Did the cynics condone theft?
Possession and dispossession in the Diogenes tradition

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the evidence in the Diogenes tradition on the issue of theft. A line in Diogenes Laertius suggests that the Cynic approved of temple theft. However, before that can be taken as proof, various other factors need to be taken into account: Cynic philosophical principles, their view of the gods, and their adherence to begging and voluntary poverty. Finally, the Diogenic anecdotes dealing with theft should be considered. It appears that the Cynics could have constructed a case for legitimising theft, but that they probably neither drew the conclusion, nor put it into practice themselves. The claim that Diogenes condoned temple theft may have found its way into his Life from a hostile source, but it more probably goes back to Bion of Borysthenes.

1. Introduction

When ancient Greek philosophy is approached on issues such as politics and criminality, it is worthwhile not to remain restricted to the canonical voices of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic schools. Various other, ‘smaller’ voices should also be given the opportunity to be heard, especially for the unusual, often controversial angles with which they approach the issues, in the process opening up fresh insights into humankind and its relationship with society. One such smaller voice belongs to the ancient Cynics, since antiquity known for their original, non-conformist, and even provocative methods and views.

The topic I would like to explore in this paper is the Cynic stance towards theft. In the final section on the life of Diogenes of Sinope, his biographer relates the following information:

(He saw) nothing improper in taking something from a temple...¹

The sentence’s context belies its potentially explosive significance. It is
tucked away, almost escaping notice before the more controversial and interesting issue of eating all kinds of flesh - including that of humans! The latter argument is derived from the (Anaxagorean) view that everything shares essentially the same substance. But while the justification of cannibalism might be more provocative, condoning temple theft in ancient times would have been equally sensational, entailing much more than the breaking of a religious taboo. Temples in ancient times served as treasuries and general repositories of valuable dedications, which were of great social and political significance. Such a statement had the potential of having wide social and political repercussions. The whole system was rather precariously kept in place by the fear of the gods. The occasional looter of temple precincts had to bear the stigma of being a *hierosylos*, (temple-robber), and was expected to be visited by the wrath of the gods sooner or later for the committed sacrilege.

How should this statement attributed to Diogenes be taken? The line’s vocabulary is rather unspecific. Terms like *sylao* (to pillage) and *thesauros* (treasury) are absent; the infinitive *labein* (to take) is very general, and even more so the ‘something’ the taking of which is not *atopon* (out of place). Does it mean that the Cynic philosopher condoned temple theft, or - worse still - the plundering of sanctuaries? Or does it rather intend to be a statement about the existence of the gods or their involvement in human affairs? Can it be applied more widely to mean that the Cynic saw nothing wrong in stealing altogether? Is the claim compatible with what we know about Cynic philosophy and its basic tenets? Finally - in the light of the problematic sources for Cynic philosophy - the following question should be asked: may it perhaps be attributed to a misunderstanding, or an attempt at misrepresenting the ancient Cynics? Answers to these questions are not clear-cut; indeed, a good case can be constructed in favour of, as well as against the condoning of theft among the early Cynics. The remainder of this paper will present the available evidence.

2. Cynic principles: Life according to nature, and communal property

As said, the Cynics were known for their radical anti-social position, and it is not impossible - on the basis of the movement’s philosophical principles - to derive a defence of stealing. Two such principles coming to mind are their particular definition of property, and their radical understanding of ‘life according to nature’.

To begin with the latter: Diogenes was known to have advocated life *kata physin* (according to nature) as the road to happiness. The distinction between *physis* (nature) and *nomos* (custom, convention) was a feature of fifth
century intellectual life, especially among the sophists. Various positions were advocated, ranging from correspondence between *physis* and *nomos*, to radical opposition between the two concepts. Diogenes adhered to the school of thought that saw *physis* to be opposed to the follies of culture and society. The wise man - that is, the Cynic - is able to see through all forms of conventionality that obscures the simple truth of nature. A similar view is found in a fragment transmitted of the fifth century sophist Antiphon, in which he argues that the edicts of *nomos* are impositions, while those of *physis* are compulsions. If one transgresses against the *nomoi* but escapes the notice of one’s fellows, one remains free from disgrace and damage. But when you transgress against *physis*, damage is inevitable, even if no one notices. For in the latter case you are up against the truth and not mere opinion. Diogenes clearly reasons along similar lines to conclude that cannibalism cannot be against nature when other cultures do it without natural damage. For the same reason, theft can be placed in the category of transgressions against *nomos*: if a thief does not get caught, his stealing is actually to his benefit. It is not wrong by nature, but only by convention and public opinion. Therefore, calling on the radical adherence to life according to nature, the Cynic could arrive at a philosophical justification of theft.

A second argument the Cynics may have employed, entails the deconstruction of the category of theft by reference to collective property. Diogenes and his successors were proponents of communal possession, an idea that seems to have found wide acclaim in philosophical circles of the era. One can easily conclude from such a premise that theft is not a crime. In a society without private property, there can be no such thing as taking something that does not belong to you. The category of criminal dispossession falls away.

3. The Cynic view of the gods

As the line in D.L. 6.73 specifically concerns taking things from temples, the Cynic view of the gods should be factored into arguments for or against its authenticity and significance. Does Diogenes perhaps defend temple theft on the basis of atheism, or on the non-involvement of the gods in human affairs? That is, can things be taken from temples because the gods do not exist anyway, or that they will or could not take revenge on humans who commit sacrilege?

Cynic religion has been treated variously in scholarship, and the theology attributed to them ranges from outright atheism, to deism, to colourless abstract monotheism and pantheism. In a balanced discussion, Goulet-Cazé concludes that the early Cynics remained faithful to the position of Diogenes, who can be described as an ‘outright agnostic, who
had rid himself, once and for all, of the basic problem of religion and succeeded in extricating himself from embarrassing questions with a display of intellectual alacrity’. Two anecdotes transmitted in Tertullian illustrate the Cynic’s agnosticism: ‘When Diogenes was asked what went on in heaven, he said: “I have never been up there”. When he was asked if the gods exist, he replied: “Do the gods exist? I don’t know, but I know it is expedient that they should”’. In Cynic epistemology, we cannot know anything about the gods, but that does not preclude their influential role in human affairs. It follows, one may assume, that Diogenes would have been reluctant to justify temple theft flatly on the basis of the non-existence or the non-involvement of the gods.

A third argument that needs consideration, is that the Cynics - like other philosophical schools such as the Epicureans - transposed their philosophical ideals to the divine sphere, so that the gods were viewed as wanting nothing and, in effect, without possessions. From such a premise, it follows that the content of temples does not belong to the gods, and may therefore be removed without fear of committing sacrilege. The argument fits well with the critical attitude of the Cynics towards conventional religious practices and superstition.

4. A Cynic syllogism: ‘All things belong to the wise’

Yet another way exists in which the gods can be brought to bear on the issue at hand: by linking them to the Cynic notion of communal possession. Such an argument can be found in a syllogism attributed to Diogenes, and attested twice in Laertius’ Life. It reads as follows:

All things belong to the gods
The wise are the friends of the gods
The goods of friends are held in common
Therefore all things belong to the wise.

What could the intent have been behind this little display of sophistry? Scholars who argue for the authenticity of the Cynic syllogisms are mostly inclined to accept the possibility of extracting analysable philosophy from them. On what that might be in this case, opinions diverge. Moles sees a truly fundamental issue involved, namely that Diogenes wants to subvert the notion of ‘sacred space’. Goulet-Cazé regards it as a justification of Cynic begging, and Branham as providing a defense for Cynic theft.

Although Branham’s proposal seems most enticing because of the close vicinity of the two traditions in Laertius, serious objections may be raised against it. As Branham himself argues, one should be careful not to take the syllogism too seriously. It appears to be deliberately contrived to suit the purposes of the Cynic, so that one is struck more by its ingenuous
stringing together of statements, than by its claim to truth. Cynic agnosticism further undercuts its validity as serious argument. Branham is therefore correct to regard it as a parody. The Cynic syllogisms aim at mocking the kind of reasoning that other philosophers take seriously. They are not meant to convince anyone not already inclined to accept their conclusions. ‘The point of the parody’, says Branham, ‘lies rather in the jarring contrast between the formal protocols of reason and the paradoxical Cynic conclusions they serve to produce...The butt of the joke is the form...Cynic conclusions are asserted while the rationality of the philosophers is caricatured as logic chopping and verbal sleight of hand’. Even so, the syllogism is more than simply a joke. The Cynics fathered the genre of the spoudaiogeloion, in which they presented serious matters in comic packaging. Likewise, they probably made use of the form of the syllogism to poke fun at formal logic, at the same time communicating something of their own views, in the typical oblique way which makes them so fascinating and frustrating at the same time.

What should be taken into account is the fact that the syllogism explicitly deals with the unique status of the wise. Greek philosophy seems to have granted privileges to her wise men ever since the legendary Seven Wise men of the archaic age. The ideal became embodied in Socrates himself, who claimed that the betterment of society was the responsibility of the few, and that arete (excellence) could only be taught by those who had the wisdom to impart the proper knowledge. Many of the antics in the Diogenes tradition become more comprehensible when regarded as applying only to the Cynic sage. As Diogenes once put it himself, like the leader of the tragic chorus, he sets in the note a little higher than it should be, in order for the rest to pick up the proper pitch. The Stoics, in later eras, made much of the notion of the ‘wise man’ as the idealised embodiment of philosophical truth, unattainable by the masses. Especially Epictetus, in his 22nd discourse, gave the Cynic the extraordinary status of the ‘scout of God’; anyone thinking of taking on the role, must first consider, long and deeply, ‘the magnitude of the enterprise’.

Therefore, when Diogenes employs the form of the syllogism to show everything is the property of the wise, it might indeed contain some parody and an element of playful cleverness. But it also contains a kernel of serious intent, in this case pertaining to the wise. It forges a privileged position in society for the Cynic sage with regard to property. At the same time, the syllogism provides the basis for drawing the conclusion that the Cynic wise cannot be guilty of theft, since everything belongs to him anyway.

From the above, it is evident that the Cynics could easily subvert the notion of private property and criminal dispossession from their own principles, even if this may only apply to the Cynic sage. However, the fact
that a justification of theft can be derived from Cynic principles, does not mean that they drew these conclusions themselves, even less that they put them into practice. These principles were offset by others, namely the Cynic emphasis on poverty and the simple life. Furthermore, Cynicism from the start emphasised example rather than prescription, practical application rather than doctrinal exposition, criticism rather than viable alternatives. Consequently, one should not remain restricted to their theory. Rather, one must try to establish what they actually put to practice.

5. Anecdotes on theft

A number of Diogenic anecdotes revolve around the issue of stealing. Some of them offer little in terms of illuminating the Cynic view. These tend to serve as vehicles for putting on display the famous wit of the Sinopean. D.L. 6.57 contains an instance of Diogenes’ knack for applying literary quotes out of context. Seeing someone who stole and got caught, he quotes the Homeric line: ‘Fast gripped by purple death and forceful fate’, which in its original context refers to the death of one of the minor Trojan warriors. The double reference to ‘purple death’ and ‘forceful fate’ insinuates that the thief was caught as much by the lure of the purple than by the enforcers of the law. But apart from the allusion that desire for material things poses a threat to one’s freedom, it tells us little about the Cynic attitude towards stealing. Equally scant light is cast by the anecdote in D.L. 6.52, where the context of theft gives occasion to a homophonic pun. Diogenes asks a thief at the baths what exactly he was looking for on the day: ‘Seeing a clothes-thief at the baths, he said: “Is it for a little unguent (ep’ all’ himation), or for another cloak (ep’ aleimmation)?”’. The question might be interpreted as implying censure on the planned deed, but the implication is obscured by the clever play on same-sounding words. Somewhat more illuminating is the anecdote where Diogenes sees two lawyers quarrelling with each other, and observes: ‘The one has stolen something, but the other has not lost anything’. Between the lines here, implied by the criticism of the profession, is a moral rejection of both dishonesty and theft.

More pertinent to the present argument, are two anecdotes involving a temple setting in the one case, and the gods as maintainers of the moral order, in the other. In D.L. 6.45, Diogenes sees temple officials leading away someone caught stealing a vessel belonging to the treasurers. He comments: ‘The big thieves leading away the small one’. The witticism alludes to two levels of temple theft: on the small scale, the occasional utensil or ornament; and on the large scale: stealing from the temple treasury by its supposed custodians. The story gives testimony to the fact that the treasures kept in the temple precinct, loomed largely in the minds of the
general populace. Diogenes plays on the suspicion - probably widespread - that those in charge of the treasury helped themselves to what they were entrusted to keep safely. The general drift is not, as one might have assumed, that Diogenes approves of either the small scale thieves or the large ones. While he aims at exposing the greater of the two evils, neither in fact meets his approval.26

Finally, in a story transmitted by Cicero, Diogenes comments on the longevity, prosperity and happiness of a certain Harpalus, known by all to be a thief. This, according to Diogenes, must certainly be held as evidence against the gods.27 Goulet-Cazé correctly notes that such commonsensical conclusions may not be used as proof of Diogenes’ atheism, but that they rather intend to expose the folly of expecting the gods to uphold the moral order.28 But one cannot detect any approval of the life of Harpalus in the saying either; on the contrary, it seems to comment on the unjustness of the thief getting away with it, thereby implying moral censure.

On the whole, the anecdotes on theft are not outright condemning, but neither do they support theft. They simply presuppose adherence to a moral order where thieving is viewed in a bad light.29 We may next look at two aspects of the Cynic way, which make it unlikely for Diogenes to have resorted to stealing, either for personal gain or for obtaining a livelihood: Cynic begging, and the poverty ideal.

6. The mendicant philosopher

The begging Diogenes is a theme widely attested in the Cynic tradition.30 Begging was considered by contemporaries a prime example of Cynic *anaideia* (shamelessness), and practised especially by the Cynics of the Roman era. Again, some stories have little more than amusement value.31 Others depict Diogenes as the beggar who manages to retain his dignity and freedom towards those who give.32 They seem to support Goulet-Cazé’s contention that the Cynic views begging as a way of getting his due.33 But they may also be intended to cover the blatant discrepancy between the begging philosopher and the central Cynic tenet of *autarkeia* (self-sufficiency).

It is not clear whether Diogenes’ begging was an integral part of his philosophical act, or merely - as his biographer suggests - referring to a passing period in his life.34 The latter may be a Stoic attempt at covering Cynic shamelessness. More probable is that his begging was a combination of Cynic provocation, of real need, and of putting to practice the ideal of the extreme simple life. Philosophers in ancient times were left to themselves to obtain a livelihood, and many were dependent on benefactors. This the Cynic notion of independence and freedom could not tolerate. One
anecdote tells of Diogenes being rebuked for begging while Plato does not. “O, but he does,” replied Diogenes, “he only ‘holds his head down low, so that no-one may hear’”\textsuperscript{35}. The final line, a quote from the *Odyssey* 1.157, contrasts the Cynic’s open begging to the idealist’s less transparent way of obtaining a livelihood, which threatened to make him a lackey of the rich and powerful.

If we conclude that begging was part and parcel of the Cynic performance, it seems less likely that Diogenes would have advocated stealing to obtain a living. By itself, the argument is not convincing: beggars may not be choosers, but little prevents them from resorting to theft. The argument is bolstered when viewed together with the Cynic notion of the simple life, and the accompanying poverty ideal.

### 7. The simple life

Cynic poverty has been integral to the movement throughout antiquity. Nothing communicated the Cynic status more effectively than their usual uniform of bare feet, folded cloak, a stick, and a wallet.\textsuperscript{36} It stood for living by the bare minimum, the simple life according to what *physis* prescribes as absolutely necessary. A famous anecdote has Diogenes seeing a boy drinking water from his hands. Immediately he throws away the cup in his wallet, with the words: “A child has beaten me in plainness of living”\textsuperscript{37}. Subsequent Cynics also took to the poverty ideal: Crates, a wealthy landowner from Thebes, did the extraordinary thing of selling all his possessions and distributing the proceeds among his fellows, in order to take up the true Cynic style.\textsuperscript{38} Another pupil of Diogenes who accompanied Alexander on his Asian campaign, reported in detail on the Indian *gymnosophistai*, the ‘naked philosophers’, who he thought resembled the life of Diogenes.\textsuperscript{39}

As with the related topic of begging, it is difficult to establish whether poverty was an ideal from the start for Diogenes. According to tradition, he came to Athens from Sinope after being exiled for ‘defacing the currency’, indicating a problematic relationship with money that lasted a life-time. One tradition would have it that he came with an already established ascetic lifestyle; when a cottage he tried to procure for himself did not materialise, he took abode in a large wine-jar in the Metroön. Another tradition, probably closer to authenticity, tells that he became a convert when one day he watched a mouse running about, “not looking for a place to sleep, not afraid of the dark, not yearning for luxuries”\textsuperscript{40}. The first principle (no abode) he applied to himself by means of a quote from tragedy:

> without a city, without a home, deprived of fatherland
> a beggar, a wanderer, having life but for the day.\textsuperscript{41}
The second principle (no fear) was the objective of Cynic training in hardiness of both mind and body, and the third (no excess) was realised by considering material things as of no concern to happiness. The Cynics went even further - possessions were considered a positive burden to the expression of freedom. Love of money he called ‘the mother-city of all evils’. The gods gave to humankind the means to live easily, he claimed, but that has been made impossible by our demand for superfluous luxuries.

Pertinent to our argument is that Diogenes was poor by choice. To the Cynic, true happiness comes from being self-sufficient, from surviving on the barest necessities, from living the life of the dog. He was not interested in personal enrichment. While upsetting the economy of the state may have been convenient to his pre-cultural politics, the aim would not have been the redistribution of wealth. Neither revolutionary economics, nor theft for personal gain, seems to fit the profile.

8. Erroneous attribution?

The considered evidence leans towards the improbability of Cynic being in favour of theft. This raises the question what to do with the opening line of D.L. 6.73: is it simply an inconsistency in the Cynic tradition deriving from Diogenes’ opportunism, or can something else be surmised behind its occurrence? As for the former, scholars have in the past been quick to blame the poor quality of thought of the early Cynics. Such evaluations are of course strengthened by their unwillingness to compromise on their subversive shock tactics against society. Going back to antiquity, they tended to elicit vehement attacks from people repulsed by their provocative shamelessness, and had to bear the accusation of moral degradation. Currently, however, the tide has turned in favour of the Cynics, and scholars are far more willing to accept their criticisms as earnest attempts to search for the truth and to better the human condition. The easy way out of apparent contradictions, namely to simply blame it on the Cynics themselves, is nowadays less preferred. Scholars tend to try and solve these by means of source criticism, that is, by postulating repeated reworking, from various angles, of the Cynic tradition.

The line indeed gives the appearance of having been inserted into its current context. On the surface at least, the idea of commonality in D.L. 6.72 is not carried over into the next paragraph. Furthermore, the major part of D.L. 6.73 deals with a justification of cannibalism and is said to stem from the Thyestes; it is not clear how the topic of temple theft could relate to the theme of a tragedy called Thyestes, nor does the argument that all matter in essence share the same substances pertain to stealing from temples. It is clear, therefore, that either Diogenes Laertius drew from
various sources, or that he used a pre-compiled source for this part of the
doxography, with the first line of D.L. 6.73 having a different origin than the
remainder of the paragraph.

How could such a claim have entered the doxography? At least three
possibilities present themselves. The first is the possibility of malicious
distortion. As argued above, the notion is not completely irreconcilable with
Cynic principles. Furthermore, I am inclined with Branham and Moles to see
some connection between the line in D.L. 6.73 and the syllogism on the
gods. D.L. 6.73 does not follow strictly from the syllogism, where the claim is
made that all things, not just things in temples, are the common property of
the gods and the wise. Furthermore, the syllogism restricts possession of ‘all
things’ to the sage, whereas the claim in 6.73 has become unspecific,
implies that nobody would do wrong by taking something from a temple.
The perversion of what originally was a jocular display of mock sophistry,
may point in the direction of deliberate misrepresentation of authentic Cynic
material. In the hands of the polemicist, it could be a handy piece of
inflammatory and damaging evidence, with which to tarnish philosophical
opponents. Not wholly true, but not fully untrue either, this little piece of
anti-Cynic propaganda could have got attached to the equally controversial
defence of cannibalism, and so found its way into Laertius’ Life of Diogenes.

A second possibility, proposed by Brown, is that the line goes back to
the Cyrenaic philosopher known as Theodorus the Atheist: in D.L. 2.99, this
near-contemporary of Diogenes is said to have claimed that theft, adultery
and sacrilege are permissible under certain circumstances. It would have
been impossible to argue such an erroneous attribution beyond the point of
conjecture, if it was not for an illuminating reference to Bion of Borysthenes
in Seneca’s De beneficiis 7.7.1, which suggests a route from Theodorus to
Diogenes. Bion studied with both the early Cynics and with the above-
mentioned Cyrenaic. In the De beneficiis, we find Bion using arguments
that closely resemble those attributed to Diogenes and Theodorus. Seneca
devotes the seventh book to an elaboration on various levels of ownership,
in the process making use of virtually all the premises of Diogenes’
syllogism. Also significant is the favourable reference to the imperial Cynic
Demetrius. Whereas Demetrius’ thoughts are not disputed, Seneca quotes
Bion in order to refute his arguments. Bion launches a double attack on the
notion of sacrilege. Since everything belongs to the gods, everybody who
appropriates anything should be considered guilty of sacrilege (i.e. not only
taking from temples). Furthermore, since the whole world is the domain of
the gods, removing something from a temple simply means moving the
property of the gods from one part of their domain to another. In both
cases, arguing from the commonly accepted premise that everything
belongs to the gods, the notion of sacrilege is eroded.
The similarity in thinking to the line attributed to Diogenes is obvious. Bion, who was not in antiquity called a Cynic but was closely associated with Cynic thinking, could have got this kind of syllogistic parody from either the Cynics or the Cyrenaics. The fact that Seneca adopts Cynic arguments, but criticises Bion, suggests that he used different sources when dealing with the issue of property in *De beneficiis* 7. It is not difficult to imagine how Bion’s thoughts might have come to be attributed to Diogenes. Bion could have used him as his spokesperson when developing these arguments, or they could simply have become attributed to Diogenes by way of association, as apparently happened quite frequently with paradoxical and shocking ideas.

9. Conclusion

The early Cynics would not have welcomed any form of apology for their own radicality. One should therefore be careful not to suppress their shamelessness if the evidence suggests otherwise. Indeed, the aspects of ancient Cynicism considered in this paper do not point conclusively in one direction only. The early Cynics could integrate a justification of theft into their basic principles and their view of the gods. It is not clear, however, that they in fact drew such conclusions themselves. Any subversion of the notions of private property and criminal dispossession is offset by the Cynic ideals of poverty and the simple life. Cynic practice suggests an adherence to a code that regarded theft and temple robbery as among the immoral actions.

As the line in D.L. 6.73 appears isolated from its immediate context, the possibility should be seriously considered that it does not share the same degree of authenticity as the rest of the doxography. Especially the argument of Bion, that the whole world belongs to the gods, so that removing something from a temple cannot be regarded as sacrilege, looks suspiciously similar to the line in the Diogenes *Life*. But even if it does go back to Diogenes himself, its lack of context renders impossible any final decision as to whether it should be considered serious philosophy, or a parody of philosophical logic.

Endnotes

Diogenic tragedy *Thyestes*, which, however, applies more to the section on cannibalism than to the first statement.


7. D.L. 6.73.

8. Plato advocated communal possession in his ideal state, as did the Stoic founder Zeno.


11. Cf. Goulet-Cazé (n. 9), 73.

12. Kindstrand (n. 3), 240.


14. The categorical syllogism’s four elements can be broken up into two separate Aristotelian syllogisms: Syllogism A: Friends have everything in common; but the gods are friends to the wise; therefore, what belongs to the gods also belongs to the wise. Syllogism B: All belongs to the gods; but that which belongs to the gods, belongs to the wise as well; therefore all belongs to the wise; cf. Goulet-Cazé (n. 13), 220–221 n. 18.


16. Moles (n. 13), 140. Moles’ view is better supported by Bion’s argument in Sen. *Ben.* 7.7.2; cf. below.

17. Goulet-Cazé (n. 9), 72; R.B. Branham, ‘Defaing the currency: Diogenes’ rhetoric and the invention of Cynicism’ in Branham and Goulet-Cazé (n. 2), 93–94.

18. The truth value of the three premises is less scientific than proverbial, according to Goulet-Cazé (n. 9), 72, ‘with a vaguely Pythagorean or Platonic flavoring’; cf. D.L. 8.10.


22. Branham (n. 17), 95 n. 45.
26. I cannot agree with Kindstrand (n. 3), 240 that Diogenes defends the ‘small thief’; Brown (n. 13), 32: ‘Diogenes felt no indignation towards the lawbreaker, because he regarded all laws as “unnatural,” but he could not have approved of the reasoning which led the criminal to think the goblet worth stealing’.
27. Cic. De natura deorum 3.34.83; cf. also 3.35.88.
28. Goulet-Cazé (n. 9), 71.
29. The Cynic criticism in Cic. Off. 1.35.128, that some immoral acts are not shameful to mention, while some moral acts are, is primarily directed against discrepancies between morality and decency, but tacitly accepts theft as among the immoral actions.
31. A popular anecdote was of Diogenes begging from a statue. When asked why, he answered: ‘To get practice in being refused’; D.L. 6.49; Plut. de vitios. pud. 7. A standard sentence constituted his line of approach: ‘If you have given already, give to me as well; if not, start with me’; D.L. 6.49.
33. D.L. 6.46; 62; Goulet-Cazé (n. 9), 72.
34. D.L. 6.49 mentions that Diogenes was forced to beg when initially he came to Athens as a penniless exile.
36. Cf. Epict. 3.22.50; 4.8.5; Dio Chrys. Or. 32,9; 34.2; Kindstrand (n. 3), 161–3; Giannantoni (n. 30), 301–14.
42. D.L. 6.50.
43. D.L. 6.44. According to Epict. 3.24.67, Diogenes thanked Antisthenes for setting him free, by teaching him to distinguish between what is his and what is not; property is listed among the things not his.
44. The Epicurean Philodemus’ invectives come to mind; cf. Philod. de Stoicis. Ancient critics found a modern counterpart in the tireless devaluations of Ferdinand Sayre cf. Diogenes of Sinope: A Study of Greek Cynicism (Baltimore, 1938), 100, 104–5; The Greek Cynics (Baltimore, 1948); ‘Antisthenes the Socratic’, in Billerbeck (n. 23), 73–85.
45. Brown (n. 13), 32.
47. Seneca Ben. 7.6.7 quotes another example of obvious mock logic which he puts in the mouth of an unidentified opponent of Stoicism, and goes as follows: “The owner of prostitutes is a pimp. All things belong to the wise. Prostitutes also belong to the wise. Therefore the wise man is a pimp”.

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