THE HELLENICA OXYRHYNCHIA AND

THE ASIATIC CAMPAIGN OF AGESILAUS

by

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I declare that *The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia and the Asiatic Campaign of Agesilaus* is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.
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THE HELLENICA OXYRHYNCHIA AND THE ASIATIC CAMPAIGN OF AGESILAUS

SUMMARY

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This thesis contains a discussion of the historical content of the London papyrus, P0xy 842, the Florentine papyrus, PSI 1304 and the recently published fragment PCairo, Temp. inv. no. 26/6/27/1-35, collectively known as the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (P).

The focal point is the Asiatic campaign of Agesilaus and the battle of Sardis. Impressions gained from a personal investigation of the terrain are reviewed and an attempt is made to isolate the misconceptions that have hampered more constructive thinking on this episode of history. An endeavour is made to arrive at a personal reconstruction of the battle of Sardis and an assessment of P's credibility and value as an historian.

The thesis concludes that there is no valid reason to doubt P's credibility and that discrepancies between the two main sources, Xenophon and P, can be ascribed to the difference in historiographical approach. The autumn campaign of Agesilaus is discussed to illustrate more clearly how Xenophon's approach conditioned his writing of history.
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INTRODUCTION

An interest in history in general and Greek history in particular leads the student normally to Thucydides and his account of the Peloponnesian war. From this point it is a natural step to the events following in the wake of the war and the ancient historians who have dealt with the post-Thucydidean period. Of these Xenophon and Diodorus have left the most complete accounts, and of the two Xenophon was the accepted authority until 1906, when the discovery of some Oxyrhynchus papyri with an historical text on this period by an unknown author brought support for Diodorus who was shown to have used the Oxyrhynchus author or P, as he came to be known, as a source with Ephorus as an intermediary.

It seemed, therefore, that the importance of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia justified a renewed study and a detailed discussion with special attention to and an evaluation of the discrepancies found between the two traditions. Since Agesilau's Asiatic campaign of 395 is described in fairly extensive and continuous narrative in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, and this campaign is also covered in part by Diodorus and more fully by Xenophon, it has become the focal point of this thesis.

A summary of the historical contents of the London (P. Oxy. 842 London), the Florentine (PS.I,1304, Florence) and the new fragments, known as P. Cairo (Temp. Inv. No.) 26/6/27/1 - 35 of the Oxyrhynchus papyri is followed by a preliminary discussion of the author's chronology, digressions, scope, outlook, relation to other historians, his possible identity and the current evaluation of him as an historian.

Thereafter the campaign of Agesilaus and the battle of Sardis are dealt with in great detail and with special reference to the routes attributed to Agesilaus by P - Diodorus and Xenophon respectively. This constitutes the central chapter of the thesis. I have come to the conclusion that there is no basic discrepancy in our sources with regard to the route followed by Agesilaus from Ephesus to Sardis, and that many of the discrepancies between the two traditions of Xenophon and Diodorus - P respectively can be reconciled or ascribed to the difference in historia-
graphical approach between P and Xenophon.

In conclusion I have studied the accounts of P and Xenophon of Agesilaus' autumn or Phrygian campaign in order to illustrate how this difference in historiographical approach influenced the authors' selection of historical material and their treatment of it.
CHAPTER ONE

THE HELLENICA OXYRHYNCHIA — THE PAPYRI AND THE AUTHOR

For many generations Xenophon was the accepted authority for the post-Thucydidean period of the Peloponnesian War and the events following in its wake. Though Diodorus' histories cover the same period in fair detail, scholars, where discrepancies occurred, invariably preferred Xenophon's version. In 1906, however, there was discovered at Oxyrhynchus an historical papyrus which shook time-worn standards and brought a fresh pattern of thought on the course of Hellenic history around the turn of the fourth century. This was followed by the discovery of another papyrus in 1934, by the same author, as was subsequently established. A third fragment of what came to be known as the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia was published recently.¹ The impressive body of literature that has been activated by the discovery of the papyrus, is reflected in Bengtson's sources and bibliography for the period 404-360 B.C.²

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPYRI

(i) The 'London Papyrus'

This is the name commonly applied to the fragments discovered in 1906 from its being kept in the Papyrological Section of the British Museum. It consisted originally of 230 fragments, which were assembled by F. Blass; after proofs had been submitted to Eduard Meyer and U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, who made valuable suggestions, the papyrus was published for the first time in 1908 by Grenfell and Hunt as P. Oxy. 842 in Volume V of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri.³ It deals in great detail with the Greek History of the years 396 and 395 B.C. The original 230 fragments of varying sizes were fitted into a whole leaving about fifty-five small pieces unplaced.
The text is written in uncial on the verso of an official document with a landsurvey on its recto, which was of great service in determining the place of the detached fragments. Twenty-one columns of the historical work, written by two scribes, could be distinguished by Grenfell and Hunt, and of these the first scribe was responsible for cols. i-iv, vi, 27-xxi and all the loose fragments except Fragment 3 and perhaps 16. As the survey was written towards the middle of the second century A.D. the first editors concluded that the text on the verso could be attributed to the end of the second century or the early part of the third. The twenty-one columns are not continuous but are divided into four sections separated by gaps in which several columns may be missing. Grenfell and Hunt have named these sections A, B, C & D, with A comprising cols. i-iv, including fragments 1 & 2, and B cols. v-viii with fragments 3-7 and also cols. ix, vii and the beginnings of lines of vii on the same piece of papyrus. C contains the two fragmentary cols. ix & x with fragments 8-15, while D, by far the largest section, has cols. xi-xxi, which are continuous. In spite of the fact that the historian, to whom the first editors hereafter refer as P, seems to have followed chronological principles almost as strict as those of Thucydides, the order of the four sections is not clear.

(ii) The 'Florence Papyrus'

The second papyrus, the so-called Florence papyrus, which was found at Oxyrhynchus in 1934 was first published by V. Bartoletti as PSI 1304 in Papiri greci e latini vol. XIII (1949) Florentiae 61-81. This papyrus is kept in the Istituto Papirologico "G. Vitelli" della Universita di Firenze. The script is on the recto of the papyrus of which the verso is unused. There are three large fragments labelled by Bartoletti A, B & C, which contain parts of six columns. A smaller fragment, D, is badly mutilated and a further fragment, known as E in the editio princeps has proved to belong to the first eleven lines of the second column of A. The handwriting is a clear uncial and is thought by Bartoletti to belong to the end of
the second century A.D. The text of the two papyri is the work of the same author. This is borne out by the similarities in style and vocabulary as well as the general treatment of the material.

(iii) The fragment P. Cairo

A third papyrus known as P. Cairo (Temp. Inv. no. 26/6/27/1-35) has been made available by the Egyptian Museum in Cairo which led to publication by L. Koenen. After thorough re-examination of the historical aspects as well as of the linguistic criteria, Koenen emphatically declared himself in favour of connecting the new historical text with the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia which is known to be a continuation of Thucydides' history. P. Cairo consists of three columns of a roll which are partly damaged. The text appears on the recto while the verso has a demotic list of expenditures. The historical text is written in a small square bookhand of the late 1st century. Most vertical and oblique lines are adorned with small hooks and most letters have a similar appearance. In the new papyrus we have a description of the attempts of the Athenians under Thrasyllus to capture Ephesus in the summer of 409 B.C.

The three papyri turned out to be the main sources, entirely independent of Xenophon, for Ephorus and through him the source of Diodorus for the years 396-5 and 410-407 B.C.; the London Papyrus, the Florence Papyrus as well as that of the new fragment, P. Cairo, thus help to confirm the view of Grenfell and Hunt that the Oxyrhynchus historian intended his work to be a continuation of Thucydides' history and that his narrative therefore began with the events of 411 B.C.

In this thesis I have decided to use Grenfell and Hunt's system of reference for the London papyrus and that of Bartoletti for the Florentine fragments with regard to the indication of chapters; and for further clarity the chapter will be followed by the column number. I shall, moreover, also follow the first editors in referring to the author of the papyrus as P and the text in use will be that of Bartoletti.
(iv) Summary of the historical contents of the three papyri

The Florentine fragments A-B begin with a description of an Athenian victory over the Megarians in the year + 409 and there are references to Pedaritus and Thucydides which may refer to Cratesippidas' exploits at Chios in 409 B.C. Further on the mention of Clazomenae is thought to be a reference to an expedition of Alcibiades in 408 or 407 B.C. This is followed by an account of a naval engagement between Lysander and Antiochus, i.e. the Battle of Notium, in + 407. P then describes an incident near the temple of Demeter and Kore in which an exchange of messages takes place between Ἀμφασκός and an Athenian guard.

The London papyrus is devoted to events that occurred in the years 396 - 395 B.C. and it commences with an account of Demaenetus' expedition to join Conon and the embarrassment it caused the Athenian government who, at this stage, were opposed to sending troops and supplies to Conon. P refutes the view that the party of Epicles and Cephalus and various Boeotian cities had become hostile to Sparta only after accepting Persian bribes from Timocrates. He shows that Sparta's autocratic and unfriendly behaviour was responsible for the hostility prevalent in Boeotia. After giving an indication of the year (396 or 395) P continues his account of the Naval War. It seems that 90 ships came from Phoenicia and Cilicia to Caunus, while Conon also sailed to Caunus and a message was sent to the King of Persia. The next intelligible account is that of Agesilaus' spring campaign in Asia and the battle of Sardis. There is a detailed account of an ambush which led to the defeat of Tissaphernes and his Persians near Sardis. After the battle, we are told, Agesilaus led his army towards Phrygia Magna, ravaging the country as he went and followed at a distance by Tissaphernes. He reached the Maeander but unfavourable omens deterred him from crossing the river and attacking Celaenae. He therefore led his army back to the plain of Maeander. P then gives a detailed description (of which much is lost) of Tissaphernes' supersession and death. P also provides a
favourable character sketch, but the subject cannot be determined with certainty.\textsuperscript{19}]

In the section which follows, the narrative is fairly continuous and we have a lively description of the democratic revolution at Rhodes and the role played by Conon.\textsuperscript{20} P then gives an account of the beginning of the Boeotian War as well as a description of the Boeotian Constitution.\textsuperscript{21} This is followed by information on the parties at Thebes and we are told how the Boeotians benefitted by the Decelean War.\textsuperscript{22} Returning to the Boeotian War, P gives an account of how the party of Androcleidas and Ismenias managed to use a long-standing dispute between Locris and Phocis to provoke a war between them that eventually involved the whole of Boeotia and Sparta as well.\textsuperscript{23}]

After describing the Boeotians' invasion of Phocis, P returns to the Naval War. We are told that Conon sailed with twenty triremes from Rhodes to Caunus in order to visit Pharnabazus and Tithraustes and obtain from them money to pay the arrear wages which had been owing to the troops for many a month.\textsuperscript{24} P adds that this was a customary plight for soldiers serving the Great King. Conon, it appears, was given money taken from the estate of Dissaphernes, after he had warned Tithraustes that lack of funds for the soldiers' pay could endanger the King's cause.\textsuperscript{25} Conon's warning was substantiated when, even before he had returned from his negotiations, his Cypriot troops began to mutiny after being told that he intended cheating them out of their wages. P gives a vivid description of this mutiny and how Conon managed to restore peace and order.\textsuperscript{26}]

In the last section of the papyrus P describes Agesilaus' autumn campaign in Asia.\textsuperscript{27} There is a detailed account of Agesilaus' march through Lydia into Phrygia and Mysia. After a treacherous attack upon his rearguard in a pass of Mysian Olympus, Agesilaus retaliated with a second ambush in which the Mysians were routed. Thereafter Agesilaus ravaged the countryside as
before. At this stage he was joined by the Persian Spithridates and his son Megabates. After Agesilaus had made unsuccessful attacks on Leonton Cephalae and Gordium Spithridates persuaded him to march towards Paphlagonia where an alliance was concluded with the King Gyes, who afterwards sent a contingent of troops as well. While marching back to the coast Agesilaus again ravaged the land of the Mysians, and after making an unsuccessful attack on Miletou Teichos he arrived at Lake Dascylitis. Here he summoned Pancalus who sailed with his triremes from the Hellespont and into the lake where he was ordered to take on board the more valuable part of the booty and convey it to Cyzicus. Thereafter Agesilaus dismissed the Mysians with orders to return in spring, while he planned to spend the winter near the lake, making preparations for a march into Cappadocia. At this point the papyrus breaks off.

In the new fragment, P. Cairo, P describes Thrasylus’ assault upon Ephesus. In 409 B.C. Thrasylus, it seems, sailed to Ephesus and after disembarking all his troops, marched against the city with part of the men while the rest under Pasion followed another route. The Ephesians and a Lacedaemonian detachment engaged Thrasylus and his troops in battle near the harbour called Coressus but seem to have been defeated for after the engagement Thrasylus tried to take the city by force. But Timarchus and Poseicrates, the generals of the Ephesians, summoned their heavily armed troops and in the battle that followed they defeated the Athenians who fled to their ships and suffered heavy losses. Historically the new fragment fits in just before fragment A of the Florentine papyrus P.S.I. 1304 in which P describes a battle fought between the Athenians and the Megarians in 409.

II. THE AUTHOR AND HIS WORK

(i) Scope and date of composition

With regard to the scope of P’s work absolute certainty cannot
be obtained on the points at which P's narrative began and terminated, but a reasonable conjecture can be made from the evidence available.\textsuperscript{33}) In the London papyrus, col. ii (Ch. II), P refers back to his earlier mention of a naval battle near Amphipolis in which Timolaus, the Corinthian, defeated an Athenian general. This episode probably occurred during the latter part of 411 B.C., i.e. soon after the point at which Thucydides' history ends. According to Meyer and Grenfell and Hunt, the expedition to Thasos, which was one of Timolaus' exploits in the Decelean war must have occurred towards the end of 411.\textsuperscript{34}) According to Thucydides it was in that year that the Thasian democracy fell, the city was fortified and prompt aid was expected from the Spartans who had harboured the exiled Thasian oligarchs.\textsuperscript{35)}

Thasos is known to have had a Spartan harbour in 410 so that Timolaus with the Peloponnesian fleet must have arrived before that date.\textsuperscript{36}) The incidents related in col. ii 24 - 32 (Ch. II 4) therefore follow on the last events narrated in Thucydides' history; and the reference in col. ii 27 - 8 (Ch. II 4) to a former mention, \textit{δια μεγάλης πορείας και ποταμού}, of Timolaus' exploit at Amphipolis, probably in the main narrative, serves as an indication that P's history was a continuation of Thucydides. The earlier exploit, the plundering of certain islands (col. ii 22 - 4) perhaps occurred in 412 or early in 411 and is not mentioned by Thucydides.

Grenfell and Hunt say it is clear that P's history included, besides the events of 396 and 395, the history of the seven years between 396 and the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, and that P took the year 403 - 2 as marking a kind of epoch.\textsuperscript{37}) But the reference to a former description of an incident of 411 B.C. in col. ii 27 (Ch. II) makes it probable that P's work also included that part of the Peloponnesian war which Thucydides did not live to write. Since P, on several occasions, mentions events prior to 411, but without any reference to a former description of them, there is a strong presumption that P did not deal with these events himself; his history therefore begins where Thucydides left off.
and he intended it to be a continuation of Thucydides' work. The
discovery of the Florentine papyrus has, of course, brought con-
firmation for this view in that it deals with an Athenian victory
over the Megarians and the exploits of the Spartan nauarch
Cratesippidas, both of which occurred ± 409 B.C., and the battle
of Notium, which probably took place in 407 B.C. 38) The publica-
tion in 1976 of a new fragment, P. Cairo, which gives an account
of an Athenian assault upon Ephesus in 409, has brought further
confirmation for the view that P wrote a continuation of Thucydides'
history.

There is no internal evidence to show to what point beyond
395 the narrative was carried, apart from that which indicates the
period to which the composition of the work itself belongs, and
which constitutes a different problem. Thus the description of
the constitution of Boeotia, which is contrasted with the condi-
tions prevalent in the writer's own time, must have been written
after 387, when the peace of Antalcidas brought considerable
changes to the Boeotian League. 39) On the other hand the fact that
the Persian empire is referred to in terms which imply that it
was still standing proves that P's history could not have been
written later than 330; 40) and the use of the present tense in
connection with the border disputes between Phocis and Locris,
along with the fact that no mention is made of the Sacred War
which resulted in the destruction of the Phocians, leads to the
conclusion that P's work was composed before the end of that war
in 346. 41) Lehmann finds that new support has come for a date of
composition shortly after 350 B.C. 42) It is, however, probable
that an author as well informed as P was not writing many gene-
rations later than the events covered in his history. It is
therefore possible that the history continues down to some 20
or 30 years later than 395; but, this in view of its elaborate
scale, is unlikely. However, the surviving portions of the work
seem to indicate that it was written more on the scale of
Thucydides' history than that of Xenophon's Hellenica and the
inference may perhaps be made that it did not cover many more
years than did Thucydides' work. Two dates which might be suitable closing points for P's work suggest themselves: 394, the year of the battle of Cnidus and 386, the Peace of Antalcidas. Of these Bruce finds 336 the more probable, since the history of Diodorus, whose main source for the events covered by both the Florence and the London papyri, was undoubtedly "the Oxyrhynchus historian, albeit with Ephorus as intermediary, has been demonstrated to rest on such a source for the whole period 411 - 386"; and it may be assumed that the source was the work of P.43)

On the date of composition Bruce agrees with the first editors that this preceded the conclusion of the Sacred War.44) Inferring from P's detailed account that many of his informants could have been eyewitnesses, Bruce has suggested a date as early as 374 for the composition or part of it. He adds, however, that this cannot be claimed to be more than speculation, for his argument was based on a conjecture about the constitution of the renewed Boeotian League which cannot be proved correct.45) Grenfell and Hunt, on the other hand considered there was no evidence that P's work went further than the battle of Cnidus.46) Cawkwell is in favour of an early date but feels that Bruce's suggestion of 374 is based partly on "the wholly unsound speculation he permits himself on p. 86 of his article in Emerita xxviii, 1960."47) Bruce, of course, admits that his date is based on a conjecture that cannot be verified. It does, however, seem very likely that the date of composition of P's history was an early one, perhaps 374, as Bruce has suggested and the most probable date for the conclusion of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia appears to be 386, with the Peace of Antalcidas.

(ii) Chronology used by P

We have in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia an elaborate and detailed work of a historian of some importance who shows himself equally well-informed, whether dealing with events in Greece, the campaigns of Agesilaus in Asia or the Naval War in the years 409 - 407 and 396 - 395. In the arrangement of his material P adopted an annalistic method, evidently derived from Thucydides, narrating events in
chronological order and dividing them into years beginning in the summer (spring or midsummer). As Bruce has shown, col. iii of the London papyrus seems to leave no doubt that P based his chronological system on that of Thucydides. However, the point in the year at which P's summers and winters began, is open to dispute. Meyer, Jacoby, Bloch and Bartoletti have supported the view that P follows Thucydides in taking the spring as the beginning of his "summers" but Bruce follows Grenfell and Hunt in believing that the summer from which P reckoned the beginning of the eighth year refers to midsummer. P also made use of the customary Thucydidean formulae in order to synchronise events of different areas and we find P employing the same simple form of transition from one scene to another, which we see in Thucydides. Thucydides, however, does not use the official lunar year but the solar year and he gives his reason. The seasons are fixed by the sun; and spring is part of Thucydides' summer and begins when winter ends. In the course of his discussion of the question whether Thucydides' year is solar or lunar, whether it always begins at a fixed time and, if there was a fixed beginning, what that beginning was, Gomme quotes a list of formulae used by Thucydides in books ii to v. 24, which serve as evidence. From these formulae it is clear that Thucydides fixed the time by seasons, from the beginning of spring to the end of winter and that his year is therefore a solar year. His summer includes spring and autumn and probably lasted seven months from about the end of February to about the end of September, i.e. from the heliacal rising of Arcturus, as the period was known in the Greek agricultural context.

Grenfell and Hunt, however, believe that Thucydides "divides each year of the war into two equal parts αὔων and ἔπος, making the former begin in spring; and they consider it likely that P's work is constructed on chronological principles similar to, if less strict than, those of Thucydides. There is a certain presumption, they say, that he, too, reckoned in years which began in the spring"; and col. iii (Ch. IV) may even have commenced
with a phrase such as ἄνωθεν ἀπὸν τὴν λεύκην. "On the other hand

in col. iii line 6 (Ch. IV) might very well refer to
midsummer, the starting point of the Olympiads and the year of the
Attic archons. The later columns are compatible with either
hypothesis". But the first editors find that the account of the
naval war in col. iii (Ch. IV) favours the view that the 8th
year began in the summer. They conclude that P, like Thucydides,
reckons back to a fixed point, which, owing to the lacuna in line
10, cannot be determined.\textsuperscript{52}

As Thucydides was not the first to use the solar dating system,
he assumes that his readers will be familiar with the division of
the year into seasons and makes no attempt to explain it. The
system, however, amounts to this: spring begins with the acronyca
rise of Arcturus on the 5th March and ends with the appearance of
the Pleiades early in May.\textsuperscript{53} Autumn begins with the heliacal
rise of Arcturus - the equinox - about 20th September and winter
begins about 6th November.\textsuperscript{54} Thucydides chose this system because
the whole period of slightly more than 8 months coincided with the
normal season for the waging of war by land and by sea. But we do
not know to what extent he took the astronomers' calculations into
account for his precise dating. We find then that summer formed
about two-thirds of the solar year.

When, however, Thucydides was dealing with the past and with
long periods, he used the normal method of his age, i.e. archon
years and the lunar year or rather, the luni-solar year, for the
Greeks had to bring their lunar years into conformity with the
solar years from time to time by adding "intercalary" months.

(iii) Digressions

P is fond of digressions but his use of these, as Bruce has
remarked, is "more than a stylistic peculiarity; it is a part
of his historical method employed either to elucidate the
background ..... against which the events of his narrative took
place or to provide an explanation of the long-standing causes of the more important events or trends in the history. They seem to serve the same purpose as do some of the speeches in Lycurgus' history. The digression, however, is characteristic of Greek historiography; this feature, in fact, distinguishes the Hellenica from the Chronicle. Herodotus and also Theopompus introduced digressions into their histories and after Isocrates and Polybius digressions became common in classical Greek historiography.

The digression, considered as an element of style, is related to the pursuit of diversity as against unity in that it is intended to bring variety and rest—velut deverticula amoenae et requiem. But pleasure is not its only aim. The more austere and non-rhetorical writer uses the digression for the sake of diversity as well as for its historical content and in a work of a comprehensive nature, diversity is imperative: thus Polybius tries to achieve variety for the diligent reader. Geography has a special function in scientific historiography and here also the digression can serve to convey the geographical knowledge which is an essential background to the history that is being narrated.

There are eight main digressions from the narrative in the London papyrus. These digressions, however, do not appear to be structurally well planned but occur in the extant manuscript (and therefore also in the lost portion) two or three in succession without an attempt at better distribution. At a later stage, i.e. in Polybius, their use is structurally more systematic. The digressions on Pedaritus, on the Boeotian Constitution and on the increasing prosperity of Boeotia as a result of the Spartan occupation of Decelea are examples of a type of excursus intended to clarify complex political situations.

After the passage on Demosthenes' expedition and the reaction it elicited in Athens, P embarks on three digressions in immediate
succession, of which the first records the positive acts of hostility that preceded the adventure of Demaenetus. We are told that the party of Epicrates and Cephalus was responsible for those activities which are recorded at this stage by P to emphasize the contrast between the former policy of the group and its present readiness to have Demaenetus publicly disowned and delivered up to Spartan justice.

In the following digression P indicates that Epicrates and Cephalus had espoused a policy of open hostility to Sparta even before they made contact with Timocrates and his Persian gold. He shows that this is also true of Boeotia and other cities in Greece which were visited by Timocrates. P then suggests as the real cause of hostility towards Sparta the fact that the Spartans had treated as friends the political opponents of the Boeotians and the Argives. To the Athenians P attributes unworthy motives for war-mongering but the Corinthians, we are told, were opposed to the Spartans for reasons similar to those which moved the Boeotians and the Argives. This digression, Bruce stresses, illustrates P's interest in revealing the longer-standing causes of the events and his unwillingness to accept only immediate causes.

A digression on Timolaus' activities in the Decelian war serves to emphasize a point already made, i.e. that Timocrates' gold was not responsible for the wide-spread hostility towards Sparta.

Col. x (Ch. IX), while severely mutilated, apparently contained a character sketch of an important person whose identity cannot be established. Nor, therefore, can its relevance be assessed.

The excursus at col. xx (Ch. XVI) on Spithridates is intended to provide information on a newly introduced character and is also relevant in explaining why Agesilaus thought he would be a useful ally.
A slight digression also occurs in col. xiv (Ch. XIII) on the disputed territory between Phocis and Locri and the customary course of the border incidents which resulted. This provides background knowledge which is essential for an understanding of the stratagem said to have been employed by the Thebans to provoke war between themselves and the Phocians.

Conon's visit to Artakes and Pharnabazus to obtain arrears of pay for his troops led to an excursus on the King of Persia's disinclination to provide the wages due to those serving in his forces. This digression explains why the pay was withheld and is also important in that the question of unpaid wages was the chief cause of the serious mutiny of Conon's Cypriot land forces.65)

Grenfell and Hunt, however, while recognizing the importance of digressions such as that on the origin of anti-Spartan feeling or the one on the Boeotian constitution, believe that P's digressions are seldom very relevant and cause serious interruptions to the narrative. In support of their view they write: "Now easily he was led from one excursus to another is well illustrated, firstly by (Col.) i 20 sqq (Ch. I & II) where starting from the privateering expedition of Damaenetus, he reaches the intermediate stages of the origin of the anti-Spartan feeling, first at Athens, then in Greece in general and at Corinth in particular, - secondly by (Col.) xii 31 sqq (Ch. XII) where from the war between Boeotia and Phocis, he proceeds through the description of parties at Thebes, the causes of the previous preponderance of the aristocrats and the growing prosperity of Thebes to a sketch of the flourishing condition of Attica prior to the fortification of Decela."66)

Grenfell and Hunt concede that the digressions add greatly to the interest and variety of P's work; but I cannot agree with their judgement on the relevance of P's excursuses which, representing as they do P's attempts to probe the deeper
causes of important events and to provide essential background
detail, can only serve to enhance his reputation as an historian.
We find, in fact, that the use of digressions to provide background
detail and variety became an established practice with Polybius
who wrote in the tradition of Thucydides, which is also the tra-
dition to which P belongs. 67)

(iv) Outlook of author

While the sympathies of P were aristocratic and, generally
speaking, with Sparta, he was not guilty of exaggerated partisans-
ship and even compares favourably with Xenophon in this respect. 68)
And if he seems over-harsh in his opinion of the extreme section of
the democrats at Athens, it is equally true that he defends the
Athenians, Thebans, Argives and Corinthians against the charge
of Medizing, while not denying the acceptance of Persian bribes. 69)
He expressly refutes the pro-Spartan view and minimizes the extent
to which the mission of Timocrates was responsible for the creation
of the anti-Spartan league. 70) P takes note of the moderation of
the section of the Athenian party headed by Thrasybulus and Anytus
and of the victorious democrats at Rhodes; 71) and he classes the
leaders of the anti-Spartan faction at Thebes among the προμαχωται
γιορτίται . 72) He shows no trace of an anti-Theban bias
and his fairness towards Sparta's enemies is further illustrated
by the prominence he assigns to Conon, who figures no less
conspicuously than Agesilaus, and by the contrast between his
dry account of Agesilaus' activities and the vivid description
of the incidents of the naval war, with its outspoken expression
of admiration for Conon's skill in surmounting difficulties. 73)
Grenfell and Hunt believe that nothing gives a better illustration
of P's merits as an historian and his superiority to Xenophon, than
the correct perspective in which he draws the two main characters
in his history, showing that the spectacular but ultimately
useless triumphs of Agesilaus in the East were secondary in im-
portance to the slow but in the end successful steps by which
Conon destroyed Spartan naval power and restored Athens to a po-
sition among the leading Greek States.\textsuperscript{74})

Unlike most Greek historians, \( P \) has a marked dislike of rhetoric and seems to avoid speeches of which there is only one, consisting of nine words; which leads us to think that the 8th book of Thucydides may have been his model.\textsuperscript{75}) But we must keep in mind that the events of the extant fragments do not offer very favourable opportunities for the insertion of speeches. However, speeches may have occurred in the lost sections of \( P \)'s work. But to compensate for the absence of speeches \( P \) resorts to digressions in which, as has been shown in the discussion above, causes and motives underlying various situations are analysed.\textsuperscript{76}) \( P \) also seems to have refrained from comment, whether of approval or disapproval, upon the actions of his characters; and unfortunately the only passage in which he appears to have made a character appraisal is badly mutilated.\textsuperscript{77})
The author's relation to other historians

It seems clear from the historical content of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia that P was altogether independent of Xenophon. In fact, there is no certainty that Xenophon's Hellenica was published before P wrote his history. It would seem that Xenophon wrote his Hellenica over a long period between the years 402 and 342. But there is no clear indication as to when his Hellenica was first published and although Grenfell and Hunt assumed that this might have been between 360 and 356 B.C., W.P. Henry, writing more than half a century later, still implied uncertainty as to when Xenophon wrote his Hellenica: "we are not yet ready to interpret ancient histories, like the Hellenica. Before determining how, why, when and where the ancients wrote we must first discover what they wrote."79)

On P we have even less certainty, knowing only from passages in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia that P's history must have been composed between 367 and 346.60) But his detailed narrative has led to the conclusion that his history could not have been written more than one or two generations later than the events he describes. Even if, however, Xenophon's Hellenica was published before P had composed or published his history, there still is no evidence that P was influenced by Xenophon, for wherever they cover the same ground, we have completely independent versions.

P's text, however, shows unmistakable signs of influence by Thucydides. Not only did he write a continuation of Thucydides' history, but he also followed Thucydides' chronological system, dividing his years into summers and winters and using the customary Thucydidean formulae to synchronize events in different areas as well as the simple forms of transition from scene to scene found in Thucydides.81) It would seem, moreover, from the extant text, that Thucydides is the only historian mentioned by name in P's history.82)

On the other hand, among the historians whose work shows signs of influence by P, Diodorus clearly displays the closest connection with P. Diod. XIV 80, which contains the account of Agesilaus' campaign in the spring of 395 and the supersession and execution of Tissaphernes, is
an abbreviated version of P Ch. VI col. vi 4 - Ch. VIII col. viii;
and for his brief account of the naval war and Coron's activities in
395 B.C. (XIV 79, 4-8) Diodorus has also relied on P. There is, how-
ever, disagreement on detail between P and Diodorus and this is ascribed
to Diodorus' use of Ephorus as an intermediate source.

It was Volquardsen who, in 1868, established the fact that Ephorus
was Diodorus' authority in Books XI - XVI, with the exception of most of
the Sicilian narrative for which Diodorus, judging from the number
of speeches in his account, probably used the obvious source, i.e.
Thucydides. In 1847 Cauer attempted to assess the contents of one of
Ephorus' books as evidence for Diodorus' source, working on the basis
of an early collection of the fragments of Ephorus made long ago by
Marx. Dressler in 1873 undertook a revision and produced the only
full analysis of the fragments in existence. But references to Ephorus
discovered in recent years have partly invalidated Dressler's conclusions
on the later books. Jacoby, in his introduction to his commentary on
Ephorus gives a reliable account of the distribution of the fragments
into books.

It appears that Ephorus envisaged a scheme of 30 books for his his-
tory, giving an account of the world as a Greek of the 4th century knew
it, but that he died (probably after 336 B.C.) without completing it and
at a stage when he was writing contemporary history.

It therefore seems likely that Ephorus arranged and enlarged P's
narrative to fit into his own world-history and that Diodorus perhaps
wrote with a copy of Ephorus in front of him and in shortening his account
deviated still further from P. In Book V 1,4 Diodorus refers to Ephorus
in the following words: 'Ephorus in his world-history has been successful
both in his style and arrangement. Each book embraces events on a sub-
ject system: We have therefore chosen this type of sub-division and
shall employ it as consistently as possible. The present book is en-
titled 'The Islands'. Moreover, the position of an intermediary
who used P some time after publication suits the approximate dates
assigned to P and Ephorus. Jacoby concurs in this opinion:
any case we must recognise in him (P) the source to which Ephorus owed his wide knowledge of the older Boeotian history .... the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia was the chief source of Ephorus for the period after Thucydidès. 89)

Pausanias (fl. 150 A.D.) also agrees with P on certain points such as that Epicrates and Cephalus took Persian gold; and he follows P in associating Amphítheus with Ismenias and Androcleidas; but on other details, such as the date of Peisander's appointment as nauarch and that of Timocrates' mission and its results, he agrees with Xenophon. On the origin of the Boeotian war Pausanias again agrees with P that the Locrians involved were the Hesperian, and not the Opuntian Locrians but, like Xenophon, Pausanias represents the Locrians as the aggressors. Pausanias also agrees with P that Tissaphernes' infantry took part in the campaign near Sardis but his reference is brief and Grenfell and Hunt consider it unlikely that he himself used P as a source for III 9, 6. It would seem rather that P influenced Pausanias' sources. 90)

Polyaenüs (fl. 162 A.D.) shows agreement with P in his account of the deposal of Tissaphernes (Strateg. vii 16) which seems to be an abbreviated version of P Ch VIII col. vii - col. viii. He alone among ancient writers associates the mission of Timocrates with Pharnabazus instead of with Tithraustes.

Justin (fl. 3rd Century A.D.) is the only ancient author who mentions the mutiny of Conon's troops (P Ch. XIV col. xv 35 - Ch. XV col. xviii 6, 30) and his brief reference seems to be derived from P. 91)

Grenfell and Hunt were unable to detect any trace of P's influence in other late writers.
Identity of the author

The question of the authorship of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia is one which arose at once when the papyrus-fragments were published in 1908. Since the first years, when the identity of $P$ engaged the attention of the first editors and their contemporaries, this problem has been considered and discussed in numerous books, articles and notes by a large number of scholars, already totalling nearly 70 in 1940, but to this day no satisfactory answer has been forthcoming.

No sentence in the text agrees with any other known author with whom $P$ could be identified. Every name suggested has been supported by illustrious and learned scholars, but also rejected and contested, and many scholars have changed their opinions.

While $P$'s text gives limited assistance, we do possess basic circumstantial information from which our conjectures may proceed. Thus we know that since $P$'s history seems to have been a conscious continuation of Thucydides' history, he can only be identified with an historian who is known to have written such a continuation. We also know that his style is plain and unadorned by rhetorical figures of speech, that he seems to prefer the use of digressions to that of speeches for providing background information and that he probably wrote his history not long after 386 B.C. and certainly not after 346 B.C.

Against this background scholars from Grenfell and Hunt and Meyer to Bloch, Breitenbach and Lehmann have considered the problem of $P$'s identity and found that only a few among the ancient historians seemed to meet the conditions for identification with $P$. Thus their choice fell upon Theopompus, Cratippus, Ephorus, Androthion and Daemachus; and Bloch (p. 306 - 307) gives a table illustrating the support accorded to these candidates and the opposition they met.

The scholars in favour of Theopompus among others in Bloch's comprehensive list include Grenfell and Hunt (1908), Meyer (1908), v. Wilamowitz (1908) and Busolt (1908), with Jacoby (1909) and Dugas (1910)
in opposition. Quite lately Lehmann once again defended the authorship of Theopompus (1972).\textsuperscript{94}

While Theopompus is known to have written a continuation of Thucydides' history his birth date c 378 seems a little late for P, who proudly wrote nearer to 386 than to 346. Lehmann, however, argues that new support has come for a later date for the composition of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, namely, shortly after 350 B.C. and that since Theopompus' "Greek History" was written some time before 343 B.C., chronological objections to Theopompus are clearly untenable.\textsuperscript{95} But the really eliminating argument concerns his style which is entirely different from that of P. This difference in style has been confirmed by the inquiries of Grenfell and Hunt and of De Sanctis in 1908 and the detailed research of A. Franz and W. Bauer whose conclusions were used by P. Maas (1914). Maas subsequently drew attention to the statement of Porphyry that Theopompus plagiarized from Xenophon.\textsuperscript{97} The support given to the hypothesis of Theopompus' authorship can only be ascribed to the authority which Ed. Meyer enjoyed, and Laqueur (1934) has failed to produce convincing arguments in support of Meyer's view.\textsuperscript{98} Griffith (1954) states emphatically that "the briefest comparison of the received fragments of his writings with the Oxyrhynchus work makes it abundantly clear that he did not write the Hellenica."\textsuperscript{99} However, later, Lehmann (1972) reaffirmed the possibility of Theopompus' authorship.\textsuperscript{100}

Cratippus is mentioned by Grenfell and Hunt as a possible alternative to Theopompus. But since we have only three (reported) quotations of Cratippus we cannot compare his style with that of P, nor have we any idea of his presentation or arrangement of his subject matter. But we know that he did not include speeches in his work and that Dionysius of Halicarnassus calls him a contemporary and continuator of Thucydides, οὐκ εὐσηματικός εὐτύχιος Θύκδιδος, καὶ τα παραπλήθεντα ὅτι οАвто εὐσηματικόν γεγονόν,\textsuperscript{101} We also have from Plutarch a sketch of the contents of Cratippus' historical work:

Plutarch (\textit{De G Custom}, Ath. p. 343 C-G: οὐκ εὐσηματικός

τοῦκετοντατούει τοῦκετοντατούει τοῦκετοντατούει τοῦκετοντατούει τοῦκετοντατούει, ἐπεὶ τὸν Περσικὸν πολέμον καὶ τὸν παραμένον θρόνον τὸν Περσικὸν πολέμον καὶ τὸν παραμένον θρόνον τὸν Περσικὸν πολέμον καὶ τὸν παραμένον θρό

\begin{align*}
\text{Plutarch (De G Custom), Ath. p. 343 C-G: οὐκ εὐσηματικός} & \\
\text{τοῦκετοντατούει τοῦκετοντατούει τοῦκετοντατούει τοῦκετοντατούει τοῦκετοντατούει, ἐπεὶ τὸν Περσικὸν πολέμον καὶ τὸν παραμένον θρό
\end{align*}
Jacoby doubts the value of these testimonies and Diodorus (XV 95), it appears, mentions only Theopompus and Xenophon as continuators of Thucydides from which it may be assumed that Cratippus' name did not appear in the chronicle from which he derived his information. Moreover, Cratippus' criticism of Thucydides' use of speeches and dialogues is followed by the remark that Thucydides came round to this opinion and left the 8th book free from speeches and this leads to the suspicion that Cratippus was a late Hellenic writer who was posing as a contemporary of Thucydides. Bruce, however, does not exclude the possibility that Cratippus is P, and Lehmann recently defended a possible date for Cratippus in the mid-fourth century.

In their attempt to identify P with one of the known authors of the 4th century Grenfell and Hunt thought first of the two famous pupils of Isocrates, Ephorus of Cyprus and Theopompus of Chios. The agreement between P and Diodorus seemed to strengthen the case for Ephorus but ultimately differences in style, Polybius and Plutarch's references to Ephorus' fondness for moral reflections, his use of speeches and the fact that he wrote a universal history excluded Ephorus from identification with P. C.L. Barber (1935), after serious consideration and a detailed discussion, concluded that Ephorus probably made direct use of P as a source since he no doubt wrote relatively soon afterwards. Bloch (1940) raised a further objection to Ephorus on chronological grounds, pointing out that while P probably wrote his Hellenica before 356, Ephorus wrote his fourth book after 356, books XX ff after the publication of Callisthenes' Hellenica (343 - 335) and the 25th book after 335 and that he could not have been the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia if he related the events of the years 396 - 395 B.C. in his 18th or 19th book.

De Sanctis (1906) proposed the identification of P with Androtion. But Bloch shows that De Sanctis' proposition respecting the reconstruction of P's text (Ch. IV col. iii), i.e. the insertion of the name of the eponymous archon so as to read: Εἰς τὸν ἔτος οὗ τὴν θεσμὸν θησαυροῦμεν, is
109) untenable. Since the chronological indication of the archon cannot be placed in the formula of transition from one year to another P's text cannot be identified as a part of an Atthis. The literal fragments of the Atthidographer Philochorus show that, as is customary in chronicles, the name of the archon with his demotic appeared at the head of the account of the events of every year, in the following form: Καλλιμάχος Παραγοφός ἐν τοῖς ... .

There is, moreover, proof in a fragment of his, that Androtion also used this form of introduction. A further objection to Androtion is that the Atthidographers did not employ the chronological system of summers and winters used by P. And the fact that Plutarch (Mor. 605 C) declares that Androtion wrote his Atthis in Megara while in exile, that is, after 344/3 B.C., represents another insuperable objection to the identification of P with Androtion.110)

Finally there is Daemachus. We do not know the title or subject of his history but we are reliably informed that Ephorus used it. Also, it seems likely that Daemachus, being a Boeotian, could have written the outline of the Boeotian Constitution found in P. Breitenbach (1970), however, notwithstanding P's unquestionably good knowledge of Boeotian relations and conditions, regards it as unlikely that P was a Theban or a Boeotian and he gives the following reasons:

(c) the digression on the Boeotian constitution shows an antiquated character and could therefore have been written by any author interested in the subject;

(b) P's good knowledge of Boeotian internal politics is balanced by an equally good knowledge of the internal politics of Athens;

(c) in his political exposition of Theban party groups P writes as an Athenian would;

(d) P's treatment of the Naval War and his sympathy for Conon would seem to come from an Athenian rather than a Boeotian;

(e) the campaign of the Boeotians against the Phocians is described without any inner sympathy;

(f) P's description of the military policy of the Theban leaders against
Sparta is that of a writer who is moderately pro-Spartan minded; 

(g) P's impartiality and objectivity, also in respect of Thebans, 

militate against his identification with a Boeotian historian; 

and on this note Breitenbach concludes his detailed discussion on the 

authorship of P. 111)

In the last resort an "anonymous" author has been proposed amongst 

others, by Peter (1911), Lehmann-Haupt (1912) as well as by v. Wilamowitz 

(1926) and Bloch himself.112) If it is unlikely that P is Theopompus, 

Ephorus or any other Athenian writer and if Daemachus and the other 

Boeotian writers cannot be identified with him, while on Cratippus we have 

no certainty that he is a genuine 4th century historian, we must accept 

the possibility that, in spite of the quality of his historical work and 

the extensive use of him as a source, the name of the author of the 

Hellenica Oxyrhynchia is unknown to us - "dass der Name des Autors uns 

unbekannt ist, trotz der Qualität seines Geschichtswerkes und obwohl 

die Historiker des 4. Jhdts. ihn ausführlich als Quelle benützt haben."113)
(vii) The author's value as an historian

It is generally agreed, however, that the importance of P as an historian far exceeds that of the question of identity. In Griffith's view the most important result of the discovery of the papyrus is the stimulus P's history has given to the study of the fourth century historians in general.114) And the first editors believed that, whatever his name might be, P's work entitled him to a place in the ranks of the foremost Greek historians, "below Thucydides, but above Xenophon" and that his historical fragments represented an important addition to the evidence available before the discovery of the London papyrus.

Not only has the papyrus supplied important new information in connection with the events of 395 - 6 and the constitution of Boeotia and revealed that sources other than Xenophon were available to the later historians, but the agreement between P and Diodorus has had a far-reaching effect on historical thinking. Now it was known that the discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon can be ascribed to the fact that Diodorus derived his account for the years 395 - 6 from such a reliable source as P, it would henceforth be necessary to consider the probability that for the earlier period, 411 - 394 B.C., the divergences between Diodorus and Xenophon with respect to the campaign of Thibron and the return of the Ten Thousand, could mainly be attributed to the same cause.115)

It is, then, in the light of the new information made available by the London and Florentine papyri, to which we may now add the fragment P. Cairo, that I would like to enter into a more detailed discussion in the second chapter of my thesis, of a major event covered by P's history, in order to arrive at a personal assessment of his worth and interest.
NOTES


3. Grenfell, B.P. and Hunt, A.S., "Theopompus (or Cratippus) Hellenica" in *Oxyrhynchus Papyri V* (London, 1908), 110 - 242 (henceforward referred to as G. & H.);
I.A.F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia.* p. 1, (henceforward referred to as Bruce);

Bartolletti, p. 2.

5. cf. Canfora L., "I frammenti storici fiorentini e le Eleniche di Ossirinco", *Rhein. Mus.* 115, 1972, 14 - 19. Canfora does not believe it has been established beyond doubt that the London papyrus and the Florentine papyrus have a common author.


Breitenbach, cols. 386 - 389 and 393.
Bartolletti, p. 2 - 3.


9. cf. Koenen, p. 55; Lehmann, o.c. p. 188.

11. P(Flor. Pap.) Ch. III col. iii; Bruce, p. 31; Thuc. VIII 28 ff.
P(Flor. Pap.) Ch. IV col. iv.


13. P Ch. I & II 1 col. i 1 - 33; Bart. p. 6 & 7.

14. Ch. II 2 col. i & ii.

15. Ch. IV col. iii.


23. Ch. XIII col. xiv 7 - 40 & col. xv 1 - 32.


25. Ch. XIV 2 - 3 col. xvi 1 - 12.


32. Koenen, p. 57 - 61.

33. Bruce, p. 3.

34. P Ch. XII 3 & 4, col. xiii; G. & H. notes on col. ii 21 - 33, p. 206.

35. Thuc. VIII 64.

36. Xen. Hell. i 1 & 32, P Ch. II 4 col. ii 30 - 1; Bart. p. 8.


38. P (Flor. Pap.) Ch. I 1 - 2, col. i, Ch. II, col. ii, Ch. IV, col. iv.

39. Bruce, p. 4; P Ch. XI 2 col. xi 38; \( \alpha ψ ε μ \varepsilon τι \) άπειραστι τήν \( κλατε \) τόπο Bouter
(Bart. p. 22); G. & H., p. 122, 206.

40. P Ch. XIV 2 col. xvi.

41. Ch. XIII 3 col. xiv.


43. Bruce, p. 4, note 1, with reference to Accame, Recercche intorno alla guerra corinzia. Ch. 1 (also in Pend. Accad. Lincei XIV (1938)
433 ff & Rev. Fil. xxviii (1950), 30 ff.). Cawkwell (C.R. XVIII (1968), 288 - 290) queries the statement by Bruce that P has been shown to be the source of Diodorus for the whole of the period, 411 - 386. "Bruce may well be right" he says, "but few will agree that Accame, to whom he refers, has demonstrated any such thing.

44. Bruce, p. 5; G. & H., p. 22.

45. Bruce, p. 5; cf. Emerita XXVIII (1960), p. 86.


48. Thuc. II 1: γέγραπται δὲ εἰς ὧν ἦκαντα ἐργάτευο ἐκεῖνα ὀνόματα καὶ ἱστόμενα; Bruce, p. 8 on Ch. IV 1; Gomme Commentary Vol. III, p. 699 ff, appendix on Thucydides, "Summers and Winters".


52. P Ch. I col. i: τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνον; ; cf. Thuc. II 96 1:

53. Τὰ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων.

54. Ημεροί μὲν δὲν τοποθετεῖ κακία

55. P Ch. XIII 5 col. xv 31 ff: ὅσα συνέτειν οἱ θεοὶ θεοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς τῆς τῶν Εὐρυπέραντος;

56. XIX (XIV) κύκλως δὲ,

57. ὁδηγῶν μὲν εὖν ἀπὸστεῖλν τινής;


59. Ἐπιστεύεται ἐν Ὃν Κλεοπάτρῃ.

60. 94 Παυσανίας ἐν Κλεοπάτρῃ.


62. Gomme, p. 701: "his is a solar year. The seasons, spring, summer, autumn, winter, are determined by the sun, not by the moon". This probably also explains Thucydides' criticism of Hellenicus, I 97: τὰς χρόνους οἷν ἀρκεῖας. As a chronicler Hellenicus only counted by magistrates' years and not subdivisions by seasons.
Of this scholars do not seem to be generally aware; cf. Gomme, Commentary I, p. 280 & 363.


52. G. & H. p. 207. notes on Ch. IV col. iii 9.


54. cf. L. Holzapfel, Berliner Studien vii, 1888, 58ff; reference in Gomme l.c.

55. Bruce, p. 11 - 15.


57. Liv. 9, 17, 1 cf Dion. ad Pomp. 3; Herodotus brings variety, ἀπαίδεσις, to his readers.

58. Polybius 38, 5, 9: ἀλ γὰρ μεταλήκεις τὸν ἐκφεύγον καὶ τὸν ἐπιστασίαν ὅλην ἀπαίδεσιν ἕως τοῦ σιδηρόκλων

59. Polybius 1, 41, 77 cf. 1, 41, 6; 2, 14, 1: 5, 21, 4 & esp. 12, 2801.

60. P-lybius 38, 6, 3: κεχρημαίνοις μὲν ἀπαίτη τας εἰροι τις ἧν τῷ τοιοῦτο χειρισαί, κεχρημαίνοις γε μὲν ἀπάλταις, ημᾶς δὲ τετυγμένοις.

61. P (Flor. Pap.) Ch. II col. ii.
P (Lond. Pap.) Ch. XI col. xii.
Ch. XII col. xiii - xiv.

62. P Ch. II 2 col. i 35 - 38.

63. Bruce, p. 13.

64. P Ch. II 3 - 4 col. ii 15 - 32.


67. Polybius by F.W. Walbank, p. 40 - 42; the geographical digression more properly belongs to larger or universal histories - cf. Herodotus & Polybius. Both Thucydides & Π are concerned with events in a more limited sphere; though Π could have inserted, very appropriately, a digression on the topography of Asia Minor. The papyrus, however, does not seem to offer any evidence of such a digression in a lost portion of the work. Perhaps Π considered that he had given sufficient geographical information in his detailed description of Agesilaus' marches through Asia Minor.

68. G. & H., p. 122 - 123.

69. P Ch. II 2 col. i 35 - 38.

70. Ch. II 2 col. ii i - 10.

71. Ch. I 3, col. i.
   Ch. X 2 - 3 col. xi.

72. Ch. XII 1 col. xii 32 - 33.

73. G. & H., p. 123.
   P Ch. XV col. xviii 32 - 33.

74. G. & H., p. 123.

75. P Ch. X col. xi 22 - 23; G. & H., p. 123.

76. Ch. II 2 col. ii; Ch. XII col. xii - xiii; Ch. XIV col. xvi.

77. Ch. IX 2 col. x.

79. G. & H., p. 124;

80. P Ch. XI cols. xi - xii 2; P Ch. XIII col. xiv 3;

Thuc. II 1; P Ch. IV col. iii 1;
P Ch. I col. i 1; cf. Thuc. II 95.1 et passim;
P Ch. IV col. iii 2; cf. Thuc. IV 7; 46.1 et passim;
P Ch. XIII 5 - XIV 1; cf. Thuc. I 93.8 - 94.1.

82. cf. P Ch. II col. ii 17.


85. Dressler, R. *Das Geschichtswerk d. Ephorus nach seiner Frg.v. seiner Benutzung durch Diodor* (1873), ref. in G.L. Barber, p. 20.


87. Barber, p. 22.

88. Barber, p. 17.

89. Jacoby, F. "Kratippos" *R.E.* XI, 2 p. 1651 - 1658 (1926); quotation in English from Barber, I.c.

91. G. & H., ibidem.


96. Bloch, p. 317-319;


100. Lehmann, Hist. 21, p. 395 ff.

101. Dionys. Hal. De Thuc. 16,

102. Plutarch, De glor. Ath. p. 345 C - E.


Kratippos nicht nur seiner Grundtendenz und historiographischen Qualität nach, sondern auch in der Zeitstellung nahe an die Autoren der athenisch-patriotischen Athidographie gegen Mitte des 4. Jh. v. Ch. heranrücken, ohne dass deswegen die Zeitangabe des Dionysios von Halikarnass. radikal in Frage gestellt werden müsste!


113. Breitenbach, col. 422.

114. Griffith, p. 162.
   G. & H., p. 112.

CHAPTER T.6

THE ASIATIC CAMPAIGN OF AGESILAUS AND THE BATTLE OF SARDIS

1 SOURCES

The primary sources for the battle of Sardis are the author of th. Oxyrhynchus Papyri 842 or P (V 59 - VI 27) and Xenophon (Hellenica iv 21 - 25 and Ages. I 29 ff).

The remaining sources are derivitive and consist of:

(1) Diodorus (XIV 80, 2 - 4) who follows P, using Ephorus as an intermediate source. This connection was proved by Volquardsen who in 1868 established the fact that Ephorus was Diodorus' authority in Books XI - XVI, with the exception of most of the Sicilian narrative 1).

(2) Plutarch (Ages. X 1 - 4) who relies on Xenophon, excepting certain details;

(3) Pausanias (III 9,6) who seems to follow Diodorus;

(4) Nepos (Ages. III 4 ff,) who follows Xenophon in his brief account;

(5) Frontinus (Strateg. I 8,12) who uses Xenophon but says very little and is vague;

(6) Polyagenus (II 1,9) who also follows Xenophon in his brief reference to Agesilaus and Sardis 2).

Since, however, the text of P is badly mutilated, it is necessary to read P in conjunction with Diodorus whose account of the battle of Sardis largely agrees with that of P but also presents problems 3).

We find that the two primary sources, i.e. P- Diodorus and Xenophon, offer evidence that has been considered so contradictory that we have two distinct traditions and a resultant body of literature which is fairly extensive.
(i) Aspects of agreement

But there are important points of agreement between our two main sources which may be stated as follows:

(a) It seems likely from what remains of Ch. VI 1 - 5 of P's account that P also indicated that the battle of Sardis occurred on the fourth day after Agesilaus and his army had left Ephesus;

(b) both authors agree that the battle of Sardis occurred west of Sardis and not far from the Persian camp;

(c) in both accounts the Greeks were the first to attack;

(d) there is also agreement on the role played by the different sections of the Persian army, namely, that only the cavalry and the light-armed infantry of the Persians took an active part in the battle, while the heavy infantry seemed to have played hardly any part at all;

(e) according to both authors the Spartans were victorious and put the enemy to flight after which they captured the Persian camp and took a rich booty\(^4\).

(ii) Points of difference

It is, however, the discrepancies, real and supposed, between the two traditions which have mainly engaged the attention of scholars from the time when the first editors, Grenfell and Hunt, published the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia\(^5\) to the late seventies which saw Breitenbach, Nellen and Anderson still wrestling with the problems arising from these divergences\(^6\).

The discrepancies between the accounts of P- Diodorus and Xenophon are the following:
(1) It is not mentioned in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia that Tissaphernes expected an invasion of Caria by the Spartans; and Diodorus and Pausanias follow P in omitting this detail. Xenophon, on the other hand, states that when Agesilaus announced beforehand that he would be marching by the shortest route to Sardis, Tissaphernes suspected that he intended tricking him again. Acting therefore, on this suspicion, Tissaphernes sent his infantry into Caria and stationed his cavalry in the Maeandros plain. Nepos and Plutarch also mention this detail.

(2) A supposed divergence is concerned with the route followed by Agesilaus and his army from Ephesus to Sardis. P- Diodorus indicate that Agesilaus marched over the Karabel pass into the Hermus valley but it has been fairly generally assumed that Xenophon's route was the road over Hycapha which makes the Imolus-crossing above Sardis. This supposed divergence is altogether cardinal in my approach to this problem, and much space is devoted to it in my thesis.

(3) A further divergence results from the fact that according to P and Diodorus Agesilaus had an ambush laid by Xenocrates the Spartan during the night preceding the battle. Xenophon, however, makes no mention of this ambush nor do Plutarch and Nepos refer to it.

(4) In Xenophon Agesilaus and his army encounter the Persian cavalry on the fourth day of their march from Ephesus and when they are close to the Pactolus and Sardis, while in P and Diodorus Tissaphernes and his cavalry and light-armed infantry appear to have overtaken the Spartans when they were close to Mount Sipylos.

(5) Uncertainty also concerns the battle location. Xenophon mentions the Pactolus, while P and Diodorus have no reference to a river in the passages preceding the battle. Diodorus does mention, however, that the ambush was laid when Agesilaus was midway between Sardis and Thybarnae. But Pausanias, who is probably relying on P, reports that the battle of Sardis occurred in the plain of the Hermus.
(6) The order of participation of Agesilaus' troops differ in our sources. In Xenophon picked hoplites of the Lacedaemonians attack first, then the peltasts, the cavalry next and finally Agesilaus follows with the mass of the army. In P, who is partly followed by Diodorus, Agesilaus placed Xenocrates in charge of an ambush with perhaps nine hundred hoplites and possibly five hundred light-armed soldiers. When the Persians saw the enemy storming out of the ambush, they fled all over the plain. Only at this stage did Agesilaus send out his light-armed troops and cavalry to join the ambuscaders in pursuit of the enemy.

(7) A final discrepancy concerns the movements of Tissaphernes. Xenophon mentions Tissaphernes only twice in this section. First of all he tells us that Tissaphernes expected a Spartan invasion of Caria and accordingly sent his infantry into Caria and stationed his cavalry in the plain of the Maeander. In the next reference we are told that while the battle was taking place, Tissaphernes was in Sardis and that the Persians accused him of treason on this account. P and Diodorus, on the other hand, report that Tissaphernes, with an army of 50,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, was following and harrying Agesilaus' army when they had reached the foothills of Mount Sipylos; both also state that after the battle Tissaphernes withdrew with his army to Sardis.

(iii) Problems arising out of differences.

The first problem raised by the discrepancies is the question as to whether Xenophon and P-Diodorus were in fact describing the same battle. Ever since the publication of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia in 1908 to the present decade this issue has allowed priority in learned discussions. There seems to be general agreement - and this includes recent studies by Breitenbach (1970), Nellen (1972) and Anderson (1975) - with the first editors, Grenfell and Hunt, that it is "practically certain" that Xenophon and P-Diodorus are referring to the same battle. Cawkwell however, "strongly" disagrees with Bruce and those other scholars who accept that P-Diodorus and Xenophon are describing the same battle.
These scholars reach this conclusion mainly on the ground that:

(a) both sources locate the battle west of Sardis; and

(b) according to both sources the Spartans were victorious and captured the Persian camp, taking a rich booty.

It is furthermore considered unlikely that if two relatively important battles occurred shortly after one another in the same area Xenophon and P would have mentioned only one battle of the two and in each case a different one.

The route followed by Agesilaus and his army from Ephesus to Sardis has also given rise to much discussion. P and Diodorus indicate that Agesilaus marched towards Sipylus, which is north of the extreme western edge of the Tmolus mountain range, where the Greeks must have made the Karabel crossing into the Hermus valley. Xenophon merely states Agesilaus announced beforehand that he would lead his army by the shortest route and that Agesilaus marched for three days without encountering the enemy but that the enemy cavalry arrived on the scene on the fourth day when they were close to the Pactolus and to Sardis. From this brief description scholars from Dugas to Breitenbach maintained that the route Xenophon had in mind was that passing through the Cayster valley towards Hypacopa, whence turning north it crossed the Tmolus and meeting the Pactolus, descended alongside the river to Sardis. E. Meyer, however, affirmed long ago that Xenophon had the Karabel crossing in mind. Kaupert had reached the same conclusion, followed recently by Anderson.

The movements and manoeuvres of the Spartan troops in the plain near Sardis, and the ambush in P- Diodorus but not in Xenophon, constitute the third major problem. Xenophon's version runs as follows: The Spartans marched for three days, without incident, in fact without the enemy in sight, until they were close to the Pactolus river and Sardis. On the fourth day the Persian cavalry arrived and began to attack and kill the campfollowers of the Greeks who were dispersed for plundering purposes.
Agesilaus, perceiving this, sent cavalry to assist the Greeks under attack, whereupon the Persians mustered their entire cavalry force in battle array. Agesilaus, realizing that the Persian infantry was not yet present, decided to give battle. The Persians sustained the onslaught of the picked hoplites, the peltasts and the cavalry but yielded before the pressure of the whole Spartan army. In their flight some fell into the river but the rest escaped.

In P's account, partly reconstructed with the aid of Diodorus (28), the following are the most relevant aspects for comparison and discussion: Agesilaus with his forces encamp in the Cayster valley and near Sipylos (Diodorus) on consecutive nights (29). Tissaphernes with both cavalry and infantry outnumbering the Spartans, overtake the Greeks who have to defend themselves from attacks (30). The Spartans are now drawn up in square formation (31). P refers to a river which could be the Hermus from which we infer that the Hermus valley had been reached (32). In due course during the third night Agesilaus arranged an ambush with Xenocles in command (33). The text of P is now well preserved.

Early the next morning (of what would seem to be the fourth day as in Xenophon) Agesilaus led his army forth. And P's text is clear on the point that the Persians were following the Greek army as usual and attacking them. Some of the enemy cavalry seem to have been riding all round the Greeks while others followed in disorderly fashion all over the plain (34). At the appropriate moment Xenocles and his men rushed forth from the ambush, whereupon the Persians fled all over the plain. Agesilaus, upon perceiving that the enemy were terror-stricken, sent some light-armed soldiers and the cavalry to join the men from the ambush in pursuit of the Persians of whom they killed about six hundred. But since the majority of the enemy were cavalry and light-armed soldiers the Greeks soon desisted from their pursuit and marched against the camp of the Persians (35).

Diodorus indicates that Tissaphernes and his army did not overtake Agesilaus and his men before they had reached the foothills of Mount Sipylos since they had previously been plundering the Cayster plain
unmolested\textsuperscript{36}). Diodorus agrees with P in regard to the square into which Agesilaus formed his army after they had reached Mount Sipylos and that Tissaphernes, from this point onwards, with 10,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry, was following the Greeks and killing those who left the ranks to go foraging\textsuperscript{37}). He adds that Agesilaus clung to the foothills, awaiting a favourable opportunity to attack the enemy. Agesilaus continued as far as Sardis and ravaged the gardens of Tissaphernes. He turned back and arranged an ambush with Xenocles in command in a wooded place midway between Sardis and Thybarna. Agesilaus himself marched forth at dawn with his army, but we are not told in which direction. As he passed the ambuscade, followed by the Persians attacking his rear guard in disorderly fashion, he suddenly turned upon the Persians. A fierce battle ensued and at a given sign the men in ambush rushed forth and fell upon the enemy. The Persians, caught midway between the forces of Agesilaus and Xenocles, panicked and took to flight. Agesilaus' troops pursued them for some distance and slew over 6,000 of the enemy, also taking a large number of prisoners.

We see then, from the evidence offered by P, Diodorus and Xenophon on the movements and manoeuvres of Agesilaus' troops en route and in the plain near Sardis that we have not only lack of agreement between P and Xenophon but also between P and Diodorus. P and Xenophon appear to disagree on:

(a) the area in the Hermus valley where the Persians first encountered the Greeks;

(b) the laying of an ambush by Agesilaus;

(c) the location of the battle;

(d) the role played by Tissaphernes in the battle;

(e) the order of participation of the Greek troops;

(f) the nature of the battle;
(g) the direction in which the defeated Persians fled.

Between P and Diodorus there is disagreement on:

(i) the role played by Xenocles and his men in ambush;

(ii) the nature of the battle;

(iii) the number of slain Persians.

The fourth problem concerns the movements of Tissaphernes. Xenophon first of all tells us that Tissaphernes expected a Spartan invasion of Caria and accordingly sent his infantry into Caria and posted his cavalry in the Maeander plain. In his second reference we are informed that Tissaphernes was in Sardis when the battle took place. According to P and Diodorus, however, Tissaphernes followed the Greeks with an army consisting of 50,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry and overtook them near the foothills of Mount Sipylos. In P's account the Greeks, when they plundered the Persian camp, also took property belonging to Tissaphernes and P and Diodorus agree that after the battle Tissaphernes withdrew to Sardis.

We have, therefore, a serious lack of agreement between the two traditions on the movements of Tissaphernes.

(iv) Scholars' views on Xenophon and P

In the literature dealing with the discrepancies between Xenophon and P and the problems created by them scholars, as Nellen pointed out, make no effort to reconcile the conflicting accounts but confine themselves to judging one author to the disadvantage of the other, tending to accord historical credibility only to one of the sources. P's credibility is upheld by a group which includes Grenfell and Hunt, E. Meyer, Ch. Dugas, F. Rühl, F. Jacoby, I.A.F. Bruce and E. Delebecque; on the other hand, taking the opposite view and according credibility only or mainly to Xenophon we find scholars such as Busolt, Kaupert,
Cornelius, Breitenbach and Anderson.

The first editors of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, Grenfell and Hunt (1908) had no misgivings concerning the value of P's evidence. In their view he was not only well-informed but a more reliable authority than Xenophon. E. Meyer (1909), who believed that P's account was historically more correct than that of Xenophon, raised objections to Xenophon's version of the speed with which the baggage train of the Persian army reached Sardis and to Tissaphernes' presence in Sardis during the battle. Meyer argued that Xenophon was not a participant and that he had not initially intended to write an account of the campaign at the time it took place. A final criticism of Meyer was that Xenophon's account aimed at the glorification of Agesilaus.

Ch. Dugas (1910) accepts P's account and sees in Xenophon's version a reconstruction based on a few known facts: "il sait que, parmi les troupes perses, les cavaliers presque seuls ont pris part à la bataille, que Xenocles a attaqué le premier, ensuite qu'Agésilas a fait donner, d'autres troupes. Sans s'informer plus exactement il reconstitue tout le combat. Mais cette reconstruction ne va pas sans erreurs.

F. Rühl (1913) finds P's account reliable and mainly follows P in his reconstruction of the Battle of Sardis: "Die Beschreibung der Schlacht ist an sich untadelig;"

F. Jacoby (1926 - 30) quotes the opinion of Judeich (1892), expressed even before the discovery of P (1906), that Xenophon's account of the Sardis campaign was "schlecht und unklar", preferring Diodorus to Xenophon, "vermutlich weil Xenophon selbst nicht an dem Zuge beteiligt, sondern etwa als befördhhaber der Besatzung von Ephesos - die Kyreer befohilt Herippidas (III 4, 20) - zurückgeblieben war". Jacoby is convinced that P used as a source a kind of camp-journal, the diary of a participant, agreeing with E. Meyer, and believes that Busolt has failed to prove that P's account is a "systematische Umsetzung von Xenophons Bericht"

Bruce in his Commentary on P ascribes more credibility to the account
of P which he believes offers a clearer and more satisfactory picture of the battle of Sardis, while Xenophon's account could appear to be a reconstruction of events based on a few established facts.  

Busolt (1908), registering the earliest reaction to the publication of P, is completely satisfied with Xenophon's version throughout and takes the view that P's account is nothing but an invention revealing complete ignorance of military matters.

Kaupert (1924 - 31) believes that the topography of the area concerned offers the final proof that Busolt was right in giving preference to Xenophon's account. Judged from a military point of view, he says, objections cannot be raised against the circumstances presented by Xenophon; whereas to follow P's account artificial or unnatural suppositions have to be made.

Cornelius (1933), also a severe critic of P, drew attention to the second ambush described by P as having taken place in Mysia in the course of Agesilaus' autumn campaign and concluded, not very plausibly, however, that P might have confused in his notes the account of the Battle of Sardis with the story of the action on the Mysian Olympus.

Breitenbach (1970), like Busolt, believes that Xenophon was close to Agesilaus and in a position to receive information at first-hand where he himself was not immediately involved and there was no reason for any concealment. For this reason he prefers Xenophon to P. As for P, he finds it quite impossible to determine the source of his information.

Anderson (1975), also following Busolt and more especially Kaupert, is convinced that Xenophon's version "presents no impossibilities". While not sharing the views of De Sanctis and Busolt on the difficulties presented by the ambush, Anderson thinks that, if the ambush is to be accepted at all, the version of Diodorus is preferable to that of P. Anderson rightly concludes that the "question resolves itself into one of credibility of witnesses". He believes that scholars such as Rühl who have accused Xenophon of being a falsifier of history, have not proved
their case. With regard to P he argues that since we know nothing of
him, he may well have written a fictitious battle description and in
support of this view he calls to mind Busolt's quotation of Polybius III 33
17 on τοις διανοομένοις ομοθέτες τῶν σημερινῶν 52).

Lehmann (1977) in his discussion of a new fragment, P Cairo, published
by Koenen and attributed to the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia,
compares P's description of the Athenian offensive against Ephesus in
409 B.C. with that of Diodorus and Xenophon and concludes that in
the new fragment, as in the Florentine and London fragments, we have a
divergent account. Here also P gives details which Xenophon omits.
But Lehmann finds that Xenophon's briefer account usually excels owing
to his more credible understanding and far-sighted judgement of the his-
torical events; and this conclusion, he adds, applies equally to the
well-known divergences in respect of the course of the battle of
Sardis 53).

Nellen (1972), however, attempts to restore a "relative consensus"
between the sources. He bases his argument on two hypothetic premises:

(1) The divergent accounts of Xenophon and P refer to the same historic
    event, i.e. the battle of Sardis in the spring of 395 B.C. and

(2) during the Asia Minor campaign Xenophon was close to Agesilaus and can
    be regarded as his follower, perhaps even his confidant.

After considering the divergences Nellen concludes that both
Xenophon and P possessed a proper and more or less equally good knowledge
of the battle. The existing discrepancies, accordingly, did not originate
from a lack of knowledge, falsification or one-sided transcription, but
from the innate views of the two ancient authors on their respective
tasks. Xenophon's glorifying representation of achievements of Agesilaus
led to such a revision of the facts that a relatively unimportant engage-
ment was stylized into an historically important event in which Agesilaus
acted as a distinguished and overwhelming figure. In contrast to this the
account of P makes a much more sober impression and the successful
course of the campaign is attributed only to the appropriate tactics
of the Spartan generals 54).
II XENOPHONS’ CREDIBILITY

We see that even Nellen, who arrived at the conclusion that Xenophon and P were more or less equally well informed on the campaign and battle of Sardis, accepted, as one of his two basic premises, that during the Asia Minor campaign Xenophon was close to Agesilaus and could be regarded as his follower or even confidant.

This view is shared by Breitenbach who believes that Xenophon was present in the immediate vicinity of Agesilaus and could therefore obtain his knowledge first-hand where he himself was not directly involved. All of which, he urges, represents an argument in favour of the credibility of Xenophon’s account. [55]

But the earliest protagonist of this view is, of course, Busolt, who finds Xenophon’s account free from objections. He believes that Xenophon was an eye-witness and an experienced officer who was closely associated with Agesilaus and could obtain information from him about his plans. Busolt, however, concedes that Xenophon wrote his history many years later and that he may have forgotten certain details. But he reminds us that we know from his Anabasis that his memory was good. Busolt believes that Xenophon accompanied Agesilaus to Sardis and that he therefore must have remembered the march. [56]

Anderson, who follows Busolt in according complete credibility to Xenophon, recalls that no ancient author records Xenophon’s participation in Agesilaus’ Asiatic campaign of 395 B.C. He admits that it is possible that Xenophon remained at Ephesus in 395 B.C., perhaps with a Spartan garrison left behind to protect Agesilaus’ base. He reminds us that Xenophon may even have been detained by sickness or accident. But he points out that Agesilaus would probably have arranged for the officers at his base to be informed as far as possible, about his own movements and those of the enemy. During the next year, 394, Xenophon was certainly with Agesilaus and probably also in the campaign against Pharnabazus in the autumn of 395 B.C. [57]

Delbecque, on the other hand, finds that while Xenophon’s description
of Agesilaus and his army's stay in Ephesus clearly reads like that of an eye-witness, "rien n'indique dans le texte qu'il ait participé à la campagne d'Agesilas dans la région de Sardes. Tout indique le contraire". That this temporary absence from Agesilaus' side was not the result of an estrangement, Delebecque continues, is shown by the prominent place he accords to Herippidas in his account of the autumn campaign and the fact that he rejoined Agesilaus and served under him until the battle of Corona. It is even possible, he thinks, that Agesilaus recalled Xenophon from Lydia and gave him an opportunity "à attendre en famille une campagne qui ne l'éloignât pas trop des siens". 58)

It would, however, seem more likely that Xenophon was in Lydia during Agesilaus' spring campaign and that he remained behind in Ephesus while the Spartans marched against Sardis. One should concede the possibility, however, that Xenophon was within reach of reliable reports on the movements of the Greeks and the Persians. But Xenophon's account of the march and the battle of Sardis, which scholars such as Busolt and Anderson find free from objections, does not, in my opinion, read like the report of an eye-witness, nor even like a description based on such a report. It lacks the detail and a certain liveliness one would expect, particularly from an author such as we have come to know from the Anabasis. What strikes one especially is the vagueness, cf. III iv 21: τοιαύτα τώρα ἤκουσα αἵ τε παλαιόντα μέσα, which gives no indication as to the direction from which the Persians came.

The problem we must face, I think, is that posed by the fact that while Xenophon most probably had access to reliable information in 395 B.C. his account of the campaign and battle of Sardis does not completely reflect this position. Busolt, of course, admitted that Xenophon wrote his history many years later and that he may have forgotten certain details. 59) It would seem that Xenophon wrote Books III - IV 1 - 3 of his Hellenica not earlier than 379 - 378 B.C., which is the date Delebecque gives, and not later than 362 - 357 B.C., which is the period Breitenbach considers likely for Books III - VII. 60) If, therefore, he had not known in 395 B.C. that he would be writing the history of the campaign and battle of Sardis and had not taken copious notes, he would, in the years
following 379 B.C., have had only vague recollections of Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign— in which case he would have been very nearly as dependent on extraneous documents and reports as P must have been. Xenophon's participation in the campaign or otherwise is thus, in the last resort, less relevant than his attitude as such to his material.

There appears to be agreement on the fact that the seven books of Xenophon's Hellenica consist of two separate works. Of these the first group comprises Books I and II iii 9 or 10, which take Xenophon's history to the end of the Peloponnesian war and were written in imitation of Thucydides in 402 B.C.; the second group, i.e. Books III to VII, were written in a different manner and were still unfinished in 358. There are serious omissions in this latter section and there is also evidence of Xenophon's bias against Thebes and in favour of Sparta: Delobicque shows how Xenophon's attitude changed from pro-Athenian in Books I and II to pro-Spartan in Books III - V 3 and reverted to pro-Athenian in Books VI and VII. 61)

With regard to the omissions, however, we should keep in mind that though Xenophon, like P, was writing a continuation of Thucydides' history, the greater length of his work, i.e. the wider field covered, would have necessitated the omission of many details that could be included in a history of more limited scope. We know, too, that Xenophon had the novelist's sense for colour and drama which seems to have led him to omit the duller details of warfare such as marches and ineffectual attempts on enemy towns and to concentrate rather on negotiations and dialogues and on major events. And we have, moreover, in the events in which Agesilaus figures, Xenophon's aim to present his friend as a para-deigma or model general. We see, especially clearly, in Xenophon's account of Agesilaus' autumn campaign how Xenophon's taste for drama and his admiration for the Spartan king could influence his historical writing. 62) This subject, however, will be discussed more fully in the next section of this thesis.

Furthermore, Xenophon was not writing in the style of Thucydides but in a manner and according to conventions that obtained for historical
writing at the time he was composing his work. He was therefore less concerned with detailed and extensive narrative and the transmission of facts, than with the selection and suitable and adequate presentation of events in accordance with the intention and principles governing his attitude to historiography. 63)

P on the other hand in his continuation of Thucydides' history, not only followed Thucydides' system of dividing the war years into summers and winters but seems to have adopted also Thucydides' attitude to research and inquiry and the verification of sources and informants. Thucydides' manifesto could well have served as an example to P for his detailed narrative and lively descriptions of the democratic revolution at Rhodes and the mutiny of Conon's Cypriot mercenaries which read like eye-witness accounts. 64)

It is, therefore, possible, when considering the discrepancies between P-Diodorus and Xenophon's accounts of the battle of Sardis, to account for some of them in the light of the difference in historiographical approach between the two authors.
III A PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE TERRAIN

A study of the varying views of scholars on the discrepancies led to the conclusion that the divergence on the route was perhaps the cardinal difference, involving as it did further divergences in regard to the point where the Persians overtook the Greeks and topographical disagreements as to the location of the battle and the direction of the Persian flight. Thus it was in the belief that a personal knowledge of the topography of the two routes between Ephesus and Sardis might be helpful and serve to bring clarification, at least in my own mind, that I decided to pay a visit to Turkey.

In the course of this visit, which took place in the summer of 1978, I visited Izmir or ancient Smyrna and, using this city as base and with the assistance of a local guide who also acted as interpreter and chauffeur, I was able to follow the routes through Karabel and via Üdemiş (close to ancient Hymapae) and to gain a fairly clear impression of the terrain involved.

It was decided to travel first over the Karabel route, which crosses the Tmolus at its western extremity, and to proceed to Ephesus, which had been Agesilaus' starting point.

(i) The Karabel route

As one travels southwards from Izmir (ancient Smyrna) to Ephesus the road passes through green farmlands interspersed with leafy trees and bordered in the distance by a lofty mountain range (ancient Messogis, rising just north of the ancient Maeander). There are several villages on the route of which the first is Torbali, next comes Caybasi, where a road branches off to Bayındır, and the following village is Pamukyazi, which is about 18 km distant from Ephesus and from which a branch road leads to Mahmutlar. Another important junction is Belevi which, like Torbali, has a road to Üdemiş leading off it. Finally one arrives at Selçuk, which is close to ancient Ephesus, about an hour and a quarter after leaving Izmir by car. Here the traveller may visit the basilica of
St John and the archaeological museum which, like several others, offers mostly Hellenistic and Roman exhibits. It is also possible to make a detour to visit the Merymana or House of Mary.

Returning from Ephesus one follows the Ephesus-Izmir road, retracing one's way past Belevi and Pamukyazi which is close to ancient Metropolis where Agesilaus is thought to have left the Ephesus-Smyrna road\(^\text{67}\). Here the traveller finds himself in the fertile Cayster valley, consisting of many small farms which produce large cotton and tobacco crops\(^\text{68}\). The valley is watered by the Cayster river which is now known as the Küçük Menderes or Small Menderes, as distinct from the Büyük Menderes or Great Menderes, which is the modern name for the ancient Maeander. Two or three kilometres north of Torbali a rough, stony road, indicated by triangles on the accompanying map\(^\text{68a}\), branches off from the Ephesus-Izmir road and leads in a north-easterly direction to the Karabel pass, close to the Kemalpaşa Dağ and crossing the western edge of the Boz Dağları or ancient Tmolus mountain range. On this road, which in 1978 grew progressively worse, one passes the village of Dağkızılda\(^\text{69}\). It took about an hour to negotiate this pass by car but it seems more likely that Agesilaus would not have followed a winding route such as this but would have given preference to a crossing over a lower ridge, a little westwards of the present road, which is indicated by dashes on map A.

On the further side of the Karabel pass, proceeding from Ephesus, one enters the Gediz (ancient Hermus) valley, passing first the village Kemalpaşa which is about 30 km from Torbali and is known to be the Nymphaeum of antiquity where Agesilaus must have joined the ancient Smyrna-Sardis road if the view is correct that he made the Karabel crossing\(^\text{70}\). This Gediz (Hermus) valley is broad and fertile with numerous small farms, studded with clusters of trees and well-cultivated. Here, also, the road passes many cotton and tobacco fields. To the right, as one travels eastwards towards Sardis, the valley is flanked by a lofty mountain range, beginning with the mountain Kemalpaşa (Olympus) which reaches a height of from 1387 to 1510 metres and merging into the Boz Dağları (ancient Tmolus) which soars even higher, at Boz Dağ, to 2137 metres\(^\text{71}\). In the distance to the left, the Gediz (Hermus) is obscured
by trees. The Gediz (Hermus) valley therefore stretches wide and fertile between the mountains lying south and the river to the north, a paradise, it would seem, and irresistible to the ravaging army of an invader. It also offers sufficient level and unobstructed terrain for whatever manoeuvres such an army might find necessary.

Some distance further along this road to Sardis or Sarc as it is now known, one reaches Turğutlu, a hamlet ± 33 km from Kemalpaşa, which might well be the Thybarnae of Diodorus. About 18 km beyond Turğutlu the road passes the next village Ahmetli, which could also be considered in our attempt to identify Thybarnae. Beyond Ahmetli, which is ± 24 km distant from Sardis, there are wooded foothills which would have served very well for the ambuscade described by P and Diodorus. As one approaches Sardis the first sight which meets the eye, is the Acropolis on which survives only the remnant of a wall, possibly of a later date. Crossing the dry bed of the Pactolus now known as Croesus' golden river, and turning to the right, namely, southwards towards the mountain side, one reaches the part of Sardis which the Americans have excavated and partly restored. But this Sardis is a city of the Hellenistic and Roman period. How close the Pactolus is to the ancient city walls can be checked on Baran's plan of the ruins of Sardis. From this vantage point Sardis appears to be surrounded by high, almost impassable, mountains on three sides, leaving only one easy approach, namely the road through the Gediz (Hermus) valley. From Sardis, which by the Karabel route is 103 km from Ephesus, one reaches Izmir partly by the road just described between Kemalpaşa and Sardis, and which must have been the old Sardis-Smyrna road, for with the mountain barrier on the southern side and Smyrna situated as it was and still is, direct communication with Sardis could hardly have followed another course.

I returned to Izmir with the impression that the route indicated by P and Diodorus was a very likely one for an invading army to follow, passing as it did, through fertile farm land most of the way and making the passage across the mountains over a ridge, the low and easy pass of Karabel, which should be negotiable for a body of soldiers and the baggage train.

According to the personal correspondence of Dr. Baran, the Izmir
archaeologist, archaic and Hellenistic remains consisting of graves, foundations and a fortress wall, were found near the village of Dağkizilka which is 17 km south of Kemalpaşa. In the pass itself, in addition to the Hittite reliefs, there are also terrace walls which Dr. Baran believes were probably built for a road. This road, he says, was well-known in the Hittite period and the reliefs on the rocks were most probably intended to mark a boundary, as they do in Sirkeli and other South Anatolian passes.

Dr. Baran does not mention excavations or archaeological finds at Ahmetli but of Turgutlu he says in his second letter, that the name means "with (at) the ruins" and that he found old potsherds there.

(ii) The Tmolus (Hypaepa) route

A similar excursion was undertaken to investigate the route regarded by most scholars as the route Xenophon had in mind. Proceeding southwards from our rendezvous at Izmir along the Izmir-Ephesus road and again traversing the fertile Cayster valley past Torbali we turned eastwards at Panukyazi, which is ±18 km from Ephesus. This road passes Mahmutlar and continues to Ödemiş, which is ±60 km distant from Panukyazi and not far from the ancient Hypaepa. From this point it is no more than 8 km to Birgi, where the mountain road starts, once again a narrow dirt road but well-made.

This road, however, scales and skirts steep mountain sides over many kilometres, requiring, by car, 1½ hours to negotiate, before reaching Boz Dağ. This is a holiday resort, high up in the mountain known by the same name, where the traveller to-day may enjoy a brief respite from the dizzy heights. Here we were joined for a short while by a friend of Captain Tutcu, Dr. O. Cataloğlu, professor of Economics at the University of Izmir. Upon learning that he had a holiday home here in the mountains I assumed that he would be better informed on them than most and asked him if the difficult road we had followed to this point was the only passage across the Boz Dağ (ancient Tmolus). He replied that there was another old road some distance west of this one but that it could only be negotiated by Jeep. In his opinion an ancient road from Ephesus to
Sardis might have passed from Torbali over Dayindir (west of Ödemis) along Karakoő and Hurzum to Sardis\(^2\)\(^1\). Of these towns Hurzum lies on the banks of the Gençer Çayc, one of the tributaries of the Gediz (Hermus), which passes Ahmetli on its way to its junction with the Gediz. This route seems to be the one mentioned by Kaupert. It is described as being the shortest route i.e. 99 km as against 103 km for Ephesus-Karabel-Sardis and 105 km for Ephesus-Ödemis (i.e. Hypaepa)-Sardis. But it offers only a mountain track\(^8\)\(^1\).

Taking leave of Dr. Çataloůlu we resumed our journey on a road that still kept winding its way around the precipitous mountainsides, for a while at the same breath-taking height with glorious panoramic views. Then, at last, there came a gradual descent and a little later we reached a lovely wooded spot with fountains and waterfalls. From this point the road continues its descent and emerges just to the east of Sardis (Sart). The modern mountain road described appears to serve mainly as a connection between Ödemis and Salihli.

We found after subtracting the time spent on stops, that it had taken approximately two hours and ten minutes to cross the Tmolus mountain pass from Ödemis (Hypaepa). The distance, however, between Dirgi and Sart (the actual pass) was no more than \(+\) 50 km.

The road we followed is the modern road; but it serves to give a general impression of the difficulties an ancient army might encounter in venturing into these mountain fastnesses. Foss describes two ancient roads across the Tmolus from Hypaepa to Sardis, the one taken by the Athenians in 499 and the other "probably a more important road" which may be the road to which Strabo refers\(^8\)\(^2\). The former is calculated by Foss as a day's journey - ten hours for a pedestrian with a light load, but somewhat less on horseback\(^8\)\(^3\).

The mountain road, in fact any mountain road from Hypaepa, emerges so close to Sardis\(^8\)\(^2\) that I cannot see how a large hostile army could have approached Sardis from this angle. Even if they could have overcome the difficulties of the pass, there is hardly sufficient space between Sardis and the mountain side for the movements of an army which would probably
be marching into a trap, caught between the enemy following on their heels and the Persian troops in Sardis which was Persia’s main stronghold in the West\(^{84}\). In fact, we know that even after his victory over the Persians Agesilaus made no attempt upon Sardis. Anderson, following Kaupert, concludes that Agesilaus did march through Karabel and that this is Xenophon’s “shortest” and “direct” route as contrasted with the detour by Izmir \(^{95}\). Anderson, however, again following Kaupert believes that the Persian troops were not following the Greeks as P-Diodorus represent them, but that they must have travelled by another route, presumably Tralles-Hypaeapa-Sardis, so as to intercept the Greeks before they reached Sardis \(^{86}\). For the Persians, of course, the route would have been less hazardous than for the Greeks but I cannot conceive of the baggage train and the more heavily laden elements of the Persian army being able to surmount the difficulties offered by the Hypaeapa-Tmolus pass. Kaupert and Anderson, in fact, believe that the whole Persian army followed the Hypaeapa-Tmolus route but that the Persian cavalry were soon far in advance of the rest of their troops and that they alone arrived in time to confront Agesilaus and take part in the battle of Sardis.

Having then travelled by car over both the routes, i.e. along the Karabel pass and by way of the Tmolus, that is to say, in so far as modern roads approximate to ancient ones, I could not but conclude that the route indicated by P and Diodorus, and also intended by Xenophon, seems to be by far the more likely one for a general to choose for his army, offering as it does a fairly low and broad passage through the Karabel and almost the whole of the fertile Hermus valley for plundering purposes.
IV MAJOR HERESIES AND THEIR ORIGIN - THE ROUTES FROM EPHESUS TO SARDIS.

Whatever limitations my own investigation in Turkey may have as compared with the work of professional archaeologists and military historians such as Foss and Kaupert, it has made me realize to what extent evident unfamiliarity with the topography and terrain has misled reputable scholars to whom in other respects we are much indebted. To this category appear to belong Busolt, Dugas, De Sanctis, Bruce, Breitenbach and, ironically, Cary as well, as could be inferred from the following brief Forschungsbericht on the route taken by Agesilaus and the battle of Sardis.

Certain heresies have persisted through the years and among these, there is first and foremost the heresy in connection with the route Agesilaus and his army followed from Ephesus to Sardis in the spring of 395 B.C., closely bound up, of course, with the problem of what Xenophon and P-Diodorus said or intended to say on this issue. While there has been less doubt in regard to the route indicated by P-Diodorus, in the light of Diodorus' specific reference to Sipylos, i.e. the route over the Karabel pass, Xenophon's limited information to the effect that Agesilaus proclaimed his intention to his generals to march towards Sipylos, and the information that the Greeks made contact with the enemy horsemen only on the fourth day and close to the Pactolus have led to endless misunderstanding dating back to the months immediately following the publication of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia by Grenfell and Hunt in 190887). Busolt commented that "auf dem Umwege über das Sipylos-Gebirge, gefolgt vom Feinde, genützt zum Marsche Sipylos" hatte Agesilaos nicht in der doppelt so langen Zeit die Gegend von Sardeis erreicht. Die ganze Erzählung des Marsches mit allen Einzelheiten die uns der neue Historiker bietet, ist also eine blosse Erfindung die völlige Unkenntnis militärischer Dinge beweist... Der Marsch des Agesilaos nach Sardeis wird von der kürzesten Strasse nach dem Umwege über den Sipylos verlegt", and we have here, Busolt concluded, another of P's inventions88).

Busolt's error in supposing the Karabel route to be longer and a different route from that suggested by Xenophon has been perpetuated in
the reasoning of scholars to the present day. Yet Meyer, in 1909, correctly expressed the view that Xenophon’s shortest route was that over Nymphaeum along the Karabel: “Nach ihm erwartet Tissaphernes trotz Agesilaos’ Ankündigung, er wollte auf kürzestem Wege ἐνεπιτεῖτα πρὸς Χελων, d.i. gegen die Hauptstadt ziehen; einen Angriff auf Karien. So gewinnt Agesilaos einen Vorsprung; unbhindert gelangt er, unterwegs reichlich fouragierend, in drei Tagen in die Nähe von Sardes. Auch nach dieser Darstellung kann er nur auf der Strasse über Nymphaeon gezogen sein”[89].

Charles Dugas, in 1910, gave serious attention to the question of the route followed by Agesilaus from Ephesus to Sardis. He took note of the fact that Xenophon’s shortest route between Ephesus and Sardis had taken a little more than three days and pointed out that we know from Herodotus and Xenophon himself “que le voyage d’Éphèse à Sardes par la route ordinaire durait trois jours”, which cannot be disputed. But Dugas is wrong when he adds that we know this “route ordinaire ... remontait la vallée du Caystre jusque vers Hypaepa, puis, tournant au Nord, traversait le Tmolus, rencontrait le Pactole et le descendait jusqu’à Sardes”[90]. Dugas was relying on the evidence of at least three scholars when he erroneously concluded that the Hypaepa-Tmolus route was the ordinary route and that this was the route Xenophon had in mind[91].

Dugas, however, accepted that the Karabel-route indicated by P-Diodorus was the route actually followed by Agesilaus, in contra-distinction to Busolt who dismisses P’s account of the march as sheer invention.

Rühl (1913) maintained that it would be impossible to reach Sardis in Xenophon’s 3½ days, except by the Hypaepa route[92] and De Sanctis, in line with Dugas and Rühl describes the Ephesus-Hypaepa route as “la strada piu diretta”[93].

Kaupert, a notable authority neglected by Bruce (ref. Anderson, p. 28), on the other hand showed as early as 1924-31 in his table of distances, followed by Anderson, that there is very little difference in distance between the routes Ephesus-Karabel-Sardis (103 km) and Ódemis (Hypaepa)-Sardis (105 km), respectively[94]. But, as Kaupert has pointed out and as the modern traveller can ascertain for himself, there is a second reason for regarding Karabel, less literally, as the
"shortest route": The Karabel pass is no more than about 450 m above sea level while the pass above Hypaecba is 1065 m. and much more difficult to negotiate. It seems clear, however, as Anderson has pointed out, that Xenophon was comparing the Karabel route with the route via Smyrna, compared to which the Karabel route was certainly in 395 B.C., as it is to-day, the shorter route; and in a less literal sense it could also rank as the "shortest route" as compared to the route via Hypaecba.

Delebecque and Bruce, however, followed Dugas in his idea of "the ordinary route" and the supposition that Agesilaus led his army over the pass above Hypaecba; and in recent years we see Breitenbach following, with caution, it is true, the views of Dugas and Bruce that P and Xenophon differ in respect of the route taken by Agesilaus and that the route Sipylus-Hermos indicated by P-Diodorus was not the route mentioned by Xenophon: "Bei Xenophon ziehen die Griechen , also die Normalroute, von Ephesos in Richtung Sardes (Tmolos-Paktoles), während sie nach der Darstellung von P den Weg Sipylus-Hermos einschlagen".

We find, therefore, that in respect of the route used by Agesilaus between Ephesus and Sardis, the heresy initiated by Busolt in 1908 has persisted to the last decade.

A second heresy, though one less serious and persistent, affects the location of the battle of Sardis. Dugas made the following statement: "le plus vraisemblable est qu'il(Xenophon) croit que la bataille a été livrée à l'endroit où la route d'Ephèse à Sardes par le Tmolus débouche dans la plaine de l'Hermos". This location which Dugas attributed to Xenophon is the direct result of his assumption that Xenophon implied that Agesilaus marched over the Hypaecba-Tmolus pass. And in this approach to the problem he is followed by Delebecque and Bruce. Breitenbach is satisfied with the agreement present in the fact that according to both Xenophon and P-Diodorus the battle occurred west of Sardis.

But Nellen, who considered the question of the battle location with a view to arriving at a consensus between Xenophon and P, came to the
conclusion that the battle of Sardis was fought mainly in the area where
the Pactolus and the Hermus converge\textsuperscript{103}). This I consider to be a very
likely location for the main action of the battle since the area attri-
buted by Dugas to Xenophon would have been too constricted and also too
close to Sardis and we know from P that the Persians were following
\textit{μετά τὸν ναυμαχίαν καὶ ἔφυλεν} and that they fled \textit{μετὰ τὸν να\textsuperscript{104}).

A third heresy, one might say, which has hampered the study of
Agesilaus' march and the battle of Sardis concerns the nature itself of
the Hypaepa pass, already implied in my earlier discussion. The fact that
Herodotus mentions that the Athenians crossed the Tmolus during the Ionian
revolt in 499 B.C. to make an attack on Sardis seems to have contributed
to the impression that the Hypaepa-Tmolus pass was the one normally
used and that it presented no particular difficulties\textsuperscript{105}). Cary speaks
of "an easy pass across Mt. Tmolus (that) gave it (Ephesus) access to the
Hermus valley" which is, as his accompanying map illustrates, none other
than the Hypaepa-Tmolus pass\textsuperscript{106}). It is this erroneous impression gener-
ally of the nature of the Hypaepa-Tmolus pass which has led Dugas, in the
first place, followed by Delebecque and Bruce, to suppose that the route
which made the Hypaepa-Tmolus crossing was the "route ordinaire" or
ordinary route\textsuperscript{107}). Kaupert has shown that the pass above Hypaepa is 1065 m
as against circa 450 m. for the Karabeh\textsuperscript{108}). Clive Foss considers the
northern approach to the pass, namely from the Hermus valley, relatively
easy over the foothills, but the mountain behind the hills, he says
"presents bare rock faces in the higher and steeper parts. On the south,
however, the approach to the mountain from the Cayster valley is steep
and difficult, there are no foothills and the mountain slopes are preci-
pitous, barren and rocky \ldots\textsuperscript{109}). He concedes, however, that the Tmolus
is by no means impassable and we know that the Hypaepa-Tmolus pass has been
used from the 6th Century B.C. to the present day. Foss, as I have indi-
cated, (p. 64 above), distinguished two ancient roads\textsuperscript{110}). But in modern
times there is a narrow, winding, untarred road that scales and skirts
precipitous mountain sides for many a mile and one cannot imagine that
whichever of the two roads existed in antiquity was less daunting in the
4th Century B.C. The modern road does not seem to carry heavy traffic
and probably serves mainly as a connection between Odenis and Saiihli and
other villages in that area. In ancient times as Foss points out, this Tmolus road, "the more important road" as he describes it, which is the road to which Strabo refers, connected Sardis directly with Hypaepa which was then the main town of the Cayster valley. It would seem, therefore, that this was its main use. Dr. Baran attests that the loaded wagons of a military baggage train could not have made the Hypaepa-Tmolus crossing. However, the fact that the Hypaepa-Tmolus pass is more than twice as high as the Karabel is a very strong reason for accepting the P-Diodorus tradition on the route of Agesilaus, and to conclude that this was also the "shortest road" which Xenophon had in mind.

It is interesting to note in passing that Meyer not only concluded from Xenophon's description that Agesilaus had marched along the road over Nymphaeum (Karabel) but also believed that the Athenians in 499 B.C. had used the same route over Karabel. It is of course, generally assumed that the Ionians made the Hypaepa-Tmolus crossing, but Herodotus makes no mention of Hypaepa and since Karabel is situated at the western edge as against the Hypaepa-Tmolus which crosses the eastern edge of the Tmolus mountain range, could imply a passage across either of the two passes. I believe that even the reference to "apparent difficulty" need not exclude a Karabel crossing. However, the Hypaepa-Tmolus crossing is suggested in the last resort by Herodotus' reference to the use of guides: "it was not a great highway which would be obvious to a stranger, but was appropriate for a surprise attack." There is also a pass above Bayindir pointed out earlier (p. 54 above); but this offers no more than a mountain track.
V THE BATTLE OF SARDIS

The question of the route and of Xenophon’s presuppositions in regard to the route are the cardinal aspects of the problem of the Sardis campaign. On these two premises, fully examined in our previous discussions, the battle itself – the location of the battle and the movements of the Greek and Persian troops – hinges. It was the erroneous belief on the part of Dugas and Bruce that Xenophon implied an approach of the Greek forces along the Hyapaia – Tholus route which made them doubt possibly essential information supplied by Xenophon in regard to the scene of the battle.\[117]\)

"Für die Darstellung der Schlacht hat sich also der Schluss ergeben dass nicht bei Hell. Ox./Ephors/Diodor einerseits und Xenophon anderseits zwei ganz verschiedene Überlieferungen vorliegen, von denen man entweder der einen oder der andern zu folgen hatte, sondern dass nur eine subtile Kombination der drei Quellen Hell. Ox., Diodor und Xenophon den wahren Sachverhalt ergibt."[118]\)

This conclusion, reached by Breitenbach in connection with the battle of Notion, is also valid, I suggest, for the battle of Sardis on which the two main sources likewise offer conflicting evidence. I believe, therefore, as Hellen does, that it is possible to achieve a relative consensus between the sources.[115]\) This implies in the last resort consensus between Xenophon and P, Ephorus – Diodorus being mainly used to aid us in reconstructing gaps in the text of P.[120]\)

Proceeding from the assumption that the problem of the route followed by Agesilaus from Ephesus to Sardis has now been settled, a case in favour of some agreement between P – Diodorus and Xenophon can be made out around several further issues:

1) the day the battle took place;\[121]\)
2) the location of the battle in the Hermus valley and west of Sardis;\[122]\)
3) the fact that the Persians harassed the Greeks who then initiated the battle by attacking the enemy;\[123]\)
(4) the major role played by the Persian cavalry in the battle, with no evidence in Xenophon to contradict participation of the light infantry also, as in P's account; \(^{124}\)

(5) the defeat and flight of the Persians; \(^{125}\)

(6) the capture and plundering of the Persian camp; \(^{126}\)

(7) Agesilaus' sojourn in his camp near Sardis after the battle. \(^{127}\)

We have, however, still to face what appear to be crucial discrepancies between our sources, such as:

(a) Tissaphernes' expectation of the invasion of Caria; \(^{128}\)

(b) the stage at which the Persians overtook the Greeks; \(^{129}\)

(c) the numbers of the Persians and how their forces were arranged along the march; \(^{130}\)

(d) the ambush and the location of Thybarnae in Diodorus; \(^{131}\)

(e) the nature of the battle; \(^{132}\)

(f) Tissaphernes' movements and participation in the battle. \(^{133}\)

Tissaphernes' expectation, recorded by Xenophon, that Agesilaus would invade Caria, and that he stationed his infantry in Caria and his cavalry in the plain of the Maeander offers no insuperable difficulty. It would account at the outset for the fact that the Persians were following up from behind, overtaking the Greeks when in the vicinity of Mt. Sipylos. Hence Agesilaus could march unmolested and plundering freely for more than two days after his departure from Ephesus. \(^{134}\)

P and Diodorus omitted to record the detail on Tissaphernes' expectation of an invasion of Caria, either because P was not informed on it or because the Persian troops had merely been kept on in positions already held previously in Caria and in the Maeander plain, as Judeich believed. \(^{135}\)

P - Diodorus and Xenophon agree that the first encounter between the Greeks and the Persians occurred in the Hermus valley, but according to P - Diodorus Agesilaus and his army were near Sipylos when the forces of Tissaphernes overtook them while in Xenophon the Greeks were close to the Pactolus when the Persian cavalry arrived. \(^{136}\)

Busrolt, Kaupert and Anderson accept Xenophon's version and dismiss P - Diodorus' account of prior Persian contact with the Greeks during the approach
march. 137) P is explicit that the cavalry and light-armed troops, both
Greek and Persian, played a very specific role in the battle which arose
out of the ambush. 138) Xenophon mentions Persian and Greek horsemen only,
to begin with. This is no serious disagreement. Xenophon and P agree
that virtually the rest of the Greek army followed up and plundered
the Persian camp. The contradiction between Xenophon and P - Diodorus
could be resolved if we could assume that Tissaphernes split his forces
and sent the baggage section, accompanied by a section of the cavalry
and the light infantry followed by the heavy infantry over the Karabel
to pursue Agesilaus and check his army's raiding activities while he
himself proceeded with the rest of the cavalry over the nearer but much
more difficult Hypaepa-Imolus pass in order to intercept the Greeks
before they reached Sardis. 139) In this case the cavalry and light
infantry accompanying the baggage section, with the heavy infantry
following in the rear, could have overtaken the Greeks when they were
close to Mount Sipylius, while the cavalry section which had made the
Hypaepa-Imolus crossing with Tissaphernes could have confronted the
Greek army as they were approaching the Pactolus river. 140) For both
traditions make it clear that the ensuing battle occurred at no great
distance from the Pactolus; at all events P implies plundering of the
camp which was at no great walking distance from the scene of conflict. 141)
Anderson accordingly, following Kaupert, suggests that the Persian
cavalry were not following Agesilaus by the same route, but travelled
presumably along the Trales - Hypaepa- Sardis route arriving in the
Sardis area of the Hermus valley ahead of the Greek army. 142)

According to Diodorus, the Persians who overtook the Greeks and
began harassing stragglers who left the ranks to go plundering, numbered
ten thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry; in P the relevant
passage is badly mutilated but he is clearly referring to two divisions
of troops numbering thousands and tens of thousands and he seems to
indicate that the Greeks were heavily outnumbered. 143)
Xenophon, however, as I have observed, makes no mention of Persian troops who were following Agesilaus' army. But then he tells us nothing further of the Persian forces either, the which Tissaphernes dispatched to forestall the invasion of Coria, we are told, and which did not arrive in time to participate in the battle. According to his account, the Greeks first saw the enemy on the fourth day, when they were close to the Pactolus and shortly before the battle took place. And he says no more than that "The cavalry of the enemy arrived."\footnote{144}

We should therefore consider the possibility, as I have suggested above, that the Persian troops who, according to P and Diodorus, were harassing the rear guard of Agesilaus' army virtually represented the whole of Tissaphernes' army but excluding the cavalry detachment who tried to forestall the Greeks by cutting across the Hypaepa - Tmolus route. This Persian section could give warning of and afford additional protection against the impending threat of a major attack by the Greeks on Sardis itself.\footnote{145} Included in the army itself would have been thousands of cavalry and tens of thousands of light-armed infantry which both P and Diodorus mention, as well as the baggage train which could not be expected to negotiate the difficult Hypaepa - Tmolus crossing and which, according to Xenophon, reached the Pactolus shortly before the battle occurred and was given orders to cross the river and encamp. Anderson, however, believes, on the one hand, that the baggage train did follow the cavalry over the Hypaepa - Tmolus pass, thus delaying the cavalry's own march, and on the other that the camp which was plundered and round which Agesilaus, according to Xenophon, threw a cordon, did not include the baggage train of the whole Persian army.\footnote{146} But while there may be uncertainty in connection with the quantity of booty available, there is agreement between the two traditions on the plundering of the Persian camp by the victorious Greeks.\footnote{147} Neither P nor Diodorus mentions that the Greeks crossed a river on their way to the Persian camp but the eastern bank of the Pactolus appears to be the logical position for it; and there is nothing in P to contradict this assumption as the main battle action is clearly to be localised in the vicinity of Sardis.
The heavy infantry therefore do not seem to have participated in the fighting and were following some distance behind the baggage-train. In Xenophon the main Persian army was forestalled by Agesilaus' attack but he certainly implies it was not far distant:

\[\text{οὐ τὸς μὴ προσέκαμνεν ὁδὸν περὶ τὰ περίκοι.}\]

Their presence or near-presence is certainly implied in the fact that the whole Greek army was following up: \[\text{μακρὸς ὑπερομεταδείχθης\text{περίκοι.}}\] - which would make no sense if only the Persian horsemen were concerned. There is therefore no essential contradiction between Xenophon and P, i.e. if an answer could be provided to the cardinal question: Were the Persian forces expected from the direction of Sardis? Or coming up along the route from Ephesus? The river is certainly central in Xenophon's account. But there is nothing in the extant text of P to contradict Xenophon on this point.

While Meyer, Kaupert and Anderson believe that the whole Persian cavalry force used the Hypaepa - Tmolus route, I would like to suggest that at Tralles, or further on the route to Sipylus, Tissaphernes left the main section of his army and proceeded with a strong detachment of cavalry towards Hypaepa in order to cross the Tmolus above Sardis and intercept the Greeks before they reached the city.\[\text{[145]}\] If this were so, this cavalry section could be \[\text{οἰ τὰ ἑπαφεῖ}{\text{περίκοι.}}\] which in Xenophon (III.iv 21) \[\text{ἐν} \] on the fourth day; they may have joined the ranks of the cavalry which in P (Ch. VI 4 col vi 8) were riding around the Greeks. It is also possible that Xenophon's text implies that the baggage section which was ordered to cross the Pactolus and encamp, belonged only to this section of the cavalry. As has been mentioned above, Anderson (p.50) suggests that the camp plundered by the victorious Greeks and around which, according to Xenophon, Agesilaus had a cordon thrown, did not contain the baggage of the whole Persian army. It would seem however, that it was big enough to accommodate the captured camels in addition to the merchandise and prisoners of war and equipment mentioned by Xenophon and P - Diodorus.\[\text{[50]}\]
Xenophon's failure to mention the Persian forces who, according to P and Diodorus, were hararessing the Greek rearguard in the Hermus valley, no doubt with the object of retarding their progress to Sardis and of restricting their plundering activities must be matched against the verisimilitude of P's narrative. At all events Xenophon and P - Diodorus are in agreement - that for a good distance along the route the Greek forces were unmolested.\textsuperscript{151)

According to both traditions Agesilaus prepared for battle as soon as the enemy came into sight. In P Agesilaus formed his army into a hollow square from the moment the Persians overtook him, which formation he seems to have kept in the Hermus plain and abandoned only after the battle and when he was leading his army into Phrygia;\textsuperscript{152) and Xenophon reports that "nothing was lacking in Agesilaus' preparations" -

\begin{quote}
\textit{όλην δέην τὰς \varphiύργης \πρέπει\ναι,} \\
\textit{ὅταν ὁ \περσικός \καπιτάλας \ἐπή\να χθεῖε.}
\end{quote}

when the Persian cavalry appeared and that he was eager to give battle when he saw that the heavy infantry had not yet arrived.\textsuperscript{153)

In my approach, which is to ignore Diodorus where he contradicts P, or for that matter, introduces material which does not feature in P's detailed narrative, Diodorus' version of the ambush and the detail pertaining to Thybarnae are not strictly relevant. But since Thybarnae is introduced in every modern exposition on the battle of Sardis and allowance must be made for the state of P's text, Thybarnae and the topographical issues it raises cannot be avoided.

Diodorus, however, is known to have used Ephorus as his main source for the period of Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign but although Ephorus is thought to have copied directly from P, he was writing a world - history and this led to omissions and elaborations in the text of P which reached Diodorus. Thus discrepancies between Diodorus and P, such as those on the ambush, have commonly been attributed to Diodorus' use of Ephorus as an intermediary.\textsuperscript{154)
Marching in this hollow square formation the Greeks advanced, we are informed by Diodorus, to a point midway between Sardis and Thybarnaæ where they seem to have encamped at! spent the night. During the night, following P's narrative, Agesilaus sent Xenocles with 1400 hoplites and light-armed men ahead to lie in ambush and to be ready to attack the enemy when, coming up from behind, they came marching past. If Thybarnaæ is located at the modern Turğutlu, the actual ambush would be in the direction of Ahmetli where there may have been in antiquity as to-day wooded foothills which would provide excellent cover for men in ambush. The next morning at day-break Agesilaus roused his army and led them forward again while the Persians followed as usual, some in disorderly fashion and scattered all over the plain, while others rode around the Greeks. When the time seemed right Xenocles and his men rushed forth and attacked the enemy from the rear. Caught by surprise, as Diodorus puts it, between Xenocles' troops and Agesilaus' army, the Persians fled all over the plain.

Diodorus however, represents the ambush as having been laid when Agesilaus was on his way back from Sardis after plundering the park and gardens of Tissaphernes. But the circumstances he describes appear very unlikely. Tissaphernes is following the Greek army closely with 10,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry and is killing all Greeks who leave the ranks to go plundering. Agesilaus according to Diodorus, has formed his army into a hollow square and is clinging to the foothills of Mt. Sipylos and awaiting a favourable opportunity to attack the enemy, when he is represented in the next sentence, as marching up to Sardis to ravage the gardens of Tissaphernes. Hence Dugas suggested that this was a confusion with the plundering which took place after Agesilaus had defeated the Persians.

But more serious, and directly related to the problem of Thybarnaæ, is Diodorus' version that Agesilaus planned the ambush on his return from the abortive raid, as it appears, on Tissaphernes' estate - Tissaphernes, (IV 80 2). It had the effect of drawing the enemy, in hot pursuit of the Greek raiders returning from Sardis,
into the ambush but travelling in the opposite direction to the advance of the rest of the Greek forces which were going east on route from Ephesus. Far from P having duplicated the Mysian ambush and transposed it to Lydia and the Hermus valley as Cornelius maintains, it is Diodorus' source, doubtless Ephorus, who projected a motif taken out of the Mysian context into the situation near Sardis, where the Mysian ambush the men were left behind and Agesilaus turned back to join them after they had routed the Myssians who tried to follow Agesilaus' army. Judeich, however, who in 1892 could compare Xenophon only with Diodorus suggested a solution for this problem of the ravaging of Tissaphernes' gardens. Since Judeich did not know from P that Agesilaus marched into Phrygia Magna after the battle, he assumed that it was Agesilaus' intention to return to Ephesus via the Hymetae-Tmolus pass above Sardis but that he was stopped by the presence of the Persians in this pass.

It is, of course, still possible that Ephorus, in addition to confusing the Sardis and Mysian ambushes, has magnified casual raiding as far as Sardis into a full-scale march and that these raiders were who in Xenophon's text were attacked by the Persian cavalry.

There is also no certainty on Diodorus' ambush and battle location i.e. midway between Sardis and Thyburnae because Thyburnae cannot be identified. Moyer's view still seems to hold, namely that Thyburnae is not to be identified with Thymbrara (Xen. Cyrop. VII 2, 11, VII 1, 45). Thymbrara lies about 57 km east of Sardis in the Cogamus river valley and it is generally accepted that the battle occurred west of Sardis. Cawkwell, however, suggests that Thyburnae in Diodorus is the result of a textual corruption of Thymbrara. Admittedly the oldest Diodorus manuscript, namely the Patmos manuscript of the tenth or eleventh century, is corrupt at this point.

However, whatever the correct name may be of the place called Thyburnae in the standard texts of Diodorus, geographical considerations and archaeological finds seem to indicate that the present Turgutlu which is 35 km distant from Sardis, may well have been its ancient site.
Xenophon makes no mention of the ambush and this leads Busolt and Kaupert to dismiss the ambush as one of P's inventions and Anderson is inclined to share their scepticism.  

On the nature of the battle we have such variant accounts from P and Diodorus and Xenophon that the issue, as Anderson observes, 'resolves itself into one of credibility of witnesses'.

In P, Agesilaus, when he saw that Xenocles and his men from the ambush had put the Persians to flight, sent forth light-armed foot-soldiers and cavalry to join Xenocles and his company in their pursuit of the enemy of whom they killed about 600. But as most of the enemy involved in this incident were light-armed foot-soldiers and cavalry as well, the Greeks were unable to overtake them. They therefore gave up their pursuit and marched against the Persian camp, which they captured, taking a rich booty.

Diodorus' version that Xenocles' men do not initiate the battle but only charge the enemy upon being given a sign and after a fierce battle has taken place, can be ignored, and likewise the grossly exaggerated number of the dead, i.e. 6,000, in Diodorus, in keeping with the general approach in this study that Diodorus' text be used only to supplement P but not to contradict him. Even so there is basic agreement between P and Diodorus on the decisive role played by the ambush in putting the Persians to flight.

The discrepancies between P and Diodorus can, however, be ascribed to Diodorus' use of Ephorus as an intermediate source.

Xenophon omits the Lydian as well as the Mysian ambush. When the Persian cavalry arrived, it began to cut down the Greek camp-followers dispersed for foraging. Agesilaus thereupon ordered his cavalry to go to their relief. The Persians on their part drew up their cavalry forces in battle array. Agesilaus perceiving that the Persian heavy infantry had not yet arrived and that his own preparations were complete, decided to join battle if possible. After making sacrifice he led his phalanx against the Persian horsemen in line of battle...
and ordered picked hoplites to storm the enemy and the peltasts to lead the way at the double; next he ordered the cavalry to charge while he himself followed up with the whole army. The Persians withstood the onslaught of the cavalry but when the whole Greek army attacked they gave way, some falling into the river, while the rest took to flight.  

Xenophon's battle is a formal action which a writer with his military experience and knowledge of the cavalry could have composed with the aid of a minimum of basic facts while P's battle is not the kind of military action an ancient historian would have thought of if he had wanted to invent i.e. if he was bent on writing a "plausible but fictitious battle-piece".  

There is agreement between P - Diodorus and Xenophon in the basic defeat of the Persians and the capture and plundering of their camp.  

The text of P, unfortunately is very uncertain until the point is reached where the ambush is laid. He does seem to mention a river, and if this river is the Pactolus there might be agreement between P and Xenophon on this point. But the Pactolus is very close to Sardis at the point where it crosses the Smyrna-Sardis highway and passes within yards of the Acropolis of Sardis and near the ancient city walls. As it seems unlikely that Agesilaus would have waited to engage the enemy in battle until he was under the very walls of this strongly fortified city, I think Xenophon's location of the battle can only be accepted if we assume that the battle took place not far from the conflux of the Hermus and the Pactolus, which would be ± 6 km north of Sardis and in an area with sufficient level terrain for the movements of the troops.
According to both P and Diodorus Tissaphernes withdrew with the defeated Persians to Sardis but Xenophon records that Tissaphernes was in Sardis when the battle took place.\textsuperscript{177} It has been suggested that he stopped at Sardis for a short while to consult with his commanding officers on the Greek threat, while the cavalry detachment which had accompanied him along the Hypaepe-Tmolus route, went ahead and became involved in hostilities before Tissaphernes could rejoin them.\textsuperscript{178} In this case it is possible that when Tissaphernes attempted to rejoin his cavalry, he found them and the rest of the Persians in flight and had no choice but to withdraw with them to Sardis.\textsuperscript{179} There is nothing in P - Diodorus to conflict with this reconstruction as far as the actual battle is concerned. Tissaphernes is not mentioned by P in this immediate context. P refers to him in VI 13 v 14 when he first overtake the Greek forces and again in VII 1 vi 29-30 when he is said to have withdrawn with his troops to Sardis; and Diodorus agrees with P on Tissaphernes.

In the last resort, therefore, he was not present on the actual field of battle. But the problem remains that P - Diodorus clearly records the presence of Tissaphernes with the Persian forces in the wake of the Greeks along the route from Ephesus to Sardis.\textsuperscript{180}

P alone mentions the three days during which Agesilaus remained in the vicinity of Sardis and returned the enemy dead, raised a trophy and plundered all the surrounding countryside; after that, we are told, he led his army into Phrygia Magna.

Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus mention this interval; but Xenophon does refer to the plundering by the peltasts and to the fact that Agesilaus encamped around \textsuperscript{181} thereby suggesting that Agesilaus did not leave Sardis immediately after the battle. Reconciliation of the two sources on this issue is therefore not impossible.

Against this background of problems and crucial issues discussed, some that could be resolved but others perhaps not, to which both Xenophon and P contribute, the following pattern of events seems to emerge:
Since Tissaphernes had expected Agesilaus to invade Caria and had stationed his infantry in Caria and his cavalry in the plain of the Maeander Agesilaus was able to march unmolested and plundering freely for more than two days from Ephesus.\textsuperscript{181)}

But after they had negotiated the Karabel, ass and when they were close to Mount Sipylus, the Greeks were overtaken by the Persians who then began harassing the stragglers who left the ranks to go plundering.\textsuperscript{182)} These Persians greatly outnumbered Agesilaus' troops and consisted of cavalry and infantry, probably representing the vanguard of the main army. Agesilaus now formed his army into a hollow square and marching in this formation the Greeks advanced to a point midway between Sardis and the so-called Thybarnae which could conceivably be on the site of the modern Turgutlu where they camped and spent the night. During that night Agesilaus sent Xenocles with 1,400 hoplites and light-armed men ahead to be in ambush and to be ready to attack the enemy when they came marching past on the following day.\textsuperscript{183)} The next morning at daybreak, Agesilaus roused his army and led them forward again while the Persians followed as usual, some attacking the Greeks, while others rode around them and a third section followed in disorderly fashion, scattered all over the plain. When it seemed opportune Xenocles and his men rushed forth and attacked the enemy from the rear. Caught by surprise, between Xenocles' troops behind them and Agesilaus' army in the front, the Persians fled in every direction across the plain. Agesilaus, when he saw that the enemy was stricken with fear, sent forth light-armed foot-soldiers and cavalry to join Xenocles and his company in their pursuit of the enemy of whom they killed about 600. But as most of the enemy were light armed foot-soldiers and cavalry, the Greeks were unable to overtake them.\textsuperscript{184)} Abandoning their pursuit, the Greeks marched against the Persian camp, beyond the Pactolus, which they found poorly guarded and soon captured, taking rich spoils, including merchandise, a large number of prisoners of war, a great deal of equipment, more than 70 talents, property belonging to Tissaphernes and the camels which Agesilaus later took back to Greece.\textsuperscript{185)}
After the battle Tissaphernes withdrew with his dismayed forces to Sardis.186)

But Agesilaus remained encamped near Sardis for three days during which he returned the enemy dead, raised a trophy and plundered all the surrounding country. He then led his army forth into Phrygia Magna.187)

Having considered the discrepancies and their resultant problems, as well as the major heresies, we have found that it is possible to reach a measure of consensus if we attribute irreconcilable divergences such as the ambush and the nature of the battle, to the difference in historiographic approach between Xenophon and P. Arguing from this point of view, which I believe is the correct one, it is impossible to agree with Anderson's suggestion that P may have written a "fictitious battlepiece". I am convinced, moreover, that it would be out of character for P who, with his obvious attention to detail, seems to be following Thucydides' historiographic style, to pad his history with inventions. Nor does the casual engagement P describes appear to me to be the sort of battle an historian would invent. On the other hand, I consider it far more likely that Xenophon, who was at once an experienced general and a writer with a novelist's bent, could have used his inventive genius plus some basic facts to produce the formal battle between opposing forces drawn up in battle array which the supporters of his version, from Gussolt to Anderson, have accepted as completely satisfactory.

2) Bartoletti, Vittorio, Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, Testimonia, p. 48 - 52.


5) Meyer, E., Theopomp. Hellenika (1908), p.3: 'Von Xenophon weicht die neue Quelle vollständig ab.'


8) Nepos, Auer III 5; Plutarch, Ages. X 1.


10) P VI 4 - 5; Diod. XIV 80, 2 - 3.

11) Xen. Hell. III iv 22; P VI 2 - 3; Diod. XIV 80, 1.

12) Xen. ibidem.

13) Diod. XIV 80, 2.

14) Pausanias III 9,6.

16) P VI 4 - 5; Diod. XIV 80, 2 - 4.


18) P VI 3 & VII 1; Diod. XIV 80, 1 & 5.


21) P VI 4 - 6, VII 1; Diod. XIV 80, 1 - 5; G. & H. p. 217, n. 59; Breitenbach 394.

22) P VI 2; Diod. XIV 80, 1.


28) P VI 2 ff. and VII 1.

29) cf. Bruce, p. 78.

31) Diod. XIV 80, 1; G. & H., p. 215.

32) Bruce, p. 82.

33) Allows for 2 bivouacs in the Casyter valley and near Sipylus, respectively, and a third in the Hermus valley beyond Sipylus.

34) P VI 4, 5 - 9.

35) P VI 5 - 6, 18 - 23.

36) Diod. XIV 80, 1 - 5.


40) P VI 3; Diod. XIV 80, 1; from what remains of P VI 3, 15 - 17 it would seem that P's figures could agree with those of Diodorus.

41) Nellen, P. 46: "den einen Autor zuungunsten des anderen zu beurteilen und jeweils nur einer der beiden Quellen historische Glaubwürdigkeit zu unterstellen."

42) G. & H. p. 142 and 217 n. 59.

43) Meyer, p. 3 - 17, cf. p. 5 & 6 - "dass die Erzählung des Papyrus historisch korrekt ist als die Xenophons".

44) Dugas, p. 72.

46) Jacoby F. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* 11c, 13; Judeich W. *Klein Asiat. Stud.* 61, 1 (1892); Meyer, p. 146; Busolt G. *Hermes* 43 (1908) "Der Neue Historiker und Xenophon", p. 266.

47) Bruce, p. 150 - 156.

48) Busolt, p. 264: "Die ganze Erzählung des Marsches mit allen Einzelheiten, die uns der neue Historiker bietet, ist also eine bloße Erfindung, die völlige Unkenntnis militärischer Dinge beweist."

49) Kaupert, p. 283.


54) Nellen, p. 53: "aus werkmässigen Standpunkten der beiden antiken Autoren ...."


57. Anderson, p. 30 and 32.


60. Delebecque, p. 508; Breitenbach, H.R., Historiographische Anschauungsformen Xenophons, Bascl, 1950, p. 143: 'im wesentlichen zwischen 362 und 357/6 verfasst hat, wobei ihm einzelne, schon früher ausgearbeitete Stücke vorlagen'.


64. Thuc. 1 22, 2: MRRG 1.22.2, cf. Exarch, 22, 2, 21 - 23; Meyer, p. 146; Dugas, p. 92 - 93; Bruce, p.6; P Ch. X & XV.
65) cf. Dugas, p. 64.

66) Anderson, p. 49.

67) Dugas, p. 63.

68) P Ch. VI 2, col. v 9 Diod. Xiv 80, 1

68a) See Addendum K.

69) Anderson, p. 34: "Through this pass (the Karabel) runs at the present day an unsurfaced road, adequate probably for the sturdier types of motor vehicle, but intended rather for foot-travellers and animals. It did not appear to be much used in the summer of 1951 when I rode by it to visit the famous Hittite reliefs near the head of the pass" The modern road, of course, follows the Ephesus-Smyrna-Sardis route.

70) cf. Dugas, p. 63 'D’après Diodore et P il est probable qu’Agésilaos emprunte d’abord la grande voie d’Éphèse à Smyrne, mais ne la suit que jusqu’à Métropolis; là il la quitte, traverse le défilé de Kara-Bel et rejoint à Nymphaiion la route de Smyrne à Sardes.'

71) cf. Kauperts’ map (p. 275) 1.

72) From recent reports in the American Journal of Archaeology it would seem that to date no finds relevant to the year 396 - 395 B.C. and the Asiatic campaign of Agesilaus have been made. Dr Varan’s publication includes a description of Sardis and its ruins and excavations. His account is illustrated by photographs of the ruins and the restorations undertaken by the Americans and a map showing the ancient walls. The Temple of Artemis is late Hellenistic and the Honor Hall in the Gymnasium, which has been partly restored by the Americans dates back to the Roman period. A report in the American Journal of Archaeology, 81, winter 1977, p. 329 mentions the discovery of a monumental structure in brick and dating back to the 7th Century and Lydian history. This, it was thought, could be a fortification wall and gate. The most relevant feature of these
discoveries for our enquiry is that the Pactolus flows quite close to
the fortifications. Clive Foss (p. 29 - 33) also made important dis-
coveries while exploring Mount Tmolus. In 1969 he found traces of two
ancient roads of which the first (via Ucetepeler) was probably that
followed by the Athenians in 499 B.C. while the other, which passed
Metallon, he thinks, may have been "the major road between Sardis and
Hypaepa". Both roads, we are told, left the banks of the Pactolus about
five minutes south of the Temple of Artemis at Sardis (Baran's map, p.62).
72a) Musa Baran, Troy, Pergamon, Sardis, Izmir, p.62.
73) cf. Kaupert's map 9, Sardes SchlachtKarte.
75) cf. Clive Foss, "Explorations in Mount Tmolus"
SCCA II (1979) p.27.
76) Baran, M. cf. Personal Correspondence, Addendum R.
77) Clive Foss, p. 27 ff.
78) cf. Modern map of Anatolia, Addendum K.
79) Philippson, Reisen und Forschungen im westlichen Kleinasien II, p. 69:
"Als ich, in dem abgelegenen Bergnest angelassen, vor dem Kaffeehaus
sas, war ich aufs höchste überrascht, eine Gesellschaft Europäer ....
zum Teil im Tenniskostüm mit Rackets in den Händen, heranpromenieren
t zu sehen": cf. Foss, p. 55.
80) cf. ibidem; cf. Clive Foss p. 27 - 32.
82) Herod. V 
όπως δὲ Ἀργείων ἐπὶ πόλις ὅτε ἦσαν ἐπί στρατευμάτων Καλετορῶν, ἑνώτερον
ἐπίκαιροί τε τοῦ Τμόλου ἀπιστών, ἀφετέρου Ἀργείων.
Strabo, 13, 627:
"Ὑπαέβο τε πόλις ἐπὶ καταβαίνοντι ἀπὸ τοῦ Τμόλου πρὸς
τοῖς Καλετσίοις παῖσιν.
cf. E. Meyer, p. 5; Clive Foss p. 27 - 33.
This applies equally to the two ancient alternatives mentioned by
Foss, commencing within 5 minutes south of the Temple of Sardis,
Clive Foss, p. 30 and 33 respectively.
Anderson, p. 39;
Clive Foss, p. 32. But see below, p. 35, for further discussion
of the nature of the Hypaepa pass.
85) Anderson, p. 40 - 41; cf. Meyer, p. 5;  

86) Anderson, p. 42;  


89) Meyer, p. 5.


91) Radet, La Lydie p. 31 et 102; Cousin, Kyros le Jeune en Asie Mineure, p. 85; Hausoullier, Rev. de Philol. XXIII (1899), p. 293.


93) De Sanctis, Atti Tor. 65, p.179.

94) Anderson, P. 39; Kaupert, p. 278.

95) cf. Kaupert's graphic illustration on p. 276.

96) Anderson, p. 41.

97) Delebecque, p. 141 - 142; Bruce, Comm. p. 80 ff.


99) Grenfell and Hunt pointed out that "Xenophon does not state Agesilaus' route to Sardis"; the speculation about "the shortest route" seems to have commenced subsequently, namely with Busolt and Meyer; G. and H., p.214; Meyer, p.5.

100) Dugas, p. 69.

101) Delebecque, p. 142;  
Bruce, p. 156: "The place at which the battle took place, Xenophon knew, was on the route by which the Greeks reached Sardis ..."; p. 80:
"The route indicated by Xenophon was the normal one; P would not have described another in some detail unless he had good reason to do so".

102) Breitenbach, col. 394.

103) Nellen p. 52.

104) P V1 4 - 5.

105) Herod. V 100.

106) Cary, M. The Geographic Background of Greek and Roman History (1949) p. 162 - 3, with map on p. 160. "But Ephesus had the advantage of a dual connection with the interior by means of the two main river valleys. Its own river, the Cayster, had indeed a very short course, but an easy pass across Mt. Tmolus gave it access to the Hermus valley". See Cary's map.

107) Dugas, p. 62; Bruce, p. 80: "the ordinary route of three days' duration", with reference to Herod. V. 54; Delebecque, p. 142.


110) See my thesis, p. 52 above and note 74.

111) Strabo 13. 627; Foss p. 30 and 33 ff.

112) Baran, cf. Personal correspondence, Addendum R.

113) Meyer, p. 5.

114) Herod. V 100.

115) Clive Foss, p. 28.

116) Anderson, p. 51. see note (79).
117. Ougas, p. 62, 64; Bruce, p. 152 and p. 156; "The place at which the battle took place, Xenophon knew, was on the route by which the Greeks reached Sardis from Ephesus, and some little distance before their arrival at Sardis. His lack of information about the route leads him to suppose that the river near the scene of the battle was the Pactolus and not the Hermus"; cf. J.K. Anderson, p. 49; Delebecque, p. 265.


119. Nellen, p. 47.

120. In my reconstruction of the battle of Sardis Diodorus will be used to supplement P but not to correct him, so that, strictly speaking, the versions of only two authors, i.e. Xenophon and P, will be considered.


122. P Ch. VI 5 col. vi; Diod. XIV 80,2 - 3; Xen. Hell. III iv 22; cf. Pausan. III 9,6: Nellen, p.52: 'kann Pausanias augenscheinlich seiner allgemein hervorragenden geographischen Kenntnisse - zudem stammte er aus Ioni - die beiden Flüsse Pactolos und Hermos nicht verwechselt haben.'

123. P Ch. VI 3 - 5 col. v 34 f - col. vi 1 - 18; Diod. XIV 1 - 3; Xen. Hell. III iv 22 - 23.

124. P. Ch. VI 4 & 6 col. vi 8 - 9 & 20; Xen. Hell. III iv 22 - 23; Xenophon mentions only the Persian cavalry, saying that the infantry had not yet arrived; Pausan. III 9, 6.

125. P Ch. VI 5 - 6 col. vi 12 - 19 ff; Diod. XIV 80, 3 - 4; Xen. Hell. III iv 23 - 24; Plut. Ages X 3 - 4.

P Ch. VII 1 col. vi 31; Xen. Hell. III iv 24. The fact that Agesilaus encamped near Sardis after the battle leads one to conclude that he spent some time there before marching on.


P Ch. VI 3 col. v; Diod. XIV 80, 1; Xen. Hell. III iv 21 - 22.

P Ch. VI 3 - 4 col. v; Diod. XIV 80, 1; Xen. Hell. III iv 21 - 23; Plut. Ages. X 2 - 3.

P Ch. VI 4 - 5, col. v; Diod. XIV 80, 2 - 3.

P Ch. VI 4 - 6, col. v - Ch. VII 1 col. v; Diod. XIV 80, 2 - 3; Xen. Hell. III iv 22 - 24; Plut. Ages. X 1 - 4; Pausan III 9, 6.

P Ch. VI 3 col. v and Ch. VII 1 col. vi; Diod. XIV 80, 1 and 5; Xen. Hell. III iv 21 and 25; Plut. Ages. X 1 - 2; Pausan. III 9, 6; Polyaen. II 1, 9; Nep. Ages. 3, 4; Front. Strateg. I 8, 12.

Xen. Hell. III iv 21; P. Ch. VI 2 col. v 2 - 14; Diod. XIV 80, 1; Polyaen. II 1, 9; Plut. Ages. X 1; Nep. Ages. 3, 5; Pausanias III 9, 6, depending on P-Diodorus, does not record Tissaphernes' expectation of an invasion of Caria; cf. Nellen p. 44.

cf. Judeich, p. 62, n. 1: 'Die Angabe Xenophons, dass Tissaphernes sich wieder von Agesilaos habe täuschen lassen und seine Truppen auch diesmal in Karien und in der Maiandrosengebene zusammengezogen habe, ist wol nur insofern richtig, als Tissaphernes die alten Stellungen ruhig beibehielt, bis er Agesilaos' Absichten erkannt hatte und ihn nun sofort verfolgte.'
136. P Ch. VI 2 - 3 col. v; Diod. XIV 80, 1; Xen. Hell. III iv 21 - 22.


138. P Ch. VI 5 - 6 col. vi 20 - 21.


140. cf. Foss, p. 27 - 37.

141. P Ch. VI 6 col. vi 22 - 23.


143. Diod. XIV 80, 1; P Ch. VI 3 col. V 14 - 20.


147. Xen. Hell. III iv 24; P Ch. VI 6 col. vi 22 - 27; Diod. XIV 80, 4.


150. Xen. Hell. III iv 24; P Ch. VI 6 col. vi 25 - 27; Diod. XIV 80, 4.

151. Xen. Hell. III iv 21; Diod. XIV 80, 1; cf. P Ch. VI 2, col. v 12.

152. P Ch. VI 3 col. v 35; P Ch. VII 2 col. vi 36; Diod. XIV 80, 1; cf. Kaupert, p. 266, (contra).
"An den Abhängen des Sipylos machte er Halt, richtete sich zur Verteidigung ein und sperrte die beiden einzigen schmalen Zugänge, welche von dieser Gegend am Ost- und Westfusse des Sipylosgebirges vorüber in die Hermossehene führen. Tissaphernes' Plan Agesilaos auf jeden Fall von einem Einbruch in dieses Gebiet, das Herz seiner Satrapie, zurückzuhalten, war damit vollkommen vereitelt. Da er einen Durchbruch nicht für möglich halten mochte und ein langes tatenloses Gegenüberstehen zwecklos und für die Ernährung seines riesigen Heeres sehr bedenklich war, so scheint Tissaphernes zurückgegangen zu sein in der ganz richtigen Absicht den nächsten bequemen Zugang zum Hermostal zu benutzen und über den Tmolos, dann durch das Paktolostal nach Sardes zu rücken. Er konnte so entweder Agesilaos in den Rücken kommen, oder falls es dafür zu spät war, die eigene Hauptstadt decken und durch Sperrung des von ihm selbst benutzten Zugangs einen Einfall in die onere Kayistroschene verhüten."
Doch auf diesen Abmarsch hatte Agesilaos nur gewartet; sobald er desselben sicher war, brach er plündernd und verwüstend in die blühende Ebene des Hermos ein. Drei Tage hatte man sich ungehindert der Plünderung in der Richtung auf Sardes nähern können, am vierten überschritt man den Paktos; die feindliche Hauptstadt war erreicht. Da erschienen gerade noch zur rechten Zeit, um sie zu retten, die Reiter, welche den Vortrag von Tissaphernes' Heer bildeten. Sofort entspann sich ein Gefecht, in dem die grieche Reiterei durch ihre Hopliten unterstützt über die lediglich aus Reitern bestehenden Perser siegte. Aber Agesilaos sah doch ein, dass der Weg in die obere Kaystrosebene, auf dem er offenbar nach Ephesos zurückkehren wollte, nicht mehr frei sei; Tissaphernes hatte hier mit Erfolg Agesilaos' Manöver gegen diesen selbst wiederholt: auch Agesilaos musste umkehren."

In his Theopomps Hellenika (1911) Judeich reconsidered Xenophon's and Diodorus' accounts in the light of the new evidence offered by P and revised his earlier conclusions accordingly. But he still believed that it was from this position that he sent his infantry into Caria and posted his cavalry in the Paeander plain, probably near Trrtes, when he was led to expect an invasion in Caria. This gave Agesilaus \( \frac{3}{4} \) days to ravage the Hermus valley as far as Sardis, while Tissaphernes, after discovering that he had been misled, hurried back with his cavalry over Hypaepa-Tholus and overtook the Greeks as they were returning from Sardis (p. 128 - 129).


164. Diod. XIV 80, 2.
G. Cavpillow, Note on III iv 24 in Appendix to Xenophon A History of my times (Hellenica), p. 405 - 406.

165. See Vogels' app. crit. for Diod. XIV 80, 2 in the Teubner Text and a photocopy of the Patmos ms. in my Addendum F. See my next note.
166. See Baran - correspondence in my Addendum R. The Patmos scribe or P clearly wrestled with his archetype at this point as he used an abbreviation for &R; which was out of keeping with his practice for this section, at any rate, of his manuscript. The &R; has been restored in the Florence manuscript on F, of the fourteenth century. I have had the privilege, rare for a non-specialist, of inspecting both Diodorus manuscripts in the original, and wish to record my debt respectively to Dr. Pitaudi of the Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana and to Rev. Deacon Chrysostome Florentis, director of the Holy Monastery of Saint John the Theologian at Patmos, who located the relevant passages for me and to both of them I owe the two photostats in the 'Addendum' to my thesis. If the corruption of the text in the Patmos manuscript should reflect the state of the archetype from which all the later manuscripts derive - of this there is no certainty - it would render the transmission of the place name 'Thybarnae' all the more precarious.


169. P Ch. VI 5 col. vi 14 - 6, 27.

170. Diod. XIV 80, 3; P Ch. VI 5 col. vi 14.


174. P Ch. VI 3 col. v 43.


177. P Ch. VII 1 col. vi 29 - 30; Diod. XIV 80, 5; Xen. Hell. iv 25.


179. See note 186.

180. P Ch. VI 3 col. v 14 - 15.


182. P Ch. VI 3 col. v; Diod. XIV 80, 1.

183. P Ch. VI 4 col. v 59 - 60 - col. vi 4; Diod. XIV 80, 2 - 3.

184. P Ch. VI 4 - 6, col. vi 5 - 22.


186. P Ch. VII 1 col. vi 28 - 30; Diod. XIV 80, 5.


188. Anderson, p. 51.
CHAPTER THREE

XENOPHON'S HISTORIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH - THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGN

On the autumn campaign the discrepancies between the two traditions are negligible; but there is a completely different choice of material which clearly reflects the difference in the historiographical approach of P and Xenophon. Xenophon represents Agesilaus as the victorious general who took some cities by force while others came over to him of their own accord.

We know, however, that Xenophon differs from P in his approach to historiography. While P is content to give a sober account of the facts and details of campaigning, Xenophon is apt to skip over many of the duller details and to concentrate rather on dramatic dialogues and negotiations. He also appears to have set ideas on how an ideal general and ideal battle situations should be presented.¹)

This difference in approach is particularly striking when we compare P's version of the autumn campaign with that of Xenophon. P gives a detailed account: Agesilaus marched with his army of Spartans and allies along the coast of Lydia without harming the inhabitants, in accordance with the treaty concluded with Tithraustes.²) Xenophon, on the other hand, not only mentions his treaty but devotes eleven lines to the negotiations and dialogue that led to its conclusion; and he adds the detail that Agesilaus received thirty talents to compensate him for his undertaking to refrain from pillaging the property of the Lydians.³) P, however, informs us that Agesilaus carried out this clause of his agreement with Tithraustes.⁴)

When, however, Agesilaus entered the territory of Pharnabazus he proceeded to ravage the land, according to P's account. After he had passed the plain of Thebes and that called the Apian, he invaded Mysia and urged the Mysians to join him in his campaign, for many of the Mysians were independent and not subject to the King. Those who joined him suffered no harm but he ravaged the land of the rest. When he had reached the mountains called Mysian Olympus and realized how narrow and
difficult the mountain pass was, wishing to secure a safe passage, he
sent envoys to conclude a truce with the Mysians; the latter then
allowed the majority of Agesilaus' men to pass but attacked the rearguard
who, on account of the confined space, had abandoned battle formation.
Agesilaus therefore united his forces and spent the day in rendering
funeral rites to the dead, for about 50 men had fallen. But the next
day he posted a large force of Dorcyolidian mercenaries in ambush and then
led his army onwards again. Thereupon the Mysians, thinking that
Agesilaus was leaving on account of the losses he had sustained on the
previous day, came forth from their villages and pursued the Greeks
with the intention of harassing the rearguard as before. But the Greeks
in ambush, when the Mysians passed them, leapt forth from the ambuscade
and attacked the enemy. The Mysians in the front ranks of the pursuit
were immediately engaged in battle with the Greeks and were killed; but
the majority, when they saw the losses their vanguard was suffering, fled back
to their villages. Upon hearing the news, Agesilaus led his army back
by the same road until they joined the men of the ambuscade and camped
in the same place where he had camped the previous day. Thereafter the
Mysians to whom the dead belonged, sent envoys and took up their dead under
truce. More than a hundred and thirty had fallen. Agesilaus, after
taking guides from the villages and giving his soldiers a rest for several
days, led the army ahead and descended into the part of Phrygia which he
had not ravaged the previous summer and this he now pillaged; and here
he had as his guide Spithridates, with his son.

Xenophon, in his account of the Phrygian campaign, gives no details
of the march nor of the invasion of Mysia and the ambush. We might
suppose either that his information was inadequate or that he found other
aspects of the campaign of greater importance. He tells us that Agesilaus
arrived in the Phrygia of Pharmabazus in autumn and that he burned and
devastated the land, thus agreeing with P. 5

Having mentioned that Spithridates and his son joined Agesilaus,
the former in the capacity of guide, P pauses to explain why Agesilaus
was so pleased to have the Persian and his son with him. 6 Spithridates,
he tells us, was a Persian who had spent some time in the service of
Pharnabazus. After quarreling with him and fearing arrest and further harm, he fled at once to Cyzicus. Afterwards, however, he came to Agesilaus with his son Megabates, who was young and handsome. In view of what had happened, Agesilaus took them with him, more especially on account of the youth. For it was said that he was deeply attached to him and he also thought that Spithridates would be a useful guide for the army. For reasons such as these he welcomed them readily and led his army ahead ravaging the land of Pharnabazus as far as they went until they arrived at a fortified town called Leonton Cephalae. 7) Having made an unsuccessful attack upon it, Agesilaus set out again and led his army forward, pillaging and plundering the land that was as yet unravaged. Arriving at Gordium, a town built upon a mound and strongly fortified, he encamped his army and remained there for six days during which he made assaults upon the enemy and kept his soldiers together by providing them with numerous comforts. 8) When he failed to take the place by force owing to the energy of Rathanes, a Persian by race, who was in command of it, he set out with his soldiers and led them further inland, being urged by Spithridates to march towards Paphlagonia.

Thereafter Agesilaus led the Peloponnesians and the allies towards the borders of Phrygia and Paphlagonia and there he encamped his forces and sent Spithridates to Gyes. 9) Having made the journey, Spithridates persuaded Gyes to return with him. After concluding a treaty with the Paphlagonians, Agesilaus in all haste led his army back to the coast, fearing that their winter food supply might fail. 10) But he followed another route, supposing that the road across the Sangarius would be less tiring for his soldiers. Here again, as at Gordium, we see Agesilaus showing special concern for his men. While P is less partial to Agesilaus than Xenophon he tries to be scrupulously fair in assessing his qualities. P tells us further that Gyes sent Agesilaus about a thousand horsemen and more than two thousand infantry. 11) Having conducted his army to Cius in Mysia he remained there for ten days and again harried the Mysians in revenge for their treachery at Olympus. 12) Thereafter he led the Greeks through Phrygia along the seacoast and after making an unsuccessful assault upon a place called Miletoù Teichos, he withdrew his forces. 13) While marching along the Rhyniakos river he
arrived at Lake Dascylitis which lies below Dascylium, a very strong place and fortified by the king, where Pharnabazus was said to store all his silver and gold.\textsuperscript{14} Having encamped his soldiers there, he summoned Pancalus, who had sailed with the admiral Cheiricrates and was guarding the Hellespont with five triremes; Pancalus arrived with all speed and sailed into the lake with his triremes, whereupon Agesilaus ordered him to take on board the more valuable part of the booty and transport it to Cyzicus so that it might produce pay for his army.\textsuperscript{15} Agesilaus thereafter dismissed the soldiers from Mysia with orders to return in spring as he was preparing, in the coming winter, to march into Cappadocia. And at this point in P's interesting and detailed account of the autumn campaign the papyrus breaks off.

Xenophon commences his account of the Phrygian campaign with the statement that Agesilaus invaded the Phrygia of Pharnabazus in that autumn and that he laid waste the land.\textsuperscript{16} Here he is, of course in agreement with P, but when he continues with the remark that Agesilaus took some cities by force, while others came over to him of their own free will, we have a serious discrepancy, for according to P, Agesilaus made unsuccessful attempts to capture Leonton Cephalaes, Gordium and Hiletou Teichos, and did not succeed in taking any towns in Phrygia. At this stage Xenophon has perhaps sacrificed a few facts to his preconceived notion of how the ideal general should fare in such a campaign; or in the absence of reliable information, he has made certain deductions, and Agesilaus' rich booty has led him to assume a series of important victories.\textsuperscript{17} If adequately informed he seems to have been selective in omitting the failures and misleading with regard to the successes he mentions—-in all of which he is probably only being true to the conventions of his period and to his own turn of mind and particularism.

With regard to Spithridates, Xenophon omits personal details and merely mentions that he offered to arrange for negotiations with the Paphlagonian king and make him an ally, if he could accompany Agesilaus.\textsuperscript{18} We are then told that Agesilaus marched ahead with enthusiasm, being long since eager to cause some tribe to revolt from the king, and we see in this
detail also how Xenophon is bent on portraying Agesilaus as the ideal general or paradeigma. When Agesilaus reached Paphlagonia — and here I believe that Xenophon is using ἔντειος ἄλλης ἐν τῷ Ἰλιασάριον in the sense of "at" or "close to" and that, like P, he does not imply that Agesilaus crossed the border — Otus came and concluded an alliance with him. And it was Spithridates, Xenophon tells us, who persuaded the Paphlagonian king to leave a thousand horsemen and two thousand peltasts with Agesilaus. P, of course, calls the Paphlagonian king Gyes as against the Otus of Xenophon, but it is generally accepted that these two spellings and others represent Greek efforts to reproduce the same difficult foreign name. 19) Xenophon himself uses the variant Kotos in Ages. 3, while Theopompos in the 35th book of the Philippica calls him οἰς and Nepos (Dat. 2) has Thuys. Hilamowitz regards οἰς as the correct form and thinks τὸν may be corrupt for τὸν = οἰς. And if we accept Rühl’s restoration of P, which has been incorporated in Bartoletti’s text, P agrees with Xenophon that Gyes/Otus met Agesilaus in person. 20) In P, however, Gyes seems to have sent the troops to Agesilaus afterwards, perhaps in the same number, and it is clear that horsemen and infantry are mentioned. P and Xenophon agree on the alliance that was concluded between Agesilaus and Gyes/Otus but P gives no further details on the negotiations.

Xenophon, on the other hand, shows no concern for the details of the movements of the army but, instead, indulges his taste for drama and romance. Thus in return for the favour (of cavalry and peltasts), Xenophon tells us, Agesilaus suggested to Spithridates that he give his daughter in marriage to Otus. 21) The following 46 lines are devoted to a beguiling account of the ensuing dialogue between Agesilaus and Spithridates and Agesilaus and Otus on the marriage proposals. Next we are told that Agesilaus, having arranged for the Spartan Callias to take the girl on board a trireme, departed for Dascyllium. On Dascyllium there is agreement with P who also says that Agesilaus made his way to Dascyllium, or rather to the lake which lies below it. But Xenophon, of course, makes no mention of the vengeance taken on the Mystans or the unsuccessful assault on Miletos Teichos while P has nothing to say on the negotiations and marriage proposal. We see here very clearly how the two authors' personal approach to historiography influenced their selection of material and their treatment
of it.

Xenophon gives us a graphic description of the surroundings of Dascylium, telling us that there were many large villages with abundant provisions, game in enclosed parks, beautiful open places, a river abounding in fish, and birds in abundance for those able to trap them. Here Agesilaus spent the winter, procuring provisions for the army by means of foraging expeditions. P’s description of Dascylium is briefer and he mentions only that it was extremely well fortified and that all Pharnabazus’ silver and gold was said to be stored there. Xenophon and P seem to agree that Agesilaus had a winter camp near Dascylium, but P alone adds the detail that Agesilaus sent for Pancalus, who was guarding the Hellespont with five triremes, and had him take on board the more valuable part of the booty and convey it to Cyzicus in order that it might provide pay for his army. We have here another instance of Agesilaus’ concern for his soldiers, in this case offered by P, and apparent confirmation of the theory, discussed by Breitzenbach, that a general was expected to provide funds for his troops’ pay, and we see how P stresses what is politically and militarily important. Having made provision for his soldiers’ pay, Agesilaus dismissed the Mysian auxiliaries with orders to return in spring. In the following winter, we are told, Agesilaus would be making preparations for a march towards Cappadocia.

Xenophon, however, gives an account of an encounter between Pharnabazus and a number of soldiers who were seizing provisions without taking precautions. This episode is followed by Herippidas’ attack on Pharnabazus’ camp, which was captured, but not without losses, for many Mysians were killed by Pharnabazus’ advance guard. These Mysians troops could be those mentioned by P, but in P Agesilaus dismissed the Mysians after the autumn campaign. It is of course possible that the capture of the camp occurred in the beginning of the winter, before the Mysians were dismissed and that P refers to this episode in a lost part of the papyrus: Xenophon in his fairly detailed account of this winter also tells us that after Herippidas had deprived Spithridates and the Paphlagonians of their fair share of the booty, they considered themselves wronged and dishonoured and made preparations in the night and left for
Sardis to approach Ariaios who, they believed, had also revolted against the King and was at war with him.\textsuperscript{30)} This desertion of Spithridates and Megabates and the Rhagianians was, according to Xenophon, the most grievous blow Agesilaus suffered in the course of the campaign.\textsuperscript{31)}

Xenophon further relates how a certain Apollophanes, a Cyzican, who was a guest-friend to Pharnabazus as well as to Agesilaus, told Agesilaus that he thought he could arrange negotiations for an alliance with Pharnabazus.\textsuperscript{32)} The next 56 lines are devoted to a dramatic account of the meeting between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus and the discussion that followed. Pharnabazus could not be persuaded to leave the King's service for that of Agesilaus, but the Spartan king agreed to leave Pharnabazus' territory without inflicting further harm. Pharnabazus' son Parapitos, however, who was still young and handsome, we are told, and who had been exiled by his uncle, was left behind as a guest-friend to Agesilaus. Xenophon next informs us that after the negotiations Agesilaus left the land as he said he would and that it was already spring when he arrived in Thebes.\textsuperscript{33)}

Finding as we do, that there is a fundamental difference between P and Xenophon in their approach to historiography, it is possible to account for some of the discrepancies and many of the omissions on this basis. Xenophon has perhaps been side-tracked by his efforts to present Agesilaus as a paradigma, and further beguiled by his taste for drama and romance, while P has conscientiously noted down the drier facts and details of campaigning; but this very difference in approach has no doubt given posterity a more complete picture of this period of history.
CONCLUSION

While I cannot accept unreservedly Cawkwell's verdict that the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus has destroyed Xenophon's reputation as an historian, I am in full agreement with him when he says that "no one can profitably work on the age of Xenophon without close study of P as the prophylactic". With regard to Xenophon's good name I have come to the conclusion that the discrepancies between the two traditions have been overstressed, and that the accounts of P-Diodorus and Xenophon should be seen as complementary rather than contradictory.

In fact it has been shown that one item, which has been considered as a major discrepancy, does not exist as such at all, i.e. the supposed disagreement on the route Agosilaus followed from Ephesus to Sardis. And where discrepancies or omissions do occur, most of them can be attributed to the difference in historiographical approach between P and Xenophon.

This very difference in historiographical approach between P and Xenophon has given us a richer and more varied record of the history of the early fourth century and P has, moreover, an added importance in that the discovery of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* has stimulated and renewed interest in the Greek historians of the fourth century.

2. P Ch. XVI cols. xix - xx.


10. Ch. XVII 2 col. xxi 4 - 10.


12. Ch. XVII 3 col. xxi 14 - 17.


15. Ch. XVII 4 col. xxi 25 - 34.


17. Dugas, p. 82.

19. P Ch. XVII 1 col. xxi 3; Bartoletti Apparatus Criticus, line 19; G & R, p. 240 - 241, note 37 sqq.

20. P Ch. XVI 1 col. xxi 4; Bart. App. Crit. 20, p. 35.


23. P Ch. XVII 3 col. xxi 22 - 25.

24. Ch. XVII 4 col. xxi 26 - 34.


26. P Ch. XVII 4 col. xxi 35.


29. P Ch. XVII 4 col. xxi 33-4.


31. Xen. op. cit. 27 - 29.

32. Xen. op. cit. 30 - 38.

33. Xen. op. cit. 41.

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