John Chrysostom on slavery

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Abstract

This article examines John Chrysostom's (347-407 AD) views on the topic of slavery. His arguments prove to be quite advanced for his time, and still relevant to a modern context. I shall start by briefly describing the different views of slavery in antiquity. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of Chrysostom's opinion on slavery, which includes an examination of his statements on the social status of the slave, the manumission of slaves and the treatment of slaves. The study concludes with a critique of Chrysostom's elaborations on the topic of slavery. I shall argue that his delineations are particularly relevant to the modern researcher, since slavery, directly and indirectly, deals with issues of equality, rights and dignity – topics that are frequently debated in the scholarly and popular arenas. Chrysostom is also an indispensible dialogue partner both for the ecclesiastical and biblical sciences.

Introduction

The aim of this article is to show that John Chrysostom's (347-407 AD) views on slavery were "ahead of the times" in which Chrysostom lived. In the West, ever since the Enlightenment, slavery has been considered a violation of human rights, with various abolitionist movements throughout the world condemning the practice. However, slavery, as a social institution during the first century AD (which included the rise of the "Jesus Movement") seems to have been treated as quite a banal subject. This approach to slavery is also present in Christianity and continued until late antiquity (the second to eighth century AD): very few authors petitioned for the manumission of slaves. Instead, most arguments state that the earliest Christian authors called for the humane treatment of slaves. Chrysostom, however, puts forward advanced arguments in his discussion of slavery. He is an important figure in Christian studies, since he was a very influential Christian leader and prolific writer, spending most of his time in Antioch of Syria and thereafter becoming bishop of Constantinople in 398 AD (Kannengiesser 2004:II:783-785). His advanced arguments prove to be an important source for understanding slavery in antiquity and also enable us to regard John Chrysostom as a creative dialogue partner in modern research on this topic.

As far as the methodology of this study is concerned, the first section of this article provides a brief overview of slavery in ancient times. Attention will be given, especially, to the theorising and conceptualising of slavery by various authors in antiquity. The second section deals with Chrysostom's views on slavery under: a) the social status of the slave; b) manumission of slaves; and c) the treatment of slaves. The third section will provide a critique of Chrysostom's views, their relevance and a conclusion of the study.

Views on slavery in antiquity

There are two problems when discussing slavery in antiquity. Firstly, it needs to be realised that all views on slavery in ancient times are scholarly reconstructions of the phenomenon (Glancy 2006:3). These reconstructions are based on evaluation and interpretation of primary source data, whether these be writings, inscriptions or archaeological evidence. Often the primary source data are in conflict with each other or are contradictory. Secondly, modern views on slavery are delicately intertwined with views on human rights. For the modernist, speaking about slavery outside the context of human rights would prove nearly impossible (Hunt 2007:106). Human rights, however, is a rather new concept and one that is rarely present in antiquity. Some ancient authors may speak about humanity and humane treatment, but the concept of human rights as it is known today can be traced back only to the fifteenth century with the British Bill of Rights, and is a notion that only gained momentum in the eighteenth century (cf. Hunt 2007:113-129; Ishay 2004:21). Great care therefore needs to be taken when

discussing ancient views on slavery. This discussion will include views from Graeco-Roman culture, Yahwehism and Judaism, and the first-century Jesus Movement.

The problem in Graeco-Roman culture was that certain groups of people were not regarded as human beings. In most instances, only free men were regarded as human beings – as the term is understood today. Aristotle argued that slavery is not only natural, but even just (Garnsey 1996:11): nature, he said, dictates that some humans rule and others be ruled (Aristotle, *Pol.* 1.1.2; esp. 1.5.1). This principle, according to Aristotle, governs the universe, since it is evident not only in human beings and animals, but even in music (*Pol.* 1.5.3). Given that the distinction between freed and enslaved is crucial, the free male body exercises authority over the free female body, and any slave or animal body – this is the *ordo naturalis*. Slaves were considered not only to be naturally inferior, but also morally reprehensible (cf. Plato, *Leg.* 80.264; Xenophon, *Oec.* 12; Wiedemann 1981:61). According to Pliny the Elder (*Nat.* 35, 36), honours of freedmen, such as artistic practices, were not supposed to be taught to slaves. If one browses through the texts cited in Thomas Wiedemann's *Greek and Roman slavery* (1996), it becomes evident that slaves were marked by the stigmata of social shame and moral inferiority. In antiquity, a person's social status was determined by two factors: honour and shame. Malina (2001:29-30) notes that honour exists where gender status, authority and respect come together. Honour is also intricately bound to kinship. Hornblower and Spawforth (2004:670) state:

The ideal type of slave is the socially dead chattel, ripped forcibly from organic ties of kin and community, transported to an alien environment there to be treated as merely a piece of property or as a factor of production to be used and abused at will, an animate tool or beast of burden with no sense of self other than allowed by the slave-owner and no legal, let alone civic, personality whatsoever.

The latter statement affirms that slaves could not possibly have any social honour in the eyes of peers and occupied the lowest stratum of the social ladder. With the Stoics, however, one does find strong arguments for the humane treatment of slaves, especially from Seneca (*Ep.* 47), whose arguments would be used later by the Renaissance humanists (McHugh 1999:1066).

Within Yahwehism and later Judaism, Israelite slaves had more benefits than non-Israelite slaves. According to the book of Exodus, the Israelites themselves were once slaves and were freed by Moses from Egyptian rule. An Israelite slave had to be set free on the seventh year of his duty (Ex. 21:2-6) or in the year of Jubilee (Lev. 25:39-43), although it is not known to what extent these exhortations were actually followed. The status of non-Israelite slaves was not so favourable. These slaves became permanent property and could be inherited (Lev. 25:44-46). This is also known as chattel-slavery, where the owner exercises all authority over a slave. This preference of owning slaves from cultures other than one's own was also a characteristic of Greek society (Hornblower & Spawforth 2004:670). Later on in Judaism, Philo recognises the institution of slavery, and like many authors of antiquity, uses it as a metaphor in his moral philosophy. Although Philo was a Jew, his school of thought was Hellenistic and influenced by Stoic philosophy (Garnsey 1996:157-159). Indeed, Judaistic views and first-century Christian views often agree on the issue of slavery, since the first-century Christian writers were also Jewish.

Christianity in the first century is not silent on the issue of slavery. It is worth pointing out that the New Testament texts themselves nowhere contain a condemnation of the practice or institution of slavery. Instead, first century Christian authors tend to provide guidelines for regulating the practice of slavery. Paul exhorted masters to treat their slaves fairly, since they also had a master in heaven, while slaves, he said, were obliged to obey their masters (Eph. 6:5-9). Paul's letter to Philemon regarding some dispute with his slave Onesimus affirms Paul's view on the need to treat slaves humanely. Paul frequently refers to himself as a "slave of Christ" in the opening salutation of his letters. As with the Graeco-Roman philosophers, slavery became a metaphor that was used extensively in ethical, metaphysical and religious discourse (cf. Combes 1998:50-62; Martin 1990:30-34). Discussions of Christian views after the first century will have priority in the following sections of this study, and I will therefore not examine them in any detail here.

In conclusion, slavery in antiquity was either seen as a natural state or a divine institution. The legal codices cited were understood as the divine will. What is also evident is that the human body was regarded as meant to be ruled. Klaus Berger (2003:64-65) formulated this theory in his historicopsychological discussion of the New Testament. Although free men exercise authority over women, children, slaves and animals, the divine principle, or God, rules the free man. Finally, slavery became a useful metaphor in moral and religious discourse.

In this following section, attention will be given to Chrysostom's views on the social status of slaves, their manumission, and treatment of slaves by their owners. Chrysostom's views, however, remain his personal opinions, and do not imply that this was the norm in, for instance, fourth-century Antioch. It is not known to what extent people actually followed his advice. However, his influence may have had an impact on the middle- and upper echelons of society, which made up the majority of his audience (Mayer & Allen 2000:73-87).

The social status of slaves

When Chrysostom elaborates on the social status of slaves, it needs to be remembered that Chrysostom's audience was mostly middle- and upper class citizens, most of whom were probably slave-owners. Chrysostom's three homilies on Philemon is the most important source for this discussion. He notes that Paul actually honoured the slaves in Philemon's household by including them in his epistolary salutation (*Hom. in Phlm.* 1.2). Directly after this statement, Chrysostom affirms the view in Galatians 3:28 that "the Church knows no distinction between master and slave".

But it is only in the second homily on Philemon where he expounds the notion that Christian slaves have honour. How was this possible? He uses Philemon 15, and takes as his main premise Paul's urging of Philemon the slave-owner to accept Onesimus the slave as a brother. Onesimus is no longer a slave, according to Chrysostom's exposition, but is "more honourable than a slave" (*Hom. in Phlm.* 2.3). Furthermore, in the same section, Chrysostom now affirms that, by becoming a brother to Philemon, Onesimus is equal in honour with Philemon. Equality of honour, or *isotimia*, between master and slave, would seem unthinkable. But by reinstating the slave within the realm of kinship, he or she gains honour. There is no longer a difference between a slave and a noble person (*Hom. in I Tim.* 17.2; cf. Kehnscherper 1957:166). Chrysostom assures slave-owners that they must not feel ashamed, because Paul himself calls a slave his brother (*Hom. in Phlm.* 3). This approach asks for a measure of humility from the slave-owners. He constantly emphasises humility with regard to slave-owners, and interestingly points out in one homily that slaves, like wealth, serve as high-status markers for slave-owners (*Hom. in Joh.* 28.2), markers that are superfluous for Christians.

Despite this, Chrysostom's writings nonetheless imply the underlying inferiority of slaves. In his preface to the homilies on Philemon, Chrysostom advises his audience "not to abandon the race of slaves, even if they have proceeded to extreme wickedness" (cf. also *Prof. Evang.* 5). It seems, therefore, that to Chrysostom, slaves only gain a grant of honour once they become Christians. It was common knowledge in the ancient world that one's honour (or shame) is symbolised in one's blood and lineage (Malina 2001:36-37). Only by including them in a fictive kinship community do slaves receive honour-status. Chrysostom seems to allude to Stoic thinking when he states: "For the Gentiles will also say that *even* [italics mine] one who is a slave can be well-pleasing to God." In another instance, Chrysostom states that it is astonishing that slaves, rather than philosophers, have learned certain Christian doctrines (*Hom. in Act.* 36.1). Chrysostom, like many other patristic authors, regarded slavery as a result of sin (cf. *Laz.* 6.7; *Hom. in I Cor.* 40.5).

In conclusion, Chrysostom argues that slaves need to be treated as honour-equals once they enter the church. Notwithstanding this, they are still treated in the stereotypical fashion of his day - as social inferiors.

The manumission of slaves

From 316 to 323 AD (the reign of Constantine I), churches could manumit slaves (*Cod. Justin.* 1.13). This procedure was called *manumissio in ecclesia*. This procedure does not, however, imply that the church rejected the institution of slavery as such. Westermann (1955:130) notes that this practice was followed by Greek and Roman temples and Jewish synagogues long before the official Christian institution of *manumissio in ecclesia*. It does, however, suggest that the church's adoption of this legal practice helped to cultivate a generally negative attitude towards slavery. Nonetheless, nearly a century after this decree, during Chrysostom's time, slavery was still accepted and practised by Christians, as is evident from Chrysostom's own writings. It is unsure whether Chrysostom in his personal capacity had slaves, but there may have been slaves in the common treasury of the church. Chrysostom did have some difficulties with a man called Eutropius, a former slave who became a consul and who then proceeded to abuse his power. Eutropius eventually lost the trust of the Emperor and government and was sentenced to death. Chrysostom, after much reasoning with Eutropius, whose fall was imminent,

and having delivered his melioristic sermon *In Eutropium*, could only succeed in postponing Eutropius's execution.

An interesting development later on, in 484 AD, was that slaves could be admitted to monasteries with the consent of their owners. They would then be considered "free" as long as they remained in the monastery (cf. *Cod. Justin.* 1.3, 37-38; Westermann 1955:159; McHugh 1999:1066-1067). Although some monasteries harboured fugitive slaves (on the basis of Paul's letter to Philemon), the manumission of slaves for the specific purpose of allowing them to enter monasteries was probably not common practice before 484 AD.

There is an indication that Chrysostom felt uneasy about slavery (Kelly 1995:99), probably due to its association with sin as mentioned earlier and also because slaves were considered as wealth. The manumission of slaves in Chrysostom's thinking has not to do with a disposition against the institution of slavery, but is instead aimed against the practice of accumulating wealth. Chrysostom's writings are permeated with the notion that wealth corrupts. The following *locus classicus* (*Hom. in 1 Cor.* 40.5) is quite important, and therefore the entire, lengthy section is provided (cf. Migne PG 61.353.42-354.18):

So, why do you have many servants? Since as in our case we ought to follow only our need, and in our table, so also in our servants. What is the necessity then? None at all; for, in fact, one master only needs to employ one servant; or rather two or three masters one servant. But if this is too difficult, consider those that have none and enjoy more prompt attendance. For God has made people in such a way that they can take care of themselves, or rather even their neighbour. And if you do not believe it, hear Paul saying, "These hands ministered to my necessities, and to them that were with me" [Acts 20:34]. After that he, the teacher of the world and worthy of heaven, did not care to serve many others. Do you then not consider it shameful to have whole herds of slaves, not knowing that this truly is what most of all brings shame upon you? Did God not provide to us then both hands and feet for this reason that we might not stand in need of servants? Since the class of slaves is not there due to necessity, for otherwise even Adam would have had a slave formed for him, but it is the result of sin and the punishment of disobedience. But when Christ came, He put an end also to this. For in Christ Jesus there is neither slave nor free [Gal. 3:28]. Therefore, it is not necessary to have a slave. And if it is at all necessary, let it be about one only, or at the most two. What is the use of swarms of slaves? For as the sellers of sheep and the slave-dealers, so do the rich among us take their round, in the baths and in the forum. However, I will not be too exact. We will allow you to keep a second servant. But if you collect too many, you do not do it for the sake of basic human need, but in self-indulgence. Therefore, if it is in their aid, I ask you not to assign any of them in ministering to yourself, but when you have purchased them and have taught them trades whereby to support themselves, let them go free. But when you threaten them, when you put them in chains, it is no more a work of philanthropy.

This reference is a very detailed example of Chrysostom's views on slaves and their manumission and one that makes his position on the issue of slavery clear. There are two apparent points in this instance. Firstly, Chrysostom tells slave-owners that they should not, in fact, own any slaves. They should attend to their own needs and, like Paul, serve others. This, however, is not because slavery is in essence wrong and degrading, but because slavery becomes a form of social gluttony. He demonstrates this by way of an argument of necessity or anangkê. People are created by God sufficiently to care for themselves; after all, Adam did not have a slave. Once again, the link is made between slavery and sin. In another homily, Chrysostom puts forward the same argument and says that not even the angels need servants (Hom. in Heb. 28.10). If people really need slaves, one or two at the most will suffice. Chrysostom therefore still allows people to have some slaves. Secondly, he does speak out very strongly in favour of manumission. Christians should purchase slaves and teach them a certain trade so that they can support themselves and then set them free. Chrysostom here stands in direct opposition to Pliny, who categorically stated that slaves should *not* be taught the arts of free persons. Socially, Chrysostom's is a very effective strategy, since Chrysostom actually places a responsibility and accountability on the slave-owner to only release slaves who could support themselves and contribute to society. Much later in history, during the eighteenth century in the American South, this became a problem with the mass manumission of slaves. Many slave-owners freely manumitted their slaves, but these former slaves had no means or trade with which to support themselves. Another greater problem was that people preferred to manumit their cheapest slaves, who were usually women, and these exslaves certainly could not support themselves (Wolf 2006:73-75). Chrysostom, however, does not permit Christian slave-owners to manumit their slaves without teaching them a means of support first.

His notion of *philanthrôpia* is probably the closest Chrysostom comes to the notion of human rights. One should treat another person with charity for the sake of humanity and human dignity. He also seems convinced that the first Christians in Jerusalem set their slaves free (*Hom. in Act.* 11.3). Furthermore, he mentions in the same line that all slaves need to be treated humanely. It is in this same section that one finds a conservative move by Chrysostom in favour of manumission.

However, Chrysostom does not encourage all Christian slaves to make themselves free. This is based on his interpretation of Paul's argument in 1 Corinthians 7:21. The interpretive problem with this verse, as Harrill (1995:68) notes, is the brachylogy (omitting an object in a clause) in the Greek clause *mallon chrêsai*. Although Harrill (1995:68, 118-121), on the basis of grammar and philology, believes that Paul means a slave should "rather use" his or her freedom, Chrysostom, in an argument based on his understanding of Pauline theology, states that a slave ought to make use of his or her status as a slave (*Hom. in I Cor.* 19.5; cf. Harrill 1995:77-79). Chrysostom seems to allude to the statement in Ephesians 6:5 that slaves should obey their masters and, therefore, on the basis of this verse, does not encourage manumission. It also needs to be remembered in this instance that a few decades earlier, in 355 AD, the Council of Gangra in Paphlagonia, anathematised people who encouraged slaves to break free on religious grounds (Kelly 1995:99). It may have been a sensitive issue in the church, which is possibly why Chrysostom follows a safer route – that is, encouraging slave-owners to train and manumit their slaves.

The treatment of slaves

Much can already be deduced from the above sections on how a Christian slave-owner ought to treat a slave. It has been shown that they need to be treated as brothers and social equals once they have accepted the Christian faith. Nor should slaves be kept in huge numbers; it was preferable to own no slaves – at most, it was permissible to own two. Chrysostom's ideal was that slaves should be purchased, educated and manumitted. Glancy (2006:9) points out that not all Christian slave-owners necessarily treated their slaves humanely, and refers to a fourth or fifth century Christian slave-collar discovered with an inscription reading: "I am the slave of the archdeacon Felix. Hold me so that I do not flee." This may have been the only alternative, though no less degrading than the practice of facial than tattooing, which Constantine did outlaw (Thurmond 1994:493). But if a Christian should decide to keep a slave or two, how, according to Chrysostom, should he treat his slaves?

He vehemently condemns people who force their slaves to do illegal and immoral acts (Hom. in Phlm. 1.2). He states that some people force their slaves into marriages against their own volition. Others make them perform sexually immoral acts, theft, fraud and violence. Slave marriages within Christianity would be recognised as legitimate marriages, and not merely contract unions or contubernia (Bradley 1994:50; Glancy 2006:28-29). The Christian legitimatisation of slave marriages is especially made clear by both Basil the Great (Ep. 199.42) and Chrysostom himself (Hom. in Eph. 12.2). The issue of marriage between slaves and free persons and among slaves only received the most formal attention at the Councils of Verberie in 752 AD and Compiègne in 759 AD, but Chrysostom made it clear that adultery with a slave woman is just as serious as adultery with a princess (Hom. in I Thess. 5.2; Hom. in II Thess. 3.2). However, from the above statement in his homily on Philemon, it seems that some slave-owners may have taken advantage of this, and forced slaves into marriages against their will, probably to satisfy and justify the sexual needs of the owner. Using slaves as sexual surrogates is abhorrent to Chrysostom. But if a slave is forced to do illegal and immoral acts, he or she must refuse and suffer punishment rather than be found guilty of such acts. The slave will suffer for failing to obey his or her master, but this will be considered righteous suffering (Hom. in Phlm. 1.2-4). Nor does Chrysostom ever say anything that might encourage the maltreatment or severe punishment of slaves by slave-owners (Hom. in Phlm. 2.3).

According to Chrysostom, then, slave-owners need to treat their slaves with respect and dignity. In Chrysostom's writings, slaves are elevated to the level of fellow human beings and kin, and therefore need to be treated as such. Slaves are responsible for their own moral (and immoral) actions, and must not obey any commands from their master that are in conflict with God's commandments. Although slaves need to obey their masters, their primary obedience must remain to God.

A critique of Chrysostom's views on slavery

John Chrysostom wrote in a context where the Christian religion had recently become the religion of the state. This state was not opposed to slavery, but in fact accepted it as a necessary part of society.

Within this context, it seems reasonable to suggest that Chrysostom's views on slavery would have had a very positive impact on the slow process of eradicating slavery.

However, the weaknesses in Chrysostom's arguments do need to be understood. Firstly, Chrysostom speaks exclusively within the Christian context, and it seems unclear what his opinions were on non-Christian slaves. Any privilege a slave may have is conditional on his or her becoming a Christian. Christianity forms the new kinship structure into which slaves may be accepted as brothers and sisters and honour-equals. Outside this structure, his views do not seem to apply. His views are not inclusive and priority is given to Christians. Secondly, Chrysostom does refer to the notion of humanity, or philanthrôpia, when deliberating on the topic of slavery, but it never truly becomes a hermeneutical key in his work. Instead of humanity, Chrysostom prefers Christian virtue and asceticism as trajectories for his statements against slavery. This problem may be linked to the problem of Christian exclusivism. Humanity is today regarded as a common denominator between all people, regardless of their religious convictions. This notion would prove slightly problematic for Chrysostom, who believed that people of other religions were slaves to sin and the devil (cf. Hom. in Joh. 4.4; Hom. in II Tim. 8.3). Thirdly, Chrysostom also seemed to have been unable to escape the stereotyping of the time. Whether in his introductory discourse on Philemon or in his numerous metaphors of slavery, the slave is in fact still the worthless and the wretched, slow to learn and not always trustworthy. Fourthly, Chrysostom still allows people to have slaves. Not many, but only one or two at the most. It becomes clear that Chrysostom's agenda is not so much aimed at impacting on slavery as impacting on the affluence enjoyed by certain people. Chrysostom, probably unconsciously, does still imply to a certain extent that slaves are property, since the wealthy need to dispose of their money and property (including slaves). Fifthly, there is a certain problem in attributing sin as the cause of slavery. It dehumanises the atrocity of slavery and replaces it with something that has no face, and something that cannot be held liable for slavery. The truth of the matter is that it is human beings who are responsible for the disgrace of using other people in the same way as animals or possessions. The significant achievement of both Enlightenment thinkers and proponents of certain abolitionist movements is that they removed the anonymity of responsibility for slavery and identified the human faces behind it.

Having said all this, Chrysostom remains one of the most prolific of all patristic writers and one who took a definite stance against slavery. Whatever his reasoning or motives may have been, he makes it clear that he is extremely sceptical about the "need" for slavery and that he understands the ideal reality as one without slavery. For a start, Chrysostom does not hesitate to address his wealthy audience on the problems of slavery. He advises them that a truly virtuous human being is someone who does not own slaves. But since they are part of a world in which slavery is a reality, they can effect change. His advice on buying slaves only to educate and manumit them is admirable. He understands that slave-owners can ameliorate the condition of slavery. Secondly, Chrysostom's honour grant to slaves based on a fictive kinship structure proves to be significant. Although it is exclusively Christian, he understands that slaves can only regain their dignity and honour if they are restored within a kinship system. Patterson's (1982:13) statement that slavery is the "permanent, violent domination of innately alienated and generally dishonoured persons" would certainly apply to the fourth century AD. Seen in this light, Chrysostom's development of Pauline thought on slavery and kinship restoration is invaluable. It also needs to be noted that Chrysostom appeals for the humane treatment of female slaves, and lashes out harshly at anyone who sexually abuses female slaves. Finally, he never called upon slaves to revolt against their owners or the state.

Chrysostom's views are highly relevant for modern research in Christian historiography and historical science, and various other theological disciplines, since his arguments, although pre-modern, are by no means primitive. Firstly, his sensitivity to society and interpersonal relationships is valuable in a context such as South Africa, where debates about equality and social issues are common. Slavery in itself is a debate about dignity, rights and equality, and therefore still very relevant – all possible voices, past and present, need to be heard in this debate. Secondly, his views specifically on slavery, and the various problems associated with it, are useful today, in a modern setting, in eradicating the phenomenon of enslavement, which is still practised in certain remote corners of the world. Finally, it would be impossible to ignore Chrysostom as a representative *Wirkungsgeschichte* on the Christian treatment of the whole issue of slavery.

Conclusion

In conclusion it can be said that John Chrysostom's views on slavery, despite having various deductive and ideological flaws, do represent a conscious stance against this inhumane practice. Being one of the more prolific authors of the so-called golden age of patristic literature, he does not hold in reserve his opinion that people in fact should not own any slaves and he actively calls for the education and

manumission of slaves. He is, therefore, representative of a voice in the church's history that resounds with a cry that all human beings deserve dignity – and that all must strive towards achieving that dignity.

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Endnote

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Most of the writings discussed in this study, namely the homilies, are from Chrysostom's time at Antioch (Quasten 1990[1950]:424-480). The Greek texts can be found in J-P Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* (PG), while literal English translations can be found in the relevant volumes of P. Schaff's *Nicene, Post-Nicene Fathers* (NPNF). Direct citations from Chrysostom in this study are translated by the author, with the relevant PG reference provided.