
by

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1954 Greek stamp showing an inkblot on the Hansard column containing Britain’s “never” statement—the author’s collection.
Acknowledgements

This dissertation could not have been completed without the guidance and encouragement of individuals to whom I wish to express my gratitude; my long-time mentor and supervisor of this dissertation, Professor Zenon Stavrinides, University of Leeds, who after escaping the litigious grasp of the late Archbishop Makarios, continued to make great contributions in the area of Cypriot studies. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor at the University of South Africa, Professor Alex Mouton for his patience and encouragement during the course of this project; my external examiners, Professor Hubert Faustmann, University of Nicosia, Dr. Klearchos Kyriakides, University of Hertfordshire, and Dr. Andreas Constandinos for taking the time to read this document and make useful recommendations for its improvement. Finally, I would like to thank Professor Richard Metzger, Rutgers University, for his patience and support during the course of writing this dissertation.
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Preface

The purpose of this present study is to critically examine the dynamic of the Anglo-American “special relationship” in the context of the Cyprus question in the 1950s. While there are some very fine studies which singularly examine British and American policies towards Cyprus during these years, there are few, if any, that specifically focus on the formulation and internal machinations behind those policies. This study aims to fill this gap. More importantly, however, it might be more useful to discuss what this study does not do: unlike most popular literature about the Cyprus problem, it does not take an ideological position, nor does it assign nefarious motives or conspiratorial designs to the actors involved. Indeed, if anything, it seeks to demonstrate that many of the furtive maneuvers and alleged conspiracies surrounding the Cyprus problem have been woven from whole cloth. Given the fact that the parties involved, except on very few occasions, were rarely in accord, any conspiracy would not only have been unlikely, it would have been impossible.

Following an overview of the historical background of the island, which includes the push towards internationalization and the 1955 armed struggle against the British colonial administration, the study then shifts to an analysis of the many and varied attempts by Britain and the US to resolve the problem during the period of 1954-1959. During this period a number of solutions were put forward, including the June Plan, the Holmes mission, the Spaak initiative, and the Foot and Radcliffe proposals. For a number of reasons, which this study thoroughly explores, none was successful. Although in its first
incarnation, the Macmillan plan also failed, later modifications to it provided the basis for
the ultimate settlement.

It was during this period that Britain finally confronted the fact that there actually was a
Cyprus problem with wide-reaching implications, not merely an internal dispute between
HMG and its incorrigible colony. Prior to the 1950s, the Cyprus dispute was a British
rather than an American problem. This all changed in 1954, when Greece brought the
question before the United Nations, thus shifting the Cyprus problem from a dispute
among Britain, Greece, and Cyprus to an international conflict involving the interests of
Turkey and the United States. Between 1954 and 1958, Greece resorted to the UN five
times in attempts to resolve the Cyprus question. The eventual settlement was not decided
in the international body, however, but in an impromptu meeting between the Greek and
Turkish Foreign Ministers.

These were also the years in which Britain, and later the US, began the search for a final
settlement and where much of the mythology relating to the workings and resolution of
the Cyprus problem have their origins. The study ends in 1960, following the
implementation of a constitution based on the London- Zürich Agreements and the
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the defining points of the end of one era and the
beginning of another.

**About the Sources**

This work draws heavily upon published and unpublished official documents from the
United Kingdom, Canada, and especially the United States. Particularly useful were the
The FRUS series (Foreign Relations of the United States) and the enormous number of unpublished documents available from NARA (National Archives and Records Administration). The FRUS series is available electronically and, while the NARA collections are best searched at the National Archives in College Park, MD, documents can also be searched electronically. Some other useful official documents relating to Cyprus can also be found in the Official Documents on Canadian External Relations (DFAIT). These are also available electronically in both French and English.

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas is home to several valuable collections, including the Papers of John Foster Dulles, Presidential Papers, and the White House Central Files. The United Nations Yearbook collection is another valuable resource, especially for the General Assembly discussions pertaining to the 1950s.

The British Office of Public Records (PRO) provided the best place for documents relating to the Anglo-American relations regarding Cyprus. Most of the materials are contained in the records of the Foreign Office (FO), the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM), and the Ministry of Defense (DEFE). These too can be searched electronically. Published British documents on Cyprus are scarce, with the exception of the parliamentary debates (Hansard) and documents pertaining to constitutional proposals. The End of Empire, edited by Frederick Madden is a rare exception. The Survey of International Affairs is useful, but it is a semi-official publication which contains no actual documents. Much of the analysis of British policy and its realization with regard to Cyprus in this study is based on the outstanding work of Robert Holland, Ioannis D.
A number of fine scholarly published works have contributed not only to shaping this study, but also to the general manner in which the author views the subject at hand. Claude Nicolet’s, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974* is a pioneering study based largely on US and UK archival sources. Meticulously documented, Nicolet does not suffer fools easily and goes further than any other author to date in dismantling the conspiracies so popular in the literature of Cyprus.

Robert Holland’s *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*, is a masterly work which critically covers the historiography of the decolonization of Cyprus. It is now a standard text on British policy towards Cyprus in the 1950s. George Horton Kelling’s, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955* provides a detailed and critical study of British policy from the outbreak of World War II to the EOKA uprising of 1955.

A critical analysis of American Foreign policy towards Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus can be found in Monteagle Stearns’ highly readable, *Entangled Allies*. A career diplomat and former Ambassador to Greece, Stearns brings a clear and insightful personal perspective to a difficult and often paradoxical subject.

A comprehensive critical analysis on the internationalization question, with an emphasis on British official documents, can be found in Evanthis Hatzivassiliou’s *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-59*. Ioannis D. Stefanidis,’ *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism, and the Making of the Cyprus Problem* covers not only the
internationalization question, but also devotes several pages to US policy towards
Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom between 1949-1955.

Hubert Faustmann’s *Divide and Quit* is a broad analysis of Colonial rule in Cyprus which
includes a special survey of the Transnational Period from February 1959 to August
1960. “The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 1949-58” contained in *The
Historical Background to the UN’s Involvement with Cyprus* is an excellent, detailed
analysis of Greece’s adventures in attempting to get Cyprus inscribed on the agenda of
the United Nations.

Nancy Crawshaw’s *The Cyprus Revolt: an Account of the Struggle for Union with
Greece* is a classic study which focuses on the period between World War II and the
international agreements that created the Cyprus Republic. Crawshaw, was also
instrumental in connection with the research project which produced François Crouzet’s,
*Le conflit de Chypre*.

Turkish language sources on Cyprus are, to say the least, disappointing. Most of them
still lean towards the conventional nationalist narrative, though in recent years there has
been an effort to move towards a more balanced approach. One exception is Emer O.
Kürkcüoğlu’s, *Türkiye’nin Arap Orta Doğusuna Karşı Politikası, 1945-1970. (Turkey’s
Policy Towards the Arab Middle East)*. It was especially useful for its homegrown
analysis of the very different perceptions of İnönü and Menderes towards the 1958
coup in Iraq. Turkish Newspapers from the 1950s such as *Cumhurriyet* (still in
circulation), contain countless articles about Cyprus, though the reportage tends to be
chock-full of hyperbole, especially with regard to the Archbishop Makarios and British
policies on the island. Not surprisingly, they are all sympathetic towards the TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati).

In addition to the scholarly literature, there are also numerous personal accounts and memoirs containing valuable material relating to Cyprus. These include: E. Averoff-Tossizza’s Lost Opportunities: the Cyprus Question, 1952-1963; Glafkos Clerides’ My Deposition; Sir Hugh M. Foot’s A Start in Freedom; John Reddaway’s Burdened with Cyprus, the British Connection; Dwight D. Eisenhower’s The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961; and Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 and Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955 by Harold Macmillan.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AKEL</td>
<td><em>Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou</em> (Progressive Party of the Working People)</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Records of the Colonial Commonwealth Offices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contel</td>
<td>Consular telegram</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>UK Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>DEF</td>
<td>Defense Affairs (document series at the National Archives)</td>
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<td>DEFE</td>
<td>Documents at the Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>Delga</td>
<td>Telegrams in connection with the US Delegation at the UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>Deptel</td>
<td>Telegram from the Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td><em>Ethnikos Apeleftherotikos Synaspismos</em> (National Liberation League)</td>
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<td>EOKA</td>
<td><em>Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston</em> (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office (UK)</td>
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<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
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<td>Gadel</td>
<td>Series indicator for telegrams to the US Delegation at the UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>GTI</td>
<td>US State Department Bureau for Greek, Turkey, and Iran</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)</td>
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<td>KATAK</td>
<td><em>Kıbrıs dasi Türk Azînîligi Kurumu</em> (Cyprus Turkish Minority Association)</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program (US)</td>
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<td>Memcon</td>
<td>Memorandum of Conversation</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives and Records Administration (US)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NEA</td>
<td>State Department Office for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs</td>
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<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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**Chronological Events**

1951  Greek Government acknowledges Greek claim on Cyprus

1952  Makarios denounces Greece for rejecting recourse to UN

1953  The Papagos-Eden Incident
      Greek Government decides to resort to UN

1954  First Greek recourse to UN
      UN General Assembly bypasses Greek item

1955  EOKA armed struggle begins
      Tripartite Conference convenes

1956  Harding-Makarios talks
      Makarios deported
      Radcliffe plan for self-governance is rejected; first official reference to partition
      June Plan
      Holmes Mission

1957  Demand for Turkish army base
      Spaak Initiative
      Foot Plan
      Release of Makarios to Athens

1958  Macmillan Plan
      Inter-communal ceasefire
      Greek-Turkish rapprochement

1959  London- Zürich Agreements
      Makarios returns to Cyprus
      Makarios is elected President; Fazil Küçük is Vice President

1960  Cyprus is proclaimed an independent republic, August 15, 1960 Cyprus joins United Nations
Those who work in sovereign territory have to cultivate a suppleness and dissimulation, a tactical mind and a reserve because no issues can be forced: they must be engineered. The difference is between the craft of a fly-fisherman and someone who dynamites from a rowing boat.—Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons

Chapter I

Introduction

A nineteenth century observer once remarked “he who would become and remain a great power in the East must hold Cyprus in his hand. That this is true, is proved by the history of the world during the last three millennia” [sic.]. Situated in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is at the crossroads of three continents, and its strategic value has not gone unnoticed by statesmen and strategists from Ankara to Athens and London to Washington. The Cyprus question has proven to be the most enduring remnant of what was commonly known as the Eastern Question, summed up by Lord Morley as "that intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples, and antagonistic faiths."  

Cyprus, unlike the Sultan’s real estate in Europe and the Balkans, did not fall under the control of successor nation states after the dissolution of the Empire, but instead remained in protracted colonial suspension. The question developed into a problem, later metastasizing into a series of full-blown crises. Long after the moribund Ottoman Empire crumbled, Cyprus not only

continued to be a “bone of contention” between competing Greek and Turkish nationalism, but a persistent source of frustration, division, and conflict for Britain and the United States.³

**Historical Overview**

Beginning in the fourteenth century BC, Cyprus was colonized consecutively by the Mycenaean, Ionians, Phoenicians, and Persians. Later, it was invaded and captured by the Ptolemies of Egypt and, later still, annexed by Rome. In the seventh century AD, Cyprus was attacked repeatedly by the Saracens. In 1191 it was seized by Richard I of England who later sold the island first to the Knights Templar and then to Guy Lusignan. Between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries the island was ruled by the French Lusignan Dynasty, falling into Venetian hands in 1489. In 1572, Cyprus became part of the Ottoman Empire, where it remained for three hundred years until the ultimate phase of its colonial history when, in 1878, it was incorporated by Great Britain under the Defensive Alliance with the Ottoman Empire in return for British support against further aggression from Czarist Russia.⁴

In 1914, as a punitive consequence of Ottoman Turkey’s alliance with Germany during World War I, Cyprus was annexed by Britain. Upon succeeding the Ottoman regime, the new Kemalist administration recognized Britain’s annexation of the island under the terms of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. While Turkey relinquished claims to all its Arab holdings, it retained the Turkish inhabited areas, including Eastern Thrace. Cyprus was formally declared a Crown colony in 1925.⁵

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The Genesis of the Enosis Movement

Upon their arrival in Cyprus in 1571, the Ottomans were regarded as “liberators.” The restoration of the Orthodox Archbishop and the abolition of the feudal system were welcomed by the Orthodox Greeks. Ottoman rule, which operated on the Millet system, granted religious authorities jurisdiction over their own non-Muslim communities. Accordingly, each group within the empire became a separate legal entity. While the system afforded each non-Muslim confessional group many rights, these were usually dependent upon the benevolence of the Sultan and local officials. In Cyprus, the Eastern Orthodox Church became increasingly influential during the Ottoman period since it represented the single Christian authority on the island. Church leaders held important positions within the government and the Orthodox Christian elite often ruled side by side with their Muslim counterparts. Moreover, the Archbishop enjoyed complete recognition from the Sultan as the millet başı, leader of the community.

During the 1821 Greek War of Independence, the Ottoman governor, Küçük Mehmet executed the Archbishop of Cyprus, Kyprianos, along with 500 other members of the Greek Orthodox elite, ostensibly for trying to foment an insurrection among the Orthodox Christians. Since the Church leadership enjoyed a privileged place in Cyprus and had no reason for discontent, it is far

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6 The concept of “citizenship” did not exist beyond the Ottoman Millet. Identity was based on social factors, region, and religion and not ethnicity: Rainer Bauböck, Bernhard Perchinig, Wiebke Sievers, eds., Citizenship Policies in the New Europe, (Amsterdam: Imiscoe/ Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 264. For a comprehensive study of relations between the Ottomans and the Eastern Orthodox establishment see Andrekos Varnarva, British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915. The Inconsequential Possession, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2009).

7 Bauböck, n. 286.

8 Greece won its independence from the Porte in 1828.
more likely that the Governor was threatened by the Archbishop’s considerable power and influence rather than by any nefarious plot against the Porte.\(^9\)

The birth of the *Megali Idea* – the “Great Idea” to unite all territories historically dominated by Greek communities, including Constantinople under the auspice of one national state followed Greece’s successful war of independence. It would play a crucial role in the Greek national narrative and foreign policy from 1840 until the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 (Asia Minor Disaster).

When Britain took over the administration of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, the Turkish – or in the terminology of the time the ‘Muslim’ – population of Cyprus was about one-fourth, while almost all of the rest of the inhabitants were Greek.\(^10\) Over time, the presence of the British would grow increasingly less tolerable for the Orthodox Christians and become a significant factor in the development of Greek nationalist sentiments and aspirations. These aspirations would later be manifested in the enosis movement.

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\(^9\) Bauböck; Varnarva, *ibid*.

\(^10\) The idea of “Greekness” arose among what we now call ‘Greek Cypriots’ at the beginning of the Twentieth century. Turkish Cypriots, however, had to wait for the Turkish Republic to be established in 1923 before it made sense for them to identify themselves as Turks. Prior to 1910, the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus identified themselves in religious, not ethnic terms. Ethnic identity has always been a dicey issue for Cyprus. For example, Rauf Denktaş, who, among other things, would later become President of Northern Cyprus, is credited with saying “there is nothing Cypriot except for Cyprus donkey,” although he insists that it was Makarios who made the statement: Quoted in Agnieszka Rakoczy, “A Life dedicated to the Cyprus Problem,” *Cyprus Mail*, 2009. For the purpose of this study, subsequent chapters will refer to the two communities as Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively.
The enosis movement [the desire for union with Greece] was not part of the framework of the *Megali Idea*, although periodically the British and Turks would falsely make this claim by linking it to the revival of irredentist nineteenth century nationalism:

…claiming that Greece was pursuing the *Megali Idea* in Cyprus is to misunderstand the whole idea of the Greek Grand Design of the past. The Megali had aimed at the reestablishment of a large Greek kingdom, something which could not be achieved by the annexation of Cyprus alone.\(^\text{11}\)

At the 1912 conference in London over the Balkans crisis, Lloyd George made an informal offer of enosis to Prime Minister Venizelos as a *quid pro quo* for a British base at Argostoli or Cephallonia.\(^\text{12}\) In 1915, Britain made the Greek Government another offer of enosis in addition to concessions in western Thrace and Asia Minor in exchange for its support of Serbia. Although the offer was declined, Greece was drawn into the war a few years later. The offer at that point was no longer on the table. At the end of World War I, Britain’s official policy towards Cyprus was that the status of the island would remain unchanged for strategic reasons.\(^\text{13}\)

In 1931, less than six years after the British assumed control of Cyprus, economic grievances, combined with Greek nationalist aspirations, ignited a crisis resulting in an armed insurrection against the colonial administration. Although the insurrection was quelled in a matter of days, Britain countered by arresting more than 2000 persons, deporting the church leadership, imposing restrictions on the press, and dissolving all representative institutions, including the

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\(^\text{13}\) The possibility of ceding Cyprus to Greece was also briefly considered in 1919: Stavros Paneli, *The Making of Modern Cyprus*, (Nicosia: Interworld Publication, 1990), 97.
Legislative Assembly. This left the power to legislate exclusively in the hands of the Governor and his Advisory Council. According to Stefanidis:

[T]he Deportation Law of 1931 and the restrictive laws of 1937 on the Orthodox Church ensured that the Greek nationalist movement was bereft of both its ecclesiastical and lay leadership. Significantly, after the death of Cyril III in 1933, the all important throne of Archbishop and Ethnarch would remain vacant for fourteen years. 15

The growth of the enosis movement provoked strong reactions from the Muslim population. As the ethnic minority on the island, they viewed any call for Cyprus’ unification with Greece as a tacit threat to the survival of their community. Moreover, to counter Greek demands for enosis, the Turkish Muslims pointed out at every opportunity that Cyprus had never been a Greek possession and, if Britain were to ever relinquish control of the island, it should be given to Turkey, the heir of the Ottoman Empire.

**Postwar Nationalism in Cyprus**

During World War II, Britain made no attempt to reinstate the constitutional liberties that it had revoked in 1931. Nor did the British make any effort to draw up new constitutional provisions or to guarantee civil liberties. After October 1941, however, Britain began to loosen its grip on the island and political meetings were again allowed. More importantly, permission was granted by the governor for the formation of political parties. The communists wasted no time in taking advantage of the relaxed political climate, and soon after established the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), which was the successor to an earlier communist party that had been established in the 1920s and banned following the unrest of the 1930s. 16

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15 Stefanidis, *ibid.*, 1-2.
Due to the wartime alliances with the Soviet Union, US officials did not regard communism as the evil specter it would become in later years. There were, however, some, such as the clergy, who were uncomfortable with the growing influence of the new party. In order to meet this challenge, a group of nationalists known as the Panagarian Union of Cyprus (PEK), was established. The municipal elections of 1943 yielded impressive results for AKEL. The next election, held in 1946, AKEL’s National Liberation League (EAS) candidates captured the four metro centers, including Nicosia.

In addition to permitting the formation of political parties, the British began to rescind some of their restrictive measures toward the church. In 1946, the government repealed the 1931 Deportation Law and other repressive measures, allowing the Church to once again reassert itself in the political life of the island.

On June 21, 1947, Cyprus elected its first archbishop since the 1931 uprising. Leontios died shortly after his election. He was succeeded by the Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios II, who, until his death in 1950, refused to entertain any alternative to enosis. This was a timely event for the politically conservative Ethnarchy—the traditional leadership of the Orthodox Church—which now had the opportunity to reclaim the archbishopric. From that time forward, right wing politics and the ecclesiastical powers that be would be intimately linked.

In addition to controlling PEK, the Ethnarchy also established the “national” Cyprus Workers Confederation (SEK) to challenge the AKEL-oriented Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO)

for the support of labor. From that time forward, an intense division between Left and Right would be a salient feature in the politics of the Greeks on Cyprus, leaving no quarter for more moderate voices.

During this period, the Turkish Muslims were also experiencing a political awakening and beginning to feel their “Turkishness” more acutely. In 1943, a group of nationalists established the Cyprus Turkish Minority Association (KATAK). In 1944, Dr. Fazil Küçük split from the organization and formed the Cyprus National Turkish People’s Party (KMPHT). One of the principal objectives of the KMPHT was to prevent the annexation of Cyprus to Greece.

Between 1945 and 1949, the British colonial administration was forced to contend with an increasingly chaotic political situation which was more the result of competition between Left and Right factions within the Greek community rather than nationalist fervor. This competition, however, did not mean that the two communities had abandoned their opposition to the colonial administration and they continued to agitate against it.

The latter half of 1945 saw a marked increase in violent incidents. The aftermath of the war also brought economic hardship as military expenditures declined and agricultural markets experienced a downturn. Strikes became commonplace. At the same time, Cyprus began to play an important role as a way station for Jews immigrating to Palestine. The establishment of internment camps for Jewish immigrants attempting to enter the British mandate became a

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further source of contention, as well. Once again, social unrest and economic fears served to further strengthen support for AKEL.20

Cyprus again became the object of ethnic nationalist designs by the Greeks, prompted by World War II. In March 1941, prior to the German invasion of Greece, Prime Minister Alexandros Koryzis requested British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to revisit the question of ceding Cyprus to Greece as a reward for its contribution to the war effort. Eden responded by saying that he was not ready to entertain that “most delicate political question at that time.” 21 Immediately prior to the invasion of Greece, Emmanuel Tsoudero, who had assumed the Premiership following Koryzis’ suicide, appealed to the British government to install King George in Cyprus. The request was denied. Although Tsouderos, as head of the Greek Government in exile, factored Cyprus into Greece’s post-war territorial claims, the official position of the British government was that such claims would not be considered while the Empire was still at war.22

Hence the post war years found Greece engaged in bitter civil conflict, and subsequent governments were too reliant upon British aid to revisit the Cyprus question with any representative of the Crown, even unofficially. The ambivalence of the Greek government towards Cyprus did not dampen the enthusiasm of the Greek Left who raised the Cyprus question at every opportunity. On a visit to London in September 1945, Archbishop Damaskinos,

the Greek Regent, offered bases not only on Cyprus, but also anywhere on Greek territory.\(^{23}\) The British, however, were quite adamant about keeping the whole of Cyprus permanently within the Empire, believing that economic development could dampen the fires of Greek nationalism: \(^{24}\)

Having made our position clear on the question of union with Greece we shall be better able to go forward with a policy of economic improvement, social welfare and constitutional advance. But before we can start on this policy with any hope of eliciting any adequate amount of local goodwill and support, we must make it clear that we are not playing with the idea of handing the island over to a foreign power.\(^{25}\)

**Lord Winster’s Mission**

Meanwhile, the British government began to appreciate that ruling the island as a colonial possession was not only unpopular, it was “inappropriate.” In October 1946, the British Colonial Government had lifted some of the repressive measures taken since 1931 and announced a program for constitutional reform and economic development. In March 1947, the Labour government appointed Lord Winster as the Governor of Cyprus with a special mission to establish a consultative Assembly of leading Cypriot representatives to work towards a new constitution based on self-rule.\(^{26}\)

**Consultative Assembly and the Proposals**

The new archbishop continued to resist British policy in general and any policy in particular that did not actively endorse enosis. Nevertheless, the assembly opened with eighteen members present. Although the Ethnarchy refused to cooperate, Leftist representatives from the Greek and

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 186-187; the Greek Left included the National Liberation Front (EAM) and the Greek Communist Party (KKE).


\(^{25}\) Minute by Dawe, September 6, 1945, CO/67/327/16, quoted in *ibid.*, 206.

\(^{26}\) Stefanidis, *ibid.*, 4.
Turkish communities accepted to participate in the workings of the Consultative Assembly created to consider the new constitution.

The Assembly convened in November 1947, and the Winster Constitution was submitted in 1948. The constitution would grant greater autonomy to Cyprus by providing for the establishment of a legislature with an elected majority, proportional community representation, and an executive along with a formally nominated majority of ministers. Foreign affairs and defense, however, would still be under the control of the Crown. The British proposals did not come anywhere near satisfying the expectations and aspirations of the Greeks. Consequently, the call for “enosis and only enosis” became an even more attractive prospect to the population at large. Much to the dismay of the Ethnarchy, AKEL was forced to abandon its endorsement of full self-government and unite with the Right-leaning elements in support of enosis. The organization also reached out to Turkish community to join in the anti-colonial struggle.

The Greek representatives rejected the British proposals. The Archbishop and the Greek right wing organizations denounced them and the leftist, reiterating their objections, withdrew from the Assembly on May 20, 1948. Lord Winster dissolved the Assembly on August 12 stating that the offers would remain open for consideration for any representative leaders who wished to re-examine the proposals for the purpose of their implementation. He also re-affirmed that no change in the status of Cyprus and its sovereignty was contemplated. The constitutional offer technically remained on the table until 1954, but was never again revisited. Thus a step forward that might have lead to independence was not taken. Although it failed, the constitution

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symbolizes the only serious attempt by the British to propel the island “along the classic path of self-government.” According to Holland, the draft constitution represented the “a very modest proposition which fell markedly short of the degree of self-government recently acquired, for example, by Malta.” By January 1949, AKEL, too, gave its unconditional support for enosis. The idea of self-government as a precursor to self-determination was denounced as a “serious error.”

When the British withdrew from Greece in early 1947, the Greeks felt more at liberty to assert their own views regarding Cyprus. Emboldened with the knowledge that they had the full support of the motherland, in March of that same year, the Greek National Assembly declared official support for union with Greece. AKEL and the Nationalist Right reiterated their demands for enosis.

The rising influence of AKEL did not go unchallenged by the colonial administration nor unobserved by the Americans—ever watchful of the communist threat. Ronald Turnbull stepped in as Acting Governor following Winster’s resignation. Similarly to Winster and British officials in general, Turnbull had convinced himself that only a minority of Greek community favored enosis—and the movement was not “authentic.” That it appeared to be larger than it actually was due to intimidation by the Church and the Communists who shared a mutual distaste for the British. He also believed that the movement had been co-opted by politicians, journalists,

29 Louis, *ibid.*, 222.
30 Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 16.
31 Stefanidis, *ibid.*, 5.
32 Kelling, *ibid.*, 76-78.
“intellectuals” and other assorted opportunists for their own gain. This was, of course, wishful thinking.33

In an effort to curb Leftist activities, Turnbull initiated measures reaffirming the supremacy of the colonial administration. Harsher penalties for sedition were introduced, and a number of Leftists were arrested and imprisoned. Political activities by civil servants were prohibited and restrictions were placed on trade union activities. Moreover, there were allegations of manipulation of the electoral registers in the 1949 municipal elections.34 A suggestion by the Americans, however, that the influence of Greece and Turkey be brought to bear in influencing the elections in support of an anti-communist candidate was rebuffed by the colonial administration on the grounds that it amounted to nothing less than foreign meddling.

As Louis put it, “the Winster Constitution foundered on the shoals of enosis.” Interaction between the colonial administration and the Nationalist Right was as strained as ever with virtually no contact between colonial and church officials. The installation of Sir Andrew Wright as Governor was met with encyclicals issued by Church leadership who urged their flock to resist participation in governmental affairs. It was in this environment that the enosis movement took a turn that would impact all future negotiations regarding Cyprus. 35

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33 Louis, ibid., 220.
34 Stefanidis, ibid., 5-6.
35 Louis, ibid., 222.
Chapter II

Cyprus and the UN

On September 27, 1949, AKEL took the initial step towards internationalization of the Cyprus problem by proposing cooperation between itself and the Ethnarchy to advance the cause of enosis at the United Nations. In November of the same year, the AKEL dominated city councils petitioned the Security Council against colonial rule and proclaimed the Greek Cypriot’s desire for enosis. Believing conditions to be favorable for union with Greece, AKEL petitioned the United Nations to sponsor a plebiscite and soon after began collecting signatures in support of the effort. While rejecting AKEL’s proposed alliance, Makarios, the Bishop of Kition, through the Orthodox Church, organized a plebiscite.

The campaign, which began on January 15, 1950, resulted in a 96 per cent vote in favor of union with Greece. The results, along with a petition for enosis, were taken to the Colonial Governor. The Secretary for the Colonies responded by reiterating that any talk of union with Greece was a closed matter. The plebiscite results and a petition for enosis were also presented to the Greek Chamber of Deputies, where Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos urged the deputies to acknowledge the petition and integrate the Greek Cypriot appeal for enosis into national policy.  

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In the meantime, AKEL again made an overture to the Ethnarchy to join forces and, among other things, called for the establishment of an all-party delegation to appeal to the Greek Government to formally claim Cyprus--and if Britain objected--to proceed to the United Nations. The Ethnarchy again refused cooperation with AKEL. While the Ethnarchy endorsed the spirit of the initiative, it had a corresponding proposal of its own. Represented by Kyprianos, the Bishop of Kyrenia, the Ethnarchy sent its own delegation to Athens, London, and finally the UN. Results of the plebiscite would be presented to the United Nations as confirmation of the Greek Cypriot desire for union with Greece. AKEL, which would not be included in the UN mission, sent out its own group, called the People’s National Delegation, to lobby European officials for support before embarking on its mission to the UN.

Meanwhile, the British were attempting to persuade the new coalition government in Athens to discourage the delegates from approaching the UN and, should this be unpreventable, to ban them from being received by any senior government official. The British cautioned that such a move would be tantamount to “interference into the affairs of the United Kingdom.” Despite assurances that the Greek government had no intentions of making a case for Cyprus, Ambassador Sir Clifford Norton stepped up the pressure. Unconvinced, Norton tried to impress upon King Paul that the receipt of “unruly subjects” would set a “dangerous precedent, comparable to the attitude of the Bulgarian Government to dissident Greeks.” The King evaded the issue, citing public sensitivity towards the matter.

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2 Ibid, 275.
3 Ibid., 275-276.
4 Stefanidis, Isle of Discord, 11.
5 Ibid., 11.
Assurances, however, did not diminish the growing unease that the British had regarding the possibility of internationalization. From the beginning, HMG tried to elicit the support of the American Government in restraining the Greeks and to prevent the Cyprus question from being brought to an international forum. Although the US admitted, at least at this stage, that the Cyprus question “was not a matter of direct concern,” it proved to be more accommodating in the first instance.  

While the US Embassy did unofficially approach Greek officials to caution them against agitation, Washington was reluctant to pursue this matter any further than necessary for fear of damaging the Greek Government.

**American Ambivalence towards Cyprus**

Beginning in May 1950, petitions sponsored by the Greek-American Lobby began to circulate around Washington requesting that the American delegation take the lead in presenting the Cyprus Question to the United Nations. This pressure, in conjunction with traditional anti-colonial sentiment, made Britain more than a little disconcerted. Since many of these petitions were sponsored by members of Congress, the State Department was forced to reply, stating that the United States government was not “directly involved” with this issue and thus could not lend its support in sponsoring such an initiative. This did not mean that the US did not hold strong views on the status of the island and have a stake in how the Cyprus question unfolded: “in view of the strategic considerations involving Cyprus, agitation for enosis […] must be discouraged.

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6 John D. Jernegan to Spiros Minotos, Memorandum, February 10, 1950: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/2-150, NARA.
7 Stefanidis, *ibid.*, 12.
9 Raymond A. Hare to Jack K. McFall, Memorandum: SDCDF, doc.747C.00/6-250, NARA.
However, continued examination of the question is essential in order to provide a long range solution mutually satisfactory to all parties interested.”

**UN Delegation**

On May 20, 1950, the Ethnarchy delegation arrived in Athens. Broad popular support in the country made it impossible for the Greek government to deny them an audience. Their arrival spurred a debate in Parliament, during which several deputies expressed their support for enosis, with the exception of leftist representative Ioannis Sofianopoulos, who favored direct Anglo-Greek negotiations over a route to the UN. This view prevailed, and the delegation received no more satisfaction from the Greek Government than it did from the British.

With their mission unsuccessful, the delegates appealed for help from the Church and the court of public opinion. The General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) also lent support to the cause, helping to create the Panhellenic Committee of Struggle with the Union of Cyprus (PEAEK). This organization was primarily involved in lobbying activities in Parliament, in addition to fueling public interest in the issue. Subsequent to a second unproductive meeting with the Greek Government, the delegation sponsored a petition calling for the parliament to acknowledge the validity of the plebiscite and publicly proclaim its support for enosis

At this moment, the delegation received unexpected assistance in form of British incompetence. Responding to a parliamentary question on June 21, Colonial Under-Secretary John Dugdale not only restated Britain’s “no change” policy regarding the Cyprus question, but also offered an

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11 Stefanidis, *ibid.*, 12.
12 Crouzet, *ibid.*, 346-347; Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 61, 63.
unflattering critique regarding Greek administration of the Dodecanese which had been ceded to Greece in 1947. This incident provoked righteous anger in Greece followed by mass demonstrations, and fueled support for the enosis to such a degree that no “no public figure dared to oppose it or try to put the brake on too openly.” Both the British and the United States embassies, which had earlier expressed relief over the extraordinary lack of public anti-British sentiment on Cyprus, reported that this was not true. For example, on May 26, Ambassador Norton commented that, “the press is perhaps more universally friendly to us than I remember.”

The Korean crisis, combined with trouble stemming from the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Greece, made agitation about Cyprus all the more unwelcome. On June 27, 1950, then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asked the American Embassy in Athens to remind the Greek government that the country had much more serious existential problems and that, in present circumstances, Greece’s “number one problem […] was its survival as a free nation.” Nationalistic aspirations were a “luxury” that Greece could simply not afford: “US is trying to keep Greeks afloat in [a] sea of current difficulties and guide them into [a] relatively safe harbor. It cannot do so if Greeks continue to exhaust themselves and embarrass us in heading for such distant shores as Cyprus.” In true cold warrior fashion, Acheson harshly condemned the present Greek Government, calling it “dangerous,” and expressing shock that the US supports a

government that permits “red infiltration” into its ranks after “so much blood and money has been spent […] to suppress Communist aggression.”

Despite the questionable policies of the Plastiras Government, the State Department stopped short of granting Britain’s request for an official reprimand, nor was the US forthcoming in supporting Britain’s efforts in excluding discussion of the Cyprus at the UN. The main point of disagreement between the US and Britain regarding UN involvement was the disagreement between the two allies over the organization’s capability in dealing with the Cyprus issue. Britain maintained that Article 2 (7) of the Charter prohibited discussion of Cyprus on the ground that it was a matter of internal jurisdiction. The US, on the other hand, took a broader view whereby “any international question could be discussed in the appropriate UN forum.” The State Department greatest fear was the possibility of the Soviets using the Cyprus issue to their own advantage at the UN. In order to avoid this, it was suggested that the Greek delegation be persuaded to negotiate a direct settlement with Britain. Britain, of course, wished to avoid this route at all costs. Thus the British campaign to win over the Americans continued throughout the summer of 1950, but with no success.

Despite pressure from the American and Greek governments, the Cypriot delegation maintained that a UN forum was still the most effective Cyprus means to exert pressure on Britain. While it supported the idea of enosis in theory, the Greek government went out of its way to discourage bringing it into a public arena. Following a parliamentary debate on the matter, the government

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20 Acheson to American diplomatic officers, Deptel Washington 1225, (undated): SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-2650, NARA.
21 Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, 106-107.
released a communiqué emphasizing the potential “harmful developments that might result,” if “irresponsible” debate on the Cyprus question continued.22

After an unsuccessful attempt to meet with parliamentary officials in London, in July, the delegates arrived in the United States, where Greek-American associations and Congressional sympathizers had actively begun laying the foundation for their case. In a meeting at the State Department with Assistant Secretary of Congressional Relations, Jack McFall, on September 13, 1950, the delegates requested that the Americans hold mediation talks between the British government and the Cypriots in an effort to circumvent any discussion of the matter at the UN. McFall responded by insisting that the question concerned British domestic policy, and citing the general trend in international affairs, said that it would be inappropriate to raise the issue at this point.23

Although the attempts by the delegation proved fruitless, they did, however, succeed in drawing attention to the Cyprus issue.24 The Greek press had been especially useful in garnering publicity for the State Department meeting in which they portrayed the Americans as being sympathetic to the Greek point of view.25 AKEL which had also attempted to gain access to the United States and to meet with officials in London were completely unsuccessful. Moreover, the organization’s whirlwind tour of the capitals of Europe proved futile in advancing the cause of enosis except for

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23 Memcon between McFall and Ethnarchy Delegation, September 14, 1950: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/9-1350, NARA.
an anemic reference by a Polish representative who censured the Greek Government for its failure to support the Cypriot people.  

Anglo-Greek Relations and the Enosis Cause

On October 18, 1950, Makarios III was elected Archbishop of Cyprus. Meanwhile, the British continued to press the Americans for support for their position regarding the future of the island, this time employing both military and diplomatic conduits. The following day, a review of Britain’s Middle East Policy and Strategy was forwarded to the State Department which, among other things, emphasized the importance of taking measures to retain Middle East countries, including Cyprus within the Western orbit.

Although both the British and American military agreed on this point, the State Department did not share the British view that either party had heard the last from the Cypriots regarding internationalization. Accordingly, it submitted a variety of views targeted at mitigating the problem. These included a renewed constitutional proposal and more aggressive British foreign aid to the island. While the Americans were eager to avoid raising the Cyprus question at the UN, the State Department was not pleased with what it perceived as Britain’s indulgence of AKEL. In response, Britain argued that a resuscitation of the 1948 Constitution would only encourage further agitation for enosis.

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26 Porter, Contel Nicosia 30, September 6, 1950: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/9-650, NARA; Stefanidis, 16.
27 “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Ambassador at large (Jessup),” Washington, October 19, 1950: FRUS, 1950, V, 217.
29 Stefanidis, ibid., 17.
In January, 1951, the colonial administration took a step backward, and re-instated the sedition laws on Cyprus. The administration issued four amendments intended to fortify existing “sedition” legislation. These included the power to arbitrarily take action against any persons suspected of illegal activity, as well as the suppression of newspapers and other publications. Archbishop Makarios denounced these measures as being “illiberal” and “undemocratic.” 30 The actions of the British also revived the enosis issue in the Greek press and in the minds of the anti-colonialists in the US. London responded to the public relations debacle by urging “utmost leniency” and the laws were quietly allowed to expire. 31

Confronted by opposing demands from Makarios, Britain, and the United States, the Greek Government convened a council of the party leadership on March 21, attempting to reach an accord regarding the government’s policy towards Cyprus. The meeting accomplished three things. First, the council reiterated its commitment to work within the construct of the “ancestral Anglo-Greek friendship;” secondly, it gave the government the right to present a twofold proposal to the British that included ceding Cyprus to Greece as a quid pro quo for bases anywhere in Greek territory, and a promise by the British to settle the issue consistent with the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination. Lastly, it provided a forum whereby the Greek government formally claimed Cyprus for the first time. In February, in a reaffirmation of the Greek Government’s commitment to the island, the new Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelios 32 stated: “I am happy to have the opportunity to express from this official tribune to the Chamber

30 Crawshaw, ibid., 87.
31 Stefanidis, ibid., 18.
32 The elections of September 20, 1951 failed to produce a clear winner, resulting in a coalition between General Nikolas Plastiras and Premier Sophocles Venizelios, Ibid., 19.
and the whole of the Greek people the demand for union with Mother Greece, a matter which constitutes the ardent desire of the Greek people.”  

Any mention of recourse to the UN was noticeably and deliberately omitted. Initially, it appeared that this strategy would be acceptable to Makarios. On March 27, the Archbishop met with British Ambassador and remarked that while it was one thing to avoiding the matter “in present circumstances,” it was quite another to consider it a closed subject. The Archbishop pointed out that Britain had the power to “quell” agitation for enosis if only they would issue a statement explaining that, while there could be no “alteration of the island’s status at present,” HMG would be “willing to discuss the question at some specific time in the future.”

While explaining the Greek Cypriots’ “ardent desire” for enosis the Archbishop downplayed the potential pitfalls of internationalization by dismissing any Turkish reaction as “relatively unimportant.” Makarios pointed out that Cyprus would be [a] “safer military base” for Western powers if it were united with Greece as this would curtail the hazards inherent in a disaffected population. Such concern might be surprising coming from someone who would later fight to limit the size of the British SBAs on the island, but it is indicative of Makarios’ attitude towards enosis at this point. The Archbishop also stressed that if the present impasse continued, it would only provide more opportunities for communist propaganda against the “imperialist US and UK.” This would not be the last time that the Greeks had tried to use the threat of communism against the Americans. Nor would it be the last time they failed to take Turkish sentiments for the island seriously. As the author Stavrinides points out, “although the Greeks ought to have

33 Quoted here in Kelling, ibid., 108.
known better, they believed that Turkish Cypriot nationalism was not as genuine and passionate as theirs.”

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Chapter III

First American Initiatives

In April, the American Embassy in Greece issued an unofficial collection of ideas similar to the ones earlier presented by Makarios. These included a British assurance to discuss a potential change in the status of the island, a rehabilitated constitutional proposal, an offer of dual nationality and, finally, an understanding between the British and Greek governments whereby the latter would work to discourage enosis agitation in exchange for support of Greece’s admission to NATO. The final point, however, was later rejected by the State Department. This was the beginning of an inquiry into the consistency of American policy towards Cyprus which, at this point, was targeted only towards maintaining the status quo.

Before the Foreign Office could issue a response, however, Makarios rejected any consideration of compromise, saying that a future promise to discuss Cyprus was essentially meaningless unless followed by a guarantee to cede Cyprus to Greece “within a reasonably short time.” Makarios then appealed to the Greek Government to issue an urgent message to the British. If this was unsuccessful, they should state their claim in the upcoming UN General Assembly. In any event, the Archbishop and the Greek Cypriots seemed bound and determined to steer a course towards internationalization, regardless of the consequences. No doubt, this revelation kept many a diplomat awake at night in Athens, London, and Washington. The Foreign Office,

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1 Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, 61-62.
3 Peurifoy to Acheson, Embtel Athens 3345 April 7, 1951: SDCDF doc. 747C.00/4-7, NARA.
for its part, seemed reluctant to consider the American proposals beyond the point of discussion
and was loath to raise the question of a change in the status of the island for fear it would
encourage the proponents of enosis to “redouble their efforts.”

Unaware of the American initiative, the Greek Government did not present its earlier proposals
until May 2, 1951, despite Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison’s unambiguous message that
HMG would neither consider the Greek proposals nor discuss the status of Cyprus for the
immediate future. Not only were the Greek Government’s proposals rebuffed, it was also advised
to discourage enosis agitation so as not to unduly antagonize the Turks.

In the early 1950s, American thinking with respect to the Cyprus issue had no clear definition.
While State Department officials had kept a low-keyed interest in Britain’s handling of the
problem, it was evident that the US considered Cyprus a matter between Britain and Greece. The
Cold War dogma of the period tended to assign a communist connection to just about every
disturbance and popular movement occurring in a colonial region and Cyprus was no exception.
The US may not have held a consistent policy regarding Cyprus, but it knew what it did not want
to happen.

In October 1951, at the urging of the British, the Americans were forced to confront the question.
Referencing the British aide-mémoire of August 13, 1951, which essentially reaffirmed the
position that Cyprus should be retained on strategic grounds, the State Department basically
reaffirmed this view when it concluded that “the surrender of British sovereignty over Cyprus
would have a most serious effect on the Allied position in the Middle East.”

\[4\] Acheson, Deptel Washington 4224, May 9, 1951: FRUS, 1950, V, 534.
\[5\] Memcon between Morrison and Melas, 95133, 1081, 57, May 2, 1951.
State also recommended that further agitation for enosis as well as attempts to raise the problem in an international forum would be “unwise and inopportune at this time,” and every effort should be expended to prevent this from happening. Moreover, at the conference on colonial questions on October 9, the American representative was instructed to consider with his British counterpart “possible tactics” to be engaged if the question was brought forward at the General Assembly.6

While State Department officials agreed that there was nothing that could be said or done at this point to pacify those Greeks who were determined to agitate for enosis, it believed that “certain helpful adjustments” could be made by the British that might reinforce the position of Britain and the United States in any potential General Assembly discussion. For example, it was recommended that Britain steer clear of issues that might provide “material inimical to the common objectives” of the US and the UK. Although Britain received some of the support it wanted, the State Department stopped short of advising the Government to issue a joint US-UK statement regarding retention of British sovereignty over Cyprus, and believed that it might be more beneficial if the US refrained from publicly identifying with the issue.7 At this stage, while there was little concerted effort between the US and the UK on the Cyprus issue, a hint of daylight was beginning to emerge.

Makarios and the UN Campaign: an Overview

Whatever views the US and the UK might have held made little difference to Makarios, who doggedly kept up the pressure to increase international awareness and create international

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6 Aide-mémoire Department of State to the British Embassy, Annex 1, October 1, 1951: FRUS, 1951, V, 539-540.
7 Ibid.
pressure in support of Greek Cypriot aspirations. Between October 1952 and March 1953, the Archbishop made visits to the United States, Britain, France, and Greece, as well as Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. In Damascus, much to the amusement of the British, the Archbishop was forced to listen to the irredentist claim that Cyprus was actually part of Greater Syria. But Makarios was determined to at least create the appearance of support of the Arab countries for a UN alternative. On April 25, 1952, the Archbishop gathered a Pancyprian National Assembly. Addressing 600 delegates, he reiterated his pledge to intensify his enosis campaign and to resist any or all compromises with the British colonial administration. Most of all, he vowed to step up the effort towards internationalization. The meeting ended with a resolution to bring the Cyprus question to the UN. In retrospect, the Archbishop would have been wise to be careful what he wished for because taking the question before an international forum opened the door for Turkey to stake its claim on the island.

Through a barrage of press conferences and meetings with diplomats and politicians he promoted the demand for union with Greece. He particularly focused on the representatives to the UN General Assembly of the countries he visited. Even more importantly, Makarios moved to invite the Leftists to join his endeavors. On June 28, 1953, about 10,000 Cypriots, including many AKEL supporters, gathered at Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia to hear Makarios. He announced his intention to bring the Cyprus question to the UN and appealed for support in the struggle for enosis from anyone and everyone, including the communists. He was convinced that the

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8 Crawshaw, *ibid.*, 51-52.
communists would lend support to his efforts given their history of pursuing the Cyprus question through the UN as well.9

On August 10, 1953, Makarios sent a petition to the UN General Assembly calling for the Cyprus problem to be inscribed on its agenda. The Archbishop was seeking to persuade the General Assembly to issue a resolution demanding recognition of the right of self-determination in Cyprus.10 In view of the fact that only sovereign states had the right of appeal to the UN, and no member state had sponsored the request, his petition was ignored. Greece, anxious to circumvent a public disagreement with Britain, declines to submit the petition to the international body. In response, Makarios announced his intent to do so with the support of Arab states if the Greek position remained unchanged. Prime Minister Alexandrou Papagos, whose Rally Party had swept the elections in November, would have lost face if he failed to respond.11

Subsequently, on September 21, 1953, the Greek Ambassador to the UN, Alexis Kyrou, announced at a plenary session that Greece, regardless of intense public opinion, “for the time being” would not sponsor Makarios’ call for discussion of the Cyprus question at the UN.12 This was an event, according to Faustmann, that marks the first time Greece had used the UN—but ironically only to express its intentions not to use it in this matter. Although the overture seemed

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9 The AKEL-affiliated organization (EAS) National Liberation Coalition (Ethnikos Apeleftheroticos Synaspismos), demanded in 1951 that the Cyprus question be taken up at the UN. In 1952, AKEL favored shared action in the struggle for enosis but its attempts to create a united front were rebuffed by the Right. Stavros Panteli, A New History of Cyprus: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, (London: East-West Publications, 1984), 244-245; Hubert von Faustmann, “The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 1949-58” in The Historical Background to the UN’s Involvement with Cyprus, www.palgrave.com, 2003, 8.
10 Faustmann, ibid., 9
11 The center-liberal government of Plastiras-Venizelos resigned on October 10, Ibid.
12 “Speech by Alexis Kyrou, Head of the Greek Delegation, at the VIII Session of the General Assembly of the UN, September 21, 1953, “Press and Information Department, 9; Embtel, Yost Athens 614, August 26, 1953: FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, 676.
to satisfy Makarios and the Greek public, it was a red flag for Britain. It did, however, buy Papagos much needed time to advance the high-level bilateral negotiations his government was seeking.\(^\text{13}\)

Kyrou had earlier approached the Archbishop and attempted to persuade him to abandon his appeal to the UN on the grounds that it stood no chance of success without US support and would serve only to benefit the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Stephanos Stepanopoulos, who had approached the US in the hope of engaging its assistance in dissuading Makarios from bringing the Cyprus question to the UN, feared that if the Archbishop moved forward without Greek support, he might publicly accuse Papagos of betraying the Cypriots, thus weakening his government. Conversely, if the Greeks decided to support the appeal, bilateral negotiations with Britain would be impossible. Moreover, the likely failure of the initiative would only serve to undermine the Greek public’s confidence in the UN, which would be particularly inopportune at a time when Greece was increasing its military presence in Korea.\(^\text{14}\)

While cancelling a planned visit to Cyprus, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, as part of his Near East tour, did meet with Prime Minister Papagos in Athens. In the meeting, the Greek Prime Minister attempted to link the Cyprus question with Greek prospects for joining the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), pointing out the importance of Greek membership in the organization. The Greek Government, he said, “seeks a solution [to the Cyprus question] which would not disrupt the existing pleasant Anglo-Greek relationship,” but cautioned that “no

\(^\text{13}\) Faustmann, \textit{ibid.}, 9.
Greek Government [could] afford to ignore the Cyprus issue.”\textsuperscript{15} After commenting on the slow progress that was being made towards resolving the issue, Dulles assured Papagos that in “an area so historically important to Greece,” his country’s position would be thoroughly considered.\textsuperscript{16} It was clear that the Secretary’s primary concern was to secure Greece’s commitment to fulfill its obligations to the anti-communist cause, primarily with regards to Korea, and did not wholly appreciate what was really at stake with Cyprus.

**Papagos-Eden Incident**

Following Greece’s announcement at the UN, on September 22, 1953, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden met with Papagos, who was convalescing in Athens from a liver ailment. When the Cyprus issue arose, Eden abruptly refused to discuss it saying, “[…] for the British Government there exists no Cyprus question, either at present or in the future,” adding that “after all there was a Greek population in Alexandria and New York, but that did not suppose that the Greek Government was demanding enosis for them.”\textsuperscript{17} Papagos responded by saying that if that was the British position then Greece reserved the right to handle the matter in the manner that it deemed “best and most expedient” and with “full and absolute freedom of action.”\textsuperscript{18} The Greek Prime Minister was offended and furious, while Eden did not regard the meeting as particularly notable, since in his mind, he was not saying anything new. On October 15, Papagos addressed a note to Eden suggesting bilateral talks which the Foreign Secretary ignored. The rebuff made it impossible for Papagos to later accept an invitation to London, “if he had to return and say that

\textsuperscript{15} Peurifoy, Embtel Athens 3476, May 28, 1953:ibid., 835; Memcon by the First Secretary of Embassy in Greece (Schnee) with Office of the Prime Minister of Greece, Athens 51, May 27, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, IX, pt. 1, 156.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 156-157.

\textsuperscript{17} Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and Field Marshall Papagos, quoted here in Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), 32.

\textsuperscript{18} GPR Meeting, February 7, 1955, 671, quoted here in Stefanidis, Isle of Discord, 48.
the question of Cyprus had not even been discussed.”  

According to Holland, the Eden-Papagos incident marked the “beginning of the end of the traditional framework of Anglo-Hellenic friendship,” and the “trigger” leading to the internationalization of the Cyprus question.

Following his exchange with Eden, the Greek Prime Minister’s stance did indeed harden, and he concluded that Britain might never be ready to discuss the Cyprus question with the Greek Government. The combined pressure from Makarios, the Ethnarchy, public opinion, and the Greek Left led the Greek Prime Minister to the realization that to oppose enosis for the sake of securing Greek–Anglo relations was a losing proposition. Britain responded by enlisting US support. In 1953, the State Department’s anti-colonial sentiments regarding Cyprus were a distant second compared to its Cold War objectives. State Department officials still held to the British viewpoint that any tempering of the Cyprus question could only have dire consequences for Britain’s remaining imperial holdings. This fact, combined with Makarios’ willingness to accept support from AKEL, drew the US and Britain closer at this stage. As a result, the American Embassy in Athens was directed to preclude any attempt by Greece to bring the Cyprus question to the United Nations. At least for the moment, Britain felt secure.

In December 1953, Kyrou, informed the United States and the Britain’s delegates that if the United Kingdom Government continued its present uncompromising position, the Greek government would bring the Cyprus question to the UN. British officials, however, still held fast

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19 Memcon between Baxter (Acting Director, GTI), Athanase G. Politis (Greek Ambassador) and Henry A. Byroade (Assistant Secretary, NEA) Washington 366, April 5, 1954: FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, 685-686.
20 Holland, ibid., 32.
21 Nicolet, US Foreign Policy Towards Cyprus, 44.
22 Faustmann, ibid., 7- 8.
23 Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, 130–2.
24 Faustmann, ibid., 8.
to the belief that the Greeks were not sincere and, in any event, the US would do everything in its power to prevent this from happening, despite the fact that the Americans continued to insist it was not a party to the problem. 25

In November 1953, when the State Department learned of Greek intentions to take the Cyprus question to the UN, the initial American attitude was tentative. While it was clear that the US had a stake in the dispute, it still preferred, as much as possible, to remain above the fray. This attitude changed, however, when it became clear that Greece would bring the issue to the UN unless Britain relented in its hard-line position regarding bilateral discussions. In January, 1954, Britain submitted another aide-mémoire to the State Department this time requesting official support for its policies on the Cyprus question.

The document covered three essential points, the American response to which would form the basis for future US policy towards the island. 26 First, the British wanted “assurances that the United States continues to share the British view that joint strategic interests of both countries demand the maintenance of the present status of Cyprus.” Secondly, Britain sought “confirmation that the United States will continue to discourage the Greek Government from pressing its claims to Cyprus.” And lastly, Britain wanted “an agreement to inform the Greek Government that the United States would oppose placing the Cyprus question on the agenda of the General assembly or its discussion at the UN.” 27 While the first two points were tentatively agreeable, subject to the views of the Department of Defense, it was decided to adopt a non-

25 Panteli, ibid., 248; Kelling, ibid., 142.
26 Stefanidis, ibid., 185.
committal view with respect to the third. The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose to not take a position in the dispute between Britain and Greece which, in their view, did not currently affect US interests.

Concentrating on the defense aspect of the British formula, they limited their statement to US military interest in the island. While they admitted the importance of the base facilities to US strategic interests, they did not necessarily hold the opinion that the strategic interests of Britain and the US required the retention of the present status of the island, instead preferring “those arrangements which are most likely to permit their continued use by the armed forces of the United States.” It was probable that the Joint Chiefs were aware of the Greek proposal in which Britain would receive bases in Cyprus and Greece in exchange for enosis.

The Ambassador to Turkey, Avra M. Warren, agreed with all three points, but with regard to the third, advised that “discussions [of] this issue can only serve to weaken existing friendly relationships between Greece, UK, and Turkey, and thus further Soviet efforts to disrupt western unity.” He also warned that any excursion into the UN would give Turkey a “voice in any decision [to] alter [the] status of Cyprus.” In a State Department telegram of April 5, Dulles had reaffirmed the US position that it was “firmly opposed” to raising the Cyprus question at the UN, echoing concerns about negative effects on international relations and concern over disruption within NATO.

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28 Ibid., 679-680.
29 Robert B. Anderson to Dulles, Memorandum, May 19, 1954: ibid, 687.
31 Dulles, Deptel Athens 2901, April 5, 1954: ibid., 684.
The official US response to the British aide-mémoire was not issued until July. It stated that the US Government “recognizes that Cyprus is of strategic importance to the United States, but is unable to confirm that United States strategic interests require that there be no change in the sovereignty over Cyprus.” Regarding the third point, it was noted, “should the Greek Government raise the matter in the United Nations, the United States Government would be confronted with the importance it attaches to the “principle of the self-determination of the peoples.” Needless to say, this was not the ringing endorsement the British were expecting.

The British request for support on the Cyprus issue had compelled US policy makers to tackle the gnarly question of how to square its traditional anti-colonial doctrine when it conflicted with national imperatives. This point is underlined by Stefanidis in his observation that “the British aide-mémoire forced upon US decision makers the dilemma they had been evading since 1950, namely that of reconciling general principles with concrete political and strategic interests.”

So far, 1954, then, had not been a banner year for Anglo-American relations. In addition to the Cyprus issue, differences between the two countries had emerged over US policies in Indochina during the Geneva conference in March. The UK had also been critical over purported CIA involvement in a coup against Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the communist-friendly leader of Guatemala and the installation of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. Indeed, Dulles was so

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32 Draft aide-mémoire attached to Baxter, June 25, 1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-2554, NARA.
33 According to Stefanidis, the US traditional principles could be “bent” whenever they conflicted with strategic interests, or relations with allied colonial powers. For example, the US had chosen to abstain from voting on Resolution 637A (VII) in support of self-determination, 184.
34 Stefanidis, ibid., 185.
35 The main point of disagreement between Britain and the US was the possibility of a US unilateral strike against China in retaliation for its activities in Indochina, see Robert L. Beisner, Acheson, (New York: New York Oxford Press, 2006), 487.
36 Ibid., 581.
infuriated over Britain’s lack of support for Guatemala that anyone merely mentioning the Cyprus issue was in danger of “being thrown out of the room.”

**Never Say “Never”**

On July 24, the Cyprus issue took a turn for the worse escalating into a full-blown political crisis when the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Henry Hopkinson, whose “job,” according to Holland, was to “divert attention to Cyprus,” announced a vague and unserious constitutional offer, followed by the declaration that “the British Government cannot contemplate a change of sovereignty in Cyprus.” It was clear that Hopkinson was unprepared for the inevitable attack by the opposition that this announcement would inspire. When questioned by his hostile colleagues in Labour whether this would mean that island could not expect self-determination in the near future, he responded with the following:

> [...] it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent...I have said that the question of the abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise—that British sovereignty will remain [italics mine].

According to a desk officer in the Colonial Office, the beleaguered Hopkinson “had completely gone off his prepared brief.” A short time later, matters were made worse when Hopkinson’s department chief, Oliver Lyttleton, stated that due to Greece’s volatility that he could “imagine

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37 B. Salt to Young, September 9, 1954, FO 371/112848, WG108/185.
40 Holland, *ibid.*, 38.
no more disastrous policy for Cyprus than to hand it over to an unstable though friendly
Power."41

These statements, along with the bad-tempered exchange between Papagos and Eden, were
surely decisive factors in convincing the Greeks that they had no choice but to raise the Cyprus
issue in the UN General Assembly. The word “never” infuriated Greece as it signified that
Britain had eliminated any prospect for enosis now or in the future. While these missteps surely
contributed to future strife on the island, they were simply a blunt admission of Britain’s post-
World War II policy. For the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, however, they represented Britain’s
final word on the subject.

**The British Constitutional Offer**

The constitutional offer, which was approved by the cabinet on July 26, was later described by
then press officer Lawrence Durrell as a constitution “for Zulus.”42 Not only was it less liberal
than the one offered in 1948, it was more restrictive than any pre-war constitution. The
justification for this backward step was that since the Greeks had not been responsible enough to
take up the 1948 offer which, in Britain’s view, had provided “a high degree of internal self-
government,” a modified version was in order. Among other things, the proposed arrangements
called for a majority of official and nominated members in the assembly, with a token number of
elected officials. In the 1948 constitution, representation was the other way round. There was a
majority of elected as opposed to official and nominated members. Furthermore, unofficial

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members of the legislature would be appointed to the Executive Council to take control of the Departments. It also proposed to now enforce the sedition laws.  

Needless to say, the offer was denounced from Athens to London. After hearing the conditions proposed in the new offer, Labour minister Aneurin Bevan rightly concluded that the new constitution assured that “under no circumstances can Cyprus look forward to self-government.” Washington was also disappointed since it had hoped that the British could have seen their way to produce some sort of arrangement based upon mutual agreement that offered genuine political reform.

**The First Greek Appeal to the UN**

In the aftermath of Hopkinson’s unqualified statement in the House of Commons and Lyttelton’s accompanying blunt remark, it came as no surprise when on August 16, 1954, Papagos submitted an appeal to the UN demanding the “application, under the auspices of the UN, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in case of the population of the island of Cyprus.” Makarios and the mayors of Cyprus endorsed the Greek petition under a separate memorandum presented by the Greek representative at the UN. Meanwhile, the British Embassy in Athens received two alternative proposals from Papagos. The first was an option for mediation from the Council of Europe, where the Greeks had already submitted a request for a  

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45 Wood to Arthur L. Richards, director of GTI, Memorandum, August 10, 1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-1054, NARA.  
46 According to Kelling the petition is dated August 20, 1954, which was the date the Greek appeal was officially submitted to the UN Secretary-General. Papagos, however, signed the appeal on August 16, the date in the UN Yearbook, Kelling, 145; *UN Yearbook, 1954*, New York, 94.  
discussion on Cyprus. The second suggestion was for secret negotiations for a new constitution, which the Prime Minister would then try to pitch to the Ethnarchy. The British remained unresponsive on both points. 49

In a meeting with Papagos on August 11, Cavendish W. Cannon, the US Ambassador to Greece, made one last effort to clarify the American opposition to bringing the Cyprus question to the UN. What followed was a “candid discussion” during which Cannon attempted to define the difference between political realities and lofty principles. The Ambassador explained that while the US held a principled position with regard to self-determination, its policy, such as it was towards Cyprus, was conditioned by broader strategic interests and commitments, and that the US and Britain had more important uses for their time. Consequently, Greece should not expect “a sympathetic attitude” if it brought the Cyprus question to the UN. 50 While Papagos expressed understanding for the American position, the meeting did nothing to change Greece’s advance towards the UN.

On the day of the appeal, President Eisenhower wrote to Churchill with an offer “to do something,” and expressing concern that Britain’s handling of the problem might have a negative effect on US opinion. The letter was in response to the August 20 letter from the Prime Minister in which he warned that failure of the US to support Britain at the UN would cause “deep distress” and “difficulties in guiding public opinion into the right channels in much larger matters.” 51

49 Stefanidis, ibid., 66.
50 Cannon, Embtel Athens 344, August 11, 1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.03/8-1154, NARA; ibid, 66.
Two US mediation attempts by private citizens followed. On August 21, Churchill met with Spiros Skouras, the Greek American President of Twentieth Century Fox and a personal friend of Eisenhower. Skouras tried to persuade Churchill to send a letter to Papagos telling him “that the present situation was not a suitable one in which to discuss the Cyprus question but at some time in the future HMG would do so.” The idea was rebuffed by the British Prime Minister who responded by saying, “‘[t]he Greeks should have a sense of proportion in looking at world problems and might also do well to remember with gratitude what the country did for them at the end of the war.”52 The second attempt by socialite Fleur Fenton Cowles, a former consultant to President Truman’s Famine Emergency Committee and editor of Flair magazine, was no more successful. Cowles, did, however, manage to impress Papagos enough to extract a promise to moderate Greek agitation once the item was inscribed on the agenda.53

Turkey Enters the Dispute

Meanwhile, Turkey had largely remained largely silent on Cyprus, and was content to do so as long as it felt secure that Britain would succeed in holding the island. The Greek appeal to the UN, however, alarmed the Ankara Government and signaled a potential threat to the status quo. The possibility that Cyprus might fall into the hands of a mercurial Greece represented a threat to the security of Turkey’s southern border. Turkey also felt some responsibility for the welfare of the Turkish Cypriot community, or at least that is what it claimed whenever Greece pressed a claim on the island. Until the Greek appeal, the Turkish Government had held to the argument that there was no Cyprus problem, and any questions regarding the status of the island was a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

53 Byroade to Dulles, Memorandum October 7, 1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10754, NARA.
Indeed, in early April, Foreign Minister Köprülü reaffirmed this line, adding that no change in the island’s status was anticipated. But in the event that should happen, Turkey had a right to advance its claim.54 Greece’s determination to make Cyprus an international issue, however, drastically changed the dynamics of the situation. As a result, Turkey moved from the sidelines into active involvement in the dispute by declaring its intention to “coordinate very closely with Britain” at the UN. Turkey had inadvertently become Britain’s unofficial ally in the Cyprus question and would use its new status in the future as means to advance its position.55

The temptation to exploit Turkish weaknesses regarding Cyprus was not new. While wary of the potential pitfalls in doing so, Clifford Norton, the UK Ambassador in Athens commented soon after the Church-sponsored plebiscite: “the Turkish card is a tricky one, but useful in the pass to which we have come.” 56 Greek determination to move ahead in the UN erased all past reservations the FO had about playing the ‘Turkish card.” 57 Eden needed no convincing and was especially keen on going this route.58

On February 24, the Embassy in Ankara asked Turkey to express its opposition to Washington about raising the Cyprus question at the UN. The British also wanted the Turks to approach Athens in the same manner. While agreeing to the first request, the Turks refused to sound out the Greeks for fear that it might discredit the Anglo-Turkish position that the Cyprus question did not exist.59

54 Stefanidis, ibid., 55.
55 Crawshaw, ibid., 63, 73.
57 Ankara Embassy to FO, February 24, 1950, FO1081/28.
The Anglo-Turkish alliance was officially confirmed by Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in Ankara on August 28. A few days later, as per a British request, Menderes sent a dispatch to Dulles in the State Department denouncing Greek policy and reaffirming Turkey’s “vital” interest in the island. He also requested that the US make every effort to oppose the Greek initiative at every turn. In response, a letter was sent by Acting Secretary of State Smith on September 6 on behalf of Dulles, expressing regret over Greece’s decision to bring the Cyprus question to the UN and assuring the Turkish Prime Minister that the US government would “weigh with [the] fullest sympathy” the views of his government in “formulating its policy.”

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60 Memcon, Howard to Baxter, September 13, 1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-1354, NARA.
Chapter IV

Charting a Course: US Policy for Cyprus

The prospect of UN intervention compelled the US to take into account the interests of all parties in formulating a strategy for the inevitable UN showdown. For their part, the Greeks attempted to get the Americans in their corner by reminding them of a core tenet set forward in the joint declaration between Eisenhower and Churchill on foreign policy ("Potomac Charter") which states: we uphold the principle of self-government and will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence."

Greece took care to ground its claim on the principle of self-determination and not enosis since they understood that the latter would not be acceptable to the US and Britain, let alone the Turks. Britain, on the other hand, sought to appeal to American strategic interests and its communist obsession by arguing that British sovereignty over Cyprus was critical for the establishment of a base for its Middle East Air Force in addition to its Middle East Land Forces. Citing Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the UN Charter, Britain also maintained that since Cyprus was a domestic issue, the UN could have no jurisdiction in

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1 The Eisenhower-Churchill Declaration ("Potomac Charter") reaffirmed the principles of the Atlantic Charter which was the blueprint for the post-WWII world and the foundation for many international treaties and organizations, including the UN: “Common principles of Anglo-American Policy: Declaration by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,” June 29, 1954, Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954 in United States Department of Historical Office, American Foreign Policy Documents: 1950-1955, Western Europe, (New York: Millwood Press, 1974), 1707; Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 71; Hatzivassiliou, Britain and International Status of Cyprus, 47-48.
deciding the matter. Since this interpretation conflicted with the “Potomac Charter,” the US did not agree. Furthermore, the British insisted that their position was a reflection of the will of the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot people, a dicey argument at best, given that it was Britain that had been actively pursuing the Turks in an effort to ensure support for its position at the UN.

When it was discovered that the Turks were waffling regarding their support for Britain at the UN, the Colonial Office grew alarmed and reminded the Foreign Office that it would be “wise to give the Turks further encouragement to keep them on the mark” since it would “severely damage our position at the UN if the Turks were to adopt a neutral attitude on the question of Cyprus on the Assembly agenda.”\(^2\)

The mantra by British officials that that the Americans did not fully appreciate Turkey’s interest in the Cyprus issue is called into question by the existence of documentary evidence to the contrary. A record of a conversation as early as February 26, 1954 between Ambassador Warren and Turkish Undersecretary Nuri Birgi stated that the Turkish Government “would consider such action by Greece ‘most unfortunate,’” and believed it “most desirous to avoid involvement if the issue is raised.” Furthermore, if this should happen, Turkey “will assert its interest and ask [to] participate [in] any Anglo-Greek discussions.”\(^3\)

The charge of American obtuseness with respect to Turkey is further called into question by a March 1954 memorandum of conversation between Feridun C. Erkin, the Turkish Ambassador to the US, and GTI Deputy Director Baxter:

Although the question of Cyprus with Greece has been a controversial one for many years, the Turkish Government has taken no note of it and has always attempted to play down any press agitation because the enosis issue has never before been officially supported by the Greek Government. It has been the view of the Turkish Government that there has been no reason for any change in the status quo but it must now express its concern at the Greek Government’s announced intention of presenting this question in the UN. 4

Regarding the Greek Cypriots’ argument that the status of Cyprus should be based on majority will, the Turkish Ambassador explained to Baxter “that it is not the international custom to decide questions of sovereignty solely on the basis of the majority wishes of the population, but there are equally important geographical considerations which must be taken into account”—clearly a reference to the close proximity of Cyprus to the Anatolian mainland. Erkin concluded by pointing out that the Soviets would be the real winners in a UN debate, a concern shared by both Britain and the US. 5 The accusation that the Americans did not understand Turkish views on Cyprus is further disproved by the fact that Bowker, the British Ambassador in Ankara, had told the Foreign Office that the Turkish Government’s position had been made quite apparent to Washington and Athens. 6 What was really gnawing at the British was not that the US did not understand the Turks, but that the State Department did not agree with British tactics and had no real appetite for pressuring the Turks on behalf of HMG. 7

5 Ibid.
7 Passage based on an analysis by Nicolet, ibid., 49.
In the summer of 1954, the Greeks and Turks were anxious to maintain a low profile with regard to Cyprus, and both wanted to keep the issue off the UN agenda. While the Greeks still believed that the issue could best be resolved through bilateral negotiations with Britain, the Turks remained steadfast in their belief that Britain would continue to remain on Cyprus. Moreover, Greece and Turkey had been co-signators in the 1953 “treaty of peace and friendship“ and, in August 1954, jointly signed the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia. Neither country wanted to risk these gains by taking a hard-line position with respect to Cyprus.8 The Turkish Cypriot community, though it had consistently opposed enosis, had generally refrained from direct action because under British rule their minority status and identity were secure.

The Greek Cypriots, however, and Makarios in particular, had none of these restraints. In July 1954 the Archbishop took to the wires with a telegram campaign aimed at enlisting the support of US officials. A cable to Eisenhower declared that “on behalf of the Greek people of Cyprus we strongly protest [the] intended move to Cyprus of the British Middle East Joint Headquarters,” warning “so long as Cyprus remains under foreign rule [the] headquarters will be in an unfriendly land.” 9 On July 30, the Archbishop made a speech rejecting the prospect of a constitution and stating that although the campaign would remain peaceful, “British supporters of imperialist dreams only understand force.”10 The not so subtle threat of violence seriously disturbed State Department officials who urged

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8 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 43.
10 Circular telegram 766 to Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia, July 31, 1954: SDCDF, 747C.00/7 3154, NARA.
the Greek Government to take steps to “‘restrain Makarios’ from stepping out of his role as religious leader and inciting the Cypriot population to violence.’”

The US now understood where all interested parties stood in respect to the issue. The decision now had to be made which side the Americans would support or whether the item should be discussed at all. After outlining possible lines of action, Chalmers B. Wood of the Office for Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (GTI) recommended that the US “[…]seek to obtain postponement of consideration of the question in the General Committee [and seek] direct negotiations between[…]representatives of all segments of the population of Cyprus and the British authorities.” While the GTI was calling for abstention and postponement of the Cyprus question, the Office of Dependant Affairs argued for the inclusion of the item on the agenda since it was anticipated that anti-colonial sentiment would be running high in the General Assembly: “were we to advocate a full-scale discussion of Soviet ‘colonialism’ our sincerity would be challenged unless we advocated a strong anti-colonial position [on all items, including Cyprus],” even though the situation would “jeopardize our relationship with our closest allies, two of whom are on opposite sides of the debate.”

A third view expressed by the Bureau of United Nations Affairs (UNA) argued for a vote against the inclusion of the issue on the agenda, maintaining that “Assembly discussion or action cannot lead to constructive results” and “would raise serious questions affecting

Article 2/7 of the Charter.” 14 The UNA view came closest to the British and Turkish positions, who at this stage, had been jointly lobbying against the inclusion of the Cyprus question on the agenda. 15 A new element, however, was about to be introduced into the equation, the possibility of linking the Cyprus issue to the item of Chinese representation at the UN. 16

Undersecretary Henry Cabot Lodge, the American Ambassador to the UN, was the first to suggest that the Cyprus issue might be a useful lever for obtaining British support on the issue of Chinese representation. 17 In August the Ambassador began pressing for indirect negotiations with the British. In a memorandum of conversation dated August 17, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, David Key, recounted a conversation with Lodge where the Ambassador urged Robert D. Murphy to take a forceful position with Minister Scott regarding the Chinese representation issue. Lodge urged that Murphy point out to Scott that the Chinese question is “of greater concern to us than anything else on the Assembly’s agenda.” The Ambassador further suggested that if this appeal failed, “it might be necessary to link the Cyprus question with the Chinese issue: […] “ since “there is a great preponderance of opinion in this country that Cyprus

15 Nicolet, ibid., 50.
16 In brief, the issue of Chinese representation at the UN revolved around Britain’s position tending towards recognition of the PRC in the UN which the US firmly opposed: “Eden advised Dulles that the growing consensus in Britain, the Commonwealth, and Europe generally, leaned toward recognition of Communist China and the best course was to “face the problem squarely and get it over with.” Consequently, the Secretary could not guarantee that the British Government would maintain a cohesive front with Washington on this issue: Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy towards Taiwan, 1950-1955, (Chapel Hill NC: UNC Press, 1996), 142.
17 Ibid., 50.
should be turned over to Greece and that we will have to take this into account in our position on this question.”¹⁸

In a meeting with British UN delegate, Sir Pierson Dixon, in early September, Lodge brought up the matter of Cyprus and Chinese representation, and asked Dixon if “had any objection to discussing [the] two subjects concurrently.” ¹⁹ Dixon laughingly responded saying, as it happened, he had specifically been instructed by Eden not to “‘link” the two issues, though it was undeniable that the two were obviously linked. Turning to the subject of the Greek inscription, Dixon tried to pin down the Ambassador regarding the American position. Lodge’s reply, however, was less than definitive, saying that while he “could not speak officially on the subject,” he believed that the US was not in favor of inscription.

Despite Dulles’ prior warning “not to do anything which savored ‘crudities,’”²⁰ Lodge could not resist baiting the British delegate: “we could thus either abstain or we could vote ‘no’ or we could vote ‘no’ and lobby our friends.” Those were the three possible alternatives. But whatever position we might take, the item might well get on the Agenda. What our decision would finally be I could not possibly tell.” When Dixon commented that it looked as though the US was refusing to define its position on Cyprus until the UK defined theirs on Chinese representation, Lodge did not respond.

¹⁹ Lodge to Dulles, Memorandum September 9, 1954: ibid, 779-781.
²⁰ Ibid, Dulles’ original admonition can be found in Dulles, August 31, 1954, quoted in Howard, Memorandum:”Summary of Development with Regard to the Cyprus Question,” September 13, 1954: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/9-1354, NARA.
At this point, the British were convinced that the US was leaving them to twist in the wind on the inscription issue. Consequently, they began a diplomatic campaign throughout Western Europe and “white” Commonwealth countries to persuade those governments to close ranks in opposing Greece. The Australians reluctantly agreed to lend their support, but privately complained to Selwyn Lloyd that Britain’s failure to make any genuine strides towards the constitutional issue made the situation awkward. France on the other hand was standing firm, though given its track record, especially in North Africa and Indochina, “backing from that quarter was not entirely advantageous—as if a hitherto sober citizen was suddenly seen consorting with a notorious alcoholic.”

On the upside, Britain was having some success in enlisting the support of several governments. The downside was that these were mainly inconsequential countries, with less than wholesome reputations. At this stage, some officials were growing uncomfortable with the position that their government had obliged them to defend; as one sardonically commented, “if the Ethiopians understood the issue, they probably would not support us.” The Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq, sided with Greece. Despite the best efforts of Britain, the composition of the General Committee weighed heavily in favor of Greece.

Of the fifteen members, only Australia, France, and the Netherlands were seen as dependable, though the British were headed for a world of hurt with the Dutch. The US, along with Canada, Colombia, and Ecuador were expected to abstain. On September 23,

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21 Holland, *ibid.*, 42.
22 Iran, Pakistan, and India were among the countries to support Britain.
23 Buxton minute, September 24, 1954, FO112862, WG1081/589, quoted here in Holland, *ibid.*, 42.
24 Despite British support for the Dutch claim in West Irian, the Netherlands voted with Greece.
Greece won the first round, and the item was inscribed on the agenda. The British were furious with the Americans. In a telegram from New York following the UN defeat, Selwyn Lloyd, then British Prime Minister of Supply, bristled over the absence of American support:

Bob Dixon and I are both most dissatisfied with the behavior of the US Delegation. So far as we can see they have not lifted a little finger to help us [...] Cabot Lodge expressed complete ignorance of any idea that they should help us [...] When I indicated that it might perhaps have occurred to them to try and help us without any agreement, his reply was a reference to the Greek vote and the telegrams he had from Senators, etc. asking him to vote for inscription.

It was not only the British who were angry about the alleged perfidy of their American ally. On October 23, Papagos met with Secretary Dulles for a brief luncheon in Paris, a sojourn from his extended tour of the Iberian Peninsula. In the meeting, the Greek Prime Minister protested a remark by Ambassador Cannon to Acting Prime Minister Kanellopoulos whereby he allegedly told him that the “US would not maintain its neutrality on the Cyprus question in the UN.” Clearly irritated by this remark, Papagos sought reassurance from Dulles that the US would retain its neutrality about the Cyprus question at the UN and to refrain from lobbying other nations in this regard. He also handed the Secretary a lengthy memorandum accusing the US of assisting the UK on the Cyprus question. Attached was a personal message to Eisenhower with a warning that

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27 No record of this conversation is found in State Department files. Papagos’ memorandum stated that Cannon told Kanellopoulos on October 15 that the US would “oppose any substantive recommendation by Committee I of the General Assembly on the Cyprus question:” *FRUS, 1952-1954*, VIII, n. 721.
the US could expect an “extremely unfavorable reaction by the Greek people” should its current policy on the Cyprus question continue. 29

Dulles tried to downplay any question of the American position by pointing out that since the British had a voiced similar criticism; it was a good indication of US neutrality.30

Obviously, the Greek Prime Minister took this statement as a promise that the Americans would remain neutral. But according to a memorandum of conversation dated December 16, 1954, Dulles had “promised” nothing to that effect and “made no commitment.”

Furthermore, State Department officials parsed the definition of “neutrality,” arguing that the word itself was subject to interpretation:

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By supporting a motion which was not directed against either Greece or Great Britain, the United States had, it seemed to Mr. Baxter, played a neutral part. We could not interpret the term "neutral" in such a narrow sense as to mean nothing but abstention on a Greek motion seeking application of the principle of self-determination to the People of Cyprus. 31
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While it is evident that throughout 1954 the Americans were sending confusing signals, this particular misunderstanding was as much the result of what the Prime Minister inferred, as anything the Secretary said. It is significant, however, that in this conversation Papagos suggested if the US could not retain its neutrality, it might help to have the item postponed for the year.32 This statement points to the fact that the Greek Prime Minister left the meeting uncertain as to where the Americans stood. When in November, following the Congressional elections, the US tried to persuade the rival parties to move for postponement, their initiative was rebuffed across the board. The

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32 Ibid., 719-720.
rejection for postponement frustrated the US. Lodge told Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Nutting and Dixon that the best he could promise was to vote against the Greek resolution, and the US “would not button-hole delegates or actively lobby on UK behalf” if Britain persisted in its efforts to have the Greek item “dealt with” and “killed.”

The New Zealand Resolution

Once the Greek appeal had been inscribed, Britain tried to resort to procedural means in an attempt to defeat the appeal. London enlisted the help of the “friendly nation” of New Zealand to submit a draft resolution not to consider further the Cyprus question. It was decided that the committee should be asked to discuss and vote on this proposal before taking up the substance of the Greek item.

On December 14, when Committee I considered the Greek item, New Zealand put forward a draft resolution on a point of order stating that the General Assembly would decide not to pursue it further. The rationale for this maneuver was that the New Zealand government was concerned “over the political consequences which would ensue from a debate on the substance of the question […] [and that since] the Greek claim for union with Cyprus with Greece […] was bound to adversely affect relations between Greece

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[...] the United Kingdom and Turkey [...] The Cyprus question involved the stability and security of the Middle East.”

Britain needed for the New Zealand draft resolution to show that the Greek motion was not based on a principle of self-determination, but rather a “territorial claim”. Abandoning its previous “neutral” position, the US stepped in to support the British. Ambassador Lodge, commenting on the ruling and the New Zealand resolution, stated that “it did not prevent Greece from stating its case since a decision not to consider the Cyprus question did not preclude discussion.” Moreover, he added, “‘prolonged’ consideration of the matter would only increase tensions and embitter national feelings at a time when the larger interests of all concerned are best served by strengthening existing solidarity among freedom-loving nations.” The British move was successful, and Committee I decided to give precedence to discussion of the New Zealand resolution over that of the Greeks.

Prior to the vote, however, Colombia and El Salvador submitted an amendment to the effect “that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus.” This was significant in that it addressed the competence of the General Assembly to deal with the Cyprus question rather than permanently removing it from its agenda. It also gave Greece a chance to save face even though its own motion had failed. Confronted with the realization that this was the most that could be achieved

36 UN Yearbook, 1954, 94.
at this stage, Greece cast its vote in favor of the New Zealand resolution and in the process, nullified its own.\footnote{Faustmann, \textit{ibid}, 14.} The amended draft resolution was adopted 49 to 0, with 11 abstentions. Greece, Britain, the US, and all NATO members voted in favor. The General Assembly endorsed the amended resolution 50 to 0 on December 17, with 8 abstentions.\footnote{The resolution of the General Assembly read: “The General Assembly, considering that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus, decides not to consider further the item entitled ‘Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus.’” Resolution 814 (IX), \textit{UN Yearbook}, 1954, 96.} The Greek resolution was never put to a vote.

As expected, the contending parties had widely divergent interpretations of the proceedings. The British and Turkish delegates emphasized that their votes for the resolution did not imply recognition of UN competence to discuss the item. The Greeks, on the other hand, interpreted it to mean the exact opposite. According to Kyrou, in inscribing the item on the agenda, the General Assembly “had recognized the international character of the issue.”\footnote{Editorial note, \textit{FRUS}, 1952-1954, VII, 748; Crawshaw, \textit{ibid.}, 88.} Even more importantly, the insertion of the phrase “for the time being” left the door “wide open” for future discussions of the issue.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} What both sides overlooked was that these resolutions were in no way binding for future Assembly proceedings.\footnote{Stefanidis, \textit{Isle of Discord}, 91.}
Chapter V

An Emerging Pattern: Preventing a Second UN Round

The ink had not yet dried on the New Zealand resolution when the parties to the dispute began gearing up for a second UN showdown. The US had received word that the matter would again be brought up in the next General Assembly unless substantive progress was made towards the situation. The Americans, who had yet to formulate its eventual Cyprus policy, feared that they could be confronted with even more “serious difficulties” in the UN and even on the island itself. ¹ The State Department, obsessed as ever about keeping a balance within NATO, believed that the best course was to retain a “flexible attitude” with regard to Cyprus by encouraging an “orderly and evolutionary development of Cypriot political rights.”²

Meanwhile, the British had been contemplating ways in which to win American support should the Cyprus question again arise in the coming year. The Foreign Office had convinced itself that the principle of self-determination, and enosis in particular, had been hijacked by the communists and by Alexis Kyrou.³ They now believed they had a chance of keeping the Cyprus question off the international stage since four leading Cypriot communist had been recently killed in a plane crash in China, and Kyrou was no

³ Kyrou, a Cypriot himself, and an ardent advocate of enosis, was expelled from Cyprus by the British for anti-British activities during the 1931 uprising. He was believed to be one of the main agitators in pushing the Greek agenda at the UN, Warren, Embtel Ankara 897, February 26, 1954: Ibid, 681.
longer with the Greek Foreign Office. The US, however, did not share this optimism and continued to press the British for a negotiated rather than an imposed constitution which seemed to be the default approach by Britain whenever the issue arose. Britain, therefore, believed that the best way to secure future American support would be to give the Cypriots a stake in the governance of the island. Thus the State Department welcomed the news that the Colonial Governor of Cyprus now believed that, “it may be possible to find [a] way out of [the] local impasse only if some declaration favoring eventual self-determination can be made,” and that he had cause to be optimistic that the British Government was now open to such a formula.

The US may have been too optimistic in this regard. A National Intelligence Estimate for Greece, dated, January 18, 1955 indicated that, “although the enosis issue is likely to be a continuing irritant in Greek relations with the UK, Turkey, and the US, it is unlikely that Greece’s alliances with these powers will be strained by this or any other issue.” This assessment could not have been further off the mark. In early spring, disagreements between the Colonial and Foreign Office in London, and especially the offices of Eden, dashed all prospects for developing a more laissez-faire approach. Furthermore, the “serious difficulties” feared by US officials were not the communist intrigues or inter-communal violence they had anticipated for the island. The Cyprus issue was about to become even more complex and violent with the onset of the EOKA campaign. It was the beginning of what the British quaintly refer to as ‘the troubles.’

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4 Nicolet, American Policy Towards Cyprus., 54.
5 Raymond Courtney, US Consul in Cyprus, to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 68, February 17, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3-1755, NARA.
6 Ibid, 55.
The EOKA Campaign

The reigning calm that had existed in Cyprus since the end of the Greek confrontation at the UN abruptly ended. On the morning of April 1, 1955, in what appeared to be a coordinated campaign, EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston), founded by the ultra Cypriot nationalist Colonel George Grivas, launched an armed struggle aimed at ending British rule and uniting Cyprus with Greece. On the same day, leaflets were distributed all over the island by EOKA calling for Greek Cypriots to “throw off the English yoke.” The campaign targeted government buildings and installations including the police and military, but with the exception of one EOKA fighter, no one was killed. Turkish Cypriots, however, were not targets in the campaign. At least at this stage, EOKA had no desire to transform inter-communal tensions into all out warfare since such a development would only serve to make a British withdrawal all the more difficult.

EOKA’s armed struggle came as shock to the Americans, who were unfamiliar with the organization. Though violence on the island was not unknown to US officials, they were unprepared for an organized campaign. The British, too, were taken by surprise. Contrary to prior assessments, the communists were not at the center of this new violent activity. Following the attacks, AKEL, along with the communist-controlled trade unions, issued a sharp condemnation, distancing them from the violence. For the Americans, especially, this was a perplexing development since it was an article of faith among the cold war

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8 Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict, 31.
10 Courtney Contel Nicosia 74, April 4, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/4-455, NARA.
warriors in the Government that the communists were the root of all evil in Cyprus. And this faith was not easily shaken.

Almost three months after the attacks, the US Consul to Cyprus Raymond Courtney still insisted that although the communists “do not seem to have taken part in these events, [...] one could hardly expect [them] not to be preparing to make good use of them.”11 If the usual suspects could not be held accountable, then just who was behind the violence? Britain had been incensed by the anti-colonial broadcasts by the state-owned Athens Radio in Cyprus. Neither Papagos nor any other Greek official seemed eager to condemn or discourage violence on the island, despite numerous pleas from US and UK diplomats.12 Already in January 1955, the British had seized a Greek vessel smuggling arms and explosives into Cyprus, further fueling suspicions.13 Although never definitively proven, both the British and Americans were convinced that the Greeks, namely Papagos, had “[given] the green light for EOKA to start its operations in Cyprus.”14

Near the end of March, there were signs that the British were searching for some sort of formula for self-determination, one which would “imply no definite British obligation for its application” but which would reassure the Greeks.15 While the US and Britain shared a mutual interest in preventing the Greeks from again taking the Cyprus issue to the UN, Britain’s motivation for avoiding the forum centered on retaining the colonial status of

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11 Raymond Courtney, FS Dispatch from Nicosia 118, June 30, 1955: *ibid.*, 3273, doc. 747C.00/6-3055, NARA.
12 Thurston, Embtel Athens 2763, June 21, 1955: *ibid.*, doc. 747C.00/6-2155, NARA.
13 According to Panteli, in a meeting with Grivas on January 11, 1955 Makarios informed the Colonel that he had indeed “secured the support of Papagos for their aims which were still to be sabotage,” 154.
the island. The Americans, on the other hand, wanted to prevent the Soviets from benefiting from any friction within the NATO alliance. While encouraged by this more liberal trend, the US continued to maintain that any formula needed to include a specific promise for self-determination if the British hoped to gain American support.

A tentative agreement between British and American officials regarding the future of Cyprus was reached in return for supporting the British policy and for US pressure to prevent a second Greek UN initiative. But the EOKA uprising and the upcoming elections in Britain took precedence, and the political future of Cyprus was, for the moment, set aside. In early April, Churchill resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced by Anthony Eden. The Americans hoped that the new change in leadership might prompt a more flexible approach to the Cyprus issue since “it was well known that Churchill was determined not to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”16 The US would, over time, discover just how wrong this assessment was.

**First Tripartite Conference Initiative**

The British response to the EOKA campaign was to invite the Greeks to participate in a Tripartite conference in London for a discussion on the “political and defense questions affecting the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus.” 17 In June, Dulles raised the Cyprus question with Macmillan in San Francisco, who told the Secretary that he had “a plan” that he could not yet reveal, but which he hoped that it would “relax the tension.” 18 By August 1955, Britain all but guaranteed Turkey would have a decisive role in charting

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the course for the future of Cyprus by extending an invitation to Ankara to also participate in the upcoming conference. Britain knew that neither country was in a position to decline the invitation since doing so would compromise their respective positions before the UN. Turkey’s inclusion in the conference was a source of dismay for Dulles who feared that Greece would not be pleased with this development. The British Ambassador, however, responded to his concerns by saying that since Greece was Turkey’s ally in NATO, they should welcome the prospect of Turkish participation “unless they were completely intoxicated by their own propaganda.”

Britain needed to ensure that Greece would either feel the pressure to concede or compromise its position. In order to achieve this, Turkey needed to present a strong enough case at the conference, and if that did not succeed, to win the debate at the UN. The Foreign Office hoped that with Turkey as a political partner, Greece would find the British colonial presence and the vague promise of enosis a preferable course. The alternative was to risk the implications that Turkish interference might bring. Not surprisingly, in July, Ambassador Melas called on Dulles to protest the inclusion of Turkey in the conference. Dulles reminded the Greek Ambassador that “Greece should not make it difficult for her friends to support her, and that that since the conference would include discussions of defense questions, the inclusion of Turkey was not “inappropriate.” The Greek Ambassador was in no way satisfied and left the meeting.

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20 Nicolet, ibid., 59.
21 Faustmann, The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 19.
repeating the charge that Britain was “once more following its policy of divide and rule.”

The British already knew that the Turkish mindset going into the conference was to keep the status quo on Cyprus. On August 18, Warren met with Turkish Prime Minister Zorlu and informed him that the US seriously hoped that the parties would not come to the conference “with fixed and irreconcilable positions,” and while the US had not yet formulated a policy on the Cyprus question, “time was on the side of the Greeks.” On August 23 Ambassador Melas met with Assistant Secretary Warren, who also told the Ambassador that he too believed time to be on the side of Greece, and they could “therefore afford to be reasonable.” Seeking further clarification of this remark, Melas met with Secretary Dulles the next day. Dulles explained that since current world opinion was moving towards favoring self-determination, it was only a matter of time until the Cyprus question was resolved along the lines of what Greece wanted. The Secretary also explained that the US had made a similar statement to the Turks, advising them to show some degree of flexibility or else risk damaging Anglo-Turkish relations, although he did offer reassurances to the Turks that the US had no intention of taking sides and would remain non-involved in the conference.

23 Ibid.
25 Drafted by Baxter and Wood, Deptel Washington 231, August 18, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-1855, NARA.
27 Ibid., 277.
28 Baxter, Memcon:“Cyprus,” August 23, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/ 8-2355, NARA.
Britain’s invitation to a conference on Cyprus was a double source of anxiety for the Greeks. First, the invitation suggested that Britain no longer considered the Cyprus question to be an internal domestic affair, signaling a shift in Britain’s ‘never’ position. Second, the Greek government feared that the conference was a ruse calculated to frustrate the forthcoming Greek appeal to the UN and give Turkey parity in the dispute. Essential, the Greeks found themselves in almost untenable position: accepting the invitation would invite a strong negative reaction from the press as well as the Cypriots. Refusal, however, would surely invite almost universal condemnation and compromise the Greek position at the UN.

In the end, Greece chose to accept the invitation but decided not to include Cyprus in its UN appeal during the regular application period. Both of these decisions by the Greek Government prompted a strong reaction from Makarios, who immediately went to Athens. What followed was a heated confrontation between the Archbishop and Papagos. This resulted in a shift in policy by the Greek Government, which submitted its appeal for the supplementary agenda of the General Assembly on July 23.

The Tripartite conference convened in London between August 29 and September 7 1955. Almost immediately, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Britain, and Turkey hit an impasse. Britain, which had anticipated this development, planned to break the stalemate by presenting its new constitutional proposals. For some time the Americans had been

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anxious to discover the contents of these proposals, but at the same time, keep cordial relations with Britain. In order to entice them into revealing the plan, the US Embassy in London revealed to the Foreign office a text to be presented to Greece that called for a denunciation of the violence in Cyprus and a plea for the Greeks not to bring the issue to the UN. This maneuver pleased the British, but incensed US Embassy officials in Athens, who called it “most inappropriate that ‘the British had been given a tip-off on the Department’s instructions.’” This move by the London Embassy ran contrary to the US position formulated by the NEA which stated, “[u]ntil we know whether the British plan [contains] any constructive steps we should keep our position quiet.”

Following Macmillan’s opening remarks, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos took the stage and set forth his government’s basic position which called for a plebiscite at a time to be determined; Britain would also be allowed to maintain a military presence on the island. It was then Zorlu’s turn to speak. Encouraged by the British, the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed his country’s position in the most extreme manner, using a creative Turkish interpretation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne to justify his argument. He claimed that any alteration of the Treaty of Lausanne would effectively void the Treaty and jurisdiction of Cyprus would then revert to Turkey. He also underlined the terms under which Britain was granted sovereignty over the island:

...when Turkey receded within the boundaries of her national pact with the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish Government felt the need of specifically determining the fate of Cyprus and, by Articles 20 and 21 of that

33 FO to Athens 319, June 11, 1955: FO 371/117637, doc. RG 1081/4477.
35 John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, to Dulles, Memorandum : “Suggested Conversation with Foreign Secretary Macmillan re Cyprus,” June 13, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-1355, NARA.
36 Le conflit de Chypre, 690-708.
Treaty, determined the status of the Island. According to Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish sovereignty of Cyprus lapsed on the 5th November, 1914 and Cyprus was legally annexed to Great Britain as from that date. Article 21 of the same Treaty contains definite stipulations as to the conditions under which the people of Cyprus who were all Turkish subjects would assume Turkish or British nationality. By the terms of this Article the signatories have agreed that those of the inhabitants of Cyprus who do not opt to remain Turkish citizens could only become British subjects. In other words, the fate of the Island was exclusively a matter of concern between Turkey and Great Britain. It was thus agreed and consented to by all the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, and it was on those terms that the Island went to Great Britain.37

Stephanopoulos was shocked by Zorlu’s speech and accused the British of being behind Turkey’s unreasonable position. It was all that Foreign Secretary Macmillan could do to keep both parties from walking out of the conference.38 On September 6, Macmillan revealed Britain’s new constitutional plan for Cyprus in the hope that Stephanopoulos and Zorlu would agree to give them some consideration. The plan called for internal self-government with guarantees of proportionate representation of the Turkish Cypriots and a supervisory committee consisting of British, Greek, and Turkish representatives. While recognizing the right to self-determination, it steered clear of any commitment to a precise date.39

Stephanopoulos’ reaction was measured. He told Macmillan that the Greek Government was still undecided, but that he knew his government would be disappointed since the proposals failed to give a “categorical assurance for self-government and a specific date for the promulgation of the constitution.”40 On the other hand, Macmillan found himself

37 Statement by the Minister of State and Acting Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu at the London Conference on Cyprus, August 31, 1955.
38 Butterworth to Dulles Embtel London 877: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00//9-255, NARA.
39 Faustmann, ibid., 20.
pleading with Zorlu to be reasonable or risk making a “deplorable impression” by allowing the usually high-strung Greeks to appear more levelheaded than the Turks.\footnote{Record of Conversation, September 7, 1955, quoted here in Holland, \textit{Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus}, 74.}

The foremost question on Zorlu’s mind was whether the British Government accepted “any principle of self-determination, which might ultimately lead to the independence of the Island or to its accession to another country.” Macmillan responded by saying that “we do not accept the principle of self-determination as one of universal application. We think that exceptions must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, strategical, and other considerations.”\footnote{Cmd. 9594, \textit{The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus}, 37; see also Butterworth, Embtel London 447, September 9, 1955: \textit{FRUS, 1955-1957}, XXIV, 279-280.} Macmillan further explained that while this was “the basic principle on which British policy was founded, […] it was not necessarily in all circumstances [the] overriding principle.”\footnote{Holland, \textit{ibid.}, 75.} This was, in the words of Holland, “just another more complicated way of falling back on Hopkinson’s ‘Never’ statement of 28 July, 1954.”\footnote{Holland, \textit{ibid.}, 75.}

\textbf{Anti-Greek Riots in Turkey}

On the same day, riots erupted in Istanbul and Izmir, sparked by the news that the birthplace of Ataturk in Thessaloniki had been bombed. Serious attacks against Greeks and Armenians followed. It was later discovered that the bombing was carried out by a Turkish \textit{agent provocateur} and that the riots were orchestrated by the Menderes Government, which took the opportunity to suggest that the trouble was the direct result of Greek-Turkish tensions over the Cyprus issue. In contrast, Stephanopoulos, unaware of...
the Turkish complicity in the incident, apologized on behalf of the Greek government.

This incident not only sabotaged any hope for progress in the conference, but would also be a factor in the shift in international opinion in favor of Turkey. 45

The Americans reacted by immediately issuing a statement to the Menderes government deploring the incident and “apparent lack of effective police intervention which [appeared] to have been [the] result of coordinated planning.” 46 No official US reaction was offered to Greece. Liberal Party leader George Papandreou feared that the US might be abandoning Greece since it had failed to condemn “the atrocities in Turkey against the Greeks.” 47

On September 13, a Foreign Ministry official reported that the Greek Government, particularly Stephanopoulos, was “deeply concerned” about the growing public and press attacks against the US for failing to officially condemn the violence. 48 During a meeting with Ambassador Melas on the same day, Assistant Secretary Jernegan finally acknowledged the atrocities, telling him that the US was “shocked by the outbreak of violence in Turkey” and had made its views known to Ankara. Jernegan was also quick to add that it was important not to allow this incident to further damage inter-allied relations within NATO and the Balkan alliance. 49

The Americans were trying to appear to be the honest broker by trying to mitigate relations between Greece and Turkey, but their main concern was an earlier

48 Thurston, Embtel Athens 653, September 13, 1955: ibid, 288.
49 Memcon between Melas and Jernegan, September 12, 1955: ibid, 543.
announcement by Greece that its forces would not participate in NATO maneuvers, and that it was contemplating severing diplomatic relations with Turkey. It was clear that the US had underestimated the depth of Greek resentment regarding the slow US response in condemning the Turkish actions. A message to Dulles from King Paul not only drove home this resentment, but also served as a warning that an affirmative vote for inscription of the Cyprus issue at the UN would be regarded as “a positive sign of friendship.”  

But not this, nor an appeal from Stephanopoulos, nor the sober assessment of Ambassador Cannon that the Greeks would risk estranging its allies to put Cyprus on the agenda could compel Washington to look beyond its preoccupation with its own immediate interests. 

**Aftermath of the Tripartite Conference**

On September 17, the Greeks rejected the British plan on the grounds that it did not provide for future self-determination for the island, saying that “this constitution was a type that could not be regarded as adequate for so highly developed and civilised a people as the Cypriots.” Moreover, the Greeks believed that the committee’s right to intervene in the administration of Cyprus would only serve to undermine the experiment in self-government. For its part, Turkey also rejected the British proposal outright, arguing that a constitution which did not afford equality to the Turkish Cypriots was a non-starter, and would never be acceptable. Macmillan’s comments to Zorlu, which unequivocally rejected the principle of self-determination, emboldened the Turks and made it easy for

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50 King Paul to Dulles, Message (undated): *ibid.*, 77-78.
51 Hoover, Deptel Athens 853, September 20, 1955: *ibid.*; It was Cannon’s conclusion that despite the best efforts of the US the Cyprus issue might be inscribed “by virtue of support that Greece may receive from the Afro-Asians, Soviets, and Latin Americans.” Cannon to Baxter, Embtel Athens 752, September 21, 1955: *ibid.*, 301-303.
them to rebuff the proposals, while citing Greek intransigence as the reason. Although the Tripartite conference was a diplomatic failure, it was a watershed moment for Greece and Turkey in that it established the two as interested parties in the Cyprus dispute. 54 As Hatzivassiliou concludes:

From now on, the Cyprus question could no longer be approached as “a colonial” issue with an international perspective, but an international question with a colonial aspect. This development is important for two reasons: first, if the Cyprus issue was viewed from a colonial perspective the will of the majority population (Greek Cypriots) would be considered more carefully than if it were an international question; secondly, in an international question, the views of the most important ally of Britain, which in this case was Turkey, would most likely prevail. 55

From this time forward, Greece would focus all of its energy on making the UN an instrument of Greek policy.

Britain was the one country to benefit from the London conference. The riots in Turkey had shifted international public opinion in favor of the British view that an open debate about Cyprus would only worsen the situation. 56 Moreover, Britain’s sponsorship of the conference combined with Macmillan’s constitutional proposals, unacceptable as they were, created the sense that Britain had made a genuine attempt to move towards self-government for Cyprus. 57

**Second UN Appeal**

When movement for a second Greek recourse to the UN began in the spring of 1955, US officials were still hopeful that some agreement could be reached that would make this

55 Hatzivassiliou, *ibid.* 41.
option unnecessary. In the aftermath of the failed London conference, the British were desperate to win US support at the UN, and were clearly alarmed by rumors that the Americans were contemplating supporting Greece. The Greeks were also harboring the unfounded belief that, this time, the Americans would come through in the international forum. Once again, pragmatism fell to GTI Director Chalmers Wood, who recommended the US take a laissez-faire position in any UN debate. According to Wood, a vote for inscription would give the UN jurisdiction over a question where it clearly should have none. On the other hand, a vote against inscription would place the US in a position where it was publicly opposing its friends. Thus, the best course of action would be for the US to abstain, so as to “remain non-committal on a question which involved three of our allies.”

Despite misgivings, in the end, Dulles agreed with Britain, and the US voted against inscribing the Cyprus issue at the UN. On September 23, absent US support, the Greek appeal was rejected by the General Committee 7 to 4 with 4 abstentions. The US defended its vote by again emphasizing that the “importance [of] free world unity and [the threat] to NATO far exceeds that of [the] Cyprus question.” The majority of the General Assembly backed the Anglo-American position and sustained the decision of the General Committee. As was the case in 1954, support for Greece came largely from the communist countries, Latin America and Arab states. The US had been Britain’s

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61 Crawshaw, ibid., 137.
63 UN Yearbook, 1955, 77–8
advocate in the General Committee, arguing that negotiations, not international involvement, were the surest path to a solution for Cyprus. While Britain and Turkey reiterated their arguments from the 1954 session, Greece argued that the situation had deteriorated to the point where UN intervention was the final resort.  

The US had pinned its prospects on the success of the London conference in the hope that recourse to the UN might be avoided. The Turkish riots, however, alarmed the State Department which was “ever fearful of doing anything that might look to some right-winger on Capitol Hill as a concession to Moscow.”  

While the US had few tangible interests in Cyprus, Turkey, in addition to being a NATO country, was also a member of the Baghdad Pact, thus making her a more valuable ally than Greece. By voting against inscription, the US believed that it could compel the three parties to continue discussions, which were considered key to resolving the Cyprus question and securing NATO unity. What the Americans failed to appreciate was the profound effect that the vote against inscription would have on the NATO alliance and Greek-American relations at large.

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64Ibid., 78.
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10 Courtney Contel Nicosia 74, April 4, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/4-455, NARA.
warriors in the Government that the communists were the root of all evil in Cyprus. And this faith was not easily shaken.

Almost three months after the attacks, the US Consul to Cyprus Raymond Courtney still insisted that although the communists “do not seem to have taken part in these events, [...] one could hardly expect [them] not to be preparing to make good use of them.”\footnote{Raymond Courtney, FS Dispatch from Nicosia 118, June 30, 1955: \textit{ibid}., 3273, doc. 747C.00/6-3055, NARA.} If the usual suspects could not be held accountable, then just who was behind the violence? Britain had been incensed by the anti-colonial broadcasts by the state-owned Athens Radio in Cyprus. Neither Papagos nor any other Greek official seemed eager to condemn or discourage violence on the island, despite numerous pleas from US and UK diplomats.\footnote{Thurston, Embtel Athens 2763, June 21, 1955: \textit{ibid}., doc. 747C.00/6-2155, NARA.} Already in January 1955, the British had seized a Greek vessel smuggling arms and explosives into Cyprus, further fueling suspicions.\footnote{According to Panteli, in a meeting with Grivas on January 11, 1955 Makarios informed the Colonel that he had indeed “secured the support of Papagos for their aims which were still to be sabotage,” 154.} Although never definitively proven, both the British and Americans were convinced that the Greeks, namely Papagos, had “[given] the green light for EOKA to start its operations in Cyprus.”\footnote{Tozun Bahçeli, \textit{Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955}, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1990), 35.}

Near the end of March, there were signs that the British were searching for some sort of formula for self-determination, one which would “imply no definite British obligation for its application” but which would reassure the Greeks.\footnote{Hatzivassiliou, \textit{Britain and the International Status of Cyprus}, 25.} While the US and Britain shared a mutual interest in preventing the Greeks from again taking the Cyprus issue to the UN, Britain’s motivation for avoiding the forum centered on retaining the colonial status of
the island. The Americans, on the other hand, wanted to prevent the Soviets from benefiting from any friction within the NATO alliance. While encouraged by this more liberal trend, the US continued to maintain that any formula needed to include a specific promise for self-determination if the British hoped to gain American support.

A tentative agreement between British and American officials regarding the future of Cyprus was reached in return for supporting the British policy and for US pressure to prevent a second Greek UN initiative. But the EOKA uprising and the upcoming elections in Britain took precedence, and the political future of Cyprus was, for the moment, set aside. In early April, Churchill resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced by Anthony Eden. The Americans hoped that the new change in leadership might prompt a more flexible approach to the Cyprus issue since “it was well known that Churchill was determined not to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”\(^\text{16}\) The US would, over time, discover just how wrong this assessment was.

**First Tripartite Conference Initiative**

The British response to the EOKA campaign was to invite the Greeks to participate in a Tripartite conference in London for a discussion on the “political and defense questions affecting the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus.”\(^\text{17}\) In June, Dulles raised the Cyprus question with Macmillan in San Francisco, who told the Secretary that he had “a plan” that he could not yet reveal, but which he hoped that it would “relax the tension.”\(^\text{18}\) By August 1955, Britain all but guaranteed Turkey would have a decisive role in charting


\(^{17}\) Stavrinides, *ibid.*, 28.

the course for the future of Cyprus by extending an invitation to Ankara to also participate in the upcoming conference. Britain knew that neither country was in a position to decline the invitation since doing so would compromise their respective positions before the UN. Turkey’s inclusion in the conference was a source of dismay for Dulles who feared that Greece would not be pleased with this development. The British Ambassador, however, responded to his concerns by saying that since Greece was Turkey’s ally in NATO, they should welcome the prospect of Turkish participation “unless they were completely intoxicated by their own propaganda.”

Britain needed to ensure that Greece would either feel the pressure to concede or compromise its position. In order to achieve this, Turkey needed to present a strong enough case at the conference, and if that did not succeed, to win the debate at the UN. The Foreign Office hoped that with Turkey as a political partner, Greece would find the British colonial presence and the vague promise of enosis a preferable course. The alternative was to risk the implications that Turkish interference might bring. Not surprisingly, in July, Ambassador Melas called on Dulles to protest the inclusion of Turkey in the conference. Dulles reminded the Greek Ambassador that “Greece should not make it difficult for her friends to support her, and that that since the conference would include discussions of defense questions, the inclusion of Turkey was not “inappropriate.”

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20 Nicolet, ibid., 59.
21 Faustmann, The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 19.
repeating the charge that Britain was “once more following its policy of divide and rule.”

The British already knew that the Turkish mindset going into the conference was to keep the status quo on Cyprus. On August 18, Warren met with Turkish Prime Minister Zorlu and informed him that the US seriously hoped that the parties would not come to the conference “with fixed and irreconcilable positions,” and while the US had not yet formulated a policy on the Cyprus question, “time was on the side of the Greeks.” On August 23 Ambassador Melas met with Assistant Secretary Warren, who also told the Ambassador that he too believed time to be on the side of Greece, and they could “therefore afford to be reasonable.” Seeking further clarification of this remark, Melas met with Secretary Dulles the next day. Dulles explained that since current world opinion was moving towards favoring self-determination, it was only a matter of time until the Cyprus question was resolved along the lines of what Greece wanted. The Secretary also explained that the US had made a similar statement to the Turks, advising them to show some degree of flexibility or else risk damaging Anglo-Turkish relations, although he did offer reassurances to the Turks that the US had no intention of taking sides and would remain non-involved in the conference.

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23 Ibid.
25 Drafted by Baxter and Wood, Deptel Washington 231, August 18, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-1855, NARA.
27 Ibid., 277.
Britain’s invitation to a conference on Cyprus was a double source of anxiety for the Greeks. First, the invitation suggested that Britain no longer considered the Cyprus question to be an internal domestic affair, signaling a shift in Britain’s ‘never’ position. Second, the Greek government feared that the conference was a ruse calculated to frustrate the forthcoming Greek appeal to the UN and give Turkey parity in the dispute. 29 Essentially, the Greeks found themselves in almost untenable position: accepting the invitation would invite a strong negative reaction from the press as well as the Cypriots. Refusal, however, would surely invite almost universal condemnation and compromise the Greek position at the UN. 30

In the end, Greece chose to accept the invitation but decided not to include Cyprus in its UN appeal during the regular application period. 31 Both of these decisions by the Greek Government prompted a strong reaction from Makarios, who immediately went to Athens. What followed was a heated confrontation between the Archbishop and Papagos. This resulted in a shift in policy by the Greek Government, which submitted its appeal for the supplementary agenda of the General Assembly on July 23. 32

The Tripartite conference convened in London between August 29 and September 7 1955. Almost immediately, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Britain, and Turkey hit an impasse. Britain, which had anticipated this development, planned to break the stalemate by presenting its new constitutional proposals. For some time the Americans had been

29 Faustmann, ibid., 20.
31 Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, 124-125.
anxious to discover the contents of these proposals, but at the same time, keep cordial relations with Britain. In order to entice them into revealing the plan, the US Embassy in London revealed to the Foreign office a text to be presented to Greece that called for a denunciation of the violence in Cyprus and a plea for the Greeks not to bring the issue to the UN. This maneuver pleased the British, but incensed US Embassy officials in Athens, who called it “most inappropriate that ‘the British had been given a tip-off on the Department’s instructions.'” This move by the London Embassy ran contrary to the US position formulated by the NEA which stated, “[u]ntil we know whether the British plan [contains] any constructive steps we should keep our position quiet.”

Following Macmillan’s opening remarks, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos took the stage and set forth his government’s basic position which called for a plebiscite at a time to be determined; Britain would also be allowed to maintain a military presence on the island. It was then Zorlu’s turn to speak. Encouraged by the British, the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed his country’s position in the most extreme manner, using a creative Turkish interpretation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne to justify his argument. He claimed that any alteration of the Treaty of Lausanne would effectively void the Treaty and jurisdiction of Cyprus would then revert to Turkey. He also underlined the terms under which Britain was granted sovereignty over the island:

…when Turkey receded within the boundaries of her national pact with the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish Government felt the need of specifically determining the fate of Cyprus and, by Articles 20 and 21 of that

33 FO to Athens 319, June 11, 1955: FO 371/117637, doc. RG 1081/4477.
35 John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, to Dulles, Memorandum: “Suggested Conversation with Foreign Secretary Macmillan re Cyprus,” June 13, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-1355, NARA.
36 Le conflit de Chypre, 690-708.
Treaty, determined the status of the Island. According to Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish sovereignty of Cyprus lapsed on the 5th November, 1914 and Cyprus was legally annexed to Great Britain as from that date. Article 21 of the same Treaty contains definite stipulations as to the conditions under which the people of Cyprus who were all Turkish subjects would assume Turkish or British nationality. By the terms of this Article the signatories have agreed that those of the inhabitants of Cyprus who do not opt to remain Turkish citizens could only become British subjects. In other words, the fate of the Island was exclusively a matter of concern between Turkey and Great Britain. It was thus agreed and consented to by all the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, and it was on those terms that the Island went to Great Britain.37

Stephanopoulos was shocked by Zorlu’s speech and accused the British of being behind Turkey’s unreasonable position. It was all that Foreign Secretary Macmillan could do to keep both parties from walking out of the conference.38 On September 6, Macmillan revealed Britain’s new constitutional plan for Cyprus in the hope that Stephanopoulos and Zorlu would agree to give them some consideration. The plan called for internal self-government with guarantees of proportionate representation of the Turkish Cypriots and a supervisory committee consisting of British, Greek, and Turkish representatives. While recognizing the right to self-determination, it steered clear of any commitment to a precise date.39

Stephanopoulos’ reaction was measured. He told Macmillan that the Greek Government was still undecided, but that he knew his government would be disappointed since the proposals failed to give a “categorical assurance for self-government and a specific date for the promulgation of the constitution.”40 On the other hand, Macmillan found himself

37 Statement by the Minister of State and Acting Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu at the London Conference on Cyprus, August 31, 1955.
38 Butterworth to Dulles Embtel London 877: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/9-255, NARA.
39 Faustmann, ibid., 20.
pleading with Zorlu to be reasonable or risk making a “deplorable impression” by allowing the usually high-strung Greeks to appear more levelheaded than the Turks.  

The foremost question on Zorlu’s mind was whether the British Government accepted “any principle of self-determination, which might ultimately lead to the independence of the Island or to its accession to another country.” Macmillan responded by saying that “we do not accept the principle of self-determination as one of universal application. We think that exceptions must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, strategical, and other considerations.” Macmillan further explained that while this was “the basic principle on which British policy was founded, […] it was not necessarily in all circumstances [the] overriding principle.” This was, in the words of Holland, “just another more complicated way of falling back on Hopkinson’s ‘Never’ statement of 28 July, 1954.

**Anti-Greek Riots in Turkey**

On the same day, riots erupted in Istanbul and Izmir, sparked by the news that the birthplace of Ataturk in Thessaloniki had been bombed. Serious attacks against Greeks and Armenians followed. It was later discovered that the bombing was carried out by a Turkish agent provocateur and that the riots were orchestrated by the Menderes Government, which took the opportunity to suggest that the trouble was the direct result of Greek-Turkish tensions over the Cyprus issue. In contrast, Stephanopoulos, unaware of

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42 Cmnd. 9594, *The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus*, 37; see also
44 Holland, *ibid.*, 75.
the Turkish complicity in the incident, apologized on behalf of the Greek government. This incident not only sabotaged any hope for progress in the conference, but would also be a factor in the shift in international opinion in favor of Turkey. 45

The Americans reacted by immediately issuing a statement to the Menderes government deploring the incident and “apparent lack of effective police intervention which [appeared] to have been [the] result of coordinated planning.”46 No official US reaction was offered to Greece. Liberal Party leader George Papandreou feared that the US might be abandoning Greece since it had failed to condemn “the atrocities in Turkey against the Greeks.” 47

On September 13, a Foreign Ministry official reported that the Greek Government, particularly Stephanopoulos, was “deeply concerned” about the growing public and press attacks against the US for failing to officially condemn the violence.48 During a meeting with Ambassador Melas on the same day, Assistant Secretary Jernegan finally acknowledged the atrocities, telling him that the US was “shocked by the outbreak of violence in Turkey” and had made its views known to Ankara. Jernegan was also quick to add that it was important not to allow this incident to further damage inter-allied relations within NATO and the Balkan alliance. 49

The Americans were trying to appear to be the honest broker by trying to mitigate relations between Greece and Turkey, but their main concern was an earlier

48 Thurston, Embtel Athens 653, September 13, 1955: ibid, 288.
49 Memcon between Melas and Jernegan, September 12, 1955: ibid, 543.
announcement by Greece that its forces would not participate in NATO maneuvers, and
that it was contemplating severing diplomatic relations with Turkey. It was clear that the
US had underestimated the depth of Greek resentment regarding the slow US response in
condemning the Turkish actions. A message to Dulles from King Paul not only drove
home this resentment, but also served as a warning that an affirmative vote for inscription
of the Cyprus issue at the UN would be regarded as “a positive sign of friendship.” 50 But
not this, nor an appeal from Stephanopoulos, nor the sober assessment of Ambassador
Cannon that the Greeks would risk estranging its allies to put Cyprus on the agenda could
compel Washington to look beyond its preoccupation with its own immediate interests. 51

**Aftermath of the Tripartite Conference**

On September 17, the Greeks rejected the British plan on the grounds that it did not
provide for future self-determination for the island, saying that “this constitution was a
type that could not be regarded as adequate for so highly developed and civilised a people
as the Cypriots.” 52 Moreover, the Greeks believed that the committee’s right to intervene
in the administration of Cyprus would only serve to undermine the experiment in self-
government. 53 For its part, Turkey also rejected the British proposal outright, arguing
that a constitution which did not afford equality to the Turkish Cypriots was a non-starter,
and would never be acceptable. Macmillan’s comments to Zorlu, which unequivocally
rejected the principle of self-determination, emboldened the Turks and made it easy for

50 King Paul to Dulles, Message (undated): *ibid.*, 77-78.
51 Hoover, Deptel Athens 853, September 20, 1955:*ibid.*; It was Cannon’s conclusion that despite the best
efforts of the US the Cyprus issue might be inscribed “by virtue of support that Greece may receive from
the Afro-Asians, Soviets, and Latin Americans.” Cannon to Baxter, Embtel Athens 752, September 21,
1955: *ibid.*, 301-303.
them to rebuff the proposals, while citing Greek intransigence as the reason. Although the Tripartite conference was a diplomatic failure, it was a watershed moment for Greece and Turkey in that it established the two as interested parties in the Cyprus dispute. 54 As Hatzivassiliou concludes:

From now on, the Cyprus question could no longer be approached as “a colonial” issue with an international perspective, but an international question with a colonial aspect. This development is important for two reasons: first, if the Cyprus issue was viewed from a colonial perspective the will of the majority population (Greek Cypriots) would be considered more carefully than if it were an international question; secondly, in an international question, the views of the most important ally of Britain, which in this case was Turkey, would most likely prevail. 55

From this time forward, Greece would focus all of its energy on making the UN an instrument of Greek policy.

Britain was the one country to benefit from the London conference. The riots in Turkey had shifted international public opinion in favor of the British view that an open debate about Cyprus would only worsen the situation. 56 Moreover, Britain’s sponsorship of the conference combined with Macmillan’s constitutional proposals, unacceptable as they were, created the sense that Britain had made a genuine attempt to move towards self-government for Cyprus. 57

**Second UN Appeal**

When movement for a second Greek recourse to the UN began in the spring of 1955, US officials were still hopeful that some agreement could be reached that would make this

55 Hatzivassiliou, *ibid.* 41.
option unnecessary. In the aftermath of the failed London conference, the British were
desperate to win US support at the UN, and were clearly alarmed by rumors that the
Americans were contemplating supporting Greece. The Greeks were also harboring the
unfounded belief that, this time, the Americans would come through in the international
forum. Once again, pragmatism fell to GTI Director Chalmers Wood, who
recommended the US take a laissez-faire position in any UN debate. According to Wood,
a vote for inscription would give the UN jurisdiction over a question where it clearly
should have none. On the other hand, a vote against inscription would place the US in a
position where it was publicly opposing its friends. Thus, the best course of action would
be for the US to abstain, so as to “remain non-committal on a question which involved
three of our allies.”

Despite misgivings, in the end, Dulles agreed with Britain, and the US voted against
inscribing the Cyprus issue at the UN. On September 23, absent US support, the Greek
appeal was rejected by the General Committee 7 to 4 with 4 abstentions. The US
defended its vote by again emphasizing that the “importance [of] free world unity and
[the threat] to NATO far exceeds that of [the] Cyprus question.” The majority of the
General Assembly backed the Anglo-American position and sustained the decision of the
General Committee. As was the case in 1954, support for Greece came largely from the
communist countries, Latin America and Arab states. The US had been Britain’s

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61 Crawshaw, ibid., 137.
63 UN Yearbook, 1955, 77–8
advocate in the General Committee, arguing that negotiations, not international involvement, were the surest path to a solution for Cyprus. While Britain and Turkey reiterated their arguments from the 1954 session, Greece argued that the situation had deteriorated to the point where UN intervention was the final resort.64

The US had pinned its prospects on the success of the London conference in the hope that recourse to the UN might be avoided. The Turkish riots, however, alarmed the State Department which was “ever fearful of doing anything that might look to some right-winger on Capitol Hill as a concession to Moscow.” 65 While the US had few tangible interests in Cyprus, Turkey, in addition to being a NATO country, was also a member of the Baghdad Pact, thus making her a more valuable ally than Greece. By voting against inscription, the US believed that it could compel the three parties to continue discussions, which were considered key to resolving the Cyprus question and securing NATO unity. What the Americans failed to appreciate was the profound effect that the vote against inscription would have on the NATO alliance and Greek-American relations at large.

64Ibid., 78.
Chapter VI

The Harding-Makarios Talks

Soon after the decision not to inscribe the Cyprus item on the UN agenda, Britain appointed Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, a seasoned military man and retired Chief of the General Imperialist Staff, to replace Sir Robert Armitage as Governor of Cyprus. Harding, who was given broader powers than his predecessor in regard to security, believed that before a political solution could be found, violence on the island first needed to be brought under control.1

The new Governor arrived in Cyprus on October 3, 1955, for a scheduled meeting the next day with Archbishop Makarios at Ledra Palace. This meeting would be the first significant effort to find a negotiated settlement for the Cyprus problem, and discussions between Makarios and Harding would proceed intermittently over the several months. The diplomatic contortions of the Harding-Makarios talks have been thoroughly analyzed elsewhere, and will not be covered in any great detail here.2 The talks were held between October 4, 1955, and February 29, 1956, punctuated by a several interruptions and backroom haggling over who was responsible for making sure that the discussions did not break down. Sir John Reddaway, then Acting Administrative Secretary,

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characterized them as “a dialogue of the deaf.”³ Initially, Harding was confident that a satisfactory agreement could be reached based upon the principle of self-determination and, in his view; there was no one more moderate than Makarios to negotiate the terms for a constitutional government. Although the parties did reach a tentative agreement regarding a liberal form of self-government and the right of self-determination, in the final stages, the talks broke down.⁴

According to Faustmann, the failure of the Harding-Makarios talks rests largely with Britain’s reluctance to compromise on a number of critical points. First, the Colonial Government refused to rule out a possible Turkish veto with respect to Greek Cypriot self-determination and to grant a Greek majority in parliament; secondly; Britain rejected Makarios’ argument that the Greek Cypriots and not Britain, should be responsible for the internal security of the island; and lastly, Britain flatly rejected any program that would grant amnesty to EOKA fighters.⁵

While Harding’s political inexperience contributed to the breakdown of negotiations, Makarios was hamstrung by his own political constraints. The Archbishop had to proceed cautiously since too many compromises on his part could easily brand him a traitor among the extremist elements within the high Orthodox clergy and the EOKA. While the British had, through procedural means and US assistance, managed to dodge the Cyprus issue at the UN yet again, they knew it was a matter of time before the Greeks succeeded in having it inscribed on the agenda: “At the United Nations we were successful through

⁴ Faustmann, The Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 22.
⁵ Ibid, 22.
the use of a procedural device which enabled anti-colonial delegations and the United States to avoid voting against self-determination. We cannot expect to do the same trick again, and the Greeks might well get a majority. “6 Hopkinson’s 1954 statement, which had proposed no change in sovereignty and included the fatal word “never,” had been the cause of consternation in Greece as well as Cyprus, but it was Lyttleton’s remark about Greece being an unstable country that drove the Greeks over the edge. The British resented US support as much as they needed it, and knew they were in competition with the Greeks for American favor. Past resistance by the US made them uncertain as to whether they could count on its support should the question again arise in the future. Still Britain knew it had to come up with a new formula in order to keep the Greeks from seeking a third recourse at the UN.

By February 1956, Makarios had abandoned his hard-line “enosis and only enosis” position, while Britain discarded their uncompromising “never” mindset, replacing it with what is probably their best-known abuse of the English language, the now infamous double-negative formulation: “it is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of the consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean.”7

7 Makins to Dulles, Letter containing a new formulation for Cyprus, November 11, 1955: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 314. According to Holland, external restraints on both sides had been the main reason for the failure of the talks, Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 87.
From this time forward, Britain’s new formula for self-determination would not be “never” but “not yet.”

**Beginning of Active US Engagement**

Following the death of Papagos in October 1955, the US began considering a more active policy towards Cyprus. Ambassador Lodge, who had urged a more vigorous engagement on the part of the State Department, advised Dulles to contact the new Greek Prime Minister, Constantinos Karamanlis, and his Foreign Minister, Spyridon Theotokis, who they believed might be more forthcoming with regard to the Cyprus issue. The Ambassador was determined to wake the State Department from its ambivalent stupor by insisting that the time was “now or never,” and by pointing out that the “Greek element” in the US “had been aroused because of this question.” Referring to the messages of protests he had received, he reminded Dulles that “next year with all the Congressman running,[ Cyprus question] it would be a factor.”

Moreover, with a presidential election on the horizon the potential for a political backlash was a real danger. Lodge emphasized that “it will not be possible to politically to take the line next year that was taken this year.” It was becoming apparent that the US could no longer afford to be ambivalent where Cyprus was concerned. It was now not only an international issue, but it was becoming a domestic one as well. Further pressure needed to be applied to the British to find a solution for the Cyprus problem.

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8 CO 926/548, Select Documents, 426.
9 Lodge to Dulles, Letter, October 11, 1955: doc. 611.81/10-1155, NARA.
In a conversation with Dulles, Macmillan indicated that the Foreign Office might be agreeable to a formulation for self-determination based on the Eisenhower-Churchill Declaration of June 29, 1954 (Potomac Charter).\(^{11}\) Since the declaration did not explicitly mention self-determination, Britain felt secure in using it in its new formula. The US, however, did not interpret the British position to mean that self-determination could never be applicable to Cyprus. In any regard, the Americans had to be pleased that Britain at least appeared to take into account the all-important objective of securing NATO:

Her Majesty’s Government adheres to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the [Declaration] Potomac Charter, and the Pacific Charter to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of the consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean.\(^{12}\)

In a letter to Washington on November 11, the FO anticipated that the State Department would be satisfied with the new British formula and thus press the Greeks to also get on board:

You will no doubt draw Mr. Dulles’ attention to the reference in our new formula to the Potomac Charter […] which he recalled in his message to Mr. Macmillan on October 5 […]. We hope that he will use his influence with the Greek Government to persuade them to accept the new formula and in turn to persuade the Greek Cypriot clergy to do likewise.\(^{13}\)

Ambassador Cannon in Athens noted that the British formula “though less specific than some hoped, it is [a] definite step in [the] direction sought by the Greeks and, if saner

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\(^{13}\) FO to Washington 5502, November 11, 1955: PREM 11/834.
judgment could prevail, by [the] Cypriots themselves." On November 24 the British Ambassador asked the State Department to instruct Ambassador Cannon to press the Greeks to recommend the British formula to Makarios. The State Department instructed Cannon to make this approach and any other that would help to keep the British initiative "alive." Karamanlis, Theotokis, and Dulles agreed that the new formula was a "real step forward," but the Greek Prime Minister felt that he could not commit himself prior to the elections, because he believed that the opposition would "make great political capital" out of the "national unity theme.""17

This was acceptable to the US, since the overwhelming American interest was to safeguard governments in the region responsive to Western security concerns. The Karamanlis government, which tended to lean right, needed to tread carefully since it already had a dubious reputation at home for being too conciliatory where Western interests were concerned. Still, the British were grateful for any US support in handling the Greeks, and were pleased that some cooperation from Athens was finally forthcoming.

In an unprecedented move by the British, the FO agreed, for the first time, to include an American proposal "to hold talks [with Makarios] for the purpose of clarifying the

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14 Cannon, Embtel Athens 1297, November 22, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-2255, NARA.
17 Luce, Embtel Rome 1962, December 1, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12-155, NARA.
18 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 40.
formula and exploring [a] method [of] application.”\footnote{Foreign Minister Theotokis commented that the British formula was “put in such a way to be practically unintelligible:” Dulles, Embtel Paris Secto 7, December 17, 1955: \textit{FRUS, 1955-1957}, XXIV, 321; Dulles, Deptel London 3113, December 3, 1955: \textit{ibid.}, 314.} They even went so far as to allow the US to rephrase the wording of the first paragraph, according to the proposals of Ambassador Thurston in Athens—not to expand it, but to make it easier for the Archbishop to accept by changing the double negative formulation of self determination.\footnote{The full text of the US revised formula can be found in an attachment to a note dated December 8, 1955: Barbara Salt to Chalmers Wood: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12-55, NARA; In a meeting between Dulles and Macmillan in Paris, the Secretary of State described the double negative as “awkward,” after which, Macmillan reportedly agreed to remove it: Dulles, Embtel Paris Secto 7, December 17, 1955: \textit{FRUS, 1955-1957}, XXIV, 321; Thurston to Dulles, Embtel Athens 1381 December 1, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12-155, NARA; Dulles, Embtel Athens 1963, January 13, 1956: \textit{FRUS, 1955-1957}, XXIV, 330.} Although the State Department regarded the revised formula favorably, Dulles did express concern for being publicly identified with it should it fail: “In [the ] Department [‘s] view [the] revised formula represents [a] fair offer and [it] is in the US interest to continue [to] work for understanding based on it, despite risk of adverse publicity. If we use our good offices rather than co-sponsor [the] formula, we can avoid some of this odium.”\footnote{Dulles, Embtel Athens 1963, January 13, 1956: \textit{FRUS, 1955-1957}, XXIV, 330.}

Unlike the Americans, Britain did not harbor a fetish about maintaining the integrity of NATO’s southeastern flank. Macmillan, especially, appeared undisturbed by any potential communist intrigues. In a conversation with Makins in London he stated that he did “not believe the Greeks would go Communist or leave NATO” because “[a]ll Greek Parties, including the Opposition were capitalists.” It was this reasoning that led Britain to conclude that the Greeks would “[not quarrel] with the United States so long as the Americans took a firm view” and did “not allow themselves to be frightened or
bullied.”²² For his part, Eden was in full accord with this opinion. It was apparent, however, where British priorities lay; they believed they had less responsibility towards securing the Western alliance in the Mediterranean than they did with finding a way out of the Cyprus problem.²³

State Department officials were not the only ones disturbed by what they perceived as conflicting priorities. President Eisenhower himself expressed similar concerns and was well aware of the fact that Britain and the United States did not “see eye to eye” on a number of issues. In a diary entry dated January 1, the President expressed bewilderment over Britain’s inability to construct a program for Cypress that would be “perfectly acceptable to the Greeks, the Cypriotes [sic], and at the same time would protect Western world interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Clearly the President, at least at this juncture, did not have a full appreciation of just how tall an order that was.²⁴

Similarly, Eisenhower also lamented Britain’s strong-arm tactics towards Jordan regarding its membership in the Baghdad Pact: “they went blindly ahead and only recently have been suffering one of the most severe diplomatic defeats Britain has taken in many years” after Jordan’s withdrawal from the Pact “under compulsion of riots.” Eisenhower feared that a similar fate awaited NATO. “Likewise,” he continued, “they have dilly-dallied with the Cypress situation until now three countries, as well as the

²³ Nicolet, ibid., 71.
island itself, are all excited, namely, Turkey, Greece, and Britain.” 25 These thoughts
provide a revealing view of the singular opinions held by Britain and the United States,
ot only towards Cyprus, but the Middle East at large.

While Britain was mainly concerned with the erosion of her empire, the Americans were
largely focused on the disruption of the Western alliance in the larger framework of East-
West rivalry. 26 Despite the disparity between the US and Britain with respect to Cyprus,
the British understood that American support, no matter how tepid, was indispensable.
Policy differences aside, during this phase, tensions between the US and Britain subsided
and a spirit of cooperation prevailed. 27

In the end, attempts to alter the double-negative formula regarding self-determination had
little impact on Archbishop Makarios’ decision to accept or reject it. The British held
little hope for a satisfactory resolution for Cyprus anytime soon. To a large degree British
policy was hobbled by the inflexibility of the Turkish position, which could not be
dismissed since it was Britain who had invited Turkey into the mix. But the US was still
determined to try to salvage the negotiations. On March 5, Ambassador Cannon
suggested that the US try to mitigate the damages by pointing out that the problem had
been “narrowed” to a few items: “in describing these we can help [the] British get [the]
Turks off their high horse in [the] crucial demand for “equal’ representation. Latter point

25 Ibid.
26 Nicolet, ibid., 72.
27 FO to Washington 5770, November 29, 1955: PREM 11/1250; Makins, Washington to FO 3017,
September 12, 1955: DEFE 11/180..
goes to the heart of the question since there can be no solution if the British continue to let the Turks retain their hidden veto over forthright expression of HMG’s true intent.”

American support was not without its constraints either, because of its concern with preventing the defeat of the Karamanlis government in the upcoming elections. For its part and, despite its interests, Turkey kept a surprisingly low profile during this period, choosing to remain silent with respect to its interests in Cyprus. As a matter of fact, in their meeting in Paris, it was Dulles who had to introduce the subject of Cyprus into his discussion with Zorlu.

Following the failure of the Harding-Makarios talks, the Archbishop, along with the Bishop of Kyrenia and two others, were arrested on March 9, 1956 and exiled to the Seychelles. They would remain there for thirteen months. The final straw for Britain which led to the Archbishop’s exile was his refusal to publicly denounce EOKA violence. The Archbishop’s defiance on this point would be a reoccurring theme in future negotiations with Britain. But despite their differences, the Harding-Makarios negotiations represent the closest Britain and Greece had come in reaching an understanding. Makarios’ absence did nothing to quell the violence, and the EOKA struggle continued. Although the Greek Cypriot leadership argued that no negotiations could take place without the Archbishop, it was clear that EOKA would continue the struggle with or without Makarios.

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28 Cannon, Embtel 2395, March 5, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/ 3-556, NARA.
30 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 63.
Reactions to the Deportation of Makarios

News of the deportation of the Archbishop and his associates first reached the US Embassy in London via the ticker. The Foreign Office duly informed the Embassy shortly thereafter. The FO’s plan had been to inform the State Department as soon as Makarios was off the island, but a delay in the transmission of Harding’s cable resulted in the news first appearing on the ticker. The deportations, however, had not come as a complete surprise to the State Department. As early as June 30, 1955, Consul Courtney in Nicosia had alerted Dulles to the likelihood that if the security situation on the island continued to deteriorate, it would likely lead to the “arrest of large numbers of persons possibly including the Archbishop and his associates.” In September, 1955, then Governor Armitage had been advised that plans were underway to deport “the other bad bishop”, Kyprianos, Bishop of Kyrenia, whom the British always considered to be a greater threat than Makarios.

On November 26 Harding proclaimed a state of emergency on Cyprus. He had been in the process of initiating another round of talks with Makarios in which the Archbishop’s continual refusal to publicly distance himself from EOKA violence was becoming a major point of contention. The British interpreted the breakdown of the talks not only as evidence of “bad faith” on the part of the Archbishop, but also indicative of his

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32 Courtney, FS Despatch Nicosia 118, June 30, 1955: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00’6-3055, NARA.
33 Panteli, ibid., 172.
34 The state of emergency included: banning public assemblies; introduction of the death penalty for carrying a weapon; and declaring strikes illegal. British troops were put on a wartime footing, and approximately 300 British policemen were transported to the island as replacements for EOKA sympathizers who had been purged from the local forces, see Parliamentary Debates: Official Report: House of Commons: “Cyprus,” 546, November 28, 1955.
collusion with EOKA. Lennox-Boyd said Makarios’ refusal to condemn the violence made him as culpable as one who encourages it.  

The Americans, sensitive to the importance of keeping the allies at peace with each other, refrained from publicly commenting on Makarios’ alleged sympathies with EOKA. American intelligence agencies did, however, conduct its own investigations of the Archbishop’s activities. The investigations yielded no hard evidence which made American support for Britain all the more difficult. Since the US fully understood that the Greeks would jump at the chance to exploit any sign of trouble in Anglo-American relations, the US resisted public criticism of Britain’s actions. Despite the urgent advice of Cavendish W. Cannon, the US Ambassador to Greece, Washington refused to distance itself from Britain. It was only after the repeated urgings of Cannon and protests from Senate Minority leader, William F. Knowland, that the State Department reluctantly issued an anemic statement to the press. While emphasizing American commitment to a satisfactory solution to the problem, it was conspicuously silent with regard to the deportations: "the United States Government earnestly hoped that basic agreements might be reached which would enable the people of Cyprus to achieve their legitimate desire of cooperation in the establishment of a government truly representative of the people of the island."  

Although privately, many in Washington were appalled at being put in so embarrassing a position by an “ally who frisks nuns and deports an archbishop,” in reality, US officials

35 The Times, March 6, 1956.  
36 Ibid., 74-75.  
were less concerned with the deportations than with publicly alienating Britain. The British, however, saw the incident in a completely different light. London seethed at the implicit censure in the State Department’s declaration and, if that were not enough, the next development threatened to bring Anglo-American relations to the “boiling point.”

In Athens, Ambassador Cannon followed up Washington’s declaration by issuing his own statement to the press expressing his “sympathetic concern” and praising the Greeks for their “dignity and statesmanship” in the matter. Apparently, Cannon was unaware of Washington’s “tilt” towards Britain when he made his statement. Meanwhile, the London Daily Mail, seizing upon the Ambassador’s statement, vigorously denounced it as a “kick in the teeth” to Britain, while Ambassador Makins called for an official explanation. In an effort to smooth over the incident, the State Department hurriedly issued another statement that appeared to back away from its earlier position by insisting that the US was “not taking sides.”

At his press conference President Eisenhower initiated his own damage control by emphasizing the special relationship between Britain and the US and, of course, the critical preservation of the NATO alliance:

Here is a place where two of our very best friends are engaged in an argument with very great difficulty. Now, we are friendly to both, not only friendly in the sense of traditional friendship with these two peoples, but on top of that, both are vitally necessary to NATO . . . So we are ready to do anything that is reasonable and practicable to help in reaching some solution, but the solution itself is going to have to be reached by the people most greatly concerned.

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
The President’s well-intended remarks only served to further complicate the situation by not for the first, nor even the last time, neglecting Turkey’s interest in the Cyprus question. Eisenhower’s omission prompted Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick of the Foreign Office to resurrect the earlier accusation that “the Turkish point of view was not sufficiently appreciated in the United States, although Kirkpatrick quickly added that “he was not defending the Turkish point of view.” The Turks, for their part, appeared to not have noticed the slight. Nicolet attributes this to the possibility that Turkey interpreted the ambiguous “best friends” reference to mean Britain and Turkey. Whatever the meaning, on March 18, London’s Observer noted that the effect that Eisenhower’s statement had had on the whole affair was that it brought “America […] back where she always was – an impartial well-wisher planted firmly on the fence.”

For the moment, the embattled Ambassador Cannon was forced to defend his words by explaining that the embassy staff had “reviewed [the] situation and decided that if [they] were to hold the line for major US interests in Greece and [the] Eastern Mediterranean […] something must be done at once. I therefore decided on a personal statement.” Although Cannon accepted responsibility for his part in the whole affair, he was not hesitant in assigning the State Department its fair share of the blame. In a telegram to Dulles dated March 14, Cannon criticized the State Department’s statement as “not quite meeting the national psychological situation” in Greece. In his effort to dodge the diplomatic bullet, the Ambassador was aided by Greek officials who informed him that

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42 Nicolet, ibid., 75.
his statement came “at five minutes to Midnight for Greece,” and because of it, the US “need not now worry about Greek participation in NATO.”

Cannon’s explanation was quickly followed by a response from Under Secretary Herbert C. Hoover, who attempted to bridge the American credibility gap by trying to clarify State Department policy: “our statements since [the] deportation [s] were designed solely to restore [an] atmosphere permitting [the] resumption [of] negotiations.” By the end of the week the injured parties seemed somewhat placated, though Britain was less than happy about the continued US pressure for a resumption of negotiations, which clearly was not possible without bringing the Archbishop back from exile, a move Britain was not prepared to make. For the British, the talking was over, at least for the foreseeable future. And despite their best efforts, the Americans could not change their minds.

44 Cannon to Dulles, Embtel, Athens 2538, March 14, 1956: SDCDF, 747C.00/ 3-1456, NARA.
Chapter VII

New Approaches to the Cyprus Problem

An article in *Time* magazine characterized the deportation of Makarios as “one of the most muddleheaded decisions of Prime Minister Eden's indecisive tenure”\(^1\) and, indeed, there were many who would agree with this assessment. First and foremost, the Archbishop’s deportation created a vacuum in Greek Cypriot representation. Despite EOKA’s suspicions about the Archbishop’s commitment to enosis, without him, there was little hope for any real progress. The Ethnarchy was especially adamant that no negotiations could take place without him, and the Opposition in Britain agreed.\(^2\) The Americans also shared a similar view. Moreover, they were of the same mind as the Labour Party that London was not moving quickly enough in developing a new plan for Cyprus.\(^3\) But unbeknownst to the impatient Americans, a new formula was in the works which, at least partly, reflected the prevailing views of the US diplomatic establishment.\(^4\)

In the short-term, there was no plan to return the Archbishop to the island, but the new scheme did entail revisiting the question of self-determination and the inclusion of

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\(^1\) “Exile Comes to the Archbishop,” *Time*, March 19, 1956.
\(^2\) Following Makarios’ deportation, the Athens Government not only recalled the Greek Ambassador to Britain, but it also instructed Greece’s permanent representative to the UN to register a formal protest with that organization. Moreover, there was a massive public protest in Athens in which thousands converged on Constitution Square waving Greek flags and chanting anti-British slogans, *Ibid.*; Although Labour made a show of attacking the Conservatives over Cyprus, it did not represent a very “effective Opposition with regard to colonial policy in general” in that when confronted by a choice between principle and politics, it purposefully chose the latter, see, Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 120-121 and Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*, passim.
\(^4\) Holland, *ibid.*, 131.
NATO. It was Governor Harding, in a memorandum issued in April 1956, who introduced a role for NATO into the proposal and, what is more, became the principal architect of the plan.

**Weighing the Options**

In February 1956, the politically ambitious Governor of New York, Thomas Dewey sent a memorandum to Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams suggesting that “NATO may be the only peaceful ultimate haven for Cyprus.” In response, Robinson McIlvaine, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public affairs, told Adams that the idea of NATO assuming responsibility for the administration of Cyprus was highly unlikely, since any placement of NATO forces required the unanimous agreement of all its members. And there was little chance that Greece, Turkey, and Britain could be brought on board with such a plan. He did, however, suggest that NATO might be enlisted in an effort to reconcile the differences among the three parties. Greece was especially “cool” to the prospect of NATO interference. Among their objections was the belief that NATO involvement in the Cyprus issue might give the UN permission to “back away” from the issue.

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5 According to Holland, the idea of self-determination after a fixed interval was one that had been suggested several times by the Americans see, *ibid.*, 131.
7 Dewey to Adams Memorandum, February 8, 1956: Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President, WHCF (Confidential File), 1953-61, Subject Series, Department of State (April 1956), DDE-Library, 3; Dewey had three unsuccessful runs for the Presidency of the US, putting him on par with another persistent, but failed presidential candidate, William Jennings Bryant. The governor’s interest in international affairs was likely motivated by his desire to gain a cabinet appointment in the Eisenhower Administration.
8 McIlvaine to Adams, Memorandum: *ibid.*, 3.
9 Cannon, Embtel Athens 2602, March 21, 1956: SDCDF, 747C.00/3-2156, NARA.
Shortly thereafter, Dulles also weighed in on the feasibility of a NATO solution. In a
telegram to Ankara on April 4, 1956, the Secretary of State acknowledged “the growing
feeling [that] NATO should not sit idly by with all its implications for future unity and
cooperation.” But at the same time, the Secretary was not oblivious to the possible loss
of prestige and unity of the alliance should it become embroiled in the dispute and
expressed concern that NATO recognition might also provide the Greek Government
with a situation where it would reject any solution that did not include enosis. 10

A few weeks later at a news conference, in response to a question along the same lines,
Dulles said, “to put a situation like Cyprus under the administration of a council […] 15
nations acting through representatives who […] cannot agree on anything except after
lengthy discussion, is not an effective form of government.”11 Despite this opinion,
Dulles, at a Council Meeting in Bonn on May 3, told Selwyn George that unless the
Cyprus situation showed some improvement, a NATO solution might be inevitable.12
According to Holland, the Americans, although reluctant to involve the alliance in the
Cyprus problem, recognized that “the NATO stick provided one means by which the
Eisenhower Administration could coax the British into a more conciliatory frame of
mind.”13

In April the island experienced its first inter-communal clashes, lending a new gravity to
the search for a solution to the problem. In the past, EOKA had targeted only those Greek

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11 Dulles, “The Role of NATO in the Cyprus Dispute”: Reply Made by Secretary of State to a Question
asked at a News Conference,” April 17, 1956: American Foreign Policy Current Documents: 1956:
Western Europe, 403.
12 Holland, ibid., 125.
13 Ibid, 126.
Cypriots whom they regarded as traitors and British soldiers, and any Turkish casualties were collateral damage. Initially, EOKA attacks were mainly directed against Turkish constables in retaliation for their cooperation with the British police. Over time, however, as the attacks grew more violent, the British redoubled their efforts to solicit Turkish support for their policy and to bolster enthusiasm among the Turkish Cypriots for the importance of the role of Turkey in Cyprus.  

Meanwhile, Anglo-Greek relations remained tense. Since the departure of the Greek Ambassador to London, the last remaining conduit between the two countries was the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Charles Peake, who had anticipated the early demise of the Karamanlis Government and was regarded with suspicion by the Greeks. He also believed that the Greek Government had allowed itself too be too closely aligned with extremist elements and could not disassociate itself from Makarios. Indeed, in May, Washington had learned that the consensus in London was that the “Cypriot tail still wags the Greek dog,” and [the British Government] “could only maintain [the] pretense of negotiating without being able to take a constructive position.”

This, however, was not the only reason for Britain’s inflexibility. Cyprus was critical to Britain. But events outside of the Cyprus dispute were making the island’s geographical location even more important in their minds and, arguably, the imaginations of many in

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14 One example of Britain’s propaganda campaign and its continual efforts to play the “Turkish card” in Cyprus is in a handbook issued to British troops based on island at the time. Among other things, the pamphlet makes use of dubious pro-Turkish arguments such as the idea that Cyprus was actually the geographical continuation of Anatolia: *Why We Are in Cyprus: Background Notes for British Servicemen*, March, in FS Despatch Nicosia 122, April 26, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/4-2656, NARA.

the government. As a result, Harding’s new set of proposals were about to come into
direct conflict with the ambitions and nationalist sentiments of the “Party of Empire.”

The last British troops were slated for withdrawal from the Suez base on June 13, 1956.
Accordingly, it is useful to examine the conventional arguments that favored the retention
of the status quo in Cyprus. First, the island was regarded as "the last remaining British
base of any importance in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area." Withdrawal
from the Suez Canal strengthened the strategic value of the island and "made it a
necessity to securely hold it as a 'spring board' for British troops." It also served as "a
convenient base both for Air Force operations and the movement of troops by air [within
the Middle East].” Moreover, Britain had treaty obligations with Iraq and Jordan as well
as through the Baghdad Pact that might require a swift deployment of troops to the
region. 16

Furthermore, the volatile situation in the Middle East might easily result in "some
depetration of oil to the United Kingdom and Western allies generally, and at the same
time, would open the way for Russian and Communist infiltration." Finally, Cyprus was
important to the security of the eastern flank of NATO. The British Government believed
that in the event of a military crisis, both Greece and Turkey would need further support
“and this could best be done from Cyprus.”17 Of course, safeguarding NATO was the

16 “Defence Strategy in the Middle East Cairo,” Dispatch 5 March 16, 1956: A1838/2 item152/11/72/1
pt.4, National Archives of Australia quoted here in Stavros T. Stavrides, Cyprus in March 1956, Australian
Documents, " (Athens: National Center for Hellenic Studies and Research, 2006); Hatzivassiliou, Britain
and the International Status of Cyprus, 70
17 Ibid.
foremost concern of the United States.

In anticipation of Britain’s withdrawal from Suez, the Conservatives in Parliament were gripped by “a spasm of ultra sentiment.” Consequently, Eden’s position shifted dramatically from the urgency of preserving Cyprus as a base for defense against the communist threat and Soviet aggression, to arguing for the necessity of a strong presence in Cyprus as the only way for Britain to safeguard the oil reserves of the Middle East. Economic considerations, not military or ideological ones, now defined his new doctrine—“Cyprus is a NATO interest, but it is not only that” Eden stated in a speech on June 1 [emphasis added]. The Prime Minister believed that similar to Gibraltar, Cyprus needed to remain firmly within the empire and described the slippery slope that would ensue should Britain lose the island: “no Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that.” While this may have been an overwrought statement and oversimplification of the problem, it is important to note that it did reflect a current of British thought at the time.

This thinking may have resonated through the corridors of Parliament, but the British military took a somewhat different view of the island’s importance. The Chiefs of Staff (COS) now believed that Cyprus, because of its lack of deep water ports, was of no

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18 Holland, ibid., 135.
19 FS Despatch London 2990, June 4, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C00/6-456, NARA, 1.
practical use to the navy. Moreover, with one exception,\textsuperscript{21} they also concluded that the island was virtually worthless for securing the oil installations of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{22}

Despite the significant conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff, the British Government stood firm in its view that retention of the island was a “stabilizing factor” in the Middle East. If this was to be the case, then the Chiefs of Staff held firm in its belief that Turkey needed to come along “in any change that might be contemplated” as it was an essential ally in both NATO and the Baghdad Pact.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, there were some Foreign Office officials who assumed that “the Turkish-political’ objectives might well take precedence over the British Government’s requirement for a base in Cyprus.”\textsuperscript{24}

To a certain extent, the Americans shared the same views. An NSC meeting on May 17 indicates that the US was rethinking its traditional Cold War containment policy and moving towards substituting its military strategy with an economic approach:

[W]hatever the nature of the changes going on in the USSR, we could at least safely conclude that these changes require us to do more by way of building economic strength around the periphery of the Soviet Union, rather than continue our present scale to build military strength around the periphery. The older policy which we have continued to pursue was obviously justifiable when it was undertaken some five years ago in the light of Soviet aggressive moves against Greece, Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. Now, however, the time has come to reverse this policy.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{The ‘June Plan’}

\textsuperscript{21} Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Gerald Templar was the dissenting voice.
\textsuperscript{22} Hatzivassiliou, \textit{ibid.}, 69.
\textsuperscript{23} Quoted here in \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{25} Memorandum: Discussion at the 285\textsuperscript{th} NSC Meeting, May 17, 1956: \textit{Declassified Documents}, doc. 1988 2269, 13.
In June 1956, Britain introduced a new constitutional plan based partly upon Harding’s proposals, contingent upon the elimination of terrorism and the full restoration of law and order. The plan was to be formulated by the newly appointed Constitutional Commissioner, Lord Radcliffe, the prominent British jurist whose past accomplishments included arbitrating the border between India and Pakistan in 1947. Although the plan did not provide for an immediate guarantee for self-determination, it did allow for the possibility after ten years.²⁶ This, however, would be conditional upon a joint security treaty between the UK, Turkey, and Greece as well as full protection of minority rights:

It shall be a condition of any change in the international status of Cyprus, that a treaty shall be concluded between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, regulating their common interest the use of Cyprus for military purposes. Such a treaty would be terminable only by an agreement between the parties, would provide that the United Kingdom should continue to be responsible for the external defence of Cyprus and to enjoy facilities in the island as may be necessary for this purpose and for that of discharging British Treaty obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East […] It shall similarly be a condition that the implementation of a decision to change the international status of Cyprus would be made dependent upon a special treaty arrangement by which the interests of minority racial groups were fully safeguarded.²⁷

One of the most salient features of the ‘June Plan’ was that the “question of self-determination” [could] not be raised internationally by the three governments, or be discussed between them, during the intervening period of ten years.”²⁸ But from a tactical standpoint, the most striking feature was that while it was to be withheld from the Greeks, Turkey was to be informed of the plan and pressured into accepting it. This would be no easy task since the British Government had previewed it to the Turkish Government and that it had received a “rough reception.” The Turkish Foreign Minister

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believed that it was “dangerous,” in that it was“apt to make the Greeks more
intransigent.” 29

From the beginning, it was understood that any real success for the British plan was
dependent upon the support of its “friend,” the US. 30 While Ambassador Makins in
Washington believed that Dulles needed to be pressured, he also anticipated the
objections that the Secretary of State might entertain, highlighting them in a letter to the
Foreign Office on June 13. First, Dulles would have difficulty with a constitution that
was to be imposed rather than negotiated, as had been the case in a similar situation in
1954— and there was no reason to think that the Secretary had changed his views.
Second, he would object to the ambiguous structure of the “elected majority” Finally, it
could not be excluded that Dulles still held the hope that negotiations with Makarios
might resume. Makins attributed these possible objections to the fact that the Americans
have “never given due weight to the strength of Turkish feeling.” 31

Request for official US support came in a June 19 letter from Foreign Secretary Selwyn
Lloyd, prior to Dulles receiving the actual plan. In it, Lloyd defended the British
government’s reasons for informing the Turks beforehand, saying that since a “sharp
reaction” was to be anticipated, “we feel bound to put the draft statement of policy before
the Turkish Government in advance.” 32 Similarly, in a message attached to the proposal
statement, also dated June 19, Lloyd provides the following observations: the “main
problem in handling Cyprus was the Turks […] the new British proposal provided

29 Memcon between Coulson and Dulles, June 19, 1956: ibid., 368.
30 Holland, ibid., 138.
reasonable safeguards for the Turkish position, but the Turks would need ‘a lot of persuading if they were to accept this.”33 This view was undoubtedly shared by many in London.

Dulles was unimpressed by the explanation and annoyed at being presented with an obvious fait accompli.34 In a memorandum to the British chargé d'affaires, John Coulson, he lamented that the US had “no voice in this question except as the British Government desired us to have one.”35 He emphasized that there was little chance that the US would cooperate with the initiative. His reasons, however, were very different from the ones which Makins had anticipated. Dulles’s main concern regarded the overarching security safeguards granted to Turkey: “the Secretary then asked if the treaty provisions of the plan did not give the Turks in effect a veto, since if they did not adhere, the plan could not commence. Mr. Coulson agreed that this was so.”36 In a meeting between Makins and Dulles a few days later, Dulles elaborated on this point:

The Secretary observed the principal objection to the British proposal...was the provision that settlement of the question of self-determination would depend upon a British-Greek-Turkish Treaty even in advance of NATO consideration of the problem...at present the Turks would have no legal basis to obstruct a settlement, but under the terms of the proposals...they would know that they would have the legal power to stall the implementation of the self-determination feature. Thus the British would be depriving themselves of their sole legal responsibility in the matter and would bring about a divided authority that might cause trouble in future years.37

33 Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: lot 66 D. 204, “UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Dulles/Herter, 7/54 thru 3/57, “Vol. I.
34 Moreover, it did not help matters that a few days previously, EOKA had bombed a restaurant in Nicosia, killing U.S. Vice Consul William P. Boteler and wounding three other American members of the consular staff as they sat at dinner, see Holland, ibid., 138.
36 Memcon between Coulson and Dulles, June 19, 1956, ibid., 368; Holland, ibid., 138; Hatzivassiliou, ibid, 72.
Makins countered by saying that this was unlikely to occur since even if the Turks or the Greeks could effectively block the implementation of the plan after a ten year period, they could not withstand the international pressure. And at any rate, should this happen, NATO could surely step in to pressure Greece and Turkey into negotiating a more equitable solution. Dulles, however, remained unconvinced, since in his view “neither the Greeks nor the Turks were nearly as sensitive to international pressures as the United States and Great Britain.”\(^{38}\) Dulles went on to say that based upon his understanding of the proposals, NATO would have no jurisdiction in “absence of the Treaty itself,” and he could not “envisage” a scenario in which NATO could successfully compel the Greeks and Turks to reach a settlement. Consequently, Dulles had serious reservations about the merits of the proposals.\(^{39}\) Moreover, the Secretary believed that under the plan, the Greeks and Turks would be granted extraordinary rights that they did not at present possess which would significantly limit the flexibility the British had in “disposing of the problem.” Dulles also worried that the US would find itself in the difficult position of supporting the plan and hesitated to do so “unless there were some reasonable chance of acceptance by Greece.” The Secretary concluded that this was unlikely to happen without first privately discussing the matter with the Greek and Turkish Governments.\(^{40}\)

All that remained was for President Eisenhower to convey these misgivings to Prime Minister Eden. Aware of the President’s limited understanding of the Cyprus situation, Dulles communicated his assessment in the simplest terms: “let us suppose the UK

\(^{38}\) Ibid, 373.
\(^{39}\) Ibid, 373.
\(^{40}\) Ibid, 374.
wanted to make Cyprus independent, Greece would have the veto power over that. If they
[British] did this thing [the plan], then their hands would be tied theoretically in
perpetuity.41 Accordingly, Eisenhower communicated this idea in a letter to the British
Prime Minister on June 23. “Is it wise,” the President asked somewhat rhetorically, “for
you to dilute your own authority by giving both Greece and Turkey what amounts to an
indefinite veto power over any future change in the International status of Cyprus? […]It
seems to me important,” he continued, that the United Kingdom should retain a sufficient
initiative and flexibility in its own hands[…]” He concluded by asking if there was not
some way that Britain might avoid granting a veto power to either Turkey or Greece.42

As might be expected, the British were furious. Harding immediately contacted the
Colonial Office. He could scarcely believe that the Secretary “was in favor of
maintaining indefinitely British sovereignty over Cyprus.” The alternative explanation
could only be that the Americans were trying to press the British into “the granting of a
constitution which would certainly be used to as a quick and easy stepping-stone to self-
determination and hence to enosis.” Harding agreed with Peake’s assessment that the US
was hoping “to appease the Greeks in general and Karamanlis in particular.”43 Harding
was mistaken in his appraisal. As it happened, the US, including Dulles, was in favor of
British sovereignty all along.44

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41 Dulles to Eisenhower, Telecon, June 23, 1956: Papers of John Foster Dulles 1951-1959, Telephone
Conversations Series, Memoranda of Telephone Conversations-White House January 3, 1956-August 31,
1956, DDE-Library, quoted here in Nicolet, ibid., 81.
43 Harding to Lennox Boyd, Nicosia to CO 1232, June 26,1956: FO 371/12902,doc.RG 108/1378,PRO,
quoted here in Nicolet, ibid., 82
44 Ibid.
Throughout the latest Anglo-American drama over Cyprus, the State Department had been preparing a memorandum on the preservation of US overseas military bases, operating rights, and facilities. The US was experiencing an increasing opposition to its military presence in many of its client states and worried that increased pressure might make it difficult for local governments friendly to the US to continue their cooperation:

In Iceland and Saudi Arabia, our existing base rights are in jeopardy. In Morocco, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the Azores, we are faced with difficult negotiations whose outcome is uncertain. In the Philippines and Okinawa, local opposition in some aspects of our overseas base programs has become so outspoken that maintenance of our existing facilities is becoming a major internal political issue. In Thailand, criticism is beginning to mount, led by opposition elements. Even in Spain there are signs of trouble. Our British allies have already suffered from the general change in attitude and are faced with the loss of their existing bases and military rights in Ceylon and with major complications in Cyprus and Singapore.  

It was against this volatile backdrop and in relation to the looming Suez crisis that Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the following observation, underlining the importance of preserving British sovereignty in Cyprus:

[...] the British would be completely out of the picture in the Middle East if they lost Cyprus and its bases. While the American military have not counted on using Cyprus bases in the event of hostilities, nevertheless the fact remains that if we were barred from a Cyprus base we would have to go in and seize some other base or else induce the Turks to provide us with one.

The above assessment clearly refers to Operation Stockpile, an initiative that was under consideration at the State Department in May 1956. The idea of using Cyprus as a location for a “pool” of US aircraft and military equipment came from Dulles, who was

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looking for a way to meet Israel’s demands for arms without supplying them directly. It was also intended to deter attacks by both the Arabs and Israelis. Both parties would be aware of the pool, and in the event of an attack, the victim of the aggression would receive the aircraft. The idea was eventually shelved, however, after it was concluded that although Cyprus would be the only possible place for stockpiling military equipment, “the island itself” would present the US with “very serious complications.” Moreover, Admiral Radford expressed reservations about having a pool of military equipment in the region “to be turned over to someone who is aggressed against after aggression has occurred” was not “realistic” and “did not serve the purpose for which it was intended.” Radford was also concerned that that the airfield facilities in Cyprus were not very good and would not be adequate for a turn-over point for Israeli pilots.

Up to this point, the US position regarding a solution for the Cyprus problem still remained uncertain. While the Americans were at a loss as to find a specific resolution for the island’s troubles, they were perfectly clear in what they wanted with regard to their own interests. The US believed that Cyprus should be available for military use in the event of a regional conflict or another emergency. Given this, it stood to reason that the island needed to be under the control of a dependable ally, which at present could only have been the UK. From the American perspective, the June Plan jeopardized the

49 MacArthur to Dulles, Memorandum: April 9, 1956, SDCDF, S/S-NEA, Lot 61, D 417, Omega #1, 2, NARA.
stability of Cyprus and thus threatened the military installations there. In light of increasing opposition against Western bases throughout the rest of the world, Cyprus was now more important than ever to the alliance. Consequently, there were no tears in Washington when the Turkish Government officially rejected the proposals on June 30, 1956.
Chapter VIII

Lost Opportunities-EOKA Ceasefire

On July 12 Eden announced in the House of Commons the appointment of Lord Radcliffe as Constitutional Commissioner. Radcliffe was tasked with arranging a set of proposals aimed at granting a measure of liberal self-government to Cyprus under British sovereignty and safeguarding both Turkish Cypriot rights and British strategic interests. President Eisenhower issued a brief announcement stating that “the US welcomes the intention of the British Government […] to proceed with the development of self-government on the island of Cyprus.”

The creation of a Constitutional Commission was also regarded as a step forward by Governor Harding since it reflected his views on the relationship between violence and constitutional questions which had softened since his dealings with Makarios. It appeared that Governor Harding was backing away from his original position to first establish order on Cyprus and "let the murderers make the first move if there is to be a stopping of violence" before seeking a political solution. But he defended the Radcliffe appointment with claims that the “terrorists were beginning to crack,” and it was only a matter of time before Security Forces would “break” EOKA.

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1 Dulles, Deptel Athens 171July 14, 1956: SDCDF, 747C.00/7-1456, NARA.
2 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 142.
3 Quote by Harding in “The First Move,” Time, August 27, 1956.
4 Governor Harding’s Broadcast on Cyprus, July 12, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-1356, NARA.
The source of Harding’s confidence was not only the victories against EOKA in June, but also the nearly successful apprehension of its leader, Colonel George Grivas.  

On August 19, in a move that took everyone by surprise, leaflets presumably written by Grivas, were scattered throughout Cyprus ordering the "suspension of operations by all forces under [his] authority," in return for a ceasefire. In response, the Greek government promptly drew up a communiqué characterizing the EOKA offer as a "noble decision." But at the last minute, fearing that the leaflets might not be authentic, decided to hold the communiqué for twenty-four hours. Britain’s first reaction was equally cautious saying, "you must remember, that this is only one man's offer, and it came from pieces of paper scattered in the street."  

Working on the assumption that the offer was legitimate, the British were quick to seize upon this development as evidence that the organization was losing strength as a result of the Governor’s “get tough” policy. Although publicly terming the ceasefire offer "a chance for a fresh start," Harding confided to Consul Courtney that he believed that the “EOKA truce resulted from the organization’s own recognition of its weakness [and that] British operations waged against it had harassed and disrupted EOKA’s campaign of terror.” He also believed that the truce was merely a ploy by EOKA “to rest and reshape the weapon to be ready to strike again.” With this in mind, Harding decided to relax the restrictions against the public and exploit the growing disenchantment of the Greek

7 Ibid.
8 Courtney to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 55, August 20, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8 2056, NARA.
Cypriot populace toward EOKA. He was hoping to use this opportunity to eradicate EOKA once and for all. ⁹ On August 22, Governor Harding announced that EOKA had three weeks to surrender with its arms; they then would be given the choice of deportation to Greece or standing trial in Cyprus. This was a step too far for EOKA which responded by warning that it would resume its activities at midnight on August 27 unless the order to lay down arms was withdrawn.¹⁰

Harding had underestimated Greek Cypriot sympathy for the terrorist organization and misjudged the underlying reasons for the truce in the first place. EOKA’s offer was not a breathing spell aimed at helping the organization “reshape to strike again,” but a means to provide the conditions favorable to Makarios’ release so that negotiations could resume.¹¹ Moreover, the belief that Britain’s resolve in fighting the terrorists was the main reason for EOKA’s stand down was misguided and gave it a false sense of superiority. Rather than exploit the opportunity to engage in meaningful negotiations, Harding chose to continue to promote a hard-line position, even going so far as to publish the terms of EOKA’s surrender.

The State Department and US embassy officials both knew a lost opportunity when they saw one. The US believed the Greek Government would now be amenable since it had concluded that the Cyprus conflict was only serving to strengthen Turkey’s hand.¹² The Americans had in fact, advised the Greek Government to use its influence with Grivas to

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⁹ Ibid.
¹¹ Holland, ibid., 175.
¹² Thurston to Dulles, Embtel Athens 674, August 23, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-2356, NARA.
call for a truce, indicating that they might coerce Turkey and the UK into adopting a
more conciliatory position for a new political arrangement. 13 While the British policy had
been to refuse all negotiations with EOKA until the violence had ceased, the State
Department lamented that the UK’s response to the cessation of violence was to layer on
a new set of crushing demands rather than initiate a constructive political course. This
sense of loss and frustration with London’s position is underlined in a telegram from the
State Department to the UK Embassy on August 24:

In Department view recent events [in] Cyprus will result [in a] slipping away [of] unexpected opportunity
by some rapid UK move designed [to] appear as [a] positive response [to] EOKA truce without appearing
as concession to violence. British surrender terms alone seem likely to lead to renewed violence and
increased Greek and Cypriot distrust…UK position has been no further negotiating possible until violence
ended. Violence has ended but main UK response has been what amounts to, in the eyes of EOKA,
additional demand for complete surrender, resulting in confirmation Greek distrust British motives…If no
positive UK response soon, EOKA may indeed resume violence regardless present strength. 14

The American assessment of the situation was proving to be far more accurate than that
of London. Grivas’ response to Harding’s terms for a cease-fire was to issue a pamphlet
entitled, “Victors do not Surrender.” 15 In fact, the only “Cypriot” to take up Harding’s
offer was “a forlorn donkey, dragging a bunch of wooden rifles strapped to his rump
through the streets of Nicosia, bearing a sign around its neck, declaring ‘I surrender, my
Field Marshall.’” 16

Abandoned Attempts

13 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 75.
15 Grivas, Memoirs, 86.
16 Holland, ibid., 150.
Throughout the summer of 1956 the British held firm to the conviction that their hard-line stance towards EOKA would ultimately result in the complete eradication of the organization. They also continued to resist negotiations for a political solution. There were two reasons for London’s intransigence: first, the capture of portions of Grivas’ diaries in June and August indicated that Makarios was complicit with EOKA (which if true, justified the Archbishop’s continual exile). Secondly, Makarios’ absence from the island meant that there was no other Greek Cypriot of any stature willing to take up negotiations. This was evident by the refusal of anyone to come forward and meet with Lord Radcliffe while he was in Cyprus.

The UK defended its position by arguing that the increasing instability of Suez made Cyprus even more strategically important to Western interests. Although the US agreed, this did not necessarily mean that that the political process should be entirely shelved. In fact, in July, Cannon sent a cable to Washington saying that Foreign Minister Averoff might be willing to use his considerable sway with the Ethnarchy in support of a cease-fire on the island, provided he had ample guarantees of a forthcoming satisfactory settlement.

During the spring of 1956, the Americans, frustrated by the UK’s lack of progress with regard to Cyprus, made a number of mediation attempts of their own. Spyros Skouras,

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17 British Colonial Secretary, Allan Lennox-Boyd, presented the Parliament with some selected quotes from the documents intended to demonstrate the involvement of the Archbishop with EOKA. These included its founding, operations, and even the selection of victims. Although many observers called for the full and unexpurgated publication of the diaries, the British Government refused, see Parliamentary Debates, (House of Commons), 1955-56, vol. 558, September 14, 1956, 383; Holland, ibid., 52.
18 Courtney to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 10, July 16, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.007-1656, NARA.
19 Cannon to Dulles, Embtel Athens 324, July 26, 1956: ibid, doc. 747C.00/7-2656, 2.
President Eisenhower’s close friend and diplomatic gadfly, resurfaced almost two years after his first mediation attempt in 1954. His new plan was to persuade the Turks that relations between Turkey and Greece were “infinitely more important than the Cyprus question” and to urge the two countries to try to resolve the problem between them. Furthermore, he was convinced that the only way the Cyprus problem could be settled was to grant the island “Commonwealth status,” a proposal he believed that would be acceptable to the Greeks and the Cypriots, and one to which the Turks could not “reasonably object.”

Needless to say, neither Ankara nor Washington was impressed with this plan, and not surprisingly, little came of it.

A second proposal that was suggested called for the possible intervention of Canada aided by the US. This proposal involved a mission to the UK by Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson. The plan was scuttled, however, because it was thought that Pearson might not be impartial when it came to Greece. Moreover, the Canadians, who had no direct interest in Cyprus, were not wholly convinced anything substantial could be achieved by their intervention at this point.

A third scheme for resolving the Cyprus issue was conveyed to the State Department by the President of the Pan-European Union, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. His plan

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21 Wood, Memcon, “Cyprus: Possible Canadian Intervention,” May 21, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/5-2156, NARA.
22 “[…] although Canada was not directly concerned in the Cyprus issue and we were not anxious to accept any special responsibility, we were interested in seeing a solution arrived at both as members of the Commonwealth as well as of NATO. If there was anything we could do usefully through NATO or privately with the U.K., we would be glad to consider it though it was difficult to see what even the most well intentioned intervention from outside could accomplish at the moment: “Conversation with Mr. Theotoky, Greek Foreign Minister, Secretary of State to High Commissioner in United Kingdom,” May 7, 1956, 603, Telegram DL-749, DEA/50141-40: DFAIT.
called for Cyprus to have independence via a constitutional monarchy under King Paul of Greece. The plan also included a bi-cameral Parliament composed of a 50/50 Christian and Muslim representation, while the UK would take responsibility for the island’s defense. Although the Count insisted that Greece and Turkey had responded favorably to the scheme, it was never pursued. The Americans thought it too ambitious and unrealistic, and besides, Washington had what it believed was a much more concrete proposal in the works, one that it believed had a chance of leading to a solution for Cyprus. The plan included both immediate and eventual goals aimed at the well-being and aspirations of all interested parties. The person chosen to bring it together was Julius C. Holmes, Special Assistant to Secretary Dulles.

The Holmes Mission

While still the Consul General at Tangier, Julius C. Holmes wrote a letter to Secretary Dulles detailing a ten-year plan for self-government during which time, there would be no change in the international status of the island. Although the plan called for retention of the Governor, his veto-power would be limited. At the end of ten years, a NATO-supervised plebiscite would be held which would afford the population the opportunity to vote for any of the following; enosis, local autonomy under the auspices of the Greek monarchy, complete autonomy, or self government under British sovereignty. All of these options would be accompanied by guarantees for minority rights. Regardless of the outcome, British military rights would be assured. The full settlement would be

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24 Dulles, Department of State Instruction CA-1170, August 7, 1956, SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-756, NARA.
guaranteed by NATO and “made to appear a collective action as far as possible.”

Although the US was reluctant to involve the alliance, the procedural aspects of the plan, “resorting to a quiet Trieste-type mediation effort,” were enough to alleviate American fears. Simply stated, this meant that there would be a common ground for compromise should the interests of any concerned party be in jeopardy. Near the end of July, Ambassador Cannon suggested that the US pressure the British into allowing Cyprus the “opportunity to enjoy [the] possibility of peaceful evolution […] of full independence within the Commonwealth […] for the security and prosperity of the island.”

Chalmers Wood, of the Bureau for Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs became involved with the issue and suggested that the proposal include a promise for the return of Makarios in advance of the Constituent Assembly elections in exchange for a statement by him denouncing violence. The Turkish Cypriots also had to be assured of substantial minority rights in return for their cooperation in Assembly elections that would likely result in a Greek majority.

Following White House approval for the plan, William M. Rountree of the State Department prepared a paper detailing the US goals in the Cyprus dispute and the steps necessary to achieve them. First on the list of “immediate goals” was “to have talks

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25 Holmes to Dulles, Letter, June 6, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-2056, NARA; Memorandum from Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Holmes) to the Secretary of State, attached to William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to Dulles, July 30, 1956: FRUS, XXIV, 1955-1957, 388-392.
26 Palmer to Lister, Memorandum: “Julius Holmes’ Suggestions on Cyprus,” June 20, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-2056, NARA.
27 Cannon to Dulles, Embtel Athens, 324, July 26, 1956: ibid, doc. 747C.00/7-2656, NARA.
between the parties resumed and in such a state of progress before the November United
nations General Assembly that acrimonious conflict […] can be avoided.” The “eventual
goals” included a guarantee that “bases in Cyprus” would be at the permanent disposal of
Great Britain […]” This follows an idea popular in the Labour Party whereby Britain
might eventually reduce its strategic requirement for the island by having “bases in
Cyprus” instead of “Cyprus as a base.” 29 Another eventual goal was guarantees of “the
rights of the island’ populace, including “full protection for minorities.” The final goal
was an assurance “that Cyprus would not be considered by the Government of Turkey as
a threat to its security.”30 The last point suggests that the US was very aware of Turkish
interests in Cyprus and was hoping to ward off any objections that Turkey might have to
its proposals. Indeed, Vice-President Nixon, in his visit to Ankara in July, described
Turkey’s “positively pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem,” adding that the
Turkish Prime Minister “had gone so far to suggest that if Cyprus were joined to Greece,
the Turks would go to war to prevent it.” The reason for this fear, the Vice-President
explained, was the proximity of Cyprus to the Turkish mainland.31

29 The original source for “bases in Cyprus” instead of “Cyprus as a base” formulation first appeared in a
speech by Aneurin Bevan, the prominent Labour MP. The full context of the quote is as follows: “It is hard
to discover whether the government wants Cyprus as a base, or whether they want a base in Cyprus. If the
former is the case, then the discussions with Archbishop Makarios have been dishonest from the beginning.
I can see no real conflict between Britain's strategic interests and the Cypriot desire for self-government.
There is no justification for the Archbishop's deportation; it is essential to remember that persons whom we
look on here as terrorists are looked on by their fellow nationals as patriots. Why does the Tory party keep
deceiving itself? It is no use refusing to negotiate because they have been associated with violence - it is
absurd when we consider the history of Ireland, “Gold Coast and India:”Parliamentary Debates, (House of
Commons), March 14, 1956, col. 393.
30 “Goals in the Cyprus Dispute,” undated, attached to Rountree to Dulles, Memorandum: FRUS, 1955-
1957, XXIV, 385.
31 Nixon, quoted here in: Editorial Note: “290th N, Memorandum SC Meeting: Nixon Briefing on
With respect to the procedural aspect of the proposals, the State Department thought the first step should be to have its “representative sound out the British” beginning with Ambassador Makins in Washington. If in his view, the British Government saw “merit in the plan,” an envoy should then proceed to London. If that meeting proved successful, he should then go to Athens. On August 22, the State Department suggested that Secretary Dulles’ visit to London might provide the occasion to “test Britain’s receptivity “to the Holmes plan. Department officials worried that the EOKA truce had lulled the British into believing that they could solve the problem without US help, and thus London might be in “no mood” to consider the American initiative.  

Because the most vigorous opposition to the plan was likely to come from the Turks, the envoy needed to “line up his strongest arguments” for his meeting in Ankara. The State Department had anticipated Turkey would have strong apprehensions regarding the plan due to domestic political pressures. Consequently, it would be necessary to convince the Turks that Cyprus would not fall under the control of a “military hostile to Turkey” and also persuade them that because union with Greece was economically unsound, a plebiscite would not inevitably lead to such a decision. Moreover, a guarantee for minority rights and the “ten-year cooling off period” prior to any decision in favor of enosis might also appeal to the Turks. Finally, the plan echoed Skouras’ earlier argument that Turkey needed to recognize that it was in the interest of the Western alliance to find a settlement for Cyprus. Success for swaying the Turks lay in the belief that they were “realists” who would be inclined to accept the inevitability of a changing situation, as

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32 Dulles, Tedul 19, August 22, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-2256, NARA.
34 Ibid., 388.
they had the previous winter when it looked as if the Harding-Makarios talks might actually succeed. According to the British Ambassador at Ankara, the Turkish attitude at that time was one of “grudging acceptance of a fait accompli.” 35 The plan also included a provision for a US official to travel to the Seychelles to obtain the approval of the exiled Archbishop.

On August 28 Greek Foreign Minister Averoff sent a telegram to Ambassador Thurston asking whether the US had plans to mediate between Greece and the UK in light of the EOKA ceasefire. Although unable to go into the specifics of the impending plan, on September 3, Under Secretary Hoover wrote a personal letter to the Foreign Minister assuring him that the State Department was “considering the Cyprus question urgently.” 36 The following day, Assistant Secretary Rountree wrote a terse letter to Dulles stating that “experience has demonstrated that the mere dispatch of messages to the several parties in the dispute is not an effective means of dealing with the matter.” And that it would be more productive if “the United States should designate an experienced officer to go to London, Athens and Ankara to have talks quietly and informally […] and seek to find and widen such common ground as may form the basis for a solution” Simply stated, in light of increasing Turkish intransigence, Greek disillusionment, and Britain’s shortsightedness, the time was now right to introduce the Holmes Plan. At Rountree’s recommendation, Dulles designated Mr. Julius C. Holmes to be the officer in charge of the mission. 37

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35 Memorandum from Holmes to Dulles, July 30, 1956, attached to ibid., 391.
37 Rountree to Dulles, Memorandum, September 4, 1956: ibid., 400.
The Secretary of State realized the urgency in acting quickly in order to not alienate Greece and to prevent, what could only be, an acrimonious third round at the UN. Although Ambassador Barbour noted that that Cyprus may not be as important as the Suez situation, he warned that the growing crisis in Suez “made progress in [the] Cyprus issue all the more necessary.”38 Two days later, President Eisenhower approved Holmes for the mission. Although he was instructed to “explore [the] Cyprus Problem secretly and at the highest level with Governments concerned,” he was cautioned not to attempt any formal mediation and to consider his task only an exploratory mission.39 Dulles’ cautionary note to Holmes that he would find progress on Cyprus “hindered more by lack of private communication than by lack of common ground” was wishful thinking.40 As Holmes would soon discover, privacy would be the least of his problems.

The British Embassy in Washington regarded the initiative favorably. The attitude of most officials in London, on the other hand, was generally non-committal. Although Lloyd assured Holmes that he would discuss the matter with other officials, it was clear that the British were far more concerned with what, if anything, the US would do to keep the Cyprus issue off the provisional UN agenda and support the proposed British inscription against Greece. 41

Officials in Washington were quick to grasp the advantage of linking the UN issue with the Holmes mission. Rountree proposed that the British should delay their inscription

38 Ibid., 403.
40 Ibid., 404.
against the Greeks and Dulles approved. In 1956, mostly as a result of the continual violence, world opinion was no longer favorable towards Cyprus. The British sought to use this to their advantage by launching their own UN appeal, arguing that Greece’s intervention in Cyprus was tantamount to supporting terrorism against HMG on the island.

Rountree argued that Britain should delay its inscription and consider the benefits that might be derived if Holmes were to meet with the Greeks prior to the General Assembly meeting. The US feared that a showdown between Greece and the UK could only push the Cyprus issue further into the background and give the Soviet Union an opportunity to capitalize on disunity within the alliance. 42

On October 1, Sir Anthony Nutting, the British Minister of State for Foreign affairs, met with Holmes and approved his mission: “[…]as long as discussions were confined to self-government on the basis of a liberal constitution with the issue of self determination ‘indefinitely postponed’ although the principle itself [would be] reaffirmed.” Although London had taken the decision to present its inscription at the UN before October 2, Holmes was promised that no action would be taken before he had the opportunity to meet with the Greek Government and relay his findings to the London Embassy. 43

Holmes arrived in Athens on October 5 where he was warmly met by Karamanlis and Averoff. Although the Turkish position had toughened over the past year since the London Conference, the Greeks, on the other hand, seemed to be in a more conciliatory

42 Nicolet, United States Policy in Cyprus, 89.
43 Aldrich to Dulles, Embtel London 1776, October 1, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 120.1540/10-156, NARA.
frame of mind. They appeared to be willing not only to grant the British more rights but also to delay the issue of self-determination “for a long time” and press Makarios into an agreement.\textsuperscript{44} The outcome of the meeting in Athens produced a document from the Greek to the British Government which stated that “regardless of the outcome [of the] plebiscite, UK military facilities” would be “guaranteed into perpetuity.” Moreover, Greece would grant NATO control of the “militarization” of the island and “accord Turkey and Britain generous economic privileges.”\textsuperscript{45} Of course Greece gave these guarantees confident that the plebiscite would be in its favor.

Upon his return to London, Holmes found a “bewildered” Prime Minister Eden. Clearly irritated by American meddling, the Prime Minister refused to meet with Eisenhower’s emissary.\textsuperscript{46} Holmes’ meeting with Nutting and Kirkpatrick though less than enthusiastic was not entirely discouraging. It was apparent that both Greece and the UK would have their items inscribed on the agenda. But Holmes requested that the two countries place their items at the end. This would leave a window of two to three months which might just be enough time to find a way out if his mission proved successful.\textsuperscript{47} It was evident by Britain’s delayed response to Holmes’s request that the Cyprus problem dwarfed in comparison to the looming crisis over the Suez Canal. When the British finally did respond a month later, the Greek proposals were rejected on the grounds that they “were less favorable” than the Britain’s June plan the previous year and that they did not contain “security pacts.” Holmes countered that he saw no reason why the Greeks would

\textsuperscript{44} Thurston to Dulles, Embtel Athens 1158: October 5, 1956:\textit{ibid.}, doc 120. 1540/10-556. There is also a portion of this document in: \textit{FRUS, 1955-1957}, XXIV, 412-415.


\textsuperscript{46} Eden quoted here in \textit{ibid.}, 157.

not be willing to amend this oversight, but it soon became apparent that Britain had
“decided not to attempt a negotiated solution at the present time but on the contrary
intend to proceed unilaterally [with the Radcliffe Constitution]” maintaining that it was
“better to take one step at a time” since it was anticipated that a “truly liberal
constitution” would be unsatisfactory to the Turks. “48

When Holmes then attempted to secure a promise to consult the Greeks and Turks prior
to announcement of the Radcliffe proposals, He was told by Nutting that it would
“probably be better to promulgate the constitution unilaterally, possibly with showing the
texts to the Greeks and Turks an hour in advance.” 49 Upon hearing this, Holmes
concluded that meeting with the Turks would be pointless since it was clear that the
British had already made the decision to proceed unilaterally rather than attempt a
negotiated solution. And with that, the Holmes Mission was abandoned.

The Holmes mission was not so much a failure, as it was a casualty of Britain’s
reluctance to fully commit to its implementation. Clearly Britain was not prepared to give
support to an American initiative while it had a home-grown plan in the works in the
form of a proposed Constitution by Radcliffe and more importantly was preoccupied with
the threat of war in the Middle East. 50 Moreover, Britain’s confidence that it was on the

48 It is interesting to note that the belated British response was addressed to “Mister Juliet Holmes,”
evidence that the British did not consider the Holmes mission to be a serious initiative: Aldrich Embtel
49 Ibid., 421.
50 Holmes was thoroughly convinced that the Suez crisis was the main obstacle to progress in the
negotiating a settlement for Cyprus: “It is now clear at the time of my first substantive discussion with the
British the decision had already been taken to intervene with the French in Egypt, and they were unwilling
to discuss Cyprus which was their base for military operation,” Holmes to Hoover, Memorandum: “Report
verge of finally defeating EOKA was also another likely factor for its decision to reject a
negotiated settlement. Although no decision had been taken to move forward with the
constitution as of Holmes’s departure in November, during the summer of 1956, while
Holmes was actively pursuing his mission, the British Ambassador Makins contacted the
State Department and informed Dulles that his Government had “worked out a plan it
hoped would be acceptable to Turkey” and that it wanted US support with Turkey and
eventually with Greece.\footnote{Greek Ambassador (Melas) to Secretary of State Dulles, Memcon, December 26, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12-2156, NARA.}
Chapter IX

He (Eden) thought perhaps they ought to take it to the Security Council [...]. I said 'Supposing Nasser doesn't take any notice?' whereupon Selwyn Lloyd said 'Well, I suppose in that case the old-fashioned ultimatum will be necessary.' I said that I thought they ought to act quickly, whatever they did, and that as far as Great Britain was concerned, public opinion would almost certainly be behind them. But I also added that they must get America into line—Hugh Gaitskell to Anthony Eden

The Suez Factor

“Is that you Anthony? Well, this is President Eisenhower, and I can only presume that you have gone out of your mind!” These were the heated words reportedly shouted by Eisenhower in a trans-Atlantic phone call to the Downing Street office of Prime Minister Eden upon learning of the Anglo-French intervention in Suez. Eisenhower thought he had reached Anthony Eden, but it was actually his press secretary, William Clark, who took the call.¹

When Anthony Eden and his French and Israeli counterparts, Guy Mollet, and David Ben-Gurion, gathered in a secret meeting in October to make a joint agreement to attack Egypt, Eden hoped for US support, or at least friendly indifference.² He did not imagine

² The secret meetings ran from October 22-24 and the agreement reached between the three leaders was known as the Protocols of Sévres, the existence of which was initially denied by Anthony Eden. Consequently, Eden sought to have any written record of the meeting expunged. The “Dean Memorandum,” was written by Sir Patrick Dean in 1978 at the behest of Lord Trend, the former Cabinet Secretary, subsequent to the publication of Selwyn Lloyd’s book on Suez. The memorandum gives a
the Americans, who had come to blows politically with Nasser over Egypt’s recognition of China and its acceptance of Soviet arms, to present a serious problem. What Eden and his co-conspirators failed to understand was that while the US would like to have seen Nasser gone, it was opposed to doing it through military intervention until all other options were exhausted. Eisenhower was likely right on the mark with regard to Eden’s mental condition at the time, considering that the Prime Minister “was out of his depth, under intense stress, and gobbling amphetamines.”3 Whatever the Prime Minister’s state of mind, Britain’s part in the Suez misadventure would prove costly in that it would damage Anglo-American relations, bringing them to their lowest point since the 1920s.4

In July 1945 Eisenhower cancelled a promised grant of $56 million towards the construction of the Answan Dam. In retaliation, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The shareholders, the majority of whom were British and French, were promised compensation. Nasser, however, reneged on the promise and announced that those revenues would instead be applied towards the Answan Dam project. Following Nasser’s nationalization of the canal, Eden wrote an exploratory letter to Eisenhower in an attempt to gain US support for a possible military excursion into Egypt arguing, “if we take a

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3 Quoted in ibid., 100. Eden’s “stimulant” use was likely a consequence of his many surgeries for a liver ailment. Eden himself, made reference to his amphetamine dependency during the Suez crisis when he tendered his resignation in January 1957 saying, “I do not think I should be serving the best interests of my colleagues or of the country if I were to continue in my present condition:” R.R. James, Anthony Eden, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), 397.

firm stand over this now, we shall have the support of all the maritime Powers. If we do not, our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are convinced, be finally destroyed.”

In response, Eisenhower cautioned against using military force and expressed the conviction that the region could be secured by more peaceful means:

We recognize the transcendent worth of the Canal to the free world and the possibility that eventually the use of force might become necessary in order to protect international rights. But we have been hopeful that through a Conference in which would be represented the signatories to the Convention of 1888, as well as other maritime nations, there would be brought about such pressures on the Egyptian Government that the efficient operation of the Canal could be assured for the future. For my part, I cannot over-emphasize the strength of my conviction that some such method must be attempted before action such as you contemplate should be undertaken. If unfortunately the situation can finally be resolved only by drastic means, there should be no grounds for belief anywhere that corrective measures were undertaken merely to protect national or individual investors, or the legal rights of a sovereign nation were ruthlessly flouted. A conference, at the very least, should have a great education effort throughout the world. Public opinion here, and I am convinced, in most of the world, would be outraged should there be a failure to make such efforts. Moreover, initial military successes might be easy, but the eventual price might become far too heavy.

Despite Eisenhower’s words of caution, the British Government had made the “firm decision” to drive Nasser out of Egypt, and that military intervention was necessary to achieve this aim. Eisenhower was simply not prepared to link the seizure of the Canal with the threat from the Soviet Union. While they hoped for US assistance, it was apparent that Britain was prepared to proceed with this objective with or without Washington’s support.

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5 Eden to Eisenhower, Letter July 27, 1956: in Peter G. Boyle ed., The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 146; Guy Millard, Eden’s private secretary and author of a detailed history of the period, believed that it was a mistake for Britain to tackle both the question of the Canal and the Nasser regime at the same time. This was also the conclusion of the US: “Memorandum on Relations between the United Kingdom, the United States and France in the months following Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in 1956:”CAB, 21/3314, October 21, 1957.


7 In private meetings with Murphy and Barbour, Eden and Macmillan went so far as to draw a parallel between the US’s reluctance to enter WWII and its absence of support for the British plans for the Suez. According to Barbour, Eden and Macmillan maintained that if the US “had been with them from the beginning, chances of WWII would [have been] far less than if [the US] had not delayed:” Barbour, Embtel London 550, July 31, 1956: FRUS, 1955-1957, XVI, 61.
Although the Americans had not been completely oblivious to the deployment of forces in Valetta and Cyprus, they were still shocked by Britain’s participation in the reckless excursion in the Suez. In the aftermath, France moved towards challenging US supremacy whenever and wherever it could. Britain on the other hand, was anxious to rebuild its tattered relations with the Americans. But the damage was profound enough to poison the atmosphere between Britain and the US, and relations between them would not improve until Nutting, Kirkpatrick, and Eden himself were eventually replaced within the British administration. The Suez excursion marked the end of Britain’s hegemony in the Middle East. Anthony Eden’s January 1977 obituary in the *Times* put it best: “Eden was the last Prime Minister to believe Britain was a great power and the first to confront a crisis that proved it was not.”

With regard to Cyprus, the island provided a staging point for the Anglo-French initiative known as “Operation Musketeer,” the British the invasion of Egypt. This operation was organized in tandem with “Operation Kadesh,” the Israeli move into the Sinai. The Israeli maneuver consisted of a large-scale attack on Egyptian forces following a move towards the Canal Zone. On Cyprus, large forces were deployed in support of the invasion. This military buildup had unintended consequences for the British, however, in that it

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8 For a fuller explanation of the US position with regard to Britain’s planned excursion see, Appendix 5.
9 The Suez debacle resulted in the US suspension of aid to Israel in protest against the invasion of Egypt on October 30. The following day, Dulles criticized Britain and France for its attempt to take the Suez Canal by force. On the domestic front, Eden was the target of sharp criticism as well. On November 1, William Yates, a Conservative MP interrupted a point of order saying, “I have come to the conclusion that Her Majesty's Government has been involved in an international conspiracy.” The same day, representatives from the US and the Soviet Union at the United Nations jointly issued a demand for a cease-fire. The British and French vetoed a cease-fire in the Security Council but the General Assembly passed it by a vote of 64-5 vote. Faced with a united front, the governments of Britain, France, and Israel agreed to a withdrawal and were replaced by UN peacekeepers: Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, *The Suez Crisis*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 84-87, 144.
provided EOKA with plentiful new targets, evident by a drastic increase in casualties among British personnel between September and the end of 1956.  

**The Shadow of Partition**

If the time had not been right for the American-sponsored Holmes mission, prospects were not much better for Lord Radcliffe’s proposals.  

The announcement that the proposals would be made public had been issued weeks in advance, and it was anticipated that emotions would be running high regarding the Greek and British items inscribed at upcoming UN debate. The British, eager to dial down tensions with the US following the Suez fiasco, realized they could no longer delay presenting the proposals to the interested parties. Hence, at the urging of the State Department, they reluctantly agreed to give copies of the proposed Constitution to Greece, Turkey, and the US in advance of the official publication.

State Department reaction to the Radcliffe proposals was ambivalent. While officials noted they contained some “good features,” it was apparent that they were little more than an attempt to maintain what the British in India used to call their paramountcy.  

The proposals, which were officially submitted in December, granted broad discretionary powers to the Governor, including control of defense, foreign affairs, and internal security, giving him an irrevocable veto over all legislation. The power to amend the Constitution was vested in the Crown rather than in the Legislative Assembly. It also

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made a provision that ten members of the Legislative Assembly could constitute a quorum. This granted the twelve Turkish Cypriot members the power to legislate should the Greek majority be absent from or boycott any proceedings. Although the proposals did include an option at some indeterminate time in the future for self-determination, they made no substantial concession to the Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination, which in all likelihood, would translate into union with Greece. To have done so would have further inflamed the hard-line Suez backbenchers in Parliament and threatened the Eden Government.

There was also one final lesson to be drawn from Britain’s failed excursion in Egypt which concerned the utility of Cyprus as a base for military operations. In an article in the London Sunday Times, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck wrote: "unless I, as a soldier, am grossly at fault in my estimate of Cyprus [...] it has none or practically none of the requisites of an efficient military base.” Undaunted by this argument, Lennox-Boyd doggedly held to the official government line that Cyprus remained strategically important and that a move towards self-determination must be postponed. Moreover, if the Greek Cypriots continued to call for enosis, the “inevitable” result would be the partition of the island into Greek and Turkish zones. He went to say that “any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community […] shall be given freedom to decide for themselves their status.”

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15 Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) : “Cyprus (Lord Radcliffe’s Proposals), December 19, 1956, 562, col.1272; Indeed, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes not only found the Radcliffe Constitution “logical material for negotiation,” but also termed Lennox-Boyd’s talk of partition "an interesting, attractive idea.” Quoted in “Proposed Constitution,” Time, December 31, 1956.
recognized a separate right to self-determination for Turkish Cypriots. From this time forward, Turkey would now have a say in the future of the island.

The consensus of the State Department was that, not only would Greece reject the proposals, but also that it might be dangerous for the US to endorse them, leaving the US open “to accusations of supporting British colonialism.”\(^{16}\) Still, the acceptance or rejection of the proposals did not revolve around the substance of the proposed constitution. The crucial element lay in what Turkey believed was the promise of partition. Lennox-Boyd’s statement in Parliament had raised expectations in Turkey that the two countries were of the same mind regarding partition. According to Holland, the double self-determination option was added at the last minute at the behest of the Turkish Government after Lennox-Boyd had indicated that the wishes of the Menderes Government would be given special consideration and included in the official announcement.\(^{17}\)

In the interim, the British Defence Committee had concluded, in a November 29 meeting, that the Suez affair underlined the need to keep the island in intact saying that, the “association of […] other countries, particularly Turkey, with Cyprus as a military base would make it easier to resist the Greek claim to sovereignty over the island.” Similarly, on the following day, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) reviewed the situation and determined that there was “an overwhelming military argument against partition.”\(^{18}\) Still another high British official insisted that "partition could never work because […] you

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\(^{16}\) J.D. Iams to Wood, Memorandum, December 19, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12-1956, NARA.
\(^{17}\) Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 166-167.
\(^{18}\) Quoted here in Nicolet, *ibid.*, 92.
would have to shift whole villages. There is no one area where Turks predominate."  
Although all assessments pointed to partition as running counter to British interests, they 
appeared willing to take that risk rather than compromise their colonial authority. HMG 
was determined to force Greece’s hand: either accept Britain’s sovereignty over the 
island or risk partition. The latter, of course, would forever rule out any prospect for 
enosis.

Meanwhile, in a meeting in Paris on December 13, Menderes emphasized to Dulles the 
importance of settling the self-determination question in the immediate future, saying that 
“if left open it, would only cause trouble for future, and Turkish people would think 
Greece had received a gift.” The Prime Minister went on to say that “Turkey would 
accept the Radcliffe proposal as [a] draft, provided it understood at the same time that 
when self-determination [was] implemented it, would be through partition.” For his part, 
the Secretary did not share the Turkish and British views that partition should be included 
in an immediate solution for Cyprus. Dulles recognized the need to move forward with 
the Radcliffe proposals and he hoped that Turkey would view them favorably in the 
instant and leave the question of partition for a future time.  

The Greeks, on the other hand, were far less enthusiastic regarding the Radcliffe scheme. 
On December 14, Dulles was approached by Greek Foreign Minister Averoff, who 
expressed his government’s disappointment towards the British report for a Cyprus 
Constitution. He was especially troubled by the reserved plenary powers that would be

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19 Quoted in Time, Ibid.
vested in the Governor. Dulles then asked how the Greek Government viewed partition of the island and was told that “they [the Greeks] were giving some sympathetic study to that possibility.”

Notwithstanding Dulles’ views, the partition option, along with population transfers, had some currency in certain circles, not only in the UK, but also in the US. One of the first to entertain the notion was none other than Eisenhower, himself. According to Dulles, on June 7, “in the course of a somewhat rambling discussion,” the President speculated “whether it was feasible to separate the Turkish population from the Greek,” by moving the Turkish Cypriots to the Northern part of the island. Dulles countered by telling the President that the idea was not practical because “they [the Turkish Cypriots] were working in the mines and were part of the general life of the island.” Eisenhower’s suggestion for a line of demarcation in the North, however, would prove to be more prescient than he could have realized at the time.

At the end of June, the Foreign Office decided to undertake a closer examination of the feasibility of partition. Kirkpatrick, especially, became fixed with the idea, believing it to be the only viable course for the conflict. He proposed to have a line drawn north, east of Limassol, which would result in the transfer of about 60,000 persons. In the US, the reaction to this proposal was generally unfavorable. Dulles, the ambassadors to London and Turkey, along with the consul in Cyprus pointed out the social, political, economic,

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21 Upon reading the Radcliffe Constitution Averoff remarked to Holmes that in order for it to work “the governor would have to be a saint as so much power was reserved in him:” SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/12 1456, NARA.
and strategic reasons against partition. Citing the examples of Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and especially Palestine, they further argued that partition, in general, had yet to yield a satisfactory result. Despite State Department reservations, some in the US Embassy in London were sympathetic to Britain’s stance on partition “not on its merits, but as a tactic to encourage support on [the] island for self-government,” in other words, as a means, to sate the Greek appetite for enosis. Dulles, however, still remained unconvinced and troubled by this course of action.

It was only after it was learned that some Greek officials, namely Averoff, were willing to consider the idea of partition that the State Department re-evaluated its position, but only then as “a desperate solution of last resort.” Although it should not be encouraged, officials reasoned that it might prove useful as a means to persuade Turkey and Greece to moderate their present positions.

While it is true that the Greeks objected to partition as presented in the Radcliffe Proposals, they also indicated that they might not be entirely hostile to the idea. Indeed, Foreign Minister Averoff had told Dulles in a meeting in December that “if the Turks

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24 Dulles, Deptel Nicosia 16, etc., July 20, 1956: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-2056, NARA; Warren to Dulles, Embtel Ankara 131, July 17, 1956: ibid., doc. 747C.00/7-1756; Foster to Dulles, Embtel London 377, July 21, 1956: ibid., doc. 747C.00/7-2156.
25 Foster to Dulles, Embtel 377, July 21, 1956: ibid., doc. 747C.00/7-2156, NARA.
26 Aldrich to Dulles, Embtel London 1055, August 24, 1956: ibid., doc. 747C.00/8-2456, NARA.
28 Owen T. Jones, Director of the Office of GTI, to James Lampton Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Memorandum: “Cyprus Partition Proposal,” September 18, 1956: ibid., doc. 747C.00/9-1856, NARA.
29 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 1632, November 7, 1956: ibid., doc. 120.1540/11-756, NARA: Quoted here in Nicolet, ibid., 93.
wanted partition, the Greeks would be willing to consider that.”31 While it is difficult to imagine that the Greek offer for partition was a serious one—assuming that it was—the plan might go accordingly: the Greek Cypriots would be presented with partition as one possible option in a plebiscite. Since the Cypriot population would vote en masse on the question of self-determination, it was a foregone conclusion that the partition option would never pass—given that the Turkish Cypriots constituted only eighteen percent and it would take thirty-two percent of the rest of the population to achieve a majority. Considering that Greece would insist in the coming years that it wanted Cyprus to decide its own course; if the majority “wanted partition, then partition it should be.”32 But even if this came to be the only viable solution, as Nicolet noted, “the devil would be in the detail.”33

The Greek line of demarcation for partitioning the island, however, was significantly different than the one proposed by Kirkpatrick or Eisenhower. Averoff told Holmes in early November that he envisioned the line to be drawn from Larnaca to the northern coast. This would leave only a small portion of the eastern part off the island to the Turkish Cypriots. This division, of course, would never be acceptable to the Turks.34

Britain and Turkey, however, had another plan. Unsatisfied with mere partition, the two countries wanted the option of double self-determination in which the Turkish Cypriots would be free to decide their own course. This would pose a grave problem if the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were allowed to vote separately in that it was possible for the

32 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 81-82.
33 Nicolet, ibid., 92.
34 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 81-82.
Turkish minority to decide the fate of the entire island. In other words, a relatively small part of the electorate could impose its will on the majority and partition the island against the will of the Greek Cypriots. Although both the Greeks and Turks seemed somewhat amenable to the idea of dividing the island, it was clear that the two sides would never be able to agree on where the line should be drawn.  

In the end, Turkey accepted the proposals while the Greeks rejected them. Averoff denounced them as "illiberal and undemocratic" and followed by pressing a Greek demand for a U.N. debate on self-determination for Cyprus. The political class on Cyprus took a similar view, and even if they were so inclined, none was willing to openly support them. Although politically, he could afford to do so, true to form, Makarios refused to endorse the British initiative while still in exile.

On December 19, the State Department informed the Embassies in Athens, Ankara, and London that the British Foreign Secretary had requested that the US issue a statement in support of the Radcliffe Proposals. The British believed that such a statement would go a long way in helping Greece with regard to public opinion and allow it to have a greater flexibility towards the proposals. On December 27, when a statement finally came, it was crafted in such a manner as to appear non-committal as to avoid alienating the parties involved:

The United States has noted with sympathetic interest the long and earnest labors of Lord Radcliffe to find a formula for self-government for Cyprus. The making by the United Kingdom of proposals for self-government could be the first step towards an eventual, peaceful and generally acceptable final solution of

35 Ibid.
36 Quoted in Time, “Proposed Constitution.”
the Cyprus problem. The formula now produced by Lord Radcliffe seems to be unacceptable in certain respects by some who are concerned with the matter. Nevertheless, the United States still hopes that our three allies who together with the people of Cyprus, are deeply concerned with this issue will strive to agree upon a solution which is so important to themselves and the entire free world.37

On December 29, Averoff, on instructions from Karamanlis, called on Ambassador Allen in Athens to register a “strong but friendly protest” in response to the statement on the grounds that the United States “had taken sides with Turkey and the United Kingdom against Greece.” According to the Foreign Minister, the statement had caused “great embarrassment” to Karamanlis. Allen responded by saying that he personally opposed the statement, but if every nation protested whenever they had differences, “we would spend all our days protesting.”38

When pressed for the reason for their opposition, the Greeks charged the statement was biased against them because Ambassador Melas suggested that Turkey be included as an interested party, a rather feeble claim given that Greece had already discussed Cyprus with Turkey during the Holmes mission. In a conversation with Averoff on January 18, Dulles expressed surprise that Greece had interpreted the statement as an endorsement of the Radcliffe Proposals since the US neither mentioned adherence to them nor demanded that they be the basis for further discussion. Dulles explained to the Foreign Minister that the US did not endorse the proposals and that endorsement had not been the intent of the statement.39

38 Allen, Embtel Athens 2324, December 29, 1956: SDCDF, 747C. 00/12-2956, NARA.
Both Britain and Greece were disappointed with the US response. While Britain had sought US support in order to pressure Greece into accepting the Radcliffe proposals, Greece trotted out its usual litany of doom and gloom predictions should the US fail to support its position, not only here, but also in the upcoming UN debate.\textsuperscript{40} Clearly the big winner in 1956 was Turkey, which saw its position strengthened by Britain’s pledge of double self-determination in its December statement, though London and Ankara had a different understanding as to what the statement meant. Turkey believed that it had reached an agreement with Britain to accept self-determination in return for British acceptance of partition.\textsuperscript{41} This difference in interpretation would come back to haunt Britain in future negotiation with Turkey over Cyprus.

\textsuperscript{40} Memcon between Dulles and Caccia, December 21, 1956:ibid., 439-440; 1956 Allen, Embtel Athens 2632, January 28, 1957:ibid., 442;
\textsuperscript{41} Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 89.
Further UN Negotiations

As the date of the forthcoming UN debate grew near, Britain remained anxious to avoid a debate on Cyprus in the General Assembly. Inscription of the Greek item had been avoided the previous year, due mainly to the support Britain had received from the Americans. And the British were again seeking US support this time around. If the US was unable to do this, Ambassador Makins suggested to Dulles that HMG might inscribe its own item on the Agenda demonstrating the Greek Government’s role in inciting violence on Cyprus.\(^1\) Although Dulles could not tell Makins exactly what the American position would be, he did conclude that “it was not wise to campaign against the inscription of the Cyprus question unless there was a chance of success.”\(^2\)

While the US also wanted to avoid having Cyprus issue aired in the UN, the State Department worried that this time there might be increased support for Greece due to changes in the composition of the General Assembly. The US needed to walk a fine line so as not to be perceived as playing favorites, thus alienating not only the concerned parties, but other nations sympathetic to the Greek position.\(^3\) Consequently, it was not surprising when the Americans rejected the suggestion by Greece to set up a committee

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2 Addendum to Wood, Memcon, October 2, 1956: SDCDF, lot 64, D 199, NARA.
within the UN to investigate the problem. A suggestion by India for a resolution calling for the independence of Cyprus had similarly been opposed. The US feared that both suggestions would open the way for Soviet meddling which could prove even more detrimental to US interests than the present impasse. ⁴

The US was anxious to maintain control over Greek maneuvers in the UN and avert any proposals that might be deemed unacceptable to Britain and Turkey. In order to accomplish this, the Americans decided to initiate discussions on the basis of a draft resolution with a view towards direct negotiations between the British and the Cypriots. Although the resolution called for the “renewal of direct negotiations” between the two parties, it did not “commit the US to any controversial ‘solutions.’” In other words, there would be no discussion of independence or partition. The resolution’s principal aim was to persuade the UK to negotiate a settlement with Cyprus without any “substantive UN involvement” or participation by Greece and Turkey. ⁵

London, however, was less than enthusiastic towards the American resolution because it would involve the release of Makarios, thus suggesting that the British policy of the past several months had been seriously misguided. While sympathetic to British sensitivities, the State Department was growing frustrated and concerned by the lack of progress towards the Cyprus issue. It concluded that the situation was worsening and that no advancement was possible without the active participation of the Archbishop.

⁴ Marselis C. Parsons, Jr. (BNA) to C. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Memorandum: “Situation Regarding Cyprus,” January 16, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-1657, NARA.
Consequently, Dulles instructed the Embassy in London to convey the following message to HMG:

We realize HMG does not wish [to] release Makarios from Seychelles until he condemns violence, but it is now 22 months since violence started, 10 months since Makarios [was] deported and many more months may be required [to] restore law and order. Meanwhile continuation [of] violence will inevitably cause furthering hardening and distrust on both sides rendering eventual achievement [of] any understanding increasingly difficult. We therefore urge HMG [to] seriously consider resumption [of] talks with Makarios and leaders of other Cypriot groups […]  

In a State Department cable to the UN delegation, Dulles made his frustration with the matter clear while emphasizing where American priorities ultimately lay:

In our view major issues of preserving NATO solidarity and forestalling communist penetration of [the] Mediterranean are being subordinated to [the] lesser issue of Cyprus and more narrow interest of three parties concerned therewith. Unless and until all parties recognize [the] magnitude of peril involved in continuation of Cyprus stalemate and are prepared [to] make necessary compromises, US efforts towards finding a solution will continue [to] be frustrated.  

Accordingly, the State Department concluded that it could not “without jeopardy to more important considerations” actively support any proposals submitted by any of the parties involved. It was also emphasized that the US would vote against any “condemnatory resolution” by the British, such as criticism of the Greek Government by the British for meddling in Cyprus. Furthermore, given the British and Turkish opposition towards any resolution calling for “immediate self-determination,” the US would abstain from any such resolution regarding this matter and instead focus its energies on preventing further antagonism between Greece and the UK. From this time forward US policy would be “mainly governed by the continued desire to keep the debate in low key and minimize [its] involvement in Cyprus.”  The desire to keep the Cyprus issue manageable and placate the involved parties reflected the thinking expressed in the State Department

6 Ibid, 444.  
8 Ibid.
memorandum issued a few weeks earlier calling for the seemingly impossible objective to find a “solution on which all parties could agree.”

Meanwhile, the Greeks refused to come to terms with US objections to their proposal for setting up a UN committee to investigate the Cyprus issue. Aware of the effect that Cyprus was having on Greek domestic public opinion, a decision was taken to at least pay lip-service to the Greek desire for British-Cypriot negotiations. The British, on the other hand, were livid when they learned that the US would vote against their resolution to censure Greece for its support of terrorism. In a message to Dulles in early February, Foreign Secretary Lloyd expressed concern about the effect the forthcoming debate would have upon Anglo-American relations. He also let it be known that London would not look kindly upon the absence of US support in this matter:

The fact of Greek support for terrorism is generally acknowledged here…Therefore if the United States [should] vote against a Resolution calling for the cessation of Greek activities, it will be regarded here as an unfriendly act and will cause most unfavorable comment…I do hope that the United States Delegation will make it clear beyond doubt in the course of the debate that the United States Government does not condone the Greek behaviour and urges that it should stop.

In a telephone conversation from Dulles to Rountree on February 10 regarding the possible implications of Lloyd’s message, Dulles commented that the Foreign Secretary’s

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9 Parsons to Ebrick, Memorandum: “Situation Regarding Cyprus,” January 16, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-1657, NARA; Nicolet rightly points out that it is at this juncture where the pattern of American policy towards Cyprus was set. Indeed, except for some notable interruptions in the mid 60s, this conciliatory attitude continues to inform US policy to present day, see Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 95.

“unfriendly act” comment sounded like something that would be said “when you are going to war with someone.”

This was only one of many indications of the strained diplomacy that existed between the US and Britain in the post-Suez climate. The Americans realized that if they were to move beyond the Suez debacle and have a constructive role in the Cyprus issue, they needed to prevent further deterioration of the “special relationship.” Consequently, Washington decided to shelve its resolution for negotiations with the Cypriots since it “did not want to run heads-on into the British at this point.” The State Department also considered the possibility of abstaining from all resolutions with “substantive implications” rather than risk making the UN a forum for airing US-Anglo differences.

Help came in the form of an Indian resolution presented by V.K. Krishna Menon on February 26, who introduced an Algeria-style compromise resolution calling vaguely for negotiations "in accord with the principles [...] of the UN Charter." With the exception of Afghanistan and Panama, both of whom abstained, every member of the General Assembly pounced, 76 to 0, on the opportunity to “sweep Cyprus back under the carpet.” The Indian resolution pre-empted what promised to be an emotional and contentious showdown for all involved for which everyone was grateful. The resolution

12 Quoted here in Nicolet, ibid., 96.
13 Ibid.
14 Menon was easily the most unpopular delegate at the UN. His eight hour speech defending India’s position on Kashmir holds the record as the longest ever delivered in the United Nations Security Council. He was generally regarded as patronizing and arrogant and was actively disliked by President Eisenhower. Menon, upon learning of Afghanistan’s abstention mused, "well, they have a somewhat similar quarrel with Pakistan. As for Panama, I guess I was rude to the Panamanian delegate." Quoted in “Subdued Quarrel,” Time, March 4, 1957.
included a note by the General Assembly, which expressed the hope for “a peaceful, democratic, and just solution” for the Cyprus issue. It also included a call for “continued negotiations” to achieve this end. Devoid of particulars, the resolution satisfied everyone in that it left open the question as to which parties would be involved in any future discussions.

The Bermuda Conference and the Return of Makarios

In January 1957, Eisenhower invited Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to a meeting designed to restore confidence in US and Britain relations after the Suez adventure, and reaffirm British support for US policies where both countries had parallel interests. The Bermuda Conference, which was held between March 20-24, was intended to publicly demonstrate that the “special relationship” was still alive and well, and to provide an opportunity for the two leaders to privately air their differences over Middle East affairs. Eisenhower and Macmillan were old friends who had served together in North Africa during World War II so, on a personal level, the prospect for a productive meeting was good.

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16 Harold Macmillan who became Prime Minister on January 10, 1957 had expressed his regret to Dulles as early as December for having to support Eden’s Suez policy and presents himself as the victim of Eden’s seemingly reckless actions. In his memoir, however, Macmillan paints an entirely different picture, describing himself as a staunch defender of Eden’s policies while attacking Dulles for not supporting Britain and taking the issue to the UN. Moreover, the Prime Minister’s diaries reinforce his unfavorable attitude toward the Secretary of State, describing him as “the most dunder-headed man alive” and charging that, “under his direction, the US was an ‘impatient, mercurial, panicky’ ally:” cf, Dulles Memorandum for the Record, December 12, 1956: Papers of John Foster Dulles 1951-1959, General Coresp. and Memoranda Series, Gen. L-M, DDE-Library; Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 158; The Macmillan Diaries, The Cabinet Years 1950-1957, Peter Catterall, ed., (London: Macmillan, 2003), 432.
Among other things, Eisenhower urged Macmillan to set aside Britain’s animosity toward Egyptian President Nasser and appreciate that restoring relations with Egypt while working to isolate Nasser internationally would be more conducive to Anglo-American interests in the region than outright hostility. Eisenhower and Dulles also pressed the British to consider Saudi Arabia's King Saud as a counterweight to Nasser. The British, however, were not ready to relinquish their claims against Egypt, but they did express their willingness to support the Saudi King, as well as an understanding on security issues.\(^{18}\) Regarding Cyprus, the Bermuda Conference was important in that it was the occasion for the decision to return Makarios from exile.\(^{19}\)

It is not clear how big a role Eisenhower played in convincing the British to release the Archbishop, but there are strong indications that American pressure was a key factor in London making a major gesture of conciliation towards Makarios by agreeing "to put the most charitable interpretation on [Makarios’ statement] and to let him free."\(^{20}\) Following the offer from EOKA for a ceasefire in Mid-March, Makarios was invited to issue a statement calling for an end to violence. The Archbishop obliged after a fashion: "I appeal to EOKA to declare the cessation of all operations, provided that the British government show a spirit of understanding by simultaneously abolishing the present state


\(^{19}\) President Eisenhower commented that he had “received many representations[…]emphasizing that if Makarios were returned to Cyprus, real progress towards a solution of the present problem could start:” Memcon, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, between the Delegations of the US and the UK, March 21, 1957: *FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII*, 465; Lennox-Boyd indicated that the British “were prepared to release Makarios if he agreed to renounce the use of terrorism:” "Colonial Secretary’s Statements", RIIA, 1957, 411-412.

\(^{20}\) In a cabinet meeting on March 29, Dulles made the observation that the Archbishop’s release “may have resulted finally from the presentation the President made to Prime Minister Macmillan:” L. Arthur Minnich Jr., Assistant Staff Secretary to the President, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, March 29, 1957: Ann Whitman File Cabinet Series, Cabinet Meeting of March 29, 1957, DDE-Library; Dulles, Memorandum for the Record, March 23, 1957: *FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV*, 467.
of emergency [in Cyprus].” He also insisted that negotiations regarding the island's future should be between Britain and "the Cyprus people.”21

When Macmillan returned to London on March 27, the primary concern was how to induce parliament into supporting the release of Makarios despite his refusal to explicitly renounce violence. The Archbishop’s response threatened to split Parliament, where the Conservatives were less apt to support the decision on these terms. Edward Heath, Government Chief Whip in the House of Commons, warned the Cabinet that he could not guarantee Conservative support if Makarios were released under these circumstances. Lord Salisbury, argued that Makarios had "deliberately refrained" from meeting Britain's conditions for his release.22

In a statement to the House of Commons a few days later, Lennox-Boyd explained "while Her Majesty's Government cannot regard [Makarios' statement] as the clear appeal for which they asked, nevertheless they consider that in the present circumstances it is no longer necessary to continue the Archbishop's detention." Lennox-Boyd added that although the Government would not allow for the return of the Archbishop to Cyprus itself, nor would it abide by his demand for immediate lifting of the state of emergency on the island, it would "obviously" allow Makarios to participate in future discussions on the status of Cyprus.23 Although the Archbishop’s statement could not be interpreted as unambiguous, it satisfied the British enough to grant Makarios a conditional release to Athens.

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For its part, the US had never approved of Makarios’ deportation. From the start, the State Department had tried to persuade the British to release him and renew negotiations. State Department officials remained steadfast in their view that the path to a solution could not be achieved without the Archbishop.24 As early as September 1956, Lennox-Boyd had confided to Holmes that Makarios’ exile “was never intended to be permanent.” And even if he “failed to denounce terrorism,” he would still be free to go wherever he chose—except for Cyprus of course.25

Elsewhere and in Cyprus, news of the decision to release Makarios was welcomed enthusiastically. The island’s church bells tolled in celebration, spelling out "Makarios" in an old Greek code, and dancing crowds poured into the streets. To the British authorities, who had long maintained that most Greek Cypriots were tired of EOKA's bloody campaign, the waving Greek flags, photographs of dead EOKA guerrillas, and the voices of thousands of Cypriots shouting "EOKA!" and "we have won" was a disturbing revelation.26

In London, however, the mood among some was much more somber. Following Lennox-Boyd’s statement in the House of Commons on February 19 expressing the hope that Makarios would “at least give some indication that he proposes quite definitely to say [that the violence on Cyprus should cease] in the very near future,”27 Lord Salisbury resigned from the Cabinet. It was apparent he had little faith in the leadership or motives

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26 “Hanging Sword.”
of the Archbishop. In his letter of resignation, Salisbury wrote that by freeing Makarios, Britain had handed the initiative to the Archbishop, "and he will be able to edge us along from point to point. We shall have a sword of Damocles hanging over our heads."\(^{28}\)

\(^{28}\) Quoted in “The Hanging Sword,” *ibid.*
Chapter XI

The Push for a NATO Initiative

The celebrations in the streets of Nicosia provided a rare occasion on which Greek public opinion was at least momentarily favorable to the actions of the HMG and Macmillan was determined to make the most of this opportunity to move forward on Cyprus. For this to happen, however, the US would have to hold up its end of the bargain struck in Bermuda.

On March 20, Britain and Turkey agreed to accept the offer by NATO to establish a committee to find fresh strategies for dealing with the Cyprus problem. This development marked the first time, with the exception of the Holmes mission, that the UK had allowed outside interference in what it considered to be a domestic issue. The main reason for Britain’s acceptance of NATO involvement was to keep the discussions among the three alliance members concerned with Cyprus. The Greeks, of course, preferred that the discussions be kept between the Cypriots and the British so as not to be outflanked by Turkey and Britain.

In the past, it was the Greeks who had tried to internationalize the problem with their continuous attempts to bring it to the UN, while Britain had vigorously fought against any such move. In this instance, the roles were reversed, and it was Britain that was trying to internationalize the problem while the Greeks wanted discussions restricted to
the island itself.¹ Since Britain and Turkey had accepted the NATO offer, it was necessary that Greece be pressured to follow suit.

A memorandum of conversation between the delegations of the US and the UK suggests that Macmillan and Eisenhower had come to mutually advantageous agreement: the Prime Minister would do all he could to press for the release of Makarios, while the American President would pressure Greece into accepting NATO Secretary-General Lord Ismay’s plan for forming a “three-man commission” to search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.² According to Nicolet, Britain’s interest in involving NATO revealed more than a desire to continue the tripartite negotiations within the alliance since it was improbable that NATO would serve merely as a “reasonable atmosphere for discussion of the Radcliffe proposals in which the future of the international status of Cyprus would be taboo.” Thus the acceptance of NATO had to involve a shift in the “strategic premises” of the island.³

**Change in the Strategic Value of Cyprus**

After meeting with Prime Ministers Eden and Karamanlis in July, 1956, Spyros Skouras reported that Eden believed successful settlement was contingent upon the permanent retention of “British sovereignty over base areas following self-determination”

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¹ Message from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, March 31, 1957: *FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 470;* for the entire text of this message see, Appendix 6.
² In Polto 2135, dated March 12, George W. Perkins, the US Permanent Representative to NAC, reported from Paris that during a conversation with Ismay, he was told that the Secretary-General intended to write three letters to the three Permanent Representatives to the NAC from Greece, Turkey and the UK to implement measures for settling the Cyprus problem. According to Perkins, Ismay intended to propose appointing three “outstanding citizens” to perform “good offices,” *Ibid.,* 747C.00/3-1257, *FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 461;* Dulles, Memorandum for the Record, March 23, 1957: *ibid., 1955-1957, XXIV, 383.
Here it must be pointed out that the emphasis on “base areas” represents a critical departure from Eden’s earlier conviction of the strategic importance of the island as a whole. Prior to the military excursion in Egypt, Britain had not fully evaluated the utility of the military installations on Cyprus. In contrast to the estimation of the Defence Committee of November 29, the COS Committee concluded that if Britain had no plan to use Cyprus as a base for a strategic reserve, “it was probably not necessary to spend the large annual sums which would be required to maintain our position in the island as a whole.”

The detonation of the first British hydrogen bomb in May, 1957, code named “Short Granite,” consolidated the idea that the days of conventional military power were coming to an end and that this new weapon was not only more efficient, but could also provide “more bang for the buck.” All of this was part of Secretary Duncan Sandys’ general defense review, designed to call attention to mobile air and sea forces and the reduction of manpower to the extent that it would eliminate the necessity for National Service by

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5 According to Sir Charles Knightly, Commander of Anglo-French forces, Cyprus lacked the adequate harbors necessary for launching an amphibious attack. Furthermore, the island was also unsuitable for any airborne excursion larger than two battalions since only one of the three military fields on the island was adequately equipped. These revelations, led C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to Eisenhower, to conclude that if “Cyprus as a military base cannot handle either landing craft or more than two airborne battalions is not much of a Middle East bastion of [the] empire:” C.D. Jackson to Luce, Memorandum, April 11, 1957: Papers of C.D. Jackson, 1931-67, box 71, DDE-Library.
7 There is some controversy as to whether Britain may have bluffed about the success of its first hydrogen bomb test. According to some sources, the May 15 test actually produced a blast with a force equal to only 0.3 million tons of high explosive, far short of its thermonuclear goal. In comparison, the first American H-bomb had a yield of 10.4 million tons, c.f., Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons ,Vol. V, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); John Patrick Diggins; The Proud Decades: America in War and Peace 1941-1960, (New York: W.W. Norton & CO., 1989); Lorna Arnold and Katherine Pine, Britain and the H-Bomb, (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2001), 140.
1962. Accordingly, to retain the island merely to accommodate the Royal Air Force would be superfluous since a strategic reserve could just as easily be based in Britain. Cyprus was, however, still useful as a staging ground for the RAF against the Soviet Union and to provide air support for the Baghdad Pact, in addition to its intelligence and broadcasting installations.

On March 20, in a dinner conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club in Bermuda, the Prime Minister, much to the surprise of Eisenhower, expressed Britain’s reservations regarding the tactical importance of Cyprus. Macmillan was of the opinion “that they [the British] were growing more and more doubtful as to the strategic value of Cyprus. With the increasing range of aircraft, Cyprus became less important and he did not know that it was worth the effort and the trouble.” Any notion that Macmillan was not serious was dispelled in a second conversation on March 21 when the Prime Minister stated that Britain was not “greatly interested in Cyprus except for the military importance of the island, a factor which is changing and probably now less than before.”

Both the Prime Minister and the President agreed that although the military importance of the island was becoming “rather less,” it was “still useful to have a base there.” The Prime Minister was also of the mind that “perhaps partition would be the best answer.”

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His explanation for this opinion must have been even more surprising to the Americans. Macmillan revealed that “were it not for the Turks, the British probably would have gone much further by now towards a solution.”\(^\text{13}\) In a journal entry a few days earlier, Macmillan had written that he “was not persuaded that we need more than an airfield […]” and that once British military installations had been secured, “the Turks and Greeks could divide the rest of the island between them.”\(^\text{14}\) While the British preference for partition is apparent at this stage, the formal decision to pursue a change in the status of the island would not be reached until the summer of 1957.\(^\text{15}\)

All this discussion of partition was nothing new. The Turks had expressed an interest in it as a viable alternative in early January. In Turkey’s view, in the event of a change in the international status of Cyprus, the best course would be to cede the island to its former colonial possessor, the United Kingdom. If this was not an option, they would be willing to make the “sacrifice” and accept partition as a compromise solution.\(^\text{16}\)

A few years earlier, Eisenhower, too, had expressed support for the idea of partition, as well as dismay over the Greek position since, in his view; the Greeks had no legal jurisdiction. He now stated “if we supported partition, including most of the NATO partners, Greece might find it difficult to oppose.”\(^\text{17}\) The policy of pressuring Greece

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\(^{15}\) Hatzivassiliou, *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus*, 96.

\(^{16}\) Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director of GTI, Memcon with Mehmet Baydur, Counselor of the Turkish Embassy, January 8, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-857, NARA.

could not prevail, however, without a united front by the Western allies, which at this stage, was not forthcoming.

Initially, the first task for the US was to convince the Greeks to accept the tripartite discussions under the auspices of NATO. Greece was careful to publicly present the February 26 UN resolution as a call for negotiations between the Cypriots and the British, as this would be the only viable move towards an equitable solution. The State Department wanted to encourage British-Cypriot negotiations on self-government, in addition to discussing a long term arrangement within NATO. The Americans hoped that simultaneous discussions would lead to a “clearer definition of the eventual status [of] Cyprus,” warning if Greece rejected the latter that the US would be “disinclined” to pressure Britain on the former.18

Responding to Lennox Boyd’s announcement in the House commons regarding the NATO offer to undertake conciliation for Cyprus, Karamanlis issued the following statement:

It is regrettable that the British colonial secretary has shown that, once again, his government is not approaching the Cyprus issue in the correct manner, but is persisting with its demand that peace is a condition for a solution, even though it is clear, as history has shown, that peace can only come as the result of a solution. Therefore, the request that Archbishop Makarios call for a cessation of violence is pointless, since the leader of the National Cypriot Fighters’ Organization (EOKA), in an initiative on March 14, said that he would call a halt to all action as soon as the archbishop was freed [...] Moreover, the liberation of the ethnarch is provided for in the relevant UN resolution, since it calls for a continuation of talks with him. Archbishop Makarios is the natural, but also the elected representative, of the Cypriots. The Greek government can only abide by the decision reached unanimously by the UN General Assembly and approved by all NATO members [...]19

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On March 21, Karamanlis rejected Ismay’s offer on procedural grounds, saying that because the UN resolution called for direct talks between the British and the Cypriots, his conciliation was essentially meaningless. But it is important to note that by emphasizing the “procedure” and not the substance of the proposal, Greece avoided the charge of obstructionism since it did not permanently rule out the possibility for a NATO initiative in the future.  

Karamanlis was aware of the fact that Greece had the support of the Americans for bilateral negotiations, though not for a strict interpretation of the resolution. Since the UN resolution did not “specify the shape that negotiations should take,” the State Department maintained that NATO involvement would not run contrary to requirements for a UN resolution. Karamanlis, however, was not to be swayed by this argument.

In a telegram to Herter, the Greek Prime Minister said he believed that Britain was using NATO as means to “avoid carrying out [the] clear requirements of the UN,” and that NATO involvement would lead to negotiations which would include Turkey, while a UN resolution specifically called for talks between the UK and the Cypriots. An American resolution calling for bilateral discussions needed to be scuttled as a result of British pressure, but according to Assistant Secretary Rountree, this analysis was the one favored by the US since it “called for renewed efforts by the British government and the Cypriots to come to an agreement.” 

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21 Herter, Embtel Athens 3134, March 19, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3-1957, NARA.
The Question of Independence

Following the Indian-sponsored UN resolution calling for autonomy for the island, the Greek Government had been “swinging for independence for Cyprus”. At the same time the US was pressuring Greece to accept a NATO initiative; the Greeks were similarly trying to influence the Americans to consider the possibility of independence for Cyprus. This might have been accepted as a good faith option by the US if it had not been for the fact that Foreign Minister Averoff showed his hand in a debate in the Greek Parliament on March 11 when he stated that independence for the island would be “merely a stepping-stone” on the path to enosis.

State Department officials were “not happy” about independence as a solution for Cyprus. In a conversation with Karamanlis, Ambassador Allen expressed the fear that it would open the door for the “the Soviets would start intriguing in Cyprus at the first possible opportunity,” and do nothing to dampen Greek Cypriot desire for enosis. Averoff was quick to try to dispel such fears by suggesting a treaty similar to one signed with Austria which abrogated the “right of self-determination” would similarly guarantee that Cyprus would remain independent and not become a part of Greece. Still, the

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23 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 2478, January 11, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C00 /1-1157, NARA.
24 Averoff quoted in Reddaway, 74; In a speech before the general assembly in late February, Averoff declared that Greece was not demanding Cyprus for herself, and would even be willing to see the island become an independent state, saying that it would be "as a tribute to liberty" for the Assembly to pass a Greek resolution demanding self-determination for Cyprus: “Subdued Quarrel,”Time, March 4, 1957; Ioannis Stefanidis and Giannēs D. Stephanidēs, Stirring the Greek Nation, ( Farnham Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2007), 87-88.
26 The Austrian State Treaty, signed in May 1955, specifically denied Austria the right of self-determination “because peace of Europe in matter of Anchluss was more important than right of self-
Americans and British remained uneasy regarding Averoff’s statement in Parliament, despite the Foreign Minister’s reassurances that any demand for self-determination for Cyprus would be only for “home consumption.”²⁷

Although the Greek plan did not rule out enosis permanently, this was the first time in the history of the Cyprus dispute that Greece proposed the idea of guaranteed independence. While it is generally believed that Athens was pressured by Washington to agree to a plan for guaranteed independence, documentary evidence reveals that it was Averoff and Karamanlis, not Dulles and the State Department, who made the initial overtures for such a solution. As early as 1956, Greece appeared to be open to such a prospect when faced with the possibility of partition presented in Britain’s statement in December.

The December 1956 statement by the British Colonial Secretary, naming partition as a viable alternative, gave encouragement to the Turks, who had joined the call for partition in early January. The statement, however, had the opposite effect on the Greeks, who viewed the prospect of independence as the lesser of the evils. Although the Greeks were eager to promote the independence proposal, they were careful not to propose it themselves since any Greek-sponsored initiative might be viewed unfavorably by the Turks.²⁸

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²⁷ Allen, Embtel Athens, 2487, January 14, 1957, 747C 00/ 1-1457, NARA.
While the Americans may have been “unhappy” about the Greek scheme for independence, Britain and Turkey were downright hostile to the idea. On April 27, Ambassador Warren commented that he was more concerned with the Cyprus issue now than at any time since his arrival in Ankara.²⁹ Facing resistance from all sides, the Greeks felt they had nothing to gain by discussing the eventual international status of the Cyprus question in advance of British-Cypriot negotiations. Ambassador Allen, however, suggested rather than shelving the NATO offer entirely, Karamanlis take the position that the proposal was unsuitable “for [the] time being,” since the UN resolution called for direct discussions between the British and the Cypriots, as a necessary condition for discussions to commence.³⁰

Under Secretary of State Herter, however, saw Allen’s deal as insufficient given that the UK and Turkey had not agreed to discuss the internal state of affairs ahead of resolution of the international status. Herter’s proposed solution was to tackle both problems at the same time. It was carefully crafted as to not suggest that NATO be a substitute for bilateral discussions on “self-government, but rather as a “complement,” since the question of self-government could not be settled until there was “also an understanding” on the international status of the island:

Our hope is to encourage simultaneously British-Cypriot negotiations on self-government as well as [a] long range arrangement within NATO which will lead to [a] clearer definition of the eventual status of Cyprus and will allow the Cypriots proper opportunity [to] exercise eventual choice.³¹

²⁹ Editorial note: ibid., 482.
³⁰ Allen to Dulles, Emntel Athens 3164, March 20, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3, NARA.
In return for Greek cooperation, a plebiscite with an option for guaranteed independence would be held to determine the future status of the island.\(^{32}\)

For his part, President Eisenhower’s idea of pressuring Greece was to write a letter to King Paul urging him to use the opportunity “for the purpose of creating an atmosphere which will lead to constructive negotiations between the Cypriot communities and the British authorities,” but fails to realize that Greece and Turkey might like to be included as well. The President ends the letter by suggesting that NATO might have a role to play “considering the international aspects of this question.”\(^{33}\)

This was the state of affairs following the Bermuda Conference. For the moment, things had gone as far as they could and the Americans realized there was nothing to be gained from pressing the Greeks further. Dulles suggested that the best course of action might be to fall back and wait until the new NATO Secretary-General, Paul-Henri Spaak assumed the office in May with the hope that a fresh approach could then be formulated. \(^{34}\)

\(^{32}\) Ibid.


\(^{34}\) Dulles, Deptel Paris Topol 1880, etc., June 4, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/4-657, NARA.
Chapter XII

Pressure for Active US Involvement

Greece may have resisted American pressure for accepting the NATO offer, but Athens continued to lobby the US in support for independence for Cyprus. The State Department, however, was growing impatient with the lack of progress towards a solution and acutely aware of the danger that an unresolved Cyprus problem presented for the NATO alliance. A personal letter from Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery to Eisenhower earlier in November echoed the frustration of the State Department. In his letter, Montgomery expressed the view that the continuation of the Cyprus controversy posed a “danger to the Free World,” and urged the President to “bang together the heads of Karamanlis and Menderes in order to effect a compromise.”

A discussion between State Department officials noted that Harding had also reached a similar conclusion and decided that if anyone could press the Greeks and Turks to reach a settlement Eisenhower was “the man to do it—” a generous estimation of the President’s powers of persuasion given that Eisenhower’s finest diplomatic achievement regarding Cyprus thus far was to congratulate himself for encouraging the British to release Makarios.

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2 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State, December 9, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, XXIV, 517.
Still, the President assured the Field Marshall that he and Dulles shared his concern regarding the negative affect that the Cyprus problem was having on the Alliance and on Greek-Turkish relations. He also agreed that a way needed to be found in order to draw the Greeks and Turks closer. For Eisenhower this meant persuading both parties to “restrain themselves” in the debates at the UN so as not to “further interfere” with the main priority of the US, the working of the NATO alliance.³

Towards Guaranteed Independence

Although the US did not officially endorse the idea of guaranteed independence for Cyprus, the Americans, anxious for an alternative to enosis and partition, began to explore other venues. The US briefly considered a second Holmes mission but shelved the idea until it was clear what Britain’s next move would be.⁴ A plan for more direct involvement by the Americans was offered by the US Ambassador to Britain John Hay Whitney. In a telegram on March 15, the Ambassador wondered whether progress could be made toward a solution by working “procedurally” for an improved “atmosphere” as a way to buy time until the US could decide which substantive solution it preferred. But whatever solution the Americans decided, it needed to be acceptable to all three parties in order to be effective.⁵ Given the volatile history of the negotiations thus far, herding cats might have been easier.

³ Eisenhower to Montgomery, Letter, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, December 11, 1957, doc. 488, Vol. XVIII, December 11, 1957. This is a reference to the July 12 request by Greece to include the Cyprus question on the agenda of the Twelfth session of the General Assembly. Although the United States agreed to support any resolution acceptable to the three interested parties, it continued to emphasize that the only way to resolve the problem was through “quiet diplomacy”: FRUS, 1955 - 1957, XXIV, 514 - 17, 519 – 20.
⁴ Dulles, Deptel, March 2, 1957: ibid., 458.
In April, Chalmers Wood suggested to the GTI director that as the leader of NATO, the US should use its clout “to try and steer this problem towards a reasonable outcome,” since it appeared that a solution from Britain, Greece, and Turkey would not be forthcoming. Wood’s proposal included the elimination of both enosis and partition as part of any solution, since there was no possibility of ever reconciling these two positions between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, Britain’s insistence upon retaining full sovereignty was becoming less convincing in light of Macmillan’s revelation in Bermuda that Cyprus no longer held the same strategic importance. Consequently, the only remaining reasonable course was to endorse the prospect of guaranteed independence consistent with the Greek proposals.

Athens was sensitive to the fact that the Americans did not want to appear to be endorsing any particular solution, but it still hoped that the US might propose the idea of independence. Although officially the American position was one of neutrality, the US realized that the Greco-Turkish relations were in the balance and that an alternative was necessary to counter any moves towards enosis and partition.

On February 13, Averoff had called on Dulles and told him that he understood the “delicacy of the problem for the United States,” and asked if the US could not lend its support, that it would at least maintain its neutrality. The Foreign Minister also said that

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7 Ibid.
8 Williams, Gadel 137, February 8, 1957: SDCDF, 747C.00/2-6-57, NARA. In this message the State Department instructed the United Nations Mission clarify to Britain, Greece, and Turkey that with regard to the Cyprus debate the “US planned to take no further initiative at this time.”
in his view the immediate predicament in the United Nations was “to get out of the
debate without damage to the settlement and with some help towards it. “We want,” he
said “to have a discussion without insulting each other too much.” 9

**Formulating a Decisive US Policy**

On April 16, Under Secretary of State Herter contacted the embassies and regional
consulates, indicating that the US “now seriously [has] doubts whether either enosis or
partition would prove to be peaceful or practical solutions […] the US now believes that
either independence within the Commonwealth or independence outside the
Commonwealth coupled in either case with a treaty preventing enosis are worthy [of]
serious consideration.”10

The proposed approach emphasized that any change in the status of the island would have
to be gradual, since the Cypriots had relatively little experience in self-government. A
period of self-government, the terms of which would be negotiated between the two
communities and the British, would provide an opportunity for the two communities to
assume responsibility for their own affairs. Not only would enosis be prohibited, but also
Cyprus would not be permitted to join any other state without the full consent of the three
interested parties.

Moreover, any solution should accept British sovereignty over bases on the island. The
telegram ended with the suggestion that the British Government consider inviting Cypriot
leaders to London for negotiations and to urge Makarios to attend and participate, as well.

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10 Herter, Deptel London 7312, etc., April 16, 1957: *ibid.*, 473.
The document is important in that it represents the first time the US departed from its usual “neutral” course and endorsed a concrete policy regarding the Cyprus dispute.¹¹

The reactions to the new policy from the embassies in Athens and London were generally favorable. The London Embassy informed the State Department that the Foreign Office had no “objections to Ambassador Warren presenting to the Turkish Government the views contained in Telegram 7312.” The Foreign Office, however, did caution that it might be better to tell Turkey that the US had “informed” rather than “discussed” its views with the British Government.¹² The Athens Embassy response was even stronger in that it told the State Department that it “fully agreed” with the views in the London telegram. The Embassy did, however, recommend that a “distinction” be made between the “eventual status of Cyprus” and “self-determination.”¹³

The April 20 interim reply from Ankara to London, however, was less optimistic, noting that “unless there is some drastic change in [the] political atmosphere, it is no more possible that [the] Turks would sit down at the same negation table with Makarios than that [the] Pope should sit down with the devil.” ¹⁴ Whether this was the case, it would never be known. On April 27, the Turkish Government signaled that it would oppose any form of independence. Turkey was in the midst of an election, and the Menderes

¹¹ Ibid, 474.
¹² Editorial note: Ibid., 474.
¹³ Ibid.
¹⁴ Ibid: This sentiment is supported by a note transmitted by the Turkish Government to Greece regarding Cyprus. The note accused the Greek Government of having “enotist designs” […]“aimed directly at Turkey” and of being in “close collaboration with Makarios.” The note also pointed to the tendency by the Greek Government to “make declarations in international organizations and then to deny them before its proper public opinion” as “a manifest proof of its ill intentions:” Editorial note, Ibid., 471.
government could not be involved in any solution that placed any great degree of confidence in Greek intentions. Britain readily agreed with the Turkish objections.15

Meanwhile, Greece, with support from the US, was willing to allow NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak to investigate the matter. It was urgent that the US apply decisive pressure since it was evident that Britain was also growing increasingly impatient with the lack of progress. There was a great fear in Washington that the British might “pull a Palestine.” In other words, retreat quickly and leave the mess for others to deal with.16 After careful consideration, Spaak informed Ambassador George W. Perkins that he had come to the many of the same conclusions as the Americans, including a guaranteed independence option but without the interim period of self-government.

The British were not pleased with the fact that Spaak’s proposals mirrored those of the US and instructed the British Ambassador to NATO to “shoot this proposal down as soon as possible.”17 They were angry and disappointed by what they perceived was American sympathy toward Greece. Foreign Office officials even went so far as to make a personal attack against Ambassador George Allen saying, “the State Department are not well served by their Ambassador in Athens” because ‘he swallows whatever Averoff tells him.’”18

The American push for guaranteed independence finally persuaded London that it was on shaky ground. Britain realized that both the US and Spaak stood firmly against its

15 Whitney to Dulles, Embtel London 6387, May 22, 1957: SDCDF. doc, 747C.00/5-2257, NARA.
16 Quoted here in Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 248.
17 Quoted here in Holland, ibid., 197.
18 Quoted here in Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 99.
preference for partition; an option it felt committed to uphold owing to Lennox-Boyd’s December 19 statement.\footnote{Hatzivassiliou, \textit{ibid.}, 113.} While urging the US not to completely take the partition option off the table, the British withdrew to formulate a new approach to the problem. Turkey had suggested a new tripartite conference, and Britain decided to accept the plan.

An oral communication dated July 24 proposed a plan calling for Greek and Turkish representatives to meet in London for conference in September. The plan included an invitation to Spaak and US representatives to observe but not to participate. The conference would have no set agenda, but rather discuss “without prejudice every solution so far mooted.” The only “fixed requirement[s]” were that any proposed solution had to be predicated upon securing “essential military facilities under British control,” preventing communist penetration, and guaranteeing the peace of the island.\footnote{Note in Memcon Between the British Ambassador (Caccia) and Dulles Washington, July 25, 1957: \textit{FRUS, 1955-1957}, XXIV, 483.}

Although Dulles was supportive of the British initiative, he was skeptical about whether the Greeks could be persuaded to attend the conference, recalling the attitude of the Greeks toward such meetings in the past.\footnote{Roger Allen had been reporting since late June that the Greeks would not participate in the conference because of the lingering hard feelings stemming from the 1955 conference. Allen believed that “much of the venom which has since embittered our relations with Greece dates from that time:” Allen to Young June 28, 1957, FO 286/1415.} Dulles knew that it would be difficult to prevail upon the Greeks to participate without assurances of support that the US was not ready to offer for fear of alienating Turkey. Still, Ambassador Caccia underlined the importance of American participation and was hopeful that the US presence would not only persuade the parties to attend, but also have them approach the meeting with a
“spirit of compromise.” Just convincing the Greeks to agree to attend the conference would be enormously difficult—to hope that they would do so in “the spirit of compromise” was magical thinking.

On August 3, the British extended an invitation to Greece to attend the conference in London to which Averoff did not immediately respond. On August 7, the Greek Foreign Minister gave his reply. Greece would not take part until they were reasonably confident that there was “at least the serious hope that a solution be found.” Despite continual pressure by the US, the Greeks remained firm in their conviction that a plan needed to be in place before they would agree to participate in a tripartite conference. It became academic, however, when the Turkish Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel informed the British that no conference would be held prior to the mid-October general elections for the Grand National Assembly.24

22 Ibid, 484.
23 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 114.
24 The elections in Turkey were held on October 27 with Menderes’ Grand National Party the clear winner, taking 421 seats.
Chapter XIII

Second Tripartite Conference Initiative

In May 1957 Macmillan suggested that an agreement based on the Radcliffe proposals should be discussed with the Greeks, Turks, and the Cypriots but that the idea of self-determination be shelved “for a period of, say, ten years.” It was the only rational outcome seeing as it was impossible to reconcile Britain’s penchant for partition with the US’s preference for independence.¹

A memorandum by Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd following a meeting of the CPC on May 29 emphasized the importance of Turkish compliance with any eventual British solution, while using the threat of partition as leverage against the Greeks if they decided to move forward on the question of self-determination. Furthermore, the memorandum called for soliciting support from both Spaak and the US in order to pressure Greece and Turkey.² This new hard line policy was a clear indication that the British were growing increasingly impatient with finding a search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. It also signaled a readiness to implement the Radcliffe Constitution by the end of the year if none of the concerned parties stepped forward to negotiate it, although it must be pointed out that it had been rejected by both Makarios and the Greek Government.³

¹ Quoted in Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus*, 106.
² Hatzivassiliou, *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus*, 110
The CPC meeting concluded with support for following Turkey’s suggestion for a new tripartite conference. Anticipating the probable outcome, Macmillan sketched a possible course of action: if the conference broke down, which was the most likely scenario, Britain would inject the idea for self-determination based on the Radcliffe proposals. If this proved unsuccessful, Britain would then hold a plebiscite which offered a choice between partition or continued British rule.4 Needless to say, neither of these options would be palatable to the Greeks.

Prior to making any rash move they might later regret, the British decided to first consult the new Secretary-General Spaak, the US, and Turkey. The State Department agreed to meet with the British and discuss the possible course of action but, at the same time, warned them not to make the same error that they made in December 1956 when they decided to exclude Greece.5 The Foreign Office, however, had good reason why it did not want to inform the Greeks in advance. If the past was any indication, Greece would sabotage the whole initiative by rejecting any proposed plan out-of-hand and leaking it to the press.

The British were hoping for the full endorsement by Dulles and Spaak. It was especially important that they both be on board since it would not be easy to persuade the Greeks to accept an initiative for which they would likely have no enthusiasm.6 To further pressure the Greeks, a plan was proposed in which Britain would invite Spaak and a US official as

4 Ibid., 110.
5 Dulles, Deptel London 542, July 18, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-1657, NARA.
6 Ibid.
observers. In early August, Spaak met with Ambassador Allen and urged that the US attend the conference in just such a capacity.  

Upon learning about the conference, Dulles’s initial reaction was to ask Ambassador Caccia what he knew to be a rhetorical question, if there was “any reason to hope that the Greeks would attend?” The Secretary recalled the difficulty in persuading the Greeks to join in the 1955 conference and commented that “it would probably be very difficult for the US to prevail upon Greece to participate without assurances of support,” which the US was in no position to extend due to the sensitivities of its “other ally, Turkey.” At this stage, the US decided against sending an observer because “it would involve [the US] too deeply in [the] Cyprus dispute and might serve to detract from the role Spaak would play in bringing the parties together.”

Although the Americans supported Spaak’s participation as an observer, they were still skeptical with regard to British objectives and suspected that the initiative was only a “tactical move” to forestall another UN debate. They were also worried that the UK would not approach the conference with an open mind. Furthermore, there was legitimate concern that Turkey would insist upon interpreting the December 1956 statement by Britain as an endorsement for partition and hold to its present “uncompromising position” due to pressure from the forthcoming Turkish elections. Thus, the Americans believed the best course of action was to engage the UK in the interim since it might prejudice its

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position with Greece. On the other hand, it was noted that not to do so would open the US to criticism from Britain that it had again let them down.¹⁰

The State Department still had reservations about US participation in the proposed conference. In an August 6 meeting between Dulles, Rountree, and Coulson, the Secretary of State expressed his doubts whether it would be “useful” or “advisable” for the US to participate. Dulles’s qualms stemmed from the fact that the US had no authority, responsibility, or “new ideas” to contribute.¹¹ After much deliberation, the US relented and agreed that it would send an observer “without prior commitment for or against any particular proposal.”¹² Spaak would also participate. It was hoped that the presence of the US and Spaak might assuage Greek fears about being outflanked in the negotiations.

Reassurances, however, would not be enough. Following earlier consultations with Menderes, Ambassador Fletcher Warren confirmed that Turkey would insist upon partition. This, of course, would be a deal-breaker for Greece, which would accept no invitation unless partition was categorically ruled out.¹³

Meanwhile, an invitation was extended to Greece on August 3, to which Averoff did not immediately respond. On August 5, Roger Allen reported that Greece would decline, citing a recent leak about the conference as the reason for its refusal. Greece’s official answer came two days later. Regardless of American encouragement, Greece refused to

¹⁰ Ibid.
¹¹ Meeting Between Dulles, Rountree and Minister of the British Embassy (Coulson), Memcon, August 6, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-657, NARA.
¹² Dulles, Embtel Athens 465, August 7, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/8-75, NARA.
¹³ Nicolet, ibid., 107.
participate in the conference until there was good reason to believe that “at least the serious hope that a solution could be found.” Averoff believed that Greece had more than demonstrated its willingness to cooperate. First, they had informed Spaak in early June that they were now definitely in agreement with his paper on a solution for Cyprus and, in a meeting with Perkins on August 6, Averoff had revealed that he was ready to deal with Turkey in a more direct manner. Furthermore, Averoff now had Makarios on his side, having finally succeeded in persuading the Archbishop to accept Spaak’s plan for independence. While Makarios may have been persuaded to take up the cause of independence, much to the dismay of the Greek Government, he remained opposed to the idea of a new tripartite conference. In a statement to the opposition newspaper *Eleftheria*, the Archbishop expressed the view that “the problem [did] not concern the three parties” and could only be “settled through negotiations between Great Britain and [the] people of Cyprus.”

On August 8, the London Embassy informed the FO that the State Department would be willing to attend the Cyprus conference as an observer. Having finally convinced a reluctant State Department to participate, Ambassador Allen was saddled with the unenviable task of informing an already skeptical Dulles that the Greeks would be a no show.

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14 Dulles, Deptel London 1130, August 8, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-857, NARA.
16 Hatzivassiliou, *ibid*, 117.
17 Quoted in Allen, Embtel Athens 439, August 8, 1957: *ibid.*, 747C.00/-857, NARA.
18 *Ibid*.
19 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 426, August 7, 1957: *ibid*, doc. 747C.00/8-757.
On August 8, Greece issued an official refusal to participate in the tripartite conference, citing a host of other concerns including lack of time for preparation and the fear that Turkey would be willing only to consider partition as a solution. While Greece reaffirmed its position that any solution would need to involve the Cypriots, Averoff implied that if “certain other conditions” were met, Cypriot participation might not be necessary after all. Since Greece did leave open the possibility of exploring the question further through diplomatic channels, the Foreign Office’s immediate reaction was “not one of discouragement,” but, rather, “when the lady says no, she means maybe.”

The Greeks were coming to appreciate the predicament summarized by Dulles to the British, and confirmed by an FO official that the December 19, 1956, statement involving partition was indeed still applicable. Even if the British had had the will, the Turks were not about to release them from what they perceived was a “pledge” enshrined in the 1956 statement. This made Britain’s assertion that it would come to the conference with an open mind appear all the more cynical. Accordingly, Averoff countered with three types of solutions which would be acceptable to the Greek Government, one of which involved guaranteed independence under the aegis of NATO:

a) Independence with [a] guarantee for a period of 20 years

b) Independence with [a] guarantee against change except by consent [of] majority of UN or NATO.

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21 Barbour to Dulles, Embtel London 995, August 8, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-857, NARA.
22 *Ibid*.
c) British sovereignty with plebiscite after ten years.  

As an added incentive, Averoff promised that Greece would participate in the conference if Britain would accept any of the three solutions. He also expressed a willingness to examine any other solutions that might be proposed.  

As expected, the Foreign Minister’s initiative was rejected by Britain and everyone else. On October 10, Assistant Under Secretary Archibald Ross of the FO told Barbour that Britain considered an interim solution to have all the “disadvantages and none of the advantages of real progress,” and would do nothing to resolve the problem. While Britain had not completely given up on the conference idea, at this stage it was, “if not dead, lying totally unconscious.”

**Bilateral Discussions and the Tridominium Plan**

Meanwhile, Britain informed the Embassy in London that Charles Wiggin had contacted the State Department to convey Britain’s interest in beginning secret discussions with the US, regardless of whether the Greeks would attend the conference. The Embassy in London regarded this overture as a constructive sign that the British were serious about finding a solution for Cyprus. The Embassy added that, although the US should “welcome the opportunity for discussions,” it should take care that they be “viewed as a continuation of regular diplomatic discussions rather than constituting any new procedure.” The State Department was anxious to avoid any high–level talks for fear of

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26 As told by Whitney to Dulles, Embtel London 2352, October 10, 1957: *ibid.*, doc. 747C.00/10-1057.
27 Embtel London 1379, August 17, 1957: *ibid.*, doc. 747C.00/8-1757.
feeding Greek or Turkish paranoia that there was a conspiracy afoot to present them with an Anglo-American resolution *fait accompli*. 28 Consequently, Ambassador Barbour, with the blessing of the State Department, insisted on informal talks on the Embassy level. 29 The sensitivity of the situation was not lost on Macmillan, as evident by the following message from the Prime Minister to the Secretary of State:

I am very glad to hear that you have agreed to informal, secret and exploratory talks with us about Cyprus...But this is of course, a matter of the greatest delicacy for us. I know you will understand that secrecy is vital, but I should be grateful if you would ensure that knowledge of our conversations is kept to the smallest possible circle as it will be on our side. 30

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the British, Dulles was quietly encouraging Athens and Ankara to negotiate directly with each other on the diplomatic, but not the PM, level. Dulles reasoned that pressure from the possible London Conference, combined with the upcoming Turkish elections, might exert undue pressure on Karamanlis and Menderes and that discussions between diplomats might be more “fruitful.” 31

The discussions between Britain and the US got underway between September 10 and 18. Dulles outlined the strategy to be used in a telegram to Walworth Barbour, the US representative in the bilateral talks. 32 Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar was the UK principal. First, Dulles wanted to clarify Britain’s intentions concerning its defense plans for Cyprus specifically, the types of installations, the location of enclaves, and an estimated rate of military expenditures. Barbour was also charged with exploring the question of

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30 Presidential Correspondence: “Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence,” 1955-1959: SCSDF, 747C.00/8-57, Lot 66 D, 204.
“interim arrangements” vs. “ultimate status.” But given the tensions among the interested parties, Dulles doubted that an agreement on ultimate status could be reached. Furthermore, Barbour should take care to emphasize that the US would not endorse any particular solution with respect to interim arrangements or ultimate status but, instead, consider the three conditions provided in the British oral communication issued in late July as “a useful point of departure:”

a) Retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty
b) Protection of the island from communist infiltration;
c) Establishment [of] peace and tranquility in [the] island as a whole 33

These conditions should also include “the preservation of NATO unity,” the “desirability of avoiding an international financial burden,” and “enlisting the support and cooperation” of the Ethnarchy in a quest for a solution. 34

Surprisingly, the bilateral discussions yielded some useful results. The British believed that the best solution for the island might be a condominium in which Britain, Greece, and Turkey would be in charge of the part of Cyprus not retained for British military installations. According to the provisional plan, administration of the island would be in the hands of a governor chosen by the three parties and self-government would be based

33 British Embassy in Washington D.C., Oral Communication, July 24, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-2457, NARA.
chiefly on the Radcliffe Constitution. Remarkably, the Americans were intrigued and granted that the British plan had “merit” that warranted further consideration. Both parties agreed that the next stage would be to submit the proposal to Spaak, who should be encouraged to present it to Ankara and Athens as his own initiative.35 Despite the State Department’s enthusiasm, not everyone was convinced that the condominium, or as it would be later named, the tridominium, was a particularly practical one. Ambassador Allen’s view was that “there would not be [the] slightest chance of acceptance by Greece.” Belcher, the US Consul in Nicosia, was likewise unimpressed and predicted that the plan would be “completely unacceptable to [the] Cypriots.”36 It is difficult to understand why seasoned officials and diplomats believed that the Greeks would accept any proposal which included only items it had so vigorously rejected in the past. And, even more importantly, why it was realistically believed that Greece would suddenly willingly grant Turkey an equal stake in Cyprus.37

No sooner had the talks ended when the US began to take a more sober look at the feasibility of the British tridominium idea. The first misgivings were conveyed to Barbour on September 23, citing Allen’s opposition as a reason for not proceeding with the plan.38 When Allen recommended the alternative idea of an Anglo-Greek condominium like the one put forward in the London Times by a former Minister of State

37 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 872, September 19, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/ 9-1957
at the Colonial Office, Warren’s countered that this would of course “very likely be rejected out of hand by Turkey.”

In a telegram to London on October 7, Dulles advised the Embassy that it should inform the British that “after further consideration of [the] condominium proposal, we feel it would be unwise [to] seek to persuade Spaak to advocate a particular solution before exploratory talks on his part [...] we believe that [the] condominium plan as outlined to us presents serious problems, of which the greatest would be the question of where ultimate authority lies in [the] event [of a ] dispute between co-domini or crisis on the island.”

The US was turning back to its original plan for diplomatic talks through Spaak. The Americans believed it would be more useful, not to mention safer, to focus on “collecting the views” of the concerned parties in separate talks and steer clear of any particular solution which might alienate the parties. In the end, the principal objection to the British plan lay in its practical application. Dulles did not think that the Greeks could accept it because it “gave Turks a legal status on Cyprus.”

Needless to say, Britain was disappointed. The US was now leaning towards an interim solution since it was obvious that by October, Turkey and Greece were unlikely to agree to any foreseeable compromise. Britain, however, rejected the idea for an interim solution, citing the present “precarious situation” on Cyprus with the possibility that

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39 Allen to Dulles, Embtel Athens 916, September 25, 1957: *ibid.*, doc. 747C.00/92557; Warren to Dulles, Embtel Ankara 928, September 28, 1957:*ibid.*, doc. 747C.00/ 9-2857, NARA.
42 Memcon drafted by Dale, Department of State, 266, October 22, 1957, *ibid.*, 511.
terrorism could start again at any moment and the fact that Britain could no longer in terms of “money or manpower” hold the island indefinitely.\footnote{Ibid.}

It had been clear since Makarios’ release that Turkey’s position would harden and remain that way at least until after their elections on October 27. Meanwhile, Greece was trying to delay any move until the forthcoming UN debate. Moreover, Greece had become more obdurate since MP Barbara Castle’s statement at Brighton reaffirming the Labour Party’s belief in self-determination and the “resolution” adopted stating its intention to resolve the Cyprus problem by granting it to the island:\footnote{Ibid, 510.} “Cyprus should be given the right of self-determination and after a set period may opt for Greece: but it is fully possible that the Cypriots, once the right of self-determination has been conceded, may decide to stay within the Commonwealth,” adding that “if given five years in office,” Labour would “endeavor to complete the freedom operation” within that time frame.\footnote{Transmitted in Telegram 2328 from London, October 9, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-957, NARA; “The Five Year Itch,” Cyprus Mail, October 7, 1957.}

While the Greek Government, Greek Cypriots, and most of the press voiced unanimous approval for Mrs. Castle’s statement, an editorial in the Cyprus Mail was quick to point out that it was not a resolution, but “merely a statement of intentions in rather equivocal terms by one of the Party[‘s] executive[s].”\footnote{For a summary of press reaction to the Brighton statement see: FS Despatch Athens 244, October 10, 1957:ibid., doc. 747C.00/10-1057; FS Despatch Nicosia 32, October 10, 1957: ibid., 747C.00/10-1057. “The Five Year Itch,” Cyprus Mail, October 7, 1957.} The editorial warned that if Labour was not clearly committed to the five year period for self-determination, then they were “playing a dangerous game.”\footnote{“The Five Year Itch,” Cyprus Mail, October 7, 1957.}
Consul Belcher worried that the statement might cause EOKA to rebuild its strength as a counter to what would likely be an uptick in Turkish efforts to combat enosis. The American Consul was not wrong. On October 9, the Turkish Cypriot leader Fazil Küçük summed up the Turkish position towards the Labour statement: “the Labour Party action will force the Turkish community so far obedient to laws and serving the cause of justice to defend its rights by the use of force.” This was an ominous threat.

Belcher agreed with Deputy Governor Sinclair’s opinion that the Labour statement had greatly complicated efforts to achieve a solution. He recommended that rather than sit idly by and wait for a Labour takeover of the Government of the United Kingdom, the US should continue its efforts with the Greek and Turkish Governments to achieve a solution as soon as possible.

**American Neutrality in the UN Twelfth Session**

On July 12, 1957, Greece submitted for the fourth time the “Question of Cyprus” for inclusion in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly. The US chose to play referee and try to “exercise a moderating influence” in order to keep the British and Greeks from each other’s throats in this, the latest excursion into the international forum. On September 17, Eisenhower telephoned Dulles to discuss the current state

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49 Ibid., 2.
affairs with regard to the Cyprus. The President had little to add except to repeat his usual tin-eared comment that “Cyprus never belonged to Greece.” 51

The run-up to the Twelfth Session followed a familiar pattern, with the US unable to persuade Greece to refrain from submitting their resolution and with Greece attempting to press the Americans to support their claim for self-determination by citing internal stability issues. Anxiety about a communist overthrow of the Karamanlis Government, however, was not as urgent an issue for the US as it had been in previous years. Hence, Greece could no longer summon the specter of the communist threat in order to extract support from the State Department for its claim at the UN.52

Ambassador Lodge, one of the US officials most sympathetic to the Greek case, asked to be allowed to support a Greek compromise which the British might deem acceptable.53 Britain, however, was not prepared to act without first sounding out the Turks and would therefore not consent to any compromise, except for an anemic proposal to which Greece would never agree.54

51 “The Sec. said the Greek-Turkey thing is a mess. The Pres. said the Greeks are demanding unless we take their side, they will be tough. The Sec. said we probably won’t favor putting it on the UN Agenda because if it comes up, it will be shambles, but we need more definite commitments from the British. They dragged the Turks in and got them excited so the issue is considered to be Greek-Turkish and not Greek-British. The Pres. said Cyprus never belonged to Greece,” Editorial Note: Telcon between President Eisenhower and Dulles, September 17, 1957:ibid., 506.
52 An OCB report in December later confirms this view stating that “currently there is no communist threat to Greek internal security. For the past five years there has been political stability and reasonable economic growth:” OCB Report: “Operations Plan for Greece: Objectives and Special Operating Guidance, “December 11, 1957: ibid., 606.
53 Lodge to Dulles, Embtel New York Delegation 489, November 28, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-2857, NARA.
54 Lodge to Dulles, Embtel New York Delga. 550, December 5, 1957:ibid., 747C.00/12-557.
On December 9, Averoff approached Lodge following the First Committee adjournment and “urged in the strongest terms the US remain neutral and abstain from voting on Greek self-determination resolution.” When Lodge asked Averoff whether there was reason to hope that Greece and Britain would agree on a resolution, the Foreign Minister replied affirmatively, but made it clear that Greece could never agree to any resolution “stipulating parties to [the] dispute since this would give Turkey veto power over any solution.” On the basis of Averoff’s statement, Lodge suggested that he be authorized to assume a neutral position on the Greek resolution should it come to a vote, at the same time, recognizing that it would be preferable if this did not happen.55

At this stage, the consensus at the bureau of European Affairs (EUR) was that Greece should no longer be permitted to try to blackmail the US into supporting its claim by voting against their item at the UN. The Americans, however, were not quite prepared to go that far and ultimately opted to abstain on the vote of self-determination for the Cypriots.56

At the last minute, Greece agreed to an amendment expressing its willingness to engage in further negotiations and discussions with all concerned parties. The amended Greek resolution was adopted by the First Committee. It failed, however, to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary for final approval in a vote at a plenary meeting of the Assembly on December 14. The final tally was 31 for and 23 against, with the 24

56 Nicolet, ibid., 110.
abstentions, among them the US.\textsuperscript{57} As a result, the biggest Greek success at the UN thus far had also been a failure.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957, 75.}
Chapter XIV

Derailing the Spaak Initiative

While Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the US were occupied at the UN, NATO Secretary-General Spaak was actively seeking a resolution to the simmering Cyprus conflict. The US and, less enthusiastically, Britain had earlier agreed that the Secretary-General should “adopt a general method of collecting views” of Greece, Turkey, and Britain and look for a “common understanding on an interim arrangement” while taking care to avoid advocating any particular solution. Spaak, however, had other ideas and appeared to be deviating from this script. According to Dulles, the Secretary-General had “already attempted [to] persuade [the] parties of [the] merits of […] guaranteed independence, without success.” The Secretary-General decided to take the upper hand because none of the parties involved was inclined to accept a proposal put forward by another. ¹

At a time when Greece and Turkey were certain to rebuff any proposal the other country endorsed, the Americans had warned Spaak that NATO’s role as a mediator could become seriously compromised and that it would be best to engage in quiet diplomacy and avoid promoting any particular course of action.² Eager to move forward and confident in his ability, Spaak disregarded the State Department warning and instead proceeded to explore specific solutions. These included a plan for a combined guaranteed

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² Ibid.
independence and dominion status with the Greeks, or a NATO guarantee for military
assurances and minority guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots.³

Spaak’s self-assurance was not shared by State Department officials, however. After
reporting that he had been in touch with all of the principally interested parties, he said he
believed that his discussions had been useful in clarifying the problem. He also said he
was confident that in a few months he might be able to propose a solution.⁴ The State
Department feared that Spaak might “run with the ball in the wrong direction” by
committing US support for a solution to which there was no general agreement.⁵

When Spaak proposed the idea for a NATO conference, Dulles knew it was time to rein
him in by reaffirming his original mandate.⁶ Convinced that he would be able to make a
breakthrough before the UN debate in mid-November, the Secretary-General devised a
framework for a settlement based upon ideas assembled from meetings with the British
and Greeks that might also be acceptable to the Turks.⁷ At this point, there appeared to be
a revelation on the part of the Greeks regarding Turkey’s attitude, signaling a major shift
in Anglo-Greek relations. This is confirmed by Averoff who cited the “intransigence” of
Turkey and the “prospects of renewed fighting” because of it.⁸ The Greek Foreign

³ Frederick E. Noting Jr., Deputy Head of the Mission to NATO, to Dulles, Embtel Paris Polto 837,
October 7, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-757, NARA.
⁴ Memcon between delegations of the US and NATO, October 24, 1957: FRUS, 1955-1957, IV, 174
⁵ As told by Whitney to Dulles, Embtel London 2352, October 10, 1957: ibid., doc. 747C.00/10-1057, 2.
⁶ Dulles, Deptel Paris Topol 1287, October 30, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-2257, NARA.
⁷ Paris Polto 1333, November 18, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-1857, NARA.
⁸ The Security situation had indeed begun to deteriorate in October 1957, with Grivas making bombing
attacks on the island, riots had erupted the week of the UN debate, see Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the
Minister said that “the Greek people now “realize that not the United Kingdom, but Turkey stood in the way of a solution of the Cyprus problem.””

The Spaak initiative consisted of a formula for a settlement that included guaranteed independence for Cyprus, a NATO base under British control, and an international statute safeguarding minority rights. The US was unconvinced and feared that it would be counterproductive to “engage the prestige” of the Secretary-General with such a solution at this time, reaffirming the general American inclination for more restrained explorations. Spaak continued to work behind the scenes throughout the fall of 1957, but it was apparent that a solution would not be found that year. In the absence of clear American support, the Spaak initiative became one more abandoned and failed attempt to resolve the Cyprus problem.

At this stage, the US understood that no new departures would be undertaken until after the installation of the new Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, who first had to have the opportunity to review the situation and make recommendations. The Americans hoped that the change in governorship might provide a new opportunity for the continuation of quiet diplomacy with the possibility of wringing concessions from both the Greeks and the Turks. While Spaak proposals may have failed to win the support of the interested parties, as a result of his efforts, Britain now showed itself open to the possibility of finding a solution through NATO.

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10 Burgess to Dulles, Embtel Paris Polto 1333, November 18, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-1857, NARA.
Changing of the Guard

In December 1957, HMG announced that Harding would be replaced by Sir Hugh Foot, the Governor of Jamaica. As governor, Harding had become identified with operations against EOKA by instituting a number of hard-line measures including executions, curfews, school closures, communal fines, and 20,000-soldier man hunts. He banished Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles for inflaming Greek Cypriot desire for enosis and publicly stated that the British Government should never negotiate with him, although he had earlier attempted to do so. Clearly, if Britain hoped to have any chance for a political settlement, Harding needed to go.13

Holland, however, cites two other reasons for his removal. The first was the loss of substantial support of his security forces for rescuing “photojournalist” and EOKA member Nicos Sampson from the gallows,14 a man he had called a “dedicated killer if there ever was one.”15 The second reason was the Castle statement which encouraged the Greeks to retire to the trenches rather than continue political discussion.

Although released from exile in March 1957, Makarios had still not yet been allowed to return to Cyprus. Despite his absence, not to mention his obstinacy, it was clear that that no other Greek Cypriot leader had the authority to move negotiations forward. With this in mind, Belcher, with the support of James K. Penfield, Counselor of the Embassy in Athens seized the occasion of the change in the governorship to put forward the

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14 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 206.
15 Quote attributed to Harding in “Autobiographical Notes,” (no pub.)1974. 2.
suggestion that the Archbishop be allowed to return to the island. In a letter to Bruce Laingen at the Bureau of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Consul Belcher argued that it was the only way to restore normality to the island. Belcher, however, was not optimistic that this would happen given that Harding on his way out had urged the delay of the Archbishop’s return until after an international agreement had been reached so as not to further antagonize the Turks.

Then again, Harding did agree with Belcher’s view that the US needed to more forcefully engage with regard to Cyprus. According to Holland, this view represents “[...] a unique instance [...] of a British colonial governor calling for American interference in the affairs of his own territory.” Indeed, Eisenhower, himself, during the fall of 1957 was told, most notably by Montgomery, that” it was "high time we got the Cyprus problem settled"” even if that meant “bang[ing] together the heads of Karamanlis and Menderes.”

Even more telling was Karamanlis’s observation following the UN debate in December that the US “must intervene decisively”— after which Averoff added that “the US was the only power which could bring about a solution.” Secretary Dulles responded by pointing out that while the US sympathized with Greece, it had no “mandate to settle the Cyprus problem,” and therefore, could only hope to “appeal to reason on both sides.” In reality, the State Department was growing weary of the wrangling and wanted to buy time until Sir

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16 Belcher to Laingen, Letter Lot 60D39, Entry 1315, NEA, GTI, files relating to Greece and Cyprus, 1955-1958, NARA.
17 Belcher to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 113, November 11, 1957: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/11-257, NARA.
18 Holland, *ibid.*, 209.
Hugh Foot assumed office, with the hope that he might bring new ideas in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Sir Hugh Foot arrived in Cyprus on December 3, 1957, and almost immediately began to prepare ground for new negotiations. Cyprus would soon discover that it had a new kind of governor. Unarmed and unescorted, Foot toured the streets of Nicosia, mingling with the locals and, in a gesture of good faith, granted clemency to hundreds of detainees. Five days before Christmas, he triggered celebrations in Nicosia by releasing 89 men and 11 women from detention camps who were accused of supporting EOKA. All of this was in marked contrast to his predecessor, who never ventured out unless heavily escorted. Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike were favorably impressed, calling him "a governor with guts."21

The view from Ankara, however, was angry consternation that Sir John Harding, the military man, had been replaced by Sir Hugh Foot, the colonial civil servant with a reputation for having a liberal predisposition. Ankara’s apprehension that Britain might no longer be relied upon to hold Cyprus was aggravated by the Labour Party resolution calling for self-determination following an interim period of self-government.22

At this point, however, Britain was open to any solution that might be acceptable to both Greece and Turkey, provided that it would not further compromise its position in the

Middle East. Clearly, Britain desperately wanted to be rid of Cyprus, but did not want to throw out the colonial bathwater with the baby.23

**The Foot Plan**

In January 1958, the Americans, impressed by Sir Hugh Foot’s performance in changing the general atmosphere on the island, decided to have another go at making progress in Cyprus.24 In the month since he became governor, Foot had strived to build what he called "bridges of trust" between his administration and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Foot journeyed to London to meet with Macmillan and the Colonial Office to work out the details of his plan. While indulging his fondness for Biblical analogy, he was careful not to be overly optimistic saying, “on our journey to the Promised Land, we are not yet at the Jordan. We are just about at the Red Sea. Our task must be to find a good road toward an eventual settlement.”25

The Foot Plan called for a seven-year period of self-government for Cyprus under Britain, prior to self-determination and on equal terms for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In other words, double self-determination. It also called for the preservation of bases under British sovereignty, along with the possibility of a Turkish base, which the Turks had indicated that they might accept in lieu of partition. Foreign Secretary Lloyd defended the idea of double self-determination by maintaining that Britain could not

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25 “The Bridge Builder,” *Time*, January 13, 1958; journalists such as Ömer Sami Coşar wrote scathingly about the Foot Plan, but all Turkish newspapers of the time expressed suspicion to one degree or another about Foot and his proposals see, Ömer Sami Coşar, “Kıbrıs İçin Plan mı?” (“New Plan for Cyprus?”), *Cumhuriyet*, January 9, 1958.
abandon the principle since it had already committed itself to the idea. To do so would compromise any hope of cooperation from the Turkish Cypriots. Although the British expressed doubts that the scheme would work, they agreed to accept any solution that had the acceptance of Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities. Regarding procedure, the Turkish Government was to be informed of the plan in advance of Greece who, everyone agreed, would be a tougher sell. 26

Counselor Penfield warned the State Department that Greece would likely interpret the self-determination formula as partition and, hence, would categorically reject it. Roger Allen was equally “pessimistic” about Greek acceptance and the likelihood of developing any formula that would be agreed to by the parties concerned. Notwithstanding this, Penfield concluded that since there was no better alternative on the horizon every effort should be taken to help the Foot plan succeed, and Washington and London agreed. 27

Foot, however, seemed to have the utmost confidence that his plan would succeed. Indeed, the consensus among the bureaucrats of London and Cyprus was that the new governor was being “a little bright-eyed about it all.” 28 Still, Foot was convinced that the plan would be embraced by the large majority who were “increasingly fed up with the current uncertain conditions on the island.” He believed that after the Cypriots accepted the proposal, Greece would follow suit. 29 It must have therefore come as quite a shock when his plan was spurned by Ankara.

27 Penfield, Embtel Athens 1936, January 14: ibid., 570-571.
On January 14, the Turkish Government rejected the Foot Plan and, instead of an intervening period of self-determination, suggested that Cyprus be partitioned at the end of one year and simultaneously invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to a meeting to discuss “final disposition of the island.” If Greece refused to attend such a meeting, it was suggested that the British and Turkish Governments settle the Cyprus issue between themselves. The vision of the Promised Land was slipping away, and the Foot Plan was beginning to look like forty more years in the desert.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Averoff, who had heard only whispers of the British plan, proposed the idea that perhaps direct talks between Greece and Turkey might be more productive. On January 22, Averoff met with Penfield for a discussion on Cyprus. Among other things, he told the American Counselor that he was convinced “emphatically and categorically,” after meeting with the Turkish Ambassador to Greece Vergin, that Turkey was preparing to offer to settle the dispute on the basis of Greek acceptance of two essential points: “1.) Turkish troops in Cyprus [and] 2.) special minority arrangements which could remove Turks from Greek domination.” The Ambassador purportedly closed the discussion by adding "whenever you have anything to tell me, I am authorized immediately to take [a] plane to Ankara to report." Later the Counselor reported that he found it difficult to believe that Vergin would have said these things to Averoff unless he was indeed authorized to” hint at a new Turkish offer” on a footing acceptable to Greece. Taking into account that there was little else on the table, Penfield believed that the offer might be worthy of consideration by the Greeks.  

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30 Embtel 1910 Ankara, January 16, 1958: SDCDF, 747C.00/1-1658, NARA.
The suggestion for a Turkish base in Cyprus re-emerged in talks between Lloyd and Foreign Minister Zorlu in Ankara during the Baghdad Pact meeting, in which Dulles was present. Governor Foot initially took part, as well, but left after five days. Zorlu, who was notorious for his intractable and abrasive manner and characterized by Governor Foot as “the rudest man I ever met,” insisted upon three points as the minimum conditions for Turkey’s acceptance of the British plan, the most important being the availability of a base.

Lloyd asked Dulles if there was any chance that Greece would go along with such the plan considering these conditions, Dulles thought an arrangement for a base might be possible if conditions did not also include any action which would likely lead to partition. The discussions broke down, however, when Zorlu added too many unacceptable requirements. As Charles Foley, editor of the Times of Cyprus put it; Lloyd had been “pounded solidly” for five days. Disappointed and undoubtedly exhausted, he eventually told Menderes that he wished thereafter to deal only with him.

Meanwhile, Dulles met with Menderes in Ankara and informed him that he thought Turkey was entitled to “strategic security” that amounted to more than “mere paper guarantees that Cyprus would ever fall into hands hostile to Turkey.” In order to receive these guarantees, however, Turkey needed to be “flexible with respect to all other aspects of the settlement,” an obvious reference to the idea of a Turkish base— and one which

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32 Sir Hugh Foot, A Start in Freedom, (New York: Harper & Row), 1964, 159; Prime Minister Macmillan apparently shared this opinion of the Turkish Foreign Minister, saying he was “one of the stupidest— except for low cunning—rudest, and most cassant men I have ever met, Horne, Macmillan, ii, 102.
33 Charles Foley, Times of Cyprus, February 1, 1958 quoted here in Holland, ibid., 230.
was beginning to have some appeal. 35 This point is further confirmed in a discussion on February 11 between the Secretary and Ambassador James W. Riddleberger:

The Secretary said that he thought the Turks had a good case regarding Cyprus when they put it on a basis of security and said he thought the Turks had to be satisfied on this aspect of their claims regarding Cyprus. As he saw it, the idea of such a base made some sense. This satisfaction should be provided by something more than a paper guarantee. He thought that it might conceivably be provided by a Turkish base on the Island […] 36

Dulles’ statement to Menderes, along with the knowledge of Britain’s desire to be rid of the island— even if it meant partition— could only have served to encourage Turkish intransigence. Indeed, the Turkish position towards Cyprus had recently begun to harden, touching off a new wave of attacks on the island. At the NSC meeting on January 30, CIA Deputy Director, General Charles P. Cabell reported that “Cyprus had been the scene of repeated violence.” And what was even more alarming was that the Turkish Cypriots were beginning to attack the British for the first time in an effort to force partition of the island. 37 Meanwhile, the Ethnarchy Council warned EOKA leader Grivas that a recommencement of violence might prove harmful to their cause and only squander the sympathy won at the UN. In fact, in early April, Foot offered to secretly meet with Grivas “alone and unarmed any place at any time” in an effort to convince the EOKA leader to restrain from resuming hostilities. 38

In March, Lloyd expressed the opinion that the Greeks might be more likely to settle now than they had in the past since they seemed finally to understand the strength of Turkish feeling and realized that time was not working in their favor. The Turks, on the other

hand, were growing more intransigent. Nowhere was this more apparent than in an incident that took place at a Turkish Party at a restaurant where the announcement of new bombings brought “Turk toasts to EOKA.”

Recognition of the dilemma confronting Britain was revealed in a conversation between Belcher and Governor Foot in early February. According to Belcher, Britain’s ability to make further progress was hamstrung not only by the hard bargaining of the Turks, but also by the willingness of both Greeks and Turks to use violence to advance their respective cases.

The British were now facing the question of “how to disengage without giving either or both Greeks and Turks [an] excuse for further resort to violence.” Furthermore, Britain was now considering the Cyprus problem as one whereby the entire future of NATO and the Baghdad Pact were in the balance, and it might be forced to choose between Greece and Turkey. If this were the case, it was clear Britain would choose the latter. While the British seemed prepared to confront EOKA if necessary, they did not want to compromise British-Turkish relations by having to put down Turkish Cypriot violence as well.

While Greece expressed a qualified approval of the Foot plan, it opposed the idea of double self-determination and objected to the prospect of a Turkish base on the island. Greece did, however, promise to consider any plan, including a provision for a Turkish base, if provided with the full details. Greece’s new spirit of cooperation was termed by

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39 Embtel from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, March 29, 1958: ibid., 598.
40 Belcher Contel Nicosia 304, April 16, 1958, ibid., 599.
Penfield as the “most hopeful situation here since [the] Makarios-Harding talks [had] failed.”

Greece’s new conciliatory attitude needed to be used to its best advantage. While the British were occupied with trying to “wean the Turks away from partition” with the possible option for a base, Governor Foot was engaged in outlining a new plan for a Constitution.

**Bases for Partition**

In March of 1958, a governmental crisis erupted in Athens which left the Foreign Office not “unduly” disturbed. Believing it might be some time before the Greek Government would be able and willing to deal with problem, the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem shifted to the British Government and, to a lesser extent, the State Department.

The two most pressing concerns were the question of internal government and the question of international status. The most pressing concern for the US was the latter.

Acting Secretary Herter feared that the British were being overly optimistic about the parties’ readiness to compromise in this regard. He was especially worried about the Turks. Ambassador Whitney had informed the State Department that the Turkish Government was prepared to accept the idea of a base provided that there were three of them and that they be located mostly in urban areas, a condition viewed by the Foreign Office to be “not very realistic.” Furthermore, Turkey expected to receive these bases

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42 Penfield Embtel Athens 2243, February 14 1958: *ibid.*, 593.
44 Karamanlis resigned in early March after fifteen deputies and two ministers voted against a bill to change the Greek electoral system. He was voted back into power in mid-May, Whitney Embtel London 5368, March 11, 1958: *FRUS, 1958–1960*, X, pt 1, 595; Before he resigned, Karamanlis took steps to insure that the caretaker government had the power to continue negotiations on Cyprus, Hatzivassiliou, *ibid.*, 131.
45 Herter Deptel Ankara 2850, March 12, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3-1158, NARA.
immediately—or at least in very near future. It also expected any constitution for the island to be federal in nature, i.e., grant broad autonomy to Turkish Cypriots. 46

These provisions would never be acceptable to the Greeks who, in effect, would consider them a disguised form of partition. Dulles, however, was not ready to scuttle the idea of a base for Turkey as an acceptable trade off for self-determination for the rest of the island, believing it to be “a hopeful avenue to [a] compromise solution.” 47 It was, of course, necessary to make it clear to the Turks that a base would have to be a substitute for partition and not merely a “stepping stone thereof.” 48

Belcher’s chief concern, however, was that the base idea had the same drawback as another popular American idea, guaranteed independence. But while independence could potentially be a move towards enosis, a Turkish base on Cyprus could similarly be regarded as a move towards partition. 49 The former would never be acceptable to the Turks any more than the latter would be acceptable to the Greeks.

47 Dulles, Deptel Athens 2979, April 3, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3-2758, NARA.
48 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 178 March 11, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3 – 1758, NARA.
49 Belcher FS Despatch Nicosia, 78: “Two Alternatives to Enosis or Partition,” April 11, 1958: ibid, doc. 747C.00/4-1158, NARA.
Chapter XV

The Cyprus problem has always been this simple choice of evils [...] It is not until we have closed the door on Enosis by physically and irreversibly readmitting the presence of Turkey into Cyprus, that we could ever get the Greek and Greek Cypriots to accept the principles of partnership. —John Reddaway, Minute, May 6, 1958

The Macmillan Plan

In late February, Governor Foot submitted proposals for a seven-year partnership plan to the Colonial Office. History would remember it as the Macmillan Plan, although it was largely the invention of Governor Foot’s starkly pragmatic aide John Reddaway. Its central features included a three-man commission composed of the British Governor plus one Greek and one Turkish representative, (in addition to six elected members, four Greeks and two Turks) with the Governor exercising a veto in foreign affairs, defense, and internal security; an option for Greek or Turkish nationality while retaining British citizenship; and complete autonomy in communal affairs under two independent assemblies elected by Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively.¹

If Greece and Turkey agreed to this “adventure in partnership,” Britain would be willing, when the time was right, to “share sovereignty” of the island with them.² The plan, which was publicly introduced on June 19, 1958, fundamentally envisioned an enterprise between Greece, Turkey, the UK, and the two Cypriot communities. The scheme was especially attractive to Macmillan who had earlier promoted a similar idea. But it was not

¹ Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 236.
² Quoted in “Romans, 5:3-4,” Time, June 30, 1958
until early May that the State Department was informed about this forthcoming joint venture. At a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen, British Foreign Minister Lloyd told Secretary Dulles that Britain’s “agonizing reappraisal of the whole Cyprus business” had led to the development of a new plan.3

Since the Turks were proving to be “unapproachable” on the subject of dropping partition in return for a base,4 the British Government was now prepared to move forward with the “tridominium” idea following the Greek elections. While aware of the “practical difficulties,” Lloyd stressed that Prime Minister Macmillan himself was prepared to go to Athens and Ankara “for three months if necessary” in order to gain acceptance. Moreover, Lloyd let it be known that the Prime Minister was not above begging if need be—and if that failed—exploring “some kind of partition.”5

Although Lloyd realized that Dulles was hostile to the idea of partition, at least in principle, he asked the Secretary to consider it as a potential option. Dulles told the Foreign Minister that the US was not opposed to any plan that seemed likely to work, but he warned, as he did previously, that the Greek Government would never accept any solutions that gave Turkey official jurisdiction over the island: “today the Turks have only a moral position because Cyprus is close to Turkey, but they have no juridical status there.” Dulles believed that the Greeks would never acquiesce in “granting them such a status.”

4 On May 5 Lloyd met with Zorlu at the same meeting in Copenhagen where it became clear that Turkey was not willing to abandon the partition-for-base idea, rendering it for all practical purposes dead.
5 Ibid.
The Secretary still seemed to favor the idea of offering the Turks a base, an idea he believed that Britain could promote on its own. Dulles argued that the British could just tell the Turks “this is the way it will be,” and if they chose not to take the offer, that would be their own decision. He believed that that plan might be easier to advance compared to trying to convince the Greeks and Turks into accepting a tridominium solution which he thought had little chance of success. But still he promised that the US would help in any way possible. The Foreign Minister was also concerned that the Greeks, who were uncertain as to where Ankara really stood on Cyprus, were becoming frightened regarding Turkish intentions. Lloyd assured Dulles that they would not make the same error as they had in the past by refusing to make public all offers on the Cyprus question. This time Britain would inform both the Greeks and Turks of the plan ahead of the announcement but that “Mr. Macmillan would not drop this idea simply because somebody says no to it at the outset.”

At this stage it should be pointed out that December 1956 pledge was, if not officially, implicitly part of the plan. The Macmillan plan offered a number of scenarios: continuation of British rule along with limited participation of Turkish and Greek officials, but potentially also independence; self-administration for the Turkish Cypriots; or the continuation of British rule. In essence, the plan gave the Greek Cypriots two choices, parity with the Turkish Cypriots or partition. As Hatzivassiliou points out, contained within the Macmillan plan was the “element of blackmail because it could be implemented with the cooperation of one community and one state.”

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6 Ibid.
7 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 137-138.
Macmillan’s enthusiasm for his self-named plan made it difficult for the Americans to convince the British of the infeasibility of a tridominium solution for Cyprus. Acting Secretary Herter suggested to Dulles that he might try to persuade the British to further test the possibility of a proposal granting the Turks a base on island in place of partition. The Americans believed the plan to be fundamentally flawed since it left open the question of who had the “ultimate authority in the event of a dispute between the co-domini or in case of an emergency on island.”

But even more so, the US believed that the condominium would never be accepted by the Greeks and was bound to stir violent reactions in both Greece and Cyprus.

On May 17, an outline of the Macmillan plan, along with its tentative application, was published in the London Times. Since the Americans were anxious that elements of the plan not be disclosed prematurely, they were dismayed to find that it had been leaked to the press. The US was surprised to learn that the plan did not involve partition, nor did it include provisions for a Turkish base on the island. Furthermore, emphasis had shifted from the tridominium idea to the establishment of communal assemblies and a ministerial council, with the “eventual goal” of a probable future shared responsibility or tridominium.

Needless to say, US officials were bewildered. At the State Department, Dulles was at pains to understand the shift in strategy, and in a telegram to London he asked Ambassador Whitney to explain “the major factors that led to [the] evolution of British thinking away from the base idea, to [the] tridominium idea momentarily and finally to

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9 Ibid.
[the] communal assembly/ministerial council formula [...].”\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, the Secretary wanted to know if it was only Turkish opposition to the base idea that convinced the British to abandon it without first taking advantage of the assistance the US had offered in Copenhagen. Whitney’s response was that the base idea was abandoned “at least temporarily” due to Turkish opposition, and that the British felt that no assistance from the US could change their mind. As to the tridominium, it was “shelved” due to US misgivings about the practicality of its implementation.\textsuperscript{12}

In a message on May 23, Lloyd informed Dulles that Lennox-Boyd told the House of Commons that the new plan would be announced no later than June 17 and that it outlined the broad terms of the proposed plan. With respect to the abandonment of the tridominium idea, the Foreign Secretary explained that the Government had concluded that “serious obstacles” prevented its immediate implementation—the most serious obstacle being its unacceptability to the Greeks. Likewise, the proposals for a Turkish base were also abandoned despite support from Spaak and the US for this solution. And since no final plan, at least one which would satisfy all parties, was at hand, the best course would be an interim solution. Although the Embassy had been given a rough outline of the plan, Dulles had yet to receive an actual copy.\textsuperscript{13}

**No Support for the Macmillan Plan**

Dulles’ reply to Lloyd left no question that he was even more incredulous about this solution than he had been about the tridominium idea. Not only would the plan be

\textsuperscript{11} Dulles Deptel London 8280 May 21, 1958: SDCDF, doc. &4&C.00/5-1758, NARA.
\textsuperscript{13} Lloyd to Dulles, Message, May 23, 1958: \textit{ibid}, 614-615; Dulles finally received his copy on June 3: Caccia to Dulles, Letter including Macmillan Plan, June 3, \textit{ibid.}, 617-621.
rejected by Greece and the Greek Cypriots because it would clearly establish the Turkish Government as a participant in the affairs of Cyprus but also because it contained no provision for an eventual offer following Britain’s relinquishment of sovereignty over the island. Dulles urged the Foreign Secretary to reconsider the plan and determine if adjustments could be made in order to make it more palatable to the Greeks, or at least leave enough time for consultation with the Greeks and Turks in advance of a public announcement. The Secretary ended the letter with a tentative offer of US support, not for the plan itself, but an assurance that it would at least be given some consideration. 14

In what Deputy Governor Sinclair called “their all-out bid for partition,”15 on June 7 the TMT exploded a bomb outside of the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia. The explosion triggered rioting by Turkish Cypriots followed by counter-attacks from the Greek Cypriots.16

Gangs of angry Turks overran the Greek quarters of the city, burning buildings and attacking Greek Cypriots. The British were now in the midst of a “virtual Palestinian situation,” in other words, quitting the island to leave the communities to fight it out.

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16 The fact that this attack was Turkish in origin was confirmed by Rauf Denktaş in an interview for British television in 1984: “there was an explosion at the information bureau of the Turkish Consulate. A crowd has already gathered there, a crowd of the Turkish Cypriot community. And they almost immediately decided that Greeks had done it and they were swearing vengeance against the Greeks and so on. The explosion started a night of riots in Nicosia. Turkish Cypriots burned and looted Greek shops and homes. Soon came counter-attacks... Later on, a friend of mine, whose name must be kept secret, was to confess to me that he had put this little bomb in their doorway in order to create an atmosphere of tension so that people would know that Turkish Cypriots mattered.” *End of Empire: Cyprus, Britain’s Grim Legacy- ITV*, June 26, 1984; an earlier similar account was also provided by Emin Dirvana, then Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus in a letter to the in the Turkish newspaper, *Milliyet* on May 15, 1964: “I was told that on June the 7th 1958, a bomb was placed in the Turkish Information Office in Nicosia by people who, as it was later ascertained had no connection at all with the Greek Cypriots. The Turks of Nicosia were filled with so-called “sacred-indignation” and committed incidents similar to those on September the 6th and 7th [1955] in Istanbul:” “Former Turkish Ambassador in Cyprus unmasks Denktash and reveals the plot” reprinted in, *Cyprus Today, Supplements* 1-5, 3rd series, 22nd April-5th June, 1964.
between themselves. The following day, the riots spread throughout the island. On June 9 Consul Belcher reported that a 24-hour curfew had been imposed in Nicosia to prevent further deterioration of the situation, and Foot was attempting to quiet the situation by meeting with the leaders of the two communities. While the Governor was occupied with making friendly overtures to the Cypriots, the army which was calling for tougher measures on the island took to calling the beleaguered Governor, “Sir Hugh Pussyfoot.” One disgruntled officer put it plainly: “this trouble can be quieted down. We’ve had tougher ones, you know. From the Bronze Age through to us, these people have had their affairs run for them. That’s their way.”

In July, the Governor visited the Turkish quarter of Nicosia to try to persuade the Turkish Cypriots to restrain from further violence. He also wrote a conciliatory letter to the Archbishop Makarios, offering to allow him to return to the island once the violence had subsided. Foot then flew to London to meet with Macmillan and other Conservative cabinet members, and to plead with Labour MPs not to “rock the boat” with regard to the Macmillan plan. Barbara Castle, however, was unconvinced and made an appeal to her Party to stand by its earlier pledge to grant the Cypriots the right to determine their own future. In other words, allow the Greek Cypriots to vote for enosis.

Later, in a debate in the House of Commons, Aneurin Bevan, the “terror of the Tories,” summed up Labour’s position with regard to the Macmillan plan: “we do not commend these proposals […] but we advise the Greeks and Turks not to reject them out of hand.”

Labour did have one serious misgiving regarding the separate municipalities and worried

17 Sinclair quoted in Contel Nicosia 389, June 9, 1958, 622.
18 Belcher, Contel Nicosia, June 9, 1958: SDCDF, 747C.00/6 - 958
that this feature would only solidify differences between the two communities rather than compel them to work to resolve them. Back in Cyprus, Grivas, in a gesture of defiance, issued a leaflet describing Governor Foot as a “Trojan Horse,” and the Macmillan plan as a “new monster.” The Governor’s earlier offer to reach out to the EOKA leader had been rebuffed and instead he was told to “chew your plan and swallow it.” Despite

In a conversation with Ambassador Riddleberger in Athens, Vergin, the Turkish Ambassador, shared his personal observation about the contagious situation on Cyprus saying that “any fool who may break a window of his embassy in Athens can set off riots in Istanbul.” This statement prompted the American Ambassador to observe that the Turkish Ambassador went as far as a representative can go in suggesting that nothing would be accomplished until the US decided to intervene and have a serious dialogue with both Ankara and Athens.

Meanwhile, as Cyprus was descending into chaos, Macmillan was en route to Washington to outline the British plan for Cyprus and try to sell it to a skeptical State Department. Although not confident, the Prime Minister was hopeful about the plan, calling it “perhaps the last chance” for a solution for the island. Macmillan was also determined, once and for all, to put to rest the feasibility of Turkish demands for bases on Cyprus as a condition for acceptance of a final solution, an idea favored by Dulles. The Prime Minister said he foresaw one problem with this solution, (there were actually two

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20 It was envisaged that Greek and Turkish Cypriots would be allowed to establish separate communal municipalities in the five largest towns on the island. This was especially troubling because the municipalities had been the one forum where all Cypriots could engage the political process. The separate municipalities issue would become a major source of friction between the two communities following independence, see Diana Markides, *The Issue of Separate Municipalities and the Birth of the New Republic of Cyprus: 1957-1963*, (London: University of London press, 1998).


problems, the other being that the Greeks could never be made to accept it) namely, when 
Britain finally did relinquish sovereignty (as far as security of the Island is concerned), it 
would leave “‘practically a civil war’” in its wake.”

This solution, which Macmillan described as “partition minus,” would give the Turks 
leave to install troops throughout their base area, leaving the Greeks to respond in kind 
thus creating a situation tantamount to telling the communities to “go fight each other.” 
This situation would place Britain in the middle of a conflict it could not control, and one 
which would make the Palestinian recourse look inviting.  

Given the urgent situation on Cyprus, the State Department feared that Britain might be 
tempted to present the plan as a *fait accompli* to the Greeks and Turks, both of whom had 
received advance copies of the final draft. In a memorandum of conversation between 
Dulles and Macmillan, the Prime Minister assured his colleague that this was not the 
intention, and Britain would merely request that the Greek and Turkish Governments 
give serious study to it and use it as the basis for personal discussions with him.  

Describing the plan as a “noble effort,” Dulles promised the US would lend “such 
support as we feel we can,” but that it would likely not support the plan publicly, since 
America would not wish to “engage her prestige in this way,” especially given that it had 
not even been consulted. He did, however, promise private support from the US, but 
this was far less of a commitment than Macmillan had hoped for.

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24 *ibid.*, 625-627.
25 *ibid.*, 627.
The emergency on Cyprus delayed the public announcement of the plan. Greece called the North Atlantic Council to lodge a formal protest against the events on the island. Athens was even considering breaking off diplomatic relations with Turkey. The Greek Government had already evacuated its NATO personnel from Izmir, a move that Zorlu called “childish,” adding that if Greece wanted to get out of NATO, “let her go, we would be better off without her.” This was exactly the sort of tense atmosphere the Americans were trying to avoid, and the last thing it wanted was to have “Greeks and Turks killing each other.” What was truly remarkable was Zorlu’s brazen complaint to the British that the riots were the responsibility of the British Government for attempting to force the Greek and Turkish Cypriots into “undesired cooperation.”

On June 13, Herter contacted Eisenhower to tell him that the State Department thought that the US should do whatever it could to get the Greek and Turkish Governments “to keep their shirts on.” Herter believed that the most effective way to do that was for the President to send personal messages to Karamanlis and Menderes. From his farm in Gettysburg, President Eisenhower was again in fine form with his response to the crisis, blaming the situation on the British whose “proposals haven’t helped but have made both sides mad.” Adding insult to injury, Eisenhower sent nearly identical messages to both Prime Ministers, further infuriating the Greeks for failing to distinguish between the perpetrators and the victims. This was a charge the US would hear time and again. The President was also puzzled by the anti-American demonstrations taking place in Athens,

29 Ibid., 641-642
30 The Greeks were likely offended by the statement, “the great sacrifices your people and ours have made for peace must not be lost”. Ibid., 642
and could not understand the “Greeks getting mad at us”— adding that “everywhere in the world everyone thinks we can fix everything. They don't realize we don't run the whole world.”

Demonstrating an unsettling lack of awareness of the particulars, why he asked Dulles, since “Turkey is thinly populated,” was it not possible to relocate the 5,000 Turkish Cypriots to some place where they would be “in a better position.” The Secretary responded that “we would never get them out of there,” adding that the number of Turks was actually 160,000— twenty percent of the island’s population. To that Eisenhower commented that “knocks out any resettlement” and “all we can do is pray.”31 It was quickly becoming apparent to both the British and the Americans that the Cyprus dispute had the potential to become a greater threat to the western alliance than ever before, and it was imperative that Greece and Turkey be made to restrain their actions before it was too late to turn back.

A Greek petition at the NAC led to discussions in Paris, during which the Americans along with Spaak, without endorsing the proposals, tried to urge the Greeks and Turks to seriously consider them, but to no avail. Both Greece and Turkey rejected the proposals at the NAC meeting on June 13, even before the British could publicly announce them.

For its part, Greece wholly rejected the plan. In a conversation with Riddleberger, Averoff cited the “most serious defect” was that it created a Turkish legal right over Cyprus, and that even if the remainder of the plan were acceptable, no Greek Government could agree to a change in the effectual status of the island. Launching into an emotional

diatribe, the Foreign Minister complained that the British had clearly allowed Turkey to blackmail them with threats of “unpleasant consequences” should they not provide “certain clarifications.” He added *il ne manquait plus que ça* – threatening to escalate the situation—should Britain again surrender to Turkish intransigence.

Neither was the US spared his indictment, complaining that the Greeks were convinced that the Americans had abandoned them in favor of backing a British pro-Turkish position. The fact that the Turks were also dissatisfied seemed not to register. In the end, Averoff thought it best that the British simply make an announcement that both Greece and Turkey had rejected the proposals. 32

Ambassador Melas was also quick to convey his displeasure with the Americans, “assert[ing] flatly that it was up to the United States to decide,” whether it did or did not “want Greece,” and pointing out once more that, “should the Karamanlis Government fall as a result of the British proposals, there was no alternative but the Communists.” 33 The State Department, however, was not buying it and had long ago stopped taking such hysterical declarations by the Ambassador seriously. But the possibility of a military coup, as well as further unrest in Greece and Cyprus, was not as easily dismissed. On June 17, in a conversation with Riddleberger, Foreign Minister Averoff “emphasized in strongest possible terms” the dangerous situation in Greece repeatedly stating "we are facing chaos," claiming that “even a military dictatorship would be ineffective.” As

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proof of this he pointed to the recent disaffection among lower ranking army officers in Greece and Cyprus.34

Macmillan expected that the Turks would also reject the proposals since they fell short of partition and, true to form they did. The Turkish government, which had so effectively stirred up mainland demonstrations in addition to the riots it had provoked on the island, knew it had the leverage to make Britain yield to its demands. It was only a matter of time when it would happen, and experience had taught them that if they waited long enough, the British would modify any plan that did not meet Turkey’s approval.35

Foreign Minister Zorlu, of course, saw things differently. In a telegram to Eisenhower via the Department of State, he recycled the fatuous assertion of partition being a “sacrifice” Turkey was willing to make in the spirit of compromise. He also made the implausible claim that the idea of partition originated with Averoff and the Greeks:

As you are already aware, Mr. President, the question was first created by Greece and all the efforts made by Turkey to find a peaceful solution have remained fruitless. Even when Turkey, with the object of reaching a compromise in this matter and at great sacrifice, accepted the idea of partition, which had first been put forward by Mr. Averoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece and later recommended by the United Kingdom, Greece adopted a more pretentious (sic) attitude towards this concession and further intensified its encouragement of the campaign of terrorism which it had undertaken with the purpose of securing the annexation of the Island; I think that it would also be useful if I informed you in this connection, Mr. President, that Turks in villages where they are not as numerous as the Greeks have been subjected to a constant propaganda of terrorism for the last two years, and have been forced to migrate to places where the Turks are in majority.36

While it is true that Greece was somewhat sympathetic to the possibility of partition, it did so based upon the assumption that the principle would be only one possible option in

35 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 120.
a plebiscite in determining the island’s future. There is no known evidence that supports the claim that partition was originally a Greek invention.

The Americans were optimistic that the NAC discussions were going well. On June 15, Spaak had drafted a resolution calling for talks between the governments concerned, “taking fully into account the proposals presented to this Council by the U.K., along with the continued readiness of the Secretary General to tender his good offices.” Fearful that a public statement could intensify the situation, Eisenhower, at Dulles’s suggestion, urged Macmillan to delay the parliamentary announcement of the proposals pending further NAC discussions. Macmillan agreed to delay the announcement for 48 hours and only after prompting from Spaak. When Dulles suggested a plan of procedure at NAC, the British reacted unfavorably because they felt that the US proposals did not give enough weight to their arrangement for Cyprus, and to go beyond it would like “opening a Pandora’s box.”

Nevertheless, HMG would proceed full ahead with what Nolting called a “partnership plan with no partners” or, as Holland puts it, “no admirers except its inventors.” On June 18, Ambassador Whitney reported that the “United Kingdom intends to proceed

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37 Hatzivassiliou, *ibid.*, 81-82.
39 Nolting to Dulles, Embtel Paris Polto 4180, June 15, 1958: June 15, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-1558, NARA.
41 Dulles’s plan included bilateral and trilateral talks between Britain, Turkey, and Greece; the establishment of an NAC advisory board; and the involvement of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in some of the discussions, Dulles to Nolting, Deptel Paris Topol 4693, June 17, 1958: *ibid.*, 660-661.
42 Nicolet, *ibid.*, 121.
43 Nolting to Dulles, Embtel Paris Polto 4180, June 15, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/6-1558, NARA, pt. 3; Holland, *ibid.*, 269.
insofar as possible with [the] implementation of [the] Cyprus proposals, regardless of whether Greek and Turkish acceptance could be obtained.”  

The NAC meeting was inconclusive in that neither Greece nor Turkey flat out rejected nor accepted the plan. Despite the clear lack of enthusiasm, Macmillan was not deterred. The Prime Minister was determined to see his plan through even if it meant that Britain would go it alone.

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44 Whitney, Embtel London 6058, and April 18, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 603: By the end of June, Greece, Turkey as well as both communities had rejected the proposals. Makarios also found them unacceptable describing the idea of 'partnership' as the imposition of a “triple condominium.”
Chapter XVI

*Everything happens twice in Cyprus, It's like watching a really terrible film around for the second time—Charles Foley, September 15, 1958.*

**Macmillan Revisited**

On June 21 Greece publicly rejected the Macmillan plan. As for the Turks, although they rejected the plan, they did not consider it wholly irreconcilable with their demands for partition. The underwhelming response by both governments, however, prompted the State Department to reassess its own position with respect to the British proposals.

On June 20, GTI Jones wrote to Assistant Secretary Rountree to ask if there might be a way to modify the plan so that it might be implemented in a manner that would reduce the need for formal Greek and Turkish participation, and to make it a “truly interim arrangement.” Prior to Macmillan’s visit to Washington a few weeks earlier, the State Department had contemplated suggesting two particular amendments to the plan that had not been put forward to the Prime Minister at the time, but warranted some consideration now. The first of these amendments eliminated the representation of the Greek and Turkish Governments in the Ministerial Council—a point on which the “Greeks were choking” because it did in fact give the Turks jurisdiction on the island. The second of these amendments removed the right to dual citizenship from consideration. As to
procedure, it was recommended that it should follow Spaak’s suggestion for NAC bilateral talks between Greek, Turkey, and Britain.¹

In order to keep the talks on center, it was important that the plan serve as a basis for discussion and not merely a point of departure. The American’s role would be to remain in the background. It would step forward only when it became apparent that Britain was faltering in its resolve to advance their proposals; the outcome looked like it might lead to a dangerous situation; or if Britain asked for American assistance.² The US, while not wholly on board with the plan, was determined to support the British in this endeavor.

Near the end of June, the Turkish Government’s implacable policy towards Cyprus began to soften, however. The shift in the Turkish position was likely prompted by the developing Middle East crisis of 1958, following Egypt’s integration with Syria to form the United Arab Republic.³ There was a growing fear among Pact members, not only Turkey, that Nasser was making a territorial bid for the Middle East, and no one was quite sure as to the extent of communist involvement.⁴ This situation, combined with serious economic and political pressures in Turkey, gave Opposition leader Ismet İnönü

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² Ibid., 675.
³ In January 1958, during the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Meeting in Ankara, participants had apparently voiced concerns regarding the projected Egyptian-Syrian merger. Dulles, who was in attendance as an observer, told Eisenhower that the Middle East Pact members regarded the proposed merger as "an unhappy development which can presage much trouble." Pact members expressed uncertainty regarding the possible degree of communist involvement, but the Secretary believed that Jordan and Lebanon would also feel pressure to join and that Saudi Arabia and Iraq would follow in kind: Dulles to Eisenhower, Jan. 29, 1958: AWF/D-H Series, Ann Whitman File, DDE-Library; Herter to Eisenhower, Jan. 30, 1958: AWF/I: International Series: Saudi Arabia, DDE-Library; Telcon, Eisenhower and Dulles, February 1, 1958: Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, Telephone Conv—DDE-Library.
⁴ A British Cabinet discussion in May reached conclusions similar to those of Dulles: “If Lebanon was compelled to accede to the United Arab Republic, Iraq and Jordan might not be able to retain their independence:” Cabinet Conclusions (58) 43, May 15, 1958, CAB 128/32, pt. 1.
the occasion to publicly criticize Menderes and Zorlu for failing to solve the country’s internal problems and for behaving recklessly in the midst of troubling events in the region.⁵

While author Christopher Hitchens attributes Turkey’s new more conciliatory attitude to the substantial loan provided to Ankara in the midst of the Middle East crisis, no known documentary evidence supports this assertion. As is the case with so many of his other allegations regarding Cyprus, Hitchens is mistaken. In fact, evidence suggests the opposite may be true. On August 4, 1958, King Paul reported that Karamanlis was “embittered” over the fact that the US had contributed $234 million of the $359 million aid package given to Turkey with no “apparent attempt” on the part of the US to “influence” the Government of Turkey. The King also expressed his own disapproval at the failure of the US to “make an effort with the Turks before pushing [the] package aid deal.”⁶ If the US was instrumental in modifying Turkey’s position, the Greeks certainly did not seem to think so.

Whatever the reasons for the Turkish change of heart, by mid-summer momentum for the plan had subsided. Foreign Minister Averoff therefore tried to solicit US support for two proposals modifying the British plan: Greek and Turkish advisors to the Governor should be chosen by the two Cypriot communities rather than by the Greek and Turkish

⁵ Holland offers two explanations for the Turkish shift in policy: the first being that the Iraqi coup in July “provided a convenient screen behind which Menderes and Zorlu could give up their exaggerated posture of aggression,” and the second assessment that , Turkey was a genuinely “frightened country,” which caused it to amend its stance, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 269; National Intelligence Estimate, “Prospects for Turkey, “December, 30, 1958, NIE 33-58: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 785.

⁶ Cf. Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 365, August 4, 1958:ibid., 691-692; Christopher Hitchens, Détente and Destabilization: Report from Cyprus,” New Left Review 94, 1975:61-73, 67; Hitchens, who is generally a fine writer, seems to be unduly influenced by the nationalist/ Leftist view with regard to Cyprus. This unfounded assertion is also made in Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 65.
Governments, and that enosis and partition be excluded as plebiscite choices. While both items were primarily designed to prevent Turkey from acquiring jurisdiction in Cyprus, the US believed that only the former would have a chance of being accepted in Ankara. Since all the solutions proposed in the last year offered Turkey some immediate or future stake in the island, it was doubtful that Turkey would relinquish these apparent gains.\(^7\)

On July 10, Karamanlis met with Riddleberger to again make a plea for immediate US intervention on the Cyprus issue. Characterizing the British plan for Cyprus “as the worst yet,” he threatened to “adopt a more intransigent position,” obviously a veiled reference to the UN. The Prime Minister bitterly complained that the US had abandoned Greece. He also expressed his disappointment that the State Department had not yet commented on the substance of Averoff’s proposals, and tried to press the Ambassador on this point. Fearing that it would be drawn into bilateral discussions, the US had deliberately made a point of sidestepping this issue. While the Americans were willing to act in an advisory capacity, it was deemed inappropriate to take an active role. Moreover, Washington recognized that the British and Greeks needed to meet for their own bilateral talks, during which Averoff’s proposals could provide an impetus for constructive discussion. Otherwise, the introduction of new proposals from all sides would detour the British line of procedure.\(^8\)

On July 15, Averoff spoke to the US Ambassador in Athens and explained that Greece could not agree to NATO arbitration due to the domestic unpopularity of the organization at the present time. This decision not only excluded Greek participation in any NAC  

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\(^8\) Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 100: *ibid.*, 684-685.
discussions, but also prevented Greece from engaging in bilateral discussions with Britain. This decision, however, did not exclude possible informal discussions with Spaak.⁹ There were several reasons that finally persuaded Greece to reconsider and agree to discussions with the British: mass arrests of EOKA members in Cyprus; a round of proposals by Spaak acceptable to Greece; Macmillan’s readiness to go to Athens; and, most importantly, the evolving Middle East crisis.

For Britain and the US, the events in the spring and summer of 1958 posed almost as much of a threat to Middle East stability as the Suez Crisis two years earlier. By mid-July, the situation in the region had grown even more urgent. On July 14, a group of army officers staged a bloody coup in Iraq and toppled the pro-western monarchy, Britain’s most important regional ally. Fearful of a similar fate, King Hussein of Jordan, who had been forced to expel British troops two years earlier, appealed to Britain and the US for help against pro-Nasserite subversives in the kingdom. In response, the US instituted an airlift of petroleum, while Britain flew a contingent of 2000 paratroopers from Cyprus into Amman to stabilize the regime. Meanwhile, the political crisis in Lebanon prompted the Americans to dispatch Marines into that country to fortify the pro-western government of Camille Chamoun against internal opposition and threats from Syria and the UAR.¹⁰ The outcome was a synchronized British-American enterprise, with the British navy opening its bases in Cyprus to the US Navy and the US transporting British supplies for its air force personnel in Jordan.

For the Cyprus question, the Middle East Crisis served to consolidate the Turkish position. The Iraqi coup represented a severe blow to the Menderes Government, which was facing internal opposition not only for its domestic policies, but for its policies towards the Middle East. The Government saw the hand of international communism in the coup and feared that the threat would also spread to Turkey. The Western allies were duly worried about the threat to Turkey’s security. In addition to its persistently tense borders with Syria and the Soviet Union, it now faced a potentially hostile Iraq.11

Moreover, Turkey had demonstrated its importance to the Americans by permitting the US to use Incirlik air base during the American intervention in Lebanon, a concession that was outside the scope of its NATO obligations. On July 17, Turkey joined with other Baghdad Pact members in issuing a joint communiqué welcoming the “initiative by the U.S. for upholding the integrity and independence of free and peace loving countries [...]”12

Not only had the crisis given new life to the “special relationship” between Britain and the U.S., but it also served to underline Turkey’s importance to the US and to NATO. That Greece had cause to worry was confirmed by Consul Belcher a few days after the Iraqi coup when he suggested that the events in the Middle East had tilted the outcome of the Cyprus issue in favor of Turkey: “if they wish [to] salvage anything from [the] wreckage [of] their case they had best give very close re-consideration to [the] limited

11 Menderes’ position is in sharp contrast to that of İnönü who perceived the Iraqi coup as an act of national liberation and Iraq’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact as an opportunity to strengthen the alliance by removing Arab opposition to the Pact: Emer O. Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye’nin Arap Orta Doğusuna Karşı Politikası, 1945-1970. (Turkey’s Policy Towards the Arab Middle East) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1972), 133-134.
benefits from [the] Foot [Macmillan] plan. “13 A special NIE issued on July 22 noted that the Turks had “responded enthusiastically to U.S. and U.K. military intervention, “ while Greece, “although generally supporting of U.S. actions in the Middle East, [was] nervous lest the crisis should strengthen the position of Turkey on the Cyprus issue and threaten again to frustrate Greek hopes for Cyprus.” 14 

Meanwhile, the internal situation on Cyprus was deteriorating. In early July intercommunal violence intensified with mass arrests of nearly 2000 Greek Cypriots and the creation of a new Turkish underground movement, the TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati), a pro-partition organization formed by Rauf Denktash and Military officer Riza Veruşkan. 15 So grim was the situation that when Spaak suggested a new interim proposal for Cyprus, it was received favorably by Greece. The so-called “Frigidaire Theory” stated that since no definitive solution was possible at present, a provisional solution had to be found which would not “prejudice any final solution, neither towards partition, enosis, nor independence.” In other words, it would put any specific solution on ice for the foreseeable future. In response to Spaak’s proposal, Averoff remarked that “in one sense” this was a plan that Greece had already proposed, to delay a “definite solution indefinitely.” 16

13 Belcher to Dulles, Contel Nicosia 41, July 18, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-1858, NARA.
15 This was known as “Operation Matchbox.” According to Holland, Governor Foot made the decision to “take the field against EOKA” but not against TMT. Greek suspects were arrested before any Turks were apprehended and Kıcık and Denktash were notified beforehand that only a handful of Turks would be taken into custody as a part of a larger maneuver. By the end of the third day 1, 992 Greeks were detained but only 58 Turks, a disparity Charles Foley’s newspaper described as a “laughable contrast,” see Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 267.
On the one hand, the ambiguity of the Secretary-General’s proposals gave Greece renewed optimism that it could prevent Turkey from gaining a formal stake in the island. On the other hand, they created a dilemma as to which initiative to follow: Spaak’s proposals or Macmillan’s plan. Ambassador Riddleberger’s initial reaction was to push Spaak’s “Frigidaire Theory.”\textsuperscript{17} The Department of State, however, believed that the Macmillan plan under the auspices of NATO offered the greatest hope for a Cyprus solution, adding that the British Government should be encouraged to be more obliging with regard to Averoff’s proposed modifications.\textsuperscript{18}

Meanwhile, Macmillan who was very eager to ‘have a shot at the Greeks,” announced on August 1 that he would be going to Athens and then Ankara, regardless of whether or not Karamanlis agreed to a meeting.\textsuperscript{19} Ambassador Riddleberger later wrote that the Greek Prime Minister’s “rather surprising acceptance” of the meeting was probably “due to his being flattered and caught off guard” by [the] sudden Macmillan offer [to] come to Athens.\textsuperscript{20}

On August 14, Lloyd wrote to Dulles to explain that Macmillan’s talks with the Greeks and Turks had given Britain a clearer picture of their respective views towards Cyprus. The Turks were prepared to accept the plan provided it did not contain any significant modifications. The Greeks, on the other hand, were less forthcoming because they believed that it gave Turkey a greater voice in the affairs of the island than ever before.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 682.
\textsuperscript{18} Herter, Embtel Athens 124, and July 10, 1958: \textit{ibid.}, 682; Herter Deptel London 1102, July 26, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/7-2158, NARA.
\textsuperscript{20} Riddleburger to Dulles, Embtel Athens 411: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-858, NARA.
Mindful of Greek concerns, the British decided to make certain modifications to the plan to make it more accommodating to Greece, but not so much so that the Turks would back away. Lloyd informed Dulles that the idea of dual nationality, to which the Greeks objected, would be eliminated, and that the status of the government representatives would be changed so that they have a presence on the Governor’s Council. Macmillan also promised that if the violence ceased, Archbishop Makarios would be permitted to return.\(^{21}\)

As a *quid pro quo* for Turkish acceptance of the plan, a provision was added which would remain a source of friction between the two communities for years to come, the Municipalities issue. Although the British realized the pitfalls and divisive nature of establishing separate municipalities, Macmillan was determined to implement his plan. So, in his statement on August 15, the Prime Minister declared that, “in accordance with the spirit of the decision whereby the communities are encouraged to order their own affairs, the Governor will where local circumstances make this desirable and authorize the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot Municipal Councils.”\(^{22}\). Municipal Commissioner B.J. Surridge would later comment that the municipalities issue was, “an administrative nonsense but a political necessity”\(^{23}\). As previously stated, the Labour Party had great difficulty with this item as well and argued that it would only further alienate the two communities rather than bring them together.

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\(^{22}\) Full text of Prime Minister Macmillan August 15 statement can be found in Reddaway, 111-113.

\(^{23}\) Minute, Surridge to Higham, January 19, 1959, CO926/805.
Turkey received the plan favorably for two reasons. First, as stated previously, Turkey really was motivated by fear. The recent events in Syria and Lebanon convinced Turkey that that the communists had penetrated the region and she wanted to reach a settlement before her security became a bigger issue than Cyprus. Second, Menderes had extracted a pledge that if and when the question of self-determination arose it would be implemented in line with the December 1956 statement. Greece, on the other hand, opposed the revised plan because it recognized in principle the separate existence of the two communities, the possible future partition of the island, and the recognition of Turkey’s status as a party to the conflict.

Averoff called the British statement unacceptable. He especially objected to the provision which would create separate Greek and Turkish municipal councils, and feared its implications. On August 19, the Greek Ambassador in Washington, George V. Melas, resigned in protest over American support for the British plan. Karamanlis, in a personal message, expressed Greece’s disappointment with the substance of the revised proposals and duly informed Macmillan that the “Greek Government ‘regret that they are unable to cooperate in the application of your plan’” [sic.]. For Karamanlis and most Greeks, Macmillan's modified plan represented a set of demands they could never accept.

25 As told by Menderes to the US Ambassador in Ankara: Warren to Dulles, Embtel Ankara 659, August 20, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-2058, NARA.
26 Jones to Berry, Office Memorandum, August 15, 1958: *ibid*.
27 Melas had announced his resignation a few weeks earlier telling Dulles that he “did not wish to have anything to do with what would turn out to be a funeral for Greek-Turkish friendship: Mallinson, *Cyprus*, 25.
28 Text of message to the Right Honourable Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, from Monsieur C. Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece, August 19, 1958, *Correspondence Exchanged between Mr. Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece and the Right Honourable Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom*, June 10, 1958-August 19, 1958: Greek Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens.
Fearing a renewal of violence, Sir Hugh Foot sent a personal plea to Archbishop Makarios in Athens: "If this chance is not at once seized, I can foresee nothing but continuing misery for Cyprus." But the Archbishop would not be persuaded and, on August 16, Makarios flatly rejected the Macmillan plan.

The State Department’s reaction to the Macmillan plan of August 15 was generally favorable, noting that it had “appreciably narrowed the margin” of disagreement between Greece and Turkey. But the Americans expressed doubt that it could be carried out without cooperation from the Greek Cypriots, and saw Makarios as more of an obstacle than the Greek Government. Thus it was suggested that the British consider “bending their plan slightly more in favor of the Greeks” so that it might be more readily accepted. Specifically, it was recommended that the role of the Greek and Turkish representative be “clarified, and that it be emphasized that these representatives would function as advisors to the Governor but have no part in the administration of the island. The US also recommended that a single assembly be created as soon as both communal assemblies were operative.

The U.S. Embassies in London, Ankara, and Athens all had singular reactions to the State Department’s counter-proposals. London expressed skepticism as to whether the U.S. should risk another of its own initiatives rather than just put its support behind the British plan. Athens generally agreed with the State Department’s suggestions, if for no other

31 Barbour to Dulles, Embtel London 1209, August 31, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-3156, NARA.
reason, that it would signal to the Greek Government American willingness to take a
more active role, thus easing some of the tension between the US and Greece.32

The least enthusiastic response came in mid-September from Ankara, where it was
pointed out that the State Department’s assessment was “in sharp contrast as to [the]
degree of flexibility that remains in [the] Turkish policy.” Ankara also noted that the
“major obstacle to Greek cooperation is Greek emotion,” and if the US were to lean on
anyone, it ought to be the Greeks.33 For better or worse, it was this opinion that
ultimately prevailed and, with that, the latest US suggestions were abandoned.

32 Riddleberger, Embtel Athens.
747C.00/9-958.
Avoiding the Macmillan Plan

Despite the refusal by the Greek Government and Makarios to accept the Macmillan plan, the British Government decided to proceed with its implementation with only Turkish cooperation.\footnote{Lloyd to Dulles, Message London, September 13, 1958: \textit{FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 701.}} This was no surprise since from the beginning; it had been the British intention to implement the plan once Turkish support could be ensured. Although the State Department had come to believe that it was the Greeks who were the obstructionists, it did not mean that the US was not concerned about the potential consequences of a unilateral implementation of the Macmillan plan. The US was especially concerned about the arrival of the Turkish Government representative on the island, which was likely to incite another round of EOKA violence. Even more troubling to the Americans was the prospect that a defeat of the present Greek Government, in connection with Cyprus, might steer Greece away from its pro-western orientation.\footnote{Memcon between delegations of the US and Turkey, New York, September 19, 1958: \textit{ibid.,} 702-703.}

In a meeting with Zorlu on September 19, Rountree introduced the possibility that Turkey might designate the Turkish Consul General in Nicosia as its representative on Cyprus in order to make the implementation of the plan less traumatic for the Greeks. Zorlu initially balked at the idea, saying that he “did not think the position of the Turkish representative should be ‘diminished’” since that item was the only “advantage” to the Turks that the
British plan offered. Moreover, the Foreign Minister did not believe that the Greek threat to withdraw from NATO was a serious one, and that Greece could eventually be induced to cooperate with the plan. Nevertheless, he agreed to present the initiative to Menderes who, a few days later, accepted it.

The prospect of the implementation of the Macmillan plan alarmed the Greeks, who regarded it as the beginning of a shared sovereignty of Cyprus with the Turks. In an effort to forestall a unilateral application of the arrangement, Karamanlis and King Paul himself appealed to the US to intervene, warning that its implementation could have “dangerous repercussions not only for the internal conditions but also on the international relations of Greece.” Indeed, Prime Minister Karamanlis had informed the Secretary General that Britain’s determination to proceed with its Cyprus plan would “undermine Greece's position in NATO.”

On September 22, Eisenhower telephoned Dulles to discuss the King’s letter. He told the Secretary that the US should notify the British Ambassador of the King’s appeal citing it as another reason for postponement. The President concluded the conversation with the warning not to “make any mistakes in a hurry. Once it's done, it's done.”

The Americans were not taking Greek concerns lightly. A September 23 NIE report on Greece indicated that US believed that Greece’s reaction might very well include “at least

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3 Rountree to Dulles, Circular Telegram 301, September 20, 1958: SDCDF: 747C.00/9-2058, NARA.
4 Hall to Dulles, Embtel Ankara 1007, September 23, 1958:ibid., doc. 747C.00/9-258.
6 Editorial note, ibid., 704.
a partial disengagement from NATO” and additional further strain, if not the total
disintegration of Greek-Turkish relations.⁸ Although Dulles and Eisenhower were in
agreement, the Secretary knew that the British were determined to move forward with the
plan and thus would never agree.

The same day, Dulles met with Caccia to relay his concerns and brief the Ambassador on
his conversation with Eisenhower. The Secretary told the Ambassador about the
President's reaction to his letter from the King and his opinion that a delay in the plan
might be wise. He also warned that if the plan went forward, the Greeks would likely
walk out of NATO, and even went so far as to suggest that the Turkish representative on
Cyprus might well be assassinated.⁹

Despite these objections, the Prime Minister stood firm. Macmillan, in a message to
Eisenhower on September 24 positioned himself as the lone champion of Turkish rights
on Cyprus. He reiterated his determination to go forward, saying that the Greek
Government was at present “not strong enough to accept any policy, and adding that
therefore [t] the only hope is that in due course they will acquiesce.” The Prime Minister,
did, however, agree with the suggestion that the appointment of the Turkish Consul
would be a wise move in that it would somewhat ease the Greek position.¹⁰

Macmillan believed that his uncompromising stance would eventually bring the Greeks
around. Hence it must have come as quite a shock to the British when the NATO

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⁹ Dulles, Memcon with Caccia, September 22, 1958: Papers of John Foster Dulles 1951-1958, General
Coresp. And Memoranda Series, Gen. A-D, DDE-Library. This conversation is also found in Dulles to
Macmillan, Memcon: SDCDF, lot 44 D 199, NARA.
Secretary General, with the blessing of the Americans, presented proposals not unlike his principles of July and those of the US in late August, with the added idea for a tripartite conference. ¹¹

**The Push for NATO Involvement**

On September 24, the NATO Secretary-General flew to Athens, where he was confronted by a “disturbingly emotional […] troubled, anxious, disoriented and bitter” Karamanlis. ¹² Despite his skepticism, the Greek Prime Minister agreed to mull over the possibility of Greek participation in a tripartite conference on Cyprus, provided he was given some guarantee that Greece’s participation did not “imply Greek recognition of Turkish interest in Cyprus” ¹³ be given consideration. Spaak returned to Paris where he proposed the idea to the NATO council.

For its part, the US, which had lent its support for the Macmillan plan up until its rejection by the Greeks, believed that, at this juncture, it needed to withdraw that commitment and vigorously support Spaak’s initiative for a conference. The Americans hoped that since the “substantive differences were so slight—at least in their opinion—that a “bridge could be found” that would not compromise Britain’s plan of action. ¹⁴

Britain, which did not want to be viewed as obstructionist, accepted the conference initiative in principle, provided it was within the scope of the British plan, and did not

¹⁴ Memcon between the US and NATO MC-16, September 27, 1958, “Secretary’s Trip to Boston”: *ibid.*, 710-711.
significantly hinder its application. The Turkish representative, however, in what Nolting
described as a “violent and abusive speech” apparently penned by Zorlu, flatly refused to
participate.\textsuperscript{15}

In a meeting with Ambassador Caccia on September 29, Dulles, urged the British
Government’s participation in the conference and expressed the hope that, while the US
supported the British plan, that it might be further clarified in a conference. Meanwhile,
Turkey re-evaluated its hard-line position, backing away from Zorlu’s incendiary
language, and agreeing to accept the initiative. Greece, on the other hand, felt betrayed
and, in what had now become a familiar pattern, appealed to the Americans for support.

By now, however, the US had grown frustrated with all the drama and diplomatic intrigue
and was coming to believe that no proposal would ever satisfy the Greeks. President
Eisenhower emphasized to Melas the “importance of having a sense of proportion”
regarding the Cyprus dispute in the Ambassador’s farewell phone call. Similarly, the
President, while underlining the US’s capacity to intervene in the dispute, cautioned the
Greek King that “in pursuing its Cyprus policy Greece [should] measure its immediate
objectives respecting Cyprus against its bonds of interest and interdependence with the
other nations of the West.”\textsuperscript{16} Clearly Eisenhower was warning the Greeks against any
rash behavior that might cause their allies to withhold support in the event of a future
threat or crisis.

\textsuperscript{15} Nolting, Embtel Paris Polto 803, September 28, 1958: \textit{ibid.}, 711-712.
\textsuperscript{16} Memcon between Eisenhower and Dulles, September 29, 1958: \textit{ibid.}, 715; Eisenhower to King Paul I,
Greek intransigence and weariness with the whole Cyprus soap opera was not the only reason that the US decided to fully back the British plan. Another reason, according to a memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, was that the US now urgently needed British support to prevent the inscription of Chinese representation on the UN agenda, an issue which American policy makers regarded as crucial. 17 In 1958, tensions between the US and Britain following the Suez crisis had all but subsided and the two countries were enjoying “exceptionally close” and “increasingly coordinated” relations. Having recovered from Britain’s criticism of US involvement in Guatemala, the only real disagreement that remained was over Far East policy, specifically Chinese representation. 18 The British agreed to support the Americans on this issue in return for their support in keeping Cyprus off the agenda. 19

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Averoff accused the US of not only of switching support from the more acceptable Spaak plan but also of backing the unacceptable Macmillan proposals. Moreover, Greece believed that the Americans were also pressing her to participate in a conference that supported the new Spaak initiative endorsing the placement of the Turkish representative on the island, even though it was emphasized that neither the Greek or Turkish representatives would have a sovereign role or administrative authority. 20

19 Lodge to Dulles, Memorandum: “US Policy in the UN on Colonial Questions, such as Cyprus and Algeria,” January 12, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-1359, NARA..
On October 3, Riddleberger reported that Averoff had made a counter-proposal suggesting that Greece might participate in a conference if the modified Macmillan plan was to include a plebiscite on independence after seven years which excluded both enosis and partition.\(^{21}\) Herter responded by instructing Riddleberger to advise the Foreign Minister that the US could not support his proposal as a “conference precondition,” adding that while Averoff was free to raise the plebiscite proposal at a conference based on the Spaak plan, the US did not hold out much hope that it would be accepted.\(^{22}\)

The NATO initiative definitively broke down on October 22, and Makarios rejected the idea for an international conference on October 26. The following day, Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower saying that Britain had decided “to let the Greeks simmer for a period,” adding that “if we run with them now it will only consolidate them; if we do nothing, their self-doubting will take affect.”\(^{23}\)

Despite the failure of the NATO initiative, Macmillan was not “unduly depressed,” and preferred to see the glass half full. While focusing on the progress that had been made, he pointed out the fact that Greece had at least “dropped their talk about leaving NATO.”\(^{24}\) In any event, both the US and Britain needed to conserve their resources and reserve their strength for the forthcoming UN debates, which threatened to be the most contentious yet.

\(^{21}\) Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 907, October 3, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-358, NARA. 
\(^{23}\) Macmillan to Eisenhower, Message October 27, 158: ibid, 732. 
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 733.
US Refusal to Support Greece

On November 3 Lodge wrote to Dulles to inform him of a conversation he had with Queen Frederika of Greece where she had made an urgent plea for the “United States to adopt a hands off attitude on the Cyprus question—if it should come into the United Nations.” By "hands off" the Queen meant not only a public attitude, but also warned of working behind the scenes since such activities always had a way of getting back to Greece.

The Queen explained that at present, Karamanlis was the only strong politician in Greece and that if the US became identified with being on the “wrong side” of the Cyprus question his government would fall, leaving only the King and the Queen to defend the western alliance. The Americans, however, had heard this before, and in any regard, they had already cut a deal with the British about Cyprus in return for UK support on the all-important, but unrelated Chinese representation issue.

From November 24 to December 4, the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly discussed the Cyprus issue. The UK, Greece, and Turkey withdrew their resolutions almost immediately, and the contentious pro-Greek proposal sponsored by India was likewise withdrawn. A Belgian-sponsored resolution, which had been considered too pedestrian, was soon abandoned. Similarly, a Colombian resolution, supported by Greece calling for the UN and the Secretary General to work towards the advancement of a

“peaceful, just, and democratic solution to the problem,” also failed with 17 in favor, 17 against, and with 47 abstentions.

In the end, an Iranian solution calling for the three parties to the dispute to hold a conference to address the interim and final solution for Cyprus carried the day. The resolution was approved by the Committee with the backing of the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the United States. The vote was 31 in favor, 22 against, and 28 abstentions. Of the NATO countries, only Greece and Iceland voted against the resolution.26

The Greeks were crushed—hung out to dry without US support and with only Iceland in their corner. They now faced the humiliating prospect of a UN motion supporting the kind of discussions they had already rejected from NATO. The lengthy and often bitter debate on Cyprus did little, at least at the time, to moderate the rigid positions of the parties to the dispute. Efforts to reach an agreement on a compromise resolution ended in failure, yielding only an anemic declaration by the President of the Assembly.

It was probably during the later stages of these contentious debates, however, that the Turkish Foreign Minister and his Greek counterpart laid the foundation in private for the later fruitful discussions which would eventually result in a settlement for Cyprus. The Cyprus question needed to be resolved, and both Greece and Turkey were coming to the realization that neither enosis nor partition would ever be an acceptable resolution for the international community.

The following day, however, Averoff and Zorlu shocked everyone by co-sponsoring a compromise resolution on Cyprus which was introduced in the General Assembly on December 5 by the Mexican representative. The resolution called upon the parties to “continue efforts’ to reach a just settlement in accordance with the U.N. Charter.” It was adopted unanimously and without objection.  

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Chapter XVIII

Cyprus goes “on and off” like a dish at a cheap restaurant—Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way

The Search for a Final Settlement

Following the final Greek humiliation in the General Assembly, Zorlu approached Averoff, who steeled himself for the abuse he believed was coming. The Greek Foreign Minister was only too familiar with the sharpness of his counterpart’s tongue, and he warned his colleagues that “he was afraid that he might not be able to restrain from being extremely rude to him.” Instead of the predictable deranged rant, however, Zorlu surprised the demoralized Averoff and uncharacteristically congratulated him on putting up such a good fight in the Political Committee. While conceding defeat, Averoff steered the conversation towards the mutual dangers faced by both Greece and Turkey and lamenting the hatred “whipped up” between the two countries because they were “unwilling or unable to agree.” Zorlu admitted that he, too, was “alarmed by the common dangers” facing both countries, and then offered to meet privately with his Greek counterpart to discuss their differences. Averoff agreed to the discussions, but only if the Iranian resolution was dropped. The following day, the British and Turkish delegations, with American encouragement, replaced the Iranian resolution with one sponsored by a Latin American country.1

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1 Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, Lost Opportunities, 295-299; Foot, A Start in Freedom, 176-177.
On December 6 Zorlu and Averoff held a private meeting wherein the Turkish Minister explained that while his government favored the Macmillan plan because it would sooner or later lead to partition, he also said that he understood that it could not be implemented without Greek cooperation and without irreparably damaging Greek-Turkish relations. The American Embassy in Ankara held a similar view in that they believed that the plan could not be carried out without “incurring a grave risk of creating a New Palestine,” which they regarded as a greater threat to US interests than the present impasse.2

In light of the instability in the Middle East, it was more essential than ever to preserve the integrity of the NATO alliance. This was not only critical to the Americans. Turkey, too, realized that it needed Greece, since it was its only bond to NATO in an increasingly hostile region.

With the support of the Greek Government Makarios had shifted his position from advocating enosis in favor of a guaranteed independence even before the final UN debate.3 Turkey also signaled it was open to discuss the possibility of a guaranteed independence solution with the Greeks—provided Britain or no one else was involved in the process and that Greece would agree to recognize the Turkish Cypriots on the island as a community, not just a minority. For their part, Greece would also agree to discussions provided that the “Turks realized that eighty is more than twenty.”4

The initiative was likely a response from the Turks to Averoff’s anxious appeal to the Turkish Embassy in Athens on the eve of the UN debate, calling for Turkey to re-evaluate the “concept

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4 Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 153.
of ‘independence.’" As Bahcheli points out, for Turkey, “partition had been a maximalist position and Ankara was prepared to settle for less,” meaning an administrative rather than a geographical partition, which at least theoretically, did not seem incompatible with the idea of independence.

A few weeks earlier on November 18, Zorlu approached Dulles to explain the Turkish concept of partition was not necessarily calling for the division of the island but for a "kind of an intellectual partition," namely, that the two communities must be given the idea that neither was being governed by the other. “He believed that the three concerned parties should work to achieve this end, adding that he did not think it desirable to “mix the United Nations” in this matter.  

Turkey was especially concerned that no committee be formed under the UN, since it was likely to exclude any form of partition in the settlement.

A few short weeks before no one believed a settlement possible. Now, almost miraculously, Greece and Turkey were coming together to negotiate a final solution for the island. But both sides had their own motives for making concessions towards a final solution.

There were several reasons for the drastic shift in Turkish policy. First and foremost, Turkey was largely driven by security concerns and fear of the communist threat from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. These factors, combined with Khrushchev’s attempt to turn the international spotlight on the

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6 Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, 42.
7 Memcon between delegations of the US and Turkey, November 18, 1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 746; Rauf Denktash, on the other hand, took the hard-line view with regard to a solution for the island’s troubles: "We hope we shall never see an independent Cyprus!" We are Turks, 100-000-strong, not Greeks, and this island is as much ours as theirs. The Greeks want freedom from the British. All right, we want freedom from the Greeks," quoted in “Bitter Breakdown,” Time, November 10, 1958.
8 Hatzivassiliou, ibid., 163-165.
“German Question” in mid-November with his ultimatum regarding Berlin, forced Turkey to confront the fact that it was surrounded by hostile entities. Moreover, a change in the government in Athens might also likely mean a shift towards a more neutral policy, thus breaking Turkey’s geographical bond with NATO and leaving her 360 mile common border with the Soviet Union even more vulnerable. Turkish concern over a Labour ascendency in London, with its stated commitment to the principle of self-determination, was another factor. Turkey realized that a partition solution within the UN would never pass since the widespread belief in the General Assembly favored independence as the best course.

Similarly, Greece realized that there was no hope of ever achieving enosis through the international body. It was also faced with the danger of seeing partition become a reality if it continued on its uncompromising path. As a result, the Greeks “began to consider independence an acceptable first stage solution of the Cyprus crisis.” Moreover, the murder of Catherine Cutliffe, the wife of a British soldier and a mother of five in Varosha, allegedly by EOKA, cost it its last remaining outside sympathizers and triggered wide-spread arrests, further undermining the organization.

Finally, both Greece and Turkey were exhausted with the endless haggling over the island, and both were under severe domestic pressure to reach a settlement. Furthermore, many Cypriots were beginning to believe that the revised Macmillan plan would be the best they could hope for,

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9 Reference to the Second Berlin Crisis: In November 1958, Nikita S. Khrushchev launched a campaign to put an end to the Allied presence in West Berlin and to force the West to recognize the Soviet puppet regime, the German Democratic Republic.


and tried to convince Makarios that this was the last chance to rescue the island from catastrophe. 13 Confronted by these realities, the Archbishop decided to split the difference and choose the middle ground, for the first time renouncing the cause of enosis in favor of a negotiated settlement based on guaranteed independence.14

**Abandoning the Macmillan Plan**

The meeting between Averoff and Zorlu in Paris went so well that the two issued a joint appeal to Governor Foot to commute the executions of two Greek Cypriots that same night.15 Keeping with the spirit of reconciliation, EOKA, at the behest of Makarios, announced a unilateral truce on Christmas Eve in order that the negotiations might proceed in an atmosphere free of violence. In return, the British commuted the death sentences of four of the organization’s members.16 On that same day, the British and Americans were finally briefed as to the substance of the negotiations between the two Ministers and then only when it became necessary to inquire as to whether the United Kingdom had any objections to the core of the principles established thus far.17

Although London responded favorably to the bilateral discussions, the British warned the Americans not to offer direct encouragement to any of Averoff’s initiatives.18 The Foreign Office agreed not to press the two sides with respect to implementing any aspects of the British

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13 Belcher Contel Nicosia 102, August 16, 1958: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/8-1658, NARA.
18 Whitney, Embtel London 3353, December 27, 1959: SDCDF, 747C.00/12-2758, NARA.
plans and decided to notify the US Embassy only if problems between the two arose rather than reporting any partial progress.19

When the US Embassy in London related the State Department’s anxiety over the potential consequences implementing the British plan would have on discussions between Greece and Turkey, John Mansfield Addis, Head of the FO’s Southern Department, was quick to point out that the concern was unfounded since there was really nothing to indicate that the two sides had made any progress since their meeting in Paris.20 Macmillan, in a message to Dulles, made a similar claim, saying that Britain had not been given any details regarding the discussions and had intentionally avoided asking any questions, but understood that there had been no meaningful advancement:

You are aware in general terms of the promising development in regard to the Cyprus question which has taken place since the debate in the United Nations. Zorlu and Averoff have had direct discussions/1/ with a view to finding a new approach to the problems of Cyprus on the basis of restoring Greek-Turkish friendship. The two Foreign Ministers explained their ideas to the Foreign Secretary in Paris a week before Christmas/2/ and asked if Her Majesty's Government were agreeable to their continuing their discussions. From the account which they gave, it seemed clear that at that stage in their discussions no details had been settled and that they had not done more than exchange very general ideas.21

Macmillan appeared anxious to present the British as interested observers rather than as vested participants. Since the meeting in Paris, Britain had reluctantly chosen to adopt a laissez-faire stance, relying only upon information gleaned through brief exchanges in Ankara through diplomatic channels. Macmillan was quick to point out to Dulles that Britain had only recently learned that Averoff and Zorlu would be meeting again in Paris in late January.22

22 Ibid.
Despite words of warm encouragement, Britain was still determined to push the Macmillan plan although Turkey was no longer pressing for it and, doing so, would likely endanger the fragile Greek-Turkish reconciliation. While Britain repeatedly insisted it would accept any initiative that was agreeable to both the Greeks and Turks, its actions betrayed that claim. In an initiative reminiscent of 1956, Britain mounted a major operation against EOKA in the Troodos Mountains, contrary to the advice of the US. This was followed by a furious statement denouncing terrorism in Cyprus.23

On January 4, Governor Foot sent a message to Lennox-Boyd urging him to delay the publication of the Surridge Commission municipal report and the electoral bill for the Turkish House of Representatives, two fundamental features of the Macmillan Plan, worrying if Britain “could plausibly be accused of wrecking the best chance of an amicable settlement that has not yet appeared.”24

In the words of Holland, Britain had an “‘overriding obligation’ not to upset the apple-cart being pushed uphill by the Greeks and Turks.”25 The Governor’s request, however, was refused. Similarly, protests from Averoff were generally ignored. But when Zorlu also recommended that the publication be deferred, the British realized that it would be impossible to implement local provisions of the plan if the Turks were not in agreement.26

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23 In June 1956, the British mounted a major offensive against EOKA in the Troodos Mountains, but netted only a handful of its members. Instead of breaking the organization, EOKA widened its campaign to include additional towns and villages throughout the island and attacking the families of British servicemen; Barbour Embtel London 3600, January 13, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/1-1359; Belcher, Contel Nicosia 321, January 14, 1959: ibid., doc. 747C.00/1-1459.
24 Foot Telegram to Colonial Office January 4, 1959, Co 926/805.
25 Ibid.; Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, Holland, 301.
26 Holland, ibid., 302.
When the Americans suggested that it might be wise to delay the publication of the Surridge Commission municipal report and the electoral bill, Macmillan, in a letter to Dulles, reluctantly agreed to a short delay for the latter if only to maintain the “the best possible atmosphere” for the upcoming talks in Paris, and only if they showed signs of progress.”27 Regarding the electoral bill, Macmillan, sounding more like Turkey’s lawyer than an interested party, insisting that “if the current talks come to nothing, we must be ready to fulfill our undertaking to the Turks to hold elections this year” [sic.]. Emphasizing Britain’s resolve to move half-speed ahead in implementing the plan, the Prime Minister added, “If we do not go forward, there is a risk of slipping back and losing the ground gained since last summer,” 28

Aside from Britain’s tepid support for the Greek-Turkish negotiations, Macmillan refused to stray from his course, since he had convinced himself that it had been British resolve that had made possible the spirit of reconciliation in the first place. “The steady advance of our progressive plan seems to have been an important factor in bringing about the improved attitude of both Greeks and Turks,” he said. 29 This, however, was only true with respect to Greek acceptance of the negotiations, for which the Americans could claim at least as much credit having departed from their former neutral position.30 Holland points to a certain degree of jealousy on the part of Britain in this. Simply stated, Britain could not abide the fact that Greece and Turkey had been able to accomplish in a short time what they could not after years of trying.

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 The belief that the Macmillan Plan itself had been the motivation for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement was the conventional wisdom in Britain at the time. Macmillan later wrote “the impetus given by our plan […] was one of the main causes of the settlement […]” Riding the Storm, 668; Former Prime Minister Anthony Eden went as far as claiming in his memoirs that the Macmillan plan “brought international agreement:” Lord Avon, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, 413. The truth was that the threat by Britain to implement the plan had pressured the Greeks to find a way out by participating in direct negotiations with Turkey, Nicolet, 135.
Britain was also desperately trying to maintain a measure of control over the dynamics of the situation. 31

It was also apparent that both the Greeks and Turks were suspicious of British intentions and preferred to keep them away from the negotiations. While Averoff refused to comment publicly on their progress, he privately told the Americans that talks were “going well.” Zorlu and he did, however, share a common concern that the UK might do something to “sabotage” the talks with continuing military operations on the island. He warned that if EOKA “reacted with a renewal of violence,” continuing negotiations would be impossible.

Averoff believed that there were two “elements” in the British Cabinet that were working at cross purposes. The first were the “Tory die-hards” who were determined to hold Cyprus and would “use any means to torpedo the talks.” The second element involved Ministers “‘indifferent’ to Cyprus overall but prepared to be ‘helpful.’”32 Interestingly enough, he placed Macmillan in the latter group.

**Something Like a Miracle**

The negotiations in Zürich and London preceding independence were, in the words of Averoff, “hard fought and arduous.”33 Both sides understood just how much was at stake. Failure would have likely meant one of the following: the division of the island between Turkey and Greece, a tridominium, or the continuation of British rule.

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31 Holland, *ibid.*, 300; 302.
33 Roberts to Foreign Office, January 20, 1959 FO 144639, RG1073/6.
The Zürich negotiations took place from February 6-11, 1959, at the Dolder Grand Hotel and were attended not only by the two Foreign Ministers, but by Prime Ministers Menderes and Karamanlis as well. On February 11, the two sides announced that they had reached a settlement on the future of the island.

"It would seem only tactful to inform the British government," purred a self-satisfied Averoff at the end of the meeting. It was clear that the Greek Foreign Minister was enjoying his new prestige. The text of the proposed settlement was duly presented to the British Government on the same day.34  The official “Cyprus Settlement,” which would come to be known as the Zürich Agreement, consisted of the following: (a.) a draft of the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, (b.) a Treaty of Guarantee between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the UK, (c.) a Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, (d.) a supplementary article inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee, and (e.) Agreed Measures for the new preparations.35

It is important to remember that the basic structure of the constitution in the Zürich agreement was based on the less contentious features of the Macmillan Plan. The main difference was that plan was a final solution that eliminated the governmental representatives. In other respects, the communal chambers, municipal separation of the communities, and the principal of mutual cooperation between Greece, Turkey, and Britain had all been agreed to by Athens prior the 1959 conferences and were included in the final settlement.36

36 Hatzivassiliou, *ibid.*, 171.
On February 14, Karamanlis returned to Athens for a discussion with Makarios, who lent his support to the agreement. On the same day, Averoff and Zorlu flew to London to consult with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd. The result of these consultations was an agreement between the three parties that certain areas of Cyprus should be retained under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. A supplementary article was to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee to respect the integrity of the areas retained by Britain as well as secure Britain’s rights in connection with their usage. This included over-flight rights and the use of various facilities and roadways outside the Sovereign Base Areas.

The London Conference opened at Lancaster House on February 17. The three parties were represented by their foreign ministers, while the Cypriots were represented by Archbishop Makarios and Turkish leader, Dr. Fazil Küçük. The British had not yet signed off on their part, but as Lloyd told Whitney, the agreement was “in the bag” unless “the rats get at it.” The Ambassador could not help but believe that Lloyd not only had the leader of the rat pack, Makarios, in mind, but also his own “right-wing back-benchers” as well.37

The Basic Structure provided for the Republic of Cyprus to have a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. One of the following Ministries—Foreign Affairs, Defense, or Finance would be delegated to a Turkish Cypriot. A council of Ministers made up of seven Greek Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriot Ministers would assist them. Final veto power would, however, rest with the President and Vice-President. The judicial system was to be regulated jointly by a Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice; these would be composed of one Greek and one Turkish Cypriot judge, each with a neutral president.

Each community was to have a respective Communal Chamber which would hold authority over
taxation and all religious, cultural, educational, and personal questions relating to its community.
The Civil Service would have a 70:30 ratio of Greek to Turkish Cypriots, respectively. A
Cypriot army would consist of 2,000 men with a 60:40 ratio of Greek to Turkish Cypriots.
Separate municipalities in the five largest towns were to be created by their Turkish residents. In
each of the towns, however, a coordinating body would be established, staffed by members of
both communities to oversee the work that needed to be executed jointly. Finally, the President
and Vice-President were to examine, within four years the question, of whether or not this
separation of municipalities should continue. A very important stipulation was that the basic
articles would be unalterable.

Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee states:

The republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity, and security,
as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or
economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibit any activity likely to promote, directly
or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.  

Greece, Turkey, and the UK would be guarantors of these provisions. A key component of the
Treaty was Article III, which stated that in the event of any “breach of these provisions,” the
guarantors should confer with each other to decide if “common or concerted action may prove
impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole
aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present treaty.” That Greece,
Turkey, and the UK would be guarantors of these provisions would later prove to be the most
contentious and troublesome article in the Zürich settlement.

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39 Ibid.
The Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey called for the creation of a tripartite Headquarters on the island, with contingents of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. These could only be increased or reduced through an agreement by both the President and Vice-President. The aforementioned Greek and Turkish officers would be in charge of training the Army of the Republic. Command of the tripartite Headquarters would be on a one-year rotational basis, with a Cypriot, Greek, and a Turkish General Officer assuming the position for a period of one year. The Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom formalized the transfer of the sovereignty of the island except for the base areas which would be retained under British sovereignty. It also included the aforementioned rights and Sovereign base areas retained by the British.

Under the “Agreed Measures to Prepare for the New Arrangements in Cyprus,” a time limit of one year was stated for the establishment of the Republic. These measures called for the establishment of a “Joint Commission in Cyprus” responsible for completing an outline of the constitution; a “Transitional Committee in Cyprus” charged with designing a blueprint for adjusting and restructuring the Governmental apparatus to facilitate the transfer of authority to the republic; and a “Joint Committee in London,” whose most important function was the preparation of final treaties, including “inter alia matters arising from the retention of the areas in Cyprus under British Sovereignty.” This last item would be especially problematic in the swift establishment of the republic.

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40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
On February 18, the second day of the conference, the Archbishop raised a number of objections
to the Zürich Agreement which was unpopular with the Greek Cypriots. Among them was the
Turkish Vice-President’s final veto power. Makarios complained that while the Greek Cypriot
President would have the trappings of power, he would not have the authority to exercise it.
Makarios also objected to the number of seats allocated to the Turkish Cypriots in the House of
Representatives— the 70:30 ratio between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and the defense
alliance which granted Turkey the right to install troops on the island.\(^{43}\) Greek newspapers on
the island reported that the area allotted to Britain for permanent bases, the Greek-Turkish ratio
in the military forces, and the municipal divisions provided for in the five cities were also
problematic for the Archbishop.\(^{44}\)

The Greek public, who believed that Makarios had been manipulated in London into accepting
the Agreements, immediately sought out a scapegoat and conveniently found one in “perfidious
albion”\(^{45}\) This was hardly the case. Greece and Turkey were both taken aback by the
Archbishop’s obstinacy, and it was largely their resolve to do whatever was necessary to make
the Agreements move forward. The precise circumstances of how and why the Archbishop
came to sign the Agreements are obscured by conflicting accounts and historical revisionism.
Makarios, himself, was prone to revising history whenever it was politically expedient. When
Makarios made the decision to endorse the idea of independence he may have well believed that
it was only an interim phase and not necessarily the end of the road for enosis.

\(^{43}\) Whitney, Embtel London 4317, February 18, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/2-1859, NARA.
\(^{44}\) Reported by Berger, Embtel Athens 1880, February 2, 1959: ibid, doc. 747C.00/2-1859.
\(^{45}\) Ibid.
Once the Greeks and the Turks reached their offstage agreement, the Archbishop found himself under pressure by a panorama of opinion on both the Left and the Right. Although he would later protest that he had been steamrollered by Greece into accepting the Agreements, and had not been properly consulted as to their substance, this charge was later refuted by Averoff. Even supporters, who accompanied him to London and who would later become his critics, insisted that the pressure brought by the Greek Government was not nearly as strong as he had maintained. In hindsight, Averoff concluded that Makarios obduracy was due to his insecurity about his community’s support in London, since General Grivas had been furious that EOKA had not been properly represented in the Archbishop’s delegation. Averoff also went as far as claiming that the Agreements contributed to the later rift between Makarios and Grivas.

Pressure by the Greek Government, however, cannot be entirely dismissed. In an FO meeting on February 18, Averoff is reported as saying that “he had made it clear to the Cypriots that the Greek Government’s support for the Zürich Agreements and the Governmental Declarations was final and there would be no further changes in Greece’s foreign policy over Cyprus.” To emphasize their resolve, the Foreign Minister added that “the Greek Government would hold elections […] on this issue to demonstrate that the people of Greece agreed with them in refusing to support the Cypriots any further.”

As to whether the Archbishop should be allowed to state his case at the final session of the conference, Selwyn-Lloyd thought he should, while Averoff believed he had already expressed his views and should not be given the opportunity to further obstruct the process. Zorlu agreed

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46 Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict, 31-32.
47 Averoff-Tossizza, ibid., 350.
saying, “the Agreements must stand or fall as a whole and were not negotiable to suit the Greek Cypriots.” The Turkish Foreign Minister added that the Archbishop “had been consulted at every stage and could only be asked whether he accepted the agreements or not.” 49 This position is confirmed by Karamanlis, who bluntly told the Archbishop that the Greek government was already committed to the Zürich agreement and had no intention of reneging on it.

The Greek President laid down an ultimatum: take the agreement or suffer the “blame for wrecking the conference.”50 “How could you possibly have objections now when we had agreed in Athens to accept the British proposal that there should be no further discussions of any of the issues that had been settled in Zürich?” the Prime Minister asked. Karamanlis concluded the conversation by warning the delegation that “this is the end of the Greek government’s Cyprus policy, and if Makarios wants to carry on the struggle he will have to look elsewhere for support.”51

With only twelve hours to make a decision, Makarios spent the night "in prayer and reflection."52 Resigned to the realities of the situation, the next morning, the Archbishop finally accepted the Agreements unconditionally. That afternoon, the delegates approved the "agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.” Afterwards, the three Prime Ministers signed the agreement in Menderes's hospital room, where he was recovering from a plane crash that had

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49 In the end Selwyn-Lloyd persuaded the participants at the meeting to give Makarios a final opportunity to get his views on record: “if he rejected the Zürich documents, there would be an immediate recess without allowing him any further debate. Then the three P.M.s would meet, affirm their agreed position and emphasize Makarios’ isolation:” Ibid, 465.


51 Averoff-Tossizza, ibid., 348.

52 “Hotel Diplomacy,” ibid.
taken the lives of three members of his delegation. Macmillan then went before the House of Commons to pronounce it a "victory for reason and cooperation [...] a victory for all."53

The speculation on the Archbishop’s motives for accepting the Agreements prompted him to issue a statement in May 1959, explaining his performance at the Conference:

I signed the London Agreements fully conscious of my responsibilities towards the people of Cyprus. Failure of the London Conference on Cyprus because of a refusal to sign would have had catastrophic consequences for the future of Cyprus…Because it has been said that I signed after strong pressure from the Greek Government, I declare that no power on earth could have compelled me to sign the agreements if I had believed them to be contrary to the interests of the people of Cyprus. In the conference room I fought to the last moment to achieve better terms in the proposed agreement. Finally, however, refusal to sign, I repeat again, would have heaped many aggravated troubles on the people of Cyprus…With regard to the Greek Government I honestly believe that it made every effort to achieve the best that was possible under the given circumstances. The fact that the Greek Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister drew my attention to the consequences which would result from the refusal to sign the agreements did not constitute pressure on their part, but the performance of a duty. I put my signature to the London Agreement. I do not repent, I do not retract.54

In the end, the Archbishop’s reasons for placing his signature on the Agreements were not due to Greek pressure or even blackmail as many Greeks, Greek Cypriots, and some Western sympathizers would later claim, but because in not doing so, he risked the prospect of political isolation and responsibility for further violence and possible partition of the island.”55 While it might be tempting to characterize the Archbishop as a mere political opportunist in this regard, ultimately he was a pragmatist who believed that thirty percent of something, give or take, was better than a hundred percent of nothing.

53 Ibid.
54 “Archbishop Makarios: Statement May 21, 1959,” printed in Madden, 468.
55 Averoff-Tossizza, 350; While authors such as Christopher Hitchens attempt to portray Makarios as a statesman for accepting the Agreements despite his reservations, it is clear, at least in hindsight, that the Archbishop had virtually no choice in the matter: Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History, Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1984).
Chapter XIX

Towards Independence

The conclusion of the settlement meant that the British were finally free of the Cyprus morass. Needless to say, they were both elated and relieved. While some Tories lamented the loss of another jewel of the empire, most thought it was a small price to pay for peace on the island and the renewal of good relations with Greece along with the re-establishment of NATO unity. The Americans, too, were pleased about the settlement and made it known in an official statement issued by the State Department on the day of the signing: “the United States wholeheartedly welcomes the conclusion of an agreement on the substance of the final settlement of the Cyprus problem,” adding that “the leaders of the three Governments concerned and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have earned the thanks of the entire free world.”¹ The usually elsewhere engaged Eisenhower praised the Agreements as “a victory for common sense,” an “imaginative and courageous act of statesmanship,” and “a splendid achievement.”² There is no doubt that these were heartfelt sentiments. The conclusion of the settlement removed the US from the untenable position of having to stand on the sidelines and do little more than urge “quiet diplomacy” and occasionally offer advice while Britain, Greece, and Turkey attempted to try to hammer out a solution.³ It is not true or, more accurately as Nicolet puts it, it is an “inconceivable distortion of facts” that “Eisenhower forced Harold Macmillan to give up

² Quoted in Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, 124.
sovereignty but denied the Cypriots real independence.” 4 As Stearns rightly argues: in the events leading up to Cypriot independence […] the United States was an interested observer but not a participant.” 5

**Defining American Interests**

No sooner had the Agreements been concluded when preparations were underway to transfer the sovereignty of the island as “as soon as practicable” for fear that any delay would create “difficulties.” 6 Meanwhile, the Americans took advantage of this transitional period to secure their own interests on the island. On February 20, the Foreign Office reassured the Americans that they had taken steps to “safeguarded US interests” in the agreement and that these rights would also extend to all agreements signed prior to the end of British administration on the Cyprus. 7 The Americans wanted, if possible, to sidestep any questions regarding the future of the vital communications and intelligence facilities on the island and “avoid giving Cypriots grounds for belief [the] question will be open for discussion.” 8

First on the list was to secure the critical central net control post for the CIA’s Middle East Communications Activity (MECA) located outside of Nicosia, which had been functioning under State Department cover as the Radio Relay Station. It was the primary medium for electronic communications between all US diplomatic posts and CIA stations in the Middle East and

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4 This is only one of many overarching allegations made by journalists Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig in *The Cyprus Conspiracy, America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 74-75; Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus*, 140.
6 *Select Documents*, 465.
7 Embtel London 4378 February 20, 1959: SDCDF, 747C.00/2 – 2059, NARA.
Africa, and between these posts and Washington.\footnote{Background Paper: US Communications Facilities, May 24, 1962Lot Files, Entry 3051B, Conference File 2116, Visit of the President of Cyprus to Washington D.C., 6/5-9/62, Briefing Book, NARA.} Second, since 1949, the US had operated their Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) monitor station on Cyprus, which monitored foreign radio broadcasts from the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.\footnote{Ibid.} Finally, the US had been trying to secure installation rights for its Voice of America (VOA) transmitter on Cyprus since 1957 because Greece had denied the American request to install it on Rhodes.\footnote{Position Paper for the Macmillan Talks, Washington, October 23-25 1957"Location of VOA Transmitter on Cyprus, “(no date) Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President, WHCF, (Confidential File), 1953-61, State Department (October 1957) (2), doc. 4, DDE-Library.} Although Greece later reconsidered the prospect of allowing the transmitter to be installed on Rhodes, the US finally concluded that Cyprus was “a better spot technically and several hundred miles closer to the target area.”\footnote{Belcher, Contel Nicosia 321, April 14, 1959: \textit{FRUS, 1958-1960}, X, pt. 1, 782.}

On April 16, 1958, in what had become known as Project Delta, the British agreed in principle to allow the US to construct a VOA transmitter on Cyprus to provide enhanced coverage of the Middle East.\footnote{Staff Notes Prepared for President Eisenhower, April 16, 1958: \textit{FRUS, 1958-1960}, XII, 298.} In March, 1959, however, Consul Belcher voiced concern over the possibility that the operation rights might be linked to American aid for Cyprus, when Makarios, for the first time, requested the enormous sum of $20 million in economic assistance from the US and an equal sum from the UK—shamelessly suggesting not do so might be regarded by Cypriots as a “dereliction” of duty.\footnote{Belcher, Contel Nicosia 391, March 6, 1959: \textit{FRUS, 1958-1960}, X, pt. 1 779-780.} Considering the particular and general interests the US had in Cyprus, it was agreed in principle that aid for the new nation might be required.

It was at this stage that the Americans realized they needed to be more proactive or risk jeopardizing not only the VOA program, but the entire communications infrastructure on the
island. From this point onward the economic advantages of hosting the facilities was brought forward in every discussion with the Cypriots. The programs suddenly became “offers” and it was pointed out that they needed to close the deal or risk losing the opportunity to Greece which had lately warmed to the idea of a VOA installation on Rhodes.15

The Archbishop insisted that he would be “more than happy” to have American communications facilities in principle, but made it clear that a “financial quid pro quo” was expected in exchange for extending “Cypriot hospitality.” Makarios asked Consul Belcher if the US ever paid “rent” or “royalties” under the “existing arrangements” that it had with the British. Belcher said no, explaining that the US paid rent only for antenna rights, but had bought the property on which the stations stood. Makarios then interjected saying, “well, you know we will be poor and you will have to pay us something.” Belcher reiterated that at present the US did not pay rent and that there was no provision to do so under the current operation. It was apparent that the Archbishop was determined to extract the maximum return for his island. Considering the substantial amount of money that the US was already pouring into the Cypriot economy, Belcher sensed a bit of a shakedown, but overlooked it, believing it was important to first secure the agreements in principle and sweat the details at a later time.16 On January 1960 Makarios finally signed an agreement declaring American communication facilities would be welcome on the island following independence.17

**Lifting the Ban on AKEL**

15 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 438, April 14, 1959: *ibid.*, 782.
17 Barbour, Emble London 3468, January 13, 1960: *Ibid*, 806-807; The existence of this agreement calls into question the assertion later made by O’Malley and Craig that “[the US Government] secretly carried on operating [communications facilities] after independence without raising the issue with the Cypriots:” *ibid.*, 82. This claim is also rightly refuted by Nicolet in *ibid.*, 143.
The communications facilities were not the only matter troubling the Americans. Now that the state of emergency was no longer in effect on the island, Governor Foot believed the time was right for lifting the ban on AKEL, which Harding had proscribed in 1955. The Governor defended his position by arguing that the struggle against EOKA had proven that banning an organization would only serve to strengthen it. In a conversation with Consul Belcher in May, Foot suggested that an effort be made to “beat them openly through promulgation of equal or better policies.”

Needless to say, the Americans were not impressed by this risky argument, and were aghast at the prospect of the communists being permitted to operate freely on the island. Although officials in London largely shared the American concern, they were reluctant to challenge the Governor on this issue. An important reason for this was the earlier secret “Gentlemen’s Agreement” between Karamanlis and Menderes which called for the encouragement of Cyprus’ participation in NATO by Athens and Ankara and for the mother countries to lobby the President and Vice-President of the new Republic to ban the Communist Party on the island. It also called for a general amnesty for all former members. This in effect granted Turkey and Greece the extraordinary right to act as proxies for Cyprus in NATO and to influence the Cypriots to keep “the lid” on communist activities on the island.

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18 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 482, May 19, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/5-1959, NARA.
19 Madden, Select Documents, 461-462.
20 Holland, Britain and the Revolt on Cyprus, 305; While a first draft of the NSC policy paper on Cyprus urged the full admission of Cyprus to NATO, the final draft stated that although the Cypriots “are not likely, at least in the initial years of their independence, to seek membership in NATO,” the US should “take no initiative to secure the admission of Cyprus[…] but be prepared to consider such admission if the question is raised: NSC Report: “Statement of US Policy toward Cyprus” (NSC 6003), February 9, 1960: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 819-828; see also Chapter 20 of this text.
The US still held firmly to the view that “communist tactics are [designed] to exploit nationalist feeling in order to consolidate the position of local communist parties and to weaken Western influence and security.”\(^{21}\) Since the strength of the communist lay almost exclusively in the Greek Cypriot community and the labor movement, Makarios understood that lifting the ban was necessary to his political survival. AKEL was one of the best organized groups on the island, and its influence would only increase in the future. Makarios played no small role in influencing Foot’s decision to lift the ban. The Archbishop stated he was strongly in favor of lifting the ban “as soon as possible,” and that no further developments could induce him to change his mind. While Foot raised the question with the Colonial Office that lifting the ban might weaken the Archbishop’s position, he finally concluded that Makarios “knew best how to play the Cypriot political game.”\(^{22}\) When questioned by the British as to Ankara’s position regarding the legalization of AKEL, Zorlu replied that Turkey was not opposed, providing the action was limited to AKEL only and did not include the Cypriot Communist Party.\(^{23}\)

For its part, the Foreign Office was also in favor of lifting the proscription against the organization. According to Addis, the question of lifting the ban on AKEL had “been under constant review at high level [with] HMG” since the previous summer. While Britain sympathized with the American’s “strong views against lifting the ban” and recognized the broad range of opinion even within the HMG, “on balance,” it did not believe it could reverse the decision. AKEL was legalized on December 4, 1959.\(^{24}\) The draft of the new NSC paper entitled

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\(^{23}\) While Addis assured Zorlu that the British Government had no intentions of lifting the ban on the Communist Party, which had been proscribed in 1931, he also admitted that there “was in fact, little distinction between the Communist Party and AKEL:” Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Ibid, 804.
“US Policy toward Cyprus “supplanted NSC 5718 of August 1957. It was amended to include a caveat stating that the US should [b]e prepared, as appropriate and feasible, to encourage the re-imposition of the ban on the Communist Party of Cyprus.”25

Fine Tuning the Settlement

While the Americans were occupied with communication facilities and communists, the British had its own troubles with the Cypriots. The details that had been sidestepped in the early days of the settlement were beginning to surface. Only two weeks after the Agreements had been signed, Consul Belcher expressed concern about the prospect of mutual cooperation between the two communities. Osmen Örek, one of the chief negotiators for the constitution and slated to become the first Minister of Defense for Cyprus, colorfully described the new government as “an automobile with Makarios at the wheel and Küçük controlling the gears and brakes.”26

The first controversy to emerge was questions about the economy, with the Greek Ambassador to Washington bitterly complaining that the Turkish Cypriots were requesting economic assistance from Turkey. This was not a welcome development since rather than unify the two communities; it further emphasized their separation through attachment to the mother country.27

The second problem centered on political cooperation—or lack thereof. A particular point of contention concerned the definition of the Turkish Vice President’s veto powers.28 A third question concerned the Cypriot military. While the Greek Cypriots accused the Turkish Cypriots

26 Belcher, FS Despatch Nicosia, March 5, 1959: SDCDF, quoted here in Nicolet, ibid., 145.
27 Liatis, Memcon with Laingen: “Cyprus,” March 12, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/3-1259, NARA.
of smuggling arms, they themselves were not completely innocent, having failed to surrender EOKA weapons to the British as per a prior agreement.29

Consequently, a furor erupted over the so-called “Deniz Incident,” which involved the interception by the British naval patrol of a Turkish caique smuggling arms. Despite being caught red-handed, Turkey went on the defensive, acting like the aggrieved party. On October 27, Zorlu summoned British Ambassador Burroughs to “recite his tale of woe” and protest Greek and British conduct with regard to the incident, calling it “the last straw” in a string of grievances.30 Still, the Greek Government was determined to not let the incident interfere with the implementation of the London-Zürich Agreements.31 Makarios’ reaction was to suspend the intra-communal talks.32

Adding to the troubles, the Archbishop was now haggling with Julian Amery, the UK’s chief negotiator, over the size and location of the Sovereign Base Areas. Makarios was adamant that Cypriot villages be excluded from the base perimeter, a demand that Britain could not concede. The size of the base also came into question, with both sides seemingly wrangling over every square inch, and Lloyd threatening to resurrect the whole London Agreement,33 prompting Macmillan to remark “[…] Makarios will bargain up to the last point, but will throw it all away on the difference between an area eleven miles by eleven, or six miles by six.”34

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29 Ibid; Nicolet, ibid., 145-146.
31 Briggs, Embtel Athens 1114, October 27, 1959; ibid., 800-801.
32 Ibid., 799-800; A statement by the Turkish Foreign office in regard to the Deniz incident, appeared to satisfy Makarios who indicated that it might lead to a renewal of the talks: Belcher Contel Nicosia 176, October 24, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/10-2459, NARA.
33 Faustmann, ibid., 404-409; Jones to Herter, Memorandum: Message from Mr. Lloyd Concerning Cyprus, “February 1, 1960: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/2-160, NARA.
Makarios also brought up the prospect of the bases area being ceded to the Republic of Cyprus should the British ever withdraw. Since Britain had no intention of ever doing so, they believed the point was moot. A proposal put forward by Küçük for a 100 square mile compromise for the British base area was deemed “unacceptable” by the Archbishop. Makarios countered with an offer for 80 square miles which was rejected by Britain. Governor Foot described the impasse as “brinksmanship with a vengeance.” He expressed concern that if the Cypriots failed to close the deal they would be making a “grave mistake” since if Amery left with no solution, it would be difficult to restart the talks. Foot was convinced that Makarios had no intention of trying to meet the British even halfway and knew that they would never concede to his demand for an 80 square mile base area. When Consul Belcher suggested that maybe the Greeks were counting on Britain to be reluctant to pay for another round of talks, the Governor responded by saying that he was “sure” that his government was willing to “endure considerable trials” and spend “millions” rather than give in.

In the end, the base area was limited to 99 square miles, while Makarios won over the question of ceding the base to the Republic of Cyprus should the British ever decide to leave. But it was Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod who swiftly brought an end to the Cyprus problem by stepping up the timetable for liquidating the colonial holdings of the British Empire, including Cyprus. On July 4, he announced in Parliament the agreements for independence for the island had been finally concluded.

**The First Election**

35 Belcher, Embtel 420, April 4, 1960: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/4-560, NARA.
At the first Presidential elections of December, 1959, the ultra nationalists Right and the communist AKEL concluded that there was someone they detested even more than each other, the Archbishop Makarios. The settlement which had officially repudiated enosis and granted Britain Sovereign Bases on Cyprus’s south coast left both groups dissatisfied—and not for the first time, the Right and Left abandoned their purported principles to unite in a common cause. The communists lent their support to the moribund right-wing candidate Ioannis Clerides and his Democratic Union party to run against Makarios. Their joint platform consisted of opposition to the newly-minted Zurich-London Agreements as the basis for independence, although for different reasons. The Democratic Union saw the Agreements as unworkable and a stumbling block to the goal of enosis, while AKEL, though not opposing the Agreements as such, feared the NATO-ization of Cyprus.

During the campaign, the Archbishop made one speech denouncing the "modern hypocrites and Pharisees," and somewhat disbelievingly proclaiming that "I am the least interested man in these elections." Makarios, who was the frontrunner, handily defeated Clerides 68.85 to 35.15 per cent. Following the election, Makarios struck a deal with AKEL, offering the organization 5 seats in Parliament out of the total 35 occupied by the Greek Cypriots, bringing to his side the strongest party on the island. The remaining 15 seats were held by the Turkish Cypriots. On the basis of the Zürich and London Agreements, a constitution was drafted and Cyprus was proclaimed an independent state on August 16, 1960.

38 "The First President, “Time, December 21, 1959."
Chapter XX

The problem of Cyprus, always an international rather than a colonial problem, has now been resolved and the island has become an independent Republic as the result of friendly agreement between all the countries concerned. Who dares to say that this is anything but a story of steady liberal progress— Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way

US Policy and the New Republic

In theory, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus meant that those who led the struggle for enosis and the ones who had advocated partition of the island would now be required to collaborate on running the newly independent state. This would prove to be far more difficult in practice. While the constitution that emerged after more than a year and a half of wrangling reflected “the legacy of intercommunal strife rather than a model for sound government based on democratic lines,” for the Greek Cypriots it was probably the best arrangement that could be negotiated at the time.¹ The Zürich-London agreements may have created a state, but they could not compel the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots to bury old grievances and join in the spirit of mutual cooperation.

In some respects, the new Republic and the agreement which brought it into existence only served to intensify them. Fraser Wilkins, the new Ambassador at the Embassy in Nicosia noted that three months after independence the Greek and Turkish communities remained “preoccupied with communal phobia and post mortems on Zürich-London agreements,” which in his view was

a distraction from the internal and external Communist threat.\textsuperscript{2} For Britain, independence meant that it was finally free of the burden of Cyprus, at least for the moment.

In May 1959, Governor Foot raised the question of military aid to Cyprus. Foot informed Consul Belcher that he and his advisors preferred the Cypriot military to use the British equipment already in stock on the island provided it was free of charge. In the event it required payment, however, the Governor favored US equipment if it could be provided without charge. After some reconsideration, however, Foot concluded that it might be best that the Cypriot army use equipment similar to that used by Greece and Turkey. Since Greek and Turkish officers would be in charge of training the Cypriot army, Foot reasoned that they should work with equipment already familiar to them. This, of course, meant US equipment like that used by NATO.

Belcher, who was growing impatient with the issue, recommended that the State Department try to reach an early decision in this matter and strongly advised that the US should concentrate more on economic rather than military assistance to Cyprus.\textsuperscript{3} The State Department had already made the decision that the Cypriot army should be equipped out of the Greek and Turkish MAP (Military Assistance Program) surplus which, of course, had been supplied by the US.\textsuperscript{4} When Ambassador Briggs inquired whether the US would oppose the transfer of its MAP equipment to the Cypriot army,\textsuperscript{5} Acting Secretary Dillon said it had no objection, but warned that the transfer would not be enough to substantiate an increase in military assistance to Greece and Turkey as compensation.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{2} Wilkins, Embtel Nicosia 248, November 18, 1960: SDCDF: 780A.00/11 – 1860, NARA.
\textsuperscript{4} Dillon Deptel Nicosia 477, May 6, 1959: \textit{ibid.}, 786; Dillon, Deptel Paris 185, December 2, 1960: \textit{ibid.}, 841.
\textsuperscript{5} Briggs, Embtel Athens 411, August 13, 1959: \textit{ibid.}, 790-791.
\textsuperscript{6} Dillon, Deptel Athens 601, August 28, 1959: SDCDF, Cyprus, doc. 747C. 56/8-1359, NARA.
Secretary Herter suggested to his Ambassador in London that it might be useful to raise the question of financial and material support for the Cypriot army with the Foreign Office to get its views on how best to resolve the problem. 7 This was not merely a courtesy call to keep Britain apprised of its intentions. The Americans were clearly looking for a way to minimize the sticker shock of equipping and maintaining the Cypriot military, which was estimated at some £2,000,000 annually. In other words, the US was trying to find a way to redistribute the enormous financial demands for investment in the new Republic. The Americans were more than happy to pass on the request for military aid to Greece, Turkey, and the UK. Moreover, since all three were NATO members, the US could be confident that Cyprus would be guided in the right direction. Britain, however, was not keen to honor the request for military equipment, but promised to consider it and hoped that the US would do the same. 8

**An “Unimportant Matter”**

In October 1959, Belcher received a request from Makarios concerning the “unimportant matter” of the new Cypriot army. As he handed Belcher the letter containing the request for military aid, he portentously remarked, “this is [the] first time I have signed [a] request on [the] part of the new republic to be for assistance on any kind. It is [the] first but I know it won’t be the last.” 9

Washington expected any request for military assistance for Cyprus to come indirectly from Turkey and Greece. US officials wanted to avoid the military aid issue for a number of reasons, but mainly because they had yet to develop a cohesive policy in this regard. Makarios’ direct request, however, did raise a few “delicate questions:”

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7 Herter, Deptel London 2380, September 23, 1959: *ibid.*, 792; Embtel London 1221, September 3, 1959: SDCDF, doc. 747C.00/9-359, NARA.
(1) Was Makarios' request made with knowledge and approval Kuchuk [sic.] and other members of the Transitional Committee and does it therefore represent a coordinated Cypriot request?

(2) What is the relationship, if any, between Makarios' request and current talks of Cypriot-Greek-Turkish military committee in Athens?

(3) If none, are Greek and Turkish Govts privy this request?

These questions could not be put to the Archbishop directly for fear that it would undermine his competence to represent the “Cypriot Govt-to-be,” or suggest that he might be “playing Greek community politics.”

Two critical questions that the US would soon have to address, however, had yet to be raised: what US interest would be served by supplying military aid to Cyprus, and what was the prospect for Cyprus joining the NATO alliance?

**Military Assistance and the NATO Question**

Initially, the Cyprus and NATO issue would appear to have been settled through the Gentlemen’s Agreement concluded in February 1959, where Karamanlis and Menderes had agreed to support Cyprus’ entry into NATO. The agreement, however, was not binding to any third party without its explicit consent. Since it was merely an informal agreement between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, it did not bind Cyprus nor any of the Guarantors—nor did it settle the question for the US.

The conclusion of an NIE report dated October 6, 1959 was that “Cyprus will probably become a member of the UN and […] may remain in the Commonwealth, but will probably not join NATO.”

A briefing note for the Planning Board Meeting scheduled for the following week, however, took a different view—suggesting that it might be a more secure arrangement if

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10 Herter, Deptel Nicosia 150, October 28, 1959: *ibid.*, 801.
Cyprus became a member of NATO in its own right rather than trust in the agreements it had with Greece and Turkey. Accordingly, a section was inserted into the NSC report on US policy for Cyprus urging the US to “[s]upport the admission of Cyprus to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as soon as feasible following independence.” In this regard the briefing note questioned if it were sensible for the US under all conditions to make Greece and Turkey responsible for direct military assistance to Cyprus. This was an important development in that from this time forward, the issues of NATO and military assistance would be linked.

The offices of Budget and Treasury were the first to raise objections to NATO membership for Cyprus. The number crunchers worried over the escalating costs in military spending and an unrestricted policy of supplying arms to a small country such as Cyprus. The Defense Department had broader concerns, and worried that if the US gave military assistance to Cyprus, every “newly-emerging independent country” would be queuing up to get its share: “the US had to draw the line somewhere […] and Cyprus is the place where the line should be drawn.” This was the view of the majority of the Planning Board, including the JCS. The State Department and the OCDM (Office of Civil Defense Mobilization), however, argued that the US should be prepared to consider military assistance “if encouraging the Cypriots to look to Greece, Turkey, and the UK failed,” and it was concluded that military assistance was “absolutely essential” to

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14 Nicolet, ibid. 160.
achieve American objectives. The question was did those objectives also include NATO membership for Cyprus?

The Office of European Regional Affairs was among the first to sound the alarm about the wisdom of supporting the island’s entry into NATO. A memorandum dated November 3 cautioned that supporting Cyprus’ ascendency would undermine the effectiveness of the alliance and contribute nothing to the common defense. Rather than taking in “an inexperienced and indigent unknown quantity as a full member,” the memorandum stated, “it would be preferable to extend the NATO area to cover an independent Cyprus, somewhat as the Treaty was extended to cover Berlin.” The assessment that Cyprus would be a dead weight on the alliance from a military point of view is reflected in the JCS memorandum of November 6:

The decision as to whether direct military assistance should be provided to any nation by the United States should rest upon an estimate of its contribution to the military security of the United States […] The principal US military interests in Cyprus lie in the denial of Cyprus to USSR as a military base and, in the continued availability of British military as well as certain US facilities. The planned 2,000-man Cypriot armed force will contribute nothing to the preservation of these US interests. Further, the governments of Greece, Turkey, and the UK are obligated by the London Agreements of February 1959 to ensure the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. Thus it is concluded that there is no military justification for the provision of US direct military aid to Cyprus.

Furthermore, it was recommended that the already overextended MAP funds not be exploited to satisfy purely political objectives. This included replacing any Greek or Turkish MAP equipment that might be shifted to Cyprus. The divergent views of the State Department, representing the minority, and those of the majority of NSC members, could not be reconciled before the crucial decision as to whether direct military assistance should be provided to any nation by the United States should rest upon an estimate of its contribution to the military security of the United States […] The principal US military interests in Cyprus lie in the denial of Cyprus to USSR as a military base and, in the continued availability of British military as well as certain US facilities. The planned 2,000-man Cypriot armed force will contribute nothing to the preservation of these US interests. Further, the governments of Greece, Turkey, and the UK are obligated by the London Agreements of February 1959 to ensure the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. Thus it is concluded that there is no military justification for the provision of US direct military aid to Cyprus.

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meeting of December 1, 1959. President Eisenhower commented that he was unaware of any request from Makarios for military assistance. Upon learning that the initial request of 2½ million would only be the beginning, the President decided to delay any consideration of military assistance until he had an opportunity to consult with Dulles.21

Not surprisingly, the British Chiefs of Staff had formulated similar views about the same time as the JCS, but the British assessment was even harsher:

The proposed Cypriot Army and the Greek and Turkish contingents to be stationed in Cyprus are [...] too small [...] to be anything but an embarrassment to SACEUR if they were offered to NATO in an operational role, nor are they strategically required by him [...] The Chiefs of Staff, therefore feel most strongly from the military point of view, it would be a grave disadvantage to admit Cyprus to NATO. 22

Moreover, the question of Cyprus in connection to NATO raised security concerns because as a member, Cyprus could veto the military plans of the Alliance. The exclusive use of the United Kingdom’s bases on the island could also be in jeopardy. Finally, the Cypriot Government would have access to sensitive NATO documents. Given the strength of the Communist Party and its antipathy towards the Alliance, this could pose a security risk.23

Similarly, a brief submitted to the Cyprus Ministerial Committee in January argued that admission of Cyprus to NATO could give the Soviets the opportunity to exploit any disharmony that might erupt within the Alliance:

The only question referred for the consideration of [the] Ministers is whether Cyprus should become a member of NATO and whether a NATO headquarters might be established in the island. There are substantial military

21 The State Department and the OCDM represented the minority; while the majority consisted of the Defense Department, Treasury, Budget, and JCS: Marion Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary of NSC, “Memorandum of Discussion at the 426th Meeting of the NSC, “December 1, 1959: FRUS, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 805.
22 Annex to COS Committee Minute: “Republic of Cyprus—Admission to NATO,” January 6, 1960: DEFE 11/430, also quoted in Nicolet, ibid., 162.
23 Ibid.: Nicolet, ibid., 162; Mallinson, Cyprus: a Modern History, 90.
arguments against Cyprus becoming a member of NATO [...] If Cyprus became a member of NATO, any dispute that may arise between Cyprus and either Turkey or the United Kingdom could be represented by the Russians as dissension within the NATO alliance [...].

The debate within the NSC regarding direct military assistance to Cyprus was finally resolved in late January 1960, following Makarios’ sudden assurance that the US could retain communication facilities on the island. This development removed the main argument of the State Department that military aid might serve as a good bargaining chip when it came to US interests. The immediate response of the State Department was to draft a negative response to Makarios’ request for military assistance, pointing out that this was a matter for the Guarantor Powers and not the US. If the Archbishop had expected to be compensated for his decision he was in for a disappointment.

With that issue more or less resolved, two more questions still remained. First, how should the US handle any potential Greek and Turkish requests to replace their MAP equipment that they may intend to deliver to Cyprus? Eisenhower expressed concern with the idea of giving two US allies arms that might be used against a third ally. On this question it was decided not to make a decision, since the argument for keeping this option open still had some appeal. Rather than choose between the minority and majority views, Eisenhower instead decided to have a clause inserted into the new NSC paper stating, “any such request should be referred to the National Security Council for consideration in the light of the circumstances then existing.”

24 Brief submitted to the Cyprus Ministerial Committee, January 1960: Quoted here in Mallinson, ibid., 91.
Now all that remained was the question of NATO membership for Cyprus. Despite confirmation that Cyprus was not presently covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the final decision was made that the disadvantages for Cyprus’ admission to NATO far outweighed the advantages. Accordingly, the final version of the NSC Report on US Policy toward Cyprus stated that since Cyprus was “not likely, at least in the initial years of independence, to seek membership in NATO,” the US should “[t]ake no initiative to secure the admission of Cyprus to NATO but be prepared to consider such admission if the question is raised.”

The above evidence should be enough to finally put to rest one of the favorite themes of the conspiracy theorists namely, that the US forced independence on Cyprus with the intent of cultivating the island for inclusion in NATO. Unfortunately, old memes, like old habits, die hard and, in this instance, it might be easier to persuade the true believer to abandon his search for relics of the True Cross.

**Epilogue**

In May, 1960 Consul Belcher was forced to remind the State Department that the negative reply to Makarios’ request for military aid, which had been prepared in January, had never been dispatched. He had concluded that while the American Government was anxious to safeguard its interests in Cyprus, it wanted to do so on the cheap. In a scathing appraisal of the US Government’s performance thus far, Belcher stated that the “[p]olicy decision to persuade allies to shoulder the burden of necessary aid [is an] excellent one in many areas of the world,” it is

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29 This has long been an article of faith not only among conspiracy-minded writers such as O’Malley and Craig, but also a general belief among many Greek Cypriots: cf. *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, 68-86.
not, however, sufficient for Cyprus, since “we have vital interests in both monitoring and radio
relay facilities.”

The State Department was slow to take the hint. Only after a second reminder in July by the new
American Consul General L. Douglas Heck did officials finally give permission to advise
Makarios and Küçük of the State Department’s decision. Heck was also quick to remind officials
to be prepared to receive further requests for aid from the Archbishop. Not coincidentally, the
disappointing news came only after the final settlement in British-Cypriot negotiations on the
Treaties, including specifics relating to the acreage the UK would be allowed to retain for its
SBAs. The State Department was reluctant to jeopardize these negotiations by counseling the
Archbishop to look to the British for economic and military assistance.

In September 1960, the Soviet Ambassador to Athens visited Cyprus and promised aid in the
form of several shiploads of grain. To counter this offer, Fraser Wilkins, who had been called
on to replace Belcher, recommended a program that included plans for increased grain shipments
and economic aid, stepped-up American and cultural information programs, dispatching labor
organizers to strengthen non-communist labor unions (SEK), and a one-time military assistance
for the Cypriot army. The State Department responded by explaining that while it was aware
of the steady deterioration of non-communist trade unions, it believed no progress could be made
in reorganizing SEK as a counter to the PEO until Michael Pissas, the Secretary-General of the

30 Belcher, Contel Nicosia 458, May 3, 1960: SDCDF, doc. 747C.5-MSP/5-360, NARA.
32 Boggs, Memorandum of Discussion at the 434th Meeting of the NSC, February 4, 1960: ibid., 816.
33 Nicolet, ibid., 164.
35 Wilkins, Embtel Nicosia 248, November 18, 1960: SDCDF: 780A.00/11 – 1860, NARA.
trade union movement in Cyprus, was removed.36 Regarding the military aid request, Wilkins was again told that equipping the army was the responsibility of Greece and Turkey.

On the economic and political level, Wilkins was a little more successful. Concern over the Soviet shipment of grain had prompted the State Department to re-evaluate its position and, in November, a request by the Government of Cyprus for economic aid was finally approved. 37 Moreover, after noting the decline of communist influence in the trade unions, a decision was made that the US would train non-communist union leaders in the US while an American trade unionist would be brought to Cyprus.

1960 marked the end of the Eisenhower Administration. It had been a long eight years. In that time, Cyprus had morphed from a question to a dispute and finally to a resolution, albeit a tentative one. John F. Kennedy would not only inherit the legacy of the decisions made by the Eisenhower Administration vis à vis Cyprus, but also be forced to make a few of his own.

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Conclusions

Prior to the internalization of the Cyprus problem in 1954, the American position towards the conflict could best be described as ambivalent. Believing it had no dog in the fight, the US preferred to fall back on its traditional ideals of liberal democracy and anti-colonialism while disdaining Britain for its colonial stance. The first Greek appeal at the UN, however, drove home the realization that the Soviet Union now had a venue in which to engender disharmony among the Western allies by exploiting the Cyprus problem. Hence, internationalization changed everything.

While sympathetic to the Greek desire for self-determination for the island, the Americans were faced with trying to reconcile its principles with the realities of the Cold War and its traditional support for Britain which maintained that, due to its strategic importance, Cyprus could never be fully independent. Eventually the Americans got over their evasive stance and, gradually, political pragmatism came to dictate US policy towards the island.

While relations between the US and Britain were often stormy during the 1950s, due to the frequent ham-handedness of British diplomacy, undermining of American initiatives, and most importantly, the Suez crisis, the special relationship survived.

By the late 1950s, however, Prime Minister Macmillan, unlike his American counterpart, was not quite as obsessed with the security of NATO’s southeastern flank. Following the military excursion into Egypt, the British began a re-evaluation of the utility of military installations on the island and concluded that it would be more efficient to retain bases on Cyprus instead of
retaining the island as a whole. Moreover, Britain’s detonation of the hydrogen bomb in 1957 caused an upsurge in British military confidence which contributed to the downgrade of the strategic value of Cyprus. At this stage, Britain’s primary objective was to work to rid itself of the troublesome island but, in a manner that allowed it to save face while still keeping a military foothold there. It was also at this point that Britain began seriously contemplating partition as a viable way out of the Cyprus morass. The Middle East Crises of 1956 and 1958 enhanced the strategic importance of Turkey, causing Britain to minimize Greek fears and actively consider the Turkish preference for partition as a solution.

When it came to UN involvement and Cyprus, more often than not, the US found itself supporting, or at least not actively opposing, Britain’s attempts to prevent Greece from taking the issue to the international forum. When American self-interest was at stake, however, US officials had little difficulty in linking unrelated issues such as the question of Chinese representation to the Cyprus problem in order to gain British support.

Above all, the US feared the deterioration of NATO’s southern flank and communist exploitation of ally disunity. The Eisenhower Administration, which had always regarded the Cyprus problem through an East-West prism, tended to minimize regional and internal conflicts in an attempt to convince Greece, Turkey and, most importantly, the Cypriots themselves that their own desires and disagreements were secondary to the real threat of a disruption of the NATO alliance. It should be remembered, however, that it was not only the Western powers that had an interest in the island. Greece and Turkey also had a stake in resolving the Cyprus question and each hoped to gain maximum leverage over the other in the process.
The conclusion of the Zürich-London Agreements in 1959 came as a relief to both the US and Britain, but also presented new challenges. Although far from perfect, they seemed to satisfy all parties, at least in the short term. After years on the backburner of American foreign policy, Cyprus now would be cultivated for its value in the ongoing struggle for Soviet containment. No longer under the protection of Britain, the US now needed to mark out its own interests and deal with Cyprus, not as a colonial backwater, but as an independent state.

While the US believed that the Cyprus settlement was a move towards stimulating NATO harmony, it would prove to be only a temporary reprieve. Almost immediately, inter-communal tensions threatened to derail the fledgling Republic and reignite tensions between Turkey and Greece. Rather than ending the story, the creation of the Cyprus Republic would trigger a much stronger and more active US involvement than ever before, one which in 1960, no one within the US Government could ever had anticipated.
Appendix 1

NO. 5475. TREATY OF GUARANTEE. SIGNED AT NICOSIA ON 16 AUGUST 1960

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,
I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,
Have agreed as follows:

Article I
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

Article II
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

Article III
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.
Article IV
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

Article V
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have signed the present Treaty.
DONE at Nicosia this sixteenth day of August, 1960, in English and French, both texts being equally authoritative.

For the Republic of Cyprus:
Ο ΚΥΠΡΟΥ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ, (Archbishop Makarios) Fazil Küçük
For Greece:
G. CHRISTOPOULOS
For Turkey:
Vecdi Türel
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Sir Hugh Foot

www.kypros.org/Constitution/Treaty.htm
Appendix 2

CYPRUS: Statement of Policy

August 15, 1958

On June 19, 1958, the Prime Minister presented to Parliament a statement of the policy which Her Majesty's Government intends to pursue in regard to the Cyprus problem for a period of seven years. This policy was explained by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons in broad terms and its outline and main practical features were described in the Parliamentary Statement of Policy of June 19, 1958 (Command paper 455). As Parliament was informed, the policy has been the subject of friendly and confidential consultations and discussions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the last few days the Prime Minister has had the opportunity of personal meetings in Athens and Ankara with the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, which have enabled him to acquaint himself at first hand with the views of their respective governments.

After the most careful consideration of the views expressed to him by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, and, in the light of the advice tendered by the Governor of Cyprus regarding the situation in the island, Her Majesty's Government have decided to proceed to give effect to the policy as announced to Parliament in the following manner:

An Order in Council has already been approved authorising the preparation of electoral rolls in the island. This is expected to take two to three months. Meanwhile in accordance with the spirit of the decision whereby the communities are encouraged to order their own communal affairs, the Governor will where local circumstances make this desirable authorise the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipal councils. When the electoral rolls are complete it will be possible to hold elections for the two Houses of Representatives. The preparations for the elections should involve consultations between the Governor and leaders of the two communities. If, as Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope, violence ceases, this will make possible the return of those at present excluded from the island in order that they may play their part in these electoral processes and in consultations on the details of the system of representative government and communal autonomy set out in the statement of policy. As soon as the Houses of Representatives have been elected, they will be asked to elect their representatives to the Governor's Council, which will then become the authoritative body to deal with all matters not specifically devolved upon the Houses of Representatives or reserved to the Governor at his discretion.

With regard to the Representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments as proposed in the statement of policy, Her Majesty's Government feel on reflection that the representatives of other sovereign Powers could not suitably sit as members of the Council under the chairmanship of the Governor. It would be more correct to regard them as specially appointed representatives of their countries with direct access to the Governor and with such other facilities as they need to carry out their functions. Her Majesty's Government invited the Governments of Greece and Turkey to appoint their representatives accordingly with
effect from October 1. The establishment of this system of communal assemblies charged with certain specific functions, and of the Governor's Council charged with other more general duties does not exclude and should with general good will facilitate the development of some form of representative institution serving the interest of the island as a whole.

As regards the proposal for dual nationality, it does not appear that there is need for urgent action in this matter. Further enquiries have revealed that any special provision of this kind would require carefully devised legislation in view of the complexities of international law; it is, therefore, wiser to defer action pending the consideration of the legal and other aspects.

Finally, Her Majesty's Government appeal with confidence for support from all concerned for the two major concepts which underlie their policy. The first is a period of calm and the cessation of violence in the island. The second is the deferring for a period of seven years of any final solution without prejudice to the future or the views and aspirations of any parties concerned. At the same time such a period cannot be a period of stagnation. Her Majesty's Government feels that the form of growth and development which they propose is one suited to the needs of the moment, and in conformity with the two principles which appear to be generally accepted by all concerned.

www.kypros.org/Constitution/Treaty.htm
Appendix 3

To Paul I, King of the Hellenes

Dear King Paul:

I would like to tell you that I very much appreciated your letter of March 15, 1957. Your views on the Cyprus problem, especially with respect to Archbishop Makarios, were of great value to me and my associates at Bermuda and during the Conference I took the opportunity of urging that the Archbishop be released.²

It is encouraging to learn that the Archbishop has recently been offered the opportunity of leaving the Seychelles.³ His release presents a great opportunity and, as you stated in your letter, marks 'a definite step toward a possible solution of this thorny problem'. I sincerely hope that with your advice and encouragement the Greek Government will do everything possible to use this opportunity for the purpose of creating an atmosphere which will lead to constructive negotiations between the leaders of the Cypriot communities and the British authorities.

Further, I would urge you to consider the possibility that NATO could at the same time play a useful role in considering the international aspects of this question.⁴ If the domestic and international aspects of the problem could be more clearly separated, and if they are approached with courage and resourcefulness, I believe that this painful problem can gradually but certainly be solved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.⁵

Thank you again for your letter. Please accept the best wishes of myself and Mrs. Eisenhower and convey our greetings to Queen Frederika.

Sincerely
Appendix 4

Letter from US Secretary of State Dulles to Greek Prime Minister Papagos,
September 18, 1955

I have followed with concern the dangerous deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations caused by the Cyprus question. Regardless of the causes of the disagreement, which are complex and numerous, I believe that the unity of the North Atlantic community which is the basis of our common security, must be restored, without delay.

Since the time, almost a decade ago when Communist expansion first posed a serious threat to the free world, the close and friendly cooperation of Greek and Turkey has proved a powerful deterrent to Communist ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean. In Korea, Greek and Turkish troops fought valiantly, side by side, to repel the Communist aggressors.

I cannot believe that in the face of this common achievement, any problem will long disrupt the course of Greek-Turkish friendship. Nor can I believe that the unhappy events of the past two weeks will reverse policies of cooperation which were initiated twenty-five years ago under the far-sighted leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Atatürk.

Since 1947 the United States has made very considerable efforts to assist Greece and Turkey to maintain their freedom and to achieve greater social and economic progress. We have extended this assistance—and extend it now—because we believe that the partnership of Greece and Turkey constitutes a strong bulwark of the free world in a critical area.

If that bulwark should be materially weakened, the consequences would be grave indeed. I urge you therefore, to make every effort to assure that the effectiveness of your partnership is not impaired by present disagreements.

I am confident that the spirit of close cooperation that Greece and Turkey have so often demonstrated in the past as fellow members of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Balkan Alliance will enable you to transcend immediate differences in the interest of free world unity.

Reprinted from Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1955, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 167. The exact letter was written to both Papagos and Menderes which cause much consternation in Greece since the Greeks believed that Dulles failed to differentiate between victim and aggressor.
Appendix 5

Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden
July 31, 1956

DEAR ANTHONY: From the moment that Nasser announced nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, my thoughts have been constantly with you. Grave problems are placed before both our governments, although for each of us they naturally differ in type and character. Until this morning, I was happy to feel that we were approaching decisions as to the applicable procedures somewhat along parallel lines, even though they were, as would be expected, important differences as to detail. But early this morning I received the messages, communicated to me through Murphy from you and Harold Macmillan telling me on a most secret basis of your decision to employ force without delay or attempting any intermediate and less drastic steps.

We recognize the transcendent worth of the Canal to the free world and the possibility that eventually the use of force might become necessary in order to protect international rights. But we have been hopeful that through a Conference in which would be represented the signatories to the Convention of 1888, as well as other maritime nations, there would be brought about such pressures on the Egyptian government that the efficient operation of the Canal could be assured for the future.

For my part, I cannot over-emphasize the strength of my conviction that some such method must be attempted before action such as you contemplate should be undertaken. If unfortunately the situation can finally be resolved only by drastic means, there should be no grounds for belief anywhere that corrective measures were undertaken merely to protect national or individual investors, or the legal rights of a sovereign nation were ruthlessly flouted. A conference, at the very least, should have a great educational effect throughout the world. Public opinion here and, I am convinced, in most of the world, would be outraged should there be a failure to make such efforts. Moreover, initial military successes might be easy, but the eventual price might become far too heavy.

I have given you personal conviction, as well as that of my associates, as to the unwisdom even of contemplating the use of military force at this moment. Assuming, however, that the whole situation continued to deteriorate to the point where such action would seem the only recourse, there are certain political facts to remember. As you realize employment of the United States forces is possible only through positive action on the part of the Congress, which is now adjourned but can be reconvened on my call for special reasons. If those reasons should involve the issue of employing United States military strength abroad, there would have to be a showing that every peaceful means of resolving the difficulty had previously been exhausted. Without such a showing, there would be a reaction that could seriously affect our peoples’ feeling toward our Western Allies. I do not want to exaggerate, but I assure you that this could this could grow to such an intensity as to have the most far-reaching consequences.
I realize that the messages from both you and Harold stressed that the decision taken was already approved by the government and was firm and irrevocable. But I personally feel sure that the American reaction would be severe and that the great areas of the world would share that reaction. On the other hand, I believe we can marshal that opinion in support of a reasonable and conciliatory, but absolutely firm position. So I hope that you will consent to reviewing this matter once more in the broadest aspects. It is for this reason that I have asked Foster to leave this afternoon to meet with your people tomorrow in London.

I have given you here only a few highlights in the chain of reasoning that compels us to conclude that the step you contemplate should not be undertaken until every peaceful means of protecting the rights and the livelihood of great portions of the world had been thoroughly explored and exhausted. Should these means fail, and I think it is erroneous to assume in advance that they must fail, then world opinion would understand how earnestly all of us had attempted to be just, fair and considerate, but that we simply could not accept a situation that would in the long run prove disastrous to the prosperity and living standards of every nation whose economy depends directly or indirectly upon East-West shipping.

With warm personal regard—and with earnest assurances of my continuing respect and friendship,

As ever

D.E.
Appendix 6

Message from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower
March 31, 1957

Dear Friend: Thank you for your letter about Archbishop Makarios. As you say, this was a difficult decision for us and you will have seen that it was not taken without loss for the Government. I do not believe that the Archbishop has changed his views in the Seychelles; he is the Bourbon of Cyprus. But events in the island and in the world are surging past him. Harding has beaten terrorism militarily, and the world now recognizes that Cyprus is an international problem.

I am sure that your aid in persuading all concerned to face reality could be of decisive help. Of course my right-wing assume that we released the Archbishop at your request, so private pressure by you would be better than public statements.

Warm regards, as ever

Harold Macmillan
Appendix 7

Persons of Interest

John Mansfield Addis  Head of the Southern Department, British Foreign Office, late 50s.
Julian Amery  UK chief negotiator on the SBAs.
W. Park Armstrong, Jr.  Special Assistant to the US Secretary of State for Intelligence, 1950-1957.
Mehmet Baydur  Counselor, Turkish Embassy to the US, late 1950s.
Sir Winston Churchill  UK Prime Minister, 1940-1945; 1951-1955.
Thomas Edmund Dewey  Governor of New York, 1943-1954.
John Foster Dulles  US Secretary of State, 1953-1959.
Sir Anthony Eden  UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951-1955; Prime
Minister, 1955-1957.
C. Burke Elbrick  US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 1956-
1957; Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, 1957-1958.
Ferudin Cemal Erkin  Turkish Ambassador to the US, 1953-1955.
Sir Hugh Mackintosh Foot  Governor of Cyprus, 1957-1960.
Andrew B. Foster  Counselor, US Embassy in the UK, 1950s.
Haydar Görk  Turkish Ambassador to the US, 1955-1957.
James C. Hagerty  Press Secretary to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961
Christian Archibald Herter  US Under Secretary of State; OCB Chairman 1957-1959.
Julius C. Holmes  US Consul-General in Morocco, 1955-1956; Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State, 1956-1957.
Herbert C. Hoover, Jr.  US Undersecretary of State; Chairman OCB, 1954-1957.
Henry Hopkinson  British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, 1954-1959.
İsmet İnönü  Prime Minister of Turkey until 1965; President, 1938-1950.
Baron Hastings Lionel Ismay  Secretary-General of NATO, 1952-1957.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G. Lewis Jones</td>
<td>Staff member, US Embassy to the UK; 1950s; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, 1959-1961.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Ivone A. Kirkpatrick</td>
<td>UK Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until 1957.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Fazil K Küçük,</td>
<td>Founder of the newspaper <em>Halkin Sesi</em> (Voice of the People), 1942; Turkish Cypriot leader, 1959-1973; Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus, 1959-1963.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spyros Achilles Kyprianou</td>
<td>Cypriot Foreign Minister, 1960.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Bruce Laingen</td>
<td>Officer, GTI, US Department of State’s NEA, 1955-1959; Officer for Greek Affairs (State Department), 1959-1960.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexis S. Liatis</td>
<td>Greek Ambassador to the US, 1958-1962.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sir John Selwyn B. Lloyd</td>
<td>UK Minister of Supply until 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1956-1960.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.</td>
<td>US Permanent Representative to the UN, 1953-1960.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick B. Lyon</td>
<td>Minister-Counselor and Minister at the US Embassy in Turkey until April 1958.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Lyttleton</td>
<td>UK Secretary of State for the Colonies until 1954.</td>
</tr>
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Sir Roger Makins  UK Ambassador to the US 1952-1956.

Jack McFall  First Secretary of the Embassy and Consul, Greece, 1949; Assistant Secretary of State, 1949-52.

George Melas  Greek Ambassador to the US until 1958.

Adnan Menderes  Turkish Prime Minister, 1950-1960.


Sir Anthony Nutting  UK Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 1954-1956.


Alexandros Papagos  Greek Prime Minister 1952-1955.

Sir Charles Peake  UK Ambassador to Greece, 1951-1957.


George W. Perkins  US Permanent Representative to NAC, 1955-1957.

Cyril John (Lord) Radcliffe  UK Constitutional Commissioner, Cyprus, 1956.

Admiral Arthur M. Radford  Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953-1957.

John Reddaway  UK Administrative Secretary to the Governor of Cyprus, 1950s


Nicos Sampson  “Journalist” and notorious EOKA member; executioner of the “murder mile.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
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<tr>
<td>Duncan Sandys</td>
<td>UK Secretary of State for Defence, 1957-1959.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selim R. Sarper</td>
<td>Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1960-1962.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Henri Spaak</td>
<td>Secretary-General, NATO, 1957-1961.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephanos Stehabopoulos</td>
<td>Greek Foreign Minister, 1950s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Ronald Storrs</td>
<td>Governor of Cyprus, 1926-1932.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sophocles Venizelos</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Greece, 1944; 1950-1951.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurredin Vergin</td>
<td>Turkish Ambassador to Greece, 1950s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles D. Wiggin</td>
<td>First Secretary of the UK Embassy in the US, 1950s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraser Wilkins</td>
<td>First US Ambassador to the republic of Cyprus, 1960-1964.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murat W. Williams</td>
<td>Deputy Director of GTI, US Department of State’s NEA, 1956-1959.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Winster, (Reginald Fletcher)</td>
<td>Governor of Cyprus, 1946-1949.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalmers B. Wood</td>
<td>Director of GTI in charge of Greek Affairs at US Department of State’s NEA until 1957.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Hillary Young</td>
<td>Head of the Southern Department, Foreign Office, 1954-1957.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatin Rüştü Zorlu</td>
<td>Turkish Foreign Minister, 1957-1960.</td>
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  - NSC Series.
  - Press Conference Series.
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  - General File.
  - Papers of John Foster Dulles 1051-1959:
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