

**"CAUGHT AT CROSSROADS – WHICH WAY FOR NGOs?"**  
**An analysis of NGO post-drought “rehabilitation through to development” interventions in**  
**Machakos District (Kenya): 2001 - 2006.**

by

**ESTHER LOVENESS OKWANGA**

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**SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR HENNIE SWANEPOEL**

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## DECLARATION

Student Number: 558-800-6

I, ESTHER LOVENESS OKWANGA; do hereby declare that this Doctoral Thesis titled: "**Caught at crossroads - which way for NGOs?**" **An analysis of NGO post-drought "rehabilitation through to development" interventions in Machakos District (Kenya):2001 – 2006**"; is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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SIGNATURE

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DATE

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study was inspired by two personal experiences in the course of my twenty year career in relief and development work; the experiences were in two communities; at different points in time; in two different countries and in spatial terms, approximately four thousand kilometres apart. Notwithstanding the distance between them and differences in terms of cultural and traditional considerations; the two communities had two things in common; they were both rural and poor. At the same time however, they displayed a degree of assertiveness that is uncommon in many a poor rural community in Africa.

In both experiences, the two communities had been victims of a natural disaster during which they had benefited from relief assistance delivered by NGOs; the relief assistance was greatly appreciated. In the aftermath of the emergency phase, the NGOs remained in the communities to implement post-disaster mitigation and preparedness interventions; the goal of the interventions was to reduce the communities' vulnerability against similar threats in the future. The NGOs' donors concurred that building the resilience of the communities against future threats to their welfare was the right course of action in the post-disaster phase of the interventions. To this effect, the funding provided was strictly earmarked for longer term disaster mitigation interventions; at that point in time however, the communities' expressed and most pressing felt needs were in respect of the short to medium term post-disaster period. Such differences of opinion resulted in the communities adamantly refusing to participate in the planned interventions. My first reaction in both experiences was one of irritation by what at the time, I perceived as unreasonable behaviour and ungratefulness on the part of the communities. In time and on reflection however, I came to realise that there was nothing unreasonable about the behaviour of the communities; they were simply exercising their right to be involved in decisions on matters that affect their lives. I am grateful to the two communities; in Gwanda District (Zimbabwe) and Bagamoyo District (Tanzania) for the assertive position they took; such assertiveness was to be the trigger factor for further reflection on the challenges NGOs face in pursuit of their noble mission of serving the poor and disadvantaged in society. In time, such reflection was to influence my choice of the subject of study.

At some point during the study, I encountered some challenges and considered de-registering; I extend my gratitude to Professor Frik de Beer and Dr. Derica Kotze of the Department of Development Studies at UNISA for their support and interventions at the time. Part of the support resulted in the

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## SUMMARY

Non Governmental Organisations have been operating in Africa since the 1940's; then, their work was heavily biased towards relief work. From the 1980s however, the role of NGOs evolved to include development; understandably, African governments were finding it increasingly difficult to provide adequate levels of basic services for their people. To this effect and initially; NGOs got involved in development as short term "gap fillers" in the provision of basic services; health and education amongst others. As Africa's development discourse continued unabated, NGOs were recognised by donors and host governments alike, as indispensable to the provision of such services; in time however, they became the subject of criticism for allegedly failing to irreversibly ameliorate the conditions of the poor.

In delivering services, NGOs work in a complex partnership characterised by power imbalances. The partnership involves donors who own the means of production which facilitate NGOs' work and host governments who "own" the humanitarian space which NGOs need to fulfil their humanitarian mandate. While seemingly poor and powerless, the communities served wield the power to facilitate or block the success of NGO interventions through their commitment and/or lack thereof; respectively; NGOs' contribution is their skills and humanitarian spirit. The success of NGO interventions is a function of resources, humanitarian space and the goodwill that donors, host governments and the communities served bring to the partnership table respectively.

The study sought to establish why between 2001-2006; NGO post-drought rehabilitation through to development interventions failed to irreversibly reduce vulnerability against drought in communities in Machakos District and the extent to which power imbalances which characterise "partnerships for development" contributed to the failure by NGOs to fulfil their mandate.

The study revealed that NGOs are unwaveringly committed to their humanitarian mandate however; the power imbalances that characterise "partnerships for development" and in particular, that between NGOs' and donors militated against the fulfilment of their mandate in Machakos District. When NGOs fail to deliver on their mandate; they lose credibility amongst the other partners and this reinforces the power imbalances; it's a vicious cycle. "Caught at Crossroads..." NGOs are indeed.

**Key Concepts**

Development partnerships; community participation; empowerment; impact; sustainability; accountability.

**Areas for further study:**

The study was limited to post-drought mitigation and preparedness interventions in Machakos District which by expert opinion (agro-ecological classification) is semi-arid or marginal; as such, the District has the potential for self sufficiency in food security. This is the possible explanation for lack of enthusiasm by donors in funding longer term food security interventions in the District following the drought of 1999-2001. It may well turn out that had the interventions been in the very arid Districts and/or in other development sectors, the picture with respect to donor interest might have been very different. With respect to the host government; food security issues are politically sensitive; to this effect, that public authorities' decisions on priorities and targeting might have been different had the interventions been in other less politically sensitive development sectors; cannot be ruled out. Finally, with respect to the communities and as the saying goes, "a hungry man is a very angry man"; that some of the negative sentiments expressed about the interventions can be attributed to this very fact cannot be ruled out either. Against this background, studies in the arid Districts in Kenya or elsewhere and/or in other development sectors would go a long way towards increasing NGOs' knowledge on the factors which influence the behaviour of the various stakeholders in partnerships for development in different contexts. An increase in such knowledge would broaden the nature and scope of strategies and options available to NGOs to overcome the factors that act as constraints to the realisation of their cherished goal of sustainable development in the communities they serve.

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

BOND	British Overseas NGOs for Development
CECM	Community Environmental Conservation Monitors
CES	Community Environmental Scouts
CHW	Community Health Worker
CIVICUS	World Alliance for Citizen Participation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DMG	District Management Group
DSG	District Steering Group
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPI	Expanded Programme on Immunisation
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoK	Government of Kenya
GNP	Gross National Product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV/AIDS	Human immunodeficiency virus/Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTRAC	International NGO Training and Research Centre
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KFSSG	Kenya Food Security Steering Group
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MAP	Multi-Country AIDS Programme for Africa
MANGO	Management Accounting for NGOs
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDBS	Multi-Donor Budget Support
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIC	Newly Industrialising Countries

ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/Aids
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	(United Nations) World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation



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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background

According to Meredith (1985: 153), the end of colonial rule in Sub Sahara Africa (hereafter referred to as Africa) came amidst jubilation; and the mood of euphoria aroused by the advent of self rule was raised to even greater heights as nationalist politicians campaigning for power made one lavish promise after another. However, deeply affected by mass poverty, meagre resources, disease and illiteracy as the continent was, there were no easy solutions to meaningful development; consequently, the honeymoon was short lived leaving behind a sense of unfulfilled expectations. More than half a century on and for a number of reasons, the African leadership has failed to reverse the state of underdevelopment which characterised the states they reclaimed from the colonial powers. Such a state of affairs was what prompted Timberlake to write a book in 1988 whose title was “...*Africa in crisis...*” the work was inspired by the devastating famine experienced in the Horn of Africa in the early eighties. The work was an account of his reflections (Timberlake 1988: x) on what he referred to as “...environmental bankruptcy...” on the continent. The primary focus of the work was indeed on environmental bankruptcy; however, he went on to articulate other fundamental socio-economic and political issues underwriting such a state of bankruptcy; within and outside Africa. Close to three decades after the well documented famine in the horn of Africa, the continent is still in crisis and environmental bankruptcy is but only one manifestation of the complex problems that has left the continent’s social, economic and political fabric in tatters.

Development scholars and political analysts amongst them Rodney (1971); Davidson (1992) and McMichael (2004), cite colonial legacy, poor economic policies; political instability and corruption as amongst the most significant contributory factors to under-development in Africa. With respect to a colonial legacy, McMichael (2004: 25) argues that while it was acknowledged that independence in the colonies was imminent, the attitudes prevailing in London, Paris, Brussels and Lisbon were such that; such a development was not synonymous with loss of influence in how the independent states would be managed. He supports his argument by citing the British Committee on Colonial Policy which in 1957; advised the then Prime Minister that while Britain could still exercise control in the colonies, it was most important to ensure that British standards and methods of doing business permeated the life of the colonies even after they became independent states . In addition, McMichael (2004: 25-26)

observes that such a post independence agenda was facilitated and easily realised by amongst other things, some Africans who stood to gain from decolonisation. To secure such gains, they formed indigenous elite groups which readily collaborated and cooperated with colonial administrators in return for support in their campaigns to assume power once independence was conferred on the colonies. Once in power and in order to appease the former colonial masters to whom they owed their positions, the economic policies they pursued turned out “poor”; understandably, just like in the colonial days, they were designed to serve not the interests of the masses but those of small elite groups.

With respect to political instability, Shah (2010) argues that yet again; this can be traced to a colonial legacy in so far as by creating artificial boundaries; colonial powers brought together many different ethnic groups and constructed equally artificial “nations” out of them. Needless to say, such arbitrarily created “nations” neither reflected the ethnic make-up of the original traditional kingdoms nor had the ability to accommodate the cultural diversity that characterized the ethnic groups which formed the new nation states at independence. Shah (2010) links the political instability and corruption which has characterised the continent to the diversity of ethnic groups forced into an artificial oneness by the arbitrary drawing of borders. He cites the example of the civil war in Angola which tore the country apart for close to three decades and which he argues, can be traced to competition by ethnically aligned groups for the control of resources; mainly diamonds and offshore oil. These views are supported by McMillan (2005: 4) who notes that the civil war lasted as long as it did because the warring groups enjoyed the support of western and North American governments and their multinational corporations. The variety and scope of such support at any given point in time was a function of the prevailing economic interests of these governments and their multinationals; with the result that neither side could be guaranteed of a decisive victory at any specific point in time hence the war raged on for as long as it did. The involvement of multinational corporations was to give rise to another phenomenon, corruption; McMillan (2005: 7) observes that corruption was rampant amongst Angolan officials on both sides; they not only diverted oil revenues into personal off-shore bank accounts but also took bribes from corporate executives in exchange for access to the oil reserves. He cites a corruption court case involving senior executives of the French corporate Elf in which by their own admission; the executives revealed that the company had regularly made payments both to sides; the government and the insurgents. In addition, the executives revealed that in 1991, the corporate had opened a US\$2 million Swiss bank account for the UNITA rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi!



As is evident from the foregoing, the arguments by development scholars and political analysts alike; that a colonial legacy, poor policies, political instability and corruption are significant contributory factor to the under-development in Africa appear to be plausible not least, because they are interrelated. Thus and as McMichael (2004: 26) notes, poor economic policies can be traced to a colonial legacy whereby Africans who stood to gain from decolonisation perpetuated colonial policies which did little if anything to serve the interests of the masses. Poor economic policies generate poverty and misery amongst the masses and in such situations, competition for scarce resources is inevitable; and, if one of the competing groups cannot get their hands on the resources; their disgruntlement might well find expression in dissent and/or even armed resistance leading to political instability. In the face of threats to their hold on power and the benefits associated with such power, the ruling class may well resort to corrupt practices to mobilise the financial resources with which to maintain their hold on power. Unfortunately, in a situation in which in the operating environment in the new global political economy is highly competitive and business will stop at nothing to realise the profit motive and African governments often turn a blind eye to; nurture and/or promote or even encourage corruption, Africa is not likely to get out of the crisis soon. Over the decades, numerous forums have been convened year-in; year-out at various levels to discuss what needs and should be done to reverse such a state of under-development on the continent. Notwithstanding these initiatives and while some progress has been made over the years however, that the crises in Africa rage on unabated is evident up to the present day, in the standards of daily living; in the levels of illiteracy and the less than optimal health, economic and social welfare status of the masses as the following highlights reveal.

### **1.1.1 Economic and social welfare considerations**

In measuring the progress made by Africa in development; in the economic sphere, there is evidence to suggest that in the 1980's; the continent actually regressed rather than make progress. Such evidence is provided in the annual United Nations Human Development Report of the year 2000 in which it is stated (UNDP 2000: 181), that between 1980 and 1990, the continent's per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased from US \$692 to \$614 or a decline of approximately 11 percent. During the same period, the combined average for all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) a category into which Africa falls, the decrease was minimal, from US \$258 to 257 or a decline of approximately 4 percent; in relative terms therefore, Africa lagged behind LDCs as a group, by some 7 percentage points. The dawn of the new millennium saw improvements in Africa (UNDP 2002: 193) whereby in 2000, per capita GDP had risen to (US) \$1,690 or an impressive 175 percent increase on the 1990 figure

however, at that point in time, the combined average for LDCs had risen to US \$1,216; a 373 percent increase on the 1990 figures or more than double the increase posted by Africa.

At the Fifty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly held in 2000, (United Nations 2000), member states adopted a resolution in which they made a commitment to attain a set of eight clearly defined development goals to be realised by the year 2015, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The goals were with respect to the eradication of poverty; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating disease and in particular, HIV/Aids; ensuring environmental sustainability and developing global partnerships for development. Five years into the MDGs in 2005, further strides had been made in Africa and according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2008: 232), per capita GDP had increased to US \$1,998 or an 18 percent increase on the 2000 figures. In relative terms however, the continent still lagged behind for the combined average for LDCs increased to US \$1,499 or a 23 percent increase during the same period. As is evident from the three periods cited above, Africa's performance lagged behind that of LDCs as a group; in addition, it is reported (UNDP 2002: 18) that between the periods 1990 and 1999, China excluded, the recorded reduction in the world's population living on less than (US) \$1a day was from 28.1 to 24.5 percent or a reduction of 3.6 percentage points; in real terms however, the number actually increased by 2 percent from 916 to 936 million. During the period, Africa's contribution to this category of people was the highest at 47.7 in 1990 and 46.7 percent in 1999; while Africa's contribution was the highest during the respective periods; all the same, the 1 percent reduction represents some improvement it can be argued. In real terms however (number of people), there was an increase of nearly 24 percent from 242 to 300 million people in this category. This is a sharp contrast to South Asia, one of the least developed regions in the world where the level of poverty reduction recorded in 1990 and 1999 was 44 and 36.9 respectively or a reduction of 16 percent; and in real terms, a reduction of some 5 million people (from 495 to 490 million) or 1 percent.

In the 1980's and as pressure mounted for African governments to fulfil the promises they had made during the liberation struggle era but which for lack of resources, they could not fulfil; they resorted foreign borrowing from donor governments and multilateral institutions alike; this marked the beginning of Africa's foreign debt crisis. Understandably, relative to comparable regions; African economies were under-performing and this is evident in the United Nations Human Development

Report of 2008 (UNDP 2008: 288) in which it is stated that in 1990 and 2002, imports and exports were 26 and 27 percent of GDP respectively or a negligible positive balance of a mere 1.0 percent. During the same period (UNDP 2004: 201), the ratio of debt servicing expressed as a percentage of GDP was 20.4 and 10.6 percent respectively; quite an achievement it can be argued, especially given that African economies are driven by the export of primary commodities at the same time as the continent had posted a negligible positive balance of 1 percent in the import/export ratio. However, such an achievement could only have been at the expense of some other equally pressing obligations and in particular, the provision of basic services to the people. In 2005 (UNDP 2008: 288) the continent's import/export ratio was recorded 35 and 33 percent respectively or a negative 2 percent; by implication, export earnings could not even cover the cost of the imports let alone generate a surplus with which to service debts; the provision of basic services must have dropped to an even lower level on the priority list.

On Africa sliding into a debt crisis, Schwab (2001:131-132) observes that this can be traced to the practice by many an African government to use borrowed funds to finance unproductive sectors and in particular, over-inflated bureaucracies. He cites the example of Ghana where in 1993, even with a total US \$5.3 billion worth of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) development assistance since independence in 1957 or on average, close to US\$150 million a year, the country failed to promote food security through appropriate measures to raise productivity. During the same period, the manufacturing sector was in a state of decline due to neglect and the only sectors in which growth took place were transportation, wholesale and retail. But then, these subsectors generated little in the way of foreign earnings for recapitalisation into the country's economy; debt servicing and/or a surplus for the provision of basic services for the masses. Such inappropriate use of borrowed funds saw Africa sink deeper and deeper into debt and according to Shah (2005a) whereas in 1970, Africa's debt was just under \$11 billion, by 2002, it was over \$ 295 billion or twenty seven times higher. In a situation in which the level of debt was increasing as alluded to by Shah, Schwab (2001:132) concludes the trend of a reduction in the debt servicing ratio expressed as a percentage of GDP between 1990 and 2002 was not so much a reflection of a reducing level of debt and/or improvements in the economic performance of the continent but rather, a reflection of African governments' limited financial capacity to service foreign debt in the face of competing priorities.

### 1.1.2 Health considerations

It is reported (UNDP: 2008: 264) that between 1970-1975 life expectancy in Africa was 46.0 years increasing to 49.1 years during the period 2000-2005 or an increase of 6.7 percent; the combined averages for LDCs during the two periods were 44.6 and 52.7 years respectively or an increase of 18.2 percent. It is apparent from these figures that during the period under review, whereas Africa's position was better than the combined average of LDCs during the period 1970-1975, the continent lagged behind the LDC group during the period 2000-2005. With respect to infant mortality rates (0-1 years), the report (UNDP: 2008: 264) has it that in 1970, the rates in Africa and the LDCs were reported as 144 and 152 per thousand live births respectively. By 2005, both groups had made some gains with Africa's rate down to 102 or a reduction of 29 percent; the combined average for LDCs was down to 97 or a reduction of 49 percent. At the respective points in time, the same trend is evident in average child mortality rates (0-5years) which in Africa were 244 and 172 per 1000 live births or a reduction of 29 percent while the combined average rates for the LDCs were 245 and 153 or a reduction of 37 percent. Yet again, whereas Africa's position was slightly better in 1970 by the year 2005, the gains made by the continent were far below the combined average for LDCs. With respect to the closely related health indicator, maternal mortality rate; in 1990 (UNDP 1999a: 171), the rate in Africa was 1041 per 100,000 births while the figure for LDCs stood at 979. Ten years later in the year 2000, (United Nations 2005: 23), Africa posted a figure of 920 or a reduction of 11 percent while the combined average for the LDCs was 450 or a reduction of 54 percent. Another important health indicator is access to improved sanitation and water sources; between 1990 and 2004 (UNDP: 2008: 254), the number of people with sustainable access to improved sanitation in Africa was 32 and 37 percent respectively or an increase of 15.6 percent; the combined average for the LDCs was 22 and 37 percent respectively or an increase of 68.2 percent. With respect access to improved water sources, in Africa, the figures stood at 48 and 56 percent or an increase of 16.7 percent while the figures for LDCs were 51 and 59 percent respectively or an increase of 15.7 percent. In many respects in the sphere of health; Africa was ahead of the LDCs combined at specific points in time; over time however, the continent lagged behind and while with respect to access to safe water, in relative terms, Africa did not lag behind the LDCs in 2004 however, it can be argued that a one percentage point difference is negligible.

Discussion on health would be incomplete without making reference to the HIV/AIDS scourge. Official statistics prior to the year 2000 are either not available or if they are, they are unreliable since

hitherto, African governments played down the prevalence of the disease in a bid to protect their tourist industries. However, for the years 2001 and 2003, UNAIDS (2004: 190) reported that the number of people infected with the virus the world over was 34.9 and 37 million respectively; of these people, a staggering 23.8 and 25 million respectively, were in Africa. Africa's contribution to the scourge during both years thus remained constant at approximately 68 percent of the global total. In addition, the report's estimate of the global total of children (0-14years) living with the virus (UNAIDS 2004: 192) was 2 and 2.1 million in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Of these numbers, 1.8 and 1.9 million respectively, were in Africa or a constant 90 percent of the global total of this category during the two periods. The phenomenon has been explained as a reflection of lack of access to health services and treatment since the prevalence of the disease amongst children is a result of *in-utero* transmission by infected expectant mothers; they subsequently deliver babies which are already infected by the virus. Lack of access to health facilities and services is hardly surprising for it is reported (UNDP 2002: 169) that during the period 1990-9, Africa was the only region amongst the LDCs with countries in which per capita expenditure on health was only \$5 if not less. In addition, the continent was in 1998, the only region with countries in which the number of physicians per 100,000 population was five or less.

According to Dixon, McDonald and Roberts (2002: 232) HIV/AIDS prevalence and mortality rates in Africa are highest amongst the economically productive age; he cites the example of South Africa for which mining is one of the largest industries and for which it is estimated that around 60 percent of the workforce is aged between 30 and 44 years; the very age group in which prevalence rates are highest. Elsewhere on the continent, if it is assumed that the largest industry whatever it may be; employs a comparable proportion of the 30 and 44 years group, this points to a situation in which even if the political environment had been conducive to productivity and economic growth, the human capital deficit created by the scourge is a gap that Africa would still have found difficult to fill. In the past two or so decades, HIV/AIDS has been a major contributor to Africa's record of high mortality rates and this has given rise to yet another social welfare dilemma, that of Aids orphans. As at the end of 2003, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA 2004: 7) estimated the number of Aids orphans at 43.4 million with the number expected to increase to 50 million by 2010. Furthermore, the orphan crisis had resulted in changes in the composition of households whereby the phenomenon "child-headed households" and/or households in which grandparents assumed guardianship of their orphaned grandchildren had become the order of the day in some communities. In rural settings in Africa, the elderly are a category of people who are neither in gainful employment nor have a pension

to live on; under the circumstances and for lack of means, the orphaned grandchildren under their care are often forced to drop out of school at an early age. Such grandparents-reared orphans ultimately get caught up in a “poverty trap” for with little or no education and/or skills, their chances of getting a job in a shrunken and already saturated job market are slim; many end up as street children and later in life, street people.

### **1.1.3 Education and literacy level considerations**

In 1960, Africa’s population was estimated at 240 million (UNDP 1995: 187) and notwithstanding such a population size, Meredith (1985: 306-7) observes at the dawn of independence, only a few countries could boast of a university enrolment of more than two hundred students in any given year. Such a situation was inevitable for in Kenya for example, Eshiwani (1990: 1-2) notes that before independence, the educational system for Africans had been designed primarily to meet the needs of the colonial power and in particular, to ensure that the colonies would be self sufficient in financing their own development and not become a burden on the Imperial Treasury. The colonial system of education was thus narrow in scope since the primary objective was to produce a labour force capable of taking instructions for maximum productivity and efficiency on the farms. In 1963, (Eshwani 1990: 3) independence ushered in a new era that changed the occupational roles of Africans in so far as they had to assume responsibility for the management of their sovereign states. Such a development of necessity meant that newly independent Kenya had to have the human capital with the pre-requisite and "appropriate" education; in the right quantities and of a quality that adequately prepared Kenyans for the new roles they were to play in running their own affairs.

With respect to quantity, Timberlake (1988: 4) notes that during the period 1960-1980, school enrolment grew faster in Africa than in any other developing region; however, maintaining and/or making improvements in the quality of education proved difficult and a trend that soon emerged was one of lowering standards in order to get as many students as possible to attain tertiary education. According to Nieuwenhuis (1996: 22), another factor compromising the quality of education was that for lack of resources, ministries of education could not meet the increased demand for trained teachers to make for an optimal teacher-pupil ratio. Faced with such a situation, they resorted to appointing untrained or less qualified teachers to ease the pressure exerted by large classes on the teaching corps. The consequent lowering of educational standards (Timberlake 1988: 4) was that African students aspiring to enrol at universities abroad had to undergo a bridging course and/or sit qualifying

examinations so they can be at the same pre-university level as their local counterparts. In turn, what this meant was that African governments sponsoring their nationals in universities abroad had to keep them there longer implying higher costs which they could ill afford at a time that their economies were not doing so well as illustrated earlier. For those who did not make it to universities abroad; local colleges and universities turned out to be “...mass production institutions...” producing hundreds of graduates but who after graduation, were idle for months or even years because of a lack of employment opportunities.

The trend of pupil enrolment “en masse” continued unabated for two decades however, in time and restricted by increasingly dwindling resources, the pace slowed down and according to a United Nations Development Programme report (UNDP 2002: 180), during the period 1985-7 and 1995-7, the majority of LDCs spending less than 5 percent of their Gross National Product (GNP) on education were in Africa. Furthermore (UNDP 2002: 152), at the dawn of the new millennium in the year 2000, the combined gross enrolment for primary, secondary and tertiary schools in Africa was only 42 percent of the total population of school going age groups while adult literacy levels stood at 61.5 percent. In the context of Africa, there is a positive correlation between the level of education and employment prospects; income and personal/household wellbeing of which food security is an important dimension. Likewise, there is a positive correlation between literacy levels and optimal health (through a better understanding of the cause and effect of disease); in a situation in which the performance of the educational sector was less than optimal, the less than optimal socioeconomic welfare and health status of the majority of Africa’s peoples was inevitable.

#### **1.1.4 Security considerations**

It is reported (UNDP 2002: 17) that during the period 1990 – 1999, Africa had the highest number of war casualties, some 1.5 million out of a global total of 3.0 million or 50 percent; this in the main was a result of the fact that during the period, no less than twelve countries or 25 percent of the countries making up the continent were at war. Scwab (2001) gives a catalogue of both civil and cross border wars that have been witnessed on the continent during the past three decades or so; in West Africa (Swab 2001: 36-38), he cites the example of Sierra Leone where a civil war raged from 1991 to 1999 and in the process, millions of people lost their lives while hundreds of thousand lost their limbs. In Central Africa, Scwab (2001: 56-58) notes that the civil war which ended the rule of Mobutu started as a low key obscure guerrilla movement offensive thirty years earlier in then Zaire; in time however, it

developed into a full blown war in 1996. Furthermore, while the objective of the war namely, to depose Mobutu was realised in a mere seven months; the ensuing internal power struggles turned the conflict into a regional war as Zimbabwe and Angola on the one hand and on the other hand, Rwanda and Uganda were drawn into the conflict in support of opposing sides. In the Horn of Africa, (Scwab 2001: 73) a civil war which broke out in Somalia in 1991 continues unabated to the present day with the sad result that the country cannot be classified as a sovereign state; under the circumstances and by United Nations definition, citizens of Somalia have been “stateless” since then. Finally, in Southern Africa (Scwab 2001: 84-86) and while during their struggle for independence, the three major ethnic groups in Angola had fought a common enemy, the Portuguese; at independence in 1975 the groups turned on each other in a civil war that was to last until 2002. There were many other wars on the continent during the period it suffices to mention only the long drawn ones.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2002: Annex 5), during the periods 1992 and 2001, Africa is on record as having generated approximately 5.6 and 3.6 million refugees respectively or 31 and 30 percent of world total which then stood at 17.8 and 12 million. Conflicts not only generate asylum seekers and refugees but also internally displaced people (IDPs) within the country at war. With respect to IDPs, the agency (UNHCR 2002: Table 13) also reported that in 2006, the agency assisted a global total of 10,285,400 of this category and of this number, 4,333,400 or 42 percent was generated by the five top IDP producing countries in Africa at the time namely, Democratic Republic of Congo; Liberia; Somalia; Sudan and Uganda. According to Harsch (2003), war situations, be they civil or cross border, take the countries at war backwards in terms of development because first of all, they result in the destruction of infrastructure and human capital to varying degrees. Secondly, in such situations, expenditure on defence becomes the top priority and inevitably; resources are diverted from productive sectors and the provision of basic services to financing the war effort. Thirdly, the negative effects of conflict are not necessarily confined to the countries at war but often spill over into neighbouring countries, even those at peace. In substantiating the views on the impact of conflict on neighbouring countries, Harsch cites the example of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire which in 2002 which paralysed the 1,200 kilometre railway line linking neighbouring Burkina Faso's capital Ouagadougou to the Ivorian port city of Abidjan and further afield, Mali and Niger (through Burkina Faso). In a situation in which the “umbilical cord” of their trade was severed, the economies of these neighbouring countries were as it were; exsanguinated of their life blood; they all collapsed. Thus, the impact of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire went beyond the borders of the country



in conflict to paralysing the economies of neighbouring countries; Burkina Faso and further afield, Mali and Niger.

The negative effects of conflict on both the country in conflict and those neighbouring it also often go beyond economic development considerations as well as beyond the immediate and short term periods. The protection of and providing for the welfare of IDPs is the mandate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) while with respect to refugees, it is the mandate of UNHCR. All the same, while countries hosting these categories of displaced populations are spared of the burden of protecting them and providing for their welfare however, there are profound hidden long term costs for these countries. The hidden costs are in terms of the degree of pressure on land carrying capacity generated by mass population movements and the impact of such pressure on the environment. An example of such phenomenon is given by Kanyamibwa (2007: 7) in a study he conducted for the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). The study established that in the Great Lakes region, in countries that had experienced protracted conflict situations namely; Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda; the impact of refugees and IDPs on the environment had been significant. This he noted, could be traced to the fact that with limited space for small gardening activities to supplement their World Food Programme (WFP) food rations, they dug and planted vegetables and crops everywhere, on river banks and steep slopes. Limitations in space also extended to the welfare of their domestic animals and over-grazing in catchment areas became the order of the day; a combination of these factors resulted in soil erosion on a large scale. He concluded that natural disasters such as drought and floods experienced by several countries in the region were probably linked to climate changes induced by environmental degradation. In turn, the environmental degradation could be directly linked to pressure on land carrying capacity generated by high concentrations of displaced populations at various points in time. The researcher concurs for in her experience in field work, environmental degradation is a distinguishing feature of the environs around IDP and refugee camps; it is easy even for a first time visitor to a refugee or IDP camp to accurately guess that they are approaching the camp; the degree of deforestation tells it all. Needless to say, such an impact on the environment has long lasting consequences for food security for both IDP and refugee hosting countries.

### **1.1.5 Food Security consideration**

According to McCarthy (1986: 58), as far back as 1981, the word "crisis" was already being used in connection with Africa and the starkest evidence of the continent's creeping economic paralysis was the increasing need for food aid. McCarthy's observations are supported in a report by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO 2005a: 27) in which it is stated that by mid 1984, the agency had identified twenty-four countries or half of the continent as seriously affected by food insecurity and in need of food aid. At that point in time, the estimated combined population of the twenty four countries was estimated at 150 million and of this population, approximately 30-35 million or 20 percent were considered at risk. The report also states that during the period 1970-1980, the average annual growth rate of total agricultural production in Africa was 1.1 percent increasing to 1.7 percent during the period 2000-2003. However in both relative and real terms, the continent was lagging behind for during both periods, the combined average growth rate for all developing countries was 2.8 and 3.1 percent respectively. The above figures suggest that in relative terms, Africa's rate of growth in agricultural productivity was 54 percent between the two periods while that for all developing countries, the increase was 10.7 percent; in other words, Africa performed better than all developing countries combined during the period.

The relative growth in agricultural production however did not translate into improved food security and this is evident in a report by FAO (2005a: 67) in which it is stated that a total of 1.5 million metric tonnes of food aid were disbursed to Africa between 1970-1980 with the quantity increasing to 3.5 million metric tonnes in 2003 or an increase of 133 percent. For all the developing countries, the combined average of food aid disbursed was 10,214 million metric tonnes during the period 1970-1980 and 8,773 million in 2003 or a decrease of 14 percent. The figures suggest that of the total food aid disbursed to all the developing countries during the period 1970-1980, approximately 15 percent was disbursed to Africa; the percentage more than doubled in 2003 approximately 40 percent. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1999a: 214) the trend in which the need for food aid in Africa was increasing is evident in the fact that in 1994/5, approximately 2.5 million metric tonnes or 40 percent of the total food aid disbursed to developing countries went to Africa. This speaks volumes for in 1995, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1998: 177) estimated Africa's population at 555.7 million while the combined total of developing countries at 4,394 million; what this means is that while constituting only 11 percent of the total population of developing

countries, Africa consumed close to half of the food aid disbursed to all developing countries combined.

The backbone of many an African country's economy is agriculture and a study conducted in 1998 by Bishop-Sambrook (2005: 4) revealed that the contribution of agriculture to GDP in Ethiopia, Malawi and Nigeria was 50, 36 and 32 percent respectively. The significant contribution of agriculture to African economies is supported in a report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA 2009a: 12) in which it is stated that African economies remain heavily dependent on agriculture for employment generation; aggregate output; foreign exchange earnings and tax revenue. At the same time however, it is noted in the report that in Africa, the agricultural sector in Africa suffers from under-capitalization; this is reflected in the low levels of irrigation (6 per cent of arable land compared to 40 per cent in Asia), inadequate land management, limited technology and limited access to credit and insurance schemes for farmers. In addition, poor roads; marketing infrastructure and poorly funded agriculture-related institutions of higher education, research and extension services limits the extent to which the potential for maximising productivity can be fully exploited . The combined effect of these factors is that in Africa, agriculture is characterized by weak linkages with other sectors including agro-processing and agribusiness and remains a relatively low priority area in public spending; in most countries, the sector receives less than 6 per cent of annual budgetary allocations, well below the objective of 10 per cent agreed by African leaders in Maputo in 2003.

According to UNECA (2009a: 118) a combination of the factors cited above has resulted in a situation in which African agriculture remains largely traditional and is dominated by rural peasant farmers, smallholders and pastoralists; in addition; in addition, it remains heavily dependent on rain-fed crops. Depending on a critical input (rain) but for which farmers have little control, yields are often low and farmers can be trapped in a cycle of poverty and food insecurity for decades. There is evidence in support of these observations in an evaluation report of the US government response to the drought in Zimbabwe during the period 1991/3 in which Callihan, Eriksen & Hemck (1994; Annex D) note that at the household level, the level of decline in food production resulted in some 4.6 million or 43 percent of the population depending on food aid for survival. Understandably, poor rains in any given agricultural season mean that farmers cannot produce enough food for their own consumption let alone have a surplus to convert into cash with which to buy food and/or other basic necessities of daily living. According to a United Nations Development Programme report (UNDP/UNISDR 2005: 7), the

impact of climatic variability and/or a drought is generally higher in relatively simple and predominantly agricultural economies whereas in more complex and diversified economies, it is better absorbed. At the macro-economic level, such an impact is indirect and takes the form of knock-on effects on industries which add value to production and the export of weather-dependent products. To illustrate the knock-on effects, the report cites the example of Zimbabwe where during the drought in 1991/1993; the country recorded a 45 percent drop in agricultural production resulted in a 9 percent drop in manufacturing output; an 11 percent drop in GDP and a 62 percent decline in the value of the stock market. A similar situation was witnessed in Kenya during the drought of 1999-2001 where the cost to the economy was some \$2.5 billion, a significant loss which can best be thought of as 2.5 billion dollars of foregone development in terms for example, of hospitals and schools not built.

Less than optimal agricultural productivity, the backbone of many an African economy further compounds the problems of governments already struggling to meet the basic daily needs of their people and for the rural household for which agricultural productivity is the one and only source of livelihood, it becomes a vicious circle whose implications go beyond nutritional considerations. Thus, with little or no “safety nets” on offer from the government, a normal coping mechanism for households is doing away with perceived “non-necessities”; for rural households, high on the list of “non necessities” is often the children’s education. Such a fate for children in drought stricken and food insecure communities is captured in a report by World Health Organisation on Mozambique (WHO 2002: 15) where during a drought in 2002/3, the agency expected higher levels of pupil absenteeism and a reduction in the levels of enrolment (drop outs) in the school year starting January 2003. In addition to simply lack of school fees, high absenteeism and school drop-out rates are often linked to the increased need by households for their children to contribute to family labour; searching for food and fetching water or caring for other family members; younger siblings and the elderly while parents go out in search of food. In a study conducted in the Somali region of Ethiopia on the impact of the 2006/7 drought, such a phenomenon was confirmed by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF 2006); in one of the households studied, as the family’s small herd of sheep and goats started to die and the family’s income and basic food supply increasingly decreased, the parents sacrificed the education of their only daughter and had her working as a housemaid to supplement family income.

In a drought situation and by implication, crop failure, the question of raising school fees in communities for which agricultural production is the main livelihood does not even arise. This was

evident during the drought of 2002-2003 in Southern Africa where UNICEF reported (IRIN 2002) that the more than 10 percent school drop-out rate recorded could be attributed to the fact that families were forced to use school fees to meet the drought-induced rising costs of staple foods. In addition, even for those children whose parents did not sacrifice school fees for household food security, absenteeism was high for the children were too weak from hunger to make the often long walk to school. Such a positive correlation between the severity of a drought and school absenteeism was evident in the Ukambani region of Kenya (Eastern Province) during the drought of 1999. According to the Machakos District (Eastern Province) annual report of 2000 (Government of Kenya 2000: 33), the rate of absenteeism from school and mosque related extracurricular activities was so high that the local branch of the Kenya Balal Moslem Mission lodged a formal complaint with the District authorities. The Mission's concern was that parents were being forced to send their children to "dangerous" urban environments in search of low paying jobs to supplement family income. Although not so scientifically done; all the same, the records on school attendance trends kept by the Mission and schools in general were later adopted as an indicator for measuring the impact of a drought in rural communities in the Eastern Province as a whole. During a subsequent drought in 2006 in Kenya and taking into account the possible impact of the drought on school enrolment and attendance, the Daily Nation (2005) reported that the government had made a decision to waive school fees in the worst affected arid north and north eastern parts of the country. In addition, the government also introduced supplementary school feeding programmes as an incentive for parents to continue to send their children to school as well as to ensure that the children would have the level of energy necessary for them to concentrate in class and thus get maximum utility out of attending classes.

According to FAO (2005b: 14), education has long been acclaimed as one of the most powerful engines for reducing hunger and poverty; lack of education thus undermines productivity, employability and earning capacity resulting in the perpetuation of hunger and poverty. FAO further notes that research shows that investments in education have resulted in higher returns than investments in physical capital and that in the rural areas where the vast majority of the world's hungry people live, a farmer with four years of primary education was on average, almost 9 percent more productive than a farmer with no education. Indeed a phenomenon such as drought compromises productivity in predominantly agricultural communities and the implications go beyond nutritional considerations and/or the present; thus, when schooling is disrupted if not altogether abandoned in early childhood, the end result is low literacy levels within whole communities. In turn, lack of

education and low literacy levels limits productivity in later life in terms of employability and earning capacity. The implication of such a situation is that the next generation cannot afford to send their own children to school and there emerges a pattern of “inherited poverty” spanning across generations. The situation of the rural poor is further compounded by high population growth rates and according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2002: 165); between the period 1975-2000, the region’s population doubled from 303 to 606 million; it was expected to grow to 866 million or an increase of 42% by 2015. With an estimated average of 80 percent of Africa’s population living in rural areas coupled with low literacy levels and a corresponding lack of understanding of the demerits of poor child spacing practices, it can safely be assumed that the contribution of this group to such high population growth rates was and will continue to be substantial. Thus, even if weather patterns had remained stable over the years and there had been no episodes of drought, in time, individual household food production levels would have witnessed a decrease anyway; not least, because of a reduction in land carrying capacity due to high rates of population growth.

Being generally poorer than their urban counterparts, why do rural folk have large families in a situation in which they can ill afford to adequately provide for them, one is inclined to ask? Hetch (1995: 403) argues that family size reflects a rational response to a concrete economic situation adding that the cost-benefit ratio of extra children is high for poor families in poor societies or those societies in which resources are extremely unequally distributed. The rationale for large families the argument continues; is that large families are a sort of compensatory mechanism for children are expected to and do contribute economically to the household resource base; in agricultural activities and/or in the informal economy from a very early age and they continue to do so throughout their lives. As such, (Hetch 1995: 404) manpower considerations are a driving force behind large families; she however cautions that the consequent high population growth rates mean a reduction in available resources for the sustenance of any given community. Hecht refers to the phenomenon as the "Tragedy of the Commons" in which in the face of an increasingly decreasing common resource, each actor in the community seeks to maximise his individual utility. In the process, increased exploitation is the only way to increase benefits but unfortunately, the cost in terms of environmental degradation is not borne by the actor alone but by all users, even whole communities. She concludes her argument by pointing out that regardless of the theories put forward to explain the deteriorating food security situation in the Third World; the equation is not complete when specific regional histories, economic and social dynamics are ignored.

It is apparent that food security issues cannot be addressed in isolation for as Hetch argues, many factors influence the form and impact of environmental and food security issues; this suggests that in addressing food security issues, there is a need to look beyond simply ensuring that people have enough to eat for the day, week or month. This is important for humanitarian actors and especially for NGOs for in drought-induced food security crises, the preoccupation with life saving interventions may crowd out longer term strategies for reducing the vulnerability within communities by amongst other things, increasing community resilience against future droughts. Such a long term perspective and holistic approach is no longer a matter of choice if humanitarian actors are to realise their cherished goal of engaging grassroots communities in activities that lead to sustainable development. Changes in the ozone layer and global warming are phenomena which have been cited as major contributory factors to climatic change and its consequences on the predominantly agricultural economies in Africa; poor communities have limited if any control over such global phenomena. However, preserving land carrying capacity by amongst other things, making a contribution to environmental conservation; adapting agricultural practices to changing weather patterns and having the number of children that they can afford to provide for; are dimension of daily living which communities have the potential to control. To this effect, the promotion thereof should be part of a comprehensive mitigation package by humanitarian actors in their design of post drought “recovery through to development” interventions (activities designed to rebuild communities’ resilience against a future drought). The study seeks to examine the extent to which post drought recovery through to development interventions by humanitarian actors supported communities to take charge of those factors for which they have the potential to control; to promote their own food security and if not, to examine the underlying causes to such an outcome.

## **1.2 The “Third Sector” Non Governmental Organisations**

### **1.2.1 Non Governmental Organisations**

According to Matenga (2001) Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been operating in Africa since the 1940’s however, it is since the 1980s that their role as development players offering an alternative approach to poverty alleviation and long-term sustainable development in poor communities in developing countries, gained prominence. Thus as African governments increasingly found it difficult to provide an optimal level of basic services for their people and the pressure on their meagre resources mounted due to amongst other things, the burden of foreign debt, they exploited the good will and humanitarian spirit that is the defining philosophy of NGOs. NGOs were thus welcomed

as short term "gap fillers" however, as the scope and nature of the problems widened, it became apparent that they would be in for a "long haul". A long haul it turned out to be indeed for more than half a century on and in the face of an increasingly deteriorating socioeconomic and political environment coupled with the poverty and misery generated in the process, the sector did not have to worry about "business opportunities" and/or "secure markets"! A combination of these "market conditions" have seen the sector grow and according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2002: 102), from a humble beginning way back in 1839 when the first NGO (the Anti-Slavery Society) was registered in the United States, the number of NGOs has since grown phenomenally. The most notable period of such growth was between the years 1914 and 2000 whereby in Europe and North America for example, their number grew from 1083 to 37,000 with a fifth of the NGOs in existence and operating internationally by the year 2000 having been established after 1990.

Scholars at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI 1995: 1) attribute such a growth rate to a trend that emerged in the 1950's and 1960's in which hitherto, the relationship between NGOs and institutional donors had been one of each camp pursuing its own agenda with little interest in each other's activities and on occasions, the two camps were even suspicious of the other's motives. In time however, attitudes changed and according to the scholars (ODI 1995: 3), such a change in attitudes saw an increase in donor confidence in NGOs and a corresponding increase in the level of resources channelled through the sector. In addition and whereas hitherto, support had been mainly for relief operations, donors increasingly perceived support for NGO development interventions as a natural progression. Such new thinking in the donor community was welcomed by NGOs because for a long time hitherto; NGOs had been arguing that relief operations which are not followed up by "recovery through to development" interventions were tantamount to "fire fighting" exercises. A study carried out by Campanaro, Hepburn, Kowalska & Wang (2002: 14-15) revealed that to this effect, some NGOs had been making impressive strides in so far as they had been adapting relief programmes to incorporate development activities while others had gone further in such adaptation resulting in the emergence of the *contiguum* approach. The *contiguum* approach is more holistic in so far as relief, recovery and development phases of an intervention are viewed as overlapping as opposed to being viewed as a *continuum* in which one phase must take place before the next. While this was expected to set the stage for a new approach to relief interventions (Campanaro et al. 2002: 24) for which the objective was to irreversibly increase community resilience against threats and hazards in their environment; this however did not happen. This development, the scholars note; can be traced to administrative



arrangements in the donor community in which relief and development departments existed and operated as separate and independent entities with little if any operational relationship between them. Such arrangements meant that often, technocrats in development departments were not well versed in relief issues and vice versa. In turn, such administration arrangements meant that it was difficult for NGOs to design, mobilise funds and implement recovery through to development interventions as a complete package. Under the circumstances, the planning of interventions continued to be fragmented; worse still, whereas a relief operation might have been well funded; on approaching development departments for post relief interventions, NGOs would be informed there are no funds for the purpose. In such a situation, NGOs would be forced to leave communities until the next disaster as such; their interventions continued to assume the form of “fire-fighting exercises”; understandably, with no interventions to reduce the vulnerability of communities to hazards in their environment, NGOs would be back in the communities when the next disaster struck.

### **1.2.2 The Third Sector - a “thriving industry”**

Notwithstanding some of these contradictions in funding arrangements, the donor community continued to court and increase their engagement of NGOs as development aid partners (UNDP 2002: 102); such a trend is evident between 1970-1990, a period during which the level of donor funding channelled through international NGOs by both institutional and private donors to developing countries increased seven-fold from USD 1.0 to 7.2 billion. During the same period (UNDP 2002: 204-6), their governments' contribution to their international work rose from 20 to 36 percent; furthermore, in 1990 and 2000, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) disbursed some \$15,658 and \$11,791 million (respectively) worth of Official Development Assistance (ODA) through NGOs. This represented approximately 3.0 percent of the total of \$469 and \$353 million disbursed in Africa by the organization during the respective years. At the individual donor country level, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI 1995: 2) reported that in the ten year period up to 1993/4, the United Kingdom increased its official funding of NGOs by almost 300 per percent from approximately £17.0 to £68.6 million. During the same period, Australia increased its ODA through NGOs from (Australian Dollars) \$20 to \$71 million or an increase from 1 to 6 percent; comparable expansions occurred in Finland, Norway and Sweden from the 1980's through to the early 1990's. Over and above such ODA funding through NGOs, another trend witnessed was the co-option of NGOs by donors as partners in the implementation of what are primarily the donors' own projects. In such “delegated project” arrangements, a donor surrenders all the funds earmarked for projects in a specified country to

an NGO on a “sub-contractual” basis. Country studies conducted by ODI indicate that in countries with a large and growing NGO presence, 5 percent if not more of bilateral aid funds were disbursed through such sub-contractual arrangements.

As is evident from the above, the amount of resources mobilised and invested by NGOs in the quest to improve the situation of the poor and disadvantaged is of a level that many an African government has never been able to achieve in any given comparative period. Smillie (1995: 1) however argues that just like in the global political economy, more resources flow back to the NGOs’ home countries than do to the recipient countries and communities served. He cites an example of the United States where in the mid 90s, in the process of disbursing a staggering combined income of \$400 billion in overseas aid, NGOs indirectly created 1.4 million jobs back home and directly, they created eight million jobs. This figure he argues; was higher than the estimated combined workforce of the Central and all Federal State governments during the period. In Canada, Smillie (1995: 1) notes that in 1993, the combined income of registered Canadian charities estimated at a staggering \$62 billion benefited the country's economy in so far as over half of the amount was paid out in salaries and benefits to some 1.3 million people or 9 percent of the country's entire labour force at that point in time. Such a record of “industry” growth rate, income level and level of employment creation over the years is still but only a dream for many an African government and points to a sector which at the time was thriving; to date, it continues to thrive. This is supported by Chege (1999: 1) who notes that a major shift in the funding of development in Africa, already under way for several years; was accelerating; Chege made these observations following an announcement by the United States embassy in Kenya at the time; that the US government would be channelling most of its development aid for Africa, estimated at some \$711.3 million through NGOs, rather than governments. At about the same time, the Dutch embassy in Kenya followed suit and announced that the Dutch government which spent \$835 million in development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa in 1996-97, would be decreasing direct aid to governments and give more to NGOs.

### **1.2.3 “NGOs - Achievers or Deceivers?”**

Such was the title of a weekly British Broadcasting Corporation World Service live chat programme (BBC World Service: 2005) during which listeners from around the world phoned-in their views and opinions. An interesting comment made by a listener in South Africa was “...by its very nature, an NGO should eventually become extinct after its work is done; but who wants to lose their job...?” The

sentiments are echoed by Abdul-Raheem (2000) who argues that while some NGOs are involved in the charity business out of a moral and/or political commitment, there are many who are doing it only for career purposes adding that “...if one is a disaster manager, what will they do if there are no more disasters...”? He further argues that this was particularly true at a time when more and more NGO money was going into emergency operations rather than long term development work; he warned of the potential danger of emergencies being converted into permanent situations. In support of these assertions, Abdul-Raheem (2001) cites the example of Ngara hitherto, a little known small town in north western Tanzania but which as a result of the influx of refugees escaping the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda in 1994, became the second-biggest human settlement after the state capital, Dar-es-Salaam. He further observes that in time, Ngara was totally controlled not by the government but by NGOs adding that suggestions by the government of Tanzania that long-term development work in Rwanda itself would actually persuade the refugees to go home were met with excuses. Amongst the excuses was that it was not their mandate; Abdul-Raheem concludes his observations and his arguments by alleging that for fear of losing their jobs and influence, many of the NGOs did not want the camps to be closed.

Such sentiments bordering on allegations of a desire by NGOs for a permanent presence in communities are unfair it can be argued; however, Tandon (1995) argues that such allegations can be traced to the way some NGOs portray themselves. In turn, such portrayal can be traced to a self perception of some NGOs as purely functional regardless of the sphere in which they are engaged; welfare, development or refugee work. Perceiving themselves as purely functional, such NGOs focus on mere palliative interventions to reduce the effects of increasingly deteriorating social and economic conditions; as such, while they do good work in these fields, unwittingly, they perpetuate the very conditions that they seek to alleviate. He further argues that there are very few NGOs that might be considered as “thinking” NGOs which he defines as those NGOs that regularly and systematically evaluate what they are doing and how this influences or is influenced by issues related to state, society and development in the context of the broader global political economy. Tandon concludes that this one reason that they have come under fire for failure to “deliver” on their sustainable development agenda.

Shivji (2006: 13) gives another perspective to the seemingly failure of NGOs to deliver and argues that while some NGOs may be appreciated by the people whom they purport to serve, ultimately NGOs derive not only their sustenance but also their legitimacy from the donor community. Thus, while many

NGOs are set up by morally motivated individuals with a genuine desire to “do something” to respond to the needs of the poor, it is also true that a substantial number of NGOs are set up to respond to what is perceived to be in vogue within the donor-community at any particular time. Tandon (1995) concurs and observes that with NGOs increasingly commissioned by donors; the state or even the corporate sector to do consultancy work for them or to be their implementing agencies for the delivery of services; prioritising what is in vogue with the donor-community was inevitable. In defence of his views, he argues that it is ironic that a non-governmental body is assigned by a government to do a governmental job funded by a donor agency which is an outfit of the government!

According to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI 1996: 1-2) as donors increased their funding for NGO development work and the level of such funding began to account for a significant part of the overall aid programme, the former increased their demands for NGOs to demonstrate what the funds were achieving on the ground in terms of both the quantity and quality of interventions. On quantitative criteria, the performance of projects would be judged against the specific objectives for which the funds were provided for example, if the project involved the construction of a water point, donors wanted to see physical evidence that one had been constructed. On qualitative criteria, a wider set of standards were used to assess the impact of the projects in terms of the extent to which the quality of life amongst the beneficiaries had changed for the better. INTRAC (2001: 1) quotes one Blankenberg as defining impact in terms of long-term and sustainable changes introduced by a given intervention in the lives of beneficiaries. The changes can be anticipated in line with specific objectives or unanticipated; unanticipated changes can extend to people not belonging to the primary beneficiary group. The impact of NGO intervention is increasingly the subject of scrutiny and scepticism and as implied by Shivji (2006: 13), this problem for NGOs can be traced to the irresistible temptation to respond to what is perceived to be in vogue within the donor-community at any particular time and not necessarily by the needs on the ground. This view is supported by Nunnenkamp (2008: 1) who observed that NGOs from donor countries taken together have a strong tendency to replicate the aid allocation of their governments or “back donors”. As such, with independent decision-making limited, NGOs that depend on government funds have little choice but to pursue those activities which are popular with donors. Such activities may not necessarily address the most pressing or the felt needs of the communities served as such; the activities will have little if any impact at all; worse still, they may even have an unintended negative impact for example, they might induce dependency.

It is evident from the foregoing that the power relationships between NGOs and their donors is skewed in favour of the latter and this can be traced to different and in some cases, even conflicting interests; this presents a challenge for NGOs for first of all, it means that their interventions are limited to what donors are interested in funding at that given point in time. Secondly, if NGOs must continue to access donor funding, then of necessity they must observe and strictly adhere to the conditions laid down by donors on what the funds can or cannot be used for; these conditions may well be in conflict with NGOs principles and values. Besides, compliance with donor conditions especially when they are in conflict with what and/or how the host government and the communities served would prefer to see interventions implemented is what has often led to allegations that NGOs are agents or even spies of their home governments and not advocates for the poor. Such a view which is implied by Abdul-Raheem (2000) when he alleges that some of the most powerful foreign NGOs behave like civilian branches of their home governments who give them a lot of money. Such volumes of money at their disposal he further alleges, is evident in their extravagant lifestyles; he cites the nineties of which he says that foreign NGOs were easily identifiable by the latest models of four wheel drive vehicles they went around in; vehicles which earned them the nickname “4 x 4’s” and/or “development tourists”! As if the scepticism and ridicule in the host countries was not enough, back home Smillie (1995: 39) observed that often, NGOs were sarcastically described as latter day imperialists, exploiters and their staff as “...smiling faces going places...” More than ten years on, the description of NGOs by sceptics was even harsher “...deceivers...”!

On the increasing level of resources which flow through NGOs from their home governments, McGann and Johnstone (2006: 6) share the sentiments expressed by Abdul-Raheem and caution that such a level of resources presents problems for NGOs. The problems, the scholars explain; can be traced to the fact that such a level of resources raises questions about the credibility of NGOs for if the greater part of their funding comes from foreign donors, the possibility that donors are dictating their goals cannot be ruled out. Besides, large amounts of funding coupled with conditions donors impose on the funding renders NGOs susceptible to manipulation and thus the tendency to behave like extensions of their home governments. The same concerns are echoed by Edwards and Hulme (1998:8) who argue that while official funding encourages NGOs to become providers of social and economic services on a much larger scale than hitherto, it compromises their performance especially in other areas of development activities such as institutional development and advocacy. In addition, it weakens the legitimacy of NGOs as independent actors in society and distorts their accountability away from

their grassroots and internal constituencies to overemphasis on short-term quantitative outputs as demanded by donors. Besides, while their intentions are noble as articulated in their mission statements in which the notion “reducing vulnerability”, “poverty-reduction” and “sustainable development” feature prominently, Shivji (2006: 13) argues that NGOs face many constraints in their efforts to live out these notions. Amongst such constraints are first of all, NGOs are limited in decision making powers on what they can do where and when; these decisions lie with the donors who provide the funding for their work. Secondly, in a situation in which increasingly, donors are using criteria borrowed from the corporate sector for measuring the performance and success of NGOs, the notions are quickly forgotten and preoccupation with strategic plans and log frames becomes the priority. Thus, donors even dictate the “how” NGOs will work and in the process, the latter spend disproportionate amounts of time tabulating and quantifying outputs and consolidating them into reports which are often a non-negotiable pre-requisite for more funding.

Impact or to be precise, lack of it is where NGOs have come under fire for if the definition of impact given earlier is an acceptable working definition, then the scepticism about the impact of NGO interventions is not unfounded. This premise is based on the fact that simplified, the criterion for measuring the success of NGO interventions (impact) translates into the degree and speed with which an NGO successfully “works itself out of a job” in any given community. The validity of such a simplified criterion it can be argued, lies in the fact that “working oneself out of a job” implies that the target communities have been successfully supported and nurtured into assuming responsibility for their own welfare in a sustainable manner and do not need external financial, material and/or technical support in the future. That being said and given that it is not uncommon to find an NGO working in the same community for years; this however does not make NGOs “deceivers”; on the contrary, dependent on donors for the means of production as they are, they do not always have the flexibility and/or the independence to make decisions on what they do, where, when and how. Under the circumstances, realising their cherished goal of sustainable development in such an operating environment becomes difficult if not impossible. Thus, regardless of the soundness of their vision and good intentions on how to move communities forward along the development continuum, in the final analysis, they can only do what is possible within the available means of production – means which they do not own and by extension, means they have no control over.

The situation of NGOs is clearly unenviable and this is eloquently captured by Smillie (1995: 238) who said of them then "...Today's NGOs are at a major interchange where several twelve lane major highways meet in a series of high overpasses, dark tunnels, tight curves and fast merging traffic..." Since then, the situation has changed little and if anything, the "Spaghetti Junction" implied by Smillie in which NGOs were caught more than fifteen years ago has since witnessed the "construction" of more lanes, overpasses, dark tunnels and tight curves in order to meet the needs of the ever growing "traffic" of stakeholders and interests. Thus, whereas prior to 1970, the only stakeholder group consisted of donor governments which provided NGOs with funding mainly for relief operations; in time and borrowing a leaf from donor governments; multilateral donors, the UN system, World Bank and International Monetary Fund followed suit and started courting NGOs as development partners.

According to Damlamian (2006:5) the realisation by the global community that including business in the process of international development was desirable, coupled with pressure on business from civil society to give back something to the communities in which they made their profits and/or to make good the environmental damage their operations inflicted in these communities; the corporate sector did the same. Then there were the aid-recipient (host) governments for in a situation in which more development aid was being channelled through NGOs (Tandon 1991: 75); they were concerned about the constituencies from which the western NGOs derived their agendas and to which they were primarily accountable. Host governments thus became an important stakeholder if only to monitor what was perceived as NGO tendency to secrecy and non-transparency amongst other manifestations of mistrust. Finally and while beneficiary communities are not inclined to make "noise" about the quality of NGO interventions, by virtue of the fact that government donors started to demand that NGOs demonstrate the impact of their interventions in terms of the extent to which the quality of life amongst the beneficiaries had changed for the better; such "noise" was being made on their behalf. Indeed the "traffic" of stakeholders and interests was growing and this coupled with a widening scope in the variety of sectors NGOs were involved in due to availability of resources, the scope of accountability became even more complex.

With respect to interests, donor "giving" decisions are increasingly influenced by factors ranging from political, security and economic considerations and even simply for publicity and in particular, the "CNN effect" (a term used to describe the impact and degree to which an event makes international headlines). For African governments, maintaining popularity and staying in power by amongst other

things, being seen to be a caring government and in the process, covering up their failures to adequately provide basic services for their people is important. To this effect, they decide what NGOs can do, where and when in their sovereign territories. Last but not least, the communities served also became an important stakeholder group for while in general they appreciate the services provided by NGOs, they increasingly demanded that they be involved in decision making on what is in their best interests. In the event that there is no goodness-of-fit between donor priorities and the needs on the ground meaning that available resources will be for interventions which do not necessarily meet the felt needs of the communities served or the targeting of communities as dictated by a host government is inappropriate, for the purpose of maintaining good relations, a tendency by NGOs is go by such the decisions of both donors and host governments alike. Under the circumstances however, NGO interventions will have little if any impact at all in so far as they will not be addressing community felt needs; “Caught at Crossroads” indeed NGOs are. However, notwithstanding such a dilemma, NGOs strive at all times to fulfil their mandate of meeting community felt needs; besides, notwithstanding the fact that primary responsibility for the welfare of communities primarily lies with governments, NGOs have invested more towards this end than the majority of African governments.

According to Clark (2000; 4) this was clearly evident in Ethiopia where during the well documented famine crisis of 1984-85, NGOs were catapulted into high prominence because suspicious of the policies of the Mengistu regime, many international donors insisted on channelling relief aid through NGOs. Such prominence was a result of the visibility of NGOs in providing the only means of survival for and saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. This, NGOs were able to do for at the point in time, the government was overwhelmed by the severity of the drought besides, it had become almost paralysed by pressure from an escalating civil war waged by armed resistance groups. The same can be said of Kenya where according to Aklilu and Wekesa (2002: 1), barely recovering from a drought in 1996-1997, the country experienced a severe drought during the period 1999-2001. The drought, the worst witnessed in thirty seven years affected 4.4 million people; it was subsequently declared a national disaster and in response to the disaster, (Government of Kenya; World Food Programme & FEWSNET 2006: 4), NGOs took centre stage in a disaster relief operation coordinated by the Government of Kenya and supported financially by the international donor community including UN Agencies. The operation benefitted some 2.75 million people who during the crisis were totally dependent on food aid for survival.



### 1.3 The research problem: “Caught at Crossroads”

It is said of the drought in Kenya in 1999-2001 (Government of Kenya; World Food Programme and FEWSNET 2006:2-3), that the cost of the relief operation was phenomenal with the Government of Kenya estimating that the combined cost of the emergency relief operation was approximately \$190 million with \$102 million spent on food relief alone. According to Swift, Barton & Morton (2001: 3), as the drought came to an end; reflecting on the costs incurred during what was a mere palliative intervention and recalling that barely two years earlier, there had been another relief operation in response to the drought of 1996/7, there was increasing concern by both the Government of Kenya and donors about the social, economic and environmental cost of relief operations. The concerns were not baseless for according to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO 1996), the number of people that needed and benefited from food aid assistance during the 1996/7 drought was 1.8 million; pointing to an emerging trend in which the number of people in need of food was increasing with each subsequent drought episode. Such a trend evoked real fears of a creeping dependency syndrome; the fears were not baseless for according to Swift et al. (2001: 4), between 1997 and 1999, assessments carried out pointed to the potential for agricultural productivity of a level that could meet food requirements in some parts of the country. In a situation in which the number of people requiring food aid in 1999-2001 was higher than in 1997, it was concluded that readily available food aid and/or anticipation of food handouts during periods of drought was leading to laxity and failure by communities to exploit the potential for optimal food production that existed during agricultural seasons characterised by rainfall normal patterns.

In addition to these internal reflections, an evaluation of the 1999-2001 emergency relief operations conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2001) revealed that first of all, the pattern of drought episodes in Kenya going back a few decades, was increasingly assuming a predictable cyclical pattern. Secondly, notwithstanding evidence of such an emerging predictable pattern, every drought episode had been managed as a crisis focusing on food relief without due attention paid to longer term mitigation measures and in particular, environmental protection measures. Thirdly, lack of a comprehensive drought policy was resulting in increased destruction of forests for income generation and in particular, charcoal; logging without replacing trees and uncontrolled clearing forests for agriculture. Fourthly, poor agricultural practices including stream bank and steep slope cultivation was accelerating soil erosion resulting in the silting of dams and pans usually used as dry weather water reservoirs. Fifthly, conflicting land-use interests for example, the prioritisation of

tourism and wildlife management; ranching and commercial forestry over agriculture was reducing household land assets. Finally, while some parts of Kenya notably, the Central, Rift Valley and Western Provinces were traditionally agriculturally productive, poor rural infrastructure made it difficult to move food commodities from these “green belts” of Kenya to the drier parts. The effect of poor infrastructure on food security in Kenya is evident in the fact that according to the World Food Programme (WFP 2002: 6-7), the emergency relief appeal launched by the agency in 1999 was not so much for the usual donations-in-kind (food commodities) but instead, cash donations with which to purchase and transport maize from within Kenya itself! Food commodities would indeed be bought within Kenya itself for the green belts cited above had produced enough surpluses to cover a substantial part of the food deficit in the drier parts of the country.

In the aftermath of the relief operation and in planning the recovery through to development interventions; stakeholders took into account the findings of the evaluation and the sentiments that the NGO community had been expressing all along that relief operations which are not followed by sustainable rehabilitation through to development interventions are tantamount to “fire-fighting” exercises. It turned out that at about the time that the drought struck in 1999, the Government of Kenya (2004: vii) had started an initiative to develop a National Disaster Management Policy however, the process had stalled as relief operations became the priority over the government’s normal daily business cycle. Shaken by the impact of the drought on communities and livestock as well as the cost, the process of developing a Disaster Management policy was resumed in 2001 with the Office of the President consulting widely with other Government Ministries, the private sector, NGOs and other development partners. Even as the policy was still in draft form, in 2001 and taking into account the draft provisions, donor governments and UN agencies pledged funding for a variety of post drought interventions for implementation by international NGOs while the Government of Kenya provided a modest amount of funding for local NGOs to do the same. To this effect, UNICEF (2001) launched an appeal for US\$10.0 million for continuing nutritional support for its target groups (women and children) and mitigation activities; the construction of underground water sources and community gardening projects amongst others. The governments of Britain; Japan, Norway and the United States responded positively to the appeal however, the resources mobilised by UNICEF, some US\$3.2 million, fell far short of the requirements; understandably, development work does not evoke as much sympathy as relief operations in disaster situations. Other than through UNICEF, donor governments

also provided funding directly to their home NGOs or through their development aid agencies; but again, the funds provided fell short of the interventions that NGOs had planned.

According to World Agro-Forestry (2005:18), the failure of the 2004 long rains (March–June) particularly in the Coast and Eastern Provinces and to a lesser extent; the North-Eastern Province resulted in another drought in Kenya. This time round, an estimated 2.3 million people required food aid; in response, World Food Programme (2004) appealed for and mobilised food commodities to meet the food aid needs of the 2.3 million people; the cost was approximately US\$82 million. This number of people requiring food aid represented a 16 percent reduction on the figure of 2.75 million people who received food aid during the 1999-2001 drought while the amount spent on food this time round (\$82 million) represented a 24 percent reduction on the \$102 million worth of food distributed in 1999-2001. Donor response to the recovery through to development interventions implemented by NGOs between 2001 and 2004 had indeed been limited at only 32 percent of the appeal all the same, a reduction in both the number of people requiring food aid in 2004 and the corresponding reduction in the cost of the relief operation suggested improvements in the resilience of communities against drought. A possible explanation given for such improvements was that notwithstanding the less than optimal level of funding and the consequent limitations in the scope of the mitigation interventions implemented by NGOs between 2001 and 2004; the interventions had certainly made a difference in reducing the degree of vulnerability within communities.

On their own part, NGOs argued that had they had adequate resources, vulnerability would have been reduced to an even higher level than the 16 percent recorded. The arguments by NGOs were noted however, according to the World Food Programme (2004); the 2004 drought was not as severe or as widespread as that of 1999-2001 which was on record as the worst in thirty-seven years. Against this background, the attribution of the reduction in vulnerability in communities to NGO interventions implemented between 2001 and 2004 raised questions with some stakeholder groups arguing that the reduction was but only a reflection of the fact that the 2004 drought was not as severe or as widespread as that of 1999-2001. In Machakos District according to the Government of Kenya (2011), in a situation in which the impact of the 2004 drought was not as severe relative to that of 1999-2001, NGOs found it even more difficult to secure funding from their traditional donors to consolidate the post-drought recovery through to development interventions they had started in 2001. All the same and with meagre resources mobilised from other sources, some NGOs remained in the communities

consolidating post drought recovery through to development interventions they had started in 2001 albeit, on a reduced scale and narrower scope. This account was later confirmed by the NGOs themselves.

Typical of a trend in which Kenya was experiencing a drought on average every two years, the Inter-Agency Food Security Steering Group of the Government of Kenya's (2005a: 4) reported a near total failure of the short rains (November-January) in twenty six Districts and estimated that 3.5 million people would require food aid between March 2006 and February 2007. Once again, the drought was declared a national disaster and according to a joint Food Security Update issued by the Government of Kenya, FEWSNET & WFP (2006: 3) the volume of food aid required to avert famine between March 2006 and February 2007 was estimated at 396,525 metric tonnes at an estimated cost of \$227.3 million. Notwithstanding the fact that during the period 1999-2001 and in 2004, donors had injected some (US) \$102 million and \$82 million worth food relief into drought relief operations respectively, typical of humanitarian emergency situations; the drought evoked sympathy from the international donor community and they generously responded without much persuasion. So much was the generosity that by April, \$100 million or 44 percent of the total appeal had been mobilised; this is important to note for by then, the cyclical pattern of drought episodes and a trend of increasingly decreasing shorter intervals in the previous ten years had been established.

The impact of the drought episodes of 1999-2001 and 2006 in Kenya suggests that the number of people in need of food aid in 2006 estimated at 3.5 million represented an increase of 27 percent increase on the 1999-2001 figure of 2.75 million and 52 percent on the 2004 figure of 2.3 million people. In terms of the cost of food aid, there was an increase from \$102 million in 1999-2001 to \$227 or approximately a 122 percent increase; this translates into a per capita expenditure on food aid of \$27 in 1999-2001 and \$65 in 2006. The irony of it all is that while a phenomenal \$100 million was mobilised for the 2006 relief operation within a relatively short period, donors had not shown the same enthusiasm in responding to the UNICEF appeal for funding for long term preventive, preparedness and mitigation measures in the aftermath of the 1999-2001 drought and even less so in the aftermath of the 2004 drought. Such lack of enthusiasm in funding long term mitigation measures is evident from the cited study carried out by Campanaro et al. in 2002; a period which coincided with the UNICEF appeal. It can thus be concluded that while increasingly, donors acknowledged the fact that longer term mitigation measures were the durable solution to recurrent food insecurity in vulnerable communities,

such acknowledgement did not always translate into concrete action in terms of availing funding for such interventions. Such a contradiction will be revisited in the chapter on relationships between NGOs and other stakeholders in humanitarian interventions.

In a situation in which the number of people requiring food aid in 2006 was higher than that during the 1999-2001 and 2004 drought episodes, it can be argued that notwithstanding the fact that NGOs had been implementing post-drought recovery through to development interventions since 2001, vulnerability within communities actually increased between the two periods; understandably, with limited resources, there was a limit to what they could do. Indeed, the nature and scope of interventions were limited by inadequate funding however; failure to reduce vulnerability within communities can also be the result of the quality of interventions and in particular, the implementation approaches and methods used. It is possible that the quality of interventions may have been compromised as elaborated earlier by what Edwards and Hulme (1998:8) observed as the tendency by NGOs to prioritise accountability upwards over their grassroots constituencies as well as overemphasis on short-term quantitative outputs as demanded by donors. This is particularly important for while some gains were made in 2004, these were reserved in 2006 as is evident from the increase in the number of people requiring food aid. That being said, such failure to sustainably reduce vulnerability within communities cannot be attributed exclusively to NGOs for while they may have been the only actors in the drought mitigation interventions; there are many “behind the scenes actors”. Such actors are represented first of all, by NGOs’ back donors (government, institutional and corporate alike) and it is possible that the post drought interventions implemented between 2001 and 2006 were limited in nature and scope by corresponding limitations in funding and/or by restrictions on what activities could be used for without due consideration of the most pressing needs the ground. Secondly, there are the host governments who wield the power to decide what NGOs will do where, when and even how and last but not least, there are the beneficiary communities themselves in who there will be no commitment to the interventions if they are not involved in decisions on the priority needs and what will be done about them in their interest. Community commitment and a sense of ownership are pre-requisites for the success in development interventions.

As is evident from the foregoing, NGOs are but only one of a number of parties operating in a complex partnership which is often characterized by divergent and conflicting interests and motives. In such partnerships, first of all, donors are inarguably the “fiddlers” who by virtue of their “dollar power” name the “tune” in terms of decisions on what NGOs can do, where, when and in some cases, even

how. Secondly, host governments by virtue of their “turf power” hold the key to the nature, scope, where and when NGO humanitarian interventions can take place within their sovereign territories as such, the establishment of a country presence by an NGO is at the pleasure of the host government. The only exception is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for which the Geneva Conventions confer on the organisation, the “Right of Initiative” to intervene albeit, only in conflict situations. Finally there are the beneficiary communities themselves who at the height of a crisis are often highly susceptible to suggestions of what is in their best interests and are only too happy that someone is doing something about their situation. Such an attitude by beneficiary communities is illustrated by Narayan, Chambers, Shah & Petesch (2000: 224) in a study they carried out in which they quoted a villager in Zambia who stated “...Had it not been for PUSH (an NGO), we would be dead...” However, the scholars caution that while deeply appreciated in many places, once the worst is over for the communities, NGOs do not systematically receive high ratings on criteria considered important by poor people some of who would like to be involved in decision making in community projects implemented by NGOs.

In 1994, a “Code of Conduct” which spelt out the principles of conduct for NGOs in disaster response interventions was published by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR). The first of such principles (SCHR, 1994: 5) is that “...The humanitarian imperative comes first...” the Code also confers an obligation on humanitarian actors to provide humanitarian assistance whenever and wherever it is needed the most and in accordance with the principles of neutrality and impartiality. Originally eight international NGOs that became the Steering Committee signed up to the Code; many more have signed up since then. Recognising that strict adherence to the Code at all times is possible only when NGOs have the latitude to prioritise the most pressing needs in the communities they work, a recommendation made in the Code to donor governments (SCHR, 1994: 12) is they should provide funding with a guarantee of operational independence. Unfortunately, this is not always the case and Smillie and Minear (2003: 5) observe that while donors place the onus for quality, efficiency and effectiveness on service delivery agencies, the restricting and/or earmarking of funds for reasons other than the needs on the ground renders the agencies unable to meet the impact standards dictated by the same donors and/or perform to their own satisfaction in terms of strictly adhering to their principles and values.

According to Smillie (1995: 2), earmarking funds for political interests was evident in Ethiopia where at the beginning of the well documented famine in the early 80’s, repeated requests for food aid were

dismissed by western governments as exaggerations by a brutal pro-Soviet regime. During the period that western governments were denying that the situation was desperate, NGOs could not access funds from their governments to intervene in the humanitarian crisis and the limited interventions they carried out were facilitated by meagre resources mobilised from private sources. Likewise, host government decisions on what is to be done for communities in stress, when and how are often rooted in vested political interests and this is particularly so in the sensitive issue of food security. Thus, the “District” or some other administrative structure that an NGO might find itself allocated may not necessarily be where the most pressing needs are; in such situations, NGOs have two hard choices; to ignore the principle, “...The humanitarian imperative comes first...” (SCHR, 1994: 5) and at least be seen to be doing something in the “here and now” or to strictly adhere to the principle but then risk being told to pack, go and practise their humanity elsewhere!

With respect to communities, the researcher concurs with the views by Narayan et al. (2000: 224) that once the worst is over, NGOs do not necessarily receive high ratings on criteria considered important by the poor they serve and in particular, their involvement in decision making on the nature and scope of projects. The researcher has personal experience of such community attitudes in Zimbabwe in the aftermath of a drought relief operation implemented during the period 1991-1992. An NGO which had provided food relief food assistance in Gwanda District in Matebeleland South Province remained behind to engage communities in post-drought relief activities; unfortunately, the only funds the NGO had at its disposal were strictly earmarked for environmental conservation and in particular, the planting of indigenous trees. At a meeting with the community to discuss post drought interventions, the NGO was ridiculed when it announced that the funds available were for environmental conservation activities involving the planting of indigenous trees. Community opinion leaders reacted angrily with one telling the NGO that if that was the only assistance the NGO could provide for the community, it should look elsewhere for community engagement for they could not feed their children on trees! It turned out the most pressing felt needs within the community at that point in time, was the construction of water points and the restocking of their domestic herds. These felt needs it can be argued, were very sound not least, because they represented interventions which would address the needs of the present (food production and rebuilding livelihoods) and the future (increasing community assets and thus resilience against future droughts) in an ordered and logical manner.

Another experience that the researcher had was in a community in the coastal District of Bagamoyo in Tanzania in 2004/5; while the epicentre of the Tsunami which struck Asia was thousands of kilometres from the East African coastline; all the same, the effects were felt in three East African countries namely, Tanzania, Kenya and Somalia; albeit, not to the same degree as in Asia. With respect to people, the damage was limited to minor injuries however, damage to infrastructure was significant and thanks to the “CNN effect”, some \$15 million including unsolicited donations was raised in an appeal launched by one NGO. The focus of the interventions would be the reconstruction and/or repairs to damaged houses and communally owned buildings; schools; clinics, churches and mosques amongst others. Given that the communities were predominantly rural and construction materials were readily available locally, the relief operation was completed ahead of schedule. At the outset, it had been agreed with the donors that any funds left over could be rolled over into a second phase involving risk reduction and disaster preparedness interventions and specifically, against the impact of another Tsunami in the future. To this effect, the post disaster interventions planned involved building on local knowledge and traditional practices which had been known to be effective against comparable threats to community wellbeing in the past. The well considered intention of both the donor and the NGO was to render communities better prepared and to put into place, risk reduction measures to ensure that they would be able to cope unaided if ever faced with such a threat in the future. At a meeting with the community to develop the work plan, the NGO was ridiculed with community opinion leaders arguing that there were more pressing urgent needs; in particular, they cited the number children that had died the previous year of malaria and malnutrition and were adamant that they would not be party to wasting money on so called disaster preparedness and risk reduction activities against a threat that scientists predict might not recur for decades!

In addition to such community attitudes against what they perceive as mismatched priorities, attitudes within the NGO community have also been cited as a contributory factor for the seemingly lack of impact of their interventions and in particular, the use of labels like “poor”, “helpless” etc. to describe communities in stress. Narayan et al. (2000: 264) note that historically, many development professionals have given priority to and used the material aspect of people's lives to arrive at these labels. They further note that important as this is, poor people's views of wellbeing span across wide and varied experiences and meanings including material, physical, social, psychological and spiritual dimensions as such, the sole use of material criteria is misleading. The researcher concurs with these views by Narayan et al. for such labels coupled with the enthusiasm with which donors readily avail



resources for relief assistance can result in a situation in which in time, communities start believing that they are so poor that they cannot do anything to help themselves. Such was the basis of the well founded fears of the Kenya Government in 2001 that readily available relief assistance as a response to the plight of the “poor and helpless” drought stricken communities would lead to dependency on food aid. Dependency syndrome regardless of its origin, compromises the survival instinct which is so natural to man and results in individuals or whole communities failing to activate instinctual defence and coping mechanism in the face of threats or hazards to their wellbeing.

The phenomenon is evident in the experience of a retired Archbishop of the Anglican Church in Kenya (Gitari 2005) who at some point in time during his career; at the invitation of a community, he presided over a church service to pray for the survival of crops that were withering under unfavourable weather conditions. For two consecutive years hitherto, the weather conditions had been worse prompting an NGO to implement an emergency intervention involving the distribution of fertilizer to avert an imminent disaster; total crop failure. With weather conditions showing a marked improvement this time round and considering the situation being not so desperate, the NGO had rounded up the emergency intervention and left the community. Following the church service, the Archbishop went from one small holding to the next praying for the crops but in the process, he deliberately skipped one farm; the owner was surprised and asked why his farm had been ignored. The Archbishop’s response to the farmer was that his crops did not need prayers but instead, some honest and serious hard work in land preparation prior to planting followed by equally honest and serious hard work in the care of the crops during germination through to maturity! According to Tandon’s classification alluded to earlier, it is likely that the NGOs which had donated fertiliser perceived itself as purely functional as such, having provided assistance during the critical phase, it considered its job done. However, while the intervention did avert a disaster by preventing total crop failure during the bad years, an unintended outcome was the nurturing of dependency. At the same time, had the NGO not intervened, it would have come under fire for failing to fulfil its mandate of alleviating human suffering; for NGOs therefore, it is clearly a “lose-lose” situation!

## **1.4 The Study**

### **1.4.1 Purpose of the study**

Following a drought episode in Kenya during the period 1999-2001, NGOs that were involved in the relief operations remained behind in communities implementing post-drought recovery through to

development interventions. Reflecting on the findings of an evaluation of the relief operation led by the UNDP, the interventions were carefully selected and aimed at increasing the resilience of the target communities against a similar phenomenon in the future. Amongst the interventions, health and nutrition education, provision of underground water sources and agricultural extension services featured prominently amongst a long list of planned activities. However, due to limited donor interest in funding the interventions, the nature and scope of the interventions were limited; all the same, when Kenya experienced another drought in 2004; the number of people affected and requiring food aid was 16 percent less than that recorded during the drought of 1999-2001. In the light of this development, it was assumed that amongst other factors and while limited in scope, the post drought interventions implemented by NGOs had made a contribution to increasing community resilience against the drought in 2004. However, another drought experienced in Kenya in 2006 proved such an assumption wrong for the number of people requiring food aid increased by some 52 percent on the 2004 figures and despite the gains made between 2001 and 2004 in terms of an increase in the resilience of communities against drought, the number of people vulnerable to drought in 2006 represented a 27 percent increase on the 1999-2001 figures. A trend in which the number of people requiring food aid in 2006 increased by 27 and 52 percent on the 1999-2001 and 2004 figures respectively; suggested that people were more vulnerable in 2006 than they had been in 1999-2001 and in 2004. The trend also suggests that not only had the post drought interventions implemented by NGOs between 2001 through to 2006 been unsustainable but more seriously, the gains made between 2001 and 2004 had been reversed. The study sought to examine and identify factors that contributed to the increase in the vulnerability of people to drought; draw important lessons from the experience and translate the lessons into recommendations which hopefully, will stimulate further debate on what NGOs can and should do for more effective interventions.

#### **1.4.2 Importance of the study**

Such a debate is important today and specifically in the context of Kenya, where it is apparent that in the past two decade or so, drought episodes have increasingly assumed a clearly identifiable and predictable cyclical pattern with the intervals between the episodes getting shorter. The search for approaches leading to a permanent solution in terms of sustainable development is no longer a matter of choice. Debate on permanent solutions to the sustainability of NGO interventions is important now more than ever before for as McGann and Johnstone (2006: 1) point out, NGOs have moved from backstage to centre stage in the world political economy and are exerting their power and influence in

every aspect of international relations and policymaking. Jennings (1995:13) concurs, adding that being frustrated with state inefficiency in programme management coupled with frequent misallocation of resources and an urban bias, official donors increasingly turned to NGOs as an alternative vehicle for channelling development assistance to the Third World. In addition, the economic crisis in the 90s coupled with pressure from international financial institutions for reductions in public sector spending resulted in many a southern government withdrawing from the provision of certain public services. NGOs moved in to fill in the gap and in the sphere of health for example, DeJong (1991: 4-5) notes that donors perceived NGOs as a viable alternative for service delivery; at the same time and in the face of declining resources and difficulties in providing adequate services for their people, host African governments increasingly recognized the contribution of NGOs in this sector and welcomed them.

On the increasing reliance by donors on NGOs as an alternative vehicle through which to channel development assistance to the Third World, Chege (1999: 1) notes that this was clearly evident in a US policy adopted in 1992 in which the importance of working more closely with NGOs was emphasised; understandably, host governments were widely seen as corrupt and inefficient. In time, other major donors notably Britain and Germany followed suit; government-NGO partnerships became the trend and a survey conducted in the United States in 2005 (Williamson 2005) suggested that in general, NGOs were more trusted to do what is right than governments and business. The trust and confidence in NGOs eventually outstripped trust in states and enterprises in the US and Europe and in an operating environment characterised by such perfect conditions, NGOs unleashed their energy and zeal in pursuit of the fulfilment of their mandate. They became a positive force in influencing domestic and international policies and affairs; working to alleviate poverty; protecting human rights, preserving the environment and providing relief worldwide. Williamson however points out that the popularity of NGOs with donors stimulated a parallel surge in interest in the responsibilities such privileged influence brought about adding that in what appeared to be a backlash against NGOs, debate amongst the various stakeholders increasingly focused on their accountability and more broadly, on their legitimacy.

The observation of such a trend is shared by Jennings (1995: 14) who observed that the increased resources available to NGOs were correspondingly and increasingly accompanied by rising expectations among donors of what NGOs could deliver as well as demands for accountability. In many ways, the demands for accountability were provoked by the NGOs themselves for as Lee

(2004:4) points out, since the second half of the 1990's, NGOs had been challenging companies, governments and multilateral organizations to become more transparent and accountable. In time, the tables turned on NGOs and according to Christensen (2004: 1-2), the do-good nature and the commitment of NGOs to their cause were no longer considered sufficient to produce positive results; they were increasingly required to demonstrate what their programmes accomplished on the ground. Such demands by stakeholders gained prominence in the aftermath of what was perceived as a horrifying failure of NGOs to discharge their mandate during the Rwanda genocide in 1994 during which it was alleged that refugee camps were used as recruiting and vehicle fuelling stations by organized bands of killers. Since then and increasingly, NGO performance, accountability and legitimacy has become the subject of scrutiny, suspicion or even outright scepticism as is evident from the terms that have used to describe them as alluded to earlier.

Suspicion or even outright scepticism expressed by the public at large can be dismissed as an over-reaction for in humanitarian disasters in particular, NGOs are hailed as champions of the humanitarian cause. However, suspicion and scepticism have been expressed in credible circles, by academics and political analysts alike; sources which cannot be easily dismissed. Amongst political analysts is DeGregori (2002) who argues that while NGOs are groups that claim to be the voice of the poor and powerless; groups who take to the streets in protest against the evils of globalization, multi-national corporations, modern technology and biotechnology, more often than not, such groups are not helping the poor but hurting them. He defends his views by citing the example of Southern Africa where he alleges that as drought, famine, disease and death was stalking the region in 1992/3, the anti-GM food campaigns and false fears spread by some NGOs hindered the relief efforts of the WFP. He concluded that like the multi-nationals that they criticize; the Green, anti-globalization and Environmental NGOs are revenue-maximizing organizations who make their money by marketing fear without any regard for the human cost adding that inducing fear and fundraising are their full-time jobs.

In the host countries and while governments increasingly recognized and welcomed the contribution of NGOs, Campbell (1996; 9) observed that in states where government capacity was weak and local government had almost disintegrated under structural adjustment, a tendency by NGOs was to bypass state institutions and establish "parallel structures" for implementing their projects. In addition, the increasing tendency by donors to channel funds through NGOs resulted in competition for resources between host governments and NGOs; this generated suspicion or even resentment within host

government circles. In turn, the resentment of NGOs by host governments often found expression in restrictive measures being taken against NGOs in order to curb their power and control over development resources and their influence on communities. Fear of influence on communities can extend to the political sphere and NGOs involved in civil rights education and advocacy have been accused of inciting the masses when a host government is under pressure to deliver on election promises. Vaknin (2005) argues that such a perception by host governments of NGO inciting the masses is not baseless for under the guise of think tanks and lobby groups, some NGOs are ideologically biased; he cites the example of the International Crisis Group which he alleges, had openly interfered on behalf of the opposition in parliamentary elections in Macedonia adding that others had done so in Belarus and Ukraine; in Zimbabwe and Israel amongst a long list of others. He concludes that no field of government activity is now exempt from the glare of NGO's adding that they serve as self-appointed witnesses, judges, jury and executioner rolled into one.

In addition to imposing restrictions on when, where and how an NGO operates; the consequences of being perceived as interfering in domestic politics can extend to outright deregistration of the organisation. In turn, deregistration means that the resident and work permits of its expatriate staff are withdrawn and they must leave the country immediately with little time to plan the exit. Mbofana (2004) cites an example of such a reaction to perceived NGO “misconduct” by the government in Zimbabwe where in the disputed elections of 2002, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change made substantial gains. Realising that its grip on power since independence was sliding, the government blamed its misfortune on “campaigns of misinformation of the masses” by NGOs and in particular, those involved in civil rights education and advocacy. In the aftermath of the elections, the ruling ZANU-PF party tabled an NGO Bill in Parliament which required NGOs not only to declare their sources of funding but also to give detailed accounts of how they used the funds. More seriously, it empowered the government to deregister an NGO whose source and use of funding was considered “suspect”! The Bill was subsequently “fast tracked” through Parliament and conveniently passed as law a year before the Parliamentary elections of April 2005.

When donors and host governments demand more accountability of NGOs by amongst other things, empirical evidence of the impact of interventions and/or are disgruntled by the lack thereof, NGOs can take comfort in attributing this to the need by these two categories of stakeholders to advance their own vested interests. However, when such demands and/or disgruntlement come from the poor and

disadvantaged communities served, they have to be taken seriously even when seemingly unjustified or unreasonable. Appeasing all the stakeholders in development partnerships is a tricky balancing act for NGOs for on the one hand; the economic, political and/or security interests of donors may well be such that there is no goodness of fit between the needs on the ground and what they or the communities perceive as the priorities. When there is no goodness of fit between the priorities of donors and the needs on the ground at the same time as NGOs are dependent on donors for resources inevitably, the choice of interventions will be limited to those for which donors will fund but which might not necessarily address the communities' felt needs. Furthermore, while host governments are only too happy to "download" what is primarily their responsibility onto NGOs however, they do not always create the space which is a pre-requisite for NGOs to discharge their humanitarian mandate effectively. Worse still and in some instances, in the quest to cover up their failure to adequately provide for their peoples, some host governments have been promoting the idea that NGO services are a right and not a privilege! In the process, aid-induced dependency which is gradually degenerating into chronic proportions has become the order of the day in many a community in Africa. Regardless of the genesis of felt needs within communities, induced by governments for political mileage or otherwise; NGO interventions must always be designed such that they meet the felt needs of communities and no amount of blame apportioning will absolve them from accountability for failing to do so. At the same time and more importantly, interventions must be designed such that they do not render the said communities even more vulnerable and dependent than they were before the well intended interventions.

On interventions that render communities even more vulnerable than they were hitherto, Dunford (1998) argues that this was the case in many a poor community when micro-financing development interventions became popular with donors in the late 1990s. NGOs embraced the concept in the belief that this was indeed an innovative approach to helping people escape poverty in the long term however, in their enthusiasm to use the approach for poverty alleviation; they increasingly adopted "best practice" performance standards of the commercial banking industry. In their enthusiasm, they completely overlooked the fact that in the first place, the failure of the market to meet the enormous demand of the poor for financial services could be traced to the performance standards of this very industry! Thus, notwithstanding the fact that NGOs principles and values are linked to the higher purpose of changing the conditions of the poor; "microfinance" became the main preoccupation and the popular approach to "poverty reduction" but with little attention paid to the longer term impact on the

very conditions they were trying to ameliorate. The end result was that the poor became poorer; Dunford (1998) cautioned NGOs to take note of the fact that “...the road to hell is often paved with good intentions...”

These sentiments are worth noting for over the years, of the billions of dollars worth of development assistance injected into the continent by the donor community, a substantial portion channelled through NGOs; however, NGO sceptics argue that there is little to show for a good return on investment in terms of sustainable development. The real challenge for NGOs as implied earlier by Edwards and Hulme (1998:8) is their tendency to direct accountability “upwards” understandably; they continue to be heavily dependent on government, institutional and corporate sector donors for resources to facilitate their work. Borrel, Donini, Kent, Minear, Moomaw, Mowjee, Najam, Purdin, Walker & Wisner (2004:74) share these views and further observe that a growing trend is one of NGO programming decisions being driven by for what, where and when funding is available. They caution of the danger that responding to the whims of donors may mean moving away from particular thematic or geographic areas in which they have developed expertise and instead, pursuing activities that are not likely to have any real impact. The scholars conclude that NGOs face enormous pressures to maintain their programme identity and integrity when faced with funders with particularistic agendas adding that if NGOs are indeed organizations whose values distinguish them from other actors, they follow donor fashions at their own risk.

This last point is worth noting for this is what appears to have happened when micro-financing was fashionable with donors and NGOs embraced the concept wholesale but with disastrous consequences; rendering communities more vulnerable and poorer than they had been prior to the interventions. Such an outcome of NGO interventions is inexcusable and no amount of blame apportioning can absolve an NGO from creating such a situation amongst the poor and disadvantaged not least, because these categories are their very “*raison d’etre*”. In any case, it can be argued that the conditions which government, institutional and corporate donors attach to funding of NGO work are designed to meet their own accountability obligations to their constituencies; tax payers, member state shareholders and investor shareholders respectively. It can also be argued that the same can be said of host government for while the principle is selectively observed, at least in theory, whatever decisions they make on what NGOs can do, where and when is in part fulfilment of their accountability obligations to the people who conferred the mandate to rule on them. For NGOs and while rarely demanded; but as their “*raison*

*d'etre*”, accountability should primarily be to the communities they serve; at the same time and in order to keep the resources flowing in, they have to appease donors however, in situations in which often, NGO and donor priorities are divergent if not in conflict, NGOs often find themselves caught in the “Spaghetti Junction” implied by Smillie (1995: 238).

In addition to identifying the factors that contributed to the increase in the vulnerability of people to drought in Kenya in 2006, the study also seeks to examine how multidirectional influences as represented by the interests and priorities of the various stakeholders in development partnerships impact the outcomes of NGO interventions. It is hoped that an analysis of such a complex and multifaceted interplay between divergent and often conflicting stakeholder interests and motivations will stimulate debate which will lead to further in depth studies on how the problem of what clearly is an unequal power relationship amongst the stakeholders in “partnership for development” can be resolved. This is more important now than ever before for perceived as they once were as the undisputed “champions of the humanitarian cause”; NGOs did not have to worry about their image and reputation as long as they were distributing alms to the poor. In time however, with the winds of change blowing across the donor community, host governments and the beneficiary communities alike, these stakeholders increasingly demanded that NGOs be accountable upward, laterally and downward respectively. Accountability to constituencies whose interests and motives are diverse and/or even conflicting means that there will be occasions during which NGOs are caught in the “Spaghetti Junction” implied by Smillie. Success in navigating their way out of such a dilemma requires NGOs to develop strategies that facilitate the realisation of their noble goal of sustainably improving the conditions of the poor and disadvantaged at the same time as meet the expectations of all the stakeholders in the partnership for development.

### **1.4.3 Focus of the study**

The focus of the study is the then Machakos District in the then Eastern Province of Kenya of which the District capital Machakos Town is located approximately sixty-five kilometres south of the state capital, Nairobi. A new constitution promulgated in 2010 dissolved the Province and District system of Local Government administration and replaced them with a system of Counties, all the same, by virtue of the fact that during the period under study, the Local Government administrative system was one of Provinces and Districts, the study will be based on the old system. The District covered an area of 6,281.4 square kilometres (Government of Kenya 2005b: 3) and in terms of agricultural productivity, it



fell into “Region Four” a category classified as semi-arid or marginal; understandably, only 26 percent of area covered by the District had only medium potential for agricultural production. In addition, agricultural activities were in the main, the cultivation of rain fed crops; this is the explanation for the fact that during the drought of 1999-2001; the worst recorded in thirty seven years, Machakos was severely affected along with thirty seven other Districts. According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC 2004: 1), 260,497 people or approximately 29 percent of Machakos District’s estimated population of 906,644 (1999 census) were affected by the drought and required food aid. In the aftermath of drought (Community Development Trust Fund 2002); a number of both international and local NGOs which had been involved in drought relief operations remained in the communities engaging them in drought mitigation and preparedness activities. In the main, the activities during this post drought phase were the construction of water sources, agriculture and other drought mitigation related projects; the goal of the activities and projects was to facilitate early recovery and enhance longer term food-sufficiency in the District. To this effect; in addition to the US\$3.2 mobilised by UNICEF and disbursed through international NGOs for the purpose; donor governments also provided funding directly to their home NGOs.

According to World Agro-Forestry (2005: 18), the failure of the 2004 long rains (March–June) dashed hopes for a good maize harvest in the marginal agricultural areas of Eastern, Central and Coast Provinces as well as the southern Maasai rangelands. In Eastern Province, of the thirteen Districts making up the Province, seven were affected and people needed food aid however, Machakos District was not amongst them. To this effect, there were no food aid interventions implemented either by the Government of Kenya or NGOs as people could meet their basic food requirements without external assistance. It did indeed appear that community resilience against drought in communities in Machakos had been strengthened to a level that had seen them “graduate” from reliance on food aid to being food secure even during a drought. However, when Kenya was struck by another drought in 2006 (Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2006), 29 percent of Machakos District population needed food aid with the figures in four of the twelve Divisions making up the District estimated to be as high as 50 percent.

#### **1.4.4 Statement of the research problem**

According to the Government of Kenya (2005b: 6), in 2002, the population of Machakos District was estimated at 954,082 while in 2008, it was projected to be around 1,056,535; if the year 2005 is taken as the mid-point between the two periods and it is assumed that the population growth rate remained fairly constant; at the beginning of 2006, the District’s population can be estimated at 1,005,308. With

29 percent of the District's population requiring food aid in 2006; this translates into an estimated 291,539 people or 31,000 more than in 1999-2001 when the figure stood at 260,497. Such a development suggests that contrary to the impression given in 2004, not only were communities in Machakos District still vulnerable to droughts but even more people had become vulnerable. Against this background, it can be argued that the seeming reduction in the vulnerability of communities against drought in Machakos in 2004 was not sustainable because while in relative terms, the percentage of the District's population vulnerable to drought in 1999-2001 was the same as in 2006; in real terms however, an even higher number of people were vulnerable to drought in 2006.

#### **1.4.5 The research questions**

The fact that the interventions were not sustainable raises the following questions:

- i) What were the factors that facilitated the gains made in terms of increased community resilience against drought in 2004?
- ii) What were the factors that contributed to a reversal in 2006, of the gains made in 2004?
- iii) What can NGOs do in the future, to build on the factors that facilitate the impact of their interventions and/or overcome the constraints that act against such an impact?

#### **1.4.6 Objectives of the study**

In order to answer the above question the objectives of the study are as follows:

- To identify and analyse factors that facilitated gains made with respect to increased community resilience against drought between 2001 and 2004; through post drought recovery through to development interventions implemented by NGOs in Machakos District.
- To examine and establish why the gains made during the period were reversed in 2006; to the extent that the degree of vulnerability to drought in communities reverted to the same level as it had been before the interventions of 2001-2004.
- To explore and recommend how best NGOs can build on the facilitating factors and/or overcome the constraints for even greater impact in future interventions at the same time as meet the needs of all the stakeholders, donors, host governments and more importantly, the communities served.

#### **1.4.7 Limitations to and scope of the study**

First of all, the study is focusing only on one of thirty seven and one of twenty six Districts in Kenya affected by the drought of 1999-2001 and 2006 respectively as such, the impact of NGO interventions in other Districts may present a completely different picture thus, conclusions made from this study may not necessarily apply to the other Districts. All the same, sceptics and critics of NGOs will argue that lack of observable impact of interventions even in one community let alone a whole District is inexcusable.

Secondly, the study is focusing only on food security, a sector which inarguably, is a very sensitive one; according to Macrae & Zwi (1992: 301) food aid and food security issues have been used for political, economic and military purposes by governments of the day. In the political sphere, undermining the ability of communities to produce and/or to access food renders them destitute and dependent on the state or welfare agencies, such dependence makes them politically compliant. The views by these scholars are not baseless for during a drought in Zimbabwe in 2004; in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (Focus on Africa 2004), the then Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Matebeleland alleged that the government was denying much-needed food aid and related food security support to targeted rural communities. The targeted communities the allegation continued; were those in the strongholds of the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The system used to deny MDC supporters of food aid and related post drought support (seeds; fertiliser etc.) involved a requirement that households produce a valid ruling party membership card as a precondition to receiving such aid. Food aid can also be used by the government of the day to portray the image of a caring government by claiming credit for mobilising food aid and/or food security support especially during droughts. At the same time, opposition groups often exaggerate the plight of the affected people in the hope that this will trigger anti-government public opinion to their political advantage. Against this background, caution has to be exercised in appraising accounts of the situation given by various groups and parties; for that the accounts and perceptions maybe influenced by political considerations cannot be ruled out.

Thirdly, the study is limited to post drought recovery through to development interventions; this sector is but only one of a whole host of other sectors in which NGOs were involved in Machakos District during the period; it may well turn out that given the relatively low level of political interest in these other sectors and by implication less interference, NGO performance displays a completely different

picture. Fourthly, the period under scrutiny of necessity means that this is a historical study implying a heavy reliance on records of the institutions involved and the institutional memory of subjects at the community level. Depending on the organisational culture of the institutions involved, records dating back to 1999/2001 may be hard to come by. Finally, institutional memory of subjects at the community level going back close to ten years may be scanty for since then, Kenya has experienced three more severe droughts generalised across most parts of the country and the possibility that accounts of experiences will be mixed up cannot be ruled out.

## **1.5 The research setting and design**

### **1.5.1 Research setting**

The research setting is Machakos District in the then Eastern Province in Kenya (up to 2010 when a new constitution abolished Districts and Provinces and replaced them by Counties). The rationale for the choice of Machakos is that the District was classified as marginal or semi-arid in terms of agricultural productivity relative to the arid northern parts of the country where agricultural productivity is severely hampered by climatic conditions and community livelihoods are limited to pastoral activities. In a situation in which Machakos District was by no means the worst in terms of the potential for agricultural productivity, it was expected that post drought recovery through to development interventions implemented by NGOs would see communities coping with future droughts without external assistance. This did not happen instead, two years after seeming gains in community resilience against drought in 2004, the gains were reversed with the result that in 2006, the percentage of the District's population in need of food aid was back to the level of 1999-2001 at 29 percent. Against this background, it can be argued that the drought mitigation and preparedness activities implemented from 2001 through to 2006 had not been sustainable.

### **1.5.2 Research design**

Mouton (1996: 107-108) defines research design as a set of guidelines and instructions to be followed in addressing the research problem; the rationale for a research design is thus to help the researcher to plan and structure a research project in such a way that the eventual validity of the research findings is maximized through either minimizing or where possible, eliminating potential error. In addition, Mouton (1996:38) emphasises that the overriding principle in the choice of the various techniques is that they must be appropriate for the task at hand. The task at hand was to establish why between 2001 and 2006; the impact of post drought recovery through to development interventions implemented by

NGOs in Machakos District had not been sustainable resulting in increased vulnerability of communities to drought in 2006 relative to 1999. According to Denzin (1989: 83) qualitative research goes beyond mere fact and surface appearances; it extends to the translation of history into experience and establishes the significance of the experience or a sequence of events through the voices and feelings of the person or persons affected in accordance with their own reality. Parker (2004: 159) concurs with this assertion adding that qualitative research is the study of processes and behaviours in their natural settings; through which the researcher tries to make sense of phenomena and the meanings that people attribute to them. In the light of this; by seeking to “make sense” of why vulnerability communities increased (history); to establish the meanings attributed to such phenomenon by the people affected (experience) and the extent to which it affected the quality of life in the affected communities; the study is primarily qualitative research in design. In the interventions however, NGOs were not the only actors as such, the study also sought to establish the views and opinions from the other stakeholders in the main, donors, the host government and the NGOs themselves for in partnerships for development, these stakeholders play different roles in such interventions; directly or indirectly.

On reality, Chambers, Wedel & Rodwell (1992: 293) argue that it is what people perceive it to be; as such, although a conceptual base may guide the evaluation, it is important to recognise that multiple realities and perspectives may exist amongst the subjects. In the light of this, there was some quantitative dimension to the study in so far as there was a need to cross-validate the subjects’ “reality”; such validation was done by examining records of vital indicators published by the host government and as validated by UN agencies. The study is focusing on the period, 2001-2006; as such, temporary considerations are such that the research will be a historical and descriptive study; finally, in the light of the third objective namely, to stimulate debate on how best NGOs can navigate their way out of what is a labyrinth of vested and often conflicting interests which compromise the impact of NGO interventions, it is an applied research study.

A detailed account of the research methodology is described in Chapter 5.

### **1.5.3 The layout of the study**

This first chapter is an introduction to the study; the second chapter looks at the course of development in Africa and some of the contributory factors to the discourse in the continent’s development path and

which discourse has resulted in millions of people being dependent on food aid year in year out since the early 80's. This will be followed by revisiting development theory to establish the extent to which the different schools of thought explain the discourse in Africa's development path from the dawn of independence to the present. This will be important to examine for some scholars assert that the status African states as the "poor cousin" in the global political economy today and the problems such a status generates, food insecurity amongst others; can be traced to a colonial legacy. In turn, the global political economy is a creation of and is nurtured by post colonial powers' governments and institutions' desire to maintain their pre-independence status and hence the emergence of neo-colonialism. Condemned to the status of the "poor cousin" in the new world order and unable to provide optimal basic services and food security for their people, African states welcomed NGOs to fill in the gaps created by their unenviable situation. But then, in so filling in the gaps, NGOs are but only one party in a partnership in which the other parties are their "back-donors" (government, institutional and private) whose generosity facilitate their humanitarian ventures; the host governments on whose sovereign territories NGOs discharge their humanitarian mandate and last but not least, the communities which are the beneficiaries of their noble mission. Against this background, the fourth chapter will be an in-depth examination of the "goodness of fit" with respect to the interests, motives and behaviour of each of these important stakeholders and the extent to which these dimensions facilitate and/or act as constraints to goal attainment by NGOs. Field work will follow the completion of the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter will capture the research methodology used followed by data presentation and findings (chapter 6) and finally, conclusions and recommendations (chapter 7).

It is hoped that amongst the recommendations will be issues that will stimulate debate within the NGO community on how to position themselves for optimal relationship management which meets the needs first of all, of the communities which are NGOs *raison d' etre*; their "back donors" whose generosity facilitate their work and host governments who hold the "chip" to access to communities in need at any given time.

## CHAPTER 2:

### A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AFRICA: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE DISCOURSE IN THE CONTINENT'S DEVELOPMENT PATH.

#### 2.1 Introduction

More than two decades after Timberlake (1998: x) described Africa as a continent in crisis; the crises continue unabated and some scholars argue that a colonial legacy and events during the Cold War were major contributory factors to the status of African states as the “poor cousin” in the global political economy today. This chapter analyses the extent to which this argument is valid at the same time as examine what role if any, internal factors might have contributed to a situation in which African states continue to be dependent on external aid up to the present day. Indeed, aid has become the lifeline of many an African state; in making improvements in the basic infrastructure, industrial production, salaries for civil services, the provision of basic services and even food security of which NGOs are in the forefront.

According to Kinfe (1995: 9) colonialism had its roots in a mixture of adventure, greed and idealism all which drove Europeans to foreign lands; by the end of the sixteenth century, England had developed a commercial sea fleet which made it possible for the colonial power to penetrate the furthest corners of the earth. Schwab (2001:14) shares these views and notes that the decline in the profitability of plantation economies in the West Indies; the upsurge in anti-slavery movement activism and in time, the abolition of slavery in 1805; created an income gap and the need for an alternative means for filling the gap. According to Shillington (2005: 301), as the impact of these developments started to be felt, Africa offered Britain, France, Germany and other European powers an open market that would fill the income gap created as well as garner them a trade surplus. Thus, with Africa opening up as an open market, the economies of Europe; hitherto running negative trade balances increasingly offset them by the income from overseas investments in Africa. According to Schwab (2001:15) the need to maintain these lucrative markets saw an increase in adventurous explorations of the African continent by Europeans and one outcome of the explorations was official claims of large swaths of the continent by European monarchs and their governments.

Such claims according to Kinfe (1995:10), led to fierce competition and even conflict; the competition was taken to even greater heights as the Industrial Revolution sweeping across Europe at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century increased the need for raw materials for the fast growing industries. In addition, the

Industrial Revolution triggered urban migration as people were driven from the countryside to the towns and cities in search of work in the factories; such a development resulted in a decline in agricultural productivity. In Britain for example, such a shift in the mode of livelihood from agriculture to wage earning in cities and towns meant that Britain could no longer feed her growing population. To this effect, the colonies increasingly came to be perceived as valuable and indispensable assets for continued access to cheap and reliable sources of raw materials for the growing industrial sector and food commodities for the growing urban population. Willis (1985: 121-122) shares these views and notes that the increasing dependence on overseas assets for both raw materials and food amongst the colonial powers fuelled territorial ambitions resulting in the emergence of a new power struggle in Europe. The power struggle intensified following the humiliating defeat of France by Germany in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 and bitter about the defeat and humiliation, France sought to mobilise other colonial powers in a campaign of animosity against Germany. To this effect and according to de Blij & Muller (2003: 304), France came up with a plot to play the other colonial powers against Germany by convincing them that Germany was about to consolidate the victory by extending the aggression to the colonies. Aware of such a plot and in order to pre-empt it, the then German Chancellor, Otto van Bismarck was proactive and sought to secure Germany's interests; he subsequently engaged fourteen European nations in a dialogue whose goal was to prevent potential conflict in the colonies in the future.

According to Willis (1985: 122), as the dialogue was underway, Bismarck took advantage of a border dispute between the Belgians in Congo and the Portuguese in Angola and hosted what came to be known as the Berlin Conference in 1884. During the conference, colonial boundaries were demarcated based on the spheres of economic interest of the main colonial powers notably, Britain, France, Belgium, Germany and Portugal and a code of international law concerning the colonial conquests already made in Africa was ratified; this marked the legitimisation of colonialism. With each having been allocated their own pieces of territory, the colonial powers got on with the business of managing their colonies. Smillie (1995: 2) notes that in Europe, the growth of towns and cities prompted by the Industrial Revolution saw improvements in the standards of living. At the same time however, such improvements could only be enjoyed by those in gainful employment and not the unemployed; the squalid living conditions and poverty amongst the unemployed was to be an important factor in the conception of the idea of the welfare state. The welfare system of state management became the system



under which Europe was administered for no less than a century and in managing their respective colonies, the colonial powers simply extended the system to the colonies.

## **2.2 Colonial legacy**

### **2.2.1 The welfare state and state management systems**

In time, the welfare state system of state management was consolidated in the colonies and according to Smillie (1995: 2), it reached its epitome at about the same time that European colonial empires began to crumble. Unfortunately and notwithstanding the fact that the system was about to fall from grace back home; as Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and others began to withdraw from their colonies, they left behind the idea of the state as the provider and government as the nation's primary if not exclusive social arbiter and economic actor. The withdrawal of the colonial powers ushered in new governments who adopted the idea *wholesale* understandably, they lacked ideas of their own and this can be traced to the fact that under colonial rule, the new leaders had never been exposed to meaningful participation and/or hands-on experience in state management. As such, they were both politically and economically ill equipped to adapt the welfare state system even to a form which remotely resembled the system as it had operated in Europe. Under the circumstances, the system failed to work for the new African states; this is illustrated by Turok (1987:8) who quotes a group of Kenyans as saying "...For it (independence) to be more than word, the colonized must take charge of their own affairs and obliterate colonial social and economic forms, creating fresh ones in every sphere...". They lamented that the entire colonial system had been passed on virtually intact and had been perpetuated in practically unchanged form in the previous two decade. The sentiments were an expression of disgruntlement by seemingly lack of reforms two decades into independence.

Babu (1981: 38) makes similar observations on the perpetuation of colonial systems of state management and argues that the lack of meaningful change can be traced to the fact that first of all, the new leaders were really struggling to manage a transition of incredible complexity. Secondly, in a situation in which they did not have any ideas of their own, the new leaders did indeed hang onto and perpetuated colonial state management systems. He further argues that for a welfare system to work, it requires substantial amounts of resources which the new states did not have understandably; they had inherited backward economies based on subsistence farming. In time however, there was a realization that the welfare state system was not workable and the new leaders retreated unfortunately, as they retreated, the gap between human needs and the capacity of the state to meet them widened. Equally

unfortunate was the fact that this was a time when pressure from the claimants of the benefits of liberation was mounting. Potholm (1988: 148) notes that such a situation was inevitable for in the quest to galvanise public support for the end of colonialism and convinced that after independence, a lot could be accomplished; political leaders had raised expectations amongst the masses. After independence and with expectations high, the masses increased their demands for opportunities, rewards, security and meaningful changes in the standards of daily living but which demands could not be met for lack of resources. Failure to meet the demands was to sow the seeds for disgruntlement and later, civil strife and conflict; according to Ake (2006: 2), this was inevitable for in addition to failing to deliver for lack of resources; the new leaders administered their states in an unusually statist manner. Such a style of management was inherited from colonial administrators; they were the sole decision maker in the distribution of land; on who should produce what and how; in the legislation of taxes and on the form and scope of the instruments of control amongst other things.

According to Windel (2009: 3) the statist management style of the new African leaders can be traced to a colonial heritage and in the sphere of education for example; for decades, colonial powers had left education for Africans to the missionaries however, the pressure exerted by the demands of expanding trade and administration forced the former to introduce state education in the colonies. Understandably, both the colonial administration and commercial enterprises needed local staff to fill in lower posts; posts which would have been difficult to fill with settlers and/or expatriates. Thus, with education designed to produce “miniature versions” of the colonial administrator and/or company executive, it was designed such that it would socialise Africans into the management styles of their prospective employers. For those considered lacking in the potential for such jobs, the colonial educational system was designed (Ake 2006: 2) not to enlighten and empower them but instead, to ensure a productive labour force that would remain steadfast in the performance of often tedious and disagreeable tasks. A combination of lack of exposure to sound state management systems coupled with inappropriate education and training saw the new leaders manage their new sovereign territories using inherited obsolete state management systems which were unworkable in the new order. The effects of such an order of things will become apparent at a later stage in the text.

### **2.2.2 Political ideology**

In the political sphere, Kiefe (1995: 109) notes that likewise, the new leaders were ill equipped to assume the mammoth task of establishing viable political institutions due to lack of experience; given, the new leaders had been exposed to different types of political institutions but that is all they had ever

had, exposure. This in the main was because in British colonies for example, while there were no explicit clauses barring Africans from participating fully in political affairs all the same, the constitutions contained clauses which made such participation by Africans impossible. This is evident in the then Southern Rhodesia where according to historical records (Government of Zimbabwe: 2006a), there was no explicit clause on racial segregation in the Constitution before 1969. Furthermore, as far back as 1923, the only explicitly spelt out criteria for eligibility to vote and/or be voted into political office was a stipulated minimum of immovable property formally owned; income (a minimum wage of a hundred pounds per year) and specified educational qualifications (ability to write fifty words in English). However, the criteria was covertly discriminatory against Africans for first of all, being predominantly rural as they were, ownership of immovable property (in the main, land), was not formalised in the form of possession of title deeds. Instead, acquisition was simply through a traditional inheritance system in which seniority amongst siblings and gender considerations were the main criteria. In the cities and towns, the housing provided for Africans in the townships belonged to the City or Town administration with Africans renting them from the said authorities. Secondly, not many Africans commanded the stipulated minimum income in those days for a common practice by colonial powers was to pay African workers “in kind”. An account by the researcher’s late mother who was a teacher from the mid-1930’s to the mid-1940’s was that she was often paid in food commodities; sugar, salt, cooking oil etc. and nearer Christmas, it was usually clothes and shoes; salary was rarely paid in cash Thirdly and according to Meredith (1985: 306) in the 50’s, out of its combined population of about two hundred million, Africa’s primary school enrolment stood at approximately 33.0 percent of the eligible age group and less than 3.0% of these obtained secondary school level education. Under the circumstances and in the then Southern Rhodesia for example, even if one was one was lucky to get an education and was able to write the required fifty words in English, the chances are that they did not officially own immovable property and/or command an income of a hundred pounds per year and thus would not be eligible to vote or be voted into political office.

The result of such covert marginalisation of Africans in Southern Rhodesia, (Government of Zimbabwe: 2006a) was that in 1928, only 62 blacks out of a total electorate of 22 000 or 0.28 percent were eligible to vote or be voted into office and in 1956, the figure was 560 blacks out of a total electorate of 52 000 or 1.0 percent; negligible figures by any standard. The situation was slightly better in French colonies for according to Potholm (1988: 38), in addition to the absence of explicit clauses segregating colonial subjects from indigenous French citizens; in the French constitution, the colonial

power actually saw and treated the colonies as part of France. To this effect, colonial subjects were integrated economically and socially into the larger framework with a small number of elite Africans being gradually absorbed into French life. Furthermore, Knife (1995: 57) observes that a new constitution carved by the Fourth Republic in 1945 made provisions for the colonies to enjoy a wide measure of political, administrative and economic reforms as junior partners of France. Such a gesture was in recognition of the role that the colonies had played when Paris fell to the Germans in 1940 and in particular, the fact that for a period, Brazzaville in French Congo had actually hosted what was left of the French government. The gesture saw Africans play some role in French Parliamentary elections (Meredith 1985: 18), resulting in nine black elites being elected as deputies from amongst the six hundred or so legislators who made up the Constituent Assembly. In time however, it became apparent that the reforms altered little in the balance of power in the colonies for the number of deputies was so small that their impact in terms of influencing parliamentary decisions and policies was negligible. Besides, while pursuing this policy of integration in which an African could attain equal status with a Frenchman, Potholm (1988: 38) notes that this concession was not allowed to interfere with the view that colonies were a source of manpower for France, an outlet for goods from the metropolis and a source of raw materials.

Schwab (2001:16) explains such covert or overt alienating arrangements as a manifestation of the fascism of colonialism whose agenda was removing the colonized from history; usurping any role they may have wished to play and socializing them into internalizing their inferiority. The lack of experience in running political institutions was to present a dilemma for the new African leadership for according to Kinfe (1995: 109), while in former British colonies for example, they had been exposed to the Westminster type of democracy however; the imperial power had not extended and/or applied the same democratic principles in administering the colonies. At the same time, they had also been exposed to the communist ideology and Stalin's one-party absolutism through the support and counsel the new leaders had enjoyed from Russia during their struggles for independence. However and yet again, exposure to communism is that is all they had had, but not hands on experience in such a system of state management. Besides, the argument continues, even if the new leaders had had hands on experience in both doctrines, neither of them were relevant to the new order in Africa characterized as they were, by centralism and authoritarianism.

On centralism and authoritarianism, Young (1994: 101) argues that notwithstanding the value tag placed on democratic principles and expounded by European colonial powers, they managed the colonies in an authoritative and absolutist style to assert their control and thus extract resources with no questions asked. He supports his argument by quoting a French official in Africa who is on record as stating that “...the European commandant is not posted to observe nature ...He has a mission... to impose regulations, to limit individual liberties...to collect taxes...” The same can be said of the Belgians in the Congo where Gann and Duignan (1979: 30) observed that following in the footsteps of the Dutch in Indonesia, King Leopold’s philosophy was that the colonies should be exploited, not by the operation of a market economy, but by state intervention and compulsory cultivation of cash crops to be distributed by and/or be sold by the state at controlled prices.

The centralist and authoritarian nature of Stalin’s one-party absolutism needs no elaboration it suffices to mention that according to Rees (2003: 40-41); in the 1930’s, by abandoning the long-established Lenin era practice of “democratic centralism”, Stalin’s motive was to shift the locus of power. Such a shift in the locus of power saw an end to a system of oligarchic rule and the erosion of mechanisms for collective leadership and accountability thereby establishing the perfect conditions for the personal dictatorship which characterised Stalin’s rule. With state management exposure limited to the Westminster type of democracy and Stalin’s one-party absolutism both of which were repressive and which repression the liberation struggles had been about, it was a dilemma for the new leaders. In a situation in which they were in no position come up with informed decisions of what would be in the best interests of their peoples, the new leaders resorted to experimenting with this, the other or a combination of political models. In this respect, Ayittey and Shirima (1999) cite the example of Tanzania where in 1967, the then President Nyerere castigated capitalism or the “money economy” arguing that it encouraged individual acquisitiveness and economic competition. Nyerere further argued that these attributes were foreign to Africa and contradicted the traditional forms of economic and social organisation based on socialist principles of communal ownership of the means of production and collective responsibility for the welfare and security of communities. Nyerere subsequently adopted an alternative political ideology; “African socialism” or “Ujamaa” to counteract what he referred to as the relentless pursuit of individual advancement; the concept took root and Tanzania became a nation of small-scale communalists.

Nyerere (Shivji 2009) saw Tanzania essentially as a nation of village communities and villagization as a means of accelerating development and facilitating provision of health, education, water and other

social services; to this effect, in the early 1970s; Nyerere embarked on a forced villagization programme in order to consolidate “Ujamaa”. According to Ayittey and Shirima (1999); by 1976, some 13 million peasants had been forced into 8,000 cooperative villages. In addition to forced relocation, Nyerere introduced regulation requiring peasants to sell their produce exclusively to the government which would subsequently do the distribution at prices determined by the state. Notwithstanding the enthusiastic backing of the Ujaama socialist experiment by western donors and the generous funding provided to make it work, the results were disastrous. Some scholars argue that the philosophy was doomed to fail and Maghimbi (1992: 228) points out that in part, this can be traced to a misconception by Nyerere that simply decreeing that villages will “revert” to the traditional forms of living would automatically turn them into the pre-colonial homogenous, cooperating and collectively responsible entities he had envisaged. A misconception it was indeed for very few such villages genuinely fitted the definition of Ujamaa; Ayittey and Shirima (1999) concur adding that this was inevitable for the “Ujaama” philosophy was based upon a complete misunderstanding by Nyerere, of African cultural heritage in so far as he misread the communalism of African traditional life to mean that the means of production in indigenous Africa were communally owned when in fact they were privately owned.

Ibhawoh and Dibua (2003) explain the failure of Ujamaa from another perspective arguing that while the philosophy was unique in its inward orientation and in its attention to social equity and distributive justice, it was self contradicting for it shared the same premise and fallacy of the concept “development” in so far as it was rooted in the belief that African peasants and rural dwellers were hapless victims of underdevelopment. Another contradiction was that while believing that reverting to African traditional values would spare the peasantry of the vices of capitalism and take them to higher levels of social and material well being at the same time however, “material well being” was defined in terms of the Westernization of the peasantry. The scholars conclude that the contradictions inherent in taking people back to traditionalism at the same as the Ujamaa ideology sought as to improve the conditions of the peasants according to Western standards were bound to result in failure of the philosophy to address the problems it was seeking to address. Babu (1981: xv) views the failure of Ujamaa from an economic development perspective and argues that first of all, Nyerere overlooked the broader market dynamics for which the peasantry would be expected to manage and in a situation in which they were inadequately prepared for such a degree of responsibility, the philosophy was bound to fail. Secondly, improvements were to be achieved through production methods firmly rooted in

social values corresponding to pre-feudal modes of production. Under the circumstances and in a situation in which the peasantry were expected to deal with market dynamics of the day, yet again, Nyerere completely overlooked the need to transform the peasant into a new person with corresponding new values which would enable him to rise up to new challenges created by the development of both new forces and relations of production.

Babu's argument is supported by Hoselitz (1995: 17) who argues that economic development consists not merely in a change in production techniques but equally important, a corresponding reorientation of social norms and values. Ayittey and Shirima (1999) concur adding that instead of taking the peasantry through a reorientation forwards in terms of social values and norms to enable them to stay abreast of the market dynamics of the day, the approach actually took the peasantry backwards. The peasantry was indeed taken backwards for a report published by the OECD (1998) has it that by the close of the millennium, more than three quarters of the population in Tanzania was still rural with most farmers still using traditional hand-tool techniques which could rarely cultivate more than two hectares in any given season. Besides, according to Ayittey and Shirima (1999), the impact of forced resettlement into Ujamaa villages went beyond socio-economic development considerations for the high population density generated in the process later proved to be an ecological disaster. They cite a United Nations report which estimated that by 1991; about one-third of Tanzania was threatened by desertification due to deforestation, over-grazing, over-cultivation and population density in some parts of the country because of the government's policy of villagization that was vigorously pursued in the 1970s.

### **2.2.3 Urban biased economic policies**

According to Knife (1995: 12), Africa was underdeveloped from the very outset and such a state of underdevelopment could not have been more evident than in the interior; remote and lacking in basic infrastructure. Such inequalities of colonial planning can be traced to the fact that colonial powers had been interested in investing only in those parts of the interior which had the potential to develop into reliable sources of raw materials and food commodities in demand back home. There was no interest on the part of the colonial powers to invest in the general development of the interior and so the seeds of a dualistic mode of development were sewn. These views are supported by Swift (1984) who notes that the main colonial powers namely Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium established the terms on which Africa would participate in the world economy. Thus for example, Britain's division of labour in

the colonies saw the growing of coffee earmarked for Kenya; cotton for Sudan and for Ghana, the climate was considered perfect for cocoa plantations. Furthermore, the preferred sectors were provided with supporting infrastructure; storage facilities complemented by road and rail networks to link administrative centres to the belts and/or locations which were considered strategic to production for export and trade. Traditional African food crops (maize, cassava, or sorghum) were restricted to areas of low agricultural potential with little if any supporting infrastructure.

The situation was no better in the French colonies for as Emeagwali (2003) observes, in Côte d'Ivoire for example, France considered the impact of colonial economic ventures on the conditions of the natives as externalities, if therefore any improvements were to be made in the condition of the natives, it was solely for the purpose of enhancing their performance as labourers! In addition to manpower, effective economic exploitation required infrastructure and in particular transport networks to move goods and labour from one part of the country to another. To this end, France invested heavily in the construction of roads, railways and harbours but only along those belts leading to the northern part of Côte d'Ivoire and the Sahel regions where French settlers had established plantations. Offiong (1980: 119) echoes these views adding that European powers did not establish colonial states to carry out a programme of political development or change but instead, to establish efficient and effective administrative states for the purposes of economic exploitation. At independence therefore, with the continent's role in the world economy limited to simply a "source of raw materials" for industries in the home countries, industrial development was limited to those sectors and locations which facilitated the exploitation and export of these resources. Agriculture for food security and industrial sectors for production for domestic markets in the colonies were certainly not high on the list of priorities; all the same and like they did in other spheres, the new leadership adopted and perpetuated the system of such a dualistic model of development.

In pursuit of such a model, the new leadership paid little attention to the development of the rural areas; the hub of agricultural productivity; the low levels of agricultural productivity and the related food insecurity that has characterized the continent for close to three decades is clearly linked to such an urban bias. Turok (1987: 15-16) notes that while agriculture was the only sector that would be the launching pad for economic development in Africa; it was dominated by the peasantry located in often remote and "forgotten" parts of the country. Remote as these parts of the country were, the new leaders made little if any effort to make the level of infrastructural investment necessary to facilitate increased agricultural productivity. In a situation in which the agricultural sector was grossly neglected at the



same time as the industrial sector in many a newly independent African state was still poorly developed, economic development was but an illusion. This situation Turok (1987: 16) further notes; can be traced to the fact that an appropriate level of investment was not on the new leaders' agenda for the insatiable drive for consumption overrun concern for production and while social services were provided, the provision of these was unbalanced; generally favouring the rich rather than the poor; the urban elite rather than the rural poor. Turok concludes that the capacity of the bourgeoisie-led post independence economies to generate growth as well as improve the living standards of the masses proved illusionary and records show that the policies pursued amounted to a massive betrayal of the interests of the people. Timberlake (1988: 1) shares these views and notes that the neglect of rural areas is evident in the fact that the importance of the agricultural sector was not reflected in development budgets worse still, the colonial policy of milking the economic surplus out of agriculture to meet needs of the towns and cities continued unabated.

Bates (1981: 35) attributes the practice of milking the economic surplus out of agriculture to meet needs of the towns and cities to a persistent urban bias which can be traced to the importance African leaders attached to political survival by amongst other things, appeasing the enlightened urban elite. Timberlake (1988: 1) illustrates this by quoting a relief worker in the Sahel during the famine of the early eighties as saying, "...starve the city dwellers and you have a riot; starve the peasants and they die. If you were a politician, which would you choose...?" Decades into independence, the neglect of the rural areas continued unabated for the leaders failed to recognize the positive correlation between infrastructural improvements in the rural areas and increased productivity. This is evident in Tanzania where over four decades into independence, in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, then President Mkapa (2003) argued "...the productivity of our farmers is limited by lack of access to loans..." It is apparent that in attributing limited productivity by farmers to lack of access to loans, he was denying the link between poor policies and the performance of the agricultural sector and in the context of Tanzania, the ill conceived Ujamaa philosophy cited earlier. In any case, such loans are often facilitated by external aid as such, they are administered through local banks and/or finance houses designated by and on borrowing terms and conditions set by no less than the recipient governments themselves. Harsh (1997) observed that better access to credit was increasingly recognized as an effective tool for improving agricultural productivity amongst poor farmers; to this effect, small and short-term loans of as little as \$100-200 could make a significant difference to their productivity and incomes. In Tanzania therefore, all it would have taken was for the government to

make the terms and conditions for borrowing favourable to farmers; after all, the size of the loans required as observed by Harsh was so small that as Head of State, Mukapa was probably getting that much as a daily “out-of-pocket” allowance!

Urban biased policies and the consequent neglect of rural areas acted as constraints against increased agricultural productivity in many ways; this is one explanation for the perennial food security crises that has characterized the continent for close to three decades. In turn, such perennial food insecurity on the continent has prompted the international community to respond to the crises on humanitarian grounds; to avert deaths from starvation. Over the years, NGOs have become major players in emergency food security response operations as was the case in Kenya during the drought of 1999-2001; 2004 and again in 2006.

#### **2.2.4 The failure of political institutions and the emergence of dictatorships**

According to the United Kingdom Government (2001: 6), even in those African countries where the transition to independence passed peacefully and the new leaders wasted no time in defining the role of the state in development and taking measures to harness national resources towards ensuring economic growth; it was by no means an easy process. The difficulties can be traced to the emergence of a typically African leadership style based on centralisation of power and patronage networks that allowed little popular involvement of the masses at national or local level. This observation is supported by Knife (1995: 101) who notes that faced with mounting pressure for meaningful political reforms, the new African leaders became as preoccupied with the problems of holding state together, political control and staying in power as much as they were with development policies. Babu (1981: 38) shares these views adding that the consequent dictatorial tendencies resulted in a situation in which a trend that soon emerged was the concentration of power in the hands of a leading clique to begin with and in time, such arrangements degenerated into the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual, the Head of State. Babu (1981: 39) concludes that such one-man dictatorship emerged not by accident but instead, by design through the creation of a one party state whose justification was the argument that the masses were not yet ready for democracy!

Some scholars argue that one party states were the creation of colonial powers who would not let go and amongst these scholars is Knife (1995:19) who cites the example of Niger of which he says on granting self-government to the former colony, France banned all political parties except the Nigerien Progressive Party (NPP) with Hamani Diori, the party leader becoming Prime Minister in 1959; Niger

thus became a one-party state from the very outset. This view on France's contribution to the emergence of a one party state in Niger is supported by Sharife (2010) who notes that France's smooth handover of power in the former colony was realised through negotiated military and resource agreements that interlocked the interests of France with those of handpicked "native governors" in the run up to independence. The agreements saw France being granted preferential and priority access to strategic resources and in particular, uranium deposits as well the space to position and maintain French military bases in the former colony to sustain the rule of dictators who were expected to reciprocate by protecting French interests at the same time as keep the dictators in line. According to Knife (1995: 20), on assuming power and with France's support, Diori became a respected figure worldwide for his role as a spokesman for African affairs. At home however, he became increasingly unpopular for what was perceived as his neglect of domestic affairs and his tendency to favour family members, close friends and fellow Djerma tribesmen in cabinet and other important appointments. Surrounded by an inner circle of staunch loyalists, corruption in his administration became the order of the day; this generated disgruntlement amongst the masses to the extent that barely four years into his rule in 1963, there was an attempted coup but which Diori successfully repressed with the support of French military troops.

According to Knife (1995:19), such arrangements and support from the former colonial powers nurtured the environment for dictatorial rule which in time; reduced African politics to personal and/or factional power struggles. In such an environment, leaders ruled not through parliamentary systems and constitutions which they had inherited from the departing colonial authorities but instead, through manipulation; amending and rewriting constitutions to extend extraordinary power and discretion to a leader at the same time as restricting the power of the representative assemblies (parliaments). In countries where constitutions were not so manipulated, their provisions were simply ignored and/or electoral systems were changed to ensure that the government of the day could never lose an election. Another dimension of colonial legacy in the political sphere according to Berman (1998) was the nature of political relationships in the colonial state which he argues, typically took on a patron/client form for colonial administrators sought to secure the loyalty of chiefs and headmen. To this effect, the former often provided these functionaries with "benefits" to supplement their meagre official salaries; such a practice nurtured the notion that the state was the principle source of benefits and a perception that a patron/client relationship was critical to maintaining power and access to the state resources. By the time the colonial states recoiled, African elites who later became leaders had internalised such

practices; the seeds of nepotism were sewn; nepotism flourished especially where a leader had the support of the former colonial power as is evident in Niger under Dirori.

On nepotism, Ake (1996:4) notes that nepotistic tendencies by the new African leaders can be traced to the make-up of nationalist movements which he argues that while united by common grievances against colonial oppression, these groups were essentially a coalition of disparate groups as such, unity amongst these nationalist coalitions was artificial, fragile and never free from tension and conflict. At independence therefore; a combination of the high value tag placed on capturing and consolidating power; fear of losing the power to rival groups coupled with socialization under a colonial system in which one had to “buy” support and loyalty resulted in a situation in which they did exactly that to maintain their power. According to Kinfe (1995: 101), this is evident in the fact that civil services filled by loyalists and influential individuals deemed necessary for political survival grew at an alarming rate. He further notes that the impact of the growth of these institutions is such even up to the present, the state remains the biggest employer in many an African country with the civil service salary bill accounting for a grossly disproportionate part of national budgets. Meredith (1985: 53-4) shares the views by Kinfe (1995: 101) and argues that with loyalty the main criteria for appointment to political office and/or a senior public service position; civil servants acted not as catalysts of change but as instruments for the continued political control of those to whom they owe their salaries, benefits and favours. An example of civil servants and government officials acting as instruments of their benefactors is in Zimbabwe where in the run up to the controversial 2002 Presidential elections, one Jonathan Moyo (2002) then Minister of Information was quoted as categorically stating that civil servants who belonged to and/or sympathized with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) had no place in the employment of the government adding that they should resign or risk being fired!

Finally, another perspective to the emergence of dictatorship is given by Knife (1995: 98) who argues that this can be traced to the fact that during their struggles for independence, African nationalist leaders had been forced to operate underground and/or resort to guerilla warfare. As such, the only experience of leadership and governance they had ever had was leading liberation movements in a state of war and tension. In such an environment, there is no room for the application of democratic principles; be it in the choice of leadership and/or decision making and some leaders simply emerged by virtue of their prowess in guerrilla warfare. Unfortunately, come independence, some such leaders failed to make the transition from “guerrilla warfare leader” to “statesman” and government business

continued to be run using liberation politics methods. Amongst such methods was maintaining popular support amongst the masses by clinging onto broad anti-colonial rule slogans but with political manifestos void of any specific content with respect to political, economic and social advancement. Such a genesis and the consequent style of leadership displayed by some of the new leaders are illustrated by Kidane (2009) in his account of the rise to power of Isaias Aferweki, the President of the Republic of Eritrea. He says of Aferweki that within four years of joining Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) guerrilla movement at the age of twenty, he was appointed the commander of the armed wing. In time, he defected from the ELF and joined a splinter group, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) where within a short period, the leadership qualities he displayed in guerrilla warfare made him popular and a hero of the Eritrean struggle for independence. In 1991, when Eritrea eventually gained independence from Ethiopia, he was the Eritrean peoples' preferred choice of Head of State however ten years into his rule, it was apparent to many Eritreans that he had not changed from a guerrilla warfare leader to a Head of State. Many went into exile for fear of their lives and have since been describing their homeland as the "North Korea" of Africa and Aferweki as its "Kim Jong-Il...a paranoid, irrational, eccentric and reclusive leader..."

In the light of the such a political discourse and while Ake (2006: 3-4) acknowledges that political independence did bring about changes in the composition of the state managers however, the character of the state remained much as it had been during the colonial era; controlling every aspect of the economy tightly to maintain its power and domination. He concludes that political independence turned out to be not the heroic achievement it was meant to be but instead, mere accommodation of radical elements in nationalistic movements and/or racial integration. This in the main was because the tendency to reproduce the past was reinforced by the disposition of the dominant social forces in the post colonial era. As such and with a few exceptions, the gaining of independence was not so much a defeat of colonialism as it was acceptance by the colonial powers of the inevitable and hence the orchestrating of a handover of government to their chosen African successors who could be trusted to share their values and be attentive to their interests.

### **2.2.5 Conflict, civil and cessation wars**

Conflict, civil and cessation wars which characterized the continent in the post independence period can be traced to disgruntlement of the masses with dictatorial tendencies of the new leaders and some scholars amongst them, Abbink (2002:3) attribute such tendencies to colonial legacy. Abbink argues

that the humiliation and/or destruction of African societies under colonialism and the continued subjection of African economies and state policies to dependency relations with the developed world inevitably rendered African leaders unable to construct a legitimate and inclusive national polity. Chiriyankandath (2008: 45) concurs adding that the new states faced the unprecedented challenge of fashioning a peculiarly *modern* form of statehood modelled not on basic forms of a state but on the elaborate modern Western state that had been developed over centuries. Furthermore, the argument continues, the new states were inhibited by the fact that the conditions in which power was transferred were often far from optimal. Thus, even in cases where independence was achieved relatively peacefully and was not preceded by violence and/or an armed struggle, it was marred by the hurried transfer of administrative responsibilities, belated and unsustainable political compromises, economic dependence and largely untested legislatures and governments. On unsustainable political compromises, untested legislatures and governments, Chiriyankandath (2008: 45) cites one Nolutshungu who observed that in Nigeria, the post-colonial political system was fatefully structured along regional and ethnic lines; in the process such an arrangement introduced elitist and paternalist notions of democracy. In turn, this sowed the seeds for authoritarian rule as the ruling group at any given point in time tried to cling onto power; unfortunately, such a style of leadership quickly and tragically gave way to successive military coups barely six years into independence not to mention a three-year civil war in Biafra that was to claim close to three million lives.

On the destructive nature of colonialism on African societies, Schwab (2001:16) shares the views and argues that the arbitrary drawing of borders simply on the basis of the political and/or economic strategic importance of a stretch of territory or on the grounds that a physical landmark (river or mountain range) was convenient for such demarcation resulted in the social dislocation and/or division of groups of people hitherto identifying themselves as one (a clan or tribe) and assigning them new national identities. An example that comes to mind in the splitting of even families is the interesting profile of one Aggrey Awori (Government of Uganda: 2009), Minister of Information and Communications Technology in the Republic of Uganda at one point in time. The Awori family was traditionally characterised by polygamous marriages and typical of such families, they tended to be large with households spread across a relatively wide area. During the demarcation of the border between Kenya and Uganda, the family was split with some Aworis “becoming” Ugandans while the others became Kenyans. While still in the opposition, Aggrey was a presidential candidate in the Ugandan elections of 2002; ironically, at that point in time, his elder half brother was the Vice

President of the Republic of Kenya. Thus, had Aggrey won the election in Uganda, he would have been the President of the Republic of Uganda at the same time as his elder half brother was the Vice President of the Republic of Kenya!

With respect to the splitting of groups, Potholm (1988:215) cites the example of Somalia where he notes that unlike in most African countries; throughout the ages, the population of what until 1991 was the Republic of Somalia was virtually homogeneous; however, the strategic possibilities presented by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 generated interest amongst the European colonial powers. To this effect, by the turn of the century, the British had laid claim to what in the present day is the unilaterally declared state of “Somaliland” in the north west; the French laid claim to what is present day Djibouti in the north with the Italians laying claim to the central and southern part of what was formerly the Republic of Somalia until it disintegrated in 1991. Potholm (1988: 216) further notes that after colonization, the only period that Somalis experienced unity as a people was after the outbreak of World War II when Italy occupied British Somalia. During the occupation, Italy brought Somalia under a single government and Somalis were seen and treated as a unitary group however, the arrangement was short lived for the British regained their former territory in a counter offensive in 1941. On reverting to British rule and while the colonial power did little in terms of developing the territory, it did however permit and even encourage political activity; to this effect, by 1947, the Somali Youth League hitherto the Somali Youth Club and the Hisbia Digil Mirifle hitherto the Patriotic Benefit Union were established political parties. However, notwithstanding the space and opportunity to participate in pluralistic politics, the political parties that emerged were characterized by clan and lineage loyalties for a number of reasons. Amongst such reasons is that in Somali culture and first of all, kinship was and continues to be an important factor in placing an individual in society and providing him with a point of reference. Secondly, there is also a strong achievement orientation in Somali culture which Schwab (2001:16) argues, can be traced to colonial administrative practice of selecting one sub-group to serve the colonial administration and thus elevating it into the “elite” relative to the rest who remained politically and economically marginalized.

The social dynamics of affiliation and achievement which is the defining characteristic of Somali clan culture is evident in a study carried out by the World Bank (2005a: 16) in which it was found that members of a clan or sub-clan tend to provide unqualified support to their leaders as they see their upward mobility closely associated with the success of their clan or sub-clan. According to Dersso (2009:2-3), the Darood was the elite clan at independence understandably, they had been selected and

elevated above the rest through exposure to the British colonial administration as junior clerks and assistants amongst other positions. In addition, they had been exposed to political mobilisation through the establishment of the Somali Youth League as far back as the 1940's with the rest of the clans marginalised and repeatedly subjected to violence and repression by the state during the period of colonization. Independence changed little for the marginalised clans for as Potholm (1988:219-20) notes, from the time Somalia became a Republic in 1960 through to 1969, three successive Prime Ministers, Sharmarke; Husseyn and Egal were all from the same clan, the Darood. Furthermore, the potential for conflict was fuelled by the behaviour of the ruling Darood who continued with the exploitative and extractive practice inherited from the colonial powers. The institutionalisation of the exploitation of the other clans set the stage for antagonism and rivalry as various groups vied for control of the state machinery for political dominance; the ensuing power struggles resulted in a brutal civil conflict and secessionist clan war that saw the former Republic of Somalia disintegrate in 1991. Two decades on, the conflict continues unabated and with no substantive government in place since then, what is left of Somalia is not recognised as a sovereign state and by United Nations definition, its citizens are "stateless". Such a definition extends to those Somalis in the unilaterally and self declared state of "Somaliland" a breakaway republic governed by a secessionist administration but which remains unrecognized by any state or international organization even though regional states and Israel have expressed such a possibility in future. In the light of this, Potholm concludes that the introduction of political and social relations/structures alien to Somali religious and clan-based traditional political structures and social organisation effectively undermined and transformed such indigenous structures to the extent of alienating some clans in the process.

In time, such a colonial legacy was taken to another level whereby competition and conflicts degenerated from the ethnic/clan to the individual level. In this respect, Tadjó (2004) cites the example of Côte d'Ivoire which under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny from independence in 1960 through to 1993, a combination of sound foreign investment policies and a policy welcoming migrant labour from neighbouring countries saw the country become the most advanced economy in West Africa. Houphouët-Boigny was succeeded by Henri Bédié in what according to Lamin (2005: 11), was a fierce contest against one Allasane Ouattara, the prime minister since 1990; on assuming power, Bédié proceeded to exclude Ouattara and his followers from full participation in political processes. The justification for such exclusion according to Badmus (2009: 51); was a Bédié-conceived and state sponsored ethno-nationalist ideology sweeping the country at the time, "*Ivoirité*" or "real" Ivorian



citizenship which by definition, such a status applied only to those for whom both parents were Ivorians. The ideology eventually became law and according to Tadjó (2004), the law was used to bar a substantial number of northerners from running for office and/or from voting on the grounds that they were not “real” Ivorians. Understandably, because of Houphouët-Boigny’s policy of welcoming migrant labour from neighbouring countries; many northerners were of mixed parentage; amongst this category was Ouattara for who one of his parents was from Bukina Faso. The protests and civil strife that followed the barring of Ouattara from running for office saw Bédié’s rule last only nine months (Nanga 2005); he was replaced by Robert Guei in December 1999 who likewise, also barred Ouattara and his supporters from participation in political processes. As if history was repeating itself (Tamakloe 2011), Guei was deposed in a coup and forced to flee the country after only ten months in office; he was replaced by Laurent Gbagbo who like his predecessors; also barred Ouattara and his supporters from participation in political processes. The catalogue of the chaos and violence witnessed in Côte d’Ivoire from 1999 through to 2011 and which can be traced to political power struggles is well documented and needs no elaboration. It suffices to mention that it took no less than political and military peacekeeping interventions by both the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to bring the chaos and violence to an end in April 2011.

The catalogue of civil strife and conflicts in Africa is long but to name only a few; Abbink (2002:3) sums the catalogue by explaining that a remarkable domain of antagonism in contemporary Africa’s political discourse is obviously that of communal identity notions. He further argues that the notions in which regional, societal or ethnic characteristics have come to play an important role were conceived and nurtured in the framework of colonialism. Furthermore, since the emergence of the post-colonial state, such a colonial heritage has since been reinforced by the current phase of globalization. The result of undergoing such a process has been to bring out differences rather than similarities for in a political environment characterized by power struggles, the creation of “others” and the emergence of patterns of exclusion became necessary for any group’s political survival. These views are supported by Kiefe (1995: 64) who expands the argument by pointing out that in the process of allocating themselves territory simply on the basis of economic interest, little attention was paid to existing ethnic boundaries and/or tribal power structures. The end result was a legacy of national identity crisis, border disputes and secessionist aspirations all of which have been pervasive all over Africa since then.

The consequences of the perennial civil strife and/or conflict (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer 1996:41), were first of all, the erosion of the potential for economic development understandably, conflict results in disinvestment, destruction of infrastructure and the deterioration of human and other forms of social capital. Secondly, given that armed conflict situations always involve two armies and inevitably, one or both are funded through the government budget; expenditure on defence becomes the priority. In turn, prioritising expenditure on defence means that a disproportionate percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used for the purpose to the detriment of economically productive sectors. Thirdly, in the post war period, restructuring of expenditure might not necessarily free up resources for social and economic development for a government must of necessity demobilise a substantial portion of its over-inflated but now redundant military force. Fourth, in an effort to be “better prepared and equipped” next time round, a common tendency is to use the savings so made to improve the quality of the military force through training and/or acquisition of better military hardware amongst other things.

In concluding this section, the arguments of the proponents of the colonial legacy school of thought that the catalogue of civil strife and conflict in Africa can be traced to a colonial legacy is strong not least, because the seeds of such strife and conflict were sewn by amongst other things, the division of peoples and the pitching of selected and elevated groups against their fellow compatriots in the quest to keep the wheels of the then colonial administration oiled and in motion. At the same time, it can be argued that passing a law as happened in Ivory Coast; that barred an individual from holding office when in fact that same individual hitherto; had held the second highest office in the land with no questions asked (!) points to manipulation for political ends and this has nothing to do with colonialism.

### **2.3 The Cold War era**

Scholars such as Hadenius (2002) argue that Africa was a “casualty” of the Cold War from two perspectives; politically and economically. With respect to the political perspective, Hadenius (2002:6) argues that in the main, this was a result of the fact that the United States, one of the principals of the Cold War and its allies notably Great Britain and France amongst others; were pushing for western ideology and corresponding democratic forms of government. Smillie (1995: 116) shares these views and notes that the importance the alliance attached to governance based on democratic principles was evident in Ethiopia during the well documented famine of the 1980’s. During the crisis and for a long time, Western governments ignored repeated requests for food aid by the Ethiopian government for the

perception then was that accounts of the gravity of the situation were exaggerations by a brutal and pro-Soviet regime; they hoped that the famine would deepen the political crisis and Mengistu would find himself in exile sooner rather than later. Then there was the Soviet Union, the other principal of the war; Babu (1981: 12) notes that disgruntled and distrusting the colonial model of political, social and economic organisation, African nationalists who had come into contact with communism welcomed Soviet counsel and readily accepted and internalised the political ideology. Thus, as the West and East extended the battlefield beyond Europe, African states were caught at an “ideological crossroads” and faced with such a dilemma; they treaded carefully, veering from one side to the other. Babu further notes that the dilemma faced by African leaders can be traced to the fact that notwithstanding the relationship with the Soviet Union, for a number of reasons, the newly independent states did not completely cut off the umbilical cord with their former colonial powers either.

This view is supported in a report published by no less than a former colonial power and a strong ally of the United States during the Cold War (United Kingdom Government 2001: 6) in which it is acknowledged that the problems of governance in the newly independent African states were exacerbated by political and commercial rivalry between the principal Cold War belligerents and the reluctance of former colonial powers to cede influence even after formal independence. According to Young (2003:4) by “sitting on the fence” in the face of such a dilemma, African leaders hoped that a neutral position would give them a bargaining chip in so far as the antagonising super powers would be courting them for ideological influence and dominance. Furthermore, African leaders hoped that they would be protected in so far as the two super powers and their allies had generally legitimated some elements of global pluralism in the social systems of sovereign states. Besides; there was an agreed code of conduct between the principal Cold War belligerents restricting non-interference in the internal affairs of their allies outside Europe. This according to Meredith (1985: 156); was wishful thinking and/or an inaccurate appraisal of events on the world stage by African leaders for their adoption of a non committal position was to render Africa vulnerable to overt and covert foreign interventions second time round. This is the main, was a result of the fact while the legitimisation of global pluralism in the social systems of sovereign states meant some restrictions on interventions in the internal affairs of these sovereign states, it however did not mark the end of foreign interventions in the independent African states. Thus, while the United States and its allies began to play down the

promotion of democratic and related principles in governance as a primary agenda for the War, it turned its focus on military and security policy considerations.

With respect to military and security policy considerations, Lemanchard (1982: 116) cites the example of Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the then Belgian Congo and a continent-wide respected nationalist leader who did not last for consistency in his views on the evils of colonialism and steadfastness in his vision for a truly independent Congo. Lumumba had once been described by the United States government as a man not to be trusted, a person who was "...a Castro or worse..." and in the quest to ensure that Western military and security interests were not compromised by Lumumba, the CIA discovered Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, a newly appointed army Chief of Staff. Lemanchard further notes that perceiving Mobutu as an "impartial arbiter" in a conflict that developed between the then President, Joseph Kasabavu and the Prime Minister, it is alleged that the CIA played a direct role in influencing Kasabavu's decision to use Mobutu to depose Lumumba. Lumumba was subsequently and violently removed from power and replaced by Mobutu; a man considered friendly to Western interests. However, despite the fact that for close to four decades, Congo's people suffered under the dictatorship of Mobutu, the United States continued to support him. This view is shared by Young & Turner (1985: 389) who note that in 1977, when Shaba Province was invaded by the dissident group, Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), the United States played albeit, a belated and inconsequential role in support of Mobutu. However, during the second invasion in 1978, the super power played a much more active and decisive role by providing transportation and logistical support to French and Belgian paratroopers that were deployed to aid Mobutu against the rebels.

In Angola, according to Leao and Rupiya (2005); even before independence, foreign interests were building up as a result of the failure of the three main Angolan liberation movements to reach an agreement on the model of power-sharing at independence. As independence approached, conflict among the liberation movements intensified, so did foreign interests; the warring superpowers were particularly eager to ensure that the faction that assumed power after independence was one which would be friendly; most sympathetic to their ideological cause and one which would guarantee the protection of their economic interests. On its part, the United States government authorised a grant of US\$300,000 to the pro-Western National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in January 1975. The Soviet Union's reaction to this development was increased arms deliveries to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Alarmed, the United States increased funding to the

FNLA and for the first time, funded the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); yet again, the Soviet Union reacted only this time round, indirectly through its ally, Cuba which had been aiding the MPLA since the mid-1960s. Cuba sent military instructors in late spring in 1975 and by early October, more Cuban military personnel had arrived and this time round, it was not as instructors but as combat troops. According to Malaquias (2000), realising that Angola was becoming an “off-site” battle ground in the ideological warfare between East and West with the country caught in the crossfire; Agostinho Neto then President, seriously considered the adoption of a non-aligned foreign policy. Unfortunately, Neto did not live long enough to make the policy changes he was contemplating and on his death only four years into his rule in 1979; his successor José Eduardo dos Santos, a Soviet-trained petroleum engineer abandoned any pretence of a non-aligned position in favour of even closer ties with the former Soviet Union and Cuba.

The Soviet Union welcomed this new foreign policy orientation in Angola and by 1986, (Franklin 1997: 219) Angola was playing a central role in the Cold War; reciprocating, the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Eastern bloc nations increased their support for the MPLA government. To this effect, the Soviet Union gave an additional \$1 billion to assist the Angolan government in its war against the other factions while Cuba sent in an additional 2,000 troops to the already 35,000-strong force serving in Angola. At the same time, Savimbi’s relations with influential American conservatives became stronger for he was seen a key ally of the U.S. effort to oppose and rollback Soviet-backed, non-democratic governments around the world. According to Talbot (2002), Henry Kissinger, then US Secretary of State defended the United States involvement in Angola and in particular, support for the FNLA and UNITA in terms of limiting Soviet influence. The justification was bought across the political divide in both Senate and Congress and according to Malaquias (2000), the perception in the United States in the early 1980’s; that under dos Santos, Angola was the face of communism in the region saw the US government pursuing a clear and unambiguous policy to overthrow the MPLA regime and bring UNITA to power through the ballot box or bullets!

With respect to the economic considerations, Gilpin (2001: 5) notes that during the Cold War, while political and ideological considerations were indeed critical and the United States and its major allies generally subordinated potential economic conflict to the need to maintain military and security cooperation however, they did not lose sight of the profit motive. These views are shared by Kinfe (1995: 63) who points out that protection of economic interests and the fear of losing western investments and commercial gains made in Africa led to a degree of protectionism that was yet again,

to translate into overt and covert foreign interventions. The importance attached to protecting western economic interests is evident in Niger where according to Knife (1995:20), notwithstanding the one party state dictatorship which characterised Diori's rule, France continued to support him to the extent of providing him with military advisors and troops to assist him to crush an attempted coup in 1963. In 1972 however, the relationship soured when Diori insisted that the former colonial power pays a realistic price for the country's uranium exports. The threat posed by Diori on the former colonial power's economic interests was not taken lightly; he had to go and he did go when one Lieutenant Colonel Seyni Kountché led a successful military coup ironically, with the support of French military advisors and troops, an arrangement which had saved Diori from a coup ten years earlier!

The western alliance was not the only party in pursuit of the profit motive for according to Knife (1995:73), while Soviet Union assistance was supposed to assist the newly independent states to break their economic dependence on the *imperialist* West and to develop their economies independently, the focus of the assistance was on the development of the state sector and not the broader economy. These views are shared by Kanet (2006: 336) who observes that until the mid-1960s, Soviet support to the Third World was limited to providing weaponry and military training; economic and technical assistance was modicum. In addition to military support, the super power also sponsored a growing numbers of students from the Third World to study in the Soviet Union and in other European communist countries however, this was not so much to equip them with the skills they needed to make a meaningful contribution to development in their home countries upon return but instead; to ensure the emergence of African elites who would propagate the communist ideology. Knife (1995:73) concurs adding that these arrangements were meant to ensure that the beneficiaries of the assistance would remain ideologically loyal and economically dependent on the super power. Besides and unlike the assistance from the West and notwithstanding the fact that Soviet assistance was for unproductive sectors, a vast portion of it was in the form of repayable credits. To this effect, between 1954 and 1977, of the US\$ 1.8 billion assistance committed by the Soviet Union to Africa, only slightly more than US\$ 50 million or 2.7% was in the form of non repayable grants. Under such arrangements, Soviet assistance did not yield any economic benefits for Africa on the contrary; such arrangements resulted in indebtedness merely for consumption and not for investment purposes.

In concluding this section, it is apparent that during the Cold War, regardless of the style of leadership, a dictator or otherwise, an African leader could count on the support of whichever side of the East-West ideological divide he was aligned; in any case, in a number of cases, some leaders owed their

positions to this or the other side of such a divide anyway. However, while such support was forthcoming from whichever side, it did not necessarily translate into social and economic development for in the main; it was limited to military support to ward off politically and ideologically “incorrect” opposition groups. As such, the support was not so much designed to benefit allies in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World but those providing it in terms of having the upper hand in the ideological warfare and/or protecting the latter’s economic interests. Furthermore and for Africa in particular, one outcome of getting caught up in the Cold War was the creation of a vicious cycle for in the quest to maintain their ideological dominance; the super powers went to the extent of creating and/or nurturing dictatorships; with no voice to express their objection to and/or opposition against such leadership styles, the masses often resorted to uprisings. Such uprisings often degenerated into full blown civil conflict meaning that there could be no meaningful development as resources and energy were diverted toward war efforts.

In turn, oppressive administrative machineries and/or perceived continued failure by governments to provide for the masses were to trigger even more dissent to which the reaction of a government so threatened was often, an even higher degree of heavy handedness. Such a reaction by a sitting government would result in an even higher degree of dissent eventually leading to coup after coup and needless to say, further digression along the development continuum. For the African states, perennial civil strife if not all out war meant that there could be no meaningful development as the military imperative took precedence and resources were diverted towards war efforts. As such, despite the political rhetoric, assertions and cosmetic modifications designed to give the impression that the business of managing political and economic affairs was firmly in African hands, decisions on both continued to be heavily influenced by political and economic interests in the metropolitan capitals of both sides of the Cold War ideological divide.

#### **2.4 Africa’s dilemma in the new post Cold War economic order**

During the Cold War, even in those countries which were spared of the destabilising effects of foreign interventions and some degree of productivity was possible all the same, markets were limited since access to world markets was determined by ideological allegiances. According to Gilpin (2001: 13) the end of the Cold War ushered in an increasing acceptance of economic liberalism and the opening up of global markets; access which hitherto, was determined by ideological allegiances. The opening up of access to global markets in the post-Cold War era is evident in a report by the British Broadcasting Corporation (2004) on Ethiopia in which the British government is said to have dispatched a high level

ministerial level delegation on a mission to Addis Ababa to “...strengthen economic ties...” with Ethiopia. During the Cold War, Ethiopia was considered a pariah and such a gesture would have been unthinkable then; by the end of the mission and given the new world order, no less than a ten year aid agreement covering a variety of development and economic sectors had been signed. The new world order would have been good news for the less developed countries only according to FAO (2003: 17-18) and in Africa in particular, a broad range of factors including differentiated population dynamics; effects of climatic change; the level of technical development and domestic policies amongst others, resulted in a situation in which the playing field could not possibly be level. Such unfavourable conditions for comparative and competitive advantages resulted in a situation in which in Africa, expenditures on imports always exceeded that on exports understandably; the know-how and the pre-requisite technology to producing finished products which meet global standards had to be imported.

Streeten (2001: 368-9) gives another perspective to competitive advantage and argues that for the majority African states, attaining this status required structural adjustment, the very essence of development. In turn, such adjustment in the context of a globalised political economy required adapting from country to town; from agriculture to industry; from production for household consumption to production for markets and from largely domestic trade to a higher ration of foreign trade. Streeten however notes such adaptation often resulted in both favourable and unfavourable changes; favourable changes included unexpected improvements in the terms of trade, availability of additional foreign capital for investment and greater benefits from the international division of labour while unfavourable changes were manifest in high social costs because often, such changes were forced upon a country, “...too late...” According to Shah (1998), for many a Third World country and Africa in particular, change was indeed forced upon them “...too late...” for first of all, structural adjustment was forcing them into the global market place before they were economically and socially stable and ready to adjust. Secondly, they were being told to concentrate on cash crops and commodities produced elsewhere in the world in a situation in which they were lagging behind in know-how and technology. Thirdly, they were being told to export more in order to raise enough money to timely pay off their debts but in a situation in which their commodities could not meet global standards for lack of know-how and technology both of which were at a cost many an African state could not afford. Understandably, at that point in time, some African states were already heavily indebted; the list of factors undermining Africa’s comparative advantage is long but to name a few.



Fair (1985: 177) adds another perspective to the problem and argues that the structural adjustment programmes “recommended” to African governments in the wake of the post Cold War era involved broad packages characterised by cuts in government spending and in particular cuts on personnel costs in often over-inflated civil services. Other measures included doing away with food subsidies; inefficient parastatals and more reliance on the private sector; devaluing currencies and better accounting. Some African governments took heed of the recommendations and religiously implemented the measures however, amongst the social welfare “casualties” of spending cuts and in particular, in the civil service; were groups to whom the majority of African ruling parties owed their status as the “government of the day”; some paid heavily for so “towing the line”. The Ivory Coast comes to mind as an example of a government that so paid heavily for according to Schwab (2001: 143), the decision by the government in the 1990’s to restructure public enterprises led to layoffs and pay cuts; banks collapsed and loans were recalled. In the agricultural sector, the move to stabilise commodity prices on behalf of cocoa farmers at a time when the commodity’s price was steeply declining resulted in many a farmer going bankrupt. The ensuing economic crisis triggered strikes and protests of a level not witnessed hitherto. Schwab concludes that the political, ethnic and religious discord that confronted the Ivory Coast in the late 1990s into 2001 can be traced in part to the economic policies pursued by an unpopular government. A similar situation was witnessed in Sudan where according to Timberlake (1988: 179), enjoying a special client relationship with the United States, President Jaafar Nimeiri took advantage of the superpower's Economic Policy Initiative (EPI) which offered \$500 million to those nations willing to undertake “more dynamic, growth oriented economic policies”. His attempt to implement the “recommended” measures; devaluation of the currency and the slashing of subsidies on basic commodities were to be the trigger factor for the riots that ended his rule in 1985.

African governments were clearly in an unenviable position for in order to be competitive, they had to implement structural adjustment programmes but then, the unfavourable changes associated with such adjustment generated dissent, civil strife and even conflict; a phenomenon whose impact on economic development amongst other causes had rendered them the “poor cousin” in global business competitiveness in the first place! This view by is supported by Abdul-Raheem (2000) who observes that over the years and time after time, African governments have succeeded in convincing the IMF, World Bank and other western controlled lending institutions that they are so poor that without the latter’s loans, there can be no improvements in the health and education sectors and/or in

infrastructure. In the process of benefiting from loans for such purposes however; when their hold on power is threatened, they can easily mobilise enough resources to arm and equip their armies and wage counter insurgency wars for years! This they are able to do because notwithstanding the fact that the Third World and African countries in particular, turned out to be bad debtors; the arms industry in Europe and North America readily sell landmines to the latter on credit terms without much persuasion. Abdul-Raheem laments that it is a tragedy that increasingly, many African governments have become totally dependent on food aid to avert deaths amongst the masses; at the same time however, the same African states are self sufficient in landmines when their positions are threatened! Abdul-Raheem's views of business malpractice in the arms industry in Europe and North America were once echoed by former President Mahathir of Malaysia (2003) who in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation accused the West of creating and sponsoring wars in the Third World by using member countries as testing ground for new models of weapons. In order to maximise profit, the allegation continued, arms dealers in the West were selling weapons to one side in a conflict and should they prove superior to those used by the other side; they would persuade the latter to buy the same model or an improved version in order to match or have superior firepower over the adversary!

In other sectors, Abbink (2002:3) argues that while the end of the Cold War and the new liberalized global economic order in which all members supposedly had equal status and access to markets was in itself good however, not so direct and/or covert foreign interventions designed to promote and ensure the continued protection of the economic interests of the economically powerful nations continued. This argument is supported by Knife (1995: 18) who argues that such protection of the economic interests of the economically powerful nations is evident in the fact that from independence through to the liberalised global economic order, the most critical decisions affecting the political economy in the Third World and in Africa in particular (access to investment opportunities and markets amongst others) continued and continue to be made in the metropolitan capitals. More seriously, such decisions were and continue to be made in forums marked by a conspicuous absence of African participants. This view by Knife is supported by Gilpin (2001: 18-19) who notes that notwithstanding the supposed subordinated role of the state in the new and liberalised global economic order, powerful governments continued to be the primary actors in both domestic and international economic affairs. In addition, they continued to set the rules within which other actors functioned and used their power to influence economic outcomes in a bid to protect their nations.

The views by Knife (1995: 18) and Gilpin (2001: 18-19) are evident from a conference convened in Washington by the United States government in June 2003 to discuss subsidies awarded to farmers. During the conference, one Nicholas Berg (2003), then a Senior Vice President of the World Bank and a key note speaker at the conference observed that other than stakeholder multilateral financial institutions (World Bank; IMF etc.) and United Nations agencies (Food and Agricultural Organisation etc.); the rest of the participants were from the economically powerful Europe and North America; representation from the Third World including Africa was conspicuously absent. He subsequently took it upon himself to assume the role of spokesman for those nations excluded and in an interview with British Broadcasting Corporation World Service's World Business Report programme he asserted, "...stop subsidies to local farmers so poor nations can be able to feed their people..." According to Callebro, Calegar & Cappi (2000) subsidies paid to farmers by governments in industrialised countries are a form of protection from external competition in so far as in the event of over-production and excess supply and by implication, the lowering of commodity prices, farmers are paid the difference between the going market price for these commodities and a guaranteed or fixed target price should the latter be higher. In addition, in such situations, governments may also provide export marketing support through subsidizing transportation and storage costs; alternatively, they will buy the surplus from the farmers outright and dispose of it as food aid. Hassett and Shapiro (2003) concur adding that the European Union's policy of farming subsidies and tariffs have richly rewarded European farmers and swollen European food output while depressing world food prices and undercutting African exports. On undercutting African exports, the scholars argue that EU farm aid not only subsidizes inefficiency in so far as there is no disincentive for farmers to limit production to profitable volumes of produce; thus, unhindered production of surpluses has the effect of blocking the entry of many farm products from Africa thereby stifling economic growth in that continent.

These arguments are not baseless for with generous subsidies from their governments, farmers in Europe or North America can never make a loss for in a good agricultural season, they make a profit and in a bad season, they are guaranteed of at least a break-even position thanks to the compensatory mechanisms in place to protect them from loss. Such subsidies and the buffers they represent against losses are non-existent for the African farmer and in a situation in which almost all agricultural produce in Africa is rain-fed; in the event of adverse climatic conditions; poor or erratic rainfall patterns in a given agricultural season; yields are poor and they make a loss. In the event of good rains

and a bumper harvest and by implication, excess supply; commodity prices fall, and the African farmer makes an unrecoverable loss.

In concluding this section, it is apparent from the foregoing that the end of the Cold War and the liberalisation of global markets did not benefit Africa to the extent envisaged and Abdul-Raheem (2001) argues that far from delivering the promised gains; liberalisation, structural adjustment, privatisation and technocratic management have seen African countries sink deeper into debt and have resulted in ever increasing poverty. There is empirical evidence in support of these views by Abdul-Raheem and not least, in the establishment by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1999 to assist countries for which there could be no development nothing short of debt relief. That Africa remains the “poor cousin” in the global political economy was inevitable and this can be traced to a combination of the factors cited above; the situation was compounded by the fact that first of all, Africa did not have the same starting point as the major European economic powers the continent was expected to compete with in the new order. Secondly, disruptive and destabilising foreign interventions during both the Cold War and in particular conflict; meant a reversal of whatever modest gains had been made during the first decade of independence. In such a situation and with no comparative advantage, there was little scope for building a competitive edge against the powerful economies of Europe, North America or the Soviet Union. Thirdly, continuation of protectionist practices by the more powerful nations in the post Cold War era; overtly through amongst other things, subsidies paid to farmers or covertly through insisting on structural adjustment programmes, resulted in a situation in which African governments increasingly found it difficult to feed their people let alone produce a surplus for export and thus increase its export earnings. That being said and while admittedly, African governments have no control over protectionist practices by economically powerful governments and phenomenon like the increasingly pronounced impact of climatic change on agricultural productivity, the backbone of many an African economy; all the same, there are internal factors for which African governments have control. Amongst these factors are investment in rural areas, the hub of agricultural productivity and which for limitations in the pre-requisite know-how and technology for the development of the industrial sector; is the only sector with the potential to take African economies into the future. The continued neglect of rural areas has resulted in many a farmer being disenchanted; and seeing no future for themselves in terms of making a living out of agriculture, the economically productive age groups are deserting the rural areas and heading for the towns and cities in search of work. The impact of the urban drift on a massive scale in a

situation in which the job market is shrunk and/or already saturated needs no elaboration; the poverty in the slums in many an African city tells the story only too well.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

It is apparent from the foregoing that a number of factors explain the discourse in Africa's development path. However, the view by some scholars and African leaders alike, that the discourse is exclusively the result of a colonial legacy, the Cold War and the post Cold War global political economy has to be challenged. Indeed, these factors were significant contributory factors to the status of Africa as the "poor cousin"; disadvantaged of a comparative advantage from the very outset and later, the undermining of the potential to build up a competitive advantage. However, there are as many internal and equally significant contributory factors to such a state of affairs; this premise is based on the fact that Africa was not the only continent which at some point was under colonial rule; Latin America and Asia went through the same experience. Some countries in these regions successfully shook off the colonial hangover and have since become forces to be reckoned in the global political economy; the "Asian Tigers" are one example of such a phenomenon. In any case, even if Africa was the only continent to have been under colonial rule, there is Ethiopia, a country that was never colonised but which notwithstanding the fact that it was spared of the alleged negative impact of colonialism on the development of its comparative advantage; if anything, it has witnessed as much political turmoil as in the former colonies and remains one of the poorest countries in Africa today.

Regardless of the contributory factors, what is an indisputable fact is that increasingly; Africa is not able to adequately provide basic services, economic livelihoods and food security for the majority of its people. To this effect and whereas NGOs initially came in as short term gap fillers, three decades on, the services they provide have become indispensable to survival in many a community in Africa; in the provision of education, health and social services and shelter; some even pay the salaries of some sectors of African public service sector. In being off-loaded of what clearly is their primary responsibility, host African governments should be grateful to NGOs not least, because the latter's humanitarian gestures limit the degree of damage to a government's public image for failure to fulfil its mandate. This however is not always the case; on the contrary and time after time, NGOs have come under fire by the same governments that are benefiting from the complementary services that NGOs provide; allegations ranging from "meddling in domestic affairs" to "agents of foreign powers" amongst

others are not uncommon. Such is the dilemma for NGOs which will be examined in depth in the chapter on relationships between stakeholders in development assistance.

## CHAPTER 3

### DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND THE DISCOURSE IN AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT PATH

#### 3.1 Introduction

The United Nations (1961) General Assembly resolution 1710 (XVI) designated the 1960's as the United Nations Development Decade. Explicit in the resolution was to accelerate progress towards self-sustaining economic growth and social advancement in individual nations so as to attain in each under developed country, a substantial increase in the rate of growth. In addition and according to Offiong (1980: 3), each country would set its own targets and have as the objective, a minimum growth rate of an aggregate national income of 5 percent by the end of the decade. However and notwithstanding the commitments made, between 1965 and 1968, Africa recorded the lowest growth rate with the average annual growth of GDP at only 3.3 percent; a rate representing per capita GDP of a negligible 0.5 percent. According to the United Nations (1987: 8), realising that the goal of declaring the 1960's as the "United Nations Development Decade" had not been realised, the then Secretary General of the United Nations established the "Brundtland Commission" in 1983. The purpose of the Commission was to take to a higher level, the importance attached by member states to the "United Nations Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and beyond". Amongst the terms of reference of the Commission was to examine and analyse environmental conservation measures that member states could embark on to promote and facilitate development. At the conclusion of its work, the Commission defined sustainable development as "...development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."

According to Ake (1996:8), commitment to development by the new leaders in independent Africa was already implicit in the ideology of the nationalist movements and without exception, they believed that one important lesson to be learnt from the humiliation of colonisation was the need to overcome weaknesses; not only in the political sphere but also in the military, economic and industrial/technological spheres. At the same time, in the face of a rising tide of nationalism and realising that colonialism could not survive, the colonial powers started promoting the idea of development. To this effect, they started exploring the concept "partnership in development" to maintain a presence and some leverage in the colonies after independence as well as to court what they hoped would be future allies in the fight against communism.

Notwithstanding the efforts made and the partnerships formed to promote development in Africa, the envisaged overcoming of weaknesses in the political, military, economic and industrial/technological spheres and the desired goal of “self reliance; plenty and happiness” for all has been difficult to realise since independence. This is evident as alluded to earlier, in the level of indebtedness, non-viable economies and in the context of this study; the fact that more than half a century into independence, the continent is increasingly finding it difficult to feed itself with the majority of countries depending on food aid year in year out.

This chapter revisits some of the tenets of development theory and in the context of this study which is focusing on food security, modernisation and development theories are particularly relevant. This premise is based on the fact that with respect to modernisation; Jenkins & Scanlan (2001: 721) argue that international trade and investment stimulate economic development and spread technological and operational innovations across national borders; ultimately, this increases social welfare and contributes to industrialization and growth in turn; a combination of these factors improve food consumption. This assertion by Jenkins and Scanlan is a contradiction in the context of African for despite the level of resources invested in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to promote development for close half a century; food consumption has not improved; on the contrary, the continent is increasingly dependent food aid. The level of resources invested towards development in Africa is illustrated by Mwilima (2003: 39) who notes that in the 1970s, Africa accounted for 25% of foreign direct investment to developing countries; two decades on in the 1990’s, FDI flows to developing countries surged and in Africa, it became the leading source of external financing. In addition to FDI and according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2011: 1); realising that debt was acting as a constraint to development in poor countries, the IMF and World Bank launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative to address the development needs of low-income countries. By the end of 2011, of the thirty six countries which benefited from the initiative, thirty were in Africa however; notwithstanding a combination of FDI and debt relief, economic development continues to lag behind other regions and the perennial food security crises continue unabated.

With respect to the dependency school of thought, Wimberley & Bello (1992:899) argue that investment dependence has a harmful effect on food security in the Third World adding that MNC penetration reduces food security in the periphery countries. They explain their view by pointing out that as farming systems are integrated into the global agribusiness supply chain; crop rotation and



recycling of organic matter are replaced by the intensive use of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers; besides, MNCs' use technology intensive production methods. The harmful effects of the intensive use of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers on the local environment compromises productivity especially in poor communities who produce simply to meet their own consumption. At the same time, the use technology intensive production methods means that "man is replaced by machine"; this generates unemployment which exacerbates household food insecurity especially in a situation in which the potential to produce food for one's own consumption is already compromised.

### **3.2 Development Theory**

Various schools of thought attempt to explain under development in Third World countries and according to Leys (1996:8), the first versions of development theory were the work of economists who believed that economic problems would ultimately bow down to the actions of modern benevolent states endowed with sufficient supplies of capital and good economic analytical skills. Based on such beliefs, they wrote development plans for newly independent states in Latin America, Asia and the yet to be independent colonies of Africa. Such a belief by modernisation theorists is supported by Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 11) who note that in almost all theories of modernisation, it is assumed that the political, social, and economic course which characterised Western Europe and the United States foretold the future for the underdeveloped countries. As such, for under-developed countries, the development process would involve replicating and completing the various stages that characterized the social transformation of the developed countries.

By the 1950's, such positivist orthodoxy according to Leys (1996:5); had not delivered any of the envisaged results adding that this was to be the trigger factor for debate on how the economies of the colonies of Britain, France and Portugal might be transformed and made more productive. Such debate was particularly important at the time; a period which coincided with the withdrawal of colonial powers and the emergence of new independent sovereign states in Africa and the transformation of the then still semi colonial states in Latin America. These views are shared by the World Socialist Movement (1997) who observed that the concerted effort by national governments and international agencies to "develop" the Third World was linked with de-colonisation as it was believed that this would help make political independence more "meaningful". However, for a number of reasons, this did not happen and according to Todaro & Smith (2003: 73), one of the reasons was the inappropriateness and/or irrelevance of many of the implicit assumptions of Western economic theory

on the conditions in Third World nations. Such inappropriateness and/or irrelevance Todaro and Smith argue, can be traced to the misconception that just as the Marshall Plan had worked in Europe, it would work in the Third World. In the process, the assumption overlooked the fact that the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe was facilitated by the existence of prerequisite conditions namely; well-integrated commodity and money markets, highly developed transport facilities, a well-trained and educated work force, the motivation to succeed and an efficient government bureaucracy amongst others. Such conditions did not exist in the Third World besides, the stages theory failed to take into account the fact that being part of a highly integrated and complex international system, even if Third World countries had developed the best and most intelligent development strategies; these could be nullified by external forces beyond their control.

Rapley (2007: 3) notes that at the outset, the models appeared to have delivered; in the main, this was facilitated by the post-war world economy boom during which demand for third-world products rose; this provided Third World governments with the capital they needed to develop their industries and infrastructure. However, in time; problems with these strategies began to emerge and it became increasingly clear that the growth rate of many Third World economies could not sustain the improvements made in the standards of living of their people. This in the main; was due to the fact that the industrial development that took place consumed more resources than it generated and the wastage was exacerbated by the inefficiency of the state. As the post-war boom came to an end in the 1970s, the shortcomings of the state were exposed. According to Leys (1996:11-12), having failed to deliver, modernisation theory was challenged prompting the emergence of dependency theory. Proponents of dependency theory argued that under-development in the Third World was the result, not of internal factors but instead; of external interventions by powerful nations and in particular, interventions whose primary goal was profit maximisation. The pursuit of such a goal was precisely what had kept the Third World in subordination since colonial times and in the process, the seeds of dependency were sewn. Thus, metropolitan policy was maleficent and self-serving and capitalist development offered nothing to the periphery. These two perspectives on development will now be examined.

### **3.2.1 Modernisation Theory**

According to Rojas (1996) modernisation theory was the historical product of three main events during the post-World War I era namely, the growth of a united worldwide communist movement led by Moscow; the rise of the United States as a superpower to contain the growth of the international

communist movement and the imminent de-colonisation of Africa and Asia. The imminent de-colonisation of Africa and Asia prompted the United States to encourage political and economic scholars to explore ways of promoting a capitalist orientation to economic development and political order in the new nation-states “in-formation” and thus avoid losing them to the Soviet socialist block. The scholars subsequently came up with a number of distinct but interrelated schools of thought viz. the Classical Evolutionary, the Structural Functionalism (also known as the Systems approach) and the Sociological and Economic perspectives.

The main proponent of the Classical Evolutionary perspective according to Seyoum (2001:110) was Auguste Comte who believed that human evolution was predetermined, inevitable and unidirectional; all societies would move from a primitive to an advanced state adding that such evolution was good as it represented progress, humanity and civilization. To this effect, Comte identified five diametrically opposite characteristics which he argued, differentiated traditional (primitive) from modern (advanced) societies. The characteristics took the form of affectivity versus affective neutrality; collectivism versus individualism; ascription versus achievement (with respect to status in society), role diffusion versus role specificity and finally particularism versus universality in interpersonal relationships. Against this background, a modernising society was one in which the attributes that characterise traditional society were gradually being replaced by those that characterise the modern society. In the context of this study of which food security is at the centre, the movement towards modernity is captured by Smith (1973: 61) who points out that modernisation in predominantly agricultural societies is about replacing older agricultural practices with new ones. Such societies can be regarded as modern when they display specific characteristics; the extent to which these characteristics are exhibited gives an indication of the degree of modernity that has been reached.

Agricultural productivity in traditional societies was influenced by and influenced the social organisation of these societies; it is for this reason that the attributes; affectivity, role diffusion and collectivism will be the focus of the analysis of modernisation theory. According to Seyoum (2001:111) affectivity is manifest in unquestionable trust; faith and loyalty to the values and beliefs of one’s kinship group as a whole. Role diffusion is manifest in an individual particularly in a position of leadership; playing a multiplicity of roles simultaneously; “executive”, “administrator” and “judge” amongst others; all rolled into one. Finally, collectivism manifests itself in collective social responsibility within a given community. The characteristics distinguishing traditional and modern

societies are interesting in the context of this study for according to UNDP (2006:7), the record of droughts in Kenya, go back to 1928. All the same and notwithstanding the fact that old agricultural practices had yet to be replaced with new ones and external food aid did not exist, communities did not altogether become extinct as a result of the impact of droughts.

A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that as the head of the clan, the chief made all the decisions on food security for his subjects (role diffusion); amongst such decisions would be drought mitigation and preparedness measures (executive) and how a “relief operation” would be managed (administrator) in the event of a drought. In addition, believing in the chief’s wisdom and trusting that the decisions he made were in the interest of the whole community, the decisions were religiously carried out with no questions asked (affectivity). During the drought of 1999-2001 in Kenya, amongst the categories targeted by UNICEF (2001) in the agency’s appeal for food aid were vulnerable children and in particular, orphaned child-headed households. The phenomenon “child-headed household” would have been the definition of “shame” in a typically traditional society for social safety nets for such children were readily available through collective social responsibility (collectivism). As such, a child was an orphan only in terms of not having biological parents otherwise a child had “parents” throughout his/her life. Thus, while social organisation in traditional societies was far from modern all the same, the defining characteristics of such societies; affectivity, the diffused role of the chief and collectivism, served them well. Against this background, it is argued that in Kenya, the move towards “modernity” did communities a de-service in so far as had they remained traditional, then perhaps these children would not have featured as a special category in UNICEF’s appeal.

With respect to the structural/functionalist perspective, Talcott Parsons (Johnson 1993: 116) was the main proponent; concerned about the problem of social order, Parsons argued that if individuals were really separate entities pursuing their self interest, there could be no order. As such, the basis of social order was that while people act on the basis of their values; in practice, their actions are oriented and constrained by the values and norms of people around them. To elaborate on how order came about (Knapp1994: 191-192), Parsons drew an analogue between human society and a biological organism and just like a biological organism was made up of different organs, so was society; it was made up of different institutions that were its constituent parts. Each institution had a specific function to perform as a contribution to the optimal functioning and maintenance of the social fabric of the society and for the good of the whole. Parsons identified four functions which were critical for the optimal functioning

and maintenance of society namely; adaptation to the environment, goal attainment, integration and latency. According to Seyoum 2001:110), Parson assigned the function of adaptation to the environment to the economy; to produce and distribute goods and services for people to survive. However, in Parson's view, it was not just any economic system but the capitalist form which he perceived as the only form capable of adapting to the environment. Goal attainment through the employment of resources was assigned to the political system but one which had to be based on European and/or North America models of democracy. In turn, goal attainment would be enhanced by integration through the administration of justice by legal and religious institutions but again, not just any religion but branches of Judeo-Christian religions. Finally, some family structure had to operate to facilitate procreation and as an institution for the transmission and maintenance of values from generation to generation through socialization; this function of the family is what Parsons referred to as latency. These components had to function in an interrelated and harmonious manner to facilitate a state of equilibrium which was a precondition for progress in any given society; malfunction in one component would destabilise the whole society.

Of the main tenets of the structural functionalist perspective, adaptation to the environment; goal attainment and latency are relevant to the subject under study. There can be no argument against the assertion that the different institutions of any given society have a critical role to play and that a prerequisite for the well functioning of the whole society is that the constituent institutions work in a complimentary manner. With respect to the economy, modernisation theorists assert that adaptation to the environment is a characteristic peculiar to modern society; there is evidence to suggest that the assertion is based on limited understanding of patterns of daily living in traditional societies. Such evidence comes from an interview conducted with one Mutua (2011) whose age is estimated at somewhere between 90 and 100 years since he was already married and had two children at the onset of World War 11; a period during which in his Kamba tribe's tradition, boys got married around the age 18-20. Mutua is a respected community opinion leader and is recognised as the institutional memory on pre-modernisation daily patterns of living his native Machakos District. In his account of how the Kamba people adapted to the environment, Mutua stated that when certain ecological signs pointing to a poor rainy season were observed; an unusual mild cold season or the appearance of certain foliage and/or insects; "...we did not waste time and energy planting crops which we knew would wither away anyway. Instead, we increased our trading activities (wooden sculptures and sisal baskets) with the Kikuyu's ...". In the light of this, it can be said of the traditional Kamba communities

in Machakos District, that they had in place mechanisms which they effectively used to adapt their patterns of livelihoods to changes in their environment in order to shield themselves against anticipated food insecurity. Such defence and coping mechanisms are not peculiar to the Kambas for such adaptation was also evident amongst the Pedi; northern Sotho tribes of South Africa. According to Moninig (1988:147), with their economic life revolving around agriculture, the Pedi used phenomena observed in their natural environment to predict future weather patterns. Amongst such phenomena was the appearance of certain insects, the growth of certain shrubs and the timing of the budding of new foliage amongst other signs; such signs guided the Pedi in decisions on what crops to plant and when to plant them for maximum return on investment in terms of harvests.

With respect to goal attainment through employment of resources, Dore (2001) notes that during colonial times, amongst nationalists expressions of disgruntlement with “modernising” colonial rule was repudiation of Western concepts of property rights. This, Dore’s argument continues, can be traced to a realisation by the nationalists that the pre-colonial customary land tenure system in which responsibility for land distribution rested with the chief ensured a “moral economy” rooted in a deep sense commitment to the interests and the good of society as a whole. Under the administration of chief, society was characterised by equity in communal existence supported by sound environmental management practices based on ecological knowledge and thus living in harmony with nature. According to Kieyah and Nyaga (2009: 5), in Kenya, the colonial government viewed African customary land tenure as an impediment to greater agricultural production and proper land use practices, the traditional mode of land management was subsequently replaced by a hybrid system of English and African customary law.

The system according to the Government of Kenya (2004: 9) was based on a system of Public Trust management in which Kenyan traditional rulers administered land in trust for the people under the supervision of colonial administrators. At independence in 1963, (Kieyah and Nyaga 2009: 5), a new law reclassified land into three categories namely government land, private land and trust land; responsibility for administering trust land was conferred on local government functionaries; this effectively marked the end of the role of traditional leaders in the distribution of land. Such a move was to disenfranchise communities to a level worse than during the colonial era; this in the main was the result of unscrupulous land grabbing and corruption within the local government functionary corps during the four decades of KANU rule. When the KANU was finally unseated in 2004, a commission

of enquiry established by the Kibaki government (Ndugu Commission) to investigate the scandals (Government of 2004b: 140) revealed that in County Councils in which trust land still existed, Councillors were either the main beneficiaries in land allocations or individuals and/or companies associated with them. More seriously, so much was the preoccupation of Councillors to secure a “share of the spoils” that minutes of Council meetings examined during the enquiry revealed that often, the only item on the agenda of meetings was allocation of land to Councillors! According to Mutua (2011), “... under the guidance of *aimu* (spirits)...the chief in Ukambani was a good *mutongoi* (chief/leader) and *musili* (judge) who made sure that some people did not have more than others...” Indeed, land distribution under traditional leaders in Kenya ensured a moral economy and it can be argued that the demise of the traditional authority structures is part of the reason why communities are increasingly food insecure. The premise for this argument is that even in the absence of climatic change and its impact on weather patterns and food production, the possibility that communities would still have been food insecure cannot be ruled out not least; because of the systematic dispossession of their land by unscrupulous public functionaries.

According to Seyoum (2001:103-104), the main proponents of the sociological economic perspective are Smelser and Rostow and in making a distinction between traditional and modern societies, Smelser (Seyoum (2001: 104) identified four processes namely; a shift from animal and human power to machine power; from simple to complex technology; from subsistence farming to cash crops and finally, from rural to urban settlements. Land would cease to be the only source of livelihood and wealth creation and industrialization would take root. Given that societies were characterised by different pre-modern starting points, the processes would not occur simultaneously furthermore, the momentum of change would also vary besides, the pattern and pace of development would be affected by other phenomenon notably wars and disasters. Against this background (Offiong 1980:40-41), Rostow identified five stages at which a society could be on the development continuum at any given point in time. At the first stage, the typically traditional society economy is dominated by subsistence activity of which agriculture is the most important and output is consumed by producers rather than traded. At stage two, a traditional society displays the pre-conditions for ‘take-off’ into civilisation facilitated by new levels of education; entrepreneurship and institutions capable of mobilising capital while at stage three, industrialization increases and workers switch from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector. At stage four, there is a drive towards maturity and the economy diversifies and investment opportunities are created by amongst other things, increased external trade. At the fifth and

final stage, an economy according to Rostow ( Seyoum 2001: 107-108) is characterised by mass production and the generation of a surplus which would provide a safety net for a society when threatened by the vagaries of competitive capitalist markets.

In the context of this study, the second stage; the stage at which a traditional society displays the pre-conditions for ‘take-off’ into civilisation, is where Kenya could be placed in the present. According to UNDP (1999b: 4) following independence in 1963, economic growth in Kenya reached an all-time high of an annual average per capita GDP of 6.6 percent during the period 1964-1973. The rapid growth was fuelled amongst other things, by successful rural development policies and in particular, the expansion of land under cultivation and a switch to high-value crops that led to higher agricultural output. Growth was also spurred by import-substituting industrialisation which enjoyed access to the markets in the first life of the East African Community. This development in Kenya in the first decade of independence it can be argued; is attributable to new levels of education; entrepreneurship and institutions capable of mobilising capital”. On new levels of education, the argument has support from Kiringai and Manda (2002) who note that at independence in 1963, the government identified illiteracy, disease, ignorance and poverty as the main problems to be addressed in order to achieve sustainable national development. To this effect, the first three post independence decades saw some improvements in spheres such as educational amongst others.

Rapley (2007: 2-3) notes that aware of the imperfections in the world economy and markets and confident that the state could overcome them, the thinking amongst development theorists was that assigning the state a leading role in the economy was the sure way towards development. The thinking was embraced by governments in Europe and North America; to this effect and as the colonial powers recoiled, this was the message they left with the new leaders in Africa and on their part; the new Africa leadership took heed of the message and eagerly adopted the models for they seemed to promise a rapid journey into the industrial age.

During the first decade of independence; supported by the move from traditionalism to modernity as elaborated above and a booming post war economy, the strategy appeared to work for Kenya not least, because of an increase in the demand Third World goods. According to the UNDP (1999b: 4) however, the good performance of Kenya was not sustained and this is evident in an increasingly declining per capita GDP from 6.6 percent between 1964-1973 to an average of 5.2 percent per annum during the



period 1974-1979; down to 4.1 percent between 1980-1985 sliding even further down to 2.5 percent between 1990-1995. Given, there was a window period of recovery in 1995 when the recorded per capita GDP increased to 4.8 percent however, it was down to 2.3 percent in 1997; it was expected decrease further to 2.0 percent by the year 2000. Such a trend of an increasingly deteriorating economic performance is corroborated by Kiringai and Manda (2002) who note that during the previous decade (1992-2001), the educational attainment; health and poverty status of Kenyans had witnessed a declining trend to the extent that results from welfare monitoring surveys show that the rural poor constituted 46.3; 46.8 and 52.3 percent of Kenya's population in 1992, 1994 and 1997 respectively. In the light of the above, it can be said of Kenya that while the country got as far stage three; the process stalled at this stage; this is evident in the fact that three consecutive drought episodes in 199-2001; 2004 and 2006 were declared national disasters; in other words, they were beyond the country's coping capacity; by implication, Kenya had not reached the stage of "mass consumption".

In the context of this study; there is evidence to suggest Kenya has yet to reach the stage of "mass consumption" not least, because a trend identified during the period under study (1999-2006) was one of increasing numbers of people requiring and receiving food aid due to poverty associated lack of and/or weak coping mechanisms during episodes of drought. This premise is based on the fact that in 1996/7, the number of this category of people stood at 1.8 million (FAO: 1996) increasing to 2.75 million in 1999-2002 (Akilu & Wekesa 2002:1); given, there was a 16 percent decrease down to 2.3 million during the drought of 2004 (World Agro-Forestry 2005: 18); however, in 2006, the number increased to 3.5 million (Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2005a: 4). Against this background, it is apparent that the stage of engaging the "cruise gear" which would see the production of surpluses for absorbing shocks presented by phenomenon such as drought never happened in Kenya. This is one explanation why perennial sorrowful appeals to the international community for food aid became the definition of "business as usual"! It has to be stated at this point that the focus on Kenya as an example is only because the study was carried out in communities in Kenya; the picture very much the same in other African countries.

### **3.2.2 Conclusions on Modernisation Theory**

Modernisation theorists' attempted to describe how social change and development; and the conditions for attaining the desired goal of "self reliance; plenty and happiness" for all came about. However, notwithstanding the arguments by classical evolutionists, the move from collectivism to individualism

for example, has not brought about the benefits that modernisation was supposed to deliver. On the contrary, such a move has taken communities backwards in terms of losing the benefits that collectivism once delivered. This is evident as pointed out earlier, in the fact that during the drought of 1999-2001 in Kenya, the only safety net that orphan child-headed households had in order to survive the drought was provided by “strangers”, UNICEF and other humanitarian agencies because the social safety nets once provided through collective social responsibility no longer existed. A sense of collective social responsibility was a value inculcated into the individual from a very early age; nurtured by affective behaviour and monitored and supervised through an “integrated” approach to community “administration” in which the chief’s diffuse role meant that he was custodian of every aspect of the wellbeing of his subject; social welfare, security and justice amongst other considerations.

Some scholars argue that such failure of modernisation to deliver can be traced to a number of factors and Zapf (2004:2) argues that one such factor is the fact that early modernisation theory was biased and ethnocentric in so far as the development categories, stages, and processes involved were all derived from the Western experience rather than from the developing countries. Gray (2002) shares these views and argues that the failure of modernisation processes to bring about the benefits envisaged by modernisation theorists lies in a number of mistakes. A fundamental and common error Gray’s argument continues, is the very idea that modernisation as articulated by its proponents represents a positive move when in fact it does not and cannot; for in and of itself, it does not carry any important human value and does not guarantee anything that could reasonably be thought of as human emancipation. Indeed a situation in which vulnerable children such as orphans have only “strangers” for a life-line when in fact they are living amongst their own people raises the question of the value of modernisation as a vehicle for human emancipation.

The emphasis of the structural functionalist perspective on adaptation to the environment is interesting for in Kenya, colonial administrators dismissed traditional methods of land management including what were otherwise effective methods of adapting to the environment on the grounds that such methods were an impediment to greater agricultural production and proper land use. Given, while there was some room for traditional leaders to play a role in land distribution; however, the idea the colonial powers left behind was that the creation of room for such participation was simply a “public relations” exercise. In the absence of a need for such public relations exercises and bent as they were to see themselves firmly on the path to modernisation, the new Africa leadership subsequently went full cycle

and replaced traditional arrangements for land distribution with “modern” ones. Notwithstanding the fact that in so doing, Kenya was making “progress” towards modernity, the “modern” methods of land management rendered communities worse off than they had been during colonial times.

The premise for this position is that notwithstanding the adoption of approaches deemed to be modern and better with respect to adaptation to the environment and agricultural productivity; in the sphere of food security and as is evident in Kenya, over the past twelve years or so and except for the year 2004, the number of people depending on food aid for survival in Kenya has been increasing with each drought. It turns out that the established pattern of drought is such that the frequency, on average every two years; the severity and impact is increasing with each episode. At this rate and nothing short of food aid, communities in Kenya might well become extinct in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (!); this is a sharp contrast to their traditional and not so modern predecessors who survived them all without World Food Programme; German Agro Action; Catholic Relief Services; Action Against Hunger or the Red Cross amongst others. As for goal attainment through the employment of resources for the good of all, a function assigned to the political system; the new leadership in Kenya adopted the western model inherited from the colonial era. In practice, the inherited political system was not democratic by any standard for it was designed to serve and protect only the interests of the ruling class; colonial administrators and settlers. The new ruling class were unwaveringly loyal to the doctrine and did exactly that; they served themselves well just like colonial administrators and settlers had done during colonial days. The exploitation and dispossession particularly of poor voiceless rural peasants of the only asset they had namely, land; through corrupt land allocation and deals was to disenfranchise this category of people to the extent that the majority of this category in the semi arid regions of the country have become dependent on food aid, year in; year out. Finally, with respect to latency, the replacement of collectivism by individualism has seen many an orphan in Africa become a street child for lack of a family environment to grow up in and be socialised into the values of the community.

With respect to latency, the irony of it all according to Porter (1992) is that in modernising Europe, the individualism that took root coupled with the “urban pull factor” prompted by the Industrial Revolution and the consequent escalating cost of living meant that often, both parents had to go out to work. The squalid conditions under which children grew up with little if any parental supervision saw many of these children growing up maladjusted. According to Hessen (1967: 112) this category were the lucky ones; the unlucky ones were deserted or orphaned pauper children who he notes; under the auspices of

“parish apprentices”; were sent into virtual slavery by their “modern” government as represented by appointed “poor-law” officials; the latter often bound them into long unpaid apprenticeship in return for a bare subsistence. It will be argued here that had English Victorian society remained traditional, these children would have been cared for by the broader community and would not have had to be sent into virtual slavery. Notwithstanding such glaring evidence of the impact of modernisation on the welfare of people and in particular, children; modernisation theorists did not take into account its undesirable effects even in their own backyards!

Seyoum (2001: 4) defines development as a complex set of change processes that encompasses the economy, society and the polity. As a goal-oriented process of economic change, it embodies the quantitative expansion of an economy’s productive capacity and favourable changes in the quality of life manifest in improvements in people’s living standards. This definition by Seyoum suggests a society that has accomplished all five stages of development as expounded by proponents of the sociological economic perspective. In Africa however, it is apparent that many a country stalled somewhere along the continuum as the example on Kenya given earlier clearly demonstrates; such experience in many a developing country is precisely what discredited the theory amongst some scholars. Amongst these scholars are Cardoso and Faletto (1979:10) who argued that the failure of the theory to explain the development discourse in Third World countries can be traced to the fact that the emphasis on shifts in methods of production is narrow and ignores other equally important factors such as the relationships between the forces of production; patterns of income distribution and the structure of employment amongst others.

In support of this assertion, Cardoso & Faletto (1979: 10) further argue that it may happen that a society modernizes its methods of production without corresponding advances in development that is, less dependency, self-sustained growth and improvements in the welfare of people. The argument appears valid for in Kenya for example, in 1990 (UNDP 1998:128), GDP stood at \$1023; life expectancy at 59.7 years and adult literacy at 69 percent. Fifteen years later in 2005 (UNDP 2008: 231) these indicators stood at \$1250; 52.1 years and 73.6 percent respectively. Thus while GDP witnessed an increase of 22 percent, life expectancy actually decreased by 12 percent and while adult literacy increased by 6 percent, the increase was not commensurate with the increase in GDP. According to Jarso (2010: 35-36), in Kenya, such a skewed pattern of development in which there are improvements in economic performance but little if any improvements at all in the welfare of people; can be traced to the fact that hardly a day passes without the media highlighting corruption in the government. Kenyans

continually witness the pilferage of public funds through shoddy deals between gluttonous public officials; in the process, an overwhelming proportion of Kenyans languish in abject deprivation and socioeconomic inequality. This account by Jarso points to income distribution disparities as a contributory factor to lack of meaningful development despite the increase in GDP facilitated by expansion and diversification of the economy between the two periods.

In concluding this section on modernisation theory, it will be recalled that in 1983, the United Nations Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development "...development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." It is apparent that modernisation processes did bring about benefits in terms of some improvements in people's living standards in Africa. At the same time however and as is evident from the example on Kenya clearly demonstrates, the development that took place compromised the ability of future generations to meet their own needs and in the context of this study, in the sphere of household food security. Thus, changes in the social organisation of communities and in particular, the replacement of traditional power structures and methods of land management by modern ones, disadvantaged communities who otherwise had their own albeit, not so modern, democratic and/or scientific methods of providing for and/or defending themselves against and/or coping with hazards and threats in their environment.

### **3.3 Dependency Theory**

Dos Santos (1971: 226) defines dependency as a historical condition which shapes the structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the disadvantage of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies. In such a situation, the economies of the disadvantaged countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of the economies to which their own is subjected. In addition, he argued that the relations of interdependence between two or more economies and between these and world trade assumes a form of dependence when some countries (dominant ones) can expand and can be self sustaining while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion. Seyoum (2001: 97) shares these views and argues that the development of Europe and North America became dependent on exploitation of the Third World and a converse relationship between underdevelopment in the Third World and development in Western and North America developed.

According to Cockcroft, Frank & Johnson (1972: 3), dependency theory first emerged in the 1950s and 1960's as a reaction to liberal free trade theories; the main advocate was one Raul Prebisch whose

research with the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) found that the wealth of poor nations tended to decrease when the wealth of rich nations increased. According to Rapley (2007: 26), Prebisch's structuralist perspective was later adapted to a Marxist approach by the likes of Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran and Theotonio Dos Santos who argued that contemporary under-development had its roots in past and continuing economic relations between the less-developed countries of the periphery and the now developed metropolitan countries. Rapley (2007: 26) further notes that Baran in particular, argued that the First World actually hindered the emergence from poverty of the Third World adding that imperialism had not exported capitalism to the Third World rather, it had drained the colonies of the resources that would have been used for investment as such; imperialism had killed off local capitalism through competition. According to Seyoum (2001: 84) Frank later sharpened Baran's analysis stressing that development and under-development were in fact two sides of the same coin; as such, by siphoning the surplus away from the Third World, the First World had enriched itself. In addition, by keeping the Third World underdeveloped; the ruling bourgeoisies of the First World ensured a ready market for their finished goods and a cheap supply of raw materials for their factories. Seyoum concurs with these views (2001: 84) by Baran and notes that periods of economic growth in Latin America coincided with periods of minimal intervention from the external world notably during the two World Wars while engendered stagnation and crisis coincided with a return to the world system in later years.

Other scholars extended their argument to foreign aid and Rojas (1989) in particular, argued that for less developed countries, modernizing within the capitalist system meant that first of all, latecomers as they were to the modern world, Third World countries had to buy modern machinery, technology and know-how from abroad to meet the basic conditions to compete. Secondly and in order to finance the purchases, they had to export raw materials, cash crops, and human labour; but as with any free market, the international one will reach equilibrium prices in such a way that the prices of manufactured products will increase faster than the prices of raw materials. Under the circumstances, less developed economies faced a structural handicap in the balance of payments and had to constantly borrow from abroad; in the process, they found themselves trapped in the international financial system in three ways; in trade, in investment and in financing. Rojas further argued that there was a belief amongst Western European development theorists that less developed economies suffered from scarcity of capital and the way to industrialize them therefore, had to be through imports. Against such a background, it was generally believed that with external financing, the tiny industrial sectors in the

economies of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) would expand and the road to modernization would be easier. In addition, there was a belief that Transnational Corporations (TNCs) had an important role to play as engines of growth in less developed economies to this effect and at the time of Rojas' writing, around 20-25 percent of all the capital invested abroad by TNCs was going to LDCs. In the LDCs, TNCs came to dominate the production of raw materials, energy, agricultural products for export and significant sectors of the domestic industries. Seyoum (2001: 84) shares the views by Rojas adding that the capitalist market and foreign investment is dominated by huge TNCs which he argues, have not only failed to empower the poor but have actually dispossessed them through legitimising inequalities. Such dispossession the argument continues; is evident in the fact that TNC activities generate far greater capital outflows than inflows into the underdeveloped world through amongst other mechanisms, interest payments, profit repatriation and transfer pricing. The solution to underdevelopment he concluded; was "de-linking" the periphery from the centre and pursuing autonomous and auto-centric national growth which meant more reliance on domestic resources. Such de-linking could only be achieved by introducing some form of socialism in order to neutralise the power base of the business elite who bent as they were on serving the interests of foreign capitalists, were an obstacle to such auto-centric development.

### **3.3.1 Types of Dependency**

According to So (1990: 99-100), Dos Santos identified three forms of dependency; colonial, financial-industrial and technological-industrial dependence. Colonial dependence can be traced back to 1884 when after partitioning of Africa; the colonial powers immediately established export economies based on monopolies amongst other measures designed to protect their economic interests. Financial-industrial dependence emerged towards the end of the 19th century when European colonial powers dominated the market and the colonies were treated simply as producers of raw materials and agricultural products for home industries and markets. Technological-industrial dependence emerged in the post World War II era during which underdeveloped countries depended on revenue from the export sector to import money and technology in order to industrialize. Dos Santos concluded that the economic backwardness of underdeveloped countries was not so much due to a lack of integration with capitalism instead; it was the monopolistic control of foreign capital, foreign finance and foreign technology at national and international levels that prevented underdeveloped countries from reaching an advantageous position. So (1990: 102) concurs, adding that such domination and monopolistic

control of foreign capital; finance and technology resulted in the reproduction of backwardness, misery and social marginalization of people in underdeveloped countries.

Martinussen (1997:90) shares these views by So (1990: 99-100), and other scholars such as Seyoum (2001: 84) and argues that in the aftermath of the colonial era, the move from the metropolis-satellite to a centre-periphery orientation was characterised by a pattern in which an auto-centric reproduction structure was generally self-reliant in the developed countries. In the Third World however, there remained a typically peripheral economy characterized by an exploited export sector producing luxury consumer goods for the metropolis. Under the circumstances and while Third World countries generated a surplus and foreign currency; the initial capital outlay had been borrowed as such, the earnings went towards debt servicing amongst other competing priorities thereby leaving little for reinvestment. The end result was that instead of peasants producing for themselves and stimulating their local economies, they were reduced to mere agents for facilitating wealth accumulation in richer countries. Abdul-Raheem (2000) shares these views adding that the logic of global markets dictates that we (Africa) produce what we are best at, just as in the colonial times, this condemns us to commodity production for exports. Under the circumstances, we produce what we do not consume and consume what we do not produce and unfortunately, the West and the USA that dominate the global political economy dictate the price for both!

### **3.3.2 Colonial dependence**

Rojas (1970) propounds that this form of dependence is export trade in nature and can be traced to the fact that commercial and financial capital in alliance with the colonialist state dominated the economic relations between the colonial powers and the colonies through the establishment of trade, land, mining and manpower monopolies (serf or slave) in the colonised countries. Examples of land monopolies are evident in Kenya where Knife (1995: 55) observes that a major root cause of the anti-colonial Mau-Mau uprisings between 1952 and 1960 was grievances against the systematic eviction of local Kikuyu tribes from the central highlands to make way for coffee plantations for British settlers. The same practice is evident in the then Southern Rhodesia where according to the Africa Institute Bulletin (1977), the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 later amended in 1941 allocated 50% of the land of the entire country to white settlers, 33% to blacks with the rest remaining designated for parks and nature reserves. In 1969, the Act was repealed and renamed the Land Tenure Act; it allocated an equal area of 45 million acres to blacks and whites respectively with the remainder designated state land. However,



the repealing of the Act in 1969 changed little because the allocation was done in such a way that white settlers occupied the prime agricultural land while that allocated to blacks was of inferior quality.

In the sphere of trade, the same situation prevailed for according to Willis (1985: 122), as far back as the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, monopolies existed in various forms adding that such monopolies reached a new height during the late nineteenth century, a period which coincided with increasing dependence by competing colonial powers on the colonies for food commodities and raw materials for their fast growing populations and industrialising home economies. In this respect, Knife (1995: 10) observes that as new discoveries of the resource endowment of the colonised territories were made and competition intensified; Britain for example, started to view “state intervention” as an imperative. According to the Africa Institute Bulletin (1977), in the then Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) such a view resulted in the British talking Lobengula, the chief of the Ndebele tribe, into signing the Moffat Treaty in 1888. By signing the Treaty, Lobengula not only gave the British businessman Cecil John Rhodes mineral prospecting rights but also agreed not to enter into any correspondence or treaty with any other foreign power without the permission of the British High Commissioner for South Africa. Later in the same year, Lobengula yet again signed the Rudd Concession which gave Rhodes complete and exclusive charge over all metal and mineral rights and conferred on him; sweeping commercial and legal powers which he used to form the British South Africa Company (BSAC). In 1899, the BSAC subsequently obtained a charter from Queen Victoria which granted the company the exclusive right to operate in the whole of the British territory west of the Portuguese possessions; this effectively gave the company a mining monopoly in the then Southern Rhodesia, north of then Bechuanaland (Botswana) and the north and west of the then Transvaal region of South Africa.

With respect to the exploitation of people as cheap labour, every former colonial power has own “skeletons in the cupboard” and according to Kimber (2003) the record of Belgium’s King Leopold II in Congo is the worst of them all by any standard. Reports have it that forced labour practices by his agents on the rubber plantations were so brutal that to prove that they were doing their work; they would deliver baskets full of human hands severed from those who failed to deliver the stipulated daily quota of rubber harvest at the end of any given working day. Portugal was not much better either for Meredith (1985: 30-31) notes that despite claims to be engaged in a “great civilising mission”, the traditional role for Africans in Portuguese colonies was to provide labour and to pay taxes. In addition, the labour practices of the colonial power were so bad that unless one had evidence of being in gainful employment; for six months every year, African men would be conscripted to work for the government

or on privately owned plantations, roads and mines and often, hundreds of miles from their homes. In time, the outcry by other colonial powers in protest at such labour practices by the Portuguese was so strong that in 1937, a report run in London's *Daily Express* had it that it would be a blessing for the native population in Portugal's territories if they were taken away and given to some other power!

While criticising the Portuguese, Britain was not that much better off either for according to Alexander (2000: 10), while for some time, the colonial power managed to stave off criticism of its increased demands for Africans to give more and more of their labour in Kenya; in time, the colonial power's exploitative labour practices were exposed through its record of such practices in South Africa. At the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the labour legislation enacted by Britain was based and modelled on the Dutch "Masters and Servants" Cape legislation of 1856 which amongst other provisions prohibited strikes. According to Parsons (1984:113), even before the legislation; the late-nineteenth-century mineral revolution dominated by British capital was known to have had to a profound effect on African society in Southern Africa and South Africa in particular. Such an effect was a result of the fact that the colonial power viewed and treated the pre-capitalist tributary societies of these colonies simply as reserves for a cheap supply of labour for the mining and later, the manufacturing sectors. In addition, Minter (1986: 24) notes that such conduct by Britain was inevitable for as early as 1894, Cecil John Rhodes had set the stage for the exploitation of Africans through the Glen Grey Act of 1894 in the Cape. The Act was designed to force a portion of Africans in Glen Grey District to work as migrant labourers by amongst other things, imposing taxes and replacing communal land tenure with individual title to land in native areas. The list of examples of how colonial powers maintained their economic dominance through exploitation of the natives is long but to mention a few.

### **3.3.3 Financial-industrial dependence**

Financial-industrial dependence according to So (1990: 99), consolidated itself at the end of the nineteenth century and was characterized by the domination of big capital in Europe and North America. It was later extended to the Third World through investment for the production of raw materials and agricultural products for the fast growing industrial sector and for consumption back in the home capital cities. Martinussen (1997:86) notes that as a result of such a development, a productive structure devoted to and dependent on the export of these primary products emerged in the dependent countries; in turn, such a structure resulted in dual economies characterised by a large agricultural sector and a small industrialized sector. A strong export sector is a pre-requisite for the

development of the industrial sector not least, because the latter requires substantial investment in technology and know-how both of which are facilitated by the availability of capital derived from export earnings. In the Third World and in Africa in particular, while the end of the Cold War ushered in the liberalisation of global markets, this did not bring any real benefits in terms of increased exports and corresponding export earnings for the terms of trade were not always conducive to maximum return on investment. Kufuor (1995:18) argues that this can be traced to the fact that the playing field was never level mainly because despite assertions that market forces would be the major determinants of the dynamics of the global political economy; overtly or covertly, powerful governments continued to play a significant role in order to protect their industries. Kufuor further notes that such protectionist practices were to see the most critical decisions affecting the global political economy (investment; markets, high value tagged marketable commodities and related quality control standards amongst others) being made and continue to be made in metropolitan capitals as elaborated in the previous chapter.

Gilpin (2001:18-19) argues that such exclusion was inevitable for contrary to assertions that the state would be playing a minimal role in the new and liberalised global economic order, powerful governments continued to be the primary actors in both domestic and international economic affairs. Furthermore, they continued to use their power to influence economic outcomes by setting the rules within which other actors had to function; the fixing of commodity prices, the determination of export quotas and tariffs amongst other strategies. Thus and at best, the playing field has never been level not least, because the Third World countries did not have the same starting point as those of Europe and North America. At worst, protectionism saw the goal post forever changing whenever the economic interests of the powerful nations are threatened; besides, the argument continues, there was an element of coercion. Such coercion is evident in the fact that when commodity prices, export quotas and tariffs are externally determined with no room for negotiation, the tendency by weaker nation states is to produce the commodities for which the price and quota are highest and the tariffs lowest in order to maximise return on investment. In addition to coercing governments in the Third World to focus on certain commodities through the quota system and price fixing, Hetch (1995: 404) notes that due the limited influence Third World countries have over both technology and investment decisions, powerful governments covertly dictate the quality standards that the commodities must meet; she refers to such a phenomenon as the "Issue of Externalities" and "Dependency Perspectives".

With respect to "Externalities", Hetch (1995: 405) cites the example of short-cycle crops like sugar and cotton of which the Third World is a major producer. But then, so is the United States and given its level of advancement in agricultural technology, the quality and thus competitiveness of these Third World agricultural products on the world markets is determined by the quality standards of United States commodities at any given point in time. With respect to "Dependency", the tendency by Third World governments is to seek and/or accept offers of "technical advice" from planners and/or agencies to ensure that their commodities meet the stipulated standards and are of the same quality as those from competing countries. According to Babu (1981:39), unfortunately for the Third World, there is little to show in terms of the impact of such "technical advice" understandably, his argument continues, in a situation in which the knowledge and experience of the "experts" is wholly metropolitan and/or their background entrepreneurial, the solutions offered to Africa is not from the reality of the situation but instead, from business manuals. In addition to little if any impact at all, Hetch (1995: 406) argues that the technical advice given often involves the application of technologies and/or yield enhancing chemicals that due to different ecological and/or cultural conditions are not suitable to the context. Mismatched with local ecological conditions as the technologies and/or chemicals are, the result is often environmental degradation and/or adverse influences on weather patterns amongst other undesirable side effects.

The observations and arguments by Babu and Hetch with respect to the nature and form of "technical advice" offered to Third World governments are captured by a one-time spokesman of the UN Office for Emergency Operations who Timberlake (1988: 3) quotes as saying, "...Africa's biggest problem - is too many people going around the continent with solutions to problems they don't understand..." At about the same time, the same sentiments were echoed by a then Senior Vice President of the World Bank who admitted, "...We...have failed in Africa along with everybody else...We have not fully understood the problems. We have not identified the priorities. We have not always designed projects to fit..." In any case, Timberlake (1988: 3) notes that the cost to Africa was phenomenal adding that "...advising Africa has become a major industry with European and North American firms charging as much as \$180,000 for a year of an expert's time...". Such a level of remuneration coupled with an estimated 80,000 or so such technical advisors working for public agencies under official aid programmes in Africa at the time, meant that more than half of the USD7 - 8 billion of aid spent annually by donors was going towards financing them.

According to Capps (2005) the majority of African countries were particularly vulnerable to downturns in the world economy because of the colonial legacy of heavy reliance on a narrow range of price-sensitive primary commodity exports; cocoa, coffee and copper amongst others. The slump of the 1970s saw the prices of most raw material collapse at a time when the cost of oil imports was witnessing dramatic increases; in response, the IMF began to offer short term loans to “stabilize” these countries’ balance of payments; this marked the beginning of Africa’ s foreign debt problem. On foreign debt, Babu (1981: 39) argues that debt establishes a special kind of umbilical cord which ties a country's economy to that of the donor and in the process, distorts the local economy by integrating it externally. Bond (2006: 27) concurs adding that the conditions which are often attached to aid results in many other “phantom” aspects that prevents it from reaching its targets on the ground. In support of this assertion, he cites an example from an annual report of the NGO Action Aid which had that in 2003, payments in respect of transactional and administrative costs of administering aid accounted for some 14 percent of the aid disbursed globally. In addition, technical assistance by Northern experts accounted for 20 percent while some 4 percent was technically ‘tied’ to the purchase of inputs from the donor country. Such arrangements Babu (1981:45) argues are hardly surprising for there is no such thing as “disinterested aid” adding that all aid is designed to serve specific objectives beneficiary to the donor, directly or indirectly.

This view by Babu is supported by Capps (2005) who cites the example of Western powers’ response to the world recession of 1974-75 in which they came up with a scheme which tried to boost demand for their home industries by underwriting the export of arms and machinery in the Third World. The “export credits” were in reality tied loans that could only be used for the purchase of specified imports and in the event that a Third World country could not repay the loan, the export contract would be honoured by the companies’ governments. Such arrangements did not mean exoneration from repaying the loans; on the contrary, the obligation was presented in another form namely; an export credit which would be converted into a bilateral loan which would either be charged at market interest rates or at marginally lower concessional rates and recorded as Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Notwithstanding that the gamble failed in so far as the anticipated recovery of at least part of their money through these bilateral aid arrangements did not work, this however did not stop the industrialized countries from continuing to subsidize their arms and other export industries so they can continue do business in the Third World. The persistence of developed countries on continuing to lend money to the Third World is evident in the fact that between 1976 and 1980, the Third World’s total

debt grew at an annual average rate of 20 percent. Such bilateral debt has since been killing Africans twice - by underwriting the export of arms to fuel its many wars as well as by sucking out scarce resources to ensure that arms and other industries in the developed world stay in business.

The same can be said of multilateral donors and Capps (2005) cites the example of the World Bank which increasingly lent money to fund “development projects” in the Global South from the 1950s onwards in arrangements in which a new arm of the bank, the International Development Agency was established to provide “soft” or “concessional” (cheap) loans to the least developed and poorest countries. Such arrangements were directly tied to the international financial institutions’ wider goal of establishing new avenues of accumulation of Western capital in all corners of the globe. Unfortunately, the bulk of the loans were for major infrastructural projects; however, in a situation in which the borrowing countries lacked the human capital and/or technological know-how, they relied on Western construction companies, consultants and technology as such, the projects generated a healthy profit “flow-back” to the firms of the states providing the funds and/or expertise. Babu (1981: 39) observes notwithstanding that African governments in particular, turned out to be bad debtors; readily available foreign loans became a substantial part of Africa's development strategy whereby the meaning of "protection of national interests" became synonymous with continued access to aid. He concludes that contrary what foreign aid was originally meant to do namely; to cover shortfalls in export earnings, it became indispensable to political survival whereby "progress" was and continued to be measured not on the basis of how much better the masses eat, dress and/or live but in terms of export performance and the balance of payments! In the process (Babu 1981: 45), entrepreneurs became the first and final casualties of a vicious circle understandably, instead of enjoying protection from their governments through limiting their involvement in unfavourable world markets; they were exposed even more not least, by being coerced into producing not primarily for their own consumption needs but to satisfy the consumption and production needs of the donor country.

### **3.3.4 Technological-industrial dependence**

Dos Santos (1971: 231) refers to this as a new dependence which he argues, was consolidated in the post war period and which can be traced to Multinational Corporations (MNCs) which began to invest in industries targeted at the internal markets of underdeveloped countries. The new dependence, the argument continues (Dos Santos 1971: 232-234), is characterised by the development of an industrial sector and an emphasis on industrial imports and exports instead of the traditional reliance on agriculture and raw materials. Such an approach to economic development acts against Third World

countries in so far as the development of an industrial sector is dependent on the development of the export sector which generates the necessary foreign currency earnings to maintain the industrial sector. However, in a situation in which traditional reliance on agriculture and raw materials, the only source of foreign earnings in the Third World was discouraged, it meant that countries in this group could never fairly compete in world markets for lack of a resource base with which to develop the industrial sector. Besides and of necessity, the development of the sector in the Third World and in Africa in particular, depends on technology from developing countries which countries have a monopoly over the supply of such technology anyway!

On monopoly over the supply of technology, Rapley (2007:27) concurs adding that such a practice of “selective engagement” by foreign firms was designed to secure continued access to protected Third World markets; it is this practice amongst other reasons that the Third World did not derive maximum return on the investment made from the imported technology. The other reasons are first of all, determined to maintain their competitive advantage in an environment in which through research and development, technology was ever evolving at a very fast pace, MNCs often used the Third World as a depository for technology which had become obsolete in their home countries. Thus, notwithstanding the drain on their meagre foreign earnings base, Third World industrial development was largely based on second generation production technology besides, while MNCs readily sold their obsolete machinery and equipment to the Third World, they were however reluctant to share and/or sell the know-how deriving from research and development. On selective engagement, the observation by Rapley is supported by Kema (2005: 6) who cites the example of a dispute between the Indian government and the Coca-Cola Corporation in which at one point in time, the government’s position was that if Coca-Cola wished to continue operating its subsidiary in India, it had to disclose details of the composition of the cola syrup formula used to make the beverage. Realizing that this would undermine its monopoly on the product and thus its profit motive, Coca-Cola declined to provide the details and instead, chose to close its operations rather find itself competing on a level playing field with a local company. Secondly, as the imported inputs were driving the Third World’s import bill upwards, MNCs were repatriating their profits back home further worsening the balance of payments situation in the host countries. Thirdly, in the relentless pursuit of the profit motive and while their activities created a few jobs and/or the odd linkage to other domestic productive sectors, a common strategy employed by MNCs was to ensure that capitalism did not spread too far beyond these firms.

Other protectionist strategies (Kema 2005: 6) took the form of a preference by MNC's to transfer machines and equipment (albeit, obsolete by home standards) as capital investment rather than as commodities for sale. This way and desperate as Third World countries were to develop their industries, they would go out of their way to facilitate the entry of that form of foreign capital so that they could at least keep the wheels of their industries moving. To this effect, foreign firms enjoyed many advantages; from exemption from exchange controls for the importation of machinery; financing of sites for installation thereof not to mention loans from foreign and domestic banks which prefer such clients anyway. Gilpin (2001:291) shares these views adding that foreign direct investment characterised as it is by impersonal market forces and corporate strategies; is transforming the nature of international economic and political affairs in a manner that is exploitative, a manner which undermines the nation-state and integrates national economies. Thus, contrary to the belief in some quarters that integration was highly beneficial for mankind, MNCs were not only failing to empower the poor but actually dispossessing them through legitimising inequalities. On inequalities, Rojas (1989) argues that these are evident in the net balance between the "investments" by MNCs and outflow of payments on these investments; it is always negative. This in the main is because unlike domestic industries, part of the value added in the process of production goes out of the host country and is not recycled into the domestic circular flow of income. He concludes that foreign investments are not only "economically inefficient" but further fracture the host country's aggregate demand.

Another dimension of MNCs contribution to under development and thus continued dependency in the Third World according to Nield (2002: 209); is their involvement in or abating corrupt practices in host countries, the justification of which is that this is necessary to circumvent the problem of bureaucratic inefficiency and bottlenecks to doing business in the Third World. Thus, they buy their way into securing purchases of concessions to exploit natural deposits of oil, copper, gold and diamonds or simply to get their imported inputs cleared by the local revenue authorities on time. In some instances, MNCs pay outright bribes to rulers and officials to gain export contracts particularly in the oil and arms industries and will even justify it by suggesting that bribery is "customary" in those countries as such, they need to do it to in order to be competitive. With respect to bribes, Olori (2007) cites the example of Nigeria, of which he says that a political commentator once lamented that it was a paradox that the majority of Nigerians relied on wood for fuel at the same time as the country was so endowed with abundant oil and gas reserves that it was ranked the world's sixth largest oil producer. The consequence of the heavy reliance on wood for fuel by the majority of Nigerians is corroborated in a



report by FAO (2005a: 130) in which it is stated that during the decade 1990-2000, Nigeria lost 398,000 hectares or an equivalent of 2.6% of its forests. The impact of such a degree of environmental degradation and corresponding effect on climatic patterns and by implication, agricultural productivity and long term food security needs no elaboration.

MNC apologists amongst them, Ahiakpor (1992) argue that they create jobs; rent buildings and land, or sometimes outright buy them and when they buy; they generate capital which the owners can invest in other enterprises. Besides, the argument continues, MNCs are able to make profits because of the demand for their products; thus, had MNCs not been producing the products in the Third World, the Third World would have been importing the products from elsewhere anyway. Kema (2005: 3) disagrees and argues that while MNC create jobs however, their operations do not necessarily promote sustainable economic development because they are self-serving entities and not the philanthropic institutions they portray themselves. To this effect and in the relentless pursuit of the profit motive, they turn from their homes where they assume some respectable form and image and turn to underdeveloped countries where they go uninhibited. Their uninhibited behaviour extends to engaging in activities that cause damage to the periphery by amongst other things, environmental degradation, introducing nutritional and health hazards and undermining the sovereignty of host countries.

Kema's views on environmental damage are shared by Timberlake (1988: 87) who quotes a one-time officer in the UN Office for Emergency Operations who at one point in time challenged a message in a commercial advertisement in the United States. The officer argued that the message "...our peanuts come fresh from the jungle..." was misleading in so far as "...you have to cut down trees to plant peanuts...then you get peanuts and desertification..."! With respect to nutritional and health hazards, Kema (2005: 3) cites the MNC Néstle which through sophisticated advertising in the early 1980s, the corporate popularized the use of formula as the best and "modern" method for feeding babies in the Third World. A series of studies carried out over a period revealed widespread malnutrition amongst babies fed on formula. Understandably, the marketing strategy had not taken into account the fact that being of limited means the mothers would be tempted to over dilute the mixture to make the formula go that little further. In addition, the strategy had not taken into account the quality of the water especially in a situation in which babies fed on formula did not have the protection of the immunoglobulin properties found in mother's milk. It took no less than a world-wide outcry by civil

society groups and UN agencies to contain the MNC's determination to maximize profit regardless of the costs in terms of the health and welfare of babies.

### **3.3.5 An analysis of Dependency Theory**

The arguments by Dependency theorists that colonial legacy was a major contributory factor to dependency in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World are supported by many scholars as illustrated earlier. Amongst such scholars is Knife (1995:98) who argues that the policies implemented by colonial powers for example, the dual model of development favouring the cities and the strategies and interventions applied, land and trade monopolies and forced labour amongst others; had an enormous destructive and destabilising effect on the organisation and management of the post independence African political economy. Such a view is supported by Offiong (1980: 119) who notes that European powers did not establish colonial states to carry out a programme of political and economic development or social change but instead, to establish efficient and effective administrative states for the purposes of economic exploitation. Such exploitation continued after independence and continent's role in the world economy continued to be limited simply to a source of raw materials for industries in Europe; as such, industrial development was limited to those sectors and locations which facilitated the exploitation and export of these resources. Since then according to Alemazung (2010: 63), the political and economic relationship between post-colonial Africa and the West in the new global political order have the same underpinnings and meet the same objectives as those that prevailed during the colonial period; it is based on absolute control over Africa and its human and material resources and the nourishment of Western economies with Africa's produce and markets. Under the circumstances; the exploitative and asymmetric character of the relationship continues unabated; what this means is that the continent continues to be condemned to perennial dependency not least, because powerful nations are not prepared to lose the competitive advantage deriving from their comparative advantage during colonial times; this they need to do in order to maintain optimal conditions for nurturing their international business "comfort zone" in the new global political order.

The arguments on the impact of a colonial dependency on development in Africa are strong however; Knife (1995: 98) concedes that the African state is not entirely exempt from many unpardonable acts of commission and omission. This view, he supports by pointing out that the pressure exerted by the legacy of colonial rule and/or neo-colonial interventions could not possibly have been immune and/or adamantly resistant to innovative reform. There is evidence in support of this view by Knife for as

alluded to earlier, in Kenya, instead of changing legislation on land management such that it strengthened a system that had been proved to work and ensured a moral economy, the new leadership changed the system for the worse resulting in an unequal distribution of this important resource; a resource which for the rural poor, is the only capital asset they possess. Such poor legislation and policies are also evident in Ethiopia, one of the poorest countries in Africa but one that was never colonised and by implication; it was spared of the vices of colonialism. According to an article titled “Drought, death and taxes” posted in the Economist (2002; 45), Ethiopia’s long history of dependence on food aid can be traced to poor policies in turn, poor policies can be traced to the perpetuation of a feudal system dating back to the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie in which peasants could not own land instead, they leased it from the state. For the peasants, an annual land “tax” was payable in cash within a specified period after the harvest and the penalty for failure to meet this obligation was heavy. Under the circumstances, farmers would scramble for market share in the immediate post harvest period resulting in the flooding of the market with produce. In turn, flooding the market with produce would result in a fall in commodity prices meaning that farmers had to sell more of their produce to raise the necessary cash with which to meet their land tax obligations. The result was a vicious circle in so far as at the end of the day, the peasants had neither a reserve of food commodities for their own consumption nor cash with which to buy food until the next harvest hence the perennial dependence on food aid.

The same can be said of Zimbabwe where according to Chitiyo (2002) a mechanism for addressing land inequalities was enshrined in the Lancaster House Agreement (1979) which ushered in an independent Zimbabwe. Implementation of the mechanism proved difficult for lack of financial resources all the same, in anticipation of an injection of funds from the former colonial power, Britain; the government (Republic of Zimbabwe: 2006b) developed and adopted the 1992 National Land Policy. According to Holman (2007), notwithstanding that the financial resources were availed, the policy failed to solve the problem in the main, because in the final analysis, the land acquired did not benefit landless peasants but instead, Mugabe loyalists in politics, the military and civil service, as a reward for their patronage. As if such an act of commission was not bad enough; according to O’Loughlin (2006), twenty years into independence in 2000, in an attempt to ride the storm arising from increasing disgruntlement and mounting political pressure for meaningful land reforms by the masses; under the guise of “land reform”, Mugabe pursued a policy of forced removal of white farmers from their land and unleashed a devastating cycle of often violent expropriation. The impact of such

an ill conceived policy on agricultural productivity, the engine once driving the export sector is evident in a trend analysis conducted by Hanke (2009) which revealed that by mid-November 2008, the measurable rate of inflation in Zimbabwe was estimated at 79,600,000,000 percent or an equivalent of a daily increase of 98.0 percent with commodity prices doubling on average every twenty four hours. Under the circumstances, Zimbabwe could be expected to be dependent on foreign and food aid for a long time to come!

In addition to such acts of commission, acts of omission are also evident on the part of African governments and in particular, their failure to reverse the colonial dual model of development which favours towns and cities to the neglect of rural areas. According to the World Bank (1981: 2) neglect of the rural areas is evident in the fact that basic infrastructure is almost nonexistent in some (rural) areas; ports, road and rail networks simply did not penetrate the hinterland and storage facilities and communications systems were poorly developed. The trend continued prompting the World Bank (1994: 2) to remind African governments that the adequacy of infrastructure helps determine one country's success and another's failure; in diversifying production, expanding trade, coping with population growth, reducing poverty and/or improving environmental conditions. The reminder changed little and five years later, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (2009: 17-18) reiterated that as a result of poorly developed infrastructure; road and rail networks; high fuel prices and an aged and inefficient fleet, transport costs in Africa remained the highest in the world and this was one explanation for the low levels of trade volumes on some routes.

The consequences of poor infrastructure acting as a disincentive against increased production by farmers was not only limited to the erosion of the agricultural sector's potential to generate much needed foreign earnings but more seriously, it undermined the ability of Africa to feed itself. Timberlake (1988: 32) argues that continued neglect of rural areas can also be traced to the fact that it often works out cheaper for governments to import food from abroad than from their own backyards characterised as they are by poorly developed road and rail networks and the logistical nightmare they present. However, it turned out that this option was not necessarily cheaper for according to Babu (1981: 42) , with the average import/export ratio at 1:1 at best and at worst, a negative value, this meant that of the little foreign earnings African governments generated through the feeble agricultural sector, a substantial portion of it would go towards food imports. More than half a century after colonial powers and their monopolies on land, trade and exploitation of labour ended, the crisis that

Timberlake observed more than two decades ago continues unabated and this could not be more evident in the sphere of food security as is evident from the record in Kenya.

According to Alemazung (2010: 71), financial-industrial dependency was inevitable in Africa for after independence; the former colonial masters introduced what they called development politics in the newly independent states; to make good the destruction that Europe had caused in the continent through colonialism. To this effect, development aid became the mechanism through which Europe would assist the new nations to develop; besides, the period coincided with the post war era during which the emphasis of the neo-liberal doctrine was on the development of the industrial sector. According to Dos Santos (1971: 235), this was to sow the seeds for financial-industrial dependency on the economically powerful countries for of necessity, the Third World had to resort to foreign borrowing in order to import the technology and know-how with which develop their industrial sectors. Timberlake (1988: 3) shares these views adding that for African states in particular, such a situation was tantamount to a “lose-lose” position on many fronts because first of all, the bulk of development “aid” was repatriated back to the donor country as income from purchases of technology and/or know-how in the form remuneration of “consultants”. Secondly, while the costly imported technology and know-how was meant to enhance production in the long term, the result was often the exact opposite in terms of its impact on the local ecology as pointed out earlier. Thirdly, the rate of evolution of technology and know-how in the more advanced countries was such that African states could not keep up the pace as such, they could never compete fairly in global markets characterised as they were by ever changing goal posts in terms of technological advancement and/or know-how. Such comparative and competitive disadvantages in industrial development saw African governments sink deeper into debt in order to fill income gaps in an attempt to enhance productive capacity.

African states indeed had no choice but to resort to foreign borrowing and some ended up in a debt trap; borrowing to pay off previous debts; however, notwithstanding the fact that some states ended up in such a situation, there was little to show for the degree of indebtedness. In part, such a situation can be traced to mismatched priorities; during his first tenure of office (1977 -1989) Olusegun Obasanjo was once quoted as saying of mismatched priorities, “...Seemingly reckless pursuits of programmes of state expansion undermined the equilibrium between the consumption and the resource base which in some cases was further undermined by the lifestyles of the new leadership...” These views are shared by Black (1991:130) who notes that Third World debt servitude began to take shape in the 1950’s and

1960's and was manifest in white elephants which characterise many an African capital. There is empirical evidence in support of this observation by Black when one considers the ultra modern airports, conference centres and stadia in some African capitals. Notwithstanding the phenomenal amounts of money sunk into such monuments; some such airports for example, only ever marshal in or out; a handful of domestic flights and one or two international flights a week. As for the stadia and conference centres, it is not uncommon for a whole year or more to lapse without hosting a single event which justifies such a level the expenditure; in many Africa countries, such infrastructure has since been reduced to venues for the ruling party's events no matter how insignificant. The recklessness continued throughout the post-independence period and as late as 2003 and for no less than three months (Focus on Africa 2003), parliamentary debate in Swaziland was dominated by a proposal to spend a staggering \$400 million from the national purse towards purchasing a private jet for the King! Ironically, at about the same time, the same leadership was complaining bitterly about the poor response by the international community to an appeal for food aid to mitigate the effects of a devastating drought!

In concluding the analysis on financial-industrial dependence, it does appear that by dictating that economic development would focus on the industrial sector in a situation in which the Third World had neither the financial capacity, appropriate technology and/or know-how to develop the sector, the economically powerful nations created financial-industrial dependence in the Third World. However, as the above examples illustrate, African governments not only embraced such dependence but nurtured it as Babu, Knife, Timberlake and others illustrate. Besides, as they wasted resources on unproductive sectors, in the process; they facilitated capital flight back to the countries where it had been borrowed from in the first place for often, the contracts for such prestigious albeit, white elephants were awarded to firms from Europe or North America perceived as they were, as possessing the latest technology and know-how.

With respect to technological-industrial dependence, the argument that through protectionism and selective engagement, MNCs created the environment for and exacerbated the conditions for such dependence appears valid as the example of Coca Cola given earlier clearly demonstrates. However, the "invasion" by these corporate entities was not peculiar to Africa; countries in Asia hitherto colonised, also went through the same experience. At the end of World War 11, Know (1994: 641) notes that East Asian states in particular, were at the bottom of the development ladder all the same; they recognised the need to industrialise and thus catch up with the West. However, lacking in

capitalists to kick-start the process (just like the situation in Africa); East Asian governments assumed the role of industrialist and took responsibility for the industrialisation of their economies. According to Brohman (1996: 118), that in time, the “Asian Tigers” as they came to be known; became an economic powerhouse in their own right can be attributed not to the pursuance of policies and/or structural adjustment programmes “recommended” by financial lending institutions (World Bank and IMF) but instead, to an inward as well as an outward orientation in which an activist state pursued policies of economic nationalism. Such policies involved the provision of subsidies to assist the neophyte industries to get off the ground; protecting them against market forces and competition and the active promotion of exports and investment decisions which were favourable to the growth and development of their domestic economies amongst other measures. In the light of this example, it can be argued that a sense of self determination like that demonstrated by the governments of East Asia is all that was needed by African states to turn their situation around.

At various points in time, Africa experimented with both economic nationalism and structural adjustment but with disastrous results in both cases. Of the economic nationalism path, Ayittey (1990: 5) notes that by 1980, almost every African economy was dominated by one large sector; the state sector characterized by a huge bureaucratic civil service and hopelessly inefficient state enterprises. With the main criteria for appointment into management positions in these institutions simply loyalty, their collective performance was nothing short of a scandal. He cites the example of the State Jute Bag Factory in Ghana; between 1978-1980, the state enterprise was closed for 14 months due to a shortage of raw materials; all the same, the 1,000 workers received full pay for the entire period of the closure. The same situation prevailed in Niger where in 1982, the cumulative deficit of 23 loss-making state enterprises exceeded 4 percent of the country’s GDP while in Togo, the losses of just eight state enterprises reached 4 percent of GDP in 1980. Of the structural adjustment path, Ayodele, Cudjoe, Temba, Nolutshungu & Sunwabe (2005:1) argue that foreign aid given to support reforms in Africa had not been successful either; they cite the more than \$500 billion in foreign aid which was pumped into Africa between 1960 and 1997 but which instead of increasing the rate of development, created dependence. They conclude that the record of Western aid to Africa is one of abysmal failure. These views by Ayodele et al. are supported in a report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD) (2002) in which it was noted that the failure of structural adjustment programmes to overcome the major structural and institutional impediments to capital accumulation and sustained growth is partly due to slippages in policy design and implementation. This was evident

in the fact that of the 15 countries identified as core adjusters by the World Bank in 1993, only three were subsequently classified by IMF as strong performers however, this was not attributable to sound policies but instead, to some special circumstances that were of a one-off nature and unrelated to structural adjustment policies. The argument points to a situation in which unlike the East Asian NIC's who decided to do things their own way, by blindly going along with "recommended" policies of financial lending institutions in a situation in which they were "clueless" on the appropriateness of the policies to their own situation, African governments found themselves in a worse situation that they had been hitherto.

Indeed, that some MNCs are involved in and/or abate corruption is a fact even by their own admission as is evident from a number of well publicised litigation cases however, African governments are not exactly the "powerless victims" of the scourge; on the contrary, they have been party to it all the way. Ebeh (1994: 7) observes that in Nigeria for example; public office is seen as an opportunity to enrich self and kinsmen and a means to acquire personal aggrandizement. He laments the fact that despite the country's endowment with natural resources, Nigeria remains one of the poorest nations in the world adding that the problem has to do with a primitive perception of power and authority by the leaders. This is evident in the record of Sani Abacha's looted fortune of which according to the New York Times (2004: A10) his successor President Obasanjo managed recover no less than US\$709 million and another (GB) £144 million. However no sooner had the money been recovered, the Senate Public Accounts Committee found only US\$6.8 million and GB £2.8 million of the recovered money in the Central Bank of Nigeria; the rest could not be accounted for; it had been re-looted! In Ghana, Ayittey (1990: 4) cites the example of Kwame Nkruma who while preaching socialism, his ministers were busy importing Mercedes Benz vehicles and gold beds at the same time as stashing millions into Swiss bank accounts; "socialist" ideology had degenerated into what he sarcastically refers to as "Swiss bank socialism."

In Southern Africa, Angola was not spared of the "black gold curse" either for according to Butcher (2002), despite the country's average £2 billion annual foreign earnings from enormous off-shore oil reserves; there is little to show for it in terms of economic and social development. Instead, in 1999, the government was accused of stealing up to a third of the annual income; the scandal was exposed in a footnote in the annual report of the MNC, Shell BP which stated that £75 million had been spent on a "signature fee" to win an offshore production contract. The payment never appeared in any of the government accounts and in accordance with its policy of "non disclosure" Shell BP declined to



publish details the recipients and those of similar signature fees paid for three other big contracts in Angola. In the arms industry and according to Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer (1996: x), it has been alleged that Europe and its allies continue to be party to economic underdevelopment in Africa through the destabilising effects of wars some of which as illustrated earlier, raged on for decades. Colleta et al further note that during the Cold War, the principals armed local factions or whole armies with the price tag on supplies, simply ideological allegiance. In the post Cold War era, warring factions maintained optimal levels of arms inventories through arms purchases facilitated by the control and sale of precious natural resources, forest woods, diamonds and oil; in the main, through shady deals supported by the arms industry.

Indeed MNCs and in particular those in the arms industry exacerbated underdevelopment as the above accounts demonstrates however, Ayittey (1990: 7) argues that wars in Africa are generated not by the arms industry but instead, by dictatorships or weak authoritarian regimes that maintain their authority through personalised patron-client relations; such regimes are prone to sudden, erratic and often violent changes. This was the case in the well documented civil war in Sierra Leone where according to Pratt (1999), a one-time British government special envoy to the country; since independence in 1961, ethnic loyalty was and remained an important factor in government, the military, and business. In time, corruption within the ruling class and discrimination along ethnic lines in government appointments, contracts, military commissions and promotions became the order of the day. Such a style of leadership by leader after leader and the competition for the spoils of power was to sow the seeds for the turmoil and civil war from a mere seven years into independence in 1968 until 1998 or for three decades. According to Smillie, Gberie & Hazleton (2000: 9), the brutality of the 1991-1999 phase of the war was fuelled by diamond sales, resources which would have been better invested in development initiatives. Instead, the conflict robbed the potential beneficiaries and an entire generation of children of a future; the scholars lament that while the only impact of the enormous profits made at the Sierra Leonean end of the diamond chain was terror, murder, dismemberment and poverty; in the developed world, the same diamonds were purchased by the rich as emblems of wealth and/or as symbols of love and affection.

A primitive perception of power and authority indeed, the leaders displayed; Babu (1981: 6) attributes this to the fact that being themselves of peasant origin coupled with lack of experience in the in the field of exploitation, Africa's new ruling elite tended to be less refined in their approach. Notwithstanding the origin of such styles of leadership, it is apparent that wars in Africa and the

destabilising effects cannot be attributed to the profit motive of MNCs alone on the contrary, obsession with staying in power as manifest in tribal politics, and “divide and rule” political strategies that characterises many an African leadership are as much a contributory factor. In a situation in which channels for redress are either non-existent or thwarted, the disgruntlement of marginalised groups often finds expression in armed struggles and thus civil wars. Against this background, it can be argued that MNCs in the arms industry but only take advantage of readily available “market opportunities” created not by themselves but by the style of leadership of some governments.

### **3.3.6 Conclusions on Dependency Theory**

In summary, critics of Dependency Theory argue that, that the Third World is lagging behind in development can be traced to the pursuit of economic dominance by powerful nations in the past and present. They further argue that in pursuit of the profit motive, powerful nations used and continue to use all sorts of strategies including manipulation, coercion and protectionism amongst other things, to realise their goal. In the light of the examples given in the foregoing, these arguments appear valid however, as illustrated in as many examples, indeed the African state is not entirely exempt from many unpardonable acts of commission and omission. To this effect, Babu (1981: 38) argues that to be workable, (government) institutions must be in harmony with the concrete situation to which they are designed to apply. This did not happened in post colonial Africa his argument continues; instead, the new leaders adopted wholesale, colonial systems of state management; in addition and unlike the NIC's, they blindly followed IMF and World Bank-recommended systems for managing their economies that were not in harmony with their concrete situation. Against this background, Rapley (2007: 158) argues that while many external factors were significant in the dependency that characterises Africa's development path, there are as many internal factors. Amongst such internal factors are first of all, the perpetuation of a policy of urban bias resulted in the decline of the agriculture, the only sector which had the potential to generate the resources to finance the development of the industrial sector. Secondly, the mismatching of priorities meant that African states borrowed heavily for consumption and not for investment and in so doing, they compromised their own development. Thirdly, dictatorships or one-party state regimes that emerged shortly after independence enjoyed so much power and latitude that nobody really knew when a politician or official was depositing money into a Swiss bank account. Finally, the situation was compounded by the fact that such dictatorial tendencies meant that the agents that act as watchdogs in the West; the media, elected assemblies, opposition parties and interest groups either did not exist or were rigidly controlled

by their governments. In the economic sphere and with such unlimited power, the vision for economic progress was the prerogative of a dominant individual or a small ruling class; such latitude saw malpractices and mismanagement thrive unfettered. Such mismanagement and dictatorial tendencies has generated untold misery and suffering in Africa and given their strong hold on power, the only way to remove a leader was by force and hence the catalogue civil wars that have characterised the continent for the greater part of the post-independence era right through to the present.

In concluding this section on Dependency theory, the arguments that external factors are responsible for constraining sustainable development and perpetuating dependency in the Third World in general and in Africa in particular, are strong. However, Knife (1995: 109) notes that in turning democracy into mockery and broad day light plundering of their nation states, the behaviour of leaders and the ruling class is a major contributory factor to the state of under development in many an African country today.

### **3.3.7 General Conclusions on Development Theory**

It would appear that neither modernisation nor dependency theory provide a satisfactory explanation for the state of under development in the Third World in general and in Africa in particular. The modernist school of thought's evolutionist perspective is self contradicting in so far as it presents the process as a progressive unidirectional process at the same time as proponents of the theory acknowledge that the process would be subject to the influence of other factors including wars. By the same token, perhaps even the definition of development should be defined in context based on the perceptions of any given society on what the concept "progress" means to that particular society. A study carried out by Narayan, Chambers, Shah & Petesch (2000:22-23) revealed that perceptions of "progress" indeed differ from society to society. In poor communities studied in Malawi, there was a strong psychological orientation in which for example, "...couples being respectful of each other, having peace of mind and having well-behaved children who are not selfish, ..." were regarded as progress; in Ghana, this included "...being protected by God, having children for security in old age, not holding a grudge against someone and having a peaceful mind..." The progress and satisfaction once deriving for example; from having children (biological or otherwise) for security in old age has been eroded by a shift from collectivism to individualism as such, such a move would not represent progress in the communities studied in Ghana. The same can be said of the functionalist perspective in so far as the undermining of traditional authority structures which once served societies well by

maintaining social cohesion, order and collective social responsibility has resulted in chaos and suffering of the masses as the example on Kenya clearly demonstrates. Besides, not holding a grudge against an individual or institution that is the cause of the chaos and suffering can be a challenge for many a disadvantaged individual or group as the happened in Sierra Leone with disastrous humanitarian consequences. Finally, proponents of the sociological-economic perspective argue that modernisation of the means of production; diversification of the economy; improvements in infrastructure and thus household income symbolise development. However, such advancement in the material condition of societies does not necessarily translate into happy homes for in pursuit of careers to improve household income, parents may neglect their parental obligations and this may well result in maladjusted children as did happen in Europe during the Industrial Revolution.

With respect to dependency theory, in the economic sphere, Rojas (1989) adds his voice to the argument of the likes of Cardoso and Faletto adding that economic growth and development do not necessarily go hand in hand. To this effect, he argues that a society can experience economic growth without any significant social development; it can achieve social development with little economic growth or can achieve economic growth and social development at the same time. There is evidence in support of this position by Rojas for example, Swaziland is an example of economic growth without social development for according to the UNDP (2000: 159); in 1998, per capita GDP was \$3,816; life expectancy stood at 60.7 years and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolment was 72 percent of the school going population. In 2004 (UNDP 2006: 285), the figures stood at \$5,368, 31.3 years and 58 percent respectively. Thus, during the six year period; while GDP increased by some 40 percent, life expectancy and school enrolment decreased by 48 and 19 percent respectively. Seychelles comes to mind as an example of achievement of social development with little economic growth for in 2001 (UNDP 2003: 237), the country's GDP was \$17,030; life expectancy stood at 72.7 years and adult literacy rate was 91.0 percent. In 2005 (UNDP 2008: 229), the figures were \$16,106, 72.7 and 91.8 percent respectively. Thus, while Seychelles's GDP decreased by 5.4 percent; life expectancy was maintained at 72.7 years and there was an increase albeit small, of 0.8 percent in adult literacy. Zambia is an example of economic growth commensurate with social development for 2001 (UNDP 2003: 240) the country's GDP was \$780; life expectancy stood at 33.4 years, and the combined school was 45 percent of the school going population. In 2005 (UNDP 2008: 232), the figures were \$1,023, 40.5 years and 60.5 percent respectively. The increase in GDP by some 31 percent was comparable to increases in life expectancy and combined school enrolment at 21.2 percent and 34.4

percent respectively as such, Zambia can be said to have achieved both economic growth and social development.

The emphasis of dependency theory on external factors and the playing down of equally important internal factors is also misleading furthermore, it poses the danger of exacerbating the “lame duck” syndrome for while the East Asian experience is evidence that a history can be undone, African states it appears, have put little effort towards turning their situation around. Instead, they absolve themselves from responsibility for the underdeveloped state of their nations and appear comfortable in apportioning the blame to their colonial history and events during the Cold War era. Such self pity is evident in the fact that increasingly, foreign aid is perceived as a right hence when it is not forthcoming, they complained bitterly as was cited in the example of Swaziland. Such an attitude of resignation and/or unreasonable expectations has seen African governments entrenched deeper into a state of dependency especially in the sphere of food security. Given that the donor community is increasingly using the third sector to deliver aid; humanitarian agencies have become indispensable to the filling of gaps in the provision of basic services and the delivery of food aid amongst other humanitarian interventions. Behind the scenes though, humanitarian agencies have their own challenges; such challenges determine the degree to which they can fulfil their primary mandate of alleviating human suffering whenever and wherever it occurs as well as engage communities in long term sustainable development initiatives. The next chapter examines and analyses the said challenges.

**CHAPTER 4**  
**AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOs, DONORS,**  
**RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS AND BENEFICIARY COMMUNITIES IN GENERAL.**

**4.1 Introduction**

NGOs have indeed become indispensable to filling the gaps in the provision of basic services; health, education, social services and economic livelihoods amongst others; this is not to mention their indispensability in emergency and disaster relief. According to Salamon; Sokolowski & List (2003: 2), this can be traced to increasing disappointment with both the state and the market as mechanisms for solving interrelated social, economic and environmental crises. To this effect, the aid recipient states were perceived as stifling initiative, creating unresponsive bureaucracies and generally absorbing an escalating share of national income; at the same time, the market was perceived as ignoring human needs and producing untenable social inequalities. These views are shared by Conway; de Haan & Norton (2000: 11) who say of the state in particular; that the poorest households in poor countries rarely ever benefit from direct state support; under the circumstances and of necessity, they have come to rely heavily on non-state actors. In order to cope with public problems created by a combination of these factors, there was increasingly, a frantic search for a “middle way” between sole reliance on the state on the one hand and the market on the other hand; development ceased to be the sole responsibility of any one entity but instead one of partnership between various stakeholder groups; states; their extensions; the market and civil society.

Freeman (1984: 52) defines stakeholders as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organisation’s purpose; such a definition could not better reflect the relationship between the various stakeholder groups in the work NGOs do. Amongst these stakeholders are first of all, the donor stakeholder group which provides the resources that facilitate the work of NGOs; secondly, there is the host government stakeholder group on whose territory NGOs work, filling gaps in the provision of services that the said governments cannot adequately provide for their people for lack of resources. Thirdly, at the centre of this tripartite relationship are the poor communities, the target of the services provided by NGOs which constitute the fourth stakeholder. In the relationship between the four categories of stakeholders; each party has a clearly defined role to play; donors provide the resources which facilitate the work of NGOs; host governments provide the space for NGOs to translate the resources provided by donors into services. The contribution of communities is in terms of their goodwill and commitment to their own development while that of NGOs is their skills

and expertise and their commitment to the humanitarian cause. This appears a straight forward division of labour based on each party's comparative advantage however, in practice it is not so straight forward as will become evident at a later stage.

## **4.2 Donors**

The International Development and Research Centre (IDRC 2000: 2-3) identifies a number of categories of donors that support international development namely, donor governments; multilateral donor agencies, corporate donors; foundations and private donors. The focus of the analysis of the relationship between NGOs and donors will be on government, multilateral and corporate donors since the motivation of foundations and individual donors is usually less susceptible to the influence of other vested interests than that of the other categories of donors. For government donors, such influences can be traced to the fact that they have their own "back donors" namely the tax payers from whom they mobilise the resources and to whom they are accountable in terms what they do with the said tax payers' money. The "back donors" of multilateral donors are the "shareholder" member governments of these institutions as such, the former is accountable to the latter with respect to what they do with the resources where, when and often, even how. For corporations, they are accountable to their shareholders for who the primary motive for investing in the company in the first place, is a good return on investment; in turn, a good return on investment for the shareholder is a function of the profitability of the company's operations.

### **4.2.1 Donor Governments**

In the main, western governments, Japan, and member states of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries group (OPEC) constitute the major donor governments; these governments normally channel their development assistance directly to recipient government (bilateral aid) through agencies created for the purpose. Amongst such agencies for example, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID); United States' Agency for International Development (USAID); Japan's International Cooperation Agency (JICA); Sweden's International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) etc. Development assistance can also be channelled indirectly through non-state actors for example, NGOs or multilaterally through regional or international institutions created for the purpose and in which they are member states; for example, the European Commission Humanitarian and Civil Protection Office (ECHO), the World Bank, IMF or the United Nations. The rationale for providing humanitarian and development assistance by these governments as implied in their policy statements is a sense global social responsibility. In Canada for

example (Government of Canada: 2005), such a sense of global social responsibility is articulated in an international policy statement adopted and published by the government in 2005. The policy statement amongst other things, urged governments to think beyond their own national borders and take responsibility for one another; to this effect, it covered a wide range of humanitarian and development assistance to developing countries both bilaterally and multilaterally. In Europe, (European Union 1997), as early as its establishment in 1958, the then European Economic Community, the European Union (EU) as of 1993; global social responsibility was enshrined in the Rome Treaty which established Community. In the Treaty, Article 177 as amended in 1997 states that in the sphere of development cooperation, the Community's policy and the policies pursued by the Member States shall foster the sustainable economic and social development of developing countries, particularly the most disadvantaged among them. With respect to humanitarian assistance, as far back as 1990, the European Union (2002: 3) reaffirmed both its political duty to coordinate humanitarian interventions in countries outside the Union and its moral duty to show solidarity with their civilian populations who were increasingly becoming the deliberate victims of chronic and ferocious conflicts. It was this double imperative which in 1992, resulted in the establishment of ECHO, an institution charged with administering humanitarian aid.

According to Manji & O'Coill (2002: 9-10), the general belief in the 1970s was that the failure of Africa to develop and the poverty and misery of its inhabitants were rooted in poor policies; the thinking then was that integrating developing countries into the world economy would get these countries firmly on the path to sustainable economic and social development. As a result of this belief and thinking, "neo-liberalism" emerged as the dominant political-economic ideology in the West and central to the ideology, was minimising the role of the state. According to Shivji (2006: 8), the period coincided with the oil crisis of the mid 1970s and the petrol-dollars accumulated by international banks were off-loaded in the form of cheap loans to developing countries. Such loans according to Rojas (1997), would be accessed through the IMF and World Bank however, eligibility was on condition that the recipient countries implement a number of measures amongst which was reductions in public expenditure and minimising the role of the state in the economic affairs of the country. Manji and O'Coill (2002: 10) argue that notwithstanding the level of resources availed to developing countries in the form of such loans; the benefits of such international credit were short-lived. This in the main was a result of the fact that the reductions in public expenditure imposed on the borrowing countries as a condition to accessing the loans; in health, education and social welfare programmes amongst other



sectors; resulted in increasing poverty and inequality of a level not witnessed in Africa and Latin America for over two decades. Realising the negative impact that the neo-liberal policies were having on the poor, member state shareholders availed funds to the lending institutions for various welfare initiatives to minimise the impact thereof. However, believing in the “minimalist state” as the member state shareholders of these institutions did, the palliative interventions would be implemented not by the recipient states, which after all had long been forced to coil back from the provision of social services but instead, by the ever-willing NGO sector.

In addition to their willingness, Edwards & Hulme (1995: 3) observe that NGOs were perceived as being more efficient providers of services compared to governments which were perceived as inefficient and even corrupt. Against this background, NGOs became the new “favoured child” of official development agencies and were proclaimed as the “magic bullet” to target and fix the problems that had befallen the development process. These views by Edwards and Hulme have support from many quarters and the Overseas Development Institute (1995: 3) cites three factors which influenced donors to increasingly utilise the skills and services of NGOs as an alternative vehicle through which to deliver development assistance. The scholars explain the first factor in terms of an evolutionary process in which having been engaging NGOs in emergency relief activities for some time, donors perceived their engagement in development work as a natural progression. Secondly, the record of poor performance of official donor programmes in reaching the poor and the apparent lack of impact of rural development projects financed in the late 1960s and 1970s was a cause for concern in the donor community. Thirdly, such failure of official donor programmes; the perceived success of NGOs interventions in education and health coupled with NGO claims that they had the capacity to reach and improve the lives of the poor in areas which due to limited resources, poor infrastructure and/or lack of will, governments could not reach, increasingly endeared NGOs to donors. Fourth, NGOs were perceived as a means of getting around obstacles to the impact of aid caused by inefficient and corrupt governments.

The perceived success of NGOs is supported by Jennings (1995: 13) who observed that as official donors increasingly became frustrated with state inefficiency in programme management manifest often; in misallocation of resources and an urban bias, the role of NGOs moved from the periphery to centre stage on the development agenda in the 1990s. Besides, NGOs were perceived as better able to work more effectively than governments at the community level especially as they used a participatory

approach, a process that was considered essential to democratisation and the development of civil society. Such perceived strengths and advantages of NGOs are echoed by Chege (1999: 2) who notes that first of all, NGOs' greatest strength lies in advocacy and participatory models that focus on human development. Secondly, they are very effective in demonstrating that poverty, no matter how endemic, can be tackled by involving the beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of development projects thus increasing the chances of their sustainability. Thirdly, a source of their distinct comparative advantage lies in their ability to reach important constituencies; their independence in the assessment of issues and problems; dissemination of information and awareness-raising; advocacy and local accountability. He concludes that NGOs often tackle issues that governments are unable or unwilling to take up; they provide efficient, innovative and cost-effective approaches to difficult social and economic problems; they provide leadership in advocating for and producing changes in public policy and operate in spheres where government officials are constrained by bureaucratic or political considerations.

Robinson (1991: 171-2) shares these views adding that in their more traditional emergency relief and welfare activities; NGOs were valued for their capacity to respond rapidly, flexibly and efficiently while in development activities, they were valued for the particular development approaches they employed in their activities. These sentiments are echoed by Fowler (1988: 8-9) who notes that the perceived cost effectiveness of the approaches used by NGOs coupled with the fact that for political reasons, UN agencies were not always able to access victims in situations of civil conflict and only a handful of NGOs could secure the permission to work on the ground; further endeared NGOs to official donors. The end result of such perceptions according to Fowler (1988: 9); was that member states of the European Union increasingly engaged civil society partners for the delivery of their humanitarian and development assistance. Such increasing engagement is evident in the fact that according to the European Union (2002: 13); in the two year period 1998–2000, around two thirds of the EU's funds allocated for humanitarian aid were channelled through NGOs. Furthermore and in order to create an enabling environment for non-state actors, in time, the rules of engagement in the partnerships witnessed positive developments; this is evident in Article 94 of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (European Union 2007a: 31) in which within the framework of the applicable rules, the EU undertook to continue efforts to streamline and simplify its procedures for humanitarian aid in order to reduce the administrative burden on implementing organisations. In addition and at about the same time, taking note of calls by civil society for more space, the European Union (2007b:

2) positively responded resulting in greater support to civil society actors in the field and the strengthening of dialogue with broader civil society by amongst other things, institutionalizing the space for Civil Society Organisations policy dialogue in all relevant areas of cooperation.

#### **4.2.2 Multilateral donors**

In addition to providing humanitarian and development assistance as individual states and/or, collectively as members of a regional economic block, donors also often provide such assistance through institutions they jointly create for the purpose. In such arrangements, the institutions are referred to as multilateral donors; the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), ECHO, and United Nations (UN) agencies are examples of such multilateral donors. Wallace, Bornstein & Chapman (2006: 19) note that multilateral donor institutions have been engaging NGOs in development partnerships for over three decades with the rate of such engagement increasing dramatically in the nineties. This development according to the three scholars; can be traced to the neo-liberalism orientation prevailing at the time and of which an important tenet was that economic growth was best achieved when the role of the state in development is minimised. These institutions were convinced that the engagement of non-state actors; the private sector and civil society alike was one sure way of increasing the prospects for economic growth and development. According to Malena (1995: 13); as far back as the 1970s, operational collaboration with NGOs had become an increasingly important feature of activities financed by the World Bank. On its part, the Bank attributed the increasing collaboration with NGOs first of all, to their expanding role and influence and an increasing recognition of the specific benefits which NGO involvement could bring to Bank-financed operations. Secondly, the experience of donor institutions which hitherto, had been collaborating with civil society organisations had clearly demonstrated the benefits that civil society could bring to development initiatives. Against this background, collaboration (World Bank 1998: 4) began to grow significantly in the 1980s especially in the social and rural sectors; by 1990, NGOs were involved in about 12 percent of Bank-financed projects; the figure increased to 38 percent in 1997.

Of the United Nations, Chege (1999: 2) notes that the growing importance of NGOs to the intergovernmental body is reflected in the number of NGOs granted consultative status by the UN Economic and Social Council, a forum for discussing and formulating policy recommendations on social and economic issues; in 1948, the number stood at only 41 and by 1992, it had increased to 1,350. At that point in time and increasingly, virtually every UN agency was working with NGOs in various contexts and situations; for example, in 1997 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

disbursed some \$272 million of its \$1.4 billion budget or some 19.3 percent through 443 NGOs working in 131 countries. Krut, Howard, Eric, Harris & Pattison (1997: 17) attribute this development to the fact that in its form during the period, the UN was unable to execute its mandate especially in the face of an unstable world in which poverty, civil war, displacement and the breakdown of the family to name a few, had become endemic in many parts of the world. In addition, relative to finance and trade institutions, the authority of the UN had declined dramatically; this, coupled with a financial crisis at the time, the UN needed allies to perform its operational tasks and to increase its legitimacy and status in the new global power-play; NGOs became an important category of such allies.

An important category of allies for multilateral donors indeed NGOs became for in its 1996 annual report on cooperation with NGOs, the World Bank (1997: 7) stated that there was evidence to suggest a strong correlation between project performance and NGO involvement in those sectors in which NGOs had historically been more involved. Furthermore, projects in which NGOs were involved were less likely to have unsatisfactory ratings in meeting development objectives and/or were less likely to carry risks. Such positive perceptions of NGOs were taken to a higher level following the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals; the World Bank in particular, (2005b: xi) saw civic engagement as an important means for integrating poor people's voices and citizen participation in public policy issues; improving service delivery schemes and accelerating progress toward the MDGs. To this effect, the Bank increased its efforts to promote civic engagement in the belief that this would assist member governments to exercise their leadership role in promoting sustainable development and achieving the MDGs in a cost-effective, participatory, equitable and accountable manner.

### **4.2.3 Corporate donors**

In the main, these are multinational corporations (MNCs) also referred to as Transnational Corporations (TNCs) which are companies which operate in more than one country, directly or through off-shore subsidiaries. According to Kinfe (1995:9), the history of MNCs dates back to the 16th century when England developed a commercial sea fleet for trading with the Far East; the prevailing business model then was one of a partnership between individuals who pooled their resources and acted in the interests of their own communities. In time according to Makwana (2006), the majority of corporations became charitable institutions licensed by the crown and forbidden to engage in profitable commercial activities; however, a few corporations perceived to be acting directly in the nation's interest through their engagement in large-scale, high-risk commercial activities were allowed to make a modest profit. Amongst these companies were the Massachusetts Bay Company which was chartered

by King Charles I in 1638 to colonize the new world; in time, this and similar companies such as the Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company became a crucial part of the mercantile economic policies practiced by the colonial powers. They effectively run state monopolies in the colonies and were able to accumulate great financial and economic power through publicly trading shares in their companies.

In the post Cold War era, Krut et al (1997: 6-7) note that the new global economic order was integrated by a massive increase in international economic activity and the concentration of world capital among MNCs. Such a development resulted in the emergence of a world economic government dominated by giant corporations on a completely new level. In addition and following its establishment, the World Trade Organization (WTO) saw its power increase while the authority of the United Nations as an agent of global governance diminished. In time and with such power in its hands, the WTO expanded the economic and political space for multinational corporations with the result that national systems of production, distribution, trade and consumption were trans-nationalised. The impact of this development was the dismantling of the power of nation states to manage and intervene in their economies and in Third World countries in particular, this restricted and/or dampened the competitive capacity of enterprises and productive apparatus; a globalized economy that would serve the interest of the northern transnational corporations emerged. These observations by Krut et al. are shared in a report by the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (2001: 4-5) in which it is acknowledged that multinational corporations have unprecedented influence on national governments; international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF as well as various UN agencies. Such growing power coupled with increased trade liberalization and investment resulted in a diminishing role for Third World governments in the protection of their local industries, public goods and services. The end result was that the nation state became less self-sufficient and more vulnerable to the vagaries of global supply and demand systems; furthermore and in the Third World in particular, the new order undermined national governments' ability to provide social "safety nets" for their people. In order to counter the impact thereof especially on the welfare of people, some NGOs started working towards changing the rules of the game by pressuring corporations directly; advocating for regulatory changes and/or by lobbying for fair trade and investment policies. According to Murphy and Bendell (1999: 1), it is precisely this course of action adopted by NGOs that at the outset, most relationships between the private sector and civil society were founded on conflict.

#### **4.2.4 Foundations and Private donors**

According to Fleishman (2007: 59) a foundation is a legal categorization of non-profit organization established to donate funds; to support other organizations or provide the source of funding for its own charitable purposes in accordance with the mission designated by its founder. Foundations can be either private or public and according to the Foundation Centre (2012), the difference is in how they are funded. Thus whereas a private foundation has a principal fund or endowment, a public foundation has numerous sources and must continue to seek money from diverse sources in order to sustain its work.

Foundations and private donors share the same vision and goals as NGOs namely, that of alleviating human suffering and save in situations where one party fails to meet its obligations in a contractual agreement, relations are normally smooth. In the light of this, focus on the nature of relationships between donors and NGOs will be limited to government, multilateral and corporate donors; categories for which relationships with NGOs are often influenced by a variety of factors outside the relationships.

#### **4.3 Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs)**

According to Malena (1995: 13-14), the World Bank defines NGOs as private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment and provide basic social services and/or undertake community development. As such, NGOs can be said to be value-based organizations however, in wider usage, the term NGO can be applied to any non-profit organization which is independent from government and which depends in whole or in part, on charitable donations and voluntary service. Furthermore, there are many different types of NGOs and in the field of development and relief; they include large Northern-based charities such as Oxfam, Save the Children, Plan International, CARE and World Vision etc. to Southern-based Community Based Organisations (CBOs). Of these, Oxfam, Save the Children and Plan International according to Manji and O`Coill, (2002: 572); were primarily established as “war charities” to deal with the consequences of conflict in Europe; since then, the nature and scope of NGO work has expanded to include development and advocacy amongst others.

According to Shivji (2006: 8), during the first one-and-half decades of independence, facilitated mainly by the performance of the agricultural sector, African economies showed modest growth rates relative

to other continents. However, what this meant was that Africa's export market was based on a few primary commodities traded on a hostile and adverse international market. At the same time, for lack of technology, the neophyte manufacturing sector was heavily biased towards import substitution which was heavily dependent on imported intermediary inputs. As a result of such a degree of fragility of African economies, the economic shocks of the late 1970s saw them plunge into a deep crisis. The crisis according to Manji & O'Coill (2002: 567-8), saw the continent's per capita GDP increasingly decrease and a reversal of the gains made in areas like food consumption, health and education during the period of relative growth. Under the circumstances and as African governments found it increasingly difficult to provide an optimal level of basic services for their people, there was an explosion in the growth and the presence of Western NGOs in Africa. NGO presence in Africa indeed grew and while at the outset they came in as short term "gap fillers", in a situation in which socioeconomic and political conditions were increasingly deteriorating, the expansion of the nature, scope and reach of their activities witnessed a steady growth; more than half a century on, they are still "in business" in Africa. In addition to their growing numbers, Malena (1995: 14) observes while the principles of altruism and voluntarism remain key defining characteristics, the sector became increasingly professionalised.

NGOs have been classified according to the type of work they do and Smillie (1995:27) makes reference to a typology developed by Korten in 1990 in which the scholar identified four categories based on an evolutionary process in the development and growth of NGOs. The primary focus of "first generation" NGOs is on relief and the provision of welfare services while the focus of the "second generation" is on self reliant local development through small scale community empowerment projects. "Third generation" NGOs focus on sustainable development and seek to influence the broader policy framework; finally, for "fourth generation" NGOs, the concept of organisation does not really exist instead, they are made up of loosely connected social or people's development movements which are driven not so much by budgets or organisational structures but instead, by ideas and a vision for a better world. While such categorisation is useful for understanding NGO's and how they work, it is not unusual for an NGO to be somewhere in between the categories for example, an NGO might combine some agricultural project in a food insecure community at the same time as it is lobbying for improvements in productivity-enabling policy frameworks and/or infrastructure to facilitate higher productivity by that farmers. Regardless of which category they fall into, NGOs are committed to their noble cause however, Cernea (1988: 17) points out that like any other entity, NGOs have their own

strengths and weaknesses; of the strengths, the scholar argues that it is their capacity to reach the poor, urban and rural areas alike however, it is in reaching the rural poor where they score the highest. Understandably, many a rural poor community are located in remote areas that public authorities have difficulties in accessing for lack of infrastructure as such; such communities often cannot access basic services; health and education amongst others.

The capacity of NGOs to reach the poor is facilitated amongst other things, by their flexibility; such flexibility is acknowledged in a United Nations Human Development Report (UNDP 1993: 93) in which it is stated that in the early 1980s, a rough estimate suggested that NGO activities "touched" 100 million people in developing countries. At the time of the report, it was estimated that the actual figure was nearer 250 million and was expected to rise considerably in the years ahead. Dejong (1991:7) attributes NGO capacity to reach such a large number of people to the fact that they are typically community based with their personnel residing and working in close proximity to the populations they serve. As such, NGO personnel are much more likely than remote city-based bureaucrats to understand the issues of the communities they serve and to empathise with their perceived needs. Proximity to the communities served also serves to neutralise conflicting lifestyle values which characterise city based government bureaucrats socialised as they are, in a milieu foreign to that of the beneficiaries of the programmes they design. This renders NGO personnel better equipped to adapt their programmes to local circumstances; such flexibility is a major facilitating factor to their success in service delivery. Ball and Dunn (1991: 8) share these views adding that a comparative advantage NGOs have is that they are motivated by a desire for caring and developing society as such; their programmes are designed and implemented in a manner that addresses people's felt needs. In turn, such success in addressing people's felt needs can be traced to their ability to accurately identify the needs of the poor; their ability to explore locally available resources (knowledge, indigenous technology and materials amongst others) and/or adapting technologies developed elsewhere to local conditions. Hyden (1983: 186) concurs adding that the advantage that NGOs have is that they can help to "warm" up funds, thus giving them a final "temperature" that is likely to ensure greater success than if passed through cold governmental channels. In any case, McNeill (1981: 94) argues, NGOs offer the opportunity of alleviating the problem of absorptive capacity which is most serious with governments in poor countries characterised as they are by over-inflated and inefficient bureaucracies.

Of the weaknesses, Werker and Faisal (2008: 6-7) observe that the voluntary nature of NGO work presents a challenge with respect to the impact of interventions in so far as there is no reliable means of



measuring such impact. The cost of shirking on the quality of goods and services is high for a commercial entity for consumers can choose not to buy a commercial product if they are not satisfied that it is value for money. Likewise, an electorate disillusioned by unfulfilled election promises can vote out an incumbent from office at the next elections however for NGOs, the “consumers” of their voluntarily provided services do not yield such “market power” to penalise and/or reward the service provider for the quality of the services. Chege (1996: 3) argues lack of “market power” by the consumers of the services provided by NGOs coupled with excessive dependence on external financing has seen an increasing tendency by NGOs is to prioritise upward accountability rather than downwards towards the beneficiaries. According to Rauh (2010: 34-35) another downside of heavy dependency on external funding is that it further compromises NGOs in so far as donors often impose their own norms; values and priorities. On priorities, Rauh notes that these often fluctuate depending on what is popular at any given point in time and/or what is likely to be “successful” rather than addressing the root of the problem which usually involves complex long-term processes. On the norms and values, he notes that donors were increasingly insisting on professionalism and “best practices” and in particular, the use of log-frames; tools which require NGOs to spend disproportionate amounts of time developing elaborate and minutely detailed project proposals . In the process, quality time for their core business was being diverted towards these lengthy processes as such; NGOs were exposing themselves to the risk of compromising their own performance. Bush (1992: 391) concurs with Rauh’s views on donors’ insistence on “best practices” adding that in response to such demands, nonprofits were increasingly adopting private sector orientations and techniques. He cautioned that one of the biggest challenges facing organizations in the sector was how to retain their “non-profit spirit in a for profit world” adding that by focusing on private sector orientations and techniques, they were undermining the virtues which makes them distinct from the sector.

In concluding this section, it is evident that in the provision of services, the strengths of NGOs translate into a distinct comparative advantage over state machineries for the reasons elaborated earlier. At the same time however, their weaknesses and in particular, dependency on and the tendency to appease donors to the neglect of the objects of their *raison d’etre* compromises their performance. For this act of commission, NGOs have come under fire with allegations that they are not always as neutral on issues of policy formation as they purport to be and that they often play the dual role of providing information and acting as an agent of political pressure on host government leading to potential conflicts of interest in the host countries. According to Williamson (2005), there is increasing

awareness in the NGO community that they will need to do more to prove that such allegations are unfounded; to do some soul searching and to take a position that is consistent with their *raison d'être*. It is only through taking such a position that they will regain the level of trust and credibility they have enjoyed hitherto.

#### **4.4 Host Governments**

In situations in which humanitarian and development assistance is channelled directly to governments, a government receiving such assistance is normally referred to as the “recipient” government however, in situations in which the assistance is channelled through NGOs; by virtue of the fact that such a government is hosting the NGO, it is normally referred to as “host” government. According to Manji et al. (2002: 575) political independence in Africa was achieved through the ability of the nationalist movement leaders to capture the imagination of popular formations, uniting them in the promise that only through self-determination and independence, could all their aspirations be achieved. After independence, the struggle changed from one of emancipation and/or the denial of basic rights to one of fighting poverty and providing basic needs for the masses; to this effect, the state became the “sole developer” and “sole unifier” of society with development as its main preoccupation. However, barely ten years into independence and for a number of reasons, it became apparent that for the majority of the new African nation states, “development” as envisaged by the new leaders was increasingly becoming an illusion. This as mentioned earlier, can be traced a number of factors including the backwardness of the states they inherited from the colonial powers, political instability which in some countries was evident in the first decade of independence as well the oil crisis of the 1970’s. According to Cannon (1995: 109), faced with such a dilemma, the state withdrew from the core responsibility of providing for its people and NGOs increasingly stepped in to fill in the gap left by the withdrawal of the state in such sectors as social welfare, education, or health; sectors which are primarily the responsibility of governments.

The withdrawal of the state from its core responsibilities according to Manji et al. (2002: 577); was to transform the “development” arena such that space for the proliferation of NGOs in the region opened up and rekindled their missionary zeal. According to Slim (2007: 1), the opening up of space coupled with a perception that NGOs were better placed to accurately identify and address the felt needs of poor communities saw NGOs welcomed by many an African government. They were indeed welcomed for their programmes could give some measure of legitimacy and respectability to bad governments or equally and often, to bad armed groups in whose areas of control they often found

themselves working. Thus, with well resourced NGOs filling in the gaps in the provision of basic services, negligent governments and guerrilla groups were able to present themselves to their people as socially responsible. Smillie (1995: 75) observes that the shift in donor attitudes in the 1970s, from state centred development models towards more participatory, 'bottom-up' approaches; coupled with the increasing competence of NGOs deriving from the experience effect, host governments increasingly expected them to do more. Such expectations saw governments even creating an "enabling environment" through collaboration; consultation and support in the coordination of activities and even positively publicising their activities through the media. The variety of incentives was wide and a study carried out in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya and Uganda revealed that such incentives extended to exemption from paying income tax and duty on imports at the same time as individuals and companies making a donation to charity enjoyed tax concessions. Such attitudes by host governments are hardly surprising after all, NGOs were "subsidising" them in the provision of basic services thereby offloading a substantial portion of what is primarily a responsibility of the state.

The appreciation of NGOs by host governments expressed through creating of an enabling environment as elaborated above suggests a healthy and mutually beneficial partnership between NGOs and host governments. According to Clark (1995), such an assumption is wrong for a healthy relationship is only possible when both parties share common objectives thus, if a government's commitment to poverty reduction is not sincere, NGOs will face many frustrations and the relationship will be strained. In such situations, the tendency by NGOs is to chart their own course and in the process, sideline instruments of the state; this sows the seeds for antagonism and in particular, where the government is repressive. According to Campbell (1996: 2), such a tendency coupled with the praises often showered on NGOs for the role they play in development and their focus on empowerment and people's participation at the same time as criticism of African governments as being anti-market and anti-people was on the increase; created the perfect ground for the antagonism to degenerate into suspicion and even hostility.

In concluding this section, notwithstanding the fact that the services delivered by NGOs are in general welcomed by host governments not least, because they protect these governments from exposure of their failures; all the same, the relationship between these two stakeholders has not always been smooth as observed by Campbell and as will become apparent at a later stage.

## **4.5 Communities**

According to Edwards and Hulme (1998: 11-13), functioning within the larger society of which it is a part, is a grassroots and localised unit of social organisation known as a community and by implication, such a unit shares a common habitat, concerns and a common culture that gives the locality a distinct form and character. Members in a given community particularly in rural settings; will generally cooperate with one another to provide the means for meeting the common needs of daily living. However, notwithstanding the seemingly homogeneity, shared values and collective action, the sense of belonging is not uniform across a community at both the individual or sub-group level; it is likely that some of them will even feel alienated. The qualification on the homogeneity of the community is supported by other scholars amongst them Burkey (1996:41) who argues that that rural communities are composed of individuals and groups with different and often opposing interests and even conflict of interests; as such, communities are characterised by dependence and dominance relationships and competition for resources exist amongst other discourses. Other scholars extend the argument further and de Berry (1999: 11) points out that the perception that communities are homogenous entities ignores the social dynamics, power, hierarchy and authority structures as well as value and belief systems which define patterns of living amongst people even though they may be living in the same locality; all of these dimensions can militate against joint and communal undertakings.

The perceptions about what a community is; have implications for NGOs not least, because the majority of humanitarian interventions are rarely targeted at individuals or households but instead at whole communities. In the light of this, the argument by NGOs and their supporters that they are better placed to understand the social processes within their constituent communities and to empathise with their perceived needs becomes the subject of question. This in the main; is because if de Berry's argument that the concept "community homogeneity" is a fallacy, then by implication, NGO interventions may only be "scratching the surface" in meeting felt needs at the individual and household level and by implication, not addressing "community" needs. Some of the implications of this challenge will become apparent in the section which examines the relationship between NGOs and communities and in Chapter 6 in which the research findings are summarised.

## **4.6 Factors which influence donor behaviour**

Factors which influence the behaviour of donors are worth examining for such factors influence their funding decisions; in turn, such decisions determine the level of resources available to NGOs at any

given point in time; finally, availability of resources determine what the latter can do in any given situation and at any given point in time. Thus, even in situations where a host government is unreservedly welcoming to NGOs and the communities served are committed; at the end of the day what NGOs can or cannot do is determined by availability of resources. According to Shah (2005), neo-liberalism was an ideology promoted as the mechanism for global trade and investment supposedly, for all nations to prosper and develop fairly; the proponents of the ideology believed that a precondition for this to be realized amongst other things; was minimizing the role of the state, including in the provision of basic services. Lewis & Wallace (2000: 77-78) note that minimizing the role of the state was based on a number of key assumptions about what civil society could deliver. The first such assumption was that civil society was a force and an ingredient for democratization and a natural component of a market economy. Secondly, civil society was perceived as having the potential to serve as the moral pulse of society and thus hold the state in check and in the process, democratic values would be reinforced. Thirdly, there was a perception that civil society and the market constituted an organic symbiotic whole characterized by unity rather than disjuncture and by cooperation rather than conflict. Finally, the triadic unity of state, market and civil society was assumed to be characterized by neat boundaries between the three elements each with its own discreet functions, actors and an organic harmony and balance. These assumptions according to Shah (2005); would have been valid only as charitable organizations, NGOs operate as a non-profit group as such; they do not own the means of production. Under the circumstances, while they are meant to be politically independent, in reality it is a difficult task because they must rely on funding from their governments, other funding institutions, businesses (market) and/or from private sources. As such, and depending of their vested interests, all or some of these institutions can have direct or indirect political weight on decisions and actions that NGOs make; such interests will now be examined and an analysis carried on how these impact the relationship and the work that NGOs do in communities.

#### **4.6.1 Factors influencing donor government behaviour**

Randel, German and Ewing (2004:4) note that during the 2000 UN General Assembly, member states committed themselves to unreservedly pursue the Millennium Development Goals at the centre of which was to halve the number of people living in poverty by the year 2015. To this effect, donor focus was on increased efforts to improve aid effectiveness and strengthen North/South partnerships in pursuit of the goals. However, just three years later in October 2003, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD released a controversial policy statement linking development

cooperation to the prevention of terrorism. In the policy statement, member states in the main, those of Europe and North America asserted that development cooperation had an important role to play in helping to deprive terrorists of popular support and addressing the conditions that terrorist leaders exploit and feed on. The scholars conclude that in the face of profound crises of poverty, growing inequality and conflict in the developing world, the lens through which donors would be assessing their priorities would be their own security interests and the “war on terrorism”; and not necessarily on the needs on the ground. Such political considerations according to Atmar (2001: 5); increasingly became an influential factor in donor government funding decisions in both bilateral and multilateral aid arrangements. He cites the example of Afghanistan where donors withheld development assistance during the period that the Taliban was in control with the result that there was a shift in the focus from support for capacity building of state welfare functions to community structures and from long-term development to short-term palliative assistance. Needless to say, the arrangements had little impact especially given the length of the conflict, the progressive destruction of human capital, physical infrastructure and deteriorating institutional crisis; under the circumstances, humanitarian needs simply could not be adequately met by short-term, localised, project-specific and relief-focussed interventions.

In support of this observation on political interests which influence donor behaviour, Macrae (2002:39-40) notes that modern US humanitarian assistance began with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. A provision contained in the Act was that through the Marshall Plan, the United States would be engaged in the reconstruction of Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War and in order to achieve this, the Economic Cooperation Agency, the predecessor of present day USAID was established. At the time, Washington was unapologetic about its use of aid for political purposes hitherto; however, in time, a line was drawn between long-term development assistance and life-saving emergency relief; relief activities subsequently took on a mantle of neutrality. Later in the 1990`s this position changed and the US began to explore the direct use of humanitarian assistance to achieve political ends; to this effect and in North Korea for example, policy-makers saw the famine in 1995 as a potential leverage point and attempted to extract political concessions in exchange for food aid. Likewise, in Serbia, the US and European governments hoped to shore up pockets of opposition by giving aid to certain municipalities and withholding it from others. Such use of aid for achieving political goals met with fierce opposition from civil society and the dispute reached its climax over an amendment to the Foreign Operations Bill signed into law by then President Clinton in November 1999; the Bill explicitly permitted US food aid to be given directly to armed rebel groups seeking independence for

Southern Sudan. The policy was pursued in the post-Clinton era and Lasensky (2003) observes that in 2003, the then Bush administration not only announced the largest increase in American foreign aid in two decades but also, the criteria for eligibility for recipient governments. Amongst such criteria was fighting corruption, investing in education and health care, meeting strict standards on human rights as well as good governance; of itself, the criteria was sound not least, to ensure accountability on the part of recipient governments but then, it turned out that such criteria were not consistently applied.

This assertion is supported by Zunes (2008) who cites the example of Equatorial Guinea where it is said of the Head of state, Teodoro Obiang; that he is amongst the worst of African tyrannies; at the time however, the country continued to receive U.S. government funding and military training through the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). In addition, a private U.S. security firm founded by former senior Pentagon officials was playing a key role in the country's internal security apparatus in reciprocity for the regime's "friendliness to U.S' strategic and economic interests". The same can be said Israel, a wealthy democracy of which Lasensky (2003) says that at the time, it was the largest recipient of American foreign aid; on average, over \$2 billion a year in military aid and about \$600,000 in economic assistance. At the same time and despite Egypt's history of Arab nationalism, its strategic positioning as a neighbour of Israel and its ownership of the Suez Canal saw Egypt receiving over US\$50 billion of US aid over a period going back to 1975. The irony was that Israel, a state which did not exactly need foreign aid was receiving it anyway and had Egypt not been considered of strategic political and security importance, its history of Arab nationalism would have seen it "blacklisted" from receiving aid. Such donor government behaviour was however, not peculiar to the US government for Mavrotas and Villanger (2006: 6) note that during the period 1970-1994, a study on aid carried by OECD-DAC at 5-year intervals revealed that of the twelve donor governments studied (including the Nordic countries as a group), political and strategic considerations and not institutional considerations were increasingly becoming important determinants of the aid allocation decisions. The study also found that the Nordic countries allocated aid to the poorest countries and rewarded recipient countries for sound policies and institutions; this was in sharp contrast to the US whose preference was UN friends and Middle East allies. On the other hand, the aid allocation pattern of France and Japan were linked to former colonial ties and UN voting behaviour respectively, rather than income levels and policies in recipient countries.

In addition to the factors cited above, another factor influencing government donor behaviour is what has been described as *donor mentality* or a self perception of the "big brother" in which donor

governments use their financial clout to set the rules of engagement in transactions with recipient governments and non state actors alike, including NGOs. ActionAid International (2004: 4) argues that such conditions attached to aid money were failing the recipient countries for a number of reasons for first of all; conditionality perpetuated a relationship between donors and aid recipient countries that is already stacked in favour of the former. Secondly, many of the poorest countries depend on external finance for over half of their national budgets; this gives donors strong leverage over these countries' policy choices. Thirdly, threatening to withhold essential loans and debt relief unless the recipient country implements the recommended measures is abuse of power; in any case; with respect to the privatisation of public utilities for example, many of the benefits of such privatisation often accrue to private sector companies from the donor countries themselves raising concerns about conflicts of interest.

With respect to non-state actors and according to Randel et al. (2004:174); in 2002, the European Commission (EC) published a communication on the participation of non-state actors in EC development policy. This was immediately followed by the publication of corresponding guidelines on principles of good practices for the participation of non-state actors; in dialogue and in consultation on development matters. In themselves, the guidelines were sound as they sought to promote the principle of "local ownership" by recipient countries through enhancing the participation of non-state actors amongst other things. This was a positive development however, notwithstanding the soundness of the policy, guidelines and the good intentions; the documents were developed with little official consultation or input from civil society organisations in Europe or in the developing world. Since then, non state actors have been complaining that any consultation they have enjoyed up to date has been ad hoc adding that the Commission only ever consults when it wants to legitimise its own perspective rather than to genuinely listen and/or to consider alternative viewpoints. Randel et al. conclude that even if the Commission did consult with NGOs consistently, there would still be a problem in that the Commission assumes that NGOs are representative of civil society as a whole as such, that policies are made in a participatory manner is a misconception!

In concluding this section, the factors that influence donor decisions on aid to governments are the same in the funding of NGOs for their humanitarian work. This premise is based on the fact that if donor government funding decisions are influenced by political, security and economic interests; by extension and save in emergency and/or disaster situations; no matter how desperate the situation of the poor in a country that has no value added to political, security and economic interests of donors, the



funding that NGOs can access in support of such countries will be limited. Likewise, if a humanitarian situation has little value added in terms of publicity or some other profile considerations (“forgotten disasters”); the level funding NGOs can access and by implication, the extent to which they can fulfil their humanitarian mandate will be limited. Besides, should NGOs fail to meet “professional” and “best practice” demands increasingly made by donors but which standards diverts their primary accountability from their “market” in favour of donors; the same donors will be the first to criticise; worse still, they risk losing much needed funding; “caught at crossroads” indeed NGOs are!

#### **4.6.2. Factors influencing multilateral donor behaviour**

In 2002, a forum on development and poverty reduction whose theme was “Financing for Development” was convened in Monterrey (Mexico); it resulted in what came to be known as the Monterrey Consensus (OECD-DAC 2005:7). During the forum, the global community affirmed the importance of development to the world’s well-being and called on developing countries to strengthen their commitment to policies and institutions that can stimulate growth, reduce poverty and achieve the MDGs. In addition, the global community called on developed countries to provide more and better aid as well as improved trade and debt policies. As a follow-up to Monterrey, (European Commission 2009: 9) another high level forum on harmonisation of aid whose theme was “Results Oriented Monitoring” was convened in Rome in 2003. During the meeting and amongst other things, donors made an undertaking to ensure that harmonization efforts are adapted to the receiving countries’ context and to align development assistance with the recipient countries’ development priorities. Sequel to the Rome meeting, yet another forum whose theme was “Financing for Development” (OECD-DAC 2005:7) was convened in Marrakech in 2004; to discuss the challenges of managing results for development. During the meeting, heads of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) and the Chairman of the OECD-DAC affirmed their commitment to foster a global partnership for managing for results and endorsed a set of core principles on how best to support partner countries’ efforts to do likewise. The objectives of these international forums and many others were noble; meant as they were, to define key goals, objectives and interventions that were needed for the aid effectiveness agenda; in some quarters however, the affirmations were dismissed as typical rhetoric which characterised such forum. Amongst the critics were the international NGO, ActionAid International (2004: 2) that argued that, two decades after the introduction of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment programmes across Africa, Asia and Latin America; donor agencies continued to use their financial and technical muscle to pressure the

world's poorest countries into adopting risky and unproven economic reforms. In addition, new loans and debt relief were still contingent on governments accepting highly specific economic reforms that were conceived, designed and approved in Washington by IMF and World Bank staff and their boards and not in the countries in which they would be implemented. If countries failed to comply with these stipulations, both multilateral and bilateral donors would withhold funds.

These sentiments are shared by other critics of the World Bank and Villanger (2004: 3) argues that the Bank is an instrument of developed countries' foreign policy in general and the US in particular adding that at any given point in time, changes in the Bank's policies are a mirror image of changing interests in developed countries. He further argues that Third World governments are misled in so far as counting their own governments as members, developing country officials generally perceive the World Bank as a neutral multilateral financial institution that provides objective advice. Aware of this perception in the Third World and confident that the advice given by the institution was more likely to be acted upon particularly in cases where proposed changes were costly and politically difficult; donor countries and their private sectors used the Bank to advise the Third World. Gavin (2002) concurs with these views adding that both the World Bank and the IMF have often been tools for U.S. foreign policy and foreign economic goals; this can be traced to the nature of power relationships between the stakeholders. Such relationships Gavin's argument continues, is such that unlike the United Nations where each state has an equal vote; representation within the Bretton Woods institutions is established by the size of the financial contribution. The United States is by far the largest contributor as such, it has the principal voice in determining the policies and procedures of both institutions. Furthermore and by virtue of the size of its financial contribution, the United States is able to pressure other large contributors; Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait amongst others, into following their policy preferences.

The scepticism on the neutrality of multilateral financial institutions is shared by Burnell (2004: 13) who cites the example of certain European governments which in 2002 considered the idea of delaying World Bank funding to Pakistan not so much to apply pressure for political liberalization and/or democratization but to press for greater efforts to control cross-border terrorism vis-à-vis India. On their part, Burnell, Eade & Ligteringen (2001:105) cite an example from the 70's, an era during which the focus was on commercial agriculture and industrialisation as the route to "modernising" developing countries. To this effect and led by the USA, private commercial lenders who wished to dispose of surplus deposits increasingly used the World Bank as an option offering a supportive framework for

the disbursement of loans to developing countries. While availing much needed loans to developing countries, the strategy benefited manufacturers in the developed countries more than the developing countries in so far as it created market opportunities for the export of intermediate goods especially as recession in home country reduced demand for such goods. Burnell et. al (2001: 107) conclude that even though it does not always bow to every demand of the US government, the World Bank forms part of the external infrastructure of the US adding that in general, the influence of powerful governments comes partly through the Bank`s dependence on world financial capital and in particular, that availed by the US.

Boas & McNiel (2003: 23) concur adding that as the largest shareholder, the US government is simultaneously the most influential member state; to this effect, US support for, pressure on and criticism of the Bank has been central to its growth and the evolution of its policies and practices. Mavrotas & Villanger (2004: 4) share these views adding that the influence of powerful governments such as the US government on the World Bank is evident in the fact that donors often channel funds through the World Bank and regional development banks alike when in fact both the World Bank and these regional banks give concessional loans to the same countries. The same situation prevails with donor governments who give bilateral loans to the same countries, for the same purpose that international institutions such as the World Bank are giving. This means a donor can end up dispersing the loans through three channels: bilaterally, through a regional bank as well as through the World Bank. Mavrotas et al (2004: 5) conclude that a possible explanation for such arrangements is political and economic considerations in the donor country including the achievement of foreign policy goals through the World Bank, an institution which aid recipient governments perceive as neutral and which enjoys their trust. Notwithstanding the fact that the some of the criticism is substantiated, members of the US Congress argue that the US has little influence on what the Bank does and are on record as intimating that they would like to see the US have even more influence on the Bank!

In concluding this section, the perception that multilateral donor institutions are agents of economically powerful governments` vested political and economic interests is evident from the various arguments of the various scholars cited above. Understandably, the said powerful governments are the very shareholders of the Bank as such and of necessity, the funding decisions of the World Bank will be influenced by the said shareholder governments` priorities. In a situation in which multilateral donor institutions` funding decisions are influenced by shareholder governments` priorities at the same time as NGOs are increasingly courted as partners and their resource base has expanded to include these

multilateral donor institutions, this creates a dilemma for NGOs. A dilemma was inevitable for if multilateral donor decisions are not so much their own but those of their “back donors”; the shareholder governments for which as elaborated earlier, priorities are not always based on the degree of need but instead, on many other considerations including even “the fight against terrorism”; then there will be occasions in which there will be differences of opinion between NGOs and multilateral institutions on the priorities. Such an order of things means that there will be times when the relationship between multilateral donors and NGOs will be strained due to differences in opinion or donor interests and priorities by proxy.

#### **4.6.3 Factors influencing corporate donor behaviour**

According to Schiller (2005: 7), at the outset, companies had only three sets of stakeholders; governments which issued them with the licences to operate and monitored compliance with the provisions thereof; shareholders whose capital companies owed their existence and employees whose productivity kept them in business. In time, the stakeholder group expanded to include the media and NGOs who increasingly, were scrutinising and putting pressure on business to account for the impact of their activities on the environment and society. At the same time, there was also a growing realisation by business that the impact of phenomena such as global warming and HIV/AIDS on productivity had reached a stage where it was beyond the capacity of governments alone to successfully intervene. Such a realisation coupled with pressure from the media and NGOs saw business expand its stakeholder base to include communities; customers, suppliers and future generations. Sayer (2005: 260) has a different view and argues that business involvement in poverty reduction, development and other human welfare enhancing activities in communities was not so much a reflection of a growing sense of social responsibility, instead; it can be traced to pursuit of the profit motive. He defends his argument by pointing out that for business, stable and well-governed robust societies produce healthy, educated workers and consumers or the perfect market for maximising profit whereas societies characterised by a decayed environment, high levels of disease, vulnerability to climate change and poor security carry market and financial risks.

The observations on risks are supported by Bendell (2003: 1) who notes that in order to minimise such risks, business is increasingly concerned about workplace and general community health and welfare issues and especially the fight against the HIV/AIDS scourge for there are strong economic and social reasons for doing so. In Africa in particular, the impact of the HIV/Aids scourge is significant and Bendell illustrates the impact by citing a study carried out on the South African mining company

AngloGold and now Anglo Ashanti Gold. The study revealed that in 2003, nearly a quarter of its 90,000 gold and diamond mining workers were infected with the HIV virus and the company estimated that AIDS was costing the company up to \$6 for every ounce of gold produced. Shaken by this development, in its report to society in 2007, Anglo Ashanti Gold (2007: 132) started courting civil society into partnerships to make practical and meaningful contributions to the welfare of communities in which it operated. In addition, in order to reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS on its operations (Bendell 2003: 3), Anglo Ashanti Gold became the first corporate in South Africa; to provide its staff with free anti-AIDS drugs.

In time and in relation to the HIV/AIDS scourge, other MNCs followed the example of Anglo Ashanti Gold; amongst these was Nestlé (2003) which in a report in 2002 titled “HIV/AIDS Prevention: Nestlé in Community”; the corporate announced that it had signed a partnership agreement with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in which the company would sponsor workplace and wider community HIV/AIDS interventions in Nigeria and Kenya over a three-year period. During the period, the Nigeria and Kenya Red Cross Societies between them reached 1.2 million young people with life-preserving information through youth peer education programmes and provided home-based care to thousands of people at the terminal stage of AIDS. In Southern Africa, the corporate entered into partnerships with civil society in a number of countries implementing a variety of community welfare projects. In South Africa, the corporate engaged civil society partners in an entrepreneur development initiative (“Ice Cream on Wheels”) in Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal Provinces while in the poverty-stricken areas of the Cape Peninsula, the corporate and partners served 14,000 low-cost, nutritionally-balanced meals daily through “WARMTH”; a project involving community kitchen feeding centres. In education, the corporate has since been involved in bursary schemes for academically gifted children from under-privileged homes. Following suit, in its “Sustainability Report” of 2007, the oil giant British Petroleum (2007: 32) announced that it would be increasing its CSR budget from \$106.7 million in 2006 to \$135.8 million and that it anticipated increasing the level to \$500 million over a period of five years from 2008 onwards. Amongst the interventions would be investment in education; from school-based projects to university research; in business, the development of local supplier sector while in the realm of energy, the corporate would continue to explore ways of meeting the energy needs of low-income customers.

According to Sayer (2005: 263), believing in a “division of labour” based on comparative advantage, some MNCs’ philanthropy took not the form of millions of dollars towards community welfare-enhancing initiatives instead; it found expression in “donations-in-kind”. To this effect, some Telecom and Information Technology companies would avail their technical staff and equipment to facilitate and enhance the work of relief agencies while pharmaceutical companies would earmark a portion of their manufactured inventories for donations to facilitate improvements in contingency planning by relief agencies. Borrowing a leaf from the “donations-in kind” approach, banks and other financial companies have since been exploring the possibilities and/or implementing CSR programmes involving the provision of pro-poor financial services, microcredit and corruption-reducing transfers systems.

With respect to the environment, a report by the United Nations Environment Programme (2002: 8-9) noted that although globalisation facilitated the transfer of environmentally sound technology, it did not stop the transfer or ‘dumping’ of polluting technologies or products in the Third World which had been banned in other countries. Furthermore, the report noted; in most industrial sectors, only a small number of companies were actively striving for sustainability and the gap between the efforts made and the worsening global environmental situation was widening. This portrays MNCs as selfish, manipulating and greedy entities that ruthlessly pursue the profit motive with little or no consideration of the negative impact of their activities on the environment. This is not the case with all MNCs and there is evidence (UNRISD, 1998: 1) suggesting that a new corporate ethic demonstrating a commitment towards minimizing the negative impacts of their operations on the environment was in the making. To this effect (UNRISD, 1998: 3), during the 1990s, there were a number of initiatives by business to improve its environmental record and in a number of countries; some of the most progressive environmental policies were developed when influential business interests added their weight to the conservation lobby. Furthermore, as corporate social responsibility for environmental protection increased, state agencies in a number of countries increasingly ceded control of certain areas of resource management and environmental protection to the private sector thus reducing the level of public-sector regulation in favour of voluntary agreements and/or self-regulation by business.

Another development in this respect according to Sayer (2005: 263) was that whereas hitherto, the approach to CSR by business was more often than not, a response to an imminent and/or actual emergency arising from the impact of their economic activities; in time, the approach increasingly

changed to engaging in “preventive” environmental conservation activities. Such a change in approach saw some car manufacturers and electricity-generating companies introducing programmes for offsetting the carbon emissions of their activities and products through for example, providing funding for reforestation projects amongst other initiatives. Notwithstanding these positive developments in the conduct of business, Duma (2006) argues that the profit motive remains the priority for business; in pursuit of this agenda and as business has become more multinational and electronic means of communication have advanced, there has been a reduction in the power of the nation-state to curtail the ever increasing power of the business community. Kema (2005) shares these views and dismisses as fallacy, the assertions by defenders of MNCs that they are the engine of development in so far as they create jobs, transfer technology, reduce inflation and make war unthinkable. On the contrary his argument continues; there is evidence to suggest that MNCs, whose primary goal is maximizing profit; are not philanthropic institutions for they serve the interest of no one but themselves. In the process, they not only undermine public authorities in their home countries but also cause injury to the periphery in so far as their unbridled operations in the underdeveloped countries cause environmental degradation, create health and nutritional hazards and undermine the sovereignty of host countries. Against this background, Kema (2005) cautions that while NGOs and civil society groups are warning up to business, they must not be complacent instead, they must continue to play the role of “corporate watchdog”; to monitor business malpractices wherever they operate adding that it is only because business is aware that it is being watched that it is becoming more conscious about the impact of their activities on the welfare of communities.

With respect to shareholders, Clark and Hebb (2002) note that the rise of public corporations that dominated the 20<sup>th</sup> century meant a dispersal of ownership rights across large segments of the population. While the spreading of the benefits of capitalism to a wider constituency was a positive development however, it meant that the owners surrendered control of company decision-making to professional managers who administrated the company on their behalf. In time however, this changed and today's institutional investors are re-aggregating previously dispersed shareholder power and playing a more active role in decision-making. This development according to O'Rourke (2002: 3) can be traced to the fact that contrary to the assumption that shareholders are only interested in healthy returns on their investment, both private shareholders and institutional investors are increasingly insisting on standards of company behavior. Furthermore, they have since been collaborating with NGO's and the broader civil society in playing the role of watchdog against business malpractices;

such collaboration was inevitable after all, social activists, private shareholders and corporate investors are often the same people.

The question that needs to be asked is why shareholders are turning watchdog on their own companies and/or are content with foregoing good returns on their investment by voting for a budgetary allocation for CSR which effectively means a reduction in the disposable profit margin and corresponding reductions in dividend pay-out to the investor. The answer lies in a study carried out by Godfrey, Merrill & Hansen (2009) which revealed that in the longer term; CSR, particularly investment aimed at secondary stakeholders - consumers or potential consumer markets (communities) represents longer term insurance-like protection for shareholders through increasing the potential for value creation. Such a view has support from a European Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR (European Union 2004: 9) which established that first of all, businesses that are conscious of and take measures to protect the environment were more likely to generate higher profits and thus higher dividends for their shareholders in the longer term. Secondly, businesses which observed and conformed to local legislation were more likely to succeed not least, by positioning themselves such that they retain the license to operate; thirdly, with investors increasingly becoming as much concerned about moral issues as they were about their returns on investment, the trend was one of seeking to invest in line with their own values. Finally, taking cues from developments at the business/market interface in which increasingly, business was coming under scrutiny, the thinking in the investor community was that companies with a proven record of behaving responsibly presented a lesser investment risk.

The above discussion focused on factors internal to business; external factors also played a significant role in influencing business practices and according to Zadek (2001: 7), it is a fallacy to assume that the growing importance of CSR to business has its roots in an evolution in human consciousness. On the contrary, the argument continues, it is an outcrop of the new economic order in which the ability to build up and nurture brands based on values shared with key groups in society has become essential to long-term competitiveness and profitability in business. Zadek's views are shared by the European Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR (European Union 2004: 9) which concluded that increased public scrutiny of corporate conduct, greater campaigning and more effective media coverage of critical NGOs and trade unions presented reputational risk for companies. This was particularly so for companies associated with making profits and hiring cheap labour in countries in which parents cannot afford to send their children to school, people are dying for lack of adequate medical services, housing



or food amongst other problems of the poor. Image considerations are important and extend to how a company implements its CSR activities; Damlamian (2006: 5) notes that there is an increasing awareness in business that behaving in a socially responsible manner in the environment in which they operate is an important pre-requisite for profit maximisation. In addition, there is also increasing awareness in business that while they have the financial and material resources to directly engage communities in CSR activities, they do not have the management capacity and/or know-how on how to effectively do so. Besides, there are business risks associated with venturing into territory for which they have limited experience; this renders them vulnerable to the risk of reputational damage in the event of failure to deliver.

The risks associated with business directly implementing CSR programmes are illustrated by Heap (2000: 7) who cites the example of the corporate, Shell in Nigeria which between 1992 and 1996; in response to community uprisings in protest against its operations in the Niger Delta, the company increased its spending on CSR initiatives by some 250 percent. The initiatives involved infrastructural development (construction of schools, clinics etc) however, little if any meaningful development took place in the region. In the main, this was due to the fact that the projects were implemented without due or adequate consultation of all stakeholders; the result was idle white elephants appearing across the Delta for associated manpower needs (teachers and medical personnel etc) had not been taken into account in the planning of the projects. According to Groves (2009: 11), this was not the end of Shell's problems for perceiving the corporate as a collaborator in the court ruling that resulted in the hanging of the Ogoni people activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa; the uprisings intensified and no amount of distancing itself from this course of action by state could appease the communities. Faced with such a dilemma (Heap 2000: 7); Shell entered into partnerships with local civil society and international NGOs alike; such a move by the corporate paid dividends on two fronts according to Groves (2009: 12); first of all, it facilitated the re-engagement of communities which hitherto had "blacklisted" Shell. Secondly, the re-engagement opened new opportunities for dialogue with the communities thereby providing Shell with a mechanism for securing the social licence to continue to operate in the Niger Delta. Damlamian (2006: 7) explains the gains made by Shell in terms of the fact that on environmental issues, NGOs enjoy a higher degree of trust by the public than MNCs; in turn, MNCs consider such NGOs as a great asset. Indeed, such NGOs are valuable assets for MNCs not least, because association with the former has the potential to "open doors" to business contacts and relationships with the leadership in the country and other influential institutions. Besides, NGOs with a well established presence in the county

of operation will no doubt have equally well established management capacity as such, a corporation entering into partnership with such an NGO is spared of the paperwork and grants management tasks involved in managing both the partnership and the CSR programmes.

In concluding this section, it is apparent from the foregoing that whereas at one point in time the only pre-occupation of business was maximising profit; due to a number of both internal and external factors, going beyond the profit motive is no longer a matter of choice. Understandably, in addition to exposing businesses which pay little or no attention to the impact of their operations on the environment and on society as a whole, civil society was going as far organising consumers and others in the supply chain to boycott the products of such businesses; not only locally but even globally. Furthermore, in the quest to strike a balance between short and long term financial benefits in the form of healthy dividend payouts, shareholders were insisting that management take measures to ensure that the future profitability of the business's operating environment is guaranteed by amongst other things, being conscious of the impact of company operations on the environment and welfare of the host communities. Finally and as the examples given earlier on the initiatives undertaken by Anglo Ashanti Gold, British Petroleum and Nestlé demonstrate; there was increasing awareness in business that in the longer term, success will be better realised through making a contribution to the host communities' welfare or the market. Regardless of business' motivation to engage NGOs in CSR, Schiller (2005:6) argues that such engagement is desirable because it makes for a perfect mutually beneficial relationship; he supports his argument by pointing out that international NGOs in particular, often work in a multiple of countries at the same time; however; generally they do not have adequate resources to carry out their projects efficiently and sustainably. Likewise, MNCs operate in a number of countries at the same time and have an abundance of resources but not necessarily the desire, management capacity and /or the know-how to carry out CSR programmes themselves. In partnership therefore, NGOs would have access to increased resources for their work while MNCs would be spared of administrative tasks associated with delivering humanitarian aid and more importantly, the risks inherent in doing it themselves; it is a win-win situation for both partners.

#### **4.7 The relationship between NGOs and other stakeholders in partnership for development**

For the reasons given earlier, NGOs indeed became the channel of choice for delivering humanitarian assistance by both government and multilateral institutions for according to Chege (1999: 2) they were perceived as having demonstrated that poverty, no matter how endemic; can be tackled by involving

project beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of projects. According to Clark (1991: 47), in 1989, such a perception of the capacity and success of NGOs saw government and multilateral donors disbursing \$6.4 billion to the South through northern NGOs; an amount representing 12 percent of the entire OECD-DAC's aid allocation for that year. According to Manji et.al (2002: 580), an analysis by country revealed that in 1992, DFID allocated around 8% of its aid budget to NGOs and in the United States, the level was close to 40%. Such trends Farooq (2005) notes; resulted in a situation in which between 1977 and 1999, non-profit expenditures grew 77 percent faster than the American economy as a whole. Furthermore, while the U.S. economy fell into a "jobless recovery," with total employment falling between 2001 and 2004, employment in the non-profit sector actually grew from 2 to 4 percent during the period. In the U.K. employment in the voluntary sector increased by 17.7 percent between 1995 and 2000 compared with an 8.5 percent increase in the for-profit sector. At the centre of such development partnerships in which donors contribute resources and NGOs contribute their skills and labour to achieve a common goal, are the poor the communities served; then there are the host governments who are the guardians of the communities' welfare. In a situation in which the communities served are the common denominator in terms of shared goodwill and/or generosity by all the stakeholders, it can be assumed that all would be well in relationships between NGOs and these other stakeholders. Unfortunately it is not always the case as the following accounts of the relationships reveal.

#### **4.7.1 Relationship with donor governments**

In 2005, the OECD (2005: 9-10) established the "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States" which were binding to all member states; they covered a wide range of the "rules of engagement" including aligning aid with local priorities and systems; mixing and sequencing aid instruments to fit the context; doing no harm and staying engaged long enough to give success a chance. Sequel to the establishment of the principles, at a meeting of the Council of the European Union and the representatives of Member States in 2007, (European Union, 2007a: 6), conclusions on the process towards an EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid were adopted. The Consensus covered a number of areas including common principles and good practice in humanitarian aid; some of the principles have many things in common with the NGO Code of Conduct for example, a requirement on donor countries to observe the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. In the light of this, it would appear that both donor governments and NGOs are guided by same principles in

the delivery of humanitarian aid; as such, it can be assumed that the relationship between them will be free of controversy and/or contradictions.

Hoffman & Minnear (2002: 2) point out that such an assumption is wrong for notwithstanding the good intentions and assertions by the OECD and EU which suggest a serious commitment to understanding the issues of the poor so they can give wisely and effectively, the scholars identified four trends in donor behaviour that undermined “the quality of money”. The first trend they cited was that perceiving weaknesses in some UN agencies and their programmes; donor governments started to channel more funds to NGOs and less to the UN system. Hoffman & Minear note that such a trend would have been good news; only such an arrangement carried liabilities for NGOs in so far as in general, funds were more readily available for relief interventions than for development. Such liabilities according to Giovanna, Giovanna & Haldorsson (2001: 5) pertained to the fact that even when implementing a short emergency relief operation for which resources are more readily available; NGOs generally tend to employ a medium to long-term perspective. To this effect, NGO interventions are usually planned such that they go beyond the “fire fighting” phase to include recovery through to development in the post crisis period. Understandably, with sustainable development as their ultimate goal, NGOs are aware that by themselves, relief interventions are not enough to reduce vulnerability in the longer term and worse still, they might actually induce dependence. According to Harvey & Lind (2005: 5), prolonged relief assistance can undermine local economies and large amounts of food aid can damage local agricultural production. This in turn leads to a continuing need for relief assistance creating a vicious cycle and trapping people into chronic dependency. In a situation in which funds are often more readily available for relief operations but less so for long term development, not only do NGOs risk not having any impact at all in terms of attainment of the goal of sustainable development, but even worse, the interventions might render communities even more vulnerable as a result of relief-induced dependency.

The second trend according to Hoffman & Minear (2002: 2); was the changing balance between grants and contracts; donors are awarding fewer grants and signing more contracts understandably, this gives them greater control in how their funds are spent by NGOs; NGOs are uncomfortable with the implications of being treated primarily as service delivery machinery rather than agents of institution-building and empowerment. In addition, while there may be a degree of reciprocity in contracting arrangements between governments and NGOs however, this is not the same as partnership since the

contractual terms of engagement are developed by the sponsor (donor governments). The observation on the asymmetric nature of the relationships between NGOs and donor governments is shared by Rauh (2010: 34) who argues that providing funding as donors do, they are in a position of power which allows them to set the agenda and conditions that must be met in order to receive a grant. Such power has often resulted in donors designing programme objectives in contexts very different to that in which they will be implemented and given that these objectives are heavily influenced by their own norms and values, they are often not suitable to the cultures in which they will be implemented.

Of donor power, Jennings (1995: 18) shares the views by Rauh adding that most development aid programmes claim to be based on partnership but the reality is usually very different not least, because donors have the financial power which they use to insist that the partner fulfil certain conditions. On conditionality Smillie & Minear (2003; 11) observe that some donors insist on the use of their nationals in humanitarian programmes or will be more generous if their nationals are placed in key positions. Others tie humanitarian funding for UN agencies to the use of their own home NGOs, consultants, and companies because of the visibility their work commands on the home front. Bendell (2006:68) shares these views adding that much governmental aid is often explicitly tied to the awarding of contracts to companies based in the donor country adding that the same is true with NGOs; donor governments often channel their aid through their own NGOs rather than directly to Southern organizations. For NGOs, being the “favoured child” of their own governments would be good news but then, there are instances in which a humanitarian crisis that NGOs are trying to address is the result of a conflict in which their home government is party to; overtly or covertly. The same government subsequently provides generous funding for home NGOs for the necessary humanitarian interventions; double standards it could be argued. With respect to such double standards, Stevenson and Macrae (2002) note that governments have often used the term “humanitarian” to describe and justify political and military interventions with humanitarian assistance portrayed as an integrated effort to “manage” or “resolve” conflicts and/or to facilitate “peace building”.

Bendell (2006:67) gives another perspective on such behaviour by donor governments and argues that even in a situation in which a donor government providing funding for relief interventions, conflict resolution and/or peace building; is not party to the conflict; such an “innocent” donor government will be cautious about the degree of engagement and may well earmark the funding. Such earmarking of funding may extend to specified activities; beneficiary groups and/or geographical regions all of which

may not make for a “goodness-of-fit” between competencies and sensitivities of international NGOs relative to local CBOs. In addition, it may not take into consideration the needs and/or the priorities on the ground either; this presents a dilemma for NGOs. Eade (1999: 12) shares these views adding that such a dilemma was inevitable given that NGOs are primarily involved in transferring resources from societies which have plenty to those who have little as such, their success more often than not, depends on their ability to mobilise resources primarily from their home constituencies and in particular, their governments. She concludes that it is this more than any other single factor which makes NGOs susceptible to following or at least, accommodating the agendas and fashions set by their funders.

Scholars writing in Mango (2005: 6) add their voice to this argument adding that despite the rhetoric about “good donor-ship”, little has changed for either recipient governments or non state actors including NGOs; this can be traced to the fact that donors use their financial power to dictate what funding is available, when, where, for what and how it will be used. In such a situation, the priorities of the donor country will always be uppermost in funding arrangements and these may not necessarily match the needs or priorities on the ground that NGOs would like to address. There are many examples of such manipulation of NGO development agendas by donors and Edwards & Hulme (1995: 109) cite an example of Bangladesh given by one Ramesh where in the mid nineties and as a result of the successful experience of the Grameen Bank, the emphasis on credit based poverty alleviation was driven by the ease of availability of donor funding. With large amounts of funding on offer, NGOs were unstoppable in their efforts to replicate the approach; at the same time however, the significant drop in adult literacy programmes was traced to lack of donor interest in such programmes. Thus whereas the urgent need at the time was improving literacy levels, NGOs were found wanting in addressing this dimension of development as they chased the dollars availed for credit based poverty alleviation interventions.

The third trend (Hoffman & Minnear 2002: 3) is the perceived economies of scale which have seen donors scramble to go into partnership with large well established NGOs. It was estimated at the time that the eight largest NGOs in the world between them were raking in approximately \$5-\$6 billion of their governments’ money annually; in addition, the twenty largest NGOs were the partner of choice for the United Nations and between them, representing 75% of funds allocated to NGOs by the agency. However, such a level of funding Hoffman & Minnear argue; did not always result in aid going where it was needed the most. This in the main was because in development work, it was the not so well

known and not so well funded smaller NGOs and local CBOs which were working on the most neglected problems, reducing vulnerabilities within communities and addressing long term development albeit, on a small scale for limitations in funding. According to Cosgrave (2007:31-32), visibility and high media profile and in particular in emergency or disaster situations is a motivational factor for donors to court the large well known NGOs that have a well established presence and capacity on the ground. Thus, media exposure rather than humanitarian need determine funding particularly in well publicised disasters; Cosgrave observes that the “CNN effect” is evident in the level of funding availed by donor governments during the Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster in 2004.

In addition to publicity, public pressure also is also an important factor in large well publicised disasters thus, the public sympathy generated by the Tsunami in turn, generated public pressure on politicians to “do something about it”. In such situations, Dmitracova (2009) notes that governments often prefer to channel aid through their own large well established NGOs for this category usually receive the bulk of media attention understandably, endowed with the bulk of donor funding, they seemingly do more. However, Dmitracova argues that it has been established by experts that in reality, it is actually the people living in the damaged areas (local civil society) who save the most lives and help survivors long after foreign aid workers leave. Understandably, equipped with such large amounts of funding during the crisis and “exciting” phase of a disaster, the big ones take centre stage while their smaller home country and/or local counterparts are pushed to the periphery. However, once the exciting phase is over; it is the smaller home country and/or local, not so well known or funded NGOs that usually remain behind “picking up the pieces” in the communities; a time that the real and long term impact of the disaster is beginning to unfold. At the same time, it is also a time that the “big brothers” who benefited the most from the huge amounts of funding and publicity have long taken off to the next “big and exciting one”.

Binder & Witte (2007:3) note that the competitive nature of the donor community and the pursuit of a high media profile often resulted in a situation in which increasingly, this became the main preoccupation with donors rather than what the funds accomplished on the ground. Such competitiveness and pursuit of high media profile had two outcomes; first of all, a trend that soon emerged in the USA and UK was one of increasing direct contracting of commercial service providers particularly in post disaster reconstruction and development work to plan and implement humanitarian projects. The scholars further note that supporters of such arrangements argue that the trend is good for

the introduction of competition into the humanitarian marketplace reduces inefficiencies and increases value for money in humanitarian relief by amongst other things, bringing expertise, new technology and in some cases much-needed funds. At the same time however, Binder & Witte note that critics of such arrangements caution that the trend could result in a shift of donor funding to the sector since donors might well prefer partnerships with the private sector because companies are less inclined to defend their independence than NGOs. In partnership with the private sector, donors would be able to solidify their control in the implementation of relief activities and particularly in countries where they have vested political interests. These views are supported by Hoffman & Minnear (2002: 2) who caution that while donors were increasingly dependent on NGOs for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; they may be quite willing to dispense with NGOs in favour of the private sector in certain situations. Such a development would be a disaster in itself Hoffman & Minnear's argument continues; for the private sector perceives humanitarian relief simply as about logistics. As such, the preoccupation of the private sector in a relief operation is delivering the goods and/or services to the right consignee; in the right quantities, at the right time and intact; so they can submit their invoices and get paid on time. The issue of whether or not the ultimate "consignee" (beneficiary communities) derives any utility from the goods and/or services is not their concern; the scholars conclude that the "*truck and chuck*" attitude that has been witnessed in many a relief and/or post-relief operation implemented by the private sector is evidence of such a perception. More significantly (Binder & Witte 2007:3), critics fear that the increasing engagement of the private sector will serve to weaken the application of humanitarian principles for as profit maximising entities, companies are less concerned about humanitarian principles than NGOs and might out-crowd NGOs altogether, further weakening the application of humanitarian principles.

Finally, a fourth trend identified (Hoffman & Minnear 2002: 3) was enforced coordination and there are two viewpoints on this; the first is that donors want the choices that a more competitive marketplace provides at the same time however, they also want at least a measure of coordination. In order to promote coordination among NGOs, the tendency became one of structuring and earmarking funds to force them to coordinate their activities with other agencies; a practice designed to erode their flexibility. The other viewpoint is that donor demands for coordination are legitimate and even overdue for interagency collaboration provides an effective counterweight to the increased competition that is increasingly witnessed in the NGO marketplace. Interagency collaboration indeed increases efficiency by amongst other things, eliminating duplication of effort and resources however, when it is enforced



from parties for who the primary motivation is not necessarily the “humanitarian imperative”, NGOs may well find themselves being party to hidden donor goals rather than their own. Commins (1999: 70-71) shares these views and argues that while in the past, NGO self perception was one of having a significant impact in shaping donor policies and humanitarian responses; in time, such a self-perception proved a fallacy. In the main, this was a result of the fact that in pursuit of shaping the world economy, the globalisation agenda pursued by powerful governments; transnational corporations, capital and currency markets saw NGOs pushed into roles that were to minimise their impact in the long-term. The scholar concludes that NGOs are in danger of becoming increasingly marginalised in terms of the importance of their work; of being reduced to mere “ladles” in a global soup kitchen, handing out meagre comfort or acting as useful fig-leaves to cover governments’ inaction or indifference to human suffering. Edwards and Hulme (1998:8) go further and caution that while the trend of increasing official funding of NGOs allows them to become providers of social and economic services on a much broader scale, it however compromises their performance in other areas of development activity such as institutional development and advocacy. Furthermore, it weakens their legitimacy as independent actors in society and distorts the accountability of NGOs away from grassroots and internal constituencies to overemphasis on short-term, quantitative outputs as demanded by donors.

The demands for upward accountability can indeed compromise NGO performance and a study carried out by Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman & O’Dwyer (2009: 20-21) revealed that although donors expressly indicated that they were keen to see their funding used to further broad long-term NGO charitable development objectives, they would “apply the handbrake” if the specific activities did not suit the donor’s agenda. The end result was that NGOs often found themselves working on a narrow range of specific issues and projects that the donors were prepared to fund. In addition, such manipulation of NGO agendas extended to specification of the geographical areas where activities would be undertaken; specified target groups as well as particular technology to be used. With respect to specification on what technology is to be used, rigidity in the upward-accountability requirements of the donor did not allow NGOs to report on problems and difficulties consequently, the latter played down these difficulties and problems so that they can report “good performance” and thus continue to access funding. A related challenge NGOs faced in their partnerships with donor governments was the ever increasing demand for information in the form of detailed reports. According to Davies (1997) this can be traced to the fact that disbursing large volumes of aid money to NGOs as donor government

were, they became increasingly concerned about the capacity of the recipient NGOs to manage such large volumes of aid effectively. In particular, donor governments were worried about the rate of implementation of activities as agreed; but not so much about whether or not the activities were achieving what they were designed to achieve in the communities served. Worse still, Davies notes that at a forum convened to discuss the ever increasing demands for information by donors, NGO pointed out that in order to meet the demands; they often, had to hire staff whose sole function was writing the detailed reports required by the donor. Such arrangements were increasing their administration costs and when they reported higher administration costs, at best they were criticised and at worst, they were threatened with withdrawal of funding for operating “inefficiently”. In the event NGOs did not recruit more staff and used the resources at hand for the purpose of maintaining administrative costs at a level acceptable to the donor at best, the reports could not be timely submitted and at worst, by diverting man hours from implementing activities, targets could not be met. In turn, when reports could not be submitted on time and targets could be met, it was criticism at best and threats of withdrawal of funds at worst! As is evident, access to large amounts of donor funding in a situation of unequal power relations turned out to be a real dilemma for NGOs.

In concluding this section, indeed the relationship between donor governments and NGOs is unequal; this is illustrated by Lister (1999: 10-11) in a study conducted on an international development arm of a US Christian membership organisation. The study revealed that while the donor was covertly benefiting from operational and structural influence over the NGO, there were no effective mechanisms by which the NGO could exert either structural or operational influence over the donor. Moreover, the demands of the donor with respect to the extent and types of reporting required; the timelines for the reports and the complex procedures which had to be followed; were having a structural influence in so far as the NGO had to adapt its own procedures, processes and timelines to correspond to those of the donor. The final outcome of these demands was that the NGO found itself changing the focus of its activities over the years so that they fit more closely with the donor’s priority activities. Such a inequality in the power relationships between donor governments and NGOs is eloquently captured by Smillie (1995: 173-4) who says of the United States that the seemingly ideal “marriage” between government and non profit organisations turned into a confused and expensive mess that satisfied only those with vested interests. The manipulation of NGO agendas by donor governments not only creates dilemmas for NGOs but more seriously, liabilities; such liabilities are particularly serious for the majority of the large international NGOs are signatory to the International

Code of Conduct for NGOs which seeks to maintain high standards of independence, effectiveness and impact; values which even those which have not signed, subscribe to it anyway. “Caught at crossroads” NGOs are indeed.

#### **4.7.2 Relationship with multilateral donors**

According to Boas and McNiel (2003: 3), it was environmental issues that first offered NGOs and other civil society groups the possibility to influence decision making processes and to access funding from multilateral institutions. Cernea (1998:29-30) concurs; adding that such access and influence can be traced to the perception by multilateral institutions that NGOs offered a significant and under-utilised potential to involve people in development and in particular, the lowest strata in society. Paul (1996: 1) makes the same observations and argues that the impetus for increasing efforts by the World Bank to engage NGOs in its operations is based on the fact that their presence on the ground and their first hand knowledge of the needs and interests of the poor was seen as a clear comparative advantage of the sector. In addition and according to Malena (1995:24) the Bank strongly believed that NGO involvement could contribute to the sustainability and effectiveness of Bank-financed projects by introducing innovative approaches and promoting community participation. Furthermore, NGOs were perceived to have what it takes including capacity; to increase project uptake and reach and could facilitate greater awareness of diverse stakeholder views. In time, such a comparative advantage was recognised at the highest level in the UN to the extent that in his report to the 53<sup>rd</sup> Session of the General Assembly in 1998, (United Nations 1998: 8) the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, stated that practical cooperation in operational matters between the United Nations and NGOs had undergone vast qualitative and quantitative changes in recent years. Hitherto and for a long time, with the notable exception of relief work, there was little functional interaction between the United Nations system and NGOs in the field. However, as the comparative strengths of NGOs and the potential for complementing the work of the United Nations grew more evident; they became indispensable partners, not only in development and relief operations, but also in public information and advocacy. At about the same time and according to a report by CIVICUS (1998: 1), the same sentiments were expressed by then World Bank President James Wolfensohn who is on record as saying that he believed that civil society participation was an essential element of its projects without which, such projects would not be as successful. For NGOs, this was good news coming from these multilateral donor institutions which as vehicles for transferring resources from those who have to those who do

not have; the nature of the work of civil society organisations and in particular development NGOs made for a perfect match of agendas.

According to Cernea (1998: 46), in the quest to promote stronger collaboration and partnership, the World Bank subsequently developed a number of programs and policies which included provisions for sharing information to facilitate NGO dealings with governments; and an enabling environment for NGOs to take the lead in decisions pertaining to how they will work together or with one another. To this effect, in its progress report titled “World Bank-Civil Society Collaboration” (World Bank 2001: 11); the Bank made an undertaking to make a special effort to improve the policy dialogue environment between all stakeholders (donor and recipient governments alike, other multilateral donors and civil society) in Africa. In time, the Bank went further and elaborated its vision on options for improving engagement with civil society organisations (World Bank. 2005b: 10) which amongst other things, included encouraging and promoting partnerships by assuming a facilitation role in building the capacity of governments and civil society organisations to engage each other more effectively. The capacity building initiatives involved training; sharing knowledge and best practices; convening and/or supporting multi-stakeholder discussions; encouraging and sometimes brokering negotiations on terms of engagement and providing guidance, technical or financial assistance to client governments to engage with CSOs in Bank-supported activities.

With respect to multi-stakeholder discussions, two important policy dialogue forums were created (World Bank 2005b: 13); one addressing Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) and the other, a special regional consultation forum to address HIV/AIDS concerns. With respect to the latter, such dialogue resulted in the establishment of the Multi-Country AIDS Program for Africa (MAP), an initiative involving a partnership between UNAIDS, the International Partnership against AIDS in Africa, bilateral donors and NGOs. The benefits flowing to NGOs from these partnership arrangements were significant for during the fiscal years 2005 and 2006 (World Bank 2006: 43); the MAP initiative saw \$300 million or more than or 48 percent of the total budget of \$625 million disbursed through CSOs to carry out AIDS education, prevention, surveillance, care, and treatment activities. Notwithstanding the benefits of a seemingly mutually beneficial relation between the World Bank and civil society organisations, according to the report by CIVICUS (1998: 4), many observers questioned the economic and social impact multilateral donors were having on countries of the South. Besides, despite many reforms at the World Bank, some NGOs remained deeply sceptical of its environmental and poverty

eradication efforts as well as the institution's underlying economic philosophy. To this effect (CIVICUS (1998: 2), the World Bank's strongest critics (NGOs) mobilised and staged the “50 Years is Enough Campaign” in 1994; the focus of which was the Bank's fundamental development paradigm and economic growth policies which were perceived as exacerbating rather than reducing income gaps between rich and poor. Furthermore, the Bank and other multilateral lending institutions were perceived as agents of rich governments and multinational corporations both of which they perceived as benefiting the most from globalization and trade liberalization. Some protesters even argued that there was an inevitable conflict between the lending institution and the goal of poverty reduction; they went as far as appealing to governments to cease funding the Bank and reallocate the money to more socially and environmentally responsible development agencies!

Since then, NGOs have not eased the pressure on multilateral donors to behave more responsibly and while the World Bank (2005b: 23) acknowledged that globalisation had been harmful to poor countries and their people; recalling the campaign ten years earlier, the Bank took a position. The position was that the Bank would not be engaging individuals or groups that espoused violence adding that there was little basis to expect that constructive relations are possible or desirable with obstructionist-minded groups unless their aims and tactics changed significantly. The antagonistic nature of relationship between NGOs and the World Bank has a long history however; as far back as 1998 there was no consensus even within the Bank itself that such a relationship could be attributed exclusively to attitudes and behaviour in the NGO community. On the contrary and in the report by CIVICUS (1998: 4-5), some Bank staff were quoted as admitting that NGOs had had to resort to building and maintain political pressure from outside to force the Bank to create the space for dialogue adding that even then, dialogue was not the best way to describe it, because real dialogue rarely occurred. They defended their view by arguing that the dialogue that occurred around these processes tended to be constructed by the Bank as such, engagement of civil society was often on the Bank's terms and the potential for co-optation was great hence many NGOs did not want to legitimize a process they felt was illegitimate.

Notwithstanding the history of the antagonism which often characterised the relationship between Bank and NGOs, the former was determined to make the partnership work and in 2005 (World Bank 2006: xiii), the outgoing President Jim Wolfensohn stressed the importance of Bank-civil society engagement in development policy and operations. In turn, his successor Paul Wolfowitz demonstrated in his first year in office of his intent to expand this legacy; to this effect, the Bank (World Bank 2006:

2) established new global mechanisms for Bank-civil society engagement to promote mutual understanding and cooperation. Amongst such mechanisms were a Bank-wide institutional framework, the establishment of a focal point for consultations and introducing and piloting a new monitoring and evaluation system for civic engagement. Furthermore, it conducted a review of Bank funds available for civil society engagement in operations and policy dialogue and explored possible realignment or restructuring. The restructuring of funds available for civil society involvement in Bank-funded projects (World Bank 2006: 23) resulted in the doubling of such engagement from 50 projects or 32 percent in 1990 to 217 projects or 72 percent in 2006.

According to CIVICUS (1998: 4), on the one hand, multilateral donors represent powerful forces that can make a difference in efforts to fight poverty; improve the quality of life; build democracy; ensure human rights; foster sustainable development and protect the environment. On the other hand and as is evident from the foregoing, NGO collaboration with and participation in multilateral institution financed development projects is not without problems. Malena (1995; 13) shares these views and notes that while the World Bank had policies and procedures to facilitate effective partnerships with borrowing governments and the private sector alike however, having their own distinct characteristics and culture, NGOs were different; as such, standard Bank operational guidelines were not always well-suited to effective NGO collaboration. Thus; while for NGOs, complaining or staging protests was an acceptable way of expressing disgruntlement with a donor, in a situation in which the Bank perceived such behaviour as obstructionist of which the consequences could well be the severing of cooperation and partnerships, there were two options for NGOs. The first option and for the sake of securing continued funding, was to remain silent and painfully get co-opted by an institution which may well be party to the origin of the problems of the poor in the first place; the very problems that that NGOs sought to address! The other option was for NGOs to be strictly loyal to their mandate and their constituents, the poor who are their "*raison d'être*" and openly and actively play the poor's advocate but then, risk being disengaged and more seriously, lose a substantial portion of their resource base.

An unenviable position for NGOs it is indeed and for many an NGO, caught as they are at such a "crossroads", the tendency was to prioritise institutional survival resulting in a situation in which mobilising resources took precedence over accountability to the poor that they serve. This tendency was not so much a case of "if you can't beat them, join them" but more; a belief that in the interests of the poor, it is better to be doing something in the present in the hope that attitudes and practices will

change over time. However, while such “towing the line” creates the space for NGOs to be “doing something” about the situation of the poor in the here and now, in the longer term, this compromises their performance and it may well be the same multilateral funding institutions who will make the loudest noise about lack of impact of NGO interventions; it is as it were, a “lose-lose” situation for NGOs.

### **4.7.3 Relationship with corporate donors**

According to Business Social Responsibility (BSR) (2001: 6), from the business perspective, the rise in the number and importance of NGOs resulted in an increasing recognition of the competencies and social stature that many of them possessed and the powerful synergies that were possible when companies, NGOs and governments work together. In addition, there was recognition that the long term viability of any business was a function of interactions with all stakeholders through dialogue and cooperation. On stakeholder engagement, a study conducted by Greenall & Rovere (1999: 2) revealed that taking into account the increasing role of private sector investment in developing economies and the changing role of the state from goods and services provider to market facilitator; Canadian businesses considered enhanced business-stakeholder engagement as advantageous. One distinct advantage deriving from such enhanced stakeholder engagement was the strengthening of national environmental regulatory frameworks thus creating a level playing field for all players; NGOs were perceived as important in influencing environmental policy and regulatory frameworks. In addition, in an era in which advanced information technology facilitated rapid dissemination of information from local stakeholders to a mass audience, there would be no place to hide for those companies bent on flouting the rules. For Canadian businesses therefore, expanding the stakeholder base was not only desirable but a sort of insurance for a sustainable operating environment and in time, optimal productivity and profitability.

In the light of this development, it would appear that business and stakeholder groups were moving in the same direction however, the NGO stakeholder group did not become complacent besides, the increasing ease with which information could be gathered and rapidly disseminated meant that in the event of business malpractice, through their strong networks; such information could reach all corners of the world in a relatively short time. According to Kennedy (2008), it is precisely this “corporate watch-dog” role that generated conflict between business and NGOs for the former resented the pressures exerted on it by outside agencies and especially, environmentally oriented NGOs. As a result,

Kennedy notes, for most of the previous century, an atmosphere of distrust and mutual suspicion existed in both camps and this often stood in the way of much progress by either group. This was particularly so as global environmental issues rose to prominence and the (negative) effects of climate change increasingly compromised the agendas of both business (productivity/profitability) and NGO (the welfare of the poor). Communication and cooperation between the business and NGOs was no longer a matter of choice and according to Greenall et al (1999: 7), partnering with NGOs not only opened the doors for access to the broader local stakeholder group but also, the possibility for companies operating in developing countries to tap into the skills and expertise that NGOs brought to the table. Such skills and expertise were viewed as viable options for positive spin-offs in terms of an operating environment conducive to profit maximisation. The views are supported by Gartzke (2004: 4) who notes that first of all, companies hoped to strengthen their corporate and brand image through association with NGOs which were respected and trusted by communities. Secondly, there was a realisation in business that due to their numerous contacts and networks; coupled with the fact that they work in and live with communities, NGOs were well placed to generate business intelligence. Thirdly, NGOs had the ability to influence communities (market); in turn, the thinking in the market was a critical factor in decisions on the direction product lines should take for maximum profitability. Thus, firms which had a deep insight into NGO activities within communities and formed partnerships with them would have an advantage over their competitors.

On strengthening corporate and brand image, den Hond, de Bakker & Wilts (2008) share these views adding that firms often use their relations with NGOs to portray themselves as subscribing to the same values of concern for disadvantaged communities. Besides, a relationship with NGOs can help a firm to deal with and manage complex and interrelated sets of social expectations; government regulations and to contain activist pressures both of which affect the latter's performance and thus profitability. On access to business intelligence information, Schiller (2005: 11) notes that such information enables firms to identify commercial partners and networks through working closely with NGOs. In turn and equipped with such information, firms are able to develop product sale environments, supporting infrastructure and/or new types of ethically-sensitive products for specific market conditions. Ethically-sensitive products perceived as not exacerbating the situation of poor improves a company's reputation, public image and result in positive media coverage resulting in branding paying for itself; positive media coverage may even positively affect the share price of a company. Partnerships with NGOs are thus attractive for business for the advantages are many as illustrated above however, Cowe



(2004:1) cautions that there are also dangers for even within a meaningful relationship, companies risk wasting time and money and possibly divulging sensitive information which could be misused. Schiller (2005: 11) shares the view on the dangers for business adding that in opening up their operations to “outsiders”, companies risk information leaks. Thus, while a company can safeguard itself from such a risk through the inclusion of a clause prohibiting the leaking of information in the terms of engagement, all the same, such a possibility can never be ruled out.

Information leaks indeed can never be ruled out for as the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (2001: 11) noted, while benefiting from funding provided by the private sector, some NGOs still felt that in order to tackle poverty at its roots, it was necessary to maintain the pressure on both the companies themselves and those who govern the framework within which they operate. The rationale behind this NGOs’ position was the awareness that there was a gulf in values between themselves and the private sector; such a gulf rendered their motives and methods irreconcilable to those of business. Under the circumstances, the only way to successfully affect corporate behaviour was to speak in a language that corporations understand namely, confrontation. Besides, in a situation in which governments which have the mandate to grant corporations a license to operate often turned a blind eye to corporate malpractices and conventional methods had failed, NGOs strongly felt that there was a need to remind both governments and business of their duty through “any other” means. According to Duma (2006), such contradictions in the relationship between the private sector and NGOs were inevitable; he illustrates his point by drawing an analogue in which he likens the relationship between the two travellers for who both the point of departure and final destination are not the same but by some chance, they meet in a transit lounge. In order to “kill time” and of necessity, they start a conversation and keep each other company until one has to his/her own way. As such, it a short lived relationship of convenience in which when each gets to his/her own destination, he/she resumes his/her own established lifestyle; for business, such lifestyle is represented by the pursuit of the profit motive while for NGOs, it is continuing to play the role of corporate watchdog. Notwithstanding the contradictions in the partnership between business and NGOs, Cowe (2004:1) argues that business considers the risk worth it for the credibility and reputational gains deriving from association with a reputable and trusted NGO outweigh the risks.

From the NGO perspective, den Hond et al. (2008) observe that the withdrawal of the state from the provision of basic services for their people; the growing focus on self-regulation and soft law for

business; the growing attention paid to CSR issues and the increasing international character of many social and environmental issues, saw NGOs courting business as important stakeholders. In the face of such a trend, NGOs spared no effort in gaining access to companies' management to gain leverage over how they conducted their business; this was particularly so given that for fear of driving away investors, Third World governments were reluctant to regulate them. Through such an approach which the scholars refer to as the three "I's" namely, instrumentality, identity and ideology; NGOs hoped to be instrumental in influencing policy on issues of concern to them; to strengthen their common identity and to act in order to fulfill their humanitarian ideological mandate. With respect to instrumentality, Sethi (2006: 2) observes that while NGOs have been at the forefront of campaigns for exposing companies that are perceived as exploiting the poor, partnerships between the private sector and NGOs had witnessed enormous growth in the previous decade. He attributes such growth to the fact that a number of societal issues of concern to NGOs invariably involve private sector organizations and multinational corporations in particular, are important players. Multinational corporations are indeed important players because over the years, it is often direct externalities and/or un-intended consequences of business activities that have created problems for and compromised the welfare of communities; the very problems that NGOs seek to address.

Of direct externalities Bartimole (1982) cites the activities of the Swiss-based corporation, Nestlé; the world's largest manufacturer of infant formula which the corporate aggressively marketed and promoted as good as breast milk. According to Kema (2005), the marketing strategy completely ignored and/or down-played the issue of the quality of the water which in Africa, was often undrinkable without purification besides; being of limited means, the tendency by mothers was to put less formula into each recommended measure of water to make the supply last a little longer. A number of studies revealed that a combination of these factors exposed babies to nutritional and health hazards with UNICEF estimating that in the late 1970's, one million formula-fed babies were dying every year from these health hazards. In 1977 and in response to this revelation, NGOs led a world-wide boycott not only of formula but all Nestlé products at a phenomenal cost to the corporate. Of un-intended consequences, Mokhiber (1987) cites the example of pharmaceutical companies which during the 1950s and early 1960s produced and marketed the drug thalidomide; as a non-toxic tranquilizer that had none of the poisonous potential of the barbiturates then flooding the world drug market. Unfortunately, babies born to mothers who had been taking the drug during pregnancy had one thing in common; they were born with deformities, with no legs, no arms, some had flippers or digits emerging

from their shoulders to name a few. Like in the case of Nestlé, there was world-wide outcry with NGOs in the lead.

According to Sethi (2006: 2), another factor which led to changes in attitudes in the NGO community from suspicion and hostility to collaborating with business was the realisation that while private sector organizations were often the source and/or part of the problems of the poor, the sector could be successfully engaged in the search for solutions to problems that were its creation in the first place. This is evident in the example given earlier on Shell in Nigeria where according to Schiller (2005: 6), reflecting on the damage that the MNC's operations were inflicting on the environment and the half hearted measures the company was taking to reverse the damage, NGOs of which Greenpeace was at the forefront; moved from the position of "outsiders" challenging the system to being "insiders" working with the corporate to reverse the damage. Likewise and according to Business Social Responsibility (2001: 21); in the USA in 1991, CARE welcomed Starbucks' commitment to have an impact on the lives of its workers and their families in coffee producing countries. At the time BSR published the guide in 2001, Starbucks was the largest North American contributor to CARE; donating and helping to raise \$1.2 million to support programmes in Africa; Latin America and South-East Asia. Bendell (2010) explains such a shift in patterns of business-NGO collaboration in terms of the fact that business no longer considers corporate social responsibility as consisting merely of the "nice" things a company might do with its profits. Instead and increasingly, business is going beyond image considerations to serious introspection on the moral question of how companies make their profits in the first place. Consequently, the trend has since been one of business forming strategic partnerships that are designed to tackle both internal operational issues including profitability on the one hand; and on the other hand, systematically examining the negative impact of their operations on the environment and communities; and ways of minimising them.

The benefits for NGOs engaging business in partnerships for development are many as is apparent from the foregoing and Sethi (2006: 2) notes that the forging of relationships between NGOs and the private sector was welcomed and strongly encouraged by both governments and multilateral donor institutions which perceived the development as healthy and long overdue. Another significant benefit according to Damlamiam (2006: 7); was the fact that faced with difficulties in finding and maintaining new sources of funding from governments, multilateral institutions and private donors; NGOs increasingly turned to the private sector for resources. This assertion is supported by Business Social

Responsibility (2001: 18) in which it is noted that as support from governmental sources shrank, NGOs sought alternative sources of funding and partnerships with business to enable them continue to deliver with a shrinking resource base. On its part, business was only too happy to fill the gap in NGOs' resource base in return for being on record as being socially responsible and for some companies, without having to do the work which most of them have limited capacity and/or interest to do the work themselves; it was a perfect and mutually beneficial arrangement. On increased funding opportunities, Hoffman and Minnear (2002: 3) however cautions that readily available corporate funding can lead to a lack of cost-efficiency and over-ambitious programmes. More seriously, readily available funding can lead to lack of attention to options for cost recovery including charging beneficiaries modest fees for services which would make the programmes sustainable and more beneficial to the target groups in the longer term.

In addition to the financial benefits which derive from NGO-business partnership; Murphy & Griss (2007: 7) note that business brings in expertise in management and marketing issues as well as increased understanding of the drivers of business. This is supported by Business Social Responsibility (2001: 18) which notes that in partnering with business, NGOs gain access to operational expertise, skill enhancement and other resources they lack but which are critical to increased efficiency and effectiveness in their work. Besides (Damlamiam 2006: 7), working from inside also gave NGOs greater insight into how companies really operate and this acted as a spring board for dialogue and lobbying for changes in business practices from an informed position; in time and in some instances, such changes rippled through to an entire industry to the benefit of society as a whole. Murphy & Griss (2007: 7) concur, adding that this increased NGOs' understanding of the drivers of business and presented opportunities for new solutions especially in an era in which many NGOs were disenchanted with the rhetoric and inaction of governments. Inaction is illustrated by Smillie & Minear (2003: 14) who note that NGOs had funding pushed at them by governments and multilateral donors alike following the highly photogenic Goma volcano; at the same time however, they could not get adequate funding for the much larger on-going emergency in the Democratic Republic of Congo despite reports of as many as 2.5 million deaths in 32 months.

In the long term, the courting of NGOs by business even if the primary motive is "image-cleansing" as the example of Shell in Nigeria illustrates and/or the NGOs courting business to ensure that business is part of the solution to the problems they create in the first place; the final score is a "win-win" situation

for all. Schiller (2005: 10-11) however cautions that while NGO-private sector partnerships present many advantages and opportunities for both parties, there are also risks inherent in such partnerships. Of the risks, he argues that NGO-private sector partnerships can result in co-optation and weaken NGOs' stance on certain issues and when this happens, NGOs may find themselves compromising their principles. This can lead to splits and disagreements between groups and/or activists working on the same issue further weakening their position as the defenders of the defenceless. NGOs may also find themselves reduced to fulfilling the role of appeasers; being used to do community work on behalf of companies particularly in the developing world; in the process, they may well lose their credibility among peers, the public and most crucially, other categories of their donors. Besides, partnering with the private sector could bring about changes in organisational culture for example, increased bureaucracy, formality and the loss of one of the greatest comparative advantage NGOs have - flexibility. These views are shared by Sethi (2006: 5) who argues that while NGO-business partnerships have been hailed as a positive development long overdue, they are far from perfect; adding that most of the business-NGO strategic alliances or partnerships are a form of forced marriage or a marriage of convenience in which the partners hope that eventually, they will fall in love and live happily ever after! He defends this view by arguing that the private sector has had considerable experience with all types of strategic alliances and partnerships; if therefore partnerships with NGOs were considered important and a good idea, corporations would have pushed for them as their preferred solution to resolving business-society conflicts a long time ago.

The argument by Sethi that if business thought that partnerships with NGOs was a good idea, they would have been pursuing them a long time ago suggests that business enter into partnership with NGOs not voluntarily but instead, under duress; to achieve a specific goal. Cowe (2004 1-2) shares similar views and argues that true partnerships do not really exist instead, what exists are just loose relationships or traditional sponsorships. As such, to refer to "partnership" under the circumstances is glorifying such a relationship for while it is not exactly a "...one-night stand..." it is not marriage either or if it is; it is a "marriage of convenience". Sethi (2006: 5) shares the views by Cowe adding that with few exceptions, these so called "partnerships" or strategic alliances have failed to deliver on their promises. However, Sethi's argument continues, such failure to deliver is not so much due to lack of commitment or good faith on the part of the parties involved instead; it can be traced to conflicting interests and goals which render the partnerships a complicated affair.

Tennyson and Harrison (2008: 16) concur and note that amongst some of the reasons for the failure of partnerships to deliver is that first of all, how the partnerships evolves is often different from what the parties anticipated on engagement. This can be traced to the fact that contrary to the belief by the partnering organisations that they are drawn together by a common goal; the reality is that they are drawn together by what each partner perceives the other as bringing to the table. Secondly, contrary to the belief that the partnerships are shaped round a common vision; the reality is that the partners expect the partnership activities to primarily deliver their individual organisational aims with the other's aims taking second place. Such contradictions (Sethi 2006: 5) became even more complicated for eager as each party was to proclaim success, they promised more than could deliver; they glossed over the real difficulties of managing conflicting goals and downplayed differences of opinion on the means for achieving the goals and even on acceptable levels of performance. Under the circumstances, the tendency was to assiduously try to avoid describing their respective constituencies in specific terms for fear of antagonizing the other; consequently, they were often not able to manage heightened expectations in their respective constituencies and when they failed to manage these expectations, the blame game started thereby further straining the relationships.

Another risk in business-NGO partnerships according to Sayer (2005: 262) lies in the fact that while corporate social responsibility remains a useful reminder for corporations to pay heed to environmental and social issues; it may well be used as window-dressing to cover up acts of corporate misconduct. Thus, in partnering with such businesses, NGOs risk reputational damage particularly in situations where the acts of corporate misconduct are exposed and they are perceived as having been party to it by association. Schiller (2005: 11) concurs adding that partnerships involve risks and may be a drain on resources that could be more effectively used for traditional campaigning; this is particularly so because the work culture of business is very different from that of NGOs. Such differences might also result in the partners spending disproportionate amounts of time negotiating the terms of engagement amongst other things; time which could be more effectively used for traditional campaigning. At the same time however, Schiller notes that while at outset, covering up acts of misconduct might have been a primary motive for business to engage NGOs in general however, business was increasingly becoming more conscious about the impact of their activities on the welfare of communities as illustrated in various examples cited earlier. Tennyson, Harrison & Wisheart (2008:19) concur adding that in time and as partnerships became more commonplace and those involved became more experienced, there was increased expectation of what partnerships ought to achieve besides, there was

also less tolerance of poor partnering behaviour and growing confidence in challenging poor practices. In this respect, the scholars cite the example of partners involved in a number of bio-diversity partnerships for several years during which they were able to articulate what constituted grounds for suspending and/or terminating a partnership altogether.

Murphy & Bendell (1999: 2) share the views that relationships are indeed improving and note that while at the outset, the dominant pattern of business-NGO relations was characterised by antagonism since then, some businesses and NGOs have since been quietly working together to overcome their differences for the common good. However, notwithstanding these positive changes in business' attitudes and practices, voluntary or otherwise and while this may have moved business and NGOs closer in terms of common goals, all the same, "housekeeping" problems lingered on. In this respect, Duma (2006) notes that some of these problems have to do with the fact that first of all, in trying to establish what types of initiatives the corporate is interested in sponsoring, NGOs often face a hurdle as in many corporations, there is little documented information on CSR or if information was available, it is often outdated and not in tune with the reality of the situation on the ground. Secondly, the focal point for contact is often at an inappropriate level of corporate management ranks meaning that the individual is not in a position to make decisions on suggested changes or modifications to the CSR plans in the event that they did not fit the reality on the ground and the matter has to be deferred until the next "senior management retreat"! Thirdly, in the event that one gets an audience at the right level of corporate management and the process of engagement takes off; often, there are no clear guidelines and/or timely feedback on project proposals submitted for funding. Instead, corporations are often quick to criticise the lack of professionalism within the NGO community in so far their proposals are considered of poor quality understandably, the proposals are judged according to corporate standards!

In the light of the foregoing, it does appear that for NGOs, partnerships with the corporate sector were mutually beneficial and desirable because first of all, such partnerships brought in much needed financial resources and in an environment in which the NGO resource base was increasingly shrinking, NGOs embraced business as a viable alternative for resource mobilisation. Secondly, according to the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (2001: 11), at the outset, NGO perceptions of business were very negative and the mood then was confrontational. A common strategy used to confront business was naming, shaming and taking other measures aimed at driving companies that engaged in malpractices out of business; amongst these measures was advocating for world-wide

boycotts of their products. In time however, there was a realisation in the NGO community that by placing themselves in a confrontational mode, they were foregoing opportunities to work constructively with business which had the resources and sometimes the will to create meaningful livelihoods for people and thus make a contribution to poverty reduction. In addition, there was a realisation that continuing to pursue the confrontation agenda may be hurting those on whose behalf they claimed to work. Besides, such a strategy often provoked only short-term palliative changes in corporate behaviour; for meaningful and lasting change, it was necessary to relate to business on more positive terms for in the longer term, more could be achieved through dialogue and cooperation.

The change in strategy from confrontation to collaboration, cooperation and inclusion saw NGOs benefiting from two fronts; access to corporate funding at the same time as it placed them in a position in which they could positively influence corporate behaviour and practices. Schiller (2005: 10) however notes that such a position was not without its own challenges for whereas hitherto, it was enough for NGOs to follow charity-sector rules; in partnership with business, they were increasingly expected to follow best practices in transparency, accountability and governance. For corporations in particular, such demands have since extended to accountability to the communities served; it is as it were; the tables had turned on NGOs whereby corporations were hitting back and demanding that NGOs “practise what they preach”. Such a backlash was taken to a new height when according to Lee (2004: 4); a report published by One World Trust in 2003 revealed that some NGOs including the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), CARE International and Oxfam ranked lower on organizational accountability than the often criticized companies such as Rio Tinto and GlaxoSmithKline amongst others. According to Schiller (2005: 10) some NGOs are uncomfortable with such a level of demands for accountability by business and especially those that are increasingly or entirely dependent on corporate funding. Such discomfort derives from the fact that NGOs fear that these demands by corporate partners and by implication, spending disproportionate amounts of time writing reports, may be taken to a level where “upward” accountability takes precedence over “downward” accountability; accountability to the communities served. In the light of this, NGOs are faced with the challenge of maintaining a healthy balance between “upward” and “downward” accountability and many feel that while getting closer to business, it is important that they maintain a degree of “social distance” from their corporate funders and thus safe guard their ability to influence policy frameworks.



In concluding this section, it appears that through courting NGOs and providing resources that it knows they are desperate for, business has earned itself some breathing space however; that the former continue to be corporate watchdogs is a fact as is illustrated earlier. Damlamiam (2006: 6) however points out that while campaigns against corporate malpractices have indeed been successful in the past, with increasing power and reach facilitated by amongst other things, supply chains which often span several continents; MNCs have become much more difficult to regulate at the national level. The “watchdog” task of NGOs is made even more difficult because it appears that no supra-national organization is prepared to readily take on this task. NGOs are aware of this reality hence their reservations about the kind of partnerships in which they run the risk of being totally co-opted; the reservations appear quite legitimate and as long as they prevail, the relationship between business and NGOs will always be ambiguous.

#### **4.7.4 Relationship with host governments**

According to Slim (2007: 1), most NGOs want a strong efficient state for the authority and capacity a state commands is crucial to delivering the things most NGOs care about: efficient delivery of basic services to its people; enlightened policies; pre-planned and well coordinated disaster relief interventions; the rule of law and the protection of rights amongst other things. According to Jennings (1995), such strong and efficient states were few and far between especially during the economic crisis of the 70’s which rendered states unable to provide basic services to their people. The crisis coupled with pressure from international financial institutions for reductions in public sector spending under structural adjustment programmes resulted in many a government withdrawing from the provision of certain public services. Such withdrawal is evident in a study carried out in Uganda by Cannon (1995) in which it was established that the proportion of health services provided by NGOs ranged from 30 to 50 percent; in time and under the circumstances, the common perception amongst the majority of Ugandans was that the primary responsibility of government was to provide peace and security with the provision of basic services assigned exclusively to NGOs!

Slim (2007: 1) cautions that arrangements in which NGOs substitute governments in the provision of basic services can result in neo-colonial forms of service delivery which are dependent not on citizens' political demands and action but instead, on what “outsiders” perceive as good and beneficial to the masses. This can undermine the establishment of genuinely binding political contracts between a people and its rightful government. Clark (1992:153) identifies three categories of regimes which offer

distinct environments in which NGOs operate; the liberal democracy, the single-party state and the military or other forms of dictatorship. The liberal democracy environment is characterised by freedom of association as such, NGOs are welcomed as an integral part of civil society working in close cooperation with public authorities to improve the welfare of citizens; in such environments, their work provokes little if any hostility from the host government. In a single-party state environment, a government will tolerate NGOs as long as they are perceived as strictly confining themselves to their humanitarian mandate while in a dictatorship environment and depending on political interests prevailing at the time, their activities may be severely restricted.

Farrington and Bebbington (1993: 177) share the views on both the type of political environment as a determinant of the relationship between NGOs and host governments and the views on the operating environment adding that in a dictatorship environment, the relationship is often one of “reluctant partners” characterised by mutual suspicion and mistrust. In restricted environments, Cambell (1996) notes that the severity of restrictions is determined by the degree to which a government perceives itself as politically vulnerable. In turn, a sense of vulnerability can be traced to the fact that the donor community has always been critical of the typical one-party monolithic state and the lack of legitimacy such a state is associated with. In a situation in which NGOs are the preferred partner and are funded by the same donor community which is critical of a government, suspicion and mistrust is inevitable. Suspicion and mistrust can also be traced to the fact that the organisational structure and developmental objectives of NGOs and governments often differ; in this respect, Salmen (1990: 29) notes that states tend to take the form of large, hierarchical bureaucracies with centralised and paternalistic notions of development. In contrast, NGOs are characterised by flexibility; non-hierarchical structures and values of participation and empowerment are ranked high. NGOs are thus likely to use a “bottom-up” approach while the state is more likely to adopt a “top-down” approach. Such differences in approach have the potential for generating conflict between the two parties since the NGO approach is more popular with the masses and is likely to move people further along the development continuum thereby exposing the weaknesses inherent in the rigid and bureaucratic approach of governments.

Abdul-Raheem (2001) holds a different view and argues that in most of their activities, NGOs operate in a manner that is more akin to the state, for endowed with abundant resources and backed directly or indirectly by their home governments; they assume a status higher than that of local community groups

and local NGOs in the host countries. Abdul Raheem defends his argument by making reference to their lifestyles of which he says that like the ruling elite in Africa, they go around in the latest models of four wheel drive vehicles fully equipped with state of the art high technology, communication and navigation equipment. At the same time and ironically, while they drive around in expensive vehicles, children, a category for which they purport to be advocate, have to walk anything up to ten kilometres to get to school every morning and most likely, on a half empty stomach. These views are supported in a study of the relations between NGOs and the government in Afghanistan where according to Jelinek (2009), Provincial government respondents accused NGOs of wasting funds and using donor money to pay for extravagant, luxurious lifestyles. Abdul-Raheem (2001) further argues that another dimension of NGO-state relations resulting in suspicion and mistrust is their perceived dominance and control over civil society in Africa. Such dominance is a mirror image of the crisis of the post-colonial African state which was characterized by neo-colonialism; only today, the political economy of Africa is characterized by re-colonization through the IMF, World Bank and Western NGOs. These new catechists the argument continues; joined the right-wing chorus about the inefficient state and declared their newly discovered civil society (NGOS) to be the new angels. He dismisses as fallacy; the myth that because these organizations are based “among the people” they are best placed to deliver services to the people adding that benefiting from generous grants from their home governments, NGOs became the civil arm of their governments' policies and the ideological cousins of the IMF and World Bank. He concludes that it is a case of one hand slapping one in the face and the other offering a handkerchief to wipe the tears!

With such perceptions abound, host government-NGO relationships were bound to be strained to varying degrees at various points in time, even in environments characterised by relative freedom of association. Global Policy Forum (2002) gives an example of such strained relationships in Zimbabwe, a de facto one party state until 2002 when for the first time since independence; the ruling party was challenged by a viable opposition party in a general election. The opposition did well; gaining a substantial number of parliamentary seats but not enough to dislodge the government; while the government survived, all the same, it was shaken by the outcome of the elections. At a subsequent annual congress, the government blamed NGOs on the outcome of the elections alleging that they had been the conduits through which external aid was channelled to finance the opposition's campaign. NGOs were warned that they would be scrutinised; the policy and laws governing their operations

would be reviewed and for those found guilty, the law that restricts foreign funding of NGOs would be invoked.

Such behaviour on the part of host governments is not peculiar to Zimbabwe for according to Mutasah (2007), similar behaviour was witnessed in Zambia in mid 2007 where the Justice Minister introduced a Parliamentary Bill that extended government control over the civil society sector on the grounds that this was necessary to make the sector more accountable. Ironically and not so long after the bill was introduced, addressing a workshop on aid effectiveness in Livingstone, the late President Mwanawasa praised the role of NGOs in the implementation of the country's fifth national development plan adding that jointly with government and sometimes on their own initiative, they had built schools and hospitals and ladled porridge on plates to hungry children! While so appreciating the contributions of NGOs to the welfare of the poor, Edwards & Hulme (1995: 135-136) note that governments remained suspicious of any independent NGO initiative which attempted to mobilise and provide services to disadvantaged communities without the direct involvement of the state. Understandably, states view NGOs as an extension of state policy and they are expected to implement government policy and not chart their own independent agenda. Edwards & Hulme further note that in general, NGOs were not opposed to implementing government policy however most of them were opposed to the deliberate frustration by state functionaries and to increasing state monitoring, control and direction. NGOs perceived such behaviour on the part of the state as undermining their social base and their efforts to pursue an alternative development path for the poor and marginalised sections of society. When NGOs openly express their frustration with this sort of interference by host governments, this sews the seeds for hostility and such hostility is most pronounced in the case of NGOs whose mission is addressing human rights issues. Adiin-Yaansah & Harrell-Bond (1995: 2) trace such hostility and in particular, against NGOs involved in human rights issues to the fact that governments tend to be threatened by activities which expose their failures to uphold these rights especially those which are enshrined in international human rights conventions to which a government is a state party.

Host governments are also threatened by activities that expose their failure to fulfil obligations to the masses in general and this was evident in Zimbabwe from the year 2000 onwards. According to Mbofana (2004), as voices of dissent amongst the masses increased over bad state management and the consequent impact of an increasingly shrinking and deteriorating economy and in particular, the unprecedented hyperinflation; NGOs rose to prominence for making a contribution to the welfare of

communities. Amongst such a contribution was the provision of community-based health services, education and livelihoods for the marginalised groups in society for whom the situation would otherwise have been unbearable. Besides, NGOs made a notable contribution in the economy by amongst other things, creating jobs, contributing to the ailing banking sector through foreign currency inflows and to the survival of the hotel industry (60% of the business) at a time that the tourist industry had virtually collapsed. Such a contribution by NGOs was perceived as exposing the failures of the state especially in the economic sphere; to this effect, the threat "...review the policy and laws that govern their operations..." was finally carried out in 2004 through the passing of an NGO Bill which severely restricted the scope of NGO activities and imposed conditions which made it near impossible for them to execute their mandate. According to Edwards & Hulme (1995: 136) such hostility is taken to even greater heights when NGOs reports on human rights and failures in general are taken up by local groups and used in campaigns to unseat the government of the day. Perceiving its power to be threatened by such NGOs, rather than introducing the much needed reforms, such governments are more likely to look for legal or illegal means to suppress them as the example on Zimbabwe illustrates.

Another source of mistrust between NGOs and host governments according to Bendell (2006: 10) is that the latter are particularly worried about lack of control of the work of organizations which are headquartered in their home country and which are almost entirely funded by foreigners including their home governments. The worries appear legitimate and in particular, the perceived influence foreign funded groups might have on domestic culture, economics and politics; this is particularly so in a situation in which the concept of development and how to attain it is so hotly contested. Other scholars amongst them Farrington & Bebbington (1993: 333) cite resentment which they argue is rooted in the question of the sustainability of large-scale service provision by NGOs especially in a situation in which virtually all service-delivery operations are totally dependent on large subsidies from external donors; resources which increasingly, are denied to governments. The scholars argue that were ministries of health and education allowed access to resources on this scale, then over time these ministries too, would be able to provide services as cost-effectively. They conclude that the widening gap between government and NGO resources makes state inefficiency a "self-perpetuating reality" and this sews the seeds of resentment. The frustration of host governments denied of resources by donors in favour of NGOs coupled with exposure of state failures be it in the economic or political spheres often results in drastic action being taken against the former; the imposition of severe restrictions, deregistration or even expulsion. Such drastic action by a host government is evident in Sudan where

according to the United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) (2009), as late as March 2009 the government ordered the expulsion of ten international NGOs and the deregistration of two local NGOs. The expulsions and deregistration were on the grounds of allegations ranging from spies to thieves and cooperating with the International Criminal Court which earlier, had issued an international warrant of arrest for the state president, Al Bashir. It was stated in the report that most of the expelled NGOs would be conforming to the order so as to ensure the safety of their staff for the possibility of detention and/or physical attack by members of the public could not be ruled out – it was that serious.

In concluding this section, it is apparent that the environment in which NGOs work is not always conducive to the effective execution of their mandate; this is particularly so in cases where the government is a military or other form of dictatorship as suggested earlier by Clark. In such environments, Mariam (2010) argues that the conditions which generate dictatorships, (civil and cross-border wars; ethnic and religious strife) simultaneously create the conditions which render communities vulnerable (economic regression, high unemployment rates and poverty; insufficient food production, malnutrition and disease). Thus, perceiving such governments as the source of some of the problems and like they do with corporate business, NGOs may attempt to engage them in the search for solutions and when they do, they are perceived as “meddling in domestic politics” which perception might well see them on the next flight back home. This was the case in Zambia where according to the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) (2007), the introduction of the Parliamentary Bill in Zambia in 2007 mentioned earlier was an attempt by the government to reverse a court decision to reinstate the Southern African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), a regional human rights and good governance watchdog deregistered hitherto. SACCORD had a history of being a thorn in the flesh for three successive administrations in Zambia; it led the anti-one party state movement which forced Kaunda to introduce multiparty politics in 1991; it was instrumental in blocking Chiluba's bid for a third term of office in 2001 and maintained the pressure on Mwanawasa resulting in the adoption of a new constitution in 2009. Thus, when NGOs “tow-the-line” and restrict themselves to their humanitarian mandate; they will be tolerated by a host government and thus have the space to execute their mandate. However, perceived by the poor as they are as the “redeemer” and likewise, perceived as they are by donors as the “magic bullet” for turning around the situation of the poor, if they tow the line and turn a blind eye to the conduct of a government, they risk losing their credibility in both camps. In the event that NGOs “stick to the knitting”; are true their mandate and live

out their principles and values, this might lead to loss of the space in which to fulfil their mandate; a very delicate balancing act NGOs must play if they are to fulfil their mandate at the same time as ensure that they have the space in which to do so.

#### **4.7.5 Relationship with beneficiary communities**

More than a decade ago, Chambers (1997:1) pointed out that the visions of the 50s and 60s for a better world with full employment, decent incomes, universal primary education; health for all and safe water supply amongst other things, had not happened. As a result (Chambers (1997: 7), hundreds of millions of people had become more vulnerable , more exposed to risks, shocks and stresses with loss of physical assets and fewer and weaker social support systems and the means to cope. Such a situation of the poor is corroborated in the United Nations annual report on Human Development of the same year (UNDP 1997: 24) in which it is stated that poverty had degraded human lives for centuries adding that one of the greatest achievements of the 20th century was its dramatic reduction. At the same time however, UNDP qualified the “dramatic reduction” adding that first of all, far from continuous, the progress had been marked by ascents and descents and secondly, progress had not been equally distributed with some regions lagging behind others. Indeed progress had not been equally distributed for a report published by the United Nations on progress on the MDGs (United Nations 2005: 7) revealed that between 1996 and 2001, the number of people living on less than \$1 a day in developing regions (in millions) was 78 and 74 respectively or a reduction of approximately five percent; for Asia, the figures were 748 and 703 million respectively or a reduction of six percent. In contrast, the picture was very different in Sub Sahara Africa, where the figures stood at 271 and 313 million respectively or an increase of fifteen percent.

The definition of community development has been the subject of debate for years however, for the purpose of this discussion, that articulated by the United Nations in the sixties will be used. According to Coetzee (1989: 257-8), the United Nations defined community development as the process by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of government authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of communities and in the process, communities are integrated into the life of the nation thereby enabling them to contribute fully to national progress. The United Nations further elaborated that the process was made up of two essential elements namely, the participation of the people themselves and the provision of technical support and other services in ways which encouraged initiative, self help and mutual help. The United Nations definition of development

above, points to governments as the primary drivers of development processes within their sovereign states; however; Abdul-Raheem (2001) argues that in Africa, structural adjustment programmes recommended by the Bretton Institutions as the only way of heading towards development removed the state from all areas of the economy and disempowered them. In particular, the argument continues, the insistence by these institutions on cuts in public expenditure; on education, health and social welfare services resulted in new social contradictions which made the condition of the poor worse. Under the circumstances, liberal and social democratic forces in the West, the architects of the very philosophy, began to question their own wisdom in the face of evidence on the social effects of structural adjustment; their liberal consciences sought a palliative to relieve the pain but without necessarily curing the disease. Such a solution was to find expression in increased funding for NGOs which due to the myth that because these organizations were based among the people, they were best placed to meet service delivery gaps which governments could not meet. This is how NGOs became part of the community development landscape in Africa and other parts of the Third World. On their part, African governments were only too happy to co-operate by handing over responsibility for the provision education, health and social services amongst others, to NGOs. This is evident as elaborated earlier, in the praises showered on NGOs by the then President Mwanawasa of Zambia for their role in building schools and hospitals to complement government efforts in implementing the country's fifth national development plan.

Over the years and notwithstanding the level of technical, material and financial resources NGOs have employed in their attempt to improve the lot of the poor, some scholars question the impact such a level of resources has had. Amongst these scholars are Swanepoel (1997: 15) who argues that such interventions failed to show significant outcomes; instead and unfortunately, "...the outcome of many so-called community development projects is disappointment, frustration and an even deeper apathy..." The outcomes have indeed have been disappointing for implied in any development intervention is *empowerment* of the beneficiaries of the interventions. With respect to the poor, the World Bank (2002: 15-17) defines empowerment as the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives. An empowering approach to development thus puts poor people at the centre of development and views them as the most important resource rather than as the problem. Other scholars, amongst them Narayan; Chambers; Shah & Petesch (2000: 2) argue that a significant contributory factor to the failure of development interventions to empower the poor is the imbalance in



power relationships between benefactors and beneficiaries. They further argue that such an imbalance is a result of the fact that there are 2.8 billion poverty experts, the poor themselves yet the development discourse about poverty has been dominated by the perspectives and expertise of those who are not poor; professionals, politicians and donor agency officials.

In support of this view, Chambers (1983: 104) argues that “outsiders” views of the poor are distorted in many ways adding that lack of contact or communication permits them to form such views without the inconvenience of knowledge and/or personal exposure. Shivji (2006: 11) adds his voice to this school of thought and says of Africa in particular, that the people who were supposed to be the authors and drivers of development and the liberators of their nations were reduced to “the chronically poor”. In addition, they became the subject matter of strategy papers on poverty reduction authored by consultants and discussed at stakeholder workshops in which the “poor” were represented by NGOs. Consequent to such attitudes, the poor, the diseased, the AIDS-infected, the ignorant and the marginalised were excluded from being part of the development equation; instead, they merely became the recipients of humanitarian aid provided by “true friends” and dispensed by non-partisan and non-political Non-Governmental Organisations. The views on exclusion of the poor are shared by Narayan et al. (2000: 265) who observe that poor people have limited spheres of influence and their powerlessness is evident in their inability to get a fair deal; their inability to take a stand against abuse, being lied to and cheated and their inability to access market opportunities. Furthermore, to stand up against those on whom one and his family depends is risky and can even be a matter of life and death.

Burkey (1996: xvi) notes that programmes and projects aimed at improving the socio-economic and health conditions of the poor tended to be initiated, designed and implemented from “top-down” by agencies and institutions without systematic consultations and involvement of the beneficiaries. The basic idea behind such an approach was that the introduction of modern technology and science would automatically lead to a decent standard of living for all and that the availability of modern health services would defeat illness and disability. Burkey (1996: 48-49) further points out that while these so called integrated development programmes are still popular with development agencies however in reality, they are more multi-sector than integrated. As such, each sector is usually planned by sector specialists who are primarily interested in ensuring that people are organised to implement the activities they have planned and designed. These views are supported by Swanepoel (1997: 45) who points out that the situation is one of an organisation deciding what the people’s needs are and how they should be met. In addition, many organisations view planning as a technocratic exercise taking

place in regional or central offices as such, planning and planners are removed from grassroots action. Under the circumstances, at best, a community's inputs are channelled to the planning office where at best, they are heeded or ignored and at worst, the people and community are confronted with a ready-made plan that they must accept and implement.

Such an approach alienates the people and this is evident in an example from Sri Lanka given by Burkey (1996: xi) in which a large European NGO engaged a community of resettled people in a project involving growing mulberries and selling them for income. On a visit to the project, a woman came out of her hut and in a pleading voice asked the NGO officer for permission to root out the mulberry bushes and plant chillies instead! The officer pointed out to the woman that they were her mulberry bushes and she could do what she liked with them. In Afghanistan, a study carried out (Jelinek 2009), revealed that a recurrent complaint by communities was that NGOs implemented projects regardless of what villagers had asked of them; a community elder was quoted saying; "...An organisation came to our village to ask us for our views on what type of assistance we needed, but then they did what they wanted..." That the woman in the above example on Sri Lanka was not even aware that the mulberry bushes belonged to her and that an NGO can engage a community in discussion on what should be done but then goes on to do what it thinks is good for the people anyway; speaks volumes about perceptions on concepts like community "participation", "ownership" and "empowerment"; words which appear in almost every NGO project proposal document regardless of the activities involved.

Another dimension of the problem is articulated in a review of the humanitarian system carried out by the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN 2010) in which it was established that while some agencies are more likely to seek beneficiary feedback; they however do not necessarily act on it. On the contrary, the emphasis on programme evaluation is still more on the strengths and weakness of the aid given rather than on to what degree needs were met. Notwithstanding these observations, for NGOs, the concepts "participation", "ownership" and "empowerment" are not just a matter of words that make for a project proposal that is attractive to donors. On the contrary, in a study carried out by the British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) on approaches to quality used by NGOs both in the UK and internationally (BOND 2006:20); the importance of beneficiary voices, perspectives and involvement as key elements in defining quality and the lasting impact of interventions was echoed by respondents throughout the study. In addition, it was acknowledged that meaningful participation of

the key beneficiaries in programme design; decision making and strategies were key characteristics of programme quality. This suggests that “participation” was considered critical to the quality of interventions; quality in the context of community development implies that the interventions address the felt needs of the communities served and are implemented such that the communities can continue with the activities at a cost they can afford after external assistance has ceased. So what does “participation” involve, one is inclined to ask? Swanepoel (1997: 5) puts forward two viewpoints on the concept; the first is the liberal view whose main tenet is that it is through participation that a solid local knowledge base is built; such knowledge is a pre-requisite for successful development initiatives. In addition, the view has it that it has been established that people who do not participate in their own development have no affinity for development efforts or their outcomes. The second is the radical view in which participation is seen first of all, as a way of ensuring equity for often, the poor do not get their fair share of the fruits of development and secondly, participation is seen as a democratic right. On participation as a prerequisite for successful development initiatives, Swanepoel goes on to make a distinction between active participation and a mere presence adding that failure to make a distinction between the two is perhaps where NGOs have compromised their own performance and where their claim that they are more participatory in their approach to addressing the problems of the poor has been challenged.

Such a challenge is not exactly baseless for in an evaluation conducted on USAID-funded NGOs, Tendler (1982) identified three main types of decision-making processes; genuinely representative; “top-down sensitive” in which while seemingly, the beneficiaries fully participated in the processes however; in reality, it was the NGOs that made the decisions in a relatively top-down manner. The third process involved “local elite decision-making” in which NGOs took the decisions made by local elites as representative of all the views of the poor. She concluded that often, what American NGOs regarded as participatory decision-making, was in fact not participatory at all. Indeed, perhaps this is where NGOs have been failing themselves for as pointed out earlier, the common practice is one in which needs identification and planning stages of many a development project are carried out in offices hundreds if not thousands of miles away. In a situation in which “community participation” is reduced to a mere presence at the often great and well planned “consultative” meeting but which turns out to be a forum to simply get the community to endorse decisions which have already been taken on their behalf; then it is no wonder that they “...have no affinity for development efforts or their outcomes...”

de Berry (1999: 12) articulates another perspective on the failure of community development and argues that in addition lack of meaningful participation; through the misconception that communities are homogenous entities and that the “community approach” will automatically translate into development interventions that work at the grass roots, NGOs ignore the fact that communities evolve over time. Such evolution which is in response to broader contextual events can act as a constraint against a joint and communal undertaking besides; many NGOs often find themselves drawn to one segment of the population. A study carried out by the scholar in rural Uganda revealed that those who were “consulted” tended to be a minority and in particular, those who had had some education and had a good command of English with the rest left feeling disenfranchised from influence. In such a situation, the disenfranchised may not be enthusiastic about the initiatives or their outcomes and since the interventions are designed to address issues affecting the whole community, if the felt needs in any part of the community are not addressed, then the interventions cannot be said to have been successful.

In a situation in which “community participation” is reduced to a mere presence at the great and well planned “consultative” meeting but which turns out to be a forum to simply get the community to endorse decisions which have already been taken on their behalf; the disenfranchised may not be enthusiastic about the initiatives or their outcomes. Besides and as mentioned above, if interventions that are designed to address the issues of a whole community do not meet the felt needs of any part of the community, then the interventions cannot be said to have been successful. For a long time in the past, NGOs have got away with “thinking” and “deciding” for communities however, they are sitting on a “time bomb” for in defending the Sudanese government’s decision to expel thirteen NGOs, a community opinion leader was quoted (IRIN 2010) as asking; “...When the 13 NGOs were expelled in Darfur, nobody asked why they were still there; why after three, four, five years, there was no local capacity... what were the NGOs doing all those years...?” In the light of this, perhaps communities or groups within a community have their own way of “boycotting” or “voting out” an NGO albeit, not so directly.

#### **4.8 Conclusion**

NGOs share the cherished goal of and are sincere about turning around the situation of the poor relative to other stakeholders in the “partnership-for development”, they understand the situation of the poor better than donor governments, multilateral donor institutions, corporate donors and host governments alike. In their quest to address the needs of the poor, there is a growing awareness within

the NGO community that small, often time bound and isolated projects will not have a significant impact if they are not undertaken within larger political and economic policies and structures that facilitate sustainable development within communities. Such awareness is evident in the fact since the early 1990s many of the large international anti-poverty NGOs have broadened the scope of their activities beyond simply providing relief and/or development aid to include high-profile advocacy campaigns. Such campaigns have ranged from protests against government policies, both north and south; multilateral donors and MNCs whose business practices are perceived to be exacerbating the situation of the poor. However, given that the resource base of most NGOs and in particular, for the work they do “off-shore” is dependent on funding from their governments and/or home corporations; that these “back donors” often have vested interests, both political and/or economic and that such interests may be in conflict with or work against the goal of sustainable development within the communities served presents a dilemma for NGOs.

Playing the role of advocate of the poor has not been without problems for NGOs for increasingly, the strategy has become the subject of criticism from academics, political theorists and analysts alike. This is evident in an article titled “Angry and Effective” published in the Economist (2000) on NGO protests; the editor argued that NGOs are increasingly and to varying degrees, extorting admissions of fault from law-abiding companies and multilateral donors; and insisting on changes in policy from democratically elected governments. In so doing, NGOs claim to be acting in the interests of the people but then, so do the objects of their criticism, governments; multilateral donors and the corporate sector they despise. In the West, governments and their agencies are in the end accountable to the voters who elect them; “...who elected Oxfam...who holds the activists accountable...?” he asks. He concludes that NGO advocacy is a paradigmatic example of a type of “non-electoral” representation adding that there would be no objection to the influence of NGOs and their protests if the concessions they win in the process genuinely advanced the cause of the world’s poor whose interests they claim to defend; unfortunately such advancement of the cause is very much in doubt!

With respect to multilateral institutional donors, their back donors are the same governments which are also the back donors of NGOs as such; the situation of these institutions is not much better than that of NGOs in so far as “the fiddler names the tune”. Then there are host governments which will tolerate NGOs as long as they observe the unwritten rule that whether or not they accept the manner in which a state exercises its power; it is outside their mandate to comment on such matters. Finally, there are the

poor themselves who due to their status as the “poor cousin” in development partnership power relationships, they will generally go along with suggestions of this or the other project as dictated by donors through NGOs but knowing very well it can never meet their felt needs. Under the circumstances, the sense of ownership and commitment prerequisite to the success of a development intervention is simply not there and consequently, the investment so made yields little in terms of moving the beneficiary communities along the development continuum in a sustainable manner. And when this happens, both donors, host governments and the communities themselves (albeit not as loudly as the other parties) express disappointment in the lack of impact of NGO development interventions.

Central to this study is the question why communities in Machakos District in Kenya were even more vulnerable to drought in 2006 than they had been in 2001; this suggests a lack of impact of post drought recovery through to development interventions implemented by NGOs between the two drought episodes. The reason could well have been a lack of sense of ownership within the beneficiary communities which is rooted in “...lack of affinity for the outcomes...” and which in turn, can be traced to lack of involvement (participation) in decisions on what interventions would best meet the felt needs of the beneficiaries at that moment in time; Swanepoel would argue. Non-involvement of the beneficiaries in the making of such critical decisions is certainly not always by design on the part of NGOs as illustrated earlier. Instead, it is often due to constraints beyond the control of NGOs and in particular, availability of resources which of necessity determines what they do, where, when and how they will deliver. Indeed, NGOs are not always at liberty to decide what they do, where, when and how they will deliver for this ultimately, this is a function of what resources are available for who; for what, where and when. With respect to advocacy activities, when they act they are damned and when they do not, they are damned; it is as it were a “loose-loose” situation! NGOs are indeed caught at crossroads for they are bound by clearly defined principles and values and some are actually signatories to protocols to this effect. NGOs know the right choice of exit is out of what is a complex crossroads however, they often find themselves in a dilemma in which in the quest to at least be “doing something” about a given situation of the poor in the here and now; they find themselves compromising these principles and values. It is more important now than ever before; that they come up with durable solutions to these challenges if they are to fulfil their primary mandate of alleviating human suffering and empowering communities to take charge of their own future destinies in other words, realising their cherished goal of sustainable development.

## CHAPTER 5

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY


#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the profile of the study area; Machakos District in Kenya; the rationale for the choice of the District; and describes the methods used in conducting the study from the organisation of the study, sampling of the subjects, data collection and analysis. In Chapter 1, it was stated that the purpose of the study was first of all, to identify and analyse the factors that contributed to a situation in which despite post drought NGO interventions whose objective was to increase community resilience against such phenomenon, vulnerability to drought in communities in Machakos District in Kenya actually increased in 2006 relative to an earlier drought in 1999-2001. Secondly, based on the findings; to draw important lessons from the experience and translate the lessons into recommendations which hopefully, will stimulate further debate on what NGOs can and should do for more effective interventions.

#### 5.2 The profile of Machakos District

Until 2010 when a new constitution abolished the Provinces and Districts system of Local Government administration and replaced it with a system of Counties, Eastern Province was one of eight Provinces which made up the Republic of Kenya. Stretching from the border with Ethiopia in the north and as far south as approximately only two hundred kilometres from the Kenya-Tanzania border; Eastern Province was the second largest after the Rift Valley Province.


**Map 5.1: Location of Eastern Province in Kenya**



*Source: Government of Kenya 2006*

Machakos, one of thirteen Districts making up the Eastern Province was located in the southern part of the Province with Machakos Town, the District capital, located sixty five kilometres south east of the state capital, Nairobi as illustrated in the maps below.

Map 5.2 Location of Machakos District in Kenya



Source: Government of Kenya 2006


Map 5.3: Location of Machakos Town



Source: Government of Kenya 2006

The District (Government of Kenya 2005b: 3), was made up twelve administrative Divisions of differing geographical size and population as illustrated in Map 5.4.

Map 5.4: Administrative structures and population density pattern



Source: Machakos District Office 2005.



The Divisions were made up of a combined total sixty-two Locations; in turn, the Locations were made up of a combined total of two hundred and twenty Sub-Locations. Between 2001 and 2006, the distribution of Locations in the Divisions was as follows:

**Table 5.1: Administrative structure of Machakos District 2001-2006**

<b>Division</b>	<b>Locations</b>	<b>Total</b>
Athi River	Katani; Lukenya; Settled Area.	3
Kalama	Kalama; Kola; Lubwa	3
Kangundo	Kakuyuni; Kangundo; Kanzalu; Kawathe; Kivaani.	5
Katangi	Katangi; Kawathe; Lubwa; Kathiani Iveti.	4
Kathiani	Iveti; Kaewa; Kathiani; Mitaboni	4
Machakos Central	Kathekakai; Kiima Kimwe; Kimutwa; Masaku; Mua Hills; Mumbuni; Muputi; Mutituni; Ngelani.	9
Masinga	Ekalakala; Ikaatini; Kangonde; Kithyioko; Kivaa; Masinga.	6
Matungulu	Kalandini; Koma Rock; Kyanzavi; Kyeleni; Matungulu; Nguluni; Tala.	7
Mwala	Masii; Mbiuni; Mwala; Vyulya.	4
Ndithini	Mananja; Muthesya; Ndithini.	3
Yathui	Ikalaasa; Kibauni; Miu; Muthetheni; Wamunyu; Yathui.	6
Yatta	Ikombe; Katangi; Kinyaata; Kithimani; Kyua; Matuu; Mavoloni; Ndalani.	8
		<b>62</b>

Source: Government of Kenya. 2006.

In 1999, the District's population was 906,644 (1999 census); 924,712 in 2001 (Machakos District Survey: 2001); and 996,650 in 2006 (Machakos District Survey: 2006).

**Table 5.2: Population of Machakos: 1999; 2001; 2006**

<b>Division</b>	<b>Population</b>		
	<b>1999</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2006</b>
Athi River (Mavoko)	48,936	50,404	55,444
Kalama	41,000	42,148	44,255
Kangundo	91,238	92,789	97,892
Katangi*	-	36,565	41,575
Kathiani	95,096	96,903	104,170
Machakos Central	143,274	147,572	157,164
Masinga	74,478	75,893	83,446
Matungulu	99,731	102,224	108,213
Mwala	89,211	91,174	95,276
Ndithini	32,358	33,136	39,872
Yathui	65,567	66,714	73,018
Yatta**	125,755	89,190	96,325
<b>Total</b>	<b>906,644</b>	<b>924,712</b>	<b>996,650</b>

Source: Government of Kenya. 2006.


As will be noted from the table, Katangi Division did not exist in 1999; it was carved out of Yatta Division in 2000. This is the explanation of the decrease in the population of Yatta from 125,755 in 1999 to 89,190 in 2001.

The District covered a total surface area of 6,281.4 square kilometres and according to English, Tiffen & Mortimore (1994: 3), by agro-ecological classification, the District was semi-arid or marginal with only 1,574square kilometres or 26 percent of the total surface area considered as having medium to high potential for the cultivation of crops. In addition, the only variety of crops that had the potential to grow, were rain fed crops and in the drier parts, crops which do not require high levels of rainfall; in the main, sorghum and cotton. A study carries out by the KFSSG (Government of Kenya, 2008: 1) established that during the period 2003-2008, the District had displayed a fairly constant pattern with respect to livelihoods zones as illustrated in the Table 5.3 and Map 4 below:

**Table 5.3: Machakos District: Livelihood Zones (2003-2008)**

Livelihood Zone	% Population
Mixed Farming: irrigated horticulture.	0.8
Mixed farming: coffee/ Dairy and horticulture.	33.2
Mixed farming: livestock & food crop/horticulture.	60.2
Formal/ informal employment - ranching	-
Formal employment; business and trade	5.83

**Map 5.5: Machakos District Livelihood Zones**



Source: Government of Kenya 2008

### 5.3 The choice of Machakos District

The rationale for the choice of Machakos District was that relative to the arid northern parts of Kenya where food production is severely hampered by dry climatic conditions and community livelihoods are limited to pastoral farming; the District has the potential to feed itself not least; because as illustrated in Table 5.3 above, over 60 percent of the population was engaged food production during the period under review. Furthermore, in the event of adverse climatic conditions as was experienced in 1999-2001, 2004 and 2006; there existed the potential to produce drought resistant cash crops (cotton and sorghum) which communities could convert into cash with which to buy food. In the event that weather conditions were such that even the production of cash crops was affected meaning that

communities would have to rely on food aid; it was reasonably expected that such reliance on food aid would only be a temporary measure and that with minimum support; communities would be food secure within a relatively short period.

Following the drought of 199-2001, this appeared to have happened for during a subsequent drought in 2004; seven of the thirteen Districts making up the Eastern Province were affected and needed food aid, Machakos was not amongst these. However, another drought in 2006 not only saw Machakos District back to reliance of food aid but more seriously, there was evidence to suggest that the degree of vulnerability to drought within communities had increased relative to the 1999-2001 drought. This premise is based on the fact that according to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC 2004: 1), during the drought of 1999-2001; 260,497 people or approximately 29 percent of Machakos District's estimated population of 906,644 (1999 census) were affected and required food aid. According to the Government of Kenya (2007: 3) during yet another drought in 2006; Machakos District's population then stood at 996,650 and of this population, 289,029 or 29 percent required food aid. In relative terms, the proportion of people requiring food aid remained constant however in real terms and relative to the 1999-2001 drought; the number of people actually increased by 28,532; against this background, it can be argued that in 2006, communities in Machakos District were more vulnerable to drought than they had been in 1999-2001.

## **5.4 Research methodology**

### **5.4.1 The sampling frame and the sample**

The study is focusing only on Machakos District as such, communities in the District form the primary sampling frame; other categories of the sampling frame included the NGOs, the donor community in Kenya and government ministries with functions relevant to the subject of study.

Local Government administrative arrangements during the period under review (Government of Kenya 2005b: 3) were such that Districts were made up of a number of administrative structures and in ascending order, Sub-Location; Location and finally, Divisions which made up Districts. Machakos District was made of twelve Divisions, the Divisions were made up of a combined total of sixty-two Locations; in turn, the sixty-two Locations were made up of a combined total of two hundred and twenty five Sub- Locations. With twelve Divisions, Machakos was one of the largest Districts in Eastern Province and in order to make the study manageable, a sample of Divisions,

Locations and Sub-Locations was drawn for the study. A second category of the sample was NGOs involved in drought relief and post-drought recovery through to development interventions between the periods 2001 and 2006 while the third category was the donor community as represented by donor governments; multilateral donor agencies and corporate donors. Finally, the fourth category was government ministries.

#### 5.4.2 The sampling procedure

For the sample at the communities level in Machakos District, a sample of four Divisions or 30 percent of the District was considered as adequately representing the sample population and was subsequently drawn using the sequential sampling method. The selection criterion used was the impact of the drought in terms of the percentage population which received food aid in 1999 and 2006 with those in which the impact was greatest selected. To this effect, the Divisions were ranked in descending order (1 to 12) according to the severity of the impact of the drought for both periods. The next step was “cross matching” the position of each Division in 1999 and 2006 with a view to selecting the top four perfectly matching Divisions at position one, two, three and four respectively. In the event that four perfect position matches could not be reached; Divisions appearing in the top four positions were selected regardless of the position in the respective years. The results of the sampling process at the Division level are illustrated in Table 5.4.

**Table 5.4: Results of sampling at Division level.**

Division	Population							
	1999				2006			
	Total	Food aid recipients	%	Position	Total	Food aid recipients	%	Position
Athi River (Mavoko)	48,936	3,194	6%	11	54,444	2,722	5%	12
<b>Kalama</b>	<b>41,000</b>	<b>18,450</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>44,255</b>	<b>20,800</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>4</b>
Kangundo	91,238	26,459	29%	6	97,892	30,262	31%	6
Katangi	-	-	-	-	41,575	8,618	20%	9
Kathiani	95,096	12,500	13%	9	104,170	15,626	15%	10
Machakos Central	143,274	11,462	8%	10	157,164	14,145	9%	11
<b>Masinga*</b>	<b>74,478</b>	<b>37,984</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>83,446</b>	<b>42,557</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>1</b>
Matungulu	99,731	22,933	23%	7	108,213	27,053	25%	7
Mwala	89,211	31,224	35%	5	95,276	34,299	36%	5
Ndithini	32,358	6,472	20%	8	39,872	8,772	22%	8
<b>Yathui*</b>	<b>65,567</b>	<b>28,199</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>73,018</b>	<b>35,049</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Yatta*</b>	<b>125,755</b>	<b>61,620</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>96,325</b>	<b>49,126</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>906,644</b>	<b>260,497</b>	<b>29%</b>		<b>996,650</b>	<b>289,029</b>	<b>29%</b>	

Source: Field work 2011.

As is evident from the table above, for both periods; four Divisions namely, Masinga, Yatta, Kalama and Yathui appeared in the top four positions in terms of the severity of the drought; they were subsequently selected as the sample at this level. In many ways, this came as no surprise for Masinga, Yatta and Yathui share a border with Kitui, the driest District in Eastern Province while Kalama shares a border with Kajiado, the driest District in the southern part of Rift Valley Province.

Following the selection the four sample Divisions, the process moved to the Location level and like at the Division level, a sample size of 30 percent of all the Locations making up the twelve Divisions in the District or twenty Locations ( $62 \times 0.33$ ) was considered fairly representative of the population under study. Had the distribution of Locations been uniform across the Divisions, this would have worked out at a figure of five Locations per Division ( $62/12$ ) however, it turned out that first of all, the distribution was not even; secondly, between the four selected Divisions, the total number of Locations was twenty three. Against this background, a system of proportional representation was used to allocate the number of Locations for study in each selected Division as illustrated in Table 5.5 below.

**Table 5.5: Allocation of Locations for selection (Total no. /23 x 20)**

<b>Division</b>	<b>Total no. of Locations</b>	<b>No. selected</b>
Kalama	3	3
Masinga	6	5
Yathui	6	5
Yatta	8	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>

*Source: Field work 2011*

Having allocated each Division the number of Locations for study, a list of all the Locations in each Division was drawn and the same sequential sampling method and criterion used at the Division level was used to select the sample Locations. However, it turned out that Kalama Division had only three Locations, a number below the average number of Locations in the four Divisions; against this background, a decision was taken to include them all in the sample as illustrated in Table 5.6.

**Table 5.6: Results of sampling at Location level.**

Division	Location	% pop. food aid recipients		Position		Comments
		1999	2006	1999	2006	
Kalama	Kalama	42%	47%	3	2	All three were selected by virtue of the small number of Locations relative to other Divisions.
	Kola	48%	49%	1	1	
	Lubwa	45%	45%	2	3	
<b>Total</b>		<b>45%</b>	<b>47%</b>			
Masinga	Ekalakala	45%	46%	6	6	Ekalakala Location was eliminated for it the least affected during the two periods.
	Ikaatini	53%	53%	3	2	
	Kangonde	51%	52%	4	3	
	Kithyioko	54%	52%	1	3	
	Kivaa	49%	49%	5	5	
	Masinga	54%	54%	1	1	
<b>Total</b>		<b>51%</b>	<b>51%</b>			
Yathui	Ikalaasa	51%	55%	1	1	Muthetheni Location was eliminated for while it moved one position up in 2006, the average for the two periods (38.5%) was lower than that of Wamunyu at 39%.
	Kibauni	45%	53%	3	2	
	Miu	46%	49%	2	3	
	Muthetheni	35%	42%	6	5	
	Wamunyu	38%	40%	5	6	
	Yathui	43%	49%	4	3	
<b>Total</b>		<b>43%</b>	<b>48%</b>			
Yatta	Ikombe	52%	53%	3	4	*Mavoloni Location was eliminated for while it moved one position up in 2006, the average for the two periods (44.5%) was lower than that of Ndalani at 45.5%.
	Katangi	54%	55%	1	1	
	Kinyaata	51%	54%	4	3	
	Kithimani	48%	49%	5	5	
	Kyua	53%	55%	2	1	
	Matuu	47%	49%	6	5	
	Mavoloni*	42%	47%	8	7	
	Ndalani	45%	46%	7	8	
<b>Total</b>		<b>49%</b>	<b>51%</b>			

Source: Field work 2011.

Following the selection of the twenty sample Locations, the process moved to the Sub-Location level; had the distribution of Sub-Location been uniform across all the Locations, this would have worked out at four Sub-Locations per Location (225/62) or a total of eighty (20x4) in the twenty selected Locations. Eighty was considered too large a sample and a decision was made that a sample of 50 percent of this figure or forty Sub- Locations was fairly representative of the population under study. As is evident from Table 5.7; the distribution of Sub-Locations in the selected Locations was not even; against this background, a system of proportional representation was used to allocate the number of Sub-Locations for selection in each Location. The results of the selection process are illustrated in Table 5.7.

**Table 5.7: Allocation of Sub-Locations for selection (Total no. /63 x 40)**

<b>Division</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Sub-Locations</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Allocation</b>
Kalama	Kalama	Kiitini; Nziuni.	2	
	Kola	Katanga, Iuni.	2	
	Lumbwa	Muumandu.	1	
<b>Sub-total</b>			<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>
Masinga	Ikaatini	Ikaatini; Itunduimuni;	2	
	Kangonde	Kikumini; Mikuyuni; Musingini; Kangonde.	4	
	Kithyioko	Kithyoko; Eendei; Thatha; Miangeni.	4	
	Kivaa	Kivaa; Kaewa; Iiani; Kyondoni.	4	
	Masinga	Masinga; Mukusu; Katulye; Musumaa.	4	
<b>Sub-total</b>			<b>18</b>	<b>11</b>
Yathui	Ikalaasa	Kamuthwa; Matulani; Ndithini; Ngungi.	4	
	Kibauni	Kilala; Kiunduani; Ngomano.	3	
	Miu	Kalamba; Kikulumi; Kyawikyo; Ngamba; Utithini.	5	
	Wamunyu	Kaitha; Kambiti; Kilembwa; Kyawango, Nyaani	5	
	Yathui	Kwa-kala, Kyamatula, Kyangulumu	3	
<b>Sub-total</b>			<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>
Yatta	Ikombe	Ikombe, Kitheuni, Kyasioni,	3	
	Katangi	Katangi, Mekilingi	2	
	Kinyaata	Kinyaata, Makutano, Mathing'au.	3	
	Kithimani	Kambi ya Ndeke; Kithendu; Kithimani,	3	
	Kyua	Kyua, Syokisinga	2	
	Matuu	Kakumini; Kaluluini; Katulani; Matuu.	4	
	Ndalani	Kivingoni; Mamba; Ndalani.	3	
<b>Sub-total</b>			<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>
			<b>63</b>	<b>40</b>

Source: Machakos District Office 2011

The number of Sub-Locations around the Locations was relatively small as is evident from the above table; against this background, a modified systematic sampling method was used; it involved selecting every 2<sup>nd</sup> Sub-Location in each Location in a first round. In the event that the full quota of Sub-Locations in a Location could not be reached in the first round, those not selected would be regrouped in the order in which they appeared in the first round and depending on the deficit in reaching the quota, a convenient frequency interval was adopted and used to systematically select the outstanding number of Sub-Locations to make for a full quota for the Location. In Kalama Division, the allocated quota was reached in the first round as such; there was no need for a second round. The results of the selection process are illustrated in Table 5.8.

**Table 5.8: Sub-Locations selected**

Division	Location	Sub-Location selected		Sub-Total		Total
		Round 1: Interval: 2	Round 2:	RI	R2	
Kalama	Kalama	Kititini; <i>Nziuni.</i>	-		-	
	Kola	Katanga; <i>Iiuni.</i>	-		-	
	Lumbwa	Muumandu.	-		-	
<b>Sub-total</b>				<b>3</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>3</b>
Masinga	Ikaatini	Ikaatini.	<b>Frequency Interval - 5</b> Itunduimuni;			
	Kangonde	Kikumini; Musingini.	<i>Mikuyuni; Kangonde;</i>			
	Kithyioko	Kithyoko; Thatha.	<i>Eendei; Miangeni;</i>			
	Kivaa	Kivaa; Iiani.	<i>Kaewa; Kyondoni.</i>			
	Masinga	Masinga; Katulye.	<i>Mukusu; Musumaa.</i>			
<b>Sub-total</b>				<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>
Yathui	Ikalaasa	Kamuthwa; Ndithini.	<b>Frequency Interval - 4</b> Matulani; <i>Ngungi.</i>			
	Kibauni	Kilala; Ngomano.	<i>Kiunduani;</i>			
	Miu	Kikulumi; Ngamba.	<i>Kalamba; Kyawikyo; Utithini.</i>			
	Wamunyu	Kaitha; Kilembwa. Nyaani	<i>Kambiti; Kyawango,</i>			
	Yathui	Kyamatula.	<i>Kwa-kala, Kyangulumi</i>			
<b>Sub-total</b>				<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>
Yatta	Ikombe	Ikombe; Kyasioni;	<b>Frequency Interval - 4</b> Kitheuni;			
	Katangi	Mekilingi.	<i>Katangi;</i>			
	Kinyaata	Makutano.	<i>Kinyaata; Mathing'au;</i>			
	Kithimani	Kambi ya Ndeke; Kithimani	Kithendu;			
	Kyua	Syokisinga.	<i>Kyua;</i>			
	Matuu	Kaluluini; Matuu.	<i>Kakumini; Katulani;</i>			
	Ndalani	Mamba.	<i>Kivingoni; Ndalani.</i>			
	<b>Sub-total</b>				<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Total</b>						<b>40</b>

Source: Field work 2011

**Explanatory note:** In round 2; the Sub-Locations in italics were eliminated.

Following selection of the Sub-Locations for study; whereas it had originally planned that the average of five households per Sub-Location would be the working figure at this level; it turned out that public authorities kept immaculate records of the distribution of households around the Sub-Locations. The margin in the distribution of households in Sub-Locations was wide (from 287 to 3,557); against this background, simply allocating the average five households per Sub-Location would have meant over or under representation in some Sub-Locations. To this effect, a decision was taken to use a system of proportional representation to allocate each Sub-Location the number of households for selection. Table 5.9 illustrates the distribution of households per Sub-Location and the number allocated to each.



**Table 5.9: Distribution of households in selected Sub-Locations and quotas allocated**

(Total no. in Sub-Location/43,663 x 200)

Division	Location	Sub-Location	Households	Allocation	
				By Location	By Sub-Location
Kalama	Kalama	Kiitini	1,419		6
	Kola	Katanga	1,643		8
	Lumbwa	Muumandu	2,820		13
<b>Sub-total</b>			<b>5,882</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>
Masinga	Ikaatini	Ikaatini	594		3
		Itunduimuni	930		4
	Kangonde	Kikumini	947		4
		Musingini	795		4
	Kithyoko	Kithyoko	1,127		5
		Thatha	963		4
	Kivaa	Iiani.	666		3
		Kaewa	912		4
		Kivaa	1730		9
	Masinga	Katulye	989		4
Masinga		1,145		5	
<b>Sub-total</b>			<b>10,798</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>49</b>
Yathui	Ikalaasa	Kamuthwa	564		2
		Matulani	287		1
		Ndithini	366		2
	Kibauni	Kilala	599		2
		Ngomano	305		1
	Miu	Kikulumi;	347		2
		Kyawikyo;	361		2
		Ngamba	347		2
	Wamunyu	Kaitha	651		3
		Kilembwa	439		2
		Nyaani	543		3
Yathui	Kyamatula	856		4	
	Kyangulumi	917		4	
<b>Sub-total</b>			<b>6,582</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>30</b>
Yatta	Ikombe	Ikombe	1,660		8
		Kitheuni	1,035		5
		Kyasioni	781		3
	Katangi	Mekilingi	1,047		5
	Kinyaata	Makutano	1,067		5
	Kithimani	Kambi ya Ndeke	1,426		7
		Kithendu	2,406		11
		Kithimani	2,103		10
	Kyua	Syokisinga	930		4
	Matuu	Kaluluini	1,353		6
		Matuu	3,557		16
	Ndalani	Mamba	1,809		8
		Ndalani	1,225		6
<b>Sub-total</b>			<b>20,400</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>94</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>40</b>	<b>43,662</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>200</b>

Source: Machakos District Office 2011

Having allocated each Sub-Location its quota of households, the purposive sampling method was used to select the households for participation and as had been planned, the selection criterion was first of

all; households in which members and in particular, the respondent had continuously lived in the village from 1999 through to 2006. Secondly, households rated by the community and opinion leaders as most vulnerable in terms of limitations in the means for livelihood relative to the rest of the community. It turned out the households identified around the Sub-Locations were those in which the breadwinner was deceased (households headed by widows; minors or grandparents) and/or households with disabled members who required considerable care which meant less time for the carers to pursue livelihood activities.

With respect to other categories of subjects, the purposive method of sampling was used and only those who were involved during and after the 1999-2001 drought; were selected. It was established that four NGOs that had been involved in drought relief operations stayed behind working with communities in the implementation post-drought recovery through to development activities to increase the latter's resilience against the impact of future droughts. Another two NGOs had been involved in livestock interventions during and after the drought making a total of six NGOs in this category of sample; for confidentiality purposes their names are not revealed in the text; all the same, they are available on request. For the donor community, four donor governments that had funded their home NGOs were identified and purposively selected while amongst the multilateral donors, only UNICEF was selected by virtue of the fact that the agency had directly funded interventions during both the relief and recovery phases whereas the other donor in this category had funded only the relief phase operations and not the post-drought interventions. For the corporate donor category, it turned out that no corporate donor had funded interventions during the relief or recovery phases; all the same, a well established MNC in Kenya with a long history of partnerships with NGO through both international and country level agreements was selected simply for the purpose of comparing how this category of donors manage their relationships with NGOs relative to government donors. Finally, with respect to the host government; with a decentralised system of local government in which every government ministry at the central level was represented at the District level under the leadership of the District Commissioner; it was felt unnecessary to include government ministries at the central level in the sample besides; it was felt that the information sought would be better gathered from the said ministries *in loco*; at the District level. The fourth category of sample was thus made up of government ministry representatives at the District level. At a later stage after the interviews had taken place, the offices of these functionaries were to prove very useful in the cross-validating of their records with desk-researched trends on human welfare published by KFSSG, a forum for which the membership is

the government, UN agencies and NGOs are members; the primary records were readily available in the District Office archives.

### **5.4.3 The instrument**

The study sought to go “beyond mere fact and surface appearances” especially given that in 2004, the facts and surface appearances suggested that the post drought recovery through to development interventions implemented by NGOs between the years 2001 and 2004 had enhanced community resilience against drought in six out of thirteen Districts in the Eastern Province including Machakos. As is evident from Chapter 1 however, such a phenomenon was but only a surface appearance. According to Kvale (1996:189-190); through an interview the researcher can gather information on the experiences of the subjects as articulated from their own reality. It is for this reason that the structured interview was selected as the instrument of choice with all categories of subject; to “dig” for information beyond the surface, on what had contributed to the regression in the resilience of communities against drought. To this effect, a questionnaire was developed to guide the researcher to elicit the information she required and to capture it real time as the respondents articulated their views on the various dimensions of the enquiry.

At the community level, in addition to interviews at the household level, focus group discussions were also used. According to Krueger (1988: 18), a focus group discussion is a carefully planned discussion designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening environment. On a non-threatening environment, Kumar (1987: 7) shares these views adding that an advantage of focus group discussions is that participants discuss ideas, issues, insights, and experiences among themselves in an atmosphere in which each participant is free to comment, criticize and/or elaborate on the views expressed by previous speakers. The size of the group varies however; according to Kahan (2001: 130) the number of people typically used in focus group discussions is usually small; from six to fifteen people with the discussion lasting about one and a half to two hours. The convening of group discussions was to prove most useful and in particular, in terms of cross-validating information whereby participants either corrected accounts of and/or elaborated on the views expressed by previous speakers thereby enriching the quality of the information provided.

On the advice of the Assistant Chiefs, every household that had participated in the study had to be included in the focus group discussions and the explanation given was that; that was how the

community affairs were run in the Sub-Locations adding that community members were more comfortable with such arrangements. They further informed the researcher that there was a system in place where Assistant Chiefs routinely convened a monthly *baraza* (consultative or information dissemination meeting) in their respective Sub-Locations. In addition, an Assistant Chief could convene an *extra-ordinary* baraza whenever there was an issue necessitating such a meeting and depending on the nature and/or scope of the issue (affecting the whole Sub-Location or only specific groups), such extra-ordinary barazas could involve the whole Sub-Location or participation could be limited to the affected group(s). In the context of the study, Assistant Chiefs used the monthly baraza to sensitise communities of the pending study as soon as authority to conduct the study was granted. During the meetings, they explained the purpose of the study and the rationale behind the fact that some households would be participating while others would not. The dissemination of information on the study, Assistant Chiefs explained; was important especially given the nature of the study and the possibility of raising expectations of assistance. Nearer the time of the start of the study, Assistant Chiefs convened extra-ordinary barazas of the households which would be participating to explain what would be involved in the study and to discuss and agree on the scheduling of interviews with individual households.

With respect to focus group discussions, Assistant Chiefs explained that it would be a recipe for divisions within the communities if some members from households that had participated in the interviews were selected and not others; besides, those attending might not express their views freely for “lack of a mandate” to speak on behalf of those excluded. The advice was heeded however, given that the distribution of households was uneven; in some Sub-Locations, households spontaneously became a group while in others, groups were constituted by clustering households across Sub-Location or Locations in order to make the size of the groups manageable as illustrated in Table 5.10

**Table 5.10: Focus groups constituted**

Division	Location	Sub-Location	Households	Participants	Group
Kalama	Kalama	Kiitini	6	14	1
	Kola	Katanga	8		
	Lumbwa	Muumandu	13	13	2
Masinga	Ikaatini	Ikaatini	3	15	3
		Itunduimuni	4		
	Kangonde	Kikumini	4		
		Musingini	4		
	Kithyoko	Kithyoko	5	18	4
		Thatha	4		
	Masinga	Katulye	4		
Masinga		5			
Kivaa	Iiani.	3	17	5	
	Kaewa	4			
	Kivaa	9			
Yathui	Ikalaasa	Kamuthwa	2	14	6
		Matulani	1		
		Ndithini	2		
	Kibauni	Kilala	2		
		Ngomano	1		
	Miu	Kikulumi;	2		
		Kyawikyoy;	2		
Ngamba		2			
Wamunyu	Kaitha	3	16	7	
	Kilembwa	2			
	Nyaani	3			
Yathui	Kyamatula	Kyangulumi	4		
		Kyangulumi	4		
Yatta	Ikombe	Ikombe	8	16	8
		Kitheuni	5		
		Kyasioni	3		
	Katangi	Mekilingi	5	14	9
	Kinyaata	Makutano	5		
	Kyua	Syokisinga	4		
	Kithimani	Kambi ya Ndeke	Kithendu	7	18
Kithimani			11		
Matuu	Kaluluini	Kithimani	10	16	11
		Matuu	6		
		Matuu	16		
Ndalani	Mamba	Ndalani	8	14	13
		Ndalani	6		
<b>Total</b>				<b>200</b>	<b>13</b>

Source: Field work 2011

Focus group discussions had also been planned for the NGO subject group however; it was not possible to convene them for the simple reason that none of them were willing to participate in such

discussions. The researcher concluded that this was one manifestation of the alleged competition that characterises the NGO market pace in the 21<sup>st</sup> century!

At the host government level and given that vested political interests and/or perceptions of possible positive outcomes in terms of an increase in the level of development aid, exaggerated accounts of the plight of the people was considered a possibility. Against this background, in addition to structured interviews, cross validation assumed a quantitative dimension involving desk research on documented evidence of food security stress and related indicators as captured in updates issued during the period under review, by the KFSSG in which the government, UN agencies and NGOs are members. To this effect, harvest levels relative to seasons during which the rainfall pattern was normal; fluctuations in commodity prices, local market trends and the performance of the local small enterprise sector were examined. In the sphere of health, records pertaining to food stress related indicators; malnutrition levels and the prevalence of anaemia in expectant mothers; incidence of “light-for-dates new born babies and prevalence of the protein deficiency syndrome (quashiokor) in children under the age of five (“under-fives”) were examined. Given that school enrolment and attendance rates are a secondary indicator of food insecurity, records maintained in the office of the District Education Officer were also examined. Finally, economic trends and in particular the medium of exchange and general price levels of commodities were also examined.

#### **5.4.4 Pre-testing the instrument**

Having identified the main sample for the study, the next step was to identify the sample for pre-testing the instrument; a sample of ten households or 5 percent of the sample size for the study (two hundred households) was considered adequate for the purpose. In this respect, a combination of sampling methods were used; the systematic sampling method was used to select the Sub-Locations from which to draw the sample by selecting every *n*<sup>th</sup> Sub-Location at regular intervals calculated to arrive at a total of ten Sub-Locations. This was followed by use of the purposive sampling method to identify the sampling frame in each selected Sub Location; the sampling frame at this level was made up of those households in the category “most vulnerable” as classified by the community leadership and opinion leaders but not selected for the study. Sequel to identifying the sampling frame, the random sampling method was used to select the sample households for pre-testing the instrument.

## 5.5 Organisation of field work and access to subjects

The researcher coordinated the field work throughout the study and the first step was to recruit three research assistants; the second step was to seek the permission of the District authorities to carry out the study. This involved a meeting with the District Commissioner followed by a formal request in writing supported by letter from the researcher's employer; proof of registration with UNISA and a supporting letter from the Kenya Red Cross. Permission was duly granted; in addition, the researcher sought and secured permission to have an audience with the District Management Group (DMG) at the end of one of their regular monthly meetings; the group is chaired by the District Commissioner with government line ministry representatives; District Development Officers (Division Administrators), Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs as members. During the meeting, the researcher introduced herself to the group and briefed the members on the study and how she planned to conduct it; following the meeting with the DMG, the researcher developed a work plan; it was the tool (Table 5.11) that guided the field work.

**Table 5.11: Work-plan for field work**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
Nov. 2010	Research assistants recruited	Team Leader
Nov. 2010	Introduction to District Commissioner's Office and submission of request to conduct study.  Permission to conduct study secured;	KRCS Machakos Branch  District Commissioner
Dec. 2010	Meeting with DMG  1 <sup>st</sup> Planning meeting with research assistants; draft of work-plan developed and;  Shared with the DMG.	District Commissioner  Team Leader and research assistants  Team Leader
Jan. 2011	Feedback on draft work-plan by DMG; work-plan approved.  Pre-field work meeting with research assistance: division of labour agreed.	Research team
Feb-Apr. 2011	Field work	Research team
April 2011	Post-field work meeting: review of general impressions on the exercise;  Identification of possible problems with questionnaires to flag to the data capture consultant.	Research team
May/June 2011	Data capture	Consultant
Aug.-Sept 2011	Data analysis and report writing	Researcher
Oct.-Nov 2011	Revisiting and editing complete text	Researcher

Source: Researcher

## 5.6 Data collection techniques and procedures

Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources; primary data was collected through structured interviews from four sources namely, communities, NGOs, the donor community and the Government of Kenya (Office of the District Commissioner, Machakos District). According to Dillon, Madden & Firtle (1994: 125), a standardised guideline in which specific questions are asked in a set order and manner ensures that no variation occurs between interviews besides, the researcher gains a great deal of information from a relatively small number of interviews. In a situation in which the 40 Sub-Locations selected for the study represented a combined total of over forty thousand households between them and one could get “a great deal” of information from relatively small number of interviews; it was for this reason the structured interview was used on the sample of two hundred households at the community level. The questionnaire was the tool used as a guide during the interviews for the purpose of gathering information with all categories of respondents; at the community level, the tool had been pre-tested on a smaller sample as elaborated earlier; it had been found to be appropriate and adequate for use on the main sample.

The questionnaire used in conducting interviews at the household level was divided into four sections namely; the profile of the respondents; their experience during the 1999/2001 drought; their experience of the assistance provided by the government and NGOs between the period 2001 and 2006 and their experience during the 2006 drought. For the NGOs, the questionnaire was divided into five sections namely, the profile of the NGO; organisation of work at the field level; the relationship between the NGO and the host government; communities and donors. Altogether, six NGOs purposively selected participated in the study by virtue of the fact that they worked with communities in Machakos District during the drought in 1999-2001 and stayed on to implement post drought interventions for varying periods after the drought. The persons designated to meet with the researcher were all at an appropriate level; Programme Coordinator or equivalent. For the host government, the questionnaire was divided into three sections namely, the criteria for licensing an NGO to operate in the District; working relationship with NGOs and return on investment considerations. Finally, the questionnaire for the donors was divided into four sections namely, internal administration profile of the donor; partnerships considerations; working relationships with NGOs and return on investment considerations.

At the community level, a schedule on interviews in each Sub-Location had been discussed and agreed between the Assistant Chiefs and the subject households as such; access was not a problem besides; in



order not to inconvenience respondents; the interviews took place within the confines of the subjects' homesteads. Such an arrangement was also designed to exploit the "principle of familiarity" to create a comfortable and non-threatening environment thereby rendering respondents better able to recall events. The principle was also exploited in the division of labour whereby research assistants whose primary role was to mobilise and prepare the sample households for the interviews and focus group discussions were allocated the Division which they were most familiar with. The smallest Division (Kalama) was allocated to the team leader and the rationale for this arrangement was that first of all, she would be conducting the interviews with all the categories of primary sources of data. Secondly and from an administration perspective, the researcher would be playing the dual role of researcher and coordinator of the field work simultaneously. In order to be able to play this dual role effectively; the field work was organised such that there was a gap of one week between Divisions so that the researcher would be available to supervise the preparatory work of the research assistants were doing in the next target Division.

With respect to focus group discussions, a prerequisite for success in focus group discussions amongst other considerations according to Wiersma (2000:251) is that members of the group must exhibit a high degree of homogeneity with respect to either background; behaviour or both; members of the group must also have a deep knowledge of the topic under discussion. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that Sub-Locations were often characterised by close proximity with only a dirt road; stream or some other insignificant landmarks for borders; notwithstanding the fact that some focus groups were formed by clustering Sub-Locations; their close proximity guaranteed a fair degree of homogeneity. Furthermore, with seven of the groups having more than the maximum of fifteen people recommended by Kahan & Krueger (1994: 17) and endorsing of the use in some instances, of "mini-focus groups" of three or four participants; the approach used with groups with more than fifteen participants was modified. Such a modification involved starting with a plenary for on average half an hour during which common themes were identified and clustered into three to four major categories. The group would then be divided into mini-groups of three or four people with special interest, knowledge and/or experience in the particular theme; such "group work" was allocated forty five minutes for discussion with the remainder of the time allocated to feedback from the mini groups and conclusions in a plenary setting.

The mini-group concept turned out to be very interesting because in four of the seven groups in which it was applied, while individuals were at liberty to choose to participate in a mini group of their choice, some did not get the chance to make such a choice for they were unanimously “volunteered” to participate in certain thematic mini groups. The researcher later learnt that the individuals so “volunteered” were known to be passionate and were perceived to be more knowledgeable and/or more experienced in the subject for discussion. This confirmed the sentiments expressed by a respondent in Kalama during the interviews where when asked why five elderly people had been chosen as supervisors in a government-supported project; his response was that the advice given by the *mzee*’s (old men) on terracing the hills was more useful than that given by “...those little boys and girls from the DC’s office...”! In addition; based on their perceived leadership qualities, others were nominated to chair the mini-groups. Finally and in order to exploit the principle of familiarity yet again; in cases where the group was made up of households representing one Sub-Location, the discussions were convened at the site at which the monthly barazas normally take place. In cases where the group consisted of households clustered across Sub-Locations, discussions took place at the site at which Location events normally took place while for groups clustered across Locations, the participants were asked to identify the venue of the discussions; their wishes were respected.

## **5.7 Data capture and analysis**

According to Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 26) researchers need to be able to organize, manage, and retrieve the most meaningful bits of data; in capturing data from interviews conducted at the household level and in an effort to “organize” and “manage” the data, the raw data from the questionnaires was uploaded into SPSS to facilitate the segmenting and coding of the data into meaningful information. Thus for example, for closed questions, a “Yes” was coded as 1; a “No” as 2 and “Not applicable” as 3; however, in the event that some questions were not answered because they were either inapplicable or the respondent did not have an opinion, use was made of both absolute and relative frequencies on closed questions in order not to distort the information. With respect to open ended questions; taking cognizance of individuals’ differences in perception as well as the possibility of the existence of “multiple realities”; responses were aggregated into preliminary categories of which the criteria for establishing a category was simply the frequency with which the same view and/or opinion appeared in the responses. The responses were subsequently grouped under four themes namely, the food security situation in 1999-2001; assistance provided by government 2001-2006; assistance provided by NGOs

2001-2006 and the food security situation in 2006. The grouping of responses into these four themes was designed to prove or disprove the hypothesis.

With respect to focus group discussions, the “constant comparison analysis” method was used. This method according to Goetz and Le Compte (1981:58) combines inductive category coding which involves coding by frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in raw data and simultaneous comparison of all social incidents observed. According to Dey (1993:96), internally, categories must be meaningful in relation to the data as understood in context and externally, in relation to the data as understood through comparison. In a situation in which there were no less than thirteen groups which were spread across four Divisions, the constant comparison analysis method was considered the most ideal not least, because of necessity; data would be collected internally in context at the same time as it had to be collated with data gathered from sources “external” to each group in order to draw general conclusions on the views and opinions of the subjects. With respect to questionnaires administered to NGOs; donors and the government of Kenya, the method for data analysis was the same as that used to analyse data from questionnaires administered to households; in the main, coding of closed questions. For open ended questions, yet again, responses were aggregated into preliminary categories of recurring responses following which they were grouped under themes applicable to each category of respondents.

According to Cooper & Weekes (1983: 50) univariate analysis is the simplest form of quantitative statistical analysis which describes a single variable and its attributes of the applicable unit of analysis; thus for example, if school attrition rates during a given period are the unit of analysis, the researcher captures and analyses the captured data with a view to establishing what proportion of the school population dropped out of school during the period. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that it was argued that the seeming reduction in the vulnerability of communities against drought in Machakos in 2004 was not sustainable for while in relative terms, the percentage of the District’s population vulnerable to drought in 1999-2001 was the same as in 2006; in real terms however, an even higher number of people were vulnerable to drought in 2006. Given that the argument was based on numbers, some quantitative statistical analysis was necessary to support the argument; to this effect, univariate analysis was used to establish the frequency distribution (relative and absolute) of the variables representing the impact of the drought (level of food insecurity, impact on school attendance etc) during the periods under study.

According to Harré & Madden (1975: 5) through regression analysis, the relationships between the various factors that govern real-life phenomena can be identified; the non-sustainability of the interventions suggests a cause-effect phenomenon. The second objective of the study was to examine and establish why in terms of community resilience to drought; the gains made between 2001 and 2004 were reversed in 2006; to the extent that the degree of vulnerability to drought in communities reverted to the same level as it had been before the interventions of 2001-2004. It is for this reason that regression analysis was used; to examine the relationships between the various factors that might have resulted in the reversal of the gains in community resilience made between 2001 and 2004.

## **5.8 Shortcomings and error**

Part of the questionnaire was designed according to the Likert scale or single response items; this presented problems in so far as first of all, that respondents would avoid being seen as exaggerating either way (yes or no) and thus would try to portray themselves in a more favourable light by taking the “middle ground”; could not be ruled out. When this happens, the results can be distorted in so far they will have both a central tendency and/or social desirability bias. This was the very rational for using focus group discussions as a means of cross-validating the information gathered at the household level.

## CHAPTER 6 DATA PRESENTATION AND FINDINGS

### 6.1 Introduction

The methods used to collect, capture and analyse the data were described in the previous chapter; this chapter presents the findings from the structured interviews and focus group discussion conducted in the course of the study.

### 6.2 Profile of respondents at the community level

#### 6.2.1 Age considerations

This was important to establish for being a historical study; recall on events was likely to be influenced by temporal considerations since the period under review was some twelve and five years back respectively. Besides, age considerations would influence the degree of recall on certain aspects of the experience thus for example, respondents who at the time were in school would recall the impact of the drought on schooling and school attendance better than that of respondents who were past the school going age. Similarly, recall of the impact of the drought on household food security by respondents who were adults by then, was likely to be better since at that point in time; it is likely that men in this category were already heading households while women were responsible for managing food security issues in the home. The age profile of the respondents is illustrated in Table 6.1 below:

**Table 6.1: Distribution of respondents by age group**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
55 Yrs <sup>&lt;</sup>	78	39.0	39.0	39.0
46- 55	50	25.0	25.0	64.0
31-45	52	26.0	26.0	90.0
20-30	20	10.0	10.0	100.0
Total	200	100	100	

*Source: Field research 2011*

As is evident from the above table, the majority of the respondents were over the age of 55 years; as such, during the periods under review, they were at the age which confers on an individual; responsibilities for the welfare of the family including food security.

#### 6.2.2 Gender considerations

The division of labour in Kamba tradition in food security matters is such that if a man is the head of the household, his role is simply to provide while the role of the woman is to manage such matters.

This is the reason why gender considerations were regarded as important. The distribution of the subjects by gender is given in Table 6.2 below:

**Table 6.2: Distribution of respondents by gender**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	76	38.0	38.0	38
Female	124	62.0	62.0	100.0
Total	200	100	100	

Source: Field research 2011

The results supports the division of labour amongst the Kamba’s; the majority of respondents were women at 62%; this is further supported by the fact that even in households where both husband and wife were present during the interviews, the man insisted that the woman was the right person to talk to!

**6.3 Participation in community affairs**

The degree of influence one has in community affairs is a function of his/her status; status was thus important to establish since in such a position, an individual is regularly interacting with the community as such; he/she is better placed to make an informed appraisal of conditions within the community as a whole and at any given point in time. On the level of participation in community affairs and the capacity in which respondents participated; the results are presented in Table 6.3:

**Table 6.3: Participation in community affairs.**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	154	77	77	77.0
No	46	23	23	100.0
Total	200	100	100	

Source: Field research 2011

As is evident from the above table, the majority of respondents actively participated in the affairs of their communities in various capacities.

It was also important to establish in what capacity and to what extent a respondent participated in and made a contribution to the common good of the community. The rationale for seeking this information was to establish whether or not, the community spirit that once characterised African communities still existed or had been taken over by a move towards modernisation. In the event that such a spirit still existed, an examination of the extent to which NGOs exploited such a spirit in the design of

interventions would be examined at a later stage. The capacity in which respondents participated in community affairs is illustrated in Table 6.4:

**Table 6.4: Distribution by position and contribution to community welfare**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Village Head	3	1.5	1.9	1.9
Deputy Village Head	5	2.5	3.2	5.1
VIDCO Member	36	18.0	23.4	28.5
CORPS Member	110	55.0	71.4	100.0
Not Applicable	46	23.0		
Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field research 2011

While only 4.0% of respondents held positions of authority, 73% were active in the affairs of their respective communities in more practical ways and in the main, serving as members of the communities' own (volunteer) resource persons (CORPS). Amongst such ways were contributing to community welfare in kind mainly with their labour in community projects; digging wells; fencing off community gardens and cutting grass in the rainy season to prevent the breeding of mosquitoes amongst other contributions.

## 6.4 Experience during the 1999-2001 drought

The majority of respondents stated that the situation was grave with all social support systems paralysed and most of their animals dying or dead; children not going to school for lack of fees or because they were too weak to walk to school; food aid was not a matter of choice.

### 6.4.1 Impact of the drought on household food security

The impact of the drought on household food security is illustrated in Table 6.5:

**Table 6.5: Food security situation at the household level 1999-2001**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Enough for at least one meal a day	12	6.0	6.0	6.0
Not enough for at least one meal a day	188	94.0	94.0	100.0
Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field research 2011

As is evident from the table above, the majority of the respondents indicated that they did not have enough food to make at least one meal a day. Those who indicated that they had enough food for at

least one meal a day were asked how they had managed to achieve such a status of food security in the face of a devastating drought. Table 6.6 illustrates the responses to the question

**Table 6.6: Stated reasons for not so severe food insecurity relative to other households**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Stocks from previous harvest	10	5.0	83.3	83.3
Had some money to buy some food	2	1.0	16.7	100.0
Not applicable	188	94.0		
Total	200	100		

Source: Field research 2011

Those who indicated that they had money with which to buy food were supported through the family network; children and/or grandchildren in gainful employment in towns and/or cities. An interesting finding was that the 10 respondents who managed with stocks from the previous harvest were all in the over 55 years age bracket; they explained that in the past, the practice of keeping a reserve of food stocks was how people used to survive when crops failed. On responding to the question what this involved; of the two options presented, modern methods (e.g. freezing) or traditional, the response from all the subjects was that they used traditional methods which in the case of pulses involved drying; for vegetables, it involved part-boiling (blanching) and then drying while for dairy products (meat and fish) it involved salting and then drying. With respect to meat products, they continued with the traditional practice of slaughtering their animals when they were in poor health especially when it was apparent that they were going to succumb to the illness; they would subsequently preserve the meat using the methods described above. An interesting observation in this respect was that the distinguishing feature of homesteads of the elderly was the “infrastructure” in place for the purpose; elevated mud and pole drying racks and/or storage huts elevated on rocks which was explained in terms of preventing the stored food from getting damp from moisture from the ground and/or invasion by rodents.

Finally under this section, respondents were asked how they had survived the drought. The response from all of them was that they had been assisted with food by NGOs. Fifteen respondents from households in which the head of the household was either a very old person or a very young minor stated that before the drought, they had been receiving food from the government. However, the food deliveries were not regular adding that sometimes they would go for a few months without rations.



Government rations had stopped altogether when NGOs started distributing food and they had been informed that from then on, they would be on the NGO programme of assistance. For the NGO drought relief operations, the system in place at the District Office was that public authorities would allocate NGOs the areas in which they would operate. To this effect, four NGOs were allocated a Division each for food relief operations while two NGOs specializing in livestock were allocated Divisions in which animal health was said to be in urgent need of interventions. Thus, two of the Divisions had the benefit of the services of two NGOs; one for food assistance and the other for veterinary services.

#### 6.4.2 The impact of the drought on schooling in 1999-2001

In order to establish the impact of the drought on schooling, data collection was limited to the twenty respondents in the age bracket 20-30 years as they were at school going age in 1999-2001. On whether or not they were actually in school during the period, the results were as follows:

**Table 6.7: Distribution of school going respondents in 1999-2001**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	14	70.0	70.0	70.00
No	6	30.0	30.0	100.0
Total	20	100.0	100.0	

*Source: Field research 2011*

The fourteen respondents who were in school during the period had however dropped out of school at various points in time during the period. This came as no surprise for selection for participation in the study was based on the degree of poverty and vulnerability of a household in any given Sub-Location. Table 6.8 illustrates the reasons given for dropping out of school.

**Table 6.8: Reasons for dropping out of school**

Reason	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
School fees used to buy food	7	50.0	50.0	50.0
To go for "food-for-work"	5	28.5	35.7	85.7
Failed exams due to poor attendance; could not afford to repeat the grade.	2	14.3	14.3	100.0
Total	14	100.0	100.0	

*Source: Field research 2011*

The six who were not in school at the time had long dropped out for lack of school fees; all the same, they were also affected by the drought; three of them were engaged in the rearing of livestock as a

means of income. Under the harsh weather conditions; the animals either died or realising it would be a matter of time before they succumbed to the impact of the drought, they were forced to sell them at very low prices. This exacerbated their food insecurity situation in so far as on the one hand, they were forced to cheaply dispose of the only source of assets they had by converting them into cash with which to sustain themselves on the other hand; the returns were not enough to meet household food requirements until the next agricultural season. The other three respondents were engaged in informal trading as a means of income; their accounts were the same; “business” ground to a halt as the priority for many households was securing food; it was no time for non-necessities.

## **6.5 The situation during the period 2001-2006**

This section of the questionnaire sought to establish the scope and nature of post-drought recovery through to development interventions and services implemented and/or provided by NGOs and the government in communities in the four selected Divisions in Machakos District and establish the extent to which these increased the resilience of communities against drought. It will be recalled that one of the criteria for selection into the sample was that one had to have lived in their village from 1999 through to 2006. This was designed to facilitate a linear appraisal of the situation of communities during the period under review.

### **6.5.1 Government support 2001-2006**

On the services provided by the government, the respondents (27 households) who stated that they were provided with services were all from the same Division, Kalama; this it turned out, was because due to limitations in resources, government support was provided under a system in which a cluster of Divisions would be provided with such support for a designated period on a rotational basis. Kalama Division happened to be in the cluster that was receiving government support at that moment in time. It was learnt that hitherto, the system was one of government trying to do everything and everywhere in the District; in a situation in which resources were limited, the result was that the services provided were spread thinly across the whole District and achieved little in terms of the impact of the support. It was for this reason that government had come up with a system of targeting a cluster of Divisions for a comprehensive programme of support in rotation while elsewhere, routine support would continue on a smaller scale. The services provided by the government are listed below.

- Water infrastructural improvement.
- Agricultural extension services
- Environmental conservation education

- Livestock interventions

On the question of who decided what activities would be implemented, how, where and when; the responses were as follows:

**Table 6.9: Decisions on activities**

	Government	Community	Joint decision
Who decided what the activities would be?	√	-	-
Who decided how the activities would be implemented?	-	-	√
Who decided where the activities would be implemented?	√	-	-
Who decided on when the activities would be implemented?	√	-	-
Who decided who would participate in the activities?	√	-	-

Source: Field research 2011

The respondent however explained that with respect to how the activities would be implemented, their participation in decision making was only in terms of their contribution; what manpower there was in the community and how they would organise themselves with respect to who would do what; otherwise decisions on the organisation of the actual work were made at the District Office. On how they had contributed to the government initiatives; the responses were as follows:

**Table 6.10: Contribution of the community to the government initiatives**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Labour	23	11.5	85.1	85.1
Ideas	4	2.0	14.8	100.0
Not applicable	173	86.5		
Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field research 2011

As is evident from the above table, the majority of respondents in Kalama Division contributed to the assistance offered by the government with their labour; of the four respondents who indicated that they contributed with ideas; three were retired agricultural extension officers while one had from time to time, been employed as casual labourer in the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. Of those who contributed with their labour, five elderly respondents; one in each Sub-Location, were said to have been designated “supervisors” in environmental conservation by their respective communities. This was an interesting finding for when asked why these elderly people had been so designated; a respondent in one Sub-Location stated on conditions of anonymity; that the advice given by the *mzee*’s (old men) on terracing the hills was more useful than that given by “...those little boys and girls from the DC’s office...” In other Divisions and with respect to ongoing government interventions, the sentiments were not so overtly expressed but instead, “in brackets understood”! Communities clearly

had more faith in their own traditional methods than the modern ones espoused by agricultural extension officers. Below is an image of traditional land terracing in Machakos District.

**Figure 6.1: Land terracing in Machakos District**



*Source: World Resources Institute*

On how long the services lasted, the response was that the services continued for nine months after the drought ended; it turned out the timing of the end of government assistance was by no accident, on the contrary, it was by design for this was the period which the comprehensive government programme of services targeting cluster of Divisions including Kalama Division; was scheduled to end anyway. This was the reason given by the government for terminating the services; however, as the government withdrew, it handed over the activities to NGOs which were implementing post drought interventions in Division. On whether or not the government activities had benefitted the community; respondents stated that they were happy that the government handed over the activities to NGOs for progress in the government programme had been very slow. Improvement of water infrastructure featured highly amongst the list of examples in which government was perceived as having failed to deliver in Kalama Division. In elaborating their views on how government had failed to deliver, they stated that in the twelve months the Division was on the government programme; only two out of a planned five boreholes; one each in the five Sub-Locations had been sunk but one had yet to be equipped with a pump. With respect to the digging of wells, out of a planned five, three had been dug however; yet again, one had yet to be fitted with the manual pump. In a situation in which the government had handed over the activities to an NGO only nine months into the period under review, it was felt that there was no need to ask questions pertaining to whether the duration was considered enough and/or questions pertaining to the impact thereof.

## 6.5.2 NGO support 2001-2006

This part of the questionnaire sought to establish the post drought recovery through to development assistance provided by NGOs to increase community resilience during the period 2001- 2006 and thus enable them to better cope in the event of another drought in the future. To this effect, the study sought to establish the nature of the activities implemented by the NGOs and the modalities of implementation. Tables 6.11; 6.12 and 6.13 illustrate the responses to questions asked in this respect.

**Table 6.11: Activities implemented by NGOs by Division**

	Kalama	Masinga	Yathui	Yatta
	NGOs			
Water infrastructural improvements	3	2	1	4
Agricultural extension services	Ongoing low key routine government interventions			
Environmental conservation education	3	2	1	4
Livestock services	5	-	6	-
Food preservation education	3	2	1	4
Health and nutrition education	3	2	1	4

Source: Field research 2011

On the question of who decided what activities would be implemented, how, where and when; the responses were as follows:

**Table 6.12: Decisions on activities**

Division	Kalama	Masinga	Yathui	Yatta
Who decided what the activities would be?	N	N	N	N
Who decided how the activities would be implemented?	N	J	N	J
Who decided where the activities would be implemented?	N	J	N	J
Who decided on when the activities would be implemented?	N	N	N	N
Who decided who would participate in the activities?	N	C	N	C

Source: Field research 2011

Key: N – NGO; C – Community; J – Joint NGO/Community decision.

As is evident from the above table, in all four Divisions, it was the NGOs which decided what activities would be implemented and when. On how and where the activities would be implemented, in Masinga and Yatta; these were joint NGO-community decisions while in Kalama and Yathui, the decisions were made by the NGOs. Finally with respect to who would participate in the activities, in Masinga and Yatta, the decision was made by the communities themselves while in Kalama and Yathui yet again, the decision was made by the NGOs. The differences in approach will be elaborated in the section on NGOs. With respect to the communities' contribution to the activities, the responses were as follows:

**Table 6.13: Contribution communities to the NGO initiatives**

	Kalama	Masinga	Yathui	Yatta
Money	-	√	-	√
Materials	√	√	√	√
Labour	√	√	√	√
Ideas	-	√	-	√

Source: Field research 2011

Yet again there were differences between Masinga and Yatta on the one hand and Kalama and Yathui on the other hand. Yet again, the explanations for these differences will become apparent under the section on NGOs.

The duration of the activities by NGO in years according to the accounts of the respondents was as follows:

**Table 6.14: Duration of interventions**

Division	NGO	Activities	Yrs.
Kalama	3	Water infrastructure; Environmental conservation; Food preservation and Health and nutrition education.	2
	5	Livestock education	1
Masinga	2	Water infrastructure; Environmental conservation; and Health and nutrition education.	2
		Food preservation education	1
Yathui	1	Water infrastructure; Environmental conservation; Food preservation and Health and nutrition education.	2
	6	Livestock education	1
Yatta	4	Water infrastructure; Environmental conservation; and Health and nutrition education.	2
		Food preservation education	1

Source: Field research 2011

On the adequacy of the duration of the interventions, all respondents indicated that the duration of water infrastructural improvements was adequate since the activities were completed ahead of schedule in all four Divisions; in Masinga and Yatta Divisions, the rest of the period was spent training water point attendants. Training on food preservation was completed on time in all four Divisions; in Kalama and Yathui however, this marked the end of the food preservation training programme. In Kalama and Yathui Divisions, the same situation prevailed with respect to health and nutrition activities; they ended when the NGOs left while for environmental conservation activities, the Divisions were back to the often unreliable government services. The situation was different in Masinga and Yatta Divisions

where with respect to food preservation for example; as early as the beginning of the interventions, the NGOs left much of the activities to their local affiliates. With respect to health and nutrition education; one year into the activities; the two NGOs started “Training of Trainers” activities for volunteers of their local affiliates who in turn, went around training members of the CORPS as Community Health Workers (CHW). In addition, the NGOs supported the formation of Community Health and Homecraft Clubs; a forum at which CHWs disseminated information on health, nutrition, home hygiene, running “Community Well Baby Clinics” (weighing under fives and monitoring conformity to immunisation schedules) as well as engage the communities in other family welfare enhancing activities. Under these arrangements, interventions continued as ongoing community initiatives after formal interventions by the NGOs ended. With respect to environmental conservation, given that routine low key agricultural extension services would continue to be provided by the government, before they left, the NGOs sponsored volunteers of their local affiliates for training as Community Environmental Conservation Monitors (CECMs) by the government; in turn, CECMs trained CORPS members as Community Environmental Scouts (CES) and thereafter, the former supervised the work of the latter. Under these arrangements, the activities that the NGOs had been implementing continued as ongoing routine community initiatives. Below is a summary of the views on the adequacy of the duration of the activities.

**Table 6.15: Adequacy of duration of interventions**

		Frequency	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Water infrastructure	Yes	200	100.0	100.0	100.0
	No	0	0.0	0.0	
Total		200	100.0	100.0	100.0
Environmental conservation	Yes	143	71.5	74.5	74.5
	No	49	24.5	25.5	100.0
	No opinion	8	4.0		
Total		200	100.0	100.0	
Food preservation education	Yes	200	100.0	100.0	100.0
	No	0	0.0	0.0	
Total		200	100.0	100.0	100.0
Health and nutrition education	Yes	143	71.5	71.5	71.5
	No	57	28.5	28.5	100.0
Total		200	100.0	100.0	
Animal husbandry education	Yes	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	No	57	28.5	100.0	100.0
	N/Applicable	143	71.5		
Total		200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field research 2011

In the two Divisions which benefitted from livestock interventions, the period was considered inadequate besides, the timing was considered inappropriate since many households had lost their livestock as such; the training on animal care ended up being mostly theoretical with no opportunity for hands-on experience.

With respect to the benefits of the activities, communities in Masinga and Yatta stated that there were many benefits from bringing water closer to households so that women did not have to walk long distances to fetch water to being more knowledgeable about the causes and effects of disease as well as the effects of cutting down trees. In addition, they were very proud of the fact that whereas hitherto, CORPS were only involved in work of a manual nature (repairing roads; bridges; assisting the elderly in digging cropping and harvesting etc) after the interventions they were involved in many other things for example, as CHWs, CECMs and CES. In the two Divisions in which communities felt that the duration of the activities was not long enough (Kalama and Yathui), the respondents stated that the interventions brought some benefits particularly the boreholes and wells; for the other activities



however, the benefits were short-lived as they stopped as soon as the NGOs left. On what would have been a reasonable period for the implementation of the activities; the responses in Kalama and Yathui pointed out that it was not so much in terms of temporary considerations but instead, in terms of being there long enough to ensure that communities would be able to continue with the activities on their own after the NGOs left. In emphasising this point, they went further to state that even if what it took to achieve such a level of self reliance was a mere three months, then it would have been adequate in their views. In Kalama and Yathui, livestock interventions were cited by the majority of the 57 respondents as having had the least benefit; asked at what point during the implementation that they had realised that this activity was not having little benefit, the responses were as follows:

**Table 6.16: The point at which communities realised activities would not be beneficial**

	Frequency	Percentage
From the very beginning of the activities	9	15.8
Half way through the activities	48	84.2
At the end of the activities	0	0.0
Total	57	100.0

*Source: Field research 2011*

The respondents who indicated that they sensed this at outset were senior community opinion leaders and when asked what they did about it, the response was that they did nothing for they felt that if the views to this effect came from the community as a whole, they would carry more weight. For those who only realised this half way through the activities; they felt that it was too late to do anything about it and since the activities would be ending soon anyway; it was in the interests of the community to be “polite” and part with the NGO on good terms. The researcher made note of these sentiments and made a decision to probe that matter further during focus group discussions. On what could have been done differently in order to increase the benefits of activities in Kalama and Yathui; recurring responses are illustrated in Table 6.17:

**Table 6.17: What could have been done better to increase the benefits of activities**

	Frequency	%
To discuss the priorities in the light of the short duration of the activities.	9	15.8
To give advice that was possible for communities to implement	26	45.6
To involve communities in the implementation of the activities	22	38.6
Total	57	100.0

*Source: Field research 2011*

The respondents who indicated that it would have been better to discuss the priorities in the light of the short duration of the activities were the same senior community opinion leaders who had earlier indicated that they could tell from the beginning that “...nothing would come of it...” It turned out that those who indicated that the advice had to be such that it that was possible for communities to implement came from households of lesser means relative to the others while the majority of those who cited greater involvement of the community in the implementation of the activities were in the age bracket 31-45 years.

In a situation in which regardless of the duration of the activities, there were some benefits in all the respondent communities in the four Divisions, respondents were asked if the benefits had rendered them in a better position to cope with the drought of 2006; the responses were as follows:

**Table 6.18: Benefits of activities enabled us to cope with drought in 2006**

	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	143	71.5
To some extend	11	5.5
No	46	23.0
Total	200	100.0

*Source: Field research 2011*

Respondents who indicated “to some extend” were all above the age of 55years; they explained their situation in terms of the fact that the availability of water meant that they no longer had to walk long distances to the nearest water point. The reason given by respondents who indicated that the activities did not benefit them fully was that in 2006, the situation of the majority of them was worse than in 1999-2001 as illustrated in Table 6.19:

**Table 6.19: Household food security in 2006**

	Frequency	%
Better than in 1999-2001	0	0
The same as in 199-2001	79	38.5
Worse than in 1999-2001	121	60.5
Total	200	100.0

*Source: Field research 2011*

The majority of respondents who indicated that their situation was the same in 2006 as it had been in 1999-2001 were in Masinga Division where the percentage increase in the number of people requiring food aid between the two periods remained the same at 51.0%.

In response to the question in what way the situation had been worse; all the respondents who indicated that it had been worse cited harsh weather conditions which resulted in total crop failure at the same time as there was considerable loss of livestock; the only alternative means of livelihood they had. Finally, on being asked for any other comments, 55 respondents or 27.5% made comments in which they lamented the fact that government always waited for another drought to do something instead of doing in between droughts.

## 6.6 Focus group discussions

The focus group discussions were conducted using a questionnaire as a guide. The questionnaire was divided into five sections namely, the profile of the group; perceptions on the experience during the drought of 1999-2001; the nature, scope and impact of recovery through to development support provided the government and NGOs during the period 2001-2006 and on experience during the drought in 2006. As a point of departure, a quick scan of the gender balance of the composition of the groups was carried out; on average, the women to men ratio was 2:1; this roughly matched the distribution of the sexes in the main sample. Many issues emerged from the group discussions however constant comparison analysis revealed eight recurring themes as illustrated in the Table 6.20

**Table 6.20: Recurring issues**

Group		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Division		Kalama		Masinga			Yathui		Yatta					
issues	Poverty	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Food security	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Food aid	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Participation	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Empowerment	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Culture and traditions			√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Education			√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Infrastructure			√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√

Source: Field research 2011

The eight recurring themes were subsequently reduced to three by merging related themes as follows:

- Poverty, education, infrastructure and food aid
- Culture, tradition and food security
- Participation, empowerment and food security

Reducing the themes to three worked out quite convenient for it will be recalled from the previous chapter that seven of the groups had more than the maximum of fifteen people recommended; in conducting discussions with such groups, the “mini-focus groups” constituted were assigned one of the four themes to discuss.

### **6.6.1 Poverty, education, infrastructure, and food aid**

As is evident from the table above, infrastructure and education emerged as issues in Masinga; Yathui and Yatta Divisions understandably, these Divisions are relatively remote and typical of such remote areas; schools are few and far between meaning that children have to walk long distances to school. The groups were very vocal in their criticism of government for the lack of infrastructure and in particular schools and roads arguing that their poverty and increasing food insecurity can be traced to neglect by the government in these areas. The groups in these Divisions understood the problem the same way; lack of road networks meant that even in a good agricultural season, they had difficulties taking their produce to the market; as such, they did not make enough money from their labour to meet their daily needs including school fees. For lack of school fees, many children dropped out of school and with little education, their chances of getting jobs in the future were poor; the majority of these children joined the ranks of the jobless later in life. With no jobs, their only means of livelihood was tilling the land but then; with limited access to markets due to poor road networks, they made little money; with little or no money, they could afford not send their own children to school and the cycle of poverty continues. In the event of a drought, the situation was even worse for with little food to eat, the issue of school fees did not even arise, besides even if school was for free, on empty stomachs, the children could not walk the long distances to school; many failed the exams due to absenteeism. Many families could not afford keeping their children in school longer than necessary as such, when a child failed exams due to hunger-induced absenteeism and had to repeat a grade; that marked the end of schooling for most of the children thereby setting the stage for poverty in the next generation.

In Yathui Division in which livestock interventions had been implemented by an NGO but in a situation in which most of the animals had either died or had been sold off; the communities lamented what they perceived as a waste of resources on activities that got them “...nowhere...” Furthermore,

being aware that it was the government that decided what NGOs would do and where; there were sentiments of disappointment that government did not insist on NGOs coming with projects that would “...really make a difference...”. With respect to projects that would have a real difference, they cited the long promised construction of a grain depot from where Grain Marketing Board would collect their produce for the market as one that could have taken communities “...somewhere...”.

### **6.6.2 Culture, tradition and food security**

The view that the food security situation in 199-2001 was so bad that receiving food aid was not a matter of choice was shared by many groups. It was acknowledged that some degree of food insecurity could be expected during drought episodes however, food aid was not the first line of defence for survival on charity is considered as humiliating amongst the Kambas. Participants were vocal in criticising government for inaction in preventive and mitigation measures and only intervening when “...people are on the knees...” adding that by the time government reacts, children have stopped going to school because they are too hungry to do so or for lack of school fees; animals are dying or dead and/or people are surviving on tree roots. In addition and in Kalama and Yathui in particular, government was criticised for being party to NGO interventions that did little to change the situation of the poor in so far as they alleged that by allowing NGOs to come in with ideas that were alien to communities, people were worse off than they were before the NGO came in. This they attributed to the fact that when NGOs came in with their own ideas on what was to be done and how; this they blamed the government which they alleged is always telling visiting foreign NGOs that we are “...poor...” One community opinion leader in a group in Kalama got a “standing ovation” when he angrily asserted, “...even poor as we are, we could still be spared of the humiliation of food aid... we are only poor in our pockets and not in our heads...if only these...”

In this respect, sentiments pointing to disappointment with the fact that the methods advocated particularly in environmental conservation and food preservation were not workable were strong. The argument was that if anything, the methods were likely to make people poorer in so far as they would need to spend a disproportionate amount of their meagre earnings on the methods. The best approach in their view; would have been to listen to accounts of how communities coped in the past and identify where improvements on these cultural and traditional methods could be made so they can match the challenges of the day. This did not happen instead, NGOs brought “...pieces of paper...” which they said had come from the donor stating what was to be done and how; in Kalama Division, a community

leader attested to being privy to a “piece of paper ” from the donor on what the NGO had to do and how. A Village Head in one of the groups in Yathui attributed the increase in the number of people requiring food aid in 2006 to a combination of factors; the discouraging of traditional methods that worked and were affordable to communities and the fact that the activities did not go long enough for people to grasp the new methods. Similar sentiments were expressed in Kalama where an elderly female participant lamented that the NGO operating in the Division had discouraged traditional methods of food preservation as old fashioned and ineffective and instead, promoted modern methods involving the use of “...medicines...” which after the NGO left, she knew not of a single family which could afford them.

In Masinga and Yatta, while communities were not better off in 2006 than they had been in 1999; they were not worse off either despite the fact that the rate of crop failure in their view was worse than in 1999. This they attributed to the fact that the NGOs that had served them well in so far as they had not interfered with their traditional styles of living; this had been facilitated amongst other things by the fact that they worked in partnership with “...our people...”(local affiliates) who knew and understood what worked for communities or otherwise. With respect to food preservation for example, the NGOs had left this to their local affiliates to implement the activities using methods that communities had used for generations and which had been proved to work. They had done the same in respect of environmental conservation for in facilitating the training of volunteers of the local affiliates in modern methods, it was not so much a case of introducing new ways of doing things but instead; using the knowledge to enhance the effectiveness of traditional methods. Realising improvements in the effectiveness of traditional methods as enhanced by the training of the volunteers; communities had unleashed their zeal in engagement and commitment to the extent that they made modest financial contributions for transport and meal allowances for the volunteers.

### **6.6.3 Participation, empowerment and food security**

On participation and empowerment, in Masinga and Yatta Divisions; NGOs were hailed for the manner in which with limited resources, they had engaged the communities in manner that would ensure activities would continue after they left. A shared view was that in some activities for example, food preservation; they had left it to their local affiliates to engage communities with their role limited to training trainers amongst the volunteers of the affiliates. The volunteer trainers happened to be the same people who were the communities’ CORPS as such, what this approach did was to take the

CORPS to a higher level of skills and knowledge. In addition, they had encouraged and supported the formation of Community Health and Homecraft Clubs coordinated by the trainers to ensure that activities would continue in a coordinated manner. Furthermore, the work the NGOs were doing was appreciated by public authorities to the extent that Assistant Chiefs put a system into place whereby time was allocated at the end of the monthly baraza for people to participate in their chosen clubs of which in Health clubs, Maternal and Child Health (MCH) and Environmental Conservation were most popular. In the Health clubs, home hygiene and nutrition were the main focus of activities while in Homecraft clubs; the focus was on food preservation. In Environmental Conservation clubs, land and water management were main activities. Even more appreciated was the fact that to the best extent possible, the NGOs had encouraged and promoted the use of locally available resources (knowledge, indigenous technology, materials etc.) In Masinga in particular, a shared view was that; that, people needed food aid in 2006 was the result of the severity of the drought for they gave many examples of an increase in the capacity of communities to cope with threats and hazards in their environment. In particular, they cited a decrease in malnutrition amongst children and the elderly and an increase in the number of children whose immunisation regimen was up to date. This they attributed to the fact that equipped with a higher level of knowledge and skills, their CORPS were doing a good job in monitoring the health of under-fives. These assertions were later confirmed during desk research of records kept in the office of the District Medical Officer and cross validated against country reports produced by UNICEF during the period.

Groups in Kalama and Yathui attributed the poor outcomes of NGO interventions to lack of meaningful participation in decision making on the nature, scope and organisation of activities. Such lack of meaningful participation was implied in the views on culture and traditions in so far as the view that NGOS came with “ready-made” projects was strong. To this effect and first of all, they cited the livestock interventions which they argued; by the time the NGOs came in towards the end of 1999 advising communities to sell off some of their livestock, the herds had already been depleted as a result of the drought anyway. At the same time; the few animals left were in such a state of poor health that they did not generate enough income to see them through to the next agricultural season; they cited the market prices of livestock in 2000; for a cow, a decrease in price from (Kenya Shilling) KES 1,200 to KES750; a goat from KES600 to KES350 and a chicken from KES 450 to KES275 on average. A vocal opinion leader in Kalama had the group in tears with laughter when he emotionally asserted that “...talk about destocking when the animals are either dying; dead or have been sold off at give away

prices is like Tololwa (Kenya's popular Mathare United Football Club striker) shooting one of his magical goals from an off-side position..."! In addition, views that with the size of the herd so depleted after the drought in 2001; livestock interventions were not a priority were strong; groups in Yathui lamented that the level of resources spent on the activities had not been used to address more pressing needs. Of such needs, the long promised government Grain Marketing Board collection warehouses at Location level were cited yet again.

Secondly and in other interventions, activities had been implemented in a disjointed manner and in Kalama for example, participants cited a situation in which the health education team completed its work before the water team came in. As such, the lessons on home hygiene were given in the "...air..." in so far as talking about hand washing but without the water with which to practice proper hand washing was to no avail. They dismissed as excuses, the reason given by the NGO that it had received the money for health education before the funding for other interventions and had to observe the timeline set by the donor as such, it could not wait until the money for sinking boreholes and digging wells was received. Finally, expressions of disappointment were strong against arrangements in which the NGOs "...brought their own people..." to implement the activities. They argued that; that the health education workshops took place before the water interventions would have not mattered had the NGO used human resources available within the communities for the CORPS would have continued with the work after the boreholes were sunk and/or the wells were dug. It turned out that by the time the water projects were completed; having completed their work, the health education teams had all left. They attributed the fact that even more people needed food aid in 2006 to the poor outcomes of the recovery through to development interventions and citing in particular, lack of participation and poor prioritisation.

## **6.7 Interviews with NGOs**

### **6.7.1 Profile of NGOs**

With respect to the duration of their presence in Kenya, four NGOs started operating in Kenya in response to the drought of 1999-2001 while respectively, two had had a presence of eight and five years prior to the drought. With respect to their mission statements, the following common themes were explicitly stated or implied: *poverty reduction*; *capacity building*; and *sustainable development*. Their activities covered the whole range of activities which characterise humanitarian organisations namely relief; development and advocacy.



### 6.7.2 Decision making on field activities

For all six NGOs; some decisions on what field activities, when and where they will be implemented were made centrally at the headquarters while others were made at the field level. On the criterion on the level at which decisions were made; the response from all of them was that decisions on activities funded by institutional donors were all taken at the central headquarters for the simple reason that this was the level at which partnership agreements were negotiated and signed. In turn, the reason why partnerships were negotiated and signed centrally was because donors were increasingly providing funding under *restricted projects* arrangements which involve the donor sending out a call for bids for specified activities in a specified country or countries and NGOs compete for the funds. The implications of such arrangements is that NGOs submitting a bid against such a call are therefore effectively committing themselves to restrict the activities and location to what the donor has already decided as specified in the call for proposals. Under the circumstances, field offices have no say in the matter except to implement the activities in accordance with the project specifications. In addition to restrictions on what activities and where they will be implemented, it was not uncommon for institutional donors to specify the timeline of project cycles (when it starts and finishes); staffing and/or procurement modalities.

Funds can also be availed through an appeal in which case, NGOs indicate what they want to do, where and when and it is up to the donor to decide whether to fund the activities or not. Appeals offer NGOs more flexibility but then, this mode of funding is increasingly becoming less attractive to donors. Finally, field offices occasionally made the decision on activities but normally, only in situations in which the activities are funded through the NGO's own resources mobilised from private donors; foundations, individuals and/or the organisation's own public fundraising events.

### 6.7.3 Organisation of work at the field level

This section sought to establish how the NGOs organised the implementation of their activities and in response to staffing issues; the responses are illustrated in Table 6.21 below:

**Table 6.21: Staffing**

NGO	1	2	3	4	5	6
Directly implement activities with salaried staff					√	√
Community contributes in kind (labour)	√	√	√	√		
Sometimes the community does all the work and NGO only supervises		√		√		

Source: Field research 2011

The two NGOs that indicated that they used salaried staff in all their activities were those specialising in livestock; the explanation given was that this was highly technical work which required people with specialised training. The four which indicated that communities made contributions in kind explained that involvement and contributions by the communities was enshrined in their “Rules of Engagement” with communities in the field. The two which indicated that sometimes the community does all the work and they only supervise were involved in low technology and low cost community social mobilisation interventions.

On staff costs in relation the average annual budget over the past ten years; the responses were as follows:

**Table 6.22: Personnel costs as a proportion of the budget**

NGO	<10%	11-20%	21-30%	31-40%	41-50%
1			√		
2		√			
3			√		
4		√			
5				√	
6				√	

*Source: Field research 2011*

NGOs 2 and 4 had the lowest personnel costs; they attributed this to their approach in which to the best extent possible, maximum use was made of locally available resources; people, materials, knowledge and indigenous technology. NGO 5 and 6 had the highest personnel costs, a factor attributed to the fact that their work was highly specialised and required skill sets which were not readily available in poor communities. NGOs 1 and 3 attributed their level of their personnel costs to the fact that they used local people hired under temporary contract arrangements in which one had to have a stipulated minimum level of education and/or professional qualifications.

The study also sought to establish who decided the permissible percentage of personnel costs relative to the budget in any given programme/project. The response was the same across all six NGOs; in restricted projects, donors stated the threshold for personnel costs as a percentage of the budget (usually not more than 30%); in unrestricted projects, this was negotiated with the donor. On whether a threshold of a maximum of 30% was a reasonable level, NGOs 5 and 6 indicated that it was not reasonable explaining that sometimes, specialised expertise had to be sourced from outside the country of operation; from the region or even abroad; this made personnel costs a significant cost centre in the budget. NGOs 2 and 4 stated that they had no problems with the thresholds with one respondent adding

that such thresholds are necessary in some cases; he declined to elaborate all the same, the researcher guessed that this was to do with criticism by the likes of Abdul-Raheem (2000) as alluded to earlier, of NGOs as self serving. NGOs 1 and 3 had no position save to make comments which the researcher interpreted to mean that it was the donor' s prerogative to dictate what will be done with the funds.

On post drought interventions implemented in 2001-2006, accounts of interventions and their duration given by the six NGOs in their respective allocated Divisions matched the accounts given at the community level as illustrated earlier in Table 6.14.

**Table 6.23: Adequacy of duration of interventions**

<b>NGO</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
Water infrastructural improvements	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	n/a	n/a
Environmental conservation education	No	Yes	No	Yes	n/a	n/a
Food preservation education	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	n/a	n/a
Health and nutrition education	No	Yes	No	Yes	n/a	n/a
Livestock interventions	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	No	No

*Source: Field research 2011*

As is evident from the above table; the time allocated to improvements in water infrastructure was considered adequate by all four NGOs involved in this sector. With respect to environmental conservation, two NGOs indicated that the duration was not adequate; the explanation given on why they had not continued with activities for a longer period, they both cited the fact that the duration had been stipulated in the agreement with donors adding that the level of funds availed was such that the activities could only cover the stipulated period. The same explanation was given for food preservation activities by one NGO; in Kalama however, the view of the NGO that the duration was adequate differed from that of the communities. In the main, this was due to the fact that the NGO saw the duration of the activities only in terms of completion of the planned number of training workshops whereas the communities saw it in terms of a period long enough for them to grasp the new methods that the NGO was promoting. On health and nutrition education, two NGOs stated that the duration was not adequate; the same sentiments were expressed by the two NGOs involved in livestock interventions; they both stated that the duration of the interventions was inadequate. For all of them, it was the same situation; the duration of the activities was a function of the period for which funding was availed and not necessarily the needs on the ground.

For the two NGOs that indicated that the duration of all the intervention was adequate, the explanation given was that first of all they were working in partnership with their local affiliates and the volunteers

of the local affiliates were members of the same communities being assisted; as such, continuation of the interventions was guaranteed. Secondly, realising that donor funding was not guaranteed forever, they had designed the projects such that to the best extent possible, maximum use was made of resources available within the communities themselves; people, local knowledge, materials, indigenous technology and sometimes money. With respect to money and as communities began to recover from the drought, each household was asked to make a modest monetary contribution of between KES100.00– 150.00 (or then an equivalent \$1.30-2.00) a month depending on their means. The money was pooled and used to pay modest stipends for water point attendants and/or transport allowances for CORPS; CHWs; CECMs and CESs to attend quarterly District coordination meetings in Machakos Town; this kept the cadres abreast of the latest developments in their respective areas of involvement as well as enhance their knowledge and skills.

Finally, those NGOs that were forced to prematurely close the projects were asked what the government’s reaction was to this development; the response was the same; government expressed regret that they had to leave before the communities were at a stage that they could look after themselves all the same, their assistance during and after the drought was appreciated.

#### 6.7.4 NGO relationships with host government

On at what point in time the NGO started working in the District relative to the 1999-2001 drought, the responses were as follows:

**Table 6.24: NGO presence**

NGO	Presence prior to 1999	Presence established during drought
1		√
2	√	
3		√
4	√	
5		√
6		√

*Source: Field research 2011*

NGOs 2 and 4 had had a presence in the District before the drought while the rest had established a presence in response to the drought. On whose decisions it was where they would work in the District; the office of the District Commissioner stated that for the four relatively new NGOs; it was their decision. Understandably, the system in place was that the registration of NGOs was decentralised to the District level with central government only keeping records of who is involved where; such information was captured from District reports through the office of the Provincial Commissioner. On

whether or not the NGOs were comfortable with their allocated Divisions, the two livestock NGOs stated that at the outset they were however when they learnt through the monthly DSG meetings at a later stage that overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster, District authorities had simply used an allocation system based on the principle, “equitable geographical distribution” to allocate Divisions to NGOs; they were not very happy. The system involved simply making sure that all Divisions had a comparable number of agencies providing assistance and did not necessarily take into account the nature or the degree of the needs. They cited three Divisions in which the livestock situation was more desperate than in their allocated Divisions however, the three Divisions already had an “adequate” number of NGOs hence they ended up in Kalama and Yathui where the livestock situation was not as desperate as in the other three. Asked what they did about it; the response was that they accepted the situation for first of all; by the time they made the discovery, they had already established themselves in the allocated Divisions, it was too late to negotiate. Secondly, for fear of upsetting the very authority that had granted them the space to do something about the situation of the victims of the drought and on the advice of their headquarters abroad; they decided to accept the situation.

The other two relatively new NGOs addressing human needs stated that with the situation so bad across the whole District, it mattered little to them, where they made their own contribution while the two NGOs that had been working in the District prior to the drought stated that being membership organisations, they had always had a presence across the entire District through their local affiliates. To this effect, when they announced that they would be implementing drought relief interventions, District authorities had given them the option of deciding in which of the Divisions they would make their contribution. As such, these two NGOs “allocated” themselves the Divisions in which they implemented their relief operations and by extension, post drought interventions. The decision on their selected Divisions they explained; was based on information gathered through DSG meetings on the severity of the drought. A secondary consideration was the strength of their local Branches on the ground for enshrined in their respective organisational philosophy was a belief that it is better to intervene in settings where interventions can have the greatest impact rather than spread oneself thin on the ground.

On whether or not the process of getting the NGO registered was made easy by the host government; those NGOs that established a presence in the District in response to the drought stated that the registration process was easy; a factor they attributed to the fact that the situation was so desperate that

public authorities welcomed any assistance offered by NGOs. Public authorities had gone further to facilitate the entry of the NGOs by writing supporting letters to expedite processes relating to the issuing of work permits for expatriate staff by the Department of Immigration as well as to get imported equipment and materials for use in the relief operations cleared by Kenya Revenue Authority (Customs Department) amongst other facilitating interventions. At the time that the two NGOs that had a presence prior to the drought started working with their national affiliates in Machakos District, they did not have to go through the formal registration process. The explanation given for this was that as the affiliating bodies of their national affiliates which were already registered; all they were required to do was to submit the credentials of the affiliating organisation and append their signatures to an addendum in the terms of engagement originally signed between District authorities and their national affiliates.

On the coordination of activities with public authorities, the DSG served as the forum for the purpose; the District Commissioner regularly convened and chaired monthly meetings of the group; the membership consisted of all government ministries represented at the District Office and relief and development partners operating in the District. At these meetings, government ministry representatives would give status reports on their respective sectors while NGOs would brief government on what they were doing within communities. The forum was considered very useful by all respondents in so far as it provided them with an insight into the situation in the whole District and presented an opportunity to share experiences; identify common challenges and share ideas on how to address the challenges. In addition, the forum also presented NGOs with an opportunity to get an insight into who was doing what and where in the District. The information was useful in so far as to the best extent possible, it facilitated the economic and effective use of available resources by amongst other things, the sharing of resources and in particular, those pertaining to logistics; communication facilities (radio base stations) and transport etc. for those working in adjacent Divisions. However, this was not always possible because first of all, some donors even specify how the logistics will be handled and as mentioned earlier, it is not uncommon for them to insist that procurement will be done from their home companies or the companies' subsidiaries in the country of operation. Secondly and in such situations, making a financial contribution to services provided by a supplier in arrangements in which another NGO is the primary client but which the supplier is not one that is specified in the terms of engagement might well be considered a breach of the terms of engagement and get the NGO into trouble with the donor.

It is apparent that in DSG meetings, information and reports were voluntarily shared between the government and NGOs with instant feedback given to the latter. In addition, all six NGOs indicated that there was no requirement by the government for them to declare their sources of funding; the level thereof and/or how they used the funds. All the same, in their reports to the DSG; the NGOs voluntarily included summaries of income and expenditures. Sharing of financial information also served the purpose of making the government aware of the stage of the projects; as such and at any given point in time, the authorities had an indication on when activities would end.

On visits to the project sites by the government, all six NGOs stated that the question of a “visit” did not arise as they worked with the government (as represented by the Assistant Chiefs) on a daily basis. All the same, whenever the Chief, District Development Officer or the District Commissioner was in the area; often, they would stop by a project site but more as a public relations exercise and for encouragement and moral support rather than to inspect the projects.

On whether they had ever differed with the host government in opinions on the use of funds, the response from all respondents was that, that question did not arise for on community entry or the start of a new project, NGOs always shared the plans and budgets for the interventions and it was on the basis of such information that permission to engage communities and/or start a new project was granted. The two NGOs that had had a long presence in the District further stated that whenever they had unrestricted funds; the needs were already known as such, it was matter of informing public authorities that they are now in a position to address the needs.

Finally, in general; NGOs enjoyed a mutually supportive and collaborative relationship with public authorities from the Sub-Location through to the District level; this made their work easy and fostered cooperation from the communities.

#### **6.7.5 NGO relationships with communities**

The accounts given by the four NGOs involved in people welfare on decision making with respect to the activities in the aftermath of the 1999-2001 drought matched the responses given at the household level as illustrated in Table 6.12; they all stated that they had made the decisions on what activities would be implemented and when explaining that this was because the funds mobilised were earmarked

for the specific activities with the timelines of the project cycles clearly stated. With respect to how and who would be involved in the implementation of activities in Kalama and Yathui, the reasons given for making the decisions was that this was enshrined in the partnership agreement with the donor. In Kalama, the development NGO explained that the implementation methods involved some “technical” dimensions necessitating a minimum level of basic education. To this effect and in health and nutrition education for example; the NGO stated that completion of secondary school was the minimum requirement with biology taken as subject of study considered “an added advantage”. On decisions on where the activities would be implemented; in Kalama and Yathui where decisions were made by the development NGOs, a number of reasons ranging from access to the communities and proximity to a health centre etc; the researcher concluded that the basis of the decisions was more for the NGOs’ convenience rather than needs considerations. This section did not involve the two NGOs involved in livestock for they had stated earlier that they were working though the entire Divisions allocated to them. Finally, when asked what the reaction of the communities was on the decisions taken by the NGOs on their behalf, the response was that the communities accepted the decisions.

The accounts given by the NGOs on the contribution of communities mainly in the labour matched that given by the communities themselves as illustrated in Table 6.13 with communities in Masinga and Yatta going further to willingly make a modest contribution in money for the purpose of facilitating the work of their CORPS. On achievements, they all cited the availability of safe drinking water and the reduction in the distance women had to walk to fetch water thus creating time for them to carry out other household chores. In Masinga and Yatta where clubs were established, women in particular had benefitted from increased knowledge and skills in the management of health, nutrition and hygiene in the home while in Kalama and Yathui, immunisation rates children and vaccination of domestic animals were cited as major achievements.

On the facilitating factors, they all cited the instant relief that the relief interventions brought to the communities as such and at the outset; there was a lot of excitement and enthusiasm about the projects; in Kalama and Yathui however, the NGOs had noticed a decline in the enthusiasm half way through the post drought interventions. Such a development they had attributed to the fact that communities were behaving this way because they were over the worst. In Masinga and Yatta as elaborated earlier, the enthusiasm was taken to even greater heights as the communities’ sense of security was taken to a higher level in terms of having their own CORPS empowered with a higher level of knowledge and



skills. With respect to the constraints, the four NGOs who had worked in Kalama and Yathui cited the limited duration of the interventions which prevented them engaging communities long enough to make a difference.

In Masinga and Yatta, communication with communities continued along the same lines as it had always done whereby the NGOs took advantage of monthly Sub-Location barazas to engage communities in formative evaluation of the activities and address any issues of concern to the respective parties. Borrowing a leaf from the NGOs working in Masinga and Yatta through information sharing at DSG meetings, the two NGOs which had been implementing livestock interventions in Kalama and Yathui also started attending monthly barazas in their respective Divisions. Their explanation for following suit was that implementing highly technical projects as they did, they realised that they would never have the opportunity to get to know the communities if they did not take advantage of these community gatherings to interact with the communities. In addition, this presented the opportunity to jointly evaluate progress; listen to, raise and discuss issues of mutual concern and jointly work out solutions. The two NGOs working through project teams in Kalama and Yathui stated that in their view, it was not necessary to meet with whole communities since the community leadership and project teams participated in the monthly project review meetings which they convened; as such, they were of the view that communities were adequately represented by these two categories.

On the impact of the drought in 2006, the four NGOs involved in people welfare stated that the 2006 drought had been worse in so far as there was an increase in the number of people requiring food aid relative to 1999-2001. However, the two NGOs that had been operating in Masinga and Yatta qualified their statements by pointing out that relative to the rate of crop failure; the percentage increase in the number of people requiring food aid at zero and 2 percent respectively pointed to an increase in community resilience against drought. Such an increase in resilience they attributed to the fact that the communities had assumed responsibility for continuing with mitigation activities after formal interventions ended albeit; on a small scale. The four NGOs that had been operating in Kalama and Yathui attributed the situation in these two Divisions to the fact that as a result of limitations in donor support, they were not there long enough to support communities to build up their resilience against a future drought.

### 6.7.6 NGO relationships with donors

The NGOs were asked to provide information on their regular donors over the past ten years or more and indicate what categories of activities they funded. The results are illustrated in Table 6.25.

**Table 6.25: Categories of donors and activities funded**

NGO	Donor	Activities Funded
1	Own Government European Commission	Relief/Development Relief/Development
2	Own Government European Commission	Relief/Development Relief/Development
3	Private sector Foundations	Relief/Development Relief/Development
4	Governments European Commission	Relief/Development Relief/Development
5	Own Government Private sector	Relief/Development Development
6	Own Government Private sector	Relief/Development Development

*Source: Field research 2011*

As is evident from the above table, with the exception of one for which one of the regular donors was the private sector, in the main, the major donors for the other NGOs were governments; their own or through the European Commission.

With respect to relief interventions, donor governments were said to be more flexible in so far as in its appeal, an NGO would state what it intended to do however, a common trend was one of donors selecting what they would fund from the presented “menu” of interventions. They also stated that it was often difficult to secure funding for post disaster recovery through to development interventions and if funding for this category of activities was availed, it was often for a maximum of two years. In the event that funding was availed for more than two years; it was rarely for the same projects but instead, a completely new cycle of funding for different activities.

On the attributes of funding for development in terms of restrictions or flexibility in the use thereof; all six NGOs stated that in the past ten years, it had become increasingly difficult to secure funding through an appeal for development interventions designed, developed and for implementation in countries identified by NGOs. Instead, the trend was one of calls for proposals for funding for restricted projects in the donor’s priority countries and it was up to the NGO to decide whether the country and/or activities fitted with their own priority countries and/or activities. Furthermore, it was not uncommon for a donor to provide funding for a relief operation in a country which is not amongst its list of priority countries. In the event that an NGO accepted funds for a relief operation in such a

country; what this meant was that the NGO would have to close its operations at the end of the relief phase.

The same situation prevailed with the European Commission whereby in honouring the contributing member states' instructions with respect to the disbursement of development assistance through non-state actors; the Commission would state what the funds were for and where they could be spent. For the NGO which had a substantial portion of its income coming from the private sector; it stated that the system of priority countries was also practiced; the criterion was often countries in which the company had operations or countries in which it had an interest in establishing a presence.

On the position of the organisation with respect to the earmarking of funding, they all stated that in principle they were opposed to the practice adding that if funding was available for countries which in their view, needs were not the greatest, they would decline the invitation to submit a proposal. At the same time however, they all stated in the past ten years, they had accepted earmarked funding for activities that were not exactly the burning priority in a particular country at that particular point in time. They defended decisions to go against their own position in terms of "getting a foot in" and then using the country presence as a launching pad for advocating for more pressing needs; they cited situations in which the strategy had worked. On whether there had been an occasion in which turning down the offer of earmarked funding had compromised the chances of securing funding in the future; the NGO for which the private sector was a major donor stated that this had happened on a number of occasions adding that such a position by the NGO had resulted in it being "...blacklisted..." At a later stage however, relations with the corporate resumed; this was interesting because the resumption of relations according to the respondent was prompted by an imminent image crisis for the company!

On the level at which decisions are made on the various dimensions of project management, the results are illustrated in Table 6.26.

**Table 6.26: Decision making in project management issues**

NGO		1	2	3	4	5	6
Dimension	Locus of decisions						
Project design	Donor decides						
	NGO decides	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Joint decision						
Implementation method	Donor decides	√			√	√	√
	NGO decides			√			
	Joint decision		√		√		
Frequency of reporting	Quarterly			√			
	Half yearly	√	√		√	√	√
	Yearly						
Format of reporting	Donor's format	√				√	√
	NGO's format			√			
	Agreed with donor		√		√		
<b>Other dimensions</b>							

Source: Field research 2011

As is evident from the above table, all the NGOs stated that they made the decisions on project design; in restricted projects however, they stated that the design was often influenced by cues from the donor adding that if a proposal against a call is going to appeal to the donor, one of necessity must design it along what the donor has in mind. On how the projects would be implemented; three NGOs that stated that it was the donor however, this was never explicitly stated; instead, it was implied in the budget lines of the various cost centres. One NGO gave an example in which under the cost centre “procurement”, a budget line made reference to a “...provision for the pre-shipment inspection of the goods by the xxx...” (the donor government’s own export pre-shipment inspection agency); “in brackets understood”, the goods were to be sourced from the donor government’s country. Another NGO gave a similar example in respect of personnel in which a provision for “...housing for three expatriate Project Manager, Accountant and Coordinator...” appeared in the budget and by implication, the NGO had to fill in these three position with expatriate staff regardless of whether or not, such skills were readily available locally. For two NGOs; how the activities would be implemented was a decision jointly taken with the donor; it was only the NGO which is funded by the private sector that stated that it made the decisions itself.

On the frequency of reporting, it appears that government and related institutional donors were satisfied with two reports a year however, the NGO whose main sources of funding was the private sector indicated that it had to submit reports on a quarterly basis; this the respondent explained, was because the donor wanted the reports to be aligned to its business reporting calendar. On the reporting format, the same NGO stated that it used its own format; three stated that they used the donor’s format

while two stated that they had negotiated for a reporting format agreeable to both themselves and the donor. The differences were interesting for first of all, an examination of the NGOs revealed that the two NGOs which successfully negotiated for a format agreeable to both had been in existence for much longer; they were larger in terms of geographical coverage around the globe and their activities covered a wide range of sectors. In contrast, those which went along with reporting formats of the donor had not been in existence as long as the two cited above; they were smaller in terms of geographical coverage and the scope of their work was narrower.

On whether or not they were comfortable with the arrangements on decision-making; they all stated that in general, they had no problems with the arrangements. However, with respect to how the activities would be implemented and in particular staffing and procurement arrangements, the four NGOs that stated that the donors make the decisions lamented that such arrangements often compromised their efficiency in so far as in some instances, they could have easily recruited people with the same if not a higher level of skills and experience and sourced project materials locally or regionally at a much lower cost and by implication, more resources into the target communities. With respect to reporting requirements, the four NGOs which strictly adhered to donor requirements had no opinion and the researcher concluded that for fear of severing their own “umbilical cord” they went along with such decisions anyway, but under duress.

On communication with donors in terms of a forum in which to discuss progress and/or differences of opinion on the management of projects; four NGOs stated that such a forum existed, however, it was their headquarters staff which attended the meetings and they would be briefed on the outcomes of the discussions. However, in the views of the respondents, since little had changed in the general terms of engagement, it was assumed that donors ignored many of the concerns which from time to time are raised during such forums by the NGOs’ headquarters. The situation of the other two NGOs was different for they had put into place a system in which depending on the issues, field personnel were from time to time invited to form part of the NGO delegation at such forums. In addition, involvement of field staff was not restricted to operations in which there were cooperation problems; often field staff from operations in which the partnership was working well, were invited to showcase success stories and explore ways of strengthening the partnership for even better results in terms of the impact of interventions. Furthermore, and in order to get donors to get an insight into project management issues directly from field practitioners themselves, during internal annual programme review meetings

convened by their respective headquarters; donors were invited to have the opportunity to interact with field staff on the day designated for “Views from the Field”. They attributed the relatively incident-free nature of their relationship with donors to such a system of communication with their donors.

On donors visiting projects, they all stated that this happened occasionally at the invitation of either party; it was common practice for example, to invite the Ambassador or his representative to commission a newly constructed water point, opening a health centre etc. funded by his government; during the ceremony the donor government representative would be briefed on and be taken on a tour of the project and any others in the area. The same situation prevailed with multilateral institutions like the European Commission in which the resident representative was often invited to commission a project; in addition, if an executive from the donor institution was visiting the country, the resident representative would request a site visit; these arrangements suited all six NGOs. For the private sector; given that the funds were usually disbursed through local subsidiaries; it was easy and the NGO often got local representatives to visit project sites from time to time.

On whether there were clearly identifiable behavioural patterns that distinguished government, multilateral and corporate donors the NGOs had engaged with over the years; the response was a strong “yes” from all six NGOs. With respect to the approach to funding agreements; scheduling of activities and the modalities of implementation and reporting schedules, the five NGOs whose main donors were governments or their multilateral institutions rated the latter as less rigid compared to government. The one NGO funded mainly by the private sector enjoyed the greatest latitude and was of the view that their funders were interested only in results and not “control” adding that, that was the very reason why in fundraising, it targeted the private sector and foundations for it did not want to be treated like a “...government department...and all those controls...”!

## **6.8 Interviews with host Government**

Interviews with the host government were held at the District level for first of all, because government ministries relevant to the subject of study were represented at this level; secondly, it turned out while there was a central policy on the registration and management of NGOs, the implementation of the policy was decentralised to the District level. The respondent was the Senior District Development Officer or the *de facto* Deputy District Commissioner with ministry representatives in attendance to elaborate on issues pertaining to their sector.

### **6.8.1 Background to NGO presence in Machakos District**

The respondent first gave an overview of central government policy on the registration and management of NGOs; the policy had provisions pertaining to the conditions for registration; the conditions that must be met for an NGO to be admitted into a District and the framework for engagement with communities at the District level. The process for the registration of foreign NGOs at the central level involved clearance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; verification of the NGOs credentials by the “parent” Ministry for example, health NGOs by the Ministry of Health; agro-forestry NGOs by the Ministry of Agriculture etc. then finally, to the Ministry of Local Government, Planning and Development from where they would be referred to the District of their choice or a District is recommended to them. Having completed these stages, the NGO would head for the District where the District authorities would register the NGO and issue the licence to operate.

On whether the District authorities had ever turned down an application for registration by an NGO which had successfully undergone the clearance at the central level, the response was “yes”. This he explained; was in the case of a faith-based NGO whose profile on the surface was one of the ideal typical humanitarian organisation committed to improving the conditions of the poor. However, during the interview with the District Management Committee, by its own admission, the NGO had clearly stated that a secondary motive was recruiting members into its religious doctrine. Such a revelation sealed the fate of the NGO for memories of an experience in neighbouring Kitui District two years earlier were still fresh. The faith-based NGO had been registered by the Kitui District authorities on the understanding that its agenda was solely development assistance to the communities however; it had been discovered barely six months into its operations that it was using conversion into its religious doctrine as a pre-condition for receiving development assistance.

The account given by the District authorities on how the six NGOs had established a presence in the District; their motivations for establishing a presence; the Divisions in which they worked during and after the drought of 1999-2001 and the interventions they were involved in matched the information provided by both communities and NGOs. On whether or not they had lived up to their stated motivation for wanting to work with communities in Machakos District; he stated that they had done a sterling job during the relief phase. However, he pointed out that in post-drought phase, interventions in Kalama and Yathui had not had the expected outcomes adding that this can be traced to the fact that they did not engage communities long enough to have any impact.

## 6.8.2 Working relationships between public authorities and NGOs

On who decided in what Divisions of the District individual NGOs will be involved, the response was that such decisions were made by the District Management Committee; he explained that the rationale for this arrangement was that as custodian of the welfare of the people, government knew best what the needs were and where unfilled gaps existed. Furthermore and in response to whether or not NGOs readily accept the decisions; he emphasised that the matter was not for debate adding that NGOs were at liberty to accept or reject the Division allocated to them. In the event that they did not accept the allocated Division, they were equally at liberty to consider a District elsewhere to offer and provide their assistance. With respect to preferred operations/programmes, the respondent stated that development interventions which empowered and imparted skills to communities were preferred for the simple reason that “...prevention was better than cure...” He lamented the level of resources spent on the drought relief operation in the District during the period 1999-2001 adding that a small percentage of that amount invested in development would have yielded higher returns in terms of longer term food self sufficiency.

With respect to the appropriateness of activities implemented in the post drought phase relative to needs within communities at the time; the response was that they were all appropriate only some of them only “...scratched the surface...” as such, they did not result in empowering communities to a level where they could take full charge of their future. In this respect, he cited the example of the livestock interventions in which all the project staff were brought in from outside and lamented the fact that first of all the activities did not continue for long enough secondly, even if they had, given that the communities were not involved at all in the implementation; there was no-one in the communities to carry on with the work after the NGOs left. He qualified the view “not long enough” by stating that it was not so much about timelines in terms months or years instead; it was about implementing the activities long enough to empower communities to a level where they could continue to implement the activities with minimum external interventions. Finally, on what the government’s reaction was when the NGOs announced that they would be winding up their operations, the response was that there was nothing the government could do especially in a situation in which the duration of the activities was a function of the provisions in the partnership agreements the NGOs had signed with the donors.

Accounts given by NGOs on coordination mechanism in the form of monthly DSG meetings at which issues were discussed; reports shared, feedback given and decisions taken matched those given by the



host government respondent. He further pointed out that in the event that an NGO could not attend a coordination meeting due to the exigencies of service; they had the benefit of minutes of the meetings which were circulated to all partners. This according to the respondent; was important to ensure that all partners had the same information at any given point in time.

The reason given for government not requiring NGOs to declare their sources of funding; how much they had available and/or how they used the funds was that NGOs voluntarily shared such information in their reports to the DSG as such there was no need to demand any more information in this respect. Closely related to this dimension; there was no system in place for scheduled and formal visits to project sites by the government as the government as represented by the Assistant Chiefs was on site all the time. However, whenever on a field trip to a Division, the District Commissioner always tried to make the time to stop by the site to encourage and motivate NGOs and not so much to inspect the projects.

On whether District authorities ever received complaints from communities about NGO conduct, the response was that at some point during the post drought interventions, District authorities had received such complaints. The complaints were in respect of the fact that the NGO had been “head hunting” and recruiting members of project committees without consulting them on who they preferred to be included in such committees. The same situation prevailed with respect to staff; the NGO was recruiting project staff from outside the communities and even the Division; the communities were not happy about such arrangements and would have preferred the project staff from within the communities. The authorities took up the matter with the NGO but then the NGO argued that enshrined in the project document was the minimum qualifications for the various positions and if such incumbents could not be identified within the communities and/or Division, it looked elsewhere. The NGO further argued that the District authorities had a copy of the project document in which the modalities of implementation were elaborated! The respondent lamented the oversight on this important dimension of the modalities of implementation adding that they had to explain to the communities that that is how the NGO’s donor wanted to see the project implemented. Finally, notwithstanding what the respondent referred to as “...little hiccups every now and then...” in general, the working relationship between the District authorities and NGOs was good and mutually supportive. To this effect, NGOs religiously honoured their commitments and conformed to the operational rules of engagement while public authorities did their best to facilitate their work as they were valued as

partners in the development of the District. The authorities had never had a case in which they had to ask an NGO to leave the District for misconduct.

### **6.8.3 “Return on Investment”**

On “return on investment”, the researcher sought to establish public authorities’ views on the benefits deriving from NGO interventions during the period 2001-2006. Improvements in the water sector featured high; altogether sixteen boreholes were sunk and twenty four wells were dug in the four Divisions. In addition, the respondent stated that there was also increasing awareness on how communities could contribute to environmental conservation and at the initiative of the communities themselves; in Masinga and Yatta Divisions, it became an offence punishable with a “heavy fine” to cut down a tree without authorisation from the Assistant Chief. Food preservation interventions implemented had resulted in improvements in household food security in some communities especially in Masinga and Yatta Divisions.

Improvements in food security were evident in so far as relative to 1999-201; in Masinga, the percentage increase in the number of people requiring food aid remained constant at 51%; in Yatta, the increase was 2% and he attributed this to the fact that when Katangi Division was carved out of Yatta Division in 2000; people were given the option of voluntary relocation. It turned out those who chose to relocate were relatively young families while for a variety of reasons ranging from lack of the energy to make the move; heritage of the land spanning many generations and/or sentimental/cultural considerations (late spouse and/or children’s graves on the property), the majority of those who chose to stay on were elderly people. Thus, the population in what was left of Yatta Division after the creation of Katangi Division was generally of less means relative to the economically productive age groups which opted for the voluntary relocation; by implication; they were amongst the most vulnerable to environmental and related socio-economic shocks. In Kalama and Yathui, he attributed the increase in the number of people requiring food aid to the fact that post drought interventions had not been successful due to restrictions on the duration of the interventions. All the same, with respect to animal health, there had been notable improvements in so far as the two Divisions attained a 75% vaccination rate for domestic animals. However, since the NGOs left after only one year, the services had discontinued and unless a household could afford the vaccines in which case government agricultural extension officer would administer the vaccines for them, the animals did not get vaccinated.

On whether the benefits had rendered communities better able to cope with the drought of 2006, the respondent stated that they had; especially in Masinga and Yatta where increasing awareness by communities about the importance on environmental conservation was evident in the fact that at the communities own initiative; it became a punishable offence to cut down a tree without authorisation from the Assistant Chief. He was of the view that the reason why the benefits were not so evident in Kalama and Yathui was a result of the fact that the manner in which the NGOs implemented their interventions was simply not sustainable. He explained the non-sustainability of the interventions in Kalama and Yathui in terms of the approaches used by the NGOs which in his view, did not build on existing knowledge or the use of locally available resources adding that communities can never sustain activities in which the implementation methods are alien. Besides; he continued, there is the question of affordability; “...how can you possibly expect the communities to continue with the activities that they cannot afford after you are gone...” he asked in a frustrated tone.

On District authorities’ expectations of the outcomes of the assistance delivered by NGOs, he quipped, “...half a dose of medicine is more dangerous than no dose at all...” adding that if interventions are not sustainable, communities may be much better without the assistance in the first place. Finally, the respondent was asked what action the District authorities take when it is apparent that the approach that an NGO is using in the implementation of activities is not sustainable. The response was that back then in 2001, District authorities were still in a state of shock from the impact of the drought and accepted any form of assistance that was on offer. Following the lessons learnt from the experience of the 2006 drought, District authorities had since developed a District Development “Charter” spelling out how community development will be conducted. The charter was shared with partners old and new alike and for new ones, subscribing to the charter is a pre-condition for licensing. In the event that an NGO is uncomfortable with the provisions of the charter, they were asked to go and renegotiate the terms of engagement with their donors. On one or two occasions, an NGO had invited District authorities to be part of the delegation to the negotiation table with the local representative of the donor and after authorities explained the rationale behind the charter, the donor made some concessions and relaxed some of the provisions in the partnership agreement with the NGO. In the event that either the NGO or its donor(s) are not prepared to work within the provisions of the charter, their offer of assistance is declined.

## 6.9 Interviews with donor representatives

Based on the information given by the NGOs, three categories of donors were identified; government; institutional and the private sector. For the private sector, it was not possible to identify a representative of the NGO's donors in Kenya however one multinational corporation with a well established presence in Kenya and which is a well known NGO "donor" at the international as well and the local level accepted to give an interview. The findings of necessity would be treated with caution since the particular corporate donor did not fund any activities during the period under review all the same, it was felt that an interview with the corporate would give the researcher some insight into how this sector works with NGOs especially given that it had years of experience in funding NGOs at both the international and local level.

### 6.9.1 Internal administration profile of the donor

For four of the NGOs, their governments had been their regular donors in the past ten years; these governments had foreign missions in Kenya and they agreed to give interviews; they were subsequently assigned a number corresponding to the numbers assigned to their home NGOs for ease of reference as follows; G1; G2; G5 and G6. In all cases, the respondent was a representative of the government's development cooperation agency or a member of the mission so designated; as such, they were well versed in the position of their government on development partnerships with NGOs. The institutional donor had a well established office in Kenya with a desk specifically designated for partnerships with NGOs. The same situation prevailed with the private sector concern whereby within the CSR Department, there was a well established NGO Liaison desk.

First and foremost, the researcher sought to establish whether the donors had preferences in the categories of programmes/operations they funded; the results are illustrated in Table 6.27

**Table 6.27: Donor preference in funding programmes/operations**

Category	G1	G2	G5	G6	I	C
Development						√
Relief						
Both	√		√	√	√	
Advocacy	√	√	√	√	√	
Other						

Source: Field research 2011

Government and the institutional donors indicated that their funding preference was for both relief and development programmes; this they explained in terms of the fact nation states had a global social responsibility to respond to disasters at the same time, development interventions were one way of reducing the vulnerability of people to the impact of disasters. They also all stated that they supported advocacy activities because in some recipient countries, poverty was the result of poor policies and/or neglect of sections of society. For the corporate donor, the preference was exclusively development programmes; the respondent explained that company CSR policy was such that emergency and disaster situations are best left to those with the comparative advantage of knowledge, skills and experience. As for advocacy, the response was that this was outside their mandate.

On how funding was availed to NGOs, the responses are elaborated in Table 6.28

**Table 6.28: Modalities of availing development funding**

	G1	G4	G5	G6	I	C
Unsolicited offers	√	√	√	√	√	√
Respond to appeals	√	√	√	√	√	√
Calls for proposals	√	√	√	√	√	

*Source: Field research 2011*

Both government and the institutional donors’ explanation for unsolicited offers was that governments always factored into their annual budgets, a provision for engaging non state actors in development work. They also stated that such unsolicited funds were disbursed in arrangements in which they would send out a call for proposals against which NGOs would submit bids; such arrangements were ideal for it ensured that only those NGOs for which the specified activities were their mandate and/or were interested in, would submit proposals. Another very interesting reason given by a government respondent was that in the event of a likelihood of closing the year with a large positive balance of funds earmarked for engagement with non-state actors, a call for project proposals would be sent out to the NGO community so that the funds can be exhausted. They however admitted that such arrangements created problems for NGOs for the project cycle was often extremely short since the activities had to be implemented, completed and reported on before the end of the running financial year. In addition to the problem of short project cycles, the funds would be strictly earmarked to fit the purpose for which they were allocated in the first place. For the corporate; the respondent stated that unsolicited offers were sometimes made in response to results of market research pointing to a need to increase disposable income in the market. He cited the example of a project in which in partnership with an NGO, the corporate built a shed for the informal sector so that artisans could continue work even when it was raining.

With respect to response to appeals, government and the institutional donors indicated that their NGO partners are not always successful and the main reason given was that they can only respond positively if the proposals are for interventions for which there is an allocation of funding in the budget in any given financial year. The corporate indicated that given that such appeals are normally launched in response to emerging societal concerns and which concerns might be having an impact on the robustness of the market; NGOs are usually successful in securing funding through appeals. Furthermore, this was the preferred arrangement for the corporate for often, this led to market intelligence which the company was unaware of hitherto; besides, since by the time NGOs appealed for support, the needs are already identified and the project is already designed, the company was spared of the tedious ground and paper work.

## 6.9.2 Partnership considerations

On the criteria the agency/company used in selecting NGOs for awarding grants or contracts, the results were as elaborated in Table 6.29.

**Table 6.29: Criteria for selecting NGO partners**

Criteria	G1	G4	G5	G6	I	C
Home registered NGOs	√	√	√	√		
NGOs registered in a member state of a regional economic block					√	
International NGO alliances	√	√	√	√	√	√
Any “tried and tested” local NGO						√
<b>Other criteria</b>						

Source: Field research 2011

As is evident from above, government donors primarily engaged their own home NGOs as well as international NGO alliances of which their home NGOs were members; the same was the case with the institutional donor; the preference was international NGOs and/or alliances even though an emerging trend was increasing engagement of local NGOs particularly in advocacy interventions. In certain situations however, a donor government funded the activities of a local NGO but only through a home NGO or international alliance; thus for example, DFID could fund the Kenya Red Cross activities but only through the British Red Cross; Action Aid Kenya activities through Action Aid International etc. The practice with the corporate donor was engaging with local NGOs directly understandably, funds were usually availed through local subsidiaries. At the same time however, at the global level, the corporate engaged with international NGO alliances as was the case with Nestlé and IFRC; in such

arrangements, it is up to the alliance to decide which of the members would be allocated the funds for use in their respective countries.

For government and the institutional donor, the criteria and decisions on the selection of NGO partners were made centrally at headquarters abroad. For the corporate donor, decisions on the criteria for selection were made centrally at the headquarters in the case of global cooperation agreements, while in the case of cooperation agreements with national NGOs, decisions were decentralised to the country.

On the factors which determined the level of funding for a given programme/project; the response was the same with all categories of donors namely, record of performance and accountability. In addition, they all stated that on initial engagement, they started “small” increasing the amount as the NGO proved beyond any reasonable doubt that it was a partner that could be trusted to deliver and to account for the funds. On earmarking of funds, the donor government representatives stated that increasingly, funding for NGO interventions was earmarked for the simple reason that decisions on what the funds could be used for was part of the overall national development cooperation and aid budget architecture. As such, they were only conduits for transferring funds whose purpose was voted for at the parliamentary level. For the institutional donor, the nature of funding, earmarked or otherwise, was determined by the instructions from the back donor providing the funds, a government or a regional bank.

It was put to the respondents that they were the donor-NGO partnership interface; as such, they were privy to the real issues and needs on the ground as articulated by NGOs; with such information at hand, was there any scope for them to influence aid allocation decisions. The response was that they tried to influence decisions however, the government’s and/or regional block members states’ priorities were the ultimate determinant of budgetary allocation decisions. For the corporate donor, allocation decisions were a function of the profit margin in any given year and as for earmarking, this was not the practice for the simple reason that NGOs acted as their market and community welfare intelligence agents; as such, they were better informed on the needs within communities and the issue of earmarking funds simply did not arise.

On the question on whether or not there was a stipulated threshold above which an NGO partner cannot incur expenditures on core costs (personnel administration etc.) the government and institutional donors stated that they had. They went on to explain that the position of their government

and/or regional block member states was that the bulk of the funds available to NGOs must be used on the beneficiaries and not to create jobs or to increase NGO staff salaries and benefits. On how NGOs react to such arrangements, the response was that they did not like it; one government donor respondent and the respondent for the institutional donor were sympathetic to NGOs and admitted that this was not fair especially given "...what we demand of them in terms of reporting..." The corporate donor respondent stated that as long as an NGO partner could justify the percentage of the budget going towards core costs and it was "...delivering..." the company was flexible on such matters.

### **6.9.3 Working relationships with NGOs**

All the categories of donors stated that there was an annual forum in which they met with the NGO partners to discuss issues of mutual interest however, government donor respondents stated that in the main, such interaction was with the NGO headquarters staff. They lamented that save for a few NGO partners, field operatives never attended these meetings adding that their accounts from the lived experience would go a long way towards strengthening their case for flexibility in decisions on allocation of funds. The institutional donor respondent stated that hitherto, the agency was also meeting with NGO headquarters staff however, borrowing a leaf from a partner that from time to time brought along its field staff to the meetings, they had started encouraging other NGOs to do likewise. The corporate donor also had a forum in which the company met with partners at least once a year and given that partnerships were at the local level, there was always a good representation of field staff at these meetings; the company found the forums very useful in terms of getting a good insight into some of the challenges the partners faced in the course of implementing the activities.

The government and institutional donor respondents all stated that in addition to the forums, they required and received periodic reports bi-annually however, they all stated that they did not systematically give feedback; instead, they only asked for clarifications and/or raise issues whenever there was a need. Feedback of a general nature was however given during the annual forums convened to review progress; during these meetings, issues and any concerns raised by the NGO partners were addressed to the best extent possible and within the parameters of the government or agency policy on cooperation with non-state actors. The corporate representative stated that they required NGO partners to submit progress reports at intervals aligned to the company's own business reporting calendar and the rationale behind such arrangements was to avoid duplication of effort.



On visits to programme and project sites interestingly, one government systematically organised such visits on an annual basis. The visits were organised for groups of public opinion leaders (business, the media amongst others) to selected countries with which the government has bilateral cooperation agreements. While they were in the country, their Embassy they would take them on a tour of both bilaterally funded projects as well as those for which funding was channelled through NGOs - accountability to the primary constituency (the tax payer) indeed! The other government donors did not have such a system in place; instead, they would visit programmes and projects if they happened to be in the country for some other business and the reason given for this was that responsibility for such visits was delegated to their foreign missions. For the institutional donor, the agency had regional and/or country offices in many parts of the world and it is through these offices that funds were disbursed as such, responsibility such monitoring visits was left to the said offices. For the corporate donor, such visits were regular and on request by either party; the company usually took advantage of the annual shareholder meetings to showcase what the company was doing in the sphere of CSR by taking delegates on a tour of company supported projects.

On the donors' experience with NGO partnerships in terms of conformity with the terms of engagement, they all stated that in general, NGOs conformed; the institutional donor respondent went further to state that the level of conformity was impressive relative to what he referred to as "...our often unreasonable demands..."

#### **6.9.4 "Return on Investment"**

On what percentage on average; of the donor's development assistance had been channelled through NGOs in the past ten years, the corporate donor's response was that all its development assistance was channelled through NGOs as part of its CSR policy. However, once in a while, the company made a direct contribution to the government's national development efforts and usually infrastructural (roads; construction of rural health and business centres etc.). On conditions of anonymity, he stated that whatever the company did in this respect, it had to be such that there are direct or indirect benefits to the company; access to markets, a healthy market etc. Government and the institutional donor respondents could not give an estimate of the percentage of development assistance channelled through NGOs all the same, they stated that the allocation for non-state actors was on average 2.5% of the total development cooperation budget including advocacy activities; in addition, a provision of an average of 5.0% was always made for relief. In the event that any one of the cost centres did not exhaust the

provision made, the funds would be re-allocated to ensure that they are exhausted by the end of any given financial year. On the differences in the level of budgetary provision, the explanation was that while short term in nature, relief operations were more expensive especially given that disasters often occur in poor countries and characterised as they are by poor infrastructure, logistics was always a high cost centre. For the corporate donor, the same system prevailed whereby a provision was made for CSR with the level determined by the profit margin of the previous year.

On the government/agency/company's expectations of the outcomes of the assistance channelled through NGOs, the response for all categories of donors was the same; with respect to relief operations, saving lives and in development, changing the conditions of the poor. With respect to relief operations, goals had been met to a greater rather than lesser extent; with respect to development, all respondents across the board stated that poverty reduction was the expectation. On whether the expectation in development had been met, the responses were not straight forward instead; they were elaborations on views on why development had not taken place in the targeted communities. The arguments ranged from the view that poverty was an outcome of complex interrelated issues which could not be tackled with a single intervention to the fact that development was a process as such; it was not possible to judge the outcomes after a limited period of intervention.

None of the government or institutional donors had ever prematurely terminated a partnership agreement with an NGO; however in some partnerships, they had had to avail extra support for an NGO partner including placing their own reporting specialists as well as accountants. It turned out these arrangements had been put into place in partnerships in which the funding was an unsolicited offer and/or in response to a realisation that the NGO partner was stretched to the limit with respect to manpower considerations. For the corporate donor, such a situation had never arisen and the respondent put it down to flexibility in which even mid-cycle in a programme or project, the company was open to negotiation on the modalities of implementation of the projects.

Finally, they all stated that NGOs were indispensable development partners and their governments/agency company was always striving to improve working relationships with NGOs to ensure that through the partnerships, the shared goal of reducing poverty amongst the poor and disadvantaged would be realised.

## 6.10 Examination of records for cross-validation of information gathered during the interviews

In addition to the interviews with the various categories of subjects; desk research of records of vital indicators of the impact of a drought were examined. Amongst these were records on health trends in the office of the District Medical Officer and in particular records pertaining to trends in the prevalence of nutritional disorders in pregnant and lactating mothers; new born babies and “under-fives”. The rationale for the choice of these categories was that these are categories which the law in Kenya requires that their health is regularly monitored at designated intervals or shorter if in the doctor’s or the midwife’s opinion warrants it. To this effect, pregnant and nursing women are expected to attend ante-natal and post-natal reviews and there is a system for monitoring child growth from birth until the child is five years old. Against this background, it was felt that statistics on these categories were more reliable since with other conditions and categories of the population; that some people do not necessarily go to the local health centre to seek medical attention when sick could not be ruled out. The findings are summarised in Table 6.30.

**Table 6.30: Health indicators of the impact of drought**

Division	Prevalence rates of nutritional disorders								
	Anaemia (pregnant/lactating mothers)			“light for dates” (new born babies)			“light for age” (“under-fives”)		
	1999	2004	2006	1999	2004	2006	1999	2004	2006
Kalama	22%	15%	24%	35%	29%	41%	41%	36%	46%
Masinga	30%	25%	35%	45%	39%	51%	50%	45%	57%
Yathui	19%	12%	18%	29%	26%	32%	34%	31%	41%
Yatta	28%	21%	27%	37%	32%	46%	44%	38%	51%

*Source: Office of the District Medical Officer: Machakos District. 2011*

A second trend examined was that of school attendance and drop-out rates. The findings in respect of school attendance and attrition rates are summarised in Table 6.31.

**Table 6.31: School attendance and attrition rate indicators of the impact of drought**

Division	Absenteeism			Attrition rates		
	1999	2004	2006	1999	2004	2006
Kalama	27%	14%	31%	15%	9%	21%
Masinga	40%	25%	43%	44%	19%	45%
Yathui	24%	9%	29%	29%	7%	33%
Yatta	33%	19%	37%	37%	16%	37%

*Source: Office of the District Education Officer: Machakos District. 2011*

Finally, trends in the market prices of domestic animals were examined; the rationale for examining records pertaining to these trend is that in an interview with the Machakos District Agricultural Officer, he stated that in the face of a drought; the tendency by households was to try and recover their

investment by selling off the animals before they succumb to the impact of the drought and/or to raise money with which to buy food. As each household took this course of action, excess supply was generated relative to demand with the result that prices fell. In any case, while people in the meat industry and/or ranchers in parts of the country which were not as badly affected by the drought had the potential to increase demand; often, the animals were in such a poor condition that they negotiated the prices downwards to a level where households did not realise much in terms of a return on investment. The findings in respect of market prices of domestic animals are summarised in Table 6.32.

**Table 6.32: Trends in the (average) domestic animal sale prices (in Kenya Shillings – KSH)**

Division	Cattle			Goats			Chicken		
	1999	2004	2006	1999	2004	2006	1999	2004	2006
Kalama	1150.00	1,250.00	1,000.00	600.00	675.00	575.00	300.00	350.00	250.00
Masinga	950.00	1,100.00	750.00	450.00	550.00	475.00	175.00	250.00	125.00
Yathui	1200.00	1,400.00	1,100.00	650.00	750.00	650.00	375.00	400.00	325.00
Yatta	950.00	1,150.00	950.00	500.00	600.00	500.00	250.00	275.00	175.00

*Source: Office of the District Agricultural Officer: Machakos District. 2011*

The trends in the indicators of the impact of a drought examined namely; health; school attendance and attrition rates and the “performance of the local market” support the accounts of both public authorities and communities in Machakos District that the impact of the 2006 drought was worse than that of 1999-2001.

## 6.11 Conclusions

It is apparent from the findings that in many dimensions of the study which required cross validation of the accounts and views given by the various categories of respondents, there were no major discrepancies. This facilitated arriving at conclusions without leaving some questions unanswered. In every respect, the findings were revealing with respect to the diversity of interests, expectations, interests and motives that influence the behaviour of the various stakeholders in the partnership for development of which NGOs are at the centre, “caught at crossroads” NGOs are indeed. The next chapter summarises the conclusions and makes recommendations with respect to how NGOs can meet the expectations of all stakeholders without compromising their own vision and principles.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

It will be recalled that in development interventions, NGOs are but only one stakeholder in a partnership in which the other stakeholders are the communities they serve; the host governments that allow them the space to work with communities and donors who facilitate their work through availing resources for the purpose. In the partnership, NGOs are the centre of delivering the services aimed at moving communities along the development continuum. This chapter summarises the findings from the research, draws conclusions and makes recommendations on what NGOs should do or not do; in order to meet the divergent and often conflicting interest and motives of the other stakeholders without losing their vision and/or compromising their principles.

#### **7.2 Summary of the research findings**

##### **7.2.1 Findings in respect of communities**

In order to fill in information gaps from interviews conducted at the household level and to get an overall impression of the views of the communities on the post drought interventions implemented by NGOs between 2001 and 2006, focus group discussions were also conducted. The main findings are presented in three broad categories namely; views on food aid, interventions implemented by NGOs during the period under review and views on what NGOs can do better or differently in engagement with the communities for better results in the future.

##### ***Views on food aid***

An impression given is that the subject communities had a strong sense of self pride and determination; this can be traced to the fact that self reliance is a core value in Kamba culture; as such, children are socialised to cherish and internalise the value from a very early age. To this effect, the communities studied acknowledged that during severe droughts as was witnessed in 1999-2001 and 2006; they would need assistance to ensure that they had enough food for their daily nutritional requirements. However, such assistance should be but only a short term stop gap measure to see them through until the next agricultural season; perennial reliance on food aid is considered humiliating. The importance attached to self reliance in food security is evident in the fact that historically; using albeit, not so scientific methods, when a drought was predicted, they did not invest heavily in planting crops. Instead; they would concentrate on crafts which they were good at making and they would trade these

with the Kikuyu's in the greener Central Province in exchange for money which they then used to buy food or exchange the products for actual food.

This importance attached self reliance in food security is also evident in the fact that the communities did not view the adequacy of the duration of the post drought interventions implemented by NGOs in terms of temporary considerations; months or years. Instead, they defined the adequacy of interventions simply in terms of a period long enough to regain their resilience and build their capacity to a level where they can be self reliant in food security even in the face of another drought in the future. Thus; even a three or six months duration would have been considered adequate if at the end thereof, the interventions rendered them better able to provide for themselves no matter how severe a drought in the future.

Finally, communities' longer term perspective on self reliance in food security was evident in expressions of disappointment with the lack of infrastructure and in particular, road networks and schools which communities cited as a threat to their food security. They explained that even in a good agricultural season, they had difficulties getting their produce to the market for lack of road networks. As such, they did not always get good returns on their investment; thus, in the event of a drought; they did not have a reserve of cash with which to buy food. With respect to schools, these were few and far between meaning that children had to walk long distances to school; during droughts, school drop-out rates increased. This in the main was because first of all, with no reserves of cash with which to buy food, the question of raising school fees did not even arise; secondly, on half empty stomachs, children were often not able to make the long walk to school. With little or no education, their children joined the ranks of the unemployed in later life and the only option for a livelihood was tilling the land however, with the same conditions prevailing namely; lack of infrastructure and distant schools, they would face the same fate as their parents; locked in poverty in the villages. The link between education and poverty as will be recalled from Chapter 1, is supported by a study conducted by FAO (2005b: 14) in which it was established that lack of education undermines productivity, employability and earning capacity resulting in the perpetuation of hunger and poverty. Furthermore, the study established that a farmer with four years of primary education is on average, almost 9 percent more productive than a farmer with no education.

### *Views on the interventions implemented by NGOs*

With respect to the organisation of activities; the funds that all six NGOs had available for the interventions were earmarked; as such, there was no room to involve communities in decision making on the nature or prioritisation of the activities. The same situation prevailed with respect to when the activities would be implemented understandably; a common feature of restricted projects is that the project cycle timelines are also stipulated in terms of when they start and by when they must be completed. On where the activities would be implemented, for four NGOs, this was a decision of the District authorities in so far as they allocated the NGOs the Divisions in which they would work; for the other two NGOs however, this was the decision of the NGOs themselves. Such latitude was facilitated by their long presence in the District and the fact that they had been working in all Divisions long before 1999. At the community level, in two Divisions in both human welfare and livestock interventions, decisions on where the activities would be implemented were made by the NGOs; the communities had no say in this respect. In the other two Divisions; where activities would be implemented was to the best extent possible, a joint decision between the NGOs and communities. The only exception to such an arrangement was in respect of sites at which boreholes would be sunk and wells would be dug for even the NGOs themselves had no say in such decisions. This in the main is because the identification of sites where the water table is such that the yield will be high is a highly technical exercise which only geologists can do. With respect to how the interventions would be implemented and by who, the same pattern emerged whereby in two Divisions, the NGOs made all the decisions to the exclusion of communities. In two other Divisions, it was a joint NGO-community decision how interventions would be implemented with the communities deciding who would be involved within their ranks.

On organisational arrangements, sentiments of disappointment were strong in Kalama and Yathui where NGOs made all the decisions; such disappointment was a result of a perceived mismatch between some activities that the NGOs insisted on and the communities' felt needs at that point in time. In this respect, they cited livestock interventions in which the main activities were the vaccination of animals; training on fortifying stock feed and the construction of cattle dips at a time when the herds were so badly depleted and there were hardly any animals left; the pressing felt need at the time was restocking of the herds. Disappointment was also expressed at the disjointedness of some activities; in this respect, they cited the example of health education teams which completed training in home hygiene at a time when water was still scarce because the boreholes had yet to be sunk and wells

dug. The lessons on the importance of hand washing before handling food and/or after visiting the toilet were thus to no avail. They would have preferred the health teams to come at a time that water was readily available.

In Masinga and Yatta Divisions, the situation was different in so far as to the best extent possible, the NGOs involved communities in the organisation of the activities and decision making at the various stages from the outset through to the end of the formal interventions and/or leaving some decisions to be made solely by the communities themselves; this partially explains the enthusiasm with which the interventions were embraced by the communities.

With respect to implementation modalities; in Kalama and Yathui, communities were of the view that even if the duration of the interventions had continued for a longer period; the outcomes would still have been poor. This they explained; was because the NGOs had head-hunted and selected members of project committees by virtue of their “qualifications” without any consideration of whether or not the selected people commanded respect within the communities. The practice in the community in such projects was that decisions on who would serve on the project committee were taken by the community as a whole; at a properly constituted baraza with the criteria for selection being the degree of respect an individual commanded within the community and their record of successfully leading community projects in the past. The NGOs had done the same with project staff; in a number of Locations in which they claimed they could not find enough people with the required “papers”, they brought in people from other Locations and/or even Divisions. The practice in the community in such projects was that project staff would be recruited from the CORPS with the criterion being the individual’s record of dedication and performance in previous projects. The communities acknowledged that in the livestock interventions, there was a need to bring in people from outside since the specialised skills required were not available within the communities.

However, they questioned the wisdom of bringing in people from outside the Locations/Divisions for activities like health education when members of the CORPS had been carrying the activities for years. They felt alienated by this approach which they argued, totally ignored established patterns of community organisation besides; the NGOs were promoting methods for enhancing community garden yields, food preservation and animal care which they could never afford for they involved the use of chemicals. They strongly argued that animal manure, salt/heat and simply dipping the animals



respectively were methods that they had used throughout generations and they had worked for them. Besides, the livestock NGOs were promoting the feeding of animals in enclosures using stock feeds; this in their view could never work because their animals were used to freely grazing besides, they could not afford stock feeds. They felt let down first of all by being alienated and secondly, by being led in a direction that in their view, would exacerbate poverty within communities.

The situation was different in Masinga and Yatta where the approach used by the NGOs in the implementation of activities was perceived as empowering communities by amongst other things, involving communities in decision making and even leaving some decisions to be made by the communities themselves. In addition, the approach increased their resource base in so far as it enhanced the knowledge and skills base of CORPS through appropriate training and deployment; in so doing and given that the CORPS were their own people; continuation of community initiatives was guaranteed even after the NGOs left. This had generated enthusiasm; a sense of ownership of the interventions and had fuelled the sense of self determination to the extent that households made modest financial contributions to maintain the momentum of the move towards self reliance.

#### ***Views on what could have been done differently or better***

In this respect, four closely linked categories of issues were identified namely, community involvement (participation); change or lack of it in the situation of communities (impact); increase in community resources and capacity (empowerment) and self reliance in the future (sustainability). Views on these issues are elaborated below.

With respect to community involvement, communities in Kalama and Yathui expressed strong disapproval of the approaches used in the implementation of activities because involving an imposed leadership and/or operatives considered strangers as they did; they changed little if anything in their situation. This they explained; was because people lost interest and were not enthusiastic about getting involved in what they perceived as activities by and for the NGOs and their chosen people. They would like to see the involvement of the community in decision making at every stage of such interventions including decisions on the choice of project leaders and operatives; people that have been tried and tested and people who will continue to be amongst them in the future and not those who come and go. Furthermore, while acknowledging that they were poor; in the view however, that did not mean that there was absolutely nothing in terms of resources within communities, on the contrary; they were endowed with people determined to turn their situation around and local knowledge which had seen

communities cope with drought without external assistance in the past. In their interventions therefore, NGOs should build on these cultural and traditional methods that had worked for communities for generations and were affordable rather than discourage their use and replace them with alien methods that communities cannot afford to sustain when the NGOs leaves.

In Masinga and Yatta where the NGOs used an approach in which they worked for, with and through communities; the interventions were embraced with enthusiasm; the enthusiasm was taken to a greater height especially as the approach was perceived as increasing the communities' resource base. This was particularly so in respect of knowledge and skills for through appropriate training and deployment and the broadening of the nature and scope of services provided by the CORPS besides, the CORPS were their own people; people who would remain in the communities and continue implementing the interventions even after the NGOs left. To this effect, communities were satisfied with the approaches used by the NGOS and having benefitted from such an approach, they had since been insisting on the use of such an approach with NGOs which from time have expressed an interest in working with them in other dimensions of community welfare enhancing interventions.

### **7.2.2 Conclusions on the findings in respect of communities**

In concluding this section, it is apparent that NGO interventions in Kalama and Yathui were headed for failure from the very outset; this can be traced first of all, to imbalance in power relationships between benefactors and beneficiaries. This is supported by Narayan et al (2000: 2) who argue that power imbalances in relationships between benefactors and beneficiaries is a significant contributory factor to the failure of development interventions to empower the poor. In these two Divisions, such power imbalances are evident in the fact that all decisions; from what activities, when; where, how through to who would participate were made by the NGOs. Such an approach to engaging communities, Chambers (1983: 104) argues; can be traced to "outsiders" views of the poor; such views are distorted because for lack of contact or communication, it permits them to form such views without the inconvenience of knowledge and/or personal exposure.

Indeed those NGOs which established a presence in response to the drought were outsiders to some extent not least; because the first time they came into contact with the communities was when the drought struck. In any case, except for one which belatedly tried to do so; they did not make any effort to attend the monthly barazas, a forum which would have presented them with the opportunity to get to know the communities in which they were working. Instead, they assumed that the small group

(project committees and operatives) with which they interacted represented the whole community; the assumption was wrong especially given that these categories had been head hunted with the selection criteria being the level of education. As such, these individuals considered themselves or were considered a sort of “elite”; this is supported by de Berry (1999: 12) who in a study carried out in rural Uganda revealed that those who were “consulted” tended to be those who had had some education and had a good command of English with the rest left feeling disenfranchised from influence. Under such arrangements, Burkey (1996: xvi) notes that while aimed at improving the socio-economic and health conditions of the communities; projects were initiated, designed and implemented from “top-down” by the “elite” without systematic consultations and involvement of the beneficiaries.

Such an approach first of all; alienates people and this evident in Kalalma and Yathui where enthusiasm for the interventions was simply not there for communities perceived the activities as for and by the NGOs and their chosen people. With such attitudes prevailing, communities did not participate in the activities; understandably, and as Swanepoel (1997: 5) argues, it is through participation that a solid local knowledge base is built; in turn, such knowledge is a pre-requisite for successful development initiatives. In addition, people who do not participate in their own development have no affinity for development efforts or their outcomes; lack of affinity for the development outcomes is evident in the perception of the activities as, for and by the NGOs. Secondly, the approach resulted in failure by the NGOs to recognise the potential inherent in communities as represented by the determination of the communities to turn around their situation irreversibly and local knowledge which had seen communities cope with drought without external assistance in the past. In turn, failure to recognise the potential inherent in communities resulted in the use of approaches which were alien and/or the introduction of methods beyond the means of the communities; under the circumstances, there was nothing to show for the NGOs “having been there”. This is supported by Burkey (1996: xvi) who argues that failure of development interventions can be traced to a misconception by development agencies that the introduction of modern technology and science would automatically lead to a decent standard of living for all.

The relative success of interventions in Masinga and Yatta can be traced to meaningful participation of the communities to the extent of handing over responsibility for activities which communities were perceived as having the potential to implement with little if any support from the NGOs. Such an approach and the sense of being valued it generated in the process, was to be the magic wand that

unleashed the communities enthusiasm and zeal to the extent of making modest financial contributions to maintain the momentum of move towards realising the cherished goal of self sufficiency in food security and self reliance in other dimensions of daily living.

### **7.3. Findings in respect of the host government**

District authorities made all the decisions on registration, licensing and the allocation of Divisions to NGOs wishing to work in the District. In many ways, such a decentralised system especially with respect to the licensing and allocation of Divisions was the best and the premise for this position is that District authorities know better than any other level of government where the needs are. However, as is evident in 1999, the nature and degree of need as criteria for allocating Divisions to NGOs was not strictly applied; instead, the guiding principle was simply; “equitable geographical distribution”.

The contribution of NGOs in enhancing the welfare of communities was greatly appreciated; this evident in the fact that public authorities went out of their way to ensure that the establishment of a community presence by an NGO and/or getting started in a programme or project was smooth. Support by public authorities extended to facilitating the timely issuing of work permits for NGO expatriate staff by the Department of Immigration as well as expediting the clearance of imported programme/project inputs by the Kenya Revenue Authority. In addition, it is evident that public authorities were committed to engaging with NGOs in an open and transparent manner in an environment characterised by mutual trust. In this respect, public authorities used the monthly DSG meetings as a forum and mechanism for open and effective communication; such an approach to engaging with NGOs was mutually beneficial to both stakeholders. In addition, it engendered trust hence public authorities felt that there was no need to require NGOs to provide information on their sources of funding and related details in depth.

#### **7.3.1 Conclusions on the findings in respect of host governments**

Host governments appreciate the services NGOs deliver in communities as illustrated by the extent to which they will go to ensure an environment supportive of the latter’s work. Such appreciation is illustrated by Mutasah (2007) who as alluded to earlier, cites the glowing tribute paid to NGOs by late President Mwanawasa of Zambia for the role they had played by in the implementation of the country's fifth national development plan. Matenga (2001) traces such appreciation to the fact that as African governments increasingly found it difficult to provide an optimal level of basic services for their people and the pressure on their meagre resources mounted due to amongst other things, the burden of

foreign debt, they exploited the good will and humanitarian spirit that is the defining philosophy of NGOs. To this effect, NGOs have become indispensable in the provision of basic services and in emergency and/or disaster relief. Such a view of NGOs as indispensable in relief and development is evident in Machakos District for notwithstanding the fact that NGO interventions did not always result in sustainable development in communities, all the same, and no matter how little the contribution to this end; it was appreciated by public authorities.

#### **7.4 Findings in respect of NGOs**

First of all, the findings suggest that NGOs continue to be heavily dependent primarily on government donor funding; either directly from their home government or through multilateral donor institutions. This is supported by Eade (1999: 12) who notes that this was inevitable for NGOs are primarily involved in transferring resources from societies which have plenty to those who have little as such, their success more often than not, depends on their ability to mobilise resources primarily from their home constituencies and in particular, their governments. At the same time however, such dependence creates liabilities for NGOs as was evident in Kalama and Masinga where; were it not for the power imbalance in favour of NGOs relative to the communities served; they would have been sent packing even before the interventions started. Understandably, the approach was perceived as inappropriate from the very outset.

The inappropriateness of approaches can be traced to dependency on donors for funding and just like the power relationship between NGOs and the communities they is skewed in favour of the former by virtue of resource endowment; the relationship between NGOs and donors is skewed in favour of the latter. This is evident in the fact that by their own admission; NGOs had agreed to terms of engagement in which the decisions on what activities were to be implemented, when, how and by who were specified by their respective donors; a category of stakeholder located thousands of kilometers away and as such, has little idea on the situation on the ground in terms of pressing needs. They had agreed to such arrangements because of a self perception that they did not have the power to influence decisions as well as a belief that if they did not agree to the terms of engagement, they would not secure the funding. Such a self perception of the “poor cousin” with little or no power to influence funding decisions by donors is supported by Rauh (2010: 34) who notes that the power relationships between NGOs and donors is skewed in favour of the latter; this allows donors to set the agenda and conditions that must be met in order to receive a grant. The end result is that programmes designed by

donors are often not suitable to the cultures in which they will be implemented. Understandably, donor priorities are heavily influenced by political and security considerations as well as their own norms and values. Jennings (1995: 18) concurs; adding that most development aid programmes claim to be based on partnership but the reality is usually very different not least, because donors have the financial power which they use to insist that the partner fulfil certain conditions.

Faced with such a situation and by their own admission; the NGOs in Kalama and Yathui went along with the decisions made by their donors on the programme design; the prevailing attitude was that if the donor was providing the funds then it was its prerogative to decide how the funds will be used. In adopting such a defeatist attitude however, the NGOs generated liabilities for themselves in so far as they entered into agreements whose provisions were clearly counter-productive to sustainable development; in so doing, the NGOs compromised the impact of their interventions even before they started. Under the circumstances, the NGOs were clearly victims of the contradictions that often characterises the behaviour of donors in their relationships with NGOs. Victims they were indeed for on the one hand; the NGOs were “strangers” in the communities in which they worked and as alluded to earlier, community participation in the interventions would have enabled the former to build up local knowledge. However, under the agreements signed with the donors, there was no space for community participation for this is how projects had been designed; project committee members and staff would be selected based on specified minimum educational qualifications. In a situation in which communities had their own systems and procedures for organising such activities, it was as it were, communities were forced into a marriage arranged by the NGO which the latter hoped, would work out in time. The “marriage” failed to work however, realising that they did not have the power to unilaterally declare a “divorce”; all the same; communities estranged themselves from the union by amongst other things, lack of enthusiasm and affinity for the outcomes. The end result was little or no return on investment for the NGOs.

It was also apparent that limited local knowledge by the NGOs in Kalama and Yathui resulted in a self perception of “donor-in-loco” and a corresponding self image of the “big brother”. The symptoms of the “big brother” syndrome are manifest in a “tunnel vision” of the communities as “poor and helpless victims of circumstances” to the exclusion of exploring potential for self sustenance that might exist within communities. This is supported by Shivji (2006: 11) who argues that in Africa in particular, the people who were supposed to be the (authors and) drivers of their own development were reduced to

“the chronically poor” and marginalised as they were, they were excluded from being part of the development equation. Instead, they merely became the recipients of humanitarian aid provided by “true friends” and dispensed by non-partisan and non-political Non-Governmental Organisations. Under the misconception that communities are poor in everything, the dominant approach to engaging communities in development interventions is “working for communities” as opposed to “working with and through communities” as happened in Kalama and Yathui. The message from the vocal opinion leader in Kalama was clear in this respect; as communities, they were only poor in their pockets but not in their heads as such, they had the potential to contribute to their own development.

In contrast to the situation in Kalama and Yathui, it is apparent that in relative terms, NGO interventions in Masinga and Yatta were successful and this can be traced first of all, to the fact that a comparative advantage that the latter had was that they were membership organisations with national affiliates in Kenya. Secondly, they worked in partnership with the local branches of their respective national affiliates as such, they had the advantage of local knowledge in respect of patterns of daily living, locally available resources; what works and what doesn't and most importantly the intricacies of Kamba traditions including the importance of community power structures. Thirdly, through the experience effect, they were aware of the internal administration arrangements in their respective donor institutions. Amongst such arrangements were that after a provision for engagement with non-state actors had been made in the national budget in any given fiscal year, it was operatives in Development Cooperation Departments that made second level decisions on which non-state actor to engage; who would get how much, for what and how they would translate the funds into tangible results on the ground. Furthermore, they had become aware that these operatives often made such critical decisions based on very little information on the realities on the ground.

Aware of these arrangements, the NGOs had come up with a system in which field personnel from operations facing challenges would be included in the NGO's delegation to annual donor-NGO progress review meetings; a system designed to give the donors first hand information on the issues and the realities on the ground. In time, the system was advanced and they started regularly inviting the operatives to their own internal annual progress review meetings attended by Regional and/or Country Representatives and their Programme Coordinators. This was designed to create an opportunity for them to get an insight into the challenges in the field from no less than field personnel themselves and thus fill in the information gaps critical to informed decision making on the part of the

donor operatives as well as show case success stories. The arrangements were appreciated by the donor operatives and in a number of cases; the information gathered from such meetings had subsequently influenced donor decisions in favour of the NGOs.

#### **7.4.1 Conclusions on the findings in respect of NGOs**

The conclusions on the findings in respect of NGOs are linked to the objectives of the study as follows:

Objective 1: To identify and analyse factors that facilitated gains made with respect to increased community resilience against drought between 2001 and 2004.

First and foremost, following the drought of 1999-2001; in 2002, weather conditions in Machakos District assumed a near normal pattern increasing to a normal pattern in 2003; as such, the level of agricultural productivity assumed corresponding patterns. In addition, notwithstanding the less than optimal outcomes of some post drought intervention in some Divisions including Kalama and Yathui; the whole District had benefitted from the water interventions. Secondly, in Masinga and Yatta amongst other Divisions where interventions had been relatively successful, communities were the wiser with respect to household food security and in particular, food preservation of the surplus which due to poor infrastructure, they could not take to the market. Thirdly, having been working with communities even before the drought of 1999-2001; the NGOs in Masinga and Yatta, exploited the principle of familiarity with communities and were able to design the projects and use approaches that they knew would be acceptable to the communities.

With respect to public authorities, the NGOs in Masinga and Yatta exploited the confidence and trust built over years of a presence in the District to their advantage. To this effect, they had been allowed to choose where in the District they would work during the relief phase of 1999-2001 and by extension, during the post drought phase. Such a privileged position was to prove a comparative advantage for being aware of funding trends in post-disaster development interventions and by extension; the post drought interventions; they selected Divisions in which they could make a real difference. Against this background, they selected Divisions where they had a solid base in the form of strong local Branches of their national affiliates and strong volunteer networks. Fourth, enjoying a status synonymous with “honorary” members of the communities in which they worked; being treated as “...part of us...” and equipped with intimate knowledge of the communities, the NGOs exploited locally available



resources; people, materials, knowledge and indigenous technology with the result that the prospects for continuity and sustainability were good from the very outset.

Finally, having been in existence for much longer than the rest and exploiting the experience effect, they had come up with innovative ways of overcoming the constraints and challenges presented by the new aid architecture involving as it does; unilateral decision making in project design by donors; ever increasing demands on reports and reporting and inflexibility in the nature and scope on interventions.

In the light of the above, it is concluded that a combination of near normal weather conditions; local knowledge and corresponding appropriate approaches to development used by some NGOs and in particular, community involvement and participation; use of locally available resource and building on what exists rather than replacing it through the employment of methods alien to the communities; were significant factors that facilitated the gains made between 2001 and 2004. Unfortunately, the NGOs in Kalama and Yathui did not have the comparative advantage of local knowledge and all the advantages it carries hence they did not do so well in terms of the outcomes of their interventions during the period under review.

Objective 2: To examine and establish why the success of NGO post drought interventions posted in 2001-2004 were reversed in 2006.

In this respect, first of all, development interventions aimed at building communities' resilience against threats and hazards in their environment do not generate as much interest as emergency and/or disaster interventions. Thus, while the emergency phase in 1999-2001 was adequately funded; in the aftermath of the drought, funding for post drought interventions was very low; this was particularly so since Machakos District was declared food secure in 2004; the result was that the case for funding for consolidating post drought related development interventions was even weaker after 2004. Against this background, it is concluded that NGOs did not have funds to consolidate the work they had started in 2001; as such, funding constraints were a major contributory factor to the reversal of the successes posted between 2001 and 2004.

That where donors will spend their funds is increasingly influenced factors other than the situation and needs on the ground has been alluded earlier however; such decisions are also informed by trends and this is particularly so in the funding of development interventions. According to Jennings (1995:13), being frustrated with state inefficiency in programme management coupled with frequent misallocation

of resources and an urban bias, official donors increasingly turned to NGOs as an alternative vehicle for channelling development assistance to the Third World. In making funding decisions on interventions implemented by NGOs; donors are informed by trends; these trends they are able to map from a number of sources including programme progress reports that NGOs generate and submit to donors. At the same time; donors are increasingly insisting that the programme progress reports are written on templates that they themselves develop. The implication of such an arrangement is that in reporting, NGOs are limited to the nature and amount of information that the donors want and not necessarily the information that might make for informed decision making. Under the circumstances and in a situation in which NGOs perceive themselves as having no power even to negotiate on reporting requirements that make for effective communication, funds may be allocated for non-priority interventions or may be allocated for short term interventions when in fact the needs are long term; worse still, funds may not be allocated at all This is what appears to have happened in Machakos District in 2001; worse still, funds may not be allocated at all as was the case three years later following the drought of 2004.

In Kalama and Yathui, notwithstanding the inadequate duration of the activities between 2001 and 2004 and the lack of funding to consolidate them between 2004 and 2006; the interventions might still have had impact in some community elsewhere in the District only the NGO self perception of lack of bargaining power was also at play in the relationship with the host government. It will be recalled that in allocating Divisions to NGOs, the host government simply used the principle “equitable geographical distribution”. According to Shoham (2001: 8), it was widely acknowledged in Kenya at the time; that politicians at various levels perceived the provision of emergency food aid and ensuing post relief assistance as a resource through which to gain political mileage; to this effect, they often insisted on humanitarian assistance being distributed fairly across all constituencies. It is possible that in adopting the principle “equitable geographical distribution”, District authorities were taking the cues from the politicians and used the system in order to be seen to be non-partisan. At the outset, the NGOs were not aware that this is how allocations were made; at a later stage however, they became aware of this but made no effort to re-negotiate the terms of engagement. Amongst the reasons they gave for going along with the allocation decisions decision was that they did not want to upset the authority to who they owed the space to do “something” about the situation of communities.

It appears that the self perception of powerlessness by NGOs in their relationships with donors and host governments alike as elaborated above; is replicated at the NGO-community interface where a “tunnel vision” of the communities as second level “poor cousins” as implied by Chambers (1983: 104) results in engaging communities using the “working for” as opposed to “working with” approach. In the process and as did happen in Kalama and Yathui; due to limited local knowledge and in particular, community patterns of daily living, locally available resources; what works and what doesn’t and most importantly, community social organisation and power structures; as the “big brother” the NGOs made all the decisions for the communities; what will be done, where, when, how and even by who. Under the circumstances; even if the NGOs had had the resources to implement interventions after 2004; there was nothing to consolidate understandably; community capacity was still at the level at which it was at the beginning of the interventions in 2001 as such, the NGOs would have had to start all over again.

Finally, for the NGOs in Kalama and Yathui, their performance was further compromised by the fact that they were not really international organizations but instead, organizations working internationally. The latter operate using a unitary model in which the NGO is a singular legal entity as opposed to the former which are membership organisations with affiliates across the entire world. For the NGOs in Kalama and Yathui, with no national affiliate and local Branches or “troops at the frontline”; coupled with the fact that the communities had not had the opportunity for hands-on involvement; when the NGOs left, that marked the end of the activities. Understandably, there was no-one on the ground to continue with the interventions and/or simply to let them know what was happening after they left.

In the light of the above, it is concluded that; that in some Divisions, the outcomes of the interventions were poor was certainly not by design on the part of the NGOs. This premise is based on the fact that as is evident from the experience of NGOs in Kalama and Yathui; in the quest to fulfil their humanitarian mandate, NGOs are caught in a vicious circle. Thus, on the one hand, they must continue to access donor funds; at the same time however; the funding is increasingly availed with conditions that compromise the fulfilment of that very humanitarian mandate. When their performance is so compromised and they seemingly fail to deliver on the mandate; it is the same donors that are at the forefront of criticising them; more seriously; they might even “apply the hand break” on funding. In the event that donors take this course of action, the tendency by NGOs next time round is to follow the terms of engagement even more stringently however, in a situation in which failure to deliver can be

traced to the terms of engagement in the first place; NGOs are back to square one with the donors leading the chorus of criticism. It is a vicious cycle that reinforces the self image of the “poor cousin”

All the NGOs experienced funding constraints at the time and by implication, limitations in what they could do; for the sake “doing something in the here and now” some accepted their “poor cousin status” but then and in so doing, they failed to fulfil their mandate. Others, particularly those in Masinga and Yatta came up with innovative strategies for overcoming the constraints; amongst such strategies was the formation of partnerships with their national affiliate and more importantly with the communities served. In addition, their approach was one of maximum use of locally available resources and more importantly the use of first of low technology and low cost intervention methodologies which communities could afford to sustain even after they left.

Objective 3 of the study is addressed under the section on recommendation.

## **7.5 Findings in respect of donors**

It was established that save in emergency and/or disaster situations, donor funding priorities with respect to priority countries and the nature and scope of interventions determine what funding will be availed to non-state actor partners. In turn such priorities are influenced by the cues coming from the donors’ own “back donors”; tax payers in the case of governments; member states in the case of regional development agencies and shareholders in the case of the corporate sector. Cues coming from non-state actors through progress and trend reports were also taken into account in decisions on the nature and scope of interventions however; by their own admission, such influence did not extend to decisions on the priority countries and/or the level of funding for the interventions but in the main, in the implementation approaches and methodologies.

There was a tendency by government and donors to prefer to directly engage only with their home NGOs; with respect to international NGO alliances, they preferred to engage those indirectly through multilateral donor institutions of which they were shareholders. The same trend prevailed with institutional donors; the preference was NGOs registered in member shareholder states and/or international NGO alliances. Both government and multilateral donors had no problems with funding local NGOs provided they were members of international alliances of which their home or regional NGOs were members but on the condition that the primary partner was the latter and they did not have to deal directly with secondary recipients.

Contrary to the perception by NGOs that donor decisions were “cast in stone” and as such, it was not possible to influence them otherwise; donors actually appreciated the learning opportunity direct interaction with field operatives presented; a system which some innovative NGOs had come up with. Such learning had seen some donors agree to modifications in the terms of engagement including reporting requirements; a dimension of partnership which often generated discourse in the partnerships.

NGOs were valued as partners by both government and multilateral donors; this is supported by the Overseas Development Institute (1995: 3) which cites a number of factors which endeared the former to the latter. Amongst such factors first of all, the record of poor performance of official donor programmes in reaching the poor and the apparent lack of impact of rural development projects financed in the late 1960s and 1970s. Secondly, the perception that NGOs were an alternative means of getting around obstacles to the impact of aid caused by inefficient and corrupt recipient governments and finally, their capacity to reach and improve the lives of the poor in areas which due to limited resources, poor infrastructure and/or lack of will, governments could not reach. Chege (1999: 1) confirms these observations and notes that as donor confidence in NGOs increased, there was a corresponding increase in the level of resources channelled through the sector. He cites the example of a US policy adopted in 1992 in which the importance of working more closely with NGOs was emphasised. In time, other major donors notably Britain and Germany followed suit; government-NGO partnerships became the trend and a survey conducted in the United States in 2005 (Williamson 2005) suggested that in general, NGOs were more trusted to do what is right than governments and business.

It was also established that in the event that the funds allocated for the delivery of development assistance through non-state actors were not going to be exhausted before the end of a running financial year; donors actually made unsolicited offers to NGOs to absorb what otherwise would be a positive balance. By implication, there are times that donors are as desperate for NGOs to take their money as NGOs are to secure it at other times. This suggests that contrary to NGOs self perception of lacking in bargaining power, in many ways they yield more bargaining power than donors do. There is evidence in support of this view for it is generally acknowledged within the NGO community that the fastest way to get “de-commissioned” by a donor is not so much about ending up with a deficit at the end of a project cycle but instead, to end up with a positive balance!

Notwithstanding the contradictions that characterise working relationships between government and multilateral donors and non-state actors; NGOs are appreciated by donors and are rated highly with

respect to compliance with donor requirements albeit; such compliance is often under duress. That such compliance is often under duress is acknowledged in donor community circles; this is evident in the fact that realizing that there are times that their demands stretch NGOs to the limit; donors have often provided extra support to enable NGOs to meet the demands.

Finally, corporate donors had no problems in engaging directly, local, international, NGOs working internationally or International NGO alliances. With respect to local NGOs, this was explained in terms of the fact that often, the funds were disbursed through local subsidiaries anyway and the problems that the company was trying to address through CSR were local; it made sense to directly engage with local NGOs. In addition, it appears that corporate donors afforded NGOs greater latitude in decision making within the partnership.

### **7.5.1 Conclusions on the findings in respect of donors**

The relationship between NGOs and donors is indeed characterised by power imbalances however, this does not necessarily mean that donors are adamantly resistant to the influence of NGOs. Besides, Commins (1999: 70-71) observes that in the past, NGOs once perceived themselves having a significant impact in shaping donor policies and humanitarian responses. If they so perceived themselves then; by the same token, they can do so today; only they need to come up with innovative strategies for meeting the challenges of the day and in particular, the evolving donor culture and aid architecture as the NGOs which worked in Masinga and Yatta did.

## **7.6 Recommendations**

This section addresses Objective 3 of the study namely;

To explore and recommend how best NGOs can overcome the constraints and/or build on the facilitating factors for even greater impact in future interventions at the same time as meet the needs of all the stakeholders, donors, host governments and more importantly, the communities served.

To this effect, the following recommendations are made:

### **7.6.1 Recommendation in respect of donors**

Increasingly, donors are demanding accountability from NGOs at the same time however; donors are increasingly earmarking the funds they avail to NGOs; under these arrangements, donors decide on what, where and even how the funds can be used. The implications of such an aid architecture is that

NGOs are not always able to address the most pressing needs in the most desperate places and/or to use methods and approaches that facilitate goal attainment; and when the goals are not attained, it is the same donors that criticise NGOs the loudest. Such a contradiction can be traced to power imbalances and has often led to strained relationships between these two stakeholders; in the light of this, is recommended that:

Just as NGOs had a significant impact in shaping donor policies and humanitarian responses at one point in time; they should go back “memory lane” and establish what it is that so positioned them then; and come up with innovative strategies to reclaim the bargaining power which they seem to have lost over time. The ground is fertile for the engagement of such strategies not least; because there is evidence to suggest that while seemingly in a relationship characterised by power imbalances in which NGOs need donors more than donors need them; donors need NGOs as much.

Adopting a defeatist attitude creates a vicious cycle which perpetuates the status of “poor cousin” for NGOs; Commins (1999: 70-71) argues that it is such self-perception that has seen NGOs pushed into roles that minimise their impact in the long-term. When this happens and needless to say, development outcomes are poor; it is the same donors who will be at the forefront of criticising NGOs for failure to deliver. In turn, when a donor is not happy with the performance of an NGO, the tendency by the former is put even more stringent conditions on funding; in response and in order to continue to accessing funding; the tendency by the NGO is to appease the donors by taking the degree of conformity to an even higher level. The end result is that the NGO compromises its performance to an even higher level and the vicious cycle starts all over again. In the light of this, is recommended that:

In the pursuit of fulfilment of their humanitarian mandate; there is no place for a defeatist attitude; instead, NGOs should remain steadfast in the observance of their principles and values and loyal to their primary constituency, the communities serves after all, communities are their “raison d’etre”. Taking such a stand is not a matter of choice, neither does it compromise the chances of funding in the future after all; donors need NGOs as much as NGOs need them.

In order for such a strategy to work in favour of NGOs; they must speak with one voice and not allow donors to play them against each other by “rewarding conformists” and thus coerce the rest into towing the line.

## **7.6.2 Recommendations in respect of host governments**

Indeed, power imbalances are also evident in the relationship between NGOs and host governments however; like with donors; public authorities are not adamantly resistant to the influence of NGOs; on the contrary, public authorities can be flexible as is evident from the fact that two NGOs actually decided where they would work. Given, these two NGOs had the comparative advantage of local knowledge and the experience effect both of which rendered their interventions more successful resulting in them enjoying the confidence and trust of public authorities and communities alike. However; it can be argued that the other NGOs could have so positioned themselves only they did not exploit the opportunity presented by monthly barazas to acquire such local knowledge. In any case, public authorities value the services provided by NGOs and this is evident in the fact even in cases where impact is not optimal; NGO contributions no matter how little; are appreciated. In the light of this, it is recommended that:

The common “denominator” between NGOs and public authorities is the communities served; a category for which the shared goal is that of moving communities along the development continuum; as such, the way to public authorities’ “heart” is doing exactly that; through interventions that make a difference in the quality of life in the communities served. In turn, interventions that make a difference in the quality of life in the communities are a function of project design and implementation approaches. To this effect, NGOs must endeavour to ensure that implementation approaches foster true partnerships with public authorities by amongst other things, aligning implementation approaches to public policy frameworks. This is important for approaches designed elsewhere by operatives who have little idea on the situation on the ground may not be suitable to the cultures in which they will be implemented.

Like with donors, public authorities’ expectations on the outcome of development interventions implemented by NGOs within communities are increasing. At the same time and as has been illustrated, the increasing trend towards restricted projects compromises the outcomes of NGO interventions; in turn, less than optimal outcomes erodes the confidence and trust that public authorities might otherwise have in an NGO. In the absence of confidence and trust, NGOs cannot reasonably



expect to enjoy the degree of space that is conducive to the outcomes of interventions. In the light of this, it is recommended that;

NGOs should always remember that public authorities are the guardians of the communities they serve; as such, they should strive at all times to work within public policy frameworks. In situations where funding conditions are such that they are not aligned to otherwise very sound host government policy frameworks; NGOs should exploit the goodwill of public authorities as one NGO successfully did; inviting District authorities to be part of the delegation to the donor to defend the Machakos District Development Charter and negotiate for terms of engagement that would facilitate alignment of the interventions to the Charter. This is important for regardless of the amount of resources invested in community development initiatives; if the interventions are not in line with public policy, the outcomes will be poor. Poor outcomes erode the confidence and trust that public authorities might otherwise have in an NGO and the cycle of compromised performance starts all over again.

### **7.6.3 Recommendations in respect of communities**

The conditions attached to funding by donors can be traced to the need by government and institutional donors to meet their own accountability obligations to their constituencies; tax payers and member state shareholders respectively. The same can be said of host governments; the constituency in this respect and at least in theory; is represented by national policy frameworks and the communities of which they are guardian. This suggests that these categories of stakeholders are aware of and are unwavering in their commitment to meet their accountability obligations to their respective constituencies. For NGOs, the constituency for primary accountability is the communities served. In the light of this, it is recommended that:

NGOs unwaveringly live out their principles and values for their legitimacy is a function of the degree to which they fulfil their humanitarian mandate; a mandate which is conferred on them by the poor, disadvantaged and the voiceless of this world. By implication, fulfilment of their humanitarian mandate means that NGO interventions have impact and results in observable changes in the social and economic conditions of the poor, disadvantaged and the voiceless of this world. It was pointed out in Chapter 4 that according to the United Nations (Coetzee 1989: 257-8), community development was made up of two essential elements; the participation of the people themselves and the provision of technical support and other services in ways which encouraged initiative, self help and mutual help. On

participation; under restricted project funding arrangements, NGOs are not always able to create the space for the participation of the communities served; understandably, how the interventions will be implemented is specified in the funding agreements as was the case in Kalama and Yathui Divisions. In the light of this, it is recommended that:

While they may feel powerless to bargain on other conditions enshrined in funding agreements, NGOs should never agree to project designs and/or arrangements that exclude the communities served from participation and/or do not encourage “...initiative, self help...”. This is important for to agree to such conditions would be counter-productive to community development; the United Nations will argue.

Community participation enhances an NGO’s knowledge and understanding of the served community’s “world”; its culture and traditions; norms; value systems; patterns of daily living; dreams and aspirations amongst other dimensions of the community’s world. In turn, local knowledge influences the nature, form and shape of approaches to the interventions will assume; approaches which take into account all these considerations are more likely to be successful in so far as they generate a sense of ownership and harness affinity for development efforts and their outcomes. In the light of this, and for those NGOs engaging communities for the first time, it is recommended that;

NGOs include a “pre-engagement” phase as a standard feature in the work plan with “getting to know you” as the main activity during this phase.

By implication, when communities participate in NGO interventions aimed at addressing their needs, a partnership is formed between the NGOs and the community. The establishment and nurturing of partnerships with communities served is a critical ingredient to the success of NGO development interventions. This is particularly so for under restricted projects; characterised as they are by amongst other things, specified project cycles; NGOs are often not in a position to engage communities long enough for the impact of interventions to be felt. In the light of this, it is recommended that;

NGOs should endeavour to form and nurture partnerships with the communities they serve; be they formal or informal; in order to ensure continuity after the NGO leaves.

NGOs cannot be everything to every community at all times and in all places; as such, whether by design or under duress in order to conform to the restrictions specified in funding agreements; there

will come a time when an NGO has to leave a community. As elaborated earlier, the failure of development interventions in part, can be attributed to the misconception that the introduction of modern technology and science would automatically lead to a decent standard of living for all. Local knowledge facilitates informed decisions on approaches to interventions in so far as an NGO is able to accurately identify locally available resources; what works in the community's "world" or otherwise. In turn, what works in the community's "world" is amongst other things, a function of affordability; as such, affordability is an important determinant of the degree to which communities will be able to continue with the activities after the NGO leaves. In the light of these, it is recommended that.

To the best extend possible, NGOs should use locally available resources; people, materials, indigenous technologies and methods of doing things that have worked for the communities over the generations and are affordable.

#### **7.6.4 Conclusions on recommendations**

In concluding this section on recommendations; it is apparent that over the years, NGOs have been making mistakes in the management of relationships with other stakeholders in the partnership for development. With respect to donors and host governments; the mistake has been in terms of a self perception that they lack the power to influence decisions. With respect to communities, the mistake has been in terms of a perception that communities are so poor; to the exclusion of recognising the potential and the sense of self determination that might exist within the said communities. NGOs have indeed made mistakes however; they must not become despondent about the seemingly lack of prospects for turning their situation around; instead, they should learn from the experience of a successful entrepreneur which goes as follows:

**Q:** *What do you owe your success to?*

**A:** *To making the right decisions **all the time**.*

**Q:** *How do you manage to make the right decisions all the time?*

**A:** *Through experience.*

**Q:** *How did you acquire the experience?*

**A:** *Through making the wrong decisions **most of the time!***

As is evident from the experience of the entrepreneur, NGOs can use the experience of making mistakes *most of the time* to their advantage in terms of avoiding such mistakes *all the time* in the

future; this is important for only this way, can they reclaim their power to influence decisions and public policy in favour of the communities they serve; their very *raison d'être*.

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**APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX 1  
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY RESPONDENTS**

**A. Profile of respondents**

- 1. Division .....
- 2. Location .....
- 3. Sub Location .....
- 4. Name of Village .....
- 5. Number assigned to respondent
- 6. Sex: Male   
Female
- 7. Age Group: 55 yrs <   
46 - 55   
31 - 45   
20 - 30
- 8. Do you actively participate in community affairs?  
Yes   
No
- 9. If yes, what capacity?  
Village Head   
Deputy Village Head   
VIDCO member (Village Development Committee)   
CORPS member (Community Own Resource Persons)
- 10. If you belong to none of these bodies, in what way do you contribute to the welfare and/or affairs of your community?  
.....  
.....

**B Experience during the 1999/2001 Drought**

- 11. How was your family's food security situation during the drought in 1991-2001?  
Had enough for our needs   
Did not have enough for our needs

12. If you had enough for your needs how did your family achieve position?  
 We had food stocks from previous harvests   
 We had money with which to buy food.
13. If you had stocks from previous harvest, is it the practice in your family to keep the surplus in any given harvest for future use?  
 Yes   
 No
14. If “yes” how do you preserve the food?  
 Modern methods (freezing etc.)   
 Traditional methods (drying etc)
15. If you used traditional methods, can you explain these methods and state how well they work.  
 .....  
 .....
16. If you did not have enough for your needs how did your family survive?  
 We were assisted by the broader family and/or the community   
 We were assisted by the government.   
 We were assisted by NGOs
17. If you were assisted by NGOs please name them.  
 .....  
 .....
18. Were you attending school during this period  
 Yes   
 No
19. Did the drought affect your schooling in any way?  
 Yes   
 No
20. Please elaborate on the option you have given above  
 .....  
 .....
21. If you were no longer attending school in what way did the drought affect your life?  
 .....  
 .....



**C. Experience during the period 2001- 2006: Assistance by government**

22. If you were assisted by government during the drought what services did the government provide you with after the drought to make sure you were better prepared in the event of another drought?

Water infrastructural improvements

Agricultural extension services

Environmental conservation education

Livestock interventions

Health and nutrition education

Any other services not listed above .....

23. Who decided what activities would be implemented?

The government

The community

Joint decision

24. Who decided how the activities would be implemented?

The government

The community

Joint decision

25. Who decided where the activities would be implemented?

The government

The community

Joint decision

26. Who decided on when the activities would be implemented?

The government

The community

Joint decision

27. Who decided who would participate in the activities?

The government

The community

Joint decision

28. What was the community's contribution to the activities?

Money

Labour

Ideas on how they should be provided

29. For what period of time did the activities continue?

Through the entire period

For the greater part of the period (more than 3yrs)

For a relatively short period (less than 3 yrs)

30. In your view was this long enough?  
 Yes   
 No
31. If “yes” can you explain why in your view the period of implementation of the activities was adequate?  
 .....  
 .....
32. If the period of implementation of activities was inadequate, can you explain your reason for this view?  
 .....  
 .....
33. What reason was given by the government for ending the activities?  
 .....  
 .....
34. In your view what would have been a reasonable period for the implementation of the activities?  
 Through the entire period   
 For .....years
35. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above  
 .....  
 .....
36. Did the activities benefit your community?  
 Yes   
 No
37. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above  
 .....  
 .....
38. If the activities did not benefit your community at what point during the implementation did your community realise this?  
 From the very beginning of the activities   
 Half way through the activities   
 At the end of the activities
39. What did your community do about it?  
 .....  
 .....

40. If the activities benefitted your community, what changed in the life of the community as a result of these activities?

.....  
.....

41. Did the changes help the community to cope with the drought of 2006?

- Yes
- No

42. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above.

.....  
.....

43. If the activities did not benefit your community what in your view was the reason for this?

.....  
.....

44. Please give your view about what could have been done differently to ensure the activities benefit your community.

.....  
.....

**D. Experience during the period 2001- 2006: Assistance by NGOs during**

45. If you were assisted by NGOs during the period 2001-2006; in what activities did the NGOs engage your community to make sure you were better prepared in the event of another drought?

- Water infrastructural improvements
- Agricultural extension services
- Environmental conservation education
- Livestock services
- Food preservation education
- Health and nutrition education
- Any other services not listed above .....

46. Who decided what activities would be implemented?

- The NGOs
- The community
- Joint NGO-Community decision

47. Who decided how the activities would be implemented?

- The NGOs
- The community
- Joint NGO-Community decision

48. Who decided where the activities would be implemented?  
 The NGOs   
 The community   
 Joint NGO-Community decision
49. Who decided when the activities would be implemented?  
 The NGOs   
 The community   
 Joint NGO-Community decision
50. Who decided who would participate in the activities?  
 The NGOs   
 The community   
 Joint NGO-Community decision
51. What was the community's contribution to the activities?  
 Money   
 Labour   
 Ideas on how they should be provided

Indicate which NGO was involved in what activities and for how long from the list you gave earlier. (Respondents will be assured that the NGOs will be given a number and not cited by name in the text)

NGO	Activities	Duration
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		

52. In your view was this long enough?  
 Yes   
 No
53. If "yes" can you explain why in your view, the period of implementation of the activities was adequate.  
 .....  
 .....
54. If the period of implementation of activities was inadequate, can you explain your reason for this view?  
 .....  
 .....

55. What reason was given by the NGO for ending the activities?  
.....  
.....
56. In your view what would have been a reasonable period for the implementation of the activities?  
Through the entire period   
For .....years
- Please elaborate on the option you have selected above  
.....  
.....
57. Did the activities benefit the community?  
Yes   
No
- Please elaborate on the option you have selected above  
.....  
.....
58. If the activities did not benefit at what point during the implementation did your community realise this?  
From the very beginning of the activities   
Half way through the activities   
At the end of the activities
59. What did your community do about it?  
.....  
.....
60. If the activities benefitted your community, what changed in the life of the community as a result of the activities?  
.....  
.....
61. Did the changes help the community to cope with the drought of 2006?  
Yes   
No
- Please elaborate on the option you have selected above.  
.....  
.....
62. If the activities did not benefit your community, what in your view was the reason for this?  
.....  
.....

63. Please give your view about what could have been done differently to ensure the activities benefit your community?

.....  
.....

64. How would you describe your general food security situation during the drought of 2006

Better than in 1991/2001

The same as in 1991/2001

Worse than in 1991/2001

Explain in what way it was better/the same/worse

.....  
.....

65. Please give any other information you think may assist the researcher to better understand the situation

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

**APPENDIX 2**  
**INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUPS**

**A. Profile of group**

- 1. Division .....  
.....
- 2. Location .....  
.....
- 3. Number assigned to focus group
- 4. Gender distribution: Male/Female ratio .....  
.....

**B. Experience during the drought 1999-2001**

- 5. How did the drought of 1999-2001 affect the community?
- 6. Were you prepared for the drought?
  - Yes
  - Partially
  - No

If no, what was the reason for this?  
.....  
.....

If partially; how?  
.....  
.....

If yes, was this through your own efforts or you had been receiving assistance for the purpose?  
.....  
.....
- 7. If you had been receiving assistance for the purpose by who?
  - Government
  - NGOs

**C. Assistance given by government 2001-2006**

- 8. Did government continue with the assistance after the 1999-2001 drought?
  - Yes
  - No
- 9. What are your views on the nature of and how the assistance was provided by the government.  
.....  
.....

10. Did the activities make the community better prepared for the drought of 2006?  
Yes   
No

11. If not, what could have been better or done differently to better prepare you to cope with the drought of 2006?

**D. Assistance given by NGO/NGOs 2001-2006**

12. What are your views on the nature and how the assistance provided by NGOs.  
.....  
.....

13. Did the activities help the community to cope with the drought of 2006?  
Yes   
No

14. If not what could have been better or differently to better prepare you to cope with the drought of 2006?  
.....  
.....

**E. Experience during the drought of 2006**

15. What was the situation like in the community during the 2006 drought?

Food  
.....  
.....

Water  
.....  
.....

Health in the community  
.....  
.....

Schooling  
.....  
.....

Domestic animals  
.....  
.....



**F. Towards the future**

How do think droughts should handled in the future to make sure that the community will be better able to cope with droughts.

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

**APPENDIX 3**  
**INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONDENTS**

**A. The background to NGO presence in Machakos District**

1. At what level of government are decisions of on criteria for qualification for the registration of an NGO made?
  - Centralised at the Ministry’s Headquarters
  - Decentralised at Provincial Office
  - Decentralised District Offices
  
2. At what level of government does the actual registration of NGOs take place?
  - Centralised at the Ministry’s Headquarters
  - Decentralised at Provincial Office
  - Decentralised District Offices
  
3. Have Machakos District authorities ever turned down an NGO’s application for registration/a recommendation to admit an NGO into District from Central government?
  - Yes
  - No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above.

.....  
.....

4. Please provide information on NGOs that were operating in Kalama, Masinga, Yathui and Yatta Divisions during the drought of 1999-2001 through to the drought of 2006.

NGO	Division	Activities	Duration
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

5. How did these NGOs establish a presence in the District?
  - Through an emergency relief operation
  - Through a development programme:
  - At the invitation of the Government
  - Requested a presence

If NGO community entry was through a development programme and at the invitation of the Government, what were the reasons which prompted the government to seek the assistance of the NGOs?

.....  
.....

If through a development programme and the NGOs requested for a presence, what reasons did they give for their interest in working with communities in the District?

.....  
.....

6. In your view, have they lived up to stated motivation for wanting to work with communities in Machakos District?
- |           |                          |
|-----------|--------------------------|
| Yes       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| No        | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Partially | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above.

.....  
.....

**B. Working relationships with NGOs**

7. Who decides in what Divisions of the District individual NGOs will be involved?
- |                     |                          |
|---------------------|--------------------------|
| The NGOs themselves | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Government          | <input type="checkbox"/> |

8. If it is the NGOs, is the Government comfortable with the decisions?
- |     |                          |
|-----|--------------------------|
| Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| No  | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....  
.....

9. If it is the government which decides do NGOs readily accept the decisions?
- .....  
.....

10. Do Machakos District Authorities have “preferred” operations/programmes for the NGO contribution to the enhancement of the welfare of communities?
- |     |                          |
|-----|--------------------------|
| Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| No  | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above.

.....  
.....

11. During the period 2001-2006, whose decision was the choice of post drought activities that NGOs engaged communities in Kalama; Masinga; Yathui and Yatta Divisions?  
The NGOs themselves   
Government

12. In the view of government; were the activities appropriate relative to needs within communities at the time?  
.....  
.....

13. For how long were the NGOs engaged with communities in post drought activities?  
< 2years   
2-3years   
3years<

14. In your view was the duration of the activities long enough?  
Yes   
No

Please elaborate on the response you have given above.

.....  
.....

15. If the activities did not continue for long enough, what was the reason given by the NGOs for prematurely terminating the activities?  
.....  
.....

16. Did the District Authorities readily accept the reason given by the NGO?  
Yes   
No

17. In your view what would have been a reasonable period for the implementation of the activities?  
Through the entire period   
For .....years

18. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above  
.....  
.....

19. What was the District Authorities' reaction to the premature termination of activities by the NGO?  
 .....  
 .....
20. Was there a forum in which District Authorities met with the NGOs to discuss issues of mutual interest including updates on progress and any constraints they may be facing in the implementation of the programmes and projects?  
 Yes   
 No
21. If there was an established forum for dialogue with the NGOs at what level of District Authorities were the forums convened?  
 District level   
 Division level   
 Location level   
 Sub Location level
22. If yes, were these forums useful?  
 Yes   
 No
23. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above.  
 .....  
 .....
24. If there were no such forums, what other channels of communication did the District Authorities have to engage the NGOs in dialogue?  
 Written reports at designated intervals   
 Communication through telephone calls; electronic communication   
 Ad hoc meetings.
25. If communication was through written reports at designated intervals was this a requirement by the District Authorities?  
 Yes   
 No
26. If submission of regular reports was a requirement by District Authorities did NGOs always conform to this requirement?  
 Yes   
 No
27. If NGOs always conformed to the requirement, did the District Authorities give feedback on the reports submitted by NGOs?  
 Yes   
 No

28. If yes, was the feedback useful as a formative evaluation tool for the NGOs (suggestions for improvements in the management of the programmes/projects taken positively and implemented)?  
 .....  
 .....
29. If the District Authorities never gave feedback on submitted reports, what is the reason for this?  
 .....  
 .....
30. Was there a system of scheduled visits by District Authorities to programmes/projects NGOs were implementing?  
 Yes   
 No
31. If yes, how did the visits come about?  
 District Authorities request   
 Always suggested by the organisation   
 A combination for the two
32. What circumstances prompted a request for a visit by the District Authorities?  
 .....  
 .....
33. What circumstances prompted a suggestion or invitation by NGOs for a visit by the Government?  
 .....  
 .....
34. If the District Authorities never visited the programme/project sites, what means did the government have for verify progress reports (written or verbal updates)?  
 .....  
 .....
35. Have the District Authorities ever received complaints from communities about NGO conduct?  
 Yes   
 No
36. If yes, please elaborate on the nature of complaints  
 .....  
 .....
37. How did the District Authorities resolve the problem?  
 .....  
 .....

38. How is the District Authorities working relationship with NGOs in general?
- Excellent
- Good
- Fair
39. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above
- .....
- .....
40. What is the experience of the District Authorities in terms of the honouring of commitments; conformity with operational rules of engagement etc. on the part of NGOs?
- Excellent
- Good
- Poor
41. In the experience of the District Authorities, please give four common areas in which NGOs do not conform to the operational rules of engagement.
- .....
- .....
42. In the event that an NGO is not conforming to the rules of engagement how does the District Authorities deal with the situation?
- .....
- .....

**C “Return on Investment”**

43. In your view did NGO interventions during the period benefit the communities?
- Yes
- No
44. If yes, in what way did the benefits improve the welfare of communities? Where possible please give statistical evidence of the changes.

Dimension of welfare	Improvements in the welfare of communities
Water situation	
Environmental conservation	
Food security	
Health and Nutrition	
Livestock	
Any other	

45. Did these improvements render communities better able to cope with the drought of 2006?
- Yes
- No

46. If yes, in what way?  
.....  
.....
47. If the activities did not benefit communities what in your view was the reason for this?  
.....  
.....
48. Please give your view about what could have been done differently to ensure the activities benefit communities maximally?  
.....  
.....
49. In general, what are the District Authorities expectations of the outcomes of the assistance delivered by NGOs?  
.....  
.....
50. If the event when it is apparent that the approach that an NGO is using in the implementation of activities, what action has the District Authorities take to address the situation?  
.....  
.....
51. Please provide any other information that you think might help the researcher better understand how partnerships between your agency and NGOs work.  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....



**APPENDIX 4**  
**INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NGO RESPONDENTS**

**A. Profile of the NGO**

1. Name of NGO .....
2. Number assigned to respondent NGO
3. Designation of respondent in organisation .....
4. No. of years NGO has been in operation in Kenya  
20 yrs <   
10 - 19   
< 9
5. What is your organisation's mission statement?  
.....  
.....
6. What activities is your organisation involved in, in general?  
Relief   
Development   
Relief/Development   
Advocacy
7. At what level are operational decisions made in your organisation?  
All decision making at centralised headquarters abroad   
Some decision making at centralised headquarters abroad   
All decision making decentralised at the field level
8. What determines where decisions are made?  
.....  
.....

**B. Organisation of work at the field level**

9. How does you organise your work within communities?  
Directly implement activities with salaried staff   
Community contributes "in-kind" (labour, materials etc.)   
Community implements and organisation only supervises
- Please elaborate on the option you have selected above  
.....  
.....
10. What is the percentage of personnel costs on your annual average budget in the past ten years? .....

11. Who decides the permissible percentage of personnel costs relative to the budget in any given programme?  
 Donors   
 The organisation
12. If it is your donors who decide, in your view is this a reasonable amount to allocate to personnel costs?  
 Yes   
 No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....  
 .....

13. After drought relief operations, what activities did your organisation engage communities; whose decision was the choice of activities and for how long did your organisation implement the activities?

Activity	Decision		Duration (years)
	Government.	Organisation	
Water infrastructure installation			
Environmental conservation			
Food preservation			
Health and nutrition education			
Livestock interventions			
Other activities			

14. In your view was the duration of the activities long enough?  
 Yes   
 No
15. Please explain why in your view the period of implementation of the activities was adequate or inadequate?  
 .....  
 .....
16. If in your view the duration of the activities was inadequate what was the reason for your organisation not continuing with the activities for longer?  
 .....  
 .....
17. What was the host government's reaction to the premature termination of activities by your organisation?  
 .....  
 .....

**C. Relationships with host government**

18. During the 1999-2001 drought did your organisation already have an established presence in Machakos District?  
Yes   
No

19. If yes, who decided in which part of the District where your organisation would be involved in relief operations?  
The Organisation   
Government

20. If the decision was that of the government, were you comfortable with the decision?  
Yes   
No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....  
.....

21. Was the process of getting your organisation registered made easy for you by the host government?  
Yes   
No

22. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....  
.....

23. Is there a forum in which NGOs meet with the host government to discuss issues of mutual interest including updates on progress and any constraints you may be facing in the implementation of programmes and projects?  
Yes   
No

If yes; in your organisation's views are these forums an effective way of communication?

.....  
.....

24. If no; what other channels of communication are available to your organisation to dialogue with the host government?

.....  
.....

25. If yes; in your organisation views are these alternative forums an effective way of communication?

.....  
.....

26. Did the host government require your organisation to report on your activities?  
 Yes   
 No
- If yes, did you get any feedback on the reports and was the feedback useful?  
 .....  
 .....
27. If no, did your organisation voluntarily share its reports with the host government?  
 Yes   
 No
28. If yes what is the host government's reaction to this gesture?  
 .....  
 .....
29. Did the host government require your organisation to declare the source; level and/or how funds were disbursed in the course of implementing your activities?  
 Yes   
 No
30. If yes, is your organisation comfortable with the requirement that your organisation declares its sources of funding and how you use these funds?  
 Yes   
 No
- Please elaborate on the option you selected above  
 .....  
 .....
31. Did the host government ever visit the programmes and projects your organisation was implementing within communities?  
 Yes   
 No
32. If yes, are such visits requested by the host government or they are or always suggested by your organisation?  
 Government request   
 Always suggested by the organisation   
 A combination for the two
33. What in your view would be the ideal arrangement?  
 .....  
 .....

34. Has there ever been an occasion in which your organisation and the host government differed in opinion in the use of funds?
- Yes
- No

35. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....

.....

36. If yes, how was the matter finally resolved?

.....

.....

37. How is your working relationship with the host government in general?
- Excellent
- Good
- Fair

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....

.....

**D. Relationships with communities**

38. Following the drought of 1999-2001; to what extent were communities involved in decision making on what activities would be implemented; where water point would be sited; when activities would be implemented and how?
- Actively involved
- Involved to a certain extent
- Not involved at all

39. If actively involved, at what level of the community were the decisions made?
- Community leadership
- Community Development Committee
- Project Committee
- The community as a whole

40. If Project Committee who selected the project committee members?
- The organisation
- The community

41. What criteria was used in the choice of project committee members

.....

.....

42. If involved to a certain extent, what dimensions of the decision making processes were the communities involved in?

.....

.....

43. In the community was not involved at all, did the communities readily accept the decisions?  
Yes   
No

44. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above  
.....  
.....

45. Did your organisation require the communities to make a contribution to the activities other than in the decision making processes?  
Yes   
No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above  
.....  
.....

46. In your view did the community willingly make a contribution or there was a need to convince and persuade?  
Yes   
No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above.  
.....  
.....

47. Give a brief description of the achievements during these interventions.  
.....  
.....

48. What in your view were the factors which facilitated your achievements?  
.....  
.....

49. If you did not achieve as much as you had initially planned, in what aspect of the interventions did your organisation fail to realise its objectives?  
.....  
.....

50. What were the constraints you faced which rendered your organisation not able to realise its objectives?  
.....  
.....

51. Was there a forum in which your organisation met with the whole community to discuss issues of mutual interest including updates on progress and any constraints you may be facing in the implementation of activities?  
 Yes   
 No
52. If yes; did your organisation find these forums useful (your concerns and those of the communities are listened to and issues and concerns are openly discussed, addressed and the way forward mapped etc)  
 .....  
 .....
53. If no; what other channels of communication exist to dialogue with the community?  
 .....  
 .....
54. In your view are these other channels effective?  
 .....  
 .....
55. If not, what has your organisation done to ensure open and ongoing dialogue with the community as a whole?  
 .....  
 .....
56. Your organisation was involved in the 2006 drought relief operation; how would you describe the situation of the people during the drought?  
 Better than in 1999-2001   
 The same as in 1999-2001   
 Worse than in 1999-2001
57. Can you explain your reason for this your view?  
 .....  
 .....
58. Please give any other information that you think may assist the researcher to better understand the operating environment of your organisation.  
 .....  
 .....

**E. Relationships with donors**

59. Provide the following information on your regular donors over the past ten years or longer.

Donor	Activities Funded

60. For development funding; what is the average duration of the funding arrangements?  
 < 2years   
 2years <

61. Under what arrangement are the development funding provided?

NGO	Attributes of development funding			
	Activity earmarked	Country earmarked	Region earmarked	Un-earmarked
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				

62. What is your organisation's position on the earmarking of funding?  
 .....  
 .....

63. Has there been an occasion in which your position on the earmarking of funding had compromised your chances of securing funding?  
 Yes   
 No



64. On the occasions that your organisation has accepted earmarked funding, at what level are decisions on project management including reports and reporting intervals?

NGO		1	2	3	4	5	6
Dimension	Locus of decisions						
Project design	Donor decides						
	NGO decides						
	Joint decision						
Implementation method	Donor decides						
	NGO decides						
	Joint decision						
Frequency of reporting	Quarterly						
	Half yearly						
	Yearly						
Format of reporting	Donor's format						
	NGO's format						
	Agreed with donor						
<b>Other dimensions</b>							

65. Is your organisation comfortable with these arrangements?  
 Yes   
 No

66. If not, why not?  
 .....  
 .....

67. Do you have a forum in which you meet with your donors to discuss differences of opinion on management of projects?  
 Yes   
 No

68. If no, why not?  
 .....  
 .....

69. Do you ever get feedback on the reports you submit to your donors?  
 Yes   
 No

70. If yes, in your view is the feedback useful as a formative evaluation tool?  
 .....  
 .....

71. If no, has your organisation ever taken up the matter with the donors?  
 Yes   
 No
72. If yes what was the donor(s) reaction?  
 .....  
 .....
73. If no, why has your organisation not taken up the matter with the donor(s)?  
 .....  
 .....
74. Do your donors visit the programmes and projects your organisation in implementing with their support?  
 Yes   
 No
75. If yes, are such visits:  
 Scheduled at regular intervals from the outset of the partnership   
 Not scheduled but occasionally requested by the donor   
 Never requested by the donor and instead, always suggested by the organisation   
 Even on suggestion by the organisation, the donor has no interest in visiting the projects.
76. What in your would be the best arrangement and why?  
 .....  
 .....
77. In your view are there clearly identifiable behavioural patterns distinguishing government, multilateral and corporate donors you have engaged with over the years?  
 Yes   
 No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above.

.....  
 .....

78. Please give any other information on the relationship with you may relevant to this enquiry.  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....

**APPENDIX 5  
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR DONOR RESPONDENTS**

**A. Internal administration profile of the donor**

1. Name of donor .....
2. Category of donor  
 Government   
 Multilateral   
 Corporate
3. Coded number assigned to respondent to donor (G1..; I1...; C1...) .....
4. Designation of respondent in organisation .....
5. Does your agency/company have “preferred” categories of operations/programmes for funding NGO work?

Category	G1	G2	G5	G6	I	C
Development						
Relief						
Both						
Advocacy						
Other						

6. Give reasons why your agency/company prefers these activities.  
 .....  
 .....
7. Give reasons why your agency/company does not prefer the activities you have not selected.  
 .....  
 .....
8. How do you avail funding for development NGO work?

Donor	G1	G2	G5	G6	I	C
Unsolicited offers						
Respond to appeals						
Calls for proposals						

**B. Partnership considerations**

9. What criteria does your agency/company use in selecting NGOs for your grants/contracts?

Criteria	G1	G2	G5	G6	I	C
Home registered NGOs						
NGOs registered in a member state of the region						
Any “tried and tested” international NGO						
Any “tried and tested” local NGO						
Other criteria						

10. At which level of your agency/company are decisions of on criteria for the selection of NGO partners made?

- Centralised at headquarters abroad
- Decentralised at regional/country offices

11. What are the major determining factors for the level of funding for a given programme/project?

- Needs
- Availability of resources
- The profile of the NGO
- The home country of the NGO
- Record of performance and accountability

Other

.....  
 .....

12. Does your agency/company earmark funds availed to NGOs?

- All the time
- Sometimes
- Never

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....  
 .....

13. Since your office is at the donor-NGO partnership interface, is there any room for you to advocate for the issues which NGOs from time to time bring to your attention with respect the priority needs?

- Yes
- No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....  
 .....

14. Does your agency have a predetermined threshold above which an NGO partner can spend funds on core costs?
- Yes
- No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....

.....

15. How do NGOs react to these arrangements?

.....

.....

**C. Working relationships with NGOs**

16. Is there a forum in which your agency/company meets with the NGOs you fund to discuss issues of mutual interest including updates on progress and any constraints they may be facing in the implementation of the programmes and projects?
- Yes
- No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....

.....

17. If no, what other channels of communication does your agency/company have to dialogue with the NGOs which your agency funds?
- Periodic reports
- Ad hoc meetings

.....

.....

18. If through periodic reports, at what intervals does your agency/company require an NGO partner to submit reports?
- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Bi-annually
- Annually

19. Do you systematically give feedback on the reports NGOs submit to your agency/company?
- Yes
- No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....

.....

20. Is there a donor forum where you discuss modalities of cooperation and issues of mutual concern with NGOs with which you have a shared partnership?
- Yes
- No

Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....

.....

21. Does your agency/company ever visit the programmes and projects being implemented by NGOs with your funding support?
- Yes
- No

22. If yes, how are such visits generated?
- A regular schedule of visits is agreed at the outset.
- Visits are always requested by agency/company at its discretion.
- Visits are always requested by NGO(s) at its discretion.

Please elaborate on your view?

.....

.....

23. What is the experience of your agency/company with NGOs partnerships in terms of conformity with your terms of engagement?
- Excellent
- Good
- Poor

24. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above

.....

.....

25. In the experience of your agency/company, please give four common areas in which NGOs do not strictly observe your condition of partnership.

.....

.....

26. In the event that an NGO partner does not strictly observe your conditions of partnership how does your agency/company deal with the situation?

.....

.....

**D. “Return on Investment”**

27. On average, what percentage of your agency/company’s development assistance has been channelled through NGOs in the past ten years?
- |             |       |
|-------------|-------|
| Relief      | ..... |
| Development | ..... |
| Advocacy    | ..... |

Can you elaborate on the reasons behind the differences (if any) on the level of funding between the different categories of activities.

.....  
.....

28. What are your agency/company’s expectations of the outcomes of the assistance channelled through NGOs?

.....  
.....

29. Have these your agency/company’s expectation been met?

All the time	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sometimes	<input type="checkbox"/>

30. Please elaborate on the option that you selected above

.....  
.....

If your selected option was “all the time” what in your view was the main facilitating factor?

.....  
.....

If your selected option was “sometimes” what in your view were the constraints?

.....  
.....

31. Has your agency/company ever terminated a partnership agreement with an NGO prematurely?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please elaborate on the option that you selected above

.....  
.....

32. Has an NGO ever terminated a partnership agreement with your agency/company prematurely?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please elaborate on the option that you selected above

.....  
.....

33. Please provide any other information that you think might help the researcher better understand how partnerships between your agency/company and NGOs work.

.....  
.....  
.....