

A Survey of Southern Africa

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WHITE MAN'S COUNTRY



It is wrong, and we detest it, but detestation will not remove it. Here is a suggestion for alleviating the condition of a substantial minority of the oppressed by sitting down to talk toughly with the oppressor.

A black African might sum up the pages to follow like that, or in stronger words. They are about southern Africa, most particularly the republic of South Africa; their argument is that the four million or so whites who control the bottom quarter of Africa are in such a strong position (**see page vi**) that if change is to come at all it will have to be with their acquiescence. The reasons why the West should seek to initiate change are set out on **page v**; proposals that might lead towards some kind of concessions from the white chiefs appear on **page xii**.

Dr Verwoerd, prime minister of South Africa, has neither horns nor tail. Yet for the 7½ million Africans who live in the "white" 87 per cent of his republic there might very well be written above the doorways: *Abandon hope all ye who enter here*. One feature of South Africa's form of oppression is that it covers almost every aspect of life. (**See pages vii to xii.**) The system affects white lives too. No sensitive citizen can be happy with the position of his country as the "polecat of the world" (an Afrikaner description). Nobody is truly free who, when alone, fears the black man—or black criminal—in the streets at night. No democrat-at-heart can happily witness the creeping advance of police-state methods in his country, especially when he knows that these methods are necessary to make him secure—that he prefers the secret police to the prospect of introducing political safety valves into the system.

Thus these pages are as concerned with the fate of white South Africans as they are with the blacks. It would not make any sense if one kind of oppression were replaced by another, or if widespread chaos and bloodshed were introduced where none now exists. It is true that white South Africans are responsible for a government that behaves abominably towards most non-white South Africans. But the problem of one sort of people set down in the middle of another sort is terrifyingly difficult. The way to a less hellish South Africa does not lie through pillorying white South Africans, but rather through helping them to change the situation in which they find themselves. This, at its base, is that they enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world, while they are scared stiff of waking up from their present Hollywood dream life to find themselves an oppressed minority in a black-governed, black man's country.

One way of tackling granite is to chip at it. Southern Africa taken as a whole approaches, in area, the size of the United States. The problems of its constituent parts are discussed piecemeal in the pages that follow, with special articles on the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique (**page xxvi**); the British colonies of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland (**page xxix**), Rhodesia; and the independent African states of Malawi and Zambia (**page xvi**). If economists ruled the world, this area could be different (**see pages xxi to xxv**). As it is, its nearly 40 million people have yet to find political peace. The first article explains why the West should care. The last article (**page xxx**) is an Afrikaner's reply.

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
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


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WHY SOUTH AFRICA IS THE WEST'S BUSINESS

SUCCESSIVE South African governments have argued that it is a cardinal principle of international affairs that countries do not seek to poke their noses into one another's business. Everything in this survey contradicts that principle.

In the United Nations it has long been decided that the internal policies of the republic of South Africa are a proper subject of world discussion. Twenty years of resolutions condemning apartheid began with discussion of the treatment of South Africa's Indians at the first session of the United Nations in 1946. It may be that the steady shrinkage of the world is being accompanied by a steady enlargement of the case for considering whether or not there are certain things that no government can do without arousing the expressed concern of outsiders.

But why particularly South Africa? And why should the West be called upon to move South Africa to cure its own sickness? There are two answers: moral and political. The moral ones had better come first.

South Africa is a special case because its form of discrimination is racial and unashamed. All oppression is abhorrent. Today, with the coloured nations of the world independent, oppression based on race is most widely and passionately abhorred. Yet the South African government takes pride in its system (which it calls "separate development," not oppression or discrimination), and South African law entrenches, in fine and public detail, the proud and public view that no black man shall step across the white line. India's caste system has inflicted misery on millions of untouchables, but at least the Indian government is officially trying to abolish discrimination against them.

But why is the West so often called upon to be involved? The short answer is that South Africa is at least as much part of the West as Australia, and for Europeans it is a good deal nearer. Four out of every ten of its white inhabitants speak English at home; most Afrikaners and literate Africans have a good knowledge of English. The country's two white groups originated in Britain, Holland and (providing the fertile Huguenot strain) France. Its own new language, Afrikaans, is a child of Dutch and a member of the western family of languages and cultures. Its law is Roman-Dutch, its history that of the Dutch and British empires, its literature that of the West. Most of its whites (120,000 Jews apart) are Christians; so are a high proportion of its non-whites.

Two-thirds of the West's gold is produced in South Africa; a thousand million pounds' worth of British investment lies in the republic. It is a country of proper trains and buses, railway lines, motorways and industries, and a jammed telephone system. Divide the world any way you like—according to language, history, culture, trade, religion, investment—and South Africa comes out on the West's side of the line.

These are the grand links. There are thousands of smaller ones—the daily messages that pass between the headquarters of virtually every large company in Britain (and a good handful in America) and their South African branches or subsidiaries; the cricket matches; the family ties; the mining news on all our financial pages; the oranges. No wonder Mr Macmillan, then British prime minister, wept when South Africa was forced to withdraw from the (British) Commonwealth.



Englishmen and (white) South Africans at cricket: more than playing games unites the two.

Because it is part of the family South Africa cannot be ignored. The British Council of Churches in its special report published this year on "The Future of South Africa" suggests "dissociation" as a first step in a policy for South Africa. This is not possible. National boundary lines set the republic apart, but everything else makes it as much a problem for the West as the problems of the Negroes have been for America, or the Algerians were for France. For the Atlantic world, South Africa is the worm in the bud.

THE other side to all this moralising is political. The Tory member of parliament, Mr Patrick Wall, told Birmingham Young Conservatives earlier this year that there were two views about the future of Africa. "The extreme left of both [British] major political parties, the Liberals and the American State Department believe that Africa is a black continent and that the whites are only there on sufferance," he said. "If their presence becomes embarrassing to Britain or America they should get out." Mr Wall went on:

The contrary view which, I believe, is shared by the bulk of British people is that not only is the contribution made by the white minority essential to the future well-being of the whole continent, but that should the present division of the world between "have" and "have-not" nations continue, then for strategic and economic reasons the four million whites in southern Africa may well become vital to the security of both Europe and America.

Mr Wall's arguments are sound; the trick is to draw the right conclusions. The security of Europe and America, in a strictly military sense, would undoubtedly be best secured by making sure that the politically "safe" whites keep control over the southern part of Africa. In this way overflying rights, the port of Simonstown, and all the other uses of that strategic area would be secured for the West. The trouble is that to act upon this line of thinking is a sure way of losing the political battle, not only in Africa but in Asia as well. Precisely because southern Africa is a part of the West its politics are a liability for Europe and America; this fact is the new white man's burden.

The most potent expression of this is not the series of anti-western resolutions based upon South Africa that get passed by the Organisation of African Unity. A greater threat is that the Africans, in their search for means of overthrowing apartheid, will

WHERE MIGHT IS WHITE

MEASURED by every kind of strength, Africa's white south is where the power lies on the black continent; these maps show it. Most important of all, southern Africa's white men command the only truly effective military power in Africa south of the Sahara. By all current experience (the Congo, Angola) the quality of the white soldiers is far higher than that of their untrained, usually ill-equipped, black counterparts.





South Africa itself has a full-time army of about 15,000; it could put 250,000 trained men into the field at short notice. Only Egypt could match this sort of trained manpower; it is 4,000 miles away. The Institute of Strategic Studies demonstrated last August that of about 400,000 trained soldiers in the forces of the independent African states, about 250,000 are in the Arab countries; the Congo and Ethiopia account for half the rest.

Dr Verwoerd has his own firearms and ammunition factories: the first FN automatic rifle made in his republic was handed to him in August 1964. Certain "railway workshops" in certain parts of the country have been closed to all Africans, including African workers, for more than a year now: it is believed that they are being used to make tanks. Private enterprise was put in charge of the munitions production board last year; it is now working at full speed. South Africa's defence budget has trebled—to £115 million—in the past five years.

(Spending on African schooling has gone up from £9½ to £11½ million in the same period.) Jet trainers are to be built in the republic. The South African air force already has French Mirage jets, British Buccaneers, Vampires, Shackletons, Canberras, and American Sabres. It also has 200 active Harvards (and 300 in storage) each able to carry eight 19 lb fragmentation bombs.

The organisation of South Africa's defences against outside attack is thus so far advanced that outside attack can, for all practical purposes, be discounted. But what about internal rebellion? Africans are in training as rebels in several black African capitals—but so far, it seems, they are caught by the South African secret police as fast as they return. Even if they were to start guerrilla warfare, they would come up against the highly trained and well-armed part-time "commandos"—which means virtually every able-bodied white man and woman—if the police and the army could not cope in the first place. Even the many light aircraft clubs that South Africans use for weekend flying are organised on a stand-by emergency basis for spotting and attacking guerrillas.

The industrial base for all this power is also in white South Africa's hands: one of the features that these maps in fact bring out is that few of the sources of real power (mines, electricity, railways, roads) lie outside white South Africa.



listen in increasing numbers to the Chinese communists. The Chinese have it easy: all they have to do is whisper fiery words about wars of liberation and driving out the white colonialists. The West is faced with the far trickier problem of helping to end white oppression in the south without replacing it with something worse. The West could find itself in the grotesque position of fighting for Dr Verwoerd simply because the Chinese communists are supporting those who fight against him. The West's aim should be to prevent the fight from starting at all—not by sitting squatly on the status quo, but by doing what it can to move South Africa into different policies.

These are the negative political reasons for doing something about South Africa. There is an immensely strong positive one. The clue lies in Mr Wall's reference to the whites being "essential to the future well-being of the whole continent." By all common sense and logic, southern Africa should be the furnace, not of

hatred, but of economic development for all Africa right up to the edges of the Sahara. It has the capital, the trained men (black as well as white), the infrastructure and industry, and the involvement with the continent. A sane South Africa, suitably assisted, could take from the West much of the burden of helping Africa's new countries to develop their own economies. After all, on strictly technical and economic grounds, who are better qualified to build Dr Kaunda's railway from his Zambian copperbelt to the Tanzanian coast than the excellent managers of the South African Railways and Harbours administration?

The articles on pages i to xviii were written by Joe Rogaly, who was born in South Africa.

WHAT APARTHEID IS ABOUT



Officially, it is about this:

South Africa's population consists of eleven national groups: a White group, a Coloured group, an Indian group and eight Bantu (Black) ethnic groups.

Each group has a distinct identity of its own and a way of life determined by language, culture, heritage, outlook and environment. Each group has evolved in its own way, according to its stage of development and particular way of life.

South Africa's answer to the problem of the peaceful coexistence of these different peoples is seen in the policy of separate development which makes it possible for the various groups to enjoy the full privileges of a free society each in their own area, unhampered by the strains imposed by a multiracial society.

THIS quotation from an official government booklet, "South African Quiz," is the first part of the answer the booklet gives to the question: "What is meant by the policy of Separate Development?" It goes on to say that, historically, the first

Europeans moved up from the south of the country, while the "Bantu" (the government-chosen name) moved down from the north. The whites made the republic of South Africa out of what was then "virtually an empty part of the continent. . . . The migrating Bantu settled in the areas best suited to their needs." The whites reserved the "Bantu homelands" for these people by statute in 1913; these areas have been added to since then by buying white-owned land and "today the Bantu are being assisted to develop separately from the Whites in their own homelands."

The official description tells how the "Bantu, in their homelands, preferred a subsistence economy" which is why they have remained underdeveloped. Quoting from Dr Verwoerd, it explains that in these circumstances the whites became the guardians of the Bantu. And "insofar as separate development involves continued control by the guardian over the wards, it is of a transitional nature only." The control will lapse as the Bantu advance.

The whole concept, the booklet says, rests on "the just claims and moral rights of each group to advance towards self-government and self-determination, but with due recognition of the need that a balance must be struck between different values and different rights. Absolute right for any one group may mean tremendous injustice to another." As Dr Verwoerd has pointed out, the idea is not based on superiority or inferiority, but merely on the fact that people are different. Racial hatred, Dr Verwoerd argues, cannot be eliminated in an enforced multiracial state; only the policy of separate nation-building, the policy of good neighbourliness, can do that.

Eight self-governing Bantu national units are envisaged. The first of these, the Transkei, achieved self-government at the end of 1963. According to this pamphlet, "it is foreseen that the eventual relationship between the Bantu and European will develop into a commonwealth pattern and, economic-

ally, into a form of South African common market—in other words political independence and economic interdependence." One reason why all this is necessary is that:

The mixing of two such alien elements as White and Black leads to unhappy social results—racial miscegenation, moral deterioration of both, racial antipathy and clashes, and to many other forms of social evil.

These necessarily selected quotations have been presented in order to give some idea of how the South African government explains its own policy. Supporters of that policy range from those who say much the same sort of thing in more robust language to those who say, frankly: "It's either us or them. Unless we stay on top, we go under. If we have to go under, we'll pull every last one of them down with us." There is a great deal of argument on details among apartheid theorists. For example, Dr Verwoerd has laid it down that no white capitalists may operate inside the African areas; his scheme of things calls instead for "border industries," with the factories on one side of the boundary line and the workers on the other. But some Afrikaners who support him argue that there can be no true development of the African areas without allowing white capital and expertise in. The trouble is that the theory of separate development is gradually solidifying into dogma; there can be no breach, even in its minutest detail, without lengthy theological debate at the top.

Inside the Bantustans

SOMETHING like four million of the republic's Africans live in the thirteen per cent of the land now labelled "Bantu homelands." On the map most African areas are small pock-marks; there are 260 in all. The only large single piece making any real sense is the Transkei, which is a little bigger than Belgium. Its capital, Umtata, is reached by train or a good tarred road from East London; this road, in fact,

is the main South African national route from Port Elizabeth to Durban. The road itself is part of white South Africa.

So is the capital, Umtata. Your correspondent was not able to have any Africans—not even the chief minister, Chief Kaiser Matanzima—to a drink or a meal in his hotel. “The whites of Umtata would be up in arms,” Chief Kaiser explained with great charm when finally a permissible meeting-place (his office) was found. “Why provoke them?”

Chief Kaiser presides over a cabinet in which he became the minister of finance and his brother the minister of justice. Education, the interior (best described as local administration), agriculture and forestry, and roads and public works are the other portfolios. There has been some talk of taking over health, but for the rest of the Transkei's affairs it is the South African, not the Transkeian, government that is responsible.



“Go ahead—develop”

Nor does the Transkei government run what seems on the map to be the whole Transkei. Dr Verwoerd seems to have no firm intention of incorporating Port St Johns, Umzimkulu or Matatiele into the Transkei in the foreseeable future; as for 26 townlets in the area, a racial zoning committee has been deciding how to divide these “white spots” into areas for separate black and white occupation, as elsewhere in the republic. The white areas, which generally means the town centres and the existing white suburbs, are stoutly resisting African penetration. Most of these “towns” are actually small trading villages. Many of them have a curiously English quality, since this part of the republic, like the rest of the eastern Cape Province, has more English-born farmers and traders in it than Afrikaners. A town like Butterworth is immensely English; Idutywa, with its blanketed Xhosa horsemen, is a colonial outpost. In time, it is theorised, the “white spots” will fade away.

But at present it is rural Transkei that can be described as self-governing; to this the African areas in the towns are being added. It is a country of immense beauty. The green hillsides are sensuous and smooth; the road sinews through them with lazy strength. If the car stops there is silence; the little white-painted huts dotting the hillsides look like Eden, and are

about as relevant to modern life (if that is what people want). The people in these huts are not, however, so innocent of modern politics as they might seem: before the Transkeian government could be set up there was such resistance that emergency regulations (banning meetings and giving powers of arrest without warrant) were proclaimed in 1960. They are still in force.

Some people are born politicians; some have politics thrust on them. The people of the Transkei can hardly help being involved in the affairs of the republic that owns them, for their sons, brothers and fathers go there to work. When they lose jobs in the white towns, or when they have made enough money and stop work, they are “endorsed out” by officials, which means that they are obliged to come home. Most Transkeians are Xhosas, many of whom traditionally seek work in the western Cape. But, theoretically, the government is trying to clear all Africans from the western Cape. So loads of Xhosa wives and children have been returned to the Transkei; the men have remained because the factories need them, and they are moving into hostels. The ratio of men to women in the African townships in the Cape is now seven to two.

As fast as the men are shipped out of white man's Africa back to the Transkei, more come flooding back to fill vacancies. Sometimes it is the same men. The “endorsing out” satisfies the theory of clearing Africans from the area; the recruiting back makes it possible for industry to carry on. Taxed about the human misery of this situation, Afrikaners will reply, “you cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs.”

The effect of this shuttling back and forth (700 miles, Cape Town to Umtata) on the African men is of importance for the future. It certainly introduces politics into the Transkei in a direct way; the tale is that every hostel room at Langa location, Cape-town, has spawned its own secret society.

The Transkei's own official politics are complicated. Its assembly consists of 64 chiefs (paid by the government) and 45 elected members. Chief Kaiser Matanzima was elected chief minister in 1963 by 54 votes to 49 (six members did not vote) and it is generally accepted that most of Chief Kaiser's votes came from chiefs, while most elected members supported the leader of the opposition, Chief Victor Poto, who is himself no radical but stands for multi-racialism as opposed to apartheid.

The Transkei opposition's most articulate spokesman is Mr “Knowledge” Guzana: mission-educated, arts degree at the old Fort Hare college, and by turns a teacher and lawyer. He has the equivalent of a white middle-class house outside Umtata; he says that the African nationalists in the rest of Africa “have not set us a good example. We are not impressed by what they have done.” He would have the Transkei an ordinary province of South Africa, like the Cape, with representatives in the central parliament.

Certainly Dr Verwoerd need fear a Poto-

Guzana government no more than he need fear the governments of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland—all are in the palm of South Africa's hand. What the Transkei opposition, and even the government, could do is to wring certain small concessions from Pretoria. The most important of these is on education.

One of the first decisions of the Transkei parliament, supported by both sides of the house, was to scrap “Bantu education” (South Africa's separate but not equal schooling for blacks) and to replace it with the ordinary Cape provincial education system. It was also decided to teach Africans in English and Afrikaans, instead of Xhosa, thus going against one of the Verwoerd government's most cherished principles—“mother-tongue education.” Putting these decisions into practice is another matter: a select committee has been working on how to do so, with Afrikaans government officials doing their best—as British officials did in colonial days—to see that head office policy is adhered to as much as possible.

Inside Black City

DREAMS of the future apart, the present reality is that the African areas of South Africa are too small, poor, overcrowded and underdeveloped to support even their existing populations. The work is in white South Africa, and of the 7½ million Africans living and working there, roughly four million are in the urban areas. The 3½ million Africans working on farms in South Africa are a subject all on their own; some are recruited by the department of prisons, which hires convict labour out to farmers; most of the rest are poorly paid, tied to their employers, and without political rights.

It is the town Africans on whom the spotlight plays. These are the most advanced of southern Africa's black people, and thus they are the biggest problem to the theorists of apartheid. Many of them have lived around the cities all their lives; many come from families that once owned property in the African areas of these cities (this is now illegal); many, in degree of education, way of life and general spirit are more like American Negroes than they are like their tribal forefathers. They are westernised to an extent that few other Africans anywhere have become.

These are the “cheeky kaffirs”—the ones who are far more politically sophisticated and socially demanding than the more willingly subservient tribal Africans. It is these who, because of their numbers and their presence in “white” South Africa, are the most feared; it is these who, because of the fantastic growth of industry in the republic (see pages xxi and xxii) are most needed. Half a million such Africans live in their own “black city” a comfortable 17 miles outside Johannesburg: three-quarters of these in “Soweto,” the part of