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PROJECTS IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA

CDC has 122 projects in 30 Commonwealth countries with an estimated capital commitment of over £125 million. Of these projects, 13 are in Central Africa Region (Malawi, Rhodesia and Zambia) and nine in Southern Africa Region (Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland) with total commitment £49 million. Details of typical projects are given below.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Bechuanaland

The Lobatsi abattoir was completed by CDC eleven years ago. In 1960 the project was turned into a registered company, Bechuanaland Protectorate Abattoirs Ltd in which the BP Government and the Livestock Producers' Trust hold half the share capital. CDC has managed the abattoir since its inception. It handles all the country's export cattle and in 1964 achieved another new record with a total kill of 111,758 head. Modernisation and expansion recently completed has enabled the abattoir to kill 1,000 head per day. A subsidiary company operates a cannery and freezing works. The annual turnover is nearly £5 million.

Swaziland

On the low veld, the Swaziland Irrigation Scheme complex represents a CDC investment of £8 million. It comprises the original CDC agricultural project with a 42-mile canal, completed in 1957, and main storage dam now being completed, with 6,000 acres under rice, sugar cane and citrus. The adjoining Mhlume Sugar Co. was launched with Hulett's Sugar Corporation in 1958. It has 10,000 acres cane, and estimated

1965 sugar production of 72,000 tons. Also part of the SIS project is the Vuvulane Irrigated Farms scheme on which 62 Swazi small farmers are growing cane and other crops under irrigation with plans for expanding the numbers.

Usutu Pulp Co. Ltd, formed in 1959 by CDC and Courtaulds Ltd. to exploit the 100,000 acre pine forest planted by CDC, is now producing at a profit 100,000 tons of quality kraft pulp per annum. CDC's investment in the company is £8.3 million.

CDC has provided a large part of the finance for the construction of the railway, opened in November 1964, to link the iron ore mine on the western escarpment with the Mozambique line to Lourenco Marques. CDC also has an investment in the iron ore mine at Ngwenya promoted by Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd and Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd.

CENTRAL AFRICA

The projects in Malawi, Rhodesia and Zambia comprise investments in agriculture, cement manufacture and textiles and in local development agencies, and loans to public bodies for power and water supplies, air transport and for African housing.

Inter-territorial Corporations

CDC lent £15 million for the Kariba dam which was built with cement from Chilanga, another CDC project. It is lending £1.5 million to Central African Airways Corporation towards the purchase of two BAC 1-11 aircraft (a previous loan for Vickers Viscounts was recently repaid).

Malawi

CDC is lending nearly £2 million for the Nkula Falls hydro-electric scheme now under construction and it has provided the finance for the Mudi River Water Board's Walker's Ferry scheme to supply water to Blantyre/Limbe.

The Vipya Tung Estate in Northern Malawi is one of the main sources of employment in that part of the country as well as providing a valuable export crop from its 5,000 acres of tung trees. At Kasungu, CDC has been managing a training scheme for African farmers learning to grow flue-cured tobacco.

CDC's most recent investment in Malawi is a textile mill in partnership with David Whitehead & Sons (Holdings) Ltd of Lancashire and the Malawi Government's Development Corporation.

Rhodesia

CDC has an investment in the Industrial Promotion Corporation of Central Africa Ltd (of which CDC's Regional Controller is Chairman): the Highfield (Salisbury) housing estate (among others) was largely built with money from a CDC loan to the Rhodesia Government.

Zambia

The Chilanga cement works was built by CDC in 1951. It has since expanded its capacity to 165,000 tons a year and has become a public company with a quotation for its shares. Recently the Zambia Government acquired a substantial holding in the company and a large expansion scheme has been approved. There is also a loan to the Lusaka Central Electricity Corporation.



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SOUTHERN AFRICA—REGIONAL OFFICE: Palace Building, 52 Pritchard Street, Johannesburg.

CENTRAL AFRICA—REGIONAL OFFICE: Throgmorton House, Jameson Avenue, Salisbury.

MALAWI OFFICE: CDC Representative, Downs House, Victoria Avenue, Blantyre.

ZAMBIA OFFICE: Zambia Development Corporation Ltd, c/o Martin & Co, Permanent House, Cairo Road, Lusaka.



A favourable view of "Black City," Johannesburg

the city that is controlled by the (white) Johannesburg city council; the rest are in contiguous government-run townships.

Soweto is not an African word; it is an abbreviation of "South-Western Townships." "Black City's" 26 square miles support about 77,000 houses. All but a couple of thousand of these are neat boxes in long rows; each has a tiny garden in front and behind, a tap in the backyard and (except for about 1,800 of them) a flush toilet. Around 10,000 of the houses have electricity. It is proposed to give them all electricity, and to light every street, over a period of ten years.

The inside of most houses is the same: two very small front rooms and two back. New houses come without inside doors or plastering; it is for the inhabitants to finish them off. From inside, these houses are one step up from squalor; from outside, they look like a vast improvement on the slums they have replaced. About 35,000 people (7,000 families) in the final slum, Pimville, have yet to be rehoused.

This standard Johannesburg pattern is repeated all along the Witwatersrand—the cluster of towns along the gold reefs that includes Johannesburg as well as the biggest part of the country's industrial gold mining, and white-population strength. Each major town in the republic has its Soweto. The credit for the building of these vast, unexciting but at least hygienic satellite cities must be given to Dr Verwoerd himself. As minister for Bantu affairs, he promoted them; the cost has totalled £100 million in ten years.

The most cheeky of all the "cheeky kaffirs"—the intellectuals among South Africa's town Africans—say that they preferred the free life of the former slums to the easily inspected uniformity of the new regimented boxes. Pimville, for example, still has many speakeasies (they call them shebeens) deriving from the days when Africans were not allowed to buy or drink wines, beers, or spirits. In Soweto the government has provided sparkling new bars; these look like hospitals inside, and African policemen lean against the counters. The result is that many of the shebeen

queens have moved into Soweto, in spite of the government pubs, and they get the custom. The shebeen is simply a back room, with a gramophone, a few chairs, and a centre table to take the glasses. Its primary quality is its illegality: inside it there is a feeling of escape from the restrictions of life in South Africa.

For many Africans in Johannesburg the new townships are a material improvement upon what went before (as is the comfortable new Johannesburg African railway station). But there is no freehold in the Sowetos; there was in some of the slums that went before them. Although most houses are within something like a mile of the nearest railway station, the crowded trains and the long journey to town every morning mean getting up before dawn and arriving home after dark every day. A Johannesburg newspaper reported some years ago that the Africans were so crowded on these trains that they rode between the carriages, or crushed into them beyond safety limits, and that, as a result, some 150 a year were killed on the Soweto-Johannesburg route alone. Asked if this figure still applied, the official spokesman for South African Railways answered: "It is an underestimate."

In Dr Verwoerd's new black cities the streets are long and straight; their layout meets the convenience of strategically placed police stations. Most important of all, the whole of Soweto (like the other black townships) is divided into tribal districts, so that Zulu may not live alongside Sotho, or Xhosa become a neighbour of Tswana. Few more obvious applications of the principle of divide and rule exist; the immediate effect has been to increase the number of tribal clashes by emphasising differences.

Soweto is tightly controlled by minor officials who administer monstrous regulations. Any white man going in, or indeed any African wanting to visit any town in South Africa for longer than 72 hours, needs a permit. A man who loses his job might have 72 hours to find another. If he fails, he can be told to leave his house, Soweto and, indeed, Johannesburg—or be held in an "aid centre." Any resident of

the township found "undesirable" may, on no other ground, similarly be expelled. Grown-up sons may not live with their parents in Soweto unless they were born in or have jobs in Johannesburg. If man and wife both work and the man loses his job, both might be endorsed out (the endorsement appears on the pass every African must carry); or, perhaps worse, maybe only one of them. The administration of all this, which was tightened up by the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964 to give officials almost universal powers over the residence and movement of Africans in all of white South Africa, is in the hands of local labour bureaus; the officers in charge of these bureaus are now being designated "peace officers," and have powers of arrest and search of houses. It is possible for the labour bureaus to "endorse out" Africans who have lived in, say, Johannesburg all their lives; if this happens, the order must be confirmed by Pretoria. The man would then be expected to go "home" to a tribal reserve he may never have seen.

Anyone knocking on any door in Soweto will soon enough be told one or two personal tales of hardship resulting from this web of regulations. It might be a case of the house being searched for "illegal residents" or of a close friend or relative being "endorsed out" or of a few weeks of panic between jobs hoping that the somewhat cumbersome labour bureau machinery does not start working between the expiry of the permit and the finding of the new job. A surprising number of these tales have a more or less happy ending: it is one thing, it seems, to devise intricate laws for regulating people's lives, and quite another to operate them efficiently. "So-and-so was endorsed out and it took him two months to find his way back," is a fairly common tale. Africans are not without ingenuity.

The purpose of all this is not to torture the town Africans (whose wages are going up and whose jobs are more stable than they were); it is to pretend that their numbers can be controlled. They cannot. Their numbers grow every year. In 1950, 28 per cent of South Africa's non-whites lived in the towns; in 1960 it was 37 per cent and it will, according to the present trend, probably approach 45 per cent by 1970. These are proportions of a growing population; the white population, in spite of immigration, is growing less fast and thus, even in the cities and in spite of influx control, is being more outnumbered every year.

Inside White City

WHAT about these whites? In very broad general terms, the 40 per cent of them who are English live mainly in the cities, do most of the business, and vote traditionally for the United party (but nowadays increasingly for the government). The Afrikaners have, during the past ten years, been streaming from their farms into the towns; they are getting better jobs (and

most government jobs); more of them are becoming businessmen, and most of them vote for the governing National party. Many white farms are big and generous and would seem home to a Texan. Not all whites in the suburbs have swimming pools, but nearly all families have at least one servant and some more than that.

As individuals they are often likeable, and have a wide range of views, even on colour. As a group of voters, they have moved sharply to the right during the past five years. One reason is that they have been frightened by what they have read of the black African north, and especially the Congo; another is that they have been shocked by sabotage and occasional acts of terrorism in South Africa. The number of liberals among them has dwindled. Everyone expects the shrinking United party to be virtually obliterated at the next general election; with the possible exception of the Progressive party (which has one parliamentary member, the brave Mrs Helen Suzman) South Africa may be in danger of moving towards the African pattern of a one-party state.

THIS is the first point about the country that must be grasped by outsiders looking for sources of change. The present government, which came to power in 1948, will not be turned out by the white voters in the foreseeable future; far more likely is that its strength, which has increased at every election since 1948, will continue to grow.

Nor will there be a revolution. Five years ago white liberals and African nationalists could always be found in South Africa; the talk would be of organising a strike next week, or a protest the week after. The South African police have frightened off many of these people, and imprisoned or banished the rest. They have proved so efficient, and have a network of informers (African as well as European) so well organised, that out-and-out rebels are simply not to be found; anti-government conver-



Not for use—but they make me feel secure

sations are veiled by prudence. People are either plotting a revolution in deeper secrecy than they have previously been capable of doing in South Africa, or there is no plot. The second conclusion looks, to the inquiring visitor, much the more likely.

The area of white opposition is, indeed, likely to shrink. The press is still free, although inhibited by government threats; so are all conforming white citizens. What is diminishing, as the need for the secret police grows, is the area of white freedom. The time may yet come when the value to the government of the *Rand Daily Mail* (whose outspoken liberalism frightens white voters into the government's arms and also looks good as a free press to show overseas visitors) will seem small enough for it to attack that newspaper and its bold and persistent editor, Mr L. O. V. Gandar. The mood of the whites is such, however, that there would be tut-tutting, and even protest, from the remaining white liberals—and general acquiescence apart from that.

White South Africans are also secure in the knowledge that sporadic internal rebellions (as opposed to an organised revolution of which there is no sign) can be stamped out as quickly as they arise. This is because of the immense police and military strength of the government (described on page vi). For the same

reason any now conceivable invasion from outside is doomed to quick failure. If the Portuguese can halt three simultaneous attacks in their colonies, South Africa has nothing to fear.

From where else might change come? One theory, held by many businessmen in Johannesburg, is that apartheid will eventually collapse from its own economic absurdity. What South Africa has at the moment is integration in the sense that more and more Africans are needed in more and more jobs, some now semi-skilled, in the factories (see page xxii); these increased numbers must live, if not inside the white cities, then at least in the satellite "black cities."

The trouble with this theory is that it is hard to visualise just how and at what point the existence of a large migratory black labour force outside the cities will begin to evolve into a black part of an integrated society. The usually quoted analogy with the history of the working-class movement in Britain is false: British workers were harder to keep down because they were not distinguishable by colour. At any rate the South African government seems confident that it can keep all the political doors firmly bolted even as the economy continues to suck in African workers. Proponents of this theory speak of "economic integration" as something that already exists in South Africa. It is an integration of a very particular kind, with the whites at the top and in the centre and the blacks at the bottom of the job scale.

Yet this theory has its uses, for it argues about apartheid on apartheid's terms, and it is only here that change can be searched for. It is inside the political, social and religious structure of this tightly knit (and strange) African tribe of Afrikaners that the solution for South Africa must initially be sought. There are only two million of them in the whole world; their fervent nationalism is an expression of their passionate desire to preserve themselves; yet they, like all of us, are torn by internal doubts.

CHIPPING AT THE GRANITE

WHAT has been written up to now has aimed to show that the Afrikaners have South Africa tightly under their control; any change must of necessity be change they agree to. This is the point where concessions must be looked for. In the seeking, two points must always be remembered. The first is that these Afrikaners will fight to the death for the right to continue existing and that, as they see their southern Africa, they will be obliterated unless white South Africans dominate it. The second is that, since their National party government came to power in 1948, the net effect of the world's attacks upon apartheid has been to drive an increasing number of English-speaking whites into their laager; the white South Africans themselves have always chosen more apartheid, not less, in response to world pressure.

This, indeed, is the starting-point for a possible debate between

South Africa and the West. Spending money on Bantustans—and the South African government has aimed at spending £57 million in the years 1961-66—is by Afrikaner Nationalist standards a daring left-wing thing to do; giving the Bantustans some governmental powers, however circumscribed, is considered to be even more radical. But this is radicalism of a kind that the South African government has itself chosen to risk; it is, for some members of that government, a genuine attempt to solve South Africa's problems.

The first thing to do in this far from ideal situation is for Britain and America to recognise both the seriousness and the long-term nature of the problem. This could best be done by setting up a working group of Foreign Office and State Department officials whose task it would be to study the internal movements inside the Afrikaners' National party. It would be a



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
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good thing if this "South Africa group" could be broadened to include, say, France and some Commonwealth countries—but Britain and America would have to be the mainspring to the whole enterprise.

Acquiring information and digesting it apart, the first purpose of this group would be to align western policies, quietly and calmly, and to set about opening a dialogue with the South African government. There would be no point in pretending at the beginning of such a dialogue that the West had suddenly come around to a belief in apartheid, or even to lukewarm support for it: the whole exercise proposed here would be of no use unless the essential principles that the West believes in for the area were unequivocally stated.

After that it is for the governments to do the talking. The strengths of the South African government would have to be acknowledged. But the strengths of the West ought also to be spelt out. There are many ways short of economic sanctions in which the needle could be stuck into South Africa should the West choose. Every diplomatic, economic, political, financial and other favour now granted the South Africans should be listed by the "South Africa group" (which should have a devoted full-time secretary) and the list carried around in each one of the members' pockets.

The West should be able to argue that while the strength of Dr Verwoerd's army may be mighty, the passage of time is mightier still. His African opponents will not always be relatively so weak; their possible Chinese assistants will not necessarily always seem so remote; the annual growth in the economy will not necessarily always seem so certain. The West could also point out that the pressure emanating from the African and Asian countries increases every year; the nagging to do something about South Africa gets more persistent, and louder, as time passes. The case for answering this nagging, in the West's own self-interest, gets stronger too. No western country is thinking of using economic sanctions, or a blockade, as a weapon against South Africa. But, the South Africans could in all honesty be told, western opposition to other people's demand for the use of sanctions might come to be less staunch as the cost of opposing it is seen to grow.

Here it should be made plain that *The Economist* does not support the use of a blockade to bring down apartheid in South Africa. (A blockade to stop the South Africans imposing apartheid on South West Africa might be a different proposition.) The main reason, apart from qualms about using force to change the internal affairs of any country, is that a blockade with the object of bringing down apartheid would not work: the Afrikaners would rather lack than go black. To them the ultimate defeat would be the handing over of their country to the Africans; any privations brought on by a blockade would be better than that.

But there are many other people in the world who do demand sanctions. Dr Verwoerd will not give away his country to avoid economic hardship. But he might, say, increase his expenditure on "Bantu education" if the alternative were a really determined blockade. This is a deliberately absurd example: no one is going to threaten sanctions in order to push up African education. But between the smallest changes that the South Africans might be willing to agree to rather than suffer the world's economic wrath and the biggest change of all—handing over the country—there must be an equilibrium point. This is what the rest of the world should seek.

What the West ought to have in mind is an overall settlement for the whole of southern Africa that includes the maximum advance for Africans that can realistically be wrung out of the South African government. About sanctions, the West should tell the South Africans the plain truth: that the West is still

against them, but it is getting hard to resist African and Asian pressure to use them. If the moment came when the American and British governments chose to yield to this pressure, the aim would be to achieve a defined and possible objective. The West should straightforwardly admit that it knows it cannot bully the Afrikaners into submission. In return, Dr Verwoerd should realise that effective sanctions cannot be ruled out.

So much for the stick. There are plenty of carrots. One is that if there were a package-deal settlement part of it might be for the West to lay off needling South Africa and to welcome it back into the comity of nations, to depolecatise it. If part of the package deal meant more spending on Africans, the West could offer money. If the deal looked like having a chance of being accepted by neighbouring African countries, the West might try to nudge them into acceptance. If other things allowed, it might even offer to increase the price of gold.

WHAT would be the ingredients of such a package deal? There would be two kinds: the grandiose and the minor. It would be well worth while at least to examine Dr Verwoerd's suggestion of a "southern African common market": there are a lot of obstacles but anything that can be done to strengthen the economic links that already exist, and get white South African officials talking to their black counterparts, might be constructive. This could be combined with a look at Dr Verwoerd's scheme for a "commonwealth of southern African states." The South Africans mean by this mainly the present ridiculous Bantustans plus white South Africa. The idea is still ridiculous even when the South Africans point out that the African reserves may be only 13 per cent of the republic but contain a much higher share of the good agricultural land. For the Afrikaners' own Tomlinson commission pointed out in 1955 that the African areas, undeveloped, cannot support their present population. It is also no good fudging the issue by using the large (mainly desert) area of Bechuanaland as part of a scheme that could claim to have half of southern Africa in black hands.

On the other hand it is no use, in these territorial calculations, to point out that the only fair carving up of South Africa is one that both sides, black and white, agree to. Right. But the West is going to get only what it can squeeze out of the whites, and no more. This understood, it is still practical for the West to propose a scheme for a lot more land for Africans; which would link it into more sensible units; and would arrange for such genuine African states to be given a genuine degree of self-government (leading to at least as much independence as the nearby British protectorates hope to enjoy) and a whole lot more development aid and technical assistance.

If such thinking included a black-governed Rhodesia and in the long run an independent Angola and Mozambique, there might indeed begin to take shape a group of black states in southern Africa that could join in an economic union (if not a political one)

● One thing the South African government could be asked to do straight off, before waiting for the niceties of the negotiations outlined here to take effect, is to improve the treatment of people in its prisons. Too many reports have come out of beatings in South African prisons; of people kept in solitary confinement too long for mental health; of 19th-century standards of food and hygiene for African prisoners. Other allegations—for example, torture by suffocation or electric shock—remain to be disproved. The fact that the people who are bruised and bullied in South African jails are as often as not political prisoners makes their treatment no less reprehensible. This week's news that the South African government is investigating some of the more widely reported allegations is at least a start.

with white South Africa. This could easily include Dr Banda's Malawi; it is conceivable that, given the right circumstances and the right pressures from the West, it might even include Zambia. The economic advantages of this for the whole area, and especially for the African states, is plain; the political advantages would be that a good number of the Africans in the southern quarter of the continent would be in black-governed territory—and to that extent rescued.

But the Afrikaners would never allow them to govern white South Africa. Who else could be thus "rescued"? It is here that the smaller points of concession come in. For a start the 1.7-million-strong mixed-blood "Coloured population," which is mainly in the Cape Province, should be taken in as part of the white group; many of the comparatively liberal Cape Afrikaners (thoroughly smashed as a political force by the diehard Transvaalers) would agree to this. These "Cape Coloureds" mostly speak Afrikaans; their forefathers were the same as the Afrikaners'; they have been described in *Die Burger* as "brown Afrikaners." The 500,000 Indians should similarly be included.

There remain, in this theorising, the 7½ million unrescued Africans, the ones in the present white areas; their number is continually growing. But making the Bantustans more genuinely self-sufficient and self-governing and, most important, much larger might do what Dr Verwoerd has so far only been able to promise, most unconvincingly, for 1978: turn the migrant tide. At any rate, if all that has been suggested up to this point were achieved, South African whites would be that much relieved of the torturing pressure inside their imaginations: the fear of being swamped by overwhelming black numbers in their own country.

If this really happened it might then seem realistic to hope for better treatment of the remaining Africans inside white South Africa. The crux of the question is political rights. Dr Verwoerd argues, no doubt correctly, that any concession towards giving Africans the vote is the "thin end of the wedge"—the end-result would be African control. So getting Africans the vote for the white parliament is not, in the context of this argument, a practical proposition (although the West should not hide its belief that, in the long run, stability means government by consent of

all the people). But if the whites felt less politically threatened by the Africans why should the latter not vote for genuine city councils in their own black satellite cities? The government has moved tentatively in this direction already; it should be pushed into going much further much faster. At its most ideal, it might even seem practical to propose a form of self-government for these Sowetos that took its inspiration from the Swiss cantons.

It is hard for Britain, with its current obsession against a few tens of thousands of coloured immigrants coming into its own white little islands, to argue against influx control in the imaginary white South Africa projected here. But why not at least more security of tenure for those there, plus local self-government? It could be bargained for. Indeed, some Afrikaner theorists have proposed a combination of black, white and "multiracial" states for South Africa; others simply propose multiracial areas (say, the centre of Johannesburg) in which mixed cinema shows and hotels for all comers could be allowed.

It is at this level that the most undramatic of the reforms come in. Is it really necessary to bully the black population with daily arrests for technical offences? Is it really saving the purity of white South Africa to prevent those theatres that choose to do so from allowing in audiences of all races? Why should black lawyers not be allowed to practise in the centre of Johannesburg? All these manifestations of petty apartheid or "pinprick apartheid" are the ones that hurt most in the daily life of the people—and each comes under the unacceptable justification that "intermingling leads to friction between the races" or that it encourages miscegenation.

Many questions are deliberately left untackled in this tentative list of proposals—for the whole operation would have to be undertaken with a mixture of clarity on general principles and flexibility about details. It would have to be remembered, for instance, that economic advance is no substitute for political rights—but also that it is simply not possible to engineer political rights for southern Africans if that puts them in control over the whites, at least before that misty day in the future when either the whites undergo a change of heart or the blacks so increase their strength as to be able to force one.

WHERE THE PARTNERS PARTED

"Partnership" between black and white cannot be made to work: the disappearance of the short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963 proved that. But now each of the three component parts of that federation is in a position to be included in a southern Africa settlement.

BRITAIN is not always right. In December 1963 one of the favourite themes of South Africa's Nationalist theoreticians was proved correct. The federation that had joined together Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland broke up and the idea that "partnership" between the Africans and the whites could be made to work was, to the Afrikaners'—and the Africans'—satisfaction, proved dismally wrong. This was partly because there never was a true partnership: the federation was run by white men. Even so, the federation's dire experience is seen by white people in South Africa as a demonstration

of the truth of their belief that separation of the races (with the whites fully in control of the process) is the only viable solution for mixed societies.

Each of the former territories of the central African federation has since taken a different political path. Southern Rhodesia, renamed Rhodesia, is still governed by white men who are negotiating hard for independence from Britain so that they can cement their control of the country for as long as possible. Northern Rhodesia, renamed Zambia, became an independent republic last October and is doing its best, in a situation where geography and econo-

mics force it to compromise with the white-ruled states, to retain the purity of its African nationalist soul. Nyasaland, renamed Malawi, became independent last July; it has chosen the path of compromise.

Dr Banda's Malawi

With inevitable irony, history chose Dr Banda to spearhead the destruction of the central African federation on the ground that it was dominated by white men in Salisbury—and it has chosen Dr Banda to lead his independent country according to

the need to compromise on almost every aspect of government with white men in Lisbon, Lourenço Marques, Pretoria and, still, Salisbury.

He has established good diplomatic relations with the Portuguese, thus recognising the arguments of geography in a country whose productive southern half is surrounded on three sides by Portugal's Mozambique and whose only railway outlet leads to the Mozambique port of Beira. Dr Banda has an aim in doing this. He has been led to believe that in some future southern African settlement the Portuguese government might cede part of Mozambique's vast undeveloped north-western wastes to Malawi. For what this idea is worth, it is something that the West ought to bear in mind when investigating a policy for southern Africa on the lines proposed in these pages.

Dr Banda's relations with Salisbury, Pretoria and even Zambia's African nationalist capital of Lusaka are governed by the fact that (according to the 1961 census) more than half the Malawians who work for wages do so in Rhodesia, on the copperbelt mines in Zambia, or on the Witwatersrand mines in South Africa. They send back some £2 million a year; Malawi's budget now runs at £15¼ million a year. Even so, the expected deficit this year (£6¼ million) will have to be covered by a grant from Britain—and this will be forthcoming in spite of its being normal British policy not to help balance the budgets of former colonies after independence.

In this situation Dr Banda is old and wise enough to tailor his undoubted African nationalist sentiments to the immediate needs of his country. He says things like: "The government will not Africanise for the sake of Africanisation. . . . No European will lose his job just because he happens to have a white skin, and . . . no African will be promoted to a higher post . . . just because he happens to have a black skin." The British applaud; the unpromoted African newly educated do not.

This is Dr Banda's problem. He is in the fortunate position of being able to pursue conservative policies in a radical Africa because he has successfully been built up as a Messiah to his people, and because he does not hesitate to use dictatorial methods, or to condone bullying by party thugs, in order to stay on top. But he has lost the support of many African intellectuals; indeed last September he lost very nearly his whole cabinet, the members who then rebelled now being in exile. They objected partly to his too conservative (for their liking) policies, and more particularly to his insistence on taking all decisions himself, leaving nothing to "my boys." What he will be like if he becomes president (Malawi will be a republic on July 6, 1966) these ex-ministers shudder to think.

In some ways, therefore, Dr Banda is just as bad for Malawi as he is good for it in others: the test of his value will be to see what happens when he is no longer there. Meanwhile, for the rest of southern Africa,

the government of some four million proudly independent Malawians (who treat their 14,000 whites with great care and respect) is an example of how economics and geography can prove more powerful than even the most passionate of political emotions.

Dr Kaunda's Zambia

It might seem at first sight as if the Banda line is very seldom, if ever, applicable—as if in Zambia, say, extreme dislike of Dr Verwoerd and Mr Ian Smith would overcome any argument based on economic or geographic necessity. Yet one of the first actions Dr Kaunda took on the eve of his country's independence was to make a public offer of exchange of ambassadors with the republic. His condition was that his African ambassador should have the freedom to move in Pretoria that would be granted to Dr Verwoerd's man in Lusaka. To the South Africans this seemed preposterous: how could a black Zambian be allowed to roam into white South African hotels and restaurants?

But the public expostulations made by Dr Verwoerd himself at the time must be balanced by the remarks many Afrikaners made to your correspondent in private—that "it must come one day"—and by the pressure from the more world-orientated of Dr Verwoerd's supporters for sensible diplomatic relations with black African countries.

It would certainly make sense for Zambia to have an ambassador in Pretoria, however much apartheid is anathema to its people. Landlocked, with eight neighbours (four white-governed, three black and independent and one, Bechuanaland, set on the

way to black independence), the new Zambia is both symbolically and literally at the heart of what divides black Africa from white-ruled southern Africa.

It is rich—its copperbelt comes second only to the Witwatersrand as a source of wealth and power on the continent. Yet this richness depends upon the financial and managerial expertise of two main groups: Mr Harry Oppenheimer's Anglo American Corporation (which is in so many of the gold mines) and the largely American controlled Roan Selection Trust group. The working of the mines, in a country that went into independence with fewer trained and educated Africans than most, depends upon the skills of its white miners, a goodly proportion of whom are from Rhodesia or South Africa. The mining requires power from the Kariba hydroelectric station that Zambia runs jointly with Rhodesia, and the copper travels to the sea along a railway line through Rhodesian and Portuguese territory. In 1964 Rhodesia was Zambia's largest supplier of imported goods; South Africa came second, and Britain third.

In the short run at least there is very little that Zambia's new African nationalist government can do about this situation. On the last day of 1964 its minister for commerce and industry, Mr Nalumnio Mundia, formally gave 12 months' notice of termination of Zambia's trade agreement with South Africa which, he said, was "repugnant" to his government. The result at the end of this year is expected to be an increase in the cost of the fifth of Zambia's imports that now come from South Africa (Rhodesia supplies 40 per cent), although the Lusaka government is hoping to get entrepreneurs to manufacture some substitutes locally, while it is putting



Dr Banda



Dr Kaunda and Mr Wilson



Mr Smith's men in the street