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**CRISIS
IN
AFRICA**

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
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Journal of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Volume VII

1953

Number 2

CRISIS IN AFRICA

A Study of Africa South of the Sahara

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

The plethora of recent works on Africa — not all of which have been included in the bibliography appended to this issue — is a clear manifestation of the rapidly increasing significance of this area to the contemporary international scene. These studies also indicate, however, how sorrowfully lacking is any comprehensive treatment of this region which, in its complexity, is worthy of all the ratiocination it has thus far provoked.

This volume does not attempt to propose solutions to the multitude of recent outbursts in Africa; it should, however, provide a succinct explanation of the many facets of those problems that have lately become so newsworthy.

It was this burgeoning awareness that prompted the JOURNAL to consider an issue devoted to a study of this area, and with the arrival of each additional article, the importance of both subject and treatment became more and more evident. It is our belief that the distinguished group of contributors to this issue have done an enviable job of research and writing, and we hope that in conveying the results to our readers we will be stimulating new lines of thought about Africa. We warmly invite our readers to comment on how adequately they feel we have accomplished this purpose.

Because of the "me-too-ism" that each additional symposium appears to represent, the attempt has been made in this issue to present a survey of Africa south of the Sahara centered around the theme of the influence of South Africa upon the problems and policies of her neighbors.

A word must be said about the terminology used in this issue. The stranger to contemporary Africa should find it odd, indeed, to hear "European" used synonymously with "white"; although the reason for such usage should be self-evident from even a brief history of the region, the reader must nonetheless be cautioned not to let this "new" use confuse his understanding.

A further difficulty will undoubtedly arise over the use of such words as "black," "non-European," "African," "native," "Bantu."

These words are reasonably interchangeable, but, as happens so often in semantic considerations, the use of each betrays the predilection of the use — a bias that should also be obvious contextually.

We in the United States have become forever more sensitive to our own indigenous racial problem, and because of this, the attempt is frequently made to find analogies between South Africa and the United States. Such analogies are some small help to a preliminary grasp of the problem, but it would be wrong to confuse in the process the very different social, economic, political, historical, and moral components.

As Africa becomes more urgently linked to the immediate peace of the world community, there will be further attempts to explain its unique position. It is the hope of the Editorial Board that the present issue of the JOURNAL constitutes a significant contribution in this direction.

AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE

by Harry R. Rudin

Colgate Professor of European History at Yale University, and Chairman of the Department of History, Professor Rudin is the author of several books and numerous articles.

A world preoccupied with the challenge of Russian communism in the middle of the 20th century has suddenly found itself face to face with a startling challenge in Africa. For the Russian challenge we were more or less psychologically prepared; for the one in Africa, on the other hand, we were far from ready, the reason being the great ignorance of the Dark Continent that generally prevails in the West. One may well wonder whether there is time for us to acquire the information needed if our decisions in this critical age are to have the intelligence required for our survival. Our ignorance and neglect of Africa may prove soon to be very costly.

It is hard to realize that the last continent to be fully explored by Europeans is the one that lies closest to Europe. A century ago men did not know the location of the sources of the Nile, the course of the Congo, the existence of Victoria Falls, or the snow-covered peaks of Kenya and Kilimanjaro. Many of the places unknown a hundred years ago have now become popular points of interest for today's curious tourist; Kilimanjaro has become a backdrop for Hollywood movies; honeymooners cross the Sahara in a jeep in a few worryless days that appear sacrilegious when set over against the years of hardship confronting those who first made the hazardous trip less than a century ago. And there are Africans born half a century ago into the traditional ways of African life who have now acquired higher degrees from universities in Europe and America, who have found employment in the United Nations, who live in the world's biggest city, who travel to and from the land of their birth in mighty airplanes, who can lecture to their own people on the puzzling and paradoxical behavior of "civilized" white men in their native surroundings in the United States or in Europe. So short has been the time for these tremendous changes that we must admit having here the biggest revolution in history; its like in the past is unknown and its outcome in the future lies hidden from our view.

Why did Africa have to wait so long before the West became aware of it? The simple answer is that the West has had other and greater interests, to which those of Africa have been secondary. During the age of discovery Europeans were concerned with the Far East and access to its wealth. Explorers who made their fearsome and cautious way along the forbidding coast of West Africa in the 15th century found the huge continent an almost insuperable obstruction on the route to the Indies. Their primary interest was the establishment of way stations where India-bound ships could put in, even though some posts were located in West Africa in the 17th century for purposes of trade. The first Dutch settlement at the Cape in 1652 is the best known and the most recently celebrated effort of Europeans to establish such a way station where fresh water and vegetables could be obtained for an otherwise scurvy voyage to India, the Spice Islands, or faraway Japan.

Europeans developed another interest in Africa when they realized that here people could be found to work as slaves on the sugar and cotton plantations in America. Africans were taken from their homes by the millions, sold into slavery, and shipped thousands of miles over dreaded seas to strange lands and strange employment. Even less than one hundred years ago a few European slave-runners were carrying on a clandestine and profitable trade in human beings in West Africa, although a growing humanitarianism had generally made such traffic illegal. After the slave trade was prohibited and the institution of slavery was abolished, Europeans seemed to lose their interest in Africa for a while, and turned their attention again to the Far East. The demand for a shorter route drew men's attention to the need of a canal at Suez. In 1869 that great work was completed and the canal was opened to traffic.

It was about this time that curiosity concerning the interior of Africa led to serious explorations by such men as Livingstone, Stanley, Nachtigal, de Brazza, and others. Europe came to know of inner Africa at a critical time, when the great depression of the 1870's was causing men to look for markets for the goods that Europe produced but could not consume. Now for the first time Europeans were profoundly interested in Africa. The consequence was that the vast continent was partitioned within the space of ten years, between 1880 and 1890. The major powers of Europe — Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and Italy — participated in this labor. The British vector of interest ran north and south, between Cairo and the Cape in the main; for the other powers the vectors of interest ran east and west. Where the lines of interest intersected, more or less serious diplomatic crises occurred, of which the gravest one was that between France and Britain at Fashoda in 1898-99. These and other conflicts

of interest made it necessary to set territorial bounds to the claims of rival European powers. So vague, however, was the knowledge of the interior that agreement regarding borders had to be in terms of latitude and longitude. In effect, borders were written in the heavens; many of them had to wait until the 20th century before a detailed knowledge of the hinterland made it possible to fix metes and bounds on solid terrain.

One cannot say that a warm concern for the well-being of Africans dictated the policies of European countries in the African continent. Whoever has handled the treaties to which ignorant chieftains affixed their wavering X's as symbols of their acceptance of the white man's rule cannot escape the conviction that varying degrees of deception must have been employed to persuade Africans into signing papers which they could hardly understand. As time went on, Africans found out that they had lost their lands; and they soon learned that their labor was so necessary for the white man's purposes as to be requisitioned by a variety of compulsions. Resistance to this alteration of their accustomed manner of living led to cruel countermeasures by the better-armed Europeans.

For all its cruel aspects, the Christian imperialism of Europeans, it must be said, did bring much that was of permanent good for the health, education, and training of Africans; it was definitely superior to the imperialism of the Muslims, who invaded from the north across the Sahara and brought with them none of the blessings of the West. Instead, the Muslims continued the slave practices which the Europeans had abandoned. While it is true that Christian countries no longer sold the bodies of black men after the manner of the slave-merchant, they never hesitated, when the needs of diplomacy required it, to barter with one another about African territories, whose inhabitants were never consulted as to who should be their white masters.

In the period between 1880 and 1914 the initiative for the occupation and exploitation of territories in Africa came largely from individual Europeans interested in profitable investments; as a rule it was they who persuaded their governments to proclaim the occupation of colonial territory and to provide for its administration. For the governments the costs of these colonial undertakings were greater than the returns. Not all private investors in Africa made money; the failure to make a profit was usually explained by talk about the great lack of transportation facilities and the shortage of labor. There were those who gambled and made out handsomely, as in the gold fields and diamond mines. Elsewhere more modest returns were obtained.

The First World War marked a turning point in the relations of European countries with Africa. The change was due to new forces driving Europeans into a greater dependence on the neglected con-

continent. The world-wide economic base that European commercial and colonial expansion had laid in the 19th century began to experience that contraction which has speeded up considerably in recent years as semi-colonial lands in the Far East and elsewhere have achieved a greater economic independence along with political independence from the West. In other areas of the globe high tariffs and other restrictions on trade have narrowed markets and interfered with the securing of essential supplies. Just as surely and clearly as the possibility of trade with distant Asia in the 15th century diverted Europeans from Africa, so the diminution in our day of economic possibilities in Asia has compelled Europeans to look more and more to Africa for the resources hitherto supplied more readily by the Orient. Furthermore, the economic demands of the West have been increasing steadily as new inventions have created new needs and as preparation for war has expanded the demand for critical minerals. The Second World War intensified the economic problems of the West by revealing the discouragingly inadequate domestic supplies of such minerals as zinc, lead, copper, and iron ore. New sources of supply have had to be found. And all the time the areas of the world where the white man can freely engage in his quest for such resources are steadily diminishing.

A glance at African exports in the middle of the 20th century offers one method of picturing this greater dependence of the West on Africa. In dollar values the exports of Kenya and Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Tunisia have increased two and one-half times between 1938 and 1950. In the same period the exports of the Gold Coast have increased nearly three times; those of Nigeria three and one-half times; those of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, French West Africa, and French Morocco four times; those of Angola five times; and those of Liberia eight times.

Very significant is the growing share of the United States in African exports, as the following table shows:

| Colony | 1938 (Thousands) | 1950 (Thousands) |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Nigeria | \$ 3,290 | \$36,974 |
| Gold Coast | 6,591 | 64,450 |
| Sierra Leone | 215 | 1,430 |
| Tanganyika | 855 | 6,205 |
| Kenya and Uganda | 2,645 | 13,744 |
| Northern Rhodesia | 15,572 | 30,299 |
| Southern Rhodesia | 1,851 | 6,939 |
| Nyasaland | 3 | 417 |
| French West Africa | 1,484 | 3,756 |
| French Equatorial Africa | 11 | 39 |
| Belgian Congo, Ruanda-Urundi | 1,039 | 25,495 |
| Angola | 180 | 10,316 |
| Mozambique | 209 | 3,831 [1949] |
| Liberia | 1,030 | 13,921 [1949-50] |

Since dollar quotations are not reliable criteria for purposes of comparison in a time of fluctuating prices, however, the rising quantities of critical minerals exported from Africa are a better index of the greater dependence of the West upon Africa:

| Colony | Mineral | Quantities exported | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | | 1938 | 1950 |
| Nigeria | Tin ore | 23,489,000 lbs. | 25,574,000 lbs. |
| " | Columbite | 0 | 2,354,000 lbs. |
| Gold Coast | Manganese | 726,000,000 lbs. | 1,593,000,000 lbs. |
| " | Bauxite | 0 | 114,948 long tons |
| Sierra Leone | Chrome ore | 498 long tons | 13,909 long tons |
| Tanganyika | Diamonds | 3,590 carats | 131,237 carats |
| Northern Rhodesia | Copper, blister | 413,700,000 lbs. | 487,158,000 lbs. |
| " | " electrolytic | 77,803,000 lbs. | 164,166,000 lbs. |
| " | Lead | ? | 27,730,000 lbs. |
| " | Zinc | 14,969,000 lbs. | 50,792,000 lbs. |
| French Equatorial Africa | Diamonds | 16,003 carats | 116,481 carats |
| Belgian Congo & Ruanda-Urundi | Refined copper | 154,870 metric tons | 167,007 metric tons |
| " | Tin | 1,813 metric tons | 4,020 metric tons |
| " | Tin ore | 6,657 metric tons | 16,353 metric tons |
| " | Diamonds | 5,759,000 carats | 2,457 kilograms |
| " | Cobalt | 5,401 metric tons | 9,026 metric tons |
| Angola | Diamonds | 671,000 carats | 555,000 carats |

For obvious reasons governments have not published statistics on the quantities of uranium produced in and exported from the Belgian Congo and the Union of South Africa; at the present time it seems that we are dependent on Africa for something like 90 per cent of our uranium, whose value to us needs no stressing. Because of the depletion of reserves in the Second World War, the United States is now importing iron ore from Liberia. In sum, the critical significance of Africa to the West can be partly measured by our absolute need of cobalt and columbite in the manufacture of jet engines, of manganese in the manufacture of steel, and by the utility of other minerals for both prosperity and security.

This list of goods is by no means an exhaustive one. Africa produces a large number of other commodities of importance to the west — cacao, palm kernels, palm oil, sisal, cotton, coffee, tea, lumber, tobacco, rubber, precious woods, vegetable oils, hides, and skins.

Europeans are becoming increasingly interested in living in Africa, since insurmountable immigration barriers have been erected in other parts of the world. Our times are such that Africa is now becoming the land of opportunity for Europeans with no other place to go. Many have come as permanent settlers. Portugal, for example, has a plan for settling hundreds of thousands of its people in the African provinces. In the last 25 years there has been a considerable increase in the white population in all parts of Africa, especially in those parts where the climate is hospitable. Where the number of whites is largest the greatest discontent is to be found among the Africans. The pres-

sure upon the land grows heavier with the passing of time as the African population increases alongside that of the Europeans. One can be sure of great difficulties in the future when one realizes that Africa does not produce enough food for its present population; competition for arable lands is already tense in Kenya, as the headlined difficulties with the Mau Mau show us daily. The situation will become much worse before it gets better. Because of the dollar shortage and the need to produce foods within the sterling area, Great Britain undertook the costly groundnut scheme in Tanganyika and the chicken-and-egg-raising experiment in Gambia. Had these efforts proved successful, it is safe to assume that other food-producing experiments would have been tried elsewhere. It is not difficult to imagine a tougher struggle in the future between Europeans and Africans for land than that now in being — and this without any reference to the lands required for air and naval bases in various parts of the continent.

African lands and resources cannot be developed unless the problem of labor is solved. The labor shortage has always been a serious problem in Africa; with industrialization it will become more serious. Plans already exist for various industrial projects in addition to the well-known ones in South Africa, Northern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo. One of the most recent is the British plan for the production of aluminum in the Gold Coast, where there are rich reserves of bauxite. The plan calls for a hydroelectric project on the Volta River. In other parts of Africa there are similar schemes for utilizing water power, of which Africa has greater resources than any other continent. Roads and railroads have to be built; harbors have to be constructed; workers have to be trained; the land has to be prospected; and health problems have to be solved. All these desiderata taken together have led to ten-year plans for colonial development under the sponsorship of governments rather than private enterprise.


Intelligent Africans are well aware of these trends and their recollection of past relations with Europeans makes them fearful for the future of their fellows in Africa. The budding struggle between whites and blacks is an inevitable part of the East-West struggle now going on. The challenge of Africa is being added to the challenge of communism. If the Europeans now in control of Africa cannot reassure the Africans, the latter may well turn to Russia for help, not because of a doctrinaire interest in communism but rather because in their inability to get concessions they may feel a need to rely on the enemy of their enemies. Two wars in the 20th century have taught Africans one simple truth: the only way to get rid of undesirable masters is to get them defeated in war — the Germans in the First World War and the Italians in the Second. It would be tragic beyond

words if millions of Africans come to feel it necessary to look to Russia for that redress of grievances that only their European masters are in a position to make at the present time.

In this connection it is of the utmost relevance to recall the communist doctrine which asserts that imperialism is capitalism's highest and latest stage and that capitalism can be made to collapse when its imperialist props are removed. While the intellectual content of the doctrine contains a lot of nonsense, the fact is that the loss of Africa, wholly or partially, would be irreparable.

The impartial historian has to admit that Africans have reasons for some of their distrust of the West. During the last generation many grandiloquent promises have been made to them — in the Fourteen Points, in the principles of the mandates, in the Atlantic Charter, in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, and in the principles of trusteeship under the United Nations. Who can argue that these promises have been fulfilled? On the contrary, there have been developments that alarm intelligent Africans. The decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include both Tunisia and Morocco within the defense perimeter of NATO without consultation with the peoples involved is evidence that the interests of Africans are subordinate to those of Europeans — that Africans can be placed in the front lines of a third world war without a say in the matter. Perhaps the most alarming event in recent history has been the decision of the United Nations to create the independent state of Israel, a decision that in effect told hundreds of thousands of Arabs to move out of their homes so that Europeans could have the land for themselves. Given the gravity of today's population problems throughout the world, peoples in other underdeveloped areas fear that they may be told some day to make room for whites who can make better use of the land than the natives can.

Thus Africa poses great problems for a world engaged in a struggle with Communist Russia. If leaders in the West fail to arrive at an intelligent composition of differences satisfactory to Africans, the consequences will certainly prove to be serious, if not fatal to the cause of the West. One thing is sure: if men of intelligence and good will cannot find a solution, men without intelligence and good will will have to do it.



ALBERT MACK

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA

by XYZ

with the assistance of Lorraine Sullivan

Lorraine Sullivan is a student at Columbia University.

South Africa is going through the convulsions of a racial crisis that has assumed far more than national importance. It is a crisis that threatens to inflame the whole of the African continent. In the eyes of the non-Western world, South Africa has, moreover, become the testing ground of Western democratic and liberal traditions, and the situation holds untold danger. South Africa — an independent state — has, paradoxically, become the focal point of the “colonial question.” The outcome of the crisis is now inextricably involved with the question of whether the West, the unhappy heir of an imperialistic tradition, can redeem itself in time to win or to retain the good will and the confidence of the non-European world.

From the point of view of the world at large, the South African crisis presents a profound moral and ideological issue. There is, however, an even deeper involvement abroad with what is happening in South Africa today. On the part of the West, the concern about South Africa reveals a curious and belated sense of guilt that derives from an awareness of the excesses, during past centuries, of Western colonization in Asia and Africa. The South African crisis is, furthermore, a matter of practical international politics. The concern abroad reflects anxiety about the future of race relations in general, and is also an expression of the fear that South Africa may prove to be the Soviet's most powerful (albeit unintentional) ally in the struggle for Africa.

The reaction abroad to the crisis in South Africa has not thus far been notably constructive, but has rather tended to be one of moralizing-from-afar. While this reaction frequently derives from sincere ideological disagreement with, and moral indignation about, the racial policies practiced in the Union, it tends to obscure the historical roots and present-day complexity of the problem. High-minded condemnation often goes hand in hand with the gross oversimplification both of

the issues involved and of potential solutions. This particularly applies to the tendency to single out individuals (such as Prime Minister Malan), or the National Party, or the doctrine of apartheid, or white South Africans generally, as the source of all evil in South Africa, while overlooking the fact that it is a whole social system which is at fault. Present-day race relations in South Africa are the product of a long process of development in which most of the significant reagents have been at work for several centuries. Discriminatory racial policies and practices are rooted not only in the traditions, but in the social and economic structure of the Union and of southern Africa generally.

This fact clearly does not constitute an "excuse" for any contemporary practice or policy which either violates basic human rights or is repugnant to morality or to the Western democratic tradition. It does, however, require realistic recognition and consideration in the assessment of the present situation. Abstract "moralistic" solutions devised without such historical and sociological perspective are inevitably doomed to failure. A total social structure cannot be changed merely by a change of heart or, for that matter, by a change of government. Any peaceful solution of the South African problem inevitably involves the constructive remodeling not only of human attitudes but also of established social, economic, and political institutions, which is clearly a task of gigantic proportions.

POPULATION AND AREA

The importance of South Africa in the wider African perspective is not immediately apparent from a comparison of surface areas and population aggregates. The total surface of the Union¹ represents only about six per cent of the surface of Africa south of the Sahara² and four per cent of the surface of the African continent as a whole.³

¹ The Union of South Africa is not taken to include South-West Africa. The surface of the Union is 1,224,000 square kilometers and that of South-West Africa about 823,000 sq. km.

² "Africa south of the Sahara" is here defined as all of Africa excluding Spanish West Africa, the Spanish possessions in North Africa, Morocco, Tangier, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Somalis; the concept of "Africa south of the Sahara," as here used, therefore, corresponds to the region designated by the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook* as "Tropical and Southern Africa" (see issue for 1952, p. 20). The region "Africa south of the Sahara" is sometimes defined to include the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Somalis; see South African Institute of International Affairs, *Africa South of the Sahara: An Assessment of Human and Material Resources* (New York, 1951). The area of Africa south of the Sahara, as here used, is 20,078,000 sq. km.; when the more inclusive definition of the region is adopted, the total area would be 24,479,000 sq. km.

³ The total surface of the African continent is taken to be 30,292,000 sq. km. The Union with South-West Africa included represents about ten per cent of the total area of Africa south of the Sahara and somewhat less than seven per cent of the total area of the African continent. For the data used, see United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1952.

(The area of the Union is equal to somewhat less than one-sixth of that of the United States of America.) The population of the Union is 12,646,000, or about one-sixteenth of a total of approximately 200 million for all Africa, while the population of Africa south of the Sahara is approximately 134 million.⁴

The Union has a European population of 2,643,000, which represents at least six times the combined European population of the remaining territories in Africa south of the Sahara,⁵ and probably about one-half of the total European population of the African continent.⁶ In addition, the Union contains 366,000 Asians, or more than two-thirds of the Asian population of Africa south of the Sahara, a

POPULATION OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, MAY 1951

| "Racial" group | Population | Percentage of total population |
|--------------------|------------|--------------------------------|
| European | 2,643,187 | 20.9 |
| African | 8,535,341 | 67.5 |
| Cape Colored | 1,102,323 | 8.7 |
| Indian | 365,524 | 2.9 |
| Total | 12,646,375 | 100.0 |

population which is derived mainly from relatively recent immigration from the Indian sub-continent.⁷

THE UNION'S SOCIAL SYSTEM

South African society is a caste society⁸ with caste status being determined on the basis of "race".⁹ Political power, economic opportunity, and rewards, as well as educational opportunity and social privilege, are concentrated in the hands of the upper caste, the European minority, and are at a minimum in the case of the lowest caste, the African majority. Cape Coloreds (people of mixed descent) and Indians occupy intermediate positions.

⁴ See United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1952, p. 102. The inclusion of the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Somalis, would bring the total population of "Africa south of the Sahara" to 160,000.

⁵ Exact figures are not available. Approximately 320,000 Europeans live in eastern and central Africa and approximately 80,000 in western Africa. See United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in Africa* (Supplement to *World Economic Report*, 1949-50), (1951), p. 3.

⁶ See *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁷ See *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁸ A caste society may be defined as an hereditarily stratified society in which social mobility between the different strata is at a minimum and in which marriage or sexual intimacy between persons from the different strata is, in particular, forbidden. In a caste society personal status is first and foremost dependent upon caste membership.

⁹ For an analysis of the South African social system in terms of caste, see, in particular, R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, *South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit* (Johannesburg, 1945).

The social system in South Africa is built more unequivocally on the basis of "white supremacy" than it is anywhere else in Africa. In South Africa "white supremacy" is both a tradition and a political creed. Historically, the tradition of "white supremacy" is rooted in the great cultural disparity between European settlers and the seventeenth century indigenous inhabitants of the Cape,¹⁰ and in the subsequent subordination of tribal Africans by literate Europeans and the establishment of a rural socio-economic system not unlike feudalism. With the rise of towns and the development of mining and secondary industry, the doctrine of "white supremacy" was firmly entrenched in an economic system which was largely built on the basis of unskilled migrant labor. In addition, the principle of "white supremacy" has become entrenched in discriminatory social practices, in a wide range of legislation, and in a political system which openly vests the power to rule in the European minority.¹¹

During the course of South African history there have been few significant deviations from the doctrine of "white supremacy" — deviations mostly resulting from the leadership of Christian missionaries and from the nineteenth-century application of British liberal political concepts to the problem of suffrage in the developing institutions of self-government at the Cape.¹² The first major challenge to the South African tradition of *inequality* has in fact only appeared during recent decades — in the form of the impact of urbanization, industrialization, and education on the status, attitudes, and political consciousness of the non-European groups. This challenge is in no small measure responsible for the present racial crisis.

As regards the Union's position in the rest of Africa, it will suffice, for present purposes, to say that the frank espousal of the

¹⁰ The early origin of the tradition of racial inequality in South Africa is of considerable historical significance in that it preceded eighteenth-century European enlightenment and equalitarianism. It did, on the other hand, represent a reversal of the initial application of Christian equalitarian doctrine. "In the early days of the Dutch East India Company's rule at the Cape [from 1652 onward], a profession of Christianity was considered sufficient grounds for placing black and white upon more or less the same level. A baptized black, indeed, enjoyed to all intents and purposes the rights and privileges of a European. But it soon came to be considered a disgrace for Europeans to marry people of colour; in fact, as far back as 1685 marriages between Europeans and freed slaves of full colour were prohibited, although the whites and half-breeds could marry if they chose. . . . By the middle of the eighteenth century, a radical change had taken place in race attitudes — people of colour were no longer freely admitted into the European or Christian community; . . ." (*Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa*, No. 24, 1948, p. 1089). See also J. S. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937* (New York, 1939).

¹¹ See I. D. MacCrone, *Race Attitudes in South Africa* (London, 1937) for an historical and analytical study of the subject.

¹² See L. M. Thompson, *The Cape Coloured Franchise* (Johannesburg, 1949), pp. 2 ff.

doctrine of "white supremacy" has made European rule in South Africa anathema to black Africa. The present-day pattern of discriminatory practices and inequality of political status and economic opportunity in the Union, has become a major source of suspicion of, and hostility against, Europeans all over Africa.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE UNION

From the economic point of view, the Union occupies a dominant position in Africa, and particularly in the southern African sub-continent. Modern economic development in the region is largely concentrated in the Union. It produces about five-sixths of Africa's total output of gold and has a similarly predominant share in the production of several other minerals.¹³ It accounts for approximately one-fourth of the total merchandise foreign trade (exclusive of gold exports) of the whole African continent. It has the only large-scale steel industry on the continent, as well as the only substantial concentration of industrial production serving an internal market.¹⁴ The Union, finally, attracts a disproportionate share of capital from abroad and also has the highest level of internal capital formation.¹⁵

The economic importance of the Union in southern Africa is not, however, merely a matter of greater economic production and development, but lies in its social and economic interdependence with neighboring territories. This is particularly true of the British High Commission Territories — Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland — but to a considerable extent also of the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and Mozambique. The Union has a far-reaching impact on the social and economic life of these territories, and plays an important role as a source of their imports and as a market for their exports and labor. The nature of its position in the region is also reflected in its relatively high level of urbanization. Of the twelve cities in Africa south of the Equator having a population exceeding 100,000,¹⁶ seven are situated

¹³ In 1949 the Union produced 86 per cent of the continent's output of gold, 89 per cent of the coal, 99 per cent of the platinum-group metals, 67 per cent of the antimony (metal content), 60 per cent of the chrome ore, about 40 per cent of the asbestos, manganese, and tungsten ores, and in 1948 nearly the entire supply of nickel. See United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in Africa* (1951), pp. 41-42.

¹⁴ See *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁵ See *Ibid.*, p. 41; and S. Herbert Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa* (London, 1938).

¹⁶ Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Germiston, and Springs (Union of South Africa); Leopoldville and Elizabethville (Belgian Congo); Luanda (Angola); Salisbury (Southern Rhodesia); and Nairobi (Kenya).

in the Union and these have a combined population of roughly three times the combined population of the other five.¹⁷

The Union's particular position in the economic life of southern Africa is, finally, a direct outgrowth of the form that modern economic development has taken in the region. Generally speaking, the highest levels of economic development in Africa south of the Sahara have been attained in areas where capital investment from abroad and permanent European settlement were attracted by readily exploitable mineral and other resources which were in demand on the world market.¹⁸ These areas, by far the most important of which are in the Union, have become nuclei for the development of European-dominated exchange economies superimposed upon, and gradually bringing about the disruption of, the traditional subsistence economies. Tribal economies, many of which are at present in a state of disintegration, have become increasingly dependent upon the European-dominated exchange economies, a state of affairs which greatly contributes to the Union's economic ascendancy in the region.

The gradual disruption of the traditional subsistence economies of southern Africa is part of the broader process of the disintegration of tribal life in general, a process which has been aided also by missionary influences, by education, and by other contacts with the world at large. The deterioration of the tribal economies, brought about in part by the growing incapacity of primitive methods of agricultural production to keep pace with the expansion of population, is the result also of the large-scale use of labor from tribal areas in the European-dominated wage economies. Notwithstanding the initial reluctance of Africans living in subsistence economies to exchange their labor for wages, economic pressure and the growing demand for the products of modern industry are forcing large numbers to seek such employment outside the tribal areas. The prolonged absence of large numbers of able-bodied workers from the tribal areas has, in its turn, had far-reaching effects upon tribal life and economic organization — and so the vicious circle continues. An extended system of migrant labor has consequently become a characteristic feature of economic and social life in Africa south of the Sahara. The mining, industrial, and European farming areas in the region — more particularly the Union and

¹⁷ Calculations based on data given in the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook* for 1952 (pp. 202-203). The data in question are largely derived from census enumerations and, in the case of these cities, generally relate to 1951. The data used relate to cities as such and exclude the populations of "suburban fringes" outside official city boundaries, an exclusion which probably tends to reduce the ratio of preponderance of the urban population of the Union over that of the other territories in the sub-continent.

¹⁸ Cf. L. H. Samuels, "African Economic Development," in South African Institute of International Affairs, *Africa South of the Sahara* (1951), pp. 172-173.

Southern Rhodesia — have become importers of labor from tribal areas characterized by subsistence economies.

The disruptive impact on the subsistence economy is greatest in South Africa. Economic pressures in the direction of the emergence of a homogeneous economic system have, however, to some extent been offset by deliberate governmental attempts to preserve the dual nature of the economy. In the Union, as in certain other areas of permanent European settlement,

... the development of a homogeneous economic society is restrained as a matter of policy and of institutional practice by the European settlers. In the Union of South Africa, in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, the system of Native Reserves tends to perpetuate the dual nature of the economy by governmental policies which attempt to segregate the indigenous subsistence society from the impact of modern economic development. These Native Reserves, by being maintained as areas of tribal life, are to a large extent cut off from the direct effects of the developments taking place outside them. With practically no internal capital resources, as they become increasingly unable with their existing techniques to support growing populations, they become exporters of labour.¹⁹

The exact extent to which the Union employs migrant labor — from inside and outside its own borders — is not known, but the total number of migrant workers from territories other than the Union probably exceeds 250,000. African labor in the mining industry is almost exclusively recruited from rural areas — the majority (in the case of the Transvaal gold mines, approximately 60 per cent) being recruited from beyond the borders of the Union. The Union draws migrant workers in large numbers from as far afield as Nyasaland and Tanganyika. In 1950 there were employed in the country at least 40,000 African workers from Nyasaland, 8,000 or 9,000 from Northern Rhodesia, 16,500 from Southern Rhodesia, more than 100,000 from Mozambique, at least 60,000 from Basutoland, 17,000 from Bechuanaland, and 11,000 from Swaziland.²⁰

¹⁹ United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Review of Economic Conditions in Africa* (1951), p. 11.

²⁰ These figures probably err on the conservative side. The figure given for migrants from Southern Rhodesia relates to 1946 (see United Kingdom White Paper on *Central African Territories: Geographical, Historical and Economic Survey*, Cmd. 8234, 1951, p. 16). The figures relating to migrants from the other British dependencies are the figures given by the governments of the territories concerned (see United Nations, *Non-Self Governing Territories: Summaries and Analyses of Information Transmitted to the Secretary General during 1951*, Vol. II, 1952, pp. 117, 122, 183, 192, and 215) and in some cases relate only to migrants leaving the territory in the specific year. The figure for Mozambique is known to err on the conservative side insofar as the number of African workers recruited from that territory for the mines of the Transvaal alone is set at a maximum of 100,000 by a South African-Portuguese convention (see *Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa*, No. 24, 1948, pp. 493 and 494).

The far-reaching implications of these figures²¹ become evident only when they are seen in relation to the total populations of the "labor-reservoir" territories. The adult male absentee ratio in the Native Reserves in the Union is generally more than 40 per cent and in some areas 60 per cent and higher.²² As regards the High Commission Territories, the proportion of male absentees was recently estimated at 40 per cent from Basutoland, 48 per cent for Bechuanaland, and 25 per cent for Swaziland.²³ In Bechuanaland, "about four men in five have either been abroad in the past or are still away . . ."²⁴ In Nyasaland the number of absent migrant workers in 1950 was 143,000 as against a total of 103,000 employed in the wage economy of the territory itself, and a total population of 2,340,000.²⁵

Quite apart from its disruptive impact on tribal life and economic organization the prevalent system of migrant labor in southern Africa entails an enormous wastage of productive energy and tends to keep both output and earnings at a very low level. The practice of recruiting labor over wide areas through large recruiting organizations tends to reduce the competition between employers.

It is a significant paradox [says the United Nations Department of Economic Affairs] that, in the face of almost constant complaints of shortage of labour in Africa, the wages of Africans in many parts of Africa and over long periods have remained relatively static . . . That wage rates have not . . . risen more materially is explained by the fact that the majority of African wage earners are members of a labour force serving two economic systems.²⁶

From the preceding analysis it is evident that both the instability and the low-wage structure of African labor — in the Union as well as in the exchange economies of the other territories of southern Africa — are rooted in the large-scale migration of unskilled labor

²¹ It should be borne in mind that Southern Rhodesia also draws heavily on migrant workers from the same "labor-reservoir" territories. The imbalance between the labor needs of the exchange economy and the indigenous labor supply in Southern Rhodesia is actually even more extreme than in the Union. In 1949 59 per cent of all Africans engaged in wage labor in the territory were non-indigenous. These included 82,000 from Nyasaland, 46,000 from Northern Rhodesia, 74,000 from the Portuguese territories, and 5,000 from Tanganyika and elsewhere. (See Cmd. 8234, p. 17.)

²² See Union of South Africa, *Population Census, 1936*, Vol. I, *Sex and Geographical Distribution* (U. G. No. 21, 1938), Table 13.

²³ Estimates given to the Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages Commission (U. G. No. 21, 1944). Another authority places the adult male absentee rate as high as 50-60 per cent for Basutoland and Bechuanaland and 25-30 per cent for Swaziland; see Hugh Ashton, "The High Commission Territories," in Ellen Hellman, ed., *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa* (New York, 1949), p. 721.

²⁴ Isaac Schapera, *Migrant Labour and Tribal Life* (London, 1947), p. 157.

²⁵ See United Nations, *Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summaries and Analyses of Information Transmitted to the Secretary General during 1951*, Vol. II (1952), pp. 186, 191, 192.

²⁶ *Review of Economic Conditions in Africa* (1951), p. 12.

which transcends political boundaries. At the same time there is little doubt that the most likely avenue of future advance for the African lies in the accelerated development of stable and literate African industrial populations, and in the replacement of the present low-wage structure by an appropriately differentiated and graded wage structure. The economic basis of racial inequality will therefore continue to exist as long as large numbers of African workers continue to "serve two economic systems."

In future economic development, the fate of the Union is closely interrelated with that of its neighbors. Numerous pressures will no doubt continue to be exerted for the preservation of the dual nature of the economies of the region, but other forces undermine the existing system. The increasing economic deterioration of tribal areas, and the consequent pressure on individuals and families to move permanently to areas of wage employment, is one such force. The shift of the emphasis from mining to secondary industry is another — employment in secondary industry is not subject to the same rigid regulation and control with respect to housing, movement, etc., as employment in the mining industry, and is therefore more conducive to the permanent urban settlement of workers with their families. In addition, secondary industry, for its efficient operation, needs a labor force that is far more differentiated and graded according to skill than that which has traditionally met the requirements of the mining industry. Finally, the exhaustion of the rural supply of European potentially skilled workers is bound to lead to greater opportunity for Africans.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It falls outside the scope of the present article to attempt to assess the possible outcome of the present racial crisis in South Africa. It is rather the purpose to counteract the popular tendency to think of the problem primarily in political terms, as if it were possible to effect a solution or remedy the situation merely by voting a specific political party into or out of power. There can be no doubt about the importance of the role of government and of political action in any modern society, but it is sometimes overlooked that a government of necessity must function within the limits imposed by the social and economic system and its long-term structural changes. Long-term trends of development within the social and economic system often run contrary to the objectives which govern political action, and in such cases the political action is doomed to failure. In the light of the preceding analysis of the race problem in South Africa, it may very well be that the policy of the present Government of the Union is thus in conflict with fundamental structural changes in the South African economy and society.

APARTHEID — A SLOGAN OR A SOLUTION?

by N. J. J. Olivier

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The South African policy of "apartheid" has caused world-wide comment and discussion. In the world outside South Africa such comments have usually ranged from bitter denunciation to mild and indifferent justification. Born and bred in South Africa, and belonging to the Afrikaans-speaking section of the European population, this writer has no doubts whatsoever that such a policy, from a human, ethical, Christian, and scientific point of view, is one which, if carried into effect, would improve race relations in South Africa and would lead to human happiness and a spirit of good will between white and black; although convinced that such improvement, happiness, and good will could be achieved only by a sane and just implementation of a policy of separate development — a term preferable to that of "apartheid" — the writer realizes that it is well-nigh impossible to deal exhaustively with the subject in a single article, the more so since he has no illusions about the magnitude of the task facing anyone who attempts to justify the South African policy before a world forum which is almost completely ignorant of the South African background and realities of life.

The policy of apartheid, formerly also called segregation, is, in principle, the traditional policy followed by successive generations and governments in South Africa in relations between white and black — a policy of white South Africa to save itself and its way of life from total extinction by the numerically superior, illiterate, and relatively primitive black masses.

In the beginning of the seventeenth century the greatest portion of the southernmost part of the African continent was practically uninhabited. When the Dutch colonists settled at the Cape in 1652,

the migratory Bantu tribes had scarcely crossed the northern borders of what is today the Union of South Africa. In the course of time the eastward and northward expansion of the white colony had to meet the southward-moving Bantu tribes; at the end of the eighteenth century they met and clashed in the eastern parts of the present Cape Province. It is therefore a complete fallacy to state that the Bantu in South Africa have a stronger aboriginal claim to the country than the Europeans: the Bantu were at that time as much foreigners as the whites were. Equally fallacious is the prevailing assumption that the Bantu had to part with their land under duress, and that the whites stole their land from them; in this connection the whites in South Africa have a record far superior to their brethren in North America!

In the wars following the contact between white and black, the Bantu were eventually vanquished and brought under the direct control of the Europeans and the European government, thereby putting an effective end to the devastating strife between the various Bantu tribes themselves. It would have been a comparatively easy task for the Europeans of that time to withdraw their protection, to allow the Bantu to annihilate themselves by internecine wars, and even to assist in this annihilation; they could, in other words, have followed the course adopted in North America and Australia. Instead, compelled by their religious convictions and humanitarian principles, they accepted the onerous duty of trusteeship over these barbarous and warlike peoples — the task of Christianizing, civilizing, educating them, leading them to a fuller and happier life. It cannot be denied that, in this connection, South Africa has a record of which she can rightly be proud.

It is a well-known fact that the Europeans in South Africa have a distinctive race or color consciousness. To anyone ignorant of the present-day facts of South African life and their historical background, this attitude toward race relations is often mystifying. To the scientific and open-minded observer, however, such an attitude is completely understandable and justifiable. The simple truth is that it was (and still is) a direct and inevitable result of the vast differences between the two groups, and was (and still is) fundamentally nothing other than a determined attempt by the whites to preserve their identity, their way of life, and their continued existence. Consider the following facts:

The Racial Differences. That racial differences do exist, nobody would deny; that the Bantu and the Europeans in South Africa belong to two distinct racial types, with distinct and unalterable biological characteristics is also a fact so evident that no one would attempt to deny it. It is only natural that the European colonists came to regard these distinctive characteristics as so many racial dif-

ferences, and since they were wont to associate with people of their own racial type, they considered these differences, according to their taste and traditions, as aesthetically disagreeable.

The Differences in Civilization, Culture, and General Way of Life. The colonists came into contact with a people whose level of civilization was not only far lower, but clearly primitive. Their general culture, material and otherwise, and their way of life were characteristic of a primitive people, and of course vastly different from those of the European colonists. Their warlike nature, their social institutions, their legal and administrative system, their primitive subsistence economy, their language—all these accentuated the differences between white and black.

The Difference in Religion. The primitive level of civilization and culture was accompanied by a similarly primitive religious system; ancestor worship and witchcraft were two of the main facets of this system, pervading almost the whole political, social, and economic field. In contrast, the European colonists were deeply imbued with the Christian faith and the Protestant principles, and many had fled to South Africa for the sake of religious freedom. The Bible and their religion played a significant role in their everyday lives, and was a source of inestimable comfort and succor in the many and varied depredations they so patiently suffered. It is exactly because of this that they felt themselves duty-bound not to annihilate these heathen but to convert them to Christianity and to bring them to accept salvation in Jesus Christ.

The Difference in Numbers. From the outset the European colonists were greatly outnumbered; there is no doubt that if they had decided on a course of assimilation, they would have disappeared into the black heathendom of Africa as effectively as if they had been completely vanquished in war. Of necessity they had to arm and protect themselves against this ever-growing menace, and how could it better be done than by throwing an impenetrable armor around themselves—the armor of racial purity and self-preservation?

Thus it is evident that the origin of South African color consciousness is understandable and justifiable. The difference in color, as the most evident racial difference, became tantamount to a difference between one way of life and another, between barbarism and civilization, between heathenism and Christianity, between overwhelming numbers and practically insignificant numbers. Although some of the facets of the problem may have changed, this color consciousness remains as active as ever; it has become a tradition into which almost every white child is born, and an indivisible part of his mental make-up.

Let us consider, in the light of the four points mentioned above, the main aspects of European-Bantu relations as they exist today:

(1) The racial differences are as pronounced today as they were 300 years ago. The European population has in a remarkable way succeeded in preserving its identity as a group racially distinct from the Bantu.

(2) The differences in civilization and culture have become somewhat less because of European influence and activities, especially in the educational and missionary fields. A very small percentage of the Bantu population has completed the process of acculturation and has become completely Europeanized and civilized; among the rest (the overwhelming majority) western civilization and culture have been accepted in varying degrees, but in general by far the bigger section of the Bantu population is still in a relatively primitive stage of development, although not wholly untouched by western civilization. It is the educated minority group that the outside world generally sees; this group is the most vociferous and most clamorous, feeling the restrictions placed by European overlordship as unbearable and unjustifiable. That so small a number of Bantu has become completely Europeanized, in spite of the long contact with Europeans and their civilization and in spite of educational and missionary activities, is due mainly to their tenacious clinging to old customs and usages and to their preponderance in numbers. The urbanization of large numbers of Bantu as a result of industrial development and their integration into the economic life and activities in the European (non-native) area, must of course hasten the disintegration of the tribal system and their acceptance of European ideas and ways of life.

(3) What has been said above about the differences in civilization and culture also applies to the differences in religion. Only a minority of the Bantu has become Christian in the full sense.

(4) The numerical preponderance of the Bantu is still on the increase. This can be ascribed, *inter alia*, to the absence of internecine strife, the non-occurrence of famine, the provision of medical services—all due to European intervention or assistance—coupled with the absence of birth-control measures. At the moment there are about eight and one-half million Bantu in the Union of South Africa as against approximately two and one-half million Europeans; the Bantu population thus outnumbers the white population 3.4 to one. It has been estimated that in another 50 years the Bantu population will have increased to approximately 20-22 million, and the European population to about six million.¹ With this unique situation, it is

¹ These estimates do not take into consideration the almost 1,500,000 other non-Europeans in the Union.

understandable that white South Africa views with scepticism suggestions concerning their racial policies put forward by countries where the problem does not exist. The matter is made much worse in that the Bantu of the Union of South Africa are but a fringe of the vast Bantu population on the African continent.

From these facts it follows that no European community in South Africa would be willing to commit suicide by following a policy which would lead to its own political, economic, and social subservience with eventual extinction, either by force or assimilation.

The crux of South Africa's native problem could thus be succinctly stated as follows: the European population has the unalterable and indomitable determination first, to preserve its identity and continued existence as a separate, distinctive entity; and second, to retain and exercise its right of political self-determination at all costs. On the other hand, the Bantu population must be afforded the right of national self-expression, in politics, economics, and the like. In other words, it is impossible to follow indefinitely a policy by which the Bantu or at least the educated and civilized section of it, would be denied political rights and economic opportunities. Bearing in mind the facts and considerations stated above, the only possible solution of these two apparently irreconcilable principles lies in the acceptance and application of the policy of separate development.

Such a policy aims at the gradual and systematic disentanglement of the two groups, making it possible for each to exercise political rights and enjoy economic opportunities within its own territory. It means a large-scale development of the existing native areas within the Union of South Africa. Approximately thirteen per cent of the area of the Union has been put aside for exclusive native use; by far the greater portion of this area consists of fertile agricultural land, with an excellent rainfall. These territories have become denuded and eroded as a result of the primitive agricultural methods employed by the inhabitants, and they are in general under-developed and poor, mainly because industrial and urban development has been confined to the European areas. There is, however, not the least doubt that these territories could be developed on the basis of a diversified economy, to the extent that they could accommodate two to three times their present population, which numbers somewhat over three million. If the size of the present native areas makes such a policy unrealizable in its full extent, then only one alternative remains: the extension of these areas either within the Union or in collaboration with other governments. Considering the agricultural methods employed by the natives in their areas at the present time, it would be nonsensical to consider a large-scale extension of these areas at present. As a matter of fact, the time may arrive when the European groups

in the Union and elsewhere in Southern Africa would be compelled, in their own interests, no longer to think in terms of the reservation of land for the natives, but of the reservation of land for the Europeans, leaving the rest of the continent to the native.

It is quite clear that the European population, possibly with international assistance, will have to bear the brunt of the development and will have to assist for many years to come with capital, technical skill, and management, especially for the development of the basic services (transport, power, water) and primary and secondary industries. By following a policy of decentralization in the non-native area, it would be possible to create fairly large-scale industrial activities in the vicinity of the native areas, enabling the natives to obtain remunerative employment without any harmful effects on their social and family life. In general, the economies of the native and non-native areas will probably be integrated to form an economic whole.

Politically, the policy of separate development envisages the creation of a number of Bantu territorial units with an increasing measure of self-government. The basic principles to be applied in this connection is that Europeans living in the native areas will be citizens of the European state; natives living in the European area will be integrated into the political machinery of the various native areas. What the eventual form of collaboration between the European sector and the various native sectors will be is difficult to foretell, but it is quite possible that it may develop along federal lines, eventually resulting in a United States of Southern Africa or a Southern Africa Confederation. Only an arrangement of this sort can do justice to the political and economic aspirations of the native peoples, and still guarantee the Europeans' continued political existence. Such a policy aims at forestalling the race conflict that is inherent in the present situation by removing the root cause of the problem — the intermixture of the races. The same solution was put in force in the former British India by its partition into the two separate states of India and Pakistan. When it is considered that this division was brought about solely because of the religious differences between Hindus and Muslims, how much stronger is the claim for a territorial division in Southern Africa!

The main obstacles to the implementation of this policy are those of land and labor. The former has been dealt with briefly above; as regards the latter, it is worth remembering that the availability of relatively large numbers of unskilled native laborers has resulted in a general unwillingness to mechanize and rationalize. There is a scandalous waste of manpower and there probably will be for as long as the present policy continues. While recognizing the important role "cheap" native labor plays in the economic structure of the European

area, one can hardly argue that this could not be changed in the course of two or three generations. The natural increase of the European population, immigration, mechanization and rationalization, more efficient use of available labor, coupled with the system of migratory native labor—these may all be factors that would assist in decreasing the number of natives at present living in the European area. The contention that a policy of separate development must of necessity lead to economic disruption and chaos is without substance.

As could be expected, opinions in South Africa are in no way unanimous as to the course that should be adopted. In the main, two opposing schools of thought may be distinguished: that of "integration" and that of separate development. The first school favors the increasing integration of the native population into the economic life of the European area, and the removal of all restrictions hampering the permanent settlement of natives in the European towns and cities. It is generally conceded that economic integration will eventually lead to political, economic, and social equality between white and black. Some of the people favoring integration, however, refuse to admit this obvious fact, believing that it would be impossible to have complete integration and still "keep the native in his place."

Among integrationists one finds the following groups, listed in order of increasing number of followers: (1) Those in favor of the immediate granting of political equality between white and black, regardless of differences in civilization and culture. The Communists are practically the only ones subscribing to this view. (2) Those favoring the placing of the natives on a separate voters' roll, with limited representation in the legislative institutions. The majority favors a weighted franchise. (3) Those favoring a common voters' roll, with a weighted franchise in the case of natives, *i.e.*, only natives possessing certain qualifications (as regards the level of civilization reached) to be enrolled. (4) Those favoring a common roll for all, white and black, who possess certain defined qualifications. (5) Those in favor of the creation of parallel legislative institutions, in essence amounting to the creation of a white parliament and of a black parliament. (6) Those favoring the retention of the present position and opposed to any material extension of the present political rights of natives, regardless of the extent of economic integration.

Very often the integrationists favoring the latter two policies are regarded, and regard themselves, as protagonists of the "apartheid" policy; although believing in the necessity and desirability of the economic integration of white and black, they are convinced that a policy of political and social discrimination can be maintained. Some even propagate the curtailment of the limited political rights at present enjoyed by the natives.

Those subscribing to a general "apartheid" policy can be classified as follows: (1) As in (6) above. (2) As in (5) above. (3) Those favoring curtailment of the political rights at present exercised by natives. (4) Those favoring a larger measure of territorial separation, with the retention of present native political rights in the European area and the gradual development of local governing institutions in the native areas. (5) Those in favor of eventually complete, or almost complete, territorial separation with the removal of the present political representation of natives in the Union Parliament, and the development of legislative institutions in the native areas. There are minor differences as to the form and measure of self-government that is to develop in the natives' own areas.

All this must appear rather bewildering to an outsider. It would, however, simplify matters if it is remembered (a) that probably no less than 95 per cent of the whites in South Africa are strenuously opposed to any form of political equality in the European area, now or in the future; (b) that the majority still believes in economic integration. But an increasing section is beginning to see the inevitable difficulties ahead if (b) is continued and (a) is held as an unalterable conviction, as undoubtedly will be the case. It is this increasing section of the white population that sees in a constructive policy of separate development the only possible avenue of escape for white and black.

The recent general elections will inevitably influence the native policy to be followed in the course of the next couple of years. Because of this development, and because so much has been said overseas about the government of South Africa under the premiership of Dr. Malan, it is relevant here to examine what the government's attitude has been in respect of the various policies mentioned above. Although there is danger in over-simplification, the following points may be considered to be a correct exposition: (1) The government, in conformity with the wishes and convictions expressed and held by the majority of the white population, has been definitely and firmly opposed to any form of political and social equality in the European area of South Africa. (2) The government has made the application of the principle of segregation effective over a larger number of fields than has been the case in the past. (3) With the possible exception of the abolition of the Natives' Representative Council (which in any case refused to function unless all discriminatory laws were immediately repealed) and measures designed to control the influx of natives into the urban areas, all of the measures taken by the government were dictated by absolute necessity for the maintenance of law and order or in the interests of the natives themselves; as far as this writer is able to judge, none was designed to place additional unjustified hardships

upon the native population. (4) On the contrary, some of the measures have been progressive and constructive² — although naturally not enough so in the minds of some people. The idea that the policy of the Malan government has been incomparably more oppressive than that of any previous government is untrue and is, to a large extent, the creation of the English press in South Africa, which left little undone to oppose and hamper the present government whenever opportunity offered. (5) By the appointment of the Commission on the Socio-economic Development of the Native Areas, whose report is expected during the course of next year, it proved the seriousness of its purpose to assist the natives in these areas to a fuller and happier life. (6) In connection with the policy of separate development, envisaging eventual complete separation of the races, the attitude of the government, as expressed by its Minister of Native Affairs, has been more or less as follows:

The government is a democratic government chosen by the electorate to govern for five years. It is impossible to carry out a policy of complete separation within such a short period, and *as a practical policy* the government therefore has no intention of effecting such complete separation; it is not, however, opposed to the ideal. The government is in general not in favor of the continued increase in the measure of economic integration, although it is impossible to stop or reverse this process, which has been gathering momentum for the last 20-30 years, within the parliamentary life of this government; it would do everything possible, however, to create such conditions as circumstances allow as would enable future governments to proceed on the road to effecting an ever-larger measure of separation, if the electorate so desires.

Lack of space prohibits a more detailed discussion, and also makes it necessary for the writer to confine himself deliberately to the issues between white and black and to leave completely aside the problem of the Indian and colored populations of the Union. What has been attempted is an interpretation of some of the prevailing lines of thought and reactions in South Africa on the native problem; if the writer has succeeded in focusing attention on the complexity and immensity of these problems, and on the fact that we need a little more assistance and a little less suspicion from the outside world, he will be more than thankful.

² Among these are the Native Building Workers Act, the Bantu Authorities Act, the Native Services Levy Act, the Native (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act., etc.

APARTHEID — ANOTHER VIEW

by Z. K. Matthews

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The policy of apartheid espoused by the government of the Union of South Africa under the leadership of Prime Minister Daniel F. Malan is deserving of the most serious study, not only by the inhabitants of South Africa who are directly affected by it, but also by all persons interested in contemporary problems in the continent of Africa and their probable repercussions throughout the rest of the world. That the advocates of apartheid themselves, in spite of their isolationist tendencies, appreciate the interdependence of countries and peoples in the modern world was indicated by their exploitation of distant Mau-Mauism, British Gold Coastism, and United Nations debates as vote-catching factors in the recent South African election.

In dealing with this subject it is essential to be on one's guard against certain approaches which, by their apparent plausibility, may prove misleading, if not positively mischievous, because they tend to cloud the real issues involved. One of these is the evolutionary approach, the appeal to history. Under its pseudo-intellectual spell it is easy to mistake figments of the imagination for undisputed or indisputable facts and convince oneself that to account for something "historically" provides a kind of moral justification for the thing itself. Thus the advocates of apartheid have created the myth that when Jan van Riebeeck established his settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 there were no Bantu tribes within the boundaries of what is now known as the Union of South Africa, and that these tribes, migrating from their ancestral homes conveniently located somewhere outside, invaded a country which the whites had already claimed for themselves. Quite apart from the fact that the question of invasion priorities is of doubtful validity, its very relevance is questionable, for even if the white invaders *had* found any Bantu at the Cape of Good

Hope, the legitimate hopes and aspirations of such tribes would not have received any greater practical recognition. The now virtually extinct Bushmen and Hottentots testify to this.

Similarly to suggest that when the Voortrekkers left the Cape for the interior in 1836 they encountered nothing but empty open country is apparently not regarded by apartheid-pleading or pro-apartheid historians as inconsistent with the claim that the Voortrekkers had to conquer hordes of barbarians in the course of the establishment of their Republics!

Generally these historians conveniently forget to add that the parts of the interior of the country which those early pioneers found uninhabited in 1836 are still largely uninhabited today; for even with his superior technological civilization the white man has up to this day not been able to make the karoo and the desert provide for anything more than a relatively sparse population.

Another myth of the advocates of apartheid is to claim credit for things which have happened among Africans which they or their forebears had little or no share in bringing about. Thus they pat themselves on the back for the evangelization and the educational development which has taken place among Africans, when the fact of the matter is that the credit for that work belongs to missionaries and missionary societies which carried on their work in the teeth of the opposition or active hostility of the advocates of apartheid. The names of Vander Kemp, Moffat, Livingstone, Phillip, William Shaw, John Bennie, Stewart, and other "blessed missionaries," as they were once described by an irascible Cape Governor — the real pioneers of mission and educational work among Africans — will not be found on the apartheid scroll of honor. One has only to compare the educational work done among Africans in Natal and the Cape prior to Union with the missionary-sponsored position of Africans in the former Republics at that time to question the view that the separationists felt that they were religiously bound not to destroy the heathen but to convert them and to "save" them.

Mention must be made of one more myth, namely, that the color consciousness of the separationist is inevitable and necessary if he is to preserve himself and his racial identity. It would not be in keeping with the beautiful world of make-believe which he has constructed, for him to ask himself why this inevitable color consciousness is so local in its manifestation or how its inevitability is consistent with the emergence of the colored population (persons of mixed descent) in South Africa.

In short, just as all kinds of similar *ex post facto* arguments had to be manufactured to rationalize and justify the institution of slavery — including the appeal to racial differences, differences in religion,

scriptural citations, the advantages of slavery to the slave, etc. — modern white domination over blacks has not been at a loss for materials to construct its mythological charter. Experience shows that there is no limit to what the human being can do to his beliefs when he is confronted with the need to justify the policies which subserve his self-interest.

What, then, is the nature of apartheid, and what are the grounds of opposition to it on the part of those who disagree with its basic assumptions and its practice, whatever its historical origin may be? Viewed in the most favorable light, the policy of apartheid contemplates the setting aside of areas in South Africa in which African interests shall be paramount and areas in which white interests shall be paramount; in other words the separation of whites and Africans into self-sufficient socio-economic units — total separations into what has been called distinct white and black "areas of liberty." For many years, both before and since Union, relations between black and white in South Africa have been inspired in large measure by the spirit of apartheid, albeit called by different names at different times. Although other policies, such as assimilation and trusteeship, have had their adherents in the country and have in varying degrees exercised a moderating influence, the policy of apartheid has been in the ascendancy all the time.

Apartheid is based on the assumption that the African differs so radically from the European in his cultural background and in his needs and aspirations that it must forever remain impossible to find common ground upon which black and white can work together harmoniously in a common political structure. An attempt is then made to justify the policy on the ground that separation would in fact enable the African to develop on his own lines in his own areas, wherein he would find full scope for the exercise of his capabilities and for the realization of his hopes and aspirations.

But giving lip service to the philosophy of apartheid has not prevented its advocates from acquiescing in the organization of South African national life in such a way as to make the realization of the stated "ideal" impracticable. This is what has been described as the "lie in the soul." Thus South Africa has adopted — and has no intention of departing from — a land policy which makes impossible the living of the African apart from the white man on a permanent basis. The result is that there is a far greater number of Africans who spend the major part of their lives outside the limited areas set aside for African occupation than there is of those who begin and end their days within the Reserves. This anomaly is the outcome of an economic system which is dependent for its very survival upon the employment of Africans in non-African areas.

Similarly, the system of administration in the African reservations is so dependent upon the European for its success that it provides no scope for the African to acquire the skills and techniques which might stand him in good stead if he were in fact allowed to develop on his own. For example, the Transkeian Territories of the Cape Province, perhaps the best known African area in the Union, are as white-dominated as any other rural area of like size in the Union, if not more so. The same story is to be told regarding other services intended specifically for Africans in different parts of the country. Thus the special school system for Africans is administered, controlled, and dominated by Europeans who show little or no readiness to allow the African to manage his own affairs in his own sphere, even if these same Europeans happen to be believers in apartheid. Nor does the policy in post offices, railroad stations, and other public institutions where apartheid dictates that differential arrangements should be made for Africans apply behind as well as in front of the counter. In short, throughout the Union, both inside and outside the so-called African areas or in any institutions specially intended for Africans, apartheid guarantees the *baaskap* (boss-ship) of the white man over the black without according the African the much-trumpeted blessings of apartheid. All is confirmed by Dr. W. M. Eiselen, one of the principal advocates of separation, who writes:

In practice the Native finds his freedom of movement and action severely curtailed, that in his efforts to rise to a higher level, he finds his progress in the economic, the social and political fields barred by the white man, who claims permanent superiority by virtue of his colour. He finds to his dismay that many of the Europeans who appear to champion the cause of equal opportunity for all, resent close contact and familiarity with the Native, and that they are not prepared to go beyond distant friendship.¹

The attitude which is here ascribed to the Europeans "who appear to champion the cause of equal opportunity for all" applies *a fortiori* to those who subscribe to the doctrine that there shall be no equality between black and white in church or state.

Throughout their contact with the Europeans the African people have never wavered in their rejection of apartheid. Nothing which has happened thus far has shaken them in their conviction that there is no genuine desire on the part of its advocates to create an area, or areas, of liberty or untrammelled development for Africans, but only an intention on their part to convert South Africa into a single area of liberty for Europeans. Therefore the African looks upon the policy of apartheid as but a thinly-veiled form of exploitation and white

¹ W. M. Eiselen, "The Meaning of Apartheid," *Race Relations*, Vol. XV, No. 3, p. 74.

domination and he regards any person who advocates it as his political enemy. However long he may be physically compelled to endure it, he is determined not to give his assent to a policy which is designed to place every European permanently in a position of artificial superiority over every black man in every sphere of life, a policy which covertly or overtly places him in the position of being merely a means to the ends of others.

While the modern advocates of separation are prepared to admit that past practices in South Africa have had the effect of domination of white over black, they would like the world to believe that dressed in the new look of apartheid this policy has more than enough merits to offset the demerits of past practice. According to them, the trouble in the past was a lack of clear objectives and the consequent adoption of a policy of aimless drifting from one scheme to another. What is required to remedy the situation is that

the ultimate goal should be clearly seen, namely, the separation of White and Native into separate self-sufficient socio-economic units, a process which will spread over many years. The aim once in view, both parties will be able to adapt themselves gradually to the new circumstances envisaged by separation, and they will bear with greater equanimity and less bitterness the many hardships which they will meet in the transition.²

The obvious flaw in this line of reasoning is the implied suggestion that clarity of objectives has some virtue of its own apart from the nature and the contents of the goals envisaged. Yet it is precisely because its objectives *are* so transparent that apartheid cannot be "contemplated with equanimity" by those whose interests will be adversely affected by its execution. The policy contemplates the setting up of "separate self-sufficient socio-economic units" under the final control of a government in which Africans will not be directly represented, for under apartheid unilateral action by the omniscient white man is a *sine qua non*. The rest of the population must be satisfied to have things done to or for them. Unfortunately, the ingenuity of man, including "apartheid-man," has not yet devised a political or social system under which the legitimate rights of any people, or any section of any people, can be safeguarded by an institution or institutions in which that group has no direct and effective voice. The African does not desire or intend to become a mere rubber-stamp of European decisions, nor will he be satisfied with being consulted about his affairs in institutions such as the advisory councils or advisory boards which now exist or the so-called "Bantu Authorities" (in which no final decisions can be taken) that have been suggested for the future.

² Eiselen, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

The African will therefore continue to demand the right to work with the white man at all levels of South African national life. The present trend of events in that country seems to indicate that the white man regards it as altogether unthinkable that he may ever have to share with the black man the authority that he has monopolized for so long. The recent election, in which the separationists won a sweeping victory, is probably regarded as an endorsement of the "whites only" policy, but as long as non-whites have no share in approving or disapproving any particular policy it is a misnomer to describe that policy as "national," and while these conditions prevail it requires no special gift of prevision to suggest that the country will search in vain for peaceful and harmonious relations between black and white. The Africans have always subscribed to a policy of positive cooperation between black and white for the common good. Nothing which has thus far been said or done in the name of separation or apartheid is likely to lead them to succumb to the blandishments thereof.

A final word about the attitude of the outside world to this problem. Dr. Max Yergan, described as "America's foremost authority on Africa," has recently emerged as an apologist for the white man's "fears."³ In his view, critics of South Africa's racialist policies must bear in mind the high "economic stakes" involved. Dr. Yergan seems to be quite oblivious to some of the facts in this situation. It may be a matter of minor concern to him, and to those who think like him, but there are millions of people in that country whose "fears" and "stakes," economic and otherwise, are deserving of serious consideration. The fact that they are vote-less and defenseless and largely inarticulate should not lead the world, under the guidance of "authorities on Africa," however eminent, to underrate the importance of Africans' views on matters affecting their destiny in the land of their birth.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

by Marian Neal

On the Editorial Staff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Miss Neal's study of "The United Nations and Human Rights" was recently published by International Conciliation.

As the author of an article in *Foreign Affairs* recently wrote, "hard choices" lie before the Union of South Africa.¹ The efforts of the white minority in South Africa to develop a multi-racial society predicated quite frankly upon the theory that all men are *not* created equal have come under severe criticism from the outside world. In their denial of racial equality, the policies of the South African government run directly counter to the worldwide movement toward respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination on the basis of race, sex, language, or religion which has gathered increasing momentum since the end of World War II.

International opinion concerning developments in the Union of South Africa was vigorously expressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations last December. In a resolution adopted by a vote of 24 in favor, one against (the Union of South Africa), with 34 abstentions, the Assembly declared that

in a multi-racial society harmony and respect for human rights and freedoms and the peaceful development of a unified community are best assured when patterns of legislation and practice are directed towards ensuring equality before the law of all persons regardless of race, creed or colour, and when economic, social, cultural and political participation of all racial groups is on a basis of equality . . .

The Assembly called upon

all Member States to bring their policies into conformity with their obligation under the Charter to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.²

At the same time, a commission was established to study the racial situation in the Union of South Africa and report its findings to the eighth session of the Assembly, which will meet next fall.

¹ C. W. M. Gell, "Hard Choices in South Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1953), pp. 287-300.

² General Assembly Resolution 616B (VII), 5 December 1952.

³ See *U.S. News and World Report*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 18 (1 May 1953), p. 52 ff.

What hope is there that the international concern voiced in the chambers of the United Nations will influence the course of events in the Union of South Africa? On the basis of past experience, little hope can be held out, at least from a short-range point of view. For seven years, the United Nations has been dealing unsuccessfully with one aspect of the South African racial problem, namely, the treatment of Indians, or, more precisely, South African nationals descended from Indians who migrated to the Union between 1860 and 1911. This group, now numbering about a quarter of a million, has been the object of discriminatory legislation designed to restrict its freedom of movement, use of public facilities, admission to schools and universities, employment in industry, voting and office-holding privileges, marriage with people of other races, freedom of residence, and freedom to engage in various business activities.

The Indian government brought this situation to the attention of the General Assembly in 1946, charging that the government of the Union was violating international agreements previously entered into with India regarding the treatment of these people and was also violating the provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although the Union government has argued forcefully that the agreements with India were not in the nature of international agreements, that Article 2(7) of the Charter prohibited intervention in the internal affairs of member states, and that the Charter obligations concerning human rights were not precise enough to be binding on member states, a majority of the members of the General Assembly has consistently upheld the right of the United Nations to deal with the question. Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1948 has subsequently been cited as an additional reason for international action concerning this problem. Though the Declaration is merely a statement of aspirations and is clearly not binding on member states, it has been referred to in this case as a standard from which member states should not deliberately and flagrantly deviate.

The prevailing attitude has, in fact, been to devote less attention to the legal niceties than to the moral issues involved. In the words of the Indian representative in 1946:

We must remember that, in the present case, the minds of millions of people in India and in other parts of Asia and in Africa have been moved to intense indignation at all forms of racial discrimination . . . This is a test case . . . Mine is an appeal to a conscience — to the conscience of the world, which this Assembly is.³

³ General Assembly, Official Records, First Session: Second Part, 50th Plenary Meeting, 7 December 1946, p. 1019.

Once having decided to consider the question, the Assembly had several alternative methods of procedure. It could enter immediately into consideration of the merits of the case and could adopt a resolution expressing its conclusions in as strong or mild terms as it judged the situation to require. Or it could avoid discussion of the problem itself and concentrate on finding the best possible way of bringing India and the Union together to work out a mutually acceptable solution. The Indian government has from the beginning favored the first course, in the form of a strong public condemnation of the South African government. The Assembly has tried both.

The first resolution passed by the Assembly, in 1946, was a compromise condemnation. It noted that relations between India and the Union had become strained as a result of this issue, expressed its opinion that the treatment of Indians should conform to the "international obligations" assumed in the agreements concluded between the two governments and the relevant provisions of the Charter, and asked the two governments to report back to the next session on measures adopted "to this effect."⁴ The reaction in South Africa was immediate and outraged. High government officials as well as popular newspapers and journals attacked what they considered the illegal and unjustified interference of the United Nations and vowed not to comply. The following year, India itself reported that "One of the direct results of the resolution . . . was the intensification of anti-Asiatic feeling in the Union."⁵ Though India asked for a reaffirmation of this resolution, there was a general feeling that it would be more constructive to try to bring the parties together for a round-table discussion of the issue. A draft resolution to this effect, however, failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote in plenary session.

In 1949, another resolution was passed, calling for a round-table conference, taking into consideration the purposes and principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but omitting any reference to the 1946 resolution. But by this time, the point had clearly passed when a friendly solution might have been possible. The government of General Smuts had been replaced by that of the implacable Dr. Daniel P. Malan, whose announced mission in life was to secure the supremacy of the white race in South Africa. When his government proceeded to enact the Group Areas Act, permitting the establishment of areas for the exclusive occupation or ownership of single racial groups and limiting trade to those in the area, India and Pakistan (which had been included in the proposed conference) refused to take part in any round-table discussions. In 1950

⁴ General Assembly Resolution 44 (I), 8 December 1946.

⁵ General Assembly, Official Records, Second Session, 1947, First Committee, Summary Records, Annex 5, p. 535.

and in 1951, the Assembly also tried to encourage direct talks among the three states, but its appeal to the Union to suspend implementation or enforcement of the Group Areas Act was taken by that nation as even more flagrant intervention in its internal affairs. Finally, a few months ago, the Assembly, at its seventh session, established a good offices commission to try to bring the parties together, repeating once again its request to the Union government to suspend the implementation or enforcement of the Group Areas Act.

There is no reason to suppose that the government of the Union will respond more favorably to this appeal than it has to the exhortations of the past, particularly since the Assembly has also decided to interest itself in the general question of the racial policies of the Union. The attitude of the South Africans toward the United Nations has passed from mildly critical, when the Indian question was first raised, to intensely bitter. South Africans have, if anything, been hardened in their determination to pursue their objective in defiance of world opinion.

As the ineffectiveness of the methods used by the Assembly became apparent, a number of warning voices were raised. The Netherlands representative stated in 1950, for example, that it was "irresponsible" to condemn the policy of the Union "without a full knowledge of the facts and without making any constructive suggestions as to what that State should do."⁶ The representative of Chile declared that it was "pointless" to adopt resolutions not acceptable to all of the parties.⁷ In 1952, the representative of the Philippines, which had always been one of the most severe critics of the Union, admitted that "the discriminatory measures taken in the Union of South Africa must have some reasons behind them, and the parties concerned ought to study and eliminate the causes which had given rise to the situation."⁸

With all of Africa, and of Asia, watching the white man's struggle to maintain his position of dominance in the Union of South Africa, it is important that any role played by the United Nations should be a constructive one. Thus far, it has satisfied the demand of these areas for international support for the principle of respect for human rights without distinction on the ground of race. The United Nations has yet to find a way, however, to convince the South African government of the error of its ways or to assist in creating conditions of peace, stability, and justice in that explosive land.

⁶ General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 47th Meeting, 20 November 1950, p. 293.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 46th Meeting, 18 November 1950, p. 284.

⁸ General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 29th Meeting, 2 January 1952, p. 161.

EAST AFRICA

by Enoch E. K. Mulira

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British East Africa is composed of Kenya Colony and Protectorate, Uganda Protectorate, and the United Nations Trust, Tanganyika. The area is traversed by the Equator, but because of its high altitudes, it has both tropical and temperate climates. The coastal belts are dry and arid, while the highlands get heavy tropical rains. With two dry and two rainy seasons, two annual harvests are possible. Kenya Highlands, Uganda, South Tanganyika, and the country around Mount Kilimanjaro are the most fertile areas, and for this reason are thickly populated. The total population of East Africa is nearly 18 million, of whom 258,500 are non-Africans (214,000 Indians and Arabs; 44,500 Europeans). Most Africans are of the Bantu language family.

Before the coming of the Europeans in the nineteenth century, the Africans were at different stages of political development. The Baganda and the Banyoro of Uganda had a centralized type of government under a long line of kings, while other nations were either in small states under kings or in smaller units under elders. Among the Baganda and Banyoro, central and local councils were highly organized; the smaller state councils were more democratic. Besides the Baganda and Banyoro, there were other big nations like the Kikuyu, the Masai, the Wasukuma, the Bahaya, and the Chaga. In Zanzibar the Arabs, who had traded in slaves and goods with East Africa for many years, had set up a strong kingdom; even today Zanzibar, though under a British resident, has little in common with the rest of British East Africa, where Swahili¹ and Islam are the chief remaining legacies of the Arabs.

¹ The *lingua franca* of East and Central Africa.

After the slave trade had been officially abolished, several old Arab dealers carried it on privately, and the Arab slave trade in the East still flourished. In Europe, Christian philanthropists thought that evangelical work and the opening up of free trade in Africa would liberate the Africans. At the same time European explorers were growing interested in the unpenetrated hinterland; politicians, also, were thinking of expanding their empires into Africa. These three types of people were well represented in the opening up of the continent in the nineteenth century: David Livingstone was the missionary; Henry Morton Stanley, the explorer; Cecil I. Rhodes, the empire builder.

Soon after information about East Africa was released in Europe, English and German missionaries, traders, and empire builders arrived on the scene. After competition and struggle, the British claimed sovereignty of Uganda, and the Germans of Tanganyika. At first Kenya looked unpromising, but soon the British realized its strategic importance and saw that its highlands could serve as a future settlement for white Britishers; subsequently the coastal belt was made a protectorate and the highland a colony. In these parts the Europeans made tricky agreements with the African rulers, many of whom realized only too late that the agreements, made in languages they did not know, meant the unconditional surrender of their land, their people, and their power. New artificial boundaries which sometimes divided one people into two—one under the British and the other under the Germans—were made. At first the Imperial Governments vested political power in the trading companies, but the companies found the task of governing very expensive and soon relinquished their control, forcing the powers to set up colonial administrations.

While all this political jumble was dazzling the African rulers, the humble and meek Christian missionaries were coming into East Africa with a new message and hope of God's love and human brotherhood. The African was surprised to see the same European fountain flowing with both sweet and sour wine. The missionaries were often misunderstood because of their ruthless white comrades, imperialists and traders. Many Africans are prejudiced against the missionaries and their work simply because of their being European, yet the missionary is the only person who has gone to Africa for the sake of the African. He has faithfully preached and spread the Gospel. Single-handed, missionaries pioneered in African education and medical work, and afterwards interested the African and Colonial Governments in such fields. About 90 per cent of all education is still run by missionaries; all contemporary African spokesmen had mission education.

After the confusion and the civil wars which followed the acquisition of East Africa by foreign powers, there was a lull. This was followed by World War I, in which East Africans fought each other in Tanganyika, some under the Germans, others under the British. After the war, the League of Nations made German East Africa a British mandate. This consolidation brought many blessings, and the following twenty years before World War II saw much change and progress in East Africa. Roads were built. The Kenya and Uganda Railway was extended to the heart of Uganda and linked with the Tanganyika Railway. East African trade and currency took a turn for the better; cotton and coffee became the basic economic crops. The settlement of Kenya Highland was encouraged by the British Government. African education began to take on a definite plan, the East African University College at Makerere progressing steadily. British Government departments were established; civil wars and the Arab slave trade were terminated. On the other hand, consolidation meant more African subordination to the British overrule. Twice the Federation of East Africa was proposed by England, but it was strongly opposed in both instances by the Africans.

The British Colonial Indirect Rule worked ceaselessly during this period, and its superiority to the traditional administrations was much to its credit. By improving on the native administrations, a few British officials were enabled to rule over seventeen million Africans through the native chief. Yet the African looks back and says the old order, when he had land and government in his hands, was better. This is the same old story: the English under the Romans; the French of St. Joan of Arc under the Britons; the Americans of Washington and the Indians of Ghandi under the English; the Africans under the Europeans. The East African demands self-government in the British Commonwealth, preferring to rule himself and make mistakes than to be ruled well by another man. He also feels that the only way to learn how to govern is to practice governing. He feels that Europeans have land they call home in Europe, that he once had land too, but now has none. He is determined to fight with words until justice is tapped and his paradise lost regained. African chiefs and the civil servants, however, have become the British black empire builders, who have stood united against the nationalists. On the surface the chiefs and the British rule the people; fundamentally the nationalist leaders do. This is the main root of East Africa's social, economic, and political ills.

Current affairs begin with World War II, in which the East Africans fought faithfully on the side of the Allies, serving in North Africa, the Middle East, India, and Burma. What disappointed the educated African soldier was to find color discrimination in a war

for a common cause. Many educated and outstanding soldiers started and ended the war as sergeants; the rank of regimental sergeant was the highest possible attainment of the Africans, whose salaries, wages, uniforms, food, and equipment were all inferior to those of other races. The effects of the war were far-reaching, and in the post-war period many changes have taken place in East Africa.

African existence is based on agriculture; no land, no life. The African grows cash crops along with his own food. Cotton and coffee are for trade; plaintain, maize, sweet potato, and cassava are for food. Farming is by hoe, and as a rule each family tends two to five acres. In Kenya, white settlers have influenced legal action forbidding the Africans there to grow coffee, the chief economic crop; throughout East Africa, higher prices are paid for coffee grown by Europeans, even if it is inferior to that grown by Africans. All the wholesale and a large proportion of the retail trade is in the hands of the Indians and the Europeans. The Indians play the role of middlemen, buying nearly all the land produce from the Africans and selling it at a handsome profit. The farmer grows thin, the Indian fat. The African is struggling to cut out the Indian by joining in growers' cooperative societies and by venturing into the retail trade. There are, too, government-sponsored cooperative societies. Although these have done good work, most Africans distrust them because of their rigid laws. The Land and Credit Bank gives loans to African farmers and businessmen, but many who would benefit by the Bank find it hard to get the security required by the government.

The government stabilization of prices, because of fear of inflation, has created additional economic problems. The farmers get less for their crops than the market prices, while the governments collect and accumulate the balance, which the farmer considers as his earned money. Some of these million pounds have gone to Community Development; the rest has been put aside as a reserve fund.

Salaries and wages of the professional, skilled, and unskilled African workers are always in the third grade. The European comes first, the Indian second, the African third. So, if the European gets 200 dollars per month, the Indian gets 140 and the African 70 dollars. Unskilled African wages are ridiculously low — between five and ten dollars per month. In rural areas Africans supplement this sum by growing food crops, but in urban areas they starve, steal, or turn to prostitution. Other races are paid in relation to the cost of living, but the African is not. Economic subordination, along with detribalization, seems to paralyze and poison African originality, zeal, and responsibility.

The governments are working very hard to control soil erosion; nevertheless, erosion and alienation of land are creating many social and economic problems. Because about two-thirds of Kenya is dry, most of the Africans live on the 16,000 square miles of the Kenya Highlands. Two-thirds of this good land, most of which has not yet been cultivated, belongs to the 2,000 white settlers, each of whom owns, on the average, five square miles. On the other hand, 500 Kikuyu live on one square mile. And the Kikuyu population is increasing. Since the dawn of the white settlement, the Kikuyu have been demanding the return of their unused land, but the government and the Colonial Office have done nothing to solve this problem. The Mau Mau uprisings, which are costing Kenya innocent lives, are the outward expression of inner hunger and resentment over land distribution.²

The British have disturbed the traditional ownership of land. In Uganda the land used to belong to the community, with the king as trustee. Sir Harry Johnson,³ when he made the Uganda Agreement in 1900, for no good communal reason, gave half of the land in Buganda (9,000 square miles) to 1,000 leading chiefs as registered freehold land. Now the landlords sit in armchairs and wait for the unearned rent. Sometimes poor peasants who pay small rents are driven off the land so that it may be lent to big foreign farmers, who pay the owners handsomely. Other landlords may hoard land for their children's future use and refuse it to those who want to farm it now.

Social inequality is also stressed in East Africa. Municipal and government quarters are assigned according to race. The best houses and sites are exclusively for Europeans; the second best are for the Indians; and the remainder — the shanty houses in the unhealthy areas — are for the Africans. Education, too, is sliced in three. While 30 pounds are spent on the white child, five shillings are thought an extravagance for an African child. Education is not yet free and compulsory, and only the rich can afford to send their children to school. No Africans are accepted in European schools.

All colored are excluded in the hotels, restaurants, and clubs in Kenya. In Uganda and Tanganyika, no discrimination is the principle, but in practice discrimination is still dominant. Instead of one government-financed hospital there are three everywhere: European,

² As of March 1953, 203 Africans, thirteen Indians, and nine Europeans have been killed in these disturbances. Most of the Africans killed were chiefs, headmen, and other African supporters of the whites, who agreed with the white settlers and the government.

³ Sir Harry Hamilton Johnson was sent to Uganda in 1899 as a special Commissioner to set the country in order after the Sudanese mutiny and civil wars.

Asian, and African. "Europeans" and "Non-Europeans" on the doors of the public train latrines are always printed in big letters. These practices, which sound like South Africa in East Africa, feed and foster racial bitterness.

Community Development is a post-war government project in the three territories. The new Department of Community Development, in collaboration with other departments, is doing creditable work. Demonstration teams go out to live and work with the people, teaching improved ways of agriculture, sanitation, self-help, cooperation, citizenship, literacy, etc. The Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches have been doing this kind of work in education for the young and adults for the last 70 years; in Uganda about 50 per cent of the five million people are literate and Christian. Medical and sanitary work, however, lags behind; ill-health, malnutrition, and immature deaths still prevail. These problems will best be tackled by well-educated Africans, for European usefulness is limited and handicapped by language and custom. Although locally educated Africans can do the routine work, they seem paralyzed and satisfied as the white man's assistant. But when a promising African is given a chance to go abroad for higher education, he grows very concerned about social, economic, and political problems. His sense of duty and responsibility for the first time genuinely taxes his thinking. He becomes the type of leader that Africa needs. A few dozen East African students are in England and India; less than a dozen are in the United States, where West Africans may be found in hundreds. America, through the Point Four Program, the Fulbright Plan, and other philanthropic foundations, is helping the less developed countries, but very little has been done for East Africa, either by the United States or by UNESCO, and neither the British nor the Africans can supply dollars to those who wish to come to the United States for an education. East Africans must appeal to private American citizens for support.

In principle the rule of East Africa is indirect, in practice it is almost direct. There are Native Administrations and above them the British officials. Nominal chiefs are in reality civil servants. The supreme ruler in each territory is the Governor, who rules through the Executive and Legislative Councils. These councils have *ex officio*, nominated, and, in a few cases, elected members who represent public interests. African interests are far from being represented proportionately. For example, in Uganda, supposedly the most advanced of the three territories, the Executive Council is composed of the Governor, six *ex officio* members, one nominated official, and four nominated unofficial members (two Indians and two Africans since 1952). The Legislative Council has the Governor, six *ex officio* members, ten nominated officials, and sixteen unofficial nominated mem-

bers (eight Africans, four Europeans, four Indians). The population of Uganda is five million Africans, 35,000 Indians, and 3,500 Europeans. This is the typical colonial democracy. The Africans in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika have loudly opposed the degree of representation as well as the method of nominating the so-called people's representatives. As a rule the Governors nominate the chiefs, that is, the officials of the Native Administrations. The Africans want to elect their representatives by vote. The British fear that independent nationalists, who might endanger the colonial policy, will be elected.

The British have helped to revise the Native Administrations. Since 1945, the people have had elected members on the local councils, and they are now formulating the local county governments. But the African officials still form the majority on the councils. The British and the chiefs oppose popular demands that the majority be elected rather than nominated. The Baganda of Uganda, the leading kingdom in East Africa, want to elect their Prime Minister; their king and the British, who have veto power, have flatly refused, fearing the choice of the nationalist leader and his government. This suppression of public opinion led to the murder in 1945 of the Baganda Premier whom the British had confirmed against popular opposition. In 1949, economic and political independence led to a bloody civil disturbance in Uganda, which involved the destruction of life and of a good deal of personal and public property. At this time the Africans demanded the resignation of Kawalya Kagwa, the Premier, whose interests they thought were detrimental to African interests. The British refused the request and had to protect Kawalya Kagwa by armed force. Such trouble keeps recurring, and will continue to recur until true democracy is established, in spite of the fact that agitators or suspected national agitators very often find themselves deported without trial!

The British and the settlers in East Africa still want the Federation of East Africa, which the Africans strongly oppose. The East African High Commission and its Central Legislative Assembly, which was proposed by the Colonial Office in 1945 as White Paper 191, met with African opposition at first. Its purpose was to handle the East African interterritorial services, like customs and excise, post-office and telegraphs, railways and harbors, the Production and Supply Council, East African currency, etc. This Africans thought to be the Federation in disguise, and only after they had been assured that the Assembly had no political power did they accept it. The Kenya white settlers opposed it, however, because it provided for equal representation — six Africans, six Europeans, six Indians — in each territory. They sent a deputation to London and forced the revision of the Paper, which returned in 1947 as White Paper 210. Now the

Europeans had five members; the Asians four; the Africans three. In addition, there were seven other white officials. The Africans and the Indians opposed the second Paper, but no heed was taken and the Paper came into force in 1948. Thus, fear on the part of the white minority hinders true democracy.

The 120 million pounds voted by the British Government under the Colonial and Welfare Act was fully appreciated in East Africa. But the British Overseas Food Corporations, like the Kongwa Ground Nut Scheme in Tanganyika, and the foreign mining companies, which introduce foreign capital into the country, are disputed by the Africans. In reality, this type of development does not add anything to African economic and cultural well-being, but merely entices Africans to leave their homes to work for a pauper's wages. It would be better were the British to encourage local corporations and cooperative societies to produce needed commodities. The Owen Falls Dam under construction in Uganda on the Nile and the textile town which is to follow the dam will also undoubtedly create many industrial problems.

While South Africa wishes to extend her empire into East Africa, England, after the loss of India and Burma, wants to consolidate in Central and East Africa. The Africans flatly oppose this. They want their independence first. Afterwards they may choose to form an African Dominion as a member state of the British Commonwealth.

This writer strongly feels that the colonial governments in East Africa should be dissolved. In their place, each territory should create a central dual African government, in which the present British governors would automatically become the presidents, and their high officials the ministers and secretaries. The Africans should be their deputies. African local government should go on as usual, but in a more democratic way. After ten years some of the British officers would be replaced by Africans. Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika would become either three small Dominions or one big Dominion in the British Commonwealth. For some years to come East Africa will need British technicians and administrators to fill the skilled positions.

Although colonial governments are generally undesirable, the British are the best of the lot; in spite of their faults, the British are certainly more human than others in dealing with the Africans, who are better off and more advanced in the British dependencies than in any other European colony. "Short live the British Empire; long live the British Commonwealth."

CENTRAL AFRICA*

by Michael Scott

Michael Scott, active in African problems since 1926, has long been associated with the cause of non-Europeans in Africa. In 1949 he served as the spokesman in the United Nations Trusteeship Council for several South West African tribes, pleading against incorporation of the Mandated Territory by the Union of South Africa. Since then he has been active in his opposition to the proposed Central African Federation.

The proposed Central African Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is designed to establish Federal Government for the three territories to deal with subjects listed as exclusive subjects for the Federal Assembly and concurrent subjects for both the Federal and Territorial Legislatures. Included under the exclusive subjects are defense, immigration, emigration, control of imports and exports, primary and secondary education of those other than Africans, and higher education of all races. The concurrent list includes deportation, migration between territories, control of the Land Banks, health, and prisons. An African Affairs Board is proposed which will be a standing Committee of the Federal Parliament with the right to request that matters considered to be "differential" on grounds of race shall be reserved for Her Majesty's pleasure, and sent to the Secretary of State in London for Parliament's approval. The Governor General, however, may assent to the Bill if he satisfies himself that it is not a differentiating measure, or that the reasons for objecting to it are "of an irrelevant or frivolous nature." The Board is to consist of three African-elected members and three European members elected to represent African interests, with a Chairman, appointed from among the members by the Governor General, who will have a casting vote. Since the Chairman is likely to be a European, it cannot be said that the Africans will have a majority even in the African Affairs Board.

* The three territories of Central Africa are: Northern Rhodesia, 290,000 square miles with a population of nearly two million Africans and 37,000 Europeans; Southern Rhodesia, 150,000 square miles with a population of nearly two million Africans, 115,500 Europeans, and 3,000 Asians; and Nyasaland with an area of 48,000 square miles and a population of over two million Africans, 4,000 Europeans, and 5,000 Asians.

The purposes of the federation are proclaimed to be, in the words of the Hon. Roy Welensky,¹ one of the chief protagonists of the scheme, "to facilitate the mobilization and development of the immense potentialities of the region for the good of its inhabitants and the benefit of the world in general." Among the "secondary" objectives, "the first place must be given to the establishment of political stability and strength in Central Africa." This, Mr. Welensky declares, "is essential for the defence of the free world." The third object is to "fortify the British way of life and Western civilization in Central Africa . . .," and the fourth objective is "to create for Western Europe, and for Great Britain especially, the area of economic and demographic expansion essential to their continued national health and prosperity."

The fallacy in this line of argument would seem to lie in the assumption that economic development, which includes the attraction of capital investment from Britain and America to these three territories, can be accomplished only by the creation of a "strong" federal state.² The form of strength envisaged is that of a state in which a small white oligarchy of 200,000 settlers will exercise absolute control over an African majority of 6,000,000 and a small Asian population. The representation to be accorded the Africans in a House of Assembly of 35 members is nine — six specially elected Africans and three Europeans nominated to represent African interests. The remaining 26 members will represent the white communities of the three territories — and changes in the constitution are possible only by means of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly.

The lesson of British history and of British relations with North America, Asia, and South Africa, on the one hand, and with West Africa on the other, emphasizes the political and economic dangers of attempting to build a civilized order on the basis of racial domination. The existence of a multi-racial society in Central and East Africa complicates the problem of evolving representative political institutions, but the answer does not lie in the imposition of a rigid constitution which places the majority in permanent subordination to a racial minority. Orderly progress, both economic and political, will depend upon some degree of flexibility and adaptability of the constitution

¹ Hon. Roy Welensky, "Development of Central Africa through Federation," *Optima* (a quarterly review published by Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa), December 1952, pp. 5-10.

² These territories are governed at present by Legislative Councils, on which, in the case of Southern Rhodesia, there are no African representatives. In Nyasaland there are two African members and one Indian out of a total of eighteen members. In Northern Rhodesia there are two African members out of 21, and two of the Europeans are elected to represent African interests.

to an increasing responsibility on the part of those more backward elements of the population which constitute the majority in the territories in question.

The tragedy which the Western world has watched unfolding in South Africa has arisen from the failure of the constitution to provide either the means of constitutional change or the channels of economic advancement and opportunity for the majority of its inhabitants. The constitutional "safeguards" failed to protect the political rights of non-Europeans, meager as these were; Africans, numbering three-quarters of the population in South Africa, have now three representatives (who must be white) in a House of Assembly of 156 members. Nor have safeguards prevented the dispossession of the Africans of all but thirteen per cent of the total land surface of the Union. On the contrary, there has grown up, despite the liberal intentions that inspired many of those who framed the constitution, a whole state system based on the concept of racial discrimination against non-Europeans; the over-crowded African reserves have become reservoirs of cheap labor for the mines, industries, farms, and homes of the white one-fifth of the population.

South Africa has the unique distinction in the Western world of having an economy based on the availability of cheap migrant labor.³ Although it cannot be denied that economic and social advancement of Africans has taken place under this regime, the color barriers to occupational and political freedom of expression have created an increasingly disillusioned and disaffected population. The undoubted increase of secondary, technical, and higher education which has taken place tends to increase the frustration and resentment which has become a major cause of economic and political instability.

While racial conflict and non-cooperation are becoming increasingly apparent in South Africa, another state of a similar pattern, in which the minority will hold the over-all majority of representation, is proposed for Central Africa in order, so it is claimed, to offset the dangers of South African nationalism. The fact that a very large proportion of the white population of Northern and Southern Rhodesia are South Africans and Afrikaners is ignored, and the proposal of their spokesman in Northern Rhodesia, Mr. van Eeden, that they should accept federation as a first step towards a United States of Southern Africa is welcomed by the leading English-speaking Northern Rhodesia newspaper, *The Central African Post*.⁴ This movement might easily grow, for the imposition of federation against the declared

³ This has hitherto been secured by political subjection whereby such legislation as the Pass Laws, the Masters and Servants Act, the Urban Areas Act, and other industrial legislation has been enacted.

⁴ 23 January 1953.

wishes of African opinion as expressed through representative councils and chiefs would generate resentment amongst both black and white, and in the event of racial conflict the white sections of the population would inevitably seek support from their confreres both to the north and south. A greater federation of Central Africa with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika is the declared aim of the ambitious politicians of the Capricorn Society,⁵ and is advocated by Mr. Welen-sky and Sir Dougall Malcolm as well as by some members of the opposition in South Africa who, while agreeing with Dr. Malan on many fundamentals, see little prospect of ousting him without the assistance of the English-speaking peoples of the Rhodesias.

Thus for the non-Europeans in Africa the prospect of a consolidated white supremacy bloc extending from the Cape to Kenya is becoming ever more real and menacing. The projected imposition of this federal scheme against the declared opposition of the overwhelming majority of the African inhabitants has prompted deputations to Britain asking her to be true to the protecting agreements made by Queen Victoria with the Chiefs and their peoples. The question arises whether there is not some more workable method of effecting the necessary economic coordination (including coordination of communications) which would attract investment from Britain and America.

The former Colonial Secretary, Mr. Creech Jones, believes it would be possible and much more desirable to develop the former Central African Council by giving it executive power along the lines of the East African High Commission.

Some experience already exists in Africa which can be drawn on. . . . I can only hint at one or two possible lines which might be examined. For example, a High Commission might be created for Central Africa. That High Commission might consist of the two Governors and Prime Minister. To that High Commission could be surrendered by the three territories certain powers agreed on separately and collectively by the territories and Her Majesty's Government. These powers would be concerned with certain specified services. These services could not be added to or taken away except by the consent of . . . all of the three Legislatures and the consent of the Secretary of State. A guarantee could be given against political fusion. The three territories would continue to enjoy their existing status and Legislatures. The work of the High Commission should be accounted for to the public through an Assembly. This public assembly could be a body representative of the three Territorial Legislatures. It would agree the proportions [*sic*] in which each

⁵ The Capricorn Declarations which were published by the Capricorn Africa Society, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, in 1952 read on page 3: ". . . We believe that the colonies of S. Rhodesia, and Kenya, the protectorates of Uganda, Nyasaland and N. Rhodesia, the territory of Tanganyika, should be bound in a single self-governing federation under the British Crown . . ." and in the appendix, page 10 to these declarations: ". . . The Society regards its Declarations as a backcloth to the official plan for Central African federation and does not dispute that the smaller federation must precede the wider one."

territory would be represented in the Assembly. It could consider problems within its competence and direct the High Commission. The method of Territorial representation would be as each parliament or Legislative Council determined, but so far as the Protectorates are concerned the representation should be drawn from the Legislative Council and composed of all races in proportions agreed between them. It is a disagreeable fact that at this stage some regard to race must be paid, but part of the African representation might include for the time being persons of experience who have the confidence of Africans and can represent their interests (such as missionaries, officials, or other persons acceptable to Africans). To these might be added an agreed number of representatives of Asiatic people and perhaps one or more representative not of race but of the unofficial elements in each of the Territorial Legislatures. In such an arrangement, both Africans and Europeans could cooperate and Africans would gain from the wide experience of such work and increasingly play an active part in Central African affairs.⁶

The historical contribution of the British Commonwealth has been in the development of Parliamentary institutions and representative forms of government and in the extension of democracy to the hundreds of millions in India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. Through the hard lesson of experience in other continents, backward peoples have grown toward freedom and responsibility and a free association of peoples of many different races has been achieved. This is still the British mission in Africa. At this turning point in Africa's history and in the history of Britain's relations with Africa it would be tragic indeed if Britain were to take wrong decisions which might lead her into a morass of racial conflict and violence and counter-violence, from which it would be difficult either to retreat or to reconstruct a more co-operative social order and political system.

Partnership is not an ideal that can be imposed on an unwilling people. It can be attained only through actual experience of the advantages of cooperation and understanding. Representative parliamentary institutions in Central Africa will take time to develop. Meanwhile confidence in them should not be impaired by political action which violates the whole principle of government by consent of the governed. The foundation can be laid in the present day through the acceleration and coordination of economic development on which increased educational and social services must depend. For peoples apparently at such divergent levels of political and educational development a planning authority might well be appropriate now, and it might lead the peoples to learn through experience the values of a more cooperative civilized order.

⁶ A. Creech Jones, *African Challenge: The Fallacy of Federation* (London, 1952), pp. 33-34.

WEST AFRICA

by Jonathan Chukwuka Ezenekwe

Coming from Nigeria, Mr. Ezenekwe is a Doctoral candidate in Public Law and Government at Columbia University, and President of the African Students Union of America.

The area known as West Africa extends from Dakar on the extreme west coast of Africa to the Cameroons on the eastern side of Nigeria. The whole area is made up of about fifteen small territories, which occupy about two and one-half million square miles, and have a population of over fifty million. With the single exception of the independent territory of Liberia, the entire area is under the jurisdiction of four alien powers: France, Great Britain, Portugal, and Spain.

The French control Senegal, Mauritania, French Sudan, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger Colony, Dakar, Togoland, and the Cameroons, a total area of 1,815,768 square miles (three-fourths of the land area of West Africa and twenty times larger than France itself) with a population of 16,500,000, of whom 50,000 are Europeans. The British dominate Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the Cameroons, Togoland, Gambia, and Sierra Leone, an area of 470,784 square miles whose 39,386,150 inhabitants constitute more than half of the entire population of West Africa. Portugal and Spain control Guinea and Fernando Poo, respectively, both areas totaling about 38,944 square miles with about 350,000 people. These two foreign powers have the least area and the least influence in West Africa. Finally, there are two trust territories — the Cameroons and Togoland — which are divided into French and British administrations.

Statistics on the small floating alien white population in West Africa are incomplete. They include roughly 80,000 Europeans whose permanent settlement has not been encouraged; a great many of them are civil servants or commercial and missionary employees of the metropolitan powers. There is also a small number of Lebanese, Syrians, and Indians, who are strictly on a commercial venture and take no part in social and political problems. West Africa, then, must be regarded as the land of its indigenous inhabitants.

West Africa is far from being a uniform block, and among its main groupings there are great diversities. In analyzing the basic social, cultural, economic, tribal, and political problems, it is necessary at the very outset to examine the colonial policies of the four governing powers, because the lives of the people in West Africa — their occupations, their industries, and their social welfare problems — depend upon these policies.

French colonial policy is that of *assimilation*, centering upon a desire to make the colonial groups part and parcel of continental France, in what is called the French Union. Assimilation calls for complete incorporation of African communities into metropolitan France, with supposedly complete social, civil, and political equality. This kind of political assimilation has been extended to economic and cultural fields, giving the Africans a sense of satisfaction and justifying somewhat French exploitation of their lands.

For administrative purposes, the entire group of French West African colonies is divided into subdivisions under the direction of French oversea administrations. Despite the fact that Indirect Rule is not a major administrative procedure with the French, the local indigenous rulers are allowed, wherever possible, to exercise delegated authority in the tribal areas, subject to strict supervision of French subordinate administrative officials.

The French system of highly centralized autonomy has been adopted in the colonies. There is no idea of instituting an independent local rule subject to the superintendence of metropolitan France; instead, the administration of the French colonies is direct from Paris, with Parliamentary control vested in the Ministry of Colonies and its Bureaus. At almost any time Parliament can legislate for the colonies by decrees which the French colonial officers must carry out. This highly centralized handling of colonial problems not only subordinates African interests to those of the French minorities in the colonies, but also destroys the natural incentive of the chiefs and local officials in dealing with affairs of their country. It is little wonder that the political aspirations of the Africans are negligible. The native council does not exist. The chiefs have no recognition. Local social and cultural institutions are not fully recognized; rather, the French language, French art, and French culture are substituted. There are no native courts; judicial power rests with the French officers. The difficulties of administering these areas by direct rule from France are obvious; France employs twice as many personnel as does England in British West Africa.

British colonial policy is that of governing the indigenous people until such time as the British feel that the people are ready to govern themselves. There is no attempt to assimilate the local peoples, nor

to make them imbibe British culture, at least not by direct legislation, although this could be possible through educational policy. The British Parliament has nothing to do with the supervision of the colonies, nor are colonial peoples directly represented in Parliament.

The policy of training the local people to govern themselves led to the introduction of Indirect Rule. Under this system the British allowed certain existing political and social institutions to remain. The chiefs, the emirs, and their courts were recognized as an integral part of the governmental machinery; existing local laws were legalized, and the chiefs were given more power. Where that power was threatened by dissatisfied people, the British supported the chiefs with force. Yet native laws, sanctions, and courts are approved only insofar as they are in accordance with the British system; the emirs, the chiefs, and their aids have all the power they need only when they rubber-stamp the orders and instructions of the immediate British officer. That such a form of government will ever lead a nation to self-government has been questioned by the nationalists, for no incentive is given to the study of democratic methods of administration. The system encourages stagnation, since the educational, social, and welfare programs of the people receive little or no attention. Under such an order representative local government has not grown up. Some people are inclined to believe that under this system the people will not be ready for self-government for years to come, and that as a result the British stay will be prolonged.

Both Portugal and Spain practice the eighteenth century philosophy that colonies exist primarily for the benefit of the holding countries. Neither has a clear-cut policy, except the maintenance of political control by economic control. Portugal, however, has introduced the system of *assimilado*, through which an African who can speak and write Portuguese is given some amount of power over those who still hold to tribal ritualisms. Despite the great personal prestige accruing from educational and property qualifications, racial discrimination in Portuguese West Africa is absent both in theory and in practice, and the Africans enjoy complete political equality with the Portuguese, even though the colonies are allowed very little autonomy. Both in system and in philosophy the Portuguese colonial policy can be likened to that of the French.

Political organization among the people of West Africa must be examined within the context of these colonial policies. In the French colonies the political philosophy of assimilation calls for a uniform method of administration and strict centralized supervision of administrative details. Independent local political parties have little opportunity to grow in the territories; they are not encouraged and may be

looked upon with disfavor by the French. The very fact that their territories have direct representation in the French Parliament gives some of the African leaders a false notion that their political difficulties have been solved and that they can always depend upon the mother country for political guidance. In addition, the very liberal racial attitude of the French¹ tends to promote complacency. Nevertheless, some political parties do exist. What is said of the French is true, to a limited degree, of the Portuguese West African colony.

In British West Africa conditions are different. The policy of training colonial people in the art of self-government until they are able to stand on their own feet, politically and economically, allows for much freer political activity. There is no indication that the government encourages any political activities, at least in the earliest stages, but neither have such activities been discouraged. Yet in spite of the neutrality of the government and the lack of features conducive to political association, political organization has recently appeared in some of the British areas.

Political organization in the Gold Coast was begun by Wallace Johnson of Sierra Leone, who has been known as the father of West African nationalism. In 1930 he founded the Gold Coast Youth, under the direction of Dr. Danquah. With its main objectives to gain economic security for the poor laboring masses of the Gold Coast,² this party attracted many of the intelligentsia, particularly those in the coastal areas.

The United Gold Coast Convention, headed by George Grant, was another important party, better organized, and with less internal conflict than the first; but as time passed, party cohesion decreased. When Nkrumah arrived from England to serve as secretary for the party, disagreement soon manifested itself between him and Dr. Danquah. Nkrumah, an ardent nationalist and a remarkable orator, disagreed with Dr. Danquah, a proponent of gradualism, over the basic issue of home rule, Nkrumah wanting it "now" and Dr. Danquah "in our time." In 1949 Nkrumah, with a group of young admirers, broke away from the United Gold Coast Convention and founded the Convention People's Party, the party which swept the polls in the last election and sent Nkrumah and his party officials to the seat of the government.

In Nigeria efficient political organization came very late, the Gold Coast being far ahead of Nigeria in this respect. The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) came into existence with the

¹ French officials have made a definite attempt to treat Africans with respect and dignity.

² Nana Y. T. D. Agyeman, *West Africa on the March* (New York, 1952), p. 48.

Constitution of 1922 and later merged with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), an organization founded by the late Herbert Macaulay, a distinguished scholar and political leader. It is difficult, however, to determine how many members of the NNDP now belong to the NCNC.

In 1935 a very strong political party, called the Nigeria Youth Movement, came into being and gained tremendous impetus under the direction of H. O. Davis. This party urged the abolition of Indirect Rule, which the leaders thought was obsolete, and as all subsequent political parties have done, it advocated self-government for Nigeria, maintaining that after the achievement of self-government, Nigeria should remain within the Commonwealth. Attracting the more responsible element of the people in the southern part of the country, it had branches in the large cities of the South and took considerable interest in local government.³

The strongest party in West Africa, with the largest number of followers, is the NCNC. Dr. Azikiwe is the president, but the party is not dominated by him, as some foreign writers think. There is a clear line of authority through the whole hierarchical structure, and the local and provincial branches all have their share in formulating the policies of the Council. The party platform demands immediate self-government and political unification for Nigeria's thirty million people. It strongly denounces the system of Indirect Rule and calls for proper local government authority, for a general public school system, and for certain measures of economic and social planning. To get the support of the people, the top ranking officials toured the entire country in 1944, soliciting funds and sympathy. It was this tour and the speeches made by the leaders that really awakened the rural areas, where ninety per cent of the Nigerians live, to the political issues in their country.

Membership in the NCNC is open to several trade unions, professional and non-professional organizations, market groups, tribal unions, cooperative unions, and individuals. At the beginning the party was very strong at Lagos, which is the seat of the national government and an area of great attraction for youth. Subsequently, local branches appeared in the East and North. At the outset the party was fully embraced by all tribal groupings, the reason being that the platform pledges were those which appealed to the nationalistic tendencies of the people. As time passed, other parties sprang up and the national influence of the NCNC declined.

³ William Malcolm Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories* (London, 1950-51), part 3, chapter 2.

Many political observers have stated that the NCNC has lost some of its influence as the result of the last election and because of litigation over the misuse of funds. Others think also that the emergence of the Egbe Omo Ododu (a religious-political organization for the promotion of Yoruba interests) and the Action Group has diminished NCNC influence. There may be some validity in this reasoning, but the important fact is that popular, responsible government necessitates a two-party system in order to be effective. For a time it seemed as if the NCNC would be the only strong party, and therefore the emergence of the Action Group as a rival was a welcome political gesture.

The Action Group was hastily organized, under the leadership of Owolwo, shortly before the last general election. The impression had been created that the NCNC is composed mainly of Easterners, for whom its victory in the election would mean political power. This situation, inflamed by a press war between some top Yoruba leaders and Dr. Azikiwe, indicated that Yoruba prestige and interests would be at stake if they did not have a party to counteract the NCNC. The Action Group was organized on this assumption, and was supported by the economic resources of the Egbe Omo Ododua. The party gained influence and won most of the seats in the last general election in Lagos and in other parts of the western provinces; attempts are now being made to extend it to other sections of Nigeria. With very few exceptions the political platform of this party is almost the same as that of the NCNC, although it is less insistent than the NCNC in demanding immediate self-government, and its attack on the policies of the Nigerian government has been very moderate. The Action Group advocates the division of Nigeria into tribal units, emphasizing the divergent development of various regions, while the NCNC pleads for a unified Nigeria irrespective of tribal and language differences. The approach of the Action Group has made it very difficult for the party to get membership across tribal lines, and it seems to have become the party of the Yorubas, while the NCNC is the party for the Ibos. Instead of using their political strategy to fight for a common purpose, these parties are turned into tribal weapons. Without doubt inter-party conflicts will exist, but they should not be along tribal lines; for tribal loyalties and cultural and linguistic ties should never form the political basis of Nigeria. If parties are formed purely on tribal interests, they may help to deepen the tribal prejudices which from time to time crop up among the people of Nigeria, who need unity of action in order to achieve their goal of self-government and political, social, and economic improvement. Unless this unity is achieved, Nigeria, like India, will be divided along tribal and religious lines. Unity can be promoted by better understanding between the

leaders of the two parties; mutual suspicion and distrust among them will only weaken the country.

Everywhere in West Africa nationalism is rising. Youth is indifferent to problems without political context; school children, farmers, market women — all are talking politics. This fact refutes the government's idea that political questions are instigated by a small American-educated minority; the indication is that nationalism will continue to rise until full independence for the masses is achieved.

PROPOSED FEDERATION OF WEST AFRICA

Dr. Nkrumah has asserted from time to time that his primary aim is the political unification of all the countries of West Africa into a United States of West Africa. This sounds like a very wise objective. At present each country is a self-sustaining unit, with little or no contact with the others, and ignorance creates suspicion and distrust among the Africans in these territories. In a united West Africa some of the barriers will be cleared, according to Dr. Nkrumah.

Only the overly optimistic can think that unification will be easy, however. Before it can come about there must be complete political and economic independence for all of the territories. France, with her policies of assimilation, is not yet ready to consider self-rule for her territories, even if they are politically and economically ready for it. In British areas, because of diversities in political, educational, and economic development, home rule will come in stages and at different times to different territories. In addition to these political questions are the cultural diversities. (There are, for example, fifty dialects in West Africa.) Even if cultural and social difficulties can be minimized by processes of education, there remains the question of transportation and communication; the topography of West Africa has made railroad and road building in some areas an item of very heavy expenditure. It is possible, however, to place the long-range planning for federation of West Africa in the hands of the political leaders of these countries. If it is achieved, it will set an example for other parts of Africa to follow.

It is unfortunate that the Hon. Dr. Malan, the Prime Minister of South Africa, looks with disfavor on the political advances of West Africa. Malan fears that when political autonomy comes to West Africa, power will be in the hands of the Africans rather than the Europeans. Giving Africans political power means endangering the position of South Africa, where Dr. Malan has kept the country in a state of tension for many years because of fear of two rivaling forces: political subjugation by the white and physical absorption by the non-whites.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS

The foreign governments in West Africa do not give adequate regard to the cultural and social needs of the people. Particularly in the areas under British control, many governments feel that the projection of foreign techniques into African tribal life will destroy the continuity of the simple cultural pattern and will create social and personality problems which the governments are not ready to handle; museums, art centers, and recreational facilities are looked upon as unnecessary expenditures for which the government has no funds. The French have taken a different attitude: art centers and museums with local and foreign collections have received much attention from both the government and private organizations.

To a limited degree in the large cities, trade unions, schools and colleges, tribal unions, churches, and similar private groups are major centers of social activities. But in the rural areas, the family constitutes the focal center of social and cultural activities. Custom in these areas establishes definite functions for every social relationship, and tribal functions have become one of the most important aspects of social and cultural life.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF WEST AFRICA

Rapid economic progress in West Africa depends in part upon a good system of communication and transportation, an adequate power supply, the availability of raw materials, markets, and labor, and the willingness of both the people and the government to foster industries as a means of providing jobs and security. Some of the above requirements for development are not present in West Africa.

In common with other underdeveloped areas of the world, West Africa has a low per capita level of production and consumption. Over 97 per cent of the people depend upon subsistence agriculture for their livelihood. Most Africans produce to eat and not to sell, and cash crops like cotton, coffee, and cocoa which sell very well in the international market do not appeal to them.

Some government agencies and missionary groups have advocated that the prosperity of the Africans lies in the land. The slogan "back to the soil" is unduly used to divert the attention of impatient youths who have flocked to the big cities in search of white-collar jobs during the post-war boom. Many young Africans do not want to go back to the farms and till the soil with a stick. More mechanized and modernized farm methods are needed to increase agricultural productivity and this, of course, presupposes the breakdown of the stale tradition of "farming only to eat." But economic progress cannot be secured through mechanization of agriculture alone. It is important that better marketing procedures be instituted for the sale of farm pro-

ducts. The farmer now has no alternative but to sell his produce to foreign companies, who fix the prices to be paid for the crops and often pay the ignorant farmers only a fraction of the market price. This injustice could be alleviated by appropriate government supervision.

The colonial powers have played a vital part in the economic progress of West Africa. Great credit goes to France, who for a long time pursued very systematically the economic development of her colonies. But in many instances this development has centered upon the extraction and exportation of raw materials. Therefore it is not surprising that the railroad lines run only to the coal and tin mines. Similarly, the British formation of the Colonial Development Corporation, with authorized capitalization of £100,000,000, is geared toward development of roads, communication, and other economic projects indirectly connected with British economic welfare.

Africans are now looking to increased industrialization. They know that their economic plight will not improve unless they are able to manufacture the shirts they wear rather than buy them from Japan, or make the cement they need for their houses rather than import it from England. The Nigerian government has proposed a new industrial program for Nigeria and has set up a Department of Commerce and Industry to help in economic and industrial planning. Even here, however, there is a vicious circle: the improvement of the health of the people is impossible without a heavy expenditure of money; on the other hand, this money will not be forthcoming until the productive and purchasing potentialities of the people are increased, which can happen only after the general health and living standards of the people have been raised.

Economic development demands close cooperation between the Africans and their European partners. The few thousand migrant Europeans have merely scratched the surface of Africa's vast resources. It is unfortunate that Africans have not taken an active interest in developing these potentials, and that their governments have not encouraged them to do so. Capital investment must come from abroad, but thus far attempts to secure it have not been successful because of governmental jealousy, popular suspicion, and fear of foreign exploitation. Until the foreign governments in West Africa realize that the economic structure of their home governments cannot sufficiently bear the burden of rapid development of these areas, they will be only planning on paper. Until the Africans realize that they have no local capital to carry out heavy economic and industrial projects and that foreign investments are essential, their hopes and aspirations for a productive and industrial Africa will be just wishful thinking.

FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA

by L. Gray Cowan

Assistant Director of the School of International Affairs, Columbia University. Professor Cowan is leaving shortly for two years of research in Africa under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

The vast region in the central part of the African continent, known as French Equatorial Africa, covers an area of slightly less than one million square miles and has a total population of only 4,350,000 of which, according to the 1946 census, about 8,000 were Europeans. While in terms of certain areas of Europe and Asia a population of slightly more than four persons per square mile seems almost negligible, there are huge areas of French Equatorial Africa which are part of the Sahara Desert, and hence virtually uninhabitable. However, it should be remarked that while the total population has almost doubled today from the figure given in the census of 1921, it is still far from the estimated number of eight to ten million given for the area in 1913. In part, the decline in native population during the present century is attributable to the expansion of European influence. New diseases, to which the natives had no immunity, and the general disturbance of native economic life, particularly during the early period of European influence, caused a rise in the death rate without a corresponding increase in the number of births. Efforts of the French administration to introduce public health measures have apparently successfully counteracted the trend toward declining numbers. It may be assumed that, with industrialization, population figures may again rise rapidly before the turn of the century.

European exploration of the area of French Equatorial Africa goes back to the sixteenth century, although Portuguese voyagers had discovered the mouth of the Congo River as early as 1484. Missionaries were established in the Gabon at an early period, but their work was confined to the coastal areas and appears to have come to an end by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Sporadic attempts at exploration were made by various French groups prior to the Franco-Prussian

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War, but at home little interest was shown in the area. Finally, a French naval officer, Pierre Auvorgnan de Brazza (who had been born in Italy but was a naturalized French citizen) undertook two expeditions into the interior. One, from 1875 to 1878, covered the Congo Basin. The second, in 1879, was aimed at securing for France the northern bank of the Congo, and when Stanley arrived on the scene in 1881, he discovered that the local native king had already signed a treaty with France placing the territory under French protection. De Brazza's exploit is remembered today in the name of the territory's chief city.

French control was gradually pushed north until it met with British opposition at Fashoda in 1898. Gradually the vast area southwest of Lake Chad was taken over as far west as the border of the German Cameroons. International rivalries prior to World War I provoked constant debate over the actual boundaries of the French colony. As part of the Agadir agreement of 1911, France ceded to Germany over 10,000 square miles of territory in the Cameroons, but this was restored to her by the Versailles Treaty. Under the Mandate System, France received the larger part of the former German colony and is today responsible for it under the Trusteeship Council. The final determination of the limits between French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa was made in 1929.

Despite the very considerable effort taken to bring the territory within the bounds of the French Empire, Equatorial Africa remained largely neglected up until very recent times. Even as late as 1930, only some 215 kilometers of railways had been built, as compared to over 3,000 in West Africa. At the same period, local budgets in French West Africa amounted to more than 600 million francs (of 1930 value) compared to 114 million in Equatorial Africa. The capital invested in commercial enterprises in the colony came to only a little over 300 million francs. While a wealth of natural products existed, little effort at exploitation was made, and the colony's chief yield appeared to be in black troops for use in the French armed forces.¹

Conditions improved somewhat during the 1930's, but no substantial advance could be made since, with the advent of the depression, governmental and private funds from Metropolitan France were available for development only in very limited amounts. Since the end of World War II, however, the picture has changed considerably. French interest in Equatorial Africa has grown materially, and with the coming into operation in 1947 of the *Plan de Modernisation et d'équipement* for the French Union as a whole, a wide variety of economic and social projects has been undertaken to bring about a

rapid development of the resources of the territory. The financing of this program for all of overseas France is undertaken by a combination of French government capital and contributions from the budgets of the individual colonies, managed by an agency known as the *Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social des Territoires d'Outre-Mer* (FIDES). The work of FIDES has been concentrated on the development of natural resources, the provision of basic capital equipment (roads, bridges, port facilities, etc.), and social welfare (health and education).

In French Equatorial Africa the accent has been on agricultural research for the development of new products, particularly cotton and rice. Exploration for new mineral sources is underway, and there are hopes of developing copper deposits and petroleum, but these are long-range rather than immediately available resources. Efforts are being made to push electrification by hydro power of the larger centers. One of the chief problems of the area, the lack of internal communication, has been vigorously attacked; but so far, in part because of high construction costs, relatively little has been accomplished. Over seven and one-half billion francs have been spent on road-building equipment, and on the roads themselves, but many years of work still remain. The ports of Douala and Pointe Noire have been expanded, as have air fields for removed from the coast; however, the problem of providing ready access to shipping centers for agricultural or other products produced in the interior is far from solved.

In the social field, public health and hospital facilities have been expanded, but from the point of view of the native population as a whole, it would appear that only the surface of this problem has been scratched. Well over one billion francs have been spent on educational facilities ranging from primary schools to technical colleges. Again, however, in comparison to the total population of school age, educational opportunities remain extremely limited.

The administration of French Equatorial Africa has undergone some changes with the advent of the French Union. The area comes under the classification of "Overseas Territories," and, as such, is permitted representation in the metropolitan governmental organs and in the Assembly of the French Union. From the four administrative divisions (*Gabon, Oubangi-Chari, Moyen-Congo, and Tchad*) representatives are elected by the local Assemblies. These local Assemblies have in themselves only limited powers, chiefly concerning local budgetary matters. For the territory as a whole, a *Grand Conseil* seeks to harmonize the budgets of the four administration divisions. The Governor-General still remains a powerful figure under the post-war regime, and he is responsible not to the local authority but to the government in Paris.

¹ Figures are drawn from G. Bruel, *L'Afrique Equatoriale Française*, Paris, 1930.

Space does not permit a detailed examination of the operation of the new administrative institutions; however, an important difference in the development of local autonomy between the French and British territories must be noted. While the policies of both are aimed, from a long-range viewpoint, at a large degree of local control, the present concept of the French Union does not foresee eventual complete separation of the territory from some relationship with what might be termed "Greater France." In the British case, the development of local control in the Gold Coast has gone so far that total removal of the territory from the Commonwealth may easily be envisaged. It is too soon to venture an answer to the problem of whether the sounder basis for local autonomy in an overseas territory proceeds from the French plan of instituting elective Assemblies for each administrative division, or from the British emphasis on developing local control in the smallest administrative units at the village level first and proceeding toward ever-larger units as the democratic process becomes integrated with native institutions. It may well be that both methods have their particular advantages: in the one case the process of establishing democratic institutions is speeded; in the other a surer foundation for their permanence is laid.

French Equatorial Africa today is embarking upon a new era in its history — one of rapid economic expression and political growth. Its potential riches are only beginning to be understood, after centuries of neglect. Whether this economic development will provide a sound foundation for future democratic government will depend upon the wisdom of French policy in the decades to come. And not only the native peoples, but the outside world as well, will be watching the unfolding of that policy with unceasing and often critical interest.

THE BELGIAN CONGO

by Jan-Albert Goris

Well-known in Dutch letters under the pen name of Marnix Gijsen, Dr. Goris is the Belgian Commissioner of Information in the United States, a former student of Washington University, Seattle, and the author of numerous works on historical, artistic, and literary subjects in Dutch, French, and English.

From different sides the attention of the American public has been drawn to the fact that the Belgian Congo at present is a booming pioneer country with practically unlimited possibilities. Although this picture has been somewhat romanticized in the press, it is basically correct.

Progress in the Belgian Congo, in the technical field as well as in the social field, has been rapid since the end of the war, and everything seems to indicate that the trend will be constant. The capital, Leopoldville, which had 80,000 native inhabitants in 1944, has at present 240,000 native inhabitants; the number of white inhabitants went up from 5,700 to 12,000 in the same period. In 1939, the export-import total was 800,000 tons; now it is over two million tons. Power production went up from 338 million kilowatt hours in 1946 to 714 million at present with a possibility of increase by another 500 million in the very near future. Out of a total population of eleven million natives, close to a million children are in school; missions, Protestant as well as Catholic, are constantly expanding. Transportation is also developing at a swift pace, as are harbor facilities, trade, and industry. No wonder that some American visitors called the Belgian Congo today "the Texas of Africa," which in their view was an unmitigated compliment! It should be added that no social trouble of any importance has developed in the Belgian Congo and that the entire enormous country, one third of the size of the United States, is completely peaceful.

The Congo is administered from Brussels, Belgium's capital. The Minister of Colonies appoints the Governor General, the provincial Governors, the judges, and the local administrators. The Governor

General has a great deal of authority which he can exercise without consulting the Minister, but general policies are laid down by the Belgian Government assisted by a Colonial Council. This Council has only an advisory function, but since it is restricted in number and composed of people who have had long and important roles in Congo affairs, its advice carries great weight.

In the Congo proper, nobody — white or black — has the franchise. There exists, however, a Government Council which discusses the budget and all matters submitted to it by the Governor General. Provincial councils assisting the provincial governors assume the same advisory duties as does the Government Council; in the past few years the native population has gained representation in these councils. The 120 territorial divisions of the Congo are directed by territorial administrators who control the local chiefs designated by the tribes, subject to approval and censor of the administration. As a whole the country is divided into two distinct sections: the major part which is governed according to local customs under white supervision, and a smaller part which consists of the natives who have left their tribal environment and have flocked to the cities. There are about a thousand native groups and another hundred groups living outside of the native custom laws. One of the most striking aspects of the latest development in the Congo is the mushroom growth of the native cities, for natives are flocking to the industrial and commercial centers in order to partake of the benefits, material as well as social, of civilized life. About fifteen per cent of the total population presently live in cities, and although the sudden growth of the principal cities has not led to any violent conflict, it presents several sociological problems.

The most delicate question to be solved — as delicate for the white as for the black man — is the one created by the social status of the *évolués*, a number of natives who qualify for admission to what is considered as civilized society by virtue of their scholastic background, their intellectual or technical achievements, their way of life. The government of the Congo has refused to create a caste and recognize the *évolués* as a kind of native aristocracy. It has, however, consented to register officially these qualified natives who have abandoned the objectionable aspects of native life and whose intellectual and social status entitles them to certain advantages.

The exodus to the cities created a demographic problem of the first order; the birth rate is low in several regions, and the villages are further depopulated by the exodus which leaves behind only the women, children, and old people. The majority of the natives who migrate to the city are men between the age of 15 and 30, who represent 21 per cent of the male population, while the corresponding female percentage is 14 per cent. The government is confronted with the

dilemma of either encouraging migration to the cities in order to speed the technical development of the country, or of discouraging this migration in order to keep the villages in running condition — but slowing down, by so doing, the progress of the Congo. The government has constantly taken the latter course and severely controls labor recruitment and the location of new industries.

An entirely new aspect of Congo life since the war has been the growth of labor unions. Among the 3,100,000 adult men in the Congo, there are about 1,700,000 who are engaged in agriculture. In the last thirty years, the number of workers in industry and trade has climbed from 51,000 to 800,000. Labor unions have been created in more than thirty localities and although it takes time to develop the native's solidarity with his union — he is much more conscious of solidarity with his tribe — the unions have already obtained excellent results by peaceful means: steady increase in wages, better application of social legislation, and creation of technical and professional schools.

Education is largely in the hands of the missions. The basic idea is to spread instruction as widely as possible. The government and the missions refused until recently to follow the example set by some other colonial powers which give higher education to a few natives who then become "showpieces" to prove that the innate intellectual gifts of the negro equal those of the white man. This thesis has always been considered self-evident in the Congo. Those responsible for the educational program felt, however, that it was to the good of the population as well as to that of the colonizer to create a large body of students who would learn the essentials and who would be educated to become skilled workers, nurses, medical assistants, desk managers, or small businessmen, etc. Recently, the basis has been laid for higher education at Kisantin where courses of a university character will be given in medicine, veterinary science, agronomy, administration, commerce, and teaching. Similar university colleges will be created in Leopoldville and in Astrida (Ruanda). The Belgian authorities want to give the native students a chance to complete their higher education in their own environment and do not encourage their exodus to Belgium, except after the completion of their education.

In the religious field there are a large number of native priests and nuns, and in 1952 the first negro bishop was consecrated.

Other recent developments of importance are: the success which greeted the establishment of a series of savings banks for negroes, and the construction of a sports stadium in Leopoldville, which has a seating capacity of 100,000.

The economic picture of the Belgian Congo is dominated by the progress of the Ten Year Plan, which was initiated in 1949 with the eventual purpose of making the Congo's economy less vulnerable.

Indeed, the Congo retains in a closed circuit only a small portion of its production, and its economic system is too exclusively based on export. The Plan provides for \$30 million for the agricultural program, \$40 million for housing, \$20 million for drinking water, \$40 million for education, and \$40 million for training. In total, the Ten Year Plan will cost \$500 million for that part of the program which deals only with public equipment and welfare. From private sources an equal amount is to be invested in expenditures that parallel or supplement the official program, so that, in all, the expenditures will amount to one billion dollars in ten years.

The most striking aspect of the economy of the Congo today is that it remains practically uninfluenced by foreign factors. In the last year prices for the mining output of the Congo (which comprises copper, tin, gold, diamonds, etc.) have been firm, while the agricultural products, especially palm oil and rubber, have declined. However, for the first time it became noticeable that the internal market in the Congo assumes an aspect independent of the world trend. While world markets have regressed since 1950-1951, the internal market in the Congo is still booming: investments increase, labor shortage is evident, raw materials are scarce, etc. Land which is now 3,500 francs the square meter was sold in Leopoldville before the last war at 35 francs. Legal minimum wages have gone up by 60 per cent in two years; this fact together with the constant labor shortage incites the producer to speed mechanization in agriculture and in industry. Economically, the country is located half-way between the stage of underdevelopment which characterizes most central African countries and the more developed economies of North and South Africa.

It is estimated that investment capital from Belgium to the Congo comes in at the rate of \$70 million a year. Generous technical assistance has been given to the Congo by the United States but the scientific and research equipment which the Congo possesses is of such a high order that this help mainly enlarges upon what is already done or is under way.

On the issue of communism, there is no reason for alarm in the Congo. Small local uprisings have been due to purely religious fanaticism. It is hoped that progressive education will steadily diminish the still widespread belief in sorcery and medicine men which sometimes leads to excesses.

A CASE FOR MORAL JUDGMENT

by Emory Ross

Dr. Ross has just recently retired after serving for many years as Secretary of the Africa Committee, Division of Foreign Missions of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America.

Of the decisions which men and nations have to make, those demanding moral judgment are perhaps the hardest. For in that judgment a minimum of outside force is faced and a maximum of inner power is demanded. For the same reason a right moral judgment in human society can be strongest of all.

Seething with unrest, Africa begins to appear as a critical world area today, but Africans do not generally threaten to impose their demands through warfare and can as yet muster no dominant physical force against the West. Africa has considerable potential but little actual physical power. It provides most of the world's gold and many other needed products but its industrial productivity, in today's power meaning of that word, is small — and what exists is in the hands of Westerners. It has water power greater, perhaps, than that of all the Western world — one short stretch of the lower Congo River is estimated to have more than Western Europe — but only a tiny percentage is captive and used. Although it produces most of the world's uranium, Africa has no atomic bomb. Africa has millions of brave people passionately devoted to their ancestral land and doubtless ready to die for it if they must, but there are no great armies on that continent just beyond any national or ideological frontier to threaten and force the West on the policies it must pursue regarding Africa. Africans can non-violently resist, or they can strike, riot, kidnap, assassinate, murder, burn. But the West can imprison, gas, machine gun, or starve them by the million if it wills. For the Africans have few arms, no munition factories, little physical facilities for real war. The West's judgment about Africa has to be a moral one.

That moral judgment is essentially this: are or are not Africans to be aided and encouraged by all suitable measures to gain their full share of freedom with responsibility in a free world?

The outside world today sees these questions posed dramatically and bafflingly in the Union of South Africa and in Kenya. Apartheid and Mau Mau are strikingly like the obverse and reverse of a single moral question. One is counted as legal, the other as illegal. Apartheid — white taking repressive and separatist initiative against black — has practically the whole weight of "law and order" for it. Mau Mau — black taking murderous initiative against white — has the whole weight of law and order against it.

Yet both crises present the basic moral problem of man's relationship to man — not just present relationship, but past, and also prospective, hopeful, future relationship. It is not enough to appeal merely to "law and order." Law and order in Africa is today almost wholly the white man's law and order. To us, in the West, it may seem fairly good. But to Africans it can appear of different character, for it is not their law and order; it is the white man's. In most cases they have had little to do with its making or with the fundamentals of its enforcing; they more or less have to take it on white "say-so." Their confidence in white authority is not as great as perhaps it once was. For many of them it is not so great that they are willing to accept it blindly or to submit voicelessly to its administration solely by whites. Human beings can get to the point under colonial rule where they will strike back at almost anything proposed by their rulers. History is full of examples.

Law and order in a multi-racial and presumably democratically-based society such as that of Kenya and the Union or the United States, can maintain fullest allegiance, and therefore have general validity and enforceability, only when there is just and adequate (although in the earlier stages not necessarily equal) participation by representatives of the different groups in the planning, making, and enforcing of law and order.

In Kenya some of the wisest leaders of all three racial groups, African, European, and Indian, have been saying repeatedly that the restoration of law and order (that is, the suppression of lawlessness) is not enough. The achievement of understanding, confidence, and cooperation necessitates something more, they say, and cite the importance of agreement and progress in the solution of economic, educational, racial, political, and land problems. Other leaders, however — principally some of the Europeans whose views have been widely aired — put major emphasis on law and order and seem to give rather later and lesser place to multi-racial agreement and progress.

Here, too, the problem of moral judgment enters. A good many externals of law and order in Kenya can conceivably be restored and maintained for a time by the continued, mounting use of physical force. But if force alone is employed, the situation of Kenya in the next decade will likely be worsened, for the Europeans will have stifled some of their own best ideals of Christian democracy. The Indians, if they join in or condone such action, will have helped vitiate some of the dearest principles of human freedom and progress for which Indians in their homeland and some of them in Kenya have struggled through long years. The Africans, on their side, will feel that they have additional evidence that the foreigners' democracy and religion is largely a formula and a fake, designed to keep them "in their place" with the white man over them. The hope of avoiding this result is notably strengthened by the public, courageous, and persistent action of many Christians in Kenya — Christian and other Africans defying the Mau Mau even to death, and Christian Europeans opposing their racial fellows who cry for ever more force and balk at the accompanying imperative of multi-racial understanding and cooperation.

Because large areas of Africa are not yet externally ignited by racial, economic, and political explosions, a great deal of Africa south of the Sahara appears on the surface fairly placid. There would still seem to be at least a little time for the West to gain the understanding which is now largely lacking in many Western circles. Particularly is better understanding needed in the top echelons of political, military, and economic leadership in the United States. Individuals in that top leadership may know a good many of the facts about the topography, the soil and sub-soil, and the current political organization in some or all of the two-score political subdivisions of Africa. Many of those "facts" have been transplanted from the West in the past generation or two. We know them from the West; we may think we recognize them when we meet them again in Africa. We do not, really, unless we know something of what Africans think of them, and how they may be adapted to African life or Africans adapted to them.

Mere knowledge of this transplantation is insufficient and may be truly dangerous, if it alone serves as the basis of American action, for as a high Belgian industrialist said a few weeks ago to an American seeing Africa for the first time, the human element is more important than the economic in understanding and succeeding in Africa. Without this human understanding, the economic factors introduced into Africa are likely to be either stifled or atomized; with it, they can be dynamized and fructified. There are foreigners who appear to place chief emphasis on the weak rather than the strong and on the bad rather than the good in African society. There are not a few Africans

who do precisely the same regarding the foreign influences they have seen. When such a spirit predominates, understanding lags, cooperation tarries, and tensions mount.

Where tensions are greatest in Africa today, the possession and utilization of land is always involved. Other factors have their significance but almost all major problems in Africa can be at least somewhat illumined by an understanding of the land problem.

It must be remembered that land, and the water it contains, forms a material base to stable society which is held to instinctively and tenaciously by nearly all people. Africans almost everywhere in their own country feel that they have a traditional and authoritative right to their ancestral land, and to its eventual disposition if it is to be disposed of, either under customary or Western law. Their attitudes toward land also have that traditional, deep-seated, spiritual quality which in various but powerful forms are characteristic of animistic communal society.

In direct conflict with these views are those of some of the permanent European population whose ancestors arrived in South Africa 300 years ago and in Kenya 50 years ago. Many of these hold that they have clear and permanent rights to the land given them under the Western-type law and order imported into Africa by their governments. In accordance with the Western pattern, the rights they claim include "ownership" of the land which, in the days of their ancestors, was in great part not visibly inhabited or "owned."

Their governments brought in adaptations of the Western concept of private ownership of land — a concept that had proved useful and acceptable in the West. As with so many other aspects of Western culture, law, and order, the assumption was that with some minor modifications it would prove equally useful and acceptable in Africa, and it has — to the European settler. The land he has thus acquired is "his," and it will be passed on to his children. He has "improved" it in Western fashion beyond anything accomplished or even dreamed of by the African in his traditional isolation and ignorance.¹

Thus the Western concepts of individual initiative, risk, and accomplishment, of private and secure ownership and inheritance of land and other assets seem applicable and just to the second and third and tenth generation Europeans. And other Europeans, newcomers to Africa without the heritage of ancestral residence, are coming in, buying land, and further strengthening the pattern of European possession and use of the none-too-plentiful good land.

¹ For example, one modest-sized farm in eastern Africa is producing four tons of pyrethrum a month, for which the going price is around \$750 a ton. Production costs, moreover, are not exorbitant.

From a Western point of view the settler's case is not without strength, and, for that matter, Western attitudes toward land may in the end come to be adopted and adapted by the Africans themselves. But from the Africans' present point of view, the Europeans' title to the land, based on Western law, is in many cases not acceptable as just, inviolable, or permanent. This arises from the fact that land is a tribal, group possession. It is not permissible for an individual to "own" land, in the Western sense of the word, even though he be a member of the tribe; it is therefore quite impossible to think of a non-member of the tribe as "owning" their ancestral land. If it be said, as it is in some cases, that earlier Europeans, governmental or other, "bought" the land from tribal chiefs or councils, the African attitude often is that such a transaction, if it took place, was misunderstood, was not regarded as a "sale" in the Western sense of the word since Africans had no concept of land "sale" in that fashion. And if it be insisted by Europeans that an individual chief or council *did* understand the Western meaning of "sale" those many years ago — a thing which is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove now — the African can say with, for him, convincing finality: "Even so, the transaction is not valid, for no chief or council in our tribe had authority to 'sell,' in your meaning of the word, land which was not theirs but the tribe's."

Further strengthening the feelings of many Africans in this matter of alienation of the land to European governments and individuals is the fact that almost everywhere the African has deep spiritual, or at least spiritistic, ties with his ancestral land. The souls of his forefathers, of himself and his contemporaries, and of all their children yet to come are tied to those lands. To lose their land can seem like losing their souls.

Long and complex arguments have been presented about this controversial subject of the Europeans' gaining effective possession of African land in certain colonial areas. The reasoning can be convincing to some Europeans, for after all it is based on Western law and order. But we do not always understand the varied African approaches to this matter, since few of them coincide with the European ones. The single clear exception to this is found embodied in the mutually-held idea of land's being basic to life.

The arguments from each side over this fundamental land matter in African-European relationships often spring from different premises, and aim at different objectives. Neither in the premises nor in the objectives is there yet that commonalty which in human affairs gives best hope of agreement and cooperation.

Here, clearly, the West must take the lead in the moral judgments that are called for. If it be true that the West possesses greater

insight and development in human affairs, its responsibility is so much greater.

It seems probable to the writer that great as may be the basic difference of opinion between African and European over the nature, possession, and utilization of land, it could not in itself have produced the high tensions that now exist in some parts of Africa had it not been for additional factors.

One among these has been the slow progress achieved in making elementary education more widely available, and in establishing and multiplying opportunities for higher education. In this, Africans in British East and Central Africa feel themselves at a special disadvantage as compared to those in British West Africa, and they tend to lay the blame at the door of the European settlers, feeling that too much "improvement" among the Africans is not wanted by the latter, and that several governments are too subservient to the settlers' views.

Another factor linked to this inadequate education is the Africans' feeling that they are counted by Europeans as unfitted to participate as fully and satisfyingly in their countries' economic and industrial developments and rewards as might otherwise be possible. They think that this debarment was in part the aim of the inadequate educational policies.

Because of this scanty educational and economic participation, the prevailing argument of the Europeans is that the Africans are not capable of, nor indeed entitled to, an increasingly effective share in the political government of their country. The Africans are beginning to feel that without this share it may be progressively more difficult for them to obtain the education and economic participation they desire. So they feel themselves caught in a vicious circle: they cannot get education to get economic strength to get political participation to get education for themselves and their children's children.

The Africans believe they see pervading this baffling circle the blinding, stifling, maddening influence of racial prejudice, discrimination, and even hatred. It is not wholly irrational for them to ascribe nearly all their difficulties with European authority to the too-prevalent and oft-declared racial attitudes of influential Europeans. This total ascription is neither wholly accurate nor wholly just, but that it is made should be understandable to white persons who have the heart to see the blight in human affairs which irrational, senseless racial prejudices have consistently produced.

Racial prejudice was a Western import into Africa. It was not the Africans who first introduced racial antagonisms in Kenya; it was not the Africans who conceived and have continued to develop racial "apartness" in the Union. Like many importations race prejudice is long in taking root among Africans, and for two or three

generations its crop in Africans' hearts has been sparse. It still is. Witness the numbers of resisting Kikuyu thus far killed by their Mau Mau fellow tribesmen — many times the number of European victims.*

In Africa south of the Sahara nearly all of the governed are black and nearly all of the governing are white. Practically all whites can go to school if they so wish, but relatively few blacks can. Servants are nearly all black and masters are predominantly white. Laws are made mostly by whites for both white and black; in some places there are different laws for each color. Where white and black are doing essentially the same work, they are paid different wages, with the black nearly always getting less than the white. *When such discrimination goes on and on and seems to become fixed and unchangeable, something eventually is bound to give way.*

The human spirit has a remarkable absorptive capacity. It can take great shocks, bear heavy burdens, make vast adjustments when there is room for it to move. But the human spirit is less able to bear injustices put upon it solely because of something about which it can do absolutely nothing. Color is such a thing. No man can do anything about his color — in another generation or two or three, maybe; but now, no. Prejudice and injustice on account of color — or construed as being on account of color — can make men truly desperate. That is slowly being demonstrated in some parts of Africa.

Significant as are the physical, economic, and political features of Africa, the basic human and spiritual facts of African life are still more important. For in the traditional animist, communal society of Africa the spiritual and what we call the secular are all tied in a bundle, as they once were in the lives of our ancestors. For ourselves, we have contrived to take the bundle apart. Some of the elements we have put together again in remarkably good ways; some have been put together in ways which threaten our whole society, indeed our whole world.

In Africa we have the last remaining large primal society on our planet. It has much of a pristine wholeness of life which we have lost and now try to regain. Can we help Africa to join our world without making all the errors we "developed" people of the earth have made? A basic moral judgment is required.

*Ed Note: See footnote 2, page 159.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE CHOICE BEFORE SOUTH AFRICA, by E. S. Sachs. Philosophical Library. 220 pp. \$5.75.

THE PEOPLES AND POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRICA, by L. Marquard. Oxford University Press. 258 pp. \$3.50.

RACIAL SEPARATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, by Eugene P. Dvorin. University of Chicago Press. 256 pp. \$4.50.

The three books under review jointly and severally constitute valuable additions to the growing literature devoted to the color problems of South Africa. Written by authors with rather different backgrounds—two white South Africans and one *Uitlander* (the Afrikaans term for an outsider)—they represent different approaches to the South African dilemma.

Sachs is a practical trade unionist who brought upon himself the wrath of the advocates of apartheid because of his relentless struggle against race discrimination in the trade union field. He is most forthright in condemning the manifestations of race hatred which he believes to be standing in the way of the achievement of a "truly democratic way of life" and most facile in his statements regarding the choice before South Africa. A typical example is his categorical assertion that "anyone who is not a fool or a political knave and is possessed of ordinary intelligence will readily grasp the simple truth that the way to remove the 'black menace' is to stop oppressing and humiliating the non-European people . . .," which is, of course, much easier said than done.

Marquard brings to his task the results of a prolonged and close acquaintance with the problems of African administration and a serious endeavor to be objective and impartial in dealing with the hopes and aspirations of the various peoples of South Africa. And yet the fact that he is an opponent of the present trend of official policies in the Union is by no means disguised. His conclusion that South Africa will search in vain for

a solution of her problems until she begins to solve them along the lines of genuine partnership between her "European and non-European citizens" is no less pertinent because it would be controverted most vehemently by those who wield power in South Africa at the present time.

But that it will not be a simple matter to exorcise the white fear of the non-white is brought out very clearly by Dvorin whose well-documented study makes a not-unsympathetic analysis of the fundamentals underlying the policy of apartheid. The imperviousness of the separatist attitude to the kind of objective reasoning advocated by both Sachs and Marquard is shown by Dvorin to be due among other things to the fact that racial inequality has, among those who subscribe to it, been raised to the level of a dogma believed to be "Christian, moral, and ethically justified." Faith and fear do not necessarily constitute the best foundations for rational behavior or for the evolution of a policy inspired by "the spirit of liberty, of culture, and of humanity that is characteristic of the greatest traditions."

In the opinion of this reviewer all three books suffer from the defect that they do not give the reader a sufficient indication of what the views of the non-Europeans themselves might be on the issues involved. This may be due to a tacit assumption that, in any event, their views either can be taken for granted or will not in the last analysis be as decisive as those of the Europeans in the settlement of the questions confronting South Africa. There may be, and probably is, a vital difference between what non-European views ought to be and what they actually are, and continued disregard of the necessity for a comprehensive analysis of this aspect of the matter by those who are so patently anxious to make constructive contributions to the study of South African problems cannot but be regretted.

Z. K. Matthews

WEST AFRICA ON THE MARCH, by
Nana Yaw Twum Duah Agyeman.
William Frederick Press. 73 pp. \$2.00.

Under the impact of two centuries of colonial rule West Africa has witnessed the cruel exploitation of its vast resources of raw materials without having accrued any substantial benefit for its own people. In digest form Mr. Agyeman has traced the development of the positive native reaction to the influence of Westernization, in which the dynamic elements of nationalism and democracy have in turn awakened the nationalist spirit in the ancient Ghanaian sector of Africa. This self-awareness has been best exemplified by the intrepid action which the Gold Coast has taken under the leadership of Premier Nkrumah to wrest itself from the bonds of Indirect Rule by Great Britain.

Mr. Agyeman's refutation of any strong communist infiltration in West Africa and any communistic character in its nationalist movement does not exclude the possibility of future communist expansion in this land of political and labor unrest. Herein, Mr. Agyeman cites the need for the ruling powers to change their colonial policy, to give the indigenes more purchasing power in order to relieve their economic stress and thereby avoid any possible spread of communism. In this connection he also criticizes the misdirection in allocating Point Four funds to the British and French governments, maintaining that financial and technological aid should be given directly to the indigenes. In this way West Africa will be able to use all of its available resources, support its people, and eventually attain self-sufficiency.

Many of the leaders of the Ghanaian National Front, such as Dr. Renner and Komla Gbedemah, share Dr. Nkrumah's greatest dream—a federation of West Africa. All these men contend that only through such unity can West Africa achieve its own salvation and help to solve the multifarious problems of the non-Western world. The reader must judge the efficacy of the ambitious program with caution, for this country fomenters with the ideas of political adolescents who nonetheless act in behalf of a country with a future.

Allen Stewart

WHITE MAN'S AFRICA, by L. E. Neame.
Stewart, England. 105 pp. £0. 10s.6d
SOUTH AFRICA, by Jan Hofmeyr, re-
vised and edited by J. C. Cope.
McGraw-Hill. 253 pp. \$3.75.

Mr. Neame's "rationale" of apartheid accentuates the fear which lives with every white South African. Driving relentlessly from the assumption that the white race is innately superior to the black toward the conclusion that separate development is the only feasible policy, the author loses rapport with his reader by lapsing into emotional and often dogmatic racist arguments. In his championship of total apartheid, furthermore, Mr. Neame ignores many of the practical obstacles facing its application under present-day conditions. What is to be done, for example, with the two or more million industrialized natives in the cities, who have been thrown into an alien European system and only partially digested? Mr. Neame thinks that separate residential sections with separate rules and administration is the solution. This reviewer suggests that in a city where people of all races are economically integrated—where they feel enforced superiority and inferiority by constant contact—segregation is impossible practically and undesirable morally.

Stating bluntly that he would favor apartheid if it were feasible, but that social and political separation cannot accompany economic interdependence, the late Jan Hofmeyr asserts realistically that in the present industrial state it is "too late" for the wholesale application of apartheid. Thus he favors the independent and unhampered development of the tribalized natives on large agricultural reserves, but argues that the Europeanized urban laborer must be allowed to advance as a co-worker with the white; through such cooperation will finally come mutual tolerance and respect.

Whatever may be the difficulties of effecting the partial-apartheid policy espoused by Messrs. Hofmeyr and Cope—and one obvious prerequisite is a change in the psychology and restrictive policy of the white trade unions—the authors are to be commended for their rational approach to a problem fraught with emotional overtones.

George Sherman

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440 Fourth Avenue New York 16, N. Y.

AFRICA: A Study in Tropical Development, by L. Dudley Stamp. John Wiley and Sons. 568 pp. \$8.50

Dr. Stamp's work is to be welcomed as a worthwhile counterbalance to the racial emphasis of many current books on Africa. The indirect outgrowth of a series of lectures on underdeveloped countries, it is dispassionately and objectively written in a very pleasant style. Scholars and politicians who wish to understand the continent and to implement the Point Four program may find it useful and it is perhaps one of the best introductions to the problems of Africa.

After a brief historical introduction, the study begins with a description of the geographical background of the continent and its constituent countries. Much valuable information, essential to an understanding of the future development of the area, is condensed into a readable form without undue loss of detail. Although the author does not intend to offer any predictions as to future planning, his book is nevertheless very suggestive in

this respect, since he not only evaluates the successes and the failures of projects undertaken in the past, but contrasts measures already taken with problems yet to be solved.

Professor Stamp's purpose is one of scholarly research and understanding of Africa; it is hardly possible to find any political, racial or cultural bias in his approach, even in a fully detailed account of the responses of African natives to Western culture. The text is well illustrated with many maps and diagrams and contains the latest figures on population, production, and trade.

As soon as the reader opens this book, he will feel Africa much closer to him than before, for in Professor Stamp's mind Africa is no longer an isolated, static, "black continent," but a quick-changing area whose fate is intimately connected with that of the free world and whose development has an immediate effect on the national interest of the United States.

Kun-hsi Lu

THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA AND PAKISTAN, by W. Norman Brown. Harvard University. 308 pp. \$4.50.

FREE INDIA IN ASIA, by Werner Levi. University of Minnesota. 161 pp. \$2.75.

The latest in the American Foreign Policy Library's series on contemporary nations, Mr. Brown's work is an admirable addition to these notable studies. Professor Donald C. McKay, editor of the series, introduces the book as a work designed to provide information and promote understanding in an area where there is a predominance of in-expertness and non-comprehension, and he lauds the author's impartiality on issues that have been traditionally treated in partisan fashion.

Commendable as this work may be, it falls short on both these counts. As a scholastic treatment, Mr. Brown's study is rich in background material, fascinating in detail, and incisive in analysis. But the bibliography and the textual detail are no substitute for footnoting, which is singularly lacking in many places where the omission is inexcusable. In his chapters on partition and the dispute over Kashmir, moreover, the author leaves subtle indications of a bias that tends to put Pakistan in a less favorable light than her neighbor on the sub-continent.

Finally, the title is a misnomer. A concluding chapter on relations to the United States constitutes about its only justification, but perhaps the brevity and the "after-thought" quality of this chapter is merely an indication of the parallel quality of America's own participation in the area.

Dr. Levi picks up, in a sense, where Mr. Brown leaves off, examining India's foreign relations since 1947 and explaining them in terms of national interest and security. He neatly pokes holes in the idea of "Asian solidarity" and concludes that the policy for the West should be one of assistance without political considerations and of understanding without impatience.

Dr. Levi has produced an extremely readable book that can also serve as a model of careful research and thorough documentation; studying it should prove valuable to both specialist and layman.

Albert Mark

THIRD FORCE IN CHINA, by Carsun Chang. Bookman Associates. 337 pp. \$4.50.

The loss of China to the forces of communism is regarded in the West as our most serious defeat since the start of the "cold war." In his *Third Force in China*, Carsun Chang, former leader of the Chinese Democratic-Social Party and originator of the 1947 Constitution which governs Formosa today, relates the unpleasant story of the final victory of the Chinese Communists. Though the emphasis of his analysis is on the turbulent period from 1944 to 1949—the "period of the mediation" which witnessed the complete victory of Mao Tse-tung—the author does give some attention to the early period of modern China under Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang-Kai-shek. He also gives his readers a general picture of the present regime. Mr. Chang develops as his major theme his personal convictions as to the future of China. He believes that there exists, within the Chinese people, deeply ingrained democratic values which can, given proper conditions, lead to the establishment of a stable democratic government in China; hence the title: *Third Force in China*.

The value of this book is greatly increased by the fact that the author, as one of the political leaders of China up to 1949, was a participant in many of the events which he describes. His political position as the leader of a Western-oriented party permits him to analyze both the Communists and the Kuomintang with relative objectivity. Out of this experience with the Kuomintang, the reader discovers Mr. Chang's basic conclusion as to the main cause of the fall of China: the internal corruption and disaffection which resulted from the personal despotism of Chiang-Kai-shek.

The analysis of the Communist victory is well developed and sheds much light on a controversial problem of American foreign policy. Aside from a rather erroneous examination of the much-maligned Yalta Conference and an unrealistic presentation of the evidence for the existence of a third force in China, Mr. Chang does a great deal to clarify the extremely befuddling events which have occurred in China since 1944.

Morton Schwartz

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RUSSIA ABSENT AND PRESENT, by Wladimir Weidle. John Day. 153 pp. \$3.00.

Russia Absent and Present in an esoteric discussion of the perennial question: does Russia belong culturally to Europe or to Asia? Mr. Weidle's scholarly though sometimes meandering thesis states that Russia's ties are Western, originating in Athens and Rome, introduced into Russia through Constantinople, and solidified through the efforts of Peter the Great and his successors. The enigma of Russia is not that she has an alien culture but that the culture she does have never seeped below the surface of the educated and the aristocratic, that it was imposed upon a marsh-like foundation of unassimilated peoples and as a result was absorbed and suffocated by them. The problem is therefore not one of seeking a Russian culture, but of having the Russian identify himself with the culture that already exists.

E. Ramón Arango

PHILOSOPHY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT, by Charles S. Seely. Philosophical Library. 319 pp. \$5.00.

Mr. Seely insists that the conflict of our times is a philosophical one and that the barricades of the future will be constructed around the two camps of idealism and materialism. Materialism is in the ascendancy; idealism has seen better days. Clearly, if we are to proceed intelligently in constructing a more stable future, we must understand the tenets that constitute these two conflicting ideologies.

Mr. Seely's approach, however, is too simple-minded. His world is painted in two colors: red and black. His idea of philosophy is unduly idealistic; he believes that the aim of philosophy is to explain all aspects of the "unproved" world. This is a scholastic bias. Philosophy's aim is to clarify fields of human action by dealing with contemporary issues. Mr. Seely's pat distinctions distort rather than clarify the issues of our times.

Arthur A. Diener

I DREAMT REVOLUTION, by William Reswick. Henry Regnery. 328 pp. \$4.50.

Prejudiced books are sometimes valuable. This has frequently been true in the case of writings in which the politics of the Soviet Union were criticized by men of Social-Democratic or other left-wing persuasions. In the past, such volumes bucked a pro-Russian tide. Today they more readily achieve popularity as the historical insights of men who were intimate with Stalin's work and were often victims of his operations. Such a book is William Reswick's.

Reswick, as the title indicates, was a believer in the Revolution and a friend of Alexei Rykov, who became the Russian Premier in 1924. Rykov's election was the result of his position in the right-wing coalition which united with Stalin against Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. To its consternation, the right-wing grouping later discovered that, once Stalin had purged the Bolshevik Party of its left wing, he had enough power to remove and destroy the right, both politically and physically.

As Chief of the Moscow Associated Press Bureau, Reswick had the fortunate misfortune to penetrate the Kremlin Walls precisely at the historical moment that Stalin chose to load the ranks of the Party apparatus, and particularly the secret police, with appointees who were personally loyal to Stalin's henchmen but ignorant of and disloyal to the traditions about which Reswick and his friends in Russia had dreamt.

Reswick himself was arrested by the secret police and was saved from death only by the personal intervention of Yagoda, who had not yet become a gullible instrument of the Stalin apparatus. This intensely dramatic scene, which the author relates with a fine historical understanding, provides an excellent clue to the reason for the degeneration of Russia.

Diaristic in style, personal, and admittedly biased in its pro-Bukharin politics, *I Dreamt Revolution* is nevertheless objective in its political insights and excellent as a journalist's report. For those who enjoy books about intrigue, it is quick and vivid reading.

Avel Austin

SOVIET CIVILIZATION, by Corliss Lamont. Philosophical Library. 433 pp. \$5.00.

The author has been a student of Russia for twenty years and a visitor to the country on two occasions. The display of knowledge in this work, however, is blatantly apologetic and fails to reveal the objectivity of his original intention. Just enough of the critical is inserted to remind the reader that the book reveals the opinion of a stalwart democratic thinker who is liberal enough to understand what his eyes and ears have told him during his studies and tours of Russia. But one cannot help but think that Dr. Lamont wore blinders the entire time and only occasionally turned his head to see what lay on the other side of the "Primrose Path." For those who are sufficiently grounded in the realities of Soviet civilization to weed the facts from Lamont fiction, his book is a tolerable counter-offensive to exaggerations of American propaganda.

E. Ramón Arango

LINCOLN AND THE RUSSIANS, by Albert A. Woldman. World Publishing Co. 311 pp. \$5.00.

Lincoln the "realpolitiker" is the portrait drawn by Albert A. Woldman's *Lincoln and the Russians*. Despite Lincoln's dislike of the Russian political system, he was quite willing to use Russia to redress the international balance; the Russians, notwithstanding an equal distaste for a democratic government, made it very clear that they considered a strong and united America essential to offset Britain.

Russia's outstanding service was to block effectively Anglo-French intervention in the Civil War, and America reciprocated by abstaining from the Polish Rebellion of 1863 and by providing a haven for the Russian fleet.

Woldman's attempt to draw a parallel between cooperation during the Civil War era and possible cooperation today overlooks the unique role that mutual hostility to England played. His consideration of Russian Ambassador de Stoeckel's complete misunderstanding of democratic government forms an interesting part of a generally useful and entertaining work.

Henry Krisch

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Super-duper "patriots" who prefer to roundly condemn the Soviet Union won't like this book. Neither will leftists who view Russia as a Utopia of supermen. But Corliss Lamont's sound and practical program will be welcomed by millions of thoughtful Americans as a monumental contribution to the cause of peace.

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TITO, by Vladimir Dedijer. Simon and Schuster. 443 pp. \$5.00.

As source material for understanding the growth of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the rationale of the revolutionary communist, and the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, this work is a valuable addition to the political literature of the times. As a means of getting to understand the Yugoslav leader at any depth, however, it is extremely lacking.

Tito, is a sometimes subtle, sometimes not-so-subtle, attempt to justify communism in Yugoslavia and to gain sympathy for the Yugoslav position in the current dispute with Moscow. It is valuable, nevertheless, for it gives a thorough picture of the struggles for power that are becoming increasingly important in the Communist world. Perhaps the most important contribution of the book is its discussion of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute. The Yugoslav experience has provided evidence of Soviet intent at complete control from Moscow and Soviet methods have been clearly illustrated. The failure of the Soviet to understand the unique, partisan character of the Yugoslav communists is, as Dedijer points out, an important factor behind the break.

It is this reader's impression that Tito is trying to convince the West that he wishes to follow a policy of live and let live. How much of this is due to a sudden change of heart and how much to political expediency is a matter for speculation. On the basis of communist practice in the past, one would tend to feel that the latter motive is more correct. Nevertheless, Tito has so far given the West no cause for regretting the aid it has given him.

Great credit is due Dedijer for the presentation of his case. His very enjoyable style makes his book quite interesting reading and almost succeeds in convincing one that the Yugoslav communists are not such bad fellows after all. One can admire the bravery, skill, and devotion to the cause that the revolutionary communist displayed during the pre-war and wartime periods of persecution and turmoil. A quick awakening comes, however, when it is realized that they themselves have now turned persecutor in a much more thorough and effective manner.

Richard Cornell

ANATOMY OF A SATELLITE, by Dana Adams Schmidt. Little Brown and Co. 490 pp. \$5.00.

The failure to save Czechoslovakia's independence has been imputed by many Western historians and journalists to the indecisiveness of President Benes and to the lack of determination of the non-Communist politicians. Mr. Schmidt in *Anatomy of a Satellite* rightly points out that the responsibility lies also on the shoulders of the Western powers. He stresses the psychological effect of Munich, the political advantages given to the Communists by the Soviet "liberation" of the country, and the post-war approach of the Allies who, in view of their lack of preparedness, were not able to grant any effective support to anti-communists in case of civil war.

The author, a *New York Times* foreign correspondent who spent over a year in Czechoslovakia, depicts in a narrative style, interspersed with true stories and also with remarks based on his scholarly background, all facets of life in this Central European Republic after the Communist coup d'etat in February 1948. His purpose is to show that even a country oriented toward the West may become communist, and that communism must be checked by positive action. The implication for the reader is that the fate of Czechoslovakia is the best evidence of the impossibility of a "peaceful coexistence" between Soviet communism and western liberalism.

Mr. Schmidt rejects the notion that the new regime will easily succeed in the re-education of the Czech and Slovak peoples, for their ties with the liberal past are too strong. He puts Czechoslovakia in a position of being a bridge between East and West geographically. He also stresses that Benes from 1945 to 1948 was trying to build up a compromise synthesis of "socialism and the rights of man," which worked pretty well until the authoritarian heart of the East stepped up against such coexistence. It is doubtful whether this short experience can be regarded as evidence of the compatibility of these two concepts. The answer can be found only in future developments wherever similar attempts at synthesis may be made.

Oleg Zabrodsky

THE RUSSIAN MIND, by Stuart Ramsay Tompkins. University of Oklahoma. 291 pp. \$4.00.

The Russian Mind by Stuart Ramsay Tompkins is an interesting but repetitive analogical study of the methods of thought control and repression that were employed by the Czarist government to quash all liberal philosophy which tried to find expression in Russia through education, the press, Freemasonry, and literature. The book is not written from the usual historical approach, but takes for granted some basic knowledge of Russian history and at least a skeletal understanding of the Russian "type." Mr. Tompkins feels that there is nothing new under the totalitarian Russian sun. As far as methods are concerned, only the characters have changed from Czarist to Communist. The plot remains the same.

E. Ramón Arango

BRAZIL: an Interim Assessment, by J. A. Camacho. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 112 pp. \$2.50.

Latin America, that too often forgotten area, is receiving the critical attention of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in a series of analyses of individual countries. Their book about Brazil, written by J. A. Camacho, a man with a conscientious knowledge of the country, effectively presents a bird's-eye view. The book, however, has a more pertinent theme: though Brazil has the potentialities to become one of tomorrow's important nations, it will do so only if its people realize what they have and develop their assets. The much-believed assertion that Brazil is the "land of tomorrow" is not necessarily accurate. The country has the characteristics necessary for either remaining as it is today—a land of constant change—or developing into something greater and more stable. This survey deals with every aspect of Brazil accurately and intelligently, and it will become, without doubt, a small classic about this many-phased country.

Ike Chocrón

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MODERN ASIA EXPLAINED, by W. R. McAuliffe. Philosophical Library. 163 pp. \$3.25.

It is hardly possible, in a book of this size, to treat in either a comprehensive or a scholarly fashion the somewhat immodest aim of the author, which is to sketch the geographical, social, religious, and historical backgrounds of the newly independent nations of Asia and the Near East.

While the author does not completely succeed in apportioning his treatment of the various nations in accord with their relative importance, his treatment of the post-war nationalist movements and their relation to the indigenous communist forces is both fair and unemotional, but shallow.

Martin Dubin

THE RETURN OF GERMANY, by Norbert Muhlen. Henry Regnery. 310 pp. \$4.50.

GERMANY'S NEW NAZIS, prepared by the Anglo-Jewish Association. Philosophical Library. 76 pp. \$2.75.

The Return of Germany is primarily a comparison report on West Germany and East Germany since the cold war, with an emphasis on what Germans think, feel, and are doing in relation to neo-Nazism, communism, anti-semitism, democracy and Soviet and American influences. It is written for the American audience who, the author believes, has been the victim of inadequate news coverage.

Not only is Muhlen's book a competent and objective analysis of the German scene; it also reflects insight and understanding. All too often the German has been considered by authors as a collective mass, rather than as an individual with a problem. Muhlen portrays the individual in his environment, not as the whole but as one who makes up the whole. This is the story of the German of today who values his individuality highly, who considers his private life inviolable, and who lacks a responsible interest in politics. Only if motivated by memorable experiences of the past (as in Berlin) or by force (as in East Germany) has he injected himself into the struggle between East and West.

Germany's New Nazis, written by a nameless British foreign correspondent commissioned by the Anglo-Jewish Association, is concerned with the extent to which neo-Nazism, linked in some instances with East German Communism, has once again appeared as a serious political force. In forewarning the world of the anti-democratic features still existing or undergoing a revival in West Germany today, the author hopes to avert a repetition of history.

A chapter on the Nazis in East Germany would have been more desirable than the occasional references to the situation in the East; this is especially important since the blending of the "red" and "brown" has taken place a second time. Yet, informative and concise, the booklet serves its purpose in bringing a problem of immediate concern to the attention of the free world.

Helmut Ressimeyer

GERMANY IN POWER AND ECLIPSE by James K. Pollock and Homer Thomas. D. Van Nostrand Co. 661 pp. \$10.00.

Some of the most crucial problems of modern times have been created by the rise of modern Germany and by her attempts to dominate the heartland of Europe. Since it is impossible to discuss these problems intelligently without a long-range knowledge of the circumstances which have created this country, a concise yet comprehensive analysis of German history has long been needed.

This need has been to a great degree filled by *Germany in Power and Eclipse*, written by James K. Pollock and Homer Thomas, both of whom are scholars long associated with German problems. The volume approaches German background from a geopolitical point of view and discusses such problems as territory, population, and the development of German politics and government institutions. Although geopolitics is by no means an accurate science, the present writers have approached their task intelligently and have shown that German problems can be validly discussed in these terms.

One feature of the work which is especially valuable is the separate treatment of the various regions. A loose confederation of sovereign states until 1871, Germany must be discussed in this context to be understood thoroughly, and in no other place is an individual treatment of the unique backgrounds and problems of the various areas and provinces to be found.

Originally intended for army use, the book draws on much reference material not easily available elsewhere. The authors have realized that Germany as it was before the war no longer exists. Therefore they have chosen to omit a discussion of the war and post-war periods in this work and have reserved the problems peculiar to this era for a proposed second volume.

On the whole, *Germany in Power and Eclipse* suffers from a rather pedantic style. It is, however, a scholarly work and, in the opinion of the reviewer, ranks with Veit Valentin's *The German People* as one of the most important surveys on Germany yet published.

Kenneth H. Toepfer

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS. UNESCO National Distributors. \$1.00 per copy.

During recent years there has been a veritable flood of books and articles on subjects pertinent to international affairs. For those seriously but avocationally concerned with world problems, the difficulties of keeping up with current literature have become well-nigh impossible, while for those doing research on a specific question of international relations, there is a definite need for a means of locating information and analyses more promptly and inexpensively.

The *International Political Science Abstracts* promise to be invaluable in both these respects. Abstracts are taken from journals throughout the world and range over an exceptionally broad list of topics. Unfortunately, the material which will be handled must be limited at present to articles; if the *Abstracts* are to become adequate tools for research, they should eventually be expanded to include selections from books as well. A cumulative index would be an additional asset.

One unavoidable difficulty in serving an international audience is that of language, for it would be neither economical nor necessary to publish in a variety of languages. After two years of experimentation, the policy has been established that articles originally written in English will be abstracted in English, while articles written in any other language will be abstracted in French. Since an abstract is obviously no substitute for the article itself, and since most of the users of the *Abstracts* are English-speaking, this solution is practical, but it does not entirely solve the problem. When it becomes economically feasible, every abstract should be published in both English and French, thus enabling persons who do not read one of these languages—undergraduates, for example—to utilize material inaccessible to them in its original form.

Despite these limitations, both of which have financial causes, the *Abstracts* are by far the most useful tool developed in the field of political science in many a year. It is to be hoped that their audience will be sufficiently wide for the Editors to effect the desired expansion.

Morton Schwartz

UNDERSTANDING EUROPE, by Christopher Dawson. Sheed and Ward. 261 pp. \$3.50.

The theme of Christopher Dawson's book is the danger in which Europe finds itself today, from both external and internal causes. The main internal cause is, according to the author, the lack of common spiritual aims and of a common system of moral values. Externally, and to some degree internally, Europe is menaced by the dangers of mass organization and its dehumanizing results. European civilization is at stake. Mr. Dawson feels that the only way out of this situation is to reunite Europe on the basis of its great Christian heritage.

The author is both a Roman Catholic and an English Liberal, and the dualism of these two radically different concepts of life is reflected in his book. He is inspired as a Catholic by the grandiose conception of Christendom which in the Middle Ages knew no barriers of language or state; yet as a modern liberal he recognizes disruptive nationality as an essential element of European culture. One aspect of this conflict is his treatment of Eastern Europe, where he regards the Congress of Vienna as originating a "fundamentally healthy" system, yet where the unity of empires so established checked and retarded the development of nationalism.

The message of unity is valuable, but its only practical outcome could be the elaboration of some system and of a faith. This the author omits. Although he suggests re-education in Christian values, he does not say how it could be done. The fundamental problem of such a re-education would seem to lie in synthesizing the centralization and spiritual vigor of Catholicism with the intellectual independence of Protestantism.

It is for man as an individual, and for his way of life—Democracy—that the West stands today against the East. But these faiths, to have driving power, must be universal. Yet, it is Western European opposition to the principle of universality, both in religion and in government, that has created the democratic way of life. The resolution of this conflict seems to be the condition of Europe's spiritual survival.

Anna Maria Cienciala

THE MAKING OF FRANCE, by Marie Madeleine Martin. Translated by Barbara and Richard North. Evre and Spottiswoode, England. 296 pp. £0.21s 0d.

The Making of France is the history of an idea—"the idea of France." Mlle. Martin's book, the first written by a woman to receive the "Grand Prix d'honneur" of the French Academy, is a brilliant example of deep scholarship and synthesis. It is a firmly-directed quest into the origins and development of French nationalism and, to a large extent, a history of the French contributions to Western culture.

The author traces the evolution of the thought and consciousness of the French about their country, beginning with the glorification of France as the defender of the faith; passing through the conflicts of the Capetian Kings with the Emperors, the Papacy, and England; through the Reformation and Religious Wars, to the Revolution of 1789. After the Revolution, which tore the essence of France away from its embodiment in the Monarchy, Mlle. Martin follows the course of nationalism to the war of 1914. Her book is delightful to read and sheds much light on abstruse historical developments. It is a worthy tribute to the great country to which its author belongs.

Anna Maria Ciencala

THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, by Howard F. Cline. Harvard University. 407 pp. \$6.00.

THE MEXICAN VENTURE, by Tomme Clark Call. Oxford University. 258 pp. \$6.00.

How fundamental is the relationship between the United States and Mexico to the development of the Mexican nation? This is a matter of dispute. The tendency today is to suppose that Mexico is more and more making her progress independently of political or economic control by the United States, but the validity of this thesis is the point of contention. Despite his title and its implications, Howard F. Cline, in *The United States and Mexico*, has done a far more effective job than Mr. Call in proving that Mexico has grown steadily closer to economic independence and at the same time has developed politically and economically at a rapid rate. In *The Mexican Venture*, Mr. Call, enumerating instances in which progress has been achieved, fails to provide the necessary integration between the components of progress that make that progress understandable and significant. While Mr. Cline presents an exceedingly comprehensive and penetrating analysis, Mr. Call, especially by comparison, seems to accentuate isolated examples of progress, thereby implying that the advance is faltering rather than steady.

William Kubns

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
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