GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD): A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE

By

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY in the subject PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION at the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

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CO-SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR E J VAN DER WESTHUIZEN

10 JUNE 2011
DECLARATION

I declare that “GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD): A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE ” is my own work and that all the sources that I have used and quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

_________________________________________

M H Maserumule

Student no. 3217-484-5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to He who blessed me with cognitive skills to engage my intellectual prowess to go through this passage of scholarship. This is a gift from which great ideas from great men owe their existence. The context from which the object of this study is examined is NEPAD, which is a great idea from the African leadership, especially the former President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. NEPAD owes much of its intellectual foundation to Mbeki’s sense of vision as ingrained in the African Renaissance. To this I say thanks generally to the African leadership and specifically to Mbeki for the great idea that invoked in me a sense of what I needed to study in this doctoral degree.

Being engaged in a study of this sort is like an adventure without a precedent. This is so as much of the contemporary contributions in the field of Public Administration as a science are based largely on positivist epistemology. Their objects of inquiry are grounded largely in empiricism. I choose to examine a non-empirical object and deviate from the mainstream scholarship in the field by engaging the African paradigms of knowledge in the formulation of the thesis that this study propounds. A resolve to venture into this adventure was impelled by a sense of commitment to make a contribution to the body of knowledge by developing a theoretical paradigm from which good governance in the context of NEPAD could be understood from the Public Administration perspective.

In this exercise I traversed through slippery epistemological grounds oscillating between modernism, postmodernism and the African epistemology. As at some point I was to slipper guidance from my promoters maintained my intellectual balance to remain on course, focussed and committed to my resolve. I battled until I reach finality. For this I thank Professors Wessels and Van der Westhuizen. I also thank Professor Shadrack Gutto for having had time for me to engage him on issues of African leadership and good governance as they relate to NEPAD. This interaction was so intellectually fruitful and stimulating that it led to our co-authoring of an article in the International Journal of African Renaissance. The article tested the validity of my contention on good governance that undergirds the process of the evolution of this study.
My humble gratitude also goes to Professors Kwandiwe Kondlo, David Mello, Motodi Maserumule, Mutuwa fhethu Mafunisa, Gilingwe Mayende, Chris Landsberg and Prins Nevhutalu for consistently reminding me to finish this study. Elijah Tjiane, Kgau golo Motswaledi and Doctor Mminele also reminded me of the same. My association with you assisted me in many respects to remain focussed on what matters most in life, which is knowledge. I have the privilege of being taught the same in my upbringing by my mother, Meta-Wa-Bauba. She has always been the pillar of my strength and the compass of my direction. To her I do not know how many appropriate words I could use to express my appreciation for having taught me the virtue of resilience and determination except to just simply say “thank you very much for being my mother”.

To my sister, Gloriah, and brothers, Motubatse and Ramatabane, I say your moral support and words of encouragements have always been the reservoir of my strength. To my children, Darlington and Kgomotso, I wish to say my not always being with you was intended to set this precedent which I hope you, together with Moloko, Masego and Lefa, would follow. This wish is for every child of Africa. Thank you very much to Moloko Maserumule for typing this work and Gladys Mosala for her advice on the intricacies of the English language. I thank Lynne Southey for editing the thesis. My friend Matome Mathole has always been beside my side in most of my endeavours in life including, more importantly, the amount of encouragement he gave me as I walked this path of scholarship.

I dedicate this work to my departed sister, Kholofelo Ramakebe Maserumule, whose untimely death robbed me of an opportunity to say to her that I took up the gauntlet you threw down at me and yes, “I did it”.

iv
SUMMARY

The object of this study is *good governance*, the context for its consideration is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the disciplinary perspective from which it is considered is Public Administration. *Good governance* is a conceptual *problematique*. It is multi-dimensional, value-laden, trans-contextual and nebulous. The question of what *good governance* means is a subject of contestation. Good governance is used in NEPAD as a principle without the attempt to clarify its meaning at the conceptual level. Much of the existing body of scholarship on NEPAD also considers good governance largely as a principle rather than a concept. This erroneously presupposes unanimity on its meaning. The African leadership is divided on what *good governance* means in the context of NEPAD. In this regard scholarship largely fails to provide an intellectual solution.

The extent of complexity of the concept in the study lies in the fact that the context of its consideration [NEPAD] is itself a subject of contestation whereas the disciplinary perspective [Public Administration] from which it is considered has not yet reached a consensus with itself about its theoretical base. Against this background the question that the study asks is, what does the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD mean for Public Administration? The study examines this question to make a contribution towards a better insight into, and broadening of, the body of scientific knowledge by engaging in conceptual, theoretical and philosophical studies to understand *good governance* in the context of NEPAD and determine its meaning for Public Administration.

The study finds that the paradigm of engagement in the existing body of literature is framed in the binary logic, which is rooted in realist epistemology or positivism. This approach to scientific discourse is limited in dealing with complex conceptual, theoretical and philosophical questions. The study develops, as a contribution to science, an alternative epistemological framework from which *good governance* in the context of NEPAD could be understood. Such epistemological framework is, for the purpose of this study, termed the *contingent co-existence of opposites*. It is used to conceptualise *good governance* in the context of NEPAD and determine its meaning for Public Administration.
KEY TERMS

Good governance; governance; New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Public Administration perspective; binary logic; contingent co-exisaitence of opposites; New Public Management(NPM); modernism; post-modernism; New Public Service; New Public Administration theory; citizen-focussed theory; developmental state; democracy, minimalsist state; Politics-administration dichotomy discourse; humanistic theoretical variation; heterodoxy and epistemological crisis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>AAPAM</td>
<td>African Association of Public Administration and Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJPAM</td>
<td>African Journal of Public Administration and Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPER</td>
<td>Africa’s Priority Programme of Economic Redressing</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>African Peer Review Panel</td>
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<td>ASSADPAM</td>
<td>Association of the Southern African Schools and Departments of Public Administration</td>
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<td>ATN</td>
<td>Africa Trade Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AWHF</td>
<td>Adjustment with a Human Face</td>
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<td>BODA</td>
<td>British Overseas Development Agency</td>
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<td>BWI</td>
<td>Bretton Woods Institutions</td>
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<td>CAAPAM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Association of Public Administration and Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFRAD</td>
<td>African Training and Research centre in Administration for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODERSIA</td>
<td>Council for Development and Social Research in Africa</td>
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<td>DDA</td>
<td>Danish Development Agency</td>
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<td>DPSA</td>
<td>Department of Public Service and Administration</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>GEAR</td>
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<td>HSGIC</td>
<td>Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee</td>
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<td>ICTs</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
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<td>IIAS</td>
<td>International Institute of Administrative Sciences</td>
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<td>IJPA</td>
<td>Indian Journal of Public Administration</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
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<td>INAB</td>
<td>Instituut Nacional de Bosque</td>
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<td>IRAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPA</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
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<td>LPTS</td>
<td>Long-Term Perspective Study</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme</td>
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<td>NAI</td>
<td>New African Initiative</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
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<td>OEEC</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAT-NET</td>
<td>Public Administration Theory Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>POSDCORB</td>
<td>Planning, Organising, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPASA</td>
<td>Public Policy Association of Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
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<td>SAAPAM</td>
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<td>SAPSN</td>
<td>Southern African People’s Solidarity Network</td>
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<td>TWIN-Africa</td>
<td>Third World Network - Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>UNESCAP</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISA</td>
<td>University of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN- PAAERD</td>
<td>United Nations Programme of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION........................................................................................................ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..........................................................................................iii
SUMMARY................................................................................................................v
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................ix

# CHAPTER 1: CONTEXTUAL SETTING

1.1 Introduction......................................................................................................1
1.2 Research question............................................................................................7
1.3 *Good governance* as the object of study.......................................................16
1.4 *Raison d'etre*....................................................................................................18
1.5 Purpose and objectives.....................................................................................19
1.6 Research methodology....................................................................................21
1.6.1 Critical scholarship review........................................................................24
1.6.2 Conceptual analysis.....................................................................................30
1.6.3 Philosophical analysis................................................................................30
1.6.4 Theory-building..........................................................................................31
1.6.5 Textual analysis..........................................................................................32
1.6.6 Hermeneutics.............................................................................................34
1.6.7 Ideological-critical reading .......................................................................36
1.6.8 Discourse and conversational analysis......................................................37
1.6.9 Content analysis..........................................................................................38
1.7 Sequential arrangement of chapters in the thesis..........................................39
# CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF EXISTING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SCHOLARSHIP ON GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Contextual aspects of the review for consideration</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Epistemological framework for the review of Public Administration scholarship on good governance</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1</td>
<td>Procedural democratic strand</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2</td>
<td>Substantive democratic strand</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3</td>
<td>Eclectic strand</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.4</td>
<td>Dimensions of eclecticism</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Books and chapters in books</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Papers presented at selected scholarly Public Administration gatherings</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Selected scholarly Public Administration Journals</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.1</td>
<td><em>International Journal of Public Administration</em></td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.2</td>
<td><em>International Review of Administrative Sciences</em></td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.3</td>
<td><em>African Journal of Public Administration and Management</em></td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.4</td>
<td><em>African Administrative Studies</em></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.5</td>
<td><em>Administratio Publica</em></td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.6</td>
<td><em>Politeia</em></td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.7</td>
<td><em>Journal of Public Administration</em></td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Presentation of, and reflection on, the results of Public Administration Scholarship review</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.1</td>
<td>Public Administration scholarship approach to the discourse on good governance as <em>principle</em> rather than a <em>concept</em></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.2</td>
<td>Few instances of conceptual consideration of <em>good governance</em></td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 3: UNPACKING THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT

3.1 Introduction ................................................................. 153
3.2 Framework of analysis ................................................... 154
3.2.1 Historical-process perspective ....................................... 156
3.2.2 Comparative-analytic perspective ................................. 170
3.2.3 Philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective ....................... 194
3.2.3.1 African Renaissance ............................................... 196
3.2.3.1.1 Etymological context of African Renaissance .......... 197
3.2.3.1.2 African Renaissance as a philosophical paradigm ....... 200
3.2.3.1.3 Pan-Africanism ............................................... 205
3.2.3.1.3.1 Nineteenth century thinking on Pan-Africanism ...... 211
3.2.3.1.3.2 Twentieth century thinking on Pan-Africanism ...... 213
3.2.3.1.3.3 Twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism ... 227
3.2.3.2 Neo-liberalism .................................................... 239
3.2.3.2.1 Meaning of the concept neo-liberalism .................... 239
3.2.3.2.2 Philosophical and theoretical context of neo-liberalism 241
3.2.3.2.3 NEPAD and neo-liberalism ................................ 246
3.3.3 Synthesis .................................................................. 256
3.4 Conclusion .................................................................... 260

CHAPTER 4: THE CONCEPT GOOD GOVERNANCE

4.1 Introduction .................................................................. 263
4.2 Governance and good governance .................................... 265
4.2.1 Meaning of governance .............................................. 269
4.2.2 Meaning of good governance ....................................... 279
4.2.2.1 Philosophical and theoretical antecedents .................. 280
4.2.2.2 Evolution of good governance in the contemporary development discourse and its conceptual problematique character .......... 290
4.2.2.2.1 Contextual antecedents ....................................... 291
4.2.2.2.2 Conceptual evolution ......................................... 296
CHAPTER 5: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE OF THE STUDY

5.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................312
5.2 Historical and epistemological antecedents of Public Administration.........................313
5.3 Question of the paradigmatic status and theoretical base of Public Administration…327
5.3.1 Traditional paradigms of Public Administration......................................................331
  5.3.1.1 Politics-administration dichotomy discourse – the question of locus.................331
  5.3.1.2 Principles of Public Administration – towards the focus.................................335
  5.3.1.3 Humanistic theoretical variation........................................................................340
  5.3.1.4 Contingency theory – an exercise towards a synthetic discourse.......................345
  5.3.1.5 Heterodoxy and epistemological crisis...............................................................347
  5.3.1.6 Political Science route.......................................................................................349
  5.3.1.7 Administrative Science route............................................................................351
  5.3.1.8 Reclaiming Public Administration as Public Administration.........................353
  5.3.1.9 Minnowbrook I debates....................................................................................355
5.3.2 Contemporary paradigms of Public Administration..................................................359
  5.3.2.1 New Public Management (NPM)........................................................................360
  5.3.2.2 Governance.......................................................................................................373
  5.3.2.2.1 Networked governance..................................................................................375
  5.3.2.2.2 Global governance.........................................................................................377
  5.3.2.2.3 Theory of multi-level control.........................................................................380
  5.3.2.2.4 Theory of subsidiarity....................................................................................381
  5.3.2.2.5 Developmental state and democracy.............................................................383
  5.3.2.2.6 Minimalist state and NPM..............................................................................386
  5.3.2.2.7 Good governance and effective government paradigms..............................388
  5.3.2.3 New Public Service and New Public Administration theory..........................389
  5.3.2.4 Postmodernism and Public Administration.......................................................397
    5.3.2.4.1 Modernism....................................................................................................397
    5.3.2.4.2 Postmodernism............................................................................................401
    5.3.2.4.2.1 Evolution of postmodernism in Public Administration............................403
CHAPTER 7: TOWARDS EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONCEPTUALISING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT AND ITS MEANING FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 480
7.2 Contextual aspects of the epistemological framework ....................................................................................... 481
7.3 Contingent co-existence of opposites .............................................................................................................. 485
7.4 Meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD ....................................................................................... 489
7.4.1 Good governance in the context of NEPAD ................................................................................................. 490
7.4.2 Meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration ................................................. 503
7.4.3 Citizen-focussed theory ............................................................................................................................... 510
7.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................... 528

CHAPTER 8: SUMMATION

8.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 530
8.2 Contextual aspects of the study .......................................................................................................................... 530
8.3 Public Administration scholarship engagement with good governance in the context of NEPAD ......................... 533
8.4 Meaning of NEPAD within the context of the object of study .............................................................................. 538
8.5 Good governance and the question of its meanings in the development discourse .............................................. 540
8.6 Disciplinary perspective of the study – Public Administration ............................................................................ 542
8.7 Can the Public Administration discipline derive any epistemological value from the literature beyond the field in considering good governance in the context of NEPAD? ........................................................................................................................................ 543
8.8. Epistemological framework for conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD ............................. 545
8.9 Implication of the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration ..................... 552
8.10 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..557

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………559
FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Typology of the objects of study or units of analysis…………………………17
Figure 1.2 Systematic scholarship review………………………………………………...28
Figure 1.3 Research plan………………………………………………………………38
Figure 2.1 Illustration of epistemological framework for the review of Public Administration scholarship…………………………………………………54
Figure 3.1 Framework of analysis……………………………………………………..155

TABLES

Table 4.1 Broodryk’s typology of the values of African philosophy of humanism…289
Table 5.1 Hood’s summary of the doctrinal components of New Public Management (NPM)……………………………………………………………………..363
Table 5.2 Postmodern Public Administration research designs and methodological approaches…………………………………………………………410
Table 7.1 Variables of good governance in New Partnership for Africa’s Development………………………………………………………………………..496
CHAPTER 1

CONTEXTUAL SETTING

1.1 Introduction

The object of this study is good governance\(^1\) and the context of its consideration is New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). It is considered from the Public Administration perspective as a concept. In the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative of NEPAD, its purpose “is to contribute to strengthening the political and administrative framework of participating [African] countries” (NEPAD 2001: para. 80), good governance is used as a principle and emphasised as a sine qua non for sustainable development. In much of the existing body of scholarship it is contended that NEPAD is anchored on the imperative of good governance, which underpins the essence of this contemporary development paradigm. It is a foundation upon which NEPAD is based (Akokpari 2005: 01-21; Gumede 2005: 201; Maipose 2005: 50-74; Melber 2005: 37-49; Ngwisha 2005: 121-134; Osei-Hwedie 2005: 22-36; Ross 2004: 03; Stremlau 2002).

As the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s sustainable development, NEPAD is a topical subject rigorously discoursed and highly contested. Various attempts to define and explain it abound with reflections that do not converge on sameness (Adedeji 2002: 10; Akokpari 2005: 01-21; Ikome 2007: 15-16; Nabudere 2002: 03; Ngwisha 2005: 124; Ross 2004: 03). The discourse on NEPAD often “leads into very intricate pathways of arguments, with many traps for the unwary” (Hospers 1992: 28). This necessitates critical analysis to acquire a comprehensive insight into what this development paradigm entails [NEPAD]. An in-depth analysis of NEPAD is provided in Chapter 3 of the thesis. In this chapter the objective is to only introduce the object of this study – good governance – and, for this purpose; NEPAD (2001: para.1) is simply defined as in the introductory paragraph of its founding document as:

\(^1\) In this study reference to good governance in italics refers to it as a concept whereas its usage in the ordinary font format refers to a principle.
... a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. [It] is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world.

The former President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki – one of the founders of NEPAD who played a central role in its conception and development – explains that NEPAD is based on the conviction that “in order for [African] governments to influence globalisation, they would have to go beyond the atomistic nation-state and zero-sum sovereignty and recognise their interdependence” (Gumede 2005: 198). In the Address to the Joint Sitting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces on 31 October 2001 in South Africa, Mbeki said that NEPAD represents a resounding inflection expressing an assenting response by Africans to a vexing question raised in the World Bank Publication of 2000 entitled Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? (Mbeki 2002: 149)

As the literature on the history of development in Africa indicates, NEPAD is not the first initiative developed to address the development challenges on the African continent. A variety of development initiatives, some developed in Africa by Africans others externally by international organisations such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were pursued in the past (Abrahamsen 2000: 25-45; Ake 1996: 01-17; Browne and Cummings 1985: 78-148; Cheru 1989: 01-14). These early development initiatives are important preludes to understanding NEPAD and are considered extensively in Chapter 3 of the thesis for comparative analytic purposes.

The analysis of development discourse on Africa in Chapter 3 of the thesis suggests that the early development initiatives failed largely because of their economic reductionism approach to development (Abrahamsen 2000: 25-45; Ake 1996: 01-17; Cheru 1989: 01, 13-14; Council

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2 For the purpose of this study, “early development initiatives” refers to all Africa’s previous development programmes, which came before the conception of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), developed with the intention to effect development in Africa. Examples of the development initiatives referred to in the foregoing are, among others, Monrovia Declaration of 1979, Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 and Abuja Treaty of 1991.
for Development and Social Science Research in Africa and the Third World Network-Africa 2002). This is in spite of the fact that some of the early development initiatives, especially those that emerged after the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, made reference to the political dimension of development. The economic reductionism approach is premised on the “econo-mythical” invocation that “if the economics are right, everything else will fall into place” (Cernea 1994: 07).

Compared with Africa’s previous development initiatives, NEPAD does not lose sight of the importance of political and public administration dimensions of development with strong emphasis on good governance. It links these dimensions or variables of development to the economic and socio-economic ones. Mhone (2003a: 16) writes that “while NEPAD may not be the first initiatives to posit the need for continental approaches to transformation, it is the first to posit the grand problematique as entailing the need to attain sustainable human development and democratic or [good] governance as joint objectives”.

Good governance as envisaged in NEPAD is categorised into, on the one hand, Democracy and Political Governance Initiative and, on the other hand, Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative (NEPAD 2001:para 79-92). The Democracy and Political Governance Initiative of NEPAD covers issues such as democracy, human rights, African Peer Review Mechanisms, peace and security and consolidation of the public sector capacity for efficient and effective delivery of NEPAD programmes. The Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative are concerned with enhancing the quality of economic and public financial management, banking supervision, and corporate governance (Cilliers 2003; Dogonyaro 2002a; NEPAD 2001: para. 79-92).

This study focuses on good governance as in the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative of NEPAD. Good governance issues in NEPAD’s Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative are research objects for other independent studies outside the scope of this study. The usage of good governance in NEPAD as a principle appears to be based on the supposition that its meaning at the conceptual level is obvious and unanimity to this effect exists. In the NEPAD founding document, there are no attempts to explain it as a concept. In this study good governance is examined as a concept, not a principle. A principle refers to a normative prescription of what is right or consistent with “a universal and fundamental law, doctrine or truth” (Allen 2004: 1107). It is about the way things ought to be done. Its purpose
is to guide human action, relational existence and interactions. In contrast with a principle, a concept is an “abstraction of reality” (Fox & Meyer 1996: 24) or “idea abstracted from particular instances” (Allen 2004: 282). It “has one meaning that can be expressed by different words” (Pauw 1999a: 11). Words used in context give concepts contextual meanings, which are used as the basis to understand principles. A principle is a tool of guidance whereas a concept is a “tool of thinking” (Pauw 1999a: 11). Blackburn (2005: 70) writes that “a concept is that which is understood by a term” used to express it.

As explained above, the context for engaging good governance in this study is NEPAD. It is considered from the Public Administration perspective. A more detailed consideration of good governance as the object of study is provided in sub-section 1.3 below and Chapter 4 of the thesis, whereas a reflection on what this study means by ‘a Public Administration perspective’ is provided in Chapter 5. For now, it suffices to only explain that, following the convention in the writings of scholars in the field of Public Administration, using capital letters in ‘Public Administration’ symbolises the subject, theory or science, whereas small letters or lower case in public administration refers to that which “is investigated by the subject…” (Pauw 1999a: 10). In this study reference to ‘Public Administration’ and ‘public administration’ should be understood as such.

The meanings of public administration abound in the available literature. For the purpose of this study, public administration should just simply be understood as “organised…executive functions of the state” (Pauw 1999a: 22). The word functions, as used in this definition refers to “a higher order or abstract category under which concrete services, institutions, activities and people may be subsumed” (Pauw 1999a: 22). As the operational branch of government, public administration plays a critical role of putting into practice developmental programmes and projects aimed at enhancing the quality of life of the citizens. However, in the early initiatives for Africa’s development, it appears that public administration has been given a scanty consideration. This observation is based on the results of the analysis of these development initiatives in the preparation of the proposal for study. Some of them are considered in the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis respectively. In NEPAD – as the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development – the foregoing omission seems to have been attended to. Public administration is now being acknowledged as a fundamental variable in the quest for sustainable development on the continent (NEPAD 2001: para. 80-85).
NEPAD (2001: para 80-85) emphasises that sustainable development in Africa necessitates, among other things, public administration reforms focusing on the administrative and civil services, public institutions and their activities and people in the employ of African governments (public servants). In the NEPAD Capacity Building Plan (2002: on-line) public administration is considered as “an important component of the NEPAD strategy”. It is the “art of managing the state apparatus for the sake of achieving the aims of governance” (Mhone 2003a: 08). The importance of public administration in the pursuit of sustainable development cannot be overemphasised. The successful implementation of NEPAD, whose basis, as indicated above, is rooted in good governance and through which it seeks to achieve sustainable development, depends largely on the quality of African public administration (Mhone 2003a: 02-22). The kind of state “needed to promote inclusive economic participation and sustainable human development in a manner that uplifts the poorest of the poor” is “the grand problematique of public administration and governance”(Mhone 2003a: 07).

The importance of public administration is emphasised in the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative of NEPAD (2001: para 79-85) and also in the Declaration on the Implementation of NEPAD adopted in Maputo, Mozambique, during the Second Assembly of the African Heads and Governments of the African Union in 2003. The former NEPAD Secretariat Deputy Director-General, Smunda Mokoena, in a statement read on behalf of Wiseman Nkuhlu, also the former Chairperson of the NEPAD Steering Committee, at a seminar on Public Sector Leadership Capacity Development for Good Governance in Africa held in Kampala, Uganda on 27-30 January 2004 where 42 African countries took part, reiterates the contents of the Declaration referred to in the foregoing that the “…Capacity Development Programme on Governance and Public Administration is an essential comportment (sic) of NEPAD”.

In emphasising the importance of public administration within the broader framework of NEPAD, Kajura (2004: 01-03), the third Prime Minister and Minister of Public Service in Uganda, contends that “…no sustainable development of the continent or its various states is feasible without a robust public sector”. Also, writing in the editorial page of the Development Policy Management Bulletin to focus the attention of the fourth Pan-African Conference of the Ministers of Public Service “on the future direction and shape of governance and public administration in Africa”, Mohammad-Bande and Latib (2003: on-
line) point out that the “critical role of the state and institutional capacity to innovatively face the challenges that are confronted across the continent is (sic) recognised within the broad architecture of…NEPAD”.

The African countries participating in the NEPAD initiative are required to reposition and strengthen their public administration systems along the requirements of good governance (NEPAD 2001: para. 79-84). Despite the recognition of public administration as an important variable in the contemporary development paradigm, its theoretical and pedagogical focus as a field of study lacks developmental perspective. It is argued in Chapter 5 of the thesis that, as an academic discipline, Public Administration is limited to administration, which merely studies government activities or functions. It ignores the development dimension or approach to the study of government. This perhaps explains the reason for a conclusion in Chapter 2 of the thesis that scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited. As argued in Chapter 5 of the thesis, there are only a few instances in the Public Administration literature that attempt to mainstream developmental issues in the disciplinary discourse (Cloete 2003: 15; Edigheji 2003: 73; Godbole 2003: 168; Hakim 2003: 313-314; Hassen 2003: 117; Ullah 2005: 424).

As this study finds in Chapter 2, not much has been written about NEPAD and its good governance foundation from the Public Administration perspective. Kapur (2005: 119) makes an important point that “of late there is renewed debate world over with much focus on good governance”, which, according to Chakrabarty and Bhattacharya (2005: 01), “has gained in importance in conceptualising contemporary public administration”. It has permeated the parlance of Public Administration since the 1990s (Pardhasarandhi, Raju & Venkatamallu 2004: 301). But, as demonstrated in sub-section 1.2 below, good governance is a conceptual problematique. Its meaning is, as argued in Chapter 4 of the thesis, fraught with ideological, philosophical and theoretical contestations. It is also shown in Chapter 2 of the thesis that the consideration of good governance in much of the Public Administration scholarship is largely not situated within the context of NEPAD.

For the African countries to comply with the requirements of NEPAD on good governance, it is important that a common contextual understanding of its meaning as a concept is established (Maserumule 2005a: 198). Such understanding is important to inform practice or “get a grip on the first-order of reality” (Wessels 1999a: 369). The first-order of reality
differs with the *second-order of reality*. The latter is concerned with the world of conceptualisation and theorisation. A detailed discussion on these aspects is provided in sub-section 1.3 below. A search for contextual meaning of scientific concepts such as *good governance* is about conceptualisation, which is an exercise that examines concepts used to understand social reality. For, as Pauw (1999b: 465, 469) puts it, concepts are tools of thinking; they inform action or practice. To improve thinking, a clear understanding of the concepts used and expected to inform action or practice is fundamentally important (Maserumule 2004a: 76-78).

*Good governance* in the context of NEPAD is explained as a conceptual *problematique* in sub-section 1.2 below. This is followed by its explanation as the object of this study. The rationale and purpose for consideration of *good governance* as a scientific concept in the study is explained. The research methodologies that the study uses to examine *good governance* and determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are also explained.

### 1.2 Research question

It is pointed out in sub-section 1.1 above that good governance in NEPAD is used as a *principle* that ought to be followed by African countries in their attempts to achieve sustainable development. Its usage as a *principle* without first examining it as a *concept* presupposes that there is a ‘conceptual consensus’ on its meaning in the context of NEPAD. A preliminary review of the literature and discourses on NEPAD indicates that such supposition is incorrect.

In the treatise that examines the promotion of good governance in Africa through the African Union (AU) and NEPAD published in the book *The New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Debates, Opportunities and Challenges*, Akokpari (2005: 19) states that “*good governance* has become an evocative term yet its precise meaning has remained fluid and nebulous”. Bovaird (2005: 217) observes that “*good governance* is a contested concept, both in theory and practice”. Sinha (2004: 111) concurs with Bovaird (2005: 217) that “when one talks of good governance one really has an ideal in mind that is difficult to specify in great
detail and accuracy”. Likewise, Mushni (2004: 48) observes that “good governance, like a good life, does not lend itself to a normatively neutral treatment”.

As discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis, good governance is a value-laden and multi-dimensional concept and, because of its epistemic relativism, can mean different things to different people depending on the context in which it is used. From its etymological antecedents, good governance in the development discourse has always been a conceptual problématic. It is susceptible to a variety of interpretations appropriating meanings that befit the context of its usage. Given the heterogeneous and diverse nature of the African continent, good governance as used in NEPAD is predisposed to ideological and political contestations; prone to different interpretations and understandings influenced by the contextual idiosyncrasies of its conception (Abrahamsen 2000: 25-45; Ake 1996: 01-17; Cernea 1994: 07; Cheru 1989: 01, 13-14; Maserumule 2005a: 198; Osei-Hwedie 2005: 22-36).

Ijeoma (2007: 183) writes that “creating a common understanding of [good] governance and leadership issues despite the diversity of the continent” is one of the fundamental challenges that face NEPAD. The heterogeneous nature of the continent makes it difficult to set “standards, benchmarks and indicators for the elements of good governance that are acceptable and that actually measure correctly what has to be measured”(Ijeoma 2007: 183). This is a challenge that appertains to the empirical world. It is, however, a reflection of the conceptual problématic nature good governance. De Beer (1999: 436) offers instructive perspective on the complexity associated with the interpretation of nebulous concepts such as good governance whose meanings are dependent on the context within which they are used as follows:

We must never forget that the interpretation of politics and the politics of interpretation are intimately related. This means the arts of explanation and understanding, of interpretation and reading, have a deep and complex relation with politics, the structures of power, and social values, which organise human life. The outcome of reading is always the product of struggle about the ideological and ethical assumptions and implications of writers and readers. Political and economic realities have a direct bearing on the practices of reading, interpretation, and scholarship.
In the context of the above exposition, the question is: what does good governance in the context of NEPAD mean? To the unwary, this question may sound simple. However, it is not as easy as it is often trivialised to be in much of the existing body of literature, which does not give good governance adequate consideration from a conceptual perspective. As determined in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis, in much of the contemporary discourse good governance is dealt with as a principle. Scholarship efforts to examine it as a concept in the context of NEPAD and determine its meaning are limited. But, does this not constitute epistemological shortcoming or limitation? For, a large body of scholarship is unanimous in the contention that good governance is a conceptual problematique. The meaning of good governance is often the subject of contextual and situational peculiarities of its conception. The context for its consideration in this study is NEPAD, which is propagated as Africa’s contemporary development paradigm.

The question about good governance in NEPAD is intricate. It is convoluted by contestations on the context of its conception, which is NEPAD. The discourse on NEPAD is fraught with intellectual schism and contestations largely focusing on its good governance imperative. Given the nebulous character of good governance and its propensity to abuse, intellectual efforts should have been made to lucidly untangle it at the philosophical, theoretical and conceptual levels; and thereafter contextualise its meaning to befit the NEPAD context. As explained above, “concepts are tools of thinking” (Pauw 1999a: 11) whereas contexts are parameters for intellectual engagements with objects of study. Theories are frameworks used to explain, in the context of human sciences, scientific phenomena and philosophies provide the context for systematic reasoning and thinking to ensure logical coherence in the discourse.

The consideration of good governance as a principle in NEPAD without establishing a common understanding of its meaning engendered contestations in the African leadership. In a statement made at the Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in Johannesburg on 19-20 October 2002, Anyang Nyongo, the Kenyan Minister of Economic Planning, emphasised “that NEPAD needs to be better explained and better understood by all development stakeholders”. Nyongo (2002) explains that NEPAD “is not an implementation agency; instead it is a framework for collaboration and coordination under the African Union”.

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In the Global Coalition for Africa’s (GCA) 2003 Policy Forum hosted in Accra under the theme *NEPAD and Security* the differences of opinions about what NEPAD is, particularly on the issue of good governance, dominated the debates to the extent that a call by some scholars for a summit to thrash out NEPAD was made (Maloka 2003: 20). The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, started the debate with the contention that NEPAD is neither a programme of action nor a set of projects but merely a framework to be considered by countries in developing their national policies (Maserumule 2005a: 198).

Zenawi implied that NEPAD is a mere guideline with no mandatory effect. This was in contrast with what one may call a *general understanding* among the majority of African leaders in that Policy Forum who seem to have accepted the thinking of the champions of NEPAD that defines it as a *pledge* to chart a new development trajectory for Africa underpinned by good governance as a *sine qua non* for sustainable development. A *pledge* embodies mandatory connotations. NEPAD is generally understood as being “based on the concept of good governance in Africa” (Gumede 2005: 08).

The former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, joined the debate that as a country they support NEPAD but have reservations with the African Peer Review Mechanisms (APRM). The APRM is a monitoring and evaluation programme of the African Union (AU) intended to engender the culture of good governance in Africa (Maserumule 2005a: 198-199). Mogae’s contention is fraught with syntactic ambiguity. It is constructed in a manner that it could be understood in more than one way that may be contradictory. On the one hand, Botswana supports NEPAD. This may be interpreted to mean that Botswana subscribes to a general understanding of NEPAD. On the other hand, Botswana indicated that it has reservations with its APRM, which embodies the essence of how NEPAD is understood in the majority of the membership of African leadership. In this Botswana contests the good governance foundation of NEPAD. Its argument is that democracy and good governance have always been an integral part of its system of government and therefore the review of its political and administrative governance systems is not necessary (Maserumule 2005a: 198-199).

Gumede (2005: 211) explains that the “mainstay of NEPAD’s plan to hold African states accountable to good governance rests on the peer review mechanism, whereby heads of state and government will agree to an external assessment of how well they are fulfilling their
obligation”. Levy Mwanawasa, former President of Zambia, said that the APRM “must not be about isolation”; former President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique cautioned against “talking about peer pressure even in countries with blatant human rights violations”; whereas Theo Ben Gurirab of Namibia said “we do not need external auditors, we have our own… constitution and electorate, we do not have a problem with good governance” (Akokpari 2005: 13, 15). Daniel arap Moi, the former President of Kenya, Robert Mugabe, the President of Zimbabwe, and Muammar Gaddafi, the President of Libya, forthrightly rejected the idea of APRM. These African leaders made it very clear, according to Gumede (2005: 211), that “they will brook no examination by fellow Africans as part of a peer review process”.

Gaddafi dismissed the good governance foundation of NEPAD as a conspiracy of the Western imperialists intended to re-colonise Africa. With Moi and Mugabe, Gaddafi strongly rejected the incorporation of good governance in the African Union Charter, although with no success. South Africa, under the leadership of the former President Mbeki, insisted that good governance constitutes the core of NEPAD as the contemporary strategic framework for sustainable development in Africa and is a key imperative in forging partnerships with the developed countries of the North (Gumede 2005: 210-211).

The former head of policy co-ordination in the presidency highly regarded as the intellectual guru responsible for most of the strategic policy positions that the African National Congress (ANC) and South African government pursues, Joel Netshitenzhe, said, with regard to the foregoing: “we need to look at ways to address poor governance in Africa and communicate the difference between the good governance African states and the poor governance ones” (Gumede 2005: 199-200). The notion of good governance in NEPAD pitted African leaders against each other and the debate on it as a policy imperative at the African political leadership level is polarised. Gaddafi was seen as the representative of the old generation of African leadership whose governance credentials are at variance with the good governance imperative that the young generation of African leadership espouses. Gaddafi (Gumede 2005: 210) charges that:

*Good governance is a creation of colonial capitalists and racists. Africa has its own style of governance, democracy and political culture, which needs to be preserved. We don’t want imposed conditions.*
The position of Zimbabwe, Kenya and Libya on the debate on good governance in NEPAD is perhaps easy to understand, given the chequered governance record of the political leadership of Mugabe, Moi and Gaddafi respectively. It is rather the perspective of Botswana on good governance in NEPAD and APRM that is somewhat surprising. In 2008 the former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, won the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. The foundation was established to encourage good governance in Africa. It developed the Index for African Governance, which complements the official NEPAD and APRM country review process. The Index is used to “measure the rule of law, transparency and corruption, safety and security, and sustainable economic opportunity” (Maserumule & Gutto 2008: 71).

In the contemporary political and development discourses on Africa Botswana is considered as a model for democracy and good governance in Africa (Sokhulu 2004: 01). But, with such recognition, why did Botswana have reservations about good governance as envisaged in NEPAD and APRM? The answer to this question may be found in some scholars’ and activists’ intellectual contestations that reject the view that Botswana is a model for democracy in Africa (Good & Taylor 2005: 21).

In the paper entitled *Is Botswana advancing or regressing in its democracy?* Sokhulu (2004: 01-15) uses cases that range from human rights violations, limitation of political campaigning and freedom of the press to prohibition of civil society to engage in politics to validate the contention that Botswana is not a paragon of virtue when coming to matters of governance and democracy. The Botswana government’s action in respect to the foregoing aspects exemplifies the opposite of what it claims to stand for, namely democracy and good governance.

Sokhulu (2004: 15) writes that “the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism faces a challenge of ensuring that Botswana upholds and implements the principles of good governance”. It is interesting to note that Botswana has always been vociferous in condemning Mugabe largely on matters that are said to be concerned with good governance in Zimbabwe, especially the land reform policy that made huge media headlines. But, how does the controversial land reform policy in Zimbabwe differ with the human rights violation of the San community or *Basarwa* in Botswana? The San community was displaced from its ancestral land and
dumped in “a place of death”, which Ngakaeaja, the co-ordinator of the Botswana Section of the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa, describes as being beset with “problems of poor health, low literacy, inadequate education, bad housing, poor hygiene, TB, AIDS and malnourishment, fragmentation, stigmatisation, social exclusion and lack of participation in the mainstream politics” (Sokhulu 2004: 13).

Mugabe argues that the controversial land reform policy in Zimbabwe, characterised by violent land seizures, is an exercise in pursuit of good governance. Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth because of what was described as practices that goes against the grain of good governance emphasised in NEPAD as the basis for addressing the socio-economic challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, and continued marginalisation of Africa. Canada’s High Commissioner in Pretoria (South Africa), Lucie Edwards, is quoted in the Zimbabwe Independent (2002: on-line) as having said “the decision of the Commonwealth troika, two of whose members were prominent African leaders and NEPAD leaders (Mbeki and Obasanjo), to suspend Zimbabwe was seen as a sign of real political will to apply the principles of good governance within the region”.

Despite being part of the troika that took the decision to suspend Zimbabwe, Mbeki argued strongly against such suspension but was ultimately kow-towed into submission. It was pointed out that the US$64 billion on offer for trade and investment from the developed countries under the NEPAD plan may be endangered by his stance on Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe Independent 2002). This is a very interesting case of contestation of ideas on the meaning of good governance. It appears that the developed countries, through the Commonwealth, assumed the intellectual hegemony and defined for the Africans what ought to be the meaning of good governance in NEPAD. Mbeki’s contention against the suspension of Zimbabwe indicates that the NEPAD leader also had his own understanding of good governance in the context of NEPAD.

Zimbabwe’s policy position on land reform got massive support from the African foreign ministers in a resolution adopted on the eve of the African Union (AU) Summit in Lusaka on 9-11 July 2001. Gaddafi “was one of the backers of the resolution of African foreign
ministers without a whimper about ZANU-PF\(^3\)-inspired violence in Zimbabwe” (Gumede 2005: 210). The former Presidents Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Frederick Chiluba of Zambia are reported to have publicly supported Zimbabwe’s land reform; thereby also implicitly contending that Mugabe’s government is pursuing good governance policies. However, the overwhelming voices within and outside Zimbabwe reject such views and argues that Zimbabwe’s system of governance is bad in the extreme (Brown 2002, Maserumule 2005a, Mugabe 2002). This underscores Bovaird’s (2005: 217) observation that “good governance is a contested concept, both in theory and practice”

The contestations on NEPAD point to a lack of contextual understanding of good governance as the basis of its foundation and underscore its conceptual problematic character. This necessitates scholarship intervention. Given its centrality in the contemporary development discourse, the debate on good governance should not only be limited to politicians whose engagements with it are influenced by their ideological dispositions. Scholarly endeavours to examine good governance as a concept in the context of NEPAD is an important epistemological exercise that could greatly contribute towards its better understanding as a principle.

Maserumule (2005a: 198) argues that the usage of good governance in NEPAD as a principle without first clarifying it as a concept is like ‘putting the cart before the horse’. Concepts are used to understand reality. They are intellectual bases from which principles that guide human existence and interactions could be understood. To understand the meaning of the principles of human relations, interactions and behaviour, the concepts that are used in their formulation should first be clarified, taking their contextual settings into consideration.

In the Conference of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management on 27-28 November 2002, the NEPAD Secretariat [Dogonyaro], in [his] keynote address, challenged the intelligentsia to engage in interpretive studies and determine the meaning of good governance with a view to make contributions towards a common understanding of its meaning in the context of NEPAD (Dogonyaro 2002a). In a similar way Fraser-Moleketi (2004: 04-05), the former Minister for Public Service and Administration in South Africa, made an appeal to African scholars in a seminar on Public Sector Leadership

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\(^3\) This acronym stands for Zimbabwe African National Union-Popular Front.
Capacity Development for Good Governance not to confine their discourses and debates only to the political facet of good governance.

Fraser-Moleketi was concerned that many of the intellectual contributions on good governance are biased towards the political dimension of the concept. The public administration discourse on the concept is equally important. As the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development, NEPAD, as explained above, does not lose sight of the importance of the public administration variable of development where, in the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative, a strong emphasis is put on good governance. Against this background, the question that this study poses is:

What does the concept good governance in the context of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) mean for Public Administration?

In the existing body of knowledge, as extensively reviewed in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis, it is clear that much of the scholarship contributions on good governance in NEPAD are made from the political and economic perspectives. They are limited in determining its contextual meaning for Public Administration. The question about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD is not answered in the body of literature as reviewed in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis. In an attempt to validate the observation made in relation to scholarship treatment of the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD, the candidate published two articles on the subject in the Journal of Public Administration in 2005 and the International Journal of African Renaissance Studies in 2008 respectively, with the latter co-authored with Professor Shadrack Gutto, an expert on issues of NEPAD. In both articles the contention is that scholarship engagements with the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD are limited.

At the time of completing this study no rejoinder from the community of scholarship either from within or beyond the field of Public Administration came forth to contest the observation made regarding the good governance question in the context of NEPAD. The question asked above is not yet answered in the existing body of knowledge. To examine it, this study, for reasons of epistemic logic, first analyses how the concept good governance is used and understood in the broader NEPAD discourse and determines what it means or how
it is defined in its context. The implications of such meaning for Public Administration are thereafter determined to answer the question that the study asks. As explained above, good governance in the NEPAD context is the object of this study. It is examined from a Public Administration perspective, which is also, as already argued, fundamentally important in the development discourse on Africa. This study is conceived against the foregoing background. Good governance as the object of study is considered and explained in sub-section 1.3 below.

1.3 Good governance as the object of study

In the scholarly essay Research in Public Administration Wessels (1999a: 371) makes an important observation that Public Administration scholarship is largely concerned with empirical questions or problems. It is, as Houston and Delevan (1990: 678) explain, “engaged in little theory testing”, and construction. This study, as is clear in sub-section 1.2 above, posits a conceptual question, which makes its unit of analysis a non-empirical phenomenon. It is therefore, because of its focus on non-empirical phenomenon, a deviation from empiricism, which, as is clear in Houston and Delevan (1990: 678), McCurdy and Cleary (1984: 49-56), Wessels (1999a: 361-381), dominates in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship.

That which is studied as the unit of analysis or object of study in this thesis is good governance. Mouton (2005: 51-52), Wessels (1999a: 368-369) and Babbie (1992: 92-95) categorise objects of study or units of analysis into some kind of various levels or categories of knowledge. The object of this study is explained in terms of these scholars’ epistemological matrices. The study, as pointed out in sub-section 1.2 above, asks a non-empirical question, which, in terms of Mouton’s (2005: 51-52) classification of units of analysis, places the object of this study in World 2. Mouton (2005: 52) explains that World 2 “objects” are concerned with conceptual or non-empirical phenomena.

The research endeavours whose units of analysis fall in the World 2 category attempt to understand patterns and trends of the discourse in the scientific literature by studying and analysing ideas and writings of other scholars or reviewing the body of knowledge. They are concerned with analysing scientific concepts; developing theories and models. In contrast, the objects of study in World 1 are concerned with empirical research problems or real life issues
such as social, political and economic phenomena. The empirical research studies “human behaviour, historical events and social programmes” (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 84; Mouton 2005: 51-52).

Mouton’s (2005: 51-52) classification of objects of study or units of analysis seems similar to Wessels’ (1999a: 368-369) levels of reality, which researchers in Public Administration focus on, namely first-order of reality and second-order of reality. The first-order of reality refers to the practice of public administration. It is concerned with empirical phenomena. According to Mouton’s (2005: 51-52) classification, empirical phenomena fall in the World 1 category. The second-order of reality pertains to Mouton’s (2005: 52) World 2, which, as Wessels (1999a: 369) explains, refers to “theories, models, concepts, research methods and other constructs used to get a grip on the first-order reality – the practice of public administration”. Good governance as a concept, in the context of Wessels’ (1999a: 368-369) orders of reality, falls within the second-level order of reality.

The distinction between empirical and non-empirical objects of study is even more lucid in Babbie and Mouton’s 2006 book The practice of social research. Babbie’s (1992: 92-95) objects of study or units of analysis classification are condensed with Mouton’s (2005: 51-52) World 1 and World 2 analogy and the following typology, with an addition of oval box vignette, to befit the context of this study, is developed in a figure format in Figure 1.1 below for illuminative purposes (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 85).

**Figure 1.1: Typology of the objects of study or units of analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World 1 Objects</th>
<th>World 2 Objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical objects</td>
<td>Scientific concepts or notions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological organisms (living organisms) and processes</td>
<td>Scientific theories and models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human beings (individuals or groups)</td>
<td>Scientific methods and techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human actions and historical events</td>
<td>The body of scientific knowledge or literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social interventions (programmes or systems)</td>
<td>Scientific data or statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural objects (art or literature) and technology</td>
<td>Schools of thought, philosophies, or world views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social organisations (political parties or clubs) and institutions (schools, banks or companies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectives (countries, nations or cities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Good governance in NEPAD is, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 in the oval box vignette with an arrow pointing to the side that encapsulates World 2 objects, dealt with as a scientific construct or concept [World 2 object] rather than a principle or policy [World 1 object]. But, why does this study focus on good governance in the context of NEPAD as a non-empirical phenomenon from a Public Administration perspective? An answer to this question is considered in sub-section 1.4 below.

1.4 Raison d’être

It is pointed out in sub-section 1.2 above that the usage of good governance as a principle in NEPAD presupposes that there is a ‘conceptual consensus’ on its contextual meaning as a concept. A preliminary review of the literature on good governance and NEPAD as presented in the sub-section 1.2 above indicates that such supposition in incorrect. This is validated in Chapter 2 of the thesis where a comprehensive review of the body of Public Administration scholarship is presented. Good governance in the context of NEPAD is a conceptual problematique that scholarship needs to examine to develop a contextual understanding of its meaning (Akokpari 2005: 01-21; Maserumule 2005a: 198; Maloka 2003: 03; Osei-Hwedie 2005: 22-36).

This study examines good governance in the context of NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective. This is because the accumulated body of knowledge systematically reviewed indicates that scholarship endeavours to examine good governance in NEPAD to determine its meaning for Public Administration are limited (see Chapter 2 of the thesis where the public administration scholarship is reviewed). This is indicative of a gap in the existing body of knowledge. As Latib and Semela (2004: 64) observe, the foregoing may be the result of the fact that Public Administration “conceptual reflection, theory construction and research have, in many respects, not reflected sufficient responses” to the African realities (see Chapter 5 of the thesis for the basis of this conclusion). It is this limitation in the body of knowledge that constitutes a fundamental raison d’être for undertaking this study to, from a non-empirical perspective, make a contribution to the Public Administration body of scholarship on the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD.
NEPAD is a contemporary African development initiative which the African scholarship should rigorously engage together with its imperatives such as good governance in a contextual manner taking into consideration its theoretical and philosophical foundations. In this Fraser-Moleketi (2004: 05) challenges scholars in the field that “the responsibility in terms of the restoration of African influence on public administration and public sector…development on the continent as well as exporting insights to the mainstream of current public administration and governance thinking to improve [our] understanding of [our] uniquely African position rests on academics”. This is a challenge particularly to African scholarship that this study intends to take up as its significance in the mainstream contemporary public administration and governance discourses is important.

The study attempts to broaden the body of knowledge on NEPAD as a new paradigm for sustainable development in Africa with specific focus on *good governance* from the Public Administration perspective. The relevance and importance of this study in the contemporary discourse on the development of the African continent cannot, in the context of the above exposition, be over-emphasised. For, as Fraser-Moleketi (2004: 04) observes, “currently the trend is to focus on the political dimension of governance, with public administration and public sector leadership development issues being relegated to the periphery”. This study attends to this vacuity. But, what is that which the study exactly intends to achieve? This question is considered in sub-section 1.5 below.

1.5 **Purpose and objectives**

The purpose of this study is to understand the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD and determine its meaning for Public Administration. It seeks to make a contribution towards a better insight into, and broadening of, the body of scientific knowledge by engaging in conceptual, theoretical and philosophical studies to understand *good governance* as emphasised in *NEPAD’s Democracy and Political Governance Initiative* from a Public Administration perspective. It achieves this by:

- critically reviewing the Public Administration scholarship to determine how it engages *good governance* in the context of NEPAD;
pointing out a gap in the existing body of knowledge in so far as Public Administration scholarship engagement with good governance, which is the object of the study or unit of analysis and a non-empirical phenomenon, in the context of NEPAD, is concerned;

unpacking⁴ NEPAD as the context of the object of this study;

critically analysing good governance to provide a theoretical framework to determine its meaning in NEPAD;

critically reviewing other scholarly literature outside the Public Administration discipline, as well as official and popular literature, and internet blogs to determine how the concept is used and understood by other users;

clarifying the Public Administration approach of the study for reasons of disciplinary contextualisation in the consideration of good governance in NEPAD;

determining whether insights acquired from the ‘other’ literature as pointed out above could be used to enrich Public Administration scholarship in the conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD;

using conceptual, theoretical and philosophical insights acquired through a critical review of scholarly literature and an understanding of how the concept is used by other users as reflected in the official and popular literature to construct an epistemological framework that could be used to understand good governance in the context of NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective;

recommending the epistemological framework as referred to above as an alternative to the neo-liberal paradigm largely used in the contemporary scholarship engagement with good governance in NEPAD;

in the context of that epistemological framework, conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD and determining its meaning for Public Administration to answer the question that this study posits in sub-section 1.2 above; and

summarising the findings and contributions of the study to the body of knowledge on good governance in the context of NEPAD and its meaning for Public Administration.

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⁴ The word “unpacking”, as it also conspicuously appears in the title of Chapter 3 of the thesis, is used to emphasise the in-depth nature and approach of the discourse on various aspects that pertain to the object of this study.
In the context of the above, the question that may come to mind is: how does the study achieve its aims and objectives as stated above? This question is concerned with the methodological approaches in so far as the execution of the study is concerned. So far, the type of study being undertaken, which is non-empirical in nature, and the kind of results that are aimed at have been explained. What now ought to be explained is how the study is executed. This is considered in sub-section 1.6 below.

1.6 Research methodology

For clarification purpose, it is important that a distinction between research methodologies and research designs is, at the outset, made. This is because of the fact that research methodologies are often used interchangeably with research designs as if they mean the same thing. Mouton (2005: 55-56) explains that “these are two different aspects of research project”, which are inextricably intertwined and, as such, researchers confuse them. Research design is a plan outlining how one intends to conduct scientific inquiry into a particular phenomenon, entity, process or event identified as the object of study or unit of analysis (Mouton 2005: 55-56). It is mainly concerned with the type of study being planned; “the results it is aimed at”; its “point of departure [as] research problem or question”; and it “focuses on the logic of research” (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 75). The logic of research is the activity of reasoning based on scientific data required to answer research question/s (McNabb 2002: 06-08).

Leedy (1993: 08) defines research methodology as “a basic procedure, and the steps in solving an unresolved problem…” This definition is the same as in McNabb (2002: 05). Brynard and Hanekom (1997: 27) define research methodology in more specific terms as “the how of collecting data and the processing thereof within the framework of the research processes”. Mouton (2005: 56) explains that the research methodology “focuses on the research process and the kind of tools and procedures to be used”. Compared with research design, the research methodology is concerned with the collection of data using the most objective procedure (Mouton 2005: 56).
This study is non-empirical in nature and, as indicated in sub-section 1.2 above, posits a conceptual question. The object of study or unit of analysis, as extensively explained in sub-section 1.3 above, falls in Mouton (2005: 51-52), Babbie and Mouton’s (2006: 85) World 2, and Wessels’ (1999a: 368-369) second-order of reality. The results that this study is aimed at are formulated in sub-section 1.5 above. In the context of the foregoing, the question is: which methodological research approaches can be used to acquire insights necessary for engaging with a non-empirical object of the study as explained in sub-section 1.3 above?

In the literature on social science research there are a variety of non-empirical research methods, which, as part of the preparation for the execution of the study, were analysed and the following are found to be more appropriate to engage with a non-empirical object of the study: critical scholarship review, conceptual analysis, philosophical analysis and theory-building (Adams & White 1994: 569; Bak 2004: 25; Brynard & Hanekom 1997: 28; Mouton 2005: 175-180). These research methods are, according to Bak (2004: 25) and Mouton (2005: 52-53), used to engage with theoretical, non-empirical or conceptual questions or problems.

An analysis of research literature in human sciences reveals that there are other methods that are appropriate in the study of the meaning of concepts. These methods are textual analysis, hermeneutics, discourse and conversational analysis, and ideological critical reading. However, these research methods are, as compared to the ones mentioned above, categorised as empirical methods in terms of Mouton’s (2005: 166-170) epistemological template. As the review of scholarship in Chapter 2 of the thesis reveals a gap in the existing body of Public Administration literature in its engagement with good governance in the context of NEPAD, it is important that, in addition to the review of ‘other’ scholarly literature, the official and popular literature is also analysed to determine how this concept is used and understood by other users as reflected in other sources.

In the context of this study official literature refers to the official publications such as the files and documents of the NEPAD Secretariat, Heads of State and the Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of NEPAD, the African Peer Review Panel (APRP), County Review Teams, the African Union (AU) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP); the policy documents that have been developed by the African countries that relates to NEPAD particularly on the issue of democracy and good governance; and speeches and conversations
of the African political leadership and officials made in their capacities that link them to NEPAD on the issue of good governance.

Due to a lack of universally recognisable caption in the human sciences research that describes the category where newspapers and magazines as other important texts of reference could be subsumed, popular literature is a term used for this purpose in the study. It refers to newspapers and magazine articles and reports on good governance in NEPAD. The research methods that the study uses to engage with the official and popular literature are, as mentioned above, textual analysis, hermeneutics, discourse and conversational analysis, ideological critical reading and content analysis. But, as pointed out above, Mouton (2005: 167-170) classifies these methodological approaches as being part of empirical studies; yet, this study is concerned with a non-empirical phenomenon. To this the question is, can empirical methods be used to answer non-empirical questions?

In proffering the answer it seems appropriate to first point out that a search for knowledge is a dynamic intellectual process which must be pursued in a systematic manner; and it should be able to appropriately employ various methods of research with the potential to generate valid knowledge or make a valid contribution to science. It should therefore not be limited by rigid distinctions between empirical and non-empirical objects of study, which often lead to inflexible application of research methods. For, there is a relationship between empirical and non-empirical worlds of scientific research. Schutz captures this as follows:

*The thought objects constructed by social scientist, in order to grasp social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men, living their daily life within their social world. Thus the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, that is constructs made by actors on the social scene, whose behaviour the/a social scientist...observes and explains in accordance with the procedural rules of science, (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 29) and [are often the subject of scholarship engagement to improve their meaning and understanding] “used to get a grip on the first-order-reality”. (Wessels 1999a: 362-369)*
Good governance is a thought object constructed as a principle in NEPAD by the political thinking of the African leadership in the real world. This thought object is engaged in this study as a concept to determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD. So, the answer to the question whether empirical research methods can be used to answer non-empirical question is: it depends on how they are used and the purpose of such usage. In this study, textual analysis, hermeneutics, discourse and conversational analysis, ideological-critical reading and content analysis are, as explained below, used to determine how the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD is used and understood by actors in the social scene. These research methods, which Mouton (2005: 167-170) classifies as empirical methods, are used in the study in complementation of the four non-empirical research methods as mentioned above.

1.6.1 Critical scholarship review

A review of scholarship is an important “component in any type of research” (Majam & Theron 2006: 603). Leedy (1993: 87) explains that a review is about “looking again (re + view) at the literature or scholarship (reports of what others have done) in a related area: an area not necessarily identical with, but collateral to, your own area of study”. Its importance in scientific studies is expressed metaphorically by Leedy (1993: 87):

*Those who do research belong to a community of scholars, each of whom has journeyed into the unknown to bring back a fact, a truth, and a point of light. What they have recorded of their journey and their findings will make it easier for you to explore the unknown: to help you also discover a fact, a truth, or bring back a point of light.*

With scholarship review, as Mouton (2005: 87) explains, the researchers are not merely interested in literature, “which sounds as if it refers merely to a collection of texts, but in a body of accumulated scholarship”. An adjective critical is added to scholarship review to emphasise an in-depth manner that a body of scholarly literature is engaged in the study. In the context of this study, a critical review should be understood as a rational reflection, which takes the form of inductive reasoning, on scholarship engagements with scientific phenomena. It is about critical engagement with scholarship, which, using Bak’s (2004: 69) conceptualisation, means:
• giving a clear exposition of the argument;
• determining and assessing the support for a certain claim made to get a clearer understanding of an issue;
• determining the truth of the premises and the validity of argument;
• clarifying and analysing the language used and the meaning of concepts;
• showing how the article or book fits into the academic debates and current literature;
• discussing the theoretical and social context in which ideas are developed;
• discussing possible implications that the ideas or claims could have; and
• demanding informed thinking and creativity.

Mouton (2005: 87) explains that scholarship is reviewed to:

• ensure that one does not duplicate a previous study;
• see how other scholars have investigated the research problem one is interested in;
• discover what the most recent and authoritative theorising about the subject is;
• find out what the most widely accepted empirical findings in the field of study are;
• identify the available instrumentation that has proven validity and reliability; and
• ascertain what the most widely accepted definitions of key concepts in the field are.

The concept *scholarship* is consistently used in the study. But, what does it mean? Kuye (2002a: 13) defines scholarship as “the collective quest for knowledge, supported by a diverse inquiry of domains and delivered in a logical sequence, as may be exhibited in teaching, research and practice”. A synthesis of authoritative writings on human science research of authors such as Bak (2004: 51-75), Gay (1990: 35-53), Henning, Van Rensburg and Smith (2004: 12-28), Leedy (1993: 87-107), Mouton (2005: 87-86), Wessels (1999a:
361-381; 1999b: 382-415) and Wessels (2004: 168-184) indicates that scholarship comprises the following elements:

- clearly conceived definitions of intellectual phenomena;
- a theoretically and/or empirically-grounded thesis presented in a logical and sequential manner that makes a significant contribution to the critical body of knowledge;
- authoritative theorisation and conceptualisation;
- scientific measuring instruments with proven validity and reliability to measure the extent and scope of phenomena;
- rigorous scientific discourses and intellectual engagements;
- commitment to truth; and
- focus on real issues.

Using Leedy’s (1993: 187) metaphorical expression, in this study scholarship records of scholars in the forms of books, chapters in books, articles in scientific journals and scholarly papers who, by penning down their scholarly reflections, traverse the world of science, are reviewed to discover a fact, a truth or bring back a light on the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. A distinction in the study is made between scholarship review as presented in Chapter 2 of the thesis and a reading of other scholarly literature as part of the non-empirical research method of study. The objectives of scholarship review in Chapter 2 are to:

- acquire more scholarly insight into whether and how the Public Administration scholars examines *good governance* in the context of NEPAD;
- ensure that the object of study as explained in sub-section 1.3 is not a duplication of previous research;
- contextualise the study;
- authenticate the validity of the research question as posited in sub-section 1.2 in terms of its importance and worthiness as the object of study for consideration as a subject for scholarly engagement;
- provide a framework for the importance, relevance and motivation of the study in the contemporary scholarship on development in Africa;
• discover authoritative theorisation and conceptualisation of *good governance* as propagated in the field of Public Administration;
• ascertain whether there are widely accepted definitions of *good governance* in the field;
• determine whether such definitions befit the NEPAD context; and
• point out a gap in the existing body of knowledge on the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.

An extensive and critical scholarship review to contextualise the study in Chapter 2 reveals that scholarship endeavours to examine *good governance* in the context of NEPAD to determine its meaning for Public Administration are limited. This necessitates a review of other scholarly literature outside the Public Administration discipline. The purpose of reviewing other scholarly literature, which is not the same as in Chapter 2 of the thesis, is to find out how scholars in other disciplines conceptualise, theorise and philosophise *good governance* in the context of NEPAD to explore the extent that the Public Administration scholarship “could be enriched by the perspectives of [other] disciplinary approaches” (Nabudere 2007: 24). A review of such other scholarly literature is provided in Chapter 6 of the thesis.

The process of scholarship review in the study started with the identification and categorisation of the literature related to the object of study that meets the requirement of scholarship through various means such as a library catalogue, book-find, index to periodicals, general and domain-specific indices, the internet, and dissertation abstracts; international indices. Scholarship materials reviewed are books and chapters in books, articles in scientific journals, and academic or scholarly conferences / symposia / workshop outputs and occasional papers. Scholarship review in Chapter 2 of the thesis is limited to Public Administration literature and the purpose of this is explained above.

NEPAD is a relatively new continental development initiative. Much of the scholarly contributions on NEPAD emerged mainly from the end of 2001. Consequently, 2001 is used in the study as a *terminus a quo* in the review of Public Administration scholarship; whereas 2010 is chosen as a *terminus ad quem*. This means that the scope of scholarship review in
Chapter 2 of the thesis is limited to Public Administration scholarly outputs that emerged during the period 2001-2010.

A review of literature in the study followed the following sequence of actions, as explained in Brynard and Hanekom (1997: 12-14): scan read, make an overview, comprehensive reading, and read critically and write down ideas. Scan read entails studying the table of contents and index of publication to determine whether a particular publication is relevant or if it contains a chapter, section, paragraph or even a concept relevant to the topic of the study. This exercise was followed by reading the relevant chapters, sections, paragraphs or concepts identified through the scan read technique as being relevant to the object of study or unit of analysis to develop an overview of what they entail.

The views propagated by scholars on the subject are clearly determined. An in-depth evaluation of the ideas of scholars, by means of double-barrelled questions is made: what/why; where/why; when/why; which/why; and who/why. A critical scholarship review of literature is dependent on secondary data, which refers to data collected and used by other researchers to develop theories (Adam & White 1994: 569; Brynard & Hanekom 1997: 28). A critical scholarship review in the study is illustrated in Figure 1.2 below.

**Figure 1.2: Systematic scholarship review**

![Scholarship review process](image-url)
Intervention

Review of other scholarly literature outside the Public Administration discipline to determine how other scholars conceptualised and theorised good governance in the context of NEPAD. The official and popular literature is also considered to determine how the concept is used and understood by other users.

Insights acquired through a review of a wide range of literature are used in the study to develop an epistemological framework that can be used to understand good governance in the context of NEPAD.

In the context of that epistemological framework the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration is determined and is propagated as the thesis of the study.

Source: Own illustration.
1.6.2 Conceptual analysis

Conceptual analysis refers to that type of method of research concerned with the analysis of “the meaning of words or concepts” (Mouton 2005: 175). It explains the relationship of a concept to other concepts, and points out the implications of a concept as used in a particular context (Bak 2004: 10; Mouton 2005: 175). Conceptual analysis, as also in the case of critical scholarship review, is dependent on secondary textual data. It is used in the study to analyse the meaning of *good governance* as propagated in the contemporary body of scholarship. This entails systematic analysis of the different dimensions of *good governance* and clarification or explanation of its theoretical linkages to other concepts such as democracy.

The implications of different viewpoints on the meanings of *good governance* are revealed in the study. And, more importantly, conceptual propositions on the meaning of *good governance* in so far as their contextual appropriateness or inappropriateness to NEPAD are concerned, are considered and delineated. This intellectual exercise is aimed at making a scholarly contribution towards the understanding of the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.

1.6.3 Philosophical analysis

Mouton (2005: 178) explains that philosophical studies are aimed at analysing arguments that propagate or reject a particular epistemological position, “sometimes of a normative or value-laden kind”; they “develop substantive points of view about the meaning of life (metaphysics), morally acceptable behaviour (ethics) and coherent and consistent forms of reasoning (logic)”. These types of studies address, according to Bak (2004: 10), “some problems in thinking”. They are concerned with seeking better ways of thinking and understanding of intellectual phenomena. The philosophical studies deal with “questions of meaning, explanation, understanding and normativity” and their analytical methods take the form of normative analysis, ideology critique, deconstruction and phenomenological analysis (Mouton 2005: 178).
This study is concerned with the meaning of good governance, which, as argued in subsection 1.2 above and Chapter 4 of the thesis, is a normative or value-laden concept that can mean different things to different people depending on the context in which it is used (Abrahamsen 2000: 25-45; Ake 1996: 01-17; Cernea 1994: 07; Cheru 1989: 01, 13-14; Maserumule 2005a: 198; Osei-Hwedie 2005: 22-36). The usage of philosophical analysis as a research method to generate philosophical insight for engagement with the non-empirical research questions of this study is therefore an appropriate approach to establish conceptual clarity on the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD.

The philosophical insights are used to formulate a framework used in the discourse of the study as a basis to reject the neo-liberal paradigm that appropriates meanings to good governance that are not contextual to NEPAD. In rejecting neo-liberal conceptualisations of good governance as an inappropriate paradigm to understand the meaning of the concept within the context of NEPAD, the tendencies of dogmatism and intolerance of other philosophies often characteristic of philosophical traditions is avoided. The study remains focussed to its epistemic imperative or commitment to truthful knowledge. It contextualises philosophical insights about the meaning of good governance in the mainstream scholarship on Africa’s development to NEPAD and makes a scholarly contribution to the body of knowledge on the contextual meaning of the concept.

1.6.4 Theory-building

As pointed out in sub-section 1.5 above, one of the objectives of this study is to develop an epistemological framework that can be used to better understand good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration. An appropriate non-empirical methodology used in the study to specifically realise this objective is theory-building, which, according to Du Toit, Knipe, Van Niekerk, Van der Waldt, Doyle (2002: 410) refers to “a process which begins with a set of observations (i.e. descriptions) and moves on to develop theories of these observations”. For science to make progress, theory-construction should always be at the ‘centre’ of scholarship endeavours in the expansion of the boundaries of knowledge (De Vaus 1994: 25-26).
Mouton (2005: 176) explains that theory-building is “aimed at developing theories to explain scientific phenomena”. It is used to address “questions of meaning and explanation; questions of the theoretical linkages and coherence between theoretical propositions; questions related to explanatory and predictive potential or theories and conceptual models” (Mouton 2005: 176). As Du Toit, et al. (2002: 411) put it, “theory allows for a classification and conceptualisation of facts” used to “confirm, disapprove, improve or formulate a theory”.

The object of this study is good governance. It is examined as a scientific concept. As observed through a critical review of literature in the study, much of scholarship engagements with good governance are located within the neo-liberal paradigm, which refers to a theoretical framework of thinking embedded in the notions of market individualism and minimal statism (Heywood 1997: 409). The neo-liberal conceptualisations of good governance are obtrusively used as a basis to understand the meaning of the concept in the context of NEPAD. This study rejects this epistemological approach as a travesty of scholarship. NEPAD is an African development initiative, developed by the African leadership for Africans. It is strongly argued in the study that what Mazrui calls “alien paradigms” cannot be used as the theoretical framework to understand good governance in the context of NEPAD (Mazrui 2002: 15-23).

1.6.5 Textual analysis

As pointed out in sub-section 1.2 above, this study examines a conceptual question, which is about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD. Good governance and NEPAD are a subjects of rigorous debate and much is written about them by other actors who are not necessarily part of the scholarship community, namely the African leadership and other officials who are linked to NEPAD. Their reflections on NEPAD and its good governance imperative are also important and cannot be ignored. It is important to determine how good governance in NEPAD is used and understood by other users as reflected in other sources such as the files and annual reports of the NEPAD Secretariat, the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), the African Peer Review Panel, the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament, Country Review Teams and other governments in Africa and other countries of the world; and the speeches of politicians and government officials on NEPAD and good governance made in their official capacities. These sources of insights on good governance in NEPAD are subsumed as official literature in the study.
The study of ‘other’ literature is necessary particularly in the context of the results of review of literature in Chapter 2 of the thesis, which indicates a gap in the existing Public Administration body of knowledge on the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD. For the purpose of this study, the ‘other’ literature refers to official materials on NEPAD. The method used to study such literature is textual analysis. The textual analysis is “interpretative undertakings” (De Beer 1999: 437) used in the studies that examine exploratory, descriptive, conceptual and theoretical questions (Mouton 2005: 167). It is associated with the reproductive reading modality, which, according to De Beer (1999: 438), is concerned with the “understanding of a text or document or, in everyday language, knowing what it is about”. This modality represents the most common form of reading when documents are studied. It is used in the study to study the official literature.

The scholarly literature outside the mainstream Public Administration discourse is also part of what this study considers as the ‘other’ literature. So is also the popular literature. Scholarly literature refers to books and chapters in books, papers presented in scholarly gatherings and articles published in scholarly journals whereas popular literature refers to articles published in magazines and newspapers. This ‘other’ literature is reviewed in Chapter 6 of the thesis to determine whether insights so acquired could be used to enrich Public Administration scholarship in the conceptualisation and theorisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD. In respect to scholarly literature the methodological approach used in engaging with it is critical scholarship review, as explained in sub-section 1.6.1 above, whereas in the case of the popular literature textual analysis and content analysis methods are considered. Content analysis method is considered and explained in sub-section 1.6.9 below.

De Beer (1999: 438) explains that in reproductive reading modality “the total equivalence of the message [as contained in the text] is reclaimed and a meaningful part of the frame of reference of the text concerned is cut out, as if that part never existed, as if the boundaries that remain or are drawn in this way can be totalised, and as if the abscission of the reader’s frame of reference has never taken place”. This is perhaps one of the fundamental flaws in the reproductive reading modality. It gravitates towards a literal meaning of the text in terms of its contents without taking into account the context of the texts.
Felman (1985: 107) states that “it is vulgar to be literal”. MacLean (1990: 163) supports this in the contention that “it is the very search for precision in language which is the cause of ambiguity, obscurity, and unintelligibility”. The reproductive reading modality or textual analysis is used in the study to acquire a comprehensive insight into the official literature’s usage of the concept good governance in NEPAD, and, because of its intratextual naïveté in terms of its analytical approach, textual analysis is linked up with the hermeneutic reading modality to cater for the inadequacy as explained in the foregoing. But what is hermeneutics?

1.6.6 Hermeneutics

In the nineteenth century hermeneutics was generally understood as the “art and science of interpretation, primarily, though not exclusively, of religious texts” (McLean 1996: 220). It became so much used in the twentieth century, when its focus shifted from a primarily religious context into secular social theory. Compared to textual analysis in terms of its textual reproductive reading modality as explained above, hermeneutics is not only concerned with the meaning of text. It also more importantly focuses on the context of the text. As Babbie and Mouton (2006: 30-31) put it, hermeneutics “is a science of text interpretation”. McLean (1996: 220) states that the question that hermeneutical scholars ask in their engagement with the textual materials is: what meaning does the text have when it is put in its social context? De Beer’s (1999: 445) formulation of the question that the hermeneutic reading modality asks in analysing the text is instructive, namely:

- What is the meaning of the text?
- How is the intention of the author related to this meaning?
- Is an objective understanding of the text possible?
- What are the limitations of this understanding and to what can they be ascribed?
- Can the text be related to other themes?
- Are there cultural and historical dimensions in the text which are foreign to [the] reader[s], and can they be overcome?

These questions inform the hermeneutic analysis of the texts that relate to NEPAD as the context for engagement with good governance. The NEPAD document and other related texts are studied to ascertain the meaning that they implicitly and explicitly appropriate to good
governance in NEPAD. Such meaning is thereafter compared with the intentions of its crafters [Thabo Mbeki, the then President of the Republic of South Africa; Olusegun Obasanjo, the then President of Nigeria; Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the President of Algeria; and Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal] and the African leadership as a whole to determine congruency and incongruence in so far as their perspectives on the development of Africa are concerned. The intentions of the crafters of NEPAD and that of the African leadership as a whole are determined through the analysis of speeches made and conversations had in engaging with NEPAD. The hermeneutic analysis in the study is also used to determine whether an objective understanding of NEPAD is feasible.

The attempt to understand NEPAD is approached from three perspectives, namely comparative-analytic, historic-process, and philosophical-cum-theoretical perspectives. The comparative-analytic perspective attempts to understand NEPAD in terms of the extent of its distinction from, or similarity to, the previous development initiatives, which, as pointed out in sub-section 1.1 above, are important preludes to understanding NEPAD. The historic-process perspective seeks to understand NEPAD in terms of how it evolved or on the basis of the process of its formulation. Here, the unit of focus is on the process. The philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective is more concerned with the theories and philosophies that underpin NEPAD. It attempts to understand NEPAD on the basis of its philosophical and theoretical dispositions. The philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective subscribes to the view that scientific constructs can appropriately be understood in the context of their philosophical and theoretical antecedents.

In some texts on NEPAD strong ideologically-based jargons and phraseology, which “place definite restrictions on hermeneutics’ claim to universality” (De Beer 1999: 447), are used. The hermeneutic reading modality thrives on simplicity of language used in the formulation of texts or what Habermas (De Beer 1999: 446) calls natural language, which “refers to language as it is understood within Gadamer’s hermeneutics, namely the dialogue of everyday language”. But, as indicated above, some texts on NEPAD, as Gadamer (De Beer 1999: 436) puts it, use ‘monologic language system’, which “refers to theories that are constructed monologically with the support of controlled observation”. The dialectic formulation of the contents of such texts is complex and to decipher their meanings needs a methodological approach that goes behind Gadamer’s hermeneutics. It is in this context that
the study considers ideological-critical reading as the appropriate methodological approach to study the literature formulated with complex ideological concepts and expressions.

1.6.7 **Ideological-critical reading**

The ideological-critical reading does not suggest that, as it may mistakenly be assumed because of the use of the adjective *critical* in its formulation, hermeneutics is not critical in its approach to textual analysis. In fact, its usage as part of the methodological approaches in the study is because of its emphasis and disposition to critical treatment of texts. The ideological-critical reading is therefore not considered in this study on the basis of hermeneutics shortcomings on critical textual engagements, but solely because of its appropriateness in the analysis of complex textual composition. For, as De Beer (1999: 447) puts it “stepping out of the dialogic structure of everyday language and using language in a monologic way, one can overcome the limitations of understanding hermeneutically”.

Following the Habermas discourse on the theory of textual reading, a distinction is made between hermeneutics and ideological-critical reading on the basis of the language used in the construction of textual materials, namely, natural language and monologic language systems. The ideological critical reading is used in the study to complement the hermeneutics method, particularly in so far as its shortcomings as they relate to the reading of complexity are concerned, not as diametrically opposite methods. For, as De Beer (1999: 447) puts it, “the monologically structured language system cannot be interpreted without access to natural language – the monologic language system has to be translated into easily [understandable] language”. The ideological-critical reading is also used in the study of complex philosophical and theoretical texts related to the object of this study which are not written in an easily understandable language.

As pointed out in sub-section 1.2 above and argued in Chapter 4 of the thesis, *good governance* is a value-laden concept of which its conception and usage is influenced by the ideological inclinations of its users. It is, using De Beer’s (1999: 436) words, “the product of the struggle about the ideological and ethical assumptions” in terms of the organisation of society. In this study an attempt is made to decipher the ideological context of *good governance* as used in NEPAD. But, what is an ideology?
In Heywood (1997: 40-41) ideology is defined as, from a social-scientific viewpoint, a “more or less coherent set of ideas that provides a basis for organised political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify, or overthrow the existing system of power relationships”. Blackburn (2005: 178) defines ideology as “any wide-ranging system of beliefs, ways of thought, and categories that provide the foundation or programmes as political and social action: an ideology is a conceptual scheme with practical applications”. Fox and Meyer’s (1996: 60) definition is more of a combination of Heywood (1997: 40-41) and Blackburn (2005: 178) perspectives on the meaning of ideology. They define ideology “as a set of political beliefs and values that are constrained or linked together; a system of interdependent ideas (such as principles, traditions, codes of conduct) present in social groups or communities and which represent their specific political, social, moral, religious and economic interests” (Fox & Meyer 1996: 60).

The ideological values are embedded in the concepts that are used in the formulation of texts and often obfuscate their simplicity. To understand the texts that are being studied the ideological framework of the concept used in their formulation is important. However, the ideological expressions are not easily understandable. This, according to De Beer (1999: 448), cannot be “overcome by the practice of naturally acquired communicative competence”; hence the importance of ideological reading of texts, which this study uses in the quest for the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD.

1.6.8 Discourse and conversational analysis

The discourse and conversational analysis is closely related to conceptual analysis because it is used to study the “meaning of words within the larger chunks of texts, such as conversations or discourses” (Mouton 2005: 168). This sounds more of a non-empirical research method. The discourse and conversational analysis is also about the analysis of everyday conversations and discourses on “real-life problems”. It is used in this study in an attempt to address a non-empirical question (Mouton 2005: 168-170). The discourse and conversational analysis is, according to Mouton (2005: 168), “sometimes defined as the analysis of language beyond the sentence” because, in contrast with other methods that study smaller units of language, it studies larger chunks of language.
There is a plethora of texts on NEPAD in the existing body of knowledge. NEPAD is the subject of contemporary discourse or conversation on the development of Africa. The discourse and conversational analysis is used in the analysis of the meaning of words used in the larger chunks of texts which form part of the contemporary discourses or conversations on NEPAD and its good governance imperative. This method is therefore, in view of the foregoing, appropriate in its usage in the study and is used to complement the other research methods as explained above in the search for the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.

1.6.9 Content analysis

Content analysis is another important research method which is also considered in this study. This research method is defined as a study “that analyses the content of texts or documents such as letters, speeches and annual reports” (Mouton 2005: 164). It is related to other research methods as explained above, especially textual analysis. In this study content analysis is specifically used as an appropriate research method to analyse political speeches, conversations and official documents of the NEPAD Secretariat and the African Union. The official documents of different African governments that relate to good governance in NEPAD are analysed using the content analytical approach to acquire an insight into their contents. It is used to analyse the contents of popular literature such as articles in magazines and newspapers that are concerned with good governance and NEPAD. The insights acquired through content analysis are, together with those generated through other research methods as explained above, used in the search for the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD. Figure 1.3 below shows how the plan of the research is structured.

**Figure 1.3: Research plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of research</th>
<th>Non-empirical study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit of analysis or object of study</strong></td>
<td>Good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research question</td>
<td>What does the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD mean for Public Administration?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conceptual question</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Category or level of the unit of analysis or object of the study

| World 2 category or second-order level of reality | Scientific construct |

### Contextual points of focus

- New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
- Public Administration
- Meaning of good governance

### Classification of data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Type of data</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sources</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary, textual and hybrid data</td>
<td>Scholarly literature: books and chapters in books, articles in scientific journals, academic or scholarly conferences/symposia/workshop outputs and occasional papers on NEPAD, good governance and Public Administration. Official literature: official publications on NEPAD, good governance and Public Administration. Popular literature: newspaper articles and reports on NEPAD and good governance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Research methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Non-empirical research methodologies</strong></th>
<th><strong>Critical literature review</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theory-building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophical analysis</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Empirical research methodologies</strong></th>
<th><strong>Textual, hermeneutics and textual criticism</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse and conversational analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological critical reading</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Wessels (1999a: 376)

### 1.7 Sequential arrangement of chapters in the thesis

Chapter 1 introduces the nature of the study. It presents the question that this study seeks to examine and explains the object of this study or unit of analysis and reasons or rationale and motivation for undertaking the study. The aims and objectives of the study are explained.
Towards the end of Chapter 1, the methodological approaches in examining the unit of analysis in an attempt to answer the question that the study posits are explained.

Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of Public Administration scholarship to determine how scholars in the field examine good governance in the context of NEPAD. This entails a critical analysis of the writings of Public Administration scholars, with specific focus on their theorisation, conceptualisation and contextualisation of good governance to NEPAD. Based on this intellectual exercise, a conclusion on the state of scholarship engagement with good governance in the context of NEPAD to determine its meaning for Public Administration is made, which confirms the observation made in Chapter 1 based on the preliminary reading of literature that points to a gap in the existing body of knowledge in as far as the object of this study is concerned. The study seeks to bridge this gap in the existing body of knowledge.

To systematically realise the objective of the study, the context of the object of study, which is NEPAD, is examined with the intention to acquire an in-depth insight into what this contemporary model for Africa’s development is and entails. This is attended to in Chapter 3 of the thesis. Based on the critical reading and review of the accumulated body of African scholarship on the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development, it is clear that NEPAD is engaged from different perspectives. Keet (2002: 04) captures this in the observation that “many focus more on the overriding external orientation [in terms of its fund-raising strategy geared towards foreign investment] and increased overseas development aid (ODA) to Africa [from the countries of the North]; yet other analyses combine various or all of these dimensions”.

Consistent with the accumulated body of African scholarship’s approach in engaging NEPAD, the discourse in Chapter 3 is disaggregated into three perspectives, namely comparative-analytic, historic-process and philosophical-cum-theoretical perspectives. These perspectives are referred to in sub-section 1.6.6 above and explained in Chapter 3. In the context of the analytical framework based on these three perspectives, a conclusion is made in Chapter 3 on what NEPAD is. Inevitably, Chapter 3 is expansive as the intention is to be as exhaustive as possible in studying the literature on NEPAD. This should not be misconstrued as inordinate. For, this chapter is concerned with the context of the object of this study. It is from this context that propositions that relate to the thesis of the study evolve.
The importance of being as detailed as possible in discussing NEPAD as the object of the study in Chapter 3 cannot be over-emphasised.

Having clarified NEPAD as the context of the object of this study in Chapter 3, attention is paid, in Chapter 4, to good governance as a concept. This concept did not originate in NEPAD. In Chapter 4 the concept good governance is considered from a broader perspective to provide a background for its contextual analysis in Chapter 7, which attempts to determine its meaning in NEPAD. Chapter 4 focuses on the evolution of good governance in the contemporary development discourse. In this chapter the conceptual problématique character of good governance, as referred to in Chapter 1, is determined. The philosophical antecedents of the concept are also considered as part of the discourse on good governance in Chapter 4. In this chapter the proposition is that the concept good governance, like that of governance, is as old as human civilisation. It is traced from the earliest foundations of political theory in ancient Greece.

It is pointed out in sub-section 1.1 above that good governance, as the object of this study, is examined in the context of NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective. A detailed discussion on what this study mean by a ‘Public Administration perspective’ is provided in Chapter 5. In this chapter the epistemological foundations of Public Administration are considered to explain the perspective of the study. Similar to Chapter 3 the attempt in Chapter 5 is to be as exhaustive as possible in the analysis of the literature that relates to the various epistemological trends that characterised the evolution of Public Administration. This is important for comprehensive enunciation of the perspective from which this study considers good governance in the context of NEPAD. It gives the study a disciplinary focus and grounding. It is therefore inevitable that the chapter is as detailed as presented in this study.

As pointed out above, it is observed in Chapter 2 that scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited. This necessitates the consideration of other sources of insights to find out how good governance in the context of NEPAD beyond Public Administration is conceptualised, theorised and philosophised. A review in Chapter 6 attends to this and determines how good governance in the context of NEPAD is used and understood by other users in other sources that include scholarly literature [books, chapters in books, articles in scientific journals and
papers presented at scholarly gatherings], official documents, and other texts such as speeches, newspaper reports, magazine articles and internet blogs.

It is determined in Chapter 6 whether insights from other literature could be used to enrich Public Administration scholarship in the conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. The conceptual, theoretical and philosophical insights acquired through a critical review of scholarly literature and an understanding of how the concept is used by other users as reflected in other sources are used to develop an epistemological framework in Chapter 7, which is used to determine the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration; thus answering the question that the study asks in sub-section 1.2 above. It is in Chapter 7 where the thesis of the study is formulated and propagated as a contribution to the body of knowledge. In Chapter 8 the discourse of the study is summarised and the conclusion is made.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF EXISTING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SCHOLARSHIP ON GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Introduction

Based on the preliminary reading of the literature in Chapter 1 of the thesis it is hypothesised that scholarship endeavours to examine good governance in the context of NEPAD and determine its meaning for Public Administration are limited. This is validated in this chapter through a comprehensive review of Public Administration scholarship to determine how it engages good governance in the context of NEPAD. Such review is important to contextualise the research question of the study. It entails critical analysis of the writings of Public Administration scholars, with specific focus on their theorisation and conceptualisation of good governance to determine whether their intellectual efforts are located, and aim to untangle the concept, within the context of NEPAD. The objective of this chapter is to authenticate the observation made in Chapter 1 of the thesis that scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited.

At the outset contextual aspects for consideration in the review of the existing Public Administration scholarship on good governance in NEPAD are explained. This is followed by the attempt to construct the epistemological framework used in this chapter to systematise and contextualise the review process. Using the epistemological framework as constructed, books, chapters in books, papers presented at scholarly gatherings and articles published in scholarly journals are reviewed as the body of Public Administration scholarship to determine how good governance is engaged in the field; and whether such engagements are contextual to NEPAD. The results of the review are reflected upon and, towards the end, conclusions are made, which validate the contention based on the preliminary reading of literature in Chapter 1 of the thesis that scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited.
2.2 Contextual aspects of the review for consideration

For the purpose of this chapter, scholarship comprises books, chapters in books, articles in scientific journals, and academic or scholarly conferences, symposia, workshop outputs and occasional papers in the field of Public Administration that deal with NEPAD. The meaning of scholarship is provided in Chapter 1 of the thesis; wherein it is also pointed out that NEPAD, as the context for engaging with the concept good governance, is a relatively new development initiative on the African continent. Much of scholarly contributions on this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development emerged mainly from the end of 2001. On this basis 2001 is used in this chapter as a terminus a quo in the review of Public Administration scholarship.

To cover as many perspectives on good governance as possible for the purpose of scholarship review in this chapter, 2010 is chosen as a terminus ad quem. The scope of scholarship review in this chapter is limited to Public Administration scholarly outputs that emerged during the period 2001-2010. A reference to the literature that falls outside the periods mentioned above in the discourse is made for explanatory and reflective rather than review purposes. These contextual aspects are clearly explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis. Their restatement here is for emphatic and, more importantly, contextual reasons.

A search for scholarship outputs through the various methodological means as explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis yielded a substantial amount of literature in the field of Public Administration with some books, journals articles and conferences, symposia and workshop paper titles bearing either the concept governance or good governance. These concepts are inextricably intertwined; hence often used interchangeably in various disciplinary discourses. A reference to governance in the conceptual analysis of good governance is, for reasons of epistemic logic and scholarship rigour, an inevitable necessity. However, these concepts are not the same. A conceptual analysis of governance and good governance in terms of their distinction and relatedness is provided in Chapter 4 of the thesis. For the purpose of this chapter it suffices to only point out that governance and good governance were used as key
concepts in the search for relevant literature necessary for Public Administration scholarship review.

2.3 **Epistemological framework for the review of Public Administration scholarship on good governance**

For a scientific object to be considered as *good* in human sciences it must be subjected to rigorous *reason* with reference to *purpose* (Kant 2000: 50-52). However, such *reason* is often inevitably influenced by the ideological idiosyncrasies of its epistemological antecedents or foundations. For, as Babbie and Mouton (2006: 543) put it, ideology and science are linked. In this Nkrumah (1970: 56) explains that in the science of knowledge ideology, philosophy and theory constitute a continuum in the logic of knowledge. A crude distinction often made among them undermines their epistemological nexus. This aspect is attended to extensively in Chapter 3 of the thesis where the philosophical and theoretical antecedents of NEPAD are determined.

Going back to the notion of a reason Kant (2000: 51) argues that a *reason* must have a concept of what sort of a thing the object ought to be. The object of scientific inquiry in this study is *governance* with the prefix *good*, which complicates rather its relative simplicity in terms of its meaning. For, the question of what constitutes *good governance* depends on the ideological propensity of the discourse. Scholarship discourses on *good governance* in the existing body of knowledge in the field of Public Administration abound. Their considerations of *good governance* are, however, diverse and interspersed by different ideological antecedents of their conceptions. To be able to handle the intellectual variations in the conception of the concept with relative ease, it is important that the epistemological framework is constructed and used to review the existing body of Public Administration scholarship in a systematic manner to determine how, and whether, it engages *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

Based on the extensive study of Public Administration scholarship, the results of which are presented and reflected upon towards the end of this chapter, the intellectual trend or pattern in theorising and conceptualising *good governance* as *conceptus ratiocinatus* could be disaggregated into three epistemological strands embedded in different ideological antecedents of its conception juxtaposed as *procedural democratic strand, substantive*
democratic strand and eclectic strand. These epistemological strands are, for the purpose of this discourse, used as the framework for the review of the body of Public Administration scholarship to realise the objective of this chapter as pointed out in its introductory part.

The concept epistemological strand is used in this chapter to refer to certain elements in the discourse on good governance in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship that suggest a particular paradigmatic disposition in the “changing forms of knowledge that arise from new conceptualisations of the world” (Blackburn 2005: 118-119). In different epistemological strands certain dimensions of the discourse are embodied, in which it is important to determine in a uniquely and sufficient way each element of a system of knowledge in the engagement with good governance. As part of the epistemological construct for the review of the existing body of Public Administration scholarship, the concept dimension is used in this chapter to refer to those aspects that determine the parameters of the discourse or the extent to which the discourse in the different epistemological strands engage good governance in the determination of its meaning.

2.3.1 Procedural democratic strand

The procedural democratic strand is embedded in the theoretical and philosophical antecedents of neo-liberalism, which are considered comprehensively in Chapter 4 of the thesis that deals with the evolution of good governance as a concept in the development discourse. The notion of neo-liberalism is about the “belief in the moral necessity of market forces in the economy and entrepreneurs as a good and necessary social group” (Adesina 2001: 06). Thorsen and Lie (no date) observe that during the past twenty years the concept of neo-liberalism dominated the political and academic discourses with some perspectives even suggesting that it is a dominant ideology shaping the world today. Saad-Filho (2005: 01) declared that “we live in the age of neo-liberalism”. As a political philosophy neo-liberalism is embedded in neo-classical economics. Its definitions are many and varied, with most of them describing it pejoratively as global capitalism aimed at destroying the welfare state. It is about “the falling away of the welfare functions of public enterprises and utilities” (Adesina 2001: 07).
In neo-liberalism the private sector plays a central role in that the larger part of the control of the economy is located within its purview whereas the state is assigned the responsibility of maintaining political stability. The rationale behind this arrangement is based on the misconception that curtailing the role of the state in the economy and restricting it to the political dimension of governance would necessarily give rise to efficient government. This is in contrast with the notion of developmentalism, which, as explained below, emphasises state intervention in the economy to provide direction in the pursuit of the ideal of a developmental state. Each of these ideological paradigms appropriate meanings that befit their theoretical and philosophical antecedents to good governance.

In the context of procedural democratic strand the parameter or the dimension of the discourse in determining the meaning of good governance is confined to the philosophy of neo-liberalism. Its conception is limited to the formal aspects of democritisation, which are largely concerned with the political dimension of the concept. Olowu (2003: 04) calls this approach in studying the meaning of good governance a process perspective. The definitional focus is on the procedural aspects of liberal democracy and emphasises, as key variables in the conception of good governance, “the need for a rule-based, open, transparent, efficient, accountable precepts of formal democracy” and “representative forms of government with periodic elections based on universal suffrage and other related aspects of what is normally understood to be representative democracy, underpinned by constitutionally and legally entrenched protection of universal human rights and freedoms” (Mhone & Edigheji 2003: 03).

The conception of good governance within the procedural democratic strand is “based on the model of a liberal-democratic polity, which protects human and civil rights, combined with a competent, non-corrupt and accountable public administration” (Leftwich 1993: 605). Gordon (2004: 79) explains that this “model is resolute; capitalist economy and elite (oligarchical) democracy. Its normative telos writ large in the conception of good governance in the procedural democratic strand context, which is more focussed on the intrinsic value of the concept. The meaning of good governance in the procedural democratic strand is articulated with terms expressive of requirements or standards of normativity. It is embedded in the normative theory (Blackburn 2005: 255), which, in the context of public administration, is concerned with “a belief or policy based on group norms or value objectives” that indicate what the government ought to do (Fox & Meyer 1996: 86).
In the procedural democratic strand the conception of good governance is based on the extent to which processes and systems of government adhere to the prescribed neo-liberal principles without emphasising their transcendence effects or outcomes. The neo-liberal normative elements of the concept are used to determine its meaning. Metz (2001: 143) observes that “meaning theorists typically think of meaning as itself an intrinsic value”. In this school of thought the conception of good governance is confined to its means rather than its ends. The focus is largely on the political and economic aspects of liberal democracy.

2.3.2 Substantive democratic strand

In contrast with the procedural democratic strand as a paradigm of conceptualism, the substantive democratic strand contends that a concept that bears a character of epistemic relativism as good governance should be subjected to rigorous reason with reference to purpose in determining its meaning. It ought to be ens rationis emphasising its ends. For, the connotation of what is considered good in governance is embedded in the ends rather than the means. The substantive democratic dimension of the discourse on good governance is embedded in the doctrine of teleology. This means that the meaning of good governance within the substantive democratic strand is based on the teleological conceptualisations, which emphasises its ends rather than its means.

The teleological approach in the study of meaning of concepts refers to a doctrine that explains phenomena by reference to their goals or purposes. It does not capture the normative dimension of concepts in their conceptions. Its focus is on the transcendence effects or outcomes, which emphasise the importance of the extrinsic value of concepts in the determination of their meanings. In the theory of meanings transcendence effect is about determining the meaning of concepts on the basis of their “relationship with objects in the world” (Metz 2001: 143).

The epistemological disposition of good governance in the context of substantive democratic strand emphasises the extrinsic value in the conception of the meaning of the concept. Good governance is conceived of “as …a function of connection with something external” (Metz 2001: 137-153; see also Gordon 2004: 71-73). The substantive democratic strand is based on the notion of developmentalism, which, as referred to above, emphasises “the need to attain
sustainable human development in the long-terms” (Mhone & Edigheji 2003: 03). The element of *sustainable human development* in the conception of *good governance* exemplifies the *extrinsic value* that ought to be the *ends* that constitutes the essence of its meaning.

In the *substantive democratic strand* the focus in the conception of *good governance* is on the substantive aspects of democracy, not normative values, processes or systems as in the case of the *procedural democratic strand*. The emphasis is on the socio-economic aspects of democracy, which are more concerned with the outcomes of the activities of government. In this conceptual paradigm *good governance* is defined in terms of the impact of public sector or government outputs on society (outcome) or *transcendence effect*, which refers to the *ends* or the *extrinsic value* of the concept. This approach in the study of the meaning of *good governance* could be associated with Dalton and Dalton’s (1988: 25) concept of *social effectiveness*.

Using Pauw, Woods, van der Linde, Fourie & Visser’s (2002: 25) words, *social effectiveness* could be defined as being concerned with “measurable positive change in the well-being of the clients [citizens] of the administrative process or official activities”. This is about the *transcendence effect*. Scholars whose writings subscribe to the *substantive democratic strand* propagate that it ought to be the conceptual focus in conceptualising *good governance*. In this paradigm of conceptualism *good governance* is defined on the basis of the extent the welfare of the citizens is enhanced by government action, not compliance with the prescribed normative values (Maserumule 2006: 434-438).

### 2.3.3 Eclectic strand

An *eclectic strand* is largely a synthesis of *procedural democratic strand* and a *substantive democratic strand*. The concept *eclectic* is derived from the Greek word *eklegein*, literally meaning to choose or select. In philosophy eclectic position, as Blackburn (2005: 109) explains, “is one that seeks to combine the best elements of other views”. This epistemological approach in the science of knowledge is called eclecticism. As used in this study as an epistemological context for the conception of *good governance*, scholars whose conceptions of the concept gravitate towards the *eclectic strand* emphasise that both the
procedural and substantive aspects of democracy are important in conceptualising *good governance*. They propagate a holistic approach in the study of scientific concepts.

On the one hand, the eclectic approach jettisons the *procedural democratic strand* proposition that construes the meaning of *good governance* as matter of promoting *intrinsic value* without any consideration of aspects that pertain to its *transcendence effect*. On the other hand, it jettisons the *substantive democratic strand* of confining conceptualisations of the concept only to its *extrinsic value* emphasising *transcendence effect* without reference to the normative dimensions of the concept. The *eclectic* approach contends that the meaningfulness of concepts, especially those whose meanings are as relative as *good governance*, depends on the synthesis between their *intrinsic* and *extrinsic values*.

Metz (2001: 143) writes that “to promote *intrinsic value* is to have *extrinsic value*”. The strand of convergence between the *intrinsic value* and *extrinsic value* in determining the meaning of *good governance* in the context of *eclectic strand* is a *transcendence effect*. The *eclectic strand* emphasises that *good governance* is a multi-dimensional concept. Its understanding cannot therefore just simply be limited to a particular *epistemological strand*. Both the *intrinsic* and *extrinsic values* of *good governance* are important dimensions of the discourse in conceptualising its meaning. The basis for the conception of *good governance* within the *eclectic strand* context comprises the procedural democratic or process dimension, substantive democratic dimension, ethical dimension, *societal-state nexus* dimension, *state-market nexus* dimension and the market imperative dimension.

In eclecticism a reasoning to untangle the connotation of *good* as prefixed to *governance* is based both on the *means* and *ends* of the concept. These conceptual variables are key to understanding the meaning of *good governance* within the *eclectic strand* context. This approach to understanding the meaning of concepts is based on Bowell and Kemp’s concept of *means-end* reasoning in the book *Critical Thinking – A Concise Guide*. The *means-end* reasoning is about “arguments that specify an *outcome* as being either *desirable* or *undesirable*, along with an *action* said to be either necessary or sufficient for bringing about that *outcome*” (Bowell & Kemp 2005: 215). It differs with that of *means* reasoning in *procedural democratic strand* and *end* reasoning in *substantive democratic strand*. The *means* reasoning is only concerned with an *action* said to be either necessary or sufficient for
bringing about a particular outcome whereas end reasoning is focussed on the outcome (see also Wessels 2005: 125-141).

The eclectic approach in the study of concepts propagates that both the means and ends are important in the conception of the meaning of good governance. It could be associated with Mushni and Abraham’s (2004: 10) heterogeneity thesis, which postulates that in dealing with scientific phenomena the different perspectives in the existing body of knowledge ought to be taken into consideration to enhance the epistemological validity of the discourse. The converse of heterogeneity thesis is homogenisation thesis, which propounds that an attempt to understand scientific phenomena should be pursued through “an examination of an influential trend in current thought” (Mushni & Abraham 2004: 10). The homogenisation thesis in conceptualising good governance is associated with the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of neo-liberalism.

2.3.4 Dimensions of eclecticism

The procedural democratic and substantive democratic dimensions of eclecticism in the conception of good governance are respectively key conceptual elements that underpin the different epistemological strands as explained in sub-sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 above. The ethical, societal-state nexus, state-market nexus and the market imperative dimensions comprise other important elements generally implicated in either procedural democratic strand or substantive democratic strand, which are, however, enunciated here specifically for comprehensiveness and emphatic reasons.

The ethical dimension of the discourse on good governance uses elements of moral theory to determine its meaning. But, what is moral theory? Van Hooft (2006: 02) defines moral theory as the study of the rights and wrongs of human actions and behaviours. It is concerned with morality, which refers to a set of generally acceptable conventions created from time immemorial used in the contemporary world to structure social lives and regulate human relationships (Van Hooft 2006: 02). Good governance from the moral perspective is defined on the basis of the virtue of ethics. It emphasises compliance of human actions and behaviours in government with certain prescribed moral norms as key determinants of its meaning.
The conception of *good governance* from the perspective of ethical dimension is implicated in the neo-liberal discourse on the concept and is more focussed on the *means* of its meaning. It gravitates towards the *procedural democratic strand*. This differs with the *societal-state nexus* dimension of eclecticism, whose conception of *good governance* centres on the notion of civil society. The *societal-state nexus* dimension emphasises the importance of state-society relations in achieving sustainable development and is implicated in the *substantive democratic strand* notion of *developmentalism* (Mhone & Edigheji 2003b: 03).

The participation of citizens in the development processes and the impact of such in enhancing the quality of life of the citizens are considered critically important variables in the conception of *good governance*. Analogous to *societal-state nexus* is the notion of *state-market nexus* dimension. The *state-market nexus* dimension is concerned with the role of the private or business sector in the social realm of the business of government and its relations with the state in the pursuit of a developmental state agenda. In the context of *societal-state-market nexuses* the dimension of the discourse in untangling the meaning of *good governance* is based on the state ability and capacity to forge strategic partnerships with the civil society and private or business sectors based on a shared vision of promoting the welfare of the citizens (Olowu 2003: 04; Hakim 2003: 313-314; Okot-Uma 2003: 283; Godbole 2003: 168; Hassen 2003: 117).

Based on the philosophy of market fundamentalism, the market imperative dimension of eclecticism in the conception of *good governance* could be associated with the *liberal democratic strand*. It is at the core of neo-liberalism as a political philosophy and emphasises free market notions in conceptualising *good governance*. Adesina (2001: 07-08) explains that “the aspiration to extend the market logic to every arena of social and economic relations (realised or not) manifests itself in attempts at inserting the commercial principles into the heart of the traditional terrains of social policy”; where every aspect of service delivery is defined “as a business concern, driven by business logic: from municipal services to the running of health and educational institutions”. This means that in neo-liberalism “the entrepreneur becomes the high priest in the world driven by market logic”. (Adesina 2001: 08).
With the emergence of the New Public Management (NPM) approach, which, according to Auriacombe (1999: 129) “swept the entire Anglo-American world of public administration during the 1980s and 1990s” neo-liberal thinking assumed preponderance in the science and art of governance with importations of private sector templates used to engender the spirit of entrepreneurialism in the business of government. One of the fundamental factors that precipitated the evolution and fruition of NPM is ingrained in Ronald Reagan’s famous words that “government is not the solution to the problem; government is the problem”.

NPM was introduced as a solution to fix government as a problem. It replaced the traditional public administration which had been a dominant paradigm for much of the twentieth century (Schmidt 2008: 111). Minogue (2003: 14) explains that the NPM is embedded in neo-liberal philosophies and “is driven by the assumptions that large state bureaucracies are inherently defective and wasteful; and that the market is better equipped than the state to provide most goods and services”. Thurow (Downs & Larkey 1986: 23) casts doubts on the epistemic validity of the proposition that underpins the conception of NPM approach to public administration in the contention that “American government may be bureaucratic and inefficient, but American industry is just as bureaucratic and inefficient”. In spite of this, most countries around the world embraced the NPM approach. Its influence in the thinking on public administration became so profound and, for sometime, assumed the prominence of a dominant intellectual paradigm.

NPM sought to engender the administrative reforms through the virtuous of the 3Es, namely economy, efficiency and effectiveness, in the running of the business of government. In much of the Public Administration literature that subscribes to the NPM the virtuous of the 3Es underpins the conception of good governance and is embedded in the market imperative dimension of the concept (Bacon & Eltis 1976: 110-111; Heald 1983: 38-41; Pollit 1990: 58-59). Good governance in the market imperative dimension is defined in terms of fiscal stability. Such conception is premised on neo-liberal notions of reduction of government expenditure and the size of the public service. Economic thinking rather than thinking about public interests preponderates in the conception of the concept [good governance]. Eclecticism as a paradigm of conceptualism in this chapter propagates that the conception of good governance should be based on the synthesis of its conceptual dimensions as explained above.
The epistemological framework enunciated above is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. It is, as constructed for the purpose of this study, used in this chapter to review the body of existing Public Administration scholarship, which, for systematic reasons, is organised into books and chapters in books, papers presented at scholarly gatherings, and articles published in scholarly journals. These scholarship outputs are reviewed as such in separate sub-sections below to determine how and whether the concept of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is engaged in a manner that determines its meaning for Public Administration. The books reviewed in this chapter are catalogued and classified as Public Administration literature in most libraries.

**Figure 2.1: Illustration of epistemological framework for the review of Public Administration scholarship**

![Diagram](own-illustration)
2.4 Books and chapters in books

In the book *Governance in Southern Africa and beyond – experiences of institutional and public policy reform in developing countries* a myriad of governance issues are discoursed. This book was published in 2003 and comprises 15 chapters. It is edited by Olowu and Mukwena, prolific scholars in Public Administration in Africa. Because of its focus on governance in Southern Africa, the expectation is that the book would make a substantial contribution to the discourse on good governance in NEPAD. However, reference to NEPAD in the book is made in only two chapters, which are not situated within the context of the object of this study, namely good governance.

Landsberg (2003: 36) in Chapter 2 of the book makes reference to NEPAD only within the context that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) should be “restructured in line with priorities spelled out by the African Union (AU) and NEPAD”. Good governance is one of those priorities, but is not given specific and adequate consideration either as a principle or a concept (see Landsberg 2003: 21-44). This is in spite of the fact that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is hailed as an important strategic innovation in pursuit of good governance within the NEPAD framework, is mentioned in Landsberg’s (2003: 38) contribution in the book focussing on the institutional and governance dimensions of SADC.

In the contemporary development discourse, reference to APRM is naturally expected to deal with good governance, which, as a principle, is emphasised as a *sine qua non* for sustainable development in NEPAD. It is explained in Chapter 1 of the study that the APRM is a monitoring and evaluation programme of the AU intended to engender the culture of good governance in Africa. The omission of good governance in Landsberg’s (2003: 21-44) engagement with the institutional and governance dimensions of SADC constitutes a fundamental shortcoming in as far as the epistemological and ontological dispositions of the contribution to the body of knowledge is concerned. This is so in that, as explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis, good governance in NEPAD is a conceptual *problematique* that needs to be examined to determine the contextual meaning that can be used as a basis to understand its usage as a principle. For, as argued in Chapter 1 of the study, concepts as abstraction of
reality are intellectual antecedents of the principles that guide human relational existence and interactions.

In Chapter 4 of the book, which deals with the legitimacy of modern self-government using Namibia as a case study, Totemeyer’s (2003: 71) consideration of NEPAD is only in terms of how this development initiative may bring about a “higher degree of self-sufficiency and thus less dependence on foreign capital” by African countries. Same as in the case of Landsberg’s (2003: 21-44) Chapter 2 as referred to above, good governance in the context of NEPAD is not considered in Totemeyer’s (2003: 61-84) contribution to the discourse in Chapter 4 of the book. It is therefore not possible to determine, in the context of the epistemological framework enunciated in sub-section 2.3 above, Landsberg (2003: 21-44) and Totemeyer’s (2003: 61-84) intellectual propensities in their thinking on good governance in the context of NEPAD.

Going back to Chapter 1 of the book Olowu (2003: 03-19) describes “governance changes in Southern Africa”; analyses “five key governance issues”; and highlights “the institutional implications of changes taking place in the region”. Compared with other chapters in the book, which are purely empirical in their approach in discoursing the issue of governance in Southern Africa and beyond, with the exception of Hakim’s (2003: 305-322) Chapter 14, the first part of Olowu’s (2003: 04) chapter succinctly considers good governance, which is the object of this study, from a conceptual perspective. It attempts to clarify its meaning as a concept rather than a principle. Olowu (2003: 04) provides a conceptual context within which good governance could be understood by first reflecting on two definitional perspectives on governance. For, as pointed out in sub-section 2.2 above, governance and good governance are inextricably intertwined such that often the discourse on one inevitably leads to the consideration of the other.

Firstly, governance as conceived by the international financial institutions and most United Nations Organisations is defined as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social development” (World Bank 1994 in Olowu 2003: 04). Secondly, governance is defined as being about “the sharing of authority for public management between state and non-state organisations” (Olowu 2003: 04). In this conceptual perspective on governance, Olowu (2003: 04) states that “whether governance is good or bad is judged not only by the outcomes but also by processes: the use of state and non-state
institutional resources to solve social problems”. The implication in this perspective is that both the means and ends of the concept good governance are fundamentally important in determining its meaning.

The conception of good governance from a process perspective is based on the normative values of the “rule of law, accountability, participation, transparency and the enjoyment of human and civil rights” (Olowu 2003: 04). In the epistemological framework used in this chapter as analytical construct, the foregoing are formal aspects of liberal democracy subsumed as part of the procedural democratic strand. The institutional “outcomes” and the notion of “state-society relations” as implicated in Oluwu’s (2003: 04) explanation of the concept are respectively concerned with the substantive aspects of democracy and the societal dimension of good governance.

Coupled with the formal aspects of liberal democracy, the substantive aspects of democracy and societal dimension of the concept are emphasised in Olowu (2003: 04-05) as key variables that are equally important in the conception of good governance. This perspective is synthetic in conceptualising good governance and therefore gravitates towards the eclectic strand. However, Olowu’s (2003: 04-05) conceptual engagement with good governance is not located within the NEPAD context. Neither is Hakim’s (2003: 305-322) conception of the concept in Chapter 14 of the book, which deals with good governance in the Arab World.

Hakim’s (2003: 313-314) contribution to the discourse on good governance is that this concept refers to a government “that lives up to its responsibilities by ensuring the promotion of the public welfare, the effective delivery of public goods and services, the maintenance of law and order, and the administration of justice”. Similar to that of Olowu (2003: 04-05), this definitional perspective is based on the substantive aspects of democracy and normative values of procedural democracy drawn mainly from the philosophical antecedents of liberal democracy. According to Hakim (2003: 314) good governance “transcends government to encompass an efficiently functioning market and a society that is responsible, engaged and empowered to take part in the formulation and implementation of decisions affecting them”. This perspective propagates that the state-market nexus and societal-state nexus dimensions of good governance are important aspects that undergird its conception. Hakim’s (2003: 313-314) approach embodies elements eclecticism in the conception of good governance.
The contributions as in other chapters of *Governance in Southern Africa and beyond-experiences of institutional and public policy reform in developing countries*, authored by different authors, are neither relevant to the object of this study nor the context of its consideration, which is NEPAD. They lack reflexive flair as their epistemological preoccupation is enmeshed purely in empirical discourse, which does not examine the thinking on *good governance*. The focus of their empirical analyses is on the institutions, policies and activities of the governments of South Africa (Fraser-Moleketi & Van Dyke Robertson 2003: 45-60), Namibia (Godana & Mukwena 2003: 85-110; Katjavivi 2003: 111-128; Ndjoze-Ojo 2003: 129-162; Kukuri 2003: 163-178; Shaetonhodi 2003: 179-226; Chirawu 2003: 227-248), and Anglo-Carribean (Gomes 2003: 283-304). Ogiogio’s (2003: 325-346) contribution on fundamental issues for effective intervention in building macro-economic capacity focusses on Africa as a whole.


In the foreword that contextualises the discourses on various public administration issues in the publication, McKinnon (2003: v), the Commonwealth Secretary-General, emphatically states that “efficient public services are essential for good governance”. Edited by Green who is an expert in the public administration of Commonwealth countries, of all the contributions made in the book, it is only Khobotlo (2003: 231-236) and Okot-Uma’s (2003: 287-294) disquisitions that specifically focus on *good governance* and consider its conceptual complexity, although, in the case of the former, in a succinct way.
Khobotlo (2003: 231) starts the discourse with an intellectually provoking statement that, in spite of it being the most acceptable way of doing business in the public service universally, “good governance is elusive for many countries”. Okot-Uma (2003: 283) observes that “some discretionary space left by the lack of a unique, well-defined scope for what good governance encompasses continues to exist”. This necessitates intellectual attempts to delve much into the conceptual aspects of good governance to develop a deeper and contextual understanding of its meaning. Khobotlo’s (2003: 231-236) disquisition falls short in this regard. It is therefore not that much significant in its contribution to the discourse on the meaning of good governance.

Okot-Uma (2003: 283) states that “whatever definitional format good governance may assume, there is general consensus on the procedural aspects of democracy that good governance should, among others, be participatory, transparent and accountable in characteristic”. The attempt to define good governance in Okot-Uma’s (2003: 283) contribution on the subject is more focussed on “the processes and structures that guide political and socio-economic relationships, with particular reference to the commitment to democratic values, norms and practices; trusted services; and to just and honest business” without reflecting on the outcomes intended to be realised by this arrangement. It is largely concerned with the means rather than also focussing on the ends of the concept. In providing an explanation in this regard, Okot-Uma (2003: 287) only states that good governance “has major implications for equity, poverty and quality of life”. These aspects are not specified as the ends in the conception of good governance, although the implicature may be suggestive of this.

Okot-Uma’s (2003: 287) conceptual insight into the meaning of good governance gravitates largely towards the procedural democratic strand. It is not located within the NEPAD context. With the exception of Khobotlo’s (2003: 231) contribution which also in its consideration of the conceptual aspects of good governance does not make any reference to NEPAD, the other contributions in the publication are based solely on “a set of principles and practices” and eschew theory (Green 2003: vii). This approach to the discourse does not embody scholarly reflexive analysis of good governance as a scientific concept in the body of Public Administration scholarship. It presupposes unanimity in the meaning of the concept. This approach to the discourse exemplifies Mushni and Abraham’s (2004: 10) homogenisation thesis associated with the procedural democratic strand. Most of the
contributions in the book mimic the international financial institutions and the United Nations Organisation’s conception of the concept introduced to prescribe a particular development trajectory to the developing countries (Hassen 2003: 117). Maserumule (2005a: 194-211) explains that the foregoing typifies the hegemonic influence of Eurocentricism on current thought on good governance in the development discourse.

In Public accountability and transparency – the imperatives of good governance, Godbole (2003: 168) enunciates that “good governance covers more than mere administrative reforms”, which, as is clear in the body of literature cited in this chapter, are associated with the concept [good governance](see Kapur 2005: 119; Abraham 2004: 155-170; Wollmann 2004: 171-192; Mathur 2004: 214-231; Agnihotri & Dar 2004: 232-252). In this book the concepts public accountability and transparency are examined as critical prerequisites of good governance. It is ostensibly for this reason that Godbole’s (2003: 168) contention on the meaning of good governance is that it “has much to do with ethical grounding and firm adherence to certain moral values and principles; and it essentially looks at the government from the point of view of its acknowledged stakeholders, beneficiaries and customers”.

Godbole’s (2003: 168) conception of good governance embodies the ethical dimension of the concept, which is prescriptive of how government organisations or individuals within government organisations should conduct themselves in discharging their duties. Its emphasis is largely on the adherence to moral standards whereas other dimensions of good governance as explained in the eclectic strand are not considered. It does not specify the outcomes for such action. Godbole’s (2003: 168) perspective on the concept is based on means-reasoning associated with the procedural democratic strand. Its reference to “stakeholder, beneficiaries and customers” is not articulated within the context of the notion of state-society relations, a variable considered as one of the key dimensions in the conception of good governance within the eclectic strand. Godbole’s consideration of good governance in the book is not located within the NEPAD context.

In Better governance for development in the Middle East and North Africa, which, as pointed out in its acknowledgement page, is a publication of the World Bank based on the contributions of network of scholars and opinion makers in the Middle-East and North Africa, good governance is extensively considered. As published in 2003, the anticipation is that the book’s consideration of good governance would make reference to NEPAD,
particularly that part of its focus is North Africa. While in *Public accountability and transparency – the imperatives of good governance* as reviewed above the consideration of *good governance* focuses on public accountability and transparency, in *Better governance for development in the Middle East and North Africa* the focus is on the democratic imperatives of inclusiveness and accountability.

The organisation of the book is based on the democratic principles of inclusiveness and accountability. It is contended in the book that *good governance* is a value-laden concept; its meaning is inevitably subjective and contextual. Khobotlo (2003: 231) and Okot-Uma (2003: 283), as referred to above, emphasise this point in their disquisitions on the concept *good governance*. The same is stressed in Chapter 1 of the study in explicating *good governance* as a conceptual *problematique*. This scientific endeavour to determine the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration is motivated by the foregoing. The nebulous character of the concept is explained in the book (World Bank 2003: 31) as follows:

...putting “good” in front of “governance” invites a judgement about the quality of governance in a particular environment. Judgements are subjective by nature. Governance as the process of exercising authority can take various shapes across countries and over time. What one society considers to be “good” governance may be looked upon negatively by another. Or it may be judged critically by the same society at a later stage of its evolution.

From the Middle East and North Africa’s perspective, it is propounded in the book that “governance is good when the process of forming and implementing rules is inclusive and the makers and implementers of the rules are accountable to the people” (World Bank 2003: 26-27). This conception of *good governance* is focussed on the processes and the formal aspects of democratisation, with specific reference to inclusivity and accountability. The style of engagement with the concept in the book is similar to that of Okot-Uma (2003: 283) and Godbole (2003: 168), whose works are already reviewed above. The substantive aspects of democracy are not considered in the formulation of the definition of *good governance*. This suggests propensity towards a *procedural democratic strand*. The discourse on *good governance* in the book is not located within the context of NEPAD, not even a single
reference is made to it as the contemporary paradigm for the sustainable development of Africa.

In the *Strategic management support technologies in the public sector* Cloete (2003: 07-24) considers the concept *good governance* in Chapter 2 of the book, which deals with the changing perspectives on public management. As pointed out above, the concept *good governance* and *governance* are inextricably linked. In a discourse on *good governance* a reference to *governance* is, as pointed out in sub-section 2.2 above, an unavoidable epistemological necessity. Cloete (2003: 11-15) acknowledges this in untangling *good governance* in the book. The approach in this regard is similar to that of Oluwu (2003: 04) whose work is already reviewed above. They both start with a reflection on the concept *governance* to provide etymological context for consideration of *good governance*.

Cloete (2003: 11) starts with the factors that necessitated the emergence of the governance paradigm in Public Administration and contends that its evolution was a response to weaknesses in the liberal, free-market-based New Public Management (NPM) approach to Public Administration (Cloete 2003: 11). Minogue (2003: 07-08) explains that “good governance and the NPM are mutually supportive reforms”. The NPM “is a component of the broader strategy of good governance; and it is in good governance that we see the efficiency concerns of public management combine with the accountability concerns of governance”(Minogue 2003: 08).

The NPM approach came about as a result of a need to, following the *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (SAPs) of the international financial institutions of the 1980s, conceptualise an alternative epistemological paradigm to replace the traditional system of public administration (see Cloete 2003: 11-15), which originated in the nineteenth century and continued to be the subject of rigorous discourse in most Western countries until the last part of the twentieth century (Maserumule 2002: 95; Reader 1981: 75-93; Robbins 1990: 303-327; Wilson 1887: 197-222).

Hughes (1994: 24) writes that “the traditional model of public administration is the longest standing and most successful theory of management in the public sector”. A detailed discussion on the paradigm shifts in terms of the theoretical disposition of the discipline at various periods in the history of its evolution is provided in Chapter 5, which explains the
Public Administration perspective of the study in examining *good governance* in NEPAD. In this chapter the focus is only on how and whether the Public Administration scholarship engages the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

In the attempt to explain *good governance* Cloete (2003: 11-12) refers to the World Bank’s conception of the concept and makes an observation that “although the [World] Bank places a strong emphasis on the development of a free market economy, it sees the political elements of good governance as predictable, open, transparent policy-making processes, professional bureaucracy, an accountable executive, a strong participative civil society and a culture of acceptance of the rule of law”. Upon explaining the World Bank’s conception of *good governance* supposedly to acquire insight into the etymological context of the concept Cloete makes an important contribution to the governance discourse about its meaning.

*Good governance* is “prescriptively conceptualised” in Cloete (2003: 15) as the achievement by a democratic government of the most appropriate developmental policy objectives to develop its society in a sustainable way by mobilising, applying and coordinating all available resources in the public, private and voluntary sectors, domestically and internationally, in the most effective, efficient and democratic way”. A closer look at this definition reveals that there are two key aspects that underpin Cloete’s conception of *good governance*, namely *developmental policies* and *sustainability*. Seemingly in an attempt to obviate any possible ambiguities that these aspects may engender in the discourse, Cloete (2003: 15) explains *developmental policies* “as those types of policies which succeed in raising the quality of life of a society’s citizens” whereas *sustainability* is used in the definition as being about “the institutional and functional durability of public policy programmes”.

The World Bank’s *Governance*, which, as indicated above, Cloete (2003: 11-12) refers to, predates the NEPAD initiative. It was published in 1994. Its conception of *good governance* falls outside the scope of this chapter. The publication *Governance* is mentioned in the discourse of this chapter solely because Cloete referred to it in *Strategic management support technologies in the public sector* (2003), which is being reviewed as part of the scholarly Public Administration literature to determine how, or whether, the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is dealt with from the perspective of the discipline.
In spite of making reference to the World Bank’s conception of the concept, Cloete’s (2003: 15) definition of *good governance* does not replicate the [World] Bank perspective on its meaning. This is in contrast with other authors in whose writings on the World Bank’s conception of *good governance* is accepted uncritically without any intellectual effort to significantly engage it (Godbole 2003: 168; Okot-Uma 2003: 283). Cloete’s (2003: 11-12) scholarly contribution to the body of knowledge adds a fresh perspective in the *good governance* discourse, especially in so far as its meaning is concerned. It appears to be an attempt to complete, or perhaps correct, the World Bank’s conception of *good governance*, whose definition of the concept is limited to free-market principles and a myriad of democratic values without emphasising what ought to be the outcomes of institutional adherence to them. This means that the World Bank’s conception of *good governance* is more concerned with the *means* than emphasising the importance of the *ends*.

Cloete’s (2003: 15) conception of good governance is formulated in a manner that clearly specify the *outcomes* “of institutional and functional durability of public policy programmes”, which is about enhancing the quality of life of the citizens. This is the *end* which institutional policies, principles and government actions should always be aimed at achieving. In the *substantive democratic strand* it is postulated that any intellectual endeavour to define *good governance* should make reference to *purpose*, which is concerned with the *outcomes*. The *means* to the *end* in Cloete’s (2003: 15) conception of *good governance* is not based on a set of neo-liberal principles. This in contrast with the approach adopted in the writings of Olowu (2003: 04), Hakim (2003: 313-314), Okot-Uma (2003: 283) and Godbole (2003: 168) whose conceptions of *good governance* embody neo-liberal imperatives.

Cloete’s (2003: 15) definitional perspective is ingrained in the notion of *developmentalism*, which, as explained above, emphasises “the need to attain sustainable human development in the long-terms” (Mhone & Edigheji 2003b: 03). This is clear in the usage of *development policies* and *sustainability* as key aspects that constitute the essence of Cloete’s (2003: 15) definition of *good governance*. These aspects appertain to the parlance of the contemporary discourse on the development of Africa. Cloete’s (2003: 15) perspective on *good governance* is grounded in the mainstream Public Administration discourse and uses the foundational public administration value of promoting the welfare of the citizenry as the epistemological basis in the conception of the meaning of its meaning. The emphasis is largely on the *ends* of the concept, substantive aspects of democracy, *transcendence effects* or *outcomes*. 

64
In the epistemological framework constructed to review the body of Public Administration scholarship Coete’s (2003: 15) conception of *good governance* could be situated in the *substantive democratic strand*. With Cloete’s (2003: 15) usage of the concept *sustainability* in the conception of *good governance*, a sense of intellectual expectation that a significant contribution to the body of knowledge is to be made on its meaning within the context of NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective is generated.

The concept *sustainability* is a key nomenclature used in the contemporary development discourse in Africa and, as pointed out in Chapter 1 of the study, constitutes the essence of what NEPAD is in terms of its official definition in its founding document (NEPAD 2001: para 1). In this it is important to point out that, as shown in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the question about what NEPAD is is a subject of contestations in the existing body of scholarship. Cloete’s (2003: 15) contribution to the discourse on *good governance*, which appeared in 2003, a year after the publication of NEPAD, does not make any reference to this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s sustainable development. The discourse on *good governance* in the book is not located within the NEPAD context.

In the book *Governance in the New South Africa: the challenges of globalisation*, *good governance* is considered. This book was published in 2003 and its title sounds more relevant to the object of this study. Can this book fill the void in the writings of other scholars as referred to above, especially in so far as their shortcomings in contextualising their engagements with *good governance* within NEPAD? In Chapter 1 of the study it is pointed out that NEPAD was developed with the intention of strategically repositioning Africa to contend with the dynamics of globalisation (see Kudjoe 2002; NEPAD 2001: para. 59-67; Nkuhlu 2002).

Any publication that therefore deals with issues of globalisation in the contemporary development discourse on Africa is naturally expected to make reference to NEPAD. Edited by outstanding African scholars such as Guy Mhone and Osono Edigheji, the book comprises 10 chapters, which “address the overall challenges and tensions that confront South Africa in its quest for democratisation and good governance, and the promotion of equitable growth and development, in the context of domestic and external pressures to adhere to economic liberalism and the imperatives of globalisation” (2003b: 02).
In examining the implications of globalisations on governance in the book, South Africa is used as a case-study which, to a great extent, represents similar challenges in most developing countries brought about by the new world order constructed around the philosophy of market fundamentalism. A central nexus of engagements in the book is, in the context of global developments such as globalisation and economic liberalism, the governance challenge. Mhone and Edigheji (2003b: 01) state that “South Africa is confronted with the major challenges of attempting to promote democratisation, good governance and sustainable human development in the context of an increasingly integrated global order driven by market fundamentalism…” These challenges are, however, as Mhone and Edigheji (2003b: 02) explain, “… not unique to South Africa”; they are also applicable to many other developing countries.

In Chapter 1 of the book Mhone and Edigheji (2003b: 01-15) set the context for governance and globalisation discourse. Such context, which seeks to focus the discourse in other subsequent chapters, revolves essentially around the issue of good governance. Mhone and Edigheji’s (2003b: 03) conceptualisation of good governance is premised on three aspects: “first the need for a rule-based, open, transparent, efficient and accountable government; second, the need for the government to undertake its task in a manner that is participatory and consultative and that generally lives up to the democratic precepts of formal democracy; and third, the need for the government or the state to ensure that substantive aspects of democracy are achieved, which would be compatible with the need to attain sustainable human development in the long term”.

Mhone and Edigheji’s (2003b: 03-04) definitional perspective on good governance appears to be a synthesis of the meaning of the concept as propagated within the context of market fundamentalism and developmentalism. In the context of market fundamentalism the definition of good governance is grounded in the precepts of procedural democracy whereas in the case of developmentalism the conception of the concept is rooted in the imperatives of substantive democracy. Their conception of good governance could therefore be located within the eclectic strand.
In this introductory chapter Mhone and Edigheji’s (2003b: 03) discourse does not deal extensively with the contrasting perspectives grounded in different paradigms related to the meaning of good governance. Their definition of good governance is not related to NEPAD, although in contextualising the discourse of the book in its introductory chapter, reference to NEPAD is made. Their reference to NEPAD is only in the attempt to explain globalisation and its implications in the contemporary world rather than also engaging the concept good governance with a view to making a contribution to the body of knowledge about its meaning in the context of NEPAD (see Mhone & Edigheji 2003b: 05).

The definitional aspects of good governance, as Mhone and Edigheji (2003b: 03) propagate in Chapter 1 of the book, are further considered by Mhone in Chapter 2 of the same book. Mhone (2003b: 36), whose disquisition relied on Edigheji’s (2002) earlier contribution to the body of knowledge on the subject, states that good governance is characterised by the following, which are also considered as critical factors that consolidate democracy and development:

- the need for the state to be relatively autonomous from the interests of particular groups;
- the need for strong civil society, which is able to articulate and promote the interests of the members of their respective groups;
- the need for devolution of power through decentralisation to facilitate a greater responsiveness to local needs;
- the need for embeddedness, whereby there are formal and institutionalised ways in which the interests of various groups are synergised within the state;
- the need for institutionalised procedures and processes for accountability;
- the need for a strong and adaptable bureaucracy that is able to accomplish its administrative, management, implementation and monitoring tasks efficiently and effectively; and
- the need for the primacy of law.

These aspects Mhone (2003b: 36) mentions as being critically important in understanding good governance embody the elements of both procedural and substantive democracy with emphasis on the societal dimension of the concept. This is consistent with the eclectic
conceptualisation of *good governance* Mhone and Edigheji (2003b: 03) proffered in Chapter 1 of the book to contextualise the discourse on the subject in other subsequent chapters. Mhone’s (2003b: 36) disquisition does not necessarily make a distinction at the conceptual level between *good governance* and *governance*. These concepts are used interchangeably in the discourse. But, *good governance* and *governance* are not synonyms and cannot therefore be used indiscriminately. In Chapter 4 of the study the distinction is made between these concepts.

Mhone (2003b: 36) makes a very important observation that the concept *good governance* “is generally utilised uncritically under the assumption” that it can just be “appendec to procedural and representative democracy to enhance the consolidation of democracy and to promote development”. The point that Mhone (2003b: 36) makes is that [good] governance is a relative concept, which is evolutionary; any attempt to define it should take into consideration the context of its conception. This point is emphasised in the writings of Khobotlo (2003: 231), Okot-Uma (2003: 283) and World Bank (2003: 31) as reviewed above.

Mhone’s (2003b: 19-68) consideration of *good governance* in the discourse on democratisation, economic liberalisation and the quest for sustainable development in South Africa does not make any reference to NEPAD, which is the context within which this study attempts to understand its meaning [good governance] for Public Administration. In Chapter 3 of the book, which Edigheji (2003: 72-73) authored, *good governance* is considered in the discourse that examines the notion of state-society relations in post-apartheid South Africa. The same as in Mhone’s (2003b: 36) disquisition, Edigheji’s (2003: 72-73) discourse does not make any conceptual distinction between *good governance* and *governance*. This is clear in the interchangeable manner in which these concepts are used presupposing their synonymy. In making reference to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Edigheji (2003: 72-73) states that:

*Governance is the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels. Governance comprises the complex mechanism, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their*
legal rights and obligations. Good governance has many attributes. It is participatory, transparent, and accountable. It is effective in making the best use of resources and is equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Governance includes state, but transcends it by taking in the private sector and civil society. All three are critical for sustaining human development. The state creates a conducive political and legal climate. The private sector generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction-mobilising groups to participate in economic, social and political activities.

The UNDP’s definitional perspective on [good] governance as presented above may, to the unwary, appear to be a shift from the ideological paradigm of market fundamentalism to developmentalism. However, a closer look at the definition suggests the contrary. It still advocates the notion of a minimalist state, which is about limiting the intervention of government in matters of socio-economic development to “that of night-watchman, providing a conducive climate for private agents to function” (Edigheji 2003: 73). This thinking is rooted in the philosophy of market fundamentalism, not developmentalism. The notion of developmentalism is concerned with the substantive aspects of democracy. It requires that the state should play an active interventionist role and provide direction in matters of socio-economic development.

Edigheji (2003: 73) did not substantially and critically analyse the UNDP’s definitional perspective on good governance, which is cited at great length in the discourse, except to state that “government, civil society and markets all have important roles in public governance-achieving social good and minimising social ills”. This is an important contribution to the discourse on good governance. The state-society-market relations underpinned by the imperative of co-operative governance are critically important variables in the conception of the concept within the context of developmentalism and are explained as dimensions of eclecticism in the epistemological framework.

The societal-state nexus dimension of good governance emphasises the importance of civil society in the processes of governance. The state-market nexus dimension is concerned with the role of the private or business sector in the social realm and its relations with the state in the pursuit of a developmental state agenda. In the context of state-society-market relations good governance is understood in terms of state ability and capacity to forge strategic
partnerships with the civil society and private or business sectors based on shared vision of promoting the welfare of the citizens (Olowu 2003: 04; Hakim 2003: 313-314; Okot-Uma 2003: 283; Godbole 2003: 168; Hassen 2003: 117).

Edigheji’s (2003: 69-113) conception of good governance gravitates towards eclecticism. It is not located within the context of NEPAD. Reference to NEPAD in the discourse is just to demonstrate the extent to which South Africa exerts influence in the global arena. It is only stated that “South Africa’s leading role in promoting the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the formation of the African Union (AU) as well as its recent meetings of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are indications of the country being a “leading advocate of change, building international coalitions for the reform of the global trading system and multilateral institutions” (Edigheji 2003: 88).

The cursory way that Edigheji (2003: 69-113) makes reference to NEPAD does not differ from Landsberg (2003: 36-38) and Totemeyer’s (2003: 71) succinct considerations, as referred to above, of this contemporary model for Africa’s sustainable development in their discourse. In Chapter 4 of the book Hassen (2003: 117) deals with good governance in a robustly analytical manner engaging the concept in the context of the discourse on a system of analysis for the reform of the public service. Hassen (2003: 117) reflects on two dominant paradigms with an immense influence on its [good governance] meaning: new managerialism and development restructuring.

The conception of good governance within the context of the new managerialism is ingrained in the philosophical antecedents of the “grand plan” of the international financial institutions formulated to prescribe a neo-liberal development trajectory for the developing countries, Africa in particular. Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1991: 15), senior staff members of the World Bank, whose intellectual outputs Hassen (2003: 117) referred to, enunciate that good governance is about “a minimum core of characteristics that are generally agreed upon”. Hassen (2003: 117) explains that the minimum core characteristics of good governance as referred to above are essentially about liberal democracy with free markets. In the epistemological framework the conception of good governance within the context of the new managerialism is rooted in the procedural democratic strand.
In the context of development restructuring Hassen (2003: 117) observes that good governance is conceptualised and defined in terms of societal-state nexus dimension and state-market nexus dimension. This approach to the discourse on good governance is dismissed in the contention that the “co-operative mode where state and non-state actors participate in a mix of networks conflates the ends and means of government; and also ignores the fact that the term is used by a range of actors to legitimise different political or social projects” (Hassen 2003: 117-120).

Hassen (2003: 120) analyses the paradigms of conceptualism in the conception of good governance. With contrasting epistemological strands at play as frame of reference in examining good governance, Hassen (2003: 120) cautions against constricting analytical methods of the concept within a particular intellectual confine. In this a particularly important proposition is that “analytical methods that have comparative value and lend themselves to practical concerns must be adopted” (Hassen 2003: 120). This analytical construct that Hassen (2003: 120) proposes sounds more analogous to the eclectic strand used in this chapter as part of the epistemological framework constructed to review the body of Public Administration scholarship on good governance. Hassen (2003: 120) does not propose any specific definition as the focus of the contribution is not on what good governance is but on how this concept could be analysed and understood. The contribution is not located within the NEPAD context.

From Chapter 5-9 in the book, good governance is dealt with parenthetically mainly as a principle rather than also as a concept and reference to it is not located within the NEPAD context. A detailed review of these chapters would not serve the purpose of realising the objective of this chapter as clearly explained in its introductory part (McLean 2003:146-181; Mc Lennan 2003:182-214; Mogale 2003: 215-242; Habib and Kotze 2003:246-270; Gasa 2003:272-312).

Bond and Guliwe’s (2003: 313-345) Chapter 10 makes reference to NEPAD, but not within the context of analysing the concept good governance with a view to determine its contextual meaning in this contemporary model for Africa’s sustainable development. Their chapter examines the South African civil society’s contestation of the government’s philosophical and practical approach to development. Bond and Guliwe’s (2003: 313, 319) reference to NEPAD is only in terms explaining it as “the most ambitious modern plan for Africa’s
further integration into the world economy” and the issues raised in it are relevant to those that the civil society emphasised during the critical policy advocacy ahead of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg in 2002. It does not deal specifically with good governance for one to make a determination on how the concept is engaged.

Chapter 11 is a summary of scholarly contributions made in the book, which, without an analysis of the concept good governance, emphasises its importance towards developmentalism and democratic governance in the context of globalisation. The discussion in this chapter does not make any reference to NEPAD (see Mhone & Edigheji 2003c: 348-360). So, the book Governance in the new South Africa: the challenges of globalisation, in spite of the appropriateness of its title to the subject of this study, falls-short of making contribution to the body of knowledge on the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration. Except a in few instances, notably Hassen’s (2003) contribution as reviewed above, much of the perspectives in the different chapters of the book are, in spite of the fact that the book is classified also as part of Public Administration literature, not located in the mainstream Public Administration discourse. The intellectual engagements with good governance in the book are largely concerned with issues of political economy in the development discourse.

In Good governance, democratic societies and globalisation the concept good governance is extensively considered in terms of “three contexts”, which form the basis of the compositional organisation of the book, namely societal, administrative reforms and corporate contexts. This book is a collection of 19 essays that discuss “good governance in democratic societies in the context of globalisation” from a broader and cross-cultural perspective beyond disciplinary confines (Munshi & Abraham 2004: 07). Compared with Governance in the new South Africa: the challenge of globalisation, as reviewed above, Good governance, democratic societies and globalisation sounds even more relevant to the scientific object that this study seeks to examine, namely good governance as a concept. The book was published in 2004, two years after the launch of NEPAD. But, is the manner in which the book deals with good governance contextual to NEPAD? How much contribution does it make in the contemporary body of knowledge towards the determination of the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration?
In Chapter 1 of the book Munshi and Abraham (2004: 09-25) provide a context for engagement with the issues of good governance, democratic societies and globalisation. Of critical importance to the object of this study is an attempt to rationalise the multi-disciplinary approach of the book in its consideration of good governance. Munshi and Abraham (2004: 10) contend that:

*Much of the discussion on good governance has been carried out in a segregated manner, maintaining disciplinary and other demarcations. This is the reason why chapters on issues of governance, administrative reforms and corporate governance have been put together. They have a bearing on each other. For good governance, administrative reforms provide a mechanism of governing, and it can well be argued that corporate governance, in spite of its specificity, suggests good governance at the level of corporation which in turn is dependent on good governance at the macro-level.*

In this quotation the point that is made is that an attempt to engage good governance ought to be pursued in a holistic manner. This approach to the study of good governance gravitates towards an epistemological strand of eclecticism and follows the logic of heterogeneity thesis. As explained above, heterogeneity thesis postulates that in studying scientific phenomena, especially those as nebulous and multi-dimensional as good governance, the different perspectives in the existing body of knowledge ought to be taken into consideration to enhance the epistemological validity of the discourse (Munshi & Abraham 2004: 10). Munshi and Abraham’s (2004: 09-26) heterogeneity thesis is an important contribution to the body of knowledge on how to untangle good governance whose meaning has always been determined through an examination of the World Bank(WB) and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) influential conception of the concept. It provides an alternative framework to the homogenisation thesis. As explained above, the homogenisation thesis refers to the attempt to understand scientific phenomena through “an examination of influential trend in current thought” (Munshi & Abraham 2004: 10).

As an analytical construct the homogenisation thesis is jettisoned on the basis that its fundamental limitation lies in the error of simplification and failure “to take note of the complexity of the concepts used in scientific discourse (Munshi & Abraham 2004: 20). In the epistemological framework developed above, the homogenisation thesis is associated with
the *procedural democratic strand* whose conception of *good governance* is embedded in neo-liberal philosophies and theories described in Leftwich (1993: 605) as the constituents of “broad historical convergence point of diverse developmental trajectories”. Munshi and Abraham’s (2004: 09-26) introductory chapter that sets the context for the discourse in the book does not make any reference to NEPAD.

As pointed out in the above exposition *good governance* in this book is engaged within the societal, administrative reform and corporate contexts. The discussions from Chapters 2 to 7 are subsumed as being concerned with the societal context of governance. In Chapter 2 of the book Munshi (2004: 33-53) deals with the concern for *good governance* from a comparative perspective. Such consideration of good governance is located in the Indian debate on government reform. Munshi (2004: 33) starts the chapter with the citations of the critics of the World Bank’s conception of *good governance* and introduces *good governance* as a conceptual *problematique* whose meaning is fraught with ideological contestations. Munshi (2004: 48) explains that “good governance, like good life, does not lend itself to a normatively neutral treatment”. This jettisons the perspectives associated with the *procedural democratic strand* that define *good governance* on the basis of the formal aspects of democratisation.

*Good governance* is a value-laden concept. Any attempt to untangle its meaning should go beyond an influential trend in current thought. While acknowledging that efficiency and adherence to the imperatives of democracy are important variables in the conception of *good governance*, Mushni (2004: 46-47) emphasises that the notion of public interest is key in the conception of the concept. In this Mushni (2004: 46-47) advocates *heterogeneity thesis* as the appropriate analytical construct from which *good governance* could be considered. This analytical construct is associated with the *eclectic* strand in the epistemological framework developed in this chapter to review the body of Public Administration scholarship on *good governance*.

In defining *good governance* Munshi (2004: 51-52) propagates that the concept “signifies a participative manner of governing that functions in a responsible, accountable and transparent manner based on the principles of efficiency, legitimacy and consensus for the purpose of promoting the rights of individual citizens and the public interest, thus indicating the exercise of political will for ensuring the material welfare of society and sustainable development with
social justice”. This definition gravitates towards Cloete’s (2003: 15) conception of good governance as considered above. It is not only about the prescription of certain normative values that ought to be adhered to in conducting the business of government. The transcendence effect with extrinsic value is also considered as a key dimension in the conception of good governance.

Munshi’s (2004: 51-52) definition also, more importantly, reflects on what ought to be the outcomes of adhering to such normative imperatives used as basis for the conception of good governance. This is clear in the usage of concepts such as “the material welfare of society”, “public interests” and “sustainable development” in the formulation of the definition of good governance. Mushni’s (2004: 51-52) conception of good governance emphasises the importance of both the means and ends of the concept. It is eclectic in its approach to untangle good governance. Perhaps another important contribution Munshi (2004: 51-52) makes to the discourse is the notion of social justice, which the neo-liberal thinking on the concept fails to capture in the conception of good governance. In Chapter 7 of the thesis social justice is extensively considered as an important factor in the contemporary scholarly discourse in search of the theory of Public Administration.

In Chapter 3 of the book that deals with the social, cultural, and linguistic affairs in the European Union, De Swaan (2004: 66) defines good governance as: “corporate or governmental administration that is not corrupt, technically competent, legally correct, efficient in its administration and oriented towards the interests of its citizens, customers or employees”. This definition is formulated in a manner that synthesises aspects of procedural and substantive democracy. It embodies elements of eclecticism. The conception that informs the formulation of the definition is more focused on the administration of government, rather than government in its totality. De Swaan’s (2004: 66) conception of good governance is made within the context of a discourse on the administration of the affairs of the European Union.

In Chapter 4 of the book Liberatore (2004: 70-109) reflects on the European debate about governance and democracy in a supranational context (European Union). This chapter appears to be a continuation of De Swaan’s Chapter 3 in that both are concerned with governance issues in the European Union context. Liberatore (2004: 75) notes that “good governance is a concept often used (e.g. by the World Bank) to indicate some integrity of
public action, as against corruption and fraud”. This is concerned with the ethical dimension of good governance.

Liberatore (2004: 75) does not offer a detailed and critical conceptual analysis of good governance. Citing the European Union White Paper on Governance and its Challenges upon which the discourse in Chapter 4 is based, Liberatore (2004: 74) states that good governance is based on the following principles: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence. These are the principles that most authors as referred to above incorporate in their formulation of the definition of good governance and are embedded in the procedural democratic strand of the epistemological framework.

Liberatore (2004: 84-85) associates good governance with sustainable development, and, in the context of the European Union, states that “programmes to promote good governance have been launched at various levels, from local to global or – more often – from global actors and institutions to national and local ones”. As argued above, the element of sustainable development in the conception of good governance exemplifies the extrinsic value of the concept that ought to be the ends that constitutes the essence of its meaning. Liberatore’s (2004: 84-85) consideration of good governance embodies the dimension of procedural democratic strand and substantive democratic strand. It is eclectic in its approach to the study of good governance. The first part of the definition is focussed on the means while the second part is on the ends of the concept.

In Chapter 5 of the book Martell (2004: 92-109) discusses the notion of Third Way in Europe, focusing on national differences in terms of its understanding and application in countries such as Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands and Sweden. The discourse in Chapter 5 does not make any reference to good governance (Martell 2004: 92-109). The only thing that Martell (2004: 97) mentions, which is related to Mushni’s (2004: 51-52) definition of good governance, is the imperative of social justice. Martell (2004: 97) argues that the Third Way involves social justice. The notion of social justice is associated with the substantive aspects of democracy, where the emphasis in the conception of good governance is on the outcomes of the socio-economic activities of government.
In Chapter 6 Sinha (2004: 110-132) looks at good governance, market friendly globalisation and the changing space of state from an Indian perspective. The disquisition starts by providing a context of the discourse which points out that the debate on the role of government in the economy is characterised by schism in terms of the degree of its involvement. Often when the issue of the role of government in the economy arises, the notion of good governance inevitably come up and assumes prominence in the discourse. The more “more specific questions of importance being raised”, in so far as the foregoing is concerned, are: what constitutes good governance in the context of economic development? What are the constraints in achieving good governance? (Sinha 2004: 110-112).

In the attempt to provide answers to these questions, Sinha (2004: 111) does not necessarily make a distinction between governance and good governance, but makes a very important point that “when one talks of good governance one really has an ideal in mind that is difficult to specify in great detail and accuracy”. Sinha (2004: 111) offers some conceptual insights into the meaning of good governance in that this concept should be understood in terms of “two distinct but interrelated aspects”, namely “the content of policies and strategies that define the priorities of action and the quality of the institutions of governance, the rules and processes through which policies are formed and implemented”.

In as far as the first aspect that relates to the content of policies and strategies that define the priorities of action is concerned, Sinha (2004: 111) cites the following examples of what is meant: “macro-economic policies of the state, its programme to enable investments, and accumulation, and its approach to distributive justice”. The issues of public participation, voice of the governed, transparency and accountability are cited as examples that relate to the quality of the institutions of governance. Sinha (2004: 111) explains that the conception of good governance in terms of the aspects as mentioned above is about the search for “functional governance that can serve the purpose of promoting material development that is both equitable in some socially accepted sense and sustainable into some foreseeable future”. Consistent with the writings of most scholars on the subject (Cloete 2003: 15, Liberatore 2004: 84-87), Sinha (2004: 112) contends that good governance is linked to development.
Sinha’s (2004: 110-132) discourse is situated within the Indian context, but makes an important contribution to the body of knowledge on the meaning of good governance. In the context of such meaning as proposed, India’s economic and institutional reforms are analysed and the conclusion thereof is pessimistic. Sinha’s (2004: 127) conclusion is that “India, since political independence, has failed to transform its economy and society into a fully modern industrial one, despite having been able to hold onto political democracy”. A lack of good governance is advanced as a reason for the foregoing, which it is said “affects the poorest of 40 per cent of India’s population the worst” (Sinha 2004: 128).

An important point with conceptual implications that emerges from Sinha’s disquisition is that liberal democracy does not necessarily translate into good governance. This in a way jettisons the tendency in much of the writings in the existing body of knowledge that define good governance in a manner that sounds almost synonymous to liberal democracy. Sinha (2004: 129) argues that good governance “must…ensure sustained development opportunities for the poor and deprived people of the world”. This is a very important contribution to the body of knowledge for consideration in examining good governance particularly within the context of developing countries.

Sinha’s (2004: 110-132) consideration of good governance follows the eclectic approach in determining the meaning of the concept. It clearly articulates the transcendence effect of the “two distinct but interrelated aspects” that, as stated above, are emphasised as being important in the conception of good governance. The transcendence effect is about the ends of the concept, which in the context of Sinha’s (2004: 129) proposition on the meaning of good governance, is “sustained development opportunities for the poor and deprived people of the world”.

Chapter 7 of the book as authored by Jha is not necessarily of much assistance in so far as its contribution to the meaning of good governance is concerned. Not even a single reference is specifically made to good governance in the discourse. Jha’s(2004: 133-148) contribution only analyses India’s constitutional and political system; and clearly demonstrates how the country degenerated into what in the book is termed predator state, which implies deviation from good governance. Sinha (2004: 127-128) arrived at the similar conclusion in the analysis of economic and institutional reforms in India.
Abraham (2004: 155-170) considers *good governance* in the discourse on a comparative analysis of administrative reforms between India and three European countries, namely United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands in Chapter 8 of the book. It is contended that the administrative reforms are key in ensuring good governance. In spite of this, Abraham (2004: 164) does not offer any conceptual insight into the meaning of *good governance* within the context of administrative reform. This is also the case in Chapter 9 of the book, which, as authored by Wollmann, also offers a comparative analysis of administrative reforms in different countries such as United Kingdom, New Zealand, Germany, Sweden, France and United States of America. Wollmann's (2004: 171-192) discourse, which seeks to determine whether there is convergence or divergence in terms of public sector reforms among the countries as referred to in the foregoing, does not, compared to Abraham (2004: 164), even make specific reference to *good governance*. This is the same in Chapters 10 and 11 of the book.

In Roeber’s (2004: 193-213) Chapter 10 in the book the administrative reform in Germany are considered from a local government perspective. Mathur (2004: 214-231) deals with the administrative reform in India in Chapter 11. It is observed in this chapter that the administrative reforms as influenced by the neo-liberal policies of multi-lateral organisations such as the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have “gradually broadened their scope by suggesting reforms in the overall framework of governance itself” (Mathur 2004: 214). This observation, which probably could have resulted in the consideration of *good governance* in the discourse of the chapter had it been pursued further, is not expatiated. It is only stated in the conclusion of Chapter 11 of the book that the administrative reform[s] “challenges the basic issues of governance”.

In Chapter 12 of the book Agnihotri and Dar (2004: 235) refer to *good governance* in a rather more perfunctory manner without any attempt to specifically examine its meaning. Their contribution seems to be based on the false assumption about the existence of unanimity on its meaning. Similar to Mathur (2004: 214-231) in Chapter 11 of the book, Agnihotri and Dar’s Chapter 12 deal with governance reforms in India. In Chapter 13 Rajan (2004: 253-269) analyses the role of non-government organisations (NGOs) as partners in the process of reform in India. In spite of the fact that Rajan (2004: 258-259) made reference to the issue of governance in the discourse of the chapter, the discussion does not come out clear on the concept of *good governance*. 
The perspectives on governance in Chapters 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 respectively authored by Reed (2004: 276-301), Seth (2004: 302-324), Vincentis (2004: 324-342), Schmidt (2004: 343-359), Abell and Reyniers (2004: 360-382) and Bhattacharyya (2004: 383-403) are grounded in the theories and philosophies of economics and business administration. Their engagement with governance issues is pursued from the corporate sector perspective and are therefore not within the context of the purpose of this chapter, which, as explained above, attempts to review the existing body of public administration scholarship to determine its treatment of the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

A detailed review of the book as presented in the above exposition is more focussed on chapters whose discourses are embedded within, or related to, the field of Public Administration. The findings in terms of how the different authors deal with the concept *good governance* in their respective chapters are expressed above. In some instances, as pointed out above, important contributions are made in terms of how the concept *good governance* could be understood (Munshi 2004: 51-55; De Swaan 2004: 66 & Sinha 2004: 111). The focus of the different chapters in the book is on India and Europe. The United States of America is to some extent considered for comparative-analytical purposes. The discourses in the book on *good governance* are not contextual to NEPAD. In the entire book not even a single reference is made to NEPAD. This is perhaps because of the fact that the contextual setting and focus of the book is not Africa.

Out of 25 chapters that comprise the book, only 2 deal specifically with good governance. In Chapter 14 of the book Pardhasarandhi, Raju and Venkatamallu (2004: 301) observe that the “concept of good governance has suddenly entered the vocabulary of public administration since the 1990s”. With this kind of a context in introducing good governance as a subject of discourse the expectation is that its meaning in the context of public administration would be determined. The discourse fails to meet such expectation. It is only stated that “good governance is not simply something that government can achieve or do by itself; it depends upon co-operation and involvement of large number of citizens or organisations” (Pardhasarandhi, Raju & Venkatamallu 2004: 301). This perspective is consistent with the societal-state nexus dimension of good governance, which, as explained in the epistemological framework above, emphasises the imperative of state-society relations in achieving sustainable development. The societal-state nexus dimension is implicated in the substantive democratic strand notion of developmentalism.

Compared with Pardhasarandhi, Raju and Venkatamallu’s (2004: 301) Chapter 14, which, although, as indicated above, made reference to good governance, deals with the Public Administration and ICT paradigm, Arora’s (2004: 313-321) Chapter 15 and Satyanarayana’s (2004: 322-340) Chapter 16 are the 2 chapters that specifically focus on good governance. In Chapter 15 of the book that deals with good governance at the grass-root level, Arora (2004: 313-321) makes a very important contribution to the meaning of good governance. Simply and succinctly put, Arora (2004: 313) states that “good governance generally means looking after the welfare of all in all respects”. The focus here is on the ends of the concept. Arora’s (2004: 313) perspective on the meaning of good governance is couched in the parlance of the epistemological doctrine of teleology and is embedded in the substantive democratic strand of the concept.

In Chapter 16 of the book that deals with good governance for sustainable development Satyanarayana (2004: 323-325) attempts to examine good governance by making reference to the World Bank’s conception of the concept, which, as argued elsewhere in this study, is embedded in neo-liberalism. In the further attempt to determine the meaning of good governance, Satyanarayana (2004: 324) provides the results of the studies, published in the
Indian Journal of Public Administration (IJPA) on the meaning of the concept. In this Satyanarayana (2004: 324) observes that “the World Bank’s conception of good governance entails reforms in four areas:

First, an economic role of the state which includes budget restraints, reducing bureaucracy and accent on results, both in planning and in evaluation of programmes and people, investment in basic social services and infrastructure, protecting the vulnerable, protecting the environment, service to the public, with a special concern for quality and citizens as clients.

Second, a set of specific policies or policy reforms viz: fiscal consolidation, reduction and redirection of public expenditures, reform and reduction of taxes, maintenance of competitive exchange rates, financial, trade and investment liberalisation, overall deregulation, and privatisation of state enterprises.

Third, the non-economic aspects of government, which include electoral democracy, transparency, accountability, participation, responsiveness in the processes of government, the assurance of safety and security to citizens, the non-arbitrary rule of law, effective enforcement of contracts, protection of human rights, reduction of military expenditure, private sector techniques for motivating employees such as merit pay, mission statements and quality circles.

Fourth, good governance in the World Bank’s perception also involves notions like corporate management, corporate culture and bottom-driven rhetoric.

(Satyanarayana 2004: 324)

From the studies on good governance published in the 1998 Special Issue of the Indian Journal of Public Administration, Satyanarayana (2004: 324) extracted the following as its components:

- mobilisation and utilisation of natural resources for betterment of society;
- maintenance of macro-economic stabilisation;
interaction among the government, civil society and private sector;
respect for democratic institutions, and human rights and values;
proving suitable living environment;
citizen caring and responsive administration;
providing safety and security to the people;
control of corruption and corrupt practices;
emphasising on organisational effectiveness;
capacity building of the communities;
ensuring people's participation;
satisfying the expectations of all the stakeholders – including customers, employees and suppliers;
compliance of standards set by the investors;
maintenance of honesty and ethics rather than imposition of legislation forcefully in the societal organisation;
organisational pluralism-state, market, and societal organisations for governance;
transparent administrative system;
competitive government, injecting competition into service delivery;
performance partnership between government, NGOs and private agencies; and
e-government. (Satyanarayana 2004: 324)

These aspects that Satyanarayana (2004: 324) propagates as the components of good governance encapsulates all the dimensions of eclectic strand in conceptualising the concept as explained above, namely the procedural democratic dimension, substantive democratic dimension, ethical dimension, societal-state nexus dimension, state-market nexus dimension and the market imperative dimension. This eclectic approach does make an important contribution to the body of knowledge on the meaning of the concept, although is not within the context of NEPAD. In most of the definitions of good governance as propagated in the writings of different authors some referred to in this chapter, the above-mentioned aspects are used as the bases of their formulations and are reiterated in the other publication titled The good governance standard for public services. As published in 2004, this publication(The
Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services 2004: 04-30) propounds that the concept *good governance* means:

- focussing on the organisation’s purpose and on outcomes for citizens and service users;
- performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles;
- promoting values for the whole organisation and demonstrating the values of good governance through behaviour;
- taking informed, transparent decisions and managing risk;
- developing the capacity and capability of the governing body to be effective; and
- engaging stakeholders and making accountability real.

In its engagement with the concept *good governance* the publication *The good governance standard for public services* does not make any reference to NEPAD. Perhaps the reason for this is that the book was not written from the African perspective. A further search for the relevant Public Administration literature led to the consideration of the book *Public sector reform – Governance in South Africa*. The book is authored by Miller and was published in 2005. With the sub-title *Governance in South Africa*, one thought that its content would delve much into the concept of governance and, because of their being inextricably intertwined subsequently good governance and situate it within the NEPAD context. Miller (2005: 01-146) does not provide any conceptual insight into the meaning of *good governance*. Also, in dealing with the issue of public sector reform Miller (2005: 01-146) does not make any reference to NEPAD. NEPAD emphasises the importance of public sector reform to enhance the capacity of public administration in Africa. This aspect is not considered in Miller’s (2005: 01-146) book.

In *The role of public administration in alleviating poverty and improving governance*, a book published in 2005 and comprising 45 scholarly essays; no reference is made to NEPAD. However, the key issues that the contributors in the book seek to address are consistent with the fundamental objective of NEPAD, which, as stated in Chapter 3 of the thesis, is to “eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and
collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and thus halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process” (NEPAD 2001: para. 67).


Good governance as key imperative in alleviating poverty and improving governance is considered in some essays in the book, but not within the context of NEPAD. In the essay titled Poverty and Governance: The Role of the State, Good Governance, and an Enabling Policy Framework in Poverty Alleviation in Malaysia in the book being reviewed, Siwar (2005: 28) states that “good governance is reflected in improved public sector management, sound financial management and public sector reform It is characterised by open and enlightened policy-making, with sound economic management based on accountability, participation, predictability and transparency” (Siwar 2005: 28).

Mangahas (2005: 647) contends that these principles Siwar (2005: 28) mentions constitute the basic elements of good governance. They form part of the procedural aspects of liberal democracy. Rahman and Rahman (2005: 28) write that the above-mentioned principles are critically important in realising good governance. Scholars such as Olowu (2003: 04), Okot-Uma (2003: 283), Godbole (2003: 168), Mhone and Edigheji (2003b: 03) as cited above emphasise the same point that Mangahas (2005: 647), Rahman and Rahman (2005: 28) make
to explicate *good governance*, although their perspectives on the subject also consider the importance of the substantive aspects of democracy.

Mangahas (2005: 647), Rahman and Rahman’s (2005: 28) articulations on the meaning of *good governance* based on the procedural aspects of democracy could be situated in the *procedural democratic strand* of the epistemological framework. In further explicating *good governance* Rahman and Rahman (2005: 142) states that this concept is a reform strategy with a particular set of initiatives that focuses on strengthening the institutions of civil society that make the government more accountable, more open, more transparent and more democratic. The notion of civil society is consistently emphasised by most scholars whose conception of *good governance* gravitates towards *developmentalism* (Edigheji 2003: 73; Hassen 2003: 117; Hakim 2003: 313-314; Godbole 2003: 168). The notion of civil society is mentioned in *societal-state nexus* dimension as one of the key variables that are important in the conception of *good governance* and is associated with the substantive aspects of democracy.

In the essay entitled *Poverty reduction in Bangladesh* in the book being reviewed, Ullah (2005: 424) asks the question *does good governance matter?* In the attempt to engage this question, Ullah (2005: 424) contends that “good governance demands that government policies that must be put into place in order to promote sustainable livelihoods must involve wide participation of civil society, issues of accountability and transparency, decentralisation and issues of corruption”. This perspective is eclectic in its consideration of *good governance*. The conception of the concept specifies the *means* and *ends* of *good governance* and focusses on its various conceptualisation dimensions, namely *societal-state nexus* dimension, procedural democratic dimension, substantive democratic dimension and ethical dimension. Ullah’s (2005: 424) notion of “sustaining livelihood” resonates sameness with that of “sustainability”, which Cloete (2003: 15), as referred to above, used in the formulation of the definition of the concept *good governance*. *Sustainability* is concerned with *public interest*.

Hayllar (2005: 611) explains that “in theory, good governance requires policy-makers and administrators to make and implement decisions that best serve the *public interest*”; although in practice “it is seldom clear just where the *public interest* lies”. For, what is in the *public interest* is often a matter of contestations. This aspect is considered extensively in Chapters 4
and 6 of the study. For the purpose of this chapter it suffices to only point out that the notion of *public interest* is consistently emerging in the contemporary discourse as one of the critical variables emphasised as the *end* of the concept *good governance*. Hallar’s (2005: 611) thought on *good governance* could be situated within the *substantive democratic strand* as its conception of the concept is largely teleological in its approach.

Siwar (2005: 28), Mangahas (2005: 647), Rahman and Rahman (2005: 28), Ullah (2005: 424) and Hayllar’s (2005: 611) perspectives on *good governance* in *Poverty and governance: the role of the state, good governance, and an enabling policy framework in poverty alleviation in Malaysia* make an important contribution to the body of knowledge and could possibly be useful in determining the meaning of the concept in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.

In *Administrative change and innovation: a reader* as edited by Chakrabarty and Bhattacharya and also published in 2005, which is a collection of 11 essays on administrative reform plus a comprehensive introduction, Kapur’s (2005: 119-130) Chapter 3 and Pradhan’s (2005: 341-358) Chapter 11 in the book come out clear in terms of their relevance to the object this study, which is concerned with the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration. Kapur’s Chapter 3 looks at information technology and good governance from an Indian perspective. It is consistent with much of the discourse on governance as in *Good governance, democratic societies, and globalisation*, especially in as far as Abraham (2004: 155-170), Wollmann (2004:171-192), Mathur (2004: 214-231) and Agnihotri and Dar’s (2004:232-252) discourses on administrative reform in India and their implications on the meaning of *good governance* are concerned. *Good governance, democratic societies, and globalisation* is reviewed above.

In the context of administrative reform Kapur (2005: 119) observes that “of late there is a renewed debate world over with much focus on good governance and public management. This is emphasised in the introductory part of the book, which set the context for the discourse, where Chakrabarty and Bhattacharya (2005: 01) write that *good governance* “has gained in importance in conceptualising contemporary public administration”. Kapur (2005: 119) observes that *good governance* in much of the contemporary public administration discourse is associated with the administrative reform phrases such as “reinventing
government”, “mission-driven government”, “market-orientated government”, “service-first” and “empowering citizens”.

In Kapur’s (2005: 120) discourse on good governance reference is made to the World Bank’s perspective, which identifies the following as parameters of the concept: “political and bureaucratic accountability, independence of judiciary, participation of religious and social groups and freedom of expression and information”. Kapur (2005: 121-122) does not necessarily interrogate the World Bank’s conception of good governance. In dealing with information technology as an enabling technology to achieve the broader goal of government, Kapur (2005: 122-123) propounds the following as the agenda items of good governance:

- Enhancing effective and efficient administration;
- Improving quality of life of citizens;
- Establishing legitimacy and credibility of institutions;
- Making demonstration responsive, citizen-friendly and citizen caring;
- Ensuring accountability;
- Securing freedom of information and expression;
- Reducing cost of governance;
- Making every department result-orientated;
- Improving quality of public services;
- Improving productivity of employees;
- Eradication of corruption to re-establish credibility of government by ensuring integrity of individuals;
- Removal of arbitrariness in exercise of authority;
- Use of IT-based services to demystify procedures and improve the citizen-government interface.

To put the above-mentioned factors in context, Kapur (2005: 123) emphasises the importance of enhancing the quality of life of the citizens as being the core variable in the conception and definition of good governance. This is clear in the contention that “an institution or a government department is not created or established for the welfare of its employees, nor for the benefit of trade union or their federations; it is created for servicing the customer, client, the beneficiary, the citizen”(Kapur 2005: 123). This is reiterated in Pradhan’s (2005: 341-
Chapter 11 in the book, which focuses on civil service reform in India, in the contention that [good] “governance must extend beyond conventional bureaucracies and empower the citizens…” The same is emphasised by a number of public administration scholars in their intellectual attempts to untangle good governance (Cloete 2003: 11-15; Munshi 2004: 51-52). In their conceptions of good governance Kapur (2005: 119-130) and Pradhan’s (2005:341-358) managed to maintain a proper balance between the means and ends of the concept. Their approach in examining good governance is eclectic.

Kapur (2005: 119-130) and Pradhan’s (2005: 341-358) consideration of good governance in Chapters 3 and 11 of the book respectively make an important contribution to public administration discourse on the meaning of the concept. However, these contributions are not located within the context of NEPAD. Similar to the contributions in Good governance, democratic societies and globalisation as reviewed above, Kapur (2005: 119-130) and Pradhan (2005: 341-358) deal with the issue of administrative reform and its implication on good governance from the Indian perspective. In Chapters 1, 2,4,6,7,9 and 10 of the book, which for the purpose of the discourse in this Chapter are referred to simply as “other chapters”, the issue of administrative reform is discoursed.

Given the fact that the issues of administrative reforms are, as is clear in much of the public administration literature, associated with good governance, these “other chapters” as specified above were considered relevant in the review of the meanings of the concept [good governance] as propounded in public administration body of scholarship. In these chapters in Administrative change and innovation: a reader, good governance is considered as a principle ostensibly on the basis that tends to suggest that there is existence of unanimity at the conceptual level in terms of its meaning.

Much of the articulations on the meaning of good governance in the different chapters of the book gravitate towards neo-liberal conceptions of the concept. Often the distinction between governance and good governance in the discourse is not made. These “other chapters” are, for the purpose of this study, not that much of value in so far as the objective of this Chapter, which, as stated above, is to establish how the public administration scholarship treats the concept good governance, is concerned (Wilson 2005: 85-101; Bhattacharya 2005: 102-118; Kamarch 2005: 131-178; Cohn 2005: 181-213; Wu 2005: 217-224; Painter 2005: 225-247; Chakrabarty 2005: 251-277; Mathur 2005: 278-294; Arora 2005: 295-316).


In *The art of governance – analyzing management and administration*, Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn (2004: 03-17) examine the concept *governance* as an organising theme for empirical research. In this contribution a detailed conceptual analysis of *governance* is considered, including its evolution in the field of Public Administration. The focus is on *governance* rather than *good governance*. There is no reference in the book to NEPAD.

In the *Governance and the public sector* published in 2005 a myriad of perspectives on *governance* and *good governance* are collated in one volume, including some articles drawn from different scholarly journals where they were originally published. The year of publication of some of the articles in this collection that Hodges (2005) edited predate a *terminus a quo* of the scope of scholarship review in this chapter, which is 2001. The contributions in this collection are considered as originally published as articles. However,
the articles in this collection are not part of the selected Public Administration journals considered for the purpose of review in this chapter. They are used as references for the discourse on good governance in the other chapters of the study whose scope of literature analysis in terms of their terminus a quo and terminus ad quem respectively is not as restrictive as in this chapter.

Kooiman’s (2005: 61-83) contribution in the Governance and the public sector is the only one that is relevant to the object of this study that seems not to have originally been published as an article in a journal elsewhere before. It engages in a detailed conceptual analysis of governance and argues that governance is a complex concept as is variedly defined. Kooiman makes reference to good governance, but not in a manner that engages in a detailed conceptual analysis of the concept. The evolution of good governance is traced from the World Bank’s diagnosis of the Sub-Saharan Africa as that of bad system of governance. Its usage in NEPAD is not mentioned.

Of particular importance for the purpose of this review is the observation that good governance “reflect[s] many of the theoretical and practical issues which are raised by many of the other approaches to governance applied to developmental problems” and, as an analytical concept, it “reflects the major ambiguities and tensions within modern liberal theory, such as the neutrality of the state, the role of a liberal public sphere, and questions around the liberal self” (Kooiman 2005: 64-65). This attests to the observations that good governance is a contested concept that does not normatively lend itself to neutrality or coherence of thoughts.

Public Governance is a collection of articles on governance originally published in different journals. They are collated into volumes 1-4 dedicated to specific themes as theories of governance, public sector reform, public policy and democratic governance respectively. In the same way that Hodges’ (2005) collection is treated in terms of its usage as a reference in the study, the articles published in Bevir’s collection are considered as originally published in their respective journals. In this collection only one article originally published in the International Review of Administrative Sciences is identified and is reviewed in the subsection that deals with articles published in journals of Public Administration selected for the purpose of this chapter. The other articles in Bevir’s Public Governance are considered as
important references in the chapters of the study whose focus is not as restrictive as in this chapter.

In *Public governance - a blueprint for political action and better government*, Apreda (2007: 01-23) deals with the semantics of public governance. In this the expectation is that this concept would be conceptually analysed in contradistinction with *governance* and *good governance*. This is not forthcoming in the book. A reference to *good governance* is not made. Only *governance* and *corporate governance* are considered in the discourse. This makes the discourse on the semantics of *public governance* incomplete, for it belongs to the same conceptual parlance with *governance* and *good governance*. These concepts are used interchangeably in some literature – where it is presupposed that the distinction between them is nothing less than semanticism.

In *Governance and the democratic deficit – assessing the democratic legitimacy of governance practices*, Fenger and Bekker (2007: 13-33) suggest that *good governance* is one of the variants of *governance*. In this a distinction is not necessarily made between *governance* and *good governance*. These concepts are, instead, considered as two sides of the same coin. Can *good governance* therefore be understood as *governance*? This question is attended to in Chapter 4 of the study.

Fenger and Bekker’s (2007: 13-33) perspective is consistent with Dwivedi and Mishra’s (2007: 701-722) take on the issue that *good governance* is a subset of the process of governance, which is based on the ingredients of liberal democratic polity such as “accountability, transparency, fairness, equity, and ethics”. Dwivedi and Mishra’s contribution is in the *Handbook of globalisation, governance and public administration*, which is edited by Farazmand and Pinkowski. In the same book Sharma (2007: 685-698) examines the nature of decentralised governance in Africa focussing specifically on the obstacles and measures for strengthening decentralisation for good governance. In this Sharma makes reference to good governance as empirical object rather than as concept. Because of the focus of the contribution on Africa, one expected that Sharma would make reference to NEPAD. This is not forthcoming.
Maheshwari (2007: 314-322) considers the theory and practice of good governance. It is explained that “good governance must necessarily seek its base in a set of formally proclaimed structural attributes such as written constitution, rule of law, judicial review, natural justice, [and] limited government”. This thinking subscribes to Western liberal thought from which good governance is defined along the procedural aspects of democracy. In dealing with good governance Maheshwari does not make reference to NEPAD.

In Governance in dark times – practical philosophy for public service, Stivers (2008: 104-122) deals with governance and good governance. The book examines thinking on governance largely as a philosophical concept with practical or empirical implications. NEPAD is not considered in the book. In The governance of daily life in Africa – ethnographic explorations of public and collective services, Becker (2009: 73-199) reflects on good governance in terms of what it is not. The context of the discourse is Tanzania. Becker starts with the history of good governance to develop a context from which the Tanzanian bad system of governance is analysed.

An observation with significant conceptual implications that Becker makes is that in the contemporary studies on good governance various themes are attached to it. In this Becker (2009: 74) states that the discourse on governance “is not merely formulaic, but itself political”. This challenges the homogenisation approach to the study of good governance. In the consideration of good governance, Becker does not make reference to NEPAD. This is also the case in other contributions in the book, whose focus is on the governance of daily life in Africa (Blundo & Le Meur 2009).

In From government to governance – expanding the horizon of public administration to public management, Khan (2009: 153) considers good governance in contradistinction with poor governance. It is stated that “good governance, in contrast to poor governance, focuses on creating conditions that are conducive to good living” (Khan 2009: 15). What Khan considers as ‘good living’, which in terms of the foregoing, appears to be teleological imperative upon which good governance is conceptualised, is expressed in neo-liberal terms. The aspects used as the conceptual variables of good governance gravitate towards the procedural imperatives of liberal democracy. In this book the consideration of good governance is not within the context of NEPAD.
In The new face of government – how public managers are forging a new approach to governance, McNabb (2009) deals with governance as an empirical object and steers clear of its conceptual nuances. The book does not specifically make reference to good governance. Instead the focus is on governance and there is no reference to NEPAD. In Leadership, and good governance in public administration – a critical need for transformative African leadership and good governance for adoption by the South African public service, Naidoo (2009) challenges Eurocentricism and proposes an Afro-centric model from which concepts of leadership and good governance could be engaged. Naidoo de-contextualises these concepts from their neo-liberal confines and contextualises them to African realities. This book is an important contribution to the contemporary discourse on governance and the Afro-centric model Naidoo proposes may be instructive to the contemporary discourse on the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD. The consideration of good governance in Naidoo’s book is not located in NEPAD.

In the book The Zuma administration – critical challenges the issue of governance is considered. This book is a compilation of essays dealing with the governance question from varying perspectives. It was published in 2010 and the context for engagement is South Africa. In the book the political and governance challenges facing South Africa during the Zuma administration are considered rigorously. However, the consideration of the question of governance in the book is as an empirical object and no reference is specifically made to good governance in the context of NEPAD (Kondlo 2010a: 01-14; Maserumule 2010a: 15-50).

From the review of a sample of selected books, whose subject categorisation in most libraries is Public Administration, as published between the period 2001 and 2010, it is clear that the question about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration posed in Chapter 1 of the thesis is not answered. Out of more than 170 contributions in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship in the form of books and chapters in books as reviewed above, only four make reference to NEPAD. However, such reference to NEPAD is not located within the context of the object of this study, which is good governance (Landsberg 2003: 21-44; Totemeyer 2003: 71; Mhone and Edigheji 2003: 03; Bond & Guliwe 2003: 313-245).
Is the reason for limited coverage of NEPAD in the Public Administration books associated with the fact that NEPAD is a relatively new continental development initiative? Or, is it because the issues that pertain to African development are often considered as belonging to the Developmental Studies or African Politics, not Public Administration? The answers to these questions which are extensively considered in Chapter 5 of the thesis are not simple. In this chapter it suffices to state that, as Wessels (2008: 282) points out, “public administration scholars study institutions, people, policies and activities of especially the executive branch of government”, not necessarily aspects that pertain to African development. This has always been the style of Public Administration as a science in terms of its locus and focus (Gildenhuis 1988). In the gathering of scholars in the field of Public Administration in South Africa in 1991 dubbed New Public Administration Initiative (NPAI) the foregoing was acknowledged as a fundamental flaw in the theory of the discipline. In this gathering it was resolved that new approaches to the study, teaching, and practice of Public Administration should be adopted, which must, among others, entail “an explicit developmental focus” (Cloete & Mokgoro 1995: 04-05).

Notwithstanding the contention that suggests that the philosophical and theoretical foundations of Public Administration lack developmental focus, there are a few instances in the books reviewed above where attempts to mainstream developmental issues in the mainstream Public Administration discourse are made (Cloete 2003: 15; Edigheji 2003: 73; Godbole 2003: 168; Hakim 2003: 313-314; Hassen 2003: 117). However, those attempts have not yet reached a level where it could be said that the developmental approach is entrenched to the extent that it constitutes a paradigm in the study of Public Administration. They have not yet reached a point where they are considered as part of the philosophical and theoretical tradition of Public Administration. This aspect is considered extensively in Chapter 5 of the thesis.

Much of the scholarly contributions on NEPAD as a contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development, as pointed out in Chapter 1 of the thesis, emerged mainly from the end of 2001. The period between 2001 and 2010 is a reasonable time for books on NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective to have been written and published. Or, as implicated in the above exposition on the paradigmatic status of the discipline, perhaps the reason for the foregoing lies in its reductionist nature, which restricts and reifies Public Administration. With limited books or chapters in books that deal specifically with the concept good
governance in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective, this chapter now turns to papers presented at scholarly gatherings, which are normally organised around topical issues, of which NEPAD has always been one since its conception. Can papers presented at scholarly Public Administration gatherings fill the void in the books and chapters in books on the question of good governance in the context of NEPAD?

2.5 Papers presented at selected scholarly Public Administration gatherings

A prominent organisation in Africa that often hosts scholarly gatherings to discourse critical issues in the field of Public Administration is the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM). In a description on the cover of its scholarly publication, African Journal of Public Administration and Management (AJPAM)], AAPAM is defined as the “only continent-wide professional association that brings together policymakers, management practitioners and scholars associated to a number of reputable international professional and academic associations established to promote scholarship, and the practice of governance, in the field of Public Administration and Management, which, among others, include the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) and Commonwealth Association of Public Administration and Management (CAAPAM)” (African Association for Public Administration and Management 2005a).

The objective of AAPAM is to “provide a forum for exchanging ideas and experiences between public administrators, managers, scholars and teachers of Public Administration in Africa; bring together top African administrators and managers to discuss topical managerial problems with a view to sharing experiences and trying to find solutions to Africa’s development problems; foster professionalisation of Public Administration and Management in the African continent; promote research in Public Administration and Management; and foster affiliation and maintain liaison with other international bodies and organisation interested in public administration and management” both as a field of study and practice (African Association for Public Administration and Management 2008: on-line).
AAPAM achieves its objectives by hosting annual roundtable conferences, series of workshops and seminars that address “critical issues in African Public Administration and Management aimed at sensitising and providing knowledge and skills to senior level policy-makers, with a view to promoting and enhancing human capacity development on the continent”(African Association for Public Administration and Management 2008: on-line). NEPAD is surely a critical and topical issue in the contemporary development discourse in Africa. Because of its multidisciplinary approach to development, NEPAD appeals to a broad and diverse community of scholarship. It is examined in the contemporary body of scholarship from different disciplinary perspectives.

In the field of Public Administration AAPAM, looking at its objectives, appears to be the appropriate forum appropriately positioned in the continent’s Public Administration scholarship to make a significant contribution to the body of knowledge on a variety of issues that pertain to NEPAD, especially its good governance imperative, from the perspective of the discipline. Between the period 2001 and 2009 AAPAM hosted numerous conferences under different themes, which did not specifically deal with NEPAD. In 2001 AAPAM did not host a conference. The first conference of AAPAM after the launch of NEPAD was hosted on 23 March 2002 in Abuja (Nigeria) dealing with managing change in the globalising economy. In Chapter 1 of the study it is pointed out that one of the fundamental objectives of NEPAD is to “halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process”. This Mahmud Yayale Ahmed, Head of the Nigerian Civil Service, captured in the speech to declare the conference open. Ahmed’s (2002) opening speech articulated the essence of the theme of the conference and managed to provide the context for the discourse on how the African public service could respond to globalisation within the NEPAD framework. The speech did not specifically make reference to good governance in NEPAD.

In the papers that were presented at the conference and the deliberations that ensued an important contribution to the body of knowledge in terms of how the African public administration could be repositioned in the face of globalisation was made. However, the discourse in the conference did not engage in a detailed conceptual analysis of good governance in the context of NEPAD to determine its meaning for Public Administration in Africa. The focus was largely on the institutions, people, policies and activities of public administration. The papers and deliberations in the said conference were largely concerned
with empirical questions (African Association for Public Administration and Management 2002a).

In the roundtable conference of 24 November 2002 in Maseru, Lesotho, the issue of African public service in the 21st century was debated with some papers and deliberations making reference to NEPAD and good governance without any attempt to untangle it conceptually and determine its contextual meaning (African Association for Public Administration and Management 2002b). On 25 April 2004 the AAPAM roundtable conference in Banjul, The Gambia, addressed the issue of poverty reduction, which is at the core of the NEPAD initiative. It was emphasised that poverty is one of the biggest challenges that Africa faces. The fundamental question that the conference sought to address was about the role of the public services in poverty eradication strategies. The discourse in the conference, with some acknowledging NEPAD as an important framework for poverty reduction, was more focussed on the strategic interventions that the African public service could consider in dealing with this issue (African Association for Public Administration and Management 2004).

In the roundtable conference that followed on 26 March 2005 in Mombasa, Kenya, the focus was on the roles that the state and public service could play in creating wealth. The papers presented and the deliberations made reflected on various aspects of public administration and wealth-creation in Africa as problems and challenges for development. As in other conference proceedings of AAPAM, some papers made reference to NEPAD and good governance in respect of which attempts to define it were made, although, for the purpose of the object of this study, not in a significant way (African Association for Public Administration and Management 2005b).

Good governance was considered within the context of the discourse that examined partnership between state and non-state sectors on the issue of sustainable development on 27 December 2005 at the AAPAM roundtable conference in Livingstone, Zambia. It was dealt with largely as a principle or normative value; although in some instances a few attempts were made to venture into its definitional or conceptual aspects. The attempts to define good governance in the 2005 AAPAM roundtable conference centred on the societal-state nexus dimension of the concept (African Association for Public Administration and Management 2005c).
The societal-state nexus dimension emphasises the importance of state-society relations in attempting to achieve sustainable development and is implicated in the substantive democratic strand notion of developmentalism. The issue of partnership between the state and non-state sectors in the pursuit of development in Africa is underscored in NEPAD; hence other papers and deliberations at the conference situated their discourses in NEPAD. It was emphasised as one of the key variables in the definition of good governance. The AAPAM roundtable conference on 28 December 2006 in Arusha, Tanzania focussed on effective delivery of public services in Africa, which was emphasised as the critical imperative of good governance. The consideration of good governance in the Arusha conference was largely in terms of it as an empirical rather than a conceptual object (African Association for Public Administration and Management 2006).

In other roundtable conferences of AAPAM that followed in the subsequent years not much attention was paid to NEPAD and the critical aspects that are associated with it such as the concept of good governance. The conference proceedings of AAPAM between the period 2001 and 2009 did not come with an Africa-focussed epistemological framework from which the concept good governance in NEPAD could be discoursed and contextualised to determine its meaning for Public Administration. In the 2010 AAPAM Conference, a specific reference was made to NEPAD and APRM, which is a key instrument to achieve good governance. Among others, the participants in the conference “examined the implications of implementing national strategic visions simultaneously with global and regional initiatives such as the MDGs[and] NEPAD”(African Association for Public Administration and Management 2010).

In the opening address the Minister for Public Service and Administration in South Africa, Richard Baloyi, underscored the APRM as “an important tool in the realisation of Africa’s vision”(African Association for Public Administration and Management 2010). As pointed out above, the APRM seeks to achieve good governance, which is underscored in NEPAD as a prerequisite for sustainable development. However, the deliberations in the conference did not engage good governance as a concept to formulate a clear understanding of what it means in the context of NEPAD. More search for the proceedings of other scholarly Public Administration gatherings to determine how they engage good governance in the context of NEPAD uncovers important contributions related to the object of this study. Of particular relevance to the object of this study is the South African Association of Public
Administration and Management (SAAPAM) conference hosted under the theme *Good Governance Challenge in NEPAD* on 27-29 November 2002 at the University of Pretoria.

In this SAAPAM conference, Dogonyaro (2002a), from the NEPAD Secretariat, appealed to the intellectuals and academics in the field of Public Administration to debate the concept *good governance* and make a contribution towards a common and better understanding of its meaning in the context of NEPAD. The implication in Dogonyaro’s appeal is that there is no common understanding of the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. This observation is made in Chapter 1 of the study, where *good governance* is explained as a conceptual *problematique* that should be examined to develop a contextual meaning that befits NEPAD.

With the theme of the conference being concerned with the good governance challenge in NEPAD the expectation was that the papers presented would analyse *good governance* within the context of NEPAD and determine its meaning for Public Administration. Maphunye’s (2002) presentation which examined the contemporary changes in South Africa’s civil service and their implications for good governance within the framework of NEPAD managed to capture the essence of the theme of the conference. The presentation attempted to take up the gauntlet thrown down to Public Administration scholars by Dogonyaro about making a contribution towards a common understanding of *good governance* within the context of NEPAD. Maphunye’s (2002: 08) presentation raised and attempted to answer the question, ‘what is *good governance* in the context of NEPAD?’ This question is similar to the one that this study examines: what does the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD mean for Public Administration?

Maphunye’s (2002: 08) attempt to proffer an answer to the question raised in the discourse of the presentation is that “in relation to the civil service, good governance in the context of NEPAD means that government needs officials whose operations are transparent and accountable”. This conception of *good governance* is similar to that of Godbole (2003: 168) whose work has already been reviewed above. It gravitates towards procedural democracy. In terms of the epistemological framework developed to review Public Administration scholarship on *good governance* in this chapter, Maphunye’s conception of the concept could be located within the *procedural democratic strand*. 
Vil-Nkomo’s (2002c) presentation on the development challenges of NEPAD did not tackle *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from a conceptual perspective. It was only said that “good governance emerges as a challenge for development on the African continent” (Vil-Nkomo 2002c: 01). The presentation fell short of making a contribution to the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. In other presentations in the conference different issues were considered within the framework of NEPAD but fell short of emerging with a clear conceptual clarity on the meaning of *good governance* within the context of NEPAD. Kroukamp (2002) dealt with network management and looked at how it could strengthen local management and governance in a NEPAD environment. The presentation did not adequately clarify the NEPAD environment, which was, for the purpose of the theme of the conference, important for contextual discourse.

Beebe (2002) looked at how rapid assessment process could be used to evaluate the NEPAD initiatives. From a governance perspective, Cilliers (2002) made a contribution dealing with the issues of peace and security as one of the pre-conditions for NEPAD to succeed. This augured well with Kuye’s (2002a) presentation, which dealt with leadership issues in Africa focussing specifically on the imperatives of responsibility, accountability and good governance. Kuye (2002a) did not provide a comprehensive conceptual analysis of these concepts. Mazwai (2002) tackled the issue of management of information in the NEPAD context and focussed especially on the challenges for the media. The presentation was not necessarily steeped in the mainstream Public Administration discourse, although presented at the Public Administration conference.

Mokgoro’s (2002) presentation focussed on NEPAD and the African development initiative, which is concerned with the requisite capacity necessary for the success of this contemporary initiative for Africa’s sustainable development. Pityana (2002a) explored public-private partnership challenges for NEPAD whereas Mokate (2002) dealt with the role of think-tanks and professional associations in the advancement of NEPAD. Makgetlaneng’s (2002) presentation focussed on the importance of the primacy of the political factor in the regional integration project in Africa and made reference to NEPAD. Towards the end of the conference Fraser-Moleketi (2002) made a key note address on the role of professionalised public service in the advancement of the NEPAD governance challenges. Fraser-Moleketi (2002) acknowledged the complexity of the concept *good governance*. As such, Fraser-Moleketi (2002) did not venture into a detailed analysis of the meaning of the concept in the
context of NEPAD. This was the challenge that was left for scholarship to entertain. Fraser-Moleketi delivered the keynote address in her capacity as the Minister of the Public Service and Administration (DPSA) in South Africa.

Vil-Nkomo (2002c), Kroukamp (2002), Beebie (2002), Cilliers (2002), Mazwai (2002), Kuye (2002), Mokgoro (2002), Mokate (2002), Makgetlaneng (2002) and Fraser-Moleketi’s (2002) discourses on NEPAD in the SAAPAM conference fell short of contextualising good governance with a view to determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration. Other papers presented at the said conference were not relevant to its theme. Their main concern was not grounded in the thematic focus of the conference, which was about the good governance challenge in NEPAD. These other papers dealt with a variety of important Public Administration issues, but did not to link them to NEPAD (Bekker 2002; Cloete 2002; Griffin 2002; Kollapen 2002).

In the manner in which the theme of the SAAPAM conference was formulated NEPAD ought to have constituted the context of engagement with a myriad of Public Administration issues that pertain to the good governance challenge in Africa. But, the papers presented in the said SAAPAM conference and the deliberations that ensued missed the opportunity to specifically and strictly focus on the theme of the conference and comprehensively explore various dimensions of good governance in NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective. Following the SAAPAM conference, the issue of good governance and NEPAD came out in the theme of another scholarly Public Administration gathering in South Africa. The Association of the Southern African Schools and Departments of Public Administration (ASSADPAM) and Public Policy Association of Southern Africa (PPASA) hosted a mini-conference in Port Elizabeth on 29-30 May 2003. The theme of the conference was Policy and Management Implications for Good Governance in Southern Africa. It was considered in the light of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol and NEPAD.

Much of the discourse in the ASSADPAM and PPASA mini-conference focussed on how these professional associations in the field of Public Administration could strategically position themselves to effectively respond to the knowledge needs of contemporary policy developments on the African continent. The intellectual outputs of the mini-conference did not make contribution to the body of Public Administration scholarship specifically on the meaning of the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD as the discourse was
largely action-orientated rather than also engaging the theories or questioning the basis of thinking that informs the contemporary development paradigm on the African continent (Association of the Southern African Schools and Departments of Public Administration and Public Policy Association of Southern Africa 2003).

From 14-18 July 2003 the International Institute for Administrative Sciences (IIAS) hosted its international regional conference in Yaounde, Cameroon to discourse the issues that are at the core of the NEPAD initiative, namely governance and poverty reduction. The theme of the conference was *Shared governance: combating poverty and exclusion*. According to Bourgon (2003: 02) the Yaoundé conference “was very special as was the first [conference] in the 73-year history of the IIAS to be held in Sub-Saharan Africa”. It brought together the international community of Public Administration scholarship to discourse the challenge of governance and poverty in Africa.

As the general rapporteur in the conference, Bourgon (2003: 04) provided the context for the discourse of the theme of the conference in the observation that, as “adopted in 2001, NEPAD is a new approach for long-term development on the continent” which “recognises the importance of good governance”. In spite of this contextual framework, out of 59 presentations made at the conference, only one paper authored by Kuye (2003) situated its discourse on governance and poverty in Africa in the NEPAD framework. Kuye’s (2003: 02) paper examined “the use of Public Administration approaches to target policy development for the African Union (AU) and NEPAD”. The paper makes an important contribution to the body of Public Administration scholarship on NEPAD. However, it does not offer the analysis aimed at untangling the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. This paper is published as an article in the *African Journal of Public Administration and Management* and is considered extensively in sub-section 2.6 below.

Mafunisa’s (2003) paper on the role of civil society in promoting good governance is relevant to the object of this study, but its discourse of the subject is not located within the context of NEPAD. In this paper good governance is considered from an empirical rather a conceptual perspective. The paper is published in the *International Review of Administrative Sciences* (IRAS). It is considered in more detail in sub-section 2.6 below. The other presentations made at the conference were not relevant to good governance as the object of this study or NEPAD as its contextual setting.
In a seminar on *Public sector leadership capacity for good governance in Africa* in Kampala, Uganda on 27-30 January 2004, Fraser-Moleketi (2004: 01-05) made an important appeal to 85 delegates from 29 African countries in an opening speech to African scholars that they should not confine their discourses and debates only to the political facet *good governance*. Fraser-Moleketi was concerned about the lack of rigour in scholarship engagements with *good governance* from the Public Administration perspective. However, the presentations that followed Fraser-Moleketi’s speech were not that rigorous in presenting Public Administration perspectives on the concept of *good governance* (Ali 2004: 01-12; Batoko 2004: 01-05; CAFRAD 2004: 01-11; Fitzgerald 2004: 01-07; Kiyaga-Nsubuga 2004: 01-08).

The context for engagement with the issue of public sector leadership capacity for good governance in Africa in the seminar was not necessarily NEPAD. This is in spite of the fact that the former NEPAD Secretariat Deputy-Director-General, Smunda Mokoena, in a statement read on behalf of Wiseman Nkuhlu, also the former Chairperson of the NEPAD Steering Committee, pointed out that the capacity development programme on Governance and Public Administration is an essential compartment of NEPAD. The discourse in the seminar did not make any significant contribution to the meaning of *good governance* within the context of NEPAD (Ali 2004: 01-12; Batoko 2004: 01-05; CAFRAD 2004: 01-11; Fitzgerald 2004: 01-07; Kiyaga-Nsubuga 2004: 01-08).

Most of the contributions in the seminar were mainly concerned with issues of leadership in Africa. The good governance part of the theme of the seminar was given scant scholarly attention; where it is mentioned in the discourse, it was glossed over without a deeper analysis and was considered only as a *principle* and not a *concept* that needed to be examined from the African Public Administration perspective (Ali 2004: 01-12; Batoko 2004: 01-05; CAFRAD 2004: 01-11; Fitzgerald 2004: 01-07; Kiyaga-Nsubuga 2004: 01-08). Soobrayan (2004) makes an important observation in the governance discourse that the “North impose a particular conception of governance on the South”. This is an issue that should have equally captivated scholarship discourse in such an important seminar on public sector leadership capacity development for *good governance* with the intention to develop propositions on how this concept should be fathomed in the context of NEPAD from the African Public Administration perspective.
A further search for the themes of scholarly Public Administration gatherings using good governance, Public Administration and NEPAD as key words did not yield much results. Instead, what was observed in the search for such themes is that a contribution on NEPAD would be made in a scholarly Public Administration gathering whose theme does not necessarily relate to good governance in NEPAD. For instance, in the ASSADPAM conference from 13-14 May 2004 in Pretoria Maserumule (2004d) made a presentation on good governance as a sine qua non for sustainable development. The paper examined the notion of good governance and contended that not much has been made of unpacking it to develop a contextual understanding of its meaning in the context of NEPAD. This paper was not related to the theme of the conference, which was the State of Public Administration and Management theory and practice in Southern Africa, but made an important contribution to the discourse on the meaning of good governance in NEPAD. The paper was published as an article in the Journal of Public Administration. It is considered in more detail in sub-section 2.6 below as part of the Public Administration literature reviewed to determine how the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD is engaged in the field.

The other observation made in the search for good governance and NEPAD-related outputs of Public Administration conference proceedings is that since 2007 NEPAD’s topicality seems to have waned following the end of the presidential tenure of Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in 2007 and the African National Congress’s (ANC) recall of the Thabo Mbeki as the President of South Africa in 2008. Both Obasanjo and Mbeki were instrumental in driving the NEPAD agenda on the continent. If the observation made in the foregoing is true, then the dearth of scholarship on NEPAD is a worrying trend in that topicalisation of issues for research agendas appears to be driven by political personalities rather than the relevance of issues to societal imperatives. NEPAD is an important subject that still needs to be thoroughly researched and discoursed. The discourse on NEPAD should not stop just because its founders are no longer active in the domestic politics of their countries. Otherwise this amounts to personalisation of scholarship agenda.

In the selected scholarly gatherings in the field whose proceedings are reviewed above the question about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration is not answered. This question continues to elude Public Administration scholarship. In the search for more literature on the object of this study, attention is now being turned to the articles published in scholarly Public Administration journals; perhaps
they may provide an answer to the question that this study asks, namely *what does the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD mean for Public Administration?* Compared with conference papers and proceedings, the articles published in scholarly journals are more reliable in terms of their scholarship quality and relative easiness in their tracking. The articles published in scholarly journals are subjected to a more rigorous evaluation and are systematically catalogued in the repository of scientific knowledge. It is relatively easy to track them through periodical index search facility.

2.6 **Selected scholarly Public Administration Journals**

Scholarly articles on NEPAD are published in different journals in the field of Public Administration. They are reviewed as part of Public Administration scholarship to determine how they engage *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. For being able to manage this study, while at the same time trying to be as exhaustive as possible, reference is made to the articles that relate to the object of this scientific exercise as published in the following selected journals: *International Journal of Public Administration, International Review of Administrative Sciences, African Journal of Public Administration and Management, African Administrative Studies, Administratio Publica, Politeia and Journal of Public Administration.*

2.6.1 **International Journal of Public Administration**

The *International Journal of Public Administration* is highly regarded in the discipline, publishing scholarly articles that are, as a requirement for their acceptance, subjected to rigorous intellectual scrutiny through a blind-refereed process (Forrester & Watson 1994: 464-482). It is a medium through which scholars and practitioners in management and administration “share and engage theoretical issues, as well as application of concepts and theories, with their colleagues in the practitioner community” (*International Journal of Public Administration Website*). The articles in this discipline-specific scholarly Journal are reviewed to establish how the concept *good governance* is examined from a Public Administration perspective; and how it could be understood in the context of NEPAD.

At the time of this review a total of 133 Issues of the Journal had already been published in volumes 24-33 during the period 2006-2010. In all the articles in these *Issues*, not even a single reference is made to NEPAD and the imperatives that undergird it in engaging with the
question of governance in Public Administration. A reason for this perhaps lies in the fact that the primary focus of the Journal is on the American theory and practice of Public Administration, whereas NEPAD is about African development. However, matters dealing with comparative and developmental administration are also, in a limited scale, considered in the Journal. The African Public Administration perspectives on governance in the Journal, at least in the Issues that have been studied for the purpose of this review, are under represented.

The concept governance was used as a key pointer to a wider array of scholarly contributions in the Journal that bears relevance to the object of this study and were analysed to establish how scholars in the field examines good governance from a Public Administration perspective. Various issues of the different volumes of the Journal are dedicated to specific themes that the respective articles should address. In all the volumes of the Journal as reviewed for the purpose of this study good governance is not put forward as a theme for specific consideration and engagement by scholars in the field. Instead, it is dealt with as part of issues that fall within certain themes.

The review of the contributions in the Journal starts with Liou’s (2001: 1005-1022) article, which examines the question of governance in the process of economic development. This contribution does not necessarily and specifically deals with good governance. The gist of the discourse is generally on governance rather than good governance. In the article entitled Towards good governance: a half-century of India’s administrative development, Jain (2001: 1299-1334) observes that “since independence, India has undertaken a number of efforts to establish an effective development-oriented, citizen-friendly and responsive system of administration to contribute towards good governance”. The article does not conceptually analyse good governance. Its focus is on how good governance could be achieved as a programme of the Indian government.

Zafarullah & Huque’s (2001: 1379-1403) discourse does not fill this lacuna in the body of knowledge in the article on Public management for good governance: reforms, regimes, and reality in Bangladesh. In this article, it is only argued that the “achievement of good governance remains a distant dream in the absence of a vital and effective tool of public management” (Zafarullah & Huque 2001: 1379). The article does not specify what it means by good governance. Jain (2001: 1299-1334), Zafarullah & Huque’s (2001: 1379-1403) engagements with good governance are respectively embedded in the Indian and Bangladesh
public administrations. They are considered in this review to draw some lessons in how they conceptualise *good governance* and whether such lessons could be instructive in the attempts to develop a public administration understanding of this concept in the context of NEPAD. Jain (2001: 1299-1334), Zafarullah and Huque’s (2001: 1379-1403) articles are, however, not that much helpful in that they are mainly concerned with the empirical rather than conceptual issues of good governance. They are not contextual to African situations and realities.


In the article that seeks to determine whether good governance matters, Chou (2008: 54-75) examines the objectives of civil service reform and the value of promoting the practices of good governance in China. Compared to some articles reviewed above that deal with governance rather than good governance, Chou’s article makes a specific reference to good governance. The contention in the article is that in China attempts to realise good governance through reform initiatives are scuppered by the fact that the civil service is not insulated from politics. In Sarker (2008: 1416-1440) the conclusion on the same issue is that patron-client politics constrains the institutionalisation of good governance. The context of Sarker’s article is Bangladesh.

The issue of political-administrative interface and patron-client politics Chou and Sarker raise in their respective articles might be another important variable for consideration in theorising *good governance*. Chou and Sarker’s articles deal with good governance as a *principle* and a *programme* rather than a *concept*. Hope’s (2009: 728-740) article on capacity development in developing countries also deals with good governance as a *programme* that needs to be
institutionalised. Chou (2008: 54-75), Sarker (2008: 1416-1440), and Hope’s (2009: 728-740) move from the assumption that the conceptual issues on the concept *good governance* have been settled and that generally there is a conceptual consensus on its meaning.

In the article that evaluates the welfare state in Finland, Salminen (2008: 1242-1258) makes a distinction between old and new governance. Salminen argues that good governance is subsumed in the latter. In Wallis and Gregory (2009: 250-273) the notion of new governance is considered. Wallis and Gregory argue that “governance has been made more complex by New Public Management-type reforms that have changed the balance between political and managerial accountability” (2009: 250). Sarker (2009: 1101-1123) also deals with new governance.

In analysing the new mode of public governance and public accountability, Sarker, using Bangladesh as a case study, writes that public accountability is a fundamental element of good governance. Its consideration in this article is limited to accountability as it pertains to market-society relationship in the context of liberal democratic tradition. In all these articles on new governance their reference to good governance is as a *principle* rather than a *concept* (Salminen 2008: 1242-1258; Wallis & Gregory 2009: 250-273; Sarker 2009: 1101-1123).

In the article on institutionalised governance Gunter and Forrester (2009: 349-369) describe *governance* as the relationship between the state and civil society. The article does not establish the relationship between *governance* and *good governance*. In Chapter 4 of the thesis it is argued that *governance* is a conceptual presage of *good governance*. The discourse on *governance* is often naturally expected to make reference to *good governance*. This is not forthcoming in Gunter and Forrester’s (2009: 349-369) article. In the article that proposes a governance reform model for improving Bus Transit Operations in Los Angeles Chen and Wikstrom (2009: 868-897) steer clear of conceptual aspects of *governance* and do not make reference to *good governance*. So is the case in Wiggan’s (2009: 1026-1047) article on “mapping the governance reform of welfare to work in Britain under New Labour”.

Azmat, Alam and Coghill (2009: 829-851) examine integrated governance as a prerequisite for sustainable market-orientated development in Bangladesh. Their article proposes an integrated governance model that establishes a strategic nexus between state, business and civil society. This model is based on the conception of *governance* as a concept used to
describe the relationship between government, the market and civil society. It assumes its essence in the emphasis that these strategic sectors of governance ought to work together in an integrated manner in the pursuit of a common goal.

The notion of integrated governance is one of the variants of good governance. Its consideration is therefore logically expected to be preceded by a detailed conceptual analysis of good governance for reasons of theoretical contextualisation. This is not forthcoming in Azmat, Alam and Coghill’s (2009: 829-851) article. Bode (2010: 61-72) coined yet another variant of governance called disorganised governance, which is defined “as a regime of hybrid co-ordination shaped by a nervous interplay of partnership-building and disruptive segregation, with important repercussions on the overall outcomes” of government activities. It is not explained how this concept of disorganised governance relates to good governance.

At the time of this review the other issues of volume 33 of the Journal had not yet been published.

2.6.2 International Review of Administrative Sciences

The International Review of Administrative Sciences (IRAS) is a prestigious journal of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) published four times yearly in three editions: English, French and Arabic. Compared with the International Journal of Public Administration whose focus is largely on the American public administration theory and practice, IRAS is open to academics and practitioners from all regions of the world. In one of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences Monographs the purpose of the Institute, which is represented in more than one hundred countries, is succinctly explained as follows:

IIAS is an international organisation with a scientific purpose. It exists to advance the study and practice of public administration and public management. The Institute operates at a global level and is funded by states world-wide; but is independent of any of them and, through its links with the United Nations, seeks to develop a voice and a vision that is neutral, as objective as possible and grounded in the exigency of the fact. (Petroni & Cloete 2005: v)
Scholarship pedigree and the scientific outlook of IIAS naturally influence the quality of intellectual content of the journal, which promotes pluralism in public administration discourse. It is therefore expected, in the context of the foregoing, that the journal would not promote theories and practices of particular countries to the neglect of others in engaging with a myriad of public administration issues. Between the periods 2001-2010 38 issues of IRAS were published and articles contained in them that bear relevance to the object of this study were selected and analysed, starting from volume 67 to 76 of the journal. At the time of this review the Issues 3 and 4 of the journal in 2010 had not yet been published.

The articles in the journal whose topics contain key concepts such as governance, public governance, good public governance, good local governance, and good governance show a semblance of relevance to the object of the study. These key concepts were used as guides to bibliographic search by means of which about 26 relevant articles published in different volumes of the IRAS were identified. The articles were analysed to acquire scientific insights into how the Public Administration scholarship as recorded in the journal conceptualises good governance and whether such conceptualisations could be instructive in determining the meaning of the concept in the context of NEPAD. The result of such review analysis is that not even a single article reviewed in the journal published during the period specified deals specifically with NEPAD whereas good governance is dealt with largely as a principle rather than a concept.

However, some articles attempt to engage good governance and their contribution to the body of knowledge on the object of this study is invaluable, whereas others are empirically and contextually irrelevant and do not offer much intellectual insight on the object of this study. Bovaird and Loffer (2002: 07-24) and Metcalfe and Metcalfe’s (2002: 267-286) articles, respectively concerned with various aspects considered as important to benchmarking of good local governance and tools for good governance, make an important contribution to the body of knowledge on good governance in the body of Public Administration scholarship.

In examining various approaches to the study of governance and how the concept and practice of governance is connected with public administration and public management, Olowu (2002: 345-353) similarly makes a significant scholarly contribution, which is mainly theoretical, to the contemporary discourse on governance. Olowu (2002: 345) argues that “the rediscovery of governance in public administration discourse has enriched the
This accentuates the point that governance in general and good governance in particular, is an important dimension of Public Administration. Olowu (2002: 345-353) does not consider the meaning of good governance as a concept to determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.

Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002: 511-531) add to the governance discourse in their article that deals with “multifaceted nature of governance reforms in failed states, and the complex interplay of political and technical factors”. An important point that they propagate, which could serve the intellectual cause to develop a Public Administration understanding of good governance in the context of NEPAD, is that “appropriate incorporation of sometimes conflicting values and agendas and democratic processes to maximise effectiveness can contribute to bringing the conceptual and practical aspects of promoting governance reforms…” (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2002: 511). A lesson that could be drawn in this argument is that engaging in the scholarship business of appropriating meanings to elusive intellectual phenomena such as good governance is a challenging adventure that sometimes may seem insurmountable. This perhaps explains the reason in most scholarly contributions that good governance is, as robustly argued above, dealt with mainly as a principle rather than also as a concept from an incorrect premise that presupposes universality in terms of the applicability of the meaning of the concept.

De Vries (2002: 599-618) looks at the changing trends towards governance and away from government in the context of the Netherlands. A detailed conceptual analysis of governance, government and, also in particular, good governance, to demonstrate their distinctions, is not given to provide a theoretical framework for the discourse. The approach of the article is mainly historical rather than theoretical. The article does not assist much in the search for the meaning of good governance.

Well thought though the intention is to fill the void as pointed out in the foregoing, Bovaird and Loffler’s (2003: 313-328) article is spot-on in that, in its evaluation of the quality of public governance, it correctly examines the meaning of governance and good governance, and the dimensions of public good governance. This approach is important in that it provides a conceptual framework to engage issues that relate to measuring good governance. This article is important and could certainly help in the attempt to develop the meaning of good
governance in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective as it discusses how this phenomenon can be measured in different contexts around the world.

Bouckaert and Van de Walle (2003: 239-343) take the discourse on measuring good governance further by comparing measures of citizen trust and user satisfaction as indicators of good governance. A central argument in the article (Bouckaert & Van de Walle 2003: 239-343) is that:

...current attempts to measure trust and satisfaction in government are misleading if they claim to be measuring good governance for two reasons. First, satisfaction is difficult to measure and very service-specific. Second, trust in government is easier to measure but its linkage with good governance are [sic] far from clear. Even when trust in government can be measured, it is not at all clear whether changes in the level of trust are actually influenced by government-related factors. Trust could be insufficient but necessarily part of a set of indicators which are unnecessary but sufficient for good governance.

As this study is not necessarily about the meaning of good governance, one may ask why Bouckaert and Van de Walle’s (2003: 239-343) article is given such prominence. The reason is that the issues that they raise on good governance are fundamentally important and intellectually stimulating. They add a fresh perspective in the governance discourse. Their contributions greatly assist in enriching the quality of conceptual engagements on the issue of good governance, which may be used to construct a Public Administration perspective on the concept within the context of NEPAD. So is Knack, Kugler and Manning’s (2003: 345-364) article, which also deals with issues of measuring governance, and Bovaird and Loffler’s (2003:313-328) article as referred to earlier in the exposition above.

Knack, Kugler and Manning (2003: 345) “summarises progress made in a World Bank Initiative funded by the UK [United Kingdom] Department for International Development to test and develop policy-relevant and politically acceptable quantitative indicators of governance”. An attempt to measure good governance is necessary to determine the outcome or transcendence effect of the actions of government, which is emphasised in the substantive democratic strand as a key variable in the conception of good governance. Subramaniam (2003:471-481) sums up the relevance and importance of governance as an important
dimension of public administration worth consideration particularly in the development
discourse. This is clear in the assertion that “any worthwhile development has to be sustained
and sustainable over the long term; the major support for such sustenance in any modern
organised society comes from the process of [good] governing” (Subramaniam 2003: 471).

Subramaniam’s (2003: 471) argument follows the same logic of the crafters of NEPAD that
good governance is a sine qua non for sustainable development in Africa. But, the question
still is, what is good governance? This article does not particularly delve into conceptual
analysis of good governance. It, however, raises intellectual consciousness by cautioning that
“sustainable development and quality governance, [which some prefer to call good
governance] sound deceptively simple concepts”. These concepts are complex because of
their contextual relativism.

On Japan’s governance model, Kudo (2003: 483-504) only describes Japanese administrative
reform along the imperatives of the New Public Management (NPM). The contribution does
not deal with the theoretical and conceptual issues of governance. Benhamadi (2003: 505-
519) also, in the article on governance and diversity, does not reflect on the conceptual and
theoretical antecedents of good governance. The article focuses only on the management of
diversity in the Canadian public service as a means towards achieving good governance. It is
not clearly explained what the article means by good governance. However, deducing from
the style and logic of the discourse, it appears that the article’s engagement with good
governance, as is also the case in Kudo’s (2003: 483-504) article referred to earlier, gravitates
more toward the neo-liberal paradigm or the procedural democratic strand.

Haque (2004: 271-290) and Hofmeister and Borchert (2004: 217-232) consider governance in
the context of partnership between government and civil society; between government and
private sector respectively. Haque (2004: 271-290) reflects on the contemporary debates on
governance in the context of partnership between the state and non-governmental
organisations; and “explains the forms and dimension of such partnership in the case of
Bangladesh”. Within the discourse on public-private partnership in Switzerland, Hofmeister
and Borchert (2004: 217-232) deal with what is called a new governance approach, which is
about “public-private governance”. Their article is concerned “with proposals to launch a
code of conduct for public-private governance and present some initial ideas for a public-
private governance model, which looks for sustainable outcomes” in public administration.
In the *Public-private partnerships: from contested concepts to prevalent practice*, Bovaird (2004: 199-215) considers good governance in the context of the discourse on public-private partnerships. This article is re-published twice in volumes 1 and 2 of Bevir’s collection on *Public governance*, as referred to above. Bovaird (2004: 241) defines *good governance* as “the implementation by multiple stakeholders of quality of life improvements through agreed principles and processes of working together”. The definition is conceived within the context of determining the role, objectives and performance management systems of different stakeholders in the PPP arrangements. It is technicist in its approach to conceptualise *good governance*.

Haque (2004: 271-290) and Hofmeister and Borchert (2004: 217-232) deal with modalities rather than conceptual issues of *governance* from the public-private sector and civil society partnership perspective. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the societal-state nexus dimension and the state-market nexus dimension are implicated in Haque (2004: 271-290), Hofmeister and Borchert’s (2004: 217-232) engagement with the modalities of governance. These dimensions are explained in the epistemological framework developed to review the body of Public Administration scholarship as part of the *eclectic strand* and are critically important in understanding *good governance* as a multi-dimensional concept.

Mafunisa (2004: 489-469) takes the debate further in the article that looks at the role of civil society in promoting good governance in South Africa. The article argues that good governance is a cornerstone of reconstruction and sustainable development. This is consistent with, or rather similar to, Subramaniam’s (2003: 471) contention referred to earlier about the centrality of good governance in promoting sustainable development. The notion of *sustainable development* is emphasised in the *substantive democratic strand* as an important variable in the conception of *good governance* which is concerned with the *ends* of the concept.

Mafunisa’s (2004: 489-496) contribution to scholarship on the subject gravitates towards a paradigm embedded in civic activism tradition that propagates the view that civil society is central in conceptualising and understanding *good governance*. It puts more emphasis on the societal-state nexus dimension of *good governance*. Mafunisa’s engagement with *good governance* is not located within the context of NEPAD and is considered largely from the
empirical rather than conceptual perspective. In Astier’s (2005: 133-150) article, although reference in its topic is made to global governance, the content of the discourse is not related to the object of this study. Bovaird’s (2005: 217-228) article is more relevant to this study. It specifically deals with governance as a key concept and observes that its emergence in the public domain is relatively new, “although the concerns which it embraces are age-old” (Bovaird 2005: 217).

Bovaird’s (2005: 217-228) article “traces the evolution of the concept and maps the contours of its current position in public administration” and makes an important observation, which is largely the reason that prompted this study, that [good] governance is a “contested concept, both in theory and in practice”, although “there are already many attempts to delineate its dimensions more clearly and to assess how well it is being achieved in different contexts” (Bovaird 2005: 217). Bovaird (2005: 217) concludes the discourse with a philosophically challenging statement set to engage the Public Administration scholarship on governance for sometime as follows:

> Public governance principles are being incorporated within legislation but there is a need for proportionality – such principles need to be weighed against cost-effectiveness considerations. It is unclear whether we are moving to a future in which government remains the key player in public governance or whether we might move through “governance in the shadow of government” to self-organising policy and service delivery systems – “governance without government”.

This statement is intellectually challenging and one expects it to be taken up by other scholars to further the discourse on governance generally and good governance in particular. However, a series of articles on governance that followed the publication of Bovaird’s (2005) article did not further the discourse on governance issues raised above. Instead, De Vries’ (2005: 405-424) article investigates patterns of generalised trust among political and administrative leaders in 18 countries. A critical point that relates to the study De Vries (2005: 405) propagates is that “in order to enhance practices of good governance, one needs a society in which policy-making is relatively effective and that has adequate problem-solving capacity”. This perspective is largely concerned with the means rather than the ends of the concept good governance.
In Azmat and Coghill (2005: 625-638) the importance of good governance as an imperative of development in the developing countries is emphasised. Their article focuses on Bangladesh. It looks at the effect of the absence of good governance on the success and sustainability of the market-based reform in the agriculture sector. Various indicators generally recognised as the most effective measurement tools of governance across the world such as accountability, rule of law and control of corruption were used as analytical tools to deal with the issue of good governance and market based-reform. These indicators of good governance are subsumed in the procedural democratic strand and are largely limited to the formal aspects of democratisation. They are concerned with the means rather than the ends of the concept good governance.

In Birner and Wittmer (2006: 549-572) the notion of “collaborative governance” is introduced, which is ostensibly similar to Haque (2004: 271-290), Hofmeister and Borchert’s (2004: 217-232) propositions on the modalities of governance referred to earlier. Using Guatemala’s forest administration as a case study, the Instituut Nacional de Bosque (INAB), Birner and Wittmer (2006: 549-572) reflect on what is termed innovative public sector reform option, which is about delegation of authority to an independent agency that is jointly managed by professionals from the public sector, the private sector and civil society. Birner and Wittmer’s (2006: 549) notion of collaborative governance is implicated in the societal-state nexus dimension and state-market nexus dimension of eclectic strand. In the context of these dimensions, the discourse on the meaning of good governance is based on the state ability and capacity to forge strategic partnerships with the civil society and private or business sector in the pursuit of a shared vision of promoting the welfare of the citizenry.

The majority of the articles related to the object of this study in the IRAS as reviewed in this part of the chapter deals with the issues of governance precipitately from the neo-liberal perspective or what Argyriades (2006: 155-170) calls “market models of governance”, although some attempted to bring into the equation the civil society imperative as another critically important variable that needs to be considered in conceptualising good governance. The articles did not unpack the concept good governance within the context of NEPAD. Their context for scholarly engagement with good governance is largely neo-liberalism, which propagates the notion of “market model governance”. This notion of governance could be associated with the market imperative dimension of good governance, which advocates
the importation of private sector principles, managerial practices and private sector involvement in the provision of public services. It is based on the philosophy of market fundamentalism and is associated with the procedural democratic strand.

Argyriades’ (2006: 155-170) article cautions against the “market model governance”, which, seemingly, the contemporary Public Administration scholarship seems to have accepted as the definitive answer to public sector reform particularly in the developing countries. This intellectual mindset and scholarship approach is robustly contested in the article in that it legitimates “coercive isophormism”, which means imposing solutions “on developing countries without any regard to the institutional context and administrative capacity in each particular case” (Argyriades 2006: 155). Although Argyriades’ (2006: 155-170) article does not also specifically examine good governance in NEPAD, it sets an important context for discursive engagement to develop a Public Administration understanding of the concept in the context of this contemporary African development initiative.

Johnson and Gudergan (2007: 583-596) deal with the governance of public-private partnership in the context of Australian experience. In this governance is used in a strictly technical sense. This article is concerned with governance as an empirical object rather than good governance as a concept. Likewise, Kuditshini (2008: 195-216) and Tamekou’s (200: 217-234) articles do not make reference to good governance. They examine global governance and the National Governance Programme (2006-10) in Cameroon respectively. In Samarutunge, Coghill and Herath (2008: 677-702) governance is dealt with in the context of the 2004 Tsunami as a system of institutions, policies, rules and regulations in terms of its response to crisis situations, not as a concept. The article does not make reference to good governance. This is also the case in Kernaghan’s (2009: 239-254) article, which examines integrated governance as one of the variants of good governance.

Johnson and Brinkerhoff (2009: 585-607); Moloney (2009: 609-627), and Brassard (2009: 629-648) deal with governance in the varied contexts of the subjects of their engagements, but not as a concept or in a manner that relates it to good governance. Kim (2009: 555-563) deals with the question of aid as a good governance conundrum. In this Kim calls for a more realistic discourse on this subject away from its constriction in the aid discourse. Ormond (2010: 219-238) deals with the issue of sustaining political will for public governance
change. The concept of public governance is not defined and its relation to good governance is not determined.

2.6.3 **African Journal of Public Administration and Management**

The *African Journal of Public Administration and Management* (AJPAM) is described in sub-section 2.5 above. The focus of AJPAM is on public and development administration and management in Africa. AJPAM shares a similar focus with the *Administratio Publica*, which is reviewed below. Like the *Administratio Publica*, it differs with other journals as reviewed in this chapter in that its focus is not, according to its aim, only on public administration and management issues, both as theory and practice, but also deals with aspects of development. AJPAM is produced annually in Nairobi, Kenya.

The articles published between the periods 2001-2009 in AJPAM were analysed to determine the extent of their consideration of the issue of NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective and how, specifically, the good governance imperative of NEPAD is dealt with. It transpires in the analysis that, during the period under review, only one article, which was contributed by Kuye in the 2006 edition of the journal, dedicates its discourse to NEPAD.

Kuye (2006: 67-78) uses targeting policy as a Public Administration approach to implement NEPAD. This is an important contribution, particularly within the context of the fact that, as already mentioned earlier in this chapter, not much that is scholarly has been written about NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective. On the issue that relates specifically to the object of this study, Kuye (2006: 69) contends that policy targeting could support the NEPAD imperative of good governance. In the attempt to explain good governance, Kuye (2006: 69) relies mainly on the official conception of the concept as expressed in the official documents of NEPAD and AU, which neither brings new insights that differ from the neoliberal propositions on the meaning of the concept nor provide a framework for contextualising the concept to African realities.

This is in spite of an important point made that “most developing nations utilise systems which may not really address the needs of local concern” (Kuye 2006: 68). A reason for this is often the result of trying to understand African challenges particularly on the issues of governance using foreign paradigms and conceptualisations. On the meaning of good
governance in NEPAD, Kuye (2006: 69) only states that “the issues of democracy and good governance have a bearing on the rule of law, the equality of all its citizens, the sustenance of the principles of equality of opportunity for all and the adherence to the principles of the separation of powers, while at the same time, maintaining the independence of the judiciary”. This perspective gravitates more towards the theoretical and philosophical antecedents of neo-liberalism. It is therefore located within the procedural democratic strand, whose conception of good governance is limited to the formal and procedural aspects of liberal democracy.

In the article on enhancing sustainable governance and development in Africa Forge (2007: 68-79) acknowledges the conceptual problématique character of good governance. In conceptualising good governance Forge synthesises the procedural aspects of democracy with those of substantive democracy. This means Forge’s conception of good governance adopts an eclectic approach. The article is not located within the discourse on NEPAD. For, as pointed out above, it is only Kuye’s article that is situated within the NEPAD discourse. The articles in the 2008 and 2009 editions of the journal are found not relevant to the subject of the review. At the time of this review the 2010 edition had not yet been published.

2.6.4 African Administrative Studies

African Administrative Studies is a journal of the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for development (CAFRAD), which is a Pan-African intergovernmental organisation established in 1964 by African governments with the support of UNESCO. CAFRAD is defined as “the first uniquely Pan-African training and research centre in the continent for the improvement of public administration and governance systems in Africa” (African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development 2006). With its journal published twice per year, CAFRAD “is devoted to the study, research, dissemination and exchange of knowledge and information on all aspects of public administration and management” (African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development 2006).

A search for contributions relevant to the object of this study as published in the African Administrative Studies resulted in the identification of six articles, which were found through extensive analysis of African periodical literature database. Mulikita (2002: 01-12), Dlamini
(2002: 13-24), Musa (2005: 29-33), and Alabi’s (2009: 61-78) articles deal with the question of good governance in Zambia, Swaziland, and Nigeria respectively. In the article entitled *Entrenching good governance in Zambia’s public administration: challenges and opportunities*, Mulikita (2002: 04) makes it clear that “no attempt will be made to coin yet another definition of good governance”. The article moves from the premise that *good governance* represents “the ideological triumph of neo-liberal capitalist paradigm over the socialist/Marxist model at the end of the 1980s”. Mulikita (2002: 01-12) does not make any contribution towards the theorisation and conceptualisation of *good governance* from the African perspective.

The article seems to have accepted the neo-liberal conception and theorisation of *good governance*. The consideration of *good governance* in Mulikita’s (2002: 01-12) article is exactly as conceptualised by the International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is in spite of the fact that the article is published in the journal of a Pan-African intergovernmental organisation. Musa’s (2005: 29-33) article on *good governance* and the democratisation process in Nigeria does not differ with that of Mulikita in its approach to the concept of *good governance*. The article uncritically accepts the conceptualisation of the concept by the World Bank and does not add any fresh insight into, or alternative perspective on, how this concept could be understood.

Mulikita (2002: 01-12) and Musa’s (2005: 29-33) approaches to *good governance* exemplify the hegemonic influence of Eurocentricism on African scholarship characterised by preoccupation with influential trend in current thought rather than developing alternative epistemological frameworks that can be used to develop contextual understandings of scientific phenomena. This epistemological practice is related to Mushni and Abraham’s (2004: 10) *homogenisation thesis*. Mulikita (2002: 01-12) and Musa (2005: 29-33) do not make any reference to NEPAD, which is the context of the object of this study.

Dlamini’s (2002: 13-24) article on *Ethics, accountability and good governance* does not make any significant contribution to the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. The consideration of *good governance* in Dlamini’s (2002: 13-24) article is only as a *principle* rather than a *concept*. Bandora and Mulikita’s (2005: 70) article on *APRM and quest for capable public administration in Africa in the 21st century: issues and challenges* is relevant to the object of this study in many respects. For APRM is hailed as the custodian of
good governance, which is emphasised in NEPAD as a *sine qua non* for sustainable development.

The article considers *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective. It is contended in the article that good governance is a core element of a capable democratic state underpinned by a capable and result-oriented public administration. Bandora and Mulikita’s (2005: 59-70) article does not venture into a conceptual analysis of *good governance* to determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration. Good governance is, instead, dealt with in the article as an empirical object. Alabi (2009: 61-78) focuses largely on local governance in Nigeria. The term local governance is not defined whereas good governance is not mentioned in the article. In this article reference to NEPAD is not made. At the time of this review the 2010 editions of the journal had not yet been published.

2.6.5 *Administratio Publica*

*Administratio Publica* is a journal of the Association of Southern African Schools and Departments of Public Administration and Management (ASSADPAM) produced biannually. Its aim is to promote interest in and study of Public and Development Management and Public Administration. The journal differs with the others as reviewed above in that its focus is not, according to its aim, only on Public Administration and Management issues, but also on aspects of development. As a Public Administration and Management journal with a developmental focus, one assumes that the articles published in it would naturally concentrate more on developmental issues mainly from the Public Administration and Management perspectives. Indeed, some articles published in the different editions of the journal managed to bring the dimension of development into the mainstream Public Administration and Management discourse. However, the consideration of developmental issues in the field has not yet reached a point where the development approach could be considered a paradigm in the study of Public Administration.

In all the articles published in the journal between the periods 2001-2008 only three, including the guest editorial of the 2008 edition, are found to be relevant to the object of this study. At the time of this review the 2009 and 2010 editions of the journal had not yet been issued. In the guest editorial of 2008 edition Auriacombe (2008: ii) states that Public
Administration scholars should acknowledge “the consequences of New Public Administration and emerging evidence of the critical role governance plays in determining societal well-being”. This perspective appears to have been influenced by Jocelyn Bourgon’s 5th Braibant Lecture in the *International Review of Administrative Sciences* of 2007, which challenges Public Administration scholars to construct a new theory for the discipline. In responding to this challenge, Auriacombe (2008: vii) writes that “it is also necessary to extend the scope of the debate to the concept of governance as a contextual influence that shapes the practices of public administration in the same way as already established perspectives in public administration, although in different language”.

With such a profound context for the discourse, one expected a more theoretical and conceptual perspective on, because of its relations to governance, good governance and what it means or ought to mean from a Public Administration perspective. This is so especially that a reference in the editorial page is made to Frederickson (2004: 11-12), whose work questions whether the use of the concept of good governance provides an opportunity, or impedes, theorisation activities in the field. The guest editorial is not particularly forthright in conceptualising, and theorising about, good governance. This is in spite of the fact that the guest editorial prefaces an important discourse in South Africa which Cameron (2008: 43-68) eruditely spearheaded, which laments lack of theorisation in the field of Public Administration as an academic discipline. Auriacombe (2008: iii) was surely constrained by the fact that the guest editorial merely introduces issues discoursed in the journal rather than necessarily contributing to the debate on them.

In the same edition Cloete published an article entitled *Impact of the governance paradigm shift in South Africa: reflections on public administration and management research, 1990-2007*. The article reflects on public administration and management research in South Africa and other important academic and government initiated events that necessitate the rethinking of the theoretical and practical focus of the discipline. The expectation is that the article would unpack what is meant by a ‘governance paradigm’ and reflect on the theoretical and conceptual aspects associated with the discourse on governance and good governance. This is not particularly clear in the article. However, Cloete’s (2008: 19-42) article is a very important contribution to the body of knowledge in the field as it clearly discusses factors that influenced the development of the discipline in South Africa.
In the article dealing with the alternative service delivery mechanisms, Thornhill (2008: 117) states that the “concept governance has entered the literature of Public Administration in the 1980s”. A detailed conceptual and etymological analysis of governance is not provided. Its relationship with good governance is not made. It is only stated that governance is a difficult concept to define (Thornhill 2008: 105-128). In spite of this, the issues discussed in the said articles are critically important and relevant to the contemporary discourse on service delivery. In all the three articles reviewed in the foregoing reference to NEPAD is not made and good governance is not sufficiently considered as a concept in their discussions.

NEPAD is a topical issue in the contemporary development discourse on Africa’s development, which also needs to be considered from the Public Administration perspective. Much of the discourses on NEPAD are concerned with the economic and political dimensions of the initiative. The Public Administration dimension of NEPAD is not given substantial scholarly consideration. In examining the issue of Public Administration research, Wessels (2004: 168-187) emphasises that a topicality of an issue researched is one of the critical aspects used in the evaluation of scientific contributions. The articles should “address topics that are central to or on the cutting edge of the field” (Wessels 2004: 174), which, undoubtedly, NEPAD is, particularly in so far as its implication for Public Administration is concerned.

2.6.6 Politeia

Politeia is a refereed journal produced and published by the Departments of Political Science and Public Administration and Management at the University of South Africa (UNISA). According to the University of South Africa on-line journals’ web page, this journal “is one of only two South African academic journals devoted to both political sciences and public administration”. The aim of this interdepartmental scholarly publication is to promote the study of, and interest in, the political sciences and science of public administration. The articles contained in the different volumes of the journal from 2001-2010 are reviewed to determine the extent of their consideration of good governance and NEPAD.

Lutabingwa, Sabela and Mbatha (2006: 73-88), Cloete and Auriacombe (2007: 192-206), Bauer and Motsamai (2007: 159-178), and Mangu (2008: 01-24) that are found to be relevant to the object of this study. Masango (2002: 52-65) examines public participation as a critical ingredient of good governance. The article deals with good governance as a principle rather than a concept. Its engagement with good governance is not located within the NEPAD context and gravitates more towards the homogenisation thesis. It uses the procedural democratic strand parlance in engaging with the concept good governance. Compared with Masango’s (2002: 52-65) contribution, Hussein (2003: 79-80) attempts to clarify the meaning of good governance. It starts with a succinct reflection on the historical context of the concept [good governance] focussing on its evolution in the development discourse.

Hussein (2003: 79-80) states that the concept good governance “was first used by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies in the late 1980s and was understood as mere donor conditionality”. In much of the existing literature unanimity exists around the point that Hussein (2003: 79-80) makes (see for example the works of, among others, Abrahamsen 2000: ix, 25, 30; Randall & Theobald 1998: 40; Landell-Mills & Seralgeldin 1991: 15; and Hassen 2005: 117). Good governance “is now being recognised as the reform that underpins all other reforms and is a major subject in Africa”. It is emphasised in NEPAD as a prerequisite for sustainable development.

Hussein (2003: 80) explains that good governance “is a multi-dimensional concept; the interrelated dimensions of which include the political, institutional and technical dimension”. This is underscored in the eclectic strand. The aspects subsumed as comprising the political dimension of good governance are “decentralisation, legal and institutional frameworks, accountability, transparency, and popular participation” (Hussein 2003: 80). In the epistemological framework developed in this study, these aspects comprise the procedural democratic dimension of eclecticism. In the existing literature so far reviewed attempts to define good governance in most instances are circumscribed to the political dimension of the concept, which is about “a form of political authority that exists in a country” (Hussein 2003: 80). The definition of good governance in the context of the political dimension of the concept is made in the existing literature in terms of the elements or aspects that underpin the democratic governance (Hussein 2003: 80).
In some instances some of the democratic elements or aspects that comprise the political dimension of *good governance* are often considered as being more important than the others in various definitional perspectives on the concept (Omiya 2000: 197 & Sharma 2000: 178 – whose works are not reviewed for the purpose of this chapter but vividly authenticate the observation made in the foregoing). As far as the other dimensions of *good governance* are concerned, Hussein (2003: 80) explains that “the institutional dimension is concerned with the ability to manage and get things done through institutional mechanism” whereas technical dimension “focuses on resource constraints and the technical know-how concerning efficient and effective utilisation of resources in quality service delivery and economic development”. Hussein (2003: 80) links the *means* and *ends* of the concept *good governance* in the conception of its meaning.

The imperatives of decentralisation, legal and institutional frameworks, accountability, transparency, and popular participation; the ability to manage and get things done through institutional mechanism; technical know-how concerning efficient and effective utilisation of resources are all the *means* that should translate into quality service delivery and economic development as the *ends* of the concept *good governance*. Hussein’s (2003: 79-93) article makes an important contribution to the discourse on the meaning of *good governance*. However, it is not located within the NEPAD context. The article examines good governance and decentralisation at the local level in Malawi, which is the context of its discourse.

Looking at NEPAD to determine whether it is the appropriate strategic imperative to realise the African Renaissance, Matthews (2003: 62-77) makes reference to good governance. It is considered as one of the fundamental components of the African Renaissance, which “places emphasis on the importance of the promotion and consolidation of systems of governance that are democratic and well run” (Matthews 2003: 65). Leaning largely towards the *Africanist* conceptualisation of the African Renaissance, Matthews (2003: 62-77) appears to dismiss NEPAD as a neo-liberal economic framework not grounded in African theories and philosophies of development. The implication embedded in Matthews’(2003: 62-77) contention in so far as the concept of *good governance* in NEPAD is concerned is that it is a neo-liberal construct, whose meaning is the same as the one propounded by the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Makgetlaneng (2004: 33-50) examines NEPAD and the penetrated nature of the socio-political and economic system of African countries. In this article Makgetlaneng argues that “a concrete understanding of the penetrated nature of the socio-political and economic systems of African countries - a characteristic feature of being Africa’s dominated dependence – on the developed countries – and the failure of African political leaders to solve this problem is of crucial importance in understanding the New Partnership for Africa’s Development”. Makgetlaneng’s (2004: 33-50) article does not consider the public administration imperative of the African countries, also as a penetrated system. This omission in a way makes the discourse incomplete.

The penetration of African countries by developed countries and the extent of the phenomenon of imperialism with its consequences cannot only be explained in terms of socio-political and economic systems. This phenomenon penetrated each aspect of human life in Africa. It is in this context that one expected Makgetlaneng (2004: 33-50) to extensively reflect on the phenomenon of intellectual imperialism, which is about a penetrated intellectual system, with specific reference to good governance in the context of NEPAD. Good governance has always been consistently defined within neo-liberal paradigms by the developed countries and the multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for Africa without any serious consideration of the continent’s contextual peculiarities. The African scholarship is generally not rigorous in rejecting this intellectual imperialism (see Maserumule & Gutto 2008). Makgetlaneng (2004: 44-45) only states that:

\[
\text{The issue of good governance which is regarded as a necessary requirement for increased foreign investment is the issue African leaders must settle with the masses of Africa. It is not the issue they should spend time and energy negotiating with leaders of developed countries.}
\]

In this one could decipher a very important point Makgetlaneng (2004: 45) makes that Africans should assume intellectual authority particularly in engaging with the meaning of concepts that are often bandied about to purportedly define Africa’s course of development such as good governance. Although this point has not been dealt with extensively in the discourse on the nature of socio-political and economic systems of African countries, it could be instructive in the construction of Africa focussed epistemological framework for engaging
with issues that pertain to the trajectory of development on the continent (Africa) such as *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

Barichievy, Piper and Parker’s (2005: 370-393) research paper that assesses participatory governance in local government in South Africa does not make any reference to the concept of *good governance* and NEPAD. This is in spite of the fact that the concept of *participatory governance*, which they deal with from an empirical perspective, is one of the dimensions of *good governance* and democracy that emphasises the importance of citizen participation in the decision and policy-making processes of government. In Lutabingwa, Sabela and Mbatha (2006: 73-88) the notion of *shared governance* is explored to determine its feasibility in the traditional leadership and local government nexus. As is the case of the participatory governance that Barichievy, Piper, and Parker deal with in their contribution, *shared governance* is also an important aspect of *good governance*. However, reference to this concept is not made in the article. NEPAD is also not considered.

Bauer and Motsamai (2007: 159-178) consider the concept of *good governance* in their article, which focusses on the observance of democratic governance practices in human rights and democracy-orientated NGOs in Lesotho. In that part of the article that sets the conceptual framework of the discourse, a distinction between *governance* and *good governance* is made. This conceptual exercise is important for clarification purposes especially in that some scholars often use these concepts interchangeably as if they are synonymous. Bauer and Motsamai (2007: 162) “observe that there is vital links between *governance* and *good governance*”.

*Governance* is defined as “how decisions related to achieving certain goals are taken and with how key relationships are maintained and feedback is provided” whereas *good governance* is said to be “action orientated in the sense that it links the process within the framework with actions” (Bauer & Motsamai 2007: 162). In expatiating on the meaning of *good governance*, Bauer and Motsamai synthesise the procedural aspects of democracy such as the rule of law, participation, transparency and accountability with sustainable development as the *transcendence effect*. The notion of *sustainable development* appertains to the substantive aspects of democracy. The conceptualisation of *good governance* from this perspective is framed in the context of *eclectic strand*. 
Bauer and Motsamai’s (2007: 159-178) consideration of *good governance* is not located within the context of NEPAD. Neither is Cloete and Auriacombe’s (2007: 192-206) article on governance and transparency in South Africa. In this article the definition of *good governance* is exactly the same as the one Cloete (2003) proposed in the book *Strategic management support technologies in the public sector*. This book, including particularly how good governance is conceptualised, is reviewed above. Like Matthews (2003: 62-77) and Makgetlaneng (2004: 33-50), Mangu’s (2008: 01-24) article on state reconstruction, leadership legitimacy, and democratic governance in Africa makes reference to NEPAD, the AU and APRM. NEPAD is the programme of the AU which uses the APRM as a mechanism to ensure that the good governance agenda of this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development is realised. The article makes reference to good governance, but not in a manner that examines its meaning as a concept. Mangu only states that the twin objectives of NEPAD “are to eradicate poverty and foster socioeconomic development, in particular, through democracy and good governance” (2008: 16).

### 2.6.7 *Journal of Public Administration*

In South Africa a *Special Edition of the Journal of Public Administration* [Vol.37 no 3.1] was produced in 2002 as, according to Vil-Nkomo (2002a: 282), “a small contribution to the NEPAD challenge”. The contributions focus on NEPAD. The *Journal of Public Administration* is refereed and published by the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM) on a quarterly basis. The aim of the *Journal* is to “further the understanding of the theory and practices of public administration and management by publishing peer-reviewed articles, case studies, exemplar profiles, viewpoints and research results from practitioners of all grades and professions, academics and other specialists on a broad spectrum of administrative concerns regarding local, provincial, national, and international affairs” (*Journal of Public Administration* 2002: Item 2 and 3).

In the *Editorial Page* of the 2002 3.1 *Edition* of the *Journal*, Vil-Nkomo (2002a: 281), as a guest editor, makes a point that “good governance emerges as a challenge for development on the African continent”. A cue from this editorial commentary creates the impression that some of the contributions in the *Journal* would, as part of the intellectual process of discoursing NEPAD, specifically devote much of their focus to the concept *good governance*.
and give it a contextual meaning. This *Special Issue of the Journal of Public Administration* comprises six articles and four viewpoints.

The articles by Heath (2002: 327-254), Links and Gama (2002: 306-326), Muthien and Khosa (2002: 326-391) and Schoeman (2002: 254-364) and viewpoints of Enoki (2002a: 392-397), Fraser (2002: 398-404), Hopwood and Lodder (2002: 412-416) are more focussed on the economic dimension of development in NEPAD and do not address the issue of *good governance*. Dogonyaro’s (2002b: 284-292) article makes a cursory reference to the political administrative dimension of development in the context of a discussion on the development of human capital to advance the objectives of NEPAD. *Good governance* in Dogonyaro’s article is not specifically mentioned or considered. Vil-Nkomo’s (2002b: 293-305) article, which examines the type of African leadership needed for NEPAD to succeed, deals with issues of democracy and political governance from a wide-ranging perspective. The article does not specifically and adequately deal with the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

This *Special Issue of the Journal of Public Administration* was compiled from the presentations made at the conference hosted in South Africa by Mafube Events and Communications, South African Broadcasting Corporation and Faculty of Economic Sciences at the University of Pretoria in April 2002. Its theme was *Unpacking NEPAD: Opportunities for Business, Entrepreneurs and SME Communities*. The aim of the conference was to engage with the NEPAD initiative to acquire a clear insight into what it entails. The papers presented at the conference, which eventually were published as articles in the said *Special Issue of the Journal of Public Administration*, are not embedded in the mainstream Public Administration discourse. Their engagements with NEPAD are pursued purely from the business perspective. This is in spite of the fact that these articles are published in the *Journal of Public Administration*.

In addition to the *Special Issue of the Journal of Public Administration* dedicated specifically to NEPAD, other special and regular issues published between the periods 2002-2010 contain articles on NEPAD and/or on various issues related to the object of this study. In Cloete’s (2002: 438-452) article elements of *good governance* are considered; and, this concept is conceptualised “as the achievement by a democratic government of the most appropriate development policy objectives to sustainably develop its society, by mobilising, applying and
co-ordinating all available resources in the public, private and voluntary sectors, domestically and internationally, in the most effective, efficient and democratic way”.

This conception of *good governance* is exactly the same as the one propagated in Cloete’s (2003) book *Strategic management support technologies in the public sector*, which is reviewed above. Cloete’s (2002: 440) disquisition is not expressed within the NEPAD context, but is so ingeniously articulated that it could be instructive in the quest for a contextual meaning of the concept *good governance* in NEPAD. Kroukamp’s (2004: 185-199) article deals with network management and demonstrates how this practice could enhance local management and governance in a NEPAD environment. Initially presented as a paper in the SAAPAM conference, this article makes an important contribution to the contemporary discourse on the development of Africa particularly in so far as innovative ways of successfully implementing NEPAD are concerned. Kroukamp (2004: 186), like Cloete (2002: 440), makes an important observation that could be relevant in the attempts to conceptualise the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD:

*Most governance concepts highlight the arrangements and collaboration in which public as well as private, and voluntary sectors aimed at solving societal problems and creating societal opportunities.*

In this quotation one could easily deduce that Kroukamp’s (2004: 186) perspective gravitates towards *societal-state-market nexuses* dimensions, which emphasise that *good governance* should be understood on the basis of forging strategic partnership with civil society and private or business sectors based on a shared vision of promoting the welfare of the citizens. This is similar to Birner and Wittmer’s (2006: 572) notion of *collaborative governance*, which is explained above. Kroukamp’s (2004) article was initially presented as a conference paper in the SAAPAM conference of 27-28 November 2002, whose theme was *Good Governance Challenges of NEPAD*.

In Kuye’s (2004: 458-469) article the attempt is made to mainstream the NEPAD debate in the Public Administration paradigms. The article “explores the use of public administration approaches to targeting policy for continental development” (Kuye 2004: 458). It makes
reference to good governance in the broader NEPAD debate and does not accord a specific and a detailed attention to it with a view to conceptually determine its meaning in the NEPAD context. This article is similar to the paper Kuye (2003) presented in the International Institute for Administrative Sciences in Yaoundé, Cameroon and subsequently published in the African Journal of Public Administration and Management (AJPAM) (Kuye 2006: 68-69).

In the article published in the Journal of Public Administration that motivated this doctoral study, Maserumule (2005a: 194-211) puts it to the community of scholarship that the concept good governance in NEPAD is used without much intellectual efforts to contextualise its meaning to befit the philosophical antecedents of this contemporary development initiative in Africa. The intention was to invoke rejoinders from scholars in the field to gauge whether the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD is a researchable area of study in the existing body of knowledge. Since the publication of the article, the validity of the observation that Maserumule (2005a: 194-211) made was never challenged. This is considered as an indication, or rather a suggestion, of acceptance by the community of scholarship of the existence of lacuna in the existing body of knowledge on the contextual meaning of good governance in NEPAD.

Maserumule’s (2005a: 194-211) article examines the political-administrative dimension of the concept good governance in NEPAD from a conceptual perspective. In this article important contributions to the body of knowledge on the meaning of good governance are made. As this article was published as part of the reading for this study, its theoretical and philosophical propositions are considered in Chapter 7 of the thesis, which focusses essentially on the attempts to answer the question about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.

The articles on, or related to, NEPAD, published in the subsequent editions of the Journal of Public Administration did not specifically deal with the observation Maserumule (2005a: 194-211) made about a lack of contextual understanding of the meaning of good governance in NEPAD. Mukamunana and Kuye (2005: 590-604) engage a very important component of NEPAD concerned with good governance in Africa, which is the African Peer Review Mechanism. This article generates important innovative ideas necessary for NEPAD to succeed particularly in so far as its Peer Review Mechanism is concerned. Good governance
is consistently mentioned in the discourse of the article as a fundamental principle necessary for sustainable development on the continent. Mukamunana and Kuye’s (2005: 590-604) article does not examine good governance as a concept to develop a contextual understanding of its meaning in NEPAD for Public Administration.

Schalk, Auriacombe, and Brynard (2005: 496-521) article is not concerned with NEPAD, but is related to it in that it examines the successes and failures of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with the intention to draw lessons for the African Union (AU). NEPAD is the programme of AU; a review of this article for the purpose of this study is therefore appropriate. In engaging with the OAU and AU, the article makes a very important point that “unlike the OAU Charter, the AU founding principles” emphasise the importance of good governance on the continent (Schalk et al 2005: 504). The article does not, in relation to good governance, make reference to NEPAD. This is also the case with Fourie’s (2006: 43) article examining the application of good governance in public financial management.

In another article that examines how the financial control measures could enhance good governance, Fourie (2007: 733) argues that “a sound system of internal financial control is one of the key elements of good governance”. Fourie states that “good governance depends on accountability” and “requires clear areas of responsibility and a clear understanding of the relationships between the departments’ stakeholders and delivery outcomes”(2007: 733, 742). It is stated that “good governance gained prominence during the eighties which was shaped by international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF report(1994) highlighting the economic crises confronting the Third World countries and specifically the Sub-Saharan Africa” (Fourie 2007: 741).

Fourie’s approach in discoursing good governance is technicist. It is limited to the administrative dimension of good governance in a financial management context and deals with it largely as a principle rather than a concept. A reference to NEPAD is not made. In the article on re-thinking Pan-Africanism Ijeoma (2007: 179-194) makes reference to NEPAD and good governance. In this article Ijeoma argues that the AU and NEPAD could achieve the Pan-African ideological goals and objectives in the new millennium if properly applied. Ijeoma cautions that the biggest challenge of this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development is NEPAD’s good governance imperative in terms of creating a common understanding of its meaning in a continent as diverse as Africa. A proposition on what could
possibly be considered in the attempt to determine the meaning of the concept in the heterogeneous context of the continent is not offered.

Rahim’s (2007: 298-316) article, whose title bears some relevance to the subject of this review, does not make reference to either good governance or NEPAD. In the article that examines civil society and citizen participation in governance processes in Zimbabwe IJe and Mapuva (2008: 124) state that, among a myriad of other critically important developmental issues, good governance “attracted international attention” and is emphasised by the global civil society as an imperative that the “nations of the world have made concerted efforts to uphold”. The article does not determine the meaning of good governance as a concept or make reference to NEPAD in dealing with the issue of civil society or citizen participation in the governance process in Zimbabwe. This article, like many other others as reviewed in this chapter, appears to move from the premise that there is a common understanding of the concept good governance in the contemporary development discourse.

In the article that compare, from the analytical perspective, the leadership roles of Nigeria and South Africa on NEPAD, Ijeoma (2008: 141-159) reiterates the observation made in the article published in 2007, as reviewed above, that the challenge facing NEPAD revolves around its good governance agenda. Good governance is dealt with as a principle and no attempts are made to venture into its analysis as a concept. The same is the case in Nzimakwe’s (2008: 44-58) article on the value of civil society participation in governance. In this article Nzimakwe (2008: 44) states that participation in governance “is a key cornerstone of good governance”. To this effect Nzimakwe (2008: 51) determines how civil society contributes to democracy and good governance, which is considered as a principle. The article does not consider good governance as a concept in the context of NEPAD.

Kuye and Kakumba’s (2008: 631-645) article on development initiatives and global governance makes reference to good governance. In this article it is observed that good governance “continues to capture a generous attention in a wider socio-economic and political spectrum of policies and decisions, both at national and international level[s]” (Kuye & Kakumba 2008: 631-632). Perhaps what is more important in the article, for the purpose of this review, is the observation that there are several positions on what constitutes good governance. However, as Kuye and Kakumba (2008: 632) point out, “there are common
denominators that explain the term”. Those common denominators are embedded in neo-liberalism and are largely concerned with the procedural aspects of democracy.

Kuye and Kakumba (2008: 632-633) succinctly contrast neo-liberal and Africanist thinking on good governance and correctly observe that this concept is lately being linked to sustainable growth and development. The concept of sustainable growth and human development is subsumed in the idea of substantive democracy. There is a shift in thinking on good governance from it being defined only in terms of the procedural aspects of democracy to that which also considers its substantive disposition. This aspect is dealt with extensively in Chapter 4 of the thesis. Kuye and Kakumba (2008: 631-645) did not necessarily engage in a detail conceptual analysis of good governance. However, their article provides an important theoretical context from which good governance could be conceptualised in the context of NEPAD. The consideration of good governance in Kuye and Kakumba’s article makes reference to NEPAD as the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development.

In the article on institutional mechanisms and good governance Fourie (2009: 1114) observes that the term good governance is sometimes “applied out of context without a particular description of what it means in the given context”. This observation is similar to the one that Kuye and Kakumba (2008: 631-645) make in their article about the different positions on what constitutes good governance. Fourie (2009: 1114) defines good governance “as consisting of the various operational processes and systems which a public organisation requires to deliver services to the public”. It is pointed out that “the common thread in a multitude of definitions is that good governance in essence addresses the allocation and management of resources to respond to collective challenges such as fraud and corruption” (Fourie 2009: 1114). This perspective on good governance is similar to that propagated in the earlier article, which is reviewed above. Its conception of good governance is limited to the administrative and corporate dimensions of the concept. It addresses issues that pertain to the organisational processes and systems and relate them largely to aspects of financial management in the public sector.

In the public sector context good governance is as much an administrative and corporate concept as a political concept. The consideration of good governance in Fourie’s (2009: 1114-1123) is not located within the context of NEPAD. In Koma’s (2009: 451-452) article it is observed that “one of the strategic priorities of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) requires member states including South Africa to adhere to good governance values including but not limited to political, economic and corporate governance”. The article’s engagement with good governance focuses only on the corporate dimension of the concept making reference to various King Reports on the subject. In the public sector context good governance is a political, administrative, corporate and economic concept. Its consideration ought to take into consideration this conceptual verity. Although Koma’s (2009: 451-452) article makes reference to NEPAD, the context of engagement is not embedded in this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development.

Hartslief (2009: 327-340) examines the South African presidential participation programme called imbizo, as a mechanism to achieve participatory governance. In Barichievy, Piper and Parker’s (2005: 370-393) article in Politiea the concept of participatory governance is examined. In reviewing the article, it is stated that the concept of participatory governance is one of the conceptual variants of good governance. Its consideration in a scholarly discourse is therefore naturally expected to be located within a conceptual analysis of good governance as its conceptual foundation. Hartsfield’s article (2009: 327-340), like that of Barichievy, Piper and Parker (2005: 370-393) falls short in this regard. The article does not make reference to NEPAD.

In the discourse on what is termed “post-Polokwane political rhetoric”, Steyn-Kotze (2009: 222-233) makes reference to substantive democracy. It is stated above that subsumed in the notion of substantive democracy is the contemporary thinking on good governance that links the concept to sustainable growth and human development. By making reference to substantive democracy one thought that Steyn-Kotze would also deal with the concept of good governance. This is not the case. Steyn-Kotze’s (2009: 222-233) article does not make reference to good governance or NEPAD.

Ijeoma’s (2009b: 578-594) article on policy dilemmas and prospects towards meeting the millennium development goals (MDGs) in Africa “develop[s] a conceptual framework which may be useful to linking [them] to policies and actions of development”. The MDGs seeks to achieve sustainable development. As a concept sustainable development is at the core of the contemporary thinking on good governance. NEPAD seeks to make a contribution towards the attainment of MDGs. The MDGs’ aspects that Ijeoma discusses could be used to formulate an appropriate meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD. Dlalisa and
Mafunisa’s (2009: 688-701) article discusses the national integrity framework as a model for instilling good governance in local government. Their article does not define the concept *good governance*. Implicitly, the article assumes that there is a conceptual consensus on the meaning of *good governance*. A reference to NEPAD is not made in the article.

Tshiyoyo’s (2009: 771-779) article explains public service delivery in the Democratic Republic of Congo and makes reference to, among other important aspects in managing public affairs, governance. Although the title of the article suggests that governance, among others, would be interrogated, this is not forthcoming. In this article governance is considered as the empirical object. Its consideration does not make reference to *good governance* or NEPAD. In the article on globalisation Ijeoma (2009a: 81) addresses “some critical policy issues on this [phenomenon] and gives an overview on the expected role of the states in pursuit of a better global public administration”. To this Ijeoma (2009a: 88-89) argues that promoting visionary leadership for good governance is critically important.

*Good governance* is explained in the article “as the sum of many ways that individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affair within the state laws in the common interest of the stakeholders” (Ijeoma 2009a: 93). Ijeoma, as is clear in the articles that are reviewed above, made an important contribution to the discourse on NEPAD in the field of Public Administration. However, in this particular article on globalisation reference to NEPAD is not made (Ijeoma 2009a: 81-96). This is in spite of the fact that NEPAD is largely considered as Africa’s response to the globalisation phenomenon (NEPAD 2001:para 59-57; Kudjoe 2002; Nkuhlu 2002). At the time of this review only one issue of the journal had already been published for 2010.

2.7 Presentation of, and reflection on, the results of Public Administration scholarship review

A comprehensive literature review to determine how, or whether, Public Administration scholarship engages *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is presented in this chapter. It is explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis that the object of this study is *good governance*; the context of its consideration is NEPAD; and the dimension of the engagement or approach is Public Administration. Much of scholarship on NEPAD emerged mainly from the end of 2001, which is used in this chapter as a *terminus a quo* in the review of the Public
Administration literature. For reason of extensive coverage of scholarship on NEPAD 2010 is chosen as a *terminus ad quem*. The results of the review of Public Administration scholarship as presented in this chapter are based on the intellectual outputs that emerged from 2001 to 2010.

Because of its importance in the methodological orientation of this research endeavour, the issue of demarcation in the review of Public Administration scholarship is also explained in Chapter 1 of the study. Although it is not always possible to study all the relevant scholarly publications related to the object of this study, adequate review of scholarship is fundamentally important to enhance the epistemological validity of the propositions of a research study. Scholarship review provides a scientific base for any research activity and explains the theoretical, philosophical or empirical contexts of objects of study.

In this chapter the attempt is made to be as exhaustive as possible in the coverage of the main aspects of the object of this study by gathering and analysing as much conceptual, theoretical and philosophical insights as possible from the existing body of Public Administration scholarship, which, as reviewed in this chapter, refers to books and chapters in books, and articles published in scientific journals. Having used the epistemological framework developed in this chapter for the purpose of the review of Public Administration scholarship, it is found that a large body of knowledge in the field that emerged during 2001-2010 approaches the discourse on good governance from an empirical perspective as a *principle* rather than a *concept*. It is only in a few instances in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship that the conceptual dimensions of the concept are considered.

A very small amount of the discourse in the body of scholarship in the field makes reference to NEPAD, but not in a manner that sufficiently examines the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective. It is in the context of this that the study concludes that scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited. This means that there is a void in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship, which this study seeks to fill. As explained in Chapter 1 of thesis, the purpose of this study is to understand the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD and determine its meaning for Public Administration.
The results of the review of Public Administration scholarship are disaggregated into separate sub-sections below and, because of their importance in contextualising good governance as the object of the study and a conceptual problematique that undergirds the research question posed in the chapter, are considerably analysed and critically reflected on.

2.7.1 **Public Administration scholarship approach to the discourse on good governance as a principle rather than a concept**

The first important finding of the study that relates to the objective of this chapter is that the majority of the discourse in the field of Public Administration that emerged during 2001-2010 approaches good governance from an empirical perspective as a principle rather than a concept. It does not adequately examine the thinking on the concept good governance. It is explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis that a principle is a normative prescription of what is right or consistent with “a universal and fundamental law, doctrine or truth” (Allen 2004: 1107). It is concerned with the way things ought to be. A principle guides human action, relational existence and interactions. But, how does a principle differ from a concept?

A concept is about human thoughts or “abstractions of reality” (Fox & Meyer 1996: 11). Pauw (1999a: 11) explains a concept on the basis of its distinction from a word and a term. It is explained that “words accumulate their meanings through use in contexts” and, consequently, “may have different meaning[s]” whereas a term refers to “one or more words with a fixed meaning in a specific, usually technical discourse, not used in their ordinary language or even dictionary senses”(Pauw 1999a: 11). While a word may have different meanings and a meaning of a term is fixed, “a concept has one meaning that can be expressed by different words”. In those different words the meanings of concepts are prone to intellectual contestations. An answer to this epistemological puzzle in untangling the meanings of concepts lies in contextualism.

In the theory of knowledge contextualism is concerned with a discourse that flows logically and progresses through choice of expression taking into consideration circumstances that surround intellectual phenomena engaged in a systematic manner (Blackburn 2005: 77; McLean 1996: 109). The contexts within which concepts are conceptualised and articulated using different words determine their meanings. To understand the meaning of concepts, it is important that their contextual setting is determined and understood. A context refers to
circumstances that surround or even prompt the conception of intellectual phenomena. As McLean (1996: 109) puts it, “knowledge of the context of intellectual production is critically important in the analysis of intellectual phenomena as it may throw light on the meaning of concepts”.

Blackburn (2005: 70) explains that in the theory of conceptualism nothing is common to objects except application of the same words to them. But, do Pauw (1999a: 11) and Blackburn (2005: 70) deal with the same issue in fundamentally different ways or do their perspectives simply contrast with each other on the meaning of a concept? This is a philosophical question which, due to the specific focus of this chapter, cannot be fully explored. Suffice it to only state that words used in context give concepts contextual meanings, which are used as epistemological bases to understand principles. This means that concepts are intellectual foundations of principles that guide human action and behaviour. Or, to put it the other way round, principles are the consequences of the conceptual scheme on what ought to be their meaning in the real world. Lucidity in the meanings of concepts is fundamentally important for shaping debates and enriching the epistemological profundity of the discourses.

To maintain their power concepts must be used in their proper context. Pauw (1999b: 465) explains that concepts are “tools of thinking”; words are tools of language; contexts are “the environment or frameworks in which concepts operate”; and principles are tools of guidance (own emphasis). The context from which this study engages good governance is NEPAD and the parlance of Public Administration is a tool of language used to articulate its contextual meaning. Scholarship in the mainstream human sciences including Public Administration seems largely unanimous that good governance is a value-laden concept; elusive in nature; and characteristically nebulous. It means different things to different people, depending on the context in which it is used and the different words used in the articulation of its conception. Good governance is predisposed to ideological and political contestations prone to different interpretations and understandings influenced by the contextual idiosyncrasies of its conception (Abrahamsen 2000: 25-45; Ake 1996: 01-17; Akokpari 2005: 19; Cernea 1994: 07; Cheru 1989: 01, 13-14; Khobotlo 2003: 231; Maserumule 2005a: 198; Osei-Hwedi 2005: 22-36; Okot-Uma 2003: 283).
In the existing body of Public Administration scholarship on *good governance* as reviewed in this chapter the foregoing epistemological verity is largely ignored. The approach to good governance as a *principle* rather than a *concept* presupposes the existence of a conceptual scheme that suggests a universal consensus on its meaning. This typifies the extent of the pernicious influence of the cultural, political and economic forces of the West and the intellectual propensity of the international financial institutions, or what is called Eurocentricism, on the contemporary body of knowledge on good governance advocating it as a *policy imperative* without any scholarly consideration of it as a *concept* from other perspectives.

Its introduction as a *policy imperative* suggests that the meaning of *good governance* was presented as a *fait accompli* in the development discourse dominated by scholars attached to the First World universities “as an attempt to offer their vision of modernisation over the Marxist ones of the USSR, Communist China, and Cuba”(Gordon 2004: 79). Their thinking on *good governance* developed into orthodoxy that underpins the Western aid and development policy prescribing its application as a *principle* especially in the developing countries rather than first engaging it as a *concept* to secure a common understanding of its meaning (Leftwich 1993: 605).

In the large body of scholarship in the field of Public Administration *good governance* is accepted and advocated as a *policy imperative* prescribed by Western thinking. This epistemological phenomenon exemplifies intellectual imperialism, which scholars in the field describe differently. Maserumule (2010b: 77-94) calls it *global ipsedixitism*; whereas Clapper (2005: 183) refers to it as *learned imitationism*. These descriptions seek to explain the phenomenon of scholarship fixation with foreign paradigms characterised by total disregard of contextual setting of the objects of studies where meanings of scientific concepts are imposed by those wielding global hegemonic power and masquerade them as *ens rationis*. The validity of arguments in the context of the foregoing epistemological phenomenon is based on authority rather than reason or what in Latin is expressed as *argumentum ad verecundiam* (Blackburn 2005: 22).

To acquire a deeper insight into the contextual framework of this contention, reference should also be made to Chapters 4 and 6 of the thesis. In Chapter 4 of the thesis the evolution of *good governance* in the development discourse is discussed whereas Chapter 6 focuses on
this concept specifically in the context of NEPAD. Since its conception following the World Bank and International Monetary Fund *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (SAPS) in the 1980s most writings in the field of Public Administration as reviewed above subscribe to good governance as a *policy imperative* prescribed by these international financial institutions and do not critically consider it as a *concept* that merit rigorous consideration in the scholarly discourse. They just wrote about it largely as a *principle* on the basis of a false assumption that a common consensus on its meaning exists at the conceptual level. This is exemplification of Mushni and Abraham’s (2004: 10) notion of *homogenisation thesis*, which is associated with the *procedural democratic strand*.

As a *policy imperative* good governance in the large body of Public Administration scholarship is discoursed within the context of the international financial institutions influential trend in the current thought about its meaning as a *principle* (Cloete 2003: 11-12; Edigheji 2003: 72-73; Hassen 2003: 117). By engaging with good governance largely as a *principle* without concomitant consideration of its conceptual dimension the Public Administration scholarship ostensibly assumes the advocacy role in respect of it as a *policy imperative* prescribed by the international financial institutions. This “jeopardise(s) the unconditional character of scholarly truth” (Wessels 2008a: 277) and imperils the “credibility of science” (Edwards 2004: 277).

In the discourse on *good governance* Public Administration scholarship seems to succumb to the doctrine that no truth exists beyond that approved by the international financial institutions, which have the hegemonic power to define and impose its conception of the meaning of concepts in the body of knowledge. In agreeing with Gordon’s (2004: 79) contention as referred to above, Mulikita (2002: 01-12) asserts that good governance as a *policy imperative* represents “the ideological triumph of neo-liberal capitalist paradigm over the socialist/Marxist model of the 1980s”. The Western scholarship is instrumental in propagating good governance as a *policy imperative* “with universal developmental relevance for all cultures and societies in the modern world” (Leftwich 1993: 605; see also Gordon 2004: 79). Wessels (2008a: 278) cautions that “policy advocacy can easily lead to political correctness with the consequent vanishing of thoughts concerning the truth”.

142
Taking into account Pauw’s (1999a: 11) nifty assertion that concepts are tools of thinking, the Public Administration scholarship’s disproportionate preoccupation with good governance as a policy imperative implies epistemological retardation in the development of the conceptual base of the discipline. This is symptomatic, or a microcosm, of the skewed nature of the discourse in the body of Public Administration scholarship, which is biased towards dealing with empirical questions rather than equally considering the theoretical, philosophical or conceptual objects of scientific inquiry in the field. This has always been the shortcoming that characterised the Public Administration scholarship in the efforts to develop the discipline (Gildenhuys 1988; Frederickson 1980, 1995 & 2009; La Porte 1971; Marini 1971, 1992; Schwella 1999; Syracuse University, Department of Public Administration 2008; Theron & Schwella 2000; Tshikwatamba 2007; Kanyane 2008; Waldo 1971, 1992).

The problems that pertain to the philosophical, theoretical and conceptual grounding of the discipline, scholarship practices and patterns of engagement with scientific concepts in the field are considered as important aspects in reflecting on the results of the review of Public Administration scholarship on good governance in this chapter. They provide an appropriate contextual framework for understanding the Public Administration scholarship treatment of good governance as a principle rather than a concept. In the article published in the Public Administration Review entitled Why can’t we resolve the research issue in Public Administration McCurdy and Cleary (1984: 49-55) contend that Public Administration does not lend itself to systematic inquiry, theory-testing and building; or answer a question embodying causal proposition. It is largely orientated towards applications, not basic research. These observations are based on the analysis of 142 doctoral studies completed under the mentorship of scholars from 57 different universities in the United States (McCurdy & Cleary 1984: 49-55).

Five years after McCurdy and Cleary’s (1984: 49-55) article, Houston and Delevan (1990: 674-681) make a similar deduction in their article also published in the Public Administration Review entitled Public Administration research: An assessment of the journal publications. These American research projects assessing the state of the discipline are replicated in South Africa. In the two separate research projects Cameron and McLaverty (2008) and Wessels (2008b) evaluate the state of Public Administration scholarship in South Africa. In the article published in the Administratio Publica with a title similar to that of Houston and Delevan(1990: 678), Cameron and McLaverty (2008: 69-96) analyse 383 articles comprising
278 articles from the *Journal of Public Administration* and 105 from the *Administratio Publica* published during the period 1994-2006.


> there had been very little theory development in the discipline. Most articles tended to be practical problem-solving, which limits development and the testing of theory. In the *Journal of Public Administration* 86% of articles and 89% in *Administratio Publica* contributed towards practical problem-solving. Only 14% of the articles in the *Journal of Public Administration* and 11% in *Administratio Publica* contributed towards theory generation.

In the article published in the *Journal of Public Administration* entitled *Public Administration scholarship without condition: A South African perspective* Wessels (2008a: 285-286) makes reference to two research projects as referred to above and explains that both studies show an under-representation of research in the field of Public Administration in theory development and testing. Instead of being more reflexive in nature and questions the basis of thinking (Cunliffe & Jun 2005:227) research in Public Administration is largely concerned with empirical questions. It is not orientated towards theory-building and development of conceptual base contextual to the idiosyncrasies of the discipline. In agreeing with Wessels (2008a: 286), Clapper (2005: 185) makes this observation:

> ...Public Administration research tends to be research of government programmes, determined by political ideologies, agendas, and expediencies. Topics on the current Ph.D., Masters and contract research agendas evidently simply test whether government policies are implemented correctly rather than critically analysing the relevance of policy agendas, or definitions of correctness. The narrow research that results from such approaches, as
witnessed in most extant South African Public Administration research, is characteristically devoid of scientific rigour and tends to be descriptive rather than analytical.

The characterisation of the state of Public Administration scholarship as presented provides contextual insights into the finding of the review in this chapter that good governance in the field is engaged with largely as a principle or a policy imperative rather than as a concept. This is because of the fact that, as Houston and Delevan (1990: 678) put it, “Public Administration research is engaged in little theory testing” and development. It is set up in a manner that does not make much of a contribution to the development of the conceptual base of the discipline (McCurdy & Cleary 1984: 49-55; see also Wessels 2008a: 276-290; Wessels 2008b; Cameron & McLaverty 2008: 69-96; Cameron 2008: 43-68; Cameron & Milne 2009: 380-395). It is only in a few instances that the conceptual dimensions of good governance are considered in the body of Public Administration as reviewed in this chapter.

2.7.2 Few instances of conceptual consideration of good governance

In the context of the epistemological framework used in this chapter, it is observed that in the few instances where good governance is considered as a concept in the existing body of knowledge in the field of Public Administration scholarship is divided along three paradigms of conceptualism: procedural democratic strand, substantive democratic strand and eclectic strand. The consideration of this scientific concept in much of the Public Administration discourse often adopts an interchangeable approach by simply assuming that good governance is synonymous with governance. These concepts are used indiscriminately by some scholars whose works are reviewed in this chapter. The distinction between good governance and governance is not made (see Edigheji 2003: 72-73; Mhone 2003b: 36; Sinha 2004: 111).

The conception of good governance within the procedural democratic strand context is rooted in neo-liberal theories and philosophies. It subscribes to the international financial institutions conceptualisation of good governance coined as part of the World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) development paradigm that primarily attributes Africa’s development crisis to internal factors such as bad governance and human rights violations (Havnevik 1987). Good governance was introduced as a normative concept prescriptive of
certain neo-liberal variables used as the bases for its conceptualisation and definition in that body of Public Administration scholarship indicated in this chapter as being gravitational towards the *procedural democratic strand*. It is used to refer to a political regime based on the model of a liberal democratic polity descriptive of a democratic capitalist system propounded as being “functional for competitive and free market economies”; and, as the argument goes, “promote a prosperous and peaceful world” (Leftwich 1993: 605).

The neo-liberal variables used in defining *good governance* in the scholarship outputs of some scholars in the field of Public Administration include, among others, the rule of law, openness and transparency, efficiency, accountability, universal suffrage, human rights and freedoms (Khobotlo 2003: 231; Okot-Uma 2003: 287-294; Godbole 2003: 168; Siwar 2005: 28; Rahman & Rahman 2005: 28; Mangahas 2005: 647; Maphunye 2002: 08). These aspects are closely related to the surveillance focus of the international financial institutions over macro-economies (Camdessus 1997: iv), which also include emphasis on competent and non-corrupt public administration (Leftwich 1993: 605; Randall & Theobald 1998: 40).

The proposition of the meaning of *good governance* whose definition is constructed along the neo-liberal variables as referred to above is based on the philosophy of market fundamentalism. Using Leftwich’s (1993: 605) words, but not necessarily within the context of their usage, as a whole, the meaning of *good governance* as propagated by the international financial institutions “rests on the crucial but often unspoken assumption that although it is essentially Western in origin, it has universal … relevance for all cultures and societies in the modern world”. The conception and conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of the philosophy of market fundamentalism became so authoritative especially during the 1980s and 1990s. It assumed the proportions of orthodoxy used as a frame of reference largely in that body of Public Administration scholarship whose engagement with *good governance* as a concept is situated within the *procedural democratic strand*.

The conceptualisation of *good governance* as a concept in that body of scholarship in the field of Public Administration subsumed in this chapter as being embedded in, and gravitating towards, the *procedural democratic strand*, uncritically acquiesced to the orthodoxy as referred to above. Its theorisation and ‘philosophisation’ of *good governance* mimic in style and language the international financial institutions’ conception and conceptualisation of the concept. It does not offer fresh insight into the meaning of *good*
*governance* alternative to the international financial institutions’ conceptual framework. Its definitions and conceptualisations largely in the scholarship outputs inclined towards the *procedural democratic strand* are not necessarily located in the mainstream Public Administration discourse.

The usage of the concept from the *procedural democratic strand* perspective is obtrusive and does not cohere with the theoretical and philosophical antecedents of, and propositions within, the discipline with little intellectual efforts aimed at its contextualisation to befit the epistemological idiosyncrasies of the field. Much focus in the conceptualisation of the concept in the *procedural democratic strand* context is on the procedural or formal aspects of liberal democracy considered as being critically important variables in defining *good governance*. The aspects are more concerned with the processes of democracy rather than its substantive aspects. The process perspective on the meaning of *good governance* is largely concerned with the political economy of the concept.

Using the parlance of epistemological framework to review the body of scholarship in this chapter, the conception and conceptualisation of *good governance* within the *procedural democratic strand* context by some scholars in the field of Public Administration emphasises that the meaning of the concept lies in the aspects that pertain to its *means*. Their approach in examining the concept *good governance* is that of thinking of “meaning as itself an intrinsic value” (Metz 2001: 143). This approach to conceptualism is associated with the *homogenisation thesis*, which is about the attempts to understand scientific phenomena through “an examination of an influential trend in current thought” (Mushni & Abraham 2004: 10). The influential trend in current thought in the definition of *good governance* is that which the international financial institutions propagate with the presupposition that there is a generally agreed upon meaning of the concept (Landell-Mills & Serageldin 1991: 15).

In the development literature as reviewed in Chapter 4 and also used in Chapter 6 of the thesis it is explained that in the history of development in Africa those wielding global hegemonic power consistently imposed their understandings of meaning of development and the concepts that are associated with it such as *good governance* on the less powerful and such meanings are often accepted without any serious consideration of their contextual appropriateness. Maphunye (2002) attempts to define *good governance* in NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective, but the contextual antecedents of the effort remained
rooted in the neo-liberal orthodoxy of the international financial institutions rather than that of NEPAD. Bourgon (2003: 04) made reference to *good governance* in NEPAD in a paper presented at the Public Administration scholarly gathering in a manner that does not untangle the concept with the intention to determine its contextual meaning based on the philosophical and theoretical antecedents of NEPAD.

In their consideration of *good governance* in NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective, Bandora and Mulikita (2005: 70) do not venture into the conceptual analysis of the concept to determine its contextual meaning. The contributions of these scholars, compared to a myriad of other scholarship outputs on the subject as reviewed in this chapter, make specific reference to *good governance* in NEPAD and attempt to deal with it from a Public Administration perspective. Their intellectual attempts mimic in style and dialectical parlance the neo-liberal meaning of *good governance* and suggest that this concept ought to be understood as such. They fail to contextualise the meaning of *good governance* in NEPAD. But, does this not suggest that Public Administration scholarship fails to master the art of contextual discourse in its engagement with *good governance* in the context of NEPAD?

The usage of the concept *good governance* in NEPAD in the contributions of scholars whose works are reviewed in this chapter follows the conceptualisation logic of the international financial institutions. But is this how *good governance* in the context of NEPAD should be understood in terms of what it means for Public Administration? A failure to go beyond neo-liberal orthodoxy in conceptualising *good governance* in the discourse about its meaning may give credence to the misconception that there is a generally agreed upon meaning of *good governance* with a universal relevance to all contexts. It is misleading to talk about a generally agreed upon meaning of *good governance* as there is no evidence in the etymology of the concept that, for example, African scholarship was part of the intellectualisation process that heralded that agreement on the concept in terms of what it entails.

The limitation inherent in the homogenisation approach of Public Administration scholarship whose conceptualisations of *good governance* gravitate towards the *procedural democratic strand* is that it ignores the relative character of, and other important variables associated with, the concept. Its definitional focus on the processes and formal aspects of democratisation trivialises the significance of contextual discourse on the meaning of
concepts that are nebulous in nature. The *procedural democratic strand* is jettisoned in the writings of some scholars whose approaches in conceptualising *good governance* adopt a more substantive democratic approach based on the concept of *developmentalism* advocating the notion of state-society-market relations. The *substantive democratic strand* emerges as an alternative paradigm of conceptualism in the contemporary development discourse that some scholars, whose works are reviewed in this chapter, used in conceptualising the meaning of *good governance* (Arora 2004: 313; Cloete 2003: 15; Hayllar 2005: 611).

The Public Administration scholarship whose engagement with *good governance* is embedded in the *substantive democratic strand* emphasises aspects that pertain to the *ends* rather than the *means* of the concept in its conceptualisation. Its epistemological disposition in conceptualising *good governance* is more on the extrinsic value of the concept conceived of “as…a function of connection with something external” (Metz 2001: 137-153). It is based on the teleological conception and conceptualisations of concepts. This paradigm of conceptualism defines scientific phenomena or concepts by reference to goals or purposes. Arora (2004: 313), Cloete (2003: 15), Hayllar’s (2005: 611), Cloete and Auriacombe (2007: 192-206) conceptualisations of *good governance* fall within the *substantive democratic strand* context. It is concerned with the outcomes of the socio-economic activities of government. In the *substantive democratic strand* as a paradigm of conceptualism, *good governance* is defined in terms of *transcendence effect*.

A semblance of consensus exists in the body of Public Administration scholarship that subscribes to the *substantive democratic strand* that the *transcendence effect* in determining the meaning of *good governance* refers to sustainable human development (see Arora 2004: 313; Cloete 2003: 15, Cloete & Auriacombe 2007: 192-206, & Hayllar 2005: 611). In the context of *substantive democratic strand* as a paradigm of conceptualism *good governance* is defined on the basis of the goal or purpose of attaining sustainable human development, not the processes or procedural aspects of democracy. In the body of Public Administration scholarship whose conceptualisation of *good governance* is rooted in the *substantive democratic strand* as reviewed in this chapter, no reference is made to NEPAD.

Resulting from the critical review of Public Administration scholarship as reviewed in this chapter, another paradigm of conceptualism that synthesises the *procedural democratic strand* and *substantive democratic strand* could be observed. As explained in sub-section
2.3.3 above and for the purpose of this study, it is called *eclectic strand*. This paradigm of conceptualism combines the best elements of *procedural democratic strand* and *substantive democratic strand* in the conceptualisation of *good governance*. In the attempt to define *good governance*, Olowu (2003: 04) captures the essence of eclecticism as analytical construct in the assertion that “whether governance is good or bad is judged not only by the outcomes but also by the processes: the use of state and non-state state institutional resources to solve social problems”.

The body of Public Administration scholarship whose conception and conceptualisation of *good governance* adopts an eclectic approach follows a holistic logic of *means-ends* reasoning. It is premised on the contention that both the *means* [process] and *ends* [goal] of the concept are critically important in the conception and conceptualisation of *good governance*. In engaging *good governance* as a concept the Public Administration scholarship whose thinking is inclined towards eclecticism acknowledges that *good governance* is a multi-dimensional concept. Its conceptualisation adopts an *integrationist* approach and defines *good governance* on the basis of the interplay of various dimensions of eclecticism. This paradigm of conceptualism is associated with the *heterogeneity thesis*, which postulates that the study of scientific phenomena or concepts ought to be pursued from different perspectives to enhance the epistemological validity of the intellectual discourse.


### 2.8 Conclusion

The question that this chapter sought to examine is: *how does the contemporary body of Public Administration scholarship engage the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD?* In the attempt to answer this question, a wide range of scholarly intellectual outputs in the field of Public Administration are extensively reviewed to find out authoritative conceptions, conceptualisations and definitions of the concept; and determine whether they
befit, or are contextual to, NEPAD. 2001 is used as a *terminus a quo* whereas 2010 is *terminus ad quem* in the review of Public Administration scholarship in this chapter. The results of the review of Public Administration scholarship presented in this chapter are based on the intellectual outputs that emerged from 2001-2010.

For systematic engagement with the existing body of Public Administration scholarship on *good governance*, the epistemological framework is developed and used as analytical framework for the purpose of the review of scholarship. The results of the review indicate that a large body of Public Administration scholarship that emerged from 2001 to 2010 approaches the discourse on good governance from an empirical perspective as a *principle* or *policy imperative* rather than as a concept. It is only in a few instances in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship that the conceptual dimensions of *good governance* are considered. These results of the review of the body of Public Administration scholarship on *good governance* in the context of NEPAD are reflected upon to contextualise them in the mainstream disciplinary discourse and expatiate on various contextual aspects that pertain to their specificities.

The consideration of *good governance* as a concept in few instances in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship is divided along three paradigms of conceptualism juxtaposed as *procedural democratic strand*, *substantive democratic strand* and *eclectic strand*. The body of scholarship in the field reviewed in this chapter whose epistemological antecedents are subsumed as being situated within the *procedural democratic strand* in conceptualising *good governance* makes reference to NEPAD, but not in a way that contextually and sufficiently untangles the concept to determine its contextual meaning for Public Administration. It is determined that the conceptualisations of *good governance* in the body of scholarship in the field inclined towards the *procedural democratic strand* are not necessarily located in the mainstream Public Administration discourse. This presupposes a void or gap in the existing body Public Administration scholarship engagement with *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

The body of Public Administration scholarship that conceptualises *good governance* respectively from the *substantive democratic strand* and *eclectic strand* perspectives do not make any reference to NEPAD. Scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited. Because of its
epistemic relativism, *good governance* is prone to intellectual contestations; hence the importance of *contextualism* in examining the concept. But, what does this study mean by a NEPAD context? It is explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis that the context of engagement with *good governance* as the object of this study is NEPAD. This contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development is extensively considered in Chapter 3 of the thesis.
CHAPTER 3

UNPACKING THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT

3.1 Introduction

The context of engagement with *good governance* as the object of this study is NEPAD, whose definition in Chapter 1 of the thesis is based solely on the official literature. This type of literature does not provide adequate epistemological context for examining the object of the study. In this chapter, in-depth analysis of NEPAD is provided to determine what it is beyond the official perspective. Its objective is to unpack NEPAD as the context from which *good governance* in this study is examined. For, as explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis, the purpose of this study is to determine the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration. In Chapter 2 of the thesis it is found that scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited. The attempt to understand NEPAD is important for answering the research question that undergirds this study, which is presented in Chapter 1 of the thesis.

Various attempts to explain NEPAD in the available body of literature abound with a myriad of reflections that do not converge on sameness. Keet (2002: 04) observes that “many focus on the process of NEPAD’s formulation; others focus more on the overriding external orientation [in terms of its fund-raising strategy geared more towards foreign investment] and increased overseas development aid (ODA) to Africa [from the countries of the North]; yet other analyses combine various or all of these dimensions” (see also Adesina 2001: 01). Consistent with these intellectual trends and patterns on how NEPAD is engaged, the discourse in the existing body of literature is disaggregated into three perspectives, namely *historical-process, comparative-analytic, and philosophical-cum-theoretical* perspectives. These perspectives are used as framework of analysis in this chapter to understand NEPAD. The intention is to unpack NEPAD on the basis of its historical evolution, variations from
other development initiatives that preceded it, philosophical and theoretical antecedents. At the outset it is important to explain this framework of analysis.

3.2 **Framework of analysis**

The *historical-process* perspective examines NEPAD on the basis of its development and the process of its formulation. It historicises the evolution of NEPAD. Its unit of analytical focus is on the historical process. The *comparative-analytic* perspective attempts to understand NEPAD on the basis of the extent of its distinction from, or similarity to, the previous development initiatives. It embodies a comparative analysis and uses it as a scientific tool. Mouton (2005: 154) explains that “comparative studies focus on the similarities and, especially, differences between groups of *units of analysis*”. The *philosophical-cum-theoretical* perspective is probably the most important one, especially in so far as the purpose and objectives of this study as explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis are concerned. This perspective examines NEPAD on the basis of its philosophical and theoretical dispositions. It subscribes to the view that scientific concepts can be appropriately understood in the context of their philosophical and theoretical antecedents (Blackburn 2005: 77; Bullock, Stallybrass, Trombley & Eadie 1988: 645; Pauw 1999b: 464-465; Schwella 1999: 65).

The concepts *philosophy* and *theory* underpin the *philosophical-cum-theoretical* perspective and are often fraught with imprecision in terms of their distinction. It is important to elaborate on their meaning. *Philosophy* is important in scholarship discourse. It “is an intellectual undertaking based on reliance on a reasoning to justify claims” (Schwella 1999: 63). A philosophical discourse is concerned with thought about thought (Bullock Stallybrass, Trombley & Eadie 1988: 646); its objective is to critically evaluate beliefs, “which involves attempts to provide rational grounds for accepting(using) or rejecting (not using) beliefs which are normally taken for granted without thinking or justification”(Schwella 1999: 64).

*Philosophy* moves from a normative premise. It is prescriptive in nature (Pauw 1999b: 465). *Theory* is important for the development of science. It is an epistemic framework used to explain, in the context of social sciences, scientific phenomena. Schwella (1999: 65) explains that… “constructing theories involves an attempt to explain facts in terms of the general laws through hypotheses, which have to be tested against reality. A *theory* is descriptive in nature.
Pauw (1999b: 464) explains that the practice of theory *par excellence* is philosophy. This illuminates the level at which a theory graduates into a philosophy.

The epistemic logics of various perspectives used as analytical framework are, towards the end of the discourse, synthesised to arrive at a conclusion about what NEPAD really is. An insight into NEPAD acquired through this exercise is used in Chapter 7 of the thesis to construct an epistemological framework, as a contribution to science, which can be used to understand *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective. Such an epistemological framework is recommended in the study as an alternative to the neo-liberal paradigm obtrusively used in much of the contemporary body of knowledge on *good governance*. The framework of analysis as explained above is illustrated in Figure 3.1 below.

**Figure 3.1 Framework of analysis**

![Diagram of Framework of Analysis]

Own illustration.
3.2.1 *Historical-process perspective*

The evolution of NEPAD is inextricably linked to the inception of the democratisation process in South Africa, which, upon the demise of the apartheid system of government in the early nineties, played a prominent role in engaging the continent and the world to chart a new course of development. This is evident from Melber’s (2005: 38) observation that “with the successful democratic transition, South Africa emerged during the second half of the 1990s as a new political factor on the continent” with so much influence on the politics of development. At the beginning of the democratic system of government in 1994, Nelson Mandela, the first democratically elected President of South Africa, made an appeal to African leadership at the summit of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in Tunis for serious consideration of the need for sustainable development on the African continent. Mandela (1994) said:

> One epoch with its historic tasks has to come to an end. Surely, another must commence with its own challenges. Africa cries out for a new birth. Carthage awaits the restoration of its glory...we know it is a matter of fact that we have it in ourselves as Africans to change all this. We must, in action, assert our will to do so. We must, in action, say there is no obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing...African Renaissance.

While still the Deputy-President of South Africa Mbeki revived and popularised the notion of African Renaissance, which enthused scholars in Africa and the Diaspora to pen down a myriad of ruminations on its meaning and what it entails. For now, it suffices to explain that, in the context of this study, using a capital letter in Renaissance symbolises a particular philosophical paradigm whereas its usage in small letter or lower case is in the sense of it as a verb. After Mbeki took over as the President of the Republic of South Africa in 1999, African Renaissance became the philosophy that underpins the South African foreign policy (Dlamini-Zuma 2001). In some of the literature on the contemporary development of Africa, the African Renaissance is regarded as the philosophical antecedent of NEPAD, although some critical scholars contest this perspective. Because of its glaring importance in the discourse on NEPAD, particularly in as far as its philosophical foundation is concerned, the African Renaissance is dealt with in more detail in a separate sub-section below (Bond 2002: 62; Gumede 2005: 195-213; Landsberg s.a: 02-03; Mathebe 2001: 119-120; Melber s.a: 03).
The analysis of the contemporary body of literature on African development studies singles out Mbeki as a key player in the evolution of NEPAD. This point is, based on the extensive review of literature, argued extensively in Chapter 6 of the thesis (African Union 2002: on-line; Bond 2002: 51-81; Landsberg 2005: 12; Maserumule 2004b: 11-30; Matthews 2002; Nabudere 2002: 01-28). Landsberg (s.a: 02-03) explains that “even before assuming the position of being the President of the Republic of South Africa, Mbeki’s political vision was not only about domestic issues. Mbeki “set out to introduce the politics restoration and pragmatic justice globally (sic)...especially with regard to African-Western relations and North-South ties” (Landsberg s.a: 02-03).

Landsberg’s (s.a: 02-03) analysis of the influence of Mbeki on the continent and global stage is consistent with a plethora of perspectives that constitute the contemporary body of scholarship on the contemporary development that the continent pursues (Bond 2002:62; Maserumule 2004b: 11-30, 2004c: 81-87; Vale, s.a: on-line; Matthews 2002; Nabudere 2002: 01-28; Ubomba-Jaswa 2002: on-line). Bond (2003: 134), a prominent scholar on development studies, asks a fundamental question pertinent to the argument that the discourse of this study propagates: “can Thabo Mbeki change the world?” Bond’s analytic attempt to deal with this question is critical of Mbeki’s approach in engaging the world about the development of Africa and as such the answer proffered is not in the affirmative. In spite of this, the very reason that prompted Bond to posit the question is a clear demonstration of an influential role that Mbeki plays in the attempt to set what Landsberg (no date: 02-03) calls “a new Agenda for Africa”.

With the concept of African Renaissance, which, according to Mathebe (2001: 119-120), “offers a clear reflection of [his] political determination and will to address the desperate socio-economic and political conditions of the contemporary African societies”, Mbeki sought “a strategy for global and continental socio-economic progress”(Bond 2002: 53) that could establish “a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world, including the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations”(NEPAD 2001: 40, 70). Landsberg (s.a: 02-03) explains that in the new framework of interactions Mbeki envisaged in the vision of African Renaissance, “Africa and the industrialised countries had to be locked into a new and genuine partnership; Africa’s states had to become more democratically accountable while northern states had to recommit themselves to participating in Africa’s vast
development challenges”. It was emphasised that good governance is key to the renaissance of Africa. This is clear in Dlamini-Zuma’s parliamentary briefing of May 2001 that “[South Africa]’s foreign policy is not only anchored in [its] domestic policy, but on the responsibility that the [country] offers hope for all humanity”.

Dlamini-Zuma explains that South Africa, in its attempt to reposition post-apartheid foreign policy orientation seeks to make a contribution to a world whose value system is based on democracy, good governance, people-centred development, peace, stability and security, promotion of co-operation, partnership and good neighbourliness” (Gumede 2005: 196). This Mbeki (Gumede 2005: 196) earlier emphasised in addressing the African National Congress’ (ANC) National General Council in Port Elizabeth [South Africa] in July 2000 that :

\[
\text{When we decided to address the critical question of the ANC as an agent of change, we sought to examine ourselves as an agent of change to end the apartheid legacy in our own country. We also sought to examine the question of what contribution we could make to the struggle to end apartheid globally.}
\]

With the African Renaissance concept, Mbeki provided a context of the vision for Africa’s development, which is used as a philosophical basis to engage the world about the development of a new form of co-operation between Africa and the developed world (Gumede 2005: 195-213; Landsberg, s.a: 03). African Renaissance, as Melber (s.a: 03) observes, “managed to rally policy-makers, bureaucrats and intellectuals alike behind the idea still highly relevant as a concept of African self-respect, dignity and pride”; it provides “a philosophical basis for new policy formulation”. Mbeki traversed the “world’s political and economic centres” to, at the cusp of the 21st century, articulate Africa’s new development vision (Bond 2002: 62).

Because of [his] political acumen and the advantage of moral political authority that the ANC commanded, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Extraordinary Summit held in Sirte, Libya in 1999 mandated Mbeki to engage the developed countries on the expunction of Africa’s financial indebtedness to them as creditors. This was, according to Ngwisha (2005: 121), as a result of the “realisation that there was a direct relation between the debt crisis and development”. The argument was that, for development to take place on the African
continent, new arrangement with the developed countries that sought to alleviate Africa’s burden of debt would be “prudent” (Ngwisha 2005: 121).

In the mission to engage the developed countries Mbeki was partnered with Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the President of Algeria (African Union 2002: on-line; Ngwisha 2005: 121). At the time of OAU Summit in Sirte, South Africa and Algeria were respectively the chairs of the Non-Aligned Movements (NAM) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Landsberg (s.a: 03) explains that the mandate assigned to these countries through their leaders appeared to have been as a result of their chairpersonships of these organisations. In April 2000, the South Summit of NAM and the G-77 were convened in Cuba, Havana where various issues of development of the continent were discussed. Arising from the discussions in the Summit, concerns that pertain to the hegemony of the developed countries in their dictatorship of the trajectory for Africa’s development were raised.

Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo, the former President of Nigeria, were delegated to convey the concerns of African countries to the G-8 countries and the Bretton Woods institutions. This task was essentially consistent with the one given to Mbeki and Bouteflika at the OAU Extraordinary Summit of September 1999 in Sirte, Libya, which was about engaging the developed countries about the issue of cancellation of Africa’s external debt. As a result of this, a decision was taken in the OAU Summit held in Togo in July 2000 that the two mandates should be combined and the three Presidents were then assigned a broader task of engaging the developed countries of the North about the establishment of “a constructive partnership” for Africa’s renaissance (African Union 2002: on-line; Landsberg s.a: 03; Maserumule 2004b: 11-30).

Through its leader Nigeria was included in the mission of engaging the developed countries about the development of Africa in its capacity as the chair of the G-77 (Landsberg s.a: 03). It joined South Africa and Algeria. Olusegun Obasanjo, the former President of Nigeria, joined Mbeki and Bouteflika in the mission to explore the feasibility of establishing a constructive partnership with the developed countries of the North. In much of the available literature on the historical context of NEPAD the Nigerian influence is understated, while South Africa assumes prominence. Yet the demise of apartheid in South Africa, coupled with the collapse of military dictatorship in Nigeria, were integral in creating an intellectual space for new thinking about the development of the continent.
As Ikome (2007: 119) explains that, with “the end of military dictatorship in 1999”, Nigeria “resume[d] its continental leadership role”. The election of Olusegun Obasanjo as Nigeria’s first civilian leader after more than a decade of military rule came at the most opportune moment in the pursuit of a continental agenda” embedded in the concept of African Renaissance (Ikome 2007: 119). Kornegay (2000: 02) concurs that “with Obasanjo’s re-entry into the political scene against the backdrop of a new inter-African environment, influenced by a post-apartheid South African campaign for an African Renaissance under Mbeki, a happy convergence of the South African and Nigerian agenda began unfolding. The emphasis shifted to the notion of South-North constructive partnership for Africa’s sustainable development.

The concept of constructive partnership between Africa and the developed countries of the North was raised by the three Presidents at the G-8 Summit in Japan in July 2000. This concept heralded a new paradigm model for the development of the continent, with some scholars arguing that it is embedded in Mbeki’s vision of African Renaissance, which has such a profound global influence in thinking about Africa’s development in the 21st century. That thinking is centred on the conviction that good governance in Africa is a sine qua non for sustainable development (Bond 2002: 62; Landsberg no date: 02-03; Melber 2005: 38). Gumede (2005: 201) explains that:

"From the moment he became the ANC President, and thus Mandela’s heir apparent, Mbeki pondered the question which those in his inner circle claim cost him many a sleepless night. How was he to stamp his own image on the country’s highest office when the larger-than-life Mandela vacated it? The answer, say members of his inner circle, came to him early one morning in the cabin of an aircraft ferrying him to Europe. He would follow his natural calling to lead an economic, spiritual, social, cultural and political renewal of the entire African continent. (Gumede 2005: 201)

Bond (2002: 62) observes that Mbeki traversed the world to sell the concept of African Renaissance particularly to the developed countries of the North. In the official literature and in some scholarly body of knowledge, it is explained that the African Renaissance was concretised into a policy framework titled *Millennium Partnership for African Recovery*
Programme (African Union 2002: on-line), which, however, in the writings of other scholars is referred to with slight variance. It is referred to as the Millennium African Recovery Programme, Millennium African Recovery Plan, Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme and Millennium African Renaissance Programme (Bond 2002: 62; Landsberg no date: 03; Matthews 2002; Ngwisha 2004: 124). Irrespective of various ways this initiative is being referred to, its acronym MAP, by which it is so known, is the same in the writings of scholars on the history of NEPAD and the discourse of the study likewise refers to it as such. Nabudere (2002: 05) explains that MAP was conceived by Mbeki, but drafted with the support of Bouteflika and Obasanjo. This authenticates the contention that Mbeki was instrumental in the evolution of NEPAD.

In agreement with Bond’s (2002: 62) observation on the evolution of NEPAD, Nabudere (2002: 05) remarks that “it is interesting to note the way Mbeki went about mobilising support for his plan with the external powers even before it was drafted”. According to Bond (2002: 62), MAP was first introduced in a power point skeleton “to selected elites during Mbeki’s meeting with Bill Clinton”, the former President of the United States (US). In July 2000 MAP was introduced in the Okinawa G8 meeting and, in September the same year, at the United Nations Millennium Summit and European Union gathering in Portugal (Bond 2002: 62). With the help of several economists, MAP’s content and composition quality was enhanced. MAP was subsequently endorsed by the former President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, in an unknown venue during his special visit in South Africa (Bond 2002: 62). This was, as Bond (2002: 62) conjectures, because of “fears of the disruptive protests that had soured a Johannesburg trip by the new IMF czar, Horst Koehler, a few months earlier”. Writing in the ANC Today (2001: on-line), Mbeki confirms Bond’s (2002:62) observation about how MAP was introduced in this way:

During the year 2000, we spent sometime meeting the political leadership of the developed world of the North. Accordingly, in May we met Prime Minister [Tony] Blair and President [Bill] Clinton in London and Washington D.C., respectively. We also met the then Governor George W. Bush in Austin, Texas. In June, we were part of the Berlin meeting on progressive governance...In the same month; we visited to participate in and addressed the meeting of Nordic Prime Ministers. Again in June, we addressed the meeting of the European Council held in Portugal, which was
attended by all heads of government of the EU. In July, together with Presidents Obasanjo and Bouteflika, we met heads of state and governments of G7 in Tokyo, and had the opportunity to hold bilateral discussions with the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori. While in Tokyo, we also met the President of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn. Later, in Pretoria, we also held discussions with the Managing Director of IMF, Horst Kohler. In September, we addressed the UN Millennium Summit and had an opportunity to meet Presidents [Vladimir] Putin of Russia, among others. Before this, we had also interacted with the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who committed the UN to co-operate with us as we worked on the MAP. (Mbeki 2001: on-line)

Nabudere (2002: 06) observes that “… Mbeki refers to all his visits in the plural of we without any indication as to “with whom he carried out these earlier briefings”. In the context of the historical facts about the evolution of NEPAD as presented above, one is inclined to naturally assume that we refer to Mbeki, Bouteflika and Obasanjo. This assumption is, according to Nabudere (2002: 06), incorrect. Nabudere (2002: 06) contends that Mbeki “did all the briefings without coming to any agreement as to what should be Africa’s strategy in this endeavour with other African leaders and African civil society in general, if indeed the programme he was canvassing for was to be a truly African recovery programme”. In this contention, Nabudere (2002: 06) uses Mbeki’s words at the meeting of business leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on 28 January 2001, where in attendance for support were Olusegun Obasanjo, Ben Mkapa (President of Tanzania) and Abodoulaye Wade (President of Senegal) (Bond 2002: 63; Landsberg s.a: 03; Melber 2002: 07). Mbeki (2001) said:

We intend to brief all Heads of State over the next few months. Our aim is to be as inclusive as possible. Thereafter substantive consultations with the leader of the developed countries and multilateral institutions would take place...The implementation of the plan will commence as soon as briefings have been completed and commitments made by a critical number of African countries...Countries that are not ready will be welcome to join later.
A confluence of factors as discussed above leads to one conclusion that, as Nabudere (2002: 07) captures it, the development of “MAP was an entirely Mbeki affair, including the briefings that led to [its] drafting”. Bouteflika and Obasanjo were just mere “signed on partners” (Bond 2002: 62; see also Nabudere 2002: 07). While the development of MAP was underway, Abdoulaye Wade, the President of Senegal, and other Francophone African countries worked on OMEGA Plan (Bond 2002: 63; Landsberg no date: 03; Maserumule 2004b: 19; Matthews 2002; Nabudere 2002: 08). An attempt to find out what might have prompted the conception of the OMEGA Plan in the literature reviewed did not result into anything significant. It seems, however, that the OMEGA Plan was a strategy of the Francophone states, through Wade, to claim a part in the African leadership role of determining the direction of the contemporary trajectory of Africa’s development, which was dominated by their Anglophone counterparts through the MAP initiative (Ikome 2006: 130).

While Mbeki, as explained above, made a presentation on the MAP at the World Economic Forum on 28 January 2001 in Davos, Switzerland, Wade unveiled the OMEGA Plan at the Franco-Africa Summit in Yaoundé, Cameroon (Ikome 2006: 125; Landsberg s.a: 03; Nabudere 2002: 06). At the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, on 1-2 March 2001, Obasanjo made a presentation on the MAP to the African Heads of State while Wade presented the OMEGA Plan. These documents were endorsed by the OAU with an emphasis that, acknowledging “the synergy and complementarity that existed between” them, they should be amalgamated into one, including also the Economic Commission for Africa’s Global Compact for African Recovery (GCAR) (African Union 2002: on-line). The same presentations on the initiatives for Africa’s development were, according to Melber (2002: 07), made at the Conference of Ministers of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Algiers on 8-10 May 2001. South Africa presented the MAP, Wade presented the OMEGA Plan and UNECA presented the GCAR (Melber 2002: 07).

Akokpari (2005: 04) explains that the MAP was developed by Mbeki and its “main objective was to address Africa’s debt”. It is an initiative that was, as explained above, developed with the support of Bouteflika and Obasanjo. The OMEGA Plan was developed by Wade and its support base was rooted in the Francophone African countries. As compared with the MAP, the OMEGA Plan was, according to Landsberg (s.a: 03), “essentially an infrastructural development plan”. Nabudere (2002: 08) explains that the OMEGA Plan “identified the need to develop physical capital and human capital as the key prerequisites for sustained and
balanced growth and argued for investment needs in priority sectors to be brought under the purview of a single international authority”. Akokpari’s (2005: 04) interpretation of the OMEGA Plan is that it “was concerned with building regional infrastructure and educational projects”.

The OMEGA Plan was formally introduced in June 2001 at the International Conference of Economists in Dakar, Senegal where it was a subject of the proceedings. At the said Conference, the discussions on OMEGA Plan were mainly focussed on its “coherence, logic and feasibility” (Sall 2003 as interviewed and cited in Ikome 2006:130; see also Nabudere 2002: 08). A closer look at the MAP and OMEGA Plan reveals a great degree of congruence in terms of their vision. Nabudere (2002: 08) writes that the MAP and OMEGA Plan “were inspired by the need to launch Africa on a path of sustained growth and development at the dawn of a new century and both were based on the premise that Africa must assume the primary responsibility for that effort”. They were, as Maserumule (2004b: 19) observes, essentially similar. Nabudere’s (2002: 08) comparative analysis is in congruence with Ikome’s (2006: 130-131) summary of areas of commonality between the MAP and OMEGA Plan. The following observation on MAP and OMEGA Plan are made:

Both initiatives recognised the need for Africa to keep pace with globalisation, and reduce the development gap between it and the industrialised world. Both emphasised the importance of regional economic co-operation, and both were concerned with restructuring Africa’s economic relations with the industrialised world, particularly as regards ODA, FDI, and market access. Overall, the ultimate goals of both initiatives were to lay a durable foundation for the economic renewal of the continent and reduction of poverty. (Ikome 2006: 130-131)

Alongside the MAP and OMEGA Plan there was a GCAR, in which, as stated above, a decision was taken that it should also form part of the amalgamation of the two initiatives as it had the same objective, which was about Africa’s recovery and development (African Union 2002: on-line). GCAR is an initiative of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). It was developed in 2000, following a mandate assigned to it by the African Ministers of Finance (Akokpari 2005: 04). In much of the body of literature that deals with the historical evolution of NEPAD, GCAR is often not given much attention.

Nabudere (2002: 08-09) explains that, through the MAP, the African leaders wanted to establish a “compact”, which would commit them to a trajectory of development as envisaged and introduced in the Programme (MAP). GCAR, according to Akokpari (2005: 04), encapsulated the concept of a peer review. With GCAR, the idea was, as Nabudere (2002: 09) explains, “to lead to the creation of a Forum of African Leaders who would make decisions about sub-programmes and initiatives and review progress on its (MAP) implementation”. With reference to a statement of African Ministers of Finance, Nabudere (2002: 09) explains that the GCAR was to be a “technical rudder” that ties the MAP and OMEGA Plan together.

Nabudere (2002: 09) traces the origin of the idea of GCAR from a speech made by the Executive Secretary of the UNECA, K.Y. Amoako, at the 8th session of the UNECA Conference of African Ministers, which took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2000. In the speech, Amoako made an appeal for the development of a compact between Africa and the developed countries of the North that would herald a kind of partnership where the former commits itself to good governance and the latter reciprocates with investment of resources through aid, debt relief and opening up of their markets to engender joie de vivre in the African economies. The strategic essence of NEPAD lies in this thinking.

Following Amoako’s plea, the Conference adopted a resolution that the UNECA formulates the compact and submits it for consideration by the Joint UNECA Conference of Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Economic Development and Planning in Algiers in May 2001. It was also proposed that the Executive Secretary of UNECA (Amoako) engage all the stakeholders considered to have a strategic influence to ensure a successful implementation of the envisaged compact. In carrying out the task as suggested, it transpired that the MAP and OMEGA Plan were developed for the same purpose. Consequently, the GCAR “became an important document for cementing the two African documents together into the New African Initiative” (NAI) (Nabudere 2002: 09).
Ikome (2007: 130-134) provides a detailed exposition on the process of merging the MAP and OMEGA Plan, but the GCAR is not mentioned. This is a serious omission in a scholarly discourse on the evolution of NEPAD. GCAR is an important variable that constitutes the historical antecedent of NEPAD as Africa’s contemporary paradigm model for sustainable development. Ikome’s (2007: 130-134) delineation of the imperative of a merger between MAP and the OMEGA Plan is insightful and instructive. It relied mainly on the primary data obtained through interviews from individuals who were close to the process of amalgamation of the MAP and OMEGA Plan (Ikome 2007: 130-134).

An important point of historical significance not appropriately captured in a plethora of intellectual outputs on the evolution of NEPAD, which Ikome (2007: 131) makes, is that complementaries between the MAP and OMEGA Plan did not necessarily translate into an easy process of merger between the two. Much as the contextual setting, vision and most aspects that were emphasised as being critically important for Africa’s development were similar, if not the same, the prioritisation of issues and strategies differed (Ikome 2007: 131). A closer analysis of these documents reveals that the MAP prioritised democracy, human rights and good political and economic governance whereas the OMEGA Plan puts more emphasis on basic infrastructural development, education, health and agriculture. Ikome’s (2007:131) analysis of the MAP and OMEGA Plan makes a similar observation.

The MAP identified mainly political factors in terms of its prioritisation as being fundamentally important to sustainable development whereas the OMEGA Plan was propitiously more inclined to economic factors. The schism between the MAP and OMEGA Plan in terms of their strategies and priorities necessitated, as Ikome (2007: 131) puts it, “intensive negotiations and substantial compromises”. Shinkiaye, the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Ethiopia and African Union explains the context of contestations in the process of merging the MAP and OMEGA Plan in an interview with Ikome (2007: 131) in 2003 that:

A close reading of the ‘yellow document’ produced in October 2001 reveals lots of gaps, especially as various actors at the time were still trying to protect their respective interests and perspectives. However, after the merger, particularly after a considerable period of working together within the framework of the heads of state and government implementation committee,
greater mutual trust has developed and African leaders of the NEPAD have become more willing to make concessions to move the initiative forward – rendering the thinking behind the initiative radically different from what it was at the conception of the precursor initiatives.

The process of merger commenced in earnest in May 2001 at a Conference of African Ministers of Finance in Algiers (Ikome 2007: 132), where, as indicated above, the UNECA was, following the resolution of its Conference in Ethiopia in November 2000, supposed to submit details of the compact which Amoako talked about (Nabudere 2002: 09). The African Ministers of Finance appealed to the experts that drafted the MAP and OMEGA Plan to integrate them (Ikome 2007: 132). The importance of such integration was underscored, as succinctly pointed out above, in the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, on 1-2 March 2001 (African Union 2002). Ikome (2007: 132) summarises the contextual basis of a decision that the summit took on the imperative of a merger between the MAP and OMEGA Plan as follows:

The Summit recognised the synergy between and complementarities of these initiatives. African leaders realised that, if the continent was to be taken seriously, it had to present a single, co-ordinated initiative to its international co-operation partners – and that to have more than one initiative will be confusing to Africa’s partners, will undermine credibility, and will lead to a splitting of scarce resources, focus, and capacity. Therefore, the main motive for merging the two initiatives was to ease Africa’s dealings with its external partners.

Following an appeal by the African Ministers of Finance, experts from nine African countries – Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania and Mozambique convened a meeting on 2-4 June 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria, to thrash out the modalities for achieving a merger of the MAP and OMEGA Plan. Although the issue of a merger was considered, much of the deliberations were mainly concerned with enhancing the content of the MAP initiative, where states could still make contributions on various issues within the context of eight themes identified as being fundamentally important to achieve sustainable development. It is reported that the foregoing irked the Senegalese delegation as it countered
that it had attended the meeting of the MAP rather than that of a merger of the MAP and OMEGA Plan (Ikome 2007: 132).

The Abuja meeting of experts did not yield the anticipated results as the Senegalese delegation could not agree to a merger on the basis that it had arranged a meeting in Dakar in two weeks time to enhance the comprehensiveness of the OMEGA Plan (Ikome 2007: 132). This is in spite of the fact that the Abuja meeting of experts had taken a decision about the constitution of an integration team that was to gather at the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) in South Africa (Midrand) with a mandate to sanitise that which would have been discussed at Abuja and develop a comprehensive and coherent integrated document (South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs 2004).

The Dakar meeting as organised by Senegal to, as indicated above, fine-tune the OMEGA Plan, took place on 11-13 June 2001 with the MAP initiating states in attendance, namely Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa. This meeting seems to have engendered sanity among African states in their negotiations about the merger of the two documents. A sense of unanimity that the MAP and OMEGA Plan were feasible development initiatives prevailed. It was, however, emphasised that the continent should avoid depleting its strength with parallel development programmes. A dominant thinking was that Africa should assert itself as a united front in the face of globalisation. This boosted the process of merging the MAP and the OMEGA Plan (South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs 2004).

Subsequent to the Dakar meeting, the African countries that support the MAP, as mentioned above, including Ghana, Uganda and Libya met in Cairo, Egypt, on 18-21 June 2001 to finalise the MAP programme of action and also, with a sense of optimism after the Dakar meeting, consider the issues of a merger of the MAP and OMEGA Plan. At that time, Senegal had declared its commitment to the merger and, consequently, “a framework and procedure to guide the integration process was subsequently agreed upon” (Ikome 2007: 132-133). If the Dakar meeting laid down a firm foundation for the amalgamation process to unfold, the Cairo meeting was the apex as, afterwards, the integration process continued and the production of a consolidated document on 29 June 2001 was its culmination. The consolidated document was presented at the meeting of the MAP Steering Committee in Pretoria, South Africa, which the OAU and UNECA also attended, by experts who integrated the MAP, OMEGA and GCAR (South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs 2004).
Vigorous debates ensued and the result of this intellectual exercise was a final compilation of a common consolidated document ready for presentation at the OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, on 11 July 2001 as the new continental framework for sustainable development. It was agreed that the consolidated document should be titled *A New African Initiative (NIA): Merger of the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme and the OMEGA Plan*. GCAR is not specifically captured in the title of the consolidated document as also part of the imperative of a merger. This may create the misconception that it was not as important as other documents, which, as explained above, is not true (Akokpari 2005: 04; Ikome 2007: 133; Nabudere 2002: 08).

A reason GCAR did not feature prominently in the original title of the consolidated document is a matter that the body of literature reviewed is silent about, except some scholars only noting that it is a “little known document” (Abider 2002: 08), whereas others, in their discourse of the history of NEPAD, did not mention it at all (Ikome 2007: 122-143; see also Bond 2002: 53-81; Landsberg s.a.: 03; Maserumule 2004b: 11-32; Matthews 2002). Mama Ballad See, the Senegal ambassador to the AU, said Mbeki and Wade met in Pretoria on 7 July 2001 before the Lusaka OAU meeting and the consolidated NAI was considered and approved. The two Presidents “left Pretoria for Lusaka together to demonstrate that they were agreed on the final document” (sic) (Ikome 2007: 133; see also Landsberg s.a.: 03). NAI was officially presented at the 37th summit of the Heads of State and government of the OAU in Lusaka, Zambia, on 11 July 2001. A unanimous decision was taken at the summit for the adoption of NAI as Declaration 1(XXXVII). This cleared a way for the implementation of NAI, which was, subsequently, endorsed by the G8 members in July 2001.

Following the Declaration of the Summit, a 15 member Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) was, in a manner that ensures a representation of all the regions of Africa, appointed. Obasanjo was named the chairperson of the Committee and was to be assisted by Wade and Bouteflika, whereas Mbeki was to serve as the Secretary. The HSGIC was mandated to fine-tune NAI and, to maintain its efficiency in carrying out its task, it was decided that a Steering Committee and a Secretariat be instituted, “to be temporarily located in South Africa” (Ikome 2007: 133; see also Akokpari 2005: 04; Landsberg, s.a: 03; Ngwisha 2005: 121-122; African Union 2002: on-line; Matthews 2000; Ubomba-Jaswa 2002: on-line).
The HSGIC met in Abuja, Nigeria, to consider some modifications on NAI (Landsberg, s.a.: 03; Melber 2002: 07), subsequent to its formal adoption in Lusaka as “Africa’s principal agenda for development” (African Union 2002: on-line). Following the Abuja meeting, NAI was renamed the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which became a mandated development programme of the African Union (AU). The AU was launched officially in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002 to replace the OAU (African Union 2002: on-line; Keet 2002: 04; Matthews 2002; Ubomba-Jaswa 2002: on-line).

NEPAD is a product of confluence of the MAP, OMEGA Plan, and GCAR. It is “based on the concept of good governance in Africa in exchange for investment from the North” (Gumede 2005: 208). Good governance as the strategic imperative of NEPAD soothed the ears of the North. Gumede (2005: 208) writes that “NEPAD breaks new ground in speaking to Western democracies in Western language”. Throughout the historical evolution of NEPAD, good governance was emphasised as being key to the renaissance of Africa. The good governance imperative of NEPAD pitted African leaders against each other as it was criticised largely by the old generation of African leadership as punting towards the interests of the West. This is explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis.

NEPAD was conceptualised, developed and adopted by the African leadership. It appears, however, that the process of its development was not inclusive. It missed the opportunity to democratise development. The consultations on NEPAD were conducted largely with the international community rather than the African people in respect of whom this initiative is intended to benefit. This begs the question whether NEPAD is an African-owned development initiative or its ownership lies with the African leadership whose perspective on the development of Africa does not necessarily represent those of her people. The fundamentals of sustainable development dictate that planning for development should not only be about people, but should also be with the people. The historical evolution of NEPAD seems to have missed this important lesson.

3.2.2 Comparative-analytic perspective

As Nyong’o (2002: 07) asks, “is NEPAD an improvement on; a diversion from; or an aberration to earlier” development initiatives? Where is the point of its variation or
invariation from its precursors? These questions constitute the essence of what the comparative-analytic perspective seeks to examine in unpacking NEPAD. In the available literature on developmental issues in Africa it is clear that NEPAD is not the first initiative to address the development challenges of the continent. This is acknowledged in the NEPAD document that “there have been attempts in the past to set out continent-wide development programmes”, which, however, “for a variety of reasons, both internal and external, including questionable leadership and ownership by African themselves, have been less than successful” (NEPAD 2001: para. 42).

As Africa’s contemporary development paradigm, NEPAD claims to stand out in stark contrast with the past development initiatives (NEPAD 2001: 59), although in some instances, as is demonstrated below, some scholars contest this assertion. This makes the attempt to understand NEPAD not easy. The question that often preponderates in the contemporary development discourses and debates since NEPAD came into being in 2001 is whether it would, as compared to the early development initiatives, make any difference in the development of Africa, if, indeed, it is different.

The earliest precursors of NEPAD or previous African development initiatives are the Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence of 1973 and the Monrovia Declaration of 1979, which, in the 1980s, were followed by what Nyong’o (2002: 06) calls “a continental Marshall Plan, crafted as The Lagos Plan of Action and The Final Act of Lagos” (see also Adedeji 2002: 03-04; Mafeje 2002: 05; Olukoshi 2002: 03-13). In reaction to Africa’s efforts “to forge their future and craft their own indigenous development strategies”, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “with the support of, or at least connivance” with, the countries that provide aid to Africa, came up with counter plans (Adedeji 2002: 03-04). The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) introduced in the 1980s are a case in point (Browne & Cummings 1985:78-148). NEPAD (2001: para. 24) specifically makes reference to SAPs that they “provided only a partial solution”, which mainly “promoted reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions” without equally giving the necessary “attention to the provision of social services”.

The epistemic logic from the analyses of the impact of SAPs on the development of Africa in the existing body of scholarship is that they dismally failed (Abrahamsen 2000: 25-45; Ake 1996: 01-07; Cernea 1994: 07; Cheru 1989: 01; 13-14; Council for Development and Social
Science in Africa and the Third World Network-Africa 2002: on-line; Keet 2002: 04-39; Nyong’o 2002: 03-09; Olukoshi 2002: 03-13), although NEPAD (2001:para. 24), as compared to its precursors, puts it mildly that “…only a few countries managed to achieve sustainable higher growth under these programmes”.


These development initiatives, particularly those that emerged in the 1980s and early in the 1990s, are considered “landmark strategies which together provided the continent’s preferred development agenda…” (Adedeji 2002: 03-04). These Africa’s early development initiatives are referred to in this part of the discussion to demonstrate the extent of their variations, similarities or sameness with NEPAD. Perhaps the first important point upon which NEPAD (para. 59) proclaims its distinction from “all previous plans and initiatives in support of Africa’s development” is its strategic approach to development, which is based on the concept of *partnership* and the emphasis of good governance as a *sine qua non* for sustainable development. This is in contrast with the concept of *self-reliance*, which consistently informed most of the early African development initiatives. The early African development initiatives were mainly concerned with issues of liberation of Africa from colonialism rather than equally focussing on good governance (Tesha 2002: 17).

Dogonyaro (2002: 04) explains that the “concept of partnership was deliberately chosen by the initiating African leaders in christening this initiative to emphasise that this must be a relationship of partners, of peoples who shares a common future – both positive and
negative”. As envisaged in the NEPAD initiative the concept of partnership refers to an association of, or a relationship between and among, Africans countries, organisations and individuals with a common interest in the development of Africa (Dogonyaro 2002: 05). It is also, more importantly, about a relationship between Africa and the rest of the world, particularly the developed countries.

Partnership is a vogue concept and is increasingly preferred as being more appropriate than co-operation and compact in defining the characteristic of international co-operation required in the pursuit of sustainable development. This is in contrast with the concept of co-operation and compact which were used in some of the earlier African development initiatives. Adedeji (2002: 12) explains that “the concept of partnership conveys a relationship stronger than co-operation but weaker than a compact, which implies making binding commitments, whereas co-operation often has a non-binding effect. Compared with compact and co-operation, partnership “involves joint effort, joint responsibility, but does not always result or bring about binding commitments” (Adedeji 2002: 12).

For the concept of partnership to herald any significant paradigm shift in thinking about development in the contemporary world, particularly as it pertains to the developing countries, the developed countries should cease to “maintain their economic progress along the present lines” where “the relations between the North and the South in general and Africa in particular will continue to be characterised by a domination of the strong over the weak, a drain of resources from the poor nations to the rich, and appropriation of an increasing share of the world’s resources by those who are already prosperous”(Adedeji 2002: 12). This is a challenge that the previous African development initiatives based either on the concept of co-operation, compact or self-reliance failed to deal with. Now the question is whether NEPAD, with its strategic orientation on the concept of partnership, will succeed.

In the available literature on Africa’s development, the notion of partnership as a strategic imperative that undergirds NEPAD is informed by the success of the Marshall Plan in the development of the economy of Western Europe after World War 11. NEPAD is perceived and even defined by others as the African version of the Marshall Plan. In its original sense, the Marshall Plan is a development programme conceptualised and designed as a strategic means to rebuild the European economies destroyed during World War 11. This programme was administered by the European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), whose establishment
was sponsored by the United States (US). The Marshall Plan as a collaborative effort of the war-devastated European countries (the recipients) and the US (the donor) was based on the conviction that economic reconstruction is not dependent only on massive financial aid but also on large-scale transfer of technology. This turned the Western Europe economy around. It is contended in much of the African scholarship that NEPAD is an imitation of the European Marshall Plan (Adedeji 2002: 09; Bond 2002: 53-81; Loots 2006: 11-25).

The proposition that NEPAD is based on the European Marshall Plan suggests that this contemporary African development paradigm is a deviation from the previous African development initiatives. Adedeji (2002: 09) argues that using the Marshall Plan as a template for Africa’s development is disingenuous as that it “ignores the fundamental difference between the conditions which had prevailed in post-World War 11 Europe and those of contemporary developing countries”. Such fundamental difference lies in the fact that:

*Europe was before the war a developed industrialised market economy. What the plan did was simply to facilitate, within a time frame of four to five years, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of what had existed before the war. A favourable human factor was still in place in spite of the war. So did appropriate institutional framework and an enabling environment exist. In such circumstances a two-gap model was appropriate. But this is not the case in so far as the conditions in developing countries, particularly Africa, are concerned. What they need is not rehabilitation and reconstruction but building anew, transforming their polity and its economy and putting in place all the essential infrastructure required for development to take off and become sustained.* (Adedeji 2002: 09)

Adedeji (2002: 11) makes an observation that “it is the Africans who are claiming that they are forging a *partnership*” whereas “the other side will no doubt continue to see it as a donor-recipient relationship”. This begs the question: would the concept of *partnership* as a critical imperative in the realm of international co-operation change the *status quo* in so far as development in the contemporary world is concerned? This is asked in the context of the fact that the previous African development initiatives failed because of the North’s uncompromising position to change its economic power relations with the South. The initiators of NEPAD traversed the world in an attempt to get potential partners on board the
contemporary development trajectory. NEPAD was vigorously sold to the G8, European Union [EU], Nordic or G7 countries, United Nations, World Economic Forum and the private sector at the DFD in Monterrey and Dakar respectively (Dogonyaro 2002: 05). This is in contrast with the previous African development initiatives, which are essentially inward-looking in their approach to development.

Using a metaphor in engaging with NEPAD, Adedeji (2002: 08) cautions that the partnership arrangement for development where “the management and administration of the African initiative is entrusted to a board of directors comprising debtor and creditor representations, IMF, World Bank, European Union, Japan, USA and Canada is worrisome as it poses the danger of exacerbating “neo-colonialism rather than advance the cause of economic decolonisation”. This warning seems to have been heeded to as partnership arrangements with regard to the management and administration of NEPAD are not structured in terms of debtor and creditor representation. Perhaps, for the benefit of the reader, it is important that this aspect is explained further.

NEPAD is a programme of the African Union and the highest authority in terms of its implementation is vested in the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC). This differs from previous arrangements where the early African development initiatives were pursued under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The foundational objective of the OAU was not necessarily concerned with the pursuit of development and democracy in Africa. Its preoccupation was to decolonise Africa. This influenced most early African development initiatives pursued under its auspices. The HSGIC is a product of a Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was later transformed into the African Union (AU), formulated and pronounced at its summit of 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia. Its composition was structured in a manner that ensures appropriate representation of the African Union region. HSGIC initially comprised three states per AU region or 15 members state, namely:

- North Africa – Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia
- West Africa – Nigeria, Senegal and Mali
- Central Africa – Cameroon, Gabon, and Republic of Congo
- East Africa – Ethiopia, Mauritius and Rwanda
In July 2002 the AU Summit in Durban, South Africa, took a decision to increase representation of HSGIC with one representation per AU region. This pushed members’ state representation in terms of numbers from 15 to 20. At the end of July 2003, Ghana, Kenya and Libya were confirmed as additional members of HSGIC, following the decision of the AU Summit of July 2002 (Mkalipi 2004: on-line; NEPAD 2002: 01-96). Writing in the NEPAD Annual Report, Nkuhlu, former Head of NEPAD Secretariat, states that HSGIC is an important move to institutionalise “leadership by heads of state and government and thus gave the programme a unique character lacking in previous initiatives” (2002: 15). This point is reiterated by Olusegum Obasanjo, then the chairman of HSGIC, that, through HSGIC, African leadership assumes political ownership of NEPAD, both in terms of its management and administration (NEPAD 2002: 07-13). The previous African development initiatives lacked political clout. This point is dealt with more extensively in the discussion below.

It is further pointed out in the NEPAD Annual Report (2002: 81) that the chairpersons of the African Union Commission and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government are ex-officio members of the NEPAD HSGIC. To facilitate the work of HSGIC, NEPAD Steering Committee, comprised Personal Representatives and tasked with a responsibility to develop “Terms of Reference for identified programmes and projects; and for overseeing the work of the NEPAD Secretariat. The NEPAD Secretariat is another important structure in the management of the programme. Its functions are, as stated in the NEPAD Annual Report (2002:82), as to:

- co-ordinate the NEPAD projects and programmes;
- mobilise technical and financial support;
- facilitate and support implementation;
- provide information that promotes the programme in Africa and internationally;
- liaise with development partners, especially the developed counties and multilateral development institutions
- mobilise private sector participation
- represent the programme at development forums; and report on progress.
As put in NEPAD (2002: 81), the three-tier governing structure of NEPAD comprises HSGIC, Steering Committee and Secretariat is aimed at:

- ensuring effective political leadership of programme development and implementation;
- developing a deep commitment by African leaders to NEPAD;
- ensuring capacity for technical analysis and programme development;
- accelerating economic integration at the sub-regional and continental level; and
- engaging development partners, the international community and multilateral organisations.

From the above exposition, it is clear that NEPAD, as Africa’s contemporary development programme, is driven by the African political leadership. This is in contrast with the previous development initiatives such as LPA, which are said to have been driven mainly by technocrats or African experts (in Onimode 2004: 237). Wade (2002: 49) explains that, because of the foregoing, the 1980s and 1990s African development initiatives “were made to be put in drawers and there was not even an attempt to implement them”. The reason for this was that they lacked political clout. With NEPAD, as Wade (2002: 49) argues, the foregoing is set to change because, in contrast with the early African development initiatives, its architects are decision-makers and would therefore bequeath the appropriate political credibility to it. In continuing with the discourse on NEPAD from a comparative perspective, it is important to make reference to specific early African development initiatives in the context of their evolution.

The early African development initiative that this discourse starts to refer to in contradistinction with NEPAD is the Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence. It is explained in the existing literature that this early African development initiative is the first African attempt to address the problem of development on the continent after independence from colonialism. It was adopted in 1973 by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as “inward-looking regional development policy for the transformation and development of the African economies to correct the imbalances and asymmetries that had been created by the colonial and neo-colonial order” through “Africa’s gradual disengagement from the world economy within a framework of individual and collective self-reliance”(Tesha 2002: 17). This differs with NEPAD’s concept of partnership.
with the developed countries. The concept of *self-reliance* is based on the dependency theory. The essence of strategic orientation of this concept is more concerned with the decolonisation of Africa.

Most early African development initiatives that followed the *Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence* were modelled along a similar thinking or concept of *self-reliance*, which gravitated more towards the philosophy of Pan-Africanism and dependency theory. This is clear in the *Kinshasa Declaration on the Principle of the Establishment of an African Economic Community*, which was adopted following the *Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic independence*. The Kinshasa Declaration of 1973 was mainly a framework for regional economic integration as a strategic imperative to realise a self-reliance model of development. The philosophy of Pan-Africanism and dependency theory is explained in the discussion that examines NEPAD from a *philosophical-cum-theoretical* perspective.

Following the unsatisfactory results of these development initiatives the *Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa* was developed and adopted in 1979 as the Monrovia Declaration. It laid a foundation for the *Lagos Plan of Action*, which was adopted in 1980. In all these early African development initiatives the conceptual paradigm that informed their conception is the concept of *self-help*, which, as pointed out above, differs with NEPAD’s concept of *partnership*. The *Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa* and the *Lagos Plan of Action* were preceded by the *Economic Commission for Africa’s 1976 Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa*, which, according to Adedeji (2002: 07), was their intellectual and theoretical antecedent. This Revised Framework came with a development strategy for Africa and emphasised that it must be anchored on four principles, namely “self-reliance, self-attainment, the democratisation of development process and a fair and just distribution of the fruit of development through progressive eradication of unemployment and mass poverty” (Adedeji 2002: 07). With the exception of the concept of *self help*, some aspects in the foregoing are similar to those that NEPAD propagates. Can this perhaps be a point of similarity between NEPAD and the early African development initiatives as specified in the foregoing?
In spite of its variations with the early African development initiatives on aspects that pertain to the strategic approach to development it is pointed out in the NEPAD document that the problems that necessitated the conception of NEPAD are the same as those of its precursors. What is, however, different is that “…there is today a new set of circumstances …” brought about mainly by globalisation (NEPAD 2001: 42-43). The context of that time was informed by the attempt to correct the economic imbalances created by colonialism. Mkalipi (2004: online) observes that “the political and economic context within which NEPAD is taking place and the magnitude of challenges facing the continent [are] new”. But, does this mean that NEPAD is the same as its precursors in terms of the development issues that ought to be dealt with and is, at the same time, different in terms of the new context of the same issues as brought about by a new set of circumstances? An answer to this question is not necessarily easy particularly in the context of a plethora of perspectives that abound in the body of knowledge on what exactly NEPAD is.

As explained above, NEPAD’s fundamental objective is to eradicate poverty and position Africa on a path of sustainable development. Although expressed with different words, the foregoing has always been the vision of all previous African development initiatives. Since the first attempt of the African leadership to address the problem of development in the Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence of 1973, the issues that necessitated African development interventions have always been poverty and underdevelopment. The Monrovia Declaration of 1979, the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos of 1980, Africa’s Priority Programme of Economic Recovery (APPERR) of 1986-1990, United Nations Programme of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD), the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustments for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation of 1986 (AAF-SAP), the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development of 1990, the United Nations Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s of 1991 and the Abuja Treaty of 1991, were all concerned with the same issues. The African leadership assigned with the responsibility of preparing and implementing NEPAD contends that the fundamentals of this development initiative are not different from the previous African development initiatives (Adedeji 2002: 10).

Much of African scholarship is, however, critical of NEPAD; especially in as far as its relation with the previous African development initiatives is concerned. Keet (2002: 08) observes that, apart from the assertion that NEPAD is not different from the previous African
development initiatives, the contemporary development initiative [NEPAD] only acknowledges them in an insignificant way with only a single reference that:

There have been attempts in the past to set out continent-wide development programmes. For a variety of reasons, both internal and external, including questionable leadership and ownership by Africans themselves, these have been less than successful. (NEPAD 2001: para. 42)

In a declaration of a large African civil society meeting hosted under the auspices of the continental Africa Trade Network (ATN) and the Southern African Peoples Solidarity Network (SAPSN) in Port Shepstone, KwaZulu Natal, South Africa, at the same time when the AU was launched and NEPAD was declared as its official economic programme in Durban, it was argued that NEPAD:

ignores and sidelines past and existing programmes and efforts by Africans themselves to resolve Africa’s crises and move forward from programmes such as the Lagos Plan (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991), the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAP-1989), the African Charter for Popular Participation and Development (1990), the Cairo Agenda (1994) and others.

Keet (2002: 09) contends that “NEPAD fails to draw out the lessons to be learned on the conceptualisations and the content, or the many factors and forces behind the weak or non-implementation” of Africa’s own indigenous development initiatives and does not even reflect, perhaps as a premise of its conception, on the destructive role of the Bretton Woods Institutions. NEPAD only states that the SAPs of the 1980s provided a partial solution to Africa’s development problems. This is in contrast with the early African development initiatives especially those that evolved mainly as a direct antithesis of the Bretton Woods institutions SAPs introduced to outflank the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980.

Ikome (2007: 51) contends that the LPA “represented the first continent-wide effort by Africans to forge a comprehensive, unified approach to their continent’s economic development”. It was embedded in the dependency theory. In explaining the strategic intervention of LPA, Adedeji (2002: 05) states that “Africa’s development could not be
merely a passive result of the world system to which the continent had been bound by the historical legacies of slave trade, colonialism and the various neo-colonial associations and agreements such as the Lome and Yaoundé Conventions with the European Economic Community”. The conceptual foundation of LPA is *self-reliance* (Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, para. 2), whereas that of NEPAD is *partnership*. The promulgation of LPA marked a fundamental departure from the Eurocentric model of development, whereas some African scholars, as demonstrated below, contend that NEPAD is located within it (Adesina 2002: 13; Ikome 2007: 15-16; Keet 2002: 14; Taylor & Nel 2002: 163-168).

Compared with the *Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence* of 1973s propagation of gradual disengagement from the global economy, the LPA was more radical in the articulation of Africa’s economic relations with the developed economies. In this it appears that the LPA fundamentally differs with NEPAD. The LPA sought to achieve self-reliance through internally generated, self-sustaining economic and social development using Africa’s own resources and capacities. To achieve this, regional economic co-operation was made the centrepiece of Africa’s development (Browne & Cummings 1984: 25; Ikome 2007: 50-52) whereas in NEPAD the strategic approach is partnership with the developed economies of the world.

The idea that underpins the philosophy of self-reliance was that “Africa must actively strive to reduce its dependence on external nations and replace this dependence with a self-sustaining development strategy based on the maximum internal use of the continent’s resources (Browne & Cummings 1984: 25). Maloka (2002: 08) observes that in the attempt to examine the LPA’s philosophical foundation of self-reliance, African scholars such as Samir Amin and Kindane Mengisteab coined concepts such as *delinking* and *autocentricity*, which, respectively, imply Africa’s disengagement from the global economic processes and establishment of meaningful interdependent economic relationships. The idea was to “develop national and inter–country capacity to meet, albeit progressively, the greater part of Africa’s economic needs using only African resources” (Shaw 1996 in Ikome 2007:52). NEPAD uses the same language as LPA, but within the context of the concept of *partnership* rather than that of the early African development initiatives of *self-help*.

The LPA (1980) qualifies that its self-reliance disposition does not mean that the continent should totally cut itself off from the outside contributions. But, this appears somewhat
contradictory with LPA’s radical stance on disengaging from the global economy. The expectation in the LPA context was that the developed countries should assist the developing ones in their developmental efforts. But, is this not oxymoronic? Compared with the outward-oriented model of development, the LPA’s theoretical foundation was presented as being inward-looking based on the imperative of self-reliance (Browne & Cummings 1984: 25). It is explained in the LPA (1980) that the outside contributions or external aid should only supplement Africa’s own initiative and should not be the pillar in its development. This line of reasoning seems similar to that that seeks to rationalise the partnership approach of NEPAD in the pursuit of sustainable development.

The LPA’s qualification that disengaging from the global economy does not preclude foreign or external assistance bears some resemblances with the imperative of partnership, which underpins the essence of NEPAD as Africa’s contemporary development paradigm. NEPAD is highly criticised particularly on the “fund-raising strategy geared more towards foreign investment and increased development aid to Africa” (Keet 2002: 04) as an outward oriented model of development. Ravenhill (1986) observes that “for the most part, the plan [LPA] appears to be a little more than a plea for externally financed self-reliance” in that “rather than meeting the costs of development from internally generated resources, international donors are expected to foot the bills”.

Ravenhill’s observation, but put differently, is consistent with Amin’s (1990: 89) contention that the LPA was inward-looking only in as far as its pronouncements were concerned. Its successful implementation as an alternative development paradigm was contingent upon external aid. Tesha (2002: 18) states that “while its philosophy was essentially African, the LPA was dependent upon the good will and commitment of the international community for its implementation”. This is the same argument used against NEPAD. The outward-orientation of African development initiatives naturally exposes them to vulnerable positions (Adedeji 2002: 03-04; 2004: 236; Amin 1990: 89; Keet 2002: 14). Could this perhaps be the reason that the LPA could not withstand being countered by the SAPs?

Africa’s efforts “to forge their future and craft their own indigenous development strategies” have always been countered by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “with the support of, or at least the connivance” with, the countries that provide aid to Africa (Adedeji 2002: 03-04; see also Browne & Cummings 1985: 78-148). The LPA was thwarted

In this similarities and variations with NEPAD could be drawn. NEPAD seeks to change the African economy from being import to export-orientated. However, in contrast with the Berg Report, NEPAD argues against the exportation of raw materials to the developed economies. Because of the failure of SAPs to engender the necessary economic growth, another African development initiative entitled *Alternative African Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes* (AAF-SAPs) of 1989 was developed. The AAF-SAPs was essentially the antithesis to the model of development that the SAPs propagated. The African development initiative was developed by the United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA). It is consistent with much of the postulations of the African scholarship on the alternative Africa-focussed development paradigm (see Adedeji 2002: 03-17; 2004: 236; Keet 2002: 04-39; Kwakwenda 2004a: 03-19; Mafeje 2002: 03-16; Onimonde 2004: 20-48), which, as Adesina (2002: 13) observes, converges on the point that the neo-liberal structural programmes of the Bretton Woods Institutions:

...have reversed policies and programmes, have dismantled institutions in place since independence to create and expand integrated production across and between our economies in agriculture, industry, finance, and social services...[which] in spite of their limitations, sought to address the problems of fragmented internal markets and weak production structures, as well as the economic imbalances and social inequalities within and between nations inherited from colonialism, and aimed also to address the inappropriate integration of our economies in the global order...[but, as a result of IMF/WB interventions] the associated social and economic gains generated over this period have been destroyed.

The AAF-SAPs dismissed SAPs on the basis of its preoccupation with, or limitation to, the economic dimension of development. It emphasised that human and social dimensions of
development are also critically important in the pursuit of sustainable development. The AAF-SAPs builds on the Charter on Human and People’s Rights of 1981 and the Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER), which was adopted by the OAU in 1985. Maloka (2002: 08) explains that the adoption of the Charter took place “at the height of the reign of various forms of authoritarian rule on the continent, and was indeed a progressive development, especially in that it was informed by a comprehensive and developmentalist notion of human rights”.

The fundamental objective of the Charter was to engender the culture of human rights in Africa, which was considered a key imperative in the pursuit of socio-economic development on the continent. In contrast with the preoccupation of other early development initiatives such as the Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence of 1973, the Kinshasa Declaration on the Principle of the Establishment of an African Community of 1973, and the Lagos Plan Action of 1980, the Charter on Human and Peoples Rights introduced the imperative of political stability in the development discourse as another important aspect for consideration. The imperative of political stability is similarly emphasised in NEPAD as the sine qua non for sustainable development. This is captured in the good governance imperative of NEPAD.

Maserumule (2005a: 196-197) writes that NEPAD differs with some of the African development initiatives, especially those that were promulgated before the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, whose preoccupation has always been with the economic dimension of development. Subsumed in NEPAD’s good governance imperative is, in addition to the political dimensions, the public administration dimension of development. It is argued in Chapter 1 of the study that in the early initiatives for Africa’s development, public administration has always been given a scanty consideration. In the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development in NEPAD, the foregoing is observably no longer the case. NEPAD emphasises public administration as a fundamentally important variable in the quest for sustainable development on the continent (NEPAD 2001: para. 80-85).

Compared with the Charter on Human and People’s Rights, APPER was promulgated as the “attempt to revive the Lagos Plan of Action after five years of unsuccessful implementation initiative”, With APPER the OAU acknowledged the important role that the international community could play in assisting Africa to extricate itself from the development quagmire
that has always been characteristic of Africa. APPER committed the OAU to call up the international community through the United Nations (UN) to assist in tackling Africa’s development challenge. It identified Africa’s debt burden as one of the greatest impediments to the implementation of LPA. As discussed above, NEPAD evolved from the similar premise, that is, eradication of debt as one of the key conditions for sustainable development.

The strategic approach of NEPAD to development is, as explained above, based on Africa’s partnership with the developed countries. The basis of its rational is the same as that which informs APPER. In both NEPAD and APPER the role that the international community could play in assisting Africa in the attempt to extricate itself from the crisis of poverty and underdevelopment is underscored. At its Special Session in 1986, the UN responded positively to a recommendation for the adoption of APPER, which was subsequently converted into the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD), 1986-1990 (Adedeji 2002: 03; 2004: 236; Maloka 2002: 08). UN-PAAERD was hailed by a former United Nations Secretary-General (Maloka 2002:09):

As a unique agreement between African states and the international community, with both sides committing themselves to serious far-reaching efforts to accelerate Africa’s development process. It was the first such programme ever adopted by the United Nations, and it created major expectations for better prospects for Africa

The pact between African leaders and the international community in the form of UN-PAAERD, which the former UN Secretary-General talked about, was based on the principles of mutual commitment, responsibility and co-operation. In exchange for the aid that the international community through the UN committed itself to mobilise, African leaders made a commitment to execute a “sharply focussed, practical, and operational set of activities, priorities, and policies at national, sub-regional and regional levels as elaborated in APPER” (Maloka 2002: 09). In a similar fashion, NEPAD seeks to commit the African governments to good governance in exchange for foreign monetary assistance from the developed countries. In this respect some degree of similarities between APPER and NEPAD exist.

Tesha (2002: 18) explains that “four years after the adoption of APPER in 1985, no resources were made available for its implementation and therefore accelerated implementation of the
LPA as envisaged still did not materialise”. The international community reneged on its commitment to provide aid to Africa and this led APPER cum UN-PAAERD to fail. The Bretton Woods Institutions seized this opportunity. They pushed ahead with their SAPs to counter UN-PAAERD as the African development programme constructed in co-operation with the international community under the auspices of the UN. In drawing from these experiences some scholars predict that NEPAD, because of its dependence on foreign funding, is most likely to suffer the same fate (Adedeji 2002: 04; Keet 2002: 14).

With the failure of UN-PAAERD, further attempts to come up with the alternative development paradigm were pursued. This resulted in the AAF-SAPs. Soon after the promulgation of the AAF-SAPs, the World Bank crafted a counter plan entitled *Sub-Saharan: From Crisis to Sustainable Development – A long Term Perspectives Study* (LPTS) of 1989. The LPTS primarily attributed the crisis of development in Africa to internal factors such as bad systems of governance characterised by human rights violations (Akokpari 2005: 01).

Much as evidence to authenticate the foregoing is well-documented in the existing literature and therefore cannot be contested, the LPTS was, however, a meretricious, parochial, and superficial and biased study of Africa’s development. Its analysis and diagnosis of Africa’s development conundrum underplays other important critical variables such as “the impact of external forces and factors in the international economy” (Keet 2002:14), particularly as globalisation “became the dominant intellectual paradigm” in the 1980s (Gaye 2005:56). The LPTS is dealt with extensively in Chapter 4 of the study, which traces the first usage of the term *good governance* in the contemporary development discourse to it.

In contrast with the previous African development initiatives, especially those that came before the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, NEPAD blames Africa’s lack of orientation to the so-called “global standards of democracy” as the stumbling block to sustainable development. This reasoning gravitates more towards the LPTS’s contention that the crisis of development in Africa is a consequences of internal political factors such as a bad system of governance characterised by human rights violations. Akokpari (2005:01) writes that “in the early 1980s, the World Bank attributed sub-Saharan Africa’s lack of development to the absence of good governance”. This is the premise upon which the good governance imperative of NEPAD is based. Stephen Gelb, a South African economist who had been a
member of Thabo Mbeki’s team that drafted the earlier version of NEPAD (Melber, no date: 07) writes that:

There is some evidence that Africa suffers from being perceived by investors as a bad neighbourhood. Africa as a whole is rated as significantly more risky than is warranted by these [economic fundamentals]. Notwithstanding the evidence that the South African state has some clear dissimilarities from other states in Africa, South Africa’s growth and investment performance were affected [by poor governance on the rest of the continent]. (in Gumede 2005: 199)

This explains the tenacity of the proponents of NEPAD to good governance. Whereas some of the early African development initiatives’ pursuit of development focussed on decolonising Africa, especially those that were promulgated before the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, NEPAD focusses largely on reconstructing and developing post-colonial Africa along the imperative of good governance. Gumede (2005: 199) explains that the NEPAD approach to Africa’s development was informed, or rather influenced, by the foreign policy of the Mbeki administration. Compared with the human rights orientation and focus of the Mandela presidency, the Mbeki administration “placed more emphasis on poor governance in Africa, both political and economic, as being responsible for the negative perceptions in the investor community” (Gumede 2005: 199). Keet (2002: 14) challenges this perspective on the basis that it underplays the negative “impact of external forces and factors in the international economy” on Africa’s development.

Adesina (2002: 13) contends that NEPAD is “driven by a discourse that is based on a distorted reading of Sub-Saharan Africa’s post-colonial experience and current challenges”, which is a reflection of the thinking of “new corps of African Heads of State whose politics is defined by the global neo-liberal counter-revolution”. It is limited in interrogating the global political economy or international economic factors, which are linked to the crisis of development on the African continent (Taylor & Nel 2002: 163-168).

The contention that the external forces and factors in the international economy are reasons for Africa’s development crisis should not be misconstrued as a suggestion that internal political factors did not have any negative impact. The point that this discussion attempts to make is that both external economic factors and internal political forces constitute
fundamental reasons for Africa’s underdevelopment. The discourse in the development literature that tends to emphasise either external economic forces or internal political factors without consideration of the other borders on naivety.

The Declaration on Africa’s Development Challenges adopted at the Conference jointly organised by the Council for Development and Social Research in Africa (CODERSIA) and the Third World Network-Africa (TWN-Africa) on 23-26 April 2002 in Ghana, Accra, where prominent scholars from Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, South America and activist intellectuals in academic institutions, civil society organisations and policy institutions from 20 African countries were in attendance, concluded that:

_NEPAD, while many of its stated goals may be well-intentioned, the development vision and economic measures that it canvasses for the realisations of these goals are flawed. As a result, NEPAD will not contribute to addressing the development problems of the continent. On the contrary, it will reinforce the hostile external environment and internal weaknesses that constitute the major obstacles to Africa’s development. Indeed, in certain areas like debt, NEPAD steps back from international goals that have been won through global mobilisation and struggle._

This conclusion is substantiated through an identification of various factors considered as the fundamental flaws of NEPAD. In the Declaration on Africa’s Development Challenges, an observation is made that NEPAD “reproduces the central elements of the World Bank’s Publication of 2000, _Can Africa Claim the 21st Century and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s Global Compact for African Recovery_.” It is argued that NEPAD is embedded in neo-liberal economic policy framework and rehearses the structural adjustment policy packages of the 1980s without reflecting on their destructive effects on the development of Africa. This is a reason most critics of NEPAD depict it, in contrast with Africa’s early development initiatives, as a neo-liberal project (see Landsberg, s.a: on-line). The notion of neo-liberalism is discussed in the part of the discussion that seeks to establish the philosophical and theoretical foundation of NEPAD.

The analyses that locate NEPAD to neo-liberalism contradict definitional perspectives that it is an African-owned development initiative. Ownership in the context of the discourse of this
study should not only be understood on the basis that NEPAD has been crafted and is managed by African leadership. For, claiming ownership, as Adedeji (2002: 11) puts it, does not amount to having ownership. Ownership of a programme or any intellectual output is also, more importantly, about the contextual appropriateness of the philosophical and theoretical development paradigms that undergird its conception and inform its content. A closer look at NEPAD, particularly in so far as its strategic approach to development is concerned, gravitates towards the modernisation theory, which propounds the thesis that the development of the economies of the developing countries is contingent upon those of their developed counterparts. Its philosophical paradigm is neo-liberalism.

Compared with the pre-Lagos Plan of Action, Lagos Plan of Action and post-Lagos Plan of Action African development initiatives, which are inward-looking and whose conception is centred on the imperative of self-reliance, with its conceptual foundation rooted in the philosophy of Pan-Africanism, NEPAD appears to be a deviation from a long-established indigenous consistency and African intellectual pattern in thinking about development in Africa. It is a “liberal, market-driven, and outward-looking” initiative which “envisions a deeper integration of the continent’s economies with the global economy” (Ikome 2007: 15-16). NEPAD is consistent with the SAPs model of development based on the idea that the African economies should be integrated into the world economy and contrast the Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence of 1973s imperative of gradual disengagement from the global economy and LPA’s radical position that advocated a more complete cut-off of African economies from the international one.

Adedeji (2002: 05) observes that NEPAD, as compared with the previous African development initiatives, which, as discussed above, were always countered by the alternative development plans of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the donor community, was surprisingly well-received by the same institutions (see also Keet 2002: 14). Adedeji (2002: 05) makes a similar observation that “the NEPAD song is at present more soothing to the ears of the West than that of the LPA”. The LPA is one of the previous development initiatives which was, like NEPAD, considered as Africa’s Marshall Plan. But it was countered by the West (see Nyong’o 2002: 06). Africa’s regional strategic sectors for development as identified in the LPA such as food and agriculture, industry, human resources, transport and communications, environmental protection, science and technology
and gender are similar to those identified in NEPAD (see LPA in Maloka 2002: 37-139; NEPAD 2001; Adedeji 2002: 16).

The previous Africa-focused development initiatives were based on the principles of self-reliance, self-sustainment, socio-economic transformation, holistic development and democratisation of the development process (Adedeji 2002: 07). The principles or the strategic framework upon which NEPAD is anchored are “African ownership, responsibility and leadership and capacity-building; partnership with the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations on the basis of mutual commitments and obligations; nurturing an enabling socio-political environment by minimising conflict and promoting democracy and human rights; creating an enabling economic environment by ensuring macro-economic stability and maintaining transparency and accountability in institutional support mechanism for the market; and promoting sub-regional and continent economic integration” (Ohiorhenuan 2002: 10). The differences and similarities between the previous African development initiatives and NEPAD on the basis of the principles or strategic framework upon which they are based, as referred to in the foregoing, are clear (see Dogonyaro 2002: 03; Ohiorhenuan 2002: 10).

Conspicuous by its omission from the principles or the strategic framework that underpin NEPAD is the self-help imperative, which, as pointed out above, has always been the fundamental principle of the previous African development initiatives consistently used as a basis for their formulation. In spite of this NEPAD is, in the perspectives of mainly its proponents in the official literature and pronouncements of African leadership, tasked with the responsibility of championing the initiative, referred to as the philosophy of self-help (see Ross 2004: 03-04). This is rejected in much of the existing body of African scholarship, where, instead, NEPAD is defined as a market-driven and outward-looking development initiative whose success is pinned on the benevolence of developed countries (see Adedeji 2004: 04; Bond 2002: 53-81; Keet 2002: 14; Kwakwenda 2004: 03-19; Mafeje 2002: 03-16; Onimonde 2004a: 20-48).

The previous African development initiatives emphasise the principle of self-sustainment, which is concerned with attempts to meet the costs of development from internally generated resources. NEPAD’s strategic approach to development is based on a new partnership with the industrialised world, which is also the basis for its resources mobilisation strategy. This is
akin to the modernisation theory that development of the economies of developing countries is dependent on those of their developed counterparts.

Relying on foreign donors particularly from the industrialised world exposes NEPAD to a risk of foreign imposition of conditions for aid as *quid pro quo* for assistance. This may imperil NEPAD’s principle of African ownership and leadership, which in the previous African development initiatives, was secured through the principles of self-help and self-sustainment. In this Moyo (2002: 207) argues that “NEPAD appears to ignore the ideological dimensions of external funding and market-based model of development in a harsh globalised environment”. Moyo observes that “despite the failure of aid and transnational capital in promoting pro-poor development in Africa, the overriding concern in NEPAD appears to be access to capital rather than any moral, social and political considerations (2002: 207).

It has always been the objective of the previous African development initiatives to accelerate and deepen regional economic integration, a principle upon which NEPAD is based. The previous African development initiatives’ emphasis of regional economic integration was aimed at achieving the ideal of self-help and self-sustainment. NEPAD’s emphasis of this principle is, in contrast, concerned with enhancing the competitiveness of the African economies in the global front. The principle of regional economic integration in the NEPAD context is propagated as a basis for the integration of African economies in the global economy. This could be deduced from NEPAD’s objective of eradicating poverty and, more importantly for the purpose of the contention of this discussion, to strategically reposition Africa in the world economy to ensure that it is appropriately poised to contend with the dynamics of globalisation (see Kudjoe 2002; NEPAD 2001: para 59-67; Nkuhlu 2002).

NEPAD’s principle of anchoring the re-development of the continent on the resourcefulness of the African people is consistent with the United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF) *Adjustment With A Human Face* (AWHF) and UNECA’s AAF-SAPs, which both rejected the inhuman character of the SAPs. The AWHF and AAF-SAPs emphasised the importance of human and social dimensions of development. This thinking is reiterated in the LPTS, which contends that sustainable begins with the empowerment of people. The objective of development paradigm that the LPTS proposed was to unleash the energies of ordinary people; to empower them to take control of their lives; to make government listen to their people (World Bank 1989: 54).
The AWHF, AAF-SAPs and LTPS contend that development must be people-oriented. Ikome (2007: 14-15) argues that, in contrast, NEPAD is, however, in terms of its ideological orientation, market-driven; whereas the LPA is state-driven. NEPAD seems to be a derivative of “the dominant growth economics of the industrialised market economies with its principal concern on increasing the growth of the nation rather than the development of people. Compared with the AWHF, AAF-SAPs and CPPDT, NEPAD is emphatic on the principle of the democratisation process of development, which is mainly concerned with the political dimension of development. In this respect NEPAD differs with the pre-LPA and LPA African development initiatives but gravitates more towards sameness with the post-LPA African development initiatives such as AWHF, AAF-SAPS and CPPDT. But, as discussed above, the process of its formulation did not involve the people that it sought to benefit. It is in this respect that it appears ironic that NEPAD talks about the democratisation of the development process whereas it is not the product of the same.

In respect to the principle of a comprehensive, holistic and integrated development approach, NEPAD is consistent with the AAF-SAP’s propositions. This approach to development is based on the contention that cultural, sociological, psychological, political and administrative factors are all important dimensions of development as the economic dimension. They equally deserve adequate consideration in thinking about development interventions to address the socio-economic problems besetting the African continent (Gueye 1999: 243-265; Vil-Nkomo & Myburg 1999: 266-278).

The previous African development initiatives predating the AAF-SAP such as the Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence of 1973 and the LPA were mainly concerned with the economic dimension of development. NEPAD starkly stands out in clear contrast with the previous development initiatives, where most of them are mainly wrapped in economic reductionism. Their conceptual inclinations gravitated towards an “econo-mythical invocation” that if the economics are right, everything else will fall into place” (Cernea 1994: 07).

The economic reductionism approach to development in Africa is inadequate. Cultural, sociological, psychological, political and administrative factors are also important dimensions of development that equally merit substantial consideration in the quest for the solution of the
socio-economic problems besetting the African continent (see Gueye 1999: 243-265; Vil-Nkomo & Myburg 1999: 266-278). The previous development initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 did make reference to the political dimension of development, but not in the same emphatic manner as NEPAD, without downplaying the economic imperatives of development, does. NEPAD attempts to put emphasis equally on both the economic and political dimensions of development. Its approach to development seems holistic and this makes it fundamentally different from the previous narrow development approaches that Africa pursued, which, as pointed out above, were essentially wrapped in economic reductionism.

In its *Democracy and Political Governance Initiative*, NEPAD emphasises that, for development to be sustainable, the political and administrative imperatives of development are critically important, and along with the economic aspects, ought to always be taken into consideration when a development cause is crafted. This is clear in the contention that “development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance” (NEPAD 2001: para. 79). African leaders are enjoined by the NEPAD initiative to take joint responsibility to, among others, promote and protect democracy, human rights in their respective countries and regions, by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participatory governance at the national and sub-national levels”(NEPAD 2001: para. 49). This is consistent with the post-LPA African development initiatives such as AWHF, AAF-SAPS and the CPPDT.

NEPAD’s consideration of the political imperatives of development led scholars such as Stremlau (2002: on-line) to conclude that the initiative “is more [of] a political process than the reiteration of commitments to meet the development targets set by the United Nations Millennium Assembly”, which, in its *Democracy and Political Governance Initiative*, “addresses more politically sensitive issues”. This view, which is consistent with some of contributions made to the body of knowledge on NEPAD, deviates from the mainstream perspectives that NEPAD is a socio-economic programme crafted to strategically position Africa in the global economy and to also make a significant contribution in influencing development efforts on the continent towards the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals as adopted by 147 heads of state and governments of 191 nations in September 2000 (see also Maserumule 2005b: 194-211; Ross 2004: 01-18; Mathoho, undated: 01-14; Vil-Nkomo 2002b: 292-305).
As pointed out above, in contrast with all the previous African development initiatives, NEPAD incorporates “mechanisms for a reviewing process to ensure that mutually agreed [development] targets and standards are achieved”. Such process is called African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is a voluntary monitoring and evaluation programme. APRM marks NEPAD’s distinction from all the previous African development initiatives in the most fundamental way. It has never happened in the history of development in Africa that a monitoring and evaluation process was made part of the development initiative. The APRM is aimed at fostering the culture of good governance in Africa. The concept of good governance in NEPAD, which this study focusses on, is inextricably intertwined to APRM. Gumede (2005: 208) writes that the fundamental difference of NEPAD from “the earlier development plans is the strong focus on democracy and good governance”.

The disquisition from a comparative-analytical perspective indicates that NEPAD is consistent with the previous African development initiatives in respect of the developmental goals of eradicating poverty and addressing the problem of under-development on the continent. The fundamental variations lie in their strategic approaches to achieve the developmental goals as specified, although in some instances, particularly in far as its comparison with the post-LPA initiatives are concerned, a semblance of similarities exists.

The pre-LPA and LPA African development initiatives converge with NEPAD on miniature issues, largely in an insignificant way. The theoretical orientation of NEPAD appears to differ fundamentally with the previous African development initiatives. On the basis of the analysis from a comparative-analytic perspective, NEPAD gravitates more towards the modernisation theory, which is embedded in neo-liberalism, whereas its predecessors are premised on the dependency theory, which is embedded in Pan-Africanism. This aspect is considered in the discussion on NEPAD from a philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective to determine whether the same conclusion as in comparative-analytic perspective could be reached.

3.2.3 Philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective

Despite a conclusion from a comparative-analytic perspective as presented above, which makes reference to the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD, the existing
body of scholarship is divided specifically on this aspect [philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD]. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006: 29-30) observes that it is not clear “whether NEPAD is a true Pan-Africa development [initiative] or a part of the ideology of EurAfrica”. Landsberg and Hlope (1999: 04) make a similar observation that, “on the one hand, the African Renaissance”, which some consider as the philosophical foundation of NEPAD, “bears a close resemblance with Pan-Africanism of yesteryear as it borrows heavily from, and identifies closely with it”, whereas, “on the other hand, it departs from such Pan-Africanism, at times even radically so” (Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 04).

In the contemporary development discourse on Africa that assumes a protagonist position on NEPAD African Renaissance is considered as its philosophical foundation and is understood as being associated with Pan-Africanism and the dependency theory (Mathebe 2001: 119-120; Melber no date: 03). This differs from the conclusion arrived at from the comparative-analytic perspective in sub-section 3.2.2 above. The critique of NEPAD contends that this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development is a neo-liberal initiative embedded in the ideology of EurAfrica, which is associated with the modernisation theory. The philosophical context of the modernisation theory is neo-liberalism (Bond 2002: 62; Gumede 2005: 195-213; Ikome 2007: 69; Landsberg, s.a: 02-03). This critique is consistent with comparative-analytic perspective in sub-section 3.2.2 above that the theoretical orientation of NEPAD gravitates more towards the modernisation theory, whose philosophical foundation is neo-liberalism.

The divergence of the discourse on the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD engenders an epistemological puzzle on what this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development really is. In this part of the discourse NEPAD is critically analysed from the philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective. On the one hand the African Renaissance is critically considered extensively as some scholars argue that it is the philosophical foundation of NEPAD. On the other hand, neo-liberalism is likewise considered as critical scholarship contends that it is the philosophical foundation of NEPAD. In this attempts are also made to determine the theoretical foundation of NEPAD; hence the philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective of this part of the discourse. Towards the end a synthetic perspective is formulated. The intention of this exercise is, in a further attempt to understand NEPAD, to untangle the epistemological puzzle regarding the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD.
3.2.3.1 *African Renaissance*

In the contemporary body of knowledge African Renaissance is largely associated with the former President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki (see Bond 2002: 53; Landsberg no date: 02-03; Mathebe 2001: 119-120; Melber, s.a: 03; Gumede 2005: 195-213), who is “described by those close to him as the most substantial African intellectual to have emerged in the ANC” (The Centre for Development and Enterprise 1999: 137). Much of Mbeki’s political shrewdness and intellectual acumen is attributed to the influence of Oliver Tambo, the ANC President during its banishment, with whom he worked closely in exile in the struggle against apartheid (Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 08).

Barrell (2000: 09) explains that the concept of Renaissance had long fascinated Mbeki in as early as the 1970s while he was still a middle-ranking official in the ANC in exile in Botswana. Mbeki was “the crucial influence in persuading a group of pro-ANC activists working inside South Africa…to hold what he called a Black Renaissance Convention” (Barrell 2000: 09). A decade later, Mbeki’s articulation of the Renaissance, after the ANC assumed power in 1994, was more expanded; went beyond just a mere rallying point for political activism; and assumed philosophical heights, which enthuses scholars to incessantly pen down a myriad of ruminations on the rebirth of Africa (Maserumule 2004c: 81-87).

The concept of *African Renaissance* is, however, not a new philosophical construct in the parlance of African politics (see Mafeje 2002: 03-18; Maserumule 2004c: 81). It does have a long history in the politics of development in Africa and “has varied in form at different historical phases” (Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 02). Diop (1999: 03) writes that “any accurate definition of the concept of African Renaissance” needs “some historical depth”. The focus of this part of the discourse is on African Renaissance as a philosophy, not necessarily on its history. Its relation with the *dependency theory* is also determined. But, to understand the African Renaissance as a philosophy, its historical contextualisation is important and should, for reasons of epistemic logic, be considered as part of the discourse. However, the intention here is not to solve historical questions, but study the ideas and beliefs that undergird the *African Renaissance* by, among others, analysing concepts used to structure it as a thought to lay bare its philosophical foundations and propositions (see Blackburn 2005: 276).
Blackburn (2005: 276) explains that “in philosophy the concepts with which we approach the world themselves become the topic of inquiry”. They are important in contextually understanding the philosophical and theoretical propositions in scholarly discourse. To understand NEPAD from a philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective, some relevant aspects on the etymological context of the African Renaissance are considered. The understanding of this concept is important to contextualise, systematise and enhance its epistemological profundity and logic in the contemporary socio-economic and political discourse in seeking better ways of thinking, interpretation and understanding of the philosophical and theoretical disposition of the African Renaissance as the object of engagement in this part of the discourse on NEPAD.

3.2.3.1.1 Etymological context of African Renaissance

In much of the existing literature attempts to determine the etymological antecedent of African Renaissance make reference to the European Renaissance (Legum 2000: 67-76; Ramose 2000: 47-61). Barrell (2000: 10) explains that the concept Renaissance was first used in Europe in 1855 to describe the historical movement that originated in Italy in the fourteenth century and permeated other parts of Europe. The attempts to define Renaissance in the existing body of literature on African politics converge on sameness and are largely premised on the dictionary meaning of the concept, which refers to it as the “revival of art and letters under the influence of classical models in the 14th-16th century”(Legum 2000: 68; Magubane 1999: 12-13).

The philosophical context of the dictionary meaning of Renaissance relates to the European Renaissance. But, why is the concept Renaissance consistently used with the capital letter ‘R’ in much of the existing literature? Does this imply that its meaning is not the same as when used with a small letter ‘r’? Simply put, the question is: does the concept Renaissance differ from renaissance? The consideration of these questions is fundamentally important. For, “in philosophy the concepts with which we approach the world themselves become the topic of inquiry” (Blackburn 2005: 276).

Ramose (2000: 48) observes that in most dictionaries Renaissance and renaissance share a common meaning as they are all defined as being concerned with the rebirth, renewal or revival. The analysis of scholarship on the etymology of Renaissance suggests, however, that
its usage with the capital letter ‘R’ means that it is a “historical concept [and a philosophical movement] signifying a particular period in the history of Europe” (Ramose 2000: 48-49). Magubane (1999: 13) explains that Renaissance “first received its name from those who thought of the middle Ages as a dark, trance-like period, from which, according to Robert Palmer, the human spirit had been awakened”. The notion of rebirth or renewal, which constitutes the essence of what a Renaissance is, is embedded “in the belief that Europe in the fifteenth century, after a long interruption, took up and resumed the civilisation of the Greco-Romans” (Magubane 1999: 13). So, as Magubane (1999: 13) puts it, “in a more fundamental sense”, the concept Renaissance means the “birth of the modern era or modernity”. It is associated with novelty and change in social dynamics. For the purpose of this study, using capital letter in Renaissance symbolises a particular philosophical paradigm whereas its usage in small letter is in the case of it as a verb literally meaning rebirth, renewal or revival.

Ramose (2000: 49) writes that “as a historical concept the Renaissance is deeply rooted in Europe and has Europe as its primary reference point”. But, does this mean that the usage of Renaissance and its meaning in the European context is the same as in the African context? Can the European Renaissance be used as the epistemological context from which the African Renaissance could be understood? Barrell (2000: 09) writes that “Mbeki appeared to share a standard view of what Renaissance meant for Europe”. This observation is, however, a subject of contestation (see Barrell 2000: 08-20; Diop 1999: 03-09; Legum 2000: 67-76; Magubane 1999: 10-36; Prah 1999: 37-61).

Magubane (1999: 17) writes that “to understand the idea of African renaissance we must take stock of the crises to which the European renaissance was an answer”. The implication in this assertion is that the European Renaissance is a relevant factor of epistemological significance in the attempt to understand African Renaissance. Legum (2000: 68) cautions against conceptual obfuscation of African Renaissance with the European Renaissance. Nkrumah counsels that Africa’s encounter with Europe ought to be recognised, but not as the template from which the African experience could be understood and interpreted.

Ramose (2000: 53) writes that in essence Nkrumah rejected “mimetic philosophy and its corresponding action”. The instructiveness of this instruction in the philosophical and theoretical discourse on the development of Africa is fundamentally important. For, the
contexts of the paradigmatic trajectory of *African Renaissance* and *European Renaissance* are diametrically different with no points of significant epistemological convergence.

Pheko (1999: on-line) writes that “the European Renaissance was the foundation of slavery, colonialism and racism [and] Africa has nothing to gain from this decadence, which was responsible for the worst holocaust of the African people in memory” and therefore cannot be used as the conceptual template from which the concept of *African Renaissance* could be understood (own emphasis). The dictionary definition of *Renaissance* as referred to above is not adequate (Legum 2000: 68) and could, in the context of the attempt to understand *African Renaissance*, be misleading particularly if it is not grounded in African or indigenous ethno-philosophies. So, in the context of the foregoing, the question is: what is *African Renaissance*?

Landsberg and Hlope (1999: 01) explain that *African Renaissance* is a “comprehensive construct with a multiplicity of sub-constructs” and “should be viewed as a conceptual tool for the political, economic, social, cultural and educational analysis of the African continent”. Prah (1999: 43) explains that “in the sense that is contemporarily used and understood”, the concept of *African Renaissance* dates back to the nineteenth century. It is embedded in “different elements of earlier philosophical discourses on Pan-Africanism…” (Melber 2002: 06).

Landsberg and Hlope (1999: 01) state that *African Renaissance* is a late twentieth century variant of Pan-Africanism that seeks to confront the challenges of globalisation in the international order dominated by the West. Mamdani (1999: 125) also relates the *African Renaissance* to Pan-Africanism in the assertion that “we need to acknowledge the large idea of which the call for an African renaissance is a child – the idea of Pan-Africanism – and to recognise that it has been pushed forward more through debates than through chorus (Mamdani 1999: 125). There is a slight variation between Prah (1999: 43) and Landsberg and Hlope (1999: 01) on the exact historical dates or periods that mark the origin of *African Renaissance*. So, to understand the meaning of *African Renaissance* it is important that its philosophical foundations and prepositions are, to paraphrase Blackburn (2005: 276), laid bare. This is considered within the context of the historical antecedents of African *Renaissance* in terms of its evolution.
3.2.3.1.2 African Renaissance as a philosophical paradigm

Mboya (2004: 32-39) explains that the *African Renaissance* is ingrained in the ideological and philosophical postulations of African leaders and political intellectuals such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Amilcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Patrice Lumumba of Zaire, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. Magubane (1999: 11, 31) enlarges the list of political and intellectual personalities whose postulations are associated with the African Renaissance to include, among others, Queen Regent Lebotsibeni of Swaziland, Mahomed V of Morocco, Abdul Gamal Nasser of Egypt, Murtala Mahomed of Nigeria, Agostinho Neto of Angola, Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique, Seretse Khama of Botswana, W.E.B Du Bois and Martin Luther King of America, Marcus Garvey of Jamaica, Pixley Isaka ka Seme, Albert Luthuli and Oliver Tambo of South Africa. Steve Bantu Biko and Robert Sobukwe of South Africa are other important political and intellectual personalities not mentioned in Mboya (2004: 32-39) and Magubane’s (1999: 11, 31) works that scholarship on *African Renaissance* also significantly recognises as having made important contributions to the body of knowledge on this philosophical paradigm (see Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 02-03).

The philosophical and political intellectual outputs of some of these dominant personalities in the history of politics of development that seeks to assert Africa, which endured centuries of colonialism in the politics of international power relations, are important points of reference as they historically shaped the discourse on the renaissance of Africa and are considered in this chapter. Perhaps articulated with variant philosophical lexicons, the postulations of political and intellectual personalities on the renaissance of Africa converge on the same epistemological strand that its purpose is to challenge the domineering Western philosophical discourse on the development of Africa (Matthews 2002), as embedded in the concept of *European Renaissance*.

Like Pheko (1999) as cited above, Magubane (1999: 18) explains that European Renaissance was built on slavery, which Du Bois (1975: 141) describes as “an economic, social and political catastrophe probably unparalleled in human history”. The paradigm of development that the *European Renaissance* propounds is based on imperialism, which Magubane (1999:21) explains “was not simply [about] the freedom of spirit and body of European men, but a new freedom to destroy freedom for the rest of humanity”. Du Bois (1975: 135) writes
that “for four hundred years, from 1450-1850, European civilization carried on a systematic trade in human beings of such tremendous proportions that the physical, economic and moral effects are still mainly to be remarked throughout the world”. The *European Renaissance* appears to be the philosophical foundation from which the modernisation theory evolved.

The proposition of the modernisation theory is that development is a process where economic growth could be trickled down from the advanced economies of the industrialised states to underdeveloped traditional societies. This theory seeks to rationalise the logic of European Renaissance (Ikome 2007: 69; Tucker 1992: 07). The German philosopher, G.W.F Hegel (1770-1831), so eloquently and clearly articulated the philosophy that underpins the *European Renaissance* and its implication on Africa. In dismissing “any possibility that the black continent could have produced anything comparable to a thought” (Diagne 2008: 23), Hegel(Magubane 1999: 24-25) propounds that:

*The Negro represents natural man in all his wild and untamed nature. If you want to treat and understand him rightly, you must abstract all elements of respect and morality and sensitivity – there is nothing remotely humanised in the Negro’s character...nothing confirms this judgment more than the reports of missionaries. [Therefore], in as far as History goes back, Africa proper has remained for all purposes of connection with the rest of the world shut up. It is the Gold-land compressed within itself-the land of childhood, which, lying beyond the days of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of Night...The peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, for the very reason that in reference to it we must give up the principle that accompanies all our ideas - the category of universality. In Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet reached the realisation of any substantial objective existence – as for example, God or Law, in which the interest of man’s volition is involved, and in which he realises his own being...Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negro is slavery. Negroes are enslaved by Europeans and sold to America. Bad as this may be, their lot in their own land is worse, since there slavery quite as absolute exists, for it is the essential principle of slavery that man has not yet attained self-consciousness of his freedom, and consequently sinks down to a mere Thing –*
an object of no value. Among Negroes moral sentiments are weak, or more strictly, non-existent.

Hegel “wiped Africa out of history in the conclusion that “historicity and philosophy were the distinctive, specific characters of Europe and only Europe” (Diagne 2008: 23). In his teachings Hegel (Magubane 1999: 25) disseminated the message that Africa:

is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movement in it – that is in the northern part – belong to the Asiatic or European world...What we properly understand by Africa is the unhistorical, underdeveloped spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here as on the childhood of the world’s history...The history of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of history; Asia the beginning.

Diagne (2008: 23) explains that Hegel’s concept of ‘Africa proper’ implies that the conclusion made about Africa, as presented above, does not apply to all of it. In Hegelianism the notion of ‘Africa proper’ refers to Sub-Saharan Africa. Egypt and Maghrib are not considered as part of Africa as the former is linked to Asia, said to be the beginning of history; whereas the latter is considered part of Europe, although “in derived way”(Diagne 2008: 23). Following Hegelianism, other ethnological paradigms evolved and continued to propagate the philosophical propositions of Hegel, albeit in varied form. Compared to Hegelianism that out-rightly rejected any existence of corpus of knowledge in the African society, the ethnological paradigms as referred to in the foregoing acknowledges that Africans did display some mental activities that, however, could not be considered as a thought because it did not comply with the epistemic imperative of the theory of universalism and the principles of sufficient reason as understood from the Western perspective (Diagne 2008: 23; see also Nkrumah 1964).

Diagne (2008: 23) explains that Levy-Bruhl extensively studied the mentality of Africans and characterised it as the “other reason and philosophical spirit” foreign to Eurocentric logic, rationality and “capacity to think and live by a consistent system of sound principles”. The Timbuktu manuscripts dispute Hegelianism and Levy-Bruhlian that in Africa there was not any intellectual activity that could be associated or considered, in an epistemological sense,
as a thought or a body of knowledge (see Hunwick & Boye 2008; Jeppie & Diagne 2008). Diop (1960: 133) writes that “four centuries before Levy-Bruhl wrote his *Primitive Mentality of Black* Muslims Africa was commenting on Aristotle’s formal logic and was devoted to dialectics”.

In *Toward an Intellectual History of West Africa – The Meaning of Timbuktu*, Diagne (2008: 19) contends that “it is impossible to give a proper account of the history of philosophy on the African continent while ignoring the significance of Islam in Africa”. Appiah (1992: 144) supports Diop (1960: 133) that philosophy in Africa has a long history in Muslim philosophical writings; “much of it written in Africa so that the study of philosophy can be seen as traditional and endogenous”. Diagne (2008: 24) specifies some of the Muslims that are associated with the origin of philosophical thoughts in Africa as “al-Farabi in the ninth century AD; Ibn Sina in the tenth; al-Ghazali in the eleventh and Ibn Rushd in the twelfth”. This suggests that African philosophies predate *European Renaissance*, which, as explained above, dates back to fourteenth century.

In interpreting the Timbuktu manuscripts Diagne (2008: 24) finds that Muslim scholars, some of whom are specified above, “contributed to the universal history of [philosophy] as a discipline by pursuing a fruitful dialogue with the likes of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus from their own perspectives”. The Greek philosophy evolved from the philosophical thoughts of Muslims scholars (Diagne 2008: 24). So, Hegelianism and Eurocentric perspectives that propagate a thesis that Africa does not have any intellectual history cannot hold. This part of the world history in so far as the history of African epistemology is concerned has always been suppressed to assert the philosophy that underpins the epistemological premise of the *European Renaissance* (see Jeppie & Diagne 2008; Hunwick & Boye 2008).

The Hegelianism and Levy-Bruhlian teachings lost the essence of the transformative imperative of science, which, according to Babbie and Mouton. (2006: 545), is about the usage of “the power of knowledge to serve the interests of all of humankind”. Their Eurocentric and racial sciences inspired and dominated by Western Europe sought to engender and strengthen the pattern of intellectual hegemony to serve the interest of the white race. This is what Babbie and Mouton (2006: 545) calls “false consciousness in science” or “ideologisation of science”, the germination and maturation of which was fostered by *European Renaissance*. In reaction to the epistemological travesty that the European
scholarship propagated in its treatment of the history of Africa, Nkrumah (1970: 62-63) writes that:

In the African Renaissance, we [must] place great emphasis on the presentation of history. Our history needs to be written as the history of our society, not as the history of European adventures. African society must be treated as enjoying its own integrity; its history must be a mirror of that society, and the European contact must find its place in this history only as an African experience, even if as a crucial one. That is to say, the European contact needs to be assessed and judged from the point of view of the harmony and progress of this society. [For], the history of Africa, as presented by African scholars, had been encumbered with malicious myths. It was even denied that we were a historical people. It was said that whereas other continents had shaped history, and determined its course, Africa had stood still, held down by inertia; that Africa was only propelled into history by the European contact. African history was therefore presented as an extension of European history.

Diagne (2008: 23) observes that around the Second-World War an “Africanists thought” evolved to counter Hegelianism and Levy-Bruhlian or European scholarship on the history of Africa. Its proposition was based on the contention that, among others, African customary law, customs and ethics are “a coherent set of philosophical principles expressing an original ontology” from which the Bantu philosophy, moral philosophy of the Wolof, Akan philosophy and Yoruba philosophy evolved (Diagne 2008: 33). These philosophies are part of the body of African philosophy and their normative premise and prescriptive propositions are implicated in the discourse of this chapter on what the philosophy of African Renaissance entails. The concept of African Renaissance is located within these historical verities on the African philosophies. Prah (1999: 43) traces the origin of African Renaissance in the nineteenth-century “spirit of westernised anti-colonialism” which emerged “as a reaction of the westernised African elite freshly brought into the international capitalist order during the era of free trade which followed the end of slavery”. The concept used to describe this spirit of westernised anti-colonialism is Pan-Africanism.
Pan-Africanism is characteristic of critical, contextual and activist African scholarship and intellectualism that has emerged since the colonial era and provided Africanist perspective on the development of the continent (Maserumule & Gutto 2008: 70). The westernised African elite or nationalist thinkers of the nineteenth century such as Martin Delaney, Edward Blyden, Africanus Beale Horton, John Mensah Sarbah and J.E Casely Hayford Prah (1999: 43) mentions are among those that are associated with the historical, philosophical and ideological foundation of Pan-Africanism and are said to be pioneers that led the struggle against racism and European imperialism (see Araia 2007; Pheko 1999; McLean 1996; Mazrui 2001, 2003; Walters 2009; Kalomoh 2009; Browne, undated; Ijeoma 2007; Omara-Otumu, undated; Shivji 2009).

A large body of African scholarship locates the philosophical foundational antecedents of African Renaissance to Pan-Africanism, with the intellectual personalities referred to in the foregoing playing a critical role in shaping it as a coherent thought (see Melber 2002: 06; Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 01; Nabudere 2002: 03-28; Nyong’o 2002: 02-09). So, in the context of the foregoing, the importance of Pan-Africanism in the attempt to understand African Renaissance cannot be over-emphasised. Henry Sylvester-Williams coined the concept Pan-Africanism (Araia 2007; Pheko 1999), following Edward Blyden’s concept of African Personality that Africa is “the spiritual conservatory of the world” (Langley 1973: 08). Du Bois and Garvey enhanced the intellectual profundity of the concept of Pan-Africanism, which subsequently developed into ideology, philosophy and a movement that permeated Africa and its Diaspora.

As Walters (2009: on-line) explains, the term Diaspora refers to people of African descent outside of Africa. The concept Pan-Africanism is defined as a socio-political worldview, ideology, philosophy and movement that, in response to European slave trade, racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism seek to engender the spirit of African unity among native Africans and members of the African Diaspora into a global African community. It is defined as “the perceived need to mobilise all peoples of African descent against racism and colonialism” (M’bayo 2003: 19) and “a philosophy that is based on the belief that Africans share common bonds and objectives and...advocate(s) unity to achieve these objectives” (Walters 2009: on-line).
The *Pan-Africanism* presupposes that “a mutual bond exists among blacks regardless of geographic residence, or origin” (Browne s.a: 01). Taking into account the factors that necessitated its conception as a “socio-cultural movement of a people who were fighting to assert themselves in a world that was hostile to their existence, Thompson (1969: 38) suggests that *Pan-Africanism* may be seen as an idea that:

was concerned not only with the protest but also with the fashioning of a coherent philosophy which would enable the African as well as ‘Negro’ man not only to enhance his material welfare but to elevate him from the centuries of humiliation which has been his lot and thus enable him to re-establish his dignity in a world that has hitherto conceded him none.

The various attempts to define *Pan-Africanism* abound in the existing body of literature and much of it gravitates more towards commonness (see Browne, undated; Mazrui 2001; Pheko 1999; Walters 2009). However, there are other perspectives that do not conform to the conventional understanding of *Pan-Africanism* in terms of what it is. In these other perspectives *Pan-Africanism* is considered as a “passion”, “ideological romanticism” and “ethnic sentimentalism” rather than a “way of thinking”. It is criticised as being defined more in terms of its “rhetorical manifestations” than by “its nominal characteristics”; and has always conveyed “various, sometimes contradictory, ideas to the diverse individuals who professed to be Pan-Africanists with some scholars referring to it as “macro-nationalism” – a term used to describe the ideological belief among widely dispersed people of common ancestry (*Political Dictionary*, s.a: on-line).

By people of common ancestry reference is made to the human race of African origin in Africa and the Diaspora. This means that people of European descent in Africa are defined as non-Africans. In this sense Pan-Africanism embodies racially-exclusive connotations in pursuit of “equal rights, self-government, independence and unity for African peoples” (McLean 1996: 357). Although the context of its foundational antecedents might justify its racialised approach, the epistemic question in this regard is whether the foregoing is not a case of ideologisation of science or false consciousness in science? These expressions are used in the parlance of Afrocentrism to jettison Eurocentricism as disseminated largely through the teachings of especially Hegelianism and Levy-Bruhlian.
But is Pan-Africanism not Hegelianism or Levy-Bruhlian in reverse expressed within the African context? Does it also not racialise science? Does it not react rather than epistemologically respond to Eurocentricism? Is this not the question of reacting to a racialised science with a racialised science? In the context of all these questions, a further question is whether Pan-Africanism could be considered as part of the epistemological discourse especially in the attempt to understand it as a philosophical antecedent of the African Renaissance. Or, is it just a mere political ideology? But, how does philosophy differ with ideology? Are they diametrically divergent with no points of convergence? In an ideological discourse these questions may be dismissed as contextually flawed. For, Pan-Africanism has always been about social justice. However, for reasons of epistemic and contextual discourse, these philosophical-cum-theoretical questions are important and merit some considerations. The attempt to answer these questions is part of the discourse on Pan-Africanism in this chapter.

In Blackburn (2005: 276-277) philosophy is defined as “the study of the most general and abstract features of the world and categories with which we think: mind, matter, reason, proof and truth”; it is “what happens when a practice becomes self-conscious”. It is explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis that it is concerned with the analysis of thinking in seeking better ways of understanding the social world. Its epistemological basis is consciousness and logical reasoning rather than empiricism and its objects of inquiry appertain to the world of meta-science (Bak 2004: 10; Mouton 2008: 178) and are driven by “critical interest” (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 14). Nkrumah (1970: 56) explains that “philosophy always arose from a social milieu”, which affects its content; and conversely, “the content of philosophy seeks to affect social milieu either by confirming it or opposing it”. Nkrumah explains that “in either case, philosophy implies something of nature of an ideology” (1970: 56).

The objective of philosophy is not so much about providing solutions to for example, historical, physical or legal questions, but to study the concepts that structure a particular thinking to “lay bare their foundations and propositions” (Blackburn 2005: 276). In contrast with philosophy, ideology is defined as “any comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world” (McLean 1996: 233). Nkrumah (1970: 58) explains that ideology is integrative intent directed at fundamental change in a society; it “guides and seeks to connect [unite] the actions of millions of persons towards specific and definite goals”. Its intonation in expressing change in society is ingrained in
revolutionary parlance that propagates fundamental overhaul of any societal imperative or system. The concept ‘revolution’ is antithetical to ‘reform’. Nkrumah’s (1970: 73-74) explication is edifying:

*reform is not a change in the thought, but one in its manner of expression, not a change in what is said but one in idiom. In reform fundamental principles are held constant and the details of their expression modified. In the words of Marx, it leaves the pillars of the building intact. Indeed, sometimes, reform itself may be initiated by the necessities of preserving ideological fundamental principles. Reform is a tactic of self-preservation.*

In contrast, revolution, both as a concept and social action, is about fundamental change. Nkrumah (1970: 56) writes that “when the revolution has been successful, the ideology comes to characterise the society,” and philosophy becomes its instrument. In explaining this connection that connects *philosophy* and *ideology* in the science of knowledge, Nkrumah (1970: 66) adds *theory* as also an important part of this epistemological nexus. A theory is an epistemic framework based on empiricism used to explain facts and test them against reality. Nkrumah(1970: 66) illustrates this point with reference to *The Republic* of Plato that:

*We are confronted with an example in which philosophy is made the theoretical basis of a proposed social order. In that proposal, philosophy would be instrument of ideology belonging to the social order proposed by Plato. Philosophy performs this function in two ways. It performs it as a general theoretical statement to which a specific social-political theory is parallel. Philosophy also performs this ideological function when it takes shape as political philosophy...Through political philosophy, it lays down certain ideals for our pursuit and fortification, and becomes an instrument of unity by laying down the same ideals for all the members of a given society.*

In Nkrumah’s (1970) *Consciencism-Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization* the proposition is that philosophy is the instrument of ideology. A crude distinction often made between philosophy and ideology that suggests that they are diametrically opposite poles far from each other undermines their epistemological connection, together with theory, in the continuum of knowledge. The attempt to understand Pan-Africanism as a philosophy in this
part of the discussion is pursued within the context of the epistemological verity in terms of its relation with ideology and theory as explained above. A larger body of African scholarship on Pan-Africanism appears to contend that, using Babbie and Mouton’s (2006: 545) words, it is part of the “transformative imperative of science”, which refers to the use of the power of knowledge “to serve the interests of all of humankind”.

Pheko (1999: on-line) writes that “Pan-Africanism was developed by outstanding African scholars, political scientists, historians and philosophers living in Africa and the diaspora” whereas Mazrui (2003: 01) contends that it is a product of African intellectualism. Mazrui (2003: 01) explains that “the modern intellectualism and origins of Pan-Africanism are intertwined; we can imagine intellectualism without Pan-Africanism, but we cannot envisage Pan-Africanism without the intellectualization of the African condition”. The concept of intellectualism is defined as “an engagement in the realm of ideas, rational discourse, and independent enquiry” (Mazrui 2003: 02). The essence of these contentions dispute the critiques of Pan-Africanism, as referred to above, and propagates that it is part of the body of knowledge and therefore there is epistemological merit in its consideration as a philosophy.

Thompson (1969: 38) and Walters (2009) whose works have already been referred to above contend that Pan-Africanism, apart from it being a movement and ideology, is a philosophy. Pan-Africanism is considered in this study to understand it as the philosophical antecedent of African Renaissance. Among some of the methodological approaches to philosophical studies such as normative analysis, deconstruction, and phenomological analysis, ideology critique is specifically used to make sense of Pan-Africanism, which evolved over time and, according to Ijeoma (2007: 180), was “characterised by seesaw-shifts in emphasis as continental or diasporic issues have become dominant” in its development into a comprehensive set of ideas that galvanise thinking on African unity. The intention is not to solve historical questions associated with it, but to study the thinking that undergirds it in different periods in the history of its evolution to make sense of it as the philosophical antecedents of African Renaissance. However, in studying such thinking reference to historical facts becomes inevitable.

Ackah (1999: 13) problematises the history of Pan-Africanism that “as a vehicle of protest that accommodated diverse dehumanising experiences of people of African origin and descent, with reference to the East and West Diaspora, the Pan-Africanist “movement has no
single founder or particular tenets that can be used as a definition”. However, much of what is in the existing body of knowledge is coherent and instructive in historicising Pan-Africanism. Araia (2007: on-line) explains that “Pan-Africanism has a rich history that dates back to the 18th century, [whose] roots...are not in Africa but in the Caribbean and United States”.

Bankie (1994: on-line) explains that originally the Pan-Africanist thought was conceived to counter the cultural and psychological effects of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism. It evolved to challenge European imperialism and hegemony etched in the political, economic and cultural spheres of the African society. In much of the existing African scholarship on Pan-Africanism the contention is that European Renaissance and imperialism ideologised science, which Babbie and Mouton (2006: 545) define as “the wilful and intentional abuse of scientific knowledge in the service of domination”. The ideologisation of science occurs when “a dominant group in society dominated by race, class, gender or capital produces and controls the production of knowledge in order to legitimate their position of power over other groups in that society” (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 543). The concept of Pan-Africanism is the antithesis of European imperialism whose thesis is ingrained in Hegelianism and Levy-Bruhlian. It is in the context of the foregoing that it is contended that Pan-Africanism, from its inception, has always been about the renaissance of Africa.

In the On-Line Political Dictionary it is written that “as a philosophy Pan-Africanism represents the aggregation of the historical, cultural, spiritual, artistic, scientific and philosophical legacies of Africans from the past times to the present”. Prah (1999: 44-46) formulated a very useful analytical template based on the historical periodisation of the system of knowledge that evolved to challenge the European epistemology on the development of Africa. Such analytical template categorises the Pan-African thought into three epistemological phases.

The first phase appertains to the nineteenth-century thinking on Pan-Africanism and is associated with the ideas of, among others, Edward Blyden, Africanus Horton, Alexander Crummell, Attoh Ahuman and Henry Sylvester Williams whereas the second phase is associated with the ideas of the twentieth-century thinkers such as William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Joseph Casely-Hayford, George Padmore, and Kwame Nkrumah. The third phase refers to those twenty-first century ideas on Pan-Africanism penned down largely following Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance and subsequent development of
NEPAD. The ideas of some of the intellectual figures mentioned and even those that are not mentioned above are referred to in this study as part of the discourse on Pan-Africanism.

For the purpose of this study, these phases are disaggregated and designated as nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries thinking on Pan-Africanism and are analytically considered as such. This exercise is critically important in contextualising and systematising the discourse on Pan-Africanism. It seeks to determine the link between Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance, which as pointed out above, some scholars argue constitutes the philosophical foundation of NEPAD. A detailed discussion on the different phases of thinking on Pan-Africanism is necessary.

3.2.3.1.3.1 Nineteenth century thinking on Pan-Africanism

The nineteenth-century thinking on Pan-Africanism is characterised by three aspects that contributed to its conceptualisation. The first one is centred on a universal expression of black pride in the form of Negritude, which was a reaction to subjugation and domination of people of African origin and descent that alienated and marginalised the African cultural heritage. The term Negritude refers to a movement based in America spearheaded by Aime Cesaire and Leopold S. Senghor who are also part of the nineteenth century thinkers on Pan-Africanism (Bankie 1994). As a concept negritude is about black consciousness and the quality of being of the black African race. Araia (2009: on-line) writes that David Walker also made an important contribution to the Pan-Africanist thinking that revolves around “a universal expression of Black pride and achievement”. In the attempt to assert a sense of black pride, achievements and “to educate people of African descent and challenge the dominant white supremacists”, Walker published Appeal in 1829 wherein he “reminisced the glorious past of African civilization” (Bankie 1994: on-line).

The second aspect that characterises the nineteenth century Pan-Africanist thinking was more concerned with the protestation against slave trade, which Bankie (1994: on-line) explains as a “merciless shipment of Africans to Europe and the Americas”. It advocated the return by the people of African descent living in the Western Diaspora to Africa. The third aspect of the nineteenth-century Pan-Africanist thinking was more focussed on the liberation of the African continent and continued to be the focus of Pan-Africanism even in the twentieth-century. It was largely a reaction to the “brutal occupation of Africa by the Western powers,
especially after the Berlin Conference in 1885 (and) was unacceptable to the people of African descent and a host of their intelligentsia” (Bankie 1994: on-line).

Prah (1997: 24) writes that “one of the largest single factors that contributed to the ultimate task of the conceptualisation of the idea of Pan-Africanism by African intellectuals was the Berlin Conference of 1885, at which Africa was carved up and apportioned amongst the Western powers without her consent”. In challenging slavery and European colonialism to advance the intellectual struggle for the liberation of Africa and those in the Diaspora the nineteenth-century Pan-Africanism centred largely around the notion of accommodative arrangement under Western aegis. The essence of the ‘accommodative approach’ in countering European imperialism was premised on the thinking that the decolonisation and liberation of Africa is achievable by engaging the colonisers to be part of the solution of the problem of colonialism.

But, the philosophy that undergirds the accommodative approach of the nineteenth century thinking on Pan-Africanism appears to have been more of the attempt to reform colonialism rather than completely obliterate it together with all other aspects that are associated with it. As explained above, “reform is not a change in the thought, but one in its manner of expression, not a change in what is said but one in idiom”(Nkrumah 1970: 73). It is antithetical to revolution, which refers to fundamental change of the status quo. The nineteenth-century thinking on Pan-Africanism lacked philosophical radicalism and revolutionary flair. Its reformist approach in countering European imperialism and colonial system implied acceptance of the major points upon which they revolved. This approach to Pan-Africanism borders on naivety as it displayed a sense of nescience to the fact that European imperialism and colonialism were deliberate acts of the Western power.

To engage the Western power with anticipation that it would reverse its imperial and colonial pursuits was just myopic thinking. It was like expecting the coloniser to suddenly change and become the custodian of revolution. At the end of the nineteenth-century and towards the dawn of the twentieth-century the Pan-Africanist thinking in reaction to the resolutions of the Berlin Conference and in continuance with the pursuit for colonial freedom assumed a radical slant with the African intellectuals such as William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, Joseph Casely-Hayford, Marcus Garvey and George Padmore making important contributions towards its conceptual development using revolutionary parlance (see Prah 1999: 24).
3.2.3.1.3.2 Twentieth century thinking on Pan-Africanism

The twentieth-century philosophical disposition of Pan-Africanism benefited from more intellectual contributions that heralded its second phase, which, as compared with the “accommodative approach” of the nineteenth-century thinkers whose engagement with colonialism was somewhat moderate, was more radical and articulated with revolutionary intonations. Prah (1999: 45) observes that “during the second phase colonial freedom increasingly assumed centrality in the formulation of the idea of an African awakening”. This means that the struggle for the liberation of Africa continued to be a fundamental aspect of focus that characterised Pan-Africanist thinking.

The quest for political unification of the African continent emerged prominently as another important aspect that dominated the twentieth-century thinking on Pan-Africanism. The political and intellectual figures whose ideas are associated with the twentieth-century second phase of Pan Africanism include largely those Mboya (2004: 32-39), Magubane (1999: 11, 31), Landsberg and Hlope (1999: 02-03) and Prah (1999: 24) mention in their works as referred to above. Their intellectual contributions to the Pan-Africanist thought contributed to what Mathebe (2001: 116) calls “a realist epistemology that fuelled the anti-colonial struggles”.

Du Bois and Garvey particularly played an important role in shaping the philosophical orientation of the twentieth-century political and intellectual thinkers that emphasised that “for Africa there is no substitute for self-reliance as a long term struggle”(Mazrui 2001: on-line; see also Kondlo 2009) to achieve “total African liberation and total unity” (Nyerere 1967 in Prah 1999: 44). This marks a paradigm shift from the nineteenth-century philosophy of “accommodative arrangement” to that of “collective self-reliance”. Kondlo (2009: 50-51) writes that, compared with the first phase of its evolution, “a relatively well-developed Pan-African philosophy came into existence” in the second phase. Araia (2009: on-line) explains that the Pan-Africanist philosophy of self-reliance was stronger in Garvey, who, in its practical assertion, established “self-reliant stores, factories, corporations, and shipping lines, owned and run by Africans in the diaspora”. Du Bois was moderate in his approach to the concept and philosophy of collective self-reliance.
Araia (2009: on-line) explains that Du Bois’ “ideological foundation was eclectic” in that, “on the one hand, he was for Pan-Africa liberation” whereas, on the other hand, “he sought white technology and capital for its realisation”. It is in respect of the latter aspect that the philosophical discourse of Garvey and Du Bois on Pan-Africanism becomes dialectical. The Du Boisian approach to Pan-Africanism was reformist and socialist in terms of its ideological disposition whereas Garvey’s approach was more radical and capitalistic in orientation. This seems to be a contradiction with conventional thinking that often associates socialist thinking with revolutionary or radical tendencies whereas capitalism is associated with a reformist approach to social transformation.

The concept of collective self-reliance in the context of the philosophy of Pan-Africanism as in Garveyism advocates disengagement from the European colonial economy. This is a radical and fundamental departure from the Pan-Africanism philosophy of “accommodative arrangement”. In *The Philosophy & Opinions of Marcus Garvey*, the concept of radicalism is explained as:

> a label that is always applied to people who are endeavouring to get freedom. Jesus Christ was the greatest radical the world ever saw. He came and saw a world of sin and his program was to inspire it with spiritual feeling. He was therefore a radical. George Washington was dubbed a radical when he took up his sword to fight his way to liberty in America one hundred and forty years ago. All men who call themselves reformers are perforce radicals. They cannot be anything else, because they are revolting against the conditions that exist. Conditions as they exist reveal a conservative state, and if you desire to change these conditions you must be a radical. I am, therefore, satisfied to be the same kind of radical, if through radicalism I free Africa. (Garvey 1986: 18-19)

In spite of variations in their articulation of Pan-Africanism both Du Bois and Garvey subscribed to the notion of self-sufficient economy or collective self-reliance as fundamentally important in the pursuit of African Renaissance (Araia 2009). The Pan-African philosophy of collective self-reliance appears to be the epistemological context from which the dependency theory evolved. The dependency theory evolved as the antithesis of the modernisation theory. Its premise is that Africa’s underdevelopment is the consequences of “the political mechanism of domination and control” (Tucker 1992: 12) and its proposition is
that development in the developing countries is dependent on their strategically positioning themselves and establishing political leverages that can be used as a basis to change the power relations in the international economic system.

The dependency theory is inward-looking in terms of its approach to realise the renaissance of Africa. It advocates that Africa should disengage from the “world economy within the framework of individual and collective self-reliance” (Tesha 2002: 17). The Pan-African philosophy of collective self-reliance is the epistemological nexus that connects the African Renaissance and the dependency theory together. In explaining the philosophical context of the dependency theory, Garvey (1986: 23) cautions that “the disposition of the many to depend upon the other races for a kindly and sympathetic consideration of their needs, without making the effort to do for themselves, has been the race’s standing disgrace by which we have been judged and through which we have created the strongest prejudice against ourselves”. The Pan-African philosophy of collective self-reliance, which constitutes the essence of the dependency theory of development, seeks to correct this anomaly.

In South Africa the Pan-African philosophy of collective self-reliance found expression in Black Consciousness, a concept that was neologised into the parlance of Pan-African political discourse in the 1960s and is associated with Steve Biko. Maddox (s.a: on-line) explains that “black consciousness drew on a tradition of black nationalist thought in South Africa associated with Africanist movements and emerged during a time when the older anti-apartheid movements, especially the African Nationalist Congress and Pan-African Congress(sic), had been driven deep underground by state repression”.

As a philosophy of liberation, Black Consciousness benefited from the postulations of, among others, Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, and “the rhetoric and ideology of black power and black theology coming out of the United States in the 1960s” (Maddox s.a: on-line). Its proposition was that black South Africans should rely on themselves in the pursuit of their liberation and assert South Africa as an African nation. With their participation in the First Pan-African Conference in 1900 in London, Bu Bois and Garvey had a platform to articulate their Pan-Africanist perspectives, which had a huge impact on Africans on the continent, especially its philosophical imperative of collective self-reliance. Legum (1962: 24) writes that, as early as 1897, Du Bois pronounced that “if the Negro were to be a factor in the world’s history it would be through a Pan-African movement”. This idea was later to be
propagated in the Pan-African Conference, which was the brainchild of Henry Sylvester-Williams, an Indian Barrister who coined the term *Pan-Africanism* (Bankie 1994: on-line). Clarke (1991: 105) explains that “this conference was the beginning of a structural, ideological concept of Pan-Africanism”.

Legum (1962: 25) reports that in the said conference Du Bois articulated the problem of the twentieth-century as “the problem of the color line – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea”. Du Bois prescribed that the solution to this problem lies in the “resurgence of Africa”, which is similar to Garvey’s “awakened Africa” (Prah 1999: 44). Garvey “sought to unite all Africans the world over; to establish a bridgehead on the continent of Africa from which to fight colonialism and weld the whole of Africa into a united nation” (Thompson 1969: 42). This pursuit was based on the imperative of social equity and justice that the welfare of all the people ought to be supreme in all aspects that constitute the conduct of any form of authority. In this sense the consciousness that undergirds Pan-Africanism as nurtured by its ideological foundation assumes general and abstract characters. It is the philosophy of liberation. The Pan-African philosophy of liberation that undergirds Garveyism could be explained and understood within the context of Malcom X’s attempt to explain the “nexus between the African experience and Black Diaspora” (Araia 2009: on-line). Malcolm X (1964) said:

> when the African continent in its independence is able to create the unity that is necessary to increase its strength and its position on this earth, so that Africa too becomes respected as other huge continents, then, wherever people of African origin, African heritage or African blood go, they will be respected – but only when and because they have something much larger that looks like them behind them. (in Araia 2009: on-line)

In the twentieth-century the Pan-Africanist thinking started to gain more ground in Africa with the emergence of a plethora of intellectual contributions to Pan-Africanism as the body of philosophical thought. In 1905 Pixley Isaka Seme, the founder member of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912 who later became its president made an important contribution to Pan-Africanism in a speech at the Columbia University, which up to date is still very important, instructive and widely cited in the contemporary body of scholarship on
the African Renaissance (Dunton 2003). In the speech entitled Regeneration of Africa Seme (1905) said:

*I have chosen to speak to you on this occasion upon The Regeneration of Africa. I am an African, and set my pride in my race over against a hostile public opinion...The African recognizes his anomalous position and desires a change. The brighter day is rising upon Africa. Already I seem to see her chains dissolved, her desert plains read with harvest, her Abyssinia and her Zululand the seats of science and of religion, reflecting the glory of the rising sun from the spires of their churches and universities. Her Congo and her Gambia whitened with commerce...Yes, the regeneration of Africa belongs to this new and powerful period. By this terms regeneration, I wish to be understood to mean the entrance into a new life, embracing the diverse phases of a higher, complex existence.*

The First Pan-African Conference of 1900 and Seme’s Regeneration of Africa was followed by a myriad of other intellectual activities, which also contributed significantly towards the development of Pan-African nationalist thought in Africa (Dunton 2003: 555-573). Of more importance among them is perhaps the Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945, which expressed its objectives as being “to promote the well-being and unity of African peoples and peoples of African descent throughout the world; to demand the self-determination and independence of African peoples and other subject races from the domination of powers proclaiming sovereignty and trusteeship over them; and to secure equality of rights for African peoples and the total abolition of all forms of racial discrimination”(Araia 2009: online).

The rallying cry for the Congress was Africa for Africans and its resolutions were consistently clear in their demand for political independence and autonomy. The message expressed with cautions was that the “age-old African patience was wearing out and that Africans were unwilling to starve any longer while doing the world’s drudgery” (in Legum 1965: 32). The Manchester Congress condemned “the monopoly of capital and the rule of private wealth and industry for private profit alone” and advocated, instead, the notion of “economic democracy as the only real democracy” (Legum 1965: 155). It was attended by delegates from all over the “colored world” (Thompson 1969: 58), with Kwame Nkrumah
from Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya as its two organising secretaries from Africa. This Congress had a huge influence in the transplantation of the Pan-Africanist thoughts and movement in Africa (see also Shivji 2009).

In the contention that the “artificial divisions and territorial boundaries created by the imperialist powers are deliberate steps to obstruct the political unity of the West African people”, the Manchester Congress heralded the idea of African unity in the twentieth-century Pan-Africanist thinking, which Nkrumah later pursued with the assistance of George Padmore described in Shivji (2009) as the Pan-Africanist mentor of Nkrumah. Thompson (1969: 126) explains that the “Pan-African nationalism [in Africa largely] remained in the realm of ideas” until the independence of Ghana in 1957 which “removed one of the disabilities under which the [Pan-African] movement had operated in the first phase, namely, the absence of a base [on the continent] from which propaganda and ideas could be disseminated”.

In 1958 the first two Pan-African Conferences were held in Ghana in April and December respectively. This marked the inception of the Pan-African political movement on the continent with a clear agenda that revolved around the philosophy of total liberation of the African colonies. The Pan-Africanism in Africa was launched to “promote economic cooperation; to appreciate one another’s culture”; and to sustain the continuance of struggle against colonialism and apartheid [in South Africa] to achieve the “total independence of the continent” (Araia 2009: on-line). Thompson (1969: 126) writes that “the wider implications of the first two Accra conferences of 1958 ushered Pan-Africanism [on the African continent] into the realm of realpolitik” and contributed significantly towards the twentieth-century political body of knowledge.

In its evolution in Africa Pan-Africanism as a significant force in global politics was constricted and narrowed to focus on unity, total liberation and solidarity among Africans in Africa. This is in spite of the fact that “the diasporas have played an important role in the reinvention and revitalisation of the country’s identity and sense of itself” (Ijeoma 2007: 180). The twentieth-century conceptualisation of Pan-Africanism in the context of Africa was “confined to demanding the independence of African countries still under colonialism” (Shivji 2009: on-line). This was achieved through the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, which institutionalised Pan-Africanism.
The OAU was assigned the task of decolonising Africa, providing leadership to initiatives to end apartheid in South Africa and forging unity on the continent. The twentieth-century thinking on Pan-Africanism propagated continentalism or continental unity. But, was this not the case of reifying Pan-Africanism as the philosophical body of thought and also imposing intellectual limitations on its universal applicability? For, one of the fundamental characteristics of philosophy is that it is abstract and a general interpretation of the social world.

Shivji (2009) writes that the focus on colonial freedom “showed the limits of the Pan-Africanism of the African states”. The institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism in the OAU as a political system appears to be an exercise towards epistemological reductionism that seeks to ideologise it as the body of philosophical thought. But, as Nkrumah (1970) argues, philosophy is the instrument of ideology. Therefore necessarily there are no contradictions between philosophical and ideological pursuits. Taking into account Blackburn’s (2005: 267-277) enunciation that “philosophy happens when a practice become self-conscious, the institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism in the form of OAU may not necessarily be considered as an act of reifying it as a philosophical thought.

Looking at Blackburn’s (2005: 267-277) explanation of philosophy again and putting it conversely, one may argue that the act of creating the OAU is an example of self-conscious becoming practice. But, is this not an exercise towards empiricism? The answer to this question is that it is not. Instead, it is the point where philosophy connects with social reality. Nkrumah (1970: 56) talks about social milieu affecting the content of philosophy and the content of philosophy affecting the social milieu.

To ensure the epistemological value of its relevance in the body of knowledge, the abstract nature of philosophy should not be disassociated from social reality. The essence of this contention is that, as Pauw (1999b: 464) argues, “philosophy should be as practical and as theoretical as possible”. But, is this not an epistemological paradox? Pauw (1999b: 464) explains that the description of philosophers as the most theoretical tribe of people with their heads in the clouds is not correct. Bullock et al. (1988: 646) explains that philosophy is concerned with thought about thought. This thought about thought ultimately informs how things ought to turn out in the practical world.
As a philosophical thought, Pan-Africanism in Africa is the consequence of African realities and situational peculiarities as bequeathed by colonialism. The twentieth-century thinking on Pan-Africanism in Africa appropriated a meaning that differs from the one associated with its original conceptualisation in the nineteenth-century, which was propounded as both “the ideology and philosophy of liberation for continental and Diaspora in the political, economic and cultural spheres” (Araia 2009: on-line). The nineteenth-century conceptualisation of Pan-Africanism was broad in terms of its philosophical disposition. It was based on the imperative of solidarity among all black African and peoples of African descent outside the African continent (Walters 2007; see also Bankie 1994; Araia 2009).

With its narrow conceptualisation focus, the twentieth-century thinkers in Africa on Pan-Africanism appear to have epistemologically shifted from the belief that the liberation of Africa is a key to the liberation of the people of African origin, African heritage or African blood irrespective of their geographical location in the world. The ideological narrowness of the African version of Pan-Africanism in the twentieth-century obscures that “nexus between the African experience and Black Diaspora” (Araia 2009: on-line) Malcolm X, as cited above, emphasises in the attempt to explain Pan-Africanism. It is not in synch with Du Bois and Garvey’s postulations that Pan-Africanism is about the “oneness or the sameness of Black people everywhere and at all times” (Kondlo 2009: 51).

In the twentieth-century Pan-Africanism assumed the character of being “Africa’s own protectionist ideology” (Ijeoma 2007: 182). The narrow Africa-focused interpretation of Pan-Africanism was informed by the realities of Africa characterised by “the new challenges and tasks of post-colonial independence”, which among others, “included building government institutions and establishing political authority of the newly-independent states” (Kondlo 2009: 52). Ijeoma (2007: 181) observes that “while Pan-Africanism started as a stateless and nationless movement, it has had to reconcile its more transcendental agenda with the national agenda of new states and nations”.

The meaning of all these intellectual dynamics in the evolution of Pan-Africanism in Africa as a body of philosophical thought in the twentieth century is that, although it is largely the intellectual product of exogenous factors, its conceptualisation in the African context assumes endogenous disposition. Or, was it perhaps the question of contextualisation? It is in this
context that Kondlo’s (2009: 50) observation that most definitions of Pan-Africanism embody “heuristic conceptions of historical materialism as understood and articulated from the point of view of Africans” is precise. Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana after independence in 1957 was instrumental in shaping the discourse on Pan-Africanism in Africa in the twentieth-century.

Ramose (2000: 53) explains that “Nkrumah’s philosophy for decolonisation” was expressed in his well-known and widely cited punch-line *seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you*. In its evolution as a philosophy of liberation in Africa Pan-Africanism was characterised by ideological chasms and contestations. In the 1960 *All Africa Conference* contestations arose in terms of how Pan-Africanism in Africa could be achieved. This resulted in divisions among the African countries that are subsumed into two antagonistic groups, namely the Casablanca and the Brazzaville. The Casablanca group comprised Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt whereas the Brazzaville group was made up of Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Senegal (Araia 2009: on-line).

The Pan-African pursuit of the Casablanca group propounded that “Africa must develop its own common market for a viable development” (Araia 2009: on-line). Its thinking was ingrained in the Pan-African philosophy of collective self-reliance, which, as explained above, was stronger in Garveyism. The Casablanca thinking on Pan-Africanism epitomised Garvey radicalism, but assumed Du Boisian socialist orientation. It postulated the imperative of disengagement from the European colonial economy. The Casablanca version of Pan-Africanism was therefore dialectically a synthesis of Garvey’s radical approach to the liberation of Africa and her Diaspora and Du Boisian’s socialist orientation. In contrast with the Casablanca group’s ideological position, the Brazzaville’s pursuit of Pan-Africanism gravitated more towards the nineteenth-century Pan-Africanist thinking that centred around, as explained above, “the accommodative arrangement under Western aegis” (Prah 1999: 44).

Araia (2009: on-line) explains that “the Brazzaville group thought embracing Pan-African socialism would keep the former colonisers (or the West as a whole) at bay and deprive Africa of the potential aid needed for development that Europeans can provide”. Whereas the Casablanca group was more radical and revolutionary in the pursuit of Pan-Africanism, the Brazzaville position on the matter was a moderate approach advocating that the process of
unifying Africa ought to be gradual. Nkrumah opposed to this position and contended that Africa should immediately “begin the triumphant march to the kingdom of *African Personality*, and to a continent of prosperity and progress, of equality and justice…” (in Araia 2009: on-line). Ackah (1999: 17) explains that Nkrumah “believed that the only way to resolve the problems of imperialism and neo-colonialism in Africa was the formation of a unitary socialist government”.

To Nkrumah, a political union of African states was an urgent task and even expressed Ghana’s readiness to give up its sovereignty in the interest of African unity in its Constitution of 1960 as a sign of commitment to this Pan-Africanist ideal. Nkrumah’s position on political unification of the continent polarised the Pan-African discourse and engendered hostilities. Shivji (2009: on-line) writes that Nkrumah was accused of pursuing a personal ambition with the potential to destroy the Pan-Africanism. The head of Nigerian delegation to the 1960 *All Africa Conference* is quoted to have said “if anybody makes this mistake of feeling that he is a Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa the whole purpose of Pan-African will, I fear, be defeated” (in Legum 1965: 192). Although the contestation appeared to have degenerated into personality characterisation at issue was Pan-Africanism versus nationalism. This was a clear manifestation of deep-seated ideological and philosophical variations in the approach to Pan-Africanism.

The heads of newly-created independent states of Africa, on the one hand, propagated a gradualist approach to Pan-Africanism whereas Nkrumah, on the other hand, laid “greater stress on the vital importance to Africa’s survival of a political unification of the entire continent” and argued against regional economic groupings (Nkrumah 1963: 14). So intense was the contestation on continentalism that it pitted the advocates of African unity against each other. Shivji (2009: on-line) writes that “Julius Nyerere clashed with Nkrumah at the 1965 OAU Assembly of Heads of State in Accra following the latter’s criticism of regional groupings as hurdles towards continental unity. Nyerere subscribed to the gradualist approach to continentalism, which, in spite of it appearing as euphemism for nationalism, eventually triumphed.

Nkrumah’s revolutionary philosophy and theory appeared to have been defeated. In the 40th anniversary of the independence of Ghana Nyerere (1967) explains that Nkrumah “underestimated the degree of suspicion and animosity which his crusading passion had
created among a substantial number of his fellow Heads of States [as they] had a vested interest in keeping Africa divided” (in Shivji 2009: on-line). As accurately put in Accra Mail (27 March 2002), “African leaders do not want self-government in Africa; they want fiefdoms”. Poignantly, Nyerere(Shivji 2009: on-line) narrated a story that captures the essence of the deep-rooted sentiments against continentalism as follows:

After the failure to establish the [African] Union Government at the Accra Summit of 1965, I heard one Head of State express with relief that he was happy to be returning home to his country still Head of State. To this day I cannot tell whether he was serious or joking. But he may well have been serious, because Kwame Nkrumah was very serious and the fears of a number of us losing our precious status was quite palpable.

The OAU is the consequence of these contestations on continentalism, which some arguing that it veered from the Pan-Africanist agenda and became an elite club of African nationalists that pursued their own rather than that of the African people (Taylor 2002: 403-412). Ijeoma (2007: 185) explains that this made African unity a matter of African Heads of States that even the preamble of the Charter of the OAU talked about We the Heads of State rather than We the People of Africa. What subsequently followed was “territorial nationalism and the pursuit of power by Africa’s pseudo-bourgeoisies and compradors” (Shivji 2009: on-line). Nyerere described the OAU as a committee of dictators that often shielded each other’s authoritarian tendencies in the name of solidarity (Ijeoma 2007: 185). Mkandawire (2004: 04) observes that the African leadership in the last four decades was characterised by ignorance of calls for basic services; fomenting of ethnic conflicts; rejection of regional integration in the name of protecting national sovereignty; conflation of national sovereignty with their persona and egos; and lack of accountability.

Ijeoma (2007: 182) explains that “a major challenge to the realisation of the Pan-Africanist ideology [in Africa] has been how to bridge the gap between the Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone and Afro-Arabic countries, who are known to veer towards their traditional allies in the form of their mother countries allies [e.g. Britain, France, Portugal]”. The Casablanca group characterised the African countries’ reliance on their mother countries allies and Western aid” as “panhandling and dependence” (Araia 2009: on-line). The Casablanca and Brazzaville chasm, which was subsequently bridged through persuasive engagement and
compromise towards gradualism, was, however, not necessarily about Pan-Africanism as a philosophy for decolonisation. The chasm was about the strategic approach towards realising the objectives of Pan-Africanism.

On the objective of securing a complete liberation of the continent, the twentieth-century Pan-Africanism achieved significant strides. This is clear in the total decolonisation of Africa and the end of apartheid in South Africa (Ijeoma 2007: 186, 191-192). But, this achievement was hollow in that the continent continued to economically rely on the West and other countries such as Japan (Ramose 2006: 03) and is still politically divided. This is contrary to the Pan-African philosophy of collective self-reliance. As explained above, “the founding fathers of Pan-Africanism were always acutely aware that one of the functions of Pan-Africanism was to develop the economies and the technological capacity of the continent” (Ijeoma 2007: 188); “develop [a] common [African] market for a viable development” (Araia 2009: on-line) without being dependent on the Western countries. Ijeoma (2007: 191) concludes that:

*Pan-Africanism has not done well. The political unification and economic integration of the continent have thus failed (at least when judged against the dreams of the key figures of the Pan-African movement), as have the documents and plans prepared by Pan-African conferences. The declarations and rhetoric of the African leadership have similarly yielded little. Pan-Africanism has failed when judged against projects of regional co-operation on other continents. It has failed when judged against the well-articulated, widely shared understanding of the needs of the African people. It has failed when judged against the emotive force of Pan-Africanism discourse.*

These failures are a reflection of ideational inadequacies of the twentieth century Pan-Africanist thinking, which omitted fundamental basic units upon which it ought to have been constructed. This is in spite of a well articulated philosophical context the early twentieth-century Pan-African thinkers such as Du Bois, Garvey and Nkrumah set to frame the thinking on the renaissance of Africa. These Pan-Africanist thinkers emphasised that a people-centred development, mutual reliance and continentalism are the basic units upon which Pan-Africanism as a philosophy of liberation ought to be embedded. But, as explained above, the Pan-Africanism discourse in Africa was more focussed on decolonisation and continental
unity. Its focus only on these aspects lost sight of the imperative of people-centred development.

Ijeoma (2007: 179-194) explains that democracy, social justice and good governance have also not been the central organising principle for Pan-Africanism in Africa. Consequently, “the weakness of Pan-Africanism has been its failure to protect the Africans from their tyrants” (Ijeoma 2007: 187). It did not deal with issues of corruption, maladministration, leadership and governance challenges as they were not part of the concepts that structured the Pan-African thinking in the twentieth century. This was an epistemological faux pas in philosophical and theoretical thought. The pursuit for continentalism failed to reconcile Pan-Africanism with national aspirations, ignored, at the conceptual level, the reality of territorial nationalism, which eventually triumphed in thwarting any efforts towards African unity. This exemplifies the failure of second-order reflection on Pan-Africanism to get a grip on the first-order reality.

As explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis, the first order reality refers to objects of scientific inquiry in the empirical world whereas the second-order reality appertains to the faculty of ideation on non-empirical objects of inquiry. The first-order reality informs and influences the second-order reality; conversely the second-order reality does the same on the first-order reality (see Wessels 1999a: 368). This is consistent with Nkrumah’s logic that “philosophy always arose from a social milieu”, which informs its content; conversely “the content of philosophy seeks to affect social milieu either by confirming it or opposing it” (1970: 56). A philosophical discourse is second-order reflection concerned with thinking about thinking. As a function of philosophy, thinking is important and if pursued incorrectly would be inexact in dealing with the exigencies of social realities.

Nkrumah’s pursuit of a politically united Africa failed to realise the empirical reality of competing national interests, which is the first-order reality in the discourse on Pan-Africanism. It lacked cognitive foresight or prescience on the possible practical consequences of such pursuit. The Pan-Africanist thinking in the twentieth century was therefore characterised by a disjuncture between the first-order reality and second-order reality. This is the point where philosophical and theoretical propositions lose their epistemological significance as relevance to reality does not exist. It is in instances of this nature that nescience preponderates.
In its transplantation in Africa, “Pan-Africanism was nationalised, or more correctly statised, under the rhetoric of territorial nationalism” (Shivji 2009: on-line) and constricted. It was “watered down by both ideological shifts and vicissitudes of adjustments” (Ijeoma 2007: 188). In the process the epistemological nexus that connects it to its ideological and philosophical foundation got lost and territorial nationalism dominated the twentieth century thinking. What this thinking on Pan-Africanism failed to consider as epistemological verity is that when continentalism is led by states, “the very vision of larger unity tends to disappear as state leaders get embroiled in the pragmatism of power politics”(Shivji 2009: on-line).

Mkandawire (2004: 04) summarised the consequences of the failure to consider the foregoing epistemological verity in the discourse on Pan-Africanism in Africa which are already mentioned above. The Pan-African concept of continentalism failed. As a result, Africa continued to rely on the Western economy. This is an aberration from the Pan-African concept of collective self-reliance and confirms the propositions of the modernisation theory of development, which the philosophy of Pan-Africanism jettisons. The modernisation theory is associated with the ideology and philosophy of neo-liberalism and its antithesis is the dependency theory, which is associated with Pan-Africanism.

In the context of the above exposition, this study propounds that the ideological, philosophical and theoretical inadequacies of the twentieth century thinking on Pan-Africanism gave way to neo-liberalism, which emerged and assumed dominance as a philosophical paradigm in the development discourse. It discredited Pan-Africanism and its concept of continentalism was replaced by globalisation. Mkandawire (1999: 14; 2004: 04) describes that the last four decades of Pan-Africanism in Africa as lost decades. Gaye (2005: 56) observes that in the 1970s until towards the end of the 1980s the Pan-Africanist zeal for the renaissance of Africa faded as globalisation “became the dominant intellectual paradigm” and dominated the development discourse. With the end of apartheid in South Africa attempts to re-gain the lost grounds in so far as Pan-Africanism is concerned were resuscitated and pursued with earnest in Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance. This marks the inception of the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism.
3.2.3.1.3.3 Twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism

Following Prah’s (1999: 44-46) analytical template, the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism constitutes the third phase in the Pan-Africanist thought. It is a post-colonial and post-apartheid phase of intellectualism on Pan-Africanism, which Thabo Mbeki, with the concept of African Renaissance, vigorously pursued and declared the twenty-first century an African century (Nabudere 2002: 04). This phase embodies contemporary formulations and structure of Pan-Africanist thinking. If Kwame Nkrumah shaped the discourse on Pan-Africanism in Africa in the twentieth century, Mbeki did likewise with the concept of African Renaissance in the twentieth-first century. But, as explained in sub-section 3.2.3.1 above, it is important for contextual reasons to restate here that African Renaissance is not a new concept in the parlance of African politics. It does have a long history in the African epistemology. This aspect is already considered above as a prelude to this part of the discussion.

But, in the sense that it is contemporarily used and understood, what does the African Renaissance mean? Is it embedded in the philosophy of Pan-Africanism or a *EurAfrica* ideological and philosophical paradigm for Africa’s development? In addition to these questions, Nabudere (2002: 04) asks, what is the relation of African Renaissance to Pan-Africanism? These questions are important in this part of the discourse because, as pointed out above, the existing body of scholarship is characterised by a chasm in proffering answers (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). The attempt to answer these questions is important to understand NEPAD, since in some of the contemporary existing body of scholarship it is argued that its philosophical and theoretical antecedents are embedded in the African Renaissance.

Prah (1999: 43) observes that in the sense that the African Renaissance is contemporarily used and understood, its origin “go back to the nineteenth-century”. But, does this adequately answers the questions posited above? The answer is, ‘not necessarily’. The attempt to relate African Renaissance to Pan-Africanism in order to understand its meaning as discussed in sub-sections 3.2.3.1.3.1 and 3.2.3.1.3.2 above was within the context of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries thinking respectively. The meaning African Renaissance assumed varied connotations at different epistemological phases of Pan-Africanism in the context of history. The generic meaning of African Renaissance as a concept and its evolution in the philosophical and theoretical discourse on the development of Africa is considered in sub-section 3.2.3.1.1 above. But, for the purpose of providing answers to the specific questions as
raised above it is important that some contextual aspects associated with African Renaissance as contemporarily used are considered.

As pointed out in sub-section 3.2.3.1.1 above, the contemporary development discourse on Africa that assumes a protagonist position on NEPAD contends that African Renaissance is the twenty-first century variation of Pan-Africanism (see Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 01; Mafeje 2002: 03-18; Magubane 1999: 11, 31; Mboya 2004: 32-39; Melber 2002: 06; Prah 1999: 43). Its meaning is inextricably linked to the democratisation of South Africa. This is the context that needs some consideration. Melber (2005: 38) observes that “with the successful democratic transition, South Africa emerged during the second half of the 1990s as a new political factor on the continent” with a great amount of influence on the politics of Africa’s development. At the summit of the now defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1994 Nelson Mandela, the former President of South Africa said:

One epoch with its historic tasks has to come to an end. Surely, another must commence with its own challenges. Africa cries out for a new birth, Carthage awaits the restoration of its glory...we know it is a matter of fact that we have it in ourselves as Africans to change all this. We must, in action, assert our will to do so. We must, in action, say there is no obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing...African Renaissance.

This was an earnest appeal to the African leadership for the renaissance of Africa. Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, revived and popularised the African Renaissance vision and ignited enthusiasm among scholars in Africa and the Diaspora. This was probably an attempt to regain the lost ground of the twentieth century Pan-Africanism. The concept of African Renaissance is a response to the domineering Western political discourse on Africa’s development, which assumed preponderance when the twentieth-century thinking failed to sustain the ideals of Pan-Africanism (Ijeoma 2007: 187-191; Shivji 2009; Mkandawire 1999: 14; 2004: 04).

In September 1998 intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora converged in Johannesburg, South Africa, to untangle the concept of African Renaissance. Their intellectual engagements made an important contribution to the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism and were recorded in the book entitled African Renaissance: The New Struggle (1999). In this
book Makgoba (1999: xii) asserts that “the African Renaissance is a unique opportunity for Africans to define [themselves] and [their] agenda according to [their] own realities and taking into account the realities of the world around [them].’ It is ‘about African reflection and African definition’; ‘reiterating who we are and what we as Africans are all about’; and ‘being agents of [Africa’s] history and masters of [her] own destiny’ (Makgoba, Shope, & Mazwai 1999: xii).

The African Renaissance is explained as being “about the ancient pride of the peoples of the continent” and their determination to assert themselves in a globalising world (Magubane 1999: 10). Breytenbach (1999: 92) explains that, “for Garth le Pere, the African Renaissance is a convenient ideological anchor for South Africa to lock all of Africa into a common destiny and moors its future with the rest of Africa; seeks the revival of Africa’s fortunes, and wants Africa to play a bigger, more self-sufficient role in the global economy”. In this two conceptual strands in the contemporary conceptualisation of African Renaissance could be discerned, which Vale and Maseko (1998: 278-283) subsumed into Africanist and globalist conceptualisations.

The Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance is concerned with a “rediscovery and reinterpretation of Africa’s past and challenges dominant narratives within international relations” (Matthews 2002: n.a). It is “the philosophy of self-centred development giving priority to the human and rejecting the false values of modern Europe and Africa-power hunger, domination instinct, individualism, quantitativism, productivism – which have led the world to a human deadlock” (Diop 1999: 09). Its “emphasis is on reclaiming Africa’s past as a means of driving South Africa and the rest of the continent into a prosperous future” (Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 02). The Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance draws heavily from the philosophical postulations of early thinkers on Pan-Africanism, as specified in sub-sections 3.2.3.1.2, 3.2.3.1.3.1 and 3.2.3.1.3.2 above, and represents a call for the conception of an Africa-focussed development paradigm as an alternative from the globally accepted one based on the philosophies and theories of neo-liberalism.

The globalist conceptualisation of African Renaissance is concerned with economic globalisation and political liberalisation. It accepts neo-liberal frameworks of development; encourages Africa to take part in this pursuit; and considers modernisation, industrialisation, free markets and trade liberalisation as key imperatives in Africa’s pursuit for sustainable
development (Matthews 2002: n.a). The globalist conceptualisation advocates that “Africa should position itself in the mainstream of the world economy and become an integrated part of the process of economic globalisation” (Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 02). It draws heavily from the philosophies and theories of neo-liberalism. For original insight into the concept of African Renaissance, reference is made to the intellectual outputs of Thabo Mbeki (Sijori 2009: 72) who, as its champion, said:

When once more the saying is recalled, Ex Africa semper aliquid novi! (Something new always comes out of Africa!), this must be so, because out of Africa reborn must come modern products of human economic activity, significant contributions to the world of knowledge, in the arts, science and technology, new images of an Africa of peace and prosperity. Thus shall we, together and at last, by bringing about the African renaissance depart from a centuries-old past which sought to perpetuate the notion of an Africa condemned to remain a curiosity slowly grinding to a halt on the periphery of the world.

With the concept of African Renaissance, the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism appears to be a synthesis of the nineteenth and twentieth century thinking. It reiterates a thesis that has always been part of the African thought associated with the ideological, philosophical and theoretical foundations of Pan-Africanism that Africans on the continent and in the Diaspora share a common ancestry and destiny (Mbeki 2002: 126). The African Renaissance emphasised the Pan-African imperative of black pride and African unity. It talks about redefinition of “Africanness as a representation of human hope and not the epitome of human despair; restoration of Africa to her rightful place as an equal player with other continents in the determination of the future of the common humanity; ending poverty and underdevelopment; political and economic integration”(Mbeki 2002: 123, 125-127, 131). In African Renaissance – The New Struggle, Mbeki (1999: xv, xvi, xviii) writes that:

The new African world which the African renaissance seeks to build is one of democracy, peace and stability, sustainable development and a better life for the people, non-racism and non-sexism, equality among the nations, and a just and democratic system of international governance. By taking [this] position,
we [are] saying that we want to see an African continent in which the people participate in systems of governance in which they are truly able to determine their destiny and put behind us the notions of democracy and human rights as peculiarly Western concepts. Our vision of an African Renaissance [is] provision of a better life for these masses of the people whom we say must enjoy and exercise the right to determine their future. That renaissance must therefore address the critical question of sustainable development which impacts sensitively on the standard of living and the quality of life of the masses of our people.

By articulating the concept of African Renaissance as the twenty-first century variation of Pan-Africanism, Mbeki provided a context for Africa’s development. Mbeki enunciates the concept of African Renaissance as a philosophical basis upon which to engage the world on a new form of co-operation and partnership between Africa and the developed world (Gumede 2005: 195-213; Landsberg s.a.: 03). Melber (2005: 03) observes that African Renaissance “managed to rally policy-makers, bureaucrats and intellectuals alike behind the idea [as originated in the nineteenth century Pan-African discourse] still highly relevant as a concept of African self-respect, dignity and pride”; it provided “a philosophical basis for new policy formulation”. In separate reviews of the existing body of scholarship Matthews (2002) and Maserumule (2004c: 81-87) find that unanimity exists among those twenty-first century scholars and intellectuals that assume a protagonist position on the subject about what the African Renaissance as a variation of Pan-Africanism seeks to achieve. Their perspectives are consistent with Mbeki’s articulation of the African Renaissance.

In their writings the scholars and intellectuals referred to above propagate that the ideological, philosophical and theoretical pursuits of African Renaissance as a variation of the twenty-first century Pan-Africanism seeks to re-discover and promote African history, culture and values in a manner that represents Africans as having a proud historical, cultural and moral heritage; to redefine Africa and determine its destiny; to create an agenda of African unity through Pan-Africanism; to promote and consolidate the democratic systems to ensure good governance; to extricate Africa from the shackles of underdevelopment, marginalisation and the position of powerlessness in the global arena; to promote and encourage economic development as part of the empowerment of Africa, including science
and technology; to challenge the imposition of foreign templates and influences on Africa; and collective self-reliance; and to ensure stability on the continent.

The twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism corrects the fundamental omissions in the Pan-African thought of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with additions of aspects that are generally considered the basic units of what ought to have long been its conceptualisations. It attends to the ideological, philosophical and theoretical inadequacies of especially the twentieth century thinking on Pan-Africanism, which is characterised by epistemological reductionism. The concept of African Renaissance bequeaths to Pan-Africanism a meaning that goes beyond decolonisation and African unity. These aspects constitute the basic unit of the Pan-African thought of the twentieth century. The contemporary Pan-African thought “seeks equality and achievement with the rest of humanity in all areas of human endeavour” (Prah 1999: 45). It transcends the racially exclusive connotation of its meaning of an African. Mbeki traversed the “world’s political and economic centres” to articulate Africa’s new development vision based on the concept of African Renaissance and was widely accepted (Bond 2002: 62).

Mbeki’s conceptualisation of African Renaissance is rooted in the history and tradition of the political philosophy of the ANC, which, in the twenty-first century, came to define his intellectual being and prowess as one of the influential thinkers on Africanism. This contextual verity is important to further understand the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism as expressed through the concept of African Renaissance in the persona of Thabo Mbeki. The philosophy of Pan-Africanism has always since its inception in the nineteenth century been about securing “equal rights, self-government, independence and unity for African peoples” (McLean 1996: 357). By African peoples reference was specifically made to the human race of African origin in Africa and the Diaspora. This refers to what Blyden, Garvey, and Du Bois called the African nation (Prah 2006: 223). In the research work on culture, language and history (1991) Prah (Bankie 1994: on-line) makes a distinction between citizenship and nationality that:

*Citizens of a state can be of various nationalities. While citizenship requires the acknowledgement of equal rights for all nationalities within the state, nationality per se transcends citizenship and transcends often-state borders, especially in the African case.*
This has always been the context from which African nationalism is defined and understood in the parlance of Pan-Africanism. Nyerere (1967: 194) argues that “African nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic, and is dangerous, if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism”. The conceptualisation of African nationalism within the context of the foundational antecedents of Pan-Africanism connotes racially exclusive meaning. This means that people of European descent in Africa were not defined as Africans.

In the 1905 The Regeneration of Africa speech Seme, the first President of the ANC, did not subscribe to the racially exclusive conceptualisation of African nationalism. At the time when Seme made the speech the ANC was still at the embryonic stage and the context of the time naturally exposed its germination to the ideological and philosophical propositions of Pan-Africanism, which then was a dominant political consciousness among Africans in Africa and the Diaspora. However, with its establishment in 1912 the ANC veered from the mainstream Pan-Africanism thinking on African nationalism to a racially inclusive nationalism, a position which was three decades later vehemently opposed by its Youth League after its formation in 1944 (Kondlo 2009).

Anton Lembede, who Kondlo (2009: 53) describes as “the leading ideologue and theoretician in the Youth League” was key in challenging the ideological position of the ANC on its racially inclusive nationalism. Van Vuuren (2000: 63) writes that Lembede tried to systematise the cardinal principles of African nationalism and equated them with “Africanism as inspired by a vision of a reborn African nation”. Lembede contended that “all over the world nationalism is rising in revolt against foreign domination…[and] among Africans also clear signs of national awakening, national Renaissance, or rebirth are noticeable on the far off-horizons” (in Karis 1973: 317). Mahlangu correctly observes that “the nationalist fervour sweeping through the continent” of Africa preoccupied the political consciousness of the “small but growing number of Africanists” in the ANC (Kondlo 2009: 52).

Van Vuuren (2000: 63) explains that “Lambede’s projection of African Renaissance was Africanist in a racially exclusive sense”, which stood in stark contrast with “the tradition of a racially inclusive nationalism among African intellectuals in which African liberation and the birth of a new nation was regarded as a multi-racial project”. This engendered a “national question” in the liberatory philosophy in the South African body politics, in which its attempts to engage became even fiercer with the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 by
the Congress of the People under the leadership of the ANC. The Freedom Charter defines South Africa as a multi-racial society. The domination of this racially inclusive African nationalism in the ANC led to a split by a group of Africanist ideologues to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) of Azania in 1959, with Robert Sobukwe as its founding President (Kondlo 2009: 53-63).

The PAC charged that the ANC, with its position of the racially inclusive African nationalism, betrayed the ideals of Pan-Africanism. It “argued that South Africa was an African nation occupied by colonial settlers who had no inherent right to be there” (Maddox, n.d, on-line). In the PAC Inaugural Conference in 1959, Sobukwe explains fundamental character of its ideology and position on African nationalism that:

*In Africa the myth of race has been propounded and propagated by imperialists and colonialists from Europe, in order to facilitate and justify their inhuman exploitation of the indigenous people of the land. It is from this myth of race with its attendant claims of cultural superiority that the doctrine of white supremacy stems.* (Sobukwe 1959: 30-34)

Kondlo (2009: 61) enunciates that “Sobukwe’s emphasis on the oneness of mankind characterised the humanitarian aspects of South Africa’s Pan-Africanism. The ANC emphasises the multi-racial race of humankind. The ideological chasm between the ANC and PAC on African nationalism means that the ‘national question’ remains unanswered. In the 1960s and 1970s the Black Consciousness Movement philosophy of Steve Biko “entered the lexicons of Pan-African political discourse” and attempted to synthesise the diametrically divergent ideological positions of the ANC and PAC on the question of African nationalism. In this intellectual pursuit, Biko (1978: 48-53) did not use the concept *nation.*

In the *Black Consciousness* parlance the concept used is *black,* which is defined as “those who are by law or tradition politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group in the South African society and identifying themselves as a unit in the struggle towards the realisation of their aspirations’ (Biko 1978: 48). In explaining this definition, Biko (1978: 48) further said “being black is not a matter of pigmentation; being black is a reflection of a mental attitude”. But, what exactly does this mean? Biko’s usage of the concept *black* is neither in the sense of the ANC’s tradition of a racially inclusive nationalism
nor PAC’s racially exclusive nationalism. As Biko (1978: 48) puts it, the concept of “black is not necessarily all-inclusive”.

The fact that we are all not white does not necessarily mean that we are all black. Non-whites do exist and will continue to exist for a quite long time. If one’s aspiration is whiteness but his pigmentation makes attainment of this impossible, then that person is non-white.

But, in the context of the above exposition, the Black Consciousness philosophy is not a synthesis of the ANC’s racially inclusive nationalism and PAC’s racially exclusive nationalism. It introduces a totally new dimension in the Pan-African discourse on African nationalism, which heralds another ideological and philosophical paradigm. For, a synthesis is concerned with the analysis of a thesis and antithesis and combines their separate or diverse elements into a coherent whole. This is not what the Black Consciousness philosophy does in the Pan-African discourse on African nationalism. The answer to a ‘national question’ is still elusive.

The Black Consciousness philosophy is instructive but not definite. It is within the context of these ideological and philosophical contestations on Pan-Africanism or African nationalism that Mbeki’s African Renaissance should be understood. For, Mbeki’s articulation of African Renaissance so much influenced the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism, which is rooted in the ANC tradition of a racially inclusive nationalism as laid bare in the speech made on the occasion of the adoption by the Constitutional Assembly of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill, 1996. In this well-thought out and famous speech generally considered as profoundly formulated, and eloquently articulated (see Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 09), Mbeki (1996) ingeniously captured the essence of African Renaissance in relation to African nationalism and powerfully pronounced that:

I am an African. I owe my being to the Khoi and the San whose desolate souls haunt the great expanses of the beautiful Cape – they who fell victim to the most merciless genocide our native land has ever seen, they who were first to lose their lives in the struggle to defend our freedom and independence and they who, as a people, perished in the result...I am formed of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home in our native land. Whatever their own actions,
they remain still part of me. In my veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the East. Their proud dignity informs my bearing, their culture is part of my essence...I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women of Hintsa and Sekhukhune led, the patriots that Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to the battle, the soldiers Moshoeshoe and Ngungunyane taught never to dishonour the cause of freedom.

My mind and my knowledge of myself is formed by the victories that are the jewels in our African crown, the victories we earned from Isandhlwana to Khartoum, as Ethiopians and as the Ashanti of Ghana, as the Berbers of the desert. I am the grandchild who lays fresh flowers on the Boer graves at St Helena and the Bahamas, who sees in the mind’s eyes and suffers the suffering of a simple peasant folk: death, concentration camps, destroyed homesteads, and dreams in ruins. I am the grandchild of Nongqause...I come of those who were transported from India and China, whose being resided in the fact, solely, that they were able to provide physical labour, who taught me that we could both be at home and be foreign, who taught me that human existence itself demanded that freedom was a necessary condition for that human existence. Being part of all these people, and in the knowledge that none dare contest that assertion I shall claim that I am an African.

The superlatives used in the speech and its material content resembles a high degree of congruence with Pixley Isaka ka Seme’s 1905 *The Regeneration of Africa* speech, part of which is cited in sub-section 3.2.3.1.3.2 above. Seme talked about different races of mankind that are composed of free and unique individuals whose equality should not be determined on the basis of racial identity. For, that is where racism starts. This presupposes that multi-racialism is a societal reality that ought to be part of thinking on the question of African nationalism. Mbeki talked about being a descendant of different human races that constitute the African nation, including that of European origin [European Africans] in Africa and that of African origin in Europe [Diaspora]. Likewise, this also presupposes the concept of multi-racialism, which in the context of the discourse on African nationalism; means a racially inclusive definition of an African. This illustrates the consistent intellectual and ideological pattern of the ANC on the question of African nationalism, which frames the contemporary thinking on Pan-Africanism as expressed through the concept of African Renaissance.
Mbeki’s African Renaissance essence is even more expansive in that it also considers human races of European, Indian, Chinese and Arabic origins in Africa as the confluence that constitutes important variables in the conceptualisation of African nationalism.

The Mbeki conceptualisation and theorisation of African Renaissance as a variant of the twenty-first century thinking on the Pan-Africanism factor in also the imperative of continentalism, which is already explained above, and globalisation. Shezi (1998: on-line) argues that “the African Renaissance cannot be conceptualised, understood and attained, in isolation of the dictates of the global economic system”. This is emphasised in Mbeki (1999: xvii) that “we must …insert ourselves into the international debate about the issue of globalisation and its impact on the lives of the people, and make our voice heard about what we and the rest of the world should do to achieve the development which is a fundamental right of the masses of our people”. As Landsberg and Hlope (1999: 02) explain, with the concept of African Renaissance, attempts are made to position Africa in the mainstream of the world economy to become an integral part of the process of economic globalisation. In this the intention is to influence the process of globalisation to the benefit of Africa in the pursuit to eradicate poverty (see Matthews 2002).

Shezi (1998: on-line) explains that “in practice”, the foregoing “suggests [that] beyond the realm of theory, political rhetoric and discourse, the attainment of the African Renaissance will necessitate greater regional economic integration with Africa itself on the one hand [continentalism], and an effective integration of the African continent into international economic system [globalisation]”. This means that the contemporary thinking on African Renaissance as variant of the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism does not only focus on Africa but also seeks to attend to global challenges. It embodies globalist perspective (Breytenbach 1999: 92), which also introduces the concept of co-operation and partnership between Africa and the developed countries of the West (see Mbeki 2002: 126). The concept of African Renaissance was used as a basis to engage the developed countries of the world to assist in the development of Africa, on which they largely agreed. Mbeki (2002: 126) remarks that “this must be the very first time in half a millennium that countries historically responsible for African slavery and colonialism agreed to define their co-operation with Africa on the basis of what Africans themselves think about themselves and their future”. 
Sijora (2009: 72) writes that “Mbeki understood the structural violence of hegemonic global political and economic thinking and practice”, and, with the concept of African Renaissance, wanted to disarm and dislocate the “naturalised hegemony of the neo-colonial liberal discourse”. With the concept of African Renaissance, Mbeki sought to “renew Africa’s interpretation of its history, identity and destiny in whose light would be perceived the world” (Sijora 2009: 72). It engenders “a belief in law governing the character of the historical process; confidence in the power of human reason and its ability to discover objective truth”; which involves “seeking alternative ways of experiencing modernity; mass leisure and consumption based on non-colonial traditions or life-worlds, but without being nativist or reductive in anyway” (Sijora 2009: 72).

It is in the context of the above epistemological logic that undergirds the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism as expressed through the concept of African Renaissance that NEPAD was conceptualised. The body of thought that assumes a protagonist position so far analysed propounds that NEPAD evolved from the concept of African Renaissance, which is the twenty-first century variant of Pan-Africanism. This school of thought contends that NEPAD is a true Pan-African development initiative. However, there is another body of thought that jettisons this proposition in the proposition that NEPAD is part of the ideology of EurAfrica based on neo-liberalism. It epistemologically gravitates more towards the modernisation theory. This antithesis part of the discourse is important to answer the question whether NEPAD is, in terms of its philosophical and theoretical foundations, a true Pan-African development initiative or part of the ideology of EurAfrica. These propositions are synthesised in sub-sections 3.3.3.3 below to formulate a perspective on what NEPAD is from the philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective. For now it is important to consider the antithesis of the thesis that NEPAD is a true Pan-African programme. At the outset neo-liberalism is extensively considered. This is important for reasons of contextualisation and epistemological logic. For, NEPAD is, among others, critiqued on the basis that it is ingrained in neo-liberalism.
3.2.3.2 Neo-liberalism

Adesina’s (2001: 01) observes that “much of the criticism of NEPAD has focused, procedurally, on the lack of consultation in its drafting, and, paradigmatically, on its neo-liberal content, the same set of policy instruments that have damaged Africa over the last 20 years”. The criticism of NEPAD on the basis of the procedure of how it came about is considered above where NEPAD is considered from the historical-process perspective. In this part of the discourse the focus is on the critique of NEPAD, whose emphasis is more on it as a neo-liberal development initiative. It is concerned with the antithesis of the thesis that NEPAD is a true Pan-African development initiative and that its philosophical and theoretical foundations are rooted in neo-liberalism. But, what is neo-liberalism? In the following sub-sections neo-liberalism as a concept, philosophy and theory is considered to, towards the end of this chapter, develop an epistemological framework for synthesis of different propositions about the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD.

3.2.3.2.1 Meaning of the concept neo-liberalism

Thorsen and Lie (s.a.: 01) observe that the concept of neo-liberalism “has become as imprecise exhortation in much of the literature, often describing any tendency deemed undesirable”. Adesina (2001: 06) makes a similar observation, but with illustrative context being South Africa, that in the parlance of the Tripartite Alliance the concept neo-liberalism is considered a byword for ‘right-wing’ and is wielded as a political weapon against those that pursue policies that are perceived incongruous with the socialist or leftist agenda. The definitions of neo-liberalism are many and varied, with most describing it pejoratively as global capitalism aimed at destroying the welfare state (see Bourdieu 1998; Chomsky 1999; Touraine 2001; Hermansen 2005; Saad-Filho & Johnston 2005; Hagen 2006).

Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005: 01) argue that it is “impossible to define neoliberalism purely theoretically”. Thorsen and Lie (s.a.: 09) observe that in much of the existing body of scholarship neo-liberalism as a concept is widely acknowledged as an important construct in the political economy discourse, but is left undefined with claims that it defies definitions. This obfuscates the imprecision of the concept even further. To illustrate the imprecise nature of the concept neo-liberalism, Thabo Mbeki, in response to a comment expressed in pejorative sense at the Continental Experts Meeting on NEPAD in Pretoria in June 2002 that
NEPAD is a neo-liberal development initiative, retorted that “I would like to be further informed about what this thing called neo-liberalism is, because I heard it used frequently but I do not seem to understand what it means.”

Adesina (2001: 06) explains that “at the heart of the apparent confusion is a deficit of understanding concerning the relationship between conceptual discussions about neo-liberalism and actual policy implementation. Pauw (1999b: 465; 469) explains that concepts are tools of thinking. They are used to lay bare philosophical and ideological propositions (see Blackburn 2005: 276-277). If we use them incorrectly particularly in developing policies, the thinking that undergirds them would be inexact (Maserumule 2004a: 76-78). Thorsen and Lie (s.a.: 01) believe that, in spite of the existing conceptual confusions in the attempt to appropriate a meaning to it, neo-liberalism might still be given a more precise definition.

In their paper titled *What is Neoliberalism* Thorsen and Lie (s.a.) provide a detailed analysis of neo-liberalism, tracing its conceptual foundation from liberalism and also attending to its conceptual history to develop an epistemological context for the proposition of its meaning. Their proposition of the meaning of neo-liberalism, based on extensive review of the literature on the subject, is that it:

*is a loosely demarcated set of political beliefs which most prominently and prototypically include the conviction that the only legitimate purpose of the state is to safeguard individual, commercial, liberty, as well as strong private property rights. This conviction usually issues, in turn, in a belief that the state ought to be minimal or at least drastically reduced in strength and size, and that any transgression by the state beyond its sole legitimate purpose is unacceptable. These beliefs could apply to the international level as well, where a system of free markets and free trade ought to be implemented as well; the only acceptable reason for regulating international trade is to safeguard the same kind of commercial liberty and the same kinds of strong property rights which ought to be realised on a national level.* (Thorsen & Lie s.a.: 14)
Consistent with Thorsen and Lie’s (s.a.: 14) definitional perspective, Adesina (2001: 06) explains that the concept of neo-liberalism refers to a “belief in the moral necessity of market forces in the economy and entrepreneurs as a good and necessary social group”. Following this explanatory logic, it is clear that the concept of neo-liberalism is anchored on two fundamental aspects: the market forces in the economy and entrepreneurship. Adesina (2001: 06) explains that in neo-liberalism “market forces are not only morally necessary but inherently good and are the most appropriate ways to allocate resources and create incentives in society”, whereas the entrepreneurs are the primary social force for deploying and implementing this virtuous mode of managing society”.

Karl Marx calls neo-liberalism “commoditisation of social life” (in Adesina 2001: 06); its objective is to “intensify and expand the market, by increasing the number, frequency, repeatability, and formalisation of transaction” (Treanor, s.a., 05). Adesina (2001: 07) explains that the principle of market transaction and its application to as many areas of social and economic existence and interaction as possible define the core value and principle of neo-liberalism. It is about “the falling away of the welfare functions of public enterprises and utilities” (Adesina 2001: 07).

3.2.3.2.2 Philosophical and theoretical context of neo-liberalism

Thorsen and Lie (s.a.) observe that during the past twenty years neo-liberalism dominated the political and academic discourses with some perspectives suggesting that it is the dominant ideology shaping the world today. Saad-Filho (2005: 01) declares that “we live in the age of neo-liberalism”. Harvey (2005: 02) explains that neo-liberalism is a distinctive economic “theory of political economic practices rather than a complete political ideology”. This perspective deviates from much of the existing thinking in the body of knowledge that the concept of neo-liberalism represents a revival of liberalism. Thorsen and Lie (s.a: 12) explain that neo-liberalism “does not seem to be any sort of clear-cut connection or even correlation between a favourable assessment of neo-liberal economic practices and a commitment to liberalism ‘proper’.” This is clear in A Brief History of Neoliberalism by David Harvey, wherein neo-liberalism is explained as:
in the first instance a theory of political practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, healthcare, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But, beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit. (Harvey 2005: 02)

In neo-liberalism the private sector plays a key role in that part of the control of the economy is located within its purview in terms of authority. The rationale behind this arrangement is based on the belief that curtailing the role of the state in the economy would necessarily give rise to efficient government. Blomgren (1997: 224) adds a philosophical perspective in the discourse on neo-liberalism. Thorsen and Lie (s.a: 12) explain that Blomgren (1997) studied the political thoughts of Friedman, Nozick and Hayek and concludes that they are a representative of neo-liberal political philosophy. In defining neo-liberalism from the normative perspective, Blomgren (1997: 224) writes that:

*Neoliberalism is commonly thought of as a political philosophy giving priority to individual freedom and the right to private property. It is not, however, the simple and homogenous philosophy it might appear to be. It ranges over a wide expanse in regard to ethical foundations as well as to normative conclusions. At the one end of the line is anarcho-liberalism, arguing for a complete laissez-faire, and the abolishment of all government. At the other end is classical
Thorsen and Lie (s.a: 14), Adesina (2001: 06), and Trenor’s (s.a: 05) conceptualisation of neo-liberalism is consistent with Harvey’s (2005: 02) theorisation and Blomgren’s (1997: 224) philosophical perspective. In this Thorsen and Lie (s.a: 12) observe that “Blomgren’s basic characterisations of neo-liberalism overlap… to a considerable degree with Harvey’s definition, but emphasise more clearly the internal diversity of neoliberal thought”, which are subsumed into consequentialist and deontological neo-liberalisms. A consequentialist neo-liberalism of Blomgren is the categorisation of intellectual inputs of Friedman (1962; 1980) and Hayek (1944; 1973) based on the theoretical groundings to neo-liberal evaluations and policies. This neo-liberal thought advocates adoption of policies that are considered to have a potential to achieve positive consequences in the overall economic performance. It is based on the assumption that neo-liberal policies such as deregulation, privatisation and radical tax cuts would achieve such positive outcomes, as referred to in the foregoing. This thinking is based on Friedman’s (1962; 1980) intellectual inputs.

Thorne and Lie (s.a: 13) observe that, in as far as the foregoing is concerned, it “means that Friedman in the end wants to bring about the neo-liberal package of policies and economic practices because human beings are by nature social, and that their social nature dictates a certain way of organising society which places a great emphasis on individuals being free to choose”. In the same vein, Thorne and Lie (s.a: 13) explain that Hayek (1944: 1973), “while approximating at places a utilitarian argument in favour of neo-liberalism”, also bases his political thought on the concept of natural law. Hayek’s theory of neo-liberalism is based on the notion of a spontaneous order of social life, which is contended that it is “better than any kind of artificially created order when it comes down to securing individual liberty and well-being”(Thorne & Lie, s.a: 13). Hayek’s neo-liberalism jettisons distributive justice by the state on the basis that it poses a threat to principles of equality before the law and rule of law with a potential to compromise individual liberties (Mahao 2009: 73).

Blomgren’s deontological neo-liberalism is based on Nozick’s (1974) work on political philosophy, which argues in favour of the good consequences of neo-liberal policies Friedman and Hayek propound, which are referred to as right measures for creating a society in accordance with the imperatives of justice and natural rights. Nozick’s theory of neo-
liberalism is grounded in the “idea which states that a set of immutable natural rights have been conferred to all human beings, and that these rights makes it difficult to see that the state could have any legitimate role to play at all” (Thorne & Lie, s.a: 13). Nozick’s proposition is that much government intervention in the economy could be necessary only if it is pursued to rectify the past injustices (Thorne & Lie, s.a: 13).

Blomgren’s analytical framework is instructive in understanding neo-liberalism, but it is not the end in itself. There is room for other interpretative frameworks perhaps theoretically grounded in utilitarianism rather than natural law. Blomgren appears to be aware of this epistemological possibility. This is clear in the question, “is it meaningful to view neo-liberalism as a cohesive tradition of political thought, given the widely different theoretical justifications of the same set of policies in circulation?” (Thorne & Lie, s.a: 13-14). Because of the limited scope of this study, the answer to this question is not provided. For, the intention is just to understand neo-liberalism.

As the late twentieth-century political philosophy neo-liberalism gained prominence and dominated the development discourse and thinking. The philosophies and theories of neo-liberalism became the basis for the formulation of policies in most countries, especially after influential politicians drawn from the neo-liberal tradition were propelled to power, the most known ones being the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and former US President Ronald Reagan. Mahao (2009: 73) explains that these politicians sought to reconfigure “the global political economy in line with their neo-liberal impulses” through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). With the Washington Consensus, which John Williamson coined to describe a set of policy prescriptions and “market-oriented reforms that economies of Latin America could adopt to attract private capital back to the region, following the poor economic growth performances and crippling debt crises of the so-called lost decade of the 1980s” (Loots 2006: 13), neo-liberalism become universalised.

The Washington Consensus refers to a consensus between the Washington based international financial institutions [International Monetary Fund and the World Bank] formulated to specifically salvage the developing countries from the crisis of underdevelopment. It is referred to in this part of the discussion because it is an example of a neo-liberal project, which some scholars associate with NEPAD. The policy prescriptions of
the *Washington Consensus* emphasise the following aspects as being fundamentally important:

- Fiscal policy discipline.
- Redirection of public spending from subsidies, especially indiscriminate subsidies, toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services such as primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment.
- Tax reforms – broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates.
- Interest rates that are market determined and positive but moderate in real terms.
- Competitive exchange rates.
- Trade liberalisation – liberalisation of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions; any trade protection to be provided by law and relatively uniform tariffs.
- Liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment.
- Privatisation of state enterprises.
- Deregulation: abolitioning of regulations that impeded market entry or restricted competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds and prudent oversight of financial institutions. and

Mahao (2009: 73) explains that the IMF and WB ensured that the national political, social, economic and constitutional landscapes in the developing countries were restructured in a manner that was consistent with the philosophies and theories of neo-liberalism by imposing conditions to loans and other forms of support offered to them. The architecture of neo-liberal political economy that the IMF and WB espoused through their Structural Adjustment Programmes were liberalisation of politics, rolling back the state and freeing the market from the vagaries of politics (Mahao 2009: 74-75). These aspects are implicated in the discourse on neo-liberalism.

Much of the contemporary critical, contextual and activist African scholarship on the development in Africa contends that the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD are embedded in neo-liberalism (Adesina 2002). In this sense NEPAD is considered as part of the ideology of *EurAfrica*. The body of African scholarship that propagates this perspective is
an antithesis of the thesis that NEPAD is a Pan-African development initiative. In the context of the philosophy and theory of neo-liberalism as discussed above, this part of the discourse now reverts back to that part of its purpose and considers perspectives critiquing NEPAD as a neo-liberal development initiative. This is important for the purpose of evaluating their epistemological verity as this intellectual exercise moves towards a completion of the discourse on the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD.

3.2.3.2.3 NEPAD and neo-liberalism

Adesina (2001: 02) writes that “NEPAD is having specific ideological locations and driven by specific development paradigms”, while, much of the contemporary critical, contextual and activist African scholarship on the development in Africa contends that its philosophical and theoretical foundations are embedded in neo-liberalism. This contests the view that NEPAD, with its foundation on the concept of African Renaissance, is embedded in Pan-Africanism. As explained above the concept of African Renaissance is subsumed into Africanist and globalist conceptualisations with the former embedded in Pan-Africanism and the latter ingrained in neo-liberalism.

Garth le Pere (1997: 02-03) contends that Mbeki’s conceptualisation of African Renaissance embodies both the Africanist and globalist perspectives. Vale and Maseko (1998: 278-283) contend that this is a contradiction as globalist conceptualisation of African Renaissance is concerned with the “mix of markets” whereas Africanist conceptualisation is about the “reinterpretation of history and culture”. NEPAD is the product of this contradiction, which makes it susceptible to contestations on what exactly it is.

The existing body of scholarship on NEPAD is polarised on the question around its philosophical and theoretical foundations. The protagonist scholarship on NEPAD contends that Mbeki’s African Renaissance as the conceptual foundation of NEPAD is rooted in Pan-Africanism. This part of the discourse focuses on the antithesis of the foregoing thesis. It contends that NEPAD is ingrained in the philosophies and theories of neo-liberalism. Adesina (2001:02) proffers a contextual basis for this proposition in the contention that NEPAD is the extension of South Africa’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), which the ANC government introduced in 1996 as a macro-economic policy.
Compared with the *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP) of 1994, GEAR was rejected mainly by the ANC’s Alliance Left, civil society and activist intellectuals. The basis of such rejection was that GEAR is grounded in neo-liberalism and is replicating the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) that prescribed models for development in Africa. But, the SAPs failed to effect development in Africa (see Adesina 2002; Adedeji 2002; Nyong’o 2002; Nabudere 2002; Obi 2001). The neo-liberal discourse of development premised on the market model of “private sector export-led growth, free trade, unhindered movement of finance and expulsion of the state from the economy” is not appropriate intervention in pursuit of sustainable development (Obi 2001: 147).

According to Desai (2004: on-line), “in practice GEAR operated as a home-grown structural adjustment”, which heralded “a fundamental shift away from the *statist* service delivery models of the past where the state subsidised and delivered [public] services, towards a neo-liberal service delivery model where the private sector dominates”. It is based on the neo-liberal concept of market sovereignty, where political decisions are replaced by market choices; citizens are transformed into customers; and their needs are served by the market instead of politics (Hobsbawn 2007: 104). In this political system, “political state itself becomes a superfluous relic” (Mahao 2009: 75). It “acts as a service *ensurer* rather than *service provider* and [public] services are run more like business, with financial cost recovery becoming the most effective measures of performance”(McDonald and Smith 2002: 01). GEAR advocates neo-liberal development initiatives and practices such as privatisation, reduction of public expenditure and trimming the size of the public service (Maserumule 2010a: 19). It follows the dictates of the *Washington Consensus* on how to achieve economic growth.

In spite of its rejection by the Alliance left of the ANC and the shortcomings of neo-liberalism as its ideological foundation, GEAR was pushed through the political; processes and became the socio-economic policy of the ANC government. It was considered by the Alliance Left and activist intellectuals as a deviation from the RDP, which is integrated policy framework for socio-economic renewal, transformation and empowerment to establish a systematic approach to the democratisation and development of the South African society.
Compared to GEAR which advocates the neo-liberal imperative of a minimalist state, the RDP envisaged a type of state with a leading role in creating a strong, dynamic and balanced economy to address the social, economic and political inequities bequeathed by the apartheid system of government. Its strategic approach gravitated more towards the Keynesian welfarism, which is about a political system where “government undertakes the main responsibility for providing social and economic security of the state’s population (McLean 1996: 526). The word Keynesian is used to identify the contribution of Keynes John Maynard (1883-1946), a British economist, to economic theory, which essentially synthesises capitalism and socialism (McLean 1996: 256-257).

Mbeki is considered the chief architect of GEAR as the socio-economic development paradigm for South Africa and also, as explained above, that of NEPAD as the contemporary continental developmental paradigm. Based on Mbeki’s idea of African Renaissance, NEPAD follows the same neo-liberal paradigm as GEAR. South Africa, as a regional hegemon, has a geo-political and economic advantage to exert influence on a wider scale. With the concept of African Renaissance, which, as explained above, is the intellectual basis of NEPAD, South Africa in the persona of Mbeki defined the developmental trajectory of the continent. It is in this context that Daniel, Habib and Southall ask “whether the [African] renaissance is not Pax Pretoriana thinly disguised as a Pax Africana” (Shivji 2009: on-line). The view that Mbeki’s African Renaissance is ingrained in Pan-Africanism is jettisoned as much of the existing scholarship contends that it is more inclined towards the globalist conceptualisation of the concept [of African Renaissance].

Pheko (1999: on-line) argues that the “so-called African Renaissance is trying to borrow and transpose the rationale” of European Renaissance, which, “is the foundation of slavery, colonialism and racism”. In this Pheko (1999: on-line) strongly argues that “Africa has nothing to gain from this decadence [European Renaissance], which was responsible for the worst holocaust of the African people in memory”. As a conceptual foundation of NEPAD, the African Renaissance, in the context of the foregoing logic, is not ingrained in Pan-Africanism. It fails to meet the cardinal philosophical grain of Pan-Africanism, which is the integration of the Diaspora and the continent (Bankie 1994: on-line).
Shivji (2009: on-line) argues that Mbeki’s *globalist* conceptualisation of African Renaissance is “a spurious echo of European history” that displaced Pan-Africanism. In Shivji (2009: on-line) Landsberg and Kornegay explain that “the pinnacle of Mbeki’s Renaissance of Africa has been a drive for the virtues and dictates of the free market in Africa”, which “essentially boils down to making Africa safe for overseas multinational investment and private capital”. Mbeki’s concept of African Renaissance is based on the belief that sustainable development in Africa is dependent on the continent being fully integrated in the global economy (Nabudere 2002: 14). This goes against the fundamental objective of Pan-Africanism, which is based on the idea of uniting Africa. Instead, the concept of African Renaissance seeks to engage changes in the international economic system (Landsberg & Hlope 1999: 04).

The policy expression of the concept of African renaissance is NEPAD, which is argued is a continentalised version of ANC government’s GEAR (Adesina 2001: 02; Shivji 2009: on-line). If GEAR, according to Desai (2004: on-line) is home-grown SAP for Africa, NEPAD is home-grown SAP for Africa (see Shivji 2009). Matthews (2002) argues that NEPAD is embedded in the *globalist* conceptualisation of African Renaissance. It is largely on this basis that much critical African scholarship rejects it.

Bond (2002) dismisses the idea that NEPAD is a warmed-over- Washington Consensus; polishing, not abolishing, global apartheid. This is similar to Adesina’s (2001: 02) contention that NEPAD is a Class Project driven by neo-liberal logic of Washington Consensus. This argument is the same as that used to describe the Mbeki administration’s approach to macro-economic policy-making and economic relations in South Africa. This concept of Class Project is used in the politics of the Tripartite Alliance to refer to a package of market-based policies whose ideological inclination seeks to modernise and remodel the ANC and government along the neo-liberal philosophy. GEAR is used in the contemporary political discourse largely in the Alliance Left of the ANC and by activist intellectuals to illustrate the extent to which the ANC had veered from its revolutionary character and tradition towards neo-liberalism (see Desai 2004, Pillay 2008, Habib 2009, McDonald 2002).

The development philosophy that informs and structures the thinking that went into the formulation of GEAR is the same as that of NEPAD (Adesina 2001). It is based on neo-liberal-inspired constructs (Taylor 2002: 410). Agreeing with Adesina (2001: 02) and Bond (2002) Ijeoma (2007: 190) observes that NEPAD is based on neo-liberal, market-friendly
Washington Consensus prescribed as policy architecture for development. “For many years, African governments have collectively sworn” by the neo-liberal policies of the IMF and WB (Ijeoma 2007:190), which characterise the structure and content of NEPAD (Adesina 2001: 01-33). Ngwane (2002) calls NEPAD a “pseudo-homegrown African disguise” of the “same old lethal combination of neo-liberalism and repression”. It provides “ideological justification and legitimacy for a new capitalist revolution as the only path to reconstruction of Africa’s development in the 21st century” (Obi 2001: 149). Its objective is to strengthen imperialism’s hold “by tying the African canoe firmly to the West’s neo-liberal ship on the waters of globalisation” (Nyong’o, Ghirmazion & Lamba 2002: 42).

The development paradigm that informs NEPAD befits the neo-liberal agenda of the Western powers. In Shivji (2009: on-line) Landsberg and Kornegay explain that NEPAD’s orientation in neo-liberalism is the reason “Washington supports the thrust of a Mbeki articulated renaissance” and also “accounts for why Mbeki is clearly liked by America’s Corporate Council on Africa as well as Western European investors”. Taylor (2004: 404) concurs with Landsberg and Kornegay that the message of development ingrained in NEPAD befits the global neo-liberal discourse. NEPAD fails to adequately interrogate the international or global political economy (Taylor & Nel 2002: 163-180). It is framed within a global development discourse that misreads African developmental realities. Its philosophical and ideological basis on partnership between Africa and the international community is a reflection of its intellectual limitation to interrogate the global political economy (Adesina 2002: 02; Obi 2001: 153). For, as Nabudere (2002: 19) puts it, “Africa is the most open part of the global economy” and therefore “does not need to seek partners in order to join the global economy”. This is fundamentally important empirical and epistemological verity in the development discourse that was ignored during the conceptual development of NEPAD.

NEPAD is “framed within the ownership and partnership paradigm of global co-operation discourse as dictated by the G8 [countries] whose leaders were consulted during the process of its formulation” (Obi 2001: 154; see also Nabudere 2002: 51). The people that NEPAD claims to have been drawn up for were not consulted. This makes a mockery of Mbeki’s claim that NEPAD reflects “the sovereign will of the people and the aspirations of the masses” (in Sowetan, 24 July 2001). Taylor (2002: 408) contends that “the whole [NEPAD] initiative [is] remarkable for its lack of consultation with civil society in Africa”. In elaborating on this point further, Taylor (2002: 411) writes that the lack of consultation on
NEPAD “is eerily reminiscent of that other vision promoted by one of the very same African leaders: the African Renaissance of Thabo Mbeki”, about which talk “has generally slipped from view, since it had no foundation in civil society and, beyond the media glare, had no real meaning”.

While NEPAD is an Africa-authored development initiative, it is externally-owned. Its claims that it is home-grown and African-owned is jettisoned in the existing body of critical scholarship (see Obi 2001: 148; Taylor 2002: 409). According to Olukoshi (2002: 90) “ownership rests in…geographical origin and more in …local anchorage”. Obi (2001: 156) explains that “what this implies is that ownership could be more apparent than real, being a claim of a hegemonic African ruling elite to mask a transnational capitalist project hinged upon the reproduction of capitalist accumulation globally”. Obi (2001: 156) concludes that NEPAD is owned by a globally aligned faction of African ruling elite, not the African people. It may have emanated from Africa, but it is not African. Adedeji (2002: 43) makes an observation that “there is always a childlike naivety among African leaders and policy-makers that rhetoric and reality are the same and that claiming ownership is tantamount to having ownership”. The African ownership of NEPAD is undermined and obscured by its ideological strategic imperative embedded in the concept of partnership. The concept of partnership as envisaged in NEPAD is already explained above.

But, can the concept of partnership as a critical imperative in the realm of international co-operation change the status quo in so far as development in the contemporary world is concerned? This question is asked in the context of the fact that the previous African development initiatives failed because of the North’s uncompromising refusal to change its economic power relations with the South. Nabudere (2002: 16) observes that the understanding of the West of the concept of partnership is based on that some countries that do not toe a neo-liberal line will be isolated and marginalised while those that do would be rewarded. The case of Zimbabwe’s dismissal from the Commonwealth countries is used as example. The G8 Africa Action Plan is also cited as an example of asymmetrical relations that underpins the Africa-West NEPAD partnership (Obi 2001: 163). In the understanding of the West, the partnership as envisaged in NEPAD does not seek to unite Africa to tackle its own problems, but to engender disorganisation on the basis of new western philanthropy- a new recolonisation” (Nabudere 2002: 16). Adedeji (2002) calls it a “feudo-imperial
partnership” between the strong (G8 countries) and the weak (Africa) (see also Obi 2001: 168).

The dependence of NEPAD on foreign resources ensures that the partnership as envisaged become that of subordination with the capitalist countries maintaining their hegemony in a rapidly globalising world (Obi 2001: 149; Taylor 2002: 409). This is neo-imperialism against which Shivji (2009: on-line) cautions that “people’s Pan-Africanists must be wary of African states and their imperialist backers who wrap up their nepadisms in the garb of Pan-Africanism”. In this NEPAD is rejected as being “in line with compradorialism rather than Pan-Africanism” (Shivji 2009: on-line); its objective being to strengthen imperialism’s hold “by tying the African canoe firmly to the West’s neo-liberal ship on the waters of globalisation” (Nyong'o et al. 2002: 42).

Based on the adoption of neo-liberal economic reform, NEPAD seeks to integrate African economy as a way of contending with the challenges of globalisation. This is consistent with the globalist conceptualisation of African Renaissance and is in contrast with the previous Africa-focussed development paradigms embedded in Pan-Africanism and gravitated more towards the Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance and the dependency theory. Africa-focussed development paradigms are based on the Pan-African imperatives of collective self-reliance, “integration, popular participation in developmental processes, and the removal of inequities in the international economic and trading system” (Obi 2001: 150, 157).

The theoretical context of the previous Africa-focussed development paradigms is dependency theory whereas that of NEPAD, because of its neo-liberal foundation in the concept of partnership, is the modernisation theory. It is at this point where the philosophy of neo-liberalism interfaces with the modernisation theory, which propounds the thesis that economic growth to underdeveloped societies trickles down to Africa from the advanced economies of the industrialised states (Ikome 2007: 69). The idea here is to build the economies of the developed countries in the belief that the benefits of their strengths would cascade down to the developing ones. As a development paradigm, the modernisation theory was used as a framework from which neo-liberal structural programmes that engendered underdevelopment instead of development in Africa emanated (see Adesina 2002: 13). It is ironic that NEPAD gravitates towards the modernisation theory as the epistemological
foundation of its theoretical foundation. This demonstrates that NEPAD is a “neo-liberal, market-driven and outward-looking” development initiative, which “envisions a deeper integration of the continent’s economies within the global economy” (Ikome 2007: 15-16).

Based on the strategic imperative of partnership, NEPAD ignores the fact that “history and the current situation leave Africa with no other credible or viable option, than collective self-reliance” (Ijeoma 2007: 193). In this Ijeoma (2007: 193) advises that “a more democratic and developmentalist project in which collective self-reliance is the guiding principle would ineluctably lead to the realisation that the Pan-African vision not only resonates well with the African people’s identities, but also provides both the ideological scaffolding and resource base for individual and collective progress”. But, instead of pursuing the notion of collective self-reliance, the African leadership, with NEPAD, chose to be in partnership with the developed countries of the West. Of particular note is the acceptance of “the governance programme which the international financial institutions developed within the framework of orthodox structural adjustment repackaged under purported ownership” (Olukoshi 2002: 89).

NEPAD mimics the Washington Consensus prescription on the liberalisation of politics as understood from the Western perspective. This explains the reason for its acceptance by the West. Based on the proposition that “development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance”, NEPAD states that “Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, [whose] core components include political pluralism, allowing for existence of several political parties and workers union, fair, open, free, democratic elections periodically organised to enable the populace to choose their leaders freely” (NEPAD 2001: 17).

Nabudere (2002: 14) writes that “the G8 [countries] welcomed NEPAD, which in their view was based on the principles of responsibility and ownership, with an emphasis on democracy, transparency, good governance, rule of law and human rights as fundamental factors of development”. In this democracy in NEPAD is conceived along its procedural rather than substantive aspects. NEPAD’s commitment to the so-called “global standards of democracy” is euphemism for embracing liberal democracy, which today has become so universalised. Obi (2001: 165) contends that “in the modern world liberal democracy cannot satisfy the emerging political and economic demands that are a result of new forms of social
awareness”. In the US context Chomsky (2007: 97) observes that the neo-liberal political economy distorts democracy and exposes its limitations in that

Americans are encouraged to vote, but not to participate more meaningfully in the political arena. Essentially the election is yet another method of marginalising the population. A huge propaganda campaign is mounted to get people to focus on these personalised quadrennial extravaganzas and to think, “That’s politics”. But it isn’t. It is small part of politics.

This is the type of democracy that NEPAD, because of its neo-liberal orientation, propagates (see Obi 2001: 160). The narrow neo-liberal interpretation of democracy engenders thinking in the political discourse that focusses not on politics, but actors in the game of politics. It denigrates participatory politics. Voters’ attention is diverted from policy issues to political personalities with questions being asked whether a candidate is a nice person without looking at what he or she represents. This reifies the true essence of democracy “to little more than a beauty contest between politicians and political parties” (Mahao 2009: 76). Nabudere (2002: 14) explains that the G8 [countries] accepted NEPAD because in their view it “was based on the principles of responsibility and ownership”, with an emphasis on the democratic imperatives of accountability, transparency, good governance, rule of law and human rights as fundamental factors of development.

NEPAD is crafted in the manner that commits the African leaders to the global standards and values and makes them accountable to the international community rather than to the African people. Its focus on accountability is therefore “one-sided, in favour of African leaders and their global partners” (Obi 2001: 165). The conception of the concept of rule of law “is embedded in the interests of business and other powerful sectors of society” and “pays sanctimonious homage to civil rights, while actively undermining socio-economic rights and marginalising the pursuit of substantive justice”(Mahao 2009: 76). This is consistent with Hayek’s 1940 critique of the political arrangements that make it possible and even necessary for the state to regulate the market, protect the weak and marginalised, promote equality and social justice.
The philosophy of neo-liberalism, with its nefarious influence, redefined the nature of democracy, whose conception in NEPAD “fitted the global neo-liberal discourse” (Taylor 2002: 404) and “pander to a donor audience (rather) than responding to, or representing the concerns of the domestic forces in the vanguard of the struggle for the reform of the political space and developmental agenda” (Olukoshi 2002: 90). This deviates from the developmental conception of democracy, which Saul (2005: 140) puts thus:

...democracy is an expression of the nation-state. It is an expression of the role and the power of individual citizens inside those states – an expression of their ability to engage in national choices; to set the direction of the nation-state on internal and external matters; to define the nature of public good.

Mahao (2009: 77) observes that “in the age of neo-liberal globalisation the state has been rendered structurally incapable of effectively promoting the public good”. NEPAD failed to consider this empirical verity (see Taylor 2002: 404). Instead of rejecting the neo-liberal development paradigm of development because of its limitations, NEPAD acquiesced to it as its philosophical and theoretical compass. NEPAD is couched in a framework that is “lacking in the kind of basic social anchor that can ensure that democracy and governance proposals that are made are moved from the realm of the pro forma and technocratic to the arena of the political as a living experience marked by contestations and negotiations among the bearers of competing interests” (Obi 2001: 165).

Olukoshi (2002: 90) observes that in its Governance and Democracy Initiative NEPAD “raises more questions than it answers”. This observation is so apt in relation to the raison d'être for this study, which attends to the good governance question of NEPAD. This question is perhaps one more question that NEPAD raises without providing answers. This is even more so in the APRM. Obi (2001: 167) contends that “being an incentive to external donors to support African leaders who practice good governance”, the APRM “is a much more complicated issue than it appears to be on the surface and may yet become a noose around the necks of some African leaders that can be tightened at the will by the donor community”. In this “NEPAD appears to ignore the ideological dimension of external funding and a market-based model of development in a harsh globalised environment” (Moyo 2002: 207). Its preoccupation is more on accessing the “capital rather than any moral, social and political considerations” that should underpin the essence of good governance.
Nabudere (2002: 13) writes that “the parameters for good governance were tailored not to free the African people, but to please the development partners so that they can play their part in financing NEPAD”. Tadesse (2002: 275) counsels that “a good governance discourse that is based on a procedural conception of democracy conceived as separate and apart from socio-economic rights and structures – as does NEPAD – has extremely limited transformatory potential”. Good governance, transparency, accountability, anti-corruption, trade liberalisation and poverty alleviation are part of the neo-liberal lexicon and “all go to underscore the linguistic dimension of NEPAD’s extraversion” (Obi 2001: 156).

Despite its commitment to the virtues of good governance, accountability, transparency and poverty alleviation, NEPAD promotes choiceless democracy, which is elitist in its approach to governance. The concept of choiceless democracy refers to that kind of democracy which merely gives people the right to vote, but not a choice in so far as their socio-economic rights are concerned. In this democracy is conceived from the procedural democratic strand perspective, which ignores its substantive aspects (see Chapter 2 of the thesis for the meaning of, and distinction between, the procedural democratic strand and substantive democratic strand). Its inclination to the Washington Consensus paradigm makes NEPAD’s elitist development project alien to African contexts and realities. This is clear in the manner in which the process of its formulation unfolded, which, as explained above, did not involve the African people for whom it is drawn up. It pandered to the interests of the West and is therefore ingrained in the philosophy and theory of neo-liberalism. The notion of democracy in NEPAD appears to be the antithesis of Saul’s (2005: 140) conception of the same in a developmental context, which is referred to above.

3.3.3 Synthesis

The existing body of scholarship is polarised on the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD. The essence of contestations centres on two conceptual strands in the conceptualisation of African Renaissance, which are the Africanist and globalist conceptualisations. Those scholars that assume a protagonist position in the discourse contend that NEPAD evolved from the Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance, which is considered as the contemporary epistemological variant of Pan-Africanism. The contention is that NEPAD is a true Pan-African development initiative. The epistemological
basis of this is premised on what NEPAD ought to achieve rather than also focussing on how it intends to achieve its objectives.

The objectives of NEPAD are expressed in normative sense. What NEPAD ought to achieve could be associated with its philosophical foundation. As explained in Chapter 1 of the study, philosophy is prescriptive and moves from a normative premise (Pauw 1999b: 465). That aspect that pertains to how NEPAD intends to achieve its objective could be associated with its theoretical orientation. The theoretical aspects are concerned with epistemic framework to explain intellectual phenomena. Compared with philosophy, theory is descriptive and explanatory in nature (Schwella 1999: 63-65).

The critics of NEPAD assume an antagonistic position and contend that this contemporary development initiative evolved from the globalist conceptualisation of African Renaissance and is therefore a neo-liberal development initiative. The critique that NEPAD is a neo-liberal development initiative is focussed on how it seeks to achieve its objectives. It is more on its strategic imperative, whose essence is expressed in the concept of partnership. Coupled with the superlatives used to express its vision, NEPAD appears more inclined towards the ideals of the African Renaissance as expressed from Africanist conceptualisation perspective. This is so in that key to NEPAD’s vision is eradication of poverty and placing Africa on a path of sustainable development.

Adesina (2001: 03) writes that “if NEPAD is neo-liberal, it cannot be concerned with poverty”. Therefore, at the philosophical level NEPAD is embedded or grounded in Pan-Africanism, which, in essence, means that Africans should take charge of their destiny. This is clear in, for example, Mbeki’s articulation of African Renaissance, which, as explained above, largely represents the contemporary thinking on Pan-Africanism and is propagated in the existing body of literature that assume a protagonist position on NEPAD as its philosophical foundation. Mbeki (2002: 151) strongly argues that NEPAD “is an African-owned and African lead development programme”. This contention is consistent with the vision of African Renaissance as expressed from the Africanist conceptualisation perspective, which underscores the African orientation of NEPAD in so far as its philosophical foundation is concerned.
With an *Africanist* conceptualisation of African Renaissance, Africans seek to “redefine their Africanness as representation of human hope and not the epitome of human despair” (Mbeki 2002: 131) and NEPAD is considered as a programme for this pursuit. The theoretical paradigm that befits this philosophical thinking is the dependency theory. However, in the pursuit of its Pan-African ideals NEPAD gravitates towards the *globalist* conceptualisation of African Renaissance. It invokes neo-liberal strategy. Adesina (2001: 03) observes that “NEPAD raises the issue of poverty but uses neo-liberal framework to deal with it”. It is at this point that its theoretical orientation assumes a *globalist* meaning, which is influenced by the *globalist* conceptualisation of the African Renaissance.

As explained above, the *globalist* conceptualisation of African Renaissance accepts neo-liberalism as a globally accepted paradigm of development. But, does this not herald epistemological paradox and contradiction in the discourse on the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD? Can neo-liberal frameworks be used to realise the Pan-African development agenda of NEPAD as expressed in its objectives? As the intellectual product of epistemological paradox and contradiction, NEPAD appears to be an attempt to neo-liberalise Pan-Africanism. But, is it epistemologically possible and logical that Pan-Africanism could be neo-liberalised? The attempt to answer these questions is critically important to lay bare the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD.

Maserumule and Gutto (2008: 77) explain that the strategic imperative of NEPAD in its approach to sustainable development lies in the concept of partnership. This is in contrast with the concept of self-reliance, which is the philosophical grain of Pan-Africanism. Ijeoma (2007: 189) observes that “there is a heightened tension between the assertions of collective self-reliance and the appeals for financial dependence” as encapsulated in the concept of partnership between Africa and the developed countries of the West. The concept of partnership gravitates more towards the modernisation theory of development, whose philosophical antecedent is neo-liberalism. This means that NEPAD is philosophically embedded in Pan-Africanism but theoretically ingrained in modernisation theory. But, is this not epistemologically contradictory? Ijeoma (2007: 190) writes that “NEPAD settled the contradiction between the continental vision of Pan-Africanism and neo-liberal, market-friendly Washington Consensus development paradigm, with propensity towards the latter”. 

258
The intellectual pattern in the existing body of thought on the politics of development in Africa has always been consistent in associating Pan-Africanism as a liberatory philosophy with the dependency theory whereas neo-liberalism is considered as the philosophical paradigm of the modernisation theory. In so far as the foregoing is concerned, the question is, does it make any epistemological sense to understand NEPAD as being philosophically Pan-African and theoretically neo-liberal? In the context of Aristotelian binary logic which propagates that something is either/or, but hardly ever both, the answer to the foregoing question is that it does not make any epistemological sense. But, is the Aristotelian binary logic as an analytical tool adequate enough to untangle the epistemological puzzle and complexity on the philosophical and theoretical foundation of NEPAD?

Adesina (2001: 04) observes that “much of the criticism or defence of NEPAD has been driven by [the] posing of binary opposites”, which obscures the fundamental nature of identity as it is played out in the content and deployment of NEPAD”. As a tool of reasoning, the Aristotelian binary logic is fraught with fundamental limitations and often fails to untangle complexities in the philosophical and theoretical discourse. It “hinders both political practice and understanding of social processes” (Adesina 2001: 04) and cannot therefore be followed in this study as a tool to understand NEPAD.

Adesina (2001: 04) argues for displacement of the Aristotelian binary logic and its substitution with “the affirmation of contingent co-existence of opposites”. This approach to understanding NEPAD is epistemologically instructive in providing a framework for the formulation of a synthesis on the diametrically opposite perspectives, as explained above, on the philosophical and theoretical foundation of NEPAD. The theory of contingent co-existence of opposites is explained in detail in Chapter 7 of the thesis, where it is submitted to the body of knowledge as the epistemological framework that could be used to understand the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD.

For the purpose of this chapter it suffices to only point out that using the theory of contingent co-existence of opposites as an analytical framework, Adesina (2001: 05) propagates that NEPAD ought to be understood “as a class project, within a particular interpellation of a network of identities: even when they seem contradictory at first”. Adesina (2001: 05) explains that “identities here are not some disembodied or imagined social practice; they are rooted in real material contexts, aspirations and interests”. In the context of the logic of
theory of contingent co-existence of opposites, it seems opportune to formulate a contextually synthetic perspective to answer the question whether NEPAD is a true Pan-African development initiative or a neo-liberal paradigm for Africa’s development.

Based on the literature that assumes protagonist and antagonist positions on what NEPAD is in terms of its philosophical and theoretical foundations, the proposition of this study is that NEPAD is, at the visionary level, embedded in Pan-Africanism. Much of what has been articulated with Pan-African superlatives as its vision is consistent with the philosophical postulations of Pan-Africanism. However, the strategic imperative of NEPAD is paradigmatically located in the modernisation theory, which appertains to the philosophy of neo-liberalism. NEPAD is philosophically embedded in Pan-Africanism and theoretically ingrained in neo-liberalism.

In the context of the theory of contingent co-existence of opposites the answer to the question raised above whether it makes any epistemological sense to understand NEPAD as being philosophically Pan-African and theoretically neo-liberal is, contrary to it being answered in a negative sense in the Aristotelian binary logic context, now answered in the affirmative. NEPAD is a contingent co-existence of opposites premised on the ideological pragmatism of Mbeki. It is a synthesis of the Africanist and globalist conceptualisations of the African Renaissance.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter examines NEPAD to understand it as the context for consideration of good governance as the object of this study. It is pointed out that various attempts to unpack NEPAD in the available body of literature abound with a myriad of reflections that do not converge on sameness. To systematically analyse and understand the plethora of perspectives on what NEPAD is, a framework of analysis is developed from the rich body of scholarship by analysing intellectual trends and patterns on how this contemporary development initiative is engaged. The discourse on NEPAD is disaggregated into three perspectives, namely historical-process, comparative-analytic and philosophical-cum-theoretical perspectives. These perspectives are used as the framework of analysis.
From the *historical-process* perspective NEPAD is analysed on the basis of its historical evolution. The conclusion in the context of this perspective is that NEPAD was conceptualised, developed and adopted by the African leadership. The process of its development was not inclusive of the African people. The consultations in respect to its development were conducted largely with the international community rather than the African people to whom NEPAD is intended to benefit. The *comparative-analytic* perspective sought to understand NEPAD on the basis of its distinction from, or similarity to, the previous African development initiatives. Following a rigorous comparative analysis the *comparative-analytic* perspective in the study concludes that NEPAD is consistent with the previous African development initiatives only in respect of the development goals of eradicating poverty and addressing the challenge of underdevelopment on the continent. Its variation from the previous development initiatives lies in its strategic approach to realising the development goals as specified in the foregoing, although in some instances, particularly in as far as its comparison with the post-LPA initiatives are concerned, a semblance of similarities exists.

The pre-LPA and LPA African development initiatives cohere with NEPAD on miniature aspects, largely in an insignificant way. The theoretical orientation of NEPAD differ fundamentally with the previous African development initiatives. NEPAD gravitates more towards the modernisation theory whereas its predecessors are premised on the dependency theory. The conclusions arrived at in respect of the analysis of NEPAD from the *historical-process* and *comparative-analytic* perspectives respectively lead to the question about the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD, which is extensively considered from the *philosophical-cum-theoretical* perspective.

In the analysis of NEPAD from a *philosophical-cum-theoretical* perspective it is determined that scholarship on its philosophical and theoretical foundations is polarised. On the one hand those scholars that assume a protagonist position on NEPAD contend that, with the concept of African Renaissance, this contemporary development initiative is embedded in Pan-Africanism. On the other hand, the critics of NEPAD jettison this proposition. Their contention is that NEPAD is a neo-liberal paradigm for Africa’s contemporary developmental trajectory.
The concept of African Renaissance is subsumed into *Africanist* and *globalist* conceptualisations, with the former said to be ingrained in Pan-Africanism and the latter in neo-liberalism. Based on the analysis of these binary of opposites in the discourse on NEPAD, the *philosophical-cum-theoretical* perspective concludes that NEPAD is a contingent co-existence of opposites premised on the ideological pragmatism of Mbeki. Following the logic of the *theory of contingent co-existence of opposites* NEPAD is, at the visionary level, embedded in Pan-Africanism. However, its strategic approach to development is ingrained in the modernisation theory, whose philosophical context is neo-liberalism. It is a synthesis of *Africanist* and *globalist* conceptualisations of African Renaissance.

Against this background, it is now appropriate to attend to the object of this study, which is *good governance*. NEPAD as the context for consideration of *good governance* is unpacked. As explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis, NEPAD premises Africa’s sustainable development on good governance. The usage good governance in NEPAD is as a *principle*. There are no attempts to examine its meaning in the context of NEPAD as a *concept*. To logically realise the purpose and objectives of the study as explained in Chapter 1, it is important that the concept *good governance* is considered from a broader perspective beyond the NEPAD context. This is attended in Chapter 4 of the thesis. The purpose of this exercise is to provide a conceptual background for contextual analysis of *good governance* in the attempt to determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD.
CHAPTER 4

THE CONCEPT GOOD GOVERNANCE

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 3 of the thesis NEPAD is unpacked. For, it is the context from which good governance as the object of this study is considered. However, the concept of good governance did not originate in NEPAD. Good governance in this chapter is considered beyond the context of NEPAD. For, this concept has been part of the contemporary development discourse even before NEPAD was conceived. Good governance did not originate in NEPAD. Its ‘originative’ historical context dates back to the earliest foundations of political philosophies and theories. In this chapter the consideration of good governance differs from those in Chapters 2 and 6 of the study. The objective of Chapter 2 of the thesis is to determine whether the consideration of the concept by Public Administration scholarship is contextualised to NEPAD. The answer to this question is that it is not.

In Chapter 6 of the thesis the literature beyond Public Administration is reviewed. The objective is to determine whether insights acquired from this literature could be instructive to, and enrich, the Public Administration scholarship in theorising, conceptualising and defining good governance in the context of NEPAD. In this the answer is that in certain instances the literature beyond Public Administration scholarship could be instructive and enrich the disciplinary discourse on the concept of good governance in the context of NEPAD. Compared with Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis, the objective of this chapter is to examine good governance in its broader context and determine how it evolved to arrive at its current conceptual form and usage. This exercise is important to build a theoretical base from which important insights could be drawn in answering the question about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.
Despite the different objective of this chapter, the conclusions made in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis contain important indications as to the theorisations and conceptualisations of good governance in the broader context for generalisations. This chapter builds on the results of the literature review in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis. Towards the end reference is made to NEPAD. This is for reasons of contextualisation. At the outset the concepts good governance and governance are considered to clarify the conceptual confusions engendered by their conflations. Their relatedness and distinctions are determined. In this exercise it is established that good governance and governance are conceptually closely intertwined.

*Governance* is a conceptual presentiment of good governance. Without the concept governance good governance would not have been part of the conceptual scheme in the parlance of the contemporary development discourse which shapes thoughts and perceptions in the description of the paradigm of thinking in state formation or re-invention. But governance does not owe its conceptual existence to good governance. The conception of governance without good governance is logically possible. However, the same cannot be said about good governance without governance. For, good is an adjective qualifying the noun governance. Good governance owes its conceptual existence to governance.

Against this background, it appears appropriate that, for contextual reasons and epistemological logic, to understand good governance reference should first be made to governance. This chapter attends to this logical necessity. Various definitions of governance are considered and studied. The definitions are a key entry into the realm of conceptual discourse. Pauw (1999a: 20) explains that “defining is an attempt to channel thinking in a specific way.” So, “definitions matter because ideas matter” (Pauw 1999a: 25). In the definitional discourse a conceptual lineage between governance and good governance is determined. This is followed by a comprehensive discussion on the evolution of good governance. Its ‘originative’ historical context is traced back to the earliest foundations of political philosophies and theories. It is determined how this concept evolved into the current conception in the contemporary development discourse. In this, more importantly, the conceptual problematique character of good governance is determined. Towards the end conclusions are made.
4.2  **Governance and good governance**

As shown in the extensive review of the existing body of literature in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis, some scholars, on the one hand, use the concepts *good governance* and *governance* interchangeably implicitly suggesting that they are synonymous or mean the same thing (see for example Edigheji 2003: 72-73; Mhone 2003: 36 & Sinha 2004: 110-112; Bourgon 2003: 02-14; Leftwich 1993: 605-624). Yet some on the other hand maintain that these concepts are not the same (see Olowu 2003; Cloete 2003). Olowu (2003: 04-05) states that it is relatively easy to define *governance* rather than *good governance*. Johnson (1997: 02) makes a similar observation that “unlike the term *good governance*, *governance* facilitates dialogue because the concept is less restrictive and less political”. The *United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific* (1998) explains that, compared to *governance*, which is as old as human civilisation, *good governance* is a relatively new concept in the contemporary development discourse. Brand (2007: 561) concurs that “*good governance* is en vogue”. In a vastly expansive scholarly corpus on *good governance* as reviewed in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis the same observation is made. But is this necessarily true?

In the *Educational Governance – A Defining Review*, it is observed that the concept *governance* “appears in Etruscan literature, 13th century Middle English and a number of 16th century texts including Machiavelli’s *The Prince*” (National Health Service Education for Scotland 2007: 06). Its origin is also associated with the late 14th century Greek politics. The concept *governance* is a derivative from the ancient Greek word *kubepvan*, which in some writings is written as *kubernao* (*European Commission* 2001: on-line), *kybernan* (Bell & Hindmoor 2009:149), *kubernan* (Huynh-Quan-Suu 2001: n.p). This ancient Greek word literally means to “pilot, steer or direct” (Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 149). In its etymological sense *governance* is essentially about control (Scott 2002: 63; see also Rose 2000: 321). Most definitions in the contemporary body of knowledge are embedded in this concept of *control*, which encapsulates the essence of the meaning of *governance*. This aspect is expatiated in sub-section 4.2.1 below. Scott (2002: 63) explains that “the term *governance* shares its etymology with the word *cybernetics* used to connote the “science of control systems”.
Brickhouse and Smith (s.a) observe that the word *governance* was first used by Plato in the philosophical dialogue with Socrates in *The Republic*. De Torre (1997: on-line) explains that, “regarded as Plato’s most important work, *The Republic* has long been studied as a seminal text of the Western literacy and philosophical cannon”. Plato’s *The Republic* is still to date considered as the most intellectually and historically influential work in the contemporary body of knowledge on the political philosophy and theory. In this seminal work, Radice, as an advisory editor, writes that “inspired by Socrates’ inquiries into the nature of ethical standards, Plato sought a cure for the ills of society not in politics but in philosophy, and arrived at his fundamental and lasting conviction that those ills would never cease until philosophers became rulers or rulers philosophers” (2003: n.p).

Plato’s philosophy is that the solution to the challenges that faced Athenian political situation following the Peloponnesian War was not to reform its political system, but adopt a system of government by the best and brightest minds. Plato’s belief was that “the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy, and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers”(Plato 2003: xiii-xviii). In *The Republic* Plato is concerned with how political authority should be structured for the good of society. In this philosophical dialectic, Plato sought to define an ideal society (Philippoussis 1999:109-143), hence the title of the book *The Republic*, whose original ancient Greek version is *politeia*, meaning city-state governance (see Annas 1981; Cross 1964; Ferrari 2007; Kraut 1997; Strauss 1964).

The etymology of *governance* dates back to this ancient Greek parlance. This concept is traced to *politeia*, which emerged in Plato’s realisation “that when politics is not the most appropriate way to bring the deontological change, the politico logical and politeio logical attempt is a better one”(Philippoussis 1999: 109-143). The concept *politeia* means the order or a character of political community. Its Latin translation is *res publica*, meaning the public business. Plato’s *The Republic* is a direct English translation from the Latin word *res publica* (Lee in Plato 2003: xxxi). Since its usage by Plato, the word *governance* became available in other languages. For example, in Latin it is *gubernare*; in French *gouvernance*; in Spanish *gobernanza*; in Portuguese *governance*; in Italian *governare* (Huynh-Quan-Suu 2001: n.p).
As one of the oldest concepts in the theory of politics, governance has undergone various conceptual mutations. In the On-Line Etymology Dictionary (2001-2010: on-line) it is explained that in the 1550s governance was used to mean a “system by which a thing is governed”; in the 1560s it meant “action of governing”; in 1702 it assumed the meaning of “governing power in a given place”; whereas between 1879 and 1909 it was used to connote government’s act of asserting authority characterised by “imposed order over freedom”. The contention that the concept governance is as old as human civilisation is correct. However, in contrast with much of the propositions on these concepts, this chapter argues that the foregoing does not necessarily presuppose that, as compared to governance, the concept of good governance is relatively new.

Good governance has always been embedded in the concept of governance. To clarify the basis of this contention a distinction between ‘the concept of good governance’ and the ‘concept good governance’ needs to be made. The denotation embedded in the former is that of good governance as an idea. It is ideational whereas the denotation in the latter is terminological. In simple terms this means that the ‘concept of good governance’ refers to an idea whereas ‘the concept good governance’ refers to a term. A distinction between a concept and a term is made below.

The concept of good governance is concerned with the normative dimension of governance. It is prescriptive of a particular way in which political authority or power ought to be exercised. In its etymological sense, governance means exercise of control, power or authority. How that authority, power or control ought to be exercised is the question of good governance (see Maserumule 2005a: 201). In The Republic Plato’s engagement with Socrates was largely concerned with the normative dimension of governance. Plato’s (2003: xiii-xviii) philosophy provides a substantive point of view on how political power or authority of government ought to be structured to ensure that the function of exercising control or act of governing is carried out for the good of society.

In the proposition that “mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers” (Plato 2003: xiii-xviii) Plato exemplifies preoccupation with the normative dimension of governance, which was concerned with how authority ought to be exercised to achieve a just and good society. This has always been the preoccupation of the early philosophical
discourses on political theory. Plato’s philosophy of good society as propounded in The Republic is still to date a subject of much ideological, philosophical, theoretical and political interest. From its early proposition, Plato’s philosophy engendered rejoinders and contestations from, among others, Aristotle, who was Plato’s student.

In the context of that time Plato’s philosophy in The Republic presupposed human civilisation in that it was concerned with how to sophisticate and improve the system of governance in ancient Greece. The contention that this chapter advances is that the concept of good governance, like that of governance, is as old as human civilisation. What is relatively new is the term good governance deployed in the contemporary development discourse to express it as a concept. Because of the different contexts from which the concept of good governance evolved its meaning is fraught with variations. Even the terms deployed to express it at different historical periods in its evolution differ.

To follow the logic of this contention is perhaps important that a distinction between a concept and a term is made. Pauw (1999a: 11) explains that a concept “is a thinking tool”. It “has one meaning that can be expressed by different words”, while “a term is one or more words with a fixed meaning in a specific, usually a technical, discourse” (Pauw 1999a: 11). In the context of the contention of this part of the discourse a concept refer to an “idea abstracted from particular instances” (Allen 2004: 282). It is subjective mental imagery. Does this sound too much into a realm of philosophy? Blackburn (2005: 70) clarifies that “a concept is that which is understood by a term, which is used in “expressing [a concept or idea] in making judgement”.

Plato used the term good to express the concept of a just and good society whereas Aristotle used common good. These terms were used to engage with the normative dimension of governance, which, in the contemporary development discourse could be associated with the term good governance. It is important to explain that Plato’s usage of good was not in the sense of it being an adjective. It was used as a noun. Likewise Aristotle used good as a noun but qualified it with the adjective common. In the contemporary development discourse, as explained in sub-section 4.1 above, good is an adjective qualifying the noun governance. In spite of their various terminological phraseologies, all these concepts are used in a teleological sense expressing a particular ultimate purpose that ought to be attained by a particular way that a political system and authority, power or control should be structured.
That ultimate purpose is a just and good society subsumed in the concept of the general welfare. Wakefield (1976: 664) defines this concept as “a moral imperative which…would be what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently”. Freysen (1999: 29) explains that “on a more mundane level, the general welfare can be expressed as the greatest happiness of the greatest number”.

In the context of this exposition it is contended that the ‘originative’ historical context of good governance dates back to the earliest foundations of political philosophies and theories. It has always been part of the ancient Greek politics on how best the city of Athens could be run (see Kraus s.a; Philippoussis 1999; Plato 2003). Just to re-emphasise the point made above, like governance, the concept of good governance is as old as human civilisation. These concepts are conceptually closely related but not synonymous. Governance is the presentiment of good governance. In examining good governance, it is important that reference is made to governance. This is for reasons of contextualisation and epistemological logic.

4.2.1 Meaning of governance

The question that is raised in sub-section 4.2 above in response to Olowu (2003: 04-05) and Johnson’s (1997: 02) observation that it is relatively easy to define governance rather than good governance appears to be the appropriate introduction to the discourse on the meaning of governance. For, some scholars contend that governance “has become a floating signifier, carried this way and that by the shifting currents of global policy-making”; “this vagueness contributes to complacency and contradictoriness…” (Goldsmith 2005: 106). Its usage is nuanced with definitional variations. Jordan, Wurzel and Zito (2005: 477) doubt whether, “despite its wide-spread use”… “such a broad portmanteau can be fashioned into coherent analytical concept”.

Maserumule (2005a: 200) observes that scholars in development studies and other related disciplines are cautious to commit themselves to a single definition of governance, though in many instances semblances of similarity of perspectives regarding its meaning do exist among them. In the literature that defines governance attempts are often made to distinguish it from government. This is important in that often the concept governance is conflated with government. Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008: n.p) write that “while both concepts
[government and governance] involve intentional behaviour on the part of an organisation and its members to achieve certain goals, governance is a broader concept than government”. Governance is a multifaceted and elusive concept (Maserumule 2005a: 200). Caporaso (1996: 32) defines government as the institutions and agents that “occupy key institutional roles and positions”. Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008: n.p) explain that “governments have the formal authority to act; they also have powers to enforce compliance with their activities, rules and policies”.

While government could commonly and easily be understood, governance “is variously understood, each analysis reflecting the bias of each observer” (European Commission 2002: 332). In the Governance, European Governance and Global Governance the European Commission (2001) observes that governance is a versatile concept “used in connection with several contemporary social sciences, especially economics and political science”. In the Oxford English Dictionary of Current English (1996: 587) governance is defined as “the act or manner of governing, of exercising control or authority over the actions of subjects; a system of regulations”. This dictionary definition appears to be a synthesis of various connotations that appeared over many centuries of the etymological evolution of the concept.

In defining governance much of the body of literature moves from the dictionary premise. The emphasis is on the exercise of authority, power or control and the tools for such are laws, rules or a system of regulations. The conceptualisation of governance from this perspective presupposes that governance is essentially about control. This conceptual paradigm dominates most attempts to define the concept. As explained in sub-section 4.2 above, governance shares the same etymological foundation with cybernetics as each is derived from the Greek word steersman, which connotes control (Scott 2002: 63).

It is explained in EDinformatics (s.a: on-line) that “the word cybernetics was first used in the context of the study of self-governance by Plato in The Laws to signify the governance of the people”. In The First International Congress on Cybernetics in Belgium, Couffignal (1958: 46-54) defines cybernetics as “the art of ensuring the efficacy of action”; whereas more recently Kauffman (2007: 15) defines it as “the study of systems and processes that interact with themselves and produce themselves from themselves”. Cybernetics is “the interdisciplinary study of the structure of complex systems, especially communication
processes, control mechanism and feedback principles” related to control theory (EDinformatics, s.a: on-line).

Scott (2002: 63) explains the concept of control as “the effect which inputs to a system have so as to hold the system within a particular state or produce particular outputs”. The control theory is based on the proposition that to control any form of activity in a system is key to realise the optimum results of what is intended. The instruments of control are rules, regulations, norms and standards, which each constituent in a system ought to subscribe to. The premise from which the control theory moves is that governance is fragmentary in nature. It is characterised by the dispersion of resources that are key to enhance the capacity to govern, some of which are located outside the confines of formal government authority (Scott 2002: 63).

The concept of governance embodies “a wide range of non-state actors in the process of governing society” (Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 150), which include the market, civil society and international organisations. Scott (2002: 63) explains that “there is a long history of non-governmental resources being deployed for control purposes for functions which might be regarded as governmental in character”. This means that control of activities in a system is not exercised only by the authorities of government. The non-governmental actors can also exercise control on different levels of government. The constituents in a system of governance control each other.

Governance “involves efforts to construct policy responses at the multiplicity levels, from the global to the local” (Wallace 1996: 11-12). In this Sloat (2003: 129) explains that “the state does not dominate the policy-making process but increasingly involves multiple actors; their relationships are ‘non-hierarchical’ and ‘mutually dependent’, regulation is the primary governance function, and decisions are made by problem-solving rather than bargaining”. The interaction of the multiplicity of actors at different societal levels play itself out “as a function of the interplay of ideas, interests and institutions and focussed on the choices made by a variety of actors about how to respond to an issue” (Wallace 1996: 12).

Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2007: 05-06) explain that the concept governance is used by “successive civilisations to refer to the exercise of authority, control and direction” by government. With governance being a dominant concept in the running of the state “some
analysts warn about the state’s implied lack of control” in that authority on policy matters is depleted among various actors at different societal levels (Sloat 2003: 129). As conceived by the international financial institutions and most United Nations (UN) organisations governance is defined as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social development” (World Bank in Olowu 2003: 04). The United Nations Development Programme – UNDP (Edigheji 2003: 72-73) is more explicit and comprehensive in defining governance. It states that:


Governance is the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the complex mechanism, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations...Governance includes states, but transcends it by taking the private sector and civil society. All three are critical for sustaining human development. The state creates a conducive political and legal climate. The private sector generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction-mobilising groups to participate in economic, social and political activities. (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] in Edigheji 2003: 72-73)

In the definition of UNDP the multifaceted nature of governance is underscored. Governance comprises political, economic and administrative dimensions as distinct facets or levels where authority is exercised. In the United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA) the multifaceted character of governance is also emphasised. UNECA (1999: on-line) defines governance “as the use of political, economic and administrative authority and resources to manage the nation’s affairs”. This definition gravitates more towards sameness with that of the World Bank (in Olowu 2003:04) and UNDP (in Edigheji 2003: 72-73).

Compared to the definitions of the World Bank (in Olowu 2003: 04), UNDP (in Edigheji 2003: 72-73) and UNECA (1999), that of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is limited to the political dimension of governance. For the purpose of this chapter, the political dimension of governance is concerned with exercising political authority. This entails the authority to take political or policy decisions on matters that pertain to the management of public affairs. The OECD defines governance as “the use of political
authority and exercise of control in society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development (Fuhr 2000: 64).

Furubotn and Richter’s (1997: 05) definition of governance is predicated on the political and administrative dimensions or facets of governance. It is defined as “a system of rules plus the instruments that serve to enforce the rules”. This is similar to Bovaird and Loffler’s (2002: 07-24), the European Commission’s (2002: 335), and Lynn, Heinrich and Hill’s (2007: 06) definitions of governance. Bovaird and Loffler (2002: 07-24) define governance as “the set of formal and informal rules, structures and processes which define the ways in which individuals and organisations can exercise power over the decisions (by other stakeholders) which affect their welfare and quality of life”.

Governance is defined by the European Commission (2002: 335) as being concerned “with the establishment and operation of ‘institutions’ (in the sense not of organisations but of rules of the game) which define actors and their responsibilities, both in co-operation towards society’s objectives and in the resolution of any conflicts that may arise”. In this definition ‘institutions’ refers to “substantive, policies, public processes, and even spontaneous behaviour” (European Commission 2002: 335). Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2007: 06) define governance as the “regimes, laws, rules, judicial decisions and administrative practices that constraint, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goals and services”. In these governance is defined in too narrow and institutional a manner as the focus is only on the political and administrative facets of the concept.

Although formulated differently in the definitions referred to above it is clear that the essence of the meaning of governance is, according to the views of some scholars whose works thus far cited, embedded in the concept of control. For, words such as regimes, systems of rules, laws, judicial decisions, governing and exercising of control as used by different authors in their definitions of governance presuppose authority. The definition of governance as the exercise of authority, control or power could be traced back to its etymological foundation. Perhaps to this extent the etymology of governance provide a common, but not a universal, epistemological template from which this concept could be defined and understood as semblance of similarity as to its meaning exists among some scholars.
Fowler (2002: 94) defines *governance* as “the acquisition of and accountability for the application of political authority to the direction of public affairs and the management of public resources”. This definition is biased towards the political dimension or facet of the concept. Although the concept of political authority is used in the definition, it is counter-balanced by the imperative of accountability, which appertains to the theory of democracy. The principle of accountability is one of the traditional cornerstones of democracy, which requires that government ought to be held accountable for its act of governing or exercising of authority or control in the management of public affairs. In the context of the theory of democracy, which is premised on the concept of majority rule, *governance* is not just simply about government exercising authority or control. It is also, more importantly, about government being held accountable by those on whose behalf it ought to act in their interests (see McLean 1996: 129-132).

In the *United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific* (UNESCAP) *governance* is simply defined as “the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)” (1998: on-line). The character of such process is not specified. In a democratic society the process of decision-making and implementation is inclusive whereas in that which is undemocratic the opposite is the case. UNESCAP’s formulation of the definition of *governance* differs from those of the international financial institutions and most United Nations (UN) organisations, which define *governance* as the manner in which power, authority or control is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social development. This is in spite of the fact that UNESCAP itself is one of the UN organisations.

Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008: n.p) explain that *governance* “is about the process through which a decision is made, rather than the substance of the decision itself”. They describe it “as the way in which an organisation chooses to engage in certain activities backed by goals shared by its constituents” (Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008: n.p). Although decision-making function and choosing to “engage in certain activities” presupposes authority in policy choices, Carrington, DeBuse and Lee’s (2008) definition, like that of Fowler (2002: 94) and UNESCAP (1998), is not enmeshed in the nuances and parlings of the theory of control. Caporaso (1996: 32) defines *governance* as being about the “collective problem-solving in the public domain”. Olowu (2003: 04) particularises actors in the collective problem-solving as the state and non-state organisations. This means that concept
of governance is not limited to the activities of state actors in their pursuit of the business of government.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) explains that “governance includes states, but transcends it by taking in the private sector and civil society” (in Edigheji 2003: 72-73). This means that the societal and market facets or dimensions of governance are important key variables in conceptualising and defining the concept. If UNESCAP (1998) and Carrington, DeBuse and Lee’s (2008) conceptualisation of governance as the process of decision-making is inclusive of state and non-state actors, then their definitions of the concept could be located in the democratisation theory.

The notion of “collective problem-solving in the public domain as a variable that Caporaso (1996: 32) propounds in the definition of governance presupposes collaboration between the state and non-state actors in dealing with matters of public interest. It is not about control. However, this should not be misconstrued as the proposition that the democratisation theory and the theory of control are binary opposites from which governance could be understood. For, in a democracy some degree of control over the activities of state and non-state actors in the business of government is critically important. Otherwise governance would degenerate into chaos.

In the publication entitled European Governance – Preparatory Work for the White Paper the European Commission (2002: 335) warns of the danger of defining governance as a “series of additions to governmental structures designed to make those structures more attractive in a sceptical world”. Implicit in this statement is that non-state actors in the governance process ought to add value. This could be realised if authority is shared between state and non-state actors. This thinking appears to have influenced the approach of other scholars in their attempts at the definition of governance.

Olowu (2003: 04) defines governance as being about “sharing authority for public management between the state and non-state organisations”. Similarly, Salamon (2002: 02) explains that governance is an “elaborate system of third party government in which crucial elements of public authority are shared with a host of non-state governmental or other-governmental actors”. It refers “to a process by which governments increasingly govern in partnership with a range of non-state actors” (Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 150-151).
The sharing of authority with non-state actors could be interpreted as democracy in praxis and a commitment to practically give effect to the concept of majority rule. In the notion of civil society the concept of governance is appropriated in a democratic and a social dimension. Of critical importance in governing in partnership with a range of non-state actors is the notion of networks, which Bevir and Rhodes (2002: 55-56) contend are important in conceptualising governance.

The “networks” are “the defining characteristics of governance” and offer a “co-ordinating mechanism notably different from markets and hierarchies” (Bevir & Rhodes 2002: 55-56). This definitional and explanatory perspective on governance appertains to the theory of networked governance. It appears to be a context from which Larmour, in the article entitled Modes of Governance and Development, cryptically define governance “as a form of co-ordination” (1995: 17). In the study on governance in weak states in Melanesia conducted subsequent to the article cited in the foregoing Larmour (1996: 01) elaborated on this cryptic definition in the perspective that “governance is the result of the interaction between different models of co-ordination”.

Subsumed in the theory of networked governance are two theoretical paradigms, which are interrelated, from which governance could be understood, namely governance as a socio-cybernetic system and governance as self-organising networks (Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008). These theoretical paradigms of governance “emerges in the more complex information era times of the 1990s to address the limitations of the state and the market in addressing the many complex challenges facing society” (Schmidt 2008: 111). Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008: n.p) explain that the socio-cybernetic system and self-organising networks as theories of governance “play off of the theory of governance as the minimalist state”. The emphasis in these theories is that “partnership with civil society, co-innovation and civic leadership [are the] driving ideas” in the management of public affairs in this contemporary world whose complexity poses a governance challenge that outstrips the theoretical depth of the New Public Management approach (Schmidt 2008: 111).
Goldsmith (2005: 106) explains that Larmour’s definition offers opportunity for contemplation of governance “not as a singular and unified mode of development but as a theoretical and practical way of linking loosely connected social subsystems (markets, communities and hierarchies) – indeed forming them (if the policy settings are correct) into virtuous cycles”. So, the definition of governance as sharing of authority (see Olowu 2003: 04; Salamon 2002: 02; Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 150-151); “form of co-ordination”(Larmour 1995: 17); and “linking loosely connected social subsystems” (Goldsmith 2005: 106) could also be understood within the context of a developmental state. Yet, some may argue that the definition of governance as being about sharing of authority with non-state actors, especially the market, could be located in the theory of minimalist state, which bears some resemblances with the theory of subsidiarity. The central idea that undergirds the theory of subsidiarity is that an individual citizen within the state achieves self-actualisation “only in being enmeshed in a society” (Cullen 2000: 124; 127).

In the theory of a minimalist state the market is emphasised as a key variable in the definition of governance whereas in the case of the theory of subsidiarity the emphasis is on individuals in society as non-state actors. The definition of governance in the context of a minimalist state is embedded in neo-liberalism, which refers to a “belief in the moral necessity of market forces in the economy and entrepreneurs as a good and necessary social group” (Adesina 2001: 07). Bell and Hindmoor (2009: 149-150) write that “within political science…the term governance has acquired a more specific and contentious meaning as a label used to describe the involvement of a wider range of non-state actors in the process of governing society and the marginalisation, decentring or hollowing out of governments”.

In the literature thus far reviewed governance is defined differently. The National Health Service Education for Scotland (2007: 06) observes that “there is no single agreed definition of the term” – [this is] a reflection of “different levels and diverse contexts in which governance is applied”. Governance is a complex concept (see Sloat 2003: 128), whose serious consideration in this chapter reveals that it does not simply exist and is given to people as pure perception, but rather that different people perceive of it differently because they hold different theories about it. In some instances the definitions of governance are the same as that of good governance.
In the study that started a Europe-wide discourse on governance entitled *Governance, European Governance and Global Governance* European Commission (2001) makes a very important observation that the concept *governance* is currently used in contemporary social sciences with different meanings located within different theoretical paradigms. With the different definitions of *governance* studied and analysed above, this chapter arrives at the same conclusion as the European Commission (2001) that this concept is used with different meanings located within different theoretical paradigms. In this the question is whether a synthesis of different definitional perspectives on the concept *governance* is possible. Or are they binary opposites?

In moving towards a synthetic perspective, it is submitted that perhaps *governance* could just simply be defined and understood as the exercise authority, power or control in partnership with, or among a wide range of, democratic sectors to maximise participation in the process of decision or policy-making and implementation of the same. The way that authority, power or control is exercised; the way those processes of decision or policy-making are conducted; and the way those decisions or policies are made and implemented; the content of those decisions or policies; and whether the implementation of those decision or policies enhances the quality of lives of members of society or not determines whether a particular system of governance is bad or good. It is here that the conceptual relationship between *good governance* and *governance* is located. It is explained in sub-section 4.2 above that *good governance* is concerned with the normative dimension of *governance*. Caluser and Salagean (2007: 12) corroborate that “*good governance* is a normative conception of the values according to which the act of *governance* is realised.” The contention made in sub-section 4.2 above that *governance* and *good governance* are closely conceptually intertwined concepts is authenticated. *Governance* is a conceptual presentiment of *good governance*.

The thoughts on how the business of government ought to be conducted, which do not converge on sameness, have always been part of the development discourse concerned mainly with the normative guidelines and value judgements prescriptive of a particular system of governance. In the contemporary development discourse the normative disposition of *governance* is exemplified by prefixing *good* to *governance* to create *good governance*. This adds complexity to the conceptual question on *governance*. For, what is *good* is a question of relativism and value judgement. This brings the discourse to the object of this study, namely *good governance*. This concept is considered in its broader context with
reference to its philosophical and theoretical antecedents, evolution in the contemporary development discourse and *problematique* character associated with it.

### 4.2.2 Meaning of good governance

The normative character of *good governance* is manifested in its varied theorisations, conceptualisations and definitions as determined in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis, articulated in terms of ‘ought’ rather than ‘is’. The meaning of *good governance* is ingrained in the prescriptive conclusion of ‘what ought to be’ as opposed to a descriptive deduction of what *governance* is (see Bowell & Kemp 2002: 129). Reasoning on what constitutes *good governance* is based on *value judgements* whereas that of *governance* is based on *fact*. However, Blackburn (2005: 255) points out that “the philosophy of social sciences is fraught with problems of distinguishing between fact and value”. Could this perhaps be a reason some scholars use normative words to define *governance* and therefore in the process conflate it with *good governance*?

The analysis in sub-section 4.2.1 above managed to narrow down the different perspectives on *governance* into three variables that feature in most definitions studied: exercising of authority, control or power; sharing of authority and partnership among the democratic sectors; and a form of co-ordination or linking loosely connected subsystems. Based on these variables the attempt is made to synthesise the different definitional perspectives on the concept and from this exercise a submission is made to the body of knowledge as to the definition of *governance*. This perhaps explains the basis of the observation of some scholars that it is relatively easy to define *governance* rather than *good governance*. But, recalling the question asked in sub-section 4.2 above, is this really true? For, in some instances value-laden nuances are used to define *governance*. This complicates rather its relative conceptual simplicity. In instances where value-laden concepts are used to define *governance* its distinction with *good governance* is not made.

Perhaps the fundamental distinction between *good governance* and *governance* is that the former is expressed in terms of ‘ought’ (value) whereas the latter is in terms of ‘is’ (fact). But, what is *good governance* and how did this concept evolve to arrive at its current form and usage? What is the character of its conceptual *problematique* in the broader contemporary discourse? In the attempt to answer these questions this part of the chapter
starts with a reflection on the philosophical and theoretical antecedents of *good governance*. This is followed by the analytical consideration of *good governance* in the development discourse. Throughout the discourse the conceptual *problematique* character of *good governance* is delineated.

4.2.2.1 **Philosophical and theoretical antecedents**

The practice of theory *par excellence*, according to Pauw (1999b: 464), is a philosophy. Philosophy is important in scholarship discourse. In juxtaposition with theory, philosophy “is an intellectual undertaking based on reliance on a reasoning to justify claims” (Schwella 1999: 63). It is concerned with thought about thought (Bullock *et al.*, 1988: 646). Its objective “is the critical evaluation of beliefs, which involves attempts to provide rational grounds for accepting (using) or rejecting (not using) beliefs which are normally taken for granted without thinking or justification” (Schwella 1999: 64). Philosophy moves from a normative premise; it is prescriptive rather than descriptive in nature (Pauw 1999b: 465).

A theory is an epistemic framework used to explain, in the context of human sciences, scientific phenomena. It is very important in the development of science. Schwella (1999: 65) explains that… “constructing theories involves an attempt to explain facts in terms of the general laws through hypotheses which have to be tested against reality”. As argued in sub-section 4.2 above, the concept of *good governance* has long been part of, or implicated in, the early philosophical discourses on the normative imperatives of politics, which far precedes what is popularly propounded as its origin in the 1980s. Its relative neologism in the contemporary development discourse is as a *term*. This means that what is relatively new is the *term*, but the *concept* is as old as *governance*. The meaning of a *concept* and a *term* in the context of this contention is provided in sub-section 4.2 above.

The concept of *good governance* is traced back to the propositions of the early philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. In the disquisition on democracy and the quest for responsible governance in Southern Africa Omoyefa (2010: 111-112) links *good governance* to the notions of *good* and *common good*, which, respectively, are associated with Plato and Aristotle philosophies on the question of a just and good society. Omoyefa (2010: 111-112) states that the outcome of *good governance* ought to be “the good of all, i.e. common good”. The concepts of *good* and *common good* have a long history that dates back to ancient Greek
philosophy. They are considered in this part of the discourse as the philosophical and theoretical antecedents of good governance.

In dialogue with Socrates in *The Republic* Plato theorised about the ideal state. In this seminal text Plato sought to come up with a “theoretical constitution” (or to critically present the theoretical framework and principles for a constitution) in order to “establish a good society – which [is] described as the one founded on good principle and grounded on a good leadership, that is to say the principle of justice and the leadership of philosophers” (Philippoussis 1999: 09). Plato conceived “a political theory for a just society” (Okpala, s.a.: n.p) in the proposition that “the answer to society’s ills lies not in reforming political systems but in adopting philosophic principles as guidelines”, of which their implementation necessitates “creation of what [Plato] calls ruler philosophers – individuals who will lead society into an ethical existence based on predetermined principles as expounded in *The Republic*”(e-Notes 2010: on-line; see also Plato 2003: 189-240).

Plato’s *The Republic* is predicated on the notion of good in society, whose origin is traced “in the first quarter of the IVth c. BC” (Philippoussis 1999: 109; see also Kraus s.a: on-line). It was conceived for Plato’s fellow Athenians. In *The Republic* Plato argues that “the end of man, both as individual and as a society, was the Good” (Fejfar 2007: 01). In this Plato was preoccupied with the concept of good in governance. Good governance does have a long conceptual lineage, which goes back to the ancient Greek politics or earliest foundations of political theory. When Plato engages Socrates on the question of a just and good society he was primarily concerned with the theory of good in governance (see Plato 2003). Aristotle and Aquinas took the Platonian concept of good in their theorisation of the political state and prefixed common to good to create common good.

In the book entitled *Aquinas, Aristotle and the Promise of Common Good* Keys (2006) examines Aquinas’ notion of common good and argues that it should be read with Aristotelianism. Webster (1990: 122) defines common good as “belonging to or shared by each or all”. In the Cheathouse (2010), an internet blog for scholarly engagements, it is explained that Aristotle’s common good differs with Plato’s concept of good in that the former is about doing good rather than knowing good. This is perhaps a reason that some scholars argue that Plato’s theorisation of a state is too abstract and expressed in parlance of extreme philosophical dialects whereas that of Aristotle is more practical.
De Torre (1997: on-line) writes that “Plato’s philosophy, like Lao Tze’s, is more idealistic, poetical, and mystical while Aristotle’s, like Confucianism, is more realistic and practical”. Plato’s conception of good focussed on the character of human personality. It is premised on the assumption that “certain states of being were good by nature and that humankind could come to know at least in part the character of that good” (Powell & Clemens 1998: 06). According to Plato, this is the foundation of a just and good society. In this it is contended that Plato propagates the individualist notion of a human person (see Therrian 2009). In Aristotle’s conception the connotative implication is that of “material benefit, advantage, and interest as much as more intangible forms of good” (Powell & Clemens 1998: 06).

Aquinas suggests that doing good involves putting in place particular laws that seek to engender the good in the organisation of society “for men to attain happiness” (De Torre 1997: on-line). This presupposes the tangible form of good Powell and Clemens (1998: 06) talk about. Aquinas’s contention is that “the end of law is the common good” whereas, in contrast, Plato argues that the “end of man… [is] the good” (Fejfar 2007: 01). Plato (2003: 189-240) argues that the good in society could be realised if philosophers became rulers or rulers philosophers. This means that it is the philosophers that know the good and are therefore the only ones that can rule in a good way to achieve a good society. In this Plato advocates the rule by a guardian class of philosophers, which Omoyefa (2010: 108) calls “institutional dictatorship”.

Aristotle’s concept of common good is premised on the rule of the masses rather than a guardian class of philosophers. This influenced Aquinas’s philosophical position on the theory of state formation from which the modern idea of democracy is derived. Aquinas’s position is captured in the rebuke of tyranny as “the worst possible form of government, to the extent that the tyrant keeps all the power to himself,…instead of using it for the common good and general justice, and for the liberty and welfare of all” (De Torre 1997: on-line). Plato’s theory of good is jettisoned by Aristotle. The contention in this regard is that its approach to realising the idea of good society is flawed because it is premised on aristocracy rather than democracy.
A fiercest attack of Plato’s philosophy, which borders on vitriolic, is by Karl Popper, whose work became so dominant in the Western World since the Second World War. The basis of Popper’s contention is that Plato’s proposition on how to achieve a good society is based on the “sovereignty of (an) egocentric individual of the so-called democratic man in the Sophistic sense” (Philippoussis 1999: 111), which “wrongly placed egotism, as opposed to collectivism” and emphasises the notion of individualism (Cap’nthinkwright, internet blog 2010: on-line). Egotism is the opposite of altruism. It is associated with the concept of selfishness, which is concerned with one’s own interest or pecuniary self-interest.

In the book entitled *The Virtue of Selfishness*, Rand (1989) redefined selfishness and argues that it is much misunderstood with all sorts of negative connotations heaped on it. To Rand (1989) “the truly selfish person is a self-respecting, self-supporting human being who neither sacrifices others to himself nor sacrifices himself to others”. The concept of altruism, in contradistinction with that of selfishness, refers to “a selfless desire to vivre pour autrui or live for others” (Meadowcroft 2007: 358). The French social theorist, Auguste Comte, coined the term altruism, which is used to describe “the positive moral virtue of acts whose principal end was the welfare of others” (Meadowcroft 2007: 358).

In *The Open Society and its Enemies* Popper charges that Plato “wreaked havoc in science, politics and philosophy down through centuries” (Cap’nthinkwright, internet blog 2010: on-line). Philippoussis (1999: 109-143) strongly defends Plato’s philosophical propositions in the article that examines the question of Plato’s notion of leadership in *The Republic*. Philippoussis contends that the criticisms against Plato are based on mistranslation of the philosopher’s work and are thus essentially misunderstood, especially the concept of philosopher-king or ruler-philosopher. The concept of a philosopher as envisaged in Plato as a key variable in the theory of a just or good society refers to (Philippoussis 1999: 109-143):

*a man of education and culture, [who] leads rather than rules society, governs rather manages its affairs, proposes rather than imposes its legislation.[It is] a man of “service” rather than “utility”[who is] the most appropriate to lead both intellectually and politically – both pedagogically and demagogically – [and who] the people have chosen as “the best amongst themselves”.[As] the intellectual leader [is] a man of vision, as a political leader[is] a statesman.

This man is first and foremost, the leader of himself with his ethical and
political paideia, and thus truly open in his relationship with others. He must be an allocentric person in his exercise of justice.

So Plato’s concept of how to achieve a good society is misunderstood by its critiques? Or perhaps this is just a question of the concept of good being normative in its character and therefore bound to be a subject of contestations? For, what is good is a question of value judgement inevitably influenced by the ideological and philosophical idiosyncrasies of its epistemological foundations (Kant 2000: 50-52). Chomsky (1997: on-line) explains that subsumed in Aristotle's concept of common good is the state as “a community of equals” with people being supreme, equally and fully involved in the processes of governance to achieve a welfare state, which should provide “lasting prosperity to the poor by distribution of public revenues”. Does this presuppose social justice – which is not merely concerned with the administration of law but with the achievement of justice in every aspect of society? The outcome of the common good is the best of all the people (Chomsky 1997: on-line).

Fejfar (2007: 01) observes that, “with extreme relativism” inherent in the normative character of the concept of good, “the tendency is to interpret the common good not as a heuristic or a principle or a metaphysical quiddity, but instead to interpret the common good as a conventional majority”. This rejects Aristotle’s conceptualisation of the common good. Fejfar (2007: 01-02) expatiates that:

In theory the common good means something more than just the view of a conventional majority. The Good does not represent the will of a conventional majority. The Good is defined as the Truly Worthwhile. In the first instance the Truly Worthwhile means that the scale of values of all participants in society is assumed to begin with Rational Self Interest, and to proceed with Autonomy as fundamental values. Rationality implies the use of Logic. The Self is the True Self, where deep in one’s heart one is at once both oneself and God, the True Self is me, as the Holy Spirit in me. It is the True Self in my heart that I follow.

This sounds extremely theological. Feijar’s (2007: 01) explanation of the good is grounded in religious faith and is consistent with Aquinas’s conception of the concept. Keys (2006) argues that Aquinas’s version of the good is influenced by Christian faith, which is said to be important in philosophical inquiry into the foundation of society and politics. Kraus (s.a: on-
line) explains that “Christianity brought new ideals in the Middle Ages with writers such as Augustine stating that God was the common good”. In this Sulaidman (s.a: on-line) asks a pertinent question: “do we need to believe in a given metaphysical system, such as a formal religion, to be good?” This question is answered in the affirmative, especially by the Catholic theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries in their attempt to further develop Aquinas’s conception of common good along the democratic imperatives, which, “historically, though not without flaws and blemishes, worked out through the English, American and French liberal political revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries (De Torre 1997: on-line). To clarify some of the concepts used in explaining good and to contextualise the contention regarding its meaning as presented in the above, Fejfar (2007: 02) states that:

Autonomy means Self-directed. An autonomous person is one who follows the Self in him or her. A self-directed chooses voluntarily, and creatively helps others. An autonomous person rejects authority as invalid. Reason is the only authority, not some authoritarian person. The autonomy of all persons must be promoted. This means the provision of meaningful work in a well ordered society that works. It is assumed that if a person pursues Rational Self Interest and Autonomy, that that person will choose rationally, Constitutional Democracy, individual rights, a regulated economy, and a right to self-defense.

The contention in Fejfar’s (2007: 02) explanation is that the concept of good starts with individuals and their inner beings. In this the assumption seems to be that the good inherent in human beings could be translatable into a good system of government for a just society. The Christian literature largely contends that the notion of good is achievable through subscription to a formal religion. Sulaidman (s.a: on-line) differs with this perspective that a person “can be good without holding any specific metaphysical beliefs”. In this the proposition is that “faith in God, which then translates into faith in the integrity of the Universe and its laws, and in the right place of humanity within the cosmic scheme, is an existential human condition that transcends religious dogma and doctrine”. Using Qur’an Sulaidman (s.a: on-line) substantiates this perspective that “…faith in God is neither a metaphysical nor a theological construct; rather it arises from the innate cognizance of the mind of the One who is Absolute, Eternal, Changeless and like unto Him this is none”.

285
Of particular importance in the discourse on the good is the question of ethics, whose etymological antecedents are traced to the Greek word ethos. Alongside ethics is the concept of morals or morality, which is derived from the Latin word mores. The meanings ingrained in the concepts of ethics and morals or morality are that of habitual or customary behaviour. Sulaidman (n.d: on-line) explains that:

An ethical or moral act is not just a customary act performed from an attitude of indifference, however, right and good that act may happen to be. An ethical act, rather, is one that is consciously intended to be right and good. In other words, not only what we do, but also what we think, what we say, and how we freely decide when faced with choices with ethical implications go in the making of our moral fibre. As such, a moral life is lived intentionally and consciously in harmony with the moral imperatives – in action as well as thought, speech, and choice.

The ethical or moral behaviour in the business of government is critically important. Both Plato and Aristotle consider ethics as the key imperative of good and common good respectively (see Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2007: on-line). Sulaidman (s.a: on-line) asks yet another interesting question: do we have to be religious to be ethical? In the theological context this question is answered largely in a positive sense. But, Sulaidman (s.a: on-line) has a totally different view:

Ethical awareness originates in the human experience, and is cognized as indispensable on the grounds of enlightened self-interest. The moral imperative is the bedrock of human survival and prosperity. [Therefore] ethics ought to be viewed in relation to sustaining and enhancing [the] life experience of peoples worldwide; rather than in relation to any eschatological notions. Ethical values are neither relative nor sectarian; they are grounded in the universal experience of humankind, not just in the doctrines of one particular religion. As such ethics should be taught outside of any theological framework, and introduced early on in the educational processes as a shared enterprise. (Sulaidman s.a: on-line)
Looking at all these earlier philosophical discourses it is clear that at the core is how the welfare of society could be promoted. This question is at the core of the concepts of the *good* [associated with Plato] and *common good* [associated with Aristotle]. In the contemporary theories on state formation the discourse on the question of a just and good society is subsumed in *good governance*. This chapter traces the conceptual lineage of *good governance* from these earlier philosophical and theoretical propositions on how to construct a just and good society, whose conceptual abstraction is embedded in the concepts of *good* and *common good*. These concepts have a long history in Western philosophies and theories of a state and are the antecedents of *good governance*.

The concept of *good governance* is as contentious as the concepts of *good* and *common good*, on which discourse is fraught with contestations, is not about their teleological disposition but on how to achieve the ultimate purpose of governance, which is a just and good society as subsumed in the concept of the general welfare. The concept of general welfare is explained in sub-section 4.2 above. The notions of *good* and *common good* presuppose particular normative dispositions, whose propensity is a subject of influence by particular contexts; hence answers to their meanings do not converge on sameness. It seems as if the conceptual *problematique* character of the concepts of *good* and *common good* is bequeathed to *good governance*, whose evolution in the contemporary development discourse displays the same character.

A closer reading of African scholarship on how to achieve a just and good society indicates that this subject has not only been the sole preoccupation of Western philosophies and theories. It has also been part of the ancient African philosophical and theoretical considerations. This is a very important point that merits illumination for reasons of completeness in the discourse on the philosophical and theoretical antecedents of *good governance* (see Maserumule 2009: 756-770). The African philosophies and theories on a myriad of issues, including the governance question, have a long history that, as some African scholars contend, even predates the Western epistemology (see Diop 1960: 133; Nabudere 2007: 06-34).

In the interpretation of the Timbuktu manuscripts Diagne (2008: 24) points out that African Muslim scholars “contributed to the universal history of [philosophy] by pursuing a fruitful dialogue with the likes of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus from their own perspectives”. Of
particular relevance to the governance question on how to achieve a just and good society is the African philosophy of humanism, which embodies values and beliefs that underpin the foundations of sound human relations and co-existence of all African societies. It is based on the African axiom that *I am because we are*. This African philosophy of humanism is defined as a “social ethic” and “a unifying vision” (Teffo 1999: 153-154). It is about the righteousness of being human, a belief in the centrality, sanctity and foremost priority of human beings in all kinds of interactions (Bengu 1996: 05; Dlomo 1991: 50; Vilakazi 1991: 07).

The African philosophy of humanism is “a collective interdependence and solidarity of communities of affection” with emphasis on the value of social relations (Mbigi 2005: 69). It is “a way of life that sustains the well-being of a people/community/society” (Sindane & Liebenberg 2000: 31-46). Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s (1995) words are instructive in explaining the African philosophy of humanism:

*Africans have a thing called ubuntu; it is about the essence of being human, it is part of the gift that Africa is going to give to the world. It embraces hospitality, caring about others, being willing to go that extra mile for the sake of another. We believe that a person is a person through other persons; that my humanity is caught up and bound up in yours. When I dehumanise you, I inexorably dehumanise myself. The solitary human being is a contradiction in terms, therefore you seek to work for the common good because humanity comes into its own in community, in belonging.*

The universalism of the African philosophy of humanism finds expression in the fact that it is found in all African languages. For example, isiZulu – *ubuntu*; seSotho – *Botho*; Akan(Ghana) – *Biakoye*; Yoruba – *Ajobi*; Shangaan – *Numunhu*; shiVenda – *Vhuthu*; ixiTshonga – *Bunhu*; isiXhosa – *Umntu*; Shona – *Nunhu*; Kishwahili (Tanzania) – *Ujamaa*; Swahili(Kenya) – *Utu*; Ugandan – *Abantu*; English – *Humanness*; Afrikaans – *mensheid* (Broodryk 2006: 23-26). African scholarship is unanimous that the core values of the African philosophy of humanism are humanness, caring, sharing, respect, and compassion (see Sindane & Liebenberg 2000: 31-46; De Liedfe 2003: 13; Mbigi 2005: 65-77; Bengu 1996: 01-61; Ramose 2006: 03-17; Mangaliso 2001: 24). These normative values define a social and political ideal of a just and good society in the African context (see Nkondo 2007: 90).
Broodryk (2006: 174) expatiates extensively on the core values ingrained in the African philosophy of humanism and provides specific examples of what each entails. The following Table 4.1 illustrates Broodryk’s exemplification of the values that underpin the African philosophy of humanism.

**Table 4.1: Broodryk’s typology of the values of African philosophy of humanism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HUMANNESS</th>
<th>SHARING</th>
<th>RESPECT</th>
<th>CARING</th>
<th>COMPASSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warmth</td>
<td>Giving (unconditional)</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>Love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>Cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Open-handedness</td>
<td>Obedience</td>
<td>Helpfulness</td>
<td>Informality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td></td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Charity</td>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
</tr>
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<td>Humanity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Normativeness</td>
<td>Friendliness</td>
<td>Spontaneity</td>
</tr>
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But, how do the African philosophies of humanism differs from the Western philosophies of *good* [associated with Plato] and *common good* [associated with Aristotle]? The governance question on how to achieve a just society in the context of the African philosophy of humanism is based on the sanctity of humanity in a collective, which, according to Nkondo (2007: 90), emphasises the “supreme value of society, the primary importance of social or communal interests, obligations and duties over and above the rights of individuals”. A key aspect that the African philosophy of humanism emphasises is the notion of collectivism as opposed to individualism. Nkondo (2007: 90) explains that the African philosophy of humanism proposes “a general theory about the ontological priority of society over the individual”. Subsumed in the African philosophy of humanism is the virtue of self-sacrificial altruism for others. Do these differ with Plato’s concept of the *good* and Aristotle’s *common good* as the defining characteristics of a just society or perhaps the broader Western philosophies and theories on governance?

The thinking of some scholars on this question is that in the Western philosophical sense the proposition on how to achieve a just society is based on the notion of individualism whereas in the African philosophical sense a key concept is collectivism (see Sindane & Liebenberg 2000: 31-46; De Liedfe 2003: 13; Mbigi 2005: 65-77; Bengu 1996: 01-61; Ramose 2006: 03-
Mangaliso 2001: 24). Much of the critiques of Plato’s concept of good argue that it is inclined more towards aristocracy and therefore is based on the notion of individualism. But, Aristotle’s concept of common good revolves around collectivism in a democratic sense. This is clear in Aristotle’s notion of majority rule, which is a key variable of common good. Is this not similar to the essence of the African philosophy of humanism?

The generalisation of the distinction between the Western and African philosophies needs to be properly contextualised lest facts of philosophical and theoretical verities on the antecedents of good governance get distorted. The Western and African philosophies are not necessarily binary opposites. The propositions of the African philosophy of humanism “that people are first and foremost social beings, embodied agents in-world and engaged in realising a certain form of life” (Nkondo 2007: 90) and that people should be allowed to “experience their lives as bound up with the good of their communities” (Nkondo 2007: 91) are respectively implicated in Plato’s concept of good and Aristotle’s common good. The difference lies at the level of emphasis in the epistemological continuum. In the review of the book Aquinas, Aristotle and the Promise of the Common Good Therrian (2009: on-line) makes a similar observation.

Therrian (2009: on-line) writes that Keys (2006) attempts to synthesise the individualistic notion of human person with the collectivist notions of the common good. To this the African philosophy of humanism could be added, as it is based on the notion of communitarianism. Key’s “thesis is that the foundational principles of Aquinas’s political theory reconcile the apparent conflict between the particular good of individuals and the common good of the political community” (Therrian 2009: on-line). Does this provide a philosophical and theoretical template from which the concept good governance could be understood or assist in untangling the conceptual problematique character of the concepts of good and common good, from which the conceptual lineage of good governance is traced?

4.2.2.2 Evolution of good governance in the contemporary development discourse and its conceptual problematique character

In the contemporary nomenclatural form the term good governance is traced from the World Bank Report of 1989 entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development – A Long-Term Perspectives Study (LTPS). This term “was used for the first time by the World
Bank Report of 1989” to describe the post-cold war paradigm for a just and good society (Abrahamsen 2000: ix, 25, 30). As contended in sub-sections 4.2 and 4.2.1 above, the concept of good governance does have a long ideational lineage that dates back to the ancient Greek history on the normative imperatives of politics. In the earliest foundations of political theory Plato’s concept of good and Aristotle’s common good were used to describe the similar, if not the same, course for a just and good society. So the idea or concept of good governance is not new. It has always been in the centre of the ideological, political, philosophical and theoretical discourses, which have always been characterised by contestations, on how to achieve a just and good society.

The different definitions of what is meant by good governance are studied in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis. To avoid being pedantic and running the risk of useless reverberations, those different definitions are not repeated here. For, as pointed out above, this chapter builds on Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis. Good governance introduced “a new orthodoxy” based “on the model of a liberal-democratic polity” that “dominates official Western aid policy and development thinking” (Leftwich 1993: 605). Its evolution in the contemporary development discourse is characterised by “two parallel meanings that often overlap” (Leftwich 1993: 606). The first one is associated with the World Bank’s interpretation, which is limited to the administrative and managerial dimensions of the concept. The second meaning of good governance is associated with the Western thinking and the donor community whose interpretations put emphasis on “competitive democratic politics” (Leftwich 1993: 606). But, what are the contextual antecedents of the concept of good governance in the contemporary development discourse?

4.2.2.1 Contextual antecedents

The context that precipitated the evolution of good governance in the contemporary development discourse could be located in “the political ascendancy of neo-liberal theory in the Western theory and public policy from the late 1970s”, which informs the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s (Leftwich 1993: 607). The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) refers to “a package of measures which the IMF, the World Bank and individual Western aid donors – singly, but more often in concert – sought to persuade many developing countries to adopt during the 1980s in return for a new wave of loans”(Leftwich 1993: 607). They were propounded as the appropriate frameworks through which the concept
of a just and good society could be realised. This concept had long been the preoccupation of the early philosophical and theoretical discourses, as explained in sub-section 4.2.2.1 above.

The philosophical and theoretical foundations of SAPs are embedded in classical liberalism that “if the economics are right, everything would fall into place” (Cernea 1994: 07). This is reminiscent of the modernisation theory, which, as explained in Chapter 3 of the thesis, suggests that the model of development that succeeded in the developed countries could be replicated with the same amount of success in the developing world. The development thesis based on classical liberalism, which the SAPs of the international financial institutions prescribed as the solution to the development conundrum in the developing countries propounds that political stability is the outcome of economic liberalisation (see Chomsky 2007, Ikome 2007: 69; Leftwich 1993: 605).

The international financial institutions’ interventions or involvement in matters of development especially in the developing world are rationalised with the propositions of the global theory of governance, which propounds that social challenges “may be resolved not only by a sovereign (that is, a national) government, but also by international organisations composed of multiple sovereign governments” (Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008: n.p). In the context of SAPs development is conceived as the imperative of the market rather than of common good. This thinking is embedded in classical liberalism. The concept of classical liberalism is associated with, among others, Adam Smith, who, in The Wealth of Nations, advocates that the free market economy is an appropriate trajectory towards the construction of a just and good society. The free market approach to development is associated with the concept of a minimalist state.

Chomsky (1997: on-line) explains that Adam Smith, like Aristotle, “understood that the common good”, from which the concept of good governance is traced, “will require substantial intervention to assure lasting prosperity of the poor by distribution of public revenues”. But, is it not that Chomsky (1997) somewhat misreads Adam Smith’s theory of a just and good society, whose specification of areas of government intervention presupposes a minimal state intervention, save in circumstances of absolute necessity? The notion of “substantial intervention” that Chomsky (1997) talks about is more in congruence with the concept of a developmental state.
Leftwich (1993: 620) defines a developmental state as that “state whose political and bureaucratic elite has the genuine developmental determination and autonomous capacity to define, pursue and implement developmental goals”. But in defining, pursuing and implementing developmental goals the democratic imperative of citizen participation in the processes of governance is critically important. For, as Evans (2009: 09) puts it, the “developmental states must be vehicles for socially defining and choosing societal goals, in addition to being instruments to achieve them”. This function “puts effective participation in democratic deliberation at the top of the list of the capabilities the developmental state must foster” (Evans 2009: 09).

A conceptual point that needs to be clarified is that, although democracy is not a prerequisite of a developmental state, it is an important imperative to facilitate a developmental state project. A developmental state should therefore not be misconstrued as the antithesis of democracy. Abraham Lincoln defined democracy as the government of the people for the people by the people (see Omoyefa 2010). This definition is embedded in ancient Greek sense that democracy means rule by the people (McLean 1993: 129). The essence of the meaning of democracy is in the concept of majority rule, which Plato rejected as not a particularly correct approach to achieve a just and good society (see Omoyefa 2010: 108; Philippoussis 1999: 109-143; McLean 1996: 130).

Plato’s philosophy is against the concept of majority rule as it seeks to transfer the control of “government from experts in governing to populist demagogues” (McLean 1996: 130). Although initially propounded, the idea of the majority rule that “the majority ought to be sovereign, rather than the best, where the best are few” in Aristotle’s rejection of Plato’s philosophy deviated “on the ground that government by the people was in practice government by the poor, who could be expected to expropriate the rich” (McLean 1996: 130). The ancient Greek philosophical and theoretical discourses on the concept of a just and good society influenced the evolution of a modern state and fertilised the contemporary thinking on governance.

In spite of the philosophical and theoretical positions of Plato and Aristotle on the concept of majority rule, democracy was pursued, particularly subsequent to the American Civil War (1775-1783) and the French Revolution (1789), in protestation against the exclusive nature of the feudal and aristocratic system of governance (Gildenhuys 1993: 52-53, McLean 1996: 130).
130-131). The wave of democratisation in the United States and France spread to a number of countries in Latin America, Africa and the former soviet block. In some countries, especially in Africa, post-colonial independence democracy was used as a means to pursue socialism. This was largely influenced by the Eastern European Communism, with which most post-colonial leadership in Africa had some association. They pursued democratic socialism, which is nothing else but a euphemism for communism (McLean 1996: 130-131).

In other instances the post-colonial systems of government in Africa deteriorated into kleptocracy in the name of democracy. This concept was coined from the word *kleptomania*, which means irresistible and recurrent desire to steal. The concept *kleptocracy* refers to the government of kleptomaniacs – that is, those in the political leadership positions that unduly enrich themselves with state resources. It is from this context that the concept of bad governance emerged, which is the antithesis of good governance. This concept of bad governance was used to characterise the system of government in most African countries of post-colonial independence. With the collapse of Eastern European Communism in the late 1980s, which “meant that the West no longer feared losing Third World Allies or clients to communism in a competitive bipolar world” (Leftwich 1993: 609), neo-liberalism assumed preponderance as a dominant paradigm.

Democratic socialism was replaced by liberal democracy, which provided “the ideological [and theoretical] framework for the rise of governance discourse” (Goldsmith 2005: 106), which “has a profound relationship to a neo-liberal narrative that emphasises the inefficiencies of bureaucracy, the burden of excessive taxation, the mobility of capital, and competition between states”. This thinking provided the ideological context from which the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s evolved.

In much of the existing body of literature the contextual antecedents of *good governance* in the contemporary development discourse are traced from the SAPs, whose approach to development presupposes economic reductionism. It is traced from the era that marked the end of the Cold War and the late 1980s attempts by the international financial institutions – World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – in concert with individual Western aid donors “to shatter the dominant post-war, state-led development paradigm and overcome the problems of development stagnation by promoting open and free competitive market economies, supervised by minimal states” (Leftwich 1993: 607). However, in the SAPs
context the attempt to achieve a just and good society was limited to a mere economic concept, which gravitated towards market fundamentalism. Maserumule (2005a: 197) argues that the economic reductionism as a paradigm of development is fraught with inadequacies. Amuwo (2002: on-line) explains that the international financial institutions and the donor community’s conception of development in the economic reductionism context requires that:

Aid recipients (to) balance their financial books well, to avoid balance of payment deficits. To do this all that is required is to follow both the letter and spirit of orthodox economic reform stipulated by those institutions and the donor community: trade liberalisation, currency devaluation, subsidy withdrawal from agriculture, privatisation of commanding heights of the economy, and the private sector as the engine of development.

The conception of development on the basis of the economic variables was rejected as fundamentally flawed by African scholarship as it fails to consider the people as the true intended beneficiaries of development (see Maserumule & Gutto 2008: 66). This contention appears to ingrain a semblance of validity as the empirical evidence demonstrates that the economic reductionism approach of SAPs to development, especially in the developing world, is flawed and consequently failed in many respects. In the Alternative African Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAPs) developed by the United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA) a different epistemological framework based on the philosophy of a human-centred development paradigm emerged as the antithesis of the classical liberal foundation of the SAPs. It is the intellectual output of Pan-African scholarship (see Maserumule & Gutto 2008: 69-71).

The AAF-SAPs human-centred framework “implies full democratisation of all aspects of economic and social activities and in all stages from decision-making to implementation” (Adedeji 2002: 242). The main focus of AAF-SAPs is on the social dimension of development, which is concerned with building, strengthening and promoting “democratic institutions as well as tolerance throughout society” (Caluser & Salagean 2007: 13). The AAF-SAPs is based on the UNICEF study entitled Adjustment with a Human Face (AWHF), which emphasises the human and social dimensions of development. A human-centred development paradigm is premised on the African philosophy of humanism.
Soon after the placing of the AAF-SAPs as the alternative paradigm for Africa’s development, the World Bank crafted a counter plan entitled *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development – A Long – Term Perspective Study* (LPTS) (1989). It emerged as a “new orthodoxy [that] dominates official Western aid policy and development thinking” (Leftwich 1993: 605). Jordan, Wurzel and Zito (2005: 477) state that “even the sceptics concede [that the foregoing] has achieved a paradigmatic orthodoxy”.

Leftwich (1993: 605) writes that “at the core [of this orthodoxy] is the confident assertion that good governance and democracy are not simply desirable but essential conditions for development in all societies”. This is the context from which the term *good governance* emerged in the contemporary development discourse to express a neo-liberal concept that political factors are as important as economic ones in the attempt to engender the course of sustainable development (see Leftwich 1993: 605-624). The term *good governance* is a neologism in the contemporary parlance of neo-liberalism. However, as argued above, the concept which it expresses does have a long history that dates back to the earliest foundations of the political philosophies and theories on a just and good society.

In the current nomenclatural form the term *good governance* was formally used for the first time in this World Bank publication, hereafter referred to as LPTS (Abrahamsen 2000: ix, 25, 30). It was used to describe the neo-liberal paradigm on how to achieve a just and good society. This is an ideal that has always been the preoccupation of the early philosophical and theoretical discourses. The proponents of *good governance* as a neo-liberal concept propound that the “democratic capitalist systems promote a prosperous and peaceful world because they are not best able to generate economic growth and do not go to war with each other” (Leftwich 1993: 605). Now the question is, following its introduction in the contemporary development discourse through the LPTS, how did *good governance* evolve?

### 4.2.2.2 Conceptual evolution

The LPTS ushered in yet another development framework. It emphasised that development should be firmly rooted in societies’ concerns, and should “reflect national characteristics and be consistent with a country’s cultural values” (World Bank 1989: 193). Similar to the AAF-SAPs, the LPTS emphasised the importance of the democratisation of the development process. The objective of the development paradigm propagated by the LPTS was to “unleash
the energies of the ordinary people; to empower them to take control of their own lives; to make communities more responsible for their development; and to make governments listen to their people” (World Bank 1989: 54). The civil society was promoted as key to these empowerment arrangements.

The theoretical foundation of the concept of a civil society could be traced to the theory of subsidiarity to which Catholicism significantly contributed to its evolution following its origin in classical Greece. Thomas Aquinas in his social teachings and medieval scholasticism engaged the concept of subsidiarity. In the seventeenth century Johannes Althusius developed the principle of subsidiarity along the theories of the secular state and its “subsequent echoes” can be found “in the thoughts of political actors and theorists as varied as Montesquieu, Locke, Tocqueville, Lincoln and Proudhon”(Carozza 2003: 41). In the latter part of the nineteenth century the principle of subsidiarity became the preoccupation of the Roman Catholic social theorists (Carozza 2003: 41). This was at the time when the discourse on the position of the church, state, society and individuals in a society was at its peak (see Ederveen & Pelkmans 2006: 04).

With the concept of subsidiarity the Catholic social theorists “sought some sort of middle way between the perceived excesses of both laissez-faire liberal capitalist society and Marxian socialist alternatives” (Carozza 2003: 41). The origin of the concept of civil society is traced from this context. In the theory of subsidiarity it is emphasised that social authority needs to be given a space to co-exist with political authority. The civil society exercises social authority. In this the proposition is that society is an organism made up of different hierarchies of organs that interface with the political authority and support each other in the pursuit of the common good. The organs of societal formations need to be given the space to participate in matters of governance (see Cullen 2000: 124-135).

In the introduction of good governance in the development discourse the World Bank’s LPTS states that political legitimacy is a sine qua non for sustainable development; development efforts will not yield the desired results “if the political context is not favourable” (World Bank 1989: 60). For Nzomo (1992: 100) this appeared to be acceptance of the critique against the SAPs, launched by the UNICEF and UNECA. So, does this mean that the World Bank, as an integral part of the international financial institutions, was criticising itself because the SAPs are its creation? What necessitated the World Bank’s paradigm shift in its earlier
approach, which placed “the state and society at the service of the market, under the presumption that economic growth alone will deliver development” (Bendana 2004)?

The SAPs approach was limited to the economic dimensions of development. The political and social dimensions that the AAF-SAPs of the UNECA subsequently emphasised as equally important in addition to the economic dimensions were not considered in the SAPs. The paradigm shift in this context refers to the World Bank’s subsequent consideration of the political and social dimensions of development, in addition to the economic one, as equally important. Leftwich (1993: 606) explains that this is because of the fact that the “Western governments begin to take a serious interest” in the political imperatives of development.

The paradigm shift in thinking in the development discourse represented a somewhat counter-revolution to classical liberalism. It is in this context that neo-liberalism assumed “political ascendancy”, not only as an economic theory, but also as an epistemological framework with “strong dimensions which involve both normative and functionalist theories of politics and the state” (Leftwich 1993: 608). In the normative sense neo-liberalism propounds that economic and political freedom represent the “essence of good life itself” whereas in the functional sense the proposition is that “democratic politics is necessary for a thriving free market economy (Leftwich 1993: 609).

The neo-liberal scholarship used the collapse of Eastern European communism as the empirical basis to validate their propositions. Its contention is that “non-democratic communist states [are] unable to produce sustained economic growth, and that their political structures prevented economic change” (Leftwich 1993: 609). This fostered the emergence and preponderance of neo-liberalism as the hegemonic epistemology (see Nabudere 2007: 70). Good governance evolved as the post cold war nomenclature used to describe a paradigm shift in the development discourse, which propounds that “democracy is a necessary prior or parallel condition of development, not an outcome of it” (Leftwich 1993: 605). This concept has, however, always been a subject of contestations with implications as to its meaning. Can this be because of the fact that its conceptual lineage, which is traced from the earliest foundations of political theory on how to construct a just and good society, has always been characterised by philosophical and theoretical contestations and that the same is now being bequeathed to it? The conceptual problematique character of good governance in the context of the contemporary development discourse is considered below.
4.2.2.2.3 Conceptual problématique

The notion of a problématique is used deliberately to underscore the conceptual difficulties associated with good governance in the contemporary development discourse. In Warfield and Perino (1999: 221) a problématique is explained as a “graphical portrayal – a structural model – of relationships among members of a set of problems”; “a product of a group process whose design benefits from the writings of Aristotle, Abelard, Leibniz, De Morgan, C.S Peirce, and Harry”; “a name for the array of problems.”; and “a structural portrayal applicable to specific problematic situations”. A specific problematic situation that undergirds the research question of this study is the concept good governance.

Good governance evolved into the current form following the contention that Africa’s development crisis is attributable to internal factors such as bad governance, corruption and human rights violations (see Akokpari 2005: 191; Caluser & Salagean 2007: 13; Leftwich 1993: 605-624). It was introduced as a normative concept prescriptive of certain governance imperatives and was propounded as an alternative conceptual framework from which solutions to Africa’s development conundrum could be sought (see Havnevik 1987). In the contemporary development discourse good governance evolved as a response to crisis-ridden situations in the developing world characterised by contestations of ideas on how to deal with them. This predisposed it to different interpretations.

It appears from the existing body of literature that good governance, from its first emergence in the World Bank’s LPTS of 1989, went through various conceptual mutations because of different contexts in the history of its evolution in the contemporary development discourse. Caluser and Salagean (2007: 13) could not have put it more aptly that good governance is “one concept, a variety of contexts”. It does have transcontextual history. Leftwich (1993: 606) observes that the World Bank “interprets [good governance] in primarily administrative and managerial terms”. This is because of the fact that the World Bank’s Article of Agreement does not allow it to entangle itself in the political dynamics of the sovereign countries (Leftwich 1993: 608).
Caluser and Salagean (2007: 13) categorise the World Bank’s limited, apolitical and technicist interpretation of good governance as a technical dimension of the concept. It is concerned with “the economic aspects of governance, namely the transparency of government accounts, the effectiveness of public resources management and the stability of the regulatory environment for private sector activity” (Caluser & Salagean 2007: 13). This is clear in the World Bank Report of 1992 entitled Governance and Development, where good governance is, following its introduction in the development discourse by the World Bank’s LPTS, further explored. The World Bank’s technicist approach to the concept was more pronounced in 1997 where good governance was defined as “the need for an effective state apparatus…as a necessary precondition for development”. This thinking is largely concerned with the fact that public administration as the apparatus of the state needs to be competent, non-corrupt, efficient, effective and accountable in the manner that it conducts the business of government.

In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) publication entitled Good Governance – the IMF’s role (1997: iv) Camdessus explains that good governance focuses mainly “on those aspects that are closely related to the surveillance [by the international financial institutions] over macro-economies – namely transparency of governments, the effectiveness of public resources management and the stability and transparency of the economic and regulatory framework for private sector activity”. These are exactly the same aspects that Caluser and Salagean (2007: 13) explain constitute the technical dimension of good governance. To these aspects Randall and Theobald (1998: 40) add the fight against corruption, accountability and efficiency in the administration of the state (Randall & Theobald 1998: 40). In this the conception of good governance is premised on the virtues of 3Es – economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The theoretical foundation in this paradigm of conceptualism is located in the New Public Management (NPM) approach. In this paradigm economic interest and not public interest is the foundational lynchpin that ingrains the connotative essence of good governance, with the goal of fiscal stability propounded as one of the key variables in its conceptualisation (see Maserumule & Gutto 2008: 66). This thinking is in synch with the SAPs, whose strategic approach to effect development was based on stabilisation and adjustment.
Leftwich (1993: 607) explains that stabilisation refers to “devaluation and often drastic public expenditure cuts” whereas adjustment refers to the transformation of “economic structures and institutions through varying doses of deregulation, privatisation, slimming down allegedly oversized public bureaucracies, reducing subsidies and encouraging realistic prices to emerge as a stimulus to greater efficiency and productivity, especially for export”. The NPM is part of the agenda of the SAPs embedded in neo-liberal philosophies (Maserumule 2009: 762) and “is driven by assumptions that large state bureaucracies are inherently defective and wasteful, and that the market is better equipped than the state to provide most goods and services”(Minogue 2003: 04).

Abrahamsen (2000: 11) explains that by “calling simply for the efficient and optimal management of a nation’s resources” the World Bank sought to engender the understanding that good governance is a politically and culturally neutral concept. This line of reasoning is faulty. It trivialises the conceptual complexity of good governance. The addition of the word good to governance complicates further a rather already complicated concept. The complexity that the word good engenders in the governance discourse has always been a conceptual puzzle even in the philosophical and theoretical discourses of the early philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle.

In the World Bank’s LPTS the political dimension of good governance is considered as a key variable of its conceptualism. This is in spite of the consistent interpretation of good governance by the World Bank in a narrow sense as a technical rather than a political concept. The reason for this is explained above. Caluser and Salagean (2007: 13) explain that the political dimensions of good governance are concerned with “the legitimacy of government, the accountability of the political elements of government and respect for human rights and the rule of law”. The addition of a political dimension to the meaning of good governance is largely the contribution of the Western governments. Leftwich (1993: 606) explains that while the Western governments emphasised the importance of administrative improvement, they were also insistent on democratic politics. This explains the intellectual pattern in the existing body of knowledge where the attempt to define good governance synthesises the technical and political dimensions of the concept.
Abrahamsen (2000: 30) defines *good governance* as the “exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs” in a manner that ensures openness and accountability, the rule of law, freedom of press, increased grassroots participation and the building of legitimate, pluralistic political structures. This definition links the connotative etymological essence of governance, which in the ancient Greek sense means to control, with the *technical* and *political dimensions* of *good governance* as propagated in the contemporary development discourse.

Amuwo (2002: on-line) does the same in the definition of *good governance* as “legitimate government, one that is properly put in place by the electorate themselves and that stays in close touch with the people”; and is characterised by a “functional state that is institutionally strong, efficient and effective anchored on publicly determined, predictable, and increasingly routinised rules of the game”. This definition synthesises the *technical* and *political dimension* of *good governance*. But, what are those *rules of the game* that Amuwo refers to in the definition above? An answer to this question is perhaps embedded in Carlos’ (2001: 163) perspective that *good governance* is about the “emergence of a reformed state, governed by the rules of legitimacy, transparency, accountability and responsibility”. These aspects revolve around the *technical* and *political dimensions* of governance.

The consideration of the *political dimension* of *good governance* and proposition that “democracy is a necessary prior or parallel condition of development” deviates from the earlier propositions of the modernisation theory, upon which the SAPs is based, that it is an outcome of economic growth (Leftwich 1993: 605). This can be understood within the context of the world-wide wave of democratisation that evolved following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the ascendance of “Western liberal democracy as universal” (Kondlo 2010: 03-04). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the international donor community comprise, for example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the bilateral development agencies such as the British Overseas Development Agency (BODA) and the Danish Development Agency (DDA) contributed to the World Bank’s discourse on *good governance* which expanded to include the *political dimension* of the concept (Chowdhury & Skarstedt 2005: 04-05).
The international jurisprudence on human rights also contributed significantly towards the evolution of the political dimension of good governance in the consideration of the concept along the democratic imperatives of development as a key variable of its conception. This emphasis on democratic politics in the conceptual evolution of good governance could be traced to Aristotle’s theory on how to achieve a just and good society. In the concept of common good Aristotle emphasised that a democratic state is a key imperative to achieve a community of equals and a better life for all (Chomsky 1997: on-line). The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) identifies key aspects that preponderate in the existing intellectual attempts to conceptualise good governance as transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness (Chowdhury & Skarstedt 2005: 05). This exemplifies the contribution of international law to the existing body of knowledge on good governance, especially on the development of the political dimension of the concept. The OHCHR introduced a political right-based framework to define good governance.

The understanding of good governance in a manner that synthesises both the political and technical dimensions of the concept had a profound and wide influence in the development discourse. Since the World Bank’s publication of the LPTS, this conceptual pattern dominated the contemporary development discourse on good governance. In much of the existing body of literature, especially that which subscribes to neo-liberal scholarship, the attempt to define good governance is more of a synthesis of the technical and political dimensions of the concept (see Chapter 2 and 6 of the thesis). This is so because the LTPS “was made a textbook for hundreds of IMF/WB and other experts who swept in and out of the continent” (Keet 2002: 14). It is an example of what Tucker (1992: 12-13) calls “unequal power relationship that prevails in the production of knowledge”:

The production of knowledge about the Third World has taken place in the context of and as an integral part of unequal relationship between the West and the Third World. In this context one group has the power to articulate and project itself and its worldview on others. The others thus become Others – objects to be studied, described and developed. Overpowered by the hegemonic discourse of the West, Third World societies are stunted in their capacity to articulate their own identities and world views. They tend to internalise the perspective of the modernisers and developmentalists, a process that is
facilitated by the comprador intellectuals in the Third World. This is done not only through control of the media but also through ownership and control of the whole infrastructure of the production of knowledge.

Those wielding global hegemonic power impose their understandings on what ought to be the meaning of concepts on the less powerful, particularly on those concepts of power such as good governance, which is prescriptive of how power and authority relations ought to be structured in a given society (Caluser & Salagean 2007: 11). The meanings of such concepts are often accepted without serious consideration of their contextual appropriateness. This is a clear case of intellectual imperialism. Sadar (1999: 44) warns that:

*The power of the West is not located in its economic muscle and technological might. Rather, it resides in its power to define. The West defines what is, for example, freedom, progress and civil behaviour; law, tradition and community; reason; mathematics; and science; what is real and what it means to be human. The non-Western civilizations have simply to accept these definitions or be defined out of existence.*

Through neo-liberalism the West defined good governance for the world. It is propagated that, “although the concept is essentially Western in origin”, it is crucial for economic growth and development and does have “universal developmental relevance for all cultures and societies in the modern world” (Leftwich 1993: 605). This view is rejected largely by African scholarship. Good governance is not a politically and culturally neutral concept. Johnson (1997: 02) argues that the word good as prefixed to governance is “condescending and even imperialistic”. It assumes that liberalism is the only ideological, philosophical and theoretical paradigm from which good governance could be understood. This paradigm of thinking is not new in the development discourse. It could be associated with the homogenisation thesis, which, as explained in Chapter 2 of the thesis, propounds that the attempt to understand scientific phenomena should be pursued through “an examination of an influential trend in current thought” (Mushni & Abraham 2004: 10).
Leftwich (1993: 605) locates this thinking on good governance in “aspects of modernisation theory of the 1960s, which held that the Western economic and political liberalism represented the good society and that it constituted the broad historical convergence point of diverse developmental trajectories”.

Does the consideration and development of the political dimension of good governance as one of the key variables of its conception in the World Bank’s LPTS represent a paradigm shift in the liberal thought on the meaning of the concept? Leftwich (1993: 605) answers this question positively. The LPTS’s paradigm of conceptualism, which emphasised the importance of the political dimension of development, appears to be a paradigm shift from the international financial institutions’ economic reductionism approach of the SAPs in the conception of good governance (see Cernea 1994: 07).

Abrahamsen (2000) disagrees and contends that the LPTS is “very seductive and almost common-sensical”. The language used in the articulation of the LPTS could be misleading particularly to the unwary in the sense that it might appear that the World Bank is deviating from the SAPs; yet, it is not. At face value it appeared to gravitate towards a human-orientation of development, a paradigm that African scholarship propagated in the rejection of the SAPs economic reductionism approach to development (see Adedeji 2002: 242).

The LPTS deceitfully used the parlance of the AAF-SAPs to reinforce the World Bank and IMF commitment to the SAPs as the model for Africa’s development. The World Bank selectively borrowed certain elements such as “good governance”, “poverty conscious” and “people-centred” from the AAF-SAPs and used them as a basis to “disarm [its] critics”; “polished-up and [use them to] defend their continued role in Africa (Keet 2002: 14-15). The implication of this on good governance is that it is no more than a concept of a repackaged structural adjustment programmes. Its meaning is ingrained in the nuances of economic liberalisation and defined in terms of economic growth and stability (see Manji & O’Coill 2002: 576-583). This brings into the discourse yet another dimension with conceptual implications on the meaning of good governance, namely economic dimension.

The economic dimension of good governance is associated with the SAPs, which “were highly contested in many parts of Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s”. In the economic dimension sense good governance is defined as a “structural necessity for market reform”
(Chowdhury & Skarstedt 2005: 04). It is “part of an innovative international approach” to state formation “firmly grounded in liberalism” and Western history that advocates economic liberalisation as “effective antidotes to violent conflict and to poverty and underdevelopment” (Bendana 2008: on-line). Abrahamsen (2000: 64-65) opines that the LPTS:

*seems to go around in circles, always leading to one factor: economic liberation. [Good] governance is conceptually linked to economic liberalisations, and civil society is regarded as emerging from the liberalisation of the economy and reduction of the state. Empowerment of the people is reduced to cost-sharing, and becomes a tool in the hands of liberal economists. The bourgeoisie is regarded as both the source of economic growth and democracy, and cultural sensitivity entails only a commitment to build on the traditions that are compatible with capitalism and modern state structures. The LPTS’s effort to distance itself from past development failures, its endless repetition of the specificity of Africa and its respect for indigenous traditions and cultures…amount to little more than a new gloss on age-old prescriptions. [The actual intentions of the LPTS] (are) to reconstruct structural adjustment, give it a more democratic face while simultaneously delegitimising more interventionist and socialist strategies, which by implication become examples of poor governance.*

The conception of *good governance* following its introduction in the World Bank’s LPTS is limited to the procedural aspects of democratisation and administrative reform. This paradigm of conceptualism is classified in Chapter 2 of the thesis as the procedural democratic strand. Its ideological, philosophical and theoretical context is neo-liberalism. The focus of conceptualism in this paradigm is on the intrinsic value of the concept. It is preoccupied with the extent to which internal processes and systems of government adhere to the norms and principles of neo-liberalism. The transcendence effect of adherence to such norms and principles is not emphasised as a key variable of conceptualism. This means that the focus is on the *means* rather than the *ends* of the concept. The teleological variable of the concept is ignored. This contradicts the logic of conceptualism, especially when dealing with concepts whose meanings are subjects of contextual relativism. Kant (2000: 50-52) teaches that for a scientific object to be considered as *good* in human sciences it must be subjected to
rigorous reason with reference to purpose. In this a teleological variable of conceptualism is underscored, which is concerned with the ultimate purpose of the concept.

The fundamental question that the neo-liberal scholarship fails to answer is: what is the transcendence effect of economic growth, fiscal stability, efficiency effectiveness and compliance with a host of the imperatives of procedural aspects of democratisation? Much of the existing body of literature subscribes to neo-liberal scholarship and paradigm in the conception of good governance (see Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis). Also subsumed in this paradigm of conceptualism is the grounding of good governance in the moral theory, which is concerned with the rights and wrongs of human actions and behavioural patterns (Van Hooft 2006: 02). This is an addition of the ethical dimension of good governance.

In their articulations of the concepts of the good and common good from which the philosophical antecedents of good governance are traced, Plato and Aristotle respectively consider ethics as a key imperative in the construction of a just and good society. Godbole (2001:2) explains that “good governance has much to do with the ethical grounding of governance”. The conception of good governance along neo-liberal paradigms and dimensions is rejected largely by that African scholarship that subscribes to the human-centred development paradigm, which, as explained above, is the philosophical and theoretical foundation of AAF-SAPs (see Adedeji 2002; Amuwo 2002; Keet 2002; Tucker 1992; Manji & O’Coil 2002; Asante & Abarr 1996).

The proposition of African scholarship is that good governance ought to be understood within a human-centred development paradigm as “ownership by the people of reform and development programmes initiated by the state or government; this entails participatory democracy, decentralisation of decision-making centres of power on both political and sense” (Amuwo 2002: on-line). In this people are in the centre of development and, more importantly, are defined as the direct beneficiaries of the distributional effects of economic growth and the socio-economic gains and outcomes of state activities. The objective is to promote the general welfare of society or enhance the quality of life of the citizens. This approach to development differs with the neo-liberal approach to the concept of good governance which defines the concept only in economic, political and technical terms.
In the human-centred paradigm the *human* and *social dimensions* are key variables in conceptualising *good governance*. This means that the concept *good governance* is not simply defined on the basis of the economic variables as if they are the *ends* in themselves. The focus is also placed on the transcendence effect of full democratisation of all aspects of economic and social activities. In this the notion of civil society is underscored. Its engagement in matters of national interest, unlike in the neo-liberal paradigm, is not only for reasons of compliance with the requirements of procedural democracy.

The civil society substantively plays a key role in a collaborative manner with government in the pursuit of what is in the interest of the citizens. In this the power relations between the state and society are structured in a such a manner that the civil society could have a space to exercise social authority. As explained above, this thinking could be located to the theory of subsidiarity. The proposition of the multi-level theory of governance that is subsumed in the concept of governance is “a wide range of non-state actors in the process of governing society” (Bell & Hindmoor 2009: 150) could also be used as a theoretical context from which the importance of the concept of civil society as key variable in conceptualising *good governance* could be understood.

The human-centred development paradigm uses the substantive aspects of democracy as the paradigm of conceptualism, where the extrinsic value of economic and social activities in enhancing the quality of life of the citizens is emphasised as a key variable in understanding the concept of *good governance*. In the context of the human-centred development paradigm the concept of *good governance* is conceived of as “…a function of connection with something external” (Metz 2001: 137-153; see also Gordon 2004: 71-73). The logic of reasoning that informs the human-centred development paradigm is that the attempt to determine the meaning of a concept that bears a character of epistemic relativism such as *good governance* should make reference to purpose (see Kant 2000: 05-52). The conceptualisation of *good governance* along the aspects of substantive democracy could be associated with the theory of a developmental state, which emphasises that government ought to play an interventionist role in the economy in the interest of the developmental needs and the welfare of the citizens(see Leftwich 1993: 620; Maserumule 2010a: 16-17). The notion of the general welfare of the citizens has always been the epicentre of Plato’s concept of the *good* and Aristotle’s *common good*. 

The contrast in meanings of *good governance* is stark. In the development paradigms as propagated by the international financial institutions the conception of *good governance* is embedded in liberal economics. In the development paradigms conceptualised predominately by Africa-grounded experts, *good governance* is underpinned by human and social dimensions of development. This perspective on *good governance* is evident in other development initiatives such as the Arusha Charter for Popular Participation and Transformation, which was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to emphasise the imperative of public participation in the development process. This is consistent with the AAF-SAPs. With the rejection of the LPTS by the African experts and scholarship, the international financial institutions continued with their efforts of exploring and prescribing models for Africa’s development, which essentially maintained the conception of *good governance* in neo-liberal terms. This is clear in the World Bank’s World Development Report of 1991, which, according to Keet (2002: 14), was developed to counter the Charter for Popular Participation and Transformation.

The contestations over the appropriate paradigm for Africa’s development grew with the inception of the democratisation process in South Africa in the early nineties, and continued in earnest with Thabo Mbeki’s presidency of the country as he emerged as a key strategic thinker and role player in Africa and globally. The renewed quest for Africa’s development in 2001 resulted in the *New Partnership for Africa’s Development* (NEPAD). In this contemporary model for Africa’s sustainable development *good governance* is emphasised as a *sine qua non* principle. In much of the existing body of scholarship it is contended that NEPAD is anchored on the concept of *good governance*, which underpins the essence of Africa’s contemporary development trajectory (see Akokpari 2005: 01-21; Osei-Hwedie 2005: 22-36; Maipose 2005: 05-74; Melber 2005: 37-49; Ngwisha 2005: 121-134; Ross 2004: 03; Stremlau 2002). In the NEPAD document *good governance* is used as a principle. There are no attempts to enunciate it as a concept.

In much of the existing body of literature, as pointed out in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis, *good governance* is dealt with largely as a *principle* rather than a *concept*. The usage of good governance as a *principle* without first untangling it as a concept presupposes that there is a conceptual consensus on its meaning in the context of NEPAD. The analysis of the intellectual engagements of the African leadership on NEPAD, as presented in Chapter 1 of the thesis, indicates that the foregoing supposition is incorrect. So, the question is: what does
the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD mean? This question is asked in the context of the fact that, as pointed out in the above, good governance is, from its philosophical and theoretical antecedents, and its historical evolution in the development discourse, a conceptual problematique. It assumed different and even contrasting meanings in different contexts in the history of its evolution. Akokpari (2005: 19) observes that “good governance has become an evocative term yet its precise meaning has remained fluid and nebulous”. It is a trans-contextual, value-laden and multidimensional concept with multivocal meanings and, because of its epistemic relativism, can mean different things to different people depending on the context in which it is used.

Good governance is susceptible to a variety of interpretations appropriating meanings that befit the context of its usage. It is, given the heterogeneous and diverse nature of the African continent, predisposed to ideological and political contestations abstractly prone to different interpretations and understandings influenced by the contextual idiosyncrasies of its conception (Maserumule 2005a: 198). For, as De Beer (1999: 436) puts it:

We must never forget that the interpretation of politics and the politics of interpretation are intimately related. This means that the arts of explanation and understanding, of interpretation and reading, have a deep and complex relation with politics, the structures of power, social values, which organise human life. The outcome of reading is always the product of the struggle about the ideological and ethical assumptions and implications of writers and readers. Political and economic realities have a direct bearing on the practices of reading, interpretation, and scholarship.

4.3 Conclusion

In this chapter the concept good governance in the broader scholarly context is considered to determine how it evolved to arrive at its current conceptual form and usage. Compared with its consideration in Chapters 2 and 6 of the thesis, good governance in this chapter is examined beyond the NEPAD context. Notwithstanding the foregoing, towards the end of the chapter a succinct reference is made to NEPAD. This is for reasons of contextualisation. At the outset the concepts good governance and governance are considered and clarified. In this
exercise the chapter contends that the concept of *good governance*, like that of *governance*, is as old as human civilisation. Its neologism in the contemporary development discourse is as a *term*, not a *concept*. This means that the *concept* of good governance is old, but the *term* used to express it in the contemporary body of development scholarship is relatively new. To clarify this submission to the body of knowledge, a distinction between a *concept* and a *term* is made.

It is also contended that *governance* is a presentiment of *good governance*. Following this logic, *governance* is considered to determine the conceptual lineage of *good governance* to it. Against this background *good governance* is critically considered and extensively discussed. The focus is on the philosophical and theoretical antecedents of the concept, and its evolution in the contemporary development discourse. It is found that *good governance* is a neo-liberal term used to describe the contemporary paradigm for the concept of a just and good society. Its philosophical and theoretical antecedents are traced from Plato’s concept of *good* and Aristotle’s *common good*.

Towards the end of the chapter the conceptual *problematique* character of *good governance* in the contemporary discourse, which is characterised by contestations of ideas as influenced by different ideological, philosophical and theoretical idiosyncrasies of its consideration, is delineated. In this it is found that *good governance* is a multi-dimensional, value-laden, nebulous, normative [prescriptive rather than descriptive], and transcontextual concept, which means different things to different people, depending on the bias of the user. This is a conceptual *problematique* character of the concept *good governance*. Its usage in NEPAD as a *principle* without determining its contextual meaning as a *concept* is as problematic as it is in the broader context. This study examines the concept *good governance* in NEPAD to determine its contextual meaning for Public Administration. In the following chapter the attempt is made to explain the Public Administration perspective of the study in its consideration of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.
CHAPTER 5

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE OF THE STUDY

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4 of the thesis *good governance* is extensively considered to determine how it evolved to arrive at its current conceptual form and usage. This is important to understand the concept of *good governance* in its broader context. *Good governance* is the object of this study. The perspective from which it is considered is Public Administration whereas the context for its consideration is NEPAD. In Chapter 3 of the thesis NEPAD is unpacked. The Public Administration perspective from which *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is considered in this study is enunciated in this chapter. This is important to give the study a disciplinary grounding and focus. The objective of this chapter is to clarify the Public Administration approach of the study for disciplinary contextualisation in considering *good governance* in NEPAD. This exercise contextualises attempts to answer the question posited in Chapter 1 of the thesis about the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.

As explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis, according to convention in the writings of scholars in the field, using capital letters in ‘Public Administration’ symbolises the subject or theory, whereas small letters or lower cases in public administration refers to that which “is investigated by the subject…” (Pauw 1999a: 10). A reference to ‘Public Administration’ and ‘public administration’ in this chapter should, unless indicated otherwise in the discourse of this chapter, be understood as such. The consideration of Public Administration in this chapter is largely as a science. For, the object that this study examines is non-empirical in character.
This chapter examines the historical and epistemological trends in the evolution of Public Administration to acquire insights into the philosophical and theoretical antecedents of the field. Subsumed in this exercise is a discussion on the paradigmatic status of the discipline. The paradigms of Public Administration are, for the purpose of this study, disaggregated into traditional and contemporary paradigms and discussed as such. It is clear from such discussion that the theoretical question in the discipline is a subject of contestation. Towards the end the chapter asks whether it is really possible to theorise good governance in the context of NEPAD from a disciplinary perspective that has not yet reached a consensus with itself about its theoretical base. This question is answered in Chapter 7 of the thesis.

5.2 Historical and epistemological antecedents of Public Administration

In much of the existing body of literature in the field Thomas Woodrow Wilson is considered almost universally as the “founder” of Public Administration (see, among others, Charkrabarty & Bhattacharya 2003: 04; Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 01-05; Carroll & Zuck 1985; Dobuzinskis 1997: 298-316; Gildenhuys 1988: 08). But, is this really true? The answer to this question is provided later in the critical analysis of the existing body of literature on the history of Public Administration as a science presented as part of the discourse. For now, it suffices to state that, having had an illustrious academic career and been prolific in his writing on matters that pertain to the field of administration, Wilson became the President of the United States of America in 1912. The article entitled The Study of Administration which Wilson published in 1887 in the Political Science Quarterly and reprinted in various publications is widely cited as authoritative reference that marked the beginning of the history of Public Administration as a science and field of study (see Charkrabarty & Bhattacharya 2003: 04; Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 01-05; Carroll & Zuck 1985; Dobuzinskis 1997: 298-316; Gildenhuys 1988: 08).

In the article referred to above, Wilson (1887: 197-222) makes a case for the study of Public Administration. He contended that the subsequent times that followed the era of the “early administration” came with complexities that necessitated specialised, focussed education and training in the administration of the state. ‘Early administration’ refers to the systems of administration that predate what most scholars in the field termed the ‘traditional model of public administration’. It existed in antiquity [before the Middle Ages]. The ‘traditional
model of public administration’ originated in the mid-nineteenth century (see Hughes 1994: 25). It evolved to supplant the early administrative systems that were “based on loyalty to a particular individual such as a king or a minister, instead of being ‘impersonal’, based on legality and loyalty to the organisation and the state”(Hughes 1994: 25). Hughes (1994: 25) further explains that:

*Early [administrative] practices often resulted in corruption or misuse of office for personal gain...Practices we now think alien were commonplace ways of carrying out government functions under earlier administrative arrangements. It was once common for those aspiring to employment by the state to resort to patronage or nepotism, relying on friends or relatives for employment, or by purchasing offices; that is to pay for the right to be a customs or tax collector, and then to charge fees to clients, both to repay the initial sum invested and to make a profit. Key administrative positions were usually not full-time but were only one of the activities of someone in business. The normal way for a young man to gain employment (only men were employed) was to apply to some relative or family friend in a position to help. There was no guarantee that people employed would be competent in any way.*

The staffing practice as explained above is analogous to the spoils system that, at some point in history, was promoted in the United States (US). Its remnants are to date discernible in most countries. The spoils system is ingrained in the thinking that to the victor belong the spoils. It is a practice where every administrative job from the top to the bottom is open to be filled by the cadres or appointees from the ruling party. This system or practice reached its peak in the 1830s in the US during the presidency of Andrew Jackson (Hughes 1994: 25). In relation to this practice, Jackson(White 1953: 318) once said:

*The duties of all public offices are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance. Offices were not established to give support to particular men at the public expense. No individual wrong is, therefore, done by removal, since neither appointment to, nor continuance in office is a matter of right. He who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living that are enjoyed by the millions who never held office.*
This means that no expertise was needed for carrying out public administration functions. The spoils system was neither effective nor efficient. Its consequences were “periodic chaos which attended changes of administration during most of the nineteenth century; the popular association of public administration with politics and incompetence; the growing conflicts between executive and legislature over appointments, which led in 1868 to the impeachment trial of the American president; and the almost unbelievable demands upon presidents – and upon executives of state and local governments as well – by office-seekers, particularly following elections” (Mosher 1982: 65). It is against this background that Wilson’s article of 1887 was penned.

Wilson argued that politics should be separated from public administration; and public servants should be trained, their quality assessed to determine the appropriateness of their qualifications to areas of placement in the administration of government. A need for specialised, focussed education and training in the administration of the state which Wilson emphasised in the article of 1887 had already been acknowledged in the mid-nineteenth century in Britain’s Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853 (Hughes 1994: 27). The Northcote-Trevelyan Report (Reader 1981: 81) rejected the spoils or patronage system, as was also applied in the British civil service, and made the following recommendations:

*The public service should be carried out by the admission into lower ranks of a carefully selected body of young men, who should be employed from the first upon work suited to their capacities and their education, and should be made constantly to feel that their promotion and future prospects depend entirely on the industry and the ability with which they discharge their duties, that with average abilities and reasonable application they may look forward confidently to a certain provision of their lives, that with superior powers they may rationally hope to attain to the highest prizes in the Service, while if they prove decidedly incompetent, or incurably indolent, they must expect to be removed.*

Wilson reiterated Northcote-Trevelyan’s proposition in the contention that “it is getting harder to run a constitution than to frame one” (Wilson 1887: 198). According to Wilson (1887) the function of running the constitution is that of administration whereas that of framing it is that of politics. This means that “the object of administrative study [is] to
discover, first, what government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it can
do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either
of money or of energy” (Wilson 1887: 197). These questions underscores the necessity for
Public Administration as a distinct science or field of study from, but at the same time,
related to, the Political Science.

Wilson (1887: 197-199) explains that the science of politics had, at the time of penning his
article, already “begun some twenty-two hundred years ago” whereas “no one wrote
systematically of administration as a branch of the science of government”. This presupposed
a vacuum in the study of government where political scientists or writers preoccupied their
intellectual engagements with only “the constitution of government”, “nature of the state”,
“the essence and seat of sovereignty”, “popular power and kingly prerogative”, “the greatest
meanings lying at the heart of government”, and “the high ends set before the purpose of
government by man’s nature and man’s aims” (Wilson 1887: 197-120).

The administrative dimension of government was, according to Wilson (1887), never given a
systematic thought; hence his intellectual intervention that called for the study of Public
Administration as a distinct body of science. But, is it necessarily true that the administration
of government was never a subject of systematic inquiry and thought prior to Wilson’s
famous publication of 1887? This question goes back to the one asked earlier whether it is
necessarily true that Wilson is the “founder” of the science of administration of government.
The attempt to answer this question was earlier deferred. Its consideration is now appropriate.
An analysis of the existing literature indicates that Wilson’s assertion that presupposes a lack
of systematic inquiry and thought prior to his publication on the study of administration does
not seem necessarily correct.

In the article that examines the theory of Public Administration Thornhill and Van Dijk
(2010: 100) write that “although Wilson is considered as the father of the study of Public
Administration, he only re-invented the science that had been developed much earlier in
Europe”. They argue that “Public Administration as a discipline is much older than the
popularly held view that it only commenced with Woodrow Wilson’s article published in
1887” (Thornhill & Van Dijk 2010: 101). This study concurs with this observation. Their
article traces the history of the science of Public Administration in the 16th century Western
European national states where expert knowledge in the administration of government
became a fundamental necessity for efficient and effective carrying out of public functions (Thornhill & Van Dijk 2010: 99).

That part of Thornhill and Van Dijk’s (2010: 99) article that deals with the historical antecedents of the discipline is based largely on Chapter 3 of the book entitled *Public Administration on contemporary society: A South African perspective*, which Hanekom co-authored with Thornhill. This book was published in 1983. Based on the same book, Hanekom (1988: 67-79) wrote a paper, which was contributed as a chapter in the conference proceedings entitled *South African Public Administration – Past, Present and Future*. In these references the contention is that recognition of administration as a distinct science predates Woodrow Wilson’s 1887 publication. This is true in respect to *kameralwissenschaft*, which is the German word for the science of administration.

For English speakers *kameralwissenschaft* refers to *cameralism*. This concept is part of the social process in the German states with a long history that predates the period 1555. However, tracing “each link in (its) continuity from that date” (Small 2001: 04) is an adventure that most scholars do not venture into. Much of the discussions on *kameralwissenschaft* relate to the eighteenth century developments that added an important impetus in the germination of the science of administration (Van Poelje 1953: 10). *Kameralwissenschaft* or *cameralism* is concerned with the German writings that emerged from the mid-sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century (Small 2001: 04). The historiography of *kameralwissenschaft* or *cameralism* in Wakefield’s (2005: 311) words in the following narrative are instructively captivating:

*Cameralism, the effort to systematise and institutionalise the education of cameral officials (kammerbedienten), had its genesis in the everyday vexations of a cranky Prussian king. “Stupid, stupid, bad karl!” scrawled an angry Frederick William 1 on the back of one administrative protocol. He had had enough of incompetent cameral officials and hated what he saw as the rampant “Juristerey” that surrounded him, complete with its endless legal processes and long-winded, overpaid, fractious jurists. The king made a habit of screaming obscenities at his officials. He called them “fools, stupid devils, idiots, dogs, school boys, crooks, thieves, scoundrels, rebels, rascals” and many other obscene, nasty, untranslatable names. They were stupid*
“stupid oxen who drink like beasts and know nothing else”

Frederick William wanted less trouble and more obedience, less disputation and more “economy”. When War and Domains Councillor Kornemann died in the autumn of 1727, for example, the king demanded that his replacement be an “honest economus”. When a legal counsellor, David Christian Pauli, sought Kornemann’s position, Fredrick William scribbled: “what do I need with a Consulent, have they won a single case in 15 years? Not one”.

The Kammer in Magdeburg pushed the issue, again requested that a special Consulent be appointed, and the king lost his temper. “I do not want to establish any judicial Kollegium…instead, they should economise and permit no loss in revenues…I want no scoundrels!” Fredereick William wanted his cameral officials (Kammerbedienten) to know something about agriculture and manufacture, mining, and forestry, accounting and commerce. Too often, he believed, Prussian officials behaved like “ABC-school boys” when confronted with such subjects, forced to learn their jobs from the very beginning.

In this narrative the importance of administrative expertise is underscored, which Cyrus reiterated in a response to this question: “which are the two most secure and important foundations for making people, Reich and Land happy, the wise and courageous monarch made in all his experience and power?” The answer to this was “Eine auserlesene Armee un eine gute Wirtschaft der unterhanen”, meaning “an excellent army and well-fed subjects” (Tribe 1984: 263). This line of thinking has always been part of the ancient Greek philosophical discourse associated largely with Socrates and Plato. Socrates, whose teaching influenced Plato, believed that the only type of person suitable to govern others is the philosopher (see Plato 2003; Taylor 2001).

In 387 BC Plato established an Academy in Athens, which is often referred to as the first University in Europe. Among the subjects taught at the Academy was political theory and philosophy. Aristotle was Plato’s student at the Academy. The dialectical and pedagogical approach of the Academy sought to combine philosophy with practical politics. As influenced by Socrates basic philosophy and dialectical pattern of the discourse, Plato propounded a thesis that “only the philosopher who has achieved true knowledge is fit to rule; democracy, rule of the majority, is usually rooted in mere opinions” (Philosophy
Professor, n.d: on-line). Both Socrates and Plato were disillusioned with politics; hence their teachings were against politics. In the concept of philosopher-king, they believed in expert knowledge in the running of the affairs of government.

Philippoussis (1999: 11) defines a philosopher-king as “every human being who reaches the level of logical and ethical arete” – “the one who precisely attempts and strives for excellence of becoming what one is capable of being”; or “any person raised as any other intelligent child and educated well, along with many others”. It is only education, moral rectitude and personal excellence that constitute the philosopher-king. These aspects are the criteria for assumption to governing and administrative positions. The leadership erudition of leaders so created is not “exclusively rhetorical and oratorical, but also axiological (logical and ethical) and gnoseological (ontological and metaphysical)” (Philippoussis 1999: 117). This is the philosophical context of Plato’s Academy, which undergirded its dialectical and pedagogical mission.

Philippoussis (1999: 119-120) explains that, according to Plato, “it is fundamental that a democratic societal polity and successful policy need and demand self-conscious and responsible people who are well educated and well informed, otherwise true democracy does not work”. Chakrabarty and Bhattachrya (2003: 01) explain that “in the history of Western political thought, Aristotle’s Politics and Machiavelli’s The Prince are also important contributions to both political and administrative issues and ideas”. The issue of administrative science has long been implicated in the philosophical discourses of the early philosophers. Shafritz and Hyde (1992: 01) trace “writings on public administration…to biblical time and before, ancient Egyptians and Babylonians, the ancients of China, Greece, and Rome”. In the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD) in ancient China the Confucian dictate that “government should be handled by men chosen, not by birth, but by virtue and ability and that its main aim was the happiness of the people” was pursued (Hughes 1994: 24).

In The Republic, which, as explained in Chapter 4 of the thesis, is to date still regarded as the most important intellectually and historically influential work in the contemporary body of knowledge on political philosophy and theory, Plato engaged with Socrates on the question of a just and good society. Plato’s pursuit of this question demonstrates systematic thinking on the administration rather than politics of governing. In a thesis on a just and good society, Plato is not only concerned with what this ideal means, but also, more importantly, how it
could be achieved. A concern with how a political ideal could be realised is an administrative question, which the early Greek philosophers pursued systematically with intellectual coherence. In this Plato’s thesis is that a solution to societal ills does not lie in politics, but in philosophy. This proposition was propounded in the context of the Athenian political situation following the Peloponnesian War. It was contended that the challenge that faced Athens at the time was not to transform its political system, but the philosophical system embodying the principle that government should be run by those of the brightest minds (see Plato 2003: xiii-xviii).

Plato believed in rule by the best. This is similar to what Cyrus propounded or Cameralism sought to achieve. In philosophising and theorising about government Plato steered clear of the political dimension of the concept. The focus of his philosophical discourse has always been on the administrative aspects of government. Omoyefa (2010: 107) writes that “Plato is not a known supporter of democracy as he prefers institutional dictatorship to democracy”. This earned Plato enormous criticism especially from Aristotle and Popper (see Popper 1945; Voegelin 1957; Strauss 1964; Bertrand 1945).

In Plato’s concept of ruler-philosopher democracy as a political concept is not used. Plato’s concept of ruler-philosopher was dismissed on the basis that, as compared to democracy, it is aristocratic in its approach to government. Be that as is, the fundamental point that this discourse on the historical antecedents of Public Administration as a science drives is that the assertion that prior to Woodrow Wilson’s seminal article as referred to above the administrative aspects of government were never given a systematic thought is a distortion of the history of the discipline. It is also propounded that the pedigree nexus of the historical antecedents of the science of Public Administration extends beyond the kameralwissenschaft or cameralism. This should not be misconstrued as trivialisation of this important epoch that heralded the systematisation and institutionalisation of administrative education. Rather, it should be looked at as an exercise in locating historical facts in their proper context. So, kameralwissenschaft or cameralism was part of the discourse, rather than a single factor, that contributed towards the development of the science of administration of government (see Small 2001: 04).
In 1727 Friedrich Wilhem 1 ordered that chairs in the cameral sciences in the areas of economy, public policy and public finance be established at the Prussian Universities of Halle and Frankfurt (Tribe 1984: 263). This marked an important historical epoch in the development of the science of administration characterised by its formalisation as an academic discipline to be taught at the universities. The University of Utrecht also established a chair in cameral sciences. Small (2001: 05) explains that cameral scholars “approached civic problems from a common viewpoint, and proposed a coherent civic theory consistent with the German system of administration at the same time in course of evolution”. The fundamental propositions of cameralism are that “the central problem of science [is] the problem of the state”; “the object of all social theory [is] to show [that] the welfare of the state might be secured”; “the welfare of the state [is] the source of all other welfare”; the key to welfare of the state is the revenue to supply the needs of the state; and the whole of “social theory [radiates] from the central task of [providing] the state with ready means”(Small 2001: 05).

The teachings of cameralism are not only concerned with the stability of the state in terms of maintaining law and order, but also, more importantly, collective prosperity. This means that they are concerned with what Aristotle termed the common good. Johan Heinrich Gottlob Justi (1717-1771) is said to be a highly acclaimed professor of cameralism, which, however, more recently is jettisoned as nothing but publicity or even propaganda for the early modern fiscal state (Wakefield 2005; see also Lindenfeld 1997; Tribe 1988; Small 1909). Lorenz von Stein (1815-1890) made an important contribution in the development of the science of administration. A lawyer by training, von Stein is recorded in the history of the discipline as being among those that changed kameralwissenschaft to verwaltungslehre and bequeath to it a largely administrative law orientation (Hanekom 1988: 68).

Thornhill and Van Dijk (1910: 99) make an observation that “Lorenz von Stein is considered the founder of the science of public administration in Europe”. But, is this not a slight misreading of the history of the discipline especially in the context of the contributions of different personalities that comprise cameralism made in the evolution of the science of administration? Small’s (1909) book entitled The Cameralists – The Pioneers of German Social Policy, which extensively reviews the writings of different cameral scholars, assists in clarifying this important historical fact on the science of administration. It is not easy to specify a particular personality in certain terms as the founder of Public Administration as a
science. For there are a myriad of factors that contributed towards the evolution of the discipline (see also Tribe 1988; Lindenfeld 1997; Wakefield 2009).

Hanekom (1988: 68) explains that in the nineteenth century a French literature that sought to discern the science of administration from the administrative law emerged: “Charles-Jean Bonin, *Principes d’administration publique* (1808); Vivien (a vice-president of the Council of State), *Etudes administratives* (1845); L’ Aucoc (Conseiller d’ Etat), *Conferences Sur l’administration et le droit administratif* (1865). In 1887 Wilson made an important contribution to the discourse on the science of administration of government, with some, as pointed out above, referring to him as the “founder” of the discipline. This issue is dealt with above. It is argued that, rather than being considered as the founder of the discipline, Wilson should just simply be understood as having made an addition to the discourse that had long existed before the 1887 publication on the study of administration. This Wilson actually acknowledges in the article on the study of administration where the attempt is made to answer the question about where the science [of administration] had grown up”. Wilson (Shafritz and Hyde 1992: 13-14) wrote:

*Washington forbids us to believe that any clear conceptions of what constitutes good administration are as yet very widely current in the United States. No; American writers have hitherto taken no very important part in the advancement of this science. It has found its doors in Europe. It is not of our making; it is a foreign science, speaking very little of the language of English or American principle. It employs only foreign tongues; it utters one but what our minds alien ideas. Its aims, its examples, its conditions, are almost exclusively grounded in the histories of foreign races, in the precedents of foreign systems, in the lessons of foreign revolutions. It has been developed by French and German professors, and is consequently in all parts adapted to the needs of a compact state, and made to fit highly centralised forms of government; whereas, to answer our purposes, it must be adapted, not to a simple and compact, but to a complex and multiform state, and made to fit highly decentralised forms of governance. If we would employ it, we must Americanise it, and that not formally, in language, merely, but radically, in thought, principle, and aim as well. It must learn our constitutions by heart;*
must get the bureaucratic fever out of its veins; must inhale much free American air.

This extract demonstrates the fact that, contrary to the writings of most scholars on the history of the discipline, Wilson is not the founder of the science of administration of government. Wilson acknowledges that the science of the administration of government originated in Europe, not the United States. In his own words in the article referred to above Wilson admits that “administration has been most studied and most nearly perfected” in Prussia (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 15). But, this somewhat contradicts Wilson’s introductory assertion that “no one wrote systematically of administration as a branch of the science of government until the present century had passed its first youth and had begun to put forth its characteristic flower of systematic knowledge” (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 11). In this statement Wilson presupposes that prior to the contribution on the study of administration in 1887 there was never any systematic thought on the science of administration. This cannot be true. Wilson’s article was published in 1887. So, Wilson’s “present century” appertains to this period. Wilson’s article is fraught with contradictions.

Hanekom (1988: 67) writes that “it is possible to find a proof of the formal study of administration during the sixteenth century”. It is argued above that the history of the science of administration could be traced back to the ancient Greek periods of Socrates and Plato, which far predate Wilson’s then ‘present century’. Wilson’s article was set to engage European scholars on the science of administration of government. It was a rejoinder, meaning a systematic reply to a scientific discourse that was already in existence. Sahni (2003: 25) argues that the period earlier than Wilson’s The Study of Administration was not bereft of intellectual activities. This period is termed a pre-foundation era, which is often missed in the discourse on the history of the discipline.

Sahni (2003: 25) associates the commencement of this era with Alexandra Hamilton, who, according to George Washington, expressed a perspective that underscores the importance of knowledge in civic matters as early as 1781. Hamilton is quoted to have said: “I can venture to advance from a thorough knowledge of budget that there are few men to be found, of [my] age, who have a more general knowledge that [I] possess, and none whose soul is more firmly engaged in the cause, or who exceeds [me] in probity and sterling virtue” (Sahni 2003: 25). Kent (Sahni 2003: 25) observed that Hamilton demonstrated interest in the “history and
science of civil government, and…practical results and various modifications of it for the freedom and business of mankind”. Van Riper (Sahni 2003: 25) contends that “if anyone deserves a title as the founder of the American administrative state it is …Alexander Hamilton”. Wilson consolidated the discourse on the science of administration. He “advocated for a more systematic, methodical, and intellectual exercise as well as the resources for the management of public administration” (Sahni 2003: 26).

Chakrabarty and Bhattacharya (2003: 04) explain that, “writing against the background of widespread corruption in the US, science meant to Wilson a systematic and disciplined body of knowledge which he thought would be useful to grasp and defuse the crisis in administration”. In making a case for the science of administration Wilson (Shaftritz & Hyde 1992: 13) argued that:

The idea of the state and the consequent ideal of its duty are undergoing noteworthy change; and “the idea of the state is the conscience of administration”. Seeing every day new things which the state ought to do, the next thing is to see clearly how it ought to do them. This is why there should be a science of administration which shall seek to strengthen and purify its organisation, and to crown its duties with dutifulness. This is one reason why there is such a science.

De Bos (1988: 59) states that Wilson’s case for the science of administration needs to be understood within the context of the circumstances that beset America at the time. It was the time when the American civil war had ended 22 years earlier, but its repercussions were still very visible. America had not yet fully recovered from the aftermaths of the War. It was the time when the status of Black Americans had only improved with a minute margin. They were not seriously considered in the processes of government. Wilson’s propositions were made at the backdrop of appointments in the American public service having long been subjected to patronage and the spoils system (De Bos 1988: 59).

The American system of administration was characterised by appointments in the public service of those who could not effectively and efficiently carry out the functions of a state. In reaction to this state of affairs in the context of making a point for the study of administration Wilson argued that “the complexity of the executive activities of government make it
impossible for a public official without a specific training, equipped with only a lay knowledge of governmental activities, to cope successfully with his executive functions” (Hanekom 1988: 69). Wilson (Woll 1996: 36) contends that “…mere unschooled genius for affairs will not save us from sad blunders in administration”. In this Wilson argued for the separation of politics from administration. It was only in 1883, after the assassination of President Garfield by a rejected seeker of public office, that the merit system was introduced.

Wilson’s proposition was made at the time when “public administration as a field of action distinct from political action and subscribing to an ethic of political neutrality, and Public Administration as an academic discipline distinct from Political Science had yet to gain general acceptance in the minds of American intellectuals (De Bos 1988: 59). Much as Wilson’s article was a rejoinder to the European scholars about the science of administration, it was also a reaction to the circumstances that had beset the American system of government. It is interesting to note that in spite of a much earlier acknowledgement as the scientific area for academic pursuit in Europe, the formal study of Public Administration in Britain did not get much favourable attention. The attempt to introduce it as an academic discipline was resisted. According to Hanekom (1988: 69) “only two full chairs in Public Administration” existed in Britain in 1972. This was due to a challenge of language in that much of the writings on the subject were in German and French, which few people in Britain could read and write. In this one detects that language has been a critical factor in the evolution of the science of administration.

Hanekom (1988: 69) writes that “Public Administration as an academic discipline as it is known today was established outside Europe – in the United States. Its evolution as an academic discipline is attributed to Wilson’s 1887 article. Does this contradict Thornhill and Van Dijk’s (2010: 100) contention, which, as indicated above, this study agrees with, that Public Administration as a science “had been developed much earlier in Europe”? Not necessarily. Hanekom’s (1988: 69) consideration of the history of the discipline is in terms of how “it is known today”. This qualification predetermines and limits the scope of considering historical facts in so far as the evolution of the discipline is concerned. The contention advanced in this chapter regarding the evolution of the discipline should not be misconstrued as trivialisation of Wilson’s contribution. It is a fact that Wilson made an important contribution in the discourse on the study of the administration of government as a distinct science from other disciplines. But the analogy that tends to suggest that Wilson’s
contribution is the only important factor in the evolution of the discipline is not consistent
with a wealth of historical evidence, much of which is referred to above.

Botes (1988: 119) writes that Wilson’s 1887 The Study of Administration led “to the
inception of Public Administration as a science to be taught at academic level”. But, as stated
above, professorates in the science of administration had already been established as early as
the 18th century in Prussia. This is the fact that Wilson acknowledges in his well-known and
widely cited article of 1887 on The Study of Administration, which, as argued above, was
largely a rejoinder to what the German and French scholars have been propagating (Shafritz
& Hyde 1992: 11-24). The observations made with regard to the antecedents of the discipline
raise important issues, which, because of the limited scope of this chapter, could not be dealt
with in greater detail. They may be a subject for another study that seeks to re-write the
history of the discipline. As stated above, the objective of this chapter is to articulate the
disciplinary perspective from which this study considers the concept of good governance in
the context of NEPAD, which is Public Administration. For this reasons, it suffices to end
this part of the discourse with the proposition that, as it is currently studied as an academic
discipline, Public Administration does have a long history that still needs to be critically
examined to close some hiatuses in the body of knowledge that chronicle its historical and
epistemological antecedents.

To fully articulate the perspective from which this study examines the concept good
governance in the context of NEPAD, the question that needs to be asked is, what is that
which Public Administration seeks to study? What is its contextual setting? These questions
are concerned with the focus and locus of Public Administration, which, in the existing body
of knowledge, are considered in terms of various paradigms considered to be useful analytical
frameworks to understand the theoretical evolution of the discipline. Golembiewski (Henry
1975: 378) explains that “the paradigms of Public Administration may be understood in terms
of locus or focus.

Vosloo (1988: 265-266) defines focus as the what of Public Administration whereas the locus
is concerned with the institutional where of the field of study (see also Henry 1975: 378). Du
Toit and Van der Waldt (1999: 41) explain that the focus of the discipline is concerned with
“aspects of the activities of the public sector emphasised in Public Administration” whereas
the locus is concerned with where the “emphasis is in the public sector in the study of Public
Administration”. In the existing body of literature the notions of loci and foci of the discipline are used as an analytical framework from which the theoretical evolution of the discipline is considered (see Mosher 1975; Henry 1975; Golembiewski 1964; Caldwell 1965). Henry (1975: 378-386) arranged the intellectual development of the field into four phases and appropriated a term paradigm to describe them. Before this discussion could consider the different phases of intellectual development of the field it is perhaps important, for reasons of contextualisation, to consider the question of the paradigmatic status and theoretical base of Public Administration.

5.3 **Question of the paradigmatic status and theoretical base of Public Administration**

The term paradigm is associated with Thomas Kuhn, following the book *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*. Kuhn (Botes 1988: 120) argues that “the development of a science can be best understood in terms of paradigm”, which refers to “a set of acceptable definitions and terms to explain certain phenomena and manifestations”. Coetzee (1988: 134) explains that a paradigm is a pattern of thought, “a tradition, a school or a style of science that has concrete historical significance as well as explicit assumptions, methods and research projects” whereas Babbie and Mouton (2006: 06) explain a paradigm as the “authority of a certain theoretical tradition”. A paradigm directs “the efforts of scholars away from the resolution of pressing administrative problems to the study of arcane theoretical puzzles”, and to also “…dictates the connective taxonomies of important subjects of inquiry and forces the scholars, so to speak, to work and to think within the ambits of the paradigm” (Starling 1982: 14).

Because of the contextual relativistic character of the truth in the human sciences, Ryan (1977: 234) explains that Kuhn also considered a paradigm as the “ideology of the scientific community”. The question of the paradigm of Public Administration engendered so much debate in the field that does not converge on sameness. On the one hand, there are those that contend that Public Administration does not have a paradigmatic status whereas, on the other hand, there are those that contend that it does (see Botes 1988: 119-130; Freysen 1988: 159-167). The argument that Public Administration cannot be assigned a paradigmatic status is based on the fact that, as a field of study, it does not have universally accepted theories (see Arnold 1974: 210; Barton & Chappell 1985: 253; Denhardt 1981: 628). Some argue that
Public Administration does not have a theoretical base for it to be considered a science. It is more of the arts rather than science and does not appear to have any potential of ascending to a level of science (see Gulick & Urwich 1937: 191).

Much of the contentions against the paradigmatic status of Public Administration appear to be based on Rabinow and Sullivan (1979), and Ryan’s (1977) contributions on the theory of knowledge. A paradigm evolves when a scientific pursuit reaches a point where a universal consensus as to the framework of teaching and research is achieved. To this the question is whether, in its development, Public Administration has ever reached that universal point of ‘epistemological consensuses’. According to Kuhn (Rabinow & Sullivan 1979: 02), the human sciences lack a universal consensus “on method or the generally acknowledged classic examples of explanation”. This observation was made in contradistinction with the natural sciences, which are said to have achieved some success with regard to the foregoing (Rabinow & Sullivan 1979: 02).

Subsumed in this observation is the contention that Public Administration as a human science cannot claim a paradigmatic status, which refers to a “prevailing scientific framework within which the scientist works” (Reader’s Digest 1984: 1235). Its teachings, research, and theories are fraught with “vagueness, indefiniteness, and imprecision”; “differences in opinion over meaning, definition, interpretation, methods and approaches” (Botes 1988: 119). It failed to develop “a coherent body of systematic theory that justifies autonomy in its own right” (Caiden 1971: 18) and is characterised by “inarticulate and incoherent conceptualisations” (Pesch 2005: 01). The theoretical foundation of Public Administration is not properly determined and articulated (see Barton & Chappell 1985: 273; Lorch 1978: 57). McCurdy and Cleary (1984: 49-55) observe that “Public Administration has not come to grips with the basic questions of research that should be settled in a mature field of study”. These aspects are the opposites of what makes a science assume a paradigmatic status (see Rabinow & Sullivan 1979; Ryan 1977).

The critiques of Public Administration argue that it does not have its own epistemological, theoretical and philosophical base. It is largely dependent on the theoretical and philosophical antecedents of other disciplines. The critiques of Public Administration as an academic discipline argue that it does not justify its existence “as a self-contained and separate science”; rather it “should be part of some other academic disciplines usually with the
artificial status of a so-called mother-discipline” (Botes 1988: 119). Botes reiterates Caiden’s (1971: 18) point that “after a century of research, writings and teachings, no universal agreement has been reached on the theoretical substance and epistemological content of Public Administration” (Botes 1988: 119). Nargesian, Esfahani and Rajabzadehe (2010: 75) argue that “in the Public Administration there is nothing as a paradigm, because according to the definition of paradigm, different governments and communities in a specific time period do not have consensus on a set of views as a united and a dominant pattern”.

The question of the theory of Public Administration is still a subject of intellectual contestation in the contemporary discourse in the field. Samier (2005: 13) recently observes that the field of Public Administration “is a theoretical wasteland, subject to mindless empiricism and parochialism”. Botes (1988: 119) contextualises the observation made regarding the theoretical or paradigmatic question of the discipline in the statement that “it is totally impossible to find absolute consensus on the epistemological and philosophical substance of a social science such as Public Administration”. This means that a paradigmatic status of a discipline in the human sciences is not possible as by its nature is fraught with contestations on the methodological and research questions whose answers need to inform the epistemological content of the field of study. It is often argued that the reason for this is that “social science knowledge is value-laden and ideological that truth is never attainable” because the object of its inquiry “is so complex and indeterminate that no objective and valid research is ever possible” (Mouton 1999: 271-272).

According to the body of knowledge that Freysen (1988: 162) categorises as “the classical empiristic school of thought, Public Administration does not have a paradigmatic status”. However, Gulick and Urwick (1937: 191) argue that “those who assert dogmatically that [Public Administration] can never be anything else” [science] fail to draw lessons from the fact that, for example, “metallurgy was completely an art several centuries before it became primarily a science”. From the works of scholars such as Caldwell (1965: 54-57), Golembiewski (1964: 113-123), Henry (1975: 378-386), and Waldo (1955: 36-47), systematic intellectual efforts to delineate the focus and locus of the discipline, which consistently attempted to assert its paradigmatic status, could be discerned. Their reflections on the intellectual development of the field are based on various phases, which are generally considered in much of the existing body of literature as the paradigms of Public Administration. However, the paradigmatic status cum theoretical question of the discipline
is a subject of contestation. To this the question is whether it really possible to theorise about *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from the perspective of a discipline that has not yet reached a consensus with itself about its paradigmatic status and theoretical base.

To acquire a deeper insight into the Public Administration perspective from which *good governance* as the object of this study is considered in the context of NEPAD, the discourse on the paradigmatic and theoretical questions of the discipline is systematised largely along the analytical framework of Nicolas Henry (1975) as proposed in the article entitled *Paradigms of Public Administration*, namely *politics-administration dichotomy, principles of administration, Public Administration as Political Science, Public Administration as Administrative Science* and *Public Administration as Public Administration*. Various terms are designated to these aspects used to describe the old paradigms of Public Administration, namely “bureaucratic paradigm”, the “old orthodoxy”, the “old-time religion”, or simply “traditional public administration”, which all refer to a “narrowly focussed pattern of thought…routinely attributed to public administration’s scholars and practitioners from the publication of Woodrow Wilson’s essay until the 1990s” (Lynn 2001: 144).

Since Henry’s 1975 article the other important epistemological trends in the evolution of the discipline have emerged, which some authors termed the new Public Administration. These include the theoretical propositions that relate to the discourse on the New Public Management (NPM), Governance, New Public Service and New Public Administration theory, and post-modern Public Administration (see Denhardt & Denhardt 2000; Bourgon 2007; Henry 2008). As Lynn (2001: 52) observes, “for nearly a decade, public administration and management literature has featured a riveting story: the transformation of the field’s orientation from an old paradigm to a new one”. In this chapter the paradigms that Henry proposed in the article published in 1975 as referred to above are categorised as the old paradigms of Public Administration whereas the latter ones that emerged from the 1980s are considered as the new ones.

In the discourse of this chapter the old paradigms of Public Administration are simply referred to as the traditional paradigms whereas the new ones are considered as the contemporary paradigms. The categorisation of the discourse on the theoretical evolution of the discipline in terms of the traditional and contemporary paradigms of Public Administration is solely for the purpose of this study. This point is emphasised in the context
of the fact that, as Chakrabarty and Battacharya (2003: 06-07) observe, “there is no unanimity among scholars about the boundaries of the discipline and its theoretical frameworks” in terms of its historical and epistemological evolution.

5.3.1 Traditional paradigms of Public Administration

The discourse on the theoretical evolution of Public Administration is systematised according to the various themes that represent the different epistemological trends in the historiography of the field. It starts with the politics-administration dichotomy, which is generally considered as the foundational paradigm of the discipline (see Rommel & Christiaens 2006: 613). This is followed by a focus on the following important aspects: principles of Public Administration, humanistic theoretical variation, contingency theory as an exercise towards a synthetic discourse, heterodoxy and epistemological crisis, political and administrative science routes, reclaiming Public Administration, and the Minnowbrook debates.

5.3.1.1 Politics-administration dichotomy discourse – the question of locus

Sahni (2003: 26-27) explains that Wilson originated the dichotomy paradigm, which Frank J. Goodnow (1900) subsequently wrote substantively about it in a book entitled Politics and Administration: A Study of Government. Leonard D. White is also said to have contributed immensely to the discourse on the paradigmatic evolution of Public Administration. His book entitled Introduction to the Study of Public Administration published in 1926 is regarded as the first publication “devoted to the field” (Henry 1975: 375). White’s book is premised on four critical assumptions “that formed the basis for the study of public administration”:

- the administration is a unitary process that can be studied uniformly, at the federal, state, and local levels;
- the basis for study is management, not law;
- administration is still an art, but the ideal of transormance to a science is both feasible and worthwhile; and
- the recognition that administration “has become, and will continue to be the heart of the problem of modern government.” (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 41)
Goodnow’s book, as referred to above, “is [also] regarded as one of the cornerstones of the public administration movement”, which “originated in the United States in an attempt to separate politics (which was supposed to be concerned with policy) from administration (which was supposed to be only the means of executing policy)” (Hanekom 1988: 70). The politics-administration dichotomy discourse is largely concerned with the attempt to locate the locus of Public Administration, which, according to Goodnow (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 25-28) and Henry (1975: 379), is the executive governmental institution or state bureaucracy. As explained above, the locus is concerned with “where public administration should be” (Henry 1975: 379). Wilson (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 18) contends that:

_The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics; it at most points stands apart even from the debatable ground of constitutional study. It is a part of political life only as the methods of the country-house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the manufactured product. But it is, at the same time, raised very far above the dull level of mere technical detail by the fact that through its greater principles, it is directly connected with the lasting maxims of political wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress._

Wilson attempts to delineate the locus of Public Administration in contradistinction with the realm of politics. The fundamental proposition of the politics-administration dichotomy is that, according to Wilson (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 18), “administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics”; therefore, “administrative questions are not political questions” – “although politics sets the tasks for administration”. Using the works of German scholars such as Biuntschli to substantiate this proposition Wilson (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 18) contends that:

_Politics is state activity in “things great and universal”, while “administration, on the other”, is “the activity of the state in individual and small things. Politics is thus the special province of the statesman, administration of the technical official”. “Policy does nothing without the aid of administration”; but administration is not therefore politics. But we do not require German authority for this position; this discrimination between administration and politics is now, happily, too obvious to need further discussion._
As pointed out above, Goodnow published a book in 1900 devoted to the distinction between politics and administration, an issue that Wilson argued that “is too obvious to need further discussion” (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 18). But, if the latter observation is anything to go by, the question is, why did Goodnow dedicate a book to an issue as obvious as the distinction between politics and administration? Was this a presentiment or precognition that a debate on the politics-administration dichotomy would never result in a consensus? To date the issue of the politics-administration dichotomy is still a contested subject with no “single clear-cut answer” (Rommel & Christiaens 2006: 615).

In Goodnow’s book Wilson’s proposition that government has two distinct functions, namely politics and administration is reiterated. Goodnow (1900: 10-11) explains that politics “has to do with policies or expressions of the state will” whereas administration “has to do with the execution of these policies”. Henry (1975: 379) explains that “separation of powers provided the basis of the distinction” between politics and administration; “the legislative branch, aided by the interpretive abilities of the judicial branch, expressed the will of the state and formed policy, while the executive branch administered those policies impartially and apolitically.”

Stillman (1991: 107) argues that the politics-administration dichotomy ensured that public administration emerges “as a self-conscious field of study, intellectually and institutionally differentiated from politics”. In White’s book, as referred to above, the discourse on politics-administration dichotomy is continued. Dwight Waldo writes that White’s book “was quintessentially American Progressive in character and, in its quintessence, reflected the general thrust of the field: Politics should not intrude on administration; management lends itself to scientific study; public administration is capable of becoming a “value-free” science in its own right; the mission of administration is economy and efficiency, period” (Henry 1975: 379).

Shafritz and Hyde (1992: 41) explain that, compared to Wilson and Goodnow (1900), White’s (1926) book “avoided the potential pitfall of the politics-administration dichotomy”. This is clear in White’s defining of public administration, which emphasised the ‘managerial phase’. The question about the extent of the participation of administration in formulating the purposes of the state remained unanswered. White (1926) “avoids any controversy as to the
precise nature of administrative action”. This makes Wilson (1887) and Goodnow (1900) the principal pioneers of politics-administration dichotomy. But, are they, really? This question is asked in the context on the fact that a closer reading of the literature on ancient Greek politics, as discussed in Chapter 4 of the study, indicates that the issue of politics-administration dichotomy had long been implicated in Socrates-Plato’s philosophical dialogue. It is ingrained in the concept of rulers-philosopher.

In the article entitled *The question of Plato’s notion of Leader in the Republic*, Philippoussis (1999: 115) examines Plato’s concept of rulers philosopher, which is said to mean “the man of arrête and ethos i.e. the one who precisely attempts and strives for excellence”. Plato’s *The Republic* propagates a thesis that a cure for the ills of society cannot be found in *politics*, but rather in *philosophy*. This is only realisable if philosophers became rulers-philosopher (Rice 2003). Philippoussis (1999: 114) explains that in trying to understand Plato’s concept of rulers-philosopher, “the distinction of demarchy must always be made in the case of democracy which refers to power”. In *The Republic* Plato “does not state or imply that the archon (leader) has either legislative or judicial power, instead he is always discussed as having only executive office”. It appears that Plato’s philosophical preoccupation was on what later became known as the *locus* of administration, which is explained as being distinct from the realm of politics.

As explained above, both Socrates and Plato were disillusioned with *politics*; hence their teachings were against *politics* in the Sophistic sense. The notion of politics-administration dichotomy had long been implicated in the ancient Greek philosophical discourses of Socrates and Plato. It is in this context that Wilson (1887), Goodnow (1900) and White’s (1926) intellectual antecedents on the question of administration in contradistinctions with politics need to be understood. The distinction between administration and politics appears, however, to be a false paradigm in the discourse on the theoretical evolution of Public Administration as a science. This is so in that, using Self’s (1981: 151) words, “social processes include a rationalised sphere of settled procedures (administration) and non-rational matrix (politics) which flows into this settled sphere”. This means that “politics is an area of change and indeterminacy and administration is one of stability and routine” (Self 1981: 151). These spheres of government are inextricably intertwined that any attempt to treat as separate tantamount to unnecessary fragmentation of Public Administration as a field of study.
Self’s (1981) contribution is part of a plethora of perspectives that undergird the evolution of the field systematically contesting the politics-administration dichotomy as a false paradigm. Wilson later capitulated and accepted the fact that Public Administration cannot be studied in isolation with the other branches of Public Law, lest it be distorted and robbed of its true foundational antecedents deeply embedded in the principles of politics. Much of the contemporary discourse on the relationship between politics and administration is consistent with this thinking (see Minogue 2003: 01-30; Waldo 1984). The discourse on the issue has even shifted from political-administrative dichotomy to political-administrative interface (see Mafunisa 2003b: 85-101; Maphunye 2001: 312-323; 2005: 212-228; Maserumule 2007: 147-164). Does this suggest that the theoretical question on the politics-administration nexus is settled? This is a question for another discussion. Suffice to only emphasise that the politics-administration dichotomy discourse in the evolution of the discipline has always been an exercise in clarifying the *locus* of Public Administration. In this the question is what about the *focus* of the discipline?

5.3.1.2 Principles of Public Administration – towards the focus

Leornard D. White’s book, as referred to above, published in 1926, was followed by F.W Willoughby’s *Principles of Public Administration*. This book was published in 1927. Willoughby’s contribution heralded a paradigm shift in the discourse on the evolution of the discipline from being preoccupied with the question of *locus* to the emphasis on the *focus*-meaning “the specialised *what* of the field” (Henry 1975: 378). Similar to White’s book, Willoughby’s publication was a “fully fledged text in the field”, which heralded a “new thrust of public administration: that certain scientific principles of administration were there, that they could be discovered, and that administrators would be expert in their work if they learned how to apply these principles” (Henry 1975: 379). In their *Papers on the Science of Administration* as published in 1937, Luther H. Gulick and Lyndall Urwick emphasised and reiterated the proposition of Willoughby about the principles of Public Administration. Gulick and Urwick (1937: 49) explains that:

*There are principles which can be arrived at inductively from the study of human organisation which should govern arrangements for human association of any kind. These principles can be studied as a technical question,*
irrespective of the purpose of the enterprise, the personnel comprising it, or any constitutional, political or social theory underlying its creation.

Gulick and Urwick (1937) were concerned with the subject-matter (focus) for the study of Public Administration (Hanekom 1988: 71). Henry (1975: 380) observes that in Gulick and Urwick’s publication “principles were important, but where those principles were applied was not; focus was favoured over locus, and no bones were made about it”. This is in sharp contrast with the politics-administration dichotomy, whose preoccupation, as explained in sub-section 5.3.1.1 above, was largely on the locus of Public Administration. Gulick and Urwick formulated the mnemonic POSDCORB which stands for Planning, Organising, Staffing, Directing, Co-ordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting to articulate the principles of Public Administration, (Hanekom 1988: 71).

Henry (1975: 380) writes that Gulick and Urwick’s contribution represent a “high noon of orthodoxy” in the evolution of the discipline. The application of Gulick and Urwick’s principles of Public Administration impacted positively on the public sector performance. This led to a high demand for trained public servants, even in the private sector. As a result Public Administration as an academic discipline achieved a high degree of credibility as a science. It achieved optimum level of development (Hanekom 1988: 71; Mosher 1975: 64). The contribution of Willoughby, Gulick and Urwick in defining the focus of the discipline is based on the works of classical organisational theorists such as Frederick Taylor’s Scientific Management, Henry Fayol’s Principles of Organisation, Max Weber’s Bureaucracy, and Ralph Davis’s Rational Planning (see Robbins 1990: 34-37). Most scholars agree with this observation.

Shafritz and Hyde (1992: 41) write that “between the world wars, while management in both the public and private sectors was being established as an identifiable discipline, the influence of scientific management or Taylorism was pervasive”. Hanekom (1988: 71) makes a similar observation that “Willoughby, in his book, was influenced by the exponents of the scientific management movement, which was propagated as far back as 1911 by Frederick Winslow Taylor and others.” Thornhill and Van Dijk (2010: 99) observe that “Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick integrated the ideas of earlier theorists like Henri Fayol” whereas, according to Chakrabarty and Bhattacharya (2003: 04), “if Wilson is the pioneer of the discipline, Max Weber is its first theoretician”. The relationship between Davis’ Rational Planning and the
theoretical base of the discipline is not explicitly enunciated in the literature studied. However, it is implicated in the principles of Public Administration that Willoughby, Gulick and Urwick propounded in their respective publications as referred to above.

Robbins (1990: 34) explains that Frederick Taylor’s publication in 1911 entitled *Principles of Scientific Management* “marked the beginning of serious theory building in the field of management and organisations”. This is true, as indicated above, in respect to its influence on the evolution of the theoretical base of the discipline “between the world wars” (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 41; see also Hanekom 1988: 71). Taylor’s scientific management theory is based on four principles: “the replacement of rule-of-thumb methods for determining each element of a worker’s job with scientific determination; the scientific selection and training of workers; the co-operation of management and labour to accomplish work objectives, in accordance with scientific method; and a more equal division of responsibility between managers and workers, with the former doing the planning and supervising, and the latter doing the execution” (Robbins 1990: 35). Its proposition was on how best each job on the shop floor could be executed. It was therefore limited in its theorisation scope as the focus was only “at organizing work at the lowest level of the organisation – appropriate to the managerial job of a supervisor” (Robbins 1990: 35).

Most scholars are unanimous that Taylor’s scientific management contributed towards the theoretical evolution of Public Administration. But, here lies a disjuncture, which is critically important in studying the theoretical antecedents of the discipline. While Taylor’s scientific management is limited to shop floor in its theorisation, Gulick and Urwick’s statement of the state of the art of organisation theory was more focussed on the upper-management level. Their theoretical proposition “took the point of view of the top” (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 41), whereas that of Taylor took the point of view of the “shop floor” (Robbins 1990: 35). Because of this, one may be inclined to ask whether Gulick and Urwick’s proposition of the principles of Public Administration was really influenced by Taylor’s scientific management theory.

The literature on the theoretical antecedents of the discipline is not clear on this aspect. This may perhaps be a research question for another study that seeks to re-interpret the history of the discipline and challenge the mainstream historiography. Another fundamental question that relates to the foregoing arises from Henri Fayol’s principles of organisation, which, as
pointed out above, Thornhill and Van Dijk (2010: 99-100) observe are among those of earliest theories Gulick and Urwick integrated in their work. Based on many years of experience “as a practising executive”, Fayol developed “general principles for all managers at all levels of the organisation and to describe the functions a manager should perform” (Robbins 1990: 35-36). This is in contrast with Taylor’s limited theorisation focus on the lowest level in the organisation (Robbins 1990: 35) and Gulick and Urwick’s focus on upper management (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 41). In this the question is whether Gulick and Urwick’s principles of Public Administration are really the consequences of the integration of the earliest classical organisational theories.

Fayol’s proposition is based on fourteen principles that are considered to be universally applicable: division of work, authority, discipline, unity of command, unity of direction, subordination of individual interests to the general interests, centralisation, scalar chain, order, equity, stability of tenure of personnel, initiative, and esprit de corps (Robbins 1990: 36-37). There is a high degree of congruence between Fayol’s principles of organisation, Gulick and Urwick’s POSDCORD. Closely related to Fayol’s principles of organisation is Max Weber’s Bureaucracy, which refers “to the way that the administrative execution and enforcement of legal rules is socially organised” (New World Encyclopaedia, s.a.:on-line). Weber’s theory of bureaucracy is based on following principles of organisation: division of labour, a clear authority, formal selection, procedures, detailed rules and regulations, and impersonal relationships (Robbins 1990: 37).

According to Chakrabarty and Battacharya (2003: 04), “Max Weber provided the discipline with a solid theoretical base”. Most aspects of modern Public Administration are associated with Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy (New World Encyclopaedia, s.a.:on-line). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) explain that the theory of bureaucracy:

> connoted a rational, efficient method of organisation, something to take the place of the arbitrary exercise of power by authoritarian regimes. [It] brought the same logic to government work that the assembly line brought to the factory. With the hierarchical authority and a functional specialisation, they made possible the efficient undertaking of large complex tasks. (In New World Encyclopaedia, s.a.: on-line).
Compared to Weber’s *Bureaucracy*, Ralph Davis’s *Rational Planning* propounds that the manner in which organisations are structured is the consequences of the logical outcome of their objectives. It puts emphasis on the economic value of organisation. The primary objective of organisations as proposed by Davis is to provide economic services. Planning is the key imperative that undergirds the *Rational Planning* theory. The management’s formal planning determines the organisations objectives, which, “in logical fashion, determine the development of structure, the flow or authority and other relationships” (Robbins 1990: 37). The purpose of formal planning is to guide the activities that members of the organisation engage in to create the organisation’s products or services.

Davis’s *Rational Planning*’s influence on the theoretical evolution of Public Administration is not, as compared to other classical theorists, explicitly pronounced in the literature studied. This observation is made above. But, the theoretical propositions of Davis’s *Rational Planning* seem to have hugely influenced Gulick and Urwick’s *Papers on the Science of Administration*. In their mnemonic, POSDCORD, planning is underscored as a key imperative for organisational efficiency and effectiveness. This is a foundational essence of Davis Rational Planning theory. Taylor, Fayol and Weber did not particularly use the concept planning in their theories of organisation. In this context the contention is that Davis’ work contributed significantly towards the theoretical evolution of the discipline, especially in so far as Gulick and Urwick’s propositions are concerned. The imperatives of directing and coordinating in Gulick and Urwick’s mnemonic also appear to be based on the *Rational Planning*’s variable of flow of authority and the creation of relationships within the organisation.

In this it is important to explain that authority as a variable in the theory of organisation is also underscored in the works of Fayol and Weber. Davis’s organisational imperative of creating relationships within the organisation could be related to Fayol’s principle of esprit de corps, which means a spirit of working together as a team to ensure harmony and unity within the organisation. This could also be related to Taylor’s scientific management principle of “co-operation of management and labour to accomplish work objectives” (Robbins 1990: 35-37). Weber’s theory of bureaucracy propounds impersonal relationships and hierarchical authority as the key imperatives of organisational efficiency. Hughes (1994: 28) explains that “throughout its long history, the traditional model of public administration followed Weber’s theory virtually to the letter, either implicitly or explicitly”.

339
In spite of their theoretical variations in their propositions, the earliest classical theorists’ works appeared to have influenced the theoretical base of the discipline. Much of their propositions undergird the essence of Gulick and Urwick’s *Papers on the Science of Administration*, which, as pointed out above, represent the “high noon of orthodoxy” (Henry 1975: 380). Therefore the question whether Gulick and Urwick’s principles of Public Administration are really the consequences of integrative exercise is answered in a positive sense. The classical school of thought is the epistemological anchor of the traditional model of public administration, which Hughes (1994: 24) characterises “as the longest standing and most successful theory of management in the public sector”. However, the humanistic school of thought, which contributed towards the evolution of humanistic public administration, rejected the classical management and organisational theories and supplanted them.

5.3.1.3 Humanistic theoretical variation

The humanistic theoretical variation in the evolution of the discipline challenged Gulick and Urwick’s principles of Public Administration. It heralded another important epistemological trend in so far as the theoretical base of Public Administration is concerned (see Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 41). The theorists that came up with the counter-propositions to those of classical theorists constitute the human-relations school of thought, whose thesis is that organisations are made up of both tasks and people. Its fundamental rejection of the propositions of the classical theorists is based on the observation that their consideration of organisation is premised on the mechanistic rather than a humanistic point of view. The proponents of the human relations school of thought are, among others, Elton Mayo, Chester Barnard, Douglas McGregor and Warren Bennis (Robbins 1990: 38-41).

The epistemological antecedents of the human relations school of thought are found in Social Psychology. Its proposition “became a continuing tradition of public administration as did scientific management” (Hughes 1994: 38). Shafritz and Hyde (1992: 41) observe that, “although this was not immediately apparent, the theoreticians of human relations and behavioural science approaches to management were very much contemporaries of Gulick; they were simply prophets before their time”. For, a more humanistic focus in organisational theorisation would eventually take the place of the epistemological foundation of Gulick and Urwick’s propositions on the science of administration.
The evolution of the human-relations school of thought is linked to Hawthorne’s studies conducted between 1924 and 1927, whose thesis is that social norms of members of the organisation or a group are the key determinants of individual work behaviour. The implications in this thesis are that in theorising about organisational designs and management systems, a human element, is a critical variable. This thinking “ushered in an era of organisational humanism”, which emphasised the importance of human dimension of the organisation. Hughes (1994: 37) explains that the “focus of human relations [is] more on the social context at work rather than regarding the worker as an automaton responsive only to financial incentives”. Mayo’s theory that considers the psychological context of the organisation had a huge impact in the management of the public sector, where, compared to the private sector, it was applied to a greater extent (Hughes 1994: 38-39). Fry (1989: 151) observes that:

Mayo’s ideas have had an undeniable impact on the study of organisation. One does not have to agree to Mayo’s position to appreciate the fact that critical issues are raised and examined in his works. Moreover, Mayo’s work was largely responsible for a major shift in the study of organisations. His concern with the attitudes and sentiments of the worker, the importance he attached to the social group in determining individual behaviour, and his search for ‘knowledge-of-acquaintance’ based on direct observation, all served as an inspiration for a succeeding generation of scholars.

With the publication in 1938 of The Functions of the Executive, Chester Barnard made an addition to the human-relations school of thought with the synthesis of Taylor, Fayol, Weber, and Mayo’s works. Barnard’s proposition is that organisations are co-operative systems that comprise the tasks and people. These organisational variables, both in theory and praxis, “have to be maintained at an equilibrium state”; “managers need to organise around the requirements of the tasks to be done and the needs of the people who will do them” (Robbins 1990: 39). Barnard “challenged the classical view that authority flowed from the top down by arguing that authority should be defined in terms of the response of the subordinate; he introduced the role of the informal organisation to organisation theory; and he proposed that the manager’s major roles were to facilitate communication and to stimulate subordinates to high levels of effort” (Robbins 1990: 39).
Henry (1975: 380) observes that Barnard’s propositions in *The Functions of the Executive* did not immediately have an overwhelming impact on Public Administration at the time of its introduction. Such influence only came later through Herbert Simon’s *Administrative Behaviour* in 1947, which critiqued the field (Simon 1947a). Simon’s proposition is considered later in the discussion. For reasons of logical flow of the discourse, it is important that other contributions to human relations school of thought are considered. Abraham Maslow’s Theory of Hierarchy of Needs and Douglas McGregor’s Theory of X-Theory Y are cited in the existing body of literature as also having made significant contributions to the human relations school of thought. Their works attracted the attention of Public Administration scholars.

Based on the analysis of the reactions of people to the demands of life, Maslow came to the conclusion that a “human being is a perpetually wanting animal” (Fox, Schwella & Wissink 1991: 108) whose needs could be differentiated in terms of a hierarchy of five needs: physiological, safety, social needs, esteem, and self-actualisation (Robbins 1982: 277-279). The psychological, safety and social needs are categorised as lower-order needs which are satisfied largely by external factors such as money, tenure and pleasant working conditions. The psychological needs include, among others, shelter, sex and freedom from hunger and thirst; safety needs are concerned with security and protection from physical and emotional harm; and, social needs are concerned with affection, belonging, acceptance and friendship. Human needs that relate to esteem and self-actualisation are categorised as higher-order needs and are satisfied through internal interventions (Robbins 1982).

Self-respect, autonomy, achievements, status, recognition and attention are important aspects that make up the human needs that relate to esteem. A need for fulfilling one’s potential or self-fulfilment relates to self-actualisation (Fox, Schwella & Wissink 1991: 108). Robbins (1982: 278) explains that “although no need is ever fully gratified, a substantially satisfied need no longer motivates”. Maslow’s theory of hierarchy of needs appears to be particularly important for public administration, whose business is driven largely by the human needs dynamic, especially in so far as those needs whose satisfaction are contingent upon external intervention. However, in the contemporary body of literature, Maslow’s theory is used largely from the motivational perspective within the context of human resource management. It is not considered in the broader context of Public Administration. This is reductionism.
In contrast with Maslow’s theory of hierarchy of needs, McGregor’s thesis is that there are two distinct ways in which human beings are viewed: one is essentially negative whereas the other is essentially positive. The negative views of human beings are categorised as Theory X whereas Theory Y is used as the descriptive of the positive ones (Robbins 1990: 39-40). Similar to Maslow’s theory, McGregor’s theory is limited to the internal organisational and management dynamics that relate to the views of human beings subsumed in Theory X as follows:

- Employees inherently dislike work and, whenever possible, will attempt to avoid it.
- Since employees dislike work, they must be coerced, controlled, or threatened with punishment to achieve desired goals.
- Employees will shirk responsibilities and seek formal direction whenever possible.
- Most workers place security above all other factors associated with work and will display little ambition. (Robbins 1990: 40)

In contrast with Theory X the assumptions subsumed in Theory Y are that:

- Employees can view work as being as natural as rest or play.
- Human-beings will exercise self-direction and self-control if they are committed to the objectives.
- The average person can learn to accept, even seek, responsibility.
- Creativity – that is, the ability to make good decisions – is widely dispersed throughout the population, and is not necessarily the sole province of those in managerial functions. (Robbins 1990: 40)

It is said that “much of the enthusiasm, beginning in the 1960s, for participative decision-making, the creation of responsible and challenging jobs for employees, and developing group relations can be traced to McGregor’s advocacy that managers follow Theory Y assumptions (Robbins 1990: 40). Shafritz and Hyde (1992: 41-42) trace the concept of participative decision-making to Mary Follett’s (1868-1933) contribution to management thought, whose work, which appeared in the 1920s and 1930s was, according to
Parker (1984: 736-745), “somewhat neglected by subsequent writers and commentators”. In *The Giving of Orders* Follet challenged the concept of superior-subordinate power relations in the Weberian sense (Shafritz & Hyde 1992: 42) and re-defined the concept of control in organisation in a manner that, according to Parker (1984: 736-745), differs from the classical management tradition.

Follet made an important contribution to the conceptual management literature on control in organisations, especially in the proposition that ‘power should be exercised with’ as opposed to it being ‘exercised over’. This challenged the theoretical foundations of bureaucracy, whose death Warren Bennis eulogised. Follet’s work, which “offers a deeper insight into the behavioural and holistic dimensions thinking on control” (Parker 1984: 736), is not mentioned in the human relations school of thought, whose evolution is based on the rejection of the classical management thought. In writing about the death of bureaucracy and its rejection Bennis claims that its:

> Centralised decision-making, impersonal submission to authority, and narrow division of labour [were] being replaced by decentralised and democratic structures organised around flexible groups. Influence based on authority was giving way to influence derived from expertise. (Robbins 1990: 41)

The human relations school of thought whose object of scientific focus is on individual beliefs, values and behaviour as part of the organisational culture, personality, human nature and higher order potential made a significant contribution toward Public Administration as a humanities discipline. Samier (2005: 08) explains that a:

> Humanistic public [is] human-focused, individual-concerned study, grounded in the end-values of dignity and freedom, reflecting what it is to be human, and informed by values such as peace, justice, equality, and human rights presupposing tolerance and personal responsibility to oneself and others. It is a perspective from which administration is viewed as worlds that are humanly created, and therefore alterable.
In humanities the praxis of human communities and society at large are theorised (Kondlo 2010b) and the “perspectives which draw attention to the cultural and social dynamics of people and institutions” are generated (Mkhandawire 2009: n.a). Public Administration “was broadened through organisation theory, primarily through the human relations school of thought” (Samier 2005: 10). Was this to the extent of it assuming the status of a human science in a strictly epistemological sense? Some fundamental perspectives on this question are implicated in the “dissent from mainstream public administration accelerated in the 1940s” (Henry 1975: 380) and reiterated in the contingency theory that emerged in the 1960s. To this the question is what is the contingency theory? What is its effect on the evolution of Public Administration? Because of its implication in the foregoing, the contingency theory is considered as part of the discourse on the history of Public Administration.

5.3.1.4 Contingency theory – an exercise towards a synthetic discourse

Robbins (1990: 410) contextualises the evolution of the contingency theory appropriately in the formulation that:

Neither the mechanistic forces of darkness nor the humanistic forces of light could muster evidence that their solution, and only their solution, was right for all occasions. The conflict between thesis and anti-thesis led to a synthesis that provided better guidance to managers. That synthesis was a contingency approach.

Is the contingency theory an exercise towards a synthetic discourse in the evolution of Public Administration? This question is asked in the context that, as discussed in sub-sections 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.2 respectively above, the classical organisational and management theories and the humanistic ones impacted systematically on the evolution of Public Administration. So, if the contingency theory synthesises them, the question is what is the implication of such on the theoretical base of Public Administration? As explained above, the contingency theory evolved as a synthesis of the classical and humanistic schools of thought (Robbins 1990: 41). It is, according to Hanson (1979: 98), “perhaps the most powerful current sweeping over the public and private sectors of management”. In the context of this it is clear that the contingency theory made a significant contribution towards the theoretical evolution of
Public Administration. Some of the proponents of the contingency theory are Herbert Simon, Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn (Robbins 1990: 41).

As pointed out above in the book entitled *Administrative Behaviour*, Simon (1947) offered a “devastating critique” of the traditional foundations of Public Administration in classical theories (Henry 1975: 380). Simon (Robbins 1990: 41) argued that “organisation theory needed to go beyond superficial over-oversimplified principles to a study of the conditions under which competing principles were applicable”. Simon’s contention was later reiterated in Katz and Kahn’s (1966) environmental perspective in their book *The Social Psychology of Organisations*. Robbins (1990: 41) explains that Katz and Kahn’s environmental perspective made a major impetus in promoting the concept of open-system in organisation theory. Their contention is that organisations are part of the environment within which they exist. It is therefore important that the relationship between the organisation and environment should always be maintained. This is to ensure that the organisation adapts to changing circumstances “if they are to survive” (Robbins 1990: 42).

The assertions that public administration, both as a theory and practice, should respond to its ever changing environmental context, which is not static, are grounded in the contingency theory (see Hanson 1979: 98-116) which emphasises openness and adaptability (Dobuzinskis 1997: 303). The mechanistic and humanistic variety is inadequate as their theorisation of public organisation is inward-looking and short of factoring in the “publicness” of public administration as a critical variable that distinguishes its contextual foundation from the private sector administration (see Pesch 2005). In this the contingency theory fills the void that the classical and humanistic theories did not attend to.

As one of the proponents of the contingency theory Simon “offered an original synthesis of the economic theory of rational choice and the psychology of decision-making” (Dobuzinskis 1997: 303) in the *Administrative Behaviour*, a book referred to above. This is illustrative of the synthetic character of the contingency theory in praxis. It is an exercise towards a synthetic discourse. The contingency theory seems to have provided a theoretical context from which the politics-administration dichotomy was criticised and heralded heterodoxy and epistemological identity crisis in the evolution of Public Administration. This marks another important epoch in the historiography of the discipline.
5.3.1.5 Heterodoxy and epistemological crisis

Simon critiqued the theoretical and conceptual foundations of Public Administration in the classical empiristic school of thought of, for example, Taylor, whose “ideas on scientific management were later recast into a more theoretical and systematic mold by Luther Gulick and Lyndal Urwick as the editors of the seminal Papers on the Science of Administration (Dobuzinskis 1997: 302). It needs to be noted that Simon’s critique of the field was preceded by that of Chester Barnard in The Function of Executive in 1938, and Fritz von Morstein-Marx’s Elements of Public Administration in 1946 (Henry 1975: 380; Hanekom 1988: 71-72). Although Barnard’s work had fundamental implications on the theoretical and conceptual foundations of the field, Henry (1975: 380) explains that it is actually Marx’s contribution to the discourse on the epistemological grounding of Public Administration that first “questioned the assumption that politics and administration could be dichotomized”.

A period 1946-1950 was characterised by a plethora of intellectual activities that systematically evolved into a body of knowledge that dissented from the traditional politics-administration dichotomy rooted in the classical theories. These include the intellectual outputs of, in addition to Chester Barnard, Fritz Morstein Marx, Herbert Simon’s works as already referred to above, that of Robert A Dahl, John Merriman Gaus and Dwight Waldo (see Coetzee 1988: 139). Marx (Starling 1982: 21) contended that, using discretionary power; administrators are engaged in policy-making, a function that transcends into the political realm of government. According to this line of thinking the dichotomy between politics and administration is a false notion. Marx’s contention was followed by Simon’s article entitled Proverbs of Administration, which question the principles of administration.

Henry (1975: 380) observes that “the most formidable dissection of the principles notion appeared in 1947 in Simon’s book Administrative Behaviour, published after the article referred to in the foregoing. In this book Simon managed to render “the very idea of principles moot” in effectively demonstrating “that for every principle of administration advocated in the literature, there was a counter-principle” (Henry 1975: 380). The validity of the principles concept was also questioned in Dahl’s work entitled The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems (Dahl 1947: 01-11). In the article Trends in the theory of Public Administration Gaus (1950: 168) writes that “a theory of public administration means in our time a theory of politics also”. According to Henry (1975: 380), Gaus’s assertion, as
referred to in the foregoing, is “the most succinct statement articulating” a new sense of awareness about a false notion of politics-administration dichotomy. In The study of Public Administration Waldo (1955: 05) explains that the contestation on politics-administration dichotomy is concerned with the rigid distinction rather than, per se, with politics and administration.

Henry (1975: 380) observes that “by mid-century, the two defining pillars of public administration – the politics/administration dichotomy and the principles of administration – had been toppled and abandoned by creative intellects in the field”. Consequently public administration was “bereft of a distinct epistemological identity” (Henry 1975: 380). The heterodoxy trend that characterised the period 1938-1950 bequeathed to Public Administration an epistemological identity crisis. This much was so in that displacement of the politics-administration dichotomy and principles of administration meant that Public Administration was extricated from the classical empiristic paradigm. But, this did not necessarily mean embracing a behaviourist humanistic paradigm (see Simon 1947b: 202). This somewhat contradicts Samier’s (2005: 10) point that “public administration was broadened through organisation theory, primarily the human relations school”.

In the article entitled The Science of Public Administration Simon (1947b) offers an alternative paradigm from which Public Administration could evolve a new epistemological identity. Simon’s (1947b: 202) proposition centred on what was termed: “a pure science of administration” and “prescription for public policy”. Henry (1975: 380) explains that Simon’s new paradigm for public administration meant that:

There ought to be two kinds of public administrationists working in harmony and reciprocal intellectual stimulation: those scholars concerned with developing “a pure science of administration” based on “a thorough grounding in social psychology”, and a larger group concerned with “prescribing for public policy”, and which would resurrect the then unstylish field of political economy. Both a “pure science of administration” and “prescribing for public policy” would be mutually re-enforcing components (Henry 1975:380): There does not appear to be any reason why these developments in the field of public administration should not go on side by side, for they in no way conflict or contradict.
Henry (1975: 380) explains that Simon’s proposition for a pure science as an alternative paradigm puzzled most scholars and engendered a sense of apprehension in the field of Public Administration and Political Sciences alike. The contention that Public Administration should be theoretically grounded in Social Psychology engendered a sense of alienation as most scholars in the field did not have any training in this area. Simon’s concept of ‘pure science’ was interpreted as meaning that a “science of administration logically would ban public Administrationists from what many of them perceived as their richest sources of inquiry: normative political theory, the concept of public interest, and the entire spectrum of human values” (Henry 1975: 381).

Samier (2005: 10) observes that Simon provided “a logical positivist rationale for the separation of facts, values and the criteria for a programme of experimental research necessary to produce a comprehensive theory of administration”. In this it appears that Simon continued with the scientism trajectory (see Samier 2005). Simon was, however, neither a classical empiricist nor a humanistic behaviourist (see Dobuzinskis 1997). The notion of social psychology that Simon propounded as the alternative theoretical base for Public Administration is associated with contingency theory, which, as explained above, evolved as a synthesis of the classic empiristic paradigm and a behaviourist humanistic paradigm (Robbins 1990: 41).

To obviate the possibility of being reduced to a ‘technically oriented pure science’ without any connection with the political and social realities, another body of knowledge emerged in the 1950s to challenge Simon’s proposition that Public Administration should be theoretically grounded in Social Psychology and also rejected the concept of value-free science. To reclaim its epistemological identity and rid the field of the crisis it faced, attempts were made to embed the discipline in the Political Science, its homely mother discipline from which it historically evolved.

5.3.1.6 Political Science route

Rather than allowing a possible extinction and dissipation of Public Administration in Social Psychology, the intellectual preoccupation with the theoretical aspects of the discipline that evolved at the height of its epistemological identity crisis wanted to embed it in Political
Science (Henry 1975: 381). This marked another important historical and epistemological trend in the evolution of Public Administration. Dahl (1947) argued against the concept of value-free science, which Simon was propounding, as being not possible as Public Administration is by its nature value-laden. Taking the contention further, Waldo (1948) critiqued, as Samier (2005: 10) puts it, “the field’s move away from moral philosophy and political economy towards an ideology and administrative efficiency”. The basis for this was that Public Administration is conceptually linked to Political Science, and it is argued that the public policy-making process is such a nexus between these two disciplines.

The intellectual activities of the 1950s were consistent with the efforts of political scientists that had started in the 1930s, which questioned the growing independence of Public Administration from Political Science as a discipline. The contention was that engagement with the Public Administration should be limited to “intellectualised understanding” of the executive branch of government rather than “knowledgeable action”. In the article entitled Political Science and Public Administration – A Note on the State of the Union, Martin, in 1952, added a voice to a campaign for a “continuing dominion of political science over public administration” (Martin 1952: 665). In the 1950s Public Administration was characterised by the intellectual efforts to assert a Public Administration-Political Science nexus, which, according to Henry (1975: 381), resulted in the field being defined away, “at least in terms of its analytical focus and essential expertise”. This heralded “a renewed definition of locus – the governmental bureaucracy, but a corresponding loss of focus” (Henry 1975: 381), which scholarship in the field, as explained above, in the 1920s and 1930s attempted to define.

Contrary to the commitment to rescue Public Administration from its epistemological identity crisis, the Political Science route propounded as its ‘refugee’ deepened the challenge of asserting itself as independent field of study. It started to experience a downhill spiral in the 1950s and well into the 1960s, and was referred to in peripheral terms. So much so that it subsequently faced eminent expunction from the epistemological radar. In relation to this, the following narrative on the evolution of Public Administration is edifying:

**In 1962, public administration was not included as a subfield of political science in the report of the Committee on Political Science as a discipline of the American Political Science Association. In 1964 a major survey on political scientists indicated that Public Administration Review was slipping in prestige**
among political scientists relative to other journals, and signalled a decline of faculty interest in public administration generally. In 1967, public administration disappeared as an organising category in the program of the annual meeting of the American Political science Association. (Henry 1975: 381)

In describing the situation presented above, Waldo (1968: 08) writes that “the attitude of political scientists [was] at best one of indifference and [was] often one of undisguised contempt of hostility”. Only four percent of the articles published in five prestigious Political Science journals between 1966 and 1970 were dedicated to Public Administration (Starling 1982: 14-15). This is ironic in that in the late 1940s and 1950s political scientists strongly argued that Public Administration should “stay within the homey confines” of Political Science as “the mother discipline”, following the displacement of the politics-administration dichotomy (Henry 1975: 381). A contemptuous treatment of Public Administration by the political scientists led some scholars in the field to explore another alternative, which was the Administrative Science route. But, was this not an exercise in oscillating from one crisis to another in terms of the epistemological identity of the discipline? A consideration of the Administrative Science and its impact on the evolution of Public Administration may assist in the attempt to answer this question.

5.3.1.7 Administrative Science route

Although the Administrative Science route was not as impactful as the Political Science one, it also represents an important historical and epistemological trend in the evolution of Public Administration. With its epistemological antecedents in organisation theory, Administrative Science became an available option for the scholars in the field. The Administrative Science paradigm provided a focus rather than a locus (Starling 1982: 16). In the 1960s, organisation theory was the overarching focus of Public Administration (Henderson 1966), and as such, the organisation development enthused “many younger public administration as offering a very tempting alternative for conducting research on public bureaucracies but within the framework of Administrative Science: democratic values could be considered, normative concerns could be broached, and intellectual rigor and scientific methodologies could be employed” (Henry 1975: 382; see also Kirkhart & Gardner 1974: 97-140).
The Administrative Science route was criticised as obscuring the identity and uniqueness of Public Administration in a similar way what Social Psychology and Political Science did. It failed to acknowledge the “publicness” of the administration of government by falsely putting it on the same epistemological pedestal as that of the private sector irrespective of the fundamental variations regarding their foundational values and goals. The public sector is driven by public interest or societal welfare whereas the private sector is profit-driven. This contextual verity was ignored. The question whether it is possible to talk about public administration without the public because of its submergence in the Administrative Science appeared not to have mattered most to the proponents of Public Administration as Administrative Science. This created conceptual confusion and exposed Public Administration as a field of study to a “possibility of absorption into other branches of Administrative Science, such as Business Administration” (Hanekom 1988: 72-73; see also Henry 1975: 382-383; Pesch 2005).

Samier (2005: 10) observes that “the 1970s was the second major identity crisis period centred on whether public administration was an independent discipline with a distinctive theoretical foundation”. This observation is based on the contentions of scholars such as Waldo (1968), Ostrom (1973), La Porte (1971), Golembiewski (1977), Caiden (1971) and Gladden (1972). Waldo (1968) critiqued the field on the basis that it lacked adequate theoretical base. Ostrom (1973) observed that Public Administration in the 1970s was preoccupied with public choice theory and administrative efficiency concerns, but avoided difficult and complex questions of administration as they pertained to the organisation of government and its democratic imperatives. Because of this, theorists and practitioners are said to have lost confidence in the scientific credibility of the discipline (Ostrom 1973).

Samier (2005: 10) cites La Porte as having put it that “public administration existed in a state of antique maladapted analytical models and normative aridity: teaching and research tended to be based on past problems or instant response to present establishment problem definitions, which have limited utility for intellectual vigour or relevance to students and practitioners”. Caiden (1971) critiqued the field as being theory-less whereas, in similar terms, Golembiewski (1977) stated that a theoretical base for Public Administration was aimlessly pursued, fraught with intellectual crisis, and therefore in need of a new epistemological compass for it to be salvaged from obscurity. Gladden (1972) somewhat offered a proposition that its salvation might be in its historiography. This appears to be the context from which a
synthesis of different epistemological strands in the history of the evolution of Public Administration was attempted. The result of this exercise was the attempt to reclaim Public Administration from itself; hence the descriptive Public Administration as Public Administration.

5.3.1.8 Reclaiming Public Administration as Public Administration

The intellectual efforts to reclaim Public Administration as Public Administration characterised the pattern of the discourse defining the epistemological trend in the evolution of the field in the 1970s. Such intellectual activities moved from the premise acknowledging that organisation theory has achieved some degree of progress in enunciating “how and why organisations work, how and why people in them behave, and how and why decisions are made” (Henry 1975: 383). Another area of progress acknowledged relates to “refining the applied techniques of management science, as well as developing new techniques, that often reflect what has been learned in the more theoretical realms of organisational analysis” (Henry 1975: 383). However, the progress referred to in the foregoing did not amount to a pure science of Public Administration in terms of its disciplinary focus and locus. This means that the fundamental challenge for the intellectual activities of the 1970s in reclaiming Public Administration as Public Administration and restoring its epistemological identity lay with the determination of the locus and focus of the discipline.

For, as Henry (1975: 383) put it, “there had been less progress in delineating a locus of the field” and “there [was] not yet a focus for the field in the form of a pure science of administration”. However, certain fundamental social factors unique to the developed countries were zeroed in on as the proper locus of Public Administration (Henry 1975: 383). But, is this not a case of epistemological imperialism? Social factors unique to the developed countries are not the same as those in other countries, especially the developing ones. It is therefore a travesty of epistemological verity to suggest that the theories developed on the basis of factors that are unique to the developed countries could have universal relevance for all cultures and societies in the modern world. It is wrong to define the locus of Public Administration from this perspective, especially in the attempt to reclaim the epistemological identity of the field.
The intellectual activities that sought to assert Public Administration as Public Administration were correct in acknowledging that the rigid distinction between politics and administration did not provide an appropriate paradigm for the theoretical evolution of Public Administration (see Hanekom 1988: 73). The same was also the case in respect of the rigid distinction between the private and public sectors. Henry (1975: 383) explains that the traditional and rigid distinction of the field between the public sphere and private sphere appears to be waning as “public administration’s new and flexibly defined locus waxes”. So, the intellectual activities of the 1970s appeared to have had an ample opportunity to assert Public Administration as Public Administration as the climate then was appropriately befitting for such occurrence. This is so in that the fundamental focus in the discourse on reclaiming the field has been increasingly about “policy science, political economy, the public policy-making process and its analysis, and the measurement of policy outputs” (Henry 1975: 383). These aspects are critically important in evolving the focus and locus of Public Administration.

The developments of the 1970s happened after the Minnowbrook I of 1968, wherein the importance of reclaiming Public Administration was underscored (see Marini 1971). Because of its importance in the evolution of Public Administration, the Minnowbrook I is considered in a separate sub-section below. For now, it is perhaps important to point out that the intellectual activities of the 1970s did not necessarily result in a universal settlement of the question of the focus of Public Administration as an academic discipline or a field of study (Henry 1975: 383). In South Africa administrative processes or functions were introduced in 1967 by J.J. Cloete and most South African scholars considered them as the subject-matter or focus of Public Administration. Cloete’s analytical framework based on six generic administrative processes [policy-making, organising, financing, personnel provision and utilisation; the determination of work procedures and control] had an “unbelievable long-lived influence” (Marais 1988: 170) on the scholarship character and orientation of most scholars in South Africa (Maserumule 2005b: 18-19).

The six generic administrative processes approach is similar to the Gulick and Urwich’s principles of Public Administration. Although it was initially supported, the Cloete approach was criticised and subsequently rejected (see Marais 1988: 169-192). In Europe some degree of consensus on the focus of Public Administration existed. This much could be discerned from the 1977 International Institute of Administrative Sciences where 46 delegates reached a
consensus that the focus of Public Administration training for senior government officials should be centred on the following aspects: political institutions and processes; organisations and organisational behaviour; policy analysis, formulation, implementation, and review; personnel and finance; and methodology (International Institute of Administrative Sciences 1978: 05). It needs to be emphasised that the foregoing were largely for training rather than academic purposes.

In the United States in 1978 a group of American researchers agreed on the following as important aspects that Public Administration should focus on: “personnel management; workforce planning; collective and labor management relations; productivity and performance management; organisation/reorganisation; financial management; evaluation research and program and management audits” (Mushkin, Sandifer & Familton 1978: XIII). Henry (1975: 383) states that to successfully reclaim its epistemological identity “Public Administration should, and perhaps must, find a new paradigm that encourages both a focus and a locus for the field, and its pillar ought to be public interest. The question of the focus of the field is a contested issue. It is not yet settled. This is clear in the evolution of what this study terms contemporary paradigms of Public Administration that emerged in the 1980s (Samier 2005: 10). Before the contemporary paradigms of Public Administration are considered, the Minnowbrook I of 1968 is discussed. The reason for this is explained above.

5.3.1.9 Minnowbrook I debates

Frederickson (2009: 01) states that “Minnowbrook is an enduring legend in public administration, a narrative with an attendant mystique and mythology”. It is where scholars in the field first gathered in 1968, later in 1988 and 2008 respectively to engage the challenges that were said to have beset the theory and practice of public administration (Frederickson 1980). Perhaps for reasons of contextualisation it is important to point out that the intellectual activities in Minnowbrook are disaggregated into Minnowbrook I, Minnowbrook II and Minnowbrook III in the contemporary body of literature on the theoretical question of Public Administration.

Minnowbrook I appertains to a conference of young scholars in the field convened in 1968. It was sponsored by Dwight Waldo. Minnowbrook II refers to a subsequent conference that took place in 1988, whereas Minnowbrook IIIrefers to the 2008 one (see Cameron & Milne
Their differences do not only lie in the fact that they were convened in different years, but also in a myriad of other factors as implicated in the discussion below. Compared to Minnowbrook II and III, Minnowbrook I is considered a watershed conference that significantly contributed towards the evolution of Public Administration (see Cameron & Milne 2009: 382). The intellectual outputs of its proceedings were collated in a book entitled Towards a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective. Marini edited this book, which was published in 1971. This part of the discourse focuses largely on the Minnowbrook I.

The Minnowbrook I was largely a response to a question of relevance of Public Administration to the contextual dynamics and realities of that time and its future as an academic discipline. The latter perhaps explains the youthful character of the delegates to the conference, who were under the age of 35 (Frederickson 1980: xi-xii; Waldo 1971: xiv; see also Henry 2008; Marini 1971). Cameron and Milne (2009: 382) explain that “a number of Minnows moved into positions of leadership in the discipline”. Surely this put them in strategic positions to inculcate a radical thinking that emerged in the Minnowbrook I to shape the field of Public Administration, which the older generation would not have possibly pursued with the same vigour.

One of the factors that prompted the Minnowbrook I conference was that the evolution of the field was shaped largely by the older generation of academics and practitioners. This was, for reasons of sustaining the future of the discipline, perceived as being “unstrategic” (see Frederickson 1980: xi-xii, Waldo 1971: xiv). The Minnowbrook I deviated from the concepts associated with the traditional public administration such as efficiency, effectiveness, budgeting, and administrative techniques, which were key imperatives in shaping the epistemological foundation of Public Administration in the early days of its evolution. Its fundamental thrust was the dissatisfaction with the state of the discipline in the context of which the focus of the discourse was on the values, morals, ethics, social equality, client-focus, inter-personal relations and group dynamics, the broad challenges of urbanism and social dynamics, and technology (Marini 1971: 15; Henry 2008; Waldo 1971: xvi). These aspects were disaggregated into different themes that contextualised the Minnowbrook I discourse, namely, relevance, anti-positivism, personal morality, innovation, client-centredness, an anti-bureaucratic philosophy (Marini 1971: 15). Frederickson (2009: 02)
points out that the imperatives of democracy as they relate to Public Administration were also added as one of the major themes of the Minnowbrook I discourse.

The Minnowbrook I conference attempted to base the epistemological foundation of the discipline on the normative theory and philosophy; attend to the question of relevance of the discipline to social issues; and extricate the field from its positivist orientation. This could be understood within the context of La Porte’s (1971: 19) observation that “the literature in Public Administration has contributed almost nothing to major advances in either the analysis or normative understanding of complex public organisations”. The literature that emerged in the context of the spirit of the Minnowbrook I thinking expatiated on the various themes that emanated from the conference, especially in so far as the questions of social equity and democratic administration were concerned.

The intellectual activities associated with the Minnowbrook I thinking are said to have evolved into a New Public Administration, a description used to characterise the thinking of that time. Much was written to make a contribution to this evolving pattern of thinking in the body of Public Administration knowledge. In the book *New Public Administration*, Frederickson (1980) wrote about social equity and the democratic imperatives that ought to underpin the normative foundation of the new Public Administration, both in theory and praxis. Frederickson (Henry 2008: n. a.) wrote that “it is incumbent on the public servant to be able to develop and defend criteria and measures of equity and to understand the impact of public services on dignity and well-being of citizens”.

The Minnowbrook I scholars rejected the traditional models of public administration, especially those centred on the bureaucratic philosophy and, instead, advocated new models built on the imperatives of openness, trust and honest communications. The salient aspects of Minnowbrook I consensus that undergird the New Public Administration were that:

- *public administrators and public agencies are not and cannot be either neutral or objective*
- *technology is often dehumanising*
- *bureaucratic hierarchy is often ineffective as an organisational strategy*
- *bureaucracies tend toward goal displacement and survival*
• co-operation, consensus, and democratic administration are more likely than the simple exercise of administrative authority to result in organisational effectiveness
• modern concepts of public administration must be built on post-behavioural and post-positivist paradigms that are more democratic, more adaptable, more responsive to changing social, economic and political circumstances. (Henry 2008: n.a.).

The essence of the New Public Administration was based on the contention that the discipline should be extricated from its historical homely confines of Political Science, and also from its management orientation, which has always been technocratically inclined. A contention was that Public Administration should assert itself on normative and democratic grounds. To this the question is whether the New Public Administration realised the objective of revolutionising the discipline. Henry (2008: n.a) and Denhardt (2008) concur in their answer to this question, which is answered in a negative sense. Henry (2008: n.a) contends that the “New Public Administration never lived up to its ambitions of revolutionising the discipline”. In similar terms, Denhardt (2008: 102-103) contends that the Minnowbrook perspectives, although they made important propositions towards a new theoretical paradigm of the discipline, failed to offer one. However, this should not be misunderstood as a suggestion that the New Public Administration, as informed by the Minnowbrook I, was insignificant in the evolution of the discipline.

Cameron and Milne contend that Minnowbrook I was a watershed gathering of young scholars, and arguably the most influential initiative in trying to shape Public Administration. Although it was an American initiative, it had global influence (Cameron & Milne 2009: 381). Henry (2008: n.a) observes that “the movement had a lasting impact on public administration in that they nudged public administrationists into reconsidering the traditional intellectual ties with both political science and management, and into contemplating the prospects of academic autonomy”. Some scholars consider the New Public Administration as a paradigm. However, because of its failure to provide an alternative theoretical base for the discipline, this study considers the New Public Administration as the contextual antecedent of the contemporary paradigms of Public Administration rather than a paradigm itself. The question of what constitutes a paradigm is discussed in sub-section 5.3 above.
Henry (2008) explains that the New Public Administration inspired the development of contemporary paradigms such as the New Public Service and Post-Modern Public Administration. Frederickson (2009: 02-03) makes a similar observation that the contemporary Public Administration Theory Network on post-modernism and the *Journal of Administrative Theory and Praxis* are rooted in the Minnowbrook I and the propositions of the New Public Administration. This is interesting in that the New Public Management (NPM), which evolved immediately after the New Public Administration in the 1980s in response to the financial crisis of the 1970s, does not seem to have derived any epistemological value from the Minnowbrook I propositions and the New Public Administration.

Cameron and Milne (2009:387, 390) make a similar observation that, “while Minnowbrook I occurred sometime before the NPM arrived on the international scene, the theme of the former was distinctly anti-business and ‘it did not attempt to embrace business principles’”. The theoretical foundation of the NPM is embedded in the market economics whereas that of New Public Administration is ingrained in the concept of social equity and democratic norms. Frederickson (1995: 31-32) observes that there are fundamental variations between the New Public Administration and the NPM. The discussion on the NPM below illuminates this aspect in a comprehensive manner. In spite of the foregoing, the Minnowbrook I laid an important contextual foundation from which some of the contemporary paradigms of Public Administration, as discussed below, evolved. It is important to point out that the Minnowbrook II and III occurred in different times in the evolution of the contemporary paradigms of Public Administration and are therefore, for the purpose of this study, referred to in the following discussion on those paradigms.

5.3.2 **Contemporary paradigms of Public Administration**

Samier (2005: 10) observes that the 1980s and 1990s saw a multiplicity and a new sense of intellectual efforts in the quest for a theoretical base of the field, which continued well into the 21st century. At the time of completing this study in 2010, the debate on the theoretical question of Public Administration was vigorously pursued with the focus of the *International Review of Administrative Sciences* (IRAS) and the international body of Public Administration scholarship being a New Public Administration theory. As recently as 2007
Jocelyn Bourgon anchored the discourse on the new theory of Public Administration in the article published in the IRAS entitled *Responsive, responsible and respected government: Towards a new public Administration Theory*. This article was first presented as a paper in the 2006 Braibant Lecture.

Bourgon’s other papers presented in scholarly gatherings during the period 2008-2009, although they had in different titles, consistently articulated what ought to be the new theory of Public Administration in the 21st century. This is clear in Bourgon’s keynote address of 01 September 2008 at the PAC Conference in York, United Kingdom, entitled *New directions in Public Administration: Serving beyond the predictable*. On 24 February 2009 Bourgon presented a paper in Canberra, Australia, entitled *New Governance and Public Administration: Towards a dynamic synthesis*, which supported the proposition for the alternative paradigm made in the 2007 article referred to earlier. Bourgon did the same in the paper entitled *Public purpose, government authority and collective power* presented at the *XIV Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reform del Estado y de la Administracion Publica*, Salvador de Bahia, Brasil, 27-30 October 2009.

Bourgon’s contribution is considered in sub-section 5.3.2.3 below on the discussion on the New Public Service and New Public Administration theory. A succinct reference to it here is made to contextualise, and demonstrate the extent of the contemporariness of the discourse on the theoretical paradigms of Public Administration and the fact that it is still to date a contested subject. Bourgon’s New Public Administration theory follows Denhardt and Denhardt’s theoretical proposition dubbed the New Public Service published in the *Public Administration Review* in 2000. As indicated in sub-section 5.3 above, the contemporary paradigms of Public Administration are disaggregated into the New Public Management (NPM), Governance, New Public Service (NPS), New Public Administration theory (NPA) and Postmodernism in Public Administration. They are discussed as such below.

5.3.2.1 **New Public Management (NPM)**

Schmidt (2008: 111) states that the NPM became a powerful paradigm in the 1980s but “starts to wane in the 1990s against the backdrop of the complex and diverse governance challenges”. However, other scholars contend that the NPM emerged in the 1980s, “but it came to full fruition” and therefore establish itself as a paradigm only in the 1990s (see
Drechsler 2005: on-line). This is a minute discord in the historiography of the discipline based largely on the dating of an epistemological trend in a particular period in the evolution of Public Administration. The substantive essence of the contention of most scholars on the emergence and paradigmatic status of the NPM is the same. Hood (1995: 03) writes that “the rise of NPM …is one of the most striking international trends in public administration”. It is “the most important reform movement of the last quarter of a century”, which, in 1995, “was still possible to believe in NPM” (Drechsler 2005: on-line).

Some interpreted the emergence of the NPM as a revolutionary intellectual paradigm that supplanted the traditional Public Administration. Tshikwatamba (2007: 755) writes that the emergence of NPM amounted to an equivalent of intellectual coup on Public Administration. Cameron and Milne (2009: 390) concur with Tshikwatamba. It “was presented as a framework of general applicability, a “public management for all seasons” (Hood 1991:8), which had global influence. Gasper (2002: 19) observes that “at one stage, NPM’s proponents claimed to have intellectually defeated the older public management and to be in the process of replacing it”. As a new paradigm? Lynn (2001: 144) explains that “while many in public administration doubt that there is a new paradigm – a New Public Management – few doubt that there was an old one.” This reverts the discourse back to the paradigmatic question of the discipline, which is dealt with in sub-section 5.3 above. It is therefore not repeated here, save to explain that it is referred to in the foregoing to point out that scholarship is not unanimous on the NPM as a paradigm.

However, as indicated in sub-section 5.3 above, for the purpose of this study the NPM is considered in this part of the discourse as a contemporary paradigm of Public Administration representing a continuation of ceaseless intellectual activities in a perpetual effort, which often appears to move in a cycle, to construct a universally acceptable theoretical base of the discipline. But, is this intellectual adventure feasible? This question is asked in the context of contentions advanced in sub-section 5.3 of the study. The emergence of the NPM is attributed largely to the financial turmoil of the 1970s. The fundamental thrust of its evolution is said to have been based on the attempt to engender productivity, performance, accountability, and flexibility in government (Denhardt 2008: 137).
But, as Hood (1995: 94) metaphorically puts it, “as with the disappearance of the dinosaurs, there is no single accepted explanation of this alleged paradigm shift”. In relation to this Hood (1991: 06) had earlier observed that “there is no single accepted explanation or interpretation of why NPM coalesced and why it caught on”. These observations presupposes that the NPM is a consequence of the multiplicity of factors, whose emphasis and articulation in the contemporary body of literature on the historical antecedents and evolution of the discipline differ from one scholar to another, depending on the intellectual disposition of the author or perhaps also an ‘unbiased’ commitment to dissect the literature and objectively ascertain historical facts for a balanced narrative. Before the discussion delves deep into the philosophical aspects that undergird its evolution, it is perhaps important to first explain this phenomenon called NPM and its doctrinal proposition.

In the existing literature the NPM is ill-defined (Hood 1991: 04). This study adopts Drechsler’s definition, which it finds the simplest way of succinctly articulating the essence of this phenomenon. Drechsler (2005: on-line) defines NPM as “the transfer of business and market principles and managerial techniques from the private sector into the public sector, symbiotic with and based on neo-liberal understanding of the economy”. Rhodes (1991: 01) explains that the NPM:

... [focuses] on management, not policy, and on performance appraisal and efficiency; the disaggregation of public bureaucracies into agencies which deal with each other on a user-pay basis; the use of quasi-markets and contracting out to foster competition; cost cutting; and a style of management which emphasises, amongst other things, output targets, limited-terms contracts, monetary incentives and freedom to manage.

The field of Public Administration is awash with a rich body of literature on the NPM. However, the outstanding contribution in proposing the NPM as the “only way to correct [the] irretrievable failures and even moral bankruptcy in the old public management” (Hood 1991:04) is perhaps that of Osborne and Gaebler in their 1992 best seller entitled Reinventing Government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the Public Sector. This book made a significant contribution to the discourse on the NPM as a new paradigm in the management of public affairs. It was used as a vehicle for “proselytising” and … “educating new converts” (Shafritz & Russell 2005: 311). In the context of the impact of Osborne and
Gaebler’s book, which was published in 1992, perhaps the observation made above that the NPM reached fruition and established itself as a paradigm in the 1990s is correct. But, what is the doctrinal foundation of NPM? Hood identifies seven doctrines of the NPM, which are summarised in Table 5.1 below.

### Table 5.1: Hood’s summary of the doctrinal components of the New Public Management (NPM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Typical justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>Hands-on professional management</em> in the public sector</td>
<td>Active, visible, discretionary control of organisations from named persons at the top, free to manage</td>
<td>Accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility for action, not diffusion of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><em>Explicit standards and measures of performance</em></td>
<td>Definitions of goals, targets, indicators of success, preferably expressed in quantitative terms, especially for professional services</td>
<td>Accountability requires clear statement of goals; efficiency requires hard look at objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Greater emphasis on <em>output controls</em></td>
<td>Resource allocation and rewards linked to measured performance; break up of centralised bureaucracy-wide personnel management</td>
<td>Need to stress results rather than procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Shift to <em>disaggregation of units in the public sector</em></td>
<td>Break up of formerly ‘monolithic’ units, unbundling of U-form management systems into corporatised units around products, operating on decentralised line budgets and dealing with another at arms length basis</td>
<td>Need to create manageable units, separate provision and production interests, gain efficiency advantages of use of contract or franchise arrangements inside as well as outside the public sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shift to greater <em>competition</em> in the public sector</td>
<td>Move to term contracts and public tendering procedures</td>
<td><em>Rivalry</em> as the key to lower costs and better standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Stress on private sector <em>styles of management practice</em></td>
<td>Move away from military-style public service ethic; greater flexibility in hiring and rewards; greater use of PR techniques</td>
<td>Need to use proven private sector management tools in the public sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Stress on greater <em>discipline and parsimony</em> in resource use</td>
<td>Cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, resisting union demands, limiting compliance costs to business</td>
<td>Need to check resource demands of public sector and do more with less</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hood’s (1991: 04-05) explanation of the doctrinal basis of the NPM concurs with that of Rhodes (1991: 01), as referred to above. Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 20) follow the mainstream discourse on the doctrinal foundation of the NPM. However, in their concept of re-inventing government and in contrast with Hood’s (1991: 04-05) cross-cutting doctrines, Osborne and Gaebler base the NPM on ten entrepreneurial doctrines. The consideration of Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992: 20) contribution on the doctrines of the NPM is also necessary to acquire insight into this important phenomenon in the evolution of the discipline from scholars whose book is acclaimed as authoritative. The proposition of Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 20) in which the said ten doctrines are ingrained is that:

... entrepreneurial government must promote competition between service providers. They empower citizens by pushing control out of bureaucracy, into community. They measure the performance of their agencies, focusing not on inputs but on outcomes. They are driven by their goals – their missions – not their rules and regulations. They redefine their clients as customers and offer them choice... They prevent problems before they emerge, rather than simply offering services afterwards. They put their energies into earning money, not simply spending it. They decentralise authority, embracing participatory management. They prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic mechanisms. And they focus not simply on providing public services, but on catalysing all sectors-public, private and voluntary-into action to solve their community’s problems. (Osborne and Gaebler 1992: 20)

The seven doctrines that Hood (1991: 04-05) identified; and Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992: 20) ten doctrines, as presented above, are implicated in much of the discussions on the NPM (see Rhodes 2005: 03-16; Ferris & Graddy 1998: 225-240; Lynn 1998: 107-123; Feldman & Khademian 2001: 339-361; Kickert 1997: 731-752; Green-Pedersen 2002: 271-294; Parker & Gould 2005: 230-255). However, Hood (1991: 04) observes that the “different commentators and advocates of NPM have stressed different aspects of doctrine”, but their discussions overlap. It is in such overlapping that the basis for scholarship coalescence on the doctrines of the NPM is found. It appears that the Minnowbrook II was not part of that coalescence of scholarship on the NPM. Garcia (2003: 99) explains that a “strong adversarial attitude toward business was evident” in the Minnowbrook II deliberations.
The Minnowbrook II, which took place at the height of the NPM hype in 1988 convened to reflect on the Minnowbrook I did not specifically discuss the NPM, which then was an emerging epistemological trend that emphasised the reform trajectory of reinventing government through the use of business principles and market mechanisms (Frederickson 2009: 06). Cameron and Milne (2009: 383) explain that this was probably as a result of the fact that the Minnowbrook II took place at the time when the ideas that undergird the NPM had not yet been crystallised into any coherent thought. They further point out that it is only in 1991 and 1992 respectively that the propositions of the NPM were concretised and systematised in Hood’s *A Public Management for all seasons* and Osborne and Gaebler’s *Reinventing government*.

The Minnowbrook II focussed on democracy, ethics, responsibility, philosophy, and even economics (Bailey 1989). Its biggest shortcoming is that it did not adequately deal with the question of implementation. Garcia (2003: 99) writes that “there was little vision of how the public service can function at its best within what promises to be a future of declining market share, as the United States faces the reality of a global economy and a changing industrial base”. The NPM was particularly concerned with this reality. Is this perhaps a reason the NPM assumed more prominence in defining the epistemological evolution of the discipline particularly between the 1980s and 1990s?

Green-Pedersen (2002: 271) makes an observation that “the scholarly debate about NPM has increasingly been influenced by what Premfors (1998: 145-146) labels the *structured pluralism story*, focussing on variation in the extent to which different countries have implemented NPM reforms”. Because of the limited scope of this chapter, such *structured pluralism story* is not narrated. Instead, the focus is, as an attempt to further understand the NPM, on what this study terms the *unstructured pluralism story*, which is concerned with variations in the accounts of the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the NPM. For, as Hood (1995:94) metaphorically puts it, “as with the disappearance of the dinosaurs, there is no single accepted explanation of this alleged paradigm shift”. This point is mentioned above with the promise that it would later be attended to. The promise is now being fulfilled.

In explaining the origin of NPM, Hood (1991: 05) uses the metaphor of it being a “marriage of opposites”, meaning that it is a product of “two different streams of ideas”, namely, the ‘new institutional economics’ and the ‘business-type managerialism in the public sector’. The
‘new institutional economics’ is the idea that is associated with the post-World War II intellectualism as it pertains to the public choice theory, transactions cost theory and principal-agent theory. These theories are traced from the early works of scholars such as Black (1958), Arrow (1963) and Niskanen (1971). Drechsler (2005: on-line) states that the NPM “is of particular interest in the post-autistic economics (PAE) context because [it] largely rests on the same ideology and epistemology as standard textbook economics”. Based on the ideas of contestability, user choice, transparency and incentive structure, the thinking that undergirds the ‘new institutional economics’ contributed significantly towards the generation of administrative reforms doctrines, which constitutes part of the epistemological essence of the NPM, the other part lies in the ‘business-type of managerialism’.

The business-type managerialism is embedded in scientism or the scientific management approach, from which “a set of administrative reform doctrines based on the ideas of professional management expertise as portable, paramount over technical expertise, requiring high discretionary power to achieve results (free to manage) and central and indispensable to better organisational performance, through the development of appropriate cultures and the active measurement and adjustment of organisational outputs” evolved (Hood 1991: 05-06). The NPM is a synthesis of the ‘new institutional economics’ and the ‘business-type managerialism’. It is the offspring of the marriage of opposites that Hood (1991: 05) used as a metaphor to explain the “two streams of ideas” from which it evolved.

Minogue (2003: 04) explains that conceptually the “NPM is a response to perceived failures of the command and control state with its Keynesian philosophy of stabilisation and redistribution, and strong internal values, public interest and public accountability”. It represents a particular intellectual paradigm in the development of the art and science of public administration. As a reform initiative, the NPM is embedded in the doctrine of market economics and managerialism, whose proposition is that solutions to administrative challenges could be found in institutional economics and management rather than politics and policy (Hughes 1994: 02). Its “goal is a slim, reduced, minimal state in which public activity is decreased and, if at all, exercised according to business principles of efficiency” (Drechsler 2005: on-line).
The NPM’s focus is largely on the inside of the organisation with the intention to achieve economy, efficiency and effectiveness or what is referred to as the “3Es” (Hughes 1994: 02). Rhodes (2005: 09) writes that the first thrust of the NPM captured by the foregoing acronym has ingrained in it phrases such as ‘value for money’ and ‘better use of resources’. The NPM is viewed as a “determined effort to implement the “3Es” in the public sector (Hood 1991: 03-07; Shafritz & Russell 2005: 311). Drechsler (2005: on-line) explains that the NPM is “popularly denoted by concepts such as project management, flat hierarchies, customer orientation, abolition of career civil service, depolitisation, total quality management, and contracting-out” of public services. It is further explained that it is based on the “understanding that all human behaviour is always motivated by self-interest and, specifically, profit maximisation” (Drechsler 2005: on-line).

The NPM derives its theoretical essence from the market economics rather than democratic imperatives (Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008). It is embedded in the philosophy of neoliberalism. The NPM shares similar epistemological proposition with economic theories in the quantification myth that “everything relevant can be quantified; qualitative judgements are not necessary” (Drechsler 2005: on-line). Minogue (2003: 03-04) observes that in much of the existing literature on NPM there is a general consensus that, with the exception of Hood (1998), NPM involves “a novel conception of the state-society, public-private set of relationships” and its “roots as a new philosophy of governance are to be found in the neoliberal thought”. The introduction of NPM marked the inception of a fundamental paradigm shift from the traditional model of public administration. It ushered in a totally different system of governance, which “shows that major paradigm shifts in theory and policy may actually happen” (Drechsler 2005: on-line).

The NPM sought to replace “the rigid, hierarchical, bureaucratic form of public administration” that “predominated for most of the twentieth century” – said to be “discredited theoretically and practically – with a “flexible, market-based form of public management” (Hughes 1994: 01). It jettisoned the German sociologist Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy and was widely accepted as a “new paradigm” in managing public affairs by international institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and in countries such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand (see Hague, Harrop & Breslin 1998; Hughes 1994). It originated in Anglo-America during the times of Thatcher and Reagan. The NPM was also used as a reform
template in most developing countries (see Maserumule 2009: 755-770; Schmidt 2008:109-129). The NPM was vehemently pushed as part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s imposed on most developing countries as the solution to especially the African developmental conundrum. This aspect is discussed extensively in Chapter 4 of the study.

Minogue (2003: 04) explains that the reform model that the NPM propagates is “driven by the assumptions that large scale bureaucracies are inherently defective and wasteful, and the market is better equipped than the state to provide most goods and services”. The theoretical premise of this proposition is embedded in the market economics and private sector philosophies of management. Its proposition is that the public sector should be run according to business principles. As explained above, the virtuous of the “3Es”: economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, constitute the fundamental thrust of the NPM. Its proponents argue that the “NPM is a response to perceived failures of the command and control state with its Keynesian philosophy of stabilisation and redistribution, and strong internal values of public interest and public accountability” (Minogue 2003: 04).

The NPM is consistent with the theory of a minimalist state. They share the same philosophical foundation in neo-liberalism. In contract with bureaucracy the NPM is concerned with the results rather than hierarchy, rules, regulations, processes and procedures. It propounds that efficiency and effectiveness in government could be achieved through “a withdrawal from direct service provision in favour of a steering or enabling role” (Minogue 2003:4). Max Weber argues that bureaucracy “is the most efficient means by which organisations can achieve their ends” by “division of labour, a clear authority hierarchy, formal selection procedures, detailed rules and regulations and impersonal relationships” (Robbins 1990: 37).

The NPM propounds that the private sector is given the opportunity for “involvement in the provision of public services” on a more competitive rather than control basis” (Schmidt 2008: 111). The philosophical and theoretical orientation of the NPM spelled ‘the fall of a public man’. This phrase is used as a title of the book Sennet authored, which was published in 1986. In the review of the book The fall of public man, Lumley (s.a.: n.a) aptly captures the contextual implications of the NPM as a public service reform initiative and the context of its rationality in this way:
We live at a time when all that is public is being downgraded, while the private is identified with good quality, fast delivery and personal satisfaction. To many, public ownership spells bureaucracy, public service broadcasting equals paternalism and state education means cultural deprivation. By contrast, private enterprise, whether in education, in formation or entertainment, has new-found confidence. This dramatic change in the relationship between public and private spheres is often attributed to Thatcherism. However, we need to broaden our horizons. Clearly, the British experience is closely paralleled elsewhere, while in countries like Italy public life has long been regarded with cynicism. Moreover, the current crisis needs to be understood as a historical development. (Lumley s.a.: n.a)

But, did the NPM revolutionise Public Administration as science in terms of its epistemological content, theoretical validity, and ability to define its focus as an academic discipline? What are the fundamental epistemological trends that could be observed in the NPM in terms of its impact on the evolution of Public Administration? Drechsler (2005: n.a) explains that “NPM is part of the neo-classical economic imperialism within the social sciences, i.e the tendency to approach all questions with neo-classical economic methods”. This explains the reason NPM, for some time, emerged as a dominant paradigm to the extent of nearly assuming the status of orthodoxy, but perhaps not in the same way as bureaucracy did.

For neo-liberalism as the philosophical antecedent of the NPM was, following its ascendancy in the political thought of the 1980s, extolled as marking “the end of history, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (Fukuyama 1989: 04), beyond which human knowledge cannot traverse (Mahao 2009: 76). But, contrary to the foregoing, neo-liberalism appears to signify the beginning of history in human knowledge and ideological development. This is so in that neo-liberalism is now being challenged in the contemporary body of knowledge on all fronts (see Leftwich 1993: 605-624). The philosophy of neo-liberalism is considered extensively in Chapter 3 of the thesis. It is referred to here only to explain the philosophical context of the NPM.
Drechsler (2005: on-line) observes that in 1995, it was still possible to believe in NPM, although there were the first strong and substantial critiques of its proposition. However, as time gravitated towards the end of the 1990s, the criticisms against the NPM escalated to higher proportions. This resulted in the emergence of an extensive body of anti-NPM literature that challenged its paradigmatic validity. To locate this observation in its proper context, it needs to be pointed out that the criticisms against the NPM are as old as its emergence in the 1980s. For, when Hood penned the seminal article entitled *A Public Administration for all seasons*, which was published in 1991, the attempt was to respond to the critics of the critics of the NPM then already in existence, but “scattered among a variety of often ephemeral sources” (Hood 1991: 09). The anti-NPM literature accumulated extensively as neo-liberalism was dismissed and its failure to create a new world order exposed following the end of the Cold War (Leftwich 1993: 605-624, Mahao 2009: 69-79; Minogue 2003: 01-30).

The NPM was criticised as “like the Emperor’s New Clothes in the well known Hans Christian Andersen story – all hype and no substance”; it “damaged the public service while being ineffective in its ability to deliver on its central claim to lower costs per (constant) unit of service”; “in spite of its professed claims to promote the public good (of cheaper and better public services for all), it is actually a vehicle for particularistic advantage”; and, contrary to the claim that is a public management for all seasons, “the different administrative values have different implications for fundamental aspects of administrative design-implications which go beyond altering the settings of the systems”(Hood 1991: 09). Hood (1991: 08-10) reviewed these criticisms and concludes that most of them “have not been definitely tested”; and largely bother on semanticism. But, in the literature that subsequently appeared towards the end of the 1990s, the critiques of the NPM seemed to have been vindicated as the empirical studies conducted confirms most of their positions on the NPM. It is during this period that the criticisms against the NPM assumed a systematic and coherent body of knowledge that rejected the NPM (Dent, Chandler & Barry 2004).

In the anti-NPM body of literature important epistemological trends in the evolution of Public Administration as a result of the impact of the NPM could be discerned. The development of the discipline at the time of NPM showed signs of revisionism to the 1956-1970 paradigm when Public Administration sought epistemological refuge in the Administrative Science (Henry 1975: 382-383). A contention advanced against this epistemological trend in the
evolution of the discipline is that it obfuscated the identity and uniqueness of public administration as it failed to distinguish the ‘publicness’ of the administration of government from that of the business sector. The critique against the NPM is based on the same contention. Drechsler (2005:online) contends that the NPM “harvests the public; it sees no difference between public and private interest”. Rhodes (2005:09) adds:

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\text{The NPM is based on the conviction that the public sector must emulate private sector management. However, as Ranson and Stewart argue, just as the job of management varies in the private sector, so there are distinctive tasks in the public domain and there are also distinctive purposes and conditions. For example, a defining characteristic of the public sector is the determination of collective values out of the mosaic of conflicting interests, a process which extends beyond such values as managerial efficiency to encompass equity and justice. The NPM does not always recognise the distinctive tasks, purposes and conditions of public sector management. There has been a narrow focus on efficiency at the expense of, for example, broader notions of public accountability.}
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This is one criticism that Hood (1991:03-19) did not make any reference to in the article that engaged the critiques of the NPM. Does this presuppose its validity? In this the answer is proffered in a positive sense. Just before the publication of Hood’s article in 1991, William Waldegrave, the Secretary of State for Health, in Trafford Memorial Lecture in 1990, warns that:

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\text{Without remitting for one moment the pressure to get a better management system, borrowing what is useful from business, let us watch our language a bit. It just bears saying straight out: the NHS [National Health Service] is not a business; it is a public service and a great one. (Waldegrave 1990)}
\]

These are profound thoughts that contain elements of doubts into the validity of the NPM articulated by an official from one of the governments that have always been in the forefront in championing the NPM agenda. The NPM eroded the foundational value and normative basis of the science and practice of public administration. With the commodification of the public good, the concept of a citizen was supplanted by a market nomenclature of a customer and a customer service. The parlance of market economics and managerialism permeated the
conceptual foundation of Public Administration. This created conceptual inconsistencies for theorising and philosophising as the NPM estranged the normative and conceptual foundations of the field.

Drechsler (2005: on-line) explains that “the use of business techniques within the public sphere… confuses the most basic requirements of any state, particularly of a democracy, with a liability: regularity, transparency, and due process are simply much more important than low costs and speed”. In the article entitled *Paradoxes of public sector customer service*, Fountain (2001: 55) argues that the concept of customer service in government is poorly developed. It is overenthusiastic rhetoric that obscures clear thinking (Fountain 2001: 55). Maserumule (2009: 765) also questions the usage of the concept of a customer in Public Administration. In this the argument is that the concept of a customer, whose theoretical antecedents are embedded in the private sector business administrative systems and philosophies, is a characterisation of people in society. People become customers when they enter into transactional relationships of mutual benefit. These types of relationships are characterised by abundance of choices in case either of the party reneges or is not satisfied with the services they get from the other. This means that a customer has the power of choice. The same, however, cannot be said about the relationship between government and people (Maserumule 2009: 765).

Box, Marshall, Reed and Reed (2001: 608-619) argue that the NPM eschews substantive democracy. The epistemic imperative of NPM is a subject of fierce contestation. Its criticisms are so many that this chapter cannot cover them all. Suffice to point out that the NPM is part of modernism, which a plethora of ideological, philosophical, theoretical and empirical contestations in the contemporary body of knowledge and which seems to have succeeded in exposing its limitations to the extent of justifying its displacement. Heinrich, Hill and Lynn (2004: 03) explain that “beginning in the early 1990s, it became popular to argue that the field of public administration must be repositioned on new intellectual and practical foundations to avoid collapsing into rubble of irrelevance”. This came up very clear in the Twenty-Fifth International Congress of Administrative Sciences in July 2001 in Athens, whose theme was *Governance and Public Administration in the 21st Century: New Trends and New Techniques*. 
In the proceedings of the 26th International Congress of Administrative Sciences Kim (2005: 38) reports that “there have been calls in the public sector for a new paradigm that will redefine and re-conceptualise administrative systems and improve relationships between and within government, citizens, businesses, and government ministries”. The idea of governance emerged as a widely proposed alternative framework to the NPM, with most scholars beginning to make important scholarly contributions towards its development as a paradigm of Public Administration (Kickert 1997: 731-735; Garvey 1997; Peters & Pierre 1998; Kettl 2000, 2002; Salamon 2002). According to Kim (2005: 38), the “Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) promise to strengthen government’s policy effectiveness, political accountability, transparency, and public participation”. The ICTs bequeathed to the parlance of Public Administration concepts such as e-governance, e-government, e-democracy, and e-citizen, which basically refer to the use of technological tools to enhance the quality of governance. Some scholars regard these concepts as representing another paradigm in the field of Public Administration, which replaced the NPM.

Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler (2006: 467-494) proclaimed that the NPM is dead and the digital-era governance is taking over. This presupposes that the emergence of ICTs in Public Administration heralded another paradigm. In the context of the discussion in sub-section 5.3 above, this study does not subscribe to the foregoing view. For, the concepts such as e-governance, digital governance, e-citizen, and e-democracy evolved to describe the usage of technological tools rather than patterns of thinking in the Public Administration epistemology. In the following sub-section governance is discussed as one of the contemporary paradigms of Public Administration that followed the NPM.

5.3.2.2 Governance

Harlan Cleveland is credited as the first person to use the word governance, however, not as a Public Administration paradigm, but rather an alternative phrase to it (Frederickson 2005: 02). Lately scholars in the field are subsequently making important contributions toward the development of governance as a paradigm of Public Administration to supplant the NPM (see Kickert 1997: 731-735; Garvey 1997; Peters & Pierre 1998; Kettl 2000, 2002, Salamon 2002). Fenger and Bekker (2007: 13) observe that “the concept of governance has become a very popular theme in the theory and practice of Public Administration”. Although some
scholars use it as being synonymous to the NPM (Khan 2009: 07), the difference between the two is distinctly marked. Governance is emerging as a contemporary paradigm of Public Administration to correct the imperfections and limitations associated with the NPM (Kickert 1997: 731-752).

Cloete (2003: 11) explains that the emergence of the governance paradigm in the field of Public Administration was necessitated by the weaknesses in the liberal, free-market based NPM approach. It is argued that the scope of governance transcends the intra-organisational focus of the NPM and its market orientation. It offers a possible theoretical paradigm “that lie(s) far beyond the standard responses, structures, and processes” (Kettl 2002: 123) associated with bureaucracy and the NPM. Governance “shifts the unit analysis from programs and agencies to tools of action; and the focus of administration from hierarchy to network, from public versus private to public plus private, from command and control to negotiation and persuasion, from management skills to enablement skills”(Heinrich, Hill & Lynn 2004: 03-04). It has the potential to expand the focus, and redefine the locus, of the discipline (Henry 2008).

A comprehensive conceptual analysis of governance is provided in Chapter 4 of the thesis. Such analysis cannot be repeated, except to point out that, in the literature that emerged to challenge the NPM and offer governance as an alternative paradigm, the prefix public is added to governance to make it public governance (Apreda 2007; Bevir 2007; Kickert 1997; Osborne 2009a). Does this presuppose any conceptual implication of some sort? Bevir (2007: xxi) explains that the term public governance is used specifically to “describe changes in the nature of the state following the public sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s”, which were “intensified by global changes, including an increase in transitional economic activity and the rise of regional institutions such as the European Union (EU)”. It is used to indicate that engagements with public governance “do not deal with analogous uses of the word governance to refer to patterns of rule other than those associated with the formal authority of government”. However, there is a theoretical connection between public governance and governance, for, both concepts are concerned with patterns of rule, although the latter in more general and holistic terms as compared with the former which, as indicated in the foregoing, is associated with the formal authority of government. Public governance is a subset of governance (Bevir 2007: xxi).
For the purpose of this study, the term *governance* rather than *public governance* is preferred, lest it lose the philosophical essence of its etymological context, which is discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis. Henry (2008: n.a) explains that “governance is a surrogate word for public administration and policy implementation”. The governance paradigm seems to have drawn so much from the Minnowbrook I rather than Minnowbrook II. This is based on the fact that the governance paradigm emphasises a shift from the NPM orientation on management to policy issues, which is one of the fundamental propositions that came out very clearly in the Minnowbrook I debates (Garcia 2003: 98). In the concept of networks and collaborations Minnowbrook III appears to have had significant influence in the evolution of the governance paradigm. This is clear in the different definitional perspectives on *governance* as presented in Chapter 4 of the thesis, which reflect various theoretical contexts from which it is said that the concept could be understood (Fenger & Bekker 2007: 14).

*Governance* is defined by some as the networks of interactions and collaboration. The question of managing the international public sector was also emphasised in Minnowbrook III. It is subsumed in the variation of the governance concept of global governance. The consideration of the various theoretical contexts of the concept may be important for developing a deeper theoretical insight into the essence of *governance*, which is propounded as the emerging paradigm in Public Administration. Various theoretical propositions subsumed in the different uses of the concept of *governance* in the existing body of literature are disaggregated into the following: *networked governance* (Schmidt 2008), *global governance*, *theory of subsidiarity*, *minimalist state theory and NPM* (Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008), *theory of multi-level control* (Scott 2002), *developmental state* and *democracy* (Leftwich 1993), and *good governance* and *effective government* (Larmour 1995). This presupposes that the “governance theory is an intellectual project attempting to unify the various intellectual threads running through a multidisciplinary literature into a framework that covers this broad area of government activity” (Henry 2008: n.a.). Those intellectual threads are discussed below.

5.3.2.2.1 **Networked governance**

The concept of *network* features prominently in most definitions of *governance* to emphasise the importance of that link and relationships among the various actors with a stake in the business of government. Henry (2008: n.a.) states that *networks* “can serve a range of
impromptu purposes such as creating a marketplace of new ideas”. It highlights the importance of the links and relationships among different entities that considered “elements of a broader strategy for service production and delivery that [are] open to a range of means of generating services” (Peters & Pierre 2003: 02). According to Schmidt (2008: 111) networked governance “emerges in the more complex information era times of the 1990s to address the limitations of the state and the market in addressing the many complex challenges facing society”.

The idea that undergirds governance from the networked perspective is that of “partnership with civil society, co-innovation and civic leadership” (Schmidt 2008: 111). Khan (2009: 07) explains that, compared to the NPM, governance “emphasises a link between the civil society organisations and the state”. Other scholars add the private sector in the governance equation (see Salamon 2002) as part of that network in the governance system. It encompasses “the predominance of network relationships, deregulation, hybridisation of public and private resources, and use of multiple instruments in policy implementation” (Heinrich, Hill & Lynn 2004: 03).

**Governance** is looked at as the “totality of theoretical conceptions on governing” (Henry 2008: n.a). Kooiman (Henry 2008: n.a.) defines governing as “the totality of interactions, in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities; attending to the institutions as contexts for the governing in interactions; and establishing a normative foundation for all activities”. Henry (2008: n.a.) explains that “governance refers to self-organising, inter-organisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state”. It is “about arms-length, indirect relationships with dispersed and diverse entities rather than about the supervision of civil servants who are organised by agency and governed by employer contracts” (Heinrich, Hill, & Lynn 2004: 03). The authority is dispersed among multiple centres of networks, as they have considerable autonomy. This means that authority is not centred on one centre. There is no sovereign authority (see Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008). This thinking is based on “the widespread belief that the state increasingly depends on other organisations to secure and deliver its policies” (Bevir 2007: xxi).
Networked governance extends far beyond intergovernmental relations, which focuses only on the relationships between and among government institutions within a particular nation state. Intergovernmental relations is that part of the locus of Public Administration concerned with “the structures of public organisations dealing mainly with the way the executive organisations are formed, readjusted, reformed” (Chakrabarty & Bhattacharya 2003: 02) and, more importantly, related. Perhaps the appropriate concept analogous to networked governance could be that of intersectoral collaboration, which in some universities has been identified as a specific area of study in the Public Administration curricula, especially in South Africa (Maserumule 2005b: 14-27).

The concept of networked governance expands and redefines the locus of Public Administration to include “influential and meaningful relationships that are found to exist between Public Administration and its surrounding socio-political and economic milieu” (Chakrabarty & Bhattacharya 2003: 02). Its implication is that theorising in the field of Public Administration should move beyond public bureaucracy dynamics as units of analysis and factors in other aspects outside the confines of the formal authority of government, that are, however, critically important in the functioning of government. In this the governance paradigm heralds an important epistemological trend in the evolution of Public Administration.

5.3.2.2.2 Global governance

It is clear in the propositions of networked governance that the concept of governance “involves efforts to construct policy responses at the multiplicity levels” (Wallace 1996: 11-12). Such levels do not only refer to the domestic entities or actors in the national policy development and implementation processes, but also to the international ones. This presupposes that the global actors are also key considerations in the governance concept. It is from this perspective that the notion of global governance emerged, which Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008: n.a) regard as the new theory of governance. In the global context the conception of governance is described in terms of “the international organisations that operate on a global scale and the link between activities of their members in a specific field of international relations” (Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008: n.a.).
It is explained in the existing literature that the concept of governance as it applies to the international organisations is characterised by “a shared understanding of objectives and standards of conduct pertinent to the organisation’s specific subject, or goal, of governance; agreed-upon rules that seek to give structure and substance to the organisation’s objectives; and a regulatory structure to monitor and enforce compliance with the organisation’s rules, tend to their amendment, and resolve disputes arising from their interpretation” (Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008: n.a). The driving force of global governance is the globalisation of the international economy, which “became a dominant intellectual paradigm” in the 1980s (Gaye 2005: 56).

Globalisation preoccupied the attention of most scholars in the field, particularly in terms of its implication on the theory and practice of public administration (see Farazmand & Pinkowski 2007). The discourse on globalisation is implicated in Chapter 3 of the thesis. For the purpose of this chapter, it suffices to only rehearse its definition. Ekpo and Ibom (2002: 14) define globalisation as “a process of integrating economic decision-making such as the consumption, investment, and saving process all across the world; it is a global market in which all nations are required to participate”. It is about the interdependence and interconnectedness of the modern world”; a “trend [that] has been accelerated since the end of the cold war” (United Kingdom, White Paper on International Development 2002: par. 17).

Mhone (2003b: 26-27) explains that “while analysts may differ as to the extent [of globalisation], there is a general agreement that some international exchanges or movements represent something more than internationalisation, especially since the nation-state is unable to control the rapidity or intensity at which such transactions occur, so that they appear to be independent of any one entity”. Globalisation heralded fundamental global changes, which manifested themselves in the “lateral and interinstitutional relations in administration in the context of the decline of sovereignty, the decreasing importance of jurisdictional borders, and a general institutional fragmentation” (Frederickson & Smith 2003: 222). Governance as a body of theory seeks to understand all these phenomena, which impacts on Public Administration and seeks to redefine the locus and focus of the field.
Global governance offers an opportunity to elevate the minor status of comparative administration, which Samier (2005: 11) states “demonstrates a number of problems in public administration”. Dahl (Samier 2005: 11) “argued that claims for a science of public administration are hollow without a comparative perspective and knowledge upon which to base a body of generalised principles independent of their particular national setting”. The global governance transcends the national state settings. It propagates that the societal challenges “may be resolved not only by sovereign (that is, national) governments, but also by international organisations composed of multiple sovereign governments” (Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008: n.a).

The implication of the governance concept on Public Administration in the context of the proposition of global governance is that the theoretical developments in the field should take into account the phenomenon of globalisation and internationalisation, lest they be irrelevant. But, some may argue that globalisation and the concept of international relations belongs to the Economic and Political Sciences respectively, not Public Administration. But, as pointed out above, the “governance theory is an intellectual project attempting to unify the various intellectual threads running through a multidisciplinary literature into a framework that covers the broad area of government activity” (Henry 2008: n.a.). The attempt to accommodate globalisation and internationalisation in the field is through a comparative Public Administration. However, Samier (2005: 12) observes that comparative Public Administration is still “lacking in development and legitimacy”.

In as far as the propositions of the networked and global governance are concerned, the fundamental question is, with the multiplicity of participants or actors in the affairs of government, how is the issue of control and accountability to be handled? Henry (2008: n.a) further poses fundamental questions: “when authority and responsibility are parcelled out across the network, who is to blame when something goes wrong?”, and “how does government relinquish some control and still ensure results?” These questions articulate the paradox of the governance theory. To this one may further ask whether the propositions of governance are feasible in practical terms. These questions need to be adequately answered for the governance concept to supplant the NPM as a theoretically sound alternative paradigm of Public Administration. Do the answers to the questions referred to in the foregoing perhaps lie in Scott’s (2002) theory of multi-level control?
5.3.2.2.3 Theory of multi-level control

In *The Governance of European Union: The potential for multi-level control*, Scott (2002: 59-79) considers governance within the context of the *theory of multi-level control*. Its proposition is that to control any form of activity in a system is key to realising the optimum results of what is intended. The instruments of control are rules, regulations, norms and standards, which each constituent in a governance system ought to subscribe to. The *theory of multi-level control* presupposes that governance is essentially about control of the different constituents at various levels of interactions. The definition of governance as the exercise of authority therefore appears to be rooted in the *theory of multi-level control*, “where authority refers to systems of accountability and control” (Heinrich, Hill & Lynn 2004: 04; see also Scott 2002: 63).

In the concept of governance the proposition is that state actors and institutions are not the only relevant institutions to dispense authority on matters of public interest. This is clear in the networked and global governance dimensions of the concept as explained in sub-sections 5.3.2.3.1 and 5.3.2.3.2 above. Sloat (2003: 129) explains that “the state does not dominate the policy-making process but increasingly involves multiple actors”, whose “relationships are non-hierarchical and mutually dependent”. The *theory of multi-level control* propagates that the multiplicity of actors in the governance system should be controlled and the effective system of accountability needs to be instituted. A premise from which this theory moves is that governance is fragmentary in nature. It is characterised by the dispersion of resources and authority that are key to enhance the capacity to govern, some of which are located outside the confines of government.

Scott (2002: 63) explains that “there is a long history of non-governmental resources being deployed for control purposes for functions which might be regarded as governmental in character”. The control of activities in a governance system is not exercised only by the authorities of government. The non-governmental actors can also exercise control on different levels of government. This is where the essence of the *theory of multi-level control* lies. In this theory the concept of control in the governance system is not in the sense of “the traditional systems-theoretical, cybernetic approach of steering”, but that of “co-directing actors in a market of societal traffic among various social actors” (Kickert 1997: 736). The interactions of multiplicity of actors at different levels play itself out “as a function of the
interplay of ideas, interests and institutions and focussed on the choices made by a variety of actors about how to respond to an issue” (Wallace 1996: 12).

In as far as the concept of governance within the context of the theory of multi-level control is concerned, Sloat (2003: 129) observes that “some analysts warn about the state’s implied lack of control” in that authority especially on policy is depleted among the various actors at the different societal levels. The manner in which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank conduct their business in relation to the different member states exemplifies how the concept of governance is applied in the global context. Another example is in relation to the extent to which the civil society and the business community might wield power in the business of government.

Some argue that the governance concept in the global context limits the sovereignty of nation-states (see Kohler-Koch 2001), complicates accountability and emasculates government authority. These appear to be valid concerns, which relate to the questions asked in sub-section 5.3.2.3.2 above. The theory of multi-level control does not seem to have adequately provided answers to these questions. However, the theory of subsidiarity seems to suggest that the concerns for accountability and control are misplaced in the governance discourse. But what does this mean? To acquire a detailed insight into the context of this contention, the theory of subsidiarity is considered below as another important dimension in the governance discourse.

5.3.2.2.4 Theory of subsidiarity

The theory of subsidiarity contends that limiting state sovereignty and authority is critically important to enhance local democracy (see Cullen 2000: 124; Carozza 2003: 40). Its proposition is that the complexity of the contemporary governance challenges makes it difficult to address them through the notions of state sovereignty or the arrangement where government solely exercise authority. The proposition of the theory of subsidiarity is that “each social and political group should help smaller or more local ones to accomplish their respective ends without, however, arrogating those tasks to itself” (Carozza 2003: 38). It bequeathed to the body of knowledge as a governance theory “a conceptual tool to mediate the polarity of pluralism and the common good in a globalised world” (Carozza 2003: 38).
The theory of subsidiarity is linked to global governance in that its focus is on the relationship between international organisations and member states. Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008: n.a) explain that the theory of subsidiarity “is based on the view that an international organisation possesses certain powers traditionally exercised by the sovereign state because its member countries surrendered these powers upon entering the particular organisation”. The assumption that underpins this theory is that systems of governance in nation-states improve when international organisations take part in their domestic policy activities and initiatives. It enhances legitimacy, acceptability, efficiency and effectiveness (Carrington, DeBuse & Lee 2008).

The participation or involvement of the IMF and the World Bank in various nation-states’ developmental initiatives is often cited as examples of the theory of subsidiarity in praxis. However, this arrangement is a subject of contestation when coming to the question of power relations between the international organisations and nation-states, particularly in Africa. McLean (1996: 482) uses the case of the European Union to illustrate this point and argues that “what to one person is [a matter] of only local interest, to another is a matter of union-wide concern”. This means that often there would be contestations in terms of which matters are of local nature and could therefore be handled within the jurisdiction of nation-states as opposed to those that could be handled in the international realm or space. In this the concept of governance could get complicated.

Central to the idea of subsidiarity is the individual citizen within the state who achieves self-actualisation proportions “only in being enmeshed in a society”. This idea is based on the proposition that “individual citizens prima facie know best what is good for them”, and “is broadly concerned with the limits of the right and the duty of the public authority to intervene in the social and economic affairs of individual citizens or groups of citizens” (Cullen 2000:124, 127). The state assists the social person by creating opportunities appropriate for maximising human potential. The fundamental principle associated with the foregoing is that the state should not “intervene in the private affairs of citizens unless it is necessary in order to safeguard the common good”; “in many instances in which good and conscientious citizens (for whatever reason) are unable to fend for themselves, the public authority has an obligation to assist human flourishing by the establishment of an appropriate infrastructure that will enable everyone to thrive” (Cullen 2000: 125).
The notion of ‘intervention and not interference’ in the theory of subsidiarity could be associated with the parlance of a developmental state (see Leftwich 1993: 620) whereas that of limiting government intervention in the societal affairs could be related to that of a minimalist state. As pointed out above, these aspects are propounded in some literature as other theoretical contexts from which the governance concept could be understood. They are also considered below. A developmental state is discussed along with democracy whereas a minimalist state is coupled with the NPM. This is because of the fact that these aspects share the same philosophical and theoretical foundations.

5.3.2.2.5 Developmental state and democracy

Moore (1995: 89-96) opines that “both democracy and development depend on the prior construction of an effective developmental state, which is regulatory, competent and distributive, and creates the political authority to manage social and political conflicts”. Smith (2003:156) explains that “the concept of a developmental state as an objective of state-building first appeared in the late 1960s” and was used as a framework for the analysis of Latin American development from 1971 “but made its greatest impact on the study of economic development with the publication of Chalmers Johnson’s 1982 MITI and the Japanese miracle: The growth of industry policy 1925-1975. In this seminal work Johnson analyses factors that undergird Japan’s successful post-war construction and industrial renaissance, what Beeson (s.a.) describes as the efforts of a “plan rational state”, which is a developmental state.

Johnson (1982) defines a developmental state as that type of state rationally planned in a manner that makes it possible and necessary for government to influence the direction and pace of economic and social development rather than leaving it to the dictates of the markets (see also Beeson, n.d; Castells 1992; Mkandawire 1998; Sindzingre 2004). Another instructive definition is found in Leftwich (1993: 620), where a developmental state is defined as that “state whose political and bureaucratic elite has the genuine developmental determination and autonomous capacity to define, pursue and implement developmental goals”. In the context of a developmental state governance implies the ability of government to co-ordinate the national developmental efforts of different strategic actors and channel them towards the developmental agenda; intervenes, rather than interferes, to ensure the successful pursuit of such agenda. The propositions of a developmental state suggest that
governance in the 21st century ought be characterised by, using Kim’s (2005: 15) words, “mutually beneficial relationship and co-operation between public and private sectors”.

As a theoretical context from which governance could be understood, the propositions of a developmental state do not necessarily differ with those of the networked and global governance because they also emphasise the importance of that link or relationship between the public and private sector in the pursuit of the national states’ developmental agendas. The civil society is also mentioned as a key strategic sector in that linkage, which is a key aspect in the pursuit of democracy. One of the fundamental imperatives of democracy is popular participation. The democratic governments ought to always act in the interest of the citizens (Heywood 1997: 65-82). In defining, pursuing and implementing developmental goals the democratic imperative of citizen participation in the processes of governance is critically important. For, as Evans (2009: 09) puts it, the “developmental states must be vehicles for socially defining and choosing societal goals, in addition to being instruments to achieve them”. This function “puts effective participation in democratic deliberation at the top of the list of the capabilities the developmental state must foster” (Evans 2009: 09).

In the context of democracy the essence governance is underscored in the concepts such as ‘public interest’ and the ‘public service’, ‘the rule of law and etat de droit’, ‘citizens and civil society’. These aspects were emphasised in Twenty-Fifth International Congress of Administrative Sciences in July 2001, where governance was discussed as an important epistemological trend in the evolution of Public Administration in the 21st century (Heinrich, Hill & Lynn 2004: 05). But, democracy is not the end in itself, but a means to an end. The end of democracy ought to be development. In this context the proposition is that the concept of a developmental state is an appropriate supplement to that of democracy. In a developmental state government establishes social and economic goals. While the means of production are privately owned, the state intervenes to provide guidance, to ensure that the utilisation of the means of production is aimed at realising the national interest (Beeson, s.a.; Evans 1998; Johnson 1982; Palidano 2000).

A developmental state is neither capitalist nor socialist. It is also not necessarily democratic in the sense of the early theory of democracy, whose emphasis was on the procedural rather than substantive or developmental aspects of the concept. However, some elements of each are either ingrained or implicated in the imperatives of a developmental state, which therefore
appears to be a synthesis of capitalism, socialism and democracy. In a capitalist state there is
private ownership or control of factors of production with state intervention in the economy
being either minimal or totally absent. Although in both capitalism and developmentalism
factors of production are privately owned, the fundamental difference lies in the extent of
state control and its involvement in the economy (see Beeson, s.a.; Evans 1998; Johnson
1982; Palidano 2000; McLean 1996: 54-56).

The importance of democracy in a developmental state is underscored above. However,
Leftwich (1993:620) seems to suggest that the theories of governance embedded in the
imperatives of procedural democracy in theorising governance are, in a developmental state
context, insufficient variables. In this the contention is that a key variable in theorising
governance should not necessarily be a democratic state in the neo-liberal procedural sense,
but a developmental state. In a way this perspective challenges the conception of governance
in neo-liberal democratic terms. Some authors are more forthright in rejecting the theorisation
of governance in neo-liberal democratic terms in the contention that such approach is a
disguise for continued neo-colonial domination of economic relationships between the
developed and developing countries (Barya 1993: 16-23; Gibbon, Banguraand & Ofstad

A theoretical point that needs to be clarified here is that, although democracy is not
necessarily a prerequisite of a developmental state, it is an important imperative to facilitate a
developmental state project. A developmental state should therefore not be misconstrued as
the antithesis of democracy, especially as it pertains to the substantive dimension of the
concept. In fact, it appears conceptually feasible to synthesise a developmental state with
democracy. From this conceptual mix the concept of a developmental democracy emerges as
being appropriate to capture the essence of both a developmental state and democracy.
Heywood (1997: 72) defines this concept as being concerned “with the development of the
human individual and the community” The implication in this is that any intellectual exercise
in theorising governance ought to be premised on the notion of public interest, which
constitutes the essence of developmental democracy. In this context the contribution of the
governance paradigm is that Public Administration should reassert its normative antecedents
in the concept of democracy, but also, more importantly, reposition its intellectual and
practical foundations in the imperatives of a developmental state, which, in many respects, is
the antithesis of a minimalist state.
5.3.2.2.6 Minimalist state and NPM

Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008: s.a.) explain that as the theory of governance the minimalist state “refers to an organisational structure that arises when there is no government involvement” in the societal affairs. But, is it not that ‘minimal’ presupposes ‘little’ rather than total absence of government? Carrington, DeBuse and Lee’s (2008) perspective on a minimalist state is problematic. It introduces a new concept associated with the idea of governance without government, whose theoretical antecedents could be located in anarchism. The theory of anarchism espouses “a social state in which there is no structured government or law or in which there is resistance to all current forms of government”; it promotes “the absence of rules, which leads to the absence of any identifiable social structure beyond that of personal autonomy” (The Free Dictionary s.a.: on-line).

William Godwin (1756-1836) is credited as the first philosopher who provided a coherent intellectual base from which a relatively small body of literature on anarchism evolved, which jettisons the mainstream political philosophies on the theories of governance. It challenges the very concept of government. The theory of anarchism moves from the premise that “the state is inherently unjust” and “seriously question[s] whether moral agents should govern others” (Halliday 2003: on-line). Its theoretical proposition is a deviation from a larger body of political philosophy on the existing theories of government and governance in their variations. This is so in that, as Halliday (2003: on-line) explains, “Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, to name just a few of the most important political and moral philosophers, all assumed that the state is necessary and proceeded from that assumption to develop their respective theories of government”.

The theory of anarchism is not related to a minimalist state theory in that, in contrast with the former proposition that government is inherently unjust and therefore not necessary, it limits human potential, corrupts innocent human spirit and imposes ceilings on individual achievements (The Free Dictionary s.a.: on-line), the latter proceed from the assumption that government is necessary (see Halliday 2003: on-line). It is incorrect for Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008) to explain a minimalist state theory along the propositions of anarchism which propagate the notion of total absence of government in the lives of the citizens. Much of the contemporary usage of the concept of a minimalist state derives its denotative essence
from the post-cold war attempts to overcome the developmental challenges associated with a state-led development paradigm (Leftwich 1993).

A minimalist state means little government intervention in the affairs of society. Its theoretical proposition is that to enhance the welfare of society open and free competitive market economies should be promoted (Leftwich 1993: 607). This approach to development underpins the theoretical basis of the *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (SAPs) of the 1980s, whose philosophical foundation is neo-liberalism. It is from this context that the NPM evolved, which, as pointed out above, Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008) disaggregate as part of the theoretical context from which governance could be understood. Some scholars, as Khan (2009: 03-09) observes, “define governance as the New Public Management (NPM) or managerialism”. In one of its many definitions, governance is defined as market-based approaches to government (see Frederickson 2004). This obscures the distinction between governance and NPM. It is a deviation from the perspective that governance is the emerging paradigm to supplant the NPM. The minimalist state theory fails to make a distinction between the NPM and the emerging governance paradigm. It regards governance and NPM as synonymous.

Along with the NPM, the minimalist state theory trivialises the governance question to just mere managerial ones simply locating their answers in the notion of less government or “limited, apolitical and technicist notion of governance”. It is therefore rejected as being too simplistic, naïve, and a deeply flawed theoretical context from which the concept of governance could be understood as the paradigm of Public Administration (Leftwich 1993: 608). In this the contention is that “contestation about the nature and direction of economic development, the distribution of costs and benefits of transformation, the institutional forms of government and the character of the state is contestation about power”, which is politics (Leftwich 1993: 608). The appropriate concept that captures the essence of this epistemological verity is governance, which is not synonymous to the NPM. It is incorrect to use a minimalist state theory as a context from which governance could be understood. Another confusion that relates to the theoretical context of governance is found in the proposition of Larmour (1995: 17), who states that good governance and effective government are the paradigms from which governance could be understood. These aspects are considered below.
5.3.2.2.7 **Good governance and effective government paradigm**

As pointed out above, in Larmour (1995: 17) *good governance* and *effective government* are propounded as the theoretical paradigms from which *governance* could be theorised and understood. In the article entitled *Theories of Governance and Pacific microstates: The cautionary tale of Tuvalu* Goldsmith (2005: 105-115) points out contradictions in Larmour’s theorising of *governance*. In the *good governance* paradigm *governance* is “glossed for the most part as transparency, accountability, democracy, legitimacy and the placing of limits on arbitrary (state) power”. So contagious this paradigm appears to be in that it observably influenced the writings of some other scholars who use the concepts *good governance* and *governance* interchangeably, implicitly suggesting that they are synonymous or mean the same thing (see for example Edigheji 2003: 72-73; Mhone 2003b: 36, Sinha 2004: 110-112; Bourgon 2003: 02-14; Leftwich 1993: 605-624).

*Good governance* as the paradigm of theorising *governance* is problematic in that it does not make a distinction between these two concepts. The concept of *good governance* is discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis. Larmour’s (1995: 17) *effective government* paradigm propounds that the essence of *governance* lies “in the ability to get things done, whether democratically or not”. This notion constitutes the integral part of the proposition of the NPM approach to Public Administration, which, as discussed above, Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008) consider as one of the analytical templates for theorising *governance*. This is not in sync with the propositions in the existing body of Public Administration literature that the governance paradigm is emerging to supplant the NPM. In this one could discern a misplacement of the governance concept as an epistemological trend in the evolution of Public Administration.

The propositions of *effective government* paradigm are not in sync with the theoretical propositions of the *good governance* paradigm. It is here where the contradiction is, which “points to longstanding theoretical struggles in the social sciences” (Goldsmith 2005: 106). The *good governance* paradigm “draw[s] on the traditions of pluralism and elitism, where politics are determinant in the final instance” whereas the *effective government* paradigm “draw[s] on economically determinist approaches to politics, such as traditional Marxism, corporatism and contemporary neo-liberalism” (Goldsmith 2005: 106). These theories of *governance* as propounded by Larmour (1995: 17) are contradictory (Goldsmith 2005: 106). This is also true in respect to some of the theories of governance, as discussed above, that
Carrington, DeBuse and Lee (2008), Schmidt (2008), Scott (2002) and Leftwich (1993) identified to make sense of the governance paradigm in Public Administration.

Carrington, DeBuse and Lee’s (2008) observation that, in spite of their contextual variations, there is a theoretical consensus on what constitutes governance, cannot be true. In theorising about governance it appears that anything goes. It is in this context that, depending on a particular viewpoint, the different definitions of governance are propounded, which convey contradictory meanings and understandings of the concept. In this the question is whether governance could be considered or accorded the status of a paradigm of Public Administration whereas its epistemological position is still fraught with fundamental theoretical questions. The discourse now turns to a New Public Service and the New Public Administration theory, which represent important epistemological trends in the theoretical evolution of Public Administration.

5.3.2.3 New Public Service and New Public Administration theory

The discourse on governance is further enhanced by the emphasis on the concept of democratic citizenship, the importance of community and civil society engagements, organisational humanism and discourse theory, which necessitated a further re-conceptualisation of Public Administration both theoretically and practically (see Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 589). This resulted in the emergence of another epistemological trend in the evolution of Public Administration, where the paradigm of the discourse shifts from the theoretical propositions of the traditional Public Administration and NPM to that of a citizen-centred approach in theorising the business of government. Underpinning this shift is the notion of social equity the Minnowbrook I debates emphasised as a fundamental pillar for theorising in the field of Public Administration (see Garcia 2003). Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) term the citizen-centred approach a New Public Service, which is propounded as a distinct paradigm from the traditional Public Administration and the NPM whereas Bourgon simply refers to it as the New Public Administration theory. In this paradigm social equity is added to “efficiency and economy as a rationale or justification for policy positions” (Garcia 2003: 98).
Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 550) define the New Public Service as “a set of ideas about the role of public administration in the governance system that places citizens at the centre”. In metaphorically contextualising their propositions in the New Public Service, Denhardt and Denhardt ask: “as the field of Public Administration has increasingly abandoned the idea of rowing [traditional Public Administration] and has accepted responsibility for steering [NPM], has it simply traded one adminicentric view for another?” Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 32) explain that “those who steer the boat have far more power over its destination than those who row it”.

Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 549) further ask a suggestive question that “in our rush to steer, are we forgetting who owns the boat?” To answer this question, Denhardt and Denhardt make reference to King and Stivers’ (1998) book Government is us, from which the answer is obvious: the government belongs to the people. This is the context from which Denhardt and Denhardt’s New Public Service emerged as an alternative paradigm to traditional Public Administration and the NPM. It is based on the theories of democratic citizenship and coheres with the Minnowbrook I of defining effective Public Administration in the context of an active and participatory citizenry (see Frederickson 1989).

Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 554-555) explain that “concerns about citizenship and democracy are particularly important and visible in recent political and social theory, both of which call for a reinvigorated and more active and involved citizenship”. In contradistinction with the traditional Public Administration and the NPM the fundamental focus of the New Public Service is on serving the citizens rather than steering. Minogue (2003: 24) explains that this suggested paradigm of Public Administration to supplant the NPM “will identify and respond to general social values rather than attempt to control and manipulate societies, and will give due weight to social and political values rather than subordinating these to economic values”.

Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) proposition in the New Public Service is closely similar to that which Bourgon (2007) proposes in the New Public Administration theory. This is the reason their propositions are coupled and discussed as such in this chapter. However, the context of such similarity is not similar. Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) move from the context of offering an alternative paradigm, which does not necessarily amount to the rejection of the status quo. It simply means that there may be other ways of looking at
scientific phenomena or objects of study. This is clear in the contention that the vibrant evolution in thought and practice in the field cannot simply be understood in terms of the traditional public administration and the NPM templates. There are more than two choices or a third alternative. It said that such is based “on recent intellectual and practical developments in public administration” Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000: 553) hence is referred to as the New Public Service.

Denhardt and Denhardt framed their proposition in post-modernism, which they accept contributed towards creating a “climate in which it makes sense today to talk about a New Public Service” (2000: 553). In contrast with Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) context from which their proposition is propounded, that of Bourgon (2007) is more of an exercise of synthesising the propositions of the classical public management theory with the new public management theory to develop the New Public Administration theory. It appears that at the time of making a contribution in 2007, Bourgon was aware of the existence of similar thoughts on the development of the theory of Public Administration. This is clear in Bourgon’s conjecture:

*I suspect that everything that follows in this text already exists to varying degrees in public administrations around the world. The ‘newness’ of a New Public Administration theory (if indeed newness exists) will not be found in new ideas, but rather ‘in the way the fabric is woven, not necessarily in the threads that are used’. (Bourgon 2007: 08)*

Denhardt and Denhardt’s contribution to the discourse on the New Public Service as the emerging paradigm of Public Administration was published in the Public Administration Review in 2000 whereas that of Bourgon followed seven years later in the International Review of Administrative Sciences. Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) and Bourgon’s (2007) contributions appear to be the only ones that authoritatively wrote about the New Public Service and the New Public Administration theory respectively. In the works of other scholars these aspects are simply glossed over (see Dobuzinski 1997: 298-316) especially in the discourse on post-modern public administration (see Bevir 2004: 605-625; Marshall & White 1989: 89-122; Bogason 2001: 165-193; Boje 2001: 431-458; McSwite 1997a: 174-181; VrMeer 1994: 85-91; Stivers 1999: 520-522): not referred to all (see Kickert 1997: 731-752), or referred to rudimentarily (Thornhill and Van Dijk 2010: 95-110).
The New Public Service owes its existence to a myriad of factors that some constitute as the integral part of the historiography of the discipline. Among them is the Minnowbrook I’s New Public Administration debate. Henry (2008) explains that the New Public Administration inspired the development of the contemporary paradigms such as the New Public Service, as proposed by Denhardt and Denhardt (2000), and post-modern public administration. Bourgon (2007) does not specifically refer to the importance of Minnowbrook I debate in theorising the New Public Administration theory. Instead, the basis of the thesis “flows from the values that have guided traditional public administration” and “the aggregation of new knowledge and new experience acquired overtime – particularly during the 1980s and 1990s” (Bourgon 2007: 08).

The goal of Bourgon’s theorisation exercise is to achieve “a new and unifying theory for Public Administration” (2007: 08). However, Thornhill and Van Dijk (2010: 108) believe that the possibility of a single or unified theory in the field is not necessarily feasible. As argued elsewhere in the study, the foregoing is true, especially in the context of the fact that a single or unified theory in the human sciences, of which Public Administration is one, is not necessarily possible. So much so that even in the physical sciences the idea of a single or unified theory is proved to be a misnomer (see Samier 2005). Bourgon’s pursuit of a unified theory appears more inclined towards positivism. This contrasts Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) theorisation approach in their proposition of the New Public Service framed in post-modernist terms, and is in spite of the fact that the wave of post-positivism had already started to sweep the intellectual landscape of scholarship in the field when Bourgon published the article on a New Public Administration theory. Is this because of the fact that the basis of Bourgon’s theorisation is anchored in the classical public administration and new public management theories whose epistemological foundation is, according to Dobuzinskis (1997: 303), positivist in orientation?

In spite of the different contexts from which Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) and Bourgon (2007) respectively advance the New Public Service and the New Public Administration theory, the essence of their propositions converge in many respects. The primary theoretical and epistemological foundation of the New Public Service is democratic theory. This is also the case in respect of Bourgon’s New Public Administration theory. However, compared to Denhardt and Denhardt (2000), Bourgon is not really that elaborative on democratic theory as
the contextual foundation of the New Public Administration theory. Bourgon only makes a one-liner reference to democracy in the statement that “concepts of citizenship, democracy or public interest have evolved over time and they are continuing to evolve” (2007: 15). These concepts are key variables of theorisation in both Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) and Bourgon’s (2007) propositions on the theory of Public Administration.

Bourgon (2007: 15) states that “a journey towards a New Public Administration theory must start at the most basic level”, which is ingrained in the concept of citizenship. In this Bourgon draws from Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) proposition in the article entitled *The New Public Service, putting democracy first*, which is elaborative on the concept of citizenship in the context of democracy. While Bourgon (2007: 15-17) simply talks about citizenship, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 552) talk about democratic citizenship, which, in simple terms, means a much more engaged citizen in the process of governance. In the contemporary theories of democratic citizenship, it is enunciated that government exists to promote the general welfare of the citizens. This is in contrasts with the NPM paradigm based on the economic theory of neo-liberalism where government exists “to ensure citizens can make choices consistent with the self-interest by guaranteeing certain procedures (such as voting) and individual rights” (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 552).

The theory of democracy redefines the concept of citizenship far beyond neo-liberal conceptualisations. In the New Public Service Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 552) define citizens as individuals that comprise society looking “beyond self-interest to the larger public interest, adopting a broader and longer-term perspective that requires a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the whole, and a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake”. The definition of citizens in Bourgon’s New Public Administration theory is more of a combination of a neo-liberal economic theory and the contemporary theories of democracy that emphasise the substantive and developmental aspects of the concept. Bourgon (2000: 16) explains that “today, we would readily agree that citizenship encompasses” both the economic and social aspects of the concept, and that, more importantly, “citizens are more than constituents, voters, clients or customers”.

This is a critical point that King and Stivers (1998) emphasise, which both Bourgon (2007), Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) use as their authoritative reference in conceptualising citizenship as the basis of their theorisation. In concurrence with Bourgon’s (2007:16)
conception of citizens as citizens, not just voters, clients or customers, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 552) elaborate that in the engaged citizenship government shares authority, reduces control and trusts in the efficiency of collaboration. In this civil society is important, which Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 552-553) describe as “mediating institutions that simultaneously give focus to the desires and interests of citizens and provide experiences that will better prepare those citizens for action in the larger political system”. It is a key imperative in maximising citizen participation in the process of governance. The concept of civil society is an important variable in both Bourgon (2007), Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) theorisations and propositions, especially as it relates to the imperative of engaged citizenship.

Bourgon (2007: 16) writes that greater involvement of citizens leads to “better policy decisions” based on public interest. The concept of public interest undergirds the theoretical base of both Bourgon’s (2007) New Public Administration theory and Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) New Public Service. The essence of their articulation of public interest is similar. Bourgon (2007:18) relies on Appleby (1950) and Stone’s (1997) description of public interest. Appleby (Bourgon 2007: 18) explains that the “public interest is never merely the sum of all private interests; it is not wholly separate from citizens with many private interests; but it is something distinctive that arises within, among, apart from, and above private interests focusing on government, some of the most elevated aspiration and deepest devotion of which human beings are capable”.

Stone (1997: 18) explains that public interest “is about communities trying to achieve something as communities”; [it] is to polis (the political community) what self-interest is to the market”. In the context of how the concept of public interest is articulated, the role of government becomes that of assisting in its articulation and satisfaction. It contributes to “building a collective, shared notion of the public interest” where “the goal is not to find quick solutions driven by individual choices”, but “the creation of shared interests and shared responsibility” (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 554). Government ensures that “public interests dominate in the solutions and in the processes by which public policy solutions are achieved” (Bourgon 2007: 18). It must ensure that solutions to societal challenges are consistent with the public interest – both in substance and in process” (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 554). In this the fundamental objective is to, as Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 553) put it, serve rather than steer.
Bourgon (2007: 18) emphasises a similar point in the articulation of a variable of service to citizens, as another important aspect that undergirds the theoretical base of the New Public Administration theory. Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 553) state that “an increasingly important role of the public servant is to help citizens articulate and meet their shared interests, rather than to attempt to control or steer society in a new direction”. The implication of this on government is that its role needs to change “from one of controlling to one of agenda-setting, bringing the proper players to the table and facilitating, negotiating or brokering solutions to public problems (often through coalitions of public, private, and non-profit agencies)” (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 553). This pertains to what is referred to as collaborative or network governance (see Bevir 2007; Schmidt 2008: 111).

The essence of this type of governance as a characteristic of the New Public Service is that, instead of government responding to the needs of the citizen by saying “yes we can provide that service” or “no we can’t”, the approach ought to be that of responding by saying “let’s work together to figure out what we’re going to do, then make it happen” (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 553-554). Government needs to think strategically and act democratically. Its politics and programmes could only meet the needs of the citizens in the most effective and responsible manner if it seeks to implement them “through collective efforts and collaborative processes” (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 555). For maximisation of service to the people, Bourgon’s (2007: 19) proposition acknowledges the opportunities that the ICT’s offer and, more importantly, emphasises the importance of citizens participation in service design and holistic approach to service delivery.

Denhardt and Denhardt’s proposition is silent on the question of technology and service delivery. Given its relation to the Minnowbrook debates, one may assume that the foregoing was a deliberative omission in the discourse. In the Minnowbrook II debates “technology was seen as diminishing public service rather than a tool to improve it” (Garcia 2003: 99). Service delivery is an exercise in policy implementation, whose measure of its success is in its outcomes rather than outputs. This means that the fundamental focus is on enhancing the quality of the collective lives of the citizens, rather than serving the customers. In this government values citizenship and public service, rather than, in contrast with the NPM, entrepreneurship (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 556).
Because of the knowledge-based nature of government services in the 21st century, a solid intellectual capital needs to be created and strategic investments need to be made in the human capital of the people that are engaged in the business of government, which is public administration (Bourgon 2007: 19). The management system in the public service needs to be designed in a manner that values people, not just productivity (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 556). This perspective can be found in the humanistic paradigm, which is explained above as another important factor in the evolution of Public Administration as a human science (see Samier 2005).

Being in the service of the people in the sense that Bourgon (2007) and Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) suggest means that accountability does not simply refer to compliance with the rules and procedures as the traditional public administration and the NPM oversimplified it. It is complex. It means that the government officials engaged in public administration “should be attentive to more than the market; they should also attend to statutory and constitutional law, community values, political norms, professional standards, and citizen interests” (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 555). In the recently published article entitled Delivering Public Services: Time for a New Theory Osborne (2010) underscores much of what Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) and Bourgon (2007) propound. This presupposes that their seminal works are intellectually contagious and inform the contemporary scholarly initiatives of theorising in the field, which is centred on the concept of public interest.

Osborne (2010: 01-10) offers insightful ideas on how to construct a theory of public service delivery, which is essentially ingrained in Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) New Public Service and Bourgon’s (2007) New Public Administration theory. Denhardt and Denhardt’s New Public Service evolved also as a result of the critique of positivism, which necessitated a quest for new approaches to knowledge acquisition. This resulted in postmodernism, which came to be another important epistemological trend in the evolution of Public Administration as a science. Postmodernism is discussed as another emerging paradigm in the field in the following sub-section.
5.3.2.4  Postmodernism and Public Administration

The emergence of postmodernism proves Fukuyama’s pronouncement that liberal democracy marks “the end of history” from which human knowledge and intellectual imagination cannot traverse any further (Fukuyama 1989: 04) a fundamental “pedagogy of big lies” (Macedo 1993: 183). It escalates human epistemology to higher proportions where intellectualism charts a new trajectory in the theory of knowledge and modernism, which has always been a dominant paradigm for theorising in Public Administration, especially in respect to its theories that emerged between the 1920s and 1960s (Dobuzinski 1997: 303). McLean (1996: 395) explains that “postmodernism is a broad term originating in literary studies, used by those thinkers who seek to respond in various ways to modernism”. This presupposes that the prelude to postmodernism is modernism. To contextualise the evolutionary essence of postmodernism, it is perhaps important to first consider modernism as the epistemological paradigm of Public Administration. This is followed by the discussion on postmodernism as it relates to Public Administration.

5.3.2.4.1  Modernism

In general terms modernism, according to Blackburn (2005: 237), refers to “any movement or climate of idea, especially in the arts, literature, or architecture, that supports change, the retirement of the old or traditional, and the forward march of the avantgarde” whereas, in specific terms, it is concerned with “adherence to the ideas and ideals of the enlightenment”. It is in reaction to the latter sense of modernism that postmodernism evolved (Blackburn 2005: 237). Modernism refers “to a period of great change in the western world”, which encompassed change “in thinking and a development of different views of reality” (Smith 2002: on-line) that was a marked contrast to the traditional philosophy of science. Because of the limited scope of this chapter, the pre-modernism era, which, in the foregoing, is referred to as the traditional philosophy of science, is not delved into lest the discourse takes a long-winded route to arrive at the essence of its focus. This part of the discourse is not necessarily and generally about the history of science. Its focus is on postmodernism as one of the emerging paradigms in the field of Public Administration and a reflection on modernism is for contextualisation reasons.
McLean (1996: 395) explains that modernism originated “in the seventeenth century and ends sometime between 1945 and the present”. Smith (2002) explains that the modernist era covers the latter part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. But, there is a discord here. What about the period that covers the eighteenth century? This is a question for historiographers of the epistemology of science. The fundamental proposition of modernism is that scienticism and rationality are the key pillars that undergird the theory of knowledge and therefore constitute a means for explaining and understanding reality (McLean 1996: 395). This modernistic thought is positivist in its epistemological foundation and orientation.

Babbie and Mouton (2006: 20-21) state that the evolution of positivism is predicated on two assumptions of scholars that subscribe to positivist tradition, namely the assumptions of scientific maturity of natural sciences and sufficient degree of similarity in research domains between social and natural phenomena. It was assumed that the natural sciences had made impressive progress particularly since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. It is on the basis of this assumption that the positivists such as Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim believed that the methodology or the logic of natural sciences could interchangeably be applied in the social sciences fields such as economics, politics, society and morality. The contention was that the social and natural phenomena that the research domains of both sciences focus on are similar (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 20-21; McLean 1996: 394-395; see also Smith 2002).

The modernists believed that “science and reason would be capable of providing firm, objective, and universal foundations with which to underpin social and moral reforms” (McLean 1996: 395). This influenced the epistemological foundation of Public Administration, which, according to Samier (2005: 07), “is primarily informed by rationalism derived from modern economics, analytical philosophy, system analysis and behavioural science and pursued primarily through positivistic styles of research”. McCurdy and Cleary (1984) and Box’s (1992) studies which examined the quality of scientific contributions in Public Administration in the United States (US) found that most research projects follow a positivistic line. The replication of the same studies in South Africa found that a similar pattern or trend of positivist epistemology exists (see Cameron & McLaverty 2008; Wessels 2008).
As discussed in sub-section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 above, the contributions of scholars whose works are discussed as respectively constituting the traditional and contemporary paradigms of Public Administration, except the postmodernists, are grounded in positivism. Samier (2005: 10) observes that “Edwin Stene (1940) and Herbert Simon (1946, 1947) were the main proponents of a continuing scientism, and that the field be placed on a firmer scientific ground in order to establish a causal relationship at a rational basis for empirical research”. They followed the positivist trajectory of classical organisational theorists such as, as discussed above; Frederick Taylor, Henri Fayol and Max Weber (see Robbins 1990: 34-37).

Samier (2005: 10) explains that “Simon provided a logical positivist rationale for the separation of facts and values, and the criteria for a programme of experimental research necessary to produce a comprehensive theory of administration”. In this Simon asserts one of the fundamental variables of positivism, which propounds that “science, including social science, is not the place for value judgement” (McLean 1996: 394). But, the social world is by its nature value-driven. The notion of “a comprehensive theory of administration” sounds analogous to the ideal of a unified science as propagated by the logical positivists. They believed in scientific reductionism that “the research objects of the various sciences are mutually reducible” (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 24).

The logical positivists believed that the various laws discovered in each of the sciences could eventually be reduced to one another, and all laws reduced ultimately to those of physics”; [and] also in the feasibility of reducing terms or concepts, that is, reducing the specific language of each of the sciences to another, more basic, language of science” (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 24). In their proposition of unified science, the logical positivists continued with the contention that the social sciences should emulate the natural sciences methods in the attempt to understand social phenomena. This approach to science is called a deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation. It “regards the explanation of a specific event or phenomenon as a deductive argument whereby the event or phenomenon to be explained is directly related to a larger, comprehensive class of similar phenomena” (Babbie & Mouton 2006: 24). The deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation is, according to Babbie and Mouton (2006: 24), still today an influential positivist paradigm in the science of knowledge.
Dobuzinskis (1997: 303) observes that “if anything, the theories that emerged in the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s were even more clearly positivist than the classical bureaucratic models of the 1920s and 1930s”. This is consistent with Samier’s (2005: 10) observation, as referred to above. The basis of Dobuzinskis’ (1997: 303) observation is that the understanding of the scientific method of some of the traditional and contemporary scholars whose works had been studied, was consistent with at least some, albeit not necessarily all, the tenets of positivism; they believed that objectivity is neither impossible nor undesirable when studying human organisations; they tended to favour an inductive, empirical approach to the discovery of causal relationships; and their underlying political ideology was, if not statist, at least tolerant of the administrative state and its expanded function in the post new deal era.

Stivers (1999: 520) observes that prominent thinkers in Public Administration such as Patrick Cleveland, Luther Gulick, and Herbert Simon, in their argument for tested generalisations to guide practice, presuppose the feasibility of universal administrative truths. Their thinking is embedded in modernist or positivist epistemology. With the rejection of modernism, the positivist epistemology came under severe criticism. The modernistic thinking was rejected on the basis that, in spite of the fact that it evolved to supplant the pre-modernistic view considered to have not been inconsistent with the condition of civilisation, its basic conceptual foundation is still embedded in the parlance of the past era. Among the philosophers that wrote against modernism is Jacques Derrida. The logic of modernism is rejected on the basis that it is still premised on a linear and rational framework, which means “thinking essentially in a cause and effect way- in a straight line” (Smith 2002: on-line).

Samier (2005: 09) observes that Henry (1975) and Golembiewski (1974) tend towards a linear developmental view. Their pattern of thinking is rooted in the foundations of the old thoughts that modernism sought to change. Smith (2002: on-line) observes that, with modernism, “people were changing the outer aspects but not the basic precepts and concepts that form the foundations of old thought”. The positivist modernism logic that science is based on objective and rational analysis of social phenomena was questioned on the basis that it trivialises the complexity of social reality, which cannot simply be understood on the basis of natural science methods of inquiry. Samier (2005: 08) argues that a positivist epistemology engendered a normative crisis in Public Administration. It glosses “over complexities in the
human character, power and politics dynamics, ethics in organisational life, and opposed contextual forces shaping the world and mentality of the administrator” (Samier 2005: 08).

The positivist theories dominated by rational models bequeathed a crisis of legitimacy for practitioners where the traditional trend of separating theory from practice became clearly pronounced (Denhardt 1984). This created the challenge of relevance of the theoretical propositions of academicians to the world of practitioners. The rational models were overly instrumentalist characterised by a structuralist approach excluding “processes, and a positivist understanding of knowledge acquisition that failed to integrate explanation, understanding and critique”; “it failed to provide a moral context of personal action in organisation in addressing concerns practitioners had for values of freedom, justice, and equality associated with democratic responsibility” (Samier 2005: 11).

In the human sciences positivism “produce(s) a distinctive discipline for which purely structural, functional, and formalist explanation mask true underlying realities” (Samier 2005: 18). The nature of questioning in Public Administration as a human science is “orientated towards understanding (Verstehen), interpretation and critique”, which “variously draw on phenomenology, hermeneutics, ethnography, historiography, literary criticism, and critical theory, and other humanities-based approaches to inform theoretical frameworks and research” (Samier 2005: 18). This thinking contrasts the dominant positivism paradigm in Public Administration and adds to the emerging perspectives that reject the modernistic epistemological paradigm, which evolved into an alternative framework called postmodernism.

5.3.2.4.2 Postmodernism

The concept postmodernism is bandied about so much in the contemporary scholarly discourses and intellectual engagements. It is ambiguous and has engendered much controversy (Bogason 2001: 166). McLean (1996: 394) defines postmodernism as “a school of thought that rejects...modernism”, whose key epistemological foundations, as discussed above, are science and reason. Marshall and White (1989: 102) state that “postmodernism cannot be described in the usual meaning of description”; rather, it must be surrounded, suggested, hinted at, and ...evoked”. This is the art that Smith seems to have mastered. From a contradistinction perspective, Smith’s (2002) attempt to explain postmodernism is
instructive and authoritative. It manages to succinctly enunciate this phenomenon in a manner that integrates almost all the key aspects that undergird its essence and epistemological foundation. Smith (2002: on-line) enunciates that in postmodernism:

*There is a concentration on fragmentation and discontinuity as well as ambiguity. The postmodern focuses on a de-structured, de-centered humanity. What this really means is the idea of disorder and fragmentation, which were previously seen as negative qualities, are seen as an acceptable representation of reality by postmodernists. Modernism considered the fragmented view of human life as bad or tragic, while postmodernists rather celebrate this seemingly meaningless view of the world. It is an acceptance of the chaos that encourages a play with meaning. Postmodernism also accepts the possibility of ambiguity. Things and events can have two different meanings at the same time. A more rigid rational and logocentric or linear approach tries to avoid or reduce ambiguity as much as possible. Postmodern thought sees simultaneous views not as contradictory but as an integral part of the complex patterning of reality.*

Compared to modernism, postmodernism rejects the notion of scientific truth, and questions a belief in rational and pure objectivity implying that the truth is fixed. In the context of postmodernism “the world is seen as a much more complex and uncertain place”; “reality is no longer fixed or determined”; [and] “all truth...is relative to one’s viewpoint or stance” (Smith 2002: on-line). The fundamental contention of postmodernism is that “there [is] no way in which subjectivity could be absolutely separated for objectivity” (Smith 2002: on-line). It believes in subjective reality or relative truth, which is context-driven. Its interpretation of the social world is hermeneutic and the propositions so derived are the outcomes of critical contextual analysis, which are relative, not absolute, certain or universal (see Samier 2005).

Hilliard and Lynch (s.a.: on-line) explain that the post-modernists’ style of inquiry adopts “a relativist perspective that only accepts judgements of truth within the confines of a particular paradigm”. The theoretical propositions that evolve from this exercise are based on “subjective epistemology and realist ontology” (Hilliard & Lynch, s.a: on-line; see also Lynch & Dicker 1998: 465). Postmodernism is a rejoinder to the propositions of modernism
premised on the certainty of scientific or objective truth used to explain social reality. It is “an adventure and an expression of life experience”, and “an attempt to question the world that we see around us, especially not to take other people’s views as the final truth”; it “puts everything into question and radically interrogates philosophies, strategies and world views” (Smith 2002: on-line).

The methodological designs of postmodernism are interpretation, critical discourse, analysis and hermeneutics (Samier 2005). Postmodernism rejects the positivist notion of universal truth or explanations based on abstract or ultimate principles that claim universal relevance. The neo-liberal scholarship promoted this positivist or modernist thinking, especially in the context of liberal democracy that emerged as the new orthodoxy that dominated “official Western aid policy and development thinking” in the 1990s (Leftwich 1993: 605).

Postmodernism “is an attempt to think beyond the confines” of modernism (Smith 2002: on-line) by responding to what is perceived as the “twin failures of science and reason” (McLean 1996: 395). In their rejection of modernism, the postmodernists often cite the Holocaust incident as one of the examples of limitations inherent in the positivist epistemology in that it failed to predict the Holocaust and the devastating consequences associated with it (see Blackburn 2005: 285). McLean (1996: 395) explains that “the failure of science and reason, and the objective and universal claims made in their name undermines the possibility of ever producing totalising theories again – theories (Grand Narratives) that seek to explain and predict individual behaviour and/ or social formations on the basis of a set of incontrovertible, rationally derived propositions”.

5.3.2.4.2.1 Evolution of postmodernism in Public Administration

Does postmodernism offer any future for Public Administration as a science, which, as explained in sub-section 5.3.2.4.1 above, has always been characterised by the domination of positivist epistemology? Some scholars seem to suggest so. As a meta-theoretical basis for Public Administration, postmodernism evolved over time and the 1990s debates on the theoretical question of the field catapulted it into one of the contemporary paradigms of Public Administration (see Bogason 2001, Henry 2008). Dobuzinskis (1997: 303) observes that “futurists such as Peter Drucker, Robert Reich, John Naisbitt, Alfin Toffler and others argue that profound cultural and structural changes [that characterise the 21st century] taking
place” necessitate that the epistemological paradigms of Public Administration need to go beyond modernism or positivism and its methodological approach in the attempt to understand social reality. Towards postmodernism? As this question is suggestively formulated, the exigencies of the contemporary world fraught with complexities necessarily require answering in a positive sense.

Bogason (2001: 106) observes that “most social scientists agree that we are witnessing changes in society and in the ontology and epistemology of the social sciences”. In Public Administration this is clear in the emergence of feminist discourse, globalisation, and knowledge-based economy, which heralded new socio-economic challenges that “the objective analysis of policy problems and the management of complex organisations by unbiased technical experts have largely failed” (Dobuzinskis 1997: 304) to decipher their true essence and intensity. These factors ushered in new political and cultural contexts whose interpretations require methodological designs that transcend “the positivist credo [that] reality can be faithfully represented – mirrored, as it were – by scientific theories” (Dobuzinskis 1997: 304) and their modernist foundation.

With the concept of postmodernism, scholars in the field are increasingly attending to the epistemological deficits said to be inherent in the positivist epistemology, although the discourse on postmodernism was initially largely dominant in the US, as pursued by a small group of researchers under the auspices of Public Administration Theory Network (PAT-NET). Scholarly contributions to its evolution as a contemporary paradigm of Public Administration are emerging from different countries of the world. A rich body of literature on postmodernism in Public Administration now exists. However, Public Administration scholars in the US appear to be on the cutting edge of the discourse on postmodernism with the platform for this fully created. Scholarly gatherings are convened annually by postmodern-orientated PAT-NET members to discourse on the primary purpose ostensibly being to mainstream postmodernism in the epistemological landscape of the discipline, especially also through PAT-NET Journal of Administrative Theory & Praxis (Bogason 2001).

Frederickson (2009: 02-03) traces the origins of PAT-NET and its Journal in the Minnowbrook I, which is discussed in sub-section 5.3.1.9 above, where the same point is made. PAT-NET was created following the dissatisfaction with what was perceived as the
domination of the American Society for Public Administration by the practising world of the field, which inevitably necessarily dictated the scholarship agenda (Bogason 2001: 168). A heightened sense of intellectualism on postmodernism in the US appears to have been inspired by *The Blacksburg Manifesto* of 1983, written at the time of the presidency of Jimmy Carter to reflect on American administration in the context of the supremacy/sovereignty of the market imperative and processes in dictating and directing the action and agenda of government.

Marshall and White (1989) penned a rejoinder entitled *The Blacksburg Manifesto and the postmodern debate: Public Administration in a time without a name*. The importance of this rejoinder introduced deconstructive and interpretive approaches to Public Administration analysis which are considered in the existing literature as the appropriate research designs for postmodern Public Administration (see Dobuzininskis 1997; Samier 2005; Harmon 1981). Marshall and White (1989:90) observe that *The Blacksburg Manifesto* “reflects the consciousness of modernism while the age of its emergence was then facing postmodernism”.

Their reflection set against the backdrop of postmodernism arrived at the conclusion that *The Manifesto* is expressed in postmodernist tradition. This is clear in the observation that *The Manifesto* “seems more to be grounded”, if only implicitly none the less solidly, on the interpretivist paradigm” (Marshall & White 1989: 94) as opposed to functionalism, which appertains to modernism. Marshall and White’s (1989) rejoinder escalated the discourse on postmodernism, which, as Bogason (2001: 169) observes, “in the first half of the 1990s was scattered in a few journals”. Marshall and White’s (1989) contribution to the evolution of postmodernism is preceded by Gareth Morgan’s book *Images of organisation*, which was published in 1986, three years earlier than their article.

Morgan adopts the anti-functionalism approach and elevates the discourse to meta-theoretical proportions following the contemporary trends in organisational and cultural sociology. The contention in the book is that creative thinking could be achieved by using metaphors and imagination to understand organisational dynamics (Morgan 1986). The usage of metaphors in the Public Administration discourse attracted the interest of the participants in a conference in 1990, whose anthology is entitled *Images and identities in Public Administration*. Edited by Kass and Catron (1990), the anthology comprises the different aspects of public administration, using metaphors to understand them. In the anthology Morgan (1990:67-86)
wrote about administrative phronesis in discussing discretion and the problem of legitimacy in a constitutional system.

Kass (1990: 113-139) discusses “stewardship of fundamental elements in images of public administration”, Fox and Cochran (1990: 87-112) deals with democratic eliticism in the discussion on discretionary public administration whereas Harmon (1990: 151-180) uses a metaphor of a “tortured soul” to discuss a responsible actor in public administration. White and McSwain (1990) and Hummel’s (1990) contributions in the anthology discuss the challenges to public administration both as a field of study and a practice. In the discussion on raising a new image of public administration of the past, White and McSwain (1990: 23-59), in what they call The phoenix project, call for the reborn of the field from the ashes whereas Hummel (1990: 202-218) argues that the field adopts the approach of an “unfinished democracy revolution” in its development. A detailed discussion on the contributions of these scholars is not offered because of space constraints. However, their succinct analysis shows that they contributed significantly to the body of knowledge on postmodernism.

The 1990s saw emergence of books specifically on postmodernism in Public Administration. In 1994 Fox and Miller published Postmodern Public Administration: Toward discourse, which was followed by Farmer’s The language of Public Administration: Bureaucracy, modernity and postmodernism in 1995, and White and McSwain’s Legitimacy in Public Administration: A discourse analysis in 1997. White and McSwain co-authored their book under the pseudonym McSwite. Following “their first stab at what postmodern analysis of public administration might mean” (Bogason 2001: 171) in the article published in 1993, Fox and Miller (1994) expatiated on this subject in their book. McSwite (1997a: 177) writes that in their book Fox and Miller’s purpose is to redefine “the field’s central concern as discourse rather than expertise or technique” and their approach to realise this is to “finesse the conceptual problems” of Public Administration.

The book is concerned with policy rather than the crisis of legitimacy for the practitioners, part of its reason being a “theory dominated by rational models, overly instrumentalised concerns, a structuralist approach excluding processes, and a positivist understanding of knowledge acquisition that failed to integrate explanation, understanding and critique” (Samier 2005: 11). McSwite (1997a: 177) explains that Fox and Miller are part of the tradition of those scholars that wanted to theorise public administration out of its conceptual
box as a rational, technical, bureaucratic enterprise defining it as a distinctive way of relating to and mobilising people in the process of governance”.

Fox and Miller reject the basic model of Western democracy, or what they termed ‘loop model democracy’, which conceptualises policy in terms of input-output feedback dynamics based on the idea of a neutral public service where the administration is separated from politics. The ‘loop model of democracy’ dichotomises policy process where on the one hand, politicians interact with the citizens on policy matters and, on the other hand, the officials implement policy decisions processed through the political machinery. Fox and Miller contend that the ‘loop model democracy’ is not in sync with the contemporary realities, lacks validity, and is theoretically bankrupt. Fox and Miller introduce the notion of inter-association democracy as the appropriate model to, in contrast with “extra-bureaucratic policy network and formations” (1994: 75), enhance “authentic discourse” on policy matters. This requires participative communitarianism, which is concerned with the maximisation of direct citizen participation in public affairs.

Embedded in Fox and Miller’s “authentic discourse” are “warrants for discourse”, which, as Bogason (2001: 174) explains, means “that one has to involve oneself with sincerity (creating trust) and intentionality (creating orientation towards solving a problem at hand) in the situation; also one has to be “attentive (creating engagement but also the ability to listen) and give a substantive contribution (creating a sense that the process is going forward)”. Fox and Miller’s contribution on the conceptualisation of the process of policy in a postmodernism context is consistent with Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) New Public Service and Bourgon’s (2007) New Public Administration theory. Compared to Fox and Miller’s, Farmer’s book introduces linguistic analysis as an important postmodernist methodological design for deconstruction discourse in the field. This is clear in the aim of the book, which is to radically change the way the role and nature of public administration theory is conceptualised (Farmer 1995: 04).

Farmer believes that this could be achieved by changing the language game that the public administrationists are playing. This is, according to McSwite (1997a: 175), a powerful strategy to change the texture of Public Administration epistemology, whose inclination in modernism is inadequate. The book introduces philosophy in the field. It makes an important contribution to Public Administration bereft of philosophical discourse. There are few
philosophical books on Public Administration. The distinctiveness of the book lies in the usage of reflexive interpretation as its logic of argumentation. As McSwite (1997a: 175) explains, “reflexive interpretation is not new in public administration”. However, Farmer adds a noteworthy flair to it in the definition that it is “a process of playful and attuned dialogue with the underlying content of the language” (1995: 12).

Bogason (2001: 174) states that Farmer’s book “is an example of a critical and discourse-analysis based approach”, which, according to McSwite (1997a: 179), is appropriate for “students and academics interested in public administration theory and educated, reflective practitioners”. This is in contrast with Fox and Miller’s book which is considered to be more suitable “to those inclined towards political science and political philosophy, whose primary concern is policy formulation in a democratic society” (McSwite 1993: 179). Another point of distinction lies in the fact that, while Fox and Miller’s premise critique modernism, Farmer’s book is neither a polemic nor a critique in the “usual sense of the term” (McSwite 1997a: 175). Farmer’s (1995) approach is that which acknowledges the logical limits of modernism without discounting the contribution it made to the science of knowledge.

The other important contribution to the postmodern body of thought in the field of Public Administrative is, as pointed out above, that of the McSwites (1997b), a book published in the same year that their review article entitled Postmodernism and Public Administration’s identity crisis appeared in the Public Administration Review. The article critically reviews Farmer’s (1995) and Fox and Miller’s (1994) books. Bogason (2001: 175) considers McSwite’s book as an example of a pragmatist approach based on discourse analysis. To this extent the book might be considered to be somewhat related to Farmer’s book, which, as explained above, is an example of critical and discourse analysis. It is also related to Fox and Miller’s book in that it examines the question of bureaucratic legitimacy in a democratic context.

A key concept that undergirds McSwite’s discourse is pragmatism, propounded as a true foundation of public administration (1997b: 132). Bogason (2001: 175) explains that pragmatism “may be understood as an attitude towards reality and human experience, meaning that one has to be open to continuous experimentation” and testing of hypotheses to bypass the dichotomies that are made between fact and value, foundationalist and realivist, and phenomenology and positivism (Bogason 2001: 175). The contention of McSwite’s book
is that reframing the paradigm of the discourse in a manner that institutionalise and mainstream discourse-oriented relationships necessarily addresses the challenge of bureaucratic legitimacy in a democratic context (McSwite 1997b: 15).

A discourse-oriented relationship means “a mutual surrender to one another”; it is “offered as an alternative understanding to the egoistic (rational-choice) model” (Bogason 2001: 175). This context appears analogous to Fox and Miller’s authentic discourse. It pictures “social relationships as collaborative, grounded in joint project and joint action” (Bogason 2001: 176), where the “implacable, immutable sense of otherness” (McSwite 1997b: 15) is underscored as the key imperative that undergirds human social relations. In this “the idea is to assume a posture of permanent doubt, place experimentation in a collaborative context, and make the results the operational definition of truth” (Bogason 2001: 176). Fox and Miller’s (1994), Farmer’s (1995) and McSwite’s (1997b) works represent the first contributions in the form of books that specifically consider postmodernism in the context of Public Administration. This is in addition to a plethora of articles, especially in the *Journal of Administrative Theory and Praxis*, that preceded and followed them.

The body of knowledge on postmodernism in Public Administration is expanding, with some scholars arguing that, because of this, the field is now being philosophically, theoretically and conceptually, repositioned to justify a paradigmatic status. But, as Bogason (2001: 166) asks, does this mean that “research must then also change into something postmodern?” This question is asked in the context of Bogason’s (2001: 166) observation that, although much of scholarship agree that postmodernism engendered fundamental changes in the objects of research in the field, a consensus is yet to be researched on how to treat them analytically. But does the answer to this question not lie in the discourse on postmodernism itself?

### 5.3.2.4.2.2 Postmodernism and the question of research in Public Administration

The epistemological credibility of each field of study is determined by the appropriateness of research designs and the rigour of their methodological approaches engaged in the pursuit of knowledge. In this the question is what does postmodernism have to offer Public Administration? What are the research designs and methodological approaches that befit research endeavours in a postmodernism context? It is pointed out in sub-section 5.3.2.4.2.1
that the deconstructive and interpretative strategies are considered in the literature studied as the appropriate research designs for postmodern Public Administration (see Dobuzinkis 1997; Samier 2005; Harmon 1981). In each of these research designs, as discussed, various methodological approaches could be discerned, which are shown in Table 5.2 below to systematise and sequence the discussion.

**Table 5.2: Postmodern Public Administration research designs and methodological approaches**

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[Own illustration]

5.3.2.4.2.2.1 **Deconstructive research design and its methodological approaches**

The concept of deconstruction is associated with the French philosopher Derrida. Its essence is ingrained in the proposition that “there is no privileged point, such as an author’s intention or a contact with external reality, that confers significance on a text; there is only a limitless opportunity for fresh commentary or text” (Blackburn 2005: 90). This postmodern research design is used to isolate “the key binary of opposition of a text and then [move] to a deeper level of analysis that brings both terms of the opposition into question” (McSwite 1997a: 75-176). Deconstruction was introduced in the field of Public Administration by Marshall and White (1990: 63) in their rejoinder to *The Blacksburg Manifesto* of 1983, which is discussed in sub-section 5.3.2.4.2.1 above.
In a sequel to *The Blacksburg Manifesto*, Wamsley and Wolf (1996: 27-37), in the book *Refounding democratic Public Administration: Modern paradoxes, postmodern challenges*, consider poststructuralism a befitting methodological approach for deconstructive analysis. Poststructuralism is a term used to explain “a loss of faith, most marked since 1968, in the entire family of social and political explanations, including Saussurian linguistics, dialectical materialism, neoclassical economics and neorealist international relations theory, held by postructuralists to have obscured reality by privileging continuity over change, social structure over human agency, and generalisation over detail” (McLean 1996: 395). As a deconstructive analytical tool, poststructuralism “denies the invariant relationship between signified and signifier, prescribes relativism, and rejects truth value” (Bogason 2001: 170). The essence of deconstruction and its importance in Public Administration is underscored by Farmer (1995: 42-43) as follows:

_The play of irony is a weapon that postmodernists use in seeking liberation from the constraining effects of conceptual categories and metaphors, because they hold that failure to deconstruct texts results in human suffering. There should be no objection to a sensitive use of (say) categories in developing important “little t truth”, truths within a language or a way of life. But it is part of postmodernism’s philosophical skepticism that the categories of a language do not guarantee noncontingent (or transcendental) Big T truth, the whole and complete truth about itself. Undeconstructed categories mean that we get “facts” not quite right...Truths which seem to be interpretation-free facts are shown, through deconstruction, to depend on hidden assumptions (oppositions and metaphors) manufactured by the language used._

In this the contention is that “public administration must learn to embrace paradox, to let contradiction stand, and to stop insisting on the singular truths that one-dimensional rationalism promises but never provides” (McSwite 1997a: 176). As a postmodernism research design deconstruction is about the theory of contingent co-existence of binary opposites. In the context of Public Administration it “question what lies under the seemingly well-established categories of the bureaucratic phenomenon” (Bogason 2001: 182). It uses linguistic analysis, a method that Farmer (1995) used to analyse *efficiency* and arrived at the conclusion that there is no a particular linguistic meaning of the concept (Bogason 2001: 170).
In underscoring linguistic analysis as a deconstructive methodological approach, White (1992: 80) asserts that “theories are networks of linguistic propositions that purport to describe…events”. A linguistic analysis is premised on the proposition that “meaning is entirely emergent from a floating, shifting rhetoric, [where] “a major device is the posing of binary oppositions that cannot upon examination be sustained as truly in opposition” (White & McSwain 1993: 29). In the book *The Language of Public Administration: Bureacracy, Modernity, and Postmodernity*, as reviewed in sub-section 5.3.2.4.2.1 above, Farmer (1995) describes the approach adopted as reflexive interpretation, which is described as being “concerned with why we see (understand) what we are seeing (understanding) and with the possibilities for seeing (understanding) something different by changing the lens” (Farmer 1995: 13). In this it is clear that reflexivity is linked to linguistic analysis. It is also subsumed as methodological approach in a deconstructive research design.

Pollner (1991: 370) defines reflexivity as being about unsettling the “basic assumptions, discourse and practices used in describing reality”. Cunliffe and Jun (2005: 227) explain that reflexivity “provides a means for thinking more critically about the impact of such practice, and can lead to the construction of new organisational and social realities”. Farmer’s (1995) book, referred to above, is an example of critical discourse-analysis, which is reflexive. A qualification *critical* to discourse analysis connotes a totally different meaning from the discourse analysis as used in Fox and Miller’s (1994) book. This aspect is illuminated in the discourse on interpretative research design. For now it suffices to only explain that critical-discourse analysis is associated with Farmer, who is a deconstructivist whereas discourse analysis is associated with Fox and Miller, whose propositions are largely interpretivist. Critical-discourse analysis is related to critical theory.

Zanetti and Carr (1997: 208) explain that “through dialectic, critical theory opens the doors to the new possibilities by exploring unexamined assumptions and comparing these with the resonance of lived experience”. The epistemological context of critical theory could be articulated with Gramsci’s (1971: 404) words as “the philosophy in praxis consciousness full of contradictions, in which the philosopher…, understood individually and as an entire social group, not merely grasps contradictions, but posits… as an element of the contradiction and elevates this element to a principle of knowledge”. Critical theory ingrains important factors of deconstruction. It is subsumed as another methodological approach of deconstructive
research design. Zanetti and Carr (1997: 208) believe that it “can lead to a particularly powerful form of innovative research in which the methodology is simultaneously the therapeutic setting that overcomes the psychological and political resistance to societal change”.

5.3.2.4.2.2.2 **Interpretive research design and its methodological approaches**

The interpretive research design is a vastly expansive area (Bevir 2004: 607) based on phenomenological tradition. Babbie and Mouton (2006: 28) explain that “within this tradition the aim of human sciences is defined as understanding (not explaining) people: people are conceived, not primarily as biological organisms, but firstly and foremost as conscious, self-directing, symbolic human beings”. In this a human being as an object of scientific focus is decentred; and the analysis of “public administration is in relation to meanings or culture, rather than deductive models or legal settings”. The contemporary realities that policy-makers are confronted with are a multiplicity of factors that are multidimensional in character undergirded by a rationale for interpretivism. In this the imperatives of democratic pluralism are important. Dobuzinskiis (1997: 308) writes that “in a functioning democracy, no single interest can determine criteria for selecting the relevant facts or interpreting their meaning”.

Fox (1993) and Miller (1993) believe that discourse analysis is the appropriate methodological approach to understand the problems of understanding the role of public administration in society. Based on the work of Habermas Fox (1993) and Miller (1993) articulate the notion of discourse analysis, which is reiterated in their book as reviewed in sub-section 5.3.2.4.2.2 above, to contextualise their proposition of an ideal policy discourse model based on substantive democracy. Bogason (2001: 172) explains that Fox and Miller’s (1994) ideal policy discourse is “based on essentially equal participants in a dialogue that is authentic, that is, based on reasonableness, to be justified by the thus active subject, who is supposed to give a substantive contribution to the discourse”. This is the basis of discourse theory, which seeks to engender democratic pluralism. It emphasises the importance of free participation in the policy process for everyone and is against the domination of policy process by the elites.
In a metaphor that describes the public sphere as “energy field”, Fox and Miller (1994: 106-107) contend that policy making is about “capturing meaning”, rather than a rational analysis, in a discursive interaction of inclusiveness, where the administrators take a proactive stance to listen and engage in a policy discourse to find common solutions to societal challenges. The answers to policy challenges and goals are not “found” or “discovered”, “but arrived at through a discourse” (Miller 1993: 111). It is here where policy networks become the focus of policy analysis. The discourse theory propounds that the administrator should play an active role in the interaction with the citizens, a role that in modernistic thinking has always been the preserve of politicians, who used it for narrow political interests (Bogason 2001: 172; McSwite 1997b: 179).

Bogason (2001: 175) explains that the question of how “administrators may have a legitimate role in democratic affairs” is the general theme of pragmatism, which McSwite (1997b) introduced in his book, as reviewed in sub-section 5.3.2.4.2.1 above. Pragmatism is already discussed above. Suffice to explain that pragmatism as interpretive research design moves from the premise that “reality is best apprehended through action” (Bogason 2001: 175). It is a “view of reality as indeterminate and flexible, of morality as inherent in action, of practical consequences as determining meaning, of knowledge as pluralistic and provisional” (Snider 1998: 276).

Using pragmatism as interpretive approach researchers determine reality on the basis experimentation and experience, where knowledge is generated through experiment after experiment, with human experience being a core variable (Snider 1998: 279). Related to pragmatism is practical theory, which Miller and King (1998) introduced for interpretative purpose. It is concerned with “a critical reflection on practice as well as imaginative reflection on possible modification for that practice” (Miller & King 1998: 58). A practical theory is based on the view that “public administration has found no foundational truths to form guideposts for practitioners” (Bogason 2001: 181). On this basis practical theory coheres with social constructivism. They are both anti-foundationalism, and, to this extent, linked to deconstructivism by the “epistemology of doubt” (McSwite 1996: 114).

Social constructivism is based on subjective epistemology, which propounds it as a basis for theorisation in Public Administration. It is the antithesis of realist epistemology. Researchers that use social constructivism and anti-foundationalism seek to understand the world around
them as an ongoing discussion of their subjective perceptions of social conditions (Berger & Luckmann 1996). In interpretive research the fundamental question that researchers ask is, “what meaning do the actors involved in a particular context attach to their own actions and that of others?” (Dobuzinskis 1997: 308). This question presupposes that interpretivism uses hermeneutics and “accepts that practically all interpretations deserve equal consideration” (Dobuzinskis 1997: 308).

Dobuzinskis (1997: 308) observes that the interpretive research uses the language of theoretical philosophy laden with abstruse concepts so that practitioners may not necessarily find it easy to follow and apply it. Ospina and Dodge (2005) believe that narrative inquiry could be the answer to this challenge. This methodological approach is categorised as part of interpretive research design. A narrative is the art of story-telling, which, according to White (Dobuzinkis 1997: 308), coupled with interpretation and critique, enable social change. It is “an excellent way to put post-positivism into practice” (Dobuzinskis 1997: 308). Its importance in research is underscored in Narrative Inquiry Series Part I and II, as published in the Public Administration Review of 2005. In Narrative Series Part I it is argued that, as a form of interpretive research, narrative inquiry contributes to the pursuit of high-quality public administration scholarship” (Ospina & Dogde 2005: 143). It is explained in Narrative Inquiry Series Part II that such high-quality scholarship is achieved through the integration of rigour and relevance (Dodge, Ospina & Foldy 2005).

In spite of the contentions that postmodernism has supplanted modernism as a contemporary paradigm of Public Administration, there are those whose scholarship inclination is still grounded in positivism, subscribing to realist epistemology, engaging in a discourse and continuing with their research based on the traditional social science concepts and methods. Some reject postmodernism as an irrelevant paradigm for theorisation in Public Administration whereas others contend that it is fraught with contradictions (see Bogason 2001). Stivers (1999: 521) is of the view that “postmodernism may seem little more than an irritating distraction”, [which] “apparently refuses to grant the clarity public administrators and theorists want, while leaving them without a foundational leg to stand on”. This clearly shows that scholarship in the field of Public Administration is divided on what ought to be the paradigmatic foundation of the discipline. In this the question is would the theoretical question of the discipline ever be answered? In relation to the object of this study a further question is whether is it really possible to theorise good governance in the context of NEPAD...
from the perspective of a discipline that has not yet reached a consensus with itself about its theoretical base. This question is answered in Chapter 7 of the thesis.

5.4 Conclusion

*Good governance* in the context of NEPAD is the object of this study and is considered from the Public Administration perspective. To acquire a deeper insight into this perspective and for contextualisation reasons, this chapter focussed on Public Administration as science. This is important to give the object of this study a disciplinary grounding and focus. In this chapter Public Administration is discussed by examining the historical antecedents and epistemological trends in the theoretical evolution of Public Administration. Subsumed in the discussion are the paradigmatic status and the theoretical question of the discipline. The paradigms of Public Administration are, for the purpose of this study, disaggregated into traditional and contemporary ones and discussed as such. From this exercise important historical and theoretical insights relating to the epistemological foundation of the discipline are acquired. It transpires in such insights that the theoretical question of Public Administration is a subject of contestation.

The theoretical and paradigmatic evolution of Public Administration has always been characterised by binary opposites where the different epistemological trends in the history of the discipline evolved on the basis of rejecting each other. The contemporary paradigms of Public Administration evolved on the basis of rejecting the traditional ones. Also within the paradigms disaggregated as traditional and contemporary paradigms of Public Administration there are theoretical propositions in contestation with each other. It is only in postmodernism that the notion of co-existence of opposites is introduced, as opposed to the binary discourse based on the modernistic or realist epistemology.

The chapter ends with the question whether is it really possible to theorise *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from a disciplinary perspective that has not yet reached a consensus with itself about its theoretical base. This question needs to be understood within the context of the fact that, as determined through extensive review of Public Administration scholarship in Chapter 2 of the thesis, scholarship endeavours in the field to determine the meaning of
good governance in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective are limited. The question raised above is answered in Chapter 7 of the thesis.

Chapter 7 is preceded by Chapter 6, which is based on the question that this chapter, in the context of the contestations associated with its epistemological evolution and the fact that scholarship endeavours in the field to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD are limited, asks: can the discipline perhaps derive any epistemological value and insights into how this concept [good governance] is theorised and conceptualised to determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD from the literature beyond the field? This is the question that merits consideration and is attended to in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 6

INSIGHTS FROM THE LITERATURE BEYOND THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SCHOLARSHIP ON GOOD GOVERNANCE IN NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT

6.1 Introduction

Following its adoption in Abuja on 23 October 2001, a myriad of intellectual outputs on NEPAD abound. A substantial body of knowledge on this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development exists. However, in Chapter 2 of the thesis, it is contended that scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD in the field of Public Administration are limited. There is little that has been written about this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development in the field. In Chapter 5 of the thesis it is determined that Public Administration as a science evolved on the basis of competing theoretical paradigms in contestation with each other as binary opposites. In this the fundamental question asked is whether it is feasible to theorise good governance in the context of NEPAD in a discipline that has not yet settled the epistemological question about its theoretical base. This presupposes a limitation in the existing body of Public Administration knowledge.

The literature beyond the mainstream Public Administration scholarship is considered in this chapter to explore the possibility of expanding the disciplinary boundaries of knowledge on good governance in the context of NEPAD. It is reviewed to determine how good governance in the context of NEPAD is understood and used in the contemporary development discourse on Africa. The objective of this chapter is to establish whether insights acquired from this other literature could be used to enrich Public Administration scholarship in the conceptualisation and theorisation of good governance in NEPAD. This important in moving towards answer to the question posited in Chapter 1 of the thesis about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration
What is meant by ‘literature beyond the Public Administration scholarship’ or ‘other literature’ is explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis. For reasons of epistemic logic and systematisation of review of the literature beyond Public Administration scholarship, this chapter follows the an approach similar to the one used in Chapter 2 of the thesis. The body of literature in this chapter is organised into books and chapters in books, papers presented at scholarly gatherings, and articles published in scholarly journals. They are reviewed as such in separate sub-sections below. Perhaps a slight difference in this chapter, as compared to Chapter 2 of the thesis, is that official documents and other texts such as the speeches, newspaper reports, and magazine articles are also considered to determine how the concept is used and understood by other users.

6.2 Books and chapters in books

Africa Define Yourself (2002) is one of the series of books which Mbeki, one of the architects of NEPAD, authored. It is rich in original ideas and in its engagement with socio-economic and political issues. Essay sixteen in the book is specifically dedicated to NEPAD. Mbeki (2002: 149-157) consistently emphasises good governance in NEPAD as one of the fundamental preconditions for sustainable development on the continent. Good governance in the book is treated as a principle rather than and also, more importantly, as a concept. But, perhaps Mbeki’s (2002: 152-155) treatment of good governance as a principle with no conceptual reflections on its meaning leaves to full-time scholars the intellectual space to unpack the concept and develop a contextual understanding that befits NEPAD as the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development.

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S This part of the thesis is based on an article entitled ‘A critical understanding of good governance and leadership concepts written in the context of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the challenges to contextual discourse on Africa’s development paradigms’ in the International Journal of African Renaissance. I co-authored this article with Professor Gutto. The article was initially prepared by myself as a paper that reviews African scholarship in terms of its treatment of the concept of good governance in the context of NEPAD for presentation at the 2006 Social Sciences Conference, a collaborative research conference convened by by the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and Social Network of South Africa (SSNSA). The said paper was part of the evolution of this thesis. Gutto subsequently collaborated with myself by connecting good governance to leadership and situating African scholarship within the dynamics of changes that have characterised Africa’s politics and socioeconomic realities since the 1960s. The purpose of publishing this part of the thesis was to test the validity of my observation based on the existing body of literature in so far as how scholarship beyond Public Administration discipline treats the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD.
In *The African Renaissance: History, Significance and Strategy* Okumu (2002) situates NEPAD within the African Renaissance context and analyses it rather succinctly. What is, however, particularly important in this book is its reference to good governance. In analysing the factors that the success of NEPAD is contingent upon, Okumu (2002: 241) states that “African countries must pledge to meet vigorous aims in good governance…” But, the discussion falls short of specifying and explaining those “aims in good governance” or even to make any significant contribution in analysing the concept within the context of NEPAD and its philosophical and theoretical antecedents. Okumu (2002: 241) appears to assume that there is a common understanding of *good governance* as its consideration in the discourse is not preceded by the attempt to determine its meaning as a concept.

Similarly, in a collection of essays that Jacobs and Calland (2002) edited in the book *Thabo Mbeki World: The politics and ideology of the South African President* good governance in NEPAD is not considered as a concept. In the essay that critiques NEPAD as “globalisers’ modified neo-liberal project”, Bond (2002: 66) contends that “hot money” capital inflows and foreign direct investment feature prominently in the NEPAD initiative as prerequisites for sustainable development on the African continent whereas good governance and political stability, which are critically important for the development of the developing countries, are not accorded the same attention and emphasis. This argument is advanced within the context of NEPAD as a contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development. Bond (2002: 66) does not expound on the meaning of or what ought to be the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

In Vale’s (2002: 140) essay it is stated that a partnership envisaged in NEPAD between “rich and poor, North and South, should be premised upon the codes of institutional behaviour that have emerged in recent years” which, among others, include “enforcing the rule of law and exacting accountability, captured in NEPAD’s frequent invocation of the idea of good governance”. But, does the rule of law and accountability mean *good governance*? Is Vale’s ratiocination adequate in conceptually fathoming the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD? Vale’s (2002: 132-142) succinct consideration of good governance in the NEPAD discourse gravitates more towards the *procedural democratic strand* and does not analyse it as a concept. It is based on neo-liberal variables of procedural democracy.
Vale’s (2002: 139-142) essay, which, like Okumu’s (2002) contribution, traces the origin of NEPAD from the African Renaissance, does not fill the void in Bond’s (2002: 66) critical discussion, namely a lack of conceptual analysis of good governance in the context of NEPAD. Essays of Ryklief (2002: 113), Johnson (2002: 222), Calland and Jacobs (2002: 257) make reference to good governance. Their engagements with this concept are not located within the NEPAD context and the mainstream development discourse; and are therefore not valuable in the quest to understand scholarship treatment of the subject that this study examines.

In Poverty to prosperity: Globalisation, good governance and African recovery, Mills (2002), in an analysis of the socio-economic and political challenges of the continent in the face of globalisation, consistently makes reference to good governance and how it has always been put forward by the developed countries of the West and multilateral organisations as a conditionality for aid in Africa. In this book, Mills (2002: 60-61) makes an important observation that:

…good governance …has become a 21st century buzzword [and is] today a concept used as a literal means test for the success and potential of economic reforms. The term is taken to encompass limited but effective government, the implementation of a range of liberal macroeconomic policies, sound and forward-looking leadership, the absence of corruption, and national and regional political stability and social stability. It has become a policy end in itself,... emerging in the 1990s as a political conditionality in the structural adjustments programmes of the World Bank, in the belief that economic reforms were more likely to succeed if the right, democratic socio-political context were encouraged.

[UNECA] (1999: on-line) and World Bank (1998: 16), relate to the following variables of governance:

- improving the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the public sector;
- political and economic stability
- intolerance of corruption
- peace and national unity
- openness and transparency; law and order
- rule of law
- respect for human rights and civil liberties
- political rights and freedom of association
- multipartyism
- citizen participation in the processes of governance
- free and fair elections
- press or media freedom.

The above-mentioned aspects relate to the procedural aspects of democracy, which scholarship outputs of some scholars in the field of Public Administration subscribe to in conceptualising good governance. But, is such conception of good governance universally applicable and transcontextual? Does it constitute an adequate and appropriate intellectual framework from which to understand good governance in the context of NEPAD? Does it befit the particular context and circumstances of African nations? In neo-liberalism governance is considered as good when it complies with the principles mentioned above. But, can the same principles be used in engaging with good governance in the context of NEPAD? This question is not answered in a positive sense in Chapter 2 of the thesis, which argues that much of the existing body of scholarship in Public Administration subscribes to neo-liberalism in conceptualising good governance.

The conception of good governance on the basis of the principles mentioned above is embedded in neo-liberalism, which was denounced as fundamentally flawed largely because of its preoccupation with processes and systems rather than substantive aspects of democracy. The neo-liberal conception of good governance does not consider people as the true intended beneficiaries of development. Can Mills (2002) provide an alternative conceptual paradigm,
which may be instructive to Public Administration scholarship on the meaning of \textit{good governance} in the context of NEPAD?

A review of the book indicates that conceptual engagement with \textit{good governance} to develop a contextual understanding of what it means in NEPAD is lacking. Mills’s (2002: 56-85) engagement with the concept only makes reference to neo-liberal perspectives and does not explore Africanist views on \textit{good governance} for its contextualisation to NEPAD. This is in spite of the fact that the framework that introduces the structure of the book raised a question that creates the impression that at least a section in the broader NEPAD discourse would specifically be dedicated to a conceptual analysis of \textit{good governance} in a quest to develop a contextual understanding of its meaning: “when can \textit{governance} be considered as \textit{good}?” As raised within the context of NEPAD this question is importantly relevant as it is formulated in a manner poised to engage scholarship on the concept \textit{good governance} for contextual understanding of what it means in the contemporary paradigm for sustainable development.

Mills’s (2002: 56-85) neo-liberal engagement with \textit{good governance} underplays [his] own contention that this concept is largely “advocated by the developed North, which ignores the systems of governance practised in pre-colonial societies, and in its current form obscures the linkage of policy with culture… and wider developmental concerns”. An implication embedded in this contention is that neo-liberal Western conception of \textit{good governance} can neither be universally applicable, transcontextual nor constitute an adequate and appropriate intellectual basis to understand the meaning of \textit{good governance} in NEPAD. Mills’s (2002) approach to the discourse on good governance is the same as in the contributions of some scholars in the field of Public Administration whose works are reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. It fails to provide an alternative paradigm for conceptualising \textit{good governance}. This is in spite of the fact that Mills (2002: 56-85) dismisses the neo-liberal conception of \textit{good governance} in the contemporary development discourse as being ignorant of the system of governance practised in pre-colonial societies.

In the book Gibb, Hughes, Mills and Vaahstoranta (2002) edited \textit{Charting a new course: globalisation, African recovery and the New Africa Initiative, good governance} is referred to in almost all the intellectual contributions discussing NEPAD. In the preface \textit{good governance} is referred to at least thrice:
NEPAD “essentially establishes a ‘club’ of African states committed to good governance...; it also provides an excellent education framework on Africa’s challenges and the need for... entrenching good governance...; and... in stressing the need for external partnership, it should not serve to obscure the things that African states can and must do without outside assistance, such as ending corruption and promoting good governance”. (Hughes & Mills 2002: vii-xi)

In an opening essay in the book Pahad (2002: 01-07) contends that development in Africa requires adoption of “policies aimed at providing democracy, good governance and human rights” and the NEPAD “initiative is premised on African states making commitments to these variables of governance, which are emphasised in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) as its objective”. In making a specific reference to the southern part of Africa in the NEPAD discourse, Pahad emphasises that good governance, democracy and the rule of law are the foundation on which SADC develop. This argument is taken further by Gelb (2002: 23-38) whose treatise revolves around good governance and its importance in the development of the continent. Gelb argues that NEPAD’s prioritisation of good governance as one of the pre-conditions for sustainable development is spot-on in dealing with the issues that had often been underplayed in the development initiatives that preceded NEPAD in Africa.

Pityana’s (2002: 44) contribution to the discourse is consistent with Gelb’s (2002: 23-38) contention in that it also underscores the importance of good governance in the contemporary paradigm model for Africa’s sustainable development. Guma’s (2002: 55-66) discourse is steeped in ‘pure economics’ about economic recovery in Africa and regional integration in the SADC for competitiveness in the global economy. In this discourse good governance is also considered. Guma (2002: 64) states that “the role and importance of good governance, which spans the public and private sectors in the development process, particularly in an environment of globalisation, cannot be over-emphasised”. NEPAD offers Africa’s leadership a new focus and an opportunity to encourage “unwavering efforts to eradicate poverty, promote economic growth and [more importantly]... good governance” (Guma 2002: 66)
In dealing with the issue of post-conflict governance, Nagan (2002: 69, 71-73, 83-84, 88-89) consistently emphasises the centrality of good governance in sustaining peace and security for Africa’s development. Wars and conflicts that bedevilled Africa particularly in the twentieth century, with some still occurring in other corners of the continent as the twenty-first century dawns, necessitates a “universal commitment to dramatically set things right” (Nagan 2002: 69); this entails, among others, inculcating the culture of good governance, which is a “generally accepted normative objective of state transformation….,” (p. 71). Nagan (2002: 71) provides a brief conceptual reflection on good governance and raises a particularly important point that good governance is a complex concept that cannot just, contrary to the existing postulations on the issue, simply be understood in terms of the principles of democracy, namely transparency, accountability and responsibility. Nagan (2002: 71) contends that these principles:

... presuppose a democratic political culture supported by the rule of law. However, the complex accommodations and undertakings of the actual distribution of power within a state often obscure[s] structural as well as functional elements that are crucial to understanding the actual conditions of governance and the prospect of transformation in the direction of good governance. Thus, the presupposition that a democratic state will necessarily engage in good governance is not axiomatic truth. Injustice does happen in democratic states, hence the salience of the rule of law.

But, the concept of a rule of law is also a subject of contestation as political philosophers and legal scientists do not seem to agree on what it means (own observation from Currie. De Waal, De Vos, Govender, & Klug 2001: 75; Bealey 1999: 290-291; Burns 1999: 08; Heywood 1997: 284; Dugard 1978: 43; Matthews 1971: 27-30; Mtshaulana 2001: 521-528; and the International Commission of Jurists (1988: 144). It does not help much in the attempt to understand good governance outside the neo-liberal context that preponderates in the existing body of knowledge. In taking the discourse further, Nagan (2002: 71) notes that lately the “more fashionable phrase that is tied to good governance is the notion of civil society.” This is also the case in the Public Administration scholarship. Could this be an emergence of a new conceptual paradigm in which to understand the meaning of good governance in the contemporary development discourse? Scholarship is not authoritatively clear on this question.
The ideologically-driven intellectual postulations embedded in the civic activism tradition strongly emphasise the centrality of civil society in conceptualising and understanding *good governance* in the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s sustainable development. Some Public Administration scholars such as Arora (2004: 313), Cloete (2003: 15), Hayllar (2005: 611), Mhone and Edigheji (2003b: 03) whose works are reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis subscribe to this perspective, although not expressed within the context of NEPAD. In this respect it is clear that the perspectives of some scholars in the field [of Public Administration] gravitate towards the same intellectual direction as those of other scholars in the literature beyond Public Administration.

Apart from pointing out the complex nature of *good governance* and without conceptually engaging with it for contextualisation of its meaning in NEPAD, Nagan (2002:78, 83), towards the end of the discourse, only states that “the new leadership reflects a commitment to principles of good governance” and “the AU Constitution, which has already received a sufficient number of ratifications to come into force, will accelerate the institutionalisation of good governance and the generation of continent-wide institutions of conflict resolutions”. But the question still remains: what is the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD? This question is not answered in the subsequent contributions in the book.

Mills and Oppenheimer (2002: 91-105) make reference to good governance only in terms of its prioritisation as a pre-condition for sustainable development in NEPAD as a principle and reiterate its importance in the development of the continent. In engaging with NEPAD, Spicer (2002: 108) states that “business strongly supports the well-articulated vision of NEPAD, which aims to promote good governance” and provides a framework for “broader thinking about [it] across Africa”. Spicer (2002: 109) cautions that, as one of the NEPAD challenges, “the founders of NEPAD run the risk of overlooking the more simple policy issues of good governance that African countries can do something about it in isolation”. This could be obfuscated by a lack of detail of what good governance in the context of NEPAD entails; and without such detail good governance indicators contextual to the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD cannot be set. Apart from raising this critical issue, Spicer’s (2002: 107-115) essay does not offer any conceptual analysis of good governance for contextual understanding of its meaning in NEPAD.
In spite of extensive consideration of good governance in the discourse on the contemporary model for Africa’s development, there is nothing much in the book *Charting a new course: Globalisation, African recovery and the New Africa* that adds to the development of the contextual understanding of *good governance* in NEPAD. The contributions in the book are not significant in filling the void in the Public Administration scholarship on the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD. Bond’s 2003 book with a catchy title, *Against global apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance*, suggestive of its relevance to, and situation within the NEPAD discourse raises intellectual expectations that the void in the broader NEPAD discourse on *good governance* would probably be addressed. For Bond is well-known for critical engagement with socio-economic and political issues.

Bond’s acclaimed intellectual proficiency and prolificacy in the development discourse captured attention and the book was reviewed to establish the extent of its consideration of *good governance* from a conceptual perspective in the context of NEPAD. The book makes reference to NEPAD rather succinctly and its engagement with the factors that underpin it is broad, not adequately rigorous and postscripted. Good governance as one of the factors emphasised as a prerequisite for sustainable development is not engaged in a manner that develops a contextual understanding of its meaning as a concept (see Bond 2003: 293-305). The book is also of no benefit to the Public Administration scholarship on matters of conceptualisations and theorisation as they relate to good governance in the context of NEPAD.

*African development and governance strategies in the 21st century – looking back to move forward: Essay in honour of Adebayo Adedeji* is another book published in 2004 that deals with development in Africa. It comprises 16 chapters plus an epilogue. Each chapter focuses on its own topic on the developmental issues in Africa. In Chapter 1 of the book Kankwenda (2004:3-19), using a metaphor *Development Merchant System* (DMS), analyses the history of development in Africa for the past forty years and arrives at the conclusion that it was “forty years of development illusions”. Kankwenda (2004a: 03-19) contends that Africa’s indigenous development paradigms should be explored and appropriately harnessed as a way towards replacing the foreign-based ones as they failed dismally to extricate Africa from its development quagmire.
In this book Kankwenda offers excellent ideas on how Africa could chart its own developmental course. The discussion does not make reference to NEPAD, but the ideas that Kankwenda put forward for the development of Africa’s indigenous alternative paradigms seem to be an intellectual framework from which this contemporary paradigm model for Africa’s development (NEPAD) originated. *Good governance* features prominently as one of the propositions that Kankwenda emphasises as being key to sustainable development in Africa. In this regard, Kankwenda cautions, however, that the concept of *good governance* should not be understood within the philosophy of market fundamentalism and liberal economics that informed the *Structural Adjustment Programmes* of the Bretton Woods Institutions prescribed as medicinal recipe for Africa’s development crisis. Kankwenda (2004a: 17) asserts that *good governance* in Africa’s indigenous alternative paradigms should be understood “in the idiom of development socialisation rather than structural adjustments”.

The concept of development socialisation is about that model of development where the development processes are democratised. This model “assigns priority to the national community’s interests, implying a subjection of external relations to national priorities, collective and permanent social dialogue, true participation by the masses in choices and decisions concerning their likes, and the accountability and responsibility of ruling bodies and individuals at all levels” in the political, economic and social spheres (Kankwenda 2004a: 12-13). Although not expressed within the NEPAD context, Kankwenda’s treatise is an important contribution towards Africa-focussed epistemological framework from which concepts such as *good governance* could be discoursed and understood within their appropriate contexts. This could be instructive to the contemporary body of scholarship to know that much of its conceptualisation and theorisation of *good governance* is etched in neo-liberalism.

Onimonde’s (2004: 20-24) contribution logically follows Kankwenda’s compelling case for Africa’s alternative development paradigms and strategies. The focus of Onimonde’s Chapter 2 is on mobilisation for the implementation of alternative development paradigms in 21st-century Africa. Although Kankwenda and Onimonde’s chapters address different topics, the gist of their argument congruently converge on the same point consistently propagated as being fundamentally important to undergird an alternative development trajectory in Africa, namely: people-centred development or, as indicated in Kwankwenda, development socialisation. This model of development, as already argued above, is important in the search
for a theoretical framework for the conceptualisation of the meaning of *good governance* that befits the NEPAD context.

Onimode’s discussion does not explicitly make reference to NEPAD, but issues raised are relevant for rigorous engagement with it. Kankwenda’s (2004a: 12-13) *development socialisation* and Onimode’s (2004: 20-24) *people-centred development* are akin to some intellectual efforts in the field of Public Administration that conceptualise *good governance* on the basis of substantive aspects of democracy (see Arora 2004: 313; Cloete 2003: 15; Hayllar 2005: 611). In Chapter 3 Tomori and Tomori (2004: 30-48) analyse the *African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustments Programmes* as launched in 1989 to determine its impact on the socio-economic recovery and transformation in Nigeria. The analysis is relevant to the contemporary development discourse in Africa; but, it does not make any reference to NEPAD and good governance. This chapter is therefore, for the purpose of this review exercise, not very useful.

Kankwenda (2004a: 49-53) in Chapter 4 continues with an analysis of the *African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes* (AAF-SAP). In the analysis, Kankwenda raises an important point that clearly suggests that AAF-SAP underplay the importance of good governance as one of the critical imperatives for sustainable development. This is implicitly encapsulated in the following:

> ...AAF-SAP policy instruments and directions venture nothing in terms of political role and direction, nothing substantial enough in terms of democratisation or socialisation of the whole transformation process. What this means is that in spite of the AAF-SAP’s broad and valid development objectives, its policy instruments and directions are caught in the same trap as SAPs are. They claim to be alternative to SAP policies, but remain within the narrow, economistic approach of the classic SAP. In the 21st-century Africa, these limitations have to be surpassed. (Kwankwenda 2004b: 51)

The above-mentioned aspects seem to have necessitated the development of the NEPAD initiative, which emphasises that good governance is a *sine qua non* for sustainable development. Kankwenda’s discussion stops at AAF-SAP and therefore falls short of dealing with NEPAD and the imperatives for its successful implementation. It does not consider *good*
governance from a conceptual perspective. In Chapter 5, Ajakaiye (2004: 54-62) deals with planning and its centrality in the alternative development paradigms in Africa. Ajakaiye argues that “the primary function of a good government as suggested by Aristotle is really to plan…with the aim of maximising the welfare of the overwhelming majority of the people” (p 57).

Ajakaiye (2004: 57) argues that the role of the state should not, as the World Bank did, “reconceptualise[d] by defining good governance in terms of supporting the development of a market economy on the assumption that the promotion of markets will universally promote the achievement of the goal of maximising the welfare of the people”. This is an important contention that merits consideration in the conceptualisation of good governance in the NEPAD context. It emphasises the centrality of the welfare of the citizens as a critical variable in the definition of good governance. This perspective on good governance is based on the substantive aspects of democracy and could be important in constructing a conceptual paradigm for the conception of the concept within the context of NEPAD. Some scholars in the field of Public Administration subscribe to this perspective in conceptualising good governance (see Arora 2004: 313; Cloete 2003: 11-15; Hayllar 2005: 611).

Sunmonu’s (2004: 63-71) disquisition in Chapter 6 of the book, as is also the case in the preceding chapters, implores that Africa craft its own destiny. This chapter strongly argues that, in this era of globalisation, African governments should work together, co-ordinate and integrate their economies to achieve the objectives of the AAF-SAP. On the issue of good governance, Sunmonu refers to the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (hereafter referred to as African Charter) as a frame of reference for its conceptualisation in the context of the contemporary continental development initiatives. This is clearly expressed as follows:

All that we need to do in Africa, when talking about democracy and good governance is to put into practice the African charter. It is the African Bible and Quran for democracy in our continent. (Sunmonu 2004: 69)

The African Charter was adopted by the African Heads of States and Government at the Addis Ababa Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in July 1990 to engender popular participation of the African peoples in the development process. Its significance is
underscored in Sunmonu’s usage of an African proverb: *you cannot shave somebody’s head in his or her absence*. In the context of African development discourse, this proverb means that the African peoples should always be in the centre of development, not at the periphery. They should, in fact, be an integral part of the development process; appropriate meanings that befit their contextual peculiarities to concepts used to define and describe their development; and determine their own developmental trajectory and not let other peoples do it for them.

A line of thinking embedded in Sunmonu style of engaging with the developmental issues of the African continent could be fundamentally important in the attempt to untangle *good governance* to understand its meaning in the NEPAD context. It could be used to develop an Afrocentric epistemological framework within which African developmental issues and attendant concepts such as *good governance* could be engaged in their appropriate contexts and contextually be understood as such. Sunmonu’s (2004: 69) perspective on African developmental issues underscores Kwankwenda’s (2004a: 17) *development socialisation* and Onimonde’s (2004: 20-24) *people-centred development*, as explained above.

In Chapter 7 of the book Onubogu (2004: 72-81) deals with modernisation, globalisation and Africa’s political economy. Of particular relevance and instructive to this contribution is the emphasis that “the new paradigm of development must include more than economic variables” (Onubogu 2004: 78). This reiterates the point Kwankwenda made in Chapter 4 and could be instructive to scholarship engagement with NEPAD. Onubogu (2004: 78) mentions and emphasises *good governance* as one of the critical variables that should undergird development in Africa and emphasises that its conception should not be propagated from “a purely economistic perspective”. A holistic approach to development and its attendant concepts are considered as being more appropriate in the contemporary development discourse. This is a very important point in the contemporary development discourse, especially given the fact that, as pointed out in Chapter 2 of the thesis, a very small amount of scholarship in the field of Public Administration makes reference to NEPAD.

In Chapter 8 Anyang’ Nyong’o (2004: 85-93) considers issues of governance, security and conflict resolution in the East African Community. Anyang’ Nyong’o chronicles various external attempts to solve conflicts in the Eastern part of Africa that failed and explores reasons for such failure. Anyang’Nyong’o propagates a thesis “that in order to have effective
mechanisms for conflict resolution, parties to conflicts should accept the need to discuss and agree on issues of governance as fundamental to conflict resolution”. This underscores the importance of *good governance* in conflict resolution, the meaning of which Anyang’ Nyong’o does not provide.

Chapter 9 is more relevant to the object of this study, namely *good governance*. Mansaray (2004: 94-100) authored this chapter and in it contends that *good governance* is a difficult concept to define. Mansaray did not even attempt to untangle the concept, except to explain it only on the basis of neo-liberal principles. The issue of *good governance* in this chapter is approached from the perspective of the role of women in policy-making. The governance issue is also considered in Chapter 10 authored by Otobo (2004: 101-121).

At the outset, the point that “governance has been at the centre stage of development discourse, and equally prominent on Africa’s development agenda” is reiterated (Otobo 2004: 101). Ottobo (2004: 101) reflects on three types of governance as political, economic and corporate governance and explains that the relationship among them is analogous to a series of concentric circles: “the political governance forms the outside circle, followed by economic governance circle, with corporate governance at the centre”. The public administration dimension of *good governance* is not mentioned.

In this chapter Otobo explains the influential effects of political and economic governance and other external factors such as globalisation, liberalisation, privatisation, regional cooperation and integration, and civil society activism on corporate governance. The focus of the discussion is entirely on corporate governance and is therefore not perfectly relevant to good governance in a political and public administration context as in NEPAD’s *Democracy and Political Governance Initiative*.

In Chapter 11 Duany (2004: 125-139) deals with the problem of refugees in Africa and clearly presents it as an obstacle to good governance and development. A particularly important point that Duany makes or proposes as a solution to this problem and also as a means to achieve good governance is that government reforms in Africa are needed to establish community-based governance; and “systems of law and order need to incorporate African norms of governance”. This proposition, particularly the latter part, is an important
intellectual contribution that could be used in the discourse of this study to conceptualise the meaning of good governance in the NEPAD context.

In Chapter 12 Obadan (2004: 140-164) examines the impact of external debt on African countries and the market-based initiatives undertaken to salvage Africa from the foreign debt trap. Obadan argues that the market-based initiatives as referred to in the foregoing failed dismally to realise their intended objective of reducing debt in Africa. In the end Obadan proposes solutions that could be considered to solve the debt crisis. The external debt crisis is dealt with as one of the impediments to good governance and development in Africa.

Odediran’s (2004: 165-174) Chapter 13 is about water and sanitation, which are considered as being critically important in human development. The good governance implication and relevance of Odediran’s (2004: 165) disquisition is ingrained in the contention that “access to water and environmental sanitation is a basic human right, which is guaranteed by international conventions ratified almost by all the in the world, including the Convention on the Right of the Child”. Odediran’s (2004) perspective gravitates more towards the substantive aspects of democracy. Odediran points out that 60 percent of people in developing countries live without an adequate supply of water and also experience the problem of environmental sanitation. This causes human development deprivation and, under this condition, it is difficult to achieve good governance.

In Chapter 14 Amaizo (2004: 175-188) considers poverty and HIV/AIDS as obstacles to good governance. This chapter reiterates much of the contentions Obadan propagates in chapter 12 about external debt crisis in Africa. Amaizo analyses the extent of poverty in Africa and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, which, inferring from the analysis, are double-edged obstacles to good governance and development. The discussion looks at how the G8 countries perpetuate the problems of poverty and HIV/AIDS in Africa. Towards the end, Amaizo proposes that African expertise should be marshalled and engaged to develop home-grown solutions to these problems of poverty and HIV/AIDS.

Chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14, as succinctly reviewed above, are subsumed in the book as being specifically focussed on obstacles to good governance and development. None of the authors of these chapters, however, attempts to conceptualise good governance and develop a meaning that befits the African context. Much of the discourse deals with good governance
mainly from the point of view of it as a principle rather than as a concept. In Chapter 15 Agubuzu (2004: 191-205) deals with the subject of regional economic integration and propagates that it is … “a major element in [Africa’s] …alternative development paradigm” (p. 192).

Agubuzu explores how the idea of economic integration could be realised and a particularly important point made is that “the key policy elements that constitute the economic community/union are the successful co-ordination and harmonisation of economic policies with a view to creating a unified economic space” (p. 192). What, however, seems missing in Agubuzu’s discourse on regional economic integration is the good governance imperative of development. This is in spite of the fact that Agubuzu acknowledges that “without peace there can be no development, and that without development, peace cannot be durable”. Development is not only about economics, it is about political, administrative, and social stability.

From a transfrontier perspective, Asiwaju (2004: 206-230) in Chapter 16 takes the subject of regional integration further. In this chapter Asiwaju points out potentials and even pressures for transfrontier regionalism in post-colonial Africa. Asiwaju makes an observation that, as compared to transfrontier initiatives in Europe, Africa is lacking. Asiwaju attempts to find out the reasons behind this incongruence; and one of those [reasons] is the “entrenchment of the nation-state structure and the failure to embrace the principles and practice of democratic governance”. This brings into the equation the governance imperative in transfrontier regionalism. Asiwaju did not deal extensively with this governance imperative in transfrontier regionalism discourse.

As indicated in its back soft cover, the book [African development and governance strategies in the 21st century. Looking back to move forward: Essay in honour of Adebayo Ededeji] “brings together some of Africa’s best economists and social scientists to reflect on Africa’s previous experiences with alternative paradigms to structural adjustment and related problems; the intention is to learn from the past in order to chart viable new policy directions for the future, including critically assessing the prospects for NEPAD measuring up to the challenges involved”. It is further stated that NEPAD “is the latest attempt to chart a new course of good governance combined with an effective development strategy for the African continent”.

434
Excellent ideas that provide an intellectual framework to understand the historical antecedents of NEPAD are presented in the book. It is argued that the first part of the objective of the book is fully realised: “[reflection] on Africa’s previous experiences with alternative paradigms to structural adjustment and related problems”. The contributions in the book do not, however, adequately address the second objective, that is “critically assessing the prospects for NEPAD measuring up to the challenges involved”.

Much of the discussions in almost all the chapters in the book are not located within the NEPAD context. Good governance in the book is referred to as a principle without much consideration of it as a concept. As would naturally be expected, in view of the observation made in the foregoing, engagement with it [good governance] is not located within the NEPAD context. This is somewhat incongruous with the theme of the book, which is about African development and governance in Africa in the twenty-first century. One would naturally expect that all the intellectual contributions in the book should have been contextualised in NEPAD as a contemporary development paradigm “to chart viable new policy directions for the future [of Africa]”.

The book focusses more on the history of development in Africa than on critically analysing, in a contextual manner, NEPAD and the imperatives that undergird it such as good governance. It is only in the epilogue (2004: 233-255) that NEPAD is considered. The epilogue argues that Africa does not need a new development strategy; and that efforts should be put into exploring ways of strategising about how to operationalise the strategies that were developed in the 1980s and 1990s. Good governance is mentioned in the epilogue and emphasised as being critically important in the development of Africa. The epilogue does not delve into conceptual analysis of good governance to present a contextually-grounded meaning of what it means in NEPAD, or perhaps in an African, context.

Another book The New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Debates, opportunities and challenges, which by merely laying eyes on the title might incline one to think that its contents would adequately deal with the concept good governance and contextualise it to befit the NEPAD initiative and therefore fill the void in the body of knowledge that is being consistently pointed out in this chapter, was published in 2005. The book comprises 23 contributions by African scholars of note and is edited by Gloria Jacques and Gwen Lesetedi.
These contributions are thematically subsumed into 3 sections: section 1: NEPAD, democracy and governance; section 2: social development challenges; and section 3: the challenges of HIV/AIDS. Among them, section 1 of the book is thematically relevant to the subject of this study and therefore, only those chapters that are subsumed under it are reviewed to establish how the concept *good governance* in NEPAD is treated in the contemporary scholarship on development in Africa.

In a highly critical piece of work, Akokpari (2005: 01-21) in Chapter 1 looks at the AU, NEPAD and the promotion of good governance. At the outset, Akokpari points out that “*good governance*, conceived as a system of administration that is democratic, efficient and development-oriented, has largely been elusive in Africa” (p. 1). This is further emphasised in the end-note of the chapter that “*good governance* has become an evocative term yet its precise meaning has remained fluid and nebulous” (p. 19). With this introduction, one expected Akokpari to vigorously engage in a conceptual analysis to explain *good governance* with a view to make a contribution to the development of a contextual understanding of its meaning in NEPAD.

Akokpari’s discourse starts with a logical historical account of the evolution of the concept *good governance* in the development of the African continent from the World Bank, which, “in the early 1980s, attributed sub-Saharan Africa’s lack of development to the absence of good governance” (p. 1). Consequently, the *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (SAPs) were formulated as solutions to Africa’s governance crisis. Akokpari observes that SAPs “failed to spawn good governance” (p. 1). Another important historical point on *good governance* that Akokpari makes is that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1963 to provide leadership in the decolonisation process of Africa, did not primarily aim to promote it both as a principle and concept either. This is one of the reasons Africa is currently faced with so many governance crises, which the OAU, until its dissolution in 2002, failed to deal with.

In the context of these historical facts, Akokpari poses the question: Can the AU and NEPAD promote good governance in Africa? In an attempt to answer this question, Akokpari observes that the AU and NEPAD are premised on *good governance*, which is a core imperative of development in Africa. Akokpari points out that pessimism about NEPAD’s ability to generate good governance abounds. Much of this pessimism is ascribed to what
Akokpari calls “a truism that the formulation and implementation of NEPAD were scarcely informed by discussions, debates or consultations with Africa” (p. 6). Akokpari argues that “the lack of consultation not only exposed a major contradiction in NEPAD’s stance on good governance, but also rendered the project’s commitment to democracy highly suspicious” (p. 7).

Akokpari contends that “the dominance in African politics of neo-patrimonialism and its potential to subvert even well-meaning development programmes is a further source of pessimism for NEPAD’s ability to instigate good governance; embodying the latest set of conditions for Western aid, NEPAD is unlikely to counter the deeply entrenched neopatrimonial politics in Africa and thus spawn good governance” (p. 8). Akokpari further contends that the commitment of the G8 and other bilateral creditors in meeting aid obligations is most likely, after 11 September 2001, to be reneged on as much focus is now on war against terrorism. Citing Frank Chikane, the former Director-General in the Office of the former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Akokpari contends that “the war on terrorism would overshadow Africa’ priorities [as encapsulated in] NEPAD” (p. 9).

Another issue that may distract Western and US attention from African issues is their preoccupation with efforts to solve the intractable Israel-Palestinian problem. All these factors, Akokpari argues, are likely to impact negatively on NEPAD’s ability and capacity to promote good governance as, in terms of the structure of the partnership, its success is contingent upon external funding particularly from the rich nations of the world whose attention is now elsewhere. African Peer Review Mechanism is another important innovation of the AU and NEPAD projects institutionalised to promote good governance, which is achieved by assessing African government’s performance on the basis of certain standard practices of governance agreed upon at the AU summit in July 2002. These standard practices of governance are used as key benchmarks of good governance and include, among others, democracy, respect for human rights and the adoption of sound economic policies.

A closer analysis of the benchmarks as referred to above reveal that they are nothing more than a set of neo-liberal principles propagated by the Bretton Woods Institutions through their Structural Adjustment Programmes. This may give credence to some arguments that NEPAD is a reincarnation of SAPs. Akokpari further argues that the integrity of ARPM as a custodian of good governance is compromised by the chequered democratic credentials of some of its
panel members, who, at some point in their lives, engaged in actions that do not augur well for good governance. Akokpari also points out that “the confusing, often contradictory, interpretations of the purpose of the ARPM by African leaders reinforce the truncated ability of the body to promote good governance”.

A review of Akokpari’s discourse indicates that the approach of the chapter to good governance in NEPAD does not per se deal with it as a concept; rather, its emphasis is more on it [good governance] as a principle. This is in spite of the fact that Akokpari made a very important point that the concept “good governance has become an evocative term yet its precise meaning has remained fluid and nebulous”. It is in the context of the foregoing that one expected at least the first part of the chapter to engage in a detailed conceptual analysis of good governance with the intention of making a contribution to intellectual efforts to develop a contextual meaning of the concept [good governance] in NEPAD.

In Chapter 2 Osei-Hwedie (2005: 22-36) analyses NEPAD in a rather balanced manner, pointing out its weaknesses and positive aspects. The analysis is largely biased towards the economic dimension of NEPAD. An important point that Osei-Hwedie raises on the issue of good governance is that it is a fundamental pillar for economic growth on the continent. Osei-Hwedie contends that NEPAD is correct in emphasising it in its approach to Africa’s development. Osei-Hwedie does not define or make any contribution on how good governance should be understood within the NEPAD context.

Melber (2005: 37-49) continues to offer a critical analysis of NEPAD within the context of African and G8 policies. The analysis does not specifically focus on good governance; rather, it deals with a wide range of African and G8 countries’ policy issues and NEPAD. A particularly important point that relates to the conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD is raised. Grounding the discourse in a substantial amount of evidence based on the literature, Melber seems to be of the view that the type of partnership that Africa seeks to establish with the rest of the world through NEPAD is poised to perpetuate Western intellectual hegemony to define the development agenda of the continent. This implies that the attendant concepts such as good governance as emphasised in NEPAD would continue to be conceptualised from the Eurocentric perspectives.
In Chapter 4 Maipose (2005: 50-74) analyses NEPAD’s resource mobilisation strategies and points out problems and prospects for enhancing aid flows to Africa. Good governance features prominently in the discourse as one of the fundamental imperatives in NEPAD’s resource mobilisation strategies. Maipose’s perspective on good governance is immersed in neo-liberalism. This is clear in the reliance of Bretton Woods Institution’s conceptualisation of good governance as a frame of reference in explaining the concept. In Chapter 5 Matheba (2005: 75-89) analyses the South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe under the Mbeki administration and argues that it contradicts NEPAD and AU’s principle of good governance. Like many other scholars whose works are reviewed above, Matheba’s treatise does not expatiate on good governance and reflect on its meaning or what its meaning ought to be in the NEPAD context.

Using Malawi’s system of government as a case study, Dulani (2005: 90-108) in Chapter 6 tackles the interesting question of the relationship between democracy and development in the theoretical context of compatibility and conflict theses. The compatibility thesis propagates that democracy promotes development whereas conflict thesis rejects this proposition. The conflict thesis school of thought maintains that democracy hinders development. This argument, and the manner in which it is presented in Dulani’s chapter, is scholarly but falls short of bringing into the discourse the issue of good governance as emphasised in NEPAD as a sine qua non for sustainable development. In the introductory part of the chapter Dulani creates the expectation that good governance would also be part of the discourse in terms of its relationship with democracy and development. This is clear in the following statement:

*The recent trend towards the adoption of democratic politics and its associated good governance agenda by most African states has been portrayed as a defining moment in turning around the continent’s development potential. It is on this premise that democracy and good governance are highlighted in NEPAD as both an instrument and strategy for delivering sustainable development on the African continent.* (Dulani 2005: 90-108)

Analysis of the chapter indicates that the discourse focusses only on the relationship between democracy and development. The good governance as mentioned alongside democracy above is not considered in the discourse. Dulani’s discourse therefore, in the context of the
foregoing, appears incomplete. The discourse constitutes the last chapter subsumed under the theme *NEPAD, Democracy and Governance* in the book being reviewed. All the contributions, under the theme mentioned in the foregoing and, as indicated above, considered relevant to the object of this study, fail to untangle the concept *good governance* with a view to generate or make a contribution towards a common understanding of its meaning in the context of NEPAD.

In Gumede’s much-talked about book, *Thabo Mbeki and Battle for the Soul of the ANC*, NEPAD is considered in Chapter 9. Gumede (2005: 207) makes an important observation that NEPAD “is based on the concept of *good governance* in Africa in exchange for investment from the North”. A centrepiece of Gumede’s analysis of NEPAD revolves around *good governance*, which, however, is discoursed only from a normative perspective. Conceptual analysis of *good governance* is not provided. This is in spite of Gumede’s observation that the “*good governance* concept can be abused by the North” (p. 213) and dictates what ought to be its meaning in the NEPAD context (own emphasis). This necessitates Africa-focussed intellectual intervention to construct a contextual meaning of good governance in NEPAD, which is not forthcoming in the existing body of African scholarship.

Gumede’s intellectual intervention, like the contribution of other authors whose work is reviewed in this chapter, fails to address a critical ‘missing link’ in the contemporary development discourse: *what exactly does the concept good governance mean in the context of NEPAD?* Although in some instances important scholarly contributions are made with regard to the conceptual framework in terms of how the concept could be understood, a sample of selected books and chapters in books as examined above fall short of specifically offering a comprehensive meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. This chapter now turns to conferences, symposia and workshop papers in search of insights from the literature beyond Public Administration scholarship on the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.
6.3 Conferences, occasional, symposia and workshop papers

Following the adoption of NEPAD, conferences, symposia and workshops were hosted and scholars around the world came together to discourse and writes about it. Kanbur wrote and presented a paper on *The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): an initial commentary* in as early as November 2001, immediately after NEPAD was launched in October 2001, at the gathering of the Southern African Regional Poverty Network. The paper gives an overview of what NEPAD is about and is not very rigorous and detailed in engaging with various aspects that underpin it, such as good governance. A workshop hosted by Hanns Seidel Foundation, based in Germany, in Dar es Salaam on 24-26 February 2002 also comes to mind as but another of the first scholarly gatherings that took place immediately after the adoption of NEPAD by African leaders.

With the theme *New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)-African Perspectives*, the workshop brought together participants from nine African countries to discourse about NEPAD. In analysing the papers that were presented at the workshop, good governance was emphasised as being key to sustainable development in Africa. Those papers did not, however, engage in a detailed conceptual analysis of *good governance* to offer some Africa-focussed intellectual contributions on what this concept [should] mean in the context of NEPAD, taking into consideration its philosophical and theoretical antecedent, which some scholars argue is African Renaissance (see the Discussion Paper 16 of Melber, Gathaka, Wanjala, Cornwell, 2002: 01-45).

In South Africa Mafube Events and Communication, the South African Broadcasting Corporation and the Faculty of Economic Sciences at the University of Pretoria hosted a Conference on 1-23 April 2002 to discuss NEPAD. The theme of the Conference was *Unpacking NEPAD: Opportunities for business, entrepreneurs and SME communities* and its aim was to engage with the NEPAD initiative to acquire a clear insight into what it entails. From the presentations made at the Conference a special edition of the *Journal of Public Administration* [Vol. 37 no. 3.1 of November 2002] was produced. This is reviewed as part of the Public Administration scholarship in Chapter 2 of the thesis.
Immediately following the South African Conference on unpacking NEPAD, the Council for Development and Social Science Research in Africa (CODERSIA) and the Third World Network-Africa (TWN-Africa) brought together scholars and activist intellectuals from Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and South America in a joint Conference in Ghana, Accra, on 23-26 April 2002 “to deliberate on Africa’s developmental challenges in the new millennium” and NEPAD was the subject of discussion (CODERSIA-TWN-Africa 2002: on-line). Various issues that are critically important in addressing the development conundrum in Africa were discussed.

The Joint CODESRIA-TWN-Africa Conference arrived at the conclusion that, in the context of the history of development in Africa and the influences of neo-liberalism in Africa, “while many of its stated goals may be well-intentioned, the development vision and economic measures that it canvasses for the realisation of these goals are flawed” and would therefore not contribute to addressing the development problems of the continent (CODERSIA-TWN 2002: on-line). The CODESRIA-TWN-Africa Conference Declaration makes no reference to the concept of good governance in NEPAD, although issues of democracy and development were broadly considered in the deliberations.

CODESRIA considered good governance in NEPAD in the 2003 Conference in Uganda. In this Conference NEPAD’s emphasis on good governance was rejected in most papers and discussions on the basis that it is “a political conditionality…raised only when countries foreign or domestic policies did not appeal to the industrialised countries” (Al-Sayyid 2004: 122). Al-Sayyid (2004: 123) elaborates that African social scientists are not per se against the principle of good governance; rather, they are against its “arbitrary use by aid donors in order to punish some African countries and reward others depending on those countries’ support for the foreign policies of the aid donors irrespective of the domestic record of the countries in question”.

On 26-29 April 2002 the Heinrich Boll Foundation, the Mazingira Institute and the African Academy of Sciences held an African Scholars Forum for Envisioning Africa, Focus on NEPAD, in Nairobi. The purpose of this Forum “was to provide an opportunity for analyses and exchange among African academia and civil society about the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD and to generate proposals which could be used for raising awareness about NEPAD in the general public and for onward transmission to African
governments for impact on their interactions with the G8 countries in the NEPAD project” (Heinrich Boll Foundation 2002: on-line).

The Forum was attended by more 50 African scholars of note who presented excellent papers that undoubtedly deepened understanding of NEPAD. With such a high profile African scholarship in attendance, one expected that the issue of good governance in NEPAD would be thoroughly examined from a conceptual perspective to develop a contextual understanding of its meaning. All the papers presented at the Forum fell short, however, of achieving this (see Nabudere 2002: 01-28; Deng & Yambio, 2002: 01-26; Olukoshi, 2002: 01-13; Anyang’ Nyong’o 2002a: 01-09; Founou-Tchuigoua 2002: 01-26; Oden 2002: 01-16; Ekpo, 2002: 01-20; Dogonyaro 2002c: 02-07; Gutto, 2002: 01-13; Adeleji, 2002: 02-17; and Mafeje 2002: 03-16).

The Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), which is one of the prestigious research Institutes focussing on political, socio-economic, international and development issues in contemporary Africa, published two occasional papers in 2003 and 2006 respectively that deal specifically with NEPAD. The Occasional Publication 70 of 2003 is entitled The New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Prospects and Challenges. In this paper, Bala, Du Rand, Eliades and Fourie (2003: 01-11) provide an excellent overview analysis of NEPAD. The paper starts with an attempt to explain NEPAD, then points out its prospects and challenges, and finally offers some recommendations, which the authors concede are “not necessarily original but nonetheless conducive to the realisation of NEPAD’s goals” (Bala du Rand, Eliades & Fourie 2003: 01).

In the analysis of the challenges of NEPAD, the authors reflected on the statements made by the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, that the Peer Review Mechanism would focus on the economic and corporate aspects of good governance only. The authors, more appropriately, argued that this would have appropriated to the concept good governance a similar meaning to that originally conceived by the World Bank in 1989. This matter was, as the authors observed, since resolved that the Peer Review Mechanism would also look at the political dimension of good governance. The paper is, however, silent about the Public Administration dimension of good governance, which is overlooked in the development discourse on Africa. The meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD is also not being provided in the paper.
AISA Occasional Paper 1 of 2006 entitled *South Africa’s Foreign Investment in Africa-Catalytic Kingpin in the NEPAD Process* does not provide an answer to the question referred to above Either. In this paper Thomas (2006: 01-74) provides, in the context of NEPAD, a critical analysis of recent trends in South Africa’s direct investment in the African economies. The paper is mainly concerned with the economic dimension of NEPAD, with scant reference to issues of governance as envisaged in the *Democracy and Political Governance Initiative* of NEPAD. It does not specifically make mention of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. The Institute for Security Studies also publishes a series of occasional papers on NEPAD issues and, two of them, which seem more relevant to the subject of this study, are considered as part of the accumulated body of scholarship.

In 2002 and 2003 Cilliers of the Institute of Security Studies published two occasional papers respectively entitled *NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism* (Occasional Paper 64) and *Peace and Security through Good Governance – A Guide to the NEPAD African Review Mechanism* (Occasional Paper 70). In these papers, Cilliers makes reference to good governance in the context of the debate that once preponderated in the public intellectual discourse whether the political governance component of NEPAD should form part of the issues that African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) should focus on in fostering the

> adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs of capacity building. (NEPAD Secretariat 2003:01)

Bala, Du Rand, Eliades and Fourie’s (2003: 01-11) occasional paper as already reviewed above reflects extensively on this issue and points out that it has been resolved that APRM would also focus on the political dimension of *good governance*, not only on its economic and corporate dimensions. Cilliers (2002a, 2003: on-line) does not, in the discourse of the occasional papers, attempt to untangle *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. Could articles in scientific journals perhaps answer the question about the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD?
6.4 **Articles in scientific journals**

Many scientific contributions on NEPAD are observably made in the South African journals on African studies, but not necessarily only by the South African scholars. Scholars from other African countries, in the Diaspora and even internationally-based ones also use the South African scientific journals to publish their intellectual contributions on issues of NEPAD. A reason for this is a matter of conjecture that this study, due to its limited scope, would not venture to hypothesis about. The observation that scholarly contributions on NEPAD are made mainly to journals published in South Africa is based on an analysis of Tables of Contents of 146 different journals on African studies. These journals were obtained through H-NET, which is an international consortium of scholars and teachers that uses Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to create and coordinate internet networks to advance teaching and research in the arts, humanities and social sciences through “free exchange of academic ideas and scholarly resources” (H-NET, 2006: on-line).

Unwitting disproportionate reference to scholarly outputs in the South African journals in the study should therefore be understood in the context of the above exposition. This notwithstanding, an attempt in the review of articles on NEPAD as published in the scientific journals would, as is already demonstrated in the review of conferences, symposia and workshop papers above, be made in such a manner that maintains balance and diversity in the analysis of literature by also referring to articles in other selected journals that are not of South African origin, but deal with issues of African development.

Noticeably, scientific journals in South Africa that extensively publish articles on NEPAD are mainly *Africa Insight*, and the *South African Journal of International Affairs*. A criterion used to select these journals is their consistency in the publication of a series of articles that deal with NEPAD and their special editions that published articles dedicated only to this African development initiative. These journals are extensively reviewed to determine how the articles published in them engage with good governance in the context of NEPAD. This should not be misconstrued as ignorance of other scientific journals on African studies that may also deal with NEPAD. In fact, to the contrary, other selected journals that
disconnectedly, or appear more relevant to, engage with NEPAD are also considered as part of the review of literature beyond Public Administration scholarship in this chapter.

6.4.1 *Africa Insight*

*Africa Insight* is a peer-reviewed journal that promotes insight into the process of change in Africa. It is published on a quarterly basis by AISA in South Africa. AISA is a statutory independent research body focussing on contemporary African affairs in its research, publications, library and documentation. Its journal consistently publishes scholarly articles that primarily focus on the contemporary political, socio-economic, international and development issues in Africa. NEPAD, as a contemporary development initiative in Africa, is given a substantial amount of intellectual consideration in different issues of the journal. This is clear in the scientific contributions of Maloka (2002: 65-67), Enoki (2002b: 62-66), Fourie and Vickers (2003: 11-19), Le Roux (2004: 02), Maloka (2004: 03-11), Kebonang (2005: 03-13), Aderemi (2006: 63-67) and Khati (2006: 25-34).

Maloka’s(2002: 65-67) article challenges the critiques of NEPAD and argues that, together with the AU, it has given today’s struggle about the right to development and freedom from want, hunger, ignorance and fear, a critical edge that even global trends could not predict. In this article the concept of *good governance* is consistently mentioned. This concept constitutes the essence of Maloka’s engagement with NEPAD. The article states that NEPAD is informed by the notion of *good governance*, which is a core imperative for Africa’s sustainable development. An important point directly linked to this study that Maloka raises is with regard to the definition of *good governance*. Maloka (2002: 67) observes that NEPAD subscribes to a minimalist view as opposed to a more comprehensive understanding of *good governance*. Such a minimalist definition of the concept as envisaged in NEPAD’s *Democracy and Political Governance Initiative* focusses on “administrative and civil services; strengthening parliamentary oversight; promoting participatory decision-making; adopting effective measures to combat corruption and embezzlement; and undertaking judiciary reform”(Maloka 2002: 67).

A more comprehensive view on the concept *good governance* is, however, not provided in Maloka’s article either. A further reading of other scholarly contributions made to the journal reveals a lack of the attempt to fill the gap that, as pointed out in the foregoing, exists in the
body of knowledge in so far as the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is concerned. Enoki (2002b: 62-66) examines the reasons that spurred the focus of the international community, G8 countries in particular, to Africa’s development and NEPAD is mentioned as one of those propellers. An important observation Enoki (2002b:64) makes that bears relevance to the object of this study is that the essence of NEPAD lies in its emphasis on good governance as one of the basic principles of African development. *Good governance* features prominently in the discourse of the article and is discussed as a central concept of the NEPAD strategy.

Enoki (2002b: 64-65) dedicates a section in the article specifically to *good governance* in NEPAD and raises critical issues that necessitate rigorous scholarship engagements. The article traces the origin of *good governance* from the Bretton Woods Institutions and observes that much of its understanding in the contemporary development discourse is so much inclined to the Western style of governance (Enoki 2002b:64). Now, the question implied in Enoki’s (2002b: 64) discourse is whether that Western understanding of *good governance* can be applied to the African realities to appropriately befit the NEPAD context. This is an important question in the contemporary development discourse that needs rigorous scholarship engagements. Enoki (2002b: 66) does not necessarily provide answers to the question, but makes an important point that needs to be taken into consideration in the conceptual engagements with *good governance*, namely “it is not workable to bring Western concept of governance into Africa without respecting the traditional rules of African rural communities”. This point is similar to the one that Mills (2002: 56-85) emphasises above.

Fourie and Vickers (2003: 11-19) analyse NEPAD and critique it on various aspects, some of which Maloka (2002: 65-67) contests in an article reviewed above. On the subject that relates to this study, Fourie and Vickers (2003: 12) argue that NEPAD’s specified preconditions for development, which emphasises good governance as one of them, “translates into clear normative commitment to neo-liberalism prescribed to Africa by the World Bank and the International Monetary Funds for years”. Le Roux (2004: 02), in an editorial commentary, observes that NEPAD “has been greeted in almost equal measure [of] praise and censure since its introduction in 2001, with praise often coming from the developed world and donors for its emphasis on compliance with a set of principles relating to democracy and good governance.” Fourie and Vickers (2003: 11-19), as some of the critiques of NEPAD, dismiss
these set of principles as neo-liberal concepts premised on Western values and ignoring African ones.

Much of the criticisms of NEPAD do not, however, offer any proposition with regard to the alternative intellectual framework for interpretation of *good governance* outside the neo-liberal paradigm that could be used in contextualising the meaning of the concept in the African context. Using Le Roux’s (2004: 02) words, “in a cogent survey of the criticisms of NEPAD”, Maloka (2004: 03-21) observes that some elements of the critiques of NEPAD and the critical aspects that undergird it such as *good governance* are based on selective reading of development literature, which often results in distorted analyses and jaundiced understanding of NEPAD. One area of criticism against NEPAD, which concerns the object of this study, is the definition of *good governance*. The African Forum for Envisioning Africa, as cited in Maloka (2004: 04), argues that “the architects of NEPAD appear to have transplanted the assumption of the concept of *good governance* of the World Bank, [thus]…lacking a comprehensive understanding of the structure of African society”. This argument is similar to the one Fourie and Vickers (2003: 11-19), Mills (2002: 56-85), and Enoki (2002: 64-65) advance above.

Maloka’s (2004: 03-12) article responded to the critiques of NEPAD. The article’s engagement with criticisms of NEPAD on the issue of *good governance* is, however, not convincing. The article refers to the fact that the conceptualisation of *good governance* in NEPAD is based on the deliberations of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Lome, in July 2000, to “develop a set of common values and principles for democratic governance”. But, those common values and principles, which, among others, include public participation, probity in government and respect of the rule of law, are not different from the Western conception of *good governance*. Not necessarily that one wants them to be different. But, empirically, African peculiarities on issues of governance are fundamentally different to the Western ones. Logically therefore, what informs the meaning of *good governance* in Africa would not be the same as in the West.

A further reading of other contributions in the journal that deal with NEPAD do not specifically address the concept of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD, particularly in so far as its meaning is concerned. Kebonang (2005: 03-13) deals with NEPAD and *Foreign Direct Investment* (FDI) in Africa. At the outset, the article makes a point that *good
governance is one of the factors that are critically important in fostering investor confidence. Much of the discourse in the article is, however, about good political leadership and its influence on FDI in the African economies. Apart from the fact that the article makes mention of good governance as one of the critical variables in the promotion of investor confidence in Africa, it falls short of adequately incorporating it in its good political leadership discourse. The article is therefore not particularly helpful in the intellectual effort to untangle the meaning of good governance in NEPAD. Neither is Aderemi’s (2006: 63-67) article, which is only concerned with the role that the African Diaspora could play in the advancement of the objectives of NEPAD.

Khati’s (2006: 25-34) article that examines the achievements and challenges of NEPAD, although consistently making reference to good governance, does not fill the gap in the existing body of knowledge by engaging the concept in a manner aimed at developing a contextual understanding of its meaning in NEPAD. In different contexts in the discourse of the article, Khati’s (2006: 26, 31) reference to good governance in NEPAD is only in terms of the following:

- For the African Peer Review Mechanism to succeed ensuring good governance, funding for its activities is essential
- It is doubtful if leaders marred by old habits and a poor reputation will turn around and summarily embrace NEPAD’s principle of good governance and economic and financial accountability
- The role of the APRM, as a NEPAD programme that focuses on good governance, cannot be overemphasised, as the success of NEPAD and the AU hinge on it
- In its present form, the APRM is viewed in some quarters as impotent to rein in the countries that do not comply with the principles of good governance, economic transparency, democracy and observance of human rights. (Khati (2006: 26, 31)

In Loots’s (2006: 11-25) article that examines structural reform in developing countries, including strategic frameworks like NEPAD and APRM, good governance, as is also the case in the scholarly contributions referred to above, is mentioned and emphasised as being
critically important to achieve sustainable development on the continent. Loots’s discourse on NEPAD is embedded in the theoretical antecedents of economics. The importance of good governance as a pillar of development is also implied in Mlambo’s (2006: 41-55) article that “explores the issues of national and continental security since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity” (OAU) and Petrucznik’s (2006: 26-40) disquisition on Changing Concepts and Methods of Conflict Management in Africa. In all these scholarly contributions, good governance is not engaged with as a concept to develop a contextual understanding of its meaning in NEPAD.

6.4.2 *South African Journal of International Affairs*

This is a biannual scholarly journal published by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), which is an independent, non-governmental organisation established to promote a broader and more informed understanding of international issues. SAIIA has an established record in research and conference organisation and in producing scholarly publications. In 2004 SAIIA published a NEPAD special edition in one of its series of issues of the *South African Journal of International Affairs* [Volume 11. Issue 1 of Summer/Autumn 2004]. This special edition comprises 14 articles and 3 briefings on NEPAD, some of which were contributed by politicians and government officials.

In the editorial pages, Mills (2004: 07-10) underscores the importance of good governance as an essential prerequisite for sustainable economic growth. With this editorial emphasis on good governance, one expects contributions in the journal to specifically focus on it as an important variable of development. Malcomson’s (2004: 12) article, in an overview on the implementation of NEPAD, mentions that good governance is one of the fundamental guiding principles that the African leaders have committed themselves to in implementing sustainable socio-economic development programmes on the continent. On the whole the article describes the process of implementing NEPAD and the challenges it faces. Good governance, although mentioned in the article as a key factor to sustainable development, is not defined appropriately to understand its meaning within the NEPAD context.

In critically analysing NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism, Herbert (2004: 21-38) states that “a lack of definition, poor communication and organisational weaknesses are damaging NEPAD just as its most important venture – peer review-begins”. This, in the
context of this study, is so relevant as nebulous concepts such as *good governance* are consistently being used in the contemporary development discourse without appropriate definitions of what exactly is meant in the context of NEPAD. In looking at the background, progress, challenges and positives related to the implementation of NEPAD, Ramsamy (2004: 40) makes reference to good governance as a main principle of NEPAD and a basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development. The article does not make any significant scholarship contribution in the conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. This is characteristic of other articles contributed in the journal.

Lintonen’s (2004: 51-55) article raises critical questions about NEPAD, which scholarship should extensively attempt to deal with:

- *Does NEPAD have what it takes to create change and bring added value amid all the many other development initiatives?*
- *Is NEPAD sustainable?*
- *Does it have the credibility to fly?* (Lintonen 2004: 51-55)

These are empirical questions that need empirical answers. Another critical question, which is non-empirical in nature, that one thinks is missing in Lintonen’s article is about the concepts used to develop NEPAD. To make sense of NEPAD and also, more importantly, to be able to answer the empirical questions raised above, it is important that clarity is first sought on the concepts used to develop it, particularly those such as *good governance*, whose meanings are often the subject of controversies because of their epistemic relativism. Challenor’s (2004: 57-64) contribution to the discourse is more of a report on the role of the United States in supporting NEPAD. The discourse of the article is more inclined to the economic dimension of NEPAD, and not much is mentioned about *good governance* as envisaged in *Democracy and Political Governance Initiative* of NEPAD.

Leon’s (2004: 65-77) article states that “NEPAD direct[s] African nations to practice good governance and uphold democratic norms”. The article does not explain the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. Houghton’s (2004: 71-77) article is not about NEPAD; rather, it is concerned with the challenges of the Pan-African Parliament. Vaahtoranta and
Vogt (2004: 79-88) examine NEPAD’s reception in the Nordic countries. Their article makes an observation that “NEPAD is skilfully formulated to be in line with those values, norms and principles that have increasingly come to determine the nature of world politics and the international community after the Cold War”, of which good governance is one. An important point that could be instructive in the conceptual discourse about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD that Vaahtoranda and Vogt (2004: 81) raise is that the so-called universal values, norms and principles should be adapted, even conceptually to befit local conditions. The essence of their universality is embedded in their particularity.

Melber (2004: 89-100) takes a critical look at the role that South Africa plays in the promotion of NEPAD. Citing the Executive Secretary of CODESRIA, Melber (2004: 93) argues that Democracy and Political Governance Initiative in NEPAD, wherein good governance is emphasised as a sine qua non for sustainable development, “seems designed more to pander to a donor audience than responding to or representing the concerns of the domestic socio-political forces”. It is further contended that “NEPAD does not introduce the possibility of excluding countries not satisfying the political criteria for sustainable development revolving around, among others, good governance issues; these criteria and their implications are still to be developed”(Melber 2004: 93). An appropriate approach in the development of such criteria is to first start with conceptual issues around the meaning of good governance. Melber’s article, as is also the case in many other contributions reviewed above, falls short in this regard.

Khosa’s (2004: 101-106) article, although it deals with NEPAD, does not quite specifically relate to the subject of this study as its approach is purely from a business perspective. The subject of this study is good governance as envisaged in NEPAD’s Democracy and Governance Initiative. Ginwala’s (2004: 107-112) article implores for constructive scholarship engagement with NEPAD and cautions against always dwelling on the negative aspects that sometimes beset development on the African continent. Like other contributions in this special edition, Ginwala’s (2004: 112) article makes reference to good governance and emphasises that is one of the fundamental imperatives that enhances “NEPAD’s ability to shift global perceptions of our continent”. The article does not explain the meaning of good governance. Neither does Reagan’s (2004: 113-119) article, which examines the role that can be played by Parliament in NEPAD. The article contends that African Parliaments must
strategically position themselves in the contemporary development paradigm and should ensure that, among others, good governance as an imperative of NEPAD thrives.

Al-Sayyid’s (2004: 121-127) article on good governance and NEPAD, which reviews papers and discussions of the 2003 Conference of the Council for the Development of Social Science in Africa (CODESRIA) held in Uganda, has already been referred to above. In the article that follows Al-Sayyid’s contribution, Gibb (2004: 136) explains the processes of engagement between international actors in the Industrialised North, notably the G8 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the context of NEPAD. Good governance is emphasised as being critically important in ensuring co-operation between Africa and the international community. This concept is not explained in Gibb’s article. In Dlamini-Zuma’s (2004: 137-146), Abraham’s (2004: 147-172) and Frank’s (2004: 173-187) briefings, which comprise the last part of the contributions in the journal, good governance is consistently referred to in discoursing various aspects of NEPAD. In those briefings, as is also the case in all other articles reviewed above, good governance as a concept is not explained or defined in the context of NEPAD.

6.4.3 African Journal of International Affairs

The African Journal of International Affairs (AJIA) is a scholarly publication of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODERSIA) published bi-annually in Dakar, Senegal. The aim of the journal is to “offer a platform for analyses on contemporary issues in African International Affairs in relation to global developments as they affect Africa” (African Journal of International Affairs). In volume 4 of 2001 of the journal 4 articles that deal with, and/or are related to, NEPAD were, as respectively contributed by Adesina, Akokpari, Adejo and Obi, published. Adesina (2001: 01-33) deals with a variety of aspects considered as the basis for rethinking Africa’s development beyond NEPAD and seem to agree with most African scholars that NEPAD is a neo-liberal project rooted in the Washington Consensus. Although the importance of contextual discourse is implied in Adesina’s prolegomenon to an alternative development framework, the article does not specifically make reference to good governance in the broader NEPAD discourse.
Akokpari’s (2001: 34-55) article examining post-cold war international relations and foreign policies does not consider good governance in NEPAD from a conceptual perspective, although reference to it is made in the discourse. The article argues that “the extent to which the NEPAD and African Union make an impact in re-ordering the foreign relations of the continent depends to a large extent on the degree to which these new initiatives can assure economic security” (Akokpari 2001: 34). Adejo’s (2001: 119-141) article is not per se about NEPAD. It is, however, related to it because it deals with the evolvement of the AU from the OAU. As indicated above, NEPAD is a development programme of the AU and intellectual engagement with one is naturally expected to make reference to the other. In as far as the foregoing is concerned, an analysis of the article indicates, however, the contrary.

Adejo’s (2001: 119-141) historical account of events that resulted in the establishment of the AU does not link it to NEPAD as its development programme. An important historical fact, which is more relevant specifically to the subject of this study, that Adejo (2001: 119-141) could have emphatically pointed out is that the OAU’s fundamental flaw as the custodian of development in Africa was that its primary focus was on decolonising Africa rather than on also considering good governance as an imperative of development. The AU was established to replace the OAU and one of its founding principles is that it must promote good governance on the continent. This principle of good governance is, as stated earlier in this study, emphasised in NEPAD as a sine qua non for sustainable development. Consideration of these aspects could have made Adejo’s (2001: 119-141) contribution more complete with historical facts and also, more importantly, relevant to the subject of this study.

Obi’s (2001: 142-175) article on reconstructing Africa’s development seems similar to that of Adesina (2001: 01-33), as reviewed above. The article similarly criticises NEPAD on the basis that it is “a trans-global hegemonic project reflecting Africa’s subordination, and the wholesale acceptance by African leaders of the paradigm of their subordination as that of development based on a ‘new’ partnerships with the G8 countries”(Obi 2001: 146). Also, like Adesina’s (2001: 01-33) proposition on rethinking Africa’s development beyond NEPAD, Obi (2001: 146) proffers an alternative development path based on a popular vision of development rooted in the African people and a participatory framework of democracy”.
In dealing with the historical antecedents of NEPAD, Obi (2001: 147) contends that the *Structural Adjustment Programmes* that were developed to salvage Africa from the quagmire of underdevelopment ignores the importance of *good governance* in the development discourse. This observation is consistently made by most African scholars in the development discourse. Subsequent alternative African development frameworks attempted to give consideration to *good governance*. Obi (2001: 162-168) contends that good governance, as emphasised in NEPAD’s *Democracy and Political Governance Initiative*, is a neo-liberal concept whose meaning is crafted to befit the imperatives of liberal democracy. This is an important point that challenges African scholarship to rigorously unpack NEPAD, contextualise concepts such as good governance used in its formulation, and appropriate contextual meanings to nebulous concepts that undergird its essence.

In volume 5 of the 2002 journal, there is not even a single article that deals specifically with NEPAD, except Boafo-Arthur’s (2002: 12) flippant reference to it in the discourse that examines the influence of Pan-Africanism on the development of “strategies that have been applied by individual countries in addition to several continent-wide development paradigms”. Boafo-Arthur’s (2002: 12) article observes that “these development strategies have run the gemut (sic) of African socialism to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)”. This is the only instance where NEPAD is mentioned in the article; and no reference is made to the imperatives such as good governance, that undergird it. All other articles in this series deal with Pan-Africanism, but fail to link it to NEPAD (see Chacha, 2002: 20-39; Chikowore 2002: 40-72; Mentan 2002: 73-140; Muhammad & Umar 2002: 141-161). Pan-Africanism is an important philosophy that could be explored and used to develop an Afrocentric epistemological framework for engagement with concepts such as *good governance* and appropriate contextual understanding of what they mean particularly in the context of NEPAD (see Chapter 3 of the thesis for a detailed disquisition on Pan-Africanism).

Most of the articles in volume 6 of 2003 of the journal deal with Pan-Africanism. But, with the exception of Nyangena’s (2003: 02) article, they also do not link it with, or make reference to, NEPAD (see Simala 2003: 19-53; Forje 2003: 54-86; Lumumba-Kasongo 2003: 87-121). Nyangena’s (2003: 02) article only states that the “year 2003 has been momentous in many ways and NEPAD debate and African Renaissance offer genuine political opportunities for African unity and co-operation”. In volume 7 of the Journal, 3 articles make
reference to NEPAD, but in a context that is irrelevant to the subject of this study, which is *good governance* (see Mukwaya 2004: 35-56; Anangwe 2004: 81-97; Chitando 2004: 117-132).

Mukwaya’s (2004: 35-56) and Anangwe’s (2004: 81-97) articles deal with the phenomenon of international terrorism and both argue that the initiatives such as NEPAD could play a significant role in the fight against this scourge in Africa. Chitando (2004: 117-132) examines the role of African Instituted Churches (AICs) in Southern Africa in promoting economic empowerment. The article argues that many of the ideas that the contemporary development initiatives such as NEPAD propagate had already been implemented by the African Instituted Churches. In all these articles no reference is made to *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. Other articles that are published in the journal between 2005 and 2010 are not relevant to the object of this study.

6.4.4 *Africa Development*

*Africa Development* is another scholarly social science journal of CODERSIA published quarterly. Its “major focus is on issues which are central to the development of society” with the principal objective of providing “a forum for the exchange of ideas among African scholars from a variety of intellectual persuasions and various disciplines” (Council for the Development of Social Sciences, no date: on-line). With this objective, one is naturally inclined to assume that NEPAD, as a contemporary African development initiative, would receive much attention from contributors to the journal. Articles in different issues of the journal published from 2001-2010 were analysed and the finding is that only two articles deal with, or make reference to, NEPAD (see Mphinyane 2005: 152-162; Wasserman 2005: 163-182). Articles referred to in the foregoing do not, however, deal with *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

Mphinyane’s (2005: 152-162) article examines the question of whether [NEPAD], through its e-Africa Commission and its Science and Technology Agenda for ICT, provides for new possibilities for Africa’s marginalised indigenous minorities to engage meaningfully with development processes. Wasserman’s (2005: 163-182) article focusses on “the potential of ICTs to amplify the work done by social movements and activists in South Africa against the background of new discourses of Pan-African Unity such as those around the African
Renaissance and NEPAD. Their intellectual engagements with ICTs in the NEPAD context do not extend to the point of also considering good governance.

6.4.5 African Affairs

African Affairs is published by the Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal African Society. The Society was established in 1901 to venerate and continue with the scholarship trait of Mary Kingsley, who was an explorer of the continent, a writer and scientist on the study of Africa. It fosters “relations between United Kingdom (UK) and Africa as a whole – raising understanding and interest in all issues relating to Africa” by, among others, producing “a high quality journal African Affairs on a wide variety of African related topics” (The Royal African Society, 2000-2007: on-line). African Affairs publishes articles on recent political, social and economic developments in sub-Saharan countries. On the issue of NEPAD, which is a contemporary initiative for Africa’s development, the journal, during the period 2001-2010, published four articles contributed by Taylor (2002: 403-412), Hope (2002: 387-402), Tieku (2004: 249-267) and Jordaan (2006: 333-351).

Taylor’s (2002: 403-412) article is mainly a commentary on the controversy about the presidential elections in Zimbabwe and the manner this matter was handled by the African heads of state. The article argues that these issues cast serious doubts on NEPAD. Hope (2002: 387-402) analyses the NEPAD initiative and the challenges to be confronted for its successful implementation. Tieku (2004: 249-267) explores the interests and ideas that drove the AU process and “argues that the introduction at the Algiers summit in 1999 of two separate reform packages that were meant to reform the OAU in line with the foreign policy interests of Nigeria and South Africa set in motion the process that eventually led to the creation of the AU”. This article is concerned with the AU and not necessarily with NEPAD. It is, however, as already indicated above, related to it because NEPAD is a programme of the AU.

Jordaan’s (2006: 333-351) article examines NEPAD’s peer review process with specific reference to Rwanda’s political governance. Its contestation is that Rwanda’s self-assessment for the African Peer Review mechanism inadequately addresses a number of serious political problems that beset the country. In these articles, reference is often made to good governance
without a detailed conceptual enunciation to develop a contextual understanding of its meaning in NEPAD.

6.4.6 *African Journal of Political Science*

The *African Journal of Political Science* is published by the African Association of Political Science (AAPS). Its objective is to provide a platform for African scholarship engagement with a variety of issues of politics, economy and society in Africa. On the basis of this objective, one assumed that many of the scholarly contributions to the journal would vigorously deal with NEPAD and the critical imperatives that undergird it, such as good governance. The journal is published twice a year. Articles in each issues of the journal, from 2001-2010, were analysed, with the exception of those in volume 8 number 1 of 2003 as it was out print at the time of writing the thesis.

In all the articles published during the period under review, not even a single one of them deals with NEPAD. Similarly, a further reading of other scholarly literature on African studies in the form of articles in scientific journals indicates that much of the intellectual contributions made to the body of knowledge between the periods 2001-2010 did not consider in their discourses the issue of NEPAD and, in particular, the imperatives that undergird it, such as good governance. These journals were obtained through the African e-Journal Project, which is an internet-based system that makes journals published in Africa and about Africa more accessible to scholars worldwide. The African e-Journal Project is a joint initiative of Michigan State University, Association of African Universities and the African Studies Association. This internet site contains information about more than 1 900 journals published in or about Africa in all disciplines.

*Good governance* in the context of NEPAD, what does it mean? This question remains unanswered in the articles published in the scientific or scholarly journals as reviewed in the above exposition. In an attempt to further pursue this question the section that follows now turns to the official literature, reports, magazines and newspapers articles to understand how the concept is used and understood by other users in the contemporary discourse on the development of the continent.
6.5 **Official publications, magazines and newspapers articles**

Perhaps the most important official publication that should be considered at the outset is the NEPAD document itself, wherein good governance is prominently emphasised as one of the key policy imperatives for sustainable development. Good governance in NEPAD is used as a principle, to which, as the document declares, the African leaders are making a pledge to work, both individually and collectively, to realise it as a strategic policy imperative for sustainable development (NEPAD 2001: para 71). It is further stated in NEPAD that the African leadership:

> generally acknowledged that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance; [it thus] undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, the core components of which include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers’ union, and fair, open and democratic elections periodically organised to enable people to choose their leaders freely. (NEPAD 2001:para. 79)

The good governance foundation of NEPAD is based on the *Millennium African Renaissance Programme* (MAP) Working Group 1 that focussed on the question of creating pre-conditions for sustainable development, peace, security and governance. As explained in Chapter 3 of the thesis, MAP is a programme Mbeki developed to achieve the vision of African Renaissance. It was merged with the *Omega Plan* of Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal to form the *New African Initiative* (NAI), which was subsequently renamed the *New Partnership for Africa’s Development* (NEPAD). It is explained in Chapter 3 of the study that the *Omega Plan* was more focussed on infrastructure development whereas MAP emphasised good governance as a *sine qua non* for sustainable development. The MAP document is extensively quoted in the following to enunciate the contextual and conceptual antecedents of good governance as the foundation of NEPAD:

> For the African Renaissance to materialise African governments need to invest in policies that seek to promote good governance. Where countries have opted for good governance, regional security, economic benefits and enhanced
international stature have resulted. This should encourage other leaders to follow suit. The implementation of good governance on the continent should entail, inter alia, accountability, transparency, effectiveness, efficiency, and responsibility.

Leaders must realise that good governance implies governing on behalf of their citizens and not just for their own power. In recent times, political developments in Africa have manifested in democracy spreading throughout the continent. It has taken root in Benin, Botswana, Djibouti, Mozambique, Senegal and South Africa, to name but a few, and is now being consolidated in Nigeria. However, those countries that do practise good governance are often penalised by their neighbours’ bad performance.

In promoting good governance, regional and multilateral organisations in Africa have taken a strong stance against unconstitutional changes of government. In an era of regional integration, countries are no longer immune to the repercussions of poor governance or the disregard for the rule of law in neighbouring states. A fundamental component of good governance is regular elections that are held in a free and fair political environment and in a transparent manner to ensure legitimacy.

An important aspect of such elections is that they should truly reflect the will of the people and are conducted within the context of independent, sovereign states. Further components of good governance are the principle of separation of powers, a move away from autocratic leadership styles, democratic institutions and a commitment to combat corruption. (Millennium African Renaissance Programme Working Group 1 2001: 05)

Good governance as emphasised in the MAP document found expression in NEPAD. The African countries that participate in the NEPAD initiative are required to consolidate the “basic governance processes and practices” to meet the “basic standards of good governance and democratic behaviour”; and provide the necessary support to “initiatives that foster good governance” (NEPAD 2001: para 81-82). Good governance is stated as one of the objectives of the African Union (AU). In Article 3(a) of the Constitutive Act the objective of the AU is to “promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance”.

460
In the *AU Magazine-The Watchdog of Africa*, Olusegun Obasanjo, interviewed in the capacity as the President of the African Union, explains that NEPAD “is a comprehensive socio-economic programme of the AU” (in Eze and Senior Staff Team 2005:15-16). The AU was established to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (SAPA 11.06.2002). In an interview with the *AU Magazine – The Watchdog of Africa*, Ali Mazrui, described as “scholarly political analyst” and one of the Eminent Persons that facilitated the transformation of the OAU into the AU, explains that the OAU was established to fight colonialism on the continent, apartheid in South Africa; and to protect the borders of Africa (Tang 2005: 12-13).

At the dawn of the 21st century the objectives of the OAU had largely been completed and this needed Africa to set the new agenda, which focusses on socio-economic recovery. It is stated in NEPAD and the Constitutive Act that establishes the AU that good governance is a prerequisite to attaining the objective of the new agenda for Africa’s development. The importance of inculcating the imperative of good governance in the development of Africa was never part of the strategic policy of the OAU (see Mbeki 2003a). In neither NEPAD nor the Constitutive Act of the African Union, is the meaning of *good governance* defined. Its usage as a principle in these documents is associated and expressed with the nuances of neo-liberalism that consider *good governance* on the basis of procedural aspects of democracy. So is also the case in the MAP document, as extensively quoted above.

The so-called global standards of democracy, of which NEPAD commits the African leadership to, are nothing else but a package of neo-liberal components of good governance, which, as indicated in Chapter 2 of the thesis, some leaders rejected. NEPAD appears to move from the false premise that there is a universal consensus on the meaning of *good governance*. In the literature studied in this study what is considered as a universal consensus on *good governance* generally refers to its meaning as prescribed by the international financial institutions as part of their structural adjustment programmes. But, used within the context of a new agenda as expressed in NEPAD and the Constitutive Act, which, as indicated above, focusses on socio-economic recovery, it is a travesty of epistemic and policy logic to continue defining *good governance* in the context of the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development on the basis of procedural aspects of democracy.
Compared to NEPAD and the Constitutive Act of African Union, the MAP document is more elaborative on good governance, but considers it as a principle. The articulation of good governance in MAP is fraught with neo-liberal intonations. This is incongruous with the philosophical context of its usage, which is the African Renaissance. It is also not consistent with the objective of socio-economic recovery that NEPAD and the AU seek to realise as the focal point in the pursuit of the renaissance of Africa. As interviewed in the AU Magazine- The Watchdog of Africa in the capacity as the chairperson of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, in unpacking the APRM, stated that it is related to good governance as envisaged in NEPAD. More importantly, for the purpose of this study, Kiplagat enunciates that good governance “is not by itself”; it is about alleviating the “problems that we are faced with, in particular of underdevelopment and of poverty” (Ahmed 2005: 27).

Kiplagat’s perspective is instructive in the search for the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD. It suggests that the definition of good governance in the context of the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development should go beyond the neo-liberal paradigm and truly reflect the new agenda for the renaissance of Africa, whose focus is on socio-economic recovery. The philosophy of the African Renaissance is considered in Chapter 3 of the thesis. Mbeki often challenges the intelligentsia community to go beyond the conventional paradigms; situate engagements with matters of Africa’s development in the African Renaissance; and respond appropriately to the dominant Western political discourse on Africa. This requires construction of Afrocentric paradigms that could be used as the epistemological contexts to engage in matters that pertain to the development of Africa.

In the address made at the Conference of the South African Editors Forum (SANEF) on Media, the AU, NEPAD and Democracy in Johannesburg on 12 April 2003, Mbeki emphasises that good governance is a key concept in the renaissance of Africa. A reference to good governance was made within the context of trying to explain the reason political governance should not be part of the APRM (Mbeki 2003b). The concept of good governance in the development discourse on Africa was also emphasised in the address entitled NEPAD: A New era for Africa in a Globalising World, which Mbeki made at UNESCO on 19 November 2003 in France, Paris. In this address, Mbeki detailed how Africa, through NEPAD and the AU, could be repositioned to contend with the globalising economy of the world (Mbeki 2003c).
Good governance as a prerequisite to sustainable development was reiterated in the “Guardian” lecture Mbeki delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in Lagos, Nigeria, on 4 December 2003. In this lecture Mbeki made reference to good governance as one of the objectives of the African Union as spelt out in the Constitutive Act to illustrate its strategic importance in the development of Africa (Mbeki 2003d). In all Mbeki’s addresses and the public lecture on NEPAD and the AU as reviewed above, a sense of pan-Africanism preponderates, which should be considered as a philosophical context for engaging good governance in the context of NEPAD. In a speech made to 350 delegates representing members of elections management bodies, government representatives, representatives of the African Union Commission and the United Nations, parliamentarians, scholars, ambassadors and civil society at the Africa Conference on Elections, Democracy and Governance in Pretoria on 7 April 2003 where good governance featured predominately in the proceedings of debates and discourses, Mbeki (2003a) said:

[we] should not just define the meaning and importance of democracy, elections and governance; but [we] should engage with the philosophical underpinnings of these concepts, and situate them within the African experience and reality.

This statement emphasises the importance of mastery of the art of contextual discourse when concepts such as democracy and good governance whose meanings are subjects of controversies because of their epistemic relativism are engaged. In much of the intellectual engagements with good governance the importance of contextualisation is disregarded. Most official documents that seek to enunciate good governance in the context of NEPAD are expressed in neo-liberal terms. In Towards the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development-Progress Report and Initial Action Plan, good governance is consistently emphasised as one of the key strategic policy imperatives for sustainable development. Its meaning in the context of NEPAD is not determined. This Report of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee assesses the progress made to implement NEPAD since its adoption in 2001 and covers a variety of aspects. On the aspects that pertain to good governance, it is stated that “the adoption of the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate standards as well as the Corporate and Financial standards will reaffirm the commitment of African leaders to comply with the

In the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance NEPAD Heads of State and Government of the member states of African Union pronounced their commitment to good governance and specified certain actions that ought to be undertaken to realise this principle emphasised as a strategic policy imperative for sustainable development. Among the things the African leadership is said to have agreed to in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance in support of good governance are:

- adoption of clear codes, standards and indicators of good governance at the national, sub-regional and continental levels;
- accountable, efficient and effective civil service;
- effective functioning of parliaments and other accountability institutions in our respective countries, including parliamentary committees and anti-corruption bodies; and
- independence of the judicial system that will be able to prevent abuse of power and corruption. (African Union 2002b: para 14)

Good governance in NEPAD is closely linked to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is punt as the custodian of good governance in NEPAD. Its consideration as part of the review of the official literature is therefore important. APRM is an outstanding feature of NEPAD. It generated rigorous debates in the public intellectual space. Through APRM, NEPAD raises critical issues of governance which were never rigorously debated in the previous development initiatives as reviewed in Chapter 3 of the thesis. The APRM is a voluntary process of monitoring and evaluation conceived as a creation of NEPAD and a programme of the AU to engender the culture of good governance in Africa. It is aimed at fostering the:

adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and
reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs of capacity building. (NEPAD Secretariat 2002: 41-42)

A framework for the APRM to enhance the quality of governance in Africa was adopted at the 6\textsuperscript{th} Summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of NEPAD held on 9 March 2003 and is contained in the following documents: 

- Memorandum of Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism; Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance; African Peer Review Mechanism Base Document; Objectives, Standards, Criteria, and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism; and Outline of the Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Assessments and the Country Review Visit.
- The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the African Peer Review Mechanism is a document which African leadership accedes and commits to African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). It is the “accession document of the APRM” (NEPAD Annual Report 2002: 43).

The Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and APRM Base Document are concerned with APRM policy whereas APRM Organisation and Processes, Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the APRM and Outline of the MOU on Technical Assessments and the Country Review Visit explains the guidelines for the implementation of the APRM.

In the East African Standard of Nairobi (18.04.2005) Grace Okumu, the local NEPAD governing council chairperson, is reported to have said that “good governance must form the basis of addressing the challenges of escalating poverty levels, underdevelopment and continued marginalisation of Africa”. This is the point that Kiplagat (in Ahmed 2005: 27), as referred to above, emphasises as the mainstay of APRM and suggests that the conceptualisation of \textit{good governance} in the context of NEPAD should be based on the substantive aspects of democracy.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2002: 07-13) states that “the APRM is perhaps the most innovative aspect of NEPAD” that seeks to inculcate the culture of good governance in Africa. This much South African’s former minister of finance, Trevor Manuel (Bell 2003) underscored at the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Africa Summit in Durban, South Africa, that “… the African peer review mechanism [is a ] major breakthrough from anything that has happened anywhere previously”. The APRM is more akin to, if not based on, Europe’s Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) peer
review system (Stremlau 2002). The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2002:08) explains that, “while several international organisations including United Nations bodies and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conduct peer reviews, the most notable experience with peer review can be found at the OECD”.

A system of peer review has for many years, about four decades, always been a practice of wealthy nations, which, on a regular basis and under the auspices of OECD, engaged in a process of assessing their performance. The OECD peer review system is structured and, in various stages, conducted in terms of several thematic areas of focus considered critically important for economic growth and the performance of a country or state being reviewed is assessed against the prescribed principles, criteria and standards. NEPAD’s APRM follows the OECD approach. The OECD peer review system is, however, more focussed on the economic dimension of governance. This suggests a variation with the NEPAD APRM system, which, in addition to its propensity on economic aspects of development, also focusses on the political and administrative aspects of governance (see Stremlau 2002).

The inclusion of political governance as one of the focal points of the APRM engendered rigorous debates and much contestation (see SAPA 31.10.2002), which indicate that there is a misunderstanding on what good governance means in the context of NEPAD. By not signing the Memorandum of Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism some countries did not accede to the peer review as envisaged in NEPAD (BuaNews 25.03. 2003), which the Ghanaian Ambassador to Nigeria, Lt. General Joshua Hamidu (rtd) describes “as veritable tool for self-evaluation in Africa’s journey towards good governance and durable democracy” (Adoda 2005). The confusion around the APRM as the custodian of good governance was engendered by Aziz Pahad, the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Mbeki administration in South Africa (International Affairs Editor, Business Day 05.03.2003).

Pahad is reported to have said that political governance is not part of the mandate of the APRM (see South Africa, Government Communication and Information System 2002: on-line). Mbeki subsequently confirmed Pahad’s statement in the contention that the review of political governance is the task of the African Union’s oversight bodies such as the Commission for People and Human Rights. In backing Pahad Mbeki is reported to have said NEPAD is the socio-economic programme of the AU and peer review “arose out of those matters which are on the agenda of NEPAD, such as economic and financial
Mbeki and Pahad’s perspective on the role and mandate of the APRM seemed to have been more influenced by the work of the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), whose peer review system, as indicated above, is more focussed on the economic aspects of governance. This was in stark contrast with the general understanding of the role of the APRM in promoting good governance in Africa as envisaged in NEPAD. It is reported that even the former Head of NEPAD Secretariat, Wiseman Nkuhlu, was taken aback by the statements of Mbeki and Pahad on the role of APRM and, in response, expressed the view that in as far as he knows, “the African peer review mechanism will deal with political and economic governance” (SAPA 31.10.2002).

In the Business Day (28.11.2003) article NEPAD’s peer review still work in progress Stremlau writes “anyone questioning the salience of good governance for economic development and co-operation need only read the critique of Zimbabwe. But, as argued above, confining good governance to only economic and financial aspects of the concept as thematic areas for peer review purposes borders on naivety. It appears that Mbeki, as one of the crafters of NEPAD who played a central role in its conception, had a totally different understanding of what the meaning of good governance ought to be in the context of NEPAD for the APRM purpose. This is even clearer in how Mbeki handled the issue of Zimbabwe, which was suspended from the Commonwealth because of what was described as governance practices that go against the grain of good governance emphasised in NEPAD as the basis for addressing the socio-economic challenges of poverty, underdevelopment and continued marginalisation of Africa (see Zimbabwe Independent, 17.05.2002).

Canada’s High Commissioner in Pretoria, Lucie Edwards is quoted in the Zimbabwe Independent (17.05.2002) as having said that “the decision of the Commonwealth troika, two of whose members were prominent African leaders and NEPAD leaders (Mbeki and Obasanjo), to suspend Zimbabwe was seen as a sign of real political will to apply the principles of good governance within the region”. But, as further reported, in spite of being part of the troika that suspended Zimbabwe’s membership in the Commonwealth, Mbeki argued strongly against such suspension but was ultimately kow-towed into submission. This was after it was pointed out that the US$ 64 billion on offer for trade and investment from the
developed countries under the NEPAD Plan may be withdrawn because of Mbeki’s stance on the Zimbabwe issue (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 17.05.2002). Abdoulaye Wade, the Senegalese President and one of the troika that developed NEPAD, is reported to have said in a meeting to review NEPAD’s progress three years after its launch that when “people ask me what progress has been made, I can speak to them about good governance but I can’t explain any more”. (*World Bank Press Review*, 09.11.2004). But, Wade did not explain what *good governance* means in the context of NEPAD.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2003: on-line) explains that “the G8 countries have pledged to pump in requisite foreign investment to stimulate Africa’s development if the countries provide the enabling environment through good governance and economic reforms”. But, with its financial power and arrangements, which Mazrui describes as contradiction that may put NEPAD at risk (in Tang 2005: 13), made with regard to the financing of NEPAD, the developed countries appear poised to assume the intellectual hegemony and define what the meaning of *good governance* ought to be in the context of NEPAD for Africans. The suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth against the wishes of Mbeki is a point in case.

*Good governance* in NEPAD is highly contested in the contemporary development discourse. Coupled with contestations on NEPAD at the African leadership political level as discussed in Chapter 1 of the study, *good governance* as its foundational pillar becomes even more nebulous and obfuscated. These contestations are not merely part of the broader political discourse on NEPAD. They also raise important questions with conceptual implications on *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. A consensus at the conceptual level about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD does not exist; hence contestations on it as a principle in the empirical world abound.

A pledge of the African leadership as expressed in a plethora of official documents as reviewed in this study to work, both individually and collectively, to realise good governance as a strategic imperative for sustainable development is not based on a common understanding of what it means in the context of NEPAD. It is demonstrated in Chapter 1 of the thesis that *good governance* in NEPAD pitted African leaders against each other and the debate on it at the African political leadership level is polarised. There is a lack of common contextual understanding of *good governance* in NEPAD and scholarship in this regard, as
reviewed above in this chapter, fails to provide intellectual leadership; hence the review of the official and popular literature in this part of the study to determine how *good governance* is used by other users beyond the purview of the existing scholarship as considered in this study.

In *NEPAD Annual Report 2002-Towards Claiming the 21st Century*, *good governance* is not defined. It is only used as a principle in the same way as it is in the NEPAD document. This is also the case in a plethora of other official documents, reports and speeches of the African leadership and officials. In *NEPAD Development Capacity Building Plan* (2002) the founding premise of NEPAD is reiterated. It is stated that “many African countries continue to be dodged by dependency, conflict and poverty” and the common response to these challenges “has been to emphasise good governance as in the NEPAD strategy (NEPAD Capacity Building Plan 2002: on-line). This document does not venture into attempts to define *good governance*. It is used exactly as in NEPAD as a principle.

The focus of *NEPAD’s Development Capacity Building Plan* (2002: on-line) is “on institutional and human resource capacity required to implement development interventions”. What is defined in the document is the notion of capacity development. In the *Summary Report of the NEPAD Development Capacity Building Plan* prepared by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) in South Africa, good governance is not defined, although the issues captured are more concerned with what is generally associated with it in the contemporary development discourse. So is also the case in the *Report on NEPAD Development Capacity Roundtable* of 8 March 2002 where governance was identified as one of the core focus areas for capacity development interventions.

In the *African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Africa’s Innovative Thinking on Governance*, a document prepared for the 8th gathering of the African Partnership Forum in Berlin, Germany, from 22-23 May 2007 that assesses how the APRM fares, it is stated that the APRM questionnaire and other base documents should be revised to pay “close attention to the missing issues generic to the governance question in Africa” (NEPAD 2007: 03). This gives credence to the contention of the study that the use of good governance in NEPAD as a principle was not preceded by a thorough conceptual analysis to determine its contextual meaning. However, important insights on the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD could be deduced from the APRM reports and processes.
In the APRM reports good governance is considered in terms of the four variables, which constitute the APRM thematic focus areas, namely democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development. This means that the understanding of good governance as envisaged in NEPAD in the APRM processes is not limited to the political and economic dimensions of governance. The socio-economic and corporate governance dimensions are also considered important variables of good governance in NEPAD. This means that the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD is holistic. This deduction is based on the textual analysis of the APRM reports of Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria, Benin and Nigeria to tease out the understanding of the participants or actors in the process in as far the meaning of good governance is concerned. At the time of this study these countries had already been through a peer review process and the postulations on good governance in this section of the study are based on their APRM reports.

The APRM processes appropriate to good governance in NEPAD a meaning that transcends the neo-liberal conceptualisations based only on the procedural aspects of democracy. This is also clear in the Guidelines for countries to prepare for and to participate in the African Peer Review Mechanisms (APRM) (African Union and NEPAD 2003); African Peer Review Mechanism organisation and processes (NEPAD Secretariat 2003); Objectives, standards, criteria and indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism (NEPAD Secretariat 2003); Outline of the memorandum of understanding on technical assessments and the country review visit (NEPAD Secretariat 2003); and the African Peer Review Mechanism Annual Report (African Union and NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism 2006: x-xi).

In the APRM reports reviewed in this chapter, good governance in the context of NEPAD is not only concerned with the quality of democracy, political stability, economic growth and corporate prudence; it is also, more importantly, about the socio-economic development. This means that the participants or actors in the APRM process understanding of good governance is not limited to only the procedural aspects of democracy, which represents the means, but also considers substantive aspects of democracy as the ends that are fundamentally important variables of conceptualisations (see African Peer Review Mechanism, Country Review Report of the Republic of Ghana 2005; African Peer Review Mechanism, Country Review Report of the Republic of Rwanda 2005; African Peer Review Mechanism, Country Review Report of

The ends in the definitions of good governance in the context of NEPAD are about the socio-economic development, which must translate into qualitative improvements or enhancing the quality of life of the citizens. In the African Peer Review Mechanism, Country Review Report of the Republic of South Africa (2007) the country was commended for its performance in various initiatives that pertain to democracy, political governance, economic management and corporate governance. However, serious concerns were raised about its performance in socio-economic development – most importantly in the alleviation of poverty and unemployment.

In the official literature specifically on the APRM important insights are drawn and used to answer the question about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD, which books, chapters in books, articles in scientific journals and papers presented at scholarly gatherings failed to answer. Having determined what good governance means in the context of NEPAD, attempts are now made to realise the purpose of this chapter, which, as indicated in the introductory part, is to determine whether insights acquired from this other literature as reviewed above could be used to enrich Public Administration scholarship’s conceptualisation and theorisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD.

6.6 Are insights acquired through the review of scholarship and “other” literature beyond Public Administration scholarship instructive in conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD?

At the scholarly level the literature on NEPAD in this chapter is written largely from the political economic perspective, although in some instances its socio-economic dimensions are considered. Compared to a very small amount of the discourse in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship that makes reference to NEPAD, scholarly literature reviewed in this chapter extensively considers this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development. Except in a few instances, as is clear in sub-section 6.4 above, in much of the scholarly literature beyond Public Administration scholarship as reviewed in this chapter, the
consideration of *good governance* in the contemporary development discourse is situated within the context of NEPAD. This is in contrast with the literature as reviewed in chapter 2 of the study where it is stated that:

*A large body of Public Administration scholarship that emerged during 2001-2010 approaches the discourse on good governance from an empirical perspective as a principle. It is only in a few instances that conceptual dimensions of good governance are considered. A very small amount of the discourse in the body of Public Administration scholarship makes reference to NEPAD, but not in a manner that sufficiently untangles the concept good governance in the context of this contemporary model for sustainable development from the disciplinary perspective. This suggests a void in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship.* (Sub-section 2.7, Chapter 2 of the thesis)

In the context of the above, the question is whether insights from the scholarly literature as reviewed in this chapter are instructive to Public Administration scholarship on the conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. In much of the discourse on NEPAD in this chapter, reference is made to *good governance*, but largely as a principle. This approach to the discourse on *good governance* is the same as in much of Public Administration scholarship as reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. The consideration of good governance in the broader NEPAD discourse as a principle presupposes the existence of a conceptual scheme that suggests a universal consensus on its meaning. But, as argued in Chapters 1 and 4 of the thesis, *good governance* is a conceptual *problematique*. Its meaning is dependent on the context of its conceptualisation and usage.

The analysis of *good governance* as a concept cannot simply be ignored on the basis of false assumptions that suggest a universal consensus on its meaning. For, much of what is wittingly or unwittingly considered as a conceptual scheme that suggests a universal consensus on the meaning of good governance, and therefore used as frame of reference, is embedded in neo-liberal discourse on development as propagated by the Bretton Woods institutions and Euro-American scholarship. In spite of the fact that some scholars, whose works are reviewed in this chapter, trace NEPAD to African Renaissance, their consideration of *good governance* fails to reflect this philosophical verity. It is explained in Chapter 3 of
the thesis that some scholars associate African Renaissance with Pan-Africanism, which is characteristic of critical, contextual and activist African scholarship that has emerged since the colonial era and provided an Africanist perspective on the development discourse on Africa. However, much of African scholarship as referred to in the foregoing was suppressed and neo-liberalism preponderated (Maserumule & Gutto 2008: 70-88). This had a huge impact on the development discourse on Africa and explains the reason for the preoccupation of most scholars, whose works are reviewed in this chapter, with neo-liberal paradigms and templates. Their engagement with good governance as a principle in NEPAD is located within what Mazrui calls “alien paradigms”, which makes it impossible for Africa to understand herself in her own terms. In the global dynamics of intellectualism and politics of power relations, the concept good governance is fraught with distortions.

Gumede (2005: 213) writes that in its history in the development discourse good governance was abused to suit the agenda of the international financial institutions. Its definition underplays “clashing nationalistic tendencies and varying development needs and circumstances” of the countries of the world (Chalker in Mills 2002: 15-16). Those wielding global hegemonic power impose their understandings of what ought to be the meaning of good governance on the less powerful and such meanings are often accepted without any serious consideration of their contextual appropriateness. This is perpetrated through the conditions attached to aid provided by the developed countries and multi-lateral organisations to the developing economies. Always a condition for aid is that the benefactors must commit themselves to good governance, which its meaning is imposed onto them. This is a clear case of ‘intellectual imperialism’, which, using Sardar’s (1999: 44) words, could be explained as follows:

*The power of the West is not located in its economic muscle and technological might. Rather, it resides in its power to define. The West defines what is, for example, freedom, progress and civil behaviour; law, tradition and community; reason; mathematics and science; what is real and what it means to be human. The non-Western civilizations have simply to accept these definitions or be defined out of existence.*
This quotation sums up the reality of the contemporary world. If African scholarship fails to assert itself and challenge these inequities in the wielding of intellectual power by developing Afrocentric epistemological frameworks and paradigms within which ideas about Africa can be generated, engaged and contested, Africa would continue to be defined through foreign theories, philosophies and concepts. The power to define is very important particularly at this epoch that Africa, through the NEPAD process, seeks to reposition herself in, this era the dawn of the new global order. Countries of the world are not homogenous. Inevitably, their understanding of good governance cannot therefore be the same or similar especially when the North-South variable is taken into consideration in the development discourse. This is, however, often underplayed by Western thinking and their hegemonic character of imposing meanings of concepts on others.

The United States (US) pursues a similar ‘intellectual imperialism’ trajectory. In line with the imperatives of globalisation, the US is opening up its markets for Africa’s participation in its economy with, however, a ‘string’ attached. US African Growth and Opportunity Act, which came into effect as from 1 October 2000, makes a provision for duty free access to all products from sub-Saharan African economies. The ‘string’ attached to this is that the “US President has to designate those countries that will receive benefits conditional on their commitment to ‘appropriate’ domestic policies which support good governance, a free market philosophy and democracy” (Mills 2002: 34).

The conditions attached to aid and for Africa’s participation in the global economy are phrased in a manner that asserts the hegemonic intellectual power of Europe and America to prescribe definitions about how Africa should understand herself particularly in so far as good governance is concerned. This is perhaps one of the reasons renowned African scholars, notably Abdoul Aziz M’ Baye as quoted by Mills (2002: 34), made a call that the continent should “work towards the cessation of aid flows within 20 years in the spirit of the much-debated and somewhat maligned African Renaissance vision”.

The power of the West to prescribe and impose definitions on socio-economic and political phenomena as they relate to the concept of good governance in Africa can only be counteracted if Africa can develop the capacity to restructure the relations with the developed countries especially on issues of development. This is essentially what NEPAD seeks to achieve. It seeks to engage the existing relations with the developed countries to address “the
abnormal relationships of exploitation and dependency” so that Africa can “determine [its] own destiny and refuse to be conditioned by circumstances” (Pityana in Mills 2002: 47). This requires that the thinking processes about development in Africa should be grounded on Africa’s contextual peculiarities and African scholarship must be the custodian of this. For Africa to truly determine its destiny and own its development as NEPAD enjoins, it must develop an intellectual capacity to conceptualise and, more importantly, contextualise issues of development and appropriate meanings that befit the contemporary paradigm model for sustainable development in Africa to nebulous concepts such a good governance as they could easily be used or abused to further an “intellectual imperialism” agenda. It is only from this perspective that African scholarship, which comprises part of the literature beyond Public Administration reviewed in this chapter, can add a significant intellectual value in conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD.

The African scholarship must master the art of contextual discourse. Maserumule and Gutto (2008:70) write that good governance requires contextual theorising and should not be subjected to reductionism analysis. Unfortunately, the foregoing is characteristics of the works of most scholars as reviewed in this chapter. The scholarly literature beyond Public Administration scholarship as extensively considered in this chapter fails to examine good governance as a concept and thus its meaning in the context of NEPAD. Much of the discourse in the said literature considers good governance as a policy imperative and is based on the procedural aspects of democracy. This approach to the discourse on good governance is similar to that of most scholars in the field of Public Administration whose works are reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis.

An attempt to understand good governance along the procedural aspects of democracy is based on neo-liberalism, which some scholars in this chapter denounced as fundamentally flawed, but failed to provide an alternative meaning and understanding of the concept in the context of NEPAD (see Ajakaiye 2004: 57; Al-Sayyid 2004: 122; Kwankwenda 2004a: 17; CODERSIA-TWN 2002; Mills 2002: 56-85; Nagan 2002: 71; Enoki 2002b: 64-65; Fourie & Vickers 2003: 11-79). Good governance is acknowledged in the existing literature beyond Public Administration in this chapter as a complex concept (see Mansaray 2004: 74-100; Nagan 2002: 71; Spicer 2002: 107-115). The Public Administration scholarship in Chapter 2 of the thesis emphasises the same point.
In spite of the fact that no attempts were made in the existing literature beyond Public Administration scholarship to conceptualise *good governance* in the context of NEPAD, some contributions are instructive towards the construction of a conceptual paradigm in which the concept could be understood. They draw their epistemological value largely from the critical, contextual and activist African scholarship that, as pointed out above, emerged since the colonial era to fertilise Pan-Africanism. Their emphases in the conception of development are on people (see Kwankwenda 2004a: 17; Maserumule & Gutto 2008: 69; Onimonde 2004: 20-24; Sunmonu 2004: 69). The conception of *good governance* in the context of the foregoing development paradigm is based on the substantive aspects of democracy. This is similar to the perspectives of some scholars in the field of Public Administration whose works are reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis (see Arora 2004: 313; Cloete 2003: 15; Hayllar 2005: 611). Their conceptualisation of *good governance* is based on the substantive aspects of democracy.

In the context of the above exposition, it is contended that there is nothing necessarily new that the contributions of scholars whose works are reviewed in this chapter make to the body of Public Administration scholarship. So, the question whether insights acquired through the review of scholarly literature are instructive to Public Administration scholarship in conceptualising *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is not answered in the affirmative. This means that even in the existing body of scholarship beyond Public Administration scholarship there is a void in so far as the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is concerned. In the official and popular literature, as reviewed in sub-section 6.4 above, good governance is also considered as a principle; in some instances along the procedural aspects of democracy. This is incongruous with the socio-economic recovery objective that NEPAD seeks to realise.

In the official literature that specifically relates to the APRM *good governance* in the context of NEPAD assumes a semblance of clatiry. The instructive insights are acquired and used to formulate a perspective to answer the question on the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. It is observed in the APRM reports that *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is considered in the APRM processes in terms of four variables that constitute its thematic focus areas. *Good governance* as envisaged in NEPAD is not limited to the political and economic dimensions of governance. Socio-economic and corporate governance are
considered important variables. Based on the textual analysis of the APRM reports as referred to above, it is clear that the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is holistic.

The APRM processes appropriate *good governance* in NEPAD a meaning that transcends neo-liberal conceptualisations that define it on the basis of the procedural aspects of democracy. Its meaning is not only concerned with the quality of democracy, political stability, economic growth and corporate prudence; it is also, more importantly about the socio-economic outcomes of government interventions and actions. The participants or actors in the APRM process understanding of *good governance* is not limited to the procedural aspects of democracy, but also considers the substantive aspects of democracy as fundamentally important variables of conceptualisations. In respect to the APRM literature, as compared to those acquired from the existing body of scholarship, it is contended that insights acquired through the review of the official literature are instructive to Public Administration scholarship in conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD.

6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter the literature beyond Public Administration is reviewed. Its purpose is to determine whether insights acquired could be instructive to Public Administration scholarship in the theorisation and conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. This is because in Chapter 2 of the thesis it is found that scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD in the field of Public Administration are limited. The literature as reviewed in this chapter is categorised into scholarly, official and popular intellectual outputs. Scholarly outputs refer to books, chapters in books, articles published in scientific journals and papers presented at scholarly gatherings. The official intellectual outputs refer to the official literature such as documents and files of largely the African Union, NEPAD Secretariat, Heads of State and Government Implementation Committees (HSGIC), the African Peer Review Panel, Pan African Parliament, Country Review Teams and governments in Africa and other countries of the world; and speeches of politicians and officials on NEPAD and good governance made in their respective official capacities. The popular intellectual outputs refer to articles and reports in newspapers and magazines.
The scholarly literature as reviewed in the chapter is written largely from the political economic perspective, although in some instances the socio-economic variables of development are considered. Compared to a very small amount of contribution in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship that makes reference to NEPAD, scholarly literature reviewed in this chapter extensively considers this contemporary development paradigm with some scholars situating the engagement with it in the African Renaissance as its philosophical foundation. Except in few instances, in much of the scholarly literature as reviewed in this chapter, the consideration of good governance is located within the context of NEPAD. This is in contrast with the literature as reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. In much of the discourse on NEPAD in this chapter reference is made to good governance largely as a principle and is engaged largely along the procedural aspects of democracy. This is similar to the approach of some scholars to the good governance discourse in the field of Public Administration.

The consideration of good governance as a policy imperative along the procedural aspects of democracy is denounced by some scholars whose works are reviewed in this chapter as fundamentally flawed, but they fail to provide alternative perspectives and understandings of the concept. However, in some instances, a very small number of contributions to the body of scholarship reviewed in this chapter are instructive towards the construction of a conceptual paradigm in which the concept could be understood. It draws its epistemological value largely from the critical, contextual and African scholarship, which emerged since the colonial era to fertilise Pan-Africanism. Its conception of development and aspects associated with it such as good governance is on people. Good governance in the context of the foregoing is based on the substantive aspects of democracy.

Some scholars in the field of Public Administration whose works are reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis consider good governance from the substantive aspects of the democracy perspective, although also in a very minute way. In respect of the foregoing, it is concluded that there is nothing necessarily new that the contributions of scholars whose works are reviewed in this chapter make to the body of Public Administration scholarship. The question whether insights acquired through the review of scholarly literature in this chapter are instructive to the Public Administration scholarship in the conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD is therefore not necessarily answered in a positive sense.
In the official and popular literature *good governance* is also considered as a principle; in some instances along the procedural aspects of democracy. This is incongruous with the socio-economic recovery objective that NEPAD seeks to realise. In the official literature that specifically relates to the APRM *good governance* in the context of NEPAD assumes a semblance of clarity. The instructive insights are acquired and used to formulate a perspective to answer the question on the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. In the APRM reports *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is considered in the APRM processes in terms of four variables that constitute its thematic focus areas. Good governance as envisaged in NEPAD is not limited to the political and economic dimensions of governance. The socio-economic and corporate governance are considered important variables.

Based on the textual analysis of the APRM reports, it is clear that the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is holistic. The APRM processes appropriate to *good governance* in NEPAD a meaning that transcends neo-liberal conceptualisations that define it on the basis of the procedural aspects of democracy. Its meaning is not only concerned with the quality of democracy, political stability, economic growth and corporate prudence; it is also, more importantly about the socio-economic outcomes of government interventions and actions. The participants or actors in the APRM process’s understanding of *good governance* is not limited to the procedural aspects of democracy, but also considers the substantive aspects of democracy as fundamentally important variables of conceptualisations. In respect of the foregoing, it is concluded that the insights acquired through the review of the official literature, as compared to the scholarly literature, are instructive to Public Administration scholarship in conceptualising *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. Such insights are considered in Chapter 7 of the thesis where the epistemological framework is developed and used to determine the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.
CHAPTER 7

TOWARDS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONCEPTUALISING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT AND ITS MEANING FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

7.1 Introduction

What does the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD mean for Public Administration? This is the research question upon which this study is based. Attempts are made in this chapter to provide an answer. This entails drawing insights from the literature reviewed in Chapter 6 of the thesis. For, as determined in Chapter 2 of the thesis, the attempts to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited. The objective of this chapter is to make a contribution towards a better insight into, and broadening of, the body of scientific knowledge on the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD. This study is motivated by the conceptual problematique character of good governance, which is discussed in Chapter 1 of the thesis as the object of the study.

One of the objectives of the study, which is at the core of its thesis, relates to the development of the epistemological framework that could be used to understand good governance in the context of NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective. This is the focus of this chapter, whose purpose is to develop an epistemological framework for conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD and to determine its meaning for Public Administration. Such epistemological framework is developed using conceptual, theoretical and philosophical insights acquired through a critical review of scholarly literature and an understanding of how the concept is used by other users as reflected in the official and popular literature. In the context of epistemological framework as referred to in the
foregoing, good governance in NEPAD is conceptualised and its meaning for Public Administration is determined to answer the question of the study. The epistemological framework for conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD is recommended as the alternative to the neo-liberal paradigm based on positivist or realist epistemology used largely in the contemporary body of scholarship.

7.2 **Contextual aspects of the epistemological framework**

In Chapter 2 of the thesis it is found that scholarship endeavours to examine good governance in NEPAD and determine its meaning for Public Administration are limited. Much of the conceptualisations and theorisations of good governance in the existing body of knowledge are rooted in the neo-liberal paradigm, which defines the concept in the context of the procedural aspects of democracy. Neo-liberalism is associated with the realist epistemology or positivism, which appertains to modernism. In modernism the contention is that “reality can be faithfully represented” (Dobuzinskis 1997: 304). The proposition is that the truth is singular, contextless and universal. As explained in Chapter 5 of the study, modernism claims that all scientific phenomena that undergird knowledge could be understood through one theoretical approach that is universally applicable (Best & Kellner 1991).

At the time that it entered the development discourse in the 1980s, neo-liberal scholarship propounded that, although it is essentially Western in origin, good governance has universal relevance in terms of its conception along the procedural aspects of democracy (see Leftwich 1993: 605). This thinking is based on the homogenisation thesis (see Mushni & Abraham 2004), which is epistemologically embedded in modernism. As it is contemporarily used, good governance evolved from the philosophy of neo-liberalism. A theoretical paradigm that dominates in much of the contemporary thinking in defining good governance has always been neo-liberal in orientation. Fukuyama (1989) writes that there is nothing beyond the neo-liberal logic that can be considered as the truth.

But, can neo-liberalism be used as the appropriate framework to understand good governance in the context of NEPAD? Taking into consideration the philosophical foundation of NEPAD as discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis, this question cannot be answered in a positive sense. However, looking at it from the theoretical orientation of NEPAD, the same question may be
answered in a positive sense. The reason for this is explained in Chapter 3 of the thesis and is, for contextual reasons, implicated in the discussion below. As determined in Chapter 4 of the thesis, good governance is a versatile and trans-contextual concept. Its meaning is contingent upon the context in which it is used. It is explained in Chapters 1 and 4 of the thesis that good governance is a conceptual problématique. It means different things to different people depending on the context from which it is used. Good governance is a complex concept. It therefore cannot simply and only be understood from a positivist or realist epistemology.

The attempt to untangle the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD requires the usage of non-linear tools of scientific inquiry embedded in post-positivist science or, simply, postmodernism. This means patterning reality in a manner that does not always conform to the mainstream paradigm of conceptualism that neo-liberalism prescribes. For, neo-liberalism, because of its foundation in modernism, is fraught with limitations that may be mitigated with the usage of postmodern systems of inquiry. This should not be misconstrued as the anti-thesis of modernism and the propagation of postmodernism. For, both modernism and postmodernism do have their own limitations in the same way that they respectively make important contributions to the science of knowledge.

The foundational premise of the study from which the epistemological framework for conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD is proposed is that the beginning of truthful knowledge is to acknowledge the limitation of knowledge itself. In picking up from the postmodern paradigm in engaging good governance, the study does not move from the premise of rejecting modernism. Instead, it acknowledges the limitations of modernism without discounting the contribution it made to the science of knowledge (Farmer 1995). The study contends that the generation of knowledge cannot be based on rejecting everything from the past or dismissing the opposite view.

The approach to truthful knowledge should be that of looking at the opposite perspectives as “simultaneous views not as contradictory but as an integral part of the complex patterning of reality” (Smith 2002: on-line). The epistemological framework for conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD that this study proposes is termed the contingent co-existence of opposites. It draws largely on postmodernism. But, this should be understood in the context of the exposition provided above. In Chapter 5 of the thesis it is explained that postmodernism moves from the premise that reality is relative. It emphasises the importance
of context in interpretative and deconstructive analyses, which are important for scholarship mastery of the art of contextual discourse. In postmodernism pluralism of truth is underscored whereas knowledge is considered as being contextual and historically produced through discourses (Strega 2005: 199-235).

In drawing from Barrett’s Politics of Truth (1992) the Dictionary of Definitions and Synonyms (s.a.: on-line) explains that “a discourse is concerned with meaning and context as well as content and the practices of many authors, using many, and varied types of, sources; it helps to understand how people interpret and create reality, and to be aware of how what is said fits into a network that has its own history and conditions of existence”. Of particular importance in this explanation is the question of context in the discourse. Nanevski, Pfenning and Pientka (2007: 01) state that the “notion of context, with somewhat differentiated meanings, is fundamental in linguistics, artificial intelligence and logic”. In a contextual discourse “the truth of proposition is not absolute, but depends on the context we considered it in” (Naneski, Pfenning & Pientka 2007: 01).

A context refers to circumstances that surround or even prompt the conception of intellectual phenomena. McLean (1996: 109) explains that “knowledge of the context of intellectual production is critically important in the analysis of intellectual phenomena as it may throw light on the meaning of concepts, particularly those with multiple meanings”. From the variables context and discourse the concept contextual discourse is, as referred to above, formulated. For the purpose of this study contextual discourse refers to a debate that logically flows and progresses through the choice of expressions that take into consideration the circumstances that inform the contextual character of the scientific phenomena studied. In this study the context for consideration of good governance is NEPAD.

The contexts from which concepts are conceptualised determine their meanings. To understand the meaning of concepts it is important that their contextual foundation is taken into consideration. This means that scientific concepts need to be engaged hermeneutically. For, in hermeneutics, as discussed in Chapter 1 of the thesis, the analysis of texts is not limited to its literal meaning, but also, more importantly, focusses on its contextual meaning. The importance of context is underscored. It is one of the key variables in the search for an epistemological framework for conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD.
The context for consideration of *good governance* in this study is NEPAD. However, the review of Public Administration literature in Chapter 2 of the thesis and that beyond the scope of the discipline in Chapter 6 of the thesis reveals that a large amount of the existing body of scholarship does not master the art of contextual discourse in the consideration of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. Scholarship on good governance largely subscribes to the mainstream paradigm, which is neo-liberal in its orientation and is based on realist or positivist epistemology. This epistemological paradigm is inadequate in conceptualising *good governance* in the context of the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD.

In Chapter 3 of the thesis it is contended that at the philosophical level NEPAD is grounded in Pan-Africanism. This is expressed in the Africanist conceptualisation of the African Renaissance discussed as the foundational antecedent of NEPAD. However, in the pursuit of its Pan-African ideals NEPAD adopts the approach that gravitates more towards the globalist conceptualisation of African Renaissance. NEPAD invokes a neo-liberal strategy to pursue Pan-Africanist ideals. This suggests epistemological contradictions in the discourse on the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD.

Philosophically NEPAD is embedded in Pan-Africanism, but theoretically gravitates more towards neo-liberalism. It appears to be an attempt to neo-liberalise Pan-Africanism. But, does this make any epistemological sense? Can neo-liberal frameworks be used to realise the Pan-African development agenda of NEPAD as expressed in its objectives? This complicates the complexity of the concept *good governance* as the context from which it is used is itself complicated. Against this background the question is whether the epistemological framework for conceptualising *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is feasible.

*Good governance* in the context of NEPAD is even more complex when considered from the Public Administration perspective. This is because of the fact that, as discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis, the Public Administration discipline has not yet reached a consensus with itself about its theoretical base. The fundamental question again is whether it is epistemologically feasible to theorise *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from the perspective of the discipline whose theoretical foundation is the subject of contestations.
In the attempt to answer the questions that are raised above, the complexities that relate to the context (NEPAD) of the object of this study (good governance) and the perspective (Public Administration) from which it is considered are attended to as important variables in the construction of the epistemological framework for conceptualisation of the concept. For, as Dobuzinkis (1997: 309) explains, “complexity is the point of convergence of the new scientific thinking”. It does not look at the opposites factors as binary opposites, but considers them as integral parts “of the complex patterning of reality” (Smith 2002: on-line). This is the basis of the epistemological framework that this study proposes as the framework in which NEPAD could be understood and therefore also, the context in which good governance could be conceptualised. As indicated above, the epistemological framework for conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD that this study proposes is termed the contingent co-existence of opposites.

7.3 **Contingent co-existence of opposites**

The concept good governance in NEPAD requires contextual theorising. As already pointed out in sub-section 7.2 above, it is argued in Chapter 3 of the thesis that philosophically NEPAD is grounded in Pan-Africanism but theoretically gravitates more towards neo-liberalism. However, in the existing body of literature Pan-Africanism and neo-liberalism are treated as binary opposites. This obfuscates attempts to understand NEPAD, which is the context from which good governance is considered in this study. In Chapter 3 of the thesis it is explained that the notion of binary opposites is based on the Aristotelian theory of reasoning that something is either/or but hardly ever both.

The Aristotelian binary of logic that much of the existing body of scholarship subscribes to in dealing with NEPAD is based on modernism. It is fraught with fundamental limitations. This paradigm of thinking is inadequate in dealing with complex philosophical, theoretical and conceptual questions. The Aristotelian theory of reasoning “hinders both political practice and understanding of social processes” (Adesina 2001: 04). It is therefore, as pointed out in Chapter 3 of the thesis, not used in this study as the analytical tool to understand NEPAD.
This study proposes the *contingent co-existence of opposites*. This paradigm of theorising moves from the premise that the opposite propositions on scientific phenomena owe their existence to each other. To understand the scientific objects of study it is important that all the opposite propositions ought to be taken into consideration, not in the sense that something is either/or, but in the sense of acknowledging their contingent co-existence as opposites factors. This paradigm of theorising encourages synthesis and synchronism in the study of scientific phenomena.

The *contingent co-existence of opposites* “sees simultaneous views not as contradictory but as an integral part of the complex patterning of reality” (Smith 2002: on-line). It recognises multiple paradigms and adopts an integrationist approach in the analysis of scientific phenomena. This theory does not subscribe to the incommensurability propositions of the Aristotelian theory of binary opposites. Its theoretical premise is that in the science of knowledge the problem does not lie “in the differences between perspectives, but in the denial of the existence of others” (Rommel & Christiaens 2007: 331).

To understand NEPAD this study argues for a paradigm shift from the Aristotelian binary logic to the adoption of the *contingent co-existence of opposites*. This contention is based on the fact that, as explained above, the philosophical and theoretical contexts of NEPAD are oppositional. This engenders complexities in the discourse on NEPAD. To disentangle such complexities requires a paradigm that exceeds a realist or positivist epistemology inclined towards the Aristotelian binary of logic which is simplistic in its approach to the truth. In the human science the truth is not absolute. It is a subject of contextual relativism. To this extent the contention gravitates more towards postmodernism, which is the basis from which the *contingent co-existence of opposites* largely draws its epistemological value.

The *co-existence of opposites* is the appropriate epistemological framework to deal with complex philosophical, theoretical and conceptual questions on NEPAD as the contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development. It is used to provide a framework for the formulation of a synthesis of opposite perspectives that defines the philosophical and theoretical foundational aspects of NEPAD. Adesina (2001: 05) offers an explanatory perspective that relates to the *contingent co-existence of opposites* as propounded in this study:
The one which the co-existence of opposites and the open-ended outcome of social interaction or contending social forces provide an analytical framework devoid of teleological discourse. Outcomes are not fixed beforehand. When we confront class, ethnic, religious and gender manifestations of mutually exclusive identities; it will not be that we take them as alternative identities. Rather it is in their interpenetration and mutual embeddness that we understand real, lived existence as multilayered, contradictory and context-situated (rather than the post-modern imagined identities). We are not either/or; we are often many things embedded in one. (Adesina 2001: 05)

In the context of the contingent co-existence of opposites used as an analytical framework, NEPAD could be understood as, according to Adesina (2001: 05), a “class project within a particular interpellation of a network of identities: even when they seem contradictory at first”. The “identities here are not some disembodied or imagined social practice; they are rooted in real material contexts, aspirations and interests” (Adesina 2001: 05). Therefore, the answer to the question on whether it does make any epistemological sense to understand NEPAD as being Pan-Africanist in terms of its philosophical foundation and theoretically gravitates towards neo-liberalism is, in the context of the contingent co-existence of opposites, answered in a positive sense. The same question would have been answered in a negative sense in the Aristotelian binary of logic context, as it is associated with the homogenisation thesis where the attempt to understand scientific phenomena is pursued through “an examination of an influential trend in current thought” (Mushni & Abraham 2004: 10) patterned along the positivist construct of realist epistemology.

The discourse framed in the constructs of the binary opposites paradigm that something is either/or is characteristic of the neo-liberal scholarship or Eurocentricism and Africanist scholarship or Afrocentricism pursued as opposite paradigms. These aspects are discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis. For the purpose of this discourse it suffices to only explain that Eurocentricism is about the usage of European ideas, concepts, philosophies, theories and beliefs to interpret Africa. Afrocentricism propagates that the indigenous African ideas, concepts, philosophies, theories and beliefs should be used in interpreting and understanding Africa (see Asante & Abarry 1996, Asante 2008, Tandon 1982, Howe 1998, Magubane 1999, Diagne 2008).
Maserumule (2005a: 203) argues that both Eurocentricism and Afrocentricism are flawed approaches of engagement in the contemporary development discourse on Africa. They perpetuate stereotypes of the binary opposites discourse. In contrast with these approaches to scientific discourse, Maserumule (2005a: 203) introduces the concept of African pragmatism as an alternative analytical framework for engagement with NEPAD. This framework is premised on the contextual realities and practical circumstances that currently exist in Africa. It acknowledges the fact that in the vast majority of historical situations the struggle over how society ought to be structured and developed is a tiresome contestation framed in the binary opposites construct of either/or.

The African pragmatism as an alternative intellectual paradigm proposes that Africa, in contending with the developmental challenges of the 21st century, should learn from the indigenous African practices and experiences and also from other countries that had already traversed the trajectory of development successfully and are now being referred to as developed countries of the world. The knowledge so acquired should be synthesised and aspects that are relevant to the contemporary circumstances in Africa should be used “to craft the philosophy of development underpinned by the international best practices and joined with local values and traditions” (Dlamini 2005: 07). This pragmatism that Maserumule proposes as the alternative analytical framework to understand NEPAD finds expression in the contingent co-existence of opposites that this study submits to the existing body of knowledge as the epistemological framework from which good governance in the context of NEPAD could be conceptualised.

In contrast with the Aristotelian binary logic, the contingent co-existence of opposites is associated with the heterogeneity thesis in its proposition that in dealing with scientific phenomena the different perspectives in the existing body of knowledge ought to be taken into consideration to enhance the epistemological validity of the discourse. The opposite of heterogeneity thesis is homogenisation thesis, which is explained above. In the context of this theoretical discussion and the epistemological framework that the study proposes, NEPAD is defined as a contingent co-existence of opposites premised on the ideological pragmatism of

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6 The proposition of African pragmatism is based on the article entitled Good governance as a sine qua non for sustainable development in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): A conceptual perspective. The article is authored by the candidate and is published in the Journal of Public Administration as part of the evolution of this study. The full bibliographical details of this article is provided in the bibliography of the thesis.
Mbeki. It is based on the Africanist and globalist conceptualisations of the African Renaissance, which are opposites, not in the sense of them being contradictory, but “as an integral part of the complex patterning of reality” (Smith2002:on-line). Against the foregoing background the question that this chapter now attends to is: what does the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD mean?

7.4 Meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD

In Chapter 1 of the thesis it is stated that good governance in NEPAD is used as a principle rather than a concept. There are no attempts to determine its meaning as a concept in the NEPAD document. A large body of literature on governance that emerged after the promulgation of NEPAD in 2001 as reviewed in Chapter 2 and 6 of the thesis respectively also deals with good governance largely as a principle rather than a concept. In Chapter 2 of the thesis the existing body of Public Administration scholarship on good governance is reviewed to determine how this concept is dealt with in the context of NEPAD. It is found that very little of the discourse on governance in the field of Public Administration makes reference to NEPAD, but not in a manner that sufficiently examines the concept good governance in the context of this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development (NEPAD). In the few instances where good governance is considered as a concept in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship, no reference is made to NEPAD, which is the context of its consideration in this study. To this the conclusion is that the scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited.

In Chapter 6 of the thesis the literature beyond the Public Administration scholarship is considered to determine whether insights acquired could be used to enrich the disciplinary discourse in conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD. The findings in this study are that compared to the very small contribution in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship that makes reference to NEPAD, scholarly literature in Chapter 6 of the study extensively considers this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development, with some scholars situating its philosophical context in the African Renaissance.
Except in a few instances the consideration of *good governance* in the scholarly literature in Chapter 6 of the thesis makes reference to NEPAD. The discourse on NEPAD in Chapter 6 of the thesis considers good governance largely as a *principle* on the basis of procedural aspects of democracy. This is similar to the consideration of *good governance* in the field of Public Administration. Some scholars discussed in Chapter 6 of the thesis reject the consideration of good governance in NEPAD as a policy imperative because of its foundation in neo-liberalism. However, an alternative conceptualisation of the concept is not offered.

The contention in Chapter 6 of the thesis is that insights acquired through the review of scholarship beyond Public Administration are not instructive to the disciplinary discourse in conceptualising *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. The consideration of good governance as a *principle* rather than a *concept* appears to be based on the assumption that its meaning at the conceptual level is obvious and unanimity to this effect exists. However, the analysis of the African leadership’s contestation on the *good governance* imperative of NEPAD, as presented in Chapter 1 of the thesis, indicates that this assumption is incorrect.

In Chapter 4 of the thesis it is argued that *good governance* is a conceptual *problematique* fraught with ideological, philosophical and theoretical contestations. It is a value-laden, versatile, trans-contextual and nebulous concept. An omission to conceptually determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD points to a gap in the existing body of knowledge on this contemporary paradigm for Africa’s development, which this study attends to. *Good governance* in the context of NEPAD, what does it mean?

### 7.4.1 Good governance in the context of NEPAD

To answer the question of the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD the logic of the *contingent co-existence of opposites* is followed. For, it is used in sub-section 7.2 above to understand the context of the object of this study, which is NEPAD, where it is defined as a contingent co-existence of opposite factors premised on the ideological pragmatism of Mbeki. NEPAD is a synthesis of the Africanist and globalist conceptualisations of African Renaissance. The implication of this for the meaning of *good governance* is that the attempt to understand this concept in the context of NEPAD need not be fixated in the binary of opposites paradigm where its contextual consideration is either in terms of neo-liberalism or Pan-Africanism, not both.
In Chapter 4 of the thesis it is argued that the concept of *good governance* is as old as human civilisation. It is traced back to the ancient Greek politics. However, as it is contemporarily used, *good governance* is a neo-liberal concept, whose conceptualisation in the existing body of knowledge is generally circumscribed to the procedural aspects of democracy. But, as determined in Chapter 3 of the thesis, NEPAD as the context from which *good governance* is used philosophically gravitates towards Pan-Africanism or the Africanist conceptualisation of the African Renaissance whereas theoretically it is immersed in neo-liberalism. *Good governance* cannot therefore be understood solely in neo-liberal terms as being concerned only with the procedural aspects of democracy, which focus on the *means* rather than the *ends* of the concept.

The philosophy of Pan-Africanism should also be taken into consideration in conceptualising *good governance* in the context of NEPAD, especially the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism, whose main preoccupation is with the development of Africa rather than the politics of decolonisation rendered obsolete with the total independence of Africa when South Africa became a democratic state in 1994. The different phases of Pan-Africanist thinking are discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis, where the one that emerged in the twenty-first century provides the context for theorising and conceptualising *good governance* in NEPAD.

In the contribution of the twenty-first century Pan-Africanist thinking to the contemporary development discourse it is clear that the meaning of *good governance* in NEPAD exceeds the neo-liberal conceptions and theorisations of the concept. The contention ingrained in this thinking is that in the contemporary development discourse the interpretation of *good governance* should not be subjected to reductionism analysis, where the focus of conceptualisation and theorisation is limited to only economic and political aspects of the concept. It is on this basis that the Africanist thinking differs with the neo-liberal conceptualisation of *good governance* and, instead, propagates that the contextual theorisation and conceptualisation of *good governance* ought to be based on the substantive aspects of democracy. In this the two paradigms of conceptualism emerge as opposing binary poles exclusive of each other. It is here that the discourse on *good governance* gets divided as is pursued within the Aristotelian binary logic.
These different paradigms of conceptualism as referred to in the foregoing are juxtaposed as a procedural democratic strand and a substantive democratic strand in Chapter 2 of the thesis. One paradigm from which good governance is conceptualised is, as explained above, based on the procedural aspects of democracy associated with neo-liberal scholarship or realist epistemology. In the other paradigm associated with Africanist thinking the variables of substantive democracy are used to conceptualise good governance. The conceptualisation of good governance in the context of substantive democracy puts more emphasis on the socio-economic aspects of the concept where the focus is on the ends of the concept rather than its means. It is in this context that the notion of sustainable development emerged, which in contrast with the neo-liberal thinking that defines it on the basis of economic growth and political stability, is defined in Africanist thinking on the basis of its impact on enhancing the quality of life of the citizens.

In the context of substantive democracy good governance is conceptualised on the basis of the socio-economic outcomes of government activities on the well-being of society. The emphasis is on the transcendence effect or the extrinsic value of the concept. This is in contrast with the intrinsic value orientation of the concept in the context of neo-liberal thinking. The conceptualisation of good governance within the context of substantive democracy is consistent with Kant’s (2000: 50-52) proposition that for a scientific object to be considered good it must be subjected to rigorous reason with reference to purpose. Good governance is defined on the basis of purpose, which, in the contemporary development discourse, is sustainable human development. This is in contrast with the neo-liberal scholarship that conceptualises good governance on the basis of the processes of governance rather than their outcomes. A comprehensive discussion on the various paradigms of conceptualism on good governance is provided in Chapter 2 of the thesis and the parlance used in their enunciations is clarified for reasons of simplifying the language of the discourse on the object of the study. To understand the context of the discourse on good governance in this chapter, it is important that the reader makes reference to Chapter 2 of the thesis.

The question that is critically important in this part of the discourse is, between the procedural democratic paradigm and substantive democratic paradigm, which one could be used as the appropriate theoretical paradigm to conceptualise good governance and determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD? This question is important especially in the context of the fact that NEPAD, as explained above, philosophically gravitates towards the Africanist
conceptualisation of African Renaissance [Pan-Africanism] but theoretically moves towards the globalist conceptualisation of African Renaissance [neo-liberalism]. Do we move towards the neo-liberal paradigm of conceptualism based on the procedural aspects of democracy or the philosophy of Pan-Africanism as expressed in the twenty-first century Africanist thinking on African Renaissance, where *good governance* is conceptualised on the basis of substantive aspects of democracy?

To answer this question this study moves from the premise that neither the neo-liberal conceptualisation nor substantive democratic conceptualisation is an adequate paradigm of conceptualism. For, to provide an answer in terms of either/or would perpetuate the naivety of the Aristotelian theory of binary opposites. This may hinder the intellectual efforts of determining the contextual meaning of *good governance* in NEPAD because of its orientation to the homogenisation thesis or a realist epistemology. In this postmodernism offers an alternative paradigm for theorising. However, the anti-foundational and post-structural variables of postmodernism offer no solid ground for knowledge. To this extent it is important to invoke the opposites of these variables in modernism. For, modernism also made important contribution to the science of knowledge (see Farmer 1995).

The theorisation and conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD builds on a rich body of knowledge that has always been the subject of various philosophical and theoretical propositions. To this extent modernism is, in framing the epistemological framework for conceptualising *good governance* in the context of NEPAD, considered as a contingent epistemological paradigm opposite to postmodernism, “not as contradictory but as an integral part of the complex patterning of reality” (Smith 2002: on-line). This is where the synthetic essence of *contingent co-existence of opposites*, in contrast with the Aristotelian theory of opposites, lies.

The limitations of the Aristotelian binary theory of opposites as embedded in modernism are explained above, and also in Chapter 3 of the thesis. To understand *good governance* in the context of NEPAD this study submits to the body of knowledge that the *contingent co-existence of opposites*, used as the analytical framework to unpack NEPAD, is still the appropriate theoretical paradigm of conceptualism in determining the contextual meaning of the concept. Subsumed in the *contingent co-existence of opposites* is the eclectic strand, which, as explained in Chapter 2 of the thesis, is a synthesis of neo-liberal conceptualisation
of the concept on the basis of the procedural aspects of democracy with the substantive aspects of democracy, which define the concept in socio-economic terms.

As a paradigm of conceptualism, eclecticism propagates that *good governance* ought to be understood as a scientific object of study whose interpretation is a subject of different perspectives influenced by the ideological idiosyncrasies of their epistemological foundations. Its usage in NEPAD needs to be understood as the intellectual outputs of the contingent co-existence of opposites reasoning premised on the ideological pragmatism of the twenty-first century thinking that synthesises the Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance with the globalist conceptualisation. In this the contention of the study is that the Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance in which the philosophical context of NEPAD gravitates towards Pan-Africanism should not be treated as a binary opposite of the globalist conceptualisation of the African Renaissance, whose theoretical foundation gravitates towards neo-liberalism.

The implication of this on *good governance* is that this concept should not be understood either in neo-liberal or Pan-Africanist terms as binary opposites following the logic of the homogenisation thesis or realist epistemology, but from the eclectic perspective gravitating towards postmodernism and acknowledging the contingent co-existence of opposite factors that defines NEPAD as the context of its usage. This approach to conceptualism encourages synchronism in the study of concepts whose meanings are value-laden, trans-contextual, versatile and as nebulous as *good governance*.

In conceptualising *good governance* the neo-liberal aspects of procedural democracy as embedded in the globalist conceptualisation of the African Renaissance are as important as the substantive democratic aspects embedded in the philosophical foundation of the Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance. The conceptualisation of *good governance* from either perspective should not be propagated on the basis of a thesis and an antithesis. The approach should rather be premised on the **contingent co-existence of opposites**. The **good governance** imperative of NEPAD seeks to achieve peace, security, political stability, economic growth and corporate prudence, and democracy. These aspects are concerned with the political dimension or **means of good governance** and gravitate more towards the procedural aspects of democracy. They are, however, propounded within the context of achieving sustainable development (see Maserumule & Gutto 2008).
The NEPAD objective of sustainable development is associated with the substantive democratic dimension of the concept. It appropriates socio-economic meaning to *good governance* and represents the *ends or transcendence effect* of the concept as contemplated in NEPAD. It appears that the crafters of NEPAD intended to base the meaning of *good governance* on both the *means* and *ends* of the concept. This suggests that *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is used as a holistic concept that embraces both the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy as equally important variables of conceptualisation. This is affirmed in the APRM processes which are aimed at fostering policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development, and accelerated sub-regional and economic integration. To illustrate this point reference to APRM reports, as textually analysed in Chapter 6 of the thesis, may be necessary for deeper understanding of the thesis of this study.

At the time of completing this study, seven countries had already undergone a peer review process: Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria, Benin, and Nigeria. In the first five APRM reports an enlightening insight into the conception of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is enunciated. The variables that comprise the conception of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD are illustrated in Table 7.1 as follows:
Table 7.1: Variables of good governance in New Partnership for Africa’s Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy and Political Governance</th>
<th>Economic Governance and Management</th>
<th>Corporate Governance</th>
<th>Socio-economic Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resolution and prevention of intra and inter-country conflicts</td>
<td>Macro-economic policies that support sustainable development; transparent, credible and predictable government economic policies; sound public finance management; anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering measures; and regional integration.</td>
<td>Creating an enabling Environment for economic activities; ensuring that corporations act as good corporate citizens; adopting codes of good business ethics; ensuring that corporations treat all their stakeholders in a fair and just manner; and establishing the accountability of corporations and directors.</td>
<td>Self-reliance in development; sustainable development and poverty alleviation; policies, delivery mechanisms and outputs in key social development areas; affordable access to water, energy, finance (also micro-finance), markets and information and communication technology; gender equality; broad-based participation in development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fostering constitutional democracy; upholding economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights; strengthening the separation of powers; developing accountable, efficient and effective public service; fighting corruption; upholding the rights of women; the rights of children and young persons and the rights of vulnerable groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aspects tabulated in Table 7.1 underscore the multidimensional character of good governance. It is against these aspects as the variables of good governance that the first seven countries were peer-reviewed. The reports of the APRM issued reflect that good governance is not limited to the political and/or economic dimensions of the concept. The socio-economic and corporate dimensions are also considered important variables in conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD. This marks a fundamental paradigm shift in the conception of good governance, which has always been limited to the liberal paradigm of conceptualism or a realist epistemology.

As discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis, the Pan-African scholarship that fertilised the intellectual ground from which the Alternative African Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAPs) evolved made a significant contribution to the contemporary development discourse by attaching a socio-economic dimension to good governance. This is subsumed in the NEPAD objective of sustainable development. Martin (2003: 82) writes that sustainable development is one of the subjects that the postmodernists have been preoccupied with “since the state (capitalist or socialist) has been a hindrance in providing a venue for people to meet their own needs in any comprehensive manner”.

The emphasis in conceptualising good governance in the context of the variable of sustainable development is the humanness of policy interventions in the lives of the people, which is measured in terms of its outcomes in enhancing the well-being of the citizens. This thinking is not new in the governance discourse. It dates back to the ancient Greek philosophical discourses on how to achieve a good and just society. These discourses are framed in Plato’s concepts of the good and Aristotle’s common good. The discussion in Chapter 4 of the thesis where the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the concept of good governance are considered focusses on the foregoing aspects.

The NEPAD objective of sustainable development appropriates to good governance a meaning that transcends neo-liberal conception of the concept embedded in economic and political reductionism approaches to development. Good governance in the context of NEPAD is not only about the quality of democracy, political stability, economic growth and corporate prudence, it is also, more importantly, about the effect or impact of those ‘good practices’ in enhancing the quality of life of the citizenry. This point is underscored, for example, in the APRM Report on South Africa (2007), which commended the country for its
performance in various initiatives pertaining to democracy, political governance, economic management, and corporate governance, but raised serious concerns about its performance in the realm of socio-economic development, especially in so far as the question of the alleviation of poverty and unemployment is concerned.

The significant strides on the political and economic fronts must translate into qualitative improvements in the lives of the people. This thinking is embedded in a human-centred development paradigm, which propounds that the people ought to be the direct beneficiaries of government’s “good practices” in the pursuit of development. The understanding of good governance in the context of NEPAD as a holistic concept, integrative of political, economic and socio-economic dimensions of development should be located within the context of the African philosophy of humanism. For, subsumed in the African philosophy of humanism, as discussed in Chapter 4 of the study, is the concept of social justice, which this study contends is one of the key variables that should inform the conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD.

McLean (1996: 458) explains that the concept of social justice is concerned with the “consideration of the requirements of justice applied to the benefits and burdens of a common existence” and “is necessarily a matter of distribution”; hence some refer to it as distributive justice (Barry 1981: 110-111) or substantive justice (Mahao 2009: 73). Plato refers to it as virtue justice. The other political philosophers who contributed to the evolution of the theories of social justice are Rawls, Bentham, Mill, Locke and Kant. Based on the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, Jesuit Luigi Taparelli coined the term social justice in the 1840s. Its evolution as a coherent theory engendered contestations with neo-liberal scholarship arguing that it complicates the meaning of justice (see Barry 1981: 110-111; Carozza 2003: 41; Cullen 2000: 124, 127; Fouarge 2002; Ederveen & Polkmans 2006: 04; McIlerny 1999).

The concept of social justice is associated with substantive democracy. It is concerned with the distribution of socio-economic benefits and gains to all members of society on the basis of the principles of fairness with the intention to enhance the quality of their well-being. In this the objective is to achieve substantive justice. This is in contrast with the theory of procedural justice associated with neo-liberalism. Its preposition is that “the demands of justice are satisfied if certain rules are satisfied” (Barry 1981: 119). In procedural justice the emphasis is on the rules rather than the well-being of the citizens.
In the context of the contingent co-existence of opposites as analytical framework for theorising good governance in NEPAD along the variable of social justice, the proposition of the theory of procedural justice for compliance with the rules is not necessarily incorrect. For, rules are critically important to engender societal stability and order. However, an epistemological faux pas occurs when, in conceptualising good governance in the context of the notion of sustainable development in NEPAD, the procedural aspects of democracy or rules are emphasised as the ends in themselves rather than means to the ends.

In the context of NEPAD the ends of the concept of good governance ought to be qualitative improvements of the lives of the citizen. The human-centred development paradigm is critically important in the pursuit of social justice. However, it should not be narrowly anthropocentric. It must, in the tradition of indigenous knowledge systems and world outlook, incorporate the interconnectedness of all people as well as peoples’ interdependence with nature (Maserumule & Gutto 2008).

The African philosophy of humanism is an instructive epistemological framework that underpins the human-centred development paradigm. Mbigi (2005: 65-77) writes that the African philosophy of humanism is a “collective interdependence and solidarity of communities of affection”, which emphasises the value of social relations. Wiredu (1980: 21) writes that “it would profit us little to gain all the technology in the world and lose the essence of humanism”. Biko (1978:46) expressed the same perspective that “the great powers of the world may have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and military look, but the great still has to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face”. This is consistent with the study of UNICEF entitled Adjustment with a Human Face (AWHF), which is referred to in Chapter 4 of the thesis as one of the fundamental aspects that contributed to the development of a human-centred development paradigm.

The AWHF emphasised the importance of human and social dimensions of development. It is a critique of the SAPs, whose conception of development was limited to economic growth. The philosophy of humanism is increasingly being recognised as part of the epistemology or system of knowledge in the human sciences. It should be used as a framework within which ideas about good governance in the context of NEPAD could be generated, engaged and contested. This is important to mitigate the dominance of neo-liberal scholarship and realist
epistemology, whose approach to the development discourse is based on the homogenisation thesis and modernism. The indigenous African knowledge, particularly the concepts of ubuntu and lekgotla, need to be infused in the contemporary thinking on good governance in conceptualising its meaning in the context of NEPAD.

The concept of ubuntu constitutes the core essence of the African philosophy of humanism, which is explained above. That of lekgotla means a meeting of villagers/a community, which takes place on the basis of equality in an atmosphere where every person’s voice is heard, and there is a feeling of solidarity (De Liefde 2003). It refers to an indigenous African system of governance where a traditional leader or chief remains in constant consultation with the people, debates issues that concern the community, and collectively take decisions that the leaders and their people/community co-own. The lekgotla system is the African version of democracy. However, it differs with the neo-liberal conception of democracy in many respects. In neo-liberalism participatory politics are limited to elections (Mahao 2009: 75).

In the African system of governance there are no elections. A chieftaincy leadership is hereditary. This is not in sync with the dynamics of the contemporary world. More so that, in some instances, this African traditional leadership system founded “on age-old traditions considered sacrosanct by followers” is abused for narrow material interests (Mahao 2009: 71). In a Western sense leaders or public representatives are popularly elected. This practice is considered a very important feature of a democratic project. But, as Mahao (2009: 75) contends, election “cannot be an end in and of itself”. Philippoussis (1999:109) writes that “the art of leading and governing is more than the skilful amplification of polling rates before, and of voting numbers at, election time by pleasing gullible crowds”.

In spite of the limitations associated with the indigenous African system of governance, there are other aspects ingrained in it that could be instructive in conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD. In the indigenous African system of governance the engagement of people is more meaningful. This in contrast to the neo-liberal conception of democracy, whose limitations Chomsky (2007: 97) exposed in the context of the American system of governance. Chomsky (2007: 97) observes that:
Americans are encouraged to vote, but not to participate more meaningfully in the political arena. Essentially the election is yet another method of marginalising the population. A huge propaganda campaign is mounted to get people to focus on these personalised quadrennial extravaganzas and to think, ‘That’s politics’. But it isn’t, it is a small part of politics. (Chomsky 2007: 97)

This neo-liberal conception of democracy cannot be used as a framework from which good governance in the context of NEPAD could be understood. Instead, lessons could be drawn from the indigenous African system of governance [lekgotla], whose basis is that

- everyone has a right to attend lekgotla gathering
- everyone’s voice is heard
- there is a trust in dialogue
- stories are a means of communicating message;
- everyone shares the truth
- people are seen to listen and
- a decision is always taken. (De Liefde 2003: 60)

The lekgotla system is premised on the imperatives of maximising a meaningful citizen participation in the processes of governance. Its conception and practice of democracy is ingrained in the African philosophy of humanism, at the core of which one finds the concept of social justice, which, as explained above, Western philosophers bandied about it so much that it evolved into a paradigm that bequeathed a substantive meaning to the concept of democracy. The concept of social justice is therefore not only Western. It has always been inherently ingrained in the foundation of the African philosophy of humanism. The indigenous African system of governance within the context of the African philosophy of humanism in which the concept of social justice is embedded could be illustrated in the following narrative exemplifying its praxis:

*The kgosi called lekgotla because someone in the community had stolen cows. After he had listened to the people in the community, he came to the conclusion that the man had stolen the cattle in order to feed his family. So the purpose of the theft went beyond self-interest. The consequences for the community were*
However harmful, both economically and morally. The man was therefore given four cows and a piece of land so he could support his family on a sustainable basis. (De Liefde 2003: 72)

This scenario illustrates how the indigenous African system of governance works. It underscores the importance of the African philosophy of humanism and the concept of social justice in exercising authority on matters of governance. In the indigenous African system of governance justice is not only based on what the law says, but also, more importantly, on the humanness of justice. In this the rule of law is understood within the context of substantive justice as opposed to the procedural justice, which is associated with neo-liberalism. This is the philosophical context from which good governance in the context of NEPAD should be understood.

Mahao (2009: 76) explains that “the neo-liberal dispensation promotes an institutionalisation of the rule of law that is embedded in the interests of business and other powerful sectors of society”, where “sanctimonious homage” is paid to “civil rights”, “while actively undermining socio-economic rights, and marginalising the pursuit of substantive justice”. This cannot be the appropriate framework from which good governance in the context of NEPAD could be understood because priority is not given to the humanness of development. It contradicts Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance, which Diop (1999: 09), defines as “the philosophy of self-centred development, giving priority to the human and reject[ing] the false values of modern Europe and Africa-power, hunger, domination instinct, individualism, quantitativism, productivism – which have led the world to a human deadlock”.

In philosophising, theorising and conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD as presented in the above exposition, is it possible to venture into the definition of the concept? For, definition circumscribes concepts and is defeasible. However, “because thought and language are our access to reality, definition is very important” (Pauw 1999a: 21). In Chapter 4 of the thesis it is argued that governance is the presentiment of good governance. It is defined as the act of governing or the exercise of authority. The manner in which that authority is exercised is the question of whether that system of governance is good or bad. From this logic this study defines good governance in the context of NEPAD as the exercise of authority in a manner that meaningfully and democratically engages sectors of
governance in the pursuit of the type of development that is sustainable, whose effects in enhancing the quality of life of the citizens is underpinned by the concept of humanism and social justice. In this *good governance* is defined in relation to the public good and the sustainable well-being of society.

The ultimate measure of *good governance* is the good life that the citizens need to lead. A good life is a product of a just and good society, which, in defining and achieving the same, government interacts and collaborates with the citizens and the private sector. The conceptualisation of *good governance* in NEPAD in the context of the contingent co-existence of opposites sought to incorporate the African epistemology, which has largely been marginalised in the mainstream discourse on this concept (see Asante 2008; Asouzu 2004; Basu 1998; Kraak 1999; Landell-Mills 1992). This is appropriate particularly in the context of references to NEPAD as the African development initiative. But, what does *good governance* in the context of NEPAD in the exposition above mean for Public Administration? This question is fundamentally important as it is the basis of this study. Its engagement is necessary to realise the objective of this study. It is considered below.

### 7.4.2 Meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration

The conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD as presented in sub-section 7.4.1 above contains meanings with far-reaching epistemological implications on the theoretical foundation of Public Administration. Its theoretical evolution largely followed the Aristotelian theory of binary logic. The contemporary paradigms of Public Administration as discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis evolved on the basis of rejecting the traditional ones. This necessarily means that the theoretical space for determining the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD in Public Administration is limited by its positivist propensity towards the realist epistemology, save the emergence of postmodernism as a contemporary paradigm for theorisation in the field.

The discipline evolved largely on the basis of the contestations of competing theoretical paradigms that seek to supplant each other. To this the question raised in sub-section 7.2 above is, for contextual reasons, restated here: is it epistemologically feasible to theorise *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from the perspective of the discipline that has not
yet reached a consensus with itself about its theoretical base? This question is posited in the context of the fact that the approach in the disciplinary evolution is that of change in theory rather than epistemological growth. This is so also in respect to postmodernism, whose, propositional, essence, ironically jettisons the theory of binary logic in scholarly discourse.

The postmodern paradigm also evolved on the basis of rejecting realist or positivist epistemology of Public Administration upon which some of its paradigmatic propositions are based. This is with the exception of Farmer’s (1995) writings on postmodernism, which acknowledge the contribution of modernism to the science of knowledge. The discourse on the theoretical paradigm of the discipline based on the theory of binary logic fails to appreciate the importance of contingent co-existence of opposites as the basis for epistemological growth in the science of Public Administration. It is characteristic of realist epistemology or positivism.

The Aristotelian binary of opposites approach bankrupts the discipline of its theoretical profundity. It discourages synchronism and synthesis because of its synchronic approach. Its premise is that there is only one truth. The homogenisation thesis informs this approach, which is positivist in orientation. It is based on empiricism and its epistemological premise is that knowledge is derived only from the observable facts and experience. As discussed in Chapter 1 of the study, Wessels (1999a: 337) observes that Public Administration scholarship is largely concerned with empirical questions. It is “engaged in little theory testing” (Houston & Delevan 1990: 678).

In Chapter 2 of the thesis it is determined that a large body of Public Administration scholarship that emerged during 2001-2010 approaches the discourse on good governance from an empirical perspective as a principle rather than a concept. There are only a few instances where the conceptual aspects of good governance are considered. Such considerations subscribe to neo-liberalism, which claims universalism as the ideological, philosophical and theoretical frame of reference for engagement with good governance. Neo-liberalism is not entirely incongruent with the context from which good governance is considered in this study, which is NEPAD. It is contended in Chapter 3 of the thesis that theoretically NEPAD gravitates more towards neo-liberalism but philosophically is more inclined towards Pan-Africanism. What is the implication of this on the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration?
For the discipline of Public Administration *good governance* in the context of NEPAD means that the philosophical and theoretical paradigms of conceptualism need to transcend their epistemological reductionism, positivist orientation or realist epistemology, and premise the quest for knowledge on the *contingent co-existence of opposites*. For, as Samier (2005: 08) puts it, a positivist epistemology “gloss[es] over complexities in the human character, power and politics dynamics, ethics in organisational life, and opposed contextual forces shaping the world and mentality of the administrator”. It is not an appropriate epistemological paradigm for engaging a concept as complex as *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

The paradigm of theorising that this study proposes for Public Administration scholarship in the consideration of good governance in the context of NEPAD is the *contingent co-existence of opposites*. In theorising *good governance* to provide a conceptual context for its conception in NEPAD, Public Administration needs to be eclectic in its approach. This requires a broader view of scientific objects studied and a wider range of methods to introduce a new basis for thinking about thinking, or what Pauw (1999a: 09) calls “theorising about theorising”.

In studying a scientific concept as versatile, trans-contextual, value-laden and nebulous as *good governance*, whose meaning is fraught with contestations and contradictory perspectives, all the propositions associated with it are important – in spite of their oppositional contradictions – especially that NEPAD as the context in which *good governance* is used is defined as the intellectual output of contingent co-existence of opposite factors. This approach to scientific discourse is based on the thinking that science matures when the contingent co-existence of opposite factors are taken into consideration in thinking about thinking or theorising about theorising. It facilitates plurality of theories and synthesis of oppositional propositions.

In the consideration of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD the Public Administration scholarship needs to shift from the theorisation paradigm of moving from the premise of rejecting the existing theories and substituting them with the competing ones to that of acknowledging their co-existence. For, in the human sciences the truth is not absolute. It is contextual. Public Administration is a human science. It evolved as such, especially in so far as its history in Anglo-Saxon countries is concerned (Samier 2005: 09). In Public
Administration *good governance* in the context of NEPAD means that the theoretical discourse in the field needs to engage this concept beyond the theoretical foundations of the traditional and contemporary paradigms of Public Administration based on the realist or positivist epistemology, whose limitations are succinctly pointed out above and extensively discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis.

Frederickson (2004: 12) observes that the concept *good governance* in Public Administration “has progressed from obscurity to widespread usage, particularly in the last decade”. Brand (2007: 541) explains that “good governance is *en vogue*” and “has become a leading concept in public administration”. Minogue (2003: 07) observes that “good governance and new public management are regarded as mutually supportive reforms, with greater political accountability contributing to more efficient and less corrupt government”. In much of the contemporary body of Public Administration literature *good governance* is associated with the NPM paradigm. It is considered a new conception that seeks “to foster the relationship between economic growth and democracy” (Salih 2001: 12).

The synthesis of the “efficiency concerns of [new] public management” with the “accountability concerns of governance” (Minogue 2003: 08) resulted from the acknowledgement of the experiences of *Structural Adjustment Programmes* in the 1980s that development cannot simply be limited to economic reductionism. The political dimensions of development subsumed in the concept *good governance* were considered as also critically important. In this the meaning of *good governance* is limited to the political and economic dimensions of the conceptualisation of the concept. The socio-economic dimensions of the concept are not given much attention. In this neo-liberalism is a foundational paradigm and *good governance* is defined along the procedural aspects of democracy. This influenced the discourse in the field, especially when the NPM assumes the proportion of orthodoxy and asserts itself as the sole paradigm from which the objects of studies in the field could be considered.

Gasper (2002: 19) observes that “at one stage NPM’s proponents claimed to have intellectually defeated the older public management [traditional public administration] and to be in the process of replacing it”. This exemplifies the Aristotelian binary of opposite character of the discourse on the theoretical evolution of Public Administration, where the existing theory is rejected and replaced by the new ones. In this paradigm of theorisation the
space for theoretical reflections is limited; restricted and reified to positivism. In the NPM context the conception of *good governance* is based largely on the virtues of the 3Es, which refers to efficiency, effectiveness and economy (see Rhodes 1991: 01). It is not necessarily inappropriate to use these aspects as the bases from which *good governance* could be conceptualised. What is wrong is to use them as the *ends* rather than the *means* of the concept.

In the NPM context economic thinking rather than thinking about public interest dominates the realm of public policy and the conception of *good governance*. The postmodern paradigm rejects this perspective, which is based on the realist or positivist epistemology. The NPM evolved on the basis of rejecting the traditional models of Public Administration. As argued above, the theoretical evolution of Public Administration on the basis of rejecting a particular paradigm dominant at a particular time in history retards the epistemological growth of the discipline and limits the capability for theorising.

The conception of *good governance* in the context of the NPM is limited to the intrinsic value of the concept. In this the foundational value of Public Administration, which is concerned with the promotion of the general welfare of the citizens, loses emphasis. This conception of *good governance* does not befit the philosophical foundation of NEPAD, whose strategic essence is embedded in the objective of sustainable human development, a subject which largely “remain[s] only in fledging form or marginalised in the discipline” (Samier 2005: 09). It is at the periphery in terms of the *locus* and *focus* of Public Administration. This is in spite of the coherence of the NEPAD objective of sustainable human development with the foundational value of Public Administration. More of the writings in the field focus on the process of governance than on the actual goal of public administration, which is to promote the general welfare of the citizens. This is about sustainable development.

The study contends that the premise from which *good governance* in the context of NEPAD could be understood from the Public Administration perspective is embedded in its foundational value, which asserts the importance of social equity and social justice in the conceptualisation of the concept. In this conceptualisation exercise the study draws from the Minnowbrook Conference of 1968, which, as discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis, sought to base the epistemological foundation of the discipline on the normative theory and philosophy;
attend to the question of relevance of the discipline to social issues; and extricate the field from its positivist orientation.

The proceedings of the said conference underscored the imperative of social equity in Public Administration (see Garcia 2003). This is the epistemological framework from which good governance in the context of NEPAD should be understood from the Public Administration perspective. In this the supposition is that good governance in the context of NEPAD is much more than its neo-liberal usage in the mainstream Public Administration literature, which defines the concept along the procedural aspects of democracy.

The NEPAD objective of sustainable development, where the eradication of poverty is specifically subsumed as part of it, necessitates that the substantive aspects of democracy should inform its conception. The conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective should, however, not be pursued along the Aristotelian theory of binary opposites, where the procedural aspects of democracy are considered as the exclusive binary of the substantive aspects of democracy in defining the concept. Its conceptualisation along the procedural aspects of democracy in the existing body of knowledge is largely the contribution of neo-liberal scholarship whereas, as discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis, the African scholarship made a significant contribution in assigning a substantive meaning to democracy in the contemporary development discourse, where the socio-economic imperatives of development are underscored.

The study contends that, in conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD, both the substantive and procedural aspects of democracy are important. This is so, especially in so far as the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD are concerned. Good governance in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective needs to be conceptualised in a manner that encapsulates both the intrinsic and extrinsic values of the concept while at the same emphasising its transcendence effect in relation to its conceptual essence. As discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, the conception of good governance in terms of its intrinsic value is concerned with the means rather than the ends of the concept. The focus is largely on the political and economic aspects of liberal democracy. From the extrinsic value point of view good governance is conceived of “as…a function of connection with something external” (Metz 2001: 137).
Good governance cannot just simply be conceptualised on the basis of the processes of government, but also on the basis of the outputs of public administration. The objective of NEPAD is to achieve sustainable human development. This exemplifies the necessity for conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD in terms of its extrinsic value. But, more importantly, the ultimate conceptual variable in the conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD lies in the transcendence effect, which ought to be about maximising the quality of life of the citizens. The transcendence effect is concerned with the outcomes of the processes of governance and the outputs of public administration.

In the context of NEPAD and from the Public Administration perspective, good governance is “much more than mere efficient management of economic and financial resources, or particular services; it is also a broad reform strategy to strengthen institutions of civil society, and make government more open, responsive, accountable and democratic”(Minogue 2003: 08). Good governance is not just about the economic growth, durability of democracy and the provision of basic goods and services to the citizens. It is about maximising the distributive effect of the socio-economic benefits to achieve the good life that the citizens should derive from the policy interventions and activities of government. Good governance is about public interest.

In the context of NEPAD good governance needs to be understood as a shift in emphasis from the paradigm of conceptualism rooted in “utilitarian market culture and public choice theory heavily oriented towards a view of the public and public officials as driven by utilitarian, selfish economic interests” (Samier 2005: 15). It is about “a conception of the good society, and the good administrator that goes with it”(Samier 2005: 15) whose sense of public administration loathes corruption; is driven by altruism and a public service ethos (Meadowcroft 2007: 357-373) characterised by a total commitment to the betterment of human life. The conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective as propagated in this study locates the citizens “in all human aspects and capacities in a central position” of intellectualism, “drawing on both the knowledge and methods of humanities disciplines” (Samier 2005: 16).

To make sense of the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration as propounded, it is important that a theoretical paradigm is developed for this purpose. For, as is conceptualised in the above exposition, good governance requires an
alternative theorisation based on the synthesis of different paradigms that undergird the historical evolution of Public Administration. To this a citizen-focussed theory is developed and propagated as the appropriate epistemological framework from which the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration as propounded in the above exposition could be understood.

7.4.3 Citizen-focused theory

The epistemological foundation of this theory is based on the propositions of contingent coexistence of opposites and the heterogeneity thesis. It moves from the contingent co-existence of opposites premise that, in spite of their theoretical variations, the existence of the traditional and the contemporary paradigms of Public Administration need to be acknowledged and considered in a theorisation exercise towards an alternative theoretical framework with a view to a synthesis rather than rejecting one theory in favour of the other. The rejection of one theory does not mean that its substitution is perfect. For, there is no perfect theory. To this extent citizen-focussed theory draws from the postmodern propositions.

The citizen-focussed theory acknowledges that, in spite of their shortcomings in many respects, certain theoretical elements of the traditional and the contemporary paradigms of Public Administration are epistemologically sound. It builds on them and uses aspects such as social justice, public interest and sustainable human development as the conceptual tools for theory construction. The approach in constructing a citizen-focussed theory is eclectic. In the New Governance and Public Administration: Towards a Synthesis, Bourgon’s (2009a:3) words could not have better captured the essence of the contingent co-existence of opposites that this study proposes as an epistemological framework towards a new theory of Public Administration, from which the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration could be understood.

Bourgon (2009a: 03) said that the public sector reforms since the 1980s “represent an incomplete journey”. To complete the journey these reforms “need support from a new synthesis of public administration that takes into account the solid foundations inherited from the past; the lessons learned over the last quarter of a century as well as new insights from other disciplines” (Bourgon 2009a: 03). Bourgon’s contribution to the body of knowledge,
especially since 2007, has consistently been concerned with the construction of a ‘New Public Administration’ theory. In the 5th Braibant Lecture in 2007 on *Responsive, Responsible and Respected Government: Towards a New Public Administration Theory*, which was subsequently published in the *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Bourgon (2007: 07-26) established the analytical paradigm towards a new theory of Public Administration, which has consistently been a common theme that features in most subsequent writings on the subject.

Bourgon’s article is preceded by Denhardt and Denhardt’s *New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering*, an article published in 2000 in the *Public Administration Review*. Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000: 459-559) proposition, as discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis, is largely premised on the attempt to assert the ‘publicness’ of Public Administration following the NPM’s attempt to diminish and supplant it with theories and philosophies from the business administration (see also Haque 2001: 65-82). Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) theoretical proposition represents an important epistemological trend in the evolution of Public Administration where the paradigm of the discourse shifts from the traditional Public Administration and the NPM to that of a citizen-centred approach. This is a contrast to the NPM’s customer-focused approach.

The *citizen-focused theory* that this study propagates draws important insights from Denhardt and Denhardt’s theoretical propositions. This is also the case with respect to Bourgon’s theoretical proposition, whose ‘New Public Administration theory’ is consistent with the contingent co-existence of the opposite paradigm of theorising. The citizen-focused theory that this study propounds is therefore not the anti-thesis of either Denhardt and Denhardt’s ‘New Public Service’ and Bourgon’s ‘New Public Administration theory’ as some of the most contemporary paradigms of Public Administration as discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis. It builds on them.

In the 2007 Braibant Lecture Bourgon (2007: 07-08) spoke “primarily of the need for a New Public Administration theory, recognising that to label anything ‘new’ is a risky business”. Bourgon (2007: 07-08) explains that those “who embrace new ideas sometimes tend to regard earlier ways of thinking as old and out-dated” whereas, “in contrast, others are deeply wedded to long-held views and argue that there is nothing new”. It is as a result of this that theorising in Public Administration is often a tiresome contestation. It is precisely because of
this that the study avoids describing its theoretical proposition with the adjective or qualification ‘new’. Pollit (2007: 38) makes an important observation about theorising in Public Administration, which, in the context of the purpose of this chapter, perhaps merits consideration:

*If academics attempt to construct a new general theory, it will immediately be criticised and challenged by our peers on all sides. That is the nature of the academic world and, indeed, one of its key strengths. And such disputes cannot be settled by an appeal to the facts, because deep epistemological as well as empirical differences traverse our academic communities.* (Pollit 2007: 38)

The fundamental reason for this, beyond what Pollit (2007: 38) offers, lies in the fact that theorisation in the field of Public Administration has largely been fixated to Aristotelian binary opposite paradigms. This paradigm of theorisation bequeaths a fundamental epistemological *faux pas* to the science of knowledge, which became so much so with the introduction of the NPM in the 1980s. In Chapter 5 of the thesis it is explained that neoliberalism is the philosophical foundation of NPM.

Neo-liberalism was propagated as the zenith of human sciences and the ultimate paradigm for philosophising and theorising (see Fukuyama 1989: 04). In neo-liberalism the homogenisation thesis and realist epistemology or positivism are asserted. The attempt is to understand scientific phenomena through “an examination of an influential trend in current thought” (Mushni & Abraham 2004: 10). But, an influential trend in current thought does not necessarily translate into the correctness of the same.

In moving towards the ‘New Public Administration’ theory, Bourgon (2007: 08) deviates from the Aristotelian binary of opposite paradigms and the homogenisation thesis whereas Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) theory appears to be more of a revisionism towards the intellectual activities of the 1970s, as influenced by Minnowbrook of 1968, which sought to reclaim Public Administration as Public Administration. Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) proposition draws significant insights from such intellectual activities. In explaining the roots of their theoretical proposition, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 552) write that “like the New Public Management and the old public administration, the New Public Service consists of many diverse elements, and many different scholars and practitioners have contributed, often
in disagreement with one another”. Therefore what Bourgon (2007), and Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) propose as the new theories of Public Administration are not necessarily new.

Bourgon (2007: 08) offers a hypothesis that seeks to avoid the extremes of oppositional theories in terms of their contradistinctions and moves towards a synthesis. This theorisation approach is similar to the one that this study proposes. It is premised on social constructivism, which underscores subjective epistemology as the basis for theorisation in Public Administration. Social constructivism is the anti-thesis of realist epistemology. It is used to understand the world as an on-going discussion of subjective perceptions of social conditions (Berger & Luckmann 1996).

The difference between this study’s citizen-focussed theory, Bourgon’s (2007) ‘New Public Administration theory’ and Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) ‘New Public Service’ lies in the terminologies and the content of the theories proposed. As pointed out above, a term that Bourgon (2007: 07-26) uses to describe the paradigm propounded is ‘New Public Administration’ theory whereas Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) use the New Public Service. This study avoids the usage of both terms largely for the very same reasons that Bourgon (2007: 07-08) uses to rationalise its usage. The adjective ‘new’ attached to a theory is, as Bourgon (2007: 07-08) correctly points out, a “risky business” in that it tends to consider “earlier ways of thinking as old and out-dated”. This may perpetuate the naiveté of Aristotelian binary of opposites paradigm.

The ‘New Public Administration theory’ of Bourgon (2007) and the ‘New Public Service’ of Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) may be conflated with the New Public Administration and the NPM. The New Public Administration refers to a body of thought that emerged largely in the 1970s following the Minnowbrook I debates of 1968. It sought to reclaim the foundational value of Public Administration as embedded in social equity. The phrasing of Bourgon’s theoretical proposition largely resembles a term used to describe the intellectual activities of the 1970s. This may be confusing.

Some scholars in the field use the description New Public Management interchangeably with the New Public Administration presupposing their synonymity. The NPM and the New Public Administration represent different intellectual activities in the evolution of the field. In
spite of this the term New Public Administration is used to describe the theory Bourgon (2007) proposes. Bourgon was clearly aware that terming a theoretical proposition with the qualification ‘new’ may engender contestations. Consequently, attempts are made in the article to explain the reason for the usage of the adjective ‘new’. Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) do not explain why they termed their theory ‘New Public Service’.

Bourgon’s (2007: 08) contention is that “the newness of a New Public Administration theory (if indeed newness exists) will not be found in new ideas, but rather the way the fabric is woven, not necessarily in the threads that are used”. Bourgon uses Frederickson’s (1980) work to substantiate this contention. Frederickson (1980) writes that “the newness may also be in the use of fabric...however threadbare” (in Bourgon 2007: 08). But, the manner in which the fabric is woven is a *means* to an *end*. In this metaphor, and in the context of this discourse, that *end* is a theory – which is a product of systematic thinking on scientific phenomena. So, in theories ideas are found.

A theory that proclaims its distinction from other theories in terms of its validity ought to display a sense of originality. This may presuppose a new idea that should inform a new theory. The new ideas evolve from the old ones, which are synthesised into a coherent body of thought to create a new theory. A synthesis is not about repacking old ideas into a new bottle, but it is concerned with a creation of new ideas from the existing ones that could systematically be structured into a particular pattern of thought used to explain scientific phenomena. In the final analysis, there is nothing like, in a literal sense, a new theory in the human science. This study differs with Bourgon’s (2007) contention that newness of a theory is not found in ideas but rather in the way theories are constructed. The contention of the study is that the ‘newness’ of the theory ought to be found in both the intellectual process of its construction and the ideas that emerge from it. The new ideas are the product of a synthesis of old ideas.

To avoid being mirrored in unnecessary obfuscations this study resorts to a simple term to describe a theoretical paradigm that it proposes as an appropriate epistemological framework from which the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD could be understood from the Public Administration perspective, namely *citizen-focused theory*. The fundamental concept that undergirds *citizen-focused theory* is that of public good. It is pointed out in subsection 7.4.1 above that the concept of public good means “any good that, if supplied to

514
everybody, and from whose benefits it is impossible or impractical to exclude anybody” (McLean 1996: 412). This means that public good is about what is in the interest of the citizen.

The concept of public good is ingrained in the foundational value of public administration, which is about the promotion of the general welfare of the citizens. Bourgon (2007:9) writes that “a commitment to serving the public good owes much to the public administration theory that prevailed at the beginning of the twentieth century, which the NPM jettisoned. The citizen-focussed theory invokes the foundational value of public administration as the premise of its proposition and draws much from Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) theory. To this extent the citizen-focussed theory deviates from the anti-foundationalism of the postmodern paradigm. Its proposition is that government plays a central developmental role in the pursuit of public good. It engages the markets and civil society in a manner that forges a collaborative partnership to achieve what is in the interest of the citizens.

In the definition of what is in the interest of the citizens, government assumes a strategic leadership in the citizen-government interface democratic mechanisms and processes to establish a national consensus. The citizen-focussed theory differs from the mainstream scholarship pattern of defining good governance in neo-liberal terms of market sovereignty, whose long term objective is to transform the inhabitants from citizens to consumers—“whose needs are served by the market and not by politics”; where “the political state itself becomes a superfluous relic” (Mahao 2009: 75). It is, however, not against the engagement of the markets in the pursuit of the national developmental agenda.

The citizen-focussed theory puts the state in the centre in serving the public good, where the outcomes of government intervention in the lives of the citizens ought to be development-orientated. It is not preoccupied with whether government is too big or small, but whether it works (see Obama 2009). In the pursuit of their developmental roles, the governments of particularly the developing countries should avoid a replication of a post-war state-led developmental paradigm where government dominates in defining a developmental national trajectory. This approach to development led to a developmental stagnation in most African countries (see Leftwhich 1993: 607).
The *citizen-focussed theory*’s proposition is that the definition of what is in the interest of the citizens should be determined with, and not for, the citizens. This thinking is rooted in the ideological, philosophical and theoretical propositions of Pan-Africanism and the Africanist conceptualisation of the African Renaissance, which are discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis. It is also consistent with the paradigm of thinking propounded predominantly by Africa-grounded experts, whose conception of development is anchored in its human and social dimensions. This is clear in the Arusha Charter of Popular Participation and Transformation, as referred to in Chapter 4 of the thesis, which emphasises that the citizens need to be engaged in a meaningful way on matters of development and governance (Keet 2002: 14). It is from this paradigm that the *citizen-focussed theory* draws important lessons on how government should provide a strategic leadership in the definition of what is in the interest of the citizens.

In the *citizen-focussed theory*, public participation is not simply defined in a limited sense “as an undertaking of regularly scheduled elections” (Mahao 2009: 75). As the imperative of democracy, public participation in the context of citizen-focused theory is concerned with the citizen’s “ability to engage in national choices; to set the direction of the nation-state on internal and external matters; to define the nature of the public good” (Saul 2005: 140). The philosophical foundation of *citizen-focussed theory* and the context from which the public good need to understand is social justice, which is subsumed in Plato’s concept of good and common good as respectively discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis. The preoccupation of these early philosophers in their engagements was on how to achieve a just and good society.

This is the epistemological thrust of *citizen-focussed theory* which this study propounds; where the sanctity of humanness is paramount and permeates each aspect of governance, public action and conduct. In this the African concept of humanism is instructive and, because of its epistemological coherence with the concept of social justice, Plato’s good and Aristotle’s common good, the *citizen-focussed theory* also uses it as its philosophical foundation. A concept closely related and analogous to the *citizen-focussed theory* is found in the adage *Batho Pele*, which is used in South Africa to describe the state’s approach to the transformation of the public service from its apartheid orientation to that which is democratically inclined and citizen-centred. The adage *Batho Pele* means people first.
As a policy initiative *Batho Pele* is likened to Service Compact (SERVTCOM) in Nigeria and the Citizen First Charter in the United Kingdom (UK). The principles that underpin these policy initiatives are similar and all move from the premise that to improve service delivery the citizens should always be put first in the activities of government. They involve, among others, consultations, service standards, access, information, redress, courtesy, openness, transparency, value for money, improved service delivery, trained staff, responsiveness to the needs of the citizens and popular empowerment (see Abdullah 2008; Mokgoro 2003; Sekoto & Straaten 1999; Arko-Cobbah 2002). These aspects are largely concerned with the procedural democratic pursuit of public administration.

They are consistent with Bourgon’s (2007: 15-21) and Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) building blocks for an alternative theoretical paradigm as discussed in Chapter 5 of the study. The *citizen-focused theory* propounds that the citizens should always be in the centre of the business of government, not in the margin or at the periphery. This is underscored in Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) ‘New Public Service’ and Bourgon’s (2007) ‘New Public Administration theory’. In this, the fundamental question is, what is a citizen? Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 549-559) and Bourgon’s (2007: 16) conception of the concept is appropriate as it befits the essence of the propositions of the *citizen-focused theory*. It goes beyond the neo-liberal constructs of citizenship and encompasses its economic and social dimensions.

The economic dimension of citizenship relates to property rights whereas social dimension is concerned with the socio-economic rights of citizens to services such as health and education. In this the citizens are conceived as being “more than constituents, voters, clients, or customers” (Bourgon 2007: 16). They are no longer mere legal beings or equal bearers of rights but are, respectively, “political community including rights and responsibilities”(Bourgon 2007:17). In this the role of government is to promote “citizenship, public discussion and public integration” (Bourgon 2007: 17) by “serving rather than steering them” (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 549).

The *citizen-focused theory* that this study propounds adopts Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000: 549-559) and Bourgon’s (2007: 16-17) conception of citizenship and a citizen. To this extend, the *citizen-focused theory* coheres with Denhardt and Denhardt’s and Bourgon’s theoretical propositions. So is the case in respect of the concept of public interest. The
fundamental concept that undergirds the *citizen-focussed theory* is that of public good. Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) and Bourgon (2007) use the concept public interest.

Bourgon’s theory puts emphasis on the common or shared interest of citizens. Denhardt and Denhardt (2000: 555) explain that “the public interest results from a dialogue about shared values, rather than the aggregation of individual self-interests”. The definitions of public interests abound, with some dismissing the concept as being non-existent. In moving towards the alternative theory of Public Administration, the contributions of Appleby (1950) and Stone (1997) on the concept of public interest are instructive. Appleby explains that:

*The public interest is never merely the sum of all private interests...It is not wholly separate from citizens with many private interests; but it is something distinctive that arises within, among, apart from, and above private interests focussing on government, some of the most elevated aspiration and deepest devotion of which human beings are capable.* (in Bourgon 2007: 18)

Stone (1997: 18) explains that “the concept of public interest is to the polis (the political community) what self-interest is to the market, it is about communities trying to achieve something as communities”. The perspectives of Appleby (1950) and Stone (1997) on public interest are consistent with the imperative of collectivism in the African philosophy of humanism as expressed in the African axiom “I am, because we are”. In this the emphasis is that the individual being is part of the collective being.

Tshikwatamba (2004: 262) explains that “collectivism is a cultural value aspect of the African people and is both a theory and a practice in the African communities”. Gasper (2002: 34) makes a very important point that it is dangerous to appropriate a *Gemeinschaft* interpretation to the term community, which presupposes “a whole shared culture” or “cultural homogeneity”. This interpretation of community uses culture as a concept of exclusion rather than inclusion. Gasper (2002: 34) argues for the usage of *Gesellschaft* interpretation – which defines community as “citizens living together and co-operating according to common rules”. This captures the essence of collectivism, which is expressed in the ideal of Pan-Africanism, as discussed in Chapter 3 of the study, and other expressions that evolved from the revolutionary theories and philosophies that framed the intellectual foundation of the struggle against colonialism and, in the case of South Africa, apartheid. The
examples of expressions of collectivism associated with revolutionary theories and philosophies are, among others, ‘unity is strength’, ‘together we stand, divided we fall’, ‘an injury to one is an injury to all’.

The concept of collectivism is subsumed in Biko’s (1978) philosophy of Black Consciousness, which is explained in Chapter 3 of the study. This philosophy sought to forge and engender a sense of collective approach and synergy of efforts in the struggle against apartheid, as is the case with Pan-Africanism as a revolutionary theory and a philosophy challenging colonialism. The struggle against colonialism and apartheid has always been about social justice, altruism and public interest. These are the fundamental aspects that undergird the citizen-focussed theory that this study proposes. This theory seeks to refocus the orientation of public administration to the citizen. Its proposition is that the pursuit of public interest ought to result in services to the citizens.

The notion of service to the citizens is concerned with the implementation of public policy as motivated solely by the attempt to realise public interest or achieve the public good. In the citizen-focussed theory, public policy is conceived of as a product of the interaction of multiplicity of factors and actors, and an inclusive process of deliberations and citizen engagements in the process of governing the state. Bourgon (2007: 20) explains that “the contemporary policy process is characterised by a dispersion of power and responsibility” where “government is an important player, but one that must work with others to move society in a certain direction”.

The global dynamics “have given rise to new issues of public concern that require global solutions; government must increasingly work with other governments and many international organisations; and technology enables greater public access to the public policy process” (Bourgon 2007: 20). Bourgon (2007: 20) brings in the governance dimension of public administration. The concept of governance is considered extensively in Chapter 4 of the thesis and its evolution in the field of Public Administration as considered in Chapter 5. For the purpose of this chapter, it suffices to point out that governance “involves efforts to construct policy responses at the multiplicity levels, from the global to the local” (Wallace 1996: 11-12).
Sloat (2003: 129) explains that “state does not dominate the policy-making process but increasingly involves multiple actors, their relationships are “non-hierarchical” and “mutually dependent”; regulation is the primary governance function, and decisions are made by problem-solving rather than bargaining”. The interaction of multiplicity of actors at different societal levels plays itself out “as a function of the interplay of ideas, interest and institutions and focussed on the choices made by a variety of actors about how to respond to an issue” (Wallace 1996: 12). These insights are at the core of citizen-focussed theory on how the business of government needs to be conducted.

Any policy outcome in the form of public services needs to focus on enhancing the quality of life of the citizens. This is the epistemological essence of the citizen focussed theory. In this, similar to Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) and Bourgon’s (2007) proposition, the citizen-focussed theory espouses a citizen-centred approach to service delivery-where “the fundamental characteristic of the public service [is] commitment to serve citizens in order to advance the public good”. The guiding principle and philosophy is altruism, which, as explained in Chapter 4 of the thesis is concerned with “a selfless desire to “live for others” or “vivre pour autrui” (Meadowcroft 2007:358). In this context service delivery is defined and understood on the basis of the well-being of the citizens (see Maserumule 2005a: 202).

Bourgon’s (2007: 13) explanation that “a citizen-centred approach to service delivery “does not reduce” the concept of “the citizens to that of a customer or a mere user of government services” aptly benefits the conception of a citizen in the context of the citizen-focussed theory. Government “serve citizens, not customers” and “values people, not productivity” (Denhardt & Denhardt 2000: 555-556). As discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis, the concept of a customer appertains to the NPM. Most scholars reject its usage in Public Administration.

Gasper (2002: 34) warns that “the perception in some recent New Public Management of citizens as only customers is [a] dangerous reduction”. In the parlance of NPM, citizens are conceptualised as customers. The citizen-focussed theory maintains that in public administration citizens are citizens, not customers. The concept of a citizen is not conflated with that of a customer. The citizen-focussed theory differs from NPM as the latter seeks to transform the inhabitants from citizens to customers (see Mahao 2009: 75). It is explained that a concept closely related and analogous to citizen-focussed theory is found in the adage Batho Pele, which is used as a philosophical foundation upon which South Africa’s policy
approach to improving service delivery is rooted. The concept of Batho Pele, is found in all African societies and is at the core of the African philosophy of humanism.

In a contribution on the theoretical and philosophical discourse on service delivery made as part of the theorisation exercise of this study in the article entitled *Pedigree Nexus of Batho Pele Principles: Where is the Tie?*, Maserumule (2009: 764-767) deals with the question of a citizen and a customer in public administration. Maserumule (2009: 764) writes that Batho Pele – an African adage meaning people first – perfectly befits the imperatives of the African philosophy of humanism. In the African context adages are not fashionable nifty phraseologies that are only important in enhancing the richness of language used in conversations or used for political correctness. They represent a particular philosophical orientation in terms of how things ought to be in a social world.

The adage Batho Pele expresses a particular philosophy that ought to inform the behaviour and conduct of the public service. As in the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery in South Africa, the adage Batho Pele seems to have, however, been used for dialectical rectitude rather than grounding the foundation of the public service in the African philosophy of humanism. The usage of the adage Batho Pele is correct in that it represents a particular philosophical direction that the public service needs to take into account in an attempt to re-invent itself into an effective machinery of government. However, a fundamental faux pas in the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery is the usage of the concept of a customer, which, in terms of its theoretical and philosophical context, is inappropriate in articulating the African philosophy of humanism the adage Batho Pele represents. Throughout the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, a key concept used to explain the imperatives that undergird Batho Pele as a policy framework for improving service delivery is that of a customer.

This is a neo-liberal construct embedded in the administrative reform theory and philosophy of the NPM that underpins changes that shook the entire Anglo-American world of public administration (see Auriacombe 1999: 129); where, in dealing with the public good, economic thinking rather than thinking about public interest dominates the realm of public

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7 The article is published in the *Journal of Public Administration* as part of the theorisation exercise of this study. This part of the discussion that deals with the concept of a customer draws heavily on the article in question.
policy. In much of the existing body of literature in Public Administration, the customer-focused approach to service delivery is rationalised on the basis that the private sector organisations are managed better than the public sector and, therefore, as the thesis goes, importations of business practices in managing public services is appropriate, particularly the one propounding that the citizens must be treated as customers.

The citizen-focused theory does not subscribe to this thesis. For, it disregards the significance of the distinction between the private and public sectors. The concept of a customer commonly used in the private sector business is increasingly permeating the science and practice of governance to the extent of obfuscation of the distinctiveness of public administration as the business of government. The usage of the concept of a customer as being synonymous to that of a citizen creates conceptual inconsistencies in scholarly and policy discourse. Treating a citizen as a customer goes against the philosophical grain of the essence of the very concept of Batho Pele, which, as explained above, means people first.

The concept of a customer, whose theoretical antecedent is embedded in the private sector business administrative systems and philosophies, is a characterisation of people in society. People become customers when they enter into transactional relationships of mutual benefit. These types of relationships are characterised by abundance of choices in case either of the party reneges or is not satisfied with the services they get from the other. This means that a customer has the power of choice. The same, however, contrary to the theoretical and philosophical propositions of the NPM, cannot be said about the relationship between government and the people. The concept of a customer is not part of the parlance of the African philosophy of humanism, which the adage Batho Pele represents. It belongs to the theory and philosophy of neo-liberalism.

Modern governments are put in power by people following democratic processes. These types of government are, therefore, the government of the people. When in power, democratic governments do not conduct their business of government like an enterprise with a client- or customer-base. Instead, the preoccupation is to enhance the quality of life of the citizens by delivering public services. People depend on the public services for their well-being and do not have a choice of getting them elsewhere as they are often monopolies of government. This is because of the fact that citizens, in the context of the foundational value
of public administration, are not customers, but just people who, with the power of votes, assign government the mandate to serve them.

To subject them to the vagaries of the market for the services that they want in the name of promoting competition in the delivery of services is to go against the essence of the African philosophy of humanism from which the concept of Batho Pele is based. Service to the people, contrary to transactional relationships of a customer and a service provider, is not profit-driven. It is about prioritising public interest in the pursuit of public good. This is the essence that the concept Batho Pele embodies, which differs from the NPM imperative of empowering people rather than serving them.

The customer-focussed approach to service delivery, which, as argued above, is a neo-liberal concept, is used in much of the existing body of literature to explain the concept of Batho Pele, which is embedded in the African philosophy of humanism. But, can neo-liberal theories be used to explain African philosophy? This is a theoretical-cum-philosophical question that suggests paradoxes in the theoretical and philosophical discourse. It is an epistemological puzzle. In the context of neo-liberalism, service delivery improvement is defined in terms of fiscal discipline, reduction of public expenditure and quantity outputs. The main concern is with money rather than with people.

In the context of the African philosophy of humanism, service delivery is about enhancing the quality of life of the citizens, not only on the basis of the number of tangible services delivered, but also in terms of how those services change the lives of the people for the better. This means that service delivery is not only about outputs, it is also about the outcome of government action that seeks to qualitatively change the lives of the people for the better. As pointed out above, the foregoing constitutes the epistemological essence of the citizen-focussed theory, which, in some respects, coheres with Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) and Bourgon’s (2007) theoretical propositions but, at the same time, differs with them in other respects.

The points of convergence and divergence between Bourgon’s ‘New Public Administration theory’, Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) ‘New Public Service’ and the citizen-focussed theory that this study propounds are implicated in the discussion above. But, perhaps the fundamental distinction lies in the fact that the rationale for the proposition of citizen-
focussed theory is not based only on the limitations of traditional Public Administration and NPM. Its synthesis is not limited to these theoretical paradigms of Public Administration, which, as discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis, evolved as binary opposites in the existing body of knowledge.

In contrast with Denhardt and Denhardt’s (2000) New Public Service and Bourgon’s (2007) ‘New Public Administration theory’, the citizen-focussed theory draws important insights for its epistemological foundation and the basis for synthetic social constructivism from the classical Greek philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, African philosophy of humanism, African Renaissance, revolutionary theories and philosophies such as Pan-Africanism and Black Consciousness, which all converge on one thing: the sanctity of humanness. This ought to be the epistemological basis for philosophising and theorisation in the human sciences. The citizen-focus theory gravitates towards Afrocentrism as its philosophical location, which differs from Eurocentrism.

Eurocentrism is peddled through Western philosophies and theories from which much of the contemporary discourse on governance is based. In the teachings of Hegel that influenced a large body of Western philosophical and theoretical thoughts, the concept of humanity does not include Africans. They are defined as sub-humans. Oguejiofor (2007: 67) observes that the “humanity of the African remains enigmatic” (Oguejiofor 2007: 67). In Chapter 3 of the thesis, Hegel’s theory of humanity is explained as scientific racism and ideologisation of science. The ideological foundation of apartheid in South Africa and the justification for colonialism could be traced to Hegelianism.

Oguejiofor (2007: 60) observes that thinkers of the Enlightenment, in spite of emphasising “the importance of reason against prejudice and authority, kicking against the good of tradition”, and “pretending to give free reign to thought and reflection ended up being apologists for”, using Anene’s (1966: 92) words, “the most iniquitous transaction in human history”. In addition to Hegel, other Enlightenment thinkers “counted among the giants of western philosophy” are David Hume, John Locke, Immanuel Kant and Charles de Montesquieu (Oguejiofor 2007: 60-61). The philosophy of Eurocentrism is incongruous with the citizen-focussed theory that the study propounds. Instead, the citizen-focussed theory coheres with Afrocentrism, which as a philosophical paradigm, is “transcendental to the being of humans” (Oguejiofor 2007: 66).
As explained in Chapter 4 of the thesis, the conception of humanity in an inclusive sense owes its evolution from Catholicism. In *Before Colour prejudice*, Snowden (1983: 70) writes that the “Greco-Roman view of blacks was highly positive”. Tempel systematised African philosophy of humanism into a coherent body of thought that guided the pursuit for a just and good society, whose epistemological foundation included the following: “unity and the interaction of being; the brotherhood of human beings; familyhood and values of kingship relationship; hospitality; fertility; altruism; and communalism where the life of individuals is grafted into that of society” (Oguejiofor 2007:65). These aspects undergird the citizen-focussed theory that the study propounds. Oguejiofor (2007: 66-67) explains that:

[Tempel’s] humanistic perspective was influenced by the self-image acquired by philosophy through the ages – the image of being the highest expression of human intellect or rationality, a development initiated by Aristotle who believed that philosophy should not descend to the level of day-to-day needs; a view that philosophy is not a utilitarian endeavour and should be engaged only when normal needs have been satisfied. It is therefore an activity reserved for those belonging to the well-to-do classes who usually have no need to work. A preoccupation preserved for the highest ranks of humanity, it is even fit for the gods. It is with this preconception that the word philosophy entered the modern African intellectual vocabulary.

In the words of Tsaney Serequeberhan, philosophy in this sense ‘is tacitly and surreptitiously...privileged as the true measure of the humanity of the human as such’ (1994:3). It is perhaps because of Tempel’s injection of this sense of humanity into the word, and its unequivocal application to Africa, to the Bantu, that Tempel is accepted by some, without much argument, as the father of contemporary African philosophy. It is not that Tempel taught Africans to think, but that he started the process of re-humanisation, and in that process, philosophy was a useful instrument. (Oguejiofor 2007:66-67)
Edward Wilmot Blyden, the founding father of Pan-Africanism, is “the first philosopher to defend the humanity of the African through his emphasis on African personality. This aspect is considered in Chapter 3 of the study. In drawing from the African philosophy as explained in the foregoing, the citizen-focussed theory embraces the humanity of the human as the basis for any government activity. In the citizen-focussed theory, a human is recognised—“not as possessing philosophic ability, not as possessing a pleasant appearance, not as living in a mansion or in a hut, not as being the citizen of a rich or poor country – but rather as being a member of that species which has been given the honorific title of humanity which Aristotle described as a rational animal” (Oguejiofor 2007: 70-71).

The basis for theorisation in the field of Public Administration as a human science needs to move from the premise of the sanctity of humanness as the epistemological foundation of the discipline. The activity of government public administration is, or ought to be, concerned with enhancing the quality of life of human beings or citizens. This means that the outcome of government action ought to be about human development on a sustainable basis, which, in the context of citizen-focussed theory, simply means improving the lives of citizens as human beings, not as customers. This is achieved through “a people-orientated rather than state-orientated political structure” (Oguejiofor 2007: 70).

In this the citizen-focussed theory draws important lessons from the indigenous African governance practices expressed in the concept of lekgotla, which is explained above, and that of izimbizo. These concepts are used particularly in South Africa as part of the contemporary parlance in the governance discourse and a conceptual framework from which policy initiatives that seek to maximise citizen-participation in public affairs are articulated. The concept of izimbo is a plural for izimbizo, which, in a traditional sense, refers to a gathering of community members to address issues of common interest.

Its principles are the same as that of lekgotla. Kondlo (2010b) explains that imbizo is a society-led and people-centred form of interaction between government and the governed to maximise public participation on policy matters and ensure interactive deliberations on matters of societal interest. It is concerned with that “connection between the state and society” (Robinson 2007:532), which is critically important in deepening democracy. In an imbizo “the participants enjoy the same right to speak irrespective of status in society and decisions are made on the basis of consensus; procedures for the conduct of meeting are
usually less formal but effective given that they evolved with the society over a long time” (Kondlo 2010b).

The izimbizo are concerned with participatory governance, and, in the contemporary political system, could be used to enhance or complement the quality of representative democracy (Ginsborg 2008: 12). This indigenous system of African governance is an important concept that forms part of an integral epistemological foundation of citizen-focussed theory. The logic that informs the construction of citizen-focussed theory is that theorising in Public Administration needs to “move away from the process of moving away from traditional society” (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1992: 32) and the indigenous African knowledge system.

Much of the existing theoretical paradigms in the field of Public Administration are the propositions of Euro-American scholarship pronounced with the suggestion that they ingrain an element of universal relevance for all cultures and societies in the modern world. Macedo (1993: 183-205) calls this approach to science “the pedagogy of big lies”. Ramose (1992: 65) underscores the importance of the indigenous African knowledge system in the assertion that “the tradition must function as a source from which to extract elements that will help in the construction of an authentic and emancipative epistemological paradigm relevant to the conditions in Africa”. For a theory to be of any epistemological value, it needs to be contextually relevant.

In the philosophy of humanism theorising in Public Administration needs to have a developmental focus, give priority to humanity; and rejecting “the false values of modern Europe and Africa-power hunger domination instinct, individualism, quantitativism, [and] productivism – which [all] have led the world to a human deadlock” (Diop 1999: 09). The epistemological basis of citizen-focussed theory that this study proposes should not be misconstrued as Aristotelian binary of opposites paradigm to scientific discourse where the paradigm of the discourse is disaggregated into either/or. It is rather an attempt to point out the limitation of Eurocenticism and the contribution that Afrocentrism could make in the development of the epistemological framework that could be used as a paradigm from which good governance in the context of NEPAD could be understood from the Public Administration perspective.
The limitation of the Aristotelian binary approach to scientific discourse is explained above. The *citizen-focussed theory* is based on the epistemological propositions of contingent co-existence of opposite factors. It seeks to assert the eclectic nature and inter-disciplinary character of Public Administration, which, according to Gasper (2002: 40), is “at the crossroads of several disciplines”. The *citizen-focussed theory* is propounded in this study as the epistemological framework from which the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration could, as conceptualised in sub-section 7.4.2, be understood.

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter the research question of the study as posited in Chapter 1 is answered. Using the conceptual, theoretical and philosophical insights acquired through a critical scholarly literature and an understanding of how the concept is used by other users as reflected in the official and popular literature, the epistemological framework for conceptualising *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is developed. In the context of this epistemological framework, *good governance* in NEPAD is conceptualised and its meaning for Public Administration is determined. This provides an answer to the research question that undergirds this study: *what does the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD mean for Public Administration?*

At the outset the contextual aspects of the epistemological framework are discussed and clarified. This is followed by the actual development of the epistemological framework, which, for the purpose of this study, is termed *contingent co-existence of opposites*. This paradigm of theorising is extensively discussed and used to determine the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. This is followed by a reflective discussion on what the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD means for Public Administration.

To make sense of the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective, a theoretical paradigm termed *citizen-focussed theory* is constructed, discussed and offered as a contribution to the on-going contemporary discourse on the theory of the discipline. This is important to expand the frontiers of theorisation in Public Administration. The *citizen-focussed theory* makes an important contribution towards
a better insight into, and broadening of, the body of scientific knowledge on the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration. This chapter essentially concludes the purpose of this study. The contentions and the propositions of this study are summarised in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 8

SUMMATION

8.1 Introduction

Mouton (2008: 124) writes that a “concluding chapter is perhaps the most important because it presents the end product of” the research endeavour. This chapter marks the culmination of the study, whose findings, conclusions and propositions are presented in a summation form. For reasons of contextualisation, the chapter starts with a succinct reflection on the contextual aspects that underpin the basis of the study. This is followed by a summation of the findings in respect to various objectives that the different chapters comprising the study sought to realise.

The findings of the study are discussed by drawing together the results from the proceeding chapters. In the discussions it is shown how the results of each chapter link up with the object of the study. The discussion in this chapter shows how the study responds to the research question. This is subsumed in the propositions in respect to the findings that point to an existence of a gap in the existing body of knowledge on good governance in the context of NEPAD. The implications of the propositions of the study for Public Administration are determined.

8.2 Contextual aspects of the study

This study examines good governance as a concept. The context for engaging this concept as the object of the study is NEPAD and the disciplinary perspective is Public Administration. NEPAD is a contemporary development initiative in Africa conceptualised and adopted by the African leadership to achieve sustainable development. As the literature on the history of development in Africa indicates, NEPAD is not the first initiative developed to address the developmental challenges of the African continent. A variety of developmental initiatives,
some developed in Africa by Africans, others by the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, were pursued in the past and, for a variety of reasons, did not achieve much success.

Compared with some of the previous African development initiatives whose philosophical foundation is largely embedded in neo-liberal inspired-economic reductionism, NEPAD does not lose sight of the importance of either the political or public administration dimensions of development with strong emphasis on good governance. In the *Democracy and Political Governance Initiative of NEPAD*, whose purpose “is to contribute to strengthening the political and administrative framework of participating [African] countries” (NEPAD 2002:para. 80), good governance is emphasised as a *sine qua non* for sustainable development. It is contended in much of the existing body of literature that NEPAD is anchored on the concept of *good governance*, which underpins the essence of Africa’s contemporary development trajectory.

Good governance in NEPAD is used as a *principle* without the attempt to clarify it as a *concept*. As tools of thinking concepts are the intellectual constructs used to formulate principles. Or, to put it the other way round, principles are the consequences of a particular conceptual scheme on what ought to be their meanings. To understand the meanings of principles, concepts used in their formulations should first be clarified, taking into consideration their contextual antecedents. The meaning of a concept as nebulous as *good governance* is inevitably susceptible to the contextual idiosyncrasies of its conception. Its usage as a principle without any attempt to clarify its meaning as a concept presupposes a gap in the existing body of knowledge on NEPAD, which this study seeks to fill.

*Good governance* is a conceptual *problematique*. It is value-laden, trans-contextual and multi-dimensional meaning different things to different people. Because of its epistemic relativism, *good governance* is susceptible to a variety of interpretations. For, it is a concept that is intended to contribute to the life chances of people. It is difficult to attach a meaning to *good governance* that is totally value-free or contextless. Given the heterogeneous and diverse nature of the African continent, the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD engenders ideological and political contestations abstractly prone to different interpretations and understandings influenced by a myriad of contextual idiosyncrasies of its conceptions and conceptualisations. The intricacy of the concept is convoluted by the
contestations around the context of its conception, which is NEPAD. The discourse on NEPAD is fraught with intellectual schisms. These contestations on NEPAD are not merely part of the broader discourse on this contemporary model for sustainable development. They also raise important questions with conceptual implications on *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

There is a lack of common understanding of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD. The African leadership is divided on what this concept means whereas the existing body of knowledge on NEPAD does not provide answers. This study is conceived against this background. Its consideration of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is pursued from the Public Administration perspective. The literature review reveals that many scholarship contributions on *good governance* in the contemporary body of knowledge on NEPAD are made from the political and economic perspectives. This is in spite of the fact that public administration in NEPAD, as compared to the early initiatives for Africa’s development where it has always been given a scanty consideration, is now being recognised as a fundamental variable in the quest for sustainable development.

NEPAD emphasises that sustainable development in Africa requires, among others, public administration reforms focussing on the administrative and civil services, public institutions and their activities and people in the employ of African governments. These are important subjects that scholars in the field of Public Administration largely write about. The question that this study examines is: *what does the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD mean for Public Administration?* This question is formulated to direct the scientific endeavours of the study towards its purpose, which is to understand *good governance* in the context of NEPAD and determine its meaning for Public Administration. It seeks to make a contribution towards a better insight into, and broadening of, the body of scientific knowledge of the concept *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective.

To realise the purpose of this study the following research methodologies are used in the study: *critical scholarship review, conceptual analysis, philosophical analysis, theory-building, textual analysis, hermeneutics, ideological-critical reading, discourse and conversational analysis* and *content analysis*. These research methodologies were carefully
selected on the basis of their appropriateness in generating conceptual, theoretical and philosophical insights necessary to answer the research question.

The study comprises 8 chapters sequentially arranged in a manner so that each addresses a particular objective as specified in Chapter 1. In most cases research starts with a question and ends with an answer, which embodies the findings of the study. The findings of research are the most important component of any scientific endeavour as their epistemic value in terms of their contribution to the body of knowledge is ingrained in them. They are a culmination of a scientific study and ought to be consistent with its purpose and objectives; and, more importantly, answer the research question. The details of the findings of this research exercise in respect to its purpose are encapsulated in the different chapters of the study; and are, in the following, succinctly presented in a systematic manner consistent with its objectives as stated in Chapter 1.

8.3 Public Administration scholarship engagement with good governance in the context of NEPAD

Much of scholarly outputs on NEPAD emerged mainly from the end of 2001, which is used in this study as a terminus a quo in the review of Public Administration scholarship. To be as exhaustive as possible in the review of the scholarship outputs that have emerged since 2001, 2010 is chosen as a terminus ad quem. The findings of the review of Public Administration scholarship as presented in this study are based on the intellectual outputs that emerged in 2001-2010. Largely through critical scholarship review, conceptual analysis, philosophical analysis and ideological-critical reading, important insights into how and the extent to which Public Administration scholarship engages good governance in the context of NEPAD were acquired and used to make a determination in so far as this part of the objective of the study is concerned.

With the use of the epistemological framework developed in Chapter 2 of the study to systematically and critically review the body of Public Administration scholarship, it is found that a large body of knowledge in the field that emerged during the period 2001-2010 approaches the discourse on good governance from an empirical perspective as a principle rather than a concept. It does not adequately examine good governance as a concept. This
presupposes that there is existence of a conceptual scheme that suggests universal consensus of its meaning.

Good governance is advocated as a policy imperative without any scholarly consideration of it as a concept from other perspectives. Its introduction as a policy imperative was introduced as a *fait accompli* in terms of its meaning in the development discourse. In the large body of scholarship in the field of Public Administration *good governance* is accepted and advocated as a policy imperative as prescribed by Western thinking. Its engagement with it as a principle is based on the false assumption that a common consensus on its meaning exists. This approach to the discourse on scientific phenomena is an exemplification of the *homogenisation thesis*, which, in the epistemological framework for the review of Public Administration scholarship as developed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, is associated with the *procedural democratic strand*. It is characteristic of the skewed nature of the discourse in the body of Public Administration scholarship, which is biased towards empirical questions rather than equally also considering theoretical, philosophical or conceptual objects of study.

In a few instances of consideration of *good governance* as a concept, the existing body of Public Administration scholarship is divided along three paradigms of conceptualism: *procedural democratic strand*, *substantive democratic strand* and *eclectic strand*. Through a systematic analysis of the different dimensions of *good governance* and the clarification or explanation of its theoretical linkages with other concepts, the study finds that the usage of this concept in some of the Public Administration discourse often adopts an interchangeable approach by simply assuming that it is synonymous to *governance*. *Good governance* and *governance* are used indiscriminately. The distinction between them is not made.

The scientific insights acquired through *ideological-critical reading* and *philosophical analysis* indicates that the conceptualisation of *good governance* within the *procedural democratic strand* context is rooted in neo-liberal theories and philosophies. It subscribes to the international financial institutions’ conceptualisation of *good governance* coined as part of the World Bank-International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) designed *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (SAPs) of the 1980s that primarily attributed Africa’s development crisis to internal factors such as bad governance and human rights violations.
The meaning of *good governance* whose definition is constructed along the neo-liberal paradigms is based on the philosophy of market fundamentalism. Its conceptualisation in the context of the philosophy of market fundamentalism was so authoritative especially during the 1980s and 1990s that it assumed the proportion of orthodoxy. That body of Public Administration scholarship whose engagement with *good governance* is situated within the procedural democratic strand uses the neo-liberal conceptualisation of the concept as a frame of reference. It uncritically subscribes to the orthodoxy and conceptualises *good governance* on the basis of various aspects of procedural democracy from a process perspective. Its theorisation and “philosophisation” mimic in style and dialectical parlance the international financial institutions’ conception and conceptualisation of the concept and are not necessarily located in the mainstream disciplinary discourse of the field.

The influential trend in thinking about *good governance* is that which is propagated by the international financial institutions with a supposition that there is a generally agreed-upon meaning of the concept. Its usage from the procedural democratic strand perspective is obtrusive and does not cohere with the philosophical foundation of NEPAD. Much focus in the conceptualisation of the concept in the procedural democratic strand context is on the procedural aspects of democracy considered as being critically important variables in defining *good governance*. These aspects are more concerned with the processes of democracy than with its substantive aspects.

The large of body of Public Administration scholarship whose engagement with *good governance* appertains to the procedural democratic strand is mostly concerned with the political and economic dimensions of the concept. It does not offer a fresh insight into the meaning of *good governance* that differs from that of the international financial institutions and does not, except in insignificant instances, make reference to NEPAD. It is only in respect to a very small amount of the discourse in the body of Public Administration scholarship whose engagement with *good governance* is subsumed under the procedural democratic strand that reference to NEPAD is made with some intellectual outputs specifically considering *good governance*, but not in a manner that sufficiently clarifies it as a concept to determine its contextual meaning for Public Administration.
The attempts to conceptualise and define *good governance* in NEPAD from a Public Administration perspective remain rooted in neo-liberal orthodoxy. There are no intellectual efforts to situate the discourse on the concept in the philosophical foundations of NEPAD. The Public Administration scholarship fails to contextualise the conceptualisation of *good governance* to NEPAD and consequently also fails to determine its meaning for the discipline. By engaging *good governance* from the *procedural democratic strand* perspective without contextualising it to NEPAD, the Public Administration scholarship does not seem to master the art of contextual discourse. Its homogenisation approach to conceptualism ignores the relative character of, and other important variables associated with, the concept.

The definitional focus of the concept on the processes and formal aspects of democratisation trivialises the significance of contextual discourse in engaging nebulous concepts such as *good governance*. The Public Administration scholarship’s consideration of *good governance* is embedded in positivism. The *procedural democratic strand* is rejected in the writings of some scholars in the field of Public Administration whose approaches in conceptualising *good governance* adopt a more substantive democratic approach based on the concept of developmentalism advocating the notion of state-society-market relations. This introduces another strand or paradigm of conceptualism. It is, as also discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, called *substantive democratic strand*.

The *substantive democratic strand* is an alternative paradigm of conceptualism in the contemporary development discourse that some scholars used in their conceptualisation of *good governance*. The Public Administration scholarship whose engagement with *good governance* is embedded in the *substantive democratic strand* is based on the teleological conceptualisations of the concepts. This paradigm of conceptualism defines scientific phenomena or concepts by reference to goals or purposes. The conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of the *substantive democratic strand* is based on the outcomes of the socio-economic activities of government.

In the *substantive democratic strand* as a paradigm of conceptualism, *good governance* is defined in terms of the *transcendence effect*. This is a fundamental contrast with the *procedural democratic strand* in the theory of conceptualism. A semblance of consensus exists in the body of Public Administration scholarship that subscribes to the *substantive democratic strand* that the *transcendence effect*, in determining the meaning of *good*
governance, refers to sustainable human development. In the context of the substantive democratic strand as a paradigm of conceptualism good governance is defined on the basis of the goal or purpose of attaining sustainable human development, not the processes or procedural aspects of democracy.

In the body of Public Administration scholarship whose conceptualisation of good governance subscribes to the substantive democratic strand as reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, no reference is made to NEPAD. Resulting from the critical review of Public Administration scholarship in Chapter 2 of the thesis, another paradigm of conceptualism that synthesises the procedural democratic strand and substantive democratic strand is observed and, for the purpose of this study, is called the eclectic strand. This paradigm of conceptualism combines the best elements of procedural democratic strand and substantive democratic strand in the conceptualisation of good governance.

The body of Public Administration scholarship whose conceptualisation of good governance adopts an eclectic approach follows a holistic logic of means-ends reasoning. It is premised on the contention that both the means [process] and ends [goal] of the concept are critically important in the conceptualisation of good governance. In engaging good governance as a concept the Public Administration scholarship whose thinking is rooted in eclecticism acknowledges that good governance is a multi-dimensional concept. Its conceptualisation adopts an integrationist approach and defines good governance on the basis of the interplay of various dimensions of eclecticism. This paradigm of conceptualism is associated with the heterogeneity thesis, which postulates that the study of scientific phenomena or concepts ought to be pursued from different perspectives to enhance the epistemological validity of the intellectual discourse.

The Public Administration scholarship that conceptualises good governance from the eclectic perspective does not make any reference to NEPAD. This, as pointed out above, is also the case in respect to the perspectives that are situated within the substantive democratic strand. Their conceptualisation of good governance from the substantive democratic strand perspective does not make reference to NEPAD. It is only in the case of perspectives situated in the procedural democratic strand that a very small amount of the discourse in the body of Public Administration scholarship does specifically make reference to good governance in
NEPAD, albeit, in as far as the question that this study posits is concerned, in an insignificant way.

In Chapter 2 the thesis finds that the scholarship endeavours to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration are limited. This finding suggests a lacuna in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship on the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD. To systematically make a contribution to the body of knowledge in as far as the foregoing is concerned, NEPAD, as the context of the object of this study, is comprehensively analysed in Chapter 3 of the thesis to acquire in-depth insight into what this contemporary model for Africa’s development is and entails. The findings of this exercise are presented below.

8.4 Meaning of NEPAD within the context of the object of the study

Based on the insights acquired through the use of research methodologies explained in Chapter 1 of the thesis, the study finds that NEPAD is a subject of rigorous intellectual engagement in the contemporary development discourse. Various attempts to unpack it abound with reflections that do not converge on sameness. The discussion on NEPAD is disaggregated into three perspectives juxtaposed as the comparative-analytic perspective, the historic-process perspective and the philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective. These perspectives are used as analytical construct in the study to understand NEPAD.

The historic-process perspective seeks to unpack NEPAD on the basis of its development. It historicises the evolution of NEPAD. Its unit of focus in the analysis is the historical process. The comparative-analytic perspective attempts to understand NEPAD on the basis of the extent of its distinction from, or similarity to, the previous development initiatives. It embodies a comparative analysis. The philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective attempts to unpack NEPAD on the basis of its philosophical and theoretical dispositions.

From the historical-process perspective NEPAD is analysed on the basis of its historical evolution. The finding of Chapter 3 of the study in respect to the foregoing is that NEPAD was conceptualised, developed and adopted by the African leadership. The process of its development was not inclusive of the African people. The consultations in respect to its
process of development were conducted largely with the international community rather than
the African people whom NEPAD is intended to benefit.

In the comparative-analytic perspective the study finds that NEPAD is consistent with the
previous African development initiatives only in respect of the development goals of
eradicating poverty and addressing the challenge of underdevelopment on the continent. Its
variation from the previous development initiatives lies in its strategic approach to realise the
development goals as specified in the foregoing, although in some instances, particularly in
as far as its comparison with the post-LPA initiatives are concerned, a semblance of
similarities exists.

The pre-LPA and LPA African development initiatives cohere with NEPAD in miniature
aspects, largely in an insignificant way. The theoretical orientation of NEPAD differs
fundamentally from the previous African development initiatives. NEPAD gravitates more
towards the modernisation theory whereas its predecessors are premised on the dependency
theory. The conclusions arrived at in respect of the analysis of NEPAD from the historical-
process and comparative-analytic perspectives respectively lead to the question about the
philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD, which is extensively considered from
the philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective.

In the analysis of NEPAD from a philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective it is found that
scholarship on its philosophical and theoretical foundations is polarised. On the one hand
those scholars that assume a protagonist position on NEPAD contend that, with the concept
of African Renaissance, this contemporary development initiative is embedded in Pan-
Africanism. On the other hand, the critics of NEPAD reject this proposition. Their contention
is that NEPAD is a neo-liberal paradigm for Africa’s contemporary development. The
concept of African Renaissance is subsumed in the Africanist and globalist
conceptualisations, with the former said to be ingrained in Pan-Africanism whereas the latter
in neo-liberalism.

Based on the analysis that follows the binary logic approach in the discourse on NEPAD, the
philosophical-cum-theoretical perspective finds that NEPAD is a contingent co-existence of
opposites premised on the ideological pragmatism of Mbeki. Following the logic of the
contingent co-existence of opposites NEPAD is, at the philosophical level, embedded in Pan-
Africanism. However, its strategic approach to development gravitates towards the modernisation theory, whose philosophical context is neo-liberalism. NEPAD is a synthesis of the Africanist and globalist conceptualisations of the African Renaissance. With the understanding of what NEPAD is as propounded in Chapter 3 of the thesis, *good governance* and the question of its meanings are critically considered in Chapter 4 of the thesis to provide a conceptual background for its contextual analysis to determine what it means in the context of NEPAD.

8.5 *Good governance and the question of its meanings in the development discourse*

*Good governance* in this study is considered within the context of NEPAD. However, this concept did not originate in NEPAD as a new paradigm for Africa’s development. It has been part of the development discourse even before NEPAD was conceived. In Chapter 4 of the thesis *good governance* is examined in its broader context. It is determined how this concept evolved to arrive at its current form and usage. In discussing *good governance* Chapter 4 of the thesis builds on the results of the literature review in Chapters 2 and 6. It examines *good governance* from a broader context for its broader understanding. It is found that *good governance* is conceptually closely linked to *governance*. In some instances these concepts are used interchangeably presupposing their synonymity. This engenders confusion. *Good governance* is considered in contradistinction with *governance* to clarify such confusion.

The etymology of *governance* and the theoretical paradigms associated with it are considered to provide the epistemological context for the discourse on *good governance*. Various definitions of *governance* are considered and studied. In this the conceptual lineage or relation of *good governance* to *governance* is determined. It is found that *governance* is a conceptual presage or harbinger of *good governance*. Against this background the evolution of *good governance* in the development discourse is critically considered and extensively discussed.

Although it did not exactly go by this term, it is found in Chapter 4 of the thesis that the idea about good governance, like that of governance, is as old as human civilisation. *Good governance* has long been implicated in Plato’s concept of the *good* and Aristotle’s *common good*. Its neologism in the contemporary development discourse is therefore as a term, not as
an idea. *Good governance* is a neo-liberal term. It evolved into the current form following the contention of the international financial institutions and other neo-liberal scholars that Africa’s development crisis is attributable to internal factors such as bad governance, corruption, and human rights violations.

*Good governance* was introduced as a normative concept prescriptive of certain governance imperatives and was propounded as an alternative conceptual framework from which solutions to Africa’s development conundrum could be sought. In some instances, some scholars use it as a descriptive concept. Most of the definitions of *good governance* are not much of a description as much as they are a prescription of certain normative positions.

In the neo-liberal paradigm *good governance* is defined along the procedural aspects of democracy. However, its conception from the neo-liberal perspective is rejected largely by the Africanist scholarship and Africa-focussed development initiatives, whose conception of the concept is built on the normative aspects of substantive aspects of democracy. The Africanist scholarship’s contention is that a just and good society cannot be attained in neo-liberal terms. *Good governance* in the development discourse is a subject of contestations. It is a conceptual *problematique* characterised by the contestations of ideas as influenced by the different ideological, philosophical and theoretical idiosyncrasies of the different contexts of its conception. *Good governance* is a multi-dimensional concept, value-laden, nebulous, trans-contextual, and normative concept, which means different things to different people, depending on the bias of the user.

The usage of *good governance* in NEPAD as a principle without determining its contextual meaning further complicates its complexity. This is even more so in that, as pointed out in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the context from which this concept is considered, which is NEPAD, is itself a subject of contestations. In this the study asks: is it possible to determine the meaning of a contested concept in a context which is itself a subject of contestation? *Good governance* in the context of NEPAD, what does it mean? The answers to these questions are considered later in this summation of the findings of the study. *Good governance* is examined in this study to determine its contextual meaning for Public Administration, which is the perspective from which the discourse is approached.
8.6 Disciplinary perspective of the study – Public Administration

To acquire a deeper insight into the perspective from which good governance in the context of NEPAD is considered, Public Administration as a science in Chapter 5 is extensively discussed focusing on the historical and epistemological trends that undergird the theoretical evolution of the discipline. Subsumed in the discussion of the study on this aspect are the paradigmatic status and the theoretical base of the field. The focus on these aspects is important to the study’s disciplinary grounding. Following what appears to be a convention in the writings of most scholars in the field, using capital letters in Public Administration connotes reference to it as a discipline, theory or science whereas public administration in small letters or lower cases refers to it as that which is studied by the subject. The consideration of Public Administration in this study is largely as a science. A reference to it as a function is indicated by the use of lower case format.

The paradigms of Public Administration are, for the purpose of this study, disaggregated into traditional and contemporary paradigms and are discussed as such. From this exercise important historical and theoretical insights relating to the epistemological foundation and trends in the evolution of the discipline are acquired. It is found that the theoretical and paradigmatic evolution of Public Administration has always been characterised by contestations where the different epistemological trends in the history of the discipline evolved on the basis of rejecting each other. The contemporary paradigms of Public Administration evolved on the basis of rejecting the traditional ones.

Within the paradigms of Public Administration there are also theoretical propositions that contest each other. The development of the discipline has largely followed the binary logic. It is only in postmodernism that the notion of co-existence of opposites is introduced, as opposed to the binary discourse based on positivism, which largely characterises the evolution and the epistemological orientation of Public Administration as a science. In spite of its propositions against the binary discourse approach, postmodernism also evolved on the basis of rejecting the positivist foundation of Public Administration.
In the post-modern literature on Public Administration studied, it is only Farmer (1995) who is found to have acknowledged the contribution of positivism in the development of Public Administration as a science. However, the postmodern paradigm does not offer a solution to the theoretical question of the discipline as is also contested on various epistemological fronts of its foundation. This leads the study to pose a question whether it is really possible to theorise good governance in the context of NEPAD from a disciplinary perspective that has not yet reached a consensus with itself about its theoretical base. This question need to be understood within the context of the fact that, as determined through extensive review of Public Administration scholarship in Chapter 2 of the thesis, scholarship endeavours in the field to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective are limited. Before the study could answer this question, attempts are made to, in the context of the foregoing observation, establish whether Public Administration could perhaps derive any epistemological value and become enriched by how the concept good governance is theorised and conceptualised to determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD from the literature beyond the field.

8.7 Can the Public Administration discipline derive any epistemological value from the literature beyond the field in considering good governance in the context of NEPAD?

In Chapter 6 of the thesis the literature beyond Public Administration scholarship is considered to explore the possibility of expanding the disciplinary boundaries of knowledge on good governance in the context of NEPAD. It is reviewed to determine how good governance in the context of NEPAD is understood and used in the contemporary development discourse on Africa. As pointed out above, the purpose of this exercise is to establish whether insights acquired from the literature beyond the Public Administration discipline could be used to enrich the theorisation and conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD.

The literature as reviewed in Chapter 6 of the thesis in respect of the foregoing purpose is categorised into scholarly, official and popular intellectual outputs. Scholarly outputs refer to books, chapters in books, articles published in scientific journals and papers presented at scholarly gatherings. The official intellectual outputs refer to the official literature such as the documents and files of largely the African Union, NEPAD Secretariat, Heads of State and
Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), the African Peer Review Panel, Pan African Parliament, Country Review Teams and of governments in Africa and other countries of the world; and speeches of politicians and officials on NEPAD and good governance made in their respective official capacities. The popular intellectual outputs refer to articles and reports in the newspapers and magazines.

The scholarly literature as reviewed in Chapter 6 of thesis is written largely from the political and economic perspectives, although in some instances the socio-economic variables of development are considered. Compared to a very small amount of the contribution in the existing body of Public Administration scholarship that makes reference to NEPAD, scholarly literature reviewed in Chapter 6 of the thesis extensively considers this contemporary development paradigm with some scholars situating the engagement with it in the African Renaissance as its philosophical foundation. Except in few instances, in much scholarly literature as reviewed, the consideration of good governance is located within the context of NEPAD. This is in contrast with the literature as reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. In much of the discourse on NEPAD in Chapter 6 of the thesis reference is made to good governance largely as a principle and is engaged largely along the procedural aspects of democracy. This is similar to the approach of some scholars to the good governance discourse in the field of Public Administration.

The consideration of good governance as a policy imperative along the procedural aspects of democracy is denounced by some scholars whose works are reviewed in Chapter 6 of the thesis as fundamentally flawed, but failed to provide an alternative perspective and understanding of the concept. However, in some instances, the few existing contributions to the body of scholarship reviewed in this chapter are instructive towards the construction of a conceptual paradigm in which the concept could be understood. It draws its epistemological value largely from the critical, contextual and African scholarship, which emerged since the colonial era to fertilise Pan-Africanism. Its conception of development and aspects associated with it such as good governance is on people. Good governance in the context of the foregoing is based on the substantive aspects of democracy.

Some scholars in the field of Public Administration whose works are reviewed in Chapter 2 of the thesis consider good governance from the substantive aspects of the democracy perspective, although also in a very minute way. In respect to the foregoing, the study finds
that there is nothing necessarily new that the contributions of scholars whose works are reviewed in Chapter 6 of the thesis make to the body of Public Administration scholarship. The question whether the Public Administration scholarship could derive any epistemological value from the literature beyond the field in terms of how it theorises and conceptualises good governance in the context of NEPAD is therefore not answered in a positive sense.

In the official and popular literature good governance is also considered as a principle; in some instances along the procedural aspects of democracy. This is incongruous with the socio-economic recovery objective that NEPAD seeks to realise. However, in the official literature that specifically relates to the APRM good governance assumes a semblance of clearness in terms of what it ought to mean in the context of NEPAD. The insights acquired through the analysis of such literature are used to formulate a perspective to answer the conceptual question of the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD in Chapter 7 of the thesis.

In the APRM reports good governance in the context of NEPAD is considered in the APRM processes in terms of four variables that constitute its thematic focus areas. It is found in the APRM reports that good governance as envisaged in NEPAD is not limited to the political and economic dimensions of governance. The socio-economic and corporate dimensions of governance are also considered important conceptual variables for its conceptualisation. This is a very interesting observation as it suggests that a possible answer to a conceptual question is found in the official literature rather than scholarship. Normally answers to conceptual, theoretical and philosophical questions are found in the body of scholarship, not in policy literature.

8.8 Epistemological framework for conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD

The epistemological framework that the study submits to the body of knowledge as the alternative to the neo-liberal paradigm of theorising and conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD is the contingent co-existence of opposites. It is the epistemological product of this research endeavour and seeks to make a contribution towards a better insight into, and broadening of, the body of knowledge on good governance in the context of NEPAD. The contingent co-existence of opposites is a context from which the meaning of
good governance in the context NEPAD for Public Administration is determined. It underscores the importance of contextual discourse in theorising value-laden, trans-contextual and nebulous concepts as good governance. The contingent co-existence of opposites is drawn from the epistemological foundation of postmodernism. Good governance in NEPAD requires contextual theorising. The contingent co-existence of opposites is the appropriate epistemological framework for such.

In answering the question of the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD the logic of the contingent co-existence of opposites is followed in the study, which is used in Chapter 3 of the study to determine the meaning of NEPAD as the context of the object of the study. The contingent co-existence of opposites is discussed in Chapter 7 of the thesis, where NEPAD is defined as a contingent co-existence of opposite factors premised on the ideological pragmatism of Mbeki. It is a synthesis of the Africanist and globalist conceptualisations of the African Renaissance. The implication of this understanding of NEPAD on good governance is that this concept need not be fixated in the binary opposites where its contextual consideration is either in terms of neo-liberalism or Pan-Africanism.

In conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD the study argues that the philosophy of Pan-Africanism should be taken into consideration, especially the twenty-first century thinking on Pan-Africanism, whose main preoccupation is with the development of Africa rather than the politics of decolonisation. The different phases of Pan-Africanist thinking are discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis, where the one that emerged in the twenty-first century provides the context for theorising and conceptualising good governance in NEPAD. In the twenty-first century Pan-Africanist thinking on the contemporary development discourse, it is clear that the meaning of good governance in NEPAD exceeds the neo-liberal conceptions and theorisations of the concept.

The contention of the study is that the interpretation of good governance should not be subjected to reductionism analysis, where the focus of conceptualisation and theorisation is limited to only economic and political aspects of the concept. It is on this basis that the Africanist thinking differs with the neo-liberal conceptualisation of good governance and, instead, propagates that the contextual theorisation and conceptualisation of good governance ought to be based on the substantive aspects of democracy. In this, the two paradigms of conceptualism emerge as opposing binary poles exclusive of each other. It is here that the
discourse on *good governance* gets divided as it is pursued within the Aristotelian binary logic. In Chapter 2 of the thesis these different paradigms of conceptualism are juxtaposed as the *procedural democratic strand* and the *substantive democratic strand*.

The *procedural democratic strand* is based on the procedural aspects of democracy and is associated with the neo-liberal scholarship whereas the *substantive democratic strand* is associated with the Africanist scholarship. It is based on the variables of substantive democracy. In the *procedural democratic strand* good governance is defined from the process perspective in terms of the *means* rather than the *ends* of the concept. The conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of the substantive aspects democracy or within the *substantive democratic strand* puts more emphasis on the socio-economic aspects of the concept where the focus is on the ends of the concepts rather than the means. It is in this context that the notion of sustainable development emerged, which in contrast with the neo-liberal thinking that defines it on the basis of economic growth and political stability, defines it in Africanist thinking on the basis of its impact in enhancing the quality of life of the citizens.

In the context of the substantive aspects of democracy *good governance* is conceptualised on the basis of socio-economic outcomes of government interventions on the well-being of society. The emphasis is on the *transcendence effect* or the *extrinsic value* of the concept. This is in contrast with the *intrinsic value* orientation of the concept in the context of neo-liberal thinking.

For a scientific object to be considered as *good* it must be subjected to rigorous reason with reference to purpose. *Good governance* is defined on the basis of purpose, which, in the contemporary development discourse, is sustainable human development. This is in contrast to the neo-liberal scholarship that conceptualises *good governance* on the basis of the processes of governance rather than their outcomes. The critically important question that the study asked in moving towards the construction of the epistemological framework is, between the procedural democratic paradigm and substantive democratic paradigm, which one could be used as the appropriate theoretical paradigm to conceptualise *good governance* and determine its meaning in the context of NEPAD? This question is important especially in the context of the fact that NEPAD is, as found in Chapter 2 of the thesis, philosophically embedded in the Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance [Pan-Africanism] but
theoretically moves towards the globalist conceptualisation of African Renaissance [neo-liberalism].

In the context of the above exposition the question that this study asks in Chapter 7 of the thesis is, do we move towards the neo-liberal paradigm of conceptualism based on the procedural aspects of democracy or the philosophy of Pan-Africanism as expressed in the twenty-first century Africanist thinking on the African Renaissance, where good governance is conceptualised on the basis of substantive aspects of democracy? To answer this question the study moves from the premise that neither the neo-liberal conceptualisation nor the substantive democratic conceptualisation is an adequate paradigm of conceptualism in so far as good governance in the context of NEPAD is concerned.

The study argues that to provide an answer in terms of either/or would perpetuate the naivety of the Aristotelian theory of binary opposites, which may hinder the intellectual efforts of determining the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD because of its orientation to the homogenisation thesis. To understand good governance in the context of NEPAD this study submits to the body of knowledge that the contingent co-existence of opposites, used as the analytical framework to untangle NEPAD, is the appropriate epistemological framework from which the contextual meaning of the concept could be determined.

For the purpose of untangling good governance in this study, subsumed in the contingent co-existence of opposites is the eclectic strand, which, as explained in Chapter 2 of the thesis, is a synthesis of neo-liberal conceptualisation of the concept on the basis of the procedural aspects of democracy with the substantive aspects of democracy, which defines the concept in socio-economic terms. As a paradigm of conceptualism, eclecticism propagates that good governance ought to be understood as a scientific object of study whose interpretation is a subject of different perspectives influenced by the ideological idiosyncrasies of their epistemological foundations. Its usage in NEPAD needs to be understood as the intellectual outputs of the contingent co-existence of opposites reasoning premised on the ideological pragmatism of the twenty-first century thinking that synthesises the Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance with the globalist conceptualisation. In this the contention of the study is that the Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance in which the philosophical context of NEPAD gravitates towards Pan-Africanism should not be
treated as a binary opposite of the globalist conceptualisation of the African Renaissance where its theoretical foundation gravitates towards neo-liberalism.

The implication of this on *good governance* is that this concept should not be understood either in neo-liberal or Pan-Africanist terms as binary opposites following the logic of homogenisation thesis, but from the eclectic perspective gravitating towards postmodernism and acknowledging the contingent co-existence of opposite factors that defines NEPAD as the context of its usage. This approach to conceptualism encourages synchronism in the study of concepts whose meanings are value-laden, trans-contextual, versatile and nebulous as *good governance*.

The study contends that in conceptualising *good governance* the neo-liberal aspects of procedural democracy as embedded in the globalist conceptualisation of the African Renaissance are as important as the substantive democratic aspects embedded in the philosophical foundation of the Africanist conceptualisation of African Renaissance, which gravitates more towards Pan-Africanism. The conceptualisation of *good governance* from either perspective should not be propagated on the basis of a thesis and an anti-thesis. The approach should rather be premised on the contingent co-existence of opposite factors. With the imperative of good governance NEPAD seeks to achieve peace, security, political stability, economic growth and corporate prudence, and democracy. These aspects are concerned with the political dimension or means of *good governance* and gravitate more towards the procedural aspects of democracy. They are, however, propounded within the context of achieving sustainable development.

The NEPAD objective of sustainable development is associated with the substantive democratic dimension of the concept. It appropriates socio-economic meaning to *good governance* and represents the *ends or transcendence effect* of the concept as contemplated in NEPAD. It is found in Chapters 3 and 7 of the thesis that the crafters of NEPAD intended to base the meaning of *good governance* on both the *means* and *ends* of the concept. This suggests that *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is used as a holistic concept that embraces both the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy as equally important variables in its conceptualisation. This is affirmed in the APRM processes which are aimed at fostering policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development, and accelerated sub-regional and economic integration.
The reports of the APRM issued reflect that good governance in the context of NEPAD is not limited to the political and/or economic dimensions of the concept. The socio-economic and corporate dimensions are also considered important variables in conceptualising good governance in the context of NEPAD. This marks a fundamental paradigm shift in the conception of good governance, which has always been limited to the liberal paradigm of conceptualism. The emphasis in conceptualising good governance in the context of the variable of sustainable development is the humanness of policy interventions in the lives of the people, which is measured in terms of its outcomes in enhancing the well-being of the citizens. This thinking is not new in the governance discourse. It dates back to the ancient Greek philosophical discourses on how to achieve a good and just society.

The NEPAD objective of sustainable development appropriates to good governance a meaning that transcends neo-liberal conception of the concept embedded in economic and political reductionist approaches to development. Good governance in the context of NEPAD is not only about the quality of democracy, political stability, economic growth and corporate prudence, it is also, more importantly, about the effect or impact of those ‘good practices’ in enhancing the quality of life of the citizenry. This point is underscored, for example, in the APRM Report on South Africa (2007), which commended the country for its performance in various initiatives pertaining to democracy, political governance, economic management, and corporate governance, but raised serious concerns about its performance in the realm of socio-economic development, especially in so far as the question of the alleviation of poverty and unemployment is concerned.

The significant strides on the political and economic fronts must translate into qualitative improvements in the lives of the people. This thinking is embedded in a human-centred development paradigm, which propounds that the people ought to be the direct beneficiaries of government’s “good practices” in the pursuit of development. The understanding of good governance in the context of NEPAD as a holistic concept, integrative of political, economic and socio-economic dimensions of development should be located within the context of the African philosophy of humanism. For, subsumed in the African philosophy of humanism, as discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis, is the concept of social justice, which this study contends is one of the key variables that should inform the conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD.
The concept of social justice is associated with substantive democracy. It is concerned with the distribution of socio-economic benefits and gains to all members of society on the basis of the principles of fairness with the intention of enhancing the quality of their well-being. In this the objective is to achieve substantive justice. This is in contrast with the theory of procedural justice associated with neo-liberalism. In the context of the contingent co-existence of opposites as an analytical framework for theorising good governance in NEPAD along the variable of social justice, the proposition of the theory of procedural justice for compliance with the rules is not necessarily incorrect. For, rules are critically important to engender societal stability and order. However, an epistemological faux pas occurs when, in conceptualising good governance in the context of the notion of sustainable development in NEPAD, the procedural aspects of democracy or rules are emphasised as the ends in themselves rather than means to the ends.

In the context of NEPAD the ends of the concept of good governance ought to be qualitative improvements of the lives of the citizen. The human-centred development paradigm is critically important in the pursuit of social justice. However, it should not be narrowly anthropocentric. The African philosophy of humanism is an instructive epistemological framework that underpins the human-centred development paradigm. It rhymes with the study of UNICEF entitled Adjustment with a Human face (AWHF), which is referred to in Chapter 4 of the thesis as an important contribution towards the development of a human-centred development paradigm.

The AWHF emphasised the importance of human and social dimensions of development. It is a critique of the SAPs, whose conception of development was limited to economic growth. The philosophy of humanism is increasingly being recognised as part of the epistemology or system of knowledge in the human sciences. It is used in the study as a framework from which ideas about good governance in the context of NEPAD could be generated, engaged and contested. This is important to mitigate the dominance of neo-liberal scholarship and realist epistemology, whose approach to the development discourse is based on the homogenisation thesis. The indigenous African knowledge, particularly the concepts of ubuntu and lekgotla, are infused in the contemporary thinking on good governance in conceptualising its meaning in the context of NEPAD.
In the context of the *contingent co-existence of opposites* the study defines *good governance* in the context of NEPAD as the exercise of authority in a manner that meaningfully and democratically engages sectors of governance in the pursuit of the type of development that is sustainable, whose effects in enhancing the quality of life of the citizens is underpinned by the concept of *humanism* and *social justice*. In this *good governance* is defined on the basis of *public good* and the sustainable *well-being* of society. Its ultimate measure is the *good life* that the citizens need to lead. A *good life* is a product of a *just* and *good society*, in which, in defining and achieving the same, government interacts and collaborates with the citizens and the private sector. The conceptualisation of *good governance* in NEPAD in the context of the *contingent co-existence of opposites* incorporates the African epistemology largely marginalised in the mainstream discourse on this concept. Against this background the study asks: In the context of NEPAD, what does *good governance* mean for Public Administration? This question is fundamentally important as is the basis upon which this study is based. It appertains to the implication of the conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD in the Public Administration discipline.

### 8.9 Implication of the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration

For the discipline of Public Administration *good governance* in the context of NEPAD means that the philosophical and theoretical paradigms of conceptualism need to transcend their epistemological reductionist, positivist or realist epistemology, which is based on neo-liberalism, and premise the quest for knowledge on the contingent co-existence of opposites. For, as Samier (2005: 08) puts it, a positivist epistemology “gloss[es] over complexities in the human character, power and politics dynamics, ethics in organisational life, and opposed contextual forces shaping the world and mentality of the administrator”. It is not an appropriate epistemological paradigm for engaging a concept as complex as *good governance* in the context of NEPAD.

The paradigm of theorising that this study proposes for Public Administration scholarship in the consideration of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD is the *contingent co-existence of opposites*. In theorising *good governance* to provide a conceptual context for its conception in NEPAD, Public Administration needs to be eclectic in its approach. This requires a broader view of scientific objects studied and a wider range of methods to introduce a new
basis for thinking about thinking. In studying a scientific concept as versatile, trans-contextual, value-laden and nebulous as *good governance*, whose meaning is fraught with contestations and contradictory perspectives, all the propositions associated with it are important – in spite of their oppositional contradictions – especially that NEPAD as the context in which *good governance* is used is defined as the intellectual output of the contingent co-existence of opposite factors. This approach to scientific discourse is based on the thinking that science matures when the contingent co-existence of opposite factors are taken into consideration in thinking about thinking or theorising about theorising.

In the consideration of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD the Public Administration scholarship needs to shift from the theorisation paradigm of moving from the premise of rejecting the existing theories and substituting them with the competing ones to that of acknowledging their co-existence. For, in the human sciences the truth is not absolute, it is contextual. Public Administration is a human science. It evolved as such, especially in so far as its history in Anglo-Saxon countries is concerned. To Public Administration *good governance* in the context of NEPAD means that the theoretical discourse in the field needs to engage this concept beyond the theoretical foundations of the traditional and contemporary paradigms of Public Administration based on the realist epistemology or positivism, whose limitations are discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis.

It is found in Chapters 4 and 7 of the thesis that *good governance* in Public Administration “has progressed from obscurity to widespread usage, particularly in the last decade” (Frederickson 2004: 12). It is *en vogue* and “has become a leading concept in public administration” (Brand 2007: 541). Minogue (2003: 07) observes that “good governance and new public management are regarded as mutually supportive reforms, with greater political accountability contributing to more efficient and less corrupt government”. In much of the contemporary body of public administration literature *good governance* is associated with the NPM paradigm. It is considered a new conception that seeks “to foster the relationship between economic growth and democracy” (Salih 2001: 12).

The synthesis of the “efficiency concerns of [new] public management” with the “accountability concerns of governance” (Minogue 2003: 08) resulted from the acknowledgement of the experiences of *Structural Adjustment Programmes* in the 1980s that development cannot just simply be limited to economic reductionism. The political
dimensions of development subsumed in the concept good governance are considered as also critically important. In this the meaning of good governance in Public Administration is limited to the political and economic dimensions of the conceptualisation of the concept. The socio-economic dimensions of the concept are not given much attention. In this neoliberalism is a foundational paradigm and good governance is defined along the procedural aspects of democracy. This influenced the discourse in the field, especially when the NPM assumed the proportion of orthodoxy and asserted itself as the sole paradigm from which the objects of studies in the field could be considered.

The NPM exemplifies the Aristotelian binary of opposites character of the discourse in Public Administration, where the existing theory is rejected and replaced by new ones. In this paradigm of theorisation the space for theoretical reflections is limited; restricted and reified to positivism. In the NPM context the conception of good governance is based largely on the virtues of the 3Es, which refers to efficiency, effectiveness and economy. It is not necessarily inappropriate to use these aspects as the bases from which good governance could be conceptualised. What is wrong is to use them as the ends rather than the means of the concept.

In the NPM context economic thinking rather than thinking about public interest dominates the realm of public policy and the conception of good governance. The postmodern paradigm rejects this perspective, which is based on the realist epistemology or positivism. The NPM evolved on the basis of rejecting the traditional models of Public Administration. As determined in Chapter 5 of the thesis, the theoretical evolution of Public Administration on the basis of rejecting a particular paradigm dominant at a particular time in history retards the epistemological growth of the discipline and limits the capability of theorising.

The conception of good governance in the context of the NPM is limited to the intrinsic value of the concept. In this the foundational value of Public Administration, which is concerned with the promotion of the general welfare of the citizens, loses emphasis. This conception of good governance does not befit the philosophical foundation of NEPAD, whose strategic essence is embedded in the objective of sustainable human development, a subject which largely “remain[s] only in fledging form or marginalised in the discipline” (Samier 2005: 09). It is at the periphery in terms of the locus and focus of Public Administration This is in spite of the coherence of the objective of sustainable human development with the foundational
value of Public Administration. Much of the writings in the field focus more on the process of governance than on the actual goal of public administration, which is to promote the general welfare of the citizens.

The study contends that the premise from which good governance in the context of NEPAD could be understood from the Public Administration perspective is embedded in its foundational value, which asserts the importance of social equity and social justice in the conceptualisation of the concept. In this conceptualisation exercise the study draws from the Minnowbrook Conference of 1968, which, as discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis, sought to base the epistemological foundation of the discipline on the normative theory and philosophy, attend to the question of relevance of the discipline to social issues, and re-assert its foundational value, which is the promotion of the general welfare of the citizens. The proceedings of the said conference underscored the imperative of social equity in Public Administration. This is the epistemological framework from which good governance in the context of NEPAD should be understood from the Public Administration perspective. The study contends that good governance in the context of NEPAD is much more than its neo-liberal usage in the mainstream body of Public Administration literature, which defines the concept along the procedural aspects of democracy.

The NEPAD objective of sustainable development, where the eradication of poverty is specifically emphasised, necessitates that the substantive aspects of democracy should inform its conception. The conceptualisation of good governance in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective should, however, not be pursued along the Aristotelian theory of binary opposites, where the procedural aspects of democracy are considered as the exclusive binary of the substantive aspects of democracy in defining the concept. Its conceptualisation along the procedural aspects of democracy in the existing body of knowledge is largely the contribution of neo-liberal scholarship whereas, as discussed in Chapter 4 of the study, African scholarship made a significant contribution in assigning a substantive meaning to democracy in the contemporary development discourse, where the socio-economic imperatives of development are underscored.
The study contends that, in conceptualising *good governance* in the context of NEPAD, both the substantive and procedural aspects of democracy are important. This is so, especially in so far as the philosophical and theoretical foundations of NEPAD are concerned. *Good governance* in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective needs to be conceptualised in a manner that encapsulates both the *intrinsic* and *extrinsic values* of the concept while at the same emphasising its *transcendence effect* in relation to its conceptual essence. As discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, the conception of *good governance* in terms of its *intrinsic value* is concerned with the *means* rather than the *ends* of the concept. The focus is largely on the political and economic aspects of liberal democracy.

*Good governance* in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective cannot just simply be conceptualised on the basis of the processes of government, but also on the basis of the outputs and outcomes of the interventions of government in enhancing the quality of life of the citizens. The objective of NEPAD is to achieve sustainable human development. This exemplifies the necessity for conceptualising *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective in terms of its extrinsic value. But, more importantly, the ultimate conceptual variable in the conceptualisation of *good governance* lies in the transcendence effect of the processes of government and the outputs of public administration, which ought to be about maximising the quality of life of the citizens. The transcendence effect is concerned with the outcomes of the processes of governance and the outputs of public administration or government intervention in the lives of the citizens.

In the context of NEPAD and from the Public Administration perspective, *good governance* is “much more than mere efficient management of economic and financial resources, or particular services; it is also a broad reform strategy to strengthen institutions of civil society, and make government more open, responsive, accountable and democratic” (Minogue 2003: 08). *Good governance* is not just about the economic growth, durability of democracy and the provision of basic goods and services to the citizens. It is about maximising the distributive effect of the socio-economic benefits to achieve a good life that the citizens should derive from the policy interventions of government. *Good governance* is about public interest.

In the context of NEPAD the meaning of *good governance* for Public Administration needs to be understood as a shift in emphasis from the paradigm of conceptualism rooted in “utilitarian market culture and public choice theory heavily oriented towards a view of the
public and public officials as driven by utilitarian, selfish economic interests” (Samier 2005: 15). *Good governance* is about “a conception of the good society, and the good administrator that goes with it” (Samier 2005: 15) whose sense of public administration loathes corruption; is driven by altruism and a public service ethos (Meadowcroft 2007: 357-373) characterised by a total commitment towards the betterment of human life.

The conceptualisation of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD from the Public Administration perspective as propagated in this study locates the citizens “in all human aspects and capacities in a central position” of intellectualism, “drawing on both the knowledge and methods of humanities disciplines” (Samier 2005: 16). To make sense of the meaning of *good governance* in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration as propounded, a theoretical paradigm is developed in Chapter 7 of the thesis. For, as is conceptualised in the study, *good governance* requires an alternative theoretical paradigm based on the synthesis of the different paradigms that undergird the historical and epistemological evolution of Public Administration. Such theoretical paradigm is termed *citizen-focused theory*. It is developed as a contribution to the discourse on the theoretical base of Public Administration.

### 8.10 Conclusion

In this chapter the findings drawn from the different chapters of the study are presented in a summation form. It is shown how the results in each chapter link up with the object of the study and the research question. The object of the study is *good governance*, the context for its consideration is NEPAD, and the disciplinary perspective from which it is considered is Public Administration. In this the research question is, *what does the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD mean for Public Administration?* This question is asked in the context that scholarship endeavours to examine *good governance* in NEPAD and to determine its meaning for Public Administration are limited. Its engagement in the existing body of literature is framed in the binary logic rooted in realist epistemology or positivism. This approach to scientific discourse is limited in dealing with complex conceptual, theoretical and philosophical questions.
Good governance is a conceptual problematique. It is multi-dimensional, value-laden, trans-contextual and nebulous. The question of what good governance means is a subject of contestation. The extent of its complexity lies in the fact that NEPAD, as the context of its consideration, is itself a subject of contestation whereas Public Administration as the disciplinary perspective of the study from which it [good governance] is considered has not yet reached a consensus with itself about its theoretical base. This presupposes a lacuna in the existing body of knowledge about the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration. The study attends to this vacuity in the existing body of knowledge. Its purpose is to understand the concept good governance in the context of NEPAD and determine its meaning for Public Administration. It seeks to make a contribution towards a better insight into, and broadening of, the body of scientific knowledge by engaging in conceptual, theoretical and philosophical studies to understand good governance as emphasised in NEPAD as a sine qua non for sustainable development in Africa.

As a contribution to science, the study develops an alternative epistemological framework from which good governance in the context of NEPAD could be understood. Such epistemological framework is termed the contingent co-existence of opposites in the study. It is propounded as the conceptual framework from which good governance in the context of NEPAD could be understood and its meaning for Public Administration determined. In contrast with the binary logic embedded in realist epistemology or positivism, the contingent co-existence of opposites propounded in this study underscores the importance of contextual discourse in theorising value-laden, trans-contextual and nebulous concepts as good governance. It is drawn from the epistemological foundation of postmodernism. Good governance in NEPAD requires contextual theorising in determining its meaning for Public Administration. Hence the contingent co-existence of opposites is propounded in the study as the appropriate paradigm for such. It is used in the study to determine the meaning of good governance in the context of NEPAD for Public Administration.
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627


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