

**OBSTACLES IMPEDING THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS**

**IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE**

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

The research problem that was investigated in this study was to identify, explore and confirm the problems and management obstacles encountered with the change process in the South African Police Service (SAPS) from the time when South Africa became a democracy in 1994. Although national legislation and SAPS policies and directives that encourage change in the SAPS indicated the movement towards change to implement transformation, it is questionable in what way these principles of transformation are successfully implemented, what the significance and implications of these legislation and directives are, and also the effect they have on transformation in the SAPS.

Data was collected from questionnaires, a literature study, focus group interviews and interviews. Structured questionnaires concerning transformation in the SAPS were designed and distributed to 39 station commissioners in the Pretoria and Soweto policing areas. Furthermore, a literature study including material such as official SAPS documents, media and newspaper reports, library sources and national legislation regarding change has been presented. Data was also collected from non-commissioned officials who participated in four focus group interviews, and four semi-structured interviews were conducted individually with four station commissioners in the Pretoria and Soweto policing areas. International best practices have also been consulted.

The research conducted indicated that although progress has been made with transformation in the SAPS a breach exists between national legislation, SAPS policies and directives and the implementation thereof, which have an impeding influence on the transformation process in the SAPS. Particular concerns were raised that need the awareness of SAPS management. It is clear that internal communication is an essential and dynamic instrument of transformation in the SAPS, however, communication of the transformation process does not have the impact at ground level that it is supposed to have. It is also clear that members at ground level lack knowledge of the transformation process in the SAPS and the implementation thereof. In addition, conveying the sense of urgency to members at ground level need attention and must be communicated clearly and timeously. Training and development at the

lower hierarchical levels of the SAPS also need priority to enhance service delivery, public relations, the morale and conduct of members. A high number of members also need to be motivated during transformation and their readiness towards the process has to be addressed to adapt to the changes. Reasons for resisting transformation in the SAPS need urgent attention as well because this has a negative effect on the daily functioning of members. The recommendations drawn from the conclusions made in this study may provide a number of solutions that can be implemented in the SAPS to reduce the obstacles impeding the transformation process in the SAPS to enhance and improve transformation in this organisation.

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## **CHAPTER 1            OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY**

### **1.1     Introduction**

This chapter presents an overview of the study. The research problem is identified and presented. The aims and objectives of this study are outlined and the rationale for the research problem defined, which would be followed by an explanation of the scope and delimitation of the study including geographical and time limitations. Theoretical definitions fundamental to this study are then defined. Problems encountered during this study are identified and the ways in which they were overcome explained.

This chapter also focuses on the nature of the research approach and design, methods of data collection, a description of the measuring instruments and data analysis procedures. Methods to ensure validity and reliability are also integrated into this chapter.

### **1.2     Problem Identification**

The ending of the apartheid-era in South Africa (SA) in the early 1990s posed a range of difficulties for the Government of National Unity. One of these difficulties was how to create a new policing approach. The change in the South African Police (SAP) was mainly born of the fundamental political transition in SA (Marais, 1995:3). Under the post-apartheid regime, the SAP together with other police agencies of the former homelands were amalgamated into the South African Police Service (SAPS). The change of name was not the only transformation to face the SAPS. A number of former freedom fighters from previously banned organizations, such as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Azanian People Liberation Army (APLA), Self Defence Units (SDU) from townships and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), also joined the SAPS, and required a process of total transformation in policing (Marais, 1995:5). All members of the SAPS were confronted with a process of change, being the direct outcome of the socio-political transformation in SA (Bouman, 1997:4). It is therefore important that every member of the SAPS synchronised his/her thoughts to promote the efficiency of transformation. A new organisational culture had to be established that was different from the previous militaristic, autocratic and bureaucratic culture.

The SAPS has initiated a change process far beyond anything experienced in the past, which is having a radical effect on the members of the SAPS as well as the management of the organisation. The transformation since 1994 has mainly been the initiative of the government and not the police itself (Marais, 1995:5). Institutional changes that include aspects such as policing or other social structures are generally the most difficult changes to make (Malan, 1999:33). But these changes are exactly the changes that have been attempted in South Africa. If the SAPS cannot be transformed, then transformation cannot take place in SA (Brogden and Shearing, 1993:124). The change process that is taking place in the SAPS is not a process where an existing stable police organisation must make some changes in style and culture, but it is rather a process of total transformation mainly driven by the dramatic changes in SA in general.

When dealing with transformation one is often confronted with the question of why some organisations are more successful in implementing transformation initiatives than others. The answer to the question is complex and there are no fixed solutions. The overriding objective of management in the SAPS is to transform the SAPS into a “user-friendly” service, which is acceptable to all citizens of South Africa. Whether they succeed will depend on whether the members of the SAPS share this objective or not. Members of the SAPS will only co-operate if transformation initiatives are widely accepted within the SAPS (Lombard, 1996:3).

The organisational change model of John Kotter (in Kotter and Cohen, 2002: 15-177) is used as a framework throughout this study. The model explains the areas where changes must take place to transform an organisation, and how to successfully deal with changing organisations.

Kotter’s eight-step process for creating successful change is as follows:

Step 1: Establish a great sense of urgency:

- Seriously examine the market and competitive realities.
- Identify and discuss crises, potential crises or major opportunities.

Step 2: Create the guiding coalition:

- Put a group together with enough power to lead the change.
- Get the group to work together as a team.



Step 3: Develop a vision and strategy:

- Create a vision to help direct the change effort
- Develop strategies for achieving that vision.

Step 4: Communicate the change vision:

- Use every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies constantly
- The guiding coalition needs to act as role models.

Step 5: Empower others to act:

- Get rid of blockers.
- Change systems or structures that seriously undermine the change vision.
- Encourage risk taking and non traditional ideas, activities, and actions.

Step 6: Create short-term wins:

- Plan for some visible performance improvements.
- Create those wins.
- Visibly recognise and reward people who made the wins possible.

Step 7: Consolidate gains and produce even more change:

- Use increased credibility to change all systems, structures, and policies that do not fit together and do not fit the transformation vision.
- Hire, promote, and develop people who can implement the change vision.

Step 8: Institutionalise changes in the culture:

- Create better performance through customer and productivity-orientated behaviour, more and better leadership, and more effective management.
- Articulate the connections between new behaviours and firm success.
- Develop means to ensure leadership development and succession

This model is discussed in more detail and critically reflected on in 3.6.1.

It is necessary that these change factors be clearly understood by all the key players of change and by every member of the SAPS. Policing must be rendered more transparent and more

accountable to communities being served. This vision for policing prescribes the change of the nature and manner of the service that the police deliver. Firstly, it implies service delivery to all communities in an effective, transparent, accountable, legitimate, acceptable and accessible manner through the participation of communities in terms of their respective needs and expectations. Secondly, it prescribes respect for and protection of the fundamental rights of all people, whether members of the SAPS, any community, victims or perpetrators of crime and violence (South Africa. South African Police Service, 1996(b)). The research therefore investigates the obstacles impeding the change process in the SAPS and what effect they have on the transformation of the organisation.

This study is of importance as the results of this research will measure the impact and progress of change in the SAPS since 1994. It will measure progress on the following:

- Meeting the requirements of the Constitution
- Realising the mission, vision, and values statements of the SAPS
- Satisfying the needs of the community
- Meeting the urgent need for a reduction in crime in the country and
- Creating a professional and motivated value-driven quality police service

### **1.3 Value of the Study**

Once the obstacles impeding the transformation process in the South African Police Service (SAPS) are identified, the study and its results will firstly benefit the SAPS as a whole, and secondly, it will benefit every member of the SAPS. As a result, the management of the SAPS and the members on ground level will have a greater understanding of the difficulties they are encountering as a result of transformation in the SAPS. Recommendations will also be presented that will provide guidelines on how to overcome these obstacles, which may have a significant impact on transformation in the organisation. Thirdly, the South African society will also benefit from the study and its results since the SAPS will be in a position to apply all its resources, time and energy to fighting crime, which will in turn lead to a reduction in crime levels. The academic community will also benefit from this study and its results as it can be used in related studies, and research and included in learning material.

## **1.4 Goal and Objectives of the Study**

This section indicates the general aims of the study and give the reasons for studying the particular phenomenon. A clear and unambiguous statement of the research objectives is also indicated (Mouton, 2001:48).

### **1.4.1 Goal**

The goal of this study is to identify, explore and confirm the problems and management obstacles encountered with the change process in the SAPS. In any change process it is important to re-evaluate the change approach continually. In a transformation process as complex and wide as that taking place in the SAPS, there is no ready-made formula and an ongoing analysis of dynamics of change is essential to fine-tune the change engine. The focus of this study is on managers as they are implementing change downwards in the SAPS (top-down approach).

It is clear that the change process in the SAPS is not an easy task, but one with a number of fundamental obstacles. A few questions arise such as what management obstacles there are in this process and what value there is in identifying these obstacles as well as what effect they have on the SAPS.

### **1.4.2 Objectives**

The primary objectives of this study are firstly to explore and describe the response and interpretation of a questionnaire concerning change of the station commissioners in the jurisdiction of Soweto and Pretoria policing areas. A questionnaire was distributed to each station commissioner. A second objective is to explore and describe the focus group interviews with non-commissioned officials. Semi-structured interviews with four station commissioners are also explored and described.

Secondary objectives of this study are to explore and describe:

- The level of representivity of the station commissioners through compiling a demographic sketch of the characteristics of the station commissioners selected regarding gender, race, rank, length of service, divergent backgrounds and geographical area.

- The exposure to and attitude towards change by police officials at station level.
- The implementing and functioning of change initiatives by police officials at station level.

## **1.5 Delimitation of the Study**

The delimitation of the study addresses how the study is narrowed in scope. This study confines itself to interviewing two station commissioners each in the Soweto and Pretoria policing areas. Structured questionnaires, as attached per Annexure C, were distributed to 39 station commissioners in Soweto and Pretoria policing areas, which make up the sum total of all the station commissioners in these policing areas. Four focus group interviews were conducted with non-commissioned officials. Two focus group interviews were conducted in Soweto and the other two focus group interviews in Pretoria. A copy of the request for conducting focus group interviews and individual interviews at the various police stations is attached as per Annexure D.

## **1.6 Key Theoretical Concepts**

According to De Beer (1999:15) definitions concretise the intended meaning of a concept in relation to a particular study. The following concepts are central to this study and are clearly defined so that there is a common understanding of their meaning in this study.

### **1.6.1 Change process**

Problem solving is another way of thinking about the change process. Change processes can be seen as moving from a problem situation to the answer to the specific problem in a controlled way to bring a new approach and systems that need to be controlled by the organisation. Actions must be identified during the change process that bring about a desired change to the current situation. For the purpose of this study the change process will be viewed as a dramatic change from a force (SAP and other agencies) to a service (SAPS).

### **1.6.2 Obstacles to change**

Traditions and politics have proved over time to be significant resistance-to-change factors in the SAPS. Changes are often perceived as threats and the traditional response is resistance. According to Fourie (in Reynecke and Fourie, 2001:104), politics is another destructive force in

the SAPS and results in power games played by people both within and outside the organisation. In this study the obstacles that hinder the process of change in the SAPS are explored and described.

### **1.7 Geographical Limitation**

This study is confined to the Soweto and Pretoria policing areas in the Gauteng province. The whole of the Gauteng province is not included in the study because of the large geographic area of the province. The researcher aims to obtain a holistic viewpoint of the research problem; therefore, these two policing areas were chosen because of their widely divergent populations that include all the different race groups in South Africa. Gauteng province, situated in the northern central part of South Africa, has the second largest share of the population constituting 19 percent (8.9 million) of South Africa's population and is also the economic heartbeat of South Africa. Gauteng also constitutes 1.4 percent of the country's land surface. The province has seven police areas with 120 police stations. In addition, Gauteng has 24 843 sworn police officers with the police-population ratio equaling one police officer for every 356 citizens. The Provincial Police Headquarters is situated in Johannesburg (*Profile: SAPS Gauteng, 2004*). Soweto, a renowned township, has 11 police stations, is situated in the southwest of Gauteng and is mainly populated by black Africans. In contrast, Pretoria, the capital of South Africa, has 28 police stations and is situated in the northern part of Gauteng and historically known for its white conservative population.

### **1.8 Time Limitation**

This study was conducted from May 2002 to October 2004. As a result the data being collected has remained relevant. Questionnaires were distributed to the station commissioners during March and April 2003. Interviews and focus group interviews were conducted during the period 22 May 2003 to 20 August 2003.

## 1.9 Problems Encountered During the Study

Various problems outside the researcher's control were encountered during the study and included the following:

- The structured questionnaires were originally distributed to the station commissioners in the Soweto and Pretoria policing areas through official channels, namely: the SAPS Management Services, Provincial Head Office, Gauteng. However, no feedback from these station commissioners was received. As a result, questionnaires were distributed to the station commissioners by the researcher personally.
- Questionnaires got lost at certain police stations and had to be re-distributed by the researcher. In some instances questionnaires had to be re-distributed three to four times.
- In isolated cases individual station commissioners did not complete the questionnaires themselves but delegated the task to their sub-ordinates. In these isolated cases a detective commander and communication official completed the questionnaires.
- As a result of Resolution 7, discussed in 2.5 of Chapter 2, various station commissioners were transferred to other police stations during the collection of questionnaires. Consequently, such station commissioners had to be located for the return of the completed questionnaires.
- Due to the demanding schedule of station commissioners, difficulties were experienced in obtaining appointments with such station commissioners for interviews. Similarly, difficulties were experienced at certain police stations to get non-commissioned officials together for focus group interviews because of a shortage of manpower.
- In certain cases no respondents for focus group interviews attended the interviews after the researcher had confirmed such interviews. Consequently, the focus group interviews had to be re-scheduled.
- Respondents had to be reminded regularly of the focus of each question during the focus group interviews to avoid them missing the focus point of discussion.

The above problems encountered during this study proved to be very time consuming and costly. These problems were however overcome.

## **1.10 Research Methodology**

The research methodology adopted by a study refers to the exact steps that are taken to address the research problem. According to Rudestam and Newton (1992:60), the goal of the research methodology is to provide a clear and complete description of the specific steps to be followed in addressing the research problem.

### **1.10.1 The explorative characteristics of the study**

According to Welman and Kruger (1999:19), the purpose of exploratory research is to determine whether or not a phenomenon exists, and to gain familiarity with such a phenomenon.

The research aims to identify, explore and confirm the problems and management obstacles encountered with the change process in the SAPS as the goal in 1.4.1 of this chapter states.

### **1.10.2 Research approach and design**

Welman and Kruger (1999:46) state that a research design is the plan according to which one obtains research participants and collects information from them. It describes what we are going to do with the data with a view to reaching conclusions about the research problem.

De Beer (1999:24) also mentions four research questions that give structure to the research design:

- How will the design connect to the paradigm being used?
- Who or what will be studied?
- What strategies of enquiry will be used?
- What methods or research tools will be used for collecting and analysing empirical materials?

### **1.10.3 Methods of data collection**

According to Welman and Kruger (1999:129), one has to consider which data-collecting method is the most appropriate in the light of the particular population in question. For the purpose of this study the following methods to collect data were utilised.

#### **1.10.3.1 Questionnaires**

Structured questionnaires concerning transformation in the SAPS were designed and distributed to 39 station commissioners in the Soweto and Pretoria policing areas. The researcher collected the relevant questionnaires personally in an attempt to obtain as many of the questionnaires as possible for data analysis. The completed questionnaires were returned to the researcher for analysis. A copy of the request for permission to administer the questionnaire at the various police stations is attached as per Annexure E.

According to Welman and Kruger (1999:151), one may use questionnaires to obtain the following types of information from respondents:

- Biographical particulars, for example: age, educational particulars and so forth.
- Opinions, beliefs and convictions about any topic or issue.
- Attitude, for example: attitude towards affirmative action.

In this study all three types of information have been collected.

#### **1.10.3.2 Literature study**

The research design of this study is presented in the form of a literature study comprising material such as official SAPS documents, media and newspaper reports, library sources and legislation regarding change in the SAPS. International best practices regarding change have also been consulted.

#### **1.10.3.3 Focus group interviews**

Four focus group interviews were conducted with non-commissioned officials that were selected in terms of sex, race, rank, length of service, divergent backgrounds and geographical area.



Group one consisted of nine Inspectors and two Sergeants, and group two consisted of seven Inspectors and three Sergeants. In addition, group three consisted of six Inspectors, two Sergeants and two Constables. Group four consisted of five Inspectors and three Constables.

Focus groups typically consist of six to eight people, meeting to discuss an issue of common concern led by a moderator, and can be followed by one or two observers (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000:356). Gaskell (in Bauer and Gaskell, 2000:46) states that the objective of a focus group is to stimulate the participants to talk and to respond to each other, to compare experiences and impressions, and to react to what other people in the group say. The focus group is a more naturalistic and holistic setting in which the participants take account of the views of others in formulating their responses and in commenting on their own and others' experiences.

The following questions were asked during the focus group interviews:

- In your opinion, were the transformation initiatives in the SAPS clearly communicated to all the members?
- Do you have an understanding of why transformation in the SAPS is important?
- In your opinion, do you think the leadership of the SAPS created a sense of urgency concerning the need to change policing in South Africa?
- According to you, have the different transformation initiatives improved service delivery?
- Did the different transformation initiatives, according to you, impact positively or negatively on the morale of members, the quality of service, and the productivity of the members?
- According to you, why do some members resist transformation initiatives?

Four such interviews were conducted. The researcher recorded the interviews on tape recorder while participants were responding, with the view of having it transcribed later. The key features of the group interview, according to Gaskell (in Bauer and Gaskell, 2000:47), are:

- A synergy emerges out of the social interaction (the group is more than the sum of its parts).
- Group processes, the dynamics of attitude and opinion leadership, can be observed.
- There is a level of emotional involvement in groups, which is seldom seen in one-to-one interviews.

The focus group interviews conducted adhered to these features as the respondents' close working relationship with each other created a sense of camaraderie that also created emotional participation as a result of the attitude individual respondents had.

Welman and Kruger (1999:198) describe the phases of conducting a focus group interview as follows:

- The researcher introduces the topic to the group, explains the purpose of the study and seeks the co-operation of the group.
- The researcher sets rules for the interview, including the expected duration of the interview.
- Each participant can then make an opening statement of his or her experience on the topic.
- The researcher guides the open group discussion by asking questions (frankness and honesty are required to ensure trust is built and anonymity must be assured).
- The session ends with each participant giving a final statement, which may not be challenged.

Notes of non-verbal communication need to be made. Taking notes or recording should not inhibit spontaneous behaviour from participants (Welman and Kruger, 1999:198). A report should be compiled as soon as possible after conclusion of the interviews. The interviewer could make reflective notes with a view to using them in further interviews or to analysing the information obtained. The researcher must attempt to capture accurately the essence of the contents and of the recurring themes that bind them together on the basis of the descriptions of individuals' experiences (Welman and Kruger, 1999:198).

The focus group interviews conducted adhered to all the above phases.

#### **1.10.3.4 Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were conducted individually with four station commissioners that were also selected in terms of sex, race, rank, length of service and geographical area. Two station commissioners held the rank of Senior Superintendent while the other two station commissioners held the rank of Superintendent.

According to Welman and Kruger (1999:167) one may consider semi-structured interviews when:

- The topics are of a very sensitive nature.
- The respondents come from divergent backgrounds.

In the light of the above two points semi-structured interviews were conducted as transformation in the SAPS is of a sensitive nature because of the political background of South Africa. Members in the SAPS also have different backgrounds and educational levels.

Interview guides are used in semi-structured interviews. An interview guide involves a list of topics and aspects of these topics (note, not specific questions) that have a bearing on the given theme and which the interviewer should bring up during the course of the interview. Although all respondents are asked the same questions, the interviewer may adapt the formulation of the interview, including the terminology, to fit the background and educational level of the respondents. Semi-structured interviews offer a versatile way of collecting data. This method may often be used when no other one is available or appropriate (Welman and Kruger, 1999: 167).

The following questions were asked during the interviews with the station commissioners:

- In your opinion, were the transformation initiatives in the SAPS clearly communicated to all the members?
- Do you have an understanding of why transformation in the SAPS is important?
- In your opinion, do you think the leadership of the SAPS created a sense of urgency concerning the need to change policing in South Africa?
- According to you, have the different transformation initiatives improved service delivery?
- Did the different transformation initiatives, according to you, impact positively or negatively on the morale of members, the quality of service, and the productivity of the members?
- According to you, why do some members resist transformation initiatives?

This section presented the reader with a discussion of how this study was approached and designed. In other words, details were given on how the researcher obtained participants and collected information from them and what the researcher did with the data.

#### **1.10.4 Data analysis**

This research uses a triangulation of methods to ensure the validity of the findings.

Questionnaires were used to determine the obstacles to change, interviews conducted and policy documents studied.

##### **1.10.4.1 Quantitative data analysis**

Data analysis was conducted from the questionnaires by means of the Statistical Package For Social Science (SPSS) used in quantitative data analysis. The completed questionnaires formed part of the data for this analysis. The data was quantitatively analysed through descriptive statistics and is presented as tables and figures in Chapter 4.

##### **1.10.4.2 Qualitative data analysis**

One of the basic approaches to qualitative research is ethnographic summary, which relies on direct quotation of discussions. Qualitative data use words as basic tools. The eventual analysis of the information obtained from focus groups is based on the interviewer's records. The researcher took notes of the focus groups' responses with a view to writing a more complete report afterwards. The interviews and focus group interviews were tape recorded with the view to having them transcribed. The transcribed interviews and focus group interviews formed part of the qualitative data. The application of Guba and Tesch's (Tesch, 1990: 142-145) techniques formed part of the qualitative data analysis, which included grouping the data according to categories, themes and codes.

#### **1.10.5 Description of the measuring instrument**

Welman and Kruger (1999:146) state that the constructs in the human behavioural sciences often involve human attributes, actions and artifacts; it may appear to lay people that these can be appropriately measured by merely asking research participants directly about them. For example, lay people might argue that participants should simply be asked whether or not they are dominant by nature. However, for several reasons, the reliability and validity of the measurements obtained in this fashion would be highly suspect. On the one hand, participants may have insufficient knowledge about themselves, or they may be unable to verbalise their

innermost feelings. On the other hand, participants may deliberately provide incorrect answers with a view to putting themselves in a positive or negative light. The measuring instrument for this study is thus data received from the questionnaires contextualised in terms of the literature study which was validated by the interviews and focus group interviews.

#### **1.10.6 Methods to ensure validity and reliability**

Validity is concerned with the effectiveness of the measuring instrument. According to Welman and Kruger (1999:138), the instrument must measure what it is supposed to measure. In other words how accurately does it measure? Reliability is the extent to which comparable measurements indicate similar results (Welman and Kruger, 1999:142). Validity and reliability were ensured by using the following methods:

- Structured questionnaires were piloted for critical inputs before implementation and adapted where necessary.
- In terms of sampling, the convenience sampling method was used which ensured validity and reliability (all station managers in Gauteng happen to be at their respective police stations at a particular time and are readily available for research purposes). According to Welman and Kruger (1999: 62), convenience sampling or accidental sampling is the most convenient collection of members of the population that are near and readily available for research purposes.
- The data analysis techniques abided by scientific standards as a statistician quantitatively analysed the questionnaires through descriptive statistics by means of the Statistical Package For Social Science (SPSS).
- An experienced qualitative researcher also assisted the researcher in the application of Guba and Tesch's techniques by grouping the data according to categories, themes and codes.

#### **1.11 Ethical Considerations**

The Code of Ethics for Research at Technikon SA (Technikon SA, 2000:3) highlights the ethical principles that researchers at Technikon SA are expected to be faithful to, such as anonymity, violation of confidentiality etc. The researcher adhered to this code of ethics.

### **1.11.1 Informed consent**

Each participant was informed of the research in clear and understandable terms, and his or her voluntary consent was obtained.

### **1.11.2 Influences**

Measures such as sealed envelopes, a permission letter and a cover letter explaining the objective of this study were taken in the quantitative data analysis to prevent researcher influence in the meaning participants assigned to their experience and behaviour. In addition, measures in the qualitative data analysis were taken to prevent researcher influence by assuring respondents in the interviews and focus group interviews that although the researcher is also a police officer, he was not acting on behalf of the SAPS and that therefore interviews were totally independent and impartial.

### **1.11.3 Preserving anonymity and confidentiality**

Participants' anonymity was assured in this study as neither name nor location was divulged. Participants were also assured that any information they provided would not be made available to anyone who was not directly involved in this study (De Beer, 1999:50).

## **1.12 Summary**

This chapter provided an overview of the study. The rationale for the study and the relevance of the study was presented. The focus of the study was accentuated by the goal and objectives and the introduction of key theoretical definitions provided further clarification. In addition, time and geographical limitations were presented to clarify where and when the study was conducted.

This chapter presented theoretical information on the research methodology and pointed out the exact steps that were followed to address the research problem and to reach the goal of this chapter, namely: to provide a clear and complete description of the steps to be followed. These steps included the nature of the research approach and design, methods of data collection, a description of the measuring instruments and data analysis procedures, and methods to ensure validity and reliability. The goal of this study is to identify, explore and confirm the problems and management obstacles encountered with the change process in the SAPS by making use of

questionnaires, a literature study, focus group interviews and interviews. The research is of a quantitative and qualitative nature. Methods to ensure validity and reliability were explained. Ethical considerations were also outlined.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the transformation process in the SAPS from 1993 up to and including 2003. This overview presents the movement and initiatives taken towards change in South African policing during this period.

## **CHAPTER 2                    OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE FROM 1993 TO 2003**

### **2.1     Introduction**

After South Africa became a democratic country in 1994, policing in this country underwent a radical change in terms of transformation and democratisation. Laws that were non-democratic and which were rejected by most people in the country had traditionally governed policing in South Africa. As a result of the transformation process one saw a move away from a force to create a service by means of community policing, which is aimed at establishing an active partnership between the police and the community. The managerial style of policing in South Africa also began a process of transformation from an autocratic, bureaucratic and militaristic style to one that is characterised by participation and problem solving. Before democratisation in South Africa there were 11 police forces in this country, each structured under its own legislation, and functioning within its own jurisdiction. The largest of these forces was the South African Police (SAP). The other ten forces were the “homeland” police forces. Among these were the police agencies of the four “independent homelands”, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda. Police agencies from the “self-governing” homelands consisted of KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele and Gazankulu. After South Africa became a democracy in 1994 these 11 police forces were amalgamated into one South African Police Service (SAPS).

This chapter presents an overview of the transformation process in the South African Police Service from 1993 to 2003. Legislation, policy and directives provide the broad framework and foundation of this chapter. The focus in terms of the policing context has been limited to the policies and directives that promote change in the SAPS. Several SAPS policies and directives indicate the movement towards change and initiatives to implement transformation. National legislation and SAPS policies and directives that encourage change in the SAPS are discussed in order to indicate how they provided guidance to transform policing in South Africa. It is, however, important to analyse the significance and implications of these legislation and directives and the effect they have on the transformation of the SAPS.



## **2.2 Broad Legislative and Policy Framework to the Public Service at Large**

The following legislation and policies have promoted change in the public service at large.

### **2.2.1 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993**

The Interim Constitution was drafted and adopted by the Constitutional Assembly during 1993, which negotiated for the democratic transition of South Africa. The Constitution is considered to be the supreme law of South Africa (South Africa, 1993: sec. 4(1)(2) & sec. 68(2)).

The Constitution made provision for the establishment of a single South African police service that would be structured at national and provincial levels, but would function under the direction of the national government, including the various provincial governments. The National Commissioner, appointed by the President, would exercise executive command of the Service. The Minister, however, retains responsibility for policing. A Commissioner for each province would be responsible for policing in the respective provinces (South Africa, 1993: sec. 214(1)(2) & sec. 216(2)).

The responsibilities of the National Commissioner, among others, are the maintenance of an impartial, accountable, transparent and efficient police service (South Africa, 1993: sec 218(1)). This is a significant statement because in the past policing in South Africa was widely known to be repressive, centralised, politicised and militarised.

This was however to a large extent the result of the lack of legitimacy and the strongly authoritarian character of the government they served (Fivaz, 1995). The significance of the clause (South Africa, 1993: sec 218(1)) was that it introduced a total shift in the approach to policing. This clause also implied that the SAPS would strive towards an efficient police service through the rendering of an accountable and transparent service in an impartial way to all the citizens of South Africa. The South African community benefited significantly from this shift in the mindset of policing because the SAPS have become more responsible to the public they serve. They do not favour a certain part of the community, but serve the South African society as a whole. In this way the SAPS is becoming a more effective and recognizable service.

The responsibilities of the Provincial Commissioners are, among others, the development of community-policing services for the establishment of community-police forums. Community-policing is the newly adopted style of the SAPS. Community policing is, in essence,

collaboration between the police and the community to identify and solve problems together. With the police no longer the sole guardians of law and order, all members of the community become active allies in the effort to enhance the safety and quality of neighbourhoods. Community policing is democracy in action. It requires the active participation of local government, civic and business leaders, public and private agencies, residents, churches, schools and hospitals (United States of America. U.S. Department of Justice, 1994: vii). The functions of these community-police forums, among others, include the enhancement of the Service to local communities and the co-operation of communities with the police for the establishment of a more accountable Service (South Africa, 1993: sec 219(1) & sec 221(1)(2)).

Before 1994, policing in South Africa was closely associated with the military and as a result South Africa was described as a police state. Police members received military and semi-military training and were employed in an infantry role. This resulted in an unclear distinction between the functions of the police and the military. Negative effects were caused and impacted greatly on what was supposed to be a civilian police service. In addition, the larger community of South Africa viewed the police as representative of an illegitimate, repressive and unjust system. The militarised approach was therefore totally in contradiction with the philosophy of community policing. This state of affairs was ended when South Africa became a democratic country on 27 April 1994 (South Africa, 1993). As a result, the transition of South Africa from a police state to a democratic constitutional order has emphasised the need for the SAPS to be transformed to meet the new challenges associated with policing in a democracy. The Bill of Rights in the Interim Constitution cherishes the rights of individuals and requires that the government respects, protects, promotes and fulfils such rights. The SAPS is, by the nature of its work, confronted with challenges of human rights on a daily basis. It is crucial, therefore, that members of the SAPS understand and believe in the rights of individuals and see this as an integral part of their police work. In addition, in 1994 South Africa became part of the international community, which is concerned with the protection of fundamental human rights. These rights in the Constitution are in line with international human rights principles and standards. In line with the Constitution every member of the new democratic South Africa has a right to be protected by the SAPS. This right includes the right to have their human rights respected and this has necessitated that the SAPS change its style to a more humane one. On the other hand, in 2003 the National Commissioner of the SAPS indicated that 60 percent of the police officers killed in 2002 had failed to defend themselves, and said he believed the reason was because of confusion over the

right of police officers to self-defence and the level of force that could be used to defend others (New lethal force law still needs more clarity, 2003).

A discussion on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 will follow.

### **2.2.2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996**

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, which was signed into law on 10 December 1996, replaced the Interim Constitution, and is considered to be the supreme law of South Africa. This Constitution was formulated by an integration of ideas from ordinary citizens, civil society and political parties represented, and therefore represents the collective wisdom of the South African people. The adoption of this Constitution made provision for a partnership between the police and the community that was established through community policing services. This resulted in a greater co-operation between the police and the community they serve. The Service became responsible to the community, which resulted in community policing being adopted as a new style of policing. This Constitution is remarkable from a security service point of view in the acknowledgement it gives to the security services. A whole chapter (Chapter 11) is devoted to the security services of which the SAPS form a part. It stipulates certain basic values and principles that are to govern policing in South Africa and provides for one national police service that will be structured at national and provincial levels. This Constitution is also strongly based on the principles of fundamental human rights and includes principles such as transparency, efficiency and community policing, which have a major impact on policing in South Africa. Consequently it will lead to the re-evaluation of policing principles and practices by both the community and the South African Police Service. It is clear that human dignity is the most fundamental value and this lies at the root of this Constitution. According to the Constitution policing in South Africa is no longer militarised, but is a civilian police service for the community (South Africa, 1996(e): sec. 205-208).

The establishment of Community Police Forums and Boards can be used as an example of the transformation that the Constitution holds. According to the Policy Framework for Community Policing (South Africa. Department of Safety and Security, 1997(f)) the community policing approach is based on the proven assumption that the police alone cannot effectively control crime or address its causes. What is thus needed, is the development of a joint capacity to prevent and combat crime. The police must plan and manage policing problems in partnership

with the community. A Community Police Forum is one of the most effective mechanisms for joint planning and problem solving. Provincial Commissioners, Area Commissioners and Station Commissioners are responsible for the establishment of community police forums and boards in their respective areas. The offices of the Members of the Executive Councils (MECs) and the Provincial Secretariats for Safety and Security have, as outlined in the relevant legislation, an oversight and monitoring function with regard to the establishment and sustainability of Community Police Forums and Boards. Community Police Forums are therefore a means to facilitate the partnership between the police and the community and to engage in joint problem identification and consultative problem solving, and should not be seen as structures to promote personal interests of secondary objectives. Community Police Forums and boards have no direct executive powers over the police; yet these are structures that are intended to enhance consultative and participatory decision making with regard to the needs and priorities of the communities served by the police. As a result, decisions made at the Community Police Forums and Boards are to be honored.

In addition, membership of and participation at Community Police Forums and Boards is a voluntary service. All Community Police Forums and Boards should have a written constitution to deal with issues such as representation of the community at the Community Police Forum or Board, a code of conduct, conflict resolution mechanisms and procedures for the general organisation and administration of the Community Police Forum or Board. Community police forums are intended to assist the police to:

- Improve the delivery of police service;
- Strengthen the partnership between the community and their police;
- Promote joint problem identification and problem solving;
- Ensure police accountability and transparency; and
- Ensure consultation and proper communication between the police and the community.

In contrast to the above, Mbhele (1998: 9) is of the opinion that the Community Police Forum was meant to be one of the cornerstones of the post-apartheid approach to policing, but, particularly in black communities, it has not lived up to expectations. What is going wrong? In certain communities, the Community Police Forums that had been established collapsed as a result of the lack of co-operation from the police. Another reason the forums had collapsed in this particular community is that police members who had shown a high level of commitment

were transferred to another area. The new members who had replaced the transferred ones, however, did not show the same level of commitment. In addition, other reasons for the collapse of the forums were a lack of effective communication between the police and the community, antagonism shown by a certain race group in the police towards another race group in the community, and a loss of faith in the police service as a vehicle for the eradication of crime. In addition, in certain areas where there were Community Police Forums, these were reportedly “coming apart” because some of the police were not responding positively. Furthermore, according to Mbhele (1998:9), the forum members were being targeted by criminals in the area for working with the police. Another frightening factor was that some police officials felt threatened by the existence of the forums as they considered them to be watchdogs that had been unleashed to monitor the performance of the police.

In agreement with Mbhele, Pelsler (1999:10) is of the opinion that the community policing forums are the only concrete expression of the national commitment to community policing, but that they suffer from some serious flaws in the present context as they did when they were first established. It is not clear that one may speak sensibly of “community” in any one locality. Research in 1998 into the effectiveness of community policing and the Community Police Forums in the Western Cape, facilitated by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry, noted (in Altbeker and Rauch, 1998) that in the African townships, “powerlessness in the face of poverty” led to “a very open acknowledgement of a communal complicity in crime from both men and women.” As a result, an ironic potential of this pattern is that the functions of the Community Police Forums may well entrench the very societal divisions the policy that established them was meant to help overcome. This may occur through the displacement of crime to those communities that, because of their relative poverty, are less able to deal with its effects (Altbeker and Rauch, 1998).

Furthermore, can the involvement of criminals in the Community Police Forums affect the credibility of community policing? It can seriously jeopardise policing, especially if information of police operations is leaked to criminals. Criminal elements must, however, be prevented from hijacking or misusing the Community Police Forums. The Code of Conduct of the Community Police Forum should stipulate that a Community Police Forum member would be suspended from his or her responsibilities if charged with a criminal offence. Members of the Executive Committee of the Community Police Forum should therefore be screened before their appointment (South Africa. Department of Safety and Security, 1997(f)). Mbhele (1998: 13),

confirming the dangers of criminal activities in Community Police Forums, stated that some community members serving on the forums were also known to be involved in criminal activities.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme is discussed in the next section.

### **2.2.3 The Reconstruction and Development Programme**

In 1994, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was developed to eradicate South Africa's history dominated by colonialism, racism, apartheid, sexism and repressive labour policies. The RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework with the aim of mobilising all the country's people and resources towards the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future. It called for a police service that would reflect the national and gender character of South Africa with special attention to representativity and human rights' sensitivity. This is an important statement because policing in South Africa previously performed its functions in contradiction to the above principles of the RDP. The significance of the RDP is the acknowledgement that policing in South Africa was neither representative nor sensitive to human rights. This programme also emphasises community involvement through community-based structures to ensure accountability to the communities served. This programme would therefore influence the operations of the SAPS on an internal and external basis as it will create a balance between a professional, non-partisan, accountable police service that is broadly representative of the community, and a community who can identify with the police (South Africa, 1994(d)).

The RDP has an immense impact on effecting change in the SAPS. The introduction of the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 as discussed in 2.2.6 of Chapter 2 can be used as an illustration of the impact of this Programme on change in the SAPS. One of the transformation initiatives advocated in the RDP is the promoting of equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment. Consequently, the SAPS Promotion of Employment Equity and Elimination of Unfair Discrimination Policy as discussed in 2.2.6 of Chapter 2 was introduced into the Service in support of equal opportunities and fair treatment in employment regardless of race, gender, colour, or disability. Another transformation initiative advocated in the RDP was the establishment of community policing in the SAPS as discussed in 2.2.2 of Chapter 2. As a result, the community policing philosophy and Community Police Forums and Boards were introduced

into the SAPS, which created a new revolution in South African policing through the management of policing problems in partnership with the community. Furthermore, human rights sensitivity as discussed in 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 was also high on the agenda of the RDP. Accordingly, human rights were introduced into the SAPS to ensure the restoring of human rights that were neglected in the past.

The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery is discussed in the next section.

#### **2.2.4 White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery**

The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery of 1997, also known as the Batho Pele (a Sotho proverb meaning “People First”) White Paper, has one ultimate goal – improving service delivery. Importantly, this White Paper demands of all national and provincial governments to make service delivery a priority. This implies that national and provincial departments receive greater authority and accountability for service delivery and become more flexible in the way they manage their operations. This White Paper also makes provision for redressing the imbalances of the past regarding service delivery. In the light of this statement this White Paper accentuates the fact that the people of South Africa must come first; in other words, priority is given to the community, including those people that were neglected previously, to be provided with important, fair and equitable service without bias. As a result services to all levels of society must be ensured and maintained. This is in sharp contrast with the past where only a certain part of the community enjoyed adequate service delivery.

In effect, what this White Paper implies for the SAPS is that it needs to question specifically how efficiently and effectively they are rendering services to the South African society. The SAPS is thus judged by one criterion above all, which is their effectiveness in delivering services that meet the basic needs and human rights of all citizens (South Africa, 1997(e)).

To illustrate the transformation that this White Paper argues for, the Service Delivery Improvement Programme (SDIP) can be used as an example. The SDIP was launched in June 1997 and clearly spells out the SAPS’s service delivery objectives in response to this White Paper directive. Specific emphasis is also placed on improved service delivery and the development of capacity at police station level as one of the South African Police Service’s operational policing priorities (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2000(a): 3). In line

with the above directives, the SAPS furthermore committed itself firmly to provide a quality police service to the people of South Africa in the Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service for 2002 to 2005 (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2002(a): 1). The Strategic Plan outlines the direction to be taken by the SAPS from 2002 to 2005, and has as its main objective the improvement of service delivery to all communities.

This implies that members of the SAPS have to make it their daily priority to render exceptional and impartial service to the community of South Africa as a whole. Prioritising police service delivery is a momentous result in the history of policing in South Africa because service delivery was previously reserved for only a certain part of the community. As a result, all the communities in South Africa should thus benefit from improved service delivery.

According to Senior Superintendent J Henderson, head of the SAPS Service Delivery Programme, the SDIP is a management plan designed to improve the quality of service provided by every police station by improving the way it is organised. The need for the SDIP arose because of efficiency problems in the SAPS that vary from area to area. Some of these problems are the result of a lack of resources, skills and personnel, and others are the result of bad management of police stations. The SDIP is designed to identify the problems at each police station and then address them, utilising sound business practices. The SDIP has as its aim to create better-organised police stations that are accountable to their communities, while ensuring that the morale of the members is high. The management plan involves three partners: the SAPS station personnel as well as facilitators, members of each station's Community Policing Forum, and local businesses (Henderson, 2001: 1-2).

The management plan is further developed through a three-stage process that all police stations have to put together, in which all members of the station have to participate as follows:

- (1) Analysis: During this stage police station's major organisational problems and its priority crimes are identified.
- (2) Brainstorming: During this stage new practices are looked at to deal with organisational problems and crime priorities.
- (3) During this stage a Station Plan is formulated, which addresses all identified problems. In addition, the plan includes a Station Charter, which is signed by all the role-players. It contains the areas of focus and sets targets for improvements. Implementation is monitored monthly using performance indicators, for example: increased conviction of car thieves.



Quarterly presentations are made to the Area Commissioner on progress and inhibiting factors (Henderson, 2001: 2).

The establishment of partnerships with the community and the business sector is a further indication that the SAPS is committed to improved service delivery, and the realisation that policing in South Africa didn't meet the service delivery needs of the community as a whole. The participation of all the members at the police station in the SDIP will thus demand that members in the SAPS have to alter their behaviour concerning service delivery to deliver an improved service to the South African community. Performance is linked to the quality of one's thinking, behaviour and approach; therefore, does improved service delivery not depend solely on skills and knowledge, but also on the approach of the members of the SAPS that will, to a great extent, determine the success or failure of improved service delivery.

The results of the biggest police service delivery survey conducted in South Africa commissioned by the British-based Department for International Development for the SAPS, however, indicated that while the general public has a poor perception of the police, those who have had direct interaction with them are satisfied. Thousands of people cited police corruption and poor service as the reasons for what they believe is a decline in the quality of policing in their areas over the past years. On the other hand, those who had direct interaction with their local stations indicated that they received prompt and respectful service. As a result, the survey showed a striking difference between the general public's poor perceptions of the police and the satisfaction of those who had actually dealt with them (Gifford, 2001:9). An internal police survey that was facilitated by the Western Cape Department of Community Safety in 2001 among communities, to boost service delivery in the province, however, identified a lack of trust and communication between communities and the police, and a lack of sensitivity that prevented communities from interacting with the police (Police survey to seek causes of bad service, 2003: \_\_\_).

As a result, there has been a dire need for the police to create a trustworthy public image and this is a goal that has long eluded the service. Nevertheless, some progress is being made in the right direction and these efforts have been noticed by the corporate sector. A Johannesburg police public relations officer received a string of awards from private companies in recognition of his exemplary dedication to his work and his outstanding initiatives to marketing and public relations for the police. According to the officer, Inspector Adrio, in the article "Award for cops' new image" (2001: 1&2) it is a welcome sign that sectors outside the police are seeing positive

change in the SAPS, however, the Service still has to build up trust in many communities that still see the police as corrupt and inefficient. In addition, the National Commissioner of the SAPS is of the opinion that better communication is needed with the police on the ground, and is confident that, as the police improve their crime fighting abilities, their public image will change and the public will regain confidence in the police (Seepe, 2001: 6). It is therefore essential that the service that the SAPS provides meet the needs of the community at large.

The transformational aspects in the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service are discussed in the following section.

### **2.2.5 White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service**

The White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service of 1998 is a direct outcome of the previous government's discrimination against disadvantaged groups. This White Paper emphasises the need to restore employment inequalities through the development of a broadly representative Public Service with particular regard to opportunities in employment, earning levels, benefits and conditions of service. This White Paper thus focuses primarily on human resources management and the restoring of the legitimacy and credibility of the Public Service. The responsibility for turning affirmative action policy into practice remains with the national and provincial departments. The implications of this White Paper for the SAPS are far reaching. Members of previously disadvantaged groups, who were discriminated against, will now enjoy appointments in senior posts, and will receive the same earning levels and benefits as their previously advantaged counterparts, as well as equal opportunities in employment (South Africa, 1998(d)).

The race representation in the SAPS can be used as an illustration of the transformation that this White Paper advocates. According to the article "Police actively fighting racism" (2000: \_\_), in 1998, 70 percent of staff in top management was white while 30 percent was black. This improved to a ratio of 34 percent white and 66 percent black in 2000. At senior management level, the percentage of whites had dropped from 74 to 58 in the previous two years, while that of blacks had risen from 26 to 42. The Minister for Safety and Security at the time stated that the objective was to have a fully representative police service by 2004. In January 2003 nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of all functional police personnel in the SAPS were black, a quarter (25 percent) white, nine percent coloured and four percent Indian. Among commissioned officers the

proportions were as follows: white 48 percent, black 38 percent, coloured eight percent and Indian six percent. Compared to their proportion of the general population, whites and to a lesser extent Indians are over-represented in the SAPS. This could imply that average prevalence levels in the police are somewhat below the national average – especially among commissioned officers, of which 54 percent are white or Indian (Schonteich, 2003: 3). On the other hand, a labour court ruling went against the SAPS in a case involving ten white policemen who were overlooked for promotion because of their race. The SAPS appealed against the judge's ruling that it had discriminated against the policemen unfairly on the grounds of race. The judge, however, ordered that the policemen, denied promotion for two consecutive years, be promoted. In addition, the judge criticised the National Commissioner for striving solely for racial representation in his decision not to promote the applicants, and for not considering the constitutional principle of police efficiency (Nontyatyambo & Benjamin, 2003: \_\_). In opposition to the above court ruling only four out of 230 posts in the Johannesburg area for the rank of captain are reserved for white male policemen while the remaining posts are allocated for other race groups and for white policewomen (Louw, 2004: 4).

The Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998, and its imperatives are discussed in the next section.

### **2.2.6 Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998**

South Africa consists of a multicultural and demographically diverse society in terms of race, religion, gender, ethnicity, class and language. A large part of the South Africa society previously did not form part of the workforce in this country. As a result, the need for policies on employment equity arose. According to Rauch (1994: 122&123) the old South African Police force was not as dramatically unrepresentative as many observers had believed, as 55 percent of its members were black. What did characterise the force, however, was the dominance of white Afrikaner males in its senior ranks. In 1995, 80 percent of personnel holding the rank of brigadier – then the fourth highest rank in the police organisation – were white, with only one female brigadier out of the 202 brigadier posts. Women constituted 18 percent of the total police strength, and only 11 percent of the officer ranks. In 1998, women made up 20 percent of the service, and 16 percent of the officer ranks. By mid-2000, the SAPS had achieved most of its targets, with management ranks being over 50 percent black. According to Schonteich (2003: 3), in January 2003 almost 62 percent of all the functional personnel in the SAPS were black, 25 percent were white, nine percent were coloured and four percent Indian. Among commissioned

officers, the ratio was 48 percent white, 38 percent black, eight percent coloured and six percent Indian.

It follows that the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 was developed to make provision for redressing the continuous inequalities associated with past discrimination in the workplace associated primarily with race and gender. The Act emphasises the eradication of unfair discrimination of any kind and encourages employers to commit themselves to organisational transformation. Importantly, this Act's objective is to promote equality in the workplace and to protect people from being unfairly discriminated against. Significantly, this Act recognises discrimination in the workplace and thus supports and sustains people's rights, which are guaranteed by the Constitution. Government's role is to provide advice and support, and to monitor the process as a whole. This role implies that a balance will be maintained between administrative processes and the building of positive relations among employers and employees. This Act mainly affects the internal functions of the SAPS, such as, promotions, since it is civil law and not criminal law (South Africa, 1998(b)).

To illustrate the transformation advocated in the Employment Equity Act, the SAPS Promotion of Employment Equity and Elimination of Unfair Discrimination Policy (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2000(b): 1-5) can be used as an example. The objectives of this policy are to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination and harassment, and promote equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment. In the past the equal rights of all the people in South Africa were perceived not to be preserved. The significance of this policy is that the SAPS acknowledged its responsibility to promote equality and eliminate unfair discrimination as a basic prerequisite for the effective delivery of policing services. The SAPS therefore undertook to take possible measures to promote equality and eliminate unfair discrimination on any grounds, including gender, race, colour or disability. For the first time in the history of policing in this country, members of the SAPS are beginning to enjoy equal opportunities and fair treatment in employment regardless of their race, gender, colour, or disability. In terms of this policy, groups or individuals that were unfairly discriminated against or harassed can begin to enjoy restored benefits, for example women, who were neglected in the past. Although, according to Rossouw (2003:6) there is currently only one woman in the top management of the SAPS, the Minister of Safety and Security has promised that attention will be given to training and promotion of woman specifically regarding management positions. More specifically, out of 15 094 commissioned officers in the SAPS, only 3 532 are female of which 1 934 are white, 193 Asian, 244 coloured and 1 161 African (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2002(c)).

Policing in South Africa was notorious for racism and unfair discrimination before the country became a democracy. The new policy will require members of the SAPS to alter their culture of violence and to acknowledge each other as equal regardless of race, gender, colour, and disability. Policing in South Africa was stereotyped as a macho- male driven organisation, therefore one could question whether the opportunity of equal employment and the eradication of unfair discrimination will contribute towards a service-oriented and representative service with whom the community can identify.

On the other hand, the Promotion of Employment Equity and Elimination of Unfair Discrimination Policy also makes provision for fair discrimination to redress prevailing inequities and disparities for the advancement of designated groups who continue to endure the consequences of these inequalities and disparities. Designated groups refer to black people, women and people with disabilities. It is thus not considered unfair discrimination to take affirmative action measures to distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job. It is furthermore fair to take measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. According to Smetherham (2003: 3), the SAPS in the Western Cape has advertised 1 000 posts; however, none will go to coloured people if employment equity in the province is to be achieved. Between July and August 2003, there were around 7 000 coloured, 5 500 white, 2 200 black and 85 Indian members employed in the province. Before 1994, there were around 5 000 coloured, 6 000 white and less than 1 000 black members employed in the province. It follows that 400 black men and 400 black women should be employed across all seven salary bands, and another 40 Indian people and 50 white people should be employed at the lowest level. However, if employment equity is to be achieved no coloured people should be given posts. This policy also makes provision that no requirements are included in any employment policy or practice designed to exclude any employee or group of employees on the basis of a lack of relevant experience. The inherent requirements of the job shall indicate the required skills, knowledge and competencies, and measures must be initiated to provide employees who lack such experience with a reasonable opportunity to meet these requirements. As a result, the policy will ensure that suitably qualified members from designated groups have equal employment opportunity and are equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce of the SAPS.

The relevant SAPS policies and directives indicating the movement towards change in the Service are outlined below.

## **2.3 Legislative and Policy Framework of the South African Police Service**

Policies and directives that provided guidance towards change in the South African Police Service are discussed below.

### **2.3.1 South African Police Service Act, 68 of 1995**

Parliament passed a new South African Police Service Act, 68 of 1995 that provided the legal basis for the establishment of the South African Police Service (SAPS). The SAPS was hereby established. This Act is regarded as the most prominent law to manifest and outline the functioning of the Service. The Act furthermore embodies the establishment and composition of the Service, the power and duties of the police as well as the regulation and control of the SAPS. This Act also provides for the establishment of a Secretariat for Safety and Security to, among other functions, ensure civilian oversight of the Service and to promote democratic accountability and transparency in the Service (South Africa, 1995(b): art 3).

The Minister identified the need for a Civilian Secretariat for Safety and Security in 1994. The key objectives of the envisaged structure were to provide government with civilian policy management capacity, independent of the vested and occupational interest of the Police Service. The Secretary for Safety and Security Secretariat, Mr. Azhar Cachalia, was appointed in December 1995. The Secretariat then immediately took over most of the activities of the Interim Advisory Team on the Amalgamation, Rationalisation and Transformation of the SAPS. The Secretariat for Safety and Security was, however, established at a time of great public concern over the high levels of crime being experienced in South Africa (*Secretariat for Safety and Security: Brief History*, 2003). Because of this, analysts were of the opinion that the appointment of a civilian police commissioner rendered the Secretariat redundant and indicated that it might be disbanded in the ongoing restructuring of the top echelons of the civil service (*Focus on Civil Service Restructuring*, 1999).

The National Secretariat for Safety and Security was however only disbanded approximately two years after its formation and incorporated into the SAPS itself. Civilian oversight, though, still exists at provincial level as part of Provincial Government structures. The Minister for Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula stated in his foreword of the “Annual Report of the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service for the 2002/2003 financial year” (South

Africa. South African Police Service, 2002(c)) that civilian oversight and the work of the Independent Complaints Directorate are essential for preventing, investigating and combating crime in general, which are the predominant means of bringing about safety and security. These aspects require careful planning, and must be dealt with within the confines of the law and with respect for human rights.

This Act also accentuates the establishment of Community Police Forums broadly representative of the community to ensure and maintain a partnership between the community and the Service to fulfil the needs of the community regarding policing. This service will be rendered to the community at national, provincial, area and local levels, aiming to improve service delivery and to become more accountable and transparent to the community. This partnership between the SAPS and the community should result in a joint problem identification and problem solving process. (South Africa, 1995 (b): art 18(1)).

The Act signifies that the Police Service in South Africa is no longer a government organ exclusively for the government's purposes; however, remarkable emphasis in community involvement and monitoring into policing matters laid the foundation for an unambiguous Service with whom the community can identify, and to whom the Service is responsible and answerable. For the first time in the history of policing in South Africa the community technically has oversight of policing. The Act implies that the SAPS has a partner in the community for greater co-operation between the SAPS and the community it serves. Policing in South Africa before 1994 was authoritarian and characterised by weak accountability and a lack of civilian input into policing policy.

To illustrate the transformation that this Act promotes, the establishment of the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) can be taken as an example. The Act makes provision for an Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) to investigate any police irregularities. This in turn ensures civilian oversight of the police. The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) functions independently from the SAPS, reports directly to the Minister of Safety and Security, and is structured at national and provincial levels. In the past, policing in South Africa was notorious for a number of reasons, such as police brutality, corruption and deaths in police custody (South Africa, 1995(b)). According to Bruce (2003(b): 25-29), one of the fruits of the transition to democracy in South Africa has been the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), which opened its doors in April 1997. The significance of this police watchdog is that the community

now has a public voice against police irregularities, which in turn promotes police accountability and transparency.

### **2.3.2 White Paper on Safety and Security**

The Green Paper for Safety and Security, issued in 1994, set out a basic policy guide for the transformation of the Department of Safety and Security. Since then a number of policy programmes have been initiated to bring the activities of the Department in line with the Constitution and the needs of policing a democracy. To review these programmes, and to set the policy framework for the next five years, the Minister of Safety and Security approved the development of a White Paper in June 1997. A mandate committee, consisting of the Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary for Safety and Security and the National Commissioner of the SAPS, was established to provide direction to the work of five ministerial committees set up to provide content to a Draft White Paper (South Africa, 1998(e)).

The five committees, in which local and international experts and senior members of the SAPS participated, were:

- The committee to investigate safety and security issues in South Africa;
- The committee to investigate the safety and security environment in South Africa;
- The committee to investigate the principles of policing in South Africa;
- The committee to investigate appropriate guidelines to deal with crime in South Africa and
- The committee to investigate the organisational transformation of the Department of Safety and Security.

Each committee submitted a final report that contained policy recommendations that were integrated and released for discussion among internal stakeholders in November 1997. These stakeholders included the mandate committee, SAPS Management, the chairpersons of the National Council of Provinces Committee on Security and Justice, the MECs for Safety and Security, the Secretariat for Safety and Security's National Crime Prevention Strategy Team, and the Independent Complaints Directorate (South Africa, 1998(e)).

The Minister released the final Draft White Paper for public consultation after Cabinet approval in May 1998. Extensive consultation was also undertaken with key stakeholders, role-players



and civil society through provincial public hearings held in each of the provinces to ensure that the final policy recommendations of the White Paper reflected the views of provincial stakeholders, role players and the public. In addition, a national hearing was held in August 1998 in Parliament. A number of submissions were made, and provincial reports on the submissions received from the public hearing process were presented. Extensive consultation with critical audiences was also undertaken through a local government conference, meetings with most of the political parties to discuss relevant issues raised by the White Paper, and a workshop was held with the National Crime Prevention Strategy partners on issues relevant to crime prevention as outlined in the White Paper.

An internal consultation process was also conducted. The SAPS circulated the Draft White Paper extensively within their structures, and received numerous submissions. A consolidated report on these submissions was compiled by the Divisional Commissioner: National Management Services and sent to the Secretariat. Meetings were held with most of the national government departments, and the key trade unions relevant to safety and security were also consulted. The final report was presented to the Cabinet Committee for Safety and Intelligence and was approved in September 1998 (South Africa, 1998(e)).

The White Paper on Safety and Security of 1998 emphasises the importance of effective service delivery to the public by the police. The primary focus of this White Paper is improving the quality of service delivery to the South African public. In order to achieve improved service delivery, effective mechanisms were established in the form of civilian Secretariats at both national and provincial level. The role of these Secretariats is to provide oversight and more effective monitoring of the SAPS. This implies that the police will become more transparent to the community they serve and, in effect, enhance their service to the public.

In addition, this White Paper promotes institutional reform that is intended to lead to a differentiation between the political responsibility for policy formulation, and the managerial responsibilities for the implementation of the policy. As a result of this differentiation government is taking control of policy conditions under which the police are required to function. This also implies that the police will have greater managerial independence to perform their operational functions, which will ensure greater accountability for improved service delivery.

In any democratic dispensation victimisation is considered a violation of human rights. This White Paper restores human rights that were neglected by the police in the past through the empowerment of victims and witnesses of crime, by treating them with dignity and respect. In a rights-based society it is important for the police to meet the needs of citizens and to uphold and respect their human rights. The restoring of human rights and dignity by this White Paper hopes to ensure that the public will positively alter their perceptions of police effectiveness, which will lead to the increasing of public confidence in the police.

The most significant elements emerging from this White Paper are the focus on improved service delivery, community involvement and human rights. Furthermore, the White Paper attempts to reform the police to ensure that they become protectors of our communities and of human rights and, from the other side, to prepare the community to participate in providing safety and security through Community Police Forums (CPF) advocated in this White Paper to ensure greater co-operation with the SAPS at local level. On the other hand, according to Klipin (in Buntman and Snyman, 2003:407) this White Paper's implementation was undercut by at least two factors: Klipin argues that many police officers had not seen or read this White Paper and other policing policy documents. Klipin furthermore feels that the White Paper's importance was equally suspended by the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS). Steinberg (in Buntman and Snyman, 2003:408), however, goes further, claiming that this White Paper was left behind before it was even printed (South Africa, 1998(e)).

The Victim Empowerment Programme (VEP) is an example of the transformation advocated by the White Paper on Safety and Security. Similar to citizens in other new emerging democracies, South Africans are increasingly affected by violent crime; therefore, the key challenge is to respond to the immediate needs of victims of crime and violence. A whole section in the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) is reserved for a victim empowerment and support programme. The Policing Priorities and Objectives for 1998/99 (South Africa. Department of Safety and Security, 1998(f): 29) and 1999/2000 (South Africa. Department of Safety and Security, 1999:21) of the SAPS also make provision for victim empowerment to promote a victim-support approach by the South African Police Service.

It is significant that the SAPS prioritised victim empowerment and support as one of its objectives, as policing in South Africa was never known for having a victim-centered approach. Helping victims of crime was often not seen as part of the core functions of policing in South

Africa, and therefore it will demand from members of the SAPS a shift from policy to practice to incorporate the philosophy and implementation of victim support into their routine police practices to ensure that victims of crime in South Africa are treated with respect and dignity.

The Victim Empowerment Programme has as its main aim “the development of interventions and modifications in the criminal justice process, which are aimed at the empowerment of victims”. This aim will be accomplished by addressing the negative effects of criminal activity on victims through programmes that mediate these effects and provide support and skills to address them. Furthermore, a meaningful role for the victim has to be provided in the criminal justice process. In addition, the criminal justice system must be made more sensitive and service-oriented towards victims, while the accessibility of the criminal justice system to victims must be improved (National Crime Prevention Strategy, 1996:65).

The SAPS has a crucial role to play in the achievement of the aims of the Victim Empowerment Programme, but it will require members of the SAPS to become more supportive and sensitive towards victims of crime. To emphasise the importance of a Victim Empowerment and Support Programme, Davis & Theron (1999:57) are of the opinion that being the victim of crime could lead to serious physical, economic, social and psychological problems. It is, therefore, essential that victims should be given the necessary medical, psychological, social and practical assistance to empower them to cope with the trauma of victimisation.

The mission of the Programme is therefore to develop and implement a co-ordinated strategy to ensure a caring, supportive, accessible, available and thorough service to victims of crime, thus contributing to a sense of empowerment and an environment conducive to the creation of peaceful communities (South Africa. Department of Welfare, 1998(a): 1&2). This programme is multi-faceted and inter-sectoral, comprising the core NCPS departments and, amongst others the SAPS. Motivated by these initiatives and being required to carry out the functions of the Department of Safety and Security, the SAPS began with the process of developing a victim support programme. The SAPS consulted with all relevant role-players, stakeholders and communities within society. In addition, consultation with various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs) and academic institutions took place in 1995 to discuss their own roles in relation to victim support.

On the basis of consultation done on a provincial level within the SAPS, a national SAPS Victim Support Programme Steering Committee was established in January 1996. This committee was tasked with developing criteria for the training of personnel with regard to victim empowerment and support within the criminal justice system of which the SAPS forms a part (Smit, 1999: 42&43).

As a result, the SAPS identified certain training needs concerning victim empowerment and support to provide all police officials with the necessary interpersonal and communication skills to enable them to provide an efficient service to victims of crime (Nel and Pretorius, 1996:31). This training initiative is an indication of the change in approach and devotion of the SAPS to crime victims. As a result, the training initiative demands from members of the SAPS that they create an awareness of the possible needs of victims and a sense of empathy for the victim. The training is aimed at benefiting both the victim and the police as the victim will be more willing to become a witness and provide the police with more information.

A survey conducted in 1997 to test the level of sensitisation of police officials in the SAPS, however, indicated that 62 percent of the respondents believed that they lacked sufficient training in victim support, or felt that the SAPS did not sufficiently provide for the needs of victims. Furthermore, 85 percent of respondents believed that providing a better service to victims would result in improved relationships and allow for greater participation in the criminal justice system (Smit, 1999:48). The significance of the outcomes of this survey is that members of the SAPS are showing increasing empathy towards victims, thus becoming more victim-oriented. In agreement with Smit, Davis and Theron (1999:57) are also of the opinion that despite the ideal of having sufficient services available to all kinds of victims, it seems that the assistance available to crime victims is rather limited. Writing in 1997, (Snyman, 1997:164) concurs with the above statement and is of the opinion that despite the increase of crime and the violence that accompanies it, relatively little is done to address the plight of crime victims. Although some progress has been made in improving support services in South Africa, existing support services are limited, fragmented, uncoordinated and poorly marketed.

It follows that the Draft Position Paper on the NCPS Victim Empowerment Programme (South Africa, 1997(b)) also recognises that, until 1996 very little attention has been focused by the state or other agencies on seriously addressing the plight of the victims of crime and violence in South Africa. Furthermore, a 1996 survey indicated that over a period of five years, about 70 percent of

the urban population in South Africa had been victimised at least once, while most victims tend to be dissatisfied with the treatment given by the police (Van Dijk, 1996: 18-30).

Another victimisation survey conducted in 1997 similarly indicated dissatisfaction with the police (Mistry, 1997:4). Respondents were dissatisfied with the way the police behaved at the scene of crime, which gave them the impression that the police could not be bothered, while the police also blamed the victims for being careless, making the victim responsible for what happened. The police were furthermore described as insensitive towards victims. On the other hand, members of the SAPS showed a positive attitude with regard to being sensitive towards all victims of crime in the 1997 sensitisation survey.

Similarly, an internal climate study conducted in 1996 by the SAPS indicated that the majority of police personnel realised that the SAPS has a crucial role to play in victim support and that they are committed to serve those in crisis (South Africa, 1997(d): 16). Although members of the SAPS indicated that the police are dedicated to the serving of crime victims, it appears that a large part of the community is dissatisfied with the police, concerning victims of crime. As a result, it will be necessary for SAPS members to receive training on victims of crime on how to deal with victims of crime on a continuous basis. According to Smit (1999: 43), most victims of crime will have their first contact with police officials immediately after a crime has been committed against them; therefore, this contact is crucial in that it will determine to what extent victims will be able to cope with or recover from their experiences.

According to the 1996 survey, few victims in South Africa receive specialised help. However, according to Davis and Theron (1999: 58), some of the bigger South African cities offer excellent services to victims of rape, women abuse and child abuse. On the other hand, many other victims of crime in under- resourced areas have nowhere to turn to and have no option but to suffer without any assistance. It follows that the few organisations that do offer support to crime victims in general cannot cope with all the victims and do not address all the needs of these victims. This is a clear indication that there are many unmet needs among the many victims of crime (Van Dijk, 1996: 18-30). Members of the SAPS should, however, not underestimate their own ability to assist victims of crime and that they can be of great support in seeing to the many unmet needs of crime victims. It follows that the South African Police Service Victim Empowerment Programme will bring substantive changes to the way in which victims of crime are treated.

The Draft Policy Document on Change in the South African Police Service is discussed in the next section.

### **2.3.3 Draft Policy Document on Change in the South African Police Service**

After the establishment of a new South African police service, the need emerged for a statement of policy. In 1994 the “Draft Policy Document on Change in the South African Police Service” was introduced to address that need. This policy document deals with a number of key policy areas. This document provides for one national police service structured at national and provincial levels, which will function under a national and provincial commissioner, who will in turn function under the national government and the respective provincial governments. This implies that the hierarchical structure of the SAPS will be “flattened” to create a more “bottom-up” approach (South Africa. Minister of Safety and Security, 1994 (c): 20-21).

On the other hand, according to Schonteich (2003:5) out of 102 349 functional police members employed by the SAPS in January 2003, only 12 191 (or 12 percent) were constables. The SAPS also has nearly five times more inspectors and one-and-a-half times as many sergeants as constables. Leggett (in Schonteich, 2003:5) is of the opinion that the South African distribution appears to be the opposite of international policing norms, and such a “distribution is absurd in terms of functional responsibilities”. Schonteich (2003:5) is furthermore of the opinion that there is no real differentiation of function between non-commissioned officers, and the virtue of a military-type structure, with every incident having a clear line of responsibility associated with it, is vague in the SAPS. As a result, one of the principles of the Draft Policy Document on Change in the South African Police Service, stating that “the organization must be flattened, and its top-heaviness must be trimmed” (South Africa. Minister of Safety and Security, 1994(c): 21), is therefore totally in contradiction with the organisations’ practice. According to Leggett (2002: 23), it is partly to meet ambitious affirmative action targets, and to increase the proportion of officers in higher rank-related salary categories, that police personnel numbers at middle and higher management level are unhealthily high. There is almost one commissioned officer (of the rank of captain and higher) for every six non-commissioned officers in the SAPS. In addition, to emphasise the top-heaviness of the rank structure of the SAPS, the “Annual Report of the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service for the 2002/2003 financial year” (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2002(c)) indicates a total of 87 643 non commissioned officers. A total of 56 744 are inspectors while, on the other hand, only 17 585 are

sergeants and 13 314 are constables. Conversely, the commissioned rank of captain constitutes a total of 10 054.

It follows that this Policy Document significantly indicates the dangers of allowing racial and ethnic divisions to form in the structures of the police. This Policy Document furthermore advocates the demilitarisation of policing in South Africa to create a civilian structure to ensure a “user-friendly”, quality service. In other words, policing must be rendered in a non-discriminatory manner and with a respect for human rights. This is a significant statement in the sense that policing in South Africa prior to 1994 was historically known for its militaristic approach, use of force, discriminatory practices and violation of human rights.

Furthermore, this document advocates for community involvement and consultation in police activities. This implies that policing in South Africa should have the community as a partner and consultant regarding police functions. What makes this statement more significant is the fact that the larger part of this community historically saw the police as their enemies (South Africa. Minister of Safety and Security, 1994 (c): 1-22).

Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 regulates the use of force when effecting an arrest. South Africa, a newcomer into the human rights arena, recognised the value of human life and the importance of limiting unnecessary use of force, and therefore amended Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act in 1998. The amendment mainly limits the use of lethal force to circumstances where the use of force is necessary to prevent threats to life or threats of grievous bodily harm or where there is a danger of future death or grievous bodily harm (Bruce, 2002: \_\_\_\_). The Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 states that in the event that a suspect resists arrest or flees, the arresting officer may, “in order to effect the arrest use such force as may in the circumstances be reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance or prevent the person concerned from fleeing”. If a person is being arrested for a schedule 1 offence (treason, murder, rape etcetera) or if the arresting officer has reasonable ground to suspect that such an offence has been committed, and the arresting officer is unable to effect the arrest or prevent the suspect from fleeing by other means other than by killing him, “the killing shall be deemed to be justifiable homicide” (South Africa, 1977: 996-997).

The 1998 amendment to the legislation, however, provoked debate and resistance. To bring standards of practice in line with the rest of the democratic world is in order in a democracy. On

the other hand, is it realistic to limit the use of force against suspected criminals in such a violent society? According to Maepa (2002:2), the use of force when making an arrest is inherently controversial. On the one side the violent nature of South African criminal activity brings members of the SAPS into situations where the use of lethal force is often needed. On the other side there is the high number of people who are injured or killed by the SAPS. Therefore, according to du Plessis (2001: 2), in order to strike a balance between the rights of the suspects on the one hand, and the interests of justice, on the other, lawmakers would need to carefully assess the present law from a constitutional and from a practical point of view.

Despite the violent criminal activities and the number of injuries and killings of suspects in police custody, government resisted the implementation of the amended Section 49 pending further discussion by the relevant parties. The old Section 49 was found to be unconstitutional since it supposes that suspects are guilty until proven innocent. The amended Section 49 would thus have a significant impact on the members of the SAPS and their daily functioning. However, the longer the confusion surrounding Section 49 exists, the longer the uncertainty for the police continued, resulting in police who were unable to carry out their duties with confidence. Conversely, it also posed the danger that more suspects continue to be shot by police. As a result of the delay in the implementation of the amendment, members of the SAPS had not had any training in preparation for the implementation of the new Section 49. In addition, as believed by Bruce (1999: \_\_\_) there can be little doubt that there was a need for the original Section 49 to be amended to bring it in line with Constitutional provisions, which protect the right to life. Evidence from the United States of America has shown that where the police have placed restrictions similar to the Section 49 amendment on the use of force, it has had no negative impact on the safety of police officers. There is even evidence that such restrictions have contributed to decreases in levels of violence against police officers. Despite the outcome of the controversy surrounding Section 49, members of the SAPS were required to invest in a new spirit and positive attitude towards the value of human life and be able to distinguish when the use of force is unnecessary. This implied that mechanisms must be put in place to train members to achieve this new spirit and attitude with the necessary mechanisms to support members in achieving their goals.

On 20 May 2003, a national summit on police killings was held at the South African Police Service Academy in Pretoria. At this summit the National Commissioner of the SAPS made the bold statement that police were being killed because they did not understand the standard on the



use of force. To back up his statement, the Commissioner cited SAPS research that suggested that in 60 percent of police killings the police member did not offer any resistance. Members might not be drawing their weapons in time under circumstances that merit the use of deadly force; therefore, delays in reaction time caused by the confusion, and the lack of training, might pose a serious risk to lives. The delay in the promulgation of Section 49 provided for an intervening Constitutional Court decision that in return provided for a third standard, somewhere between the old and the new (Leggett, 2003: 1-3). This increased the confusion and uncertainty amongst police officials about what they should and should not do concerning the use of force. Bruce (2003(a): \_\_) is therefore of the opinion that the delay in implementing the law has prolonged confusion as to its meaning, rather than achieved greater clarity. At this stage it seemed reasonable to ask if proponents of the legislation answered questions about the precise meaning of the law or was it only the police who had put themselves in danger in relation to the use of lethal force? Furthermore, Bruce (2003(c): \_\_) is of the opinion that this confusion was likely to be linked both to unjustified uses of force by police relying on outdated legal provisions as well as to inappropriate restraint by police in situations where police should intervene or carry out arrests. Uncertainty may also be putting police lives at risk though none of the legal developments actually affect the right to use force in self-defence.

The Minister for Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, told members of the Service: “If your life is threatened, whip out your pistol and shoot in self-defence, otherwise you’re going to die” (Mbeki ends delay over new lethal-force law, 2003: \_\_). In addition, the Minister reiterated on another occasion that police should shoot to kill in order to protect themselves and the lives of community members (Police should shoot to protect themselves, 2003: \_\_). After being hindered by the Safety and Security Ministry and the SAPS for four-and-a-half years, President Thabo Mbeki finally signed the new Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which governs the use of lethal force, into operation. The President, without any announcement, published in the Government Gazette on July 11 that the new Act would come into force on July 18 2003 (Mbeki ends delay over new lethal-force law, 2003: \_\_). Proudlock (1999: 32) described Section 49 as one of the most notorious sections of South Africa’s criminal law, but the amendment of Section 49 is an important milestone in South Africa’s journey towards the creation of a democracy founded on the rule of law and respect for human rights.

The Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the SAPS and their impact on transformation in the SAPS are discussed below.

### **2.3.4 Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the South African Police Service**

In the light of the new Service, the Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the South African Police Service as presented in Annexure B was developed in 1994 to be in line with the trust toward democratic policing in this country.

“Operation Crackdown”, as part of the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS), can be used as an example of the transformation that this directive holds. Operation Crackdown is the South African Police Service’s new three-year crime combating strategy (Pelser, 2000: \_\_). The aim of the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) was to stabilise serious crime within the first three years of its inception, beginning on 1 April 2000 (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2002(d): 22). To achieve this, a geographic approach and organised crime approaches to crime were adopted. The geographic approach focused on stabilising the serious crime in the 145 “Crackdown” stations that accounted for more than half of all recorded crime in South Africa. Everyday policing operations and special operations based on the analysis of crime in each station’s ward were launched on 1 April 2000 to reach a full understanding of the ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘why’ and ‘who’ questions regarding each crime. What is the strategy all about, will it work, and more importantly is it in line with the vision, mission and value statement of the South African Police Service?

The strategy had two primary objectives:

- To reduce and stabilise crime in the targeted areas to the extent that station level policing can be normalised. To support this, the SAPS projects aimed at improving station level performance, like the service delivery improvement programme, will be focused on the 140 selected station areas.
- To improve public confidence in the police and to improve public perceptions of safety.

Furthermore, the strategy had three main components:

- A geographical approach, in which areas affected by high rates of crime, and particularly violent crime, are clustered into ‘crime-combating zones’, which are then targeted for aggressive high density street level policing

- An intelligence-driven focus on organised crime syndicates operating in these areas. This is aimed at disrupting syndicate activities by arresting syndicate leaders and ‘runners’, and by closing down the flow of stolen goods and the markets for stolen goods.
- The operational activities, which are to be supported by medium-term social crime prevention initiatives aimed at addressing the social, economic and development deficits conducive to high rates of criminal activity in these areas (Pelser, 2000: \_\_).

It follows that in the last quarter of the 1999/2000 financial year (which was the quarter just before the implementation of the National Crime Combating Strategy) 34 (79 percent) of the 43 police areas in South Africa still showed an increase in more policeable crimes. Policeable crimes are crimes such as housebreaking at residential or business premises, stock theft, theft of motor vehicles, et cetera. These crimes are labelled as more policeable, because they can, to a certain extent, be deterred and, thus, prevented by an increase in conventional policing, for example: visible patrols, roadblocks, stop and search actions. This figure went down to 28 (62 percent) in the last quarter of the 2000/2001 financial year, and dropped further to 13 (29 percent) in the last quarter of the 2001/2002 financial year. In the last quarter of the 1999/2000 financial year, 74 (51 percent) of the 145 Crackdown stations - which received more than half of the reports of serious crimes in South Africa - still faced an increase in more policeable crimes. This figure, however, went down to 55 (26 percent) in the last quarter of the 2001/2002 financial year. The crime levels in three provinces did not stabilise completely as there were minor increases in more policeable crimes towards the last quarter of the 2001/2002 financial year. In the quarter before the launch of the crime prevention strategy eight of the nine provinces still indicated increases in more policeable crimes, and the same applied to the last quarter of the 2000/2001 financial year. Five provinces, however, saw stabilisation in more policeable crimes in the 2001/2002 financial years (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2002(d): 20-23).

In contrast, Bruce (in Sylvester, 2000: \_\_) is of the opinion that the statistics should not be seen as reason to celebrate, as the statistics could merely be a change in the way crimes were reported instead of in policing. Bruce also believes that Operation Crackdown would not have had a sustainable effect on crime, and thus law enforcement is not likely to be effective until there is a qualitative improvement in the criminal justice process. However, a spokesperson for the National Commissioner of the SAPS has observed that Operation Crackdown has raised the morale of the police officers and as a result had an impact on crime fighting. Similarly, Dr de

Kock, in charge of the SAPS's statistics, said, that the figures are a positive sign and show, on all accounts, that Operation Crackdown is starting to pay off.

Although Operation Crackdown initially enjoyed considerable public and media support, and was also acknowledged by the Minister for Safety and Security as a milestone in the fight against crime, more cautious views were also raised (Pelser, 2000: \_\_):

- Concerns were expressed regarding the sometimes-crude manner in which suspected illegal immigrants were identified or, in some instances, incorrectly identified. Concern was also expressed at the treatment suspected illegal immigrants received at the hands of the police and of officials of the Department of Home Affairs.
- The hit-and-run nature of the operation was also questioned. Commentators pointed out that such operations result only in temporary reductions, or displacement, of criminal activity as the more sophisticated criminals go into hiding or move to other areas only to return when the police move out.
- The sustainability of these high-density operations and their actual impact on crime - thus, the cost effectiveness of the operation - was questioned.

The above-mentioned issues which question the operation are in contrast with the vision, mission and value statement of the SAPS that emphasises the cost-effective use of its resources, the upholding of fundamental human rights and the responsible and controlled use of police powers. Furthermore, Pelser (2000: \_\_) notes that there has been no indication that social crime prevention projects have been approved for these crime areas. This is therefore another problem in terms of the vision, mission and value statement of the SAPS, which supports proactive policing with a problem-solving approach. Does Operation Crackdown therefore defy the vision, mission and value statement of the SAPS? According to Pelser (2000: \_\_), despite these concerns, the public mood remains enthusiastic. This is probably attributable to the growing sense that government's "gloves-off" approach to crime is more than rhetorical. Operation Crackdown has had positive results that include:

- A reduction, however temporary, of actual criminal activity in the selected areas
- A challenge to the freedom with which the criminal activity flourished in these areas
- Improvements to police morale

- A developing model for multi-agency operations, from which lessons can be drawn for future operations.

The Discussion Document on Change in the SAPS is discussed in the next section.

### **2.3.5 Discussion Document on Change in the South African Police Service**

The South Africa Police Service Change Management Team put together a Discussion Document on Change Management in the South African Police Service in 1994. This discussion document reflected the approach and activities of the national Change Management Team in its task of facilitating change in the South African Police Service (SAPS), and was expected, together with the Constitution, to serve as guidance for the transformation of policing into a national police service that serves the needs of the community and utilises a community-orientated approach. This document provided for a Change Management Team and an Amalgamation Management Team that would function at National and Provincial levels, for the provision of greater focus in the areas of change management, amalgamation and rationalisation. One mandate, among others given to the Amalgamation Management Team, was to develop a strategy to initiate, standardise, direct and manage the physical amalgamation process. The primary function of the Change Management Team was to initiate structures and processes important for the success of the change process. This discussion document presented the broad outlines of the change envisaged in the SAPS, and identified key areas for organisational transformation (South Africa, 1994(b): 4-7).

The creation of the SAPS and the institutionalisation of a new philosophy of community policing implied a radical change from the old way of policing. As a result, a new mission and value system was drafted that had to be adopted by all members of the SAPS. It followed that a new strategy had been developed through the concept of community policing which was a relatively new concept for South Africans. The new SAPS had a responsibility towards the community, and the community played a crucial role as a control mechanism. The SAPS could satisfy the needs of the community through absolute transparency and accountability. Transparency would be indicated by the essence of police actions, whilst accountability would be ensured by the extent to which responsibility for actions and delegated authority was accepted (South Africa, 1994(b): 8-9).

To accentuate the new mission, values and strategy of the SAPS, the following focus areas for organisational transformation have been identified:

- **Structure**

Members should be empowered at the lowest level through the new philosophy of the South African Police Service. This will bring about more discretion at operational levels, delegation of responsibility and authority, space for flexibility and adaptability to local needs, and the co-ordination of functions and activities to create a specialised work environment. The new structure must also make provision for the appointment of senior, experienced, skilled and well trained leaders at operational level. For community policing to be successful, the structure should emphasise the status of the station commissioner and his personnel. Consequently, it was proposed in this document that the managerial style in the SAPS be transformed from an autocratic, bureaucratic and militaristic style to one that was characterised by participation and problem solving.

- **Culture**

Emphasis is also given in the discussion document to respect and to have sensitivity towards fundamental human rights and the empowerment of subordinates through risk taking and problem solving, which will have a direct impact on the culture of the SAPS. Cultural change in the SAPS is perhaps the most fundamental and difficult variable in a change programme; therefore, its effect will only be felt in the long term. In policing in South Africa the role and power culture, characterised by bureaucracy, high standardisation, conformity to rules and regulations, limited or no empowerment to subordinates, and control centred in senior management, must be transformed to a task and person culture, characterised by performance based rewards, the encouragement of risk taking by members, focus on people, team work, the empowerment of members, and collaboration.

- **Resources**

This document furthermore gave recognition to resources. Human resources are vitally important to the successful functioning of the SAPS. In order to maximise policing services within the constraints of the budget, it is imperative that members perform at an optimal level to achieve the overall strategy and goals of the Service. Emphasis is given to equal employment and equality of opportunity, professional personnel management, affirmative action and lateral entrance, human resource development, fair labour relations and the redressing of grievances and rehabilitative

discipline. The effective, equitable and efficient allocation and utilisation of physical resources also received attention. To promote the cost-effective allocation and utilisation of physical resources, the initiation of a process of out-phasing, out-sourcing, and civilianisation was recommended with the view to a leaner resource management process, which focuses on value-adding activities. Those activities that do not add value should be phased out.

In a public sector context, such as the police service, change management must take account of the political and social context. This means that the perceptions and attitudes of the community, expectations and political processes are vital factors to be taken into account in the process of change. In addition, this document identified the following characteristics of the change faced by the SAPS (South Africa, 1994(b): 12):

- The change is occurring within a unique process of fundamentally changing socio-political society. This means that the need for change is almost universally accepted, but is generally viewed with what can only be described as mixed feelings. Therefore, the most important process in change is that of clarifying precisely what it is that the change is about.
- Change is occurring within a political and organisational context, which discriminated against particular groups and benefited others; therefore, change requires the redressing of inequalities in a transparent fashion.
- Change has been driven primarily by the political process and not by police leadership. As a result, if senior management do not clearly understand or support the change, the change process will be much more difficult. The challenge for leadership is thus to lead the change process in a proactive and committed way.
- The envisaged change in the police service can be characterised as revolutionary change, as it requires changes in almost every aspect of organisational functioning.
- The process of change in the police service is enormously complex. (South Africa, 1994(b): 9-18)

The contents of this document imply that the SAPS should strive towards a more accountable, legitimate, transparent, impartial and recognisable service through the adoption of a community orientated approach and culture. Internally, it signifies that the SAPS should prioritise its

resources, and services towards community needs, and should decentralise decision taking to develop members through individual discretion and initiative. The contents of this document are also in conjunction with the main objectives of Resolution 7, discussed in 2.5 of Chapter 2. To emphasise the transformation that the Discussion Document supports, the South African Police Service Performance Enhancement Process (PEP) can be used as illustration. A performance enhancement process is an integrated process that defines, assesses, reinforces and promotes the best job related behaviours, outcomes and expected deliverables. This process thus attempts to ensure that every member in the organisation is working “smarter” to achieve better results, to help the organisation to achieve its objectives. In other words, it is a way of improving the work performance of individual employees to help the SAPS achieve its strategic objectives. For this to happen, each member must have clearly defined jobs with specific objectives to facilitate the measurement of individual performance. One of the primary objectives of the process is to ensure that members are given the opportunity to develop their job skills and knowledge to perform better (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2003: 2).

The Performance Enhancement Process is, therefore, essentially a development tool. The end result should be improved service delivery throughout the SAPS. This is done by ensuring that each member of the SAPS has clearly defined and well understood Key Performance Areas and that these are in line with the SAPS’s strategic objectives. The Key Performance Areas may refer to specific tasks, such as “helping to reduce the incidence of crime”, may be broken down into a series of tasks, which have to be performed to achieve a Key Performance Area.

It follows that there are two parts to the assessment of a supervised employee’s performance. Supervised employees are members of the SAPS being assessed in certain competencies by their supervisors. The two parts of the assessment of the supervised employee’s performance are:

- the assessment on performance, on the basis of the specific requirements of his or her job; and;
- the assessment of developmental needs, on the basis of evidence of performance. This is achieved by assessing the individual’s ability in certain competencies (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2003: 2-7).

Members of the SAPS thus have to transform from a rule-bound police force to a result-driven police service. The performance of members will be measured and competencies assessed regularly and objectively; therefore, members will have to familiarise themselves with a



performance culture inculcated and maintained throughout the SAPS. This change in emphasis is critical to the culture of policing in South Africa as a result of the change to a strictly service-orientated Service. Every member will know exactly what is expected of him or her, as management is provided with a useful and effective development tool through sustained human resource management that will ensure that a trust relationship is developed between supervisors and subordinates. In addition, constructive communication between supervisors and supervised employees on an ongoing basis is encouraged.

The Progress Report on the transformation of the SAPS, guidelines on transformation and the implementation of strategic themes in the SAPS and their implications for transformation in the Service are now discussed.

### **2.3.6 Progress Report and Guidelines on Transformation and the Implementation of Strategic Themes in the South African Police Service**

The Amalgamation Management Team compiled a Progress Report on the Transformation in the South African Police Service in 1995 (South Africa. Amalgamation Management Team, 1995(a): 1-11). This report presents the then present status of the transformation process in the SAPS, guidelines to direct transformation in the SAPS, transformation priorities, and strategic themes of transformation in the SAPS. The status of transformation in the SAPS during 1995 is discussed below.

#### **2.3.6.1 Status of Transformation in the South African Police Service during 1995**

The status of transformation in the SAPS during 1995 with regard to rationalisation, amalgamation and change was as follows:

- **Rationalisation**

At this stage a new appointment philosophy was designed whereby members in management posts were appointed according to skills and competence rather than seniority. The significance of this design was that senior management in the SAPS would become more representative. The process and procedures for senior appointments had been designed and the National

Commissioner, Deputy-Commissioners, Provincial Commissioners and Divisional National Heads had been appointed in terms of these procedures.

- **Amalgamation**

This progress report also made provision for the design and development of standardised new policies and procedures as well as for more effective labour practices. As a result measures were also undertaken to ensure the involvement and participation of police unions at all levels of the transformation process. Attention was also given to the standardisation of service conditions. Alternative rank structures were designed and a decision was taken to implement a new uniform, symbols and insignia. New colours for police land vehicles, air- and sea-craft were considered. New promotion policies and procedures were also being developed.

- **Change**

A new vision, mission and value system was developed to redirect the SAPS to render the quality service demanded by the community and members to create a safe and secure environment. A community policing pilot project was soon to be introduced at various police stations throughout the country. A common understanding of the concept of community policing was also being developed in consultation with all communities and role-players. Furthermore, the progress report also made provision for affirmative action. Internal and external expectations had necessitated that specific policy in this regard urgently be drafted. A discussion document in this regard was therefore been finalised.

Emphasis was also given to the demilitarisation and rationalisation of the SAPS to ensure that policing services were delivered to the community in a transparent and accountable manner. An audit of all resources of the SAPS was also undertaken at this stage to determine their current distribution. This audit was intended to ensure a more equitable distribution of resources so that all communities had equal access to resources. In addition attention was given to the basic training of police personnel with the emphasis on fundamental rights and community policing. Various international role-players were and still are involved in assisting the SAPS with training. One such role-player is the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), which is assisting the Training Division of the SAPS in a number of projects to review, design and develop the basic training curriculum of the police (South Africa. South African Police Service,

2002(c): 12). In addition, Sweden has made a large investment in human rights and democracy training for the SAPS, spending some R1, 9 million on workshops and training materials from 1995-1998. A United Kingdom and Commonwealth Advisory Team assisted the SAPS to develop a new basic-level training programme during 1995 worth R12 million, as well as providing support for community- policing projects in four provinces, with a combined value, between 1995-1998, of R56 million. Other active supporters of police transformation in South Africa are Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States of America (Malan, 1999: 37-38).

The transformation guidelines approved to direct the transformation process in the SAPS are outlined in the section that follows.

### **2.3.6.2 Transformation Guidelines for the South African Police Service**

In 1996, the National Commissioner of the SAPS approved guidelines that directed the transformation process of the SAPS. The function of these transformation guidelines was to act as a foundation for the execution and guidance of transformation in the Police Service. These guidelines were furthermore aimed at:

- Meeting the requirements of the Constitution:

Among other requirements, the Constitution makes provision for the establishment of a single national South African police service that is representative, impartial, transparent and accountable, through the development of community- policing services for the establishment of Community Policing Forums.

- Meeting the vision of the South African Police Service:

The vision for the SAPS is to create a safe and secure environment for all citizens in South Africa

- The establishment of a police service that will reflect the national, racial and gender character of South Africa

- The improvement of service delivery to all citizens of this country
- The eradication of employment inequalities and discrimination in the workplace.
- The restoration of and the inculcating respect for the fundamental human rights of all citizens.

These transformation guidelines as approved by the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service have been elaborated below.

#### ▪ **The New Vision for Policing**

The socio-political transformation the country has undergone, and is still undergoing, since the election on 27 April 1994, together with the prevailing levels of crime and violence, has necessitated a new vision for, and fundamental changes to, policing in South Africa. The new vision for policing is that policing should lead to the creation of a safe and secure environment. This vision therefore forms the essence of the transformation process. Externally, the community and all role players also need to share the broad vision of future policing in order to create an understanding of the role of the police, the role of the community, and the difficulties of policing, and in order to facilitate support for the police. Internally, the vision needs to be shared to facilitate the development of a vision-driven organisation, to facilitate understanding of the true role of the police and the community, and to enhance the support of the community and other role players, which is so desperately needed to create a safe and secure environment for all people in South Africa.

#### ▪ **Style of Policing**

The larger community of South Africa viewed the police as representative of an illegitimate, repressive and unjust system. As a result, consensus has been reached among most people, institutions, and organisations in South Africa that community policing should be adopted as the new style of policing. True institutionalisation of community policing entails, in addition to community involvement and participation, the total alignment of the police organisation to support the philosophy and principles of community policing. This should lead internally to the development of new organisational structures that will empower members at the lowest level. In addition, management styles based on teamwork, participation and problem solving will be established. As a result, new cultures will also be developed to replace the culture of a closed

system with a culture of involvement through principles such as accountability, participation and transparency. Externally the community needs to be made aware of the role of the police and the role that they as the community can and should play in policing. Furthermore, the perceived culture of non-involvement is to be replaced with a culture of involvement. The police should, however, facilitate this through creating trust by delivering quality, professional service and by facilitating participation.

- **Corporate Strategy**

The corporate strategy by which transformation in the SAPS is to take place is the institutionalisation of the community policing approach.

The transformation guidelines above are implemented through a number of policies, legislation and directives to give effect to these guidelines. More specifically, community policing is enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 as discussed in 2.2.2. above. The Interim Constitution of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 also made provision for the establishment of community police forums as discussed in 2.2.1 above.

- **Long Term Objectives**

The Transformation Guidelines furthermore makes provision for long-term transformation objectives. These objectives define what is important to the SAPS as a whole. The ultimate goal, however, remains the creation of a safe and secure environment for all people in South Africa. According to the Transformation Guidelines, improved quality of service, internally and externally, through community consultation and participation and the optimal utilisation of resources will form the long-term objectives of transformation (South Africa. South African Police Service, 1996(a): 2-3). In order to attain the objectives of the transformation process, transformation priorities were identified, which are discussed below.

### **2.3.6.3 Transformation priorities for the South African Police Service**

The following transformation priorities were also identified by the National Commissioner as being necessary to reach the transformation objectives:

- Developing and enhancing consultation and participation;
  - Education, development and training;
  - Developing a people orientated approach to personnel management;
  - Cost-effective and priority-directed use of resources;
  - Enhancing representivity and equal opportunity; and
  - Establishing effective communication.
- **National and Provincial Responsibilities**

Transformation in the SAPS, because the direction and standards are being set at national level, is a nationally driven process. Although most of the focus areas are to be addressed at a National level, this does not imply that the Provincial level, where most of the functions are performed and most of the resources are located, has no transformation responsibilities. It is also at Provincial that level consultation, participation and empowerment are to become institutionalised.

The national level has the responsibility to develop the policies and mechanisms that enable the lower levels to institutionalise the transformation objectives and priorities. According to the Transformation Guidelines, it is the responsibility of management to monitor, evaluate, intervene and manage resistance throughout the process (South Africa. South African Police Service. 1996 (a): 5).

These transformation guidelines were introduced into the SAPS to act as fundamental principles from which the transformation process could be developed. These guidelines furthermore had as their function the guidance of the transformation process, and were to be implemented from National level of the SAPS down to the ground level. Therefore, these guidelines are central to the transformation process and its implementation. Eight years after these guidelines were introduced into the SAPS in 1994, the question can be asked to what extent were these guidelines implemented and how successful were they? Consequent to these guidelines various directives were implemented that gave effect to some of these guidelines in order to reach the transformation objectives.

Firstly, developing and enhancing consultation and participation, as one of the transformation guidelines, can be seen as one of the successes of the transformation process. This guideline was

extensively implemented in the SAPS through the philosophy of community policing, resulting in an active partnership between the police and the community. The South African Police Service Act, 68 of 1995, as discussed in 2.3.1 above, gave effect to this guideline, emphasising community involvement and participation. The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, discussed in 2.2.1 above, also advocates the active participation of the community at all levels. In addition, The Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, dealt with in 2.2.2, also makes provision for a partnership between the police and the community. One of the visions of policing in the Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the SAPS as discussed in 2.3.4 above, specifically deals with community involvement in a consultative and co-operative manner. Similarly, other directives that resulted in the implementation of the developing and enhancing of consultation and participation between the police and the community included:

The Reconstruction and Development Programme discussed in 2.2.3 above, The White Paper on Safety and Security discussed in 2.3.2 above, The Draft Policy Document on Change discussed in 2.3.3 above, and The Discussion Document on Change discussed in 2.3.5 above. The implementation of the community policing approach is a countrywide process; therefore, as can be expected, certain communities experience difficulties in the implementation of this new philosophy. (See 2.2.2.) However, the implementation of community policing can be seen as a relative success, because for the first time in the history of South African policing the community and the police share a partnership.

Secondly, the SAPS gave effect to another guideline: enhancing representivity and equal opportunity, through the implementation of the South African Police Service Promotion of Employment Equity and Elimination of Unfair Discrimination Policy, as mentioned in 2.2.6. The SAPS thereby acknowledged its responsibility to promote equality and eliminate unfair discrimination in the organisation. The process of promoting equality and eliminating unfair discrimination is implemented from ground level to the top structures of the SAPS. As a result, members of previously disadvantaged groups have become more representative and have received equal opportunities in employment. Although representivity and equal opportunity in the SAPS improved drastically, as discussed in 2.2.6 and 2.2.5, there is, however, room for improvement as certain race groups are still under-represented. In addition, other directives were also in support of implementing representivity and equal opportunity and these included: The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), as discussed in 2.2.3 above, The White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service, discussed in 2.2.5 above, the Vision,

Mission and Values Statement of the South African Police Service, discussed in 2.3.4 above, and the Policy Document on Affirmative Action in the South African Police Service discussed in 2.3.7 below.

Thirdly, it seems that effective communication in the SAPS remains a problem. From personal experience, and according to colleagues in the SAPS, communication is not timeous, and one must always live up to expectations and rumours, and not always know what to expect. In line with the above statement, the findings of an internal climate study conducted by the Division National Standards and Management Services of the South African Police Service in 1996 indicated that only 18 percent (19 percent in 1995) of respondents were of the opinion that National Head Office communicated sufficiently about matters that affected personnel, and that only 16 percent (19 percent in 1995) believed that Senior Middle Management took purposeful action to make contact with members at lower levels (South Africa. Division National Standards and Management Services: South African Police Service, 1997(d): 21).

Additionally, the SAPS gave recognition to the cost-effective and priority-directed use of resources through the equal allocation of human and physical resources with attention to areas that were previously withheld from receiving necessary resources, as mentioned under 2.3.6.1. In the Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the SAPS, discussed in 2.3.4 above, the organization has committed itself to using its resources optimally and cost effectively. The findings of an internal climate study conducted by the Division National Standards and Management Services in 1996 showed that 64 percent and 69 percent of the respondents respectively indicated that they were correctly placed and were productively utilised in the work situation (South Africa. Division National Standards and Management Services, 1997(d): 21). The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) discussed in 2.2.3 also gave effect to the transformation process, aiming to mobilise the SAPS's resources to the advantage of transformation in the country. The Discussion Document on Change in the South African Police Service, as discussed in 2.3.5 above, also emphasised the effective, equitable and efficient allocation and utilisation of resources. The White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service, discussed in 2.2.5 above, focused primarily on human resource management.

The SAPS committed itself to adopt a people-centred approach to the management of its personnel in the Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the SAPS, discussed in 2.3.4 above. Community policing, implemented nationally, gave effect to the development of a people-



orientated approach to personnel management. As a result, it encouraged risk taking by members, and the empowerment of members at ground level, and moved the focus of the organisation to people.

The Policy Document on Affirmative Action in the SAPS, discussed in 2.3.7 below, and the Progress Report on Transformation in the SAPS, discussed in 2.3.6 above, focus on the development, training and education of members in the SAPS. The implementation of a new curriculum for the basic training of police members and the involvement of various international role-players who assist the SAPS in training, are significant steps in the development of SAPS members.

#### **2.3.6.4 Strategic themes of transformation in the South African Police Service**

Three strategic themes of transformation were identified in 1996. These transformation themes were introduced and implemented to relate to policing at station, unit, office and component levels.

The first theme introduced was equality. This theme relates to fundamental rights, equal opportunities and the eradication of discriminatory practices. The second theme was professional and effective service delivery. This theme relates to community policing and the satisfaction of community needs through police services. The last theme presented was person-centred human resource management. This theme relates to the manner in which the police support and interact with their members, and to the way in which they create a working environment conducive to effective service delivery. Each theme was intended to be introduced for a period of two months. During these two months all members on their respective stations/components were expected to analyse the various themes, assess their current situation in relation to the ideal situation, and take corrective actions to achieve the ideal status. The respective commanders of each station/component were held responsible for the successful implementation of the transformation themes. Commanders were also responsible for facilitating the development of a plan of action among the members under their command, as well as for addressing any obstacles in the work environment that might compromise the process (South Africa. 1996 (b): 2-3).

The policy that protects employees who are living with HIV/AIDS from unfair discrimination in the workplace can be used as an example of the transformation promoted by this directive (South Africa. South African Police Service, 2002(d): 8). The policy sets down employment practices and procedures that protect employees of the SAPS from unfair discrimination in the workplace. This promotes a working environment in which employees are able to disclose their HIV/AIDS status openly without fear of being stigmatised or rejected. The policy furthermore lays down procedures for managing occupational incidents and claims for compensation and introduces measures to prevent the spread of HIV. In addition, strategies have been developed to assess and reduce the impact of the epidemic on the workplace and on service delivery. Employees who are affected by HIV/AIDS are given support, enabling them to work productively for as long as possible.

However, as believed by Schonteich (2003: 1-2), as yet largely unrecognised by South African criminal justice system policy makers, HIV/AIDS could significantly impact on the country's criminal justice system agencies, especially on the police. South Africa's HIV/AIDS epidemic is likely to result in a change in the demand for the quantity and complexity of services required of the SAPS. As a result, the capacity of the police to deliver an adequate service will be undermined as an increasing number of police officers succumb to the epidemic. Between 1998 and 1999 an impact study on HIV/AIDS in the SAPS was conducted, the results of which informed a five-year strategic plan to combat HIV/AIDS in the police. The impact study showed that a maximum of 8 percent (8 520) to 10 percent (10 649) of functional police personnel – uniformed personnel and police investigators or detectives – might be infected with HIV. Schonteich is furthermore of the opinion that the SAPS's strategic plan makes some frightening predictions about expected police HIV-prevalence levels in 2015. The strategic plan predicts that by 2015, 35 percent of 25 to 29-year old police officers might be HIV-positive, while an astonishing 45 percent of 30 to 34-year old officers could have contracted the virus.

A SAPS spokesman confirmed the authenticity of the projections, but warned that these were only estimates (Mpye, 2003: 1). The spokesman was also of the opinion that, because HIV/AIDS is not a notifiable disease and testing in the police service is purely on a voluntary basis, one cannot assume that these figures are 100 percent accurate; therefore, they are only predictions that help the police with the allocation of budgets and in the formulation of various programmes to combat the disease.

As a result of the increasing numbers of people being infected with HIV/AIDS, over the next decade political pressure on the South African government to devote more resources to health and welfare services is likely to increase. Furthermore, the negative effect that the HIV/AIDS epidemic will generally have on the economy is likely to restrict the fairly generous budgets the treasury has allocated to the criminal justice system in the past. HIV/AIDS on an epidemic scale can thus detrimentally affect the capacity of government institutions. The disease is likely to have, among others, the following impacts on the SAPS:

- Increased absence from work and worker attrition as people fall ill and take sick leave, or require time off work to care for sick relatives. Police services in remote areas and disadvantaged communities may be particularly vulnerable to absenteeism or death among staff, because of shortages of skilled staff and acute resource constraints.
- Productivity will decline because of time off and the deteriorating health of HIV-positive employees.
- Morale may decline as many employees are affected by HIV/AIDS either through illness and death among close family members and colleagues, or through themselves being infected.
- The average age and experience level among police employees will fall, with negative implications for institutional memory and coherence.
- Higher recruitment and training costs can be expected (Schonteich, 2003: 4).

It follows that HIV/AIDS will hamper the South African government's ability to continue providing the levels of service that it provided before the advent of widespread AIDS. As more resources will invariably be channeled into the health and welfare sectors of the country to ease some of the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, fewer resources will be available for crime prevention, crime combating and the police service generally (Schonteich, 2003: 5).

A Policy Document on Affirmative Action in the South African Police Service is discussed in the section below.

### **2.3.7 Policy Document on Affirmative Action in the South African Police Service**

A Policy Document on Affirmative Action in the South African Police Service (final draft for approval) was drafted in 1996 but not yet approved at that stage. This document emphasises

affirmative action in the SAPS. This implies that the SAPS acknowledges the existing inequalities, imbalances and prejudices of the past that existed in the police. This policy document therefore visualises a police service that is broadly representative of the community it serves. To achieve this, this document advocates that certain measures be designed to achieve adequate protection and improvement of persons, groups or categories of persons who were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination to ensure their full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.

This document also focuses on measures such as human resource management, recruitment, selection processes, training and development, career development, promotions, transfers, target quotas and time frames to achieve its goals. The National Commissioner of the SAPS is primarily responsible and accountable for affirmative action in the Service; however, all managers in the Service are responsible for the implementation of affirmative action in their respective areas. The significance of this policy document is that the SAPS should become broadly representative of the community it serves. In addition, all personnel of the Service should be provided with equal opportunities (South Africa. 1996(c): 1-10).

The Status Report on the Transformation of the South African Police Service will follow.

### **2.3.8 Status Report: Transformation of the South African Police Service**

During November 1996, the Status Report by the National Commissioner on the Transformation of the South African Police Service was compiled. The purpose of this report was to set out the broad approach, and progress made with regard to the transformation of the SAPS. The approach to transformation set out by this Status Report is presented below.

#### **2.3.8.1 Approach to transformation in the South African Police Service**

Because of the existence of 11 different police agencies in South Africa at the time, and in response to the Constitutional obligations placed on him, the Minister for Safety and Security appointed a Change Management Team shortly after the democratic elections of 1994 to facilitate the rationalisation, amalgamation and transformation of the SAPS. This team initiated the transformation process in consultation with the Ministry, ministerial advisors, Members of the Executive Council (MECs), Commissioners of the various police agencies and later the

National Commissioner and Management Forum of the new SAPS. Although a lack of clarity existed with regard to the responsibilities of the various role-players, particularly in the provinces, the MECs for Safety and Security played an important role through making capacity available and guiding and monitoring the process within the provinces. The Status Report made provision for an approach and methodology within which transformation could be initiated and managed. This approach and methodology is explained by means of steps, as follows:

#### **2.3.8.1.1 Planning**

Planning consisted of the:

- Environmental analysis and needs determination, which included an analysis of the legal and policy framework, the influences, the environment and the determination of the obvious needs and expectations of the various stakeholders in the country
- Analysis of the current state of policing
- Development by Change Management of a vision for policing in terms of the analysis and facilitation of the development of a new vision, mission and values system by the leadership of the SAPS
- Formulation of principles whereby key transformation areas were to be managed and on which new policies were to be developed
- Gap analysis, the difference between the past, present and future state of policing, in order to clarify what needed and needs to be done
- Identification of the focus areas to be addressed, the necessary actions and success indicators
- Allocation of responsibilities to line managers
- Prioritisation of key focus areas

#### **2.3.8.1.2 Implementation**

Implementation involved the:

- Compilation of detailed strategies, activity plans and implementation plans by line managers
- Development of performance indicators
- Physical implementation

### **2.3.8.1.3 Monitoring**

The monitoring step involved:

- Management of resistance, which includes the creation of a climate conducive to change by explaining the vision and convincing people of the advantages of the vision and the changes necessitated, thereby creating awareness, communicating, clarifying uncertainties, consulting and involving stakeholders and removing obstacles
- The establishment of mechanisms to facilitate transformation, including the identification of key change levers and the facilitation of short-term visible results
- The development of a management system for the monitoring of progress
- Continuous evaluation, intervention, guidance, alignment and support by Change Management

### **2.3.8.2 General principles and progress relevant to transformation in the South African Police Service**

In addition to developing a specific approach to transformation guiding principles were developed in terms of which transformation areas were to be addressed and whereby new structures, policies, practices, cultures and management styles were to be designed. Such principles were embodied into guidelines that were developed and were made available to the responsible managers.

The Status Report then set out the progress made with the process of transformation. The progress emphasised in this report consisted of, among others a new uniform, symbols and insignia, the development of a new Police Act, the transformation of service delivery, the introduction of community policing, the development of new regulations concerning representivity, a new code of conduct, the introduction of human rights, the development of a cultural transformation programme, and the demilitarisation of policing in South Africa.

### **2.3.8.3 Areas of concern regarding transformation in the South African Police Service**

The areas of concern were identified for attention as a result of the relatively slow pace of progress and the lack of satisfactory results in certain key areas. The following areas were prioritised for attention:

- Crime Intelligence

The need for concerted efforts was emphasised to speed up the training and deployment of personnel, particularly at ground level, to gather crime intelligence physically and to manage crime intelligence effectively. The training and deployment of personnel in key areas was to be finalised before the end of March 1997.

- Communication

It was recognized that there was still a very strong “closed culture” and a hesitance to part with information within the SAPS, be it to the external or internal environment. Information sharing was still largely reactive. The information that was disseminated internally did not always reach ground level. Various internal obstacles hampered the finalisation of effective communication policies and strategies. The removal of these obstacles and the establishment of effective communication were made immediate priorities and were required to be finalised before the end of January 1997.

- Human Resource Management

The fragmented approach and relatively slow pace of service delivery was an area of concern. A comprehensive personnel utilisation plan for the deployment, development and management of human resources was to be integrated into the South African Police Service.

- Corruption integrity

Although various successes had been achieved with the investigation of corruption cases, the scope of the problem had not yet been clearly defined. Initiatives had thus far been focused on reactive measures. Endeavours were to be combined to consolidate the efforts of the various interested parties and to address corruption in a holistic manner, which would address the development of integrity, effective information management, and preventative and repressive measures.

- Budgeting and prioritising

Although a strategic plan and detailed strategies had been developed for the compilation and management of the budget and the rendering of financial services, the prioritisation of the budget was still largely limited to a process whereby funds followed the utilisation of personnel and the management of crises. Although good financial administration existed, all resources were not yet utilised strategically and optimally. Top management had not yet taken ownership of the budget through the predetermination of priorities by means of strategic planning which left room for flexibility.

The transformation process would be lead and driven by the top management, while the Change Management Team existed to facilitate the process (South Africa. 1996(d): 1-31).

The Code of Conduct of the South African Police Service will now be discussed.

### **2.3.9 Code of Conduct: South African Police Service**

A new Code of Conduct was introduced into the Service during 1997 as part of the transformation process of the SAPS. The contents of the Code are in sharp contrast with how policing was done in the past. According to Senior Superintendent Lesch, National Support Service spokesman for the SAPS, in the article “Police officers must adhere to the code of conduct” (1997: \_\_), the purpose of this new Code is to move away from enforcing service delivery from a top-down perspective towards a more willing approach by police officials to uphold the Constitution while providing a responsible and effective service of high quality that is accessible to every person in the community. This Code of Conduct provides the basis for positive discipline in the SAPS. Stated differently, Commissioner Fivaz, then National Commissioner of the SAPS, mentioned in the article “Police must adhere to code of conduct” (1997: \_\_), that the top management has no desire to return to the militaristic disciplinary style of the past, but that the demilitarisation must not be interpreted as a loosening of discipline within the SAPS. The Code of Conduct strongly emphasises the rendering of an effective, accessible service guided by the needs of the community. In addition, the Code makes provision for the upholding and protection of the fundamental rights of every person and the exercise of powers in a responsible and controlled manner. Equal opportunities and skills development are also emphasised. Every member thus commits himself or herself to carry out their duties in an



impartial, transparent, respectful and accountable manner (South Africa. 1997(a)). All the police officials in the SAPS had to sign and accept the Code, which allows for criminal charges and departmental steps against members that transgress its requirement.

To extend the upholding and protection of the fundamental rights of every person in South Africa, guided by the needs of the community, and provided for in the Code of Conduct of the South African Police Service, the old Prevention of Family Violence Act was replaced by the Domestic Violence Act, 118 of 1998. This new Act was implemented on 15 December 1999. This Act recognises that domestic violence is a serious social evil and that there is a high incidence of domestic violence within the South African society. The new Act furthermore recognises that victims of domestic violence are among the most vulnerable members of society. Additionally this Act acknowledges that domestic violence takes many forms, and that acts of domestic violence may be committed in a wide range of domestic relationships. The Act also acknowledges that the remedies currently available to victims of domestic violence have proved to be ineffective. The purpose of this Act is to provide the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from domestic abuse that the law can provide, and to introduce measures which seek to ensure that the relevant organs of state give full effect to the provisions of this Act. In promulgating this Act, government conveys that it is committed to the elimination of domestic violence (South Africa, 1998(c): 2).

This piece of legislation has important implications for policing in South Africa. The old Act applied only to married couples. In contrast, the new law will protect the elderly, gays and lesbians, children, parents, girlfriends and boyfriends. As a result, the responsibilities of the police towards the community has increased. The implementations of the Act oblige the police to intervene actively in cases of domestic violence. According to Usdin (in Assarsson, 1999: \_\_\_\_), the police have a huge responsibility in fulfilling their obligations, and attitudes within the police service also have to change since previously the police turned a blind eye to domestic violence, which they regarded as a private matter. However, with the new Act the police are obliged by law to intervene in domestic violence incidents. Webster (in Assarsson, 1999: \_\_\_\_ ) states that domestic violence is not only about violence against women, but that the problem must be seen in a broader picture, although, until recently, women were seen as less important than men even from a legal point of view.

SAPS members will thus be required to uphold the fundamental rights of every person in South Africa. They will be required to change any negative attitudes since any police officer who does not handle domestic violence with sensitivity and as a matter of urgency can be sent to jail or fined. It follows that police members have generally been involved in an extensive training programme concerning domestic violence, which according to Geldenhuys (in Assarsson, 1999: \_\_\_) was needed, since the police have usually dealt with domestic violence as a private matter. A part of the training therefore deals with attitude change. Writing in 1999, Eosielo (in Warby, 1999: \_\_\_), on the other hand was of the opinion that far more training was needed among those who were expected to implement the Act in the SAPS.

Apart from a need for training concerning domestic violence, Shaw (2002:130) questioned whether the police would be in a position to enforce the new law as questions had been raised about the extent of resources available to enforce the new law. These questions followed the comment of the National Commissioner that the government should not impose new duties on the already overworked police without providing the budget needed to perform these duties. In line with Eosielo, Webster (in Warby, 1999: \_\_\_) stated that there are many people who have to implement the Act, such as police officers, who are not confident about how to implement it. The head of the Domestic Violence, Child Abuse and Sexual Offences Unit, Captain Booyens (in Warby, 1999: \_\_\_), welcomed the new Act but commented that it would take time to implement the Act smoothly. The new Act will thus require members of SAPS to change their attitude concerning human rights. Judging from examples such as the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act, the Code of Conduct will have a significant impact on policing in South Africa.

#### **2.4 South African Police Service Internal Evaluation of the Transformation Process**

During 1996 the Division National Standards and Management Services of the SAPS conducted an Internal Climate Study. A need to transform the internal climate of the SAPS became evident during 1996 when the Service was still experiencing the new process of fundamental change. As a result these changes had a direct impact on the role, functioning, motivation and morale of members of the Service. The aim of the Climate Study was to assess the feelings and attitudes of members towards a range of issues that had a direct impact on their daily functions. Results were obtained and recommendations made on the findings.

The issues emphasised in the Climate Study were effective management, human resources, communication, morale, victim support, human rights and crime information management. The aim of a study of this nature is to measure and monitor the effect of these changes on the daily work functioning and welfare of all police personnel. Furthermore it emphasises the need for measuring the internal environment of the Service on a constant basis for management purposes. The data analysis of this climate study indicated that the majority of the respondents were of the opinion that the senior management of the SAPS was not aware of what was going on at grassroots level. More than half of the respondents were also dissatisfied with the way the Service was managed, while one third of the respondents did not believe that police management had the knowledge and experience to lead the SAPS. Furthermore, the study identified a number of issues that impacted negatively on the morale of members. The most prominent issues identified were:

- High stress levels (57 percent)
- Uncertainty regarding career opportunities (33 percent saw a prosperous future while 35 percent considered leaving the police)
- Discrimination
- Low motivation (43 percent)
- Exposure to traumatic events, and
- Withdrawal of the danger allowance

On the other hand, the majority of respondents indicated that they had been correctly placed and were productively utilised in their work situation. In addition, a positive sentiment was indicated by the great majority of personnel in the SAPS (84 percent), who acknowledged that they had a role to play in victim support. Positive perceptions on the importance of human rights were indicated by 72 percent of the respondents, who felt that human rights should apply to all police activities. However, only 20 percent of respondents had attended a lecture on human rights. A very low percentage of respondents were of the opinion that National Head Office communicated sufficiently on matters that affected personnel.

In line with the last mentioned opinion, only 16 percent of respondents were of the opinion that Senior Provincial Management took purposeful action to make contact with members at lower levels. The majority of respondents indicated that they believed that crime information was important for the successful prevention of crime. However, nearly half of the respondents were of the opinion that police officials waste too much time on the completion of reports, computer

databases et cetera, for the provision of crime information. (South Africa. Division National Standards and Management Service: South African Police Service. 1997(d): 1-24).

The transformation and restructuring of the public service (Resolution 7 of 2002) is discussed below.

## **2.5 Resolution 7 of 2002: Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service**

In terms of Resolution 7 of 2002, the Public Service, of which the SAPS forms a part, introduced a process of matching, placing and redeployment of employees at departmental level.

Negotiations for this process started already during October 2001. On 6 March 2002 the government, as a collective employer, reached an agreement with the relevant unions. Six of the unions, of which the majority are black members, signed the agreement. A small number of unions did not sign the agreement; however, the agreement remains applicable to all employees of the public sector, regardless of whether their employer organisations signed the agreement or not. This Resolution makes provision for the implementation of the restructuring and transformation process in two phases. In the first phase, departments and provinces were expected to draw up strategic plans to establish personnel needs. These strategic plans had to make provision for the training needs of personnel, the redeployment of redundant employees and the provision of voluntary severance packages (Jongbloed, 2003: 15).

The second phase consisted of the retrenchment of redundant employees. The strategic plans of the departments gave an indication of personnel – and of training needs. It was the duty of departmental task teams to ensure that the process was implemented in a transparent way in the event that employees had to be redeployed. Representatives of both the employer and employee formed part of these task teams and were also responsible for the monitoring of employees within departments. The interdepartmental task teams were responsible for the monitoring of redeployment of redundant personnel into the various departments. Each province and national department was obliged to have a task team. A moratorium was placed on vacant posts until this process was completed. However, exceptions could be made in critical and necessary instances where the interdepartmental task teams could appoint new personnel. In the second phase where employees did not meet the requirements, and could not be redeployed departmentally or interdepartmentally, they would be relieved from duty in the public service. There was however a social plan to deal with such cases (Jongbloed, 2003:15).

The main objectives of this Resolution are to enhance service delivery as well as to address representivity in the Service (Odendaal, 2003:8). The basis of this matching, placing and redeployment of personnel was conducted in terms of post requirements, qualifications, relevant experience, training requirements, affirmative action policy and representivity targets (South Africa. 2002(b)). Area, Provincial and National matching and placing committees were required to do the matching and placing of employees. The emphasis of this process was thus on improved service delivery as well as making the SAPS more representative of the population of the country. This process was important because policing in South Africa had never been representative of the whole population nor had it been known for adequate service delivery. This process of transformation and restructuring, however, caused an uproar in the safety and security sector.

In the historically black union, the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU), consisting of members from the SAPS and the Department of Correctional Service, members were downcast about the way this process was progressing. However, POPCRU was the first union to reach an agreement with the government. A spokesperson for POPCRU said that the union had received a number of complaints from its members. The most significant dispute was that members were placed in posts without considering the post requirements for the relevant post. POPCRU was however, of the opinion that if Resolution 7 was implemented correctly it could be of assistance to help manage the social and economic needs of not only the government employees but also of the society as a whole. On the other hand, POPCRU suspected the top management of the SAPS and the Department of Correctional Service of maintaining the status quo deliberately misconstruing of the concept of service delivery, therefore POPCRU felt that the whole process was being put at risk (Jongbloed, 2003: 15).

In addition, POPCRU believed that the management of the SAPS was undermining and abusing the departmental task teams and the monitoring committees, and that therefore transformation, as prescribed in the resolution, was not taking place. Furthermore, the union is suspected that the race factor was being misused to derail the process. The union also complained of confusing communication between the SAPS head office and management sub-structures. As a result, POPCRU threatened to protest and to resort to legal action and to also ask the minister of Safety and Security to intervene (Jongbloed, 2003:15).

As with POPCRU, the South African Police Union (SAPU) also felt strongly negative towards this process of transformation and restructuring. SAPU had already lodged disputes in two provinces concerning the redeployment of members without keeping the recommendations of the monitoring committees in mind. SAPU also considered turning to the Commission for Reconciliation, Mediation and Arbitration if their problem was not resolved.

The union, Solidarity, with a majority of white members, and a growing number of coloured members, indicated that they were positive about the wider spectrum of the process and stated that transformation and affirmative action are necessary. Solidarity, however, felt that Resolution 7 was not reconcilable with labour law and the Constitution, and that therefore service delivery would not improve within the public service. Solidarity was furthermore of the opinion that this resolution made it compulsory to apply affirmative action in the restructuring process and thus apply race as a criterion to transfer members, and that if members were found to be redundant, they could also be discharged, which is in contradiction with the Constitution (Jongbloed, 2003:15).

Solidarity also appealed against a ruling in the resolution stating that an employee who refuses to accept a transfer can be discharged (Jongbloed, 2003:15). This resolution was earmarked to be completed at the end of June 2003 with a three months' supplementary period thereafter. According to an article by the Safety and Security Sectorial Bargaining Committee (SSSBC) (2003:9), Resolution 7 was, however, put on hold because of various complaints of members, politicians and because of negative media publicity. On the other hand, the Minister of Public Service and Administration announced that the process would continue following a court case against the Minister. Solidarity was of opinion that this transformation was implemented outside the Constitution, and therefore wanted to test whether transformation would take place within the framework of the Constitution (Gunning, 2003: 13). This is a clear indication that there was confusion over the process of Resolution 7.

Solidarity furthermore indicated its disagreement with Resolution 7 stating that 40 percent of police members were unhappy and were considering resigning from the Service, morale was low and stress levels were on the increase over the implementation of the resolution. In opposition, the office of the National Police Commissioner of the SAPS accused Solidarity of launching a campaign to discredit police management and of spreading the flames of racial tension by propagating "half-baked truths and blatant lies". The SAPS challenged the union to provide

evidence of its argument. Solidarity, however, maintained their figures and stated that apart from white members, many coloured, and some black members were unsure of the end result of restructuring, and in addition challenged the SAPS to stop denying its members' frustrations, acknowledge there was a problem and find a solution (Hills, 2003:1&2).

The new democratic order in South Africa brought about many changes in the country and also had a substantial impact on policing. Mr. Sydney Mufamadi was appointed as the first Minister for Safety and Security in the new South Africa. On 29 January 1995, General George Fivaz was appointed by President Nelson Mandela as the first National Commissioner of the new South African Police Service. Commissioner Fivaz's first responsibility was to amalgamate the 11 policing agencies into a single united South African Police Service and secondly to align the new Police Service to new legislation and the process of transformation in South Africa. South Africa held elections in 1999 and Minister Sydney Mufamadi was succeeded by Minister Steve Tswete as Minister of Safety and Security, appointed in that position by the country's new President, Thabo Mbeki. National Commissioner George Fivaz's term of office expired during January 2000 and he was succeeded by Commissioner Jackie Selebi. Minister Steve Tswete was succeeded by the present Minister for Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, during May 2002 (*SA Police Service History in Brief [s.a]\_\_*).

During his presentation at the Handing Over of Command of the Official South African Police Service Parade, Minister Steve Tswete (2000) said: "This is a great moment in the history of the South African Police Service in particular, and in the people of our country in general. For the first time ever since its establishment in 1913, the national command of the Service was handed over to a black Commissioner". In addition, Minister Tswete stated that elsewhere in the world an event marking the transfer of a command might have just passed like any other routine ceremony. However, in South Africa, which has been bedeviled by a history of colonial domination and racial oppression for many decades, a function like this one cannot just be routine. It is, in contrast, a landmark that elevates itself above the ordinary. The Minister was of the opinion that the handing over from Commissioner George Fivaz to National Commissioner Jackie Selebi was an expressive statement that the SAPS had come of age. The handing over showed, the Service has embraced change and transformation without any hesitation and has thus pushed to the fore the unity of an institution on which all South Africans pin their hopes for the delivery of their safety and security.

The appointment of the first black civilian police commissioner was interpreted by analysts as a first step in the demilitarisation of the leadership of the SAPS while at the same time speeding up transformation to better reflect the demographics of the country. One analyst believed that the appointment of National Commissioner Selebi indicated both a desire by government to demilitarise the police service and to introduce a policy- directed management that will produce results in curbing the high levels of crime. In addition, the analyst added that the President wanted to break with the past where the top structures of the civil service were still dominated by white Afrikaner males, five years after a black government had been in power. Another political analyst was of the opinion that Commissioner Selebi's appointment could be seen as the first step in effecting changes in the manner in which the South African Police Service conducts its affairs (*Focus on Civil Service Restructuring*, 1999).

## **2.6 Summary**

This chapter provided an overview of the transformation process in the SAPS from 1993 to 2002. Various legislation and SAPS policies and directives indicated the movement and initiatives towards change in policing in South Africa. The significance and implications of these directives were also discussed to explain the importance of each directive.

Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature on the change processes in organisations, and clarifies the relationship between the proposed study and previous work conducted on the topic.



## **CHAPTER 3            LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE CHANGE PROCESSES IN ORGANISATIONS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO POLICE SERVICES**

### **3.1     Introduction**

This chapter deals with a review of the literature on the change processes in organisations. The literature review presents the reader with a summary of the knowledge base upon which the present study is built. This purpose reflects a time-honored tradition of scientific research: The study acknowledges its indebtedness to the past and shows clear linkages between what was known in the past about the topic and what has been discovered in the present research. This chapter needs to clarify the relationship between the present study and previous work conducted on the topic. The review of the literature can thus be explained as an expedition to discover what other researchers have done on the topic, how it has been researched and what the main findings have been, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the topic, and to compare it with the present study. The literature review in this study is in fact a comprehensive study of the literature published on change processes in organizations.

A large body of literature on change in organizations outside and within South Africa, as well as within the South African Police Service (SAPS), provides a basis for the present study. Literature such as official SAPS documents, media and newspaper reports, journals, library sources and legislation regarding change in the SAPS were consulted. International best practices were also consulted. This chapter explains the search process in reviewing this literature. A presentation and discussion of the literature review then follows.

### **3.2     Change Processes in Organizations**

The need for organisations to change is far more clearly recognised now than it was a few years ago when the question “Why change?” was paramount. As a result, few people nowadays would argue with the saying “change or die” (Clarke, 1994:1). Hussey (1998:7) observes that the environment in which organizations operate has become ever more turbulent, forcing organizations to adapt and modify themselves in order to continue to survive and progress. It follows that forward-looking organizations stay limber by living, breathing and creating change (Harari, 1998: 39). Therefore, as expressed by Rye (1996:13) change is vital if organizations are to avoid stagnation.

Umiker (1998:270) suggests the three general kinds of changes are:

- Organisational changes, in which departments are altered, interdepartmental relationships or reporting relationships are changed, or new management takes over, in the form of mergers, acquisitions and take-overs
- The introduction of new systems, structures, procedures, or equipment
- Restructuring of jobs

The change process must, however, be seen as moving from a problem-solving state to the solved state (Nickols, 2000). It follows that to move towards an organisation's vision to implement its strategies requires change – often quite radical change. As a result this usually means that people in the organisations are required to do new things in new ways within new structures (Gilgeous, 1997:14). Stated differently, change occurs when something ends and something new or different starts. This is where people have to learn to let go of the old and embrace the new (Scott and Jaffe, 1989:22). On the other hand, Deems (1995:3) believes that change is not a neat, linear, sequential kind of process that goes from endings to new beginnings. It is much more dynamic, more fluid, more interactive. The only constant thing around us is change (Williams, Woodward and Dobson, 2002:3). Agreeing with Williams et al., Bridges (1995:69) notes that it has become a truism that the only constant is change, yet we feel that change is different in today's times; however, there is more change than there was a few years ago. Change is therefore cyclical and there is never a definite end or start to it. Scott and Jaffe (1989:10) believe that one cannot escape or hide from organisational change. In other words, change is no longer a choice as it has "railroaded" its way over all organisations (Chang, 1994:1).

Hultman (1998:51) agrees that as human beings we strive to meet our needs within a context of continuous changes, thus, nothing remains the same from one moment to the next. Although dramatic events make us more aware of change at certain times rather than others, change is constant and we can be sure of not only death and taxes but also change. As a result a paradigm shift occurs when old facts, beliefs, values and behaviours no longer allow people to meet their needs – like a road map that no longer gets you where you want to go. Throughout history there have been many paradigm shifts, and there will be others in the future (Hultman, 1998:65). There is an old saying, "...if you carry on doing things the way you've always done them, you will get the results you have always had" (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:63).

Deems (1995:26) also shares the belief that change is constant, and that the pace of change is likely to accelerate rather than decrease. An acceleration in change can be seen as a result of globalisation. Organisations are going global in an effort to reach out to new markets. By entering the global market, organisations are forced to remold themselves in basic ways. Mergers, acquisitions, dramatic new developments in communications and computing have “blown apart” all traditional structures (Johansen and Swigart, 1994:3). Consequently, the drive for global expansion has an accelerating effect on change in organizations. In other words continuing change has become a certainty and people will be faced with more rapid change in future (Pieters and Young, 2000:10). John F. Kennedy in Eales-White (1994:1) states “change is the law of life. Those, who look only to do the past or present, are certain to miss the future”. Organisational change is not more important now than it used to be; however, it happens more often, and the period of stability after the change does not last as long as it once did. Therefore all the signs are that the tempo of change will continue to accelerate (Hussey, 1998:8).

As stated by Colenso (2004:4), this implies that to make a change initiative work in an organisation requires that people believe things other than they believe now, change the way they behave to support those beliefs, and, in so doing, develop a series of successful examples that generate a momentum to help others to change their behaviour. As also posited by *Business Basics* (1995:290), an organisation must alternately respond to movements in the social and economic environment if it is to survive, even if such an organisation intrinsically does not want to change, as change is a necessary way of life for all organisations. Therefore, any living organisation must be able to design and operate organisations that are in a state of constant change at levels, with the key word being “constant” (Colenso, 2000:7). Edosomwan (1996:11) sums this up by stating that organisational transformation efforts thus bring about change. However, no change is possible unless the people in the organisation enact, support and sustain it (Colenso, 2000:71).

If an organisation is to really change, then the people within that organisation also need to change the way they behave (Balogun and Hailey, 1999:4). Jon Maddona, CEO of KPMG (in Harari, 1999) similarly notes that to succeed people have to change the way they act, but they also have to change the way they think about the past. In other words, the people in an organisation are one of the most powerful levers for change (Clarke, 1994:46). Johnson (1991:45) similarly believes that real change is fulfilled only through the continuous development of people within a clearly defined and sensible strategic framework. The people in

the organisation thus have to play their part in enabling their organisation to change if it is to grow and survive (Williams et al. 2002:3). Although change is difficult, since the outcome is always uncertain, it is nevertheless a prerequisite for growth (Hultman, 1998:63). In other words, as believed by Clarke (1994:8), change is the very essence of business growth: it is inevitable and unavoidable. Kaplan (2003:86) believes that change must be experienced as free training in new life skills. People pay a lot of money for courses to teach them what can be learnt through experience. In other words, the change process must be seen as a learning experience. Kaplan (2003) advises that people should learn as much as possible during change and always seek opportunities to develop themselves and their organisation rather than seeing change as a barrier. They should find ways to help others see the problems or solutions and also be open to learn from others while simultaneously learning new skills. Change can therefore be seen as a great opportunity to learn through experience. Use the bricks thrown your way through change to build a foundation to create oneself and to build on that foundation.

Pieters and Young (2000:2) also emphasise the importance of change, mentioning that most organisations, no matter how they are currently put together, must increase their capacity for change to avoid getting “out of sync” with the accelerating change in their outside world. Henri Bergson, a French philosopher as cited (in Bridges, 1995:44) underlines the significance of change, stating that to exist is to change, to change is to mature, and to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly. Beer and Nohria (2000:35), however, suggest that the main purpose that should guide change initiatives in organisations is to satisfy their shareholders. In the case of the South African Police Service (SAPS) the shareholders are the South African community with whom the SAPS shares a partnership.

### **3.2.1 Methods to handle change**

According to Umiker (1998:272), every successful change initiative requires a workable, clearly defined master plan. This plan must answer the following crucial questions:

- What is the proposed change? Is it customer orientated, quality conscious, and cost effective? What do we hope to achieve by it? What are the risks, constraints, and barriers? What additional data do we need? What resources are essential? What did we do wrong last time? What additional training will be necessary? What will be the impact on existing power and status relationships?

- Will the change fit the existing organisational culture? Will the people affected see a payoff or a setback? Will the change increase or decrease profit, morale, quality, and productivity? Will the change provide an opportunity to use available skills better? Will people have more autonomy over how they do their work? Will the changes make employees' jobs (and management) easier or harder?
- Who wants the change? Why? Who will benefit and who will be affected adversely? Who will resist? Who will support it?
- When should serious planning begin? Will there be sufficient time? When must we get official sanction? When will the work start and when must it be completed?
- Where will we find the space, funds, and people to implement the change?

As a result most changes that organisations are required to undergo are vital for future success for if they are not, there is little point in making the change (Hussey, 1998:9). In other words, change will not happen unless there is widely acknowledged dissatisfaction with the status quo (Clarke, 1994:185). Change is, however, not always the result of some negative happenings, but can be the result of positive events for example getting promotion or a desire to improve. (Chang, 1994:90). Senior (1997:7) explains the forces that operate to bring about change in organisations as winds that are many and varied – from small summer breezes, which merely disturb a few papers, to gales, which cause devastation to structures and operations causing consequent re-orientation of purpose and re-building. Sometimes, however, the winds die down to give periods of relative calm, periods of relative organisational stability. The article “Take charge of change” (2002:53) use a similar metaphor, explaining change is like a surfing wave. You cannot predict what will happen or try to have some plan for what you will do when the next wave comes, because it will almost never be exactly as you planned. Anyway, no two waves are the same, ever. You just have to get in a good position, stay calm, challenge the myths and ride the wave, and put yourself in charge of change. Mann (2003:86) suggests there are certain tactics to handle change, which will be explained briefly below.

### **3.2.2 Tactics to handle change**

The uncertainty and sometimes fear that change brings are for many an unsettling business. Tension and nervousness rise for those who think they will not be able to handle change, and also for those who might not want to accept change. There are, however, certain tactics to handle change to relieve tension and to give a second thought to those not accepting change.

### **3.2.2.1 Face reality**

Change is a natural condition that is in part a result of communications speeding up and the world becoming one global marketplace. Both employees and managers are unsettled and disrupted by change.

### **3.2.2.2 Adopt the right mindset**

This tactic suggests that if you want to flourish at work nowadays, you have to be “change fit”. Both the employee and the manager are going to operate in new environments all the time, moving into contexts that require new activity. To survive they have to keep their eyes wide open and seek out opportunities. The ability and responsibility to adapt lie with the staff members, who need to cultivate their own belief in their ability to take change in their stride. If they are mentally saying to themselves “I can’t cope. When will things settle down?” they’ll talk themselves into neurosis.

### **3.2.2.3 Get down to basics**

Mann (2003) suggests that if one is struggling to accept change, one should bear in mind non-acceptance holds: one will cross management, give the impression one is not part of the team and possibly sacrifice one’s job in the process. If you are in management, be patient with people and processes, they take time to change. Learning new skills can be frightening, but you will probably also find it a satisfying experience to stretch your brain. Then be ready to change quickly and enjoy it. Factors regarded as essential for change will follow.

## **3.2.3 Essentials of change**

Umiker (1998:270) regards the following factors as essential for change in organisations:

- *Motivation.* Motivating people to change is a major challenge of leadership. Managers must understand why people resist change and cope with that resistance.
- *Competencies.* These are the technologies and expertise that enable organisations to satisfy customers and meet new standards. Competencies are affected most by hiring and training systems.

- *Creativity.* Brainstorming is often needed to create new ideas. Change also requires the skills needed to turn ideas into entrepreneurship.
- *Employee commitment:* Employees must “buy in” to the proposed change.
- *Adaptability:* Learning and retraining are very important. Some employees must be completely “recycled.”
- *Stability of workforce:* Stability requires low personnel turnover.
- *Patience:* While everything is increasingly rushed, supervisors must show a modicum of patience with those people who learn or adjust a little slower than others. But they must also couple patience with persistence.
- *Reward and Recognition:* People who must adjust to change expect some kind of payoff.

The above-mentioned literature on change processes in organisations emphasises that change in any organisation is a constant process that is inevitable. Change, furthermore, brings with it uncertainty and sometimes fear. However, change can be overcome through applying certain tactics and methods to handle this change.

Themes and subcategories that emerged from the literature on change in police organisations are now presented below.

### **3.3 Overview of Emergent Themes**

The emergent themes to be presented are: police culture, training, leadership and structure. The first theme to be presented is police culture and organizational change.

#### **3.3.1 Police culture and organizational change**

According to Rauch (1994) it is the military culture of the police in South Africa that is one of the most significant obstacles to the new government’s programme of police reform.

Consequently it will also be a major management obstacle for the South African Police Service (SAPS). Brogden and Shearing (1993:96) more specifically conclude that the police culture in South Africa is mainly responsible for the delay in transformation in the police and confirm his statement by describing the words of a former police lieutenant:

“Years of indoctrination and brainwashing would make it difficult for policemen to change their attitudes.”

The deeply rooted police occupational culture in South Africa was carried over from generation to generation and has become a trademark of policing in the country; therefore, one cannot help, but to imagine, how this police culture that stood the test of times, and of generations, can be transformed to create a professional democratic policing in South Africa.

Bayley (2001:14), however, feels that police culture can act as a brake on change, but it is not the irresistible force often portrayed. The demand is thus a change of culture influencing every member of the SAPS. However, culture, like many other things in life, is easier to talk about than to change and manage. The traditional approaches used to change culture will be described below.

### **3.3.1.1 Changing police culture**

Two approaches have traditionally been used to change police culture (Brogden et al., 1993:96). These two approaches are legalist or rule-making devices and culturalist devices. These two devices will be discussed briefly.

### **3.3.1.2 Legalist or rule-making devices**

Rules may be tightened by means of a range of measures, including changes to legislation, administrative rules, codes of practice, accountability procedures or policy guidelines (Chan, 1997:51). This approach is found, for example, in numerous pieces of legislation and policies regarding change in the SAPS:

- Every member of the SAPS must uphold and protect the fundamental rights of every person, and must act impartially, courteously, honestly, respectfully, transparently and in an accountable manner (South Africa. 1997(a)).
- In the new dispensation the Constitution is sovereign. The police are therefore responsible for the protection of the Constitution and our democracy (South Africa. 1994(c)).
- Affirmative action is a strategy for the achievement of employment equity through addressing imbalances such as those entrenched in the organizational culture (South Africa. 1997(c)).



- Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and the benefit of the law (South Africa. 1996(f)).

It is common today for people to express doubt about the power of the law to change policing. A familiar example is the statement that policing is immune to legal change because it is “police culture” not law that dominates policing (Dixon, 1995:2). In contrast to the above example, Dixon argues that the idea that police cultures are immune to legal influence is inaccurate: elements of police cultures have been formed (and changed) by the legal environment within which many policing activities occur. Police culture in South Africa is rather controversial and deeply rooted; therefore, it would be difficult for legalist or rule-making devices on their own to change the police culture in the SAPS. This implies that state change and changes in legislation, policy and constitutions alone do not give rise automatically to police transformation (Marks, 2000:559). An influential group of academics have argued that policing cannot be changed significantly by any politically feasible legal intervention (Dixon, 1995:3). Reiner (1992:232) has also come to the conclusion that the key changes must be in the informal culture of the police, and their practical working rules, and is thus of opinion that legal regulations have only limited effectiveness.

In the light of the above, only if every member in the SAPS regards cultural change as inherent and instinctive and makes it their own in their everyday practical work, will police culture be changed effectively to fit into the notion of democratic policing. Legal interventions, on the other hand, have had an impact on the SAPS; for example, by demilitarising policing in South Africa, which had a rather meaningful impact on the police culture. Mc Conville, Sanders and Lang (1991:193) acknowledge that changes in laws do have some impact on behaviour and that a greater impact could be achieved through further fine-tuning of the rules. Dixon (1995:3) also argues in support of legal regulation, criticizing both those who dismiss it as an irrelevance and those who promote it as a universal cure. Legalist or rule-making devices have an impact on police culture, but not as meaningfully as may have been intended. On the other hand, these rule-making devices have weaknesses. These weaknesses are discussed below.

### **3.3.1.3 Weaknesses of legalist or rule-making devices**

The legalist device pretends that police organisations are bureaucratic and that they have the appearance of a quasi-military, hierarchical structure that is based on rules and orientated

towards commands (Chan, 1997:54). This implies that changes in police practice can be brought about by changes in rules instituted from the top; however, efforts to institute changes from the top will seldom be successful as police management has limited control over its subordinates because of the nature of police work. In fact, it is indeed during police work that police officers interact with the community.

On the other hand, Brogden et al (1993:96-97) noticed that when rules are not congruent with police practice, members ingeniously find ways around the rules; as a result these devices fail to recognise that the culture cannot be “crushed”. Although the weaknesses of the legalist or rule-making devices give the idea of police organisations as bureaucratic, in fact these devices continue to be a well known choice among police reformers, and failures of rule-making devices are frequently met with further calls for rule-making (Chan, 1997:55). The second device to change police culture follows.

#### **3.3.1.4 Culturalist devices**

The culturalist devices seek to change the culture from inside; in other words, by exposing police officials to more community-sensitive values and norms, their ways of thinking and acting can be changed (Brogden et al., 1993:97). This suggests that, police officials must acquaint themselves with the values and norms of the community and take them to heart; only then can their manner of functioning and thinking be transformed. Culturalist devices are, however, also insufficient on their own, since legalist and culturalist devices are complementary; therefore, an orthodox approach should be followed to transform the SAPS (Brogden et al., 1993:97).

#### **3.3.1.5 Orthodox approaches - transforming the South African Police Service**

For the purpose of this study, the two orthodox approaches of transformation will be briefly discussed. The first orthodox approach is cultural colonialism. This is when the police are taken closer to the community. The second orthodox approach involves incorporating devices. This is when the community is brought closer to the police.

### **3.3.1.6 Cultural colonialism – taking the police to the community**

The aim of this approach is to arouse the interest of a difference style of police recruit and to present more valuable training in order for police to become more sensitive to the needs of the community they serve. A number of initiatives in the Status Report, Transformation of the South African Police Service (South Africa. 1996(e)), are associated with matters concerning training, recruitment and community involvement:

- An attitude cultural transformation programme “UBUNYE” was developed for implementation on 1 February 1997 to enhance respect for fundamental rights and, in broad terms, democracy.
- An entirely new curriculum for basic training was developed and applied as a pilot project in the training of students who last completed their basic training during 1995, which should result in more professional members trained in community policing, fundamental rights, problem solving, conflict resolution, negotiation and communication skills.
- The Constitution provides a vision of policing of which community consultation is a significant feature. Communities must be empowered to engage meaningfully with local police about their problems and priorities (South Africa. 1994(c)).

According to the above orthodox approach police culture in South Africa can be changed by means of recruiting more recruits that are sensitive to the needs of the community. In other words, these recruits must be taken out of the multi-cultural community to serve that same community.

Affirmative action programmes introduced into the SAPS during 1996 constitute a strategy to enhance diverse recruitment. As a result, new diverse recruits will be able to display greater resistance to the influence of police pressure, which will thus have less of an impact on them. The second orthodox approach will now be discussed.

### **3.3.1.7 Incorporative devices – bringing the community to the police**

This approach of changing police culture involves the establishment of a partnership between the community and the police. As a result of this partnership direct links between the community and the police are built, for example: community policing forums (CPF) and the Adopt-a-Cop

programmes at various schools. In 1996 the SAPS adopted community policing as their primary policing strategy and moved away from the traditional reactive style of policing, which has resulted in the multi-cultural communities in South Africa are experiencing an improvement in service delivery.

Police culture is therefore a significant mechanism for change in the SAPS. South African policing was widely known for its military culture; however, after the country became a democracy, the SAPS instituted the legalist or rule-making devices and the culturalist devices to change the military culture to a culture of involvement.

The second theme to be presented is training as a mechanism for transformation.

### **3.3.2 Training as mechanism for transformation**

As suggested by Levin, Ngubeni & Simpson (1995:5), one way of impacting on the transformation of the police is through new and different training. As a change strategy such training courses are limited because of the urgent and immediate need for change coupled with the large number of policing personnel who need to be trained or re-trained in a short period of time. Another limitation on the effects of new training programmes relates to the self-sustaining organisational culture of the police. Training may therefore not be an effective mechanism for transforming such a culture unless accompanied by major structural changes both internally within the police organisation and within the society at large. According to Levin, et al. (1995:5), there are three areas of training, which have substantial potential as transformative mediums to professionalise the police and render it more accountable and representative. These areas are:

- The basic training of new recruits;
- The re-training and upgrading of serving police officers; and
- Training of “change agents” at management level.

Similarly Haysom (\_\_\_: 8) believes that there must be a re-appraisal and redirection of police training, however, not only to educate trainees in more effective investigative and technical skills, but also to teach them the use of alternatives to violence in solving problems, and more generally the importance of human rights both now and in the future. In other words, training should be a central component of reform and transformation of the police. In concord with

Haysom, Commissioner Lombard (2001) stated that transformation had also filtered through to the training of South African police personnel. A Training Strategic Management Plan had been set up to facilitate the process as great discrepancies existed in the past as to who were given training opportunities. Training had also taken place in the management of crime statistics to obtain more suitable crime statistics and to perform more effective crime prevention planning.

The SAPS has also become more sensitive to human rights issues. Programmes have been initiated to train and inform SAPS members on human rights issues. Other training initiatives include community policing, crowd management and victim empowerment. A pilot project has also been initiated on training SAPS members on the issues of xenophobia and racism and the treatment of non-nationals. It is widely acknowledged that the transformation of the SAPS from a force to a service required a marked change in both the attitude and skills of the members of the SAPS. Consequently it is also widely accepted that the achievement of this shift lies partially in the training and retraining of these police members; on the other hand, the attendance at a training course does not guarantee change within the workplace and is not a measurement of anything other than the training department's capacity to deliver numbers. It follows that a more effective indicator of performance would be the number of members who utilise the skills on the job. This suggests that training is often seen as something separate from the real activities of the police and that members go on course and then return to the "real world" having gained very little. No link is seen, nor is one created by trainers, between the skills and attitude covered by training and their application on the job to improve both service delivery and self esteem (Insight@ipt. 1999:2-3). Rauch et al.(1994: \_\_) similarly emphasise that training and education for officials are crucial to transformation; therefore, appropriate education and training programmes could do much to ease the implementation of organisational change in all spheres of the police organisation. It is thus indisputable that training is an important vehicle for change in the SAPS. Bayley (2001:10), on the other hand, believes that recruitment and training of new personnel are not sufficient to bring about police reform, and that the benefits of both are lost if they are not reinforced by management systems.

The third theme to be presented is leadership as an aspect of change.

### **3.3.3 Leadership as an aspect of change**

The key to changing any aspect of policing is management; in other words, the way in which the members of a police organisation are brought to do what policies call for. Significant change does not occur through issuing orders or stating goals. Leaders at all levels must thus create conditions that encourage, facilitate, and oblige people to do what is desired. In other words, the grain of the organisation must be made to work with reform rather than against it. Police respond best when they believe that new programmes incorporate their own insight and on-the-job knowledge, which suggests that reform requires a bottom-up management style. Reform is more likely to occur if police officials are connected to a professional network of progressive police leaders. More specifically, police managers who want to appear modern and progressive and desire to be well regarded by their peers can be used to encourage democratic reform. Regular contact with professional networks, which invites comparison and provides opportunities for learning, is one way to do this because the leaders of these networks are likely to come from more progressive police services and more democratic countries (Bayley, 2001:10, 12&14). Sustained and committed leadership by top management, especially the most senior executive, is required to produce any important organisational change. Leadership is thus a significant dimension in any change process. According to Kotter (1996:26), the winning process is 70-90 percent leadership and 10-30 percent management, not the other way around.

The fourth and last theme to be presented is structure as an element of change.

### **3.3.4 Structure as an element of change**

Given the new philosophy of the SAPS, members should be more empowered at the lowest level. This entails, *inter alia*, allowing more discretion at operational levels, delegation of responsibility and authority, space for flexibility and adaptability to local needs, and co-ordination of functions and activities to create a specialized work environment. The new structure must also make provision for the appointment of senior, experienced, skilled and well trained leaders on operational level. For community policing to be successful, the structure should emphasise the status of the station commissioner and his/her personnel. Therefore, there must be a move away from a bureaucratic hierarchical structure towards a flat flexible structure (South Africa. 1994(b): 9). Bayley (2001:11), however, mentions that the structure of national police systems is very difficult to change, and reform in policing must be managed, not

structured, into existence. Furthermore, Bayley feels police behaviour cannot be changed by formal reorganisation within a police service or by restructuring on a national basis. As a result, changing the structure of organisations rarely affects operational behaviour because it does not touch the culture of an organisation.

Kotter and Cohen (2002:2), on the other hand, believe, put simply, that the central issue of change is never strategy, structure, culture, or systems. All those elements, and others, are important, but the core of the matter is always about changing the behaviour of people, and behaviour change happens in highly successful situations mostly by speaking to people's feelings.

Examples of changes in police organisations globally are briefly presented below.

### **3.4 Changing Police Organisations: International Examples**

During the past few years we have been witnesses of global changes in police organisations, not only in South African policing, but also in police organisations internationally. As stated by Fitzsimmons (1998:1), around the globe, democratisation and peace building processes have been transforming security forces. From Haiti to Bosnia to South Africa, international agencies have been spending vast amount of money to try to professionalise and civilianise the police – to create accountable and representative police forces to reflect the emerging “democracies” and to replace often-repressive pre-existing security forces. It is not the aim of this study to cover in particular changes in police organisations globally, but to emphasise the importance of change as well as to acknowledge the importance for foreign police organisations to change. This literature review, therefore, presents a brief overview of the organisations of the police in Germany, Colombia, El Salvador, Lithuania and Haiti, and points out some of the organisational changes that have already been carried out in these organisations. Similar to the German police force, other police agencies of the former homeland-era were integrated into the SAPS. Columbia, El Salvador, Lithuania and Haiti are developing countries, which like South Africa, needed to democratise and transform their police organisations to support their democracies. All of the above-mentioned countries' police organisations thus have undergone transformations similar to South African policing to keep in touch with their outside world.

The first international police organisation to be presented is the German police force.

### 3.4.1 Policing in Germany

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought about revolutionary changes in Germany. Familiar social and political structures fell along with the Berlin Wall; for example, crime patterns changed almost overnight as well as changes in the policing systems. This followed the unification of the East German and West German police to create one unified police force. East Germany, however, was not in a position to restructure its police force to suit its own needs. As a result West German structures and laws were essentially imposed onto the East. This situation created a significant morale problem, and many East German police officers simply quit the police. For those East German members of the force who remained, the introduction of the West German system required massive retraining. A significant issue among those members, particularly in the East, was how to “teach” the principles of democratic policing to officers trained in an undemocratic system. (Cooper, 1996:239-46).

All these changes resulted in European societies experiencing important new trends during the last decade. In Germany significant positive changes have taken place such as the improved relationship between the state, the market and the citizens. In the context of changing state functions, the role of government and public administration has already undergone extraordinary readjustments. The police, as a part of the public administration, have reacted in various ways to the new challenges brought about by trends such as public-private-partnerships, new public management, decentralisation, and the Europeanisation of human resource management. Policing itself is thus being affected, and the everyday work of a German police officer is nowadays different from that of a few years ago. Police in Germany are - or should be- service providers, and therefore a professionally managed service. The European dimension of policing is, however, more and more acknowledged. Successful policing implies constant efforts to readjust the police organization; therefore, the police have to remain in touch not only with new trends and techniques in crime, crime investigation and prevention, but also with growing demands of citizens.

Various models of public-private-partnerships are currently popular in Germany. This means that the police are no longer the only actor responsible for public security. Private security services, prevention councils, various associations, and groups of interested citizens also contribute to Germany’s interior security. It follows that German police are beginning to accept business-like managerialism, too. Improved customer orientation and better motivation of



personnel seem to be the predominant objectives. Processes of decentralisation are also taking place within the German police, such as the replacement of traditional hierarchical steering mechanisms by contact management and de-centralised resource responsibility (Koch, 1998:173-179).

Similar to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the ending of apartheid in South Africa, after the first democratic election in 1994, also brought about revolutionary changes to the country, and to policing in particular. The lesson South African policing can learn from the German transformation process is the importance of a partnership between the police and the community. Democratic policing, with the emphasis on service provision to the community, is a much more acceptable way of policing than is the autocratic style adopted in West Germany and in pre-1994 South Africa.

The second international police organisation to be presented is the Columbian police force.

### **3.4.2 Columbian police reform**

The Columbian police force had traditionally been considered corrupt, and inefficient, and it was widely thought to be infiltrated by drug traffickers. The reform of the Columbian police force was, however, initiated by the organisation's own leadership rather than by political intervention. Approximately 7 000 police officers were dismissed for having engaged in corrupt activities. The structure and culture of the force was also altered and management concepts from modern business culture were introduced. The Columbian police force also became more community conscious. This was reflected in a number of ways, including consultation with the citizens to provide the basis for a new police service, the creation of new, advanced channels of communication for complaints and claims, including the provision of customer-service lines, and, lastly, the creation of so-called citizens' consortiums for change. As a result the transformation of the Columbian police has had a distinctly positive effect on public confidence in the police, and the results are generally considered to be highly positive (Frühling, 2002: 157-158).

South African policing had previously been considered inefficient and corrupt, in a similar way to the Columbian police. The lesson South African policing can learn from the Columbian police reform is that community involvement is vital for public confidence in the police. As a result of

community involvement, public confidence will lead to greater association with the police. Furthermore, the culture of the police organisation must be a reflection of the needs of the community being served.

The third police institution to be presented is the El Salvador police force.

### **3.4.3 El Salvador police reform**

Central America's police forces gained international notoriety for their repression and brutality during the civil wars that swept the region in the 1980s. With the partial exception of Costa Rica after it abolished its military in 1948, the region has never known accountable, professional, civilian police forces that prioritized the protection of citizens. Beginning in the nineteenth century, public security institutions, were oriented towards protecting the interests of an elite group and a military institution which increasingly exercised autonomy as an informal protector of that elite. In 1992, far-reaching efforts to demilitarise the El Salvador police were launched, marking the most sweeping attempt in the region's history to create a civilian, humane and professional police force. As part of a peace accord, El Salvador's police reforms are among the earliest post-Cold War efforts by international and national actors to revamp policing. Police reforms were, therefore, central to the peace process itself. A new National Civilian Police (NCP) as the sole national-level public security force was created with responsibilities for order maintenance and protection of citizens, and a doctrine that explicitly emphasises human rights (Call, 2002:1-4).

During the apartheid-era South African policing was also notorious for its repression and brutality. The lesson for South Africa to be learnt from the El Salvador police reform is that policing is not a militaristic function that forces itself onto a community; it is the rather rendering of a civilian, professional police service with its emphasis on human dignity.

The fourth police organisation to be presented is the Lithuanian police force.

### **3.4.4 Lithuanian police reform**

Policing in Lithuania also went through an imperative change process during 1997. The government identified the need for a radical police reform that could fundamentally change its

organisation and management methods of its activities, and its role in the society. The necessity to demilitarise and restructure the police of Lithuania was also identified since the police inherited a bureaucratic and militarised system from the communist era. The implementation of a policy of co-operating with the public and of long-term complex programmes in order to reach the objectives of the police activities was also instituted. It was also identified that policing should be more accountable and transparent not only within the police organisation itself, but also to the public it serves. Training and development of police were also identified with the aim of preparing well-educated and skillful police officers (Bukauskas, 1998:377).

The lesson South Africa can learn from the Lithuanian police reform is the changing role of modern policing in society. The emphasis is currently on the peace officer with the primary function of service delivery to the community in contrast to the militaristic, repressive approach. Police officers therefore need to be trained on a continuous basis to prepare them for the changing demands of the community.

The fifth and last police organisation to be presented is the Haiti police force.

### **3.4.5 Haiti police reform**

Throughout much of its history Haiti had been politically unstable. As a result the people had become familiar with autocratic rule where the majority of people were impoverished and had not experienced a sharing of political power or much support for the rule of law. The Haiti government was overthrown by a military coup as the country moved into the 1990s and, as a result, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established. Its mandate was to modernise the armed forces of Haiti and to establish a new police force. The police were separated from the military. The role of the police in the Haitian context was defined and a training programme for recruits to the new force was instituted. Priority was also given to the management of the force, specialised skills, and the development of various kinds of training programmes for academy trainers, supervisors and technical specialists (Terrill, 2000:48-49).

An important lesson South Africa can learn from the Haiti police reform is the separation of the police from the military. Contemporary policing has a totally different role to fulfil than the military has. Policing is a civilian structure with its aim to render a humane service through the prevention of crime and the upholding of the law. Another significant lesson for South Africa is

that a community does not support an autocratic policing system. However, a community is usually willing to familiarise itself with an open, democratic policing system that is accountable to the community.

Tensions have been rising since President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's party won the 2000 legislative elections, which observers said were flawed. Furthermore, Aristide's opponents say his government has quietly condoned corruption and violence. In addition, Aristide is accused of organising gangs to attack anti-government demonstrators, and the police of being a tool of intimidation (Aristide has been accused of presenting himself as a messiah figure, 2004: \_\_).

The above-mentioned international examples of change in police organisations emphasise the importance of change and also accentuate the fact that change is inevitable and of substantial significance if an organisation is to stay in touch with constantly changing times. As a result, each of the above change efforts can have a positive impact on the international community's efforts to improve policing. However, according to Bass (2000:149), the police have traditionally been resistant to reforms that claim to change police organisations.

Bass, Reiner and Weitzer (in Marks, 2000:558), believe that transforming police organisations has proven extremely difficult given their conservative nature and general resilience to change. Marks (2000) also mentions that even in countries that have undergone dramatic changes in governance, and have stated their commitment to democracy, human rights and equitable service delivery, police forces have retained their historically abusive and discriminatory character, including democratising states such as South Africa, Mozambique, Brazil and Guatemala. The cases of ongoing police violence and other irregularities demonstrate that democratic constitutions and elections do not translate automatically into democratic policing. Seleti (in Marks, 2000:558-559), points to the Mozambican case as an example of such police resistance to transformation. Independence in Mozambique did not give rise to respectable policing. As a result the Mozambican police was extremely authoritarian and the use of violence by the police became part of police strategies to maintain authority, to control suspects, and to obtain information. It was only in 1992 that new opportunities for the transformation in the Mozambican police opened up through the General Peace Accord. A National Affairs Police Commission was established to ensure that the police did not violate the democratic rights of citizens. In addition, the United Nations, as part of its peace building initiatives in Mozambique, was involved in monitoring the police.

Marks (2000: 559) argues that there are a number of ways in which one can understand the conservatism of police organisations and their resilience to change. Firstly, once bureaucracies are established, they are extremely difficult to deconstruct. Even when state change occurs, as a result of revolution or of incremental change, institutions maintain their rules for functioning, as well as their “expert” functionaries.

Secondly, in the light of Seleti’s statement (in Marks, 2000:559), police institutions maintain legacies of historical behaviour and ideology, and are rooted in past and present cultures and traditions that may be authoritarian in nature.

Thirdly, as stated by Reiner, (in Marks, 2000:559), it is widely argued in the literature on policing that “cop culture” has universal features that are difficult to transform. These features include machismo, conservatism, pessimism and vocationalism, which to some degree give police organisations and their members a sense of identity. Marks (2000:558) also claims that internal resistance or challenge is one of the most effective and direct mechanisms for bringing about change in policing agencies, but that, for this challenge to be successful, a commitment on the part of the police agency itself to a change in the formal rules of policing must be evident. It follows that the need for change in police organisations that are in countries undergoing a process of transformation from authoritarian to democratic governance, such as South Africa, is essential. The police in particular is a necessary element in any democratisation process; it is a central institution of the state, and acts as an indicator of the quality of democratic institutions. The behaviour of police organisations is thus an important measurement of a government’s commitment to democratisation.

The police forces of Germany, Columbia, El Salvador, Lithuania and Haiti underwent various changes similar to each other; however, differences in these police forces’ change processes were also evident. Commonalities and differences in these organisations are here presented briefly. It is evident in the above-mentioned literature on change in international police organisations that political intervention played a major part in the transformation of these organisations. However, the transformation of the Columbian police force was initiated by the leadership of the organisation and not by political intervention. A significant change in German policing was the unification of two separate police forces, the East and West German police, to create one police force. The police organisations of Columbia, El Salvador, Lithuania and Haiti, however, were single police forces that went through the process of transformation. Furthermore, significant

similarities in the change processes of all the above-mentioned police forces were made. The most evident similarities are:

- The structure of the organisations was altered to become more flexible, and decentralized.
- Demilitarisation of these police forces was introduced and a more community-conscious approach was followed.
- As a result this was followed by the re-training of personnel to prepare and develop them for their new role as skillful and professional police officers.

Policing in South Africa went through similar changes as in the above-mentioned international police organisations; namely: demilitarisation, the integration of other police agencies, altering of the structure and the training of personnel to reflect the democracy. Changes in South African policing were also instituted through political intervention.

A brief discussion on resisting change will follow.

### **3.5 Resistance to Change**

According to Hooker (in Colenso, 2000:3), change is not made without inconvenience, even change from bad to better. Change, regardless of the magnitude of it, therefore, results in anxiety, fear, uncertainty and hope (Edosomwan, 1996:11). As a result, despite the adaptive characteristics of man as a biological organism, resistance to change is an endemic feature of behaviour (*Business Basics*, 1995:290). It follows that most of us experience the process of change much as we experience grieving the death of someone we love. For a while we grasp on to the way things were yesterday. In our own time, in our own way, we stay stuck until we are ready to let go of yesterday. When this release freezes us, we move forward (Take charge of change, 2002:53). Clarke (1994:52) also mentions that change can only begin when one thing ends and something new starts. In other words, for this to happen we have to let go of the old, even though we have no guarantee of what the new will bring. Learning to let go is therefore essential if change is going to happen; however, letting go means loss, and coping with loss is perhaps the greatest human challenge (Clarke, 1994:55). Pieters and Young (2000:11), on the other hand, feel that a very commonly heard phrase is that people naturally resist change. They thus believe that if this is what we believe about the people of our organisations, we are likely to approach change as if making it happen will be a battle. It does, however, seem true that people

do naturally resist imposed change and change that they do not understand or have reason to fear. Umiker (1998:278) also believes when employees do not accept change, it may be because they do not understand it or because they think it will be bad for them. Some employees lack confidence in the ability of their leaders or their team to make change work. Opportunities for changes therefore decrease when change occurs without proactive analysis, planning or direction. The likelihood of success, on the other hand, increases when one understands how people react to change and use that awareness to help navigate employees through the process. Hussey (1998:48) believes that resistance to change appears when there is a threat to something the individual values. The threat may be real or it may be a perception. It may arise from a real understanding of the change or from almost total ignorance about it. It may be something the individual has thought about deeply or it may be just a feeling that the current state is very pleasant, so any proposal to change may be considered a threat. In contrast to the above view, Chang (1994:90) feels it is not the change itself that people resist, it is their attitudes toward the change that will determine whether they will resist the change or not. Agreeing with Bass (2000:149) Babović (2000:257) believes that the democratic reconstruction of the police in countries in transition has most often encountered difficulties greater than those in other spheres of life and trusts that it is because the police have a reputation for being conservative organisations hostile to change. Babović explains that this hostility is particularly obvious in situations when democratic changes are concerned, which have the potential to lead to a limitation of police powers or to the aggravation of its social status or financial position.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, policing in South Africa went through radical democratic and fundamental changes that may have had an effect on whether members accept change or not. Conversely, change is never entirely negative, but this is also a tremendous opportunity, though even in that opportunity there is often some small loss. This can be a loss of the past, a loss of routines or traditions, or even relationships (Edosomwan, 1996:12). In line with Edosomwan, Deems (1995:30) believes that change has broadened our horizons, has enabled us to grow, and has brought us to where we are today. With every change in our lives, there have been opportunities. Resistance to change is not all bad. It can be valuable, sometimes keeping leaders from making critical mistakes. However, resistance to change is a roadblock that must be removed (Umiker, 1998:278). Hultman (1998:98-99) does not believe change is always positive or that resistance is always negative. By itself, change is inherently neither good nor bad. It is impossible to know in advance if change will turn out to be positive or negative before it is evaluated by its consequences. Every organisation, however, also requires a certain amount of

stability to function effectively. It is therefore important to achieve a balance between change and stability. According to Carnall (in Hart, 1996:210), it is inaccurate to believe that resistance to change is always negative, although it is often observed to be that way. Organisations, however, have a need to aim at various objectives for survival and amongst these objectives are likely to be a need for stability, balanced with a need for change. Although the word “resistance” has negative connotations there are times when change is inadvisable, and there are also times when resistance is the best action. Hultman (1998) explains that there are times when resistance is a problem and times when it is a solution. It follows that if people resist positive or necessary changes, resistance is a problem. On the other hand, if people resist negative or unnecessary changes, resistance is a solution. The contrary is also true: if people are willing to make negative or unnecessary changes, a lack of resistance could be a problem. Deems (1995:29) believes that instead of resisting change, people should rather consciously decide to make it work for them, and accept change in the workplace as a fact of life; then they can prepare for change.

The main reasons why employees resist change will now be discussed.

### **3.5.1 Reasons why people resist change in the workplace**

According to Kreitner and Kinicki (2001: 671) ten of the leading reasons why people resist change in the workplace are the following:

- *“An individual’s predisposition toward change:* This predisposition is highly personal and deeply ingrained. It is an outgrowth of how one learns to handle change and ambiguity as a child”.
- *“Surprise and fear of the unknown:* When innovative or radically different changes are introduced without warning, affected employees become fearful of the implications. Grapevine rumors fill the void created by a lack of official announcements”.
- *“Climate of mistrust:* Trust involves mutual faith in others’ intentions and behaviour. Mistrust encourages secrecy, which leads to a deeper mistrust. Managers who trust their employees make the change process open, honest, and participative. Employees who, in



turn, trust management are more willing to expend extra effort and take chances with something different”.

- “*Fear of failure*: Intimidating changes on the job can cause employees to doubt their capabilities. Self-doubt erodes self-confidence and cripples personal growth and development”.
- “*Loss of status and/or job security*: Administrative and technological changes that threaten to change power bases or eliminate jobs generally cause strong resistance”.
- “*Peer pressure*: Someone who is not directly affected by change may actively resist it to protect the interest of his or her friends and co-workers”.
- “*Disruption of cultural traditions and/or group relationships*: Whenever individuals are transferred, promoted, or reassigned, cultural and group dynamics are thrown into disequilibrium”.
- “*Personality conflicts*: Just as a friend can get away with telling us something we would resent hearing from an adversary, the personalities of change agents can breed resistance”.
- “*Lack of tact and/or poor timing*: Unnecessary resistance can occur because changes are introduced in an insensitive manner or at an awkward time”.
- “*No reinforcing reward systems*: Individuals resist when they do not foresee positive rewards for changing”.

Steps to overcome resistance to change are listed below.

### **3.5.2 Steps to overcome resistance to change**

The following five steps to overcome resistance to change as listed in Chang (1994:91-93) can help managers or leaders to overcome employees’ resistance to change:

Step 1: Explain the change and why it is needed.

- People will respond more favourably to change when they understand why it is necessary.
- Help people understand how they are influenced, and how they can benefit from the change.

Step 2: Encourage two-way communication.

- Get reactions and resistance out in the open.
- Clarify misunderstanding and respond to objectives.

Step 3: Gather suggestions to help put the change into action.

- Help eliminate personal fears of the unknown.
- Build a sense of control and involvement in the change.

Step 4: Agree on an action plan.

- Identify who does what and when.
- Establish commitments and accountabilities.
- Focus on opportunities and desired outcomes.
- Provide resources to implement the change plan.

Step 5: Evaluate progress and reinforce success.

- Ensure that plans are progressing, and make adjustments as needed.
- Provide recognition for support and efforts.
- Reinforce progress by publishing success.

In addition, Kreitner and Kinicki (2001: 674) recommend specific approaches to overcome resistance to change. Firstly, an organisation must be ready for change before the change can be effective. Secondly, organisational change is less successful when top management fails to keep employees informed about the change process. Thirdly, managers should not assume that people are consciously resisting change. Managers are encouraged to use a systems model of change to identify the obstacles that are affecting the implementation process. Fourthly, employees' perceptions or interpretations of change significantly affect resistance. Employees are less likely to resist change when they perceive that its benefits overshadow personal costs.

In short, managers are advised to provide as much information as possible to employees about the change, inform employees about the reasons for the change, and conduct meetings to address employees' questions regarding the change. Employees should also be provided the opportunity to discuss how the proposed change might affect them. These recommendations underline the importance of communicating with employees throughout the change process.

Police responsibilities and the way they are performed should, according to Schutte (1996:9), always be viewed in the political context, under societal and economic circumstances and developments. Hence, any changes in these areas are likely to lead to subsequent changes in the general framework for the police service and police work; therefore, the police service as an organisation needs to react to those changes. The fundamental function of policing, however, makes it an especially complex institution to change (Bass, 2000:148). Kissler (1991:258), therefore, believes that what is needed is an organisational change model that illustrates the organisation in its complexity, while setting the stage for subsequent paths to follow to minimise the turbulence caused by change. A good organisational change model should, therefore, serve as a guide for recognising and managing organisational change (Kissler, 1991:246).

A presentation and discussion of five theoretical organisational change models will follow. These change models explain why change occurs, how to bring about change, and the areas where change must take place to transform an organisation. This five organisational change models have a useful contribution to make to the process of change. Although some of these models are earlier theories of change and other models more recent, they all remain influential and are all still favoured by management educationalists.

### **3.6 Organisational Change Models**

Organisational change can be a complex process; therefore the need for a change model to assist leaders and managers to position their organisations for change and to prepare for the future impact of change became apparent.

The first organisational change model to be presented is Kotter's eight-step process of creating change.

### **3.6.1. Kotter's eight-step process of creating successful change**

Kotter and Cohen (2002:2-3) believe that successful large-scale change is a complex affair that happens in eight stages. These eight stages are: “push urgency up”, “put together a guiding team”, “create the vision and strategies”, “effectively communicate the vision and strategies”, “remove barriers to action”, “accomplish short-term wins”, “keep pushing for wave after wave of change until the work is done”, and, finally, “create a new culture to make new behaviour stick”. The central challenge in all eight stages is changing people's behaviour. Kotter believes the central challenge is not strategy, not systems, and not culture. These elements and many others can be very important, but the core problem is behaviour – what people do, and the need for significant shifts in what people do. Changing behaviour is thus less a matter of giving people analysis to influence their thoughts than helping them to see a truth to influence their feelings. Both thinking and feeling are essential, and both are found in successful organisations, but the heart of change is in the emotions of people. It follows that the flow of see-feel-change is more powerful than that of analysis. See-feel-change is when people are visually shown the truth that influences their feelings that leads to new behaviour (Kotter and Cohen, 2002: 10). These distinctions between seeing and analysing, between feeling and thinking, are critical because, for the most part, we use the latter much more frequently, competently, and comfortably than the former. Although most organisations believe change happens by making people think differently, Kotter and Cohen (2002) write that the key lies more in making them feel differently. To understand why some organisations are leaping into the future more successfully than others, one needs first to see the flow of effective large-scale change efforts. In almost all cases, there is a flow, a set of eight steps that few people handle well.

#### **Step 1: Establish a greater sense of urgency:**

- Seriously examine the market and competitive realities.
- Identify and discuss crises, potential crises or major opportunities.

Raising a feeling of urgency is the first and most critical step in a successful change effort. Reports and spreadsheets are not enough, one needs to demonstrate actions that shock people into understanding the need for change that creates a buzz and let people begin to perceive “We must do something!”

- **Core Challenges:** Get people “out of the bunker” and ready to move.

- **What Works:** Create dramatic presentations with compelling objects that people can actually see, touch, and feel; provide evidence from outside the organisation that change is required; find cheap and easy ways to reduce complacency
- **Example:** Show employees a video tape and an angry customer rather than handing out a two-page memo filled with negative “customer data”.
- **Desired New Behaviour:** People start telling each other, “Let’s go, we need to change things!”

### **Step 2: Create the guiding coalition:**

- Put a group together with enough power to lead the change.
- Get the group to work together as a team.

In the past, change was smaller in scale and moved slowly. Today, a single individual cannot effectively handle large scale, fast-paced change alone. Step 2 explains how every good change initiative needs a group of influential, effective leaders. It is important to get the right people in place who are fully committed to the change initiative, well respected within the organisation, and have power and influence to drive the change effort at their levels.

- **Core Challenge:** Get the right people in place with the trust, emotional commitment, and teamwork to guide a very difficult change process.
- **What Works:** Attract key change leaders by showing enthusiasm and commitment; model the trust and teamwork needed in the group; structure meeting formats that minimise frustration and increase trust.
- **Example:** Draft a large, diverse team made up of individuals at all levels and with different skills, rather than bowing to political pressures to leave the task of change in the hands of a small, like-minded “executive group”.
- **Desired New Behaviour:** A group powerful enough to guide a big change is formed and they start to work together well.

### **Step 3: Develop a vision and strategy:**

- Create a vision to help direct the change effort
- Develop strategies for achieving that vision.

Urgency is up and leaders are ready to lead...but in what direction? People often have the mistaken perception that a vision is not related to business realities, and is a waste of time. While creating a shared need and urgency for change may push people into action, it is the vision that will steer them in the new direction. Step 3 is about demonstrating how to provide a relevant vision, and making it work for the change effort.

- **Core Challenge:** Get the guiding team to create the right vision and strategies to guide action in all of the remaining stages of change. This requires moving beyond number-crunching to address the creative and emotional components of vision.
- **What Works:** Literally seeing/visualising possible futures; visions that are moving; visions that are so clear they can be articulated in one minute or written up on one page; bold strategies that can be executed quickly enough to make the vision a reality.
- **Example:** Marshal people around a compelling service vision that can only be realised by drastically streamlining costs, rather than delivering emotionally depressing and anxiety-producing mandates about slashing expenses.
- **Desired New Behaviour:** The guiding team develops the right vision and strategy for the change effort.

#### **Step 4: Communicate the change vision:**

- Use every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies constantly.
- The guiding coalition needs to act as role models.

Step 4 is about communication. Once a vision and strategy have been developed, they must be communicated to the organisation in order to gain understanding and buy-in. Sending clear, credible, and heartfelt messages about the direction of change establishes genuine gut-level buy-in, which sets the stage for the following step: getting people to act. This step should be revisited throughout the change effort.

- **Core Challenge:** Get as many people as possible acting to make the vision a reality.
- **What Works:** Keep communication simple and heartfelt; find out what people are really feeling and allow them to express their anxieties, confusion, anger and distrust; rid

communication channels of impediments so that important messages can get through; use new technologies to help people see the vision.

- **Example:** Create tools that help people tailor information to their specific needs, rather than forcing more generic memos and reports into over-stuffed email and in-boxes.
- **Desired New Behaviour:** People begin to buy into the change, and this shows in their behaviour.

#### **Step 5: Empower others to act:**

- Get rid of blockers.
- Change systems or structures that seriously undermine the change vision.
- Encourage risk taking and non-traditional ideas, activities, and actions.

Step 5 is about empowering a broad base of people to take action. Rather than viewing empowerment as handing out power, it should be seen as removing barriers to those whom we want to assist in pushing the change effort. This removing of obstacles should inspire, promote optimism and build confidence around the change effort. Change is not just about the motive, but also about the opportunities to achieve change.

- **Core Challenge:** Remove key obstacles that stop people from acting on the vision.
- **What Works:** Bring in experienced change leaders to increase confidence that the job can be done; create recognition and reward systems that inspire, and promote optimism and build self-confidence; give constructive feedback; help disempowering managers to experience the need for change powerfully.
- **Example:** To recognise and reward excellence, stage an emotion-filled competition in Hawaii rather than a dry, cerebral event in a suburban conference room.
- **Desired New Behaviour:** More people feel able to act on the vision.

#### **Step 6: Create short-term wins:**

- Plan for some visible performance improvements.
- Create those wins.
- Visibly recognize and reward people who made the wins possible.

Short-term wins nourish faith in the change effort, emotionally reward hard workers, keep the critics at bay, and build momentum. Organizations often tackle large-scale projects with a view to a big final payoff. Progress is communicated to stakeholders, but a disparity develops between the wins reported and the stakeholder's perception of progress, which undermines the credibility of the communication. By creating short-term wins, and being honest with feedback, progress is achieved and people are inspired.

- **Core Challenge:** Produce enough short-term wins fast enough to energise the change helpers, enlighten the pessimists, defuse the cynics, and build momentum for the effort.
- **What Works:** “Cheap and easy” wins that are visible, timely, unambiguous, and meaningful to others.
- **Example:** Focus publicly on four goals instead of 50 and make sure that no new initiatives are added until one of those goals is achieved and celebrated.
- **Desired New Behaviour:** Momentum builds as people fulfil the vision, while fewer and fewer resist change.

#### **Step 7: Consolidate gains and produce even more change:**

- Use increased credibility to change all systems, structures, and policies that do not fit together and do not fit the transformation vision.
- Hire, promote, and develop people who can implement the change vision.

Managers should not give up until the change has been entrenched in the very fibre of the organisation. You need to pursue change until the vision is a reality. In successful efforts, people build on this momentum to make the vision a reality by keeping urgency up, and a feeling of false pride down, by eliminating unnecessary exhausting work and by not declaring victory prematurely.

- **Core Challenge:** Continue with wave after wave of change, not stopping until the vision is a reality, no matter how big the obstacles.
- **What Works:** Eliminate or delegate non-priority work; show people powerful reasons to keep urgency up; use new situations opportunistically to launch the next wave of change.
- **Example:** Replace a time-consuming and painstakingly detailed monthly activity report with a one-page summary that highlights only major milestones and key financial metrics.
- **Desired New Behaviour:** People remain energised and motivated to push change forward until the vision is fulfilled.



**Step 8: Institutionalise changes in the culture:**

- Create better performance through customer and productivity orientated behaviour, more and better leadership, and more effective management.
- Articulate the connections between new behaviours and firm success.
- Develop means to ensure leadership development and succession.

When reaching the end of the change process and the urgency was there, the vision was met, the short-term wins celebrated and the changes consolidated it is important to establish new behaviour as a new tradition to ensure that leaps into the future does not slide back into the past. By creating a new, supportive, and sufficiently strong organisational culture, the change should remain. A supportive culture provides roots of the new ways of operating.

- **Core Challenges:** Create a supporting structure that provides roots for the new ways of operating.
- **What Works:** Refuse to declare victory too soon; use new employee orientation, the promotions process, and vivid stories to reinforce the vision visibly and compellingly.
- **Example:** When introducing new employees to the organisation, use videos that contain heartfelt messages from customers whose lives the company has changed and touched-rather than the usual dry speeches and boring handbooks.
- **Desired New Behaviour:** New and winning behaviour continues despite the pull of tradition, turnover of change leaders, etc.

(Kotter & Cohen, 2002:15-177)

Kotter's eight-step process to successful change is an easy to understand and very practical step-by-step model that offers clear advice. This model describes in detail the eight-step path to successful change and explains how to overcome the core challenges at each step of the process. Organisations as well as individuals in every walk of life and in every stage of change can apply this model with great ease as it captures both the heart and the method of successful change. What makes this model more powerful is that people are shown a truth that influences their feelings, rather than are given analysis to shift their thinking. Key players can thus feel free to use this model when their organisations leap to excel in a fast-changing world.

The second change model to be presented is Lewin's Three-Stage Model.

### 3.6.2 Lewin's Three-Stage Model

Kurt Lewin's model of change gives us a useful general model for conceptualising how to bring about change (Williams et al., 2002:285). Lewin's change model is an earlier theory; however it remains an influential theory and a common approach favoured by management educationalists (Dawson, 1994:16). Lewin believes that change results from change in the forces that obtrude upon the organisation, group or individual. Lewin uses this force-field approach to explain why individuals, groups or organisations change and as a result how change can be brought about. Change is brought about by actions that strengthen the driving forces or weaken resistance to change. Lewin also makes an important point that to strengthen the driving forces without weakening the resistances results in strain.

As Figure 3.1 indicates, the model has three phases. First, there is an unfreezing phase (existing behaviour) in which there is a recognition that there is a need for change and action is taken to unfreeze existing attitudes and behaviour (Williams et al., 2002:284). *Business Basics* (1995:305) explains the unfreezing phase as the most difficult phase, which is concerned mainly with "selling" the change as well as giving individuals or groups a motive for changing their attitudes, values, behaviour, systems or structures. If the need for change is immediate, clear and recognised to be associated with the survival of the individual or group, the unfreeze stage will be considerably accelerated. Cultural change is perhaps the most difficult of all. Unfreezing processes therefore need:

- a trigger;
- someone to challenge and expose the existing behaviour pattern in a visible way;
- the involvement of outsiders; and
- alterations to the power structure.


The second phase is a period of change, attitudinal or behaviour change, during which action is taken to strengthen the driving forces and weaken resistance (Williams et al., 2002:284).

According to Dawson (1994:16) this preparatory phase is considered crucial to create employee support and to minimise resistance. Thus, to bring about change one either needs to increase the strength of the driving forces or decrease the strength of the resisting forces. *Business Basics* (1995:305) mentions that this phase is also concerned with identifying what the new, desirable behaviour or norm should be, communicating it and encouraging individuals and groups to

“own” the new attitude or behaviour. This might involve the acceptance of a new culture. The ideas must, on the other hand, be shown to work to be successful. This phase thus involves the actual implementation of new systems of operation (Dawson, 1994:17).

Once this phase is completed, the third and last phase of re-freezing (new behaviour) occurs. Williams et al. (2002:284) describe this phase where the organisation settles into a new equilibrium. This phase may involve the positive reinforcement of desired outcomes to promote the internalisation of new attitudes and behaviours. The final element used in this step is an appraisal of the effectiveness of the change programme to ensure that the new way of doing things becomes habitualised (Dawson, 1994:17).

Figure 3.1: Lewin’s Three-Stage Model of Change



This, then, is the basis of Lewin’s three-phase model of change, which is still widely taught in business departments and management schools around the world. Whilst the strength of the model lies in its simple representation, which makes it easy to use and understand, this is also its major weakness as it represents an unidirectional model of change. Moreover, by creating an image of a need to design in stability (refreezing), the model has a tendency to solidify what is a dynamic and complex process. It may therefore, also result in the creation of cultures and structures not conducive to continuous change. Subsequently, Marvin Weisbord has argued that

Lewin's concept thus begins to fall apart as the rate of market and technological change enters a state of perpetual transition, rather than the "quasi-stationary equilibrium" proposed by the model. It follows that Lewin's theory may be inappropriate to organisations operating in rapidly changing environments (Dawson, 1994:17). Lewin's model also lacks detail, failing to deal with issues such as: what causes individuals or groups to co-operate, what causes them to resist, and how can one deal with it?

For the present, Lewin gives us a useful general model for conceptualising how to bring about change (Williams et al., 2002:285).

The third organizational change model to be presented is Kissler's Change Management Organisational Model.

### **3.6.3 Kissler's Change Management Organisational Model**

This particular model has three distinct levels within it. At the front level are four primary key factors that can be associated with organisational change. At the second level are several influence systems beneath the primary factors. The third and final level draws upon all of the preceding elements, i.e. several change techniques. The four key factors associated with the front level are: leadership, structure, process, and workforce. These four dimensions are shown to be embedded within the organisation's culture.

- **Leadership**

This dimension relates to the characteristics of people guiding the organisation into the future, and includes their leadership style, the way they use their influence, the people and systems guiding and motivating the organisation into the future, and all levels of leadership, personal qualities, approach to leadership and the level of their influence on the organization.

- **Process**

This dimension relates how work is designed and supported by management planning, training, communication, information technology and rewards, and also includes the mechanisms used to plan, perform, support and control the work performed by the organization.

- **Structure**

This dimension relates to the jobs, work responsibilities, reporting relationships, and departmental boundaries in the organisation that includes the roles and relationships among organisational units and individuals, and the framework within which work is performed.

- **Workforce**

This dimension relates to the abilities and characteristics of the organisation's employees, including their skills, motivation, trust, knowledge, commitment, and values.

(Kissler, 1991:258 & 260)

As indicated, a second level of influence systems lies beneath these dimensions. It was found through experience that organisations contain several of these influence systems, which affect whether, and to what extent, change can be implemented and sustained. Each of the influence systems is related primarily, yet not exclusively, to one organisational dimension. These influence systems are highly interactive and interdependent. As a result, changes to any one of them usually cause, or have been caused by, changes to others, sometimes planned and sometimes not. These influence systems are as follows:

- **Leadership dimension**

Innovation orientation

- Management's willingness to support risk associated with change encourages new ideas and commits resources to the change effort.

Vision and focus

- The existence and communication of a clear and convincing future view of the organisation.
- Clear linkage between vision and the need for change.

Leadership behaviour

- Steps taken to gain commitment of people for change.
- Addressing resistance directly and effectively and the sharing of knowledge throughout the organisation.
- Ensuring that mistakes are used as opportunities to learn.

- **Structure dimension**

Work role clarity

- Clarity of roles assigned to people in the organisation.
- Freedom to fulfil an assigned role.

Accountability

- Balance between responsibilities and assigned position.
- Perception of link between personal growth and achievement of goals tied to assigned job responsibility.

Organisational structure

- The degree to which current structures support and encourage effective performance.
- Whether hierarchy and rank are emphasised.

- **Workforce dimension**

Trust

- The degree of trust and co-operation among employees.
- Perceived fairness of management through a period of change.

Knowledge and Skills

- Capability of individuals to understand change and perform skills at the level required of them.

### Motivation

- The aspects of the work environment that encourage people to make optimum use of their skills.

### Commitment

- Personal identification with the organisation and its purpose.
- The likelihood of employees remaining with the organisation.

### Organisational values

- The perceived relationship between organisational values and those held by employees.
- How organisational behaviour and output reflects the organisation's values.

#### ▪ **Process dimension**

### Work process flexibility

- The degree to which work processes are flexible and meet customer needs in an efficient manner.

### Leadership effectiveness

- Those processes used by management to guide and sustain performance.
- Planning, resource allocation, information exchange.

### HR and IT infrastructures

- Those processes that support the performance of the organisation.
- Training, communication, rewards, performance management and information technology.


The third level focuses on change techniques that are exercised locally or across an organisation to effect change in the influence systems, and therefore also in the organisation entirely. This level is a critical area and the selection and application of appropriate techniques demand careful

diagnosis and planning. This level, however, also addresses resistance to change directly and effectively. These techniques are as follows:

- Create a vision
- Understand and manage the change, the impact on people/organisation
- “Walk the talk”
- Manage diversity in the workplace
- Motivate and mobilise employees (recognition and reward)
- Communicate change
- Participate – Encourage participation by employees in the change process/empowerment
- Develop employees

This model highlights the vision that is needed to set the stage for managing several types of organisational transformation. This model also sees the relationship between an organisation’s vision of its future state and its subsequent transformation as critical. The close relationship between the formation of a future state and the development of a supporting strategy is accentuated in this model. The model also secures a clear area of demarcation between the organisation and external variables by beginning with a vision and ending with actual output. This model is based on the belief that the organisation is not incapable over the complete spectrum of its external environmental forces (Kissler, 1991:258-265).

Figure 3.2 Kissler’s Change Management Organisational Model



Kissler (1991:259)

Kissler’s change management organisational model is a very informative model that addresses the important aspects of organisational change. This model is not presented in a complex



manner; therefore, it is easy to understand and to apply. The need for change through communicating a clear vision of the future is also recognised in this model. Another strength of this model is the direct and effective way of addressing resistance. Employees are also drawn into the change process through encouraging participation. Furthermore a close balance exists between the key factors and their influence systems in this model, which makes it highly interactive and interdependent.

The fourth model to be presented is Beckhard and Harris's (1987) model.

### **3.6.4 Beckhard and Harris's Model**

This model is concerned with motivating change. Beckhard and Harris (1987:98-99) illustrate the motivation for change as follows:

Change =  $ABC > X$ , where:

A = Dissatisfaction with the status quo.

B = A desirable future.

C = A Practical pathway.

X = The costs of changing.

Factors A, B, and C must, in other words, outbalance the costs (X) for change to occur. If the cost of changing is too high, people will resist the change. There must be dissatisfaction with the status quo, and people must perceive a desirable future and a practical pathway for achieving that future for change to be accepted and these factors must be greater than the costs of change.

Williams, et al. (2002:285) similarly emphasise the need to reduce the "costs" of change and the need to convince people that there exists a means for achieving such a future. Beckhard & Harris (1987:48-52) recommend focusing on the future rather than the present for a number of favourable reasons:

- It means that optimism replaces pessimism.
- It enables people to envisage their role and improves compliance.
- It reduces uncertainty and feelings of insecurity.
- It focuses the attention away from problems and symptoms to a reflection of what will make the organisation effective.

Beckhard and Harris's (1987) model is a motivational approach to change management; therefore, an efficient starting point is to realize that the present is problematic and a vision is

thus needed to steer the organisation into the right direction. A shortcoming of this model however is that it lacks detail. How do you convince people that the present is problematic or persuade people of a desirable vision of the future, and that there exists a means for achieving it? As a result, key players that envision the change as desirable might not be dissatisfied enough with the status quo, and thus may see the desirability of the end state as not furthering their personal interests, which may in consequence lead to resistance (Beckhard & Harris, 1987:99). Although this model's benefits for focusing on the future rather than the present may reduce resistance, strategies for resisting change can be incorporated to deal with resistance. Beckhard & Harris's model though is influential in organizational change and makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of how to manage planned change (Williams et al., 2002:285).

The fifth and last change model to be presented is Beer, Eisenstat and Spector's Critical Path Model.

### **3.6.5 Beer, Eisenstat and Spector's Critical Path Model**

This model concentrates on change at the organisational level, and applies an approach to the management of change that has been called the critical path to corporate renewal. The critical path is a general manager-led process that brings about task alignment at the organisational level by doing the following:

- Mobilising energy for change among all stakeholders in the organisation by involving in a diagnosis of the problems obstructing competitiveness;
- Developing a task-aligned vision of how to organise and manage for competitiveness;
- Promoting widespread agreement that the new vision is "right"; the ability to establish it, and cohesion to move change along by involving as many employees as possible;
- Extending revitalisation to all departments of the organisation in such a way that prevents perception that a programme is being driven from the top. Consistency must, however, be ensured at the same with the organisational changes already in progress;
- Combining changes through official policies, systems, and structures that enact revitalization;
- Constantly monitoring and strategising in reaction to expected difficulties in the revitalisation process (Beer, et al., 1990:78).

The critical path model is not a complicated model, which makes it easy to use and understand. This model has as its strength the involvement of as many employees as possible. As a result employees develop “ownership” of the change process. It follows that employees release latent knowledge and skills, provide better solutions to problems, enhance acceptance of decision, evince greater organisational commitment, reduce stress levels, and attain higher job satisfaction (Williams et al., 2002:286). As a result of this “ownership” resistance will be reduced to a great extent. This model thus follows a participative approach. However, according to Williams et al, despite all these advantages, Beer et al’s findings mainly illustrated an autocratic approach rather than a participative approach. In cases where this model was used there were also a number of instances of covert manoeuvring to implement change, and in some cases employees were deliberately kept in the dark.

Kotter’s eight-step process to successful change will be used as a framework for this study. John Kotter is regarded as the world’s foremost authority on leadership and change. This very practical and easy-to-understand model has broad relevance for leaping boldly forward in a turbulent world - to individuals as well as managers and executives. It does not matter whether one is a manager, an active agent, or if one considers oneself a passive sufferer of change in their organization, Kotter’s eight-step change process captures the heart of change. This model therefore reflects the reality of organizational change, and enables participants to gain some control over it and better manage their part.

### **3.7 Summary**

This chapter presented a review of the literature on the change processes in organisations. The purpose of this chapter was to explain what other researchers have found on the change processes in organisations to obtain a thorough understanding of the topic and to compare it with the topic of the present study. Furthermore, examples were provided of changes international police organisations underwent to emphasise the importance of change and the tendency of such organisations to follow a more community conscience approach to policing.

The five above-mentioned organisational change models illustrate how to bring about change and pin point the areas where change must take place to transform an organisation. Kotter’s eight-step process as mentioned in 3.6.1 is used as a framework for this study to explain how and where changes have taken place in the South African Police Service (SAPS).

Chapter 4 provides a presentation and discussion of the results. The presentation, analysis, and integration of both the quantitative data and the qualitative data are presented and discussed according to emergent themes and subcategories.

## **CHAPTER 4                    PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS**

### **4.1     Introduction**

In this chapter the presentation, analysis, and integration of both the quantitative data [structured questionnaires, as discussed in 1.13.1 of Chapter 1] and the qualitative data [the four focus group interviews with members on the lower hierarchical levels and four individual interviews with the Station Commissioners, as discussed in 1.13.4 of Chapter 1] are presented and discussed by means of emergent themes and subcategories to indicate the achievement of the goal and objectives of this study as mentioned in 1.4 of Chapter 1. In-depth discussions were held with independent qualitative researchers to corroborate on the emergent themes and subcategories with the aim of triangulating of the data analysis.

In order to promote the trustworthiness of the study the research methodology (as discussed in 1.10 of Chapter 1) was implemented and adhered to in the gathering and analysis of the data. The results of respondents' comments in the interviews and focus group interviews are discussed, followed by the results of the questionnaires.

### **4.2     The Outcomes of the Interviews**

Respondents' reactions to the individual interviews and focus group interviews are presented below and discussed by means of six emergent themes and their subcategories. Firstly an explanation of each theme is given, followed by the responses to the questions, which will be enriched by direct verbatim reflections of the responses. Subsequent to the presentation of each theme and its subcategories a critical reflection is presented, which will wrap up each theme.

#### **4.2.1    Communication of the transformation process in the South African Police Service**

Communication is a crucial and powerful instrument of transformation that has the ability to inform, influence, motivate, co-ordinate and direct the management and lower levels of the SAPS regarding the process of transformation. The discussion of communication of the transformation process in the SAPS will indicate the extent to which internal communication and the management of information in the organisation is effective.

The way in which internal and external communication in the SAPS takes place will follow for discussion.

#### 4.2.1.1 Communication style

The SAPS communication style is the characteristic manner in which internal communication of the transformation in the SAPS is taking place. This can take the official form of written or verbal communication, as well as unofficial informal communication in the form of rumours (the so called grapevine) or secretly released documentation, or press statements without prior formal internal communication.

It appears from the focus group interviews that respondents at ground level (lower structures in the SAPS) are uncertain about what is expected of them and how the transformation process is taking place owing to the particular communication style within the SAPS. Furthermore, members mainly have to rely on rumours to obtain information on transformation. One respondent noted that hearsay was the order of the day and that members are uncertain what to expect. *“...most of the information that reached us reach us through rumours mostly; mostly you start to hear rumours about this rumours about that but you never get a clear picture of what is actually going on”*. Respondents are also of the opinion that communication seldom reaches members at ground level; however, when it does reach ground level it is not clear and is rather instruction orientated. In addition, some respondents commented that the media such as newspapers and television have a greater impact on transformation than official SAPS communication channels. *“Dit was in die media ons het dit in die koerant gelees en oor die TV gewees. Maar ek het nie daar op die grondvlak by die stasie briewe gesien”*. (*“It was in the media, we noticed it in newspapers and television, however I never observed letters at ground level at the police station”*).

From the individual interviews with the Station Commissioners it appears that many decisions are being made at the top level of the SAPS; however, the information seldom reaches ground level but when it manages to reach ground level, the information is more of a surprise to members. *“...ek weet baie dinge het gebeur uhm op hoër vlakke dit gebeur nog tans ook en dan weet ons nie rerig die die grondvlak mense weet nie wat gaan aan nie ...jy kry nie eers altyd dit op skrif nie dat sekere dinge het gebeur en dan is jy ons op grondvlak het nooit daarvan geweet nie so dit is nie behoorlik gekommunikeer af nie”*. (*“...I know many things took place at higher levels and it is still taking place with the result that members at ground level don't know what is going on. One does not even always receive written communication on changes that result that members at ground level never knew about it therefore communication is not effectively communicated to ground level...”*). Respondents are furthermore of the opinion that

communication should first have gone down to ground level for transformation to be facilitated more successfully. Other respondents are of the opinion that communication was fairly good; however, it is not certain whether it reached ground level. Similar to the opinions expressed in the focus group interviews, respondents are of the opinion that the media has a greater influence on members than police communication structures. “...*koerante het miskien ‘n groter invloed gehad op kommunikasie as wat polisie kommunikasie gehad het so die mense het meer van die inligting uit die koerante gekry*”. (“...*newspapers perhaps had a greater influence on communication than communication in the police itself, therefore members received more information in the newspapers*”). One respondent in a senior position is of the opinion that not much was done to communicate transformation in the SAPS from 1994-1998 since most communication only started from 1999-2000. “...*I don’t think there was a lot of effort done to communicate everything down to the members. I think most of the communication only started here in 2000 1999...we were looking at an implementation scale from 1994-1995 to about 1997-1998 then I would say about 20% communication was given out...*”.

The second subcategory, the consequences of wrong communication in the SAPS, will now be explored.

#### **4.2.1.2 Consequences of ineffective communication**

Consequences of ineffective communication are the effect that incorrect or inadequate information from management level has on members at the lower levels of the SAPS. This refers to the manner in which communication is carried over to members at ground level. This can take the form of a lack of consultation with members regarding change, communications not reaching ground level, communication that lacks stability or vague communication sent to members.

It strongly emerged in the focus group interviews that communication received from the top level of the SAPS is not always clear as members did not understand what was expected from them, where they will fit into the structures, what will follow, how they will be affected, and when the transformation process will end. In addition, communication on certain transformation initiatives is changed regularly, which has resulted in increased confusion; for example Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, no. 51 of 1977 as discussed in 2.3.3 of Chapter 2. One respondent commented as follows. “...*I think now this thing of communication in the police department is not communicated very clearly ...the commissioner he said now we are still using that warning shot ...the parliamentary and they said no, no warning shot say you see now there is a difference of I mean interest between the police side and this government side. So the communication is not*

*very good*". Respondents are also of the opinion that doubtful communication in the SAPS creates disorder in their daily functioning. The change of the military rank structure to a more civilian rank structure also raised confusion among members at ground level, as demilitarisation seems to have had many different meanings to different people as a result of poor communication. Respondents also strongly expressed that decisions regarding the restructuring of the SAPS are forced upon members. Respondents furthermore emphasised the dependence on rumours to obtain information. Interestingly some respondents are of the opinion that they are not official employees of the new SAPS hence they did not receive any communication regarding the incorporation and appointment of all the agencies involved that were appointed to the new Service. *"...As we are sitted here there is no one who is actually an employer of the SA police because we've got different agencies hence we've got a new services today but if you were looking we've got the formal municipality police that were trained as the municipal police. We've got the APLA members that are incorporated into the police we've got the MK's we've got the Railways there is no specific of forming that was given to us all as members of the SA police services so in other words the only members that belong to the SAPS are members that is been appointed in the two or three past years because they are the people that are serve under the new banner of the SAPS the others we all don't belong here"*.

Similarly, respondents in the individual interviews clearly expressed their misery concerning the communication of transformation in the SAPS. Respondents are of the opinion that if the transformation process was clearly stipulated to them, members at the ground level would have accepted the process with a better attitude. As a result, members are aggrieved at not being informed properly. One respondent emphasised the uncertainty of transformation initiatives among members as a result of inefficient communication. Members were uncertain of what to expect of the amalgamation of the 11 agencies into the SAPS and how it is going to be implemented. Affirmative Action also raised confusion and uncertainty among members, as they did not know how this process is going to take place because communication does not reach ground level. Due to poor communication members feel threatened and confused and do not feel part of the transformation process.

Consultation of the transformation process by the management of the SAPS with members at the lower levels of the organisation will now be discussed.



#### 4.2.1.3 Consultation

Consultation refers to information concerning transformation that is shared by the management of the SAPS with members at the lower levels to create a better understanding of the change process among members. This can take the form of written communication, information sessions, workshops and participative decision making.

Focus group interviews with respondents revealed that not much was done from the SAPS management side to consult members at ground level regarding transformation initiatives. *“...if they can change and then first they bring somebody who can discuss with the members ...then the members know before the time that such a change are going to take place...”*. However, respondents are of the opinion that consultation must first take place before any changes are implemented in order to prepare and educate members for such changes and to avoid the unexpected. *“...they never consult us for instance there was the change of force to service we were not consulted we are not even workshop or send somebody to tell us about what is the difference between the force and the service ...they only tell us no this is no longer a force now it is a service without consulting us without at least educating us what is the difference between the two what now is expected of me from the force to the service ...consultation is very poor. So it makes even what ever they are coming with to confuse us”*. Respondents furthermore emphasised their dissatisfaction, as they were not given any opportunity to deliver inputs in a process that affected them. To underline the respondents' unhappiness it is stressed that when the labour unions are in dialogue with the SAPS management, members at ground level are not consulted about the issues being debated; however, only the outcomes are presented to the members.

As with the focus group interviews, it emerged in the individual interviews that consultation about the transformation with members of the SAPS was disregarded and as a result this led to increased confusion and uncertainty among members. *“...we were not even workshop about the resolution itself we were not even told how is it going to take place how is it going to be implemented they are suppose at least to be sending people who will take us to those restructuring business phases by phases and letting us to understand it in a proper way but it was just given to us”*. The general lack of consultation has an impact on how the SAPS management manages members at ground level within the transformation framework.

The next subcategory to follow is the unrealistic expectations that the SAPS management places on members at ground level.

#### 4.2.1.4 Unrealistic expectations by South African Police Service management

Unrealistic expectations are the impracticable expectations by the SAPS management of members at the ground level of the Service to act in a certain way. These expectations can take the form of insufficient time frames for the completion of documentation regarding change, the completion of documents of which members know little or nothing about or sudden and unexpected transfers of members to other areas far away from their residence.

Respondents in the focus group interviews expressed their concern regarding the validity of Resolution 7 of 2002, as discussed in 2.5 of Chapter 2, as its implementation occurred without giving members a realistic opportunity to complete the necessary documentation. *“...you are only given about two hours or so to complete it and some of the information it was not readily available ... how now is this is going to be valid...I was never given a chance of completing it in a proper way so that also was misleading this implementation of restructuring”*. *“...some of the people were on their way to the roadblock and they say just fill in my name in there and just guess the course of the person...it was actually incomplete...fill it in in two hours they need it now...”*. Furthermore, respondents uttered their dissatisfaction concerning the impulsive transfer of certain members to areas far away from their domicile without taking members’ personal circumstances into consideration. *“Daar word nie na hulle toe gekom en mooi met hulle gepraat en gesê hoor hier dit is die omstandighede dis hoekom ons jou graag wil verplaas nie...hulle moet nou net self sien en kom klaar...hulle word uit hulle area uit hulle gemeenskap gevat...sy is Mamelodi toe verplaas dit is baie ver van haar kind af raai wat doen hulle hulle stuur haar Soshanguve toe wat nog verder is...”*. (*“Members are not approached by Head Office explaining the circumstances and reasons why they are transferred, however they must accept the decision. Members are taken out of their areas and communities. One specific member was transferred far away from her home and child to Mamelodi and then again further away from her family to Soshanguve...”*). On the contrary, the Code of Conduct, as discussed in 2.3.9 of Chapter 2, expects members to give full recognition to the needs of the SAPS as employer. However, this expectation, among others, of the SAPS from its members certainly has an impact on members’ behaviour and is also contrary to reality. In addition, respondents experienced that most of the Station Commissioners could not maintain time limits in numerous cases with regard to requests and feedback to Head Office. No response regarding this subcategory was received from respondents in the individual interviews.

The positive attitudes of members in the SAPS during the transformation process will follow for discussion.

#### **4.2.1.5 Positive attitudes**

Positive attitudes are the confident and encouraging attitudes of members towards the transformation process in the SAPS. These attitudes can take the form of members being optimistic, constructive and self-assured towards the transformation process in the SAPS.

One respondent has a lot of faith in the government and realizes that change is necessary regardless of problems, although it is not likely to happen overnight.

*“I mean it is no easy to send the information downwards because everything is going in a fast rate ...they know what is going on. So but I mean that is the way things must go and in the long run we will catch up with everybody because of the compromise that we have to”. Another respondent is of the opinion that if communication in the police can be as effective as the new Domestic Violence Act 118 of 1998 as discussed in 2.3.9 of Chapter 2, it will benefit the entire police, and members at ground level will know what is expected of them. “...kom ons vat ‘n voorbeeld soos gesinsgeweld nê wat goed gekommunikeer is tot op grondvlak ...as die polisie prosesse in plek stel om uhm sulke aangeleenthede op daai manier oor te dra ...dan sou hulle weet die mense op grondvlak weet wat aangaan”. (“...let’s take an example such as family violence that was effectively communicated to members on ground level...if the police implement processes to convey matters in such a manner they will be acquainted with the fact that members at ground level are familiar with the process”).*

From the above, it appears that the perceptions of the respondents show that internal communication and the effective management of information about the transformation process in the SAPS are questionable. This might explain the doubt and uncertainty among members. As a result, rumours became trustworthier than official communication channels. A contributing factor to the respondents’ perception that communication hardly ever reaches ground level could be that the SAPS rely too much on the media as communication medium and as a result neglect their own internal communication structures. Furthermore, the perceptions of respondents could indicate that communication of the transformation process in the SAPS is inefficient and is not having the impact at ground level that it should. This inefficient communication explains the confusion, uncertainty and misery among members, which has also led to the unclear function differentiation. Furthermore, the autocratic style of communication has resulted in members gradually becoming negative towards the Service. This may also be a contributing factor to the

rumour- driven communication style that has become part of the culture of policing in South Africa. The reaction of respondents indicates that consultation with members at ground level is not a priority for the SAPS management; therefore, participative decision making and the introduction of a culture of involvement is non-existent. This also raises the question of the management style of a democratic police service, which is obliged to enhance interaction and consultation with its members at all levels. The creation of unrealistic expectations of members presents a negative image of the professional management of personnel and the development of human resources. In addition, it may also have a negative impact on the person-centred human resource management style, which relates to the manner in which the SAPS supports and interacts with its members. Effective service delivery may therefore also be negatively influenced because of misunderstandings and wrong interpretations of the transformation process.

The theme to be discussed next explores how members in the SAPS experience and understand transformation in the organisation.

#### **4.2.2 Understanding the importance of transformation in the South African Police Service**

For transformation to be successful, every member should have knowledge of and also be acquainted with the transformation process in the SAPS. It is, however, the responsibility of the SAPS management to empower and enable members at the lower hierarchical levels with the required knowledge to familiarise themselves with the process. This theme presents the respondents' level of understanding and experience of the transformation process in the Service.

The following subcategory looks into the attitude of members in the SAPS regarding the transformation process.

##### **4.2.2.1 Attitude of members**

The attitude of the members refers to the way members of the SAPS think of and behave towards the transformation process in the SAPS. Stated differently, the attitude of the members can also be described as the approach of members towards transformation and the mood that prevails among members towards the transformation process. These attitudes can take a positive or a negative form and have the potential to impact in a major way on the transformation environment.

Respondents in the focus group interviews firmly declared their negativity towards the transformation process in the SAPS. Respondents were of the opinion that they are affected negatively by the transformation in South African policing and therefore find it difficult to remain positive. *“Nee dit beïnvloed die lede negatief. Dit maak almal negatief”*. *“...glo my ek sukkel om myself positief te hou...”*. (*“No it influences the members negatively. It makes everybody negative”*. *“...believe me I’m struggling to keep myself positive...”*). Respondents furthermore expressed their concern regarding the aim of transformation in the South African Police Service (SAPS) and its importance. *“To me there was nothing important”*. (laugh). *“Nee ek kan geen sin insien waarom hulle dit gedoen het nie. Dit werk nie hierdie ding werk net nie...”*. (*“No I don’t see the purpose of why they did it. It doesn’t work, this thing just doesn’t work...”*). One respondent furthermore questioned the ability of the top structure of the SAPS to keep members positive.

On the other hand, a minority of the respondents were of the opinion that transformation in the SAPS must take place to keep in touch with changing times and the outside world and that therefore one cannot resist change. *“...wêreldwyd vind dit plaas ’n mens moet maar saam met dit gaan... kan nie daarteen skop nie, dit is n ding wat moet plaasvind”*. (*“...it is a phenomenon that is taking place worldwide , one cannot resist change and it must take place...”*). In addition, respondents believed that everyone should enjoy equal rights and privileges and that therefore transformation must take place. The old system caused bias and prejudice. Other respondents were of the opinion that democratic rights are the centre of attention; therefore, one must accept the transformation process and move forward. Another respondent was of the impression that transformation must take place for the sake of equality; however, it is heart-rending that other members must be disadvantaged in the process. Other respondents reasoned that they do not have a choice about transforming and as a result they have a *“...go with the flow...”* attitude. One member’s feeling was that, although the transformation process has a number of failures, it is important.

In contrast to the focus group interviews, respondents from the individual interviews evidently held positive views about transformation in South African policing. All the respondents predominantly concurred that transformation in the SAPS is important and that it has to take place since policing in South Africa cannot fall behind the rest of the modern world. Respondents were furthermore of the belief that they understand why transformation must take place as this process will benefit all the different race groups, communities and cultures in South Africa. One respondent strikingly noted that transformation is not exclusively a race or resource issue, but rather is a more extensive process. *“...we are looking to transformation as only a Black and White issue or a Coloured issue or a human resource issue I don’t think it is only*

*pertaining out of that...it is a broader spectrum we have to look at...*”. Another respondent emphasised that transformation is indeed necessary, yet the impartiality of the process is questionable.

The impact of the community on South African policing will now be discussed.

#### **4.2.2.2 The influence of community involvement**

The influence of community involvement in South African policing refers to the effect that the diverse South African community has on policing in this country through its active participation as a partner of the SAPS. This influence can take the form of community policing; community police forums and boards, as discussed in 2.2.2 of Chapter 2; sector policing, and Business Against Crime. It emerged out of the focus group interviews that the majority of the respondents sincerely consider community policing as an important approach to regain reliance and confidence in the police. “...*transformation is important in the SAPS...the SAPS had been viewed with a negative perception in the past. Now they are trying to build up the image of the SAPS...*”. Respondents also believed that community policing creates support for the reduction in crime as there is an improved understanding and communication between the community and the police. In addition, respondents view the partnership between the police and the community as a significant step toward transformation in the SAPS. The creation of a partnership, in opposition to the hostile approach between the police and the community, led to a more transparent and acceptable Service in service of the community. “...*in the past the police and the community were like enemies...the transformation has helped us to let the community and the police that they are friends...and if the community works together with the police then we can reduce the crime...*”.

On the other hand, not all the respondents were equally enthusiastic about involving the community in police affairs. Some of the respondents were of the opinion that community involvement results in the increase of crime, as police are not allowed to use force and are soft on criminals, and that therefore the community does not abide the rules. “...*it was not important ...crime is going up...we are not allowed to forcing anything...it's like now everybody has got the right to commit crime...so that people do as they wish...*”. A minority of respondents felt that although it is a good idea to involve the community in policing, South African policing is not ready to take the step as a result of a shortage of resources. In addition, these respondents were of the opinion that community policing can only be implemented successfully in the richer areas where resources are available.

The way in which the transformation initiatives were implemented will follow for discussion.

#### **4.2.2.3 The method of implementing transformation initiatives**

The method of implementing transformation initiatives is the way in which the different transformation initiatives were carried out and enforced upon members of the SAPS by the management of the Service. This implementation can take the form of an instant or immediate process, for example; the change of the rank structure and the name of the policing organisation in South Africa. In contrast, implementation can take the form of a gradual ongoing process, for example; the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as discussed in 2.2.3 of Chapter 2.

It emerged from the focus group interviews that respondents acknowledge the need for transformation; nevertheless, they dispute the way it has been implemented. Respondents stated firmly that transformation is important; however, its implementation is vague and rushed. “...*the problem is the way they implement it they don't come up clearly about the whole thing...they want to just do everything in one time they don't want to implement it in phases...*”. Respondents were furthermore of the belief that they were not taken into consideration, nor were they consulted during the process to prevent fear and uncertainty of SAPS employees before implementing transformation initiatives. “...*the ideas are good the implementation method is bad*”. One respondent clearly indicated that transformation is important; however, the management of the Service are failing to implement it effectively. In addition, respondents felt that they are not properly trained to implement transformation initiatives, which is leading to uncertainty and confusion, for example; the Performance Enhancement Process (PEP) of the SAPS as discussed in 2.3.5 of Chapter 2.

Similar to the focus group interviews, respondents in the individual interviews agreed that transformation in the SAPS is definitely important, though its implementation is lingering. “*It is definitely important...it is taken place though at a slow pace...but it is very much needed*”. Respondents furthermore added that the implementation of transformation initiatives is not unsatisfactorily, and that it could have been implemented to a greater degree as the process of transformation had been prolonged since 1994. Respondents felt that this lengthy process with its continuous changes creates anxiety and tension among members and must thus be drawn to an end. “...*implementering daarvan kan miskien verbeter...dit kan miskien vinniger afgehandel gewees het dit sloer nou al van 1994...daar is heeltyd veranderings...veranderings plaas maar stres op enige persoon...hulle moet tot op n punt kom en se dit is afgehandel*”. (“...*the*

*implementation of the transformation process can however improve since it is drawn out from 1994. There is continuous changes, however changes causes tension on every person; therefore, they must come to a point where transformation is completed...*”). In addition, respondents were also of the impression that transformation initiatives are implemented prior to proper research. As a result, the outcomes are only investigated after implementation.

Acknowledgement of members and opportunities in the SAPS will now be examined.

#### **4.2.2.4 Recognition and progression in the South African Police Service**

Recognition and progression in the SAPS is the acknowledgement that the SAPS as an organisation provides its employees with opportunities for personal growth and improvement as well as career furtherance during the process of transformation within the Service. This can take the form of post promotions or courses for skills development.

In the focus group interviews it became apparent that respondents are disappointed with the lack of recognition and progression they are experiencing as a result of the transformation process. Respondents emphasised their unhappiness, explaining that members with the necessary academic qualifications are not promoted, whereas, members with fewer qualifications are promoted. *“...a lot of people who have been writing the exam they are qualified to be promoted...but...some people who don’t even know how to write their names they are been promoted...I don’t think there is any transformation”*. To add to the members’ unhappiness, members often wait long periods to be promoted, as there are no posts available. Respondents furthermore revealed that in the previous South African Police Force members that qualified for promotion were promoted without delay. *“...hier sit ouens wat jare terug al bevordering moes gekry het hulle kan nie...”*. (*“There are members that should have been promoted years ago, yet they can’t get promotion...”*). *“I think it was good before because when you maybe you qualify for promotion they just promotes you...”*. In addition, some of the respondents are of the sentiment that the SAPS are paying specific attention to the previously disadvantaged members and as a result are not concerned about other members, who are not being promoted. Consequently, respondents believed that the previous advantaged members are now being disadvantaged and posed the question: how are the SAPS management going to rectify the situation?



One respondent in an individual interview was of the opinion that during the promotion of previously disadvantaged members the abilities of such members were not taken into consideration but only the colour of their skin. “...*daar is nie gekyk na jou, uhm, ‘n persoon se kundigheid nie, daar is net na die persoon se velkleur gekyk*”. (“...*A member’s skill was not taken into consideration, only the colour of the member’s skin...*”).

The subcategory to be discussed below concerns the members in the lower ranks of the SAPS’s unclear and uncertain understanding of the transformation process in the organisation.

#### **4.2.2.5 Uncertainty at ground level**

Uncertainty at ground level refers to the vague and doubtful understanding of the transformation process in the SAPS among members in the lower echelons of the Service. Because all the facts are not known about the process, questions arise that lead to a lack of confidence in transformation. Uncertainty can take the form of doubt, scepticism, fear and hesitancy among these members towards transformation.

Without doubt, respondents in the focus group interviews were of the opinion that members on the ground are uncertain about what to expect from the transformation process because the SAPS management does not share information on transformation with members. As a result, members at ground level are speculating about a process that leads to a lack of understanding and confidence. “...*someone have to come down and tell us this is reason...So we keep on guessing...the maybes doesn’t make you to be confidence or to understand what you are doing*”. Additionally, respondents felt that members in the lower levels of the Service are not properly informed nor taken into consideration when transformation issues are dealt with; therefore rumours thrive in the SAPS. “*As hulle ons net beter kan inlig...hulle moet die mense in ag neem*”. “...*daar is te veel rumours*”. (“*If they can only inform us better...they must take the members into consideration...there are too many rumours*”). Respondents of similar ranks also revealed that their job descriptions are not clearly understood, which promotes confusion about seniority and what is expected of them. One respondent in the individual interviews believed that members do not wholeheartedly understand transformation, which has led to a lot of grievances and misunderstandings.

From the above it is apparent that the perceptions of the approach towards transformation have made the mood of the respondents one of mixed emotions. The doubtfulness of respondents about

the aim and importance of transformation might be the result of the inability of the SAPS top structure to effectively communicate the importance of transformation to members at the lower levels. In addition, this might explain the negativity among members towards the transformation process. On the other hand, a number of respondents fully understand transformation and remain positive towards the process and its objectives. This raises a question about the willingness of negative members to understand transformation and to change their attitude toward it. Respondents' positiveness may be illustrated through their acceptance of community involvement in policing affairs. On contrast to this, respondents' negative attitude towards transformation can be illustrated through their unwillingness to involve the community in policing matters. Furthermore, respondents' negative and doubtful attitude towards transformation may be explained by the vague and sweeping implementation of transformation initiatives. A contributing factor to respondents' negative attitude may also be their unhappiness about the lack of recognition and progression in the SAPS during transformation. The progressions observed by the respondents highlight the concern that the officers who are currently being promoted may not necessarily be fully qualified to serve in their new positions, but are merely being promoted in order to get the right equation. In addition, the high level of uncertainty among respondents illustrates the inability of the SAPS management to communicate effectively the importance of transformation to members in the lower echelons of the Service.

The next theme for discussion focuses on the urgency with which the SAPS is transforming the organisation and the impact this is having on the lower levels of the Service, the influences within and outside the organisation as well as resistance to change.

#### **4.2.3 The sense of urgency to transform the South African Police Service**

Transformation in the SAPS is thought to be a long-term process as a result of various factors such as the complexity of the process, the enormous workforce and the political and historical background of policing in this country. This theme concerns the impact, influences and consequences of implementing transformation initiatives.

The impact of transformation on members at ground level is discussed below.

#### 4.2.3.1 Impact on ground level

The impact on the ground level refers to the consequences for and the effect and influence on members in the lower levels of the Service that are caused by the implementation of transformation initiatives in the SAPS. This impact on the members can take the form of confusion, uncertainty, negativity or anxiety.

It distinctly emerged from the focus group interviews that respondents are confused and uncertain as they frequently receive communication on transformation that requires speedy action without knowing the reasons for it. One needs to keep in mind that in a strict bureaucratic and hierarchical environment asking questions to obtain clarity or reasons is not always allowed. The respondents were also of the opinion that the management of the SAPS were unable to convey the urgency of transformation to members at ground level. As a result, members at this level are not informed about this process and therefore feel that they are used as instruments. This, in turn, creates negativity and anxiety among them. *“...they were unable to give it to the members in that sense of urgency...I must feel part and parcel of that change...not like a instrument that is been used like a remote...”*. Furthermore, respondents stated that they are left in the dark during transformation and are not taken into consideration nor are they encouraged to participate in the process. Respondents are also of the understanding that the urgency to change is not realized by members at ground level as a result of poor communication from higher levels. Therefore uncertainty and confusion are created among members. *“...do not have that urgency of changing for one reason that they don't know their future...they are not properly informed of what they are supposed to do...”*. Respondents furthermore felt that the implementation of transformation initiatives is being prolonged; on the other hand, these initiatives are forced upon members to act within a short period of time. Some respondents felt that a number of errors were made during the amalgamation process of policing in South Africa as a result of urgency and the fact that this process was not implemented more strategically.

Respondents in the individual interviews, however, expressed mingled feelings. One respondent explained that, although there is an urgency to transform the SAPS, the implementation of the process is taking longer than people expected for the reason that certain preventative steps are taken to ensure that the end result has greater success. On the other hand, some respondents have contradicting feelings about the process. One respondent firmly stated that members at ground level are compelled to accept changes, and added that if it were a more thoughtful process there would be

fewer complications and negativity, although there are still members that are positive. In addition, transformation should have been implemented at a slower pace with thorough communication to the members that explained the proposed objectives of the process. “...*hulle het ons ryp gedruk...as dit ’n meer deurdagte proses was sou hulle nie uhm gesit het met die probleme wat daar tans is nie...*”. (“*They forced us to change...if it was a more thoughtful process they wouldn’t have had the problems they are having presently...*”). Members felt that they should also have been given the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the changing environment. “...*dit was ’n vreemde ding almal moes gewoond raak daaraan*”. (“...*it was an unfamiliar process, everyone had to adapt to it...*”). The respondent additionally stated her abhorrence towards the urgency of certain transformation initiatives as a number of members were transferred without the consent of the Station Commissioner. In contradiction, another respondent believed that there is no urgency towards the implementation of transformation initiatives. “...*the Public Management Finance Act...it was from 1999 implemented but till now there is no accountability on the ground...what is the use of something that is taking 4 to5 years only to be communicated...*”.

Internal and external influences that may have an effect on transformation in the SAPS will follow for examination.

#### **4.2.3.2 Internal and external influences**

The internal and external influences refer to factors, from within and outside the SAPS, that have an effect on the transformation process in the organisation. Internal influences can take the form of the management of the SAPS, while external influences can take the form of the government, political parties, trade unions or the community.

The general opinion of the respondents in the focus group and individual interviews was that external influences are mainly responsible for the transformation in South African policing. Respondents were convinced that the top structure of the police was forced to change by the new government and therefore considered transformation to be a political issue. “...*hulle was forseer om te verander...dit was meer ’n politieke ding...dit is die nuwe regering wat dit afgedwing het*”. (“...*the police were forced to change...it was more of a political issue...it was the new government that enforced the change*”). As a result, the management of the police had to force members at ground level to transform. Furthermore, respondents were of the view that the SAPS management do not have independency to implement their own policies because of strong political influence and

the reaction of political parties. “...we don’t have act in this way because IFP will react in this way...ANC will do in this way...the leadership of the SAPS don’t have that freedom of implementing their policies...”. Respondents were also sceptical about the influence of the representing labour unions and the affiliation they have with different political parties. Some respondents were of the opinion that the negative perception of the community towards the police created the need to change. In contrast, one respondent felt that it was initially the top structure of the police that initiated transformation and then discussed it with parliament. The different feelings and thinking could influence the change process in the form of resistance.

The reluctance of members in the SAPS to transform will now be examined.

#### **4.2.3.3 Resistance to change**

Resistance to change is the willingness with which members of the SAPS oppose or withstand the transformation process. This resistance can take place as the result of a lack of effective official communication.

Respondents in the focus group interviews agreed that, as a result of resistance to change, communication of the transformation process does not reach members at ground level as effectively as it should. Some members in the higher ranks are against transformation; therefore, processes that are supposed to reach members timeously are delayed. “...they don’t want this changes to happen...you find that this person is the one who must send the communication down but he is holding it till the last minute...it is not going to be effective...”. No response was received in the individual interviews with the Station Commissioners regarding this sub-theme.

From the respondents’ perceptions it appears that the SAPS management has failed to convey effectively the sense of urgency to members at ground level to transform the SAPS. This might explain the anxiety, uncertainty, confusion and fear among members. A contributing factor to respondents’ feelings might be the impact of external influences enforcing change upon them. This may have a causative effect on members which encourages them to resist change and also impacts negatively on their approach and attitude towards service delivery.

The effect of transformation in the SAPS on service delivery will now be discussed.

#### **4.2.4 The effect of transformation on service delivery**

The new SAPS emphasises the need for effective service delivery, which was previously neglected by the police in South Africa. As a result, the South African community expects efficient service delivery from the SAPS in a democratic system. A discussion of this theme will present the respondents' reaction to, and experience of, service delivery as a result of the implementation of transformation initiatives in the SAPS.

A discussion of public relations between the community and the SAPS will follow.

##### **4.2.4.1 Public relations**

Public relations are the interaction between the community in general and the SAPS about safety and security matters. This comprises all external communication between the SAPS and the broad community and excludes all forms of internal communication.

Respondents in the focus group and individual interviews agreed to a great degree that community-orientated policing has resulted in improved service delivery and positive relationship between the police and the community. Furthermore respondents believed that the improved behaviour of the police and the community is the result of more interaction between the community and the police. Previously the police was not a transparent organisation and therefore rendered service only to a certain group in the community. As a result, the disadvantaged community distanced themselves from the police. In addition, the respondents felt that the creation of a partnership between the police and the community consequently contributed to a reduction in crime. *"...previously we were working on our own which we don't get information from the community...the police are not that much open to them...this days they phone you day and night give you different information...and you are getting successes"*. Some respondents were of the opinion that the police are more human rights orientated and that therefore a greater understanding is created between the police and the community. However, respondents felt that the community takes advantage of the police as they are of the opinion that the police are soft on criminals. Nonetheless, not all the respondents were that optimistic as they were under the impression that the community does not have respect for the police. *"...mense het nie meer respek vir die polisie nie"*. (*"...people don't have respect for the police anymore..."*). On the other hand, certain respondents were convinced that the community nevertheless has the perception that the SAPS is a force as there are no co-ordinated activities

outlined to inform the broader community that South African policing has changed to a police service that has to perform its duties within the law. Additionally, respondents expressed their discomfort with members of the community involved with the Community Police Forums since these members continually express resentment of policing; however, they seldom take the first step to improve the situation. One respondent stated that complaints against the police have not diminished; the focus of complaints has rather been displaced.

The subcategory to follow for discussion is the training and development of SAPS members.

#### **4.2.4.2 Training and development**

Training and development is the preparation and education of members of the SAPS to learn the skills that are needed in a changing organisation and the opportunity to grow and progress in such an organisation. Training takes the form of basic training, in-service training and management development. Development takes the form of learning new skills and attaining post promotions to a higher rank.

Respondents in the focus group interviews expressed contrasting feelings regarding the training and development of members of the SAPS and the effect on service delivery during transformation. Some respondents were under the impression that service delivery has improved through the partnership with the community, but that there is room for improved education and training courses. On the other hand, other respondents were of the opinion that the SAPS is currently not rendering an effective service as they were doing previously as there is a need for supplementary training. However, these respondents acknowledged that transformation is a learning experience and that they have to adapt to changes and their policing style. They expected service delivery to improve in future. *“...nee ons lewer nie huidiglik ‘n beter diens as in die verlede nie; daar is baie opleiding en die tipe van goed...vorentoe ja behoort daar ‘n beter diens gelewer te word maar ons leer nog”*. (*“...no currently we do not render improved service delivery than previously as additional training is required...in the future service delivery will improve; however, we are still learning...”*). In contradiction to the optimistic remarks, other respondents felt that a number of members are appointed in positions for which they do not have the necessary knowledge of the work. In addition, consideration was not given to the lack of skills of members from the previous police agencies and liberation movements. This resulted in substandard service delivery and more complaints against the police. Respondents furthermore believed that transformation is a slow learning process but that

they had not been given a chance to adapt themselves to the changes, which, was delaying improved service delivery. *“...everything is done under urgency...but everybody is still learning and everything is been pushed very quick so it doesn't give anybody chance to adapt themselves...”*. Respondents also expressed their demoralisation at not being promoted to higher ranks although they have the necessary qualifications and experience. On the other hand, members with fewer qualifications and less experience are being promoted.

It strongly emerged from the individual interviews that respondents are not as confident as respondents in the focus group interviews. The overwhelming feeling is that, as a result of imbalances in the past, members without the necessary knowledge are appointed to positions that result in a decrease of competency, experience and discipline in the SAPS. *“...mense bevorder het wat nie kundig is in die pos waarheen hy bevorder is nie...die dissipline...die meeste kundigheid het verlore gegaan”*. *“Ons dienslewering is nie meer op standaard nie”*. (*“...service delivery in the police is not up to standard as members are promoted that do not have the necessary expertise for the post they are promoted to...discipline and most expertise are lost...”*). In addition, more complaints are received against members of the SAPS. One respondent was of the opinion that white members that are transferred to historically black townships do not have the necessary training to render an effective service to such a community, as they are not able to communicate adequately due to language differences. Furthermore, respondents were of the view that, as a result of fewer opportunities to be promoted to a higher rank, members in the Service only do what is really necessary and no more. On the other hand, members that are fortunate enough to get promotion shift the work down to their subordinates. Another respondent, however, experienced transformation as a continuous learning process that is measured against feedback from the community. *“...it is a daily process we are try all means to educate where we are lacking we are measuring ourselves by going to the community”*. The general lack of training and education during transformation seems to play a role in the low morale of members.

The morale of members in the SAPS during the period of transformation will now be examined.

#### **4.2.4.3 Morale of members**

The morale of members refers to the degree of confidence and self-esteem that members of the SAPS have during the process of transformation. This can take the form of a positive attitude or unconfident, negative mind-set.



Respondents in the focus group interviews generally had similar opinions regarding the lack of morale of members. The respondents strongly expressed their negativity towards certain transformation initiatives and the effect they have had on them. Respondents felt that they have been negatively affected by the restructuring, changing of rank structures, transfers and the uncertainty in the SAPS. Respondents furthermore experienced a negative impact on service delivery because of the restructuring as members are concerned that they may be transferred at any time. Additionally, hard-working members that show perseverance in their work express their negativity towards the SAPS since they also may be transferred without consultation. As a result, respondents considered service delivery to be inadequate and below standard. Respondents felt that this is the reason why some members continuously do not report for duty as they are strained. *“Nee, nee, nee...”*. *“No, no, no...”*. *“...they make all the members negative. Service delivery is also poor very poor”*. *“Many members going out on stress...members are going on sick leave just to get away...when you come back you are not happy”*. Furthermore, respondents described their lack in confidence as working only for the sake of working and not devoting themselves to their work because of a lack of effective communication, which creates confusion. On the other hand, a minority of respondents were still remaining confident, realizing that they have to adapt their style of policing to familiarise themselves with transformation. One respondent in the individual interviews was of the opinion that a number of positive attitude changes can be viewed among members. *“...in my policemen I can also see a lot of uhm attitude changes openness uhm accountability, much more...”*. In addition, another respondent from the individual interviews explained that members are making an effort to improve their service to the community through the implementation of suggestions from the community.

The behaviour of SAPS members in general during transformation will now follow for discussion.

#### **4.2.4.4 Conduct of members**

Conduct of the members refers to the behaviour of members in the SAPS during the process of transformation. Conduct can take the form of discipline, respect, effective service delivery and attitude of the members.

Respondents in the focus group and individual interviews were of the opinion that the changing of the rank structure in the SAPS had a negative influence on the discipline of members throughout the organisation. *“...die rangsverandering...het ‘n groot invloed op die dissipline gehad...toe die*

*range begin voeter toe is alles deurmekaar...*”. (“...the changing of the rank structure had a great influence on the discipline...when the rank structure changed everything became disorderly...”). Respondents were also of the opinion that the previous military rank structure had had a positive influence on discipline and respect in South African policing. Additionally, respondents argued that members do not have the necessary respect for officers as a result of the new rank structure. When members are reprimanded, officers are regarded as racists. Furthermore, the respondents were also of the opinion that the implementation of Resolution 7 of 2002, the restructuring of the SAPS, as discussed in 2.5 of Chapter 2, has had a substantially negative influence on the discipline in the Service. As a result, complaints against members of the SAPS reached high levels in a short period of time. “...net na Resolusie 7...het ek binne die eerste twee weke het ek seker 15 klagtes teen die polisie gekry”. (“...after the implementation of Resolution 7 I received in the region of 15 complaints against the police during the first two weeks”). After the implementation of Resolution 7 members were reluctant to render effective service to the community. From the above response it appears that the conduct of a large group of members is in contradiction to the Code of Conduct of the SAPS, as discussed in 2.3.9 of Chapter 2. This Code specifically makes provision for each member of the SAPS to render a responsible, accountable and effective service of high quality guided by the needs of the community.

The degree of authority that members in the SAPS have will be discussed next.

#### **4.2.4.5 Police powers**

Police powers refer to the position of authority and control members of the SAPS have to perform their daily tasks. Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, no 51 of 1977, as discussed in 2.3.3 of Chapter 2, regulates the use of police force and recognises the value of human rights.

One respondent in the focus group interview expressed his frustration that policing is not the same as it was previously; current policing has too many restrictions. He argued that the SAPS has limited powers as a result of the introduction of human rights; therefore the community is not frightened of the police anymore. In addition, the community no longer has respect for the police. “...’n polisieman is nie ‘n polisieman soos hy vroeër jare was nie ons hande is afgekap...jy het nie meer daai respek...vroeër jare het jy gebewe as jy ‘n polisieman sien...van sy krag is bietjie weggevat met hierdie menseregte...”. (“...policemen are not the same as previously, our hands are cut off...we don’t receive respect anymore...previously people shuddered when they saw a policeman...”).

*a policeman's powers are now limited with the introduction of human rights...*"). Other respondents, however, were concerned that the community, and in particular criminals, will take advantage of the police's new community-orientated policing approach as members of the SAPS do not have much experience in this policing style. As a result, respondents felt that this had a negative impact on service delivery. On the other hand, some respondents were not demoralised by the introduction of the community policing approach in the SAPS and thus welcomed human rights as an integral part of policing since they empower them in another way. Consequently, members of the SAPS are more reachable by the community they serve. *"...the policemen were taught human rights...they can now be more accessible to the community that they serve..."* Interestingly, one respondent in the individual interviews was nevertheless convinced that the public still see members of the SAPS as a force and not a service.

The following subcategory for presentation is the resources with which the SAPS has to perform its duties during the period of transformation.

#### **4.2.4.6 Resources**

Resources in the SAPS are the means resorted to for support to achieve the objectives of the organisation. These take the form of physical and human resources. Physical resources refer to vehicles and other equipment. Human resources refer to the people working for the SAPS.

Some respondents were of the opinion that the shortage of resources has a negative impact on service delivery in the SAPS. As a result of no new recruits being appointed for a number of years, respondents felt that there was a shortage of human resources that, in turn, negatively affected service delivery. *"...for quite a few years there was no new recruitments so we really have a shortage of man power in this process"*. In addition, other respondents felt that the ratio of police officials to the community is too small; therefore, the police cannot render an effective service. Furthermore, respondents felt that resources have been scaled down, as management do not consider resources necessary for effective service delivery. *"...the police expect us to go out there and service the community with what?"*

From the above it appears that transformation has not had the impact on service delivery that the SAPS management expected it to have. A contributing factor to the substandard service delivery could be the shortage of resources in the Service. In addition, negative discipline of members in the

SAPS may also be a contributing aspect to unsatisfactory service delivery. This might also explain the low morale experienced by members. On the contrary, it seems as if community-orientated policing has a positive impact on service delivery in the Service. As a result, communities and members of the police in the lower ranks are empowered. The community policing approach may, however, explain respondents' concern that the police nowadays have limited authority and control. It appears that members still have a repressive and autocratic mindset about how policing should be rendered. As a result, respondents' appeal for supplementary training and development if responded to by management could develop the confidence of members towards a more democratic police service, thus improving service delivery to the community.

The next theme for discussion will examine the impact of transformation on the morale of members, quality of service and the productivity of the members.

#### **4.2.5 The impact of transformation on the morale of members, quality of service and the productivity of the members**

Change in any organisation brings with it certain concerns among members that, in turn, have an effect on their daily functioning. This theme addresses the implications of transformation for the respondents' self-esteem, service-excellence and production.

Measures that encourage and stimulate members of the SAPS in their daily functioning are examined next.

##### **4.2.5.1 Motivational aspects**

Motivational aspects of the working environment are prospects that are present in the working environment to inspire and stimulate members of the SAPS to grow in the organisation. These can take the form of career development and growth through promotions or pay progressions.

Respondents in the focus group interviews responded with mixed emotions to aspects that inspired motivation. The main concern of respondents is the new promotion system in the SAPS. They were of the view that there is no opportunity for promotion because of the non-availability of vacant posts. As a result, members find it difficult to stay positive, as there is no chance of progression, which in turn also affects service delivery. *"I say a very very big negative". "...jy wil tog vorder jy*

*wil nie sit waar jy sit nie...daar is nie poste beskikbaar nie...ons kanse vir bevordering ons is onseker daaroor...*". ("...one certainly wants to progress and not stagnate...there is no vacant posts available...we are uncertain of our chances for promotion..."). On the other hand, some respondents are attempting to stay positive as they still have a degree of pride in their work as police officers, and the knowledge that their service is to the advantage of the community. "*...ons beur maar voort... ek gaan nie dat dit my onder kry nie, want elke mens het darem nog jou trots om te kom werk...*". ("...we are pushing forward, I'm not going to let it get over me because every person must have the pride to come to work..."). In opposition, other respondents clearly expressed their demotivation and made no secret that they had lost the interest to further their career in the SAPS. In addition, respondents found that members who are promoted are not necessarily those with the highest qualifications, as was the situation prior to 1994. The respondents also expressed their dissatisfaction with the restructuring process, as expressed in Resolution 7 of 2002, as discussed in 2.5 of Chapter 2, which has a negative effect on the morale of the members. As a result, members only report for duty but do not render effective service.

From the individual interviews it emerged that respondents consider the transformation process to have had a negative impact on the morale of most members in the SAPS as most of them have a "*...go with the flow...*" attitude. On the other hand, there are still members that are positive and deliver good service. Furthermore, respondents felt that the imbalances in the rank structure are creating a problem for all the members. The non-availability of posts limits possibilities for progression; therefore, members have no drive to perform better. "*If you are performing what is the initiatives for you to keep performing...?*".

The next subcategory will discuss members of the SAPS's readiness for transformation.

#### **4.2.5.2 Members' preparedness towards transformation**

Members' preparedness towards transformation in the SAPS is the readiness of members to adapt to the changes in the Service. This can take the form of prior communication, education or preparation of members to familiarise themselves with transformation initiatives.

The overall reaction of respondents in the focus group interviews was that the entire transformation process is unclear to them, thus affecting their morale negatively. Furthermore, respondents revealed that they do not know how to deal with the community and how the community will react

to them. *“...we don’t know how they are going to react on us...”*. The respondents also expressed their concern about not knowing if their jobs are guaranteed.

Respondents in the individual interviews’ point of view was that if the transformation process had been introduced to members gradually, the impact of this process would not have been as negative as it is. In addition, respondents were of the opinion that Resolution 7, the restructuring of the SAPS, had a negative impact on the productivity of the members as they were completely bewildered about what Resolution 7 is. *“...ek kon in daardie tyd waarneem dat hulle produktiwiteit het ook afgeneem...”*. (*“...during that time I could witness that members’ productivity has decreased...”*). On the other hand, one respondent felt that members progressively became more positive as they realized they did not have to fear changes. *“...some of them they realized there is nothing to fear...they have changed... their moral is getting better”*.

The knowledge and experience that members in the SAPS are receiving and are exposed to will be examined next.

#### **4.2.5.3 Knowledge and experience**

Knowledge and experience refer to the exposure that members of the SAPS receive on policing matters to familiarise themselves with these matters and to gain accumulated knowledge. This refers to the need for experts in specialised fields in the SAPS, for example: experienced detectives.

Some respondents in the focus group interviews felt that transformation is a good idea, but that the implementation of it is not effective as members at ground level are not prepared for handling changes. Besides, respondents experienced that members are appointed to units although they do not have the necessary experience or knowledge to meet the job requirements. *“...hulle het net die mense gevat...vir speurdiens”*. *“Dit maak nie saak wat jy van die speurtak weet nie”*. *“...hoe gaan hy die dossiere ondersoek”*. (*“...people were just taken to work at the detective branch, regardless of whether the person has experience of the work...how are they going to investigate the case dockets?”*). As a result, service delivery, morale and productivity have been negatively influenced. Nevertheless, one respondent positively commented that members need to be educated to adapt to modern policing for the improvement of service delivery. *“...motivate our members and give them skills”*. *“...the situation we are faced now is different to those we have faced previously”*. Consequently, the number of tasks that individual members of the SAPS have to manage to obtain

the objectives of the organisation has also increased. A few respondents indicated their negativity towards Resolution 7 of 2002 as members with the required experience are transferred and replaced with members with no experience of the required job. In certain instances transferred members are not replaced. This has resulted in additional workloads on members who already struggle to achieve their goals. *“...members that have been transferred by this Resolution 7 this makes one negative...those members they have many dockets... we also we have lots of dockets...their dockets must be shared amongst us...”*.

It appears from the respondents' reaction that members in the SAPS were not prepared, conscientised or organised for a complex process like transformation. This might explain the lack of knowledge and experience among members of the Service, as they were not able to familiarise themselves with new policing duties and methods. Besides, motivational aspects, such as promotions and pay progressions to members in the SAPS are limited. As a result, the quality of service, morale of members and the productivity of members are negatively influenced, and several reasons for resisting transformation surfaced.

An examination of the reasons why members in the SAPS resist transformation will follow.

#### **4.2.6 Reasons for resisting transformation**

This theme deals with respondents' explanations about why members in the SAPS oppose change and what the consequences of this are.

The first reason why members resist transformation concerns reward systems and this reason is discussed below.

##### **4.2.6.1 Reward systems**

Reward systems refer to methods that the SAPS apply to the benefit of its members to enrich and fulfil them in return for their service other than members' normal monthly salaries. This takes the form of post promotions, salary upgrades or a bonus system.

Respondents in the focus group interviews revealed their negativity towards the promotion strategy in the Service, describing it as unfair. As a result of the uncertain promotion policy, respondents felt that there is no progression in the SAPS regardless of their academic qualifications. *“Jy kan mos nie*

*vir 'n ou wat nie geleer het sommer net 'n rang gee nie...omdat sy velkleur nou reg is nou kry hy dit sommer...". ("You cannot just instantly give a rank to a person without the necessary academic qualifications...because the colour of his skin is right he gets promotion..."). "...the old members of the SAPS...we can't get rank...they are filled up by those members...". On the other hand, respondents were of the view that members from the previous liberation movements and previously disadvantaged members are promoted whether they are qualified to do the work or not. This causes negativity and opposition to transformation. Respondents were also of the opinion that they are less likely to resist transformation if they receive what they deserve. One respondent in the individual interviews noticed that members are resisting change as a result of not being promoted for several years; however, they do not openly express their resistance.*

Cultural traditions, as one of the reasons why members resist transformation, will now be presented.

#### **4.2.6.2 Cultural traditions**

Cultural traditions are the long-standing organisation-specific beliefs or habits of members in the SAPS, such as the beliefs or habits that the Transkei police and Bophutatswana and other police agencies brought into the amalgamation process. These traditions can take the form of a member's political preference, language, uniform, rank structure or discipline code. They can also take the form of amalgamation, as discussed in 1.2 of Chapter 1, or the strong prevailing identity with previously banned organisations, such as Umkhonto we Siswe (MK) and the Azanian People Liberation Army (APLA), as mentioned in 4.2.1.2 of Chapter 4.

From the individual interviews with respondents it was clear that members resist change because they do not want to be deprived of police force culture as a result of the integration of other police agencies into the SAPS. *"...a lot of police forces will be bring together I didn't want to lose police force culture...".* In addition, some members do not accept the new rank structure and still use the old rank structure to address colleagues. Furthermore, the interviews revealed that members do not accept Resolution 7 of 2002, the restructuring of the SAPS, and that therefore a number of members resign from the Service or retire as medically unfit. *"...also now Resolution 7 of 2002...I'm not speaking of White members I'm speaking of Black members...either going out of the police or go on medical".*



The comfort and ease with which particular members of the SAPS perform their daily duties will now be examined as another reason for resisting transformation.

#### **4.2.6.3 Comfort zone**

Comfort zone is the ease that members enjoy in a particular sphere in the SAPS. This can take the form of special benefits and treatment, least responsibilities, minimum distance between work and residence or familiarity with one's surroundings. Resistance to change is usually vested in the fact that a person's comfort zone is changed and familiar routines are upset. Fear of the unknown refers to the feeling of anxiety and apprehensiveness by members of the SAPS about the unfamiliar transformation process and what the change will bring.

Some respondents presented various reasons why members resist change the moment their comfort zone is endangered. More specifically, respondents felt that members want to work as little as possible. It follows that if members are transferred to other stations, they resist this change because they are frightened that their workload will increase, and therefore would rather resign from the Service. *"...if a person does maybe a very few...and he is comfortable there...and they transfer you...there they expect me to do the job..."*. Another factor noted is that members become familiar with one another and thus do not want to be transferred. In addition, certain members enjoy special benefits and treatment, so that the moment their positions are in danger, they resist change. *"...they resists seeing that they were on the gravy train..."*. No response was received from respondents in the individual interviews.

Respondents were of the opinion that resistance to change is caused by the fear of the unknown. They felt that members resist change because the process is not effectively communicated to them, which results in an uncertainty about their future and a scepticism towards transformation. *"Fear of the unknown...you don't know what is going to happen nothing was communicated...you go there being uncertain"*. One respondent, however, felt that political struggles are responsible for members resisting change. This can take the form of the strong political influence in the SAPS, as discussed in 4.2.3.2 of Chapter 4, which may not be in accordance with a member's political point of view. One respondent in the individual interview remarked that members resist change as a result of a fear of the unknown and that therefore it is important that they must understand the purpose of change. *"...fear of the unknown...if it is an instruction and people don't know where it is coming from and what the purpose is they won't understand that it is going to be beneficial to them..."*.

From the above, respondents gave the impression that members in the SAPS resist transformation in the organisation because they see that this process is totally unfamiliar and frightening to them. A contributing factor could once more be ineffective communication from the SAPS management to members at ground level. This might explain why members do not want to relinquish long-standing cultural traditions as they are so deeply embedded into them. The ease members enjoy in their work could also be an underlying explanation. It furthermore appears that if members do not receive additional deserved remuneration, incentives or any encouragement they will resist change.

The results of the questionnaires will now be presented to illustrate the responses of the respondents.

### **4.3 The Results of the Questionnaires**

In this section, the results of the questionnaires as discussed in 1.13.1 of Chapter 1 are presented as tables and figures to indicate respondents' reactions towards transformation in the SAPS.

#### **4.3.1 Demographic profile and gender of respondents**

The demographic profile of respondents refers to the particular policing area in which respondents perform their duties as mentioned in 1.10.3.1 of Chapter 1. Gender refers to the sexual category of the respondents, in other words male or female. From a total of 28, 11 respondents (39,29 percent) are from the Soweto policing area whereas a total of 17 respondents (60,71 percent) are from the Pretoria policing area. A total of 23 (82,14 percent) respondents are male, while only five (17,86 percent) are female. According to Tyson, Steyn and Gibson (2004:19), the mid-2004 population in South Africa is estimated at approximately 46.6 million. Females, however, constitute 50,7 percent of the total population while males constitute 49,3 percent of the total population in South Africa.

#### **4.3.2 Position of respondents**

The position of the respondents, as presented in the table below, refers to the designation or title of a respondent at a specific police station.

**Table 4.1 Position of respondents**

<b>Position</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Station Commissioner	26	92,86
Communication Official	1	3,57
Detective Commander	1	3,57
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100</b>

Of a total of 28 respondents, 26 (92,86 percent) were station commissioners, one (3,57 percent) was a communication official and another one (3,57 percent) was a detective commander. Structured questionnaires were designed and distributed to 39 station commissioners to complete, as mentioned in 1.10.3.1 of Chapter 1. Two station commissioners, however, delegated the completion of the questionnaires to a communication official and a detective commander respectively as indicated in Table 4.1 above.

#### **4.3.3 Rank distribution of respondents**

The following table presents the rank distribution of respondents.

**Table 4.2 Rank distributions of respondents**

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Director	1	3,57
Senior Superintendent	6	21,43
Superintendent	16	57,14
Captain	4	14,29
Inspector	1	3,57
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100</b>

Of a total of 28 respondents, 16 (57,14 percent) had the rank of Superintendent; six respondents (21,43 percent) were Senior Superintendents; four respondents (14,29 percent) were Captains; one respondent (3,57 percent) was a Director and one (3,57 percent) respondent was an Inspector. A knowledge of the rank distribution in the SAPS presented in 2.3.3 in Chapter 2 will create a sense of deeper understanding of the representativity of this sample.

#### **4.3.4 Respondents' period of employment in the South African Police Service**

The respondents' length of service as employees in the SAPS varied from 11 years to 32 years. Of a total of 28 respondents, five respondents (17,86 percent) had between 11 and 16 years of service. Furthermore, 16 respondents (57,13 percent) had between 17 and 22 years of service while only six respondents (24,99 percent) had between 23 and 32 years of service.

#### **4.3.5 Training courses successfully completed by respondents**

Training can normally be divided into basic training, in-service training and management development. The training courses that respondents completed successfully from 1994 to 2002 can be divided into in-service training, management development and other training courses. No respondent had, however, undergone basic training since 1994. Respondents received in-service training in, among other topics, visible policing and crowd management, crime prevention, special weapons and tactics, disciplinary hearings, basic fraud and basic office computer courses. Training courses related to management development included, among others, the officers course, station commissioners functional skills course, emerging leaders programme, principle-based leadership, middle management courses and the detective commander course.

Respondents also completed training courses relating to transformation in the SAPS. Of a total of 14 respondents, five respondents completed a diversity course between 1994 and 1999. Two respondents completed a gender sensitivity course during 1998 and 1999 while four respondents completed courses in human rights between 1996 and 2000. Additionally, three respondents completed training in community policing during 1999 and 2000. Furthermore, two respondents completed a service delivery improvement programme during 2000 and 2001 and one respondent completed a colleague sensitivity course during 2001.

#### **4.3.6 Home language of respondents**

The table below presents the home language of respondents. Most of the respondents predominantly spoke African languages, such as Zulu, Tsonga, North Sotho, Tswana and Shangaan. The other respondents primarily spoke Afrikaans and English respectively.

**Table 4.3 Home language of respondents**

<b>Home Language</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
English	3	10,71
Afrikaans	12	42,86
Zulu	2	7,41
Tsonga	1	3,57
North Sotho	5	17,86
Tswana	4	14,29
Shangaan	1	3,57
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100</b>

The majority respondents (42,86 percent) were Afrikaans speaking while five respondents (17,86 percent) spoke North Sotho. In addition, four respondents (14,29 percent) spoke Tswana and three respondents (10,71 percent) spoke English. Two respondents (7,41 percent) were Zulu speaking whilst one respondent each (3,57 percent) were Tsonga and Shangaan speaking.

According to the Census 1996 figures, Zulu is the mother tongue of 22,9 percent of the population, followed by Xhosa (17,9 percent), Afrikaans (14,4 percent), Sepedi (9,2 percent), English (8,6 percent), Tswana (8,2 percent), Sotho (7,7 percent), Tsonga (4,4 percent), Swati (2,5 percent), Venda (2,2 percent), Ndebele (1,5 percent) and other languages at 0,6 percent (Tyson et al., 2004:30).

As a diverse and multi-racial country South Africa has 11 official languages. The table below presents the languages, other than respondents' home language, in which they were able to deliver service to the community.

**Table 4.4 Languages, other than respondents' home language in which they were able to deliver service**

<b>Other Language</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
English	24
Afrikaans	16
Xhosa	5
Zulu	8
Venda	1
Swati	3
Tonga	6
Ndebele	6
North Sotho	9
South Sotho	8
Tswana	10

Most respondents (24) were capable of delivering service to the community in English. Afrikaans was also a well-spoken language as 16 respondents could provide service to the community in this language. Out of the African languages, ten respondents could mainly present Tswana in order to serve the community, followed by North Sotho with nine respondents, South Sotho with eight respondents, and Zulu also with eight respondents. Tsonga, with six respondents, Ndebele, also with six respondents and Xhosa, with five respondents were however, not that widely spoken while Venda, with only one respondent, was not widely communicated at all.

#### **4.3.7 Determining the organisations' readiness towards change**

The objective of the questions in this section was to determine how prepared members of the SAPS are for the change process in the organisation.

A total of four respondents (14,29 percent) indicated that the top management of the SAPS experienced problems laying down the necessity for change and establishing a clear vision for the future. However, 20 respondents (71,43 percent) claimed that the SAPS lacks experience and

believed that there is room for improvement. Only four respondents (14,29 percent) were convinced that the SAPS has the necessary skills and adequacy to transform the organisation.

Furthermore, six respondents (23,08 percent) were of the opinion that the SAPS is experiencing problems when compared with international police institutions. On the other hand, 15 respondents (57,69 percent) were of the view that the SAPS lacks experience and can improve in this regard, while only five respondents (19,23 percent) were persuaded of the SAPS's competency and skills in this field. Two respondents did not respond to this question.

In addition, eight respondents (28,57 percent) were of the opinion that the SAPS experiences difficulty being flexible, cooperative and making fast decisions, and that flexibility, cooperativeness and making fast decisions is furthermore new to the organisation. Sixteen respondents (57,14 percent) believed that the SAPS can improve or that it lacks experience in this regard. No more than four respondents (14,29 percent) were convinced of the Service's sufficiency and skills in this field. Additionally, 11 respondents (39,29 percent) stated that a police culture that encourages the taking of risks and gives recognition for continuous progress is new to the SAPS and that problems are experienced in this field. Sixteen respondents (57,14 percent), though, were of the belief that the SAPS needs experience in this field and can therefore improve. In contrast, only one respondent (3,57 percent) thought that the SAPS is adequate and has the necessary skill.

Moreover, five respondents (17,86 percent) considered the SAPS to have problems regarding the use of specific methods to evaluate working performance. In the same way a total of 18 respondents (64,29 percent) were of the point of view that the SAPS could improve since they lack experience in using specific methods to evaluate working performance. Another five respondents (17,86 percent) were, however, more opportunistic, indicating that the SAPS adequately uses specific methods to evaluate working performance with the necessary expertise.

What is more, nine respondents (33,33 percent) argued that key activities currently experienced in the SAPS to support change are new to the organization and that problems are therefore experienced. Thirteen respondents (48,15 percent) believed that the organisation lacks experience and can therefore improve key activities currently experienced in the SAPS to support the change process. Only five respondents (18,52 percent) were convinced that the Service is adequate and has the skills required in this field.

Furthermore, 20 respondents (71,43 percent) concluded that the SAPS experiences problems rewarding individuals and/or groups for initiative taken or for identifying the main reasons for organisational problems, and were also of the view that this policy is new to the organisation. Seven respondents (25 percent) felt that the SAPS needs experience and improvement in this field. Only one respondent (3,57 percent) was convinced of the skill and competence of the organisation in this regard. Additionally, ten respondents (35,71 percent) believed that the SAPS experiences problems regarding effective communication between police management and all other levels in the police. In the same way, 13 respondents (46,43 percent) believed that there is room for improvement in view of the fact that the Service lacks experience in this field. Conversely, five respondents (17,86 percent) were of the opinion that effective communication takes place between police management and all other levels of the Service.

Furthermore, seven respondents (25 percent) were of the opinion that the SAPS experiences problems in successfully implementing other change programmes because they are new to the organisation. A staggering total of 13 respondents (46,43 percent) sensed that the SAPS do not have the required experience and that there is room for improvement. In contrast, eight respondents (28,57 percent) felt that the SAPS has successfully implemented other change programmes.

Five respondents (17,86 percent) considered that members of the SAPS experience problems in taking personal responsibility for their actions. An overwhelming total of 19 respondents (67,86 percent) were of the view that members can improve their personal responsibility for their actions while merely four respondents (14,29 percent) were convinced that members take personal responsibility for their actions.

#### **4.3.8 Change management**

The aim of the questions in this section relates to change management in the SAPS and how members on the lower levels of the Service experience change.

Eleven respondents (39,28 percent) were of the opinion that democratic management styles in the SAPS lead to better discipline. On the other hand, eight respondents (28,57 percent) were not that optimistic and disagreed that democratic management methods lead to better discipline, while nine respondents (32,14 percent) were not certain if this is the case. Interestingly, an astounding total of 14 respondents (50 percent) were of the view that discipline in the SAPS is undermined by the



demilitarisation of the police. In contradiction to this statement, ten respondents (35,71 percent) disagreed, while only four respondents (14,29 percent) were not certain.

Furthermore, 14 respondents (50 percent) were of the belief that the changes to which the SAPS is presently exposed are necessary for the effective existence of the SAPS whilst eight respondents (28,57 percent) disagreed. Six respondents (21,43 percent) were not sure if the changes in the SAPS are indeed necessary for the effective existence of the SAPS. Fourteen respondents (50 percent) agreed that changes currently implemented in the SAPS would certainly improve the functioning of the organisation. Six respondents (21,43 percent) however disagreed and felt that changes currently implemented in the Service would not improve the functioning of the organisation, whilst eight respondents (28,57 percent) were not sure.

In addition, nine respondents (33,34 percent) agreed that Affirmative Action is a positive strategy in an attempt to create a more acceptable SAPS in the eyes of the community. On the other hand, ten respondents (37,04 percent) disagreed, while eight respondents (29,63 percent) were not sure. Conversely, a total of 16 respondents (57,14 percent) were of the view that Affirmative Action does have a negative influence on the standard of policing. Eight respondents (28,57 percent) agreed that Affirmative Action does not have a negative influence on the standard of policing. A total of four respondents (14,29 percent) indicated they were not certain.

Nineteen respondents (67,85 percent) overwhelmingly agreed that the members of the SAPS do not always understand community needs and that greater community involvement will solve the problem. In contrast, four respondents (14,29 percent) disagreed, whilst five respondents (17,86 percent) were unsure. Thirteen respondents (46,43 percent) positively agreed that Community Police Forums do not contribute to the workload of the still overworked SAPS. However, eight respondents (28,57 percent), less optimistic, were of the thought that these Forums certainly contribute to the workload of the still overworked SAPS. Seven respondents (25 percent) were not sure whether this is the case or not.

Additionally, 18 respondents (64,29 percent) overwhelmingly agreed that members at operational level must form part of the decision-making process in the SAPS. On the contrary, five respondents (17,86 percent) believed that members at operational level must not form part of the decision-making process in the SAPS, whereas another five respondents (17,86 percent) were doubtful. In the same way, the majority respondents, 17 (60,72 percent), were of the thought that members at

station level are not taken into consideration when policy changes are being made, which affects them directly. Four respondents (14,29 percent) disagreed with this and seven respondents (25 percent) were uncertain.

Respondents were further divided in their response concerning community participation in operational matters of the SAPS. Nine respondents (32,14 percent) believed that the community must not be withheld from participating in operational issues of the SAPS. Equally, another nine respondents (32,14 percent) disagreed with this. Ten respondents (35,71 percent) were uncertain. In addition, respondents remained tentative regarding community involvement in policing matters. Fourteen respondents (50 percent) accepted that the public must have greater influence in the SAPS concerning the establishment of priorities regarding the working methods of the police. Six respondents (21,43 percent), however, disagreed and eight respondents (28,57 percent) were not sure. Furthermore, an overwhelming total of 20 respondents (71,43 percent) disagreed that the community should be able to instruct the police in what order they should attend to complaints. A mere two respondents (7,14 percent) were of the opinion that the community should be able to instruct the police in what order they should attend to complaints. On the other hand, six respondents (21,43 percent) were not sure.

Respondents, moreover, had diverse feelings about identifying themselves with the necessity of changing policing methods in South Africa. Twelve respondents (42,86 percent) disagreed that members at station level understand the reason why the change in policing methods in South Africa is necessary. Nine respondents (32,15 percent), however, felt quite the opposite, and agreed that members at station level do in fact understand the reason why changes in policing methods are necessary. A total of seven respondents (25 percent) were not sure whether changes in policing methods are the reality or not. In addition, an overwhelming total of 18 respondents (64,29 percent) believed that the changes in the top management of the SAPS do not have the support of members at station level. In contrast, a smaller number of respondents, five (17,85 percent), agreed that members at station level approve of the changes to the top management of the SAPS. Another five respondents (17,86 percent) were not certain.

Further, only six respondents (21,42 percent) were of the sentiment that management pays attention to grievances concerning changes being instituted. On the other hand, a total of 12 respondents (42,86 percent) were of the belief that the management of the SAPS does not pay attention to grievances regarding changes being instituted, while a large number of respondents, ten in total

(35,71 percent), were doubtful whether SAPS management pays attention or not. Respondents also had diverse views regarding the new rank structure in the SAPS and the effect it has on the organisation. A number of 14 respondents (50 percent) were of the feeling that the new rank structure in the SAPS does not contribute to effective service delivery and the changing of the militaristic rank structure has not been successful. Conversely, only six respondents (21,43 percent) agreed that the shift to the new rank structure has been successful and that it has contributed to effective service delivery. Eight respondents (28,57 percent) were not certain. Thirteen respondents (46,43 percent) were, in addition, of the opinion that rules and regulations do not discourage police officers' initiative and must therefore not be changed. Nine respondents (32,14 percent) disagreed and six respondents (21,43 percent) were doubtful.

#### **4.4 Summary**

This chapter provided the presentation, analysis and integration of the qualitative data [the four focus group interviews with members at the lower hierarchical levels and four interviews with Station Commissioners] and quantitative data [structured questionnaires distributed to 39 Station Commissioners in the Soweto and Pretoria policing areas]. The respondents' reactions to the individual interviews and focus group interviews were presented and discussed by means of emergent themes and subcategories to explore the outcomes of such interviews. An explanation of each theme and subcategory furthermore provided the reader with a clear understanding of the themes and their subcategories. In addition, respondents' responses to the questions were furthermore augmented by direct verbatim reflections from respondents. A critical reflection on each theme provided a wrap up on each theme.

The results of the questionnaires were presented as tables and figures to indicate the respondents' reactions towards transformation in the SAPS. The tables and figures provided background information of the respondents for contextualisation purposes and a deeper understanding of how prepared members of the SAPS are for the transformation process in the organisation and, moreover, how they experience change.

Chapter 5 presents the interpretation of the findings. Kotter's eight-step process of creating successful change is used to interpret and measure the data according to the legislation, policies and directives, literature, interviews, and focus group interviews in order to provide an indepth interpretation of the findings.

## **CHAPTER 5            INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS**

### **5.1     Introduction**

This chapter presents the interpretation of the findings. Data is interpreted and measured according to Kotter’s eight-step process of creating successful change (Kotter & Cohen, 2002). Firstly, an overview of each step of Kotter’s eight-step process is presented, which is accentuated with other authors’ models in support of Kotter. Each step of these models is then complemented with literature sources, as well as legislation, policies and directives implemented in the SAPS. Thereafter, management and ground level perspectives from interviews and focus group interviews are integrated to form a holistic interpretation of the findings.

### **5.2     Overview of Kotter’s Eight-Step Process of Creating Successful Change**

Change can easily be recognised as needed but the reality of creating that change, and, most importantly, making it stick, is extremely difficult. It is no longer only a matter of management; attention must be paid to the importance of leadership to facilitate change. The world-renowned expert on leadership and change, professor John Kotter, created a practicable eight-step process, as discussed in more detail in 3.6.1, for implementing successful change. These eight steps are:

- Establish a sense of urgency
- Create a guiding coalition
- Develop a vision and strategy
- Communicate the change vision
- Empower broad-based action
- Create short-term wins
- Consolidate gains and produce even more change
- Anchor new approaches in the culture

The first step “Establish a sense of urgency” will be interpreted according to the literature review and the presentation and discussion of the results of the study to urge people to let go of the past and move forward.

### **5.2.1 Step 1: Establish a sense of urgency**

Raising a feeling of urgency is the first and most critical step in a successful change effort as explained in 3.6.1. This step has as its central challenge to make sure that sufficient people act with sufficient urgency with behaviour that looks for opportunities and problems that energises colleagues to a new desired behaviour. In other words people must be motivated with the urgency to change and move forward with a sense of “Let’s go, we need to change things!”.

The significance of this step is also accentuated in Lewin’s Three-Stage Model as discussed in 3.6.2. The unfreezing phase (existing behaviour) of Lewin’s model of change makes provision for the recognition that there is a need for change and action is taken to unfreeze existing attitudes and behaviour. This phase is thus mainly concerned with “selling” the change as well as giving individuals or groups a motive for changing their attitudes, values, behaviour, systems or structures. In addition, Beckhard and Harris’s model (1987), illustrating the motivation for change, as discussed in 3.6.4, also values this step. As a result, Beckhard and Harris’s model advocates that people must perceive a desirable future and a practical pathway for achieving that future when there is dissatisfaction with the status quo.

The literature review on the change processes in organisations, as presented and discussed in Chapter 3, furthermore supports and highlights the importance of raising a feeling of urgency advocated by Kotter. Colenso (2000) values this step, as presented in 3.2, believing that to make a change initiative work in an organisation, it requires that its people believe things other than they believe presently, that they change the way they behave to support those beliefs, and in doing so they develop a series of successful examples which generate a momentum that helps others to change their behaviour. In support of Colenso, Williams et al. (2002) also draw attention (discussed in 3.2) to the importance of the people in an organisation playing their part in enabling their organisation to change if it is to grow and survive. Mann (2003) moreover suggests (in 3.2.2.2) that the ability to adapt and responsibility of adapting to change lies with every person in the organisation; therefore, people need to develop their own belief in their ability to take change in their stride. Similarly, Bayley (2001) furthermore emphasises the significance of this step (in 3.3.3) explaining that leaders at all levels must create the conditions that encourage, facilitate, and oblige people to do what is desired. In other words, the grain of the organisation must be made to work with reform rather than against it. Hultman (1998) regards

this step as significant (in 3.2), explaining that a paradigm shift occurs when old facts, beliefs values and behaviours no longer allow people to meet their needs.

Additionally, certain legislation, policies and directives that provide guidance in the public service at large, in particular the SAPS, created the intention of raising a feeling of urgency among members of the SAPS. Firstly, the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, as discussed in 2.2.1, aimed to generate a sense of urgency through the provision of creating a new single SAPS that would be impartial, accountable, transparent and efficient. The Interim Constitution and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, as discussed in 2.2.2, furthermore intended to raise a feeling of urgency through the development of a new style of policing, namely community policing, and through the establishment of community police forums. Moreover, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), as presented in 2.2.3, was developed that called for a police service that would reflect the national and gender character of South Africa, with special attention to representivity and human rights sensitivity. Besides the above directives, the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, as examined in 2.2.4, also meant to raise a feeling of urgency accentuating that priority is given to important, fair and equitable service delivery to South African communities, including those that were neglected in the past. The White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service and the Employment Equity Act, no. 55 of 1998, as discussed in 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 respectively, endeavoured to create a sense of urgency for implementing actions aimed at redressing past discrimination in the workplace associated primarily with race and gender.

The South African Police Service Act, no. 68 of 1995, as presented in 2.3.1, additionally appears to create a feeling of urgency to transform the Service through the provision of a legal basis for the SAPS, as a result of which the SAPS was established. This Act provides for the establishment and composition of the SAPS, the power and duties of the police, as well as the regulation and control of the SAPS. The White Paper on Safety and Security of 1998, as examined in 2.3.2, also formed a sense of urgency by focusing on improved service delivery, community involvement and human rights. Furthermore, the Progress Report and Guidelines on Transformation and the Implementation of Strategic Themes in the SAPS, as discussed in 2.3.6, created a sense of urgency through the presentation of the then present status of the transformation process in the SAPS as well as the provision of transformation guidelines to act as a foundation for the execution and guidance of transformation in the SAPS. Urgency was furthermore raised in this directive through the identification of transformation priorities in order

to reach the transformation objectives in the SAPS. Moreover, strategic themes of transformation were introduced and implemented, namely: equality, professional and effective service delivery and a person-centred human resource management that contributes to the creation of a sense of urgency. The Policy Document on Affirmative Action in the SAPS, as discussed in 2.3.7, also raised an atmosphere of urgency through advocating measures to achieve adequate protection and improvement of persons, groups or categories of persons who were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination to ensure their full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. Besides the above legislation, policies and directives that created a sense of urgency to transform the SAPS, the Code of Conduct of the SAPS, as explored in 2.3.9, contributed to the creation of a feeling of urgency. The purpose of this Code was to move from enforcing service delivery using a top-down approach towards a more enthusiastic bottom-up approach by police officials. This Code also provides the basis for positive discipline in the SAPS.

From the respondents' perceptions, as discussed in Chapter 4, it appears that the SAPS management have failed to convey effectively the sense of urgency to members at ground level to transform the SAPS. *"...they were unable to give it to the members in that sense of urgency...I must feel part and parcel of that change... not like a instrument that is been used like a remote..."*. As a result, members are confused and uncertain as they frequently receive communication on transformation that requires speedy action without knowing the reasons for it. Respondents are furthermore of the understanding that the urgency to change is not realized by members at ground level as a result of poor communication from higher levels, which creates confusion and uncertainty among members. In addition, respondents are of the belief that the implementation of transformation initiatives is being drawn out, and that these initiatives are forced upon members, who have to take action within a short period of time. The respondents also believed that members at ground level were compelled to accept changes and that if the implementation of transformation was a more thoughtful process there would be less negativity and fewer complications. Members were also of the opinion that they should have been given the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the changing environment. *"...hulle het ons ryp gedruk...hulle moes nie ek dink as dit 'n meer deurdagte proses was sou hulle nie gesit het met die probleme wat daar tans is nie...dit was 'n vreemde ding almal moes gewoon raak daaraan"*. (*"...management forced change upon us...they should not have done that, if it was a more thoughtful process management wouldn't have the problems they currently have...it was an unfamiliar process that everyone had to get used to"*). Additionally, the respondents were convinced that management of the police forced members at ground level to transform as a result

of pressure from the government. Moreover, from a management perspective, as indicated in 4.3.7, just over a quarter of the respondents were of the opinion that the SAPS experiences difficulty in terms of flexibility, cooperativeness, and the capability of making fast decisions, and that this is furthermore new to the organisation. However, just over half of the respondents expressed the opinion that the SAPS can improve in this regard. Less than a fifth of the respondents were convinced of the Service's sufficiency and skills in this field. This could be directly related to the bureaucratic nature of management in the SAPS rather than a democratic system.

For change to be embraced, as a first step there should be a sense of urgency to change. This change was intended by legislation, policy documents and directives, as discussed in Chapter 2, but at grassroots level it did not happen. This is a critical failure of the transformation process in the SAPS. Although there was recognition for the need to change, adequate action was not taken by the management of the Service to energise and motivate members of the SAPS to change their attitude and behaviour. In other words, the top structure of the SAPS exclusively focused on building a rational organisation, and racing ahead with the implementation of transformation while mostly ignoring the feelings that block change. Consequently, members of the SAPS do not have enough urgency, energy and motivation for large-scale change, thus making sensible change not viable. As a result, the transformation process in the SAPS has been to a great extent negatively affected as the management of the SAPS has failed to develop a sustained mindset of "let's go, we must do something to change" among members at grassroots level.

### **5.2.2 Step 2: Create a guiding coalition**

Creating a guiding coalition, as examined in 3.6.1, has as its main challenge to get the right people in place that are well-respected within the organisation and have the trust, emotional commitment and teamwork to guide a very difficult change process to create an influential, effective group powerful enough to guide large change.

Kissler's Change Management Organizational Model, as discussed in 3.6.3, also regards this step as essential by making provision for people and systems to guide and motivate the organisation to move into the future. The literature review examined in Chapter 3 provides further significance to the importance of creating a guiding team. Bayley (2001), in 3.3.3, emphasises the key to changing any aspect of policing is management; in other words, the way in which the



members of a police organisation are brought to do what policies call for. In support of Bayley (2001), Kotter also emphasises (in 3.3.3) that sustained and committed leadership by top management, especially the most senior executive, is required to produce any important organisational change.

The Discussion Document on Change in the SAPS, as reviewed in 2.3.5, made provision for a group to provide greater focus in the areas of change management, amalgamation and rationalisation. As a result of this provision, the Change Management Team and an Amalgamation Management Team were established. In addition, the White Paper on Safety and Security, as presented in 2.3.2, made provision for five ministerial committees to provide content to a Draft White Paper on Safety and Security. Among these committees were the committee to investigate the organisational transformation in the Department of Safety and Security.

From the respondents' perceptions, as examined in Chapter 4, it emerged that respondents were of the view that the SAPS management do not have the independence to implement their own policies because of the strong political influence and reaction of political parties as well as the influence of representing labour unions. "*...we don't have act in this way because IFP will react in this way...ANC will do in this way...the leadership of the SAPS don't have that freedom of implementing their policies...*". Furthermore, respondents were convinced that the top structure of the SAPS was forced to change by the new government. Consequently, almost two thirds of the respondents, from a management perspective, as indicated in 4.3.8, believed that the changes in the top management of the SAPS do not have the approval of members at station level. Nonetheless, almost a fifth of the respondents agreed that members at station level approve of the changes to the top management of the SAPS. However, another fifth were not certain whether this is the case.

Although policies and literature make provision for a guiding team to steer the SAPS in the right direction, the reality is that the guiding team does not have the trust, influence over or and support of the workforce to guide and facilitate change in the SAPS. It can also be deduced from the interviews that other members of the SAPS will feel similarly. Consequently, the guiding team is not powerful enough to drive and guide the difficult change that is needed in the organisation. Without trust, influence and support both the guiding team and the workforce are weak; therefore, successful transformation in the SAPS is threatened since there is no efficient guidance.

### **5.2.3 Step 3: Develop a vision and strategy**

In successful large-scale change, a well-functioning guiding team answers the questions required to produce a clear sense of direction. It is therefore important for the guiding team to know what the vision for the new organisation is. In other words, the guiding team must set a clear direction and embrace sensible visions for such an organisation. Kotter thus regards the core challenge of this step, as explained in 3.6.1, as getting the guiding team to create the right vision and strategies to guide action in all the remaining stages of change and this requires that the creative and emotional components of vision are addressed.

Kissler's Change Management Organizational Model, as discussed in 3.6.3, in addition values this step and provides for the existence and communication of a clear and convincing future view and supporting strategy of the organisation as well as a clear linkage between vision and the need for change. Similarly, Beckhard and Harris's Model (1987) for motivating change, presented in 3.6.4, furthermore accentuates the development of a vision through the realisation that a vision is needed to steer a changing organisation in the right direction. Beer, Eisenstat and Spector's Critical Path Model (1990), as presented in 3.6.5, moreover highlights the development of a vision by means of developing a task-aligned vision and promoting widespread agreement that the new vision is right.

In accordance with the above models, the literature presented in Chapter 3 furthermore supports the significance of developing a vision and strategy in changing organisations. Gilgeous (1997) judges (see 3.2) that to move towards an organisation's vision and to implement its strategies thus requires change. Johnson (1991), as presented in 3.2, similarly believes that real change is fulfilled only through the continuous development of people through a clearly defined and sensible strategic framework.

The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, as discussed in 2.2.1, provides a vision for the SAPS through the appointment of a National Commissioner, whose responsibilities are, among others, the maintenance of an impartial, accountable, transparent and efficient police service. To emphasise the strategy of the SAPS, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, as examined in 2.2.2, makes provision for community policing as the new strategy for the SAPS. In support of the Constitution, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) also draws attention to the eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future as a strategy for change in the SAPS.

Furthermore, the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, as discussed in 2.2.4, makes provision for redressing the imbalances of the past regarding service delivery as another strategy for change. In addition, by restoring employment equalities and abolishing discrimination against disadvantaged groups through the development of a broadly representative Public Service, the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service, as discussed in 2.2.5, the Employment Equity Act, discussed in 2.2.6, and the Policy Document on Affirmative Action in the SAPS, examined in 2.3.7, promoted yet another strategy for change in the SAPS. The SAPS Act, no. 68 of 1995, as presented in 2.3.1, also makes provision for a vision through manifesting and outlining the establishment and composition of the SAPS, the powers and duties as well as the regulation and control of the Service. A Draft Policy Document on Change in the SAPS, as examined in 2.3.3, furthermore provides for a statement of policy in the SAPS. The Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the SAPS, as per Annexure B, makes provision for, among other things, the vision of the SAPS, which is to create a safe and secure environment for all people in South Africa. The Discussion Document on Change in the SAPS, examined in 2.3.5, as well as the Progress Report and Guidelines on Transformation and the Implementation of Strategic Themes in the SAPS, discussed in 2.3.6, draw attention to the vision of the SAPS and the institutionalisation of community policing as the corporate strategy of the SAPS. Another strategy with the aim of creating change in the SAPS is the introduction of the process of matching, placing and redeployment of employees at departmental level through Resolution 7 of 2002: Transformation and Restructuring of the Public Service, as discussed in 2.5.

It emerged from the respondents' perceptions in Chapter 4 that members mainly had to rely on rumours to obtain information on transformation in the SAPS and had no sense of the bigger picture and the visionary focus of the process. In addition, some respondents were of the opinion that the media had a greater impact on transformation than official SAPS communication channels. *“Dit is meer soos “rumours”...niemand weet r rig wat gaan aan nie...ons het dit in die koerante gelees en oor TV gesien. Hulle het net op’n dag gekom en ges  ons skakel nou om van die milit ristiese houding na geen milit re houding...”*. (*“It’s more like rumours, and members don’t exactly know what’s happening... we read it in newspapers and saw it on TV. The police just suddenly decided to change from a militaristic approach to a non-militaristic approach...”*).

Furthermore, it emerged that communication received from the top level of the SAPS is not always clear as members did not understand what was expected from them, where they would fit

into the structures, what would follow, how they would be affected, and when the transformation process would end. As a result, members were uncertain of the future vision and strategy of the SAPS. “...jy het nooit geweet waar jy gaan inpas by die structure nie en wat gaan volg op die structure nie so ek dink nie regtig dis duidelik vir ‘n ou gestel nie alles was vir my baie onduidelik gewees”. (*“One never knew where you will fit into the structures and what will follow. I don’t think it is clearly stipulated; everything was unclear”*). In addition, respondents were of the opinion that the management of the SAPS did not provide members at the lower levels of the Service with a clear sense of direction. As a result, members were expected to accept changes without any encouragement. Moreover, respondents believed that if the transformation process had been clearly stipulated to them and the vision clearly communicated, members at the ground level would have accepted the process with a better attitude. Respondents furthermore revealed that not much was done by the SAPS management to consult members at ground level regarding transformation initiatives; therefore, respondents felt that consultation must first take place before any changes are implemented in order to prepare and educate members for such changes, to avoid the unexpected and embrace sensible visions for the SAPS. As a result, members at ground level are uncertain of what to expect from the transformation process because the SAPS management does not share information on transformation with members. Contrary to the aim of this step, respondents expressed their concern regarding the aim of transformation in the SAPS as well as its importance. As a result, members at ground level are speculating about the process that leads to a lack of understanding and confidence. Because of the bureaucratic and hierarchical nature and organisational culture in the SAPS, informal communication channels, such as the “grapevine”, function very strongly and often have a negative impact. A minority of the respondents were, however, of the belief that transformation in the SAPS is important and must take place to keep in touch with the changing times, and to grasp the visionary focus of the process. “...wêreldwyd vind dit plaas ‘n mens moet maar saam met dit gaan...dit is ‘n ding wat moet plaasvind...jy moet maar ‘go with the flow’...”. (*“Transformation is taking place worldwide and one has to accept it...it is something that has to take place...one has to ‘go with the flow’...”*).

Consequently, from a management input, less than a quarter of the respondents, as pointed out in 4.3.7, indicated that the top management of the SAPS experienced problems laying down the necessity for change and establishing a clear vision for the future. However, two thirds of the respondents expressed that the SAPS lacks experience and believed that there is room for improvement. Less than a fifth of the respondents were convinced that the SAPS has the

necessary and adequate skills to lay down the necessity for change and establishing a clear vision for the future.

Without a clear vision successful change is not likely to happen. Although many documents advocate the establishment of a vision and strategy, uncertainty and confusion reigns among members of the SAPS at grassroots level. It follows that these members do not have a clear sense of direction and that they are unlikely to know what change is needed and what the vision and strategy of the new organisation is. This implies that the transformation process in the SAPS is indistinct as a result of a lack of vision for change. It follows that members of the SAPS cannot act on the vision, which has an enormous impact on the transformation process since members are confused about the linkage between a clear and convincing future view and the need for change.

#### **5.2.4 Step 4: Communicate the change vision**

In this step the guiding team has to use every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategy constantly in a clear, simple and heartfelt manner to create understanding and buy-in among the organisation's people. The main goal of this step, as discussed in 3.6.1, is thus to get as many people as possible acting to make the vision a reality in order to motivate such people to buy into the change, which will also show in their behaviour.

Kissler's (1991) Change Management Organizational Model, as examined in 3.6.3, in addition gives emphasis to the communication of a clear and convincing vision and the clear linkage between vision and the need for change. Kissler's (1991) model furthermore makes provision for personal identification with the organisation and its purpose. In support of Kotter and Kissler's change models above, Beer, Eisenstat and Spector's (1990) Critical Path Model, as discussed in 3.6.5, also campaigns for widespread agreement that the new vision is right, for the ability to establish it, and for cohesion to move change along by involving as many employees as possible.

The Progress Report and Guidelines on Transformation and the Implementation of Strategic Themes in the SAPS, as presented in 2.3.6, advocates for the community and other role-players to share the broad vision for future policing in order to create an understanding for the role of the police and the role of the community itself. This report furthermore accentuates that the vision needs to be shared internally to facilitate the development of a vision-driven organisation.

Additionally, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, as discussed in 2.2.2, makes provision for the new strategy of policing in this country, namely community policing. This Constitution was formulated by the collective wisdom of South Africa including ordinary citizens, civil society and political parties getting people to buy into the new strategy of policing. Although many strategies were implemented through policies, legislation and guidelines, as mentioned in 5.2.3, such policies do not provide for communicating the strategies to the workforce.

Respondents indicated in the interviews, presented in Chapter 4, that they were uncertain what was expected of them, where they would fit into the structures, what would follow, how they would be affected and how the transformation process was going to take place because of the particular communication style in the SAPS. *“Daar is nooit gesê ons wil verander ons wil die hele “image” van die polisie verander nie wat dink julle daarvan. Hulle het self besluit die groot base daarbo luister kom ons verander die uhm embleem...die uniform...ons moet dit maar net aanvaar hulle het nie ook ons in ag geneem wat hier onder is...”*. (*“It was never communicated that they want to change the image of the police. The top structure of the police decided on their own to change the police. Members at the lower levels just had to accept it, we were never consulted about the process...”*). Respondents furthermore experienced that hearsay was the order of the day and that communication seldom reached members at ground level; however, when communication did reach members at ground level, it was not clear, instruction orientated and often a surprise. Respondents were also of the opinion that transformation is not clearly communicated from SAPS management side as it should first have gone down to ground level for transformation to be facilitated more successfully. As a result, the respondents regard the implementation of transformation initiatives as vague and instantaneous. Moreover, certain transformation initiatives raised enhanced confusion and uncertainty as communication on these transformation initiatives were changed regularly. *“Dan word dit afgestel en dan gaan dit weer voort en ‘n mens het nooit geweet waar is jy aan of af nie”*. (*“It is cancelled and then again it’s decided to proceed with, and one never knew what to expect”*). The respondents were also of the opinion that members at the lower levels of the hierarchical structure would have accepted the transformation process with a better attitude if the process had been clearly stipulated to them. A minority of the respondents, however, were of the opinion that change will not happen overnight and few transformation initiatives are effectively communicated.

Some respondents also questioned the aim of transformation in the SAPS and its importance. *“As far as communication is not right we will not understand why it is important to transform the police because someone have to come down and tell us this is the reason because of one two three and if communication is not right then obviously we will not understand why we have to be re-transformed. So we keep on guessing maybe it is because of this...so the maybes doesn't make you to be confident or to understand what you are doing”*. *“...because they did not consult they did not communicate...”*. Official SAPS communication channels are also under question and the respondents believed that the media had a greater influence than SAPS communication channels. Additionally, just over a quarter of the respondents from management, as indicated in 4.3.7, believed that the SAPS experiences problems regarding effective communication between police management and all other levels in the police. Correspondingly, just under a half of the respondents believed there is room for improvement as the police lack experience in this field. Conversely, only a fifth of the respondents were of the opinion that effective communication takes place between police management and all other levels of the Service.

Furthermore, three quarters of respondents from a management perspective, as presented in 4.3.8, disagreed that members at station level understand the reason why the change in policing methods in South Africa is necessary. On the other hand, just under a fifth of the respondents agreed that members at station level do in fact understand the reason why changes in policing methods are necessary. A quarter of the respondents were, however, not sure whether this is the reality or not. In addition, more than half of the respondents thought that members at station level are not taken into consideration when policy changes that affected them directly are being made. A fifth of the respondents disagree with this while a quarter of the respondents were uncertain. The lack of effective communication to members at grassroots level seems to be a huge obstacle in the organisation's quest to transform. Without effective communication of the change vision total transformation in the SAPS cannot become a reality.

### **5.2.5 Step 5: Empower broad-based action**

This step deals effectively with obstacles that block action, especially disempowering bosses, lack of information, the wrong performance measurement, ineffective recognition and reward systems, and a lack of self-confidence. The central challenge of this step, as discussed in 3.6.1, is thus to remove key obstacles that stop people acting on the vision. Furthermore, systems or structures that seriously undermine the change vision have to be changed. In other words, when

people begin to understand and act on a change vision, barriers to their pathways must be removed. Additionally, risk taking and non-traditional ideas, activities, and actions should be encouraged. As a result of these actions, more people should be able to act, and more people do act, on the vision.

Supportive of Kotter's change model, Lewin's Three Stage Model of Change, as presented and examined in 3.6.2, makes provision for alterations to the power structure. The magnitude of the empower broad-based action step is furthermore highlighted through Kissler's (1991) Change Management Organizational Model, as discussed in 3.6.3. Kissler draws attention to addressing resistance directly and effectively, ensuring that mistakes are used as opportunities to learn. Kissler's model additionally emphasises the importance of Kotter's theory, through stipulating the encouragement and participation by employees in the change process thus empowering them. The model also advocates that employees are motivated and encouraged through recognition and reward systems, and that they are developed. Beckhard and Harris's Model (1987) further supports Kotter's theory, acknowledging that uncertainty and feelings of insecurity have to be reduced through optimism that replaces pessimism.

The literature review on change processes in organisations examined in Chapter 3 moreover highlights the value of empowering others to act. In accordance with Kotter, Umiker (1998), as presented in 3.2.3, is also of the viewpoint that managers must understand why people resist change and that they must be able to cope with that resistance. This implies that the chances of change happening increase when one understands how people react to change and when one uses that awareness to help navigate employees through the process. Furthermore, Umiker (1998) realises that people who must adjust to change expect some kind of reimbursement. Kreitner and Kinicki (2001) add (see 3.5.1) that people resist when they do not foresee positive rewards for changing. Rauch (1994) and Brogden and Shearing (1993), presented in 3.3.1, similarly agree that the culture of policing in South Africa is mainly responsible for the delay in transformation in the SAPS. Bayley (2001) furthermore supports Kotter's philosophy (mentioned in 3.3.3), explaining that police respond best when they believe that new programmes incorporate their own insight and on-the-job knowledge. Therefore, reform requires a bottom-up management style. The literature reviewed generally supports the empowerment of members at the lowest levels through granting them more discretion at operational levels, a greater delegation of responsibility and authority, and space for flexibility and adaptability, as presented in 2.3.5. Chang (1994) provides a stronger basis for this step, as presented in 3.5.2, and suggests that



people must be assisted to understand how they are influenced, and how they can benefit from the change. Reactions and resistance must also be brought into the open. Furthermore, recognition must be provided for support and efforts.

Various policies and directives, as discussed in Chapter 2, support this step of Kotter's model in the form of changing systems or structures that create barriers that stop people from acting on the vision. More specifically, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), examined in 2.2.3, acted to remove barriers through realising the importance of representivity in the SAPS in order to encourage people to act on the vision. The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, discussed in 2.2.4, provides national and provincial departments with greater authority and accountability with regard to service delivery, which intends to establish a more flexible way in which to manage their operations. Moreover, the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service, presented in 2.2.5, and the Employment Equity Act, examined in 2.2.6, emphasises the need to restore employment inequalities through the development of a broadly representative Public Service with particular regard to opportunities in employment, earning levels, benefits and conditions of service. The Draft Policy Document on Change, as discussed in 2.3.3, furthermore empowers broad-based action through providing a "flattened" structure for the SAPS to create a more "bottom-up" approach. The Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the SAPS suggests that community orientated policing will result in members becoming more empowered in terms of personal development and individual participation as well as in the use of direction. The Discussion Document on Change in the SAPS, as presented in 2.3.5, advocates what Kotter promotes in his change model exactly. This Discussion Document makes provision for a change in the role and power culture of policing in South Africa which is characterised by bureaucracy, high standardisation, conformity to rules and regulations, limited or no power to subordinates and a control-centred senior management. According to the Discussion Document the SAPS culture must be transformed to a task and person culture, characterised by performance-based rewards, the encouragement of risk taking by members, focus on people, team work, the empowerment of members, and collaboration. In addition, this document also gives recognition that members should be empowered at the lowest level through the new philosophy of the SAPS. If the principles of the document are implemented this will lead to more discretion at operational levels, delegation of responsibility and authority, as well as space for flexibility and adaptability to local needs.

Few, if any, of the bureaucratic obstacles that could hamper the transformation process in the SAPS were actually removed. From the respondents' reactions, in Chapter 4, it came to light that members in the lower structures of the SAPS were uncertain of what was expected of them and how the transformation process was going to take place. As a result, members had to rely on hearsay to obtain information on transformation. It follows that respondents at ground level speculate about the change process, which in turn creates a lack of understanding and confidence as well as a feeling of disempowerment. *"...most of the information that reached us reach us through rumours mostly mostly you start to hear rumours about this about that but you never get a clear picture of what is actually going on". "...daar is net vir jou gesê daar gaan transformasie plaasvind al die lede en al die streke gaan saamsmelt jy het nie geweet hoe gaan dit jou raak nie..."*. (*"...they just told us transformation is going to take place and all the regions and members are going to amalgamate, we didn't know how we will be affected..."*). The respondents were furthermore dissatisfied with the recognition and progression they are experiencing in the SAPS during transformation and were also of the belief that specific care is given to previously disadvantaged members. *"Daar sit mense in offisiere posisies wat lankal al moes bevordering gekry het nou kom hier 'n meneertjie en omdat sy velkleur nou reg is nou kry hy dit sommer..."*. (*"...There are members in officers positions that should have been promoted long time ago, however members with the right skin colour are rather promoted..."*). More specifically, respondents raised their concerns of the new promotion system in the SAPS, stating that the non-availability of posts limits possibilities for progression in the organisation; therefore, affected members have no drive to perform better. *"...I cannot be productive...there is no motivation in myself..."*. On the other hand, respondents were of the opinion that they will not resist change if they receive what they deserve. *"Die ander was agtergeblewenes nou is ons weer die ouens wat agterbly...'n mens voel jy word nog steeds benadeel hoe gaan 'n ou dit regstel ons kan dit nie regstel nie hoe gaan bestuur dit regstel?"*. (*"The other members were previously disadvantaged, however, now we are the members that are disadvantaged...we cannot rectify this, how are management going to rectify this...?"*). *"Mense wat ook bevorder kon word word teruggehou...dit raak nou ernstig...glo my ek sukkel om myself positief te hou ek moet probeer"*. (*"Members that have to be promoted are denied promotion...it's getting serious...believe me I'm struggling to remain positive, however I must try"*). *"...dit is meer die onsekerheid oor wat die toekoms gaan oplewer...waarvoor werk jy...daar is nie poste beskikbaar nie so ons kans vir bevordering ons is onseker daaroor..."*. (*"...it's more the uncertainty of what the future holds...what is one working for...there are no posts available for promotion so that leads to uncertainty..."*).

Additionally, nearly a quarter of the respondents from a management perspective, as presented in 4.3.7, were of the opinion that a police culture that encourages the taking of risks, and provides recognition for continuous progress is new to the SAPS and that therefore problems are experienced in this field. What's more, almost a fifth of the respondents felt that members of the SAPS experience problems in taking personal responsibility for their actions. Two-thirds of respondents were of the opinion that members can improve their personal responsibility for their actions while less than a fifth of respondents were convinced that members take personal responsibility for their actions. Respondents disagreed about community involvement in operational matters of the SAPS, as presented in 4.3.8. A fifth of the respondents believed that the community must not be withheld from participating in operational issues of the SAPS. Equally, another fifth of the respondents disagreed, while just more than a fifth of the respondents were uncertain about this. Respondents generally remained cautious about community involvement into policing matters. Half of the respondents accepted that the public must have greater influence in the SAPS concerning the establishment of priorities about the working methods of the police. Just more than a fifth of the respondents disagreed on this point, while just more than a quarter of the respondents were not sure. Less than a quarter of the respondents were of the belief that management pays attention to grievances concerning changes being instituted. Conversely, almost half of the respondents believed that the management of the SAPS do not pay attention to grievances regarding changes being instituted, while less than a quarter of the respondents were uncertain about whether this is the case or not.

Members at the lower levels of the SAPS are confronted with several obstacles that in turn, hinder them from acting on the vision. As a result, members are discouraged from participating in the change process and thus have a negative impact on transformation as members distance themselves from the transformation process, which leads to a feeling of disempowerment.

#### **5.2.6 Step 6: Create short-term wins**

In successful change efforts, empowered people generate short-term wins. These short-term wins have the ability to encourage and cultivate confidence, trust and devotion in the change process among employees. Short-term wins also have the ability to reward hard working employees emotionally, give confidence to employees not believing in the change process, and build momentum for further changes. Without enough wins that are visible, well timed, clear, and important to the workforce, change efforts undoubtedly turn out to be problematic. When

people feel urgency and are empowered and enabled to act, they are encouraged and energised to further the change process. The core challenge of this step, as presented in 3.6.1, is thus to produce enough short-term wins fast enough to energise the employees that supports change, make the change process clear to doubtful employees, comfort sceptic employees and build momentum for the change process. It follows that momentum builds as people try to fulfil the vision, while fewer and fewer resist change.

Lewin's Three Stage Model, as examined in 3.6.2, furthermore makes provision for the positive reinforcement of desired outcomes to promote the internalisation of new attitudes and behaviour.

A range of legislation, policies and directives presented in Chapter 2 characterise short-term wins in an effort to build momentum for the change effort. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), as examined in 2.2.3, called for a police service that would reflect the national and gender character of South Africa with special attention to representivity and human rights sensitivity. The SAPS Act, as presented in 2.3.1, can also be seen as an attempt to create a short-term win through the establishment of the new demilitarised SAPS. In addition, the Progress Report and Guidelines on Transformation and the Implementation of Strategic Themes in the SAPS, discussed in 2.3.6, as well as the Status Report on Transformation in the SAPS, presented in 2.3.8, set out the progress made with transformation at the time. In accordance with these documents, alternative rank structures were designed and a decision was taken to implement a new uniform, symbols, insignia, to transform service delivery, introduce community policing and human rights and to demilitarise the police. The critical question that needs to be asked is have the hearts and minds of police officials changed?

From the respondents' perceptions, as presented in Chapter 4, it emerged that the change of the military rank structure to a more civilian rank structure caused confusion among members at ground level as demilitarisation seems to have had many different meanings to different people. What could have been a short-term win was in fact for them a long-term loss. *"...the ranks it was a bit confusing because it happens after amalgamation...I am from military police...if there is a change it is so difficult just to take it like that and when we came under the SAPS we are using the military ranks..."*. It follows that members do not have the feeling of a "win" regarding demilitarisation; rather, they regard it as a "loss". As a result, members felt they were negatively influenced by the restructuring, changing of rank structures, demilitarisation and transfers in the SAPS. *"Dit beinvloed die lede negatief, almal word nou negatief oor verplasing en herstrukturering en verandering in die polisie..."*. (*"It influences members negatively as*

*everyone has become negative as a result of transfers, restructuring and changes in the police*”). It follows that respondents are of the feeling that the previous military rank structure had a positive influence on discipline and respect in South African policing. “...*daar was nog meer ‘n mate van respek en dissipline toe die range begin voeter toe is alles deurmekaar*”. (“...*there was a sense of respect and discipline; however, when the ranks changed everything was disorderly*”). Consequently, many respondents were confused about the difference between a police force and a police service as they were never consulted nor educated about the South African policing organisation being changed from a police force to a police service. On the other hand, respondents agreed to a great degree that community-orientated policing has resulted in improved service delivery and a positive relationship between the police and the community. “...*it has improved because now we are working with a community with the understanding of each other and the policemen were taught human rights...they can now be more accessible to the community that they serve so I think the service delivery has improved...*”. Conversely, some respondents were convinced that the community nevertheless has the perception that the SAPS is a force as there are no co-ordinated activities outlined to inform the broader community that the SAPS has changed to a police service, which is obliged to perform its duties within the law.

On the other hand, the management input, as presented in 4.3.7, revealed that over a quarter of the respondents were of the opinion that key activities currently undertaken in the SAPS to support change are new to the organisation and that problems are therefore experienced. Just less than half of the respondents, however, believed that the organisation lacks experience and can therefore improve key activities currently undertaken in the SAPS to support the change process. Only a fifth of the respondents were convinced that the Service is adequate and has the skills required in this field. Furthermore, a fifth of the respondents considered the SAPS to have problems regarding the use of specific methods to evaluate working performance. Almost two thirds of the respondents were of the point of view that the SAPS has the potential to improve since it lacks experience. Another fifth of the respondents were, however, more optimistic indicating that the SAPS adequately uses specific methods to evaluate working performance with the necessary expertise. In addition, just more than two-thirds of respondents concluded that the SAPS experiences problems in rewarding individuals and/or groups for initiative taken or for identifying the main reasons for organisational problems. These respondents were also of the view that rewarding individuals and/or groups for initiative taken or for identifying the main reasons for organisational problems is new to the organization. A quarter of respondents, however, felt that the SAPS need experience and improvement in this field. Less than a fifth of

respondents were, however, convinced of the skill and competence of the organisation in this regard. Additionally, from a management perspective, as presented in 4.3.8, nearly a quarter of the respondents were of the opinion that democratic management styles lead to better discipline. On the other hand, a third of the respondents were not that optimistic and disagreed that democratic management methods lead to better discipline while just more than a third of the respondents were not certain if this is the case. Moreover, half of the respondents were of the view that discipline in the SAPS has been undermined by the demilitarisation of the police. In opposition to this, more than a quarter of the respondents disagreed with this statement, while a fifth of respondents were not certain.

Half of the respondents were of the feeling that the new rank structure in the SAPS does not contribute to effective service delivery and that the changing of the militaristic rank structure has not been successful. Conversely, just less than a quarter of the respondents agreed that the shift to the new rank structure has been successful and has contributed to effective service delivery while just more than a quarter of respondents were not certain. Additionally, almost two-thirds of the respondents agreed that all the members of the SAPS do not always understand community needs and that greater community involvement will solve the problem. In contradiction to this, a fifth of the respondents disagreed with the statement, while less than a fifth of respondents were not sure. Furthermore, almost half of the respondents agreed that Community Police Forums do not contribute to the workload of the still overworked SAPS. However, just more than a quarter of the respondents were of the thought that these Forums certainly contribute to the workload of the still overworked SAPS. A quarter of the respondents were not certain whether this is the case or not.

The SAPS after 1994 created various visible short-term wins such as a new uniform, symbols, insignia, rank structure, demilitarisation and the implementation of the community policing approach; however, most of these wins are superficial and not meaningful enough to members at grassroots level to penetrate their emotional defences. Furthermore, the SAPS has not created meaningful visible wins fast enough to as many members as possible. As a result, the momentum of the transformation process in the SAPS has been hampered.

### **5.2.7 Step 7: Consolidate gains and produce even more change**

After the first set of short-term wins, a change effort will have gained direction and momentum. In successful situations, people build on this momentum to make the vision a reality by keeping urgency up and a feeling of false pride down, not declaring victory too soon. The main challenge of this step is thus to promote continuous change, not stopping until the vision is a reality, no matter how big the obstacles. As a result, people have to remain energised and motivated to push change forward until the vision is fulfilled.

The literature review on the change processes in organisations in Chapter 3 furthermore highlights the importance of this step. Deems (1995), as presented in 3.2, also shares the belief that change is constant, and that the pace of change is more likely to accelerate than to decrease. In other words, continuing change has become a certainty and people will be faced with more rapid change in future, as stated by Pieters & Young (2000) in 3.2. Hussey (1998) is furthermore of the view, presented in 3.2 that organisational change is not more important now than it used to be, but that it happens more often, and the period of stability after the change does not last as long as it once did. Colenso (2000), as presented in 3.2, is therefore of the opinion that any living organisation must be able to operate within a state of constant change at all levels, with the key word “constant”.

In order to ensure continuous change, and to provide momentum to the change effort, a range of legislation, policies and directives, discussed in Chapter 2, were introduced with the aim of transforming the SAPS. These pieces of legislation, policies and directives, as presented and discussed from 2.2.1 to 2.5, such as the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the White Paper on Safety and Security and the Policy Document on Affirmative Action in the SAPS, have as their main aims to enhance service delivery, address representivity and promote equality in the SAPS.

From the respondents' responses, as presented in Chapter 4, it appears that members of the SAPS are not as energised and motivated to push change forward as the SAPS management would like them to be. Respondents were of the opinion that they are influenced negatively by transformation in the SAPS and that they are experiencing difficulty remaining positive. Some respondents also questioned the ability of the top structure of the SAPS to keep members positive. “...verstaan hulle hoe om 'n ou positief te hou die ouens by die topstruktuur? Ek staan

*baie negatief...ek is baie ongelukkig...ek sukkel om myself positief te hou... ”. (“...does the top structure of the SAPS understand how to keep members positive. I’m very negative...I’m very unhappy...I’m struggling to remain positive...”). A minority of respondents were of the opinion that transformation in the SAPS must take place for the SAPS to keep in touch with the outside world. On the other hand, other respondents reasoned that they do not have a choice but to transform and that therefore they have a “go with the flow” attitude. “...wêreldwyd vind dit plaas ‘n mens moet maar saam met dit gaan”. (“...it’s a worldwide phenomenon and one has to adapt”). In contrast, some respondents showed signs of motivation and energised feelings towards the transformation process in the SAPS by realizing the need for change.*

The respondents also believed that the continuous changes in the SAPS cause tension for every person and that therefore the SAPS must come to a point where transformation is completed since it has been drawn out since 1994. “...dit sloer nou al van 1994 af...daar is heeltyd veranderings...van 1994 af loop polisiemanne al met veranderings, veranderings, veranderings en hulle moet tot op ‘n punt kom en sê dit is afgehandel”. (“Transformation has been taking place since 1994 with continuous changes. Since 1994 members of the police have been confronted with change after change. They must come to a point where transformation is completed”). Additionally, from a management perspective, as indicated in 4.3.7, a quarter of the respondents were of the opinion that the SAPS experiences problems successfully implementing other change programmes, as this process is new to the organisation. Furthermore, just less than half of the respondents believed that the SAPS does not have the required experience to successfully implement other change programmes, feeling that there is room for improvement. On the contrary, just over a quarter of the respondents felt that the SAPS has successfully implemented other change programmes.

The critical question must be asked whether a bureaucracy with a bureaucratic management style that focuses on keeping things in place rather than improving and facilitating continuous change can function like this. Furthermore, the SAPS has not created structured situations in which members can take risks to deal with difficult bureaucratic and political problems. In addition, members of the SAPS are not energised and motivated to push change forward, thus making continuous change in the organisation an ideal rather than a reality.



### **5.2.8 Step 8: Anchor new approaches in the culture**

Tradition is a powerful force. Leaps into the future can slide back into the past if new approaches in the culture are not anchored. Change can be kept in place by helping to create a new, supportive, and sufficiently strong organisational culture. A supportive culture provides roots for new ways of operating. It keeps the revolutionary technology, the globalised organisation, the innovative strategy, or the more efficient processes that work to make the organisation achieve its desired change. Making change stick in any sphere of life can be very difficult. If this challenge is not well met at the end of a large-scale change process, enormous effort can be wasted. The core challenge of this step, as mentioned in 3.6.1, is thus to create a supporting structure that provides roots for the new ways of operating to generate continuous new and winning behaviour. Lewin's Three-Stage Model, as presented in 3.6.2, also emphasises the importance of this step by making provision for the habitualisation of new way of doing things.

The literature review on change processes in organisations, as presented in Chapter 3, however states that it is not an easy task to create a new, supportive, and efficiently strong organisational culture. Rauch (1994) is of the opinion (presented in 3.3.1) that it was the military culture of the police in South Africa that will be one of the most significant obstacles to the new government's programme of police reform. In support of Rauch, Brogden and Shearing (1993:96), discussed in 3.3.1, more specifically conclude that the police culture in South Africa is mainly responsible for the delay in transformation in the police. On the other hand, Bayley (2001) however, as stated in 3.3.1, believes that although the police culture can act as a brake on change, it is not the irresistible force often portrayed. Brogden and Shearing (1993:96) furthermore mention two approaches, presented in 3.3.1.1 that have traditionally been used to change police culture.

The first approach is the legalistic or rule-making devices approach. During this approach rules may be tightened by means of a range of measures, including changes to legislation, administrative rules, codes of practice, accountability procedures or policy guidelines. According to Chan (1997), as presented in 3.3.1.3, the legalistic device approach supposed that police organisations are bureaucratic and have the appearance of a quasi-military, hierarchical structure that is based on rules and orientated towards commands. This approach continues to be a favourite choice among police reformers. Nevertheless, Brogden et al. (1993), as presented in 3.3.1.3, believe that when rules are not congruent with police practice, members ingeniously find ways around the rules, and as a result these devices fail to recognise that the police culture cannot be "crushed". The second approach is the culturalist devices approach. These devices

seek to change the culture from inside; in other words, by changing peoples' ways of thinking and acting. However, culturalist devices are insufficient on their own; therefore an orthodox approach should be followed. The first orthodox approach is cultural colonialism. This is when the police are taken closer to the community. The second orthodox approach is the incorporative devices approach. This is when the community is brought to the police. Kreitner and Kinicki (2001) furthermore believe, as stated in 3.5.1, that whenever individuals are transferred, promoted, or reassigned, cultural and group dynamics are thrown into disequilibrium. Additionally, certain legislation, policies and directives, presented and discussed in Chapter 2, have as their aim to institute a supportive culture that provides roots for new ways of operating. The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, and the SAPS Act, no. 68 of 1995, as presented in 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.3.1, provide for the implementation of community policing in support of a new organisational culture. Moreover, various other legislations, policies and directives provide the police with new ways of rendering service to the South African community. These documents are the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, discussed in 2.2.4, the White Paper on Safety and Security, presented in 2.3.2, the Code of Conduct of the SAPS, examined in 2.3.9, as well as Resolution 7 of 2002, discussed in 2.5. Furthermore, the White Paper on Affirmative Action, and the Employment Equity Act, no. 55 of 1998 as discussed in 2.2.5 and 2.2.6, advocate the restoring of employment inequalities and the elimination of discrimination against disadvantaged groups. As a result, these two documents provide for a new vision of how the workforce in the SAPS will look in future. The Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the SAPS, as examined in 2.3.4, provides for, among other things, new ways of operating through the controlled and responsible use of police power.

From the respondents' responses, as examined in Chapter 4, it emerged that members resist change as they do not want to be deprived of police force culture through the integration of other police agencies into the SAPS. *"We talk about change they said that a lot of police forces will be bring together, I didn't want to lose police force culture..."*. On the other hand, respondents considered community policing as a significant concept to regain trust and confidence in the police. Additionally, respondents agreed to a great degree that community-orientated policing has resulted in improved service delivery and positive relationships between the police and the community. Respondents also felt that the creation of a partnership between the police and the community had contributed to a reduction in crime. Conversely, some respondents felt that the community takes advantage of the police as members of the community believe that the police are soft on criminals and the community does not have respect for the police. *"...it did improve*

*the service delivery from that year because the image of the police have been changed automatically from forcing people to servicing people so people did understand what the police stands for...the people take advantage of the police”. “...the SAPS had been viewed with a negative perception in the past...they are trying to build up the image of the SAPS so that the society as a whole must start to look at the SAPS as a valid organisation...the negative perception must go away from the eyes of the people...”.*

Some respondents were under the impression that service delivery has improved through the partnership with the community, but that there is room for improved education, training and developmental learning programmes. On the other hand, other respondents were of the opinion that the SAPS are currently not rendering an improved service as there is a need for supplementary training. Respondents are furthermore of the opinion that the shortage of resources in the SAPS has a negative impact on service delivery in the SAPS.

From a management perspective, as presented in 4.3.7, half of the respondents were of the belief that the changes to which the SAPS is presently exposed are necessary for the effective existence of the SAPS while just over a quarter of the respondents disagreed. However, less than a quarter of the respondents were not sure whether changes in the SAPS are indeed necessary for the effective existence of the SAPS. Correspondingly, half of the respondents agreed that changes currently implemented in the SAPS would certainly improve the functioning of the SAPS. However, less than a quarter of respondents disagreed, while just over a quarter were not sure. Although the majority of members of the SAPS accept community policing as a new approach to policing, the old culture is still anchored strongly in their current behaviour. As a result, changing the police force culture into a service delivery culture is indeed one of the most significant obstacles to the transformation of the SAPS.

### **5.3 Summary**

This chapter interpreted the findings and measured the guidelines implemented in the SAPS as well as the feedback from respondents at management and ground level according to Kotter's eight-step process of successful organisational change, and other authors in support of Kotter. In addition, literature in support of each step was also presented to emphasise the importance of each of the eight steps. Additionally, the impact of each step on the transformation process in the SAPS was explained to present a holistic picture of the interpretations.

Chapter 6 will provide a summary of the dissertation from Chapter 1 to Chapter 5 whereafter the interpretations made in this chapter will be examined and conclusions drawn. Recommendations will also be made, based on the main findings and the Kotter model, to address the obstacles impeding the transformation process in the SAPS.

## **CHAPTER 6            SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **6.1    Introduction**

This chapter provides a summary of the dissertation from Chapter 1 to Chapter 5 whereafter the interpretations made in Chapter 5 are examined and conclusions drawn. Subsequently recommendations are made, based on the main findings and the Kotter model, to address the obstacles impeding the transformation process in the South African Police Service (SAPS). It is clear that if the SAPS management commit themselves to the recommendations made in this chapter there may be a significant improvement in the implementation and management of the transformation process in the SAPS. This could also impact on service delivery.

### **6.2    Summary**

Chapter 1 opened with an introduction to the rationale for the research that was undertaken, namely: to identify the obstacles impeding the transformation process in the South African Police Service (SAPS). Furthermore the problem statement was provided whereafter the purpose and importance of this research were explained. The value of this research and its results were also discussed. The goal and objectives followed, which provided the aims and reasons for the study as well as a clear and unambiguous statement of the research objectives. The primary objectives of this study were to explore and describe the station managers' in the jurisdiction of Soweto and Pretoria policing areas response to, and the interpretation of, the questionnaire concerning change distributed to each station manager, and to explore and describe the focus group interviews with non-station commander officials. Semi-structured interviews with four station managers were also held and the respondents' opinions were explored and described. The secondary objectives of this study were to explore and describe:

- The level of representivity of the station managers through compiling a demographic sketch of the characteristics of the station managers selected regarding gender, race, rank, length of service, divergent backgrounds and geographical area;
- The exposure to and attitude towards change by police officials at station level;
- The implementing and functioning of change initiatives by police officials at station level.

Furthermore the delimitation of the study addressed how the study was narrowed in scope. Key theoretical concepts central to this study were defined to provide a common understanding of their meaning in this study. Geographical and time limitations followed for discussion whereafter

problems encountered during the study were acknowledged. The research methodology then followed that explained the exact steps that were taken to address the research problem and consisted of the explorative characteristics of the study, the research approach and design, methods of data collection and analysis, methods to ensure validity and reliability, and ethical considerations.

Chapter 2 presented an overview of the transformation process in the SAPS from 1993 to 2003. Legislation, policy and directives implemented during this period provided the broad framework and foundation for this chapter. The focus of the chapter was on the policing context for a discussion on various SAPS policies and directives that indicated the movement towards change and initiatives to implement transformation. Examples of transformation that the various acts, policies and directives hold were given. The significance and implications of these directives were also discussed to explain the importance of each directive.

Chapter 3 provided a holistic literature review of existing publications on the specific problem that was researched to present the knowledge base upon which the study is built. The viewpoints of a variety of authors that relate specifically to the key concept, namely change processes in organisations, were discussed to place the current study within the conceptual and theoretical perspective as well as to obtain a thorough understanding of the topic. In support of the literature an overview of the emergent themes was also presented and discussed. Furthermore, a summary of examples was presented of changes in police organisations internationally to point out similarities and differences to changes in the SAPS and to emphasise the importance of organisational change in police organisations. This chapter concluded with a presentation and discussion of different change models illustrating how to bring about change to transform an organisation.

The aim of the analysis presented in Chapter 4 was to understand the various elements of the data obtained through an analysis of the relationships between concepts, constructs and variables to identify and isolate patterns and trends as well as to establish themes and subcategories that emerged in the data. The data collected were described and illustrated by means of interviews with four Station Commissioners, focus group interviews with members at the lower hierarchical levels of the SAPS, and structured questionnaires. Questions relevant to transformation in the SAPS were asked. Quantitative measures were integrated with qualitative measures, and the research design and approaches were triangulated to ensure the richness of the data. In support of triangulation, in-depth discussions were held with independent qualitative researchers to

corroborate on the emergent themes and subcategories. An explanation of each theme was presented, which was enriched by direct verbatim reflections of the responses. A critical reflection of the themes and their subcategories rounded off each theme. This chapter concluded with the results of the questionnaires, which were presented as tables and figures to indicate the respondents' reactions towards transformation in the SAPS, and in addition provided the reader with background information of the respondents for contextualisation purposes.

In Chapter 5 the results of the analysis done in Chapter 4 were interpreted and measured against Kotter's eight-step process of creating successful change as presented and discussed in Chapter 3. The structure of this chapter is based on the actionable eight steps for implementing successful change of the world-renowned expert on leadership and change, professor John Kotter. These steps are: create a sense of urgency; build a guiding team; develop a vision and strategy; communicate the change vision, empower others to act, create short-term wins, consolidate gains and produce even more change and institutionalise changes in the culture. An overview of each step of Kotter's model was presented, which was supported by the inclusion of other authors' models, as presented in Chapter 3, to emphasise the importance of these eight steps for successful organisational change. In addition, each step of these models was then complemented by literature sources, as presented in Chapter 3, as well as by legislation, policies and directives, as presented in Chapter 2. This chapter concluded with SAPS management and ground level perspectives from the interviews and focus group interviews that were integrated to form a holistic interpretation of the findings. Lastly the impact of each of the eight steps on the transformation process in the SAPS was explained to round off the holistic finding of the interpretations.

### **6.3 Recommendations**

The research conducted indicated that after ten years of transformation the SAPS has various shortcomings. These shortcomings create obstacles, which have an impeding influence on the transformation process in the SAPS, which in turn has a negative impact on transformation in the SAPS as a whole. As a result, there are a variety of concerns that need the attention of the SAPS management. The organisational change model of John Kotter for implementing successful change was used as the framework for this study. Recommendations are therefore made based on the eight steps of this change model, in Kotter and Cohen (2002:15-177), to address the obstacles impeding the transformation process in the SAPS. The primary challenge of these eight steps is changing people's behaviour, organisational culture, work procedures and service delivery. The key to behavioural shift is less about analysis and thinking, and more about seeing and feeling

change. Recommendations will, therefore, be made by indicating dynamic reasons for change that affect the emotions, behaviour and attitude of people.

### **6.3.1 Step 1: Create a sense of urgency**

The first step in successful change processes is to ensure that the appropriate people in the organisation act with enough urgency that encourage the workforce to make use of opportunities and to identify shortcomings that in turn will inspire colleagues with adequate confidence to make change in the organisation a reality. When the workforce does not realise the urgency to change the organisation, organisational change can turn out to be problematic.

The outcomes of this research, however, indicate that the management of the SAPS were unable to convey the urgency of transformation to the members at ground level. As a result, these members do not realize the urgency of changing which in turn created confusion, uncertainty, negativity and anxiety among members who had no idea about the effects of a complex change process, rather than raising a feeling of urgency. Consequently, members focused on self-preservation instead of organisational transformation. Members were, furthermore, not encouraged to change. Changes were forced upon members, which may have had a contributing effect on members' pessimistic attitudes, which were driven by fear, confusion and hesitation.

It is thus recommended that the SAPS management implement very concrete, visual information that influences the emotions, feelings and behaviour of a large number of members at a time as a visualising showing method to increase the sense of urgency among members to transform the SAPS. Members could thus be shown dramatic videotapes of unsatisfied and angry members of the public that will reflect the inefficient service delivery and overall image of the SAPS. This means that members are shown valid, credible and dramatic evidence from outside the organisation that demonstrates that change is required in the SAPS. It follows that the real problem from the point of view of the community, rather than management's opinion, is raised and visualised by members.

Industrial theatre could also be applied as a method to demonstrate to members of the SAPS the urgent need to change the organisation. Dramatic role-play could thus be staged through this method to show members the advantages of the change process as opposed to the old method of functioning, for example: how members of the SAPS previously interacted with the community and how they should interact with them presently, how to perform their daily duties with a



human rights orientated approach, how to empower victims of crime when attending complaints and also demonstrate to members the advantages of community policing.

It is suggested that videotapes and role-play be presented in the eleven official languages of South Africa in order to address and overcome the diversity of members in the SAPS and their diverse educational levels. As a result, members could familiarise themselves with what they see and hear and apply it in performing their daily duties. Moreover, group participation amongst members of the SAPS could be encouraged through showing videotapes and by means of industrial theatre, which in turn could raise a feeling of urgency to change.

Members at ground level of the SAPS are therefore shown the need for change with a convincing, memorable illustration that they can actually see, touch, and feel. As a result, members may be astounded, some may become alarmed or annoyed. On the other hand, many members may find false pride reducing and a sense of urgency increasing within them, which replaces fear, confusion and anxiety. Consequently, more members of the SAPS may tentatively begin looking for problems, listening to members of the public, and also listening to SAPS management when they talk about the need for change, thus raising a sense of urgency to transform the SAPS. Subsequently, members of the SAPS may well change the mindset that one can do little if one is not a manager through such behaviour.

### **6.3.2 Step 2: Build the guiding team**

When urgency to change an organisation is realised it makes it easier to build a team with the trust and emotional commitment to guide the change process and also to institute teamwork and solidarity that is vital within such a group. Therefore, it is imperative to get the right guiding team in place who are fully committed to the change initiative, well respected within the organisation, and who has the power and influence to drive and lead the change effort at their levels.

Sustained and committed leadership by the top management of a changing organisation is required to guide and motivate such an organisation into the future in order to produce any important organisational change. From the reaction of the respondents in this study it emerged that the leadership of the SAPS does not have the trust, influence and support of the majority of the workforce to guide and facilitate change in the SAPS as a result of unpopular changes made by the top management, strong external influences, and management not being independent.

It is therefore suggested that a diverse team be put together made up of individuals from the former SAP, other police agencies of the former homelands and individuals from previous liberation movements that were amalgamated into the SAPS to reflect the diversity of the organisation. These individuals must have different and appropriate skills, the leadership capacity, the organisational credibility, and the experience to handle a specific kind of organisational change such as the SAPS is experiencing. Consequently, it will bring an end to creating politically constructed groups at the top bowing to political pressures and leave the task of change in the hands of a small executive group. As a result, the SAPS will have the independence to implement its own policies without strong political pressure and interference since change in the SAPS thus far has been driven primarily by the political process and not by police leadership. It is furthermore advised that a network of guiding teams be established at provincial level to create enhanced communication and interaction between members at ground level and the guiding teams and also to bring such teams closer to members at ground level.

Taking the political history of South Africa, and in particular the SAPS into consideration, trust and teamwork amongst members of the guiding team must be created to avoid a contradicting guiding team with conflicting interests. Teamwork by the guiding team should therefore be encouraged and could be achieved through the practical implementation of programmes such as anger management programmes, conflict resolution, intervention programmes, problem solving and team building excersises. These programmes should allow the guiding team the opportunity to get rid of those feelings of dread and create a practice of working in the spirit of trust, harmony and commitment.

It is also recommended that the leadership of the SAPS develop sensible strategies to regain the trust, support, and commitment of the workforce in order to guide and facilitate organisational change in the SAPS. However, these strategies have to be compelling, eye-catching, and dramatic to help the workforce visualise problems, solutions, or progress with the aim of affecting the workforce at a deeper level than surface thinking. The guiding team of the SAPS could show support and commitment to the change process through regular visits to police stations. As a result, member's concerns could be directly taken notice of, member's fears and uncertainty could be directly addressed by the guiding team and progress with the change process could be shared with members at ground level. In addition, it is proposed that the leadership of the SAPS move away from the present autocratic and bureaucratic command and control style to a more democratic and person-centred leadership style that is characterised by participation and problem solving. Subsequently, members at the lower hierarchical levels will

become more empowered through risk taking and problem solving, which will in turn reflect a democratic institution.

In addition, it is advised that change management and leadership programmes for achieving excellence are implemented in the SAPS to apply the process of work group construction and development, which develops an understanding of the need for different leadership and/or management styles, depending on the nature of change. Such programmes would provide skills, which will enable the guiding team facilitating change in the SAPS to be a more effective work group and will also promote co-operative behaviour and team effort. As a result, strong teams will be put together to meet the performance goals of the SAPS and transformational leadership characteristics may be displayed that in turn will increase the functional effectiveness of the guiding team.

### **6.3.3 Step 3: Develop a vision and strategy**

With urgency up and leaders ready to guide the change process a clear sense of direction and approach to the change process is now needed. The guiding team should embrace explicit and sensible visions and strategies that are moving and visualising. A well-functioning guiding team should specify what change is needed, what the vision for the new organisation is, what the best way to make the vision a reality is, and what should not be altered. Clear answers to these issues place an organisation in a position to suddenly excel to a better future.

In order for transformation to be conducive for the organisation and to be embraced by members of the SAPS, the vision and strategy, and its implementation should be properly researched, gradual, practical, understandable, and effective. From the perceptions of the respondents it is evident that the top management of the SAPS experiences problems with specifying the necessity for change and establishing a clear vision for the future. In addition, the implementation of the transformation process in the SAPS appears to be vague and spontaneous rather than planned.

Although a vision and strategy have been created for the SAPS, members are uncertain of the future view and strategy of the Service, thus having no clear sense of direction where the transformation will take them. It is thus suggested that a persuasive and convincing vision be communicated to members at ground level in such a manner that they can act on the vision. Therefore, it is recommended that members be shown visual examples such as video case studies, and also participate in simulation excersises, demonstrations, practical excersises and

play acting that demonstrates how the SAPS currently functions, and how the organisation will look after the vision is a reality. As a result, group participation could also be facilitated. It is also recommendable that these visual examples be used in conjunction with compulsory workshops and information sessions held on a regular basis to educate and inform members on the vision that will steer them in the new direction. These visual examples may be absorbed more deeply by members since the brain has the ability to captivate intensely what is seen, in particular. Moreover, these visual examples should be illustrated in the various languages of the specific target group at the time, which in turn could address and overcome the diverse educational levels of the members of the SAPS.

Moreover, the vision of the SAPS should be publicised in official journals, magazines and on salary advices received by members on a monthly basis. In addition, it is proposed that the vision be communicated to members through modern technology such as the Internet, Intranet, cell phone text messages, and the introduction of a toll free advice and care line that assists members with free advice and information.

It is also suggested that all transformation initiatives and endeavours to be implemented in the SAPS should be directed by clear guidelines and a thorough systematic approach to avoid changes being instituted for the sake of achieving the proposed equity, as well as to prevent the implementation of various transformation initiatives at once. The researcher, therefore, recommends that post appointments made to previously disadvantaged members should occur with the necessary diplomacy and insight to prevent substandard service and the exodus of experienced members in specialised positions. As a result, it is advised that a specific policy in this regard urgently be drafted to act as a guideline for the implementation of transformation initiatives in the SAPS. This policy will ensure that aspects related to the implementation of transformation initiatives are in equilibrium with these policy guidelines.

It is also proposed that support programmes such as coaching and mentorship programmes be implemented at ground level in the SAPS change process to resolve conflict associated with role confusion and ambiguity concerning the vision and strategy of the SAPS. Consequently, understanding and consensus could be developed between the SAPS management and members at ground level regarding the change vision and strategy to be adopted. Interpersonal competence building among members, group ownership of the change process and commitment to change as well as role identity could furthermore be established through the implementation of coaching and mentorship programmes.

Additionally, it is also suggested that the SAPS management initiate proper research into implementation methods before implementing transformation initiatives. Thorough research of implementation methods and its outcomes would improve the change approach in general. Members at ground level should also be taken into consideration, through a consultative approach, before implementing transformation initiatives. Technical teams should be appointed at provincial and area level to educate and consult members at ground level and to evaluate and co-ordinate the implementation process. This will enable members at these lower levels to adapt themselves and be psychologically more prepared for change in the SAPS since their fears and uncertainties will be addressed, and thus change will not come as a surprise any longer. Since 1994 continuous changes have taken place in the SAPS. As a result, these ongoing changes cause tension in members.

#### **6.3.4 Step 4: Communicate the change vision**

The central challenge of this step is effective communication. After the development of a vision and strategy, effective communication must take place throughout the organisation to familiarise the workforce with the change process in order to achieve understanding and acceptance of the changes among them. Communication must, however, be kept uncomplicated and sincere. It must also be established what the workforce's real feelings are and anxieties, confusion, anger, and distrust must be addressed. New technologies can furthermore assist people see the vision. Furthermore, it is imperative to communicate the vision for the organisation and the strategy for change to take place to facilitate insight and acceptance of the change effort. The primary test of this step is to get as many people as possible acting to make the vision a reality. The most noticeable explanation why communicating the vision does not succeed is probably the lack of clearness.

Effective communication is of extreme importance for the successful functioning of any organisation during a period of transformation. From the respondents' reactions it clearly emerged that the internal communication and information management of transformation in the SAPS appears to be unreliable, confusing and uncertain.

As a result, it is recommended that the SAPS adjusts its communication style to enhance interaction and consultation with its members at all hierarchical levels to reflect a democratic police service. It is furthermore suggested that SAPS management develop a sustainable culture of participative decision-making and to introduce a culture of involvement to replace the existing culture of a closed system to create a people-orientated approach to communication. As a result,

the SAPS will not neglect its own internal communication structures and will also move away from its present perceived autocratic style of communication. Consequently, it will also minimise the grapevine communication in the service, thus creating a favourable impact on members at ground level.

The SAPS should make use of, among other things, modern technology to communicate the transformation process to members nationally by providing each police station with the necessary facilities such as Internet, Intranet and audiovisual education and training projects to facilitate internal communication. These facilities should be utilised to their maximum potential. Regular information sessions on transformation should also become practice and should be compulsory to all members at the lower levels. Communication on the transformation process will thus remain timeous and continuous, which in turn will minimise confusion and uncertainty at ground level. Additionally, it is recommended that communication on the transformation process be co-ordinated by the national, provincial, and area level down to station level to ensure that information reaches ground level and is not limited to a certain level. This will ensure that internal communication and information management of transformation in the SAPS are synchronised and that contradictory messages or misleading information are minimised, which will enhance the credibility and reliability of information.

### **6.3.5 Step 5: Empower others to act**

This step entails empowering a fundamental part of the workforce to take action. The main challenge of empowering others to act is to remove key obstacles that impede people from acting on the vision rather than handing out power. A contributing factor to remove key obstacles is the creation of recognition and reward systems that encourage the workforce, increase their optimism and also build confidence for the change process. The desired new outcome of this step should be that a greater number of the workforce experiences the need to take action to change.

From the outcomes of this study it appears that few, if any, of the bureaucratic obstacles that could hamper the transformation process in the SAPS have actually been removed, such as ineffective internal communication on transformation and the lack of creation of recognition and reward systems. It is proposed that such barriers be removed through practical, visual, and concrete means such as filming members in the community service centre interacting with the community. As a result of this visual process members could, for the first time, see aspects of their actions of which they were unaware. Possibilities for improving service delivery, improving community relations, and building the image of the SAPS may in this way possibly come to

light, creating for many an excitement, and a we-can-do-better optimism. Consequently, this first-hand information may help empower members by providing them with feedback on the vision.

Training and development is a powerful tool during the transformation process in the SAPS has the ability to prepare, educate and empower members of the organisation, and therefore has a major contribution to make to this process. Although a new curriculum for basic training has been developed and applied in the training of students undergoing training since 1994, it strongly emerged from the responses of the respondents that the majority of members in the SAPS had undergone basic training prior to 1994, and are in desperate need of supplementary training and development concerning the activities of a changing police organisation.

These members should undergo supplementary training and education in fields such as human rights, fundamental rights, community policing, labour relations, victim support, conflict resolution and management and leadership in order to equip and empower themselves to adapt to changes in their policing style. Such training and education should also be developed through an integrated programme that will initiate, direct, and manage the process to be addressed and that it be co-ordinated at provincial and area level. As a result, training and education of members will take place on a sustained and continuous basis that could in turn ensure the individual development and personal growth of these members. It is, in addition, also suggested that such training takes place through practical informative sessions and workshops facilitated by professionals such as industrial psychologists and/or institutions of higher learning.

In order to empower members further, it is proposed that police managers and members at ground level are introduced to unorthodox methods that seek solutions to problems that would normally be ignored by logical thinking. Such methods could include creative programmes that encourage lateral thinking among members, which could empower them to handle change more innovatively, for example: self management workshops that could empower members to manage change productively and life skills programmes that could empower members to break the restraints of low self esteem and lack of self confidence that in turn could also empower them to participate and communicate and also awake a sense of ownership among them to ensure both the members and SAPS's well being. It is also suggested that the SAPS management creates and encourages teamwork among members where interdependence, high morale, organisational excellence, trust and productivity is at an optimal level in order to facilitate successful organisational change in the SAPS.

Mentorship and coaching programmes could also be effectively implemented to develop members at ground level for the change process through a credible source of inspiration and influence from their mentors. On the other hand, protégé's workshops could furthermore empower members in enabling them to work effectively with their mentors. Coaching skills could, in addition, demonstrate what members have to do during a change process, for example: how to apply community policing or how to empower victims of crime. As a result, high quality on-the-job learning and development opportunities for members at ground level are created, which could encourage, promote and support individual development of such members.

Moreover, it is advised that those members from previously disadvantaged groups that lack knowledge, leadership and managerial experience and that are earmarked for managers' positions be gradually and systematically introduced to such positions and not instantaneously placed in manager's posts as is the case presently. These members should be required to undergo an extensive leadership and management training and development programme that will empower them to be efficient managers whereafter these managers will continuously be monitored and evaluated. This implies that experience, competence and discipline will not be lost with the replacement of so-called previously advantaged managers by previously disadvantaged managers.

From the respondents' reactions it emerged that previously advantaged members with the required academic qualifications and experience are overlooked for post promotions to a higher rank as a result of the imbalances of the past. The disregarding of these members' achievements demoralises them and demotivates them for attending training and development courses, which in turn has a negative effect on the morale of the SAPS. It is recommended that members with the required academic qualifications and experience be promoted or at least be given recognition in the form of salary upgrades or a bonus system in order to empower them. Promotion systems and post appointments must place emphasis on merit and ability. As a result, such members may become more positive towards transformation, which will also minimise resistance to change. Besides the above recommendations, it is also proposed that the SAPS management develops a promotion policy without further delay since an interim promotion policy has been lingering for a number of years without reaching a conclusion. This drawn out state of affairs certainly has a negative effect on the development and morale of members.



Additionally, the broader community should be educated concerning police activities since the community still has the perception that the SAPS is a police force. Therefore, it is recommended that SAPS management initiates co-ordinated activities to inform the broader community that policing in South Africa has changed to a police service that has to perform its duties within the democratic law. These activities can take the form of media advertisements, and community, and school projects. These activities will in effect contribute to the development of members.

### **6.3.6 Step 6: Create short-term wins**

The principal challenge of this step is to generate enough short-term wins, in the shortest time possible, to encourage the people in the organisation that supports change, make the change process clear to the sceptics, calm the disbelievers, and create momentum for the change process. Short-term wins have the ability to promote reliance in the change endeavour; expressively reward industrious employees, keep disbelievers peaceful, and build momentum for change. These wins must however be as noticeable as possible to as many people as possible so that they break through emotional resistance by being meaningful and unambiguous. Furthermore, these wins can be achieved cheaply and easily, even if they seem small compared with the grand vision. The needed new behaviour is when momentum builds as people realize the vision, while fewer resist change.

The outcomes of this study, however, indicate that members of the SAPS regard most of the short-term wins created as superficial, confusing and not meaningful enough; the SAPS has thus not created meaningful wins fast enough. It is, therefore, recommended that when transformation initiatives are introduced, extensive educational programmes be implemented simultaneously to inform and educate all members at ground level in order to penetrate their emotional defences. These educational programmes could take the form of regular and sustainable transformational workshops, which explain the when, how and who of such an initiative. It is furthermore recommended that a list of each initiative that could be a short-term win be compiled for presentation at these educational programmes to assess the following:

- When could this change initiative realistically be implemented? How many months/years will it take?
- Who will be affected?
- How much effort and expense will it take? Grade it on a 1 to 10 scale, from almost no effort to huge time and expense.
- How unambiguous will the win be? (1 to 10)

- How visible will it be? (1 to 10)
- Will this be viewed as a meaningful win? (1 to 10)
- Who will see the win as meaningful?
- What will the rewards be?

As a result, this consultative and participative method among members at ground level could build faith in the change effort and also attract pessimistic members who are not yet actively helping. Consequently, power could be taken away from cynical members. These members therefore may become empowered by visualising the win and, in addition, uncertainty and fear could be addressed. Additionally, it is recommended that the SAPS focuses on one change initiative instead of on more than one, and also that the organisation ensures that no new initiatives are added until the initial initiative is achieved and celebrated. Moreover, it could follow that short-term wins are achieved faster, which in turn might raise a feeling of accomplishment, and a sense of optimism among members in the SAPS going through the transformation process. In turn, these wins will provide feedback to change leaders in respect of the credibility of their visions and strategies.

### **6.3.7 Step 7: Consolidate gains and produce even more change**

After accomplishing the first short-term wins, a change endeavour will have direction and momentum. In successful change efforts people have a tendency to build on this momentum to make the change vision a reality by maintaining urgency and a sense of misleading pride down; to eradicate pointless, fatiguing, and disheartening work; and by not proclaiming success too early. The key test of this step is to persevere with continuous change, not ending in anticipation of the realisation of the change vision, regardless of how confronting the barriers to successful change are. The wanted new conduct is for members to persevere with courage and enthused actions to make change a reality until the change vision is accomplished.

However, the results of this study indicate that the members in the SAPS are not as energised and motivated to push change forward as the SAPS management would like them to be since they feel they are negatively influenced by transformation. Interaction between the police and the community they serve must be strengthened through practical, visible, and ambitious methods as counter-measures to build momentum. It is, therefore, proposed that local police stations, where practically viable, be located strategically between residences in neighbourhoods where constant intermingling between the members of the SAPS and the community can take place, rather than

being located in huge impersonal office blocks in busy city centres or in town outskirts. As a result, collaboration or new collaboration norms could directly be created. Mutual negative stereotyping between the police and the community may possibly decrease since this partnership could be strengthened and a physical environment conducive for change could be created. Additionally, the creation of a community between the SAPS and the public could be strengthened to visibly continue the change effort, empowering and inspiring members to push change forward.

The SAPS should constantly compare where it stands in relation to other leading international democratic police institutions to build on the momentum of transformation in the Service. Comparing these international best practices with the change process in the SAPS could act as a measure to prevent the early declaration of the victory of transformation in the SAPS since such comparisons may point out potential obstacles that could hamper the momentum of transformation. A primary aim of the SAPS management during the period of transformation could be the building of the sustained momentum of such a process and the keeping up of urgency among members. The management of the SAPS should also obtain extensive firsthand information on issues that demotivate members to build momentum and keep urgency up. In addition, it is suggested that the SAPS management do a comprehensive fact finding mission on how to keep members at ground level positive. These fact-finding missions could take the form of personal visits to members at police stations where information can be exchanged to address concerns and gather relevant information. As a result, structures could be created to deal with difficult bureaucratic and political problems in order to make the vision of the SAPS a reality.

#### **6.3.8 Step 8: Institutionalise changes in the culture**

Tradition has the ability to become customary and habitual, which also has a controlling influence over people. For this reason one must unquestionably be convinced that the changes are ingrained and well established in the culture of the organisation to ensure that the new approach will be sustainable. The main challenge of this step is thus to create a structure with the necessary support that provides roots for the newfound functioning of the organisation. One must, however, make absolutely sure of the continuity of behaviour and the results that help a new culture grow. The desired new behaviour of this step is that new and successful behaviour persists regardless of the hindrance of tradition, replacement of change leaders, and other obstacles.

In contrast, the outcomes of this study point to the fact that the deeply embedded South African Police force culture could be a major force to reckon with during transformation in the SAPS. New (and old) members of the SAPS should start with an employee-orientation programme, showing members through video case studies how the SAPS as a changing organisation is increasingly transforming, and what values lie behind those new practices. Members could be shown video clips of serving members of the SAPS and members of the community who have benefited from transformation initiatives the SAPS has introduced. Consequently, this visualised method may assist members of the service to understand the end result and connect the new operations of the SAPS to personal values.

This employee-orientation programme could consist of the following characteristics:

- It could introduce the SAPS's new way of operating;
- It could rely greatly on visual effects such as video case studies. New recruits could see serving members communicating about their work and hear them tell real life stories about how they were doing their work and how it is being done presently;
- It could use animation, role-play and mimic creatively to show concretely what is usually discussed in very abstract ways. When animation is done well, it may be memorable in a way that a traditional briefing is rarely memorable;
- Visual effects such as this show a core value in the new culture and could do so through a dramatic heartfelt message from a member of the community.

With this kind of orientation, compelling visions provoke feelings that could help members of the SAPS behave "correctly" faster. Continuity of such action and success may help embed the new behaviour deeper into the culture. Another way that a fragile culture, such as the SAPS is currently experiencing, can be reinforced is through the promotions process. Therefore, it is furthermore proposed that those members who truly reflect the new norms be promoted into authoritative positions. By doing this, an increasingly solid and stable foundation could be created in the transformation process of the SAPS and may also make these norms more influential as a result of the power and visibility of those positions. Consequently, those members who embrace the new culture become more empowered, which in turn could lead to the behaviour that the SAPS is striving for. It follows that a positive cycle may develop.

## 6.4 Conclusion

This chapter summarizes chapter 1 to chapter 5 whereafter recommendations were made to address the obstacles impeding the transformation process in the SAPS. It is clear that if the SAPS management commit themselves towards the recommendations made in this chapter the problems and management obstacles impeding the transformation process in the SAPS will to a great extent be clarified. This in turn will impact positively on transformation in South African policing and will enhance the learning curve of becoming a true democratic police service.

This study is important as the obstacles impeding the transformation process in the SAPS are identified and explored. This consequently indicates the existence of several areas of contradiction and breaches between policy and practice as the emergent themes and subcategories indicated. Beside optimism and creditable examples of transformation initiatives implemented in the SAPS, this data however presents a disappointing picture of scepticism since many practices on the ground do not reflect the intentions of the legislation, policies, and directives. Although various directives on transformation have been implemented it emerged that mechanisms to address transformation in the SAPS have been difficult to successfully put into practice. Transformation initiatives implemented such as the change from a force to a service, the change of the police emblem and uniform, and the change of the rank structure are rather superficial changes. These changes can be seen as window dressing to shine its outside appearance since transformation in the SAPS has focussed greatly on race issues and reaching affirmative action targets, thus neglecting total transformation. The management of the SAPS should focus on changing member's behaviour- what members do, and the need for significant shifts in what members do. Members in the SAPS's thoughts should be influenced in order to help them to see the truth to influence their feelings since the heart of change is in the emotions. Despite progress in transforming South African policing much remains to be done as the recommendations suggest. The South African Police Service is still facing many learning challenges.



## **Annexure B**

### **The Vision, Mission and Values Statement of the South African Police Service**

One mandate given to the South African Police Service in this Vision is to “create a safe and secure environment for all people in South Africa”. This statement emphasises that the foundation for the accomplishment of this vision will be established through the needs of the community. This statement specifically deals with community involvement in a consultative and co-operative manner with the police. This statement furthermore argues for the upholding and protecting of fundamental human rights of all the people in South Africa to ensure a professional and effective service. The South African Police Service consequently commits itself to adopt a people-centred approach to the management of its personnel, to ensure equality of opportunity and to use its resources optimally and cost effectively. Emphasis is also given to the responsible and controlled use of police powers. The significance of this document is the creation of a balance between policing needs and the priorities of the community. As a result, this will lead to proactive policing with a problem-solving approach.

Community-orientated policing will thus promote a holistic approach between the police and the community externally, and between the management and members in the lower ranks internally. This implies that the previously autocratic, centralised control structure will become more decentralised, which will promote effective communication internally and externally. It follows that members will become more empowered in terms of personal development and individual participation, and in the use of discretion. Democratic oversight over the police will lead to a more legitimate, credible, accountable police service, which is not subject to political interference (South Africa. Department of Safety and Security, 1994(a): 1-9).

## Annexure C

### Questionnaire

#### Section A:

1. Please indicate your answer to the following questions in the applicable space marked with a “X”?

(i) Gender

Male	
Female	

(ii) In which policing area are you performing duties?

Soweto

Pretoria

(iii) What is your post/position?

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2. What rank do you hold in the South-African Police Service? Since when?

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3. How many years service do you have in the South-African Police Service?

---

4. How many courses have you successfully completed from 1994 – 2002?  
specify.

Please

Course	Place	Year



5. What is your home language?

--

6. In what other language(s) can you deliver service?

English		Tsonga	
Afrikaans		Ndebele	
Xhosa		North Sotho	
Zulu		South Sotho	
Venda		Tswana	
Swati			

**Section B: The determining of the organizations' readiness towards change**

The objective of the questions in this section are to determine how prepared the South-African Police Service is concerning the change process which is currently taking place. Ten key elements are indicated on this list. Evaluate the South-African Police Service by awarding three (3) points that indicates a high score (“We are adequate, I am convinced of our skills in this field”); two (2) points for an average score (“There is room for improvement; we can improve or lack experience”); one(1) point for a low score (“we experience problems; it’s new to our organization”).

1. Did the top management of the South African Police Service stipulate the necessity for change and did they establish a clear vision for the future?

1	2	3
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2. Was a comparison made between the South African Police Service and other police institutions in the rest of the world?

1	2	3
---	---	---

3. Is the South African Police Service flexible, co-operative and capable of making fast decisions?

1	2	3
---	---	---

4. Do the police culture encourage the taking of risks and are recognition given for continuous progress?

1	2	3
---	---	---

5. Does the South African Police Service use specific methods to evaluate working performance?

1	2	3
---	---	---

Name these methods

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6. Do key activities that are currently experienced in the South African Police Services support change?

1	2	3
---	---	---

Give examples of such activities.

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7. Does the South African Police Service reward individuals and/or groups for initiative taken or for identifying the main reasons of organizational problems?

1	2	3
---	---	---

Give examples of such awards

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8. Does effective communication take place between police management and all other levels?

1	2	3
---	---	---

9. Did the South-African Police Service successfully implement other change programmes?

1	2	3
---	---	---

Name such change programmes

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10. Do members of the South-African Police Service take personal responsibility for their actions?

1	2	3
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Section C: Change Management

Note: Please answer the questions in this section according to the scale below and mark with a “X”

I absolutely agree	5
I agree	4
I'm not certain	3
I disagree	2
I absolutely disagree	1

1. Management pays attention to grievances concerning changes being instituted.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

2. Democratic management styles in the South-African Police Service leads to better discipline.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

3. The present rank structure contributes to effective service delivery and the changing of the militaristic rank structure was successful.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

4. The changes to which the South African Police Service is presently exposed are not necessary for the effective existence of the South African Police Service.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

5. The discipline of the South African Police Service was undermined by the demilitarization of the police.

1	2	3	4	5
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6. Changes that are currently implemented in the South African Police Service will improve functioning of the organization.

1	2	3	4	5
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7. Community needs are not always understood by all members of the South African Police Service, therefore greater community involvement will solve the problem.

1	2	3	4	5
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8. Community policing forums contribute to the workload of the yet overworked South African Police Service.

1	2	3	4	5
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9. Affirmative Action is a positive strategy in an attempt to create a more acceptable South African Police Service in the eyes of the community.

1	2	3	4	5
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10. The public must have a greater influence in the South African Police Service concerning the establishment of priorities regarding the working methods of the police.

1	2	3	4	5
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11. Members on operational level must form part of the decision making process in the South-African Police Service.

1	2	3	4	5
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12. The community can instruct the police in what order they must attend to complaints.

1	2	3	4	5
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13. Rules and regulations don't discourage police officers' initiative and must therefore not be changed.

1	2	3	4	5
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14. Affirmative Action did not have a negative influence on the standard of policing.

1	2	3	4	5
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15. The community must not be withheld to participate in operational issues of the South African Police Service.

1	2	3	4	5
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16. The changes in the top management of the South African Police Service carry away the approval of members on station level.

1	2	3	4	5
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17. The members on station level understand the reason why the change in policing methods in South Africa was necessary.

1	2	3	4	5
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18. Members on station level are not taken into consideration when policy changes are being made that affects them directly.

1	2	3	4	5
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## **Annexure D**

### **Request for Conducting a Focus Group Interview**

The Station Commissioner

#### **REQUEST FOR CONDUCTING A FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW AT \_\_\_\_\_ POLICE STATION**

I refer to the telephonic conversation you had some days ago with Johan van Graan, one of the registered Mtech learners in the Programme Group Police Practice. The topic of his dissertation is: *“Obstacles impeding the transformation process in the South African Police Service”*. One of his data collection techniques is focus group interviews with non-commissioned police officers in the Pretoria and Soweto areas, and your station was selected as one of the police stations, due to the fact that it operates in a dynamic environment.

I will appreciate it if your office can arrange for 12 non-commissioned officials to partake in the focus group interview that will be conducted at your police station on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_, and at \_\_\_\_\_ with yourself. I will appreciate it if you can keep diversity factors in mind when selecting the participants.

The purpose of the interview is to obtain the views of these officials on their experiences with, and perceptions of, the transformation process in the SAPS. The research results will be dealt with in confidence and anonymity and participants do not have to fear that their comments will in any way be linked to them individually. The information gathered during the interview will contribute towards a better understanding and management of the transformation process in the SAPS.

Johan van Graan obtained permission from the Head of the Directorate Research, Senior Superintendent Johan Schnetler, to conduct the research. In this research project, Johan van Graan will adhere to the Code of Research Ethics of the Technikon SA, that ensures amongst other things, confidentiality of the data collected.

Your kind consideration of this request for interviews will be appreciated.

Yours sincerely

Dr. H. F Snyman  
Chief lecturer: Police Practice  
Coordinator: M & D Tech programme: Police Practice

## **Annexure E**

### **Request for permission to administer questionnaire**

The Station Commissioner

#### **REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO ADMINISTER QUESTIONNAIRE AT \_\_\_\_\_ POLICE STATION**

One of the Mtech learners in the Programme Group Police Practice at the Technikon SA, Johan van Graan, identified “*Obstacles impeding the transformation process in the South African Police Service*” as the topic for his dissertation.

This research has as its aim the identification of obstacles that hinder the transformation processes that have to occur in the SAPS, and your participation in this research project will contribute towards this. This research project is focused on the greater Pretoria and Soweto policing area, and all the police stations within this area will participate in it. As part of his data gathering for the research project, he needs to you to fill out a questionnaire concerning change in the SAPS. The data thus gathered will assist him in obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the dilemmas that you and your police station faces on a daily basis, in the change process.

Johan van Graan obtained permission from the Head of the Directorate Research, Senior Superintendent Johan Schnetler, to conduct the research. In this research project, Johan van Graan will adhere to the Code of Research Ethics of the Technikon SA, that ensures amongst other things, confidentiality of the data collected.

Your kind cooperation will be highly appreciated, and will contribute to a better understanding of the obstacles impeding the change process in the SAPS, and identify measures to overcome them.

Yours sincerely

Dr. H. F. Snyman  
Chief lecturer: Police Practice  
Coordinator: M & D Tech Programme: Police Practice



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