An examination of the required operational skills and training standards for a Close Protection Operative in South Africa

By

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RESEARCH REPORT

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NOTES

- The term Close Protection has been written with capital letters when it is used to describe the specific specialist field of security (one core concept). When describing a related aspect such as close protection team or close protection training, capital letters have not been used. The same would apply for the term Principal which is used to distinguish a core object and related aspects such as principal profiling which has no capital letters.

- The chapters of this research report have been structured from macro concepts down to micro concepts. The first two chapters serve as an introduction, as well as an overview of the research methodology that was applied in this research. The following two chapters explain the close protection industry, the way it is regulated and provide a detailed analysis of Close Protection itself. Chapters five through to ten deal with specific issues and themes identified during the research and the final Chapter makes recommendations based on the research that was conducted.
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<tr>
<td>ABET</td>
<td>Adult Based Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Active Opposition</td>
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<td>AOP</td>
<td>Attack on Principal</td>
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<td>ASP</td>
<td>Armament Systems and Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Bodyguard</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>Counter Action Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Centre Body Mass</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>Close Protection Operative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CQB</td>
<td>Close Quarters Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETQA</td>
<td>Education and Training Quality Assurance (body)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device/Identification of Explosive Devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAD</td>
<td>Immediate Action Drill</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBA</td>
<td>International Bodyguard Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSB</td>
<td>National Standards Body</td>
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<td>NQF</td>
<td>National Qualification Framework</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Skills Authority</td>
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<td>NTIS</td>
<td>National Training Information Service</td>
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<td>NVQ</td>
<td>National Vocational Qualification</td>
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<td>OBE</td>
<td>Outcomes Based Education</td>
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<td>PBA</td>
<td>Professional Bodyguard Association</td>
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<td>PSIRA</td>
<td>Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority</td>
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<td>POSLEC SETA</td>
<td>Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector Education &amp; Training Authority</td>
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<td>PES</td>
<td>Personal Escort Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>RPL</td>
<td>Recognition of Prior Learning</td>
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<td>RST</td>
<td>Residential Security Team</td>
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<td>RTO</td>
<td>Registered Training Organisation</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Secure Advance Party</td>
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<td>SAQA</td>
<td>South African Qualifications Authority</td>
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<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
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<td>SAAF</td>
<td>South African Airforce</td>
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<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service</td>
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<td>SGB</td>
<td>Standards Generating Body</td>
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<td>Security Industry Authority</td>
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<td>SOB</td>
<td>Security Officers Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>VETAB</td>
<td>Vocational Education and Training Accreditation Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>Very Important Person</td>
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<td>VIPPASA</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The aim of this study was to determine the current operational skills requirements for Close Protection Operatives (CPOs) in South Africa. Operational skills refer to those skills that are vital in order for a CPO to effectively protect a designated person (this person is referred to as the ‘Principal’). In order to determine any shortcomings in the Close Protection industry, twenty in-depth interviews were conducted with current operational CPOs. A detailed literature review was also done in order to create a solid platform for the research and to assist in the verification of the information.

During the research, it was found that the task of providing Close Protection could be divided into various sub-categories. This was necessary in order to gain a rounded perspective of a CPO’s roles and duties. CPO’s tasks in their entirety had to be unpacked into their smaller sub-components. In fact there were many ways to subdivide the skills requirements and functions of CPOs. It was, however, found that the actual subdivisions were less important than the gaining of a comprehensive understanding of how all the aspects are interrelated and should function synergistically.

The need for regulation of the South African Close Protection industry was identified as a major concern among all interview respondents. In order to determine the relevant factors involved in regulation, the way countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and Israel regulate their industries, was assessed. It was noted that the industry in South Africa is ‘partially regulated’. This means that there is some sort of registration process for CPOs but no comprehensive monitoring and enforcement of accepted minimum competency standards. Currently in South Africa private sector CPOs are rated on the same scale as security guards and must be registered as a Grade level C with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). This is not an effective manner to regulate CPOs. CPOs should be viewed as professionals and specialists since their skills far exceed those of a security guard (Grade C). According to South Africa’s Skills Development Plan all industries will fall under Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs).
Close Protection is grouped under the Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector Education and Training Authority (POSLEC SETA). There is currently a South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) Unit Standard for Close Protection (Protection of Designated Persons, Units Standard number: 11510). However, the research revealed that while the unit standard correctly outlines the operational skills requirements of CPOs there are no assessment guidelines or clearly defined minimum skills requirements. Before the unit standard can be effectively implemented, agreed industry minimum standards for the relevant skills divisions in Close Protection need to be identified and implemented. But currently there is some confusion regarding which body is responsible for, firstly developing acceptable unit standards; secondly, getting the industry as a whole to agree and accept such standards; thirdly, to see to it that training on those standards is provided; and finally the monitoring of these standards in practice.

In this study various training related factors were identified and examined in order to assess whether the way CPOs are trained in South Africa is effective or not. Aspects such as the intensity, focus, duration and content were examined. In general it was found that it is important for the following to be implemented:

1. Effective screening and pre-training evaluation of potential trainees.

2. Training should be job orientated and focus on training CPOs for the functions that they will actually have to perform.

3. Training methodologies should focus on an outcomes based approach and utilise the fundamentals of adult based education.

4. Training should simulate reality including the related stress factors that are placed on operational CPOs such as lack of sleep and high levels of activity interspersed with boring waiting periods.
5. Ongoing training and re-training are vital components to a CPO maintaining operational competency.

6. Close Protection instructors need to have both an operational background and training in instructional methodologies before being considered competent.

It is important that in the long term international recognition of South African Close Protection qualifications is achieved. This is essential since many South African CPOs operate internationally. Globalisation and improvements in technology have made it easier for international networking to take place. This has meant that clients are using CPOs in different countries and international comparisons are inevitable. If South African CPOs are to be considered ‘world class’ then internationally recognised minimum standards need to be implemented for the South African Close Protection industry.

The research indicated and highlighted various trends that may affect the Close Protection industry. The trends identified that seemed most relevant to the South African Close Protection industry were as follows:

- Increased public awareness of international terrorism has resulted from acts such as the 9/11 attacks. This has made people more aware of the need for and benefits of security. Use of well trained CPOs is one of the ways that potential clients are able to minimise their exposure to any potential terrorist attack.

- A CPO’s ability to communicate and liaise with all relevant parties involved in the Close Protection environment is vital to the success of any operation. Therefore it is vital that these aspects receive the relevant focus during training.

- The CPO needs to be well trained in use of unarmed combat and alternative weaponry. He/she can no longer rely on the use of a firearm as the primary force option.
A CPO needs to be able to adapt to many different situations. It is important that a CPO is trained to blend in and use the correct protocol in any given situation. The focus of operations should be on operating in a low profile manner to avoid unnecessary attention.

A CPO needs to be well trained in all aspects of planning and avoidance. The skills needed to proactively identify and avoid threats are vital to modern day operations. The CPO also needs to be quick thinking and adaptable in order to function effectively.

A CPO needs to have a working knowledge of all security related aspects that could enhance the safety of his/her Principal (i.e. multi-skilled).

In addition to the above mentioned factors, other recommendations emanating from this study focused on minimum competency standards for the identified subdivisions of close protection. Examples of possible assessment guidelines and criteria were identified covering the following broad classifications:

- Prior educational qualifications
- Physical abilities
- CPO skills
- Prior experience in guarding
- Firearm skills
- Unarmed combat
- Protective skills
- First aid skills
- Security knowledge
- Advanced driver training
- Protocol and etiquette
- Management and business skills
- Related skills
Chapter 1

MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

The area of specialist/private security is a relatively under-researched field when compared to other fields in the private security industry. This is even more apparent when considering specialist subdivisions such as Close Protection, sometimes referred to as VIP Protection or protection of designated persons. Close Protection is a holistic approach to the protection (security/personal safety) of individuals encompassing all the necessary sub-sectors of security knowledge and physical skills needed to ensure the protection of a person from both identified and unidentified threats and risks to life and personal safety.

The person receiving protection is referred to as the ‘Principal’ and in cases where the Principal is also the person financing the security operation protection services he/she would also be referred to as the client. It is almost impossible to keep a Principal in a one hundred percent risk-free state at all times. Therefore, the primary task of a Close Protection Operative (CPO) would be to minimise the exposure of a Principal to any identified risks. The CPOs tasks must also include effective planning which must take into account what could/should be done in the case of unexpected situations occurring or attacks being initiated. The CPO therefore functions in a continuous state of identifying and assessing all relevant risks and threats, while simultaneously taking the necessary preventative measures to hopefully thwart or avoid such situations.

The CPO needs not only to be able to perform all necessary functions relating to threat assessment and risk analysis but also, if necessary, physically implement the appropriate counter measure within the constraints of the law.
This would include physical combat utilising whatever means\(^1\) are available to neutralise attackers and maintain the safety of the Principal.

**BACKGROUND/RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH**

Prior to the first democratic South African elections in April 1994, the international community had imposed wide-ranging sanctions on South Africa. As with other sectors of the economy, the private security industry was also in a state of isolation and cut off from international influences and development. As a direct result of this isolation standards and operational procedures could not easily be benchmarked with the international community. Conscription of young white males for military or police service was also in place at the time. This directly resulted in a larger base of potential candidates being available for training as Close Protection Officers (CPOs).

Persons requiring the services of CPOs were primarily high ranking persons involved in one of the following sectors: political, governmental, military, police (generals/high ranking officers) or related agencies, visiting dignitaries and/or celebrities. The pool of trained candidates provided the government with enough skilled manpower to facilitate the vast majority of required close protection related services. Almost all close protection functions were carried out by military, police or related government organisations that provided all the necessary training for their personnel to effectively operate as CPOs.

After the 1994 elections, major changes occurred throughout the entire private security industry. The increase in crime levels (www.SAPS.org.za, 2004)\(^2\) saw the private security industry in this country expand to such an extent that currently a situation of saturation has been reached.\(^3\) Post-1994 also saw a large number of overseas corporations opening up offices in South Africa.

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\(^1\) Use of firearms, alternative weaponry or unarmed combat.

\(^2\) Trends in reported crime statistics since 1994 as indicated on this website, accessed on 20 November 2004.

\(^3\) “The rapid growth and expansion of the private security industry in South Africa is now an accepted fact that cannot be ignored, argued or wished away. Since the 1970s the South African private security industry has grown at anything up to 30% per annum” (Minnaar, 2004: 12).
Furthermore, a number of multinational companies that opened up in South Africa employed close protection companies to provide protection services in order to ensure the safety of their expatriate employees. The dropping of all sanctions in the early 1990s also led to a large increase in the number of international VIPs, as well as celebrities visiting this country and making use of close protection services. Moreover, changes within the military and police structures such as the elimination of conscription and the downsizing of these organisations⁴ has meant that many officials who previously may have received protective services through state organisations may now have had to facilitate their own close protection.

In addition, a large number of individuals either left the police and military protection units or alternately were retrenched when their organisations downsized and/or restructured (Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; and Van Eck, 2003). Consequently many of these individuals sought work in the private sector. This in itself has potentially been the cause of operational problems such as CPOs having different operating procedures or differing levels of operational competency. These problems can be partly ascribed to fundamental differences in the way these people were trained, as well as how they perform close protection duties.

There have been, and still are, a large number of, what can only be described as ‘dubious’, small scale companies attempting to gain a foothold in this lucrative industry and turn a quick profit. They have been able to do this by employing unqualified CPOs whom they can pay less than well-trained specialist operators. Information obtained from the interviews indicates that there are also several companies and under-qualified individuals offering low standard close protection training. Poor quality training may be one of the reasons why the competency levels of the South African CPOs are so inconsistent with varying levels of standards and quality controls.

⁴ With the exception of the SAPS, who although losing members has lifted the moratorium on recruitment, instituted in 1996, in 2003 and have started to build up numbers of operational members to anticipated levels higher than pre-1994.
These training providers like the ‘fly-by-night’ companies offering close protection services prey on the naivety of potential candidates (they achieve this by claiming to offer CPO training in a shorter time at a cheaper price). This was confirmed by one trainer who has many years of training and experience in this specialist niche area of the Private Security Industry.

They [‘fly-by-night’ training companies] offer low quality training over shorter time frames in order to try and gain a competitive advantage [get candidates who do not know the difference between good and bad training to utilise their services] (McGuire, 2003).

The industry is currently regulated through the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). This body regulates the close protection industry but only according to standards designed for the security guarding sector. These standards are for the most part inapplicable (this will be expanded on in Chapter 3) to specialist operatives such as those that provide close protection services (specialised).

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES: AN OVERVIEW

This topic will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter dealing with international comparisons. However, the information below serves as an introduction in order to place the South African industry in the correct comparative context.

It is important in this modern day and age that no research topic be analysed in isolation, especially when the topic involves the protection of peoples’ lives. Globalisation and the need for international benchmarking mean that it is vital for international trends to form part of this research. It is difficult to generalise about international standards and operational procedures as they vary substantially from country to country. The researcher, in the course of this study, was able to interview several international representatives from Israel, Britain and Australia.
Correspondence also took place, primarily via the email and internet, with the Home Office in the United Kingdom (UK), The National Institute for Criminal Justice Research of the Department of Justice in the United States of America (USA) and the Australian Institute for Criminology.

A great deal of information was also obtained through local in-depth interviews. Most of the respondents have worked or trained internationally and/or had exposure to international trainers and operatives whilst working in this country. Moreover, the researcher has had quite extensive exposure to the international specialist security field. This includes either having trained in or received training from representatives from the UK, USA, Israel and Australia. The researcher has also provided training and/or performed close protection duties internationally.

One of the primary points of interest when evaluating close protection operations on an international level is the fact that much international benchmarking takes place when many First World countries send international training teams around the world to train close protection teams in developing countries. This has occurred in the South African police protection units with a German instructor’s course being presented in South Africa, as well as several South African instructors being guests on training courses in several countries including Israel and Denmark. The main reason for this cross training occurring is usually to assist developing countries and/or benchmark competency levels between different countries. This has led to an interesting occurrence where certain countries that have no existing stated close protection standards and developmental or instructional capacity, are able to field fairly professional teams to protect their leaders. There are also existing exchange programs where cross training takes place between representatives or teams of different governments – many of these linked to private protection providers.

According to one South African based close protection company director “at one stage South African CPOs were considered leaders in the protection field speciality of providing effective protection in crowds” (Steyn, 2003).
PROBLEM STATEMENT

The research question that this study sought to answer was the following:

‘At what level of competency are South African protectors currently operating?’

There are currently no universally recognised standards (training and competencies) in South Africa for Close Protection Officers (CPOs). In the private sector CPOs are currently rated on the same scale as general security guards by PSIRA (this will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3), whereas generally the close protection operative is in fact a well trained professional, whose training and skill level requirements are considerably higher and more diverse than any grade rating offered by PSIRA. The military and police are the other major role players in close protection services and provision of specialised CPO training, both of which have their own standards and training methodologies. Accordingly, the standards applied by the various role players are not always consistent and in some cases may not have been recently adjusted in line with changing trends and demands (specifically international).

Therefore, a need exists to clarify many aspects of the close protection industry since there is a general lack of understanding and information regarding what close protection work entails or the kind of client that actually utilises such a service. Let alone being able to assess what the necessary specialised training standards for CPOs should entail. Many people have a set stereotype with regards to whom and what a close protector should be. However, these stereotypes are most often incorrect or flawed, coloured by public perceptions of security guards in general or news reports in the media. Accordingly there is no professional accepted national recognition of close protection as a separate specialised form of security provision.

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5 There have been many recent reports about nightclub ‘bouncers’ who are sometimes confused with CPOs.
According to a number of interviewees, the ineffective regulation of the industry since 1994 ‘made clear by the diversity in backgrounds and training of CPOs operating in the country today’ (Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; and Maharaj, 2004), has caused much contention with regard to who is actually qualified to do close protection work and what those holding such qualifications should be able to do. Moreover, there is considerable ongoing debate about who can actually provide this type of training (accreditation and qualified to do so). When comparing the South African close protection industry with that in other countries such as in New South Wales (NSW), Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), fundamental differences can be identified.

In NSW, Australia and the UK the following standards are professionally applied in the specialist security industry:

- Set minimum standards accepted by the industry and international community with regard to training and qualification of CPOs. In Australia CPOs are rated by the Vocational Education and Training Accreditation Board (VETAB)) and monitored by the Police Security Registry and in the UK rated on the National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) framework and licensed by the Security Industry Authority (SIA). In contrast, as yet, in South Africa there are no universally accepted standards for CPOs.

- In NSW prospective CPOs must undertake training through a VETAB Registered Training Organisation (RTO) and meet relevant minimum standards before being awarded any type of qualification. Similarly, in the UK prospective CPOs must undertake training through a service provider accredited with the Security Industry Training Organisation (SITO) and meet relevant minimum standards in order to be issued a NVQ rated qualification. In South Africa there is no consensus as to minimum standards and what accepted competencies are for CPOs.
• In Australia individuals cannot operate in the industry unless they have a VETAB rated certificate issued through a RTO and are registered with the correct regulatory body (the Police Security Registry). Similarly, in the UK, individuals must possess a NVQ rated certificate issued from a SITO registered training organisation before being able to register with the SIA. However, in South Africa the CPO industry is not monitored and at present any individual with a PSIRA Grade C (Grading levels as applied by PSIRA are explained in Chapter 3) can operate as a CPO.

• In both Australia and the UK records of qualified CPOs are available through oversight and regulatory bodies that maintain industry standards. Licences and accreditation have to be renewed periodically and a specific type of licence must be held to perform close protection duties.

While South Africa moves to implement the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) in line with the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) Act (No. 2 of 1995) unit standards6 (minimum definitions of competency) defining qualifications are supposed to be concurrently developed. The unit standard applicable, which will be discussed later in this research report, is not detailed or easily applied with regards to what the close protection industry actually needs. This issue was specifically mentioned during the interview with the current head of Law Enforcement and Training at PSIRA: “The unit standard needs far more work and adjustment before it can be applied practically” (Bodhoo, 2004).

AIMS OF THE RESEARCH

The research problem lies in the difficulty of developing accurate analyses of the skills, training and qualifications level of CPOs that are actually operating in the country today. This study will therefore focus on the necessary operational skills requirements needed to provide effective close protection in this country.

6 For more information on unit standards see Annexure 6.
Aspects such as candidate selection, training and evaluation will be examined in depth. The research problem itself can be stated as:

*What are the necessary operational skills requirements of and training standards for Close Protection officers currently operating in South Africa?*

In this research a study of the sub-categories that are involved in close protection have been made in order to determine what an acceptable minimum operational standard should be for each sub-category. The aim of the research is therefore to collect this necessary information, make comparisons, and formulate acceptable training standards and qualifications, skills level requirements, and competencies necessary for the professional services to be provided by CPOs within the regulatory framework of PSIRA and the Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector Education and Training Authority (POSLEC SETA).

An ancillary aim of the research being to forecast future trends within the industry as well as what proactive measures can be taken to ensure that the South African industry is up-to-date with international trends.

**KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS**

For the purposes of this study the following key definitions will apply. The industry jargon defined below is also vital for the reader to understand the research. (Additional terms are defined in Annexure 1: Definitions):

**Bodyguard**

The person on a close protection team directly responsible for the Principal and closest to the Principal at all times. People often confuse bodyguards with all close protectors. The bodyguard is one of the roles a Close Protector may assume.
Close Protection
The carrying out of all necessary activities by a team or individual to ensure the safety, comfort and peace of mind of a Principal.

Close Protection Operative
Either an individual or member of a close protection team that facilitates close protection.

Close Protection Team
A group of well trained CPOs that operate in a synergistic manner, fulfilling all the tasks necessary to ensure the safety, comfort and peace of mind of a Principal/Principal.

Client
The person, body or organization that is financing the Close Protection Operation.

Principal
The individual receiving close protection services.

Security
All the applicable measures needed to ensure the safety of a country, company or individual against espionage, theft or other danger/threat.

International community
Within the context of this study this term refers to the organisations, groups and individuals that are actively involved in the facilitation, training or any other related activity of close protection. i.e. that carry out their respective operations internationally.

Operational skills
Those skills that a Close Protection Officer must posses in order to provide effective close protection to a designated Principal.
Threat assessment
This is the procedure undertaken to identify, categorise, validate and plan for any threats that the Principal may be exposed to.

Risk analysis
This is the process of assessing the likelihood of threats occurring, based on aspects such as the environment, the Principal and his or her scheduled movements.

VIP
Acronym for a ‘Very Important Person’. The term is interchangeably with that of Principal.

VALUE OF THE RESEARCH
The following organizations, institutions and individuals can gain from implementing and considering the expected recommendations emanating from this research:

- The Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal Justice in the College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA), for the results obtained and also the integrated approach to the security risk management process and training of CPOs. Research findings could also possibly be utilised by this Department for inclusion in either short-courses or study material for CPOs.

- Police and military close protection and training units of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) since research in this area may assist in future training and standard setting across the spectrum of close protection services in South Africa.

- All operational CPOs since the research results will hopefully enable them to adapt the training for and provision of close protection services to not only meet international standards but also adjust the way they currently train and operate.
By doing this CPOs can provide a more professional and improved close protection service and therefore enhance their capability to keep their Principal secure and safe (protected from all possible threats).

- CPO trainers and instructors stand to benefit since they will have a complete reference to training material and standards in order to compare their current practices and training methods/standards. In addition, the material will provide them with an opportunity to be exposed to identified trends and changes, particularly from the international scene. This will enable them to adapt training programs and methodologies to ensure that at least a minimum standard is met by all trainees found competent which will hopefully be applied and monitored by the POSLEC SETA and PSIRA.

- The Private Security Industry as a whole, by using the results for the better regulating and professionalisation of the CPO sector in the industry.

In terms of the research it is hoped that the following value and benefits will be forthcoming:

- The establishment of a format that provides minimum standards regarding training across the spectrum through the relevant sectors in the close protection sector of the private security industry in South Africa.

- By the forecasting of trends that will dominate training in the future. This will assist in determining what steps should be taken to ensure that the South African industry is able to effectively respond, implement and plan for these trends.

- By providing a guideline for PSIRA and the POSLEC SETA will enable the categorising and recognition of Close Protection Operatives as a separate and specialised sector of guarding.
Currently CPOs are being rated, based on the so-called ‘Grade A to E’ guarding system. At present a CPO needs only to be a Grade C guard to work in the close protection industry. The setting of professional standards can mean the establishment of a new higher and more skilled grade carved specifically for qualified close protection specialists.

By formulating minimum required training standards, skills requirements and qualifications as a point of reference can assist in the regulation of the industry as required by various organisations (SAQA, POSLEC SETA and relevant education providers) for the further specialisation and professionalisation of this sector of the industry.

CONCLUSION

Security as a whole is a very neglected field of research, when compared to many other industries and their sub-sectors in the private security industry. Therefore, the specialist area of close protection is an area which has completely been ignored with regard to formal research. There have also been many technological developments, global changes and other changes that may not be have been included or may have been overlooked in current close protection training methodologies.

Confusion over governing and regulatory bodies and the lack of formal industry standards are also identified problems. This research has indicated that, even though there is an existing unit standard, it is not easily applied in the work place. The limited monitoring and quality control of the close protection industry has led to a severe drop in the quality and standards of close protectors and close protection operations as a whole (Bodhoo, 2004; Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004).
Local and international trends have seen a large scale growth in the close protection industry and private security industry in general. There are several relevant factors that, have contributed to this trend, which have in turn led to a need for the regulation of a growing industry.

The researcher has been able to identify that, before accepted industry and competency standards for close protection can be implemented, the relevant operational skills requirements for close protection must first be determined. These identified operational skills could then serve as a platform to develop industry-accepted minimum competency requirements and regulator practices for close protection.

Accordingly, the benefits of this research will assist and benefit not only the regulatory bodies in achieving fair and valid standards and practices but also individual CPOs, as well as close protection trainers.
Chapter 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, CANDIDATE SELECTION AND INTERVIEW FORMATS

INTRODUCTION

The majority of information obtained in this research study was gained primarily from using qualitative research methodology. The primary research tools utilised being in-depth one-on-one interviews, a literature review and Participant Action Research (PAR).

Due to the exploratory nature of this research the vast majority of information was obtained from the in-depth interviews, in many cases the interviews lasted for two hours or more. Throughout the interview selection process and the interviews, the researcher attempted to adhere to the principles of ethical and valid research in order to ensure an unbiased and applicable sample had been selected.

VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND ACCURACY OF COLLECTED INFORMATION

The requirements for internal validity and reliability, as discussed by Welman & Kruger (1999: 100), were applied during all research conducted. Every effort was made to ensure that the research information collected was valid and accurate while maintaining all ethical considerations.

In brief, much care was taken in the selection of relevant persons to be interviewed. Furthermore, the same interview schedule of questions was applied to each interviewee without the interviewer (the researcher in all cases) influencing the respondent's answers in any way, be it by means of body language, tone of voice or facial expressions or negatively formulated or leading questions.
In addition, attempts were made to create a relaxed interview environment whereby respondents were encouraged to be open and frank in their responses. Accordingly, every effort was made to make the atmosphere comfortable and non-confrontational. Accuracy and reliability of information received was enhanced in the interviews by conducting several interviews with representatives from each sector identified or until saturation levels were reached.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethical considerations in the research were addressed by adhering to the Code of Ethics for Research at Technikon SA (Technikon SA, 2002: 128-134). This was achieved by emphasizing those aspects of protecting the identity of respondents (anonymity) if so requested by them. All respondents gave permission for their names to be listed as references and for the researcher to quote on information that was obtained in the interview.

Moreover, respondent participation in the interviews was at all times emphasized to be voluntary. All respondents were also informed that information received would be treated as strictly confidential. In addition, high standards in the research were maintained by means of focusing on implementing the proper referencing and acknowledgement of sources of information, avoiding plagiarizing of information and obtaining the consent of respondents to participate and permission to undertake the research from the relevant authorities.7 These factors all aimed at increasing the acceptance of the information received by respondents, as well as to enhance the validity of the research conducted.

It became clear during the preliminary literature review that in order for the research to effectively answer the identified research problem, that the focus would have to be on in-depth, one-on-one interviews. The benefits of utilising this methodology meant that the researcher was able to capitalise on the many years of accumulated experience and knowledge of the selected interview candidates.

7 Permission to undertake interviews with SAPS personnel was obtained from the SAPS office for strategic research, as well as the relevant officials in the SANDF and SAAF.
The researcher has been involved in both close protection training and operations for the past eight years. In this time he was able to gain operational experience at all levels of a close protection operation, namely: single operative, member of the personal escort section, member of an advance team, driver, bodyguard, planning officer, team leader and group leader. Moreover, the researcher has been involved in teams providing protection for presidents, celebrities and high level corporate executives both locally and abroad. He is a certified close protection instructor with qualifications from Task International UK and the former Technikon Pretoria (now Tshwane University of Technology (TUT)). The researcher has been a member of training teams who have trained presidential, African royal family, civilian and military operatives in close protection and related skills. At present he is one of the directors of a specialised training and close protection provider company in South Africa and has links to a number of similar companies in the close protection field internationally.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WHILE DOING RESEARCH

Availability of candidates
Due to the nature of close protection work many of the candidates interviewed, who were still operational, were not always available or could not attend to pre-arranged meetings. This meant that the researcher had to be flexible, and in order to interview certain candidates several dates had to be booked until the interview could finally be conducted. In certain cases, for the interview to be completed, up to three meetings had to be arranged and rearranged since the candidate was constantly called out to perform work duties.

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8 The qualifications include: Basic Close Protection Instructor (Technikon Pretoria); Tactical Firearms Instructor (International Firearms Training Academy); Instructor in Security Management and Close Protection (Task International UK, which is a preferred training provider for the British Ministry of Defence and is a United Nations training contractor); Advanced Driving Instructor (Franco Plan Services); Tactical Baton Instructor (Armament Systems and Procedures, USA); Pepper Spray Instructor (Oleoresin Capsicum Aerosol Training); and an Unarmed Combat and Defensive Tactics Instructor (2nd Degree Black Belt Taekwondo, World Taekwondo Federation; 3rd Degree Black Belt Gendai-Ryu Ninjitsu, South African Ninjitsu Survival League; 4th Degree Black Belt Koga-Ryu Ninjitsu, Black Dragon Fighting Society USA; and 5th Degree Black Belt, Dennis Survival Jujitsu, Israel.).
**Geographical difficulties**

Certain of the respondents interviewed operate internationally and it was logistically quite difficult to interview them. The researcher was fortunately in Australia and Israel during the research period which enabled him to conduct face-to-face interviews with respondents in these countries. Attempts were made to interview candidates in different regions of South Africa, e.g. Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, in order to get a more rounded perspective and draw on different regional experiences. It was possible to interview respondents in the three cities mentioned because the researcher’s work schedule involved intensive local travelling during the research period.

**Personal training background of respondents favoured during interviews**

Many of the candidates would not accept that other CPOs from different backgrounds and training may have received quality training. It was a common trend for the majority of candidates interviewed to quote only their own training experience as valid and the quality benchmark, as well as having value above other training by disregarding other operatives training as perhaps being ‘inferior’. As a result of this it was left up to the researcher to analyse and assess the different opinions and views put forward by those interviewed in order to gain an unbiased overview of the industry as a whole.

**Respondents using differing terminology to describe the same thing**

Many of the respondents utilised different terminologies that may have been applicable or relevant only to the specific operational or training backgrounds in which they had served most of their professional life. Background reading, as well as the researcher’s personal experience, assisted greatly in eliminating misinterpretation of the information received and standardisation of the applicable terminology.

**Difficulty in certain cases of validating of interviewee credentials**

In certain cases respondents were interviewed that claimed to possess certain credentials or experience such as operational history and training backgrounds. However, it was sometimes difficult to validate the authenticity of claims made by some of the respondents. In most cases it was possible to verify credentials through other respondents.
An example illustrating the difficulty of verifying operational backgrounds was apparent when one of the respondents claimed to have had operational close protection experience with a military unit from another country. In such cases the researcher attempted to verify the information provided since it would have impact on the validity of what such a respondent claimed and the information he provided.

**Interviewees getting off topic**

Many of the respondents interviewed had vast operational experience in close protection as well as in other related security functions. It was therefore often a problem to keep candidates focused on the research problem and questions posed in an interview since they were inclined to go off on tangents and talk about other security issues not related to the specific focus of this study. This caused a problem since often interviews took far longer to complete than anticipated. This made it far more difficult and time consuming to sort the information obtained into relevant themes linked to the study focus.

**SELECTION CRITERIA FOR CANDIDATES**

In order to provide a representative sample from the overall target population the following key operational subdivisions were identified from which interview candidates to be selected:

- Police
- Military
- Airforce
- Intelligence agencies
- Private security sector
- PSIRA and POSLEC SETA regulatory bodies
- Security training centres
- Clients utilising the services of CPOs
For the purposes of this study the focus was primarily on the interviewing of currently active and operational CPOs as the scope and access to all of the areas was not deemed realistic or feasible in the allotted research period. In addition, with the delays (postponements and work demands) in setting up interviews with individuals also impacted on the time available to conduct interviews. Furthermore, since the research problem focuses on ‘operational skills requirements’, it was decided that it would be most beneficial for study requirements to focus the interviews on the sectors where actual CPOs are providing services on a daily basis.

**THE SELECTION CRITERIA FOR CPO RESPONDENTS**

For the CPO sub-category for interview candidates, whether service personnel (police, military or airforce) or civilian (private sector), the selection criteria were basically the same. This sub-category of interview candidates was selected based on the following criteria:

1. They must be/have been involved in some way with the close protection industry as a whole.
2. Possess previous or current experience in one of the above mentioned industry sub-sectors.
3. A minimum of five years’ experience in training or operations related to the close protection of VIPs and other designated persons.

**Variable factors**

As far as possible, and when a hierarchy or rank structure could be established, individuals that were in senior positions were selected as preferred candidates to be interviewed. However, if candidates in senior positions were unavailable or unwilling to be interviewed the next most senior person was identified and interviewed. In order to be as representative as possible at least three candidates from each sector were targeted to be interviewed (if such candidates were available and willing to participate in interviews).
While conducting the research it was found that most of the private sector CPOs that were interviewed had some sort of operational service history. This made it simpler for the researcher to identify common themes in both close protection operational practices and CPO training. In certain cases, it also served as a platform to assist in the verification of information since claims made by several respondents could be checked with persons who had been or still were operational with the various military or police close protection units.

Intelligence agencies were not targeted to provide interview candidates as preliminary research indicated that almost all relevant information could be collected by interviewing respondents from the other relevant sub-sectors. It was also determined that since intelligence type agencies usually operate in an isolated manner as compared to the rest of the industry, they would have little impact in terms of providing the necessary information needed to answer the stated research problem.

**Controls and international comparisons**

Originally, as a control measure and in order to provide a tool for measurement it was planned to interview at least one candidate who met the above criteria but who was not South African and had primarily international experience (not including experience on the African continent). However, the researcher was in fact able to personally interview three candidates fitting into this subgroup since the researcher travelled internationally while conducting the research. Candidates from the United Kingdom, Australia and Israel were interviewed.

Moreover, the vast majority of respondents that were interviewed in South Africa also had extensive cumulative experience in international close protection operations. This, as well as ongoing interaction with international operatives working or visiting South Africa, was also commonplace for most respondents.

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9 Operational service history refers to experience gained by a CPO while serving in any of the close protection units of the military, the police, or related government agencies.
Several of the respondents interviewed had also received close protection or related training and/or been exposed to trainers from countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and the USA. Additionally, among the interviewees there were specialist close protection instructors that had trained persons from many other countries outside of South Africa i.e. Angola, Equatorial Guinea and the United Kingdom.

Due to international business trips that the researcher was obligated to attend to during the research period, on the ground research was also carried out in Israel and Australia. Research into the regulation and governance of close protection industries in these countries was possible only at varying levels of detail. Where on the ground research was not possible liaison with officials in the Home Office from the UK and various other international bodies (these will be outlined below) was undertaken in order to gain as much information as possible.

In most cases there was a limited response but a certain amount of useful information and further references was obtained as a result of these enquiries. All available information obtained from these sources was than correlated and analysed in an attempt to assess what actually happens on an international platform with regard to the aspects of close protection that have been identified as relevant to this study. This information from international contacts was supplemented by accessing various official websites (see reference list for details).

Several countries were assessed in order to make comparisons with the applicable operational skills requirements for CPOs abroad as compared to CPOs in South Africa. Gaining information on the related training standards was, in most cases, exceptionally difficult. In certain cases no civilian access to such standards is allowed. An example of this is in Australia where access to the unit standard on Close Personal Protection is not accessible to civilians.\textsuperscript{10} Accordingly, it was also decided not to utilise the USA as a control group.

\textsuperscript{10} This is perhaps because specialised fields of security such as close protection are primarily considered the domain of government agencies or government cleared private companies and organisations.
This decision was made after email communication with the Institute for Criminal Justice Research of the Department of Justice in the United States. It was determined that each state in the USA actually sets its own standards and licensing requirements for CPOs i.e. there is no national or federal body regulating CPO activity in each state or setting national standards and competencies. As a result, CPO activities differ from state to state and are generally quite inconsistent with some states having strict requirements and others none at all.

Subsequently, it was decided to only use Israel, Australia and The United Kingdom as reference points for comparative purposes primarily because it was possible to have face-to-face interviews with CPOs and trainers from each of these countries. Much additional information was also collected from the Internet by accessing websites such as the UK Home Office and the Australian National Training Information Service (NTIS).

**Data collection methods and fieldwork practice**

The majority of data was collected by means of in-depth one-on-one interviews of selected candidates that met the established criteria. Every attempt was made to make the interview process as convenient and comfortable as possible. In several cases interviews took place in informal surroundings such as coffee shops or restaurants. Other interviews took place at the respondent’s offices in order to ensure the minimum disruption of respondent’s work activities.

The interview process was based on utilizing the interview framework schedule of questions (see Annexure 2) and then asking probing or clarifying questions in order to try and extract as much relevant data as possible. In most of the interviews the researcher used an informal approach to gather as much information as possible from the respondents during the interviews.

This data was then processed and collated in order to identify and formulate the following concepts aimed at answering the identified research problem, namely:
• The minimum standards regarding training across the spectrum through the relevant sub-sectors of the close protection industry in South Africa today

• To assist in the forecasting of trends that will dominate the training of CPOs in the future. Furthermore, to determine what steps can be taken to ensure that the South African industry is able to effectively implement the relevant strategies in order to adjust to these trends.

• To provide a set of minimum standards as a point of reference, which could be used to assist in the setting of national standards and the regulation of the CPO industry as required by various organisations (South African Qualifications Authority, POSLEC SETA, PSIRA as well as relevant training and education providers).

SELECTION OF CLIENTS (CPO USERS)

It was originally planned to interview several clients (the users or contractors of close protection services and not to be confused with a Principal who receives the actual close protection service). It was determined after the preliminary research that access to clients would be extremely difficult and sensitive. It was then determined that several of the CPO respondents actually worked directly for several clients and part of their duties was to select CPOs to provide Close Protection to designated persons. Accordingly, it was then established that these respondents could provide information from dual perspectives enabling the researcher to gain information from both CPO and client perspectives. The interview schedule of questions (Annexure 2) was then revised and adapted with additional questions being added (Annexure 3) to the identified respondent interviews.

SELECTION OF REGULATORY BODIES

The two key bodies recognized as being responsible for the regulation, setting of standards and control of the South African private security industry are the POSLEC SETA and PSIRA.
It was possible to interview officials from both organisations, namely Mr Hennie Richards, CEO of POSLEC SETA; and Mr Ash Bodhoo of PSIRA. (The interview questions posed to these officials can be viewed in Annexure 4).

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter has been to provide the reader with a broader understanding of the way in which the research was conducted. Every attempt was made to ensure the validity and reliability of the research information collected in the course of the study.

All ethical considerations ranging from plagiarism to interview ethics were taken into account in an attempt to get open and honest responses from the interview respondents while striving to eliminate any interviewer bias. The majority of interviews were carried out in an informal manner in order to create a comfortable and relaxed environment. This assisted the researcher in gaining as much relevant information as possible from the respondents.

There were certain setbacks and barriers that were encountered throughout the research process. These included logistical and CPO specific availability problems, as well as the fact that it was not always possible to validate or cross-substantiate all information collected from the various respondents. When information that was collected could not be validated it was separated out during the collation phase and was therefore not utilised in the forming of conclusions and making of recommendations.

The majority of information was gained via in-depth one-on-one interviews from a wide variety of organisations, companies and people (mainly close protection operatives). In order to ensure that an unbiased view of the CPO industry was obtained by the researcher respondents representing a cross spectrum of organisations who are actively involved in the close protection industry were selected. Every effort was made to ensure that fair representation from the different role players was achieved. This was made easier by the fact that most private sector respondents had some sort of service background, i.e. served in either the military or police.
Several of the respondents employed in the private sector also performed the functions of clients utilising the services of CPOs. This enabled the researcher to gain a wider base of information including data that focused on the close protection skills requirements from client perspectives. Information was also obtained from the two identified regulatory bodies that have an impact and effect on the close protection industry, namely PSIRA and the POSLEC SETA.

The information from the interviews was supplemented via a comprehensive in-depth literature review of all available literature from both international and South African sources on the topic (see List of References for details). The information obtained in the literature review and the in-depth interviews was eventually correlated to provide the basis of the recommendations outlined later in this report.
Chapter 3

REGULATORY ASPECTS CONCERNING THE CLOSE PROTECTION INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

It is a widely accepted concept both locally and internationally that almost all industries need to have a recognised body to serve as a watchdog. This is important to ensure quality, fair play and ethical practice for all parties involved, as well as to set training standards and levels of professional conduct. It could be said that this is even more relevant for the close protection industry, where bad service or incompetent CPOs may cost a Principal their life.

It is important to understand the overall situation in South Africa before unpacking the fundamentals of regulating the close protection industry. A practical understanding of the relevant bodies and legislative aspects needs to be gained in order to apply a workable regulatory approach.

The following legislative Acts have been identified as relevant to the current regulation of the close protection industry and will be explained in this chapter:

- The South African Qualifications Authority Act (No. 2 of 1995)

The following organisations and structures as well as their key functions will also be clarified in this chapter:

- Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA)
- The Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector Education and Training Authority (POSLEC SETA).
The following organisations and structures are considered relevant for the overall understanding of qualification and training standards development and recognition in South Africa today (These bodies and their functions are explained in more detail in Annexure 6):

- The National Skills Authority (NSA)
- The National Qualifications Framework (NQF)
- National Standards Bodies (NSBs)
- Standards Generating Bodies (SGBs).

(For a more detailed overview on role player organisations and the overall approach adopted by South Africa with regard to education, qualifications and recognition process see Annexure 6: Introduction to the National Skills Development Plan).

In terms of this research report regulation refers to the following concepts:

- The setting of an industry accepted minimum standard of competency for Close Protection officers
- Guidelines for the core competency levels in each of the relevant subdivisions relating to close protection work namely: firearms, first aid, driving, unarmed combat and relevant theoretical and practical protection skills.
- Policies and procedures for the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) for CPOs currently working in the industry.
- Enforcement of an established Code of Conduct and accepted industry standards. This enforcement could take place by regular monitoring of providers, inspection of providers and applicable disciplinary action (suspensions, fines, etc.) if providers are found to be in contravention.
- Establishing of re-qualifying and re-registering time frames, policies and procedures in order to ensure that only competent CPOs are providing protective services in South Africa.
BACKGROUND TO CLOSE PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Prior to the 1994 elections almost all close protection services were carried out by government-related departments. The introduction of a new government after these elections created a different infrastructure. The military, police and related government organisations went through a major restructuring process whereby members of former ‘resistance groups/liberation armies’ security divisions such as the ANC and PAC were integrated into their ranks. This restructuring shifted much responsibility away from police and military close protection units and saw private industry providers step in to fill the resulting gap in provision of such services. This restructuring, combined with the dropping of sanctions against South Africa by the international community, led to an increase in demand for not only close protection but also the provision of private security in general.

Today, levels of violent crime in South Africa are comparatively quite high (www.saps.org.za). In fact the United States Travel Advisory Service advises visitors to South Africa to be aware that “criminal activity, sometimes violent, occurs routinely [in South Africa]” (http://travel.state.gov/travel/safrica.html). There is without doubt a stable market demand for close protection services in South Africa today. Currently, most international clients that utilise close protection services draw their teams from the private sector (the exception would be guests of the South African government who would receive protection directly from the SAPS VIP Protection Services). In certain interviews it was even commented that South African CPOs are in high demand worldwide for their professional services and skills (Jacobs, 2003; Smith, 2004; and Steynberg, 2003).

11 The democratically elected ANC Government replaced the old Apartheid regime and aimed to adjust the existing discriminatory infrastructure in order to provide opportunities for previously disadvantaged persons.
The need for regulation

The need for regulation and setting of minimum standards for the operational skills that a CPO must possess was repeatedly mentioned throughout all interviews conducted by the researcher with South African CPOs. While preliminary research indicated that this was the primary research problem, it was interesting to note that the majority of respondents interviewed mentioned, in one way or another, that if this was not addressed it would be impossible to fully professionalise this particular sector of the private security industry.

The quotes below, emanating from the interviews are selected examples to verify this point:

There can be no way forward unless we ensure that only those people that are capable and competent to perform all aspects of Close Protection operations are the ones actually doing the work (Jacobs, 2003).

Because you only see how good a Close Protection Operative is, is when things go wrong. A lot of people who are doing close protection in South Africa today are not qualified (Van Eck, 2003).

The above two quotes reiterate the fact that a well-regulated industry ensuring the competency levels of operational CPOs is a vital component needed in order to professionalise the industry.

Quantifying the problem

In the target group of CPOs that were interviewed in South Africa the question: “In your professional opinion what percentage of the CPOs operating today have been trained effectively and could be considered fully competent to effectively provide Close Protection services” was asked (Question 7 from the interview schedule of questions for CPOs, see Annexure 2 for details).
Here the respondents were asked to give an honest estimate, based on their experience and interaction with other CPOs, of realistically how many CPOs across all the sub-sectors in South Africa were actually qualified (i.e. have the relevant experience, training or on-the-job expertise) and able to perform Close Protection duties effectively. In the interviews ‘competency’ was clarified as a CPO being able to effectively fulfil all roles and duties needed in a Close Protection operation. (These roles and duties are outlined in more detail in Chapter 4: Literature review.)

The answers varied with the highest percentage of CPO competency being an estimated 50% and the lowest being 10%. Perhaps one of the most disturbing responses came from interview twenty (Van Jaarsveld, 2004). The response from this interview graphically outlined the answer in terms of operationally competent members of the Police VIP Protection Services. The respondent’s answer was a frighteningly low 3.6%. When asked how such an exact figure was reached the respondent explained that, he had taken the percentage of persons in the unit that were totally up-to-date with all training and applicable evaluations as competent, persons who were not up-to-date with all training were therefore not fully competent. This yielded an approximate figure of 186 out of nearly 3000 policemen and women in the Police VIP Protection Services units who could be considered competent. This is fairly disturbing if it is taken into consideration that in terms of active CPOs the South African police possess the largest contingent in South Africa.

When taking the responses from all the South African respondents into account and working out the average an approximate figure of 20% of all CPOs operating in South Africa today was reached that could be considered as competent to effectively act as CPOs. This means that in the opinions of the interview respondents only one in five CPOs working in South Africa are actually competent and should be allowed to be active.
The concept of what being a ‘competent CPO’ should entail is very broad. Below are a number of the interviewees’ views on this aspect of competency. For example: “CPOs protect peoples lives, there is no middle ground between being capable and not [being capable], when peoples’ lives are at stake” (Hugo, 2003), while another remarked: “The bottom line is people die if CPOs don’t do there jobs correctly, standards must be put in place to ensure that the client gets what he pays for” (McGuire, 2003).

The above two statements are merely examples selected from the interviews that were conducted in order to reinforce the point that competent CPOs are a vital component to professionalising the South African close protection industry. Sooner or later persons performing CPO duties, who are not adequately qualified, will become a hazard to a Principal’s safety. However, it was a unanimous opinion with all respondents that were interviewed, that the only way to make sure that the Principal is getting qualified CPOs is to have an overall regulatory body set standards for the specific specialisation of Close Protection. Monitoring of these standards would also be a vital component since failure to do so and enforce training standards could cost people their lives. The provision of Close Protection services without some sort of minimum competency standards and enforcement is not something that can be taken lightly or ignored any longer.

**Regulatory options**

When looking at the available options it is vital to remain practical since many concepts and systems of standard setting and industry regulation as applied in other countries, may not be applicable within the South African or the African context.

Over 80% of the CPO respondents interviewed felt that it was necessary to have all or some of the following in place:

1. A minimum standard covering each accepted area of close protection training to form the basis for a recognised qualification.
2. A regular re-evaluation and competency assessment framework to maintain up-to-date records of qualified CPOs, as well as to clarify their operational status (ability to perform skills in terms of minimum standard requirements).

3. A penalty system or perhaps a disciplinary system with fines and sanctions that would serve as a deterrent to companies or individuals that do not comply with the above.

4. A validation database for clients to check if CPOs are current and registered.

Information from several countries and the experiences of many of the interviewed respondents have been correlated in an attempt to provide the reader with an international overview of close protection regulation and standard setting. The following information is aimed at assisting the reader to view the South African situation in context with the international environment.

INTERNATIONAL OVERVIEW

Introduction
Technology and many other factors have created what is often referred to as the global economy. It is an accepted fact and well known that occurrences in countries half way around the world can have far reaching international effects. Many people utilising the services of individual CPOs or protection teams, are people that travel frequently and, more often than not, have business or other interests in several countries. The combination of these aspects means that CPOs need to think in global terms and utilise international benchmarking in order to be effective and to keep up-to-date with current developments in their industry sector. Accordingly, it is vital that close protection training and operations are not assessed in isolation. This is necessary if operational competency standards are to be recognised internationally.
It is no easy task to create a set format to assess what is happening in the close protection industry in South Africa and then compare it internationally. The researcher was able to identify, from the various assessments of international close protection industries, that there seem to be three major groupings in terms of regulation and governance, into which a country could be fitted. These three groupings are based on assessing levels of regulation and standards in the private security industry focusing on close protection. The first grouping can be referred to as ‘regulated’; the second ‘partially regulated’; and the last group ‘not regulated at all’.

**Regulated countries**

When assessing the first classification of ‘regulated countries’ the following are examples: the United Kingdom, Australia, most of the countries in the European Union, as well as certain states in the USA. The term regulated can be described as having a minimum standard of competency (usually a unit standard or several relevant unit standards) for persons that are considered trained CPOs against which they can be measured and evaluated on a regular basis.

There is also usually some sort of national regulatory body with which persons providing close protection services must register in order to be able to legally work within the private security industry. Examples of this are agencies such as the Security Industry Training Organisation in the United Kingdom (SITO) or the Security Industry Registry run by the police in New South Wales in Australia. These organisations are responsible not only for registering CPOs but also for the enforcement of set industry practices and standards.

The concept ‘regulated’ can therefore be summarised by clarifying what a CPO must do to be able to work in the industry of a ‘regulated country’. He/she must undergo and successfully complete a training course run by a recognised (accredited) training organisation. The trained CPO must then apply to and gain the necessary accreditation (licensing) from an overseeing regulatory body that would enforce and monitor the set standards for the industry.
**Partially-regulated countries**

The second grouping is classified as ‘partially regulated countries’ such as Israel and South Africa. Partial regulation means that there may be certain of the relevant aspects and practices in place as implemented in a regulated country but not all of them. These aspects and practices would mean a set competency standards are in place and having regulatory bodies that enforce predefined industry practices.

The typical way in which these industries are run is that persons actually doing close protection duties must register with an overseeing general private security regulatory body. There are usually no standards that differentiate these persons from normal security guards or providers of other security services. Within the classification of ‘partially regulated’ countries, there may even be certain minimum standards that exist for related CPO competencies. However, these usually apply specifically to firearms and not to close protection as a specialist industry in itself.

**Non-regulated countries**

The last grouping is where there is no governing and registering regulatory body overseeing the close protection industry and enforcing set industry practices at all. There is also no accepted minimum standard or recognised qualification in this classification. Most developing countries including many of the countries, in Africa, would fit into this grouping.

The vast majority of information with regards to international regulation has come from personal interviews and internet research. When referring to the international community it can be seen that this is on the whole too large a group and it is necessary to be more specific. It is clear that when comparing South Africa with the majority of Third World countries that South Africa appears to be ahead with regard to the development of set training standards and a well regulated industry for the provision of close protection services.
There seem to be four key points relating to the provision of close protection services in Third World countries (non-regulated) which were identified and outlined in a report authored by L. Jacobs and G. Schneider. This report emanated from experience gained after providing training and close protection at presidential level in Equatorial Guinea during November and December of 2002.

The points mentioned in this report are as follows:

- The tendency to appoint untrained family members as CPOs as opposed to selecting and training the best possible candidates for the job.

- The belief that the more loyal the persons are around a Principal the better protected and therefore safer the Principal is.

- The focus on excessively tight information security and secrecy during all operations and movements (travelling) of the Principal, to the point where the CPO team is uninformed, which negates effective planning and development of close protection contingencies.

- The belief that training, retraining and minimum actual competencies are vital for effective operation is on the whole ignored and security is handled in an ad hoc, unplanned and therefore unprofessional manner (Jacobs & Schneider, 2002: 2).

When the above-mentioned points above are considered it is clear that in South Africa they are for the most part not applicable. Therefore, the focus in this study with reference to international standards was based on available information and accessibility to the relevant people within First World (regulated and partially regulated) countries – that are considered by most to be leaders in the field of close protection services. Accordingly, no firm comparisons were made between South Africa and non-regulated (largely Third World) countries.
Table 1: Differences between regulated, partially regulated and non-regulated countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGULATORY OPTIONS</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulated</td>
<td>• Industry accepted minimum competency standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Industry supervision and regulation by oversight body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CPOs must re-register with the regulatory body within a given period (e.g. once every three years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially regulated</td>
<td>• There may be regulation but not specifically for the CP industry (usually regulated within the security industry as a whole)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-regulated</td>
<td>• No accepted industry standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No set regulatory bodies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

Several countries were assessed in order to draw a comparison with the applicable operational skills requirements for CPOs in South Africa. The three countries that were selected were the United Kingdom, New South Wales in Australia and Israel.

The United Kingdom

...when compared to the UK, the primary problem in South Africa is the overall low standards and lack of regulation within the close protection industry (Sharp, 2003).

In the UK the security industry is governed by the Security Industry Training Organisation (SITO) which oversees standards of training and the Security Industry Authority (SIA) which is responsible for licensing and regulation.
There are also qualifications level ratings based on the National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) system which correspond to South Africa’s National Qualifications Framework (NQF). The primary difference being that the NQF takes all qualifications into account while the NVQ concentrates on vocational qualifications and not on tertiary level qualifications such as university degrees.

Israel

In Israel the problem at the moment is that everyone who comes out of the military [thinks he] is a close protection expert (Allon, 2003).

At a superficial level it appears as if the close protection industry in Israel is as unregulated as it is here in South Africa. However, on closer examination CPO candidates in Israel must still meet minimum firearms’ competencies which have, at the time of writing, not yet been implemented in South Africa. The fact that military service is compulsory in Israel seems to have created a surplus of persons claiming to be trained CPOs. The common sentiment seems to be that as a direct result of having undergone military training a person would be a trained CPO.

The infrastructure of private security regulation in Israel is quite capable of creating a separate database and regulatory body for CPOs (in terms of established regulatory bodies, potential inspectors and penalty systems for non-compliance). However, it seems that it has been the Israeli authorities’ choice to regulate Close Protection as part of the whole private security industry, much as South Africa has been attempting to do. Moreover, Israel has a far stricter implementation of regulating the private security industry (i.e. sight inspections and penalties or prosecution for utilising non-registered operatives).

12 The relevant regulations of the Firearms Control Act (No. 60 of 2000) have come into effect as from the 1 July 2004. The process of accrediting training and competency assessment service providers to implement the regulations is being handled by the POSLEC SETA.

13 In South Africa the PSIRA Act (No. 56 of 2001) does in fact make provision for sight inspections and penalties for companies that utilise non-registered operatives but the lack of enforcement, shortage of inspectors and limited number of inspections make these for the most part ineffective.
When the respondent in Israel was asked during the interview as to whether all security guards are registered and firearm-qualified, the response was they have to meet the minimum standards but the standards are too low to effectively ensure only the best i.e. most competent persons do the work (Allon, 2003).

Overall, the key information extracted from the interview seems to indicate that the infrastructure for regulation seems to be in place but it is the lack of suitable standards, specifically for CPOs, that fails to separate qualified CPOs from the rest of the private security industry operatives in Israel (Allon, 2003).

**Australia**

The industry in Australia is very closely monitored and tightly knit; there is not a lot of work for civilians, if anything the industry is over-regulated (Garvey, 2004).

Again, like the case of the USA, it was difficult to utilise Australia as a base for comparison since each state (seven) in Australia has different laws, standards and regulation procedures. On the whole the demand for private sector close protection officers in Australia appears quite low compared to South Africa. In Australia the vast majority of close protection tasks are performed by the relevant authorities, police or other government agencies such as the Federal Protection Service on either a federal or state level.

The majority of information gathered was focused on New South Wales (NSW) since the researcher was based in Sydney. The regulations in place in NSW seem to be more or less consistent with the other states in Australia that seemed to have relatively minor differences (i.e. registration fees, renewal procedures, scope of duties that private security officers can apply, etc.) in terms of this research.

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14 There is reciprocal recognition of qualifications between most of the Australian states. In certain cases additional requirements may need to be met by persons wanting to be registered in more than one state.
The key consideration is that there is a unit standard equivalent titled: Perform Close Personal Protection Duties (PUAPP001A), which is in place and listed on the Australian National Training Information Service. It is, however, not available for civilian perusal (see Chapter 2, controls and international comparisons). The fact that a standard exists clearly indicates that there are set minimum standards for operational competency of Close Protection Operatives in place for Australia as a whole.

In NSW, a regulation and licensing procedure for CPOs is in place with an expiry period (the duration of a licence varies from one to five years) applicable to such licences. The overseeing body is the Security Industry Registry which is administered by the NSW police service (http://www.police.nsw.gov.au). Each state in Australia also recognises licenses from one another. However, in order to operate in different states a CPO must register with the relevant authority in each state (i.e. the Security Industry Registry in Victoria) before being able to work in that state.

On a superficial level, the Australian close protection industry seems to conform to all aspects that were mentioned as concerns by the South African respondents. However, interesting questions seemed to have been raised in the Australian context on aspects such as:

1. Is over-regulation making it too difficult for potential CPOs to enter the market?

2. Is the highest level of training actually being offered since there is not really a competitive environment?

3. With the majority of training in Australia being provided by state agencies and very little private sector training taking place (as compared to other countries), the scope of career development for CPOs is very limited e.g. the highest tertiary qualification is a Diploma in Security Management with no further security related qualifications being available.
The above issues are not relevant to the current situation in South Africa but may well become so in the future.

CURRENT REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

There is no doubt that there is some sort of evolutionary process is currently causing countries to move away from totally unregulated to partially regulated and finally have the necessary infrastructure enabling them to revert to a fully regulated industry with internationally recognised qualifications. This is in fact what South Africa has been experiencing and/or trying to implement since 1994. Over time South Africa has seen the following progressive process from 1994 to the present take place in the close protection industry:

1. Prior to 1994 there was a certain amount of government regulation\textsuperscript{15} in place but after 1994 with all the changes in the industry, a state of uncertainty existed with almost all close protection providers not being registered with any oversight body. The Security Officers Board (SOB) was only being established in 1987 as a result of the Security Officer’s Act (No. 92 of 1987).

2. Establishment of SAQA (Act no. 2 of 1995).

3. Compulsory for CPOs to register with the SOB at a guarding Grade level C which was implemented shortly after the passing of the Security Officers Amendment Act (No. 104 of 1997). This has no relevance with regards to actual CPO competency standards since it is designed to regulate the standards of static guards and not well-trained CPOs.

4. Establishment of the POSLEC SETA in 2000 (POSELC SETA’s functions and duties will be outlined later in this Chapter).

\textsuperscript{15} Pre-1994 the following legislative Acts had been passed: The Security Officer’s Act (No. 92 of 1987), Security Officers’ Amendment Act (No. 25 of 1990) and the Security Officers’ Amendment Act (No. 119 of 1992).
5. In 2001 a name change from SOB to Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) occurred. In addition the scope of this body’s duties and responsibilities were broadened.

6. Standards generating bodies (SGBs) established in 2001 by SAQA (Close Protection was classified under National Standards Body 008 which was tasked to draw up unit standards for the security industry as a whole). The unit standard for Close Protection was registered on 9 October 2002.

Currently South Africa is also at the stage where minimum competencies must be agreed to by the industry as a whole, implemented by recognised and accredited (POSLEC SETA) training organisations and enforced by the specific industry regulatory body (PSIRA). At present South Africa has a regulatory body (PSIRA) and a set unit standard for CPOs. However, currently there is no enforcement of industry practices or of the set minimum competencies. POSLEC SETA is in the process of accrediting training providers based on the existing unit standard for Close Protection. Currently South Africa is moving towards the status of a fully regulated country. Once that status is achieved it will also be possible to have South African close protection qualifications recognised internationally.

The implications of a regulated industry would include aspects such as the overall professionalisation of the industry, the possibility of tertiary qualifications emanating from training qualifications, the establishment of a professional body to represent qualified members, etc. There are other international and globalisation factors that were identified during the research process. Some of these factors are either aspects that have occurred as a result of international networking, such as the sharing of knowledge initiatives between countries and international benchmarking.

Other factors are CPOs working internationally, training with each other and being forced to standardise working methodologies when international events are held (international sporting/entertainment events or political gatherings such as the World Aids conference.
or the Non-Aligned Movement Congress). These aspects will be outlined below and the critical factors that have influence over the training and operational functioning in South Africa will be highlighted.

These concepts can be used to forecast future trends and ensure that standards in South Africa, are internationally benchmarked.

**THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY (PSIRA) AND THE POLICE, PRIVATE SECURITY, LEGAL, CORRECTIONAL SERVICES AND JUSTICE SECTOR EDUCATION & TRAINING AUTHORITY (POSLEC SETA)**

There are currently two government appointed bodies that deal with the regulatory, law enforcement and standard setting for the security industry in South Africa namely the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) and the Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services & Justice Sector Education & Training Authority (POSLEC SETA). They will be discussed in more detail below:

**OVERVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POSLEC SETA**

The POSLEC SETA is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of learnerships and skills programmes, as well as the accreditation and quality assurance of courses, training and education providers in the policing, private security, legal, justice and correctional services sub-sectors in South Africa. Currently, the existing unit standard for Close Protection (existing minimum competency standards) and accreditation of Close Protection training providers falls within the scope of the POSLEC SETA.

An overview of POSLEC SETA's roles, functions and history will be outlined below. (For more details on Sector education and Training Authorities (SETAs) and Education and Training Quality Assurance bodies (ETQAs) see Annexure 6) (www.Poslecseta.org.za).
The POSLEC SETA was established by the Minister of Labour on 20 March 2000 in terms of section 9(1) of the Skills Development Act (No. 97 of 1998). It is an accredited ETQA with SAQA and responsible for quality assurance in its allocated sectors.

The scope of coverage of the POSLEC SETA, as approved and set out in the Government Gazette Notice No. 265 of 20 March 2001 include the following areas:

Policing - includes the South African Police Services, the Independent Complaints Directorate, the Secretariat for Safety and Security (inclusive of both national and provincial ones), the various metropolitan policing agencies and the Directorate for Special Operations (DSO) otherwise known as the Scorpions of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).

Private Security Services - including all private security companies, companies providing personal protection and intruder detection companies.

Legal Practice - including all advocates, attorneys, paralegals, intellectual property practitioners and commercial legal advisors.

Justice - including all judicial officers (e.g. judges, magistrates and prosecutors), the Department of Justice, sheriffs, registrars/masters of courts, interpreters and public defenders.

Correctional Services - including the Department of Correctional Services, private prisons and detention centres (private and public).

In terms of section 10 of the Skills Development Act, the POSLEC SETA has to perform the following functions:

Develop a sector skills plan within the framework of the National Skills Development Strategy for the POSLEC SETA;
Implement the skills sector plan by –

- Approving workplace skills plans
- Establishing learnerships
- Allocating grants (for aspects like worker skills development and research in POSLEC related subject matter) in a prescribed manner to employers, education and training providers, and workers; and
- Monitor education and training within the sector.

Promote learnerships by –

- Identifying workplaces for practical work experience;
- Supporting the development of learning materials (up to NQF level 4);
- Improving the facilitation of learning; and
- Assisting in the conclusion of learnership agreements.

Register learnership agreements:

- Be accredited as an ETQA as contemplated in section 5 (1) (a) (bb) of the South African Qualifications Authority Act to ensure that quality levels are maintained by accredited training providers.
- Disburse the skills development levies (See Annexure 6 for more details) in the POSLEC sector.

Liaise with the National Skills Authority on –

- The national skills development policy;
- The national skills development strategy; and
- Its own sector skills plan.

Report to the Director General of Labour on -

- Its income and expenditure; and
- The implementation of its sector skills plan.

16 Learnerships are aimed at improving the skills of the South African workforce. Unqualified persons are trained by companies in an apprentice type model. The companies receive tax breaks for providing learnerships (Behaviour Systems and Development, 2003: 20).
Furthermore, it has to liaise with the employment services of the Department of Labour and any education body established under any law regulating education in South Africa to improve the dissemination of information on -

- employment opportunities; and
- serve as a liaison between education and training providers and the labour market.

Finally, The POSLEC SETA is tasked to appoint such staff as is necessary for the effective performance of its functions and perform any duties imposed on it by the Skills Development Act (www.poslecseta.org.za).

**OVERVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PSIRA**

The core functions of PSIRA are listed in the Private Security Industry Regulation Act (No. 56 of 2001), with its primary objectives being to regulate the private security industry and to exercise effective control over the practice of the occupation of security service providers in the public and national interest of the private industry itself and for that purpose, subject to the Act to:

a) Promote a legitimate private security industry which acts in terms of the principles contained in the constitution and other applicable law;

b) Ensure that all security service providers act in the public and the national interest in the rendering of security services.

c) Promote a private security industry which is characterised by professionalism, transparency, accountability, equity and accessibility.

d) Promote stability of the private security industry

e) Promote and encourage trustworthiness of security service providers;
f) Determine and enforce minimum standards of occupational conduct in respect of security service providers;

g) Encourage and promote efficiency in and responsibility with regard to the rendering of security services.

h) Promote, maintain, and protect the status and interests of the occupation of security service provider;

i) Ensure that the process of registration of security service providers is transparent, fair, objective and conducted timeously;

j) Promote high standards in the training of security service providers and prospective security service providers;

k) Encourage ownership and control of security businesses by persons historically disadvantaged through unfair discrimination;

l) Encourage equal opportunity employment practices in the private security industry;

m) Promote the protection and enforcement of the rights of security officers and other employees in the private security industry;

n) Ensure that compliance with existing legislation by security service providers is being promoted and controlled through a process of active monitoring and investigation of the affairs of security service providers;

o) Protect the interests of the users of security services;

p) Promote the development of security services which are responsive to the needs of users of such services and of the community.
q) Promote the empowerment and advancement of persons who were historically disadvantaged through unfair discrimination in the private security industry (Government Gazette, 2002: 8-9).

Currently all CPOs operating in the private sector must be registered as Grade C in the guarding rating system as utilised by PSIRA. A Grade C license qualification permits a Security Guard to carry a firearm while on duty.

The grading system as applied for security guards is explained below.17 At present there is no universally accepted close protection standards registered by PSIRA for Close Protection training. The grade level security guard training material (Gloria, 2004) that was assessed is not explained in terms of the different specific outcomes for each grade. In the manuals the grades are not classified as below, but in order to make it easier for the reader to understand the rating system, the following differentiations have been allocated to each grade level:

**Table 2: PSIRA grades and descriptions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade E</td>
<td>Entry level static guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade D</td>
<td>Guard able to perform access control and foot/ bicycle patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade C</td>
<td>Guard is able to carry a weapon provided he/she is in possession of a Firearm Competency Certificate, as required by the Firearms Control Act (No. 60 of 2000)18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade B</td>
<td>Site security manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade A</td>
<td>Area security manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 The majority of this information below was obtained from the UBUNTU Training Academy manuals, Grade A, Grade B, Grade C, Grade D and Grade E, which cover all the requirements for grade level training by PSIRA (Gloria, 2004) and the PSIRA website (http://www.sira-sa.co.za).

18 The firearms control regulations were only implemented as from 1 July 2004 at which stage competency training service providers had not yet been fully accredited by the POSLEC SETA and the SAPS Central Firearm Registry.
The training material in the training manuals A-E Grades (Gloria, 2004) bare similarities to some of the content in a comprehensive close protection training manual. Some of these similarities include access control, search procedures, protocol, bomb and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) recognition, unarmed combat, report keeping, risk management and communication. However, the detail and additional specialised operational aspects that would be specific to close protection are not covered and those aspects (such as immediate action drills, principal profiling, firearms tactics, team structures, etc.) do not conform to the necessary detail that would be required to train a fully competent CPO.

The Grade A-E training would definitely serve as a good format or base for preparatory training in close protection. The fact that close protection training aims to produce a well rounded operative who is capable of protecting a Principal’s life under extreme circumstances means that a far more detailed training program is necessary. Close protection training should therefore be seen as advanced specialist further training to the Grade level A-E training.

**FEEDBACK AND ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSIRA AND POSLEC SETA**

You cannot regulate trained close protection professionals with the same standards utilised to regulate guards (Higgins, 2003).

The above statement was a sentiment echoed by most of the South African respondents interviewed for this study and who were up-to-date with the legislative requirements pertaining to CPOs. There are no additional legislative requirements that are specific to CPOs in the PSIRA Act, the specifications refer generally to armed persons protecting persons or assets. When correlating the excerpts (seen above) of POSLEC SETA and PSIRA’s roles, functions and duties, it would appear as if some overlapping occurs between these two institutions. An example appears to be that, subject to the PSIRA Act, PSIRA is to ‘promote high standards in the training of security service providers and prospective security service providers’. This clearly falls within the scope of POSLEC.
SETA’s functions which are primarily involved in training standards and quality related issues.

It becomes quite apparent when analysing the relevant literature available and cross-referencing the applicable interviews, that POSLEC SETA’s main function is in fact to oversee the development of standards and qualifications that are applicable and transportable through the various sub-sectors that this SETA is responsible for. The POSLEC SETA has made it clear that they will be solely responsible for the setting of training standards. This may be done by consulting with established SGBs or sourcing external subject matter experts (SMEs) to assist in creating industry applicable standards and qualifications. POSLEC will also be responsible for the establishment of set competency levels and maintenance of standards by their accredited training providers. They will achieve this by compiling a base of assessors, moderators and verifiers to maintain training standards as well as regular scheduled and unscheduled inspections and site visits by POSLEC officials. This view was substantiated by the then head of this SETA:

The POSLEC SETA is the government appointed body responsible for the setting of relevant standards and implementing such standards in the applicable industries (Richards, 2003).

Currently, there is a Unit Standard (with the title: *Provide close protection of designated persons* (Unit Standard Number 11510)) registered with the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) (see Annexure 4). The unit standard will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but in brief it describes four specific outcomes namely:

1. Ascertain the Principal’s brief and risk profile.
2. Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a Principal.
3. Protect a Principal during transit/foot/venue movement.
4. Terminate and review protection operation.
These outcomes are generic and should be implemented on any Close Protection operation. The unit standard refers to ‘learning assumed’ to be in place which directly correlates to the applicable entry requirements that will be discussed later in this report, in the chapter on training methodology. During discussions with some of the interviewees it was quite clear that the unit standard is at an acceptable level. However, neither minimum competencies nor a set of clearly defined assessment criteria are included in the unit standard.

This is a major concern since the specific outcomes that are stated in the unit standard can be demonstrated in various forms, ranging from a one hour, one protector/operative, low risk task at the bottom of the scale to a high risk, multi-team operation at the top of the competency requirements. The fact that there are no clear specifications in the unit standard actually means that no minimum standards have been clearly defined.

In other words, there needs to be some sort of specifications that outline exactly what a CPO should be able to do, at what level he/she should be able to do it and exactly how these competencies should be measured. These aspects are vital in order for the unit standard to be implemented effectively. In order to apply effective assessment criteria (definitions and specifications of how to measure the levels of operational skills requirements), the criteria would have to be universally accepted across all spheres of the close protection industry in South Africa. It would also have to be implemented in such a manner as to facilitate the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL).19 This would be a vital component for any unit standard to actually be implemented effectively.

**CONCLUSION**

The need for effective monitoring and regulation of the close protection industry in South Africa was clearly established during the preliminary research process and was verified by respondents throughout the research. There were two clear industry role player
organisations that were identified namely PSIRA and the POSLEC SETA. These organisations have the dual role of regulating/monitoring and setting training standards for the South African private security industry as a whole.

The POSLEC SETA primarily focuses on the setting of standards and the regulating of training providers by implementing an accreditation process, ongoing monitoring and regular site and quality inspections. PSIRA in contrast concentrates on enforcing the minimum competency standards and even operational practices (regular re-evaluation or re-qualification) that will be set by the POSLEC SETA. PSIRA will also ensure that all service providers are registered with them and that they only utilise personnel that are registered and qualified. This is done through a penalty and fines systems that could include prosecuting on criminal charges for offenders. PSIRA is also responsible for seeing to it that the registered service providers and their personnel adhere to the Code of Conduct for the private security industry.

Most of the South African interview respondents felt that the majority of CPOs operating in the country today are not competent enough to perform their duties effectively and if something was to go wrong during a close protection operation/assignment the consequences could well be disastrous and life threatening for all concerned. Whilst there is a unit standard for close protection training it has no clear designation of minimum competency requirements nor set assessment criteria to demarcate how to assess the competencies of CPOs or to conduct any Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) exercise. When analysing the international situation of regulation of close protection it was determined that there are three broad classifications of countries:

1. Regulated countries that have set minimum standards and regulation/licensing requirements for CPOs. For example Australia.

2. Partially-regulated countries having some sort of licensing structure. This may not be specific to Close Protectors but rather focus on the private security industry as a whole. For example South Africa.
3. Unregulated countries have no set minimum standards and have no overseeing bodies responsible for regulation of the industry. For example Equatorial Guinea.

It was mentioned earlier in this Chapter that it is a process to move from totally unregulated to a regulated industry. It was also identified during the interviews that it is important that any South African close protection qualification be recognised internationally and that CPOs skills are transportable across international boundaries (Bodhoo, 2004; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Richards, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004.). This international recognition is important if South African CPOs are to operate globally.
Chapter 4

THE CLOSE PROTECTION INDUSTRY

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE PROTECTION

Close Protection is as old as mankind and warfare. Quotes referring to persons fulfilling close protection roles can even be traced back to the Bible. A clear example of this is the reference to King Solomon’s bodyguards protecting him while he sleeps:

> Behold his bed, which is Solomon’s; threescore valiant men are about it, of valiant Israel. They all hold swords, being expert in war; every man has his sword upon his thigh because of fear in the night (Song of Solomon, verses 7 and 8, Chapter 3).

Fairly comprehensive historical summaries can be found in several publications on the subject (Oatman 1997; and King, 2001). In essence, as soon as the proliferation of survival instincts came to the fore of people’s behaviour, it was inevitable that the stronger members of primitive clans would protect the weaker members from any outside threats or attacks. Some of the earliest written records of protectors refer to the ancient Roman Praetorian Guards who were responsible for the protection of the ruling emperor. It is fair to say that as soon as rulers of almost any race in any region came into power, there were probably a select few chosen to protect these rulers (the operative term being ‘with their lives’). These ‘Protectors’ were probably chosen for their physical strength and martial skills, which obviously favoured the weapons of that day. For example the use of the sword by Samurai in ancient Japan.

Many key principles of Close Protection can even be traced back to the ancient text known as *The art of war* which was written over 2000 years ago by the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu.
Among the many applicable concepts and tactics which are as relevant today as they were when the book was written, is the idea of proactive planning and avoidance to achieve objectives.

On this point Sun Tzu stated the following:

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy and yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle (Tzu, 500BC: 106).

The above quote can be directly translated to the well accepted close protection adage often mentioned in close protection training material and sometimes referred to as the ‘Seven Ps of Close Protection’, namely “Prior planning and preparation prevents piss poor performance.” (Dynamic Alternatives, 2003: 20). In the modern day world of specialist security, Close Protection is as accepted as any other relevant security function. However, many of the interview respondents when asked about outside perceptions of Close Protection made comments similar to the one below:

The overall objectives, the attributes of the operatives and the manner in which the job is performed are still for the most part misunderstood by those not directly involved (Sharp, 2003).

Films such as ‘The bodyguard’ and ‘In the line of fire’ have added to the mystique of Close Protection. However, even though there are certainly aspects of Close Protection that are accurately portrayed in such films there are in fact many more questionable practices that are demonstrated in these films (e.g. in ‘The Bodyguard’ only one CPO attempts to protect the Principal in a high threat situation that clearly would require a close protection team). These misconceptions are understandable since the films were created purely for entertainment value and not meant in any way to be realistic portrayals of close protection operations.
There is no doubt that over time many variables including technology and experience have led to the improvement and adaptation of protective practices. Based on the researcher’s personal experience and validated in almost every interview conducted during the research, the realities of modern day close protection are quite different from the purely physical function (body protection of client/principal) that was performed by early ‘Protectors’. When describing what can be termed the ‘modern approach’, much time is spent on advance planning, paperwork and the like as opposed to the glorified images seen in the movies. The realities of long hours, poor treatment and very often relatively low remuneration seem to be common place in the way that protective services are being currently provided in South Africa.

Moreover, when considering the professional attitude and focused approach of modern day close protection specialists it is difficult not to be impressed. The individuals providing protection have developed the ability to blend in to almost any environment. They might look like everyone else in a crowd or on a street, both in dress and mannerisms but at the same time are capable of quick thinking reactions and decisive or rapid decision making. Accordingly, well-trained operatives in the close protection field have the ability to deal with dangerous situations in a very effective manner.

As this field developed and adjusted to meet the demands of a changing South Africa so too have the needs requirements of the Principals seeking this service. It is vital that the link between provision of service and client demands/needs be addressed. This is required in order to make sure that CPOs are providing protection in the most effective manner for today’s environmental and situational demands.

INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL DEMAND FOR PROFESSIONAL CLOSE PROTECTION OPERATIVES

There are several aspects that need to be outlined when looking at the increase in demand for Close Protection Operatives both locally and internationally. Several of these are not new ideas.
However, globalisation and the ease of access to information through the internet and other media sources have made the previous reasons (these will be outlined later in this section) for why Principals may have needed protection even more applicable. The rationale discussed below is not listed in any order of priority, importance or preference. It should be noted that in different regions each reason may be more or of lesser importance.

**i) Kidnap and ransom**

The first key reason for the need for protection services by individuals, families or companies to be discussed is the threat of kidnap and ransom. In general the victims of kidnap and ransom situations would be high profile and fit into one of the following group classifications: political, celebrity or wealthy. It is accepted and outlined in most relevant literature that one of the most effective ways of minimising the chances of kidnap occurring is to utilise the services of a well-trained close protection detail. This has become even more important as the earnings of most prominent public company CEOs and directors have become public knowledge (forced disclosure for reasons of transparency and good governance) and at times even being published in newspapers.

This aspect is a trend that was identified during the in-depth interview process. Several of the respondents predicted that kidnapping would increase in the future. The reasoning behind this was that as physical security measures and prevention technologies for current common crimes become more effective (for example at private homes or company offices), criminals will seek other ways to make money and kidnapping is an obvious lucrative alternative currently having less of a security threat (being caught by the police or deterred by security measures) to the perpetrators.

**ii) Terrorist activities**

The second key reason is the proliferation of international media coverage of terrorist activities and criminal violence. This has made people more aware than ever before of terrorist threats and has led to people, who may not have utilized CPOs in the past, now making use of their professional services.
A sentiment often mentioned by respondents in interviews was that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (the so-called 9/11) have forever changed the worlds’ view on security and the existing threat of potential terrorist attack. Whilst terrorism is not new the attacks of September 11 demonstrated that many people who considered themselves safe were actually still vulnerable since most (future) terrorist activities would be very difficult for anyone to forecast and therefore avoid. Effective and ongoing threat and risk analysis, which forms the backbone of any close protection operation, is probably one of the most reliable ways of minimising exposure to potential terrorist attack.

For this reason alone many clients, who previously may have felt that employing CPOs was an unnecessary expense and inconvenience may have changed their approach, post-9/11. An example of this is how it has become policy for many American and other companies to provide more stringent security for their top executives worldwide in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and Bali bombings (in Indonesia on the 12 October 2002).

**iii) Levels of violent crime**

The third reason is increased levels of violent crime (perceived and otherwise) and the associated feelings of insecurity and safety. The proliferation of violent crime and terror worldwide are definite reasons why clients may feel the need to seek close protection services. Even though crime occurs worldwide the topic is particularly relevant within the South African context.

Most [high profile] visitors to South Africa that utilise CPOs, do so to ensure that they do not become victims of crime during their stay (Rootman, 2004).

A common theme that is echoed by criminals is that they target persons who seem unaware or ‘easy victims’. Awareness and observation are fundamental functions of any close protection initiative. Close protection specialists are constantly scanning the
environment and applying effective awareness techniques to identify any potential threats or hazards and then take necessary action to avoid them.

It would therefore make logical sense that most criminals who are looking for easy victims would probably not target a person who was utilising a close protection detail.

With the comparatively high levels of violent crime in this country certain international companies with operations in South Africa have made provision for close protection services to be provided, not only for visiting high profile executives, but also for expatriate employees that are residing in this country for brief periods. One American company has gone as far as to allocate each expatriate family with a dedicated Close Protection Operative to handle all of their security needs for the duration of their stay in this country (Higgins, 2003; and Steyn, 2003). In addition, it is becoming a valid risk management activity for large companies to employ CPOs tasked with the safeguarding of top company executives from becoming the victims of everyday crime.

There is also the advent of international criminal syndicates, which utilise acts of terror to achieve their criminal objectives. These organisations are operating across borders in certain cases their activities could be classified mainly as criminal acts since the primary aim may be extortion for profit. They may use acts of terror as a tool to achieve intimidation of potential competition or law enforcement agencies. Therefore, in such situations all the benefits and approaches of utilising close protection professionals that have been previously discussed would be as relevant for minimising the risks of becoming a victim of international crime as for acts of terror.

**iv) The paparazzi and media phenomenon**

The fourth reason given for the need and use of close protection services result from the activities of the so-called paparazzi[^20] and media phenomenon. This aspect is primarily applicable to celebrities or high profile persons.

[^20]: Paparazzi is the term used to describe journalists and photographers that basically ‘stalk’ celebrities in order to obtain controversial stories or take revealing or contentious photographs.
Although public interest in famous persons is nothing new, the methods of access to information (for example easy access to information on the internet) have made it far easier for members of the media to obtain information on persons of public interest (information could include their movements, where they are staying, what functions they are attending, etc.).

In their ongoing pursuit of information and photographs many paparazzi in effect stalk celebrities. This results in the celebrity having almost no privacy and being constantly inconvenienced. A relatively effective countermeasure is to employ a close protection detail that, along with providing the standard personal security, will put in place the relevant physical security measures (such as access control and perimeter security thereby enhancing the privacy of the Principal and making access for unwanted persons extremely difficult).

v) Government outsourcing
The fifth reason for the growth in demand and the use of CPOs has been an increase in government outsourcing of such services. This is an international trend which sees close protection tasks that were originally considered the sole preserve and responsibility state agencies (police, military, intelligence or other government organisations/institutions) being outsourced to private companies.

Some examples of this are South African close protection companies deploying teams which provide protective services in Iraq on behalf of the United States and the President of Equatorial Guinea utilising a protection detail from Morocco to provide his personal close protection. The concept of a growing global economy can also be seen as a major contributing factor for this phenomenon.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The majority of literary material available fits into one of two broad categories. The first is autobiographical or anecdotal which generally involves operatives recounting their personal experiences while providing protective services.
The second are non-fiction books or training manuals which focus on the instructional and relevant operational skills required to effectively provide protection to a designated person. After a comprehensive review it was found that the autobiographical material contained very little usable information as related to the specifications of this research. This forced the literature study to concentrate on the instructional material in order to compile the necessary information that is relevant to this study.

The literature research was done in order to create a platform from which to launch the field research. The literature review contributed a large portion of information obtained for this study (with most issues and points being substantiated or confirmed by means of the interviews). The literature review demonstrated that in most of the instructional literature, even though there may be a focus on certain aspects of specialist security, there is also much standardisation i.e. generic information. Generally there are standard concepts that are universally applicable across the spectrum that detail the vital components necessary to provide effective Close Protection.

The primary aim of the literature review, as pertains to this research, has been the consolidation of the information available into a generic format to enable the reader to have a summarised overview of what Close Protectors do and how they are trained to do it. Basically this is in order to highlight the established operational skills requirements of CPOs, since this is one of the key focus areas outlined in this research.

This chapter is therefore a consolidation of many literary sources (for full details see the reference list). The vast majority of information utilised has come from the following:

- The researcher’s personal notes
- Instructional notes and handouts made available by Mr D.M. Sharp (see references)
- The Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd, Basic Close Protection Manual (the researcher was a co-author of the manual)
Overall with reference to the four specific outcomes which will be outlined below, the concept of gathering as much information as possible before planning and/or attempting to conduct an operation makes obvious sense. This format is followed by many other books and manuals that were reviewed. The Principals brief would include conducting a comprehensive Principal Profile, assessing and collecting as much information on the principals’ itinerary or movements and lastly conduct a comprehensive threat assessment and risk analysis.

The manuals, reference books and articles reviewed are, for the most part largely different in structure and layout. Certain manuals subdivide the training into the same tasks described in the unit standard namely: protection on foot; protection in transit; and protection at venues. The necessary hard skills like firearms and unarmed combat actually needed to protect a principal during these movements usually then fall into these subdivisions respectively.

Some of the other literature subdivides their content based on the theoretical and practical modules aspects of providing Close Protection. Identified problems with this format are that it sometimes causes the reader or student CPO to not effectively link together the theory and practical subject matter and skills. Without the understanding of this link it is impossible for a Close Protection Operative to apply the theory in a practical fashion which can sometime lead to a lack of fundamental understanding and reasoning as to why things are in fact done or need to be done in a certain way. In the bigger picture this could cost a Principal their life or an Operative their job.

Further methods of categorisation of training and reference material identified sometimes divide skills knowledge based on the role, duty or function being taught. In other words the content is broken down according to specific job descriptions. For example, the role of personal escort section, role of residence security team, etc. These individual job descriptions are obviously systematic in application.
The last point of interest with regards to the various layouts encountered in the literature is that in many cases training manuals are further formatted into basic, intermediate and advanced sections or are separate manuals on their own based on the level of instruction and or competency required of the student.

It is perhaps not as important to debate on the merits of subdivision as it is to identify the congruencies in the various structures and methodologies. Almost all manuals concur that each subject or subdivision is simply a part of the whole package. The vast majority of literature reviewed, at some point, emphasises that each aspect of Close Protection needs to be applied synergistically. This by its very nature refers to an integrated and holistic application of all protective and security concepts when being implemented.

**DEFINITION AND JOB DESCRIPTION**

The definition selected for this study is a summary and compilation from the available literature that was reviewed, as well as from the interviews conducted. Accordingly, the definition formulated for the purposes of this study is as follows:

*Close Protection can be defined as implementing all necessary tasks and related activities by trained professionals in order to primarily ensure the safety and security of a designated person (‘Principal’). This safety also implies the Principal’s peace of mind and if possible physical comfort.*

There are many different variations in definitions of CPOs and their job description. However, irrespective of the complexity, detail or even simplicity of any of these definitions, there appear to be three factors that are common throughout. All three are contained and can be discerned from the above definition, namely:

1. Ensuring the Principal’s safety
2. Ensuring the Principal’s peace of mind
3. Ensuring the Principal’s comfort
Ensuring the Principal’s safety
This is the key fundamental which at first glance may appear fairly straightforward and simple but even some of the best presidential protection units in the world cannot give an absolute guarantee of safety to their leaders. It is often stated that all that can be offered is the best possible protection in any given situation. When referring to safety we are not only referring to the safety from physical attack but also the health of the principal, the safety of his family and the security of his possessions and business interests.

Ensuring the Principal’s peace of mind
This refers to the protection of the Principal’s integrity, public standing and associated aspects. The CPO is a representative of his/her Principal and any actions of the CPO could have possible negative repercussions for the Principal. This could have serious implications if the media reports these actions in a negative light. A Principal has to know and trust that his/her CPO has the Principal’s best interests in mind all the time.

During the course of protecting a Principal a CPO may be exposed to classified and/or sensitive information about the Principal and his business interests or even family/personal life. It is vitally important that the CPO has the discretion and integrity to keep this information to him/herself. If the Principal cannot even trust the persons assigned to protect his life what sort of peace of mind would he/she have.

Ensuring the Principal’s comfort
This is the third concept outlined in the job description definition. Even though this is most definitely not the primary function of a CPO. However, if it does not expose the Principal to higher risk the CPO should try to make sure that the Principal is physically comfortable. If the principal appears to be safe then the majority of a CPO’s duties will be focused on ensuring the physical comfort of the Principal.
As an example to clarify this point, certain specialists feel a CPO should never carry shopping bags for the principal but if it is a low level client with very little risk and he/she would struggle to walk because of being overloaded with parcels, it would be most improper for the CPO to not assist since even if an attack took place the CPO could drop the bags and engage the threat.

PROFILE OF A CPO

“The CPO must conduct him/herself in a manner synonymous with the Principal at all times” (Sharp, 2003).

By consolidating the key concepts in most of the documents that were reviewed the following job description for a CPO was compiled:

- The modern day21 Close Protection Operative must be able to blend into any manner of situation.

- Since the modern day protector spends a great deal of time with a client, he must carry him/herself with an air of professional authority, which can only be gained through realistic, thorough training and experience.

- The modern close protector is a security specialist proficient in all areas related to protection. He/she must be able to operate as an individual or as part of a high-risk protection team.

- A Close Protection Operative must be as functional on the shooting range, as at diplomatic functions or dinner parties. When a protector is assigned to a high level client, he/she not only assumes the risks of that client but also becomes a representative of the client.

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21 The stereotype of a large aggressive individual wearing a suit and dark sunglasses and brandishing a firearm is far removed from the modern-day professionals who are trained to provide a comprehensive service in this highly specialised industry.
This means that all the actions of the protector are considered a direct reflection on the client. Therefore the actions, behaviour and public relations skills of the modern day protector must be in line with those of his client, in order to perform effectively in the modern day protective environment.

**METHODOLOGY USED TO ASSESS AND ANALYSE LITERATURE**

It was exceptionally difficult to subdivide the training and operational requirements of CPOs into workable formats. It was found that each author or training institution lists (prioritises) their material differently with the focus usually being specific to their own individual/personal ideas and methodology. Regardless of this almost all the reviewed training and instructional material tended to agree that in order to provide effective protection to a client, the close protection initiative (i.e. operation or assignment) needs to be holistic with all aspects of the protection being equally important.

In order to consolidate the information into an easily understandable format, two primary methods were focused on:

- The first method was to group similar training and operational ideas into the format as prescribed by the SAQA Unit Standard. Number 11510: ‘Provide Close Protection of Designated Persons’.  
  
- The second method implemented was to group consistent ideas together and than explain all the relevant concepts to the reader.

Each of these will be described in more detail below.

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22 For more information see Annexure 6 on the National Skills Development Plan as well as Chapter 3: Regulatory aspects of Close Protection in South Africa.
SPECIFIC OUTCOMES AS STATED IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY (SAQA) UNIT STANDARD

A unit standard can be defined as a description of the necessary knowledge and skills needed to demonstrate competency in a given task. Since Close Protection is actually the cumulative effect of many synergistic tasks it is not as easy to explain all required tasks and set standards in a single unit standard. According to the existing unit standard\(^{23}\) for CPOs the specific outcomes for a CPO to demonstrate competency are as follows:

Specific outcome 1: Ascertain the Principal’s brief and risk profile

Specific outcome 2: Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a Principal

Specific outcome 3: Protect a Principal during transit/foot/venue movement

Specific outcome 4: Terminate and review protection operation

Each of these will be discussed in more detail below.

Specific outcome 1: Ascertain the Principal’s brief and risk profile

The concept of gathering as much information as possible before planning and/or attempting to conduct an operation makes obvious sense. This is the format followed by many of the books, publications and manuals that were reviewed. The ‘Principal’s Brief’\(^{24}\) would include conducting and formulating a comprehensive ‘Principal Profile’,\(^{25}\) assessing and collecting as much information on the Principal’s itinerary or movements and lastly conduct a comprehensive threat assessment and risk analysis. Such analysis to include aspects of the Principal’s business interests, political contacts or any other relevant information or external factors that could have an impact on the levels of risk associated with the persona of the Principal.

\(^{23}\) The unit standard is registered by SAQA and is currently being used by the POSLEC SETA to accredit service providers and trainers.
\(^{24}\) The Principal’s Brief explains the way in which the Principal would like the protection detail to be run and his/her specific preferences.
\(^{25}\) The Principal Profile is an ongoing process of gathering all useful information regarding all relevant aspects related to the Principal such as lifestyle, personality, history, personal relationships, etc. These would be formatted into a document that would outline all the applicable information.
Specific outcome 2: Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a principal
Once the threats, risks and movements of the Principal have been determined comprehensive planning needs to take place. In order to provide comprehensive protection, planning needs to encompass the three aspects outlined above, namely protecting the Principal whilst at venues, in transit or moving on foot. The principal needs to be protected wherever he/she goes. Therefore arrangements must be made in order to be able to protect the Principal while in transit (flying, driving, etc.), while moving on foot and lastly at any venues or places where the Principal may be staying or visiting.

Specific outcome 3: Protect a principal during transit/foot/venue movement
Once comprehensive planning has been conducted and available resources have been allocated the actual protection operation must be conducted. A key idea that is applicable at this stage is the implementation of a flexible and adaptable approach. Performance of protection operations need to have extensive back up and contingency plans available and worked out in advance. It is assumed that the persons being utilized to provide the protection are all trained professionals and competent in all the sub-areas of protection (the latter will be described in the second part of this literature review.)

Specific outcome 4: Terminate and review protection operation
After the operation is completed it is necessary to conduct a debriefing in order to learn from any mistakes that may have occurred and to receive feedback from all the parties involved. All relevant documentation needs to be collected and consolidated in case they will be used for another operation, as well as to maintain operational security. At this stage CPOs normally submit task reports to be utilized by the team leader who will normally compile a full Operational Review document.

A more practical example being that it does not matter whether the Principal is attacked in his/her hotel room or his/her house since the bottom line is that planning should have identified the likelihood of either occurrences and put in place the necessary avoidance or counter measures, i.e. contingency plans.
Even if this was not done the Close Protector’s should have been sufficiently trained to effectively manage (spontaneously respond as their training has taught them to) the attack and keep the Principal alive.

GROUPING OF CONSISTENT THEMES

In order to effectively summarise and group the relevant information into a workable format a generic categorisation was chosen. This format does not represent a recommended method of grouping but is simply the manner in which the researcher has chosen to present the relevant material in a logical manner. It is important to note that subject matter breakdown into the categories below will be further broken down into additional sub-divisions and that these categories are not listed in order of priority or importance.

SUBJECT MATTER BREAKDOWN

1. Protective skills
2. Unarmed combat and Close Quarter Battle (CQB) skills
3. Firearm and relevant tactical skills
4. First aid and relevant medical skills
5. Security
6. Driver training
7. Protocol and etiquette
8. Written fieldwork
9. Related skills

These individual yet inter-related topics will be explained in the following section. This subject matter breakdown refers to the aspects of Close Protection that are standard within the majority of texts that were examined. In the various publications and manuals there are often differences in technical jargon but once analysed it became clear that the operational principles, outline and job descriptions are generally consistent. (The above mentioned subdivisions will be outlined below.)
PROTECTION SKILLS

This field comprises the following subjects:

**Protective team formations – individual and group**

This provides an overview of how protective teams are manned, the general roles and duties as well as certain concepts as applied to team dynamics. The aim of the material dealing with this subject is to provide an overview of team and operational structure. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the structure of a protection detail fully unless the key roles and duties of Close Protection are understood. These are explained in more detail as stand alone concepts in the majority of literature reviewed therefore they are further explained below.

**The Protective/Personal Escort Section (PES)**

Often referred to as the moving shield around a Principal, these are the members of the Close Protection team that move around with the Principal. CPOs operating in this role attempt to fulfil six primary functions and tasks namely:

- To protect the Principal by shielding him/her physically with the CPO’s body
- To divert potential attack away from the Principal by being an extra target for the attacker to deal with
- To rescue the Principal by removing him/her from the immediate vicinity/scene of the incident
- To neutralise an attacker by means of any methods of combat skills (only if this preserves the Principals’ life and no other alternatives are available)
- If necessary support the Principals’ life by providing first aid until more qualified help arrives.
- To liaise with authorities in order to enlist their assistance in preventing or combating an incident.
The Personal Escort Section (PES), as a direct result of the duties they perform, represent the Principal in the public perception more then many other of the close protection functions. This can be directly attributed to the close proximity to the Principal in which PES members operate.

**The Secure/Security Advance Party (SAP)**
The role of the Secure Advance Party (SAP) is primarily to provide as much information as possible before a Principal undertakes any action, activity or excursion. Information to be collected by the SAP includes details on the routes, venues, logistical considerations, liaisons with applicable contact persons, situational and environmental threats and/or any other relevant information that may concern the Principal or the PES team. The SAP may travel from location to location before the PES and the Principal arrive or once the Principal arrives merge with the PES team and than primarily operate in that role.

**The Residence Security Team (RST)**
The Residence Security Team’s (RST) duties are primarily to secure and protect the Principal’s residence. It does not matter what or where the Principal’s residence is (mansion, flat, yacht or hut) the team designated to protect this is fulfilling the operational definition of a RST. Residence security itself focuses mainly on the application of physical security measures such as alarms, lighting, access control, etc. The RST are the persons who run and manage these physical measures as well as handle the relevant human factor security issues such as patrols or access control.

**Venue protection**
Venue protection involves all the applied security actions taken to ensure the safety of the Principal when he/she is visiting places or locations other than his/her home or working environment. The concept of protection at various venues focuses primarily on the positioning of manpower in different situations according to the physical layout, information collected during advance work, available manpower, the Principal’s wishes and of course the relevant threats. Most reviewed literature provides preferred positioning of manpower in the following situations:
at restaurants
movies or theatres
functions and ceremonies
rallies or events
presentations or speaking engagements.

The principles taught using these examples provide a basis for understanding of how to position the protective detail in almost any situation.

Protection principles and techniques
In several of the texts that were examined there were additional chapters and modules covering specifically concepts such as Immediate Action Drills (IADs) which are planned, trained responses to an attack or specified situation. In certain of the manuals several IADs were explained in considerable detail but the primary examples described and explained were:

- an attack with a firearm at different ranges
- an attack with a knife
- hand grenade attack
- unarmed close quarters attack (Braunig, 1993; Consterdine, 1995; Dynamic Alternatives, 2003; Rapp and Lesce, 1995; and Thompson, 2003).

There are slight differences in the way that the various literature recommend IADs be performed. However, there is common ground in all of them when describing the key aspects such as awareness techniques, communications and reactions. Almost all of these include engagement and evacuation as well as applied team tactics based on the number of team members involved.

Counter Action Teams (CAT)
Counter Action Teams (CAT) refer to a team that accompanies the Principal and the PES, usually found at the rear of a motorcade or at the back of the close protection detail. The
CAT team have usually received more extensive training and therefore have increased capability with regards to counter attack and tactical intervention techniques. Their primary function would be to respond in the case of an attack situation.

In an attack the CAT team would aggressively counterattack the ‘active opposition’ (AO) while the PES and Bodyguard evacuate the Principal. In extreme situations members of the CAT team may also function as counter snipers providing cover for the close protection detail.

UNARMED COMBAT AND CLOSE QUARTER BATTLE (CQB)

This subdivision is often referred to as self defence. However, most of the literature reviewed seems to identify the importance of a comprehensive approach to this sort of training. It is a logical concept to understand that before an individual is capable of protecting someone else they must first have the capability to defend themselves. Certain manuals advocate a martial arts approach, but the more progressive literature focuses on the practical application of effective techniques and principles necessary to restrain, incapacitate or neutralise an attacker.

This subject can be further subdivided as follows:

**Unarmed combat**

Unarmed combat refers to the use of natural body weapons (e.g. hands and feet) and similar defensive strategies to effectively disengage from confrontation or disable and neutralise an attacker if necessary. Natural body weapons include any part of the body that could be utilised to inflict harm on an attacker (head, hands, elbows, feet, etc.). It also includes all relevant techniques found in combat applicable martial arts such as joint locking, throwing and wrestling.

Certain manuals concentrate on the accessing of pressure and nerve points as an effective part of their unarmed combat strategy. This topic will be expanded on in Chapter 9 (Use of force and close protection).
Edged weapon combat
Edged weapon combat applies to the use of bladed weapons like knives or any other implement that can be utilised in a cutting or stabbing like motion. This topic is totally absent from a fair amount of the literature reviewed. This is possibly due to the complexity of its nature and the conflicting opinions on what is effective and what is not. The concept of ‘knife fighting’ as applied to Close Protection focuses primarily on the capability to defend against edged weapon attack. It should be noted that in order to effectively defend against a weapon an operative must first understand how it works. This is vital otherwise there is no way of knowing what to expect and it is impossible to defend against something when the methods of application are not known by the defender.

Improvised weapon combat
Improvised weapon combat includes the use of any environmental tool that can be utilised with which to defend yourself in the case of an attack, e.g. pens, sticks or stones/rocks. This becomes very important in Close Protection since when operating internationally a CPO may not be allowed to carry any ‘weaponry’ at all with him/her into another country. Therefore the CPOs ability to deal with attack has to become more reliant on the use of weapons that can be found in the general or immediate environment. This topic is not widely discussed in most literature. However, the increasing importance for CPOs to possess this capability is becoming universally accepted.

Use of alternative weapons
‘Alternative weapons’ refers to weaponry other than firearms and edged weapons that may be utilised by CPOs as part of their operational equipment. Examples of alternative weaponry are tools such as the ASP baton, stun guns, handcuffs, mace or pepper spray. The CPO’s ability to utilise alternative weapons provides a platform from which it is easier to comply with legalities such as use of minimum force during self defence. It also enables the CPO to better defend against such weapons should the need arise as he/she would have a working knowledge of how an attacker would effectively utilise such tools.
**Team tactics and applied unarmed combat**

The concept of team tactics refers to the manner in which a Close Protection team would implement their unarmed combat and close quarters battle (CQB) into their IADs. Applied unarmed combat means that whatever techniques and tactics that are taught to CPOs need to be practiced and implemented into the Close Protection function as a whole.

All these concepts become increasingly important when considering close protection operations in crowds and when multiple attackers are involved. A small minority of the literature reviewed included unarmed combat and related IADs for various contingencies. The main example cited in most manuals was that of restraining overzealous fans who do not wish to hurt the Principal but may land up doing so as they are not in control of their actions, i.e. pressure or force of crowd behind them pushing to get near a Principal.

**Restraint and control techniques**

‘Restraint and control tactics’ are those techniques and practices that enable an attacker to be subdued without any permanent damage or injury being inflicted on him/her. This subfield is of more importance to strictly law enforcement personnel than to CPOs. There is, however, a trend for certain close protection details that have enough manpower to focus on utilising these techniques. An example of this would be in applying the tactic of ‘swarming’ where a large number of CPOs literally swarm all over the attacker/s, overwhelming him/her by sheer numbers and weight but not actually striking or inflicting injury on the attacker in the process.

**FIREARM SKILLS**

The use of firearms in close protection situations has become a topic of considerable debate and controversy all over the world. This has huge ramifications for CPO training and operations. When reviewing the literature it was found that this topic is treated very inconsistently. This is primarily because most manuals are written for persons to operate in a specific environment. As a result certain manuals concentrate on this in great detail whereas others would leave it out almost entirely.
Much of the European literature does not refer to use of firearms in any great detail. This being stated the majority of the literature reviewed still attempts to provide a relatively comprehensive platform for the use of firearms while performing close protection functions. The generic subject divisions of related firearms training are outlined below:

**Basic firearm understanding and training**

The key concepts that are taught under this heading would fall primarily into one of two areas namely: safe handling of firearms; and maintenance of firearms. The concepts and principles taught in this subfield form a foundation for further training to build on. Due to the nature of close protection work an armed CPO must possess quite a high level of competency with regards to the usage of firearms. This is vital within the context of the following aspects relevant to CPO work.

- **Crowds:** Work in crowds, which means that inaccurate firing of a firearm or over penetration (i.e. bullet going right through a target) could harm innocent civilians/bystanders.

- **Firing and movement:** The majority of IADs utilising firearms involve firing and movement which is difficult to perform unless good training and constant retraining is in place.

- **Firing distances:** The range (distance) at which the CPO will have to shoot often varies, meaning that a CPO has to have the necessary skills to compensate for sudden changes in range and conditions (e.g. visibility, rain, wind, trajectory 'downhill/uphill’, etc.) (Braunig, 1993; Consterdine, 1995; Dynamic Alternatives, 2002 and Thompson, 2003.).

**Target shooting skills**

Target shooting skills specific to Close Protection refers to the ability of a CPO or team to be able to effectively shoot and hit various targets from different positions in different places and conditions.
This denotes fire and movement, shooting from cover and vehicles, as well as implementation of IADs with firearms. The ability of a CPO to be able to fire quickly and accurately is vital.

There are different schools of thought with regards to targeting. However, most professionals seem to agree that the focus of training should be to hit ‘centre mass’ (the centre of the human body) with the additional ability to fire accurate head shots being secondary. In other words the CPO must be able to accurately hit the centre mass with multiple shots while moving and implementing the appropriate immediate action drill.

**Firearm Close Quarter Battle (CQB) skills**

‘Close Quarters Battle’ (CQB) denotes the use of the firearm at extreme close ranges in conjunction with unarmed combat (this includes not only firing the weapon but striking with it as well as utilising unarmed combat). As stated above in the sub-section on ‘the range of engagement’, the distance of an attack may vary and change very quickly. This, as well as the fact that in many situations CPOs operate in crowds, means that the capability of a CPO to effectively draw and use a firearm (the ability to draw the weapon and engage valid targets as quickly as possible is vital at short distances) at close range is an important part of his/her ability to effectively deal with attack.

**Urban movement and house penetration skills**

This concept refers to utilising the firearm in combat related situations that may occur in built up areas where the CPO may have to move through obstacles and buildings safely. The main principle focuses on how to keep yourself behind cover and move when necessary while still being able to effectively engage and neutralise the enemy. When looking at this skill in the context of a Close Protector’s role it is clearly not the same as a tactical or intervention operator whose roles may include tasks such as engaging in hostage rescue. Rather the CPO may need these skills primarily when separated from the Principal who may be under attack and the CPO must get to and evacuate a Principal in such a manner that would provide the minimum exposure to the existing threat.
Night shooting skills
The ability to fire accurately in low light conditions as well as utilise torches or illumination devices (such as laser pointers or illuminated sights) while engaging the attacker is an important skill for Close Protection Operatives that may have to work in varying environments at different times (i.e. in a hotel, at an office, at the Principal’s residence or even whilst in transit). There has been much technological advancement in the field of low light shooting, including red-dot sights, laser sights and torch attachments clipping directly onto the firearm. In extreme circumstances even night vision scopes are available. However, these would not really be applicable to the protection role of CPOs.

Protection team and single operative firearm skills
This sub-field focuses on the use of firearms as related to Close Protection. This involves various techniques as a single operative or team integrating protective strategies and techniques. The generic aims would be to provide cover for the Principal, divert the attack away from the Principal, neutralise the attacker and then evacuate the Principal while firing or being in such a position to be able to fire. These could also include actions while driving and getting into or out of vehicles. These drills need to be rehearsed until they are instinctive.

This is vital since if a CPO or team is not well versed in such tactics and able to respond instinctively there could well be delays in providing protection to the Principal which in itself could have disastrous outcomes. Innocent civilians, the Principal and/or team members could get shot or hurt if these drills are not effectively conducted.

Firearm disarming skills
When considering the huge advantage that attackers will have over the Protection Team as a result of surprise, it is vital for a CPO to have the ability to disarm an attacker who is pointing a firearm at either him/herself, another CPO, his/her principal or at a crowd. This aspect goes hand-in-hand with effective unarmed combat skills. Competencies should include being able to stop a potential attacker from drawing a weapon as well as to disarm an attacker that may already have their firearm out.
**Firearm retention skills**

Retention refers to the CPO’s ability to prevent an attacker from disarming him/her. The CPO needs to have the necessary skills to maintain control of their own firearm whether in the holster position or drawn and in use. This skill is also closely linked to the CPO having effective unarmed combat ability. As with disarming techniques the CPO must possess techniques to retain the weapon when moving through crowded areas while the weapon is holstered, as well as when the CPO has to draw the weapon.

Choice of holsters may have a large influence on this and many manuals recommend a holster with a retention clip for CPOs working in crowds since the clip would make it more difficult for an attacker in the crowd to remove the firearm from the holster whilst the extra time taken to draw the weapon is negligible. When considering the risks of the firearm being taken off an operative in such a situation a holster designed to make a disarm more difficult would definitely be an advantage for a CPO.

**Weapon integration skills**

Depending on the threat level to a Principal a CPO may need to have access to heavier weaponry than pistols (e.g. assault rifles, shotguns, etc.).

In addition to such instances the CPO, if correctly trained, will be carrying alternative weaponry (such as batons and pepper sprays) and should be able to switch from weapon to weapon as the situation and use of force levels dictate.

The key competency when describing weapon integration skills is the ability to transition smoothly from one weapon to another while applying applicable principles of close protection. This provides for contingencies that may occur and takes into account laws governing the use of force, as well as the guiding principle of limiting any harm occurring to innocent bystanders in crowded areas.

**FIRST AID**

A CPO needs to be able to provide not just emergency first aid but also deal with any medical related problems affecting his client until more qualified medical assistance is
available. Comprehensive first aid knowledge is vital for the protector in order to be able to perform all first aid related duties that may be required by the Principal or his family.

In the literature that was reviewed there was inconsistency as to what level of medical competency a CPO should have. The majority of manuals covered only the basic key concepts of first aid as relevant to close protection, namely:

- Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation
- Dealing with choking
- Dealing with wounds and bleeding

In certain cases it was suggested that CPOs need to undergo more comprehensive first aid training which would be done through external first aid training bodies such as the Red Cross or St Johns Ambulance Service.

SECURITY AND PLANNING

Most of the literature examined follows a similar outline with regards to planning and security assessments. There are slight differences in approach and layout of the different material but very little difficulty was experienced in identifying the key points and common trends. These trends can be summarised as follows:

- In order to successfully plan security, effectively allocate resources and hopefully prevent attacks on the Principal the first step is to gather all necessary information in order to conduct a thorough risk and threat assessment.

- This would happen together with a comprehensive principal profiling exercise. Principal profiling involves gathering as much information as possible on the Principal and formatting it into a workable structure to be used as an aid to determining a Principal’s exposure to various threats and risks.
• A comprehensive risk analysis and threat assessment then needs to take place in order to determine the best manner in which to provide protection.

• Once these documents have been compiled, a summary of available resources must be collated. It is important at this stage to determine budgetary constraints and logistical considerations in order to maximise the use of resources to take place within a set budget.

• It is then a process of deciding how best to allocate resources according to the identified risks and threats and to minimise the potential of those threats happening. This must take place while planning around the Principal taking into consideration such factors as his/her likes or dislikes and the need for the Principal to try and function with the minimum disruption to his or her routine or itinerary.

In order to gather the necessary information, analyse, collate and structure that information into a practical format from which a comprehensive plan as well as the necessary contingency plans can be drawn up, the following aspects need to be not only understood but applied in the correct manner:

• Understanding security as a whole
• Basic intelligence collection and processing
• Terrorism and assassination
• Bomb and Identification of Explosive Devices (IED)
• Threat analysis (obtaining information and carefully analysing it)
• Risk assessment (obtaining information and weighing up or assessing the analysed information)
• Surveillance and counter surveillance.

The above subjects form separate yet interrelated parts of conducting a well run security operation. It is important to stress that all these aspects must be viewed holistically and
that when applied there is an intrinsic synergy in the way that each aspect enhances the manner in which the final planning is produced.

**ADVANCED DRIVING**

Provision of close protection in South Africa is often confused with the services that a Security Driver (see Chapter 5 for more details on a Security Driver) might provide. However, there is no doubt that many CPOs that are currently operating in South Africa today function primarily as drivers. This is probably because most clients perceive this as the biggest risk area, i.e. when in transit between a safe location to a secured venue (this has to do with the vulnerabilities of such transporting and the high risk of vehicle hijacking especially in the Gauteng Province of South Africa).

In addition to the specialist skills of convoy and evasive driving it is fundamental that a CPO is a well trained defensive driver capable of recognising and avoiding any potential collision before it occurs.

The concept of ‘defensive driving’ is centred on identifying potential hazards before they pose a problem. The driver would than implement the necessary avoidance and management skills to ensure the safety and smooth journey of the Passenger/Principal.

Evasive driving includes all the necessary skills that would be applied when dealing with attack, surveillance or ambush situations. Lastly convoy driving refers to the tactics, practices and application of formations utilised by a close protection detail when travelling with multiple vehicles. This is all done to minimise the chance of attack on the Principal while in transit from being successful.

Each of these will be explained in more detail below:

**Defensive driving**

This is the ability to handle a vehicle in a safe and competent manner. It involves learning to pre-empt the mistakes that other drivers might make and take preventative action before they happen. The focus of defensive skills is on being sufficiently aware to
proactively identify any hazards in the environment with enough time to avoid or at the very least manage them. It is important to emphasize the vehicle control skills that are relevant under this heading such as managing skids, effective breaking procedures and emergency lane and direction changes. A CPO must at least be able to perform these skills to be considered competent.

**Security awareness and preventative driving**
This involves the integration of security concepts into defensive driving application. It means implementing knowledge a trained CPO should possess of anti-ambush, sniping attacks and vehicle security into every day driving practice.

**Convoy/motorcade driving**
This is also often referred to as motorcade driving. This aspect describes the manner in which a Principal is transported when there are two or more vehicles available to provide protection.

The methodology is designed to provide maximum security to the Principal by strategic positioning of the vehicles during all aspects of travel (stopping, cornering, intersections, etc.). This combined with planned immediate action drills should enable the convoy to effectively manage as many potential attacks and contingencies in the most practical manner while ensuring the Principal’s safety.

**Evasive driving**
Sometimes called offensive driving, evasive driving refers to the techniques employed when utilising the vehicle itself as a weapon, shield or evacuation tool. It includes advanced handling, high speed driving, and the use of techniques such as handbrake and reverse turns to effectively avoid or engage an attacker.

Various manuals go into the topic of driving at different levels. However, it is by nature a very practical subject. Therefore many of the important nuances cannot be found in the literature itself but only becomes apparent when interviewing close protection trainers and by observing the actual training (driving of vehicles) of CPOs.
PROTOCOL AND ETIQUETTE

This aspect is emphasised in all the literature reviewed and includes a wide range of subjects. The aim of training in ‘protocol and etiquette’, as defined in several manuals, is to enable the CPO to conduct him/herself in a manner synonymous with the Principal and fitting for any situation/environment that the protector might find him/herself in. The modern day protector must be able to blend in at ambassadorial house parties or on a bush safari. A CPO must be thoroughly versed in protocol to prevent embarrassment or discomfort to his/her Principal or other associated party.

The broad topic of protocol not only covers the obvious aspects of appearance and behaviour but goes deeper into the correct manner of liaison with various parties. Another factor to consider is the practical application of protocol. In other words how protocol influences the CPO’s ability to effectively protect the Principal and respond to attack situations if necessary.

It is vital that a CPO is able to relate to persons of different cultures and backgrounds, as the majority of persons utilising CPOs are international visitors to South Africa. Protocol can be subdivided into the following areas:

- Dress or appearance
- Communication skills
- Personal hygiene
- Habits
- Behaviour
- Social skills
- Customs and traditions.

All of the above are important in order to develop sophisticated, professional and well-rounded CPOs that can interact at any social level with their clients and Principals. Below the basic requirements and skills for each sub-division are discussed in more detail.
**Dress and appearance**

The overall appearance of a CPO is vital to his/her ability to function in a professional manner. The Principal needs to be able to respect and trust their CPO. This is very difficult to do if the CPO does not look the part or is unhygienic and untidy or does not dress suitably for the situation in which he/she is working. The CPO also needs to be able to blend into the immediate environment, i.e. not be conspicuous, and must thus dress accordingly. The need to blend in is accentuated by the fact that the majority of close protection operations in South Africa are performed in a low profile manner. A CPO not able to blend in would attract undue attention and therefore not be able to perform their duties very effectively, i.e. compromise the security of an assignment.

A key guideline for CPOs regarding dress and appearance would be to rather over dress than under dress as you can always dress down to blend into a situation but it does not necessarily work the other way around. Another consideration is that the CPO should attempt not to dress in a way that overshadows the Principal. The bottom line is that the CPO must dress appropriately for the situation and according to the Principal’s wishes while still being able to react tactically if necessary (draw weapons, run or fight, etc.).

**Communication skills**

This concept includes much more than simply being able to verbally communicate with persons. It involves all aspects of communication namely verbal, non-verbal, written and the subtle skill of utilising body language to communicate. Much of a CPO’s work will involve liaising with not only the Principal but any person that can contribute to the success of an operation in any way.

Therefore it is vital that the CPO is not only able to verbalise his/her requests in a concise and effective fashion but is also able to relate to people of different cultures, backgrounds and experience. This is made even more important by the mix of cultures and backgrounds of people living in and visiting South Africa these days.
Personal hygiene

Most literature includes the topic of ‘hygiene’. Even though to most persons the simple act of maintaining personal cleanliness and a professional appearance seems obvious it is a topic that cannot be ignored. Due to the fact that a CPO may be mixing with persons of high standing, it is essential for him/her to maintain a sufficient level of grooming to blend in and not attract undue attention to themselves or their Principal. It has been the experience of the researcher that many CPO trainees from previously disadvantaged backgrounds (through no fault of their own) need the basics of personal hygiene explained to them in detail.

Habits

‘Habits’ refer to activities that are done so often that a person does not consciously realise that they are being performed.

It goes without saying that good habits such as constant scanning and utilising proactive awareness are vital for a CPO to carry out their job effectively. While positive habits are very important this section is primarily concerned with negative habits such as smoking or swearing. Certain literary sources go as far as to list and describe a whole range of bad habits that could offend or embarrass the CPO and his/her Principal. Some key guidelines that were included were aspects such as drinking of alcohol, physical habits (i.e. scratching inappropriate parts of the body), verbal habits (e.g. swearing) and learnt habits (smoking). Many of the manuals reviewed did not assume that the trainee would know these things and therefore explained them in a fair amount of detail.

Behaviour

Behaviour primarily refers to the manner in which a CPO conducts himself when around the Principal. The idea is for the CPO to have the capability to behave in the correct manner in a wide variety of situations (social and business). For instance the CPO needs to know how to behave at embassy parties, in the business environment, as well as when exposed to the Principal’s private and family lifestyle. The better trained the CPO the more at ease he/she is in whatever the environment he/she must operate in. This enables
him/her to effectively perform the required protection duties without causing embarrassment to him/herself or the Principal.

An interesting point included under the subheading of ‘behaviour’ is that it is equally important for a CPO to conduct him/herself ‘correctly’ not only while working but all the time (i.e. even while off duty and in private life). The rationale behind this is that a CPO may be observed by clients while behaving inappropriately and might then not again be utilised by that client on operations in the future.

**Social skills**
A social skill refers to the way in which the CPO interacts with people in different environments. It also includes the correct etiquette that is involved when greeting persons, the correct manner to eat in formal environments as well as the correct behaviour when mixing with persons of high standing.

There are many guidelines for CPOs that fall under this heading. Some of the more generic concepts that apply here are concepts such as: “when confused mirror the people around you”; and “when unsure rather be more formal in approach and language use” (Dynamic Alternatives, 2002: 234-236).

**Customs and traditions**
It is vital for a professional CPO to have at least a rudimentary understanding of the customs and traditions of different persons that they may interact with during the course of performing close protection duties. This is important since people may be offended by a CPO’s actions without the CPO even realising it. Ignorance is not an excuse since once a person has been offended it may be difficult to undo the damage caused. This may cause embarrassment to the CPO and the Principal, as well as make any future interaction with the offended party difficult.

Some of the literature reviewed classifies customs and traditions into cultural, geographical and religious categories. Specific behavioural guidelines for the CPO under each of those headings were outlined in the literature that included the sub-heading of
‘Culture’. It is a well accepted fact by active members of the close protection industry that more CPOs lose their jobs over protocol and etiquette related transgressions than for any other reasons. This fact is easily explained as a Principal will probably never see a CPO’s hard skills ever being applied (shooting, tactical driving, unarmed combat, etc.) unless something goes drastically wrong during the protection assignment. Therefore the interaction between the Principal and his protectors will be limited to the facets of protocol and etiquette as outlined above.

**WRITTEN FIELD WORK**

Compiling of relevant documents is something covered in almost all literature reviewed. The newer textbooks and manuals also now include computer and internet skills as a ‘must’ (required skill) for all CPOs. The ability to collate collected information and format it into usable documents that can be disseminated to all the parties that require the aforesaid information is a ‘must have’ for any professional CPO. Most of the reviewed literature primarily groups the applicable written documents under their relevant operational subject group. For example threat assessments fall under planning. For the sake of practical classification under the sub-heading of written fieldwork, the relevant documents are outlined as a group. The general written documents that are covered and explained in most literature are as follows:

**Warning order**

This is usually a short document drawn up before confirmation of an operation is received. The content of a warning order is usually verbally communicated to the relevant team members or may be passed on telephonically. The warning order serves as an indicator to the team members as to what may be expected of them, when it will take, place a brief overview of the principal and of the threats known at that stage. In other words a warning order serves to alert CPOs to the basic details of a future assignment and that such an assignment is in the offing.

An outline of what is going to happen next (order of proceedings) is usually included covering aspects such as the chain of command and relevant contact people. Because a
warning order is often given verbally or telephonically specific details are often not included or pre-arranged code words are used.

**OPERATIONAL APPRECIATION**

An ‘Operational Appreciation’ is an activity designed to provide an overview of the situation and then enable the persons planning an operation to determine what resources are needed and than allocate them effectively. The Principal Profile, the threat assessment and risk analysis, categorising of the Principal and task as well as determining what security should be implemented, all fall under the heading of ‘Operational Appreciation’.

Each of these will be outlined below:

**Threat assessments**

There are several formats for threat and risk assessments that were identified in the literature reviewed. However, they generically seem to have four key components. The first component is the Principal profile which can be a stand alone document and is explained in the next heading.

The second is a risk and threat analysis which involves determining all the relevant threats that a principal could be exposed to and then correlating them with the Principal Profile to determine the risk factors (actual likelihood of an identified threat occurring). The next step is referred to as categorising or designation of threats. This process involves several systems of analysing the threat and risk as well as correlating these with the Principal Profile and Principal’s proposed itinerary. The outcome of Principal categorisation is to allocate the Principal and the operation (assignment) into a pre-defined category.

The classifications into various categories can get quite complex but as a simple overview the Principal and/or operation could be grouped into a low threat, medium threat or high threat category. Each of these would involve different logistical and operational requirements. This last aspect involves deciding on the security and way that
it will be applied in order to minimise the likelihood of the defined threat and risks occurring or at the very least minimising the effects of the threat should it occur.

**Principal profiling**

It is impossible to plan for an effective close protection initiative if nothing is known about the Principal. There are several systems and methods used to profile the Principal. Profiling in its simplest form is an attempt to find out as much as possible about a Principal in order to determine what sort of person they are and what factors linked to his/her persona might impact on the safety and security of the close protection operation. In the close protection context this is vital since not knowing relevant information about the Principal could lead to the unwitting exposure to threats that could have been avoided or planned for.

When referring to the definition of Close Protection it would be almost impossible to ensure the Principal’s peace of mind and comfort if nothing is known about his/her likes and dislikes.

In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the concept of Principal Profiling a method commonly utilised known as the ‘7 Ps of Principal profiling’ (Dynamic Alternatives, 2003, 53-55)\(^{26}\) will be described. The fundamental concept is that under each heading as much relevant information regarding the Principal as possible should be collected. This information will then be sorted and classified before being converted into the final format.

The seven Ps of Principal profiling are as follows:

**1. Places**

Places refer to all places associated with the principal, i.e. where he/she likes to go, where they work, live and play.

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\(^{26}\) The ‘7 P’s’ were originally taken from the instructional handouts of Mr DM Sharp (for details on Mr Sharp see References: Interview 1) of Task International UK and were utilised by Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd with his full permission.
2. **People**
Under the heading of people as many people that are related to, associated with or at some time or other have had interaction with the Principal should be included.

3. **Political and religious persuasions**
This refers specifically to the relevant political and religious persuasions of the Principal.

4. **Prejudices**
Prejudices concerns what the Principal likes and dislikes (e.g. extreme dislike for people that smoke).

5. **Personal history**
Personal history covers where the principal has been and what he/she has done to get to where he/she is now.

6. **Private Lifestyle**
Private lifestyle refers to what the Principal does in his/her spare time including recreational activities hobbies and pastimes.

7. **Personality**
Personality overviews what sort of personality characteristics the Principal exhibits, i.e. quiet and withdrawn, outspoken and extroverted, etc.

Once all this information has been collected it can then be analysed eliminating what may be considered superfluous or not relevant to the specific task at hand. The process would than be to transform the information into a workable document to assist in operational planning and the briefing of the operational team.

**Operations order**
An Operations Order (Ops Order) is the finalised document outlining the whos, whats, whens, whys and hows of a close protection operation. It should provide as much
information as possible including the operation specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The Ops Order should be detailed enough to cover most of the contingencies that may occur. It should also cover any additional information with regards to protocol, dress, communications and logistical information.

**Record and report keeping**

In most situations each operative would submit a report at the end of each operation or segment of an operation. The procedure for this would be outlined in the Operational Orders SOPs. After receiving each CPO’s report the team leader would prepare a comprehensive operational report which could serve as feedback for the client.

Another benefit of receiving feedback and compiling an operational report is that it provides a platform for the review of mistakes that may have occurred. It also provides an opportunity to clarify how such mistakes can be avoided in the future.

Information documents should than be stored in a secure environment as information gathered and lessons learned may very well be applied on future operations even if the operation is not with the same Principal. Secure storage of documents is vital since if the information obtained in these documents should fall into the wrong hands it would be relatively easy to plan an attack on future Principals. Once again it is important to note the way that technology is influencing the approach to compiling these documents and formatting them into information databases which can easily be accessed and utilised in future operations. Accordingly, a modern CPO should as a matter of course be at least reasonably computer literate and be proficient in the use of basic computer programmes.

**RELATED SKILLS**

In several manuals and other literature sources that were reviewed certain topics that could not really be grouped into the above broad categories were identified. These topics and subjects have thus been grouped under the heading of ‘related skills’. The inclusion of such topics may be controversial to some close protection practitioners since in certain manuals some of the skills listed were described as superfluous and not actually
applicable for close protection work. With the aim of being impartial during the review process the following topics have been included:

**Hostage crisis and management**
This subject makes reference to the accepted operating procedures that apply to hostage situations and the role that a CPO will play should the Principal and/or themselves be taken hostage. The following key aspects are outlined in the literature that contained information on this topic:

- Negotiation techniques
- Hostage survival
- Stress identification and coping
- Escape and evasion was also covered in certain manuals but very superficially and mainly relating to the operations of specialist military units that may perform close protection tasks in areas where there is minimal support and infrastructure.

**Anti- and counter-terrorism**
The topic of terrorism is covered in almost every training manual reviewed but in varying detail. However, certain literature goes into much greater depth than others by outlining the roles and duties that would be necessary to implement in order to prevent acts of terrorism from taking place (‘anti-terrorism’) and how to manage and deal with terrorist attacks and situations that may occur (‘counter terrorism’). It should be noted that whilst a CPO may not need comprehensive anti- or counter-terrorist training he/she should at the very least have a basic knowledge of terrorist activity. Most manuals included notes and background information on the following aspects of terrorism:

- Terrorist groups
- Terrorist selection and training
- General modus operandi
- Effects of terrorism on security and close protection.
The literature which included anti- and counter terrorism also focused on tactical responses to terrorist threats. Some literature also provided comprehensive notes on the mindset of terrorists as well as some of the strategies to identify terrorist activity and prevent it from affecting a CPO’s Principal.

**Counter-sniping**
In certain texts counter-sniping is also referred to as selective tactical marksmanship. This subject could also be placed in the section on firearms training (dealt with later in this report). However, the texts that contained information on this subject had it as a separate module.
In order to employ counter sniping principles it is important to know the basic fundamentals of sniping. This is taught and explained in order for CPOs to know how to implement counter measures and plan against a sniping attack.

**Specialised tactical training**
A few of the manuals reviewed included information on some of the topics below, while others mentioned these aspects as ‘nice to haves’ but not really necessary for Close Protection Operations. Some of these skills would be more applicable when the training of Counter Action Teams (CAT teams) is considered. It was also stated that if there was a high enough threat level to warrant the use of a person with the skills below, they could be sub-contracted and brought in to assist on a temporary basis. More comprehensive tactical training may include some of the following aspects:

- Rope work (rappelling and abseiling, use of ropes to gain access or egress to a structure)
- Foreign weapons training (if operating abroad where the weapons may be different to what the CPO is trained to use. This specialised knowledge could be important).
- Team tactics
- Parachuting
- Scuba diving
- Survival training in different environments.
**Waterborne security**

The concepts behind application of ‘waterborne security’ as it relates to close protection refers to providing security and ensuring the safety of a Principal while on any waterborne craft, e.g. yachts, speed boats, ocean liners, etc. This may involve the Close Protector being trained in some of the following:

- Scuba diving
- Life saving techniques
- Sea survival.

There is extensive literature available on these topics but for the purposes of this report it is enough that the relevance of the link to close protection is identified and understood.

**Aviation security**

Aviation security refers to the necessary security measures that need to be implemented when a Principal is travelling via aircraft. Most of the literature reviewed seems to agree that due to the complexity of modern aircraft it is almost impossible for a CPO to do an effective search of an airplane (for any signs of sabotage of the plane itself) without the hands-on assistance of a pilot and mechanic.

In most cases, unless the Principal has their own aircraft, this topic is not necessary for CPOs and would be limited to the vetting of the airline that the Principal chooses to fly on. Within the context of recent terrorist threats it would also include an evaluation of the airline not only on safety record but also on current threat levels, as well as the perceived risk of a terrorist group targeting that specific airline. More comprehensive training in this topic could include training in:

- Aircraft search procedures
- Parachuting
- Emergency procedures i.e. evacuation and crash procedures.
The field of aviation security is a specialist field in its own right and if it was deemed relevant it would be more logical for a CPO to utilise the services of an expert in the field than attempt to learn all the necessary skills.

**INFORMATION SECURITY**

Almost all relevant literature mentions ‘information security’ but it is attributed various levels of importance in the different literature that was reviewed.

Information security refers to all relevant aspects that control access to information on the principal and his/her movements. The increasing importance of this topic as it relates to close protection, means that even though this aspect could have been included in several other broader topics as a subfield, it is not. This is perhaps because it is a specialised field into itself and the ease of access to information through modern technology (i.e. the internet) has made the need for information security even more pertinent.

As a result, the research has shown that it should receive its own separate section to ensure that it is covered in the necessary detail. The field of information security can be broken down into the following areas:

- Intelligence gathering
- Surveillance and counter-surveillance
- Document security
- IT/computer security

Certain key concepts are universal when security as a whole is evaluated but are even more relevant when referring to close protection. Some of these are concepts such as ‘need to know’ and restriction of access to sensitive information. Once again this topic and its relevant subdivisions constitute a specialist field in its own right.

With modern technology and specialist surveillance equipment (bugs, high resolution cameras, etc.) becoming so advanced, it may be almost impossible to locate such devices
using only a hand-eye search. If threats at this level are identified it is necessary to employ the services of competent electronic counter measures (ECM) professionals that have the relevant sophisticated equipment and experience to locate such devices.

CONCLUSION

It has been quite a complex procedure to consolidate the information regarding all the relevant aspects of close protection training and operations from the available literature and manuals into a comprehensive format that provides the reader with an understanding of close protection per se. The aim has been to provide a broad overview of what has been found in the texts that were examined. Many of the topics listed above are viewed as add-ons in many manuals and are not usually considered to be absolutely necessary or a core competency for a CPO in order for them to provide effective close protection.

The primary aim of this chapter is to serve as a foundation for the chapters that follow. These chapters will relate the above theoretical breakdown into a practical format by analysing feedback from research conducted by interviewing specialists in the field. As can be seen from the many topics and subjects mentioned above, modern day Close Protection is a comprehensive discipline. It requires its operatives to not only have the necessary hard skills to perform the work but also possess the soft skills needed to keep the client satisfied and prevent potential embarrassment to the Principal by blending into the environment.

The breakdown above in no way is a recommended training format but simply provides a framework from which to explain all the relevant aspects that combine to make an effective and professional CPO. Many of the topics outlined in this chapter are re-examined in more detail later on in this report. This was necessary as focus during interviews would correlate to the information reviewed and identify certain aspects that recurred as important themes relating to the operational skills requirements of CPOs in South Africa today.
Chapter 5

CLOSE PROTECTION TRAINING AND RELATED ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

The role of the Close Protection Operative may involve the application of many different operational skills. In order for a CPO to gain these skills he/she needs to complete a comprehensive training program. This training can be explained in a three-step process, namely:

1. Training is the ongoing process of learning and developing skills

2. It is also the gaining of the relevant theoretical and background knowledge

3. It is undergone in order to ensure that the skills and knowledge can be applied in practice.

In many cases this training process would often have to occur under duress, since effective training should prepare students for the actual situations where they would have to apply what they have learned in training, i.e. simulate the conditions of real-life situations.

As far as close protection is concerned the field of necessary skills and knowledge in its entirety is very broad. This is so because almost any aspect or subfield of security could be considered relevant to close protection. During the interview process many of the respondents felt that their personal individual speciality should be trained to the highest level since in their opinion it was the most important skill for a CPO to possess.
On analysis, in terms of the South African Close Protection industry, all the relevant operational skills and related knowledge that was mentioned in the interviews could be grouped into one of three subdivisions, namely:


2. Nice for a CPO to have but more of an add-on than a necessity when compared to vital skills.

3. Related to close protection but would not really be necessary for a CPO to perform his/her duties.

A comprehensive initial training course should be considered as the starting point for almost any CPO’s career. It would be fair to say that a CPO’s initial training would probably determine operational practices for the rest of that CPO’s career. The importance of ongoing training and retraining is also a vital training component if a CPO is to remain at a level of operational proficiency. The need to determine what CPOs should actually be able to do and at what level they should be able to do it at, in order to be considered competent, was a point of concern for almost every respondent interviewed (Allon, 2003; Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Richards, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004).

Much of the information collected during the in-depth interviews focused on identifying actual current training practices and shortcomings. Although most of the respondents had slightly different opinions on some of the different aspects of training, the responses concerning the need for training were for the most part consistent.
The research concentrated on the different aspects and points of concern that were identified during the interviews. These were then correlated and analysed into relevant themes and associated points. The themes and points associated with close protection training were identified as:

- screening of candidates before training/pre-selection
- the duration of training
- the intensity of training
- the content of training
- the focus of training
- regulatory aspects and standards related to training.

Each of the aspects mentioned above will be unpacked and explained below. Wherever it was possible to do so, individual subjects were identified and every attempt was made to quantify and outline the key aspects necessary for competence with reference to that subject. This was done by correlating feedback from the various interview respondents. The process then involved finding a middle ground in what the respondents felt were acceptable standards for each subject (for more information on training standards see Chapter 11: Recommendations).

**CAN CLOSE PROTECTION BE DIVIDED ACCORDING TO TASKS AND COMPETENCIES?**

Respondents were asked if they felt it was possible to subdivide the level that potential CPOs could operate at based on the training they received, their performance during their training and their prior experience. Feedback from the respondents indicated that there are two primary schools of thought on this issue.

The first school of thought is that it is not possible to subdivide the roles and duties at all. The motivation behind this is that in order to work as a CPO, a person must be able to perform every necessary function that may be related to providing effective protection.
A common example given to illustrate this concept, is that you cannot have a person who is only trained as a driver as he/she may have to fight to protect the Principal’s life just like a normal CPO. In other words the driver would have to be cross-trained as a CPO anyway. The converse could also apply meaning that if a driver was shot or wounded another CPO would have to instantly perform the duties of the driver. The underlying assumption here is the need for CPOs to be multi-skilled. Moreover, most of the respondents who advocated this school of thought felt that with more experience and training, a CPO with the correct attributes would develop into a team leader. This approach demonstrates that there is chain of command in place and the possibility of job progression.

A CPO must be able to perform all relevant duties. He[she] may be a specialist in a certain field but should be able to operate in any function on a team (Sharp, 2003).

The second school of thought felt that you could subdivide the roles and duties according to competency and task. There were a few variances in this position but for the most part respondents outlined the following generic subdivisions that illustrate how they suggest the division, according to task, should occur:

1. Static protector
2. Security driver
3. CPO
4. Team leader
5. Group/Operational leader

Each of these will be outlined below:
**Static Protector**
A Static Protector was identified as an individual working as part of a larger team providing protection at a venue or a residence. He/she would perform these duties whether a Principal was at the venue or not.

Persons providing static duties do not move around with the Principal and have very little personal interaction with him/her. In most cases this would be considered the starting point for a CPO’s career.

**Security Driver**
A security driver would be a person trained in both security related and driving skills. His/her primary responsibility would be to facilitate the smooth transfer of the Principal from venue to venue. A security driver’s roles and duties would not extend to actually walking around with the Principal or protecting the venues that the Principal was visiting.

A slightly different mix of competencies is necessary for a person to perform either static or security driver functions. A driver would obviously need driving skills but also must have a well developed sense of protocol. This is vital as in some cases a security driver would be alone in the car with the Principal.

**Close Protection Operative**
A CPO is a person who is trained to provide the maximum possible protection in any given circumstance. The most common breakdown would be to provide protection while a Principal is static, at a venue or at his/her residence, in transit and/or on foot. A CPO must be able to operate as an individual or member of a team. By definition, a CPO should be able to perform all the necessary tasks of both a security driver and a static protector.

**Team leader**
A team leader is a person who is able to coordinate the running of a Close Protection team. He/she should be thoroughly versed in the planning, transit, venue, foot and debrief aspects of a Close Protection operation. The team leader should also have more developed communication, managerial and leadership skills than a CPO. The general
consensus among respondents was that a team leader should have at least three years of operational experience, show a natural flair for leadership and perhaps undergo additional training focussing on subjects like communication, management, leadership and administration.

**Group/Operational leader**
An Operational Leader would usually have been a CPO who has had experience as a team leader and is considered capable of coordinating several close protection teams at the same time. The consensus among the interview respondents (backing this school of thought) was that a group leader should have at least two years experience working as a team leader as well as undergo additional management skills training programs.

Training should be broken down into three subdivisions namely; Protection on foot, in transit and at venues. This means [that] a trainee could start working in each area as soon as they complete that [specific] subdivision. It makes it [training] more cost effective and applicable for trainees (Jones, 2003).

There is merit to both schools of thought with each having definite advantages. According to the first school of thought, considering operatives competent only when they can perform all necessary CPO duties would ensure that a more professional service would be offered to the client. This means that the Principal would probably be safer as the security personnel on the protection team would all be cross-trained (multi-skilled) CPOs.

The second school of thought endorses the utilisation of persons who are maybe only trained as security drivers or static guards, i.e. one specialisation. There could be potential pitfalls should things go wrong as these security persons would not be cross trained to perform all close protection functions. However, the advantages are obvious when considering costs, length of training and utilising of a wider resource pool of security personnel.
It is the opinion of the researcher that both schools of thought have advantages and disadvantages and it should be left up to the client to decide what level of security staff he/she would like.

**SCREENING OF CANDIDATES BEFORE TRAINING (PRE-SELECTION)**

All respondents agreed that there must be some type of pre-evaluation before potential students are accepted on a close protection training course. The respondents seemed to agree on what the aspects to be assessed should be, even though certain respondents placed more emphasis on the need for pre-evaluation than other respondents did.

The relevant aspects with which a prospective CPO candidate should be able to comply with are outlined below (in no particular order of preference):

- Should not have a criminal record (this could be verified through a background check via the SAPS Criminal Records Centre)
- Pass a full medical examination and a basic fitness evaluation test
- Possess a valid drivers licence
- Matric (some respondents said that a Standard 8/Grade 10 was sufficient)
- Demonstrate an ability to cope with stress and fatigue
- Exhibit basic competence with a handgun.

The subject of pre-selection requirements and prior educational qualifications will be expanded on in Chapter 11: Recommendations, in the section covering whether prospective CPOs need to have had prior experience in guarding before being accepted for CPO training.

**DURATION OF TRAINING**

The duration of training refers to the time frame necessary to train a person from totally unskilled to the level of a competent close protection operative. Whilst ongoing training
and retraining are key considerations when discussing time frames, they will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

Determining of a universally accepted time frame for basic CPO training is exceptionally difficult without set standards of minimum competency for all of the relevant aspects involved in providing close protection. This is so, primarily because if it is not known exactly what a prospective CPO should be able to do and at what level of competency it should be performed at, it is almost impossible to determine exactly how long it would take to achieve the necessary level of competency or the required intensity or length of training required.

Therefore, in order to gain input on relevant time frames from the interview respondents, they were asked to apply the parameters set in the following question:

"How long would it take to train an individual, who possessed all the correct physical and psychological attributes, to achieve the competencies necessary for the provision of effective Close Protection?"

It is important to clarify that a respondent’s feedback on training course duration was based on his/her opinion on whether CPO duties could be subdivided or not. It is interesting to note that respondents who came from a service (military or police) background were usually of the opinion that training should be much longer in duration than what was felt sufficient by their civilian counterparts. This could be attributed primarily to resources and budget differences between the way training and courses are run in the military or police in comparison to the private sector, i.e. the government sector is far better resourced in terms of CPO training and equipment. The suggested time frames have been correlated from the respondents’ feedback and divided according to the different schools of thought outlined above.

Training course time frames vary and are largely based on such factors as course content, time worked per day and number of students per course (student-to-instructor ratio).
Some interviewees felt that training could be done in a matter of weeks. In such cases it then had to be further clarified to determine whether students worked weekends as well. Many respondents also felt that before a prospective CPO could be said to be competent he/she should undergo an apprentice (in-service training) period where he/she would be supervised and guided by an experienced operative. The relevant time frames will be discussed below:

(For the sake of uniformity, number of days not weeks was used as the measuring tool for duration. Eight hours of training was considered one day.)

**Fully competent CPO**

If a candidate selection process was applied and the initial training is followed with a six month in-service apprenticeship (supervision of a trainee CPO by an experienced CPO), the shortest possible training time mentioned during the interviews was an initial training course of twelve full days. Other respondents felt that this was not sufficient and that a six-week training course was necessary for successful graduates to be considered fully competent CPOs.

The average accepted duration for a candidate to achieve the necessary competence in the required operational skills of close protection was 18–25 days. This was based on including a short (either one full day or half-a-day), student selection and vetting process prior to the commencement of training. It was also mentioned that advanced training programmes could be developed that would enhance the CPOs skills and knowledge that were imparted in the initial training.

**Subdivision of roles and duties**

The most logical approach to the training of CPOs in the various subdivisions of close protection is to look at this method (training according to role and duty) of training in a progressive manner. In other words meaning that once a candidate has completed the skills requirements for static, transit and foot protection, he/she would have fulfilled the
requirements to operate as a fully competent CPO (as above). Each of the previously mentioned task subdivisions has been given a training duration (as explained below).

The initial starting point for a prospective CPO would be to qualify as a static protector (a static protector was identified as the starting point for training a CPO in a sub-divided manner). Once qualified as a static protector the prospective CPO would then undergo training to qualify as a security driver. However, several respondents did mention that whilst it would be preferable for static protection to be the starting point, this is not fixed and could still be changed (flexible approach). It would not really make a difference whether a potential CPO qualified as a security driver or static protector first. The recommended training time frame for each of these close protection aspects was estimated to be between seven and ten days.

In order for a candidate to then further qualify as a CPO, he/she would have to undergo additional training in the provision of close protection to a Principal while on foot. The recommended training time frame for protection on foot was also between seven and ten days. This would mean that for a new student to qualify as a fully competent CPO, he/she would have to undergo an overall training period of between 21 and 30 days.

**INTENSITY OF TRAINING COURSES**

The concept of intensity refers not only to the duration of training each day but also to the level of physical, emotional and psychological stress that is placed on the candidate during the training, as well as the detail of the course content. The intensity of the training seems to be a controversial issue with almost every training provider interviewed stating that the training that they offer is the most ‘intense’ on the market. Respondents who were not involved with training of CPOs obviously referenced the training that they had been through. Their individual training was usually described as ‘being more intense than other CPOs training may have been’ (Hugo, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004).
A topic of interest which was mentioned during several of the interviews was whether training candidates at a consistently high intensity is actually the best way to produce the most competent CPOs (Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). Even though it may have been worded in different ways, of the interviewed respondents many, made statements similar to the one below:

When the focus of the training is to produce ‘Special Forces type’ operatives [CPOs], much of the point may be missed as the students are not actually being trained to do the job [of close protection] that they will have to perform (McGuire, 2003).

Moreover, other relevant factors that were discussed during some interviews focused on the skills progression of students while they undergo training. Issues such as the logical progression of training, as well as the focus on training the prospective CPO for the actual job requirements of close protection, as opposed to the perceived requirements, were raised. It is vital that the training builds up progressively to a point where the realities of the close protection world are experienced by trainees.

Some of these would include aspects such as little sleep, irregular eating patterns, and monotonous periods of time followed by frantic activity, team interaction and coping with frustration while staying alert.

Information obtained in the interviews and literature as well as the researcher’s personal experience indicated that it is possible to train CPOs in a shorter time frame i.e. eight to twelve days providing that the intensity is high. In other words training time would be approximately 15 or 16 hours a day (the number of hours is not necessarily shorter but more hours of training are crammed into less days). It was also mentioned that the CPO should then have to spend time undergoing an apprenticeship and be mentored by a more experienced CPO.
For training based on applicable competencies to be successfully presented in this framework, it must be assumed that candidates have undergone a pre-selection evaluation and possess all the preferred attributes (these attributes will be discussed in Chapter 6) of a CPO.

**CONTENT OF TRAINING COURSES**

Content refers to the actual subject matter that is taught to the students during a close protection training course. For the purposes of this study, content will be grouped according to its nature into either being theoretically or practically based. A common concern expressed by several of the respondents, was that much of the theory taught on Close Protection training programs was either irrelevant or did not relate to what was actually done in practice. This concern was mentioned mainly by respondents who had a more operationally based, than training based backgrounds.

Furthermore, another area of concern mentioned in several interviews was that the content in many close protection training programs was not reality based. It was stated that:

> Training material is not tailored to what working CPOs actually do but rather on what the instructor or training institution feels is important (Higgins, 2003).

Statements like the one above could lead us to believe that in many cases, training content is either not outcomes based or in line with the way that CPOs are actually operating in South Africa today. In the in-depth interviews, respondents were first asked to identify what they considered, in order of importance, to be the required operational skills a CPO should possess in order to effectively perform his/her duties. They were then asked to explain what training a person would have to undergo in order to be able to meet the skills requirements that they had just identified.

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27 It was mentioned on several occasions during interviews that there is a perception that time spent on theory aspects in training does not prepare candidates for the realities of close protection work (Higgins, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; and Van Eck, 2003).
Based on the respondent’s replies, two basic key grouping criteria for skills requirements could be identified, namely:

1. **Personal attributes and personality traits**
   Certain of the skills requirements were based on physical attributes and appearance and others on psychological or personality characteristics. Most of these cannot actually be taught (not a learnt skill). However, if a candidate did have them, even on a rudimentary level, they could most probably be developed.

2. **Learnt skills**
   The relevant CPO skills that could be taught conform almost exactly to those covered in the literature review section of this research report (Chapter 4). These skills are consistent with almost any close protection training program that was examined. What differs between the different training programs is the focus and time spent on each aspect (focus will be discussed in the next section). Several of the respondents mentioned that content could be divided into different levels of candidate proficiency e.g. basic, intermediate and advanced. This is, in itself, a controversial issue as respondents differed in their opinion on whether you could subdivide the competencies required of CPOs at all. Certain interviewees stated that there is no such thing as basic level since a CPO is either competent or not (he/she can either protect somebody effectively or cannot).

However, even if this argument is applied, it still leaves room for higher levels of proficiency over and above what can be considered the minimum level of competency for a CPO. The wide scope of subject matter that would fit into the ‘nice to have’ and ‘related skills’ categories are almost endless. Therefore a CPO could constantly be expanding his/her knowledge base of close protection related knowledge and skills. “A CPO should always be learning, the process of broadening skills and knowledge should be ongoing for all CPOs” (Hendricks, 2003).
THE FOCUS OF CLOSE PROTECTION TRAINING

It would stand to reason that the focus of training should be on the subjects that would be vital for performance of effective CPO duties in the South African environment. One of the primary identified problems is that even though most respondents agreed on the basic subjects that would fall into this category, they differed on the focus that should be given to each aspect. These differences were mainly on the amount of time that should be spent on each aspect, the detail at which the subject should be taught and what could be considered the level of competency for each subject.

As previously stated (section in this chapter on training intensity) the focus issues mentioned be each respondent seemed to directly correlate to each respondent’s training and operational background. Respondent’s opinions and beliefs on training focus differed quite extensively, several examples of this are as follows:

1. One respondent expressed the opinion that if a CPO was not trained to paramedic level than he/she would not be able to perform effectively as a CPO (Smith, 2004).

2. Another respondent felt that a CPO needed full and comprehensive training as a sniper in order to effectively implement counter-sniping principles during a close protection operation. (Jones, 2003)

3. A third respondent expressed the opinion that if a CPO has not worked on a presidential level protection team, then he/she could not be considered competent. (Hendricks, 2004) Conversely another respondent stated that he felt that CPOs working in the private sector that came from presidential protection teams were not very effective since they were used to having extensive resources available and were used to operating in one specific role on a close protection detail (for example as a driver). This differs from the civilian sector where CPOs have to perform all protective related duties. i.e. are multi-skilled as opposed to single specialist (Higgins, 2003).
4. Another respondent expressed the opinion that in order for a CPO to be competent he/she must be able to draw and fire his/her weapon at a target in less than one-and-a-half seconds (Jones, 2003). The majority of other respondents felt that this was not necessary and that more time should be spent on developing applicable force options like alternative weaponry and unarmed combat (Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004).

By correlating information collected from the applicable literature as well as from the in-depth interviews several key focus areas were identified. Overall it is not possible to say that one aspect is more important than another. Rather the approach should be that all aspects are interdependent and that each is vital for the effective performance of close protection duties. In other words an integrated and interlinked training programme would be the ideal, where multiple skills support and supplement each other to develop a ‘well rounded’ (holistic) multi-skilled CPO.

Some of the key focus points that were identified in this research as being vital to ensure a well-rounded training programme can be outlined as follows:

- Practical application of close protection theory including knowledge of all legalities involved in the provision of close protection

- Ensuring the trainee has the ability to cope with fatigue, stress, boredom and adverse working conditions through reality based training scenarios and an intense training regime

- Ensuring that a trainee is taught all physical skills (fitness, unarmed combat, use of alternative weaponry, firearms and driving skills)

- Basic first aid skills
• Ability to work as an individual or member of a team

• Development of trainee attributes such as commitment, aggression and determination

• Soft skills such as protocol, people skills and liaison ability

• Determination of the trainee’s integrity and trustworthiness through scenario-based training.

Training should ideally, therefore, focus on the development of the above mentioned skills and attributes in a practical, work environment related manner. It would be fair to state that if a CPO was found particularly lacking in one of the above aspects, he/she would probably not be performing the relevant duties as effectively as they should be. Moreover, another problem is that the only time a client actually gets to see whether a CPO is capable of performing the necessary life saving and protection skills is when things have gone completely wrong (lack of planning, poor protocol or even an attack situation). At this stage, a CPOs lack of rounded competencies could potentially cost a Principal and members of the close protection team their lives, or at best the CPO company would lose the contract (i.e. not get more business from that specific client).

ONGOING TRAINING AND RE-TRAINING

Re-training can be explained as an ongoing process of repetition, re-study, rehearsal and performance of skills that a trained CPO has already been exposed to. Ongoing training can be explained as the process of gaining new knowledge and/or skills covering as many factors and aspects that are applicable to the performance of CPO and related duties. In the in-depth interviews respondents were first asked whether they felt retraining and ongoing training were necessary. If they answered yes, they were than asked what format such retraining and ongoing training should take, as well as how often it should take place.
The analysis of responses showed that all of the respondents were of the opinion that retraining was vital and that ongoing training should be done. Furthermore, the focus of such training should be on the long term career development of a CPO and not just on skills maintenance. The main reasons mentioned for the importance of re-training were two-fold. Firstly, many of the physical skills are ‘perishable’, meaning that if they are not practiced regularly the ability to perform them effectively diminishes. Moreover, many of these skills may have to be performed under extreme stress and duress i.e. pressure situations. This means that in order for a CPO to be able to perform under such conditions, there must be regular exposure to similar type situations. The safest way to do this is through reality-based retraining.

The second reason identified was simply that CPOs would usually over a period of time forget what they had learned during their initial training. This is especially true for those aspects of protection that may not be applied in the everyday working environment. This could also be attributed to the wide subject base that should be covered during initial training.

**Frequency of re-training**

Several of the interview respondents had differing opinions about how often retraining should be run. The feedback ranged from respondents saying that re-training should take place as often as possible and that a CPO should do some sort of physical training daily (Hendricks, 2003; Jacobs, 2003). Other feedback suggested different approaches such as, allocating two weeks a year for a relatively thorough close protection re-training course (refresher). In this case it was mentioned that it was the individual CPO’s responsibility to maintain fundamental physical skills and fitness levels (Hugo, 2003). A realistic approach would most probably be a combination of the above two opinions.

Ideally the individual CPO should maintain adequate fitness levels on his/her own, with group and team training (e.g. repetitive drills) taking place whenever possible but at least once a month. Longer training workshops could be run once or twice a year.
These longer sessions could last for a few days and cover a wider range of relevant skills and topics as well as serving as a forum to update the CPOs on new methods, tactics, etc. Such a format would allow for re-training that would keep the necessary skills at an effective level of competency as well as provide a platform for ongoing training during group and longer bi-annual sessions. An extra bonus to re-training is that it serves as a team building mechanism to develop trust, build confidence in each others’ skills and competencies as well as create a bond between a team of CPOs.

**The focus of re-training**

The focus of the retraining, as previously mentioned, should concentrate on perishable skills. These would primarily be those skills that a CPO would not utilise in his/her everyday work but which are vital if an attack on the Principal were to take place. These skills can be divided into one of the following broad categories:

- Every day working skills (driving, communication, protocol, etc.)
- Management of attack situations (unarmed combat, firearms skills, IADs, etc.)
- First aid and reactive skills (CPR, Principal evacuations, crisis management, etc.)
- Physical fitness and related skills (strength, stamina, agility, etc.).

Re-training should focus on maintaining all competencies in each of the above categories. A combination of individual and group training is necessary to cover all relevant aspects of the above subdivisions. As one of the respondents put it, “re-training should be done as often as a protector’s work schedule permits. It is very important for a CPO to stay sharp” (Van Rooyen, 2004).
INSTRUCTOR RELATED FACTORS

An aspect of concern that was raised by several respondents during the interviews was that they felt that close protection training in this country was not always as effective as it should be.

The most common reasoning for this phenomenon was attributed, not so much to the training content, but rather to incompetent instructors and ineffective methods of instruction. It should be noted that not all respondents felt that South African CPO training standards were low.

However, it was universally accepted that the quality and credentials of instructors was very important if there are to be high operational standards in the country. Instructor credentials and monitoring was mentioned by respondents from both service and civilian backgrounds alike. On analysis of the problem, two related aspects were identified as probable causes for any close protection instructor related problems. These were either the instructor/s possibly not having the necessary operational experience to train candidates effectively and/or they were not trained in effective instructor methodology (teaching skills).

A solution to this problem was relatively simple to identify, namely to implement a regulatory system and standards enforcement approach for instructors in order to ensure the quality level of training. The approach would have to be twofold. Firstly, ensuring that instructors receive training on how to instruct (train-the-trainer program). Secondly, verifying that the potential instructor has actually had experience in the close protection field (background checks). Problems with this approach would probably hinge on the implementation and enforcement of instructor regulation.28

In order to implement a system of instructor regulation, minimum standards (for an instructor’s credentials and qualifications) have to be identified and set levels of

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28 Instructor regulation refers to the process that an individual who wishes to operate as a CPO instructor should be made to undergo. This could include training, registration and verification of experience and credentials of prospective candidates.
competency (teaching skills) implemented, as well as quantifying how much experience instructors actually need to have in order to be considered qualified to train. The proposed process would have to be implemented at SETA level and can be explained as follows:

1. A candidate must complete a generic assessors’ course and then register with the relevant SETA. (This would be POSLEC SETA).

2. The registration will include evaluation of the candidates' resume and prior experience. In order to establish if he/she has the necessary credentials to be considered a Subject Matter Expert (SME).

3. In order to qualify as a trainer the candidate would have to undergo a train-the-trainer course recognised through the Education, Training and Development Practices Sector Education and Training Authority (ETDP SETA).

4. For an instructor to deliver training in the private sector, he/she would have to operate through a POSLEC SETA accredited training provider. In order for a company or individual to be accredited they would have to undergo quite an extensive accreditation process. This process would ensure that a provider has the ability to offer high quality training and maintain effective records of such training.

Aspects of this process are already being instituted by POSLEC SETA but it will take time to implement and enforce the full model as outlined above. Most respondents who were interviewed were totally unaware that any process was already in place at all. Those that did know about it were positive, yet apprehensive, as to the way that it would be implemented. There were also concerns about industry and regulatory bodies being biased towards certain service (training) providers and individuals.

29 The accreditation process includes a verification of service provider details and infrastructure, an assessment of the providers’ quality management system, learning materials, policies and procedures and an evaluation of all training venues available to such a company or individual. To maintain accreditation the POSLEC SETA requires updates on all of the aspects just mentioned, as well as the right to inspect training and operations at their sole discretion (www.Poslecseta.org.za).
It was mentioned that if certain providers were given preference, it would have serious long term effects on the acceptance of South African training standards internationally. As mentioned by one respondent the success and professionalism of the specialist CPO is dependant on “well trained and experienced instructors [who] are the starting point for all high quality close protection training” (Hugo, 2003).

**Instructional methodology needed for close protection training**

Instructional methodology refers to the manner in which the relevant information and skills are conveyed from trainer to trainee. The focus of this concept is now leaning heavily towards outcomes-based education (OBE). The fundamental concepts of OBE are based on the learner gaining an understanding of the rationale behind why things are done and on actual application of knowledge acquired. This differs from other approaches where students may have to learn by memorising facts and concepts.

Some other key concepts of OBE that are applicable to close protection training are directly linked to adult-based education and training (ABET), which focuses on the practical and measurable outcomes of training. The concepts of ABET would definitely be applicable to close protection training since in most cases the recommended minimum age for candidates would be 21. One of the focuses of ABET is to relate new concepts to already existing knowledge or experiences that the candidates may have had. This is effective as candidates will learn faster by relating new concepts to knowledge that they may already have. Since there is a section outlining ‘Learning assumed to be in place’ in the existing unit standard, it would be important for training methodology to concentrate on expanding on a students’ existing knowledge and competency base (Behaviour Systems Development, 2003 (a) and Behaviour Systems Development, 2003 (b)).

When considering the need for practical measurable outcomes many of the interview respondents felt that it was important for outcomes to be in line with the performance of close protection duties in the work environment. Additionally, it was stated that “Fundamental [close protection] work competencies should always take precedence over a CPO’s ‘nice to have skills’” (Steyn, 2003). This concept is important as a CPO must
keep his/her client happy and of course safe. It should be mentioned that even though the vast majority of close protection tasks never amount to a CPO actually having to utilise his/her combat related skills, it is vital to remember that a CPO is primarily employed to protect a Principal’s life and wellbeing. A CPO would not be able to do this without a solid base of effective combat related skills.

In addition, respondents indicated that they felt training should be provided in such a way as to imitate (simulate) the actual conditions within which CPOs need to operate (Allon, 2003; Garvey, 2004; Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). This idea would be in contravention of many of the training doctrines applied in training other skills. Some of these may emphasise that a trainee should be comfortable, in a well organised environment that is free from distractions in order for learning to take place. This ‘simulated training’ picks up on the concept of experiential learning i.e. on-the-job-training. Whilst both theoretical and practical skills are important in order for a CPO to provide effective protection, his/her ability to actually ‘do the job’ is what counts the most.

It was mentioned several times during interviews that Close Protection work is not for everyone and if during training a trainee cannot cope with stress, lack of sleep, discomfort and other job-related factors, he/she is actually the wrong person for the job (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004 and Van Jaarsveld, 2004.). Instructional methodology should therefore concentrate on training candidates for the job they are going to have to do. This should include all the related stress factors and duress related to close protection operations. The instructor should also concentrate on an outcomes-based approach that relates prior experiences of trainees to what they need to learn. This approach of adult based education and training is important to enable students to have the maximum possible understanding of close protection methodology.
CONCLUSION

Training is vital for a CPO to operate and perform effectively in the work environment. Various fundamental aspects related to close protection training were identified during the research. These include concepts such as the intensity, focus, content and duration of training programs. Other key areas of concern identified were aspects pertaining to instructor credentials and the instructor’s ability to deliver the training in an effective manner.

Furthermore, other relevant aspects that were related to training of CPOs and which were consistently mentioned in the in-depth interviews included concepts such as:

- Prospective candidates for CPO training should undergo a pre-selection (including a background check, physical and psychological suitability assessments, etc.) prior to the commencement of training. This pre-evaluation would be used to determine whether the candidate has the correct profile or not for being a CPO.
• Ensuring training prepares students for the actual job they must perform and is not presented based on the instructor’s preconceived ideas of what he/she believes to be the most important aspects of close protection.

• The applied training methodology must shift to focus on outcomes-based education and capitalise on the use of adult-based education techniques.

• Training conditions (lack of sleep, induced stress, etc.) should simulate the pressure and work environment of an actual close protection operation.

• Re-training should be an integral part of any CPO’s operational life. He/she should regularly attend ongoing training sessions and refresher workshops.

• CPOs should attempt to implement as much additional and ongoing training, whenever possible, to facilitate career advancement.

There were also instructor-related issues that were identified as having a major influence on the effectiveness of training. Some of the key aspects regarding instructors and instructional methodology were:

• The fact that instructors should be CPOs with valid and appropriate field experience. This is important to ensure that trainees benefit from the instructor’s hands-on-experience.

• It is necessary for potential close protection instructors to undergo training in instructional methodology. The instructor should have a recognised trainer’s (instructor’s) qualification before being allowed to present courses.

• All instructors should only be allowed to instruct on behalf of a POSLEC SETA approved training provider.
The research has indicated that in order for training to be effective, the above considerations need to be addressed. Additionally the regulation of instructors and training providers should be enforced in order to maintain standards. It is hoped that standards that are both realistic and able to be implemented will be introduced. This should enable all South African trained CPOs to gain international recognition from regulatory bodies in other countries and be allowed to operate based on their South African qualifications.
Chapter 6
PERCEPTIONS ABOUT CLOSE PROTECTION OPERATIVES AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

INTRODUCTION

In terms of this research, a perception could be described as something that a person or group of persons may believe to be reality. However, a problem with someone’s perceptions is that these may not be founded on fact and experience but rather on what seems to be the most convenient, well received or widely disseminated idea. This may also be true for persons superimposing their perceptions on reality in order to create a platform of concepts that make sense to them.\(^{30}\) This concept was verified by the information that was gathered during the in-depth interviews, in which certain respondents expressed views such as:

A Protector must be able to function as a fully trained sniper in order to implement counter sniping as he has no back up during civilian operations (Jones, 2003).

In order to be a qualified CPO, a person must be a fully trained paramedic or he/she would not be able to perform the required duties [of a CPO] (Smith, 2004).

Perception, in close protection terms would not only affect almost all aspects of training but also the way in which CPOs actually provide protection. This could be dangerous for if a CPO were to react to a perceived threat and not a real threat, the consequences could be potentially life threatening. Moreover, throughout the research, a common trend that was identified both during the literature review and the in-depth interviews was the fact that there are many misconceptions about close protection.

\(^{30}\) This explanation and description of perceptions and how they affect Close Protection have been defined by the researcher.
Additionally, there appears to be an overall lack of understanding regarding the core roles and responsibilities of CPOs by the general public, the security industry and regulatory bodies. Several perceptions-related inaccuracies were identified. These included concepts such as: who actually is qualified to be a CPO; what a qualified CPO should be capable of doing; and how he/she should actually perform close protection.

This concept has much bearing in determining the necessary operational skills requirements needed to provide effective close protection. This is especially relevant when considering the perceptions of clients, other security providers, trainers and the general public. The need to identify the realities of close protection as opposed to perceptions is vital in order to ascertain the correct profile, skills requirements and steps required to implement an effective client education program about close protection.

Furthermore, if the realities of the above aspects are not identified and the realities determined, it would be almost impossible to develop an outcomes-based training program that would be orientated to the actual job description of a CPO. A recurring theme that was identified in the interview research was that CPOs should be trained according to the actual tasks that are to be performed while operating. This should supersede those aspects that may have been defined as ‘nice to have’ skills.

A major contributing factor to inaccurate perceptions mentioned by approximately 80% of the respondents was the influence of the media’s portrayal of CPOs (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004). Movies such as ‘The Bodyguard’ and ‘In the line of fire’ have created a distorted image of CPOs and what they do. At first glance the portrayal of CPOs and their work may appear to be real but when looking closer it can be easily discerned that these films are focusing on the entertainment value of close protection as opposed to an accurate portrayal of the CPO and his/her duties.
In this chapter, aspects such as the profiling, the preferred characteristics of CPOs in terms of physical appearance and personality will be examined. The identified core skills requirements will also be discussed, as well as an international comparison between South African CPOs and their international counterparts.

CPO PROFILES

The Profile of a CPO would include, but not be limited to those physical and personality characteristics and the learnt skills that contribute to his/her ability to effectively perform all the necessary duties of close protection provision. It is vital to differentiate between what the perceived realities are and what is actually relevant to clients and operatives in the industry.

On analysis, the physical characteristics of CPOs could be unpacked into the following broad subdivisions:

- appearance
- build
- attributes

Personality characteristics would refer to those behavioural and subconscious tendencies that dictate a CPO’s behaviour in different circumstances. Lastly, learnt skills would go hand-in-hand with a potential CPO’s natural ability to absorb and perform the skills, both physical and mental, necessary to perform the different aspects of close protection.

The focus in this chapter will be on the common themes that were identified during the in-depth research. Although no one view would be entirely representative of the close protection industry, there seemed to be consensus when analysing the information collected during the interviews with regard to the above-mentioned factors. These aspects will be discussed below.
It should be noted that the distinction between what could be considered physical, personality or learnt skills is not clear. Several of the aspects that will be described could be classified into more than one of the above stated subdivisions. In terms of this research, the subdivision is perhaps not as important as the actual concepts being discussed.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CPOS

Physical appearance

When analysing what a CPO should look like, it is best to refer back to the initial job description of a CPO discussed in the literature review (Chapter 4). This would infer that a CPO who is responsible for the safety, peace of mind and physical comfort of his/her Principal should be physically capable of carrying out all activities necessary to achieve these goals. This, however, goes a step further as we need to take into consideration the Principal’s profile as well as the applicable risk and threat. It is vital to consider these variables prior to determining what the CPO should look like in a given situation. This is important as the CPO must be physically suited to the task at hand.

There are several factors which come into play when analysing the correct physical appearance of a CPO. These include the Principal’s profile, his/her personal preferences, and the environment in which the job is to take place. The identified threat and risks need always to be taken into account. The most common theme identified when this topic was discussed during the interviews, echoed the following statements:

A CPO is not a bouncer, he/she should be of normal appearance [not have distinguishing (i.e. stand-out) physical characteristics] and be capable of blending into almost any environment (Sharp, 2003).

A Protector should look like everyone else - the average man on the street. The less attention he attracts and the more he can blend in the better he can do his job (Steyn, 2003).
The concept of a CPO being able to blend into his/her environment was also mentioned in most of the relevant literature that was analysed. It seems that universally, it is accepted by the close protection industries both locally and abroad, that a CPO should conform to certain physical characteristics. Some of these will be outlined below.

1. A CPO should not be too heavily built and should be able to blend into many different environments within which he/she might have to operate, i.e. be inconspicuous and not stand out in a crowd.

2. A CPO must be able to apply the correct protocol and dress according to any situation to assist them in blending in.

3. A CPO should be in such physical condition so as to have a professional appearance yet be capable of performing all related protection duties i.e. not overweight, unfit, too young or old.

Furthermore, it should also be noted that the profile of the operation, as well as the environment wherein the operation occurred, would determine what the physical appearance of a CPO should be. The common theme identified during interviews was that protection should remain as low profile as possible (i.e. low-key and not attract unwanted attention). In other words the CPO must not draw attention to him/herself either by dress, behaviour or mannerisms. The reasoning behind this is that it is possible to go from a low profile operation to a visible and obvious high profile, but the converse is not always possible. Therefore, utilising a close protection team that would attract attention purely because of their physical appearance would not be considered the preferred option.

However, it should be mentioned that it may be advantageous to utilise CPOs with different physical characteristics based on the environmental factors and operational demands of a task.
Should the protection detail be operating extensively in crowds providing protection for a high profile Principal, it may be wise to utilise physically large ‘bouncer type’ CPOs. This would not only assist in the intimidation of the crowd but would also make the evacuation of a Principal easier should it be required.

It would therefore be fair to state that in the vast majority of close protection related situations, CPOs that blend into the environment would be utilised far more than ‘bouncer-type’ protectors. However, in certain situations the use of ‘bouncer-type’ protectors would definitely have certain advantages. The use of female CPOs is also important, as in many situations the Principal may be female. If a female CPO was not part of the protection detail, it would be really difficult to provide effective protection. All in all the specific operational situation would influence and determine what attributes a CPO for that specific operation should possess.

**Physical attributes**
The physical attributes necessary for a CPO refer to the natural responses and physical capabilities that a CPO should possess. Many of these attributes can and should be developed through effective ongoing training. However, if a potential CPO does not have the natural tendencies or inherent physical attributes, it would than probably be fair to say that this person would probably not be a very proficient CPO.

The focus of physical attributes refers not only to the ability to deal physically with potential violent attacks but also with the physical stress and duress that may be placed on a CPO during operations. These may include the ability to handle long periods of inactivity interspersed with very intense periods of activity, coping for extended periods on little sleep and irregular eating patterns.

“There is definitely a need for well trained female CPOs in South Africa today” (Van Eck, 2003). Whilst the majority of CPOs that are operating in South Africa today are males, there is a definite need for qualified female operatives in the industry.
A female CPO may not have the necessary physical strength to deal with threats using strictly unarmed combat but would be invaluable to a protection team should they be protecting a female Principal. By having a female CPO on the team the Principal could be accompanied into female toilets without attracting any undue attention.

Despite the disadvantage of not being as physically strong as men, the use of alternative weaponry and comprehensive training would enable a female CPO to operate at the same level as her male counterparts. A common measure of physical capability is what is known as ‘drag or carry’ competency. This involves a CPO having to carry or drag a dummy (between 50kg and 75kg) for approximately 25 metres, simulating the evacuation of a wounded Principal. If a CPO is competent to perform this activity, gender would not be a factor in determining operational competency.

PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS

Personality-related characteristics can be described as those psychological attributes that dictate a person’s ability to effectively manage both different people and situations. There are many aspects that could be identified and considered relevant under this heading. By using the information collected in the in-depth interviews as the primary source, the following personality characteristics were highlighted as being most relevant to close protection work:

- patience
- self motivation
- ability to operate alone or in a team
- a positive mindset
- a sense of humour

Each of these factors are inherent aspects of a person’s psychological make up. Even of these factors are not prevalent, they can be developed through training and experience.
However, if there is not a strong natural leaning towards these aspects, a potential CPO would, in all likelihood not be able to manage the rigours of the job. This may result in more than just the CPO losing his/her job but may mean loss of life for the Principal and/or members of the protection team. As emphasised by one respondent: “a CPO must be able to operate under stressful situations and cope with boredom while maintaining a positive attitude” (Steyn, 2003).

**LEARNT SKILLS**

Learnt skills refer to the profile characteristics that must be taught and developed through training. It also includes aspects that everyone may possess but may need to be more highly developed for CPO duties. Once again the aspects listed below were extracted from the information that was obtained during the in-depth interviews. The concepts that seemed to be most relevant will be explained below.

**People and communication skills**

These refer, primarily, to the tools needed to communicate effectively in all close protection-related situations. This concept would include the application of correct protocol and etiquette. In many operational situations, the CPO would need to secure the co-operation of persons, who although not part of the protection detail, could contribute to the success of an operation. These skills can be developed through basic training, including role-play and scenario staging, as well as on-the-ground experience.

**Observation and awareness**

One of a CPO’s primary tasks is the early identification of threats. This would enable him/her to then implement the necessary measures needed to avoid these threats. The concept of proactivity and avoidance is partly reliant on a CPO having excellent observation and awareness skills. These skills can be developed by training CPOs in the necessary techniques and principles that apply. It would then be vitally important for the trainee CPO to practice and develop these skills in realistic situations.
Quick thinking and adaptability
The ability of a CPO to be able to think laterally and problem solve under pressure is vital to the protection initiative. The capability to blend into different environments and operate under vastly different circumstances is part and parcel of a high level CPO’s regular operational life.

While this is an inherent personality characteristic, it can most definitely be developed through effective training. The training should focus on presenting task-related problems in a manner as close as possible to what happens in reality. This should occur with an instructor guiding the trainee CPO through the problem until the trainee develops confidence to handle these problems alone.

Hard skills
Hard skills encompass all the necessary physical skills that a CPO needs to develop in order to provide effective close protection. The key hard skill areas are unarmed combat, driving skills, firearms’ skills, protection-related skills (IADs), and first aid skills (these are explained in more detail in the literature review, Chapter 4). These skills should be developed through ongoing training.

GENERAL PERCEPTIONS

The realities of what occurs while providing close protection is something that is often not discussed. It seems as if the vast majority of persons involved would rather believe the ‘glamorous side’ of the close protection industry instead of looking at the harsh realities of what actually happens. During the interview process, this was something that almost all respondents mentioned as a point of concern.

In many cases information security was cited as a reason as to why close protection is misunderstood. It is obvious that in an industry where operational methodology is designed to keep people alive, it would be important that such methodology was not available for public access.
Whilst maintaining a certain level of discretion when referring to the sensitive aspects of close protection provision is a valid issue, the persons and organisations involved in the industry should at the very least be able to differentiate between fact and fiction.

It has also been noted that in many cases the perceptions that people in various positions related to close protection may hold directly affect the way that a protection operation is performed. There were three sub-groups of persons that were identified whose perceptions were relevant to this research namely: the general public, clients utilising the services of CPOs and lastly other security providers. Each of these will be briefly discussed below.

**Public perception**

In general the public perception of close protection can only be based on hearsay or ‘what is seen in the movies’. This for the most part would be an unrealistic picture of what actually happens, focusing on those aspects that are most entertaining. It is not exciting to watch somebody sit in a car outside a client’s house for five hours not knowing when they are to depart.

Most respondents felt that even though the public perception is important, it is not necessary or viable to attempt to educate the general public on the realities of close protection. The following reasons have been identified as to why it is not necessary to educate the general public on the realities of close protection:

1. As a direct result of the information security that is a fundamental part of any close protection operation, much of what the CPO does and how it is done should not be made available to the general public.

2. In any event the public in general would not be interested in the fundamental details, as for the most part they are unexciting and quite monotonous.
3. Almost all members of the general public would never have a need for personal protection therefore there would be no point in educating them (making them more aware).

4. In certain cases the current public perception may actually aid in the smooth facilitation of a protection operation. This may be so, in that people might be more willing to help or co-operate if they believe that close protection operations are ‘like the movies’ as this would make them feel important.

Client perception
When interviewing respondents, a common point that was mentioned by both CPOs and representatives of the regulatory bodies was the importance of clarifying the clients’ perceptions about close protection. This is a vital component if South Africa is to have an effectively regulated industry.

If clients are not aware of what a CPO should be able to do, as well as how close protection should be provided, the effective provision of protection is difficult. It may result in the misuse of protection staff or the client utilising under-qualified personnel who may charge less and undercut the qualified protection providers.

Further common themes that were identified relating to client misconceptions include, but are not limited to, some of the following:

- The belief that any ex-policeman or service person is qualified to work as a close protection operative
- That close protection duties include those of acting as a butler to the client
- The concept that CPOs do not need ongoing training and re-training
- The idea that it does not really matter what qualifications a trained CPO possesses since it is better to have a less competent person who perhaps is less expensive, than to have nobody at all.

31 For the difference between the Principal and the client see Annexure 1: Definitions
The research done in this study has indicated that unless there is some sort of client education process that deals with some of the concerns mentioned above, effective regulation will be difficult or impossible to achieve. The lack of client education may result in clients either paying too much for unqualified personnel and/or competing providers may actually engage in ‘price wars’ in order to secure business. This could have disastrous results with either under-qualified personnel being employed or the operative on the ground not getting the correct remuneration for his/her services.

The fact that in many situations the client is actually not the Principal often has a direct influence on the quality of protection that the Principal receives. It was mentioned in several of the interviews, that in many cases the clients requesting the services did not have the correct understanding of what comprehensive protection duties entail. As a direct result of this, on many occasions, clients would select service providers purely on price-related factors. This, in certain cases, has led to unqualified service providers being awarded contracts for the provision of close protection services.

Moreover, another point of concern mentioned by many respondents about close protection in South Africa was the risk of incorrect application of affirmative action policies. The worry as described by several of the respondents was that to simply implement affirmative action, unqualified persons would be employed to provide close protection services. This, in itself, could have potentially lethal results since the fundamental purpose of close protection is ensuring the safety of the Principal’s life and an unqualified person tasked with that responsibility may not be able to adequately perform such close protection services (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004.).

Perceptions by general security companies (guarding, alarm monitoring and installation and investigation companies)
Information obtained in the in-depth interviews revealed that within the security industry itself, close protection is a misunderstood and misrepresented specialisation.
This was mentioned as a point of relevance because in many cases, other security companies are requested to provide close protection services by their clients and may not utilise qualified and specialised CPO personnel (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; and Van Eck, 2003.). Additionally, in many cases during protection operations, CPOs must liaise and work with providers of other security and related services.

Several of the interview respondents were of the opinion that any company offering close protection services should be regulated separately from other security providers, i.e. become a recognised service sector on its own (Higgins, 2003; Rootman, 2004; and Steyn, 2004). While this may not be a realistic idea in terms of implementation, the concept of separating the regulation of close protection providers from other security providers may have merit.

The benefits of this approach include establishing the protection market for providers that only utilise trained personnel and that the client will probably receive a more effective close protection service. A general education package that outlined to security providers what the benefits of close protection are and what a qualified CPO’s job description should be, would be very useful. This was a possible answer to the problem of how to educate ‘other’ security providers on close protection. This was deemed important by the researcher as in many cases these other security providers offer sub-standard/not comprehensive close protection using poorly trained or unqualified CPOs to many of their clients.

Moreover, it would make the working relationship between CPOs and other security providers far more efficient. This is relevant since, although a CPO is not a specialist in all fields of security, he/she should have a generic understanding of almost all aspects relevant to the security of the Principal. This means that a CPO would know what the functions of other security providers entail but in most cases other security providers do not know enough about close protection to understand clearly how it works.
INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN CPOS

In all likelihood a Principal requiring close protection would travel extensively outside his/her country of origin. In many situations this involves either the Principal being accompanied by his/her close protection operative or team. If this does not happen the CPO will, at the very least, be responsible for providing advice on travel, accommodation, provision of close protection in the country being visited and other related arrangements.

As a direct result of this, it is vital that CPO training and operations not only be standardised in this country, but in the long term, will need to be linked to international operational practices. A CPO may have to work with a local team, resident in the country that the Principal is visiting. If operational procedures and approaches are totally different, it will make the provision of effective protection in other countries very difficult. The direct result is an increase in the risk and threat to which the Principal will be exposed.

There are also situations where the Principal travels abroad and does not take his personal protectors with but opts instead to use local CPOs at his/her destination. It would be important to know that the local team of CPOs meets some sort of minimum competency requirements and can do the job effectively, i.e. benchmarked against international standards and best practices.

In addition, another aspect to consider is the facilitation of close protection for visitors to South Africa. In many cases these visiting Principals have been exposed to close protection before and may even have teams in their own countries. If the standard of protection that they receive in South Africa is not at least equivalent to that of their international counterparts, it will be noticed and could be embarrassing or even life threatening to the Principal. As a whole, this could have long term negative effects for the close protection industry in South Africa.
It is clear that a CPO may work with a variety of Principals with differing religious, political, social beliefs or practices. Globalisation means that a CPO can no longer look at the world from only one perspective but has to be able to put aside personal beliefs and prejudices in order to perform his/her duties effectively regardless of he/she they like the Principal or agree with his/her political, religious or ideological beliefs. Providing protection internationally means that a CPO must be able to adapt and operate in any environment. It is vital that a CPO is able to meet the customary requirements of the country being visited in order to avoid offending the locals and inadvertently creating an incident.

There are also different protocol procedures that apply when working in different countries or providing protection to different Principals in South Africa. It is vital that CPOs are aware of, and taught, the way that things are done in different countries. This must include not only pre-identified protocol procedures, i.e. like how to go about obtaining police or government assistance, but also what is customarily correct in that country. This is important as undue embarrassment to the client may inadvertently take place and the client may take offence to the fact that his/her customs and beliefs are not being respected or adhered to.

**SHARING OF KNOWLEDGE ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS**

Many South African trained CPOs are operating in the world’s [security] hotspots like Iraq. Students are now coming from abroad to get trained in South Africa (Smith, 2003).

International crosstraining is not a new concept and several of the respondents interviewed have, in fact, been trained by various international instructors both in South Africa and abroad. However, what is changing is the fact that international travel has never been easier and with the proliferation of the internet, it is possible to find out about, and even organise bookings for, training in other countries.
There are also many governmental initiatives that involve sending trainers abroad to work with operatives in other countries and/or present training. This has happened on several occasions in South Africa and is an ongoing initiative. International crosstraining also happens the other way around with guest trainers and training teams coming to provide training in South Africa.

There has also, over time, been the exchange of ideas and operating practices taking place on ground level when CPOs from different countries and agencies land up operating on the same tasks. This has led to an unofficial standardising and establishment of what skills should be expected of a trained CPO. Furthermore, it should be noted that in certain scenarios, it is impractical to standardise all approaches as differing environments and situations require differing operational practices.

All-in-all, the process of sharing knowledge across borders has already initiated an informal form of benchmarking. In the long term this will make the creation of international standards smoother and more readily accepted.

**BENCHMARKING OF STANDARDS AND MINIMUM COMPETENCIES**

There are a few South African CPOs that are professional enough to work anywhere in the world, the problem is that South Africa does not have a set internationally recognised standard for CPOs (Sharp, 2003).

Due to the nature of close protection work and the fact that many top level South African CPOs receive much international exposure, it is only logical that they may be offered jobs in other countries. There is also exposure for South African CPOs when they have to perform their duties abroad. This has been mentioned simply to reinforce the necessity for international benchmarking of minimum competencies and eventually full reciprocal recognition of qualifications internationally.
In certain cases there are already existing international standards that have been established by various organisations having offices or representatives in different countries. There are many examples of such international organisations such as the International Bodyguard Association (IBA) based in Paris and the Professional Bodyguard Association (PBA) based in London. Additionally many companies and training institutions have links with associates or offices in other countries. This, to a limited degree, does allow for the validation of qualifications or persons. The key problem is that no single organisation or company has total international recognition.

During the research it was difficult to obtain objective information since most respondents felt that their organisation, agency or company was the only one that actually adhered to high standards of close protection training or had received international recognition. In several interviews, respondents made related comments about the general functioning and effectiveness of many of the existing organisations and their standards. Although the respondents explained it in different ways, the general consensus was that when taken at face value, these organisations appear to maintain a level of competency standards and implement effective validation and enforcement of their policies for all their members.

However, in reality this may not be so since many memberships involve simply paying regular fees and very little, if any, effort goes into ensuring that members are qualified or that people that these representatives may train are competent i.e. no monitoring and regular evaluation occurs. Determining the validity of this is not within the scope of this research, but it should be noted that unless an organisation’s standards are accepted by the entire industry (South African and internationally), they are not really valid or have much professional credibility.

In South Africa there are also several CPO associations as well as local representation of the international organisations. Among the larger and more progressive organisations is the VIP Protectors Association of South Africa (VIPPASA).
Furthermore, it is the opinion of the researcher that effective standard setting and industry regulation by POSLEC SETA and PSIRA is far more important than the setting of internal standards by individual associations and organisations.

The reality is that there is a definite need to establish an international benchmarked standard although this might in the immediate future not be realistic. What will, however, be viable is to ensure that the minimum standards put in place by the relevant South African regulatory bodies are of a high enough standard to be recognised by the equivalent bodies in other countries. In the future, reciprocal validation of qualifications will be vital in order to ensure that Recognition of Prior Learning can be conducted in an effective manner.

**HOW DO SOUTH AFRICAN CPOS COMPARE WITH THEIR INTERNATIONAL COUNTERPARTS?**

“South African CPOs that are good enough to work internationally are among the best operatives in the world” (Jacobs, 2003).

During the interviews certain interesting opinions were presented by the respondents. In many cases, these opinions were repeated by unrelated respondents with different operational backgrounds and histories. The fact that interviewees with totally unrelated experience and backgrounds believe the same things is in its own way a basic form of validation. Some of these opinions regarding the standard of South African CPOs will be discussed below.

It was stated by several respondents that although the overall standard of CPOs in South Africa is low, there are some very well trained and highly competent CPOs who have been trained locally. The respondents mentioned that this group of CPOs is as competent and compare favourably with any of their international counterparts.

It was also stated that because of the crime situation in South Africa (comparatively higher than many other countries especially the more developed), South African CPOs
operate at what is considered a medium threat level all the time. Whereas in many other countries where crime levels are lower, and violent crime more isolated, the level of close protection operations does not need to be conducted at the same level of intensity. This translates directly into the South African CPO being more prepared to deal with a threatening situation than many CPOs from other countries having lower threat levels, would be (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; and Van Eck, 2003).

In addition, another trend was that South African CPOs seem to operate with fewer resources and less logistical back up than their international counterparts. This is particularly relevant in the private sector where operations are usually conducted with very little or no assistance from the authorities. This differs from many ‘regulated countries’ where, on request, a protection detail may receive a good deal of assistance from the authorities such as police escorts or access to intelligence and classified information.

The research has shown that when all factors are taken into account, the overall opinion of respondents was that qualified South African CPOs are just as competent as their international counterparts. In fact in many cases respondents stated that they thought that South African CPOs are more capable of working effectively in adverse conditions with limited resources than their international counterparts.

Another point consistently mentioned was the differences in operational approach when referring to high or low profile methods of operation used in different countries. This refers to the visibility of the close protection operation. In a high profile operation no attempt is made to blend into the environment, the belief is that high visibility acts as a deterrent. In the case of a low profile operation the aim of the protection operation would be to draw as little attention to who they are and what they are doing as possible. Examples given were primarily those comparing the operational approaches of agencies from the United Kingdom and the USA. Whereas agencies from USA tend to focus on a high profile approach by using lots of manpower and resources, the British agencies
attempt to utilise only the resources necessary to get the job done without attracting undue attention (Jacobs, 2003; Sharp, 2003; and Smith, 2004).

Throughout the interviews a good deal of time was spent discussing high and low profile approaches to protection. The debate as to which is the better approach for the South African environment was not totally clear but the general consensus is that it is possible to go from low profile to high profile but not the other way around and unless there are a huge amount of resources available an effective high profile operation is very difficult to run. Therefore the focus should be on low profile as the standard operational methodology that is applied in South Africa.

CONCLUSION

The focus of this chapter was to identify and explain the relevant misconceptions related to close protection. The correct profile of a CPO in terms of physical, psychological and learnt skills was also discussed. There were three critical subgroups that were identified when the topic of perception was mentioned, namely; the public, the clients who use close protection and other providers of security and related services.

Some of the key concepts that were mentioned with regard to the close protection operatives’ profile were aspects such as his/her physical appearance and the relevant personality characteristics that are needed to be an effective operative. The general consensus was that a CPO should look like the ‘average person on the street’ in order to facilitate low profile protection. This was outlined as far more important than the physical size of the CPO. Some of the key psychological attributes that were mentioned included attributes such as patience, self motivation, ability to operate alone or in a team, a positive mindset and a good sense of humour.

When the concept of public perceptions was analysed, the general conclusion reached was that it is impractical to attempt to educate the general public on the realities of close protection. Several reasons were cited that clarified this opinion that public perceptions
would have very little effect on the actual improvement of a CPO’s operational skills and the general regulation of the industry as a whole.

It was, however, identified that an educating process (awareness programme) for clients and other security providers would be beneficial. This concept, particularly as it applies to the client, may be a vital link in the regulation and professionalisation of the close protection industry in South Africa.

Moreover, when comparing the standard at which top level South African CPOs operate, compared to their international counterparts, it was stated by several interview respondents (Jacobs, 2003; Sharp, 2003; and Smith, 2004) that local CPOs are as good, if not better than their international counterparts.

This opinion could be attributed to the fact that because of relatively high levels of violent crime in South Africa, local CPOs have become accustomed to operating in higher risk and threat operations than are their international counterparts. Furthermore, another factor contributing to this opinion is that in many cases South African CPOs operate with limited resources and logistical backup as compared to international operatives. This translates directly into the South African CPOs ability to perform effectively in adverse conditions with limited resources and backup.
Chapter 7

TERRORISM, THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND CLOSE PROTECTION

INTRODUCTION

Since the September 11 attacks people all over the world look at security differently, the importance of specialised security and Close Protection as a vital component to effective protection cannot be overestimated (Steynberg, 2003).

One of the primary identified methods of reducing the likelihood of a direct terrorist attack on a designated person or of being an unwitting victim of such an attack, would be to utilise the services of trained CPOs. Not only will the presence of security act as a deterrent in itself but it will also minimise the risk of exposure through applied avoidance and proactive planning. During many of the interviews the concept of terrorism and its effect on close protection was mentioned by several of the respondents (Allon, 2003; Garvey, 2004; Jacobs, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; and Van Eck, 2003). It was then identified as a factor that should be assessed in the terms of its relevance to close protection. It was determined that while some of the existing literature includes aspects on terrorism very few have actually assessed it within the context of close protection.

The concept of a global world economy has influenced international trends in many ways. One of these is the way in which terrorism could be perpetrated against targets on foreign soil and still achieve the desired effect on the terrorist’s targeted audience. Terrorist activity and attack on innocent civilians, in an attempt to achieve a desired political or religious outcome, is not a new threat to world security and safety.
Terrorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, the Red Army Faction in Japan (RAF), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the United Kingdom as well as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Al-Fatah in Israel to name but a few, have long been carrying out acts of terror. This has led to each country tackling terrorism in their own way. Examples of this are the establishment of counter-terrorist teams (the British SAS, the Yamam in Israel, Delta Force in the USA, etc.) or taking such Counter-terrorist action such as Israel placing undercover air marshals on all El-Al flights and recent (post 9/11) proposals to arm pilots on American flights. However, the events of 11 September 2001 have forever changed the public perception and international awareness of the terrorist threat.

Generally terrorist attacks take one of the following forms:

- hostage taking
- hijacking
- assassination
- armed attack
- bomb attack
- propaganda and intimidation campaigns

The fact that in the vast majority of cases the targets of terrorist attacks are non-combatants/civilians (see definition below) means that everyone can be a potential victim of a terrorist attack. With this concern in mind the governments of most security conscious nations have put considerable time and effort into the concepts of anti- and counter-terrorism. The need to deal with the terrorist phenomenon is understood by most security specialists and it is common place for security assessments to include an analysis of the likelihood of terrorist attack on a given target or person. In terms of proactive avoidance and prevention the use of trained CPOs becomes a viable addition to any anti-terror campaign.
The most intimidating aspect of terrorism is the largely random nature of attacks, particularly those aimed at spreading fear among the general population. However, there are those kinds of terrorist attacks where specific individuals are the target (for whatever reason). This is even potentially more relevant for a Principal requiring the services of a close protection detail.

More often than not clients utilising close protection services are high profile or influential persons. This means that if such persons were targeted by terrorist groups the potential media exposure (of the terrorist attack) and ramifications of such action would be greater, i.e. the terrorist group involved would get better exposure of its views and aims, particularly if politically motivated. From a terrorist perspective this is often exactly what they are looking for as in many cases what they desire is exposure and publicity for their given cause.

DEFINITIONS

There are many different definitions of terrorism. The breadth and scope of what is considered terrorism and what is not is constantly being changed and adjusted. When reviewing terrorism as a specialist field it is staggering to see the sub-divisions of terrorism. There are many specialist sub-categories ranging from aspects such as bio-terrorism to complex issues like state terrorism. In order to answer the stated research problem, a detailed assessment of terrorism in its entirety would not be relevant. For the purpose of this report the definitions of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Codes, Section 2656 (d) will be used. The term is the best defined therein and reads as follows: 32

The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence and audience.

32 It should be noted that there are many existing definitions of terrorism and terrorist activities, this definition has been chosen merely because it is a well-referenced example. The selection of this definition by no means validates its accuracy above that of other definitions.
The term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

The term ‘terrorist group’ means any group practising or that has significant subgroups that practice international terrorism (http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/).

What differentiates a terrorist attack from a criminal offence?
In many cases a terrorist attack would involve criminal offences, i.e. murder, assault, etc. This is not, however, true for the converse. According to the above definition, for an act to be considered an act of terror the following key aspects need to be apparent:33

- It needs to be a premeditated act, in other words it must have been planned in advance. No terrorist act is a spur of the moment act. While the victims and location may not have been pre-selected, the act itself would have involved a certain amount of preplanning. The motivation for the attack could be based on political, cultural, religious or social beliefs. However, when looking at the majority of terrorist attacks, the motivation seems to trace back to a politically-focused reasoning.

- The attack or act is usually an act of violence perpetrated against non-combatants. For purposes of the above definition, the term non-combatant is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. Civilian security personnel, such as Executive Protection Personnel, unless openly armed, would also be seen as non-combatants.

- The last key aspect relevant to defining a terrorist act is usually the attempt to gain exposure for the terrorist group’s cause by means of the ensuing media coverage of their terrorist action. In his book, *Inside Terrorism*, Hoffman devotes an entire chapter to this issue. Some of the key points that are mentioned by Hoffman are as follows:

33 The information below has been extracted and compiled from, *Terrorism inside a world phenomenon* (Davies, 2003: 14-15); and *Inside Terrorism* (Hoffman, 1998: 13-43).
- The fact that many terrorist acts are planned in such a manner as to get maximum press and media coverage

- The concept that the knowledge that many people will be informed about whom the terrorist group perpetrating the act are and why they are doing it, is sometimes motivation for terrorist action in itself

- The constant battle of television networks and other media forms to gain ratings and push up circulation means that the more extravagant the terrorist act the more media exposure each will get (Hoffman, 1998: 131-157).

Therefore, a terrorist attack by definition will usually include some sort of criminal offence (murder, attempted murder, arson, assault, etc.), whereas a criminal attack may not demonstrate any of the factors that define a terrorist action. It is often the intention behind the action that will determine whether it is an act of terror or simply a criminal act.

**TERRORISM AND CLOSE PROTECTION**

By definition almost all close protection activities attempt to minimise the Principal’s exposure to every relevant threat. The Principals’ exposure would be primarily dependant on their profile in terms of aspects such as public exposure. If the Principal is a high profile figure (featured regularly in the media, well-known, i.e. a celebrity, or holds a position of influence, for instance in business, politics or entertainment) any of the aspects listed below\(^{34}\) can increase the likelihood of terrorist groups targeting him/her:

- His/her political beliefs
- His/her religious beliefs
- His/her nationality
- His/her business dealings

\(^{34}\) The aspects that are listed have been drawn from various sources as listed in the Reference List and collated by the researcher, specifically in context of a Principal’s likelihood to be a victim through terrorist attack.
- His/her personal likes and dislikes
- The people that the Principal socialises with or is affiliated with.

The more the CPO knows about the above mentioned factors the easier it will be to determine what level of exposure the Principal may have to a terrorist attack. This would then enable the CPO to plan and hopefully implement such strategies to minimise any attack from occurring. Contingencies would also be developed covering all relevant aspects of how to deal with attacks if they were to occur.

Finally, in terms of a terrorist attack, the last aspect to consider is ‘wrong place, wrong time’. This means that simply by being at a certain geographical location and/or at the wrong moment in time the Principal may be exposed to acts of terror. Nonetheless, even this random, unforeseen exposure can be minimised. A CPO would minimise the chances of ‘wrong place, wrong time’ by being up to date with terrorist groups’ modus operandi and then planning the principal’s movements in such a way as to limit the time the Principal will be in such situations or locations.

Random acts of terror are exceptionally difficult to predict and avoid. However, effective prediction and avoidance could be achieved by employing Close Protection Operatives and risk management professionals. It is well noted and considered a ‘must learn’ topic for all professional CPOs to at least have a basic knowledge of terrorist groups and modus operandi. This is important as otherwise it is impossible to carry out a comprehensive risk and threat analysis and thereby inhibiting effective planning and contingency planning.

Avoidance of any threatening situation could be considered the primary goal of close protection. A well trained CPO tasked with the protection of a Principal that could potentially be a victim of terrorist attack should consider it a primary aspect of his/her duties to liaise regularly with relevant authorities, conduct ongoing research and fieldwork and than constantly plan according to the identified changing trends.
In their book, *You’re the target: Coping with terror and crime*, Shackley, Oatman and Finney outline their belief that effective close protection in certain cases could be considered enough of a deterrent for would-be assassins, stalkers, and terrorist attackers to select easier or less protected victims (Shackley, et al. 1989: 111-122).

**INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND TERRORISM**

The significance of the 9/11 act of terrorism in the USA has been extensive. It was not only the number of people that died in this particular incident that had such far reaching after effects (such as the United States actions against Afghanistan and Iraq). If a comparison is drawn between this specific act (9/11) and other continuous terrorist activity there have, in fact, been many more civilians killed over a period of time in places like Latin America, the Middle-east and certain Pacific-based countries than in 9/11. The resulting widespread fear and insecurity in American citizens post-9/11 could perhaps be linked to the widespread media exposure at the time of the 9/11 attack and the fact that the attacks were conducted on such a large scale, for the first time on American soil, i.e. unprecedented, and that America appeared defenceless against the onslaught. In other words, was unable to defend itself and protect American citizens. American public fears and insecurities have subsequently been compounded by the ongoing media focus and attention given to the ‘Global War Against Terrorism’.

It could be said that the 9/11 attack made people all over the world reassess their security personal and otherwise. Furthermore, people may have also started to analyse what they could possibly do to enhance there safety when travelling abroad. A practical example of this is the huge drop in air travel by tourists for a while after 9/11. One of the obvious answers, for those that could afford it, was to employ the services of security specialists (CPOs).

It is a widely known fact in security circles that something often referred to as the ‘international terrorist network’ is in operation and was at its prime in the 1980s and

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35 See Chapter 4, section on international and local demand for Close Protection Operatives for more information.
1990s. This network had been established where terrorists from unrelated groups received training and established informal networks and in certain cases co-operated in planning operations and drawing support from each other. This means that knowledge and information was shared across borders. The implication of this network is that there could well be a continuous threat to certain high-profile individuals regardless of where a VIP might be travelling in the world. An example of this is the attack at Ben Gurion airport in the late 1970s by members of a terrorist group known as the Red Army Faction. This attack was apparently perpetrated on behalf of Middle Eastern terrorists and carried out by German and Japanese terrorists.

Therefore, with both the internationalisation of the media and international operations of terrorist groups being well established, it is easy to recognise that terrorists could achieve their objectives by selecting targets that may be far removed from their home country. So too with business now being run on a global scale and international deals becoming the mainstay of large business operations, a VIP business executive may travel abroad often. It would therefore be vital for a CPO to be up-to-date and congruent with all threats in any specific set travel destination including potential terrorist or related activity.

The Al-Qaeda\(^{36}\) terrorist network is said to be active in over 60 countries. Furthermore, their modus operandi is so varied that some governments are devoting entire units to try and track down traces of the network in their own countries. For individuals without such resources, employing CPOs that can liaise with such units and work to minimise the associated risks to the Principal would be a practical measure to employ. Without effective specialist security professionals conducting ongoing liaison and research it would be almost impossible to determine when, where, why and how an attack may take place.

\(^{36}\) The Al-Qaeda network terrorist network is considered one the world’s foremost terrorist organisations, it is estimated to be active in over sixty countries and is alleged to be responsible for the 9/11 attacks and the Bali bombings in Indonesia. Its leader Osama Bin Laden is one of the world’s most wanted terror suspects.
FUNDAMENTALIST ATTACKS

We issue the following Fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies... Civilians and Military... Is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it... (Quote from a video taped interview with Osama Bin Laden on 7 October 2001).  

In security and safety terms the concept of fundamentalist attacks is a very disturbing idea. The fact that a person would be willing to trade their life in order to achieve a given objective is in itself a worrying concept for any security personnel. When that objective may involve perpetrating violent acts on a CPOs principal, it is vital for CPOs to not only be aware of fundamentalist behaviour but also how to manage and deal with it. This is obviously no small task but the modern methods of terrorist necessitate the need for counter skills to fundamentalist attack.

Fundamentalism is not a new concept. However, it takes on a different perspective when assessing its impact on Close Protection and close protection strategies (the need to protect a designated person from any threatening situation). An attack by a fundamentalist terrorist is a major problem since regardless of the form of attack (suicide bombing, firearms attack, etc) if an individual is willing to lay down their life in order to achieve their objective, they will make a very difficult adversary to defend against and protect a Principal’s life.

There are many misconceptions about fundamentalist attackers. Information on the profile of fundamentalist terrorists is mentioned in the publications of Lacquer (1999: 79-105) and Hoffman (1998; 157-185). Some of the predominant misconceptions are that: terrorists are uneducated, badly trained and easy to spot.

37 The excerpt was extracted from material utilised by Mr C. McGuire (see references for details on Mr McGuire) in a lecture on terrorism to Japanese embassy staff, presented in Johannesburg on the 12 November 2001. The original quote was taken from a CNN news update that screened the above-mentioned video interview.
However, from the vast majority of case studies in the various literature reviewed, these aspects seem to be untrue. This may mean that the fundamentalist attacker may be a well educated, highly motivated attacker and even a professional soldier who will be able to pre-empt and avoid many security and close protection initiatives, plans or measures.

It is vital that a CPO’s training and operational practices prepare him/her with the skills and knowledge of how to avoid, manage or deal with a terrorist attack should it occur. In order to achieve this all aspects of a CPO’s training need to be integrated into a focused protective strategy. When analysing the applicable factors that need to be focused on in order for Close Protection Operatives to receive the training necessary to deal with this sort of threat, the following aspects have been identified:

1. Effective risk and threat assessment skills should be included in all close protection training, in order to know recent modus operandi of current fundamentalist terrorist groups. This would also give the CPO the ability to identify any threats that are inherent as a result of geographical location and Principal characteristics/lifestyle.

2. A CPO should be well trained to utilise effective planning skills in order to pre-empt potential attacks and threatening situations. The aim would then be to avoid such situations and to plan for identified contingencies that may arise should a situation occur.

3. Effective delegation, manpower and logistical appreciation skills are vital in order to correctly forecast and then deploy the necessary close protection structure. This is done in order to create layers of defence around the Principal and limit his/her exposure identified threats.

4. Effective awareness and observational skills training should be a core part of close protection training, in order to enable CPOs to identify the subtle indicators that may precede an attack situation.
5. Mental acuity and lateral thinking ability should be part of CPOs characteristics. This should enable a CPO to be prepared for different contingencies and unexpected attacks that may occur.

6. Effective Immediate Action Drill (IAD) reflex training should be a mainstay of close protection team training. This would hopefully ensure that under the pressure of an attack situation the close protection detail will respond in the correct way.

While a fundamentalist terrorist attack is a most daunting reality, effective training covering the factors discussed above should prepare the CPO to deal with and manage any attack should it actually occur.

**TERRORISM AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION**

The South African policy on terrorism can best be explained in the following excerpt from Martin Schönteich of the Institute for Security Studies, in an article titled ‘South Africa’s arsenal of terrorism legislation’ in the journal *African Security Review*.

**“SOUTH AFRICA’S ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY**

In 1998, the South African government approved a new official policy on terrorism. In terms of the policy, terrorism is defined as:

‘An incident of violence, or the threat thereof, against a person, a group of persons or property not necessarily related to the aim of the incident, to coerce a government or civil population to act or not to act according to certain principles.’

According to its terrorism policy, the South African government is committed:

- To uphold the rule of law;
- Never to resort to any form of general and indiscriminate repression;
• To defend and uphold the freedom and security of all its citizens; and
• To acknowledge and respect its obligations to the international community.’

Moreover, according to the terrorism policy, the South African government shall:

• condemn all acts of terror
• take all lawful measures to prevent acts of terror and to bring to justice those who are involved in acts of terror; undertake to protect foreign citizens from acts of terror in South Africa
• in the event of an act of terror in a foreign country and involving a South African citizen, co-operate with the host government to resolve the matter
• not make concessions that could encourage extortion by terrorists; not allow its territory to be used as a haven to plan, direct or support acts of terror
• support and co-operate with the international community in their efforts to prevent and combat acts of terror
• use all appropriate measures to combat terrorism; and support its citizens who are victims of terrorism” (Schonteich, 2000: 39-40).

To date there are two South African organisations that are listed as terrorist organisations by the United States, State Department, namely; People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and Qibla (the name is taken from the term used to describe the direction in which Muslims face when praying). These two organisations are thought to have links to the international Al-Qaeda network. It is stated on the above website that the two organisations ‘Probably have ties to Islamic extremists in the Middle East’. There have been criminal court cases against PAGAD for urban terror attacks in Cape Town during 1998 and 1999.

The reality of a terrorist attack occurring in South Africa is something that cannot be ignored and the South African government has recently released an update draft bill on anti-terrorism (B12-2003, 1/11/2002). The government’s aim seems to be to take a much harder stance to terrorism activities.

EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL TERRORISM ON CLOSE PROTECTION

During this research several critical factors were identified that influence the way terrorism effects Close Protection. These aspects pertain to both local and international trends. These factors will be outlined and discussed below:

1. Foreign travel of VIPs

Almost all people that warrant the services of a CPO or CPO team will travel abroad relatively often. Even if the CPO or team does not accompany the VIP it falls within the scope and duties of the CPO to conduct a thorough risk and threat assessment of the situation at the intended destination of travel. The CPO would than brief the Principal accordingly.

It is therefore vital that a CPO is up-to-date with international trends and occurrences. Furthermore the CPO must have the ability to access the correct logistical and situational threat related information as well as make contact with key personnel on the ground at the Principal’s intended destination. This is important since the threat of terrorist attack may vary from country to country and region to region.

2. International terrorist networks

The fact that most established terrorist groups have contact with each other and assist each other where possible poses a unique problem to the CPO. The problem is that due to a Principal’s status, nationality, religious persuasions and/or political beliefs there may be at risk from foreign groups targeting them in countries where such a group is not believed to be active.
3. Media leveraging
Many VIPs utilising close protection services can be classified as high profile (easily recognizable by the public and regularly featured in the media). This means that a terrorist organisation wanting media exposure for their cause would attract a lot of attention by perpetrating an attack (murder, kidnap, destruction of assets, embarrassment, etc.) on a high profile VIP. It is well documented that media coverage and exposure to a larger audience base is a common motive for terrorist attacks.

4. Principal’s background, religious and/or political beliefs and affiliations
A Principal may be targeted solely because of his/her background, religious and/or political beliefs and affiliations. Reasons for this, in addition to possible media coverage may be strictly personal as fanatical followers belonging to a fundamentalist terrorist group may take personal offence to a public figure who extols different beliefs and ideals to them (for example, the Fatwa pronounced on the author Salman Rushdie for his novels on aspects of the Muslim religion which upset certain sections of this religion’s adherents).

RAMIFICATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FOR THE TRAINING OF CLOSE PROTECTION OPERATIVES

A basic knowledge of terrorist training, methodology and activities, should form part of any close protection training program. It is important for a CPO to know how his opposition trains and prepares (Sharp, 2003).

Within the context of international terrorism and fundamentalist attacks (i.e. the usually suicidal nature of these attacks and the attacker’s absolute disdain for their own lives in accomplishing an attack on their selected target) the key question to be clarified is:

*How does terrorism and its modern applications impact on the required training of Close Protection Operatives?*
Information gathered from the literature review and from the interviews undertaken, all seem to indicate that a more comprehensive and holistic approach needs to be adopted for the training of CPOs. This is not specifically because of the increase in the threat level of terrorist attacks, but the worldwide proliferation of terrorist activities remains a major contributing factor to the need for highly trained CPOs.

Terrorism is not a new threat but the combination of modern technology and improved weaponry as well as the easy access to information (internet) has made the potential for terrorist attacks an even greater concern. When assessing additions or adjustments needed for CPO training the following areas appear to be most relevant:

- The CPOs ability to use of technology (Internet) to gain information
- The CPOs ability to effectively conduct accurate threat assessment and risk analysis.
- Effective liaison skills is a must have attribute for CPOs, in order to keep as informed as possible by gaining relevant information from authorities
- A combination of the abilities needed to plan thoroughly, while also being able to adjust and adapt based on the sudden changes in a given situation
- The CPO must also obviously maintain adequate competency levels of all the relevant hard skills (unarmed combat, firearms skills etc) as relevant to the function of Close Protection.

The above mentioned aspects were mentioned in almost all close protection training texts that were examined. The majority of respondents mentioned the importance of well-trained CPOs as a vital aspect to protect a Principal from terrorist threats.
CONCLUSION

Whilst acts of terror are not a new threat to the safety of civilians, recent acts of terror such as the 9/11 attacks and the Bali bombings have changed the relevance of the threat to many people. In terms of close protection activities it is vital for CPOs to know what the existing threats to their Principal may be, as well as when, where and how these threats may manifest.

The link between the effective application of close protection and minimising the levels of exposure to potential terrorist activity are well noted. However, factors such as the fact that many Principals are high profile figures who may travel internationally often mean that a CPO needs to stay abreast of changing terrorist trends. This needs to be done in order for the CPO to minimise the Principal’s exposure to such threats.

There is existing proof that international terrorist organisations exist and have widespread networks operating in many countries. It is suggested that the South African organisations, PAGAD and Qibla probably have ties to Islamic extremists in the Middle East. This combined with the fact that there have been several bomb attacks in the last few years in South Africa means that terrorism is a real threat in South Africa.

In order to minimise the risks of terror attacks, there are certain aspects of close protection training that need to be emphasised. These include aspects such as comprehensive networking and information gathering skills that would be needed to gain information on terrorist activities from the relevant agencies and official organisations. This would than enable the CPO to effectively plan to limit the exposure of a Principal to identified threats. Effective planning would also enable the CPO to consider contingencies and make the necessary preparations to manage such contingencies should they occur. It would also obviously be vital for a CPO to be competent in all necessary hard skills (firearms, unarmed combat, etc.) should an attack actually occur.
Close Protection Operatives need to have, at the very least, a basic understanding of terrorism, including motivation and general modus operandi of terrorist attackers. This is validated by the need for a CPO to be able to provide a comprehensive service which must focus on the relevant threats facing a Principal.
Chapter 8
TECHNOLOGY, COMMUNICATION AND CLOSE PROTECTION

INTRODUCTION

The ability for a CPO to effectively liaise and communicate with all parties involved in a Close Protection task is one of the most important attributes. It is a fundamental skill necessary to do the job in a professional manner (Sharp, 2003).

In its most basic definition close protection involves the safeguarding of a designated person’s life. With such high stakes involved it is obvious that any miscommunication could have very serious consequences. During the interviews a common theme that was identified as a vital operational skills requirement for a CPO was for the CPO to be able to effectively communicate and liaise with all relevant parties (Hendricks 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004). This was also mentioned in several training manuals and literary sources to the point that Consterdine (1995: 327) states that “A CP team will stand or fall in effectiveness by its ability to communicate”.

While the topic of communication was mentioned in many of the instructional manuals, it was noted that a detailed working analysis of the communication aspects of close protection was missing. This topic was discussed in detail, in those interviews where the respondent raised communication as a key component of the CPOs arsenal of skills. The researcher has also gained extensive experience with this subject while operating as a CPO, team leader and close protection trainer.
The applicable aspects of communication as applied in the context of close protection will be expanded on in this chapter. The aim of this chapter is not to serve as an instructional framework but rather as a detailed breakdown for the application of communication and related concepts during close protection operations. Furthermore, it can be mentioned that a thorough understanding of the aspects covered in this chapter should not only be well known to all close protection trainers but to field operatives as well.

A further theme that was identified in almost every interview was the importance of applying technological improvements to all aspects of close protection operations and training (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). This concept goes hand-in-hand with communication as improved technology enables more effective means for CPOs to gather information and communicate.

Technological improvements have not only enabled more effective communication but have had effects on almost all close protection equipment, ranging from better firearms to GPS tracking systems. Several of these modifications and new operational equipment will be discussed in this chapter. It should also be noted that while improvements in technology have huge benefits for the close protection industry, there is the reality that potential attackers could utilise these tools as well. This would obviously make it far more difficult to provide comprehensive protection for a high risk Principal.

OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL JARGON UTILISED IN CLOSE PROTECTION

Much the same as almost any other specialist field, there always seems to be a language in itself when analysing the close protection industry. The use of specific technical jargon is an aspect that became apparent during the preliminary interview process. It became quite clear during the in-depth interviews that the vast majority of CPOs, almost take for granted that all people understand what they are talking about and referring to.
This was reinforced by certain of the interviewees, who actually mentioned, that persons not involved in the protection industry seem to have a limited understanding of close protection terminology (Higgins, 2003; Jones, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Sharp, 2003; and Van Eck, 2003). This can obviously lead to potential miscommunication between persons exposed to the close protection industry and those who are not.

Another trend that was identified during the in-depth interviews with CPOs was the use of different terminology to describe the same thing. The different interviewees seemed to base their specific terminologies on their own personal training and operational backgrounds. An example of this is where certain outdated terminology was used. For instance instead referring to the designated person receiving the Close Protection as the Principal he/she is referred to as a ‘F1’.

When assessing the international close protection environment the same seems to be true, where different terminology is used to describe the same thing. A typical example to illustrate the point is the way that the specialist field of close protection is generally referred to in different countries. Below is a breakdown to illustrate this point:

- Britain, South Africa – ‘Close Protection’ or ‘VIP Protection’
- Israel – ‘Body guarding’
- USA – ‘VIP’, ‘Executive’ or ‘Dignitary Protection’ and ‘Close Protection’
- Australia – ‘Close Personal Protection’.

COMMUNICATION IN CLOSE PROTECTION

There is much information available on the principles that are applicable to general communication. Some of these will be briefly outlined below and than these principles will be related to Close Protection. As outlined in the Behaviour Systems Development’s *Train-the-trainer manual*, effective communication should follow the sequence below:
Diagram 1: Process of communication

Regardless of the medium for communication CPOs should utilise the key steps as outlined in the above diagram. These aspects which are applicable to communication in all situations should be implemented by CPOs to avoid miscommunication. An example relating to the above diagram to a close protection situation could be a Principal briefing (see, Annexure 1: Definitions). If the close protection team leader (sender) does not effectively put the information across in an understandable format (encoding and sending) and if the Principal (receiver) does not understand (decode) and confirm (provide feedback) that he/she understands what is required the resulting consequences could be severe.

If we were to take the above example and assume that the protection team leader would be briefing a Principal on the ‘dos and ‘do nots' of reaction to a hand grenade attack and if the message, for whatever reason is not effectively communicated the consequences could cost lives of the Principal and protection team. This is simply one example but the concepts could be applied to almost all aspects of close protection.
BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNICATION IN CLOSE PROTECTION

The topic of communication as applied to close protection is very broad; therefore it is necessary to subdivide it into more easily explained subcategories. When referring to communication as related specifically to close protection we are able to subdivide it into the following categories:

- Communication between team members of a close protection detail
- Communication between team members of a close protection detail and the Principal or client
- Communication between CPOs and relevant persons in the external environment.

The importance of each of these areas cannot be understated. They are each vital components that are essential for a close protection operation to not only be successful but also efficient. Each of these three areas will be outlined in more detail below.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CLOSE PROTECTION TEAM MEMBERS

The subdivision of internal communications within a close protection team can be broken down into two subsections, namely: everyday communication and communication under attack. These will be discussed below.

Everyday communication
In order to understand ‘everyday communication’ with in a close protection team this aspect needs to be further subdivided. It can be broken down into three primary subdivisions namely; communication before an operation, communication during the operation and lastly communication after an operation. Each of these aspects will be briefly discussed below.
Communication aspects before a close protection operation

In terms of verbal and written communication, pre-operation communication would include an operation’s warning, comprehensive advance work and planning, an operations order (for more information, see Chapter 4, section on close protection documentation) and a full face-to-face team briefing. This process would usually first involve telephonic communication and than face-to-face verbal communication in order to pass on all relevant information.

Communication aspects during a close protection operation

Communication during a close protection operations would be either through hand radios, cellular phones and/or face-to-face verbal communication. In addition, certain close protection operatives advocate the use of hand signals to communicate concepts during an operation. The identified benefits of using hand signals are as follows:

- it is simple and quick to communicate short messages,
- it provides minimal interruption for the Principal
- it enhances team work through the implementation of forced visual contact at regular intervals between team members.

Communication aspects after a close protection operation

This phase of an operation would usually involve a debriefing for all team members as well as the application of feedback systems either written or verbal (for more information on report and record keeping see Chapter 4, close protection documentation). Communication after an operation is often not given the necessary attention in close protection manuals but is vitally important. If CPOs and other relevant parties involved in a close protection operation are not able to learn from mistakes that may have been made during the operation, it would be difficult to ensure that the same mistakes do not happen again.
Communication during an attack

Whilst the primary objective of close protection may be centred on the avoidance of any potentially dangerous situation, the realities of violent attack is most definitely something with which a CPO should be prepared to deal. Information obtained during several of the in-depth interviews indicated that there was a concern of how many CPOs currently operating in the industry would respond when actually faced with a life threatening situation. Furthermore it was mentioned that a major reason why CPO teams may not react effectively could be as a result of inefficient communication whilst under the stress of an attack (Higgins, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Jaarsveld, 2004; and Van Rooyen, 2004).

The key aspects of the way that communication takes place during an attack on the principal (Attack On Principal/AOP, utilising American terminology) were discussed with the interview respondents mentioned above. The common theme seemed to be that communication during an attack should be trained to be an instinctive response. It should be a fundamental aspect of the IAD training that forms the basis for CPO response to threatening situations.

There are several definitions of IADs but the definition selected for this research is taken from the Dynamic Alternatives’ Close Protection Training Manual: “These are planned, trained responses to an attack or threatening situation in any given environment” (Dynamic Alternatives, 2003: 34). The levels of communication that should take place during an IAD are illustrated in the flow chart below:

Flow chart 1: Communication during IADs

Step 1:
A CPO identifies an attack and should then, if possible, communicate the following key pieces of information to the rest of his/her team members:

- Direction of attack (clock or directional method see below)
- The form or type of attack
- A description of the attacker/attackers
• Inform the rest of the team that the he/she will engage the attack

**Step 2:**
(it should be noted that the aspects below should all happen simultaneously)

• The CPO identifying the attack should, if it is possible to do so, communicate a warning to the attacker (e.g. ‘drop the gun’)
• The designated Bodyguard should tell the Principal what is happening based on pre-rehearsed reaction the Bodyguard will simultaneously provide body cover and evacuate the Principal
• The rest of the team members will either provide back-up for the CPO who is engaging the attacker, and /or assist in providing additional bodycover for the BG and Principal as they evacuate

**Step 3:**

• A detailed evaluation and assessment of the situation after evacuation should be done by the team leader. The Team leader would then make a decision on what should happen next.

The steps outlined above are simply a generic example but the format could be applied to most attack-related IADs that a close protection team would face.

_Why it is difficult to communicate effectively during attacks and IADs_

Probably the key reason making it difficult to communicate under attack is as a direct result of the ‘flight or fight’ survival instincts. Under the extreme duress of an attack on a Principal a CPOs survival instincts will trigger a huge amount of adrenal release, known as adrenal dump. There are many signs and symptoms of adrenal dump that effect a CPO’s reactions, not all of these are helpful to a CPO while executing an IAD.
Geoff Thompson in his book, *Dead or Alive*, describes many of the symptoms that are triggered during adrenal release. The adrenal release symptoms that effect communication are as follows:

1. Auditory exclusion or distortion - which makes it difficult to clearly hear or distorts what, is actually heard.

2. Verbal inability - the inability to communicate complex material verbally. This occurs as a direct result of the part of the brain which runs the formation of complex speech patterns shutting down as a direct result of adrenaline causing flight or fight instinct’

3. Memory distortion - this basically refers to the fact that under extreme duress a person will only respond reflexively (apply innate survival instincts). Therefore for an IAD reaction to be effective it needs to be practiced repetitively until it becomes reflexive.

4. Freeze or panic - if a CPO has not trained to make the correct reactions reflexive, he/she may freeze or panic under the stress of a real attack. In order to avoid freezing or panicking skills need to be developed in a manner that is as close to what will occur in reality as possible (Thompson, 1999: 85-101).

Another barrier to effective communication under attack is known as the ‘flinch response. The flinch response is the human body’s instinctive reaction when faced with an occurrence that it was not prepared for. The flinch response involves three key actions namely:

1. A sharp inhalation
2. Physically moving away from the threat
3. Hands and arms being drawn into the chest or face area for protection
The relevance of these three responses in terms of communication difficulties for a CPO under attack is primarily focused on the first action of the flinch response, a sharp inhalation. This is a reflex action and can make regulated breathing difficult, this in turn would make verbal communication and clear thinking difficult for a CPO experiencing a flinch response.

HOW TO OVERCOME THE IDENTIFIED BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATION

**Realistic training and scenarios**

“Realistic, repetitive scenario-based training is the most effective way to ensure that a CPO functions effectively in a life-or-death situation” (McGuire, 2003).

The statement above refers to the fact that repetitive rehearsal and practice under realistic conditions assists in acclimatising CPOs to attack situations. This should enable them to function and communicate more effectively under the pressure of an actual attack on Principal situation.

**Use of key words to shorten and simplify communication**

“Communication under attack should be short, direct and pass on as much relevant information as quickly as possible” (Van Eck, 2003).

The use of shortened key words to represent more complex concepts enables more knowledge to be communicated and understood. This could be achieved by applying aspects such as: implementing a directional approach as opposed to a clock system approach (see Annexure 1: Definitions). Through repetitive practice during training, protection team members develop trust and an intimate understanding of procedures that should be followed under attack. This generally means that if an attack was to take place within a CPOs given area of responsibility (see Annexure 1: Definitions) then he/she would verbally communicate it to the rest of the team.
The communication from the CPO who identified the attack to the rest of the team would be based on a key identifying aspect such as; the colour of the attacker’s shirt, or one of the attackers prominent physical characteristics. These would assist the other team members in quickly identifying the attacker. The weapon or method of attack should also be communicated in as succinct a manner as possible, e.g. gun or knife attack. To illustrate that he/she was unhurt and capable of engaging the attacker, a CPO might use the word ‘mine’ or ‘engaging’ to inform the rest of the team members and let them know that he/she is dealing with the attack. A fellow team member could than utilise words like ‘cover’ or ‘back-up’ to let the rest of the team know that he/she is assisting the CPO who is engaging the attack.

At this stage, the rest of the team would then concentrate on the evacuation of the Principal whilst taking into account the potential for secondary attacks or ambushes. The CPO or CPOs dealing with the attack would then evacuate when the attackers were neutralised or the Principal was removed from the threat.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TEAM MEMBERS AND THE PRINCIPAL

The amount of direct communication between the protection team and the Principal would vary based on the following aspects:

- the size of the close protection team
- the relevant protocol based on the Principal’s status or office
- the Principal’s wishes
- the identified threat level

The Principal may or may not communicate directly with regular close protection team members. The Principal may chose to talk only to the bodyguard or team leader. It would then be the responsibility of the bodyguard or team leader to communicate with the rest of the team. It is also commonplace for the majority of communication to take place via the Principals personal assistant or if an official via the Aid-de-Camp.
Whilst taking these various differences in channels of communication into consideration there should at the very least be a Principal briefing (see Annexure 1: Definitions) and regular security update sessions.

Probably the key influencing factors determining the frequency and format of everyday communication would be the Principal’s personality and the professionalism of the protection team. In certain of the interviews it was mentioned that sometimes the CPOs relationship becomes almost one of a good friend or close associate (Higgins, 2003; Rootman, 2004; and Steyn, 2003). This occurs as a direct result of the amount of time that the Principal and CPO spend together. If this was to occur, the CPOs ability to operate professionally may be impaired. It is noted that a CPO should always maintain a professional emotional distance from his/her Principal.

Furthermore, another aspect to be considered is the communication between the team and the Principal under attack situations. Once again all the ‘difficulty factors’ mentioned in the section on ‘team communication under attack’ are applicable here. The concept should be to inform the Principal of what is going on and the necessary actions that need to be taken in as short and simple a manner as possible. A common practice among CPOs is to only refer to the Principal by his/her surname and only address him/her formally, except when under attack. The change in form of address would act as an indicator to the Principal that the situation was serious.

It has also been found that the Principal may listen more effectively when this ‘first name’ system in an emergency is implemented as opposed to if it is not. An example of the communication that might take place during an attack could be as follows: ‘John we are being shot at, get down and move to the cars’.
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CPOS AND THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT (LIAISON SKILLS)

A CPO’s ability to organise logistics and ensure the assistance of any external party who could make an operation run more smoothly is vital. This skill is probably the most common way a client will assess and measure the value for money of their Protectors (Higgins, 2003).

CPOs would need to liaise with many different people to run an effective protection operation. This liaison could take on many forms and the CPO needs to be an expert at interpersonal communication whilst maintaining operational security. There is no way that a CPO can operate in an information or communication vacuum. In fact one of the key reasons why former law enforcement personnel often excel as private sector CPOs is because of their old networks and connections. Their knowledge of military or police aspects such as their understanding of chain of command and the applicable protocols become very valuable tools.

During a close protection operation one of the first external liaisons would take place whilst conducting advance work. Advance work can be defined as the process of gathering and sorting all necessary information in order to effectively plan and then actually run the specific operation. It is at this stage that communications may be necessary with some of the following external parties:

- Police or related agencies
- Hotels or other accommodation venues
- Airlines and relevant handling agents
- Venue organisers and staff
- Security managers or other officials who may be engaged in an operation
- Hospitals and medical centres
- Any tourist officials who may provide assistance or advice
- Any other party who may be able to contribute to the success of an operation.
Whilst performing protective duties, the protection detail will constantly liaise with civilians in the immediate environment. This is vital in order for the operation to run smoothly. Communicating with external parties may take many forms. An example here could simply be liaising with the hotel concierge to organise extra rooms. A more detailed external liaison may be liaising with the relevant police contact person in order to get a police escort for a protection motorcade. The key fundamental is that if the CPO cannot communicate effectively and organise assistance from the relevant people, it would be almost impossible to run an efficient and secure close protection operation.

Some additional communication related aspects that are relevant when assessing how to train and prepare CPOs for operational duties are outlined below:

- Teaching CPO trainees liaison protocols and communication skills are vital in close protection but they are very seldom covered in enough detail during CPO training courses. When these skills are taught that focus seems to be on a superficial overview with very little assessment or evaluations being conducted (Hendricks, 2003; McGuire, 2003; and Sharp, 2003). It is important that a prospective CPO can effectively communicate. The ability to convince relevant external parties into assisting or providing information on a close protection operation becomes necessary for civilian CPOs. This is primarily because they operate without government backing and authority and therefore cannot instruct people to assist them.

- In addition CPOs need to be trained in the correct procedure to follow in order to get relevant information, assistance and co-operation from both official and unofficial external parties. This is important, since if a CPO lands up offending any persons that are involved, this can make the smooth running of an operation very difficult. This may even result in the Principal being under additional threat because of inefficient organisation.
HOW TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS AFFECT CPOS

This area basically refers to technological improvements within the field of personal communication equipment that is utilised by CPOs. Not only have there been vast modifications with hand-held radios and hands-free voice activated microphones but the wide distribution of cell phones and satellite phones have enabled easy international communication for protection details to be brought to a new level.

One CPO interviewed simply stated that “I don’t know how we ever provided effective close protection without cell phones” (Higgins, 2003).

How technology is affecting the training of CPOs
The development of technological training aids and tools has without a doubt enhanced the way that CPOs are trained. The list of training aids is extensive and enables training to more closely mimic reality. One of the major benefits of some of this technology (use of video projectors and realistic firearm models) is that close protection trainees can practice dealing with potentially dangerous situations in a safe environment. This limits the exposure of trainees to unnecessary dangerous risks while still training them effectively.

Equipment and technology have made huge advancements in realistic simulations, enhancing the way that CPOs are trained, unfortunately this happens primarily overseas (Van Jaarsveld, 2004).

An example of this in the South African training environment is the low cost and ease of use of modern paintball guns that bring a low level of risk to the student but adds to the reality of IAD training. The use of a multimedia approach to training is also becoming a core part of close protection training. Use of computer projectors, videos and CDs in training has provided the trainer with a large variety of mediums and techniques that can be used to communicate information to students.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNET ON CLOSE PROTECTION

The internet and the proliferation of the worldwide web have had an enormous influence over all sectors of trade and industry. This holds true for the close protection industry as well. The internet has created huge benefits, as well as additional threats and risks for CPOs. Probably the major benefits would revolve around the ease of access to information and the efficiency and speed of email communication. The associated risks stem from the ease of communication and access to information for attackers.

The proliferation of the internet has several points which have to be taken into consideration since they have a direct effect on the close protection industry (these will be discussed below).

**Ease of long distance networking**

The internet has made both the benchmarking of standards and the creation of national/international networks relatively easy. These networks could assist in sharing relevant information. Having established contacts with direct email access makes the accessing of necessary operational information relatively easy and quick to verify or query.

**Easy access to close protection operational methodology**

This refers to the fact that any interested parties can download or access close protection training methodology and operational principles on the internet. The impact of this is that it is now easy for potential attackers to find out how CPOs train, as well as how they would probably operate and react to different attack scenarios. This gives the potential attacker an opportunity to spot the weaknesses of a CPO team when planning an attack. This obviously poses a serious problem for CPOs.

Alternatively on the positive side this also provides CPOs anywhere in the world the opportunity to obtain the most up-to-date methods and best practices which can be built into their training.
Access to Principal’s personal and company information

“I found out things that I did not even know about my CEO on the internet” was a statement made by one of the interview respondents.39

The impact of important confidential information being accessed via the internet means that a potential attacker or merely someone out to discredit a Principal may be able to gain that information if he/she knows how to access it. Conversely the same ease of access to information also makes the conducting of risk analysis and Principal Profiling easier for CPOs. This is especially relevant when planning international travel, where information on the current political situation in foreign countries needs to be obtained and assessed with planning foreign operations.

TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS ON CLOSE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS

While it is important for a CPO not to become dependant on tools and equipment, a professional CPO will [and can] carry a wide array of weaponry and related equipment (Sharp, 2003).

Tools and equipment utilised by CPOs is quite a broad topic. It can be broken down into subcategories. These will make it easier for the reader to follow. These subdivisions are as follows:

1. Weaponry
2. Technology
3. Accessories

(Each of these aspects will be discussed below).

39 Respondent requested to remain anonymous for this information reference.
Technological improvements of close protection weaponry

The ongoing research and development by forward thinking companies (such as Glock and ASP international), as well as the application of technological improvements in almost all the weaponry used by CPOs obviously has huge benefits for them. Some of these benefits and advantages of specific weaponry are outlined below:

- The advent of smaller, lighter, high capacity (able to carry a sizeable amount of ammunition) pistols has meant that it is easier for a CPO to carry around more firepower that is easily concealable and reliable.

- Improvements in ballistic body armour (bullet-proof vests) and protective accessories (e.g. bullet proof briefcases⁴⁰) are readily available to CPOs. When such equipment is used effectively it can assist as an effective risk reduction tool.

- The proliferation of combat torches and mini hi-power handheld torches makes the carrying and use of necessary equipment far easier than outdated bulky less powerful torches. This makes them easier for CPOs to carry and are more effective (brighter and last longer) to use than older models.

- Improvements in communications equipment (see above section on communication). Smaller lighter radios and cell phones that last longer are obviously useful to CPOs when on long term contracts.

- Folding tactical batons such as the Armament Systems & Procedures (ASP) extendable baton provide an easy to carry alternative force option for CPOs. This means that the CPO could have the advantage of being able to carry a baton concealed and utilise it as a full length baton if necessary to implement a force option lower than a firearm.

⁴⁰ Carrying ballistic protection in any form could have huge benefits if an attack were to take place. Having everyday objects such as briefcases that are actually bullet-proof could be very useful for CPOs since they serve the dual purpose of a carry-case and protection device.
• Improvements in pepper sprays and mace mean that the potential for permanent damage to an assailant is minimised while the capacity to stop him from attacking is increased. This is also an excellent minimum force option as compared to the firearm.

• The improvements in combat folder knives (these are knives where the blade folds in and out of the handle), which are available in many sizes and weights making personal choice possible for CPOs when selecting a bladed weapon. These improvements make it easy for a CPO to carry a combat effective knife in comfort. It also provides the CPO with an additional force option other then the firearm.

• Flexi-cuffs such as the Armament Systems & Procedures (ASP) Trifold are light and easy to use and eliminate the necessity for CPOs to carry heavier steel and more cumbersome handcuffs.

Trends regarding other close protection related equipment
There are many tools that are utilised by CPOs whilst operational that are not necessarily weapons. These tools could assist in various aspects such as planning or monitoring the protection team during an operation. Several of these are outlined below:

• Approximately 70 % of the interview respondents considered basic computer skills (internet, e-mail and report writing) to be a vital operational skills requirement for CPOs in this day and age (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004).

• Use of electronic security measures (cameras, alarms, infrared beams and access control measures) have improved greatly in terms of sophistication and technological advancement over the last few years. It is therefore important for any CPO to have, at the very least a basic understanding of these tools since they form an important part of ensuring a VIP’s safety at work or residences.
• It is necessary for a CPO to have a basic understanding of the way that electronic surveillance takes place and the complexities involved. In most cases a CPO will make use of professionals in the field of Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) in order to negate or minimise the risks associated with information security or breaches thereof.

• Improvements in vehicle tracking systems now means that a team leader or operation room controller can simultaneously keep track of all vehicular movements during a close protection operation. This makes the overall coordination of the close protection operation far easier. It would also enable better logistical support for field operatives since it would be simpler (than in the past) for the coordinator to know where the CPO team are.

• The proliferation and widespread availability Global Positioning Systems (GPS) has made navigation and orientation (during route planning and operations) infinitely simpler and can dramatically cut down the time spent on the planning of VIP venue transfers and route reconnaissance phases of an operation. It can save both time and money since it minimises the risks of getting lost.

**Accessories**

There are several other pieces of equipment that are relevant to the close protection industry as a whole (both training and operations). Several of these are outlined below.

• The use of digital and video cameras makes training and student feedback infinitely more effective (the student can have an opportunity to actually see and rate their own performances in training).

• It also can vastly improve the quality and usability of information gathered in security audits\(^{41}\) (by having visual references to include in reports) or the need to clarify

\(^{41}\) A security audit is a comprehensive evaluation and analysis of all security aspects both physical and other. The security audit is used to determine security weaknesses. Recommendations would then be made on how to minimise the identified weaknesses. A site survey is the physical inspection and assessment of a building or physical structure in order to identify any physical hazards or security risks.
certain points during team briefings (by having visual references to illustrate key points).

- Availability of fire-retardant material (such as Proban and Nomex) as well as small but highly effective fire extinguishers has made the task of reducing the risks of fire far easier and therefore enhancing the safety of the principal.

- Improvements in first-aid equipment (e.g. portable defibrillators) mean that the protection team has less to carry (compact and lighter kits and equipment) and can achieve better results if first-aid has to be administered, then may have been possible in the past when such equipment was not readily available. The size and weight of modern equipment means that it can actually be carried with the CPO team. This obviously is very beneficial since if the equipment is needed is on hand and the Principal may not have to be evacuated to a hospital.

CONCLUSION

The importance of CPOs to be able to apply effective inter-personal communication whilst taking protocol into account cannot be overstated. It is vital that a CPO can communicate effectively using the relevant communication tools such as cellphones and handheld radios. He/she needs these skills in order to elicit the assistance of relevant parties. This is especially so if these parties are able to smooth the running of a protection operation or enhance the safety of the Principal during such an operation.

It is also important to assess how communication is affected during an attack on principal (AOP) situation. Much training needs to be done in order to ensure that a CPO team can function effectively as a unit under the duress of an attack situation. This involves much repetitive practice and rehearsal as well as ensuring that all communications are as short and simple as possible. This would enable the effective communication of the close protection team member’s actions in as short a time frame as possible.
Technology, such as the ease of access to the internet, has had a tremendous impact on the way that close protection operations are conducted. Improved (in terms of size, weight, portability, technological features and reliability) communications equipment has positively influenced close protection operations. This can be seen all the way through the operation, from the information gathering stages right up to the debriefing stage and termination stage. Improvements in close protection equipment and weaponry now mean that a CPO has the capacity to carry equipment having better performance than in the past (e.g. carrying of high capacity small frame semi-automatic pistols like the Glock 19 or 26). This means that a CPO can in fact carry more ammunition while having less overall equipment weight and therefore be better able to conceal his/her weaponry i.e. less bulky than previous equipment/firearms.

It is every CPO’s and trainer’s responsibility to keep as up-to-date as possible with changing trends and technological enhancements related to the close protection industry. This is important in order to make the provision of protection services more effective, as well as improving their existing skills and competencies. In many cases better equipment translates directly to being able to provide the Principal with better protection.
Chapter 9

USE OF FORCE OPTIONS AND CLOSE PROTECTION

INTRODUCTION

“In many situations CPOs cannot legally utilise their weapons [firearms] therefore they need to have other options, such as unarmed combat or batons” (Jacobs, 2003).

Throughout the interview process most of the respondents expressed concern regarding the use of force options available to CPOs (Allon, 2003; Bodhoo, 2004; Garvey, 2004; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004). The focus of this concept centres on the fact that most CPOs in South Africa tend to be still firearm dependant (reliant on the firearm as the primary force option) and do not have sufficient training in other force options. Force options other than a firearm would primarily be unarmed combat, improvised and alternative weaponry. The problem of firearm dependency, whilst definitely an international one, is, however, more pronounced in South Africa. In many other countries only service personnel CPOs (e.g. police and military) may operate with firearms, with the result that most civilian CPOs operating in such an environment would focus their training on additional force options.

South Africa has seen a different evolution for CPO use of force options. Firearms laws in South Africa been updated, in the past firearm regulation has been relatively lenient when compared to many other countries.

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42 This could be as a result of the past inefficient firearms control in South Africa (as compared to other developed countries), as well as the fact that South Africans have what could be called a ‘gun culture’ whereby from a young age many South Africans are exposed to firearms usage. This is particularly true of white South African males over the age of thirty who as a result of conscription, had to serve time in either the military or police.

43 For more information see the Firearms Control Act 60/2000. It should be noted that the regulations stated in this Act were only finalised and implemented on 1 July 2004.
The ease of obtaining and carrying a firearm, as well as its effectiveness as a self defence tool meant that use of firearms has been the primary choice as a use of force option for South African CPOs.

It was also only after 1994 that the civilian/private sector of close protection began expanding exponentially in South Africa. It would make sense that CPOs moving from the military or police into the private sector would have been trained in one of the services’ close protection units. A CPO with this training would therefore apply the same use of force strategies that they were trained on in their previous units. In other words since most service personnel were and still are trained in a firearms reliant manner, a CPO with this background would probably be limited in the use of force options that he/she could effectively apply.

Moreover, the vast majority of close protection trainers who became civilian instructors utilised the training methodology with which they were familiar. This methodology was also based primarily on what was taught in the various government associated agencies that were running close protection details. The doctrine for almost all of these was to be reliant on the use of firearms during attack situations. This doctrine still holds true for protection of high risk personnel, as in all likelihood if a protection detail must respond to attack in such a situation, it is probably a maximum force situation (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; 2004; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; and Van Eck, 2003).

The problem with a CPO being ‘firearms reliant’ becomes most apparent when we consider that the majority of operational close protectors working in South Africa today are not operating in extreme high risk situations. Another identified hindering factor that accompanies firearm reliance is that the situations in which a CPO could safely utilise their firearm are few and far between, taking into account situational and safety factors are considered.
In addition a further question that arises is whether the majority of CPOs operating today, actually have sufficient training to competently handle their firearms under the pressures of an attack situation, in which innocent civilians may be hurt by misplaced shots or over penetration.44

Whilst the concept of applying unarmed combat or alternative weaponry as minimum force options seems straightforward, the wider issue seems to be whether individual CPOs actually know when to use the available different force options. Other research has indicated this as a universal problem being faced by service and civilian security personnel. The controversy over applied force in self defence becomes more obvious as the concept of ‘use of minimum force’ is a key aspect needing to not only be understood but also applied in all violent situations (Mistry et al, 2001).45

This chapter aims to look at the reasons why training in force options other than the use of firearms is needed. Steps necessary to implement unarmed combat and alternative weaponry into the core training of close protection personnel will be examined. This is vital so that a CPO can respond with the correct level of force in any given violent encounter. Responding with the correct force option needs to be an instinctive process since under the intensity of attack there is usually not time to decide on what the best course of action should be or what level of force the response should be.

DEFINITIONS

Relevant background and understanding on what unarmed combat is, as well as the concept of alternative weaponry was discussed in Chapter 4. A brief breakdown of each was also given explaining further the inter-related principles that apply to this field. Some of these concepts will, once again, be clarified below:

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44 Over penetration is the term used to describe a projectile that not only enters its designated target but passes straight through it. Over penetration could be dangerous to innocent bystanders behind the target as the bullet may still be travelling at a high enough speed to cause death or injury.

45 For more information see: Mistry et al, 2001 The use of force by members of the South African Police Service: case studies from seven policing areas in Gauteng.
• Unarmed combat refers to the use of force by a CPO to restrain or incapacitate an attacker without the use of a firearm or alternative weapon.

• Alternative weaponry refers to the use of any tool or implement other than a firearm or unarmed combat that can be used to incapacitate or restrain an attacker.

• Improvised weaponry will refer to the use of everyday objects in a CPOs surroundings that could be used as a weapon or for distraction.

BACKGROUND TO THE USE OF MINIMUM FORCE CONCEPT

‘Use of force’ is a topic currently surrounded by a good deal of controversy in South Africa. This seems to be true for all parties affected by the ‘use of force’ legislation. The debate on use of force impact in various ways on all parties involved in the close protection industry, whether it is a CPO claiming that he/she has the right to utilise any means necessary to protect their client or the client claiming that they do not want firearms and violence around them.

A detailed list of examples illustrating the misconceptions regarding ‘use of force' could be provided but for the purposes of this report, use of force will concentrate on the concept outlined as:

In order for a response to be considered one of minimum force the defender (CPO) must respond with only that amount of force necessary to stop the threat (McGuire, 2003).

When assessing minimum force from the point-of-view of CPO training and operations it is important that a comprehensive understanding of the overall close protection initiative is in place. Thorough understanding of the law regarding use of force is something that cannot be ignored since a CPO who merely stops an attacker from harming their Principal is not enough. It must be done in accordance with the law. This may seem simple enough
but the reality is the CPO must decide and execute an effective and legal response to an attack situation under immense pressure.

The time that a CPO has to decide on the correct reaction in any situation can probably be counted in split seconds (i.e. the need for split-second decision-making). It would therefore be justified to state that a CPO’s reactions must be planned in advance and trained to be as instinctive as possible under the duress and confusion of an attack. The wrong decision may be made, especially if responses are not drilled into a CPOs subconscious and become a learnt and instinctive (spontaneous but correct) response at the same time.

It is an accepted fact that the use of a firearm in response to an attack is usually considered a maximum force reaction. However, in the past most close protection operations were run by the police or similar agencies and if use of force was warranted it would probably be because a definite attack on a high profile person was taking place. This would necessitate the use of maximum force in retaliation (i.e. application of firearms). It is clear now today that the majority of close protection operations in South Africa are for primarily medium and low risk clients. The protection provided for these type of clients are usually all performed by persons in the private sector and the risk level would usually not involve maximum force responses.

Moreover, even in the case of government close protection units, the altering of the ‘use of force’ during arrest46 has meant that police officers are as limited in response to violent attack as civilians (i.e. can only be utilised if a life threatening situation arises) (see Mistry et al, 2001 for more detail on s49). Accordingly if a maximum force response is utilised by police, there may be serious consequences (if the officer/s involved is found to have used excessive force, he/she may be prosecuted for their actions) after the situation has occurred. The bottom line is that the concept of minimum force has gained more

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46 This is found in Section 49 of The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 but has recently been changed in the Judicial Matters Amendment Bill introduced on 1 February 2004 (B2-2005).
acceptance and become a guiding principle with regard to the use of force, specifically deadly force.

As a consequence minimum force is applicable to all CPOs whether service personnel or civilians. Probably one of the most effective ways to deal with the legal aspects and associated new limitations on the use of force is to train the close protection operative to have rounded skills (the ability to apply various force options to deal with a violent situation).

**THE NEED FOR CPOS TO POSSESS ROUNDED SKILLS**

Rounded skills means that a CPO is sufficiently trained to possess the relevant range of force options. He/she needs to be able to apply the correct level of force in an attack situation, while taking into consideration not only the law but the safety of the CPO and Principal as well.

When assessing the operational skills needed by CPO’s, 80% of the South African respondents (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004.) interviewed were of the opinion that the use of a firearm, while providing close protection in South Africa, is an unlikely occurrence. This could be due to the fact that most criminal attacks can be avoided by effective planning and high levels of awareness during protection operations as well as the fact that the majority of South African clients that employ CPOs are not of a high risk nature.

Whilst taking this into account, it is clear that even though the CPO should be highly trained in the tactical use of firearms he/she is far more likely to utilise unarmed combat or alternative weaponry in an altercation. This would allow for minimising the risks of using maximum force in a situation where a high level force option may not be warranted. The lack of rounded skills was illustrated, during a presentation on use of force options and alternative weaponry conducted by Dynamic Alternatives Pty Ltd in
March 2001, to over 80 active members of the Presidential Protection Unit and VIP Protection Services of the SAPS. Staff of Dynamic Alternatives asked the officers attending the presentation the following to two questions:

1. Have you ever utilised your firearm to defend a Principal against attack while providing close protection services?

2. Have you ever pushed, restrained or had to strike [unarmed] someone while protecting a Principal as part of a close protection detail?

The response was clear (far more officers having had to use unarmed combat than firearms). Approximately 70 officers stated that they have had to use some sort of unarmed combat techniques while working as a member of a close protection detail, with only one officer claiming to have utilised his firearm whilst performing protection related duties. These responses were certainly interesting since after further questioning the vast majority of officers had received little if any unarmed combat and alternative weaponry training for their jobs as CPOs. It was also clear that the focus of all training that they had previously received concentrated on the use of firearms as the primary response to almost all attack situations.

Furthermore, almost all of the interviewees echoed the sentiments expressed above by these police members of close protection units. While most felt that it was necessary for CPOs to be well trained in the tactical usage of firearms, the vast majority were of the belief that unarmed combat and related skills training receives far less attention in training and retraining programs when compared to firearms skills.

The direct meaning of this, is that the way that most CPOs are trained does not correlate with the way that they are going to have to work and respond in real life situations. There appears to be a major imbalance in training methodology when assessing use of force. This will have to be adjusted in the future if a focus on practical outcomes-based training is to be achieved. A probable reason for CPOs and other security personnel not being able
to effectively apply the concepts of minimum force may be attributed to the fact that these operatives have not been sufficiently trained in the use of force options other than firearms nor do they appear to fully comprehend the implications of the use of force in particular deadly force utilising firearms (Mistry et al, 2001: 58).

SITUATIONAL FACTORS EFFECTING USE OF FORCE

There are several factors that will affect what weaponry and level of force a CPO would choose in a given situation. These are discussed in more detail below.

Firearms usage at various ranges

After assessing various relevant literature sources including assassination case studies and training manuals, certain consistencies become apparent. Aspects noted included the fact that the majority of close protection handgun shooting incidents take place at a range of less than eight metres, with many of them at less than five metres. This indicates a disturbing trend, regarding the way that CPOs are trained in comparison to what happens in reality. In several cases what happened does not correlate with the way in which CPOs are trained to utilise their firearms and tactical defensive options during an AOP (Attack on Principal). An example of this is the assassination of Yitzchak Rabin where he was shot and killed from only a couple of metres away.

A training video titled, “Surviving Edged Weapons”, that was made as an instructional tape for police officers in the USA, contains examples of knife attacks on police officers, demonstrated and verified at an approximate range of seven metres or less. It was noted by police officers in the video that a committed attacker will be able to rush and stab an officer before the officer can draw and accurately fire his weapon. The implications are that at a range of seven metres or less it would probably be more beneficial for the CPO to utilise unarmed combat or alternative weaponry as a first option and only after that to then possibly draw the firearm if the situational variables allowed this action (Calibre Press video production, 1987).

47 In the publication *The Modern Bodyguard*, the following information is given: “FBI summary of officers killed, together with police gunfight data has remained consistent - 92% of all fire-fights occur within 20 feet” (Consterdine, 1995: 230).
In order for a CPO to be able to do this, an integrated approach to tactics and response to attack needs to be applied. Due to the complexities of responding to an attack situation, it is clear that if a CPO is not trained to integrate relevant unarmed combat and associated techniques with drawing and firing a firearm, then in many cases the response would be too late or ineffective. The end result may be injury or death to the CPO and/or Principal.

It is also a well-known fact that under the intensity of attack, the human flight or fight instinct triggers adrenal dump (a huge injection of adrenalin into the body). This adrenal dump will cause, among other side effects, disorientation and inhibited judgement of space/distance perception. This means that during training, realistic situations need to be simulated in order for the trainee to be able to learn to assess and utilise the right tools based on the distance of attack whilst under the induced pressure of the simulation.

Crowds and working environment effects on use of force
A clear trend was identified during the interviews whereby the majority of interviewed respondents were of the opinion that the situations where CPOs could safely utilise their firearms effectively are few and far between. When analysing the reasoning behind this trend, the following factors could be identified:

1. In many close protection related situations that might warrant the use of force, the most common identified environment was that of working in a crowd. Any armed response in a crowded situation has the inherent risk of the CPO shooting non-combatants (e.g. bystanders). This is an obvious example of the risks of utilising a firearm in terms of safety and efficiency.

2. The next problem is the fact that in an attack situation it is not always possible to see what is behind your attacker. This means that over-penetration of shots fired could kill or injure innocent civilians.
In order to counter this concern many CPOs carry hollow-point type ammunition. However, this still leaves the problems of accurate shooting and ricochets that could injure or kill civilians.

3. There is also the problem of weapon retention. While working in a crowded area it may be difficult for a CPO to both draw and fire his weapon as the crowd may overwhelm him and take his/her weapon. It is a common rule for CPOs that when working in a crowd, they may loose jewellery and other objects on their person. Many CPOs carry retention holsters (holsters with a retention clip or similar mechanism) for such situations. These holsters may slow the drawing of a firearm slightly but makes retention of the un-drawn weapon much easier.

IDENTIFIED TRAINING INADEQUACIES IN SOUTH AFRICAN CLOSE PROTECTION

When all of the aspects outlined above are considered, the problems posed by use of firearms in crowds and the resultant risks of over penetration or missing cannot be ignored. However, these problems can be rectified through ongoing and intensive training (see Chapter 11: Recommendations, for more detail). In assessments on CPOs conducted by Dynamic Alternatives Pty Ltd, certain disturbing trends were identified. By evaluating these assessments, the following findings were noted.

1. Most of the assessed CPOs were of the opinion that they could utilise their firearms effectively under pressure. However over 50% could not pass the evaluations on the first attempt.

48 Hollow point ammunition (for example the Winchester SXT) is designed to expand and adjust shape when entering a human attacker, thereby slowing down and lodging in the assailant and causing maximum physiological damage. This is referred to as the bullet's ability for 'one shot stop', in other words the bullet is quite likely to stop an attacker with one accurate well placed shot.

49 These assessments were conducted on over 50 CPOs who underwent close protection and related tactical firearms assessments during the period November 2003 to May 2004.

50 These evaluations comprised of basic firearm handling skills i.e. draw and fire, rapid fire, turning and firing, hand and magazine changes, etc. as well as two CPO-related shooting drills - one providing cover for a Principal and the other simulating the evacuation of a Principal whilst providing covering fire.
2. Much ongoing training, retraining and practice is necessary to maintain required operational standards. The vast majority close protection respondents that interviewed were of the opinion that their peers neither had the time nor the inclination to put in the necessary “range time” in order to maintain the level of competency necessary to utilise their firearms in close protection related attack situations.

Two apparent problems were identified by the assessors with regards to the poor performance of the CPOs that were evaluated during this process. Firstly the CPOs were either not initially trained effectively with regard to the necessary competencies of close protection related firearms usage; or secondly the candidates assessed may have been trained effectively but did not retrain often enough to maintain the required level of competency. Both of these problems can be addressed through the establishment of a compulsory industry minimum standard with regularly implemented competency evaluations. Moreover, another identified problem related to the assessments mentioned above was the fact that very little unarmed combat training was undertaken by most CPOs evaluated.

There was also a cause for further concern, in that many of the assessed candidates claimed to have undergone some sort of martial arts training. This prior training was meant for them to achieve competency in unarmed combat tactics as applied to close protection. The vast majority of candidates assessed, that claimed such backgrounds did not outperform their competitors, who in some cases had very little or no unarmed combat or martial arts experience. Whether or not martial arts prepare CPOs for the demands of close protection work will be discussed below:

**Martial Arts and Close Protection**

The link between Close Protection and martial arts is frequently exaggerated. The effectiveness of many martial arts in the specialist security world is often questioned. In their book *Bodyguarding: A complete manual*, Rapp and Lesce explain this concept as follows:
Karate schools tend to train students for competition, not defence against deadly threat. They also concentrate on developing style, rather than quick economical and disabling blows and holds (Rapp & Lesce, 1999: 23).

By definition the term ‘martial art’ means that some of the system is ‘martial’ and some is ‘art’. When it comes to defending the life of a Principal against violent attack a CPO must not only have the capability to effectively defend him/herself but also the Principal that he/she is protecting. In order to have the skills necessary to provide effective protection the need for competency in unarmed and alternative weapon defence is vital.

As a direct result of the fact that a CPO may have limited time available for training and retraining the focus of such training should be on practical easy to learn and apply skills. Any system or technique employed by a CPO must meet certain criteria in order to be considered effective. These criteria are as follows:

1. The techniques must be based on the realities of attack and in line with the modus operandi of the way in which attackers actually engage their victims. All too often, techniques taught in martial arts systems are based on what the instructor perceives to be real as opposed to what actually happens in a violent attack. Moreover, these techniques are usually practised in such a controlled and unrealistic environment that they do not resemble the actual ‘real life’ situations the CPO needs to be training for.

2. The techniques that are taught to CPOs need to be simple and forgiving (not compromise the CPO if the technique does not work). If the techniques are too complicated to learn the likelihood of them being applied in pressure situations is

51 The initial aim of all combative systems was to train its proponents to deal with the harsh realities of life and death combat. However, in this day and age many of these combat systems adapted from their initial functions to become methods of self development for their proponents or sports, with the combative concepts becoming secondary. This can be clearly seen in the names of such arts as Jujitsu which means ‘gentle art’ being adapted by Jigaro Kano in the 1920s to become Judo or ‘gentle way’. While the change may seem small the focus was on transforming a combat system into a platform for self development and sport.

52 To emphasise the importance for a CPO to have good unarmed combat skills in the United Kingdom, Peter Consterdine states “When it comes to the bottom line, you have to be able to fight and remember, you are seldom if ever going to be armed, certainly never if you work in this country [United Kingdom] and seldom, even if abroad. You are dependent on your physical unarmed skills, aggression training and fitness.” (Consterdine, 1995: 271)

53 These criteria have been identified by the researcher after over twenty years of martial arts experience and nearly ten years of training CPOs in unarmed combat and related tactics. The researcher has the following martial arts related experience and qualifications: 5th Dan Dennis Survival Jujitsu; 4th Dan Koga Ryu Ninjitsu; 3rd Dan Gendai Ryu Ninjitsu; 2nd Dan Taekwondo; 2000 middle weight Black Belt full contact Survival Jujitsu champion, Israel; 1997 South African Taekwondo team member 1997, World Cup, Egypt; 1998 coach to South African Muay Thai team, 3rd Kings Cup, Thailand; and an inducted member of the first South African Martial Arts Hall of Fame in 2004.
very slim. The concept of applying forgiving techniques is designed in order not to leave the CPO off balance and open to counter attack if something goes wrong while performing the aforesaid technique.

3. Self defence techniques need to be integrated into the close protection related use of firearms and easily applied with relevant CPO operational methodology (i.e. walking formations and IADs).

4. The fact that the CPO may be carrying a lot of equipment, may be tired and have several attackers to deal with at the same time, must be taken into account when assessing the applicability of self defence techniques or tactics.

5. The CPO must have the capability to fight off attackers under any circumstance, at any distance and in any environment since the attacker is likely to engage when the CPO is least prepared to deal with the situation (i.e. attackers exploit opportunities).

**APPLICABLE LEGISLATION**

It would be impossible for a CPO to effectively apply minimum force concepts in line with the applicable legislation, if the relevant laws and procedures are not well known to him/her. Changes in South Africa legislation regarding the security industry and use of force need to be outlined. Before the South African 1994 elections, the vast majority of close protection work was carried out by designated government related units (police, military and related agencies).

When training curricula were compiled prior to 1994, the use of force guidelines and legislation were far more lenient than they are now. Past laws enabled officials to utilise firearms to apprehend suspects of any serious criminal offence (termed as a Schedule 1 offence). It was thus obviously viewed that any attack on a Principal would probably warrant a maximum force response i.e. the use of firearms.
Changes with regards to use of force

There are several fundamental changes in the way that use of force is now applied. All close protection operatives, whether part of a government organisation or not must abide by the laws of South Africa. This means that regardless of whether a CPO feels that it is correct or not to utilise a higher force level in an attack situation, he/she will be held accountable according to the law of the country.

A recurring theme mentioned during interviews was the need for CPOs to not only understand the law, but to also be able to apply it in practical situations. It seems that the majority of misunderstandings stem from the way that trainees are taught the law during their initial training. In addition, the fact that the subject knowledge is not updated in retraining sessions means that many CPOs are not informed of new changes to legislation. In order to effectively train close protection personnel, there needs to be a shift from current training methodologies to outcomes focused training. This would entail the use of practical work-related scenarios to explain how the law would apply to CPO duties and functions.

The law requirements as stated in the Close Protection Unit Standard

The SAQA Unit Standard for Close Protection lists the applicable legislative material for CPOs. The unit standard contains the relevant government Acts and information a CPO must understand, as well as be able to apply in the workplace.

These are as follows (no section numbers are mentioned in the unit standard so it would be fair to assume that the exact sections were not identified when this unit standard was compiled):

5. Applicable sections of the Road Traffic Act
7. Private defence
8. Moral and humanitarian considerations (proportionality)
9. Continuum of force
10. Vicarious liability
11. M.I.S.S (Minimum Information Security Standards)
12. Civil liability

For the purposes of this research it is not practical to further analyse the relevance of each of the above stated sections. However, it would be advised that all persons wanting a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the close protection industry in terms of the South African environment should understand the contents of the above Acts and regulations.

International laws and the relevant limitations to Close Protection
The concept of international legal limitations refers primarily to the manner in which South African CPOs may be limited when performing their duties internationally. An example of this may be that a CPO may be firearm reliant while working in South Africa. However, internationally he/she may not even be able to carry any weaponry at all. The vast majority of the CPOs that were interviewed had, at some stage in their careers, operated in various foreign countries. Some of the common themes that were identified during the interviews with these respondents with regards to the law and operation internationally can be summarised as follows:

In most parts of Europe and many other countries a CPO cannot carry any weapons at all. However, in certain other countries even if carrying a firearm was permitted, a CPO would very often struggle to obtain the correct permits and permission to carry a weapon particularly if the protection detail was deployed in a hurry. It is therefore vital that South African CPOs move away from being reactive and firearms reliant. The focus needs to shift to implementing effective preventative planning as well as towards being able to manage and deal with threatening and violent situations without the use of a firearm.
Several ideas on how CPOs could work around the difficulties of gaining access to firearms were presented during the interviews but almost all of the respondents who had operated internationally were in agreement that the ability to fight unarmed and/or utilise improvised weapons was vital for CPOs in order for them to effectively operate internationally.

CONCLUSION

There is a clear need for a shift in the way that South African CPOs train and operate. The focus needs to shift from being firearms reliant to CPOs having rounded combat skills that include unarmed combat, use of alternative weaponry and improvised weaponry. Currently most training programs cover firearms responses to attack in much detail but pay very little attention to other force options.

It is important to note that even though there are certain links between martial arts and close protection, they are not always congruent. Several key issues were identified that outlined what would make a self defence technique applicable in terms of close protection requirements. Some of these concepts focused on aspects such as forgiving techniques that are simple and easy to learn. This is vital if these techniques are to be applied under the duress of an attack situation. It is also important that unarmed combat and alternative weaponry skills are integrated with tactical firearms skills and close protection practices.

Changes in use of force legislation as well as the improbability of being able to carry weapons internationally, means that a CPO needs to have various reactional capabilities in order to comply with legal guidelines. This implies that a CPO needs to be up-to-date with any relevant changes in applicable legislation. A CPO needs to not only have a thorough understanding of relevant law but also be able to apply the law in practical work related situations.

In order for CPO trainees to actually have a workable understanding of the legislation, training needs to focus on an outcomes-based approach. This needs to include scenario
and example related training for students so that they can learn to apply their knowledge in actual working situations. There is also a definite need for the CPO to concentrate on preventative planning and to implement a proactive approach in order to avoid threatening situations. This approach should be outlined and included in all training programs. This is vital if South Africans CPOs are to be able to hold their own in the international market.
Chapter 10

FORWARD THINKING, ADAPTABILITY AND THE NEED FOR A PROACTIVE APPROACH TO CLOSE PROTECTION

INTRODUCTION

Proactive planning and the ability to perform advance reconnaissance are the most important attributes that a CPO should possess. The future of close protection will be based on these attributes (Hendricks, 2003).

The problem is action is always faster than reaction. Therefore, we prefer to take a proactive rather than a reactive approach to bodyguarding (King, 2001: 29)

The concept of being proactive and avoiding potentially threatening situations is a theme that was constantly mentioned during the in-depth interviews (Garvey, 2004; Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). The importance of acting proactively in close protection was also mentioned in several of the related literature sources (see reference list for details).

There is a need to not only be able to predict the likelihood (the when and how) of a threat occurring but to also implement the necessary measures to either avoid or limit the level of exposure of the Principal to such threats. Proactive planning is no longer a task that can be solely delegated to other parties (such as a designated planning officer). The CPO must have the skills to implement effective risk management practices both prior to and during a close protection operation.
The importance for a CPO to be able to think on his/her feet is vital. This is because during an operation the Principal’s itinerary may constantly change and it will be the job of the CPOs on the ground to implement the adjusted advance planning.

The specialist sub-field of risk management, threat identification, threat avoidance as well as comprehensive planning skills need to go hand in hand with a flexible and adaptable approach. What this means, is that it is not enough to predict what is likely to happen in a given circumstance and then plan around for that. It is possible that situations or occurrences may occur that, regardless of how comprehensive the planning was, were not factored into the operation/situation. In these scenarios it comes down to the CPO on the ground having the correct mindset, skill and experience to manage the situation.

The nature of close protection work combined with the huge number of variables that may unexpectedly occur, reinforce the need for all CPOs to have proactivity and planning skills. Today’s CPO must not only have the skills needed to plan ahead but must also possess the lateral and quick-thinking ability to effectively manage almost any situation under extreme stress. This concept was constantly mentioned throughout the research but was seldom explained in enough detail to validate the relevance of this point. A breakdown and more detailed explanation will be covered in this chapter that will hopefully assist in bridging the identified gap.

**FORWARD THINKING CPOS**

In close protection the attacker has almost all the advantages. One of the only things that can help to deal with this problem is to be proactive and take measures to prevent an attack from happening (Sharp, 2003).

The concept of forward thinking can be explained as ‘the ability to process available information and then predict the likelihood of different variables occurring in a given scenario’.  

54 This explanation was personally formulated and used by the researcher whilst providing Close Protection training to various groups including presidential and royalty CPOs.
An example of applied forward thinking could be a CPO who must take his/her Principal to the airport. It is not enough to simply know the relevant routes and pick-up and drop-off times. The CPO must attempt to predict as many aspects as possible that may form a barrier to the successful completion of the task (such as traffic jams, flat tyres, possible car accidents, etc.).

When looking at the definition of close protection the three primary objectives need constantly to be taken into account, namely: to ensure the Principal’s safety, peace of mind and physical comfort. The CPO must effectively predict the applicable variables relevant to each of these aspects as thoroughly as possible. Moreover, proactive measures should then be taken to hopefully avoid any of these problems, or at the very least, limit the potential of these problems occurring.

It is an exceptionally difficult task to attempt to predict many of the contingencies that may occur. To be able to do this a CPO needs to have had a wide range of close protection related experience, in which he/she was exposed to many variables and situations. The fact that it is difficult to gain such a level of experience means that there are not many CPOs capable of functioning as a specialist planning officer.

However, in many operations there is not an allocated budget for a specialist planning officer’s services to be utilised. Therefore the CPO on the ground would have to perform all the necessary planning him/herself. This would mean that regardless of whether a CPO is an experienced planning officer or not he/she should at the very least be competent to conduct basic planning.

Perhaps the most effective way to deal with not having a set planning officer is to ensure that during training a practical, comprehensive and realistic approach to planning is not just taught but ingrained in potential CPOs. This would mean that as a basic competency a CPO would need to be able to conduct rudimentary planning which should include the following:
• Advance work and liaison
• Principal Profiling
• Threat assessment and risk analysis
• Determining of IADs and escape routes.

Effective, applicable planning is both time and resource consuming. However, the benefits of this exercise cannot be over emphasized. There is a wide selection of planning and risk management documents available in various manuals and applicable literature. However, the concept of simply taking a proforma planning document and applying it would not be a very effective approach. There are many reasons why the use of someone else’s proforma documents is not suggested (i.e. there may be either too much or not enough detail on the proforma). This becomes especially relevant in the private sector where time, manpower and budget constraints are applicable.

A more recommended approach to planning would be to utilise a proforma in conjunction with a well-trained planning team that has the ability to predict any potentially threatening occurrences. These predictions would be based on collection of all relevant information, followed by detailed analysis of this information. This information would then be superimposed on the Principal’s profile and linked to his itinerary. The process would then involve a prioritisation of the identified threats and determination of ways to either avoid these threats or minimise the likelihood of them occurring (in many cases experienced CPOs have proforma documents for the above that would be adjusted and tailored as necessary for each task).

This planning process would run in a continuous looping system. It is a fundamental error to conduct planning prior to an operation and then consider the process complete. This is important since even if changes to the Principal’s itinerary both in times and locations are factored into the security planning for the venues, routes and resulting time frame changes would in all probability have been impossible to consider.
Therefore, a planning or advance team may have to be quickly dispatched to gather the necessary information. Once the information has been analysed, a quick assessment and threat minimisation plan has to be developed.

**THE NEED FOR THINKING ADAPTABLE PROTECTORS**

The ability for an operative to think on his feet and do the correct thing in all situations is vital (Sharp, 2003).

The term ‘adaptability’ refers to a CPO’s ability to adjust and effectively react to quickly changing variables in their environment. This means not only being able to fit into the environment in which they must operate but be able to effectively protect a person whilst adapting to a changing situation. Furthermore, it is not simply the capability to cope with adverse conditions but to process complicated, potentially life threatening occurrences and then quickly implement the correct counter-action.

During the in-depth interviews respondents were asked to list the necessary skills that a CPO must possess to be able to operate effectively. The concept of a CPO being adaptable, as well as being able to think on his/her feet is something that approximately 60% of interview respondents listed in the top three close protection operational requirements (Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Steyn, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Jaarsveld, 2004; and Van Rooyen, 2004). When interviewees were asked why they feel this was an aspect that is so important for a CPO to possess, the answer was almost universally a ‘yes’.

Most of the respondents answered something along the lines of “because people’s lives may depend on it” ( Jacobs, 2003). This reinforces the concept that a CPO’s operational skills requirements, although broad, are vital in order to perform the necessary activities needed to protect someone’s life or more specifically to keep the Principal safe and out of harms way.
As a direct result of the nature of close protection work, as well as the diversity of Principals that a CPO may have to protect, he/she may very well find themselves at an embassy party or political rally on one day and in the bushveld the next. An effective CPO should be able to blend into all relevant environments. To achieve this takes not only effective training but the CPO trainee must also have the correct physical and mental attributes for this specialised field.

According to the previously mentioned job description of a CPO, he/she must protect the integrity of a Principal not just his/her physical well being. To achieve this may mean something as simple as preventing a waiter form spilling a drink on the Principal or something as complicated as creating layers of security and access control measures to minimise the chances of attackers being able to get physically close to the Principal.

CPO’s leaving the police often have trouble adapting to the private sector as there are far less guidelines to follow and almost all close protection tasks [al the different skills] need to be performed (Steyn, 2003).

Another interesting trend that was identified during the interview process was that CPOs with a military or police background sometimes appear to have trouble adjusting to the demands and operational skills requirements of the private sector. The reasoning behind this observation focused on two primary concepts. Firstly the difficulty in accessing additional resources; and secondly, the fact that in some cases these CPOs only performed specialised functions of close protection whilst in the police or military. These two aspects will be explained in more detail below.

Limited access to resources refers to the fact that in the majority of cases service personnel would have had access to resources such as CAT teams, intelligence information or even counter-snipers while operating in the police or military.
This differs substantially from how things are usually conducted in the private sector where a protection detail may be given a set budget (usually quite small) to utilise for the entire operation irrespective of the fact that the operational team may feel that more resources are required in order to provide effective protection. The bottom line in private sector close protection is that services are rendered with a close-eye cast on making money for the service provider company or with a limited expenditure because the client does not want to pay more. Whereas often in State close protection services ‘no costs are spared’ especially when protecting high profile politically sensitive VIPs.

The concept of job specialisation goes hand-in-hand with the fact that service personnel usually have access to more state resources than their civilian counterparts. In many of the close protection operations that are run by the police or military, there may be enough operatives on the detail to allow for set (static) placement of CPOs. This means that military or police operatives may work in only one designated position of a protection detail for the majority of their service career. What often happens when such CPOs begin to work in the private sector they struggle to adapt to working with limited resources and the fulfilling of multiple functions on a close protection detail themselves. It may take such a CPO some time to gain the experience and go through retraining to effectively adapt to this different working environment.

**HOW TO IMPLEMENT A PROACTIVE APPROACH**

The ability to minimise risk by being able to predict what may go wrong and implementing contingency plans or remove the source of the problem is a vital skill for all planning officers [to possess] (McGuire, 2003).

Adopting a proactive approach through planning and fieldwork is definitely not a new concept in the fields of specialist security and close protection. The concept of detailed planning and gathering of information is usually referred to as advance work (see Chapter 4: Secure advance party).
By definition advance work entails gathering information before an operation, analysing this information and then utilising the results to pre-emptively plan to avoid the identified potentially threatening situations. Probably the key aspect of this proactive cycle would be the determination of what can actually be done in order to directly avoid or minimise the exposure of the protection detail to these identified threatening situations.

It is not necessary for a CPO or designated planning officer to be an expert in human behaviour and psychology in order to plan effectively. However, it is vital that a CPO has at least a fundamental understanding of these subjects. The CPO’s ability to forecast human behaviour (the potential attacker’s actions) in different contexts and situations is a vital component to being proactive. This is necessary in order to be able to plan ahead as well as forecast what variables may affect the running of a close protection operation and then plan accordingly to manage these variables.

The last aspect identified as a key factor in having a proactive approach is to understand what the level of training and necessary reactions a protection team should have. A CPO or planning officer must have the ability to be able, in advance, to predict the positions, mental state and reactionary capabilities of a close protection team. This is vital since when planning for contingencies, if these factors are not taken into account, it may mean that the actual application of the plan may not be realistic.

In close protection where people’s lives may depend on planning, it is important for this approach to be consistently applied towards the manner in which all planning is conducted. When taking the above into account, it can be understood that the better the CPO is at applying ‘forward thinking’, the less he/she exposes his/her Principal to potentially dangerous, uncomfortable or threatening situations. CPOs would severely limit their chances of a successful and incident free operation if they do not apply forward thinking and proactive planning.
REACTIVE ASPECTS

The concept of reflexive reaction to different situations is something that was discussed in almost every in-depth interview (Garvey, 2004; Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). Research showed that the respondents were in general agreement of what threats and attack situations a CPO should be trained to deal with. There was, however, quite a lot of differentiation with regards to what was and what was not perceived as a priority skill by the different respondents. It was also found that even though almost all the reviewed literature mentions reactionary skills, the detail did not correlate to the importance placed on this by the interview respondents. The concept of reactionary aspects will be broken down and analysed in the paragraphs that follow.

The term ‘reactive’ refers to the idea that there has been or there is about to be some sort of occurrence which may require an action from an individual CPO or close protection team. CPOs reactions can be subdivided into the following subcategories:

- The trained reflexes a CPO must have to be able to respond immediately to attack situations
- What instinctive reflex a CPO needs to posses
- A CPO’s adaptability to diverse conditions.

The concept that one objective can be achieved through different means is also relevant to CPO reactions and will also be included in the discussions below.
Trained and instinctive reflexes of CPOs

Trained reflexes refer primarily to the pre-determined Immediate Action Drills (IADs) in which all CPOs should be competent. There should be IADs in place for the majority of contingencies that would have been identified during the advance work and planning stages of an operation.

The close protection operative and/or team should be able to respond fluently and reflexively in order to provide the best possible protection for a Principal should a potentially dangerous situation actually occur. Below is a summarised list of situations for which a CPO should have trained IADs in place. It was compiled from information that was obtained in the various in-depth interviews that were conducted as well as from the personal experience of the researcher.\textsuperscript{55} It is by no means a complete list but should provide the reader with an overview of what should be required of a competent CPO. The list of situational IADs is as follows:

- Firearm attack close range (handgun or assault rifle)
- Firearm attack long range
- Knife attack
- Unarmed attack (striking, grabbing or tackling)
- Hand grenade
- Various vehicle ambushes (roadblock, rolling box attack, etc.)
- Friendly crowds (Swarming and mobbing the Principal)
- Unfriendly crowds (Rioting, throwing objects, etc.)
- Potential injury to the principal from environmental factors (such as tripping or falling)
- Medical emergency (heart attack, choking, etc.)

\textsuperscript{55} Several of these situations are outlined in the various literary sources as well. An example of this is The Modern Bodyguard (Consterdine, 1995: 203-206).
The ideal for the close protection industry and for a CPO to be considered competent, he/she should at least have the ability and skills to react in the correct manner during any of the above situations. Whilst there may be several possible reactions to any one of the above situations, the correct reaction would be that reaction which provides the maximum safety to the Principal, the other members of the team and the individual CPO.

The reactions should protect the parties in that order with the protection of the Principal being the primary objective and the safety of the CPO being the last. All of these reactions should be performed while simultaneously considering all the legal ramifications pertaining to an action.

Instinctive reflex would usually refer to the human ‘flight or fight’ instincts, as well as to physiological and psychological factors that affect the human body during survival based situations. Through effective and ongoing training most of the associated negative side-effects of adrenal release (see Chapter 8) can be minimised enabling the CPO to respond effectively according to the correct trained response. In other words, through ongoing, effective scenario and reality-based training, the correct IAD (trained response) will actually become instinctive. Experience would also contribute to making IADs reflexive and instinctual.

Adaptability to diverse situations

“The one thing that you do not plan for will most probably be the thing that does [happen]” (Jacobs, 2003).

An attacker is most likely to study the movements of a Principal and attack in as unexpected manner as possible, usually when the protection team is least prepared to respond. It is for this reason that a CPO needs to have the capability to react according to instructions and/or trained cues. Moreover, he/she should be able to very quickly assimilate all relevant information, weigh up the relevant options and implement the option that will provide the best possible outcome in terms of close protection objectives.
This is perhaps not a skill that can be taught, but more of an inherent personality characteristic.

If a person’s ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstance is more of a personality characteristic than a learnt skill, effective selection and screening of potential CPOs becomes vital.\textsuperscript{56} It would make sense to evaluate a potential CPO prior to conducting full training to assess whether he/she has the correct attributes to operate as a CPO. (Candidate selection and CPO profiling are discussed in Chapter 5 and 11)

It is obviously also possible to enhance this attribute through realistic training that simulates diverse situations. The more this is done under reality based conditions, the more beneficial this training will be. It goes without saying that experience will condition a CPO more effectively than almost any alternative training method. There is in fact, no substitute for on-the-job experience.

\textbf{Achieving the desired outcome by different means}

We are in the business of finding solutions [to client problems], the client does not have to know how you get things done, the point is that things [must] get done (Higgins, 2003).

Due to the diversity of situations with which a CPO may have to deal with, it is vital for him/her to have the ability to implement lateral thinking (think out off the box). In other words there may be several ways to deal with a problem and the most effective way may not seem to be the most obvious. This may not necessarily relate to an attack situation but how these are dealt with will affect the safety and smooth running of close protection operations.

\textsuperscript{56} This pre-evaluation/selection should assess a candidate’s personality type, physical fitness and ensure that he/she has no phobias or hindrances which could be a barrier to performing as a CPO. (for more information see Chapter 5: Close Protection training and related issues).
An example of this could be as follows: ‘A client arrives at the airport at nine in the evening and has an early television interview. The client’s luggage does not arrive and the airline says it will only get there tomorrow evening’.

There may be several options available to a CPO in order to deal with this situation and avoid inconvenience or embarrassment for the client. The CPO would probably first have to gather as much information as quickly as possible. He/she would then have to identify various courses of action and select the option that is the most effective from a safety and client preference point of view. The key concept is that CPOs may have to find solutions to many of the problems that a client may face.

The need to solve problems is something a CPO encounters every day but the problem is usually made more difficult to manage because of the limited time frames in which CPOs usually have to solve these problems and implement the solutions. There are several methods of developing the necessary skills but for the most part, problem-solving and lateral thinking capability is something that a potential CPO should posses before entering the close protection industry.

**CONCLUSION**

After collecting and analysing all the relevant information a CPO must have the ability to forecast potentially threatening situations. However, just being able to do this is not enough on its own. It is then necessary for the CPO to determine and implement the most effective manner to avoid or minimise the Principal’s and the protection team’s exposure to these threats. In order to do this, a CPO must be able to apply the skills of forward thinking and advance planning. He/she must have the ability to quickly adapt to changes in the immediate environment. These skills need to extend into not only being able to determine what the correct reaction should be but what actually is possible in a given situation. A CPO’s ability to do all of this would be based on his/her training and experience. A proactive approach should be adopted by all CPOs with the focus being on threat avoidance.
Moreover, the CPO should be able to reflexively respond to a threatening situation whether it was planned for or not. The reaction needs to be effected in such a manner as to maximise the safety of the Principal first and then that of the protection team members. The CPO should be trained to deal with, at the very least a set of identified universal threats that include scenarios such as firearms attacks, medical emergencies and hand grenade attacks. All natural instinctive flight or fight responses need to be practised constantly and honed to the point where they work hand-in-hand with close protection related IADs.

Lastly it should be an operational skills requirement for a CPO to be able to problem-solve effectively under the intense stress sometimes encountered while providing protective services. Whilst this is something that can be developed, if it is not an inherent personality characteristic, he/she probably has the wrong profile for close protection work.

The consensus of opinion emanating from the interviews undertaken for this research indicated that proactivity, effective planning ability, the CPO’s ability to adapt and problem solve are definitely key operational skills requirements. Whilst a CPO may be able to work in the industry without all of the above competencies, he/she may not be operating at the level needed to ensure the complete safety of a Principal. Not all of the previously mentioned attributes can be considered learnt skills therefore effective trainee selection (including evaluations on physical fitness, psychological profile and emotional suitability) is a vital component in order to ensure that the right people are being trained to perform close protection duties.
Chapter 11

RECOMMENDATIONS ON STANDARDS FOR CLOSE PROTECTION TRAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA TODAY

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this research was to determine the skills requirements necessary in order to formulate recommended standards for the further professionalisation of the close protection industry in South Africa. Extensive information was gathered during the research that enabled the provision of answers to the research problem posed. Throughout this study, recommendations have been given both from a researcher’s point of view and from the statements made by the interview respondents. However, it is necessary to provide a skill-by-skill breakdown highlighting what recommended minimum competency standards should be implemented in order to reach the goal of full professionalisation of this specialized sector of the Private Security Industry in South Africa.

During the interviews, respondents were asked to give their opinions on what the minimum acceptable levels of competency should be for each of the identified skills that are needed to provide professional close protection services. In this chapter these recommendations have been consolidated into a point-by-point overview. It should be noted that in many cases there are several options for implementation of standards and the recommendations given in this research are intended to serve only as guidelines.

What the industry wants

Almost every South African respondent who was interviewed indicated that even if the set standard was low, it would not initially matter since at least there would be a standard (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004).
The general consensus was that the implementation of even rudimentary regulations run by a body that understands the nature of close protection work and which (the regulatory body) would not be easily corrupted, would on its own, eliminate from the Close Protection industry many of the dubious close protection training and provider companies. This, in itself, would greatly assist in professionalising the industry as a whole. Furthermore, career pathing needs to be set. Career pathing should enable candidates to qualify for different qualifications based on their level of competency. Based on feedback and suggestions from the interview respondents, the following different levels of close protection qualifications were identified:

- Entry level (Certificate)
- Experienced operator (Diploma)
- Team leader or management level (Degree),

During the in-depth interviews the respondents were asked the following question and requested to comment on each subject:

“What kind of minimum standards would you set for the following criteria”:

- Prior educational qualifications
- Physical abilities
- CPO skills
- Prior experience in guarding
- Firearm skills
- Unarmed combat
- Protective skills
- First aid skills
- Security knowledge
- Advanced driver training
- Protocol and etiquette
- Management and business skills
- Related skills”
The feedback and information gathered during the interviews was then correlated and grouped into relevant themes. The key aspects for each of the abovementioned criteria is discussed below.

**PRIOR EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS**

The key concept being analyzed here is what level of education the prospective candidate should possess in order to be considered suitable for close protection training. The majority of respondents felt that the minimum should be Grade 12 (Matric). The remaining respondents felt that a Grade 10 (Standard Eight) would be sufficient. The point raised here was not so much the candidate’s actual capability with literacy and numeracy even though these are vital for a prospective CPO but more importantly the candidate’s level of ‘life experience’.

The overall consensus seemed to be that a candidate should be around 21 years old with a valid matric certificate before entry into a basic training program could be considered. However, it was also universally expressed by the respondents that if the candidate was younger but showed the necessary commitment and maturity he/she should be accepted for training.

Additionally it was mentioned that a candidate should have some sort of military, police or related security experience before being accepted into a close protection training program. Candidates without any previous experience could, as a form of bridging, obtain the Security Guard Grade Level C (a Grade C Guard is competent to function as an armed guard). This would be an acceptable base to begin close protection training. Prior experience was a point of concern in several interviews and is mentioned here simply as a point of consideration and not as a vital point of implementation.

**PHYSICAL ABILITIES**

A point of controversy that was identified by most of the respondents was the physical fitness and the physical competencies needed by a CPO in order to operate effectively.
The fact that actual fitness standards are not clearly defined in the existing unit standard has also led to confusion as to what the expected minimum standards for physical competency are. When analysing the information obtained via the literature review and through the interviews primarily conducted with the internationally experienced respondents, the consensus seemed to follow the statement below:

“A rounded level of fitness that is regularly assessed is a vital aspect of a CPOs operational readiness” (Sharp, 2003).

It was identified that not only is it necessary for the CPO to be fit enough to handle all operational situations (like an attack on the Principal) but it is most important for a CPO to look fit i.e. have a fit appearance and to be in the necessary physical condition needed to deal with a violent attack. The reason for this is that in many cases appearance is one of the primary criteria that the Principal has to assess the CPO on. This concept is mentioned in several literary sources but explained by Peter Consterdine as:

Being a BG [bodyguard] is a specialist, demanding job if everything is done correctly and well and a correct attitude to fitness and training is integral to being able to ‘switch on’ and dig in when things get tough (Consterdine, 1995: 290).

A point often mentioned during the interviews was that the fitness assessments done on CPOs need to be duty-related and not necessarily based on generic military or police assessments. The concept is that CPOs are best assessed based on skills they may have to perform. The example given was that it may be relevant for a CPO to carry a wounded client but not necessarily have to run five kilometres within a specified time. Therefore perhaps the fitness assessments should entail not only the generic push ups, pull ups, sit ups and endurance runs but also a dummy carry and agility course.

An example of a close protection related fitness assessment that could serve as a standard for a minimum level of competency could be as follows:
(Note: the evaluation should be done in a battery format with a two minute allocated rest period between each exercise.)

- 45 push ups in one minute
- 40 sit ups in one minute
- 8 pull ups in one minute
- 6 x 50 metre shuttle runs\(^{57}\) (each alternate run should have the CPO carrying a 50 kg dummy)
- 2.4 kilometer run in under 15 mins

The above assessment is merely an example of activities that could be utilized in an assessment and should not be considered the only valid method of assessing a CPO’s physical competency. An obstacle course or similar agility assessment course could also be used to effectively measure a CPO’s physical competency.

**CPO SKILLS**

This subdivision relates to the specific skills needed to perform close protection duties effectively. The current SAQA unit standard for close protection mentions all of the relevant skills.\(^{58}\) However, there is no definition in the unit standard for what could be considered a minimum level of competency (see Annexure 5: SAQA Unit Standard, for details). An example illustrating this is if a CPO is being assessed on his/her planning skills, at what level should he/she actually be assessed (e.g. planning for a five-day operation with a ten-man protection detail or planning for a pick-up from the airport and drop-off at a hotel. There is an obvious distance between the planning/organisational levels needed for these different operations.)

The subdivision of CPO skills is so broad that in order to simplify the relevant concepts, the four specific outcomes as identified in the unit standard have been chosen as a

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\(^{57}\) Shuttle runs refers to running back and forth between two points that are twenty five metres apart.

\(^{58}\) The relevant skills include all aspects that are needed for a CPO to provide effective protection for a Principal on foot, in transit or static at venues. This would include aspects such as firearms, skills, unarmed combat, first aid, advanced driving, etc. see Chapter 4: Literature review, for a detailed breakdown of all the necessary skills.
framework from which to expand. These serve only as examples based on indicators obtained from the research of what may be considered acceptable minimum competency standards. It would be unrealistic to explain as separate entities each and every individual competency relevant to close protection, as they function as a synergistic unit.

It is therefore suggested that in order to try and formulate some form of set evaluation standards that a guideline similar to the following be implemented:

- All written documentation should be done on the basis of protecting a medium risk level Principal. This could be clarified by outlining that there is definitely a threat but one that is not that likely to occur.

- The planning and practical evaluations should consist of a team structure with a suggested minimum of three and a maximum of six team members.

- The operation to be planned for should be at least one day long and should include protection of at least two different venues.

The first specific outcome as outlined in the unit standard is to ‘ascertain the Principal’s brief and risk profile’. In terms of evaluation this leaves a wide scope of options and tools available to demonstrate competency in this area. A recommended approach could be to highlight the key areas relevant to this competency and put them into a suggested set of documents and checklists. As a minimum these documents should include a risk and threat assessment, a principal profile and a detailed operational itinerary. To demonstrate competency, a CPO should be able to compile each of the above documents in a workable format. There should be enough information in each document to compile an effective protection plan that would ensure the safety, well-being and comfort of the Principal.

The second specific outcome is to ‘Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a Principal’. It should be noted that the specific outcomes should be conducted
progressively as it would be impossible to plan for an operation without comprehensive information on the Principal’s profile and the identified threats. In order to assess competency in this area, key concepts relevant to planning need to be demonstrated.

As a minimum these planning documents should include, but not be limited to the following:

- the written allocation of relevant resources
- a clear definition of roles and duties of team members
- a step-by-step breakdown of the different phases of the defined operation
- a summary of all necessary logistics required for the whole operation based on venues and transport
- a detailed set of contingencies and reactions to the identified threats that may occur, these should be correlated to the identified risk factors at different stages of a Principal’s itinerary.

Regardless of the format in which all the above aspects are presented, it is vital that there is a structured approach to the planning and that the plan itself is practical and can actually be implemented. A written exam could also be used to assess a CPO’s knowledge and understanding of all the relevant concepts.

The third specific outcome of the SAQA Unit Standards is to ‘protect a Principal during transit/foot/venue movement’. In terms of evaluation this could be done by utilizing a combination of practical assessments and scenario evaluations. The practical assessments should be based on a realistic scenario where the candidates should be able to demonstrate effective protection capabilities both as individuals and as members of a team. These scenarios should be performed in ‘live situations’.

An example of this could be a shopping centre where the candidate must demonstrate the relevant protective skills in a “live” environment. At this stage, it is recommended that
only controlled ‘attacks’\textsuperscript{59} are applied as the reactions of civilians or officials may endanger all parties. Key aspects to be assessed at this stage would include awareness, observation skills, positioning according to situation and profile of the Principal and operation, team work, application of planning and communication skills.

In terms of the actual physical protection of a Principal, the assessment should take place in a controlled environment like a shooting range or private training facility. The candidate should, at the very least, be able to demonstrate competency to effectively manage the following ‘Attack on Principal’ situations:

- Long range firearm attack (sniper)
- Close range firearm attack (5 - 25 metres)
- Attack with a knife or similar weapon
- Unarmed/ grabbing attack
- Hand grenade attack
- Throwing of objects at the Principal (e.g. eggs)
- Dealing with ‘autograph seekers’ and over friendly persons

The candidate should be able to demonstrate the above in simulated scenarios where safety of all participants is the foremost concern. The assessments should include demonstration of effective embus and debus\textsuperscript{60} methodology, effective demonstration of protective formations based on the scenario and the ability to react effectively to anything that may unexpectedly occur.

The fourth specific outcome as stated in the SAQA Unit Standard refers to the CPO’s ability to ‘Terminate and review a protection operation’. As stated in the unit standard this should include ‘Feedback in verbal, written, recorded formats’. In terms of actual application, a candidate should be able to submit a detailed operational report explaining his/her role in the operation and making recommendations for the future. The candidate

\textsuperscript{59} A simulated attack or ambush on the close protection detail.

\textsuperscript{60} ‘Embus’ and ‘Debus’ refers to the manner in which a protection detail should escort a Principal into and out of a vehicle (i.e. embarking and disembarking). There are specific security related procedures that should be implemented during these activities which aim to minimise the exposure of the Principal.
should also be able to verbally explain him/herself and justify all actions that were taken whilst operational during a post operation debrief session. Assessment could include a question-and-answer session and the submission of an operational report should sufficiently demonstrate competency in this area. The format and layout is not as important as the content and should remain flexible.

PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN GUARDING

The concept of a candidate having some sort of prior security-related experience before commencing with close protection training was mentioned earlier in this chapter. However, since it is an aspect that warranted different responses from the interview respondents it will be discussed in more detail. The information yielded from respondents revealed that almost all of them felt that prior experience was necessary, with the remainder indicating that it is nice to have but would not be an absolute necessity if the potential trainee had the correct profile. There were basically four types of candidate backgrounds that were identified as useful for someone who wanted to be trained as a CPO to possess. These four backgrounds were:

- Military or related experience
- Police or related experience
- Security or related experience
- Martial arts and/or firearms experience

It should be stated that simply because a person has had experience in one or more of the above sectors, it does not necessarily mean that he/she is qualified to operate as a CPO. Prior experience in one of these fields would simply be a good indicator that a person may have the potential to become a CPO. Additionally, prior experience in the above areas could enable the initial close protection training period to be shorter since it will be easier to train a candidate with related experience to achieve the necessary competencies. It was further suggested by several respondents that if a candidate has no prior military, police or related background than a candidate would be required to do basic security
guard training. The suggestion was that a candidate should train up to at least the level of Security Officer Grade C.

**FIREARM HANDLING AND RELATED SKILLS**

In general, aspects regarding firearm usage by CPOs was a point of dissension among some of the interview respondents. Certain respondents felt that the use of firearms was the single most important competency that a CPO must possess (Allon, 2003 and Jones, 2003), while other respondents indicated that the use of firearms as the primary force option for CPOs was outdated and that whilst a basic competency in firearms handling is required the need for a CPO to be highly trained in firearms usage is not as relevant as it used to be (Garvey, 2004; Rootman, 2004; and Steyn, 2003).

The reality is that the use of firearms is a maximum force option. Maximum force may be necessary when one correlates the core function of close protection, which is to protect a Principal’s life. However, what is important to determine is what scope and depth of firearm skills competency does a CPO actually need to possess. Information from both the interviews, as well as the literature review yielded several inconsistencies in the way that respondents felt that competency for CPOs should be applied. An example of this was that one respondent felt that a man size target should be used whereas most of the other respondents felt that only the Centre Body Mass (CBM)\(^{61}\) of a man-sized target should be allowed.

It would seem logical that when considering what is actually applicable in terms of training time and operational limitations that a compromise between the respondents’ various points-of-view would be the best approach. In the South African context, it seems that a CPO should at the very least, be able to utilise a pistol or revolver in a tactical close protection related duty context. The use of a hand carbine, shotgun and assault rifle could be seen as ‘add-ons’ or ‘nice to haves’ but not vital competencies for a CPO to possess.

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\(^{61}\) Centre Body Mass is the term used to describe the centre of an attacker’s body. CBM is demarcated on a target by a rectangle that is in the middle of a human silhouette; it is also often referred to as the ‘A’ Block.
The basis for establishing competency should focus on a CPO’s ability to handle a pistol. Therefore it is necessary to apply the existing unit standards for handguns. There is an existing competency assessment in place for use of a handgun (for details see SAQA Unit Standard Number 10748: Use of a handgun) that has the following critical outcomes:

- Handle handguns safely
- Apply knowledge and understanding of the relevant legislation required
- Operate, use and maintain handguns
- Shoot handgun competently.

The core competencies outlined under the critical outcome number four: ‘Shoot Handgun competently’, are as follows:

- Shooting fundamentals
- Fault analysis
- Low light shooting
- Cover (barricades) and concealment (SAQA, 2002a; 1 and 4)

It should not even be a point of debate that the above aspects should be included in a close protection related competency assessment. However, there are several more aspects that are relevant to close protection. These fall within the scope of the unit standard for tactical use of a firearm (for more details see Unit standard number 10757: Use of firearms in tactical duty related situations).

It is specifically stated in this unit standard under the heading of ‘learning assumed to be in place’ that it has been written specifically for persons who may need to utilise more specialised firearms tactics whilst performing their jobs, it states: “Competent in the relevant job related skill(s), i.e. response officer, close protection of persons, specialist units in official institutions, etc.” (SAQA, 2004b: 1).
The specific outlines as stated in this unit standard are as follows:

- Prepare relevant personnel, firearms and equipment required
- Apply knowledge and understanding of the tactical operational procedures and techniques
- Conduct post-operational de-briefings with relevant personnel (SAQA, 2004b: 2-5).

Based on the above, a relevant close protection shooting assessment should include tests and exercises that not only demonstrate basic handgun competency but also the candidate’s ability to utilize the firearm in duty-related situations. Some suggestions of this could be:

- Demonstration by single operative of drawing and firing while protecting the Principal
- Demonstration of basic close protection team reactions (performed from formations and walking drills) to simulated attacks (IADs), live fire62
- Demonstration of firing from vehicles during embus/debus or close protection related situations.

To consolidate the standards for close protection firearm usage, the feedback obtained from respondents on this aspect could easily be formatted into the existing unit standards. It should be reiterated that the accepted competency evaluation should be the minimum standard that the industry roleplayers could agree on.

It is not recommended that a competency assessment be made so difficult that most candidates would not qualify, nor should it be so easy that an untrained person could qualify easily. There needs to be an effective middle ground that can actually be applied in practice within the context of the South African close protection industry.

62 Live fire means that the drill is performed by firing live ammunition at designated targets. The use of live fire makes the assessment more realistic and lifelike. This enables the assessor to evaluate how the candidate is likely to perform if a real attack took place.
UNARMED COMBAT

This aspect is considered a vital component if we are to aim at rounded CPOs who have minimum force options available to them and are able to operate internationally. The details are found earlier on in this report (Chapter 9, Use of force options and close protection) and include the need for CPOs to have competency in unarmed combat, alternative and improvised weaponry. The feedback obtained from the vast majority of respondents indicated that it was important that an assessment covering this topic be focused on outcomes and not orientated towards a candidate’s choice of fighting style or system (Bodhoo, 2004; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Richards, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). It was also stated that it is perhaps more important that a candidate is able to deal effectively with work-related situations instead of being able to demonstrate technical competency in specific techniques. This approach is congruent with that of Leroy Thompson who states that:

No one martial art is better for those in close protection than any other, although one that incorporates blocks, strikes, throws, arm bars, kicks, disarming techniques, offence and defence with impact weapons and blades and situational awareness is most desirable (Thompson, 2003: 172).

Furthermore, it was determined that it is more important that a candidate be able to demonstrate effective attributes under stress, than being able to demonstrate sets of technique against unrealistic ‘set up’ attacks. Some of the attributes should be:

- Aggression
- Commitment
- Ability to utilise the correct force option under pressure
- Power
- Focus
The above are just examples and the list could obviously be increased and adjusted.

The key concept when analysing how CPOs could be assessed for this competency could be summarised as follows: The CPO must be able to effectively manage (neutralize, incapacitate or restrain) an assailant within the constraints of the law in a close protection related environment (the aim being to protect the Principal) utilising unarmed combat and/or alternative weaponry to achieve the best result in the most effective manner. It is important that these skills are integrated with IADs and can be performed in a simulated environment i.e. simulate real-life situations that the candidate may encounter during a CPO operation.

An example of what an assessment should test in candidates could be as follows:

- Demonstrate ability to strike effectively with different natural body weapons
- Demonstrate the ability to restrain and control an attacker standing or on the ground
- Demonstrate the ability to defend against various weapon attacks (close range firearm, knife or baton, etc.)
- Demonstrate the necessary attributes needed to manage and deal with a violent attack within the constraints of the law whilst applying effective close protection methodology.

The above is simply a suggested approach based on information obtained during the research. It is suggested that an industry accepted minimum standard competency assessment be developed and implemented in order to standardize what can be deemed as an ‘operationally competent’ CPO.

**PROTECTIVE SKILLS**

Although almost the same as the subdivision on CPO skills described earlier in this chapter, protective skills can be defined as any physical skill needed to ensure the safety of a Principal other than the use of firearm, alternative weapon or unarmed combat. This
aspect was included to allow respondents the opportunity to add any aspects they felt were relevant to protective skills that may not have been previously discussed.

Primarily, respondents reiterated the need for a candidate to be competent in the relevant application of formations, embus, debus, walking drills and related exercises. Since there are no universal textbook right or wrong ways to demonstrate many of these aspects it was mentioned that a generic approach to assessment should be adopted. In other words the candidate should be assessed on his/her workplace application and choice of protection tactic based on the situation as opposed to demonstrating every option in a repetitive fashion. A written evaluation could also be implemented to assess the CPOs basic understanding of related security concepts.

The primary concept outlined under this topic is for all the relevant subdivisions of a close protection operation to function in a holistic manner. It is vital that all sub-components (see Chapter 4: Literature review) link synergistically in order enable the CPO to provide effective protection for his/her principal in any situation. This would best be assessed in a scenario based evaluation where candidates should demonstrate their ability to provide an integrated protective initiative.

The scenario should encompass all the aspects that would be needed to run an effective protection operation, i.e. candidates are provided with a ‘Principal’ (possibly one of the instructors) who has a fictional background and is faced with an imaginary threat. Assessors could be on hand to grade and assess the candidates. The students would also be evaluated on all the necessary documentation (Principal Profile, threat and risk assessment, operations appreciation, advance work notes, Operations Order, etc.) which they should have prepared during the exercise.

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63 All aspects of a protection task would involve starting with the planning and advance work and ending with a team debrief. The scenario should ideally run for at least forty-eight hours.
FIRST AID SKILLS

The desired level of competency with regard to a CPOs first aid and medical assistance skills can be analysed from several points of view. Competent international close protection operatives who may have to work in third world countries that do not have sufficient medical facilities and personnel would obviously need a higher first aid skill level than locally based CPOs. The key concern when determining what first aid or medical competency qualifications a CPO should possess would be decided in terms of: ‘what is the minimum qualification that would be acceptable to the South African industry as a whole’?

The vast majority of CPOs in South Africa would only be operational in this country where high quality medical care is available. Therefore, the CPO would only need ‘immediate responder’ first aid training as it would not take too long for more qualified help to arrive or to evacuate the wounded to a medical facility. This view is endorsed by Leroy Thompson who states that:

The US Secret Service and many other protective teams practice what is called ‘ten minute medicine’, based on the assumption that the job of the protective team is to keep the Principal alive for ten minutes until reaching a hospital or until emergency medical technicians can attend (Thompson, 2003: 172-173).

Another point that was raised by several respondents was that in cases where medical concerns were an issue or the Principal was travelling to a country without sufficient medical facilities, a designated qualified medic could be included in the close protection team. This would negate the need for all CPOs to have a very high level of medical training as a designated medic could join the team to fill this gap.

When analysing international trends, the United Kingdom and Australia require only a basic first aid and CPR qualification that has to be kept up-to-date (either annual or three
yearly refresher training and re-qualification). Based on this and on the information obtained from the research it would seem logical that a level one (the entry level first aid qualification) would be sufficient as the minimum standard qualification that a CPO would need to possess.

It would perhaps be preferable for CPOs to have a level three (more comprehensive first responder qualification). However, the practicality of implementing this would be unrealistic in terms of the entire close protection industry in South Africa because of the extra training time that would be required, as well as the fact that this would entail additional costs for the prospective CPO.

The standards for first aid qualifications are set by the Health and Welfare SETA. It would be a waste of energy and resources to set new standards that are only applicable to the close protection industry. Specialised sessions can be held by registered training providers to deal in more detail with issues such as gun shot wounds and the like. These sessions would be add-on training for experienced CPOs that feel that they may need to operate in an environment in which they will personally have to apply these skills.

SECURITY KNOWLEDGE

The topic of security knowledge as referred to in the interviews does not concern the subdivisions of protective concepts and CPO skills that have already been discussed in this chapter. The focus of this topic is on related fields of security speciality.

This was discussed in much detail with most of the respondents who were of the opinion that a CPO should have a basic understanding of related speciality fields. It was not necessary for the CPO to become an expert in these fields but to simply have a basic understanding (i.e. a working knowledge) of what these fields entail.

The fields that were identified as relevant were: Physical security (including alarm systems and access control), risk management, electronic countermeasures (ECM), information technology (IT) security and investigation. The consensus among the

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64 Where a level one concentrates on fundamental first aid skills such as CPR, a level three includes more details on aspects such as anatomy, childbirth as well as more detailed triage.
respondents was that while it was important for the CPO to at least know what these speciality fields are about, it is not necessary for any sort of minimum standard competency evaluation to be established. The reasoning behind this was that if such services are required, it would not be difficult to gain access to the relevant specialist.

A point of interest that was raised during the interviews was that perhaps a more specialist qualification (perhaps an Advanced Close Protection Operative qualification) be created for CPOs that have gained extensive experience and undergone detailed ongoing training in related fields. At present, most CPOs seem to study for security-related tertiary qualifications since gaining higher level qualifications could expand their employment prospects. This would expose them to more opportunities in the security field other than only close protection perhaps also including the function of a security manager.

**ADVANCED DRIVER TRAINING**

The current unit standard for close protection describes that under Specific Outcome 3 (Protect a Principal during foot, transit or venue movement) the following aspects must be in place:

- Protective escort techniques while in transit.
- Defensive Driving.
- Offensive Driving.
- Evasive Driving
- Convoy and motorcade Driving

In the Unit Standard, no definition or assessment criteria are presented to explain the above concepts or provide a guideline for assessment. During the interviews, almost all respondents mentioned the above sub-categories of advanced driving as being relevant for a CPO to be able to effectively perform his/her duties.
However, when the methods of assessment were discussed with interview respondents the feedback was quite ambiguous. The practicality of implementing comprehensive assessment of the above topics would be almost impossible, especially in private sector training. It was mentioned on several occasions that the costs of renting vehicles, skidpans and organizing the necessary objects to ram would be exorbitant in comparison with what potential training candidates could afford to pay.

It would be more practical to perhaps make the minimum standard a combination of basic defensive driving with skidpan drills and convoy procedures. Before a candidate performs a physical evaluation, a basic theoretical evaluation should be conducted to ensure that the candidate has the necessary theoretical understanding of defensive, offensive and convoy driving. This should be done in order to ensure the safety of all parties involved since if the candidate does not have a good theoretical base, he/she would not be permitted to perform the practical evaluation. It would also serve as a vetting process since if the candidate does not demonstrate the necessary theoretical understanding the assessment could be postponed until the candidate is ready thus saving time and money.

A suggested example of a close protection driving assessment could cover the following aspects:

- Pre-trip inspection of the vehicle
- Observation and awareness of surroundings whilst driving
- Vehicle control
- Application of security concepts (e.g. leaving escape routes, positioning the vehicle in such a way that threats could be minimised, scanning for threats, etc.) while driving
- Demonstrate knowledge of the Principal positions while in a vehicle
- Demonstrate understanding of motorcade driving, explaining vehicle positioning, roles and duties of each vehicle as well as the application of anti ambush drills (a three-car convoy would be sufficient to demonstrate competency)
• Be able to demonstrate, on a skidpan or similar surface, the relevant collision avoidance and skid control techniques
• Be able to demonstrate basic offensive and anti-ambush techniques such as reverse turns and hand brake turns.65

The above could form the basis for a close protection driving competency assessment and has been compiled from information obtained in the literature review, the researcher’s personal experience as well as from the in-depth interviews. In order to assist training providers in curriculum development that can cater to training personnel according to the recognized standard, it is vital that an accepted minimum competency evaluation be developed for the South African close protection industry regarding driving skills.

PROTOCOL AND ETIQUETTE

Protocol was consistently mentioned by respondents as a point of concern when discussing areas of importance to professional CPO performance. The difficulty seems to become apparent when possible assessment criteria were discussed with the respondents. The majority of respondents felt that protocol and etiquette was best evaluated during a scenario or similar-type exercise where a candidate would have to demonstrate the necessary attributes (see Chapter 6: Perceptions about CPOs and international comparisons, for details) in a work-related simulation. Protocol related aspects could also be assessed in a theoretical format by using both written or oral questioning to determine candidates’ knowledge and understanding, not only of the necessary protocol and etiquette but its practical application.

MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS SKILLS

In terms of a minimum competency assessment for CPOs, the subject of business management skills would not be very important. It may be more relevant when assessing planning officers or team leaders. The business related skills that would be vital for a

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65 Reverse turns and hand brake turns are evasive manoeuvres that would be used if an ambush/roadblock was encountered. These techniques enable the vehicle to quickly turn around and evacuate in the opposite direction of an attack.
CPO to possess would at the very least include report writing, basic computer literacy and rudimentary client liaison and marketing skills.

When determining what should be included in an assessment it would be important to remember that in terms of minimum competency it may not be necessary to assess these aspects at all. The unit standard states that “learning assumed to be in place” must equal “a knowledge, comprehension and application of language and mathematical skills at NQF level 04” (SAQA, 2002c: 1). Therefore, a candidate wanting to be assessed should at the very least be able to perform the necessary business related skills, needed to perform in standard CPO operations.

**RELATED SKILLS**

During the in-depth interviews the sub heading of ‘Related skills’ was included to allow the respondents to add any information that they felt was applicable but may not have been covered under the other headings. It was also utilised to give respondents an opportunity to discuss the ‘nice to have’ add-ons to basic CPO skills that have been discussed in other sections of this study. Not one of the respondents felt that it was necessary to add on to the aspects that had already been discussed. When the topic of evaluation for ‘nice to have’ skills was discussed, with respondents it was universally agreed that each relevant skill would have its own assessment criteria and that it should not be included in a CPO minimum competency assessment.

**CONCLUSION**

In summary this research was done to ‘identify the steps needed to professionalise the Close Protection industry in South Africa’. In-depth interviews, literature review and the researchers personal experience where used to draw the information, that was needed to answer the stated research problem. It was found the ineffective regulation of the Close Protection industry, as well as factors such as content of training, instructor credentials, training methodology and lack of universal training standards where aspects that needed
to be assessed if the South African CPO industry is to be world-class. Key fundamentals that were identified for a country to have effective regulation and standards setting were:

- A minimum standard covering each accepted area of close protection training to form the basis for a recognised qualification.

- A regular re-evaluation and competency assessment framework to maintain up-to-date records of qualified CPOs as well as to clarify their operational status (ability to perform skills in terms of minimum standard requirements).

- A penalty system, perhaps a disciplinary system with fines and sanctions, that would serve as a deterrent to companies or individuals that do not comply with the above.

- A validation database for clients to verify the qualifications of close protection providers.

The concept of an accepted minimum standard that encompasses the identified relevant aspects of close protection is a vital component towards professionalising the close protection industry in South Africa. This accepted standard must divide the competencies into the relevant subfields and then provide a guideline to measure and quantify exactly what a competent CPO should be able to do.

There were certain key areas that were identified as vital components of any CPO’s skills and knowledge base. These areas refer to some of the hard skills of close protection (i.e. unarmed combat, driving and firearms) as well as the necessary soft skills (i.e. protocol, report writing and communication skills). Assessments should evaluate a CPO’s knowledge and skills in terms of both theoretical understanding and practical ability. The assessment should attempt to evaluate a CPO’s knowledge and skills in terms of what is the minimum accepted standard. If a CPO is complies with these minimum standards he/she would be regarded as being competent.
Furthermore, use of scenarios and reality-based simulations should be utilised as evaluation tools wherever possible. This is important as it is necessary for evaluations to assess what a CPO actually needs to be able to do in order to operate effectively. Eliminating preconceived ideas and focusing on the application of skills should be applied in all aspects of evaluations. These scenarios and assessments should take place in both ‘live’ and controlled environments. The safety of all parties involved in the assessment process should be the first consideration when designing and implementing any practical and scenario assessments.

Interview respondents were given the opportunity to outline what they believed were relevant aspects in the establishment of minimum competency standards for the subcategories of close protection. These opinions were then consolidated and correlated with information from the literature review, as well as the researcher’s personal experience.

Where it was possible, suggested competency assessments were linked to existing SAQA unit standards. If no unit standards could be found or the information in the existing unit standards was not clear, then suggested assessment criteria were outlined. It is important to ensure that standards are not set so high that prospective CPOs cannot qualify. Additionally, standards should not be so low that incompetent persons could qualify as CPOs.

It should also be noted that any assessment and/or minimum standards must, in practical terms be able to be implemented especially with reference to cost and available resources. The underlying goals of having minimum competency and established assessment criteria are to establish a qualifications framework for CPOs that would be internationally recognised. This would most definitely assist in professionalizing the South African close protection industry.

Finally, it was found that the vast majority of CPOs operational in South Africa may not be considered competent if measured against what respondents described as a ‘competent
CPO’. However, the few South African CPOs that are operational internationally and do maintain high quality standards may be considered among the worlds best. In the section in this paper on recommendations, suggestions were given on methods of assessing competency that are not outlined in the existing unit standard for Close Protection training. It is hoped that the findings and suggestions outlined in this research report will be implemented in some way to assist in professionalising the Close Protection industry in South Africa. A professional industry with internationally benchmarked qualifications is necessary so that qualified CPOs may gain international recognition for their skills and compete internationally in this competitive niche market of security services.
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**INTERVIEWS**

**Interview 1:** David Sharp. Pretoria. 1 May 2003. International Verifier for Task International on Close Protection training and standards. British assessor, moderator and verifier for National Vocational Qualifications in the UK.

**Interview 2:** Lourens Jacobs. Pretoria. 5 May 2003. Former Commander Presidential Protection Unit, SAPS; now specialised consultant, instructor and team leader for Close Protection related tasks.

**Interview 3:** Johan Van Eck. Durban. 11 May 2003. Former operative VIP Protection Unit and Close Protection instructor specialised training services, SAPS; now Manager of Executive Protection Standard Bank South Africa based in Johannesburg.

**Interview 4:** Clinton McGuire. Durban. 12 May 2003. Former Close Protection Operative SANDF, Freelance close protection specialist; now Director of Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd a specialist close protection training company based in Pretoria.

**Interview 5:** Jarred Higgins. Johannesburg. 2 June 2003. Close Protection specialist, General Manager Nicholls-Steyn and Associates, which is currently the largest Close Protection company in South Africa.

**Interview 6:** Norman Steynberg. Johannesburg. 7 June 2003. Former close protection instructor, SANDF, currently Chief Instructor High Risk Close Protection for Special Forces, SANDF.

**Interview 7:** Stephan Hugo. Centurion. 15 June 2003. Former Commander VIP Protection training, SAPS and Executive Protection Manager for BMW, South Africa.

Interview 9: Wayne Hendricks. Johannesburg. 16 July 2003. Close protection specialist; Former member of the Presidential Protection Unit, SAPS and personal bodyguard to Nelson Mandela; now Head of Executive Protection at Goldman Sachs, South Africa.

Interview 10: Russell Jones. Johannesburg. 30 July 2003. Close protection specialist and registered close protection Assessor with the POSLEC SETA.


Interview 14: John Garvey. Sydney, Australia. A series of informal interviews took place during January 2004. Director of Corporate Protection Services Pty (Ltd), specialist security consulting and training company in Australia.

Interview 15: Timothy Irvine-Smith, Cape Town. 23 April 2004. Director of RONIN, a specialist close protection training company based in Cape Town.


ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE 1: DEFINITIONS

The definitions below have been taken directly from the Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd. *Basic Close Protection Manual 2003* and in some cases expanded or adapted to fit definitions emanating from the research. Permission has been given in writing for these definitions to be included in this study.

Areas of Responsibility and Arcs of Fire

Refers to the predetermined zones or areas in a Close Protection formation that are allocated to a team member in advance depending on formation, environment and their position to each other and the Principal.

Attack

Any potential, actual or attempted, direct or indirect physical breach and/or threat to the security of the Principal or his/her assets, commercial ventures, as well as any other legal or personal interests and entities both locally and internationally.

OR

Any potential, actual or attempted direct or indirect breach and threat to the security and integrity of all restricted information or of any information system relating to the day-to-day functioning of the Principal and/or his/her assets, commercial ventures or any other legal, as well as personal interests or entities both locally and internationally.

Attempt

A direct or indirect endeavour to breach the security and or safety of the principal, his assets, commercial ventures or restricted information relating to the day-to-day functioning of the Principal.
Client
The Client is the organisation, body or person that is actually financing the protection operation. In certain cases the Client may also be the Principal i.e. the person receiving the protection also pays for it.

Clock system
A method of communicating between close protection team members. It describes the direction of potential threats based on the numbers of a clock. The direction the Principal is facing is always considered as twelve o’clock.

Close Protection
Those measures taken by a trained individual or team, static or mobile, overt or covert, in order to continuously ensure the safety and comfort of the Principal in a professional manner.

Cover
There are two types of cover:

Cover from sight = any structure or object that will hide something from view

Cover from fire = any structure or object that will prevent projectiles from firearms from penetrating it

Covert visit
A visit is classified as covert when the visitor and/or the circumstances surrounding the visit is of such a sensitive nature that disclosure could lead to severe damage or serious embarrassment to the Principal, his country or the country being visited.
Directional approach
This is a simplified version of the clock systems where the numbers of a clock are substituted with four directions; front, back, left and right. As with the clock system bearing is taken from the direction the Principal is facing.

Divert
The action of deflecting or drawing off the attention from one thing or person to another with the aim of getting rid of the hindrance.

Engage/neutralise
To enter into conflict with any potential threat and render it ineffective by opposite force or effect.

Escorting
Incorporates the physical accompanying of the Principal in a restricted area in order to enhance security. Or the assistance to the Principal with regards to his travelling or visiting program. Includes all measures, junctions and instructions not relating to safeguarding or protection.

Evacuate
The removal of a person or persons from a place considered to be dangerous, preferably according to a pre-arranged plan.

Immediate action drills
These are planned, trained responses to an attack or threatening situation in any given environment.

Liaise
Acting as a communication and information link on behalf of the Principal with other teams or units and relevant authorities, as well as any external parties that are involved in a close protection operation.
Overt visit
A visit is classified as overt when the visitor and the circumstances surrounding the visit are of such a nature that disclosure will not lead to damage or embarrassment to the Principal, his country or the country being visited.

Principal
A person who as a result of his/her appointment and considering such person’s stature/the position he/she fills or the knowledge he/she possesses, is in the national interest that he/she enjoys special handling and protection. The Principal is the person that the protection team actually protects.

Principal briefing
The briefing given to a new Principal outlining the following; close protection Principals and objectives, team modus operandi, the Principals’ responsibilities and any other information deemed relevant for the smooth performance of operations.

Protection
Incorporates continuous Close Protection, either static or mobile of the Principal and his/her immediate entourage.

Risk
A condition where loss or losses are possible or a combination of hazards measured against probability/likelihood of the said action/ event actually occurring.

Support
To lend assistance to the Principal, fellow team members or relevant authorities as a situation demands or requires.
**Threat**

This refers to any institution, person, organisation, item or condition that has the ability to threaten the physical safety and/or well being of the principal and/or his/her assets, commercial ventures or any other legal entity both locally and internationally.

OR

Any institution, person, organisation, item or condition that has the ability to threaten or damage the public and professional image, dignity and/or integrity of the principal and/or his assets, commercial ventures or any other legal or personal interests or entities both locally and internationally.
ANNEXURE 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS FOR CPOS

Questions

1. Please provide a brief summary of your background as related to Close Protection in both operations and training?

2. In your own understanding define the job description of a Close Protection Officer (CPO)?

3. In order of importance list the necessary operational skills (defined as the functional abilities that a CPO must have to operate effectively) requirements of a CPO?

4. In your opinion, please list, for each operational skill, what training is required to ensure that a CPO can meet these skills requirements?

5. How long would it take to train an individual, who possessed all the correct physical and psychological attributes to achieve the competencies necessary for the provision of effective Close Protection?

6. Is retraining necessary for CPOs? If yes, how often and what should the focus of such training be?

7. In your professional opinion what percentage of the CPOs operating today have been trained effectively and could be considered fully competent to effectively provide Close Protection services?

8. What current changing trends with regards to both CPO training and operations are you aware of?
9. What would you consider to be an effective method of screening for operational employment and/or training of CPOs?

10. Should civilian CPOs undergo the same training as service personnel from the military or police? If no, what differences in training would you recommend?

11. Is it possible to subdivide the training of CPOs into levels of operational capability? If yes, how would the training be subdivided?

12. In your opinion do current methods of training produce the most capable CPOs in the shortest possible time frame? If no, how can training programs be adjusted to meet the above stated requirement?

13. Please provide a brief description of any overseas training and/or operational experience that you might have been exposed to or have undergone?

14. If you have had any interaction with overseas trainers and CPOs, how would you evaluate this interaction (In terms of operational and training strong and weak points)?

15. If you have had any experience of both (South African and international operations and/or training) - what in your opinion are the primary differences in the way that South African CPOs operate and train as compared to their international counterparts?

16. What kind of minimum standards would you set for the following criteria:

- prior educational qualifications
- physical abilities
- CPO skills
- Prior experience in guarding
• Firearm skills
• Unarmed combat
• Protective skills
• First aid skills
• Security knowledge
• Advanced driver training
• Protocol and etiquette
• Management & business skills
• Related skills

Thank you for your time and information provided.
ANNEXURE 3: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS FOR CLIENTS USING CLOSE PROTECTION SERVICES

(ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ADDED TO MAIN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE)

Questions

1. What do you, as the client, think are the most important skills and attributes that a CPO should posses/ exhibit?

2. How often do you utilize the services of a CPO/ team?

3. How do you determine if a CPO you utilize is qualified and capable of providing you with the service you require?

4. Do you feel that South African CPOs are of an international standard in terms of training and professionalism?

Thank you for your time and information provided.
ANNEXURE 4: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS FOR OFFICIALS OF STATUTORY REGULATORY BODIES FOR THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY

Questions

1. In your opinion what does the future of close protection in South Africa hold in terms of both training and operations?

2. What role do you see the relevant regulatory bodies playing in the CPO industry?

3. Will set standards of operational competency for CPOs be developed and implemented? If yes, how will the enforcement of such set standards be achieved?

4. In your opinion in what ways can the relevance of standards to the close protection industry be measured?

5. How can international reciprocity of qualifications be ensured?

6. What sort of time frame do you envisage until standards for the close protection industry are implemented and regulated by the designated bodies?

7. In your opinion would re-qualification tests conducted on an agreed upon time frame and set standards be practical to implement and regulate?

Thank you for your time and information provided.
ANNEXURE 5: SAQA CLOSE PROTECTION UNIT STANDARD

All qualifications and unit standards registered on the National Qualifications Framework are public property. Thus the only payment that can be made for them is for service and reproduction. It is illegal to sell this material for profit. If the material is reproduced or quoted, the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) should be acknowledged as the source.

SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY

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PURPOSE OF THE UNIT STANDARD

The purpose of this unit standard is to enable relevant personnel who are tasked with the protection of designated person(s) (principal), to provide protection to such person(s) (principal) against harmful threats whilst in transit, on foot or at a venue.

Benefit for society of this unit standard is that the person who completes this will contribute to safety in society.

Person credited with this unit will be able to:
Ascertain the principals brief and risk profile.
Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a principal.
Protect a principal during transit/foot/venue movement.
Terminate and review the protection operation.

LEARNING ASSUMED TO BE IN PLACE
The following knowledge, skills, attitude and/or equivalent:

- A knowledge, comprehension and application of language and mathematical skills at NQF level 04.
- Competently drive a vehicle according to the k53 standards
- Understand the relevant legislation required for the lawful possession and use of relevant firearms
- Handle relevant firearm safely
- Operate, use and maintain relevant firearm
- Shoot relevant firearm competently
- Use of firearms in tactical duty related situations

UNIT STANDARD RANGE
The unit standard applies to the protection of designated persons against harmful threats, whether physical or electronic, direct and indirect.

Specific Outcomes and Assessment Criteria:

SPECIFIC OUTCOME 1
Ascertain the principal’s brief and risk profile.

OUTCOME RANGE
Principal must include:
- Designated person or persons to be protected.

Brief must include:
- Principals instruction in preparation of protection assignment.

Ascertain must include:
- Determine/confirm factual correctness.

Relevant information must include:
- Personal details
- Next of kin
- Medical, etc.

Itinerary must include:
Travel arrangements, scheduled appointments, venues, etc.

Movement must include:
  The activity of moving or transferring from one venue to another.
Venue must include:
  Appointed meeting place for an event, also means place locality.

Portfolio must include:
  Documented records, written typed or electronically stored.

Threats must include:
  Specific threats
  None specific threats.

Threat Assessment must include:
  Validate and analyse information regarding threats.
  Estimate threat probability and impact.
  Categorise risk level.
  Low Risk.
  Medium Risk.
  High Risk.
  Extremely High Risk.

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 1
1. Principals portfolio contains his/her/their relevant information.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 2
2. Principals portfolio contains itinerary of scheduled movements and events.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 3
3. Principals portfolio contains relevant information regarding threats to the principal.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 4

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 5
5. Principals portfolio verifies principals risk level.

SPECIFIC OUTCOME 2
Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a principal.

OUTCOME RANGE
Documented instruction must include:
- Responsibility to plan operation.
- Level of Authority.
- Scope of operation.

Protection must include:
- In transit protection
- On foot protection
- Venue protection.

Operational plan details, overall operational requirements and procedures, must include:
- Human resources
- Logistical resources
- Budget/Financial resources.
- Transport arrangements.
- Accommodation arrangements.
- Operational command structure, control measures and procedures.
- Operational communication methods and procedures.
- Operational contingency and emergency measures and procedures.

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 1
1. Documentation verifies tasking of responsibility to plan the protection operation of the principal.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 2
2. Documentation verifies compilation of protection operation plan based on principal’s brief and risk profile.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 3
3. Resources required are calculated and designated in planning to sufficiently meet operational requirements.

ASSESSMENT CRITERION 4
4. Contingencies and emergencies with a high likelihood are listed and appropriately planned for.

SPECIFIC OUTCOME 3
Protect a principal during transit/foot/venue movement.

**OUTCOME RANGE**

Advance reconnaissance must include:
- Physical inspection of venue/route/area.

Information gathering must include:
- Investigation
- Interviewing/questioning
- Venue layout (maps, floor plans, photographs, description of topographical features etc.)
  - Existing physical and electronic security measures and procedures at venue.
  - Hazards and or threats at or against venue.

Documented must include:
- Recorded in writing, typing or electronically

Operational command structure and control must include:
- Command structure and control measures and procedures are implemented and adhered to as per venue operational plan.
- Effective communication is established as per venue operational plan.

Transit/foot/venue protection plan must include:
- Timeous advance reconnaissance of the venue/route/area.
- Timeous liaison with relevant authorities stakeholders.
- Existing and additional physical and electronic security measures and procedures required to protect principal at/on the venue/route/area.
- Existing and additional contingency and emergency measures and procedures required to protect the principal at/on the venue/route/area.

Communication methods & procedures at/on the venue/route/area must include:
- Voice procedures
- Call signs
- Type of net, etc.

Operational order of events for the venue/route/area must include:
- Ground
- Situation
- Mission
- Execution
- Service Support
- Command and signals

Responsibilities & tasks of team protecting the venue/route/area must include:
- Protection Advance Party
- Residential Security Team
- Counter Surveillance Team
Counter Sniper Team
Resource requirements for protecting the principal at the venue/route/area.
Operational command structure and control measures for protecting the principal at the venue/route/area.

Operational command and structure must include:
   Command/control room requirements
Maps Of Area.
Telephone Numbers (Emergency Services, On and Off Duty Protection Personnel, Other Security Services, Key Corporate Personnel).
Logs (Keys, Vehicle, Personnel)
Checklists (Advance and Route Reconnaissance, searches).
Emergency Plans.
Principals itinerary.
Spare Keys.
First Aid equipment.
Search Equipment.
Firearms and Ammunition.
Radios, Telephones, Cellular Telephones, Pagers and Chargers.
Telephone Directories.
Fire Extinguisher.
CCTV Monitors or Portable Alarm Monitors.
Toilet Facilities.
Refreshments.

Fit for purpose must include:
   Suitable clean and in working order:

Searching must include:
   A building for a threat
Angling Technique - minimise exposure to threat.
Room Entry Methods
Ability to engage threat with firearm.
Unsecured areas are covered.
   A room for any surreptitious devices (bugs and IEDs)
   Floor.
   Walls.
   Ceiling.
   Furniture.
   Appliances.
   Adjacent and surrounding areas.
   Electronically

Verification must include:
   Inspection
   Testing.
Relevant protection techniques must include:
   In transit
Protective escort techniques:
   Defensive Driving.
   Offensive Driving.
   Evasive Driving.
Convoy/motorcade procedures.

Protective transit formations and formations:
Embuss and debuss drills.
2,3 & 4 vehicle formations.
Immediate action drills:
   Engage in arcs
   Provide cover for principal(s)
   Evacuate principal(s)
   On foot
Protective foot formations.
   Counter Surveillance Team
   Restraint and suspect control

Contingencies and emergencies must include:
   Power failures
   Fire
   Medical.
   Physical attack/threat on or to principal or venue or vehicles.
   Explosive.
   Sniper.
   Ambush.
   Close quarter attack.
   Threat from sabotage.
   Threat from surveillance.

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

UNIT STANDARD ESSENTIAL EMBEDDED KNOWLEDGE

Refer to the Specific Outcomes and the Assessment Criteria contained in
this unit standard and specifically:

   A comprehensive understanding of emergency/non emergency
   incidents & procedures.
   A comprehensive understanding of tactical movement & approach
   techniques.
   A comprehensive understanding of the relevant legislation.
A comprehensive understanding of client relations.
A comprehensive understanding of dealing with lethal/non lethal confrontations.
A comprehensive understanding of physical security and technology.
A comprehensive understanding of Lawful Arresting & restraining techniques.
A comprehensive understanding of search & seizure.
A comprehensive understanding of persons & property protection
A comprehensive understanding of observational techniques.
A comprehensive understanding of counter surveillance techniques.
A broad understanding of crime/incident scenes.
A broad understanding of operating effectively within a specified control room environment.
A broad understanding of handling victims of crime.
A broad understanding of electronic security.
A broad understanding of threat/risk assessment

Critical Cross-field Outcomes (CCFO):

UNIT STANDARD CCFO IDENTIFYING
Identify and solve problems related to the relevant protection operation of the principal(s).

UNIT STANDARD CCFO WORKING
Work effectively with others as a member of a close protection team/group.

UNIT STANDARD CCFO ORGANIZING
Organise oneself and one’s activities so that all requirements are met in achieving effective venue/transit/foot protection of designated persons.

UNIT STANDARD CCFO COLLECTING
Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information related to the principals portfolio to conduct a overall threat assessment.

UNIT STANDARD CCFO COMMUNICATING
Communicate effectively when dealing with confrontations/clients/public/official institutions.

UNIT STANDARD CCFO DEMONSTRATING
Understand the world as a set of related systems in that advance reconnaissance is conducted timeously and relevant information is
gathered and documented to provide an integrated protection plan.

**UNIT STANDARD NOTES**

Supplementary Information:

Specified Requirements
Specified requirements include legal and workplace specific requirements and are contained in one or more of the following documents:

**Legal**
- Applicable sections of the Firearms Control Act 60/2000.
- Applicable section of the Criminal Procedures Act, 1977.
- Applicable section of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993.
- Applicable sections of the Road Traffic Act

**Private defence**
- Moral & humanitarian considerations (proportionality)
- Continuum of force
- Vicarious liability
- Civil liability
- M.I.S.S (Minimum Information security standards)

**Site Specific**
- Standard Operational procedures
- The employer’s work specifications, and policies and procedures

**Resources required for Assessment:**

- Safety equipment and protective uniform/clothes
- Communications equipment.
- Necessary administrative and stationary issue.
- First aid/fire fighting equipment.
- Vehicles.
- Criterion referenced assessment instructions/tools.
- A suitable venue: workplace and classroom.
- Relevant shooting range.
- Shooting exercise order.
- Tools, equipment and materials for mock-up and/or range set up.
- Drill rounds and replica firearms
- Relevant Firearms, magazines and ammunition.
- Holsters and magazine pouches.
- Firearm cleaning equipment
- Relevant shooting range standing orders.
ANNEXURE 6: SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL SKILLS DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The below information has been taken from the *Train-the-Trainer manual* of Behaviour Systems Development (Pty) Ltd (BSD) and summarised in terms of relevance to this paper. It is included as an overview and explanation to the relevant role player organisation’s and groups that oversee training and standard setting for all industries in South Africa today. This information has been utilized with the written permission of BSD.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (NQF)

The Vision

The vision is an integrated skills development system which promotes economic and employment growth and social development through a focus on education, training and employment services.

The Objectives

In relation to the country:

- To facilitate a general increase in the skill profile of the population, through accredited high quality education and training links to the National Qualifications Framework.
- To increase the quality and quantity of intermediate level skills in the country.
- To facilitate, through uplifting applied competency levels, more efficient social and infrastructural delivery.
- To raise the quality, relevance and cost-effectiveness of skill development throughout the country.
In relation to industry:

- To facilitate more structured and targeted skills formation within the enterprises.
- To increase access by workers to education and training.
- To increase the proportion of intermediate level skills in enterprise.

In order that workers achieve recognized qualifications and are able to assume increased independence and responsibility, and employers achieve rising levels of productivity and competitiveness.

In relation to target population:

- To support target groups to enter regular employment or to sustain micro-level income generating activities.
- To support the establishment of viable small and micro enterprises.
- To increase access to entry-level education and training.

In order that people that are most vulnerable in the labour market, including those in micro enterprises are able to enter and successfully remain in employment, self employment and enjoy a good standard of living.
INTRODUCTION TO THE NQF

South Africa instituted a new education and training dispensation, of which the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA), the National Standards Bodies (NSB’s), Education and Training Quality Assurers (ETQA’s) and the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) are the core drivers. This new education and training structure – The National Qualifications Framework (NQF) – is being developed in the form of a matrix. All learning is done according to national standards and these are positioned on the matrix in various fields of learning at specific NQF levels.

There are two Government departments involved in the above process, namely: The “Department of Education” (SAQA Act) and the “Department of Labour” (Skills Development Act and Skills Development Levies Act). Each of these departments and their roles will be discussed in this section.
Statutory Bodies governing the NQF and National Skills development

- **Department of Education**
  - Minister of Education

- **Department of Labour**
  - Minister of Labour

- **South African Qualifications Authority**
  - This structure is the home of the National Qualifications Framework. This integrated framework seeks to:
    - provide access, mobility and progression within education and training career paths;
    - enhance the quality of education and training

- **National Standards Bodies (NSBs)**
  - Recognises and establishes SGBs
  - Recommends registration of unit standards and qualifications to SAQA
  - Updates and reviews qualifications
  - Liaises with ETQAs
  - Defines moderation across ETQAs

- **Education and Training Quality Assurers (ETQAs)**
  - SAQA accredits three kinds of ETQAs. SETAs are economic sector ETQAs. They report to SAQA on ETQA functions. Some functions include:
    - Accrediting the education and training provider, monitoring and evaluating the quality of provision
    - Register assessors
    - Certify learners
    - Evaluate assessment and moderation
    - Recommend new standards and qualifications

- **Standard Generating Bodies (SGBs)**
  - Generate unit standards and qualifications in sub-fields and levels and recommend these to NSBs
  - Recommend criteria for registration of assessors and moderators

- **National Skills Authority (through Skills Development Act)**
  - The NSA will:
    - advise the Minister of Labour on the nature and implementation of Skills Development Policy and Strategy
    - liaise with and oversee the workings of Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs)

- **Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETA)**
  - The body has the following functions:
    - to develop a strategic focus and sector skills plan
    - establish and register learnerships
    - perform ETQA functions
    - allocate grants
    - monitor education and training
THE INVOLVEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY (SAQA)

In 1995, the Department of Education formed the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) and passed an Act determining the way in which qualifications would be developed, recorded and assessed.

SAQA is the core driver for “outcomes-based” learning. Outcomes-based learning is learner-driven, which means that learners must (in their own time) demonstrate the achievement of an outcome and will be assessed as being competent or not yet competent. Learners (students) will also have to master the foundational knowledge (theory), skills, techniques and methods that can be applied in similar and new situations. Outcomes-based implies that education and training will now be defined by its outcomes at specific NQF Levels and will be assessed in a practical or simulated environment.

SAQA’s Mission

SAQA’s mission is to ensure the development and implementation of a National Qualification Framework, which contributes to the full development of each learner and to the social and economic development of the nation at large.

The Objectives Of The National Qualifications Framework Are To:
• Create an integrated national framework for learning achievements;
• Facilitate access to, and mobility and progression with education, training and career paths;
• Enhance the quality of education and training;
• Accelerate the redress of past unfair discrimination in education, training and employment opportunities; and thereby
• Contribute to the full personal development of each learner and the social and economic development of the nation at large.
SAQA Functions

- To oversee the development of the National Qualifications Framework
- To oversee the implementation of the NQF
- To formulate and publish policies and criteria for:
  - The registration of bodies responsible for establishing national education and training standards (NSBs and SGBs)
  - The accreditation of bodies responsible for monitoring and auditing achievements in terms of standards and qualifications (ETQA)
- To register National Standards and Qualifications
- To ensure international comparability of standards and registered qualifications
- To accredit courses in the absence of ETQAs

Representation on SAQA

SAQA comprises representatives from the following groups:

- Employer organizations
- Unions
- Training providers
- Professional bodies; and
- Government

THE NATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FRAMEWORK (NQF)

The Objectives Of The National Qualifications Framework Are To:

- To facilitate more structured and targeted skills formation within the enterprises.
- Facilitate access to, and mobility and progression with education, training and career paths;
- Enhance the quality of education and training;
• Accelerate the redress of past unfair discrimination in education, training and employment opportunities; and thereby
• Contribute to the full personal development of each learner and the social and economic development of the nation at large.

The NQF classifies all education and training according to eight levels. The levels measure how difficult the learning for different qualifications is and allows for comparisons between different courses. For example, Level 1 of the NQF comes at the end of ordinary, compulsory school up to Grade 9 but can also be reached through Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) for adults who did not get a chance to study at school.

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<td>8</td>
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Table: NQF Levels and Examples of Qualifications and Institutions
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<td>NGO’s, churches, right schools, private ABET programmes, unions, workplaces, etc</td>
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<td>Std 5 / Grade 7</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>ABET Level 3</td>
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The CPO unit standard is rated at an NQF level 5 (National Certificate).

**Purpose of the NQF**

To integrate training, education and prior experience into one system
To make training and education more directed and portable
To ensure that one level of learning progresses to another
To ensure the articulation of learning, ie a national certificate should have the same, nationally defined interpretation.

**Benefits of the NQF**

**To Learners**

- Access to national qualifications
- Choice in where and how to learn
- Recognition of prior learning
- National record of learning
- Portability

**To Employers**

- On-the-job training and assessment
- Training against measurable outcomes
- Standards generated by the sub-field
- Accurate skills profile of employees
- Increase productivity
- Improved safety ratio’s
- Fit for Purpose

Above and beyond a Quality Assurance Management System, attention must be given to the quality of work which each and every Employee exhibits each day. The quality displayed by a person in his or her finished product is a measurement of that persons:

![Diagram](image-url)
To determine this level of competence a learner will be evaluated according to the specific outcomes and knowledge components of a unit standard.

**WHAT IS COMPETENCY?**

Being able to perform *whole* work roles (perform, not just know about or understand) to the standards expected in employment (not "training" standards or standards divorced from work expectations) in real working environments (including all the related pressures and variances of work).

**WHAT ARE UNIT STANDARDS?**

Unit standards are the building blocks of the national Qualifications Framework (NQF) and of a qualification. Unit standards can be described as follows: “Unit standards are packaged into qualifications at specific NQF levels. They are nationally agreed and internationally comparable statements supported by specific outcomes and their associated assessment criteria together with other relevant and needed information, which will form the building blocks of the NQF”. (Dr. Olivier)

The purpose of a unit standard is to act as:

- An assessor guide
- A learner guide; and
- A guide to educator’s and trainer’s for preparing learning material

Standards are also therefore to be seen as an indication of the standard / level of competency a person has achieved. This competency has been defined as:

The ability to perform the activities in an occupation (This includes everything a person should be able to do at work if they are effective and efficient in a job), which lead to the defined outcomes of that portfolio.
NATIONAL STANDARD BODIES (NSBs)

SAQA established an NSB for each of the 12 fields of learning. Each NSB will identify sub-fields of learning.

**Functions of the National Standard Bodies**

- To ensure that national standards are written for that particular field of learning
- Define and recommend to SAQA the boundaries of the discrete field for which it is constituted
- Recommend to SAQA the registration of standards and qualifications on the NQF
- Establish and recognize SGBs (Standard Generating Bodies)
- Recommend the registration of unit standards on the NQF to SAQA.

STANDARD GENERATING BODIES (SGBs)

Each NSB will identify sub-fields of learning in which Standard Generating Bodies will develop unit standards and qualifications and ensure that the unit standards recommended by SGBs meet the requirements of SAQA.

**Who are the people/bodies/representatives on the SGBs?**

- The State / Government
- Business
- Labour
- Providers of Education
- Critical interests groups
- Community / learners
Once a standard is developed, it is published for public comment – usually on the Internet. Only when all stakeholders are satisfied with a standard, is it sent through to the NSB and to SAQA for registration.

**SGB Functions**

- To generate unit standards and qualifications in the various fields of learning in accordance to the criteria and requirements of SAQA
- To recommend unit standards and qualifications to the NSB
- To update and review standards
- To interact with ETQA’s in a continuous quality improvement cycle.

**EDUCATION AND TRAINING QUALITY ASSURERS (ETQAS)**

SAQA will accredit an ETQA to address the problems of variable standards, with reference to the provision of learning and the monitoring of the standard of assessment for registered unit standards, The ETQA will therefore, on behalf of SAQA, oversee the implementation and maintenance of the NQF.

**ETQA Functions**

- To promote quality amongst providers
- To facilitate or ensure moderation across providers
- To accredit providers in terms of quality management
- To submit reports to SAQA
- To register assessors
- To moderate assessments

**NATIONAL SKILLS AUTHORITY FUNCTIONS**

- The NSA must advise minister on:
  - National skills development policy and strategy
Implementation of strategy
Allocation of subsidies from National Skills Fund

- Liaison with seta’s
- Report to minister on implementation of strategy
- Conduct investigations

SECTOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING AUTHORITY (SETA)

The key role player to ensure that the levy system runs smoothly will be the Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA). 25 Economic sectors have been identified and the relevant SETAs have been operational since April 2000. Many of the existing Training Boards have applied to become SETAs for their economic sector, for example the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) and the Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services & Justice Sector Education & Training Authority (POSLEC SETA).

The Role of the SETAs

- To receive Skills Development Levies from SARS and pay grants according to sector and national priorities.
- To design, register, manage and promote learnerships – A learnership is an integrated skills development system aimed at integrating theoretical education and skills training.
- To perform the quality assurance and certification functions through their Education and Training Quality Assurers (ETQA) functions, under the auspices of SAQA.
- To develop and monitor training programmes, which lead to qualifications that are recognized by SAQA.
- To develop a Sector Skills Plan.
QUALIFICATIONS

A qualification is defined as an “Applied” competency. It must therefore contain the three main competencies as defined in the ETDP Practitioners Project. These three competencies are:

Practical Competency

“The ability to apply your knowledge in such a way as to achieve Specified Outcomes.”

It is not good enough to have achieved the academic portion of a qualification and not be able to perform in the workplace. The learner being assessed must therefore be able to demonstrate his/her competency in such a way so that it can be observed by the Assessor.

Foundational Competency

“The ability to understand what you are doing.”
Foundational competence is therefore found in the underpinning/embedded knowledge that the learner has acquired. It is thus the component, which enables the learner to make sense of what s/he is doing.

Reflexive Competency

“The ability to change your activities and actions to compensate for changing conditions in the workplace.”
Reflexive competency is therefore embedded in the generic skill of being able to evaluate situations and conditions in such a way as to make a decision and change what you are doing for changing conditions to achieve the same outcome. This competency can never be achieved by a learner should one of the above two competencies be neglected.
CONSTRUCTION OF QUALIFICATIONS

To understand how qualifications are constructed you have to understand that they may be “Unit Standard Based” (These mainly reside at the NQF Level 4 and down with some of them residing at NQF Level 5) or “Curriculum Based” such as those in the Higher Education band. (These mainly reside within NQF Levels 5 to 8 and are those obtained through Technikons and Universities. The industries through their Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETA’s) are entering into partnerships to ensure that the practical competency is achieved in the workplace through structured training programs.