

ELECTORAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES IN LESOTHO
IN THE PERIOD 1993 TO 2006

by

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DECLARATION

I declare that “electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho in the period 1993 to 2006” is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

T.T.T. SAOANA 25-11-2011
DATE

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation was to address the problem expressed in the following question: “Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?”

A qualitative approach was used. The researcher interviewed officials of twelve representative parties out of the total of eighteen parties. The responses of the interviewees are in appendix 5.

This work reveals the problems of the opposition parties in Lesotho. Among others, the study addressed the following issues: the reform of the electoral system, political party funding, dominance of the ruling party, prohibitive legislation and party leadership. The potential strengths and weaknesses of the opposition parties have been noted.

The MMP electoral model, introduced in 2001 and tested in 2002, created a more inclusive party system, but it is not the sole solution for the weakness of the opposition parties. Patronisation and lack of political party funding appear to be major factors.

Key words:

Lesotho, opposition parties, political participation, elections, patronisation.

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Degree: MA

Subject: Politics

Supervisor: Prof DJ Kotze´

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SUMMARY

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ACRONYMS

ABC - All Basotho Convention
ACHRN - Alberta Consultative Health Research Network
ANC - African National Congress
AU - African Union
AV - Alternative Vote
BAC - Basutoland African Congress
BAM - Botswana Alliance Movement
BCP - Basutoland Congress Party
BCP - Botswana Congress Party
BNF - Botswana National Front
BNP - Basotho National Party
BPP - Botswana People's Party
CPL - Communist Party of Lesotho
CSRS - Centre for Studies in Religion and Society
CSIR - Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
EISA - Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
FM – Frequency Modulation
Forum - Forum Party of Zimbabwe
FPTP - First Past the Post
GNP – Gross national product
HB – Ha Re Eeng Basotho
HDI - Human Development Index
IDEA – Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IEC – Independent Electoral Commission
IFI – International Finance Institution
IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF – International Monetary Fund
INGO - International Non- Governmental Organization
IPA - Interim Political Authority
KBP - Kopanang Basotho Party
KZN - KwaZulu Natal
LCD - Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LCN - Lesotho Council of NGO's
LDC – Least developed country
LDF - Lesotho Defence Force

NEC - National Executive Committee
LEP - Lesotho Educational Party
LLA - Lesotho Liberation Army
LLP - Lesotho Labour Party
LMPS - Lesotho Mounted Police Service
LPC - Lesotho People's Congress
LWP - Lesotho Workers' Party
MFP - Marema-Tlou Freedom Party
MMP - Mixed Member Proportional
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NIP - National Independent Party
NLFP - New Lesotho Freedom Party
NPP - National Progressive Party
NSS - National Security Services
PB - Party Block Vote
PFD - Popular Front for Democracy
PF-ZAPU - Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe African People's Union
PR - proportional representation
SADC - Southern Africa Development Community
SAP - Structural adjustment program
SDH - Sustainable human development
SDP - Social Democratic Party
SDU - Sefate Democratic Party
TRS - Two-Round system (French electoral model)
UDP - United Democratic Party
UP - United Party
ZANU (PF) - Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZUM - Zimbabwe Unity Movement

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The dissertation dealt with electoral political participation of opposition political parties, in Lesotho, in the period 1993 to 2006. The study covered the 1993, 1998 and 2002 general elections. The 2002 general election was the first general election after introduction of Mixed Member Proportional representation (MMP) electoral model that replaced First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral model in Lesotho.

Rose (1980: 1) states that elections are the central practice for popular participation in government. Kriek *et. al.* (1994: 107) notes that political participation has taken place since the earliest times and has been expressed in different ways in different ages. Kriek further asserts that participation means action; it is well known that actions, reactions and interaction constitute the very nature of politics; thus, political participation concerns the interactions in which politics is practised. These authors note that in studying the theory of political participation there are a number of important perspectives and that they fall into a spectrum between two distinct poles. They state that it is important to be aware of both these contrasting poles. Some of the perspectives are as follows:

- i) Activities in which persons take the initiative to become directly involved in politics, such as attending political meetings, canvassing for a political party, membership of a political party, visibly devoting ample time to political issues and running as a candidate in the elections constitute what is called active participation. However, in other cases some people simply talk politics, occasionally airing their views, only expressing their wish or opinion that the authorities should attend to certain issues; these people do not get directly involved in political matters; this is a case called passive participation and it does not lead to any political activity or action.

- ii) Behaviours such as voting, peaceful demonstrations, drawing up petitions, canvassing support, and so on, are traditionally accepted and they constitute what is called conventional practice. On the other hand, actions such as civil disobedience, violence, assassinations, and so on, constitute unconventional practice and this has to be taken into account. Also phenomena such as alienation in contrast with apathy constitute political participation. So, both completely conventional and completely unconventional political actions should receive attention, according to these authors.
- iii) Due to a number of reasons, such as big human populations, it is difficult for every person to directly take part in the discussions of national issues, so these persons must elect their representatives. There are contrasting views about representation; others criticize it for lending elitist quality to politics and for separating the ordinary voter from the political process. The contrasting view to representation is that real participation can only be effected when each individual personally participates in the discussions of political issues, and this is called direct participation.
- iv) An individual may write a letter to media such as newspaper, radio, or to a representative requesting that authorities address a certain issue; also, the individual may directly meet the representative or a role-player and discuss the matter. People can work as a group to forward their request to the media, role-player, or to the authorities, and they can work in an organized manner as an interest group and even as a political party, to try and persuade government to change its policy into legislation.

According to Almond and Powell (1966: 73), every political system has some way of handling public demands. Also there are many ways of forwarding the demands to the decision makers; for example, an angry mob can shout, a trade union can stage a peaceful protest and hand in a written list of their demands to the decision makers, or they can issue a press release calling for increased minimum wage. Almond and Powell call the process whereby the individuals and groups forward their demands to the decision-makers, interest articulation.

Almond and Powell (1966: 98) noted that the decision makers, having received the complaints and demands from the labour unions, business organizations as well as from elsewhere, juggle, bargain and compromise the conflicting interests into some form of general policy statement. This policy statement is an output. These authors call this process of converting the demands and complaints into output, interest aggregation.

While accepting the views of Kriek and others, the researcher explains the context of the proposed study as follows: electoral political participation of political parties in this study is consciously confined to taking part in the national general elections, or in the by-elections contesting parliamentary seats, or in the local government elections; contributing towards the establishment and sustainability of electoral democracies; taking part in the parliamentary debates when the government budget is discussed, and when new laws are made and in the discussion of other issues related to governance.

This study was focused on finding out how the opposition political parties manage to: influence election campaigns, articulate particular issues in their campaigns, present themselves to the electorate, influence parliament and government; and it is also aimed at establishing how these parties perform in the elections. Also, the study was focused on the role played by the opposition political parties in the party politics in Lesotho since 1993. Additionally, this work is intended to reveal the reasons why, since 1993, the opposition political parties failed to win significant numbers of parliamentary seats. In this study, analysis of electoral political participation of the opposition political parties in the 1998 and 2002 general elections was done.

The researcher explored information from the party leaders/officials, the related literature, newspapers, government gazettes, and from the Independent Electoral Commission's reports. The researcher analysed data, developed themes that he interpreted and made a conclusion.

What problems were met during the research, if any? There were problems encountered during the research. Some of the party leaders did not want to share their problems with the researcher. The researcher left the questionnaire at the

home of the leader of the Sefate Democratic Union (SDU), so that he could get ready for a face-to-face interview. When the researcher requested an appointment for the interview, the political leader over the telephone told him that he was not interested in politics anymore. That was an unbelievable story. The researcher had to replace that party.

A leader of another party, the Lesotho Workers Party (LWP), plainly refused to cooperate with the researcher. However, after trying for more than a month in January 2005 the General Secretary of this same party accepted to assist the researcher. Yet another case was that of the leader of the BNP who straightaway asked the General Secretary of the party to assist the researcher. This meant that the researcher could not interview the leader of the party. Most of the political parties do not have offices and the researcher could not make appointments with the leaders/officials easily. Most of the interviews were conducted at the homes of the party leaders/officials. So, it is important for the future researchers to be cognisant of problems of this kind. In general the interviews were successful.

1.1.1 Historical overview of party politics in Lesotho

A detailed historical overview is attached as Appendix 2 at the end of the dissertation to provide more information and historical context for this study. The most relevant points made in Appendix 2 are highlighted in this sub-section.

In 1952 the first political party, the Basutoland African Congress (BAC), was established (Leeman 1984: 173). The BAC experienced internal conflicts as early as the mid-1950s and as a result the breakaway factions established other political parties. For example, political parties that came into being as a result of splits in the mother party, the BAC, were the: the Marema-Tlou Party (MTP) established in 1957, the Basotho National Party (BNP) founded in 1958, the Basutoland Freedom Party (BFP) which was launched in 1961 (Gill1990: 211), (Khaketla 1971: 20), (Leeman 1984: 210, 214, 279) (Moleleki 1994: 93) (Weisfelder 1999: 25-27, 37, 42), the Lesotho Communist Party (LCP later CPL) founded in 1961 (Moleleki 1994: 94) (Weisfelder 1999: 33), the United Democratic Party (UDP) formed in 1967 (Mphanya 2004: 52) and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) registered in 1997 (MoAfrika 1997: 1). In 1962

the MTP and the BFP merged to establish the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) (Leeman 1984: 279) (Moleleki 1994: 94) (Weisfelder 1999: 44).

In the District Councils election of 1960 Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the former BAC up to 1958 was well established, especially in the towns and lowlands (Weisfelder 1999: 14) and it achieved a landslide victory, winning 30 seats out of a total of 40 seats. However, the BCP had received 36% of the total votes while the opposition had received 64% of the total (Matlosa 1997: 141, Mphanya 2004: 44). On the ground the opposition was far stronger than the winner, the BCP, but in parliament/Legislative Council the opposition was weak, as it had got only 25% of the seats. The explanation for this apparent inconsistency was the First-Past-the-Post electoral system in which single representatives per constituency were elected. According to Matlosa (1997: 141) and Mphanya (2004: 44), out of a total of 35,302 votes, the BCP had received 12,787 votes and the opposition 22,515 votes.

The opposition consisted of the following parties: the Marema-Tlou Party (MTP) with 5 seats, the Basutoland National Party (BNP) with 1 seat, and the independent candidates with 4 seats (Matlosa 1997: 141, Mphanya 2004: 44). However, slightly contrary to the results given in Matlosa (1997: 141) the table of the 1960 District Council Election results in Mphanya (2004: 44) gives Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA) as one of the political organizations that participated in the elections and received 231 votes or 0.7% and 0 seats. However, it is not necessary to delve into the details of the differences of these two sources, as they are mainly similar for the purpose of this dissertation.

During the 1965 general election, the Basutoland National Party (BNP) had well established itself in the countryside including the mountain areas and it won 31 parliamentary seats, the BCP 25 seats and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) 4. The opposition of the two parties, the BCP and the MFP was very strong, but it might have been stronger if the idea of "political party alliance" came into the minds of the leaders of those two parties. On the other hand, the ruling party could have strengthened its position if it had negotiated with one of the opposition parties to establish an executive coalition. According to Leeman (1984: 669) the MFP MP for Matela constituency crossed the floor to join the BNP. The period 1965 to 1970 saw very strong opposition in parliament. In the

period 1970 to 1986 the national constitution had been suspended and there was civilian authoritarian rule by the Basotho National Party (BNP). That period was followed by the era of military authoritarian rule (1986 to 1993) when all political parties had been put out of activity by the Military with the infamous legislation, Order no.4 (Lesotho 1986: 10).

In 1993, when Lesotho returned to civilian rule, the BCP under its founder leader Dr Ntsu Mokhehle achieved a landslide victory, winning all the 65 seats, having received 74.7% of the total votes (Matlosa 1997). Therefore, the opposition had received 25.3% of the total votes. So, 1993 was the beginning of a period when there was very weak opposition in the Lesotho Parliament. Actually between 1993 and 1997 there was no opposition in parliament.

In June 1997 when the BCP split with the establishment of a new political party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) that continued as government under Dr Ntsu Mokhehle, twenty-five (25) parliamentarians who stayed with the BCP formed the opposition side in parliament (Mo-Afrika 1997: 1). The action of the parliamentarians who formed the LCD is actually floor crossing. There was little time left before the next general election of 1998. The opposition in parliament constituted 38.5% of the total seats after the split of the BCP.

The national constitution of Lesotho and the Electoral Act were silent about floor crossing. There were no rules addressing floor crossing. Section 58 of the national constitution provided, only, the qualifications of a person to be nominated as Senator of the Upper House or to be elected as a member of the Lower House, the National Assembly. Also, about the qualifications of a person to be elected as a member of the National Assembly, Clause 46 of the National Assembly Elections Act of 1992 refers the reader to Section 58 of the constitution of Lesotho. So, no regulation addressed floor crossing from one side and/or one party to another inside Parliament.

Opposition political parties did not accept the results of the general election of 1998 and for some time there was political instability. Lindberg (2006: 149 - 150) argues that the political parties that do not accept or delay to accept the results of elections declared as free and fair express a form of undemocratic behaviour. There was dispute over the election results and over the legitimacy of the LCD

government. Three opposition political parties - the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) - formed a temporary united front known as "Setlamo Alliance" (Mphaololi 1998: 11). According to Karume (2003:10), it is important for political parties to establish alliances.

According to Sithetho (2005: 12), the unity and solidarity of BCP, BNP and MFP, under the alliance known as 'Setlamo sa Baitseki', influenced the formation of a commission of inquiry led by South African Justice Langa, and also led to the establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA). Sithetho said that establishment of the Langa Commission and the IPA indicated the strengths of the alliance. However, on the contrary the researcher asserts that implementation of the MoU 1994 signed by Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe caused establishment of Langa Commission and the IPA. Other political parties that were in alliance at the time of writing this dissertation were the Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) and the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD), also the United Democratic Party (UDP) with the Lesotho Labour Party (LLP).

On 10 August 1998 the Deputy President of South Africa met representatives of the LCD and three of the opposition political parties (the BCP, the BNP, and the MFP) (Langa 1998: 2). By agreement with the LCD, the BNP, the BCP and the MFP, a group of experts (known as the Langa Commission) was called upon from three countries, namely Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The Langa Commission was tasked to study what occurred at the polling stations during the election and thereafter, to draft a report and to give recommendations (Langa 1998: 2-3; Leon, *et. al.* 2001: 58; Southall 1998: 3; Sithetho 2005:12; Thai, 1998: 3). The Commission consisted of four South Africans, three Zimbabweans and three Batswana and it was under the chairmanship of Justice Pius Langa. Justice Langa came from the Constitutional Court of South Africa.

From 15 to 22 August 1998, political parties and the IEC had the opportunity to expand orally on the written submissions (Langa 1998: 7). Afterward, the Langa Commission engaged 200 students from South African universities and 100 members of the South African National Defence Force to assist them in recounting the votes cast in favour of the respective parties (Leon et al 2001: 56).

The Langa Commission found that there were small discrepancies between the results of the recount and those announced by the IEC (Langa 1998: 27); there was not much significance in the difference in numbers (Leon, et. al. 2001: 57, 58). According to Leon et al (2001: 58) the Langa Commission pointed out many serious problems that faced the IEC. Among them were that, shortly before general election, IEC had to: start a new registration system; delimit 80 constituencies; do voter education and cater for additional numbers of voters as the voting age had just been reduced from 21 to 18 years; and accomplish all the election activities within a period of 8 months. Also, the Langa Commission pointed out that at each polling station the agents did certify that the count was correct; the Commission noted the fact that some forms were not signed, but this was an acceptable human error (Langa 1998: 24).

Equally important, the Langa Commission had found out that the party agents did certify at each polling station that the count was correct. According to Leon *et. al.* (2001: 58) the Langa Commission did not content itself with reporting whether or not the alleged fraud had been proved. The report was susceptible to different interpretations (Leon, *et.al.* 2001: 58, 59).

The Langa Commission made the following recommendations (Langa 1998: 28-29):

- i) The IEC should enjoy the confidence of the community regardless of political persuasion;
- ii) The IEC should have access to sufficient resources;
- iii) The IEC together with its officers must strictly adhere to the laws governing the conduct of elections;
- iv) The election personnel should be properly and thoroughly trained. Also the contesting candidates and their agents should be trained.
- v) Equipment and sufficient stationery should be acquired and distributed in time;
- vi) After the election, it is important to account for the voters lists, ballot papers cast, ballot paper counterfoils, unused ballot paper books and the attendant completed electoral forms which should be properly labelled and sealed in secure containers. These items should be stored in secure central point where they can only be accessed as provided for by law;

- vii) The Commission recommended that the electoral system be reviewed.

An interim report was compiled and submitted to the Chairperson of SADC on the 26th August 1998 (Langa 1998: 7).

The Langa Commission report reached Maseru on 17 September 1998, some 9 days after it had been completed. That caused some misunderstanding, which culminated in the SADC intervention and the torching, on the 22 September 1998, of Maseru and some businesses in other towns such as Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek, loss of lives of 9 SADC troops, 50 Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) soldiers and 40 civilians that had allied with the opposition parties (US State Department, 2001: 2).

On the 24th September 1998 a meeting, in the presence of Police Minister Sydney Mufamadi from South Africa, took place and the agreement reached by the parties was to find a way forward instead of going back to the Langa Commission Report (Leon 2001: 49).

Makoa (2004: 90) noted that a meeting of negotiators between the opposition parties and government side was held in October 1998 under the chairmanship of the South African Minister for Safety and Security. One of the outcomes of the meeting was an agreement to establish the Interim Political Authority. In November 1998 the Interim Political Authority (IPA) Act was passed and in December the IPA was established and one major purpose of its establishment was to level the playing political field, and that included looking at the electoral system.

In 2000 the Leon Commission of Inquiry was established under the chairmanship of Justice R. N. Leon, by Legal Notice No. 33 of 2000, referred to as the Commission of Inquiry (Political Disturbances) Notice 2000. The Leon Commission was set up to study the political instability and disturbances that took place between July and November 1998 (Leon *et. al.* 2001: 1 -3). The terms of reference of Leon Commission were to:

- i) investigate, probe, examine and analyse the background to the political instability and disturbances, which occurred in Lesotho in the period 1 July to 30 November 1998;

- ii) identify the political parties and individuals who led and participated in the disturbances, the role played by the bodies or individuals in the activities related to the demonstration in front of the Royal Palace;
- iii) investigate and examine whether there was a conspiracy to destabilize and overthrow the Government of Lesotho;
- iv) identify the bodies or persons involved in the above-mentioned conspiracy;
- v) examine and analyse the role played by the Lesotho Defence Force in the preservation and maintenance of law and order in Lesotho;
- vi) examine and analyse the role played by the Lesotho Mounted Police Service in the preservation and maintenance of law and order in Lesotho;
- vii) examine and analyse the role played by the National Security Service in the protection and preservation of the national security in Lesotho;
- viii) examine, analyse and appraise the incidents relating to the confrontation between elements of Lesotho Defence Force and Lesotho Mounted Police Service in and around the Royal Palace;
- ix) investigate, examine and appraise attacks on some of the Police stations;
- x) investigate, appraise and evaluate the bodies or persons who incited, aided, persuaded and summoned members of Lesotho Defence Force to stage the mutiny of 11th September 1998 and thereafter;
- xi) investigate circumstances attendant and surrounding the arson and looting of commercial and business establishments in Maseru, Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek which occurred on 22nd September 1998 and thereafter;
- xii) investigate, appraise and evaluate any other issue relevant and which might impinge on the foregoing;
- xiii) recommend the actions that can be taken in order to prevent a repetition of those events.

The Commission studied evidence given by the witnesses. Also the Leon Commission was furnished with the exhibit of the report of the Langa Commission and Justice Langa confirmed to the Leon Commission that it was the correct document (Leon, *et. al.* 2001: 55). According to Leon, *et. al.*, the findings

of the Langa Commission were in general that the irregularities alleged were not proved (Leon, *et. al.* 2001: 57).

The Leon Commission discovered that the SADC military intervention was sharply criticised by the witnesses claiming that it was illegal (Leon, *et. al.* 2001: 116, 117). The Commission found out that the Prime Minister was in breach only of Section 92 and not of Sections 23 and 95 of the national Constitution by requesting military intervention of SADC without consulting the King (Leon *et.al.* 2001: 123). Section 23 of the Constitution empowered the Prime Minister to proclaim a State of Emergency and Section 95 required the Prime Minister to consult the Council of State. The Prime Minister had not applied those two sections.

The Commission found out the names of inciters and ringleaders of the 11 September 1998 mutiny. Also, the Commission compiled a list of all the mutineers (Leon, *et. al.* 2001: 106). The Commission discovered that persons of low ranks namely Privates, Lance Corporals and Corporals had arrested Senior Officers (Leon, *et. al.* 2001: 104). Further, the Commission compiled a list of people involved in looting and torching of properties, etc. in September 1998 (Leon, *et. al.* 2001: 127-129). The Commission made recommendations of dealing with the individual people and groups, who were involved in the above-mentioned actions of 1998. Among others it was recommended that a wide spread training program be developed for the Army, Police, National Security Services and the general public. The purpose of that program was to instil an understanding of the roles of the above-mentioned services. The Commission recommended that the disciplined forces, Army, Police and the National Security Services be retrained so that they could be apolitical. Also the Commission made recommendations of what to do in order to prevent a repeat of 1998 actions (Leon, *et. al.* 2001: 124-133).

The Leon Commission's recommendations were very important. For example, the Army and the Police would know their responsibilities and avoid getting involved in politics after special training programmes. This factor would assure the opposition political parties that neither the Army nor the Police would be used for the political purposes by government against the opposition.

In October 2001, again the ruling party split as 27 parliamentarians crossed the floor, to form a new party, the Lesotho People's Congress (LPC) that assumed its position in parliament on 12 October 2001 (MoAfrika 2001: 1) and members of parliament of this party increased the number of seats of the opposition from 1 to 28. The BNP had occupied one seat. After the split the LCD occupied 45 seats, the LPC 27 and the BNP 1 (MoAfrika 2001: 3). The seats of the opposition in parliament constituted 43.1% of the total. That split, like that of the then ruling BCP in 1997, caused in parliament the birth of a political party, and also it took place when a short time was left before the next general election.

After the 2002 National Assembly election, the new party, the LPC, won only 1 constituency seat and 4 compensatory seats. The LPC lost 26 constituency seats back to the LCD out of the 27 that it had in the previous year when it was established. Patron-client relationship theory discussed in 2.6.1 a) below explained how the ruling party guarantees its victory.

Once again in October 2006 seventeen LCD parliamentarians crossed the floor and established a new political party, the All Basotho Convention (ABC). The MP of Mokhotlong constituency, who had recently been expelled from the LCD, joined the ABC raising the number of their MPs to eighteen. So, this action reduced the seats of the ruling party from 79 to 61 while the number of seats of the opposition combined rose to 59 (Matlosa et al 2008: 146). At this point, Matlosa *et. al.* (2008: 146) posed the following question "Has this development strengthened or further fragmented the Lesotho's party system; enhanced or inhibited effectiveness of the legislature; and ultimately strengthened or weakened the country's representative democracy?"

1.1.2 Other organizations

The chiefs and colonizers were important actors in the politics of Lesotho, in the past. On the one hand the British colonizers worked hard to take control of chieftaincy and to use the system to achieve their own colonialist project of indirect rule, while on the other hand chiefs resisted and chief Masupha was one of the leaders of resistance against colonialism.

The background (in Appendix 2) indicates that interest groups like the Basutoland Progressive Association and the Commoners' League were established as early as 1907 and 1919 respectively, and they brought about varied views about how Lesotho had to be governed. The question of the status of the King and the Basotho Chiefs was important and the importance of that question continued until after independence of Lesotho. In the period after independence, a number of non-governmental organizations were established and today one finds the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCN) that brings together eighty-nine (89) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). These organizations play an important role in the politics of Lesotho today.

The background indicates that with the birth of interest groups and the political parties, various political ideas emerged in the politics of the Basotho. A number of political changes also took place, including change of forms of regimes, and from these things one could expect change in political participation.

In its thirty-eight (38) years of political independence, Lesotho passed through all four categories of polities identified by Sartori (1979: 262-264) namely: Polyparty: 1966-1970; Dominant Authoritarian: 1970-1986 (other parties banned); Military Rule: 1986-1993 (all parties banned); and Dominant Non-authoritarian: after 1993. It would be interesting to study electoral political participation of opposition political parties after the eras of authoritarian rule.

1.1.3 Literature review

This sub-sub-section is a critical review of the literature relating to the topic of this dissertation, and electoral political participation in Lesotho in particular. Also it briefly discusses the political economy of African countries. Lesotho is one of the least developed countries and poverty seems to impact negatively on the activities of the opposition political parties. Therefore, it is important to review literature explaining why African countries continue to be poor. According to Ruttan in Kotze and Labuschagne (1995: 94, 95), in poor countries with per capita incomes below \$750 there is a positive relationship between political development and economic development. The literature includes reviews of previously compiled or published studies, books or articles, government gazettes,

the Independent Electoral Commission's reports, newspapers and periodicals. Additional information for the reader is in appendix 2 and appendix 7.

The following five questions from **Garrison & Scott** (2000: 213, 214) will be addressed:

1. Which previously compiled or published studies, articles, or other documents provide available and relevant information on the selected topic?
2. What do these studies conclude about the topic?
3. What are the apparent methodological strengths and weaknesses of these studies?
4. What remains to be discovered about the topic?
5. What appears to be, according to these studies, the most effective methods of developing new information on the topic?

Before these questions can be addressed, it is necessary to provide a brief review of literature on key concepts used in this study, namely "political participation" and "electoral political participation". The discussion is on the combination of general literature and literature specifically on Lesotho.

1.1.3.1 Electoral Political Participation

What does literature say about electoral political participation? Firstly there is political participation, which is a very wide-ranging concept (**Stultz et al.** 1994: 107). **Scaff** (1975: 7) maintains that a minor renaissance in the study of political participation was witnessed in the 1970s; interest had been aroused in many contemporary societies because of preoccupation with problems of bureaucratisation, alienation, and the mobilization of citizens for political and economic development. In Western societies it was for several years that attention had also been attracted to political participation by the demands and recommendations for more extensive and satisfactory participation in the political process. Existing practices were strongly criticized, and the demands sought corrective, positive public and personal functions of participation in politics. This author further points out, that the response of social science and political theory to those crises focused on either finding an "explanation" for political participation,

or on elaborating a rationale supporting large doses of citizen involvement and initiative in the public realm. The core problem of political participation is how to answer the question, "Who takes part in what, when and how?" (Parry in Scaff 1975: 8).

According to Scaff (1975: 18) the term participation is coterminous with the idea of politics, and also the existence of participation as an idea, the actuality of which presupposed the emergence of the view that human life was valuable and meaningful only within a political community. The community's culture depends both upon the creation of public space belonging to a collective and upon public involvement of the membership. Furthermore, participation being a characteristic only of man and his associations, presupposes important qualities that are inherent in political life: rational speech, an audience of equals, and free initiative. Therefore, participation expresses a political relationship based upon persuasion through speech and not upon force, which is known as its opposite. Thus, denials of participation may only trigger violence, which is a non-political form of action occurring in the case of tyranny (Scaff 1975: 22).

Further, Scaff (1975: 77) states that in different periods, in life, changes took place in concepts depending on the changes in the way individuals and communities experienced the factual world. The understanding of the relationship between language and experience, and also between theory and practice influenced man's thinking; this is why an abstract political concept like participation is dependent in a general way, at points in its history, on the activities and institutions that govern its use and meaning; so, when activities and institutions change conceptual change is likely to occur (Scaff 1975: 77).

Scaff (1975: 81) notes the growth of two concepts of political participation in the history of political theory, namely "interaction" and "instrumental action". The first one emphasizes the idea of public membership, of citizens "sharing" justice and shaping their actions toward a "common good". The second one is very much more about influence and power than justice and community, because it stamps the idea of protecting one's rights and advancing individual interests within a competitive context (Scaff 1975: 82).

Interactional participation seems to be embedded in the process of political communication among citizens and citizen groups, especially those organized around broad interests or issues (Scaff 1975: 87). This author points out that beyond the immediate requirements of action the concept of participation, as interaction, tends to stress the goal of creating a “just” political order. Scaff (1975: 88) contends that “Justice” is a fair distribution of rewards among citizens according to publicly available criteria, and equal right to participate in the law-making process, and equal access to political offices.

Scaff (1975), expounding on the second concept, instrumental participation, says that political communication is narrowed to gaining with elites. Also it is focused at deployment of power, the most important way of exercising citizenship. Further, this author argues that in general the functions of participation are connected with the dictates of self-interest. The table below gives the differences between these two concepts of political participation expressed according to five criteria.

Table 1.1.3.1a) Participation as Interaction and as Instrumental Action

Criteria	Participation as Interaction	Participation as Instrumental Action
1. Language definition	“Sharing”	“Taking part”
2. Value-orientation	Reciprocity	Competition
3. Action type	Communicate among citizens	Influence elites
4. Ends of action	Justice	Power
5. Functions	Promote self-realization, political knowledge, & political “virtues”	Protect rights, maximize interests, & insure legitimacy

Source: Scaff (1975: 83)

Explanation of table 1.1.3.1a):

This table compares the two concepts, participation as interaction and participation as instrumental action. Criterion 1, “language definition”, shows the difference between the ordinary means of expression, “sharing” as opposed to

“taking part” in the two types of participation. According to participation as interaction the people or citizens practise “sharing” while under participation as instrumental action people “take part” in order to survive. The second criterion of value-orientation is used to show that under participation as interaction the citizens orientate their actions toward a “common good”, where each one benefits. On the contrary under participation as instrumental action there is competition; the citizens are obliged to compete for survival against the elites.

Criterion 3, Action type, shows that under participation, as interaction, there is cooperation among the people and encouragement of settling disputes through public communication. In contrast under participation as instrumental the action is targeted toward the problem of influencing the elites about the distribution of political power. Under participation as interaction the citizens share justice while under participation as instrumental action there is exercise of power and there is also struggle for power.

Lastly criterion 5 shows that participation as interaction increases political knowledge promotes self-realization and develops political virtues. On the contrary participation as instrumental action forces individuals and groups to protect their rights and to advance their own interests; also this action makes provision of legitimacy for elite decisions and for the system.

Scaff (1975:89) states that his study was not aimed to vote one concept up and another down and further mentioned that both are “rational” and “necessary” in their own ways. However, this author makes an observation that the concept of “participation as interaction” has been slighted or ignored, and it therefore deserves more balanced attention in our political practices and scientific investigations.

According to **Kersting** (2007: 134, 135) elections are the only political instrument for broad representation. Also, the electoral systems are significant democratic instruments that facilitate participation, which is one of the five criteria that define the quality of the electoral system (Kersting 2007: 134, 135, 136, 137). It is important for the people to get the opportunity of electing party candidates who will represent their parties in the national parliamentary election. The author notes that this ‘personal vote’ will encourage the voters to participate during the national

election. Further, Kersting (2007: 136) states that SADC calls for: non-discrimination during the registration of voters, freedom of association, equal opportunities, higher participation and voter turnout.

Further on, Kersting (2007: 136) asserts that both in the African Union (AU) and SADC regions there is lack of participation by certain groups, such as the youth and women. However, according to the author, both the SADC and AU encourage empowerment of the youth to vote. According to Kersting (2007: 145) Southern Africa seems to be in the lead with respect to women's electoral rights. Also Kersting notes that voter turnout in the Southern Africa region has been declining. For example, in Lesotho voter turnout declined between 1993 and 2002, from 72% in 1993 to 61% in 2002 (Kersting s.a.: 139, 141).

Kersting (2007: 136) states that in Southern Africa the only countries practising automatic or compulsory voter registration are Angola, Lesotho and Madagascar. Also, the author cites Jackman and Miller (1995) asserting that electoral systems including compulsory voting and sanctions for non-participation could improve voter turnout by 10%.

Bratton (1994: 5) poses the following question: "What do African elections suggest about the general relationship between political competition and political participation?" In answering this question, Bratton argues that on the one hand participation rises as elections become more competitive. People are motivated when electoral choices widen. On the other hand participation rises in the presence of dominant candidates who seem certain to win. Bratton asserts that people are motivated to vote for a sure winner.

Rose (1980: 84) identified two styles of electoral participation, namely ideological and coalition, and these stemming from two types of issues, position issues and valence issues. Rose (1980: 79) asserts that position issues are divisive because they are about explicit alternative values, for example "for or against state support of church schools and membership of African Union?" This author further says that valence issues do not involve legitimate alternative values, and that only one value is involved. That value may be positive, for example prosperity, or negative for example unemployment, corruption and ineffective leadership.

Thus associated with position issues is the ideological style of electoral competition in which political parties expect support from their members. On the other hand the electoral style that calls for support from all voters regardless of their membership is called coalition politics, and this style is associated with non-divisive valence issues (Rose 1980: 86). The author further states that ideological strategists may claim to build coalitions, but they will be coalitions in which only those who agree with particular positions are welcome, where only the members are able to give support.

However, this author argues that a political party has choices either of closing ranks and stressing its ideological appeal through position issues thus building up a bloc of its party supporters, or it can open ranks and establish shifting coalitions from election to election. Thus, with open ranks it appeals to floating voters by stressing valence themes. This second approach was termed “catch-all politics” by Kirchheimer (1966: 184-195) in Rose (1980: 86-87). According to Rose (1980: 86-87) in the case of ideological style parties activate their ideological base by holding rallies, parades, meetings, and by stirring up group antagonisms; but in coalition politics the strategists avoid such dramatic appeals as they can frighten away potential supporters; instead the coalition parties prefer the techniques of advertising and education to persuade voters to approve the best man or the best party.

Gunaratne (2002: 343) states that the old paradigm, Lerner’s semi-theory, established a connection between mass media and political participation or voting. In the study of freedom of press, Gunaratne (2002: 344, 345) proposed a hypothesis associating media freedom with political participation. On the basis of the strong belief that free press leads to enlightenment on public issues and thus stimulates political participation and democratic governance, Gunaratne (2002: 348, 349, 350) proposed the following hypothesis: “political participation is higher in nation-states with more press freedom than in nation-states with less press freedom”.

The hypothesis that Gunaratne (2002: 349, 350, 360) tested could not be confirmed. The author thought of many things as the possible causes of failure of the data to confirm the hypothesis, for example that the statistical method used was not accurate. In the freest press systems of the world there was not a sign of

significant impact of press on voter turnout. Also there was little evidence that press did anything to increase voting or participation in government generally. As a result of that failure of the data to confirm the hypothesis, the author stated that any one or more conjectures could be made of the following: press was not performing the role of the Fourth Estate; or political participation is much more than mere voting. This intelligent guess of Gunaratne that “political participation is much more than mere voting” carries weight and it is important for this dissertation.

Stultz et al. (1994: 105, 106) identified the following factors as relevant for participation: stimuli, personal factors, political setting and social position.

I. Stimuli

- a. Stultz contends that the more stimuli about politics people receive, the greater the likelihood that they will participate in politics, and the greater the depth of their participation. People who are exposed to media, for example are likely to participate in politics. This is a fact that cannot be denied.
- b. According to this author, persons living in urbanized environments encounter more stimuli about politics than those living in the countryside (Stultz *et al.* 1994: 105).

II. Personal factors

The more sophisticated people’s cognitions and beliefs are about politics, the greater is the likelihood of their participation in the political process. This is true, because one will have sophisticated cognitions and beliefs about politics only if one has studied and has an interest in politics.

III. Political setting

- a. Stultz maintains that crisis elections, being perceived as important, produce higher turnouts than non-crisis elections. In Lesotho it was different during the 2002 election because, compared to the results

of the 1998 election, the total number of votes dropped from 582 740 to 554 386 (Matlosa 2003: 17 in CSIR 2003). This happened in spite of the fact that the age requirement had been changed from 21 years to 18 years of age. It was expected that more people would participate in the election, but it was not the case. This made Lesotho an exception, in the matter raised by Stultz.

- b. People contacted by party workers are more likely to vote and also to participate in gladiatorial activities. This happens also in Lesotho.

IV. Social position

Higher-class persons have a greater likelihood of participating in politics than lower-class persons (Stultz *et al.* 1994: 106). However, in Lesotho it is different because, taking the sizes of the political rallies and the 2002 general election results as indicators of political participation, the opposite of the author's statement is evident. Voter turnout was higher in the rural constituencies than in the urban constituencies. Table 3.3h) below illustrates the researcher's observations. Also in the neighbouring country, South Africa, it is not true. In the rural areas of Lesotho, like in other developing countries, there are peasants who are lower class than the elite and the bourgeoisie.

V. Participation

According to Stultz *et al.* (1994: 107) participation means action, and he further asserts that it is well known that actions, reactions and interaction constitute the very nature of politics. Further on, Stultz says that political participation therefore, is about the interactions in which politics is practised. Furthermore, political participation represents the interactions in which values are authoritatively assigned to society.

Stultz *et al.* contend that neither class nor the age of a democracy determines voter turnout. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) made the following observation: the overall average turn-out in the period

after World War II in established democracies is 73%. The average for other countries is 58%. In Western Europe, North America and the Caribbean it has remained constant over the last 50 years. Turnout in South America and Asia has steadily increased, while in Africa and the Middle East it has declined since the 1980s.

Kriek (1994: 108) notes that, looking in the modern era, it is obvious that there has been a period when power and authority in the state were vested almost exclusively in the monarch. This does not leave out Lesotho; for example, a Sesotho phrase: “Le lumme!” or literally “It has thundered!” usually uttered at the end of the King’s/leader’s speech at a public meeting, actually warns the participants that the King’s/leader’s word is final. Kriek (1994: 108) notes that the participation of the general public was limited to obeying the laws and decisions of the king and to paying taxes.

According to **Southall** in Daniel *et. al.* (1999: 145) the BCP, BNP, MFP and ten smaller political parties fielded 242 candidates to contest the 1993 election. Only the BCP and the BNP ran candidates in each of the 65 constituencies. The MFP placed 51 contenders, the PFD 17 and the Ha Re Eeng Basotho (HB) 13. It had been 23 years since the political parties last had the opportunity of exercising their right to participate in an election. Southall in Daniel *et al* (1999: 154) asserts that the BNP, the monarchy and the military challenged the BCP’s rule and eventually the King deposed the BCP’s government only sixteen months after the election.

Thabane, in Leon et. al. (2001: 22) stated that the BNP unsuccessfully contested the 1993 election results. Also, he asserted that Sekhonyana¹ had been advocating that Mokhehle, the Prime Minister, would dismiss the army and replace it with the former members of his former guerrilla army, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). That caused friction between the army and the government. **Kabemba** (2003: 6) avers that one of the challenges the BCP government met was that the BNP loyalists were entrenched in the army and in

¹ Rets’elisitsoe Evaristus Sekhonyana was one of the traditional chiefs in Quthing district. Also, he was President of BNP since 1992. He was a very militant leader. During BNP government he was a member of Cabinet and he held positions of Minister of Finance & Economic Planning, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Economic Planning and during the Military rule he was Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. He passed away in 1998.

the civil service. Also, there were disagreements with the army over army compensation. Further, he stated that in response to their grievances a faction of the army mutinied in early 1994. Also, Maope in Leon (2001: 16) asserted that in January 1994, two army factions fought a battle on Hilton Hill in Maseru. Additionally, Maope stated that in April 1994 a faction of the army kidnapped a number of Ministers, including Mosisili, Minister of Justice and Maope himself.

Matlosa (2001: 12) avers that, without opposition in parliament, the single party executive arm of the BCP government found itself in conflict with other key organs of state such as the army, the monarchy/chieftaincy, bureaucracy and judiciary. So, it became increasingly difficult for the government to deliver on its own manifesto. The BCP government was unable to govern effectively and authoritatively. According to Matlosa (1997: 148) and Kabemba (2003: 6) following the army violence that included assassination of Deputy Prime Minister, Selometsi Baholo, in August 1994 King Letsie III dissolved parliament, dismissed Mokhehle government and appointed a provisional government that included BNP leader, Sekhonyana. Matlosa (1997: 148) noted that removal of the BCP government was a coup.

Also, Southall in Daniel *et. al.* (1999: 156), had stated that on the 16th August 1994 the BNP and the MFP supporters had petitioned the King, Letsie III, for dissolution of parliament and for restoration of Moshoeshoe II. On the next day the King announced deposition of the government and appointment of the six-person Provisional Council, headed by, a lawyer, Hae Phoofolo (former Deputy Governor of Central Bank) and including Sekhonyana, the BNP leader, as Foreign Minister. The Council would administer the country and establish an Independent Electoral Commission, which would prepare for a new election based on proportional representation. The BNP had rejected the election results as 'robotic'. Also, Southall in Daniel *et. al.* (1999: 154, 156) stated that the BNP and the MFP had proposed the need for PR electoral model. Further on, Southall in Daniel *et. al.* (1999: 156) noted that the King's government lasted a month and the BCP's government was reinstated on the 14th September 1994.

Under what circumstances and under whose influence was the BCP government re-instated? Matlosa (1997: 148) and Kabemba (2003: 6) noted that the elected BCP government was re-instated as a result of internal pressure by various civil

society groups and intervention by leaders of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, supported by Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth and United Nations (UN) through extensive diplomacy. Also, Makoa (2004: 87) and Matlosa (2001: 12) affirmed that re-instatement of the BCP government was effected upon a compromise solution enshrined in the Memorandum of Understanding 1994 (MoU 1994) brokered by Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe in September 1994. Additionally, Makoa (2004: 87) stated that one of the conditions in MoU 1994 read as follows: "recognition of the basic rights of individuals and groups in a pluralist and civil society shall be duly observed and fulfilled." Finally Matlosa (2001: 12) noted that, since then those three countries have remained guarantors of young democracy of Lesotho.

Southall in Daniel *et. al.* (1999: 27) contends that the plurality system may work to disadvantage the minorities. Southall cited the Lesotho 1993 election, which resulted in 65 seats to nil victory. The BCP received 74.7% votes and the BNP 22.6% but the BNP could not participate or represent its electorate in Parliament. Also Southall noted that the return to multi-partyism in Lesotho caused a de facto legislative one-partyism in an election, which the observers declared free and fair. Further Southall in Daniel *et. al.* (1999: 22), in comparing the winner-takes-all with the PR electoral systems, emphasises the virtue of PR in guaranteeing and simultaneously legitimising the representation of the minorities. Southall contends that PR facilitates coalition governments and encourages cross-party compromise and bargaining as normal behaviour. According to Southall in Daniel *et. al.* (1999: 34) in Lesotho the vanquished opposition parties are now enjoying the advantages of PR. In 1999 MMP had not been used yet in Lesotho, and opposition parties could not be enjoying advantages of PR already. So, this view of Southall in Daniel *et. al.* (1999: 34) came in rather early.

Gordon *et. al.* (2007: 76) assert that in order to keep themselves in power, most African rulers, taking advantage of monopolizing the scarce resources, build strong bases of social support. According to Gordon *et. al.*, these African leaders defuse the opposition by a wide variety of patronage devices made possible by their control of state. Further Gordon *et al* contend that these leaders practice patronage and develop clientelistic ties to key individuals and groups. Also Gordon *et. al.* state that patron-client relations became the main form of political exchange in post-independence Africa.

Matlosa (1993: 1 - 2) contends that the 1993 election in Lesotho is an epoch-making episode in the country's political history. Among the reasons that Matlosa gives is that for the first time more than five political parties participated in the electoral contest for state power. Twelve political parties placed candidates for the election. Also the election was epoch-making because it was the first time a single party, namely the BCP, won all the constituencies (65). Further, Matlosa argues that the 1993 election had an enormous political significance because it removed the mythology of political monopoly by the three traditional parties, the BCP, the BNP and the MFP.

Additionally, Matlosa (1993: 3) states that participation of the new parties afforded the voters a wider political choice. Further, he noted that change also reflects the plurality of political opinion and views in Lesotho. On the question of future relations of Lesotho with post-apartheid South Africa, the MFP and PFD/KBP alliance have a common position that Basotho have a right to express their will through a referendum about any future relations with post-apartheid South Africa. The BCP and the BNP are opposed to integration of Lesotho into post-apartheid South Africa, but unlike the BCP, which by 1992, had dropped the idea of Lesotho reclaiming the conquered territory the BNP wants negotiations to be carried out (Matlosa 1993: 18 – 20).

According to Matlosa (1993: 14) all the four parties, namely the BCP, BNP, PFD/KBP alliance agree on the need to improve social welfare facilities i.e. employment, health, education, etc. Also the BCP and the PFD/KBP alliance agree on the need to eradicate gender discrimination in society so as to ensure full participation of both sexes in productivity.

Matlosa in EISA (2006: 9) observes that there are four main areas where political parties face problems namely, leadership, elections, funding and gender equality. He notes that it is crucial how the leaders are selected, rotated, and held accountable. Also he warns about a new trend emerging in SADC, wherein a leader steps down as national president yet retains his leadership of the political party, examples being former presidents of Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. According to Matlosa it is important to know how the leaders of political parties are elected as this indicates how democratic the parties themselves are.

Further, Matlosa in EISA (2006: 9) states that funding is a big problem because most of the challenges of the political parties revolve around resource management. He asserts that political parties cannot survive on membership fees alone. Further on, he noted that SADC commits member states to 30% gender equality by 2005 and after 2005 to raise the margin to 50%. It was agreed in the Pretoria workshop, co-hosted by EISA and IDEA, that gender issue is about political exclusion and therefore gender quotas had no relevance to democracy. Also, it was agreed that a small fraction of the gross national product (GNP) be used to create a democracy fund for funding the political parties with respect to the representation they have (EISA 2006: 11).

Kriek (1994: 108,109) asserts that there are a number of approaches to studying political participation. Additionally, most perspectives fall within a spectrum between two distinct poles. Kriek (1994: 109 - 117) for example, lists some of the perspectives as follows: active and passive participation; legitimate and illegitimate participation; representation and direct participation; articulation and aggregation; participation under constant or changeable structural influences; participation under endogenous or exogenous influences; national and local participation; input participation and output participation; cross-sectional and longitudinal participation; individualistic and ecological fallacies in studying political participation; investigating participation in terms of the ideal-typical or functional-equivalent approaches; and idiographic and nomothetic approaches to research into political participation.

Dahl (1975: 5) contends that it is only a few countries that have failed to grant at least a ritualistic vote to their citizens and to hold at least nominal elections. He maintains that even the most repressive dictators usually take heed of the legitimate right of the people to participate in the government, that is, to participate in “governing” though not in public contestation. In addition, Dahl emphasizes that in the absence of the right to oppose, the right to “participate” is stripped of a very large part of the significance it has in a country where public contestation exists.

Lindberg (2006: 2 - 3) argues that elections in the newly democratising countries do not signal the completion of the transition to democracy. According to this

author, in Africa it is only after a series of elections, three electoral cycles, that democracy tends to take root. Further, Lindberg asserts that empirical evidence testifies that regime breakdowns occur after the third electoral cycle and that it is only in rare cases. For this reason, Lindberg emphasizes the need for 12 – 15 years international community support towards the newly democratising countries. Also, Lindberg (2006: 3 & 10) noted that, soon after political independence of the African countries, authoritarian regimes dominated the political landscape in Africa until the end of the 1980s. Between 1970 and 1993 Lesotho experienced both civilian and military dictatorships as mentioned in chapter 1 and appendix 2.

According to Lindberg (2006: 12) Barkan's study² shows that the more agrarian the society, the higher the geographic concentration of the vote, that is the rural voters seem to continue to prefer representatives based on how good they are as "patrons" of their respective community or constituency. Also, Lindberg (2006: 12) asserts that a couple of empirical studies of multiparty elections of the 1990s corroborate the recurrence of personalized patron-client relations in electoral politics in Africa. Further, Lindberg noted that it is not clear whether the preference for patron over policy is influenced by the international financial institutions and the donor community or by the "parochial" political culture in which dependency on someone with the right political connections is renowned, or whether it derives from something else.

Lindberg (2006: 16) argues that political participation, freedom of political competition and legitimacy of the idea of self-government are the necessary instruments for the realization of self-government. Also, he states that these dimensions constitute the three democratic qualities required in the elections. Expounding on political participation, Lindberg (2006: 37) posits that firstly, equality of political participation in elections implies legal guarantees of universal suffrage. Secondly, participatory elections imply that individuals and political parties have equal rights to exist and to field candidates. Thirdly, participation is conditioned if known antidemocrats contest in the elections, either as individuals or as parties.

² Barkan, Joel D. 1995. "Elections in agrarian societies." *Journal of Democracy* 6: 106-116.

Further on, Lindberg noted the three indicators used in the study namely, “voter turnout, opposition participation and autocratic guard gone?” According to Lindberg (2006: 38), in his study, opposition participation is measured with three ordinal values: “Boycott” for total boycotts, “Partial boycott” for cases where not all of the main candidates or parties boycott the poll, and “Yes, all” for elections where all major political parties participate.

The study of Lindberg reaffirms the suggestions of Dahl (1971) and van de Walle (2002) that the level and the quality of political competition exerted by the opposition groups is crucial in determining the level of democracy of the regime (Lindberg 2006: 149).

According to Lindberg, opposing behaviour should be important in electoral regimes where the attainment of democracy is still questionable. Also, Lindberg notes that opposition participation is very likely where at least minimal requirements for freedom, fairness of elections and relative peacefulness of campaigns are instituted. Further, Lindberg (2006: 149) posits that the above finding requires both domestic and international actors to police the rules of the game.

According to Lindberg’s findings in Africa’s free and fair presidential elections, losing parties endorsed the results immediately in only 40 percent cases; three months later the losing parties endorsed the additional 44 percent of cases. Lindberg contends that in Africa it is the new parties that dispute the elections. In Lesotho, however, the parties that dispute elections are old and usually big. Additionally, Lindberg (2006: 149 - 150) argues that the political parties that do not accept or delay to accept the results of elections declared free and fair express a form of undemocratic behaviour. These findings and argument thereof of Lindberg are corroborated by the findings of Makoah (2003: 2 - 3) below.

Further still, Lindberg (2006: 150) posits that more research is required in the democratising countries on interaction between constitutions and regulations and among the individuals within political parties in general and in opposition parties particularly. Lindberg suggests that researching this area requires collection of qualitative data of a different type from what his study generated.

Makoa (2003: 2) in CSIR (2003 Vol. 2) quoting the African charter of 1990 (p.297), says that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the people nor can economic crises be resolved. Human economic conditions cannot be improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people. Makoa further noted that, while elections are seen as basic to democracy and popular participation, only in a few cases have election outcomes not been disputed or accepted unconditionally, by the losers. According to the example given by Makoa from Bratton and van de Walle (1998:1997), in 7 out of 29 countries in which elections were held between 1989 and 1994, the losers rejected the results. Also Makoa (2003: 2-3) states that in Lesotho in particular, losers have disputed the election results, not relying exclusively on the courts of law but backing up their case with violence as they saw fit, in various ways since 1965. The above example given by Makoa shows that the elections results have been rejected in about 25% of the 29 countries studied.

Matlosa in EISA (2006: 31) asserts that the events of the mid-1990s had convinced many in Lesotho that, the electoral model was flawed and that stability and peace could not be achieved because the electoral model denied many voters fair representation. Also Matlosa notes that with the adoption of MMP in 2001 and its implementation in 2002, the country appears to be on a new and positive trajectory (EISA 2006: 30).

Makoa (2003: 4) in CSIR (2003 Vol.2) contends that people may cast their vote in order to perpetuate policies that exclude other sections of the population from participating in national decision-making processes. Also he maintains that in situations where political power is linked to survival, elections are often used to deny one's rival participation in these national decision-making processes. In the case of Lesotho elections have not taken place on the rational basis since 1965 up to the period of this study, 1993-2006. So, both arguments of Makoa are rather vague due to lack of supporting evidence. Furthermore, the author points out that in deeply divided societies, the main objective of the voters is not to appoint parliamentary representatives or rulers, but to defeat and exclude the rival party – to deny it power and access to resources. Further-on Makoa asserts that according to Africa's history, elections are part of a continuing war against

political opponents, to defeat or vanquish them (Makoa 2003: 5 in CSIR 2003 Vol.2).

On the contrary the researcher believes that elections may not be war, but a political form of action (Scaff 1975: 22), and they stay a political action providing genuine competitive contestation for parliamentary seats. Also **Kapa** (2003: 71) argues that in Lesotho, unlike in multi-ethnic countries where elections can be a means of perpetuating dominance of one ethnic group over the others, the dominant motive of voters of one party is to deny power to the rival party and often to inflict a humiliating defeat on it.

The rulers are not ordinary and unbiased role players in the political system; they are competitors in the power contest, acting as prongs and representatives of ruling political parties and implementers of their programmes. For this reason, governments manage and control electoral processes and this is bound to raise questions about trust in and readiness of the government to address its rivals' legitimate concerns (Makoa 2003: 6 in CSIR 2003 Vol. 2). The example given by this author was that of the election dispute of 1998 in Lesotho; that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had failed to provide the voters' list as required under the electoral law and that there had been suspicion that government had influenced the conduct of IEC.

Makoa (2003: 6,7) criticizes Matlosa's point of view based on Huntington's political development theory, concerning the recurrent elections-related crises; that the problem reflected the institutional decay and weakness of the societal institutions in Lesotho. Makoa's assertion is that Lesotho political parties were probably too powerful if they could, as in the past, paralyse or disrupt government, and that the institutions referred to were unspecified, thus further weakening Matlosa's argument.

According to Makoa (2003: 7) in CSIR (2003 Vol. 2), some governments manipulate electoral processes, torture their opponents, and deny opportunities and important information to their rivals. Further, this author noted that with a few exceptions, in Africa elections occur as processes external to and alien to the voters, leaving them only the right to cast their vote; and that such alienation breeds and nurtures tension, political irrationality and violence. Makoa's view is

sound. An example of its relevance is that half (6 out of 12) of the number of the party officials interviewed by the researcher argued that the MMP electoral system was imposed on the electorate and that it was not discussed but came from outside the country.

Sono (1993) has a view similar to Makoa's idea. Sono (1993) in the unnumbered page 3 of the introduction of his book contends that it is wrong to assert that the so-called liberal democracies we have today, are governments by the people. Sono argues that while they may be governments of the people, and for the people, they definitely are not by the people.

Matlosa and Sello (2005: 4) argue that one of the major weaknesses of the political parties in Lesotho is the incessant fragmentation and factionalism. Also these authors contend that Lesotho politics is strongly imbued with a personality cult of prominent political leaders such as the late Leabua Jonathan and the late Ntsu Mokhehle. This view is in agreement with that of the interviewed leaders of the MFP and the PFD who maintain that the political leaders in Lesotho patronize their political parties.

Criteria for opposition parties and participation

Two authors, Nkiwane and Ssenkumba, identify some criteria applicable to opposition politics.

Nkiwane in Olukoshi 1998: (105-108) identified factors that underlied the weakness of the Zimbabwean opposition as, neglect of the rural vote, ethnicity with permanent majorities, lack of internal party democracy, voter apathy, political violence, negative or positive unity. This author explained these factors as given below.

a) Neglect of the rural vote

It was not the issues and/or ideologies that separated the political parties and as a result caused the weakness of the opposition, but the greatest area of weakness characteristic of opposition movement in Zimbabwe, had been its lack of identification with the rural population. This author gives other possible causes of weakness of opposition parties. For example, "The party has also

been accused of resorting to blackmail and coercion in order to win the rural vote” (Olukoshi 1998: 105) and with a footnote to this statement, the author gave evidence to this fact. The matter of blackmail and coercion by the ruling party has weight and could be accepted. However, it is difficult to accept that the opposition movement neglected the rural vote because the author gives no evidence to this factor. In the case of Lesotho most of the opposition parties do not have enough funds and as a result they are not able to cover the rural constituencies. If Nkiwane could give a reason like this it could be understood better, because it is not simply neglecting the rural vote in the case of Lesotho, but lack of party funding is one of the problems.

b) Ethnicity: Permanent Majorities?

Nkiwane in Olukoshi (1998: 106) asserts that there is very little or no room for a vibrant opposition movement in Zimbabwe and that there is no chance for any opposition movement or party to make a significant impact nationally. This is because the ruling party the ZANU (PF) is made up of a permanent majority of Shona people and the opposition consists of permanent minorities, for example the PF-ZAPU is made of the Ndebele. Also the author contends that in Bulawayo urban the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and the Forum Party of Zimbabwe (Forum) achieved success because people in general had hope in these parties and they voted in their support but not on the basis of ethnicity. The cases of ZUM and Forum introduce a contradiction to Nkiwane’s assertion.

Ssenkumba, in Olukoshi (1998: 177), on the ‘ideal criteria for evaluating opposition parties’ argues that, in their view neither the fact of multi-ethnicity nor the low level of accumulation need automatically be sources of blockage towards democratic reform. The factor of ethnicity, currently, might not be applicable in Lesotho. From the information given above by these authors it is clear that ethnicity cannot always be a problem in some other countries.

c) Lack of internal party democracy

Nkiwane in Olukoshi 1998: (105-108) asserts that an autocratic form of leadership coupled with the absence of formal rules and procedures has led to internal squabbles and splits within opposition political parties. Opposition political parties in Lesotho have the same problem. Matlosa and Sello (2005:

xiv) contend that political parties in Lesotho still face numerous internal problems to become effective drivers of democratic practice and culture due to lack of external regulations governing internal party activities.

d) Voter apathy

The writer says that as opposed to the extremely high voter turnout in the first two post-independence general elections held in the 1980s, the voter turnout seems to be going down, for example a total of 54 per cent in the 1990 election and 40 per cent in 1995. Nkiwane in Olukoshi (1998: 107) states that two things are indicated by the voter turnout: firstly a trend towards voter apathy because among the voters who stayed away from voting there were some others who could have voted for the opposition. Secondly voters seemed not to have found a worthy opponent in the opposition movement and therefore did not cast their vote even in a different direction.

e) Political violence

Olukoshi (1998: 107) maintains that Zimbabwean political culture has been characterised by violence towards any form of opposition. The author cites two cases of violence between the ZANU (PF) and the ZUM in which the National Organising Secretary for the ZUM, Patrick Kombayi was shot at.

In Lesotho the cases of political violence that took place might have been different from those of Zimbabwe. Except in 1970 when the BNP refused to relinquish power, in Lesotho the discontented opposition political parties had been initiating political violence. However, the cause of the violence both in Lesotho and Zimbabwe had been the purported denial of political rights to the opposition by the ruling party. The cases of political violence which occurred after 1970 election in Lesotho were between the BCP, which had won the election, and the ruling party the BNP which rejected the BCP's victory and continued ruling.

Also in Lesotho, in 1998, the dissatisfied opposition political parties led the political violence. In Lesotho, unlike in Zimbabwe, there have not been cases of violence during the elections. About all the cases of political violence, in Lesotho, occurred after elections. Makoa (2004: 84) contends that although the military did eventually relinquish power to the elected civilian government

in 1993, their intervention did not bring about national reconciliation because political polarization and rancour still pervade political relations in Lesotho.

According to **Kabemba** (2003: 16 – 18) Lesotho's political violence has many causes, but the most fundamental cause is its weak, dependent economy, and the weak state. The dependent nature of economy places restrictions on whatever the state is capable of achieving, irrespective of the class or alliance of classes that seized control of state power. Firstly, Lesotho offers its citizens very few economic opportunities; its formal economy employs about 50, 000 people, and control of the state allows the ruling party to access these jobs. In many cases the party membership cards are used to access state resources including the jobs. Kabemba (2003: 16) further argues that nearly all the representatives of civil society they interviewed described politics in Lesotho as primarily competition for jobs as securing a parliamentary seat assured one a job; that contributes to adversarial political culture and increases the likelihood of recourse to violence.

Secondly, the military postures of the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the intolerant political culture of the 1990s. Moreover the major parties, the BCP and the BNP filled some key leadership posts with former military leaders, either from Lesotho Defence Force or the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) Kabemba (2003: 17). It is not quite accurate that the BCP filled some key leadership posts with the LLA, because their former leader and Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, publicly announced that the LLA had been disbanded. The LLA members continue holding talks with the BCP/LCD ruling party so that they may be employed and also to be provided with benefits. Also, other BCP members who were not LLA members in the first few years after 1993 did not get any preferential treatment. The BCP probably started patronising after the Palace coup of 1994. **Mphanya** (November 2008) in "the Rise and Shine Programme" over Harvest FM radio asserted that the BCP did not deploy its key personnel in the government (the BCP deployed wrong people to run the government- This is translation of his Sesotho words).

The failure of civilian political leaders to establish effective control over the state in general and part of the security forces, in particular constitutes the third proximate cause of political violence in Lesotho. **Landsberg** in Kabemba

(2003:17) suggests the following idea: 'One key lesson from Lesotho is this: the smaller and the poorer a country, irrespective of how homogeneous or heterogeneous a state, the more fierce and competitive are elections and the struggle for power'. **Rakuoane**, leader of the PFD, in Kabemba (2003: 17) gave a similar remark to that of Landsberg: 'A hungry man has no principles'.

f) Negative or positive unity

According to **Olukoshi** (1998: 108) the opposition political parties in Zimbabwe have always failed to establish a common platform or a united front. This author refers to efforts of unity as "negative unity" in Zimbabwe, because they have not served to forge common grounds but rather served as expedients for quick advantage and therefore positive unity has not been successful in Zimbabwe.

The case of positive unity is given in the finding of Kabemba about the share of small parties during the elections in Lesotho. Kabemba (2003: 8 – 9) says that between 1998 and 2002, three main Lesotho opposition political parties lost their vote share to smaller parties, because collectively the smaller parties increased their share from 5% to 20% of all the votes cast; the LCD had lost about 5% possibly to the newly formed LPC.

Ssenkumba in Olukoshi (1998: 177) proposes that the main yardsticks for evaluating the opposition political parties should, in an ideal situation, include the following things: the extent to which they pursue their organisational goals through the electoral process; the extensiveness and inclusiveness of their organisational structure and political constituency; the extent to which they employ established political avenues for achieving their goals; and, their record of internal organisational stability. These yardsticks are applicable to the case of evaluating performance of opposition parties in Lesotho.

Further Ssenkumba contends that, in practice several things are involved. Firstly, the opposition should be stable and coherent. Secondly the opposition should have organisational extensiveness and inclusiveness to attract substantial and diverse membership. Thirdly, the opposition should have well-focused objectives shared not only by the leadership but also by the membership. The importance of objectives is tantamount to the importance of the policy and programme issues

noted by **Matlosa and Sello** (2005: 52). These authors state that political parties in Lesotho usually fuse their policies with the constitutions and the manifestos. Fourthly, Ssenkumba advocates that the opposition should have adequate resources to handle its organisational affairs and it should command respect, approval and a general appeal from a broad cross-section of the population.

The question of resources is in agreement with the suggestion of Matlosa and Sello (2005: 53) that without resources, political parties cannot play their expected role in building democracy. Further, Matlosa and Sello state that one major resource that the parties need is money.

According to Ssenkumba in Olukoshi (1998: 178) the opposition party that functions well should serve to provide checks-and-balances mechanism against the government rather than merely collaborate with it. It should have credibility before the electorate, as it is also an alternative government waiting to take over power in case the government falls or the ruling party is defeated in the election. Further, the author states that the opposition party is a participant in the governmental process because it assists government directly or indirectly.

Additionally, Ssenkumba asserts that the opposition political party, with its main function of providing checks and balances in the broad political process, has to accomplish several tasks (Olukoshi 1998: 178). For example, it has to:

- participate in parliamentary deliberations;
- oppose objectionable policies;
- compel the government by all acceptable (legal and constitutional) methods to modify its policies;
- attempt to create public sentiment against government and to harness public sympathy as a precondition for winning the next election;
- propose alternative programmes.

The researcher accepts the above tasks suggested by Ssenkumba because they complement the researcher's explanation (in 1.1.3.1 above) of the context of "electoral political participation of political parties" in this dissertation. Ssenkumba maintains that opposition can achieve its objectives if there are

salient factors such as ideology, race/class, religion or ethnicity around which significant segments of the electorate can converge (Olukoshi 1998: 178).

The researcher does not agree with Ssenkumba. In the case of Lesotho about 90% of the population is Christian and the remaining 10% consists of the Islamic, Hindu and the traditional indigenous religions (U.S. Department of State 2004: 1) and (Bureau of Statistics 2005: 7). The segments of the electorate converged on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity can be insignificant because they can constitute less than 10%. In addition, there is cooperation between Christians and Muslims in Lesotho (U.S. Department of State 2004: 2). Perhaps, the factor of social class can work out in some years to come because the number of industries is increasing and the increasing number of industrial workers is organised in trade unions.

Garrison & Scott asked five questions which are relevant for literature review. These questions follow in 1.1.3.2 to 1.1.3.6, below.

1.1.3.2 Which specific previously compiled or published studies, articles, or other documents provide available and relevant information on the selected topic?

The reader should note that a number of issues, e.g. democracy, poverty, etc., related to electoral participation were considered in this study. Therefore, there are, also, a few theories used to explain these issues. Some of the documents provided information about these issues and theories.

The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa carried out a study between 2003 and 2004. The study's first stage focused on the impact of political transition on the effectiveness of democratic institutions, such as political parties (**Matlosa and Sello 2005: vi**). These authors contend that since the 1990's a number of countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) went through transition towards multiparty politics. The impact of transition on democracy remained moot and a number of questions still required to be answered. Questions put forward by these two authors, as examples, are the following:

- “Has the current political transition enhanced democratic governance?”
- “Has the transition deepened democratic culture and practice?”
- “Has the transition improved the effectiveness of democratic institutions such as political parties?”

The specific objectives of the above-mentioned study were to:

- “assess the general political and socio-economic context of each country and its possible impact on political parties;
- investigate the external regulatory and legislative environment in each country and its impact on the role and functions of political parties; and
- examine the internal functioning and structure of political parties and the impact of these on their institutional effectiveness”.

Matlosa and Sello (2005: vii) state that parties everywhere have potential to be effective and accountable, but they face big challenges. These authors contend that each country’s context suggests that political parties are crucial actors in articulating and aggregating interests, providing political leadership, recruiting and presenting candidates. Also **Sadie in Venter** (2001: 278) asserts that political parties perform important tasks, which vary according to the political system in which they operate.

Further, Matlosa and Sello noted that, although little research had been carried out, it was obvious that *external environment* - the regulatory, financial, political and electoral spheres in which political parties operate – influences parties’ strategies and organization.

Also these authors state that *internal functioning* of political parties determines how the social demands of various groups in society are represented in parliament. Parties select and train their own candidates.

Information from the above study, by Matlosa and Sello (2005), was very valuable for this dissertation. Also, in Appendix 1 (the questionnaire) the reader of this dissertation will find that some of the questions asked would also draw answers from the above study carried out by Matlosa and Sello. In certain cases

the researcher got answers, from some of the leaders, which together with Matlosa and Sello's findings, add more value to this dissertation. For example, Manyeli (in Annex 5), the leader of the NIP, when interviewed by the researcher, stated that the NIP neither used party membership nor membership cards. Also Manyeli said that for the past twenty-two (22) years the NIP, did not call annual general meetings. The finding of Matlosa and Sello (2005: 34) is that the NIP has never held an annual conference. Furthermore, according to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 42) the NIP communicates with its membership about once every month; this is in agreement with what the researcher (in Annex 5) found that in three months the NIP calls public meetings about twice.

The researcher's dissertation touches on a number of aspects of democracy as the topic is about electoral political participation of opposition parties. For example, some of the sub-questions under no.10 in the questionnaire are about democracy in Lesotho. So, Dahl's theory of democratisation and the other information in his book has been very useful to the researcher. In order to enable effective political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho the process of democratisation has to continue, so that at least all the eight institutional guarantees of democratisation, stated in Dahl's theory, are practically available.

Matlosa and Sello (2005: 14) assert that changing the electoral system alone is not enough to solve Lesotho's political problems; much needs to be done particularly in terms of institutionalising the democratic governance. This view is in agreement with the requirements of Dahl's theory. Further Matlosa and Sello contend that political parties have to play the key role in the process of nurturing and consolidating Lesotho's democratic gains. The reader should recall that this dissertation deals with political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho.

Ake (2000: 160) contends that in Africa democratisation has to be about transformation of the state before introduction of new political processes. Also Ake notes that if Africa settles for democratisation as multi-party democratisation there will be no democracy because elections will be a choice between oppressors. He asserts that a state constituted as an autocracy will remain undemocratic regardless of who is running it. In the period 1993-2006, in Lesotho, dominance of one party prevailed and in the first eight years of this

period the conditions were not different from an autocracy as there was only one opposition parliamentary seat.

Naomi Chazan in Nyango'ro (1996: 243) contends that the issue in Africa is how to streamline the state, to delimit its scope without diminishing its control. Further, Chazan noted that restructuring of the state involves changing of the economic structure. Also, Chazan asserts that any economic progress cannot be achieved without state involvement.

Ake (1996: 132) asserts that the suitable democracy for Africa would have four characteristics:

1. Democracy in which people have real decision-making power over and above the formal consent of electoral choice.
2. Social democracy that puts emphasis on concrete political, social, and economic rights, as opposed to liberal democracy that emphasises abstract political rights.
3. Democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual rights.
4. Democracy of incorporation. It should be as inclusive as possible.

Further Ake (2000: 185) avers that while in Africa democracy movement is taking the direction of liberal democracy of multi-party electoral competition, social democracy is more feasible in Africa. Indeed this type of democracy could allow existence of a developmental state practising more developmental intervention than regulatory intervention in the economic development.

Matlosa and Sello (2005: 14, 51) suggest that today Lesotho is a fairly stable democracy having transited to this stage in 1993 whereas in the period 1966-1970 Lesotho was in the embryonic stage of democracy. This is acceptable because the colonial ropes had just been shed off and there had been a change from the colonial hegemony. It is worth noting that in the socio-economic analysis of Lesotho by Matlosa and Sello (2005: 2–10) the GNP per capita value for Lesotho is not given and the per capita income is only mentioned. This is a very useful indicator of socio-economic development. Another good alternative indicator is the Human Development Index (HDI). Matlosa and Sello (2005: 6, 7) mentioned the sustainable human development (SDH), which, also like HDI,

includes the per capita income. The important thing missed out by Matlosa and Sello is giving a value for the SDH or the per capita income at least.

According to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 8) the most critical policy challenge facing Lesotho is poverty. Indeed in order to address the problem of poverty Lesotho prepared a poverty reduction strategy paper that has the strategies deployed in the fight against poverty. A number of the interviewees such as the leader of the MFP asserted that poverty was the greatest constraint impacting on their political participation.

Nyango'ro (1989: 116) states that the dominance of simple commodity production, suggests that capitalist production cannot be achieved in the near future in Africa. Also Nyango'ro contends that part of the problem of underdevelopment in Africa could be explained as the failure of capitalist production to take root in Africa. Further, Nyango'ro avers that according to dependency theory the periphery has no dynamism of its own, since external forces trigger the need for production in the periphery. This explains why Lesotho stays dependent on the core countries and why it remains one of the least developed countries (LDCs). Also, Nyango'ro (1989: 58-60) asserts that whether or not the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its supporters agree on the negative effects of its programs, there is enough evidence supporting that its conditions have been devastating to countries that have implemented them. Lesotho gets funding from IMF and World Bank.

Nyango'ro (1989: 100, 101) makes an attempt to reconstruct development theory from the perspective of internally generated capitalist development forces in Africa by examining the evolution of the internal development structure. He calls this process disaggregating capitalism in Africa. Nyango'ro (1989: 109, 110) asserts that a better way of analysing modern capitalism, its historical evolution and its application to the Third World especially to Africa, should be based on the synthesis between the Weberian institutional theory of capitalism and the Marxian social theory of capitalism. Nyango'ro asserts that this approach could enable easy understanding of development of capitalism in Africa and the rest of the Third World.

Dahl's theory takes into consideration the GNP per capita (Dahl 1975: 203). The researcher suggests that these two co-authors, Matlosa and Sello, have left out a theory that they used to measure development of democracy in Lesotho. He therefore proposes that a tool such as Dahl's theory is very appropriate to use in this respect. The work of Matlosa and Sello as indicated above is very important for this dissertation because it gives an analysis of the state of political parties and the impact of their operations on Lesotho's democratisation process (Matlosa and Sello 2005: 2).

Also very resourceful was the work of Kabemba, "From military rule to multiparty democracy: Political reforms and challenges in Lesotho". The author stated in the preface that the research work focused on electoral processes. **Kabemba** (2003: 16 – 18) asserts that among the many causes of political violence in Lesotho, the most fundamental cause is its weak, dependent economy, and the weak state. Kabemba (2003: 8 – 9) noted the case of positive unity during the elections in Lesotho in which the small parties increased their share of votes as the bigger parties lost considerable percentage of their votes.

Lindberg's work of 2006 addresses patron-client relations in electoral politics in Africa. This is a very important issue in this dissertation because it is a theory that explains elections in Lesotho. According to Lindberg (2006: 12) Barkan's study³ shows that the more agrarian the society, the higher the geographic concentration of the vote, that is the rural voters seem to continue to prefer representatives based on how good they are as "patrons" of their respective community or constituency. Also, Lindberg (2006: 12) asserts that a couple of empirical studies of multiparty elections of the 1990s corroborate the recurrence of personalized patron-client relations in electoral politics of Africa. Further, Lindberg noted that it is not clear whether the preference for patron over policy is influenced by the international financial institutions and the donor community or by the "parochial" political culture in which dependency on someone with the right political connections is renowned, or whether it derives from something else.

³ Barkan, Joel D. 1995. "Elections in agrarian societies." *Journal of Democracy* 6: 106-116.

1.1.3.3 What do these studies conclude about the topic?

According to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 40), due to lack of intra-party democracy, internal factionalism, power-struggles and splits, there have been considerable fluctuations of party membership over the past ten years in percentage terms and absolute numbers. Matlosa and Sello (2005: 43) conclude that either by default or by design, there tends to be a lull in membership drive and political mobilisation between the elections. These authors contend that the phenomenon leads to a situation where the political parties, especially the opposition parties, hardly hold public meetings and they only wake up from hibernation when an election approaches. However, Matlosa and Sello (2005: 40) state that a number of political parties notably the, BNP, NIP, LCD, LPC and the PFD had their best years of growing membership, particularly women membership surpassing 50%, in the post-1998 years including 2001 and 2003.

According to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 51) political parties are supposed to play a key role in driving the democratic project and for Lesotho parties to achieve this, they should embrace and sustain a culture of political tolerance and constructive management of political conflicts.

Ake's works are very important in warning that democracy is not only about electoral multi-party elections. Ake's work (1996) outlines the characteristics of the type of democracy suitable for Africa. Ake's work (2000) concludes that social democracy is feasible in Africa. Nyango'ro's work (1989) informs us that with the application of the dependency framework or theory the Third World countries, notably African countries, could remain continuously dependent on the core countries. Also this work tells us the importance of simultaneously developing both economy and politics in the process of democratising Africa. Further, the works of both Ake and Nyango'ro show the importance of state intervention in economic development, less for regulating and more for developing the economy by prioritising the industries. Both Ake's and Nyango'ro's works pinpoint the weaknesses of the world-systems theory, dependency and development theories and conclude by attempting reconstruction of the development theory.

Nyango'ro (1989: 156) calls for a new development strategy in Africa, to restructure Africa's relationship with international economy – inevitably moving

toward less association. As mentioned above, Nyango'ro (1989: 100, 101) suggests reconstruction of development theory from the perspective of internally generated capitalist development forces in Africa by examining the evolution of the internal development structure. He calls this process disaggregating capitalism in Africa. Ake (2000: 185) asserts that while in Africa democracy movement is taking the direction of liberal democracy of multi-party electoral competition, social democracy is more feasible in Africa.

Lindberg (2006: 12) asserts that a couple of empirical studies of multiparty elections of the 1990s corroborate the recurrence of personalized patron-client relations in electoral politics in Africa. Lindberg (2006: 150) suggests that more research needs to be conducted in democratising countries on interaction between constitutions and regulations and among the individuals within political parties in general and in opposition parties particularly.

Further in their conclusion Matlosa and Sello (2005: 51) state that the external regulatory mechanisms for parties should be streamlined and strengthened. Additionally, these authors assert that it is imperative that all legal matters relating to the existence and operation of the political parties are governed by a specific political parties' parliamentary act, enforced by a specific office such as the registrar of political parties, as is the case in some SADC countries. It is recommended that the parties enhance their systems of keeping membership records so that, they may be in a position of knowing their strengths at any given time more especially when a national election is called.

Matlosa and Sello (2005: 52) conclude that lack of policy documents beyond the constitution is a problem that tends to adversely affect Lesotho political parties in terms of their operations and public image. Their recommendation is that parties should develop policy and programme documents that complement their constitutions and from which manifestos are drawn.

According to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 52) it is difficult to conduct surveys among members as often as desired due to the fact that the parties have financial constraints. These authors recommend that the parties should make a concerted effort to sustain production of their own newsletters, both print and electronic.

Having noted that no party had indicated any international affiliations and any form of alliance or cooperation with other political parties in the country, Matlosa and Sello (2005: 53) state that it is imperative that parties in Lesotho establish international linkages and explore formal alliances among themselves.

The membership registers of the parties are not regularly updated and as a result they lack accuracy. For this reason the parties are not able to determine their political strength especially when it comes to electoral contests (Matlosa and Sello 2005: 53). These authors recommend that the parties update their membership registers.

Matlosa and Sello (2005: 53) contend that one major resource that political parties need is money. Further they state that one of the challenges facing parties in Lesotho is lack of public funding for their institutional development, and they recommend that Lesotho government introduce public funding for the parties represented in parliament.

Kabemba (2003: 53) concludes that change of the electoral system from FPTP to MMP and restructuring of the armed forces have substantially reduced the risks of the rejection of the election results and political violence. But, Kabemba warns that there is need for continued vigilance because Lesotho's political culture remains adversarial. This author further says that underdevelopment of political parties should be taken as one of the greatest obstacles to Lesotho democratisation.

Furthermore, Kabemba (2003: 53) advises that among the challenges facing Lesotho are: the inclusion of the new generation in the leadership of political parties who would be enthusiastic in multiparty democracy and also acquiring gender balance at all levels of political institutions. According to Kabemba (2003: 54) Lesotho's leadership should apply efforts to alleviate poverty and to redress inequalities in income and gender. This author recommends that the new electoral system be continuously evaluated to ensure that it remains in line with the changing political realities in the country. Also Kabemba says that Lesotho needs intensive civic and voter education about its new electoral system. Further Kabemba (2003: xii) recommends that the playing field must be levelled among all the political parties and candidates, and also equal funding and access to media should be continuously guaranteed to all.

1.1.3.4 What are the apparent methodological strengths and weaknesses of these studies?

Here, the researcher discusses some of the studies mentioned in the earlier sub-sections above.

In the work of Matlosa and Sello the methodology used is explained very clearly and the reader easily understands how the information was gathered. The methodology used for collecting data was multivariate; data was collected from secondary material in the form of written sources including academic publications. Also desktop research was used and it was complemented by structured interviews using a standard questionnaire. The secondary materials are easily obtained for collection of data and also the desktop research is convenient.

The ease of collecting data is a methodological strength. On the contrary Matlosa and Sello have not indicated the research method used in their work, even though the methodology of collecting data has been so well described. This is a weakness. Another weakness that is found in the work of Matlosa and Sello is lack of the description or mention of the sampling criteria used to select the units of analysis and the units of observation.

The methodology has not been explicitly given in the work of Kabemba. This is a weak point. However, the preface to the work is good and arouses interest of the reader to explore the book.

The work of Lindberg reveals the importance of political competition exerted by opposition groups in determining the level of democracy of the regime. The works of Ake and Nyango'ro explain why the Third World countries continue to be poor and dependent on the developed countries. Poverty seems to impact negatively on the activities of the opposition political parties in Lesotho.

1.1.3.5 What remains to be discovered about the topic?

The things that remain to be studied about this topic are the following factors in explaining the weakness of opposition parties: party membership excluding party supporters or voters (Matlosa and Sello 2005: 40); the kind of training, besides voter education, offered by some political parties, e.g. the LPC and the PFD,

(Matlosa and Sello 2005: 42). Matlosa and Sello (2005: vi) put forward the following questions:

- “Has the current political transition enhanced democratic governance?”
- “Has the transition deepened democratic culture and practice?”
- “Has the transition improved effectiveness of democratic institutions such as political parties?”

These above-mentioned matters remain to be studied.

1.1.3.6 What appears to be, according to these studies, the most effective methods for developing new information on the topic?

Matlosa and Sello (2005: 52, 53) contend that political parties should develop a culture of assessing their political strengths through regular surveys and that they should regularly update their membership registers right from the branch up to the national levels. The parties should have up-to-date records and these will facilitate developing new information on the topic. From a research point of view, in-depth interviews with party leaders appear to be an indispensable method to gain an understanding of the party dynamics in Lesotho. According to Matlosa and Sello (2005: 53) very little has been published for a qualitative study.

1.1.4 Possible gaps in the earlier studies

The researcher sees the following gap in the earlier studies of electoral political participation in Lesotho that needs to be filled: inadequate systematic analyses of electoral political participation by opposition political parties during the period 1993 to 2006 in Lesotho. A number of researchers and writers conducted studies of electoral participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. However, their works did not satisfactorily address the following problem question: “Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?” Below the works of a sample of authors are critiqued.

Makoa’s 2004 work, *Electoral Reform and Political Stability in Lesotho*, focused on interdependence and interconnectedness between the triad of the following issues: elections, constitutionalism and political stability. He asserts that together these three items could solve political problems of Lesotho and that they are

critical sinews of democracy and foundations of peace. This information was valuable for the dissertation. However, this work did not answer the problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?"

According to Makoa (2002: 1) his monograph, *Elections, election outcomes and electoral politics in Lesotho*, attempted to capture and explain the utility of general election as perceived by Lesotho electorate. Also, it endeavoured to demonstrate the relationship between the electorate perception and the recurrent political unrest and instability in Lesotho. Makoa (2002: 9) avers that, the similar voting patterns of the 1993 and 1998 general elections prompted him and his colleagues, of departments of political science and statistics of the National University of Lesotho, to embark on a study.

Their study covered the four general elections of 1965, 1970, 1993 and 1998. A total of 883 people of ten electoral constituencies of lowlands and foothills were interviewed. The research was directed mainly at finding out "what exactly a vote meant to a voter, what influenced the people to vote the way they did in the four elections and whether issues count in Lesotho elections. Their finding that "issues do not count in Lesotho elections" was very important for this dissertation. According to their finding electorates do not vote for a party because they support its policy issues (Makoa 2002: 10). However, this monograph did not address the problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?"

According to Makoa (2005: 69), in the article "Lesotho", opposition Members of Parliament do not believe that the present parliament is an agent of democracy, as according to them it is not a genuinely representative forum. Makoa contends that these MPs complain that the LCD uses its majority to forestall debates on important national issues and that the bills are often passed into law before they have been properly scrutinised. This information, about democracy in parliament, is valuable for the dissertation. However, the article, "Lesotho", focused on democracy and did not address the problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" The purpose of the study was to investigate whether the parliamentary system of Lesotho had strengthened democracy. The study revealed that all MPs could participate in the discussions

on parliamentary business, engaging one another freely through debates, motions and questions. Further, Makoa (2005: 73) avers that, weak and divided, opposition has not taken advantage of its freedom to speak to expose the defects of the system.

Matlosa's 2001 Report provided some valuable information for this dissertation, but did not answer the problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" Matlosa's work focused on elections and election administration in Lesotho. Matlosa (2001: 31) states that the election and election processes are crucial for sustenance and consolidation of young democracies in Southern Africa. Further, he says this is much more required in Lesotho, a country with political history marred by recurrent and incessant instability and often violent conflicts.

Matlosa's work answered its own key question: "why did violent conflicts, bordering ominously on civil war, erupt in Lesotho after 1998 election?" (Matlosa 2001: 31). Matlosa contends that the answer to this key question vests in the nature of the electoral outcome, which is a by-product of the electoral system Lesotho adopted since independence. Expressed simply, the electoral outcome was an overwhelming victory for the LCD and with the exclusionary feature of first-past-the-post system, the other contestants felt excluded and cheated. The sense of exclusion instilled a sense of bitterness and that indicated that before the election already there was discontent due to the split of the BCP and emergence of the LCD as the ruling party. According to Matlosa the conflict had its deeper roots not in the administration of election. In conclusion, Matlosa (2001: 31) stated that it was imperative that, Lesotho made a serious review of its electoral system with a view to broadening participation in the political system and encouraging effective parliamentary opposition.

Southall's work of about 2005, "The 1993 Lesotho election" focused on the 1993 election. It answered the question: "why did the BCP win and by such an overwhelming margin?" Southall (ca 2005: 114) gave two answers to the question. The first one was that the BCP was much better prepared than the BNP. The second was that the BCP had greater political commitment and experience of its candidates. However, Southall's work did not address the

problem question: “Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?”

Matlosa’s work, “The 1993 elections in Lesotho and the nature of BCP victory” focused on the 1993 election. However, Matlosa (1997) also looked at the 1960 District Council election, 1965 general election and 1970 general election. Matlosa (1997: 148) argued that BCP’s total victory denied all other parties even a shadow of representation in parliament. He warned that such a situation posed a serious challenge for the democratisation of Lesotho politics. Further, he pinpointed three challenges: The first was that, since BCP seized power it had attempted to entrench itself through politics of hegemony, patronage and clientelism. The second was that, BCP had been engaged mainly in managing one crisis after another. The third was that, factional fights within BCP continued to undermine its capacity to govern. The above information is useful for the dissertation. However, Matlosa’s work did not address the problem question: “Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?”

Matlosa’s work of 2000 “Electoral systems and political stability in Southern Africa” only touched the elections results for the purpose of comparison. The work was focused on electoral systems and political stability. So, it did not address the problem question: “Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?”

Kapa’s essay of 2003, “Secrecy and transparency in Lesotho’s general elections” was focused on secrecy and transparency. Kapa (2003) contends that secrecy and transparency are yardsticks to the assessment of any elections. This work did not address the problem question: “Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?”

Matlosa and Sello (2005: 53) noted that one of the challenges facing parties in Lesotho is lack of public funding for their institutional development. This point is very important for this dissertation. However, this issue alone does not answer the problem question: “Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?” Also, Matlosa and Sello recommended that Lesotho government introduced public funding for parties represented in parliament and that it should be allocated in proportion to the number of parliamentary seats

each party occupied. Their work focused on political parties and democratization in Lesotho.

Kabemba's work of 2003 is "From military rule to multiparty democracy: political reforms and challenges in Lesotho". The work was part of a wider EISA research project on democratic consolidation in Southern Africa. Its focus was on electoral processes. According to Kabemba (2003: xi), in Lesotho the study sought to evaluate the prospects for the endurance of multiparty democracy. Kabemba (2003: 530) asserts that Lesotho has made progress in terms of democratic consolidation, but he warns that the possibility of a reverse process is not excluded. Also, he states that the underdevelopment of political parties should be regarded as one of the greatest obstacles to Lesotho democratisation. This is valuable material for this dissertation. However, like the other works critiqued above, the work of Kabemba was not focused on the problem question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?" So, it did not address that question.

The above works of various writers provided valuable information for this dissertation. However, they had little information to address the problem question of the dissertation: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?"

1.2 Motivation / Research Problem

What could have driven the researcher to choose this topic for a dissertation? Studies were made about the general elections in Lesotho, but none ever provided an answer to the researcher's problem. The problem is expressed in the following question: "Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993? The answers to this problem will explain how the ruling party won the successive elections of 1998 and 2002. The researcher wants to find out how influential the opposition political parties in Lesotho have been since 1993.

Looking back at the District Council Election (local government election) of 1960, BCP had won 30 seats, other parties 6 seats and independent candidates had won 4 seats (Matlosa 1997: 141), (Mphanya 2004: 44). In all there were 10

opposition seats or 25% of the total number of seats. BCP had acquired 36.2% votes, Independents 35.3%, the BNP 19.8%, the MTP 8.0% and the BPA 0.7% votes (Mphanya 2004: 44), (Leeman 1984: 296, 662-663). The opposition was very strong because it had received 63.8% votes.

The results of the 1965 general election gave the winning party (the BNP) 31 seats, the BCP 25 and the MFP 4 seats (Matlosa 1997), and it established a very strong opposition of 29 seats that made up 44.6% of the total. Also the opposition received 58.4% of the total votes. According to the results of 1970 general election, the opposition in parliament could have been strong had the BNP leader, Leabua Jonathan, not refused to relinquish power. The BCP had won 36 seats, the BNP 23, the MFP 1 (Gill 1997: 220, Khaketla 1971: 211, Southall ca.1995: 111, Mphanya 2004: 69, Matlosa 1997). Therefore, the opposition had 36.7% of the total seats.

Comparing the period '1965 to 1970' with the period '1993 to 2006' one would notice that there existed a big difference in politics of the two periods. The findings will confirm that the following great change took place: the movement from a culture of very strong opposition in parliament (in the period 1965 to 1970), through periods of the BNP autocracy (1970 to 1986) and dictatorship of military junta (1986 to 1993), back to inclusive near-polyarchy (Dahl 1975: 8) or democratising government or hybrid regime (Gershman 2004: 4) with very few opposition parliamentary seats in the period '1993 to 2006'. The results of the general election of 1993 allocated zero seats to the opposition. The BCP had won all the 65 seats, and when the LCD split away in 1997 the remaining BCP parliamentarians formed, in number, a fairly strong opposition of 25 seats in parliament. As mentioned earlier, the opposition rose from 0% to 38.5% in parliament. However, this situation lasted a short period of less than seven months.

Also, the results of the 1998 election had only one seat for the opposition, occupied by the BNP, and in 2001 when the LPC broke away from the LCD the seats of the opposition increased to 28. The opposition grew from 1.5% to 43.1%, as mentioned in sub-sub-section 1.1.1 above. However, that situation of a strong opposition in Parliament, like that of 1997, also lasted less than seven months.

The researcher's assumption is that, since 1993 general election, opposition political parties constituted very weak opposition in Lesotho Parliament. Opposition political parties were not able to win more than one parliamentary seat in both the 1998 and 2002 general elections. There is therefore need to do further analysis of electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. The reader should note that earlier researchers carried out analyses of elections in Lesotho. However, more work has to be done.

A big opposition party that hopes to become the government, should act like a newly elected ruling party when it deals with the public; it should keep the public informed about parliamentary affairs and new developments, and should also get inputs from the public. In my view, when the political parties do their work effectively it should not be difficult for them to do well in the elections.

1.3 Research questions

Research questions can be of various kinds depending on the different types of studies (Jegede 1999: 64). Maykut and Morehouse (1994: 91) stated that Patton (1990) identified the following six types of open-ended research questions:

Experience/behaviour questions;

Opinion/value questions;

Feeling questions;

Knowledge questions;

Sensory questions; and

Background/demographic questions.

Another feature of Patton's question typology is the time frame of each question; a question can be posed in the present, past, or future tense (Maykut and Morehouse 1994: 92).

The researcher used a mixture of the types of questions in Patton's typology. It was important to explore information from experience, knowledge, observation and opinions of the political party officials and also of the members of the public. Many of the political parties, for example, had people who had long been in active political participation, such as the BAC, the BCP, the BNP, the MFP, the NPP,

the UDP and the ruling party the LCD. Below is the list of research questions that were used in this research work.

1.3.1 The main question

Why have the opposition political parties in Lesotho weakened since 1993?

1.3.2 Subsidiary questions

- i) Why did the ruling party in Lesotho win successive elections of 1998 and 2002?
- ii) What are the main causes of the poor election results of opposition political parties in Lesotho since 1993?
- iii) What are the perceived remedies for the main causes of poor election results of the opposition political parties in Lesotho since 1993?
- iv) What are the problems of the electoral system used in Lesotho?
- v) How does lack of party political funding impact on electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho?
- vi) What is the impact of poverty on electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho, since 1993?
- vii) Since 1993, did the government make it difficult for the opposition political parties to participate in elections?
- viii) What is the impact of opposition political parties in Parliament, since 1993, on participatory politics?

1.4 Theoretical framework

This study is premised on patron-client relationship theory. This theory is intended to explain how the incumbent political party won successive elections of 1998 and 2002. The researcher found it prudent to explain political and economic developments in Lesotho and for that purpose he utilized the following theories: Dahl's theory of polyarchy and Lindberg's theory of uninterrupted series of elections.

Robert A. Dahl (1975) (in *Polyarchy*) and Giovanni Sartori (1979) (in *Parties and party systems*) are some of the most prominent scholars who emphasized the

role of political parties in elections. Dahl used the indicators of contestation and inclusiveness. Dahl (1975: 1-9) developed a framework that is useful for giving guidance to transformation of a regime from hegemony to a relatively democratised regime or polyarchy and vice versa. According to Dahl (1975: 46), there are existing models and no country needs to grope through centuries of experience with no idea of the elementary institutions required for a highly liberalized regime: competitive parties and uncoerced elections are not merely a goal, but a fact.

All the theoretical assumptions are discussed in chapter 2, sub-section 2.6.

1.5 Delimitation and Limitation

i) Delimitation

This study was confined to exploring earlier studies, interviewing 12 selected political party leaders/officials from the opposition, qualitatively analysing and interpreting the data collected from the interviews, and analysing the 1993, 1998, and 2002 general elections. A sample of 24 constituencies was used in the analysis of the 2002 election.

Why was a sample of 24 constituencies used in the analysis of the 2002 election? In the 2002 election the total number of constituencies had been increased from 65 to 80. According to Neuman (1997: 222), for small populations of study (below 1000) a large sampling ratio, about 30%, is sufficiently representative and can give accurate results. Thirty percent, (30%) of the 80 constituencies is 24.

As indicated above, the researcher explored literature related to the topic and qualitatively analysed data from the literature.

ii) Limitation

Two of the interviewees, Anna Majara, the leader of the New Lesotho Freedom Party, and Peete Peete, the leader of the National Progressive Party, passed away in 2008 and 2009 respectively. That situation reduced the chances of the researcher to get back to them to clarify certain issues on what they had contributed. However, the negative impact on the

research work was not considerable because, the sample had been 12 interviewees, a number that constituted 66.7% of the total or population of 18. Their deaths brought down the number of interviewed leaders/officials to 10.

1.6 Structure of the study

This section gives the outline of the study and this comprises four chapters and five appendices.

CHAPTER 1

This chapter introduces the dissertation to the reader. It tells the reader why the given topic was chosen. This chapter states the problem identified by the researcher and it gives a list of research questions. Also, this chapter is the review of related literature. This literature includes books, government gazettes, Independent Electoral Commission's reports, newspapers, periodicals, and so on. The literature review will enable confirmation of any new finding or criticizing of a past finding. So, it is important to study related literature. In this chapter the researcher noted the gap left unfilled by the earlier studies of electoral political participation in Lesotho.

CHAPTER 2

Chapter 2 is about research design, methodology and theoretical framework. The chapter explains the sampling method used. It explains the procedures of conducting the study. Collected data is given in this chapter. The researcher briefly explains the electoral systems used in Lesotho in this chapter, so that the reader may understand the used tables. It is here that the researcher compiled data from the interviews with political leaders or party officials. Also, in this chapter the theory, on which the dissertation is premised, is discussed.

CHAPTER 3

This chapter deals with electoral systems and data of elections results, authenticity, trustworthiness of collected data, qualitative data analysis and interpretation.

CHAPTER 4

In this chapter the researcher gives a conclusion to the study, based on the findings. Also, in this chapter the researcher indicates the areas of possible future studies.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 is the questionnaire with semi-structured questions used in the interviews. Appendix 2 gives the historical background of Lesotho's party politics. Appendices 3 and 4 are respectively the sample of constituencies and of the list of political party officials. Appendix 5 contains data from the interviews. Appendix 6 is the analysis of the placement of electoral candidates by opposition parties in the 2002 elections. Appendix 7 discusses the dependency and post dependency theories.

1.7 Conclusion

Political parties should be the enlightening institutions. They should educate their supporters, who should acquire basic understanding of politics. The parties should organise trainers' workshops. The trainers should train the supporters in the branches and constituencies. The supporters should be encouraged to read various media and to attend political meetings. The political parties should teach the party supporters to discuss political issues and party policies. These parties should not wait for the next national election before they hold political rallies; they should hold these public meetings frequently and regularly in order to recruit new supporters and to promote political participation of the supporters.

The department of political science in the National University of Lesotho should take it as its responsibility to regularly evaluate the opposition political parties.

Among other means to be used by the department the researcher recommends the yardsticks identified by Ssenkumba in Olukoshi (1998: 177).

In order to enable effective political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho the process of democratization has to continue, so that at least all the eight institutional guarantees of democratization, stated by Dahl (1975:3-4), are practically available.

The regulatory, financial and the political spheres in which the opposition political parties in Lesotho operate have adversely influenced their strategies and organization.

In Lesotho a number of political parties split and new parties were established as breakaway parties and this phenomenon is a result of a lack of tolerance amongst the political parties.

The opposition political parties are capable of performing important tasks, it is of utmost importance to give them the opportunity to participate in parliament and in the other decision-making processes. Governments, including Lesotho government, should understand that the opposition parties are part and parcel of the nation-building exercise and their role should be fully recognised and fully institutionalised in the political structures.

On the basis of literature review, the researcher came to the conclusion that, although the opposition political parties are weak and have few parliamentary seats, they also achieved successes in the period 1993 to 2006. These successes are potential strengths of the opposition parties and they are as follows:

- i) It was due to the political demands of the opposition parties that the Langa Commission was established to study the irregularities in the 1998 election;
- ii) The Interim Political Authority was established to level the political playing ground after the 1998 election;
- iii) The new electoral model, the MMP, was adopted and it has a potential to enhance participation of the opposition parties in parliament.

Has the literature review answered the major research question, which seeks to find out if since 1993 the opposition political parties had gone weak? The answer is yes. The reasons are that the regulatory, financial and the political spheres in which the opposition parties operate adversely affected their strategies and their organisation. The ruling party won the successive elections of 1998 and 2002. The records show that opposition parties have been performing very poorly during the elections of the period 1993-2006. Considering the poor achievement of the opposition at each general election, the opposition political parties are still considerably weak. The researcher concludes that unlike in the period 1965 to 1970, the opposition parties had gone weak in the period 1993 to 2006.

What pattern did elections in Lesotho follow in the period 1993 to 2006? On the basis of information from the related literature the researcher comfortably concludes that, in Lesotho the elections followed the pattern explained by patron-client relationship theory.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter the researcher explains the research design, describes and explains the research techniques of conducting the research work. He explains the used sampling method, data collection methods, and the applied triangulation method. Also, in this chapter the researcher discusses the technique used for data analysis. Additionally, this chapter has the theoretical framework of the dissertation.

2.2 Research Design

For research purposes quantitative or qualitative research designs or a combination of both designs can be used depending on the appropriateness of the option chosen by the researcher. According to Myers (1997: 1), quantitative research methods were originally developed in the natural sciences to study natural phenomena, and their examples being survey methods, laboratory experiments, formal methods (e.g. econometrics) and numerical methods such as mathematical modelling. Botha (1996: 264) stated that qualitative research is important to political scientists, and with it the researcher deals with qualitative data or data in the form of values, but with quantitative research the researcher deals with data expressed in numerical format. Qualitative design is suitable for use in research work that involves handling of small amounts of data, while the quantitative method is suitable for a large population (Labuschagne 2003: 100) (Trochim 1999).

In this dissertation the research method mainly used is qualitative in nature. This research work is related to the electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho in the period 1993 to 2006. The researcher opted for major use of qualitative research because it is more suitable than quantitative research

regarding the ongoing political process in Lesotho. In support of the choice of this design, reference is made to Babbie and Mouton (2001: 270) who related qualitative research to a “process”, when they stated that qualitative research is different from quantitative research in a number of key features, such as the following: ‘A focus on process rather than outcome’.

According to Trochim (1999), quantitative research excels at summarizing large amounts of data and reaching generalizations based on statistical projections, while qualitative research excels at “telling the story” from the participant’s viewpoint, providing the rich descriptive detail. Neuman (1997: 327) mentioned that, even though qualitative and quantitative styles of research differ in several ways, they are on the other hand complementary.

The type of qualitative design used for this dissertation is the interpretive approach, which Neuman (1997: 68) says, often, is called qualitative method of research. Neuman (1997: 329) asserts that qualitative social research relies largely on the interpretive and critical approaches which both are alternatives to positivism. Also according to Burns (2003) qualitative research is called interpretive method. Burns (2003) says that interpretive research method is used to discover meaningful insights and meanings of personal experiences. Gorski (2005) states that, the researcher has to use his/her knowledge to interpret findings from the collected textual data in order to make wise conclusions. This research method derives its name from the involved activity of interpretation of findings.

This dissertation is aimed at revealing the weaknesses and/or potential strengths of the opposition political parties in electoral political participation. In view of the above explanation, in this study the researcher uses a qualitative design and there are a number of types of this design. For example Smith in Creswell (1994: 146) categorized qualitative approaches into interpretive, artistic, systematic, and theory-driven approaches.

This research work is a combination of research methods that include literature review and interviews. Information from the related literature and the interviews is analysed from a qualitative perspective. The interviews have contributed a critical component to the research, namely that of leadership perceptions. The study

deals with the period 1993 to 2006. The universe of analysis is the elections in all the eighty (80) electoral constituencies in Lesotho. The units of analysis (sample) were the elections in twenty-four electoral constituencies and the units of observation were the 'leaders or officials' of the opposition political parties. Up to the year 2006, there were eighteen registered political parties in Lesotho. For the purpose of this study twelve of their leaders/officials were interviewed. The researcher used purposeful sampling approach to select opposition leaders/officials for interviews.

Neuman (1997: 222) says that one important principle of sampling is that, the smaller the size of the population the bigger the sampling ratio has to be so as to be an accurate sample, or to be a sample with high probability of yielding the same results as the entire population. According to Neuman (1997: 222), for small populations of study (below 1000) a large enough sampling ratio, about 30%, is sufficiently representative and can give accurate results. On this basis, a sampling ratio of 30% was used in this study. The 30% of 80 constituencies is 24.

In the process of sampling the twenty-four electoral constituencies, the researcher first of all arranged the names of the constituencies alphabetically and gave them sequential numbers. Then the researcher used the random number table starting anywhere in the table and then allocated random numbers, according to simple random selection method, to the twenty-four constituencies, thereby identifying the sample. The sample of the electoral constituencies of Lesotho appears in appendix 3.

The focus of this study is on electoral political participation of opposition political parties in twenty-four electoral constituencies. This study includes comparative analysis of the general elections of 1993, 1998 and 2002, using twenty-four constituencies.

2.3 Methodology

In qualitative research, the qualitative techniques of data collection are usually applied. The researcher also used triangulation of the techniques. According to Denzin (1994: 1) triangulation is the application and combination of several research methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon. It is appropriate

for establishing credibility of qualitative analysis. It is also appropriate for validation of quantitative studies.

The researcher used a number of different research techniques to collect data:

- i) The researcher used the questionnaire given in Appendix 1 for collection of qualitative data based on the period 1993 to 2006. The questionnaire consists of various types of questions: open-ended, closed-ended and skip or contingency questions. He combined different types of questions in order to add up their advantages. He used face-to-face-one-on-one interviews in order to get the highest possible responses, and also to be able to get in-depth information related to the dissertation.

The researcher did not use these other kinds of surveys, namely, Mail Questionnaires and Telephone Interviews because they lack high response rates and do not allow for long questionnaires (Neuman 1997: 253) providing in-depth information. Respondents do not avail themselves time for answering long questionnaires and also the telephone calls involve high costs.

- ii) A literature survey and analysis of published material and written documents for the period '1993 to 2006' proved to be very useful. Botha (1996: 253) says that the most important technique for qualitative research is intelligent, systematic study of written documents and/or observation of phenomena in the life world of the researcher. This literature includes books, reports, government gazettes, newspapers, and so on.

2.4 Interviews

According to Jegete (1999: 133), an interview is the oral or unwritten form of the questionnaire and there could be two methods of conducting interviews, namely personal interview and telephone interview. For this dissertation, the researcher used a semi-structured interview schedule. The interview schedule is in the format of a questionnaire. There are open-ended and closed questions.

An open-ended question is an unstructured free-response question to which a respondent can give any answer, and a closed-ended question is a structured fixed response question which has fixed options from which the respondent has to choose an answer (Neuman 1997: 240). Also Jegete (1997: 131) stated that an open-ended questionnaire includes questions or statements that require a free-range of responses giving no restrictions to the respondents; and the closed-ended questionnaire has predetermined responses to the questions or statements. Both types of research questions have advantages and disadvantages.

The researcher conducted the interviews. According to Jegete (1999: 84), it is necessary to state who conducted the interviews. During the interviews, both the researcher and the interviewee had copies of the questionnaire in their hands; but the researcher led the interviewee by reading the questions, while the interviewee answered, explained and gave opinions related to each question as and/when necessary. The questionnaire used is in appendix 1 and appendix 5 has data collected from the interviews.

2.5 Data Analysis

In this study the researcher used micro-level analysis of the interviews. According to Creswell (1994: 153) experienced researchers can do data collection and qualitative data analysis simultaneously. However, new researchers may separate the two stages.

Creswell (1994: 156, 157) says that Yin (1989) in a case study research discussed dominant modes of data analysis such as the following:

- (a) the search for “patterns”, by comparing results with patterns predicted from theory or literature,
- (b) “explanation building”, in which the researcher looks for causal links and /or explores plausible or rival explanations and attempts to build an explanation, about the case;
- (c) “time-series analysis”, in which the researcher traces changes in a pattern over time.

The specific mode of data analysis that was found suitable for use in this dissertation was the “explanation building”. This mode was found appropriate because it could reveal the cause/s of the problem being studied in the research work.

2.6 Theoretical design

This sub-section discusses the theoretical framework of the dissertation. This study is premised on patron-client relationship theory. It is assumed that the elections in Lesotho take place in accordance with the patron-client relationship theory. Also, it is assumed that between 1993 and 2006 the opposition political parties in Lesotho were weak.

The reader should note that, in this study the researcher considered a number of issues relating to political and economic developments in Lesotho. Therefore, there are two other theories used *only to explain these issues individually*. The following other theories were used: Dahl’s theory of polyarchy and Lindberg’s theory of uninterrupted series of elections.

2.6.1 Theoretical background and its relevance for Lesotho

2.6.1 a) Patron-client relationship theory

Patron-client relationship theory explains how the ruling party in Lesotho achieved landslide victory in successive elections of 1998 and 2002. Lindberg (2006: 12) asserts that a couple of empirical studies of multiparty elections of the 1990s corroborate the recurrence of personalized patron-client relations in electoral politics in Africa.

Likoti (2008: 81) contends that the system of patron-client relationship is an exchange between a superior patron or patron group and an inferior client or client group. Likoti argues that in most developing countries particularly in Africa the ruling party acts as a patron and voters become inferior group that votes expecting rewards of some kind from the patron. According to Likoti the ruling party in Lesotho, the LCD, develops the patronage so that the voters get obligated to the patron, the ruling party, for life. Further, Likoti asserts that the electorate vote for candidates who have contributed services to their

constituencies or those who have the potential to offer services to their constituencies.

Further on, Likoti (2008: 82) states that the rural population takes the ruling party and its members of Parliament (MPs) as their patrons who provide practical assistance. Likoti points out that with introduction of free education and old age pensions, by the LCD, the level of rural communities' dependence on state-sponsored patronage is overwhelming. Further on, Likoti argues that the victories of the LCD were not confined to the rural areas. Likoti was analysing the 2007 election that is not part of this dissertation. However, the data used applies also to the elections of the period 1993 –2006.

Rakuoane, the leader of the PFD in an interview, stated that due to poverty people vote for the ruling party in order to secure their jobs and the unemployed people vote in order to get jobs. The PFD Leader contends that the ruling party patronises the masses and the opposition parties usually find it difficult to get good support from the masses.

Malebo, the MFP leader in an interview, asserted that since 1992 a great majority of people looked up to Mokhehle, the former leader of the BCP, as messiah who would save them from poverty and unemployment. Malebo's view is in agreement with both Rakuoane's and Likoti's view of the party patronising the masses. Malebo says that many people had strong belief in Mokhehle, adored him, and in their minds developed an ideology of Congress-ism⁴.

Further the MFP leader argued that it is difficult for the new parties to establish themselves when an old one is already well established. Also Malebo asserted that lack of grass roots organization and finance by political parties and lack of understanding of politics are big challenges. Further still, Malebo stated that party members adore the political leader, for example, the leader of the BCP was Prime Minister for five years, although, he had assumed his position already ill and weak so much that he could not work efficiently.

⁴ According to Malebo, the ideology of Congress-ism is an unwavering belief in the teachings of the parties established in the Congress tradition i.e. of the BCP/LCD. Malebo said they are taught this dogma: "once been a Congress always will be a Congress". Further, he asserts that the LCD members looked at Mokhehle, the leader, as their messiah. He says that a member of the LCD does not accept any ideas that could influence him/her to leave the LCD to join any other party.

Gordon *et. al.* (2007: 76) contend that most African rulers take advantage of monopolizing the scarce resources; they build strong bases of social support to maintain them in power. According to Gordon *et. al.*, these African leaders defuse the opposition by a wide variety of patronage devices made possible by their control of state. Further, Gordon *et. al.* (2007: 76) state that patron-client relations became the main form of political exchange in post-independence Africa. Also Gordon *et. al.* (2007: 77) assert that citizens “tie” themselves to the patrons in government who can help them somehow.

According to Gordon *et. al.*, the lower-level patrons are clients themselves to the higher-level patrons and at the apex of the patron-client networks are the “middlemen” clients of the ruling elite. For example, in Lesotho members of the ruling party get employment much more easily than members of other parties. Also, in Lesotho, the ruling party uses state resources, such as vehicles, and the media; the ruling party monopolizes the use of the state media while some political parties such as the ABC are not able to use the state media. Usually, when the parties campaign for the national election, the ruling party distributes food aid in the villages.

Further Gordon *et. al.* (2007: 77) contend that using the political clout, the rulers avail powerful positions and access to government monetary resources to enable these middlemen-patrons to provide jobs, to finance schools, health clinics, wells, storage facilities, roads, and other favours to their regions. Also Gordon *et. al.* assert that patronage binds the local constituencies not only to their network but to support for the regime. Additionally, Boone (1990b: 37) in Gordon *et. al.* (2007: 77) asserts that acting as a system of control, state patronage and “clientelism” serve to consolidate regimes by offering access to state resources in exchange of political acquiescence.

Chiroro (2006: 108) asserts that most of the liberation political parties, such as the ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and the FRELIMO in Mozambique have created structures at the grassroots and created links with prominent personalities who have sustained forms of pervasive clientelism and patronage. Further, Chiroro states that it is difficult for the new parties with few links to break these structures of loyalty when they recruit new members especially in the rural areas. The LCD

is a splinter party of the BCP that is the oldest party in Lesotho. The LCD has similar structures and links to those mentioned by Chiroro.

In 1997, in Lesotho, the ruling party, BCP, split giving birth to the LCD led by the Prime Minister, Dr Ntsu Mokhehle. In the 1998 election the LCD achieved a landslide victory scoring 60.7% votes and winning 79 out of 80 contested constituencies. According to Matlosa (2008: 25) the LCD participated in the election with its muscle strengthened by two main advantages: the popularity of its leader, and the control and strategic utilisation of state resources for the political mileage.

In 2001, 27 MPs of the ruling party, the LCD, crossed the floor to form a new party, the LPC. In spite of this split, in 2002 election the LCD scored 54.9% votes winning 77 out of 78 contested constituencies while the LPC scored 5.8% winning only 1 constituency (Government of Lesotho 2002: 1). Also the LCD won the remaining 2 constituencies that were contested later.

The researcher avers that these successive victories of the LCD followed the pattern explained by patron-client relationship theory. What is its relevance for this study? In principle, it provides an explanation why and how the opposition political parties weakened since 1993.

2.6.1 b) Dahl's theory of polyarchy

The work of Dahl, *Polyarchy – participation and opposition*, provided a very useful theoretical foundation for this study. Dahl's frame of reference and context are mainly American. However, Dahl's theory is applicable to the political developments in Lesotho. Dahl's work studied the conditions that favour or impede transformation of a hegemonic regime into a near-polyarchy, and the near-polyarchy into a full polyarchy. Dahl (1975: 8) defined a polyarchy in terms of two criteria (inclusiveness and contestation) as a relatively democratised regime or a regime that has been substantially popularised and liberalized to be highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation. Public participation in elections in Lesotho should be measured in terms of both criteria. On the other hand, Dahl refers to hegemony as a regime type that does not accommodate any

competition. Also he identified a near-polyarchy as a regime in between the stages of the hegemony and polyarchy.

According to Dahl (1975: 20) certain classic liberal freedoms constitute part of the definition of public contestation or competition, and participation. Some of these freedoms are opportunities to: oppose government, form political organizations, express oneself on political matters without fear of government reprisals, read and hear alternative points of view, and vote by secret ballot in elections.

Dahl (1971: 121, 122) asserts that in polyarchies there are two kinds of institutional arrangements. The first deals with the relationship between the executive and the other major political forces in the country including the relationship between the executive and the legislature that is usually the source of major problems in competitive polyarchies. Dahl further says that the studied countries, including France, rejected the classic model of assembly government. The second significant institution is the party system. Furthermore, Dahl contends that if the political parties have tolerance to one another the party systems contribute more towards integration and action than to fragmentation and paralysis.

Also Dahl advocates that highly fragmented multiparty systems can result in unstable and weak coalitions and this phenomenon may stimulate loss of confidence in representative democracy and willingness to tolerate political conflicts. In Lesotho a number of political parties split and new parties were established as breakaway parties and this could be the result of lack of tolerance to the political conflicts. Seven of the twelve party officials interviewed by the researcher confidently alluded to lack of efficient leadership contributing towards the splits of political parties in Lesotho.

During the interviews of political party officials, some of them (such as the leader of the MFP) said that one of the problems reigning in Lesotho was lack of democracy. In line with Dahl's argument, in Lesotho, the rate of fragmentation of the political system, where the population is about 2.2 million and there are 18 political parties, can cause problems of loss of confidence in the representative democracy. The alliances that these parties make are weak. For example a new alliance of the BAC, the LPC and a new breakaway group of the BCP

(Mahatammoho a poelano le kopano), called the “Alliance of the Congress Parties (the ACP)”, is weak because in the 2002 elections the BAC, the BCP and the LPC had received about 11.3% combined total votes.

Another example of fragmentation is the split of the LCD resulting in the establishment of the All Basotho Convention (the ABC), the 19th political party, on the 9th October 2006 (Chefa 2006: 2). This new party with 18 parliamentarians increased the fragmentation of the political system. The opposition seats were increased from 41 to 59 and the ruling party’s seats reduced from 79 to 61. The next election was due in 2007. In the last week of November 2006 another new party, the Basotho Democratic National Party (the BDNP) a splinter of the BNP, was established as the 20th party in Lesotho.

In 2006 three splinters from the original BCP established an “Alliance of the Congress Parties (the ACP)” as mentioned above. Additionally, the All Basotho Convention (ABC) and Lesotho Workers Party successfully negotiated an alliance; BNP and NPP also negotiated an alliance.

Dahl (1975: 3, 4) contends that there are eight institutional guarantees of democratisation, which provide a theoretical scale along which it is possible to order different political systems. The guarantees are the following:

- i) Freedom to form and join organizations;
- ii) Freedom of expression;
- iii) Right to vote;
- iv) Right of political leaders to compete for support;
- v) Alternative sources of information;
- vi) Eligibility for public office;
- vii) Free and fair elections;
- viii) Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

Further Dahl says that these eight guarantees might be interpreted as constituting two rather different theoretical dimensions of democratisation. Firstly, in different regimes these guarantees will not be available to the same extent. So, it is possible to compare different regimes according to the extent of permissible opposition, public contestation, or political competition. Secondly, regimes differ

in the proportion of the population franchised to participate in the system of public contestation. Furthermore, Dahl asserts that there should be a scale measuring the extent of the right to participate in public contestation to facilitate a comparison of different regimes according to their inclusiveness. Also Dahl (1975: 5, 6) admits that there may be more than two theoretical dimensions of democratisation.

According to Dahl (1975: 24, 25) when the suffrage is extended to the groups that had been denied political rights, the size of the electorate increases and this in turn influences a change in the structure and organisation of political parties. As a result political participation and competition increase and for a political party to survive this new political life it must reach out to its members, followers, and potential voters throughout the country. In Lesotho, in 2001 suffrage was extended to the youth who reached 18 years of age. The question is: "Did the opposition political parties in Lesotho change in structure and organisation in order to survive the new competition?" The answer to the question is that in Lesotho the opposition political parties did not change the structures before the 2002 election because it was too soon.

Another issue that possibly affects participation and competition of opposition political parties in Lesotho is that political parties are not inclusive enough to accommodate women participation in the leadership. According to Matlosa (2008b: 105) women hardly feature in the leadership structures of political parties in Lesotho, men dominate these structures. This happens in spite of Southern African Development Community's (SADC's) call for offering women 30% of parliamentary seats. The researcher believes that enough accommodation of women in party structures could be an incentive to women to participate more effectively in politics.

Why does Lesotho fail to accommodate 30% of women representation in parliament? Letuka, *et.al.* (2004: 49-52) noted that a total of 15 political parties, for the FPTP fielded 125 women and 605 men as constituency candidates for 2002 general election. Letuka, *et.al.* (2004: 50) interviewed members of the executive committees who told them that the procedure of selection of candidates for the FPTP component of the electoral model is through competition. Usually, women do well at lower levels, at village levels, but they taper off as the

competition goes to higher levels, branch and constituency/district levels. That is why, according to Letuka, *et. al.* (2004: 49) and table 2.6.1.1 below, only 125 women in contrast to 605 men succeeded to be nominated as constituency candidates for the 2002 election.

Below are the findings of the study by Letuka, *et. al.* (2004), which partly answer the above question. Letuka, *et. al.* (2004: 54) discovered that during campaigning women face more challenges than men. These challenges might have contributed to the failure of women to be elected in big numbers to the candidacy of constituencies for the 2002 general election.

The challenges include the following:

- i) Women lack confidence to be interviewed and to address people/crowds at political rallies;
- ii) Women do not read widely and therefore have minimal awareness of the changing political realities and they quickly lose interest in politics;
- iii) Women lack resources to cover campaigns;
- iv) Family responsibilities make it difficult for women to actively participate in political affairs particularly campaigning process which is demanding;
- v) Women respect and fear leadership and hence they tend to be followers and not leaders.

The PR list in table 2.6.1.2 below indicates a total of 437 women and 547 men. Letuka, *et.al.* (2004: 52) argue that the differing dimensions show that parties utilize varied approaches in drawing up the lists, and that caused different results of gender representation. Further, they discovered that preference was given to the party leader and members of the executive, who in almost all cases were male. Names of these people appear at the top in the proportional representation (PR) party lists and this partly answers the above question. Letuka, *et. al.* (2004: 52) assert that PR alone does not guarantee inclusion unless it is based on a system that alternates men and women in the list.

The complete answer to the above question is as follows: Lesotho fails to accommodate 30% of women representation in parliament because of the following major factors:

- a) firstly, competition during the election to constituency candidacy bowls out most of the women;

- b) secondly priority given to party leader and members of executive who mostly are men in the PR list.

Table 2.6.1.1 Nominated political party candidates by gender

Party	Women	Men	Total
LCD	10 (13%)	70 (87%)	80
BNP	7 (9%)	73 (91%)	80
BAC	6 (8%)	69 ((2%)	75
LPC	4 (5%)	75 (95%)	79
BCP	3 (5%)	59 (95%)	62
LWP	12 (31%)	27 (69%)	39
MFP	24 (32%)	50 (68%)	74
NPP	9 (19%)	39 (81%)	48
PFD	12 (17%)	58 (83%)	70
LEP	3 (21%)	11 (79%)	14
NLFP	12 (8%)	24 (92%)	26
SDU	6 (30%)	14 (70%)	20
LLP	8 (47%)	9 (53%)	17
CDP	9 (35%)	17 (65%)	26
NIP	0	10 (100%)	10
	125	605	730

Source: Letuka, *at. al* (2004)

Table 2.6.1.2 2002 Election PR list by party and gender

Party	Total	Male		Female	
		Number	%	Number	%
BAC	42	35	83	7	17
BCP	41	27	66	14	34
BNP	118	94	80	24	20
CDP	40	19	48	21	52
KBP	40	21	53	19	47
LCD	58	26	45	32	55
LPC	41	5	12	36	88
LWP	46	26	57	20	43
MFP	85	55	67	30	33
NLFP	46	20	43	26	57
NIP	40	32	80	8	20
NPP	61	47	77	14	23
PFD	90	58	64	32	36
SDP	40	31	78	9	22
SDU	114	25	22	89	78
UP	82	37	45	56	55
	984	547		437	

Source: Letuka, *at.al* (2004)

Botswana is an example of a country in which the governing party did not suffer fragmentation like the BCP/LCD in Lesotho did. Selolwane and Shale (2006: 123, 128-129) assert that the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (the BDP) has been in power since independence (1966) and has a track record of performance better than any of its peers in Africa in terms of management of both state affairs and its internal matters. Also the BDP never experienced any split while within the opposition the splits are common. In Botswana none of the opposition parties ever ruled. These authors state that for the opposition to remove the BDP, they should earn credibility and not accidentally acquire it as windfall from bad governance practices of the ruling party (Selolwane and Shale 2006: 129).

In support of Dahl's approach, Chiroro (2006: 101) contends that viable opposition and effective political systems are crucial for the building of democratic societies in Southern Africa. The author asserts that the opposition parties are faced with the double task of democratising the state and society and their own

internal structures. According to Chiroro (2006: 103) the opposition political parties are part and parcel of the nation-building exercise. Further, Chiroro states that if their role is not fully recognised and fully institutionalised in the political structures the Southern African democracies they will remain fragile. Further on, Chiroro (2006: 105) notes that in Southern Africa the opposition suffers from legitimacy crisis and its role remains largely undefined and regarded as a struggle for power only. The incumbents delegitimize the opposition through the media and public announcements (Chiroro 2006: 105). Also Chiroro (2006: 106) asserts that evidence in the Afro-barometer (Working Paper no 34 of 2004) survey shows that support for the opposition in the Southern African region has declined; more people trust the ruling parties.

Dahl (1975: 14) argues that when hegemonies and competitive oligarchies transform towards polyarchies they increase the opportunities for effective participation and contestation and hence the number of individuals and interest groups whose aspirations have to be taken into account in policy making. In Lesotho in the 1998 election more political parties contested than in the 1993 elections. The reason for this phenomenon in Lesotho was the transformation from the hegemonic rule of the military in 1993 and re-entrance of multiparty democracy. In Lesotho, in 2001 a more inclusive electoral model, MMP, was introduced and it was tested in 2002 general election.

Furthermore Dahl (1975: 31) states that the conceptual scheme employed in his book reflects a commitment or choice in favour of polyarchy as against less democratised regimes. Also he points out that another person could choose the other regime and study the conditions that favour movement or transformation in that direction. In addition Dahl says that the analysis carried out is independent of his commitments or biases in favour of polyarchy. Further, still Dahl emphasizes that he makes no assumption that a shift from hegemony toward polyarchy and to the third wave of democratisation (in a polyarchy further political developments go on to enhance democratisation) is historically inevitable.

Dahl (1975: 32) asserts that it would be absurd to impose on societies some sort of historical law of development. In his work Dahl (1975: 32, 208, and 209) shows that a polyarchy can change back to a hegemonic regime but the trend is that hegemonic regimes are transformed into polyarchies. Dahl (1975: 39, 40)

proposes four possible paths of transition from a hegemonic regime to a polyarchy and also he says that the fourth path avoids risks of failure, if steps toward liberalization are accompanied by a dedicated and enlightened search for a viable system of mutual guarantees. The researcher suggests that Dahl's theory entails a historical law of development determining inevitable transition of hegemonic regimes towards polyarchies, as will be seen below.

In the summary of his work, Dahl (1975: 202) gave conditions favouring polyarchy. Dahl's theory of democratisation says: "the chance that a country will be governed at the national level for any considerable period of time by a regime in which opportunities for public contestation are available to the great bulk of the population (that is, a polyarchy) depends on at least seven sets of complex conditions". These seven sets of conditions are as follows:

- I. Historical sequences
- II. The socio-economic order
- III. The level of socio-economic order
- IV. Equalities and inequalities
- V. Sub-cultural pluralism
- VI. Domination by a foreign power
- VI. Beliefs of political activists

Dahl (1975: 208,209) contends that while the number of polyarchies increases, movement in the opposite direction on a smaller scale is also possible. The researcher is in agreement with Dahl on this theory.

Furthermore Dahl (1975: 45) contends that in the future as in the past, stable polyarchies and near-polyarchies are more likely to result from rather slow evolutionary processes than from the revolutionary over-throw of existing hegemonies. However, Dahl (1975: 37) acknowledges that there may be exceptions to the law and the shortcut path may be taken. Dahl's theory is therefore important for this study, because it provides a theoretical space for public participation in the broader democratic theories.

2.6.1 c) Lindberg’s theory of uninterrupted series of elections

Lindberg (2006: 116) believes that it is not correct to label the first multiparty election as the founding election as many theories of democratisation do. He contends that there is no democratic regime yet after the first election, because it would imply that the improvements in civil liberties have come independently and ahead of elections. In his work, Lindberg (2006: 99) suggested and tested the following hypothesis: “The longer an uninterrupted series of elections a country has, the more its society will become imbued with democratic qualities”. Also the suggested and tested hypothesis is as follows: “Increases in democratic qualities are the effects of holding elections” (Lindberg 2006: 99). Is Lesotho an exception to this rule? Tables 2.6.1.3 and 2.6.1.4 below show Freedom House ratings for Lesotho and the above question will be answered.

Table 2.6.1.3 Main hypothesis of overall relationship between elections and democratization

Hypothesis: Uninterrupted series of elections ↓		→ Better or more democratic qualities in society ↓ ↓ ↓
Indicators:	Participation:	Rights of assembly: to form and join civil organisations and have open public discussion. Personal autonomy and economic rights: freedom from excessive dependence; equality by gender, education, and profession; and the rule of law.
First elections	Competition:	
Second elections		
Third elections		
Fourth+ elections		
	Legitimacy:	Intra-social acceptance: peaceful coexistence of organisations, and absence of insurgencies.

Source: Lindberg (2006: 103)

According to Matlosa (2008: 26-28) in the period 1994-2001 as indicated in the table below, in Lesotho there was limited respect for political rights and civil liberties; hence the status of Lesotho was “partly free”. The other table shows

Lesotho's improved status as "free" in the period 2002-2006. Matlosa states that Lesotho's political development involved prudent electoral and constitutional engineering triggered by the instability of 1993-1998, culminating in electoral reforms of 2002 and the ongoing parliamentary reforms that began in 2003.

Table: 2.6.1.4 Freedom House rating for Lesotho, 1994-2001

Year	Political Rights (PL)	Civil Liberties (CL)	Status
1994	3	4	Partly Free
1995	4	4	Partly Free
1996	4	4	Partly Free
1997	4	4	Partly Free
1998	4	4	Partly Free
1999	4	4	Partly Free
2000	4	4	Partly Free
2001	4	4	Partly Free

Source: Matlosa (2008: 26) (Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report 2004)

Table: 2.6.1.5 Freedom House rating for Lesotho, 2002-2006

Year	Political Rights (PL)	Civil Liberties (CL)	Status
2002	2	3	Free
2003	2	3	Free
2004	2	3	Free
2005	2	3	Free
2006	2	3	Free

Source: Matlosa (2008: 28) (Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report 2004; Freedom House, Freedom in World Report, 2006; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2007: Selected Data from Freedom House's Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties)

Lindberg's hypothesis, discussed above, is valid for Lesotho. The civil liberties ranking for Lesotho increased from a low level of 4 in 1994, a year after general election, to a better level of 3 by the third election, in 2002. Lesotho maintained the level of 3 to 2006, a year before the 2007 general election.

Bratton (1998: 51) contends that consolidation of democracy involves the widespread acceptance of rules to guarantee political participation and political competition. Moreover Bratton asserts that sustainability of democratic rule can be guaranteed by regularity, openness, and acceptability of elections, as these three factors lay the foundations of democracy. This view of Bratton is in agreement with both Dahl's theory and Lindberg's series of elections theory. Further, Bratton says that elections are not synonymous to democracy and they can be held without democracy, but democracy cannot be achieved without elections.

2.7 Conclusion

In Chapter 2 the researcher explained the research design used in this dissertation, described and explained the methodology of conducting the research work. The sampling method used to select the constituencies was a combination of *simple random sampling and the statistical sampling* method. The researcher discussed the techniques used for data collection and he explained the triangulation method used.

Since 1993 the opposition political parties were poorly represented in parliament and it meant that together with their supporters they were denied the right to oppose. The electoral system, the FPTP, and the dominance of the ruling party denied them that right. Dahl (1975: 20) emphasizes that in the absence of the right to oppose, the right to "participate" is stripped of a very large part of the significance it has, in a country where public contestation exists. The MMP electoral model used for the first time in 2002 showed a potential of improving representation of the opposition in parliament. These developments occurred in accordance with Dahl's theory. The regime changed from almost a closed hegemony to an inclusive hegemony due to the compensatory parliamentary seats that were allocated to the opposition parties. However, opposition representation in parliament was still much weaker than in the period 1965 to 1970.

Dahl contends that high fragmentation of the party system is one of the causes of unstable and weak coalitions and this phenomenon may stimulate loss of confidence in representative democracy and willingness to tolerate political

conflicts. Lesotho has a highly fragmented party system; by November 2006, there were twenty political parties for a population of about 1.8 million. This is one of the reasons why opposition parties in Lesotho are weaker than in the period 1965 to 1970 when there were not more than five parties.

In general Dahl's theory is valid for explaining the political developments in Lesotho. The seven conditions that favour Dahl's polyarchy have been considered when assessing whether the regime is a polyarchy or not, and Lesotho regime is not yet a polyarchy. According to Dahl's theory, stable polyarchies emerge in evolutionary processes rather than through revolutionary overthrows.

Democratic developments measured by the Freedom House prove Lindberg's theory of series of elections valid in the case of Lesotho. The Freedom House rating of Lesotho rose from PL3 and CL4 in 1994 to PL2 and CL3 in 2006. There had been an uninterrupted series of three elections between 1993 and 2006.

The ruling party, in the period 1993 –2006, achieved landslide victories in the successive parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002. The patron-client relationship theory explained how the ruling party achieved landslide victories in those elections. The patron-client relationship theory informs us that the ruling party usually has advantages over the opposition because, the people know about its development actions. Also the ruling party patronises the masses through a wide variety of patronage devices. Additionally, the ruling party has the resources under its control and it is in a position to use them for promoting its interests.

The ruling party buys votes in many other ways, such as distributing donations to the poor people in the constituencies when elections approach. Those who benefited usually voted for the patron. In Lesotho the BCP/LCD achieved landslide victories in successive elections of 1993, 1998 and 2002. The BCP/LCD patronised the masses. However, the BCP landslide victory in the 1993 election came after the civilian and military authoritarian rule of the past 23 years, when the people wanted a change. Also, the people wanted to give the BCP an opportunity of ruling, which it had missed in 1970 when the BNP refused to relinquish power.

Finally, the researcher asserts that, in the period 1993 to 2006, elections in Lesotho took place in agreement with patron-client relationship theory. Also, that phenomenon explained why opposition political parties weakened since 1993.

CHAPTER 3

ELECTORAL DATA, DATA FROM INTERVIEWS, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION

3.1 Introduction

The main approach in this study is to look at the weaknesses and strengths of the opposition political parties in Lesotho by assessing their participation in elections. Therefore, as a matter of introduction it is important to identify a working set of electoral data as the basis of analysis.

In sub-section 3.2 the researcher describes and explains the electoral systems used in Lesotho in the given period of study, 1993 to 2006. Sub-section 3.3 gives, in three tables, the results of elections that took place in 1993, 1998 and 2002. Also the allocation of compensatory parliamentary seats is given in this sub-section.

It is important to elaborate, at this stage, on the types of electoral systems used in Lesotho. Although some opposition political parties including the main opposition parties rejected the results of the 1998 general election, and finally agreed to hold a fresh election (that ultimately was conducted in 2002), the researcher finds it appropriate to include data of the 1998 election results.

This section focuses on electoral data and data from the interviews with the political party leaders/officials. In the process of interviewing, the questionnaire form was filled in and also the researcher took some notes. There was a considerable volume of collected data from the interviews and personal notes earlier mentioned in the dissertation, the questions had mainly been open-ended, and also the respondents had been free to elaborate on their answers. In order to analyse that voluminous data, the researcher in alignment with guidelines given by Creswell (1994:154), had to reduce the data by arranging it into categories on the basis of themes.

In the process of data analysis, the researcher used coding that according to Neuman (1997: 422) involves two simultaneous activities: mechanical data reduction and analytic categorization of data. Strauss (1987) cited in Neuman (1997: 422), defined three kinds of qualitative data coding namely, Open coding, Axial coding and Selective coding.

During the first pass through the collected data, the researcher performed open coding which is a process of locating themes and assigning initial codes. In the second pass through the data, the researcher used axial coding, a process during which the researcher focused on the initial codes or coded themes more than on the data, with new ideas emerging, and the researcher organised these ideas and themes (Neuman 1997: 423).

In the course of the axial coding the researcher identified linkages between the themes and also, the researcher reduced the number of coded themes. During the final analysis of the data, the researcher used selective coding, identifying the major themes of the research project (Neuman 1997: 424) as given in table 3.5 c) below. The researcher used the themes or sub-topics from table 3.5 c) for further analysis of the data.

3.2 Electoral systems

This sub-section will give an explanation of elections, electoral systems, political participation and also the context in which electoral participation is used in this dissertation. It will explain how the allocation of parliamentary seats is done with the current system in Lesotho. Here the researcher will give a brief description of activities that took place mainly from 1993 through 1998, culminating in the change of the electoral model.

Schneider in Rose (1980: 75) says that, as a practice of democratic politics, elections perform two functions: firstly the ideological function whereby elections give voice to the main political cleavages and issue conflicts in society and allows major interests to receive due representation; and secondly elections have the plebiscitary function, whereby elections are a referendum, an appraisal, a passing of popular judgement on the performance of the incumbent government;

in other words people vote for a government when it had been doing well and they do not support it when it had not been doing well during its term.

According to Schneider (1980: 84-87) there are two styles of electoral competition, namely ideological and coalition politics. Schneider says that while ideology is associated with abstract conceptual thinking at the elite level, at the mass level it is usually characterized by a sense of group conflict, of “us” versus “them”; also the incentives for ideological politics are weak in a two-party system and the ideological strategy prevails in highly fractionated multiparty systems with proportional representation where there are limited chances for a party to adopt a majoritarian appeal. This author asserts that the strategy used in coalition politics is to appeal for support from everybody, that is, to all voters; and as it is the approach, uses non-divisive valence issues to attract the broadest range of voters without excluding any supporters.

Matlosa (2000: 2), referring to Jackson and Jackson (1999: 366) stated that elections fulfil the following functions:

They -

- i) provide a routine mechanism for recruiting and selecting individuals to occupy seats in representative institutions;
- ii) provide periodic opportunities to review the government’s record, assess its mandate, and replace it with an alternative;
- iii) accord the elected government with domestic and international legitimacy as well as moral title to rule;
- iv) act as agents of political socialisation and political integration, providing a unifying focus for the country.

What is an electoral system? There are certain accepted procedures, rules and modalities followed in the process of conducting the elections; the electoral system is commonly understood as a combination of the administrative, procedural and the institutional framework for elections; electoral systems determine the manner and pattern in which votes are matched with the allocation of seats in parliament (Matlosa 2000: 2).

According to Matlosa (2003: 11) there are many electoral models throughout the world with distinctive advantages and disadvantages, but the democratic

governance experts do not agree on how to classify them into composite categories or clusters. This author gives an example of Reynolds and Reily (2002) who classify the various electoral models into three categories namely a) plurality-majority; b) semi-proportional; and c) proportional systems. Handley (1999: 1) uses the same categorization. The other example given by the author is that of Jackson and Jackson (1997) who advocates four categories namely a) single-member plurality; b) single-member majoritarian; c) multi-member proportional representation; and d) mixed plurality-proportional representation systems.

According to Andrew (1997: 1), the characteristic feature of the majority-plurality systems is that they usually use single-member districts. A First Past the Post system (FPTP), sometimes called a plurality single-member district system or the winner-takes-all system, changes name to Party Block Vote (PB) when the multi-member districts are used (Andrew & Ben 1997: 1); the Alternative Vote (AV), like FPTP, provides for elections to be held in single-member districts, but allows the voters to rank the candidates in order of their choice (Ben 1997: 1); another majority-plurality system is the French Two-Round system (TRS) (Andrew 1997: 1).

Matlosa (2000: 5) contends that FPTP is the simplest of the electoral systems used in the world; 18 out of 52 states in Africa, mainly the former British colonies, use the FPTP, and out of 14 SADC member states, 8 use FPTP while 4 use proportional representation (PR). Thus, FPTP and PR are dominant electoral systems in Southern Africa (Matlosa 2000: 5).

According to Michael (1997: 1), the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, one of the PR systems, originated in Germany and was established in 1949 as a result of inter-party bargaining between democratic forces. That German system is classified as personalised proportional system, while in New Zealand it is known as a Mixed Member Proportional system. The essence of this system is the way in which it combines a personal vote in the single-member districts with the principle of proportional representation as Michael (1997: 1) noted.

In Germany the electoral system is not quite a Mixed System but a PR; however it differs from the pure proportional representation only in that the 5% threshold at

national level excludes very small parties from parliamentary representation, but these parties worked so hard that now they have been able to pass that threshold. In the five decades in Germany since 1945, majority governments were usually established in the form of coalitions and any change in government came as a result of the changes in the configuration of the coalition (Michael 1997: 2). According to this author, the coalition governments in Germany were not the product of the electoral system, MMP, but could have been caused by the culture that developed there after World War II.

In New Zealand, in 1992 and 1993, a referendum was conducted in the process of changing from an FPTP electoral system. In 1993 voters adopted MMP with 53.9% of votes thus replacing FPTP; the new system was used for the first time in the elections of 1996 (Nigel 1997: 3). The referendum in the following year, like in 1992, showed that coalition governments are more likely under MMP, as the minor parties are also represented.

In the 1993 and 1998 general elections in Lesotho the FPTP system was used; however the number of contested parliamentary seats was 65 (1993) and 80 (1998). With the 1998 events that followed the election, the winds of change of the electoral model began hissing at the old system, FPTP; the view of changing the electoral system for some kind of proportional representative system in order to accommodate small political parties came into play. In November 1998 the Parliament of Lesotho passed the Interim Political Authority Act, 1998, facilitating establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA) to enable and promote the preparation for holding of the next general election (Government of Lesotho 1998: 998). According to the U.S. Department of State (2001: 6), in December 1998 negotiations under SADC supervision resulted in the establishment of the Interim Political Authority with a mandate to prepare for the new election within 18 months.

In 2001 Parliament passed the National Assembly Election (No1) (Amendment) Act, 2001, that established MMP. The main purposes of that Act were to enable implementation of the decisions of the Interim Political Authority and to establish MMP; to raise the number of seats from 80 to 120 and provide that 80 of the seats be contested on a constituency based system when the other 40 seats

were to be distributed according to proportional representation; and to add a schedule of ‘Electoral Code of Conduct’ (Government of Lesotho 2001: 1135).

According to Section 49B (2) of Amendment Act 2001, a political party intending to contest an election may nominate candidates as per Section 57 (1) (c) (ii) of the Constitution and shall submit a list including at least 40 candidates, but not more than 120 arranged in order of preference from top to bottom. Two ballot papers are used, one for an election of members of Parliament in constituencies, and the other for an election of members of Parliament by proportional representation, and unlike in Germany, the two votes are cast simultaneously on the same day (Government of Lesotho 2002: 985).

According to schedule 5 (2) of Amendment Act, 2001, the Commission shall determine the number of votes required for the allocation of a seat, then dividing the total votes by 120 or any number of constituencies that successfully contested the elections, plus the forty PR seats and rounding off the number. The resulting figure is called “quota of votes”. For example the quota used in Lesotho during the 2002 elections was determined by dividing the total votes of 554386 by the number of parliamentary seats (120) and it was found to be **4699** (though the correct figure is $4619.8 = \mathbf{4620}$) (Thoahlane 2002: 81).

Schedule 5 (3) of Amendment Act, 2001, says that the Commission shall determine the provisional total number of seats in the National Assembly to which each party is entitled on the basis of its share of the total vote and that allocation is called ‘provisional allocation of the total number of seats’ (Lesotho 2001: 1172). In order to obtain the provisional allocation of seats, one has to divide each party’s votes by the quota of votes and the resulting number is referred to as the ‘party’s quota of votes’ (Lesotho 2001: 1172).

The example from the 2002 election results in Lesotho:

BNP: 124234 votes divided by quota of votes 4699 = 26.438391

BAC: 16095 votes divided by quota of votes 4699 = 3.425197

LPC: 32046 votes divided by quota of votes 4699 = 6.819749.

The IEC in Lesotho during the 2002 elections allocated compensatory seats to each party by following Schedule 5 (3) (1) (b) of the Amendment Act, 2001, which

says that the IEC shall allocate seats to each party equal to the party's quota of votes without taking any decimal fraction into account; the example is as follows:

BNP:	26
BAC:	3
LPC	6

In Schedule 5 (3) (1) (d to g) the Amendment Act, 2001, states what the IEC has to do, by way of subtraction or addition of seats, if the number of seats acquired by a political party is greater than, the same as, or smaller than the number of seats set aside for proportional representation. As a result of the application of these sub-sub-sections of the Act, the final allocation of compensatory seats to the parties given as examples above was as follows:

BNP:	21
BAC:	3
LPC	4

From the same example above we find that the total number of seats, constituency seats, plus the number of compensatory seats were as follows:

BNP:	21
BAC:	3
LPC	5

This example shows that the LPC had 1 constituency seat and 4 compensatory seats.

3.2.1 Political developments influencing the electoral system

The question of the choice of electoral system/s used in Lesotho is very important in this study. Below, the researcher elaborates on the political developments and events that took place from 1993 until the electoral system was changed. The electoral system used in Lesotho since political independence, had been First Past the Post (FPTP). Lesotho was a British Protectorate and as a result the electoral system used and the kind of Parliament (Westminster type), were both copied from the British. At the time of the preparations for political independence of Lesotho, the question of the electoral system to be used was not a big problem because ordinary people, including political party members, were not even aware of it.

Matlosa (2003: 12) says that the political history and the concomitant political culture of Southern Africa greatly influenced the nature of electoral systems that individual states had adopted since independence. Matlosa further mentions that the majority of Southern African states adopted Westminster constitutional and political arrangements because they were British colonies.

Section 53 of the Lesotho Independence Order 1966 (Government 1966: 45), facilitated division of the territory of Lesotho into sixty constituencies. According to section 56 of the current Constitution of Lesotho (Government 1993: 57), the National Assembly consists of eighty elected members; and section 57 of the Constitution says that Lesotho shall be divided into eighty constituencies, and that each constituency shall elect one member to the National Assembly. However, when the 1993 general elections were held 65 seats were contested. In the 1998 elections the same electoral system, FPTP, was used and 80 seats were contested.

The history of elections in Lesotho shows that among the political parties that lost in the elections, there is usually dissatisfaction and also there are complaints leading to court cases, and ending sometimes in conflicts, as in 1970 and 1998. In 1993 the BNP was dissatisfied with the ballot paper and a court case was lodged. In 1994 a number of events, including abuse of human rights contrary to the Lesotho constitution, took place. These included in-fighting within the military and also within the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMP), detentions of people without trial, torture in prison, deaths of people during trial, such as that of the former Lesotho Liberation Army's (former BCP's military wing during exile period) official (Makoa 2005: 187, 188), (Sechaba Consultants, 2000: 9), (U.S. Department of State, 1995: 5).

Makoa (2005: 175) contends that Lesotho's politics remains as polarized as the time when the country attained its political independence on 4 October 1966. He noted that the MMP might not become the reconciling force it supposedly is, because it is already undermined by the differential benefits and treatment accorded to the 120 members of Parliament. Further, Makoa (2005: 187 - 188) states that a trail of violent episodes took place in the country after the 1993 election. In January 1994 the military split into two factions that fought each other, causing a lot of civilian casualties after they had begun with a battle that lasted a

whole day and night (Makoa 2005: 187), (Sechaba Consultants, 2000: 9). In April the military held a number of Government Ministers hostage and killed the Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon. Mr Selometsi Baholo (Makoa 2005: 187 – 188), (Sechaba Consultants, 2000: 9 - 10). In May 1994 the LMP went on strike over pay increases and they allowed looting of shops. In April and May 1994, the LDF and the LMP arrested a number of senior government officials and a number of striking workers.

Still in 1994, on August 17, another major event was the toppling of the BCP government by the King, backed up by both the LDF and the LMP. King Letsie III did this without constitutional power in 1994 and dissolved the government, putting in place a provisional ruling Council (Makoa 2005: 188), (U.S. Department of State 1995: 9).

According to Ambrose (1994: 5), the Council was sworn in by Chief Justice Lebona Kheola, apparently under duress, not long after he had granted a High Court Order in which all the significant portions of the Lesotho Order (1994) had been declared null and void with immediate effect, together with any other legislative instrument made contrary to the Constitution of Lesotho. The palace coup was purported to be legalised by publishing an order in the Lesotho Government Gazette Extraordinary (no. 73 of 1994 dated 17th August), also called the 'Lesotho Order 1994'. It provided for a chairman and sixteen members of the council. On 14 September the King backtracked, after experiencing both internal and external pressure and negotiations had started; he signed the agreement to reinstate the BCP government (Ambrose 1994: 3, 4, 11). In February 1995 there was a rebellion of the secret service officers known as the National Security Services (NSS) (Ambrose 1995: 3).

In 1997 there was a mutiny, by certain police officers, that resulted in the death of one senior police officer. LDF was ordered to stop the mutiny and they stormed the Police Headquarters and two police officers were killed in that action. Others sustained injuries, while two alleged leaders of the mutiny, Second Lieutenant Phakiso Molise and Sergeant Makateng, escaped to South Africa. Molise was arrested a few days later (Makoa 1998: 2).

In 1997 three Ministers - Qhobela, Mphanya and Makhakhe - were relieved from their positions and two other Ministers - Raditapole and Senaoana - resigned. In June, of the same year, the BCP split and remained with 25 seats in Parliament when its former leader established a new political party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) that took up 40 seats in Parliament and therefore became the new ruling party (Leon et al 1998: 23, 71). This schism caused ill feelings because the LCD had taken over the reins of Government, the legality of which was questioned.

The opposition political parties, the BNP and the MFP among them, that had supported the palace coup, made a call for the election to be held, but the government made it clear that there would not be an election held before 1998, before the end of its 5 years term (Ambrose 1994: 16). At that point in time there was no idea raised about changing the electoral model used.

Leon et al (1998:114), investigating the political disturbances that took place in Lesotho in 1998, sought evidence from Senior Counsel as to whether establishment of the LCD was legal and the Senior Counsel advised that it was lawful and therefore the LCD legally proceeded to govern the country. Leon et al stated that their Commission was not required to express an opinion on the correctness of the advice of Senior Counsel. However, the Leon Commission contended that, even if the formation of the LCD was perfectly lawful, there could be no doubt that its formation angered the BCP and the other political parties, escalating the political tensions that existed in Lesotho. According to Thabane in Leon (1998:23), the main antagonists to Mokhehle, the former leader of the BCP, were Qhobela, who was deputy president of the BCP, Mphanya, Toloane and Makhakhe.

In July 1997 the National Assembly Election (Amendment) Act, 1997, was passed and it established the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in accordance with section 66 of the Constitution (Government of Lesotho 1997: 515, 516). According to Section 6 of this 1997 Act, every political party has a right to nominate not more than two delegates to the IEC, who have the right to be informed of all the sittings of the Commission relating to electoral matters and decisions taken thereat.

In preparation for the next election, the number of constituencies was raised from sixty-five to eighty, as mentioned above, and the voting age was also lowered from twenty-one to eighteen (Leon, et al 1998: 16). In May 1998 these general election was held under the observation of 150 international observers and 400 local observers, and also there were observers from Ireland (Leon, et al 1998: 16; 51; 72). The LCD won the election capturing 79 constituencies while the BNP won the only remaining 1 constituency. Although the results were a sore disappointment to the BCP, the BNP and the MFP, there was no immediate response from the opposition political parties.

As the Chairman of the IEC stated to the Leon Commission, no political party made any objections or complaints about the proceedings during the election, but instead submitted favourable reports about the election. It was only after a few days that they criticized Mafisa, the chairman of the IEC (Leon 1998: 51; 72). The opposition political parties namely, the BCP, the BNP and the MFP, formed an Opposition Alliance known as “Setlamo” Alliance as mentioned earlier, and this alliance established a 16-member team whose mandate was to audit the election results. That was done in June 1998.

On 4 August 1998 Setlamo Alliance led a procession that took a petition to the King at the Palace, and on 5 August there was a gathering, comprising mainly the youth, outside Parliament. As Morrison in Leon (1998: 74) said, those were defiance processions organized by Setlamo Alliance as programmes of lawlessness or “civil disobedience”. Among the “civil disobedience” activities of Setlamo was their action to inhibit all the official, commercial and private life in Maseru, and the result was a dead city of Maseru.

In December 1998 the Interim Political Authority (IPA) was established and one major purpose of its establishment was to level the playing political field, and that included looking at the electoral system. IPA came up with a mixed system of proportional representation: Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). The electoral system used in May 2002 general election was the MMP. When the MMP replaced the FPTP, the contested seats were 80 and the proportional compensatory seats were 40 in the election of 2002. The BNP was able to get 21 compensatory seats, and the other parties shared the remainder as shown in table 3.3 e) below. These 40 compensatory seats plus 1 seat won by the FPTP,

made up 41 seats of opposition in parliament. Why was the opposition so weak? In sub-sub-section 2.6.1 a) above, patron-client relationship theory illuminated the problem of the opposition political parties.

3.2.2 Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system

Reynolds (2006: 1) contends that mixed electoral systems attempt to combine the good qualities of the plurality/majority (or other) and Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems. There are two types of the Mixed Systems, namely the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) and the Parallel system. The Parallel system has the elections of PR detached from and not dependent on those of the plurality/majority (or other). With the MMP system the seat allocation process at PR level is dependent on the outcome of the plurality/majority (or other) elections. The seats allocated at PR level compensate for any disproportionality that might be produced by the district seat results. Therefore the system is called Mixed Member Proportional (Reynolds 2006: 1).

In the MMP system both the plurality and PR apply at local, regional and national levels, that is, throughout the country (Louis 1997: 6). According to Reynolds (2006: 1), each country uses its own proportion of seats allocated to the two elements of the system. In Lesotho, parties and independent candidates contest 80 FPTP constituency seats and 40 PR compensatory seats are allocated, while in Germany there are 299 FPTP seats and 299 PR seats. This author further noted that though the MMP system is designed to produce proportional results, it is possible that in a single-member district the disproportionality is so great that the PR list seats cannot fully compensate for it.

In order to solve a problem like the above-mentioned one, proportionality can be improved by slightly increasing the size of the legislature as it is practised in Germany and also in New Zealand. In Lesotho, by contrast, the size of the legislature is fixed and it was not possible to improve the proportionality of seats of the first MMP election in 2002; the extra seats are called overhang mandates or *Überhangsmandaten* (Andrew 2006: 1).

3.3 Elections results

Table 3.3.a) Results of the 1993 general election

Parties	27 March 1993		
	Total Votes	% Votes	Seats
BCP ⁵	398,355	74.5	65
BNP	120,686	22.6	0
MFP	7,650	1.43	0
LEP	63	0.011	0
LLP	244	0.045	0
PFD	947	0.17	0
NIP	241	0.045	0
UDP	582	0.10	0

Registered Voters	736,930
Total Votes	532,678
Voter Turnout	72%
No of captured Constituencies	65
No of Parliamentary seats	65

Sources: Government Gazette of 2 April 1993

Table 3.3.b) Results of the 1998 general election

Parties	23 May 1998		
	Total Votes	% Votes	Seats
BCP	61793	10.5	0
BNP	143073	24.5	1
MFP	7460	1.3	0
LCD	355049	60.7	79
Others	16244	2.9	0
Total	584740	100	80

Source: Matlosa 2000

⁵ The results of the ruling party are given in bold print in all the tables of electoral results in this dissertation.

Table 3.3.c) Results of 2002 general election

Parties	25 May 2002		
	Total Votes	% Votes	Seats
BAC	16,095	2.9	0
BCP	14,584	2.6	0
BNP	124,234	22.4	0
KBP	1,155	0.2	0
MFP	6,890	1.2	0
NPP	3,985	0.7	0
LCD	304,316	54.9	77
LEP	-	-	-
LLP	-	-	-
LPC	32,046	5.8	1
PFD	6,330	1.1	0
LWP	7788	1.4	0
NLFP	1671	0.3	0
NIP	30346	5.5	0
CDP	1919	0.3	0
SDP	542	0.1	0
SDU	1,584	0.3	0
UDP	-	-	-
UP	901	0.2	0

Registered Voters	831,315
Total Votes	554,386
Voter Turnout	66.1%
No of captured Constituencies	80
No of Parliamentary seats (Incl. Compensatory)	120

Sources: IEC Report 28 – CSRS of 19 June 2002; Matlosa, 2003a.

Table 3.3 d) Turnout & Percentage objected and rejected votes during the general election of 2002

Sample Constituencies	Reg. Voters	Tot. Votes	%Voter Turnout	% Objected Votes	%Rejected Votes
Hololo No 2	8,500	5,828	68.56	0	3.5

Sample Constituencies	Reg. Voters	Tot. Votes	%Voter Turnout	% Objected Votes	%Rejected Votes
Motete No 3	11,768	7,797	66.26	0.05	4.9
Butha-Buthe No 5	9,398	6,315	67.20	0	3.14
Thaba-Phatsoa No 8	9,202	6,465	70.26	0	5.68
Nokong No 20	9,393	6,332	67.41	0	3.84
Mahlatsa No 22	6,981	5,092	72.94	0	4.77
Pulane No 25	8,448	5,874	69.53	0	2.2
Thupa-Kubu No 26	10,245	7,379	72.03	0	3.84
Mabote No 29	17,339	10,459	60.32	0	1.61
Maseru No 32	14,170	7,811	55.12	0.18	0.03
Lithabaneng No 35	14,151	8,715	61.59	0	1.39
Qeme No 42	12,247	8,687	70.93	0	2.50
Rothe No 43	9,766	6,999	71.67	0	4.73
Maliepetsane No 50	8,435	5,457	64.69	0	3.45
Thabana-Morena No 52	10,599	7,761	73.22	0	4.03
Likhoele No 53	11,548	8,384	72.60	0	3.2
Qhalasi No 57	9,485	6,763	71.30	0	2.2
Mohale's Hoek No 58	10,584	7,401	69.93	0	0

Sample Constituencies	Reg. Voters	Tot. Votes	%Voter Turnout	% Objected Votes	%Rejected Votes
Mekaling No 59	9,015	6,190	68.66	0	1.76
Ketane No 62	10,453	6,662	63.73	0	3.44
Qhoali No 68	10,676	7,320	68.57	0	4.73
Tsoelike No 71	10,933	7,787	71.22	0	3.06
Semena No 75	11,560	8,459	73.17	0.05	6.86
Senqu No 78	9,395	6,472	68.89	0	4.64

Source: IEC Report 28 – CSRS of 19 June 2002.

Table 3.3 e) Allocation of compensatory seats in Lesotho Parliament with MMP system

Parties	Total Party Votes (valid votes)	Party's Quota of votes	Allocation based on full quotas	Remainder of votes (equivalent to highest decimal fraction)	Party's provisional allocation of total number of seats	Constituencies won by party	Party's provisional allocation of compensatory seats
BNP	124234	21.020981	21	124	21	0	21
BAC	16095	2.723350	2	4275	3	0	3
BCP	14584	2.467682	2	2764	3	0	3
CDP	0	0.000000	0	0	0	0	0
PFD	6330	1.071066	1	420	1	0	1
KBP	0	0.000000	0	0	0	0	0
LCD	0	0.000000	0	0	0	77	0
LPC	32046	5.422335	5	2496	5	1	4
LWP	7788	1.317766	1	1878	1	0	1

Parties	Total Party Votes (valid votes)	Party's Quota of votes	Allocation based on full quotas	Remainder of votes (equivalent to highest decimal fraction)	Party's provisional allocation of total number of seats	Constituencies won by party	Party's provisional allocation of compensatory seats
MFP	6890	1.165821	1	980	1	0	1
NIP	30346	5.134687	5	796	5	0	5
NPP	3985	0.674281	0	3985	1	0	1
NLFP	0	0.0000	0	0	0	0	0
SDU	0	0.0000	0	0	0	0	0
SDP	0	0.0000	0	0	0	0	0
UP	0	0.0000	0	0	0	0	0
Independents	0	0.0000	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	242298	41	38	17718	41	78	40

Quota of votes 5910; Allocated seats were 41

Source: IEC Report 28 – CSRS of 19 June 2002.

Table 3.3 f) Explanation of the columns in the above table

Column No.	Explanation	Interpretation
1	Column no.1 contains abbreviations of party names.	The column contains party names.
2	In column no. 2, only correct accepted votes, that is, valid votes are recorded. Reference is made to Table 3.3 d) above, which provided for the valid, the objected and the rejected votes at Constituency level. So, in the final seats allocations only valid votes were used, for allocating constituency seats and the compensatory seats.	The votes recorded in column no.2 represent the correct votes obtained by each party after the final counting of votes.

Column No.	Explanation	Interpretation
	<p>The purpose of this table was to show how compensatory seats were allocated to various political parties and that is why the LCD was given zero in all the fields related to compensatory seats. Since the LCD won 77 out of 78 contested seats, it did not qualify for compensatory seats (Matlosa 2003: 24 in CISR 2003).</p>	
3	<p>This column contains the party's shares of votes as the ratio of party's total votes to the full quota of votes. The full "quota of votes" is used to divide the party's votes. This ratio is called the party's quota of votes. This ratio has decimal fractions. This ratio is used to determine the total number of seats in the National Assembly to which each political party is entitled. It is important to take notice that the LCD quota of votes equals zero because it has been taken out of the list of parties that were given compensatory PR seats.</p> <p>At the bottom of this column the total number with the fraction is 40.997969.</p>	<p>According to Lesotho National Assembly Election (No.1) (Amendment) Act, 2001, this ratio is interpreted as the "party's quota of votes".</p>
4	<p>Column 4 is filled in with the provisional allocation of seats based on the party's quotas of votes. The decimal fractions of figures appearing in column 3 were thrown away and only whole numbers were used to fill in column 4. The total, without a fraction, in the column of party's quotas should be 40.</p>	<p>This column contains the number of seats approximating the provisional total number of seats in the National Assembly to which each political party is entitled. It means that the process</p>

Column No.	Explanation	Interpretation
		of getting the exact number of required seats is not over.
5	<p>According to the Amendment Act, 2001, the total number of compensatory seats provisionally allocated is equal to the number of seats put aside for proportional representation, that number shall be the final allocation.</p> <p>In the case above, the provisional number is less than the required number of seats for PR. So, those fractions that were left out in column 4 are used, and they are converted to the equivalent numbers of votes. These are referred to as the “remainder of votes” because they were not considered when the provisional allocation of seats was made.</p>	<p>The remainder of votes is interpreted as the votes equivalent to the fractions that were left out when provisional seats were calculated. According to the Amendment Act 2001 the fractions (or remainder of votes) are taken into account only when the total number of provisional seats is less than the total number of seats allocated in the Act.</p>
6	<p>Column no.6 contains the total of number of seats won in the constituencies plus the total number of provisional PR seats of the party. For example the LPC won 1 constituency seat and its quota of votes earned it 4 PR seats; so, the LPC had a total of 5 provisional seats in column no.6.</p>	<p>The figures in this column are totals of provisional seats that each party received.</p>
7	<p>Column no.7 shows the numbers of constituencies won by each party.</p>	<p>The number of constituencies won by each party is interpreted as the number of constituency seats won by each party.</p>
8	<p>Column no.8 contains the numbers of the</p>	<p>This column contains the</p>

Column No.	Explanation	Interpretation
	total compensatory seats (PR seats) provisionally allocated to each party.	compensatory PR seats only allocated to each party.

Table 3.3 g) Final seat allocation summary

Parties	Total Party Votes (valid votes)	Constituencies won by party	Party's allocation of compensatory seats	Total number of seats	%Party votes (valid votes)	% Seats won (constituency seats + compensatory seats)
BNP	124234	0	21	21	22.4	17.8
BAC	16095	0	3	3	2.9	2.5
BCP	14584	0	3	3	2.6	2.5
CDP	1919	0	0	0	0.3	0.0
PFD	6330	0	1	1	1.1	0.8
KBP	1155	0	0	0	0.2	0.0
LCD	304316	77	0	77	54.9	65.3
LPC	32046	1	4	5	5.8	4.2
LWP	7788	0	1	1	1.4	0.8
MFP	6890	0	1	1	1.2	0.8
NIP	30346	0	5	5	5.5	4.2
NPP	3985	0	1	1	0.7	0.8
NLFP	1671	0	0	0	0.3	0.0
SDU	1584	0	0	0	0.3	0.0
SDP	542	0	0	0	0.1	0.0
UP	901	0	0	0	0.2	0.0
Independents	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0
Totals	554386	78	40	118	100	100

Source: IEC Report 28 – CSRS of 19 June 2002.

Table 3.3.h) Comparison of voter turnout between rural and urban areas

Constituency No.	Constituency Name	Constituency Location	% Voter Turnout
8	Thaba-Phatsoa	Rural area	70.26
22	Mahlatsa	Rural area	72.94
29	Mabote	Capital City suburb	60.32
32	Maseru	Capital City suburb	55.12
35	Lithabaneng	Capital City suburb	61.59
52	Thabana-Morena	Rural area	73.22

Source: Author used results in table 3.3d above, sourced from IEC Report 28 – CSRS of 19 June 2002.

The purpose of the above table is to show that in the 2002 election the percentage voter turnout in rural areas was higher than in urban areas.

3.4 Trustworthiness and authenticity of collected data

Lincoln and Guba (1985), cited in Babbie and Mouton (2001: 276, 277), stated that the basic issue of trustworthiness is simple: “How can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences (including him- or herself) that the findings are worth paying attention to or worth taking account of?” Below, the researcher responds to this question.

The researcher used various sources about each question asked in the interviews, and in that way he applied triangulation of methods of data collection. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) cited in Babbie and Mouton (2001: 277), triangulation is an important instrument of trustworthiness of qualitative research. It is the best way to elicit the various and divergent constructions of reality that exist within the context of study.

Lincoln and Guba (1985), cited in Maykut and Morehouse (1994: 276), assert that the key criterion or principle of good qualitative research is found in the notion of trustworthiness: neutrality of its findings or decisions. Credibility of data, according to Lincoln and Guba (1985), cited in Babbie and Mouton (2001: 276, 277), is one of the most important factors of trustworthiness. In order to achieve credibility of the data collected during the interviews, the researcher used probing so that the interviewees could elaborate and repeat the response given at first. In that way the interviewee repeated the response when asked differently.

The other important factors identified by the same authors above are, transferability, dependability and confirmability. The findings can be applied with other respondents and they can prove that there is transferability. Also if the inquiry or search were to be replicated with the same or similar respondents in the same or similar context the findings would be repeated and they would show dependability/authenticity. The findings in this work are the product of inquiry and not the biases of the researcher and this stamps confirmability.

3.5 Qualitative data analysis

Table 3.5a) Open Coding

Categories	Item	Counts
A. Gone weak: (Notes for column 2 of this category:) The interviewees had said, "Yes the opposition parties have gone weak". These phrases are portions of their views as remedies for the weakness.	Remedy: era of Mokhehle and Congress-ism is over; grassroots level organisations; sustain established democracy, then culture will change, role of political parties will be clearer and unity of opposition will just follow; solution in hands of people with evolutionary change; evolutionary change of people's attitude towards opposition parties; need for rulers to change attitude towards opposition parties to provide resources to these parties; need to move to PR (MMP still not fair); clear policies; ruling party must be accommodative; reducing number of splinter parties; funding of parties; address issue of poverty; develop democratic culture; all	16

Categories	Item	Counts
	stakeholders to engage in democratic practices.	
B. Gone strong	Strong	2
C. Alliance	Alliance	8
D. Internal divisions	Internal divisions	5
E. Ballot system	Ballot system	4
F. Democracy of electoral system	Democracy	1
G. Transparency	Transparency	4
H. Political party funding	Funding	12
I. Lack of leadership	Leadership	10
K. Adoration, Patronisation & polarisation	Messiah; Congress-ism; polarised;	3
L. Democratic culture	Government; absence of strong democratic institutions; lack of democracy.	9
M. Government making difficult for opposition	Government making it difficult	11
O. Poverty	Poverty	12
P. Transparency of parties	Transparency	4
Q. Lack of freedom	Lack of freedom	1
R. Lack of sufficient voter education	Education	4
S. Lack of understanding of politics	Lack of understanding	4
T. Illegitimacy of elections	Illegitimacy	3
U. Party strength in towns or countryside	Countryside	2

Table 3.5b) Axial Coding

Categories	Item	Counts
A: Internal divisions	Internal divisions	5
B: Ballot system	Ballot system;	3
C: Transparency	Transparency	4
D: Political party funding	Funding	10
E: Lack of leadership	Leadership	10
F: Gone strong; Adoration, Patronisation & polarisation; Gone weak.	Strong;	2
	Messiah; Congress-ism; polarised;	3
	Gone weak	16
G: Democratic culture	Government;	6
	absence of strong democratic institutions;	1
H: Gov making difficult for opposition	Government making it difficult;	9
	Government.	11
I: Poverty	Poverty	9

Table 3.5c) Selective Coding

Categories / Themes	Item	Counts
A. Poverty & Political party funding	Funding;	12
	Poverty.	12
B. Lack of efficient leadership & Internal divisions	Leadership;	10
	splinter parties;	1
	internal divisions.	4
C. Potential strengths or weaknesses of opposition parties	Strong;	2
	Messiah; Congress-ism; polarised;	3
	Gone weak.	16
D. Lack of democracy	Government;	24

Categories / Themes	Item	Counts
	ballot system;	3
	absence of strong democratic institutions.	1
<p>Data notes:</p> <p>In table 3.5a) Notes have been provided immediately in the column of categories so that the reader may understand what the phrases in column 2 stand for. The phrases stand for “gone weak”.</p> <p>When the analysis of data has been completed the stage of interpretation of data follows. In order to facilitate data interpretation, themes should be developed in the final stage of data analysis. Therefore the researcher had to combine the linked categories step by step as explained below.</p> <p>The researcher combined the linked categories of table 3.5a) and filled in table 3.5b). He then prepared table 3.5c) of Selective Coding by combining linked categories of table 3.5b). He combined categories D & I to form Category A; he combined A & E to form Category B; Category F was renamed Category C; he combined categories B, C, G & H to form Category D. At the stage of Selective Coding each of the combined categories represents a theme.</p>		

3.5.1 Poverty

Some of the categories in the Selective Coding will be analysed here. The first is category A that is a combination of poverty and political party funding. These two items have been combined in category A because they are linked. Political parties are expected to get their funding from membership fees, concerts and from the Government. Due to poverty in Lesotho the opposition political parties have poor funding. So, in this study poverty and political party funding belong together.

The theme poverty has in it political party funding. This also has the element of government taking advantage of the situation and commanding the elections by way of distributing food aid (liphallelo). Also campaigning for elections, knowing that situation, the ruling party (government) misuses government property,

vehicles and media (radio & newspaper) to its advantage. The Ministers hold political gatherings using this property, according to some of the interviewees.

Information from the interviews shows that the parliamentary allowances are not balanced. All the parliamentarians get allowances for being in Parliament, but in addition to these, there are also constituency-allowances that are available to MPs who are electorates of constituencies, and the ruling party with its majority constituencies gets the lion's share of these allowances. The opposition gets such allowance only for one constituency.

Most of the twelve party representatives interviewed alluded to poverty and lack of political party funding as greatly contributing towards unfair competition between the opposition political parties on the one side and the ruling party on the other side, hence poor performance of the opposition during the elections.

In the above tables of the analysis of data from the interviews, the words "funding" and "poverty" each appeared twelve times giving a total of twenty-four appearances [See table 3.5 c)]. However the representative of the BNP stated that the ruling party, the LCD, is not stronger than the BNP, and that the BNP had rejected the 2002 elections.

The leader of the MFP, Malebo (15-12-2004), admits that the opposition political parties in Lesotho have gone weak. He says that since 1992 a great majority of people looked up to Mokhehle as the messiah who would save them from poverty and unemployment. He contends that poverty is one of the major causes of the weakness and he calls it a double-wedged knife. He says that on the one side of the blade, the poor of the poorest do not go to vote. Also he says that those who cannot afford a morsel of bread do not bother to vote. On the other side of the blade, people who still have hope of survival, and those who still have some water and a little food need to be financed.

Malebo asserts that lack of political party funding and lack of grass roots organization and finance by political parties are also major factors hindering political participation of the opposition political parties. He says that these factors are related to poverty. He puts forward the following respective remedies: that,

the political parties should be financed, and that there should be well planned organizational campaigns at grass roots level.

Rakuoane (16-12-2004), the PFD Leader, says that poverty adversely affects the people. The PFD Leader contends that people vote for the ruling party in order to secure their jobs and the unemployed people vote to get jobs. According to Rakuoane, political parties are not able to establish and run party offices due to lack of funds. Rakuoane argues that, under such circumstances, it is difficult to do party work efficiently.

Further Rakuoane says that it is unfortunate that Lesotho is a poor country that if a Parliamentarian or a Councillor of Local Government, as an example, receives monthly earning, he/she feels like in full-time employment and cannot like to be replaced.

Rakuoane asserts that government should provide enough political party funding. According to Rakuoane there is comparatively better political party funding in South Africa and in Zimbabwe than in Lesotho. Additionally, Rakuoane argues that in Lesotho, the ruling party patronises the masses, and opposition parties usually find it difficult to get good support from the masses.

Also the leader of the LPC, Maope (24-12-2004), finds poverty as the most central factor impacting on the performance of the opposition political parties. He contends that due to poverty opposition political parties lack resources. Maope asserts that parliamentarians shy to criticise the government in fear of losing their jobs, as it happens in Lesotho.

Mphanya (25-12-2004), of the BCP, argues that the government of a poor country is unfortunate because politicians look for their opportunities more than for the public interests, and it is like that in Lesotho. According to Mphanya the MMP electoral system had a negative impact on the opposition political parties. He says that the opposition parties made a mistake by not discussing within the parties the question of who were to go to parliament. The members of Executive Committees felt that they had to be in parliament and poverty was the reason why they wanted to be in parliament. Mphanya contends that the opposition parties have the weakness of failing to campaign for support from their potential

alliances the farmers, workers, traditional organizations, corporations, and street vendors.

Mphanya says that Lesotho is a poor country and government does not teach the people that when they work they will be freed from poverty, but teaches them to rely on donations from outside. The parliamentarians also teach people to build up committees to receive donations. The ruling party distributes the donations and this affects the choice of people.

According to Mphanya (25-12-2004), usually when elections are close, instead of developing agriculture, government brings in the donations in the form of food, clothing, and so on, from outside. So, people vote for the government that gives them food. Donations are given to ruling party members who can certify that by producing membership cards. That incidence, in November 2005, occurred in Nokong constituency, and Red Cross cancelled the offer after getting the report. Further, Mphanya (25-12-2004) asserts that in his home village of Mapoteng, there are the disabled people and also there are the aged people (around 90 years of age), who did not get these donations.

Mphanya argues that, these donations are dangerous because they are not fairly distributed. He says that the donations should be distributed by neutral bodies such as the Red Cross, churches and chiefs directly and not by political parties. Also he asserts that political parties should have a say in the request for, and distribution of, donations.

The leader of the BAC, Raditapole (30-12-2004), says that politics of poverty is another cause for the weakness of opposition political parties. She says that the ruling party can control everything because it has money. For example, it can control employment. So, people support the ruling party for social security reasons. Further, she argues that poor funding or non-funding of the opposition political parties is another cause of the weakness. Specifically she says that the electoral party funding is not enough for the opposition political parties.

Also Raditapole says that these parties are not able to establish institutionalised structures such as the village, branch, constituency organizations of the party; and the strength of the party is in these structures. These structures need funds

to be maintained. "In the past the BCP used to have district offices, but today they are not there anymore," says the leader of the BAC. Raditapole argues that lack of these structures causes lack of legitimacy of opposition political parties.

In addition Raditapole asserts that poverty created a new society of Basotho dependent on the mercy of the ruling party; and that even for the registration of senior citizens the temporarily employed officers came from the ruling party.

The leader of the BAC argues that if the number of splinter parties can be reduced, it will be meaningful to fund a few political parties. This is the remedy that she finds appropriate to apply in order to control political party funding. Raditapole contends that in reality poverty has not been addressed, and it should be addressed.

The leader of the NPP, Peete (12-01-2005), argues that the opposition political parties are not weak. He says that the ruling party has more opportunities than the other parties. Peete contends that the Ministers of the ruling party use government vehicles for campaigning. He asserts that the political parties are not equal because the campaigns of the opposition parties do not satisfactorily cover some of the regions of the country due to the mountainous and rugged terrain. Further he states that it is because of these unequal living conditions that the ruling party always finds donations to distribute, and gets opportunities of revisiting its specific areas of interest, for example education, and as a result it is able to improve its political methodologies or approaches.

Peete, however, says that poverty adversely impacts on the performance of the political parties in general. Further he says that South Africa gives opportunities to opposition parties for exposure; it gives more funds to opposition parties than it gives to the ruling party [Comment: the last statement is incorrect because in South Africa funding is distributed on a proportional basis (Government of South Africa 1998: 2)]. Furthermore he asserts that in Lesotho the allowances of the Parliamentarians are not equal. Even though the M150 is a common allowance, the members of the ruling party receive also the constituencies' allowances. Peete contends that poverty, lack of political party funding and lack of democracy in the electoral system are the most influential factors for the poor performance of opposition political parties.

The leader of the NPP proposes the following remedy. He asserts that in a democratic situation the ruling party has to give equal opportunities with respect to: learning, effectiveness, exposure to the outside world, to being in position, and to getting funds. Also Peete says that the NPP and other opposition political parties pointed out to the local representatives of international organizations that there were imbalances between the ruling party and the opposition parties in relation to the preparations for the elections. Furthermore, he argues that these parties should get equal opportunities mentioned above.

Matete (19-01-2005), the general secretary of the BNP, asserts that lack of political party funding, poverty and government, in that order, hamper the performance of the opposition political parties. He suggests, as a remedial action to the lack of political party funding, that the state should provide political party funding to build competitive democracy. Also he proposes that poverty can be alleviated with sound economic policies that are currently non-existent. According to Matete, the overwhelming majority of people live in misery and poverty. He argues that, this situation adversely influences their support for their parties, particularly financially. On the other hand the ruling party uses the state facilities to promote its image.

The general secretary of the LWP, Leneha (26-01-2005), argues that lack of political party funding adversely impacts on electoral participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho. Also Makoa (26-01-2005) of the LEP contends that the most influential factor on the participation of the opposition parties is the lack of political party funding. However, she strongly disagrees with the suggestion that poverty is the cause of poor performance of the opposition.

The official of the LLP, Mpela (12-01-2006), asserts that poverty, lack of democracy and lack of leadership are the main causes of weakness of the opposition political parties. He states that in Lesotho there is the elite group that is rich while the other people are poor. Mpela argues that Basotho have no 'ownership of government' because elections are funded with donations and grants from outside the country.

Manyeli (02-03-2006), the leader of NIP, contends that poverty, insufficient voter education and lack of transparency are the major impediments to political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho. Majara (07-03-2006), the leader of the NLFP, asserts that lack of democracy, poverty and lack of transparency are the main problems of the opposition political parties.

3.5.1.1 Interpretation

Almost all the interviewed party officials assert that poverty and political party funding are great impediments of electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho. Also, according to Matlosa and Sello (2005: xv), one of the numerous internal problems facing Lesotho political parties is “lack of mobilization and party funding”.

The researcher’s interpretation is that poverty is one of the major problems that the opposition political parties face with respect to electoral political participation. From the data analysis the researcher is convinced that these parties are not able to run their branch offices and carry out campaigns efficiently. Also they are not able to carry out development projects because of lack of funds.

The effect of poverty extends to the parliamentarians, because they feel like people who have got employment and they tend to protect their jobs even at the end of their term. This is evident when the political parties elect the candidates for the next national election; some of the former parliamentarians who happen to be replaced have attempted to stand as independent candidates for the next election. In the period of study 1993 to 2006 poverty had been a serious problem adversely impacting on the electoral political participation of the opposition political parties in Lesotho while the ruling party had the advantage of being in control of the resources and using them.

3.5.2 Leadership

A second theme in the Selective Coding is lack of efficient leadership and internal party divisions. According to Rakuoane (16-12-2004), the leader of the PFD, lack of efficient leadership is one of the major factors that adversely impact on the electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho.

Raditapole of the BAC goes deeper into the question of inefficient political leadership in Lesotho. She argues that the leadership is poor and as a result conflicts inside the parties arise. She asserts that the emerging splinter parties are a major cause of the weakness, because there are now too many opposition political parties which fail to work together.

The leader of the BAC contends that there is general lack of leadership in Lesotho, for example in churches, and in many other organisations. She therefore makes a deduction that organisations that are brought up by the people without leadership skills will be weak. She states that the remedial action to be taken is to reduce the number of splinter groups/parties so as to have a meaningful opposition led by people with good leadership skills.

According to the leaders/officials of the BCP, BNP, LPC, MFP, NLFP and the NNP, internal party divisions and lack of efficient leadership have almost no impact on political participation and therefore need not to be identified as issues. The general secretary of the LWP and the official of the LEP say that the internal party divisions need not be considered as issues, but the lack of efficient leadership has an adverse impact on the political participation of the parties.

The official of the LLP contends that internal party divisions and the lack of efficient leadership hamper political participation of the political parties in Lesotho. The leader of NIP, Manyeli (02-03-2006), asserts that the other main problems of Lesotho political parties are their internal party divisions and the lack of efficient leadership. He says that there are many opposition political parties and that there might not have been sound reasons for establishing some of them. Manyeli suggests the following remedy. He says that there should be sound legislation regulating the establishment of political parties. Manyeli says that on the 2nd March 2006 he mentioned in Parliament, that there is lack of principled leadership of political parties.

3.5.2.1 Interpretation

According to some political parties (the BCP, BNP, LPC, MFP, NLFP and the NNP, as indicated in the analysis) the question of efficient leadership is not a

problem with the opposition parties. However, there are no sound reasons supporting their view. Some other interviewees such as the leaders of the BAC, PFD and NIP, give sound reasons why they contend that leadership of the political parties in Lesotho is not efficient. The important things in qualitative analysis are the given reasons or content and not only the figures or numbers of parties. So the researcher has looked closely at the tabled reasons.

The researcher's interpretation is that the leadership of political parties in Lesotho requires training for capacity building. There is lack of efficient leadership that adversely impacts on the electoral political participation of opposition political parties. It is through appropriate training that the political leaders in Lesotho may acquire efficiency in political participation.

3.5.3 Democratic culture and the Government

This sub-section deals with the analysis of the issues raised by some of the interviewees, which they think touch on democratic practices. These matters involve both the opposition and the ruling parties. Some of the interviewees claim that the government makes conditions difficult for the opposition political parties. Also others show that it is important for the opposition parties to start now to apply democratic principles.

The leader of BAC, Raditapole (30-12-2004), asserts that an environment conducive to effective functioning of political parties and recognition of the role of opposition parties is absent. It is the number 1 cause of the weakness of opposition parties. She argues that the ruling party sees the opposition as the enemy. Also she maintains that the media may facilitate this environment, but they are weak. Maope (24-12-2004), the leader of LPC, holds a similar view, because he says that the media are weak in Lesotho. Also Raditapole asserts that the internal divisions and infighting are outcomes of the problem of the ruling party's disregard for the opposition parties.

Raditapole notes that in the questionnaire she could have grouped together questions 10(10) [lack of transparency within the political parties], 10(11) [lack of freedom] and 10(14) [lack of understanding of politics], under one question called "Lack of democratic culture in political parties". She argues that at the end every

party has a chance to become the ruling party; therefore it must start now to practice democratic culture and give reports.

The leader of the BAC maintains that most of the political parties are patriarchal; for instance, people do not see a party if they do not say 'Ntate Ntsu (Mokhehle, the founder of BCP) or Mandela (former leader of the ANC of South Africa). Raditapole advocates that the people should not fear that a leader is being toppled when he/she is criticized or his/her party is criticized.

Further Raditapole says that the ruling party denied the opposition parties the opportunity of meeting with the pioneers of the MMP (electoral system) such as New Zealand. She says that the MMP has positively affected the political participation of the opposition political parties. According to her, the Basotho have not yet taken the advantage of the system because they still have the old attitudes. She states that the opposition political parties had written an invitation letter requesting the Secretary General of the Commonwealth to invite countries experienced in the system, such as New Zealand, to send people to Lesotho to give their experiences of the system to Basotho. To their disappointment, the Prime Minister of Lesotho refused to assist the opposition parties saying that they are a disgruntled opposition.

As mentioned earlier, in 3.5.1 above, Raditapole asserts that politics of poverty put the opposition political parties at a disadvantage in comparison with the ruling party. She contends that the ruling party can control everything, because it has public money in its custody. For example, it controls employment. Accordingly people support the ruling party for social security reasons. She poses the question about overseeing good governance, and also about the rejection of the government put in place by force: "Who oversees these things?" She further argues that demonstrations are allowed on paper, but in practice they are not allowed in Lesotho. She says that demonstrations are a tool to be used by the opposition political parties when need arises.

The leader of the BAC suggests the remedial steps to address the above-mentioned problems inflicted by the government. Firstly, the laws should be improved so as to facilitate empowering of the private sector. Secondly, the laws that allow the ruling party to control everything, such as the resources and

projects, should be reviewed so that the opposition parties can have the opportunity of undertaking projects without frustration. She says that currently when one attempts to undertake a project and one has no association with the government, there is usually no success.

According to Malebo (15-12-2004), leader of the MFP, there is insufficient voter education. He maintains that there is freedom and there is fairness in the elections. He argues that the electoral system is very democratic, because it allows women and the disabled people to be members of Parliament. Malebo contends that the ballot system could not be the cause of the problem of the opposition political parties. He says that it is, however, an unnecessary expense. On the contrary Matete (19-01-2005), of the BNP, asserts that the ballot system is a problem. He suggests that it could be done on a plane paper with a watermark, and that only the name be written. According to him the current system is wasteful, even though it is correct.

Malebo (15-12-2004) asserts that the IEC does not answer the question: "Why do people vote?". It only misleads the people. Raditapole, the leader of the BAC says that the government is using voter education only as a ploy and not as genuine voter education, arguing that the less the people know the easier it is to control them. Malebo believes that sound voter education is required, that teaches people why they vote and not how to vote.

The leader of the MFP says that there is lack of transparency within the political parties, because of the inefficiencies of the Press. He asserts that, some of the newspapers are owned by the political parties, so that in general the Press favours various political parties and as a result reporting about the proprietor political party, is not always accurate (Comment: This is a worldwide phenomenon. If the Media support different parties, they will serve as a watchdog on each other.).

According to Malebo (15-12-2004), government has money, the Ministers use government vehicles and the ruling party has the upper hand during campaigning period. He says that, although the ruling party wins, it also gets a low score because many people do not vote, because their belief is that "they already had elected a government, what else could be demanded of them?" Malebo maintains

that the second reason why the ruling party gets a low score is due to dissatisfaction with the Members of Parliament of the ruling party.

Malebo (15-12-2004) contends that parliamentarians get interest-free loans and this is likely to cause problems in the future, and it makes it difficult for the Prime Minister to replace such people. He says that when parliamentarians have got these loans it is not easy to replace them, even by elections, before they can pay back their loans.

Further, Malebo (15-12-2004) argues that the Parliament did not have committees and that comparatively speaking Botswana is far ahead of Lesotho. He emphasizes that the Parliamentary Reform Committee is a must, and that there should be Parliamentary committees. Also he says that the former committees were not effective and they have begun improving them.

Malebo (15-12-2004) agrees that internal party divisions and inefficient leadership contribute towards poor electoral participation of the opposition political parties.

The leader of the PFD, Rakuoane (16-12-2004) tables two reasons why opposition political parties are weak: (a) there is no democracy, and (b) the main opposition political party is not ready to play its role in Parliament. Elaborating on each of these reasons, Rakuoane argues that:

- (a) for a long time in Lesotho there has been no democracy, so much that a culture of no democracy has developed. Under these circumstances people do not want to be in the opposition, everybody fights to be in the ruling position.
- (b) the main opposition party, BNP, is not ready to play its role in Parliament. Instead it is always complaining about the voter turnout. For this reason, the small parties cannot support the main opposition party. In short, there is no unity among the opposition political parties.

Additionally, Rakuoane (16-12-2004) says that on the ground the opposition is about 6% less than the ruling party, LCD. He advocates that the remedy to the above-mentioned situation is to sustain the democratic process that has just started, as it will change the culture and eventually the role of the opposition

political parties will be clearer. Also, Rakuoane asserts that unity of the opposition political parties will be enabled.

The leader of the PFD contends that the MMP electoral system has very positively affected the political participation of the opposition political parties. He asserts that their small political party has its leader heading the Parliamentary Reform Committee. Rakuoane, also, proudly says that in the Pan-African Parliament, Lesotho is the only country that has representatives of four political parties, while other countries have a maximum of two parties represented.

Maope (24-12-2004), the leader of LPC, as earlier mentioned, says that the media are weak and as an example, one hardly sees media people in Parliament. Maope further states that if there could be solutions to the above-mentioned problem; there could be a change of people's attitude towards the opposition political parties. Maope contends that democracy in Lesotho assumes that political parties have a role to play, and that even the constitution allows for that, but the rulers have neglected these facts. According to Maope, there is need for the rulers to change their attitude, and to avail the resources to the political parties.

Maope (24-12-2004) asserts that the ruling party does not use the electoral model as it was agreed upon. He says that, as an example, candidates of the opposition parties are denied certain benefits such as "constituency benefits" and as a result they cannot perform effectively. He believes that the responsibility of the parliamentarians from the opposition political parties is much greater than that of the ruling party, because they look after all the constituencies and not only single constituencies, and they give reports to these constituencies. In spite of this responsibility, only the parliamentarians from the ruling party get the constituency allowances.

Maope (24-12-2004) contends that the LCD government did not accept the MMP system, and it is like they were forced into it. Maope argues that, however, this electoral model is still not fair, and the remedy is to move to a Proportional Representation (PR) model. He says that the MMP system does not allow candidates to represent the constituencies effectively. Further, Maope asserts that the "Arbitration Award" after the 1998 events had said that there was an

agreement in Lesotho to increase the number of First Past the Post (FPTP) seats to be equal to that of the MMP compensatory seats in the forthcoming general election of 2007. [Comment: It was not done because in the 2002 election the allocation had 80 FPTP and 40 MMP compensatory seats]. Elkit (2000: 1) contends that the Award states that the first election should be with an 80/50 mix ratio of constituency seats (FPTP) to Proportional Representation seats and also that in the later election the mix ratio shall be 50 per cent of each category of seats. Elkit's statement confirms Maope's assertion].

According to Mphanya (25-12-2004) of the BCP, as earlier mentioned under poverty, the MMP electoral system has a negative impact on the opposition political parties. His argument is that the members of the executive committees of the parties nominated themselves to take up MMP compensatory seats. Matete of BNP says that MMP has positively affected political participation of the opposition parties. He states that, however, some problems of attitude of failing to accept the MMP model, mainly from the ruling party, make things difficult. He asserts that the ruling party even now maintains that its parliamentarians are more legitimate than those of the proportional representation component.

Mphanya (25-12-2004) argues that government has no policy that the opposition political parties can criticize. He believes that government relies on foreign powers to do its business in the country. According to Mphanya the ruling party should be accommodative. He says that the rulers should know that the opposition political parties are their own Basotho and their views should be heard. Mphanya cites the example of Botswana that he believes has a stable government, because its constitution says that the opposition should be in parliament. Also according to Peete (12-01-2005), the ruling party Ministers have the opportunity to impose whatever they want without prior discussion with the opposition parties. The leader of NNP asserts that in a democratic situation the ruling party has to provide equal opportunities to all the political parties with respect to: learning, effectiveness, exposure to the outside world, to being in position and to getting funds.

Mphanya (25-12-2004) contends that there is a problem of illegitimacy of elections, such as in 1998. Raditapole holds a similar view as she says that in

Lesotho the only legitimate and normal elections were two (the 1965 and 1970) general elections.

According to Mphanya, a poor country is unfortunate because military intervention is used in order to suppress the political unrest in it as it was done by SADC in Lesotho in 1998. [Comment: When SADC military intervened the Langa Commission had done its work of studying whether there had been discrepancies during the 1998 election and had submitted the Report, which had not yet been seen by the public]. Further, Mphanya avers that on the contrary a similar case of political unrest in a developed country is not suppressed with the military intervention from other countries. According to him, in the Ukraine the opposition political parties rejected the results of the October 2004 election and then political unrest followed, like it had happened in Lesotho in 1998 before SADC intervention. Further, Mphanya says that, unlike in Lesotho, in the Ukraine there was no military intervention but the law was amended and elections were held on 26 December 2004.

Peete (12-01-2005) contends that, when comparing the advantages of democratic involvement in day-to-day affairs and also the relations of the ruling party with the opposition political parties in Lesotho and South Africa, it is found that South Africa is more open in democracy than Lesotho where there is no openness. He argues that South Africa gives opportunities to opposition parties to gain exposure. As mentioned earlier, Peete says that in Lesotho the allowances are not equally distributed. Each Member of Parliament of the ruling party, in addition to the common daily allowance of M150, gets constituency allowance..

According to Peete (12-01-2005), the law that prohibits the establishment of alliances by opposition parties, particularly those which got into parliament as a result of the proportional representation, shows that the political parties in Lesotho are not treated equally. Mphanya and Maope also say that the law prohibits their political parties from establishing alliances before Parliament is dissolved in preparation for the next election.

Matete (19-01-2005), general secretary of the BNP, says that in 1998 the ballot paper seemed to have been manipulated and was not uniform as it had two

different textures for one and the same election. Hence the paper was called “Pampiri sekokoto” or a hard version and a soft version. He further says that it was questionable why two versions of the paper were used in one and the same election. Also the officials of the LWP and the LEP, Leneha (26-01-2005) and Makoa (26-01-2005) respectively, complained about unequal rights between the ruling party and the opposition parties, and they also criticized the ballot system.

Additionally Matete (19-01-2005) criticizes the balloting system itself. He argues that they had been accusing the IEC of giving itself the monopoly of developing the ballot paper, when it is the responsibility of both the IEC and the stakeholders, political parties. However, Matete says of late it is better, because parties are invited, although eventually their views are thrown away. He believes that the remedy to this problem is that the IEC and government acknowledge that preparation for elections is the responsibility of all stakeholders. Matete asserts that the remedy to illegitimacy is to give the stakeholders the opportunity to exercise their full responsibility over the process of the elections, unlike what is currently taking place. The legitimacy of elections will then be enhanced.

According to Matete (19-01-2005), the BNP is still not satisfied with the process and outcome of both the 1998 and 2002 general elections. He says that after 1998, the election was postponed thrice. He argues that the ruling party seemed reluctant to provide for the election to be held; he suspects they purposefully delayed the election. He believes government made it difficult for the Interim Political Authority (IPA) to prepare for the election. Matete contends that while the election had to be held within 15 to 18 months, it was delayed for three years.

Mpela (12-01-2006) of the LLP argues that the opposition political parties are weak, because of two main reasons. Firstly, opposition political parties do not have a clear mandate from the government of Lesotho with respect to what has to be done; in other words, government does not give the opposition direction about the course of action. Secondly, the system of PR is not well accepted in Parliament. For example, the leader of the opposition has not yet been given his due respect such as being given a vehicle, and so on, by government.

Mpela (12-01-2006) also says that the members of the ruling party in Parliament undermine the opposition members of Parliament by calling them losers. Mpela

asserts that remedial action to be taken could be to amend the constitution in order to enable smooth handling of matters. He also states that the question of parliamentary reform should be fully addressed.

3.5.3.1 Interpretation

The researcher's interpretation is that the opposition political parties are not satisfied with the role of media in Lesotho. The media are not effectively and efficiently doing their work to improve the political environment. For example, they do not report sufficiently about parliament. This attitude of media reporters has adversely affected electoral participation of the opposition political parties.

The law that was passed to call the parliamentarians by different title-names caused a problem between the ruling and the opposition political parties. This law could have a negative impact on the relations between the ruling party and the opposition and on the performance of the opposition political parties. Also the law that prohibits establishment of alliances by opposition parties that joined Parliament to fill up the compensatory seats of the MMP is contentious.

Different electoral systems have advantages and disadvantages, and this is why some interviewees find the MMP system good and others find it the same as the FPTP, while still others rate it worse than the FPTP. The MMP electoral system will influence the politicians from the opposition and the ruling parties, to change their attitudes towards one another. Taking an example given in the data analysis, in the Parliamentary Reforms Committee the chairman is from the opposition party, and its members have been working together. The situation was different before the MMP system was introduced. This is an indicator of the potential of the MMP system to improve political participation of the opposition parties in Parliament. The researcher's interpretation is that the MMP electoral system has potential to enhance political participation of the opposition parties.

The opposition political parties are willing to take an active part in the development projects; they require the government to avail the resources without discrimination. The opposition political parties are willing to work hand in hand with the ruling party in the development projects. They want government to develop clear policies that can be constructively criticized. Also they want the

Constitution to be reviewed in order to accommodate the MMP electoral system. The desire of the opposition parties is that they be involved in all the stages of the process of preparing for the elections. The researcher interprets the raised ideas in this paragraph as the sign of potential strength of the opposition political parties, because if their desires could be met, they have the potential to participate effectively.

The three leaders of the opposition political parties, Malebo, Rakuoane and Raditapole, share the same view expressed in different words. The view they share is that it is usually difficult to draw the people away from the ruling party, because they adore the leader of the ruling party. The researcher's interpretation is that the ruling party patronises the masses.

3.5.4 Potential strengths or weaknesses of the opposition political parties

In table 3.5c) the responses such as "gone strong", "Congress-ism", "gone weak" and others, express the potential strengths or weaknesses of the opposition political parties.

Malebo, the leader of the MFP argues that since 1992 a great majority of people looked up to Mokhehle as messiah who would save them from poverty and unemployment. Many people had a strong belief in him, adored him, and in their minds developed an ideology of Congress-ism. Also he asserts that it is, therefore, difficult for the new parties to establish themselves when an old one is already well established. However, Malebo contends that the Mokhehle era, of Congress-ism is over and change is imminent. He says that in 1965 opposition political parties occupied 29 seats with on-the-ground support of 60% of the voters, and the ruling party had 31 seats with on-the-ground support of 40% of the voters.

As already mentioned in 3.5.3 above, Rakuoane (16-12-2004) of the PFD says that there are two reasons why the opposition political parties are weak: lack of a democratic culture in Lesotho and the attitude of the main opposition political party. According to Rakuoane, in Lesotho, the ruling party patronises the masses, and the opposition parties usually find it difficult to receive good support from the masses. However, he asserts that on the ground the opposition has

about 6% less support than the ruling party, the LCD. This small percentage difference indicates potential strength of the opposition political parties. However, opposition political parties are numerous, 17, and do not work together in alliances. He had deduced this percentage difference from the 2002 election results and not from party membership. Also, according to Government notice 28 of 2002, the correct percentage difference is 9.8% because the LCD received 54.9% votes and opposition got the rest, 45.1%. Some voters are not members of any political party.

According to Maope (24-12-2004) people participate in elections in order to get jobs and therefore they support the ruling party. When talking about establishing alliances, he says that he strongly supports the idea, but in Lesotho the opposition political parties are so weak that, such a principle cannot be used successfully. Mphanya (25-12-2004) argues that the opposition political parties are weak and that it is not their fault; the fault lies with the government because the government is weak and it is difficult to criticize a weak government. Also he says that the ruling party should be accommodative, arguing that the rulers should know that the opposition political parties are Basotho and their views should be heard.

Raditapole (30-12-2004), the leader of BAC, contends that there should be three political parties in Lesotho. She argues that the escalation of splinter parties weakens the opposition parties. Similarly, the leader of the NIP contends that there are too many opposition political parties and that is why they are weak. Also, as mentioned earlier, Raditapole asserts that poor funding or non-funding of political parties and politics of poverty are some of the major causes of weakness of opposition political parties. Also the general secretary of the BNP, Matete (19-01-2005), accepts that the opposition political parties are weak. According to Matete there are a number of reasons including poverty, lack of political party funding, and the use of government resources by the ruling party give it an advantage over the others.

Majara (07-03-2006) of the NLFP argues that the opposition political parties are weak because they do not work for the good of the nation but for their individual interest. Leneha asserts that the opposition political parties are new and therefore they do not have enough experience. Makoa (26-01-2005) of the LEP accepts

that the opposition political parties are weak and they could do better if they form alliances. Mpela (12-01-2006) of the LLP argues that the opposition parties are weak because they have not got a clear mandate from the government, of what they are expected to do.

Peete (12-01-2005), of the NPP, asserts that the opposition political parties are not weak, but the ruling party has more opportunities than the other parties. He argues that these Ministers have the opportunity to impose whatever they want without prior discussion with the opposition parties. Also he says that the ruling party uses government resources to meet its programmes.

3.5.4.1 Interpretation

Peete of the NPP contends that the opposition political parties are not weak. The secretary general of the BNP mentions two contradictory things, namely that opposition parties are not weak and while at the same time he also accepted that they are weak. The researcher picks the first response that opposition parties are not weak. So, leaders/officials of two parties say that opposition parties are not weak. All the others accepted that they are weak. However, one of the causes of the weakness supported by most of the interviewed party officials is that, the ruling party has the advantage of using government resources.

The leader of the MFP says that the people developed the ideology of Congressism and they do not accept any idea of the opposition, while the leader of the PFD says that the ruling party usually patronises the masses. Also the leader of the BAC maintains that most of the political parties are patriarchal. The interpretation of the researcher is that, these three leaders share the same view that the opposition political parties fail to draw supporters from the ruling party, but they express this view in different words. The essence of the given reason/s is that the supporters of the ruling party have a strong belief in their leader and in their party and this is a patron-client relationship issue.

The general interpretation of the researcher for this sub-section is that, the leaders of the opposition political parties contend that their parties are weak because of lack of resources and that, the ruling party has the advantage over

their parties because of using government resources. Also, the ruling party patronises the masses.

3.6 Conclusion

This section gives the researcher's conclusion drawn from analysis of electoral data and from interpretation of the analysis of data from interviews.

In each of the elections of 1998 and 2002 the ruling party, the LCD lost only one constituency out of 80. This reflects how weak the opposition parties had been.

On the basis of analysis and interpretation of data from the interviews, the researcher reaches a conclusion from each theme and at the end he makes a general conclusion.

About the first theme (poverty) the researcher draws the following conclusion; poverty is one of the major causes of weakness of the opposition political parties. The opposition political parties find it difficult even to run their offices and much more difficult to cover the country with political campaigns. Poverty is negatively related to electoral political participation. The ruling party is better off than the opposition parties; it takes advantage of being in power and it uses the resources, such as government vehicles and foreign aid to facilitate its political campaigns throughout the country.

The second theme (leadership) brings the researcher to the conclusion that leadership of the opposition political parties is weak. Among the views raised by the interviewees were that the leaders need capacity building. Lack of efficient leadership is another major cause of the weakness of opposition political parties.

On the third theme (democratic culture) the researcher draws the conclusion that whilst the elections are regularly held in Lesotho, the democratic culture is still poorly developed. The current legislation falls short of providing a level ground for development of the democratic culture and also the media are weak. This is yet another major cause of the weakness of opposition political parties.

Considering the fourth theme (potential strengths or weaknesses of the opposition political parties) the researcher draws the conclusion that the opposition parties were weak. Out of twelve interviewees, only two did not accept that the opposition parties were weak.

Finally, the researcher draws a general conclusion, from the electoral data and from all the four themes, that in the period 1993 to 2006 the opposition political parties in Lesotho had gone weak. The major factors contributing to the weakness of the opposition political parties were: poverty, weak leadership and poorly developed democratic culture.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter reaches conclusions about the study as a whole and answers the research questions articulated in the beginning of the study. It also identifies future areas of research.

4.2 Conclusion from the literature review

On the basis of the literature review the researcher concludes that the opposition political parties should encourage their supporters to discuss political issues, use various media and attend political meetings in order to be informed about political matters. These parties should not wait for the next national election before they hold political rallies; they should hold these public meetings regularly in order to recruit new supporters. The literature review confirms that the more stimuli about politics the people receive the greater the likelihood that they will participate in politics and the greater the depth of their participation (Stultz *et al.*1994: 105, 106,107).

The yardsticks identified by **Ssenkumba** in Olukoshi (1998: 177) for evaluating the opposition political parties are very important. They were very useful for this study and therefore the researcher's conclusion is that they may be used in future studies relating to evaluation of performance of the opposition parties in Lesotho. These yardsticks are the following:

- a) the extent to which they pursue their organisational goals through the electoral process;
- b) the extensiveness and inclusiveness of their organisational structure and political constituency;
- c) the extent to which they employ established political avenues for achieving their goals;

d) their record of internal organisational stability.

The literature confirms that electoral political participation does not end on the day of an election but continues until the next election. It includes providing checks-and-balance mechanisms against the government and participating in the governmental process by assisting government directly or indirectly.

In order to enable effective political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho the process of democratization has to continue, so that at least all the eight institutional guarantees of democratization, stated by Dahl (1975:3-4), are practically available.

Nyango'ro (1989) suggests a new developmental strategy in Africa, to restructure Africa's relationship with international economy – inevitably moving toward less association. Ake (2000) asserts that social democracy is feasible in Africa. According to Nyango'ro (1989) and Ake (1996), in the case of Africa, both political and economic development have to be done simultaneously⁶ for the African states to be transformed from autocratic to democratic states. It is imperative that Lesotho is successful in its struggle for economic independence. Poverty negatively impacts on the activities of opposition political parties. It is concluded from Matlosa and Sello that the regulatory, financial and the political spheres in which the opposition political parties in Lesotho operate have adversely influenced their strategies and organization.

In Lesotho a number of political parties split and new parties were established as breakaway parties and this phenomenon could be a result of a lack of tolerance amongst the political parties, as Dahl (1975:3-4) warns. Dahl (1975: 202) gave seven conditions favouring polyarchy. Lesotho has not yet met those conditions.

Also as noted in the literature that the political parties perform important tasks, it is of utmost importance to give the opposition political parties opportunity to participate in parliament and in the other decision making processes. According to Chiroro (2006) the opposition parties are part and parcel of the nation-building

⁶ See Ake's comments about the African Charter on page 220, in appendix 7, of this dissertation.

exercise and their role should be fully recognised and fully institutionalised in the political structures.

Finally, based on the literature review, the researcher came to the conclusion that, although the opposition political parties are weak and have few parliamentary seats, they also achieved successes in the period 1993 to 2006. These successes are potential strengths of the opposition parties and they are as follows:

- i) It was due to the political demands of the opposition parties that the Langa Commission was established to study the irregularities in the 1998 election;
- ii) The Interim Political Authority was established to level the political playing ground after the 1998 election;
- iii) The new electoral model, the MMP, was adopted and it has a potential to enhance participation of the opposition parties in parliament.

Has the literature review answered the major research question, which seeks to find out if since 1993 the opposition political parties had gone weak? The answer is yes. The reasons are that the regulatory, financial and the political spheres in which the opposition parties operate adversely affected their strategies and their organisation. The ruling party won the successive elections of 1998 and 2002. The records show that opposition parties have been performing very poorly during the elections of the period 1993-2006. Considering the poor achievement of the opposition at each general election, the opposition political parties are still considerably weak. The researcher concludes that unlike in the period 1965 to 1970, the opposition parties had gone weak in the period 1993 to 2006.

4.3 Conclusion from data analysis

The effect of poverty is one of the major problems that the opposition political parties face with respect to electoral political participation. With the evidence from the data analysis it is concluded that the opposition political parties are not able to run their branch offices and to carry out political campaigns efficiently due to lack of political party funding. Also they are not able to carry out development projects because of lack of funds.

The researcher's conclusion, based on the data analysis, is that there is a lack of efficient leadership that adversely impacts on the electoral political participation of the opposition political parties. The leadership of political parties in Lesotho requires training for capacity building. Seven of the twelve party officials interviewed by the researcher confidently alluded to lack of efficient leadership contributing towards the splits of political parties in Lesotho.

The researcher draws a conclusion that poorly developed democratic culture is yet another major cause of weakness of the opposition political parties in Lesotho. It is evident, from the same data analysis, that opposition political parties are weak. However, it is also concluded that the MMP electoral system used for the first time in 2002 in Lesotho, has a potential of enhancing political participation of opposition political parties in parliament. The researcher observes that a number of things still have to be done, such as revision of the legislation in order to iron out any discomfort of the opposition parties and also to accommodate the MMP electoral Model.

Have the researcher's own data answered the research question? The answer is yes. The data have indicated that the opposition parties are weak. Also the data indicated that the introduction of the MMP had a potential of making political participation of the opposition parties in parliament considerably better. Currently, their electoral political participation is much weaker than in the period 1965 to 1970.

4.4 Conclusion on the research question

On the basis of the findings from literature, analysis of electoral data and analysis of data from interviews, the researcher concludes that opposition political parties had gone weak in the period 1993 to 2006.

The patron-client relationship theory explained how during that period the ruling party was able to win the successive general elections of 1998 and 2002. The ruling party patronised the masses. Also, the ruling party took advantage of being in control of the state resources, which it used to promote its interests. The researcher draws a conclusion that the elections conducted in the period 1993 to

2006 in Lesotho can be well interpreted and understood by using the patron-client relationship theory.

The opposition political parties have a number of problems including, but not limited to, regulatory, financial and political. Both the party regulations and membership record keeping have to be improved. The national legislation has to be reviewed and amended as appropriate to facilitate better control of registration of political parties, and to provide equal treatment of parliamentarians. Provision of political party funding could enable the parties to carry out their work and run offices efficiently. Intra-party and inter-party democracy has to be developed.

If Lesotho continues to hold elections regularly, it will increase the democratic qualities in agreement with Lindberg's theory. Freedom House ratings in tables 2.6.1.3 and 2.6.1.4 above show Lesotho's achievements.

Nyango'ro and Ake urge the African states to carry out simultaneous political and economic development. Also, Ake recommends social democracy for the African states. These ideas of Nyango'ro and Ake, if applied, could bring a better change in the African states including Lesotho. Poverty could be eradicated and problems of the opposition political parties could be minimised.

What remains to be discovered about the topic? Two research focus areas that still require much more attention and future research are the following, also identified by Matlosa and Sello (2005: 40-42):

- party membership and not only party supporters or voters;
- the kind of training, besides voter education, offered by political parties.

Appendix 1

Questionnaire

To whom it may concern

I am a postgraduate student pursuing (MA) Politics with the University of South Africa and I am currently preparing a dissertation that studies the following problem: "Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho?" Please kindly spare a few minutes of your time to assist me by answering the attached questionnaire. Provide answers by ticking in the appropriate boxes or filling in the given tables/spaces, and/or simultaneously as you give answers I will fill in the form and take down notes.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho?
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

.....
.....
.....

- ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

.....
.....
.....

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation

--	--

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)

7.

1. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No

2. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral	Executive/	Minority	Legislative	United	Mergers
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Alliance (For elections)	Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	/Other (Name the other)

3. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by

writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

1. Internal divisions
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system
3. The ballot system used
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system
5. Lack of party political funding
6. Lack of efficient leadership
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties
8. The role of the military
9. Poverty
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties
11. Lack of freedom
12. Lack of fairness
13. Insufficient voter education
14. Lack of understanding of politics
15. Illegitimacy of elections
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or country side only

Appendix 2

Historical Background

In 1907, the first interest group called the “Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA)” was established, and among its tasks were to address questions relating to: ‘progress and interests of Basotho, working in harmony with the government and the missionaries, etc.’ (Machobane 1990: 129). In September 1919, a more radical interest group, the “Commoners’ League” or in Sesotho Language “Lekhotla la Bafo” was established (Gill 1997: 170).

The Commoners’ League, under leadership of the founder Josiel Lefela, fought very strongly against turning Basutoland into a Crown colony. The Commoner’s League maintained that Lesotho had to remain a protectorate and it advocated establishment of the House of Commoners. That organization published its views in the local newspaper, Naledi, between March and November 1921, slamming imperialism and chiefs (Machobane 1990:160). In the same year, 1921, Naledi newspaper was prohibited from publishing articles submitted by the Commoners’ League and since then, the organization used the South African newspapers, Inkululeko (Freedom) and Umsebenzi (The Worker) (Machobane 1990: 158, 159, 160). The appearance of the two organizations mentioned above probably enhanced political participation through informal organizations.

The Lekhotla la Toka (LLT) or the League of Justice led by Justice Malitsane Mphanya Ratsiu broke away from the League of Commoners, but it died away after World War II and its leader rejoined the League of Commoners (Matlosa and Sello 2005: 16). The BPA launched their own onslaught against the chiefs and published their views in the Naledi newspaper (Machobane 1990: 162). In 1929 the BPA and the colonial powers wanted to reform chieftaincy and the Commoners League greatly opposed that move and together with the chiefs who had ultimately consulted the nation they were successful in stopping the Council from passing those laws (Machobane 1990: 182, 183). In 1931 the National Council passed a resolution, that made it mandatory for chiefs to consult the public at regional gatherings both before and after each session of the Council

(Gill 1997: 183) and that was the beginning of accountability (Machobane 1990: 183). In the Council the chiefs tabled motions of the commoners, ultimately customary law, the laws of Lerotholi, were recognized, like it was done in Bechuanaland and in 1938 what were called Native Courts were established (Machobane 1990: 221).

Leeman (1984: 88) notes that Perham (1967) estimated, in 1933, that at any one time between 50% and 70% of able-bodied Basotho men were away working in South Africa due to increasing shortage of land and unemployment problems in Lesotho. The issue of shortage of land, raised by Leeman, is questionable.

According to Gill (1997: 202), in 1947 the issue of Basutoland's status as a Protectorate or Crown colony arose again. By 1948 some members of the National Council were elected by the District Councils, and six recognized associations elected six other members (Machobane 1990: 241, 242). In 1959 the Legislative Council was established, mainly due to the efforts of the Basutoland African Congress party (BAC) founded in 1952 by Mr Ntsu Clement Mokhehle (Gill 1997: 203), (Machobane 1990: 253). The BAC demanded a number of things and among them was "self-government in Basutoland by the Basotho". In 1954 the BAC had its press organ, Mohlabani (The Warrior) (Machobane 1990: 253, 254, 255).

The 1959 Legislative Council was unicameral and had eighty, 80, members, half of whom were elected during the District Council elections. There were forty, 40, non-elected members, twenty-two, 22, ex-officio principal chiefs; the King nominated fourteen, 14, and there were four, 4, British officials: Government Secretary, Financial Secretary, Legal Secretary and Commissioner for Local Government (Gill 1997: 204), (Machobane 1990: 262). The King, Moshoeshoe II, was head of the Executive. The increased membership provided for better representation and increased political participation than in the former Council of Advice.

In the 1960 District Councils election three political parties, Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) (new name of BAC since 1958), the Marema-Tlou Party (MT) (established in 1957) and the Basotho National Party (BNP) (established in 1958), also the BAP interest group placed candidates (Leeman 1985: 135). This

election was the first of its kind during the colonial era and one might say that it facilitated greater political participation after the distortion, by colonialists, of the good purpose of the 'Popular gatherings' or the Basotho 'pitsos'.

According to Matlosa (1997: 141) the District Council election was aimed at building a firmer foundation for efficient local government and democratizing the local structures of government. The first point of establishing 'efficient local government' could be an accurate statement to make, as for the second statement about 'democratising the local structures of government' there might be inaccuracies because, it could be difficult to say that at that time either Basotho people or the British colonialists had the same conception of democracy that Basotho and the British of today have, for example it could be any type of democracy, 'multi-party democracy', or 'socialist democracy' and so on; however, local governments cannot be discarded as important tools of democracy when they are used for that purpose, that is when they are enabled to serve that purpose, for example in the Soviet Union there were local governments and the Soviets said that they had democracy, but the Western world taught that there was no democracy there mainly because there was only one political party in the Soviet Union. For example, Popa and Munteanu (2001: 9) made a study about local governments in the Soviet and the building of democratic local governments in the former Soviet Republics. Samoff (1989: 1) said that strong local government was widely regarded as critical to administrative efficiency, citizen participation and regime legitimacy; and he further said: "At independence, Tanzania inherited the colonial variant of administratively dominated local government, a distinctly undemocratic form".

In the 1960 District Councils election women were not able to vote as the 1959 constitution had no room for their participation and also the political parties were reluctant that women vote (Machobane 1990: 295, 296). Weisfelder (1999: 14) noted that the BCP by 1960 had become a genuine 'mass' political party and the BCP had established a youth League in 1960 (Machobane 1990: 288). The MTP was established in 1957 as a result of the split of the BAC, and Chief Samuel Matete led it (Leeman 1984: 210), (Spence 1968: 37), (Weisfelder 1999: 37). There had been a difference of opinion about the new Paramount Chief, when Matete quit the post of being 'Mantsébo's Councillor. Also Matete had been a member of the BCP.

According to Leeman (1984: 210) and Weisfelder (1999: 8) in September 1955 the Basutoland National Council, heavily influenced by the BAC, passed a motion requesting that the Council be granted power to make laws on internal affairs with the approval of the Paramount Chief. The Secretary of State gave a favourable response in May 1956. Upon completion of the work on the "Report on Constitutional Reform and Chieftaincy Affairs", in July 1958, the council accepted it and in November sent a delegation to London.

Leeman (1984: 212) asserts that as constitutional developments unfolded the movement among the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI) Catholic missionaries and the minor chiefs felt that it was time that a political party was established to protect their own interests against what they called the rising 'communist' influence of the BAC. Two separate groups that could accommodate the sentiments of the OMI and minor chiefs pronounced themselves. Chief Kaiser Leabua Jonathan, former BAC member (Khaketla 1971: 18), led the first group while Gabriel Manyeli and Anthony Manyeli Catholic mission teachers who had political activity with the OMI led the second group. These two groups later merged to form the BNP. Jonathan got assistance of Duncan, a businessman in Ladybrand South Africa, to draft a constitution for the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the party was established in 1958. In the same year the Manyelis through the encouragement of the OMI formed the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) (Leeman 1984: 215).

According to Weisfelder (1999: 25) at the end of the visit of Paramount Chieftainess 'Mantsébo Seeiso to London in 1957 two members of her delegation remained behind to attend a conference on African Administration at the Cambridge University. The two men were Jonathan and Gabriel Manyeli who discussed at length political developments in Basutoland. Jonathan and Manyeli followed up the Cambridge discussions with in-depth consultations in Basutoland throughout 1957 (Weisfelder 1999: 25). According to Leeman (1984: 216) at the end of 1958 in London, during the constitutional talks, a private meeting was held at St. Ermin's Hotel (former British Intelligence Service Centre). The meeting was attended by chiefs Kelebone Nkoebe, Leabua Jonathan, Nkoebe Mitchell, Patrick 'Mota, along with the Regent, Constantine Bereng Seeiso⁷, Chaplin, Wilson, Ian

⁷ The author had omitted the surname

Fraser (a leading businessman in Basutoland), Father Romeo Guilbeault (the French Canadian secretary for Catholic Schools in Basutoland) and Mr Pheko, who served as interpreter during the conference. It was in that meeting that the CDP with other conservative elements merged into the BNP. Upon return from the London constitutional talks the founding of BNP was announced (Leeman 1984: 216).

According to Khaketla (1971: 53) at the annual conference of the BAC in 1958, it was decided to change the name of the party from the Basutoland African Congress to the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP).

Once again, in March 1961, Khaketla and others split from the BCP and established the Basutoland Freedom Party (BFP) (Weisfelder 1999: 42), (Spence 1968: 38). There had been a difference of opinion in the BCP leadership about the participation of women in the 1960 election and that culminated in the split of the party in 1961 and establishment of the Communist Party of Lesotho (Weisfelder 1999: 33), (Machobane 1990: 281), (Moleleki 1994: 93, 94, 95, 96).

In 1962 the MTP and the BFP merged to form the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) (Leeman 1984: 279), (Machobane 1990: 290). According to Leeman (1984: 295) two other political parties were founded in 1962. The first was the Basutoland Citizens' Association led by Paulus M. Ramatlapeng of Peka and it was never heard of after its announcement of February 1962. The second was announced at the end of 1962 and it was the Basutoland Labour Party (BLP). Prior to its establishment the meetings between the BLP's president, Elliot Lethata, and South African officials were held at the Crocodile Inn Butha-Buthe. Leeman asserts that the BCP reported that the South African media gave the BLP some publicity and South Africans allowed Lethata to address meetings throughout South Africa and provided him with transport. The BLP quickly disappeared.

From the early fifties to the mid-sixties in Basutoland prevailed politics for independence from colonial bondage; the question of the constitutional status of the King, as earlier mentioned, was very important (Spence 1968:37), (Weisfelder 1999: 37); however, the question of women participation was not important (Machobane 1990: 295). During the preparations for political independence the

Constitution Reform Committee had been established with the purpose of preparing the constitution for independence; that committee wanted the commoners and the chiefs to interact in a single chamber as they used to, and the idea of a bicameral parliament became important (Machobane 1990: 262, 263).

Between November 1963 and February 1964 the Legislative Council debated on the report of the Constitutional Commission of 1962 and finally drew up a resolution that had four sections with Section 2 containing eight amendments to the 1959 Constitution (Machobane 1990: 295-299). Among the amendments were: "...adult suffrage to be extended to include women"; and also establishment of "trias politica" by introducing an independent Judiciary in addition to the already existing Executive and the Legislative. Also an important amendment made was the increase of the number of members of the Lower House from forty, 40, to sixty, 60, (Machobane 1990: 299). According to the constitution the Executive Council consisted of: Resident Commissioner who was chairman, Government Secretary, Financial Secretary and the Assistant Attorney General; and in addition it had four ex-officio members: three of whom were elected by the Legislative Council and one was to be nominated by the King from among members of the Legislative Council (Machobane 1990: 262-265).

In the 1965 general election four political parties contested, namely BCP, BNP, MFP and MTP (Leeman 1984: 307, 663-669), (Matlosa 1997: 142). Also independent candidates contested. Out of a total of 60 parliamentary seats BNP got 31, BCP 25, MFP 4 and MTP 0 (Matlosa 1997: 142). BNP had won 42% of the votes. According to Leeman (1984: 669) the MFP Member of Parliament for Matela constituency crossed the floor to join the BNP. The new constitution resulting from the conclusions arrived at in London, came into force on 30 April 1965, a day after the election commenced on 29 April 1965 (Machobane 1990: 300, 301). On 4 October 1966 Basutoland got political independence and changed its name to Lesotho. At the time of independence apartheid South Africa controlled imports and more than 100 000 jobs of Basotho (Gill 1997: 215), and in 2003 (New) South Africa controlled 61 415 jobs of Basotho (Central Bank of Lesotho 2003: 73).

According to Spence (1968: 79, 80) the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Chief Leabua Jonathan had been on record as strongly opposing sanctions against the Republic of South Africa, although in October 1966 during the independence talks in London, at a Press Conference, he said that he was principled and not an apartheid man. The Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Dr Verwoerd had to be diplomatic and assure Chief Leabua Jonathan the Republic's desire for friendly relations with Lesotho (Spence 1968: 81).

The year 1966 came in with the constitutional crisis (Spence 1968: 79) and the Prime Minister deported eight South African refugees. Chief Leabua Jonathan, coming back from Lancaster House Conference introduced four bills into Parliament the: Emergency Powers Bill, Internal Security Bill, Printing and Publishing Bill, and Societies Bill. The bills caused countrywide discomfort among the BCP and the MFP people and they organized a joint protest meeting that was held in Maseru on 11 September 1966. The meeting resolved to write a petition to the King and the British Government and the petition indicated that the old Basutoland National Council had rejected the Societies Bill as undesirable. However, Chief Leabua Jonathan went ahead and enacted the four Bills (Khaketla 1971: 142, 143).

The King had been campaigning to get public support so that his powers, including control of the military, could be increased in the constitution. On the 27 December 1966 the Prime Minister through his Police Mobile Unit (PMU), the para-military troops stopped the King's last 'pitso' or public gathering and the result was bloodshed and deaths (Khaketla 1971: 147). On 28 December 1966 the King was suspected to be under house arrest and the Prime Minister never confirmed that when a member of the King's Privy Council, Mr Khaketla, investigated the matter (Khaketla 1971: 148, 149). The King's 'pitsos' used to be very big and it was suspected that the BCP gave him support (Gill 1997: 217).

The climax of the King's power struggle was reached in October 1967 when the Prime Minister attempted to force the King to either support his government positively or choose between exile and abdication (Gill 1997: 217). The Prime Minister did not get support from the Principal Chiefs and as a result the proposition of exile or abdication failed.

In the first five years after independence the BCP penetrated the rural constituencies, where it was weak before 1965 election, and it built up its membership (Gill 1997: 219). According to Leeman (1985: 95) Mokhehle, the leader of the BCP, said that, since the electorate were mostly peasants, the BCP used “short, itemized manifestos” to enable candidates and field workers to expound on them as they found fit and applicable, and that approach was exercised in the 1960, 1965 and 1970 elections. Khaketla who ultimately broke away to form Freedom Party did not support that style; Ntsukunyane Mphanya supporting Mokhehle’s idea added that if there were no talks about soil, the peasants could not want to listen (Leeman 1985: 95).

Moleleki (1994: 137) said “BCP ha se Lekhotla le ratang ho joetsa-joetsa sechaba hore na ho hotle bakeng la sona ke ho fe”. In English, Moleleki’s statement said that the BCP was not an organization that practiced dictating to the people what could be good for them; instead the BCP could be pleased to get demands from the people, and it was the reason why from 1952 the BCP used to prepare very few items to tell the masses; and it used a few items in preparation to beat the BNP in the 1970 election (Moleleki 1994: 137).

Still in the preparations for the 1965 election, Khaketla (1971: 173, 174) said that the leader of the MFP, Dr Makotoko wanted to compromise the work of the party by giving more attention to his surgery and postponing party general annual conferences (AGMs) of 1965, 1966 and 1967, and party political campaigns (Khaketla 1971:173). Dr Makotoko was replaced with Mr Ts’epo Mohaleroe who discovered that in the villages where the MFP used to reign, the BCP had taken over the members who said that they deserted the MFP because they did not see their leaders (Khaketla 1971: 170). In preparation for the 1965 election the BCP leader and the BNP leader toured the whole country three times (Khaketla 1971: 173).

The period before the 1970 election was indeed a testing one for the ruling party to show that it could lead Lesotho somewhere, maybe towards economic independence and also for the opposition parties it was advantageous to building themselves up and working as a constructive opposition by criticizing the government and so on, or building themselves through pinpointing the weaknesses of the ruling party. For both the ruling party and for the opposition

the period had advantages and disadvantages. The big question that still had to be answered was whether political participation declined in the period after the year 1960.

The 1970 general election was held on 27 January 1970 (Southall ca.1995: 110), (Khaketla 1971: 207). The Prime Minister and his clique excluded many of legitimate the BNP party leaders from the list of candidates for election (Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 268). From 28 January to 29 January 1970 Radio Lesotho announced the election results and had always been the BCP or the BNP, and that continued until the results stood at 23: 23; since then there was complete blackout for further results (Khaketla 1971:210, 211), (Moleleki 1994:142, 143). Finally the BCP had won the greatest number of constituencies: BCP 36; BNP 23; and MFP 1 (Gill 1997: 220), (Khaketla 1971: 211), (Southall ca.1995: 111).

Khaketla (1971: 207) stated that the Prime Minister had announced over Radio Lesotho on 28 and 29 January that the election had been conducted in an atmosphere of peace and quiet throughout the country. However, after receiving strong opposition from his Cabinet of Ministers on his intention to handover power to the BCP and resign, the Prime Minister on 30 January 1970 announced that he had seized power, that he was not ashamed of it, even though it might appear undemocratic, because he had people behind him; and he declared Lesotho in a state of emergency and also he announced suspension of the national constitution (Gill 1997: 221), (Khaketla 1971: 207, 208,212), (Matlosa 1997: 143), (Matlosa 2000: 7), (Southall ca.1995:111). Ntsu Mokhehle leader of the BCP, Mohau Mokitimi and Pelesana Mofelehetsi leaders of the Youth League, and two others were the first to be arrested (Moleleki 1994: 143) and thereafter other party leaders and hundreds of the BCP members also were arrested.

In the years that followed the PMU, the BNP party fanatics and their Youth League made life horrible, with the implementation of the reign of terror, for anyone who protested (Gill 1997:221), (Khaketla 1971:267 – 291) and for any other BCP supporters especially in the villages. The BCP civil servants were dismissed in big numbers and much of the party leadership (Gill 1997:222) and supporters went in exile and on the other hand the BNP tightened security in the

country (Gill 1997:222). Ntsu Mokhehle was released from detention on the 31 December 1971 (Moleleki 1994: 149).

According to Gill (1997: 221) Leabua Jonathan declared a five-year moratorium on politics stating that the Westminster system was not in tune with Lesotho's traditions and would need to be modified to meet Lesotho's requirements. In 1973 an Interim National Assembly was established with the mandate of developing a new constitution of Lesotho and its establishment caused a division within the BCP where a faction led by the deputy leader, Gerard Ramoreboli joined the Assembly and the leader Ntsu Mokhehle and his followers refused to join anything less than a true coalition government (Gill 1997: 221). In July 1974 the BCP launched the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) that operated mainly from Qwaqwa and Transkei against the BNP government (Leeman 1985: 77), (Leeman 1984: 425), (Moleleki 1994: 229), (Mphanya 2004: 93), (Southall ca.1995: 111).

The Internal Security Act of 1974 provided for detention of government opponents for up to sixty days without trial and without access to lawyers (Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 267) and this, together with threats made, caused the BCP members to go out on exile and to take up arms again (Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 267). The so-called "Likhetho-mohlolo" (meaning miracle election) was held in September 1985; all the opposition parties had boycotted it and the BNP took all the seats without opposition (Gill 1997: 239). This bogus election had excluded many of the legitimate BNP leaders (Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 268).

According to Leeman (1984: 88) the World Bank report states that in the 1980s about 60% of the Basotho labour force worked in South Africa mostly as migrant labourers on short-term contracts. About 200,000 to 300,000 Basotho out of a population of 1.2 million were employed in South Africa and 40% of them were mineworkers. These migrant labourers do not have enough time to be with their families. Leeman asserts that thousands had long settled in South Africa and they regard Lesotho as their home. Further Leeman contends that from the early 20th century Lesotho had been a labour reserve society for South Africa. Also the annual migration of such great numbers of the able-bodied people gave Lesotho a lasting problem, which continued to plague her. So, Basotho both at home and

in South Africa have been faced with multi-pronged problems, cultural, social, economic and political.

Tensions within the BNP grew stronger when the leftwing radicals, within the the BNP allied to the ANC and the Eastern Bloc, gained control over the BNP through its Youth League and certain sections of the army and village militia (Gill 1997: 239). Daniel *et al* (1999: 138) states that when Jonathan had somersaulted against working with Pretoria, a radical faction, that supported him within the BNP attempted to transform the BNP Youth League into an alternative military force. The BNP government replaced the Internal Security Act of 1974 with Internal Security Act of 1984 (Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 280). The BNP leftwing radicals believed that the BNP could entrench itself in power and ultimately establish a socialist state. South Africa could not entertain a pro-ANC government in Lesotho (Gill 1997: 240). In January 1986 South Africa instituted a border blockade that caused a crisis in Lesotho that ended up with a military coup on 20 January 1986 lead by Major General Metsing Lekhanya (Gill 1997: 240).

A military Council was established and Order No.2 of the Council placed appointed Ministers under the Military Councillors to serve as advisors of the Military Council; the Monarchy was trapped and could not bring democracy or govern effectively because all the power was in the military (Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 273). On 26 January 1986, the Military Junta deported sixty, 60, ANC activists and detained another fifty, 50, South African refugees who also later had to leave (Makoa in Rembe and Kalula 1997: 291). In 1990 the National Constituent Assembly was established for the purpose of making recommendations on the new constitution (Gill 1997: 243). The Military Council passed Lesotho Order No.4 of 1986, which banned political activities (Gill 1997: 244).

In 1991 junior military officers, under the leadership of Colonel (later Major General) Phisoana Ramaema, toppled the Military Government (Gill 1997: 244). In 1992 the Electoral Commission was established to supervise the process of election that was about to be held in 1992, but finally held in 1993 (Gill 1997: 246). The talks on reconciliation between the Military Government and the organization of Heads of Churches of Lesotho (HCL) established in the 1980s, went on up to 1988 (Maqutu in Rembe and Kalula 1990: 302) and the return, in

early 1987, of Mr Ntsu Mokhehle and others from exile was attributed to the HCL (Gill 1997: 240).

The general election was finally held in March 1993 with the BCP achieving a landslide victory (Daniel *et al* 1999: 136). The second General Election after the era of authoritarian military rule came in 1998. The opposition political parties did not accept the results of the election and as a result political crisis followed culminating in the process of inquiry by a Commission from SADC. Worst of all, the problems ended up with the burning of business facilities, shops, looting in Maseru, Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek, and burning of residential places of some of the members of the ruling party, bloodshed and deaths. Upon request by the Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, SADC sent military troops to intervene.

In November 1998 the Interim Political Authority (IPA) Act was passed and in December the IPA was established. It comprised representatives of the registered political parties, twelve in number. The IPA made recommendations that included a new electoral model, Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP). In May 2002, the general election was held for the first time with MMP and eighteen registered political parties placed candidates for the general election.

Appendix 3

Sample of constituencies

Constituency No.	Constituency Name	Random Number
2	Hololo	24202
3	Motete	12003
5	Butha-Buthe	56005
8	Thaba-Phatsoa	11208
20	Nokong	80320
22	Mahlatsa	44222
25	Pulane	19325
26	Thupa-Kubu	21926
29	Mabote	67529
32	Maseru	6332
35	Lithabaneng	74235
42	Qeme	28042
43	Rothe	48943
50	Maliepetsane	5950
52	Thabana-Morena	3252
53	Likhoele	15553
57	Qhalasi	38157
58	Mohale's Hoek	35558
59	Mekaling	19259
62	Ketane	63162
68	Qhoali	41068
71	Tsoelike	33971
75	Semena	97375
78	Senqu	19878

Appendix 4

Selected opposition political party officials

Interviewee	Opposition Political Party	Abbreviation
Matete, R.	Basotho National Party	BNP
Mphanya, N.	Basutoland Congress Party	BCP
Malebo, V.	Marematlou Freedom Party	MFP
Maope, K.	Lesotho People's Congress	LPC
Peete, P.	National Progressive Party	NPP
Makoa, T.	Lesotho Educational Party	LEP
Rakuoane, L.	Popular Front For Democracy	PFD
Ralitapole, K.	Basutoland African Congress	BAC
Mpela, T.	Lesotho Labour Party	LLP
Leneha, R.	Lesotho Workers' Party	LWP
Majara, A.	New Lesotho Freedom Party	NLFP
Manyeli, A.	National Independent Party	NIP

Appendix 5

Interviews

I). Moeketse Malebo

15/12/2004

Malebo is the leader of the MFP. I interviewed him of 15 December 2004.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

Answer: (a) Since 1992 a great majority of people looked up to Mokhehle as the messiah who would save them from poverty and unemployment. Many people had strong belief in him, adored him, and in their minds developed an ideology of Congress-ism. It is difficult for the new parties to establish themselves when an old one is already well established. (b) Lack of party political funding. (c) Lack of grass roots organization and finance by political parties.

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned weakness?

Answer: (a) The Mokhehle era, of Congress-ism is over and a change is imminent.

(b) The political parties must be financed. (c) Well-planned organizational campaigns at grass roots level are essential.

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
Maseru West	Machache

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
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Name of political party	Abbreviation
Marematlou Freedom Party	MFP

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
√					

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
	√				

6.i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
	√	

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
		√	

7.

i) Did your political party get into coalition or alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period 1993 - 2006?

Yes	No
√	

Comment on Answer (i) above: The alliance began in 1998 and continued into 2002 up to the time of election.

ii) If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (For resolving the conflict)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)
				√	

iii) Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
	√			

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
				√

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
			√	

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

- 1) Internal divisions and in-fighting conflicts 5
- 2) Lack of transparency of the electoral system
- 3) The ballot system used
- 4) Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system
- 5) Lack of party political funding 1
- 6) Lack of efficient leadership 6
- 7) Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 7
- 8) The role of the military
- 9) Poverty 2
- 10) Lack of transparency within the political parties 8
- 11) Lack of freedom
- 12) Lack of fairness
- 13) Insufficient voter education 3

- 14) Lack of understanding of politics 4
- 15) Illegitimacy of elections
- 16) Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only

More comments made by Malebo, M.

10(2): Malebo commenting on Question 10(2) said that the electoral system could not be the cause of the problem of the opposition political parties because it is very transparent. He said that the IEC is very transparent; it has very good regulations, it gives information to parties prior to doing things. According to him the electoral system is very democratic because it allows people who did not stand for elections to take seats and participate in Parliament.

10(3): On Question 10 (3) Malebo said that the ballot system could not be the cause of the problem of the opposition political parties. He said that it is, however, an unnecessary expense. He suggested that it could be done on plane paper with a watermark, and that only the name be written. According to him the current system is wasteful, even though it is correct. He further suggested that this item be removed from the list of causes.

Malebo emphasized that he could not categorize items: **10 (2), (3) and (4)**, that are related to the electoral system and the ballot system. He argued that the electoral system is very democratic, because it allows women and the disabled people to be members of Parliament.

10(9): Talking about item 10 (9), poverty, Malebo called it a double-wedged knife. He said that on the one side of the blade the poor of the poorest do not go to vote, He said that those who cannot afford a morsel of bread do not bother to vote. On the other side of the blade, people who still have hope of survival, and those who still have some water and a little food need to be financed; that is why the MFP has budgeted for them. According to the leader of the MFP, the party should get funding in order to establish projects for the public, and the party

mechanism should see to it that projects are a success. The funding should not be free-giving, “liphallelo”.

10(13): About item 10(13), Malebo said that IEC does not answer the question “Why do people vote?” it only deceives people. He said that sound voter education is required, that teaches people why they vote and not how to vote.

10(14): About lack of understanding of politics, the leader of MFP said that people were poisoned. The problem was that the party members adore the political leader, for example, the leader of the BCP was Prime Minister for more than five years, although, he assumed his position already ill and weak so much that he could not do efficient work.

10(16): Malebo commented that there is no difference between country and town, because all over in the countryside, like in the towns, there are found all sorts of people, for example teachers are found in both these places. He therefore cut out this item from the possible list of causes of the problem of weakness of opposition political parties.

10(12): The leader of the MFP said that fairness is always there. He said that there is party representation in the IEC that will stay for all the five years. For these reasons he removed this item from the list of possible causes of the problem.

10(11): According to Malebo, people are very free, and therefore he removed this item from the possible list of causes of the problem.

10(10): The leader of the MFP said that there is lack of transparency within the political parties because of the inefficiencies of the Press. He pointed out that, some of the newspapers are owned by the political parties, so that in general the Press favours various political parties and as a result reporting, about the proprietor political party, is not always accurate.

By-elections: Commenting on the by-elections, Malebo said that many Basotho have no understanding of politics, because they say that the government is in place already, so there is no need of voting in the by-elections. Malebo said that,

with minimal effort it should be possible to place a candidate, but there is no campaigning and also lack of funds contributes a lot to the problem.

According to Malebo, on the other hand government has money, and the Ministers use government vehicles and the ruling party has the upper hand during campaigning period. Malebo mentioned that, although the ruling party wins, it also gets a low score because many people do not vote because their belief is that “they already had elected a government what else could be demanded of them?” as mentioned above. Malebo said that the second reason why the ruling party gets a low score is due to dissatisfaction of the Members of Parliament of the ruling party.

General comments of the leader of the MFP:

“Parliamentarians get interest free loans and this is likely to cause problems in the future, and it makes it difficult for the Prime Minister to replace such people” (Malebo: Interview 15/12/2004). Malebo mentioned that when parliamentarians have got these loans it is not easy to replace them, even by elections, before they can pay back their loans.

Malebo stated that in 1965 opposition political parties occupied 29 seats with on-the-ground support of 60% of voters, and the ruling party had 31 seats with on-the-ground support of 40% of voters.

Malebo mentioned that he, having been in Parliament twice, in 1998 and then currently (from 2002), noticed that it is difficult to understand the reason for elections. According to him, the Lesotho Parliament is like ‘a mickey mouse’ or mockery. Malebo stated that for thirty years the opposition raised no good opposition in Parliament. Malebo mentioned that the Parliament did not have committees and that comparatively Botswana was far ahead. He emphasized that the Parliamentary Reform Committee is a must, and that there must be Parliamentary committees. He said that the former committees were not effective. He said that they had begun establishing effective committees.

Rakuoane is the leader of the PFD. I interviewed him of 16 December 2004.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho?

If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

The leader of the PFD, Rakuoane said that he had two reasons why opposition political parties seemed to be weak: (a) there was no democracy, and (b) that the main opposition political party was not ready to play its role in Parliament.

(a) Rakuoane argued that for a long time in Lesotho there was no democracy, so much that a culture of no democracy had developed. Under those circumstances people do not want to be in the opposition, everybody fights to be in the ruling position. Rakuoane said that on the ground the opposition was about 6% less than the ruling party, the LCD.

(b) The main opposition party, the BNP, is not ready to play its role in Parliament, instead it is always complaining about the voter turnout. According to Rakuoane, for this reason, the small parties cannot support the main opposition party. Rakuoane said, in short, that there is no unity.

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned weakness?

Rakuoane stated that the remedy to the above situation is sustainability of the democratic process that has just started, as it will change the culture and eventually the role of the opposition political parties will be clearer. Finally Rakuoane said that unity of opposition political parties will be enabled.

Rakuoane gave an example of what the opposition political parties could do in the 2005 local government elections where there was an opportunity of placing 1000 candidates; opposition parties could unite and get lots of seats. Rakuoane mentioned that those local government elections would be a yardstick for testing or predicting the performance of the opposition political parties in the 2007 general elections. Rakuoane said that it was unfortunate that Lesotho is a poor country, and that if a Councillor could earn M500 per month he would be like in full time employment.

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
Mants'onyane	Mants'onyane

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
<i>Popular Front for Democracy (Khoetsa ea Sechaba sa Basotho)</i>	PFD

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30001-50 000	>50 001
√					

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
	√				

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
	√	

- ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
		√	

7.

1. Did your political party get into coalition or alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 - 2006'?

Yes	No
√	

2. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (For resolving the conflict)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)
√		√	√	√	

3. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
√				

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
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Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
				√

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
				√

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

- (1) Internal divisions and in-fighting conflicts 3
- (2) Lack of transparency of the electoral system 10
- (3) The ballot system used
- (4) Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 9
- (5) Lack of party political funding 4
- (6) Lack of efficient leadership 1
- (7) Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 5
- (8) The role of the military
- (9) Poverty 2

(10) Lack of transparency within the political parties	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
(11) Lack of freedom	13 <input type="checkbox"/>
(12) Lack of fairness	11 <input type="checkbox"/>
(13) Insufficient voter education	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
(14) Lack of understanding of politics	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
(15) Illegitimacy of elections	12 <input type="checkbox"/>
(16) Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only	14 <input type="checkbox"/>

General comments of the leader of the PFD:

In connection with question no.7, Rakuoane stated that,

7(1): Alliances/Coalitions: During the 1993 general elections had established an electoral alliance with the Kopanang Basotho Party (KBP), and that PFD had always been in alliance with the Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) and the candidates of the CPL stood for elections as the PFD candidates;

7(2): Alliances/Coalitions: the PFD with a few other opposition political parties, under the umbrella of an alliance popularly known as ‘Khokanyana-ea-Phiri’, had informal alliance with the ruling party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) during the time of the Independent Political Authority (IPA) – an extra parliamentary body. Rakuoane stated that the Khokanyana-ea-Phiri was a legislative coalition.

7(3): Alliances/Coalitions: After 2002 elections, the PFD supported the ruling party on changing the Parliamentary 5th Amendment of powers of Public Service Commission. That was another case of legislative alliance, however, it was only on that parliamentary motion.

8: MMP: In response to question number 8, the PFD Leader, stated the their small political party has its leader heading the Parliamentary Reform Committee. Rakuoane, also, mentioned that in the Pan-African Parliament,

Lesotho is the only country that has representatives of four, 4, political parties, while other countries have a maximum of two, 2, parties represented.

9: Poverty: Responding to question number 9, Rakuoane said that poverty adversely affects people. The PFD Leader stated that people vote for the ruling party in order to secure their jobs and the unemployed people vote to get jobs. According to Rakuoane, political parties are not able to establish and run party offices due to lack of funds. Rakuoane mentioned that, under such circumstances, it is difficult to do party work efficiently. Rakuoane said that government should provide enough political party funding, and Rakuoane stated that there is comparatively better political party funding in South Africa and in Zimbabwe. According to Rakuoane, in Lesotho, a ruling party patronizes the masses, and the opposition parties usually find it difficult to get good support from the masses.

Mr Maope is the leader of the LPC and I interviewed him on 24 December 2004, in the morning.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho?

If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

Quoting Maope, in the interview, he said: "the BNP ruled badly, in the opinion of people, for a long time and people got polarized". Maope said that people's views switched to the other extreme, of peace, and that it was still the state of affairs. According to him the electors chose one party and rejected the other, and as such there was still no room for other parties to win enough supporters.

Maope mentioned that another setback was that there were no means of communication to reach out to the people. He said that the media were weak and as an example, he said that one hardly sees media people in Parliament. He said that political parties lack resources.

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

Maope said that the solution was in the hands of the electors, that is, when they begin to feel that they are ruled badly, they will give room to the views of other parties, and they will change their opinions and begin to support views of these other parties. Maope said that it was an evolutionary process.

Maope further mentioned that if there could be solutions to the above-mentioned problems, then, there could be a change of people's attitudes towards the opposition political parties.

Maope stated that democracy in Lesotho assumes that political parties have a role to play, and that even the constitution allows for that, but the rulers neglected those facts. According to Maope, there is need for the rulers to change their attitudes, and to avail the resources to the political parties. Maope said that the

electoral model is still not fair, and the remedy is to move to PR model. According to Maope, the Arbitration Award said that there was an agreement in Lesotho to move First Past the Post (FPP) seats to be equal to Proportional Representation (PR) seats in the next general election of 2007

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
<i>Ha Maope</i>	<i>Seqonoka</i>

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
<i>Lesotho People's Congress</i>	<i>LPC</i>

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
				√	

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
			√		

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
	√	

Maope says that there is no clause of disclosure, but the books are audited and during the Annual General Meeting (AGM) the disclosure is made to the party delegates and thereafter the delegates get back to report to the members in the constituencies and branches.

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 Months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
		√	

7.

i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
	√

ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/ Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)

iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
√				

According to Maope people go to elections in order to get jobs. Maope said that he strongly agreed as a principle, and that in Lesotho the opposition political parties are so weak that, such a principle cannot be used successfully.

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
			√	

According to Maope Lesotho's democracy assumes that political parties have a role to play, and even the constitution allows for that, but the rulers ignore this situation. So, there is need for the rulers to change their attitudes and to avail the resources to the political parties.

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
				√

Maope says that the system does not allow candidates to represent the constituencies effectively. Candidates fear to criticize the government in fear of losing the jobs, as it happens in Lesotho.

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

1. Internal divisions and in-fighting conflicts

13

2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system	6	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. The ballot system used	7	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system	4	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Lack of party political funding	11	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Lack of efficient leadership	12	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties	5	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. The role of the military	13	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Poverty	1	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties	16	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Lack of freedom	2	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Lack of fairness	8	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. Insufficient voter education	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. Lack of understanding of politics	3	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Illegitimacy of elections	9	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or country side only	15	<input type="checkbox"/>

General comments of the leader of the LPC

Maope said that the ruling party does not use the electoral model as it was agreed upon. Maope said, as an example, that candidates of the opposition parties are denied certain benefits such “constituency benefits”. So, they

cannot perform effectively. Maope further said that the responsibility of the parliamentarians from the opposition political parties is much greater than that of the parliamentarians of the ruling party, because they look after all the constituencies and not only single constituencies, and give reports to these constituencies. In other words the LCD government did not accept the MMP system, and it is like they were forced into it.

Mr Mphanya is the leader of the BCP. I interviewed him on 25 December 2004.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

Mphanya said that the opposition political parties are weak and that it is not their fault, the fault lies with the government because the government is weak and it is difficult to criticize a weak government especially when it is entrenched and he gave the following reasons:

- a) This government is not original; it took over from another, they did not start this thing (problem).*
- b) Government has no policy that opposition political parties can criticize.*
- c) Government relies on foreign powers to do its business in the country.*
- d) Government of a poor country is unfortunate because politicians look for their opportunities more than the public interests, and it is like that in Lesotho.*
- e) This government works hard to establish capitalist elite out of social structures. Also, the leaders of the ruling party are in the forefront of this elite.*

Because of these reasons, the Parliamentary Bills they, government, table in parliament are not clear. The Government is confused in the sense that it does not know whether what it does is in the public interest or not.

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

Mphanya came up with the following remedies:

- a) Clear and sound laws: The laws should not be elusive. Mphanya said that although in Lesotho land is an important economic asset, it is not known who regulates the use of land, as an example, all of the following Ministries have authority on the regulation of land,*

Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Home Affairs, Local Government, Tourism, and Communication. Mphanya said that when the Ministry of Agriculture plans to use a piece of land, one may not be surprised to find housing going on there or a school or a mining industry coming up there. According to Mphanya there is no clear law on the use of land in Lesotho. Parliament must be in a position to make sound laws. There must be places for farming, crop or animal farming, housing, and so on.

b) There should be clear policies.

c) About other remedies Mphanya said that other remedies could be found in his book of 2004, "A brief history of the Basutoland Congress Party".

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
Ha Mphanya Mapoteng in Nokong constituency	Bela-Bela

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
Basutoland Congress Party	BCP

Mphanya said that the name of BCP is still Basutoland Congress Party, because in the past Basotho residents were in Lesotho that was the present Free State, up to Qwaqwa and chief Mopeli reported, in the past and even today, to Thaba-Bosiu. During the colonial period, the colonizers called a piece of Lesotho, Basutoland. So, what is over there now is not Lesotho but Basutoland. According to Mphanya that is why they wanted to regain the ceded land. That was why in 1912 when ANC was established, the Paramount Chief of Lesotho, Letsie, was a member.

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
	√				

Mphanya said that splits of the party had a negative impact on the party membership, because a number of party members got confused and disarranged. However, there is still a big number of party supporters.

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
					<i>Almost every Thursday</i>

Mphanya said that meetings are held every Thursday of the week because they include reports of development projects.

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
	√	

Mphanya stated that there are four structures of the committees, each part dealing with money: Sub-Branch / Village committee; Branch committee; Constituency committee, and National Executive committee. According to Mphanya the party is aiming at sponsoring the village projects with moneys collected from the party buildings, and so on. According to Mphanya the money will be invested in Boliba Corporative, and every member of the party will be a shareholder.

Mphanya said that disclosure is made only to members of the party.

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 Months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
		√	

7.

- i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
	√

Mphanya said that, negotiations for merger with the former BCP breakaway parties are going on. According to him the negotiations began in 2003.

- ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/ Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)

- iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
			√	

Mphanya said 'No' in the case of Lesotho because he argued that in Lesotho there are three political parties, BCP, BNP and Marema-Tlou with different policies. According to him the policies vary from East to West. Mphanya said that if BNP sticks to its old policies, it cannot easily be in alliance with BCP, but if it can use the latest policies that one of its former leaders, Leabua, had resorted to

when they built Lesotho Bank, Agricultural Development Bank, and so on, which happened to be BCP policies, then it can be in alliance with BCP. Mphanya said that PFD had a policy of BNP because it broke away from BNP established by the youth of BNP).

According to Mphanya the ruling party must be accommodative. The rulers must know that the opposition political parties are Basotho and their views must be heard. Mphanya said that Botswana has stable government because their constitution says that the opposition must be in parliament.

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
√				

According to Mphanya MMP had a negative impact on the opposition political parties. The opposition parties were at fault; the question of who were to go to parliament was not discussed within the parties. The members of Executive committees felt that they had to be in parliament and poverty was the reason why they wanted to be in parliament.

Mphanya said that opposition parties had to talk to their alliances, farmers, workers, traditional organizations, corporations, and street vendors. However, the opposition political parties did not talk to these supporters who ultimately got confused and disappointed.

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
				√

Mphanya says that Lesotho is a poor country and government does not teach the people that when they work they will be freed from poverty, but teaches them to rely on donations from outside. The parliamentarians also teach people to build up committees to receive donations. The ruling party distributes the donations and this affects choice of people.

Always when elections are close, instead of developing Agriculture, government brings in food, clothing, and so on, the donations from outside. So, people will vote for the government that gives them food. Donations are given to ruling party members who can certify that by producing membership cards. That recently, in November 2005, happened in Nokong constituency, and Red Cross cancelled the offer after getting the report. In the village of Mapoteng, there are senior citizens aged and disabled, 90 years of age, and also who do not get these donations. So, these donations are dangerous because they are not fairly distributed. These donations must be distributed by neutral bodies like the Red Cross, churches, chiefs directly and not by political parties. All political parties must have a say in the request for and distribution of donations.

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

1. Internal divisions and in-fighting conflicts
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system
3. The ballot system used
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system
5. Lack of party political funding
6. Lack of efficient leadership

- | | |
|---|----------------------------|
| 7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. The role of the military | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. Poverty | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10. Lack of transparency within the political parties | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 11. Lack of freedom | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 12. Lack of fairness | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 13. Insufficient voter education | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 14. Lack of understanding of politics | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 15. Illegitimacy of elections | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 16. Party strength is built up either in towns or country side only | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |

Answering question 10(16), Mphanya said that 85% of Basotho are in the countryside.

General Comments of the leader of BCP

According to Mphanya in Lesotho there is need for establishment of a constitutional court. Mphanya said that there is a problem of illegitimacy of elections, such as in 1998. He further said that the case of Ukrain is like that of Lesotho in 1998. According to Mphanya, a poor country is unfortunate because military intervention by SADC was not necessary, talks had to be made in order to come to an agreement; in Ukrain the law was amended and elections will be held on 26 December 2004. Mphanya said that the expectation was that the Pan African Parliament would have in it the Pan African Court.

Dr Khauhelo Raditapole is the leader of Basutoland African Congress. I interviewed her on 30 December 2004.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

There should be three political parties in Lesotho:

- a) *The splinter parties are a major cause of the weakness, because there are now too many opposition political parties failing to pull together.*
- b) *Poor funding or non-funding of political parties is another cause of weakness. The electoral party funding is not enough for the opposition political parties. These parties are not able to establish institutionalised structures such as the village, branch, constituency organizations of the party; and the strength of a party is in these structures. These structures need funds to be maintained. In the past BCP used to have district offices. Lack of these structures causes lack of legitimacy of opposition political parties.*
- c) *Politics of poverty is another cause of weakness of opposition political parties. The ruling party can control everything because it has money, for example it can control employment. So, people support the ruling party for security reasons.*

- ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

The following could be the remedy:

- a) *Reducing the number of splinter groups/parties and having a meaningful opposition.*
- b) *Funding a few parties will be meaningful.*
- c) *Addressing the issue of poverty.*

d) *Improving the laws so as to facilitate empowering the private sector. If the laws can be reviewed, that cause the ruling party to control everything, projects and so on, the opposition parties can have the opportunity of undertaking projects without frustration. For instance, when one attempts to undertake a project and one has no identification by government, there will be no success.*

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
Teya-Teyaneng ha Rats'iu	Teya-Teyaneng No. 24

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
Basutoland African Congress	B.A.C.

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
			√		

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
		√			

It is difficult to comment because mainly we hold the party caucuses. We are currently building the party.

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
	√	

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
		√	

7.

- i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
	√

We are currently trying to find out which kind of coalition is suitable.

- ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/ Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)

- iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
	√			

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
			√	

The MMP has positively affected the political participation of the opposition political parties. However, we have not yet taken the advantage of the system because we still have the old attitudes. For example, the opposition political parties wrote an invitation letter requesting the Secretary General of the Commonwealth to invite old (with respect to use of the system) countries like New Zealand to send people to Lesotho to give their experiences of the system to Basotho. But the Prime Minister of Lesotho refused saying that we are disgruntled opposition.

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
				√

Poverty created a new society of Basotho; even for registration of old senior citizens the officers came from the ruling party - for employment.

The question of overseeing “good governance, and refusal of government put in place by force”: Who oversees this? Demonstrations are not allowed in Lesotho.

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

1. Internal divisions 2
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 8
3. The ballot system used 9
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 10
5. Lack of party political funding 3
6. Lack of efficient leadership 4
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 1
8. The role of the military 16
9. Poverty 5
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 6
11. Lack of freedom 6
12. Lack of fairness 6
13. Insufficient voter education 7
14. Lack of understanding of politics 6
15. Illegitimacy of elections 11
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or country side only 12

Dr Ralitapole's comments on question no.10.

10(2): *The system is transparent; it only has to be known by the people. The people from SADC will come to copy this system, MMP, know it, and get its benefits even before we can do because we denied ourselves that opportunity.*

10(3): *The ballot system is negotiated by IEC with the political parties, so it is not a problem.*

10(6): *There is general lack of leadership in Lesotho, for example in churches, and in many other organizations. So, organizations that are brought up by the same people will lack good leadership.*

10(7): *Lack of environment conducive for effective functioning of political parties and recognition of the role of opposition parties is the number 1 cause of weakness of opposition parties. The ruling party should not see opposition as enemy. The media can facilitate this environment. Internal divisions and in-fighting conflicts are outcomes of this problem in 10(7).*

10(10): *I can place sub –questions 10(10), 10(11) and 10(14) under one sub-question called “Lack of democratic culture in parties”. A party will be ruling at the end, so it must start now to practice democratic culture; give reports and so on. Most of the parties are patriarchal; for instance, people do not see a party if one does not say ‘Ntate Ntsu, Mandela, and so on. So, the people should not fear that a leader is being toppled over.*

10(13): *It is a ploy by the ruling party. The less the people know the easier you can control them.*

10(15): *The only legitimate and normal elections are two, the 1965 and 1970 general elections. People were normal. The environment changed after 1970. After 1993 elections the British said that there would be splits created within the opposition.*

Chief Peete Peete is the leader of the National Progressive Party. I interviewed him on 12 January 2005.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho?

If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?
Opposition political parties are not weak. The ruling party has more opportunities than the other parties. The political parties are not equal because of terrain. This situation makes living conditions unequal in different areas. Because of these differences the ruling party always gets donations, and opportunities of revisiting its specific areas of interest, for example education, and as such it is able to improve its political methodologies or approaches.

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

In a democratic situation the ruling party has to give equal opportunities with respect to: knowledge, effectiveness, exposure to the outside world, to being in position, to getting funds, and so on. NPP and other opposition political parties pointed out to the local international organizations that there is imbalance between the ruling party and the opposition parties in relation to the preparations for the elections. These parties must get equal opportunities mentioned above.

The ruling party Ministers use government vehicles, as an example, in directly campaigning. These Ministers have time to impose whatever they want without prior discussion with the opposition parties.

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
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Village/Town	Constituency name
Kolojane	Bela-Bela

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
National Progressive Party	NPP

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
				√	

The working committee holds meetings 4 to 5 times a year and the constituency committee at least twice a month. The area (tikoloho/libaka) committee holds meetings at least twice a month. The party makes contributions: Membership; money collected by the committee for any extraneous, e.g. trips; concerts, and so on. Because the collections are so meagre, some of the collections are seldom announced.

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
	√	

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
		√	

7.

- i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
	√

The NPP is however, preparing for an alliance with the BNP and that will take place when parliament is dissolved getting ready for the next elections. There is a law that prohibits establishment of alliances or crossing of the floor by the opposition parties represented in Parliament

- ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/ Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)

- iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

1. Internal divisions
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 3
3. The ballot system used
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 1
5. Lack of party political funding 1
6. Lack of efficient leadership
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 4

- | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 8. The role of the military | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. Poverty | | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10. Lack of transparency within the political parties | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 11. Lack of freedom | | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 12. Lack of fairness | <i>Contributes very little.</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 13. Insufficient voter education | | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 14. Lack of understanding of politics | <i>Contributes very little.</i> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 15. Illegitimacy of elections | | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
- contributes very little but cannot be left out.*

General comments of the leader of the NPP

Comparing advantages of democratic involvement in day-to-day affairs and also the relations of the ruling party with the opposition political parties in Lesotho and South Africa, it is found that South Africa is more open in democracy than Lesotho where there is no openness. South Africa gives opportunities to opposition parties to go out on exposure, it gives more funds to opposition parties than it gives to the ruling party. In Lesotho the allowances are not equal, even though the M150 is common; the ruling party in addition has the constituencies allowances.

The law that prohibits the opposition parties, particularly those which got into parliament as a result of the proportional representation, from establishing alliances, shows that the parties are not fully equal.

Matete is the General Secretary of Basotho National Party and I interviewed him on 19 January 2005.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

- Lack of resources
- The distributive capability of the government shifts focus to the ruling party.

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

- *Political party funding*
- *The ruling party should not monopolize state facilities (e.g. radio & transport)*

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
<i>Morija</i>	<i>Matsieng No.44</i>

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
<i>Basotho National Party</i>	<i>BNP</i>

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
					√

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
	√				

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
		<i>Treasurer gives report to party conference</i>

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
		√	

7.

i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
√	

ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary)	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary)	United Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)
--	--	--	--	---	---

	majority)	debates).	debates).		
					√

- iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
	√			

About November 2004 we made an agreement with the NPP to have relations of both inside and outside Parliament. The type of alliance we want to establish with NPP is not a merger, but another type whose modalities we are still going to work out.

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
			√	

Some problems, however, of the attitude of failing to accept, mainly from the ruling party, make things difficult. The ruling party even now maintains that its parliamentarians are more legitimate than those of the proportional representation. This is the main problem.

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
			√	

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

- | | | |
|--|----|--------------------------|
| 1. Internal divisions | 13 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system | 6 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. The ballot system used | 5 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system | 9 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. Lack of party political funding | 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. Lack of efficient leadership | 12 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties | 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. The role of the military | 16 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. Poverty | 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10. Lack of transparency within the political parties | 14 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 11. Lack of freedom | 10 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 12. Lack of fairness | 7 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 13. Insufficient voter education | 15 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 14. Lack of understanding of politics | 8 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 15. Illegitimacy of elections | 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Comments of the General Secretary of the BNP, Matete, P. R.

10(iii): *This is in two parts: In 1998 the ballot paper seemed to have been manipulated and was not uniform as it had two different textures for one and the same elections. Hence the paper began to be called “Pampiri sekokoto” or a hard version and a soft version. The question was, why were their two versions brought for one and the same election?*

The balloting system itself: We have been accusing the IEC of giving itself monopoly of developing the ballot paper, when it is the responsibility of the IEC and the stakeholders – political parties. Perhaps today it is better because parties are invited, although eventually their views are thrown away.

The remedy to this problem is that the IEC and government must acknowledge that preparation for elections is the responsibility of all stakeholders and not only one side.

10(v): *Lack of political party funding: The remedy to this problem is that, the state should provide political party funding to build competitive democracy.*

10(ix): *Remedy to poverty: Sound economic policies can alleviate poverty. Currently there are no sound policies. Overwhelming, majority of people live under misery and poverty. This situation influences their support to their parties, particularly financially. On the other hand the ruling party uses the state facilities to promote its image.*

10(xv): The remedy to illegitimacy: If stakeholders can get the opportunity to exercise their full responsibility over the process of elections, unlike what is taking place now, the legitimacy of elections would be enhanced.

10(xv): *Up to now the BNP is still not satisfied with the conduct and outcome of both the 1998 and 2002 general elections. After 1998, the elections were postponed thrice. It seemed the ruling party did not want elections to be held;*

they purposefully delayed the elections. The government made it difficult for the IPA to prepare for the elections. When the elections had to be held within 15 to 18 months, they were delayed for three years.

Rosa Leneha is the General Secretary of the LWP. I interviewed her on 26 January 2005.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho?

If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

- *Because of maturity the ruling party is bigger than opposition and they don't have rights like them.*

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

- *The opposition must have the same rights as the ruling party, so that they can work hard.*

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
<i>Ha Ntsabane/Berea</i>	<i>Khafung No.23</i>

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
<i>Lesotho Workers Party</i>	<i>LWP</i>

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
			√		

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
	√				

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
	√	

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
√			

7.

i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
	√

ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)

- iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
			√	

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
√				

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
				√

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

1. Internal divisions 14

2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 16

3. The ballot system used	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Lack of party political funding	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Lack of efficient leadership	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
8. The role of the military	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
9. Poverty	15 <input type="checkbox"/>
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties	13 <input type="checkbox"/>
11. Lack of freedom	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
12. Lack of fairness	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
13. Insufficient voter education	11 <input type="checkbox"/>
14. Lack of understanding of politics	12 <input type="checkbox"/>
15. Illegitimacy of elections	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only	10 <input type="checkbox"/>

Thakane Makoa is the representative of the LEP in the IEC. I interviewed her on 26 January 2005.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho?
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

- *It seems the ruling party has more power than the opposition political party.*

- ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

- *If the opposition parties mixed or brought together their numbers after elections, it would be easy to overcome the weakness just because they will have more numbers than the ruling party.*

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
<i>Lower Thamae</i>	<i>Stadium Area No.31</i>

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
<i>Lesotho Education Party</i>	<i>LEP</i>

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
√					

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
	√				

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
√		

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)

7.

i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
	√

ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)

iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
				√

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
√				

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
√				

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

1. Internal divisions 15
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 14
3. The ballot system used 2

4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 16
5. Lack of party political funding 1
6. Lack of efficient leadership 5
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 3
8. The role of the military 12
9. Poverty 4
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 6
11. Lack of freedom 7
12. Lack of fairness 9
13. Insufficient voter education 8
14. Lack of understanding of politics 10
15. Illegitimacy of elections 13
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only 11

Mpela is the Deputy Leader of the Lesotho Labour Party (LLP). I interviewed Mpela on 12 January 2006.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho? If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

- *Yes. Firstly, opposition political parties do not have a clear mandate from the government of Lesotho with respect to what has to be done; in other words government does not give the opposition direction about the course of action. Secondly, the system of MMP is not well accepted in Parliament, for example the leader of the opposition has not yet been given his due respect such as being given a vehicle, and so on, by government.*
- *The members of Parliament of the ruling party undermine the opposition members of Parliament by calling them losers.*

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

- *The remedy: The constitution must be amended in order to enable smooth handling of matters. The question of Parliamentary transition should be fully addressed.*

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
<i>Maseru</i>	<i>Stadium Area No.31</i>

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
<i>Lesotho Labour Party</i>	<i>LLP</i>

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
√					

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
	√				

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
	√	

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
		√	

7.

i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
√	

ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For	Executive/ Cabinet Coalition	Minority Executive Coalition	Legislative Coalition (For	United Front Alliance	Mergers /Other (Name the
-----------------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	------------------------------	------------------------------------

elections)	(For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	(Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	(for driving towards a common goal)	other)
√					

iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
		√		

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
√				

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
				√

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| 1. Internal divisions | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. The ballot system used | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. Lack of party political funding | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. Lack of efficient leadership | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. The role of the military | 16 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. Poverty | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10. Lack of transparency within the political parties | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 11. Lack of freedom | 11 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 12. Lack of fairness | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 13. Insufficient voter education | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 14. Lack of understanding of politics | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 15. Illegitimacy of elections | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |

More comments made by Mpela

Mpela asserts that there is a fear that the opposition parties are denied their rights, for example the present leader of the opposition, Kelebone Maope, has not been given the rights of a leader, and as a result they become apathetic.

Mpela contends that Lesotho politics has broken up Basotho into two nations, the central government and the local government nations; it looks like there is no mechanism to coordinate the two institutions and one could ask why such a thing happens during the period of civilization. In Lesotho there are the elite and they are ethno-demotic; they are rich when others are poor.

According to Mpela the undermining of the opposition members of Parliament weakened the opposition because as a result of that, they feared to take part during the parliamentary debates.

Mpela wrapped his responses by saying that, Basotho do not have independent government of their own; governance is done by foreigners, Basotho have no 'ownership of government'; elections are funded with donations and grants.

Manyeli is the Leader of the National Independence Party (NIP). I interviewed Manyeli on the 2nd March 2006.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho?
If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

- *Yes. The opposition has gone weak and the following are the causes:*
 - i) There are too many political parties; ii) Most of the founders established the political parties for no purpose or reason; and there are no policies to give guidance or to regulate forming of political parties.*

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

The following could be remedies:

- a) There should not be very many political parties in Lesotho.*
- b) There must be legislation regulating the establishment of political parties. Manyeli said that he mentioned on 2nd March 2006, in Parliament, that there is lack of principled leadership of political parties.*

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
<i>Mokhokhong</i>	<i>Maama No. 40</i>

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
<i>National Independence Party</i>	<i>NIP</i>

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
-------------	---------------	---------------	-----------------	---------------	---------

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001

This party does not use membership and there are no membership cards. Manyeli says that they use a different approach from others; everybody who agrees with them is welcome. Manyeli said that Basotho still do not understand politics; he gave an example of Winston Churchill who was proud to vote for a party which was not his.

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
	√				

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
√		

For the past 22 years there has not been annual general meeting (AGM).

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)

7.

i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
	√

- ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question:
Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)

- iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
		√		

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
	√			

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
				√

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

1. Internal divisions 1
2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 16
3. The ballot system used
4. Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system 15
5. Lack of party political funding 1
6. Lack of efficient leadership 1
7. Government making it difficult for the opposition parties 8
8. The role of the military 16
9. Poverty 1
10. Lack of transparency within the political parties 1
11. Lack of freedom 16
12. Lack of fairness 16
13. Insufficient voter education 1

- 14.Lack of understanding of politics 1
- 15.Illegitimacy of elections 16
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only 2

Comments of the leader of the NIP, A. C. Manyeli

- i) Manyeli said that the attitude of the ruling party was not welcoming to the opposition parties and that began in the Interim Political Authority (IPA). He further mentioned that on arrival of the opposition in Parliament after the 2002 elections, legislation, enabling parties to be called by different names, was passed. The members of Parliament (MPs) of the ruling party are called by constituency names, and the MPs of the opposition political parties are called Members of Parliament only.
- ii) Manyeli said that MPs of the ruling party get constituency allowances and those of the opposition parties do not get anything.
- iii) The MPs of the ruling party get secretaries while the MPs of the opposition do not have them.
- iv) Manyeli quoted Benjamin Disraeli saying “The privileged and the people form two nations”. Manyeli said that Lesotho Parliament is like two nations of the ruling party MPs and the MPs of the opposition. Manyeli also quoted Edmund Buck saying “Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors with different and sometimes opposing interests, a parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation with one interest; a member may be elected from Birmingham, but when he is in parliament he is a Member of Parliament and not of Birmingham”. Manyeli said that he had just made the above quotations to Parliament in the morning hours of the 2nd March 2006 the day I interviewed him.

- v) Commenting on question no.9 of the questionnaire, Manyeli said when Government strategy is poverty reduction and the national objective is poverty eradication, their (NIP) strategy is to eradicate poverty (and not only to reduce it), and he mentioned that it was where they differed with LCD government.

'Manapo Anna Majara is the leader of the New Lesotho Freedom Party (NLFP). I interviewed Majara on the 7th March 2006.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. i.) Since 1993, have the opposition political parties gone weak in Lesotho?

If the answer is yes, in your opinion, what is the most important cause?

- *Yes. The opposition has gone weak because the opposition political parties struggle for themselves and not for the nation.*

ii) What could be the remedy to overcome the above-mentioned cause of weakness?

The following can be a remedy: People should be elected by merit, and they should be people who can put forward motions in Parliament and should not stay silent in Parliament.

2. Where is your permanent residence? Please give the name of the village or town and constituency in the table below.

Village/Town	Constituency name
<i>Sekamaneng</i>	<i>Berea No. 28</i>

3. Indicate the name of your political party in the table below:

Name of political party	Abbreviation
<i>New Lesotho Freedom Party</i>	<i>NLFP</i>

4. What is membership of your political party?

5001-10 000	10 001-15 000	15 001-20 000	20 001 – 30 000	30 001-50 000	>50 001
	√				

5. In three months how many times do you hold public meetings in the constituency?

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)

0	1 to 2	2 to 3	3 to 4	4 to 6	Other (Specify)
		√			

6. i) Does your party constitution provide any clause/s on the disclosure of party finances and their usages?

No, it does not	Yes, it does	Other answer (Specify)
	√	

ii) If the answer is 'Yes' in i) above, how often are disclosure reports given to the public?

Every 3 months	Every 6 months	Every 12 months	Other Period (Specify)
√			

7.

i. Did your political party form a coalition/alliance of any kind with another/other political party/s in the period '1993 -2006'?

Yes	No
	√

ii. If the answer is yes to i) above, answer the following question: Which kind/s of coalition/alliance did your party establish with another/other party/s? Tick as many boxes as appropriate.

Electoral Alliance (For elections)	Executive/Cabinet Coalition (For gaining majority seats to control a cabinet responsible to parliamentary majority)	Minority Executive Coalition (Being in the minority, support the cabinet in parliamentary debates).	Legislative Coalition (For supporting ruling party on various issues in parliamentary debates).	United Front Alliance (for driving towards a common goal)	Mergers /Other (Name the other)
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iii. Do you think that the use of political coalitions/alliances can strengthen electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
	√			

8. How has Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system affected political participation of the opposition parties in Lesotho?

Very negatively	Negatively	No change	Positively	Very positively
		√		

It could be good only when the right MPs were elected.

9. Do you think poverty has an impact on electoral political participation of opposition parties in Lesotho?

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
			√	

10. Below is given a list of possible causes of weak electoral political participation of opposition political parties in Lesotho. Please rank these possible causes by writing numbers, 1) to 16), in the boxes against them; the most important cause must be labelled 1, the second 2, and so on.

1. Internal divisions 16

2. Lack of transparency of the electoral system 3

3.The ballot system used	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.Lack of democracy, in general, of the Electoral system	1	<input type="checkbox"/>
5.Lack of party political funding	3	<input type="checkbox"/>
6.Lack of efficient leadership	16	<input type="checkbox"/>
7.Government making it difficult for the opposition parties	16	<input type="checkbox"/>
8.The role of the military	16	<input type="checkbox"/>
9.Poverty	1	<input type="checkbox"/>
10.Lack of transparency within the political parties	2	<input type="checkbox"/>
11.Lack of freedom	11	<input type="checkbox"/>
12.Lack of fairness	5	<input type="checkbox"/>
13.Insufficient voter education	8	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.Lack of understanding of politics	7	<input type="checkbox"/>
15.Illegitimacy of elections	6	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. Party strength is built up either in towns or countryside only		<input type="checkbox"/>

Comments of the leader of the NLFP, Majara, A. M.

Commenting on no.10.3 Majara said that usually complaints are about the ballot system. The ballot system must be changed.

About no.10.6 Majara said that the leaderships of political parties need support in order to raise their efficiency.

Appendix 6

Analysis of the placement of electoral candidates by opposition parties in the 2002 election

CANDIDATES PLACED FOR 2002 ELECTIONS: YES/NO

Constituency No	BAC	BCP	BNP	LEP	LLP	LPC	LWP	MFP	NIP	NLFP	NPP	PFD
2	y	y	y	n	n	y	n	y	n	n	y	y
3	y	y	y	n	n	y	n	y	n	n	y	y
5	y	y	y	n	n	y	n	y	n	n	y	y
8	y	y	y	n	n	y	y	y	n	n	y	y
20	y	y	y	n	y	y	y	y	y	n	y	y
22	y	y	y	n	n	y	y	y	n	n	y	y
25	y	n	y	n	n	y	n	y	n	n	n	y
26	y	y	y	y	n	y	y	n	n	y	y	y
29	y	y	y	n	y	y	y	y	n	y	y	y
32	y	y	y	n	n	y	y	y	n	n	y	y
35	y	y	y	n	n	y	y	y	n	y	y	y
42	y	n	y	y	n	y	n	y	n	y	y	y
43	y	n	y	y	n	y	n	y	n	y	y	y
50	y	y	y	n	n	y	y	y	n	n	n	y
52	y	y	y	n	n	y	y	y	n	y	n	y
53	y	y	y	y	n	y	y	y	n	y	y	y
57	y	y	y	n	n	y	n	y	n	n	n	y
58	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	n	n	n	y
59	y	y	y	n	y	y	n	y	n	y	y	y
62	n	y	y	y	n	y	n	n	n	n	n	y
68	y	y	y	n	n	y	n	y	n	n	n	y
71	y	y	y	n	y	y	n	y	n	n	n	y
75	y	n	y	n	n	y	n	n	n	n	n	y
78	y	n	y	n	n	y	N	y	n	n	y	y

Source: IEC Report 28 – CSRS of 19 June 2002.

Appendix 7

Dependency and post dependency theories

Lesotho is one of the least developed countries and poverty seems to impact negatively on the activities of the opposition political parties. According to Ruttan in Kotze and Labuschagne (1995: 94,95), in poor countries with per capita incomes below \$750 there is a positive relationship between political development and economic development. The theories discussed below explain why the African countries continue to be dependent on developed countries and one of these theories gives the alternative way forward. The researcher believes that information about the theories discussed below will be useful to the reader.

a) Dependency theory

Nyango'ro (1989: 83) states that the American Economic Review (1970) describes dependency theory as a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy under which the former is subjected. Nyango'ro asserts that dependency theory denies the appropriateness of emphasis on trade excluding financial, technological, and cultural-political considerations. Also dependency theory denies the view of the causative nature of trade. According to this theory, trade is the derived effect of the basic forms of penetration: financial, technological, and political-cultural.

According to Webster (1990: 84) dependency theory was developed in the 1960s through the work of a number of academics and development economists who were not happy with the continued economic failure in Latin American countries. Further, Webster asserts that they dismissed the notions of modernisation theory that a lack of development could be caused by lack of appropriate modernising values and that exposure to the developed countries could positively benefit the Third World. According to Webster (1990: 85) and Nyangóro (1989: 83) one of the leading theoreticians of dependency has been Andre Gundar Frank.

Further, Nyango'ro (1989: 83) summarises the assumptions explaining the above phenomenon as follows:

1. Concentration of a peripheral nation's value structure upon a metropolitan partner will produce concentration of trade.
2. Political and cultural values will shape consumption preferences and production habits and will increase demand for goods from the dominant metropolitan country.
3. The means of production obtained from that country would shape economic development to require further inputs from the source of capital, thus forming a "vicious circle of dependence".

All the above three assumptions are valid in the case of Lesotho and this is why this country continuously depends on foreign aid as also indicated below by Huxtable & Villal'on (1998: 280 – 284).

Nyango'ro (1989: 83) further emphasizes that according to dependency theory, foreign connection is seen as having a negative impact on the development profile of the peripheral society. The economic relationships of the peripheral with core countries promoted development of underdevelopment of the Third World countries.

According to Huxtable & Villal'on (1998: 280 – 284) there is the critical juncture between disintegration and reconfiguration. These authors note that the economies of African states are not able to generate adequate wealth to satisfy the material needs of their citizens and these countries continuously depend on foreign aid and the INGOs. The African countries import most capital and many consumer goods and this behaviour aggravates their debts and balance-of-payments problems. Further, these authors assert that the African countries are dependent on the IFIs, the World Bank and IMF to pay their debts and to finance their balance-of-payments. Additionally these authors contend that the most often cited external threat to the African state is the IFI's imposition of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). These countries are given loans if they agree to implement and adhere to the liberal economic principles demanded by the IFIs (Huxtable & Villal'on 1998: 282), (Nyango'ro & Shaw in Huxtable & Villal'on 1998: 28 –34).

Johan Graaff and Dawid Venter in Coetzee (2001: 83) contend that Frank's stagnationist view on the interrelationship of the core and periphery forms the weakest part of the dependency theory. They say it is weak because it depicts the core as having absolute power and the periphery being completely powerless. They assert that in this view, there is no interaction between the two parts; the one is dominant over the other. Further, they say that this theory has been disproved with the examples that follow. A number of Third World countries, such as the East Asian "tigers" (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore), Brazil, Mexico and some other Latin American countries grew at a dramatic rate in the previous 15 years despite their original peripheral status. The approaches used by these countries were different from those used in other Third World countries notably African countries as will be indicated later. So, it might not be accurate to say that the theory was disproved with those few given examples.

b) Development theory

Nyango'ro (1989: 86) contends that another aspect of dependency theory is the dependent development that builds upon the new dependence a' la Dos Santos. Nyango'ro (1989: 86) states that Dos Santos' analysis moved one step ahead of Frank's notion and identified the infusion of finance and technology into peripheral production – from simple extraction to manufacturing of industrial goods, although still in a dependent form. Agricultural production also takes place. According to Nyango'ro (1989: 86), Evans defines dependent development as: "a special instance of dependency, characterised by the association of alliance of international and local capital. The state also joins the alliance as an active partner, and the resulting triple alliance is still a fundamental factor in the emergence of dependent development".

Nyango'ro asserts that while both Frank and Dos Santos fully recognize the role of international capital in the production structure of the peripheral economy, there is no explicit recognition of the role of the state as an active participant in the organization of production. Nyango'ro contends that the most significant element in the definition of dependent development is the role of the peripheral

state in the economy. Also Nyango'ro cites Brazil and Mexico in Latin America as, perhaps, having the most developed form of dependent development.

According to Nyango'ro (1989: 92) only two major works (Swainson, 1980; Marcussen and Torp, 1982) have attempted to apply the concept to African development. Swainson's work has shown the fallacy of applying the theory to Kenya. On the other hand Marcussen and Torp's have tried to apply the theory with mixed results. Nyango'ro tested the validity and applicability of the theory applied to sub-Saharan Africa. According to Nyango'ro (1989: 93) theoretically it is plausible that any increase in the manufacturing capacity of the peripheral economy may lead to more sectoral differentiation and possibly to increased productivity in the economy via the multiplier effect. However, looking back ten years, the economy of African countries had essentially stagnated or declined (Nyango'ro 1989: 93). The evidence provided by Marcussen and Torp reveals the difficulty of applying dependent development theory to Africa. Nyango'ro asserts that using Peter Evan's (1979: 32) basic criterion for dependent development, no African country fit the bill:

"Dependent development" will be used to refer to cases where capital accumulation and diversified industrialization of more than superficial sort are not only occurring in a peripheral country but are dominating the transformation of its economy and social structure". Development theory so far has not applied to Lesotho.

c) Disaggregating capitalism in Africa

Nyango'ro (1989: 100, 101) makes an attempt to reconstruct development theory from the perspective of internally generated capitalist development forces in Africa by examining the evolution of the internal development structure. He calls this process disaggregating capitalism in Africa.

Nyango'ro contends that a principal test to find out if a society is capitalist or not can be conducted by examining Marx's theoretical-historical examination of capitalism against socio-economic reality, as it exists in Africa today. According to Nyango'ro (1989: 107), Marx stated in "Pre-capitalist Economic Formations" that, "One of the prerequisites of wage labour and one of the historic conditions for

capital is free labour and the exchange of free labour against money, in order to reproduce money and convert it into values, in order to be consumed by money, not as use value for entertainment but as use value for money. Another prerequisite is the separation of free labour from the objective conditions of its realization – from means and material of labour. This means above all that the worker must be separated from the land, which functions as his natural laboratory. This means the dissolution both of free petty landownership and of communal landed property, based on oriental commune (1964: 7)”.

Further, Nyango’ro (1989: 109) asserts that like Marx, Max Weber stressed that modern capitalism does not develop from extensive trade or accumulation. Nyango’ro notes that it is at this point that world-system/dependency theory differs from Marxian/Weberian formulations. Further Nyango’ro contends that both in Marxian and Weberian formulations trade is regarded as a contributing factor but not a necessary one.

According to Nyango’ro (1989: 109) Weber listed six elements characterising the evolution of modern capitalism:

1. Private appropriation by entrepreneurs of all the means of production, separation of the workers from the means of production;
2. Formally free labour, but compelled to sell its labour;
3. Rational technology based on calculation and knowledge, especially mechanization;
4. Market exchange not burdened by irrational restraints;
5. Calculable law in both adjudication and state administration;
6. A rational monetary system and the general commercialisation of economic life.

Nyango’ro (1989: 109, 110) asserts that a better way of analysing modern capitalism and its historical evolution and its application to the Third World especially to Africa, should be based on the synthesis between the Weberian institutional theory of capitalism and the Marxian social theory of capitalism. Nyango’ro asserts that this approach could enable easy understanding of development of capitalism in Africa and the rest of the Third World.

Ake (1976) in Nyango'ro (1989: 110) suggests that in Africa there is a juxtaposition of three modes of production:

- i. Primitive community mode
- ii. The simple commodity mode of production
- iii. The capitalist mode of production.

Hyden in Nyango'ro (1989: 112) contends that Africa fails to develop because capitalism has failed to break down the pre-capitalist barriers that still exist in the Third World countries. According to Nyango'ro (1989: 114) in Africa open villages have autonomous existence with land ownership being essentially communal under traditional arrangement. Additionally, Nyango'ro asserts that this communal ownership of the means of production historically has hindered capitalism from destroying the African peasant or "natural economy" given the direct access to land. So, African countries fail to develop capitalism or socialism because of the existing pre-capitalist social relations. In Lesotho the simple commodity mode of production predominates.

In the few textile industries that Lesotho has, 100% shares belong to the foreign capitalists and they employ about 45, 000 workers. The textile goods are manufactured for export. In the rest of the industries such as mining, telecommunications, milling, brewery, etc. the Government does not hold more than 30% shares, in most of them it has 20% shares. Also in Lesotho almost every household has a piece of farming land. Lesotho is still one of the least developed countries (LDCs). So, development of the local bourgeoisie and the proletariat is a very slow process.

Nyango'ro (1989: 116) asserts that the dominance of simple commodity production means that capitalism in Africa still has a long way to go. Also Nyango'ro contends that part of the problem of underdevelopment in Africa could be explained as the failure of capitalist production to take root, whilst not denying that some forms of capitalist production exist in Africa. Another reason for the failure of capitalism is Africa's low socio-economic base; the absorptive capacity of Africa's industry in terms of both labour and materials is severely limited Nyango'ro (1989: 119). Thus the inability of the excess labour, which vacates land, to find employment in urban areas has further economic constraints that undermine capital's expansionary nature.

According to Ometoruwa (2008: 8) in Public Eye weekly newspaper, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), the mission of AFC is to reduce poverty through private-sector initiative on the African continent. The important question to answer is whether the private companies are mainly local or foreign. Ometoruwa asserts that the lack of basic infrastructure and industrial capacity remains one of the biggest problems in Africa, for it sustains poverty and undermines the continent's ability to compete with the rest of the world.

Ake (1996: 133) contends that the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) undertaken by African countries continue to weaken the state in Africa due to their one-sided emphasis on privatisation, denationalisation, and reliance on market forces. He asserts that these SAPs weaken the state even politically, undermining its legitimacy as it happened in Zambia, Gabon and Nigeria. According to Gordon et al (2007: 130) economic performance of many African countries under SAPs did not improve and much of the borrowing from IMF/World Bank was not repayable. In 1996 the IMF and World Bank launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in order to relieve the debt burdens of the poorest countries (Gordon et al 2007: 130).

Nyango'ro (1989: 146) posits that the World Bank's insistence on policy reform in agriculture and privatisation of the economy as a basis for economic development falls short of addressing the real issues confronting African states. He contends that there can be no serious change unless the socio-political structure is radically changed. Further, he suggests the appropriate way to deal with the issue as to disaggregate the complex set of interrelationships between the state and international capital and between the state and the civil society. Ake (2000: 160) asserts that in Africa democratisation should begin with the transformation of the state and later the new political processes could be introduced. Also Ake gives the reason that, the post-colonial state in Africa perhaps is more than its predecessor literally an instrument of oppression.

Ake (1996: 132) asserts that the suitable democracy for Africa would have four characteristics that follow:

1. A democracy in which people have some real decision-making power over and above the formal consent of electoral choice;
2. A social democracy that puts emphasis on concrete political, social, and economic rights, as opposed to liberal democracy that emphasises abstract political rights;
3. A democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual rights.
4. A democracy of incorporation. It should be as inclusive as possible.

Nyango'ro (1989: 148) contends that the absence of a clearly defined national bourgeoisie in Africa calls for the state to play a leading role in effecting economic development. According to Nyango'ro (1989: 148 & 149) in Africa there should be state intervention in the economy. However, this intervention should be less regulatory and more developmental as it was done in modern Japan. Also state intervention resulted in great acceleration of industrialisation in Brazil, Mexico and other newly industrialising countries (NICs) (Nyango'ro 1989: 152 & 153).

Internal contradictions within the feudal system will enable development of capitalism/socialism (Glezerman s.a.: 153). According to Hyden in Nyango'ro (1989: 112) the "capturing" or destruction of peasantry by classes representing higher forms of sociotechnological reproduction has historically been the beginning of the end of the "natural economy". The capture of the peasants by the government, since there is no bourgeoisie, will facilitate establishment of capitalism.

As a matter of comparison to Hyden's thesis, in his 'lecture iv' around 1966 Glezerman (s.a.: 153) quotes Lenin in an article called "Karl Marx": "Marx deduces the inevitability of transformation of capitalist society into socialist society wholly and exclusively from the economic law of motion of contemporary society". He explained that Marx deduced the need for abolishing capitalist system from operation of its laws and that would lead to its negation like any obsolescent phenomenon. So, in the case of Africa, feudalism or the current mode of production could be replaced by capitalism/socialism as explained in the above quotation made by Glezerman.

According to Marx and Engels teachings, a revolution is not exported/imported (Glezerman s.a.: 209), it takes place from within the country on the basis of internal revolutionary developments, because social class contradictions develop in the country. So, Africa needs to develop its bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Only assistance can be offered to sustain what has been achieved. Also, at this point, according Marxist–Leninist teachings, as in Glezerman (s.a.: 198, 211&212) it is possible for the Third World countries to bypass a stage of development and reach the next through assistance of the developed ones; for example, Uzbek, Turkmenian, Kirghiz and other republics of the former Soviet Union did build socialism having bypassed capitalism. Copying from the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution above, the case of building capitalism or socialism in Africa requires a guiding theory/ies that should be acceptable to the African states/political parties.

According to Ake (1996: 138) the democracy movement in Africa opposes authoritarian elitism and construction of development as a strategy of power and exploitation. He says that this movement does not yet have an articulated political theory. However, Ake contends that its theory posits the inescapable connection of the political and the economic, and the priority of the political and that came out clearly in the Arusha conference that developed the African Charter.

Further, Ake asserts that the African Charter for Popular Participation indicates the absence of democracy as the main cause of the crisis of underdevelopment in Africa. Further, Ake (1996: 139) urges the African countries to realize that their greatest resource is their people and it is through their active and full participation that Africa can overcome the challenges that face it. It is very important for African political parties to organise short course political training for their people. For example, the Electoral Institution of Southern Africa (EISA) offers some training throughout the SADC region.

Ake (2000: 126, 127) notes that confusion exists among scholars of development about the relation between democracy and development; some say there is no relation. Further, Ake contends that the world was impressed by the achievement under authoritarian rule by the newly industrialising countries (NICs) notably,

Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. Also the dramatic performance of China in the past 15 years reinforced that view (Ake 2000: 127).

According to Nyango'ro (1989: 149, 150) many of the pitfalls related to the state intervention in the economy are peculiar to Africa. He advises that African state intervention should be less regulatory and more developmental as mentioned above. In this way, Nyango'ro encourages the Africans to go for a **developmental state**. He cites a good example of the modern Japan. Japan did not go for capitalism or socialism. The state prioritised and assisted certain industries.

Nyango'ro (1989: 156) calls for a **new development strategy in Africa**, to restructure Africa's relationship with international economy – inevitably moving toward less association. Ake (2000: 185) asserts that while in Africa democracy movement is taking the direction of liberal democracy of multi-party electoral competition, social democracy is more feasible in Africa. Indeed social democracy could be the key to the solution of the problems facing African states, but this requires the political parties to train their people. This theory is applicable to the case of Lesotho, although there could be some limitations, such as the relationship between political development and economic development. Theoretically, political development does occur independently of economic development and vice versa. According to Adelman and Morris in Kotze and Labuschagne (1995: 95) political and economic differentiation and specialisation are increasingly associated with more liberal and more democratic political systems than with the authoritarian systems.

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