adults to all members of a community as a form of instruction, we can begin to see the value of these stories. The blends I will discuss will show our awareness and understanding of the different worlds inherent in fairytales, and how these tales might signify a deeper meaning. The second blend, in particular, is an example of how adults could use a conceptual blending network to explain a fairytale and its deeper meaning to children, rather than subjecting these stories to censorship (I will clarify this in Section 4.4), and as such, altering or disallowing the meaning-making process. To reiterate (and expand on) Barthes, “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author”, and other factions of authority so as to allow authenticity in the meaning-making process (of the reader).

4.3 The three worlds conceptual blending network

In this section, I will apply the framework of conceptual blending to the Cinderella-tales of both the Brothers Grimm and Roald Dahl, to examine how we are able to set up these counterfactual (or fictional) worlds in relation to the real world cognitively. In Section 4.1, I explained that fictional propositions represent both things that exist and things that do not exist in the real world. Accordingly, the features of imaginary beings and/or creatures are blended together with real beings and/or creatures through cross-space mappings. Thus, some elements from the fictional world correspond with elements from the real world, and some elements are entirely fictional, but we understand the elements that are entirely fictional in terms of our knowledge and experience of the real world.
Most fairytales begin with words (or with words that are similar to the phrase) *Once upon a time* and end with the words (or with words that are similar to the phrase) *and they lived happily ever after*. These phrases set up a schema (a mental representation of the structure of an inference). In cognitive linguistics, “grammar not only derives from language use, but also, in part, motivates language use” (Evans & Green 2006: 115). This means that certain usage patterns “instantiates its corresponding schema” (Evans & Green 2006: 116). Thus, hearing the words (or words that are similar to the phrase) *Once upon a time*, immediately cites the schema of a fairytale in the mind of the reader. As such, the expectations of the reader are aligned with the properties of fictional propositions (or worlds or stories), i.e. the reader expects certain elements that are intrinsic to fairytales to be presented in the narrative. For example, certain characters (people) in the story may have unreal or fantastical features, like the ability to fly or become invisible.

*The Three Worlds Network* has three input spaces. It looks at three worlds, namely the real world, the possible original fantasy world (the intertext) created by the Brothers Grimm, and the possible reinterpreted world created by Dahl which stands in-between the other two worlds. These worlds are compared in terms of the laws that govern them and how those laws are interpreted practically, for example, in terms of marriage (as will be explained later in this section). It has the following fundamentals:

**Input Space 1:** The laws governing the real world.

**Input Space 2:** Roald Dahl’s interpretation of *Cinderella*.

**Input Space 3:** The Brothers Grimm version of *Cinderella*. 
Background Frame: Knowledge of the real world and how it relates to the different possible worlds created in the two accounts of *Cinderella*. Knowledge of the different laws (world-reconstructing conventions) that govern these worlds is required as they are applied in different ways in the three worlds. There are some overlaps which will be discussed in the section dealing with the blended space.

Vital Relations: There are a number of Vital Relations in this blend. The most obvious are probably Analogy and Disanalogy. The input spaces are analogous in that we understand them as *worlds*, but disanalogous in terms of the laws that govern them. Another Vital Relation is that of Identity, i.e. each world has its own *identity* that is compressed into Change in the blend. In other words, we understand that the identity of the Prince is changed to a jam-maker. The last Vital Relation that is important in this blend is that of Role, i.e. the Prince and the jam-maker have essentially the same *role* in the story (the bringer of eternal bliss) even though they have different *identities*.

Blended Space: In the blended space, it becomes apparent that though the different worlds are governed by different laws, each world is essentially striving for a *happily ever after*. The source of this happy ending is slightly different for each world: in the world of the Brothers Grimm, it is the Prince; in the world created by Dahl, it is the jam-maker; in the real world it is understood that we are the source of our own happiness and that wealth (represented by the Prince) does not necessarily equal happiness. In the blend we understand that it is neither a Prince, nor a jam-maker that brings eternal bliss, but our own choices. Note, once more, that it is important to remember that meaning does not only reside in the blend, but is present in the entire conceptual blending network.
Emergent Structure: In the emergent structure it becomes clear that happiness is not about being wealthy or about status, or even about which world we live in, but about the choices we make in life. In other words, having the option of living in a fairytale does not necessitate happiness (as we are sometimes made to believe it would).

The network is represented as follows (note that the three points in each of the input spaces correspond with the three points in the blended space from top to bottom):

![Diagram of the three worlds network]

**Figure 10** **THE THREE WORLDS NETWORK**

### 4.4 The Cinderella’s conceptual blending network

This conceptual blending network, as mentioned earlier, may be used as a tool to illustrate how we could understand fairytales (I am using Cinderella as an example, but this may be applied to any fairytale) in terms of a deeper
meaning, rather than simply subjecting these tales to censorship, and as a result, depriving children of a whole literary legacy and disallowing the meaning-making process to take place in the reader. Young children may not understand all the intricate workings of a blend and what it means cognitively, but the elements are explained and understood easily enough. For example, a parent or teacher could explain to a child that *Cinderella* is representative of any person facing hardship (as I explain later in the blended space). This will promote the authenticity of the meaning-making process in the reader, rather than in the author (or other factions of authority). In addition, this shows that blending networks might be a useful tool in a number of educational fields, though this is beyond the scope of this dissertation and will not be discussed in more detail at this time. This network has the following fundamentals:

**Input Space 1:** Elements from *Cinderella* as written by the Brothers Grimm.

**Background Frame:** Knowledge of the Grimm version of *Cinderella*.

**Input Space 2:** Elements from Roald Dahl's version of *Cinderella*.

**Background Frame:** Knowledge of Dahl's interpretation of this tale and an understanding of how he changes certain elements (in terms of framework (prose to poetry) and content) to make them more contemporary, and thus more familiar (and funnier as a result) to children today, as well as an understanding that, essentially, his ending has the same result as the original tale, namely *eternal bliss*.

**Vital Relations:** There are a number of Vital Relations central to this conceptual blending network. The first important Vital Relation applicable to this network is that of Identity. We understand, for example, that *Cinderella* in the Grimm tale has the same identity as *Cindy* in Dahl's tale. The same goes for the *Prince*
and the *jam-maker*, as well as the *hazel twig* and the *Magic Fairy*, though their identities are compressed into Change. Cause-Effect also plays an important role. The hazel twig or Magic Fairy is connected to both the poor unhappy Cinderella and her happy ending by Cause-Effect relations. Intentionality features in this network in the form of Cinderella’s wishes for a better and happier future.

**Blended Space:** In the blended space, it becomes apparent that the fairytales might represent something other than mere stories, as was the original intent of these tales, i.e. they were used to instruct whole communities. Through elaboration, we become aware of the fact that *Cinderella* represents any person (and indeed every person) who has to face certain trials (the *stepfamily*) in life. If these trials are seen as opportunities for growth, rather than obstacles, they may act as catalysts (the *Palace Ball* and the *Disco*) for a better life (the happy ending represented by the *Prince* and the *jam-maker*). There may be some supernatural help (the *hazel twig* and the *Magic Fairy*) involved, such as a miracle by God. In addition to understanding this fairytale on a deeper level (i.e. another layer of meaning is added), we also understand that the elements are fluid. In other words, the *Prince* may be replaced by a *jam-maker*, or the *hazel twig* by a *Magic Fairy* (or a *magical bird*, or an *enchanted fish*, and so forth, as has been done in many other versions of this fairytale). It does not matter that the element (*identity*) is changed because the function (*role*) of that element remains the same.

This is an important point as it shows the open-endedness of intertextual blends. Some blends have to be interpreted in very specific ways, such as blends dealing with transitive constructions (which, in terms of form, require a noun phrase, a verb, and a second obligatory noun phrase following the verb, for example *Jason kicks the ball* or *Susan eats cake*; transitive constructions are thus usually action sentences), but intertextual blends may have varying
interpretations (only certain elements), due to the fact that it takes the reader’s subjective view into account. In theoretical terms, this is referred to as optimality constraints. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 310) write that a “theory of human cognitive powers must not only account for the richness and variety of human innovation, but also show how that innovation is guided”. We have already discussed the constitutive principles of conceptual integration which represent the first level of constraints, such as input (mental) spaces, (partial) cross-space mappings, emergent structure that occurs in the blended space and processes such as elaboration. We will now look at the governing principles which represent the second level of constraints. In a language, for example, the “grammatical patterns and vocabulary ... are constitutive ... but speakers of the language have also developed a vast additional set of principles governing what to say when and to whom under what circumstances” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 311). In conceptual blending, the underlying network places constitutional constraints on the processes involved, but there are also a number of governing constraints, for example principles that govern the compression of Vital Relations (as has been demonstrated in some of the conceptual blending networks in this dissertation). For example, Identity often compresses into Change. In intertextuality, the text/intertext construction represents the constitutive principles, whereas the content represents the governing principles in that it guides (or governs) the meaning-making process in specific ways which may have some open-ended elements that are influenced by the knowledge and physical, as well as socio-cultural, experiences of the reader. The construction of meaning is thus shown to be highly contextual and open-ended in intertexts.

Emergent Structure: In the emergent structure it becomes apparent that fairytales may have a deeper meaning to convey. If these well-loved stories are used in this way, they may become a useful educational tool, as I explained earlier.
The network is represented as follows:

![Diagram of the Cinderellas Network](image.png)

**Figure 11**  THE CINDERELLAS NETWORK

### 4.5 Summary and conclusions

Fairytales, as mentioned earlier, are based on folk tales and are therefore *implicitly* intertextual. By looking at these stories from a cognitive point of view, we are able to see the multiple layers (of meaning) that make up these stories. Conceptual integration shows how we are able to set up *possible* or *counterfactual* worlds not only linguistically, but also cognitively, which may be useful when investigating theories of language acquisition, such as *theory of mind*.

In this chapter, I examined whether intertextuality in fairytales is underpinned by conceptual blending in the same way as intertextuality in theological texts, and whether the Vital Relations identified as Analogy and Disanalogy feature
significantly in the blends found in fairytales. I did so by looking at the well-known fairytale *Cinderella*, as compiled and written by the Brothers Grimm, and later reinterpreted by Roald Dahl.

Though most fairytales are implicitly intertextual, Dahl overtly (thus *explicitly*) refers to *Cinderella*. His tale, like so many other fairytales, has been subjected to censorship, which is an important issue as it relates to Roland Barthes’s notions of *authoring* and *authority*, and as such, influences the meaning-making process. Meaning-making should not be left to authors or other factions of authority, but should, as Bakhtin, Barthes and Kristeva emphasised, be left to the reader.

Fairytales (amongst others) rely on our cognitive ability to create counterfactual or possible worlds through counterfactual reasoning. These possible worlds have certain *fictional world-reconstructing conventions* which are restricted by certain *properties* that may differ from the properties restricting conventions in the *real* world. For example, a person in a fairytale may be able to transform from one shape (human) to another (human or non-human). The three most important elements that allow the cognitive construction of counterfactual worlds are language, meaning, and the conceptual capabilities of humans that extract and create meaning from language. We do this by mapping certain elements from the real world onto other elements from the possible world(s) in the input mental spaces, and then merging these elements with other elements not present in the input spaces, through the process known as *elaboration*.

In “Revolting Rhymes”, Roald Dahl sets up a counterfactual world that lies between the real world and the original possible world of the Brothers Grimm. In doing so, he uses the content of the Grimm version of *Cinderella* as the intertext, but changes the format (from prose to poetry) and some elements in
the content in order to comment on censorship in fairytales. The two conceptual blending networks that arise from these texts are *The Three Worlds Network* and *The Cinderellas Network*.

In *The Three Worlds Network* it became clear how fairytales set up expectations in the minds of readers through **schemas**. This is done by using a framework that usually starts with the phrase (or a similar phrase) *Once upon a time*, and ends with the phrase (or a similar phrase) *and they lived happily ever after*. Hearing these words alerts the reader to the fact that the narrative is a fairytale (rather than a crime novel, for example), and in so doing, **instantiates** the schema of a fairytale. This conceptual blending network also shows the importance of the Vital Relations termed Analogy and Disanalogy. Here, as with a number of the previous blending networks, Identity also features prominently.

In *The Cinderellas Network*, the issue of censorship is raised. This type of blend illustrates how a fairytale might have a second layer of meaning, for example the Prince (in the Grimm version) represents a happy ending. Conceptual blending networks could, as such, be used as an educational tool rather than simply censoring children's literature, and as a result, disallowing the meaning-making process in the reader. This blend also demonstrates the open-endedness of intertextual blends (as opposed to blends dealing with, for example, transitive constructions which are constrained by the form, i.e. a noun phrase followed by a verb, followed by another obligatory noun phrase).

Applying conceptual blending to intertextuality in fairytales thus reveals that:

- Intertextuality in fairytales is underpinned by conceptual blending in the same way as intertextuality in theological texts, but in addition, relies on
counterfactual reasoning which is also made possible through conceptual integration.

- Analogy and Disanalogy, as well as Identity relations, also feature prominently in the blends that arise from intertexts in fairytales.

- The censorship of fairytales (which are essentially, and at least implicitly intertextual) not only hinders, but sometimes also disallows the meaning-making process to take place in the reader, which goes against the values of intertextuality as set out by Bakhtin, Barthes and Kristeva.

- Intertextual blends are much more open-ended than, for example, transitivity blends. The constitutive principles (i.e. the text/intertext construction) and the governing principles (i.e. the content) which make up the two layers of constraints, are both more open-ended than certain other types of blends, as they are subject to the interpretation of the reader which is highly contextual and relies on both the physical and socio-cultural knowledge and experiences of individual readers.

In the next chapter, I will investigate the last genre specified in the beginning of this dissertation, namely intertextuality in poetry. I will, once again, apply conceptual blending to these intertexts to establish how we are able to interpret and give meaning to these texts cognitively.
Chapter 5

Intertextuality in poems

In the previous two chapters I started exploring how we are able to interpret and give meaning to both implicit and explicit intertexts in theological texts and fairytales. In this chapter, I will look at intertextuality in poetry. As in the preceding chapters, I will go beyond the borders of simple literary analysis and show how the cognitive processes fundamental to conceptual blending can explain how we interpret poetry. In this sense, the word interpret does not merely imply the passive act of reading and understanding a text for personal enjoyment or research, but rather a means by which we can “generalise patterns and principles across readers and texts” (Stockwell 2002: 2). This means that the meanings interpreted from literary texts are not studied in isolation, but are given contexts, so that once more, we will look at the meaning(s) of the author, text and reader within specific contexts and how it is possible for us to construct meaning from these elements cognitively. I will also show how it is possible for different people to attribute different meanings to certain texts and why this no longer needs to be seen as problematic in the linguistic and literary analysis of texts.

The poem I will discuss is titled “Invitation to the Dance” (Appendix D) by Gail Dendy and was chosen for its explicit intertextual reference to a passage in the Bible. Accordingly, this links poetry, an unexplored genre so far, to the theological texts in Chapter 3. Before I illustrate and describe the conceptual blending networks found in this poem, I will first discuss cognitive poetics in Section 5.1 and literary devices and (how they relate to) cognition in Section 5.2. Thereafter, I will discuss the cognitive devices that are central to our interpretation of poetry in Section 5.3. These devices, amongst others, are
categorisation (Section 5.3.1), scripts and schemas (Section 5.3.2), and conceptual blending (Section 5.3.3), after which I will briefly describe Dendy’s poem (Section 5.4), *The Salt pillar Network* (Section 5.5) and *The Transcendence Network* (Section 5.6). Lastly, I will summarise this chapter and draw conclusions about what conceptual blending reveals about intertextuality in poetry (Section 5.7).

5.1 Cognitive poetics

The foundations of cognitive poetics, or cognitive stylistics as it is sometimes labelled, are grounded in cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology. One of the most important contributions cognitive poetics has made to the literary study of texts is the idea of *embodiment* that I discussed earlier in this dissertation. It is now understood that our minds are not only embodied in a literal sense, but also in a figurative sense. Stockwell (2002: 5) writes that

> The notion of embodiment affects every part of language. It means that all of our experiences, knowledge, beliefs and wishes are involved in and expressible only through patterns of language that have their root in our material existence. The fact that we share most of the factors of existence (requiring food, having a heat-regulating system, seeing in the visible spectrum, living in three dimensions under a sun that transits in a day, and so on) accounts for many of the similarities in language across humanity.

Embodiment thus influences the way in which we create meaning. This meaning is not attributed to a single entity, but is derived from many sources. Turner (1996: 106) writes that “Meaning is a complex operation of projecting, blending and integrating over multiple spaces ... Meaning is parabolic and literary.” In Dendy’s poem, images such as *delicious waltz* and *sexy rumba*, is intended to evoke a physical (or embodied) memory of what it *feels* like to dance. Poetry, and many other literary forms, rely on embodied meaning to
evoke feelings (rather than thoughts only) in the reader. As such, the meaning-making process is intrinsically embodied.

In terms of literary analysis (or literary criticism), meaning relates to three important elements, namely the author, the text, and the reader. Stockwell (2002: 5) writes that within the discipline of literary analysis, “the focus of attention has shifted around the triangle of ‘author-text-reader’, with different traditions placing more or less emphasis on each of these three nodes”. This was discussed in Chapter 2 where I explained how the theory of intertextuality was shaped. It is important to bear in mind that these nodes are influenced contextually, and that I also added an extra dimension, namely that of physical and socio-cultural experience (or embodiment) at the end of that discussion (in Section 2.4). This too is important for cognitive poetics, which is not merely a new way of literary interpretation, but a “radical re-evaluation of the whole process of literary activity” (Stockwell 2002: 5) which looks at the role of context in the reading of literary texts and what this means from a cognitive point of view. Stockwell (2002: 6), however, does not view literature simply as an alternative type of data and writes that

treating literature only as another piece of data would not be cognitive poetics at all. This is simply cognitive linguistics. Insights from that discipline might be very useful for cognitive poetics, but for us the literary context must be primary. That means we have to know about critical theory and philosophy as well as the science of cognition.

This passage highlights the importance of converging evidence in the cognitive sciences. Cognitive linguists (and indeed all cognitive theorists) evaluate the accuracy of their models, theories and experiments by comparing their findings (or evidence) to what is known about cognition in other related fields such as philosophy, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and so on. However, the types of evidence converging in cognitive poetics will be different
to the evidence that needs to converge in, for example, cognitive phonetics, or cognitive development studies.

In the light of this, I will discuss the poem, “Invitation to the Dance” by Gail Dendy, from both a cognitive linguistics and a cognitive poetics perspective, after which I will relate my findings about the poem to what we know about the nature of the mind from other cognitive sciences. I will begin by looking at some of the more traditional literary devices and how they relate to cognition, and then go on to show how conceptual blending can be used in literary analysis related to intertextuality, and specifically intertextuality in poetry.

5.2  Literary devices and cognition

One of the literary devices that is most obviously related to cognition, is that of foregrounding. Foregrounding takes place because certain features of literary texts are regarded as more prominent (or salient) than others. Stockwell (2002: 14) writes that “literary innovations and creative expressions can be seen as foregrounding against the background of everyday non-literary language”. Accordingly, one of the most important functions of literature is to “estrang[e] the reader from aspects of the world in order to present the world in a creative and newly-figured way”. Foregrounding within texts (thus from a cognitive poetics perspective) can be achieved in a number of ways, such as unusual formatting or phrasing (especially in poetry), repetition, alliteration, original images and metaphors, puns, metre and rhyme, and so on. All these methods of foregrounding are basically deviations from the conventional use of language that draw attention to a specific section of text. Converging evidence to support the theory that humans have a cognitive ability to “segregate any given scene into figure-ground organisation” was first described by Gestalt psychologists (Evans & Green 2006: 65). Langacker (1987), a cognitive linguist, also described how certain aspects related to the meaning of a word is
more salient than other meanings (and is then chosen above the other meanings). Saliency is thus fundamentally related to foregrounding in that poetic devices may be used to foreground certain parts of texts in order to prompt meanings that are more salient than others. This is especially true for intertexts; an intertextual reference is a type of foregrounding device that is used to elicit certain connotations.

In Dendy’s poem “Invitation to the Dance”, foregrounding takes place through intertextuality. At the beginning of the poem, Dendy quotes a passage from the Bible which is set against the rest of the poem. The reader is immediately aware of the fact that the rest of the poem is written in relation to this intertextual quotation about Lot and his wife.

In an article entitled “Foregrounding in Poetic Discourse: Between Deviation and Cognitive Constraints”, Shen (2007) writes that “Foregrounding theory generally assumes that poetic language deviates from norms characterizing the ordinary use of language (e.g. at the phonological, grammatical, semantic or pragmatic levels) and that this deviation interferes with cognitive principles and processes that make communication possible”. She goes on to suggest that a comprehensive foregrounding theory “should take into consideration both the ‘violence against cognitive processes’ … and the notion that this violence is itself limited by cognitive constraints”. I would suggest that foregrounding does not always interfere with the cognitive principles and processes that govern communication, nor that these interferences are curbed by cognitive constraints, but rather that foregrounding sets up a specific schema or script (I will discuss this later in Section 5.3.2) when it occurs in certain contexts, for example within specific literary contexts such as poetry. Poetry (and other literary forms) is a very singular kind of communication, with its own set of rules and regulations. Foregrounding is simply one of the devices it uses for communication, and because we are aware of the fact that poetry takes on
specific forms (e.g. sonnet, ballad, free verse and so on) which places constraints on the language use, we expect certain deviations (such as foregrounding through, for example, metaphor and/or other stylistic devices) and as such, are cognitively prepared for these deviances. I will attempt to show how this is possible by discussing certain cognitive devices and showing how they can be used when interpreting poetry and other literary texts.

5.3 Cognitive devices in poetry

I mentioned earlier that the interpretation of literary texts (a poem in this case) will not be studied from the traditional point of view only, but in terms of general patterns and principles that guide both readers and texts. In the same way, there are general cognitive patterns and principles that guide our meaning-making processes. I have discussed a number of these principles in the preceding chapters, such as embodiment, conceptual blending and our ability to construct possible worlds. I will now discuss a few more of these general underlying cognitive abilities and explain how they enable us to interpret and construe meaning from discourse, such as poetry, that deviates from regular discourse.

5.3.1 Categorisation

Categorisation is one of our most fundamental cognitive abilities. Cognitive science proposes that the way in which “we divide the world up and name it to ourselves determines what we think the world is, and, even more importantly, how we think that we think at all” (Stockwell 2002: 27). We may classify ourselves, for example, according to species, race, religion, culture, sex, ethnicity, vocation and so on. We do this naturally all the time. This ability to classify things and people into categories has revealed much about the nature of our cognitive abilities, for example the fact that we classify things and
people according to prototypes. This means that we arrange elements “in a radial structure or network with central good examples, secondary poorer examples, and peripheral examples. The boundaries of the category are fuzzy rather than fixed” (Stockwell 2002: 29). Lakoff (1987: 58) proposes that linguistic categories work in the same way as any other conceptual category and that evidence “about the nature of linguistic categories should contribute to a general understanding of cognitive categories in general”.

Prototypicality can also be applied to literary texts. A well-known category according to which we classify texts, for example, is genre. Texts can be grouped according to the following categories proposed by Stockwell (2002: 34):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>mode</th>
<th>poetry, prose, drama, conversation, song ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>genre</td>
<td>comedy, tragedy, gothic, surrealism ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub-genre</td>
<td>mock-epic, comic opera, airport fiction, war novel, political memoir ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type</td>
<td>sonnet, ballad, email, one-act play, short story ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>register</td>
<td>reporting language, letter-writing, narrative, lyricism ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of categorisation (and by specifically referring to Stockwell’s categories), we may, for example, recognise the mode of “Invitation to the Dance” as poetry and the type as a free verse. When we recognise a text as belonging to specific categories such as POETRY and FREE VERSE, we start expecting certain things from it. For example, we know that a poem is usually not very long (as opposed to a piece of prose which may be), makes use of literary devices (such as alliteration, allegory, metaphor, analogy, onomatopoeia, etc.), and uses language that is not always literal, but often figurative (or symbolic). We also know that a poem written as a free verse does not follow a strict stylistic structure in the way that a sonnet, for example, does. In this way, we set up a kind of cognitive schematic structure before we
even begin to engage actively with the poem. This enables us to interpret the poem and construct meaning from it.

Stockwell (2002: 31) proposes that recognising categories is a process that involves at least two stages, the first being “a holistic perception of the category as an object (a ‘gestalt’ whole) followed, if necessary, by an analytical decomposition of the object into separate chained sub-types or attributes”. This is supported by evidence from cognitive linguistics: “Rosch et al. (1976) found that the basic level is the level at which humans are best able to list a cluster of common attributes for a category” (Evans & Green 2006: 257). This means that humans first recognise a (basic level) category as a whole (or gestalt), such as the category GUITAR, after which they are able to further subdivide the category into subordinate categories such as FOLK GUITAR, CLASSICAL GUITAR, ELECTRICAL GUITAR, and so on. The recognition of a literary text (as a category) is what Stockwell (2002: 31) calls “an act of interpretation – a holistic understanding of the literary work that begins in our culture even before we begin to read the actual text. This act of interpretation, or primary understanding, is what all readers do when encountering literature ...”

Patterns in any genre are thus grounded in socio-cultural elements, but are cognitive at the most basic level when we study them as categories. This categorisation of texts allows us to interpret texts cognitively in terms of image schemas which are “mental pictures that we use as basic templates for understanding situations that occur commonly” (Stockwell 2002: 16). These image schemas set up a kind of cognitive template that helps us to construct meaning, even though a text may deviate from regular discourse.
5.3.2 Scripts and schemas

Readers may read specific texts for many different reasons. They may also have very different interpretations of the same text. This is due to a number of reasons which may be related to the writer, the reader and the text. As I explained earlier, the role of context also needs to be considered and closely related to context, are the notions of embodiment and background knowledge.

The first work done from a cognitive perspective in terms of context and background knowledge that was related to literature is known as schema theory. Stockwell (2002: 75) writes that it was “originally developed as a means of providing computer programs in artificial intelligence research with a contextual ‘knowledge’ that would enable them to process language.” In critical theory, the idea of context is problematic and the question of “how much textuality, how much readerliness, and how much history should be brought into literary critical discussions” (Stockwell 2002: 76) remains an issue, though this may be resolved by using conceptual blending, as I will show later in this chapter.

Context plays an important role in the meaning-making process, as I have shown, but is also important cognitively because (Stockwell 2002: 76)

language exhibits **conceptual dependency**. That is, the selection of words in a sentence, and the meanings derived from sentences, depend not on a dictionary-like denotation of these strings of words but on the sets of ideas and other associations that the words suggest in the minds of speakers and hearers. Often, both speaker and hearer are familiar with the situation that is being discussed, and therefore every single facet will not need to be enumerated for the situation to be understood ... In the linguistic field, the conceptual structure drawn from memory to assist in understanding utterances is a schema that was first called a **script**.
I have discussed schemas earlier in this dissertation. To recall, Lakoff (1987: 69) writes that every schema “is a network of nodes and links. Every node in a schema would then correspond to a conceptual category”. Thus, schemas are representations of conceptual categories, though it is essential to add that schemas are not innate, but based on our experience of the world. They are also not static, but may expand or change over time (Stockwell 2002: 77) and there are a number of different types of schemas, including what Stockwell (2002: 78) calls literary schemas. Stockwell (2002: 80) explains that “schema theory in a literary context points to three different fields in which schemas operate: world schemas, text schemas, and language schemas”. World schemas are schemas that deal with content, text schemas are those schemas that deal with our expectations of the way in which world schemas are structured and language schemas pertain to our expectations regarding the linguistic patterns and stylistic features of a specific subject or field.

In terms of the poem by Dendy, the world schema relates to the opening quotation (about Lot and his wife). If the reader has a Christian background, these lines (and indeed the whole poem) will have a different meaning than the meaning attributed by a reader who has no knowledge of the story of Lot and his wife who became a pillar of salt. The text schema relates to the fact that this text is a poem, rather than a piece of prose or spoken discourse, and the language schema relates to the fact that this poem is written as a free verse. Background knowledge of poetic structure, poetic devices and English (at least) is required for these last two schemas to be activated.

### 5.3.3 Conceptual blending and the meaning-making process in literature

I have mentioned a number of times in this chapter that context has been considered problematic in terms of the linguistic analysis of literature. The
reason for this is that the meaning of “a literary work can be found in the minds of readers, configured there partly from readerly processes and individual experiences, and only partly from the cues offered by the elements of the text object” (Stockwell 2002: 92). I have shown, throughout this dissertation, that the meaning-making process is a complicated one and that it involves many factors. I also concluded Chapter 4 by stating that some blends are interpreted in a specific way, such as blends dealing with transitive constructions, but that intertextual blends may have varying interpretations (though this pertains to certain elements only), due to the fact that it takes the reader’s subjective view into account, which is derived from both the physical and socio-cultural knowledge and experiences of individual readers, and is thus highly contextual. I would suggest that literary blends (i.e. blends found in literary works such as poetry that are not necessarily based on intertexts, but may be based on other literary and cognitive devices such as those I discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 (including Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2) work in the same way as the intertextual blends shown in this dissertation, in that they may have different outcomes depending on the interpretation of individuals. This, however, need not be viewed as problematic as different conceptual blending networks may be used to represent the different meanings interpreted by different individuals. In this way, a systematic linguistic analysis of literature may be achieved, even though the meaning attributed to the same text may differ from person to person. Regardless of some differences, there will be several elements that will remain unchanged (or stable). These elements (e.g. the content of a text) may be used as the basis of linguistic and literary analysis. It is important to note, yet again, that meaning resides in the entire conceptual blending network. Consequently, if any one element in any of the input spaces (or in the blended space) changes (because of a different meaning attributed to it by an individual), the meaning of the entire blend is altered, but the device of conceptual blending networks allows us to pinpoint
where and how these changes occur, and also how they change or influence other elements in the rest of the network.

5.4 Invitation to the Dance

The poem I will discuss is called “Invitation to the Dance” and was written by Gail Dendy. It appears in her collection of poems entitled “The Lady Missionary” (Dendy 2007: 41-42). This poem is written as a free verse and starts with an intertextual quotation from Genesis 19:26 that reads “But [Lot's] wife looked back from behind him, and she became a pillar of salt.” The rest of the poem is set against this quotation and is understood in terms of it.

In the story of Lot and his wife, God decides to destroy the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, but sends angels to warn Lot and his family. The angels instruct him to flee to the mountains, but Lot asks them if they may escape to a small village nearby. The angels agree and pronounce that God will not destroy that village. They instruct Lot to take his wife and the rest of his family and to run without looking back. Lot’s wife, however, does look back and is turned into a pillar of salt.

In the poem, Dendy relates certain aspects of the poem to the tale of Lot and his wife. The intertext immediately sets up a framework against which the poem plays itself out. The references are often subtle, but will be apparent to the reader who knows the story of Lot and his wife. It also sets up a religious framework that is found throughout the poem in words such as forgiveness and sin which are contrasted with images such as delicious waltz and sexy rumba. I will now discuss two conceptual blending networks, namely The Salt Pillar Network and The Transcendence Network to show how “Invitation to the Dance” may be understood in terms of the biblical intertextual reference to Lot and his wife.
5.5 The salt pillar conceptual blending network

In this conceptual blending network, the poem “Invitation to the Dance” forms the first input space and the intertextual reference to Lot and his wife forms the second input space (in both of the networks). These texts are related to each other in various ways, but as poems are literary texts that often use figurative language, rather than mere literal language, these texts may also be understood in terms of life in general and the lessons we learn on our journey. For example, the first line of the poem *I wish to take off my skin* does not mean that the narrator literally wants to take off her skin, but rather that she wants to get rid of something, probably something she did in the past, for example. In the same way, many of the lines in the poem relate directly to images and incidents from the story of Lot and his wife, but these lines should be interpreted figuratively or metaphorically, rather than literally. This network has the following fundamentals:

**Input Space 1:** The poem “Invitation to the Dance” which draws on the life journey and circumstances of the *I* in the poem.

**Input Space 2:** The story of Lot and his wife, as intertextual reference and structuring schema for the interpretation of the poem. This means that the intertextual reference (Genesis 19:26) *instantiates* the schema of the story of Lot and his wife. Because we read this intertext first, it is foregrounded (both literally or linguistically, and cognitively) which structures our reading of the poem in that we read and interpret the poem with the intertext in mind.

**Background Frame:** Knowledge of the biblical story of Lot and his wife who flee to a small village to escape the demise of Sodom and Gomorrah. They are instructed by angels not to look back, but Lot’s wife does and is turned into a pillar of salt.
Vital Relations: Analogy based on Identity relations between the poem and the story of Lot and his wife. As with the previous conceptual blending networks, Analogy and Disanalogy feature in the text/intertext construction. Cause-Effect also plays an important role in this network: we understand that the effect pillar of salt is a direct result of the cause disobey. Both Time and Space relations are present as the journeys (the journey of the I in the poem, the journey of Lot and his wife in the Bible, and the journey of the universal we presented in the blend) occur in a different time and space.

Blended Space: In the blend, we understand that the invitation to the dance (I) links with the invitation to Lot which may be understood figuratively and cognitively as an invitation to life (universal we). The cities of Sodom and Gomorrah represent the past (or sin) in our lives which may, in turn, be understood as representing mistakes and regrets that we have and carry with us. The actual running away from the cities to the village represents our journey (this is another cross-space mapping in that the I in the poem and his/her journey, as well as the journey of Lot and his family, are both understood as the journey of the universal we) between the past and the future. The turning of the head (story of Lot and his wife) or cheek (reference in the poem, which is also an intertextual biblical reference to Matthew 5:38-39 where Jesus teaches us to offer the other cheek rather than following the old law of an eye for an eye) represents us looking to the past and dragging it with us (turning head) or alternatively finding forgiveness for the wrongs we have committed (turning cheek) and moving to a brighter future. The pillar of salt is equated with standing still in the poem which may be interpreted as stagnation in our journey of life (if we look to the past continually) and may also refer to the proverbs to rub salt into someone's wounds or worth one's salt. One could say that Lot’s wife was not worth her salt, and was therefore turned into a pillar of salt to boot (i.e. to rub salt into her wounds). Finally, the
small village is equated with a city with glittering lights which may be construed as a bright future.

**Emergent Structure:** The emergent structure in this blend is the idea that if we hold on to the past and do not find forgiveness for ourselves, we will stagnate on our journey of life and not reach a bright future. On the other hand, if we run towards our future without looking back, we will find that it is bright and waiting for us.

The network looks as follows:

![Salt Pillar Network](image-url)  

**Figure 12 THE SALT PILLAR NETWORK**

The six elements in each of the above input spaces, relate to the following quotations from the poem “Invitation to the Dance” and the story of Lot and his wife respectively:
|   | *Invitation to the Dance*  
(Poem by Gail Dendy) | *The story of Lot and his wife*  
(*Genesis 19*) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>Invitation to the Dance</em> (Poem title.)</td>
<td>“Get them out of this place ... For we are about to destroy this city completely ...” (v 12-13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>“Was it a sin? I was afraid.”</td>
<td>“Then the LORD rained down fire and burning sulphur from the sky on Sodom and Gomorrah.” (v 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>“Two cities destroyed and all I think about is dancing.”</td>
<td>“… Get out right now, or you will be swept away in the destruction of the city.” (v 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>“A turn of the cheek is all that’s asked.”</td>
<td>“But Lot’s wife looked back as she was following behind him, and she turned into a pillar of salt.” (v 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>“Now I’ve stood here for far too long.”</td>
<td>“… pillar of salt.” (v 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>“The city glitters with a million lights. Please, won’t you take me to the dance?”</td>
<td>“See, there is a small village nearby. Please let me go there instead; don’t you see how small it is? Then my life will be saved.” (v20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.6 The transcendence conceptual blending network

The second conceptual blending network is a little more sophisticated in terms of meaning-extraction in that it draws on the life experience (in a very physical, or embodied, way) of someone who has grappled with the concept of life. Rather than looking only at the obvious journey of the *I* in the poem which is analogous to the journey of Lot and his wife, and also represents the journey of the universal *we*, this conceptual blending network is based on those experiences in life that bring physical pleasure, and how the concept of physical pleasure has come to be equated with sin. This network has the following fundamentals:
Input Space 1: The poem “Invitation to the Dance” as the transcendence of conventional conceptions of sin.

Input Space 2: The story of Lot and his wife, as intertextual reference and structuring schema for the interpretation of the poem.

Background Frame: Knowledge of the biblical story of Lot and his wife and of the notion that Lot’s wife was turned into a salt pillar because she committed a sin (i.e. disobeyed God’s orders).

Vital Relations: Again we find Analogy based on Identity relations between the text (poem) and the intertext (story of Lot and his wife) which also relies on Disanalogy. Cause-Effect also features in this network in that we understand that the effect pillar of salt is a direct result of the cause disobey. Finally, Representation occurs in this network in that Lot’s wife is represented by a salt pillar (which, in addition, represents the emotional state of the narrator). Sodom and Gomorrah also alternately represent sin and freedom (from the conventional conceptions of sin).

Blended Space: In the blend, the line I wish to take off my skin, which is analogous to the fact that Lot’s wife lost her skin because it was turned into salt, represents the idea that the narrator wants to get rid of the guilt she is feeling for dancing which, in turn, represents the concept of sin that maps onto the notions of a delicious waltz and a sexy rumba. Inherent in these notions, is the idea that sin is physically pleasurable (again, the idea of embodiment, i.e. our memories, and as such, the meaning(s) we construct, are linked to physical experiences) and that the enjoyment of sin should produce guilt in the sinner. The narrator is seeking forgiveness (for her sins), though she cannot stop dancing (“Two cities destroyed and all I think about is dancing”). This maps onto the notion of Lot’s wife looking back at the cities being destroyed.
In the blend, the underlying idea is that when Lot’s wife looked back, she was longing for the freedom represented by Sodom and Gomorrah, in the same way that the narrator longs to dance to get rid of the feeling of being trapped (in old conventions) and stagnating in her journey of life as a result. This maps onto the concept of the *pillar of salt*, which is the physical representation of how Lot’s wife felt, i.e. trapped. The pillar of salt now becomes a symbol of freedom, rather than entrapment, as the salt is blown away in the wind. In other words, it is not a fixed structure and being a salt pillar means being free from (or transcending) the bondage of conventions. In the same way, the narrator gets rid of the salt (which weighs her down) when she dances (“... but when I think of dance it seems each step I take drops puffs of salt”). In doing so, the narrator realises that seeking forgiveness for sins of the past is not only a futile, but also an irrelevant exercise as the traditional conceptions of sin are culturally-embedded and are therefore not necessarily universal truths. In realising this, the narrator is in fact able to *take off her skin*, in that she has now transcended the burden of the traditional conceptions of sin (which causes the blend to map back onto the first element in Input Space 1, which then becomes a blend in itself).

**Emergent Structure:** The emergent structure in this blend is the notion that conceptions of sin are embedded in socio-cultural ideologies, and are therefore not universal truths.

In the two blends discussed in this chapter, we can see how the elements in the two input spaces (which are founded on exactly the same texts) can differ completely (even though the different elements in the two blends rely on almost exactly the same Vital Relations) and thus represent two different interpretations, or two different examples of conceptual blending networks which could be used in literary analysis to account for the different meanings attributed to the same text by different readers. There are many other
metaphors and images used in this poem, but I focused specifically on those related to the intertext. Accordingly, this chapter is not a complete analysis of Dendy’s poem as it is only meant to show the ways in which conceptual blending helps to explain how we use intertexts cognitively to structure and facilitate the meaning-making process.

The network looks as follows:

![Network Diagram](image-url)

**Figure 13** **THE TRANSCENDENCE NETWORK**

### 5.7 Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, I looked at how poetry can be analysed not only literarily, but also cognitively through what is known as cognitive poetics. I took this one step further by applying the theoretical framework of conceptual blending to the poem “Invitation to the Dance” and its intertextual reference to the story of Lot and his wife. Once again, the idea of **embodiment** was explored, this
time specifically in its relation to poetry. A literary device, such as **foregrounding**, was shown to be a cognitive device as well as a literary one, and was applied to the abovementioned poem as a schema to structure our reading of the poem. Other cognitive devices, such as **categorisation**, **scripts** and **schemas**, were then discussed and applied to the same poem. Lastly, I looked at how this poem and its intertext could be understood in terms of conceptual blending (in *The Salt Pillar Network* and *The Transcendence Network*). Through conceptual blending, it becomes apparent how the poem and its intertext relate to each other on a literal, figurative and cognitive level. This may be helpful as a pedagogic tool for the teaching of poetry in lower and higher levels of education.

Accordingly, applying conceptual blending to intertextuality in poetry reveals that:

- Intertextuality in poetry, as with intertextuality in theological texts and fairytales, is underpinned by conceptual blending. Here too the Vital Relations termed Analogy and Disanalogy feature strongly, and once again the open-endedness of intertextual blends is illustrated.

- Converging evidence plays an important role in the analysis of poems in that cognitive poetics relies on what is known about the nature of the mind in the other cognitive sciences, and together with cognitive linguistics (by applying conceptual blending), can be used as a framework for cognitive literary analysis.

- Intertexts are a type of foregrounding device (both linguistically and cognitively) that is used to elicit certain (*salient*) connotations in the meaning-making process.
It is possible for different people to attribute different meanings to certain texts, i.e. two different people can read the same text and interpret it differently. This no longer needs to be seen as problematic in the linguistic and literary analysis of texts. By using conceptual blending networks to explain these inconsistent interpretations, it becomes possible to understand the roles of writer, text, reader and context. These conceptual blending networks thus also show how each of the elements may be either stable or varying, and how this ultimately contributes to the meaning-making process. For example, the element *Pillar of Salt* appears in both networks, but has a different meaning in each of the blends.

In the next chapter, I will summarise the hypotheses and findings of this dissertation, and discuss what this study reveals about the nature of intertextuality and how we are able to interpret intertexts cognitively.
Chapter 6

Intertextuality and conceptual blending

In this dissertation, I set out to show that by investigating intertextual texts from a cognitive perspective, rather than purely linguistic or literary perspectives, it becomes evident that conceptual blending underpins intertextuality. As a result, more inferences become apparent (e.g. layers of meaning are uncovered) and the role of meaning is explained as being based on conceptual structures and processes rather than purely linguistic structures and processes. The main themes that I investigated are intertextuality, conceptual blending and the meaning-making process/processes central to both these conceptions within a cognitive linguistics framework which, in turn, forms part of the cognitive sciences. Besides investigating and explaining cognitive functions such as thinking, remembering, judging and so forth, cognitive science also investigates our awareness of our knowledge-systems and belief-systems (amongst others) at a meta-level, and aims to explain these in very general and fundamental terms. This also applies to language, which is explained in cognitive linguistics in terms of its relation to the mind and other cognitive functions. Language is considered to be congruous to other cognitive processes and is explained in terms of conceptual structures and cognitive operations that are not explicitly related to language. This is in accordance with what is known as the Generalisation Commitment which is a commitment to describe the general principles that underpin language such as grammar and syntax, and the Cognitive Commitment which is a commitment to describe the general cognitive principles that underpin language and accords with what is known about the nature of the mind from other cognitive disciplines such as neuroscience and philosophy (Evans & Green 2006: 27-28).
In chapter two, I discussed the theories that contributed to what is known today as intertextuality. I explained the roles of the author, text, reader and context in relation to embodiment and how each of these nodes contributes to the meaning-making process, as well as the difference between explicit and implicit intertextual references. In this dissertation, I mostly looked at explicit intertexts which are not mere references to other texts or ideas, but actually influence the meaning-making process in that they elicit certain salient connotations through the (linguistic and cognitive) device known as foregrounding which, in turn, instantiates specific schemas. I then explained conceptual blending to show how this might underpin intertextual readings. The reason I chose Conceptual Blending Theory (within cognitive linguistics) is that it shares many parallels with intertextuality which can be summarised as follows:

- Intertextuality (as a theory) considers a text as part of a whole literary body of texts (which influences an individual text) in the same way that cognitive linguistics considers language to be congruous to other cognitive functions.

- Intertextuality, in the Bakhtinian tradition, studies how we know in the same way as cognitive linguistics studies how we know (a language).

- Both intertextuality and cognitive linguistics study the meaning-making process and regard meaning as highly contextual rather than as universal.

- Both intertextuality and cognitive linguistics regard meaning as embodied (though studies in intertextuality have not previously termed their studies as embodied, they refer to individual experience as the seat of meaning).
• Intertextuality does not study texts or language purely as a system of signs in the same way that conceptual blending does not study language purely in terms of form manipulation.

• Both intertextuality and conceptual blending regard the meaning-making process as dynamic.

• Both intertextuality and conceptual blending show that the meaning-making process is made up of layers and cannot be constructed purely from texts or language and the conventional meanings associated with words because the construction of meaning is based on the physical and socio-cultural knowledge and experiences of readers.

In chapter 3, I applied these theories to an expository (theological) text; an article written by Maluleke entitled “Of collapsible coffins and ways of dying: the search for catholic contextuality in African perspective” (2002). I used conceptual blending networks to illustrate how intertextual texts may be interpreted cognitively. By looking at intertextual texts from a cognitive perspective, we may begin to understand the thought patterns of cultures, social groups, nations and so forth. In other words, we are now able not only to describe linguistic knowledge as a form representation, but we also have insight into the actual nature of linguistic knowledge on the conceptual level. This was demonstrated in The National Anthems Network (Figure 8), which reflects the difference between American and African thought patterns and attitudes concerning prayer and religion. Another important aspect of intertextuality that came to the fore was the idea of embedded or unconscious knowledge which influences the meaning-making process, i.e. meaning is constructed from both conscious and unconscious knowledge. Unconscious knowledge was also shown to be dynamic in that it may, in specific contexts, become conscious knowledge again, for example if it is elicited in some way or
triggered by an event that. Long-term knowledge, known as image schemas influence our construction of meaning, but it is unclear to what extent unconscious (or subconscious) knowledge may influence our thought patterns (though we know that it does). In Maluleke’s article, he seems to be comparing the American and African national anthems to the prayers of the Pharisee and the tax collector told as a parable by Jesus in the Bible. When I interviewed Maluleke, he stated that he did not do this consciously, but conceded that he may have done so subconsciously. Maluleke is a theologian and as such, knowledge of the Bible is embedded in his subconscious. It would be perfectly natural for him to have had this parable in the back of his mind and reflect it in his writing without being consciously aware of it. This network also revealed the role of the reader in the meaning-making process. I was raised in a Christian household and remembered this parable when I read Maluleke’s article. My own intertext thus influenced my understanding of this implicit reference.

One last aspect that was raised in this chapter is the megablend. Megablends are blends that contain other blends. What is important about megablends is that they can be understood and constructed cognitively without knowledge of the embedded blend. The National Anthems Network illustrates this fact as it contains The Parable Network (Figure 9), but can be understood and constructed without knowledge of it. Knowledge of The Parable Network will, however, influence the meaning-making process.

Chapter 4 dealt with intertextuality in fairytales and specifically the well-known fairytale Cinderella as compiled and written by the Brothers Grimm, and later reinterpreted by Roald Dahl. Most fairytales are already based on folk tales and are therefore implicitly intertextual, but I looked at fairytales that are explicitly intertextual as well. In other words, Dahl takes the Brothers Grimm version of Cinderella and reinterprets it firstly by writing it as rhyme, and secondly by
changing some of the details in the content of the tale. An important aspect of cognition that is raised in this chapter is our ability to construct possible (fictional or counterfactual) worlds. I explained that reality is not simply the opposite of unreality and that possible worlds are constructed cognitively by our ability to blend concepts. Counterfactual worlds may also have very authentic and substantial effects on our conceptualisation(s) of the real world. This can be seen in the way in which children read and interpret fairytales. Most children believe in the existence of the magical creatures and elements found in fairytales and the possible worlds constructed in these stories. This, in turn, influences the way in which they construct meaning from texts, as well as their expectations and behaviour. For example, a child who believes in the tooth fairy may expect a monetary reward for his/her tooth, whereas a child who does not believe in the tooth fairy, will not expect a reward. The blending networks in this chapter were constructed from an adult perspective and as such reflect an understanding of the different laws governing the real world and those governing possible worlds.

Another concept that was dealt with in this chapter is the censorship of fairytales. I showed how conceptual blending networks may be used as a tool to illustrate the deeper meaning of these tales, rather than subjecting them to censorship. In so doing, we are able to educate our children, rather than deprive them of a whole literary legacy and in so doing, disallowing the meaning-making process in the reader. Children may not understand the intricate cognitive workings of a blend, but the elements are easy to understand and explain. This was illustrated by The Cinderellas Network (Figure 11). Censorship is closely related to the ideas of authoring and authority as set out by Barthes (in Section 2.2.3) and as such, goes against the values of intertextuality (which is implicit in all fairytales), namely that a reader should not only be allowed to construct his/her own meaning from a text, but that the responsibility of meaning-making actually lies with the reader, rather
than the author (or other factions of authority in the case of censorship). By looking at intertextual texts from a cognitive point of view, the multiple layers that make up these stories are revealed. Blending shows how we are able to set up possible worlds not only linguistically, but also cognitively.

Another important matter that became evident from the networks in both Chapters 3 and 4 (and was supported by the blends in Chapter 5) is that some blends have to be interpreted in a very specific way, such as blends dealing with transitive constructions, but that intertextual texts (and blends) may have varying interpretations due to the fact that the reader's view (or meaning construction that relies on his/her background knowledge and experience) is taken into account. Transitive constructions are constrained by their form, that is, a noun phrase followed by a verb, followed by a second obligatory noun phrase such as Henry throws the ball or Mary eats chocolate. The meanings of these constructions are thus constrained by the fact that transitive constructions are prototypically action sentences. Intertextual blends are much more open-ended as their constitutive principles and governing principles are much less reliant on specific structural and connotative information. Furthermore, the Vital Relations termed Analogy and Disanalogy were shown to feature strongly in the text/intertext constructions found in the blends in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In other words, the texts and intertexts are used by authors to set up analogies between certain elements in the texts and intertexts which usually pertain to the framework, but the content of these texts and intertexts are used as disanalogies to show up specific concepts that an author wishes to highlight.

In Chapter 5, as in the previous chapters, I went beyond the borders of simple literary analysis and explained how we interpret poetry cognitively. In this sense, the word interpret does not merely imply the passive act of reading a text or texts for personal enjoyment or research, but rather implies that the
meanings interpreted from literary texts are not studied in isolation, but are placed within specific contexts so that the meaning(s) of the author, text and reader within these specific contexts may be explained cognitively. One of the frameworks that aids us in this task is that of cognitive poetics which reveals the importance of converging evidence and also explains that our minds are embodied both literally and figuratively. Gail Dendy’s poem “Invitation to the Dance” was interpreted in the light of this.

Foregrounding was shown to be not only a literary device, but also a cognitive device. I suggested that foregrounding does not interfere with cognitive principles and processes, nor that these interferences are curbed by cognitive constraints as suggested by Shen (2007), but rather that it sets up a specific schema when it occurs in certain contexts, for example within specific literary contexts such as poetry. Poetry (and other literary forms) is a very singular kind of communication, with its own set of rules and regulations. Foregrounding (here in the form of intertexts) is simply one of the devices it uses and because we are aware of the fact that the language of poems is limited by the form, we expect certain deviations and as such are prepared cognitively for these deviances. These schemas thus set up a kind of cognitive template that helps us to construct meaning, even though a text may deviate from regular discourse in some way.

In Chapters 3 and 4 it became apparent that some blends are interpreted in a very specific way, but that intertextual blends may have varying interpretations. The idea of varying interpretations in literary and linguistic analysis was previously seen as problematic. I suggested that these varying interpretations do not have to be viewed in this light as different conceptual blending networks may be used to represent the different meanings interpreted by different individuals. In this way, conceptual blending may be used as a pedagogic tool for the teaching of poetry (and other forms of
literature) in lower and higher levels of education. By using conceptual blending networks, such as *The Salt Pillar Network* (Figure 12) and *The Transcendence Network* (Figure 13), to explain these inconsistent interpretations, it becomes possible to understand the roles of writer, text, reader and context in the meaning-making process. These networks also show how each of the elements may be either stable or varying, and how this ultimately contributes to the construction of meaning. For example, both of these networks have the element *Pillar of Salt*, but it has a different meaning in the two blends.

By applying conceptual blending to intertexts from different genres, I showed that:

- Conceptual blending underpins intertextuality in all genres. That is, our construction of meaning is not merely reliant on the linguistic interpretation of texts, but on cognitive processes such as conceptual blending.

- Investigating intertextual texts from a cognitive perspective reveals that meaning is highly contextual and influenced by both conscious and unconscious knowledge.

- The Vital Relations known as Analogy and Disanalogy are integral to text/intertext constructions. Analogy features (mostly, but not always) in the frameworks of these text/intertext constructions and Disanalogy features in the content of these constructions.

- The interpretation of (intertextuality in) fairytales relies on counterfactual reasoning which is also made possible through conceptual blending.
• The censorship of fairytales (which are at least implicitly intertextual) not only hinders, but sometimes actually disallows the meaning-making process from taking place in the reader, which violates the ideologies of the theory of intertextuality as expounded by Bakhtin, Barthes and Kristeva.

• Intertextual blends are considerably more open-ended than, for example, transitivity blends which are much more constrained. Both the constitutive principles (i.e. the text/intertext construction) and the governing principles (i.e. the content) which make up the two layers of constraints, are more flexible and open to interpretation because it relies on the physical and socio-cultural knowledge and experiences of the reader.

• Converging evidence from various domains plays an important role in the analysis of poems and can be used as a tool for cognitive literary analysis. For example, by using both cognitive poetics and cognitive linguistics as frameworks in literary analysis, it becomes possible to show how two different people may interpret the same text differently.

• Intertexts can be seen as both a linguistic and a cognitive foregrounding device that is used to elicit certain salient connotations in the meaning-making process.

Issues that were touched on, but were not explored in any depth in this dissertation, is the notion that conceptual blending networks may be used as a pedagogic tool, and how much of the meaning-making process is influenced by unconscious or subconscious knowledge. I showed how conceptual blending networks could be used as a pedagogic tool in terms of censorship and literary analysis, but this is only the tip of the iceberg. Similarly, I started exploring the
role of unconscious knowledge in the meaning-making process. This idea has been touched on by many theorists, going back as far as the works of Freud and Jung, but has not been investigated systematically in cognitive linguistics.

In conclusion, the conceptual blending networks in this dissertation reveal that conceptual integration underpins our ability to interpret intertexts in any genre and shows the multiple meanings inherent in these text/intertext constructions. The creativity of individuals (both writers and readers) is also illustrated in the open-endedness of the blends. The meaning-making process intrinsic to intertextuality is thus shown to be reliant on conceptual structures and processes rather than purely linguistic structures and processes. This study further reveals that intertextuality is not merely a literary phenomenon, but is in fact a cognitive phenomenon, i.e. we think intertextually. In other words, our physical and socio-cultural knowledge and experiences form a type of intertext that may be conscious or unconscious knowledge at specific times, but nonetheless influences the meaning we construct from texts or events in everyday life.
Bibliography


Appendix A

“Of collapsible coffins and ways of dying: the search for catholic contextuality in African perspective” in *The Ecumenical Review* by TS Maluleke

**Of collapsible coffins and ways of dying: the search for catholic contextuality in African perspective**

The secret of his success lay in the Nefolovhod we Collapsible Coffin which he invented soon after his arrival in the city. The coffin could be carried by one person, like a suitcase, and it could be put together in easy steps even by a child. It was cheap enough, yet durable. The instructions that accompanied it were simple to follow, and were written in all the languages that were spoken in the city. Although it was lightweight when assembled, it could carry the heaviest imaginable corpse. People came from all over--by train, by bus, by private car, and on foot--to buy the Nefolovhodwe Collapsible Coffin. There was also the Nefholovhodwe De Luxe Special, which was a much more expensive type. Only the wealthiest people could afford it. (1)

**The globalization of misery**

My journey from Johannesburg, South Africa, to Atlanta, USA, brought me deeper into the world-wide-web of desolation that was unleashed when 19 young men converted four passenger planes into sleek, flying collapsible coffins and deadly missiles. Being on a plane within days of September 11th 2001--on 21 September 2001 to be precise--made it apparent to me that I could indeed be sitting in a giant coffin, a kind of upper-class mass grave. Suddenly, what was meant to be just another trip to yet another country became a journey of faith, and a matter of life and death. The trip became not mere travel, but both a foolish risk and a pilgrimage of faith. As I walked into the aeroplane, I saw in my mind's eye flashes of what we had seen on TV for a whole week; first the one smoldering skyscraper in New York and then the image of the second aircraft slamming into the second building as a large swirling mountain of thick smoke issued out.

The first time we saw those images--on the evening of September 11th--it was as if our own living-room in Pretoria literally filled with the smoke of death and destruction relayed from a far-away land. Even at that moment though, that land was not that far away. We watched not merely as spectators but as participants in this drama of human tragedy. Ironically, the last occasions that TV in our living room had managed to affect us emotionally in such a powerful manner were the live broadcasts of the epoch-making release of Nelson Mandela, and the "beautiful" funeral of Diana, Princess of Wales. The former instantly transmitted waves of joy and hope into millions of hearts all over the world, while the latter inspired an inexplicably real and profound sense of loss and reverence worldwide. But the ghastly and evil events of September 11th tore millions of hearts into emotional rubble even as the twin towers at the World Trade Center were reduced to ash and grime mixed with human blood. How can the same global, instantaneous network of communication and air travel deliver such contrasting end-products--such beauty and such ugliness? How can such misery and joy issue from the
same source? Is this what Ben Okri (2)—a Nigerian writer and poet—was talking about when he wrote the following words?

... no, neither the good in us
Nor our capacity for evil are exhausted
And time will show just how young
We are in our abilities
Our genius for good and evil

What is puzzling about modernity and globalization is that they work both good and bad with both apparent ease and bewildering complexity. We cannot simply select the good from the bad, because the bad is often mediated by, or mixed with, the good. The seeds of death and destruction are built into the very values, systems, processes, signs and symbols of our age. Globalization creates and inspires hope even as it dashes a million hopes of millions of people; uniting even as it tears asunder, comforting without ever ceasing to kill. Never before have travel and communication been so swift and efficient—and yet our sense of community is not much enhanced.

Armed as we are with our fax machines, mobile phones, fast mail and email, it is debatable whether we communicate or know one another better than did our predecessors. We send faxes to one another and daily leave millions of electronic messages for one another, and still our words ring hollow as we continue to miss one another.

Maybe we never really intend to communicate with one another and to travel, but merely wish to play with our newfound toys, be they mobile phones, aeroplanes or personal computers. Our real relationship is with our toys and with our own selves. Why, otherwise, has the ease of travel and communication not translated into increased mutual knowledge and tolerance? Why have the amazing advances in science and technology not increased our compassion and respect for life? Why has all this information not made us any wiser, kinder or gentler? Where have all the promises of the past few centuries gone? Even more worrisome, what might our future be? Positing post-modernism as an inadequate—if not desperate—attempt by the West to respond to the insecurities and contradictions of our present age, Robert Schreiter describes the ambivalences of the latter in this way:

When drugs injected to stop one disease start another, when no number of security measures can thwart the terrorist—these experiences undermine any “master narrative” of what society can be counted on to be. When globalization offers only progress that provides no telos that can explain why things have come to be as they are; when the efficiency promised cannot be delivered; when the technical rationality does not address the sense of dread and fear that continues to arise, post-modernism in one or other of its forms will likely emerge. It may express itself in an anarchism that denies all value, or in a burrowing into a specific community or way of life as an enclave providing insulation against contingencies one faces. Or in the flood of information, it may seek the authoritarian ways of a guru who appears able to make the whole thing stop. (3)
If there ever was any illusion of a "master narrative" of what the world was going to be, the events of September 11th have put paid to it. Even the most powerful nation in the West is unable to author and guarantee a master narrative for itself, let alone for others!

These were some of the issues that haunted the discussions of the eight members of the 2001 Campbell Scholars' Seminar at Columbia Theological Seminary in Decatur, Georgia, USA. The seminar theme--"context and catholicity"--invited us to explore the dynamic, complex and necessary relationship between contextuality and catholicity (e.g. universality) for the church at the dawn of the 21st century. Such questions, of course, cannot be addressed apart from a consideration of the globalizing world of today. It soon dawned on us that economic and cultural globalization were forms of "catholicity", aspiring to some grand unity of all. We wondered whether the current discourse about diversity and locality is, at least in part, not meant to mitigate the oppressive unity and totality of the compressed global village. We noted that if globalization was indeed a form of catholicity it was a warped and deficient form--a "catholicity" without justice, dignity, coherence or a sound eschatology. It occurred to us that, despite all noble pronouncements, what is really being globalized is greed, misery and violence. The rude and painful events of September 11th prevented these issues from escaping us!

Indeed, neither catholicity nor context could be discussed with detached innocence any more. What catholicity and context is there to speak of if the world in which we live is moving deeper and deeper into chaos, suffering and violence? It seemed to us that if, as Christians, we believe that God's will is "... set forth in Christ, as a plan for the fullness of time, to gather up all things in him, in heaven and on earth" (Eph. 1:10), then there are two types of "catholicities" for which to strive. First, we need to strive for truly catholic Christian churches--churches firmly rooted in their contexts and fully awake to the worldwide church of all times and all places. Second, since God's plan through Christ is to gather up "all things in heaven and on earth", we have to strive for a truly catholic world--a world that is awake to the fact that God created all in and for love.

CLOSING EYES AND SWITCHING CHANNELS

For Africans there are more specific reasons for the emotional turmoil that has been triggered by the events of September 11th. For us, those events--ghastly and tragic as they are--are neither the first, nor are they likely to be the last, of their kind. We have lived for decades--indeed for centuries--in a long September 11th. Therefore, as an African, I would be dishonest if I did not ask some hard questions about the manner in which September 11th has attracted the attention and sympathy of the world. How many people have died in the 30-year-old war--still continuing--in Angola, and how many more must die before it matters? How many pregnant women had their wombs literally torn open before they were butchered in the 16-year-old civil war in Mozambique? How many people must die per day for a million to be slaughtered in less than three months? This happened in Rwanda in 1994. Even as we begin the 21st century, people are still being taken into slavery in the Sudan. Today, millions of Africans are dying in the face of famine, hunger, poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic while the considerable resources of the world's wealthiest nations are focusing elsewhere--ironically,
mainly on war and the military. Before the 1994 outbreak of genocide in Rwanda the USA, Belgium, France and other Western powers sent planes into Rwanda to lift out their own citizens. Many Africans saw the recent USA walk-out at the UN racism conference during 2001 in Durban as continuous with a nonchalant attitude they have come to expect. But given the Geneva discussions in which it appeared as if the world--particularly the host country, South Africa--was begging the USA not to boycott the meeting, one could say that perhaps the USA never really "walked in" on the Durban UN conference against racism.

Imagine

Imagine that you are a US citizen and that I am an award-winning researcher and writer from abroad. It is January 2002 and you have been lucky enough to get my hot-off-the-press, and by all indications soon-to-be-best-selling, book on terrorism in the USA--a topic I have been researching for three years. Imagine further that I arrived in New York in January 1999, and left at the beginning of November 2001. During my stay I had covered and researched stories about guns in American schools, shootings in the classrooms, drug wars, racial conflicts, domestic and external terrorism, and other "aspects" of my topic. By the third year, I have developed a keen sense of the prevalence of violence in American society and have become weary, if not actually sick, of it. Then, as I eagerly awaited my return home in November 2001, September 11th happens. Another, somehow culminating, gruesome topic is presented to me so that I am forced at the last minute to add one more chapter to my manuscript.

Imagine that you now have the book in your hands. Your fingers race to the last chapter, which is titled simply: September 11th. Your eyes fall up on the very last paragraph of the book. It is a farewell paragraph that describes my feelings on 9 November 2001, as my South African Airways flight lifted off from JFK airport headed for Johannesburg:

I open the little plastic bag with my headset and plug the earphones into the armrest in time for the start of the CNN news just coming across the television screen in front of the cabin. The story is about September 11th; something about a new outbreak of anthrax in Philadelphia and worries about another plane hijack in Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina. I close my eyes and switch channels to a music station. I'm leaving the USA now, so I don't care any more about the turmoil in the USA and have no interest in this latest tragic development. I have seen it all before, and I'm sure I'll see it again. But from now on, I will see it from afar, maybe watching it on television, like millions of other Africans. I'll watch the latest footage of Americans with bloated stomachs and charred lips after another chemical warfare attack by unknown terrorists. I will watch, on TV, in the comfort of my middle-class home in Pretoria's elite suburb of Centurion, as tire-fighters tear limbs off rotting bodies of crushed Americans as they desperately try to account for the dead after yet another terrorist attack on yet another doomed American city. Sure, I will watch with more than passing interest, since I have been here. I will understand now the complexities behind the conflicts. I will also know that the problems are too intractable, that the outside world can do nothing, until the USA is ready to save itself. I'll also know that none of it affects me, because I feel no attachment to the place or the people. And why should I feel anything more? Because I
am a human being? Because some ancestor of mine several million years ago gave birth to other ancestors of mine that might have given birth to Americans and that now I look like some Americans? Does that make me part of this place? Should their suffering still be mine?

Tell me honestly how you feel after reading this passage with which I close my book. Revulsion at my lack of feeling? Anger at my inability to acknowledge the hospitality of hundreds of Americans? Pity and profound sadness at my inability to see my shared humanity with Americans? Shock at my suggestion that I can go back home, insulate myself against American suffering and forget all about America? Would you not wonder what it is in this so-called globalized world that produces the kind of unfeeling and uncaring human being I have become?

Now consider this (you do not have to imagine it for, unlike my narrative which has just so offended you, this actually happened). Except for a few alterations of names and places, the words you have just read have already been uttered in one of the bluntest, and perhaps most hurtful, statements of an individual American's indifference to Africa—the words of Keith Richburg. If USA foreign policy did not appear to confirm this indifference, and if such American media as The Washington Post (for which Richburg worked) were not so influential, this particular incidence of unfeeling could be easily, and better, cast aside. For three years, Richburg was stationed in Nairobi as reporter for the Washington Post on African affairs. From there he monitored and reported on Africa's troubled spots such as Somalia, Zaire and Rwanda. The Somali war and Rwandan genocide, which he (I believe) snidely calls "two of the world's worst tragedies", (4) obviously made some "indelible mark" on Richburg. The following are the original words with which Richburg brings his polemical book on his stay in Africa to an end—a record of his feelings as he sat on the plane taking off from Nairobi and heading back to the USA:

I open the little plastic bag with my headset and plug the earphones into the armrest in time for the start of the BBC news just coming across the television screen in front of the cabin. The story is about Rwanda; something about a new outbreak of violence at the border and worries about fresh incursions from Hutu rebels based over the border in Zaire who are plotting their return. I close my eyes and switch channels to a music station. I'm leaving Africa now, so I don't care any more about the turmoil in Rwanda and have no interest in this latest tragic development. I have seen it all before, and I'm sure I'll see it again. But from now on, I will see it from afar, maybe watching it on television, like millions of other Americans. I'll watch the latest footage of refugees crossing a border some place, soldiers looting, kids with grenade launchers blasting apart yet another quaint but run-down African capital. I will watch with more than passing interest, since I have been here. I will understand now the complexities behind the conflicts. I will also know that the problems are too intractable, that the outside world can do nothing, until Africa is ready to save itself. I'll also know that none of it affects me, because I feel no attachment to the place or the people. And why should I feel anything more? Because my skin is black? Because some ancestor of mine, four centuries ago, was wrenched from this place and sent to America, and because I now
look like those others whose ancestors were left behind? Does that make me still a part
of this place? Should their suffering now somehow still be mine? (5)

After watching and reporting on the massacre of more than a million people in Rwanda, the
above quotation is the most sensitive and considerate conclusion that Richburg could come to!
I presume that his book has created some debate and discussion in some parts of the USA. I
have never been sure whether it deserved discussion except, perhaps, as an illustration of the
frightening estrangement of human beings from one another; the need for the world to pray
that, until we stop making war, God should give us a better quality of war reporters and
journalists in general; and the need for war journalists and soldiers alike to undergo serious
professional therapy upon their return from a war zone. The book has been construed as a
personal diary of one person's journey from African-Americanity, to Africanity and finally to
Americanity. In the second edition of the book Richburg responds to his critics by saying that
this book is only "a personal memoir, a first person diary of my experiences as a reporter". (6)
In these post-modern times, who can speak against anything contained in a journalistic
narrative of "personal encounters" and "views"? Nevertheless, a few remarks might be in order
here.

Imagining a different world

Despite his disclaimers, Richburg clearly intends to broadcast "facts" and does so in rather
"evangelical" and graphic language, meant clearly to push the reader into a conversion
experience: a conversion away from Africa and Africanity, and perhaps even away from
African-Americanity, to a triumphal Americanity. The plot, upshot and sum total of Richburg's
experiences and book is the gleeful statement: "Thank God I am American." (7)

As Christians, we are called upon to imagine a different world and a different humanity from
that which emerges from such exclusivist divisions--whether between the faithful and the
infidels, or between the USA and a heap of all the others (at the bottom of which you have ...
Africans).

The tragedy of Richburg's position is not that he is a black man who despises black people,
"his own people" as it were. To accuse Richburg of that would be to misunderstand and even
trivialize his inhuman views. The people Richburg despises are not "his people", and to censure
him on that score would be to subscribe to an implied racist premise. His is not just an attack
by a black man on fellow black people, it reflects disdain and disregard for human beings, a
desensitizing to human tragedy. His book invites its readers to a conversion experience to
apathy and unfeeling disregard for human beings on the thin basis, or excuse, of nationality.
Pretending to have overcome the barrier of race, it nevertheless subscribes to the idolatry of
nationality, and is unable to understand, let alone rise above, old notions of identity to search
for a larger and inclusive notion of humanity.

Here is a perfect example of uncatholic contextuality! The self-assured Certainty that "from
now on, I will see it from afar, maybe watching it on television, like millions of other
Americans" fails to understand the extent to which the lives of Americans are intertwined with
and implicated in those of Africans--and with those of other peoples of the world. We knew already in 2000 that Osama Bin Laden and his associates were responsible for the bombing of the American embassy buildings in Nairobi--a bombing in which both American and African lives were lost. Did Osama Bin Laden and his cohorts have to unleash the same barbaric acts of evil on American soil for the world to sit up and notice? Will even now the Richburgs of this world see the connections between September 11th and other tragic events all around the world?

What we are called upon to imagine, and embody, is a catholic world in which being American, Afghanistani, German or African is no index of one's value as a human being. For perhaps a threat even greater than that of terrorism is the perversion of human worth and human identity--perversions that have often been mediated through categories of nationality, gender, class and race.

However, we must go beyond painting the views, or even the actions, of such terrorists as simply the "ultimate incarnations of evil" in our world today. To do so is to over-simplify. The problem of human apathy and unfeeling will not go away after we have rebutted such views, nor will the problem of evil terrorist action cease after we have found, incarcerated or killed Osama Bin Laden and his band of followers. The problem is that there are aspects of those views and figures in our own selves and in the policies, cultures and ideologies of our own countries! Acts of terrorism are not the exclusive reserve of "loose groups" and pariah states. Even legitimate nation-states can, and indeed have, engaged in "terrorist actions". It is a mute point whether aspects of the many "wars against terrorism" are not terroristic themselves. The shameful truth is that while Richburg might be the one who speaks the uncouth and impolite words in the public square, the things of which he speaks are those which many of us think but lack the courage to say openly. Is this not why his utterances move us so? Therefore we have to move beyond the dramatic projections of "evil" in a few spectacular individuals to a recognition of the thick, and ever-encroaching, web of wickedness and apathy in human relations during our time.

**Of collapsible coffins and ways of dying**

The title of this paper has been fashioned from of a novel by Zakes Mda, a South African playwright and novelist, titled Ways of Dying. The story is set in an imaginary South African squatter camp, politely known as an "informal settlement". The main characters of the story are a funeral orator, a professional mourner and a coffin-maker. Mda employs his great literary skills, hiding behind his pathetic (if humorous) characters, as he chronicles the many "colourful" ways of dying in his squatter camp. The most distinctive features of life in the squatter camp are that any of the inhabitants can kill and die easily; and here burial rituals and rites have been elevated to the highest societal value. The squatter camp community is engaged in a dreadful but largely unspoken "ways-of-dying" competition. This is what makes the lives of the funeral orator, professional mourner, coffin-maker and all those whose paths cross theirs captivating; it is they who give shape and voice to the community's narrative of its ways of dying.
To keep the list of endless tragic stories interesting and bearable, Mda employs exquisite humour and fantastic imagination. The coffin-maker has designed and is selling a portable collapsible coffin. The person appointed funeral orator or nurse is the person who was the last to see the deceased in those crucial moments of crossing from life to death. The nurse, therefore, often has the funeral crowds firmly under her manipulative control, for people there delight in hearing the minutest details about how a person died. The nurse also has the freedom in the course of her duty to make comments a woman would not be allowed to make under normal circumstances. Hence Mda's nurse can say, as part of her oration and to the consternation of the men in attendance, that "men are dogs and are known to wander from time to time". (8) But there is little they can do for the nurse is simply "discharging her sacred duty". Thus Mda describes the antics of the professional mourner:

Throughout the funeral, orator after orator, he sat on the mound and made moaning sounds of agony that were so harrowing that they affected all those who were within earshot, filling their eyes with tears. When the nurse spoke, he excelled himself by punctuating each painful segment of her speech with an excruciating groan that sent the relatives into a frenzy of wailing. (9)

But the reader must not be fooled. Beyond his momentary importance at the funeral occasion, Mda's professional mourner is a shady character, a hobo, homeless and a beggar, confronting us with his destitution in the guise of a comedic professional. He "spends his sparse existence on the cremation ground, cooks his food on the fires of a funeral pyre, feeds on human waste and human corpses and drinks his own urine to quench his thirst". (10)

I must hasten to say, as one who grew up in a South African township, that there are no actual squatter camps, or township communities, in South Africa where such professional mourners, funeral nurses and collapsible coffin-makers are to be found! All these are Mda's creations. However, the novel is a fairly accurate, if slightly exaggerated depiction of the state of dying and rituals associated with it. Except for the hilariously comical antics of Mda's characters as well as the elaborate way in which these characters have been constructed--surely a literary device to enable readers to bear the book's uninspiring themes of poverty, squalour, violence and dying--the context of death and dying depicted in the novel is itself a real one, not only in South Africa, but in much of Africa. Since death lurks everywhere it is no longer the fact that one dies which matters but how one dies and how one is buried.

**SEPTEMBER 11TH--"MERELY" A SPECTACULAR WAY OF DYING?**

Therefore the question we have to face is: Does the September 11th tragedy present us with more than just another dramatic and spectacular way of dying in a world where violent death has become commonplace? Are the inhabitants of Mda's squatter camp becoming increasingly representative of the world in which we live? Not everyone lives in the squalor of Mda's imaginary village; but perhaps the majority do in fact live in such conditions, while the rest live in a kind of moral and ethical squalor. The degradation of ever-cheapening squatter-camp life could be seen as a testament to the unfeeling decadence of the world's wealthy minority. We must not let the ironic satire buried in the metaphor of a collapsible coffin escape us. Here fun
is being made of our efficiency-crazed world: we are even fashioning ways of dying and burying that are not only spectacular, but also efficient. We have become like the people whom the prophet Jeremiah (26:15) accused of having made a covenant with death--as means of coping with death!

When violent death becomes commonplace in the whole world, what is left but to increase the outrageousness and gruesomeness of it all? What is left but to ensure--as did the terrorists of September 11th--that the greatest number of people watch others die? For many Africans, life has been for a long time a series of "horror" movies each seeking to outdo the previous in its ruthlessness. Indeed, we are fast approaching a time when we all will feel like characters in such a film. The brutality of September 11th must lead us to a recognition of the increasing commonality, frequency and possibility of violent death and destruction everywhere. It should lead us to recognize the death-game into which the entire world is locked. If September 11th is neither new nor unique, it means that the world is in even greater trouble than we had previously imagined, and misery is being globalized in a deadly "reflexivity" that not even Robert Schreiter could have imagined:

Globalization, however, is not a process that affects just the former periphery or other still untouched areas. It affects also the West itself in a process of reflexivity whereby the out-flowing of modernization curves back upon the West ... But what reflexivity brings as well is a sense of contingency or risk that has long been the experience of countries on the periphery. (11)

Furthermore, it is not merely and only those "profoundly opposed to the inroads that modernity has made into traditional societies" (12) who are not satisfied with what is becoming of the world in which we live. Millions of people all over the world--including in the USA--are concerned about the death-road that the world appears to be taking as a result of economic globalization. It is time for Christians to explore, from their traditions, what their contribution might be in a peaceful search for a different world. Could September 11th and its aftermath--horrible and painful as it is--become a basis for such exploration?

**Inventing a new community of hope out of tragedy**

From the moment I set foot on American soil, on 22 September 2001, I immediately developed a profound sense that I was walking into a funeral--a massive national funeral ceremony. There was a hint of sorrow in the voice and written on the face of the passport control officer who interviewed me as I entered the USA. "There has been a death in the family" was the title of the sermon which Laura Mendenhall--president of Columbia Theological Seminary--preached on 16 September in response to the September 11th tragedy. How appropriate! From the eerie silence of the airport, I walked into the loud noise of American flags hanging and blowing everywhere. I saw them on cars, buildings and in the front terraces of homes, everywhere speaking to me --words of lament and words of a nation united in sorrow. I sensed a profound moment of vulnerability. This deep moment lasted for at least 25 days between September 11th and October 7th when the USA military initiated their retaliatory bombing campaign in
Afghanistan. For those twenty-five days at least, I have never, as an African, felt more close to Americans as I joined them in the human and mundane acts of mourning, lament and hoping!

I have watched with curiosity and compassion the various attempts of American television evangelists to explain biblically, and make sense of, September 11th. The subject of most of the sermons was an attempt to answer the question why September 11th happened, or to demonstrate how God was on the side of America; and in most of the sermons the two objectives were not mutually exclusive. There were those which suggested that September 11th occurred because America had either lapsed into uncharacteristic sin, or was a sinful nation at its core, and was therefore "getting what was deserved". Fortunately those preaching this view were few and far between. The most (in) famous persons who took this line were Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson--though it seems that they later partly retracted these views. Other sermons saw the perpetrators of the ghastly September 11th events as representatives of "satanic alien forces" bent on destroying Christian America.

But I also heard and read powerful and moving sermons and stories in my short stay in the USA. On 16 September, fellow Campbell scholar Kim Richter began her sermon with the simple statement: "I cannot make sense out of senselessness. I cannot tie up for you today, in a neat theological bow, all of these loose ends so tattered and frayed." She went on to preach about hope amidst suffering and tragedy. In similar tone, Jon M. Walton of First Presbyterian Church in New York City opened his September 16th sermon with two simple, honest and powerful lines: "What word is there to say that has not already been said? What cry to heaven has not already been raised so much more than any cry that we might raise?" Joe Harvard, another 2001 Campbell scholar, has written about an extraordinary inter-religious service--involving Muslims, Jews and Christians--in which he participated on the very evening of the September 11th tragedy in the city of Durham, North Carolina. I have been touched by the humility and grace with which many ministers in America in their pulpits have reflected theologically on the tragedy. As they read and interpreted the word with respect and amazing sincerity, I have watched them attempt to mould a new church and a new Christian consciousness that intends to have an impact beyond the four walls of the church. Indeed, I have experienced a nation in self-reinvention.

RITUALS THAT GIVE BIRTH TO A NEW PEOPLE

Singing a new song

Driving on my arrival along the six-to ten-mile road between Atlanta's Hartsfield airport to Decatur, I must have seen no less than a dozen billboards--ancient and modern--displaying three words from the title of America's unofficial national anthem, namely Irving Berlin's "God Bless America". This song has suddenly acquired a new significance, and many times during my seven-week stay in the USA I witnessed it performed in various, and sometimes unlikely, occasions. Long-cherished songs of gaiety sung during sporting events--such as Jack Norworth's "Take me Out to the Ball Game"--have been replaced with the much more solemn "God Bless America". It has become a new song--mostly sung in reverent supplication, other times in defiance and occasionally in patriotic triumphalism.
As a foreigner in the USA, I quickly caught the mood of lament blowing in the fluttering flags and heaving chests of those singing "God Bless America". It resonated with the lamentations of my own people and the sorrows of my own continent. In this sense I was walking on familiar ground: the sense of tragedy I feel wherever we bury another victim of AIDS descended on me many times as I watched Americans engaged in mourning rituals. Who would have thought that I could have caught, in the USA, glimpses of the heavy blanket of despair, fear and confusion which envelope African townships and villages?

I have noted with admiration and amazement as Americans of various colours and persuasions attempt--by a variety of means--to forge a new identity from the tragedy of September 11th. The agonizing attempt to forge a new people and new identity from the ruins of collapse and destruction is all too familiar to me as a South African. For the past seven years we have tried to forge a new identity and a new nationality from the ruins of a people--black and white--deformed and debased by one of the world's most racist and violent ideologies. In the process we have tried to rename ourselves as "the rainbow nation" and as "new South Africans". Our attempts to do this have been both inspirational and contested. We have seen Nelson Mandela bravely helping us to redefine what it means to be a "new" South African by performing--on our behalf--a series of most astounding rituals. He paid a special and official visit to Betsie Verwoerd--the widow of the architect of apartheid, the late Hendrik Verwoerd--even though she continues to live in a whites-only Afrikaner enclave inside the new South Africa. Who can forget that day in 1995, when in rugby world cup finals between South Africa and New Zealand, Nelson Mandela sacrilegiously wore the captain's jersey in the contested, if not hated, colours of the all-white South African rugby team--and to do that at a time when the country was engaged in heated and intense debate about what to do with dubious national symbols inherited from the apartheid regime? The now world-famous and controversial South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was one massive ritual of building a nation out of disparate communities long separated by strife, dispossession and plain old lynching. (13)

The discords, and still we sing

Yet at other times, our quest for a new nation has turned sour, The birth of a "new" South Africa has not always been smooth. During November 2000, South African national television showed us a bizarre police dog training video in which policemen repeatedly set their dogs on four young black men, whose "crime" was that they were alleged to be illegal Mozambican immigrants. A startling wave of racist xenophobia has been sweeping through the new South Africa, as South Africans blame fellow African immigrants and refugees for all their misfortunes.

In the mid-morning of 7 November 2000, a young black man employed by the University of South Africa in Pretoria was shot five times by an off-duty white policeman. Why? Because the unarmed young black man had a nervous breakdown and had allegedly become restless, frightening his fellow workers. At the beginning of April 1999, a white South African journalist sat and wrote, minutes after her ordeal, about her rape by a black man. Her article was published in an international newspaper, helping to shatter the myth of a harmonious country and creating a great deal of controversy.
The newly integrated schools and universities have become flashpoints of racial tensions among both staff and students. A black boy is now serving a rather long prison sentence for stabbing a white boy with a fork at school. There is the touching story of a white woman who adopted and cared for an HIV-positive black child until his death. There is the black boy who lost an eye after two white boys beat him severely in another school. Similarly the magic years of Mandela seem to have left our sporting codes largely untouched, so that rugby remains largely white and Afrikaner, soccer remains largely black, and cricket remains largely white and English. It sometimes looks as if, in spite of all of Tutu's and Mandela's efforts and in spite of all the tragedies and celebrations that we have shared together as South Africans, white stay white, black stay black, rich get richer, poor get poorer and all the internal divisions remain intact. One small piece of unity won today is so easily undone tomorrow. One day we celebrated the birth of a new nation; the next day, HIV/AIDS arrived and is now slowly undoing everything. And yet, we all know that it could be worse.

Can the world learn anything from our efforts at self-reinvention after many years of tragedy, alienation, unfeeling and violence? Let me mention two typical hindrances to such learning: an unfeeling, dismissive regard for people and events in the so-called "developing world, and a dismissive romanticization of aspects of people and events in that world. Consider, the romanticization of the South African Truth and Reconciliation process (a romanticization not usually meant to be dismissive). A good example of this is a recent interview I gave to a visiting Swiss NGO activist during the UN racism conference in Durban (2001). Every time I tried to show him the complexities and difficulties of the South African reconciliation process, noting the continuing realities of poverty, crime, violence and racism, my interviewer reminded me of the miraculous fact that "in South Africa blacks are not killing whites"--as if to say that many can die due to AIDS, hunger, crime and racism as long as "the blacks are not killing the whites"! Admittedly the gentleman meant well, aiming to appreciate the miracle of the South African transition, and the fact that things could be worse.

But I have often wondered why there is an apparent need for the rest of the world to romanticize the South African reconciliation process. Is it because the world badly needs some success story? Does it reflect an unspoken insistence that victims in South Africa, and everywhere, should be willing to forgive and forget at all costs? Is it part of a refusal to acknowledge partial failure and success, a longing for the simpler categories of either total failure or total success? Whatever the answers, it seems that we need to develop a vision of humanity which views human beings as creatures of God, none of whom deserves to die, whatever their race, nationality and gender. That is the "catholicity" that we must work for.

**Singing a new people into existence**

Having noted the place of Berlin's "God Bless America" in the rituals of mourning and national reinvention in the USA, I now wish to explore its significance further by comparing it to the song "God Bless Africa".
GOD BLESS AFRICA

God Bless Africa
Lord bless Africa
May her spirit rise up high
Hear thou our prayers
Lord bless us your children
Descend, O spirit. Descend, O Holy Spirit
Lord bless us your children
Lord bless our peoples
Put an end to wars and suffering
Oh Lord, Do bless our peoples.

As I listened to Americans singing "God Bless America" I could not help thinking that the national anthem of my own country, and that of several East and Southern African countries, is called "God Bless Africa". During times of despair, I have wondered if Americans would fare better than Africans in their prayerful request before God. Do they sing it like people who are used to being blessed by God--or do they sing it because, as Africans sing their song, they often feel often abandoned and forgotten by God?

In the times of apartheid in South Africa this was a song of defiance--a song giving birth to and nurturing an alternative, militant and prayerful community. This song, more than any sermon preached by Bishop Tutu, Allan Boesak or Frank Chikane, defined and nourished this alternative community, a community that included the church, but went far beyond it. It was a song of defiance sung by a people who continued to believe they were worthy of receiving God's blessings in a situation where a section of society had "detained" and "colonized" God. It was a song that imagined a catholic community larger than the tribal compartments created by the apartheid state and its church.

Like "God Bless America", "God Bless Africa" was for many years the unofficial anthem. "God Bless Africa" was composed in 1897 by a disenfranchised 25-year-old man who did not live beyond the age of 32. Over the years the song has been revised and modified, but it has lived for more than a century in the hearts and souls of millions of people in Africa, particularly South Africans.

How has this prayer-song managed to seize the imagination of three generations of South Africans and other peoples of Southern Africa? Perhaps because of its prayerful simplicity. It includes no celebration of victory in war, no summoning of the national armed forces and no glorification of country and nation--just a simple prayer imploring God to bless Africa, and to put an end to war and suffering. It had a formidable rival, of course, in white South Africa's official national anthem--Die Stem van Suid Afrika (The Call of South Africa)--a militant song culled from a fiery poem by the celebrated Afrikaans poet Cornelius Jacob Langenhoven. This is the song that was sung by white South Africa for 58 years. A portion of its first stanza goes as follows:
At thy call we shall not falter
Firm and steadfast we shall stand
At thy will to live or perish
Oh South Africa, dear land.

The black answer to this fiercely patriotic (and almost idolatrous) song was the simple prayer-song: "God Bless Africa". Black South Africans did not respond with a song that spoke of their connectedness to the African soil, or a song that inspired them to rise up and spill blood for the beloved land. The notion of love for the continent did not include suicide or preparedness for death in acts perceived as patriotic bravery; rather love for the land was subsumed under God's love in a prayer that asked for God's blessing.

**GOD BLESS AMERICA**

God Bless America
While the storm clouds gather far across the sea
Let us swear allegiance to a land that's free
Let us all be grateful for a land so fair
As we raise our voices in solemn prayer:
God Bless America
Land that I love
Stand beside her and guide her
Through the night with a light from above
From the mountains, to the prairies
To the oceans, white with foam
God bless America
My home sweet home

I do not presume to know enough about either the larger context, or the state of mind, in which the Siberian immigrant Irving Berlin wrote "God Bless America" in praise of his new adopted land. All I know is that I have been touched profoundly as I watched Americans of various races and genders sing this, their own prayer-song. As was the case in South Africa many years ago, this song has the ability to summon the nation to an imagining of an alternate community. While Irving Berlin was keenly aware of the war clouds gathering over Europe in 1938, he nevertheless proposed his revised version as a peace song and a prayer, rather than a call to arms. Thus both songs carry the same prayerful simplicity, while eschewing the temptation of the patriotic excesses noted in the national anthem above. (A song which carries the same kind of prayerfulness, though not blessed with the same simplicity, is that which has sometimes been called the African American national anthem, namely "Lift Every Voice".)

**SONGS OF DIVISION?**

If these songs demonstrate anything, it is that new communities are not born only of might and power (Zech. 4:6), but by simple prayerful songs as well. The questions that issue from
our brief discussion are numerous. We have noted the creative power of songs in Christian and general community building. But songs can also be divisive, nationalist and war-mongering idolatries. Even "God Bless America" and "God Bless Africa" can be sung and heard differently. While black South Africans felt inspired by "God Bless Africa", it became clear during the 1994 transition that many white South Africans experienced "God Bless Africa" as a frightening war song that excluded them! Therefore with the advent of the new South Africa even this sacred, hundred-year-old prayer-song had to be "diluted". After 1994 it was decided, amidst heated debates, that a portion of Die Stem van Suid Afrika should be added at the end of "God Bless Africa". That combination became the new anthem for the new South Africa: "God Bless South Africa". Thus from the two songs that were so opposed that they seemed to appeal to different gods, was born a new song for a new people. Many people welcomed it; others, both black and white, did not. As we have seen, a song revered and cherished by one group can become excluding and alienating to others.

This means that for all their community-building possibilities, even prayer-songs may give birth to sectarianism so that the "god" being appealed to is nothing but an idol. The songs "God Bless Africa", "God Bless South Africa" and "God Bless America" can lead to catholicity only if their singers regard the blessing of Africa, South Africa and America as part and parcel of God's blessing of all humanity, and all creation. But when the appeal for God to bless America, or Africa, is construed as an exclusive privilege denying the blessing of others, then even these beautiful prayer-songs are transformed into idolatrous prayers.

There is a subtler way in which these songs, and what they symbolize, can become problematic: namely, when God's prayed-for blessing of America is "benevolently" projected and imposed as the one blessing required by all peoples of the world. This distortion is evident in some Americans' insistence that all that the world needs is for "the American dream" to be extended to the rest of the planet. Surely, the world could--though not necessarily--benefit from a blessed America, just as the world could gain from a blessed South Africa. But the world is much bigger than, and different from, either South Africa or America. Indeed, much of the world may wish neither to be "blessed" in the way America wishes to be blessed, or to receive "trickle-down" blessings falling from America's bowl. A way must be found for Americans to pray "God Bless America" such that someone who is not American can join in exactly the same prayer, without feeling either threatened or excluded. Similarly, a way must be found for a Nigerian to join South Africans in singing and praying "God Bless South Africa" such that the Nigerian feels he has a stake in blessing of South Africa by God, but without needing to cease being a Nigerian.

No prayer for God's blessing should ever imply a privileging of some and the exclusion of others; this implies that we should all be prepared to cast aside our nationalistic songs, however edifying for our parochially contextual purposes they may be, in order to join all of humanity and all of creation in the march towards the unity and salvation that God has prepared. Thus the most profound song that both Americans and South Africans can sing is "God Bless Humanity and All of Creation"! Unless we all can sing such a song over and above our own anthems--official and unofficial--then we are not yet ready to participate in the missio
Dei. and not ready for the practice of genuine catholicity and genuine contextuality. These, it seems to me, are some of the implications of a genuine quest for contextual catholicity.

**African churches and African theologies since the 1960s**

By way of consolidation, I wish now to consider the question of context and catholicity in ecclesiastical and theological perspective, with specific reference to the African scene.

**CHURCHES CAUGHT BETWEEN CATHOLIC AND CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY**

Tremendous changes have occurred in African churches since the 1950s. Indeed, many of the churches of Africa would not even have been called "churches" in the 1950s--they were seen as and simply called "missions". Today the churches of Africa are too numerous to mention and they form a substantial part of today's ecumenical movement in all its variety. The shape, temperament and tenor of African Christianity has also altered and transformed. There has been a tremendous growth of African Independent Churches (AICs), that is, churches initiated and sustained by Africans without any direct sponsorship, theological or material, by churches in the West. In most of Africa there has also been a huge upsurge in Pentecostal-type "charismatic" churches, outstripping by far the growth of the so-called "mainline" churches. The result is that the African Christianity of today has a very different "look and feel" from that of the 1950s, even though it clearly reflects the reality of the 1950s and before.

I want to suggest that the interplay between catholicity and context had much to do with these significant changes. On the general plane, we could say that changes in the world, especially those related to the aftermath of the first and second world wars in the West, and the growing struggles for independence in Africa, were an important catalyst in both the transformation of former "missions" into churches, and the tremendous growth of Pentecostal- and AIC-type churches. The two world wars gave birth to a new realization of "the (sometimes deadly!) ties that bind", while also giving impetus to new calls for local contexts to be freed from oppressive ties with colonial countries.

This, then, was the stage in which African "missions" had to--and did--become churches. In this context, where the Bible was being translated into more and more African languages, it was also possible for Africans to establish their own churches without reference to Western sponsorship. The development in African Christianity grew then from a larger response to a deadly form of "catholicity" (colonialism) and to the search for a contextual integrity (political independence) which had, by definition, bidden farewell to insular and purist notions of the "local context". Therefore in their emergence, African churches--both mainline and AICs--were symbols of both catholicity and contextuality, even as the emerging independent African nations were both a joining with a larger world of nations, and a refusal to be subjected forever to the whims of colonial nations.

The heated debates in the 1970s on the call for a "moratorium on missions" belonged to the African churches' attempt to determine their own agenda under the guidance of the triune God and God's word. The call for a moratorium was an assertion of integrity and independence
(contextuality) in order to relate to fellow churches as equal recipients of God's loving grace (catholicity). Indeed, apart from an awareness of the potential and possibility of ecumenical catholicity, the call for a moratorium would have been superfluous, just as it would not have made sense to strive for political independence if there had been no awareness of similar "nations" with which to relate.

Therefore I would argue that from the earliest times the history of African churches has been a history of interplay between catholicity and context. In striving for contextual integrity African churches were, at the same time, striving for catholic integrity in the worldwide church. Contextuality was, therefore, never the opposite of catholicity, even if sometimes (in the heat of the necessarily passionate debates between African churches and their Western counterparts) things were said and done, by either side, which implied that the two notions were contradictory.

The rise, meaning and implications of Pentecostalism globally is something we have hardly begun to understand. Certainly in its African manifestations, this phenomenon has yet to be comprehended. Early indications are that it may be a particular Christian response to globalization. In many parts of Africa it seems to be helping Africans to deal with the effects of globalization in ways similar to those through which mainline Christianity helped Africans to cope with modernity. It is notable, however, that Africans were never centrally involved in either modernity or globalization.

Could this have something to do with context and catholicity? At the beginning of this essay I noted that globalization is a form of warped catholicity. If I am correct, then perhaps African Pentecostalism is at least partly an attempt, on an ecclesial and spiritual plane, to mitigate the disempowering effects of globalization upon poor and marginalized people. It is, therefore, a contextual movement seeking its way against that wave of compressing and all-consuming "catholicity" known as globalization. However, it seems to me that although there are parallels between Pentecostals in rich Western countries and the emerging Pentecostalism in African countries--especially in the way in which both are confronting the reality of globalization--there are marked differences as well. African Pentecostalism is not merely a carbon copy of either American right-wing fundamentalism or American Pentecostalism, as has sometimes been suggested.

African Pentecostalism has a distinctive African accent and idiom and yet, to the extent that it borrows from other Pentecostal movements in the world, it is (on the positive side) also part of a new Christian catholicity, and (on the negative side) caught up in the web of the very globalization it is attempting to tame.

**THE FUTURE IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE: AFRICAN THEOLOGIES SINCE THE 1960s**

Like all of theology everywhere, and in tandem with the churches which they serve, African Christian theologies of today are no longer what they were in the 1960s and 1970s. (14) In
fact they are not even what they were expected to become: behold, the future of African theologies is not what it used to be!

It was once thought that different forms of African theology--inculturation, indigenization, liberation, South African black theology, and others--were engaged in gradual rapprochement that would culminate in one all-encompassing "African theology". However, recent developments indicate that nothing of the sort has happened; instead, we have seen an explosion of many newer, even discordant forms of African theology. In the past twenty years we have seen the emergence and growth of African women's theologies--theologies that have deliberately refused to be fitted too neatly into any of the previous Western and African theological forms. (15) Nor have the predictions materialized that African theologies of inculturation and indigenization would, sooner or later, make way for theologies of liberation. Rather, issues of inculturation and indigenization persist alongside, and sometimes inside, issues of liberation--and vice versa. For example, how can the thorny and scandalous subject of female circumcision be discussed only as a matter of "indigenous culture", and not also as a matter of women's liberation? Even appeals to the Bible as the sole source and criterion for work have not stemmed the tide of innovation and contest--rather biblical hermeneutics has itself become a fierce "site of struggle" in African theologizing. Nor has the end of the cold war managed to dislodge completely the metaphor of liberation from the African theological scene. Similarly, while African independent churches (16) have become a much bigger force in African theologies than they were in the 1950s and 1960s, their often-predicted "take over" of African Christian theologizing and African church life has not occurred. What do these and similar changes mean when viewed from the perspective of context and catholicity?

A quest to be wholly catholic and wholly contextual

If African theologies started as a push for contextual integrity and focus, that push has never come to a halt. Theologies which presume that they had "their contexts" well-covered were, sooner or later, forced to the realization that there were many others which they had neglected. This is what happened to South African black theology when black women declared that this famed "theology of liberation" was, in actual fact, not that liberating to them as women. Similarly African theologies of inculturation soon faced the ire of African women who declared that "inculturation" often amounted to the incorporation, or indigenization, of oppressive elements in African cultures. They also opposed the selective use of certain biblical themes that have been used to discriminate against women.

"Context" is, therefore, never a static reality which can be figured out once and for all--not even for one day. This is because (at least in Africa) the quest for contextual integrity has always been a search for catholic integrity. That means: how could South African black theology be said to be truly contextual if it were not "catholic" enough to hear the pain of women? How could African mainline theologies be said to be catholic in scope if they were not sufficiently contextual to include issues emanating from Pentecostal and African Independent Churches? How could African theologies be wholly contextual if they dismiss summarily the impact of missionaries and their cultures on local African contexts? African Christian
theologizing—at its best—is at once a contextual and a catholic enterprise. All attempts to construe it in insular or progressive terms will simply not suffice.

Ironically, African theologians seeking to substitute the notion of "reconstruction" for that of "liberation" (17) and the post-exilic for the exodus (and this allegedly in response to the post-cold war situation) find themselves constantly reverting, in spite of themselves, to the language of liberation, inculturation and exodus—even as they insist that the latter have "expired". This is because issues of liberation and inculturation were not mere phases in some progressivist march of African theologies. Rather, all of these emphases are always there—sometimes in the background, sometimes in the foreground and at other times in the underground—in African Christian theologizing, even as new issues emerge on the scene.

**DOING THEOLOGY IN A SITUATION OF DEATH AND TRAGEDY**

African theologies and churches have recently been faced with a new context of death and tragedy. Some African civil and post-independence wars, such as the one in Angola, refuse to end. Some do end—only for new wars to be born in the same country. It will take the churches and people of Rwanda many years to recover from the 1994 genocide; and yet today, like so many other African nations emerging from conflict situations, they now face problems of poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Even the South African "miracle of reconciliation" is not, in fact, that miraculous because the damage which centuries of economic disparity and racist human relations have done cannot be erased overnight.

All these factors combine to make many African countries places of death and dying rather than places of life and living. In these contexts, Christian churches and their theologies are challenged to respond creatively and meaningfully. Therefore the theological developments alluded to above are not only about difficulties and differences; they also illustrate the enormous creativity with which African churches and African theologies are responding to the challenges facing them.

**From ways of dying to ways of living**

Many of the items on the agenda of early African theology have not disappeared but have converged or coalesced around the themes of tragedy, killing and dying. Today these themes are encapsulated and embodied in the scourges of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, violence, war and poverty. In many parts of Africa, South Africa included, death has become a way of life—coming needlessly early and with relentless frequency in many African communities. This is the picture painted so vividly by Mda (18) and horrifically evoked by the events of September 11th. In this situation, death is the stuff of life and life becomes a rather short-lived game of killing and dying. This is a frightening world, one which will slowly become "normal" reality unless something drastic is done to counter it.

From an African perspective, therefore, the tragic events of September 11th point to a frightening possibility that death as a way of life may be a "life-style" that is spreading even to those parts of the world that were thought to be protected. These are worrying and
frightening times—not because "America is under attack" but rather because humanity and God's creation has, for too long a time now, been under wanton attack, through violent deeds which seem to be increasing in their spread, frequency and brutality.

We have to find a way to move beyond the pretence of nation states, warped anthropocentrism, ethno-centric, racist and sexist, elitist identities and their arbitrary and mostly imaginary borders—the pretence that these are worthy of our worship even unto death. Better still, we are all called upon radically to interrogate all our views and positions—even our religious doctrines—in order to ensure that they are not misconstrued to underwrite a "ways of dying" ethic. Rather our doctrines, like our life of faith in Jesus Christ, must become beacons of a "ways of living" ethic.

The challenges posed by the ethics of dying and killing are enormous, and people of faith cannot overcome them on their own. However, each faith community has something unique to contribute to the task of constructing a "ways of living" ethic. Christian communities of faith have a unique contribution to make, consisting in a radical discipleship and the imitation of Jesus Christ, in whom our faith is founded. Although Jesus Christ died on the cross, he did not glorify death—even his own death. Jesus came into the world so that all—and not only Christians—may have life, and have it abundantly (cf. John 10:10).

Christian communities are therefore called to practices, habits and crafts of a "ways of living" ethic. The times require Christians to embody, and enact, the deepest values of their community. If this is done in ways that are both truly contextual and truly catholic, then they will make sense to both the Christian community and to all of God's people. Christians everywhere must seek to rise beyond narrow doctrines, beyond parochial identities and beyond bigotry, and must move out, in faithfulness to Jesus Christ, to a realization of the ties of love with which God has bound all of humanity and all of creation.

NOTES


(2) Ben Okri, Mental Fight, London, Orion, 1999, p.32.


(5) Ibid., p.247.

(6) Ibid., p.251.

(7) Ibid., p.xvii.

(9) Ibid., p.17.

(10) Ibid., p.15.


(12) Ibid., p.13.


(18) Ways of Dying.
Appendix B

“Cinderella” in Complete Fairy Tales by the Brothers Grimm

The wife of a rich man fell sick, and as she felt that her end was drawing near, she called her only daughter to her bedside and said, "Dear child, be good and pious, and then the good God will always protect thee, and I will look down on thee from heaven and be near thee." Thereupon she closed her eyes and departed. Every day the maiden went out to her mother's grave and wept, and she remained pious and good. When winter came the snow spread a white sheet over the grave, and when the spring sun had drawn it off again, the man had taken another wife.

The woman had brought two daughters into the house with her, who were beautiful and fair of face, but vile and black of heart. Now began a bad time for the poor step-child. "Is the stupid goose to sit in the parlor with us?" said they. "He who wants to eat bread must earn it; out with the kitchen-wench." They took her pretty clothes away from her, put an old gray bedgown on her, and gave her wooden shoes. "Just look at the proud princess, how decked out she is!" they cried, and laughed, and led her into the kitchen. There she had to do hard work from morning till night, get up before daybreak, carry water, light fires, cook and wash. Besides this, the sisters did her every imaginable injury—they mocked her and emptied her peas and lentils into the ashes, so that she was forced to sit and pick them out again. In the evening when she had worked till she was weary she had no bed to go to, but had to sleep by the fireside in the ashes. And as on that account she always looked dusty and dirty, they called her Cinderella. It happened that the father was once going to the fair, and he asked his two step-daughters what he should bring back for them. "Beautiful dresses," said one. "Pearls and jewels," said the second. "And thou, Cinderella," said he, "what wilt thou have?" "Father, break off for me the first branch which knocks against your hat on your way home." So he bought beautiful dresses, pearls and jewels for his two step-daughters, and on his way home, as he was riding through a green thicket, a hazel twig brushed against him and knocked off his hat. Then he broke off the branch and took it with him. When he reached home he gave his step-daughters the things which they had wished for, and to Cinderella he gave the branch from the hazel-bush. Cinderella thanked him, went to her mother's grave and planted the branch on it, and wept so much that the tears fell down on it and watered it. It grew, however, and became a handsome tree. Thrice a day Cinderella went and sat beneath it, and wept and prayed, and a little white bird always came on the tree, and if Cinderella expressed a wish, the bird threw down to her what she had wished for.

It happened, however, that the King appointed a festival which was to last three days, and to which all the beautiful young girls in the country were invited, in order that his son might choose himself a bride. When the two step-sisters heard that they, too, were to appear among the number, they were delighted, called Cinderella and said, "Comb our hair for us, brush our shoes and fasten our buckles, for we are going to the festival at the King's palace." Cinderella obeyed, but wept, because she, too, would have liked to go with them to the dance, and begged her step-mother to allow her to do so. "Thou go, Cinderella!" said she. "Thou art dusty and dirty, and wouldst go to the festival? Thou has no clothes and shoes, and yet wouldst dance!" As, however, Cinderella went on asking, the step-mother at last said, "I have emptied a dish of lentils into the ashes for thee; if thou hast picked them out again in two hours, thou shalt go with us." The maiden went through the back-door into the garden, and called, "You tame pigeons, you turtle-doves, and all you birds beneath the sky, come and help me to pick "The good into the pot, The bad into the crop."
Then two white pigeons came in by the kitchen window, and afterwards the turtle-doves, and at last all the birds beneath the sky came whirring and crowding in, and alighted amongst the ashes. And the pigeons nodded with their heads and began pick, pick, pick, pick, and the rest began also pick, pick, pick, and gathered all the good grains into the dish. Hardly had one hour passed before they had finished, and all flew out again. Then the girl took the dish to her step-mother, and was glad, and believed that now she would be allowed to go with them to the festival. But the step-mother said, "No, Cinderella, thou hast no clothes and thou canst not dance; thou wouldst only be laughed at." And as Cinderella wept at this, the step-mother said, "If thou canst pick two dishes of lentils out of the ashes for me in one hour, thou shalt go with us." And she thought to herself, "That she most certainly cannot do." When the step-mother had emptied the two dishes of lentils amongst the ashes, the maiden went through the back-door into the garden and cried, "You tame pigeons, you turtle-doves, and all you birds under heaven, come and help me to pick "The good into the pot, The bad into the crop."

Then two white pigeons came in by the kitchen window, and afterwards the turtle-doves, and at length all the birds beneath the sky came whirring and crowding in, and alighted amongst the ashes. And the doves nodded with their heads and began pick, pick, pick, pick, and the others began also pick, pick, pick, and gathered all the good seeds into the dishes, and before half an hour was over they had already finished, and all flew out again. Then the maiden carried the dishes to the step-mother and was delighted, and believed that she might now go with them to the festival. But the step-mother said, "All this will not help; thou goest not with us, for thou hast no clothes and canst not dance; we should be ashamed of thee!" On this she turned her back on Cinderella, and hurried away with her two proud daughters.

As no one was now at home, Cinderella went to her mother's grave beneath the hazel-tree, and cried, "Shiver and quiver, my little tree, Silver and gold throw down over me."

Then the bird threw a gold and silver dress down to her, and slippers embroidered with silk and silver. She put on the dress with all speed, and went to the festival. Her step-sisters and the step-mother, however, did not know her, and thought she must be a foreign princess, for she looked so beautiful in the golden dress. They never once thought of Cinderella, and believed that she was sitting at home in the dirt, picking lentils out of the ashes. The prince went to meet her, took her by the hand and danced with her. He would dance with no other maiden, and never left loose of her hand, and if any one else came to invite her, he said, "This is my partner."

She danced till it was evening, and then she wanted to go home. But the King's son said, "I will go with thee and bear thee company," for he wished to see to whom the beautiful maiden belonged. She escaped from him, however, and sprang into the pigeon-house. The King's son waited until her father came, and then he told him that the stranger maiden had leapt into the pigeon-house. The old man thought, "Can it be Cinderella?" and they had to bring him an axe and a pickaxe that he might hew the pigeon-house to pieces, but no one was inside it. And when they got home Cinderella lay in her dirty clothes among the ashes, and a dim little oil-lamp was burning on the mantle-piece, for Cinderella had jumped quickly down from the back of the pigeon-house and had run to the little hazel-tree, and there she had taken off her beautiful clothes and laid them on the grave, and the bird had taken them away again, and then she had placed herself in the kitchen amongst the ashes in her gray gown.

Next day when the festival began afresh, and her parents and the step-sisters had gone once more, Cinderella went to the hazel-tree and said— "Shiver and quiver, my little tree, Silver and gold throw down over me."
Then the bird threw down a much more beautiful dress than on the preceding day. And when Cinderella appeared at the festival in this dress, every one was astonished at her beauty. The King's son had waited until she came, and instantly took her by the hand and danced with no one but her. When others came and invited her, he said, "She is my partner." When evening came she wished to leave, and the King's son followed her and wanted to see into which house she went. But she sprang away from him, and into the garden behind the house. Therein stood a beautiful tall tree on which hung the most magnificent pears. She clambered so nimbly between the branches like a squirrel, that the King's son did not know where she was gone. He waited until her father came, and said to him, "The stranger maiden has escaped from me, and I believe she has climbed up the pear-tree." The father thought, "Can it be Cinderella?" and had an axe brought and cut the tree down, but no one was on it. And when they got into the kitchen, Cinderella lay there amongst the ashes, as usual, for she had jumped down on the other side of the tree, had taken the beautiful dress to the bird on the little hazel-tree, and put on her gray gown.

On the third day, when the parents and sisters had gone away, Cinderella went once more to her mother's grave and said to the little tree— "Shiver and quiver, my little tree, Silver and gold throw down over me."

And now the bird threw down to her a dress which was more splendid and magnificent than any she had yet had, and the slippers were golden. And when she went to the festival in the dress, no one knew how to speak for astonishment. The King's son danced with her only, and if any one invited her to dance, he said, "She is my partner."

When evening came, Cinderella wished to leave, and the King's son was anxious to go with her, but she escaped from him so quickly that he could not follow her. The King's son, had, however, used a stratagem, and had caused the whole staircase to be smeared with pitch, and there, when she ran down, had the maiden's left slipper remained sticking. The King's son picked it up, and it was small and dainty, and all golden. Next morning, he went with it to the father, and said to him, "No one shall be my wife but she whose foot this golden slipper fits." Then were the two sisters glad, for they had pretty feet. The eldest went with the shoe into her room and wanted to try it on, and her mother stood by. But she could not get her big toe into it, and the shoe was too small for her. Then her mother gave her a knife and said, "Cut the toe off; when thou art Queen thou wilt have no more need to go on foot." The maiden cut the toe off, forced the foot into the shoe, swallowed the pain, and went out to the King's son. Then he took her on his horse as his bride and rode away with her. They were obliged, however, to pass the grave, and there, on the hazel-tree, sat the two pigeons and cried, "Turn and peep, turn and peep, There's blood within the shoe, The shoe it is too small for her, The true bride waits for you."

Then he looked at her foot and saw how the blood was streaming from it. He turned his horse round and took the false bride home again, and said she was not the true one, and that the other sister was to put the shoe on. Then this one went into her chamber and got her toes safely into the shoe, but her heel was too large. So her mother gave her a knife and said, "Cut a bit off thy heel; when thou art Queen thou wilt have no more need to go on foot." The maiden cut a bit off her heel, forced her foot into the shoe, swallowed the pain, and went out to the King's son. He took her on his horse as his bride, and rode away with her, but when they passed by the hazel-tree, the two pigeons sat on it and cried, "Turn and peep, turn and peep, There's blood within the shoe, The shoe it is too small for her, The true bride waits for you."
He looked down at her foot and saw how the blood was running out of her shoe, and how it had stained her white stocking. Then he turned his horse and took the false bride home again. "This also is not the right one," said he, "have you no other daughter?" "No," said the man. "There is still a little stunted kitchen-wench which my late wife left behind her, but she cannot possibly be the bride." The King's son said he was to send her up to him; but the mother answered, "Oh, no, she is much too dirty; she cannot show herself!" He absolutely insisted on it, and Cinderella had to be called. She first washed her hands and face clean, and then went and bowed down before the King's son, who gave her the golden shoe. Then she seated herself on a stool, drew her foot out of the heavy wooden shoe, and put it into the slipper, which fitted like a glove. And when she rose up and the King's son looked at her face, he recognized the beautiful maiden who had danced with him and cried, "That is the true bride!" The step-mother and the two sisters were terrified and became pale with rage; he, however, took Cinderella on his horse and rode away with her. As they passed by the hazel-tree, the two white doves cried, "Turn and peep, turn and peep, No blood is in the shoe, The shoe is not too small for her, The true bride rides with you," and when they had cried that, the two came flying down and placed themselves on Cinderella's shoulders, one on the right, the other on the left, and remained sitting there.

When the wedding with the King's son had to be celebrated, the two false sisters came and wanted to get into favor with Cinderella and share her good fortune. When the betrothed couple went to church, the elder was at the right side and the younger at the left, and the pigeons pecked out one eye of each of them. Afterwards as they came back the elder was at the left, and the younger at the right, and then the pigeons pecked out the other eye from each. And thus, for their wickedness and falsehood, they were punished with blindness as long as they lived.
Appendix C

“Cinderella” in Revolting Rhymes by Roald Dahl

I guess you think you know this story.
You don't. The real one's much more gory.
The phoney one, the one you know,
Was cooked up years and years ago,
And made to sound all soft and sappy
Just to keep the children happy.
Mind you, they got the first bit right,
The bit where, in the dead of night,
The Ugly Sisters, jewels and all,
Departed for the Palace Ball,
While darling little Cinderella
Was locked up in a slimy cellar,
Where rats who wanted things to eat,
Began to nibble at her feet.
She bellowed 'Help!' and 'Let me out!'
The Magic Fairy heard her shout.
Appearing in a blaze of light,
She said, 'My dear, are you all right?'
'All right?' cried Cindy. 'Can't you see
'I feel as rotten as can be!'
She beat her fist against the wall,
And shouted, 'Get me to the Ball!
'There is a Disco at the Palace!
The rest have gone and I am jalous!
'I want a dress! I want a coach!
'And earrings and a diamond brooch!
'And silver slippers, two of those!
'And lovely nylon panty-hose!
'Done up like that I'll guarantee
'The handsome Prince will fall for me!'
The Fairy said, 'Hang on a tick.'
She gave her wand a mighty flick
And quickly, in no time at all,
Cindy was at the Palace Ball!
It made the Ugly Sisters wince
To see her dancing with the Prince.
She held him very tight and pressed
Herself against his manly chest.
The Prince himself was turned to pulp,
All he could do was gasp and gulp.
Then midnight struck, She shouted, 'Heck!
'I've got to run to save my neck!'
The Prince cried, 'No! Alas! Alack!'
He grabbed her dress to hold her back.
As Cindy shouted, 'Let me go!'
The dress was ripped from head to toe.
She ran out in her underwear,
And lost one slipper on the stair.
The Prince was on it like a dart,
He pressed it to his pounding heart,
'The girl this slipper fits,' he cried,
'Tomorrow morn shall be my bride!
'I'll visit every house in town
'Until I've tracked the maiden down!'
Then rather carelessly, I fear,
He placed it on a crate of beer.
At once, one of the Ugly Sisters,
(The one whose face was blotched with blisters)
Sneaked up and grabbed the dainty shoe,
And quickly flushed it down the loo.
Then in its place she calmly put
The slipper from her own left foot.
Ah-ha, you see, the plot grows thicker,
And Cindy's luck starts getting sicker.
Next day, the Prince went charging down
To knock on all the doors in town.
In every house, the tension grew.
Who was the owner of the shoe?
The shoe was long and very wide.
(A normal foot got lost inside.)
Also it smelled a wee bit icky.
(The owner's feet were hot and sticky.)
Thousands of eager people came
To try it on, but all in vain.
Now came the Ugly Sisters' go.
One tried it on. The Prince screamed, 'No!'
But she screamed, 'Yes! It fits! Whoopee!
'So now you've got to marry me!'
The Prince went white from ear to ear.
He muttered, 'Let me out of here.'
'Oh no you don't. You made a vow!
'There's no way you can back out now!'
'Off with her head!' the Prince roared back.
They chopped it off with one big whack.
This pleased the Prince. He smiled and said,
'She's prettier without her head.'
The up came Sister Number Two,
Who yelled, 'Now / will try the shoe!'
'Try this instead!' the Prince yelled back.
He swung his trusty sword and smack -
Her head went crashing to the ground.
It bounced a bit and rolled around.
In the kitchen, peeling spuds,
Cinderella heard the thuds
Of bouncing heads upon the floor,
And poked her own head round the door.
'What's all the racket?' Cindy cried.
'Mind your own bizz,' the Prince replied.
Poor Cindy's heart was torn to shreds.
My Prince! She thought. He chops of heads!
How could I marry anyone
Who does that sort of thing for fun?
The Prince cried, ‘Who’s this dirty slut?
‘Off with her nut! Off with her nut!’
Just then, all in a blaze of light,
The Magic Fairy hove in sight,
Her Magic Wand went *swoosh* and *swish*!
‘Cindy!’ she cried, ‘come make a wish!
‘Wish anything and have no doubt
‘That I will make it come about!’
Cindy answered, ‘Oh kind Fairy,
‘This time I shall be more wary.
‘No more Princes, no more money.
‘I have had my taste of honey.
‘I’m wishing for a decent man.
‘They’re hard to find. D’you think you can?’
Within a minute, Cinderella
Was married to a lovely fellar,
A simple jam-maker by trade,
Who sold good home-made marmalade.
Their house was filled with smiles and laughter
And they were happy ever after.
Appendix D

“Invitation to the Dance” in *The Lady Missionary* by Gail Dendy

**Invitation to the Dance**

*But [Lot’s] wife looked back from behind him,*  
*And she became a pillar of salt.* (Gen 19:26)

1.  
I wish to take off my skin. It is heavy  
as though I’ve slept a thousand nights  
and wakened with dew stuffed in my armpits,  
my thighs, my whitening hair.

2.  
I wish to enjoy one delicious waltz  
and a sexy rumba. I wish to be eloquent.  
My shoes have the requisite diamonds at their heels.  
My hips are satin. But there is a purple flower  
hidden deep inside my mouth.

3.  
It’s my imagination, to be sure,  
But when I think of dance it seems  
each step I take drops puffs of salt  
onto the ridge of this stony mountain.

4.  
Two cities destroyed and all I think about is dancing.

5.  
It’s my imagination, to be sure. I’m heavy,  
standing here in the sleep of a thousand nights  
and days. I think I’ve dreamt  
of a world that’s long decayed.

6.  
Forgiveness is a virtue. A turn of the cheek  
is all that’s asked. It’s little enough  
for my looking back. Was it a sin? I was afraid.

Now I’ve stood here for far too long.  
I remember I had an invitation.  
The city glitters with a million lights.  
Please, won’t you take me to the dance?
INTERTEXTUALITY REINTERPRETED: 
A COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS APPROACH 
WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CONCEPTUAL BLENDING 

by 
CHANTELLE VAN HEERDEN 

Summary 

In this dissertation, I investigate the cognitive processes integral to intertextual readings by referring to the cognitive linguistics framework known as conceptual blending. I refer to different genres of intertextual texts and then explain these intertexts in terms of cognitive principles and processes, such as conceptual blending networks. By applying the framework of conceptual blending to intertexts within different genres, I suggest that the underlying cognitive processes are universal for the interpretation of any type of intertextual text. 

My findings indicate that conceptual blending underpins intertextuality which is cognitive, creative and dynamic in nature. This means that the meaning we construct from intertexts is dependent on the context in which they appear and cannot be studied in isolation. Investigating intertextual texts from a cognitive linguistics perspective reveals new inferences (such as the influence of implicit knowledge as a type of intertext) and the creativity involved in the meaning-making process. 

Key terms: cognition, cognitive poetics, conceptual blending, conceptual blending network, conceptual integration, embodiment, expository text, fairytales, intertextuality, mental space, poetry, possible worlds, schema, Vital Relations