

Africans, again, they have reacted to the challenge by trying to remedy some of the grievances that brought it about. The Lisbon government is rocklike in its unwillingness to cut the link between Lisbon and the "overseas provinces" in Africa, or to introduce what other western countries would recognise as democracy. But it has introduced a number of major administrative reforms that change the flavour of Portugal's rule for the better.

The fact is that the Portuguese and the Afrikaners have very little in common except a common determination to prevent the African nationalists from taking over. Of all Europeans who have settled in Africa the Portuguese are the least conscious of racial distinctions. They marry black Africans, dance and eat with them, share hotels with them, and work under them in the civil service hierarchy, at any rate if they are "assimilated" Africans (a category that covers an admittedly derisory one in fifty of the non-whites in Angola and Mozambique). Most of the eleven million Africans in Angola and Mozambique live in exceedingly primitive conditions; Portuguese money has not yet been forthcoming in the necessary quantities for African education, housing and the like. The richer South Africans have spent more on their own Africans' welfare. But they see Africans as a race to be set apart; the Portuguese include Africans in all humanity. Thus when they get the sort of fright they got in Angola in 1961, they do something.

The trouble is that putting things right needs not only good intentions, but also the means of implementing them—money, and toughly competent civil servants. Portugal has large supplies of neither, and the result is that the post-1961 reform programme in Portuguese Africa looks singularly like a curate's egg. In Angola, for instance, the job of remedying the abuses of the old system of contract labour was given after 1961 to a good and hard-working man called Dr Alfonso Mendes. Though Dr Mendes never had as many inspectors under his command as he ought to have had, his Labour Institute briskly put a stop to the bad old habit by which labour recruiters got local chiefs out in the back-country to detail men for work on the plantations or in the docks. "Contract labour" under these conditions often amounted to forced labour. The labour law was changed after 1961 to remove most of the references to a "moral obligation" to work, and to forbid local administrators to take part in the recruiting process. Dr Mendes seems to have made the reform stick.

In Mozambique, by contrast, when your correspondent visited the local Labour Institute in June, it took them twenty-four hours even to find out the number of men still employed under the contract system. The figures, when they were produced, suggested that the number had been cut to a fifth of what it was in 1961. The officials also claimed that recruiters no longer went out into the bush to enlist workers; men who wanted to work under the contract

system, they said, now had to come to the towns to search out the recruiters in their offices. It may be so. This correspondent can report only that Mozambique's Labour Institute did not give him the sense of bustling zeal for reform he got in its equivalent in Angola.

Where Mozambique has out-paced Angola is in having ended the pre-1961 exploitation of African cotton-growers. The sparkling new buildings of the Cotton Institute on the outskirts of Lourenço Marques house a group of men who, under the leadership of Dr Mario de Carvalho, have done battle with Mozambique's cotton barons and think (with their fingers crossed) that they have beaten them. Under the old system a "concessionary" (usually a powerful company) was given sole cotton-growing rights over a vast tract of the country. Each concessionary provided local Africans with seeds and tools, and bought the resulting cotton. Given the concessionaries' monopoly position, they were able to buy cheap; there is also plenty of evidence that some concessionaries bullied Africans into growing cotton against their will.

Under the new system, the cotton barons are restricted to buying the stuff; the growing is done by African farmers working independently under the protective eye of the Cotton Institute. This needed a big fight in 1963 and 1964, when the former concessionaries tried to sabotage the scheme by persuading merchants not to buy cotton. The Cotton Institute won the battle by buying and marketing the cotton itself. The determined young men of the Mozambique institute, unlike their vaguer-looking colleagues in its Angolan equivalent (much less cotton is grown in Angola), have a reformer's gleam in their eye. They represent the best force at work in Portuguese Africa: the decent-minded public servants who want to stop Africans getting hurt in the businessman's scramble for profits.

BUT stopping abuses is one thing; taking Africans into the government of the country is another. Both Angola and Mozambique have made a start on the vast job of giving the illiterate mass of Africans a rudimentary grasp of the Portuguese language, by dotting the countryside with one-room "education posts" manned by "monitors." Angola is a couple of years ahead of Mozambique in this process, which will pretty sharply expand the number of Africans qualified to enter the regular primary school system.

But education makes people think. In all of Portugal's overseas territories the old distinction that debarred most of the black population from full citizenship has been abolished. Everyone is now entitled to vote, provided he is literate or pays a modest amount of tax each year. What is this going to mean?

In the short run, very little, because the top-heavy authoritarian structure of Dr Salazar's Portugal pays about as much attention to elected bodies as colonels do to barrack-room lawyers. In the longer run,



though, the Portuguese may find that the institutions they intended to make of clay have turned out, like Galatea, to come embarrassingly to life.


Take the case of Mozambique. Most of the members returned to the legislative council in last year's election were chosen the safe, indirect way, by the various organisations which in the Portuguese system speak for business, the (white) trade unions, culture and so on. Only a minority got there by direct election, and of these all but one were unopposed; the total number of voters taking part in the direct part of the elections was only 100,000. The result is not a complete bunch of yes-men—the council includes quite a few people who want a greater degree of independence from Lisbon—but the governor-general's powers are so wide that the council is just not a real counter-weight to the executive. But when the next election comes round in 1968 the change in the voting qualifications will have swollen the electorate enormously. The officials responsible for registering new voters think it may be as big as a million and a half. This is a real potential force.

A big, black electorate (the new voters will be almost all Africans) will have to be either sat on, or allowed some way of expressing itself. Dr Salazar would undoubtedly prefer to sit on it. His successor may not; people with votes are harder to sit on than people without them, especially when they are beginning to be given the education that will let them realise what other black electorates in Africa can do. Unlike the South Africans, the Portuguese have taken a first tiny step along the road to giving their black majority a share of political power. They may find themselves being pushed on to other steps: first, say, an increase in the directly elected element in the legislative council. Pygmalion may be in for a surprise.

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DR VERWOERD'S BRITISH COLONIES

IT is two years since Dr Verwoerd made his offer to the British territories of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland to become their "guide or guardian to independence and prosperity." Since then, each protectorate has held a general election (two on adult suffrage) and each has returned a conservative-minded government seized of the importance of being a good neighbour of South Africa's. Mr Seretse Khama was banned from South Africa until he became Bechuanaland's first prime minister in March, and the first Basutoland prime minister, Chief Sekhonyana Maseribane, remembers being turned away from a Bloemfontein bank-counter. But Mr Khama has had to acknowledge that "trade with the republic is our lifeblood," while the king of the Basutos, in his speech from the throne in May, said resignedly; "Lesotho [Basutoland] has only one neighbour, and my government will adopt a policy of co-operation with that neighbour."

Lesotho

IN a way this is true of all three territories, although only Basutoland—whose self-government name is Lesotho—is completely surrounded by the republic. In its elections in May, Chief Leabua Jonathan was heavily attacked by the other parties for the support he was receiving from South Africa. He flaunted the fact that he was Pretoria's favourite and his mountain-hopping canvassing in a Bloemfontein-supplied helicopter helped his Basutoland National party to its narrow victory. When drought followed the elections, he made a personal appeal to Dr Verwoerd for 100,000 bags of corn which were duly sent; this led to an angry battle in the Lesotho parliament on July 19th. (Chief Leabua himself lost his seat in May; the interim prime minister, Chief Sekhonyana, handed back the post when Chief Leabua won a by-election on July 1st.)

His main opponent, Mr Ntsu Mokhehle of the Congress party, once positively welcomed the thought that South Africa might show aggressiveness against Basutoland because he believed that this would involve the United Nations and speed the liberation of all southern Africa. But this summer his greater concern was to press the South African government to pay a recruitment levy of £50 for every Basuto who went to work on the mines and farms of South Africa. With as many as 180,000 so employed, such a levy might double Lesotho's present revenue of £4 million; but neither Dr Verwoerd nor Mr Harry Oppenheimer, who mines the gold, diamonds and copper, seems taken with the idea. These migrant workers send home more than £1 million a year anyway, and customs duties collected by the South Africans provided roughly half of the territory's revenue last year.

The prospects for the swift development

of agriculture are not great in this badly eroded country. The important mohair trade is controlled from South Africa. The expansion of small industries has gone slowly, despite the formation of Bafed (Basutoland Factory Estate Development): only two petrol depots and a window-frame factory had been installed by August. Chief Leabua is in favour of tax inducements to foreign investors; one consequence would be that Basutoland, which now has only 2,000 whites among its 880,000 population, would become open to South African investors.

If Britain eventually decides to help finance the long-hoped-for £14 million Ox-Bow hydro electric scheme in Lesotho's northern mountains, the power and pure water thus made available would almost all be sold to South Africa. Britain pays a £1½ million subsidy to the Lesotho budget, but development aid from Britain to all three protectorates has amounted to only £7.7 million over the past three years. Lesotho can, by agreement, ask for a date for political independence after next May. Genuine economic independence is still very far over the horizon.

Swaziland

SWAZILAND, by contrast, can hope to be solvent by 1968. Last year Britain gave a £1.6 million grant-in-aid towards budget expenditure of £4 million. Inland (like Lesotho), it gets to the Indian Ocean through Mozambique. It benefits from a £40 million private-enterprise contract to sell iron ore to Japan. Mr Oppenheimer has come in with the Ngwenya iron ore mine and its £9 million railway; there is also the Edwaleni hydroelectric project. With the money, the whites have come. There are 280,000 Swazis; 10,000 whites among them own nearly half the land. A minority of these



Chief Leabua Jonathan

whites hold South African passports, but it was the South Africans in the United Swaziland Association that helped the Imbokodvo, the king's party, to sweep the polls last year.

Once it seemed that King Sobhuza would like his country to become a Bantustan within South Africa. He was attracted by Dr Verwoerd's half-promise to restore to Swaziland parts of the eastern Transvaal and by the hope that incorporation might ensure his tribal position. But the overwhelming victory of Imbokodvo ("grindstone") secured the position of this 75-year-old paramount chief while Prince Makhosini, the Imbokodvo leader, caught a touch of pan-Africanism after a tour this year. In his first policy speech the prince called "a deliberate lie" the assertion that it was his party's plan "to deliver Swaziland into the hands of the republic; nor are our policies apartheid policies."

Yet his country's dependence on South Africa is considerable. Its sugar industry, with production worth nearly £4 million in 1963, depends on agreement with South Africa. Part of its hope for early solvency is based on the expectation that Dr Verwoerd will agree to a redistribution of customs revenue between the three territories that would more than double the Swazi share. British money is in sugar, pulp (Courtaulds), and asbestos (Turner and Newall). The Commonwealth Development Corporation has a finger in most Swazi pies. But South African investment dominates in timber, citrus and most farming enterprises.

Swaziland is the least politically advanced of the three territories, with only four elected members in the executive council, and with a Queen's commissioner, Sir Frank Loyd, in direct control of the executive. The Mozambique African nationalist rebel Dr Mondlane, recently accused Britain of changing its policy on refugees in Swaziland under pressure from South Africa and Portugal by allowing two Mozambiquans to be kidnapped and consequently frightening the other 300 refugees away. Britain has admitted the disappearance of the two men, while denying any change of attitude about political asylum. A British infantry battalion, the Gordon Highlanders, was based in Swaziland for two years. Theirs was at first a strike-breaking mission; the presence of their successors is a firm sign of Britain's involvement in and protection of Swaziland.

Bechuana

OFFERING a corridor to the north between Rhodesia and South Africa, Bechuanaland (independence name: Bechuana) has seen 1,700 refugees through in five years. But its role as an escape tunnel, not to mention its whole economic position, would be jeopardised if it allowed itself to be used as a base for guerrilla opera-

tions. Nearly 25,000 Batswana (total population: 540,000) worked in South African mines in 1964 and the money they sent home made up a tenth of the country's export earnings of £3.5 million. The more obvious forms of South Africa's influence may be diminishing: it is yielding to Rhodesia the administration of the whole 394-mile stretch of railway through Bechuana, and this year the country's capital was actually moved inside its own borders—from the "Imperial Compound" at Mafeking in the republic, to Gaborone. But 60 per cent of its £2.5 million worth of cattle exports go to South Africa, although the alternative market—the Zambian copperbelt—has grown since the Congolese

supplies have been disorganised by strife in that country.

Mr Khama, whose Democratic party won 28 of the 31 elective seats in March, says that he does not believe that Dr Verwoerd retains any thought of incorporating Bechuana in South Africa. But its independence would be more assured if the link with Zambia across a pinpoint of common border were strengthened. A £1.2 million loan negotiated a year ago towards building a road along the 300 miles from Francistown to Maun was the first big move towards this end. Maun could become an important development centre if plans were to go ahead to make something of the water resources of the 6,500 square miles of the

Okavango delta. One official suggestion has been to use it to irrigate 300,000 acres in the Mababe depression, and certainly the north has the most fertile soil. But most of the Batswana live close to the railway along the South African border; development of the far-away north could involve social and tribal upheaval. Copper and salt deposits much closer to Francistown may provide an easier escape from the present poverty which made Bechuana turn to Britain to cover 44 per cent of last year's budget. Britain is in the process of withdrawal from all three territories. Now everyone from big mining companies to remote herdsmen, must look on Dr Verwoerd as the ultimate, if not paramount, chief.

An Afrikaner's Reply

Die Burger

To see how the ideas about South Africa set out in these pages struck an Afrikaner, we asked the deputy editor of Die Burger of Capetown to write an article in reply. Here are Mr S. W. Pienaar's reactions:

In suggesting its policy for southern Africa *The Economist* seems to feel that it is sticking its neck out a long way. Else why the rather uncharacteristic hums and ha's? But let us not look a gift horse in its hum or its ha. Let us disregard the marked tendency towards over-grudged praise and overstressed criticism of South Africa and stick to the main point. *The Economist* observes that "it is inside the political, social and religious structure of this tightly knit and strange African tribe of Afrikaners that the solution for South Africa must initially be sought." Secondly, "that since their National party government came to power in 1948, the net effect of the world's attacks upon apartheid has been to drive an increasing number of English-speaking whites into their laager." Thirdly, that it is in the interests of black Africa, white Africa and the western world that some sort of deal be arrived at.

Intensely as I dislike the word "deal," any suggestions based on the acceptance of the fact that a white African nation has the same right of existence in Africa as any black African nation must be welcomed as a refreshingly realistic approach to a question that has too long been bedevilled by septimental clichés, uninformed criticism and emotionalism. Let us not weep on each other's shoulders over might have beens. But what a pity that this sort of realism was nowhere in evidence in the years following 1948. How desperately eager the Afrikaners were to be understood. What a profound lack of understanding and how much unintelligent and bruising enmity they met.

Came the Belgian Congo, came Algeria, came the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland—in fact every policy and suggestion that Europe had for peace and coexistence in Africa. It makes melancholy reading today. So eventually comes the suspicion that there is more to South Africa than horns and a tail. That man Malan and this man Verwoerd, was the one and is the other really no more than a fool and a knave? *The Economist*, at any rate, seems to feel not quite.

The case for an understanding is stated somewhat negatively: you meet those blockheads halfway or they make such a God-awful mess you will be sorry you did not. Still, negative or not, we are thankful for small mercies. Or are we?

In the past two decades the whites in southern Africa, with the exclusion of little more than the crackpot fringes, have drawn together under an improving united front under the leadership of that "strange African tribe of Afrikaners" and under the stress of impossible demands from outside that coincided with and stimulated impossible demands from black Africans. Attitudes have hardened enormously. Those who have tried to work for an understanding with the western powers have lost the day against those who made the early decision: They don't want an understanding; nothing but abdication will satisfy them. The large majority of us are saying: We have had the West. We have our own ideas. Let us go it alone.

It has become rather late in the day for the West to exert a positive influence on South African affairs, but not too late. What is needed is a realistic reappraisal. There has up till now been a serious underestimation of the will to live of the white man in southern Africa, of the genuine intent of the policies that are applied, of the power of upholding such policies and of the acceptance of them by non-whites. If these can be rectified and if

once the basic validity is accepted of the coexistence of separate communities, if the West were to exert its influence to strengthen this concept instead of undermining it or were at least to stop inciting non-white South Africans by direct or indirect means to reject it out of hand, and in that way were to assist the acceptance of the one surviving proposition in Africa to solve the problem of multiracial coexistence—then a vast field would open.

Once the concept of separate communities with separate freedoms is established, the whole picture will change. Concessions? Of course concessions can be made. But there is a fundamental difference between a concession intended to pave the way for more concessions on the route to black domination, and a concession paving the way for more concessions leading to a more peaceful and more friendly coexistence of separate communities and of individuals belonging to such different communities. The first is utterly unacceptable, whatever the outside pressures. The second would not need outside pressures, but could be greatly assisted by outside understanding.

Against this background and in the absence of even the semblance of a policy statement on southern Africa by the western powers, it is not possible to comment on the particular suggestions of *The Economist*.

A postscript seems to be necessary. If, as is so forcefully stated, *The Economist* believes that the Cape Afrikaners have been "thoroughly smashed as a political force by the diehard Transvalers," why ask a Cape Afrikaner to express an opinion at all? I have ventured to comment because I know *The Economist* is wrong, that the Cape-Transvaal confrontation is a myth in so far as it suggests fundamental differences. Of course there are differences of approach that do provide more and less serious irritations, but also lots and lots of fun, in politics as in rugby. It is a situation that is very often dismally misunderstood even by reasonably informed observers.



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
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