Citizenship of the world – the Cynic way

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Abstract

The article investigates the self-designation of Diogenes the Cynic as ‘citizen of the world’. It appears, contrary to scholarly opinion, that positive content can indeed be attached to the term. However, the Cynic emphasis differs from Stoic and modern definitions of cosmopolitanism. A state with moral obligations to a common humanity does not feature largely in Cynic philosophy; instead, the Cynic’s primary allegiance is to the rules of the cosmos, which call for a life of individual simplicity, self-sufficiency, moral integrity, and freedom.

1. Introduction

According to tradition, Diogenes the Cynic coined the term “kosmopolitês”, or “citizen of the world”. What he and the early Cynics could have meant by the term is not immediately clear. Scholarly opinion diverges: most scholars regard it as being without positive content, while a “revisionist” view attempts to relate it to the content of Diogenes’ Republic, as summarised in the doxography of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers, Book 6.1 This paper endorses the latter view, and expands the possible parameters of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism by relating it to key notions in the philosophy.2

Modern definitions of “cosmopolitanism” typically entail the notions of universality, humanity, and community. The general meaning connotes freedom from national limitations and local prejudices, while an extended use of the term refers to a common bond between all humanity. Various approaches emphasise different issues: political, moral, cultural, economic, and a broad understanding would indeed embrace all these aspects of human existence.3 In a Cynic understanding, I would argue, freedom and universality remain key notions, but neither community nor the unity of humankind features strongly. While socio-political aspects of Cynic cosmopolitanism may indeed be explored, they lie at the periphery of the term’s meaning. Cynic cosmopolitanism is not a political term in the ordinary sense, and it does not have an anthropocentric vision of common humanity. Instead, it is strongly individualistic, and is meant to apply exclusively to the Cynic, albeit with secondary political, cultural and economic ramifications.
Ancient philosophical notions are rarely, in their totality, capable of being implemented in the modern world. This is undoubtedly also true of Cynic cosmopolitanism. However, if we allow ourselves to examine intriguing ideas from ancient thought systems while remaining critical of the systems themselves, we may find that their understanding of the concept of world citizenship may provide an important corrective to its modern use, which contributes little to the glaring environmental threats facing the modern world.

2. The evidence

The key anecdote is recorded in Diogenes Laertius 6.63:

When asked where he was from, he said: “I am a cosmopolitan”. Like virtually all Cynic *chreiai*, the authenticity of the saying would be impossible to establish. However, the majority of scholars are inclined to believe that this particular saying did come from Diogenes himself.\(^4\) The word occurs rarely in ancient Greek literature: we encounter it first in Philo of Alexandria; between Philo and the fourth century, its single attestation is in Diogenes Laertius quoted above.\(^5\) Lack of early evidence for its use may be interpreted in two ways: either it is a late invention, or it is an early peculiarity. The latter is more likely, especially since the Cynics were known for their verbal dexterity.\(^6\) Furthermore, cosmopolitan ideas are frequently attributed to the early Cynics.\(^7\) The doxographical section in D.L. 6.72 reports that Diogenes claimed the only “correct” constitution to be the one *en kosmā*, “in the *cosmos*”.\(^8\) The following lines are attributed to Diogenes’ most famous pupil, Crates of Thebes, and express the Cynic’s independence of particular locality:

No single wall or roof is home to me
But my city and house is all the land
to take us in, ready at hand.\(^9\)

It thus seems very likely that Diogenes was the first person ever to refer to himself as “citizen of the cosmos”.

While the specific term itself was new, the ideas of the world as a fatherland, and of the individual transcending locality, were not. The Ionian cosmologists already introduced universal principles beyond all human laws.\(^10\) Democritus stated that the whole earth is accessible to the wise and that the *cosmos* is the fatherland of the good soul;\(^11\) when Anaxagoras was accused of not being politically engaged, he pointed to the heavens and protested: “But I am greatly concerned with my fatherland”.\(^12\) The fifth century sophist Hippias is often regarded as the first cosmopolitan. According to ancient sources, Hippias travelled widely and possessed
extensive knowledge of other cultures and languages. The Hippias of Plato’s Protagoras employs the nomos-physis antithesis to designate the men gathered on the occasion as “by nature” family and fellow citizens. A similar line of thinking is attributed to Socrates: Cicero reports that Socrates referred to himself as mundi incolam et civem. While scholars tend to see this as a projection from Diogenes back to Socrates, Eric Brown recently argued that Socrates may indeed be considered cosmopolitan on the basis of his rejection of ordinary politics and his limited sense of obligation towards Athens. Cosmopolitan tendencies in Socrates would have indirectly influenced Diogenes, given that the Cynic modelled himself on Socrates in a radical way, earning him the epithet Socrates mainomenos, or Socrates-gone-mad.

3. Cosmos + polis: The meaning of the term

Although the idea of ‘world citizenship’ already came a long way, the specific combination of the terms polis and kosmos was novel, perhaps even startling, so that its intended meaning, and what it was perceived to convey, is not easy to establish. One clue may be provided by the format of the chreia. How does the question, “where are you from?” lead to a self-description as citizen of the world? In ancient Greece, “origin” related to status and, in particular, to citizenship. Diogenes consequently treats the question not as purely informational, but as about current identity. He ignores his native Sinope in his response, and overrides his physical origins with a philosophical concern.

The ancient Greek word kosmos had less bearing on the universe than on order and structure. The term could, in early literature, be applied to all sorts of orderly structures: military, political and social. In Hesiod it indicates the structural ordering of the world of the gods, while Pythagoras and the Milesian philosophers began using it as referring to the universe as a harmonious system. By the third century, kosmos was fully associated with the physical universe, a universe characterised by mechanical order and functioning according to its own inviolable laws. Significantly, in its philosophical use, kosmos always embraces a reality larger than human society. The word polis, on the other hand, has the intuitive meaning of a place of communal habitation, with its own set of laws and form of governance. The Stoics defined polis as “something morally good, an organization or group of men administered by law which exhibits civilisation”. Thus, not every collection of people living together qualified as a polis. In fact, the only proper city acknowledged as such by the Stoics was the heavens (ouranos). A politeis referred to a legitimate member of a polis with the accompanying rights associated with that status. Diogenes appears to have rejected the institution of
the *polis* and all it entails, so that his self-designation as *politeia* is paradoxical. But the combination cosmos + *polis* redefines both terms: the cosmos as in a sense analogous to a *polis*, and *polis* as not necessarily restricted to the ordinary human establishments known as *poleis*.

In summary, Diogenes’ self-designation as *kosmopoliteia* refers to his current identity, an identity which is not tied to any particular locality, but to the cosmos itself. The cosmos to which he refers is the ordered reality resembling the *polis* in having its own set of behaviour-regulating laws to which the Cynic, of necessity, subjects himself. As a citizen of this ordered whole, he claims the rights and status peculiar to it.

4. Negative cosmopolitanism?

Most scholars regard Diogenes’ use of the word as “un cosmopolitisme négatif”. Diogenes has no ideal state in mind, but refers to the fact that he does not consider himself a citizen of any particular city, all the more so since he rejects the idea of a city altogether. Accordingly, nothing but negation of conventional citizenship should be read into Diogenes’ claim. This view rests on three assumptions: (1) Cynic philosophy is by definition negative; (2) cosmopolitanism must refer to some idea of a world state and common humanity, which is absent from Cynic philosophy; (3) the proper clue in the Diogenes tradition to the meaning of *kosmopoliteia* is the story about his Sinopean exile, corroborated by the reference in D.L. 6.38 to his homelessness:

> without city, without home, of fatherland deprived
> a pauper, a wanderer, having life but for the day.

None of these assumptions are conclusive. Few scholars would nowadays agree with (1). Reconstructing the content of Cynic philosophy is indeed difficult because of the sketchiness of the transmission, mostly in *chreia* form, and the nature of the philosophy itself, with its lack of orthodoxy and its emphasis on practice rather than theory. However, this only means that the method of reconstruction will differ from that of other ancient philosophies. Furthermore, it is currently accepted that the early Cynics wrote extensively; it should always be borne in mind that the *chreia* tradition presents but a small provocative slice of the original corpus, now lost. As for (2), the Cynic tradition as we have it does not contain ideas of a universal state and common humanity. But that only rules out a definition of cosmopolitanism which includes those ideas, not a form of cosmopolitanism without them. (3) The lines attributed to Diogenes in D.L. 6.38 are in tragic metre, indicating an original tragic context. The self-pitying lament does not tally with the Cynic emphasis on hardiness and self-sufficiency. Diogenes
might have written the lines himself, or applied them to himself from a now lost tragedy; in either case the intent was probably ironic. Furthermore, asserting lack of fatherland and citizenship in the conventional sense by no means translates directly into a cosmopolitanism devoid of content.

The main “revisionist” voice against the scholarly consensus is that of John Moles, who lists five proofs for a positive interpretation (without shedding light on the content itself): (1) Some value must be attached to the fact that the Cynic formulation is “positive”; an apophatic form (as elsewhere: “I am without a polis”) would have been a clearer indication that only a negative content should be expected. (2) Diogenes’ sentiments stand in a long tradition of re-evaluating restrictive boundaries of city and fatherland. (3) Diogenes’ main rival in this matter was the Cyrenaic Aristippus who, in contrast to the Cynic formulation, expresses his position in purely negative terms, that is, by remaining a xenos (foreigner) everywhere. (4) The Cynic formulation is deliberately paradoxical in linking seemingly contradictory terms: kosmos and polis. (5) It is also paradoxical in terms of Cynic philosophy itself: the severe critic of the polis calling himself politeis. In the light of the above arguments and Moles’ proofs, the view of Cynic cosmopolitanism as purely negative may be dismissed. But what positive content can be attached to the Cynic neologism?

In Moles’ view, the term’s meaning lies on two levels.25 The primary level is that of the individual Cynic. The Cynic ‘state’ essentially refers to the moral ‘state’ of the Cynic philosopher himself. As such, Cynic cosmopolitanism, related to Cynic virtues and way of life, implies positive attitudes towards the natural and the animal world, towards his peers, the gods, and finally towards humankind at large. This final point derives from the Cynic’s missionary, proselytizing activity. On a secondary level, it involves politics in the more traditional sense, which may be derived from the content of Diogenes’ Republic. If the doxography in D.L. 6.72 may be taken as summarising the Republic, Diogenes’ world state entails features of communism (communal property, women and children held in common, abolition of money) and an implied vision of the unity of humankind (actual kinship with other Cynics; potential kinship with all humans).

Moles’ analysis contributes much towards fleshing out the picture of what the ancient Cynics would have thought about citizenship and political allegiance. Although undoubtedly correct in identifying the primary “state” in the cosmopolis as the moral constitution of the Cynic, Moles tends to neglect this aspect of the term in favour of its political connotations. Undue emphasis on an envisaged Cynic society threatens to distort the philosophy, since social issues are remote from the philosophical core. Utopian thinking, in particular a return to the golden “age of Cronus”, seems to have been an aspect of early Cynic thought, but – apart from the obvious tension - their
relationship to contemporary society varied significantly between the ‘hard’ uncompromising stance of Diogenes and the ‘soft’ philanthropic Cynicism of Crates and others. The issue remained problematic to later Stoics, who solved it by granting the Cynic exceptional status above and independent from normal society. In what follows, I shall focus on the primary level in the meaning of their cosmopolitanism, and attempt to expand on the meaning of the concept from the core of the Cynic position, namely their radical siding with “nature” as opposed to “custom”.

5. Nature over custom

Moles rightly stresses that the Cynic state is defined by Cynicism’s central tenet of living “according to nature”. Can one get closer to what was meant by that, or were the Cynics satisfied with a broad but undefined understanding of *kata physin*? On closer inspection, it appears that they occupied a very particular stance in the sophistic debate on the relationship between nature and custom, and that some content can indeed be derived from their position. The issue is pertinent since the two constituent parts of the term *kosmopolitēs* evidently relate to the poles of the antithesis: *kosmos* appears to be narrowly linked to *physis*, while the Cynics considered *nomos* an integral part of the *polis*.

The fifth century debate, originating from the observation of the relative truth value of laws, customs, practices and opinions, resulted in a spectrum of philosophical positions on the issue, ranging from moderate to extreme. Furthermore, fifth and fourth century thinkers differed on the conclusions drawn from a particular position. Plato depicts the great sophist Protagoras as a moderate. In the homonymous dialogue, Protagoras tells the story of Prometheus stealing fire and “technical wisdom” for man, but not “political wisdom”. Fearing that men will destroy themselves, Zeus gives them *dikē* (justice) and *aidōs* (shame and respect), so that the *poleis* will be governed according to *dikē*, and “bonds of friendship” could unite people. While *nomos* is foreign to the original human condition, it is essential to peaceful co-existence. Respect and justice are necessary in the context of the *polis*, and the *nomoi* are the limits laid down by the *polis* to regulate social behaviour. Neither the *nomoi* nor the *aretai* reflect *physis* but, according to Protagoras, a return to *physis* is the last thing to be desired.

Other sophists were less sympathetic towards *nomos*, the most radical perhaps being the Callicles of Plato’s *Gorgias*. Callicles reduces *physis* to the right of the strong to live according to their instincts, while *nomoi* and the traditional civic excellences (*aretai*) represent a plot of the weak to contain the strong. Immorality/amorality as an extension of the natural also emerges from the fragmentary remains of a dissertation “On Truth” by the
sophist Antiphon. In Antiphon’s view, the difference between *physis* and *nomos* can be seen from the fact that transgressing against the former has an automatic effect, while transgressing against *nomos* only has an effect when observed by others. It follows, says Antiphon, that the person informed of the difference between the natural and the conventional should develop the skills of manipulating the *nomoi* to his own advantage.

In the aftermath of the debate, unless one took the route of Plato and considered *physis* as fickle as *nomos*, virtually all intellectuals sided with *physis*. Those unwilling to relinquish social involvement and civic responsibility attempted a compromise by aligning the *nomoi* with *physis*. Diogenes’ conception lies between the radical camp of Callicles and Antiphon, and the Stoic compromise. The *nomoi* only possess validity to the ignorant; the rules of the cosmos, on the contrary, are immediate, inevitable and universally valid. On this score, Diogenes distances himself from the conventional idea of the *polis* and its laws, in favour of the (unwritten) laws of the cosmos. On the other hand, he differs from Antiphon regarding the possibility of deriving moral principles from nature. While not stated explicitly, Diogenes’ ethic implies that nature is simultaneously a force of necessity and inherently moral; the philosopher’s task is to derive correct behaviour from the universally valid. In a saying that may almost be regarded as Cynicism in a nutshell, Diogenes claims that he opposes fate with courage, law/custom with nature, and passion with reason. In this saying, one may recognise in fledgling format the later Stoic notions of the rational cosmos with its own pervasive set of laws.

Many peculiarities of both the Cynic and Zeno’s early Stoic *Republic* are explicable with this position on *physis* in mind. These include incest and cannibalism, the practice of which in other cultures indicates that they do not cause a backlash from nature itself. One of the more plausible stories about the death of Diogenes was that he died after trying to eat uncooked octopus (DL 6.76), presumably while attempting to establish the validity of yet another physical constraint. The Cynic cosmopolitan is bound only to the dictates of nature.

### 6. Cynic notions that clarify their cosmopolitanism

With the Cynic stance on *physis* clarified, the relationship of other key concepts to their cosmopolitanism comes into proper perspective. Diogenes and his followers were famous for especially three features: *autarkeia* (self-sufficiency), *parrhesia* (bold speech), and *anaideia* (shamelessness). As for the latter, *anaideia* is the natural opposite of the concept of *aidōs*, which functions within the “psychology and ethics of honour” and which was considered by the Greeks as “a necessary mark of civilized life.” This
includes standards of external and internal esteem and propriety. Reacting on interpersonal, social values, *aidōs* obviously belongs to the realm of *nomos*. It would be precisely at this and other flashpoints between the demands of the natural and social propriety that the Cynic would launch his attacks, and attempt to ridicule the folly of conventional opinion in order to tip the scales in favour of the straightforwardly natural. Cairns mentions that *anaideia* often indicates the illegitimate encroachment on the honour of others through lack of moderation, thereby explaining the repeated accusations that Diogenes suffered from misplaced vanity (*heterō tuphō*). As far as self-sufficiency is concerned, the term *autarkeia* lies close to the core of ancient Cynicism. The term’s history preceding the Cynics has various connotations. Its earliest meaning may have been economic: not to have to work for someone else. But already Democritus contrasts *autarkeia* with extravagance (*polytelēs*). The sophist Hippias, whom I mentioned earlier as expressing cosmopolitan sentiments, was also notable for his *autarkeia*: Plato sketches Hippias as sporting self-made garments and shoes, as well as a ring and a girdle made after a fashionable Persian design, and claiming that he could make lots of money without any help from others. Hippias’ variety of self-sufficiency stands in contrast to that of the philosopher Aristippus, whose definition of the term was to provide for oneself with what comes to hand, even if that entails parasitising on rich benefactors. It also contrasts with the *autarkeia* of Socrates, known for his self-mastery (*enkrateia*). Xenophon depicts Socrates as being particularly austere, while Plato’s picture is of the philosopher whose “mission as a philosopher leaves him no time to attend to his worldly affairs”, who shies away from dependence on benefactors, but who does not scorn material pleasures and possessions.

Diogenes again pushed the Socratic example to the extreme. His uncompromising self-sufficiency pertains to both the moral and the material sphere. It means restricting himself to the barest necessities, testing the rules of nature as he did so, and discarding all the trappings of custom and propriety. The Cynic cosmopolitan needs none of the protections and apparent benefits of life in the *polis*, and rejects them together with the false values they generate:

He would ridicule good birth and reputations and all those sorts of things, saying that they were the ornaments of vice.

The Cynic’s self-sufficiency requires him to revert to a natural state, living like the animals with their limited needs, but also approaching the divine, since the gods too have no needs. When Diogenes was said to oppose fate with courage, this refers to his style of self-sufficiency: whereas the Stoics accepted and bowed to fate as equivalent to divine reason, Diogenes stood
up against fate and welcomed – as morally beneficial – the ensuing hardships.

Also within the realm of courage is the typically Cynic *parrhēsia* which, according to D.L. 6.69, was to Diogenes the “most beautiful thing among humans”. Initially, the concept signified a characteristic of citizens in democratic Athens (which was not possessed by non-citizens, women, children and slaves). Athenian freedom of speech consisted not only of a formal right, but also of a psychological state manifesting as the ability to say whatever you thought, while facing your fellow citizens squarely and fearlessly, regardless of how controversial your remarks may be. The term’s origin poses the question why Diogenes, a non-citizen from Sinope, was allowed to display such an insolent form of *parrhēsia* wherever he went. 49 Three corroborating factors suggest themselves. Firstly, it seems as if the concept had, by the middle of the 4th century BC broadened to the extent that its moral-psychological connotation overtook its political meaning. Secondly, the Athenians apparently afforded greater freedom of expression to their intellectuals, especially to those who played on comic conventions in their quest for even greater audacity. 50 Thirdly, it seems likely that Diogenes based his freedom of speech on his citizenship of the world: because of his allegiance to the cosmos, he experienced no restraint on speaking his mind anywhere, even when an outsider in the city: “Having reduced all norms to which he must attend to those of nature, Diogenes finds himself liberated from bourgeois inhibitions and social practices.” 51

According to Schofield, freedom (*eleutheria*) in a Cynic context was exclusively individual (not communal), moral (not political) and internal (mental). 52 Like *parrhēsia*, the term gradually shed its exclusively political connotation, leading to the Stoic paradox that only the morally good can be free. To the Cynic, freedom meant more than being liberated from societal demands: it meant being free from internal stasis, from constraints on correct moral behaviour, and acting with the utmost integrity. It seems probable that Diogenes derived his sense of freedom, the prerequisite for *parrhesia*, from his sense of being bound to the cosmos only.

7. Conclusion

Stoic cosmopolitanism no doubt elaborated on the Cynic notion. It would have featured in the scandalous *Republic* of Zeno, and the notion reached lofty heights in authors of the imperial age. A Stoic version of cosmopolitanism has been resuscitated recently by Martha Nussbaum, who kindled a lively debate on cosmopolitan education and its relationship to patriotism. 53 Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism emphasises Stoic ideas of moral obligations to serve a common humanity without the barriers of nationality,
class, ethnicity or gender. These ideals are only remotely related to Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism, in which sense of community is restricted to the Cynic’s “duty” to reveal the folly of his fellow humans. Diogenes’ conception is in the intellectual elitist mould characteristic of most of Greek philosophy, with love for or duty to all humankind singularly absent until late Stoicism. Nonetheless, I would suggest that some aspects of Cynic cosmopolitanism constitute an important corrective to the Stoic conception of the term.

In the Cynic’s hyper-individualistic paradigm, primary allegiance is not to humankind, but to the natural world. An argument can be made that the anthropocentric emphasis of the Stoic conception – so eloquently brought out by Nussbaum – threatens the survival, in the long run, of the human race on this planet. When the well-being of humans is elevated as the one good above all, one can expect everything else to remain subject to, and exploitable for reasons of, human interest. In contrast, the most distinctive aspect of the Cynic conception is that it includes both the natural and the animal world, and even promotes an animalistic state as a moral paradigm: Diogenes is quoted as taking the example of a mouse for proper moral behaviour. In the Cynic cosmos, as Goulet-Cazé observes, the hierarchy is god-animal-human. For this reason, the Cynic moral ideal is the curbing of superficial needs and the encouragement of hardiness. The Stoic compromise with socially driven norms is unable to voice criticism against a world where economic growth becomes the mantra, where unrestrained stripping of resources, ever-increasing production and frenetic consumerism are not merely allowed, but considered the tokens of governmental and societal success. In the face of these excesses the Cynic calls for simplicity and self-sufficiency. Where over-regulation creeps in, the Cynic reminds us that only the simple rules of the cosmos are truly valid. Where the lure of extravagance and the symbols of status and prosperity threaten to enslave humankind, Diogenes cries that freedom and dignity is to be found in being merely human and acting with moral integrity.

Diogenes’ uncompromising cosmopolitanism clearly cannot be implemented on a wide scale. Its great strength lies in being a counter-image, burning away excesses, reminding us of our primary allegiance to the natural world, where less constitutes the better way.

Bibliography


2. Cosmopolitical ideas in some subsequent Cynics are treated by Moles 1995:143-56.

3. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, art. “Cosmopolitanism”.


5. Philo Opif. 3; Mos. 1.157.


8. Moles 1995:132-7 argues, in my view convincing, for the authenticity of the doxographical section in D.L. 6.72, which he believes to have been extracted from Diogenes’ Republic. It follows that Diogenes’ Republic would have reflected his cosmopolitan sentiments.


10. Cf. Baldry 1965:26-8. I do not consider the evidence for the unity of humankind presented by Baldry: while this may lie at the basis of Cynic missionary activity, the sharp distinction drawn in Cynicism (as in the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus and the Stoics!) between the wise and the majority of humankind, rules it out as a core ingredient of Cynic cosmopolitanism.


14. Plato Prot. 337. Hippias’ sentiments admittedly refer to a common bond between humans, but that is based on their allegiance to “nature” as transcending locality and nationality.

15. Cic. Tusc. 5.108; also Plut. Ex. 5; Epict. 1.9.1.


18. The nature of the chreia as literary form plays a role in considerations of this kind. It is quite possible that only the fact that Diogenes referred to himself as a kosmopolitês was at first transmitted, and that the question was later added as an appropriate introduction to the apophthegm.

21. The expression displays obvious similarity to the apophthegm of Diogenes in D.L. 6.72, although Diogenes refers to the *kosmos* as opposed to the Stoic *ouranos*, and to *politeia* (constitution) instead of *polis*. Schofield’s (1991:61) translation of *ouranos* as “universe” is rightly questioned by Moles 1991:135.
24. The view was made popular by Dudley’s influential work (1937:34-7), and by Tann (1939:41-7), who argued against any possible Cynic influence that might detract from Alexander the philosopher-king’s vision of a universal brotherhood in a cosmic state. Tarn’s conjecture about Alexander was from the start greeted with suspicion and eventually refuted thoroughly, among others by Baldry 1965:114-26. The negative interpretation has proved to be more persistent, cf. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, art. “Cosmopolitanism”.
25. Moles 1995:141-2 actually distinguishes between 3 Cynic ‘states’: “The essence of the Cynic state is the virtue of the self-sufficient individual...” Apart from this “state 1”, Moles also distinguishes a “state 2” (a Cynic community) and a “state 3” (an “elastic and ever-expanding state” as the result of missionary activity and which endorses humble occupations). The latter becomes quite speculative.
27. Cf. Epict. 2.22.
29. See the introduction to the second syllogism in D.L. 6.72: “With regard to the law, he held that it was impossible for there to be political government without it”. Schofield 1991:133 regards the introduction as a Stoicising interpolation, while Moles 1995:131 leaves the issue open due to the anti-polis bearing of the whole section.
32. Plato Gorg. 483A-D; 491E-492C.
33. Antiph. Soph. Fr. 44.
34. Long 1996:34-5 sees two ways in which Diogenes differs from Callicles: (1) following nature does not give licence to exploit others, but rather limits one’s desires; (2) not all of conventional morality is rejected, but only those aspects he considers “mere irrational prejudice and ... inimical to the satisfaction of natural needs”.
38. Significantly, the ancients did not accuse Diogenes of stupidity, but of *hybris*, indicating that he was thought to overstep the limits set to humanity.
41. D.L. 6.104; Rich 1991:30 notes two sides to the notion: (1) physical: contentment with bare necessities; (2) spiritual: detachment from the world and worldly values; Long 1996:30 refers to “self-mastery” (enkratēia).
42. Seaford 2004:15.