Coloniality of Power in Development Studies and the Impact of Global Imperial Designs on Africa¹

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Introduction
When History meets Development Studies, the encounter of the two disciplines invokes an inquiry into the past, a critical reflection on the murky present, and a forecasting into the mysterious future. As a historian and a student of development, I wish today to share with you my ideas on the challenges that have been faced by African people in the course of their struggles for development of their troubled continent. Therefore, my inaugural lecture today, harnesses historical knowledge to reflect on Development Studies as an academic field, ideology, discourse, and practice from decolonial epistemic perspectives and world-systems approach.

The world-systems approach enables me to grapple with pertinent global imperial designs whereas decolonial epistemic perspectives facilitate the laying of the foundation for a decolonization of Development Studies as a field of study which has remained deeply interpellated by its Euro-American modernist and ‘civilising mission’ genealogy. A combination of world-systems approach and decolonial epistemic perspectives, form an ideal entry point to interrogate claims of objectivist-universalist knowledges, challenges of decolonization of Euro-American power structure, and problems of developmentalism (Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodriguez 2002, xi-xxx).

Decolonization as a political, epistemological and economic liberatory project has remained an unfinished business, giving way to coloniality. Coloniality is an invisible power structure that sustains colonial relations of exploitation and domination long after the end of direct colonialism (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 240-270). Coloniality of power works as a crucial structuring process within global imperial designs, sustaining the superiority of the Global North and ensuring the perpetual subalternity of the Global South using colonial matrices of power (Mignolo 2007, 155-167).

Colonial matrices of power are a set of technologies of subjectivation that consist of four types. The first is control of economy which manifests itself

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through dispossessions, land appropriations, the exploitation of labour, and control of African natural resources. The second is control of authority which includes the maintenance of military superiority and monopolization of the means of violence. The third is control of gender and sexuality which involves the re-imagination of ‘family’ in Western bourgeois terms and the introduction of Western-centric education which displaces indigenous knowledges. The last is control of subjectivity and knowledge which includes epistemological colonisation and the re-articulation of African subjectivity as inferior and constituted by a series of ‘deficits’ and a catalogue of ‘lacks’ (Quijano 2007, 168-187; Grosfoguel 2007, 214).

My concern is about how Development Studies could be made to engage with the fundamental challenge of transcending coloniality which constitutes the present asymmetrical global power structure that prevents the possibilities of meaningful development in the Global South in general and Africa in particular.

In terms of definition of development, I prefer the Bandung Conference of 1955 articulation of development, whose point of departure is decolonization in which development was defined as a liberatory human aspiration to attain freedom from political, economic, ideological, epistemological, and social domination that was installed by colonialism and coloniality (Mkandawire 2011, 7). In the Bandung version, development entailed overcoming those major obstacles to human happiness and attainment of material welfare, civil and political liberties, social peace, and human security, which can be named as colonialism and coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

This definition of development is opposed to what Thandika Mkandawire terms the ‘Truman version of developmentalism,’ where development is interpreted as Euro-American missionary task of developing the Global South in general and Africa in particular (Mkandawire 2011, 7-8). In the Bandung Conference version of development, it is conceived as a rational human response to historical experiences and human needs, whereas in the Truman version, development falls neatly within global imperial designs articulated in terms of ‘civilizing mission’ and ‘westernization’ of the non-Western world (Mehmet 1995). As will be clear in the course of this lecture, decolonizing Development Studies entails rescuing it from the Truman version of developmentalism.
The enormity of the task of decolonizing Development Studies cannot be fully realized in the absence of deployment of well-thought-out theoretical framework capable of unmasking the beast of coloniality which has been assuming different colours and wearing different masks in its endeavour to disguise itself. I, therefore, specifically deploy the concept of ‘coloniality of power’ as a major component of world-systems approach and critical concept underpinning decolonial epistemic perspectives, which highlights the darker side of modernity that has resulted in the underdevelopment of Africa.

Development Studies and development discourses are not free of the colonial matrices of power that underpin coloniality. Development Studies continues to suffer from a crisis of ideas, which culminated in the development impasse of the 1980s. The current economic crisis affecting global capitalism and which is manifesting itself as financial crisis, is a further indicator of troubled economic epistemologies that have implications on discourses and practices of development. As noted by James Ferguson, development is not innocent of power and cannot be understood outside of current power dynamics. It is part of what he terms ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1990). It cannot be reduced to simple real-life problems of hunger, water scarcity, disease, malnutrition and poverty, as if these were untouched and unshaped by broader questions of power, epistemology, representation and identity construction (Tripathy and Mohapatra 2011, 93-118).

My lecture is organised into four sections. The first section introduces the concept of decolonial epistemic perspectives, which illuminates how Development Studies has been colonised and held hostage by global imperial designs and highlights the need for its decolonisation. The second section discusses development challenges as an integral part of the African national project, highlighting how African political economies have remained hostage to invisible colonial matrices of power. The third section analyses the reality of neo-liberal imperialism and its impact on current thinking about development issues. The final section grapples with how to transcend the global development impasse and outlines the complex contours of decolonial options that take us into the post-Euro-American hegemony.
The Case for Decolonising Development Studies

The exercise of decolonizing Development Studies entails four tasks. The first is that of probing development’s relative amnesia about coloniality (Kapoor 2008, xv). The second is that of revealing its embeddedness in enlightenment and modernity’s notions of scientific progress, civilizing mission, and universal economic prescriptions. The third is that of interrogation of development’s deep imbrications in Euro-American knowledge and global imperial designs. The last is that of critiquing the current neo-liberal tendencies that masquerade as salvation for Africa (Kapoor 2008, xv).

The best approach to achieve decolonization of Development Studies is to deploy decolonial epistemic perspectives that reveal coloniality embedded in development discourse. Decolonial epistemic perspectives are predicated on the concepts of power, knowledge, and being. Coloniality of power locates the discourse of development within the context of the politics of constitution of a racially hierarchized, Euro-America-centric, Christian-centric, patriarchal, capitalist, hetero-normative, hegemonic, asymmetrical, and modern global power structure (Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodriguez 2002; Grosfoguel 2007). Within this structure, development exists as one of the technologies of subjectivation in the same league with ideas of modernity, progress, civilization, and modernization.

Coloniality of knowledge enables an investigation into epistemological foundations of development as a modernist-apparatus that has been utilized to construct what became known as the ‘third world’/‘developing world’ inhabited by a people whose being was constituted by a series of ‘lacks’ and a catalogue of ‘deficits’ that justified various forms of external intervention into Africa including the notorious structural adjustment programmes (Escobar 2012, viii). Coloniality of being extends the debates to the realm of the making of modern subjectivities and conceptions of humanism, where racial hierarchization and classification of people according to race pushed Africans to the lowest rank of human ontology where even their being human was doubted and where they existed as objects of development (Maldonado-Torres 2007).

The concepts of power, knowledge, and being help in unmasking coloniality as an underside of modernity, without necessarily rejecting the positive aspects of modernity. Through decolonial epistemic perspectives we seek to discover the benefits of analysing development discourse from the
perspective of ‘colonial difference.’ Colonial difference is a reference to the spaces, borders, and peripheries of empire that have suffered the negative consequences of modernity, such as the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid and neo-colonialism (Mignolo 2000, 49-88).

What distinguishes decolonial epistemic perspective from dominant Euro-American-centric hegemonic neo-liberal discourses, is its locus of enunciation. Locus of enunciation here refers to the geographical spaces from which academics and intellectuals speak, their ideological orientations, subject-positions (racial, gender and class identifications), and the historical processes and events that inform their knowledge-claims (Grosfoguel 2007, 213). Decolonial epistemic perspective does not attempt to claim universality, neutrality, and singular truthfulness. It is decidedly and deliberately situated in those epistemic sites such as Latin America, Asia, Caribbean and Africa that experienced the negative consequences of modernity and that are facing development challenges. At the same time it openly accepts its partiality, in the awareness that all knowledges are partial.

The overarching objective of decolonial epistemic perspective is to unveil epistemic silences hidden within Euro-American epistemology as well as deceit and hypocrisy that conceal epistemicides. It challenges what Aime Cesaire termed ‘the fundamental European lie,’ which articulated colonization as a vehicle of civilization (Cesaire 1955, 84). In short, a decolonial perspective is meant not only to change the content of intellectual and academic conversations on development, but also the terms of this conversation so as to engage with the crucial issues of epistemology, being, and power that maintain the present asymmetrical global relations.

Coloniality of power is at the core of the present global power structure where ideas of development fall neatly within a genealogy of discourses that presented Africans as people whose being was constituted by negations and lacks: lacking writing, lacking history, lacking civilization, lacking development, lacking democracy, to lacking human rights (Grosfoguel 2007, 213). At the same time human population has been undergoing social classification according to invented racial categories of inferior/superior, primitive/civilised, rational/irrational, traditional/modern, and developed/underdeveloped (Quijano 2000).

The agenda of decolonizing Development Studies entails revealing what development meant within the context of colonialism (and now coloniality)?
How was (is) it defined? In the first place, understood from the perspective of empire as the locus of enunciation, imperialism and colonialism were grand ‘civilising missions.’ Europeans were agents of development and Africans were the objects of development (Mehmet 1995).

Within colonial discourses development meant opening up the African continent for economic exploitation and the permanent settlement of white settlers. Development also meant defeating African resistance (read as the pacification of barbarous tribes resisting modernity) to pave the way for the construction of colonial states. Development meant the designation of land as the private property of white settlers in those areas that fell victim to settler colonialism, like South Africa, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Kenya and others (Magubane 1996). Development meant the rearrangement of African agrarian systems to make sure they produced the cash crops needed in Europe and America.

Development meant the dispossession of Africans, forcing them off the land and transforming them into peasants, workers and domestic servants. At the same time, acquired land was quickly transformed into plantations and farms owned by victorious white settlers. In other words, development in the colonial context meant pushing Africans out of their modes of life and production and into the evolving capitalist one, where they participated mainly as sources of cheap labour. Mbembe argued that “in implementing its projects, the colonial state did not hesitate to resort to brute force in dealing with natives, to destroy the forms of social organisation that previously existed, or even to co-opt these forms in the service of ends other than those to which they had been directed” (Mbembe 2000, 8).

Within the colonial context, development meant the transformation of African society according to the needs, demands and imperatives of colonial regimes. Frederick Cooper noted that colonialism never provided a strong national economy to benefit African people because the colonial economies were “externally oriented and the state’s economic power remained concentrated at the gate between inside and outside” (Cooper 2002, 5). It was Cooper who described the colonial state as a “gatekeeper state” that was not embedded in the society over which it presided, that stood astride the intersection of colonial territory and the outside world, and drew revenue from imposing duties on goods and taxing Africans (Cooper 2002).
Socially, colonial development entailed the reorganisation and classification of the colonial population according to race. Mahmood Mamdani (1996) described the colonial states as bifurcated social formations inhabited by “subjects” and “citizens.” To prevent the coalescence of colonised peoples into nations, colonialists used cartography, censuses and law to classify and categorise the population. Political and legal identities were enforced via the issuing of identity cards. Through its technologies of governance, colonialism transformed fluid and accommodative pre-colonial cultural identities into rigid, impermeable, singular, non-consensual and exclusionary political ones.

Within this, ‘races’ were acknowledged as having a common future as citizens, whereas tribes, as subjects, were to be excluded from this common future. Further, colonial governments denied the African people the space to coalesce into a majority identity, by fracturing them into different and competing tribes and minorities (Mamdani 2007). One good example is that of the establishment of Bantustans by the apartheid regime in South Africa that enabled the exclusion of black people from belonging to South Africa.

Politically, colonial governance assumed the character of a hybrid military/civilian model where violence was a norm of governance. Paramilitary authoritarianism was a core component of colonial governance, with disciplining of the ‘natives’ being the order of the day. Mbembe (2000, 6) has argued that “the colonial state model was, in theory as in practice, the exact opposite of the liberal model of discussion or deliberation.” Three forms of violence underpinned colonial governance: ‘foundational violence,’ which authorised the right of conquest and had an ‘instituting function’ of creating Africans as its targets; ‘legitimating violence,’ which was used after conquest to construct the colonial order and routinise colonial reality; and ‘maintenance violence,’ which was infused into colonial institutions and cultures and used to ensure their perpetuation (Mbembe 2000, 6-7).

Under colonialism citizenship rights for Africans were a scarce resource. Participation of Africans in elections was impossible. By and large, the colonial state became an institution for the exploitation of black labour and a vehicle of repression. Coercion rather than consent formed the DNA of colonial governance. Through its social, economic and political engineering processes, colonialism created a complex ‘native-settler’ question—permeated by white supremacist ideas—that prevented the formation of multi-racial nation-states out of colonial encounters (Mamdani 1996, 12-18).
In countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe, with large populations of white races, the resolution of the colonially created native-settler question has proven difficult and continues to impinge on nation-building and development. Thinking about how this question could be resolved, Mamdani located it within the politics of identity reconstruction and asked how could “a settler become a native?” (Mamdani 2001, 67). He elaborated on the intractability of the ‘native-settler’ question thus:

In the context of a former settler colony, a single citizenship for settlers and natives can only be the result of an overall metamorphosis whereby erstwhile colonisers and colonised are politically reborn as equal members of a single political community. The word reconciliation cannot capture this metamorphosis [...]. This is about establishing for the first time, a political order based on consent and not conquest. It is about establishing a political community of equal and consenting citizens (Mamdani 2001, 67).

The reality is that colonialism did not bequeath modernity to Africa. Olufemi Taiwo (2010) argues that by the time of colonisation, Africa was already becoming modern on its own terms. Colonialism disrupted those indigenous initiatives by imposingsuch structures as indirect rule, whichmasqueraded as preservation of pre-colonial institutions of governance while at the same time crippling African agency and impulses towards progress. Taiwo concluded that “colonialism was the bulwark against the implantation of modernity in Africa” (Taiwo 2010, 237).

Decolonizing Development Studies is urgent today because modernity has created numerous modern problems—ranging from climate change to the global financial crisis—for which it has no modern solutions. Neo-liberalism as a solution has proven to be problematic because it has not enabled a radical transformation of Euro-American hegemonic epistemology, North-South asymmetrical power relations, and racialised perceptions of being in which black races suffer subalternity.

As a result of the dominance of neo-liberal thinking, what is driving Development Studies today is a positivist re-evaluation and consolidation of previous concepts and techniques, as opposed to the formulation of new ideas per se. Eric Thorbecke noted that the “important contribution to development doctrine in this decade istechnique rather than theory” (Thorbecke 2007, 3). This means that the ability to formulate grand theories like modernisation and dependency has been substituted witha
concentration on methodological innovations that do not challenge knowledges of equilibrium. What is lost is a clear understanding of the underlying structural factors sustaining global system of relationships generating negative development outcomes in Africa.

According to Slavoj Zizek, ‘weak thought’ that is ‘opposed to all foundationalism’ and is taking the form of heavy empiricism that misses the bigger picture of coloniality of power and celebrates African agency without considering the structural constraints in place, is celebrated as progressive since the fall of the Soviet Union (Zizek 2008, 3-5). The development community has run out of ‘big ideas’ and ‘strong thought.’ This reality led David L. Lindauer and Lant Pritchett to argue that:

What is of even deeper concern than the lack of an obvious dominant set of big ideas that command (near) universal acclaim is the scarcity of theory and evidence-based research on which to draw (Lindauer and Pritchett 2002, 2).

‘Weak thought’ promotes a shallow understanding of global and local power dynamics, to the extent that at times ‘experts’ from the developed North are still given space to deliver their ‘pedagogy of development’ on Africa, in spite of the dismal failure of structural adjustment programmes of the late 1970s and 1980s. What is often missed is John Henrik Clarke’s warning that “powerful people will never educate powerless people on what it means to take power away from them” (Clarke Video). The reality remains that “the aim of the powerful people is to stay powerful by any means necessary” (Clarke Video). This is as true for African dictators as it is for the ‘experts’ from the Global North, and for those who primitively accumulated wealth in Africa during the colonial and apartheid eras. There is no doubt that developmental disparities in Africa are informed by deliberately constructed power asymmetries which in turn underpin and maintain socially constructed hierarchies of a ‘superior’ West and an ‘inferior’ Africa.

SlavojŽižek has railed against ‘weak thought’ which, according to him, has resulted in the ‘culturalisation of politics’ which ignores the broader historical, discursive and structural processes responsible for human developmental tragedies. He posed the question:

Why are so many problems today perceived as problems of intolerance, rather than as problems of inequality, exploitation, or injustice? Why is the proposed remedy tolerance, rather than emancipation, political struggle, even armed struggle? (Zizek 2009, 119).
The field of Development Studies is terribly affected by “weak thought” as opposed to “strong thought” (Zizek 2008, 1). To Žižek, strong thought produces “large-scale explanations” and “true ideas” which are “indestructible” (Zizek 2008, 5). Large-scale explanations have the capacity to “always return every time they are proclaimed dead” (Zizek 2008, 8). Decolonial epistemic perspective is a good example of cocktail of all those strong liberatory ideas which have proven resistant to neo-liberal mystifications.

Weak thought has even blinded some academics to such an extent that they continue to uncritically believe in the innocence of development discourses and to defend wrong causes—which have appropriated acceptable terms such as democracy, reform, development, good governance and humanitarian intervention—without sifting the dangerous colonial matrices embedded therein. The same weak thought has seen Africans annually celebrating decolonization, which Grosfoguel has correctly depicted as ‘the most powerful myth of the twentieth century’ which ‘led to the myth of a postcolonial world,’ while in reality ‘we continue to live under the same colonial power matrix’ (Grosfoguel 2007, 219).

In 2010, Achille Mbembe posed a crucial soul-searching question: “Here we are…50 years after decolonisation: Is there anything at all to commemorate, or should one on the contrary start all over again?” (Mbembe 2010) The answer came from Ali Mazrui who argued that “the 50th anniversary provides a suitable occasion not only to evaluate what has happened to Africa as a whole, but also to estimate the impact of the colonial experience on the African peoples” (Mazrui 2011, 1). What is telling is that Mazrui decided to use the 50th anniversary of decolonisation as an occasion to judge “100 years of colonial rule” (Mazrui 2011, 1). Does this mean that the 50 years of decolonisation was not worth judging? The response is borrowed from Grosfoguel who clearly stated that:

The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years (Grosfoguel 2007, 219).

There are also crucial epistemological issues such as those identified by Mahmood Mamdani, particularly the proliferation of “corrosive culture of consultancy” that has substituted diagnostic research in developmental
issues with shallow technicist prescriptions informed by symptomatic reading of the African development malaise (Mamdani 2011). The pervasiveness of this ‘consultancy culture’ manifests itself in many forms, including an emphasis on training in descriptive and quantitative data collection methods. These empiricist tools enable efficient “hunting and gathering” of raw data and the production of consultancy reports which are eventually processed into theories and developmental policy documents in Euro-American academies. This ‘consultancy culture’ ends up turning Africans into pure ‘native informants’ rather than authentic, rigorous and robust producers of knowledge that can drive African development (Mamdani 2011).

The pervasiveness of ‘consultancy cultures’ was also identified by Mamdani as manifesting itself in the tendency of academics to rely on what he termed “corporate-style power point presentations,” dominated by the parroting of buzz words at the expense of lively, engaged and rigorous intellectual debate (Mamdani 2011). The outcome has been the reduction of academic research from a long-range diagnostic enterprise to a quick prescriptive exercise (Mamdani 2011). It is within this context that ‘weak thought’ has occupied centre stage in much of debates on development and led to the glossing over of pertinent questions concerning the role of empire and Western epistemology in hampering development in Africa.

A further downside to this has been attempts to characterise the humanities and social sciences as irrelevant to development; because development is conceived in simplistic and shallow terms of ‘technicism’ and ‘innovation,’ or in ‘mortar and brick’ terms where there is little space for debate and the critique of knowledge-claims (Stewart 2007, 141). This thinking has resulted in what Peter Stewart has termed “the current dominance of instrumental reason” resulting in knowledge being reduced to the “polytechnic/technikon and industry mode of know-how” (Stewart 2007, 141). The outcome of this weak thought has been a combination of the commodification, marketisation, and pervasive managerialism invading universities as sites of knowledge generation.

Development Studies is terribly affected not only by the heavy empiricism but also by a failure to distinguish between alternatives to the systems and structures that generate underdevelopment and the alternatives within the same systems that lead to development dead-ends. Indeed, there is development literature that blames the problems of Africa on Africans themselves and totally exonerates the responsibility of imperial global
designs. It is this different reading of the African development predicament that decolonial epistemic analysis seeks to partly challenge. The point being that the scale of African development challenges cannot be clearly understood outside of a clear understanding of the historical, discursive and structural contexts of modernity, imperialism, colonialism, decolonisation, neo-colonialism, neo-liberalism and globalisation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012).

African conceptions of development are locked in the Truman version of developmentalism and the Bandung version of development has been struggling to transcend coloniality. The African national projects that embraced development as a core component assumed modernist-elitist formats and unfolded as impositions by un-decolonised postcolonial states on society.

**The African national project and development challenges**

Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo defined the national project as an important aspect of state-building involving creation of new institutions, defining new culture, forging new citizenship, formulating new policies, putting in place new political and economic programmes aimed at addressing people’s demands, and institutionalizing the idea of sovereignty of the state (Lumumba-Kasongo 2011, 70). At the centre of the African national project has been the pre-occupation with development, which was simplistically embraced as involving ‘catching-up’ with the Euro-American world on the one hand, and a rectification of colonially created economic and social problems on the other hand (Mkandawire 2011, 10-12). The intimate connection between the national project and development is well articulated by Arnold Rivkin who said:

> Nation-building and economic development….are twin goals and intimately related tasks, sharing many of the same problems, confronting many of the same challenges; and interrelating at many levels of public policy and practice (Rivkin 1969, 156).

Due to the drive to ‘catch-up’ the postcolonial states tried to achieve multiple national tasks as quickly as possible and simultaneously. These tasks began with the drive toward nation-building and state-consolidation involving uniting different races and ethnicities into one national identity as well as entrenchment of African political power in terms of building institutions, monopolising violence and forging hegemony (Olukoshi and Laakso 1996, 7-39). The postcolonial state promised to eradicate colonial autocracy and repression so as to build accountability, legitimacy,
transparency and ensure popular participation in governance. This was to be accompanied by banishment of poverty, ignorance and disease, and the promotion of economic growth so as to improve the standard of living. The more radical postcolonial states like those of Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and others also promised to reverse colonial dispossession through the redistribution of national resources. All postcolonial states became pre-occupied with the challenge of securing their hard won political independence against external threats (Mkandawire 2005, 10-55).

What indicated that development occupied the heart of the African national project was that every African state was busy implementing some form of five-year development plan or the other soon after achievement of political independence (Nugent 2004, 214). The crucial question is why did the African national project not succeed in realising its core objectives? Why has development eluded Africa? Julius Ihonvbere squarely blames African leaders and the African elite for the failures of the African national project and development (Ihonvbere 1994, 17).

Ihonvbere’s explanation is familiar and shared by many Africanist and African scholars, such as George Ayittey who argued that it is naïve to blame Africa’s misery on external factors when African leaders themselves betrayed both the aspirations of their people and their indigenous political systems (Ayittey 1994, 15-20). Moeletsi Mbeki reinforced Ihonvbere and Ayittey’s views and identified African leaders and elites as ‘the architects of poverty’ in Africa, keeping their fellow citizens poor while they enriched themselves (Mbeki 2009). It is clear that African leaders and elites are not innocent when it comes to squandering opportunities for development, betraying the objectives of the African national project, and looting the resources meant to help poor people.

Yet this explanation leaves a number of questions unanswered. How do we explain why the African postcolonial state is best known for aberrant behaviour such as repression, brutality, corruption, inefficiency and failure to promote the collective well-being of its citizens, for instance? Some scholars have responded to this question by articulating an ‘African exceptionalism’ thesis premised on a static, cultural relativist reading of the African condition and development (Chabal and Daloz 1999). One good example is the work of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz that deployed Weberian notions of modernity and progress to arrive at the conclusion that
development in Africa is informed by a different logic to that which shaped the Western world. In the first place, they assert that development in Africa is concerned with short-term consumption (the politics of the belly) (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 55-58). Secondly, they argue that in Africa there is a preference for reliance if not dependence on outside resources rather than productive activities or proper savings (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 58-60). Third, they argue that what appears as disorder to outsiders; appears as order to the African beholder (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 65-67).

What this orientalist thinking ignores is the role of coloniality of power in making it difficult for development to take root in Africa. Coloniality of power has positioned Africa at the interface between different value systems and different forms of logic: Western and African; urban and rural; patriarchal and matriarchal; religious and secular; nationalist and tribal/ethnic; modern and traditional; progressive and conservative; cultural and technical—the list is long. Until today, Western values and concepts coexist uneasily with African concepts, partly because colonialism manipulated and deployed both Western and African concepts as tools of control, domination, and subjection, destroying some of the concepts and values originating in pre-colonial Africa and re-inventing others.

The net effect of all this was the creation of an African elite that dreamt in both Western and African languages. From these African elites came African leaders. However, colonialism created elites who aspired to a capitalist lifestyle but had no capital. The black elite had seen how white colonialists used the state to engage in primitive accumulation and authoritarianism to silence African voices. Although never exposed to democracy under colonialism, they were expected to run postcolonial governments along democratic lines.

Emerging from this context, the African national project unfolded as a top-down enterprise informed by a strain of pedagogical nationalism that was intolerant of questioning and dissenting voices. Development was to be delivered in an authoritarian fashion. Single-party and military regimes emerged from the same context of intolerance informing the African national project. The postcolonial state became a leviathan suffocating and disciplining any form of opposition. Questions of state illegitimacy emerged as development projects failed and authoritarianism deepened towards the end of the first decade of decolonization (Olukoshi and Laakso 1996).
Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) emerged within the context of economic stagnation in Africa and the global shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism, which privileged market forces over the role of the state, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At the same time economic globalisation was accelerating, with enormous implications for the management of national economies. The World Bank and the IMF began to play a leading role globally. SAPs came with anti-statist philosophies, where the postcolonial state was seen as nothing but a “giant theft machine” (Mkandawire 2003, 10). This thinking inaugurated what Mkandawire described as the “wanton destruction of institutions and untrammeled experimentation with half-baked institutional ideas” (Mkandawire 2003, 10).

There is little doubt that SAPs were a wrong diagnosis of the causes of the failure of development in Africa. Pushing the state out of the development project was based on the wrong assumption that the state per se was the culprit. What was wrong was that the state had been tasked with promoting development beneficial to the African people without having been fully decolonised and thus able to serve African interests. As noted by Fantu Cheru, the age of SAPs reinforced the hold of imperial global designs over African economies, and African leaders lost the little remaining policy space they had left (Cheru 2009, 275-278).

Cheru concluded that: “What is normally accepted as ‘development’ in Africa has been essentially an imperial project, derived and financed by the dominant Western powers to serve Western needs” (Cheru 2009, 277-278). He went further to state that, under SAPs, “policy making, an important aspect of sovereignty, has been wrenched out of the hands of the African state. This is colonisation, not development” (Cheru 2009, 277). Africa has not yet recovered from this blow and the emerging consensus is that the state has to be reconstituted into a democratic institution and allowed to regain lost policy space so as to play a positive role in development. The neo-liberal dispensation in place since the end of the 1970s is in trouble today—it is riddled by crises of legitimacy and methodology.

**Neo-liberal Imperialism and the Present Global Crises**

The present moment can best be described as a troubled time in which the fate of humanity seems uncertain. At the global level, a devastating economic crisis has rocked the Global North calling into question triumphalist views of the capitalist mode of production as the only viable global economic system. The ripple effects of this crisis have been felt in
Africa and other parts of the world, simply because the capitalist system has assumed global proportions. At the same time, there is an intense drive by the United States of America (USA) and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) partners to intervene militarily in other states like Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya under the cover of humanitarian intervention and the ‘right to protect’ people suffering from the excesses of dictatorships.

This has revived debates on what has come to be termed ‘neo-liberal imperialism’ hidden within the wave of globalisation. Development Studies is yet to be well equipped to deal effectively with this rising phenomenon accompanied by a new scramble for African natural resources (Quijano 2000). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) argued that empire was alive and resurgent, carving a new economic, cultural and political globalised order. Negri (2008) emphasised that, today, empire no longer has an ‘outside’ and that it no longer tolerates any realities external to itself.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union no alternative discourse of development has emerged. A close look into the current dynamics of imperial global designs vis-à-vis Africa indicates a looming danger of ‘re-colonisation,’ beginning with those African countries endowed with strategic resources like oil, gas and diamonds. It would be simplistic to just accept recent events in Iraq and Libya as military interventions in support of democracy and human rights.

The reality is that neo-liberalism has gradually managed to naturalise a notion of politics that is dismissive of any radical thinking questioning the current status quo privileging the West. Such thinking is often dismissed as sentimental, nostalgic, anti-systemic and, at worst, terrorism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). At the same time, all Euro-American interventions—including military ones—are cast as humanitarian and developmental. Radicalism has been beaten into support for the neo-liberal status quo.

The veteran journalist John Pilger unpacks some of the dangers embedded in popular conceptions of development informed by mystifying neo-liberal thought, in this way:

‘Democracy’ is now the free market—a concept bereft of freedom. ‘Reform’ is now the denial of reform. ‘Economics’ is the relegation of most human endeavour to material value, a bottom line. Alternative models that relate to the needs of the majority of humanity end up in the memory hole. And ‘governance’—so fashionable these days—means an economic approval in Washington, Brussels and Davos. ‘Foreign policy’ is
service to dominant power. Conquest is ‘humanitarian intervention.’ Invasion is ‘nation-building.’ Every day, we breathe the hot air of these pseudo ideas with their pseudo truths and pseudo experts (Pilger 2008, 4).

To Pilger, neo-liberal discourses of development, which ideally sound like noble concepts, have been manipulated into “the most powerful illusions of our time” having been “corporatised and given deceptive, perverse, even opposite meanings” (Pilger 2008, 5). The net impact of this thinking has been the increasing articulation of development issues in terms provided by Euro-American hegemonic discourse.

At the centre of neo-liberal practices are the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as key drivers of the neo-liberal agenda predicated on Washington Consensus. As noted by Arturo Escobar, Washington Consensus is constituted by ‘the set of ideas and institutional practices that have seemingly ruled the world economy since the 1970s, most commonly known as neoliberalism’ (Escobar 2012 Preface to Second Edition). Robert Calderisi, a long-time World Bank official, being a neo-liberal argued that most of the misfortunes bedevilling Africa were self-imposed. He linked the failures of development in Africa to kleptocratic governments, mismanagement, anti-business behaviour, family values, cultural fatalism, corruption and tribalism. He called for what he termed “new tough-love” in dealing with Africa, which involved cutting foreign assistance by half and channeling the remainder to those countries that strictly and obediently pursued the neo-liberal democratic trajectory dictated by the West (Calderisi 2004, 15).

Of course, Africans are not only victims of underdevelopment; they have invariably contributed to some of the miseries. Yet problems like corruption are linked to the colonial logic of primitive accumulation. For instance, mercantilism, colonialism and apartheid are typical grand corrupt systems. The fact that the postcolonial state was bequeathed by the grand corrupt system of colonialism to some extent explains its predatory tendencies. Colonialism structured the state in such a way that it did not serve the interests of ordinary African people.

It must be remembered that it was the WB and IMF under such leaders as Calderisi, who worked for the World Bank for over 30 years in various senior positions including as the bank’s international spokesperson for Africa, that constructed the structural adjustment programmes that wreaked
havoc on Africa including cutting of subsidies on basic commodities, and opening up Africa to trade liberalization. Even in the face of the failures of structural adjustment programmes Calderisi still urged Africans not to point fingers at the West but rather to blame themselves (Calderisi 2004). This denialism of the contribution of some Western concocted policies to the development problems in Africa increases skepticism and doubts about the genuineness of the West to help with development of Africa.

Even in 2011 when the African masses in North Africa engaged in what became known as the ‘Arab Spring,’ which unfolded as an open indictment on both the limits of neo-liberalism and juridical freedom bequeathed to Africa by decolonization, Euro-American powers did not hesitate to intervene, pretending to be on the side of the struggling masses of Africa while in reality solving old scores with such leaders as Murmur Gaddafi. While the Arab Spring was unleashed against both dictators and the neo-liberal economic policies responsible for widespread poverty and unemployment, the NATO intervention in Libya during the course of the Arab Spring indicated how Euro-American powers were always ready to hijack popular movements pretending to be on their side while pursuing their permanent strategic interests. A combination of claims to advance humanitarianism, development, and the anti-terrorist struggle is today used to justify what Mignolo terms ‘re-westernization’ that began with the invasion of Iraq and involves the task of trying to save capitalism (Mignolo 2011).

**Beyond Development Impasse: Towards a Decolonial Turn**

Development impasse has taken the form of crisis of ideas, alternatives, and options within an era which has witnessed not only the collapse of socialism but also the occupation of the Wall Street. According to Zizek (2011), xi), there are five responses to this development impasse, which he described as ‘forthcoming apocalypse.’ He mapped the reactions as follows:

The first reaction is one of ideological denial: there is no fundamental disorder; the second is exemplified by explosions of anger at the injustices of the new world order; the third involves attempts at bargaining (‘if we change things here and there, life could perhaps go on as before’); when the bargaining fails, depression and withdrawal set in; finally, after passing through this zero-point, the subject no longer perceives the situation as a threat, but as the chance of a new beginning—or, as Mao Zedong put it: ‘There is great disorder under heaven, the situation is excellent (Zizek 2011, p xi-xii).
Attempts to move beyond development impasse have involved calling into question a narrative of modernity, progress, civilization, and modernization, cascading from Euro-American epistemic sites. From inside Europe and America, a Eurocentred critique of ‘modernity within modernity’ commenced with Marxism and psychoanalysis (Mignolo 2011). It involved Christian, liberal and socialist options. It has grown into post-structuralism, post-modernism, and postcolonialism as critical forms of critique of ‘modernity within modernity.’

From outside of Europe and America, the long-standing critique has sought to reveal how the achievement of development in the Euro-American zone was entwined with overseas conquest of the non-Western zones. It also sought to reject the tendency of consignment of ‘non-Western world’ to ‘static backwardness regardless of how those regions’ fates were shaped by interaction with Europe, including the side-tracking of other modes of change and interaction’ (Cooper 2005, 6).

The Eurocentred critique of modernity resulted in a series of ‘turns’ such as the ‘historical turn,’ the ‘cultural turn,’ and ‘linguistic turn’ that failed to radically transform Euro-American hegemony (Cooper 2005, 6-8). The critique of modernity from non-Western epistemic sites inaugurated the ‘decolonial turn’ that not only questions modernity but calls for the end of Euro-American hegemony that generates underdevelopment. As noted by Nelson Maldonado-Torres:

> The decolonial turn does not refer to a single theoretical school, but rather points to a family of diverse positions that share a view of coloniality as the fundamental problem in the modern (as well as postmodern and information age), and decolonization or decoloniality as a necessary task that remains unfinished (Maldonado-Torres 2011, 2).

Broadly speaking, the decolonial turn involves many initiatives including decoloniality and de-westernization which have locked horns with re-westernization. Decoloniality originated as a response to the capitalist and communist imperial designs. The Bandung Conference of 1955 was one of the major decoloniality projects that sought to chart development beyond capitalism and communism building on decolonization and Global South solidarity. Present day decolonial options also include Islamic option, feminist option, nationalist option, and Afrocentric option. Decoloniality became an epistemic and political project involving epistemic disobedience, decolonization of power, decolonization of being, and decolonization of
knowledge as those people who experienced the negative aspects of modernity continue the struggle for a new humanism (Fanon 1968).

Today, the discourse of development is caught up in four global trajectories. The first is re-westernization that seeks to save and to re-imagine the ‘future of capitalism’ (Mignolo 2011). The second is ‘reorientations of the Left’ with a view to build what is known as ‘socialism of the 21st century’ associated with some Latin American leaders such as Lula and others (Mignolo 2011). The third is ‘de-westernization’ that originated in East and Southeast Asia that has seen such countries as Malaysia, Indonesia, India and China, appropriating and adapting modernity and shifting the centre of development from Europe into Asia. As put by Mignolo:

Dewesternization means the end of long history of Western hegemony and of racial global discrimination projecting the image and the idea that Asians are yellow and that yellow people cannot think. Like many others, East and Southeast Asians have come out of the closet, and in this regard dewesternization means economic autonomy of decision and negotiations in the international arena and affirmation in the sphere of knowledge, subjectivity. It means, above all deracialization (Mignolo 2011, 48).

The fourth trajectory is the decolonial option which is a long-standing and long-term liberatory process ranged against colonially, which denied African humanity. It embraces dewesternization and envisages a pluriversal world in which Africa has a dignified space. Within decoloniality, development is understood as a graduation from colonially into liberation, and from ‘objecthood’ into ‘subjecthood’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). At the power level, development is defined as a triumph over an unsustainable Euro-American centric global status quo in place since the fifteenth century.

At the level of being, development entails graduation of African people from ‘zone of non-being’ to ‘zone of being’ (from objecthood to subjecthood) (Santos 2007, 45-87). Development becomes a consistent and persistent struggle for new humanism that was clearly defined by Frantz Fanon to mean liberation and self-determination (Fanon 1968). It is the same struggle that Marcus Garvey described as ‘universal negro improvement’ that was predicated on self-help principles (Hill 1983).

At the level of epistemology, development means successful ‘provincialization’ of Euro-American epistemological hegemony and opening up for ecologies of knowledges that reflect the plurality of human
experience including restoration of those knowledges that had been displaced and silenced (Santos 2007, 80-87). It involves turning the previously colonised peoples who have been reduced to object of Euro-American knowledge into participants and generators of knowledge from the vantage points of their geo-and bio-graphical locus of enunciation.

**Conclusion**

There is no doubt that Africans have been worked over by colonialism and coloniality since the first colonial encounters, and this reality is making it very hard for them to find a way out of the snares of colonial matrices of power. The decolonial turn predicated on unmasking invisible global imperial designs that work to keep Africa in a subordinate position forms the ideal beginning of thinking of another world of equality. The decolonial turn promotes a shift away from the delusions of a world naturalised by global imperial designs. It calls for the definitive entry of Global South subjectivities into the realm of thinking and imagining another world.

The fact that there is emerging critical thinking that accepts that Euro-American hegemony in place since conquest is no longer sustainable and that modernity has created modern problems of which there are no modern solutions, makes it imperative that we rethink the dominant thinking that has underpinned development discourse and informed development practice in Africa. Already Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff in their book entitled *Theory from the South* have posed penetrating questions such as:

> But what if, and here is the idea in interrogative form, we invert that order of things? What if we subvert the epistemic scaffolding on which it is erected? What if we posit that, in the present moment, it is the global south that affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at large? (Comaroffs 2012, 1)

For meaningful and systematic decolonization of Development Studies to take place, there is need to shift the geo-and bio-graphy of knowledge and begin to articulate the experience of development from the Africa as a privileged epistemic site capable of formulating its own development trajectory. This is possible now because as noted by Patrick Chabal, the Euro-American ‘conceit’ is coming to an end and the ‘Western societies are no longer sure of how to see themselves’ (Chabal 2012, 3). This moment of doubt engulfing the Western world must be seized with both hands by Africa in particular and Global South to push forward the decoloniality project involving ‘unthinking’ some ideas cascading from Euro-American renditions.
of development as a simple exercise of ‘catching-up’ with the Euro-American world. Indeed, the world is ripe for a shift in geography and biography of thinking about development and Africa must take advantage and relaunch its development projects while continuing to push for the final collapse of Euro-American hegemony with the aim to create another world order that is truly pluriversal.

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