

**THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND CHALLENGES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN
DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT OF THE POST-1991
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE OF ETHIOPIA**

By

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DECLARATION

I, Zigiju Samuel Beyene, do hereby declare that this doctoral thesis entitled “The Contributions and Challenges of Civil Society in Development and Governance in Context of the Post-1991 Developmental State of Ethiopia” is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. In addition, I also declare that this work has not been submitted elsewhere for a similar or any other educational or non-educational award.

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Date: June 2023

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ABSTRACT

The primary objective of this study was to analyse the contributions and challenges of civil society in governance and development and state-civil society relations in context of the post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia. To achieve this objective a mixed method approach was used where data from qualitative sources were embedded into the quantitative sources and analysed. To understand the role of civil society and state-civil society relations in the post-1991 period of Ethiopia, three periods were considered (i.e., 1991 to 2004; 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date) due to the shift in the enabling environment of civil society over these periods. Factors such as external context and internal context were considered and analysed. The role of civil society in development and governance was analysed considering the three major operational areas of civil society (i.e., advocacy, services delivery, and watchdogging). State-civil society relation was also examined focusing on different parameters. The analysis was conducted by way of comparison based on the three periods using Friedman's Analysis of Variance. Both the external and internal contexts were found to be conducive and better during the first and third periods while it was not enabling during the second period. The role of civil society in service delivery was found to be similar and better in all the three periods, but in terms of advocacy and watchdogging it was better during the first and third periods while it was completely paralysed during the second period. Regarding state-civil society relations, the first period was characterised by cooperation between the state and civil society, but the relationship lacked the principles of engagement and formality. During the second period, the relationship was characterised by confrontation and even denial of rights-based civil society. The third period was characterised by cooperation and a smooth relationship. Finally, regarding the non-formal institution, i.e., *Iddir*, it has been an essential institution that not only plays a complementary role to formal civil society but also contributes to development and governance in its own right. However, *Iddir's* potential for contribution has been constrained by lack of attention and support from the government. Based on the findings of the study, recommendations are made to concerned actors including the government, the formal civil society organisations and the non-formal civil society - *Iddir*.

Keywords: Civil society, external context, internal context, advocacy, service delivery, watchdogging, *Iddir*, governance, development, Ethiopia, government, Addis Ababa

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAU	Addis Ababa University
ACORD	Agency for Cooperation Research in Development
ACSO	Agency for Civil Society Organisations
ADLI	Agriculture Development Led-Industrialisation
ADP	Amhara Democratic Party
AHA	Africa Humanitarian Action
AI	Amnesty International
AICS	Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo
ANDP	Afar National Democratic Party
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
APAP	Action Professional Alliance for People
AU	Africa Union
BGPDUF	Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front
BIGSAS	Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies
CCRDA	Consortium of Christian Relief and Development
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CELU	Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Union
CETU	Confederation of the Ethiopian Trade Union
CEU	Central European University
CHE	Center for Human Environments
CRDA	Christian Relief and Development Association
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil society organisations
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
CSSP	Civil Society Support Programme
CUD	Coalition for Unity and Democracy
DESTIN	Development Studies Institute
DFID	Department for International Development

DIDAC	Development and Interchurch Aid Commission
ECCSA	Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sector Associations
EEA	Ethiopian Employers' Association
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
EFFORT	Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray
EHRC	Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
EHRCO	Ethiopian Human Rights Council Organisation
ELA	Ethiopian Lawyers' Association
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESPDP	Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council
ETA	Ethiopian Teachers Association
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
EWLA	Ethiopian Women Lawyers' Association
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FFS	Forum for Social Studies
FGD	Focus group discussions
FSS	Forum for Social Studies
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GGA	Good Governance Africa
GNP	Gross National Product
GPDM	Gambella People Democratic Movement
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HPR	House of Peoples Representatives

HRCO	Human Rights Commission
IAG	Inter-African Group
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KII	Key informant interviews
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
METEC	Metals and Engineering Corporation
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
NEBE	National Election Board of Ethiopia
NGO	Non-governmental organisations
ODP	Oromo Democratic Party
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OSJE	Organisation for Social Justice in Ethiopia
PANE	Poverty Action Network of Ethiopia
PDC	Peace and Development Centre
PfR	Partners for Resilience
PP	Prosperity Party
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SDPR	Sustainable Development for Poverty Reduction
SEPDM	Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigray People Liberation Front
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNISA	University of South Africa

UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
US	United States
WB	World Bank
WPE	Workers Party of Ethiopia
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This study examines civil society's contribution and challenges in development and governance in the post-1991 developmental state of Ethiopia. To this end, the study intends to thoroughly analyze the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings and historical development of civil society. In addition, it intends to examine state-civil society relations and the key roles formal and non-formal civil society play in development, governance, and societal transformation processes in general and in Ethiopia in particular. Particularly in the case of Ethiopia, the study focuses on a historical analysis of the role and contribution of civil society in the development and governance of the country and how changes in policies have impacted civil society over time. Emphasis has been given to the discussion of state-civil society relations and the role of civil society in development and governance in the post-1991 period of contemporary Ethiopia.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO TOPIC AND RATIONALE

The study of civil society is central to the debate on development studies. Experiences across many developed and developing countries show that civil society has been and continues to be an essential actor in enhancing development and governance through advocacy, watchdogging and provision of goods and services in areas that government is unable to address. They do so by partnering and cooperating with the government, making the government accountable, advocating for the people, and dialoguing with the government on policy issues (Cooper 2018:9-10; Evans & Shields 2006; WEF 2013:9). The aforementioned functions are referred to as "manifest functions," which refer to the intended functions of civil society that are deliberately and purposefully designed to bring about positive social change. Civil society can also have latent functions, which refer to the unintended and unforeseen positive outcomes that emerge from its intervention. This could be manifested in terms of positively impacting citizen's attitude in taking interest to voluntarily engage in civic activities and giving attention to social

issues (Merton 1968b cited in Seibel 2015: 697; Cole 2020). The contribution of civil society in governance and development to address societal problems is determined by several factors, including the nature of the state, the ideological positions adopted by the government, the pertinent policies emerging from these ideologies, and how they shape the nature and the role of civil society. According to Desai (2014:808) and Dessalegn (2008:82), the contextual factors including the ideological traditions in which civil society operates, are central in defining the role that civil society plays in national development and governance because these factors ultimately determine the framework in which civil society operates. The contextual factors influence state-civil society relations and civil society's internal governance, operation, and capacity.

Civil society is an entity that encompasses a range of self-organised voluntary organisations, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), not-for-profit organisations, and local community-based organisations that work to ensure social transformation and development (Naidoo & Borren 2014:788; WEF 2013:5; Cooper 2018:4). As one of the development actors, civil society works with the public and private sector in the process of transforming society. Although each sector has its function and purpose for existence, the ultimate objective towards which they work is the same, i.e., securing societal transformation through the promotion of development and governance. As a critical actor, civil society must be firm to ensure good governance and development and a stable, well-ordered society. However, what is practically observed in most African countries is that the arena for civil society to play its role is shrinking (OECD 2020:11; Hossain et al 2019:9; CIVICUS 2017; WEF 2013:7). Ethiopia is no exception.

Civil society can be analysed through different ideological lenses, including the neoliberal ideological tradition on the one hand and the developmental state ideological tradition on the other. The developmental state ideological tradition refers to state-led macroeconomic planning where the state has the most power and control over the economy. According to Keane (2012:4), throughout the establishment of the neoliberal model, the popular, post-modern conceptualisation of civil society gained prominence.

In the neoliberal ideological tradition, it is largely believed that when more space and conducive environment is created for civil society to freely organise itself, civil society could play a significant role in the process of development, governance and democracy (Kaldor 2003; Tayler 2006:204; Yeshanew 2012:370).

Evidence in the literature (Gore 2000:800; Radice 2008:1155; Singh & Ovadia 2018:1049; World Bank 1993:367) reveals that there is a shift in development thinking and ideology. Scholars argue that the dominant western-oriented Washington Consensus model of development has been strongly challenged by the East Asian developmental state model. The developmental state ideology with its successful and extensive intervention of the state undermines liberal development thinking. However, it seems that the focus on government institutions in the late 1990s signalled the beginning of the shift.

A developmental state is usually defined and conceptualised from various perspectives including ideological orientation (i.e., bringing the agenda of developmentalism into focus) and its institutional settings (policy formulation and implementation capacity) (Edigheji 2010:4). The concept can be perceived as a state that has the required authority, credibility and legitimacy in terms of planning and designing development policies and programmes and enhancing human capabilities with the intention of promoting economic growth and transformation (United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNECA) 2011:7). Although there is no agreement on the features of a developmental state, some major characteristics have been posited: (a) a political leadership with development vision and commitment; (b) a public bureaucracy with adequate capacity and autonomy; (c) a production- and profit-oriented business sector; and (d) result-oriented policy interventions and governance mechanisms (Ayee 2013:265; Musamba 2010:21).

The concept of a developmental state emerged in East Asian countries. It is characterised by a political leadership having a developmental vision (Leftwich 2010:100; Fritz & Menocal 2007:534); bureaucratic capacity (Evans 1995:561; Leftwich 2010:100); a good relationship between state agencies and private sector organisations

(Johnson 1987; Beeson 2004:33); and effective policy intervention by the state to promote economic growth (Beeson 2004:30; Evans 1995:58). The ideology of the developmental state has been adopted by some African countries because of the inability of neoliberal policy prescriptions to secure the promised development. The Western development prescriptions and policy conditionality imposed on developing nations in the past were unable to address their social and economic challenges (Fine 2010:172; Leftwich 2010:98; Mkandawire & Soludo 2000; Musamba 2010:21) which eventually led several African countries to adopt and customise the East Asian developmental state model. According to UNECA (2013:2), the success of the East Asian developmental state model has become the reference point for African countries. The UNECA, in its 2011 Economic Report on Africa clearly stipulated that the developmental state is essential for promoting and ensuring economic growth and bringing about social transformation in Africa (Ayee 2013:265; UNECA 2011:106). Accordingly, several African states including South Africa, Mauritius, Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, Rwanda, Ghana and Ethiopia are pursuing the developmental state ideology by demonstrating some or most features of developmental states adapted from the East Asian developmental state model (Maphunye 2009:21; Nigerian Economic Society 2021:14).

Since diverse ideological traditions affect and treat civil society differently, the escalating diffusion of the developmental state ideology into African countries with its unique and distinctive features is arguably creating opportunities and imposing new challenges to civil society in shaping their nature and determining their roles. This deserves further investigation to expand our knowledge in the area. The role of civil society in development and governance has not gained sufficient attention from scholars in the area. Little is known about the opportunities created and challenges imposed and how civil society can effectively contribute to the context of the developmental state ideology and the pertinent political, legal and economic environments that emerge from it.

Thus, the nature of state-civil society relationships and the role that civil society plays in development and governance in the context of developmental state that is currently

followed by some African countries, including Ethiopia, deserves further investigation to get fresh insights and suggest ways in which civil societies can contribute better. Studies that have been conducted on civil society's contributions to development and governance are scarce. Hence, this study will further our understanding of the contribution of civil society in the context of developmental states by bringing evidence from Ethiopia into the existing body of knowledge.

1.3 BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDY AREA AND RESEARCH PROBLEM

Ethiopia is one of the East African countries and is considered as one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. It is the second most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa having approximately 115 million people. By the end of 2049, the population is estimated to exceed 200 million (World Population Review 2022). About 22% of the population lives in urban areas (Worldometer 2022) and around 5 million live in the capital city Addis Ababa (Macrotrends 2022). The country is bordered by Sudan in the north-west, South Sudan in the south-west, Eritrea in the north, Djibouti and Somalia in the east and Kenya in the south. It is home to over 70 ethnic groups with different cultures, languages and religions. The two major ethnic groups are Oromo and Amhara constituting 34.4% and 27% of the population respectively (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 2015).

Ethiopia is the oldest country in Africa which has never been colonised. The majority of its political history was monarchical followed by the military regime and the current democratic regime. After a series of power shifts throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Emperor Haile Selassie came to power in 1930 and ruled the country until 1974. This regime was referred to as the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie I. Overthrowing the imperial regime through popular revolution in 1974, the military regime, usually referred to as the "*Derg*", came to power and ruled the country from 1974-1991. The current regime, namely, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991. The EPRDF introduced the federal system of government where power is devolved to individual states so that they govern themselves. The federal system has three bodies of government (i.e., the legislative, the

executive and the judiciary), two houses (i.e., the House of Peoples Representatives and the House of Federation), nine regional states and two independent City Administrations: Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (Geda & Degefe 2005:5-8).

Having this system of government and institutional setting, the country aimed at becoming a middle-income country by 2025. In order to realise this objective, the government opted for the ideological tradition of the East Asian developmental state model and officially declared it in 1994. Operating in line with this ideological tradition, the country has been striving to make progress in development and good governance to improve the living standards of its people and change the negative image of the country by pulling the people out of poverty. Efforts have been made by the government to bring about changes in the country by formulating national policies and development strategies informed by the East Asian developmental state model to help the nation come out of deep-rooted poverty. Efforts have also been made to establish institutions to implement and guide the enforcement of policy provisions.

The government has generally recognised the contribution of civil society to the development of the country in its legal and policy documents. Hence, various types of civil society organisations (CSOs) are operating in the country to contribute their fair share to the development endeavours. These, according to Dessalegn (2008:90), include formal or registered and non-formal or unregistered organisations. The registered ones refer to CSOs recognised by the law that have legal personality, purpose, mission and a clear structure and hierarchy of decision-making. The unregistered and non-formal CSOs are traditional institutions formed by the community which civil society laws enacted in the past three decades do not recognise. These unregistered or non-formal associations are those that have not been registered by government agencies and have no clear structure.

1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Although Ethiopia has often been mentioned as one of the fastest growing economies in the world, registering a good record of double-digit economic growth and infrastructure

development (Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA) 2021:32; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2014:2; Ncube et al. 2010:1), the country has received criticism about human rights, associational freedom, good governance and the way civil society is being treated (Gebre et al. 2015: 20; Buyse 2018: 966; United States Department of State 2022; Freedom House 2023:33). Despite the engagement of CSOs in the development and governance process in Ethiopia, their contribution has been limited. Some of the factors responsible for this may be mistrust between the government and civil society, interference of government in the activities of CSOs, and financial and organisational capacity-related constraints (Giday 2011:21; Yeshanew 2012:372; Cooper 2018:19). Studies also reveal that CSOs in Ethiopia are constrained by common challenges related to political and regulatory issues, resource mobilisation, donor accessibility, poor networking capacity, and poor internal capacity including human, financial and physical capital, to mention but a few (Gebre et al. 2015:21; Ariti, Vliet & Verburg 2018:294; Broeckhoven et al 2021:53, 66). The reality on the ground in Ethiopia shows that there is a weak civil society as the ideological, political, legal and economic landscape for independent social action outside the control of state is progressively narrowed down and as the broader policy environment does not favour the development of a thriving civil society. The narrowing down of civil society's space in Ethiopia since 1991, however, has not been constant. It has changed with the changing political and policy orientation of the government. In some instances, the government tended to make the civil society environment enabling and, in other instances, it tended to restrict civil society activities. In order to capture these variations, this study focuses on three different periods (i.e., 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date) that are considered to be important to show the variations in state-civil society relations and the contribution of civil society to development and governance of the country since 1991.

According to the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, civil society has been provided with the right of freedom of association and participation in various social, economic and political affairs. As a result of this constitutional provision, a proliferation of CSOs was witnessed during the early ages of the EPRDF. Because of the leverage gained from the constitution, civil society began to impose some demands

on the government, at least until the 2005 election, which ultimately created tensions between the government and civil society. In the 2005 competitive election, the ruling party lost many seats in parliament for which it accused civil society. The ruling party blamed civil society pointing out that civil society was favouring and working with the opposition political parties with the intention of defeating the ruling political party. This perception led the government to make an aggressive move against civil society soon after the 2005 election. This situation eventually resulted in the promulgation of the restrictive Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 that limited the roles, functional capacity and space of formally registered CSOs (Giday 2011:22; Pellerin 2018:28; Yeshanew 2012:372). Following the reform and political change that took place in the country in 2018, this restrictive law of civil society was nullified in 2019 and replaced by the Civil Societies Proclamation No. 1113/2019, which, as opposed to the previous proclamation, has apparently provided an enabling environment by lifting all the restrictions imposed on CSOs.

If sustainable development and effective governance have to be ensured in Ethiopia, civil society must be an effective player. Civil society contributes to development and governance by building institutions, encouraging alliances and partnerships, enforcing accountability, exposing acts of corruption, advancing human and democratic rights, and speaking up for the voiceless (Hossain et al 2019:10). Civil society also aids in humanitarian and development efforts, impacts public policy through advocacy and dialogue, and supports and defends democratisation and human rights. They are crucial to achieving the service delivery and poverty alleviation agendas because of their capacity to reach those most affected by poverty, inequality, and vulnerability. CSOs are crucial to development as independent and autonomous players and partners in the development and governance processes (OECD 2020:11; Hossain et al 2019:9).

All the abovementioned interventions are possible only when civil society operates in an enabling environment. To this end, the overall political and legal contexts need to facilitate a meaningful engagement of civil society in the policy-making and implementation processes through policy dialogue. Political decision-makers need to

acknowledge that civil society is one of the most critical agents in the governance and development process. In addition, the country's legal framework should play a positive role in recognising civil society and encouraging it to contribute to the development and governance of the country. The laws need to provide the freedom for civil society to choose operational areas or areas of intervention. The law should also provide civil society the freedom to generate financial resources from abroad and local sources without restriction, as long as the resources are used to positively affect citizens' lives.

Contrary to the above-mentioned ideally expected situations, the experience of civil society in Ethiopia's development and governance process has been characterised by challenges and constraints. In most cases, civil society organisations in Ethiopia have operated in a suppressive and less enabling environment. The political environment has not been welcoming for civil society organizations. Instead of considering civil society organizations as essential development actors that play roles in addressing various demands of society by filling the gaps the government fails to fill, the government often sees civil society as a threat. It blames civil society for engaging in political agenda and working against the government's political interests. From a legal point of view, the government devised a legal framework that was very restrictive from all perspectives. The law was not enabling because it denied the right and freedom of civil society to engage in activities or operational areas of their choice. Notably, it discouraged civil society's engagement in advocacy and politically sensitive areas of operation. The law strictly limited the right of civil society to access financial resources, particularly from foreign sources. However, the extent of these limitations has some variations across the three different periods identified for this study.

Therefore, the researcher is instigated to pick the topic to address the issues mentioned above because if civil society should contribute to the country's development, understanding the extent and nature of the potential challenges imposed on it through political and legal constraints is essential. It is also vital to examine and understand why the government has generally failed to create an enabling environment for civil society

in terms of the political and legal environment and why the government's approach has been mainly characterised by suppression.

In addition, it is important to understand how the variation in legal and other contextual factors during the three different periods identified for the study determines the nature of state-civil society relations as well as the contributions of civil society in the development and governance of the country. The researcher believes that these different times reflect varied contextual factors that determine civil society's role and the nature of state-civil society. To this end, the study takes the time element indicated above as an important focus of analysis while trying to understand the contributions of civil society in development and governance and state-civil society relations.

In order to understand the contributions of civil society in development and governance and the state-civil society relations, a range of studies (e.g., Bekalu & Wassihun 2021; Berhanu & Milofsky 2011; Broeckhoven, Gidey, Kelemework Tafere, Townsend & Verschuuren 2021; Dessalegn 2010; Dunia 2020; Dupuy, Ron & Prahash 2014; Gebre 2016; Hiwot & Steen 2019; Hyden & Mahlet 2003; Jalale & Wolff 2019; Roberts 2019; Sisay 2000; Sisay 2012) have been conducted. However, they failed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the contextual factors (as most of them focused on legal context alone) and how these factors determine the contributions of civil society. In addition, in terms of analysing the contributions of civil society in development and governance, these studies focused on limited parameters and failed to holistically capture the major areas of civil society's interventions including advocacy, service delivery and watchdogging in their studies. Furthermore, almost all of the existing studies failed to analyse the role of civil society in development and governance taking into account the time element in their analysis except for Roberts (2019) who tried to conduct the analysis taking the time element into account. However, the time span he considered was only from 1991 to 2018.

Roberts also did not adequately capture the external and internal factors that not only constrain but also determine the contributions of civil society in his analysis. It is unlikely to get a full understanding of the contributions and challenges of civil society in

development and governance without having a clear understanding of how external and internal factors affect and shape civil society. In the interest of filling this gap, this thesis pays attention to the analysis of external and internal factors that affect civil society in Ethiopia. The external contextual factors that this study considers are the factors that are external to civil society organisations and that have the potential to affect civil society and its relationship with the state. These factors include the political ideology adopted by the government, the legal framework put in place to regulate the behaviour and actions of civil society, and the economic context of the country where civil society operates (Antlov, Brinkerhoff, & Rapp 2010:422; CIVICUS 2013:10; Fioramonti & Kononykhina 2015:472). The internal factors considered in this case are those internal to civil society organisations pertinent to internal governance and capital, including human, financial, and physical capital (Antlov, Brinkerhoff, & Rapp 2010:426). These external and internal factors are critical in determining civil society's potential to achieve its objectives of making positive social change by expanding its outreach and reaching the community.

Roberts, in his analysis, also failed to apply statistical tools to make objective comparisons of the role of civil society and state-civil society relations in the three periods he classified (i.e., 1991–2005, 2005–2010, and 2010–2018).

In addition, in relation to state-civil society relations some researchers (e.g., Bekalu & Wassihun 2021; Hiwot & Steen 2019; Pellerin 2018) studied state-civil society relations. However, their analysis failed not only to show the time element but also did not address important parameters of state-civil society relations such as attitudinal factors, independence of civil society, extent of government's fairness of treatment, or the role of the agency of CSOs. To this end, this study fills the research gaps by addressing the parameters of state-civil society relations that have not been addressed by other researchers.

This study, therefore, took a different approach to understand the role of civil society in development and governance and state-civil society relations by putting the time element into context. In addition, it attempts to comprehensively address the external

and internal contextual factors that have not been comprehensively addressed by other researchers and analyse how these factors determine the contributions of civil society and their relations with the state. This helps to fill the research gaps and supplement the scant knowledge as it adds some perspectives based on the Ethiopia's case.

In addition, because the developmental state approach adopted in Ethiopia is captured in the analysis under the heading of the external context of civil society, the study provides some perspectives on how the developmental state orientation exercised in Ethiopia determines the role of civil society in development and governance and state-civil society relations. This provides an interesting perspective in terms of adding to the limited knowledge on how CSOs are being treated in developmental states. It is clear that the role of civil society in the context of the neoliberal ideological tradition has been explored and well-documented. On the contrary, our knowledge regarding the role of civil society in the context of the developmental state ideological tradition is limited. Hence, the analysis is anticipated to add some perspectives to the scant knowledge in this regard too.

In addition to the formally recognised and registered CSOs, this study considers the unregistered CSOs, which fall out of the scope of the application of the previous and the existing civil society proclamations. The non-formal or traditional institutions need to be included because they play a significant and relevant role in development and governance (WEF 2013: 6 & 11; Cooper 2018; Nweke 2012). These organisations are usually referred to as traditional associations and, particularly in urban areas, they are organised to pursue members' common economic, social and religious purposes. In this regard, *Mahibers* and *Senbetes* are examples of faith-based traditional associations; *Equb* are saving associations and can be considered as examples of economic associations, and *Iddir*, usually called a burial society, is organised for social purposes (Dessalegn 2008:85,90). Of all the unregistered associations, *Iddir* is a very popular form of a non-formal traditional association mostly in urban areas organised for the purpose of burial activities and to deal with other social purposes. These traditional organisations are not required to be registered with the government because, first, they

do not have clear formal structure; and second, their focus of attention is aiding and supporting each other and promoting existing cultural norms. They are, therefore, considered as posing no significant threats to the existing political and governance structure (Dessaiegn 2008:85). These unregistered organisations function based on traditional solidarity having no formal or uniform organisational structure or hard-and-fast rules. They emerge from within the community and play a crucial role in bringing people together and creating strong social bonds among the people to support each other (Teshome, Dutu, Teshager & Zeleke 2015). The challenge, however, lies in the fact that they have been largely overlooked by the government and other concerned bodies, assuming that they are fragile and unable to shoulder responsibilities such as development, relief, rights and advocacy that are commonly undertaken by the registered, formal CSOs. Thus, they remain on the periphery of civil society and are regarded as insignificant. In addition, studies conducted on civil society's contributions have focused mainly on the registered CSOs, disregarding the contributions of non-formal or unregistered organisations. Research focusing on the registered CSOs alone could not give a complete understanding of civil society's role in the process of development and governance.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In light of the above discussion, the following primary research question is posed:

- What are the contributions and challenges of civil society in governance and development and state-civil society relations in the context of post-1991 Ethiopia?

Specific Research Questions:

- 1 How do the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of civil society impact state-civil society relations in Ethiopia?
- 2 How and why do civil society's external and internal contextual factors influence the contributions of civil society in post-1991 Ethiopia?

- 3 Does civil society play a role in and contribute to the development and governance of Ethiopia and how do changes in policies impact on civil society?
- 4 What is the nature of state-civil society relations in the context of post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia in terms of the time periods of 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date?
- 5 How can state-civil society relations in Ethiopia be strengthened to contribute to the development and governance of Ethiopia?

Research Hypotheses:

- The contextual factors (i.e., ideological, political, legal, and economic) affect the contribution and operation of civil society differently across the three periods identified for the study.
- The contributions of civil society in advocacy, service delivery, and watchdogging vary significantly across the three periods identified for the study.
- There is statistically significant variation in the state-civil society relationship across the three periods identified for the study.

In light of the above, this study aims at analysing state-civil society relations and the challenges of civil society in development and governance of Ethiopia in the post-1991 period. The analysis was conducted based on the comparison of three different periods (i.e., 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date) as mentioned above. The study also aims at suggesting ways that help civil society to discharge its roles in the contemporary development framework of the country. In the course of analysing the role of civil society in development and governance and the nature of state-civil society relations, the study focuses on investigating how changes in orientations of the government overtime have led to change in contextual factors such as legal and political factors which ultimately determine the nature of state-civil society and civil society's role in development and governance of the country. Although the main purpose of the study is to examine the contributions and challenges as well as state-civil society in the post-1991 Ethiopia, it reviews the historical developments in the role of civil society during the monarchical and the military regimes. To this end, the analysis of changes in

government's orientations across the three regimes and how such changes determined the role of civil society are briefly addressed. In addition to analysing the contributions and challenges of civil society based on Ethiopia's case, the study also provides an analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of civil society and the generic theoretical base that determine state-civil society relations as well as the role of CSOs in development and governance.

1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Against the above explanation, the following primary and secondary objectives are formulated:

Primary Objective:

- The primary objective of this study is to analyse the contributions and challenges of civil society in governance and development and state-civil society relations in the context of post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia.

Secondary Objectives:

- To provide a thorough analysis of the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of civil society as well as the state-civil society relations in Ethiopia.
- To investigate the influence of external and internal contextual factors on the contributions of civil society.
- To analyse the role and contributions of civil society in development and governance of Ethiopia and how changes in policies impacted civil society.
- To examine the nature of state-civil society relations in the context of post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia in terms of the time periods of 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date.
- To suggest guidelines for better state-civil society relations and effective contribution of civil society to the development and governance of Ethiopia.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Effective governance and development require engagement of all concerned actors and stakeholders including the state, the private sector and the civil society sector even though the extent of their involvement depends on the nature and type of the regime. Since this study attempts to examine the role of civil society as one of the critical development actors in the development and governance of Ethiopia, it has some significance to civil society. Civil society is an entity which is working to meet societal demand by intervening in and curbing the problems of the society. To meet this objective, civil society needs to understand the nature of the context in which it operates and the opportunities available in the context. In addition, it needs to analyse and improve its own internal context and work in harmony with other development actors including the state and the private sector. In this regard, this study helps civil society not only to have a better understanding of their context and exploit the opportunities in the context but also to understand and improve the status of their relationship with other actors and optimise their opportunities.

The study is equally important for the government as it provides important information about civil society. It helps the government to understand the weaknesses and strengths in its relationship with civil society and revisit the existing policies where it is required to do so. Generally, the outcome of the study gives a good indication to the government of Ethiopia and civil society in Ethiopia of opportunities and challenges, weaknesses and strengths in order to create better relationships and arrive at better results.

From the research significance point of view, the study contributes in terms of filling the research gaps through exploring the contributions of civil society in development and governance and state-civil society relations at three different time periods (i.e., period 1 from 1991 to 2005, period 2 from 2005 to 2017 and period 3, from 2018 to date) based on Ethiopia's case. See also section 2.9 on the review of empirical studies and research gaps identified.

1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Different types of CSOs including international and local ones are operating in different areas of specialisation and at different echelons or levels in Ethiopia. Some are working at federal level, others at regional levels and others at local Kebele (local administrative unit) level. This study considers CSOs that are involved in various activities at federal level in Ethiopia and does not take into account CSOs located in various regions and localities in the country. The population of the study comprises all CSOs operating at federal level whose head offices are located in Addis Ababa. The number of such CSOs, according to the Ethiopian Agency for CSOs, is about 2084. Of these, 25 civil society organisations were selected purposively for this particular study. The selection criteria include consistency or uninterrupted operation since 1990s, organisational capacity (in terms of accessibility and coverage, financial capacity and human capital), the extent of interaction with government, areas of intervention or type of activities in which they are involved, and the extent of their influence in their areas of intervention.

The researcher believes that the research agenda raised in this study can be addressed by gathering information from civil society located at federal level. Time and resources are always against researchers and extending the study to regions and local levels in the country would demand much time and money. As a self-sponsored researcher for this particular project, the researcher was constrained by these two factors.

Methodological limitations also impacted the study because the respondents were required to answer some questions that could require them to recall past information about the status of civil society. This situation may have caused the problem of recall bias – the biasness that result from inability of respondents to properly recall past information. The researcher attempted to solve the above limitations through various mechanisms. First, to eliminate the limitations related to resources, the researcher looked for various sources of financial support. To reduce the problem that could affect the quality of the research due to the reliance on respondents' past memories, relevant information from secondary sources was obtained and triangulated.

1.9 OUTLINE OF THESIS AND CHAPTER CONTENTS

This thesis consists of seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the purpose of the study and it presents the background to the study and rationale, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, scope and limitations of the study, significance of the study and the outline of the chapters.

The second chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical background underpinning the notion of civil society. It attempts to address the conceptual development of civil society aligned with the historical development of the concept. To this end, such issues as the emergence of the concept of civil society as well as the meaning of civil society as a space between the state, market and family versus a self-standing separate entity are presented. In addition, the chapter presents important concepts relevant to the study including forms of civil society, formal versus non-formal civil society, and civil and uncivil society that deserve discussions in relation to the concept of civil society. Finally, the theoretical underpinnings that are critical to the understanding of civil society are presented focusing on two schools of thought, namely, the liberal school and the left-wing perception. The chapter also addresses the notion of development focusing on two essential issues: the concept of development and background of development theories. Following the conceptual discussions of development, theories of development are presented under three main headings, namely, market-oriented theories, the people-centred approach or alternative development approach; and the state-centred approach with the main emphasis on developmental state model. Before concluding the chapter, the concepts and some theoretical bases of governance are also discussed.

Chapter 3 is devoted to a literature-based analysis of the role of civil society in governance and development. The role of civil society in development and governance is discussed under the heading of agents for development. To this end, the role that civil society plays in terms of policy advocacy, service delivery, poverty alleviation, watchdogging, democracy and democratisation, conflict management and peace-building, and promotion of social capital are addressed. In addition, the chapter

discusses the challenges that civil society faces in the course of its contribution to development and governance and the mechanisms for overcoming the challenges.

Chapter 4 presents the role that civil society plays in societal transformation and development of Ethiopia over the last several decades. It deals with the analysis of the roles of civil society and the nature of state-civil society relations during the three regimes, namely the imperial, the military and the post-1991 EPRDF regimes by taking into account the historical and contextual perspectives. The chapter attempts to give the general overview of the nature of the three regimes followed by the discussion of civil society's role in development and governance endeavour of the country during the three regimes.

Chapter 5 is dedicated to the discussion of research philosophy, procedure, techniques and methods. To this end, it addresses the research approach and strategies, research design, sampling design including the target population, sample size and sampling techniques, data type and sources, and methods used to collect and analyse data. It also gives some highlights about ethical considerations.

Chapter 6 presents the analysis of the data collected from primary and secondary sources. The analysis of this chapter consists of two sections. The first section of the chapter focuses on the overview of civil society – past trends and current status which is analysed mainly based on secondary data. The second section deals with state-civil society relations in post-1991 Ethiopia which is analysed based on primary data including questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs).

Chapter 7 presents the external and internal contextual factors of civil society organisations in the context of post-1991 Ethiopia. To this end, the chapter consists of two major sections. The first section is the external contextual factors including ideological, political, legal and economic contexts which are analysed based on secondary and primary data. The second section of the chapter deals with the internal context of civil society mainly focusing on human, financial and social capital of civil society in the post-1991 period.

Chapter 8 addresses the role of civil society in development and governance in post-1991 Ethiopia. The role of civil society in development and governance is analysed by taking into account advocacy, service delivery and watchdogging which are considered as the three major areas of civil society intervention. The analysis in this chapter depends on primary data obtained from questionnaires, interviews, FGDs and document review as required.

Finally, chapter 9 winds up the thesis by presenting the conclusion, recommendations and areas for future research. As to the conclusion section, the researcher attempts to go beyond the normative way of providing concluding remarks and judgements based on the findings. To this end, the theoretical underpinnings that are already established in the preceding chapters are revisited and used as a litmus test to reflect on the findings that have come out of the study.

1.10 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

- *Region* – national states that together forms the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
- *Sub-city* – “Sub-City” means a second administrative stratum of the City.
- *Woreda* – an administrative unit in Ethiopia equivalent to a district.
- *Kebele* – the lowest administrative unit equivalent to villages in Ethiopia.
- *Iddir* – multi-purpose, community-based, non-formal association mainly meant for burial and mourning of the dead.
- *Equb* – non-formal association in which local people contribute money weekly that can be used by all contributors turn-by-turn.
- *Khat* – A cash crop, stimulant leaf chewed commonly in parts of the lowlands of Ethiopia.
- *Mahiber* – refers to a traditional self-help association of people organised with common goals and social responsibilities in Ethiopia.
- *Derg* – A military group that toppled the government of His Majesty Haile Selassie I.

- *Yehger Shemaglewoch* – refers to an elders’ council which is in charge of dealing with various social matters in the community.
- *Debo* or *Wonfel* – refers to a system through which farmers helped each other particularly in farming activities.
- *Jigge* or *Jiga* – refers to the humanitarian support in the form of financial or non-financial ways to help people who face different social and economic difficulties.
- *Afersata* or *Awuchachign* is also another indigenous and traditional institutions used by the people in local areas.
- *Senbete* – is practiced by the followers of Orthodox Church on Sunday morning commonly in the compound of the Church.
- *Ezen* – is related to the Muslim Mosque member’s funeral services.

1.11 SUMMARY

In this chapter, the background and the problem under the study was addressed to provide information on the context in which the topic was studied. In addition, the definition of the problem and the rationale of the study were described in the form of a problem statement, objectives and research questions. Considering the holistic role and importance of civil society in democratisation, governance and development, the significance of the study cannot be over-emphasised. Focusing on both formal and non-formal types of civil society, this research intends to analyse the role of civil society in governance and development. The analysis of the concepts and theories underlying civil society follows in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES UNDERLYING CIVIL SOCIETY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses three main concepts, namely, civil society, development, and governance. These three issues are addressed from a conceptual and theoretical point of view in this chapter. The concept of civil society is discussed focusing on two essential issues: the basic concepts and definitions of civil society and other pertinent issues such as the emergence of civil society, forms of civil society, civil and uncivil society, and formal and non-formal civil society are discussed; the theoretical underpinnings of civil society where the major theoretical lenses used in this study to analyse and understand civil society are addressed. To this end, the two dominant schools of thought namely, the liberal school and the left-wing or communitarian school of thought are presented. In addition, two other theoretical issues, i.e., the structure and agency, and state-society relations are briefly discussed. The notion of development is presented in this chapter focusing on two essential issues: the concept of development and background of development theories. Following the conceptual discussions of development, the theories of development are presented under three main headings, namely: market-oriented theories, the people-centred approach or alternative the development approach; and state-centred approach with main emphasis on developmental state model. Before concluding the chapter, the concepts and some theoretical bases of governance are also discussed.

2.2 CONCEPTS AND EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

2.2.1 Emergence of Civil Society

The term civil society and the idea behind the concept is not new as it traces back to the time of the ancient Greek philosophers. The evolution of civil society can be described in five different eras, namely, the antiquity or classical era, the middle ages, the pre-modern era or the era of enlightenment, the modern era and the post-modern era. The

antiquity or classical period is the time when the renowned ancient Greek political philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle touched upon and expressed the concept of civil society through their opinions on state and social institutions. The concept of civil society originated from the communal life in the Greek city known as *polis*. Socrates, one of the Greek philosophers, used the term “dialectic” 2000 years ago which refers to the use of public argument and rational dialogue to reveal realities and truth as a means towards civility and better life of the people (Fadakinte 2015:133; Laine 2014:60; O’Brien 1999).

According to Socrates, when disagreements and conflicts are addressed through dialogue and debate and when there is a fair representation of opposing ideas, all parties would yield the disclosure of realities, truth, civility and a good life of society. In the eyes of Socrates, conflict resolution and societal transformation and balanced development can be ensured so long as logical reasoning and supremacy of ideas are the governing principles (Edwards 2014; Menon & Jerome 2017:34; Kastrati 2016:4; O’Brien 1999). According to Socrates, such public arguments are essential to create the right balance between the need for individual and societal arguments (Cuong 2008: 27-28; Mclean, 1997; Setianto 2007: 110).

While writing about the ideal state, Plato also argued that state is nothing but a society that exercises civil virtues and committed itself to common goods (Ehrenberg 1999:5–6; Menon & Jerome 2017: 34; Kastrati 2016:64; O’Brien 1999). According to Plato, when society is characterised by justice, the commitment of citizens to common purposes, values and goods is maximised; citizens act morally, behave rightfully, and do things professionally. A society having citizens of such characteristics should be ruled by “the enlightened one” who decides on public issues based on common goods (O’Brien, 1999:1).

Aristotle used the term *koinonía politiké* which refers to political association. This political association according to Aristotle is an independent and coercion-free association where individuals having common interests unify themselves to govern their relations based on accepted ethical principles, values and norms. In such associations,

he argues, equality and freedom are exercised (Laine 2014:60; Sulek 2010:7). The concept of *koinonía politiké* stands for all associations that are tied to each other by shared goals irrespective of their type and size (Cohen & Arato 1992:84). Although every association is known to have an end, the political association is different in that it gives more attention to gearing the collective interest towards creating a good society. It helps citizens to exercise their rights and freedom by optimally utilising information and the knowledge in the society (Beauclerk 2011:877).

Although in today's context, the concept political association stands for either a state or opposition political parties, for Aristotle it shows people coming together not simply to promote political purposes, but to undertake good actions and ensure self-sufficiency (Barker 1946 cited in Laine 2014:60). Aristotle's argument is based on the idea that social life that is formed due to social ties is a necessary condition as it leads to cooperation that helps to optimally use potential. He says this cooperation helps them to optimise their abilities to communicate, to judge what is wrong and right, what is just and unjust (ibid:7). For him, this is possible through the engagement of the people in the communal life in the *polis* – the civil society.

Aristotle is credited for introducing the idea of civil society as the concept of civil society gradually evolved from his conception of *koinonía politiké* through translations into Latin as *societas civilis* and then English as civil society (DeWiel 1997:8; Laine 2014: 61; Van Dijck, Munck & Terpstra 2017:5). It is not to say though that the earlier usage and translation of the term *koinonía politiké*, which emphasises on the politically united community and active participation in political life, remained unchallenged. "The first translations of the concept into Latin, inspired by Christian thought, worked with variations of *communio* and *communicatio* for the noun and proposed *politica*, retaining the Greek term, or *civilis* as the adjective" (Wagner 2010:210). It was Leonardo Bruni, a Florentine humanist, who challenged the earlier translation by using the full term known as *societas civilis* for the first time which was vastly circulated in the discussion of European Academia (Browers 2006:52-53; Hallberg & Wittrock 2006:30; Wagner 2010:210; Van Dijck, Munck & Terpstra 2017:5). In the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin

used the term civil society to describe state as civil society that can exist without association, such as family (Bodin 1576 cited in Bobbio 1988:35).

The middle era is the time when various scholars and philosophers particularly in religious circles focused on the analysis of the feudalistic nature of the then states. According to Guthrie and Quinlan (2007:11-15), the discussion was dominated by the issue of just war, the concept which generally focuses on the moral justifiability of war. The discussion of civil society, especially in its classical sense of the political philosophers of the classical period, literally vanished during this era.

In the middle ages, some religiously affiliated discussions and arguments emerged with the intention of challenging the typically feudalistic political arrangement of the then states which also believed to have some contribution to the concept of civil society (DeWiel 1997:6; Edwards 2011:17). Saint Augustine is one of the contributors who strongly believed and reflected his thinking through his work entitled "*City of God*" in which he argued that reason oriented societal belief in natural law must be subordinated to faith in God which established a ground for law and order for the feudalistic states of the then time (Edwards 2011:17-18; Worley 2011:66). In an attempt to maintain a balance between these two demanding situations of believing in reason versus faith in God, Tomas Aquinas argued that rationality in human beings can be ensured through studying the natural law that relies on reasoning but would not be complete if it is not guided by the Devine law which, according to him, gives moral values (DeWiel 1997:10; Vieru 2010:118-120; Worley 2011:73).

Standing against the Roman Catholic Church due to their perception that the Church was characterised by rampant corruption and abuse of resources, Protestantism was started. The Protestant Church was established to march against the Catholic Church and put pressure on the state and the church that an individual should be given freedom to choose any religion they preferred rather than imposing it. This effort of putting pressure on the state was considered as one of the essential contributions to the emergence and evolution of civil society (Worley 2011:128).

The Aristotelian and the medieval conception of society remained unchallenged until the pre-modern period which is said to be the era of reasoning and enlightenment. At the end of the medieval age, a move towards secular thinking was started with more orientation towards the concept of civil society (Edwards 2011:18).

During this period of reasoning and enlightenment, the ideas of prominent thinkers of Scottish enlightenment such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, David Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith were dominant. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke considered civil society as an arena where civil virtues and rights emerge and are exercised. They emphasised that societies are the formation of social fabrics and contracts among human entities. People opted for and reached an agreement to work according to the natural laws and principles of reasons in order to live in harmonious way and ensure societal change (Kastrati 2016:65; Kaviraj 2001:289). Immanuel Kant's belief is that human beings, by virtue of their nature, seek peace while the state uses war as a means of suppression (Burchill 2005:33). Therefore, implying the importance of civil society, he emphasised the need for a system where the suppression by a single entity, i.e., the state, is challenged through rational thinking and critical discourse (Alagappa 2004: 30; Spurk 2010: 4). David Hume (date cited in Finlay 2004:383-385) argues that morality is a fundamental precondition for reasoning as it determines people's ultimate goals. According to him, people set their end goals on the basis of moral principles and use logic and reasoning as a bridge to realise their goals. Adam Smith (1759, cited in Ehrenberg 2011:21), sharing Locke's thinking, emphasised that private morality and moral sentiments serve as a glue to bring individuals together into communities that ultimately make up civil society. Although the views of these scholars and philosophers are different in terms of their understanding of enlightenment, they all stressed the need for the independence from being locked into the church mentality and the state suppression which was one of the critical reasons for the emergence of the concept of civil society (Outram 2005:28–46; Peck 2015:550; van Dijck, Munck & Terpstra 2017:2).

The modern age is another era of civil society where prominent scholars such as G.W.F. Hegel, Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx contributed to the development of the concept of civil society. The contribution of Hegel shifted the scholars' mindset from metaphysical thinking by establishing and affirming his ground on the concept of human creation. They contributed to the development of the concept of civil society by considering it as a separate entity from the state where the idea of common goods is not entertained and where diverse interests compete against each other (Edwards 2014:7; Kaldor 2003:584; Pouligny 2005:497). Alexis de Tocqueville was a prominent scholar who pointed to the idea of civil society in the modern era. Focusing his analysis on American society, he stated that individualism; equality and civic virtue helped to promote mutual respect and contended that this was possible through the formation of associations made on a voluntary basis (Edwards 2011:24-25; Geppert 2000:280; Spurk 2010:5; Woldring 1998:368). Karl Marx's argument for the emergence of civil society evolved from the disparity of economic relationships between the wealthy owners and the worker segment of the society in the context of capitalism. In short, civil society is largely shaped by class antagonism and is considered as the arena within which the bourgeoisie exploited the labouring class (DeWiel 1997:30; Kastrati 2016:65; Spurk 2010:5). In this modern era, Antonio Gramsci also recognised the emergence and importance of civil society arguing that civil society serves as a realm for the advancement of hegemony and contestation and the modern area of class struggle and competition (Ehrenberg 2011:10; Maglaras 2013:2).

The emergence of civil society development in the post-modern era is mainly explained by the importance of civil society serving as a weapon to challenge the totalitarian states (Cuong 2008:27; Singh 2012:70). The shift in perception toward civil society during this era is based on the idea of free capitalism that demands the creation of free individuals and society that is free from suppression of the State. In this sense, civil society is seen as an important voluntarily organised entity that works toward ensuring freedom and rights of individuals. Here, the central idea is the redefinition of the role of civil society in such a way that it expands the basis of democracy by challenging centralised state structure and power. According to Graham (2001), in the 1980s, the

idea of civil society was used by the political opposition in Eastern Europe to challenge the welfare state system and thereby expand neoliberal ideology. The development of civil society was used as one of the best strategies by the west to replace the welfare state and operationalise neoliberalism.

In explaining why civil society has regained such attention, Müller (2006:317) mentions four major reasons. The first cause was the effort to dismantle the dominant totalitarian communist regimes in the Central Eastern European countries which were brutally abusive and suppressive towards human and democratic rights. Civil society was considered to be an essential instrument to defend citizens' civil and democratic rights acting against such regimes. Secondly, following the collapse of communism and the communist regimes, the quest for democracy was proliferated across the world. In this period, civil society was considered as a condition for democracy, democratisation and development to be ensured particularly aligned with and incentivised by the conditional aid of the west (see also Keane 1998:12-32). Thirdly, the crisis of welfare state is considered as one of the major causes. The crisis of welfare state was deepened after the collapse of communism and the communist states. This crisis caused the fomentation and proliferation of civil society. The intervention of civil society was regarded as significant to curb the challenges that emerged from the crisis (see also Putnam 2000:137-40). The final cause was globalisation that has created a new world order characterised by diversity and continuous social mobility, technological expansion and advancement, changes in economic and social patterns, interconnectedness of nations in terms of trade and governance of transnational resource that underpin the actions and intervention of civil society at a global as well as a local level (Müller 2006:318).

The historical analysis presented in the preceding paragraphs clearly depicts that the concept of civil society is an old idea which evolved from the era of antiquity to date, but not in a linear fashion. Evolving through the era of enlightenment and later on influencing the thinking of the nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers, it unfortunately remained a loose agenda for discussion. It is only after 1980s that the

agenda of civil society was re-emerged into the discourse due to the concern of the intellectuals who struggled against the totalitarian regimes in the Eastern Europe. This cycle has yielded the return of civil society to its original birthplace, the west (Lewis 2001:3; Comaroff & Comaroff 1999:5). From this historical development and path of civil society, one can learn that civil society has huge potential that has not been fully and comprehensively used or implemented since its inception which makes it an important sector that deserves rethinking in the development circle. Notwithstanding the ups and downs that it has undergone, as a voluntary and self-organised type of social action, civil society exists in perpetuity as long as socio-economic and political situations can be reinforced by it (Kocka 2004:69-70).

2.2.2 The Concept of Civil Society

The concept of civil society is a highly contested one and subject to a variety of conceptualisations. In classical theorisation, civil society was conceptualised at different levels of meanings indicating that it is family, state and market but this idea seems to be outdated. Consequently, there is huge divergence among the scientific community away from this line of thinking (Zinecker 2011:3). The dominant views among the scholars of civil society are twofold: civil society as a separate sphere of society and civil society as a sphere and bridge between the family or citizenry, the state, and the market.

2.2.2.1 Civil society as a separate sphere on its own

Civil society as a separate sphere of society is the idea that considers civil society as freestanding and separate from the state, the market and the family (Clough & Clarke 2015:178; Jensen 2006:41; Rosenblum & Post, 2002:4; Zinecker 2011:4). According to Kaliba (2014), the term civil society has been defined by different scholars in terms of norms and values, a space for action and an antidote to the state. Despite these definitional variations, most of the conceptualisations of civil society highlight that civil society is an “associational life” different from the family, state and state institutions, the market and the political society. Although there is no agreement on the demarcation among these bodies, civil society is distinct in that its ultimate end is neither profit

making nor politics (Kaliba 2014:2). Instead, civil society is viewed as a platform for debate, exchange of ideas and common efforts. It is conceptualised as an arena in which people join each other to engage in common actions and achieve common purposes without having profit or political power motives. On the other hand, the state is responsible for making and enforcing laws while the market facilitates the exchange of goods and services for the consumption of the society (Orji 2009:82; Smith 2007:5; Swyngedouw 2005:1992). Civil society is different from political society because it does not aspire to gaining political power by representing group interests (Kaliba 2014:2).

Civil society is distinct from the state in that it is governed exclusively by private norms while the state is required to have inclusive and accommodative public norms for all citizens (Jensen 2006:41). Instead, civil society is said to be a voluntarily organised and non-profit body having a culture and role distinct from the public and private spheres (Harris 2008:131; Pagoulatos & Kastritis 2013:5). Spurk (2010:4) asserted that civil society is formally and legally independent from the state because the state composes the executive sphere including public institutions and the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the legislature which is the political sphere. Mati (2014:217-218) argued that civil society is considered as an independent sector but residual to the state and the market. This argument is based on the fact that civil society is seen as the third sector while the state is the first sector and the market is the second. While the tripartite model certainly facilitates our understanding of society and how the entire society might be classified, the usage of “third sector” according to Laine (2014:73), not only considers civil society as residual to the state and the market but also misleading. This is because, in recent years, reality is that the line between the three bodies has become blurred and undefined which makes it difficult to demarcate.

In addition to the preceding contemporary discourse of civil society, various prominent scholars argue that the concept is not a replica of the state, market or family spheres, but separate. For instance, Gramsci (1971, cited in Laine 2014:64) argued that civil society is neither state nor the economy. Habermas (date, in the translated version by Burger 1991) also argued that civil society is a public sphere detached from the state

and the market. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is absolute unanimity of views among scholars in this regard as there are some exceptions. Some scholars support a model in which the market stands for a separate sphere while other scholars include the market within the realm of civil society (Jensen 2006:41; Rosenblum & Post 2002).

Aristotle, for instance, was of the view that civil society is distinct from family but not state, while Paine, Tocqueville, Montesquieu, Hegel and Marx argue that civil society is different from the state but not the economy (Zinecker 2011:5). This leads to the following discussion of civil society as a space between state and family.

2.2.2.2 Civil society as the space between the sectors

Conceptualisation of civil society as the space between the sectors recognises the intermediary role that it plays between the state, economy and citizenry. Such conceptualisation focuses on the bridging role of civil society between the state, the market and the family (Habib 2002:viii; Mati 2014:218). This stream of thinking based its argument on the idea that it is hard to understand the concept without comparing it with other spheres that together make up the entirety of a society (Jensen 2006:41; Rosenblum & Post 2002). The line of argument that advocates binary division – between state and civil society, or tripartite division – between state, economy and citizenry, is challenging because it is difficult to get the real picture of civil society without defining it in the context of its relationship with the other spheres (Chambers & Kopstein 2008). The conceptualisation of civil society as a space between the sectors has acquired legitimacy from the failure of the view that advocates civil society as a distinctive sphere. This idea of a distinctive sphere is criticised for it assumes a clear line and demarcation between the three sectors which is not the case in reality (Evers 1995:176; Laine 2014:73; Mati 2014:218). It is also challenged on the basis of whether civil society is independent of the state (Hyden 1998:19; Nasong'o 2007:23-24; Shivji 2006).

Civil society is characterised as a space between the sectors, i.e., the state, market and family which sometimes partly overlaps and is unclearly demarcated. In emphasising

this idea, various writers argue that some sectors engage in the same operation simultaneously (Croissant et al 2003, cited in Paffenholz 2009:170). In that sense, there are certain occasions where businesses act like civil society when they have the intention of benefiting from tax exemptions from the government. Similarly, there are some entities disguised as civil society while they are engaging in business (Croissant et al 2003, cited in Paffenholz 2009:170). When different civil society groups emerge, some of them might be market-based, like business associations and entrepreneur organizations, while others might be state-based, like government-owned non-governmental organizations (Setianto 2007:117).

Scholars like Paine, Tocqueville, Hegel and Marx located civil society between family and state (Baynes 2002; Clough & Clarke 2015:178; Gordon 2000; Setianto 2007:113). However, these scholars have their own version of conceptualising civil society as a space between state and family. Hegel viewed civil society as an intermediary power and the space between the state and citizenry that also includes the economy. He was said to be a “statist” due to his bold argument that civil society and state cannot be demarcated because civil society is a sphere between family and the state that is occupied by individuals. His version of sphere concept departed from Paine and Tocqueville in that, for one thing, he considered civil society as an arena of contestation of diverse interests; and second, that state is necessary for the survival of civil society and must oversee and supervise civil society. The need for supervision of state over civil society derives from the fact that civil society is an arena of battle for individuals to meet their personal interests which may result in instability when it fails to meet them. Hence, Hegel believed that, for individuals’ interaction to yield the required fruit in the sphere of civil society, there is a need for the state to oversee civil society (Berglund 2009:4; Jones 2001).

For Paine (1791, cited in Berglund 2009:4), civil society is a sphere where citizens practise their political rights and are protected from the suppression of authoritarian states. In contrast to Hegel’s positive role of state on civil society, the position of Paine was that dictatorship states suppress individuals’ rights. Hence, he emphasised the

importance of keeping state control and influence to the minimum possible level to ensure maximum benefit for individuals and citizenry.

Although Marx was in agreement with the view of Hegel that civil society is an association that is organised to pursue private goals, his classical understanding was that it is simply bourgeois society. He observed civil society as self-centred having economic orientation (Wen 2015:71). With this line of thinking, unlike Paine, Hegel or Tocqueville, Karl Marx rejected the idea that civil society is a democratic society guided by democratic principles. Unlike Marx, Tocqueville argued that civil society and the market are different. He asserted that civil society is a non-state and civilised association that helps to check the ambition and temptation of the state to centralise power.

Some argued that the relationship of civil society and state is determined by the context in which it exists. For instance, focusing on the state-civil society relations, Chambers and Kopstein (2008) asserted that civil society should not necessarily be seen as either in support of or against the state. They argued that there are conditions where civil society may be beyond the state, separate from the state, or in collaboration or partnership with the state based on the context. In this regard, Lilja (2015:118), Heinrich (2005), and Cohen and Arato (1992) indicated that the trend of analysing and understanding civil society was shifting from considering it as a unique issue of discourse or a body distinct from the state, market and family towards understanding the concept as an arena of various types in a particular context.

The contemporary issues of civil society, particularly whether the relation between state and society is hostile or cooperative remains an agenda of debate. Chambers and Kopstein (2008:364) describe the relationship of civil society and state in six main ways which are not mutually exclusive. First, they considered civil society from a spatial perspective. In other words, it is a sphere distinct from the state where citizenry join each other to ensure mutual interest and common goals. Second, civil society is seen not just from a spatial perspective but also as an antagonistic entity which is against the state. The third view is that civil society supports the state in that it helps to create a

stable society by encouraging individuals to associate and link up with strong social bonds to achieve purposes that are beyond self-interest of each individual. The fourth observation is that civil society acts as a partner with the state because the state alone is not capable of providing goods and services that citizens require as it has limited technical and financial capacity. Fifth, civil society is seen as the society beyond the state, which essentially refers to the global civil society. It focuses on social movements and NGOs and commonly stands in opposition to the state. Finally, they viewed civil society as an agent that dialogues with the state for the purpose of checking the state and making it accountable. Here civil society is analysed and understood based on the viewpoint of Jürgen Habermas who conceptualised it as a public sphere where innovative and creative ideas are formed, deliberated and made politically effective (Habermas 1996:367). In connection with this last view, Beauclerk (2011:876) argued that civil society is a sphere where not only competing ideas are raised but also where mismatching ideas are deliberated and negotiated within civil society itself and with the state. Civil society innovates and initiates alternative ideas, lobbies and struggles for the acceptance and adoption of these ideas.

According to Chambers and Kopstein (2008:370) and Fleming (2000:2), scholars such as Habermas (1996) and Cohen and Arato (1992), considered social movement as an essential element of civil society in the public sphere. They asserted that social movement manifests itself as civil society to act against the state using either offensive or defensive strategies depending on the context. Offensively, social movement has the power of putting stress on the state to change legislation and improve the economic and political situation. Defensively, social movements often move against the suppressive nature of the state and contribute to the expansion of innovative grassroots-level participation and involvement of citizenry which ultimately contributes to the creation of an empowered, autonomous and assertive society.

The concept of civil society, the concept of state as well as the concept of market need to be widened for us to get adequate insight and understanding as to how civil society can serve as a locus of control to state power at the same time as to how civil society

and market can be part of the state (Lilja 2015:121). Ideally, the three spheres i.e., the state, market and civil society are important and strong but there is no zero-sum game among them, and hence some kind of balanced and mutual relationship is required (Zinecker 2011:12).

Although civil society has been defined from various perspectives such as normative perspective (civil society as civilised); functional perspective (civil society as democratising); and structural perspective (civil society as a third sector) (Viterna, Clough & Clarke 2015:173), the preceding discussion implies that civil society is a non-state body and associations where voluntary actions take place manifesting themselves in either a formal or non-formal way. It is neither purely driven by a profit motive nor purely dependent on the state and political sphere but works closely with them in a certain fashion in the public sphere. However, it is worth mentioning that the demarcation and boundary between these entities is complex and has never been clear (Berglund 2009:16; Neubert 2011:5; Spurk 2008:5).

2.2.3 Forms of Civil Society

According to Edwards (2011:7-8), citizens need some form of physical infrastructure in order to express their ideas, participate and deliberate on issues of their concerns including social, economic and political matters. In this regard, civil society includes grassroots associations, social movements, labour unions, professional groups, advocacy and development NGOs, and formally registered nonprofits entities having various types, sizes, purposes and levels of formality. Here emphasis is given not to their mere identities and existence, but to the manner of their interaction among themselves and other entities, namely, state and market, in the complex civil society ecosystem which varies from context to context. This system is very important for civil society. For one thing, it creates an opportunity for members to deliberate their interests and priorities; and for another, it helps civil society gain its strengths and potentials from this diversified system, without which it would become dormant, weak and even gradually die.

Although the concept of civil society is very challenging to classify and comprehend, Baumgarten, Gosewinkel and Rucht (2011:294-297) distinguish civil society and the idea of civility based on four major dimensions. The first dimension is human rights because, according to these writers, the contemporary notion of civility is unthinkable without taking into account the elements of human rights and requires active intervention and involvement of civil society to realise them. The second dimension refers to political rights where rights may be granted to some while denied to others, which implies that all-encompassing civility cannot be ensured in this dimension which calls for the need for civil society. The third is social rights which, in the context of the contemporary notion of civility, need to deal with the issues of human life and dignity. The final dimension refers to non-codified norms and practices of everyday interaction where civility manifests itself and where the need for civil society is prevalent. These non-codified norms and practices, according to the authors, are normative standards and principles that are recognised and accepted by the members of the contemporary society. According to these authors, the extent to which civil society engages in promoting human rights, political rights and social rights portrays the level of civility.

Based on its objectives, Scholte (1999, cited in Udegbumam 2014), classified civil society in three main categories, namely: conformist, reformist, and transformist. Conformist civil societies are of the idea that existing laws should be respected and properly implemented. When deviations are observed, they tend to be aggressively agitated against the state. The reformist civil societies are those who emphasise improvement and change. They want to see the society moving by insisting in the amendment of laws and policies to correct visible problems and deficiencies in society. Transformist civil societies are those that aspire to dramatic changes to all or some features that address the very foundations of society.

According to Hutchful (1996:56-57), civil society is classified in terms of three basic parameters namely, a) location – between the state and the citizen; b) functions – serving and defending the interests of private memberships; and c) institutions and politics – opposition to and collaboration with the state. In addition, civil society is also

classified based on liberal and radical approaches and views. The liberals see civil society as an arena of organised citizens that helps to establish equilibrium with the state and the market to play a counterbalancing role between the two. It also makes the state accountable and responsive to its citizens. The radical view focuses on the negotiation and conflict which results from the struggle of power and independent resistance to the state. While the liberals view civil society in its entirety as a good thing, radicals are of the view that not all civil society is good in contributing to societal transformation as there are varied interests and competing ideas (Clarke 1991, cited in Lewis & Kanji 2009:127).

According to Desse (2012:8), civil society is a diverse entity that manifests itself in different forms which encompasses religious, community-based, philanthropic, expert groups and trade unions. In addition to these five, he argues that there are two other, not often widespread, forms of civil society known as hybrid consisting of business-oriented civil society and government-oriented civil society. Religious civil societies are affiliated to religion but not with the prime interest of promoting worshipping necessarily. Their intervention areas are mainly education and health, and Christian charity such as emergency relief and humanitarian assistance. Community-based civil society is a locally based civil society that operates very closely with the community focusing on pressing issues on the ground. It is a grassroots level civil society that emphasises community development, strengthening social bonds and solidarity among the community, mobilising and sharing resources and knowledge, and supporting the local community to see and optimally use its endogenous potentials. They are interested in development, housing, and maximisation of social welfare by helping elderly, youth and children. Philanthropic civil societies are those who pay considerable attention to generosity and are mostly related to privately initiated foundations and NGOs that emanate from the concerns of humanity. According to Dietlin (2011:259), and Anheier and Leat (2006:19), it is different from charity, although there is certain overlap, in that, while charity focuses on relieving particular suffering of a society on a temporary basis, philanthropy aims at permanently addressing the problem by tackling the root causes. In that sense, philanthropy is like educating the needy person how to fish rather than

providing a fish for them. Expert groups are people who have expertise and scientific knowledge and publish technical reports in their areas of involvement. The last one is trade unions which promote and defend the interests of workers through labour and workers' associations.

Dessalegn (2008:82) also asserts that civil society could include associations, unions, mass organisations, networks, social organisations, social movements, service providers, self-help groups, grassroot or community-based organisations, and rights and freedom advocacy groups that have typical characteristics such as voluntarism, self-management, not profit-oriented, and having diversified sources of resources. The concept also encompasses a wide range of bodies including charitable events, organisations fighting against child exploitation, and volunteers working on rescuing the vulnerable groups. Although it is not an entity with political interest, civil society may include such bodies as antiwar protests, voter registration drives, or marches against policies and legislations.

It also includes global civil society that operates at global level on issues of cross-boundary and transnational interest, which is beyond the limit of a single nation's economy and politics (Anheier 2007:5; Schulpen & Habraken, 2013:20). Global civil society's intervention focuses on issues of global concern that transcend territorial geography. For instance, severe climate change; trans-world diseases like AIDS; terrorism, trans-border trade and investment have attracted the attention of civil society on a broad basis. In such cases, civil society lobbies the global mechanisms that work through inter-governmental, trans-governmental and regional arrangements to regulate and coordinate the pressing issues of global concern (Giffen & Judge 2010:3-4; Glasius & Timms 2006:191; Kaldor 2003:588; Scholte 1999:10; Wild 2006:5).

Global civil society is criticised as a means of expanding liberalism and liberal democracy across the world through global financial and non-financial institutions as well as globalisation. In line with this, Kaldor (2003:589) and Keane (2001) argued that global civil society is considered as an instrument of enhancing liberal democracy and human rights which on its way imposes the principles and values of neoliberalism. In

promoting this thinking, western governments and international organisations played a leading role by including neoliberalism in the new policy agenda which focuses on market reform and democratic reform. This neoliberal-oriented thinking and understanding of civil society, however, fails to understand the distinction between the development of neoliberalism as a paradigm and the characteristics of these developments that promote the agenda of civil society. The underlying assumption of neoliberalism as a paradigm is to have a minimal state role in the economy as the state is considered problematic. In a way, this is possible through delivering and furthering the purposes of civil society especially in the form of NGOs (Kumar 2008:23).

Civil society in general encompasses a diverse space, actors and institutional forms with different extent of power, autonomy and formality which manifests itself in the form of registered charities, development NGOs, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups (Dessalegn 2008:82; Neubert 2011:5; Whyte 2004).

2.2.4 Formal and Non-formal Civil Society

Civil society consists of a range of formal and non-formal organisations (Boris 1999; Diamond 1994:6; Fukuyama 2010:7; Yeshanew 2012:369).; It is important to briefly highlight the distinction between the formally registered and the non-formal CSOs. The formal CSOs are those that are legally registered and have formal structure, regularity and a mandate driven by needs. As a result of having legal personality through formal registration, they are not only regulated but also protected by the provisions in the legal framework (Howard 2003; Kärkliņa 2014:22). They are also able to establish some kind of relations with the government through their formal structure and institutional settings. On the contrary, the nonformal CSOs are those who do not manifest the features of the formal CSOs. They lack a well-defined structure and institutions and are without formal relationships with government either by choice or due to repression (Kärkliņa 2014:22). They are considered to be less important and do not have the characteristics of noticeable and prestigious associations. These nonformal groups are considered to play

an insignificant role in the modern and formal civil society. However, the fact that they are less visible should not leave them to remain non-formal and unsuitable for the formal status of civil society. “They are not necessarily condemned to stay outside the boundaries of civil society for ever. They may play such a role at some point in time, if they intervene in the public sphere in order to fulfil any of the formal civil society’s functions” (Sotiropoulos 2004:11).

Vers and Laville (2004:10-11) analysed the relationship between the state, civil society and the community and identified three overlapping zones, namely, state-formal civil society, state-community, and formal civil society-community overlapping domains. They asserted that civil society is non-formal where it overlaps with community, not with the state. Vers and Laville (2004:17) also developed what they call the “welfare triangle” where the state, market and private households are each located at the very end points of the triangle. While they locate civil society at the centre of the welfare triangle between the state and the market, the non-formal civil society is considered to operate between the formal civil society and the community.

Non-formal civil society is basically locally initiated, operates on a small-scale and a bottom-up approach, often deals with such issues as development of neighbourhood and climate (De Rynck & Verschuere, 2014:6; Vers & Laville 2004:17). These non-formal CSOs are said to promote diversity and pluralism based on the activities they undertake at local level. In some cases, they act as activists as they confront the government by becoming involved in politically sensitive issues (Brandsen, Trommel & Verschuere 2017:678).

Distinct from formally registered and voluntarily organised CSOs, there are creative and more vibrant CSOs which manifest themselves in the form of non-formal networks, initiatives and social movements. Social movements are often credited for their capacity to express societal concerns and their role in creating new principles, ethos and shared identities that tie members of the citizenry together. These social movements are acknowledged for their strong guts and moral fibre in facing the challenges of suppressive political systems and promoting democratisation (Fleming 2000:3). In line

with this, Lagerkvist (2015:140) used the term “shadow” strategy to reveal the existence and relevance of non-formally organised non-registered CSOs which operate in the unofficial civic arena to mobilise protest against the action of weak, violent and suppressive states.

Some scholars think that the non-registered non-formal entities involved in civic activities should be considered as CSOs. Proponents of this idea such as Sotiropoulos (2004, cited in Kastritis 2013:6), contest that CSOs must be understood not just because they are formally registered and officially recognised but based on the activities that they are engaged in. In this regard, Diamond (1994:6) argued that networks of non-formal groups should be included in the scope of civil society as they play important roles in acting in the civic domain.

Although research has largely focused on the formal CSOs, studies show that the non-formal side of associational life has not been adequately explored (McCabe, Phillimore & Mayblin 2010:8; Stefan 2003:338). Hence, filling this knowledge gap by conducting a study that takes the non-formal CSOs into account will lead to a more complete understanding of the role of civil society in societal transformation. Hence, the conception of CSOs used in this study recognises both formal and the non-formal groups outside the realm of the state and the market.

2.2.5 Civil and Uncivil Society

It is important to understand that all that is included in the conceptual domain of the civil society may not be considered civil (Schulpen & Habraken, 2013:3). Although a few scholars support the idea of uncivil society, the idea that proliferates and dominates the academic debates and policy discussions is that it is “civil society’s dark twin” (Bob 2011:12), promoting “negative social capital” and “charged with funding the works of evil” (Monga 2009:15).

This uncivil feature of civic factions goes against the argument of de Tocqueville (cited in Monga 2009:14-15) who asserted that civil society contributes positively to augmentation of freedom. The uncivil society that has an obstructive nature may exist

for various reasons. One of these reasons could be that some groups that have a hidden agenda are masked and disguised as civil society operating within the umbrella and consortium of civil society when they do not adhere to the existing laws of the country. The other reason could be that some uncivil groups, disguised as civil society, serve as an instrument for individuals or groups who have motives for political power. This is common when authoritarian regimes use such groups to deny the political awareness that citizens deserve to get through civil society particularly when they fear that civil society initiates and spreads subversive ideas.

Although it is evident that civil society is a space of freedom where ideas are shared, contemplated and deliberated among individuals having common and shared goals, the above discussion signals that it is naive to totally overlook the existence of irrational social groups in terms of their purposes which deserve critical evaluation and re-examination (Monga 2009:17-18). In support of this, Bob (2011:1-2) and Edwards (2011:483-485) described civil society from three positive perspectives, namely, associational life, the good society and the public sphere and claimed that uncivil society was problematic in terms of these three concepts. He also argued that uncivil society takes a total departure and distinction from civil society organisationally, normatively and tactically. As a result, he concluded that the idea of uncivil society has to be quarantined and stifled as it does not create a positive energy for societal transformation.

2.3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES UNDERLYING CIVIL SOCIETY

Many thinkers from different intellectual camps have contributed to the development of the concept of civil society. The underpinning theoretical viewpoints can be classified as the liberal school of civil society and the left-wing/Communitarian perception of civil society (Cuong 2008:22-24; Jailobaeva 2011:19).

2.3.1 The Liberal School of Civil Society

In the liberal line of thinking the concept of civil society is viewed by scholars in the context of natural law that emphasises that individuals have natural rights to live in

freedom and own and protect their properties. This view of civil society expanded as a result of the emergence of free capital system, interest groups and the liberalised free market. The perception that voluntarily organised and self-regulating civil society is a place where individual rights and liberty are enjoyed and where individual rights and freedom are protected from state attack and interference has begun to dominate theoretical thinking (Cuong 2008:23; Kefale & Aredo 2009:90).

In this regard, one of the classic liberal scholars, John Locke (1632-1704) argued that the state lacks impartial judges and is involved in arbitrary interventions of individual rights. Hence, civil society which is a body separate from the state should protect individuals from inconveniences imposed by the state (DeWiel 1997:17; Jailobaeva 2011:20; Paffenholz & Spurk 2006:4). Civil society can be considered as a legitimate entity and an arena where people discipline themselves, are civilised and co-exist (Jailobaeva 2011:20; Khilnani 2001:18-19). Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) also claimed that civil society is part of a wider arena i.e., “the associational life”. His conception of civil society suggests that civil society is different from economic and political society and is a place where social capital functions well. The distinction of civil society from the state is that it creates the opportunity for individuals to come together, voluntarily participate and decide on their own affairs, enjoy equal rights and protect and defend their rights from authoritarian states, which according to Tocqueville (1835) (as translated and edited by Harvey, Mansfield & Winthrop 2000), help citizens develop civic virtues like a sense of trust, honesty, tolerance and a cooperative spirit in the process of development and hence contribute to the development of what Putnam (1993) referred to as social capital in his seminal work. Tocqueville also asserts that civil society can serve as an essential instrument to promote checks and balances in power relations and support the enforcement of democratic principles. They are a platform where democratic principles, thinking, disciplines and attitude are learned (Cuong 2008:27; Paffenholz & Spurk 2006:4). This implies that good governance, democracy and development cannot be realised without the active and meaningful role and engagement of civil society.

The contemporary liberal view of civil society is based on rights and freedoms of individuals particularly in the 'private dimension' which include the element of choice and social relationships in the market and the home (Bartkowski & Regis 2003). According to the contemporary liberal assertion, individuals have a moral right which emanates from their moral autonomy and human dignity and these moral rights help individuals to constrain the government. According to this line of thinking, civil society is conceptualised as an arena between the state and the individual. It claims that state and civil society are opponents; and the state has the role of framing civil society without directly intervening in its function while civil society plays the role of checking on the state to discourage malpractices, undemocratic and unjust behaviour (Jailobaeva 2011:26-27).

In addition to the above assertion, the contemporary neoliberal conceptualisation of civil society can also be seen from the perspective of globalisation. In this case, civil society has to do with the expansion of liberal democracy and promotion of good governance across the world with the intention of rolling back the state so that it can have a minimal role in the process of development and good governance. Civil society is considered as instrumental for the materialisation of this objective and to help citizens take control of their lives (Kaldor 2003).

The preceding discussion reveals that the overall belief of liberal philosophers is that civil society is an opponent of the state and the rights and freedom of individuals are crucial elements to constrain the threats posed by the state. Notwithstanding their commonalities, these scholars have their own points of focus in understanding civil society. For instance, while Tocqueville emphasises associational life, voluntarism and importance of the majority in conceptualising civil society, Locke (1691, cited in Wijaya 2016:26) emphasised the importance of natural law that stressed the individual natural right to enjoy freedom.

2.3.2 Left-Wing Perception/Communitarian Approach/of Civil Society

In this category of civil society theorisation, the prominent pioneers whose works worth mentioning include Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci. Friedrich Hegel who is one of the eminent scholars in theorisation of civil society claimed that civil society is an arena distinct from the state, where all walks of life interact and compete for limited resources. State and civil society are complementary and balancing units of the whole organism. The state is important to balance the pressure of interest groups and to realise that civil society acts in the public interest (Cuong 2008:24).

Hegel criticised and rejected the liberal notion of civil society that an independent, autonomous and unregulated system always has a positive outcome and effects (Tayler 2006:222). The main point of Hegel's argument is that the interaction between individuals goes beyond self-interest. An individual is a social animal who is unable to realise his/her interests and objectives without interaction with others. Hence, Hegel focused on the society as a whole rather than an individual (Jones 2001; Laine 2014:63).

Karl Marx is also among the prominent scholars who contributed to the theorisation of civil society by building on the idea of Friedrich Hegel. Karl Marx claimed that capitalism promotes self-centredness and egoism. In capitalism, individual interests and the issue of production and consumption are given excess attention and this results in undermining the interest of the public that ultimately restricts the development of citizens to their optimum potential. Under the system of capitalism, the owners of production grow their business and generate profits by considering workers as a mere instrument (Cuong 2008:24; Kefale & Aredo 2009:90). As opposed to the liberal conception of civil society which perceives it as an independent counterbalance against the excessive use of state power (Kefale & Aredo 2009:90), the Marxist perception of civil society is that it is the social entity growing directly out of production and commerce. Marx considers civil society as similar to the bourgeois society which comprises self-seeking economic players (Kumar 1993:377, 379). He explained the concept of civil society as an arena of domination, which is based on the material

conditions of life where the bourgeoisie exploit the labour class. For Marx, civil society is seen as a locus of deterioration rather than liberation (DeWiel 1997:30).

The Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, whose ideology had a very strong influence from 1970-1980 in Latin America and Eastern Europe during the opposition to totalitarian regimes, critically analysed the role of civil society in strengthening or challenging the state. As stipulated in his Prison Notebooks (Gramsci 1971), he posed questions on the distinction between state and civil society and argued that the distinction is purely methodological. He asserted that both civil society and state are concurrently required to complete the process of governance and societal development. In this sense, “the state represents the structures of governance [while] civil society creates the value and normative framework for governance” (Kefale & Aredo 2009:90). Gramsci stressed the potentially oppositional role of civil society and that civil society is an arena where conducive environment for challenges and contestations is created to debate and contest political principles, ideological hegemonies and thoughts (Bui 2013:82; Laine 2014:64). He believed that civil society comprises a broad range of institutions and philosophies to challenge or support the system (Lewis 2002:583; Paffenholz & Spurk 2006). The main contribution of Gramsci was his assertion that civil society plays a substantial role in establishing the political and cultural hegemony of the capitalist classes and societal agreement (Khan 1998:113).

It is evident from the above discussion that the philosophers from the left-wing perception agreed on the distinction between state and civil society but had their own theories and perceptions about civil society. For instance, while Karl Marx paid more attention to material relations of production, Gramsci focused on cultural and ideological relations in theorising civil society. On the other hand, Hegel stressed the importance of specific historical processes that creates civil society.

2.4 STRUCTURE AND AGENCY

Structure, according to Thomas and Allen (2000:189), is conceptualised as “[t]he patterns of framework of relationships between social institutions, such as markets,

families, classes, and political factions. It includes rules of behaviour associated, for example, with moral norms and hierarchies". It refers to rules and resources (Giddens 1979:64) and our understanding as to how things have to be undertaken, how our activities are arranged around these understandings, and our competences backing these understandings (Rigby, Woulfin & März 2016:296). It is also conceptualised as the social, economic and political context in which the role of agent or actors is materialised. (Kooiman 2003:15). Thomas and Allen (2000:189) defined agency as "the actions of individuals or groups, and their capacities to influence events". It is the capability or potential of individual agents or actors to act effectively (Meyer & Jepperson 2002:101; Rigby et al. 2016:296). An agency is the body that has the capacity, knowledge and motivation to take various types of actions (Burke & Stets 2009:6).

Structure is a pattern that has both an enabling and constraining potential to agents' action (Rigby et al. 2016: 296; Hays 1994:61). It composes contexts that may facilitate or constrain the work of agents. The work of agents or actors is undertaken and located in the structure which may either obstruct or create conducive environment. Hence, structure composes the context that has the potential to determine the role of agents. These contexts could be the material, power and cultural factors that encourage or inhibit the actions of agents (Kooiman 2003:15-17).

According to Thomas and Allen (2000:189), structure and agency are terms that, in some cases, are treated in a combined way and, in other cases, are treated with the tendency of favouring structure over agency or vice versa. Giddens (2006:108) argued that these terms are essentially interrelated. Although he had some inclination towards the enabling role of structure than its constraining role, he argued that both structure and agency should be given equal attention because structure affects and shapes actors' actions and vice versa. The connection between agency (i.e., the manifestation of knowledgeable and able human agents) and the bounded structure and context in which it operates are considered equally important.

Hays (1994:61) argued that structure can be seen as something that can be formed by agency while structure also shapes the nature of agency. Agency is not only created

through supporting and enabling characteristics of structure, but is also restricted within the limits of structural constraints. Even though agency is believed to play an essential role in producing, re-producing and changing structures; the ability of agents or actors to do so varies with the influence and power, accessibility and strength of that structure.

2.5 DOES SOCIETY EXIST?

Predominantly, there are two versions of claims for the non-existence of society, i.e., the network and the neoliberal versions. The network version is one of the notions claiming society's non-existence. The most well-known iteration of the network version in contemporary social and media theory is Bruno Latour's actor-network theory. According to Latour (2005:2), it is no longer certain whether there are relationships that are distinct enough to be referred to as "social" and that might be gathered together to form a unique domain that may serve as a society. Latour (2003:143) promotes a sociology that can track the activities by which things are constructed into associations, starting from the premise that there is no such thing as society. Groups are neither fixed nor consistent collectivities; instead, they are groups of previously dissimilar parts that form and are uniform.

The second notion of the non-existence of society emerges from the ideological tradition of neoliberalism. The most well-known proponent of the neoliberal version of the assertion that society doesn't exist was British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In a 1987 interview with Douglas Keay published in *Women's Own* after she was elected to a third term, Thatcher emphasized personal responsibilities and diligence (Weeks 2019; Dean 2013). Society doesn't exist, according to Thatcher's ideology. There are just individuals who participate in markets and families that care for one another. A false assumption about the existence of society underlies the notion that the government can solve all citizens' problems. Due to this false assumption, attempts are made to address issues like poor health through government initiatives like government-funded healthcare instead of addressing them as personal or individual problems (Dean 2013; Loo 2012).

Typically, the term "society" refers to the personal ties of obligation and camaraderie that unite people of various backgrounds, levels of education, resources, and wealth (Lepore 2021). Society may be seen as the culmination of individuals' activities. Each person is born, lives, and passes away within a network of social relationships and obligations we cannot extract (Weeks 2019).

There is and has always been such a thing as society, despite the best efforts of Thatcher and Reagan. Its existence is not in doubt; the question is how it should manifest itself (Lepore 2021). The existence of society is manifested through different social institutions without which it cannot secure its objectives. One such institution is civil society. According to Ikelegbe (2001:3), civil society is an organization of citizens. It has been identified as the composite of organizations of citizens, usually non-partisan and non-profit associations. It has been characterised as the composite of citizen organisations, typically found in non-partisan and non-profit societies. Salamon and Solokowski (2016:1520) and Edwards et al (2018:99) also see civil society as multifaceted, with a wide range of individuals interacting with an expanding number of networks and groups to produce forms of social activity.

2.6 STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

State-society relations refer to the nature of relationship between society and the state in terms of rules that govern and shape the behaviour, allocation and distribution of resources, and power (Sellers & Kwak 2010:622; Yeshtila, Kjosavik & Shanmugaratnam 2016:3). State-society relations refer to the relationship and interaction between the institutions of the state and groups of various forms in the society. The central focus of this relationship deals with the rights and duties of the state and society, exercise of public power, the ways in which citizens can influence this power or authority, decisions on resources, and establishing accountability mechanisms (The Department for International Development (DFID) 2010:15).

Both the state and civil society are needed for societal transformation. When a given state has a strong and capable civil society, it is believed that it serves as a huge

potential and capacity for the state functions to be effectively undertaken. Similarly, civil society needs an enabling environment which is usually expected to be created by the state (Bradshaw 1993:353; Spalding 1996:66). Although this is the reality, state-society relations, particularly in developing nations, are characterised by a zero-sum game and competition instead of reinforcing each other.

Even though there is an agreement about the importance of the state and civil society for development, the nature of their relationship is often an area of dispute and unresolved agendas. Broadly put, civil society can be seen simply as the interaction and relationship between the private and public arena (Cohen 1999:66; Janoski 1998:16; Seligman 2000:13). This view pays more attention to the pattern of interactions and relationships between policy decision makers and the bodies outside the government; i.e., private for-profit and non-for-profit entities (Müller 2006:312).

However, Müller (2006:212, 312) argued that the state-society relationship is a matter that can be seen more clearly in more detailed classifications and perspectives, namely the empirical and normative perspectives. For him, the empirical perspective can be grouped into socio-cultural and reductionist views (i.e., the view that reduces the state-society relationship simply to an economic level). He classified the socio-cultural approach as generalist, maximalist and minimalist. While the generalist approach focuses on the restricted and responsible nature of government and thinking to the extent that civil society is a concept competing with democracy, maximalists perceive civil society as broad umbrella term, but as a non-governmental arena, and interpret the relationship of state-society as ranging from political to public and the for-profit market. In other words, it is an institutional setup that takes place outside the state including for-profit market institutions, political parties, various types of associations and social alliances. Minimalists view civil society as separate from both the state and the market. In this case, the relations of civil society with the state are manifested not only in their effort to represent the separate arena of social cohesion that works over and above certain specific bonds and interests but also in its efforts to promote shared identity between disconnected individuals. In the same way, the reductionist approach has been

classified into two subcategories: left-wing and the right-wing or capitalist libertarians the details of which were discussed in Section 2.3 of this chapter.

The normative account of civil society, according to Müller (2006:317), assumes that civil society is not a solution for everything but a necessary evil in town for the process of democratisation, development and societal transformation is unlikely without it. In this case, the relationship between civil society and the state is characterised by either supportive or mutually dependent relations or is indirectly proportional where we have either a larger range of the state's functions and smaller scope of civil society or the other way around.

It is strongly believed that, as one of the main actors, civil society plays essential role in contemporary efforts of social transformation. Hence, development and governance cannot be achieved without the support of civil society. Taking this into account, most countries, including authoritarian regimes, allow the existence of civil society in the process of social transformation. This is true for most of the countries in the world except for a few paternalistic states such as North Korea and Turkmenistan (Lewis 2013:325). However, the extent and dynamics of this inclusion or exclusion varies. In this regard, scholars classify the relationship between state and civil societies into two, namely, supportive and confrontational or contested. Scholars refer to the former as synergy (Evans 1996:1119), collaboration (Syal, Wessel & Sahoo 2021:797), and cooperation (Lewis 2013:330). This view of state-civil society relationship, according to Kalinowski (2008:346), is generally an optimistic view which assumes that state needs civil society to discharge its responsibilities and to live up to the expectation of citizens.

In this regard, state uses civil society in two ways. The first one can be seen from the functionalist aspect or optimist view (Lewis 2013:328) which emanates from the complementarity (Evans 1996) of civil society functions to the state function and cooptation (Kalinowski 2008:334; Lewis 2013:328; Syal 2021:797). In terms of complementarity, in some cases, civil society undertakes important functions that overlap with the objectives of the state. Hence, civil society and the state work in a cooperative and supportive mode as they get mutual advantage from the intervention. In

such cases, civil society complements the functions of the state. The incentive for civil society to work in such modality is that it helps them to have a smooth relationship with the government, which ultimately enables them to ensure their objectives. The incentive for the state is that civil society help the government by addressing areas such as services delivery, feeding the poor or cleaning up polluted rivers that the government may not be able to address. The government, therefore, allows civil society to operate in such areas because of its limited capacity to live up to the expectations of citizens in all dimensions of life. Cooptation is a mode of cooperation and co-existence of state and civil society. This modality of supportive relationship takes place in a situation where what Lewis (2013:328) called “state-sponsored associations” such as youth associations, women associations and development associations exist in the system to promote and legitimise the state.

The second aspect is confrontation or contestation which Kalinowski (2008:346) called the pessimistic view of state-civil society relations. The confrontational nature of state-civil society relationship lies in the challenging and contesting nature and tendency of CSOs. According to Bekalu and Wassihun (2021:84), this perspective of state-civil society’s relations emphasises that more space and autonomy should be allowed that CSOs need to enjoy for them to be able to exert pressure and make the state accountable.

2.7 DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS, THEORIES AND VARIOUS MODELS

2.7.1 Concepts of Development

Although the origin of development is attributed to the beginning of the Cold War (Corbridge 2007:180) and the second half of the twentieth century is said to be the era of development (Thomas 2000:5), some scholars argue that the concept of development is not new and has more than 200 years of history (Esteva 1992:7). Others argue that the concept of development is much older than that (Soares Jr. & Quintella 2008:105) and there is an attempt to take it back to the period of ancient Greek philosophers. For instance, according to Buch-Hansen (2012:303), Aristotle

conceptualised development as a change which is basically 'natural' that takes place in the cycle of living being's life ranging from birth to death.

Development is a much-contested concept which does not have a universal definition. There are different meanings and senses of development that make the notion inherently ambiguous. There is also the problem of multiplicity in the conceptualisation of development. There is no clear-cut answer and consensus whether development deals with state or market; whether it deals with economic growth or individual wellbeing; and whether it is good or bad. Development in human society is a many-sided process. As a result, scholars view and conceptualise it from different perspectives.

One of the dominant ways of conceptualising development is equating development with economic growth. Here, development is basically interpreted in terms of improvement in a country's economic conditions measured by certain parameters such as GDP or the real output of goods and services measured in terms of increase in income, savings, or investment (Bekele & Regassa 2012:3-4; Chiappero-Martinetti, Jacobi & Signorelli 2015:224). Scholars in this stream of thinking reside in the tradition of the neoclassical economic growth model and are mainly characterised by viewing development as something that takes place in a linear or unilinear manner, assuming that countries develop in the same way overtime (Bekele & Regassa 2012:4; Lall 1996:111; Schumpeter 1989 cited in Soares Jr. & Quintella 2008:108). One of the typical evidences for this is the observation of Rostow (1959:1) who viewed development in a hierarchical and linear way designated as the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the derive-to-maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption. According to Willis (2005:3) and Pieterse (2001:6), people in this category see development as modernity and tend to understand development from an economic perspective. They consider wealth as a good measurement and an indicator of development assuming that other essential aspects of quality of life and social elements such as education and health come after the creation of greater wealth.

Conceptualisation of development from an economic growth perspective alone has faced several challenges and counter-arguments from scholars. This argument is grounded on the idea that development is a multidimensional process (Todaro & Smith 2015:18; Vázquez & Sumner 2013:1730). Development is not just one thing or just one criterion or just one indicator like the GNP, but it is related to all aspects of society. Seers (1969:5), for instance, argues that GDP per capita is insufficient to explain development and, thus, development has also to be seen from the perspectives of poverty, unemployment and inequality. Todaro and Smith (2015:18, 22) also conceptualised development as representing changes in all aspects of society in terms of social structure, attitudes, institutions and reduction of poverty and inequality to fulfil individual and social needs and aspirations. To further strengthen the multi-dimensionality of development, Todaro and Smith classified and described three core values of development, namely, a) sustenance which indicates the ability to meet basic needs; b) self-esteem referring to the feeling of worthiness; and c) freedom from servitude which refers to having choices and alternatives in line with preferences.

According to Vázquez and Sumner (2013:1731-32), development can also be seen from the perspectives of the history of thinking and can be framed into four views. First, drawing on the conceptualisation of Lewis (1954), these authors explain development as a structural transformation, transformation from agricultural to non-agricultural, and from rural to urban where industrialisation, changes in societal structure and growth in economy were detrimental in conceptualising and understanding development. The second view is development as enhancing human development which gives attention to basic need of human beings including food, shelter, income, employment and public goods. The third perspective looks at development as democratic participation and an improved system of governance. It emphasises enhancing the citizens' voice in policy processes, human rights and freedom and access to quality services. Finally, development as environmental sustainability is concerned with the depletion of environment resulting from economic growth and mismanagement of environmental resources. It conceptualises development as an adoption of environmentally friendly policies that promote and ensure sustainability of the environment.

Bellù (2011:2-3) argues that development is a holistic, multidimensional and all-encompassing endeavour. To this end, the author classifies it into at least four dimensions. The first dimension is economic development which focuses not only on how goods and services are economically consumed, but also the formation of new goods and services for further consumption. The second dimension is territorial development which assumes that development is realised by optimally utilising and exploiting the social, economic, environmental and institutional endowments of one's geographic area without underestimating the importance and influence of the relationship with others in other geographic areas. The third dimension is sustainable development which deals with the sustainability of the socio-economic system. Human development is the other important dimension which gives emphasis to ensuring the wellbeing of citizens and their healthy relationship with society. Emphasising this, the UNDP (2010:13) describes human development based on aggregate notions formed from three dimensions, namely; education or knowledge measured by mean years of schooling; health measured by life expectancy at birth; and living standards measured by gross national income per capita. Human development, according to Bellù (2011:4), is considered as an end in itself because it fundamentally plays a role in ensuring empowerment, self-esteem and self-reliance, and enhancement of social bonds and the fabric of society.

Chambers (2005:186) and Bellù (2011:2) viewed development as good changes. Admitting what Robert Chambers says, Allan Thomas (2000:24) stated that development in its briefest form can be seen as good changes, but then asks: is that what we are dealing with? He argued that there are different meanings and senses of development that make the notion as inherently ambiguous. First, he looked at development as a comprehensive and all-encompassing notion that does not change only one aspect of life. Second, he considered development as not just a dramatic and one-time shift to another, better zone, but a continuous process of change and improvement which builds on the previous improvements. Third, he described development as a social change that has also an influence for human subjects living in it in terms of shaping their thinking and patterns of interaction. Fourth, development is

not always considered as positive as any improvement on the previous way of life may create either loser or winners. This means that development is two-sided, both good and bad. Arriola (1983) argued that reaching development in the Global North has caused bad development in the Global South. In other words, there is always a flip-side. Whenever we say development and think it is good, it may have unintended consequences or bad consequences especially in the South, particularly when it gives more exploitative power to the developed nations and when the power relationship between the developed and underdeveloped countries is unbalanced (Arriola, 2005:19-20; Raúl Prebisch, date, cited in Romaniuk 2017:2). This exploitative relationship has emerged due to the distorted form of dependency theory i.e. dependent accumulation which caused underdevelopment of the Global South (Pieterse 2001:6). Finally, Thomas (2000:24-25) takes two notions of development: imminent versus intentional development. Imminent development is spontaneous, unconscious, natural development which takes place almost in and by itself. Counterpoised is intentional development which is too structured (not too chaotic), planned, predictable and intentional and is achieved through deliberate efforts according to set objectives.

Development can also be conceptualised from the perspective of poverty. According to the World Bank (1997) and UNDP (1997) cited in Chambers (2005:185), development is believed to play a major role in making the world a better place to live in, particularly for the poor people. Thomas also agrees with this argument stating that, over the long-term, development implies moving towards getting rid of poverty, which has significant implications for improved standards of life and social wellbeing (Thomas 2000:11, 23). For Sen (1999:4,10), the 1998 Nobel Prize winner, development is a process of increasing human welfare and freedom that people deserve to enjoy from the perspectives of economic facilities, social opportunities, political freedoms, transparency guarantees and protective security, where enhancement of human capabilities is of paramount importance. However, Sen (1999:87) argues that poverty is a deprivation of human capabilities. People living in a state of poverty are deprived and unable to make substantive choices or take valuable actions (Todaro & Smith 2015:20) and any effort towards fighting against poverty is therefore a way toward to development. Scholars like

Pieterse (2001:7) put development in historical context and analysed the changes in meaning and concept of development overtime. To this end, the meaning of development has changed overtime from 1870s where it was seen from a more recent perspective as industrialisation to 1990s and afterwards where the post-development standpoint of anti-development began to dominate. For the purpose of this study, development can be conceptualised as a systematised intervention by key development actors in collaborative affairs to bring about positive changes.

2.7.2 Theories of Development

The whole notion and purpose of this section is to theorise development by identifying the incidence and the basic way of thinking about the contemporary development debates. It focuses on the debates on development relating to the nature of industrialisation and modernity, the modernisation-dependency controversy, and the state-market dichotomy. For the sake of clarity, the issues are presented in this section based on three classifications made by Giddens (2006:405-411), namely market-oriented theories, people-centred (alternative development) theory and state-centred theories of development.

2.7.2.1 Market-oriented theories

- *Modernisation theory*

Modernisation theory, which was dominant in 1950s and 1960s, is a theory that helps to explain the process of modernity focusing on how societies make progressive transitions from primitive and backward to a modern state of life. The idea was originated by the German sociologist, Max Weber, and was later taken up by other scholars like Parsons who assumed that backward countries can develop by following in the footprints of modernised society (Dibua 2006:20-22; Rapley 2007:24; Wolfgang 2003:97). This theory basically assumes that the transformation from traditional backward (or according to Max Weber “irrational”) society to modern society takes place in a phased and linear manner through diffusion of knowledge, technology, culture and modern institutions (Da Silva 2015:1). In other words, the theory calls for the

westernisation of developing countries as it assumes that replicating the western development experience is the only way for traditional societies to develop.

Halperin (2018:2) stated that the assumption of modernisation theory is founded on Rostow (1990:4-16), the American Economic historian who, in his book entitled “*The Stage of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*”, intensively explained development as a series of evolutionary and sequential stages arguing that societies have to pass through to ensure development. According to Reyes (2012:3), Przeworski and Limongi (1997:158), and Valencia (2017:7), the theory emphasises a progressive accumulation of social changes that are take place over time in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary manner.

The notion of modernisation theory has been roundly critiqued. First, it provides only one perspective of a development model grounded on western countries’ experience and ignored the development model of East Asian countries (such as Taiwan and South Korea) that sent a strong message about the possibility of growing without necessarily following the west’s path of development. The theory was also attacked for its huge emphasis on the elimination of Third World countries’ traditions assuming that these were an obstacle and did not create fertile ground for development (Dibua 2006:20-22; Killing 1984:45-56; Pongratz-Chander 2014:224; Reyes 2012:3).

- *Dependency theory*

Dependency theory as one of the Neo-Marxist or radical theories of development (Ghosh 2019:2) emerged in response to the failure of modernisation theory (Pongratz-Chander 2014:224). The claim of modernisation theory that traditional societies would achieve the characteristics of western modernity once they adopted North American society’s pattern of development did not materialise as traditional societies did not pass through the phases claimed by modernisation theory and they, thus, remained underdeveloped (Halperin 2018:2). In response to this, alternative thought and scholarly debates were initiated from the structuralist and Neo-Marxist intellectual leftist mainly based in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. The argument lies in the fact that

traditional societies are structurally different from western societies which implies the need for alternatives for development.

Dependency theory argues that the uneven relationship established based on the suggestion of modernisation theory and the structure created through the process of colonisation created an opportunity and structural convenience for advanced nations to take economic advantage of third-world countries. This asymmetrical structural relationship requires third-world countries to produce and export raw materials and unprocessed goods to advanced countries at low prices which basically gives the economic upper hand to the advanced countries and lets third-world countries remain impoverished and economically marginalised which ultimately makes it difficult for the poor countries to develop (Halperin 2018:3).

Dependency theory, in the words of Velasco (2002:44), is, therefore, “[...] a theory of underdevelopment: poor countries exiled to the periphery of the world economy could not develop as long as they remain enslaved by the rich nations of the centre”. There are two views held by intellectuals on dependency theory: those who are typically radical and suggest a total economic de-linkage of the periphery from the centre (e.g. André Gunder Frank and Amir Samin) and others who seem moderate and optimistic thinkers about dependency theory (e.g. Fernando Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Pedro Paz and others) that it is not bad in its entirety as it benefits, but not necessarily equally, both the advanced and the poor world (Ibid:44-45).

- *World systems theory*

The world systems theory emerged in the mid-1970s at about the time when the East Asian countries began to challenge the western-led model of development, sending an important signal about the possibility of development without being dependent on western ideological traditions (Reyes 2012:3).

The world systems theory understands the world as the world of capitalism and elaborates on the exploitative nature of capitalism in poor countries. According to this theory, the world, which is seen as being exclusively dominated by a capitalist economy

since the sixteenth century, is classified into three: the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery which implies a tripartite relationship as opposed to the dual relationship of dependency theory (Halperin 2018:3; Reyes 2012:3).

While the core represents the industrial nations, the periphery stands for poor countries that are characterised by exporting unprocessed raw material and agricultural products. The semi-peripheries are countries like Brazil, South Korea and India which serve as a buffer zone between the core and the periphery. The semi-peripheries had some access to the international financial system and quality manufactured goods which enabled them to import high-tech from the core i.e. the industrial nations, and export semi-processed goods in return. Furthermore, they import raw materials from the periphery and export processed and value-added goods such as steel, automobiles and pharmaceuticals to the periphery with relatively high price. This situation puts them in an advantageous position compared to the periphery. Therefore, the semi-peripheries neither benefited from the approaches of developed nations nor were they marginalised to the extent of the periphery poor countries (Wallerstein 2004:61).

Emmanuel Wallerstein, the architect of world systems theory, seemed to take an optimistic stance by making a clear departure from the typical radical intellectuals of dependency theory in that he tended to see capitalism and the spread of large markets as an opportunity for the periphery to arrive at the position of semi-periphery countries and then aspire to the status of core countries (Wallerstein 2004:60-62).

- *Neoliberal approach*

The great depression caused a major economic crisis to the US and the world economy. Between 1929 and 1930, the US GDP decreased by more than 30% and unemployment rate reached the level of 25%. Economists and politicians were, thus, concerned about the causes of these crises. It was believed by many at that time that regulation and state intervention were the direct cause of unemployment, stagnation and related financial instabilities. After the crises the British economist John Maynard Keynes, in contrast to the assumptions of neoclassical theory, made the point that the

instability observed during these crises are attributed to the fact that prices are, at least in the short term, not always flexible which is particularly true for wages (Palley 2005:22; Quiggin 2018:146). He argued that that these crises can be prevented or smoothed out by the action of the government through fiscal and monetary policies. In other words, he optimistically emphasised the positive role of the state in stabilising the economy. Another prominent scholar who contributed to economic analysis after Keynes was Joan Violet Robinson who lived between 1903 and 1983. Supporting Keynes, Robinson argued that markets are probably efficient mechanisms in the allocation of scarce resources and setting of prices but generally fail to provide full employment and prevent major macroeconomic instabilities.

After this post Keynesian period, in the 1970s and 1980s, we had a radical move away from the Keynesian model because the Keynesian policies did not work well (Palley 2005:21). It was claimed in most countries that the Keynesian policies led to a huge public deficit, inflation, external deficits and capital flight followed by financial austerity. These concerns led economists and politicians to what we call the “Washington Consensus”, the expression coined by an economist John Williamson, where the market was seen as the most efficient means of organising the economy (Munck 2005:60). The Washington Consensus is a list of ten principles mainly used by the Washington-based institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to advise countries during crises. According to ChinaFile (date, cited in Peck 2018:xxvi), the items on the list are fiscal discipline, redirection of public expenditure, tax reform, interest rate liberalisation, competitive exchange rate, trade liberalisation, liberalisation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), privatisation, deregulation and securing property rights. In short, the Washington Consensus was all about stabilising, liberalising and privatising. The set of principles in the Washington Consensus today, according to Boas and Gans-Morse (2009:149), Stiglitz (2008) and Munck (2005:60), is often equated with neoliberalism and market fundamentalism.

Neoliberalism is a relatively new concept that emerged out of the ideas of the Washington Consensus and in reaction to the failure of the Keynesian welfare state

model even though its theoretical roots go back to the classical liberalism promoted by Adam Smith (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009:158; Clarke 2005:58; Peck, Brenner & Theodore 2018:3). According to Cahill, Cooper, Konings and Primrose (2018: xxvii) and Thorsen (2012:181), it is a relatively new concept and a new phenomenon that has enjoyed a huge attention in recent years.

According to Boas and Gans-Morse (2009:143-144), neoliberalism is used in four ways i.e. policies, development model, ideology and paradigm. The policy usage of neoliberalism mainly focuses on liberalisation of the entire economy, rolling the state back to minimise its role in the economy, and stabilisation of macroeconomic situation. From the development model point of view, neoliberalism is seen as a tool to fix economic ills. It is considered as a development strategy consisting not only various economic theories but also the roles that different actors i.e. the state, private sector and civil society play and the rules of the game by which their relationship has to be governed. As an ideology, the conceptualisation of neoliberalism revolves around the role of individualism. Finally, the term neoliberalism is used to denote an academic paradigm, which is tightly related to neoclassical economic theory.

Neoliberalism gives emphasis to shifting of power from political to economic and from state to market (Akarçay & Gökhan 2018:344; Tranøy 2006, cited in Thorsen 2012:190). According to Harvey (2005:2), neoliberalism helps to ensure individual entrepreneurial rights where property rights, free market and free trade are promoted through a proper institutional framework. In this case, the role of the state is limited to creating a conducive instructional framework to assure the above-mentioned rights that individual agents need to enjoy. For the proponents of neoliberalism, according to Kingstone (2018:203), all economic problems are the direct outcomes of excessive state intervention in the economy.

Neoliberalism is driven by material interest and competition in daily life and there is a continual drive towards doing things better. This is how development occurs according to neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is based on particular values such as the importance of individual responsibility i.e., individual rights and freedom, stressing the role of

competition with acceptance of unequal economic status. In other words, there is competition almost like Darwinian Theory whereby the strongest or the most motivated or the best equipped will win. It is inherently unequal and inequality is accepted as part of the model. Neoliberals emphasise the importance of economic growth and pursue policies that improve market efficiency (Amable 2011:5; Bauman 2000:34; Scharff 2011:121). It assumes the market as “a moral force penalising the idle and incompetent and rewarding the enterprising and hard-working” (Clarke 2005:51). Due to its assumptions that people are responsible to decide about their own failure or success, it has exposed the poor segment of the society to being blamed for being poor (Passas 2000:22).

The conceptual usage of neoliberalism has two distinctive perspectives denoting its merits and demerits which, however, vary from scholars to scholar. For instance, Clarke (2005:51) and Gray (1998, cited in Horsley 2010:4) used terms like “good” and “bad” while Quiggin (2018:144) used the terms “soft” and “hard”. On the other hand, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009:140-141) used the terms “positive” and “negative” to denote the merits and demerits of neoliberalism. The negative perspective of neoliberalism arises from its attachment to the traditional laissez-faire classical economics that promotes market fundamentalism. The focus of neoliberalism on individualism and its acceptance of inequality as a normal phenomenon exposed it to criticism. This focus of neoliberalism on individualist values which ultimately posit that individuals are self-centred, egoistic, guided by the principle of accumulating material wealth, and caring for nothing except personal advancement (Horsley 2010:12) underestimates the importance of social elements in life.

The positive perspective of neoliberalism emanates from its characteristics to readjust and reform itself in an incremental way. This reflects the contemporary and modern thinking that emanates from its intention to improve on the precedent laissez-faire classical economics approach and an interest in emphasising and promoting the humanistic element (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009:139). The positive aspect, as opposed to the negative perspective, is that in its contemporary sense, neoliberalism tries to

deactivate the growing inequalities and improve social welfare (Quiggin 2018:148). This is more of a reformist aspect that retains some characteristics of capitalism but seeks to eliminate the bad or negative consequences of it (Clarke 2005:51).

2.7.2.2 People-Centred Approach

- *People-centred (alternative) development approach*

Alternative development, which gained ground in 1970s (Korten 1984:342; Pieterse 2001:7), is called alternative because it gives attention neither to the state nor to the market, but to the people. The alternative, people-centred approach was born out of the failure of the economic growth-oriented thinking of development and the technocratic top-down approach and calls for a more bottom-up, grassroots perspectives in addressing political, social, cultural, environmental or ethical matters associated with human welfare (Eade 1997:14-15; Lewis & Kanji 2009:57; Ospina & Masullo-Jiménez 2017:102; Pieterse 1998:346).

In the words of Pieterse (2009:342), the “alternative development approach is a critical, bottom-up oriented approaches to development that are centred on society (rather than on the state or market)”. It tends to understand development from the perspectives of the disempowered and approaches it from below where communities and NGOs are empowered to expand their choices and participate in a meaningful way and become agents of their own development (Pieterse 1998:346). In support of this, the UNDP (2011:2) argues “[...] people must be at the centre of development, both as beneficiaries and as drivers, as individuals and in groups. People must be empowered with the tools and knowledge to build their own communities, states and nations”.

This approach is claimed to ensure sustainable and equitable development by adopting bottom-up participation, empowerment, gender equality and an environmentally friendly approach (Lewis & Kanji 2009:60; Ospina & Masullo-Jiménez 2017:102; Schenck & Hlouw 1995:84-85).

The alternative development approach also emphasises what Pieterse (2001:7) and Friedman (1992) termed “human flourishing” (probably drawing on what UNRISD called

“capacitation” in 1974), which denotes a human being’s capacity of being fully human. The UNDP which initially called it “sustainable human development” and later on a “people-centred approach” conceptualised it as the mechanism of enhancing peoples’ capabilities and choices in order to capacitate them to realise their own needs with a better potential (UNDP 2011:2). The UNDP maintains a firm stand that enhancing human capabilities is essential to expanding peoples’ choices. According to Nicholls (1998:18), the above conceptualisation of the UNDP indicates that development occurs when people are not only considered as a means but the ends resulting in development of the people, by the people, for the people.

The “capabilities approach” understanding of development by Amartya Sen is closely related to the people-centred approach as it assumes that the main objective of development is to enhance peoples’ quality of life which is realised through access to capabilities, namely: basic goods and services, utilities and basic needs (Eade 1997:16; Sen 1985).

When we look at the above structural (or radical), neoliberal and people-centred perspectives, there is an agreement about the need for change and development but they differ in the way they perceive how development occurs. To this end, the structural model bases itself in the ideological tradition of collectivism and collective responses representing the values that reflect concerns for social justice, conflict and struggle which are inevitable. Inequalities are not accepted as in the liberal model and are to be eliminated by changing the economic, social and political structure that exacerbates disparity. Therefore, they assume that government plays an essential role in achieving these. The neoliberal model gives more attention to economic growth through policy mechanisms characterised by persistent promotion of market efficiency and doing things better which is, of course, driven by material interests and competition where individual responsibilities are given more emphasis and uneven economic status is tolerated.

The alternative development approach or people-centred approach calls not for structural or major structural change in society but for small-scale development under

local control with people becoming the agents of their own development. The approach is very much human-centred as it assumes that the satisfaction of human needs is the purpose of development. So, human needs are the basis, neither the market nor the state, where participation and empowerment of citizens take central place rather than economic growth. In that sense, the alternative development approach was a reaction to the limitations of the structural model and the neoliberal model.

2.7.2.3 State-centred theories

- *Theory of developmental state*

The concept of the developmental state is used mainly by international political economy scholars to denote the miraculous economic growth registered in East Asian countries in the late twentieth-century post-World War II era due to state-dominated macroeconomic planning and policy (Caldentey 2009:27). It is the notion that was first coined in the early 1980s by authors who studied the East Asian miracle, notably the contribution of Johnson (1982) who formulated the notion of the developmental state, which was based on the experiences of Japan, Taiwan and Korea. According to Leftwich (2000:157), the idea of developmental state was first coined by Chalmers Johnson (1982) who published a seminal work to explain the post-war Japanese miraculous growth. Following Johnson, two other authors, namely, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) made extensive use of the term in explaining the subsequent miraculous growth registered by Taiwan and South Korea following Japan (Pham 2012:28).

The developmental state model is believed to transform the economy of East Asian countries from backward substantial agrarian tradition to a more industrial development characterised by rapid economic growth (Ovadia & Wolf 2018:1056). According to Routley (2012:8), the developmental state refers to “sufficient state capacity to be effective in its targeted areas and has a developmental vision such that it chooses to use this capacity to work towards economic development”. State capacity in this sense denotes the capability of the state not only to set development goals and visions but

also to enforce their implementation particularly in disruptive and demanding socio-economic situations (Wylde 2018:1115).

Even though the tenets and prestige of this model have been challenged and have declined, as argued by Caldentey (2009:28), the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America, the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia, the impact of globalisation which is beyond the state and the influence of Washington Consensus ideological power and attacks from neoliberals and neo-conservatives, it is still regarded as a competing development model. The signal for the continuation of this model is evidenced by the fact that several Asian countries and African countries have taken it up. After its first appearance in Japan, it was taken up by the neighbouring countries Taiwan and South Korea in 1980s. Following this, it was adopted by various South Asian countries and some African countries, namely: Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and Ethiopia but exercised under different economic and political traditions (IMF 2011; Leftwich 1994; Ovadia & Wolf 2018:1056; Routley 2012:10; Routley 2014:160; Pham 2012:43, 52).

Johnson (1982:19) defined the developmental state as a state whose main aim is realising economic development by devising and enforcing necessary policy measures. In other words, it represents the state that takes on developmental functions to lead the industrialisation drive. For Caldentey (2009:28), the term developmental state denotes the state that is characterised by dominating the direction and pace of economic development. In general terms, the developmental state is characterised by a ruthless commitment to national economic development which is the overriding characteristic in Korea, Singapore and others. It is based on the notion that as long as development can be ensured, everything is all right even if it comes at some social costs. In other words, all other things are made subservient to national economic development. The developmental state is led by the developmental elite responsible for the bureaucracy which was shielded from interest groups and foreign influences which made possible certain market interventions by the government which also resulted in a weak civil society. However, different scholars have different views, which is not surprising as they have a diversity of experiences, exposure and contexts.

Routley (2012:161) summarised the views of different scholars on characteristics of developmental state as a capable, autonomous (but embedded) bureaucracy (Evans, 1995), political leadership oriented towards development (Fritz & Menocal 2007:534; Musamba 2010), a close, often mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship between some state agencies (often discussed as pilot agencies) and key industrial capitalists (Johnson 1982; 1987), and successful policy interventions which promote growth (Wade 1990; Beeson 2004). Building on the views of these scholars, Routley (2012:20-24) articulated the idea of the developmental state as having such attributes as capable bureaucracy and embedded autonomy; legitimacy based on developmental outcomes; developmental political settlement which is closely related to elite commitment and agreement on developmental vision; and business-state relations and industrial policy.

A developmental state is neither commensurate with the neoclassical grounded minimal state thinking nor with the exclusively state-led, centrally planned economic system. Johnson (1982:18-19) argued that a developmental state, which he called “plan-rational”, is characterised by identifying and prioritising development agendas that leads towards the achievement of socio-economic objectives. This feature makes it different from the command economic system which Johnson refers to as “plan-ideological” system. Hence, as argued by Woo-Cumings (1999:2), it is located somewhere between the liberal free market economic systems and centrally planned economic system which makes it, as stated by Bolesta (2007:106), neither capitalist nor socialist. According to Bolesta (2007:106), the concept of the developmental state was introduced as a point of departure from neoliberal economic ideology giving attention to the importance of state intervention in the entire economy, not to dominate the socio-economic development in its entirety, as in the command economic system, but to promote development as a priority.

According to Caldentey (2009:30), there are four key features underpinning the developmental state. The first one is that it conceives the state as interventionist where the state intervenes in a number of areas through various mechanisms of control. Second, this interventionist nature does not necessarily mean that public ownership is

exercised exclusively in the developmental state. Instead, to realise its goals, the developmental state makes use of various instruments that are related to industrial, trade and financial policies. Third, in the developmental state, the extent of state intervention varies depending on internal and external factors and stages of industry life cycle that the state is interested to encourage. Finally, the developmental state needs capable bureaucracy that is able to discharge bureaucratic responsibilities effectively and enforce the development plan devised by the state.

According to Vu (2007:28), a developmental state is characterised by two aspects, namely, developmental structures (or state capacity) and developmental roles which Zenawi (2012:167) also called structure and ideology, mainly implying the capacity and commitment of the state to initiate and pursue development agendas. According to these scholars, mainly Vu, for a developmental state to exist in a meaningful way and to achieve its objectives, the two aspects i.e. developmental structures and developmental roles are required to exist together in a blend manner because the state utilises structure or capacity to accomplish all the developmental roles.

As summarised by Pham (2012:90-91), the ideal type of developmental state is characterised by development-oriented leadership, competent state bureaucracy, pilot agency, embeddedness, sufficient state autonomy, selectivity, capacity for mastering the market, capacity to organise civil society, capacity to organise private interests, and good performance and legitimacy despite poor human rights. Pham argued that the first five have to do with the extent to which the structure of the organisation and the human elements are up to the required quality standard. The next two characteristics deal with the extent to which the state is capable and effective in its intervention mechanisms while the remaining elements occur as a consequence of the first seven. He further argued that, for a state to be developmental, initially, it has to possess the first four components, namely, development-oriented leadership, embeddedness, sufficient state autonomy, and capacity for mastering the market, without which it is impossible to ensure the rest.

Even though the scholars engaged in the conceptualisation and characterisation of the developmental state differ on some parameters, one can see that there is a common thread that the main function of developmental state goes beyond the normative role of the state; i.e. keeping peace and order, collecting taxes, regulating monopolies and negative externalities, and correcting market failures.

From the above discussion on the theories of development, it is clear that while the market-centred theories focus on rolling back the state from dominance of the entire economy, the state-centred theory stresses the key role that the state has to play in fostering development. As opposed to the people-centred or alternative development approaches, the developmental state places greater emphasis on placing people at the centre. It stresses the importance of having the people as a central player in setting and implementing their own agenda. We can also see that the above theories discussed under the classification of market-oriented, people-centred and state-centred are all relevant and operative, but their emphasis is different. The market-oriented approach particularly manifested in the (neo) liberal model led to the Washington Consensus as exemplified by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to some extent the World Trade Organisation (WTO) with the liberal assumptions of open trade and rolling back the role of government which is the dominant part of (neo) liberal thinking. The alternative development as people-centred approach and as sustainable human development which was based on the Washington Consensus is mainly reflected in the millennium declarations, MDGs and SDGs of recent times. The state-centred or structural model which is exemplified by the notion of developmental state and also reinforced by Caracas Consensus was fundamentally dominated by the reorganisation of society along structuralist principles. These models exist at the same time and compete for attention at the global level and are, in many cases, applied interchangeably in developing countries.

2.8 GOVERNANCE

Many initiatives including the governance reform were launched almost ubiquitously between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s after the decade of overwhelming dominance by

the concept of new public management. The move towards governance was seen to be fundamental because current society is dealing with “wicked problems” that cannot be addressed by public organisations alone. There is, therefore, an increasing need for partnership and cooperation with non-state actors and the need for increasing the role of citizens in various activities in co-planning and co-management (Bovaird & Löffler, 2003:315). Although it is difficult to find a consensual definition of the term governance in the literature, the concept has been widely employed in the last two decades that some authors point to an ‘industry’ of governance (Kersbergen & Waarde, 2004:143).

As studies indicate, the term governance comes with considerable prior theoretical and ideological baggage and nowadays it is found in different fields such as a) private firms where corporate governance is a common theme; b) public administrations where public governance is a central theme; and c) global institutions and their policy prescriptions to member countries where ‘good’ governance and global governance are the central themes (Cepiku 2004:2; Osborne 2010:6). The term has to do with the idea of order, or a set of rules that guide how things should be undertaken. It is conceptualised as the stewardship of various processes of activities in society and is concerned with how the desired end results can be realised (Kimani 2009:31).

Governance involves both formal and non-formal systems of interactions to arrive at decisions and solve problems (Kapucu, Yuldashev & Bakiev 2009:40). It is considered as a dimension of jointly determined norms and rules designed to regulate individual and group behaviour (Ostrom 1990). Governance refers to the rules and forms that guide collective decision-making. It is not about one individual making a decision but rather about groups of individuals or organisations or systems of organisations making decisions (Stoker 2004). Much has been said about the emergence of new, non-state institutions of governance (Haas 2004:2), where the focus of analysis has shifted from state law (Hindess 1996) to the wider range of agencies and sites of governance, which govern through a variety of forms of power and largely in their own interests with far-reaching collective impacts (Slaughter 2004:19). Given the empirical reality of the extent to which the modern state ‘rules’, it does so on the basis of a network of relations

formed among the complex of institutions, organisations and apparatuses that make it up, and between state and non-state institutions (Rose & Miller 1992:174). In support of this idea, some scholars (e.g. O’Leary, Gerard & Bingham 2006:7) describe governance as the means to steer the process that affects decisions among various actors. Ansell and Gash (2008:2) also claimed that it is about collective decision-making that could include public and non-state actors. More specifically, governance is “a set of coordinating and monitoring activities” that enable the survival of the collaborative partnership or institution (Bryson, Crosby & Stone 2006:49).

Instead of relying on state-centric, top-down and hierarchical decision-making, effective governance requires mutual understanding, consensus and collaboration of all concerned stakeholders and actors in the society. In addition to bringing the agenda of participation and civil society to the front position, it takes transparency, openness, accountability, and devolution of power into account (Toksöz 2008:17; Kooiman 2003:5; Torfing, Peters, Pierre & Sorenson 2012:3).

The emergence of the concept of governance as a new agenda in the development paradigm has shifted the traditional one-way system of governance, where one party governs the other, to a pattern of relationship where all societal actors are involved in decision-making to achieve the desired goal. In addition to establishing the political, economic and administrative power for societies to deal with their problems and make decisions, governance provides mechanisms, processes, and institutions for achieving their goals and realising their aspirations. This implies that governance is characterised by “mutual interaction and shared set of responsibilities among social actors” (Kooiman 2003:5; Toksöz 2008:5).

The idea of governance stresses that most activities should be undertaken more at market and society level and less on a hierarchical or state level. It stresses the essence of having state and non-state actors in governance, development and societal transformation. It emphasises the importance of involving concerned stakeholders and actors including the state, market and civil society in the process of decision-making in a decentralised and participatory way to promote equity, fairness, accountability and

inclusiveness and thereby ensure societal development (Aktan & Özler 2008:174; Swyngedouw 2005:1992). Hence, governance is government plus the private and not-for-profit bodies. It is a process where state and non-state actors contribute not only to devising and implementing policy instruments but also in delivering public services to realise development goals (Smith 2007:3; WB 1989:2).

At this juncture, it is also important to highlight the concept of good governance. Good governance emerged as a concept in 1980s following the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) implemented in Africa with the intention of changing economic and institutional structures using tools such as stabilisation, privatisation and deregulation. Unfortunately, SAP was not successful in Africa and the failure of this programme led the WB and other donor agencies to identify poor governance as the major sources of African crises. The notion of good governance became popular in the discourse of development after the 1989 WB Report on Africa, which indicated that the main reason for Africa's underdevelopment was a crisis of governance or bad governance resulting from corruption of different types, unaccountable and irresponsive governments, lack of capacity, and violations of human rights (Grindle 2010:2; Leftwich 1994:370).

These manifestations of bad governance had become increasingly dangerous and called for the attention of concerned international communities, financial institutions and donor agencies. Consequently, the international development agencies started to believe that good governance is instrumental for developing countries to ensure economic development. Since then, the concept has taken a central place in the discourse of development and has been defined in different ways. For instance, the UNDP (1997:14-15) emphasises that the concept constitutes nine main characteristics including rule of law, participation, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability and strategic vision. Good governance can also be conceptualised as economic and political order that functions through representation, participation, superiority of law and an effective civil society (Aktan & Özler 2008:182). According to Grindle (2010:3), the notion of good

governance has been pronounced across various political spectrums. She asserted that:

For those on the political right, good governance has meant order, rule of law, and the institutional conditions for free markets to flourish. For those on the political left, good governance incorporates notions of equity and fairness, protection for the poor, for minorities, and for women and a positive role for the state. For many others found along the continuum from right to left, the concept is attractive for its concern about order, decency, justice, and accountability.

It needs to be borne in mind that civil society is instrumental in operationalising the major pillars of good governance discussed above. However, the scope and magnitude of their contribution is determined by political ideology (i.e., political right vs. political left).

2.9 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND RESEARCH GAPS

In the analysis conducted under the heading "The State of the Enabling Environment for CSOs in Afghanistan", Roy (2017) described civil society is the key development agent and often operates under pressures imposed by the external environment that is not enabling. The researcher conducted the study by examining the legal framework, governance, socio-cultural environment, financial environment, and security environment. The study found that the contextual environment in which civil society operates in Afghanistan is neither completely enabling nor absolutely restrictive. Although funding and security issues are addressed in this study, the study is limited in that it does not examine the internal contextual factors that affect civil society. In addition, it applied simple descriptive statistics methodologically, although it was possible to go beyond and make comparisons across different parameters. The study also failed to include some important contextual factors, including ideological, economic, and political factors, in a sound and strict sense.

Using the Enabling Environment Index (EEI), CIVICUS (2013) conducted a study comparing and ranking countries worldwide, including Ethiopia. In order to analyse the

enabling environment of civil society, it used the socio-economic, socio-cultural, and governance environments. The study found that there were imbalanced scores between the measured dimensions of the enabling environment. Although the study addressed contextual factors, including political, economic, social, and cultural contexts, the analysis was limited to a specific point in time. Hence, changes across different periods were not captured.

Taking Brazil, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe as cases, Hossain and Oosterom (2021) analysed how closing the space in civil society adversely affects development by aggravating hunger and poverty. The authors noted that, notwithstanding differences in the political and economic environment, putting pressure on civil society through an unfavourable environment would prohibit and impede the broad engagement of civil society in development processes. However, they argued that the impact of civic space closures on development outcomes would depend not only on the contributions of civil society in the development process but also on how well the development programs and policies of the state and civil society are aligned. The study, particularly in Ethiopia's case, heavily relied on the legal context alone. Hence, they failed to look at the broad spectrum of external contextual factors, including the ideological, political, and economic environments, in the analysis.

Kamstra et al. (2016) examined the external factors influencing and challenging civil society. The study used four dimensions, including the level of democracy, political stability, rule of law, and economic development, that challenge civil society's strengths. The study considered associational membership as a proxy variable for civil society strength based on the data collected from 53 countries. The study concluded that, in terms of membership level, a harsh and unfavorable environment enhances the strength of civil society. Although this study was conducted using quantitative analysis, i.e., multilevel analysis, it failed to apply quantitative analysis to understand the influence of external contextual factors across different periods. In addition, it also failed to look at the ideological context from which all the political, legal, and economic factors emerge.

The contextual factors that affect the work of civil society, the relationship between the state and civil society, and the contributions and challenges that civil society faces in its engagement in societal transformation have been widely studied. Many studies have been conducted concerning the contextual factors or the enabling environment of civil society. For instance, from a legal context point of view, Dessie and Breuning (2021) conducted a study on "Building Civil Society? An Assessment of the New Ethiopian Civil Society Law and its Promise for Promoting Democracy." They conducted the study to understand if the current law has created an enabling environment for civil society to promote human and democratic rights compared to the 2009 law. They concluded that the new law could lead to a possible expansion of civil society. This study, however, is limited to the legal context based on the laws in effect since 2009; hence, it fails to give a picture of the legal context of civil society before 2009.

Roberts (2019) documented Ethiopia's case in his effort to explore the restriction of civil society space and activities in developing countries in the past decades. In his analysis, the civil society context in Ethiopia is divided into three phases: the 1991–2005 political opening, the 2005–2010 political closure, and the 2010–2018 hostile environments. He concluded that the environment for civil society was not conducive, which ultimately constrained them from contributing positively to the country's development. The study conducted by Robert had limitations in that he considered only political and legal contextual factors alone and did not regard economic and ideological factors seriously. The period considered in the study did not cover the period after 2018.

Under the title "Civil Society under Assault", Woldearegay (2018) also examined the context of civil society in Ethiopia, focusing on the legal context. The study's finding indicates that civil society could not discharge its responsibilities in promoting democracy in the country. The limitation of this study is that it focused on the legal context alone and ignored other potential contextual factors that affect the activities of civil society.

Various empirical studies were conducted in Ethiopia and elsewhere concerning state-civil society relations. One among these is the study conducted by Munalula, Vincent,

and Haggai (2018), who examined the state-civil society relationship in Zambia. They conducted a qualitative study by using data from interviews and secondary sources. The central focus of the study was to understand how the state and civil society work together and whether they see each other as friends or foes in the process of working towards furthering good governance and the development of the country. The study's findings imply that state-civil society relations in Zambia are characterised by mistrust, suspicion, and hostility. The limitation of this study is that, in addition to the weaknesses of the methodological approaches employed and the lack of analytical rigor, the study fails to use the established theoretical underpinnings that could be used as a lens to analyse and understand state-civil society relations better.

Kabonga and Zvokumba (2021) also carried out a study on state–civil society relations in Zimbabwe, focusing on the period after the fall of Mugabe. Using a qualitative approach, the article examined whether the democratisation of the system in Zimbabwe and the opening up of space for civil society in the country that the post-Mugabe regime leaders promised have been realised. The study's finding implies that the suppression and curtailing of civil society space were continued, as manifested through the continuation of the restrictive laws and superficial reforms. Specifically, the post-Mugabe government considered civil society organisations operating on advocacy and governance as foes and threats. The study focuses on analytical themes, including threats against CSOs, maintenance of restrictive laws, cosmetic reforms, and cooperation. However, other issues deserving equal attention in the analysis of state-civil society relations, i.e., the attitudes of government as well as civil society, the role of government agencies that regulate civil society, fairness in civil society treatment by the government, and the independence of civil society, were not considered in the study.

Bekalu and Wassihun (2021) also studied “Between Cooperation and /or Co-optation and Confrontation: Civil Society-State Relations in Ethiopia, from 1991 to 2018”. The finding of the study shows that in contrast to what the liberal rhetoric suggests, state-civil society relations in Ethiopia since 1991 have been more complex and manifested by the dynamics of accommodation and confrontation. The researchers tried to analyse

the politico-legal change over two different periods from 1991 up to 2005 and from 2005 up to 2018. However, as they used the qualitative analysis method, they failed to objectively compare and analyse the politico-legal changes and how state-civil society relations were shaped and affected across these two periods.

Syal, Wesse and Sahoo (2021) also analysed state-civil society relations from collaboration, co-optation, or navigation perspectives. The paper examines state-civil society collaboration in the context of India's risk reduction, where the space for civil society is limited. The finding indicates that interaction and agency extend beyond straightforward conceptions of co-optation and urge for a more diverse approach to investigating state-civil society cooperation in constrained civic spaces, with particular attention to navigation. Tadesse (2012) also studied "Complementary and Adversarial Stances in State-Civil Society Relationships and Their Implications for Democratisation and Development: The Case of Ethiopia". The study found that the relationship between the state and civil society was confrontational. The study suggested that this confrontational approach between the state and civil society should be loosened. Although this study focuses on Ethiopia as a case, it doesn't show the change and progress in state-civil society relations after 2012.

Tadesse and Steen (2019) studied "The impact of political context on state-civil society relations: actors' strategies in a developmental state". The article examines control and autonomy tactics used by both entities, i.e., the state and civil society, within the context of the EPRDF's developmental state to theorise state-civil society relations. Results imply state entities employ cross-purpose tactics to repress and/or co-opt organisations; the nature and applicability of the developmental state cause civil society to face its own problems and push them to create methods of autonomy that support its interactions with government institutions. Pellerin (2018) also analysed state-civil society relations under the EPRDF regime and examined how the relationship affects regime stability. The finding revealed that government control and suppression of civil society had weakened the contestation capacity of civil society. This situation not only indirectly halted the bridging capacity of civil society between the state and citizens but also

hampered civil society's contribution to the government's developmental agenda. These studies examined the EPRDF government's relationship with civil society, considering the EPRDF regime as a developmental state. However, EPRDF introduced the developmental state as a model only after 2005. Hence, the studies failed to show EPRDF's relationship with civil society in the period before the introduction of the developmental state, i.e., 1991–2004.

Empirical studies have been conducted concerning civil society's contributions and challenges. Examples include civil society's contributions to the promotion of democracy (Rakner 2021; Ashine & Berhanu 2021; Fidelis 2015), civil society's contribution to influencing climate change (Luhtakallio et al. 2022), civil society's contribution to uprisings and resistance against authoritarianism (Schulz 2015), contributions of civil society in promoting accountability (Ford & Philipponnat 2013), and contributions of civil society in societal transformation (Feleke 2015). While attempting to contribute to countries' development and governance processes, civil society faces different challenges. These challenges have been documented in different empirical studies. For instance, Akindede, Ayoola, and Ameen (2017) study evaluated the challenges that Nigeria's civil society faced in trying to support democratic governance. The result implies that Nigerian civil society faced various issues, such as a lack of resources, corruption, interference from the government, and a lack of coherence in their work. Mukute and Taylor (2013) also studied "Struggles for Systems that Nourish: Southern Africa's Civil Society Contributions and Challenges to the Creation of Flourishing Societies." The study discovered that in the southern African nations it looked at, civil society positively promoted political freedom and access to wealth. However, they faced difficulties making the contributions above because they relied on foreign funding sources. They were, therefore, unable to challenge the powerful and dominant political and economic entities.

From the above review of empirical studies, it has become clear that fairly adequate information has been documented on the contextual factors, state-civil society relations, and the contributions and challenges of civil society in development and governance.

However, the studies conducted on the contextual factors predominantly focused on the legal and political contexts. At the same time, equal weight and attention were not given to important contextual factors such as economic and ideological factors. In addition, attention was given to factors that are external to civil society alone, while internal factors are equally important in determining civil society's contributions to development and governance.

While most of the empirical studies addressed the contributions and challenges of civil society from an advocacy point of view, equal attention was not given to the analysis of watchdog and service delivery perspectives, where civil society engages and faces many challenges. The current study fills these gaps by thoroughly examining the external contextual factors, including legal, political, economic, and ideological factors, as well as factors pertinent to the internal context of civil society, including human, financial, and physical capacity. Furthermore, the study analyses civil society's contributions and the challenges it faces in advocacy, watchdogging, and service delivery.

Most of the empirical studies reviewed above focus on the formally recognised and registered civil society, and they overlook the contributions of the informal, traditional organisations and the challenges they face in their operations. The current study contributes to filling the gaps in this regard by exploring the contributions and challenges that informal organisations face in Ethiopia.

Concerning state-civil society relations, the current study contributes to the body of knowledge by addressing issues that did not get attention in the previous studies. These include the attitudes of government and civil society towards each other, the role of government agencies that regulate civil society, fairness in the government's treatment of civil society, and the independence of civil society from unnecessary government interventions.

Methodologically, many of the empirical studies reviewed above employed either qualitative studies or simple cross-sectional descriptive studies. Empirical studies conducted in Ethiopia failed to capture the ideological shift that has taken place over the

last three decades and the policy and political dynamics that emerged from such shifts. The current study fills this gap by considering three different periods and trying to document the changes during these three periods by comparison and applying somewhat stringent quantitative methods.

2.10 CONCLUSION

From the preceding discussion it has become clear that both liberal and left-wing approaches agree that civil society is important in bringing about development and societal transformation. The distinction is that liberal conception of civil society underlines the importance of individual rights and freedom while the left-wing approach focuses on the social whole and considers individuals as a part of the whole. In addition, liberals emphasise the notion that the state and civil society oppose each other and that the role of the state should be minimal. On the contrary, the left-wing approach stresses that state and civil society are interdependent and one is essential for the existence of the other.

Whether civil society is one part of the state, civil society divergence debate, or one part of the tripartite distinction between the three entities namely state, market and civil society, remains an agenda for debate. However, it is clear, that the proponents of the political right or neo-liberalists tend to characterise the mushrooming of civil society with market expansion and freedom, whereas the proponents of political left or leftists perceive civil society as a counter-balance to the suppression of state power and exploitation of the market capitalists (Jenkins & Smith 2001; Purdue 2007:2)

Development is a much-contested concept which does not have a universal definition or a complete consensus among scholars as there are different meanings and senses of development that make it inherently ambiguous. Some tend to conceptualise the term development as economic growth assuming it as something that takes place in a linear or unilineal manner. Others perceive development as a holistic, multidimensional and dynamic phenomenon which is related to all aspects of the society. While some tend to see development as a positive and good changes, there are others who tend to see the

flip side of it and argue that development may have unintended consequences. The researcher believes that development has the potential to bring about positive social changes when key development actors are given the space to systematically intervene in purposeful and collaborative affairs.

There are three major theoretical lenses through which development can be analysed namely, the market-oriented approach, the structural and the alternative or people-centred development approaches. The market-oriented approach focuses on more market and less state intervention (control) in the economy whereas the state-centred approach stresses the key role that the state plays in the economy. The people-centred or alternative development approach gives emphasis neither to the market nor to the state, but the people. It intends to bring the owner of the agenda to the centre of the game. One can see that these three approaches are all relevant and operative, but in different degrees of dominance in different contexts. In the following chapter, the role of civil society in development and governance is discussed.

CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the actors or agents of development and the main roles they play in development and governance. In this regard, while the three main actors, namely, public sector, private sector and civil society are discussed, more emphasis is given to the discussion of the role of civil society in the process of development. To this end, the roles of civil society in the major development agendas such as policy advocacy, poverty alleviation, service delivery, promotion of social capital, watchdogging, democracy and democratisation, conflict management, and peace-building will be addressed. The chapter also presents the role of civil society in governance. In addition, the chapter discusses the challenges that civil society faces in the course of its contribution to development and governance and the mechanisms of overcoming the challenges.

3.2 AGENCIES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE

According to Thomas and Allen (2000:189), agency refers to “The actions of individuals or groups, and their capacities to influence events.” Discussing that the state has been considered as the best capable agency to shoulder the responsibility of development and that development was totally equated with the functions of the state, Thomas and Allen (2000:189) argued that absence of options does not necessarily mean that the state is the only player in town to bring about positive social changes and development. In the past several decades, however, the state’s trusteeship and monopoly on the responsibility of ensuring development has begun to be questioned due to the emergence of competent agencies notably CSOs. In this section, the three agencies, namely: the state, the private sector and the civil society and the key roles they play in development and governance are discussed. However, more emphasis has been given to the discussion of the role of civil society as it is the main topic of the chapter.

3.2.1 The State as a Development Agency

When we consider the structuralist view, obviously the state is a very important agency in development. But the opposite is true when we see the state as the agency of development through the (neo) liberal lens. According to Thomas and Allen (2000:190), the state may play a role in three ways. First, it can generally act as a main agent to initiate development in the community. In this regard, it devises development plans and makes decisions to enforce them at national and local levels, establishes departments and units, recruits trained development experts, mobilises financial and non-financial resources and establishes rules to guide the enforcement of development plans and programmes. In fact, when we look at many African and some Latin American and Asian countries, the notion of development is very much absorbed or dominated by the state.

Second, the state can create a conducive work environment for other development agencies. This basically implies that, in this contemporary era, thinking about development without the involvement of other agencies is a dead end. This second option comes out of the capitalist thinking where the state's role should be limited to creating an enabling environment such as providing infrastructure, keeping political stability, peace and order, and devising favourable policies for other agencies outside the state to effectively play their roles in ensuring development and societal transformation. The state invests in education which is one of the critical enabling structures for development; it provides infrastructure such as primary schools, health, roads and other utilities.

Third, the state creates hindrances for development which may result in adverse reactions from citizens towards the state. Inequality may become a fact of life and the permanent state of citizens which leads to collective struggle by citizens against the state and eventually results in structural and societal change. According to Jessop (2011:242), the role of the state in economic development may range from neighbourhoods to the world market or world society in terms of helping private investment to be profitable, and in terms of protecting the labour force as workers and

citizens. The state's role has shifted from devising national level socio-economic policies to a more complex structure which manifests itself in the growing importance of local and global governance systems. Bardhan (2016:862) argued that the state plays essential roles in terms of providing law and order, contract management and an enabling institutional set up for the market to operate. It is considered as an essential agent of development that plays a role in guiding, catalysing, initiating and coordinating development instead of being a "night-watchman".

From the above discussion, one can understand two issues. First, there is a structuralist perspective and a (neo) liberalist) perspective in terms of understanding the state as an agent of development. In this regard, while the structuralists tend to expand the role of state in the economy, the (neo) liberalists tend to focus on minimising the role of the state. The second issue is that the state is both an agent and it also provides the structure for other agencies. It is an agent because it can impose demands on citizens to pay taxes and promote development; it also provides the structure because in it, there is a president (or prime minister), there is a parliament, there is a government, there is the bureaucracy and institutions that make up the entire structure. Therefore, the state is considered not only as an individual actor or agency, but also as a structure. So, here we can see that these two notions of agency and structure are coexisting.

3.2.2 The Private Sector as a Development Agency

The private sector is one of the essential agents of development as it is the main source of job creation and employment opportunities and a key contributor to national income. According to Venables (2015:5) and Avis (2016:17), 90% of the work force in the developing nations is absorbed by both the formal and nonformal job opportunities created by the private sector. The private sector also plays significant role in providing goods and services needed for the consumption of citizens as well as industries in the form of raw materials. It also contributes in terms of serving as the base of revenue through tax payments to the government. Adding to this, Brainard and Lafleur (2006:2) described the private sector as the most dynamic engine of growth and poverty alleviation and claimed that it plays a central role in development. Klein and

Hadjimichael (2003:5-6) argued that the private sector plays a determining role in enhancing innovation and productivity, improving infrastructure, providing training, developing export markets, creating job opportunities and elevating the quality of local people's life.

The private sector plays an essential role in promoting development by contributing to urban governance which is reflected in poverty reduction and upgrading slums in urban areas particularly in developing countries, promoting entrepreneurship and innovation, promoting inclusiveness and resilience by reducing unemployment, and enhancing the opportunities and reducing the challenges of urbanisation (Avis 2016:17; Hameed & Mixon 2013:7). Cranenburgh (2017:4) emphasised the role of the private sector as an agent for development in terms of its partnership with other agents of development. The private sector provides assistance for the government to overcome longstanding and difficult burdens by introducing technologies, introducing new ways of doing things and reducing reliance on foreign aids. To this end, it promotes development, governance, justice and security, which, in turn, ensure sustainable outcomes.

Generally, the private sector is considered as the engine of economic development. It enhances productivity and engagement of citizens in productive activities in both developed and developing countries. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Australian Government (2014:12), the private sector generates job opportunities, finances about 60% of the investments in developing nations; contributes about 80% of the government revenue through taxation and rents; provides essential services such as banking, education, health, communication and other utilities; produces goods and services that serve the poor; and exports goods that drive the economy.

3.2.3 Civil Society as a Development Agency

The notion of agency is an abstract idea which is more about the capacity of an individual or agent. This notion of agency has been mooted as a "third way" of thinking based on the work of Giddens (2006:866), which provides the sociological and

philosophical basis of this type of thinking. He wished to re-emphasise that it is not just the traditional left-right political dichotomy, the market and/or the state; but there is some room for individuals or groups to bring about positive social change and development. In that sense, what matters is what civil society can do and the difference they can make to social transformation despite their views and theoretical positions.

The need for civil society as an essential agent of development, as Norton (in Soesastro 1999:11) asserts, emanates from the two divergent ideas, namely, free market liberalism that looks for another way of service provision due to the inability of the government to do so; and the second idea is social democracy that emanates from the desire to strengthen the state to make it more responsive and active in provision of services to citizens. Civil society is believed to make a significant contribution in promoting equitable development by acting as a catalyst and driving force and actively participating in the process of development and governance (Demmers, Jilberto & Hogenboom 2004; Schulpen & Habraken 2013:11; Veltmeyer 2008; WEF 2013:8). Sustainable development and societal transformation are unlikely if one underestimates or undermines the role of civil society. This is because civil society is believed to be instrumental not only in designing effective public policy and development strategies but also serving as an effective actor in defining standards, collecting, organising, and disseminating information that serves as an input for decision-makers to arrive at solutions to problems. This claim does not mean that CSOs entirely replace the role of public organisations. It rather indicates that they challenge, question and alert public organisations to provide goods and services that satisfy the expectations of the society.

It is no exaggeration to say that development touches every aspect of human life. Development deals with the tasks that range from trash collection to space exploration. It is concerned with poverty reduction, democracy, human rights, conflict management and peace-building, citizens' participation, accountability and community development to mention but a few. If we need to ensure these agendas of development, it is counterproductive to think that the state is the only capable agency to shoulder the

responsibility of ensuring development and considering development as solely the function of the state.

Hence, development agents other than the state, in this case, civil society, need to be involved in the process of bringing about development and positive social changes. Notwithstanding all the challenges it faces either due to its own internal weakness or due to the pressures from external context, civil society as one of the agents of development plays a vital role in implementing development agendas by involving itself in various areas such as democratisation, shaping policies, enabling people to claim their rights, promoting accountability and making the state accountable for its actions just to mention some. According to Lilja (2015:120), civil society has the potential to initiate society for democracy, promote political accountability, produce social capital, help citizens to see alternatives by acting collectively, and support the rights of citizens.

3.2.3.1 Role of civil society in policy advocacy

Although the degree of its influence varies with the nature of the regime and the political context in which it operates, civil society is believed to influence policy-making in many ways. Civil society, especially in a democratic context, is considered as a means through which citizens can be involved in all the processes of policy-making including problem identification and prioritisation, policy formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation (Mukamunana & Brynard 2005:667; Putnam 1993:101). However, in undemocratic and suppressive authoritarian regimes, it is clear that civil society operates under a huge pressure but still plays a critical role in terms of lobbying the state and pushing it to bring about changes in unjust policies; educating voters during elections and protecting citizens from adverse actions of brutal states (Mukamunana & Brynard 2005:667).

Civil society plays an essential role in advocacy. In this regard, it raises the awareness level of citizens on issues and decisions that affect their life directly or indirectly. It also challenges the unfavourable existing situations and advocates for change representing the voiceless and the marginalised groups (Cooper 2018:9; Kreienkamp 2017:6; WEF 2013:9). The experience in various corners of the world reveals that civil society lobbies

governments to make its decisions consistent with policy objectives and legal requirements (Ohemeng 2015:671) using different mechanisms including popular media that has direct contact with and influence on elites (Cummings 2005:176; Cook, 1998:10).

To advocate changes in policy, Covey (in Ghaus-Pasha 2004:19-20) argues that civil society uses five major methods: education, persuasion, collaboration, litigation and confrontation. Education is used to provide information and various policy alternatives and innovative ideas to decision makers. Persuasion as a strategy of advocacy is used when civil society manifests itself in the form of interest groups and pushes for policy reforms. Collaboration basically focuses on the spirit of support and partnering with government by trying to achieve consensus on ground rules and norms of relationship. Legitimation as a strategy is used to influence the existing legal system putting pressure on the government to change policy. This strategy is used by civil society when the actions of the government deny human rights or when there is a breach of laws and policy. As opposed to collaborating, confrontation is a strategy used by civil society to intervene in an overtly violent way when the government is not responsive to the needs and demands of citizens. This could take the form of protests manifested through strikes and street demonstrations.

Fioramonti and Heinrich (2007:26) also argued that in order to steer policy and the political agendas of the government, civil society often uses strategies, tactics and skills different from those who do things in a business-as-usual way. According to Massimo and Makwerere (2015:7), these strategies are twofold: the “abolitionist” approach and the evolutionary approach. The “abolitionist” version of civil society advocacy is more confrontational and needs a wide support base to ensure the desired change. It focuses mainly on the macro-level political, structural and ideological issues. The evolutionary version, on the other hand, employs gradual and constructive intervention focusing on certain groups of society that are in serious need of change with the intention of gradually escalating support and reaching others. The scope of intervention is micro-level focusing on local level programmes that require technical skills and knowledge.

The fact that it concentrates on specific issues of the local community makes this approach more effective and successful which eventually sends positive lessons to others and facilitates gradual evolution and expansion.

To bring about changes in policy, civil society influences the political process and the bureaucracy through persuasion and dialogue. It does so to get issues of citizens on the policy and development agenda of the government, influence and shape the content of the policy, monitor and advocate for the policy to be put into practice as planned and influence the how of policy implementation (Cangas 2004:2; Klugman 2000:99; Wagle 1999:531). Underlining the significance of civil society's role in the policy-making process, Court, Mendizabal, Osborne & Young (2006) argued that civil society can conduct policy campaigns, experiment with new policy approaches through pilot projects, and intervene in the policy-making process at various levels by providing reliable information and support the policy-making process by mobilising resources.

Policy-making is primarily the job of the government where the three bodies, namely the legislative, the executive and the judiciary discharge distinctive roles in the process drafting policy. However, a policy cannot be effective if non-state actors such as civil society are not engaged in the process. Hence, for a policy to be acceptable, the intervention and engagement of civil society in the process of policy-making is essential. This is because civil society plays key roles in bringing the views of citizens into focus not only by negotiating with the policy-making bodies but also by keeping policy-makers alerted and informed about the needs and priorities of the citizens as policy makers may sometimes be intentionally or unintentionally negligent about the interest of citizens. Civil society is also important in supporting policy-making because policy-makers may sometimes have some deficits in knowledge, skills, competence and human and material resources needed for effective policy-making. In addition, it encourages citizens to take part in the process of policy formulation and implementation and air their concerns to make the policy reflect their interest and aspirations (Court, Mendizabal, Osborne & Young 2006:14; Massimo & Makwerere 2015:6; Reid 2000:2-3).

Generally, through its advocacy role and with the understanding that policy engagement results in a greater pro-poor effects and justice, civil society raises the awareness level of the constituencies and brings the voiceless and the marginalised citizens to the centre (Court et al. 2006:14; Sabi 2013:18). By reaffirming the legitimate rights of citizens, civil society helps citizens to demand and put pressure upon the state. It mobilises citizens and disfavoured groups through civic education and helps them enter into the zone where policy dialogues are undertaken, and political decisions are made (Cangas 2004:2).

3.2.3.2 Role of civil society in democracy and democratisation

In the democratisation process, civil society is believed to play a significant role in terms of connecting citizens and the state. It creates a conducive environment for citizens to make decisions and promotes cohesiveness among community. It plays a vital role in providing information and enhancing civic participation. For people to take part in decision-making and policy discussions, and communicate their concerns openly, information is essential. In this regard, civil society is crucial in terms of informing society about relevant issues so that they can make an informed decision that ultimately enables the society to be involved in democratic processes in a meaningful way. Citizens who have information and guide their decisions with information do not engage in conflict with the state. This results in a mature political and democratic culture. Botchway (2018: 6-7), Jaysawal (2013:4) and the UNDP (1993) regard civil society as one of the spheres that interfaces with both the market and the state in creating democracy. It further argues that the quality of democracy and the process of democratic consolidation are partly determined by civil society.

Civil society, as one of the agents of development, plays a vital role in promoting democracy. According to Diamond (1991) and Soesastro (1999:11), civil society plays a crucial role in shaping and promoting democracy in six major ways: a) it acts as a reservoir of resources to check the power of the state; b) it ensures that the state is not held captive by few groups; c) it supplements the work of political parties in stimulating political participation; d) it stabilises the state because citizens will have a deeper stake

in social order; e) it acts as a locus of recruiting new political leadership; and f) it resists authoritarianism. Adding to this, Encarnación (2003:9) argued that civil society can play an important role in legitimising new democratic governments, enhancing social integration and bonding and promoting political stability in collaboration with other parties, particularly when the context in which they operate is favourable and supportive.

From a more liberal perspective, civil society plays a role in enabling society through awareness creation and provision of timely and relevant information, helping citizens make clear decisions about who should be voted into public positions, and making government accountable for decisions it makes. Civil society is considered to be a potential mechanism through which citizens can set and realise common goals, engage in their own issues and make decisions that affect their lives, exercise the culture of tolerance and open debates and values that enable to promulgate democracy in the society (Robinson & Friedman 2005:1). Civil society influences political systems particularly during democratic transition through promoting and engaging in debates, conducting campaigns and protesting on the street (Federowicz & Sitek 2006:43; Howell & Pearce 2001; Robinson & Friedman 2005:1). Although democratic theorists tend to argue that civil society is only created after the process of transition from a non-democratic to a democratic state that creates an enabling platform for civil society to emerge and function, others who view civil society from a cultural and sociological respect argue that civil society not only exist before a transition takes place but also are often the core reason for the transition itself to take place (Kamrava & Mora 1998:895).

The contribution of civil society in democratisation can be seen from the perspective of colonisation. Based on his analysis on Africa, Orji (2009:84-85, 93-9) asserts that in the pre-colonial period, civil society in Africa was manifested through traditional organisations that assisted in creating a new form of voluntary associations such as professional association and unions. Several voluntary associations were involved in airing the voices of citizens against the colonial rule in the quest for freedom and self-determination. Hence, the contribution of civil society in colonial and post-colonial Africa

is manifested through decolonisation and demilitarisation. The author further emphasised that in the current trend of democratisation in Africa and other developing countries, civil society plays a vital role in consolidating democracy. In this regard, Orji (2009:92-94) viewed the contribution of civil society from four perspectives namely, “promotion of social justice, rights and the rule of law; enhancing state performance; promotion of popular participation in public policy-making; and promotion of transparency in governance”.

For political system and democracy to flourish, civil society is a vital non-political organisation. Putnam (1993:176) in his seminal work, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, asserted that non-political organisations play an essential role in enhancing democracy because they promote and construct social capital, trust and shared values that grow into the political domain. These are the vital elements for gluing society together and promoting interrelationships between the people and the benefits obtained from such relationships. Putnam did not deny though that there is a need for a favourable political environment for individual citizens to freely discuss their ideas and associate themselves with others. Civil society, according to Beauclerk (2011:872), can help in cultivating fundamental principles of democracy in a democratic society; enhancing administrative, political and social accountability; creating societal trust, reciprocity and networks; helping society to act collectively for better alternatives; and promoting the idea of citizenship and citizens’ rights.

Civil society is an arena of non-state and not-for-profit voluntary associations which range from nonformally organised groups to associations intervening on a large scale which are considered to be essential components of democracy and the democratisation process. Civil society is a stimulus and catalyst for democratic practices and change (Foley & Edwards 1996:38-39). Wagle (1999:529) also argued that civil society is the main contributor in the process of democratising a nation, putting pressure on and lobbying the government for policy amendments. To this end, it is considered as a precondition for democratising a political system and it is most important when interest groups are lacking in the community to make people aware about their rights and put

pressure on government when change is needed. In that sense, they play an irreplaceable role in empowering the marginalised poor people to take part in decision-making.

3.2.3.3 Role of civil society as a watchdog

Civil society contributes to making the government and political decision-makers accountable for their actions. In other words, it acts as a watchdog to hold the institutions of the government and decision-makers to account. It discharges such responsibilities by, among others, disclosing human rights abuses of undemocratic and dictator governments. In this regard, it plays key roles in providing information to local as well as international communities (Cooper 2018:9-10; Court et al. 2006:18; 2006: 14; Ghaus-Pasha 2004:18; Kreienkamp 2017:6). According to Green (2017:2), civil society exerts a remarkable effort in the establishment of international norms and legal frameworks by which the behaviour of governments at local, national and international level are governed to hold them accountable and to respect human rights.

Civil society serves as a means of overseeing the governments to establish a system of accountability. To this end, they observe, evaluate and create awareness and advance the concerns of citizens regarding misbehaviour and abuse of power. Civil society working in the area of human rights play a leading role in promoting accountability and overseeing the state and its institutions. In this regard, it helps in creating a positive mindset of citizens, which is believed to make an indirect contribution to citizens' empowerment. WEF (2013:9) explains the watchdog role of civil society from the perspectives of enhancing accountability and transparency by holding the state and its institutions accountable.

3.2.3.5 Role of civil society in service provision and poverty alleviation

In contemporary society, as opposed to previous years, citizens have become more demanding. The bodies in charge, including the government, are required to respond to the demands of citizens. Although governments, particularly in developing countries, have established various institutions to respond to service needs of the society, the

problems are still escalating. Regardless of the efforts of the government and the huge amount of budgets allocated for service provision in developing countries, citizens, particularly the marginalised, disadvantaged and economically impoverished ones are either inadequately or totally unreached with the services they deserve to get.

Civil society plays a key role in reaching such groups with social and economic services and fills the gaps that the government fails to address. Notwithstanding the critique and challenges that it faces, Clayton, Oakley and Taylor (2000:7-10) argued that civil society is widely perceived as an effective service provider to poor communities as manifested in its capacity to reach the poorest segments of society; to provide quality economic and social services, and to provide services in an efficient, cost-effective and sustainable manner.

Civil society, according to Cangas (2004:2), provides the required institutional foundation for service delivery when the state is seen to be ineffective and unresponsive in provision of services to the local community. This is true because civil society has the capacity to reach the grassroots level and respond to the needs of the poor by driving collective action which enables the poor to access social and economic services, including health and education. In this regard, Green (2017:2) and Wagle (1999:530) argued that civil society partnering with governments contributes significantly to saving lives, enhancing school attainment, improving maternal and child health by giving more attention to the unprivileged and vulnerable segments of society. According to Ghaus-Pasha (2004:15) and Anheier (2005:82–83), civil society contributes to the provision of social services including health, nutrition and education. Particularly in terms of education, it provides training and capacity-building through innovative training modalities that have an immediate impact on changing the life of the poor. Civil society is able to provide social services in an innovative and creative way because it is flexible and responsive in its approach. In addition to social services, WEF (2013:9) asserted that civil society is engaged in activities such as the provision of food and security, disaster management, and responding to emergencies.

Civil society discharges multiple responsibilities in poverty reduction and local economic development in various ways. According to Ghaus-Pasha (2004:10), civil society contributes to poverty alleviation and local economic development in at least five major ways. First, it plays an essential role in enhancing local businesses through creating market opportunities, developing economic infrastructure, enhancing free flow of information, and advocating for policies that support the development of such businesses. Second, civil society inspires new business initiatives and livelihood programmes that contribute to the survival of the local community. This is possible not only through its intervention in terms of the technical support and advice but also the resources and information it provides to the local community. Third, civil society delivers social services like education that serves as a building block for human capital to develop which helps citizens explore the opportunities around them (Anheier 2005:82–83). Fourth, it builds the institutional and entrepreneurial capacity of local organisations and the community through different mechanisms including training. Finally, civil society is involved in relief and rehabilitation activities by providing emergency services and a social safety net.

Civil society creates the opportunity for citizens to gain experience in tackling problems and strive to get out of the poverty trap they are in. This is possible because civil society always considers the involvement and participation of the community in the process of development as a means of facilitating the transfer of knowledge and skills and eventually paves the way for the community become independent of handouts and get rid of poverty. In other words, due to its strategic location and proximity, civil society allows the community to participate in various programmes and projects. This ensures the empowerment of the community and eventually enables the community to address its challenges and decide on its own fate (Khosa 2000:3; Kuye & Nhlapo 2011:99).

In the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers developed by the western donor agencies to materialise the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) developed by the WB in 1998 (DFID 2006:120; WB 2006), it is recognised that civil society plays a key role in alleviating poverty. First, it contributes to the enhancement of equity through its pro-poor

approach of development; and second, it represents the interests of a wide range of society. Through dialogue, it plays a critical role in consensus building on development programmes, strategies and policies that aim at improving the lives of citizens (Connolly 2007:4; WB 2002:239).

For the effectiveness of any poverty reduction policy interventions, there is a need to address the concerns of technical, financial and political challenges. According to Ferguson (2011:3), civil society can help any poverty reduction efforts in terms of filling technical, financial and political gaps. From a technical perspective, it helps the government and other concerned stakeholders in policy development, in initiating, designing and implementation of project and programmes, and in monitoring and evaluation. The programmes that are undertaken with effective technical support of civil society are characterised by holistic and multiple benefits for citizens, participation of those who are affected by the outcomes of the programme, and sustainability of the programmes due to the sense of ownership developed through participation (see also Powell 2009:9). Financially, the support of civil society is needed due to the inability of the government to cover all project costs. In the areas where the government faces financial resource gaps, civil society provides support by mobilising resources from various sources. Finally, the political challenges that obstruct policy implementation are considered to be one of the challenges of poverty alleviation. Civil society can ameliorate such challenges by keeping people on board through provision of information and supporting the community to come together and deliberate on a specific problem (Ferguson 2011:5).

Civil society contributes to alleviating poverty and improving the lives of citizens. Its contributions have been recognised even by governments of developing countries (except some dictatorships) as the key to addressing the growing problems of poverty. According to Ghaus-Pasha (2004:10), civil society is considered to have the capacity to contribute to poverty alleviation for different reasons. These include its flexibility, participatory and responsive nature that is commensurate with the need of the poor; the supports it provides to the grassroot entities; the need for less capital for interventions

compared to the government bureaucracy; and its ability to generate more resources from local as well as international sources and engage the community in the programmes from inception to completion which eventually contributes to the sustainability of the programmes.

From different disciplinary points of view, the contribution of civil society is recognised in various ways. For economists and developmentalists, civil society is considered as the agent of economic growth. They argue that voluntary associations are instrumental in reducing urban and rural poverty, promoting development from below, and promoting local economic development. In addition, the potential of voluntary organisations from economists' view are manifested in their capacity to create non-formal and small-scale economic activities in urban areas. Specialists in the fields of studies that focus on social and cultural dimensions emphasise the importance of civil society in supporting communities to cope with dynamic and changing environments and to shape cultural practices of the society to what the current situation demands. From the international relations perspective, people underscore the importance of civil society in terms of its role in facilitating and promoting global communication which helps to improve the marginalised status of developing countries from the rest of the world in various respects. Finally, political scientists perceive civil society as an agent that plays a vital role in regulating the relationship between state and society (Chazan 1992:281).

To sum up, civil society is considered as an entity that works towards protecting and promoting the interest of the poor. It gets closer to the local community and provides services of high value taking the poor people's priorities into account particularly in the absence of state provision. As it has access to resources from various sources (international and local), it provides food during seasonal shortages, sanitation and safe water services, primary health care services, protection against endemic and epidemic diseases like HIV/AIDS and COVID-19, schooling, school feeding programmes, building community centres, income generating activities and directly assisting the poor financially as well as non-financially. Civil society is believed to have special expertise with compassionate personnel to set and respond to the priorities of the poor which

enables it to enjoy more acceptance, trust and credibility than the formal institutions of the state.

3.2.3.6 Role of civil society in promoting social capital

Civil society helps to foster social capital which is manifested through trust, norms and networks. Putnam (1993:167-177) argued that, in a community, voluntary cooperation can easily be facilitated through social capital which is formed through established network of engagement. According to Fukuyama (2000:7), weak individuals become strong when they come together in civil associations which are created through social capital. In this sense, what seems impossible for individuals when they act alone is much easier to do when they act together through the social bond they create. To this end, through the associations they join, individuals can get their voices to be heard, participate in political activities and decisions that affect their lives, and learn and develop the behaviour of cooperation.

Putnam argued that civil society is vital because it cultivates social capital which has the potential to socially bond individuals together and eventually participate in the political arena to promote the interests of society and expand democracy. The network of civil society gives rise to social capital which in turn augments cooperation, trust and strong social bonds to reinforce reciprocity (Putnam 1993). To this end, a huge value is placed upon civil society in augmenting societal capital and positive social norms, encouraging pluralism and challenging the decentralisation of power (Brandson et al. 2017:677; Edwards 2004:7).

3.2.3.7 Role of civil society in conflict management and peace-building

Civil society can help in managing conflicts in many ways. Olufemi and Adewale (2012:725-727) argued, based on the findings of the study carried out in Nigeria, that civil society can support conflict management by: a) becoming involved in conflict analysis which is undertaken through information gathering, monitoring the situations and alerting and warning the society; b) working against the spread of small-scale military weapons which is to aggravate civil conflicts (see also Rupesinghe & Anderlini

1998:70); c) conflict resolution – in a situation where the intervention in conflict targets the interests of all parties, it would be relatively easy for civil society to dialogue and resolve the conflict; and d) conflict negotiation/peace talks. Where two parties are in conflict, civil society can also act as a third party to mediate the negotiation and settle the conflict.

Barnes (2005:12 & 13) put the contribution of civil society in conflict management into three categories, namely, those who are involved in structural problems, those who respond to specific issues of conflict, and those who think that the responses to conflict are rooted in specific civil society sector. Civil societies that focus on structural problems tend to understand that conflict and its causes are structural, and the solution should, therefore, also be structural. To this end, they believe that making changes to policy and reforming the existing system to address critical issues such as economic imbalances should be the entry point and key areas of focus for conflict to be resolved in a sustainable manner.

The second classification is related to those who are concerned with specific conflict problems. According to Barnes (2005:14-15), such civil society respond to specific conflict problems due to a) their capacity that emanates from their independence which enables them to act flexibly; b) their use of a non-coercive approach which is practised only through deliberation and dialogue; c) their identification of weaknesses of official actors due to lack of either political will or mandates; d) their capacity to enhance communication and interaction using formal as well as non-formal channels; e) their capacity to put pressure on decision-makers and key players to settle problems in peaceful ways; and f) their capacity to bear witnesses and disclose abusive and violent acts which is manifested through their ability to watch and monitor abusive events and bring them to the attention of the people and other bodies concerned.

The third category of civil society, according to Barnes (2005:12, 13), is those who believe that the responses to conflict are rooted in specific civil society sectors. Such civil society often uses their unique position and legitimacy to bring about change and remedies to problems of conflict. The incentive for such civil society to engage with and

address conflict resides in their hope that the core challenges and problems that CSOs themselves face would be addressed. Therefore, such civil societies prefer to work only on conflict cases that constrain their activities instead of considering conflict as their major areas of intervention

Studies show that the importance of civil society in conflict management has increased. For instance, Debiel and Sticht (2005:133) argued that the increasing importance of civil society in conflict management can be explained and justified in four major ways. First, the impetus that CSOs gained from the UN World conference of the 1990s that acknowledged the proliferation of new CSOs and expansion and strengthening of the existing ones at the international level. Second, the advancement of technologies that facilitate a fast and smooth flow of communication and mass media has provided an impetus to easy networking and functioning of CSOs to exert influence. Finally, the replacement of government-driven social and economic welfare by international civil society efforts which, in many cases, are the result of the ideological tradition that promotes minimal state intervention.

In peace-building, civil society play vital roles. According to the WB (2007:16) and Paffenholz and Spurk (2010:67), civil society discharges at least seven key roles. First, it involves itself in protection which manifests itself in terms of protecting the lives of citizens and their property from any harm that may come from actors involved in the conflict (see also Barnes 2005:12-16). Second, it is involved in monitoring and early warning activities which are undertaken by following up the actions of actors involved in the conflict. This practice is important as it alerts the ordinary citizens to the adverse outcomes of conflict. Third, civil society plays an advocacy and communication role so that the interests of the marginalised groups of people are placed on the agenda of the government. It also plays a key role in creating an open channel of communication for people to engage in debates, decision-making, and the official peace process (see also Barnes 2002). Fourth, it makes efforts to ensure socialisation which helps to augment democratic values and culture where norms, tolerance, non-violent practices and trust are promoted (see also Anderson, Olson & Doughty 2003:30-31). Fifth, civil society

enhances social cohesion and builds bridging ties between adversarial groups in order to establish a relationship among citizens (see Putnam 1993). Sixth, it plays an intermediation and facilitation role to promote dialogue and interaction that will, in turn, enhance partnering, cooperation and collaboration among different entities in the community. Finally, civil society provides services of different types, which are regarded as interventions that promote the mindset of peace and stability in citizens.

The role of civil society is manifested not only in peace-building but also in nation-building. According to Olusadum (2017:5-6), civil society plays an important role in monitoring government's excessive use of power and violation of human rights and the rule of law. In addition, as the effort of nation-building requires creating positive energy and enhancing a positive mindset and values which influence the attitudes of the people positively, the role that civil society plays in this regard is vital. It cultivates good values and ethical behaviours that contribute to ensuring stable and progressive society. Civil society encourages society to develop the culture of hard work, healthy competition and saving that would eventually contribute to the enhancement of societal welfare. Civil society plays a role in leadership by enhancing the quality of political debate and levelling the political playing field by training members of the political elites. In most cases, civil society performs its role professionally to make a positive impact on human life and to bring about resilience to deal with the vicissitudes of life. It serves as an alternative means of negotiation in a diversified society.

3.3 THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN GOVERNANCE

Civil society plays a vital role in cultivating and promoting governance and democracy through promoting administrative, political and social accountability; creating societal trust, reciprocity and networks; helping society to act collectively for better alternatives; and promoting the idea of citizenship and citizens' rights (Beauclerk 2011:872). According to Orji (2009:92-94), civil society contributes to good governance and development in multiple ways including a) promotion of social justice; b) protecting the rights of vulnerable groups through advocacy and rule of law; c) involving itself in and resourcing service provision to support the effectiveness of the state; d) promotion of

popular participation in public policy-making by mobilising the people particularly socially marginalised groups to meaningfully engage in politics, economic and social issues and articulating their interests at different levels; and e) pressuring and lobbying the government to ensure the availability and free flow of information related to policy formulation and enforcement. In this regard, they discover, publish and disseminate information.

Active civil society is needed to influence the state to do the right things for society and is, thus, considered to play an essential role in realising good governance and its manifestations like transparency, effectiveness, openness, responsiveness and accountability. It can do so by (a) involvement in the process of policy analysis and advocacy; (b) regulating and exposing unethical practices and behaviour of public officials; (c) building social capital and democratic practices; (d) supporting the vulnerable and marginalised groups in the society to aware them about their rights and obligations so that they can demand it from the state; and (e) participating in development activities to change the life of the society (Ghaus-Pasha 2004:3; WEF 2013:9).

According to Manor (1999:8-11), civil society contributes to the betterment of governance practices in four main ways. First, it helps to include citizens such as the marginalised and underprivileged groups of society in policy dialogue and decision-making to promote policy changes through advocacy, deliberation and tolerance. This intervention also helps to ensure participation of citizens that eventually results in a sense of belongingness and ownership. Second, civil society organises and makes relevant and timely information available to citizens regarding the policies of the government in order to help citizens make informed decisions when they are involved in decision-making. This effort of civil society contributes to making the policy-making process more transparent and to make policy-makers be more accountable for their decisions. Thirdly, civil society plays a role not only in terms of improving the quality and effectiveness of services but also enhancing accessibility and responsiveness to the demands of citizens, especially the poor. They do so through different modalities

including partnering with the government and addressing the gap where the government is unable to reach the poor people. This would obviously have a positive effect on improving the effectiveness of government and building a positive relationship and trust between the government and citizens. Finally, civil society is believed to contribute to promoting fairness, justice and the rule of law particularly when they operate in the areas related to human rights. In this regard, they usually put pressure on the government to implement the provisions of the constitution and legal and policy documents that arise from it. This effort helps to protect individuals from the suppression of the state and exercise their rights lawfully (Mukamunana & Brynard 2005:668; Putnam 1993).

Civil society is perceived as a key institution in enhancing good governance and its main pillars include transparency, effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness and accountability (Connolly 2007:4; Ghaus-Pasha 2004:3). According to Ghaus-Pasha (2004:3) and Idumarye (in Olusadum 2017:6), it does so in various ways. First, it engages in policy analysis and improvement of the quality of a policy. Second, it lobbies the government and other concerned stakeholders to make the policy reflect the demand of citizens. Third, it advocates the people to push the government to be responsive to their interests. Fourth, it monitors the behaviour of officials and discourages unethical behaviour which is against the interest of the people. Fifth, it monitors the performance and discloses any deviation to make the government accountable for its actions. Sixth, it promotes public values, norms, beliefs and a democratic ethos by promoting social capital. Seventh, it promotes equality and fairness so that the vulnerable and marginalised groups access resources and get the opportunity to take part in decision-making. Finally, it helps citizens to be active participants in politics, social and economic affairs that eventually ensures their wellbeing.

Cangas (2004:2) argued that civil society contributes to promoting good governance social justice and equality by regulating or monitoring the performance and actions of the state as well as the market. Civil society often disseminate and publicise information

regarding the rules and regulations of the government, public budgets on revenue and expenditure, success and failure in policy enforcement, the rule of law and human rights. Cooper (2018:2) asserted that civil society also plays a significant role in creating active citizens by encouraging civic engagement at different levels. Civil society's role is needed because the governance system of many countries is manifested by poor and ineffective governance systems where the government lacks transparency in its decisions and responsiveness to citizens' needs. This calls for civil society and the community to come together and pursue their interests (United Nations 2016:149-150). To this end, civil society, according to Kim (2011:39), works as issue generator, which is made possible through providing information to citizens. It also works by establishing vertical and horizontal alignment and networks with all bodies concerned, which enables it to successfully influence the decisions of the government in a way that favours the interests of citizens.

According to Edwards and Foley (2001:1-14), civil society contributes to promoting governance by building the capacity of citizens to effectively engage in the process of governance. It also contributes to providing economic and social services that help to create healthy and productive citizens that can meaningfully participate in the process of governance. Civil society also holds the state and the private sector accountable for their actions by representing citizens. Orji (2004:80-90) also argued that civil society plays an important role in promoting democratic governance for political development which is achieved through "political education, political mobilisation, promotion of popular participation in governance, legal aid, capacity-building, micro-credit services, childcare and reproductive health services to the people in the society". Other scholars (e.g. Ajayi 2006:49-62; Animasaun 2008:123-141; Gberevbie 2013:98) also believe that civil society contributes to democratic governance and political development by enhancing the involvement of citizens in the decision-making process which directly or indirectly affects their life.

The modern role of civil society is related to promoting governance and political development that goes beyond mere charity. The role of contemporary civil society

includes providing tangible and intangible services to the community; advocacy which could take the form of public education about societal problems, public policy dialogue and lobbying to improve laws or policies that are unjust; mediation within society through the creation of social capital and the strengthening of social bonds within society; and involving citizens in their own development endeavours to build a sense of belongingness and citizenship (Evans & Shields 2006:4-6). Paffenholz (2010:67) also argued that civil society promotes governance by playing seven basic roles and functions including safeguarding citizens' rights, monitoring the government to ensure accountability, playing an advocacy role, providing the public with important information, socialisation, community development, mediating between state and citizens, and provision of public services.

3.4 THE ROLE OF NON-FORMAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE

Following the democratisation process across the world, particularly since the 1980s, CSOs of different types have proliferated. Scholars group these CSOs into different forms including formal and non-formal, organised and organic, new and traditional (Cooper 2018:6; VanDyck 2017:2; WEF 2013:6) (see also section 2.2.3 to section 2.2.5 in Chapter 2).

Non-formal CSOs are formed based on gender, kinship, economic status, social relationship which functions within the society. Although they are organised groups of people in the community, they lack clear and formal structure that makes it invisible to outsiders. They are not guided by formal rules of the game by which the behaviour of individual members is shaped (Davies & Hossain 1997:8). Formed by the groups of citizens coming together for a common purpose, the non-formal CSOs have ensured tremendous results in terms of improving maternal and child health, making basic education accessible, making the government accountable for its actions, providing basic needs like food and shelter, and saving the life of the victims during the emergency times (Cooper 2018:12-13; Green 2017:1). In the absence of government

actions and response, the vulnerable poor segment of the society tends to depend on the non-formal CSOs for their livelihood (Davies & Hossain 1997:8).

The non-formal sector enhances and promotes individual's engagement in their own issues and development. It serves as a natural force of attraction that has strong power to bring and bond individuals where they debate, deliberate, get involved in productive dialogue, learn from each other and generate new ideas based on established and shared social norms and principles (Gregorio-Medel 2014:4). Non-formal CSOs, especially in this era, network with others including the formal CSOs and engage in social movements (Comas et al. 2015:50) in an official and unofficial way. Even though the role they play is not emphasised in the social movement literature, they play a vital role to change unfavourable situations that the poor citizens are suffering from (Krasynska & Martin 2017:424; Haug 2013:708). In addition, as evidenced in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, the non-formal CSOs play a crucial role in changing many aspects of citizens' lives (Aliyev 2015:183).

In explaining the role non-formal CSOs play in the context of famine relief, Davies and Hossain (1997:21-22) emphasise the importance of non-formal CSOs in the absence of other options like public actions. The importance of non-formal CSOs in famine relief is three-fold. First, non-formal CSOs build on the available capacity and make use of the existing endogenous knowledge and resources to deal with famine. Second, they serve as an alternative to the external intervention. Finally, they pay attention to household level capacity-building that paves the way to reducing vulnerability of citizens to food insecurity.

3.5 CHALLENGES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Although it is argued in the preceding section that civil society positively contributes to development and governance in multiple ways, it is not without challenges. Despite the ranges of activities and diversity of activities they undertake, civil society especially in developing countries is constrained by various challenges pertinent to internal governance and capacity problems and hostile external environment that emanates

from the nature and ideology of the government. Some of these challenges could include problems of mobilisation and allocation of resources, problems related to relevance and legitimacy of civil society, internal accountability problems, and dependency on foreign aid and lack of freedom in distributing it.

The challenges of civil society can be seen from external and internal factors. Green (2017:5) and VanDyck (2017:4) asserted that the challenges of civil society involve the internal and external factors that have the ability to determine its survival. External factors are the characteristics of the context in which civil society operates which can be seen in terms of the openness or closeness of the space, the favourability or restrictiveness of the legal and policy framework devised to shape civil society's behaviour, and the nature of a nation's foreign policy that could either refute or augment the access of civil society to foreign resources. Internal challenges include operational factors that are mainly interpreted in terms of a) governance and leadership; b) human financial and material resources; c) the relevance, accountability and legitimacy; and d) social impact in terms of the scale of intervention and reliability.

Wamucii (2014:121-122) also asserted that the internal challenges of civil society emanate from three factors, namely, inclusivity and diversity, civil society's internal dynamics, and dependency. Inclusivity and diversity imply that, in most cases, civil society operates in urban and elite-dominated areas, which leads to systematic exclusion of rural dwellers from the processes of development. Even in urban areas, civil society tends to be driven by male-dominated leadership and educated elites (see also Robinson & Friedman 2007:665). In terms of internal dynamics, civil society is supposed to be democratic, ethical, grassroots-focused and result-oriented. However, as also argued by Muhumuza (2010:9–10), it is often blamed for having poor internal and external communication, weak exercise of democratic principle internally, and domination of influential members. Finally, dependency refers to the unbalanced partnership and relationship between civil society on the one hand and the state and international donors on the other. This is a challenge to civil society because

international donors support suppressive states in developing countries which use these funds to silence civil society (Wamucii (2014:121).

Civil society has suffered from different situations that hinder its potential to contribute to development, governance and societal transformation. These situations include narrowing or closing the space or the platform on which civil society discharges its roles with the intention of limiting the freedom of association, assembly and expression (CIVICUS 2018:4; Cooper 2018:16-17; Kreienkamp 2017:7; WEF 2013:7; Poppe & Wolff 2017); increased surveillance on human rights-oriented campaigns and journalists (Ahmed & Perlroth 2017; Cooper 2018:18); increased violence which is manifested in the form of harassment, killing and detentions of campaigners (Cooper 2018:19; Kreienkamp 2017:3); media restrictions which aims at silencing civil society through strict control of information flow through media outlets (CIVICUS, 2018:11; Cooper 2018:19); and restrictions on funding which focuses on limiting the opportunity of civil society to access foreign and local fund sources claiming that civil society lacks transparent use of funds (Cooper 2018:19; Kreienkamp 2017:7; Rutzen 2015:31).

Omungo (2011:89) asserted that civil society suffer from the problems of limited funding, uncoordinated efforts within their own organisations and with other like-minded institutions, provision of fragmented services to the people they serve, unfair or uneven competition from organisations disguised as civil society but favoured by governments for political gain, absence of favourable work environments which underestimates the importance of civil society and eventually holds them at bay. According to UNRISD (2000:6-7), civil society faces at least four key challenges particularly related to policy-making and implementations. The first challenge relates to existence which relates to the legal constraints that civil society faces during establishment and registration. It is also related to the political influence imposed on civil society which is manifested in the form of violence and intimidation. The second is knowledge which refers to civil society's limitations in terms of technical expertise, experiences and practical knowledge to influence policy. The third challenge is access which refers to the problems civil society faces to access influential people who have key roles in policy-

making and the limited access to the media to persuade and convince people on their goals. The final problem is that civil society is hampered due to the limited financial power, political strength and intellectual persuasion.

The work of civil society is hampered by various factors. Steen-Johnsen, Eynaud and Wijkström (2011:558) argued that civil society, in most cases, has no financial sources of its own. This makes it dependent not only on international organisations but also on the support and subsidies of governments. Such support is characterised by cutbacks and lack of consistency which affects the operations of civil society. Governments use the limited subsidies it provides to civil society as one of the mechanisms to impose very tough control, an action which hampers the effectiveness of civil society. In addition, the need for making civil society transparent and accountable for its actions since it mobilises resources in the name of the poor, and the emerging and new governance approach resulting from the blurred boundaries between sectors and the complexity of services have challenged civil society.

Kuye and Nhlapo (2011:100-101) also underscored that civil society faces huge challenges in terms of mobilisation and management of financial resources. Funding is one of the essential factors for the success of civil society, but it has been one of the biggest challenges experienced by civil society. In addition to access to funds, financial management or the capacity to manage the accessed funds is another challenge for civil society. Financial management requires the capacity to develop and design fund-raising strategies and effectively and efficiently using it. In this regard, civil society is constrained by poor managerial, administrative and business skills and limitations in accessibility and managing funding. Furthermore, the fact that civil society uses volunteers affects the quality and retention of staff which makes it difficult for civil society to meet its promises.

The role of civil society is being restricted at global and local levels. Globally, civil society plays key roles in promoting equity, fairness and human rights. However, in many developing countries, its role has been constrained by strict media pressure and tight government regulations and interventions mainly aiming at discouraging civil

society's interventions in the areas of democracy, civil rights and rights-based activities that have the implications of questioning the power of governments. Such actions of governments are practised at both global and local levels and have the potential to adversely affect the success and existence of civil society but also the enhancement of democratic governance and accountability all over the world (CIVICUS 2018:4; Kreienkamp 2017:7; WEF 2013:7).

Civil society can address the challenges it faces using different strategies. Some of these mechanisms include: a) initiating various projects that enhances the capacity of strategic litigation in courts focusing on human rights, freedom of assembly and association (Kreienkamp 2017:10); b) networking and engagement in collaborative efforts with other like-minded organisations vertically and horizontally and working with bodies who have positive mindset about the role of civil society and have the capacity to put pressure on governments (Cooper 2018:20; Kreienkamp 2017:11); c) shifting fund sources from foreign funds which come with various conditions, to sources such as market philanthropists and social entrepreneurship (WEF 2013:15) and to domestic sources (VanDyck 2017:5); and d) enhancing the technological capacity to make effective use of various technological tools for awareness creation as well as improving its operations (Cooper 2018:22; Jezard 2018).

3.6 CONCLUSION

Development is a much-contested concept which does not have a universal definition or complete consensus among scholars as there are different meanings and senses of development that make it inherently ambiguous. While some tend to see development as positive and good, there are others who tend to see the flip side of it and argue that development may have unintended consequences. The researcher believes that development has the potential to bring about positive social changes when key development actors are given the space to systematically intervention in purposeful and collaborative affairs.

For development to be realised, there is a need for key actors' systematic interventions in collaborative affairs where they are provided with the opportunity to contribute their fair share in the process. As such, civil society is one of the key players in the process of governance and development at different levels ranging from global to local. It plays a vital role in advocacy, watchdogging and making the government accountable, conflict management and peace-building, policy formulation and implementation, lobbying, providing social services, poverty reduction, promotion of democracy and human rights to mention but a few. In the process of discharging such responsibilities, however, it is obvious that civil society faces several challenges from within and from outside. The next chapter analyses the role of civil society in Ethiopia by taking the historical and contextual perspectives into account.

CHAPTER 4: CIVIL SOCIETY'S ROLE IN ETHIOPIA: HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the role that civil society plays in the societal transformation and development of Ethiopia over the last several decades. It deals with the analysis of the roles of civil society and the nature of state-civil society relations during the three regimes, namely the imperial, the military and the post-1991 EPRDF regimes by taking into account the historical and contextual perspectives. The chapter attempts to give a general overview of the nature of the three regimes followed by the discussion of civil society's role in societal transformation and development endeavour of the country during the three regimes. The presentation is, therefore, organised in the following manner. The first section of the chapter consists of an overview of the imperial regime followed by the role of civil society and the nature of the imperial regime-civil society relations. The second section of the chapter provides the overview of the *Derg* military regime followed by the role of civil society and the nature of the *Derg*-civil society relations. Similarly, the third section presents the overview of the EPRDF regime followed by the respective role of civil society and the nature of the EPRDF-civil society relations. In the discussion, while less attention is given to the discussion of the nature of the state, more emphasis is given to the discussion of the role and the nature of the state-civil society relations in the three regimes. It is believed that such an analysis is of paramount importance in helping us understand the ups and downs, the threats and opportunities that civil society face in an unpredictable, unfavourable and suppressive environment.

4.2 CIVIL SOCIETY DURING THE THREE REGIMES

4.2.1 The Era of Monarchical Regime – Emperor Haile Selassie I

4.2.1.1 Overview of the regime

The idea of statehood in Ethiopia has a long history. Ethiopia has got the current territory through time for various reasons such as administrative complexity and territorial conflicts. In its pre-modern history, the country was known to have a huge land which was even incomparable with any other kingdom in Africa (Hyden & Mahlet 2003:219). The formation of the modern state and nation-building in Ethiopia is characterised by top-down and centralised approach where citizens would not be given the chance to decide their own political fate by themselves (Yeshtila, Kjosavik & Shanmugaratnam 2016:1). The modern history of the country starts with Tewodross II, who came to power at the end of the the era of “Zemene Mesafint” (or the era of princes) and who strived to unify the country (Mengisteab, 1997:119-30; Tronvoll, 2000:12; Van der Beken, 2007:105; Zewde, 2001). According to Zewde (1991:47) “the creation of modern Ethiopia was started by Tewodoros, incorporated by Yohanis IV who came to power and ruled from 1872 to 1889, consolidated by Menelik and completed by Haile Selassie”. Zewde asserted that the Ethiopia that we have today has been created due to the incorporation process of Emperor Menelik who was in power from 1889 to 1913 and strived to unite people who had their own language, cultural practices and identity. He initiated the establishment of a few ministries for the first time in the history of the country which witnessed his desire to install a modern bureaucratic system.

Following the footprint of Menelik, Emperor Haile Selassie who ruled Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974, strengthened the incorporation process in a more institutionalised way (Raphaeli 1967:424). With the intention of putting modern institutions in place, the emperor promulgated what is known to be the first Constitution of Ethiopia in 1931 as a formal institution through which he was entitled to appoint officials and delegate authority to an elected bicameral parliament (Bereket 1966:66; Raphaeli 1967:427). The Constitution was revised in 1955 to give, at least in principle, more power to institutions

like the parliament. The revised constitution recognised the horizontal separation of power and independence of institutions like the courts, acknowledged the protection of human and democratic rights, and mandated accountability and responsiveness of the government bureaucracy to citizens, which was expected to be ensured by the various ministries (Bereket 1966:82).

4.2.1.2 Civil society during the Emperor Haile Selassie regime

Civil society in Ethiopia has been polarised regardless of the nature and ideology of the state. The role of civil society has been limited, invisible and minimal due to the suppressive nature of the state (European Commission 2004:5; Hyden & Mahlet 2003:219). The role of civil society remained weak due to the state's enduring centralisation of state power and the perception of political officials who fundamentally view civil society as foe rather than friends in Ethiopia (Clark 2000:1).

During the Emperor Haile Selassie's era, there were traditional self-help organisations which had been existed for centuries before the emergence of formal and structured CSOs. According to Sisay (2002:5) and Clark (2000:7), the purpose of these traditional organisations was to enhance individual and societal self-reliance through mutual-support mechanisms so as to overcome various social and economic problems. According to Abebe and Vambe (2011:65-66), these include traditional knowledge and resource pooling systems that the local community uses as a means to overcome different challenges they face in their day-to-day lives. Teferri (in Abebe & Vambe 2011:66) also asserted that they were non-formal but locally organised structured institutions to address mainly economic and social problems of the members.

According to Pankhurst and Damen (2000:38) and Tadele (2015:80), the typical traditional self-help systems existing in the community during the Emperor's time include Iddir, Equib, Debo or Wonfel, Jiggee, Ezen, Senbete, and Yager Shimaglewoch. Iddir refers to the funeral self-help system Sisay (2002:5) and non-formal and traditional social insurance (Pankhurst & Damen 2000:38). Equib is a non-formal money-rotating and credit association system among the local society (Aredo 1993:11-32; Pankhurst & Damen 2000:38). Debo or Wonfel refers to a system through which farmers helped

each other, particularly in farming activities (Abebe & Vambe 2011:66; Sisay 2002:5). Afersata deals with criminal behaviour in the community (Aberra 2012:239) and serves as the local court system in villages (Sisay 2002:5).

In addition, Jiggee emphasises humanitarian support in financial or non-financial ways to help people who face different social and economic difficulties (Chimdessa, Adugna, & Beneberu 2019:125). Ezen is related to the Muslim mosque member's funeral services (Tadele 2015:80; Sisay 2005:6). Yager Shimagilewoch refers to a council of elders (Chimdessa, Adugna, & Beneberu 2019:125; Tadele 2015:80). The followers of the Orthodox Church practice Senbete on Sunday mornings, where the needy people who are not able to feed themselves are gathered and provided with foods and drinks at the event. Moreover, there were also other traditional institutions, including the Seera of Sidama (Aadland 2002:44), the Seera of Kambata (Yacob 2002:45–48), the Gurage people's traditional institutions known as Yajoka and Gardanna (Bahru 2002c:17–21), and the Gurage Road Construction Organisation (Nishi 2008:13 & 14).

The above mentioned were the traditional self-help institutions operating in the society. According to Habtu (2015:22), these traditional self-help systems were believed to lay the foundation for the establishment and development of the formal and structured CSOs as they were recognised and later registered as neighbourhood organisations and community-based organisations upon the enactment of the Civil Code. In support of this, Sisay (2002:5) argued that the struggle of workers in 1945 and the Ethiopian Teachers Association established in 1949 were typical examples of the outcomes of traditional self-help systems.

As a result of the changing demands of society and the changing nature of the problems that society faced, these traditional self-help organisations could no longer be adequate. This situation called for the emergence of the formal and modern CSOs of different forms which was materialised in the last one and half decades of the Emperor Haile Selassie regime who promulgated a Civil Code and Labour Relation Decree in the early 1960s and formally recognised CSOs. According to Hyden and Mahlet (2003:220), Habtu (2015:22) and Sisay (2002:6) the decade of 1960s is considered as an essential

milestone because both local and foreign CSOs were provided legal recognition in this decade.

Hence, Hailu (2016:36) and Tadele (2015:77) argued that the emergence and the spread of civil society in Ethiopia in its formal and modern sense were not only due to the humanitarian crises that occurred in the country at different times but also, as argued by Kassahun (2002:121) due to the motives of expanding religions in the country. Hailu (2016:36) and Hailu (2018:9) asserted that the emergence of CSOs in a new and modern form was mainly meant to provide humanitarian services due to the damages caused by the Italian invaders and to deal with the famines repeatedly occurring particularly in the northern part of the country. In addition, Berhanu (2002:121) argued that evangelising Ethiopia was one of the motives for the emergence of CSOs where Catholic and Protestant missionaries penetrated the country in the name of community development, provision of social services like education and health, and promotion of welfare for citizens.

The emergence of a professional middle class contributed significantly to the above scenario (Hailu 2018:7). As argued by Clark (2000:4), the professional middle class called for the establishment of NGOs which were capable and willing to address the needs of the needy because, in their view, both the government and traditional self-help system were unable to respond to the situation of poverty in the country. This situation resulted in the creation of CSOs that emphasised not only charity with the aim of providing welfare to the needy but also that focused on selected and specific programmes to tackle poverty. The latter are referred to as “single issue” CSOs as they essentially focused on selected issues and programmes to tackle poverty and ensure development. As asserted by Sahleyesus (2005:88-89), the typical examples of such CSOs during the Haile Selassie Regime were Family Guidance Associations of Ethiopia and the Agree Service Ethiopia. According to Hailu (2016:37-40), the Family Guidance Association, legally established in 1969, was born out of the Association for the Destitute initiated by high school students who collected money from their own pockets and strived to provide tea to the poorest of the poor. Agree Service Ethiopia was also

established in 1969 by foreign Catholic Church teachers and some progressive higher officials of the Haile Selassie regime. It was established to deal with social crises and to respond to the challenges of extreme poverty, particularly focusing on peasants.

The Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Union (CELU) was one of the well-known CSOs in Ethiopia that emerged and was registered in 1963 after the enactment of Labour Relations Decree which created room for all unions to be authorised. It was the largest union in the country representing 22 industrial labour groups. CELU was an umbrella organisation that coordinated labour unions and other self-help groups in the country. It was also recognised for sponsoring and provoking many labour protests and strikes. It became aggressive and combative against the government due to the loss of many lives as a result of the drought and famine from 1973 to 1974.

This was followed by the establishment of the Ethiopian Teachers Association. The Ethiopian Teachers Association (ETA) is also one of the CSOs established in 1949 as a traditional self-help association by some concerned schoolteachers. It is one of the professional associations which aimed at promoting the interest of teachers and protecting teachers' rights. The ETA was known to be strong and considerably vocal in terms of defending causes of the collective interest of Ethiopian teachers. One case in point was the petition it submitted to the government revolting against the reform intended to review the education sector and demanding the government to increase teacher's salary.

The Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) currently named as CCRDA where the first "C" stands for Consortium, was established in May 1973. It was started for two reasons. First, the government officials who admitted and worried about the devastating effect of the famine approached churches for assistance to be able to respond to the unprecedented famine that took place in Wollo and Tigray Provinces. Second, the proposal of some experienced church-affiliated practitioners and scholars who suggested that civil society needed to pool their resources and capacity together and act collectively to reverse the devastating famine in the country. Accordingly, the CRDA was established to effectively respond to the famine by putting together the

capacity of all active and functional CSOs operating in the country (Doheny 1997:100). It engaged in coordinating local church-oriented groups and international CSOs in relief, rehabilitation, and diverse developmental activities focusing on poverty alleviation (Clark 2000:10).

Another institution established during the Haile Selassie regime was the Ethiopian Red Cross Society established by Ethiopians residing abroad due to the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy. According to Hailu (2018:7), these Ethiopian Diasporas started to think about the establishment of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society in order to provide relief and humanitarian services to the sufferers of the damages imposed by Italy on Ethiopians. In addition, citing Pankhurst (1960) and the Office of the Prime Minister (2001), Hailu (2018:7) argued that additional non-CSOs, namely, the Ethiopian Women's Welfare Association and the Ethiopian Women's Association for Good Work Service were formed mainly focusing on issues of women.

During the Haile Selassie's Regime there were also CSOs operating in Ethiopia focusing on members' economic and business interest. These included the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sector Associations (ECCSA), the Ethiopian Employers' Association (EEA), and Farmers and Consumer cooperatives (Kebebew in Tadele 2015:82). In addition, Tadele (2015:83) stated that the ETA, Ethiopian Family Guidance Association, Haile Selassie I Foundation and Agree Service Ethiopia were among the local civil society established during the Emperor Haile Selassie regime.

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, as one of the dominant institutions in the political system of the country, played significant roles in providing voluntary services to help the poor segments of the society who were not able to fulfil their basic needs including food, clothing and shelter, particularly during the periods of famine (Alvares 1961a:541; Demessie 1967:3; Hyden & Mahlet 2003:6; Yeshtila, Kjosavik & Shanmugaratnam 2016:1). These voluntary services of the Church, according to Clark (2000:9), were formalised in 1970s because the Church established a formal non-governmental organisation named Development and Interchurch Aid Commission (DIDAC). After being formally established as DIDAC, the previous voluntary services were redefined in

terms of scope which enabled the Commission to intervene in the areas of integrated rural development, reforestation, provision of water, and health services and production of food items.

There were a few international NGOs in the country during the Haile Selassie regime. Among these, Save the Children Sweden, Oxfam GB, and Hope Enterprise were the major ones (Habtu 2015:22; Tadele 2015:83). In addition, the Catholic Relief Service and Concern driven by the Catholic faith on one hand and the Lutheran World Federation, the American Presbyterian Mission, and World Vision driven by protestant faith were among the CSOs that played a vital role in Ethiopia's development during the last decade of the imperial regime particularly in responding to the famine of 1973-1974 when it was at its climax (Dessalegn 2002:106).

Emperor Haile Selassie deserves the credit for his contribution in terms of providing legal personality to CSOs. In this respect, among the noticeable measures he took were the promulgation of the Civil Code, the establishment of the Ministry of National Community Development, establishment of the Office of Association in the Ministry of Interior, enactment of Labour Relation Decree, and promulgation of Association Registration Regulation's Legal Notice 321/66, introduction of new directives to institutionalise *iddrs* at various levels and permitting the involvement of modern CSOs from abroad. These efforts were made to provide CSOs with a legal identity, and to set legal roles and responsibilities of CSOs and the government. In addition, his speech in 1963 which focused on the need for the people to rely on participation and collective action rather than depending on the government alone, clearly revealed not only his commitment but also his interest in civil society (Tadele 2015:79). In addition to encouraging other people who could establish CSOs, the Emperor himself established a philanthropic CSO in 1955 called the Haile Selassie I Foundation (Jenbere 1959:98).

Notwithstanding the positive moves towards the recognition of CSOs, Emperor Haile Selassie remained suspicious and dubious about civil society. The enactment of various legal frameworks did not guarantee the proliferation and independence of CSOs during his regime. The regime was in fear of the actions and the ultimate consequences of free

and independent CSOs that could cause revolt against its political power and domination. Hence, the government was characterised as patronising CSOs by putting them under the scrutiny of influential leaders who had strong ties with the government (Tadele: 2015:83). It is not surprising that the imperial regime was half-hearted and fearful about free and independent CSOs as the then orientation was that the government was the only provider of goods and services where people were considered to be passive in the governance and development process of the nation (Bahru 1991:56), and where promotion of divergent ideas and opposing the position of the government, particularly the King, were considered to be socially and politically taboo (Gebru in Tadele 2015:77).

4.2.2 The Era of Military Regime (1974-1991)

4.2.2.1 Overview of the military regime

The military regime was established in 1974 when the Marxist-Leninist military junta guided by communist ideology took power by overthrowing Emperor Haile Selassie. This point in the history of Ethiopia is known as the end of the monarchical and the crown system in the country. After gaining power, the military regime which ruled the country from 1974 to 1991 immediately declared Ethiopia a republic. The military government was known as the Derg Regime. The Derg was the provisional military administrative council which was in charge of coordinating the armed forces under the socialist Ethiopia.

The military Derg overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie from power due to the unrest that emerged out of class conflict and students' movements. It named itself a provisional military government with the apparent intention of establishing democratically elected civilian government which, unfortunately, did not happen (Abate 1984:380, 387). Instead, it turned out to be a complete military regime headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam, the chairman of the Armed Forces Coordinating Council known as the Derg and the Head of the state, who brutally committed a series of killings on people who stood against him. This was manifested by the killings of many well educated and

innocent young citizens through the campaign known as “Red Terror” (Markakis 1981:13-17).

Through a nationalisation programme that emanated from pure socialist thinking, the Derg undertook extensive nationalisation of the means of production and properties in all sectors including industry, banking, insurance, and large-scale trade. It also undertook land reform to return the ownership of land to the state where individual ownership of the land was limited to 10 hectares (Dessaiegn & Ayenew 2004:6; Markakis 1981:13). The promulgation of the 1987 constitution was a final decision for the Derg to monopolise power as it acknowledged the existence of a single party known as Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) chaired by Mengistu Haile Mariam. The constitution also acknowledged elections where members of the parliament or (the National *Shengo*) were elected from only one party i.e. WPE.

The Derg regime, under the unitary state system and the communist ideological and political thinking, imposed a top-down command economic system. The entire economy was captured by the state reinforced by highly centralised bureaucratic system which was used as the machinery to run the economy. The ideological tradition of Marxism-Leninism rigidly dictated the political ideology and economic policy of the Derg, which had no room for flexibility (Mekonnen & Admasu 2019:142; Abate 1984:390). Towards the end, the Derg government tried to change its ideological and economic system to a mixed economy to survive the internal and external pressure imposed on it. However, introducing the mixed economy was not able to save it from failure as it was too late.

4.2.2.2 Civil society during the military regime

Although Ethiopia has a longstanding experience of voluntary self-help systems, the role of formal CSOs in the military time was exceptionally limited and deteriorated. This emanates from the very nature of the regime characterised by suppression and dictatorship where non-governmental CSOs were not given any room to intervene in social, economic and political processes of the country. All responsibilities were given to the state, the bureaucracy, the WPE, the military and some associations created in rural and urban areas for political purposes. It is not surprising that Mengistu behaved this

way given his alliance with the Soviet Union which was known to be a typical communist country where the role of civil society was completely missing from the equation. As stated by Antonio Gramsci (1971), in Russia, civil society was nothing, but political society was everything.

Except for some traditional self-help systems such as *Iddir* and *Equb*, no locally established formal institutions were entertained during the Derg regime. There were only a few rehabilitation- and relief-oriented NGOs operating in Ethiopia. These NGOs were attracted to Ethiopia because of the famine that the country encountered in 1973-1974 and 1983-1984. These NGOs were faith-based and their origins were rooted in Catholic and Protestant Churches (Dessalegn 2002:106; Habtu 2015:22). According to Dessalegn (2002:106), the Catholic Relief Service and Concern; and the Lutheran World Federation, the American Presbyterian Mission and World Vision were the typical NGOs. At the beginning of the famine period there were about eleven NGOs. Eventually, this number grew to 25 throughout the 1980s where some of the newly added NGOs during the famine of 1983-1984 were secular (Dessalegn 2002:106).

These international NGOs were allowed to operate in Ethiopia during the military regime not due to the willingness of the regime but simply because it could not cope with the challenges imposed on the country by the two famines. The famines, in addition to adversely affecting citizens, also attracted the attention of international media that imposed additional pressure on the government. International relief-oriented NGOs were welcomed by the military regime to come in and provide assistance because the government wanted to use them as a means of accessing donor agencies' aid resources. By opening the door to the international relief organisations, the government also tried to convince the rest of the world and the international media that it was assisting its own people to get rid of hunger. To this end, the government tactically used the advantages of the situation for image-building. For some people who did not have adequate understanding of the reality, however, it was surprising to see how a communist government who was openly hostile to capitalist thinking welcomed western-

oriented international NGOs who were literally foe rather than friends of socialist regimes.

The nature of the regime itself and the ideological tradition by which it was guided was not accommodative and inviting to civic organisations, which ultimately resulted in dismantling and entire banning of CSOs of any form except for a few international NGOs. Although the lower-level administrative units were claimed to be autonomous, decisions were usually made by the WPE in a highly centralised manner where the participation of citizens and civic organisations in the decision-making process was ignored. The Derg was a dictatorship characterised by destroying all sorts of opposition and organised civil forces that could initiate and articulate the direction for mass movements. All the political vacuums were filled by the military and cadres of the Derg. Hence, during the Derg regime, there was no civil society operating in Ethiopia as such. As mentioned above and also as confirmed by Habtu (2015:22) and Dessalegn (2002:106), only a handful of non-local or international CSOs were allowed to intervene and curb the outbreak of famine that took place in Ethiopia in 1973-1974 and 1983-1984. According to Duffield and Prendergast (1994:98), after the famine, specifically after 1985, these NGOs continued to work in the country where many of them focused on relief and rehabilitation activities while a small number of these NGOs shifted to development activities under a very tight state control. The efforts of these NGOs who engaged in development areas were not successful as such due to the rigid control and regulations imposed on them by the state. The state wanted to put them under tight control due to its suspicion that these NGOs could get involved in political matters. The extreme control and regulation of the government, however, did not completely limit these international NGOs involvement in political matters. Duffield and Prendergast (1994) asserted that some of these NGOs, with the support of Sudan, which was an opponent of the Derg regime, secretly managed to supply military weapons and other resources to liberation fronts that were fighting against the Derg regime in the northern part of the country.

According to Hyden and Mahlet (2003:220) and Dessalegn and Ayenew (2004), the suppressive nature of the Derg regime which did not allow establishment of any local CSOs led to the creation of voluntary organisations by citizens who were against social injustice and by politically oriented people living outside the country. Mainly due to the involvement of politically oriented people, the civil nature of these organisations disappeared, and they entirely turned to be political organisations which started to engage in a military struggle with the intention of ending the socialist military regime in Ethiopia. Consequently, it caused the Derg regime to pay the price for chasing and discouraging civil society. Eventually, the Derg was defeated and overthrown by the collaborative effort of liberation fronts, which were initially established abroad.

The positive developments observed particularly during the last decade of Haile Selassie regime that gave some space for civic organisations to play different roles were almost completely overturned during the Derg regime. Except for some traditional self-help systems such as *Iddir* and *Equb*, none of the locally established formal CSOs were allowed during the Derg regime. Under the chairmanship of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Derg government strictly followed and implemented the principles of communist ideology of Marx and Lenin. Consequently, it completely centralised power and established a system of mass organisations and institutional setup of its own to capture the people. These mass organisations, according to Merara (2003:201), were the Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association, the Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's Association, the All-Ethiopia Trade Union, the All-Ethiopia Peasants' Associations in rural areas and the All-Ethiopia Urban Dwellers' Association in urban areas which operated under the tight control of the highly politicised bureaucracy and the WPE. These associations were established to serve the government as political tools through the mode of patron-client relationship. By doing so, the government was able to abandon the existence of CSOs, particularly the local ones, in its real sense (Harbeson in Hyden & Mahlet 2003:219). The absence of vibrant CSOs which could play the role of counterbalancing the state power created a fertile ground for the Mengistu Administration to remain in control (Alem 2010:297).

During the Derg regime, the state-civil society relations were characterised by a rough and non-cooperative system where the state took an oppressive upper hand. The nature and type of activities in which CSOs engaged were determined and dictated unilaterally by the military government. To ensure this, the government used the Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation and the pertinent Ministry, which were in charge of registering CSOs by dictating the type of activities they could engage in. No locally established formal CSOs were permitted to operate in the country. However, the platform was relatively better for the non-formal self-help systems which were marginalised and considered to present no political threat to the government as well as for the international NGOs who were not politically charged. International NGOs were kept under tight security surveillance and were not free to engage in areas such as advocacy, human rights, political matters, or challenging the government openly. According to Bratton (1989:580), some NGOs engaged in humanitarian activities in the country were banned due to the comments and criticisms they made about the government regarding its mistreatment of citizens during the forced or involuntary resettlement programmes undertaken in the country. According to Jones (1992:85), the blockage of the space to formal local organisations and international CSOs adversely affected the government itself. The government, though it did not admit it, was adversely affected by losing golden opportunities in terms of learning from the participatory bottom-up approach to economic development, knowledge transfer to local communities, and technical and financial support that could have been provided by civil society.

Looking at the state-society relations through the theoretical lens, one can understand that the state-society relations during the Derg regime were characterised by a zero-sum game. This means that the government used its suppressive political power guided by socialist thinking to capture the entire space and to eliminate the influence of civil society. Literally, no space was left for civil society, mainly the local formal CSOs, to play any role in the system. Some locally operating CSOs were not real CSOs but were disguised as CSOs and served the political purpose of the government through the clientelist approach. These organisations were not established based on the principle of

volunteerism and their leaders were mainly from the political elite of the Workers Party. Contrary to the liberal theory of civil society that promotes an independent, autonomous and unregulated system of managing civil society, the approach of the military regime can be best explained by paternalistic relations, which are addressed in section 2.5 of Chapter 2.

4.2.3 The Era of EPRDF (Post-1991)

4.2.3.1 Overview of the EPRDF regime

The regime of the EPRDF can be classified and analysed in three major political phases. The first phase is the years from 1991 to 2004 in which it revealed no clear ideological orientation, but simply resembled the western neoliberals. The second phase is the period between 2005 and 2017 where the government openly announced itself as a developmental state. The third phase (2018 to present) is the change in political thinking to a more open system of political freedom and economic relations, particularly during the first stage, where the ruling party changed itself from EPRDF to the Prosperity Party (PP).

To start with the first phase, after the withdrawal of the Derg government in 1991, a transitional government, born out of the peace and democracy conference held in July 1991, was established (Adegehe 2009:2). The transitional period was sustained from 1991 to 1995 under the leadership of Meles Zenawi, an influential TPLF leader, as a President of the transition government of Ethiopia.

During this transitional period, huge decisions that had both positive and negative consequences were made. Some positive measures included the formation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), which provides for human and democratic rights, the introduction of federalism and a federal system of government in the country, which provides the opportunity for self-rule and shared-rule, and the introduction of a multiparty system in the country to mention, but few.

The stand of the transitional government was not clear from the ideological point of view. The rebel group were known to have the left-wing thinking during their struggle against the Derg. However, after removing the Derg government and holding power, their ideology was characterised by neither left-wing ideology nor neoliberalism although it had a tendency of intentionally disguising as neoliberalism. They were simply in a state of confusion. In support of this, Lefort (2013) asserted that the party i.e. EPRDF was confused and lacked coherence. Tefera (2019:11) argued that, on one hand, the transitional government started to privatise some economic sectors selectively and partially which did not manifest all the features of liberalism and, on the other hand, it seemingly abandoned Marxist-Leninist ideology to adjust itself to the interests of the cold War winners i.e. the west. Thus, it is fair to argue that the transitional government was in a complete zone of confusion and was at a problematic ideological crossroad.

Even though the transitional government proclaimed itself as a democratic state, the nature of democracy, namely, “revolutionary democracy”, it employed was not common. Asserting this, Tefera (2019:11) and Dereje (2011:791) stated that “[the transitional government] resorted to the rather confusing ideological claim of establishing a ‘revolutionary democracy’”. The term revolutionary democracy was mentioned officially for the first time in the arena of TPLF/EPRDF when Meles, the then leader of the party, went to the USA just one year before removing the Derg from power and indicated the shift of his party’s ideology to “revolutionary democracy”. He promised the west that he would democratise the country by liberating it from the trap of socialism. This was done intentionally to get the support of the pro-democratic west. According to Africa Confidential (1995:4), the transitional government made a drastic regime change in Ethiopia from a socialist to a democratic regime, but it was in no way a liberal democracy. Strengthening this idea, Tefera (2019: 45) stated that the government was sceptical of implementing economic and political liberalism.

The year 1995 marked a closure to the transitional government led by President Meles Zenawi. This phase of EPRDF began with institutionalised systems. The charter of the transitional government was replaced by the written Constitution of 1995. Following this,

as indicated by African Development Bank Group (2011), Lefort (2012) and de Waal (2018), the EPRDF showed a willingness to open the democratic arena for political parties, civil society and think tanks to emerge and operate. Many democratic institutions including the Election Board, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman Institution also emerged. Following the constitutional provisions that acknowledge the freedom of association, various private and public organisations including the media and voluntary organisations proliferated.

Regardless of the establishments of formal institutions, democratisation and the constitutional freedom, EPRDF was still in a complete ideological confusion. As stated by de Waal (2012:152), this was confirmed by Meles himself who said “[f]or the first ten years after we took over, we were bewildered by the changes.” No one, including top officials and political architects of EPRDF, could clearly know the ideology that they were following. It was only after 2005, the year in which the third election was conducted, following the second election in 2000, that the government made its ideology clear as a democratic developmental state.

The EPRDF showed complete irregularity in its ideological pattern as it made four ideological shifts in five decades. As asserted by Tefera (2019:34), EPRDF, initially established as TPLF, began with the ideology of ethno-nationalist followed by the “Albanian socialism” thinking. It then moved to the ideology of “revolutionary democracy” followed by what the EPRDF has currently proclaimed to be, that is, the “democratic developmental state”.

The second phase of the EPRDF began in the year 2005. Although the idea of developmental state was made official as the ideology of the EPRDF only after 2005, it existed from 2001. Meles and his party acknowledged the importance of a capable state that intervenes and play a leading role in development. In this regard, Meles took a clear stand against neoliberalism that promotes a non-interventionist ‘night-watchman’ state and that gives more space for the market to rule. He called neoliberalism a dead end. But he was in agreement with neoliberals only in that he rejected the idea of the ‘predatory state’ which he again called a dead end (de Waal 2012:152).

One of the reasons that persuaded the EPRDF to move towards the democratic developmental state ideology was partly the failure of the SAP which was implemented throughout developing countries and ultimately failed in all countries where it was instituted. The SAP was grounded on the ten Washington Consensus principles derived from the western ideological prescription, namely neoliberalism. Learning lessons from the failure of neoliberalism as manifested by the failure of SAP and its failure to support investment in infrastructure and technological capacity advancement, the EPRDF led by Meles persuasively moved against neoliberalism and instituted the ideology of the democratic developmental state in the country (de Waal 2012:152; Wuletaw 2014).

The democratic developmental state ideology of Ethiopia was introduced by Meles based on the East Asian countries' experience, essentially South Korea and Taiwan. Accordingly, the government took major steps to materialise the ideology in its political and economic system. It began not only to intensively intervene and control the market but also to determine the economic growth and developmental projection of the country instead of acting as a 'night-watchman'. De Waal (2018) highlighted that the Ethiopian democratic developmental state was meant to ensure that the state had full autonomy in regulating the economy, accelerating economic growth ensured through value creation instead of rent-seeking, and creating a conducive environment for the proliferation of home-grown small enterprises by providing them with all the necessary protections. According to de Waal (2015:156-157), Meles's view of the developmental state was based on three main agendas. The first agenda is autonomy from the private sector. With this idea he admitted the importance of the private sector for development of the country but boldly claimed that, as de Waal (2015:156) put it, "[t]he state should control the commanding heights of the economy so as to be able to lead the private sector".

The second agenda is ensuring development. According to Meles, development is a matter of survival for his country. The country is subject to deep-rooted poverty where people are suffering from hunger and death. Hence, getting rid of such a situation is a top priority of his government. It is with this in mind that EPRDF usually says "our major enemy is poverty". This notion implies the need for setting clear development goals and

gearing all resources and capacity of the nation towards ensuring development and eradicating poverty.

The third agenda is the hegemony of developmentalism. It mainly focuses on the idea that development is more related to building technological capability than capital accumulation which has to be ensured by investing in education at all levels. To promote the hegemony of developmentalism in the entire system, Meles used the leadership, the government, the party cadres, and the mass organisations to preach ideas initiated by the top critical decision-makers, essentially himself, as a dogma to the remaining bodies through the hierarchy down to the *Kebele*, which is the lowest administrative unit in the federal system of the country.

The government claimed to have achieved enormous economic progress manifested by a continuous double-digit GDP rate as a result of employing the developmental state ideology. In this regard, the government was able to register one of the fastest-growing macro-economies in the world (WB 2016:1). In addition, it also expanded the coverage of social service including healthcare and education at primary, secondary and tertiary levels; developed road networks, dams and telecommunication infrastructure (Ethiopian National Planning Commission (ENPC) 2015:29, 45; 2017:10, 26). Furthermore, by ensuring the security of the region in general and internal security in particular (de Waal 2015:161), the government was able to attract investment and enhance the inflow of huge FDI (Clapham, 2018:1158).

However, this does not imply that the developmental state of EPRDF was defect-free. The developmental state experiment of EPRDF was hampered, according to Fukuyama (2019), for various reasons, namely absence of privately owned enterprises, less attention to the quality of recruitment and insufficiency of promotion of Ethiopian civil servants, inability to accurately measure the internal rate of return; awarding of mega projects to China and the associated negative externalities, weak access of Ethiopia's export goods to developed nations' export markets, and the absence of an identity that unifies the entire nation. According to Ottaway (2019:5) and Desta (2019:42), the developmental state of EPRDF was challenged by the obsolete bureaucracy, lack of

meritocracy, a high rate of inflation and external debt, political turmoil, and ethnic strife and conflict.

The Ethiopian democratic developmental state model consists of two essential concepts that do not seem to go together in practice. These concepts are 'democratic' and 'developmental'. According to Leftwich (1995:405; 2000; 2005:692, 695), a developmental state, by virtue of its nature, is against democracy as it encourages more state intervention and less space for non-state actors. In other words, if a state is a developmental state, it is less likely to be democratic and vice versa. The two concepts are different in terms of purpose and institutional setup they need to materialise. The marriage of these two concepts in the EPRDF's developmental state makes it different from East Asian countries' developmental state approach which is mainly characterised by autocracy versus democracy.

On the World Economic Forum moderated by the television journalist Robyn Curnow in 2012, Meles, one of the authorities and the architects of the democratic developmental state of EPRDF, argued that although the ideology that he adopted for his country was called a democratic developmental state, it does not necessarily mean that the two (i.e. democracy and developmental state) are two sides of the same coin. In other words, it does not necessarily mean that one stimulates the other. He said:

“There is no direct relationship between economic growth and democracy historically or theoretically. Democracy is a good thing in and of itself irrespective of its impact on economic growth. [...] in Africa most of our countries are extremely diverse and democracy may be the only viable option for keeping these diverse nations together. So, we need to democratise but not in order to grow [or develop]. We need to democratise in order to survive as united sane nations. [...] the case for democracy can stand and shine on its own.”

The democratic developmental state of EPRDF did not achieve much in terms of democracy because the government did not have a good record of democratic exercise particularly since the 2005 national election (Clapham 2018:1161). The 2005 election

was a turning point as it disclosed the true nature of EPRDF and determined the nature of democratic process of the country. Although the government claimed that the election process was transparent, free and fair, it was full of chaos and turmoil. It ended up with the domination of the state and suppression of political parties and CSOs, which was partly the reflection of the developmental state ideology introduced by the party. In this regard, Nishi (2013a:3) argued that after 2005 election the government tends to monopolise and capture the entire political and economic system by forming a *de facto* single-party system in such a way that the role of other stakeholders including political parties and civil society is undermined. After the 2005 national election, the opposition political parties were dismantled and many of their leaders were imprisoned due to their political views. This was intentionally done by the government to weaken the opposition parties so that they are not able to have the real potential to compete with the ruling party. The blockage of critical media channels including websites and web-logs, suppression of civil society and domination of the government media for government's personal use have become permanent characteristics of the government (Abbink 2017:37-40, 50-54; Cafer, Willis, Shimelis & Mamo 2015:64; Cochrane & Yeshtila 2018:2; de Waal 2015:159; Fesseha & Abteuold 2017:18; Human Rights Watch 2015:14, 38; Lefort 2013:463; Sisay 2012:370-371). Oakland Institute (2013) stated that after the introduction of the developmental state ideology any criticism and comments against the ideology of developmental state were not welcomed and domestic debates were not entertained. These situations led the government to lose its legitimacy in terms of democracy both at international and local levels. According to Clapham (2018:1155) and Kefale (in Fesseha and Abteuold 2017:22), the efforts of the government to regain legitimacy in the area of democracy by narrating the successes registered in terms of continuous double-digit economic growth, intensive infrastructure development including highways and big dams were not successful because there was no equitable distribution of the outcomes. Although the results achieved by the EPRDF's developmental state are undeniable, the practices of democracy are minimal, and the dissatisfaction of citizens escalated which caused continuous public unrest and mob violence.

The third phase of the EPRDF (April 2018 to date) is known to be a period of many visible changes which were registered due to the change of the leader. The continuous and widespread public mob violence and popular unrest resulted in the change of the leader where the Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn was replaced by the Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed. Many positive measures were introduced by the new Prime Minister. All the political prisoners including opposition politicians and journalists were released. Citizens residing outside Ethiopia for political reasons were invited to return to their home country and continue the struggle within the country. Ethiopian media which previously functioned from outside the country were allowed to come in and operate in the country. The charity and society law ratified and promulgated in 2009 was also amended. Generally, the newly assigned Prime Minister strived to expand and open the space for all stakeholders to exercise democracy. The reconciliation of Ethiopia and Eritrea which brought the people of the two countries together was another major achievement in this period. However, these situations were not a permanent future in the country due to the reluctance of the government to establish democratic institutions and lack of a clear road map as to how to take the change forward in a permanent and sustainable manner. After the change of the leader in April 2018, EPRDF could only sustain the changes until the end of 2019. Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed, a few months after holding power, brought the EPRDF to its end by establishing its successor party known as Prosperity Party (PP) in December 2019. From the four dominant ethnic-based parties of EPRDF, only three of them, namely the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), and Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM) were willing to join the PP while one (i.e., the TPLF) refused to join. In addition to the above three ethnic-based parties, PP also embraced five parties which were previously marginalised by the EPRDF. These parties were the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP) of the Afar Region, the Gambella People Democratic Movement (GPDM) of the Gambella Region, the Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP) of the Somali Region, and the Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF) of the Benishangul-Gumuz Region.

It was clear that the birth of PP brought the EPRDF to closure, but the ideological position of the PP was not clear. It was not clear whether the ideology of developmental state employed by EPRDF was continued or aborted with the closure of EPRDF. In this regard, there is no clear-cut answer. Given the move of the PM towards privatising some public enterprises (e.g., Ethiopian Airlines and Telecommunication) that had been under the complete ownership of the state, it seems that he inclined towards adopting a liberal ideology. But the liberalisation of these enterprises was partial in the sense that the state remains in the business having a significant share (of not less than 50%) and plays a significant role in terms of regulating and shaping the behaviour of the private sector involved in the business.

This situation clearly illustrates that the government was neither fully liberal nor a fully developmental state. Hence, one can see that the period of PM Abiy was a period of ideological confusion. Due to the criticism of the government by scholars, politicians, activists and ordinary citizens that the government led by PM Abiy lacks a clear ideological departure from EPRDF's developmental state, the PM came up with the idea of *Medemer* or synergy which he published in a book called *Medemer* in 2019. In his idea of *Medemer*, he argued that the tradition of importing ideologies from abroad that had failed for the last several decades should come to an end. He promoted a 'home-grown' ideology based on the lessons that can be drawn from the long history and experience of Ethiopia's state and nation-building efforts. Some argue that the developmental state ideology has been maintained but is masked by the idea of *medemer* since the current state is involved intensively in the economy.

The idea of *medemer* can be challenged and criticised based on two major points. First, some argue that it has neither an ideological nor a philosophical base, it is rather an idea. Although *medemer* was introduced by the PM, it is not clear that it is taken as ideological motto and principle by the PP and its entire members. The other argument is that the idea of *medemer* is not much different from the idea of developmental state because many of the principles and basic assumptions of *medemer* are shared by the idea of developmental state.

4.2.3.2 Civil society during the EPRDF

The space for the associational life was limited and narrow during the imperial and the military regimes (Clark 2000:1; Dessalegn 2004; Ezana & Ayalewu 2012:9-10; Hyden & Mahlet, 2003:219; Woldearegay 2018:125). CSOs during these periods were mainly welfare-oriented and faith-based (Konjit 2008:39). This situation was changed due to the regime change in 1991 when the military regime was defeated and replaced by EPRDF. Due to the change of government from the Marxist-Leninist-oriented socialist regime, which was characterised by discouraging CSOs, to the democratic regime of EPRDF, signs of progress began to emerge (Berhanu & Milofsky 2011: ii35).

The change of government in 1991 opened a new landscape and opportunity for CSOs to proliferate not only in the area of welfare and humanitarian relief, but also in development and human rights. CSOs started to be seen as the voice of the people (Dessalegn 2008:97; Konjit 2008:39; Wondwosen 2009). In this regard, in 1993, the TGE devised a policy that requires civil society to shift from relief to development. It pushed civil society to connect relief-related resources (including finance and non-financial resources) to development-oriented activities that are designed in consultation with the community impacted (Vaughan & Tronvoll 2003:59).

Clark (2000:1, 5-6) acknowledged that huge strides were made in progress in the development of civil society after 1991. He argued that civil society was provided with the opportunity to engage in and contribute to political and economic issues. Civil society was found to be both relevant and vibrant. This was witnessed by the growth of the private sector, expansion of space for academic and professional freedom in universities, relative credibility of media, and growth in number and capacity of CSOs which were able to engage and address societal problems, even though it is hard to deny that, at the very beginning of the new regime, their impact was limited for they had limited resources, untrained personnel and limited exposure. Dessalegn (2008:97) argued that the abolishment of the Derg regime and its rigid bureaucratic apparatus created a good opportunity for CSOs and activism to emerge and proliferate. Yet, he did not deny that the authorities of EPRDF were dubious and suspicious about civil society

at the early stage. However, gradually, they began to open up the space in order to be recognised as a liberal government and to gain acceptance by western countries and donor agencies. In this regard, Sahleyesus (2005:123) argued that the relative tolerance and openness of the EPRDF, compared to the Derg regime, and the rising signal of support from international financial institutions triggered the government to allow citizens to form voluntary organisations and promote activism. Furthermore, according to Hailu (2018:10), military men and workers of the public bureaucracy who were working under the political umbrella of the military government were in need of support to survive after the fall of the Derg, which eventually pushed some individuals to establish CSOs of different types. According to Kumulachew and Debebe (2012:16, 23), the establishment of CSOs was institutionalised because of the promulgation and ratification of the EPRDF Constitution which acknowledged international and continental human and democratic rights including the rights to association. The constitution was regarded positively as it provided citizens with the right of association and to voluntarily organise themselves for common purposes.

After the change of government in 1991, various types of CSOs were set up. According to Hailu (2018:8-9), the relief and humanitarian civil society which existed during the Derg period continued to operate during the EPRDF period. Indeed, as stated by Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003:59), it needed to make some adjustments to its goals to align relief activities to the development goals of the country. Sahleyesus (2005:110-123) argued that following the fall of the military regime, voluntary organisations having different purposes were created. The first group were those that organised themselves with the aim of promoting human and democratic rights. Their main target was to act as a vanguard of democratic and human rights and defend rights of citizens and other entities from being violated by the government. Examples of such cases are Ethiopian Women Lowers Association and Ethiopian Human Rights Council which started to exert pressure on the government mainly after mid-1990s on issues related to rights.

The second type of CSO was those that had the mindset of a think-thank. These CSOs are advocacy and policy research groups established by professionals who had an

interest in influencing policy-makers and shaping national policies. These categories of CSOs are meant to generate ideas that may either be taken by policy-makers as policy inputs or challenge and question the stand of policy-makers. Typical examples of such organisations are the EEA and Forum for Social Studies (FSS). These institutions are voluntarily organised to contribute their fair share in terms of conducting research and organising a platform where policy-oriented debates are conducted based on research outputs.

The third category consists of organisations that are named voluntary and disguised as voluntary but are practically established to fulfil the interest of the government. According to Vaux (1991) cited in Hailu (2018:9), they were created by turning rebellious group relief organisations into voluntary organisations. In order to strengthen these entities, the government created ethnic-based development associations representing Amhara, Tigre and Oromo.

In the pre-2005 EPRDF period, not only the emergence of diverse CSOs but also their relative freedom, autonomy and commitment to promote justice, freedom, all human and democratic rights was evident. To this end, professional associations, think tanks, policy research-oriented bodies, religious-oriented voluntary organisations, press and media, and opposition parties emerged (Abbink 2006:173-175; Dessalegn 2010:95-101; Dessalegn & Mehret 2004:5-10; Tadele 2015:87).

The continuous and free progress and quantitative growth of CSOs during the EPRDF regime lasted until 2005. The 2005 election was considered to be one of the critical turning points in the politics of EPRDF because it was the election where many political parties actively and meaningfully engaged and contested the ruling party (EPRDF) which eventually resulted in the ruling party's huge loss in the elections. This situation exposed the hidden side of the ruling party (EPRDF). Although EPRDF proclaimed itself to be a democratic government, it turned out that it was practically undemocratic. This was witnessed by the undemocratic and unconstitutional actions it took against political parties, CSOs, and activists in the country who had direct as well as indirect involvement in the process of 2005 national election. The government illegally rejected

the result of the election, unlawfully arrested and imprisoned key political players and leaders of opposition parties, brutally killed many young citizens who went to strike against the action of the government. The government also blamed civil society for losing the election saying that civil society did not sufficiently discharge its role in terms of educating and making citizens aware of the nature and reality of democratic election (Aalen & Tronvoll 2009:200-201; Woldearegay 2018:125; Wondwosen 2009:733). This was the point where the nature of the relationship between the government and civil society began to change from friendship to foe and from cooperation to contestation or confrontation (Woldearegay 2018:125; Wondwosen 2009:731).

Following this disagreement between the government and civil society, the government promulgated the controversial Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 in 2009. The proclamation is controversial because it was against the interests of civil society and it intentionally narrowed the space in which civil society could act to contribute its fair share to the socio-economic and political situations of the country. As clearly articulated in Article 14, the proclamation deliberately targeted and curtailed the role of civil society in the areas of justice, democracy and human rights. The proclamation provides the government with unlimited regulatory power over civil society as indicated in Article 84-89. The government materialised all its suppressive regulatory actions through the Ethiopian Charities and Societies Agency, which was established by the exclusive and unilateral decision of the government (ICNL 2018; Woldearegay 2018:125; Yntiso 2017:21).

Some scholars split the post-2005 election period (between 2005 and 2017) into two phases. These are (1) the post-election closure of civic and political space, and (2) institutionalisation and enforcement of legal restrictions (Brechenmacher 2017; Roberts 2019:15). The former is the time where the political platform and environment was dramatically changed because the government lost electoral support in 2005. It was a time where the government decided to stay in power through military actions which was manifested by cracking down on opposition parties, arresting of opposition party leaders, killing of members of opposition parties, suppressing the free press and media,

and threatening CSOs (Berhanu & Milofsky 2011: ii44; Simegnish 2016:90; Stremlau 2011:716). Being in crisis mode in the aftermath of the election, the EPRDF was busy consolidating its power. It closed down more than half of the private and independent newspapers, arrested nearly 20 000 protesters and about 150 opposition leaders, journalists and bloggers, killed around 193 civilians and repressed constitutional freedom of speech through repression of the free press (Brechenmacher 2017; Simegnish 2016:90). The government blamed CSOs particularly those who were financed from abroad for involving themselves in the country's politics and making the government lose electoral support in 2005. The government, thus, decided to move against them in the aftermath of the election.

The latter is the phase where the government institutionalised all the adverse decisions against civil society and civic activism by devising a series of legal instruments. One of the typical cases is the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 followed by the establishment of the regulatory agency known as Ethiopian Charities and Societies Agency. As indicated above, the proclamation played a crucial role in terms of closing the space for civil society and restricting the constitutional freedom of speech and association. It limited the potential of CSOs' influence on the government in relation to human and democratic rights as it restricted their access to financial resources from abroad. It did not entertain or tolerate any CSO that worked in rights-based activities, peace-building and conflict management and advocacy if they sourced a significant proportion of their funds from abroad (Debebe 2010:23; Roberts 2019:15).

The other restrictive law was the Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation enacted in 2008. This law provides all the rights to the prosecutors. The law provides a special privilege to prosecutors to intervene in any print publication that sought to cause public disorder and threatened security concerns. The government devised the law to specifically curtail the influence of independent newspapers which had proliferated since 1991. It considers the defamation of state organs and government authorities as a criminal act and increased the fine to as high as USD 10 000 for breaching the law (Aalen & Tronvoll 2009:200; Brechenmacher 2017; Simegnish 2016:92). Another

restrictive law that the government enacted to repress civic activism was the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation promulgated in 2009, which was apparently meant to address the national security problems of the country. Although the government used the issue of national security as a cover, the proclamation was effectively used to oppress political parties, activists, CSOs and the media. The government used the law to exercise power arbitrarily to arrest and imprison people in the name of terrorism by violating the due process of law (Bach 2011:646; Roberts 2019:15; Simegnish 2016:92).

The government tried to justify the significance of these laws by stating that there was a need for remedial action to curb the deficiencies observed in the civil society sector and other non-state entities by creating a more comfortable and conducive environment for citizens. Hence, the government argued that creating a conducive environment for citizens to exercise their constitutional provisions, i.e., the right to association, was important. In addition, the government claimed that it was its responsibility to make sure that CSOs, media, journalist, activists and political parties in the country were operating in an accountable and transparent manner (Dereje 2011:804-805; Yntiso 2017:21). In addition, it also tried to create the image that the country was under threat of ethnic strife and that giving priority to keeping peace and order was of paramount importance (Simegnish 2016:93). Arguing against the claim of the government, some scholars stated that the government rather brutally treated CSOs and prevented civic activism using these proclamations. For instance, Debebe (2010:23) and Yalemzewd, Hopkins, Noble, Babcock and Martinez (2009) noted that the proclamations systematically limited the constitutional freedom of association. Particularly the Charities and Societies Proclamation blocked the engagement of civil society in promoting human and democratic rights by limiting access to financial sources obtained from abroad. Strengthening this, Yntiso (2017:21-22) stated that the proclamation imposed limitations on access to foreign finance and operations. According to Aalen and Tronvoll (2009:201) and Woldearegay (2018:125), if the proclamation allowed CSOs to operate in the area of advocacy, good governance, and human and democratic rights, it only allowed those who generated a maximum of 10% of their budget from abroad. As a result, as noted by Berhanu (2012), some CSOs who were working in the area of

human and democratic rights were compelled to change their area of intervention to service delivery just for the sake of survival. According to Yntiso (2017:25), Simegnish (2016:92) and Amnesty International (2012a), some CSOs were forced to entirely withdraw from the sector. According to Kumulachew and Debebe (2012:53), the typical example could be the withdrawal of five nationally known and influential right-based CSOs, namely the Action Professional Alliance for People (APAP), the Ethiopian Lawyers' Association (ELA), the Ethiopian Women Lawyers' Association (EWLA), the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), and the Organisation for Social Justice in Ethiopia (OSJE).

In general, the EPRDF literally turned out to be an authoritarian power due to the challenges it faced during the 2005 election. It became resistant to critics that emerge from media, political parties, and civil society due to the fear of losing legitimacy of the people.

“Like most autocratic regimes, the EPRDF worries that the more informed and connected the people are, the more empowered they will be to hold the government to account. In other words, Ethiopia’s attempt to gag the media and to choke civil society is not a sign of the government’s strength but rather of its weakness.” (Simegnish 2016:94).

The three successive regimes discussed in this chapter, although the outcomes they produced vary depending on the ideological orientations they employed, shared almost similar features in the way they dealt with CSOs and civic activism in the country. The major features of the three regimes and their relationships with civil society are summarised in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Civil society and the State in Ethiopia from 1950 to present

	1950-74 (Emperor Haile Selassie I)	1974-91 (Mengistu Haile Mariam)	1991- 2017 (Meles Zenawi and Hailemariam)	2018 to present (Abiy Ahimed)
Regime Type	Monarchical	Socialist/communist	Democratic	Democratic
Ideology	Imperialism (Feudal)	Socialism	Revolutionary democracy; democratic developmental state	Not clear but disguised as neoliberalism
Type of CSOs	Professional, academic, farmers, self-help	Relief and development associations formed in exile	Economic and social development associations	Economic, social, political development associations
Organisational climate in which CSOs operated	Optimistic	Militant	Cautious	Optimistic
Nature of CSOs' organisational structure	Functioning	Autocratic and disciplinary	Democratic and tentative/fluid	Democratic
Period of emergence of civil society	Towards the end of the regime	During the famine periods	At the early stage of the regime until 2005 election	Early stage of the regime to date
State-civil society relations	Relatively positive but the government dubiously approaches civil society	Complete suppression by the government	Positive until 2005 election but complete suppression afterward	Positive but still with certain level of suspicion

Source: Own information, adapted from Hyden & Mahlet (2003:221)

4.3 CONCLUSION

It is evident from the preceding discussion in the chapter and the summarised information in Table 4.1 that the three successive regimes analysed maintained dominant political traditions characterised by different degrees of authoritarianism under varied ideological orientations. CSOs and civic activism were pushed aside and ignored in the development and social transformation process of the nation. In all cases, civil society remain suppressed by the successive governments and operated under a massive suppression and control of government which curtailed its potential to contribute to the country's development. The relationship between the successive governments and civil society has generally been confrontational rather than cooperative. The overall environment in which civil society operated in Ethiopia during the successive three regimes was dominantly characterised by hostile environment although there were some occasions where the government showed some level of interest to open the space for civil society in the post-1991 period.

This resulted in almost a complete lack of vibrancy of civil society which consequently created a submissive civil society that lacks the power, potential and competence to challenge, demand and make the government accountable for its actions. The narrow space for CSOs and civic activism and the wider space for the state in the three successive regimes of the country could be one of the reasons for the limited progress of the country in terms of transforming the society, ensuring good governance, and promoting development. The next chapter presents the methodology of the study which specifically deals with the methods, techniques and procedures followed in data collection and analysis of the study.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

5.1 INTRODUCTION

With the intention of achieving the objective of this study which is stated in Chapter 1 (see section 1.6), this chapter presents the methodology of the study which includes the research design, research approach and specific strategies, sample size and sampling technique, sources of data, data collection instruments, data analysis methods and ethical considerations. To this end, the research approach reveals whether the study is qualitative, quantitative or mixed. It also sets out the research paradigm and philosophy by which the study is guided. In addition, the specific strategy that corresponds to the chosen research approach is presented. The chapter also presents the sampling design that explains specific procedures and techniques used to draw the sample of the study and the target group of the study. It also presents the sources of data (i.e., primary and secondary), data collection tools (i.e., qualitative and quantitative), methods of data analysis (i.e., quantitative and qualitative) and ethical considerations (i.e., confidentiality, informed consent and consideration of the researcher for participants).

5.2 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STUDY

From a paradigm standpoint, this research fits into the pragmatism group. According to Creswell (2009: 10–11), Morgan (2007), and Robson (2002), the pragmatic worldview encourages the use of pluralistic approaches that are most effective for learning about the issue at hand and that mainly apply to mixed-method research. From a philosophical standpoint, the research liberally draws from qualitative and quantitative assumptions. In that sense, the research is not committed to any type of philosophy or conception of reality. As a result, the research supports both the idea of an internalised universe and one that exists outside of people's minds. From an epistemological perspective, the researcher thinks that depending on the nature of the issue, both observable phenomena and subjective values might provide helpful information.

5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

Broadly classified, in research, there are three types of research design, namely exploratory, explanatory and descriptive. Exploratory research design focuses on exploring and discovering new information with fresh insight. It purely relies on subjective and qualitative information. An explanatory design, on the other hand, depends on explaining relationship between variables. It focuses on analysing cause and effect using objective and quantitative information. Descriptive research type focuses on describing the state of affairs as it exists. This study is predominantly descriptive in nature. It makes use of both qualitative and quantitative data to describe the role of civil society in development and governance as well as the state-civil society relationship in the country.

5.4 RESEARCH APPROACH

Decisions regarding the research approach and specific strategies to be used in a given study are usually informed by the nature and purpose of the study (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007:67–71; Creswell & Plano Clark 2011:60). Accordingly, in this study, a mixed method approach was applied since the nature of the problem and research questions raised in Chapter 1 requires the application of a mixed method. Mixed method research is an approach where both qualitative and quantitative research methods are combined in such a way that data of qualitative and quantitative nature can be combined and used in a systematic way. Such an approach has the benefit of offsetting both qualitative and quantitative design, providing more evidence for understanding the problem, answering the questions that cannot be answered by using only one of the two approaches (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011:12). The mixed method approach was, therefore, selected based on the notion suggested by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) that only one data set is insufficient and that different kinds of data sources are needed to address different research questions.

From the research strategy point of view, the mixed method approach has its own specific strategies that should be carefully selected and properly applied to avoid

confusion that may result from mixing the information obtained from quantitative and qualitative data sources. According to Creswell (2009:103), there are various mixed method strategies from which researchers can choose based on the relevance of the strategy to the characteristics of their studies. The specific strategy employed in this study is what Creswell refers to as concurrent mixed method. Concurrent mixed method refers to the notion that one form of a data set is integrated into another. It refers to a condition where the researcher conducts not only the collection of qualitative and quantitative data simultaneously but also the analysis of it. It is essential when a single data set is inadequate to answer all or some of the research questions.

In this study, the mixed method approach was used where both qualitative and quantitative data are embedded into one another. The researcher believes that all the research questions as set out in section 1.5 seek the use of a qualitative approach based on data collected through key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGD) and a review of relevant documents to thoroughly examine and get an in-depth insight of the contribution of civil society in development and governance as well state-society relations in Ethiopia. The study also used quantitative data obtained through a questionnaire instrument.

To be more specific, since the purpose of Research Question 1 was to determine the conceptual and theoretical perspectives underlying civil society in Ethiopia, it primarily relies on the review of literature obtained from different sources in the area. Accordingly, in order to address the first research question, the researcher undertook a thorough examination of relevant literature pertaining to the roles, contributions, and challenges of civil society. The exploration encompassed a wide range of theories, including those associated with liberalism and leftwing ideologies, as well as those relating to cooptation and cooperation, and development and governance. To further bolster the arguments, the researcher also delved into empirical literature that directly pertains to the contributions and challenges of civil society in Ethiopia and other regions. Additionally, published and official government documents, such as the constitution, policies, and civil society proclamations, were consulted. To maintain focus and relevance, the

researcher intentionally omitted literature that do not directly relate to the theories, contributions, challenges, and constraints of civil society.

Research Question 2 aims at investigating the influence of external and internal contextual factors on the role of civil society. To answer this research question data from quantitative and qualitative sources i.e., questionnaires, interviews, FGDs and document review were used. Data from questionnaire was gathered and analysed based on parameters that determine the contribution of civil society namely, a) external factors – ideological, political, legal and economic, and b) internal factors – human, financial, physical capitals and internal governance. In addition, parameters that are pertinent to the major roles of civil society including advocacy, service delivery, and watchdogging were also included into the questionnaire. The qualitative data obtained through key informant interviews, FGD and document review were also used to substantiate the data analysed based on questionnaire.

Table 5.1: Nature of research questions and approaches employed

Research Questions	Objective	Approach/Methods
How do the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of civil society impact state-civil society relations in Ethiopia?	To provide a thorough analysis of how the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of civil society impact state-civil society relations in Ethiopia.	• Qualitative – Literature review (secondary sources)
How and why do civil society's external and internal contextual factors influence the role of civil society in post-1991 Ethiopia?	To investigate how civil society's external and internal contextual factors influence its roles in post-1991 Ethiopia.	• Mixed method – primary sources through questionnaire, other qualitative data collection techniques (KII, FGD) and document review
Does civil society play a role in and contribute to the development and governance of Ethiopia and how do changes in policies impact on civil society?	To analyse the roles and contributions of civil society in development and governance of Ethiopia and how changes in policies impacted civil society.	• Mixed method – primary sources through questionnaire, other qualitative data collection techniques (KII, FGD) and document review

Research Questions	Objective	Approach/Methods
What is the nature of state-civil society relations in the context of post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia in terms of the time periods of 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date?	To examine the nature of state-civil society relations in the context of post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia in terms of the time periods of 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017, and 2018 to date.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mixed method - primary sources through questionnaire, other qualitative data collection techniques (KII, FGD) and document review
How can the civil society in Ethiopia be strengthened to contribute to the development and governance of Ethiopia?	To suggest guidelines for better state-civil society relations and effective contribution of civil society to the development and governance of Ethiopia.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Qualitative – based on the findings of research question 1-4 and review of relevant literature and experience of some other countries

Source: Own formulation (2020)

Research Question 3 addresses the contributions and challenges of civil society in the development and governance of the country. Research question 4 examines the relationship between the state and civil society in post-1991 Ethiopia. Similar to Question 2, research Question 3 and 4 required data from quantitative and qualitative sources i.e., questionnaire, interview, FGD and document review. To address state-civil society relations, data was gathered and analysed based on such factors as treatment of the state toward civil society, role of the ACSO in its interaction with civil society, independence of civil society from the state, and attitudinal factor (i.e., the attitude that the state and civil society have against each other). The qualitative data obtained through KII, FGD and document review were used to support the questionnaire-based data analysis.

Questionnaire-based data, which was meant to address Research Questions 2, 3 and 4 was gathered focusing on three different periods (i.e., 1991–2004, 2005–2017, and 2018 to date) identified for this study and analysed by way of comparison. The justification for this classification is that during these three periods, CSOs were operating under different legal, political, economic and ideological contexts. This external contextual variation determines not only the nature of state-civil society

relations but also the role that CSOs play in development and governance of the country.

Finally, the fifth research question was answered based on the findings of the Research Questions 1 to 4, consultation of relevant literature and experiences of other countries.

5.5 SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

Since 1991, civil society in Ethiopia has gone through several ups and downs due to the changes in contextual factors such as the legal frameworks that governed them over the last three decades. During this period, civil society was governed by three different legal frameworks applied in different times. To be able to analyse how these changes and changes related to political as well as economic situations affect the role that civil society plays in development and governance of the country and how it affected the relationship between the state and civil society over time, the researcher included CSOs that had existed and been in constant operation since the 1990s.

The study target population comprises civil society organizations that have existed since the 1990s. The number of such CSOs, according to the data from the Ministry of Justice and the Agency for Civil Society Organisations (ACSO), was 70 in the 1990s (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6). However, according to the database obtained from the Communication and Technology Directorate of the ACSO, of these 70 CSOs, only 25 have remained in uninterrupted operation and have sustained or existed to date. Hence, the researcher considered for the study all the 25 CSOs that have been in operation since the 1990s (see Appendix C). The main reason for focusing only on CSOs that have existed since the 1990s to date is that the study was a comparison of three different periods (i.e., 1991–2004, 2005–2017, and 2018 to date), which demanded data from CSOs that existed across all three periods. Those who were not in operation during one of the above three periods could not provide tangible and reliable information about the periods in which they were not in operation. Hence, the researcher was compelled to rely only on CSOs that existed and uninterruptedly operated across all three different periods identified for the study instead of taking the

currently existing entire population. Then, specific techniques explained below were applied to select respondents from these 25 CSOs target population.

Table 5.2: Summary of respondents from all categories

Categories	Number	Target group
Interview	27	15 CSOs' officials 2 Directors of the Agency for Civil Society Organisations 10 from <i>Iddir</i> (men and women <i>Iddir</i> from 10 sub-cities).
Questionnaire	200	From experts of the selected civil society organizations
FGD	1	One FGD with participants from all types of civil societies consisting of 12 participants.

Source: Own formulation (2020)

Since the study focuses on a comparison of the role of civil society over three different periods, it was considered essential to gather quantitative data from respondents working in the selected 25 CSOs using a questionnaire. According to the data obtained from 25 CSOs, the total number of their staff is 490, from which a sample size of 220 was determined using the sample size determination formula by Yamane (1973). The formula is represented by $n = \frac{N}{1 + Ne^2}$, where "n" represents sample size, "N" represents the population, and "e" represents acceptable sampling error (i.e. 0.05). A 95% confidence level is assumed, with $p = 0.05$. As a result, a sample size of 220 was determined, i.e., $n = \frac{490}{1 + 490(0.05)^2} = 220$. The determined sample size of 220 was distributed proportionally across the 25 CSOs (details in Appendix C). A simple random sampling method, particularly the lottery method, was employed to draw respondents from each CSO. It is important to note that the analysis was based on 200 questionnaires because 14 respondents failed to return the questionnaire. Moreover, 6 questionnaires were not used for analysis because respondents did not complete them correctly. The usable 200 questionnaires out of 220 yielded a return rate of about 91 percent, which was adequate for the analysis. In addition to questionnaires, interviews

were conducted with officials of the selected CSOs and directors of the Agency for Civil Society Organisations. Accordingly, 15 officials of civil society organisations and two directors of the ACSO who had adequate exposure, experience, and information about their respective institutions were purposefully selected and interviewed. With regard to the non-formal or unregistered CSOs, it is methodologically difficult, if not impossible, to locate all types of unregistered organisations. Hence, the researcher opted for *Iddir*, for different reasons. One of these reasons is that, of all traditional associations, *Iddir* is the most popular and best-known one in Ethiopia. The second reason is that it is very common in urban areas and relatively easy to locate. There are about 6 450 *Iddir* in the whole of Addis Ababa. Addis Ababa has 10 sub-cities and within each sub-city there are variable numbers of *Iddir*. As the intention was to gather qualitative data using the semi-structured interview technique, interviews were conducted with 10 *Iddir* leaders (both men and women) one from each sub-city. To this end, one interviewee was selected from each sub-city based on convenience sampling since they were homogeneous and had the same characteristics.

5.6 SOURCES OF DATA

In this study, both secondary and primary sources of data were used to examine state-civil society relations and the role of civil society in development and governance of the country.

5.6.1 Secondary Sources of Data

Gupta (2015:145) suggests that the main sources of secondary data are both published and unpublished sources. Accordingly, the study reviewed published and unpublished secondary documents related to the role of civil society including archival documents and official reports of the government, international organisations, CSOs, think-tanks, and other research organisations.

In addition, various books and academic journals related to civil society were consulted by accessing them through repositories such as the UNISA Library e-resources, Library

of the Ethiopian Civil Service University, Library of Addis Ababa University, Library of the FSS, African Union Library, and the Library of the UNECA.

Table 5.3: Secondary data sources and purposes

Data type	Source	Purpose
National policy frameworks	Constitution, Civil society proclamations, government policy documents related to civil society, PRSP, PASDEP, GTP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To analyse policy frameworks related to civil society and identify the context it created for civil society and how it affects it; and • To analyse policy gaps, weaknesses and strengths.
Reports on civil society	Reports of Human Rights Commission, ACSO, CCRDA, and other relevant sources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To analyse the contribution of civil society in governance and development of Ethiopia; • To assess the internal capacity, strengths and weaknesses of civil society; and • To determine and analyse CSOs engaging in different functional areas.
Published and unpublished research outputs	Publications including books, academic journals and tertiary sources such as encyclopedia (both national and international)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To examine underpinning theories and concepts of civil society; • To analyse the generic role of civil society in governance and development; and • To review empirical studies.
Relevant global data sources and experiences of other countries	International reports and standards; reports and documents on the experiences of other countries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To analyse the generic role of civil society in governance and development; and • To suggesting ways as to how to enhance meaningful engagement of civil societies in development and governance of the country.

Source: Own formulation (2020)

5.6.2 Primary Data Sources

In addition to the secondary sources, primary sources including questionnaires, interviews, and FGD were used to gather first-hand information on the subject matter of the study. Based on the permission of the respondents, a voice-recording device was used during the interviews and focus group discussions to retain the details that might be missed while writing the responses.

5.6.2.1 Key informant interviews (KII)

The researcher prepared a semi-standardised (or semi-structured) KII guide. Semi-standardised interviews were chosen for this study because, according to some scholars, they give some level of flexibility for the researcher to entertain unanticipated issues that may emerge on the spot during the interview guide. This flexible approach allows the researcher to get rich information and depth of insight on the topic of the study (Ryan, Coughlan & Cronin 2009:310; Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009:5; Tod 2006:348-349).

As indicated before, KIIs were conducted by the researcher with individuals from the purposively selected CSOs (formal and non-formal - men and women *Iddir*) and the ACSO. KII guiding questions (see Appendix D) that were believed to have the potential to provide a wide range of information and deep insight into the topic of the study were prepared in English language. Since the language medium of interviews was Amharic, the English version was translated into Amharic language by the researcher before conducting the interview. The interviews were administered by the researcher on a face-to-face basis supported with the use of a voice-recording device with the permission of interviewees. The interviews were conducted in places convenient for respondents. Specifically, the researcher interviewed all respondents face-to-face in their respective offices. However, only two respondents were interviewed via Google Meet from home. The average time taken for each interview was 90 minutes.

5.6.2.2 Focus group discussions (FGDs)

One FGD was conducted with participants from CSOs. The focus group, consisting of 12 participants, was conducted with purposively selected information-rich individuals who are experienced in working with different CSOs. Guided by a detailed FGD protocol (Appendix E), the discussion was moderated by the researcher in a democratic way where each participant was given an equal chance to forward ideas freely during the discussion. The discussion continued up until the saturation of the required information without compromising the maximum time allotted, which was 120 minutes. The researcher conducted the FGD in Addis Ababa by choosing a central location that is relatively close to and convenient for all participants. Hence, the researcher took the geographic proximity of all participants into account while choosing the location of the FGD.

5.6.2.3 Questionnaire

The researcher drew up his own questionnaire and administered it in person to respondents working for the selected CSOs. The questionnaire consisted of items formulated on a five-point Likert scale. It consisted of three major sections. Section 1 was the introduction section; section 2 dealt with the profile of respondents, and section 3 consisted of items that were pertinent to state-civil society relations (i.e. role of the agency, attitudinal factors that determine the relationship, independence of CSOs and fairness in treatment of CSOs by the state) as well as items that were related to the role of civil society in development and governance (i.e. external and internal contexts of civil society, advocacy, service delivery and watchdogging). The questionnaire was prepared in such a way that respondents could answer a single item across three different periods (i.e., 1991–2004, 2005–2017, and 2018 to date) (See Appendix F). The data generated through the questionnaire supplemented by the qualitative data and secondary data obtained from different sources were used to understand the role of civil society as well as the state-society relations during the three different periods.

5.7 DATA ANALYSIS METHOD

5.7.1 Analysis of Qualitative Data

The qualitative data from KII, FGDs and secondary sources included in the interview schedule were coded and analysed thematically. The qualitative data analysis was done in different phases. First, the collected data from interviewees and focus group discussants were transcribed. In order to transcribe and make sense of the qualitative data, the researcher changed the recorded audio data into written form translating it from Amharic into English. Second, the transcribed data was entered into the qualitative data analysis software known as Atlas.ti version 9. Third, the data captured by the software was coded mainly by themes based on the dimensions that the study intended to focus on. In the process of coding, both inductive and deductive approaches were employed. Finally, organisation and synthesis of the data were undertaken sequentially.

5.7.2 Analysis of Quantitative Data

In order to analyse the quantitative data, a descriptive data analysis technique was employed. The output of descriptive statistics was displayed using frequency distributions, percentages, mean rankings and percentiles. In addition to the description of data, state-civil society relations and the role of civil society in development and governance were analysed using comparative analysis. In this case, Freidman's ANOVA was used to compare the status of state-civil society relations as well as the role of civil society in development and governance across the three periods (i.e., 1991–2004, 2005–2017, and 2018 to date) identified for this study.

The choice of test statistics in a study is always dictated by the nature of the data at hand. In this study, Freidman's ANOVA was employed. It is a non-parametric test statistic commonly used when data from the same sample of research participants are taken and measured at at least three points in time or under three different conditions (Pallant 2016). Freidman's ANOVA was selected for this study because the same cases were measured at three different points in time (i.e., 1991–2004, 2005–2017, and 2018 to date) using ordinal scale data collected based on a Likert scale. According to Pallant

(2016), non-parametric tests statistics like Freidman’s ANOVA which need to be used when researchers deal with nominal or ordinal data, do not require stringent tests of assumptions except for the randomness of the sample. In this study, the sample was randomly selected and hence this assumption was fulfilled.

Table 5.4: Parameters of comparison, operational definition and method of analysis

Research questions	Purpose	Parameters	Measurement	Analysis method
How and why do civil society’s external and internal contextual factors influence the contributions of civil society in post-1991 Ethiopia?	To investigate the influence of external and internal contextual factors on the contributions of civil society.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External context – ideological, political, legal and economic Internal context – human, financial and physical capital, and internal governance 	Ordinal	Freidman ANOVA
Does civil society play a role in and contribute to the development and governance of Ethiopia and how do changes in policies impact on civil society?	To analyse the contributions and contributions of civil society in development and governance of Ethiopia and how changes in policies impacted civil society.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civil societies major areas of interventions – advocacy, service delivery and watchdogging 	Ordinal	Freidman ANOVA
What is the nature of state-civil society relations in the context of post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia in terms of the time periods of 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date?	To examine the nature of state-civil society relations in the context of post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia in terms of the time periods of 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Role of the Agency Attitudinal factors that determine the relationship Independence of civil society Extent of equal and fair treatment to civil society by the government 	Ordinal	Freidman ANOVA

Source: Own formulation (2020)

The data gathered on the parameters indicated in Table 5.4 from secondary sources as well as questionnaires was cleaned (e.g., 6 defective questionnaires were excluded), coded, and inserted into SPSS version 23 for analysis. Tables and figures were used as tools to display data.

5.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Research ethics is a standard of conduct that researchers are required to demonstrate in the course of research undertakings. It is essential for various reasons including generating knowledge in a genuine manner, promote accountability, trust and fairness, protecting others and reducing harm (Israel & Hay 2006:2-4). According to ESRC Research and Ethics Framework (2010:3-4), ethical issues of any research endeavour address three major concerns namely, confidentiality, consideration of the researcher for participants and informed consent, which were also the concerns of this study. The study involved human participants engaging in the research process who provide various types of information. These participants include Civil Society Agency's officials, professionals who had expertise related to the study, and heads and workers of NGOs particularly CSOs. The information gathered from these respondents was managed by applying a high level of ethical standards. This was achieved by maintaining anonymity but also demonstrating proper respect as well as protecting privacy, dignity and confidentiality of participants. The study was conducted after securing the ethical clearance provided by the Research Review Committee of the Department of Development Studies at UNISA in 2017 (See Appendix A for ethical clearance).

Data collection entirely relied on the voluntary consent of respondents. Respondents were completely free to withdraw from providing data and were not exposed to direct or indirect coercion for doing so. In addition, no material or financial inducement was provided to respondents for providing information. During data collection, the researcher informed participants how they have been chosen for the study and how the information they are providing is going to be used (see Appendix B for the consent form). The researcher also ensured to respondents that the personal as well as organizational data they provided would be treated in a confidential way so that they would not be exposed

to any physical or psychological harm as a result of giving the information. Finally, maximum effort was made to avoid deliberate distortion of data, biasness, and plagiarism that would adversely affect the quality and validity of the study.

5.9 CONCERNS FOR VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

To establish the study's validity, the researcher personally did all of the KIIs to maintain uniformity in the research process and subsequent data. The interview guide was pilot-tested on two individuals who have the information on the topic of the study before making it ready for final use. A pilot test was also conducted by distributing questionnaires to ten people who were not included in the research sample. The pre-test helped the researcher understand whether the questionnaire design fits its purpose. Furthermore, expert judgement was obtained by giving the study instruments to three experts from three different CSOs with over 10 years' experience with the civil society. Based on their comments and recommendations, adjustments to the instruments were made. Cronbach's alpha is one of the most-often used dependability measurements. It assesses the internal consistency of a scale's items. Cronbach's coefficient alpha values typically range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more internal consistency. Hence, the higher the coefficient, the stronger the internal consistency of the instruments (Sekaran 2003:205). The Cronbach's Alpha score for this study was .898; indicating strong internal reliability and hence high research quality (see Appendix G). In order for respondents to offer accurate responses on each topic, the KII and questionnaire survey were administered in venues convenient to the participants. The information gathered from respondents was double-checked against other sources. As a result of this strategy, data reliability was ensured.

5.10 SUMMARY

This chapter outlines and justifies the methodological approaches, methods and specific techniques that were employed in the study. To this end, the chapter described the research approach, research design, sampling design and procedure used in this study. It described the population and the target group of the study and the specific sampling

techniques and procedures used to draw sample from the population. In addition, data sources and data gathering tools were also presented. In this regard, it reveals that primary and secondary sources of data were used and that questionnaire, interview and FGDs were employed as data gathering tools and instruments. The chapter also presented that both qualitative and quantitative techniques of data analysis were employed. Finally, it presented the ethical issues taken into account while dealing with the subjects of the study. The following chapters (6, 7, 8) deal with presentation, analysis and discussion of results.

CHAPTER 6: STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN POST-1991 ETHIOPIA

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter consists of two major parts. The first part deals with the overview of the post-1991 status of civil society in Ethiopia. The aim is to establish the overall and brief background and profile of civil society in the country during the post-1991 period with the intention of informing the analysis of state-civil society relations in this chapter as well as the analysis in the succeeding chapters. To this end, past trends and the current status of civil society were addressed. Past trends in civil society were analysed by focusing on the registered CSOs each year from 1994 to 2021 and the rate of registrations. In addition, the current status of civil society in the country was also described based on CSO categories and intervention areas. The analysis in this section of the chapter was conducted predominantly based on secondary sources and document reviews. In addition, data from interviews and FGD was used where it was found relevant.

The second part of the chapter focuses on the analysis of state-civil society relations. State-civil society relations were compared and analysed across the three periods (i.e., period 1: 1991 to 2004, Period 2: 2005 to 2017, and Period 3: 2018 to date) identified for this research. The comparison was carried out focusing mainly on the attitudes of government as well as civil society, the role of the Agency for Civil Society Organisations (ACSO) (formerly known as Charities and Societies Agency - CSA), fairness of civil society treatment by the government, and independence of civil society. The analysis of state-civil society relations was based on the data obtained from questionnaires, interviews, the FGD, and document review. To analyse the data obtained from questionnaire, descriptive statistics such as percentages, medians, and mean rankings were used. In addition, Freidman's ANOVA, a non-parametric alternative to one-way repeated measures ANOVA, was used to test the differences in state-civil society relations across the three periods. Qualitative data obtained from interviews, the FGD, and document review were used to substantiate the results of the quantitative analysis. In order to avoid congestion in the analysis section with basic information, the

result of the response rate, reliability statistics, and profile of respondents are attached in the Appendices (see Appendix G) at the end of the thesis.

6.2 PAST TRENDS AND CURRENT STATUS OF POST-1991 CIVIL SOCIETY IN ETHIOPIA

6.2.1 Past Trends

The data presented in Table 6.1 depicts the past trends in civil society in the country from 1994 to 2021. It is, however, important to note that from 1994 to 2000 and 2001 to 2007, data for some years are missing because it was not available. As depicted in Table 6.1, the number of CSOs in the country exponentially increased from 70 in 1994 to 368 in 2000 to 600 in 2001 and 2 305 in 2007. This is because CSOs were encouraged by the open access to foreign funds following the replacement of the military regime by the democratic regime in 1991 (see section 4.2.3.2). In 2007, there were 2 305 CSOs, which increased to 2 582 in 2008. This number dramatically declined to 1 805¹ in 2009. Broeckhoven et al. (2021:57) argued that “the 2009 CSP [Charities and Societies Proclamation] likely resulted in a far smaller civil society sector than might have existed had the Proclamation not been passed”. This significant decrease in 2009 was due to the enactment of the Societies and Charities Proclamation No. 621/2009, which imposed very tight conditions on civil society (Keutgen & Dodsworth 2020: 5). As a result, more than 250 CSOs, mostly rights-based civil society were not able to continue, and only CSOs working on development and service delivery were able to re-register after the restrictive proclamation. The number of CSOs declined from 2 582 in 2008 to 1 805 in 2009. It then remained almost stagnant until 2017 but with slight increments. In 2018, however, a visible decline was observed (see Figure 6.1) because some government-affiliated and partisan CSOs terminated their operation following the reform and change of government. After 2018, the number of civil societies increased because of the enactment of the new Civil Society Organisation Proclamation No. 1113/2019 (see section 1.4), which opened up the space for all types of civil society.

¹ Some studies have reported this number as 2277 but the researcher confirmed from the Agency that the actual figure is 1 805.

Table 6.1: Past trends in CSOs in Ethiopia 2007 to 2021

Year	Total No. of CSOs	Change in %
1994	70	--
2000	368	--
2001	600	--
2007	2 305	72.8%
2008	2 582	54.7%
2009	1 805	27.1%
2010	2 220	17.7%
2011	2 205	8.9%
2012	2 100	3.7%
2013	2 250	0.4%
2014	2 161	3.2%
2015	2 222	3.7%
2016	2 302	4.3%
2017	2 400	6.4%
2018	2 231	19.3%
2019	2 581	25.4%
2020	2 633	10.3%
2021	2 871	100.0%


Source: ACSO (2021)

As depicted in Table 6.1, CSOs were not banned in their entirety between 2009 and 2017, even though the proclamation was very restrictive and harsh. As argued by Keutgen & Dodsworth (2020: 26) and Gebre (2016:8) CSOs working in the areas of development and service delivery enjoyed some level of freedom because the attention of the government was on those who were involved in politically sensitive issues of rights. Hence, development and service delivery-oriented CSOs were able to sustain themselves in the harsh and suppressive legal environment. During this period, as argued by Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020, and Programme Manager at Life and Peace Institute (LPI) interviewed on 3 August 2020:

“The government also established civil society disguised as non-partisan, neutral, civic, and independent but practically government-affiliated and partisan. These organisations operated as a civil society yet enjoyed all the benefits from the government. They received special treatment and privileges from the government. That is why the number of civil societies during the restrictive period showed a slight increment from 2009 and 2017.”

The trends in Figure 6.1 reveal that during the early period of the EPRDF regime, the number of civil societies increased drastically and remained stagnant around the middle periods of the regime until the incidence of the political reform in 2018, when the space for civil society was re-opened. In 2018, the number of CSOs began to slightly rise up.

Figure 6.1: Trends in CSOs over the seventeen years from 1994–2021



Source: Own formulation based on Agency for Civil Society Organizations data (2021)

6.2.2 Categories of Civil Society in Ethiopia

CSOs in Ethiopia, particularly according to the classification of the new Proclamation No.1113/2019, are grouped into two broad categories namely, foreign CSOs and local

CSOs. According to the Proclamation, a “Foreign Organisation” is “a non-governmental organisation formed under the laws of foreign countries and registered to operate in Ethiopia.” On the other hand, it defines a “Local Organisation” as “a civil society organisation formed under the laws of Ethiopia by Ethiopians or foreigner’s resident in Ethiopia or both.” According to the current data obtained from the ACSO (see Table 6.2), of the total number of CSOs in the country, local CSOs constitute a large proportion (about 85%), while foreign civil society constitute only 15%.

Table 6.2: Classification of CSOs

No	Category	Re-registered	Newly Registered	Total
1	Foreign Organisation	324	96	420
2	Local Organisations			
2.1	An Association	1 295	296	1 591
2.2	A Board-led Organisation	151	656	807
2.3	A Charitable Endowment	16	30	46
2.4	A Charitable Trust	1	6	7
2.5	A Charitable committee	0	0	0
	Total	1 787	1 084	2 871

Source: ACSO (June 2021) and CSP (2019)

According to the new Civil Societies Proclamation No.1113/2019, the local organisation is further classified into five, including an association, a board-led organisation, a charitable endowment, a charitable trust, and a charitable committee (See Table 6.2).

6.2.3 Consortiums

Consortiums generally refer to a group of CSOs who organise themselves under an umbrella organisation. It is an arrangement where different CSOs agree to collaborate and work together on various strategic issues while their autonomy and identity remain intact (Aster 2008:136). According to Proclamation No.1113/2019, consortium in the Ethiopian context is “a grouping formed by two or more CSOs.” In terms of categorical identity, consortiums can be under one of the categories listed in Table 6.2.

According to the data obtained from the Agency for Civil Society Organizations in 2021, there are over 74 consortiums operating in Ethiopia. Although their intervention areas vary depending on their goals, large proportions (85%) of consortiums are established as consortiums of charitable associations, while the remaining 15% operate in other intervention areas. From this figure, we can understand that consortiums in Ethiopia are dominated by charitable organisations established to work for the general public. Charitable organisations are organisations whose main agenda is to enhance citizens' social well-being and quality of life in all dimensions.

Consortiums, in general, are in charge of organising and coordinating the effort of their member CSOs to avoid duplication of efforts and overlapping of intervention areas as well as the geographic areas in which civil societies operate. In addition, consortiums are supposed to help their member organisations to access financial resources locally and from foreign donors. They are expected to arrange a platform where member organisations can come together and share information, resources, and experiences. Evidence shows that consortiums are important, particularly to empower civil society who are small in size and geographic coverage and have less access to resources (Desalegn 2008:101; Aster 2008:136). Consortiums in Ethiopia, however, are not up to the expectation in this regard due to the following reasons, as argued by FGD and interview respondents. Accordingly, some FGD respondents and the Executive Director at Good Governance Africa (GGA) interviewed on 6 August 2020 indicated that:

“Most of the consortiums are formally established and registered by the Agency but not making visible impacts as per the objectives for which they were established. For example, many civil societies are suffering from a lack of financial and other resources even when they are included in the framework of consortiums. In addition, although consortiums are supposed to prevent duplications of efforts, they are not effectively preventing member civil society from doing so. Many civil societies are concentrated and operating in one geographic area, while communities in other geographic areas are in need of the same services and interventions. Some consortiums lack resources and

technical capacity while others are amorphous and overburdened (e.g., CCRDA with its 400 member organisations) with a huge and unmanageable number of member organisations”

6.2.4 Regional distribution of CSOs in Ethiopia

The data in Table 6.3 depicts the quantitative inadequacy of CSOs and uneven regional distribution across the country. The number of CSOs is not proportionate to the population of Ethiopia, which is roughly 115 million. The proportion is roughly 1:40 000. This shows the limited accessibility of the services of CSOs. In addition to the quantitative inadequacy, the regional distribution of CSOs in Ethiopia is highly skewed.

According to the data presented in Table 6.3, about 72% of the total population of CSOs is concentrated in Addis Ababa, although the geographic area coverage of some of these civil societies may not necessarily be limited to Addis Ababa alone after Addis Ababa is Oromia (9%), followed by Amhara (4%) and SNNPR (4%).

The purpose of civil society, in general, is to reach the poor and disadvantaged segment at grassroots level. To this end, CSOs need to be close to their target groups. Contrary to this, as depicted in Table 6.3, most of the CSOs in Ethiopia are located in the capital city of the country, which is geographically distant from where the majority of the needy citizens are located. Being in the capital city is to the advantage and convenience of CSOs rather than the citizens who need the service. However, lack of proximity has the potential to limit their accessibility to the local and grassroots-level communities they are meant to serve.

The uneven distribution of CSOs in the country has to do with the geographic coverage and population. CSOs in Ethiopia tend to concentrate in small and less populous areas, and they fail to reach geographically wider and highly populous areas. In this regard, the Oromia region is not only the most populous but also geographically widest of all regions in the country. Likewise, the Amhara region is the most populous region after Oromia. Although these regions are geographically wide and populous, they are less

privileged as the number of CSOs registered and operating in these regions is minimal compared to that of Addis Ababa.

Table 6.3: Regional Distribution of Civil Society in Ethiopia

Region	Re-registered	New	Total	Percent
Addis Ababa	1 251	833	2 084	72.55
Oromia	156	105	261	9.09
Amhara	99	30	129	4.49
SNNPR	109	38	147	5.13
Tigray	64	29	93	3.24
Somali	35	35	70	2.44
Afar	24	3	27	0.95
Benishangul-Gumuz	17	1	18	0.63
Gambella	13	1	14	0.49
Dire Dawa	13	6	19	0.67
Harari	6	3	9	0.32
Total	1 787	1 084	2 871	100

Source: ACSO (2021)

In terms of areas of activities, while there is a concentration of many CSOs in some areas of operation like service delivery, there is a tendency to ignore other critical operational areas of societal concerns. The data presented in Table 6.3 confirmed that the intervention of CSOs was minimal in areas where serious human rights violations are rampant. For instance, in the northern part of the country, where early marriage is rampant, and girls cannot go to school due to such practices, the number of CSOs working in these areas is limited. In the southern part of the country, where child kidnapping and early marriage are common phenomena, again, the number of CSOs is limited. In remote rural areas of Affar and Somali regions, female genital mutilation is still widely practiced. In the Gambella region, lower incisor teeth extraction and slitting of male's foreheads are common practices. In addition, milk tooth extraction practices and removal of some oral cavity organs, including tonsils are still prevalent harmful traditional practices in many remote areas of the country, which deserve CSOs' attention and intervention.

While such demanding harmful issues remain unaddressed, CSOs that work in these operational areas are scant. The concentration of CSOs in other areas of operation and geographic areas where such problems are not common is high. In addition, a number of CSOs tend to provide similar services in one geographic area while the same services are missing in other areas. This shows that CSOs base their distribution and provision of services on their own convenience rather than focusing on the systematic identification of needy areas and people. Hence, they are competing against each other instead of cooperating. This problem occurred for different reasons. First, CSOs that work on rights-based issues tend to focus on sensational political agendas and women, children, and girls' rights. Second, the lack of coordination, harmonisation, and division of labour among CSOs is another responsible factor. The third reason could be resistance from the community.

In some cases where CSOs opt to work in remote local areas, where the original cultural practices of the community are preserved, they face resistance from the community. This is because, in most cases, communities in remote local areas do not entertain the diffusion of other practices into their culture. Therefore, when some CSOs get there to teach and create awareness, they often face resistance from the community. In this regard, CSOs have not been creative and flexible in diversifying the opportunities for intervention. The final reason is the weaknesses of consortiums as well as ACSO in ensuring even distribution and outreach of CSOs across geographic and operational areas.

CSOs in Africa tend to concentrate their services in urban areas (Orvis 2003:248), and Ethiopia is no exception. The data in Table 6.3 implies that most of the CSOs in the country tend to focus on urban areas, mainly Addis Ababa and regional capitals, in their interventions. In support of this, Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 also indicated that:

“When we look at the distribution of civil society, there is a huge urban bias. Most of the activities and offices are concentrated in urban areas. Urban dwellers

benefit more from CSOs activities and programmes than rural dwellers due to the concentration of civil society in urban areas.”

This may be due to problems pertaining to the lack of infrastructure and inconvenience of rural areas in terms of accessibility of technology, transportation, and utilities. However, according to Sharma (2018:40; 2003:4-6), a development intervention that ignores the rural-urban linkage cannot bring about the intended positive change. Hence, for CSOs to contribute positively the development and societal transformation, a balanced intervention in urban and rural areas and a contribution to rural-urban linkage are of paramount importance.

6.3 STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN POST-1991 CONTEMPORARY ETHIOPIA

Although the optimist versus pessimist or supportive versus confrontational dichotomy is the common approach to analysing state-civil society relations in the literature (see section 2.5 of Chapter 2), analysing state-civil society relations in Ethiopia tends to show one side of the equation alone. In support of this, Bekalu and Wassihun (2021:84) argued that the analysis of state-civil society relations is limited to the polarised and confrontational relationship. It also fails to capture the dynamics of state-civil society relations across time in the last three decades in Ethiopia. This section, therefore, analyzes state-civil society relations from a cooperative and confrontational perspective as well as across the three periods (i.e., from 1991 to 2004; 2005 to 2017; and 2018 to date). Table 6.4 depicts the result of the state-society relations. In order to examine state-civil society relations, it is hypothesised that there is statistically significant variation in the relationship between the state and civil society across the three periods identified for the study.

The results in Table 6.4 indicate that there was a statistically significant difference in state-civil society relations across the three time periods (period 1991 – 2004, period 2005 - 2017, period 2018 to date), $\chi^2 (2, African = 200) = 400.000, p <.001$, level of significance at $\alpha = 0.05$. Analysis of the median values revealed a decrease in state-civil

society relations from period 1 ($Md = 3.00$) to period 2 ($Md = 1.60$) and an increase in period 3 ($Md = 4.00$). Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.017$. There was a significant difference between periods 1 and 2 ($Z = -12.343$, $p < .001$), periods 1 and 3 ($Z = -12.355$, $p < .001$), and periods 2 and 3 ($Z = -12.331$, $p < .001$).

Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Result on State-CS Relations

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Percentiles		
		25th	50th (Median)	75th
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	200	2.8000	3.0000	3.0000
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	200	1.4500	1.6000	2.0000
Period 3 (2018 - to date)	200	3.6667	4.0000	4.3333

Friedman Test

Ranks	
	Mean Rank
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	2.00
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	1.00
Period 3 (2018 – to date)	3.00

Test Statistics ^a	
N	200
Chi-Square	400.000
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. Friedman Test

Test Statistics ^a			
	Period 2- Period 1	Period 3 - Period 1	Period 3 - Period 2
Z	-12.343 ^b	-12.355 ^c	-12.331 ^c
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks

c. Based on negative ranks

Source: Computed from survey data (2021)

The above result shows that the difference between the medians is statistically significant. As presented in Table 6.4, state-civil society relations during the first period were better than the second but lower than that of the third period. During the first period, the relationship between the state and civil society was not confrontation but cooperation (see section 2.5 of Chapter 2). However, the cooperation was not managed in an organised, principled, and well-guided manner. During this period, CSOs were allowed to freely engage in all operational areas, including politically sensitive agendas. As Roberts (2019:4) argued, civic space was open allowing CSOs to operate freely. The government was not focusing on controlling and suppressing and chasing CSOs because it had a positive attitude toward them.

The reason behind this, as argued by Reimann (2006:59), was that CSOs were regarded as essential actors by international donors who provided financial and technical support to Ethiopia and meeting the demand of donors was essential. In addition, the government's positive attitude emanated from the fact that it needed of CSOs' support. According to Dupuy et al. (2014:425), to improve the destruction caused by the Ethio-Eritrean war, which took place between 1998 and 2000, the government needed the support of CSOs in relief and rehabilitation. In addition, the relative political stability during the first period enabled the state to perceive CSOs as friends, not as foes, and hence, it was smooth toward civil society. Hence, though there was no firm and principled integration between the state and civil society, due to the positive attitude, it was not difficult for the two to cooperate on matters of common interest. For instance, the Programme Specialist at FFS interviewed on 19 August 2020 indicated that CSOs' participation in the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP) was one of the areas where the two worked together. In addition, the government also used various workshop platforms organised by CSOs to share ideas. Furthermore, the government used Poverty Action Network Ethiopia (PANE), a consortium of more than 75 CSOs established towards the end of the first period, to consult with CSOs to acquire input for designing and developing of the PRSP. This shows that the government had the appetite to work with the CSOs during the first period.

However, it is impossible to deny that the relationship was not well organised, formally guided, promoted, and based on clearly defined principles. This emanates from the absence of up-to-date regulatory instruments, as discussed in section 7.2.3 of Chapter 7, and the lack of capable and well-resourced entities responsible for mediating the relationship between the state and civil society. During this period, the responsibility of regulating civil society was vested in the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), which, in relation to civil society governance, was not well-equipped with the required regulatory tools and quality human resources to support, advise and regulate activities of CSOs. These issues are connected to what Wessel et al (2020:736) called capacity-related challenges. Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 argued that:

“Within the Ministry, there was only one small Unit and few individuals who had no clear understanding of civic organisations and their importance. The Unit had no proper structure and setup along with the required number of leaders and workforce. The Unit was responsible for following up, registering, and licensing of civil society. It was inadequate and incapable of dealing with the entire management and governance of civil society in the country. The Unit was not adequately aware of what civil society is all about, why they are required to exist and operate, and how they have to be managed and governed. The officials in the Unit were members of the rebel group and did not have any idea or knowledge about civil society. The Unit did not have adequate human power in terms of quantity and quality.”

Due to the open civic space created for civil society, the number of CSOs grew during the first period. However, it was evident that the demand side was not balanced with the supply side. In other words, the responsible Unit in the MoJ, both structurally and resource-wise, was not capable of responding to the increasing number of CSOs. The MoJ unit simply accepted any request from CSOs without analysing or understanding the outcome and consequences. FGD respondents also indicated that some CSOs established strong connections with donors and were able to install a sophisticated work

system that was beyond the regulatory capacity and understanding level of the MoJ unit itself. As a result, although the government did not see CSOs as a threat and wanted to cooperate with them, the relationship was less predictable and not properly coordinated.

Parallel to the MoJ, other line ministries and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Relief Commission were supposed to work with CSOs in their respective areas. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture might be required to work with CSOs in environmental protection and rehabilitation. However, there was no clear procedure for how the MoJ should work with the line ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture. Substantiating the above idea, the Programme Manager at LPI interviewed on 3 August 2020 indicated that:

“While the main body in charge of regulating civil society was MoJ, there were line ministries that had some level of responsibility to oversight and work with civil society. The challenge was, however, that there was no firm integration among these organisations. Due to the failure of integration, they were not able to make civil society accountable for their actions. The government did not have clear monitoring mechanisms to discriminate and take corrective actions. Civil societies were also not adequately aware of what is expected of them and how to access information from the government.”

Such grey areas of responsibility have the potential not only to cause misunderstanding but also to underestimate accountability. Although integrated and organised governance was missing, the first period was rated and perceived positively by CSOs because they were free to mobilise resources and do their jobs without restriction and government undue intervention.

The data in Table 6.4 reveals that, during the second period, state-civil society relations was weaker than that of the first and third period because it was characterised by contestation and adversarial relationship (Clark 2000; Dessalegn, Akalewold & Yoseph 2008; Dupuy et al. 2014: 424) rather than cooperation (see section 2.5). One of the major reasons and biggest turning points in the history of state-civil society relations in Ethiopia was the result of the 2005 election. In the 2005 election, the government lost a

large majority of the vote in Addis Ababa alone (Aalen & Tronvoll 2009:196). According to Smith (2007:6) and Broeckhoven et al. (2021: 54, 55), the reason for this massive loss, according to the evaluation of the government, was the support provided by CSOs to opposition parties (see section 4.2.3.2) such as Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD). According to the Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020:

“The government then labeled civil society as supporters of opposition political parties, claiming that they used the funds obtained from overseas sources to manipulate the country’s internal political affairs. Considering civil society existential threats, the government imposed tight restrictions, particularly on rights-based civil society.”

Hence, the previous relationship during the first period, which was characterised by trust, positive attitudes, and cooperation, turned into hostility and suspicion during the second period. Therefore, the post-election reaction of the government towards CSOs was a landmark in shaping the relationship between CSOs and the government.

The other reason for contestation was the developmental state orientation of the government (See section 4.2.3.1 in chapter 4 and section 1.2 in chapter 1) which considers development as a top priority and hence accepted service delivery-oriented CSOs and rejected rights-based CSOs assuming that the issue of right was the responsibility of the government and secondary to development (Assefa 2014:86-87; Mehret 2014:8). As a result, the government-imposed restrictions on rights-based CSOs due to its developmental state orientation that assumes that development should take priority over democratic and human rights. It believed that the issue of rights was not only secondary to development but should be the responsibility of the government alone. As a result, the government eliminated rights-based CSOs that promoted the agendas of rights from the equation by design. Hence, harsh measures were taken against the rights-based CSOs. Confirming this, Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS, in the interview conducted on 20 August 2020, said that:

“From the government side, the priority was given to development than rights. The government showed the tendency to understand rights as the sole responsibility of the government alone. The government used to control reports, activities, and budgets and investigates projects undertaken by civil society in detail. When terms related to ‘rights’ considered politically sensitive agenda for the government are found in project proposal documents, the government automatically rejects the project.”

Antagonistic and hostile relationships between the state and CSOs were partly attributed to the attitudinal problem. According to Lupin (2022: 252) and Broeckhoven et al. (2021: 71), the state had a hostile and antagonistic stance towards civil society during the second phase. The government tended to consider CSOs as thieves who brought the money from abroad in the name of the poor and spent it on their luxuries instead of spending it for the benefit of the poor (Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020). The government considered CSOs as “cash cows,” which means a “profitable business” that brings in a steady flow of benefits for individuals working in civil society. In this regard, the Late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi once said “እናንተ የውጭ ላም እያለባችሁ እና ወተቱን እየጠጣችሁ የሀገሪቱን ሳል ማሳል አትችሉም”. This is to say that “just because you are enjoying the money you are obtaining from donors, you never feel the pain of the country”. In addition, the government assumed that CSOs stood against its interest and that they blamed it for everything that went wrong. On the other hand, CSOs considered the government a suppressive entity whose sole interest was ensuring the sustainability of its political position. In addition, CSOs considered the government an intimidating and weak entity that comprised incapable institutions and personnel and had little appetite to serve the public interest and more interest in furthering its self-interest. For CSOs, the government and its officials just focused on abusing public resources for personal gain. These perceptions and attitudes played an adverse role in making the relationship between the two entities full of friction, inimical, confrontational, and antagonistic (see section 2.5). It is for the reasons mentioned above that FGD respondents expressed the relationship during the second period as “የሌባና የፖሊስ ግንኙነት” which is to say the relationship between the

state and civil society was like that of the relationship between the police and a thief. Therefore, during the second period, the government and the rights-based CSOs did not trust each other, ultimately destroying the relationship.

The attitudinal problem during the second period was not attributed to the government alone. CSOs' attitude toward the government was an additional element that exacerbated government's aggression. CSOs regarded the government as a complete evil and foe. According to the Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020:

“From their side, civil society failed to see that the government is also one of the essential actors that shoulders huge responsibilities of governing the nation. They failed to understand that the government has its perspectives that must be considered as one of the actors. Hence, insulting the government, and looking at the government a distractive, inimical, and competing entity alone was one factor that manifested the negative attitude of civil society toward the government. Most CSOs, if not all, the thinking was that they were indispensable. This situation, in return aggravated the government to close the opened-up civic space more because acting rudely toward the government would not facilitate a fertile ground for smooth communication and relationship.”

The conduct of CSOs was essential in determining how the government's attitude was shaped towards them and it shaped the nature of state-civil society relations. To this end, acting in a civic way from CSOs' side would have reduced the pressure that comes from the government side.

During the first half of the second period (i.e., from 2005 to 2008), the government suppressed civil society without having legal backing for its actions. In other words, the same law used during the first period remained in use from 2005 to 2008. In 2009, however, the government enacted a restrictive Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 to officially discourage and underestimate rights-based civil society (see section 1.4, 4.2.3.2 & section 7.2.3). This proclamation imposed different restrictions, especially on rights-based CSOs.

To ensure the enforcement of this restrictive proclamation, the ACSO was established (see section 4.2.3.2). Article 4 to 13 of the same proclamation pronounces provisions on the establishment, objectives, power, and functions of the ACSO. The ACSO began operations in 2009. The proclamation gave the ACSO the power to register and licence charities and societies (Article 68). It also provided the ACSO with the power to institute inquiries (Article 84), to cause the production of documents and search records (Article 92), demand notification of meetings (Article 86), order the removal of charities and societies officers (Article 91), and suspension and cancellation of licenses (Article 92), to mention but few (Ethiopia 2009).

Using this huge power vested in it, the ACSO restricted charities and societies - the name given to CSOs by the restrictive proclamation. In enforcing the above responsibilities, the ACSO was known for employing a suppressive and control-oriented approach. The Project Manager at Humanity and Inclusion interviewed on 14 August 2020 indicated that:

“The Agency was primarily focusing on intimidation and controlling of civil society. It strictly implemented the restrictive provisions of the proclamation. It enforced the intentionally designed provisions of the proclamation aiming at discouraging and eliminating right-based civil society that the government considered a threat. The Agency was playing controlling, an obstructing, and an intimidating role rather than facilitating one. It was suspicious about civil society and hence civil society was prone to arbitrary and unilateral interventions and measures of the Agency.”

Hence, from the above response, one can understand that, as an enforcement entity, the ACSO was able to effectively accomplish the mission provided by the government to suppress rights-based CSOs. To this end, the Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 indicated that:

“When the agency suspects civil society for making some mistakes, it used to take serious actions up to closure without passing through the required legal procedure. In addition, the CSOs right to appeal was also denied in practical

terms because the Court was party affiliated and was not in a position to make decisions on such cases. When some civil society tends to persist in questing for their rights, the leaders of such civil societies were subject to intimidation and even imprisonment.”

The ACSO focused on suppression more than anything else (Roberts 2019:25) because it viewed CSOs as a threat from two perspectives. First, based on the overall government perspective about CSOs, ACSO considered particularly rights-based CSOs as a political threat. Hence, ACSO concluded that rights-based CSOs were working with the opposition political parties to overthrow the government through conspiracy. Second, ACSO viewed these CSOs as an economic threat. It blamed CSOs for using funds from abroad for personal gain. In this regard, the Programme Specialist at FFS interviewed on 19 August 2020 disclosed that:

“Some civil societies might engage in activities that could offend the government. The government, through the agency, decided to deactivate almost all rights-based civil societies without segregating those who were engaging in purely civic works and those who were partisan. Hence, as the saying goes in Amharic, the agency’s action was like “ከተልባ ጋር የተገኘህ ሰሊጥ አብረህ ተወቀጥ” which means, ‘Sesame found with flax, crushed all together’. The Agency wanted to take maximum precaution and said, ‘Safety first’.”

However, there were certain conditions where the agency treated CSOs in a discriminatory way. One such discriminatory measure was manifested in how the government, through the ACSO, treated rights-based CSOs and service delivery-oriented CSOs. FGD respondents underscored that:

“The Agency for Charities and Society imposed significant restrictions on right-based civil society that confronted the government on various fronts including human rights, democratic deficits, service provision, social and economic injustice while it provided a relative freedom to those who were working in the area of service delivery and development.”

Rights-based CSOs were victims of government's undue intervention and legal restriction. They were subjected to various legal restrictions as stipulated in the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 (see section 7.2.3). The basis for this preferential treatment was that the government considered rights-based CSOs as a political threat.

Another discriminatory measure was reflected in the government's differential treatment between the government-affiliated and non-affiliated CSOs. In this regard, the Programme Manager at LPI interviewed on 3 August 2020 stated that:

“There were government affiliated civil societies created by the government (e.g., the Forum for Civil Society) to counterbalance the actions of rights-based civil society which challenged the government (e.g., CCRDA and PANE). The Forum, led by one of the TPLF's guerilla fighters, was government-affiliated established to overshadow strong consortiums such as PANE and CCRDA. The government supported and recognised the Forum as a defacto representative of civil society in the country. Although it was called by the name civil society, the Forum was loyal to the government and it was enforcing the direction of the government. CCRDA and PANE were among the few rights-based civil society organisations who decided to retain in the system by shouldering all the burdens and challenges imposed by the Agency.”

CCRDA and the Forum for CSOs were influential consortiums (see section 6.2.3) in Ethiopia. These two organisations were at odds with each other because of their very nature and value orientation. The Programme Coordinator at the Partners for Resilience (PfR) interviewed on 17 August 2020 mentioned that:

“CCRDA wanted to be civic and neutral or government independent while the Forum was government affiliated. The Forum for CSOs was established through the hidden hands of the government because the government intentionally wanted to create a rival organisation to challenge and reduce the importance of CCRDA. This is because CCRDA was unwilling to be a Trojan horse for the government. Therefore, even though the official role of the Forum was to mediate

between all civil societies and other stakeholders, including the government, it was doing for the government what CCRDA refused to do.”

The Project Manager at Humanity and Inclusion interviewed on 14 August 2020 also stated that the Forum was blamed for wearing “double hats”, one political and the other civic. In other words, it had no independent identity. The Forum itself inclined towards favouring CSOs that were government affiliated. It tended to ignore and discriminate against independent and principles-based CSOs. The platform and system were very challenging and unfavourable for those who wanted to work genuinely.

In addition, associations such as youth associations were established according to civil society law, but the government favoured them with the intention of using them for its own political aims. In support of this, FGD respondents indicated that:

“Associations were established as voluntary organisations, but the government used them as a political channel to promote and inculcate its political agenda into youth and other segments of the society. Hence, it was used to favour and privilege them. They could easily access resources and projects and were subject to minimal control.”

The other worth mentioning privileged organisation was the trading wing of the TPLF known as the Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT). According to Yinebeb (2018: 13), this organisation was established as an endowment with multi-billion ETB of capital. Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 stressed that:

“This endowment was one of the privileged organisations, which enjoyed a huge protection from TPLF politicians because EFFORT served them as a route through which the Tigrayan political and economic elite maximise their economic advantages.”

It is, therefore, clear that preferential treatment was given to some CSOs by the government in general and the ACSO in particular. As a result, many capable CSOs

were compelled to either close their organisations or reluctantly change their areas of interventions to service delivery just for the sake of survival.

When CSOs wanted to appeal against such discriminatory approaches of the government in general and the ACSO in particular, practically, there was no room for them to further their cases. In this regard, there was a difference between the “form”, and the “reality”. “Form” refers to what is written in the law and “reality” refers to law enforcement. Even though the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 was characterised by its restrictive nature (Broeckhoven et al. 2021:45; Gebre 2016:6), Article 104 contained provisions that enabled CSOs to raise grievances. As described in this Article, CSOs could submit their claims to the General Director of the ACSO, who should receive claims that have passed through all the administrative stages of the ACSO and decide on the matter within 15 days. If CSOs were not satisfied with the decision of the Director General, they could appeal to the Board of the ACSO within 15 days. Again, if they were not satisfied with the decision of the Board, CSOs could appeal to the Federal High Court within 15 days. Even though the appeal procedure was written in the proclamation, the enforcement agencies, including the ACSO and the Court, did not favour and serve justice; they rather favoured the ruling political party’s interest. Hence, these appeal procedures existed only in the document i.e., the “form”, and were not enforced in practice, i.e., missing in “reality”. In this regard, interviewees argued that:

“There was a situation where a single ordinary clerk could decide on the fate of civil society up to cancellation of the licence. If s/he says no, that is the end of the story; there is no other way out. One could complain to the concerned bodies, but you never get the response because the system lacked transparency and accountability. Such deliberate actions of the agency and its workers led rights-based civil society either to closure or to shift their objectives and areas of operation to service delivery.”

Following the enactment of the proclamation, about eight directives were formulated to enforce the proclamation. The Programme Coordinator at the Partners for Resilience

(PfR) interviewed on 17 August 2020 referred to these directives in Amharic as “መመሪያዎቹ የሲቪል ሰሳይቲ ተቋማትን ትጥቅ ማስፈቻ ነበሩ” which is to say the purpose of these directives was nothing but to serve as tools to demobilise civil society.

The ACSO service delivery environment was not welcoming to civil society (Lupin 2022:241). In this regard, the Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020, said that:

“When we go to the Agency to get services, we do not feel happy; we used to go with the fillings of fear and anxiety. We do not want to go to the Agency at all unless our situation compels us to do so. We tend to avoid going to the Agency as much as possible.”

There are several responsible reasons for this problem. The first reason, as indicated by the Program Manager at IAG interviewed on 4 August 2020 was that:

“The Agency had few departments having limited physical and human resources capacity in terms of quality and quantity to govern civil society. The attention of workers of the Agency was mainly on control and intimidation. Most of them, if not all, were less supportive, very aggressive, control minded, and lacked servant orientation. Most do not understand their jobs and the legal procedures pertinent to civil society. They treated things rigidly, and when users question them, they usually say, ‘That is how we are told to do it’. Hence, when civil society goes to the Agency to get service, it is a common phenomenon to get such responses as ‘ጩረሻለሁ’ or ‘I am done’ from service providers and managers at different levels in the hierarchy. This shows that they lacked a good disposition.”

The second reason was the autocratic leadership style and philosophy of the top management of the ACSO. The work culture and practices in ACSO reflected the top management’s autocratic and dictatorship philosophy. In this regard, one of the essential persons to name is Ato Meseret, the Director General of ACSO. According to the Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020:

“Ato Meseret had neither experience, nor the management skills required to govern and deal with voluntary organisations. He was assigned to the position based on his political commitment and loyalty to the ruling party. In different meetings, he insulted civil society calling them ‘ሌቦቻ’, which means thieves. He usually consumes half of the meeting by intimidating and insulating civil society. The effect of this one man’s autocratic philosophy of management was reflected on workers of the Agency down the hierarchy.”

Added to this, the Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020 also stressed that:

“Mr. Meseret was politically oriented and ideologically hostile towards civil society. He was a party functionary and veteran fighter lacking civic consciousness and orientation. He was not the appropriate person to shoulder the responsibility of governing the Agency established to deal with civic matters.”

The environment of the agency was extremely hostile. The Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020, and the Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 explained that:

“It was not easy to get into the building where the Agency was located. This was because the Agency was located on ‘Beha Building’ of Tigray Veteran Association, and the President of the Association was the same person, i.e., Mr. Mesert, who was also the Director General of the Agency. The security at the gate was very rigorous and detailed. Hence, going to that building alone did not comfort to any civil society. As a result, civil society was not interested in going the Agency during the second period unless they faced compelling cases. They preferred to avoid going to the Agency as much as possible.”

In addition to the ACSO’s strict control and restriction (Lupin 2022:243), CSOs were forced to work with line ministries and sector organisations when they wanted to undertake projects. In this regard, the Programme Specialist at FFS interviewed on 19 August 2020 indicated that:

“The Agency forces civil society to work in a framework that forces them to sign an agreement with respective sector organisations. This framework required civil society to work with respective sector organisations from project inception to outcome and impact assessment. For instance, civil society organizations working in the education sector are obliged to plan, implement and evaluate all their activities with the Ministry of Education. The same approach applies to civil society working in other sectors.”

Even though the framework was ideologically not bad, as it could promote collaboration among sectors and civil society, it was not welcomed by many CSOs from a practical point of view.

The Programme Coordinator at Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) interviewed on 25 August 2020 argued that:

“The framework constituted some difficulties. For instance, the independence of civil society was easily compromised by sector organisations; the work of civil society would be exposed to the usual administrative red tape and cumbersome bureaucracy in public sector organisations. In the process of such joint actions, sector organisations were interested in influencing the work of civil society and tend to intervene and get access to projects to abuse the resources.”

The Programme Coordinator at the PfR interviewed on 17 August 2020, and the Programme Specialist at FFS interviewed on 19 August 2020 indicated that:

“When we do research, some officials and experts, if not all, in the sector organisations want to influence the entire research process from the design to data collection, analysis, and publication of the outcomes. Particularly, they wanted to influence civil society on the research outcomes. The justification they provided was that negative outcomes would spoil and adversely affect the political image of the country if publicised. As a result, they wanted to filter and reject research outcomes that did not favour the government. Hence, the sectors were not interested in publicizing the research findings without their review.”

Such interventions compromised CSOs' freedom, integrity, and independence because politically oriented officials in government sectors tend to manipulate the manner and procedures of CSOs' projects and resource management. Of course, the government had to know what CSOs did with the money they collected in poor people's names. Not all CSOs are genuine and do their jobs with integrity. Hence, the government had to have some regulatory role to check that CSOs were discharging their responsibilities according to their goals. CSOs do not work in a vacuum; they have to report their work to the government to ensure accountability and transparency. However, the costs of binding CSOs into sector organisations' unnecessary bureaucratic red tape should not outweigh the benefits.

The relationship between civil society and line ministries or sector organisations was affected by positional instability of officials. According to FGD respondents:

“There was also frequent reshuffling of ministerial officials, state ministers, and sector heads. This situation adversely affected the work of civil society and its relations with the sectors. The main reason was that when sector officials who initially began to work on a project with civil society leave the position and are replaced by other officials, it would adversely consume much time and energy to bring the new official on board. The time lapsed during the transition would affect the project's success in terms of time.”

In addition to positional instability and reshuffling of officials, government officials were in fear and suspicious of working with CSOs, particularly rights-based CSOs, assuming that they always acted against the interests of the government. In this regard, the Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 disclosed that:

“Some political officials and cadres sometimes call CSOs leaders to their office and intimidate them based on fabricated and incorrect information. Other times they do different tricks that discourage and darken the image of civil society. They also used government-affiliated civil society, including the Forum, as Trojan horse to put pressure on other civil society.”

The data in Table 6.4 reveals that, during the third period, state-civil society relations were better than that of the first and second periods. The relationship appeared more cooperative than contested (see section 2.5). The ACSO that existed during the second period continued its operations during the third period. However, following the replacement of the 2009 restrictive proclamation by the new proclamation (see section 4.2.3.2), the mandates and role of the ACSO were redefined. The nature of state-civil society relations, characterised by hostility, was somehow changed to a positive relationship and support. In this regard, the Programme Manager at the PDC interviewed on 11 August 2020 argued that:

“Improvement of the relationship between the state and civil society was due to the ease of bureaucratic procedures and registration and licence renewal conditions of the Agency.”

In addition, the Director at the ACSO interviewed on 28 August 2020 mentioned that:

“The procedure and requirements of registration and licence renewal have been changed. Civil societies are no longer required to go up and down the stairs; they are no longer required to go to multiple organisations to bring various evidences for registration and licence renewal.”

Furthermore, the door of the ACSO is always open and accessible. In support of this, the Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 again witnessed that:

“This time, when we have cases that require us to go to the Agency, we feel free to go. We do not have hesitation and feeling of fear and distrust any longer because the current situation of the Agency is inviting and supportive. Things have changed now.”

The ACSO plays a positive role in civil society (Dessie & Breuning 2021; Dunia 2020: 375). The Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020 further witnessed that:

“Access to the Agency is easy; the agency is no longer focusing on fault-finding, intimidation, and controlling; it focuses on support and facilitation. The bureaucratic procedures of service delivery in the Agency, including registration and licence renewal processes, have been improved and simplified. In different meetings with civil societies, the Agency’s leaders usually mention that the role of the Agency is not to regulate, control, and intimidate civil societies but to enable them.”

It is safe to say that this time the agency has lived up to its promise and the expected level of performance to some extent. In this regard, the Team Leader at the ACSO interviewed on 29 August 2020 indicated that:

“Regarding customer service ranking in the country, the Agency was ranked second to the well-known organisation Document Authentication, which was ranked first in 2021.”

Leaders of the ACSO, including the Director General, are easily accessible and supportive. The Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 pointed out that:

“In some circumstances, we may not even need to go to the Agency in person, as there are possibilities to get our cases addressed through telephone conversation. We can access not only Unit Leaders and Officers but also the current Director General, Mr. Jimma, which was completely unthinkable in the case of the previous Director General, Mr. Meseret. The current leaders of the Agency are at the disposal of civil society, and their door is always open for civil society. They have a supportive mindset. They have a clean history from their personality and ethical point of view. Compared to the previous Director, the current Director of the Agency, for instance, is open, honest, and disciplined. Due to the service culture introduced and relatively exemplary roles practiced by these top-level leaders, workers across various hierarchies of the Agency also attempt to behave in the same way. As a result, services are provided promptly,

cooperatively, and in a very good manner. ‘ያዘልቅልን እንጂ ጊዜው ለሲቪል ሶሳይቲ ተቋማት የነጻነት ጊዜ ነው።’ (This is to mean that the current era is the era of freedom for civil society, we hope it will be sustainable).”

After the amendment of the proclamation, the ACSO started to provide various kinds of support to civil society. The Director at the ACSO interviewed on 28 August 2020 pointed out that:

“It is trying to help civil society to do their jobs according to the law. If it finds civil societies working against the law, it takes corrective actions, but the corrective action may not necessarily be adverse actions. It always focuses on teaching and guiding civil societies to do their jobs and appropriately achieve their objectives. When it finds civil society doing wrong, it gives priority to teaching and advising to help them correct themselves instead of jumping into punishment and closure as opposed to the previous practice. Therefore, punishment and adverse measures are considered as last resort in the current regulatory practices of the Agency.”

The Team Leader at the ACSO interviewed on 29 August 2020 also indicated that:

“Because civil society organizations have started to understand the Agency’s attitudinal change toward them, they are now positively approaching the Agency. Some civil society organizations are supporting the Agency mainly by training the Agency’s lower-level managers and staff to fill the skill and knowledge gaps.”

This implies that the relationship is gradually improving and growing.

Following the amendment of the proclamation, the ACSO restructured itself to bring itself to a position where it could be more responsive in addressing the demand of civil society. In this regard, the Director at the ACSO interviewed on 28 August 2020 pointed out that:

“From a structural point of view, the Agency has been reformed and has launched new structure where reshuffling and mergers have taken place to avoid all the previous bottlenecks and improve the efficiency of the Agency”.

For example, the ACSO created new departments that were not available in the previous structure. These are the Directorate of Research, Department of Partnership, and Directorate of Charities and Fund Administration to enhance the enforcement capacity of the ACSO and to support civil society lacking technical and financial capacity.

However, narrating of the success stories does not imply that the ACSO has no weaknesses. ACSO’s work and service delivery activities are hampered by capacity problems, which according to Van Wessel (2019:736), is a common challenge of civil society. According to the Team Leader at the ACSO interviewed on 29 August 2020:

“These capacity problems include institutional capacity problems of the Agency, including logistics, vehicles, materials, budget limitations, and qualitative and quantitative human resource. Let us look at the proportion of human resources to the number of civil societies in Addis Ababa alone. The proportion is 1:40. In other words, one personnel of the Agency is expected to serve 40 CSOs.”

Therefore, this implies that the current capacity of the ACSO does not commensurate with the rapidly increasing number of CSOs in the country, which has created an imbalance between the demand and supply side. This may not only disappoint CSOs but also indirectly affect their performance. In addition, the Team Leader at the ACSO interviewed on 29 August 2020 further pointed out that, from a physical resources point of view, the ACSO does not have its building. It uses rented offices, which exposes the ACSO to locational instability and an ongoing yearly expense.

In addition to leaders’ virtue and mannerly conduct, the supportive nature of the workforce in the ACSO and availability and easy access to the offices of top officials is other manifestations of the improvement of the relationship. In this regard, the Programme Manager at the ACORD interviewed on 15 August 2020 witnessed that:

“Staff of the Agency, even though some have skill, knowledge, and enforcement capacity gaps, are cooperative and ready to support civil society. Officers are not only humble but also accessible. Such openness and accessibility made it for civil society simple to get their cases addressed quickly.”

From an attitudinal point of view, the new government has shown a positive attitude toward CSOs. It tends to consider CSOs as development allies, not enemies. This is manifested through various positive actions taken toward CSOs, including the amendment of the restrictive and rigid civil societies’ law, which makes it possible for CSOs to enjoy civic freedom. The new law lifted all the restrictions on access to funds and preferences for operational areas. Now, CSOs can work in any sector and area of operation they want if their resources and technical capacity allow this. In terms of capacity, no limitations or restrictions are imposed on them. They are free to generate as many resources as possible from wherever they like with no restrictions as long as it is used for positive social change for the people of Ethiopia. To this end, the proclamation is one of the documents through which the government showed commitment to opening the space for CSOs (Dessie & Breuning 2021; Dunia 2020; Mehreteab and Associates Law Office 2019).

The second example related to the attitudinal change of the government was manifested through the efforts of the government to consultation with CSOs on different matters. In this regard, FG participants reported that:

“There were efforts by the government to engage civil society in policy issues. Civil society’s involvement in developing the new education roadmap was a case in point. In addition, Prime Minister Abiy held more than three consultative meetings and discussions with civil society. In addition, the Ethiopian Election Board invited civil society to participate in the election process through awareness creation to citizens and political parties on the 2021 election, providing training to political parties, and watching and monitoring the election process. This shows a good appetite and willingness from the government side to accept civil society as one of the supportive partners in development.

However, this does not, in any way, imply the absoluteness of the current government in its relationship with civil societies, as there are some procedural problems in terms of inclusion and exclusion of civil society in consultative meetings, policy dialogues and the election process.”

However, compared to the previous two periods, the attitudinal shift and commitment of the government are visible and, to some extent, action-oriented. Because of such changes, there are signals that CSOs are reviving and proliferating even in rights-based issues, which were tough to engage in during the second period (see section 6.2.1).

However, it is hard to deny that some CSOs are still suspicious because dealing with the second period's trauma has been difficult. Such CSOs are hesitant about the current reform and its sustainability. They are hesitant whether the current government will live up to its promises in terms of sustainability, allowing rights-based CSOs to operate as articulated in the new proclamation freely. Hence, they avoid rushing to positive judgment about the current state-civil society relations. In this regard, Executive Manager at the Inter-African Group (IAG) interviewed on 1 August 2020 pointed out that:

“During the post-Abiy period, some positive attitude toward civil society is observed. However, the mistrust of civil society toward the government cannot vanish because the current government is the successor of the previous EPRDF government. Hence, there is no guarantee that civil society will not go back to the second period gradually.”

Some CSOs remain suspicious and hesitant because of occasional challenges they faced during the preparation for the 2021 elections. In this regard, the Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020, described what his organisation faced while attempting to organise a debate among political parties before the 2021 elections. In this regard, he complained that:

“In the current election, we wanted to organise a debate among the political parties using the \$25,000 support we obtained from international donors. Then

we received a call from one government official who instructed us to contact the Ethiopian Electoral Board before conducting the debate. We were unhappy with his instruction because it added a bureaucratic procedure to our work. There are such occasions where civil society organizations are required to get the blessing of other bodies to do their jobs. However, this is just an incident that we faced in the process of doing our jobs but may not be generalised to the entire government intention in general.”

In terms of discriminatory treatment, there was no visible systematic and intentional discrimination as such during the third period. At the beginning of this section, it was revealed in the discussion that there was systematic bias and discrimination during the second period. The discrimination was by design and was not due to procedural and administrative defects. However, in the third period, there was no visible intention from the government side to discriminate against CSOs.

During the third period, CSOs have been guaranteed independence from the government even though one cannot be sure whether this will remain the permanent approach of the government. The Programme Manager at LPI interviewed on 3 August 2020 stated that:

“Organisations such as CCRDA suffering from huge government pressure and intimidation during the second period, can now operate freely and independently during the third period. Let alone CRDA and like-minded organisations, the Forum, which was disguised as a civil society organisation, but promoting government’s interest during the second period, has now become independent from the government’s intervention and began to move toward civic-oriented actions and began to act civic. This is manifested through the current practical actions of the Forum. The Forum has begun to take some important measures, such as developing a civil society development strategy with effective participation of civil societies, and developing CSOs’ accountability framework, which enables civil society to be accountable and responsive to the public. These

were undertaken based on the effective participation of civil society and other concerned actors which witnesses that the Forum is coming to its right course.”

Even though the freedom provided to CSOs during the third period is good, some interviewees have raised concerns about the lack of adequate safeguarding mechanisms and the possibility of opening up loopholes for some CSOs to misuse and abuse resources. Accordingly, Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 mentioned that:

“For civil societies to effectively undertake their responsibilities, it is important to implement clear and practical safeguarding mechanisms. So far, the Agency has no good mapping of civil societies in the country. There are gaps in terms of having accurate and detailed information about civil society regarding their areas of intervention, their geographic coverage, the impact of their projects on the community they serve, what and how they are doing their jobs, opportunities they have created for the community they are serving and how they can benefit the society in a better way.”

This is one of the weaknesses, observed during the third period. Loose safeguarding mechanisms create unnecessary loopholes for some unethical CSOs to misuse and abuse resources mobilised in the name of citizens. Hence, keeping the space open and even for all is acceptable, but having appropriate safeguarding mechanisms that lead to positive outcomes is equally important.

6.4 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the analysis in this chapter showed that the country's civil society activities showed a fluctuating pattern. While it showed a sharp increase from 2004 to 2008, it drastically decreased in 2009 due to the introduction of the restrictive civil society law in 2009. It remained almost constant until 2018, after which it began to increase due to enacting a new civil society law in 2019. Regarding categories of CSOs, the number of local CSOs outweighs foreign CSOs. The horizontal and vertical linkage between local and foreign CSOs is loose. In terms of regional distribution, most CSOs

are concentrated in Addis Ababa. From the urban-rural distribution point of view, most CSOs are located in urban areas.

Regarding state-civil society relations, during the first period, the relationship between the state and civil society was cooperative, but it was arbitrary, unstructured, and undefined. During the second period, however, the relationship was characterised by antagonism, contestation, and even denial of CSOs' rights, particularly rights-based CSOs. During the third period, the role of the government was limited to facilitation and CSOs' intervention areas, and access to funds was unrestricted. Hence, the relationship is apparently smooth and relatively cooperative, and supportive. Looking at the nature of state-civil society during the three periods in comparative terms, one can understand from the discussion in this section that state-civil society relations during the first and the third period were characterised by cooperation with different limitations, while the second period was completely antagonistic, confrontational and inimical. The following chapter deals with analysis of the external and internal context of civil society in post-1991 Ethiopia.

CHAPTER 7: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONTEXTUAL FACTORS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-1991 ETHIOPIA

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the external and internal contextual factors of civil society are analysed. The external context of civil society is presented with the intention of understanding whether or not the context was enabling for civil society to play their fair share in development and governance of the country. Civil society can play a meaningful role in societal transformation only when the context in which they operate is enabling. Their contribution is determined by the external contextual factors (including ideological, political, legal, economic, social, cultural, demographic and technological factors). In this chapter, only four external contextual factors, namely ideological, legal, political and economic environments are analysed. In addition to the external contextual factors, the internal context of civil society is analysed focusing on human capital, financial capital and physical capital. The analysis of both external and internal factors of civil society was conducted by way of comparing the contexts during the three periods (i.e., Period 1: 1991 to 2004; Period: 2005 to 2017; and Period 3: 2018 to date) identified for this study. Questionnaire-based quantitative analysis was conducted based on the comparison of the above-mentioned factors across the three periods using Freidman's ANOVA. In addition, data from interviews and FGD are presented to substantiate the analysis.

7.2 EXTERNAL CONTEXTUAL FACTORS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN THE POST-1991 ETHIOPIA

The role of CSOs in governance and development is determined by the context in which they operate. CSOs do operate not in a vacuum. They work in political, legal, economic, social, ideological and other similar contexts that shape their behaviour, objectives and nature of operation (Neshikj, Spasovsk & Stevkovski 2017:3). Having a clear understanding of the context is a precondition to understanding the role of civil society in development and governance and their relationship with the state. These contextual

factors are the ideological tradition of the government, the political environment, the legal framework and the economic environment. The analysis in this section focuses on the comparison of each contextual factor across the three time periods mentioned above. In order to examine the effect of contextual factors on civil society, it is hypothesised that the contextual factors (i.e., ideological, political, legal, and economic) affect the contribution and operation of civil society differently across the three periods identified for the study.

7.2.1 Ideological Context

One of the factors that shape the nature and operations of CSOs is the ideological context in which they operate. This section analyses the ideological context in which CSOs have been working in Ethiopia focusing on the comparison of the three periods (i.e., 1991 to 2004; 2005 to 2017; and 2018 to date). Accordingly, Table 7.1 presents the descriptive analysis and comparison of the ideological context during the three periods.

Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Result on Ideological Context

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Percentiles		
		25th	50th (Median)	75th
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	200	4.0000	4.0000	5.0000
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	200	1.0000	1.0000	2.0000
Period 3 (2018 - to date)	200	3.0000	3.0000	3.0000

Friedman Test

Ranks	
	Mean Rank
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	2.85
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	1.15
Period 3 (2018 - to date)	2.01

Test Statistics ^a	
N	200
Chi-Square	317.032
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. Friedman Test

Test Statistics ^a			
	Period 2- Period 1	Period 3 - Period 1	Period 3 - Period 2
Z	-12.203 ^b	-10.783 ^b	-10.751 ^c
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks

c. Based on negative ranks

Source: Computed from survey data (2021)

The results from Table 7.1 indicate that there was a statistically significant difference in ideological factor across the three time periods (1991 – 2004, 2005 – 2017, and 2018 – to date), $\chi^2(2, N = 200) = 317.032, p < .001$, level of significance at $\alpha = 0.05$. Analysis of the median values of the ideological context revealed a decrease from Period 1 ($Md = 4$) to Period 2 ($Md = 1$) and an increase in Period 3 ($Md = 3$). Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.017$. There were significant differences between Period 1 and 2 ($Z = -12.203, p < .001$), Period 1 and 3 ($Z = -10.783, p < .001$) and Period 2 and 3 ($Z = -10.751, p < .001$).

The results show that the differences between the medians are statistically significant. The high median and mean ranking values of Period 1 followed by Period 3 in Table 7.1 revealed that the ideological context was conducive in these two periods. On the contrary, the low median and mean ranking value of Period 2 reveals the ideological context was less conducive for civil society during this period. There are different explanations for these findings. The ideological context during the first period was conducive for CSOs because the government opened up the space for them to work freely during that period. However, the government was ideologically leftist (Assefa

2014:69) typically backed by the extreme thinking of Albanian communism which had a hostile attitude toward civil society. According to Leftwich (2000:163-4), such states prefer maximum state intervention in development.

7.2.1.1 The first period

The question is why the then leftist EPRDF government wanted to open up the space during Period 1 and let CSOs work freely while it was covertly ideologically not neoliberalist? The government intentionally hibernated its true nature and pretended to be pro-western in terms of ideology. It did not want to disclose its true identity. It disguised its ideological stance as pro-western to the satisfaction of western countries (Tefera 2019:474). Following the collapse of communism, the capitalist neoliberal ideology emerged as a global political order. Consequently, developing countries were compelled to join the western capitalist camp (Leftwich 1993:109-10), and Ethiopia was no exception. As a result, the then government decided to be pragmatic and eclectic in order to benefit from the situation and survive as a government (Tefera 2019:464, 471, 472).

The Executive Manager at the IAG interviewed on 1 August 2020 also confirmed that:

“The EPRDF government which came to power in 1991 did not want to disclose its true identity because it wanted to be seen positively by western countries. The EPRDF government was leftist typically Albanian Communist in nature, which western countries do not favour. In order to remain in power, the government had to get all kinds of support from western countries, which forced it to pretend that it would follow liberal line of thinking. The government was well aware that civil society organisations are the extension of liberal political ideology. Therefore, acting liberal and opening up the space for civil society, media and political parties was considered as a survival mechanism for the government”.

According to respondents from FGD:

“The government, particularly during its early stage, did not want to spoil and lose its relationship with western countries for two main reasons. First, it came to

power after consecutive seventeen years of gorilla fighting against the military regime. As a result, it was not equipped with the required capacity to govern the country without all rounded support of western countries. Second, during the guerrilla fight against the military regime, it enjoyed various kinds of supports provided by western countries.”

Hence, the government wanted to maintain the relationship by covering up its true ideological identity and allowing CSOs to operate freely in all operational areas including advocacy, watchdogging, human and democracy rights, governance, peace and security, conflict management, service delivery and development. The government's underlying ideology was leftist and interventionist, backed by Marxist-Leninist philosophy (see sections 2.3.2 and 4.2.3.1). Hence, the government should either have switched to neoliberalism or stayed with its original ideology rather than dwelling on such dishonest behaviour concerning its ideological stance. A clear and unambiguous ideology, instead of getting trapped in confusion, is essential for two reasons. First, the nature, sustenance, and firmness of the government's relationship with other development actors, including civil society, are largely determined by the clarity of its ideology. Second, the development policies and priorities by which national development is guided are also the results of the government's political ideology.

7.2.1.2 The second period

The ideological context during the second period was less conducive for CSOs as revealed in Table 6.5. In the second period, the government, right after a massive loss in the 2005 election, declared that it would follow the ideological tradition of developmental state. This moment was instrumental in revealing the true ideological identity of the then Ethiopian government, which it concealed during the first period. It is possible to say that the government unmasked itself and officially decided to take a clear ideological departure from the westerns ideological line of thinking. In the document entitled “Development, Democracy and Revolutionary Democracy” written in Amharic and published in 2006, the government of Ethiopia officially declared that it had adopted developmental state ideology (GoE 2006:72, 81). The late Prime Minister

Meles Zenawi promoted and defended this position in his scholarly work, *“African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings”*, which was presented at a development forum organised by the Initiative for Policy Dialogue in 2006. In this work, he argued that adopting the Asian-type developmental state ideological tradition would be the best for Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular to ensure development (Meles 2006:10; Semahagn 2018:126). Following the introduction of the idea into the context of Ethiopia, it even became a topical issue among scholars. Different entities organised workshops to facilitate dialogue and debates on the relevance of the developmental state for Ethiopia. Typical of such platform was the workshop organised by the FSS on “prospects and challenges for inclusive and participatory development in Ethiopia”.

The government claimed that it had adopted the Asian-type developmental state. In reality, however, there was a qualitative difference between the Ethiopian and East Asian developmental state. The difference is that, as they economically progressed, East Asian developmental state countries (mainly South Korea and Taiwan), were able at least at a later stage, to democratise their system more and more. However, in the case of Ethiopia, as the country economically progressed it remained democratically starved. Even though the government named its ideology as a democratic developmental state, according to Meheret (2014:7), the element of democracy was practically missing from the equation. Therefore, the Ethiopian developmental state was historically anomalous. Affirming this, Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 said:

“It seems that the government of Ethiopia grossly misunderstood the nature of East Asian developmental state which promoted development parallel to democracy. As their economy progressed, there was also some progress in democratic elements. In the case of Ethiopia, the democratic progress did not go with the economic progress achieved in the country.”

That is why some scholars (e.g., Meheret 2014:9) argued that the democratic developmental state notion was nothing but a ‘Trojan horse’ for the authoritarian leftist state of Ethiopia which was used as a shield for rent-seekers and corrupt officials.

Assefa (2014:68) also argued that although the constitution of the country gives equal emphasis to economic growth and human, democratic and civil rights, the government gave priority to the former. Hence, human and democratic rights-enforcing CSOs could not play a visible role during the second period.

When evaluated based on the basic features of the developmental state, which were addressed in Section 2.7.2.3 of Chapter 2, the developmental state exercised in Ethiopia has some strengths and pitfalls. A developmental state requires that political leaders be development-oriented. In this regard, the government prioritized the development and attempted to coordinate all efforts and mobilise resources towards achieving it. The development agendas were articulated, prioritised, and documented in policy and strategic documents, including rural development strategies, capacity-building strategies, foreign policy, and national development plans, including GTP I and II. The political leadership, headed by PM Meles, had a development vision, ideology, and commitment to development during the second period.

The weaknesses, however, were visible when it came to the autonomy and capability of the bureaucracy, which are the essential features of the developmental state. The bureaucracy is supposed to be autonomous (yet embedded) and capable. The bureaucracy of Ethiopia, as argued by Nigusie and Ali (2019:65), however, was characterised by inefficiency and was not capable of discharging the responsibility vested in it. It was weak from an individual as well as institutional capacity perspective. From an individual perspective, it is full of incapable workers. Although the government attempted to provide education through expanding tertiary-level education (i.e., university and TEVET levels), the focus was on quantity instead of quality. From an institutional capacity perspective, the government attempted to introduce various reforms, including justice sector reforms, tax reforms, and civil service reforms (e.g., business process reengineering and balanced scorecard), which unfortunately failed to meet the intended purpose. Although the bureaucracy is supposed to enjoy embedded autonomy, Kelecha (2022:9), Oqubay (2015:76), and Gebresenbet and Kamski (2019) argued that in the Ethiopian context, the bureaucracy suffered from a lack of trust and

credibility from citizens. The bureaucracy was not only incapable but also partisan. According to the principle of the developmental state, the bureaucracy has to be free from political intervention. However, as claimed by Nigusie and Ali (2019:65), Kelecha (2022:9), and Mengistu and Vogel (2006), many of the positions in the bureaucracy in Ethiopia were occupied by individuals who were politically loyal to the government but lacked a high-level education. Hence, the merit principle was violated. In addition, the bureaucracy was heavily politicised. Political missions were promoted and embedded within the bureaucracy through the set-up of the change army and one-to-five (see page 271) arrangements. Furthermore, as stated by Nigusie and Ali (2019:70), Hassan (2018:386), and Kelecha (2022:7), the economic and bureaucratic system was captured by patronage (i.e., unnecessary marriage between political officials and key business people), systemic corruption, and rent-seeking, which ultimately eroded the public's trust in the government. Top-level political leadership generally demonstrated political commitment and a focus on development, but its enforcement through the bureaucratic apparatus was flawed.

The government considered development as a matter of “life” and “death” (GoE 2006). As a result, it enforced developmental state-oriented policy in a manner that was less democratic and less participatory. The underlying assumption of such an intervention was that economic growth and development took priority over democratic rights. For the government, democracy, and development are not the same and are not necessarily linked (Section 4.2.3.1 of Chapter 4). The government argued that democracy is important, but not in order to get developed because the case for democracy can stand and shine on its own. Hence, for the government, the rights of citizens to access basic human needs such as food and shelter were prioritised over democratic rights, which are the right to association, to elect and be elected, and to express ideas freely. Concerning the relationship between development and democracy, while some argue that democracy should be a precondition for development (Rudebeck 2016:16; Lekvall 2013:119; Menocal 2007; Przeworski 2004:21) others argue that development should be a precondition for democracy (Treisman 2020:254; Djezou 2014:251; Inglehart & Welzel 2009:34; Mesquita & Downs

2005:85). In addition, some scholars argue that development and democracy are mutually reinforcing (Tommasoli 2013:32; Dorić 2019:251), while others argue that they may pull in opposite directions (Leftwich 2005:699). Others argue that development and democracy have no clear relationship (Vuletin, Posuelo & Slipowitz 2016; Sen 1999). The position of the Ethiopian government corresponds with this last version of the argument.

According to the government, a generation might need to sacrifice and forgo some of its interests to ensure development. As a result, the government displaced and relocated people for the cause of development in urban and rural areas. Citizens sacrificed their resources, lands and livelihoods. Indeed, in quantitative terms, it is an undeniable fact that the government achieved some progress manifested through the double-digit economic growth and development of physical infrastructure (including condominium projects, road networks and hydroelectric power), and an enhanced culture of saving. However, these achievements were problematic. In this regard, the Executive Director at the GGA interviewed on 6 August 2020 and the Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 said:

“The focus was only on physical infrastructure as it ignored the development of intra-structure i.e., the human development. The developed physical infrastructures suffered from not only poor quality but also unreasonably extended completion time beyond the plan. There were efforts to expand social services such as education, but it was only in quantitative terms. Above all, in almost all sectors, rampant rent seeking behaviour and corruption remained the common manifestation of the entire system. This was due to the enforcement of developmental state ideology, which provided the state and its officials with an indispensable and unquestionable power and autonomy”.

It is no surprise that the enforcement of the developmental state model in Ethiopia resulted in the mix of positive and negative outcomes discussed above, given the country’s poor political and administrative systems, as well as bad experiences with reform practices attempted in the country, such as tax reform, justice sector reform, civil

service reform, and institutional and structural reforms in the country via the so-called Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Scholars (e.g., Nwankwo & Richards 2004; Heidhues & Obare 2011; Logan 2015:4; United Nations 2005:29; Thomson, Kentikelenis & Stubbs 2017) argued that the implantation of neo-liberal model-led SAP was characterised by its adverse effect on civil servants or bureaucrats, the poor, and farmers. As a result, SAP failed to achieve its objective in all developing countries, including Ethiopia. This bad experience with SAP, which failed without bearing the required result after long years of experimentation, left within the bureaucracy a sense of frustration with reforms and suspicion about new reforms. As a result, the bureaucracy that was supposed to play key roles in enforcing the developmental state reforms became suspicious and reluctant. So, the point is not that the developmental state model is impossible and anomalous. It is also not to say that the developmental state model fails in all conditions. But what matters is that bureaucratic discipline, commitment, and trust, particularly at the enforcement level, play a crucial role in the success of the developmental state model.

One question that needs to be asked here is why the developmental state ideology introduced in Ethiopia during the second period was not conducive for CSOs? The answer to this question lies in government's use of suppressive means to enforce the ideology. Ideally, the government claimed to exercise developmental state ideology backed by democratic ethos and principles based on the experience of some East Asian countries like Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. That is why the government called itself a "democratic developmental state" (GoE 2006:57, 62; Meheret 2014:7). However, the practice on the ground was different. The government swept out all the democratic process and principles in the actual implementation process of the developmental state ideology. It implemented the ideology through suppressive means and a closing of the political space (Semahagn 2018:27) as reflected, for instance, in the enactment of the restrictive Charities and Societies law. The government gave priority to development but the concern of democracy in its real sense was not on the agenda of the EPRDF. Hence, the government not only gave less priority and attention to essential democratic institutions such as CSOs but also characterised them as enemies.

Part of the explanation for these problems lies in the government exercising what it called revolutionary democracy as a political line along with the developmental state ideology. Revolutionary democracy is rooted in the conventional Marxist-Leninist thinking aimed at socialist revolution. It works according to the principle of democratic centralism where members of the ruling political party make decisions based on thorough democratic deliberation at the centre. Once approved by the party, however, the decision would be sacrosanct. Any disagreements from other actors including civil society were not entertained afterwards (Aalen 2020:653, 656; Meheret 2014:4). Hence, during the second period, the government decided to unmask its identity and brought the agenda of revolutionary democracy to the forefront. By doing so, it took a clear departure from the western line of thinking and created a fertile ground to suppress and undermine the role of civil society.

After introducing the ideology of developmental state together with the political line of revolutionary democracy, the TPLF dominated government of Ethiopia promoted the notion of “the self” and “the other”, which is theoretically known as “othering” or “otherisation”. According to Brons (2015:70), the notion of “othering” is “a politically charged self-identification by means of distantiation from the other [...] thus sets up a superior self/in-group in contrast to an inferior other/out-group, but this superiority/inferiority is nearly always left implicit”. Even though the EPRDF, the coalition of four political parties, was in charge of leading the country, in reality, the real power was in the hands of the TPLF (Tefera 2019:464; Anwar 2018:5). The TPLF employed the notion of “the self” and “the other”. The reason was, according to the Project Manager at Humanity and Inclusion interviewed on 14 August 2020:

“to identify and classify those who are against it and those who are in favour. The government embraced its supporters in the framework of “change army”² and “a one to five”³ arrangements embodied in the partisan civil service system through

² A project mainstreamed by the government into the civil service with the intention of bringing all actors (i.e. party, state, and citizens) in to the same line of thinking of the idea of developmentalism.

³ The ‘one to five’ task force organized in all sectors at federal and state level is meant to be led by one person selected by his/her best performance in the sector like the role model.

which it implicitly and explicitly enforced its political interests. On the other hand, it labelled those who criticise its ideas and policies as foes.”

Therefore, there was a visible demarcation between “the self” i.e., supporters and “the other” i.e., dissenters including CSOs. With regard to the “otherising” of CSOs, the Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020 indicated that:

“With the intention of intimidating and putting pressures on civil society, the government demanded detailed report from civil society, stressed on fault-finding, severe control, and impose sanctions without convincing evidence of mistakes. The government used such mechanism to make sure that every entity in the country be it governmental or non-governmental, behave in line with the basic principles of developmental state ideology.”

In addition, embracing citizens into “the self” and labelling others as “the other” could also, according to Evans (2010:52) and Assefa (2014:78) lead the political elites and officials in the bureaucracy to establish a strong bond with those in “the self” and ultimately end up with rent-seeking and corruption. Evans (2010:52) argued that when the state creates strong ties with different sectors of society, the political elites and the bureaucracy may be trapped into rent-seeking behaviours, misuse of power and corrupt practices.

The instability of ideological foundation over the past decades in Ethiopia can also be one of the factors that adversely affected CSOs in Ethiopia. Persistence in ideological tradition helps to establish a fertile ground for institutions such as CSOs to work in a stable manner. Unfortunately, in most developing countries including Ethiopia, where political culture is not well nourished, ideology changes with the change of government, and so does the role of civil society. The Executive Director at the GGA interviewed on 6 August 2020 indicated:

“In Ethiopia, when new government comes to power it tends to abandon the ideologies of the previous government in its entirety and starts from scratch. It happened, when the military regime overthrew the monarchical regime and came

to power. It also happened when the EPRDF came to power overthrowing the military regime.”

This ideological inconsistency compelled civil society in the country to adjust their objectives with the ideology of the government in power. Such situations forced most civil society to change their identity, purpose, areas of operations, which they would not have been interested to do had the changes in ideological environment not pushed them.

7.2.1.3 The third period

Concerning the third period, the data in Table 7.1 reveals that the context for CSOs was conducive. The third period was reported as conducive mainly because of the measure taken by the current government particularly in relation to the legal framework, which governs CSOs. In this regard, the measures taken by the government to replace the restrictive Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 with a less stringent Civil Society Organisation Proclamation No. 1113/2019 were noticeable.

However, when examined from the ideological standpoint of view, the current government’s ideology seems unclear. Concerning the ideology of the current government, the Executive Manager at the IAG interviewed on 1 August 2020 indicated that:

“The ideology of the current government is not clear and no one is still talking about it, including the government. So, it seems that the country is ideologically ill-defined.”

The government often talks about the idea introduced by the PM Dr. Abiy known as “medemer” meaning, synergy or coming together which Tefera (2019:465) also called “the politics of addition”. As summarised by Mokaddem (2019:3-4), the idea of “medemer” relies on three major pillars: a) building a vibrant democracy; b) economic vitality; and c) regional integration and openness to the world. However, the idea of “medemer” is subject to criticism for lacking well-founded philosophical foundations and theoretical underpinnings. According to Abdissa (2021:10), it is just a utopia and

collection of ideas and assumptions, which does not fit in to a particular category of ideology. It neither conforms to the ideological category of right-wing nor left wing.

Considering the measures taken by PM Abiy's administration at the beginning of the reform, one may assume that it has adopted the ideology of neoliberalism. The PM Abiy and his government evolved from the EPRDF in April 2018. The TPLF-dominated EPRDF government faced a huge challenge from citizens. One of such challenges was the Qerro⁴ Oromo movement due, according to Mokaddem (2019:2), to the controversial Addis Ababa master plan introduced by the government. This situation created an opportunity in bringing pro-reform individuals from within the EPRDF to the forefront of whom the current Prime Minister Abiy was one. When PM Abiy came to power in 2018, he took some visible measures which, according to Abdissa (2021:16) included restructuring of ministerial offices and women empowerment, the release of political prisoners, homecoming of exiled opposition parties, amendment of restrictive laws, reconciliation with Eritrea and promise to liberalise state-captured enterprises including the Ethiopian Airlines. Due to these moves, the government resembled neoliberalism in its ideological approach. However, the neoliberal feature of the government, which was shown at the initial stage, did not remain the permanent characteristics of the government because, as Abdissa (2021:16) argued, all the reform efforts slowly reverted to the status quo. This makes it difficult to characterise the ideology of the state as neoliberal.

Given that there is no permanent and lasting departure from the previous EPRDF era, one can argue that the current government has not taken a different ideological lane. In 1975, when the military regime came to power, it closed the chapter of feudalism and opened the new chapter of communism. Again, in 1991 the EPRDF came to power, which resigned socialism to history and made space for a new chapter of democracy, at least idealistically. During these periods, it was clear that the ideological shift was fundamental and radical because of the total abandonment and replacement of one ideology by another. However, when we look at the changes that came about in 2018,

⁴ In traditional Oromo culture the term means "bachelor" or youth

there was no fundamental departure but an incremental change. There was no clear ideological path introduced in an official way. The previous institutions are still functioning without major reforms, but only with a minimal or minor ministerial office rearrangement. If there are changes, they are minor and incremental. Therefore, as the saying goes, it was “new wine in an old bottle”. Concerning the development projects, the government is still carrying out projects launched by the previous developmental state government. Cases in points are the GERD, road construction, 40:60 housing projects and industrial parks. The Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 also stated that:

“Dr. Abiy and most of his political comrades were born out of EPRDF, a context which shaped their thought and hence, it may be difficult for them to get rid of it in the short term, although Dr. Abiy can be seen as an exception in some respects.”

In this regard, the current tendency of the government to establish strong relationship and ally with leftist countries such as China, Turkey and Russia have also some stories to tell about the ideological features and future of the current government. Although the government was compelled to ally with Russia, China and Turkey due to the USA’s support of the TPLF, it may indicate that the government is inclined towards admitting and supporting the ideological tradition adopted by Leftist countries. In support of this, the Programme Manager at the PDC interviewed on 11 August 2020 stated that:

“At this particular time due to the pressure of western countries in relation to the conflict in the northern part of the country, the government has shown the tendency of revising its diplomatic relationship and strengthening alliance with anti-neoliberal countries like Turkey, Russia and China. Such a move may result in backslide towards a more leftist position.”

Therefore, except for some efforts made by the government at the initial stage, there is no firm evidence that shows a clear departure of the current government from the previous developmental ideological tradition.

7.2.1.4 A summary

In summary, from the ideological point of view, the first and third periods were conducive while the second period was less conducive for the operation of CSOs. The first period was conducive because the government disguised itself as liberal, although it was actually not, in order not to lose the support of western liberal countries mainly the USA and the UK. During the second period, the government disclosed its true ideological identity and officially declared that it had adopted Asian-type developmental state ideology. Following that, the government enacted restrictive laws and suppressed CSOs. During the third period, even though the ideological stance of the government is not clear, which is still the case, the context of civil society was not suppressive and restrictive. Although the ideological standpoint of the current government is unclear, it has not been restrictive to CSOs which are free to operate in all operational areas.

7.2.2 The Political Context

Political context is another essential context that determines the nature and operations of civil society. This section analyzes the political context in which civil society in Ethiopia has been working focusing on the comparison of the three periods. Accordingly, Table 7.2 presents the descriptive analysis and comparison of the political context during the three periods.

Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Result on Political Context

	Descriptive Statistics			
	N	Percentiles		
25th		50th (Median)	75th	
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	200	2.8000	3.0000	3.2000
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	200	1.0000	1.0000	2.0000
Period 3 (2018 - to date)	200	2.8000	2.8000	3.2000

Friedman Test

Ranks	
	Mean Rank
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	2.70
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	1.00
Period 3 (2018 – to date)	2.30

Test Statistics ^a	
N	200
Chi-Square	371.844
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. Friedman Test

Test Statistics ^a			
	Period 2- Period 1	Period 3 - Period 1	Period 3 - Period 2
Z	-12.283 ^b	-8.888 ^b	-12.327 ^c
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks

c. Based on negative ranks

Source: Computed from survey data (2021)

The results in Table 7.2 from questionnaire reveals that there was a statistically significant difference in political environment across the three periods, $\chi^2 (2, N = 200) = 371.844$, $p < .001$, level of significance at $\alpha = 0.05$. Analysis of the median values revealed a decrease in political environment from period 1 ($Md = 3$) to period 2 ($Md = 1$) and an increase at period 3 ($Md = 2.8$). Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.017$. There were significant differences between Period 1 and 2 ($Z = -12.283$, $p < .001$), Period 1 and 3 ($Z = -8.888$, $p < .001$) and Period 2 and 3 ($Z = -12.327$, $p < .001$).

The above results show that the differences between the medians values are statistically significant. Accordingly, the median value of the first period is higher than

the other two periods implying that there was better political environment for CSOs during the first period compared to the other two periods. There are different explanations for this.

7.2.2.1 The first period

One possible explanation is that, during the first period, the EPRDF government seemed confident for different reasons. First, the government came to power by overthrowing the socialist military regime characterised by an undemocratic command economic system. According to Roberts (2019), there was a huge hope in the large proportion of Ethiopia's people who had grievances against the ruling military regime that the EPRDF would not only install democratic systems but also improve the economically impaired Ethiopia that resulted from 17 consecutive years of civil war between the military regime and the rebel group. This hope led the people of Ethiopia to develop a positive attitude towards EPRDF, at least at the beginning. The positive attitude of the people coupled with the support provided from western countries helped the EPRDF government to develop the confidence and opened the political space for non-governmental actors including CSOs.

Another possible explanation is that during the first period, there was relative political stability in the country except for a few signals of internal unrest and external conflict with Eritrea. Internally, there were no visible cases of civil conflict and hence, the government was politically in a state of relative peace and stability during the first period. Hence, there was no reason for the government to consider non-governmental actors including CSOs as a threat and foes. It was in this spirit, according to Teshome (2009:731) that the government allowed CSOs to flourish and operate freely without restriction. In support of this, FGD respondents indicated that, "the stability in the political environment during the first period helped the government to see civil society as good partners than enemy. It is this mindset of the government that created opportunity for opening up of the space for non-state actors to operate freely as long as they make positive contribution to the societal transformation."

There are different manifestations of the opening up of the political space. To start with, a platform of political debate was facilitated among political parties. Research-based policy dialogue was also facilitated among different entities including government, think tanks and research institutions. In addition, democratic institutions such as the Ombudsman Institution, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and Ethiopian Election Board were established. Furthermore, there was a proliferation of the free press. According to Shimelis (2000:186–87) and Skjerdal and Lule (2009:49), between October 1992 and July 1997 alone 385 publications (i.e., 265 newspapers and 120 magazines) were registered. Finally, the proliferation and unrestricted engagement of CSOs in various operational areas including advocacy, promotion of human and democratic rights, watchdogging, relief and humanitarian activities, development and service delivery are some of the manifestations. CSOs that had been restricted to work only on relief and rehabilitation areas during the military regime were permitted to work on democratic and human rights after 1991. The number of CSOs that numbered only 70 in the year 1991 grew to 600 in the year 2001 (Roberts 2019:14, 16). In confirmation of this, the Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020 confirmed that:

“There was an open platform where civil society freely engage in advocacy, policy dialogue, development and service delivery to fill the gaps that the government failed to address. In relative terms, there was open space for civil society to engage in the entire development process of the country during the first period.”

The relative freedom CSOs enjoyed during the first period, therefore, allowed them to discharge different responsibilities in a wider spectrum. Among these were educating and making citizen vigilant, creating awareness on rights and freedom, observing elections, providing social services, conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources, influencing national policies through policy dialogue, promoting human and democratic rights, making government bodies accountable and advocacy. The Programme Manager at LPI interviewed on 3 August 2020 named some CSOs that were active

players during this period including “*OSJE, APAP and CCRDA.*” The freedom of CSOs in all the above operational areas, however, only lasted until 2005 election.

7.2.2.2 The second period

As indicated in Table 7.2, the second period was less conducive for CSOs. Opening up of the political space during the first period, CSOs placed considerable pressure on the government during the 2005 election in which the government lost many seats especially in Addis Ababa. The result of the 2005 election, which was, according to Bahru (2021), the only publicly contested election that the opposition parties came close to winning, was a turning point in the history of modern-day politics of Ethiopia. The government began labelling CSOs in the category of opposition parties. According to Birru and Wolff (2019:834), the government claimed that CSOs were working with opposition parties. They used the money obtained from western countries and donors in the name of poor Ethiopian citizens to support opposition parties and managed to influence the results of the 2005 election in favour of opposition parties. The government concluded that the massive loss of election to the opposition parties was mainly due to the siding of CSOs with the opposition parties. As a result, it began to take aggressive adverse actions against CSOs. According to Bahru (2021), after the 2005 election, the TPLF-dominated government of EPRDF vowed to itself never again and issued a slew of legislation that restricted civil society, silenced the media, and crippled the opposition.

After suffering the pressure imposed during the 2005 election, the government seemed to regret opening up the space for non-state actors. As a result, it decided to narrow down the space for non-state actors including political parties and CSOs (Teshome 2009:733). On the other hand, the government decided to expand the space for the state to intervene in economic development. Following the introduction of the developmental state ideology, the state began to take more space and left minimal or almost zero space especially for rights-based CSOs. The government was not interested in listening to or entertaining any concern coming from CSOs after the 2005

election because it developed an inimical attitude toward them. In this regard, FGD respondents indicated that:

“civil societies that raised sensitive issues related to human and democratic rights, youth unemployment, migration and bad governance were victim of the adverse reaction from the government ranging from intimidation to closure.”

After the 2005 election, the government targeted rights-based CSOs. To this end, it selectively attacked CSOs working on human and democratic rights, advocacy, watchdogging, good governance, peace and security and conflict management. Rights-based CSOs were targeted because the government considered them as a potential threat because the government assumed that they worked to destroy its power by working with opposition political parties. On the contrary, CSOs whose operational areas were not related to politically sensitive issues were not restricted. To this end, CSOs working in the areas of development, service delivery and infrastructure development were not restricted as long as they worked in accordance with their core ideological values and objectives.

These attacks had two faces. The government curtailed the work of all rights-based CSOs, arguing that they not only served as a Trojan horse for Western countries but also supported opposition political parties. The government accused rights-based CSOs for taking their mission from some western countries that were against the government. They not only receive their mission but also funding from western countries. Then they approached and worked with opposition political parties in the country with the intention of supporting liberal-oriented political parties to defeat the ideology of developmental state. In this regard, the Programme Specialist at FFS interviewed on 19 August 2020 criticised the government saying that:

“Even though there were some international organisations (e.g., Action Aid) which were largely suspected for invisibly intervening in political matters of the country, the government failed to differentiate those who involved in political matters and those who did not. It simply crippled right-based civil society working

in the country altogether. It is like the saying goes in Amharic ‘ከተላባ ጋር የተገኘህ ስሊጥ አብረህ ተወቀጥ’ which means ‘sesames found with flax, all crushed together.’”

The government argued that civil society, backed up by external support and working with opposition political parties in the country, is working to destroy its power and remove it from power. It accused civil society organisations of crossing the red line and getting involved in political matters outside their operational territory and domain. This phenomenon can be explained using the concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization introduced by Deleuze and Guattari in 1987. Deterritorialization, in the eyes of these authors, refers to the severance of social, cultural, and political practices from the native places and the native population when the people have been ripped away from the territory, the culture, and the life they have known. It reflects the circumstances in which people are forced to move to another place or are separated from the practices and cultural processes that give their lives meaning and sustain them. These writers conceptualised reterritorialization as reintegrating and reconnecting social, cultural, religious, and political practices with the population. It focuses on comprehending the identity crisis—how people maintain their sense of self in a society when they are constantly in distress and separated from the support system and all of their familiar resources. Reterritorialization thus refers to the process through which we understand and assist people in re-experiencing and reconnecting with the things most significant to them.

In principle, people are the source and center of power (Gordon 2009:265; Shokri 2017:5). In a political system like Ethiopia, where the government claims that democracy is the only way to hold power, people give power to rulers through the election process. Governments that come to power through such a process are said to be legitimate rulers since they get power through the people's will. In such cases, vital political decisions, such as prioritising development agendas and the allocation and distribution of resources, are assumed to be made by the people, as these decisions are made either by authentic representatives or through people's direct participation.

The reality on the ground in developing countries, including Ethiopia, is different because democracy is not practiced in a real sense even though elections are carried out, which means that the people who are the trustworthy source of power are deterritorialised from the equation of the political decision-making process.

The efforts of civil society can be more accurately expressed as reterritorialization as they struggle with the government to restore the people to their actual place of power in the political system through non-violent struggle. This is manifested through their efforts, including being a voice for the voiceless, holding the government accountable for its actions, bringing key concerns and priorities of the people to the government's attention, and advocating for human and democratic rights. Civil society puts non-violent pressure on the government so that it expands the democratic platform and opens up civic spaces. In this way, civil society strives to reconnect and reintegrate the people into the most critical decisions made in the political arena. Unfortunately, according to the government of Ethiopia, such initiatives by civil society, mainly related to rights-based issues, are characterized as an attempt to destroy government's power and hence subjected to suppression.

The second face of the attack was that the government established some organisations in the name of civil society. They were registered as CSOs but were government-affiliated and partisan. According to FGD respondents:

“one of such organisations was the Forum for Civil Society Organisation whose focus was twofold: blackmailing other civil society and providing positive information about the government to bodies concerned just to build positive image of the government.”

Because of this adverse action against rights-based CSOs, the majority of rights-based CSOs were forced to either change their areas of operation to service delivery, relief and rehabilitation, development (including local economic development, infrastructure development, and environmental rehabilitation like water shade development) or face closure (Bekalu & Wassihun 2021:86, 90). According to Kelly (2019), there were also some international CSOs that were compelled to move their offices to Nairobi, Kenya.

Hence, the role that could have been played by civil society was dashed in its entirety while the need for disclosing human and democratic rights violations was of high importance during the second period.

During the second period, secularism, the law that demands separation of spiritual and development activities, was also a problem for some CSOs whose operational area was faith related. The nature of some CSOs required a combination of both religion and development. They had the spiritual (Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, Evangelical) wing and the developmental wing. They also had their own structure and constituencies. For instance, if we take Muslim-affiliated CSOs, they were based in Somali and Afar regions. They work in areas where the Muslim community is dominant. That was the social base for these particular CSOs. It is also true for others. The government, based on the concept of secularism, demanded these CSOs separate the spiritual work from the humanitarian and development work. The government wanted these CSOs to separate the two because it wanted to regulate the activities undertaken by them through the ACSO, as it does not have the right, according to the Constitution, to regulate and intervene in religion matters. However, according to the Programme Manager at Inter-Religious Council interviewed on 26 August 2020 response:

“For civil society, separating the two issues was difficult because they could achieve their mission in a complete way only when they provide the two in parallel. Religion oriented civil society were supposed to provide holistic service i.e., spiritual, physical, mental and psychological. When the agenda of development is separated from spiritual aspect, it is all about creating materialistic, greedy, respect less, and selfish generation which lacks the ethics, moral values and manner of life. This situation made citizens to lose important values that help to leave together in a peaceful manner. The conflicts and civil wars that the Ethiopians are facing in various corner of the country are the result of eliminating the spiritual element from development endeavour. In the spiritual circle, there is the golden rule, which reads: ‘We should do to others what we would want others to do to us.’ The enforcement of secularism therefore

eliminates this golden rule from the equation of development and leads our generation to selfishness.”

Although the government hoped that suppression of CSOs would result in a positive outcome, in reality, it faced different challenges. The restriction of civil society had serious implications in hampering the national capacity to monitor human rights in general and women’s and children’s rights in particular. The government itself engaged in human rights violations. This situation attracted the attention of some international human rights organisations including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the European Union. They began to blame and accuse the government of Ethiopia for violations of human and democratic rights in the country (Amnesty International 2012b; Human Rights Watch 2010:39, 40). In support of this, the Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 argued that:

“The international community loudly condemned and exposed the government and underlined that it was responsible not only for violating rights of citizens but also for suppressing civil society, media and democratic institutions in the country. By suppressing civil society working in the country, the government undermined its own national capacity and exposed itself to criticism of international organisations located at distance which are out of its regulatory scope.”

One of the reasons that led the EPRDF government to lose its power was the suppression of CSOs. Had the government worked with civil society and benefited from its advice, critique, and policy inputs, the public mob and rallies undertaken in different parts of the country against the government would probably not have happened. In this regard, the Programme Coordinator at the PfR interviewed on 17 August 2020 indicated that:

“Suppression of civil society, media and individual bloggers was suicidal and self-defeating for the government because it is the suppressive nature of the government that initiated citizens mob and public upheavals against it. Such closure of political space where all actors could not play their fair share put the

country under a huge stress which finally exploded on the government to face irreversible challenge.”

7.2.2.3 The third period

Concerning the third period, the median value of the third period is higher than that of the second period and lower than that of first period (Table 7.2). The differences between the medians are statistically significant. This implies that there was better political environment during the third period compared to the second period. However, compared to the first period, the conduciveness of the political environment during the third period was relatively less positive as indicated in Table 7.2. There are different responsible factors for these differences.

In the third period, some observable positive changes were made to encourage CSOs. Among these, the essential turning point was the change in the overall legal environment that was manifested through the amendment of the restrictive civil society law (see section 7.2.3). In addition, the House of Peoples Representatives (HPR) established a committee named the Parliamentarian Research Initiative which was responsible to create a bridge between civil society and the parliament in the area of research. It was clear that national laws and policies should be informed by research. These studies were conducted mainly by civil society think tanks. Therefore, there is a need to link these two entities i.e., the HPR and CSOs. According to the Project Coordinator at the EEA, interviewed on 8 August 2020, this initiative was, therefore, meant to organise research conducted by CSOs and submit this to the HPR so it could make use of the findings while making national laws and policies. The parliament has eight standing committees in various sectors including social, agriculture and environment. Therefore, CSOs work with these committees according to their respective areas of intervention. Because of the improvement in the legal environment, many CSOs including those who are operating in the areas of rights have re-emerged. Democratic organisations such as Ombudsman, Human Rights and the Election Board have started to exercise some level of freedom.

During the third period, CSOs that were forced to shift their areas of operation from rights-based to service delivery were allowed to redraft their objectives and strategies to rights-based agendas. In support of this, FGD respondents mentioned that:

“Following the lifting up of the restrictive law, civil society who previously forced to exit form rights-based activity are now returning to their original areas of interest. In addition, civil society organisations are striving to rebuild and reinstate their internal capacity to begin contribution using the enabling environment created for them as an opportunity. They seem to be awakened and they are engaging in development of proposals to seek funds and revitalised their activities. Donors have managing to use the enabling environment as an opportunity to come with funds.”

During the third period, some CSOs that were active during the restrictive period completely disappeared and were banned. The reason for this, according to the Programme Manager at LPI interviewed on 3 August 2020, is that:

“They were government affiliated partisan organisations created by the TPLF dominated government to counter-balance the possible pressure that could come from genuine civil society. The legal reform and the change in political environment during the third period did not provide them fertile ground any more to disguise as genuine civil society when they are actually partisan. Hence, they disappeared because they could not survive independently. Of course, some civil society organizations (e.g., the Forum of CSOs) have changed their behaviour and returned to the right track. But the rest who wanted to stick to their hidden agenda were left with no option, except closure.”

Although the conduciveness of the political environment during the third period is better compared to the second period, as indicated in Table 7.2, it is relatively less conducive than the first period. One of the reasons is the political instability, unrest and chaos in the country that has become a threat and an impediment to reform. As the reality on the ground witnesses, the country has been in a messy political condition in the past three years (2018–2021). According to Abdissa (2021:16), it has been a common

phenomenon to see displacement of millions, killings of innocent civilians in almost all corners of the country, and imprisonment of some political party members including those who were released by the same government initially. The conflict in the northern part of the country is another challenge. The reforms proposed by the government have not materialised as expected. Hence, due to lack of meaningful institutional reforms, the institutions in the country are still weak. In support of this, the Executive Manager at the IAG interviewed on 1 August 2020 said that:

“The reforms that the current government is trying to implement are not institutionally backed and well grounded. Of course, it is understandable that a radical shift and holistic reform will take some time. But generally, it seems that there is a good beginning, but the reform has not born the required fruit yet.”

The effort of the current government at the beginning to open up the political space for civil society is partly overshadowed by these limitations.

It is with this in mind that some CSOs remain dubious about the suitability and sustainability of the open spaces and relative freedom created by the current government. FGD respondents indicated that:

“In many cases in developing countries, when a new government comes to power, it initially tends to resemble democratic, favouring the people, and promise to do all the good things for its people. However, gradually, when they face challenges from opposition political parties, media and civil society, they will begin to break the promise and turn their back to their people and become aggressive. When the government is being openly and publicly criticised, blamed for human rights abuses, lack of good governance and bureaucratic malpractices, it loses its temperament and begins to worry about its political power, which ultimately makes it aggressive. This is a common pattern and tradition of most developing countries’ politics and the current Ethiopian government may be no exception. Hence, there is no guarantee that the future of the current civil society in Ethiopia will remain as smooth as it is currently.”

For instance, as argued by the Executive Manager at the IAG interviewed on 1 August 2020 and the Programme Coordinator at Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) interviewed on 25 August 2020, most recently the government seems to be suspicious of some local and international humanitarian CSOs that are providing humanitarian support to the victim of the conflict between the federal government and the TPLF. The federal government blamed some CSOs particularly the international ones for trying to provide various kinds of support to the TPLF (categorised by the Ethiopian Parliament as a terrorist organisation) in the name of humanitarian interventions. As a result, the attitude of the government toward CSOs seems to have changed. Some even fear that the government may go beyond blaming and may permanently narrow down the space for CSOs. Hence, it is too early to conclude and judge whether the third period will remain conducive on permanent basis.

7.2.2.4 A summary

To sum up, CSOs cannot be seen in separation from the political environment. Overall, when we look at the last three decades in Ethiopia, the political space for civil society has been narrow while the space for the government has been wide. Regarding the three periods, the political environment was conducive during the first period because the government did not see CSOs as a threat. In the second period, due to the huge loss of the 2005 election to opposition parties the government considered CSOs as a threat and reacted towards them aggressively. In the third period, the space has been opened and the political environment seems conducive but there is uncertainty about the sustainability of the situation due to the overall political instability, chaos and unrest.

7.2.3 The Legal Environment

Legal environment is one of the essential factors that affect CSOs. It is one of the critical enabling environments. In an enabling legal environment, CSOs would get an opportunity to make positive contributions. On the other hand, restrictive legal environment would disable CSOs. This section, therefore, analyses the legal context in which CSOs have been working in Ethiopia since 1991. The analysis focuses on the

comparison of three periods. Accordingly, Table 7.3 presents the descriptive analysis and comparison of the legal context during the three periods.

Table 7.3: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Result on Legal Context

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Percentiles		
		25th	50th (Median)	75th
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	200	2.5000	3.2500	3.5000
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	200	1.0000	1.5000	2.0000
Period 3 (2018 - to date)	200	4.5000	5.0000	5.0000

Friedman Test

Ranks	
	Mean Rank
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	2.00
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	1.00
Period 3 (2018 – to date)	3.00

Test Statistics ^a	
N	200
Chi-Square	400.000
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. Friedman Test

Test Statistics ^a			
	Period 2- Period 1	Period 3 - Period 1	Period 3 - Period 2
Z	-12.355 ^b	-12.387 ^c	-12.552 ^c
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks

c. Based on negative ranks

Source: Computed from survey data (2021)

The quantitative results from questionnaire in Table 7.3 reveals that there was a statistically significant difference in legal environment across the three periods, χ^2 (2, N

= 200) = 400.000, $p < .001$, level of significance at $\alpha = 0.05$. Analysis of the median values revealed a deterioration in the conduciveness of the legal environment from Period 1 ($Md = 3.25$) to Period 2 ($Md = 1.5$) and then an increase at Period 3 ($Md = 5$). Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.017$. There was a significant difference between Period 1 and 2 ($Z = -12.355$, $p < .001$), Period 1 and 3 ($Z = -12.387$, $p < .001$) and Period 2 and 3 ($Z = -12.552$, $p < .001$).

The above results show that the differences between the medians are statistically significant. As presented in Table 7.3, the level of conduciveness of the legal environment during the first period was better than the second period but lower than that of the third period.

7.2.3.1 The first period

During the first period, in addition to the general provision of the Ethiopian Constitution that applies to all three periods, two legal instruments were in use to govern CSOs. Before discussing these two legal instruments, it is important to highlight the general provision of the Constitution here. The Constitution was ratified during the first period. As one of the important legal frameworks, it provides freedom of association under Article 31 which clearly stipulates that “Every person has the right to freedom of association for any cause or purpose”. According to Nega and Milofsky (2011: ii35), this article provided for a democratic institutional setup and protection to CSOs to exist and function in the country.

Other than this general provision of the Constitution, there were two laws which, according to Costantinos (1996:7-8) and Tsehai (2008:163), are the Civil Code of 1960 which gave the mandate to the former Ministry of Internal Affairs to oversight CSOs and the Associations Registration Regulation No. 321/1966. The Association’s Registration Regulation No. 321/1966 was meant to describe the registration procedure and requirements. According to Costantinos (1996:8), the regulation sets some rules and standards including application forms for registration, contents of the memorandum and articles of association, verification and review of applications, supervision of the

organisations after registration, and dissolution of the organisations. Again in 1995, according to Tsehai (2008:163), the responsibility for coordinating and supervising relief work of CSOs was vested on the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Relief Commission by Art 6/10 of Proc. No.10/1995.

These legal instruments, although they had limitations in terms of scope and comprehensiveness, were less restrictive in nature. Consequently, CSOs were able to involve in all operational areas, getting funds from any sources they wanted, and operating in all geographical areas in the country without restriction. CSOs were free to work not only on service and development agendas but also on human and democratic rights, governance, gender equality, religious and ethnic agendas, rights of children, women and people with disabilities, conflict resolution and justice sector services. In addition, no restrictions were imposed on CSOs as to how to use the funds they obtained from local and international sources. It is due to this openness and less restrictive legal environment that the legal context of civil society during the first period was rated better than that of the second period. In support of this, FGD respondents stated that:

“although the legal provisions during the first period lacks exhaustiveness and safeguarding mechanisms, it did not put unnecessary pressure and restriction on civil society. Therefore, civil society organisations were free not only to engage in various operational areas based on their own objectives and interest but also free to mobilised resources and access funds from all local and international sources at their disposal.”

The funding landscape was good that enabled CSOs to access diversified sources of funds from international organisations. Unless CSOs had their own internal capacity problems of resource mobilisation, the funding platform was conducive. For one thing, the government did not limit the access of CSOs to funds. Second, the first period was the time where donor agencies and international financial institutions such as the IMF and the WB introduced PRSP into Ethiopia, which also provided ample funding access opportunities for CSOs. According to the Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on

8 August 2020, these donors were interested in making the PRSP more participatory and engage CSOs in the process. Donors created division of labour between the government and civil society. CSOs were given a role to play in the process of PRSP. This situation, coupled with the less restrictive legal framework created an enabling environment for CSOs to access donors' funds. This enabling environment and availability of resources was one of the contributing factors for CSOs to mushroom during the first period. The Executive Director at the GGA interviewed on 6 August 2020 indicated that:

“Following the regime change, the narration was that Ethiopia, a country which was under the heavy military control for over many years, entered into a dawn of democracy and liberalisation. This rhetoric created a big channel of resources of different types from donor agencies and western countries. These supports were channelled into Ethiopia not only through bilateral relations but also through international civil society. This situation initiated the proliferation of many local civil society organisations.”

However, even though the legal instruments which were in operation during the first period did not have a restrictive nature, one cannot deny that it failed to provide various provisions that could support CSOs operations and development. Important issues such as the scope and intervention areas, state-civil society relations, access to finance, role and responsibility of CSOs and mechanisms to regulate CSOs' behaviour were not clearly articulated in the above legal provisions. According to Costantinos (1996:9-10), the entire system by which CSOs were governed suffered from practical and administrative gaps including the absence of clear registration regulations, excessive documentation requirements for registration, inadequacy and inefficiency of the employees, delays in registration, lack of an administrative appeals procedure and absence of accountability mechanisms for executive and non-executive staff. In addition, it failed to make the privileges (e.g., tax exemptions) clear that CSOs were allowed.

The fact that the laws failed to provide an adequate regulatory and safeguarding instrument created grey areas and loopholes. In this regard, Tsehai (2008:163) argued that the laws, during the first period, were “outdated in the sense that they leave much to be desired in advancing a vibrant civil society...” Therefore, they were not comprehensive enough to govern the contemporary complex nature and activities of CSOs. The Programme Manager at IAG interviewed on 4 August 2020 also indicated that:

“The laws that were in action during the first period were not restrictive but they were loose and limited in scope. For instance, the responsibility to oversight civil society working on relief activities during the first period was given to the then Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Relief Commission. It seems that nobody was in charge to oversight activities undertaken by civil society working in operational areas other than relief. In addition, because of fragmented nature of the legal instruments where some are in the Civil Code, which was enacted during the monarchical regime, and some others are in other regulations, made it difficult for interested stakeholders to access the documents when they are in need of reference.”

7.2.3.2 The second period

As the median value in Table 7.3 indicates, the legal context of civil society during the second period was not conducive compared to that of the first and third periods. For proper understanding, we can classify the legal context of the second period, which is from 2005 to 2017, into two sub-periods. These two classifications are the period from 2005 to 2008 and the period from 2009 to 2017. In the first part of the second period (i.e., from 2005 to 2008), there was no amendment to the previous legal framework. The legal instruments, which were in action during the first period, were continued. The second period was harsh and full of aggressive reactions and intimidation towards CSOs because of the results of the 2005 election. Although the government began to draft a new civil society law (Tsehai 2008:163), the previous laws were not replaced until 2009. Even though the laws were not replaced officially, this period was

characterised by what Roberts (2019:15) called “post-election closures of civic and political space” because government’s attitude and actions became aggressive after the 2005 election. The government, even before enacting the restrictive law, embarked on taking serious adverse actions to close civic space which was revealed in the form of intimidating CSOs as well as activists and individual bloggers who openly criticised it (Roberts 2019:15). The Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 used the metaphors of the cat and the rodent to express the relationship between the government and civil society. He said:

“ግዜው የዓይጥና የድመት ነበር፤ ድመቱም ያድናል፣ ዓይጡም ይሸሸል፣ ኋላም ዓይጡ በዚያው ይጠፋል። [It is just to mean that the relationship between the government and civil society was like the relationship between the cat and the rodent]. *The cat chases the rodent; the rodent runs away and finally disappears. So, the government chased civil society; civil society ran away and then disappeared.*”

In the second part (i.e., 2009 to 2017) of the second period, the government enacted a restrictive proclamation known as Charities and Societies Proclamations No. 621/2009. Article 2(2-4) of the proclamation classified CSOs into three major categories i.e., Ethiopian Charities and Ethiopian Societies, Ethiopian Resident Societies and Ethiopian Resident Charities, and International or Foreign Charities. This categorisation, according to Broeckhoven et al. (2021:55) and Robert (2019:17), was mainly based on sources of funding. In addition, Broeckhoven et al. (2021:55) stated that “residency, nationality of members, governing laws of incorporation and control of the organisation” were also factors upon which the classification was based.

Of the above three categories, the proclamation denied the freedom of Ethiopian Resident and International/Foreign CSOs to engage in promotion of human and democratic rights, gender and religion equality, children’s and people with disabilities’ rights, conflict resolution and efficiency of the justice and law enforcement services. In addition, according to Broeckhoven et al. (2021:55), these organisations were not allowed to appeal when they face problems with services rendered by the Charities and Societies Agency. According to Roberts (2019:17), in terms of mobilising foreign funds,

the Ethiopian Resident CSOs were allowed to generate between 10% and 100% of their funds from overseas while foreign CSOs were allowed to generate 100% foreign funds. By exception, the proclamation allowed Ethiopian Charities and Ethiopian Societies to engage in all the rights-based and advocacy issues mentioned above. However, it did not allow them to mobilise foreign funds that exceed 10% of their income. This is referred to as the rule of 90:10. This rule forced Ethiopian Charities and Ethiopian Societies that were allowed to engage in rights-based activities to generate 90% of their income from local sources. In addition, according to the Proclamation Article 88(1), all three categories were required to utilise 70% of their expenses for implementation of the main cause or purpose and the remaining 30% for administrative expenses. This is said to be the rule of 70:30. Due to these restrictions, the proclamation was blamed for violating the constitutional rights and freedom of association stipulated in Article 31 of the Constitution, which says, “Every person has the right to freedom of association for any cause or purpose”.

The Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 was criticised for initially being published in Amharic alone. In Ethiopia, it is customary to have an Amharic and English version, in a single document, of a proclamation in order to satisfy both local and international consumption. However, the proclamation was initially published and released only in Amharic language. The Programme Coordinator at the Partners for Resilience (PfR) interviewed on 17 August 2020 indicated that:

“The proclamation was initially prepared and disseminated only in Amharic. Some organisations like CCRDA translated the proclamation into English but just for their own internal consumption. The government released the proclamation only in Amharic intentionally to deny the access of the international communities and organisations that work on rights-based and advocacy issues although the English version was released later on after longer time. The worry of the government was that the international communities and organisations, if they access the proclamation, would complain, blame and ‘defame’ the government on the international arena.”

These situations annoyed not only CSOs but also all other parties who were concerned about the openness of civic space. That is why Roberts (2019:15) described the second half (according to his classification from 2010 to 2018) of the second period as “a hostile environment” because the closure of civic space during this period resulted in public upheavals and rallies against the government. The action of the government during this period resulted in either closure of advocacy and rights-based CSOs or a revision of their objectives to service delivery (Dupuy et al. 2014). Supporting this, the Programme Manager at the Agency for Cooperation Research in Development (ACORD) interviewed on 15 August 2020 indicated that:

“Rights and advocacy based civil society were compelled to terminate their work or shift their areas of intervention to less politically sensitive areas like service delivery because the law was less restrictive and the government was also less aggressive on these areas of operation.”

The Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 in general showed government’s disposition towards CSOs that was not amenable. Concerns from various bodies were presented to the government about the adverse effect of discouraging CSOs. Criticisms were made against the law but the government did not have the appetite to listen and nobody could stop it. Tangible efforts were made to put pressure on the government by the international communities and diplomats to avert the adoption of the proclamation. In this regard, Jalale and Wolff (2019:833) indicated that ambassadors from various countries including the USA, France, the United Kingdom and representatives of international donor agencies had a discussion with key officials of the Ethiopian government to reverse the enactment of the restrictive proclamation. Unfortunately, the deliberation effort did not have the required outcome in terms of changing the restrictive content of the proclamation. The government ignored all the voices coming from within and from abroad and proceeded with the enforcement of the law.

By imposing restrictive laws, the government was not only able to curtail CSOs’ access to foreign funds (Jalale & Wolff 2019:833) but also ultimately paralysed the intervention

capacity of CSOs in rights-based and advocacy issues. CSOs in the country are not financially self-reliant and are basically donor-dependent for financial resources (Dunia 2020:370). However, due to the restrictive laws, most donor agencies shifted the funds to other developing countries where the environment was relatively enabling. Donor agencies lost the appetite to fund CSOs not only because the law was restrictive but also due to the bold ideological shift made by the government. In this regard, FGD respondents indicated that:

“The international community and donor agencies were not happy with the Asian type of developmental state ideology marshalled by the late PM Melez Zenawi and hence decided to pour the fund to other countries that are ideologically westernised.”

In addition to the absence of overseas funds, local financial sources were also not available for civil society. According to the Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020:

“Private business organisations were not having adequate capacity to provide financial support to civil society. Even when they have the capacity, they abstain themselves from supporting rights-based civil society because they might be subject to government aggressive reaction for collaborating with them. In addition, the private businesses had no clear understanding about the contribution and importance of civil society. Furthermore, the giving culture of local private sector is weak because they have no incentive to do so. Tax exemption opportunity of certain kind could be provided by the government when private sector extends supports to civil society, but it is unfortunately missing.”

Even though the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 allowed CSOs to engage in business activities, it limited them to engaging only in activities that are pertinent to their areas of operation and objectives. It also required CSOs to obtain written approval from the ACSO before engaging in such activities (Article 103(1)).

Registration of CSOs was another area that was constrained by the proclamation. According to Tsehai (2008:163), by the Proclamation No. 471/2005, the responsibility of registering, supervising and regulating CSOs was officially transferred to the MoJ. The Ministry alone was in charge from 2005 to 2009. Right after taking on this responsibility, the Ministry started to suppress and impose tight control and regulation on CSOs. According to Bekalu and Wassihun (2021:94), the absence of a comprehensive legal framework created a loophole for the MoJ to deny the registration of some CSOs unreasonably when it suspected that they had links to opposition political parties.

In 2009, the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 was enacted. Article 64(2) of the proclamation made registration and licensing of all CSOs a precondition to exist as an organisation. In addition, Article 111(2) also states that re-registration of all existing CSOs was mandatory within a year irrespective of their type, size and operational areas. According to Article 65 (4) failure of any CSOs to comply with the re-registration requirement (i.e., one year) would be grounds for cancellation of the existing licence. The proclamation also declared the establishment of the regulatory body known as Agency for Charities and Societies (ACSO), which was established right after the enactment of the proclamation in 2009. The responsibility of governing civil society was transferred to ACSO. According to Article 6(1)(a) of the proclamation, the responsibility of enforcing the proclamation was primarily vested in ACSO, which included registration and licensing of CSOs.

The registration process used by the agency was cumbersome and inefficient. The Team Leader at the ACSO interviewed on 29 August 2020 described the process through which civil society organisations are required to pass when they apply for registration. Accordingly, he indicated that:

“Civil society are supposed to pass through a hectic administrative procedure to get registered and their licence renewed”.

The Director at the ACSO interviewed on 28 August 2020 also explained that:

“To register, the Agency requires civil society to submit a proposal about what it intend to do in its area of intervention. The Agency would then send the proposal to respective sector Ministry related to the area of intervention for further evaluation. Getting the evaluation feedback from the sector Ministry would take longer time because ministries usually do not pay attention to it. In addition to a proposal, the Agency requires civil society to prepare their internal bylaws. The Agency would again send the bylaw to another organisation called Documents Authentication and Registration Agency for further evaluation. Again, this Agency would take longer time to provide feedback. After receiving positive feedback, ACSO would again send the applicant civil society to the Ethiopian Press Agency so that the proposed name by the applicant civil society could be published on newspaper and stay on air for ten working days. Press Agency would respond to the ACSO after ten working days. It is only after reviewing the feedback on the proposal from three different organisations that the Agency would start processing the actual registration process. Getting feedback from these three institutions alone could cumulatively take more than three months period on average.”

According to the Team Leader at the ACSO interviewed on 29 August 2020:

“Within the ACSO itself, the process would also take a long time because, after getting feedback, ACSO itself requires civil society to prepare and submit minutes and statement of establishment before it proceeds with the remaining process of registration which again would take additional extra weeks.”

Therefore, the process of registration was unreasonably long and hectic. The Director at the ACSO interviewed on 28 August 2020 also asserted that:

“The registration processes was even worst for foreign civil societies. When foreign civil society wanted to register, in addition to the above-mentioned organisations, they were required to get document approval and authentication from two more organisations, namely their respective Embassy and the EFDRE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, many civil societies start the registration

process but terminate it in the middle discouraged by the long and cumbersome process of registration”.

Even though the argument against Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 outweighs the benefits by far, some argued that the proclamation played a positive role in reducing uncertainties, which were evident in the first period due to the loose regulatory framework. The Programme Manager at LPI interviewed on 3 August 2020 argued that:

“Although it was restrictive and highly bureaucratic, the proclamation contributed to some extent in formalising the context by establishing auditing and reporting mechanisms. The failure of the legal framework during the first period in setting clear and exhaustive safeguarding mechanism created a loophole for abuse and misuse of resources. The enactment of the proclamation, though its rigid and restrictive nature adversely affected civil society which discharged their roles in a manner full way, it played some positive roles in closing the loopholes and shaping the behaviour of abusive civil society.”

It is clear that governments have the duty to ensure that all non-governmental organisations, including civil society, contribute to positive social changes. However, the extent and intention of government regulations vary from country to country depending on their ideological tradition and political structure. In countries where human and democratic rights are properly exercised, the extent of the legal restrictions imposed on civil society is minimal, and the intention is not to curtail but to enable civil society to make positive social changes. On the contrary, in countries like Ethiopia, where the culture of political tolerance is not well established and where democratic principles are not fully exercised in a real sense, the government uses regulatory instruments to suppress civil society because it considers them a threat, mainly when they involve themselves in areas that are sought to be politically sensitive. As a result, the government put in place very restrictive and draconian laws that curtailed civil society's contribution. Ethiopian Charities and Societies Law 2009/621 is a typical example of such laws.

One may argue that such governments as the Ethiopian government impose restrictive laws on civil society because they are restricted by and subjected to restrictive international legal structures such as human and civil rights laws. Giddens (1984:169), however, asserts that structures play both enabling and restricting roles; therefore, this reasoning is not always valid. Only when governments act against civil society are these international laws intended to restrain them. International laws act as a restraint when governments unreasonably limit the function of civil society. These laws impose restrictions that may take the form of what Giddens (1984:176) refers to as sanctions. Structure, on the other hand, might function as an enabler. International laws enable governments to receive financial and technical assistance when governments provide spaces for civil society and uphold civil and human rights.

7.2.3.3 The third period

The data in Table 7.3 shows that the legal environment during the third period was better than that of the first and the second periods. This is because the new Proclamation, known as Civil Societies Proclamation No. 1113/2019, which was enacted in 2019, lifted almost all restrictions that were imposed on CSOs. The new Proclamation reassured the constitutional freedom of CSOs, i.e., freedom of association. It provided CSOs with the right to undertake their activities freely without undue intervention of the government. Recognising this, the Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 affirmed:

“The new Proclamation has opened more space for civil society. It has provided civil society with a more freedom, relaxed and favourable environment. In that sense, the overall intention of the Proclamation is to support civil society, not to constrain it like that of the previous Proclamation.”

The Proclamation indeed allows the state to oversight CSOs only to ensure that they are established in lawfully and that their ultimate objective is to contribute to positive social change.

The new Proclamation also lifted the discriminatory treatment towards CSOs. During the second period, CSOs were not allowed to operate in rights-based issues including gender equality, human and democratic rights, conflict resolution governance, advocacy, and issues of equality. However, CSOs were allowed to work on service delivery and development. The operational freedom restriction imposed by the previous Proclamation was nullified by Article 62(1) of the new Proclamation which says, “An organisation shall have the right to engage in any lawful activity to accomplish its objectives”. As a result, as argued by Dunia (2020), the enactment of the new Proclamation was considered as a good opportunity for CSOs as it removed the operational restrictions and enabled CSOs to freely operate in rights as well as non-rights-based issues.

Concerning the right to access funds, which, according to Dunia (2020:370), is one of the critical elements of the right to freedom of association, the restrictive 90:10 rule was lifted, and the 70:30 rule was also amended to 80:20 by the new Proclamation (Article 63(2)). In this regard, Article 63(1) (c) of the new proclamation states: “Any organisation shall have the right to solicit, receive and utilise funds from any legal source to attain its objectives”. This justifies that the new Proclamation recognises that resource mobilisation is the right of CSOs regardless of their operational areas (Dunia 2020:371). FGD respondents indicated that:

“Civil society, unless they are constrained by their own internal capacity problems, the law does not constrain their ability to access funds from different sources.”

Article 63 (1) (b) and Article 64(1) allow CSOs to engage in income-generating activities by establishing a separate business entity as long as they operate in accordance with the business laws of the country. In order for CSOs to engage in income-generating activities, all they have to do is to inform the ACSO within 15 days (Article 64(7)).

The new Proclamation amended the cumbersome registration process of civil society. According to Article 57(1), all CSOs are required to register. In addition, the new Proclamation also required the existing CSOs to re-register within a one-year period

after the enactment of the Proclamation. According to the new Proclamation, only foreign CSOs are required to submit their applications along with the work plans. However, local CSOs are not required to submit their work plans. In addition, the new Proclamation made the registration process simple. It requires CSOs to submit basic information and documents including minutes of the formative meeting, a copy of the identity card, name and logo of the organisation, the objectives of the organisation and its intended sector of operation, the region where it intends to operate, the bylaws of the organisation approved by the founders and the organisation's address. Some additional documents are of course, needed for foreign CSOs. Once these conditions are fulfilled, local CSOs are awarded registration certificates within 30 days while 45 days are required for foreign CSOs. As a result, the previous cumbersome registration process was thus amended. In confirmation of this, the Team Leader at the ACSO interviewed on 29 August 2020 argued that:

“Civil society organisations are not required to go to different organisations to register these days”.

Their registration is processed by the ACSO alone. In the process of registration, the only organisation required to be contacted by the ACSO is the Ethiopian Press Agency to get confirmation that the registration name required by the applicant CSO was not given to other CSO.

The new Proclamation has been largely acknowledged for opening up the space for CSOs. This does not guarantee, however, that the Proclamation is absolute and free of problems. According to the Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020:

“The Proclamation was not carefully crafted with clear and sufficient built-in precautions and safeguarding mechanisms. It is good that the government decided to open up the space, recognise civil society as important development partners and reduce the level of mistrust on civil society. However, opening up the space without safeguarding precautions may have unexpected outcomes as there are some civil societies that not only lack a civic conduct but also fail to

govern themselves with appropriate discipline. Some civil society may engage in politically sensitive issues like national security. Such situations may disappoint the already democratically fragile government and may trigger it to narrow down the space for civil society.”

In addition, FGD respondents showed their scepticism about the sustainability of the opened-up space for CSOs given that the political situation is uncertain and unpredictable.

7.2.3.4 A summary

In summary, during the first period the legal environment was outdated and less comprehensive. The laws during the first period were not comprehensive enough to respond to the demands of contemporary CSOs, as it was simply limited to procedural issues related to registration. It was, however, rated better than that of the second period because it was not restrictive in nature. On the other hand, in the second period, particularly the second half of the second period (2009 to 2017), there was a clear proclamation, but it was highly restrictive and the legal context during this period was known to be tight and restrictive particularly to rights-based CSOs. Hence, the conduciveness of the legal framework during the second period was rated less than that of the first and second periods. The legal environment during the third period was labelled as conducive because the new Civil Society Proclamation No. 1113/2011 lifted the restrictions imposed by the preceding Proclamation.

7.2.4 Economic Environment

Economic factors are the contextual factors that deserve attention in the analysis of the context of civil society. The economic context in which CSOs operate is important for effective contribution of civil society to positive social change. A healthy and enabling economic environment would enable CSOs to get the opportunity to make positive contributions. This section, therefore, analyzes the economic context in which civil society have been working in Ethiopia since 1991. The analysis focuses on the

comparison of three periods. Accordingly, Table 7.4 presents the descriptive analysis and comparison of the economic context during the three periods.

Table 7.4: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Result on Economic Context

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Percentiles		
		25th	50th (Median)	75th
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	200	2.0000	2.5000	2.7500
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	200	2.5000	3.2500	3.2500
Period 3 (2018 - to date)	200	2.2500	2.5000	2.5000

Friedman Test

Ranks	
	Mean Rank
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	1.60
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	2.87
Period 3 (2018 – to date)	1.53

Test Statistics ^a	
N	200
Chi-Square	261.152
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. Friedman Test

Test Statistics ^a			
	Period 2- Period 1	Period 3 - Period 1	Period 3 - Period 2
Z	-12.936 ^b	-5.152 ^c	-10.656 ^c
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks

c. Based on negative ranks

Source: Computed from survey data (2021)

The results from questionnaire in Table 7.4 indicate that there was a statistically significant difference in economic environment across the three periods, $\chi^2 (2, N = 200) = 261.152, p < .001$, level of significance at $\alpha = 0.05$. Analysis of the median values revealed a decrease in economic context from Period 1 ($Md = 2.50$) to Period 2 ($Md = 3.25$) and an increase in Period 3 ($Md = 2.50$). Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level of $p < 0.017$. There were significant differences between Period 1 and 2 ($Z = -12.936, p < .001$), Period 1 and 3 ($Z = -5.152, p < .001$) and Period 2 and 3 ($Z = -10.656, p < .001$).

The above results show that the differences between the medians are statistically significant. The median value of the first period is lower than that of the second period but similar to the third period. This implies that the economic environment in which CSOs were operating was less conducive during the first and the third period but was relatively better during the second period. There are various factors responsible for rating the economic environment of the first period as less conducive for CSOs. First, before the EPRDF period, the country endured 17 years of civil war between the socialist military *Derg* and the TPLF-guided rebel group due to which the country was in a devastating economic situation. By the time the EPRDF came to power after defeating the *Derg* regime, as discussed in Chapter 4, it took over an already economically damaged country. The economic adverse effect of the 17-year war continued to affect the country until the new government could stabilise the economic and political situation of the country.

7.2.4.1 The first period

During the first period, the country remained economically inactive because the government itself was not ideologically clear especially at the beginning and was not able to put in place institutional and macroeconomic policies immediately. Hence, it had to take time to devise such policies to put the economy of the country on track. To this end, during the first period the government was busy devising various economic policies including Agriculture Development Led-Industrialisation (ADLI) and rural development

policy and strategy which were materialised only in the second period (Executive Manager at the IAG interviewed on 1 August 2020; Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020). Even though CSOs were able to work because they were provided with open space and freedom to mobilise financial resources from internal and external sources, the overall stagnant and less vibrant internal economy of the country created a less enabling economic environment. The Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020 reported that:

“Of course, there were changes in economic path from the command economic system of the military regime to market-oriented system. However, this change could not bring immediate difference in economic performance in the short term. This situation coupled with the Ethio-Eritrean war from 1998-2000, which consumed huge resources of the country, made it the internal economic environment less enabling for civil society.”

Hence, the internal economic environment was not enabling for CSOs. Yet, CSOs could do some jobs on both rights and non-rights-based issues by using foreign funds that they could freely mobilise without restriction.

7.2.4.2 The second period

According to the data in Table 7.4, the economic environment during the second period was better than that of the Period 1 and 3. As acknowledged by the UNDP (2014:2), WB Group (2015) and Ncube et al. (2010:1), this was due to the double-digit economic growth rate registered in the country (i.e., around 10.9 percent per annum from 2005 to 2015). During the second period, the country was in a relatively stable economic state where institutional and economic infrastructure was not only established but also functioning well at least as a growing economy. As a result, the entire economy of the country was stimulated. This created a favourable economic environment for all actors working in the country including CSOs.

However, it is hard to deny that this favourable economic environment during the second period was compromised by political patronage, economic sabotage and

favouritism. The economy was not operating on a competitive basis. According to Tefera (2019:484), this is because few business elites, mainly from one ethnic group of Tigray Region, had access to economic resources through strong patronage backed by the TPLF-affiliated political elites from the same ethnic group. These political elites were motivated by the economic benefits they gained for their own personal use. This patronage-based economic sabotage made it difficult for the economy to operate on a competitive base and hence rent-seeking became a prevalent characteristic of the system. In support of this, Yinebeb (2018:12) argued that one of the critical problems of the economy was undue intervention of the government and party-affiliated businesses in the economy. The economic sabotage was committed through not only the network and patronage of political elites and business elites, but through well-established government-affiliated businesses including the Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC). In addition to this, the TPLF had a trading wing known as EFFORT through which it enforced economic sabotage. This entity was not subject to audit even though, according to Vaughan and Mesfin (2011), it had control over multi-billion Ethiopian Birr (ETB) in 2010, amounting to 2.7 billion Birr in capital and 6 billion ETB in assets. Hence, although the economic environment during the second period was considered and rated as enabling due to the awakening of the economic system and the recorded double-digit economic growth, the economic sabotage coupled with the global economic and financial crises in 2007 and 2008 limited the work of CSOs during the second period.

7.2.4.3 The third period

As indicated in Table 7.4, the conduciveness of the economic environment during the third period was similar to that of the first period but it was less than that of the second period. The public upheavals against the TPLF-led government were concluded by the removal of the TPLF from power in 2018. The TPLF-dominated government was replaced by Prime Minister Abiy's Administration, which took over an economy that was weakened and had suffered from the consequence of TPLF's economic sabotage. Along with its removal from power, TPLF removed all the resources and monies of the country through the channel of its Trojan horse business entities like EFFORT and

accumulated them in foreign banks. Because of this problem coupled with the conflict in the northern part of the country, the new administration of Prime Minister Abiy faced a serious challenge to revive the economic system. Hence, although the government allows CSOs to operate freely, they are constrained by the weak internal economic situation and donors' hesitation to provide funds due to security problems in the country.

7.2.4.4 A summary

In summary, during the first period, the economic environment was less enabling due to the inactive and stagnant nature of the economy. However, CSOs were able to work by accessing financial resources from abroad drawing on the advantages gained from the opening up of civic space. During the second period, the economic environment was better because of the double-digit economic growth registered in the country and the awakening of the economy in general. However, the political patronage and economic sabotage compromised and hijacked the favourable economic environment. The third period was characterised by a less enabling economic environment because the country could not quickly overcome the consequence of the economic sabotage of the TPLF, and the political chaos and insecurity in the country disrupted the healthy functioning of the country's economy.

A contextual analysis of civil society is essential as it helps to establish an understanding of CSOs' role in development and governance. The preceding analysis, therefore, provided a high-level picture of the external context in which CSOs have been operating focusing on ideological, political, legal and economic environments. The following section dwells on the analysis of the internal context or capacity of CSOs, which in a way, is a reflection of the external context but has significant implications for the extent of CSOs' contribution to development and governance.

7.3 INTERNAL CONTEXT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE POST-1991 ETHIOPIA

One of the factors that determine the role of civil society on development and governance is the internal capacity of CSOs related to human, financial and physical

capital. To this end, this section analyses the internal context of CSOs as a precondition for the analysis and understanding of their role in development and governance. Table 7.5 presents the result of the analysis on the internal context of CSOs.

Table 7.5: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Result on Internal Context

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Percentiles		
		25th	50th (Median)	75th
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	200	3.7500	4.0000	4.2500
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	200	1.5000	2.0000	2.0000
Period 3 (2018 - to date)	200	3.0000	3.0000	4.0000

Friedman Test

Ranks	
	Mean Rank
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	2.73
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	1.00
Period 3 (2018 – to date)	2.27

Test Statistics ^a	
N	200
Chi-Square	321.160
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. Friedman Test

Test Statistics ^a			
	Period 2- Period 1	Period 3 - Period 1	Period 3 - Period 2
Z	-12.480 ^b	-10.537 ^b	-12.363 ^c
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks

c. Based on negative ranks

Source: Computed from survey data (2021)

Like the preceding sections, the analysis of internal context of civil society relies on the comparative analysis of the three periods. First, the result of quantitative data was presented (see Table 7.5 comparing the three periods followed by the interpretation of the data in the table. Next, further analysis and discussion were made based on the data obtained from qualitative sources.

The results in Table 7.5 indicates that there was a statistically significant difference in internal capacity across the three periods, $\chi^2 (2, N = 200) = 321.160, p < .001$, level of significance at $\alpha = 0.05$. Analysis of the median values revealed a decrease in internal capacity from Period 1 ($Md = 4$) to Period 2 ($Md = 2$) and an increase at Period 3 ($Md = 3$). Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.017$. There were significant differences between Period 1 and 2 ($Z = -12.480, p < .001$, Period 1 and 3 ($Z = -10.537, p < .001$) and Period 2 and 3 ($Z = -12.363, p < .001$).

The above results show that the difference between the medians is statistically significant. The high median and mean ranking values of Period 1, followed by Period 3 in Table 7.5 revealed that the internal capacity of CSOs from the perspective of human, financial and physical capital was better in these two periods. On the contrary, the low median and mean ranking value of Period 2 reveals the internal capacity of civil society was low during this period. There are different explanations for these findings.

7.3.1 The First Period

7.3.1.1 Financial resources

During the first period, civil society had a better access to financial resources. There was free access to local and international funds during the first period because the government did not have an intention to restrict the financial access of civil society through legal and any other means. According to FGD respondents, “Unless their own resource mobilisation capacity limits them, civil society organisations were free to access all available domestic and international sources of funds.”

This period was the time when the first formal plan of the country, known as Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP) (OECD 2020), was implemented in Ethiopia since the EPRDF had come into power in 1991. In the process of the designing and preparation of the plan, western countries provided immense support to the government, which indicates that the government was in a good relationship with western governments. Hence, western donor agencies including the WB and the IMF were willing to support local and international civil society, which opened up a door of opportunity for CSOs to access funds. Due to the relatively stable global economic environment, donors were in a good position to provide funds to CSOs in Ethiopia in a sustainable manner. CSOs could access funds with minimal effort. These donors were interested in making the PRSP more participatory and they, thus, wanted to support and involve CSOs in the process. Therefore, during the first period, CSOs had a good opportunity to access foreign funds, which enabled them to strengthen themselves internally in terms of financial capacity.

7.3.1.2 Human capital resources

With regard to human capital, the status of CSOs was better. CSOs had adequate administrative, technical and professional staff. According to the Programme Coordinator at Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) interviewed on 25 August 2020, one of the reasons behind is that:

“the salary and various benefits provided by civil society were attractive compared to public and even some private organisations which made it possible for civil societies to attract relatively competent human resource.”

The salary and other incentive packages were attractive during the first period because CSOs were free to use funds granted by donors without restriction from the government. The government did not impose any restriction in terms of what proportion of funds should be used for administrative purposes. Hence, CSOs were able to provide attractive benefit packages that attracted competent citizens. This situation enabled CSOs not only to attract a competent workforce but also retain them. According to the Programme Specialist at FFS interviewed on 19 August 2020:

“workers who join civil society tend to work for long period because the benefits in other sectors were not attractive. Payment in the public sector, as everyone knows, is very low. In addition, the private sector was not developed and had no capacity to attract and absorb competent workforce particularly during the early time of the first period”.

Furthermore, the working environment and facilities of civil society were also attractive. Employees spent much of their times on fieldwork with flashy vehicles and attractive allowances. They were also exposed to various experiences through travel and participation in different workshops within and outside the country. Therefore, professionals considered CSOs as preferable places to work in. To this end, according to the response of FGD participants:

“Even some of the prominent professors were fired from Addis Ababa University by Meles Zenawi’s administration just because of their political attitude, joined and worked for civil society during the first period. In addition, competent professionals from the previous military regime also joined civil society.”

Hence, during the first period, in relative terms, CSOs were qualitatively and quantitatively capable in terms of human resources capacity because they could attract and retain the best minds by paying attractive salaries and incentives.

7.3.1.3 Physical capital

With respect to the physical capital of CSOs during the first period, they were in a better condition. Buildings and vehicles are among examples of physical capital. In relation to buildings, some CSOs including EEA, FSS and CCRDA were able to build their own building during the first period (Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020; Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020). In addition, interviewees pointed out that, vehicles are one of the resources that facilitate the work of CSOs. CSOs had vehicles because donors provided them in the form of support, and they usually would not take them away. In addition, because no restrictions were imposed on CSOs by the government as to how to use the funds they received

from donors, CSOs could purchase vehicles. Hence, the Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020 indicated that:

“In terms of financial, human and physical capital the first period was a golden age.”

7.3.1.4 A summary

The above discussion reveals that the opening up of civic space and freedom of CSOs during the first period enabled them to have better financial, human and physical capital. However, it is important to point out here that the opened space and free access of CSOs to funds coupled with government’s loose regulatory capacity, created a door of opportunity for some CSOs to misuse and abuse resources mobilised in the name of poor citizens. This was likely because most civil society lack internal auditing system, self-evaluation mechanism and accountability system. FGD respondents indicated that:

“There were incidents where some civil society failed to report the funds they obtained from donors, an action which created a loophole for abuse and misuse of resources. In such situations where resources obtained by civil society from various sources were not scrutinised, the possibility for using resources for personal gain instead of using it for the intended purpose would be high. In many incidents, civil society used large proportion of their budget for administrative purposes, which are prone to abuses of resources, while only small proportion was used for the main programme activities. Procurement procedures of some civil society were also less transparent and it was exposed to malpractices and abuse of resources.”

According to the Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020:

“Donors who provided funds were geographically distant and remotely located from civil society. Consequently, they were not able to appear in person and undertake evaluations in most cases. Even when they were able to do so, their evaluation was mainly output oriented and they were not interested in the

process through which resources were being utilised. In most cases, donors' monitoring yardstick did not match with the country's monitoring and evaluation process."

Therefore, the concern of accountability, transparency and value for money seemed to be underestimated.

In addition to abuse of resources, abuse of employee's rights through favouritism was one of the manifestations of malpractices in CSOs during the first period. The payments and benefits were attractive, as discussed above. However, according to the Programme Coordinator at Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) interviewed on 25 August 2020:

"Staff in many civil societies were required to be generalists and were supposed to handle multiple tasks, which made them overburdened and stressed. When they are stressed, it is likely that they fail to meet deadlines and deliver quality outcome. Some unethical officials of civil society tend to use such loopholes to fire employees and filled the vacant positions through kickbacks and bribes."

Hence, employees in some CSOs did not enjoy tenure guarantee. This problem mainly emanated from lack of internal accountability systems. In this regard, the Programme Manager at LPI interviewed on 3 August 2020 and the Programme Manager at IAG interviewed on 4 August 2020 indicated that:

"In some civil society there were incidences where a given individual remains in the Executive Director position for about twenty years. This situation implies that there was lack of democratic culture and ethos and lack of accountability within some civil society, if not all."

7.3.2 The Second Period

7.3.2.1 Financial resources

During the second period, the financial capital of CSOs declined considerably. This was more serious for CSOs working on rights-based issues. The access of CSOs to foreign funds was restricted by law, which contributed to the decline of the financial capital of CSOs which are donor-dependent. When their access to donor funds is restricted, their financial capacity is curtailed significantly. Hence, the action that was taken by the government to restrict CSOs' access to foreign funds through the principle of 90:10 adversely affected most CSOs' financial capacity, particularly rights-based CSOs. The 90:10 principles were indicated in Article 2.2 of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 which restricted the then Ethiopian charities and societies from receiving more than 10% of their budget from foreign donors. In other words, according to Gebre (2016:18), the legislation required Ethiopian charities and societies to generate 90% of their budget from domestic sources, through members' contribution, public collections, income-generation activities and private donations.

Even though self-reliance through income-generation and similar activities is worthwhile to ensure the independence of CSOs from donors, the existing situation on the ground did not provide them with fertile ground to do so, at least in the short run. This was because CSOs not only lacked business skills and knowhow to compete in the market but the market system itself was also spoiled and hijacked by rent-seekers. Despite financially capable and resourceful local private organisations in the country, they did not tend to lend a hand to voluntary organisations due to a poor giving culture of private businesses. In this regard, Yeshanew (2012:373) argued that it is difficult for CSOs to exist and operate without donor funds in poor countries like Ethiopia. Let alone civil society, he argued, the government itself is not able to function and respond to the demand of citizens without donor funds and support.

The access of civil society to foreign donor funds was categorised and determined in terms of their areas of intervention. According to the new Civil Society Organisation

Proclamation No. 1113/2019, CSOs working on service delivery and development were allowed to access foreign funds, and if the funds were for service delivery and development purposes, they could mobilise and use 100% of the funds obtained from abroad. However, for rights-based CSOs, it was different. Since their entire objective was focusing on rights-based issues, which the government was not happy with, they were not allowed to generate and use more than 10% of their budget obtained from abroad. This was just equivalent to a complete denial of CSOs' access to donor funds from abroad. Hence, they did not have the incentive and motivation to mobilise funds from abroad if they could not use them. This restriction, therefore, considerably affected the financial capital, the identity as well as the fate of CSOs.

As mentioned in the above paragraph, during the second period, donors were interested in funding rights-based CSOs rather than service delivery-oriented ones. They wanted to romanticise the agenda of rights than anything else in the country at that time. They wanted to support emerging democracies and install democratic culture and ethos as democratic and human rights were at an infant stage in the country. They thought that service delivery, be it social or others, was the responsibility of the government. Hence, even though the government did not intend to discourage funds for service-delivery-oriented civil society, due to donors' poor interest and appetite for funding service-delivery CSOs, their access to funds was limited. Hence, during the second period, even though government did not limit access to funding for service delivery-oriented CSOs, they could not practically access it. Hence, they were also not able to have adequate financial capital.

In terms of encouraging civil society to be financially self-reliant and donor independent, Article 103 of the Charities and Proclamation No. 621/2009 allowed civil society in the country to engage in income-generating activities. This was possible only upon a written approval of the ACSO and fulfillment of all licence and registration procedures applied to trade and investment activities (Article 103 (1) (3)). Even though CSOs were allowed to engage in income-generating activities, the proclamation prohibited them from engaging in business areas that were not directly relevant to their operational areas and

purposes. Article 103(1) of the proclamation put this as “Charities and Societies may [...] engage in income generating activities that are identical to the achievement of their purposes”. This provision was practically restrictive and prohibitive because, for rights-based CSOs, it was not easy to establish successful and profitable businesses related to their objectives of rights including human and democratic rights. Hence, CSOs, in addition to lack of business skill and knowhow, were restricted by this provision to engage in businesses and generate income.

7.3.2.2 Human capital resources

Regarding the human capital during the second period, one can understand that restricted access to financial resources would in turn adversely affect the human capital of any organisation. This is true because when an organisation is financially impaired, it does not have the ability to hire competent and capable human resources. Hence, CSOs were not in a good state in terms of human capital during the second period and the internal capacity of many CSOs deteriorated. Due to the hostile environment and poor financial capital, CSOs, particularly those working on rights-based issues, were compelled to lay off their employees due to closure. CSOs that decided to shift their areas of operation instead of closure were also obliged to lay off their workforce, particularly professionals, because the field of study and professions of these staff were no longer commensurate with the new area of operation to which the organisations shifted. The previously attractive payments and various benefits faded. The enforcement of 70:30 principle, Article 88(1) of the proclamation, which required CSOs to use only 30% of their budget to cover administrative costs while 70% was to be used for the main purpose for which the organisation was established was also another obstacle for human capital. Ideally, this principle was acceptable since the intention was to force CSOs to use more of their budgets to achieve their goals. However, 30% of their budget could not cover the administrative costs of CSOs such as house rent, salary, fringe benefits, fieldwork and related allowances and fuel, office equipment and vehicles. In order to meet the 70:30 requirement, CSOs had to cut administrative costs

such as salaries, allowances and fringe benefits and this ultimately affected their human capital status.

As a result of restricted access of civil society to foreign funds, the work environment did not remain as attractive as the first period. Consequently, they could not hire and retain the best minds (Sisay 2012:375-376). CSOs, particularly the local ones, were obliged to hire poorly capacitated employees who did not have adequate knowledge and skill of programme management and project planning and management. Workers lacked lobbying, communication, project proposal and report writing and interpersonal skills. The work of CSOs by virtue of its nature requires the above skills. The quality of the output delivered by such poor human power was poor. In this regard, the Executive Director at the GGA interviewed on 6 August 2020 and the Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 argued that:

“Lack of capacity and skills was the manifestation of the education system introduced by the EPRDF. Workers of civil society as well as the bureaucracy and the private sector were all the product of the education system that failed to capacitate citizens. Citizens carry bachelor and master’s degrees but they lacked the required capacity to deliver.”

Turnover was also one of the factors that adversely affected human capital in addition to the less attractive work environment. As a natural trend, after working for local civil society and getting some experience, employees aspired to join national level CSOs, then regional/sub-continental, and finally international level CSOs. This also holds true, as argued by Dessalegn (2008:120) in terms of mobility from rural to urban contexts. Although it is commendable from a career development point of view, this aspiration of vertical mobility had the potential to affect the human capital status of CSOs adversely, particularly the local ones. Hence, even though the problem of vertical mobility due to employee’s aspiration is similar as a natural process in all the three periods considered in this study, it augmented the already spoiled human capital situation of the second period.

7.3.2.3 Physical capital

The effect of CSOs restriction to financial resources again adversely affected the physical capital status of civil society. It is clear that financially impaired organisations cannot conduct their basic activities let alone purchasing vehicles, supply office equipment and technological facilities and own their own buildings. The Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 and Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020 pointed out that:

“Only those who were smart enough in terms of effectively and manner fully utilising the funds accessed during the first period could manage to own and retain fixed assets including buildings during the second period too. Particularly, those who built their own building during the first period used it as a means of survival during the harsh and restrictive period because they could generate income by renting portion of their building (e.g., ECA, FSS, CCRDA).”

The principle of 70:30 also played substantial role in prohibiting CSOs from having properties and fixed asset during the second period. Hence, they had weak physical capital status.

7.3.2.4 A summary

The above analysis on the second period revealed that CSOs were not doing well in terms of financial, human and physical capital. Particularly the restriction imposed on civil society in relation to access to foreign funds, which consequently affected their human and physical capital, triggered some unethical practices. In this regard, FGD respondents pointed out that:

“Some civil society bribed the Agency’s officials and officers to violate the 90:10 and 70:30 restrictive principles. In terms of enforcing these principles, the Agency’s approach was rigid and control-oriented. However, there were incidents where civil society bribed the Agency’s personnel to bypass these principles. In some cases, nonformal and even illicit mechanisms prevailed over the formal work procedure to bypass the restriction. To this end, few civil societies could

use more than 30 percent of their funds for administrative purposes through bribe. This situation occurred not only because some civil society wanted to bribe but also because there was an interest from some of the Agency's officials and personnel side to maximise their own personal gain through bribe."

Some people tried to argue for the restrictive approach assuming that it played an essential role in shaping the behaviour of some unethical civil society. The analysis of the second period, however, provided an insight that the cumulative effect of the restrictive approach affected not only CSOs' financial, human and physical capital status but also, in some instances, it triggered bribes and unethical behaviour.

7.3.3 The Third Period

The internal capacity of civil society during the third period was better compared than the second period but lower than that of the first period.

7.3.3.1 Financial resources

When we look at the internal capacity from the financial capital perspective, during the third period, CSOs are allowed to access funds from abroad without restriction. They can use 100% of the funds generated from foreign sources. In other words, the fact that the restrictive law of 90:10 was lifted (Article 63(c)) by the new proclamation of civil society, re-energised most of the CSOs. New CSOs are proliferating not only in the area of service delivery but also in rights-based issues. The withdrawal of the restrictive proclamation also attracted the attention of donor agencies. In this regard, the Programme Manager at the PDC interviewed on 11 August 2020 and the Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 argued that:

"Donor agencies have shown some interest and appetite to provide funds to civil society in the country. Although they have been a bit suspicious about the sustainability of the open space and worried about unstable political situation and security problems in the country, some donors have started to come with the funds. Recently, donors seem to be interested to provide funds to civil society

working in the health sector to fight against COVID-19, humanitarian interventions due to escalated conflict and security problem, and migration due to internal displacement. The opening up of civic space and the enabling legal environment that allowed unconditional access of civil society to internal and external financial sources re-energised civil society, although some civil society still seem unconfident about the sustainability of such enabling environment due to the political instability and insecurity in the country.”

However, it is too early to judge the outcomes of the changes during the third period objectively because it is only three years since the enabling environment has been put in place.

While the former law restricted the involvement of CSOs in any business endeavour that did not directly relate to their area of operation and objectives, the current law (Article 63 (1)(a); Article (64)(1)) allows CSOs to engage in any kind of income-generating activities irrespective of their relationship with their areas of operation and objectives. Allowing CSOs to engage in income-generating activities without limiting the area of business has two benefits. First, it strengthens the almost non-existing or loose horizontal relationship between CSOs and the business sector. Horizontal linkage between CSOs and the private sector helps to cultivate a giving culture, sharing of information, knowledge and resources. It helps them to get to know each other and work in collaboration on areas where their objectives intersect. One of the typical cases in point where the objectives of the two intersect is corporate social responsibility. Second, it reduces the extent of financial dependence of CSOs on donors. Donor dependence affects the freedom and independence of CSOs. Donors usually take the upper hand, and they want CSOs to obey them and behave in accordance with their interests. Sometimes donors impose conditions on CSOs that may not be commensurate with the purposes of the CSOs as well as their constituencies. In such cases, conflicts of interest may occur and CSOs would find themselves at a crossroad because, on one hand, they have to meet the requirements of donors and, on the other hand, they need to meet the expectations of their constituencies. If they fail to obey donor agencies, it is likely that

they would not be given a second opportunity of getting access to funds. If they fail to meet the expectations of their constituencies, they would be mistrusted (Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020; Project Coordinator at the EEA interviewed on 8 August 2020; Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020). Hence, during the third period, the new law allows CSOs to engage in any business activities without restriction with the intention of encouraging them to be financially self-reliant and reducing the dependency syndrome.

The current government has also made some efforts to support CSOs in financial terms. In this regard, the Programme Manager at the PDC interviewed on 11 August 2020 pointed out that:

“The government has provided seed money to civil society in order to fill the fund gap that has occurred due to COVID-19. It requested civil society to provide proposals on pressing social issues such as health based on which it provided financial support to civil society who are working in the surroundings of Addis Ababa. This is just one of the manifestations of government’s intention to provide financial support to civil society.”

7.3.3.2 Human capital resources

In terms of human capital during the third period, the new proclamation allowed CSOs to cover their administrative costs in a better way than the second period. The Project Manager at Humanity and Inclusion interviewed on 14 August 2020 indicated that the removal of the restrictive rules has created opportunities for CSOs to not only attract and hire a new workforce but also motivate the existing staff. This is because they could improve the remunerations they provide to their workforce due to the relative improvements in terms of accessing financial sources compared to the previous restrictive period.

Even though CSOs have already started to hire new workforces, the problem of quality still exists. FGD respondents indicated that:

“employees of civil society lack the required skill and competence even during the third period. This is again attributable mainly to the education system of the EPRDF regime, which failed to produce capable and competent work force. When the education quality fails holistically, it may be possible to produce large quantity of graduates but with poor quality. Most of the graduates of local universities who are joining civil society lack the capacity to deliver because they are the outputs of the poor-quality education system in the country.”

Even though the current government has introduced a new educational roadmap to address this problem, the impact is yet to be seen. In order to address the problem of a quality workforce, the new proclamation (Article 76(3)) granted CSOs the right to hire foreign nationals and perform technical and professional activities that cannot be performed by Ethiopians. Hence, from the above analysis one can sense that the new law has relaxed the restrictive provisions in the former law, which to some extent has begun to positively affect the human capital status of CSOs during the third period.

7.3.3.3 Physical capital

In terms of physical capital during the third period, CSOs are striving to exploit all the opportunities created for them due to the opening up of the civic space. The Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 indicated that:

“Even though there is no significant change from the second period in terms of possessing physical assets like buildings, some civil society organizations, due to the relatively improved access to funds, have enhanced their internal work environment by renting better offices and purchasing office equipment.”

FGD respondents also pointed out that:

“Now, civil society organisations have hopes and opportunities. If the current enabling situation is properly enforced and its sustainability is ensured, then the future is bright for civil society. Civil society can generate more income through various mechanisms including accessing funds from donors and engaging in various income generating activities which will enable them to possess their own

physical assets including buildings, vehicles, adequate office equipment, and technological facilities.”

Availability of physical capital is not an end in itself but is a means to an end. CSOs would not be able to discharge their responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner in the absence of the physical capital.

7.3.3.4 A summary

Some improvements discussed above in terms of the financial, human and physical capital status of CSOs were observed because of the smooth and enabling situations created by the new proclamation. Even though the enabling environment is an opportunity for CSOs to nurture and contribute more, it is equally important to establish, less restrictive but sound safeguarding precautions to promote accountability and prevent misuse and abuse of resources. Instead of putting a sound and reasonable safeguarding and regulatory mechanisms in place, the proclamation suggests that CSOs should create a self-regulatory system (Article 5(6)) and regulate themselves. Opening up the space without clear and sound safeguarding precautions may have unexpected outcomes particularly when it comes to CSOs whose integrity and moral values are questionable. In commenting on this issue, the Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020 pointed out that:

“The need for ensuring the freedom of civil society is unquestionable. However, while formulating the current proclamation, it seems that the government was politically motivated in reaction to the previous law and took an extreme step. The proclamation does not have sufficient built-in safeguarding mechanisms to make civil society a useful ally in development. It has given civil society unlimited and extreme freedom, which could create a wide loophole for misuse and abuse of their responsibilities, resources and authority.”

Both highly restrictive proclamations and extremely relaxed proclamation like the current one have disadvantages. Hence, maintaining some balance between the two extremes is required.

7.4 CONCLUSION

To conclude, in the preceding sections of the chapter, the external and internal context of civil society was analysed. From the analysis, it was shown that the external environment from the ideological point of view during the first and third periods were conducive while the second period was less conducive for the operation of civil society. Likewise external context from the political and legal point of view during the first and third period was found to be conducive while it was less conducive during the second period. Contrary to the political and legal environment, the economic environment was less enabling during the first and the third periods while it was better during the second period. Regarding the internal context, the analysis in this section revealed that during the first period the internal capacity of CSOs in terms of financial, human and physical capital was in a better state compared to the second and the third periods. This was possible because CSOs were working in a free environment where they were able not only to generate all kinds of resources from within and outside the country without restriction but also engage in any area of operation. During the second period, however, CSOs, especially, those working on rights-based issues were under a huge pressure due to the restrictive legal framework, which limited their access to foreign funds. This, in turn, weakened CSOs in terms of financial, human and physical capital. During the third period, CSOs regained their freedom because of the amendment of the restrictive proclamation. The new proclamation allows CSOs to freely access funds at their disposal from within and outside the country without restriction. This situation has created a new hope for CSOs to re-energise themselves. Hence, some improvements have begun to be seen in terms of financial, human and physical capital. The next chapter pays attention to the role of civil society in development and governance in post-1991 Ethiopia and specifically focuses on advocacy, service delivery and watchdogging role of civil society.

CHAPTER 8: ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN POST-1991 ETHIOPIA

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the role of civil society in development and governance of the country. The analysis of the formal civil society was made focusing on what Cooper (2018:9-10) identified as the three major roles of civil society, namely advocacy, watchdogging and service delivery and based on the three periods considered in this study (i.e., 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date). To examine the contribution of civil society, it is hypothesised that the contributions of civil society in advocacy, service delivery, and watchdogging vary significantly across the three different periods. In each sub-section of this chapter, the results of questionnaire-based quantitative data are presented using Freidman's ANOVA followed by further analysis and discussion based on the qualitative data obtained from document review, interviews and FGD. In addition to the analysis of the formal civil society, the role of non-formal or traditional organisations in development and governance was also addressed at the end of this chapter focusing on *Iddir*, which is one of the non-formal institutions in Ethiopia. Data from interviews and FGD was used to analyse the role of *Iddir*.

8.2 ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ADVOCACY

In terms of advocacy, civil society plays various roles. In this regard, they raise the awareness level of citizens on issues and decisions that affect their life directly or indirectly. It also challenges the existing unfavourable situations and advocates for change representing the voiceless and the marginalised groups (Cooper 2018:9; Kreienkamp 2017:6; WEF 2013:9). According to Broeckhoven et al. (2021:53), CSOs takes part in the process of laws and policy development. CSOs represent and air the concerns of the voiceless and marginalised segment of the society. Sisay (2012:370) argued that following the third wave of democratisation in the 1990s, CSOs played various roles in developing countries in terms of advocating for peace, human rights and democratic rights.

The advocacy role of CSOs is manifested in terms of promoting human and democratic rights (freedom of assembly, association and expression, freedom of accessing and disseminating information), policy influence and lobbying, conflict management and peacebuilding, to mention but few. Table 8.1 presents descriptive analysis and comparison of the advocacy role of civil societies during the three periods.

Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Result on Advocacy

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Percentiles		
		25th	50th (Median)	75th
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	200	3.1667	3.8333	4.1667
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	200	1.0000	1.1667	1.5000
Period 3 (2018 - to date)	200	3.1667	3.3333	3.5000

Friedman Test

Ranks	
	Mean Rank
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	2.74
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	1.00
Period 3 (2018 – to date)	2.27

Test Statistics ^a	
N	200
Chi-Square	322.090
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. Friedman Test

Test Statistics ^a			
	Period 2- Period 1	Period 3 - Period 1	Period 3 - Period 2
Z	-12.363 ^b	-10.603 ^b	-12.546 ^c
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks

c. Based on negative ranks

Source: Computed from survey data (2021)

The results in Table 8.1 indicate that there was a statistically significant difference in advocacy across the three periods (1991 – 2004, 2005 – 2017, and 2018 to date), χ^2 (2, $N = 200$) = 322.090, $p < .001$, level of significance at $\alpha = 0.05$. Analysis of the median values revealed a decrease in advocacy from Period 1 ($Md = 3.8333$) to Period 2 ($Md = 1.1667$) and then an increase in Period 3 ($Md = 3.3333$). Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.017$. There were significant differences between period 1 and 2 ($Z = -12.363$, $p < .001$), period 1 and 3 ($Z = -10.603$, $p < .001$) and period 2 and 3 ($Z = -12.546$, $p < .001$).

8.2.1 The First Period

As indicated in the above result, and in Table 8.1, advocacy work of civil society during the first period was better than the second and the third periods. CSOs were visible in advocacy-related issues including policy influencing and lobbying, promoting peace and conflict resolution and democracy and human rights aspects. The following paragraphs dwell on the discussion of why the role of CSOs was better in advocacy during the first period, which is followed by the discussion of second and third periods. First, we examine the policy-influencing and lobbying role of CSOs as one of the advocacy perspectives during the first period.

Policy is an instrument through which the government implements its political goals and priorities in practice. In that sense, one can say that the government is a predominant and key player in the process of policy-making, adoption and implementation. Indeed, this is more so in less democratic or autocratic governments where the government plays a predominant role in all aspects. However, a policy cannot be complete in its form and implementation if the views of players other than the government are not incorporated (Hassel 2015). In this regard, capturing the views of CSOs as one of the key players is of paramount importance. This is because CSOs are voluntarily organised around common goals that are of primary importance to the community. Hence, the majority of them have information about the problems and priorities of the community, as they are geographically proximate to the community. CSOs are believed

to influence the policy-making process by being involved at all stages of policy. Mukamunana and Brynard (2005:667) and Putnam (1993:101) argued that CSOs, especially in a democratic context, are considered as a means through which citizens can be involved in all the processes of policy-making including problem identification and prioritisation, policy formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. In addition, as argued by Cangas (2004:2), CSOs work to reaffirm the legitimate rights of citizens and help citizens to demand and put pressure upon the state. They also mobilise citizens and disadvantaged groups through civic education and help them enter into the zone where policy dialogues are undertaken, and political decisions are made.

To bring about changes in policy, civil society influences the political process and the bureaucracy through persuasion and dialogue. It does so to get issues of citizens on the policy and development agenda of the government, and to influence and shape the content of the policy, monitor and advocate for the policy to be put into practice as planned and influence the how of policy implementation (Cangas 2004:2; Klugman 2000:99; Wagle 1999:531).

In this respect, the Programme Manager at the PDC interviewed on 11 August 2020 reported that:

“During the first period civil society organizations were able to contribute to the development and governance of the country in various perspectives because the space was relatively open. During this period there were several opportunities for civil society including the opened-up space, less control from the government side, and access to funds from abroad. Given the open space created during the first period, civil society were able to engage in policy dialogue and provide policy input, producing research out puts that had policy significance, and preparing platforms for policy dialogue. As a result, the government benefited from the activities of civil society in terms of getting policy inputs, using civil society as a mirror to see itself and improve its weaknesses.”

During the first period, the government had the tendency of observing civil society as an important entity, and hence created a relatively fertile ground for civil society to engage in the policy-making process (Berhanu & Milofsky 2011: ii35). One of the most known CSOs in Ethiopia in terms of influencing policy is the EWLA which contributed to policy in terms of improving the family law, criminal procedures and criminal laws of the country. EWLA exerted as much effort as possible to bring about change in the discriminatory laws against women. To this end, EWLA could influence the government to amend the old Family Law, which was ratified in 1960. In this regard, EWLA made a concerted effort. It prepared and submitted a draft Family Law to the concerned government bodies, and it got the law approved after facing some difficulties (Dessalegn 2002:112). Although they were not as successful as EWLA, EEA, the ETA, labour unions and chambers of commerce were also in the list in terms of struggling for policy improvement (CRDA 2004; Dessalegn, 2002:112, 114; Dessalegn 2008:111; Gedifew 2019:241). Furthermore, organisations such as APAP, Ethiopian Human Rights Council Organisation (EHRCO), OSJE, Confederation of the Ethiopian Trade Union (CETU) immensely contributed in determining policy and legal gaps and lobbied the government for amendment (Beyene 2015:50; Dessalegn 2010:106-116). According to Sisay (2002:10-11), CETU boldly challenged and lobbied the government to reconsider and look for alternatives for employees of public organisations who were laid off due to the implementation of the SAP and the subsequent enforcement of privatisation in the country.

In addition to the above efforts, CSOs played a role in preparing policy dialogue forums on Sustainable Development for Poverty Reduction (SDPR) at national level. In this dialogue forum, they were able not only to bring different stakeholders together but also influenced the incorporation of cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS and environment into the strategy (Gedifew 2019:241). In this regard, Roberts (2019:16), Dessalegn (2010:211) and Yitayew (2010:204) asserted that the formulation of the government's first and second round poverty reduction strategy programmes involved considerable consultation with a large number of state and non-state actors. In support of this, FGD respondents indicated that:

“The engagement of civil society during the first period in terms of helping citizens to understand the importance of participation in policy-making process was significant. They held numerous consultations and discussions with grassroots level people particularly during the formulation process of various national policies and programmes including PRSP, SDPR and PASDEP.”

In addition, CSOs working in pastoralist areas were able to influence the government to incorporate the agendas and interests of pastoralists into the mainstream social and economic policies. Furthermore, they successfully pushed the government to restructure and reform the then Office of Disaster Prevention. In support of this, the Executive Director at the GGA interviewed on 6 August 2020 pointed out that:

“During the first period, civil society could effectively lobby the government to formulate pastoralist policy. In addition, humanitarian and relief related civil society also lobbied the government to scale up the Office of Disaster Prevention to Commission level.”

According to Dessalegn (2008:112), although they were few and lacked adequate experience in the area, some CSOs were also concerned with the preservation of the natural environment. To this end, Broeckhoven et al. (2021:53) argued that civil society in the country promoted for environmental and sustainable development policy reforms as much as they could.

Promotion of democracy and human rights is another aspect of advocacy discussed in this section. By virtue of their nature (i.e., civic), CSOs need to be pro-democracy and promoters of human rights. In this respect, they are expected to bring about changes by means of non-violent mechanisms. Carothers (1999:21) argued that CSOs whose fundamental principles are grounded in pluralism could play an essential role not only in advancing human and democratic rights but also in disciplining the state and ensuring that the interests of citizens are realised. Indeed, the above-mentioned role of CSOs, according to Berhanu (2002:123), Daniel (2019:11), Fowler (2003) and Thang (2013:25-26), is determined by the nature and political philosophy of the state. CSOs can play a positive role when the state considers it as an essential actor and guarantee freedom of

expression. As argued by Sisay (2012:370) and Ibrahim (2015:52), in a conducive and favourable context, CSOs can play an essential role in terms of inculcating democratic attitudes, skills and behaviour and building social capital, moderation of public behaviour, voter education and public debate or discourse on social issues.

In this regard, during the first period, rights-based civil society had relative freedom to engage in democratic process and promotion of human rights in the country. According to Broeckhoven et al. (2021:53), CSOs played a role in representing and voicing the concerns of the marginalised and poor segment of the society. Roberts (2019:14) and Broeckhoven et al. (2021:53) further affirmed that CSOs in the country began to shift their attention from pre-1991 emergency and humanitarian relief orientation to promotion of democratic, human rights and advocacy programmes in the post-1991 period at least until 2004.

According to Dessalegn (2002:109; 2010:211), CSOs were involved in educating voters at national and local levels to ensure a high voters' turnout, enabled citizens to actively participate in the political process, made citizens aware of how to use their ballot box and decide who their leaders should be. He further argued that CSOs, which were working in advocacy, were concerned with the issues of rights, which include civic awareness through civic education, respect for rule of law, and protecting the rights of the marginalised and under-represented segment of the society, mainly women. CSOs were also allowed to observe the election process. In addition, Roberts (2019:12), Yitayew (2010:207) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (2004:7) in its report asserted that during the first period, CSOs participated in elections. They were provided with the opportunity to participate in the political process in a more open and assertive way. Many of them were engaged in observing the election process, voter registration and civic education by organising task forces. Some of the advocacy organisations which, according to Beyene (2015:51), actively engaged in promoting a democratic ethos and values through voter education, election monitoring, promoting the idea of free and fair election include OSJE, APAP, EHRCO, IAG and Chamber of

Commerce. The Executive Manager at the IAG interviewed on 1 August 2020 confirmed that:

“The first period was the period of relative freedom. There was a circumstance in which civil society was allowed to operate freely. The role of civil society was landmark during the first period. Civil society had strong role in all aspects including democracy and human rights without significant discrimination from the government side. Civil society could involve in watching elections and voter education during the election time. This period was a ‘golden age’ in the history of civil society in Ethiopia.”

Some (e.g., Aalen & Tronvell 2009:194) called this period the era of “unprecedented liberalisation”. In line with the arguments of the interviewees, Daniel (2019:11), pointed out that the first period was relatively enabling, which enabled CSOs to make significant contributions to various rights-based activities and development programmes of the country.

Sisay (2002:7-12) presented a list of mechanisms through which CSOs in Ethiopia contributed to the democratic process of the country during the first period. Accordingly, CSOs’ contributions were manifested through advancement of civic education and raising peoples’ awareness, helping people to claim their rights, complementing the role of the government in the democratisation process, challenging and reforming the state, conflict resolution and peace-building, monitoring democratic process and promoting fair and democratic election, promoting rule of law and monitoring violations of rights.

With regard to human rights, although civic space was opened up and relative human and democratic rights including freedom of expression was ensured, few cases of human rights violations were also reported during the first period of the EPRDF regime (Dessalegn 2002:114). In such a scenario, the existence of strong human rights-oriented civil society is of paramount importance to protect citizens and ensure the protection of human rights. Organisations like the EHRCO, which was established in 1991, worked in disclosing human rights violations. EHRCO was the only visible human rights focused CSO in the country until the mid-1990s even though the number of

human rights-based organisations increased thereafter. According to HRCO (cited in Daniel 2019:14), in addition to reporting the cases of human rights violations, the EHRCO strived to provide education and held various workshops and seminars on the agenda of human rights with the intention of raising awareness of citizens on international and national human rights standards, citizens' rights and obligations. In this regard, FGD participants asserted that:

“Even though there was only limited number of civil society in 1990s, civil society working on the issues of human rights played essential roles in disclosing human rights violations including extra judicial killings, tortures, disappearances and illegal detentions of citizens and deportations of Eritreans.”

According to Roberts (2019:27) in the first period, in Ethiopia CSOs were focusing on rights issues. Donors were also interested and inclined towards funding CSOs working on rights issues. Issues of human rights and equality were romanticised areas for both civil society and donors. Hence, CSOs working on the agenda of human rights and equality were eagle-eyed about any violation of rights. As pointed out by Sisay (2002:9), EWLA, for instance, stood for women whose rights were violated through the acts of rape, abduction, domestic violence, property inheritance, employment contracts and the like. It did so by establishing legal services, which provides legal advice to women victims and calling for public resistance against violations against women. In addition, APAP established grassroots level associations working on human rights. It supported them in financial and technical terms so that they could provide legal aid services to citizens in their respective areas.

Another area of civil society advocacy role considered in this study is conflict resolution and peace-building. Conflict resolution and peace-building require the involvement and cooperation of various actors ranging from individual citizens to state institutions (Aulin 2017:15). To this end, civil society is one of the essential entities in conflict resolution and peace-building. It plays an important role in this regard by working with the local community, elderly people, non-formal societal institutions and formal state institutions. According to Sisay (2002:11), in Ethiopia, during the first period, there were a handful of

CSOs working in conflict resolution and peace-building believing that peace and development are the two sides of the same coin; one cannot exist without the other. Among these CSOs, who played roles in addressing conflict and promoting peace, PDC and IAG were the most visible ones. They played vital roles in terms of preventing and addressing conflicts among diversified groups of society in the country and even in the Horn. PDC discharged its responsibilities not only by training citizens on the agenda of conflict and peace but also by establishing a team of elderly people in different parts of the country to identify and address the root causes of conflict. IAG, on its part, also played an essential role in terms of identifying the main causes of conflict and promoting the need for dialogue to resolve it. Some religious institutions did a spectacular job in conflict resolution and advancing peace in the country. In this regard, Beyene (2015:50) asserted that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church Development Interchange Church Commission (EOC-DICAC), the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Eyesus (EECMY-DASC and EMDA (EMDA) were involved in resolving conflicts caused due to differences in religion, ethnicity, and scarcity of resources like grazing land. By doing so, they could manage the escalation of conflict to another level. The Programme Manager at IAG interviewed on 4 August 2020 also asserted that, “During the first period, civil society played significant role in conflict resolution in Somali and Oromia regions. They were also key players in resolving conflicts among the local community in Southern Omo, Borena, and Gambella border areas.”

8.2.2 The Second Period

The preceding paragraphs of this section discussed the advocacy role of civil society during the first period. The following paragraphs of this section address the advocacy role of civil society during the second period. As depicted in the quantitative results presented in Table 8.1, the advocacy role of civil society (manifested through policy influencing and lobbying, democratic and human rights and conflict resolution and peace-building) was minimal during the second period compared to the first and the second periods. Now let us see why this was the case.

As argued in Chapter 7, the overall external context of civil society was extremely hostile during the second period. The aggression of the government toward CSOs due to its massive losses in the 2005 election to the opposition political parties created a hostile environment. The positive attitude of the government toward CSOs and the relative smooth relationship between the government and CSOs suddenly turned into inimical right after the 2005 election. This situation made it extremely difficult for CSOs, particularly those who were working on advocacy and rights issues including policy influencing and lobbying, conflict resolution and peace-building, human and democratic rights to contribute their fair share through advocacy.

When we look at the advocacy role of CSOs in terms of policy influencing and lobbying during the second period, their contribution was minimal. According to Broeckhoven et al. (2021:45), rights-based CSOs were in existential threat let alone significantly influencing and lobbying the government for policy changes. The government used various legal instruments and policy tools to silence advocacy and rights-based CSOs. They were under huge political pressure, stigmatisation, characterisation and labelling. For instance, the government tended to label CSOs as pro-opposition parties simply because they engaged in the political development of the country by actively participating in the election process, lobbying the government for policy changes and attempting to make the government and its officials accountable for their actions.

Based on such claims, the government severely hampered the potential of civil society engagement in advocacy including policy influence and lobbying. This was backed by the 2009 restrictive proclamation, which narrowed down the space for CSOs. As stated by Sisay (2012:375-376) and Dupuy, Ron and Prahash (2014:431-432), the proclamation crushed many rights-based CSOs in different ways. While some were wound up and closed, others were compelled to shift their intervention areas to development and service delivery. For instance, while around 17 CSOs and two consortiums shifted their operational areas from rights to development and service delivery, many others terminated their operations.

According to Roberts (2019:25), the narrowing down of civic space during the second period resulted in the denial of divergent perspectives and alternative policy insights that could have been provided by rights-based CSOs. The consequence of such restriction of civic space and denial of CSOs to engage in rights issues resulted in a rather weak and hostile relationship between the government and civil society. In addition, it contributed to defective policy and policy outcomes, democratic deficit and poor governance in the country. In this regard, FGD participants indicated that:

“Various national policies and strategic development plans that were formulated and enacted in the country during the second period, including the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) I and II were formulated and enforced without a meaningful participation of civil society. Likewise, the Anti-terrorism Law and the 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation were also formulated and promulgated where civil society did not have a meaningful participation in the process.”

Rights-based CSOs were completely paralysed in such a way that they would not be able to engage in policy influence and lobbying activities. They did not have a mechanism to access officials to provide policy inputs. According to USAID (2019:67), there was not even a formal channel of communication between the two. In addition to the absence of official channels of communication, rights-based CSOs that were not allowed to mobilise more than 10% of their budget from overseas were also denied the opportunity to engage in advocacy and policy initiatives. Hence, their ability to shape public opinion and set policy agendas was abruptly curtailed by design, which eventually curtailed the divergent policy views and alternatives that could be provided by civil society. Yigzaw (2019:239, 241) asserted that CSOs in Ethiopia have low chances of involvement in public policy formulation process. They were not allowed to make a meaningful and critical input into the policy-making process of the country. Government’s suspicion and lack of interest in advocacy and rights-based CSOs created unfavourable environment, which consequently discouraged creative thinking and alternative policy options.

In relation to democratic and human rights which are one of the components of advocacy, CSOs were faced with serious challenges during the second period. For a democratic culture to thrive and shine, one of the important manifestations is freedom of expression and political dialogue among political agents. In Ethiopia, during the second period, the political platform was narrow as it denied citizens freedom of expression, which is guaranteed by the Constitution of the country. Individuals were not free to speak their mind and express their political views. According to Assefa (2003:102), a constructive and free political discourse that is required for the development of democratic culture is difficult in a situation where democratic institutions, political parties, individual bloggers and activists, private media, journalists, and civil societies are silenced. The restrictions imposed on these bodies in Ethiopia during the second period completely hampered the role of CSOs in building democratic culture in the country. FGD participants asked a rhetorical question:

“How can it be possible for the government to claim itself as a democratic government when almost 100 percent of the seats in the HPR was occupied by the ruling party and when civil society, media, political parties, journalists and individual bloggers were completely suppressed and imprisoned? There was no democracy in the country at all! It was just a mask and helmet!”

The second period was the period where the government showed severe aggression towards non-state bodies including media, political party, bloggers, human rights organisations and democratic institutions. The government was brutal in its actions following the 2005 election. This aggression was rooted in the massive protests triggered by the electoral dispute (Arriola, 2013; Dupuy et al. 2014:425; Sisay 2012:380). There were mass illegal detentions, extra-judicial mass killings, torture and disappearances of citizens simply because of their political opinion. Using undue force by the security forces was a common phenomenon through which human and democratic rights were violated (Smith 2005:9). In this regard, the Programme Manager at the PDC interviewed on 11 August 2020 pointed out that:

“Citizens were taken by government’s security bodies to unknown places and disappear for years. No one, including their family, was allowed to know the whereabouts of the disappeared individuals. In some cases, the detained individuals might not be released at all, while in other cases, they might come back to their family after many years of detention and suffering in unknown places. All these actions were taken by the government without following the due process of law.”

While democratic and human rights were visibly violated in the country during the second period, rights-based CSOs were not allowed to play roles in promoting democracy. During the second period, the government blamed CSOs for being opportunistic, abusing the money mobilised from donors in the name of the poor, spending the money on unnecessary administrative costs and inflated salary, lacking public support, partisan and supportive of opposition political parties, and promoting western liberal ideology because of their dependence on the funds coming from western countries. Due to this attitude, the government restricted the financial capacity of rights-based CSOs, and ultimately weakened and discouraged them from intervening in rights-based issues including democratic and human rights (Dupuy et al. 2014:25; Hailegebriel 2010:20; Yeshanew 2012). As a result, the role of civil society in promoting democratic values and principles, conducting civic education, voters training, political party training, watching and monitoring elections, and awareness creation on elections and democratic ethos was negligible or almost none.

The government was successful in curtailing and weakening the capacity of rights-based CSOs through the enactment and enforcement of legal instruments and other mechanisms. However, as argued by the Senior Resident Research Fellow at FSS interviewed on 20 August 2020:

“The victim of the action was not only civil society but also the government itself. This is because the consequence of government’s action has backfired on itself in at least two different ways. First, the decision of curtailing rights-based civil society had a serious long-term implication as it hampered the national capacity

to monitor human rights in general and the rights of the disadvantaged groups including women, children and people with disabilities in a sustainable manner. Such restriction exposed the government and opened up the door of opportunity for international human rights institutions such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to blame and accuse the government at global stage for the violation of human and democratic rights in the country. They blamed the government aloud that it was responsible for the violations of rights manifested through repressing civil societies, media and democratic institutions in the country. Second, the suppressive nature of the government initiated and triggered public resistance and political unrest and turmoil, which ultimately winded up by the removal of the government from power.”

CSOs are key players in peace-building and conflict resolution which is one of the aspects of advocacy. According to WB (2007:11) and Barnes (2005), CSOs contribute to peace-building in different ways. These are protecting citizens from undue actions and violence of governments and other parties, promoting reconciliation, engaging in non-violent forms of conflict management, preventing violence, promoting social capital and social cohesion, advocating peace, internalising the values of democracy and human rights, facilitating dialogues, monitoring and disclosing human rights violations and social injustices and enforcement of peace agreements.

When we look at peace-building and conflict resolution as one of the advocacy element, CSOs were not allowed to contribute during the second period. The above-mentioned civil society organizations' functions in peace-building and conflict resolution are possible only when the environment in which they operate is enabling and inviting. As argued by the Programme Manager at the PDC interviewed on 11 August 2020, in Ethiopia, during the second period:

“The situation was difficult for civil society working in peace-building and conflict resolution. It was the period when the very existence of peace and conflict resolution oriented civil society was threatened.”

As a result, CSOs could not contribute their fair share in peace-building and conflict resolution. In support of this, the Programme Manager at LPI interviewed on 3 August 2020 pointed out that:

“The government was using an approach of ‘negative peace instruments’ to secure peace and order. In this regard, it used two instruments, namely the military and the legal instruments to silence ‘opponents’. It used the draconically disabling and restrictive legal instruments to silence the media and civil society instead of using them positively. The government underestimated the role of civil society in peace and conflict resolution process and preferred undemocratic way to resolve conflicts and ensure peace.”

8.2.3 The Third Period

During the third period, the advocacy role of civil society, as manifested through policy influence and lobbying, human and democratic rights, and peace and conflict resolution, was better than in the second period but less than in the first period (Table 8.1). In the third period, the government is undertaking reforms of different types in order to bring about political and economic stability in the country. To realise and sustain such stability and resilience, however, the effort of the government alone is not sufficient. It has to be complemented by the non-state actors including CSOs. According to Broeckhoven et al. (2021:67, 69), it is with this understanding that the government decided to open up civic space by amending the regulatory framework and making the environment more enabling. The decision of the government to replace the restrictive law by a more relaxed regulatory framework was acknowledged by donor agencies and local and international CSOs as an essential move towards positive engagement of civil society in advocacy.

During the third period, CSOs are allowed to freely engage in policy influencing and lobbying, human and democratic rights, and peace-building and conflict resolution. FGD respondents indicated that:

“There is an effort and willingness to engage civil society in policy formulation. Typical case in point could be the involvement of civil society in education road map. However, even though the participation of civil society is far better than the previous period, there are still a lot to be done to realise fully-fledged engagement of civil society in policy process.”

The involvement of civil society was facilitated by the Civil Society Proclamation No. 1113/2029, which according to Broeckhoven et al. (2021:67-68), Dunia (2020:361) and Kidan (2019:29-30) encourages a self-regulative governance approach in CSOs. To this end, it requires the regulatory bodies to play supportive and enabling roles instead of regulatory and controlling roles. As opposed to the previous Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009, the new Civil Society Proclamation No. 1113/2019 limits the desecration of ACSO in relation to refusal of application for registration. Furthermore, it allows civil societies to question the ACSO and the Board of ACSO when the application for registration is rejected and when administrative actions are unduly taken on civil society.

Most importantly, the new law repealed the restriction imposed on rights-based CSOs and amended the prohibition imposed on CSOs related to democratic rights i.e., freedom of association, freedom of expression, monitoring election, awareness creation on democratic values, voters and political party training. The recent involvement of the Election Board of Ethiopia in 2021 election is one typical example. In addition, the Executive Director at AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020 stated that:

“Civil society, upon the invitation of the Board, involved in the process of the 2021 election through, monitoring and observing the election process, training political parties and voters, and reporting deficiencies and illicit practices observed during the election process.”

With respect to human rights, no provision is imposed to limit the involvement of CSOs by the new law. Hence, they are free to engage in human rights issues including promotion of gender equality, protecting the marginalised segment of the society, monitoring, reporting, and disclosing human rights violations including detention of

citizens, journalists and members and leaders of opposition political parties particularly during the early stage of the current government.

During the third period, CSOs are provided with freedom not only to be involved in promotion of human and democratic rights but also in promotion of peace and conflict resolution. In this regard, civil society can play roles in different ways. In this regard, the Programme Manager at IAG interviewed on 4 August 2020 and the Programme Manager at the PDC interviewed on 11 August 2020 asserted that:

“Civil society organisations monitor implementations of various peace agreements, protect the needy and unsecured groups, provide recommendations and information about peace and conflict resolution, put pressure on concerned bodies to promote peace and resolve conflicts, and strengthen the social bond among the society to build peace sustainably and promote democratic behaviour and resolve conflicts democratically. In addition, civil society can play role in facilitation and mediation of conflict resolution process, observe status of peace and facilitate problem-solving workshops and dialogue forums on peace-building. To this end, local and international civil society are making an effort to engage in peace-building and conflict resolution process to settle conflicts that are taking place in different parts of the country including the northern Ethiopia. They are also participating in the current national consultation that is meant to sustainably ensure peace in the country. One cannot deny, however, that the scope and depth of CSOs intervention is limited during the third period given the intensity of the challenge.”

When we evaluate the overall approach of the government towards the involvement of CSOs in peace-building and conflict resolution, it is apparent that the current government wanted to replace the second period’s negative peace approach by a positive peace approach. The Programme Manager at LPI interviewed on 3 August 2020 also stressed that:

“The current government seems to have opted for a positive peace approach because, as one can understand from the new law of civil society, the intention of

the government is to rely on trust, negotiation, understanding and building social capital than using restriction, controlling, intimidation and sanctions or coercion.”

The fact that CSOs are provided with the opportunity to deal with conflict resolution and peace-building witnesses, to some extent, that the government wanted to encourage and ensure civic approach in the course of dealing with conflict resolution and peace-building. However, deviations between the ‘form’ – what is intended, and the ‘reality’ – what is actually happening on the ground, are inevitable in poor countries like Ethiopia where government apparatus and available institutions are defective and where the internal capacity of civil society are deficient.

Though CSOs are provided with free space to involve in democratic and human rights promotion, policy influence, peace-building and conflict management, their contribution during the third period is not as effective as that of the first period although it is better than that of the second period. The third period is the period when civil society are supposed to play more role than any time in the history of Ethiopia in promoting human rights, promotion of peace and conflict resolution given that insecurity and escalated conflicts have become a critical concern of the society. However, as argued by the Programme Manager at the PDC interviewed on 11 August 2020:

“Civil society could not live up to the expectation because of different reasons. First, most rights-based civil society organisations are unable to get rid of the previous restrictive period’s trauma. Second, civil society organisations are unable to exploit all the opportunities provided by the enabling legal environment, because the third period is characterised by lack of security and political instability throughout the country which has become a potential threat to them. In addition, civil society organisations were also constrained by COVID-19. The other reason is that most rights-based civil society organisations are established recently following the opening up of the space after 2019. Hence, they have a maximum of three year of experience and it is too early to expect significant contributions from them in terms of curbing the escalated conflicts, displacement and killings of innocent citizens.”

The Executive Manager at the IAG interviewed on 1 August 2020 also pointed out that:

“Although all operational areas of intervention are allowed for civil society in the third period, some are reserved and remain hesitant to turn their face toward rights-based issues because of fear and suspicion about the sustainability of the currently opened-up space. Others are newly registered civil society after 2019 but they are amorphous and their work has not yet been matured enough to bring tangible impact.”

8.3 ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SERVICE DELIVERY

From service delivery perspective, CSOs work with the local community to fight against poverty, capacity-building, provision of goods and services, relief and rehabilitation, conservation of natural resources, environmental protection and rehabilitation, and local economic development. In support of this, Dessalegn (2010:199) argued that CSOs contribute to development by intervening in the provision of social and economic sector services. CSOs are considered as important actors due to its contribution to economic and social services (Lewis 2002:570). Recognising that development in its full sense is unthinkable without the engagement of civil society, various global and regional development frameworks such as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have emphasised the importance of collaborating with non-state actors including CSOs. As one of the development actors, civil society play essential roles in providing social and economic services to the poor segment of the society and thereby reduce the deep-rooted poverty in developing countries. Through service delivery intervention, civil society extends the benefits of development to the needy and marginalised segment of the society and reduces inequality (Broeckhoven 2021:44, 53, 57). According to Roberts (2019), CSOs provide goods and services, enhance local economy by developing infrastructure, promote marketing, provide relief and rehabilitation services, and build citizen’s capacity through long-term education and short-term training. Dessalegn (2010:191), Beyene (2015:19) and Heinrich (2004:22) also argued that through the implementation of different development projects, CSOs can contribute to poverty reduction, ensure economic and human development, address inequalities in society by

narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and contribute to the overall modernity of society.

In Ethiopia, CSOs whose area of operation is related to service delivery commonly engage in the promotion and implementation of projects and programmes focusing on the provision of social welfare, health, clean water, education, relief and urban/rural development. Dessalegn (2010:199) and Dessalegn, Akalewold and Yoseph (2008) described the service delivery role of CSOs in Ethiopia in the context of human development, which includes health, education, water and sanitation. CSOs also provide goods and services, enhance local economic development, build infrastructure, provide relief and rehabilitation services, and build citizen’s capacity through training. In this respect, Table 8.2 presents a descriptive analysis and comparison of civil society service delivery interventions during the three periods.

Table 8.2: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Results on Service Delivery

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Percentiles		
		25th	50th (Median)	75th
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	200	4.0000	4.5000	4.5000
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	200	4.0000	4.2500	4.5000
Period 3 (2018 to date)	200	4.0000	4.5000	4.5875

Friedman Test	
	Ranks
	Mean Rank
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	2.01
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	1.91
Period 3 (2018 – to date)	2.08

Test Statistics^a	
N	200
Chi-Square	3.874
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.144

a. Friedman Test

Test Statistics ^a			
	Period 2- Period 1	Period 3 - Period 1	Period 3 - Period 2
Z	-2.205 ^b	-.364 ^c	-2.387 ^c
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.027	.716	.017

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks

c. Based on negative ranks

Source: Computed from survey data (2021)

According to the results in Table 8.2, the difference in service delivery across the three periods (1991 – 2004, 2005 – 2017, and 2018 to date) was statistically insignificant, χ^2 (2, N = 200) = 3.874, $p < .001$, level of significance at $\alpha = 0.05$. Analysis of the median values revealed a minimal decrease from Period 1 ($Md = 4.5000$) to Period 2 ($Md = 4.2500$) and then a slight increase in Period 3 ($Md = 4.5000$). Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.017$. There were no significant differences between Period 1 and 2 ($Z = -2.205$, $p > .001$), Period 1 and 3 ($Z = -.364$, $p > .001$) and Period 2 and 3 ($Z = -2.387$, $p > .001$).

8.3.1 The First Period

The above results show that the difference in service delivery role of civil society during the three periods is insignificant. In all the three periods, CSOs were able to engage in service delivery and development activities. During the first period, CSOs could provide various services related to social and economic activities. According to Dessalegn (2010) and Dessalegn, Akalewold and Yoseph (2008:27-29), CSOs engage in a range of activities including mobilisation of resources for the development of social and economic sector, creating employment opportunities for jobless young citizens, accessing the poor and the marginalised and vulnerable segments of the society including children, women, elderly people and people with disabilities.

In Ethiopia, during the first period, CSOs contributed to national poverty alleviation, relief and rehabilitation activities, and provision of social protection services, inequality and holistically contributed to the achievement of the development goals of the country (Roberts 2019:22). In connection to the service delivery role of civil society during the first period, the Programme Officer at Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) interviewed on 23 August 2020 and the Programme Manager at IAG interviewed on 4 August 2020 also argued that:

“Civil society organisations were considered as areas of job opportunity creation. Because the external environment was relatively favourable, they could freely mobilise funds from foreign sources and make use of it for employment and provision of social and economic services. To this end, civil society played some roles in promoting development, providing social and economic service, providing relief and humanitarian services, and develop infrastructure mainly in areas where the government was not able to reach. Civil society engaged not only in provision of social services like school, water, health and sanitation but also elimination of harmful bush encroachment in Afar region and Borena areas, teaching and training nomadic citizens to engage in ploughing and agriculture, and asset diversification to mention but few.”

8.3.2 The Second Period

During the second period, the scope of CSOs' intervention was reduced to service delivery alone. Following the 2005 election, the government made an intentional move against rights-based CSOs but left development and service delivery-oriented CSOs free to operate in the country if the money they generated from abroad is not used for objectives other than service delivery and development issues. In line with this, Gebre (2016:8) pointed out that the government allowed CSOs whose objectives were limited to service delivery and development to generate 90% of their budget from foreign sources as long as they used it for service delivery purposes. Roberts (2019:22-23), Aalen and Tronvoll (2009) and Sisay (2012:380) also argued that the government, in contrast to the negative attitude it had against rights-based CSOs, remained tolerant

toward service delivery-oriented CSOs. It provided room for service delivery CSOs to play a supportive role in meeting citizens' service demands. It was comfortable with service delivery-oriented CSOs because they played a gap-filling role, which reduced citizens' pressure on the government. According to Gebre et al. (2014:81) and Bekalu and Wassihun (2021:92), the tolerance of the government toward CSOs working in service delivery areas was attributed to the mutual and common goals shared between the two actors, namely the government and service-oriented CSOs.

The government did not have an incentive to get into conflict with service-delivery CSOs as long as they were reserved and abstained from politically sensitive issues including democratic and human rights and advocacy. The government even made some positive moves toward encouraging service-oriented CSOs by relaxing the principle of 70:30. To this end, it formulated a directive⁵ and reconsidered salaries of field officers, transport expenses, and capacity-building costs as operational instead of considering them as administrative costs. By devising this regulation, the government made a visible demarcation between rights-based and service delivery CSOs during the second period. The proclamation itself, according to Broeckhoven (2021:56) and Roberts (2019), did not impose direct operational restrictions on service delivery-oriented CSOs as they were allowed to be involved in any activity in the domain of service delivery and development including roll-out programmes, building infrastructure, providing emergency relief, launching aid programmes, and providing education and training.

Many of the rights-based CSOs were compelled to shift their areas of operation to service delivery during the second period due to fear of conflict with the government (Kefale & Aredo 2009; Berhanu 2002; Dessalegn 2002) on one hand, and to benefit from the fund access allowed for service delivery civil society on the other, Dupuy et al. (2014) and Bekalu and Wassihun (2021:90) expressed this move as a move away from politically sensitive areas. They further argued that CSOs were forced to use such move as an adaptive and survival strategy to escape from the challenges imposed by the restrictive proclamation. This, according to CCRDA (2011), Roberts (2019:23) and

⁵ Amendment of the Charities and Societies Agency's Directive to Determine the Operational and Administrative Costs of Charities and Societies No. 2/211 (Amendment 2014).

Gebre et al. (2016:21) resulted in a relative increment in the number of service-delivery and development-oriented CSOs during the second period.

Just like the first period, service-delivery CSOs were able to contribute to development of the country, including human development (Dessalegn 2010:199), during the second period because the government had a positive attitude toward them. They were not subject to financial and operational areas restriction. They could access financial resources from abroad as long as they used it for the objectives they stood for. They were also free to operate in all areas without restriction so long as their operations were within the domain of development and service delivery and had no contamination with politically sensitive issues. However, the Team Leader at the ACSO interviewed on 29 August 2020 argued that:

“Service delivery-oriented civil society organisations were equally subject to hectic registration process and requirements, cumbersome bureaucracy and rigid monitoring and reporting requirements of the Agency just like right-based ones. This challenge, however, did not block them to achieve their objectives because it is not related to their daily activities; It happens once in a blue moon.”

8.3.3 The Third Period

During the third period, the status of service-providing CSOs remained similar to the previous two periods. Service-delivery oriented CSOs are allowed to continue their operation in a more relaxed and freer framework. The reconfiguration of the CSO proclamation provided a more convenient and enabling environment for CSOs to do their jobs, be it rights-based or service delivery. Hence, as argued by the Director at the ACSO interviewed on 28 August 2020):

“Service delivery-oriented civil society have benefited from the situation. Registration related challenges and bureaucratic red tape that was faced by civil society during the second period were reduced, if not eliminated in its entirety. Hence, civil society have been provided with open space and relaxed environment, which provided them with the opportunity to contribute to social and

economic service delivery including education, health, sanitation, child welfare, humanitarian relief and emergency crises, promoting self-help initiatives, and helping people to realise their instrumental and terminal values. Hence, civil society organisations are discharging their social responsibilities by filling the gaps that the government is not able to address.”

However, FGD respondents mentioned that the current insecurity in some areas in the country has partially limited the free movement and service-delivery operations of CSOs to some extent.

In general, the preceding analysis revealed that service-delivery role of civil society during the three periods was almost similar, and no significant difference was observed. Although there were some administrative and registration-related challenges faced by CSOs during the second period, it did not fully constrain them from achieving their ultimate objectives because the government did not have an incentive to noticeably suppress and restrict service-delivery oriented CSOs in all periods.

8.4 THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN WATCHDOGGING

Watchdogging is an essential monitoring mechanism on public affairs, which helps to ensure democratic governance and development of a country. It helps to eliminate factors that reduce trust in the institutions of the government and public services. In this regard, CSOs and other non-state institutions play essential roles. According to Kreienkamp (2017:6) and Cooper (2018:9), through watchdogging, CSOs and other non-state actors can hold both public and private organisations accountable for their actions. They monitor performance, human and democratic rights abuses, and corrupt practices in the entire system and make the responsible bodies accountable for their actions. In addition to providing information to the local and global community, they play an essential role in supporting the media, particularly the independent ones, which work on providing inputs to policy makers in relation to how things should be managed.

As is the case in many African countries, the mechanisms of accountability and watchdogging are insufficient and defective. However, in almost all African countries,

watchdogging institutions and CSOs are in operation. These institutions mobilise and consume huge amounts of resources in the name of watchdogging. However, it has been difficult to stop misuse and abuse of resources, human rights violations, bad governance and denial of citizens' access to public service in Africa. This is true for almost all developing countries, though with varied degrees, and, as argued by Woldearegay (2018), Ethiopia is no exception.

The Constitution and other legal documents of Ethiopia demand holding public institutions and officials accountable for their actions. The EPRDF government attempted, at least at the beginning, to exercise the constitutional provisions by putting a democratic political system in place just after the transition period. Using the opportunity provided by the Constitution and the willingness of the government, CSOs began to work on watchdogging to hold public institutions and officials accountable. Alongside the mainstream civil society, there were also democratic and watchdogging institutions established by the government. These democratic and watchdogging institutions are accountable to the HPR and supposed to be free of any intervention from the executive body. The main role of these watchdogging institutions is to hold public institutions and officials accountable for their actions. These bodies include the Auditor General, the Ombudsman, the Anti-corruption Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Election Board. These organisations are formed by the state and are supposed to be independent in their work and decisions. While some of them are known as democratic institutions (e.g., the Election Board), others are said to be safeguarding and regulatory bodies (e.g., the Auditor General, the Ombudsman). Although institutionally they are located in different categories, their main responsibility is to hold government institutions, officials and all other concerned bodies accountable for their actions.

According to Diamond (in Beyene 2015:11-12), state institutions and officials can be held accountable for their actions through the check and balance mechanisms supposed to be practised among the three organs of the state. This checks-and-balances mechanism that promotes accountability of public officials can be practically

possible when democratic and watchdogging institutions such as the Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Election Board and the Auditor General exist, are technically and financially equipped, and function independently. The independence along with technical and resource capacity and mandate of these institutions is critically important for it enables them to expose officials' wrongdoings, put pressure on the government to improve administrative malpractices and promote the rights and privileges of citizens.

In Ethiopia, these watchdogging institutions have been in existence since 1990s. Even though there are not many success stories about the watchdogging role of these institutions, their roles in terms of holding government institutions and officials accountable for their action vary across the three different periods considered in this study. This variation lies in the nature of the state during the three periods.

8.4.1 The First Period

During the first period, the government opened the space, and these bodies could play a relatively influential role. On the contrary, during the second period, the government was suppressive and interventionist in its nature which disabled the capacity of these entities to hold public institutions accountable. During the third period, the relative opening of the political space allowed these institutions to awaken a little bit.

If we look at the Election Board as an example, the pre-2005 period and the entire process and preparation made for the 2005 election could be considered as the manifestations of the role of the then National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) to exercise democracy. The Board strived to make the election as transparent as possible, by enforcing the electoral laws and striving to regulate all parties so that they behave in accordance with the law and codes of conducts and be accountable for their actions. Witnessing this, Carter Centre (2009:12, 68), argued:

In the early pre- [2005] election period, there were indications of a growing space in the country for political competition and dialogue [...]
The NEBE is to be commended for its electoral preparations and

successes in implementing the May 15 voting process. The increased transparency and responsiveness of the NEBE was an improvement over previous elections. The NEBE showed remarkable flexibility and responded in an inclusive and timely fashion to the demands to replace the complaints process that had proved inadequate.

Another institution that can be considered as an example is the Ethiopian National Human Rights Commission. During the first period, this institution was one of the important watchdogging institutions which worked to ensure accountability. The Commission, during the first period, was actively watching and monitoring various human rights violations and reported the same to the HPR and the international community for intervention. To this end, according to Mohammed (2013:7) and Yemisrach (2010:15-16), the Commission, using the power vested on it, engaged in watchdogging, and addressing claims related to human rights violations committed by the government and private entities. It dealt with complaints related to employment, which emerged out of mistreatment and undue actions taken by employers and worked on the reinstatement of some employees. The Commission also monitored prisons and detention facilities to check whether they were as per the international standards. In addition, it dealt with the issues of land disputes, security of persons, equality and non-discrimination, and evictions from land and house.

Furthermore, the Commission could undertake a number of important watchdogging activities, which helped to reveal human rights violations and promote accountability. These, according to FGD respondents, include:

“Disclosing human rights violations through publications (i.e., periodic report, sponsoring human rights related research projects and publication and dissemination of the outputs), hosting various human rights related public dialogues to use the platform as a means of publicising violent acts and promote accountability. It also worked to raise awareness of citizens to keep them alerted about human rights violation and work on holding violators accountable for their actions.”

To this end, during the first period, the Commission could play a watchdogging role by conducting a series of discussions with bodies concerned and strived to put pressure on them so that corrective measures can be taken, and accountability can be ensured.

The contributions of the above-mentioned institutions were partly attributed to the nature and composition of the HPR during the first period. Although the dominance of the ruling party's members was inevitable, the HPR was quite vibrant because they were politically active, contextually aware and outspoken members of the opposition parties who used to challenge ideas promoted in the House, particularly by the ruling party members in the House. Some FGD participants argued that:

“The availability of such opposition parties’ members, to some extent, influenced and promoted some level of check and balance. This environment eventually helped watchdogging institutions to secure and exercise their independence and report facts on the ground with a minimal pressure from the government bodies. However, this could not remain permanent feature of the HPR as well as the watchdogging institutions in Ethiopia during the second period as the situation was curved after 2005.”

8.4.2 The Second Period

During the second period, the above situation could not be sustained as it was. It seemed that the government turned to be undemocratic following the 2005 election. It began to deny watchdogging institutions the space required to hold public institutions and officials accountable. The watchdogging institutions could not exercise and enjoy their independence as stipulated in the constitution of the country. Although the 2005 election was a turning point, the closing of the space was partly attributed to the ideological shift to the developmental state where the state was a key player more than anyone else.

During the second period, watchdogging institutions were in operation, but they played a superficial role because their independence and freedom of expression was systematically denied. In support of this, FGD respondents pointed out that:

“The institutions were infiltrated by government and the ruling political party affiliated individuals. In cases where these institutions attempt to report the facts on the ground, they were exposed and subject to intimidation from security bodies and political officials.”

It was difficult for watchdogging institutions to produce and publicise reports consisting of negative content about the government. In support of this, the Project Manager at Humanity and Inclusion interviewed on 14 August 2020 also indicated that:

“When reports that are against the government generated by watchdogging institutions, the HPR would not be willing to accept and publicise. Members in the HPR usually refer to the term ‘image’. They say that such reports have defaming effect on the image of the country at global stage and hence would not be approved and publicised.”

Eventually, the watchdogging institutions were trapped by the invisible and paralysing intervention of the government. Hence, they were unable to speak their mind and boldly report facts on the ground; rather, they were compelled to write positive statements even when the government was violent in its actions. Although a single case cannot be generalised to all, one typical example of such cases could be the concluding statement made by the EHRCO in its 2016 report on the conflict took place in the territories of Oromia and Amhara regions. The report concluded that the actions taken against protesters were necessary and proportional as it meant to save lives, government investment and public properties, preserve constitutional order, prevent further destruction and contain the disturbance (EHRC in Getahun n.d.:311). This statement partly implies that the Commission was not only working in a fearful environment but was also compelled to abstain from reporting negative statements on the government.

Rights-based CSOs and government-formed watchdogging institutions were completely crippled. Watchdogging is about telling the government where it is doing wrong. However, as argued by FGD respondents:

“During the second period, no civil societies and non-state actors dare to approach the government and tell where it was doing wrong because the environment would not allow them to do so. With regard to the media, the government employed a repressive and draconic media law. Media was supposed to play a watchdogging role but was not able to do so. For example, very few investigative journalists strived to interrogate public officials on media, e.g. Ayinachin and Fit-le-fit TV programmes, but they were exposed to various kinds of intimidation.”

In addition to the mainstream civil society and other democratic and safeguarding institutions discussed above, there was also one essential programme known as “social accountability”. Social accountability is one of the essential programmes established in many developing countries to play a watchdog role as well as provide support to other watchdogging institutions to make government and non-government institutions accountable for their actions. According to Malena (2004:3) and Beck, Mendel and Thindwa (2007:1) social accountability is an approach, which helps to promote and ensure accountability through direct or indirect participation and engagement of citizens. To this end, the approach may directly engage ordinary citizens to promote accountability through various mechanisms or it may work through the institutional arrangement of CSOs with the intention of ensuring accountability in the entire system of the nation in general and public institutions in particular. Hence, it is citizen or civil society-led efforts to hold public institutions and officials accountable.

Social accountability, as a first phase, was launched in Ethiopia in 2006 and it remained operational from 2006 to 2009. The intention was to provide funds and capacity-building support to 12 select civil society and 40 partnering organisations in the form of a pilot project. It evolved to the second phase, which was in operation from 2011 to 2018. The third phase continued from 2019 onward. Hence, since its establishment, it has been in operation although the success and contribution vary with the political and legal contexts in the country (Mesele et al. 2021:124).

The social accountability as one of watchdogging mechanisms in Ethiopia was not as fruitful as expected. More efforts were made to enforce social accountability mechanisms during the period considered as the second period in this study, and indeed, some micro-level results (e.g., increase in citizen participation in local committees) were ensured at local level. However, the expected outcomes in terms of making meaningful social and policy change were not possible because of unfavourable situations including political instability, a restrictive legal framework, state of emergency and drought that curtailed the potential of non-state actors (Campbell 2020:4-5). The programme was constrained by government's intervention and interest to use it for political purposes in an invisible way. Confirming this, FGD respondents indicated that:

“The fact that the very existence of social accountability programme was guaranteed and determined by the government; and that the Head of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Dr. Abrham Tekese, was the Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Ethiopia Social Accountability Programme, depicts that the programme suffered from lack of independence. There was an effort by the government to make use of social accountability mechanism for political purposes. Local level political cadres had some invisible roles in promoting their own political agendas through social accountability mechanisms. There was intentional infiltration of the programme by politically oriented and brainwashed individuals to use the programme as a tool for political purposes.”

The restriction of watchdogging institutions' role during the second period was attributed not only to the overall narrowed political landscape but also to the orientation and nature of the HPR. According to Arriola and Lyons (2016), in all elections conducted in the country after the 2005 election, the ruling party claimed to have won almost all of the seats. In other words, almost all members of the HPR were members of the ruling party who promoted the same political ideology, interest and views; there was no diversity of ideas. Hence, FGD participants argued that:

“Any agenda presented to the HPR for decision was approved without a meaningful deliberation and objection. The stand of the then HPR was literally

the reflection of the ruling party's idea, which was not interested to accommodate and welcome ideas of rights-based and independent watchdogging organisations. That is why extremely restrictive laws such as press law, anti-terrorism law, Charities and Societies Proclamation were approved by the HPR without facing serious challenges as such.”

Given that the watchdogging institutions were accountable to the ruling party-dominated HPR, it would not be surprising that their role was crippled and devastatingly disabled during the second period.

8.4.3 The Third Period

During the third period, the status of watchdogging institutions apparently improved following the change and the political reform in the country. Some of the watchdogging organisations, particularly the Election Board and the EHRCO have begun to play visible roles in making the government accountable in different ways. For example, the Election Board took action against the ruling political party, namely the PP itself, when it failed to live up to the standard of the Board for pre-election preparation. Such a situation was completely unthinkable during the second period. In addition, as stipulated in the annual report of the Commission (2020 and 2021), the EHRCO also investigated cases of human rights abuses including massacres and rapes committed by the government forces as well as rebel group forces during the war that took place in the northern part of the country. The Commission also exposed different cases of humanitarian crises that occurred in different conflict areas in the country due to the reluctance and weaknesses of the government. It also warned the government for wrongdoings in relation to human rights violation cases, displacement and deaths of innocent civilians particularly in the northern part of the country which partly related to the weaknesses and negligence of the government.

In addition, during the third period, the Commission investigated several cases of human rights violations and produced official reports. For instance, in 2020, the Commission published an official report entitled as “መንግሥት ያለ አይመስልም ነበረ” which

is to mean, “The government did not seem to exist” (EHRC 2020). This was a bold report that criticised the government for its failure to handle the conflict that took place due to the killing of the popular singer named Hachalu Hundessa in 2020. The Commission also investigated the case of conflict that had taken place in the Konso Zone and concluded that the contributing factors to the violence, among other things, include failure of the government to respond to various demands of the people (Addis Standard, 2020). It also criticised the authorities for its failure to pay attention and take action after the massacre that took place in the Metekel Zone of Beneshangul Gumuz region (ibid.). Making such kinds of bold and direct statements against the government was not common during the second period.

During the third period, the social accountability programme continued to function with some level of improvements. As discussed above, during the second period, there was a problem of trust among citizens, service providers and government institutions in relation to social accountability. However, as argued by Cameron (2020:192), “By 2019, when a third phase of the programme began, there was more trust between the different stakeholders, and there were some signs that citizens were beginning to hold service providers more accountable. [...] it did boost citizens’ knowledge on public services and the role of government, giving them the opportunity to take on a greater oversight role”.

During the third period, the HPR was restructured, and it seems that the composition is diverse in various ways. The members of opposition political parties have occupied some parliamentary seats. There are independent individuals who won parliamentary seats and joined the House. Such diversity should allow the exercise of democratic culture in the House to some extent. Hence, the ruling party would no longer be able to get its interest and ideas easily accepted and approved by the House. Such a situation has provided watchdogging institutions a relatively fertile ground to not only work with some degree of independence but also to disclose and report illicit actions, administrative malpractices, corruption and violation of human and democratic rights with some level of confidence to the House and beyond (Executive Director at

AMADUAS interviewed on 10 August 2020; Project Manager at Humanity and Inclusion interviewed on 14 August 2020).

From the above evidence, one can therefore understand that, compared to the second period, watchdogging institutions have some level of freedom and independence during the third period. As stated by Pouligny (2005:496), they could provide the required checks and balances and put pressures on the government to fulfil its obligations and live up to its promises.

8.4.4 The Quantitative Results on Watchdogging

The watchdogging role of civil society during the three periods was analysed based on the quantitative data gathered through questionnaire. The results are presented in Table 8.3 and are commensurate with the results of the qualitative data analysed in the preceding section.

Table 8.3: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Results on Watchdogging

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Percentiles		
		25th	50th (Median)	75th
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	200	3.1667	3.5000	3.5000
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	200	1.0000	1.1667	1.5000
Period 3 (2018 - to date)	200	3.0000	3.1667	3.6667

Friedman Test	
Ranks	
	Mean Rank
Period 1 (1991 - 2004)	2.64
Period 2 (2005 - 2017)	1.00
Period 3 (2018 – to date)	2.36

Test Statistics ^a	
N	200
Chi-Square	323.325
df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. Friedman Test

Test Statistics ^a			
	Period 2- Period 1	Period 3 - Period 1	Period 3 - Period 2
Z	-12.476 ^b	-6.445 ^b	-12.363 ^c
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks.

c. Based on negative ranks.

Source: Computed from survey data (2021)

The results from the questionnaire in Table 8.3 indicate that there was a statistically significant difference in watchdogging across the three periods (1991 – 2004, 2005 – 2017, and 2018 to date), $\chi^2 (2, N = 200) = 323.325, p < .001$, level of significance at $\alpha = 0.05$. Analysis of the median values revealed a decrease in watchdogging from Period 1 ($Md = 3.5000$) to Period 2 ($Md = 1.1667$) and then an increase in Period 3 ($Md = 3.1667$). Post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at $p < 0.017$. There were significant differences between period 1 and 2 ($Z = -12.476, p < .001$), period 1 and 3 ($Z = -6.445, p < .001$) and period 2 and 3 ($Z = -12.363, p < .001$).

Generally, the preceding results of qualitative and quantitative data analysis reveals that watchdogging institutions made an important contribution to promoting accountability during the first and the third periods. During the second period, however, watchdogging institutions and other rights-based civil society could only make a minimal contribution in terms of making the government accountable. While the restrictive law disabled the mainstream CSOs, watchdogging institutions such as the Human Rights Commission and the Ethiopian Institute of Ombudsman lost their independence through intimidation and infiltration by the government.

Although civil society plays an instrumental role in watchdogging and holding the government and institutions to account through monitoring human rights abuses, providing information to both domestic constituencies and international organisations, and advancing the awareness and concerns of citizens regarding misbehaviour and

abuse of power (Cooper 2018:9; Kreienkamp 2017:6; WEF 2013:9), its watchdogging role should not be seen as similar to policing. Civil society's watchdogging role differs from policing in that the means through which it achieves the end (i.e., watchdogging and holding the government to account) are distinct. In order to watchdog and hold the government to account, civil society employs non-violent, forceless, peaceful, and civilised means, which essentially makes it civil.

Civil society organizations have a critical role to play in ensuring that political parties and state structures are held accountable for their actions. By exerting positive and proactive pressure, civil society can promote transparency and monitor the behavior of government officials. However, it is essential that this intervention is peaceful and non-violent to avoid further destabilizing the political environment. Moreover, civil society must lead by example and be a model of accountability. This means being socially accountable for their actions and ensuring that they are transparent in their own operations. By doing so, civil society can build trust with the public and maintain its credibility as a watchdog of government activities. Ultimately, the success of civil society in promoting good governance depends on its ability to act with integrity and hold itself to the same standards it expects from others. Civil society can ensure social accountability by promoting openness and sharing information, monitoring and evaluating progress and performance, and engaging stakeholders in the activities and decisions that affect them so that they can ask questions, make suggestions and demands, and give feedback.

8.5 ROLE OF NON-FORMAL CIVIL SOCIETY – *IDDIR* AS A CASE

Ethiopia is a country with rich cultural and traditional practices and institutions. Among the common traditional institutions through which the Ethiopians address different socio-economic matters are *Iqqub*, *Iddir*, *Debo*, *Mahiber*, *Affarsata* (Sisay 2003:101). For the purpose of this study, as also mentioned in the methodology section, *Iddir* is the focus. In this section, issues including the meaning of *Iddir*, how it works, socio-cultural, economic and political contributions are addressed. In addition, the challenges including

lack of legal recognition and formality, internal capacity, attitudinal problems towards *Iddir*, and lack of supports from other actors are addressed.

8.5.1 What is *Iddir*?

Iddir is a traditional institution. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, it exists only in Ethiopia, even if, according to Pankhurst (2003:14), there are parallels with distinctive features in other parts of Africa. Although definitional issues may not make sense to Ethiopian readers who are aware of the idea, it deemed important to provide the meaning of *Iddir* to non-Ethiopian readers of this paper. *Iddir*, according to Mauri (1987:6-7), is a traditional association formed by a group of individuals within the same domain of characteristics, including sex, age, living area, nature of job, and ethnicity derived by mutual interest with the objective of financially supporting each other during emergency situations such as death, illness and the like. Aredo (2010:57) also argued that an *Iddir* is a traditional establishment created with the intention of covering a range of social risks that individuals face such as funerals, food shortages, medical expenses and loss of essential livelihood assets. In addition to their original objective and areas of focus (i.e., group-oriented mutual support in case of social matters such as funerals), nowadays, *Iddir* is showing the tendency of scaling up their intervention to development issues. In this regard, Dessalegn (2008:108) and Pankhurst and Damen (2003:44) argued that *Iddir* has evolved as a development actor. Beyond their traditional agenda, *Iddir* is engaging in various issues of development at community development level. Despite the progress and contribution of such development-oriented, *Iddir*, it has minimal support provided by few NGOs such as ACORD Ethiopia, and are constrained by different attitudinal, structural and non-structural problems that are addressed elsewhere in this section.

8.5.2 How is *Iddir* Governed?

In previous periods, *Iddir* was supposed to register at the sub-city level or at the lowest administrative level in the government structure, namely the *Kebele* level (Dessalegn 2008:108). However, at least in urban contexts, currently *Iddir* has to be registered and

licenced by the Office of Workers and Social Security which is one of the government institutions. This is one of the conditions for *Iddir* to exist and operate.

Most *Iddirs* have a structure in which the roles and responsibilities of various bodies are determined. In this respect, Pankhurst and Damen (2003:40) pointed out that *Iddir* has a chairperson, secretary, cashier and treasurer, while others, particularly those that are located in urban settings, have additional officers and committees. From the observation made by the researcher during the fieldwork and the interview responses, it was also confirmed that *Iddir* is generally structured having a general assembly, chair, deputy chair, secretary, finance head, treasurer and internal auditor. In addition to this, there are committees formed by the assembly, which work with executives and handle urgent matters on behalf of the assembly.

There is an umbrella entity known as the *Iddir* Council, which has several *Iddir* under it. According to the Chair, *Kechene Iddir* Council, interviewed on 5 September 2020, *Iddir* is accountable to the Office of Work and Social Security at *woreda* level. The concerns and inquiries of *Iddir* can be presented to this Council and the Council is supposed to take and present the case to bodies concerned for solutions. The Chair of *Andinet Fana Iddir* interviewed on 1 September 2020, however, commented that:

“In principle, this chain is supposed to work to address the demands of member Iddir. Practically, however, it is not functioning well because the council itself has no capacity in terms of leadership as well as resources including human, financial and material. Most of them have no proper offices to run their day-to-day activities.”

The Chair, *Kechene Iddir* Council, interviewed on 5 September 2020 also indicated that:

“Iddir is governed by the bylaw enacted to guide its activities and regulate the behaviour of individual members. It came out from the review of some Iddir’s bylaws that most of the bylaws are meant to determine the collection and disbursement procedure of funds, the fines imposed on members when they fail

to behave in accordance with the rule, and time of regular meeting, election of leaders, terms of office and membership to mention but few.”

8.5.3 Who Does Iddir Work With?

Iddir, in addition to group-oriented mutual support, also engage in various development issues beyond the original purpose as indicated above. To discharge these responsibilities, the Chair of *Andinet Fana Iddir* interviewed on 1 September 2020 and the Chair of *Woiramba Women Development Iddir* interviewed on 4 September 2020 argued that:

“Iddir works with various bodies although most of these bodies fail to consider Iddir as an entity of significant importance. Iddir works with various government entities and organisations. For instance, it works with health sector to address pressing health challenges in the community. It also works with the education sector and school stakeholders particularly in fighting against bad practices around school compound that attract pupils to adopt bad behaviour such as chewing Khat, smoking shisha, watching pornographic movies etc. It also works with police and security personnel for crime prevention. Iddir involves in community policing by providing information about crime to the community police.”

As argued by the Chair of *Arat Menta Ena Akababiw Wendimamachoch Iddir* interviewed on 13 September 2020 and the Chair of *Sostegna Menged Youth Iddir* interviewed on 12 September 2020:

“Iddir also works with shimaglewoh [an elders’ council which is in charge of dealing with various social matters in the community] to settle conflicts. Iddir also works with a committee, which represents the community and mediates between Iddir and the community regarding the matter of development and governance. This development committee helps when Iddir engage in development activities and other pressing societal matters such as natural disaster, war, contribution for GERD, educating people on various social crises (i.e., COVID-19 and HI/AIDS)

and political matters (i.e., election). In addition, Iddir works with social accountability committee, which works on issues of making various bodies accountable for their action.”

The Chair of *Merhabetie Burial Association Iddir* interviewed on 11 September 2020 argued that:

“Iddir also works with the Work and Social Security Office, which has launched Productive Safety Net Programme aiming at reducing food insecurity and vulnerability. To participate in this programme, community members usually come together which creates an opportunity for Iddir to meet community members in one place and discuss various development and governance related matters.”

Finally, the Chair of *Woiramba Women Development Iddir* interviewed on 4 September 2020 also indicated that:

“Iddir works with some organisations such as ACORD Ethiopia. Such civil society provides financial support to Iddir though the support has been insignificant, inconsistent and lacking sustainability.”

8.5.4 What is the Contribution of Iddir?

Even though *Iddir* is viewed as traditional entities that cannot do much in terms of development and governance, they have contributed to socio-cultural, economic and political dimensions of development and governance.

8.5.4.1 Socio-cultural contribution

In terms of socio-cultural contribution, *Iddir* has engaged in education particularly working with the surrounding schools and other concerned bodies of the government. To this end, the Deputy Chair of *Day Giorgis Burial Association Iddir* interviewed on 6 September 2020 pointed out that:

“There are some Iddir who are educating students by covering all their education costs including tuition fees at elementary level. In addition, some Iddir are providing school materials like exercise books, pen, pencil, uniform at the beginning of school year. Iddir also involves in feeding students whose families are poor and are not able to feed their children. But such interventions are not common to all Iddir and are undertaken in a fragmented and occasional manner. It all depends on the capacity of each Iddir.”

Iddir is working with schools to address issues of ethical problems, deterioration of moral values, and discipline from both instructors and students’ side. The Chair of *Kidus Teklehaymanot* and *Michael Iddir* interviewed on 2 September 2020 indicated that:

“As a result of Iddir’s intervention, some corrective actions were taken on some instructors who behaved unethically in their relationship with female students, including sexual harassment, in the school compound. In addition, Iddir also work with all school stakeholders including the school itself, family, and the Office of Trade and Industry, justice sector and police to shut down shisha houses, Khat chewing houses, night clubs, small movie houses that tempt and divert students’ attention from their studies and engage in practices that are dangerous for their future life”.

School surroundings are conducive for practices that easily draw immature students into bad behaviours including early and unprotected sexual intercourse. According to the Chair of *Menzina Gishe Iddir* interviewed on 10 September 2020:

“Around schools, there are hotels that provide bedroom services which create conducive environment for sexual intercourse and trigger students to engage in such practices. In addition, there are some commissioned middlemen who mediate between schoolgirls and individuals who want to attract female students to sexual intercourse tempting them with money. By struggling a lot and working with various bodies concerned, Iddir has managed to close down some of these hotels. Successful efforts were also made by Iddir to curb the psychological and health crises of such sexual intercourse on female students and families. As a

result, in some schools Iddir has influenced the government to include the agenda of transmittable disease like HIV/AIDS into school curriculum.”

In terms of contributing to citizen’s education, some *Iddir* provide monetary support to members who join and attend university level education. Accordingly, the Chair of *Arat Menta Ena Akababiw Wendimamachoch Iddir* interviewed on 13 September 2020 indicated that:

“Some Iddir have the practice of providing a lump sum monetary support of ETB 1 500, 2 000, 3 000 and 5 000 for members who attend diploma, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, and PhD level studies respectively. Again, some Iddir prepare a platform of learning and knowledge sharing among members. In addition to learning from each other, some guests and motivational speakers are invited to provide motivational speeches to inspire members. There are also trainings provided by some Iddirs on critical thinking and innovation.”

The above activities are practices observed only in few *Iddir* that are formed and managed by youth. Such practices are not common in *Iddir* formed by elderly people and women *Iddir*. The latter two are characterised by maintaining the status quo. This may be due to lack of exposure to formal and modern education and lack of knowhow. In terms of human capacity, almost all *Iddir* are weak. In the case of *Iddirs* formed by youth, however, the Chair of *Arat Menta Ena Akababiw Wendimamachoch Iddir* interviewed on 13 September 2020 pointed out that:

“There are some educated members in the field of banking, economics, engineering, sociology etc. These people are striving to make their Iddir to be a bit modernised. They even strived to undertake mini-research and analyse the situation to exploit all opportunities in the environment. However, this is not common to all Iddir.”

8.5.4.2 Contribution to health

In terms of contribution to health of the community, *Iddir* has played roles in preventing HIV/AIDS and COVID-19. Internally, *Iddir* provide members with some money during

sickness and death of family members according to their bylaws. For most *Iddir*, this is the main reason of existence because the purpose is mutual support. However, *Iddir* are engaged in various community health-related matters. To this end, the Chair of *Woiramba Women Development Iddir* interviewed on 4 September 2020 revealed that:

“Almost all Iddir, depending on the extent of their capacity, strived to involve in prevention of COVID-19 and HIV/AIDs. Some Iddir have transmitted COVID-19 related information using microphone on roundabouts where citizens are easily available. Others used various social gatherings including Iddir meetings, funerals and wedding ceremonies to aware people on COVID-19 and as to how to prevent it.”

The Chair of *Sostegna Menged Youth Iddir* interviewed on 12 September 2020, the Chair of *Andinet Fana Iddir* interviewed on 1 September 2020 and the Chair of *Menzina Gishe Iddir* interviewed on 10 September 2020 stated that:

“There were also incidents where some Iddir used door-to-door approach to teach people. Iddir was teaching citizens focusing on such issues as social distancing, hand washing, use of facemask, use of sanitiser, and all the necessary precautions to prevent the transmission of COVID-19. Iddir provided hand sanitisers, soaps, facemasks and condoms to citizens who are not able to afford. In addition, they focused on the use of condom and refraining from having unprotected sex to prevent citizens from being infected by HIV/AIDs. Some Iddir also searched for drug addicted young citizens through snowballing mechanism and took them to treatment centres for diagnosis. In addition, some Iddir have provided monetary support to institutions that work on mentally retarded people. Although in a very rare case, there are also some Iddir, whose financial status is in a relatively better position, who managed to provide physical assets, i.e., hospital and ambulance for community’s use.”

8.5.4.3 Poverty alleviation

In addition to education and health-focused intervention, the Chair of *Woiramba Women Development Iddir* interviewed on 4 September 2020 and the Chair of *Andinet Fana Iddir* interviewed on 1 September 2020 pointed out that:

“Iddir also involves in resolving social problems of people in poverty. Most Iddir are undertaking a programme known as “ma’ed makwades”, which means sharing food. This programme aims at feeding destitute citizens who do not have the daily bread. The programme also addresses other issues such as renewing the shelters and houses of poor and elderly people. Iddir has provided supports in monetary and non-monetary terms to those who are displaced from their original occupations and livelihoods due to the security problems in the country. During such social crises, Iddir that have relatively better resource capacity provide support based on the request of their respective woredas.”

8.5.4.4 Maintenance of cultural values

In terms of maintaining fundamental cultural values of the community, *Iddir* is contributing their fair share. To this end, it is striving to discourage some practices that are considered as taboo by the community. According to the Chair of *Woiramba Women Development Iddir* interviewed on 4 September 2020:

“Iddir is fighting against homosexuality in the country by teaching the society. In recent time, such practices have showed an expanding tendency particularly in the capital of the country. This is happening because there are fertile grounds such as movie houses that show pornographic movies, expansion of nightclubs that allow naked dancing, encourage wildish behaviour and promote unreserved and unprotected sexual practices.”

Iddirs are so conscious and concerned about these problems because these practices are not only taboo and completely unacceptable by the community but also adversely affect the future of the young generation. In this regard, the Chair of *Mehal Genet Iddir*

interviewed on 9 September 2020 and the Chair of *Woiramba Women Development Iddir* interviewed on 4 September 2020 revealed that:

“Some students who have minimal or no family follow-up, pretend to go to school but actually they spend school time watching pornographic and seductive movies. They dress their uniform when they get out of their homes keeping other clothes in their bag, then they replace their uniform with seductive dresses before going to movie houses. These dresses leave some parts of their body naked particularly their belly button and they never feel ashamed of it. They even publicly say ‘እምብርት አለኝ’ which means, ‘I have the belly button’ and ‘የተወለድኩት በሞሃህን በኩል ነው’ which is to mean, ‘I was born through the womb’. This is to justify their actions saying that nothing is new, everything we are doing is normal. All these are the outcomes of exposing children to western movies without being selective. Sometimes, recreational areas such as parks that are placed in the city also encourage bad behaviours like having sex in open areas in the field. Parks have attracted and created an enabling environment for people who chew Khat sitting in a car the whole day.”

In order to curb these problems, some *Iddir* encourage their members to get married and be role models for the other young citizens in the surrounding. Some *Iddir* motivate young members who engage in marriage by providing them with monetary rewards. The Chair of *Arat Menta Ena Akababiw Wendimamachoch Iddir* interviewed on 13 September 2020 reported that:

“Most Iddir strongly believe that marriage encourages citizens to feel responsible for every action they take and decisions they make. Hence, there are Iddir who award ETB 2 000 to 5 000 depending on the capacity, when their young members get married.”

8.5.4.5 Economic and political issues.

In addition to socio-cultural perspective, *Iddir* also contributes in terms of economic and political perspectives. Regarding the economic role of *Iddir*, the Chair of *Andinet Fana Iddir* interviewed on 1 September 2020 argued that:

“Iddir contributes money for various development activities including the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Iddir also contributes resources, in monetary and non-monetary terms, i.e., labour, inner and main asphalt road networks development. Some Iddir have purchased bank share that would indirectly contribute to the economy.”

From the perspective of political contribution, FGD interviewees indicated that:

“Iddir does not usually involve in politics but upon the request of the woreda and personnel of the Election Board, provided tents during elections. Iddir also participates in election observation. Iddirs make all possible efforts including advising citizens to act according to the principles of election and exposing any illicit acts, which is against the principle of election.”

8.5.4.6 Conflict and security issues

Iddir contributes to solving and handling conflicts and security problems of the community. According to the Chair of *Merhabetie Burial Association Iddir* interviewed on 11 September 2020 and the Chair of *Woiramba Women Development Iddir* interviewed on 4 September 2020:

“Iddir provides information to the police about any crime acts observed in the community. Iddir works with the community to prevent crime and resolve conflicts. Iddir usually establishes a committee in the community, which works on conflict management, and works actively with this committee to solve conflict that takes place in the community. Conflict could happen among individuals or groups due to resources like land. When the case is simple, Iddir itself tries to settle the problem on the spot. However, when the case is complicated, they take the case

to shemagilewoch, elderly individuals who are respected by the community to settle the case. In addition, in some cases, members of the police from community policing department are invited in the process. Therefore, all possible efforts are made by Iddir to settle the cases to prevent submission of the case to the formal court. Iddir also cooperate with the community by contributing money for the salary paid to the community security guards.”

Iddir is also one important entity that bridges between the government and the community. Although, the government fails to give adequate recognition to the role of Iddir, when it wants to communicate various issues of development, the government uses Iddir because they are not only closer to the community but also acceptable by the community. The Chair of *Andinet Fana Iddir* interviewed on 1 September 2020 pointed out that:

“Iddir plays roles in transmitting urgent information, creating awareness and alerting citizens on matters that demand serious attention of the community. The government uses Iddir as one of the channels to reach the community. When it needs monetary contribution from the public, it uses Iddir. When it wants to organise citizens on various development agenda, it uses Iddir. Although it uses Iddir for the above purposes, the government fails to consider Iddir as one of the helpful entities. This is true because the government does not provide a meaningful support in legal, financial and technical terms.”

8.5.4.7 Major challenges encountered by Iddir

The above discussion regarding the contribution of Iddir is not to over-exaggerate their role and contribution beyond what they are. It is rather to show what Iddir, as one of the essential actors, is capable of making a contribution if they are provided with the opportunity, if the challenges that they are encountering are addressed and if they are provided with all-round supports. The following section, therefore, presents the challenges encountered by Iddir in the course of their actions. These challenges include a lack of legal acceptance and recognition, a lack of a collaborative mindset, a lack of

resources, and internal capacity problems, including financial, human, and physical capital. These challenges are presented in the following paragraphs.

- Legal constraints. The legal system in Ethiopia keeps traditional CSOs at bay. It fails to accept them as essential development actors. Due to the advantage of proximity to communities, non-formal institutions not only have better knowledge and understanding about the community but also, they can contribute in various ways including promoting democratic and human rights, airing the voice of voiceless and poverty reduction (Dessalegn 2008:118; Tadele 2015:93).

Despite this reality, in the three successive regimes i.e., the imperial, military *Derg* and the EPRDF, the legal frameworks have been negligent of the non-formal institutions like *Iddir*. Of these three regimes, however, the imperial regime was an exception because, as argued by Dessalegn (2008:118), there were at least some articles (i.e., Article 404 to 482) of the Civil Code 1960 and the Association Registration Regulations (Legal Notice 321) of 1966 regarding the governance of voluntary sector, which also concerns the traditional non-formal institutions *per se*.

During the *Derg* and the EPRDF regimes, the legal frameworks were not only focusing mainly on narrowing civic spaces but were also negligent of the traditional non-formal institutions. To this end, the legal documents of these regimes failed to consider institutions like *Iddir*. For instance, Article 3(2) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation 621/2009 of the EPRDF regime states that the provisions of the proclamation do not apply to *Iddir*, *Equb*, and other similar cultural or religious associations. Likewise, Article 3(b) of the revised Civil Society Organisation Proclamation No. 1113/2019 under PM Abiy's administration also states that the proclamation is not applicable to *Iddir*, *Equb* and similar traditional institutions. In this regard, the Chair, *Kechene Iddir* Council, interviewed on 5 September 2020 stated that:

“Even though Iddir is contributing to socio-cultural, economic and political streams of development and governance, it has not been recognised by the law of the government as an essential actor.”

Both the above-mentioned proclamations called *Iddir* a “traditional institution” which has adverse psychological implications and underestimates its contribution in the process of societal transformation, development and governance of the nation. The fact that *Iddir* has been denied legal recognition in the laws governing formal civil society put them at the disadvantaged position. There is no formal mechanism in place for *Iddir* to graduate from the non-formal to formal institutions. Being non-formal also has several disadvantages in terms of accessing resources, getting acceptance by different bodies and eligibility to claim various rights.

The government approaches *Iddir* only when it wants to for its purposes such as elections, conflict management and peace and security, or inculcating some propaganda into the community. It, then, never returns and visits the *Iddir* again once it has achieved the purpose. In this regard, the Chair of *Andinet Fana Iddir* interviewed on 1 September 2020 expressed this approach of government using Amharic expression as:

“መንግስት የሚፈልገው ዕድርን እንደ ሸንከራ አኝኮ መትፋት ብቻ ነው። ሲፈልገው ይጠቀምበታል፤ ነገር ግን ጉዳዩን ከፈጸመ በኋላ ዘር ብሎ አያየውም።” (This is just to mean that ‘the intention of the government is to chew *Iddir* just like sugarcane and spit it after sucking the sugar).

He also said:

“መንግስት ሲፈልግ በዕድሮች ይጠቀማል እንጂ ዕድሮችን ግን በምንም መንገድ ጠቅሞ አያውቅም”, (which is to say that the government uses *Iddir* for its purposes, but it has never benefited and supported *Iddir* back in any form).

According to Sisay (2003:101), non-formal institutions like *Iddir* should not be denied recognition not only because there are useful lessons they provide to the

formal institutions but also because they help in consolidating and bonding the community together where the formal state and state institutions fail. In addition, Yimer (2007:3) argued that *Iddir* serve as a firm ground for the formal CSOs to evolve as a strong actor in advocacy and promoting democratic and human rights. The Economic Commission for Africa also argued that these traditional institutions play essential roles in promoting democratic governance and development. For democratic states to consolidate democratic principles and ethos, they must incorporate indigenous values of the society, which is possible through the support and engagement of the traditional institutions. Traditional governance institutions can also play useful roles in terms of advising the government, enhancing participation and complementing the formal government institutions in mobilising citizens to engage in development and governance activities. This is possible only when the traditional institutions are integrated into the formal mainstream institutions instead of underestimating them (UNECA 2007: iii).

- Lack of a collaborative mindset. According to Jeffrey (2017:10), horizontal collaboration is essential for many reasons. First, it helps institutions to transfer knowledge and learn from each other. It also helps for information sharing. In addition, it helps to fill resource gaps as some resources that are not available in one institution may exist in another. Furthermore, a horizontal collaborative effort and collective action among *Iddir* can help to put pressure on the *woreda* as well as other concerned bodies to respond to the needs of *Iddir* as well as the community. Although horizontal collaboration has these benefits, horizontally, *Iddir* neither have collaboration among themselves nor with other entities like private sectors or businesspersons.

Horizontal collaboration among *Iddir* is constrained partly by *Iddir* themselves. This is because, according to the Deputy Chair of *Day Giorgis Burial Association Iddir* interviewed on 6 September 2020:

“Members of some Iddir, which are particularly formed and managed by older people, do not have a positive attitude toward horizontal collaboration among Iddir. They usually see such relationship as a threat. They complain that some weak Iddir approach the well-to-do Iddirs just to take advantage, i.e. intending to get access to resources while they have nothing to give back in return.”

Horizontal relation among *Iddir* and private businesses is also missing. There are two factors responsible for this. The first problem is attributed to private businesses. Private businesses fail to consider *Iddir* as an important and helpful entity. According to the Chair of *Andinet Fana Iddir* interviewed on 1 September 2020:

“Private businesses usually see Iddir as weak, traditional and less important entities. As a result, instead of establishing horizontal relations with Iddir, they usually prefer to establish a strong relationship with the woreda. Whenever the woreda requests them for various supports, they quickly respond because they want to be seen positively by the woreda. Establishing a good relationship with the woreda would increase their level of acceptance and importance and thereby increase their level of influence on the woreda policies and rules.”

In reality however, *Iddir* is important in terms of mediating between private businesses and the community. One typical area could be corporate social responsibility (CSR). Investors, particularly those who run large investment funds, are expected to discharge social responsibilities by responding to the demands of the surrounding local community. This could be in the form of building primary schools, health posts, manual ground water pumps and grinding machines. In the process of this corporate social responsibility, *Iddir* can play a role in terms of identifying the priority areas of the community and guiding investors to decide as to what to do, where to do and when to do the CSR projects for the community. In addition, *Iddir* can also contribute such projects through labour. On top of that, they can coordinate the community for the success of CSR projects.

The second problem of horizontal relations between private businesses and *Iddir* emanates from the internal weaknesses of *Iddir* itself. The Chair of *Arat Menta Ena Akababiw Wendimamachoch Iddir* interviewed on 13 September 2020 indicated that:

“In some rare occasions where private businesses show an interest to, for instance, financially support Iddir, they usually demand Iddirs to submit written technical and financial project proposals as to how the money would be utilised. Even though it is ideally correct, practically, however, Iddir lack skilled human resource to prepare such proposals.”

Therefore, they cannot move further to satisfy the demands of investors and access resources. Many *Iddir* do not even have strategic plan. Another destructive problem of *Iddir* that discourages horizontal relations with business entities is attitudinal and cultural problems. Particularly, *Iddir* formed and managed by aged people usually consider getting supports from others as being “degraded” and “dishonoured” and they tend to refrain from asking for support. Hence, they prefer to live according to the Amharic proverb “ኩራት እራት ነው”, which roughly means, “Pride is a dinner”.

In terms of horizontal collaboration with NGOs working in the locality, there are some organisations like ACORD Ethiopia, which provide loans to *Iddir*, particularly women *Iddir*. However, the Chair of *Kidus Teklehaymanot and Michael Iddir* interviewed on 2 September 2020 and the Chair of *Merhabetie Burial Association Iddir* interviewed on 11 September 2022 pointed out that:

“The challenge is that these organisations come with the money but they fail to build the capacity of these Iddir as to how to effectively use the money for the intended purpose. Iddir itself fail to meet the demand and expectations of these NGOs in terms of returning the loans provided to them. This is because Iddir as well as the local community have developed the mindset that the money that comes from NGOs particularly the international ones, in the form of loan is non-returnable. In addition, they may also fail to return the money because, in many cases, they fail to achieve the purposes.”

- Lack of human, financial and physical capital. Most *Iddir* face serious financial capital problems. Apart from some *Iddir* that have educated and skilled members working in government and non-governmental institutions, the majority of *Iddir* lack the technical knowhow to explore their surroundings, design project proposals and mobilise funds. Consequently, the majority of *Iddir* are compelled to rely only on members' contributions. Lack of knowhow also adversely affects *Iddir* because most of the interviewed members of *Iddir* have no idea that *Iddir*, as an institution itself, can be considered as 'group collateral' to access credit from micro-financial institutions. In addition to lack of knowhow, *Iddir* is constrained in accessing bank loans because of the need for collateral. The Chair of *Arat Menta Ena Akababiw Wendimamachoch Iddir* interviewed on 13 September 2020 pointed out that:

“Few Banks like Buna Bank, one of the private banks in Ethiopia, has launched a special programme to sponsor various social activities undertaken by Iddir. However, such opportunities are rare though they are important in terms of supporting Iddir financially.”

Generally, financial institutions like banks are not inviting and approachable for *Iddir* because of the high interest rate on loans and collateral requirements that are not affordable for *Iddir*. As a result, there is limited assistance provided by the government, non-governmental financial institutions, and private business organizations.

According to the Chair of *Merhabetie Burial Association Iddir* interviewed on 11 September 2020 and the Deputy Chair of *Day Giorgis Burial Association Iddir* interviewed on 6 September 2020:

“Iddir is also facing challenges from human capital point of view. This problem can be seen from leadership and technical workforce points of view. Iddir' leaders are elected from the members in a democratic way. However, leaders who are supposed to introduce new ways of doing things and modernising the organisation lack the required modern organisational leadership skills. Such

situation forced many Iddir to remain in the status quo. Some Iddirs, except few, do not even have strategic plan, clear vision and objectives. They are simply guided by the bylaws alone. In addition to leadership level skills, Iddir also lack technical and operational level workers. Iddir has capacity to hire and retain educated human resources in various disciplines. As a result, most Iddir are adopting backward work system. Some do not have bookkeeping and accounting system and their works are not even supported by computer. To the extent, some Iddir have no bank account and the money contributed by members are kept in the hands of individuals. They are not effectively engaging in a formal money transaction system.”

In addition to financial and human capital problems, most *Iddir* lack physical resources including offices, permanent meeting halls, vehicles, computers, internet services and other facilities. In addition, *Iddir* lacks access to land. In this regard, the Chair of *Mehal Genet Iddir* interviewed on 9 September 2020 and the Chair of *Menzina Gishe Iddir* interviewed on 10 September 2020 reported that:

“This time, land has become one of the critical resources. In order to get a plot of urban land, the formal procedure is not functioning properly and the non-formal and illegal way dominates more. The response of some officials, when it comes to land, was completely discouraging. In an official meeting one government official said, ‘Never expect the government to provide you with a land. It will never happen’. Hence, for Iddir that want to respect laws and depend on formal procedure, it is difficult, if not entirely impossible, to get access to land resources. There are a handful of Iddir who have their own buildings; most of them have accessed land resources through bribe and corruption.”

It is therefore difficult for traditional institutions like *Iddir* to access land resources with ease.

8.6 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this chapter analysed the role of formal and non-formal CSOs in development and governance by focusing on their advocacy, service delivery and watchdogging role across the three different periods identified for this study.

Accordingly, it has arose from the analysis that during the first period, CSOs could play a positive role in advocacy by making a meaningful contribution to policy, lobbying the government, and working on rights-based issues. In terms of service delivery, they could make a meaningful contribution to social service provision, environmental rehabilitation, job creation, capacity-building, relief and rehabilitation, and promotion of economic activities. In terms of watchdogging, CSOs could contribute to making the government accountable for its actions. In this regard, institutions working on human rights, gender equality and election board strived to make the government accountable by actively engaging in identifying, auditing and reporting malpractices and violence. During the second period except for the service-delivery role of CSOs which remained active, the advocacy and watchdogging role of CSOs was completely hampered. During the third period, even though CSOs' contribution in advocacy, service delivery and watchdogging was not as good as the first period, they could make some positive contributions.

With regard to the role of the non-formal civil society, i.e., *Iddir*, it is a useful institution not only in terms of complementing the works of formal institutions but also in terms of independently discharging various societal responsibilities. As seen in the analysis, *Iddir* is involved in the social, economic, political and cultural spectrum of development and governance. However, their contribution is constrained due to lack of legal backing and other forms of support from the government, poor collaboration among *Iddir* and other actors and lack of internal capacity including financial, human and physical capitals. The next chapter winds up the thesis by providing a summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this study was to analyze the contributions and challenges of civil society in governance and development and state-civil society relations in post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia. In order to achieve this, the study addressed the following specific objectives.

- To provide a thorough analysis of the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of civil society as well as the state-civil society relations in Ethiopia.
- To investigate the influence of external and internal contextual factors on the contributions of civil society.
- To analyse the role and contributions of civil society in the development and governance of Ethiopia and how changes in policies impacted civil society.
- To examine the nature of state-civil society relations in the context of post-1991 contemporary Ethiopia in terms of the time periods of 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017 and 2018 to date.
- To suggest guidelines for better state-civil society relations and effective contribution of civil society to the development and governance of Ethiopia.

9.2 SUMMARY

The opening chapter of the research work provides a detailed and comprehensive overview of the context and background of the study. It highlights the problem statement, research objectives, and the significance of the study. The second chapter goes deeper into the theories and schools of thought related to civil society. It explores scholars' different perspectives and approaches in this field, allowing for a better understanding of the subject matter. Chapter 3 conducts a literature and document-based review, analyzing the specific roles and contributions of civil society in the development and governance of societies. This chapter provides an in-depth understanding of the significance of civil society and its contributions to society.

Additionally, Chapter 4 offers a detailed account of the history and development of civil society in Ethiopia. It covers three distinct regimes, providing a comprehensive understanding of how civil society has evolved over time. Moving on, Chapter 5 outlines the methodology employed in the study. It includes the philosophical worldview, research approach and design, sampling, data collection, and analysis methods. This chapter provides insight into the research process and the methods used to gather the necessary data. Chapter 6 delves into the intricate details of state-civil society relations, examining the various factors that shape its independence and attitudes and the agency's role in civil society organizations. Chapter 7 scrutinizes the post-1991 context of civil society. It explores the political, ideological, legal, and economic factors that have influenced the growth and development of civil society in Ethiopia. This chapter provides a comprehensive understanding of the environment in which civil society operates. Furthermore, Chapter 8 offers a comprehensive analysis of civil society's role in advocacy, watchdogging, and service delivery in the post-1991 period. Finally, the last chapter provides the conclusion, recommendations, and future research areas that need the attention of researchers. To this end, the chapter will conclude the study by summarizing the key research findings in relation to the research aims and research questions, as well as the values and contributions thereof. Overall, this research provides a comprehensive understanding of civil society in Ethiopia and its contributions to society.

9.3 CONCLUSIONS

The study's first objective was to comprehensively analyze the concepts and theories underpinning civil society in post-1991 Ethiopia. The findings suggest that during the first period, the government adhered to the neoliberal model to gain support from Western countries, despite having leftist tendencies. During this time, civil society enjoyed greater autonomy and independence and was pivotal in promoting the country's overall progress. In the second period, the government adopted the developmental state ideology, which increased its role and involvement and limited civil society's role. In this period, civil society was considered a foe rather than a friend and faced systemic

suppression. In the third period, the government demonstrated interest in expanding the space for civil society organisations, despite having a unique theory of change known as "medemer". This willingness to open space allowed civil society to contribute to societal transformation.

These findings can be explained in terms of the two dominant theoretical views discussed in Chapter 2, i.e., the right-wing or neoliberal and the left-wing. When we see the findings in line with these theories, the orientation of the state in the first and third periods, i.e., the periods when the government opened up the space for civil society, confirms the rights-wing neoliberal theory that argues that creating a more fertile ground for civil society is vital for them to proliferate and to make a contribution to positive social change (Keane 2012:4; Kaldor 2003; Tayler 2006:204; Kaviraj, 2001:292; Jailobaeva 2011:27). On the contrary, the orientation of the Ethiopian state during the second period confirms the left-wing theory, which according to Femia (2001: 134), Taylor (2006: 97) and Kumar (1993), considers that both the state and civil society are interdependent and essential for each other but emphasizes the state's role more than civil society. As discussed in Chapter 6, the experience of the developmental state of Ethiopia that was practiced during the second period confirms the left-wing school of thought in that it emphasizes the state's role more than civil society in promoting development and governance. However, it diverges from this view in that it views civil society as a foe instead of considering it as an essential entity. The developmental state exercised in Ethiopia was utterly hostile to rights-based civil society, which prioritised advocating for the protection and promotion of rights. Given this, it is clear that the Ethiopian developmental state approach was not conducive to the flourishing of rights-based civil society in the country. The finding from the particular case of Ethiopia confirms the argument established in the first chapter that the neoliberal model sets a more fertile ground for civil society to effectively and meaningfully contribute to the development and societal transformation than the developmental state model.

Other developmental states need to take note of these limitations and work towards creating a more favorable environment for the growth and success of a rights-based

civil society. By doing so, they can ensure that these organizations can carry out their essential work, promote development and governance, and ensure societal transformation in the communities they serve. Consequently, this would lead to the proliferation of a more capable civil society that can play its fair share and positively contribute to the nation's development.

Overall, the study provides valuable insights into the dynamism of underpinning theoretical and ideological traditions that significantly shape the nature and status of civil society. The findings imply the importance of giving more open space and maintaining a conducive and consistent theory of change and ideological tradition over time for civil society to operate effectively and make a meaningful contribution.

The study's second objective was to explore the influence of external and internal contextual factors on civil society's contributions over three distinct periods. This is necessary as previous studies had not delved into these factors, and their role in determining civil society's contributions was not thoroughly examined, as argued in section 1.4. This study investigated various factors external to civil society. Throughout three distinct periods, the state of civil society was largely shaped and influenced by a complex array of political, legal, and economic factors. During the first and third periods, civil society organizations experienced growth and proliferation due to favorable political climates that enabled them to operate effectively. As a result, they were able to contribute significantly to Ethiopia's development through different activities and initiatives. These organizations expanded their reach and impact due to the enabling political environment, which allowed them to operate freely and without undue restrictions. However, during the second period, the government adopted a more restrictive stance towards non-governmental organizations, including civil society. This situation made it difficult for these organizations to operate and pursue their goals effectively. The government's restrictive policies and actions significantly impacted civil society's contributions and hindered their growth and impact during this period.

Concerning the legal environment, various changes in the regulatory framework have been observed over time, impacting civil society differently. The laws were inadequate

during the first period, although less restrictive than in subsequent periods. In the second period, the government imposed severe repression. It implemented legal restrictions that had notable negative implications for civil society as it limited their ability to operate freely and pursue their objectives effectively. On the other hand, the laws improved significantly during the third period, creating a more conducive environment for civil society organizations. However, it is impossible to be confident about the practicability and sustainability of the current conducive legal environment given the uncertainty and unpredictability of the country's situation.

The economic environment also played a crucial role in shaping civil society's prospects. Despite facing unfavorable economic conditions during the first and third periods, civil society organizations were able to pursue their goals because of unrestricted access to foreign funds. This situation enabled these organizations to continue operating and contributing to Ethiopia's development. However, the second period was marked by a significant economic downturn, which was accompanied by a range of setbacks, including economic sabotage that indirectly hindered the progress of civil society. Moreover, access to foreign funds was severely limited during this period, making it more challenging for civil society organizations to maintain their operations and pursue their objectives.

In terms of internal context, civil society organizations have been analyzed throughout three periods based on their available resources, including human, financial, and physical assets. During the first period, these organizations were able to attract and retain talented individuals, acquire physical assets, and generate income, resulting in a robust and thriving civil society. This period was marked by a sense of optimism and a belief in the power of collaboration to effect change. However, during the second period, civil society organizations faced significant challenges due to funding restrictions and a weakened availability of resources, including human, financial, and physical resources. This situation led to a decrease in their overall effectiveness and a reduction in the number of organizations. The lack of resources meant that civil society organizations could not carry out their planned activities, which decreased their impact on society.

This period was marked by a sense of disillusionment and a feeling that civil society organizations could not achieve their goals.

In contrast, the third period brought renewed hope for civil society organizations, providing a more open space to engage in income-generating activities without restrictions. Although this new environment created a loophole for misuse and abuse of responsibilities by CSOs in some cases, it allowed a more significant number of civil society organizations to emerge and re-energize existing ones. These organizations were empowered to carry out their activities and achieve their goals, positively impacting society. Civil society is in a much better position than in the previous period, with more resources and a greater capacity to effect change. However, it is essential to note that the sustainability of the current civil society's status is uncertain, given the overall external environment in the country. The unpredictability of contextual factors can significantly impact civil society organizations and their internal capacity. As such, evaluating civil society organizations and their resources is vital to ensure their continued success and impact. This situation will provide a better understanding of the situation and help identify areas where support is needed to ensure the sustainability of civil society organizations.

Theories pertaining to civil society's enabling environment emphasize the importance of establishing a favorable legal framework, government policies, social norms, attitudes, and economic and political factors that can influence the capacity of civil society to efficiently organize, operate, and advocate for their respective causes. Failure to provide an enabling environment may hinder their ability to bring about positive changes (Antlov, Brinkerhoff, & Rapp 2010:422; CIVICUS 2013:10; Fioramonti & Kononykhina 2015: 472; UNDP 2013). The arguments made in the above section confirm these theories in that contextual factors are pivotal in determining the extent to which civil society can contribute to fostering development and social transformation.

The external environment beyond its boundaries heavily influences the functioning of civil society in Ethiopia. The dynamic nature of this environment brings both constructive and adverse consequences to civil society, hence the need to comprehend the impact

of such factors. By examining these dynamics in detail, the study provides a better understanding of the challenges faced by civil society organizations in Ethiopia and identifies potential areas for improvement and support. This study emphasizes the significance of establishing a favorable political, legal, and economic climate to support the growth and success of civil society. Addressing the challenges imposed by these factors can significantly bolster the capacity of civil society to attain its objectives. It is important to support and empower civil society to make positive contributions to the betterment of society. However, ensuring proper oversight of civil society is equally important to prevent any negative impacts it may impose on society. Hence, striking a balance between these two issues is key to fostering a thriving and effective civil society.

In this study, the third objective is to explore the contribution of civil society in the development and governance of Ethiopia, as well as the challenges they face. The study examines three major issues that civil society seeks to address in their contribution to development and analyzes the challenges they encounter. Its significance lies in providing a comprehensive analysis of civil society's contributions and challenges, specifically in advocacy, watchdogging, and service delivery, over three different periods, unlike previous studies that focused on specific areas of intervention at a specific time.

It has come out from this study that civil society played vital roles in advocacy, service delivery, and watchdogging during the first period. They influenced policy and promoted democratic rights through lobbying and raising awareness. They provided social services, supported economic activities, and contributed to capacity-building. They also held the government accountable by identifying and reporting malpractices and violence. In the second period, civil society made positive contributions to service delivery. However, the government's aggressive behavior towards civil society limited its ability to advocate and act as a watchdog. Advocacy and watchdogging activities were considered a no-play zone for civil society. As a result, civil society could not effectively engage in advocacy and watchdogging activities. During the third period, the role of civil

society was not as prominent as in the first period. Nevertheless, they were able to make some valuable contributions in terms of advocacy, service delivery, and watchdogging. Although their impact was less significant, their contributions were still commendable.

The contribution of civil society to development has been a topic of much discussion among theorists. One of the key aspects of this contribution is to fill gaps in services that the government fails to fill due to various limitations, such as technical, financial, and time constraints. Additionally, civil society should advocate for the rights of the poor, marginalized, and voiceless groups, ensuring their human and democratic rights are respected, and their interests are reflected in policies. Moreover, civil society should play a watchdog role, holding the government accountable for its actions since governments may sometimes act in ways detrimental to their citizens' welfare (Cooper 2018:9; Kreienkamp 2017:6; WEF 2013:9; Green 2017:2; Court et al. 2006:18). Concerning service delivery during the three periods, the findings of this research confirm these theories, demonstrating that civil society organizations in the country have made significant contributions. However, concerning advocacy and watchdog role, the findings diverge from these theories in that there were restrictions on rights-based civil society, which limited their ability to advocate and watchdog effectively. These findings highlight the importance of allowing civil society to operate freely without the threat of restriction or censorship. It is essential to note that civil society organisations play a critical role in promoting rights and development and attempts to restrict their activities can have far-reaching adverse consequences for development.

In section 8.5, the role of *Iddir* in development and governance was discussed. It is essential to recognise the valuable contributions that *Iddir* makes to society, complementing formal civil society organizations and assuming various societal responsibilities, including those related to social, economic, political, and cultural development. Despite its significant contributions to society, *Iddir* has not received sufficient support from the government and other stakeholders. The government fails to provide the necessary support, including legal backing. To this end, *Iddir* is not

recognized as a civil society under the previous and existing formal civil society laws. This lack of recognition significantly hinders *Iddir's* ability to fulfill its crucial societal role. Internally, *Iddir's* effectiveness is also impeded by weak collaboration among its members and other actors, as well as a lack of financial, human, and physical capital. Overall, *Iddir* is an institution that deserves recognition for its invaluable contributions to society, and it is crucial that adequate support is provided to ensure that it continues to thrive in its essential role.

Generally, civil society is essential for a society to function well. These organizations play crucial roles in advocating for various causes, watchdogging and monitoring activities, and providing essential services to the community. The government should recognize and support civil society organizations, ensuring they have the necessary space, resources, and legal protections to carry out advocacy and watchdogging activities freely and effectively. By doing so, the government can ensure that the voices of the people are heard and their needs are met, leading to a more stable and developed society.

The question of state civil society relations remains a topic of debate. The fourth objective of this study was to examine the dynamic relationship between the state and civil society in post-1991 Ethiopia during three different periods. The findings suggest a positive and cooperative relationship between the government and civil society during the first period, but it was not principled and well-organized. The government had a positive attitude towards civil society and did not interfere with their activities or limit their access to funds. The state treated all civil society organizations fairly, regardless of their area of operation. However, during the second period, the relationship between the government and civil society became confrontational and hostile. The government developed a suspicious mindset towards rights-based civil society organizations after the 2005 election, and it imposed restrictions on them due to its developmental state orientation. The government believed that development should take priority over democratic and human rights, and it eliminated the rights-based CSOs from the equation. Both sides had negative attitudes toward each other, contributing to the

worsening relationship. During the third period, the relationship between the state and civil society became more positive and cooperative. The current government sees civil society as a development ally and has taken positive actions towards CSOs, including amending the civil society proclamations to allow for more civic freedom.

As described in Chapter 2, the theories suggest that the relationship between the state and civil society is characterized by cooperation, cooptation, or confrontation (Kalinowski 2008:346; Syal, Wessel & Sahoo 2021:797; Lewis 2013:330; Evans 1996:1119). The study's findings suggest that the relationship between the two was characterized by cooperation during the first and third periods, while it was confrontational during the second period. Consequently, it led to the state excessively suppressing the functioning of civil society and depriving it of its fundamental rights. This confrontation led to the state resorting to extreme measures to suppress and deprive civil society of its fundamental rights. This situation resulted in an unrestrained period where civil society struggled to assert its place. This underscores civil society's multifaceted and nuanced nature and its evolving relationship with the state over time. It is imperative to comprehend these divergent perspectives to fully appreciate the role of civil society in development and societal transformation.

Real collaboration between the state and civil society is needed if development and governance are to occur in an organised and sustainable way. To this end, the nexus between the state and civil society should be further defined, formalised, and based on clear principles. It has become clear that an approach where one actor puts the other actor at bay is no longer the right path to development and governance. Such an approach is a dead end. One actor alone cannot ensure development and governance. Government alone can only ensure development and social transformation by collaboratively working with CSOs, as financial, technical, and time-related capacity limitations exist. Likewise, CSOs can only successfully ensure development with the government's support as they need an enabling work environment that the government should facilitate. Hence, since the ultimate goal of these actors is to ensure development, good governance, and societal transformation, there should be a clear

division of labour between the two, and they should have positive attitudes toward each other so that their efforts can lead to positive social change. Generally, it is essential to recognize the dynamic relationship between Ethiopia's state and civil society. This study provides valuable insights into the nexus between Ethiopia's state and civil society. It underscores the importance of maintaining a relationship where both can play their fair share and contribute positively to the country's development and societal transformation.

Overall, this study aims to explore four logically interconnected research objectives deemed critical in comprehending the various aspects of civil society. The first objective involves laying down the theoretical foundation that serves as the basis for the other research objectives. It is worth noting that the government's theoretical underpinnings and ideological orientation determine the political, legal, and economic contexts within which civil society operates, which is the focus of the second objective. These contexts significantly impacted the nature of civil society, its contributions to development, and its challenges, which are the subject of the third objective. The third objective seeks to unravel the challenges that civil society faces in its quest to make a meaningful contribution to the overall development of society. These challenges can arise from political, economic, and social factors. Finally, the fourth objective explores the relationship between civil society and the state. This objective is essential because the state plays a crucial role in shaping the development of civil society and vice versa. By delving into these research objectives, a more nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics that shape civil society and its role in broader societal development can be gained. It is hoped that, in addition to its theoretical contributions, the insights gained from this study will provide a valuable framework for policymakers, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders working towards building a more robust and inclusive civil society.

9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, recommendations are made to concerned actors including the government, the formal civil society organisations, and the non-formal civil society - *Iddir*.

9.4.1 Recommendations for the Government

- It is recommended that the government prioritise creating and maintaining a stable ideological framework that can accommodate the meaningful contributions of civil society to the development and societal transformation of the country. In a situation where the overall ideology of the government is unclear, confusing, and fluctuating over time, CSOs would not be able to determine and align their organisational ideology and values with the government's overall direction and societal values. Hence, the government needs to implement an ideological tradition that gives civil society more space and entertains their contributions. To this end, the government may consider the benefits of adopting and consistently implementing the neoliberal model, which creates a more fertile ground for civil society to operate effectively and meaningfully.
- Concerning the political environment, it is recommended that the government prioritise creating a more open political space that fosters and encourages civil society to participate in civic activities, including promoting human and democratic rights, peace and security, good governance, equity and justice, and conflict management. The government needs to protect civil society's rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and association while safeguarding them from harassment, intimidation, or violence. This approach not only benefits civil society but also promotes a safe and fair society for all. This can be achieved by promoting volunteerism and acknowledging the crucial role that civil society plays in promoting social cohesion and development.
- In terms of the legal context, it is important that the government show commitment to enforcing the amended civil society law and clear up the doubt and scepticism that civil society organisations have about the sustainability of the changes made in the

legal framework. This action is essential as civil society organisations have been sceptical about the full enforcement of the new law because the country's overall situation is uncertain, its future is unpredictable, and a reversal of the new law may occur.

- Concerning the economic environment, the government should strive to create a more stable economic environment that fosters the growth of civil society organisations. This includes providing greater access to foreign funds and working to prevent economic sabotage that hinders progress. By doing so, civil society organisations will be better equipped to contribute to Ethiopia's development in the long term.
- In terms of supporting civil society, it is essential that the government extend support through different mechanisms, including tax benefits (such as income tax from grants and donations) and fiscal exemption, to help them maintain a stable and sustainable financial capacity. The government can also support civil society by establishing a national fund and providing competitive grants of different types based on their achievements measured against clear and objective criteria. It can also facilitate civil society's access to foreign funds. Moreover, it can provide technical support, business skills, and income-generation skills training. In addition, the government can provide resources such as plots of land on which civil society can build their offices or construct buildings in which they can conduct business activities to generate income and provide social services. However, this support should not be used as a loophole to compromise civil society's independence.
- It is vital that the government support civil society by encouraging the formation of networks and coalitions among civil society organisations to foster collaboration towards a common goal. By working together, these organisations can pool resources and knowledge, ultimately leading to a more impactful contribution to the betterment of society. It is important that the government encourage collaborations between civil society organisations, private sector companies, and government departments. Such collaborations can boost the support, funding, and resources available to civil society organisations from within the nation.

- The government needs to support *Iddir* by providing recognition within the existing legal framework of formal civil society. In this regard, a mechanism or procedure to graduate *Iddir* from non-formal to formal civil society should be put in place upon fulfillment of certain criteria. The government also needs to provide financial support to enhance its role in development and governance. Furthermore, *Iddir* should be provided with a special dispensation to access land resources. In terms of accessing such resources, differential and competitive treatment among *Iddir*, where more support is provided to *Iddir* that make more contributions, may be employed by putting transparent and objective criteria for differentiation in place.
- In terms of advocacy, it is important that the government engage in meaningful dialogue with civil society organisations and seek their input on policy decisions and implementation. This includes creating spaces for regular consultations and providing opportunities for civil society organisations to participate in decision-making processes at all levels of government.
- While recognising civil society's fundamental right to participate in civic life, the government can restrict these activities to nonviolent ones, promote civil society's credibility, and prevent them from supporting specific political parties or candidates through political campaigning. In order to promote virtue and establish a harmonious relationship with the government, civil society is also required to maintain transparency and accountability through financial and performance reporting on its activities. This approach can help promote a healthy civil society while protecting against potential abuses of power and resources.
- It is recommended that the government establish a clear and actionable strategy for developing the civil society sector. State-civil society relations should be based on principles of engagement and guided by a clear strategy that outlines the division of labor between the two. This would help alleviate the distrust and animosity between the government and civil society. It also helps them understand their roles in service provision, policy-making, and promoting democracy and human rights and work together in a supportive manner rather than pushing each other aside. It would help make civil society an effective partner and augment its impact on the community.

- To facilitate smooth and effective state-civil society relations, I recommend establishing national-level institutions such as an active parliamentary committee or a national council that includes civil society and government representatives. These institutions should be equipped with sufficient resources and funding to ensure the development of civil society and productive state-society relations.
- For civil society and state to be supportive to each other and alleviate the climate of distrust and enmity, their relationship should be guided by clear principle of engagement. There should be a clear division of labor between the government and civil society. They need to have positive attitudes toward each other so that their relationship and efforts can lead to positive social change.

9.4.2 Recommendations for Formal Civil Society

- To address the financial capital challenges, civil society needs to exploit all the opportunities provided by Article 63(1)(a) and Article 64(1) of the new Proclamation No. 1113/2019, which allows them to engage in any business and income-generating activities. To this end, it needs to teach itself how to effectively design business plans and establish and run profitable businesses by taking lessons from successful local and international businesses in the country. Horizontal integration and collaboration with businesses and the private sector is also paramount because it helps them learn business skills and benefit from financial support from private entities. This effort, in turn, helps civil society address human and physical capital-related challenges to meet the intended objectives. It also helps civil society to abstain from being tempted and guiding themselves by the availability of the funds.
- Civil society needs to be virtuous and create a good synergy with the government instead of considering the government as a foe. It needs to establish fertile ground for a better and smooth relationship with the government. Civil society needs to abstain from considering itself indispensable and acting rudely toward the government. Such action serves no purpose except for propagating and triggering the government's aggression. It does not create fertile ground for smooth communication and relationship with the government. Instead of focusing on

ridiculing and blaming the government, it is better to acknowledge the positive sides and then criticise the weaknesses in a balanced and genuine way.

- It is important that CSO set up a transparent and accountable internal governance system. To further strengthen their governance systems, CSOs can invest in training and capacity building for staff and board members, as well as establish clear policies and procedures for decision-making and accountability. In addition, it is important that civil society strengthens self-assessment mechanisms and also work through public relations, and provide accurate and timely information to ensure transparency. Ultimately, by focusing on these key areas of improvement, CSOs can enhance their effectiveness and credibility as agents of positive change in society.

9.4.3 Recommendations for Non-formal Civil Society - *Iddir*

- There is a need for horizontal collaboration among *Iddir*. This collaboration would help them share knowledge, resources, and information and support each other. It would also help *Iddir* to grow and create some influence on the government as well as other actors when required.
- There is also a need for collaboration among *Iddir* and local and international NGOs working at the local level. These organisations need to provide leadership, technical, financial, and capacity-building support to *Iddir*.
- There is a need for collaboration between *Iddir* and business entities. This collaboration is helpful for *Iddir* as it facilitates access to financial support from businesses. It also helps businesses discharge their corporate social responsibility (CSR) because *Iddir* can mediate between businesses and the community and guide businesses on the type of CSR projects and initiatives that can be carried out to benefit the community. *Iddir* can also participate in CSR by contributing through labour and other mechanisms. It can also mobilise people to support CSR activities.

9.5 FUTURE RESEARCH FOCUS AREAS

In development and governance, the key actors are the state, private sector, and civil society. It is unlikely that sustainable and holistic development can occur without explicit

engagement, collaboration, and division of labour among these three sectors. Failure to understand how these actors should work together to contribute their fair share would, in turn, lead to failure in development and governance. In this regard, the relations between the state and civil society, civil society and the private sector, and the state and the private sector need to be examined. To this end, this study has attempted to examine state-civil society relations. Hence, analysing the status and nature of the civil society-private sector relationships and the challenges and opportunities of such a relationship in Ethiopia and elsewhere is left for future research. Researchers need to focus on analyzing the civil society-private sector relationship not only because it was not addressed in this study but also because there is scant knowledge about the status, nature, challenges, and opportunities of such a relationship. Methodologically, a qualitative approach is preferable to explore this idea and get in-depth insight.

In the mainstream discourse of the concept of institutions, there is a dichotomous approach and perspectives between formal and non-formal institutions, where more recognition and acknowledgment have been given to formal institutions. In the context of the third sector, the formal institutions are those formally registered and legally recognised CSOs. In contrast, the non-formal ones are traditionally established in society and undertake various social activities. Africa, in general, and Ethiopia, in particular, is known to have both formal and non-formal institutions operating side-by-side in society at different scales and levels of recognition. Aligning these institutions and pulling their efforts together is required so that they make a meaningful contribution toward the common goals, i.e., development and governance. A systematic study is needed to understand how to align the contributions of formal and non-formal institutions. This study has attempted to analyse the role of *Iddir* and its relations with the state. More studies are needed to understand how to strengthen the role of traditional institutions in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa and align and integrate them into the formal institutions so that their contribution can be augmented. Again, a qualitative and case-based study may be appropriate to develop a wealth of information on this phenomenon.

Financial challenge is one of the critical challenges civil society faces. Civil society needs to be financially self-reliant. However, the question is, how can CSOs be financially independent and self-reliant? How can it fully exploit the legal door of opportunities created for them, for instance, currently in Ethiopia, to generate income and ensure their financial independence? How it can possess business development skills and what it can learn from business organisations in this regard are some of the crucial questions that require investigation in future research. Methodologically, comparative studies, case studies, and both quantitative and qualitative studies could be used.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: ETHICAL CLEARANCE

UNISA
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

**DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE
APPLICATION FOR ETHICS REVIEW AND CLEARANCE**

Date: 25/01/2017

Ref
#: 2016_DEVSTUD_Student_38
Name of applicant: Mr/Ms
Beyene ZS
Student #: 48770191

Dear Mr/Ms Beyene ZS

Decision: Ethical Clearance

Name: MR/Ms Beyene ZS

Student in the Department of Development Studies; Supervisor Prof. Kotze D

Proposal: The Role of Civil Society in Development and Governance in the Context of Developmental State of Ethiopia


E-mail: 48770191@mylife.unisa.ac.za

Qualification: Doctoral Degree in Development Studies

Thank you for the application for research ethics clearance by the Department of Development Studies' Research Ethics Review Committee for the above mentioned research. Your application was reviewed in compliance with the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics by the Department of Development Studies' Research Ethics Review Committee on 25/01/2017.

The proposed research may now commence with the proviso that:

- 1) The researcher/s will ensure that the research project adheres to the values and principles expressed in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics.
- 2) Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to the ethicality of the study, as well as changes in the methodology, should be communicated in writing to the Department of Development Studies' Research




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Ethics Review Committee. An amended application could be requested if there are substantial changes from the existing proposal, especially if those changes affect any of the study-related risks for the research participants.

- 3) The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to any applicable national legislation, professional codes of conduct, institutional guidelines and scientific standards relevant to the specific field of study.

Note:
The reference number 2016_DEVSTUD_Student_38 should be clearly indicated on all forms of communication. [E.g. Webmail, E-mail messages, letters] with the intended research participants, as well as with the Department of Development Studies' Research Ethics Review Committee.

Kind regards,



Dr. L. Ntema
Departmental Chairperson-ERC
Department of Development Studies
Room TW 4-25
Tel 012 429 2121
E-mail: ntemal@unisa.ac.za

APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM

Date

Name

Location

1. I offer Mr. Zigiju Samuel Beyene permission to use my interviews, images, and associated documentation in his research and publications, both in Ethiopia and abroad, as well as on the internet.
2. I certify that I am over the age of 18 and that I agree to the terms and conditions stated above.

Signature _____ Date _____

Researcher _____ Signature _____ Date _____

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1. እኔ ስሜ እና አድራሻዬ ከዚህ በላይ የተገለጸው ለአቶ ዝግጁ ሳሙኤል በየገንቢው ቃለ መጠይቆች፣ ጅቶ ግራፎች እና ሌሎች መረጃዎችን ለምርምር ስራዎችና ለህትመት በአገር ውስጥም ሆነ በውጭ አገር እንዲሁም በአለም አቀፍ ድህረ ገጾች እንዲጠቀሙባቸው ፈቅጂላቸዋለሁ።
2. ዕድሜዬ ከ18 ዓመት በላይ መሆኔን እያረጋገጥኩ ከላይ በተገለጸው መሰረት ከእኔ ያገኙትን መረጃዎች ለጥናቱ እንዲጠቀሙ መስማማቴን እገልጻለሁ።

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APPENDIX C: DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE BY CSOs

No.	Name of Civil Society Organization	Year of Establishment	Experts	Proportional Sample ($n_i = N_i/N \cdot n$)
1	Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA)	1991	17	8
2	Peace and Development Center	1991	23	10
3	Consortium for Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA)	1773	30	13
4	Ethiopian Guenet Church Development and Welfare Org.	1999	20	9
5	Ethiopian Red Cross Society	1935	35	16
6	Forum for Social Studies (FSS)	1998	18	8
7	Inter Africa Group (IAG)	1989	20	9
8	Abebech Gobena Charity	1980	22	10
9	Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA)	1997	20	9
10	Agency for Cooperation & Research in Development (ACORD)	1995	20	9
11	Goal Ethiopia	1987	20	9
12	Plan International Ethiopia	1995	20	9
13	Ethiopian Teachers Association	1949	10	4
14	Action for Development	1997	20	9
15	Mission for Community Development Program (MCDP)	1998	18	8
16	Integrated Service on Health & Development Org. (OSHDO)	1997	19	9

17	Professional Alliance for Development (PADet)	1989	20	9
18	Pro-Pride Ethiopia	1995	19	9
19	Mekdim Ethiopia National Association	1996	15	7
20	Ethiopian Public Health Association (EPHA)	1989	10	4
21	Mothers & Children Multisectorial Development Org. (MCMDO)	1997	21	9
22	ActionAid Ethiopia	1989	18	8
23	Facilitation for Change	1998	17	8
24	Care Ethiopia	1984	18	8
25	Selam Children's Village	1986	20	9
	Total		490	220

Source: Own Computation from the Database of ACSO (2020)

NB: n_i = sample allotted for each CSO

N_i = the population of each CSO

N = total population of all CSOs

n = sample size of the study

APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW GUIDES

Interview Guide for Civil Society and Other Sectors

1. How favorable is the ideological, legal, political, economic context for civil society during the three periods?
2. How do you describe the internal context of civil societies in terms of human, financial, physical capacities as well as in internal governance during the three periods?
3. How do you evaluate the characteristics of the relationship between the state and civil society during the three periods?
4. Do you believe that the state provides different kinds of support to civil society? If yes, what are the supports? If not, why the government abstains from supporting civil societies?
5. How do you explain the relationship between Agency for Civil Society Organizations and civil societies?
6. Do you think that the government treats all civil society equally and in a non-discriminatory way?
7. How successful are civil societies in advocacy particularly in terms of influencing government policy, lobbying, promoting human and democratic rights, managing conflicts and promoting peace during the three periods?
8. How successful are civil societies are in watchdogging the government institution and officials to make it accountable for its actions during the three periods?
9. How successful are civil societies in providing welfare and service delivery, promoting local economic development and poverty reduction to the society during the three periods?
10. How successful are civil societies in providing information (publication and other mechanism), educating citizens and building social capital in the country?
11. How successful are civil societies in working collaboratively with the state and private sector?
12. What are the main barriers to civil societies in terms of their relations with the government and in terms of their roles in development and governance of the country?
13. What are the most important actions that need to be taken to improve the impact of civil society in development and governance of the country?

Interview Guide for *Iddirs*

1. How do you define *Iddir*?
2. Does *Iddir* have a formal structure?
3. Do *Iddir* have clear vision and strategic plan?
4. What does the governance of *Iddir* look like?
5. Who does *Iddir* work with? What is the vertical and horizontal linkage of *Iddir* with other formal and non-formal sectors?
6. What are the main political, economic, social and cultural roles and contributions of *Iddir*?
7. How does *Iddir* contribute to conflict management and peace building?

8. What is the legal status of *Iddir*? Is there a legal framework that provides *Iddir* with recognition as an institution? What are the draw backs of the existing legal frameworks in this regard?
9. Does *Iddir* receive any sort of support from other stakeholders? Who supports *Iddir*? What kind of support is provided?
10. What are the major challenges of *Iddir*? How can these challenges be addressed?

APPENDIX E: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Guiding questions for FGD participants

1. How do you evaluate the relationship between state and civil societies during the three periods?
2. How do you evaluate the independence of civil societies from the government during the three periods?
3. Do you think that the government treated all types of civil societies equally and fairly?
4. Do you think that the Agency for Civil Society Organization plays supportive role in its interaction with civil societies?
5. Do you think that the government and civil societies had positive attitude to each other?
6. How do you evaluate the effect of ideological, legal, political and economic environment on civil societies during the three periods?
7. How do you evaluate the internal capacity of civil societies in terms of human, financial, physical and internal governance perspective during the three periods?
8. How do you evaluate civil society's role in advocacy during the during the three periods?
9. How do you evaluate civil society's role in watchdogging during the during the three periods?
10. How do you evaluate civil society's role in service delivery during the during the three periods?

APPENDIX F: QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction

This questionnaire is prepared to collect data on the role of civil society in development and governance. It is designed with the intention of comparing the contributions of civil society over three periods: from 1991 to 2004, 2005 to 2017, and 2018 to date. The questionnaire is organized in six parts, namely: *background information, state-civil society relations the external context of civil society, internal context of civil society, and role of civil society in development and governance*. The purpose of the questionnaire is purely academic and all the information you provide will be treated with high level of confidentiality and ethical considerations. You are kindly requested to provide genuine and honest feedback as it is vital for the quality of the study.

Instructions:

- Write a “√” mark to answer closed-ended questions.
- The questions are printed on both front and back pages. Please make sure that you have not skipped any page.

Part I: Background Information

A. Respondent’s Personal Information

- 1.1 Sex Male ___ Female ___
- 1.2 Age 25-30 ___ 31-40 ___ 41-50 ___ > 50 ___
- 1.3 Education BA/BSc. ___ MA/MSc. ___ PhD ___
- 1.4 Experience in the organisation 10-20 ___ 21-30 ___ 31-40 ___ 41-50 ___ > 50 ___
- 1.5 Current Position _____

B. Organizational Information

- 2.1 Name of the organization _____
- 2.2 Type of organization
- 2.2.1 Foreign Organization _____

2.2.2 An Association _____

2.2.3 A Board-led Organization _____

2.2.4 A Charitable Endowment _____

2.2.5 A Charitable Trust _____

2.2.6 A Charitable Committee _____

Other _____, Please specify _____

2.3 Organisation's year of service _____

Part II: State-Civil Society (CS) Relations

Note: 5 = Strongly Agree 4 = Agree 3 = Neutral 2 = Disagree 1 = Strongly Disagree

No.	Items	Year 1991-2004					2005-2017					2018 to date				
		5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1
1	The state has a positive attitude towards CS.															
2	The state recognizes the values that CS can add in advocacy, watchdogging and service provision.															
3	State media provide positive analysis about the role of CS.															
4	CS exist and function independently of the state.															
5	CS operate freely without excessive and unwarranted state interference in their internal matters.															
6	Government's oversight to CS is reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interest.															
7	CS and their members have never been harassment and encroached by police and security bodies.															
8	No cases of prior authorization from the state is required for CS to do their job.															
9	The Agency for CS supports and coordinates the activities of CS in accordance with the proclamation.															
10	The Agency builds the capacity of organizations to enable them to accomplish their objectives effectively.															
11	The Agency for CS organizes regular forums for consultation between government bodies and CS.															
12	The Agency ensures that the objectives of CS are aligned with the national objectives of the nation.															
13	The Agency for CS enforces restrictions, dissolution and termination of CS only based on objective criteria.															
14	The Agency for CS practices oversight which without imposing unnecessary pressure on CS.															

No.	Items	Year 1991-2004					2005-2017					2018 to date				
		5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1
15	The state provides unequal treatment to all CS.															
16	CS who does not criticize the work of the government enjoy more state support.															
17	CS are treated equally by the government regardless of their degree of loyalty to the government.															
18	CS are treated equally by the government regardless of their political attitude.															

Part III: External Context of Civil Society (CS)

Note: 5 = Strongly Agree 4 = Agree 3 = Neutral 2 = Disagree 1 = Strongly Disagree

No.	Items	Year 1991-2004					2005-2017					2018 to date				
		5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1
1	The regulatory environment governing CS is conducive and supportive.															
2	The legal framework allows CS to exercise their rights without discrimination.															
3	The legal framework provides guarantee against state interference in internal matters of CS.															
4	CS were consulted in the process of developing laws and policies that govern them.															
5	All CS are required to register by the law.															
6	The law makes the procedure of CS registration easy.															
7	The ideological tradition of the government matters in shaping the work and behavior of CS.															
8	The ideological tradition adopted by the state creates a favorable work environment for CS to operate.															
9	CS are effectively included in the political process of the country.															
10	CS are allowed to comment and criticize the government on its political stance, democratic and human rights issues.															
11	CS are allowed to exercise liberty and are not subject to any violations for political reasons.															
12	CS can engage in political matters without prior authorization from the state															
13	CS are allowed to earn income by engaging in economic activities and provision of goods and services.															
14	The economic condition and structure in the country is favorable for the effective functioning of CSs. .															
15	CS are allowed to legally compete for government contracts															

Part IV: Internal Context of Civil Society (CS)

Note: 5 = Strongly Agree 4 = Agree 3 = Neutral 2 = Disagree 1 = Strongly Disagree

No.	Items	Year 1991-2004					2005-2017					2018 to date				
		5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1
	My organization ...															
1	... is staffed with educated and capable human resources.															
2	... is able to attract, recruit and maintain experienced and competent staff.															
3	... is provide continuous skill development training to its staff.															
4	... is able to use accountants, IT specialists, managers/leaders and lawyers.															
5	... has adequate financial resources and budget to facilitate its works.															
6	... is financially supplement itself with the revenue generated from services, products or rents from assets.															
7	... raises a significance percentage of its funds from foreign sources.															
8	... has its own building.															
9	... has convenient and adequate working space (offices, workshop, storage, parking space etc.) to facilitate program implementation.															
10	... has modernized office equipment and facilities.															
11	... is adequately equipped with reliable transport facilities.															
12	... uses modern information communication technologies including websites and social media to facilitate its activities.															
13	... has a clearly defined governance system.															
14	... has a well-established system of internal accountability.															
15	... makes decisions in an accountable, participatory and transparent manner.															

Part V: Role of Civil Society (CS) in Development and Governance of post 1991 Ethiopia Focusing on *advocacy, watchdogging* and *service delivery*

Note: 5 = Strongly Agree 4 = Agree 3 = Neutral 2 = Disagree 1 = Strongly Disagree

No.	Items	Year 1991-2004					2005-2017					2018 to date				
		5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1
	<i>In terms of advocacy...</i>															
1	CS are routinely invited to comment on policy and legal initiatives at all stages of policy cycle.															
2	CS are involved in the process of selection and prioritization of national policy agenda.															
3	CS are involved in the national budgeting process.															
4	CS are allowed to freely present and defend their positions, without being sanctioned in policy making process.															
5	CS are provided with various mechanisms to participate in government policy making process.															
6	CS are active and effective in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs.															
7	CS are successful in lobbying the state that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation.															
8	CS are active and successful in promoting democratic and human rights.															
9	CS are active and effective in creating awareness and enhancing peoples' participation in election.															
10	CS are active and effective in training citizens in democratic and human right issues.															
11	CS are active and effective in monitoring elections.															
12	CS are active and effective in the development of political parties and a party system															
13	CS are active and effective in disclosing facts of human rights violations.															
14	CS are able to provide policy advice to parliamentarians, media and other opinion leaders.															
15	CS are able to provide information vital for the development of policies and policy alternatives.															
16	CS are active and effective in conflict management and peace building.															
17	CS play role in conflict prevention by reporting cases of war and conflict.															
18	CS play role in bringing parties involving in conflict to dialogue.															
19	CS play active and effective role in the area of conflict analysis.															
20	CS are able to work directly with local populations on the matters of conflict resolution.															
	<i>In terms of watchdogging ...</i>															
1	CS are active and effective in monitoring state's															

No.	Items	Year 1991-2004					2005-2017					2018 to date				
		5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1
	and private cooperation's performance.															
2	CS are active and successful in holding the state and private corporations accountable.															
3	CS are active and effective in keeping government accountable and responsive to community needs.															
4	CS active and effective in monitoring the actions and behavior of public officials.															
5	CS are active and effective in checking the abuse of government power by public officials.															
6	CS are active and effective in monitoring government's compliance with democratic and human rights principles.															
7	CS are active and effective in exposing malpractices and corrupt behaviors.															
	<i>In terms of service delivery ...</i>															
1	CS are active and effective in providing services in a variety of fields, such as education, healthcare, social services, water, sanitation.															
2	CS promote collective action to improve access to basic services (e.g., health and education...).															
3	CS have no barriers to providing services															
4	CS participate in all stages of designing and providing services.															
5	CS play significant role in poverty eradication.															
6	CS are active and effective in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities for poor people.															
7	CS are active and effective in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalized groups.															
8	CS provide goods and services that reflect pressing societal needs and priorities of the community.															
9	CS are able to work with actors to improve the governance of local economic development.															
10	CS are active and effective in provision and maintenance of economic infrastructure.															
11	CS are involved in helping the community to design and implement income generating projects.															
12	CS provide emergency services such as temporary shelter, food etc. after disaster or conflict.															
13	CS enhance community preparedness for natural disasters and other disasters.															
14	CS organizes community organization for rehabilitation.															
15	CS deliver social safety nets to the needy.															
16	CS provide entrepreneurial training and capacity															

No.	Items	Year 1991-2004					2005-2017					2018 to date				
		5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1
	building.															
17	CS provide vocational/technical training to the community.															
18	CS provide training on building institutional capacity.															
19	CS provide workshops and seminars for grass root organizations in basic skills															

APPENDIX G: STATISTICAL ANALYSES

G1: Response Rate

Of the 220 questionnaires distributed to respondents, 206 questionnaires were filled and returned to the researcher and only 14 questionnaires were left unreturned. Of these 206 questionnaires, 200 were found to be usable while the remaining 6 questionnaires were defective (i.e., missing questions and patterned answers). The usable 200 questionnaires yield about 91 percent return rate which is adequate to carry out the analysis. In addition, the interview and FGD were fully carried out as planned in the methodology section of the paper.

G2: Reliability Test

Before indulging in the main analysis and discussion of the data obtained through questionnaire, reliability test was conducted. The reliability test is an important instrument to measure the degree of consistency of an attribute, which is supposed to measure. The normal range of Cronbach's coefficient alpha value ranges between 0-1 and the higher values reflects a higher degree of internal consistency. Different authors accept different values of this test to achieve internal reliability, but the most commonly accepted value is 0.70 as it should be equal to or higher than to reach internal reliability (Pallent 2016:97). The following Table summarizes and presents the reliability statistics.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	Number of Items
.898	.887	94

Source: Computed from Survey data (2021)

According to the data in Table, the result of reliability test is 0.898 which is above the theoretically accepted cutoff point i.e., 0.7 Cronbach's Alpha. Hence, the requirement of reliability is fulfilled.

G3: Characteristics of Respondents

The characteristic of respondent is important to give the overall picture of the respondents' background. Accordingly, the following Table summarizes and presents data on respondents' sex, age, educational background and work experience in their respective organization.

Demographic Background of Respondents

Variables	Category	Frequency	Percent
Sex	Male	143	69.0
	Female	57	31.0
	Total	200	100.0
Age	30-40	98	49.0
	41-50	76	38.0
	> 50	26	13.0
	Total	200	100.0
Education	Masters	191	95.50
	PhD	9	4.50
	Total	200	100.0
Work Experience in the Organization	10-20	118	59
	21-30	92	41
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Own survey data (2021)

As indicated in the above Table large proportion (69 percent) of the respondents was male while the remaining 31 percent of the respondents were female. With regard to the age of respondents, majority (49 percent) of the respondents are in the age category of 31–40 followed by the age category of 41-50, which constitutes 38 percent of the respondents. The proportion of respondents within the age group of 50 year and above is 13 percent. Respondents whose age is below 30 were not included in the study because long year of exposure about civil society organizations in the country was considered as criteria of inclusion. Regarding education, majority (95.5 percent) of the respondents were Masters degree holders while the remaining 4.5 percent of the respondents were PhD degree holders. This implies that the respondents have high profile of education that makes them eligible to understand and respond to questionnaire items prepared in English. The final background information presented in

the above Table is work experience in the organization. Accordingly, majority (59%) of the respondents are within the work experience range of 10-20 followed by those with work experience ranging from 21-30 which constitutes 41 percent.

APPENDIX H: TURNITIN REPORT

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By

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By

ZIGIJU SAMUEL BEYENE

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