

**RELIGION, CONFLICT, AND POLITICS: AN ANALYSIS OF
GRAMSCI'S CONCEPT OF SUBALTERN IN KENYA**

by

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ABSTRACT

Kenya as a heterogeneous society has always faced the problem of ethnicity. Religio-ethnic political competition and mobilization of resources have become the defining aspects of electoral politics in Africa. In Kenya, religion, politics, cash, and ethnicity are frequently inseparable. This dissertation analyses the changing roles of mainline churches in public life by examining the perceived loss of the clergy's prophetic voice in mainline church buildings and the emergence of different voices in the context of increasing ethnicity and non-secular pluralism in a multicultural space examined. Using Gramsci's concept of hegemony and subalternity, the dissertation questions the politics of ethnic reconciliation in Kenya to provide options for ethnic concord that have been either misunderstood or left out by the elites. Using Gramsci's thinking of hegemony and subalternity, the dissertation will first of all study the role of civil society in legitimizing and resisting state hegemony and secondly examine the socio-political underpinnings of counter-hegemonic politics in post-2007 Kenya.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Identity, Kenya, Civil Society, Gramsci, Hegemony, Subalternity, Common Sense, Good Sense, Governance, Religion, Politics, Colonial, Mainline Churches, Pentecostal, Changing role, Exclusion, Marginalisation, Kenyatta, Moi, Kibaki.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation, especially to the people who value *freedom of expression*, *democratic governance*, and the *voice of the voiceless*. I hope that the findings of my dissertation will be of great importance.

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DECLARATION

I, JOHNN-PATRICK OCHUME ONG'OR: 58010009, declare that this dissertation is my original work through my reading, scientific method, and critical reflection. It is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Master of Arts Degree in Religious Studies. It has never been submitted to any other College or University for academic credit.

All sources have been acknowledged in full and cited.



28-02-2022

Signed: _____ Date: _____

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This full dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University supervisor:



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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA	Abaluhya Association
ACK	Anglican Church of Kenya
AEMO	African Elected Members' Organization (AEMO)
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	Africa Union
CBO	Community Based Organisations
CCM	Change the Constitution Movement
CORD	Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
COTU	Central Organization of Trade Unions
CPU	Coast Peoples Union
DC	District commissioner
DP	Democratic Party
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
FBO	Faith-Based Organisations
FORD	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
GEMA	The Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA)
GSU	General Service Unit (GSU)
HCK	Hindu Council of Kenya
HI	Horizontal Inequalities
IPK	Islamic Party of Kenya
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
KAMATUSA	Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (KAMATUSA)

KA	Kikuyu Association.
KFL	Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL)
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KAPP	African Peoples Party (KAPP)
KAWC	Kenya Africa Workers Congress
KCA	Kenya African Union
KCA	Kikuyu Central Association
KPA	Kalenjin Political Alliance
KPU	Kenya People's Union (KPU)
KFL	Kenya Farmers Association (KFA),
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
LUEA	Luo Union of East Africa
LU	Luo Union (LU),
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MU	Mijikenda Union
MUF	Maasai United Front (MUF)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAU	New Akamba Union (NAU)
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NASA	National Super Alliance (NASA)
NCCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK)
NDP	National Development Party
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPPPP	Northern Province Peoples Progressive Party

NDP	National Development Party (NDP)
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
ODM-K	Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya
PAP	People’s Action Party (PAP)
PCEA	Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA),
PNU	Party of National Unity
RGC	Redeemed Gospel Church (RGC)
SDP	Social Democratic Party (SDP)
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)
SONU	Students Organization of Nairobi University (SONU),
SNA	Somali National Association (SNA),
TNA	The National Alliance Party (TNA)
UDF	United Democratic Forum (UDF)
URP	United Republican Party (URP).
UMNO	United Malays National Organization (UMNO)
UDM	United Democratic Movement (UDM)
UNIPZ	United National Independent Party of Zambia (UNIPZ)
VOK	Voice of Kenya (VOK).
YKA	Young Kavirondo Association (YKA).

MAP OF KENYA

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

This chapter provides insight information on the background, research problem, research objectives, and research questions.

1.1 Background Rationale for the Research

The name and the geo-political region called Kenya today was the creation of the British Colonialists through the merger of the former East Africa Protectorates which were annexed by Britain as her Protectorate in 1920 (Knighton, 2009: 2). In every structure, whether physical, human, or nation-building, foundations are very important (Akpanika, 2017: 67). Some scholars like Emily Choge (2008); Atieno–Odhiambo (2002); and Paul Gifford (2009) argue that the foundation for socio-religious and political instability in Kenya was to a large extent the work of Colonial Masters and the former governments in post-independence Kenya. They argue that right from the formative stage of Kenya until pre-independence and post-independence, the various governments of Kenya during the colonial era had persistently favoured the people from central Kenya. (Choge, 2008:108) and (Gifford, 2009: 7-8).

Atieno-Odhiambo (2002:79) and Gifford (2009:8) mention that the effects of the unfriendly and unfavourable socio-religious and political situation in Kenya were masterminded by the British Colonial Masters. From their arguments, it is obvious that the disparity between the Central, Rift Valley and the continuance display of superiority and hegemony of the Kikuyu and Kalenjins, and the exclusion of the rest of the ethnic groups in power-sharing Kenyan in post-independence Kenya is the root cause of resistance, violence, and political instability in Kenya (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002: 79-81).

The U.S. government through its embassy in Kenya; estimates that Kenya’s population stands at 48.4 million people— and approximately 83 percent are Christian and 11 percent Muslim. Groups constituting less than 2 percent of the population include Hindus, Sikhs, and Baha’is.

Much of the remaining 4-5 percent of the population adheres to various traditional religious beliefs. Non-evangelical Protestants account for 48 percent of the population. Catholics 23 percent, and other Christian denominations, including evangelical Protestants and Pentecostals, 12 percent. Most of the Muslim population lives in the North-eastern and coastal regions, where religion and ethnicity—Somali and Mijikenda ethnic groups are often linked. The Dadaab refugee camps are home to approximately 209, 000 refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom are ethnic Somali Muslims. The Kakuma refugee camp is home to approximately 186, 000 refugees, including Somalis, South Sudanese, and Ethiopians, who practice a variety of religions (Embassy, 2018: 2). So, Kenya is generally a religious society. But how “this religion works out in economics, how it works out in politics, how it works out in ethnicity, how it works out in aesthetics, how it works out in defining ethical values, how it works as a true worship, as a religion itself” — those are the critical questions that we are now being called upon to engage (Chacha, 2010: 107). Oliver Kisaka, argues that “Kenyans have assumed Kenya is a peaceful country. They have assumed that their religion is deep enough. The truth is that it is not deep enough” (Kisaka, 2008: 3).

Christianity and Islam form the two dominant religions in Kenya. Given the philosophy of Islam as a way of life for a Muslim, consequently, Islam has always been closely attached to politics in Kenya, especially in the Northeastern Province and Coastal region (Ndzovu, 2014: 7). The most remarkable feature of the Kenyan Muslims, like their Christian neighbours, is a sociocultural heterogeneity that cuts across the racial, and ethnic groups in the country. As a consequence of this heterogeneity, Muslims’ political participation has often been influenced by ethnic, racial, and occasionally religious considerations (Ndzovu, 2014: 7).

In some cases, such racial and ethnic heterogeneity does not support a monolithic political voice. Instead, in a widely varied and plural community, the political control of certain personalities is bound to be injured when racial and ethnic considerations constitute the main factors of political mobilization. This, in combination with other factors, has made the Muslim community in Kenya and their political direction vulnerable to external penetration and hegemony. These cleavages are traced to the British colonial policy of racially differentiating Muslims based on their Arab and African ancestries (Ndzovu, 2014: 7).

Kenya is synonymous with incivility which often leads to deep divisions which cause major political issues to be vigorously and violently contested along the lines of intricate ethnic, religious, and regional divisions (Mwakikagile, 2007: 1-3). Issues that raise that have emerged

as complex and controversial are those regarded as essential for the existence and the validity of the state. Opposing and contending groupings tend to assume an exclusionary winner-take-all approach. These issues include the control of state power, and allocation of resources (Asingo, 2013: 6-7). The dominant group will be able to define what citizens constitute their region of rule. Ethno-political competition, which has been alive since independence, has finally degenerated into ethnopolitical competition, discrimination, and violence (Gettleman, 2008: January 30: 1). Ever since the flawed elections of 2007 that triggered a wave of ethnopolitical violence, "many people have been violently driven from their homes and many are now resettling in ethnically homogenous zones. Even some of the packed slums in certain cities have split along ethnic lines."(Gettleman, 2008: 30: 1-2).

1.2. Operationalization of Key Concepts

Affective Turn: Clough, (2007:2) argues that affective turn is broadly used to denote a renewed scholarly interest in emotion, embodiment, and affectivity in the social sciences and humanities. The affective turn marks the turn of critical theories on effect, as Clough writes, at a time when critical theory faces the analytical challenges of an ongoing war, trauma, torture, massacre, and counter/terrorism (Clough, 2007: 2). The effective turn thus marks a shift in thinking in critical theory through an exploration of the complex intersections of discursive practices, materiality, social and cultural forces, and individually experienced but historically and culturally situated emotions and effects (Clough, 2007: 2-3).

Civility: For civility to prevail the common good must be served by the political elites (Sadowski, 2020: 2). Civility is a product of dialogue and democracy (Sadowski, 2020: 3). Dialogue promotes the common good, something which seems to be receiving less attention in Kenya (Tarimo, 2008: 4). Civility requires a certain degree of humility—when that is missing, it's difficult to engage in a conversation with another human being (Sadowski, 2020: 4).

Civil Society: McLellan (1981) is of the view that "Although both Gramsci and Marx claimed to be getting their concept of civil society from Hegel, their use of the term was, in fact, very different. Whereas Marx used the expression civil society to mean the totality of economic relationships, Gramsci used civil society to refer to the superstructure" (McLellan, 1981: 204). Within this context, Femia (2002) is of the view that "For the classical Marxist tradition, civil society refers to the infrastructure, the quality of material conditions and relationships. However, civil society in Gramsci's writings belongs to the superstructure, since it comprises

ideological or cultural relations (Femia, 2002:140-141). Souvik (2016:19) argues that the term “civil society” did not get any attention during the post-second world war period in the West.

Collective will: Gramsci had a strong appreciation of Machiavelli which stems primarily from the fact that the latter theorized no utopia¹. Gramsci says that Machiavelli combined the utopias of his time and scholarly treatise artistically and imaginatively in the person of a Prince which represents the collective will. Machiavelli simply represents the process to direct this collective into political action (Gramsci, 1980:125).

The concept of ‘will’ is recurrent in the writings of Gramsci. This ‘will’ be the basis of all political action and can be meaningful only when it is the will of the many or in other words, the collective will. He says that the will is the operative awareness of the historical necessity, a “protagonist of a real and effective historical drama” (Gramsci, 1980:130).

Common Good: This is a beneficial way of life for society and its members; the social conditions that improve citizens’ well-being and help them live together peaceably. The term originated in ancient Greek philosophy and conveys Greek insight that humans are social and political animals. Plato said the common good is obtained when the citizen lived virtuously and each social fulfilled its proper functions. Similarly, Aristotle described it as a society that helps its citizens to live well, particularly by educating them on virtue and empowering them to participate in political and intellectual activities. Justice and equality were important components of the common good for these philosophers (Stilner, 2007: 255-256).

“Common” and “good” sense: Common sense is usually defined as a set of obvious, self-evident beliefs and judgments, equally accessible to all. The concept is charged with two opposite potentials. On the one hand, common sense implies that certain things are self-evident, beyond reasonable doubt and hence have clear conservative potential in that it may be used to naturalize existing relations of power (Snir, 2015: 188). On the other hand, it is intimately related to the notion of equality, thus having significant democratic potential.

Consequently, while common sense is necessary for social existence, there is no need to assume the existence of a single common sense throughout the social sphere—there may be a heterogeneous plurality of “common senses”, coexisting and making possible many different forms of communication and cooperation, not necessarily understood by all.

¹ A future age of perfect (or near perfect) happiness, justice and plenty. Although the term ‘utopia’ was popularized after Thomas More (d. 1535), it actually points to a widespread hope of humankind and a powerful source for religious imagination and for religious social action.

Equally speaking, “common sense” means for Gramsci the illogical set of generally held assumptions and beliefs common to any society” (Gramsci, 1980: 323). While “good sense” is “the philosophy of criticism and the superseding of religion and common sense”. For one to reach “good sense”, one must learn to think coherently and critically. Gramsci insists on coherence and criticism as the only way for avoiding conformism (Gramsci, 1980: 326).

Conscience: Ratzinger, (2018: 105-106) argues that “If one wants truth and respect—one has to respect the conscience of every person”.

According to an introductory dictionary of theology and religious studies, conscience refers to a sense of duty or responsibility for decisions of moral importance. More specifically, it is the human ability to judge the rightness or wrongness of certain actions. Conscience is technically distinguished from *synderesis*, which refers to knowledge of moral principles (Hartwig, 2007:271-272). Conscience refers to the ability of the human mind to apply moral principles to concrete circumstances in the exercise of practical reason. Conscience sometimes refers to an inner voice of moral authority, or as some put it, an inner voice of God calling people to moral responsibility. Regardless of whether the actual source of conscience is God or innate human ability, it is widely believed that it must be followed, since without it people are unable to make moral decisions or feel morally responsible (Hartwig, 2007: 271-272). Vatican II teaches that people must follow their conscience even when it conflicts with certain moral norms, as this in turn is the skill through which moral accountability is experienced.

Counter–Hegemony: One of the most important contributions of Gramsci's work is his position on the relationship between subaltern sentiments and counter-hegemony. Gramsci recognizes that counter-hegemonic resistance necessarily involves a struggle for people's hearts and minds, their attitudes, beliefs, and emotions about society and the world (Reed, 2012:10). Every revolution, he writes, presupposes the formation of new standards, new psychology, and new ways of feeling, thinking, and living (Gramsci, 1991: 41). According to Aronowitz (2009), counter-hegemony is the process that challenges the status quo and the normative design of political and economic relations, ultimately aiming at the liberation of humanity (Aronowitz, 2009:14).

Democracy: The word democracy suggests a system of governance in which the people do the ruling. The Greeks referred to democratic rule as government by consent (Nwogu, 2012:1).

Osondu (2014: 34) on the other hand contends that, democracy is a bargain between the government and the governed. This bargain is made up of two parts – the government’s

legitimacy, which claims obedience to its laws as well as doing what the citizens want it to do. The second part is the arrangement that regulates this bargain of legitimacy in the competitive political election. The essence of the bargain is to ensure participation in policymaking (Osondu, 2014: 34-35). This participation is the fundamental meaning of democracy. Democracy and political participation are two concepts that are interwoven; none can exist in the absence of the other. The process of establishing a democratic system requires the full participation of the people. This participation may be direct or indirect and must be by the citizens (Osondu, 2014: 35). Participation refers to the different ways in which the public expresses opinions and ideally exerts influence on political, economic, management, and other social decisions. Political participation is any activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action. It is the aspect of democracy that deals with the political environment.

While citing Kitto (1951), Nwogu (2012: 1) asserts that the Athenians saw democratic rule as popular participation at every level. All citizens had a right to attend and speak at the

Ethnicity: Ethnicity is defined as an aspect of social relations among people who consider themselves culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have minimum regular interaction (Pierli, 1999:33). Ethnic demarcation and regionalism, as promoted by ethnic leaders, revolve around the practice of ethnic discrimination.

Ethnicity is an aspect of the social relationship between agents who consider themselves culturally distinct from members of other groups with whom they have minimal regular interaction (Opondo, 2013: 60). Opondo (2013) argues that ethnicity is also a tool for political survival used by politicians in Africa. Through ethnic congregation, a section of citizens claims neglect and marginalization from the realm of economic development. In Kenya, the Luo, the Luhya, the Coast, Northern Kenya, and other sections of the country have complained of economic neglect in the last fifty years of independence (Opondo, 2013: 60).

Ethnic consciousness and regionalism: Ethnic consciousness, as well as the intense ethnic rivalry in Kenya's political arena, derives somewhat from how the colonialists established local governments and administrative boundaries based on linguistic and cultural orientations. This was influenced by a false colonialist understanding of Africans based on the idea that Africans were organized along tribal lines (Tarimo, 2008: 2). Shilaho (2018: np) argues that ethnicity is the most important adaptable among Kenya's multi-party democracy because politicians compete for power and the resulting state resources in a polity where there was a combination of rural and urban life (Shilaho, 2018: np).

Freedom: It has not been taken for granted anywhere in the world that those in power should grant full political liberty to every person, hence efforts at the international, national, and local levels to develop conventions and enact laws to pronounce and protect various kinds of the rights of the individuals (Amonoo, 2003: 3). Freedom is a central value in the Western liberal democratic tradition that has been promoted to secure individual liberty, not public justice. The dominant political and ethical tradition in the West has appropriated the assumption of liberalism that the individual moral or ethical agent is free and self-directing (Hobgood, 2007: 468). This assumption that freedom and liberty are part of the human condition is challenged by moral or ethical agents who struggle to avoid the constraints and devastating effects of structural oppression (Hobgood, 2007: 468-469).

Hegemony: The notion of “hegemony” is rooted in Gramsci’s (1992) distinction between coercion and consent as alternative mechanisms of social power (Gramsci, 1992: 137). Coercion refers to the State’s capacity for violence, which it can use against those who refuse to participate in capitalist relations of production. By contrast, hegemony power works to convince individuals and social classes to subscribe to the social values and norms of an inherently exploitative system. It is a form of social power that relies on voluntarism and participation, rather than the threat of punishment for disobedience (Gramsci, 1992: 133). Hegemony appears as the “common sense” that guides our everyday, ordinary understanding of the world. It is a view of the world that is “inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed” and which tends (Gramsci, 1992: 133).

Incivility: When the common good is missing in the governing of the state, the result of it is incivility. Since the flawed 2007 general elections incivility has increased in Kenya. When citizens forget that they are brothers and sisters in the human family, when they forget everybody is worthy of respect and dignity—that’s when we open ourselves to the dark side of human impulses (Sadowski, 2020: 3).

Organic intellectual: Is the key component of counter-hegemony, who are national-popular leaders and organizers drawn from the ranks of subaltern groups who aim to change the status quo by proposing new ways of conceiving the world (Aronowitz, 2009: 9).

Religion: *An Introductory Dictionary of Theology and Religious Studies*, states that Religion is a difficult and complex phenomenon to define. One key split in such an endeavour occurs between those who are believers in particular religious’ traditions versus those who are “scientists of religion” who strive to attain a definition applicable to the vast variety of beliefs

and practices found in different societies around the world. It states that broadly, religion consists of a “system of beliefs and practices that are linked to superhuman beings” or supernatural forces. Such beings are capable of acts that humans cannot do. They may be male, female, or androgynous. They may be gods, goddesses, ancestors, spirits, or impersonal powers that can cause evil or good to people or groups.

According to *Catholic Dictionary*, Religion is a term that was used by St Thomas Aquinas for the part of the virtue of justice by which man/woman publicly and privately worships God. Today, religion has come to mean any contact with transcendent reality that is close to human existence.

According to Babatola, (2015: 2), Religion is a belief system that uses symbols to allow people to explore their spirituality. Religion serves as a basis for identity, mobilization, and legitimization in the polity. To further strengthen the unity of faith and protect the interest of members of these religions to continue advancing the principles on which each of the religions is based groups, and associations (Babatola, 2015: 3-4).

Religion in Kenya promotes Corruption and Poor Governance as it supports Political corrupt regimes. Religion is the reason politicians have become moral insensitive—through looting and killing those who stand for the truth—since they are assured of backing from religious minds that are ready to say ‘do not judge’ or ‘the leaders are chosen by God (Ndlovu, 2005: 280-282).

Politics: Politics is from two Greek words *polis* meaning city and *takes* meaning art, skill, or method. Etymologically, it is the art of governing a city. A city here designates an organized and governed territory as a state under the jurisdiction of the city (Nwoko, 1988:2). Awolowo (1987, n.p.) defines politics as the science of and art of the management of public affairs.

According to *an Introductory Dictionary of Theology and Religious Studies*, in Christian ethics, politics is an action for social transformation. There is much agreement on the need for increased attention to what constitutes revolutionary actions and economic and political transformation envisioned by political theology and ethics (Hobgood, 2007: 1055).

Subaltern: Translated roughly as “subordinate” or “dependent” (Gramsci, 1996: 52-120), the notion of subaltern was first used by the Italian Marxist political activist Antonio Gramsci in his article “Notes on Italian History”, which appeared later as a part of his book *Prison Notebooks* (1925). For him, the subaltern classes refer primarily to “any “low-rank” person or group of people in a particular society, suffering under the hegemonic domination of a ruling

elite class that denies them the basic rights of participation in the making of local history and culture as active individuals of the same nation” (Louai, 2012: 5).

According to Ashcroft (2000: 12-13), the Subaltern has to be used by the Subaltern Studies Group as a category that “cut across several kinds of political and cultural binaries such as colonialism versus nationalism, or imperialism versus indigenous cultural expression, in favour of a more general distinction between subaltern and elite. The same notion is supported by (Steinborn, 2018: 5-6).

Political Class

The political class has no inspiring, modern, or progressive agenda to address the ills of poverty affecting the people or to modernize the country. The main purpose of political competition in Kenya is to bring the tribal warlords to power, and their primary method of political mobilization is the tribe (Kalonzo, 2009:101).

Political Competition

The main purpose of political competition in Kenya is for the ethnic warlords to come to power, and their primary method of political mobilization is ethnicity. Having locked themselves into an ethnic voting bloc, they don't need accountability and they don't need a progressive agenda. They only need one ethnic constituency (Oloo, 2010:45-46, 54). There is a single political class in Kenya made up of tribal warlords with identified and well-guarded strongholds and a comparable history of corruption, chaos, and mediocrity. Their entire political ideology can be summed up in three words: ethnicity, impunity and mediocrity (Opondo, 2013: 60).

Political Mobilization: The agents of political mobilization, are political parties, they do play a pivotal role in the flow of political information. It is arguable according to Masime and Oesterdiekhoff (2010:15), that mobilization is affected by both formal and informal party advantages such as persuasion, to the extent that attempts at formal mobilization often find already ongoing mobilization processes through social networks. Mobilization in developed democracies is mostly dependent on formal institutional arrangements of the party and is mostly deliberate and ongoing (Masime and Oesterdiekhoff, 2010:15). The political mobilization role of parties in Kenya is often effective depending on issue saliency and ethnocultural cleavages, especially ethnicity to concretize their appeal and impact. Issue-based mobilization such as the independence struggle, the agitation for multi-party democracy in the early 1990s, and the constitutional review referendum (2005) or any other issue of national

importance, have often attracted phenomenal support from the citizenry (Masime and Oesterdiekhoff, 2010:15).

Power: Reynaert, (2016: 33-34) comprehends power as a complex phenomenon. He argues that different ways and contexts in which power is used indicate this. However, it is important to gain insight into the phenomenon and to reveal the power in all its complexity. A clear description of power can create a greater awareness of the power present in every relationship and may increase the possibility of its being dealt with appropriately (Reynaert, 2016: 34, 45).

Power can best be described as a sometimes visible but, at other times, subtle phenomenon that expresses itself in different forms. Power is present everywhere and everyone has certain access to it by which everyone has a chance to exercise influence. Power makes every relationship asymmetrical, but this does not mean that power is necessarily negative (Reynaert, 2016: 34).

1.3. The Research Problem

Since Kenya's independence in 1963, the religions, particularly a variety of mainline churches and their clergy, have found themselves in a sort of ambivalent and complicated relationship with successive Kenyan governments, from the country's first President, Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), to the second President, Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002) to the third President, Mwai Kibaki (2003-2013) (Gifford, 2009:38). Each of these presidents had different ties to Christian religions (Parsitau, 2012:1).

During the colonial period, Protestant denominations and mission societies could be described as politically inactive. They opposed the Mau Mau Rebellion, which had been viewed as anti-Christian primarily for its oath-taking ceremonies and other such practices. This gave the impression that these Christians lacked nationalistic interests (Gifford, 2009: 34) and (Choge, 2008: 107). At this point, Kasomo and Naila (2013:21) note that religious leaders in Kenya have always played a significant role in the country's politics. The first joint pastoral letter from the Archbishops, Bishops, and Apostolic Prefects of Kenya dates from July 1960. This letter was written at a time when Kenya was still finding its political direction. Jomo Kenyatta and other leaders were still in prison. The letter encouraged Kenya to become independent. They posit that the concern for peace and pastoral corrections against ethnicity and revenge must be understood in the context of the Mau Mau struggle that was still fresh in people's minds. They further pointed out that: The next significant letter was written on Independence and Peace on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Independence on December 12, 1973. Other letters

followed, some directly to President Kasomo and Naila (2013). After independence, the National Christian Council of Kenya shifted its focus to reconstruction efforts, while its members became increasingly involved both theologically and socially (Gifford, 2009:35).

This social commitment coupled with evangelistic endeavours led to a kind of cordial relationship with the new Kenyatta government. After independence, and given that many of the clergy of the mainline churches were mainly Kikuyu both church and state had cordial relations. As one commentator noted: when religious and political elites are controlled by the largest ethnic group, one would expect relatively amicable relations, and when this balance is upset, a decline in sociability (cited in Njonjo Mue, 2011:180). Therefore, it can be observed that the country's first President, Jomo Kenyatta, largely maintained an amiable affiliation with Kenya's religious groups during his tenure (1963-1978) (Parsitau, 2012: 2)

However, Choge (2008:109-110) notes that during the regime of President Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002), the Christian churches, particularly the evangelical and Pentecostal churches, varied in their support and opposition to the state. Upon coming to power in 1978, Moi gradually consolidated his rule under his notorious nyayo philosophy (Choge, 2008:108). Over the years, according to Gifford (2009:35), this philosophy has morphed into a demand that all Kenyans must follow in his footsteps. Mainline churches were suspicious of this philosophy, and although he attempted to co-opt the clergy, this was rejected by mainline churches. Moi was nevertheless determined to increase his control over the country (Parsitau, 2012: 2)

By around 1985 he had centralized power under the one-party state, a party that increasingly gained control of Parliament and the Cabinet. His regime was increasingly autocratic, characterized by greed, corruption, ethnicity, nepotism, patrimonialism, human rights abuses, and poor governance (Chacha, 2010: 108-109).

Civil society and various political groups keen to push for a more democratic dispensation had asked religious leaders to spearhead the constitutional process because Christian churches and individual clergy remained the only credible and organized network that could withstand an increasingly autocratic regime (Ndegwa, 2001: 09-10). This clergy put enormous pressure on President Moi and continued to preach against the high level of political power monopoly exercised by the ruling party KANU, government corruption, ethnicity, nepotism, and human rights abuses (Kanyinga and Okello, 2010: 12-13,) and Mue (2011:2).

At this point in the early 1990s, some clergy from the main Protestant denominations became vocal in their calls for multiparty elections. Scholars have found that it was individual Anglican

and Presbyterian clergymen who came together under the umbrella of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) rather than individual churches that played a significant role in Kenyan politics during this period (Parsitau, 2012: 2-3).

The Catholic Church had initially been reluctant to join the clamour for change with the rest of the clergy. But with the publication of pastoral letters in 1992 and the emergence of a unified voice, the churches had begun to put even more pressure on the government. These Protestant ministers were later joined by Catholic bishops, who together applied wonderful pressure on President Moi's increasingly autocratic regime, demanding a new constitutional dispensation and a return to multiparty democracy. This led to increased and sustained pressure for even broader democratic and constitutional reforms (Gifford, 2009:58-59).

Christian clergy such as Bishop David Gitari of the Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK), Rev. Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), and others were influential figures who made significant contributions to the dismantling of Kenya's one-party and autocratic regime. We can demonstrate this with numerous examples. In 1989, for example, the late Bishop Henry Okullu, David Gitari, and Timothy Njoya called for the repeal of the 1982 mandate clause that had de jure made Kenya a one-party state. Bishop Okullu pushed for constitutional change and urged Kenya to abolish the one-party state, but also specifically called for a two-term limit on a future president's term (Choge, 2008:108-109).

Bishop Okullu argued that making Kenya a de jure one-party state in the first place was a mistake and called for its reversal. In his opinion, power corrupts even the best of intentions and there is a need for checks and balances (Gachuhi, 2010:10-11). Similarly, while preaching at Nairobi's St Andrews Church on New Year's Day 1990, retired Presbyterian minister Rev. Timothy Njoya called for an end to the one-party state. He condemned the one-party states in Africa, arguing that they were as doomed as in Eastern Europe, and called for their abolition. A few years ago, in 1986, he had previously preached another sermon in which he launched scathing attacks on the oppressive KANU regime (Kodia, 2014:67).

Another example where clergy from the major churches showed tremendous involvement in the democratization process was the 1988 general election. In 1986, Moi abolished secret ballots in favour of the infamous mlolongo, or queue, voting (where supporters stood in front of a picture of their chosen candidate set up) for the primary voters of the KANU. This election was marred by irregularities and shamelessly rigged, particularly given the Mlolongo voting style (Gifford, 2009: 35-36). This move was condemned and fiercely opposed by the clergy,

who argued that it was not only unacceptable and unbiblical but also a mockery of political justice and amounted to intimidation of the clergy by the electorate (Kodia, 2014:67).

Although Moi, according to Gifford (2009:36), conceded the exemption of the clergy, the clergy endured enormous pressure on Moi's autocratic actions. Not only this time as individual ministers but also under the NCCK, of which Methodist Minister Rev. Samuel Kobia was the general secretary; During this time, the resistance was organized and coordinated by this vast religious organization, which by that time had become the largest faith-based development organization in the country and a partner with reach and enormous resources across most of the country. Armed with these resources, established networks, and extensive outreach, public goodwill and support from the international community, NCCK was able to rise against the dictatorial regime of Moi (Choge, 2008:110) and (Gifford, 2009:37-38).

All these studies have not only emphasized the roles of mainline churches in the democratization process and their establishment of social services, but they also underscore and demonstrate the profound importance and significance of the Christian message on the Kenyan socio-political scene from the 1960s to the late 1990s. Accordingly, during the unsettled years of the eighties and nineties, the mainline church clergy generated a lot of heat and gained the reputation of “radical theologians” and “social activists” and had been appropriately christened the “firebrand”(Kioko & Katola, 2016: 45-46).

This small group of radicalized clerics gained uneven influence within the Kenyan community in a decade. Their achievements rested in large part on the zeal with which they forged a bold self-image structured around elements such as a commitment to societal change, a penchant for high social visibility, and last but not least, a conscious choice to focus on the political sphere as the primary target for social action (Kioko & Katola, 2016: 46). As such, Gifford (2009:35) and Parsitau (2012:3) agree that the church functioned as the voice of the voiceless and society's conscience, continually challenging the excesses of one-party rule from the pulpit, and they spoke with a voice like the men of cloth and honour. Indeed, the clergy represented a central place in the body of reformers in Kenyan politics at the time. Not only were they motivated by faith, but they repeatedly used religious language to argue for their cause. The major churches could be described as the conscience of society, the nation's watchdog, and the voice of the voiceless (Parsitau, 2012:3-4). At best, these churches developed a critical theology of protest and engagement that challenged the excesses of the state (Gifford, 2009:37-39). Religious organizations have therefore been largely involved in the constitutional review process, having

played a significant role in Kenya's transition to multi-party democracy. These churches undoubtedly articulated a social and political discourse by putting pressure on the Moi's regime (Kioko & Katola, 2016: 46-47).

The actions taken by these churches and their clergy have not only shaped the country's democracy but also helped create political and social awareness among all Kenyans. Their criticism of state managers has sometimes drawn harsh reactions from several government circles, some of which viewed the clergy's actions as unpatriotic. It is therefore predictable that church-state relations were strained at this point in history (Parsitau, 2012:5-6).

Ndegwa (2001:11-13) has noted that Moi evangelical and Pentecostal churches were co-opted to combat opposition from mainline church clergy. For example, when Moi faced increasing pressure to lift the ban, he had imposed on opposition parties, he attended a service at Redeemed Gospel Church where Bishop Kitonga delivered a powerful pro-Moi sermon.⁴ In that sermon, which was published by KBC TV, Bishop Arthur Kitonga of Redeemed Gospel Church (RGC) claimed Kenya had been like heaven for years under Moi's leadership. He said Moi was appointed by God to lead the country and Kenyans should be grateful for the peace that prevails. He berated the mainstream churches for pushing for socio-political reform and labelled their leaders as rebels preaching their gospel, not that of Jesus Christ (Gifford, 2009:116).

First, it is important to note that by this time many Pentecostal churches had not developed social activism that would allow them to voice constructive criticism of the government. As Lonsdale (2004) points out, Kenya's evangelical churches, with their conservative theology, were more concerned with the call to personal brokenness of rebirth for salvation that depended not on political activism but faith. Furthermore, many believed and still believe that when they pray for the President, the government of the day, or the authorities, they are fulfilling their civic and prophetic duty. For many Pentecostals, prayer is a form of civic engagement and political practice that requires true Christians to pray to God to establish His kingdom on earth. This is a kingdom of righteousness, free from corruption and where peace reigns (Kalu, 2008 :). In the understanding of many Pentecostals, this is even more effective than becoming more combative (Parsitau, 2012:8-9).

At the same time, analysts have argued that Pentecostals ally themselves with rulers to garner respect and benefit from state generosity. It has not escaped much notice that numerous Pentecostal churches have been rewarded for their support of the Moi's regime. Many gained

access to state-controlled media, and they continually and increasingly portrayed Moi as the God-appointed leader of the country (Gifford, 2009:35).

It is clear from the above analysis that the mainline churches played a crucial role in Kenya's public life, particularly during President Moi's rule, while evangelical and Pentecostal churches played a less prominent role, but undoubtedly did not hesitate to align with Moi come as he faced increasing pressure on main churches. Aside from keeping the Moi's government in check, the mainline churches also played significant civic and public roles, particularly in civic education, monitoring and observing elections, and in some cases even documenting flagrant electoral malpractice and human rights abuses, pushing for constitutional reforms particularly in the early 1990s (Choge, 2008:109-110; Kasomo and Naila, 2013:5).

These churches were involved in issues of civil and public life until the 2002 parliamentary elections, which ended KANU's 39-year rule. While the role of mainline churches in the democratization process of 1970-2000 has been thoroughly researched, developed, and highlighted, their roles and changes in civic and public life since 2000, particularly their interaction with politics during President Kibaki's two terms, have not been critical reviewed (Chacha, 2010:108-109).

Ngau and Mbathi (2010:145-146) cite the example of the NCK's hitherto outspoken Under-Secretary-General Rev. Mutava Musyimi, who went from principled opposition to the Moi's regime to principled cooperation, or harsh criticism to principled cooperation switched with Kibaki. Rev. Musyimi was soon appointed head of the Anti-Corruption Steering Committee, an appointment that appeared to have seriously hampered his ability to independently condemn massive government corruption, particularly during Kibaki's first term (Gifford, 2009:43). Rev. Musyimi finally resigned from his post as Secretary-General of the NCK in 2007 to join politics sponsored by the Kibaki's National Unity Party (PNU). He won a seat in Parliament and promptly remained silent on public affairs, sparking public debate about what had happened to this fierce critic (Parsitau, 2012: 6).

However, state co-optation is not the only way the clergy is corrupted. The clergy is also largely co-opted by politicians who are invited to collect funds for the churches. In the context of state co-optation and compromise, another likely explanation for the mainline clergy's laxity and lack of public voice is that the clergy seemed trapped by the tribal beetle that has sadly come to shape Kenya's politics, particularly in the characterize the recent past (Kasomo and Naila, 2013: 5-6).

Chacha (2010:114-117) similarly criticizes the apparent lack of immunity of mainline ministers from the cancer of tribalism, nepotism, and patrimonialism. He cites the examples of Catholic bishops, led by Cardinal John Njue, who appear to favour President Kibaki's rule. He also cites other examples where a group of Catholic bishops from the Central Province was perceived as a bloc sympathetic to Kibaki and the political aspirations of Gikuyu-Embu and Meru (GEMA), particularly during his first term (2003-2007). According to Gifford, the reasons given for this serious silence on the part of the Catholic clergy are that Kibaki is Catholic and comes from the Central Province and that the Kibaki regime, despite Anglo-leasing, had a far better record than Moi's (Gifford 2009: 18-19). But it has also been suggested that Mainline Church ministers from Western Kenya and Luo Nyanza sympathized with the Honourable Prime Minister Raila Odinga before and after the 2007 general election (Gifford, 2009: 59-60).

It is not surprising that Kenya's Christian churches were already compromised, co-opted, and indecisive when violence erupted in the aftermath of the botched 2007 presidential election, a move that reinforced their ability to speak out and provide moral direction at a particularly difficult moment impaired (Kioko and Katola, 2016: 47). Naturally, according to Chacha (2010: n.p.), Kenyans were frustrated by this lack of voicelessness on the part of mainline Kenyan clergy as expressed in newspapers, radio, telephone conversations and general public debate and discourse. A significant number of Kenyans have equally and increasingly expressed tremendous concern and frustration with outreach by Christian clergy, particularly those from the mainline churches, for the apparent loss of their prophetic voice in national politics, as reflected in newspapers, radio, telephone and the Generally expressed is public debates and discourses (Chacha, 2010:115-116).

The high moral conscience that mainlines clergy had in society was therefore absent in efforts to curb government excesses, particularly during President Kibaki's first term (2003-2006). In summary, church-state relations changed significantly during the Kibaki era compared to regime. However, the Kibaki era of 2002-2007 ushered in two important and significant developments regarding the role of the Christian churches in the democratization process: the withdrawal of the mainline churches from the public sphere and the entry of the new Pentecostal churches into it (Parsitau, 2012: 5).

But the single most significant development, surprising many observers, was the decline, if not a perceived decline, in the public and civic role of the major churches. Scholars and social commentators have denounced the disappearance of public theologies that could reach large

civil society audiences. Scholars and the public lamented what was increasingly perceived as a lack of voice, muffled voices, or stifled voices on the part of mainstream clergy, who many observers believe is no longer the voice and conscience of the voiceless and oppressed. It seemed as if the public profile and voice of both mainline churches had collapsed or that their political energy was flagging (Parsitau, 2012:5-6).

1. In Kenya devoted Christians and Muslims collectively have a following of up to 90 percent of the population, yet it seems that religion in Kenya has lost its common sense.
2. Kenyan politics is characterized chiefly by “politicization of religion and religionisation of politics”. Mixing the two makes religion lose its sanctity and politics become dirtier.
3. Religion in Kenya has failed to maintain continuity and social cohesion among the desperate subaltern groups, given the fact that it used to be able to contain and unify the practical operation of the “religion of the people.”

1.4. Problem Statement

The situation in Kenya has shown that democratic movements within society are necessary to respond to the economic decline, social and political injustices, and legal crises imposed on the subaltern by the rule of hegemonic politics (Ajulu, 2008: 34). Economic resentment is often aroused by the massive corruption of political elites, which are closely linked to the government and prosper while the majority suffer (Gribbs, & Ajulu, 1999: 43). Therefore, the desire for political movements that can hold the ruling elite to account for their activities and that can bring about the establishment and promotion of democracy and human rights has led to the formation of civil society organizations such as trade unions, professional associations and others (Ajulu, 2008: 33 -34). The church recognizes its position within civil society and has sometimes joined the fight for justice, although at other times it has chosen to either support government authority or remain neutral on political and socio-economic issues (Gribbs & Ajulu, 1999:43).

The history of church-state relations since colonial times in Kenya has been marked by various forms of church response, particularly under the various forms of a regimes that governed the country. During the colonial administration, the church supported government officials (Chacha, 2010: 103-104). This common origin of church leadership and government played a major role in determining the close state-church relationship that became established; so that the church could not criticize the government for injustices or its abuse of power (Mue, 2011:

2-4). Conversely, there were two individuals, notably Archbishop Beecher (Gribbs & Ajulu, 1999:43-44) and Archdeacon Owen, who dared to speak out against abuses of state power during the colonial period. But due to a lack of concerted or consistent action by the church, they have remained almost lonely voices in the deep silence of the rest of the church (Choge, 2008:107).

Kenyan politics has been rife with racial tensions since the country gained independence in 1963. But it was not until 2007 that racial misconduct erupted after a rigorous national election that left more than 1,000 people dead and thousands more displaced (Tarimo, 2008: 1-2). Even some of the overcrowded slums in some cities are racially segregated "(Gettleman, 2008: 1). Ethnic and regional discrimination, as encouraged by tribal leaders, is accompanied by racial prejudice (Tarimo, 2008: 2).

In the political sphere, leaders appeal to people of their tribes when they want to support them. Kenyan elections since 1992-2013 have been highly contested. Several factors underlie these elections and determine the perceptions, action, and strategies of political elites as elements within it competitively jostle to win power—for those who have been out of power and desperate to win it—and or sustain it—for incumbents who want to remain in power. Between these actors, all sorts of sentiments and divisive tendencies—ethnicity, religion, generation, geography—are politically unleashed on subaltern groups of the voting public (Kodia, 2014:65-66). In the religious sphere the challenge according to Tarimo (Tarimo, 2008:3), the Christian Churches are seen as part of the problem of ethnocentrism. This is because for many years Christian Churches have been using the structure of ethnicity for evangelization, and they have been reluctant to address the problem of ethnicity openly (Orabator, 2009:137).

Churches in Kenya for many years have acted as the nation's conscience in most matters of governance and moral aspects. The role that is performed by the Church in socio-politics is supposed to be performed by the opposition parties of any given nation. These parties are weakened because they are either suppressed or given monetary favours in the forms of bribes and being appointed to governmental ministerial positions (Choge, 2008:108-109).

In the 2002 national election, Moi considered but eventually decided not to challenge the third-term constitutional ban. Former vice president and later rival, Mwai Kibaki, was elected Kenya's third president. As a devout Catholic, Kibaki maintained close ties with church officials while opposing Moi's government (Chacha, 2010: 113-114). According to Gifford (2009: 40), the churches were less prominent, but no doubt on Kibaki's side during the 2002

general election. Even throughout his reign, the major churches were on his side, and the Catholic Church truly viewed him as a prominent member of the church (Gifford, 2009: 40).

However, developments since Kibaki took over in 2002, show that the major churches have shown a growing "disturbing trend" (Chacha, 2010: 134) in terms of their prophetic word, and social and community relations. Eyewitnesses saw not only the initial peace but also the unwillingness of these churches to criticize Kibaki's government as the new NARC coalition collapsed under the weight of a memorandum of understanding before the election. of major corruption such as the Anglo-Leasing scandal, growing allegations of racism and many other such injustices. Viewers have described this as a litmus test about the church's relationship with the world during the early reign of Kibaki (Gifford, 2009: 60-62) and (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).

This annoying trend toward churchgoers is more than just an explanation. Gifford (2009: 42-43), points out that a new group of pastors who took over the leadership of major denominations after the 1980s and 1990s, coincided with the election of President Mwai Kibaki in 2002, was lax. According to Oloo (2010: 40), in the larger congregations, the election of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) ruling party, with President Kibaki presented a new challenge and challenge to them. As Oloo (2010: 44-45) points out, the main churches were not affiliated with the opposition (now the ruling party) against KANU (Oloo, 2010: 46).

With the former opposition party in power, the mainstream churches had to resolve the issue of how to be the conscience of the nation without damaging good relations with the Kibaki government. This is because, for the great church leaders, the victory of the NARC was also their victory (Chacha, 2010: 114). They feel a sense of responsibility to protect managers who help them get into power. It is because of this background that the mainstream churches have either supported the government or remained mothers on important national issues. This is because they see themselves as uncooperative with Kibaki's administration (Oloo, 2010: 46-47).

Meanwhile, observers believe that Kibaki's election in 2002 coincided with the election of new church leaders such as Anglican Bishop Benjamin Nzimbi to replace the retired David Gitari while the Presbyterian Church has a new leader, Rev David Gathii, who replaced Rev. George Wanjau. The Methodist Church has also experienced similar changes after the retirement of Rev. Zablon Nthamburi. Aside from the fact that perhaps the controversial Presbyterian pastor Rev. David Gathii, other church leaders are less controversial, less talkative, and less political

than their predecessors. None of them have seriously investigated (Oloo, 2010: 45) questions the state's extremism and seemed to be unusually silent on social and political issues affecting the country. At the same time, they seem to be very much dependent on the state as reflected in their peace in public affairs and their standing in the constitutional framework (Ngau and Mbathi, 2010: 145).

The third explanation given was that the mainstream churches were severely compromised and elected as participants in President Kibaki's administration. For example, Gifford (2009) illustrates how clergymen in large denominations are placed in government by appointment (Gifford, 2009: 44-45).

However, this was not always the case. In some cases, churches seem to have been postponed and placed in unusual positions because of many related factors. Churches seem to be turning their backs on corruption and materialism, lacking integrity and focus on their servants, and above all, racism and discrimination have crept into these institutions (Tarimo, 2008: 3-4).

The competition for political power and economic resources has become intense in many countries including Kenya. Political leaders, argue Solofo Randrianja, encourage the emergence of ethnonationalism to mobilize supporters (Randrianja, 1996: 31). This type of politicized ethnicity makes its appearance when nationalism extends its field of action to another level, from socio-cultural to that politics. The progressive transformation of *Inkthe atha* Movement in South Africa, which began as a cultural association into a political organization, is a good example. When ethnic groups are politicized, ethnic identities and loyalties move from the private sphere to the public spheres (Tarimo, 2008: 7).

1.4. Research Objectives

The main goals of this research are:

To identify the role of religious leaders in Kenyan politics; establish factors that seem to promote the subordination of subaltern groups in Kenya and to underline how religion's common sense hinders the ability of subaltern groups to overcome their political subordination in Kenya.


1.5. Research Methodology

It is important to recognize that systematic observation and testing can be accomplished using a wide variety of methods. Many people think of scientific inquiry strictly in terms of laboratory experimentation. However, it is neither possible nor desirable to study all

phenomena of interest under controlled laboratory conditions. The design of any study begins with the selection of a topic and a research methodology. These initial decisions reflect assumptions about the social world, how science should be conducted, and what constitutes legitimate problems, solutions, and criteria of “proof.” Different research approaches encompass both theory and method. Two general approaches are widely recognized: quantitative research and qualitative research.

The methodology that was applied was qualitative interpretivism—the work is based on library research and review of Journals, new books, newspapers, and other secondary sources. Which have been critically assessed and corroborated with other sources to attain authenticity. This is due to the fact the researcher had limited time and resources to conduct quantitative research.

1.6. Structure of the Research



Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided detailed information on the background, research problem, research context, research objectives, and research questions. One could argue that the good strategy and structure of promoting Kenyan political parties fall short of the ideals of developed democracies. Most notable is the lack of media-based integration and impartiality regarding access to social media. Since the 2007 national elections, Kenyans have been naturally disappointed with the lack of voice of Kenyan church pastors as featured in newspapers, radio, TV, and in general public discourses and speeches.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.0 Introduction

There are limited textbooks that specifically address the role of religious, political, and even minor means of involving religious and political leaders in carrying out such roles. In this area of literature, Nigeria leads Africa - there are many books on religious and political conflicts in Nigeria (Haider, 2016: 1). In Kenya, there is also limited literature available on a program that includes religious and political leaders fighting racism, nationalism, and conflict, in addition to the regular discussions about their role in leading and following the 2007-2008 politics. conflict (Haider, 2016: 1). Ndzovu, (2005: 278) argues that race and religion are among the many forms of self-identification politics attached to major educational texts in Kenya. They are also the most vulnerable people in the world.

Many Kenyan textbooks and studies show that the bias of religious and political leaders in their role in the face of racial challenges, economic development, and electoral cycles undermine their influence and moral authority, and their ability to persuade political leaders and Kenyans are familiar with achieving national unity. It is therefore important to encourage the impartiality and neutrality of religious leaders so that they are in a position to improve the situation and act as impartial negotiators where necessary (Haider, 2016: 17).

This Dissertation is based on library research and newspaper reviews, new publications on Kenyan theology, and other secondary sources, which have been reviewed and documented by other sources for verification.

The titles of the dissertation cover the following areas: Relations between Religion and Politics in Kenya; Religion and Politics in Africa; Ethno-politics in Kenya; Tribal and Political Governance in Kenya; Ethno-Religious Politics in Kenya; Gramsci and Community; Religion - Social Cohesion and United Politics in Kenya; and Gramsci's Hegemony and Subaltern.

2.1. Religion and Politics in Africa

Akwara and Ojomah (2013: 44) state that politics and religion are so intertwined. They hold that the assertion of religious authority over a democratic state undermines the legitimacy of the state and the basic human rights of citizens; and the assertion of secular authority over religion "questions" God's authority over his creation on earth and "undermines" the power and authority of God's representatives on earth (Akwara and Ojomah, 2013: 44).

Essien (2014: 86) points out that, despite the high social cohesion in Africa and the strong African faith, some ideologies still link religion and conflict to the continent. Akpanika (2017: 65-66) argues that, in analyzing religious practices, we should be sensitive to ideas that promote deep conviction among believers, but at the same time have a balanced view of them. Liman (2012: 1) states that the study of the Nigerian conflict has shown that there is need to take a different approach understanding stand conflicts in many countries such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. He says one way is to examine how community organizations use accountability to determine their interactions with other groups (Liman, 2012: 1). He emphasizes that, in northern Nigeria, identity plays a major role in the way groups meet, religion and ethnicity are the basis of social communication (Liman, 2012: 1).

Omaga (2016: 1) speculates that political dialogue in Nigeria does not take place without bringing about religion or racial unity. The different religions and cultures, from which our values , are what define us as human beings. However, he warns us, "if we do not separate these things from the administration, they may cause our destruction". He emphasizes that "Many of the developmental challenges we face as a nation may not be due to the people or of ruling political party but primarily because we are racially and religiously divided" (Omaga, 2016: 1).

2.2. Relationship between Religion and Politics in Kenya

David and Katola (2016: 44) state that religion plays a vital role as an agent in the process of social change and development. They think that this role of religious activity means that religion cannot be limited to a particular spiritual plan at the expense of public space (David and Katola, 2016: 44).

Chepkwony, (2008: 17) argues that religion has long played a political role in traditional African governments. As a result, in Africa, the world's religious ideology plays a key role in determining power distribution. He argues that, because religion is seen as a way of life, it permeates the economic, moral, technological, aesthetic, social, and political spheres of any society (Chepkwony, 2008: 17).

Ellis and Haar (2007: 385) argue that the politics of Africa and Kenya to be clarified cannot be fully understood without reference to the widely distributed religious views in sub-Saharan societies. Through their article, they try to reconsider their beliefs about religion and politics, by looking at the various reviews and criticisms they have encountered (Ellis and Haar, 2007: 386). while such strong divisions do not reflect the views of the true nature of Africa and Kenya in particular (Ellis and Haar, 2007: 385-386). They suggest that the development of a new theater model aimed at interpreting the relationship between religion and politics in Africa and Kenya directly shows more than just striving for academic accuracy. It promises to be more than just an academic pursuit of accuracy. It promises to be very useful at a time when religious movements are consuming public space in many places (Ellis and Haar, 2007: 385-386): neo-pentecostal, charismatic and Islamic movements, but also neo-traditional movements such as the Mungiki of Kenya, or difficult-to-separate events such as the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda (Chepkwony, 1999: 27-30).

The theory of Ellis and Haar (2007: 386) is based on the premise that religious ideas held by most Africans — hundreds of millions of people — should be regarded as important, and should be viewed in their original context. They continue to argue that African views on religion and its relationship to politics are not only important in the understanding of religion and politics in general, but but in a world characterized by a new alignment of these two important factors (Ellis and Haar, 2007: 386).

Falola, (1998: 7) argues that the relationship between religion and politics is complex. They both try to protect and conserve energy, but there is a difference and a brilliance in the goals

and values they aim to achieve and the great diversity in their thinking of the natural energy source.

Paul Gifford is one of the foremost scholars in the study of African Christianity and its political affiliations (Gifford, 1988; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1993; 1994; 1998; 1999; 2004; 2009). In these works, Gifford states that African Christianity is a Western phenomenon. Gifford (2009: 33-85) points out that Kenyan churches have a different history in their response to social issues. Others have been particularly sensitive to the need of justice and peace in large communities, especially such large churches as Protestant and Catholic. I feel that through his works, Paul Gifford does not explicitly state that the Kenyan church does not play a vital role in uniting all Kenyan nationalities. However, Choge, (2008), states that church leadership regularly communicates with the church and the congregation, helping to educate and sensitize members about the effects of the Christian faith on a particular social issue (2008: 94). Okullu, (1981) suggests that, for the Church not to say and do nothing, it is as if the Church has no interest in the most important matters in human relationships. This would be a denial of all that faith stands for. Religion does not live in the sky but in a specific place and context, which includes people — these people are socially natural and therefore social (1981: 68)

However, Choge (2008) points out that in Kenya the church has played a major role in the country's politics. The first joint Pastoral Letter of the Archbishops, Bishops, and Prefects Apostolic of Kenya was in July 1960 (2008: 106-107). The letter was written while Kenya was still able to find its political influence. Kenyatta and other leaders were still in custody. The letter urged Kenya to gain independence (2008: 106-107). Concerns about peace and the clergy's admonition against racism and revenge should be understood in the context of the Mau Mau struggle, which was still fresh in people's minds (Kasomo and Naila, 2013: 4). The following important letter was written on Independence and Peace during the Decade of Independence, 12th December 1973. In it, the Bishops spoke of a peace that was threatened by greed for power and wealth (Kasomo and Naila, 2013: 4).

I agree with Gifford (2009: 38-39), and Kasomo and Naila (2013: 6-7), who argue that, despite advances in literature, theoretical understanding of religious characters remains incomplete, because the theory is largely based on a limited set of applicable cases. Many books on political economics in religious schools in East Africa and Kenya, in particular, focus on the mainstream churches, Anglicans, Presbyterians, and the Catholic Church — with organizational and historical elements that set them apart from other religious organizations. (Kasomo and Naila,

2013: 6-7). In addition, much of the theory-driven analysis focuses on high- and middle-income countries, particularly the US, Europe, and Latin America. In contrast, much of the work church and country relations in developing countries, and in Africa in particular, tends to be historical accounts and case studies, often rich in details but simple in theory (Kasomo and Naila, 2013: 6-7).

Kenga (2014: 20-26), in his Master's Research paper, highlighted the role of Religion in politics and governance in Kenya by acknowledging that Kenya's major Christian churches have played an important role in politics, including the pursuit of open politics, space, rhetoric against corruption, racism, and human rights abuses perpetrated by the former dictatorship of former President Moi. The party is opposed to the abolition of the secret ballot which would have ensured that no opposition leader is elected. They joined the Law Society of Kenya in criticizing Mlolongo's voting system. However, he failed to acknowledge the fact that the Churches did not try to unite Kenya in nationalism (Kenga, 2014: 26).

Kilonzo (2009: 102-103) explores the role of religious institutions in promoting post-2007 conflict resolution in Kenya. Kilonzo, (2009: 103-104) fails to consider that religious and political writing as suggested by Ellis and Haar, (2007: 391) has some practical implications. Among other things, it includes writing about religion in Africa and Kenya, especially in a meaningful way. His paper does not seem to fit together — it favors Kikuyu hegemony. Ideally, it challenges all religious leaders to play a leading role in the fight against racism and xenophobia (Kilonzo, 2009: 104-105). Yes, I agree that there have been problems (Kilonzo, 2009: 102) in Kisumu, Eldoret, Mombasa, Molo, and Nairobi (Kibera Mathare and Karobangi). No Kikuyu was killed in Nyanza and Western Provinces — it was the riot police who killed opposition supporters protesting the results of the rigged elections (Okia, 2011: 260; 262). In Nyanza, supporters of opposition groups target government offices or buildings, not individuals (Murunga, 2011: 7).

Murunga (2011: 7) with his 57 Discussion Paper: Automatic or Fictional:: Post-Election Violence in Kenya, 2007-2008, attempts to provide specific explanations for the nature of the electoral crisis and the ensuing crisis that put Kenya on the brink of collapse, resulting in 1 death, 133 and the expulsion of more than 350,000 people. Murunga (2011: 7) identifies and identifies major forms of violence, seeking to analyze their manifestations in different regions and to provide explanations for any differences between regions. It concludes with a brief discussion of peace, truth, and justice. The analysis reflects the disagreement of political

officials in Kenya over political disputes. In my opinion, Murunga (2011: 8-13) is a two-dimensional paper. It analyzes the political situation in Kenya with complete neutrality.

Ndzovu, (2005: 267) examines the link between religion and politics in Kenya. He preceded this by providing a global definition of the common religious and political interdependence that brings together and provides an analysis of the views of religion and politics in Islam Kenya (Elephant, 2005: 267-268). He states that, since Mohammed was a messenger of God and a political leader of the Medina region — after his death the traditional lawmakers formed a link between religion and politics by giving religious authority to political power (Elephant, 2005: 268). Because of the mixture of religion and politics, the result is the formation of an Islamic state. According to Islamic political theory, this state should be subject to Islamic law (sharia) (Elephant, 2005: 268). He argues that the idea of separating religion from politics is psychological (Elephant, 2005: 286).

Oloo (2010: 44-45) analyzes party mobility and membership in the 2007 national elections in Kenya. He argues that political influence in Kenya since independence has been seen in terms of identity. He points out that the dominant identity was the nationality reflected in his analysis as the old personality (Oloo, 2010: 33-36). He goes on to say that during the emergence of many “new” parties emerged in different years of elections. These include gender, youth, and religion (Oloo, 2010: 40-47).

Oloo (2010) is considered to be one of the "new" identities in the Kenyan electoral process in Kenya. Religious identity in Kenya includes many religious groups, including Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Hindus, evangelists, and a few indigenous churches. Although political parties cannot be established based on religion, as in other parts of Europe and South Africa — in Kenya political elites have repeatedly sought to persuade certain religious groups Oloo (2010: 44-47).

Omulo (2017), in Doctoral Thesis, Ethnicity, Governance, and Socio-Economic Development in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya and Its Luo Community, 1963-2013, explores the opposition of the state and its ruling institutions, by certain nations. hegemonic groups. It affects sub-groups, especially the Luo tribe (Omulo, 2017: 1). He describes the Luo scandal by examining the role of the Kenyan Government's investment in Nyanza province, during the period 1963-2013, Omulo (2017: 25) argues that the key to his conceptual framework is the link between political neutrality and economic problems, “nationalist” unity ,and small public investment from the books currently available.

I concur with Dividend Katola (2016: 46) that the Kenyan church presented a major challenge to the closed political regimes of President Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki, and now Uhuru Kenyatta (David, and Katola, 2016: 46). As in Choge (2008: 107) and (David and Katola, 2016: 46). Throughout Kenyatta's time, for example, the church was opposed to the rampant genocide and the vows against one nation over another. Following in the footsteps of his predecessor (Nyayo), President Moi's government was also marred by allegations of political assassination, corruption, and widespread electoral fraud. Sadly, the church in Kenya, as in many African countries, has failed as a constant criticism as a good example (Choge, 2008: 107-109).

The lack of research-driven research on the political economy of religion in Africa is particularly disturbing, given the history and current significance of religious organizations, which are among the largest and most influential civil society organizations in many African countries (Chazan, and Rothchild, 2012: 26). The main Catholic and Protestant denominations continue to be prominent organizations and social actors in Africa, as do Muslim groups. Neo-Christian Pentecostal churches and evangelical traditions have flourished with membership and a bad reputation throughout Africa, often drawing membership in older religious organizations. Collectively, religious organizations still provide significant amounts of public education and health services across the continent (Babatunde, 2007: 140).

Rhodes (2014: 13) points out that religion is the dominant force in Africa, calling for further analysis. For non-African scholars, Africa offers a set of untested cases to examine and review existing ideas of church-state relations and the religious-political economy. The different national, political, social, and economic conditions of many African countries may give rise to new ideas about how churches (and other organizations) operate. This dissertation helps to fill the gap in the literature through theory-based qualitative interpretivism — work based on library research and reviews of journals, new books, newspapers, and other secondary sources, analysing religions and political activities in Kenya.

Khan (2004: 15) notes that there are two reasons why religion and politics are intertwined. The first is the increasing use of complex authoritative expressions. Today all politicians seem to follow Macavellian's dictum — it is not necessary to be fair, they must appear to be right — therefore, politicians and political parties, and governments have produced statements that confirm their goals and strategies. It is in the production of these discourses that religion either supports political ideology or hides political motives, depending on the cultural context.

The second and perhaps most important reason why religion has always played a role in important political issues is the important role that religion plays in the formation of identity. All important political issues ultimately affect the identity of the individual and the collection and, in this process, evoke religious sentiment. As long as religion contributes to the image of the people, it will participate in politics (Khan, 2004: 16).

However, during the reign of President Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002), the Christian churches, especially the Protestant and Catholic churches, differed in support of the opposition. In his rise to power in 1978, Moi gradually consolidated his rule under his famous Nyayo philosophy and expressed his determination to follow in the footsteps of the founding president of the Republic of Kenya, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. Over the years this philosophy, according to Gifford (2009: 34-35), changed into a necessity for all Kenyans to follow in his footsteps. The mainstream churches were critical of this philosophy, and although they did try to unite the clergy, the mainstream churches resisted it. Moi was determined, however, to strengthen his hand in the country. By about 1985, he was still in power under a one-party state, a party that was even more powerful than parliament and cabinet. His empire grew through greed, corruption, racism, bigotry, patriotism, human rights abuses, and injustice (Gifford, 2009: 34-35).

2.3. Religion and Ethno-Politics in Kenya

I state as Chacha (2010: 109) that the challenges that Kenyans face are the challenges of national development. Therefore, all Kenyans need to realize that Christians, Muslims, or non-Christians alike are all part of the same boat called Kenya (Tarimo, (2008: 2). The events of the last few years have caused so much anxiety that it seems safe to say that ordinary people are openly afraid of what is happening. (Gichure, 2008: 34-35).

Kanyinga (2014: 2) reports on the challenges of participatory democracy in Kenya; examines the state of democracy and participation in the country. It explores institutional and legal processes that can influence the integration of democracy and political participation. The report examines available tools, such as the Constitution of Kenya (2010), to promote democracy and public participation in politics. He argues that the active and meaningful participation of

citizens in public affairs is a divisive factor in democratic societies, which are judged on the extent to which governments are open to citizens' participation in public affairs and the opportunity for citizens to hold government accountable. It is because of this that Kenyan and African citizens, in general, continue to seek more space for participation (Kanyinga, 2014: 2).

Kanyinga (2014: 3) highlights the violence that plagued Kenya following a dispute over the results of the December 2007 presidential election. Not many expected Kenya to burst into flames so quickly. The country has had a history of political change from one-party rule since the early 1990s and a general election culture. The violence ended in February 2008 with the intervention of the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities. Interestingly, in the development of the political economy, two ethnic groups fighting each other in the post-2007 violence, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, formed a political coalition, the Jubilee Alliance, which finally won in March 2013. election. The federation consisted of Kikuyu presidential candidates and a deputy president (Kalenjin) who were indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for post-2007 violence. They combined the power of numbers in their communities and won the election. They have been elected president and vice-president despite allegations of post-election violence. These are rare indications of Kenya's democratic policy.

Meredith (2011: 11) tries to highlight the political situation in Africa including Kenya historically. He points out that, in the British colonies in eastern and central Africa, political activity revolved around white immigrant demands for more political power. Sighting Southern Rhodesia as an example, when white people were a minority, had achieved internal independence since 1923, in Kenya they pursued a similar goal (Meredith, 2011: 11). He did not name political parties that existed before Kenya gained independence, namely the largest African party, the African National Union (KANU), and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU membership includes some of the larger tribes, the Kikuyu and Luo, while KADU includes ethnic minorities, many of whom were afraid of being ruled by large groups after independence (Kanyinga, 2014: 3).

He introduced the political work in Kenya as a history centered solely on Kenyatta and the Kikuyu nationalism that ignores all freedom fighters and the words of liberal politics. He portrays Kikuyu as the only active Kenyan nation, able to cling deeply to the world (Meredith, 2011: 81). This in my opinion is not true — many other ethnic groups are active and knowledgeable and have a deep connection to the world Kikuyuu. It is important to consider that all Africans are deeply rooted in the country (Mwakikagile, 2018: 8-9).

According to Tarimo (2008: 1), Kenya is a multiracial society, and many communities have lived in harmony for many years. In recent years, however, the ruling elites have taken the lead in the struggle for political power. As a result, Kenya is like a deep division that causes major political issues to be driven by force and violence along the lines of complex racial, religious, and regional divisions. Bayart (1993: 50) argues that the nature and meaning of nationalism are difficult to understand unless we associate it with changing social conditions. He informs us that one can continue to use the old answer to new questions if one ignores such connections. Therefore, one must consider the cultural, economic, and political changes and how they have continued to shape national identity, honesty, and interests (Tarimo, 2008: 3).

2.4. Ethnic and Political Hegemony in Kenya

Racial metal production as the first means of uniting people has become an inevitable reality of political life in Kenya. Over a long period, the resignation of scholars, activists, and civil society organizations over racist politics in Kenya has led to a decline in discourse when it comes to ways to address racism in the distribution of power, resources, and opportunities. To the extent that scholars and activists have worked to address the issue of racial segregation in the country; their efforts are limited in two ways (Kanyinga & Okello, 2010: 16).

I agree with the comments of Kanyinga and Okello (2010: 17-18) on their two points regarding the contributions of an expert on ethnic politics in Kenya; opponents, first of all, the work of learning did not succeed in influencing racial discourses beyond academic circles. Many Kenyans are likely to experience the profound effects of racist politics without having to deal with the analysis and interpretation of the situation. Many of these analytical tools have the potential to change the way Kenyans view racial, ethnic, and racial attitudes by, for example, facilitating racial, gender, and racial discrimination or pre-Kenyan racial identity. -and the post-independence history (Okello, 2010: 17-18). Second, many activists, perhaps because of the urgency of tackling racist political consequences such as corruption and political violence, use simple explanations of the situation, leaving society with an incomplete picture of darkness and racial and political elements throughout Kenya (Okello, 2010: 17-18).

Kanyinga, (2014: 12) states that in Kenya, as is the case in many African countries, nationalism is and still is a major force that unites the party because of other foundations of coexistence such as religion, and class, nationality, etc. Recent events and in many cases alien. In the

author's view, Kenyan politics is nationalism (Kanyinga, 2014: 12). Racism, when viewed as the integration of language, culture, and ethnic groups, is a major factor) around which national and regional politics in Kenya revolve around (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002: 234-235). The racial structure and the desire to control the central power are what make this possible. Significantly, Kenya has many ethnic groups but no groups are large enough to dominate another. Statistics show that the country has about 42 groups. Based on the 2009 census, large groups have a per capita population of more than 10% Kikuyu (17.15%), Luhya (13.8and 2%), and Kalenjin (12.86%), Luo (10.47%), and Kamba (10.07%).). Their total population is 64.4%. The second largest group makes up 15.07% of the population (Kanyinga, 2014: 12).

Like many African countries, Kenya is a mixed race. In the study of diversity, Kenya is considered one of the most diverse societies in Africa (Asingo, 2014: 15). The exact number of ethnic groups in Kenya is a contentious issue (Lynch, 2014: n.p.). For a very long time, it was assumed that the figure stood at 42. This figure is said to be based on a questionnaire released during the 1969 census. It seems that consensus has been reached in recent years that there are more than 42 ethnic groups in the country. Therefore, the list of questions or data for the 2009 census was included in the list of fewer than 111 nations (Lynch, 2014: n.p.). The expansion of the list of races from 42 in 1969 to at least 111 in 2009 as part of the fruit of the struggles of historically disadvantaged communities, such as Endorois, Ogiek, and Sengwer, should be officially recognized by the government. Similarly, it shows the ever-growing assertiveness of small groups that are different or distinct from the larger groups in which they were introduced during the colonial period. For example, the 2009 census included figures for the Marachi, Maragoli, Marama, and other groups that had previously been counted as part of the Luhya tribe. It also included small groups of Mijikenda and Kalenjin, such as Boni, Choli, Dahalo, Kipsigis, Marakwet, and Nandi, respectively (Lynch, 2014: n.p.).

Gachanga, (2012: 4-5), states that Kenya is a country where nationality is important. It is a country where people look to their political representatives as sources of support. As a result, in Kenya, “we” and “them” are often used interchangeably. This is because politicians think the country's resources will be transferred to their party. Thus, in the case of Kenya, competition for jobs, development resources, and other benefits become a struggle between nations to replace their political power (Ochieng, 1996: 104-105).

Atieno-Odhiambo (1996: 65-67) and Ajulu (2002: 257) think that political power and the benefits offered are taken over by two nations. Both argue that the partial distribution of

government resources is evident. Government employment, high-quality jobs, and the ability to earn money are highly biased in favor of the ruling parties. The desire to preserve these rights is a clear reason for the frequent emergence of government-sponsored conflicts aimed at oppressing minority groups in Kenya.

The quest for imperial hegemony has encouraged the fragmentation of images of racial boundaries. Racial politics, ethnic strife, self-promotion, and the emergence of a new ethnic history are commonplace in many parts of the world, especially in Africa. Over the past decade, these conditions have created tensions between nations and have reshaped social relations from a state of security and social cohesion from peaceful coexistence to suspicion and fear. In the great departure from the anti-colonial struggles, many countries have seen the struggles and conflicts between nations that lead to the loss of lives and property and the possibility of internal evictions (IDPs).

I think that diversity in itself should not be a threat to national unity and stability but the building of the Kenyan regional community in the context of nationalism has divided social norms, values, opportunities, and equality. Therefore, access to "anything" in Kenya, today is based on race. I am opposed to the fact that the Luo are the fourth largest tribe (11.65%) in Kenya, after the Kikuyu (17.13%), the Luhya (14.35%), and the Kalenjin (13.37%). The Luo population in Kenya was estimated at 2,185,000 in 1994 and 3.4 million in 2010 according to Government figures. However, this figure was disputed by many Luos as unscientific as a large proportion of the people who were considered Luos were now counted as Suba people of Kenya and Tanzania. The Suba eventually numbered about 300,000 but most of them were completely incorporated into the Luos culture. The Luo and the Kikuyu gained great political power in the early years after Kenya gained independence in 1963 (Rohwerder, 2015: 1). Ryan (2001: 28) states that Professor Gideon conducted research in Western Kenya and noted that between 30 and 40 percent of the Abaluya (Luhya) families were originally Kalenjin. An outstanding example is the Abatachoni of Ndivisi and the Kabras, traditionally, were originally related to Bongomek and Babukusu who were separated from their cousins, the Bagisu, due to the Teso invasion of the 18th century (Ogot, and Ochieng, 2000: 16-17).

The reason for this is to call for the treatment of the Luo people in Kenya — the separation of the Luo people from their Suba cousins should be applied to other Kenyan tribes. Second, to show that the people of Kenya are in a better position to embrace the spirit of nationalism as no nation can claim to be “pure”. In one way or another, they are all related because of the

similarities in marriage. Therefore, religious leaders and Kenyans have challenged the acceptance of bipartisan politics and turned away from ethnoreligious political ideologies that undermine Kenya's integrity (Rohwerder, 2015: 1).

Nationalism today has become a major social movement throughout Kenya. This organization is so strong that it is the preferred method of loyalty instead of loyalty in Kenya. I emphasize that nationalism has become so prevalent in Kenya that at all levels nationality decides to achieve positions, rights, and obligations; from the general election to elementary and secondary schools to the election of political office bearers, nationalism is often important and integrated. A person in any position in Kenya, firstly, is a citizen of his or her race and secondly a person of Kenya. This lack of loyalty to the nation has had a profound effect on all walks of life (Ajulu, 2008: 41-42)

Ethnicity is a moral phenomenon and is conflicted in content in such a way that people of different races see each competitor in the search for resources instead of their own. It can only exist in a multi-state political society like Kenya with more than 111 language groups. The relationship between the various ethnic groups within the political system produces nationalism. In the case of Kenya, its conflict is caused by international competition for natural resources. It is often characterized by racial discrimination in employment, housing, access to higher education, etc. This is often accompanied by racism and corruption. Qualifications are often offered on the racial altar thus, causing conflict especially with scarce resources (Nyabira and Ayele, 2016: 2).

2.5. Ethno-Religious Politics in Kenya

Tarimo, (2008: 8) states that the tendency for international use is also strong in the Christian congregation. This situation has deprived African churches and churches in Kenya of especially the power to promote social justice. According to Waruta (1992: 127) “most religious groups and denominations, when properly considered, are also racist in their formation and leadership. Those who are likely to be international are plagued by internal conflicts” (Waruta, 1992: 128). Tarimo, (2008: 8) emphasizes that Ethnocentrism exists in churches as it does in the field of politics. In the case of the Christian history of Kenya, this situation is linked to the methods of evangelism that are offered only to certain races, as a result, which produces mainly a single ethnic group. At the end of their reign, those tribes used to conduct their services in their languages, thus excluding all others (Waruta, 1992: 128).

What I do notice is that the Kenyan evangelical churches, with their traditional theology, were deeply involved in the call for a personal violation of rebirth with salvation that was not based on political zeal but faith. In contrast, the Presbyterians are virtually confined to the Kikuyu world, the core of their opposition at the time, while the Anglicans are also a Kikuyu and Luo church, although in recent years, like their predecessors, they have become more and more converted. Church of Kenya. The regional character of the Christian denominations in Kenya — as well as the Muslims — makes it especially difficult to distinguish between the theological system and the racial or regional confusion as a result of clerical declarations on political issues.

Kanyinga and Okello (2010: 18) argue that religion and politics have always been intertwined in Kenya, although the state and religion are constitutionally divided. Various mainstream religious groups played a major role in the multi-party democracy struggle of the 1980s and 1990s. Religious leaders have asserted their power to take a stand for what is right and, as in other matters, such as gender, youth, or racial prejudice. Leaders of elected religious groups use the pulpit to spread racist political positions (Chacha, 2010: 19-20).

At a time when it was considered the only reliable and organized network with broad connections in Kenya, the NCKK aligned with the Catholic Episcopal Conference backed by opposition political parties and the international community forced the repeal of Article 2A of the 1963 Independence Constitution which eventually ushered Kenya. in multipartyism in 1992 (Chacha, 2010: 109).

Indeed, the 2002 political revolution was achieved through the active support of the most influential congregations. When he did, new government officials worked with the clergy. It was no surprise to me that most of the public service, especially education and health, was run by religious organizations. This partnership has grown even closer because the churches were interested in making the new government legitimate, and they had high hopes for it. However, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) split immediately after winning the election. Although the churches had no intention of choosing between the two camps, thus losing contact with the majority, their position was not visible. Indeed, the main religious structures, which are heavily involved in public service, continued to work with the ruling class and seemed to favour the Kibaki camp. As the numbers grew and voting approached (the 2005 poll followed the 2007 national election), this trend became increasingly evident. What needs to be established is whether the practice was focused on or just about commenting on critical issues. Thus, in 2007, as in the last election, the churches seemed to be taking sides. Their speeches

on neutrality and respect for human rights, at least at the diocese, were like leaves of the vine that could indicate growth in light.

Parsitau (2012: 3) explores the changing roles of key churches in public life by looking at the supposed loss of the prophetic word by the clergy of the church and the emergence of other words in the context of racial and religious growth in many cultures. space. He says to understand the changing changes of the great churches in the public realm, we must go back and try to understand this historically. First, it restores church and state relations with successive Kenyan governments beginning with President Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Moi, and Mwai Kibaki. During those empires, he analyses the roles of the Christian Churches and what has changed since then. Second, it examines the entry of new players and voices into public life and examines their impact or lack. Third, by examining the failures of the Christian churches during the post-election crisis that engulfed Kenya after the 2007 presidential election (Parsitau, 2012: 3-4). He notes that, during the reign of Mwai Kibaki, observers have pointed out that the mainstream Anglican, Protestant, and Catholic churches were reluctant to criticize his first term because they were not allying with the KANU regime. This means that they are at risk and are considered to be participants in governance, for example, the Reverend Mutava Musyimi who was the general secretary of the NCCCK was elected head of the Anti-Corruption Steering Committee which is why he jeopardizes his ability to expose serious corruption in government independently. In 2007 he resigned from the NCCCK to seek a parliamentary seat under the ruling National Unity (PNU) and won.

2.6. Gramsci and Civil Society

Buttigieg, (2005: 37) states that, in Gramsci's view, society incorporates cultural institutions. He emphasizes that Gramsci is not clear about his society - this is because of this cultural "superstructure" in which the capitalist class established its sovereignty, using it to keep the working class in its place (Buttigieg, 2005: 37). Ungsuchaval (2016: 33) thinks that, in public studies, Antonio Gramsci, is considered a great thinker - because he revived Hegel's ideas of state and society. To Gramsci. "The state is the sum of the political and social community (Ungsuchaval, 2016: 33). Chakraborty (2016: 24) states that Antonio Gramsci talks about society and society in sections of the Prison Notes. He emphasizes that his vision for the state, and the community is widespread throughout his theater career. Chakraborty (2016: 24) suggests that it should be noted that there is a close relationship between Gramsci's view of the state, society, and hegemony.

2.7. Religion–Civil society and Partisan Politics in Kenya

Clayton, (1998: 5) states that civil society can be defined, broadly as: “Those discourses that exist between the family and state levels enjoy a degree of independence from government and the market and provide opposition to the balance of power of the state and the market.

Clayton, (1998: 5) presents two very broad perspectives on the type of organization that can be included as part of a community. One is a special position and the other is all-encompassing.

Clayton, (1998: 5) argues that civilization is understood as a group of expressions that engage in activities aimed at supporting or strengthening democracy. The organizations included in this definition are those that negotiate with the state, on behalf of their members or third parties, and aim to hold the state accountable to its citizens. Religious organizations, voluntary organizations, charities, trade unions and professional organizations are civil society organizations (Clayton, 1998: 5-6).

Clayton, (1998: 5-6) states that, in rejecting the limited and limited focus of a particular approach, an inclusive environment has been established that recognizes the more complex and multifaceted situation of interaction between government, society and the market.

Gibbs and Ajulu (1999: 8) state that over the past two decades the international aid community has become more interested in public opinion. They argue that there are, however, many different ways of understanding society. They argue that different schools of political thought, as well as different state knowledge, enable different interpretations (Gibbs and Ajulu, 1999: 8).

Mati (2020: 674) estimates that some African provinces, like elsewhere in the world, are trying to create and reproduce a legal-policy environment that favors a ‘developmental’ society while crippling those who are thought to be ‘political’. Mati (2020: 674) argues that public-private partnerships are the product of competitive ideas of what constitutes 'politics' and 'development' and their state of mind. Mati (2020: 674) tries to bring to the fore the role of political and social development and how these have shaped the state and public relations from colonial times to the present day in Kenya. Reflecting on the manifestation of the role that is considered to be divisive and the implications of public-private relations, he says the two roles are complementary and complimentary. The two roles also led to the many relations between the state and the community (Mati, 2020: 674).

Allison (2016) estimates that the Kenyan civil society sector has long been one of Africa's most courageous and articulate, and exemplary others on the continent. The proliferation of active NGOs in the country has put civil society organizations at the forefront of efforts to improve governance, but also, in some cases, puts NGOs in direct conflict with the government; Allison (2016: 1).

Matanga, (2000: 3) states that the history of social consciousness has passed three important stages. The first stage was the pre-18th century when political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were used to refer to the emergence of an organized political community. In this context, society was not compared to the political situation but to the natural, natural environment (Matanga, 2000: 3). The second phase, from the 18th century, clothed the concept with a different meaning and rearranged it as a central point between the private space and the state. This divided society into a political and state-society (Matanga, 2000: 3). The third category is based on the above-mentioned political events in Eastern and Central Europe in the late 1980s that led to the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union. Its (modern) civil society's goal is to protect its citizens from the invading forces: on the one hand, the political power of the state, and on the other, economic power (Tilly, 1993-1994).

Goldstone, (2004: 334) argues that social movements are often seen as the movement of those "outside of politics," or as "opponents," who seek goals that they cannot pursue through established political processes. Moreover, although the authors of "new social media" argue that this is not just a case, the social movement is often portrayed as working on behalf of people who are economically disadvantaged or disadvantaged, seeking greater wealth (Goldstone, 2004: 334).

Throughout the 1990s, Kenya was given a strong community that provided another practical agenda. This is still the case at a time when the State desperately needs a unifying factor, a social contract and respect for human rights. Okuku, (2002: 81) argues that civil society organizations include various interest organizations such as human rights organizations, trade unions, and the church in which the general public conducts business. He goes on to argue that, The rise of the focus on civil society in much of Africa, as well as in Kenya making it clear, in both developmental and democratic disputes, has been a response to the weakness of the state. Thus, it has become a staple in efforts to build an effective democratic system (Okuku, (2002: 81) states that social and democratic reforms remain problematic (Okuku, 2002: 84).

As Kasfir (1998b: 142-145) points out, without exception, African organizations cited in the common sense of society are new, have no social roots, have unrelated motives for ongoing political conflicts, and are largely funded by outsiders. He argues that academics and donors need to rethink the ideas they expect communities to contribute to democracy. In this program, they should look at least political institutions in the same way as civil society organizations. Any view of civil society and its role in the democratic process in Africa must recognize the link between civil society and the state and its limits in creating authoritarian states. It is in this context that we examine how the Christian church, NGOs, and other civil society organizations in Kenya and Uganda have participated in the democratic process. The degradation of civil society and democracy remains a problem. As it turns out, remarkably, African organizations defined by common social ideologies are new, have no social roots, have unrelated motives that are unrelated to ongoing political conflicts and are heavily sponsored by outsiders. He argues that academics and donors need to rethink the ideas they expect communities to contribute to democracy. In this system, they should treat political parties at least in the same way as civil society organizations (Kasfir 1998b: 142-145). Okuku, (2002: 201) argues that any consideration of civil society and its contribution to the democratic process in Africa must recognize the link between society and the state and its limits in creating authoritarian states. This is why Okuku (2002: 199) explores how the Christian church, NGOs, and other civil society organizations in Kenya and Uganda have participated in the democratic process (Okuku, 2002: 84).

Okello, (2010: 199) examines the impact that Kenyan civil society has had on the development of a culture of governance in Kenya — in terms of values, morals, institutions, and political structures — has focused on following the 2002 National Elections — in which many actors in civil society became involved. government for the first time (Okello, 2010: 200). He thinks that, since 1990, major changes have taken place in Kenya: the economy has become more liberal, plural politics has held firmly to the most successful multi-party elections since 1992 (Okello, 2010: 199-100).

I argue as Matanga (2000: 2) states that the absence of potential political parties in the period between 1982 and 1991 left civil society organizations as the only reliable alternative. But with the re-establishment of the multi-party system in late 1991, emerging opposition groups are plagued by divisions and national and personal aspirations for governance. This has made them completely weak so they can challenge Moi's regime. This ensured the continued role of civil society in opposition political parties. The state has used some tactics to include the community

(Matanga, 2000: 2). These include laws, propaganda, cooperation, sharing, and removal of anti-establishment community leaders, among others. It is the view of this paper that allowing society to push for change and thus initiate change should be considered as part of the state's response to society.

Why did the Catholic Church seem to be a part of and support the president, especially after the 2007 election despite the disputed election results? This view is less closely related to its position in 2008 than it has been in the long run. First, the political victory in 2002 seemed to be closely linked to the Kikuyu clergy. In the Central Province, the first nomination of candidates for the NARC was held in the districts and presided over by priests. The Catholic Church was indeed the largest in the region: In Nyeri County 41.21% of the population are Catholic. This commitment was not limited to the fact that Mwai Kibaki was a prominent representative of Nyeri and that most of the politicians in the region were Catholic. The clergy also took an active part in the discussions of the Kikuyu race. Most of the literature in the Kikuyu language came from a Catholic printing press and the leading intellectuals, the Kikuyu national philosophers, were Catholic. Thus, they were at the heart of thinking about what to expect from the leaders. Their commentary was often criticized but this did not stop them from supporting Mwai Kibaki. Local leaders were often the catalysts for unusual social cohesion. This was the case in Thika in the early 1990s when slum dwellers protested against industrial pollution and working conditions. Ten years later, the controversy involving coffee associations received religious support. The newsletter of the Murang'a Catholic diocese, Mwihoko, was closed several times and is known to have been extremely controversial (Moi) and socially (especially against many ethnic groups). The clergy was thus the most active social and political movement in local politics.

Murunga (2011: 19-20) states that the Catholic Church was the champion of the Kikuyu race and that the clergy had unquestionable power in the Central Province. There is no such comparison in western Kenya, where Catholics represent less than a quarter of the population and are just one religious force. Their relationship with the elite is very difficult to identify. However, the church sees itself as influential across the country, and some clergy comment on important issues of the election campaign (Murunga, 2011: 18-19). As a result, Cardinal Njue, archbishop of Kenya and former archbishop of Nyeri, opposed the Majimbo (decentralization) program, which formed the basis of the opposition's campaign agenda. Catholic priests from western Kenya, Odinga's fortress, began receiving threats and proclaimed that Cardinal Njue had expressed his views and not the church's views (Murunga, 2011: 19-20).

The Protestant churches emerged from this catastrophic political crisis because the expectations were low. They disappointed many followers but their self-criticism was stronger than the Catholics (Gifford, 2009: 34-35). During the election campaign, church leaders created by the colonial missionaries presented themselves politically and racially despite nationalist demands for political neutrality and respect for democratic laws (rejection of vote, rejection of electoral violence) (Gumo, Akuloba, and Omare). , 2012: 32-33). These religious organizations unanimously supported the PNU while evangelical and Pentecostal churches supported the ODM camp. At times, they even associated with Musyoka, who often proved to be “saved.” After the vote, the churches avoided party propaganda without certain Methodist and Presbyterian leaders allowing the head of the state re-election without consulting others (Parsitau, 2012: 3-4). NCCCK members embark on a mission of conversion (a “journey of conversion” led by the organization's General Secretary, Rev. Peter Karanja). They emphasized that their loyalty was marred by the difficulties Kenya experienced (Gibbs and Ajulu, 1999: 23). In line with strict Protestant principles, they openly criticized the Catholic Church while keeping silent on the topic, although clergy-led blogs (especially those owned by foreigners) expressed concern (Gumo, Akuloba, and Omare, 2012: 33-34). The nature of the debate is also different between the two Christian denominations. Although Protestants spoke of principles and morals, Catholics had a more sophisticated approach: they sought legal remedies to avoid being trapped the biased positions that might oppress them. Therefore, some bloggers demand the abolition of dioceses based on national boundaries. They have called for an end to the sending of bishops to serve among their tribal communities (Parsitau, 2012: 4).

Bedasso, (2015: 363) provides a theoretical framework for describing the coexistence of political maturity and the ongoing vulnerability in societies such as Kenya. Gifford (2009: 31-32) and Parsitau (2012: 4-5) both state that Christian organizations were shocked by the post-election crisis. Their response was to request interviews and to accept victims of genocide, especially without discrimination. They also embarked on a campaign to reflect on their role in breeding the causes of disasters. Their share was very small. The conflict showed their weakness and their inability to influence politics. It is possible that in the short term their political voice will remain inaudible. This is not the case with Mungiki, a former Kenyan who was notorious for his neo-traditional practices (Chepkwony, 1999: 29-30).

2.8. Gramsci's Hegemony and Subaltern

2.8.1. Gramsci and Hegemony

Chakraborty, (2016: 23) thinks that Antonio Gramsci was not the first person to talk about hegemony. But, he is the one who expands the concept of hegemony. He states that the concept of hegemony was central to Antonio Gramsci's thought (Chakraborty, 2016: 24). He concludes that Gramsci was the first to state that hegemony is an essential element of the ruling human race to maintain power and authority (Chakraborty, 2016: 23).

Boothman (2008: 201) attempts to identify the main source of the theory, which evolved to influence the concept of hegemony as it was later developed by Gramsci in all prison Notebooks, from its first appearance in which "leadership" and "political nationalism" were used. the same. Gramsci's concept of hegemony is based on Marx's original text, an 1859 introduction to A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, which he translated into part of Notebook 7 which set out such work (Gramsci, 1975: 2358-2360). Boothman (2008: 202) states that to follow Gramsci's view of hegemony, the first question to be asked about the use of the word "hegemony" in socialist and then communist circles years before his arrest. . From the use of the Italian Socialist, here Boothman (2008: 201) notes that in the ten years Gramsci spent in Turin, the term was now used among Italian social workers. During this time, northern and eastern Adriatic control was more sensitive to Italian nationalism. From the fall of 1797 in the Republic of Doges until the founding of the Italian Empire, Venice was under Austrian control, but before that, it had for centuries controlled much of Almatia (the coast of present-day Slovenia and Croatia — a visible and convenient location. Venetian " pan-Italian "readable act as a Mediterranean language Franca is a remarkable example of linguistic hegemony (Gramsci, 1996: 75). he was born with it (Gramsci, 1992: 260-265) and the history of the sub-provinces described by hegemonic. Gramsci, 1995: 222-223).

Boothman, (2008: 203) states that Lenin provided a great view of the Gramsci concept of hegemony. Lenin as a theologian had been "in a state of organizational and political struggle, as well as political names... re-examined the premise of the cultural struggle and constructed the doctrine of hegemony as consistent with state theory as a force and as a modern approach. of the 1848 doctrine of "permanent revolution" '(Gramsci, 1995: 357).

Gundogan (2008: 45), in his article Concept of Hegemony on Antonio Gramsci's Southern Question and Prison Books, focuses on Gramsci's South Question and Prison Notebooks as he tries to show that he simply re-analyzes class strengths from economic relations to political

power, in other words. , the power of the ruling class developed from the state empire to the political flesh in the lines of ancient Marxist writings. Gundogan, (2008: 45) speculates that in Gramsci, hegemony refers not only to the ideological and cultural leadership of ruling parties and classes over co-operatives but also to coercion, coercion, and placing the interests of the ruling party over allies or rival parties. and classes. Gundogan (2008: 45) states that Gramsci attempts to eliminate dichotomies between power and consent, foundation and superstructure, and hegemony and domination. Gundogan (2008: 45) discusses the ideas of hegemony as developed by Antonio Gramsci on his sinategies for the world, civil society, and social sciences.

Lears (1985: 568) argues that Gramsci's translated texts do not have a precise interpretation of cultural history. He says that what comes into the room is Gramsci's often cited hegemony as a 'default' that is granted to the masses in the common sense imposed on public life by the ruling party — the permit is made 'historically' with respect (and the subsequent confidence) the ruling party enjoys production ”(Gramsci, 1971: 12). Lears (1985: 568) thinks that having a Gramsci “define” the concept in this way is just the beginning of revealing its value. According to Lears, (1985: 568), the process sounds like machines — the ruling parties set the direction in public life; subordinates are deceptively enticed to ride the "basic governing" speech.

Lears, (1985: 568) warns that it would be a mistake to break the above conclusion. He thinks the concept of cultural hegemony can be understood within a variety of historical and intellectual contexts. Therefore, relying on one “explanation” is misleading. Lears (1985: 568) argues that to give Gramsci his justice, we first need to realize that the concept of hegemony has little meaning unless it is combined with the idea of domination. Lears, (1985: 568) points out that, in Gramsci, consent and coercion are almost always together, although one or the other rules. To give an example of the tsarist empire he ruled primarily by domination — that is, by the domination of coercive instruments. Among the parliamentary states, only those who are weak are forced to rely on governance; they usually dominate through hegemony (Lears, 1985: 568).

Thomas (2009: 60) speculates that hegemony was originally a theory to explain and direct the proletariat in association with other subgroups; it was Gramsci's use of the concept to analyze the power of capitalism that was his unique contribution to the idea.

Mati (2020: 674) speculates that the Gramscian conception is a hegemonic competition and therefore politically motivated. He argues that development is also a political process as it involves power in the distribution of resources and value. He predicts that some African provinces, as elsewhere in the world, are trying to create and reproduce a policy environment that favors a “developmental” society while crippling those who are thought to be political (Mati, 2020: 674).

Russo, (2012: 1) points out that hegemony is a term that has a rich history of political and cultural consequences. Although this history may seem, in a sense, to us, that is, to a place that we have kept for a long time, because it is part of a powerful political and often astonishing political experience. Specifically, the logical definition of this concept as defined by Gramsci — has been a key element in the process of mass mobilization in the European Left liberation project (Russo, 2012: 1).

Russo, (2012: 1-2) states that hegemony can be understood as the opposite of populism, even if the matrix is problematic and productive— “a challenge”, in which both appear and want to invent it, respecting the same thing. That is why in the view of Russo (2012: 1), efforts to eliminate racial prejudice seem plausible. Russo, (2012: 1-2) speculates that hegemony is not only a “force that creates harmony”, according to its general form, but also that it can be targeted in a subtle sense, as a well-known place for political and institutional equality, and thus as the ability to distinguish between forms. and integrated, speech and behavioral control and attitude of various “related” objects (Russo, 2012: 1-2).

Enrique and Ramirez (2015: 117) state that, in Gramsci, hegemony is issued by the ruling class not only by coercion but also by consensus, by controlling the coercion of their worldview, cultural philosophy, and "common sense" that allows for recognition. of its rule by the ruling classes. Williams, (1977: 109) states that hegemony is not equal ... with ideas, the formation of consciousness of the ruling class is not reduced, but includes the relationship of domination and submission, according to ... practical consciousness configurations, as a successful saturation of life in full. Enrique and Ramirez (2015: 118) concluded that Gramsci's view of morality and intelligence or hegemony is based on morality as the most important factor in the development of a global system of human research.

According to Enrique and Ramirez (2015: 120), the word hegemony is derived from the Greek verb *eghesthai*, meaning “to drive”, “to be a guide”, “to be in charge”; or perhaps from the verb *emhemoneno*, which means “to direct”, “to precede”, “to drive”, and that is why “to stay

ahead”, “to command”, “to rule”. Enrique and Ramirez (2015: 120) state that, in common Greek, the word *termeghemonia* was understood as the supreme direction of the military. As a result, the name of the military, *Egemone* was a pilot, a commander, and a military commander. During the Peloponnesian War, they fought against Enrique and Ramirez (2015: 120), often referring to the city "hegemony", a city ruled by a coalition of Greek warring cities.

Enrique and Ramirez (2015: 120) think that the concept of hegemony, before being discovered by Antonio Gramsci, already has a long history. Knowledge of this history is important in gaining an understanding of the impact of this term quickly within the Cultural Study. They believe that Antonio Gramsci's idea of national fame was invented as part of an effort to restore hegemonic phase control in the proletariat service. In Gramsci, the idea of a national-popular rubric where intellectuals can join people, thus forming a powerful tool for building popular hegemony (Gramsci, 1975: 13-20). Wilson (2001: 28-32) states that the word *gegemonia* or hegemony was one of the most important political slogans in the Russian Social Democratic movement from late 1908 to 1917 (Wilson, 2001: 28-32).

Enrique and Ramirez (2015: 120) state that, following the October Revolution, hegemony as a term ceased to function in the newly formed USSR. They insisted that it survived, however, from the external publications of Communist International. According to Enrique and Ramirez (2015: 120), the term hegemony was first used in the first two conferences of the Third International, in which Lenin adopted a series of ideas that led to the international establishment of the concept of hegemony under Soviet Prism.

Salem (2020: 4) emphasizes that Gramsci's ideas provide a complex framework for analyzing social change and that his position as the Southern Italian Marxist and his attention to the inequalities produced at various levels enable him to contribute to the establishment of global capitalism. He argues that he found Gramsci's concept of hegemony a unique interpretation of what makes some political projects more efficient than others: the balance between consent and coercion, where consent is embedded within coercion (Salem, 2020: 4).

Salem (2020: 3) examines Gramsci's concept from the theory of mobility. However, his main interests are the binding arising from hegemony thinking about empire and anticolonialism. He argues that the realities of colonialism and post-colonialism, and thus especially the formation of colonial capitalism, raise certain questions about the absence or existence of hegemony. He shows that, in the way Gramsci travels to the colony and post-colonialism, his ideas are intertwined with certain crosses of historical/racial, and capitalist (Salem, 2020: 3). Salem,

(2020: 10) describes it as a process in which certain social forces transcend their minor interests to make their project universal in other social powers and subordinate groups. This social power is within the ruling class itself, but also in the subaltern classes.

Hegemony is a central concept in this dissertation, The concept of hegemony is closer to religion and politics in the Kenyan context. Applying the concept of hegemony helps to understand how governance is created, maintained, and challenged in Kenya (Bohm, 2018: 4).

Chacha (2010: 105), thinks Gramsci, regarded hegemony as powerful cultural domination rather than just physical coercion. He goes on to argue that, equally, counter-hegemony may be enhanced when those whom Gramsci calls biological thinkers formulate ideas and base them on the experiences of groups during the struggle for social and political change.

Daldal (2014: 149) states that in constructing their theories of power and ideas both Gramsci and Foucault applied Machiavelli's theory of "relations of force". Thus, they spread power relations across complex social systems. Therefore, power, according to Gramscian analysis remains in the imagination. In other words, recognizing the power of a complex social network where one sees oneself already producing energy. If a social group can change relationships and make them "common sense", it creates a hegemonic order (Daldal, 2014: 1).

Daldal (2014: 149) states that both Gramsci and Foucault apply Machiavelli's concept of "relations of force". Thus, they spread power relations across complex social systems. They are trying to use the "good analysis" of power. Power is not just a negative concept; productive power. In the case of Gramsci the power to produce ideas (and vice versa) and the power of Foucault to produce knowledge tools (Daldal, 2014: 166).

Kendie, (2006: 89) reviews existing literature in which Gramsci's ideas have been used as tools for social research and examine whether pre-industrial African societies fit his concept. As the reader will see soon, books on Africa are very limited. The three main themes highlight the arguments of African scholars. First of all, he points out, there are scholars like Robert Fatton, who shut themselves in: *How useful Gramsci's Theory of Hegemony and Domination*, published by State University, 2006 for the study of hegemony and domination in the post-colonial African state. Second, there are those historians, such as Roland Robinson, who have developed the theory, in this case, of coexistence, investigating hegemony standards and domination, but not limited to the colonial era. Third, there are those historians, including David Laitin and David Robinson, who insist that both were read in a coherent manner as a coherent whole. Naturally, the conflict between the three approaches seems to be "a kind of

fistfight,” with full potential. In writing this paper, I have the following objectives: First, to investigate the relevance of the practical assumptions of Gramsci's ideas on African realities, and then to suggest that there be an attempt to establish and present a theory and methodology. Second, to ensure that both historical periods are considered in an integrated manner to study long-term social change in Africa (Kendie, 2006: 89).

2.8.2. Gramsci and Subaltern

Beverley, (1999: 12) uses research to strengthen Gramsci's understanding of subaltern understanding. Chakraborty (2016: 25) speculates that Gramsci has a clear view that subaltern classes will recognize their ownership in the public sphere and transform it into a leading force. Thus, Green (2011: 391) argues that what John Beverley is trying to communicate with us is that, Gramsci has little or nothing to offer subaltern studies, given his Marxism and the alleged blurring of his subaltern pregnancy — or lack thereof. . . Spivak (2006: 324) presents another theological statement of "research" and emphasizes the point of how subaltern extends beyond "proletarian". He argues that Antonio Gramsci, incarcerated, used the word "subaltern" to represent the "proletarian", to escape prison censors. But the term quickly cleared the space, as the words would, and took on the task of analyzing what the "proletarian", produced by capital logic, could not combine "(Spivak, 2006: 324).

Green, (2002: 8) states that, like many of Gramsci / s ideas and concepts, he analyzes the subaltern in certain historical contexts — his approach is almost identical to that of Machiavelli in the sense that he analyzes history to find evidence. of norms, tendencies, and certain patterns. Buttigieg, (1992: 48) points out that, Gramsci incorporates specific events, pieces of information, and observations, across all notebooks, to support and draw conclusions and general theories (Buttigieg, 1992: 48). Green, (2002: 8) states that Gramsci in Notebook 3 states that it is the scholar's job to incorporate and narrate new pieces of evidence in his theory and, if the evidence does not fit the theory, the scientist must change his mind.

Green (2011: 393) thinks that Gramsci did not develop the concept of subaltern social groups outside the boundaries of prison testing; but it is one of the earliest ideas that emerged from his extensive and open research into Italian politics, culture, and history. Like many concepts in Prison Literature, Gramsci does not attempt to provide an accurate description of subordinate groups (Green, 2011: 393).

Green (2002: 1) states that Gramsci's view of the subaltern is often misunderstood and misused — this is because many English scholars and critics of Gramsci's work have relied heavily on

or especially in the Election of Quintin Hoare and Geoffery Smith from the Prison Book. , 1971). The selection includes a few Gramsci notes in the subaltern and because the notes appear in the Gramsci notes section in Italian Risorgimento and fall under the heading "Notes of Italian History," it seems Gramsci's interest in the subaltern, as a concept, is related to his Risorgimento research, while Gramsci's interest in the subaltern is part of his extensive research into Italian history, politics, culture, and the relationship between state and society (Green, 2002: 1).

Green (2011: 387) states that Antonio Gramsci's writing has been endorsed as one of the major influences on the development of a series of books on Subaltern Studies and a research project. Green (2011: 387) speculates that, although Gramsci is often regarded as the first advisor to Subaltern Studies — the field of subaltern studies incorporates a variety of ideas, theoretical guidance, and more subjects than a labeling label. Green, (2011: 393) states that Gramsci did not develop the concept of social groups under pressure from prison inspections — it was one of the first ideas that emerged from his extensive and open-ended political, Italian, and historical research. Green, (2011: 393) points out that, Like many concepts in Prison Books, Gramsci does not attempt to provide an accurate description of subordinate groups.

Louai (2012: 4) reverses historical development and the new effects of one of the most controversial ideas in post-colonial theory. Louai (2012: 4) states that the study of the subaltern concept begins with the first definitions of the concept as originally used by the Italian Marxist political activist Antonio Gramsci in his well-known book Prison Notebooks. Louai, (2012: 4) argues that post-colonial theory as the most recent field of research has recently become the most fascinating field of study — if not called discipline — resulting in endless and numerous books written by art critics, social reformers, political scientists, literary critics, as well as political economists. Louai (2012: 4) states that one of the most recent phases of post-colonial theory was the Subaltern Studies Group or Subaltern Studies Collective founded in the 1980s by a group of prominent Indian scholars.

Louai (2012: 5) suggests that restoring the concept of the subaltern to its historical development as Gramsci first came into play is very necessary before attempting to link it to current developments in our recent times. He suggests that the idea of subalternity was first referred to by the Italian Marxist political activist Antonio Gramsci in his article “Notes on Italian History” which later appeared as part of his famous book Prison Notebooks written between 1929 and 1935 (Louai). , 2012: 5).

Louai, (2012) argues that Gramsci's theory is of great help to any reader who comes to understand the origin of subaltern theory because it tends to separate itself from the "mechanistic" and economistic form that gradually expresses the majority of Marxists. traditional studies. Do you think subaltern classes refer primarily to Gramsci's words to any "lower class" or a group of people in a particular community who suffer under the rule of a ruling class that deprives them of the basic rights to participate in local history and culture as active people of the same race (Louai, 2012: 5).

Green (2013: 116) states that Antonio Gramsci's view of subalternity is one of his major contributions to social and political thought. Thus, he acquired a class of subalternity to identify and analyze the social groups under which their political activity was neglected, distorted, or marginalized in prominent history. Thus, Gramsci conceived subalternity based on race, culture, and religion — other factors (Green, 2013: 116). However, Green (2013: 116) argues that many scholars have interpreted the meaning of the word "subaltern" in the Prison Book only partially, affirming the term "proletariat", which includes a prison investigation (Beverly). 2004; Brennan, 2006; Chaturvedi, 2007; Spivak, 1992, 2000). Some have argued that Gramsci did not write about race, ethnicity, or race (Hall, 1986), that race was not Gramsci's main concern (Mignolo 2012), and that his "untested" ideas perpetuated racial opposition (Wilderson, 2003).). Green (2013: 116) argues that such interpretations ignore the complex nature of Gramsci's understanding of non-exchange and how social and political factors, such as race and religion, are reflected in his analysis.

Green (2011: 388) emphasizes that the concept of the subaltern is a major part of Gramsci's critical investigation of power and political relations and the work of social groups that were ignored in Italian history (Green, 2011: 388). Green (2015: 256) considers that, In Prison Literature, Gramsci makes a critical analysis of subordinate groups, by examining their circumstances, the factors that cause their submission, their attitudes, culture, and the level of advertising of a political party. By trying to identify the factors that empower and prevent subaltern groups from changing their circumstances (Green, 2015: 256). Green (2015: 256) states that Gramsci argued that, unchanging political struggles are often seen automatically, which, according to Gramsci, is a contributing factor to inefficiency and, at the same time, retractable aspects of subordinate occupations (Gramsci, 1996: 48).

2.6. Ethnic Hegemony and Political Power in Kenya

Shilaho (2018) traces the discriminatory alteration of successive Kenyan governments in the process of separating and ruling British colonies. However, he says post-colonial Kenyan politicians mixed fairly and racistly for the sake of profit because they preserved a racist and divisive country Shilaho (2018: 1). Kenya's racial politics was not predetermined. He thinks that the central government, the lack of a system of a controlled political party and the absence of law enforcement politics, and the persistence of special politics, attract racism almost inevitably (Shilaho, 2018: 1). Kanyinga (2014: 85), however, states that, during the liberation struggle, KANU and Kenyatta announced that they would establish a socialist state with a more equitable social and economic distribution. However, after independence, the economy was more focused on capitalism and foreign investment, which enhanced Kikuyu hegemony (Gachanga, 2012: 3-4), appropriately, as Omulo (2017: 25-26) puts it, this resulted in "Racism."

Meredith (2011: 156) while referring to Africa in general, gives insight into the transformation of the Kenyan paradigm from the concept of national ownership to international credibility. You can see that in the first pre-independence elections, African political elites practiced politics about land ownership, thus running for office regardless of race or ethnicity. In contrast, the issue of access to state funds in the form of a lack of resources increases political risk. The result was that some politicians abandoned policy-oriented politics and turned to lobbying for electoral support (Meredith, 2011: 156). Meredith asserted that politics had taken the form of racism because of the lack of class distinctions between African societies (Meredith, 2011: 156). I agree with Shilaho (2018: 3) that, racism was justified under the multi-party democracy in Kenya because politicians compete with the country's resources in a society where there is integration between rural and urban areas. As a result, the public exerted a powerful influence on the government, which put these at risk of racially motivated politics. It has made it difficult for politicians to develop other foundations of a political party such as the sect (Shilaho, 2018: 3).

Shilaho (2018: 3) argues that the link between race and African politics was an educational issue long before many African countries adopted multi-party politics (Shilaho, 2018: 3). He predicts that racial domination and division among the first generation of Kenyan political officials in power have had two important consequences. It led to the assassination of Tom Mboya and the political discrimination of Oginga Odinga, both politicians of the Luo subaltern party (Shilaho, 2018: 3). Mboya, a brilliant politician, played a key role in Odinga's political

ouster by Kenyatta's supporters. These two political leaders are fighting for political supremacy within the Luo subaltern (Shilaho, 2018: 3).

Conclusion

The thematic literature covered the following areas: Relationship between Religion and Politics in Kenya; Religion and Politics in Africa; Ethno-politics in Kenya; Ethnic and Political Hegemony in Kenya; Ethno-Religious Politics in Kenya; Gramsci and Civil Society; Religion-Civil society and Partisan Politics in Kenya; and Gramsci's Hegemony and Subaltern.

The exact number of ethnic groups in Kenya is a contested issue. We have also learned that the tendency of deploying ethnic identities prevails also in Christian churches. The situation has deprived African churches and Kenyan churches in particular of the ability to promote social justice.

Antonio Gramsci was not the first person to speak about hegemony. But, he was the one who broadened the idea of hegemony. He posits that the idea of hegemony was the central theme of Antonio Gramsci's thought. He maintains that Gramsci was the first person to say that hegemony is an essential element for a ruling class of people to maintain its authority and power. According to Gramsci civil society performs a democratic role—consensus and support are generated through debates and discussion. the concept of the subaltern is a major component of Gramsci's critical investigation of the forces and relations of politics and activity of marginalized social groups in Italian history. Undertakes a critical analysis of subaltern groups, by examining their conditions, factors contributing to their subordination, their modes of thoughts, culture, and level of political organization.

CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSING CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE IN KENYA THROUGH A GRAMSCIAN LENS

3.0 Introduction

The concept of civil society is the focus of the current debate on democracy and democratization. In Africa, the authoritarian character of postcolonial states is emphasized by their dominance in civil society. States tend to justify this rule, as rapid economic growth and nation-building demands do not allow individuals or groups to adapt to opposition).

Many changes have occurred in Kenya since the 1990s. The economy has become more liberal, multiculturalism has taken hold, and since 1992 there have been five relatively successful multi-party elections. Introducing a new player that dramatically changes the style of power (Matanga, 2000: 6).

Okello (2010) states that civil society organizations (CSOs), widely defined as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches and professional organizations, grassroots organizations, and trade unions, have contributed to the push for political change. Despite their lack of similarity (Okello, 2010: 199). According to Maingi (2016), Community Based Organizations (CSOs) are key players in any regional development agenda. They play a vital role in social, economic, and political life. He emphasized that for any country to grow economically, it would require a large number of participating CSOs in many, if not all, sectors. The efficiency and effectiveness of these CSOs can easily turn any social economy upside down (Maing, 2016: 3).

Okello (2010) thinks that in Kenya from the 1980s to the present, civil society organizations have been used extensively in addressing anti-state relations. It is thought that only those organizations and organizations that face challenges are the only state power that includes society (Okello, 2010: 199, 201).

The value of in-depth discussion of civil society, which preceded the fragmentation of tangible manifestations and implications of patron-clientelism in Kenya, makes the following argument: a) patron-clientelism is a single institution within a set of institutions, relationships, and

organizations comprising 'community organization in Kenya. b) Institutions, organizations, and relationships that include civil society organizations in Kenya are considered as — that is, considered as part of society — because of their political affiliation. c) The political agency represented by processes within a civil society organization does more to expose civil society than the reality of these processes taking place in the "private sector", a distinct place in the political community. d) Because civil society organizations are more recognizable based on the work that is done with them it than where that work takes place, the institutions that are part of it, the organizations, and the relationships at the same time reflect and define it. If these points are true, patron-clientelism can be used to understand Kenyan society, its environment, how it interacts with the private and public sectors, and the direction of the leading political agency within it.

At a deeper level, the activities and processes undertaken by civil society reflect not only the social reality but also political domination dominated by the basic social group and its additional groups, i.e., the state, political officials, and mixed ethnic groups. Thus, patron clientelism is an institution that simultaneously reflects the reality and status of Kenyan society, as well as the general state of political domination. This is a great theme for this category. For elaboration, Antonio Gramsci's public model will be relied upon as a guide.

In this chapter, I study Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and intellectuals in an accessible way. In my discussion of hegemony, I explore its origins and point out that other ideas such as the passive revolution, society, state, historic bloc organic crisis connect and relate to Kenyan society. In exploring the concept of intellectuals, I begin by discussing the meaning and imaginary functions and youth that Gramsci does not say to intellectuals and continue to explore his subdivision of intellectuals into categories such as natural, traditional, urban, rural, and collective.

3.1. Background to the Origin of the Concept of Civil Society: A Brief History

3.1.1. General understanding of Civil Society

Mahajan, (1999: 1188) speculates that in our modern social and political theory society is always connected to democracy. However, there are still significant differences of opinion about what societies are and how they are directly related to democracy (Mahajan, 1999: 1188). In some theories, civil society organizations represent non-state organizations — organizations that limit state power at the same time allowing individuals and groups in society to control their affairs (Mahajan, 1999: 1188).

According to Kanyinga (2011: 3), civil society is not the same — it includes non-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations that organize without government control. Working in this area are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) doing development work, community-based organizations (CBOs), religious or religious organizations (FBOs), trade unions, and professional organizations (Kanyinga, 2011: 3). Thus, these many interests also suggest that there may be divisions, especially concerning the involvement of the political community (Kanyinga, 2011: 3). Mahajan, (1999: 1188), introduces another view of society. He states that civil society is where the human condition is the existence of the law (Mahajan, 1999: 1188).

3.1.2. Individual Rights as the Foundation of Civility

Colas (1997) assumes that in the 13th century when the established Catholic Church exerted great power in social and political life, the concept of "societas civilis" was coined to express an environment that had no papal influence, and was governed by laws, not from God (Colas, 1997: 9-21). Colas (1997) argues that civil society organizations point to the autonomy of the historical place through the church. In the social sphere, people had the right to choose their king and to be governed by laws that followed the shared interests of the people (Colas, 1997: 9-21).

Mahajan (1999: 1188) speculates that the term society became part of the political dialogue in the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe. He argues that at this point the clergy has used this concept to describe a type of democracy based on the rights of citizens (Mahajan, 1999: 1188).

The 17th-century scholars brought the public to the forefront of the debate because human rights were of paramount importance to them. According to Charrabarty (2016), Hobbes believed that the state was naturally violent. Imagine that people are naturally competitive and selfish and will try to increase their power and, thus, destroy themselves. There were no laws like the land and people could do whatever they wanted. There was no authority for self-determination. To achieve peace as a state, Hobbes has provided a solution — people will relinquish their rights (excluding the right to life) to independence that according to Hobbes is a Monster (Chakrabarty, 2016: 20).

Tok (2003: 239) states that the concept of 'society' is one of Gramsci's most controversial ideas. Gramsci describes society as "a group of living beings often referred to as independent" and compares it to a political society or state (Tok, 2003: 239).

3.2. Gramsci's Concept of State and Civil Society

3.2.1. An Introduction to Gramsci

Antonio Gramsci was a Marxist. Born in Sardinia, Italy, in 1891, Gramsci was a philosopher and political activist who played a key role in the formation of the Italian Communist Party in 1921. Under the pretext of assassinating Mussolini, the Italian Fascist government called for an emergency in 1926 to suppress opposition groups. Gramsci was imprisoned from 1922 to 1926, during which time he wrote his young work, Prison Letters, on which much of the following work was based. Gramsci is regarded as one of the leading inventors of Western Marxist ideology, second only to the dignity of Marx himself (Warner, 2009: 6).

Antonio Gramsci was a philosopher and politician whose dissatisfaction with peer pressure and the economic and social divisions among the people of Northern and Southern Italy brought him to study of relations and political activism (Gramsci, 1992: 87). Building on Marx, Gramsci focused on capitalism as a historically diverse economic system in which social and class relations between the system were based on historical structures (Gramsci, 1992: 87).

Burawoy, (2003) considers Gramsci's writings in prison to be inseparable from the political experiences of both Sardinia and Turin. In a sense, his pre-prison writings went from theory to theory, while those who were imprisoned began in the doctrine of realism, and political consequences (Burawoy, 2003: 203-205).

Gramsci was the first leader of the Italian Communist Party in the 20s. He introduced the idea of hegemony or leadership ideology and public morality, to explain how the ruling party maintained its position and argued that the proletariat should develop its own 'counter-hegemony' (or a different set of ideologies) to gain public leadership. from capitalism (Warner, 2009: 6).

The English publication of prison textbooks in 1971 sparked another wave of interest and allowed for a deeper study and analysis of Gramsci's work in the Anglophone world. In the 1980s, Gramsci's work became popular in the field of cultural studies and continued to supply interested scholars with energy questions. Currently, Gramsci is considered one of the most

influential Marxist philosophers. His special contribution to Marxism was incorporated into his goal of promoting traditional Marxism without economic determination (Morton 2007: 1).

Gramsci's ideas are developed in pieces and pieces throughout the prison textbooks. One can identify appropriate, or not, linear themes, such as important status, community, power, history blog, continuous change, intellectual, and international work (Böhm, 2018): 28).

3.2.2. Gramsci and Civil Society

Böhm, (2018) suggests that, for us to make sense of Gramsci's extended notion of integral state, the concept of civil society has to be clarified" (Böhm, 2018:30). In Gramsci (2010), civil society is presented as "ethical content of the State" (Gramsci, 2010:208). At times Gramsci adopts Marx's usage of the term which includes economic relations: "The State is the instrument for conforming civil society to the economic structure" (Gramsci, 2010: 208). Böhm (2018) postulates that, by defining civil society as one clear concept is not the main aim, Gramsci rather emphasizes the relationship between state and civil society (Böhm, 2018:30). The relationship between the state and civil society is described by an example of Russia and the West: "In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed" (Gramsci 2010:238). Civil society is part of the state, but it is not essentially within or dependent on the state itself, nor is the state only made up out of civil society (Bohm, 2018: 30).

Civil society provides the "primary sphere of existence and operation for subaltern groups" (Gramsci 2010: 52). Subalternity is defined as "the ability to use politics to promote one's interest" and also as a signifier for a lack of polity autonomy of the state (Gramsci, 2010:52). A lack of political autonomy appears through a lack of conformism which is essential to maintain a shared common sense of a group (Gramsci, 2010:324). If the belonging of members of one group diverges, regarding traditional practices and beliefs, fragmented subaltern groups develop within civil society creating a variety of common sense ascribed to each group (Gramsci, 2010: 324; Howson - Smith, 2008: 4).

An attempt to characterize political and socio-economic circumstances in places like Kenya to understand strategies of the dominant fundamental groups to sustain them—and revolutionary

strategy to oppose them—first require space-centric analysis.² In other words, one must realize how the process of defending the status quo by dominant fundamental groups shapes environments from which dissention might be articulated (Preisig, 2019: 3). This essentially involves consideration of civil society, a notion of political space tracing back to Aristotle, which in the broadest terms is understood as an environment involving associations and non-governmental organisations with political significance (Preisig, 2019: 3).

Preisig, (2019) postulates that Gramsci viewed civil society as a realm interrelated with political society (government) with the potential to either complement or oppose political leadership by the dominant fundamental groups. It is the sphere in which dissent to existing relations of hegemony can be articulated so that consent to the dominant fundamental groups is redirected. Civil society understood based on political agency attributable to institutions within it, reflects the influence and interests of Kenya's hegemonic fundamental groups—i.e., the political elite, influential ethnic groups, etc. (Preisig, 2019: 3).

On the other hand, civil society in Kenya also represents a space from which the possibility for re-education emerges, so that a culture critical of existing socio-economic and political circumstances can be cultivated and hegemonic reconfiguration can be realized (Preisig, 2019: 3-4).

Equally important, alongside any conversation involving Gramsci's civil society, is consideration of the cultural frame of mind institutions like patron-clientelism solidify in support of the hegemonic fundamental groups. In other words, greater understanding is needed for ideas and norms people associate with the political process in Kenya because of their entrenchment in institutions like patron-clientelism. Understanding the general popular frame of mind toward politics, manipulated by fundamental groups to sustain their hegemony, is essential to realize how these ideas can be redirected to enable the reconfiguration of economic and political circumstances (Preisig, 2019: 4).

The importance of Gramsci's views on civil society for the interpretation of contemporary politics in Kenya lies in the fact that Gramsci discusses civil society, not as a separate sphere, as is the main tendency in Kenya, but rather within the context of a complex web of relations between civil society and the state (Juma, 2008: 12-13). In other words, the liberal accounts in

² Space-Centric analysis relates to consideration of how environments shape political behaviour. In this case of Kenya this relates to the way civil society either empowers dissent or solidifies existing political and socio-economic structures (Preisig, 2019:3).

which the borders of the state and civil society are strictly defined and, the state is supposed to refrain from extensive intervention into civil society (Gramsci, 1971: 12, 159-160). On the contrary, Gramsci focuses on the conditional nature of these relations and emphasises that the relations between civil society and the state might develop in opposition to the state in one context, while in other contexts the state might refer to the totality of civil society and political society, or the state might even be identified with civil itself (Gramsci, 1992: 88-89).

Chakraborty (2016) contends that it is very difficult to trace the idea of “civil society” in Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks*. Sometimes it is clear and evident when he is speaking about civil society or state but in many cases, Gramsci does not mention the word “civil society” exactly but he adds an element of thought to the broad idea (Chakraborty, 2016: 22).

Gramsci did not invent new terms or concepts. Rather, he used existing terminology such as “hegemony”, “intellectuals” and “passive revolution” which people were *au fait* with and he expanded and developed these terms. Sassoon (1990) confirms this in her statement that Gramsci tends to use:

ordinary or traditional words to signify something new and, further, he often uses a word both in a traditional way and in a novel and sometimes an almost absurd manner (Sassoon, 1990:16).

This is one of the reasons why Gramsci’s writings are very difficult to understand, for one is uncertain in any given context as to whether he has used a term in a conventional way or in his innovative and expanded sense. Ives (2004) argues:

This method of refusing to coin new jargon – “neolalim” is the term Gramsci uses – is a prescient strategy that fits Gramsci’s political argument very well. Just as he does not want rural peasants to adopt a language imposed on them from somewhere else, he does not want

readers to adopt a new set of terms that are defined outside of their usage Gramsci then works to alter such concepts, organizing them, making them richer in meaning, comparing them to other ‘language games’, to borrow Wittgenstein’s term. And this process does not occur in abstract, philosophical reasoning, but with historical examples and concrete situations (Ives, 2004: 65).

3.2.3. Gramsci’s Hegemony and State

According to Gramsci's theory of hegemony, “the hegemony is a concept that may explain at least two things: firstly, how the apparatus of the state or a political society can lead strongly the various strata of society to accept the status quo, through legal institutions, the police, soldiers and prisoners, secondly, and this is more significant to this paper, how and where the

political society, as well as civil society, with all its institutions at their disposal, ranging from educational institutions, religions, and family up to the production of meaning and value of the product, directing and confirming agreement forms 'spontaneously' various strata of society with the status quo” (Kasiyarno, 2014:19 see also (Holub, 1992: 5).

For us to understand Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, “in so far as it pertains our predicament here, one must begin by acknowledging the double sense of hegemony in Gramsci (Vahabzadeh, 2008:107). Hegemony according to Gramsci, refers to a state of “affairs that involves governance, but it also signifies the moment of political reinstitution society” (Gramsci, 2010: 324). In both senses of the term is heavily influenced by Machiavelli, “although the genealogy of the concept can be (remotely) traced back, despite Gramsci’s acknowledgment, to Lenin and the Second International” (Gramsci, 2010: 324).

Gramsci applied the idea of hegemony in line with ideology to analyse how social classes come to dominate society without coercion (Böhm, 2018: 34). Gramsci claims that we need to look beyond the state and the economy by incorporating social order and non-state actors into the analysis (Gramsci, 2010). The insight is based on a close examination of historical moments. Gramsci organizes politics and ideology in the concept of hegemony (Böhm, 2018: 34).

Some Scholars also argued that life experiences “played an important role in the making of Gramsci's political philosophy” (Daldal, 2014:155). The experience of dictatorship supported by much of the working class is one of those important experiences which pushed him to revise the Marxist-Leninist theory of State,” adding some new concepts such as "the bourgeois hegemony in civil society" (Daldal, 2014:155).

Gramsci defines the State as "the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules" (Daldal, 2014: 156). For Gramsci, the State has an "educative" and "formative" function. The main problem of the State is to incorporate the will of every single individual into the collective will turning their necessary consent and collaboration from "coercion" to "freedom" (Gramsci, 2010: 242). This means that the State functions to create "conformist" citizens who internalize the most restrictive aspects of the "civil life", and accept them as their natural "duties" without having any resentment. The major instrument of the State in creating a new type of civilization and disseminating certain attitudes is the Law (Daldal, 2014:156).

The concept of hegemony, though it can be found in Marxist literature, is commonly associated with Gramsci's *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (1971:12). The text was written and its notion formulated while Gramsci was confined in Mussolini's prison between 1929 and 1935. Given the difficult conditions under which he wrote it, Gramsci avoided straightforward Marxist terminologies. For example, instead of "Marxism" he used the term "philosophy of praxis," and instead of "Karl Marx," Gramsci preferred "the founder of the philosophy of praxis" (Gramsci, 2010:12). By introducing new terminologies to Marxism, Gramsci seems to accomplish two things (besides avoiding the prison censor): First, he allows his reader to more than one reading of his text without sacrificing the complexities and uniqueness of the question addressed. Second, he provided a new meaning to the old, conventional aspects of Marxism. As mentioned before, Gramsci wrote the text while in prison under great stress. His works are, therefore, seen as "notebooks" or "drafts" of a future book (Anderson, 1976: 5-6). Accordingly, the notebooks or drafts contain contradictions, assumptions, ambiguity, and numerous theoretical presuppositions that Gramsci was unable to resolve. In other words, there could be more than one way to "read" Gramsci. Before we provide a working definition of hegemony, however, it is important to discuss the context in which Gramsci developed the concept (Warner, 2009: 6-7).

It is important to keep in mind that Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony concerning the State in a specific historical period, that of the monopoly and dominance of finance capitalism and imperialism (Anderson, 1976: 5-6). It was also formulated at the time of the consolidation of socialism in the Soviet Union and the response to a fierce debate among the European Marxists about the drift of the Soviet Union towards totalitarianism under Stalin; all these events influenced Gramsci's work, as did the defeat of European working-class movements that failed to seize state power in many countries (Warner, 2009: 6-7).

Political society refers to the institutions of the state proper – the parliament, the bureaucracy, the judicial system, the armed forces, and the police. Political society exerts the means of coercion and dominance through fraud, legitimate applications of violence and the "liquidation" of antagonistic groups (Gramsci, 2012:263). Seedeem theorizes that here Gramsci borrows from Machiavelli's (2012) *The Prince* and his discussion on the Centaur – half-man (civil society) and half-beast (political society) (Seedeem, 2020:38). When political society and civil society work together as a united front hegemony is willingly applied to the masses as 'leadership' and the ideological goals of the ruling classes are internalized to the point that their ideology is accepted widely (Seedeem, 2020: 38). Yet the beast (political society) must be

ready to squash antagonistic groups and apply various forms of force, coercion, fraud, or propaganda to maintain control. If hegemony is deeply ingrained in society, the act of liquidating threats will be legitimately supported by the masses as they perceive it as serving their interests (Seedeen, 2020: 38). This is essentially a “consent relationship.” However, the so-called consent is neither given nor is it fixed. It is riddled with contradictions and rifts, and it is subject to subversion and resistance from the subordinate classes or, to—borrow from Gramsci, the “subaltern classes” (Gramsci, 2012:44).

Therefore, for Gramsci, consent and coercion, hegemony and domination, are intrinsically linked. While hegemony might imply the absence of coercive forms of domination, including the application of repression and fraud, there are times when the application of coercive forms of domination are necessary under hegemony, especially when addressing antagonistic groups – “hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci, 2012: 263). According to Gramsci, the state is “therefore understood not simply as the political apparatuses of the government but the combined projections of consent from state institutions (political society) and private organizations (civil society) (Gramsci, 2012:263). Whideen contends that “by focusing on the state as a collective union of political society’s elements (parliament, bureaucracy, judicial system, armed forces, and police), without consideration of other actors in civil society, many scholars have provided a limited and rigid understanding of states, which has not recognised politically-situated and ever-evolving relational form in which states develop and operate” (Seedeen, 2020: 38-39). As Gramsci puts it ‘it would be wrong to think that this unity is simply judicial and political...the fundamental historical unity, concretely, results from the organic relations between State or political society and “civil society” (Gramsci, 2012:52).

Seedeen postulates that for Gramsci, the state “takes on an active ideological role in achieving consent through the role of organic intellectuals in internalizing and representing the interests of the ruling group” (Seedeen, 2020: 39). Political society or state-based institutions maintain legitimacy with the masses and survive times of crisis because organic intellectuals defend their function and purpose (Gramsci, 2012: 52). Such groups are vital in times of crisis; it is only when organic intellectuals fail in their ideological message that the state will resort to more blatant forms of domination, repression, and fraud. In under-developed states, when civil society is quite weak, revolutions from either the Left or the Right are possible, as in the case of the Bolsheviks in 1917 Russia and the Fascists in 1922 Italy (Gramsci, 2012: 52).

The notion of ‘hegemony’ is rooted in Gramsci’s distinction between coercion and consent as alternative mechanisms of social power (Fusaro, 2010: 5). Coercion refers to the State’s

capacity for violence, which it can use against those who refuse to participate in capitalist relations of production (Fusaro, 2010: 5).

Hegemony according to Gramsci, is somewhat complicated and underdeveloped. It is also worth noting that his main empirical example of the development of hegemony, the emergence of the Italian state, is an instance of hegemonic failure (Gramsci, 2010:58-59). Riley (2011) reasons that one of Gramsci's central messages is that hegemonies are created during revolutionary experiences in which a single social class comes to embody the interests of society as a whole (Riley, 2011:15).

Riley posits that it is particularly important to distinguish between two forms of hegemony. One form of hegemony refers to intra-class relations, and a second refers to inter-class relations (Riley, 2011:15). When Gramsci speaks of the ruling class of unified Italy he writes:

The formation of this class involved the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods that varied in their effectiveness, of the active elements produced by allied groups—and even of those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile. (Gramsci, 2010: 58-59).

Riley also contends that hegemony, according to Gramsci, can be exercised on allied groups or hostile groups (Riley, 2011:16). He argues that, for schematic purposes, it is useful to designate the first sort of hegemony intra-class hegemony and the second sort of inter-class hegemony (Riley, 2011:16). Therefore, these two dimensions of hegemony are linked for Gramsci: the structure of internal or intra-class hegemony has consequences for the ability of a group to pursue external or inter-class hegemony (Riley, 2011:16).

By contrast, hegemonic power works to convince individuals and social classes to subscribe to the social values and norms of an inherently exploitative system. It is a form of social power that relies on voluntarism and participation, rather than the threat of punishment for disobedience (Gramsci, 2012: 134).

3.2.4. Gramsci's Historic Blocs

Morton theorizes that a historic bloc³ is an alliance between social class forces. An alliance of social class forces, or a historical bloc at the national level consists of a social group that holds hegemony over subordinate groups (Morton 2007:78).

³ Historic bloc is used interchangeably with historical bloc and does not imply different meanings.

According to Morton, the concept of a historic or historical bloc has two meanings. In the first instance, it enjoins the two spheres of the economic base and the political superstructure (Morton (2007: 96-97). As Gramsci argues, “structures and superstructures form a ‘historical bloc’. “The complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production” (Gramsci, 2012:366). The concept of the historical bloc is important because it refers to a moment during the process of change that indicates that a political party has been built, and is seeking to establish hegemony. To do that, Gramsci argues that, this social class, through its political party, has to organize other social classes and political parties as well to take part in their wider political, and economic alliance, which in theory by Gramsci called a “historical bloc” (Gramsci, 2012:366). In that process, the organic intellectuals of the political party and the social class also play a fundamental role in producing the persuasive ideas and arguments needed in convincing other classes to be a part of their historical bloc, hence their upcoming hegemony (Morton, 2007: 132).

Gill assumes that a historical bloc “refers to a historical congruence between material forces, institutions, and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements” (Gill, 2002:58). Moreover, he also argues that for a new historical bloc to emerge, its leaders must engage in consciously planned struggle. Furthermore, any new historical bloc “must have not only power within the civil society and economy, but it also needs persuasive ideas, arguments, and initiatives that build on, catalyze and develop its political networks and organization – not political parties such” (Gill, 2002:58).

However, as Sassoon rightly points out that, “a historical bloc is not to be reduced to a mere political alliance since it assumes a complex construction within which there can be sub-blocs such as, for example, an agrarian bloc, a complex formation of its right, and an industrial bloc, each of these containing different elements and potential contradictions” (Sassoon, 1987:121). Subsequently, historical bloc can produce “various political blocs made up of different combinations of political allies which nonetheless maintain the general configuration of the fundamental historical bloc.” (Sassoon, 1987:121).

Sassoon proposes that the political party, the historical bloc, and the hegemony are interconnected instruments in Gramsci’s thought through which a socio-political change can be realized. She explains that the historical bloc “in implying necessarily the existence of

hegemony also implies that to create a new historical bloc alternative to the existing one, the new, progressive class must create its hegemonic apparatuses. How the working class can do this, according to Gramsci, is through the party” (Sassoon, 1987:123-124).

3.2.5. Gramsci and Integral State

Morton (2007) postulates that Gramsci was concerned with the particularities of state formation. According to him, Gramsci's writing emphasizes class struggle in the process of constituting the Italian state with the emergence of the international system of states throughout Europe (Morton, 2007: 40).

Böhm (2018) posits that, even though “Gramsci was highly concerned with the “state”, he did not formulate a complete conception of the state but instead he provides a variety of ideas and questions” (Böhm, 2018: 29). As Morton (2007) argues, Gramsci formulates “an alternative conception of the state that was identified with the struggle over hegemony in civil society.” (Gramsci, 2010: 208). Therefore, according to Gramsci, the state is the “entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules (Gramsci, 2012: 244).

Morton (2007) reasons that Gramsci by “incorporating political and civil aspects creates an extended notion of state that which Gramsci termed ‘integral state’”(Morton, 2007:88-89). An integral state in that sense means a combination of dictatorship and hegemony, heavily relying on the notion of civil society, “in the sense that one might say that Stae = political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci, 2012: 239, 263).

Morton (2007) theorizes that, according to Gramsci. Dictatorship relates to the realm of political society which aims at enforcing ideas through coercion, utilising the mode of production; whereas hegemony relates to civil society’s aim to obtain consent (Morton, 2007: 89). Howson - Smith, (2008) postulates that the integral sate ‘serves as a broad structure and represents hegemony as never simply the independent operations of political power” (Howson - Smith, 2008:3). According to Böhm (2018), this conceptualizationn of the state “allows a broader view of the working of power within a territory which is not bound by government domination but also shows power exercised through civil society” (Böhm, 2018:29-30).

Femia (2010:24) defines hegemony as “an order in which a common social-moral language is spoken, in which one concept of reality is dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of thought and behaviour.” Consequently, to appreciate Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, as defined by Femia above, there is also a need to contend with his (Gramsci’s) definition of a state. Gramsci criticized the liberals’ understanding of the state as “an apparatus of government” that is separate from other social spheres as too narrow. According to Jacques Texier, this definition views the state as an autonomous social entity identifiable exclusively with politics of force and violence (Texier, 1979: 51). Gramsci argues for an alternative definition of the state centred on the notion of “the integral state.” Accordingly, a state according to Gramsci (2010), combines “not only the apparatus of government but also the “private” apparatus of “hegemony” or civil society” (Gramsci, 2012: 261).

Kang (2016) contends that Gramsci’s theory of the integral state is the basis for understanding why an ideal-typical hegemony is, characteristically, unattainable and therefore why coercion is always the necessary counterpart of hegemonic consent (Kang, 2016: 4).

Kang speculates that what is problematic with this formulation is that it disregards the fact that the state plays a central role in the formation and maintenance of ideological consent/hegemony even in the West (Kang, 2016: 2). According to him the imperialist expansion of the European nation-states in the late 19th and early 20th centuries required an internal ideological consistency within the nation-state. Or it can be said that bourgeoisies in the European nations actively exploited the state apparatuses to form ideological consent and displace conflicts from their national boundaries to the international terrain, without which it is hard to understand the appearance of Nazism and European fascism, and the theme of the national popular will (Kang, 2016:2). Even in the 1920s and 1930s, which mark a turning point in the crisis of Marxism, the role of the state does not so much shrink or diminish as intensify in the formation of national consent, as is indicated by Braudel’s famous formulation that “capitalism only triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the state” (Kang, 2016:2).

Setting aside the problem of reformism, what is at issue with Gramsci’s first formulation of hegemony is that it assumes an exclusive relationship between consent and domination, and thereby fails to grasp an important nature of capitalism: civil society is not separable from the state but rather its domain is intersected by the state (Gramsci, 2010: 238).

Kang posits that Gramsci’s later reformulation of hegemony shows that he was aware of the inadequacy of his first model particularly in understanding the role of the state in securing

ideological consent in civil society (Kang, 2016: 4). Accordingly, his second formulation of hegemony reconceptualizes the relationship between the state and civil society: hegemony is redefined to combine coercion and consent and redistributed between the state and civil society (Gramsci, 2010: 261). Kang reasons that, with this theoretical rearrangement, which locates hegemony both in the state and civil society, the state appears as a form of apparatus (Kang, 2016:4). In this formulation, the distinction between civil society and political society is maintained, but hegemony not just works on civil society but intersects both civil society and the state (Gramsci, 2010: 263).

Kang maintains that this was not Gramsci's final version of hegemony, however. In the third version of hegemony, the scope of the state becomes extensive to include political society and civil society: "integral state" (Kang, (2016: 4). The state no longer appears as "an external and dispensable surface", but subsumes civil society within it: "hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" (Gramsci, 2012: 263). Subsequently, Anderson explains, hegemony is firmly situated within the state – no longer confined to civil society (Anderson, 1977: 23). The distinction between civil and political society is now effectively displaced into the problem of the state (Gramsci, 2012: 263). The state encompasses political society and civil society and coercion and consent become coextensive with the state (Anderson, 1977: 23).

Gramsci was concerned with the particularities of state formation. His writing emphasizes class struggle in the process of constituting the Italian state within the Gramsci was concerned with the particularities of state formation. His writing emphasizes class struggle in the process of constituting the Italian state within the specific emergence of the Italian state as distinguished from state formation throughout Europe. Gramsci presented it in contrast to the development of France, "where "the protective shell of monarchy" permitted the struggle within and between feudal classes, whereas in Italy the interests of mercantile capital were "incapable of going beyond a narrow-minded corporatism or of creating their integral state civilization" (Gramsci, 1985; Morton, 2007: 58). In Italy, the state formation was characterized by "transformism – in other words by the formation of an ever more extensive ruling class, within the framework established by the Moderates after 1848 and the collapse of the neo-Guelph and federalist utopia" (Gramsci, 2012:58).

3.2.6. Gramsci and Intellectuals

Two concepts that Gramsci discusses at length, help readers understand processes whereby the concept of civil society can be exploited to seize cultural dominance: intellectuals and

education. Intellectuals, for Gramsci, constitute a demographic expanded beyond common conception; they are represented not only by what one thinks of as a “traditional” academic— i.e., professional intellectual— but also include the thinking and organizing members ‘organic’ to each class. These intellectuals include the teachers, clergy, philosophers, scientists, industrial engineers, and organizers (Tabugon, 2015: 79). In this sense, “all men are intellectuals,” but not all men have the function of intellectuals in society (Gramsci, 2012: 9). According to Tabugon, the key distinction for Gramsci between intellectual and non-intellectual is a simple fact of the direction in which their specific professional activity is directed, toward intellectual elaboration or simple muscular-nervous effort (Tabugon, 2015: 79). In simpler terms, Gramsci seems to distinguish between intellectuals and non-intellectuals based on ideational intentionality attached to physical acts, pointing toward a particular political end (Gramsci, 2012: 9). A social worker contributes to the critical interpretation of intellectual activity, transforms its relationship with the muscular-and-emotional effort towards new equality, and ensures that the effort to create muscle itself, as a matter of common functional, constantly reviving the physical and social world, forms the basis of a new and important worldview (Gramsci, 2012: 9).

In other words, according to Preisig, an intellectual serves the function of aligning actions with ideas framed upon a critical approach to the status quo. He/she is the driver of innovation, the “mover and shaker” who directs whatever professional activity is his/her specialty toward the organization and cultivation of a particular hegemonic arrangement (Preisig, 2019: 40). (Preisig, 2019: 40). Solidarity or momentum gained by any particular intellectual current— which expounds a particular critical worldview—imitates the zero-sum competition of civil society and the prospect of hegemonic reconfiguration (Preisig, 2019: 40).

While the traditional intellectual also serves the role of elaborating a worldview so that actions are brought into alignment with the ideas and interests of a particular class, he/she is not organic to a particular class (Tabugon, 2015:79). “Traditional intellectuals experience through an “esprit de corps” their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification and thus put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the hegemonic social group” (Gramsci, 2012: 7). Therefore, “one of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer “ideologically” the traditional intellectuals” (Gramsci, 2012: 10).

The reasons for assimilating or co-opting traditional intellectuals might seem obvious, but are not exclusively related to the threat they would pose as a subversive element. By drawing them into the camp, so to speak, intellectuals can be employed as the deputies of the dominant group— or whichever group hopes to be dominant (Gramsci, 2012: 12). Intrinsicly, they exercise the functions of social hegemony and political government which comprise the spontaneous consent given by the masses of the population to a general direction imposed on social life, and the apparatus of state coercive power which legally enforces discipline on groups who do not consent (Gramsci, 2012: 12).

Preisig conceives that the assimilation of traditional intellectuals is vital for dominant social groups and challenger groups in two ways: 1) the process of elaborating a worldview that then is disseminated as an organizing element in civil society for ‘manufacturing consent can either support or contradict existing hegemonic ordering (Preisig, 2019: 41-42). According to him, it would be impossible “for a challenger group to alter significantly the existing hegemonic order while ideologies and interests reflective of the dominant group were upheld and consented to by the masses” (Preisig, 2019: 42). 2) In the case of a challenger group, a war of ideas could be won in civil society so that the consent of the masses reflects a new critical worldview subversive to the existing hegemonic order. Nonetheless, even if that is the case deputies are needed to serve the bureaucratic functions of the state when a transition in responsibility for governance— i.e., control over political society—occurs. Rather than training a new squad, it is better to co-opt the old (Preisig, 2019: 42).

Consequently, according to Preisig, the value of intellectuals, both organic and traditional, is practical. He maintains that “their work serves to either solidify ideological support for the dominant fundamental group as well as to carry out bureaucratic functions in political society over which it presides, or to elaborate a critical worldview in the process of organizing opposition to the existing hegemonic order (Preisig, 2019: 42). Concerning both functions, one could extrapolate that intellectual’s agency—i.e., their role in support or opposition to the existing hegemonic order— extends to and is reflected by the scholarship that they publish (Preisig, 2019: 42).

Gramsci believed that science (encompassing scientific literature produced by traditional intellectuals) was an inherently political activity because it, “transforms men and makes them different from what they were before... it enlarges their concepts of life, raises to a higher-level life itself” (Gramsci, 2010: 245). This point is as true for assimilated intellectuals (by the

fundamental hegemonic group) as oppositional intellectuals because even a ruling class aims to “raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level which corresponds to the needs of productive forces for development” (Gramsci, 2010: 258). It would appear, therefore, in alignment with the earlier discussion about Said, that the production of scholarship is necessarily a political activity pointed toward one of the two ends attributed here to intellectuals.⁴ If Gramsci is correct, one cannot view scholarship as simply a benign representation of life. Rather, it implicitly or explicitly has something to say about life, either reinforcing and enhancing the existing structure of relationships and institutions that compose the hegemonic order or challenging them (Preisig, 2019: 43).

Education relates to the role of intellectuals in two ways. First, in a purely mechanistic sense wherein, “the more extensive the area covered by education... the more complex the cultural world, the civilization, of a particular state” (Gramsci, 2010: 10-11). This has more to do with the development of an ethical state— one which seeks to elevate its population in correspondence to needs related to development and production— by assimilated intellectuals than activities directed toward hegemonic reordering carried out by subversive intellectuals (Preisig, 2019: 43).

Preisig stresses that a ruling class for Gramsci “would hope to empower its intellectuals in the development of a robust education system, one which produced subsequent intellectuals to carry out increasingly diverse and sophisticated functions of the state (Preisig, 2019: 44). However, this can also mean that a ruling class— one responsible for articulating the ‘areas covered by education’— could prevent the emergence of subversive currents from within the ranks of its educational apparatus (Preisig, 2019: 44). This was true for Italy’s universities described by Gramsci:

“The universities, and all the institutions which develop intellectual and technical abilities, since they were not permeated by the life of the parties, by the living realities of national life, produced apolitical national cadres, with a purely rhetorical and non-national mental formation.” (Gramsci, 2012: 228).

In this sense, according to Preisig, assimilated intellectuals through their educative functions specify the scope of education provided to students to serve and protect the needs of the ruling

⁴ According to Preisig, (2019), by “suggesting ends of intellectuals in dichotomous terms is not as saying intellectuals remain in either oppositional or supportive groups. An oppositional intellectual could be assimilated to the fundamental dominant group. And vice-versa. In other words, the function of intellectuals is dynamic and therefore their association as assimilated or oppositional does not enable a fixed registry that transcends historical circumstances (Preisig, 2019: 43)

class. This can mean simultaneously the development of productive functions within the state and suppression of ideas counterintuitive to the state. Education, in this framework, represents a tool in the same way the function of intellectuals is a tool in either service or opposition to the existing hegemonic order (Preisig, 2019: 44). The second way in which education relates to the role of intellectuals has more to do with the process of re-education, a foundational consideration in the development of oppositional strategies (Preisig, 2019: 44). It is essential to realize, here, that disillusionment with existing structures reflective of hegemonic order and willingness to use force to upend them is not enough to affect revolutionary change in industrially advanced, modern states. Intellectuals, especially those organic to particular social groups, play a role not only in organizing support for ideologies oppositional to the state but also in educating the masses to cultivate an alternative form of consent—that is, consent to alternative ideologies oppositional to those of the ruling class (Preisig, 2019: 44).

Buttigieg observes that he is an important point because, for Gramsci, revolutionary activity had little or nothing to do with inciting people to rebel; instead, it consisted of a painstaking process of disseminating and instilling an alternative “forma mentis” using cultural preparation—intellectual development and education—on a mass scale, critical and theoretical elaboration and thoroughgoing organization” (Buttigieg, 1995: 14). Organic intellectuals are essential in this process because, in the first case, they reflect the feelings and lived experiences particular to their class, attach ideas to those feelings and organize action. In the second case, because of the “higher level of social elaboration, characterized by a certain directive and technical capacity... not only in the limited sphere of his activity but in other spheres as well,” (Gramsci, 2012:5), the organic intellectual is suited to expand interests beyond corporate or class spheres and be an organizer of “masses of men”⁵. Without the organic intellectual, the cultivation of oppositional ideologies and interests for consent to be manufactured at a degree of critical mass eventuating revolutionary change is impossible (Gramsci, 2012:5). Their role in the extension of class or corporate interests beyond those spheres reflects the re-education process, without which challenge to existing hegemonic ordering—confrontation of the state apparatus by force—is futile (Gramsci, 2012:5).

Gramsci’s thinking about the role of intellectuals and education is interrelated— one could even say dialectical (Gramsci, 2012:5). But the argument to be drawn from these concepts and

⁵ The example Gramsci gives for the organic intellectual is the entrepreneur.

applied to the overarching discussion about political scholarship is a simple one.⁶ No intellectual effort is kind. Either an intellectual has been assimilated within the relationships and structures reflective of hegemonic ordering in a particular historical circumstance, or he is operating in opposition to them. The work intellectuals produce thus reflects a process of education that either serves the interests of the status quo or stands in opposition to it. Scholarship offers just one example of the ensemble of conduits through which educational processes can take place, but one should be left with the understanding that it is never neutral. If taken seriously, the positions of Gramsci should compel intellectuals (of all sorts) to consider the effect of their work (Preisig, 2019: 46).

The role of the intellectuals was the central idea of Gramsci's thought. Karl Marx used this term in a very basic sense by just making a distinction between manual and mental labour but Gramsci gave a much broader dimension to this idea. He was very clear in his view that all men are intellectuals but they are not intellectuals by social function. He clearly stated that 'All men are intellectuals ... but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals' (Gramsci, 2010: 9).

Gramsci is of the view that every man outside the sphere of his professional activity carries on some kind of intellectual endeavour. According to Gramsci, there were two kinds of intellectuals – "traditional' and 'organic'" (Hoare, 2010: 9).

3.2.7. Gramsci and Organic Crisis

The organic crisis, as Gramsci understands the concept, is associated with the limitations and contradictions of capitalism. Gramsci argues that an organic crisis emerges in different circumstances in historic blocs and cannot be understood as developing from a singular event. The crisis is an internal expression of the limits and contradictions of capitalism as a mode of production that is socially organized to maximize profits for capitalists and produces an uneven distribution of wealth to subaltern classes that cause blockages in capitalist mechanisms. A system based on such an unequal distribution of wealth inherently breeds competing social forces that disrupt and bring imbalances to the system (Gramsci, 2012:210-218). Gramsci calls this a "quantitative intensification of certain elements neither new nor original.... the intensification of certain phenomena, while others that were there before...have now become

⁶ Admittedly, according to Preisig, (2019) the depth given here to discussion of intellectuals and education served both the immediate purpose of identifying the political nature of scholarship, but also introduced ways in which hegemonic struggle occurs in civil society (Preisig, 2019: 46).

inoperative or have completely disappeared” (Gramsci, 2012:324). Therefore, according to Gramsci, capitalism is in a permanent state of crisis, the basic framework of this system cannot reconcile its inherent process of unequal appropriation from subaltern groups, which results in moments when tensions and conflicts become open and intensified and there is either a rebalancing or a collapse of the order as an alternative system emerges (Gramsci, 2012:324). Filippini argues that such an interpretation of crisis implies that it is a process of conflicting forces, causing an intensification of various forms of imbalance in societal structures. He maintains that a crisis can be calmed by an opposing force that rebalances the order or can become more acute through an intensification of distinct forces that disrupt structures and/or when previous rebalancing mechanisms become inept or are passive (Filippini, 2017: 92).

The organic nature of hegemony is premised on the integration of the ideological relations between the hegemon and subaltern actors. This ideological integration is developed through the historical structures of world order in economic, political, and social relations. The primacy and centrality of the hegemon allow it to build multi-layered networks of social relations (Filippini, 2017: 92). The organic nature of hegemony is premised on the integration of the ideological relations between the hegemon and subaltern actors. This ideological integration is developed through the historical structures of world order in economic, political and social relations. The primacy and centrality of the hegemon allow it to build multi-layered networks of social relations.

3.2.8. Gramsci and Power

Böhm contends that an often quoted understanding of power depicts Gramsci to have adopted Machiavelli’s conceptions (Böhm, 2018:30). Machiavelli describes the nature of power as “a centaur part of man, part beast, a combination of force and consent” (Cox, 1981:153).

Böhm argues that, besides the metaphor of the centaur, “Gramsci reformulates the subject of the prince, central in Machiavelli’s work into the portrayal of “the modern prince” (Böhm, 2018: 30). According to Gramsci, “The modern prince, presented as a myth instead of a real individual portrays one element of society. It is that “complex element of society in which a collective will, which has already been recognized and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take the concrete form” (Gramsci, 2010:129). Through the modern prince, Gramsci emphasises the importance of intellectuals and moral reform, as well as questions of religion and worldview incorporated into the notion of power (Gramsci, 2010:132).

Although, Gramsci's understanding of power exceeds this simple metaphor into a more complex notion. Power, as understood in hegemony, relates to the aspects of resistance, subalternity, common sense and cannot be operationalised alone (Howson/Smith, 2008:5). Interpreting Gramsci, some scholars conceptualize power as "an asymmetrical politico-economic operation that leads ineluctably to domination" (Howson-Smith, 2008: 5).

Munyikwa speculates that according to Gramsci Power is, therefore, "both a question of consent generated by how convincing an ideology is to a significant proportion of a polity, which may also be a function of a movement's capacity to organize and make itself heard and coercion the physical capacity to make others do what they may not otherwise normally do" (Munyikwa, 2018:12). To symbolise this dialectic Gramsci used the metaphor of a Centaur the Greek "half man-half beast". Precisely where on the continuum between consent and coercion a specific politically dominant entity derives its power is not only a question of historical analysis but also a core theoretical conundrum of Gramscian theory (Munyikwa, 2018:12-13).

3.3. Civil Society in Kenya

South Africa and Kenya are among the countries in Africa with a strong civil society. In the case of Nigeria, civil society has not always been pre-eminent. The military rule has in the past suppressed democratization despite the presence of a vibrant civil society and independent media (Mutua, 2012:19). Kenya is an example of a country that has been able to attain transformative reform of the state through a vigilant and strong civil society (Mutua, 2012:19). Civil society has been a key factor in almost every critical juncture of the country. Many gains in civil and political liberties throughout Moi's repressive regime have been possible thanks to a disciplined and vigilant civil society, made up of religious organizations, human rights groups, the media, and professional associations, that worked closely with opposition political parties and foreign political observers (Mutua, 2012:19). The cases of Benin, South Africa, and Kenya indicate the positive role the church and other religious institutions can play in the transition to a more open society. In Kenya for example, both Conference of Catholic Bishops and the National Council of Churches of Kenya, the umbrella organization for the mainline Protestant churches, played a leading role in the struggle for democracy against Kenyatta's undemocratic state that was later perfected by Moi (Mutua, 2008: 24). Their voices were instrumental in achieving multipartyism and drafting a new democratic constitution (Mutua, 2012: 24).

Wanyande hypothesizes that the general understanding of the civil society in Kenya has been that, “it is conceived as an organized non-state actor that seeks to work for the political, social and economic well-being of its members in particular and citizens in general. They do this by attempting to limit the capacity of the state to intrude on the interests, rights, and freedom of citizens” (Wanyande, 2009:9).

According to Wanyande, another problem that one meets in any discourse about civil society in Kenya is the tendency to talk about civil society as “a homogeneous entity although many of the organizations that claim civil society label exhibit very different characteristics, interests and approaches to their activities it is commonly assumed that the interests of civil society and those of state are must be incompatible” (Wanyande, 2009:10). The expectation in this regard, is that civil society “must always oppose the state. In reality and especially in Kenya, several civil society organizations work with the state” (Wanyande, 2009:10). He cites the example of Youth for KANU (YK92) which worked with the state to defend the Moi government and campaigned for its victory in the December 1992 general elections (Wanyande, 2009:10).

In Kenya, there is also a tendency to assume that civil society can perform better than the state in terms of catering to the interests of the citizens and in keeping the state in check (Wanyande, 2009:10).

Lastly, there is an assumption that civil society is a prerequisite for the institutionalization of democracy in Africa and Kenya to be precise, which is therefore affecting the genuine political transition. It is against the above theoretical misunderstanding with its potential to ruin an objective analysis of the role of civil society that this study will interrogate the contribution, if any, of this area to the politics of transition in Kenya (Wanyande, 2009:10).

3.3.1. The Changing Role of Civil Society in Kenya

3.3.1.1. Colonial Era

The advent of the British invasion and subjugation of present-day Kenya commenced with the formal inauguration of the Imperial British East Africa Company rule in 1888, but more officially with the declaration of the British East African Protectorate on the 1st of July, 1895 (Kihoro, 2005:8). An 1886 Anglo-German agreement had delineated the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar from the country’s coastline to ten miles into the interior (Brennan, 2008:838). In 1895, the Sultan of Zanzibar leased the administration of the strip to the British. These events set in motion the process of placing different ethnic communities with their

diverse systems of government within one large and new area of central administration (Olumwullah, 1990: 88; Jonyo, 2002: 90). The territory beyond the ten-mile coastal strip was declared to be “Kenya Colony” in 1920 (Omolo, 2002: 213). Thus, while the ten-mile coastal strip continued to be referred to as a Protectorate, the rest of the country was henceforth referred to as the Kenya Colony (Brennan, 2008: 831). Nevertheless, the British administered the Protectorate and the Colony as a two-in-one unit out of expediency (Hassan, 2002:10; Oduor, 2012: 146-147).

The colonial government viewed the few civic groups made up of indigenous people with a lot of suspicions. The government feared that the CSOs could use their popularity to mobilize citizens against the government (Wanyande, 2009: 11). The colonial regime, therefore, discouraged the formation of civic groups that could participate in the political process. Instead, it encouraged only the formation of civic groups that comprised settlers and colonialists themselves or allowed civic groups that facilitated greater penetration and control of society in line with the colonial policy (Wanyande, 2009: 11). In reaction to this, Africans formed associations or groupings that were political. These included burial societies and community forums. With time, however, these associations became avenues through which individuals expressed their political opinions against the colonizers. The traditional leaders of the clan or community normally provided leadership of these associations in the pre-independence era. Post-World War II developments also saw the growing momentum of African nationalism and the gathering of momentum of trade unions. Among the prominent labour unions was the East African Trade Unions Congress. In 1950, the union organized the boycott of official celebrations marking the granting of a royal charter to Nairobi and articulated grievances which included exploitation of workers, effects of capitalism and racial discrimination (Wanyande, 2009: 17). The Union demanded an increase in the minimum wage to workers, an end to payment by race, the abolition of the “*kipande*”⁷ and self-government for the East African territories. The union resolved that the real solution to the problem it was addressing was complete independence and sovereignty. The response of the colonial government was to harass and imprison leaders of the union. This partly contributed to the outbreak of Mau Mau in 1952 (Wanyande, 2009: 11-12).

⁷ A Swahili word for an Identity Card or a Passbook.

Seen through a Gramscian methodological lens, the post-Second World War period represented an organic crisis in colonial hegemony as the system's contradictions became evident not only in Kenya but throughout the colonized world (Wanyande, 2009: 11).

3.3.1.2. *Civil Society in Kenyatta's State*

Kenya's political independence in December 1963 was preceded by three constitutional conferences held in London's Lancaster House in 1960, 1962, and 1963 (Ndegwa, 1997: 602-604). In those conferences, the contentious issues had to do with the structure of government (regionalism versus unitarism) rather than with the Bill of Rights. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), a party mainly of the numerically advantaged Kikuyu and Luo, was in favour of a unitary state. However, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), supported by minority African communities such as the Turgen and the Giriyama along with European settlers, favoured a regionalist (*majimbo*)⁸ system. To them, the prospect of Kikuyu-Luo dominance through KANU was real, since the two groups were larger, more politically conscious, and better organized than the KADU groups, and presumably would win overwhelmingly at the polls (Ndegwa 1997:605; Atieno-Odhiambo 2002:239). Consequently, the independence constitution provided for eight regions, namely, Nairobi, Coast, Eastern, Central, Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western and North-Eastern, each with its own legislative and executive bodies (Republic of Kenya 1963, Chapter VI).

Kenya gained independence in 1963, and at this time, there were two main political parties: The Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). However, KADU was dissolved in 1964 because the one-party system was good for the promotion and realization of national unity—an integral state (Chemengich, 2009: 24). Kenya consequently became a *de facto* single-party state. KANU experienced serious internal party wrangles after the merger with KADU. These wrangles saw the reappearance of trade unions namely the Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) and Kenya Africa Workers Congress (KAWC) as a powerful force in Kenyan politics. These two unions were however competing against each other and in 1965; the government deregistered both unions and created the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) (Chemengich, 2009: 24). Members of both KFL and KAWC were senior officials in COTU. One of the results of this development was

⁸ A Swahili word for federal or devolve system of governance.

the split of the trade union movement with one faction supporting KANU and the government while the other opposed its policies (Chemengich, 2009: 24).

The Kenyatta regime was no different from the colonial state concerning civil society participation in public matters. Under Kenyatta, the government ensured that civil society engaged only in social and economic activities and not in things political including governance. Voluntary agencies including NGOs, churches, and self-help groups were allowed to provide services at the grassroots since they were considered an important force for development and they supplemented state development endeavours (Chemengich, 2009: 24).

Throughout the 1970s the perceptions grew that access to the new land in the Rift Valley was skewed toward the Kikuyu, to the disadvantage of the Kalenjin and other smaller tribes (Gachanga, 2012: 3). This favouritism toward the Kikuyu persisted in other realms such as the staffing of the civil service, and access to higher education (Opondo, 2014: 62). Two-thirds of the key provincial commissioners were Kikuyu, and the overwhelming majority of parastatal heads were Kikuyu, more specifically of Kiambu (Opondo, 2014: 62). During the majority of Kenyatta's tenure, the commissioner of police, head of the special branch, and head of the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) were all Kikuyu.⁴⁹ Throughout the 1970s growing evidence emerged that the Kikuyu had disproportionately benefited from state privilege and economic development (Opondo, 2014: 62). A report published by the International Labour Organization in 1972 illuminated regional differences in welfare and the disproportionate benefit garnered by Kikuyu-strong Central Province. Equally, land distribution programs were phased out in the 1970s leading to greater consolidation of farms into large-scale holdings. Finally, a crisis in the maize industry in the upper Rift Valley, which had become the agricultural staple of the minority Kalenjin, further highlighted the disproportionate benefits garnered by the Kikuyu. As farmers shifted to export crop production, corresponding services to deal with the excess grain such as storage facilities or export boards did not appear (Gachanga, 2012: 3-4).

Morse reasons that part of the reason for these continued inequalities was not only deliberate policy but the structure of linkage Kenyatta utilized between himself and the periphery – *Harambee*. While in place before independence, *Harambee*⁹ was institutionalized under Kenyatta (Morse, 2013:121). Generally, residents of a constituency would pool resources for a local development project such as a water well and receive supplementary or matching funds

⁹ Swahili word meaning pull together

from the government. MPs would organize their constituents and also make significant monetary contributions (Morse, 2013: 122). Therefore, local leaders had an incentive to temper local disputes and tensions to facilitate compromise. In 1965, *Harambee* took on a much more central role as a part of national development policy. Local leaders were judged by their capacity to receive *Harambee* funds. As Widner (1992) notes, *Harambee* was a “tactic in pursuit of political order, and essential tool for facilitating compromise and encouraging politicians to limit their bids for control of party offices and platform” (Morse, 2013: 122).

While economically efficient, the *Harambee* program had two significant political consequences. First, it did little to alleviate inequality since those who started farther ahead in wealth and education (generally the Kikuyu of Central Province), were likely to be able and raise more *Harambee* funds (Morse, 2013: 122-123). This was in addition to the deliberate diversion of funds to Central Province *Harambee* projects. Indeed, the first official *Harambee* project of the Kenyatta period was funded for a hospital in Kiambu (Morse, 2013: 123). Second, as long as there were resources to distribute the system persisted with little upheaval, but the gains were not attributed to the party but the local patron. Sustained by high levels of economic growth from Kenya’s export agricultural sector, Kenyatta could shuffle resources to other regions when needed, but it had to be channelled through the local representative rather than the party system (Morse, 2013:123).

Finally, with the role of political hegemonic and ethnic mobilization institutionalized in Kenya, there was a lesser need to develop party-affiliated formal institutions for social mobilization. Kenya had relatively strong labour unions at independence that became fairly energetic over issues of economic alignment (Ajulu, 2011:32-33).

In 1965, Kenyatta dissolved the existing labour unions and consolidated them into the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU). Nonetheless, as Lebas, (2011) observes, COTU was separated from party mobilization, and “the ruling party never viewed unions as a key channel for communication or implementation of policies” (Lebas, 2011:104). Likewise, some other organizations that could have been used for social mobilization existed outside of the party such as the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and several other organizations passed on from the colonial cooperative movement that catered in particular to the coffee and tea exporters, business associations, and a national women’s organization (Morse, 2013:122).

On the other hand, some important institutions with the explicit task of mobilization emerged outside of KANU along ethnic lines. In June 1970 the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (GEMA) was founded to lobby for the expressed interests of those ethnic groups and to act as a welfare union. GEMA became an important action group during the Kenyatta years, with strong influence over the slate of KANU candidates in Central Province and Nairobi. Later GEMA was a powerful force during the change of the constitution movement to replace Moi with a Kikuyu candidate to succeed Kenyatta (Hornsby, 2012:539-617). At one-point, GEMA was described as “the only well-organized mass movement in Kenya...with properly elected national district members and with regular meetings,” in contrast with the disarrayed KANU (Morse, 2013:123). Partially in response to the formation of GEMA, other tribal unions from the independence period began to take on a more prominent role, such as the Luo Union (LU), the Abaluhya Association (AA), the Kalenjin Association (KA), and the Mijikenda Union (MU) (Hornsby, 2012: 539-617).

Only leftist-oriented university organizations such as the student’s union dared to criticize the government. The media was equally silent during the Kenyatta era because there was only one national broadcasting station at this time, the Voice of Kenya (VOK). This broadcasting station was pro-government and therefore was not expected to agitate for improved democratic governance. There were only three newspapers produced by the print media: Standard, Nation, and Kenya Times (Chemengich, 2009: 24).

3.3.1.3. Civil Society in Moi’s State

With the departure of colonialism, the new empire was challenged by many development problems that were incomparable to its scarce resources. It is for this reason that NGOs and the voluntary sector, at the instigation of the state, played a major role in development during the great Kenyan era (1964-1978). However, during the Moi dynasty, since 1978, many NGOs and civil society organizations have played an additional role in promoting political representation (Matanga, 2000: 10).

President Moi's administration saw the demise of civil society. Co-operative societies, especially land acquisition co-operatives, were controlled by the government, with self-help groups included in the administrative and political structures, to ensure that their activities were monitored by government agents. All these groups had to register with the Ministry of Culture and Social Services at that time. Failure to do so has led to the denial of social grants and subsidies. The government was opposed to the activities of religious organizations such as the

National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) and the Catholic Church. The government strengthened its ties at the grassroots level by appointing trade unions, and unions; Self-help groups including the Maendeleo ya Wanawake—Women Organization (Development for Women) have become the ruling party. Women's Development was renamed KANU Development (Chemengich, 2009: 25). The community became weak and could not effectively fight for their cause. The state of public-private dialogue during this period was often controversial (Wanyande, 2009: 13-14). Underground civil society organizations that were dissatisfied with government operations also proliferated. In a few cases, members of civil society organizations have been detained without trial because they are a security breach. However, public works flourished after the abolition of section 2A (Chemengich, 2009: 25).

3.3.2. Hegemonic Party Regimes: Characteristics and Some Examples

Gandhi and Reuter define dictatorial regimes as those of a dictatorship in which a party, affiliated with the state, has always held multi-party elections (Gandhi and Reuter, 2007: 2). Well-known examples of hegemonic group rule include Mexico under PRI (1929-2000), Malaysia under the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1969-present), and Singapore under the People's Action Party (1929). PAP) (1965-present), and Zimbabwe under Mugabe and ZANU-PF (1979-now) (Gandhi and Reuters, 2007: 2). Within a dictatorship, these powerful party regimes are divided into one-party states like many former and current Communist world powers (e.g., Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam, China), because these are communist regimes. The party holds a monopoly on the political party (Gandhi and Reuter, 2007: 2). Other examples of one-party regimes not included in our definition of strong party rule include Guinea under the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) from 1958-1984 (Gandhi and Reuter, 2007: 3) and Kenya under the Kenya African National Union. (KANU) from 1969-1991. One-party regimes could be transformed into powerful party governments by allowing for multi-party elections, as was the case in Kenya in 1992 when KANU contested multi-party elections for the first time in decades. Otherwise, a strong party government could become a one-party state if the state chooses to prevent other parties from competing as, for example, Kenyatta and KANU did in 1968 when the state canceled multi-party elections and declared a one-party state. (Opondo, 2014: 62-63).

Hegemonic party regimes can also be divided into so-called uncommon democracies or states where one party has ruled for a long time, but under democratic conditions (e.g., India under the Congress Party and Japan under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) The most important

thing in a democracy is electoral competition. It is said that competition in elections occurs when there is a preconceived notion, premature instability, and repetition (Przeworski et al., 2000: 16). They control the media, oppress opponents, exploit court decisions, and misuse access to state resources as a means of controlling competition and maintaining power to stay in power. Many in the cancellation of election results to withdraw a popular decision against them. Yield reduces past uncertainty or takes action after the truth showing a reluctance to give up power (Lanston, 2002: 78).

Reluctance to allow a change of power is what separates governments like the LDP of Japan and the PRI of Mexico. When the LDP in Japan lost the election in 1993, it lost its seat. On the contrary, many observers of Mexico's presidential race in 1988 believe that PRI had stolen the election. Cárdenas would have been declared the winner if the computers of the party's election commission had not collapsed on the election date. Computers came back days later to show that Salinas, a PRI's candidate, had won just over a majority of votes (Lanston, 2002: 78).

3.4. Hegemony Elections and Party Institutions

Gandhi and Reuter, argue that the ruling party regimes are divided among other dictatorial states in two ways: by holding multi-party elections, and by party-led party politics. The benefits offered by the hegemonic group are few. The group may act (1) as a tool for mobilizing sleeping partners and binding current supporters in government, (2) how to direct the movement to support and disseminate political appointments, (3) as a data collection device, and (as 4) a legislative tool management system (Gandhi and Reuter, 2007: 4).

The second most important part of the ruling party rules is the multi-party election. Such elections may offer various benefits to powerful rulers. By giving special people and actors public access to policy and rent, elections can alleviate the pressure of opposition (Salem, 2020: 4). Such access, even if limited and controlled, gives players the incentive to work within the system (Salem, 2020: 4). By providing antagonists and undercover partners to participate in the process, authoritarian rulers increase the cost of anti-government measures in violent or anti-system ways. Multi-party elections thus become centers of cooperation and regulatory authority. In addition, elections allow dictators to exploit the problems of co-opting opponents and thus make it easier to divide and govern strategies (Salem, 2020: 4).

3.4.1. Historic Bloc in Kenya

Here, the concept of a bloc of post-colonial history, borrowed from Gramsci but used in the African context by Bayart is very useful. He argues that the ruling elites within the African context cannot be reduced to a classical Marxism into one class, namely the capitalists. And the ruling authorities cannot simply be transferred as a coalition of public forces Bayart (1993: 129-133). Relatively, the historical bloc represents the dialectical unity between the foundation and the superstructure, between the intellectual and the masses, and between the interpretation of theory and practice — in this case, between the ideas of state development and its implementation Bayart (1993: 129-133). This historic bloc seeks to "capture" and retain the grip of state power in its quest to build a hegemonic project and to demonstrate "the necessary reconciliation between building and capital structure" (Gramsci, 1971: 366). These relationships are made real through the intellectual, moral, and political processes that transcend the closed ideas of economic and corporate interests and instead show a free "political". This moral and political dimension helps to create both economic configurations but also provides a forgiving and legitimate aspect (Gramsci, 1971: 366).

In Kenya, elections are largely determined by ethnic votes. National groups vote as a blockchain, and in many cases, by one of them (KHRC, 2018: 15). This practice reduced the election to what Horowitz called ethnicatrium census in his 1985 book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. In other words, elections are simply a large number of members of competing nations. Racial voting is often directly related to the racial status of political parties. Since there is no valid basis for dividing political parties, a voter can do nothing but vote for a party that represents the interests of his or her nation (KHRC, 2018: 15). Racial voting is also a product of racial inclusion, especially during campaigns. Politicians organize voters according to their ethnic groups and spread fear of rival nations. For their part, voters support the political parties of their races to ensure that competing races do not rise or remain in power. Even if voting for one of them does not translate into significant benefits for them, voters still do so because of the symbolic benefits that are expected: — There is a "feeling" about being one of us "in charge of government or public office - a sign of attitude" (KHRC, 2018: 15).

Oyugi thinks that Kenya has only limited knowledge by competing in multi-party elections, and knowledge ends in the first three years of independence (Oyugi, 1997: 43-44). At the time of independence, he argues that the multi-party competition involved the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) —the two parties

formed in 1960 in anticipation of independence (Oyugi, 1997: 43-44). Until that year, political parties across the country were banned following the declaration of emergency in October 1952 and the ban on the Kenya African Union (KAU) - which is intended to contain the Mau Mau uprising (Oyugi, 1997: 43-44). Chemengich (2009) notes that between “1955 and early 1960 only district-based political parties or organizations were allowed in non-Mau-Mau areas. And in the territories in which they were formed, they became the institutions of the organization through which the nationalist independence movement emerged. In addition, ethnic-based political parties such as the Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Masaai United Front, were formed during this period. Later it was these organizations - both ethnic and regional, that had to be disbanded by electing a single united national party (Chemengich, 2009: 23). According to Oyugi, KANU was founded with that desire in mind. But it could not be. Accidents were very high. The counting of ethnic groups and interests has led to lower races refusing to support KANU (Oyugi, 1997: 44). Residents, fearing for the security of "their" land if such a united party came under the leadership of the Kikuyu-Luo, urged "minority" races to have nothing to do with it. Land ownership became a major political and constitutional issue in which the 'few' nations believed that they could defend their rights only under the constitution of the states (states) and their party. Unity of national unity during the independence elections was not possible in those circumstances. Thus, KADU was established as a counter-hegemony in KANU (Oyugi, 1997: 44).

In the “mid-term” elections held in March 1961, racial support was evident from both parties. KANU found support for the Kikuyu, Luo, Meru, Embu, Kamba and Kisii. KADU on the other hand found support in almost all pastoral tribes: The Kalenjin, the Masaai, the Giriama, and a few other small tribes (Bennett and Rosberg, 1961; Bennett, 1963). The Luhya, one of the three major tribes (after the Kikuyu and Luo), is divided between KANU and KADU. This form of support would prevail (excluding the Kamba) during the 1963 elections that led to independence (Oyugi, 1997: 44).

Feeling marginalized in KANU since the formation of KANU in 1960, Kamba leader Paul Ngei succeeded in uniting his fellow Kamba to form another party in 1962 - the African Peoples Party. Their goal was to create an organizational structure in which to agree on inclusion in government after the 1963 free elections. The tactic worked, and Ngei and other Kamba executives were appointed ministers after eight APP MPs (usually from the Kamba Parliament) re-joined KANU. Shortly afterward, the APP died a natural death. The seeds of international censorship in electoral politics had been sown (Oyugi, 1997: 44).

The rift between the KANU and KADU supporters did not last long, for in October 1964 the KADU was disbanded "voluntarily" and Kenya emerged as a one-party state. But the unity did not last long; because in 1966 the clear division of KANU between 'middle class' and 'radicals' in party and government control, led to the removal of radicals from the party and the government and the establishment of the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) Oginga Odinga. By-elections held in 27 constituencies that year revealed two influences on the electoral process. First, the state was determined to portray the opposition as a formation of the Luo nation by ensuring its victory in the non-Luo states by negligently in the elections.³ they and their KANU opponents: returned to the office all the KPU candidates in the Luo country (Oyugi, 1997: 44-45).

Three years of continuous discrimination and Luo divisions led to escalating tensions between the KPU and the KANU government, which culminated in violence during Kenyatta's visit to Kisumu in December 1969 (Oyugi, 1997: 45). Following the incident, KPU leaders were arrested and detained and the party was banned. Kenya is also a one-party state. It would remain so until 1982 when the de facto status was given a legal basis through a constitutional amendment. Thus, between 1969-1991, the five national elections held during the period (1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1988) were 'only KANU' elections (Oyugi, 1997: 45).

The threat posed by the former apartheid party (KPU) was to lead the KANU government to implement a strategy of denial and exclusion. Thereafter, any politician whose legitimacy was questioned or who was considered a threat to the government was denied the right to run for office. The ruling party introduced a system in which all candidates wanted to run for office. And all the candidates had to pledge allegiance to the (state) president (formerly the party president), the government, and the ruling party - KANU - as a condition of the nomination.

Hegemonic tactics used by the state appropriately destroy the possibility of the establishment of strong opposition; The ruling party did not join the organized opposition during the 1969-91 period. In these cases, no presidential race is possible (Oyugi, 1997: 46). The one-party leader was always guaranteed an automatic appointment, and since the party's internal challenges in that office were unthinkable at the time, the president was constantly 're-elected' without opposition. The multiparty movement from 1990-92 should be seen against this domain (Oyugi, 1997: 46).

Until the late 80s, any serious challenge to state authority was a sure-fire way to gain time to be arrested or regularly harassed by the political police. Fear was deeply entrenched in the

institutions. Most Kenyans can only find courage since the late 80s. The fall of the Soviet regime was closely linked to new developments (Ondigi, 2019: 21-22),

The most widely spoken Luo-Kikuyu coalition began to show signs of collapse again after 1993; In the early 1990s, there were reportedly several meetings between Matiba and Odinga as (Oginga and his son Raila) before Matiba, Charles Rubia — both expelled from KANU for anti-government protests and Raila was arrested following an abortive pro-democracy rally on -7 July 1990 which ended in revolt in Nairobi and nearby villages in Kikuyuland (Oyugi, 1997: 46).

The historical context of the party affiliations in Kenya is inextricably linked to an incident that demonstrated the quest for the restoration of multi-party democracy in Kenya in the early 1990s. In the late 1980s, a major political upheaval swept the country because of the political freedoms of the then ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) (Oyugi, 1997: 46). It was not until 1982, when Kenya became a one-party state through a constitutional amendment (1982 Section A), that multi-party politics was overthrown (Gachanga, 2012: 3). As a result, KANU became the only party, a movement that was further reflected in the gathering of senior officials to the president, successfully consolidating the powers of the state and the party (Parsitau, 2012: 2). In response to the declining political space, a collaborative effort involving civil society, religious organizations, and political repression groups came together under the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Ford) and began to seek inclusive and participatory governance (Parsitau, 2012: 2). The political pressure exerted by the reform movement (Ford) was met with pressure from the KANU government, which chose to maintain the status quo and not allow any political space (Gifford, 2009: 35-36). However, the constant pressure of reform parties led KANU to convene an emergency meeting of the National Executive Council (Saitoti Committee 1991) which proposed the repeal of Article 2A of the Constitution and the introduction of multi-party politics (Gifford, 2009: 35-36).

Although multi-party-political reforms allowed political parties to unite and present a united front to fight KANU's grip on power, opposition leaders who led multi-party politics likened multi-party democracy to multi-party politics (Oyugi, 1997: 46).

Ford, which has been seen as a wide-ranging coalition, has faced some leadership issues and disputes that have led to divisions and registrations of Ford groups such as Ford-Kenya, led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, and Ford-Asili, Kenneth Matiba (Oyugi, 1997: 45). By the time of the December 1992 elections, 12 parties had been registered. This split and increased loyalty

of the various voters, allowed KANU's easy victory in the 1992 and 1997 elections, with President Daniel Arap Moi continuing as head of both parties and the country (Opondo, 2014: 63-64).

KANU's victory was not simply the result of divisions within the opposition, with many other factors contributing to it. First of all, the constitutional amendment that revived multi-party politics did not go hand in hand with radical change. A major problem was the failure to curb excessive power and authority in the presidency. Therefore, the country adopted a multi-party democracy with laws applicable to a one-party state (Opondo, 2014: 63-64). Second, President Moi was not barred from running for office despite having held office for more than a decade. Therefore, he ran in the 1992 and 1997 elections with all the rights of office. The powerful presidency also ensured that important appointments to polling stations were made by the president, who eventually benefited from the formation and operation of these institutions (Opondo, 2014: 64). KANU won both the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1997. In 1992 President Moi won 38% of the vote and KANU won 99 of the 188 seats. Opposition parties claimed 89 seats in the new parliament and a majority of the votes cast were divided among them. A similar situation was repeated in the 1997 election, in which KANU won 40 percent of the presidency and won 113 seats out of a total of 222 (including 12 nominations). KANU's victory was confirmed by a direct presidential election and a simplified democratic system that existed in Kenya since its independence. Due to the right of succession and the demarcation of the regional boundaries of KANU strongholds, victory was guaranteed (Oyugi, 1997: 47-48).

3.4.2. The 2002 elections and the NARC coalition

The lessons learned by the opposition parties from the 1992 and 1997 general elections underpinned the preparations for the 2002 elections. The reality that a fragmented opposition could not win against a well-established and entrenched incumbent party that had been in power since independence became apparent to opposition parties and compelled them to initiate talks geared towards allying (Kasika- Nyadera, 2019: 170). The realisation that President Moi, who had served his two five-year terms, was ineligible to contest subsequent elections stirred KANU, which had been in power, into considering some form of alliance with other parties. In the run-up to the 2002 elections two competing alliance-building initiatives were pursued simultaneously (Oyugi, 1997: 46). The first involved KANU and the National Development Party (NDP). The second involved opposition parties, among them the

Democratic Party (DP), Ford-Kenya, and the National Party of Kenya (National Alliance for Change) (Oyugi, 1997: 46).

The culmination of the KANU and NDP alliance was the merger in February 2002 that saw the NDP's Raila Odinga dissolve his party and merge with KANU. This merger was, however, short-lived (Oyugi, 1997:49-50). In a bid to craft, his succession plans President Moi announced his endorsement of Uhuru Kenyatta and unilaterally declared him KANU's presidential candidate, a move that upset the more established leaders of KANU (Ondigi, 2019:25-26). Raila Odinga spearheaded opposition to the move and signalled a desire to oppose Uhuru Kenyatta. Disgruntled figures within KANU announced the formation of the Rainbow Alliance, whose name signified the diverse composition of the group (Ondigi, 2019: 25-26). Prominent personalities uniting under the Rainbow banner included George Saitoti, Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka, Musalia Mudavadi, and Joseph Kamotho. Meanwhile, progress in the opposition coalition led to the transformation of the National Alliance for Change into the NAK, led by Mwai Kibaki, Kijana Wamalwa and Charity Ngilu (Ondigi, 2019:26).

Towards September 2002 the problems within KANU reached a point of no return. The Rainbow group, which had by then registered a party called the Liberal Party (LDP) of Kenya, defected in masses from KANU and joined hands with the NAK to form NARC, with President Mwai Kibaki as its presidential candidate (Wanyande, 2006:72). NARC was a mass movement and a coalition of various sectors that united purposely to defeat KANU and Uhuru Kenyatta in the 2002 election. The coalition agreement that brought the various factions of NARC together was embodied in the Memorandum of Understanding which was to provide the blueprint of governance for the NARC administration (Wanyande, 2006: 72).

In 2002, there was a change in political leadership. That year, KANU, the country's ruling political party since independence was defeated, by a new political party: The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), formed by an alliance between the major Kenyan tribes as well as some of the marginalized communities (Tartarini, 2015: 1). NARC came to power as the new coalition government promising to reform the existing constitution by limiting the executive power (presidency), while creating checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government (Adebayo, 2012: 69). It also sought a power-sharing arrangement that would introduce the position of prime minister, put an end to corruption, tribalism, and bring about an equitable uplift of the living conditions for all

Kenyan regardless of their ethnicity. They also promised to provide free primary education (Gifford, 2009: 36).

3.4.3. The collapse of NARC

From the outset, it was clear that the overriding factor that had led to the formation of NARC was the need to defeat KANU and win political power. Although the NARC MoU outlined issues of governance the leadership was not committed to fulfilling the pledges contained in the NARC manifesto and the power-sharing agreement reached between the two parties (Ondigi, 2019: 27).

The most contentious issue was the position of prime minister, which had been earmarked for Raila Odinga¹⁰ of the LDP. Most of the leaders close to President Kibaki saw the elevation of Odinga to the prime ministership as a challenge to them. To avoid this, some of them sought to discourage President Kibaki from establishing the position. Connected to the disagreement over the creation of the position of prime minister was the 50-50 power-sharing arrangement between the LDP and NAK factions of NARC that had been contemplated in the MoU (Bedasso, 2015: 18).

Based on the appointments made by President Kibaki the NAK faction received a disproportionate share of Cabinet positions, which was contrary to the pre-election deal between the two coalition partners. Another contentious issue was the enactment of a comprehensive constitution, which formed a key pillar of the NARC manifesto (Bedasso, 2015: 18). During the campaigns, NARC had pledged that the new constitution would be enacted within the first 100 days of its assumption of office. Since NARC had come to power under the old Constitution, which had concentrated power in the presidency, members of the executive arm of government, who, themselves, wielded substantial powers, saw nothing wrong with governing under the old Constitution (Bedasso, 2015:18). Procrastination and disagreement over the completion of the constitutional review process persisted throughout NARC's five-year term and contributed significantly to the final breakup of the coalition during and after the 2005 constitutional referendum (Bedasso, 2015:18). (Bedasso, 2015:18).

Following years of corruption and ineptitude, NARC came to power based on the twin promises of zero tolerance of corruption and the efficient use of state resources. However, soon after it assumed power allegations of corruption threatened NARC's survival, with key personalities

¹⁰ Raila Odinga was credited with endorsing Kibaki and ensuring that NAK held together.

named as allegedly complicit in corrupt practices. The epitome of the corruption scandals was the Anglo Leasing scandal that implicated key people surrounding President Kibaki, and which was ostensibly engineered to amass the campaign money required to re-elect Kibaki in 2017 (Bedasso, 2015:18-19).

The split within NARC was also caused by disagreement over policy issues. The policy positions contained in the NARC manifesto¹¹ were not the product of broad consultation or participation by the constituent parts of the coalition. The time constraint imposed by the election date led the party to craft policy positions whose implementation could not be guaranteed. Further, the entrenched positions held by the affiliated NAK and LDP on key issues were not harmonized, resulting in different expectations among the coalition partners of how the government's mandate would be executed (Bedasso, 2015: 19).

Despite the challenges faced by NARC the coalition managed to hold for two and half years amid growing discontent, until 2005. The final split was caused by the acrimonious and divisive campaign that surrounded the 2005 constitutional referendum. In the run-up to the referendum, a clear fault line over the proposed new Constitution pitted the two factions of NARC against each other (Bedasso, 2015: 18). The LDP wing opposed the Constitution, citing massive manipulation of the draft Constitution by the government, and the NAK wing supported the draft Constitution as amended by the Wako Committee.¹² During the campaigns for the passage of the new Constitution, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) inadvertently created two symbols – orange for those who were opposed to the Constitution and banana for those who supported it. The orange symbol was soon transformed into the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which eventually became a political party (Ondigi, 2019: 26-27).

In the ensuing campaign, the ODM succeeded in mobilizing nationwide support and emerged victorious in the referendum campaign, effectively defeating the passage of the new Constitution. Upon the defeat of the Constitution President Kibaki swiftly dissolved the Cabinet, a move that was ostensibly intended to purge political dissenters and get rid of the Orange members still in the Cabinet and who had opposed the passage of the new Constitution. The president also began to lure the KANU leadership, led by Uhuru Kenyatta,¹³ who was in

¹¹ The LDP wing, for example, preferred devolution, while the NAK wanted retain the centralised system of governance.

¹² A Committee appointed by President Kibaki and headed by former Attorney General Amos Wako.

¹³ Although Uhuru Kenyatta opposed the constitution, he was reluctant to join ODM Party that had been formed soon after the referendum.

opposition but who had begun to warm up to the government. When Kibaki reconstituted the Cabinet, all the Orange members led by Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka were left out (Ajulu, 2011:40-41), precipitating the formation of a new alliance in anticipation of the 2007 elections and Kibaki's re-election (Ondigi, 2019: 26-27).

3.4.4. The 2007 elections: Party of National Unity and the Orange coalition

The 2005 constitutional referendum set the tone and pace for the 2007 general elections. The polarisation, divisions, and tensions that had emerged during the campaigns by the ODM, allied to Raila Odinga, and the government coalition headed by President Kibaki left nothing to chance as they crisscrossed the country galvanizing voters in an attempt to forge a winning coalition. Realising that the NARC coalition had completely collapsed, President Kibaki and his inner circle immediately began to shop for a "party vehicle" with which Kibaki could contest the 2007 elections. The dilemma faced by the Kibaki side of the divide was how to persuade Charity Ngilu, who was the registered chairperson of NAK but was in the Odinga camp, to give up the leadership of the party. When these efforts failed, those with an interest in Kibaki's re-election registered several new parties, among them ODM-Kenya and the Grand National Union (GNU) to provide Kibaki with a party platform. The problem, however, was that these parties were formed by people who were close to Kibaki—GEMA and "Mount Kenya Mafia", thereby depriving them of national appeal. President Kibaki recognized that to effectively challenge the ODM, which had transformed itself from a mass coalition into a single political party, he needed a party that could appeal to the diverse ethnic communities in Kenya, and regionally across the then eight provinces (Kwatemba, 2008: 102-103). Shortly before the 2007 election, the Party of National Unity (PNU) was formed and Kibaki immediately declared that he would defend his seat on a PNU ticket (Kwatemba, 2008: 102-103). The Orange Movement, too, faced some problems, especially that of transforming itself from a mass movement into a political party. The challenges of managing public expectations and leadership differences within the ODM, reminiscent of the schisms within NARC, threatened the survival of the movement (Kwatemba, 2008: 102-103). The first complication was that, while the leadership was still busy campaigning for the referendum under the Orange Movement, which was then a loose organisation, individuals aligned with the Kibaki government side registered a political party called the Orange Democratic Movement Party (ODM) to pre-empt any such registration by the leadership of the Orange Movement (Kagwanja - Southall, 2009: 261).

As a counter-hegemony, the leadership of Orange registered the Orange Democratic Movement of Kenya (ODM-K) to contest the 2007 elections. However, in the run-up to the elections a leadership row involving two prominent Orange leaders, Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka, created problems for the new party (Kagwanja - Southall, 2009: 261). The bone of contention was who would be the presidential candidate and the process by which that candidate was to be selected. When reconciliation talks failed Raila Odinga entered into negotiations with the leadership of the Orange Democratic Movement, whose leaders agreed to relinquish the leadership of the party. Odinga and the majority of ODM-K members defected to the ODM, effectively weakening the ODM-K and reducing it to just a small portion of the Eastern Province of the country, from where Kalonzo Musyoka hailed (Kwatemba, 2008:104). The 2007 general election, therefore, became a two-horse race involving the Party of National Unity, headed by President Kibaki, and the ODM, headed by Raila Odinga, with the ODM-K, headed by Kalonzo Musyoka, playing the role of a small but crucial “third force” (Kagwanja - Southall, 2009: 261).

3.4.5. The post-election violence and the emergence of the grand coalition government in 2008

On 27 December 2007 Kenya held its fourth general elections since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 (Kwatemba, 2008:103-104). Although the campaign period and election day were generally peaceful, the process of counting, collation, and transmission of results by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), Kenya’s former election management body, was delayed, sparking tension and unrest that cast doubts on the credibility of the process (Kwatemba, 2008: 104-105). On 30 December 2007, the ECK declared President Kibaki the duly elected president, despite bitter protests from the ODM and questions from the European Union’s observation mission about the integrity of the count. According to the ECK, President Kibaki polled slightly over 4.5-million votes, while Raila Odinga garnered approximately 4-million. Kalonzo Musyoka came third, with slightly more than 800 000 votes (Kniss, 2010:7). The announcement of the results sparked violent demonstrations characterized by the destruction of property and ethnically targeted killings and population displacement that lasted for a full seven weeks, with the social-political, and economic consequences lingering for much longer (Neubert, 2019: 9-10).

The post-election crisis in 2007/8 is one of the most significant in Kenya's recent history. The two parties were at odds over the counting of votes. The ruling party, led by Mwai Kibaki, the Kikuyu, Meru (GEMA) coalition, and other factions, were challenged by the Luo, Luhya,

Kalenjin, and other ethnic groups (Kniss, 2010: 7). Both parties claimed victory and opposition candidate Raila Odinga accused the ruling party of rigging the election. After the ongoing protests, tensions escalated and violent fighting broke out, especially in the Rift Valley and other parts of Nairobi (Neubert, 2019: 10).

The crisis precipitated a massive and unprecedented process of reform of the political structure and system. Fearing the potential for a sustained violent conflict a team of Eminent Africans under the leadership of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, aided by Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete¹⁴, brokered an Africa Union (AU)-sponsored peace deal that returned Kenya to some level of stability (Kniss, 2010: 8). The mediation led to the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act which established the Grand Coalition Government, bringing together the two parties (The Party of National Unity – PNU and the Orange Democratic Movement) as the main coalition partners. ODM-K formed a post-election coalition with the PNU, a move that saw Kalonzo Musyoka appointed vice-president (Neubert, 2019: 10).

The hegemonic contest between NAK and the LDP since 2004 has taken place within a crisis historical bloc, an era in which the non-ruling party declared the *third liberation of Kenya*. The crisis historical bloc and the contest for hegemony that has taken place in this context have seen the country removed Moi from power, catastrophic economic collapse marked by historic levels of hyperinflation, and an attending humanitarian crisis. Throughout this period six separate elections were held; all of which resulted in violence and have been less than credible.

The particularly violent elections of 2008 culminated in five years of a government of national unity. This dissertation agrees with Brian Raftopulous's Gramscian categorization of this phase of Zimbabwean history as one of *passive revolution*. The concept refers to a historical phase in which hegemonic forces and those in opposition to them remain static often as the outcome of a war of position by the dominant classes after a war of maneuver by the dominated classes. While the GNU halted the economic freefall of 2007 and led to the drafting of a new constitution and electoral laws; by the end of the power-sharing government's term in 2008, the opposition movement had failed to make good on the momentum of its inception and appeared to have stalled by the end of the shared government's term of office. While NAK hegemony was arguably based less on popular support and consent than on coercion and fraud,

¹⁴ Other members of the team included Kenneth Kaunda, Benjamin Mkapa, Graca Machel and Desmond Tutu.

it is certain that in the aftermath of the 2007 elections the rules of the political game in Kenya had not changed.

In the light of the experience of contestation and subsequent conflict after the NARC MoU, the National Accord was entrenched in the Constitution and its provisions safeguarded both in the Constitution and through an Act of Parliament,¹⁵ thus avoiding the need to solve potential conflicts over the exercise of power and authority (Neubert, 2019: 10-11). The salient features of the Accord included, among other factors, the creation of the position of prime minister, which was earmarked for Raila Odinga, the sharing of executive power between the president and prime minister; the sharing of Cabinet and government positions on a 50-50 basis and consultation in all the affairs of government (Neubert, 2019: 11). The Accord further provided mechanisms for the dissolution of the coalition. Of utmost importance was the constitutional protection of the Accord, which protected it from arbitrary and unilateral interference by the political class.¹⁶ The Panel of Eminent Africans also recommended measures to accelerate long-term institutional reform of the judiciary, Parliament, the electoral system and, land tenure practices (Kniss, 2010: 9). These were embodied in the Agenda 4 Item.¹⁷ The essence of these reforms was the attempt to re-address historical injustices touching on ethnicity, employment and income disparities (to be implemented over a year). At the center of the Agenda 4 Reforms was a comprehensive review of the Constitution (Kniss, 2010: 9). The constitutional review process began in 2009 and was completed on 4th August 2010, when the country overwhelmingly supported the new Constitution in a referendum (Kniss, 2010: 27). Within the context of electoral reform, the Constitution contained detailed provisions concerning elections and political parties and recommended timelines for enacting election-related legislation. For the most part, the Grand Coalition Government was credited with many achievements. It succeeded in restoring peace after the disputed 2007 election and the violence that followed. It was also instrumental in passing a new Constitution, something that had eluded the country for decades. The Constitution provided a new institutional framework for reform of election management, the state governance system, the distribution and devolution of powers, and the administration of justice, among other elements (Neubert, 2019: 10). Of particular importance was the enactment of the election sector laws that facilitated the 2013 elections. The Grand Coalition government was not without its challenges (Kwatemba, 2008: 106). The two centers

¹⁵ Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act of 2008 and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008.

¹⁶ Decision informed by both the 2002 KANU-NDP merger and the NARK coalition.

¹⁷ The fourth agenda item identified by the panel that involved Comprehensive reforms in the country to readdress past imbalance and inequalities.

of power (President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga) created by the Accord were a constant cause of friction and the legislative agenda of Parliament was often constrained by partisan politics, even though the tenth Parliament passed a record number of laws (Kwatamba, 2008: 100-101). While peace had been restored to the coalition, the government did very little to promote national healing and reconciliation. Malpractices associated with the past, some of which, especially corruption, had become embedded and inscribed as modes of institutional practice were proving difficult to unravel and stamp out (Kwatamba, 2008: 102).

3.4.6. Entrenching party coalition in the law: 2013 elections, Jubilee and CORD coalitions

Before the IEBC, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) was considered a party to the interests of the 2007 incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki, and this discrimination was widely regarded as a major cause of post-2007 / 8- election disputes.

The 2013 elections marked a significant departure from those of the past in several ways. To begin with, the elections were held against the backdrop of the 2008 post-election violence. They were also held under the new constitutional, legal and administrative legislation (Owour, 2012) enacted in 2011 in compliance with the new Constitution (Schulz-Herzenberg, et al., 2015: 1) The complex nature of the 2013 elections was compounded by many factors: the new Constitution introduced a higher threshold for electing the president by providing for an absolute majority and a 25% support threshold across the newly introduced 47 counties (Schulz-Herzenberg, et al., 2015: 1-2). It also introduced new elective offices at the national level and in the devolved government. Undoubtedly, the increased number of elective offices created a logistical nightmare for political parties and the IEBC, as evidenced by the logistical challenges experienced during the elections. The transitional nature of the elections and the fact that the International Criminal Court (ICC) proceedings with the 2008 post-election violence and killings were ongoing at The Hague, compounded the problems.¹⁸

Within the context of coalition politics, the new legal framework provided a mechanism for the structured formation of party coalitions – in a major departure from past practice, in which coalition formation was merely premised on a gentleman’s agreement, the Political Parties Act made provision for party coalitions and set down the timelines for concluding coalition agreements. According to the provisions of the Political Parties Act and recognizing that no political party would make it on its own without forming a coalition or alliance with others,

¹⁸ The ICC indicated six individuals, among them William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta, over the 2007&2008 post-election violence.

preparations for 2013 elections, as with all past multiparty elections in Kenya, were characterised by talk of coalition formations. The two main coalitions (the PNU and the ODM) which had contested the 2007 elections had split and new factions formed within their ranks. In the ODM a split between erstwhile allies Raila Odinga and William Ruto had caused divisions within the party (Khadiagala, 2008:11-12). Ruto declared that he would contest the election on a different party ticket; first joining the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and later the United Republican Party (URP). In the run-up to 2013, the ODM split further when the first deputy party leader, Musalia Mudavadi, defected and formed the United Democratic Forum (UDF). Because President Kibaki was not seeking re-election, having served his constitutional term limit, the PNU split and the affiliate parties that supported the re-election of Kibaki disintegrated into various factions. During the initial stages, ODM Kenya's Kalonzo Musyoka was involved in discussions with Uhuru Kenyatta in a bid to ally. As the election date approached parties that had supported Kibaki tried desperately to woo Kenyatta to seek the presidency on their ticket. Kenyatta, however, rejected all attempts and registered The National Alliance Party (TNA), which he used to contest the presidency (Ondigi, 2019: 27-28).

Another factor that contributed significantly to coalition talks was the ICC trials in The Hague. The ICC had indicted both Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto as co-perpetrators of the violence that followed the 2007 election. The pre-trial chamber of the ICC later confirmed the charges. The unintended effect was to bring together Ruto and Kenyatta, who began to mobilize support around the ICC process. Given the fact that the two leaders come from two large communities in Kenya, their communities were mobilised in solidarity with them. The prayer meetings and the mass rallies addressed by the two leaders convinced them that they could form a formidable coalition to contest the 2013 elections.

Upon leaving the ODM the new UDF leader, Musalia Mudavadi, joined hands with Kenyatta and Ruto in the hope that the two ICC inductees would consider endorsing him to run for the presidency as a compromise candidate. The three leaders were convinced that to defeat Odinga and the ODM they needed to forge a broad-based coalition. The negotiations among the three leaders led to the formation of the Jubilee Coalition but due to disagreement over the presidential candidate, Mudavadi decamped from Jubilee to the Amani Coalition, which brought together the UDF, KANU, and New Ford-Kenya, which fielded Mudavadi as its presidential candidate (Stiftung, 2012:10).

The formation of the Jubilee Coalition effectively locked out Kalonzo Musyoka of the Wiper Party, who had toyed with the idea of forming a coalition with Kenyatta and Ruto. It also sent a strong message to the ODM, where Raila Odinga had been isolated. Odinga was left with no choice but to team up with Musyoka and Moses Wetangula of Ford-Kenya and form the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD).

Another coalition that emerged shortly before the 2013 elections was the Eagle Coalition, headed by Peter Kenneth. In the 2013 elections the Jubilee Coalition, headed by Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, emerged victorious with slightly more than 6.7-million votes and also won the majority of parliamentary and senatorial seats. CORD, headed by Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka, emerged second, with more than 5.3-million votes. CORD also won the majority of the gubernatorial seats – 24 of 47. Musalia Mudavadi's Amani Coalition came third, with 483 981 votes.

Following the Jubilee victory parties aligned to both the Amani and Eagle coalitions hastened to form a post-election coalition with Jubilee. While the justification for the coalition was presented as the need for cohesion and participation in governance the main motivation was to benefit from various government appointments. Soon after the election, the parties signed a coalition agreement with Jubilee, which was deposited with the Registrar of Political Parties (RPP). This coalition increased Jubilee's numerical strength in Parliament to 233 of 349 seats, 16 seats fewer than required for a two-thirds majority. CORD, for its part, resolved to remain in opposition as the house minority¹⁹ (official opposition).

3.5. Hegemony in Kenya

Salem hypothesises that hegemony refers to a process where a particular social force goes beyond its narrow interests to universalise its project to other social forces and subaltern groups. These social forces are within the ruling class itself, but also the subaltern classes (Salem, 2020: 10). Hegemony initially referred to the process by which the working class could overthrow the ruling class and establish itself as hegemonic (Salem, 2020: 10). It was Gramsci's adoption of the concept that saw it being applied to the bourgeoisie (Gramsci, 2010: xi). Although the concept of hegemony dates back to the 19th-century Russian labour movement, Gramsci credits his use of the term to Marx's 1859 text *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy* (Boothman, 2008: 201).

¹⁹ The Constitution of Kenya 2010 provide for the house majority and minority leadership.

Although Gramsci's point of departure was bourgeois hegemony (Thomas, 2009: 223), he did not see it as identical to proletarian hegemony; as De-Smet notes, for bourgeois hegemony consent is created through paternalism and reformist politics; for proletarian hegemony, consent is formed through a continuous and reciprocal exchange between leaders and led (De-Smet, 2016: 88-89). Hegemony goes beyond ideology as false consciousness to instead understand ideology as a political project based on norms, values, and ideas that form a convincing worldview (De-Smet, 2016: 88-89). This worldview is what allows a ruling class to exercise power, particularly material power. Hegemony, then, is the result of the production of consent and the ability of a ruling class to embed coercion within that consent—a “consensual political practice” that differs from brute coercion (De-Smet, 2016: 144). Consent and coercion always exist together, and any deployment of coercion must be grounded in consent; in other words, it must be seen as legitimate. Concerning Kenya, I cite De-Smet writes: “The hegemonic rule of the dominant class can very well rely on a disproportionate use of force (war, occupation, state violence), as long as this is accepted as necessary and in the interest of the common good by its allies,” (De-Smet, 2016: 25). Under hegemony, then, coercion exists but is seen as legitimate or necessary (Gramsci, 2010: xii).

Gramsci's work centers the dialectic between the material and the ideational, explaining his emphasis on coercion and consent: The methodological criterion on which our study must be based in the following: that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways:

as ‘domination’ (*Dominio*) and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (*direzione*). A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate,’ or subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, must continue to ‘lead’ as well (Gramsci, 2010:207).

3.5.1. Hegemony in Colonial state in Kenya

Kwatamba posits that one of the “most enduring attributes of the legacy of colonialism in post-colonial Kenya was a sense of ethnic division that found expression not only in terms of group

identity but also became a mobilizing agent in pursuit of economic social-political and economic interests” (Kwatamba, 2008: 79).

Osaghae argues that the reason why ethnicity is often considered inimical to state and national politics, first, is the point that ethnicity is the hinge of various forms of nationalism, which range from assertions of language and cultural autonomy to demands for local political autonomy and self-determination (Osaghae, 2006: 6). This nationalism, which is learnt by the perception ethnic groups have of themselves as “emerging whole societies” (Horowitz, 1985: 22-36), takes place within or against the state and, as such, competes with claims made by the state (Osaghae, 2006:5). As it were, ethnic groups powerful people who lead and mobilize them, represent rival or alternative sites of power to the state, which are interlocked in a continuous struggle for power, dominance, and hegemony (Osaghae, 2006: 5).

Osaghae maintains that the second reason why ethnicity is crucial to the state of Africa is that, historically, ethnicity has been central to the process of its construction and reconstruction. According to him, this is seen in the manner in which the contemporary state, which is widely regarded as “artificial”, was constructed under colonial rule—the foundation for which this was laid in the colonization pattern and consequences of European trade and political relations with Africa (Osaghae, 2006:7).

Kenya’s social and political economy was shaped by colonialism (Ochieng, 1995: 83) when much of Kenya’s production was exported to Europe but money never returned to develop the country’s economy or its people. Colonialism also established a dual state in Kenya where European immigrants were given large tracts of fertile land while Africans were confined to places reserved for cheap labor. In a segregated system, immigrants were given ways and opportunities to accumulate, while Africans were denied the same. The division of the White Mountains did not just divide Europeans and Africans; Africans in nature reserves were also isolated from each other, where they were treated differently, depending on their perceived level of cooperation. Those communities that cooperated with the colonial administration were treated better than the opposition (Chemengich, 2009: 22).

Stiftung theorises that the colonial state in Kenya was an “exclusionary” and “segregationist” one (Stiftung, 2012: 8). He maintains that state-sanctioned segregation and exclusion, or what Gramsci, calls hegemony and subaltern, was replicated in the major towns where racial segregation went hand in hand with the ethnicisation of African settlements and reserves - (Stiftung, 2012: 8). The imposition of colonial rule in Kenya entailed a process of

Westernisation and capitalist penetration of the African economy, which saw the replacement of the African mode of production with a capitalist one and the integration of African economies into the Western capitalist system but in an exploitative and segregated manner that disadvantaged the former (Stiftung, 2012: 8).

Those areas of Kenya such as Central Province and Nyanza, which were penetrated earlier by capitalism and Western influences developed much earlier than those places where colonization and Westernisation did not penetrate (Ochieng', 1995: 89). Hegemony and subalternity in Kenya, therefore, came into being as a result of the uneven penetration of capitalism and Western influence in the country with the onslaught of colonialism (Ochieng, 1995: 89). The colonial government concentrated development only in some selected regions such as Central Kenya (Kiambu, Nyeri, and Murang'a), Eastern (Machakos and Meru); Western (Kakamega and Bungoma); Nyanza (Kisumu and Kisii); and a few urban areas, namely, Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru. This left vast areas in the Rift Valley, Coast, and North Eastern provinces undeveloped. These areas lagged in education, infrastructure, and agricultural development, despite many of them being ideal for agriculture. Therefore, upon independence, some parts of Kenya were "highly economically developed and modern, while others were still using indigenous modes of production" Ochieng, 1995: 89).

Colonial and post-colonial oppressive provinces in Kenya encouraged the formation of many factions, although their activities often faced severe opposition and severe sanctions from the government. The state often limited and prevented the emergence of political parties and arrested and imprisoned its leaders, thus defeating opposition political parties that would fight economic inequality, political oppression, land division, and other injustices. The Colonial Government established and implemented oppressive and discriminatory policies for the African people, such as the segregation of land, the denial of representation, and slavery, resulting in extreme poverty (Stiftung, 2012: 8). To address this unfortunate situation, Africans are beginning to voice their concerns about organized political parties such as the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) and the Young Kavirondo Association (YKA). These organizations challenged the consideration of African land claims, greater educational and economic opportunities and direct representation in the Legislative Council (Legco). As a result, colonial authorities appointed the first African representative to the Legislative Council (LEGCO) in 1944. A closer look at their activities and programs shows that the groups did not have a national vision and at the same time, significantly, social organizations. The reason for this was that we could not reunite Africans effectively against political oppression, which is why the

creation of such uniforms was the Kenya African Union (KCA), which later became KANU (OchOchieng995: 89).

The Mau Mau uprising and the endless African demands for political freedom and economic opportunities forced the Colonial Government to establish a framework for freedom, enshrined in the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution. The result was that in 1957 elections were held on a small scale. and these have seen eight Africans selected, including Daniel Arap Moi and Oginga Odinga, at LEGCO. To promote unity and continue the struggle for African freedom, eight African members of Legco formed the African Elected Members 'Organization (AEMO) in 1959. Unfortunately, AEMO did not last long. The smaller tribes - the Kalenjin, the Maasai, the Luhya, the Mijikenda, and other coastal tribes - are afraid of being ruled by the larger tribes - the Kikuyu and Luo. The division of AEMO was the precursor to the two major political parties to be formed in 1960, KANU, multi-ethnic, and KADU, multi-ethnic (Opondo, 2014: 61).

3.5.2. Hegemony in Kenyatta's State and the Birth of Ethno-Politics

The post-colonial political history in Kenya has been described primarily in terms of political instability. Just after Kenyan gained independence, rivalries and conflicts occurred among political, military, and ethno-regional groups to establish political regimes, build nation-states, and emerge victorious in elections or disrupt order. In those early days of independence, political instability was the most serious concern for newly established African states including Kenya, rather than political liberty or democracy (Iwata, 2017: 21). Kenyan leaders adopted a more authoritarian political system, such as a one-party system and ethnic hegemonic politics. Indeed, the struggle for state power is a feature of post-colonial Kenyan politics (Opondo, 2014: 61-62). Throughout contemporary Kenyan political history, the concept of power has remained the core issue for understanding Kenyan politics (Iwata, 2017: 21).

The combination of attitudes and strategies and responses to them by different ethnic groups was later to provide a place for future competition and conflict. Colonial authorities viewed the views of some groups as “anti-modern” and ignored them. Therefore, “development” strategies that were designed often benefited some groups at a loss. The “open” areas with more missionary stations received a better and more timely education compared to the “closed” areas (mostly inhabited by nomads) became obsolete. It has been noted that in this process, the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and a few other agricultural communities became the first beneficiaries of modern education. Education was later found to be important as a condition of access to

lucrative careers and other economic activities. But it has also been noted that in the "development" system of colonies some groups take earlier than others. The Kikuyu are said to have been the first to adapt to their social and cultural status through capitalist production (Leys, 1975: 200). This enabled them to move and adapt to a variety of local conditions outside of Kikuyuland in search of economic opportunities, especially land and businesses. Many years later, their violent economic presence would be a source of resentment for “those in power” (Oyugi, 1997: 43).

3.5.2.1. Hegemony: Single-Party Rule in Kenyatta’s state

Following Kenya's independence talks at the Lancaster Conference in 1962, elections were held in 1963 and KANU won a majority of seats. In 1963, the country gained independence, and in 1964, after a constitutional amendment, among other things, ended regional discrimination, Kenya became a republic. KADU was dissolved and some of its members joined Cabinet as a result of planned attacks by the KANU regime (Chemengich, 2009: 22-23).

Ethnicity acquires enormous power to mobilise people when it becomes a predominant identity and means more than just a particular ethnic origin; it comes to define people as speakers of a certain language, belonging to a particular religion, being able to pursue some careers but not others, being able to preserve and express their cultural heritage, having access to positions of power and wealth or not. In short, when ethnicity becomes politically relevant and determines the life prospects of people belonging to distinct ethnic groups, it is possible to mobilize group members to change a situation of apparently perpetual discrimination and disadvantage or in defence of a valued status quo (Wolff, 2006: 31).

The excerpt shows that once ethnicity becomes more than an expression of cultural identity and gets connected to social status, it determines people’s fortunes in life and becomes politicised. It makes it possible for those who feel aggrieved as a result of discrimination and those in power who want to protect their privileges to invoke ethnicity.

In Kenya’s political context, ethnicity was a factor in political competition and the allocation of national resources hence its salience. It was for this reason that the Constitution promulgated in 2010, sought to streamline political parties. It contained a framework for political parties that was principally meant to rid the country of ethnicity-driven political parties. The Constitution also spelled out the devolution of power and resources between the national and county governments and stipulated that the face of the civil service must reflect Kenya’s ethnic diversity (the Republic of Kenya, 2010). Since independence in 1963, members of the President’s ethnic group disproportionately dominated the civil service. First, it was the Kikuyu

from 1963 until 1978, then the Kalenjin until 2002 (Ajulu, 2002). The Kikuyu were resurgent after 2002 until the time of writing (Murunga and Nakong's, 2006). Significantly ethnicity was a determining factor in party loyalty during multiparty elections. Political leaders across the political divide formed political parties and campaigned on the strength of ethnicity. The upshot was ethnic bloc voting. However, Kenya's politics seemed to transcend ethnicity at some points. Chege shows that in 1961, the electorate in the then Nairobi East constituency overlooked ethnic differences and voted for Tom Mboya. Mboya, a Luo, defeated one Dr Munyua Waiyaki, a Kikuyu, despite the electorate being 64% Kikuyu (Chege, 1981: 76). The electorate in this particular constituency evaluated the two candidates based on leadership qualities.

In the 1950s, Oginga Odinga led a campaign calling for the release of Jomo Kenyatta and others from detention (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980: 16; Morton 1998: 88-9). However, Morton linked this call to a power struggle within KANU in which the Odinga faction tried to use it to neutralize one (Morton, 1998: 102). This nationalist approach to politics had been replaced by ethnic solidarity in which politicians tended to stand by fellow tribesmen regardless of the circumstances. Under multiparty Kenya, a candidate almost stood no chance in a constituency in which his tribe was the minority. Although referring to Africa generally, Meredith offered insight into the above question. He observed that in the first elections before independence, African politicians conducted politics around national identity thus, candidates were voted for regardless of ethnic belonging. However, the issue of access to state largesse in the form of scarce resources heightened the political stakes. The result was that some politicians abandoned policy-oriented politics and resorted to canvassing for electoral support along ethnic lines (Meredith, 2006: 156). Meredith argued that politics took an ethnic form because of a lack of class identity among African societies (Meredith, 2006: 156).

I contend that ethnicity was the most significant variable under Kenya's multiparty democracy because competition for state resources had made it hard for politicians to devise alternative bases for political organisations such as class. Hyden acknowledged this point when he argued that the influence of "community-centred networks" in African politics was due to the inability of class-based identity to dislodge kinship ties (Hyden, 2006: 55). Ethnic divisions among the first generation of Kenyan politicians over the control of the state had two significant outcomes. It led to the assassination of Tom Mboya and the political marginalization of Oginga Odinga, both politicians from the Luo community. Mboya, an astute politician, had been a key player in the political neutralisation of Odinga by Kenyatta's allies. The two politicians battled for

political supremacy within the Luo community (Maloba, 1995: 18). Kenyatta's allies perceived Odinga as a threat to their hold on power. He could mobilise political support and create an alternative political powerbase, as opposed to the politics of wealth accumulation, and remained among a tiny group of Kenyan politicians inclined towards ideological politics. Kenyatta's close allies led by Mboya frustrated Odinga out of the government. Odinga resigned in 1966 as both the country's and KANU's Vice President and formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU) (Morton, 1998: 125).

Mboya's ability to garner support among Kenyans of diverse ethnicities in the 1960s posed a political threat to Kenyatta and his close allies and he was a front-runner in the Kenyatta succession. In addition to being endowed with political acumen, Mboya had financial backing from America (Ochieng, 1995: 101). After the Kenyatta inner circle had used him to neutralize Odinga, they dispensed with him. He was assassinated in 1969, allegedly at the behest of some influential individuals in the Kenyatta government (Muigai, 2004: 213). The Luo who had split their loyalty between Mboya and Odinga closed ranks and rallied behind Odinga (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980: 18). Mboya's assassination threw a wedge between the Kikuyu and Luo communities and contributed to the politics of resentment in Kenya thus the confrontation between Odinga's Luo supporters and Kenyatta when the latter visited Kisumu in 1969 (Owuor and Rutten, 2009: 313). The side-lining of Odinga and his allies and the physical elimination of Mboya were meant to create room for exclusive access to power and attendant economic advantages for the Kikuyu elite. Subsequently, polarised did the political landscape become that it difficult for Kenyans to conduct policy-based politics. Ethnicity became the ideology²⁰ that informed political choices. Kenyatta was considered as founding father of Kenya yet I reason that he contributed to sowing the seeds of Kenya's postcolonial division and instability. The challenges bedevil as exclusionary politics based on tribalism, regional inequalities because of crooked allocation of national resources in favour of the President's region, and lack of national identity required to harness Kenyans' energies and talent for the attainment of economic progress were reinforced under the Kenyatta regime. Disregarding the rule of law and manipulating serve the interests of the ruling elite was part of Kenyatta's legacy. The Kenyatta state randomly amended the Constitution to achieve the political and economic ends of himself and his allies (Ochieng, 1996: 104). The legacy of

²⁰ Ekeh, (1975) refers to ideologies as conscious distortions or perversions of truth by intellectuals in advancing points of view that favour or benefit the interests of particular group for which intellectuals act as spokespersons (Ekeh, 1975:94).

colonialism in the form of a politics of regionalism remained intact. Under Kenyatta, the ethnic hegemony of one group, the Kikuyu and their allies (GEMA) over others occurred and led to a kind of ethnic exclusion that prevented an overall national vision from developing to resolve the problems of development. Ethnic politics dominated the post-colonial period and blocked the process of developing an equitable politics that might have produced a society that met the needs of Kenyans irrespective of ethnic differences. The hegemonic politics that emerged was based on ethnic alliances that excluded some and thus benefited certain regions over others.

Through speech, Kenyatta tried to portray himself as a nationalist who detested tribalism. He spoke in favour of ethnic diversity. However, the Kenyatta regime was biased towards the Kikuyu and the other closely related Meru and Embu tribes. This contradicted his nationalist rhetoric. Two years into independence, Kenyatta appeared to confront tribalism:

Tribalism is the ready-made weapon in the hands of the enemy of our Nation. This is why I will never be able to compromise with the tribalists. It is true that each of us belongs to a tribe and that we cannot change our tribes, but we must suspect the motives of those who masquerade as leaders, but yet appeal to tribal emotions. We must condemn those who seek to exploit such emotions for personal support and prestige. We must disown those who try to put one tribe against another, either by pretending to defend the interests of their tribe or by generating hate and dislike of one tribe or group of tribes. These are the actions that the colonialists and their Agents used when they fought against African Nationalism. I am telling you today that no one can be both a true nationalist and a tribal politician at the same time (Speech by Jomo Kenyatta during Kenyatta Day celebrations in 1965: 361).

The speech portrays Kenyatta as a politician who strove for an ethnically cohesive Kenya in which ethnicity was subsumed under national identity. Kenyatta favourably contrasted himself with his opponents, whom he accused of spreading tribalism. However, Kenyatta's legacy was built on colonial ethnic balkanisation and exposed a lacuna between political pronouncements and corresponding action. Muigai suggests that Kenyatta "entrenched ethnicity as the most dominant basis of political mobilisation" (Muigai, 2004: 215). Karimi and Ochieng "writing more than twenty years earlier, showed how the Kenyatta regime had exploited ethnicity to survive (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980: 15-23). Kenya in 2012 is yet to overcome this legacy. Kikuyu politicians particularly from Kenyatta's Kiambu home district dominated during his period in power. Politicians belonging to this inner court earned the sobriquet, the "Kiambu Mafia" (Leys, 1975: 246). The moniker connoted the ruthlessness with which they pursued their political and economic ends. It entailed physically eliminating perceived opponents and politically neutralising others through detention. Kenyatta's inner circle was composed of both political and economic allies and family members. His close political allies came from the

Kiambu district and other parts of the Mt Kenya region whom Karimi and Ochieng referred to as “the Family” (with a capital “F”) because they were united by financial and political interests. This group was distinguished from “the family”, Kenyatta’s immediate relations by blood and marriage (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980: 15). The exclusionary exercise of state power by these groups elicited resistance from excluded politicians some of whom were Kikuyu (Ajulu 2002: 261; Muigai, 2004: 211). Karimi and Ochieng argued that the “Kikuyu community at the time was not homogeneous since there had been internal rivalry along regional lines between those from Kiambu and Kikuyu from other districts and between the colonial collaborators and “freedom fighters” (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980: 41-3).

Omolo observed that the Kenyatta state was biased towards Kikuyu in access to the state’s bounty, capital for private business and public appointments (Omolo, 2002: 221). He cited two appointments in the academy and one in the Provincial Administration to support his claim. He mentioned Kenyatta’s appointment of Dr. Josephat Karanja as the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nairobi at the expense of several senior academics from other tribes and the appointment of another Kikuyu, Koinange, who had a certificate in education, as the college principal of Kenyatta University, Kenya’s second university which opened in 1972. Kenyatta appointed yet another Kikuyu, also a Koinange, who had no formal education as the Provincial Commissioner (Omolo 2002: 221). Thus, critics of the regime derisively referred to Kenyatta’s rule as the “Kikuyunisation” of the Kenyan state (Omolo, 2002: 221; Murunga, 2004: 187-178). These appointments were indicative of a regime that seemed to have no regard for ethnic sensibilities. This discriminatory exercise of power validated Horwitz’s cynical claim that „ethnicity entailed not the collective will to exist but the existing will to collect“ (Horowitz, 1985: 104).

During the first half of Kenyatta's administration, the country experienced significant economic growth. Kenyatta spoke with his mouth about "African Socialism", as KANU's economic policies were strangely formulated when the government published his economic vision as "Sessional Paper No. 10" in 1965 (Meredith, 2011: 264-265). Kenyatta adopted capitalist policies, which support western countries and strongly opposed policies close to anything close to what was widely understood as socialism (Matanga, 2000: 8). The clear distinction between African Socialism and Marxism noted in Sessional Paper No. 10 explains in detail why the Catholic authorities in Kenya accepted the document, with Archbishop McCarthy declaring on behalf of the Catholic Church that “we recommend that our people accept and distribute it

everywhere. in our country, because it will be the cornerstone of the development of a free and united Kenya nation.”

Although Kenyatta's economic policy was socialist in name only, those who favoured real redistribution, including Odinga, were called communists and oppressed (Meredith, 2011: 264-265). Instead of expropriating large tracts of land to satisfy the landless Kenyans, Kenyatta made a systematic change of ownership in an area called the White Highlands, buying European immigrants and overseeing the resettlement of land left by those immigrants (Gachanga, 2012: 2). The Kenyatta government handed over most of these lands to other Kikuyu people, creating endless conflicts with groups such as the Kalenjin with ancestral claims on the land. Almost all of the country's landowners were indigenous during Kenyatta's presidency, and government policies helped transfer much of the country's economic, rural and urban activities, into the hands of Kenya (Hornsby, 2013: 194-195).

Thus, the politics of the competing party in Kenya became temporary after independence. In March 1966, the Kenya People's Union (KPU) was formed as a result of ideological divisions, leadership struggles, and suppression of divisions within KANU (Meredith, 2011: 266-67). Later, the KANU stage adopted a constitutional amendment, which required members who defected from the party to win the election by whose ticket, to seek new authority. This has affected 29 members of Parliament who support the KPU. The election was so rigged that only nine members of parliament were elected, including Oginga Odinga. The KANU government continued its oppressive attacks on the opposition and in 1969 the KPU was shut down (Opondo, 2014: 62).

In Kenya, negative ethnicity got renewed impetus after independence. The Jomo Kenyatta regime began well but after consolidating power and hegemony in 1964 through constitutional amendments, embarked on Kenyanisation of the economy, which turned out to be hegemonic ethnicisation (Meredith, 2011: 266-67). From 1966, when KANU became the most important political party in Kenya, to 1978, when Kenyatta died, ethnicity in Kenya was displayed in an innumerable way—this was visible in public appointments and political formations. In Kenya, your name suggested your ethnicity and region (Opondo, 2014: 62).

Ethnicity was also seen in resource allocation. The president's region had the best schools, roads and industries. Senior government positions were appropriated on ethnic affiliation tensions rather than merits leading to discontent and ethnic tensions across the country (Opondo, 2014: 62).

Opondo argues that Kenyatta perfected the art of side-lining his colleagues, political assassination, and manipulating the electoral process in favour of the incumbency (Opondo, 2014: 62). The fragmented opposition politics, in particular, meant that the KANU has enjoyed hegemonic—if not wholly unchallenged—status at the national level since independence (Chemengich, 2009: 22-23, Gifford, 2009: 34-35 and Wanyande, 2009:10-11). As Chabal notes, “the success of the state’s hegemonic drive-in post-colonial Africa has depended not so much on the exercise of what appeared to be its power as a state but rather its ability to minimise the threat of counterhegemonic politics” (Chabal, 1994: 226). What has occurred in Kenya has been two-prolonged hegemonic to this point: the potentiality of the traditional leaders as a counter-hegemonic site was destroyed early on in the post-colonial dispensation and, perhaps just as importantly, the opposition’s ineptitude and factionalism has resulted in the emasculation of credible alternatives to the KANU—helping to sustain one-party domination in Kenya (Chemengich, 2009: 22).

Exercising the economic and political influence that came with them during the Kenyatta era, the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu groups, but mostly the Kikuyu took advantage of the situation and set up numerous land acquisition companies (Gachanga, 2012: 4-5). These companies, in the 1960s and 70s, will facilitate the settlement of hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu in the Rift Valley, especially in the arable regions especially Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Nandi Trans-Nzoia and Narok (Gachanga, 2012: 5). However, the Kikuyu, the Embu, and the Meru were not the only ones to acquire land in the post-independence Rift Valley. Newcomers to the post-independence era included the Kisii, Luo and Luhya, who migrated and bought land along the border of these regions (Opondo, 2014: 62-63).

These new settlements continued despite opposition from the indigenous people of the Rift Valley. The Nandi, in particular, staged a mass protest during the 1969 Nandi Hills summit, known as the "Nandi Declaration" after a meeting of prominent Nandi political leaders to defend what they considered to be their attacks. ancestral land by outsiders. Knowing of these protests even before the "Nandi Proclamation" the Kenyan government relied on the great Kalenjin in the government to reduce the political opposition of the immigrant (Gachanga, 2012: 7). And no one other than the then Deputy President (Kalenjin) would play a leading role in this strategy. But as the end would be. He was the same Deputy President, who found himself as the President of the country, who would have to deal with a special racial conflict arising from the hegemonic policy that he had contributed to its implementation (Gachanga, 2012: 7). During his tenure, Moi faced attempts to overthrow the government to oust him by

low-level Air Force personnel led by Senior Private Grade I Ochuka and supported by university students (Opondo, 2014: 62).

Although Kenyatta did not instigate ethnic clashes, he targeted eminent persons from ethnic groups that he felt were a threat to his leadership. Many people were assassinated including Pio Gama Pinto (Kenyan Indian), JM Kariuki (Kikuyu), Tom Mboya, D. O. Makasembo, Arwings Kodhek (all Luo), Ronald Ngala (Mijikenda of Coast), Seroney (Kalenjin) among others. This was a strategy that Moi also adopted at the height of his reign when prominent were assassinated or died in mysterious circumstances (Gachanga, 2012:2; Opondo, 2014: 62).

In 1969 two separate but related incidents upset President Kenyatta's position. On July 5, Tom Mboya, Kenya's Minister of Economic Planning and Development, was shot dead while on duty in Nairobi (Ajulu, 2011: 36). The prominent politician has been a major contender for Kenyatta as president (Meredith, 2011: 266-67). Mboya was a Luo, one of the largest tribes in Kenya, and its home was in the western part of the country. His assassination sparked shock and outrage throughout the country, especially in the Luo community. Guessing his assassination identifies the Kikuyu group around Kenyatta (Rhodes, 2014: 106). Tom Mboya, a former Luo Minister of Labor and a close friend of Kenyatta who was instrumental in the destruction of the KPU, was assassinated, presumably on Kenyatta's orders (Morse, 2013: 116).

In the early 1970s factions emerged within KANU between Kenyatta's close circle (also known as the "family") and a new populist coalition.²¹ As evidence regarding the disparity between the Kikuyu (and especially the Kiambu) and other Kenyans grew, an oppositional force in parliament led by J.M. Kariuki, John Marie Seroney, Charles Rubia, and Martin Shikuku emerged (Ajulu, 2011: 37). As a counterforce, in 1971 Kikuyu factions formed an ethnic welfare association outside of the confines of the party known as the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (GEMA) (Ajulu, 2011: 37). GEMA pushed for the formation of a stronger ideological party, partially as a way to secure Kikuyu's hegemonic interests. Kenyatta's response was in the form of stock purchases in GEMA-owned corporations. Nevertheless, as

²¹ The family faction literally consisted of members of Kenyatta's family to which he had married into, Three of Kenyatta's brothers-in-law served in state as did two of his nephews, his son and daughter. Most notably, Mbiyu Koinange—the MP for Kiambu and Minister of State—was Kenyatta's brother-in-law and held a prominent and untouchable (Widner, 1992:76).

with the KPU, ideological attacks were not tolerated and repression was used to end the populist opposition.²²

Three months later in 1969, ethnic animosity between the Kikuyu and Luo was manifested when Kenyatta visited Kisumu to officially open the New Nyanza Provincial Hospital. The town residents went into an anti-Kenyatta fury, pelting the presidential motorcade with stones after a public quarrel between Kenyatta and Odinga at the opening ceremony (Ajulu, 2011: 36). Kenyatta's security forces responded by firing on the crowd— and along the highway from to Kisumu to Kericho—killing thousands of people in what is referred to as the “Kisumu massacre” (Gachanga, 2012: 2-3).

3.5.2.2. Birth of Historic Bloc Hegemonic Oathing in Kenyatta's state

Under the Kenyatta regime, ethnicity shone and diminished depending on the opportunities and threats that the regime encountered. Although the “the Family” and “Kiambu mafia” benefited almost exclusively from the extractive hegemonic politics, whenever the regime faced criticism from other communities, it thrashed up ethnic sentiment among the Kikuyu (Meredith, 2011: 266-267). When the regime was suspected of involvement in the assassination of Tom Mboya, Kikuyu politicians responded to the near countrywide anger by organising oath-taking rituals to bind the community so that they could defend “their presidency” (Nyong'o, 1989: 245, 247). Atieno-Odhiambo argued that although the Kiambu politicians mobilised the Kikuyu to swear not to allow the presidency to leave the community, the oath was meant to ensure that the presidency remained within a certain clan from the Kiambu district (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996: 42-3). Those who were ferried to Gatundu, Kenyatta's home, took the oath and swore that “the flag of Kenya shall not leave the house of Mumbi”, i.e., Kikuyuland” (Ochieng, 1996: 102). These politicians exploited ethnic sentiment for economic and political capital. They were driven by self-interest so much that they defined ethnic belonging to the exclusion of not only other Kenyan tribes but also Kikuyu who did not belong to Kenyatta's clan (Meredith, 2011: 266-267). Responding to the anti-Kikuyu sentiments that pervaded the country and especially the political opposition from the Luo community, the last part of 1969, the election year, saw a series of "sworn" ceremonies among members of the Kikuyu party (Hornsby, 2013: 208).

²² This coalition was noted as essentially cutting across ethnic identity. However, by 1975 it's leader J. M. Kariuki had been assassinated and other members like John Seroney, Martin Shikuku, Waweru Kanja, Mark Mwithaga and Charles Rubia were detained for several years (Ajulu, 2011:37).

During the Mau Mau uprising, Kikuyu participants vowed allegiance to ceremonies involving the eating of blood and goat meat. In 1969, Kikuyu was encouraged or coerced into participating in similar ceremonies, promising to keep the presidency in Kikuyu's hands (Meredith, 2011: 266-67). Unscrupulous participants were harassed and intimidated. Presbyterian elder beat to death for resisting the practice Many ceremonies took place near the President's home, meaning Kenyatta supported him (Branch, 2011: 85). By the summer of 1969, swearing had spread throughout the Kikuyu community. There have been reports that Meru and Embu, related tribes, were also sworn in, and members of the Kamba (Hornsby, 2013: 211-212).

Although the opposition KPU initially brought the incident to the public by complaining about the parliamentary process in mid-August, the reports were strongly opposed by the government. The Christian churches played a key role in opposing the vows in September (Meredith, 2011: 266-67). The churches reacted to the crisis because of the chaos and confusion caused by the festivals among church members, who were forced to take vows that were not in harmony with Christian morality or were persecuted for their refusal. The church's initial opposition included the "illegal" actions of local clergy and parishioners in those areas that were at the center of the controversy, such as the Catholic bishop Raphael Ndingi of Machakos (Kamba state, one of the forced nations. Taking the oath) (Hornsby, 2013: 208).

Although done for national reasons, this act of swearing represents the greatest threat to the major churches in the province of Kenyatta. The oaths did not benefit the major sects and were a serious threat to the church for some reasons. More importantly, the incident threatened both the lowering of church membership and the lowering of the credibility of the remaining church members (Rhodes, 2014: 113). Much of the rejection of the oath came from sincere Christians who refused to take the oath because they considered it to be inferior to their beliefs. Christians had given similar resistance to the Mau Mau oath in the 1950s. Churches, therefore, see their members and lower-level officials threatened, beaten, and at least in one case executed by oaths (Rhodes, 2014: 113).

For church leaders, permitting the vows to continue would be a constant source of persecution for their members. In addition, some Christians withdrew from pressure and took the oath, resulting in problems of faith that disrupted their participation in their churches (Rhodes, 2014: 113). If allowed to do so, Kikuyu pledges of allegiance would discourage many church members from continuing to participate in their churches, which could have a lower impact on

the number of donations that churches can make to their members. The vows were intended to protect Kikuyu's loyalty to the KANU government in the face of political opposition (Rhodes, 2014: 113). So, they were very divisive, and this outburst of nationalism threatened to affect the church members' ability to meet and worship together, as did dividing those who chose to take the oath of allegiance and those who objected for moral reasons. This would represent a major decline in the loyalty of the members, who were encouraged and encouraged to embrace the racial hatred against the doctrines of love, unity, and solidarity that formed the core of church doctrine (Rhodes, 2014: 113).

3.5.3. Hegemony in Moi's state: Consolidation of Ethnic Politics

President Daniel Arap Moi acceded to power in 1978 after the death of Jomo Kenyatta. He inherited a centralized decision-making authority. The shift from Kenyatta to Daniel Arap Moi saw KANU assume a hegemonic place in Kenya politics—political careers began and ended with KANU (Kwatemba, 2008: 81). Moi centralised power in his person and the party became the center of political conflict—even ordinary Kenyans could only ignore KANU at the pain of personal grief (Kwatemba, 2008: 81). New president Daniel Arap Moi took some significant and deliberate steps to reinvigorate KANU as a hegemonic political party. Widner (1992) has gone so far as to argue that Moi successfully established a party-state in Kenya, although not to the same extent as TANU did in Tanzania (Widner, 1992: 88). However, Morse (2013) contends that a closer assessment of what Moi did with KANU reveals that the reforms did not fundamentally change the party's poor structural articulation or narrow social robustness established during the Kenyatta period (Morse, 2013:121). KANU became an increasingly important coercive tool of public monitoring rather than an institution for retaining elites (Ajulu, 2011:39). Under Moi, the party became much more explicitly allied toward the interest of Moi's own Kalenjin ethnic group and an alliance of smaller tribes at the expense of the Kikuyu and Luo (Morse, 2013:123).

A KANU membership card became almost essential for advancement in the civil service or access to loans and other state services (Throup - Hornsby, 1998:37). Moi went on to consolidate power in the executive branch of government especially following the attempted coup against his government in 1982 (Omulo, 2017:17). While the coup disrupted the country's economic and political affairs it strengthened Moi's reign and authority. In fact, in 1982, a constitutional amendment made Kenya a de jure single-party state. As part of the consolidation of presidential power, another constitutional amendment was passed in 1988 which gave

president Moi the power to remove and appoint members of the Public Service Commission, the Judicial Service Commission and the judiciary (Chemengich, 2009:24).

Moi, who had served as vice-president for 11 years, ascended to the presidency after Kenyatta's death. He made no pretence of bringing in the social-political, and economic reforms for which Kenya was crying out after the bruises inflicted by his predecessor in the form of state repression, political assassinations and the marginalisation of certain communities, mainly the Luo, Luhya and Kikuyu (Kwatamba, 2008:81; Gifford, 2009:13; and Gachanga, 2012: 4).

Moi stated from the beginning that he would follow Kenyatta's style—his slogan was "*Nyayo*" which in Swahili means "footsteps". Nevertheless, with time, the "footsteps" ideology changed from Moi following in the footsteps of Kenyatta to that of everyone else following in those of Moi of which he tried to co-opt the churches (Throup, 1998:38; Gifford, 2009:35). By about 1985 he embarked on centralisation of the one-party state, the party on its way to becoming hegemonic over parliament and ministers (Gifford, 2009:35). Moi's "newfound" philosophy, with the motto "*Nyayo*", with Christian principles: "peace, love, and unity" (Choge, 2008: 108; Parsitau, 2012: 2). These three pillars, Moi argued, had been the driving force behind Kenyatta's leadership since independence; and now he, Moi, would incorporate them into his style of governance. Moi's action, argues Omulo (2017:17), was a complete antithesis of his words—at least as far as the Luo and Kikuyu "ethnic groups" were concerned (Omulo, 2017:17). The incorporation and emulation seem to have mainly centred on the negative aspects of Kenyatta's rule (Omulo, 2017:17).

On assuming power, Moi, a Kalenjin from Rift Valley province also embarked on taming the Kikuyu. His first cabinet reflected national representation while reducing the numerical strength of the Kikuyu in cabinet and the provincial administration. He attempted to woo back the Luo from the political wilderness by luring Odinga with a job as a parastatal chief. Moi reinforced the politics of hegemony and dominance, endangered unprecedented corruption in the Kenyan political system (Opondo, 2014:63).

It can be argued that excessive authorization and self-determination of the Moi state partially defines the involvement of these opposition political parties and their representation in all politics. However, it is also important to recognize the role of the international community in empowering the public, by spending more money, to address the Kenyan government on local political issues (Chemengich, 2009: 23-24).

The failed coup attempts of 1982 were probably the most important turning point in Moi's consolidation of power and hegemony. It enabled him to dismantle Kenyatta's security apparatus and replace it with his own—though the extent of his success remains debatable (Ajulu, 2011:38). Throup (1989) asserts that as late as 1986 Moi had not established hegemony over the armed force. At the same, he brought back detention without trial, and dominance and hegemony once again became a pillar of political order (Ajulu, 2011: 38).

Patronage and resources came to be concentrated in Moi's ethnic group, the Kalenjin in general, and the Tugen in particular, a process that coincided with the consolidation of his hegemony in the aftermath of the coup attempt (Ajulu, 2011: 39). Additionally, Moi, like Kenyatta, politicised the allocation of public and private investments—roads, educational infrastructure, and agricultural investments were directed mainly at Moi's political constituency. The new power thus became self-consciously a Kalenjin hegemony; institutions previously dominated by the Kikuyu were "Kalenjinised" (Ajulu, 2011: 39).

Moi targeted Kikuyu's capital by closing down Kikuyu-owned banks which he perceived as a threat to his political dominance. The Kikuyu elite blamed Moi for the economic problems in the coffee industry, tea factories, and Kenya cooperative creameries in the central province (Ajulu, 2011: 39). Nonetheless, Kikuyu continued to dominate in non-political spheres such as the transport business, hotel, and real estate, and so on. The rise of nepotism and ethnicization of power provoked the Kikuyu elite and other marginalized communities to attempt a coup d'état in 1982 (Gachanga, 2012:3). However, the coup failed, which in turn increased ethnic animosity, particularly between the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo. Moi favoured the Kikuyu less and increased his support for the Kalenjin elite. However, Moi realized that the numbers favoured the Kikuyu (22%) compared to his ethnic group –Kalenjin's (12%), which is an important aspect of multiparty politics (Kagwanja, 2010: 87). As a result, through the *madoadoa*²³ policy, Moi's regime fostered land clashes in the Rift Valley that mainly targeted Kikuyu as 'foreigners' in the region. For the remainder of his single party era, Moi supported Kalenjins through education opportunities and lucrative jobs in government (Kagwanja, M. P. and Southhall, Roger, 2010). Access to resources—university education, state, and employment in parastatals—depended on whether one was recognised by the government as a member of "KANU" ethno-hegemonic" (Gachanga, 2012:3).

²³*Madoadoa* means Stain in Swahili.

Between 1992 and 2002 KANU contested narrowly won elections with high levels of electoral coercion, eventually leading to its defeat at the polls by an opposition coalition known as the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) (Gifford, 2009:16). The transition to multiparty elections was pursued reluctantly by Moi. Political opposition was multifaceted and included a younger generation of mostly lawyers (known as the Young Turks), various church groups, and expelled KANU elites like Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, and Martin Shikuku (in addition to long-standing opposition figure Oginga Odinga). Moi's reaction was heavy-handed. In February 1990, Foreign Minister Robert Ouko was found murdered, sparking rumours of political assassination (Meredith, 2011:401).

On July 4, 1990, Matiba, Rubia, and Odinga's son, Raila were detained under the Preservation of Public Security Act. Three days later on 7th July 1990, an opposition rally was violently dispersed leaving over 20 people dead and 1,000 injured (called the *Saba Saba*²⁴ protests) (Meredith, 2011:401). In August regime critic Bishop Alexander Muge was killed in a car crash, again rumoured to be politically motivated. In May 1991, Oginga Odinga was arrested after attempting to register a new political party (The National Democratic Party) (Gifford, 2009:35-36).

These developments, compounded by a severe economic downturn and continental political changes, brought further pressures upon Moi and KANU. Already in June 1990, Moi had appointed Vice-President George Saitoti to seek ways to reform KANU and limit the public's outrage. This led to the end of the queuing system and 70% primary rule, created a new KANU disciplinary committee, ended party expulsion, and created the position of KANU Vice-Chairperson. But, by mid-1991 the opposition had unified and founded the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD). FORD, explicitly a forum and not a political party, arranged several mass rallies throughout 1991 (Gifford, 2009:34). Foreign pressure also stepped up when in September 1991 the entire Paris Club suspended the balance of payments support for six months. Later that year KANU held a special delegates conference and repealed Section 2(a) of the constitution, paving the way for elections the following December (Gifford, 2009:35-36).

²⁴ *Saba* means Seven in Swahili.

3.5.4. The Counter-Hegemonic Archetype— a call for a Second Liberation in Kenya

The counter-hegemonic archetype might take some forms, including movements that seek to engage and transform the state (insider strategies) and those that seek to oppose it more directly, either through distributed forms of struggle or more traditional class-based coercive resistance (Davies, 2010:25).

The 1982 Kenyan coup d'état attempt was a failed attempt to overthrow President Daniel Arap Moi's state. At 3 A.M. on Sunday, 1 August 1982, a group of soldiers from the Kenya Air Force took over Eastleigh Air Base just outside Nairobi, and by 4 A.M. the nearby Embakasi airbase had also fallen (Omulo, 2017: 17).

From 1990, Kenya underwent a series of profound political changes, culminating in multiparty politics, which resulted in a political struggle between different political leaders. This period was marked by power brokers exploiting their ethnic backgrounds to drum up support to political pluralism, ethnic suspicions, hostility, and witch-hunting have culminated in 1992, 1997, 2007, 2013, and 2017 massacres in Kenya, destruction of property, social-economic uncertainty and insecurity (Opondo, 2014:62).

In 1991, section 2A was abolished and Kenya became a multi-party state. Many groups emerged to overthrow KANU from power. Most groups were based on regional or racial prejudice. Only FORD started as a large organization, gaining support from many nations and then becoming like a national team (Opondo, 2014: 62). However, FORD's national application was short-lived. As a result of leadership disputes, allegedly sparked by Moi's strategy of separation and governance, FORD split into two factions - FORD-Original and FORD-Kenya, before the 1992 election. FORD-Asili received its strong support from the Kikuyu tribe while most FORD-K supporters came from the Luo and Luhya tribes (Opondo, 2014: 62).

3.5.6. Hegemony Electoral Ethnopolitics in Kenya

Wanyande states that Kenya has held elections from time to time since gaining independence in 1963. This is considered to be the basis on which people's choice of leadership is determined (Wanyande, 2006: 63). Indeed, in a democratic system at the heart of a party or election, elections are a means to an end, a means of influencing the morals and content of leadership, and of building a culture of democracy in the country (Wanyande, 2006: 63). However, Kenya is no longer democratic by holding periodic elections honestly. In fact, for a long time, Kenya was a one-party state and its leadership was often determined by the disregard for actual voting

numbers. In other words, elections are not translated into rational elections in Kenya (Murunga, 2011: 20).

Moreover, the politics of being human or "internal" and "external" of a particular party in power is central to the definition, the timing of deportation or inclusion in Kenya (Okello, 2010: 8). Nevertheless, to maintain their legitimacy, and to regain their authority, these ruling leaders reaffirmed their nationality by stating a speech that divided the Kenyan political community into two factions; "they and us". This division was forced by building two relationships between "personal and each other " (Okello, 2010: 8). In this "real" was KANU, PNU as formed by Jomo Kenyatta, Kibaki, and Uhuru and their supporters. Here the "self" is constructed as the legal representative of the "people". Another "was those who participated in protests against the 2005 referendum and 1966, 1974, 1992, 1997, 2007, 2013 and 2017 elections (Holiday, 2016: 8).

Consequently, nationalism and other ownership have taken a major toll on electoral politics. The question of who is and who is not a member of a racial group plays a major role or is a very important decision on the conduct of the electorate and the type of rights a person wants. Competing nobles divide rights based on who should belong to a particular party or place (Mati, 2012: 1-2).

Ethnic identity is arguably the single most important variable in the Kenyan political arena. Political parties are commonly viewed as ethnic territories while elections are considered to be nothing more than a measure of the numerical strength of ethnic groups. Ethnic identity defines why and how politicians seek, retain, or cede power. This instrumentalization or politicization of ethnic identity is regarded as —the single most intractable problem in Kenya (Murunga, 2011:17).

3.6. The Changing Role of Civil Society in Kenya

Chemengich states that Kenya's social and political problems have their roots in the past. Only in the past can one understand now (Chemengich, 2009: 22-23). According to him, it is therefore misleading to try one definition of analysis or to use used models that do not have theoretical knowledge where a critical study of Kenyan history would make us understand its past and provide a better first place to look at. yet (Chemengich, 2009: 23). Kenya is a more organized and established country than any other East African country, and as a result,

Gramsci's belief in hegemony and domination may be more relevant to Kenya (Chemengich, 2009: 22-23).

Kanyinga, argues that in Kenya, the definition of a social organization is a subject under consideration mainly because definitions are often derived from Western culture and experience. The challenges of using this culture in identifying Kenyan and African communities are obvious (Kanyinga, 2011: 3). Kanyinga assumes that Kenyan civil society organizations are not the same — they include non-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations that organize without government control. Working in this area are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) doing development work, community-based organizations (CBOs), religious or religious organizations (FBOs), trade unions, professional organizations (Kanyinga, 2011: 3).

Okowa suggests that the belief in the centrality of the role of civil society in democracy promotion should be re-evaluated especially in the context of transitional societies like Kenya (Okowa, 2015:86-87). Contrary to the widely held view that Civil society is a platform for citizen engagement with government and other state and non-state actors, there is reason to believe that civil society has become an avenue for simmering hatred and the promotion of divisive schemes by the political class (Okowa, 2015: 86-87). Okowa (2015) maintains that in Kenya just like many south-eastern European countries, ethnic, cultural, and other social differences have become major factors of political instability (Okowa, 2015: 86-87). Therefore, today every aspect of the development plan, appointments to the government or public offices, and or opposition to any government plans and actions are interpreted in ethnic, cultural, and or regional dimensions (Okowa, 2015: 86-87). Additionally, according to Okowa, Civil society institutions in Kenya including the religious groups have taken sides in the political scenery with socio-political support or opposition to the actions of the political class emanating from the same civil society although based on regional or ethnic affiliations. This is manifesting a bigger sociological problem than the prominent issue of ethnicization of politics rendering civil society as part of the problem and in need of capacity building (Okowa, 2015: 86-87).

Bosire, argues that heterogeneity (rather than homogeneity), characterises the majority of states and societies around the world. Kenya is no exception, as it consists of different groups (for example, those based on religion, ethnicity and race) (Bosire, 2014:13). However, a particular form of heterogeneity becomes significant in defining and/or negotiating group-based claims for control of state power if it defines the socio-political (and sometimes economic) fault lines

of civil society (Bosire, 2014:13). In Kenya's case, politicised ethnic identities define the competition for control of state power. As a result, it is almost impossible to discuss Kenya's politics without reference to ethnicity (Bosire, 2014:13), Kenya's ethno-political competition has, over the years, focused on control of the presidency (Bosire, 2014:13). According to Bosire (2014:13), this generally translated presidential elections and national politics into an ethnic zero-sum game. The perception that 'ethnic control' of the presidency (to the exclusion of other ethnic communities) secured state benefits – resources, opportunities, and development – drove the competition for ethnic capture of the state. Failure to capture the presidency was equated to exclusion from development, state resources, and other opportunities. Twisted allocation, in favour of the successive presidents' ethnic communities, fuelled these perceptions which, in turn, made presidential elections deadly political contests (Bosire, 2014:13).

Ethnic identity is arguably the single most important variable in the Kenyan political arena. Political parties are commonly viewed as ethnic enclaves while elections are considered to be nothing more than a measure of the numerical strength of ethnic groups. Ethnic identity defines why and how politicians seek, retain, or cede power. This instrumentalization or politicization of ethnic identity is regarded as —the single most intractable problem in Kenya and is one of the causes of the many political ills that have tormented Kenya's body politic ever since the country gained independence from British colonial rule. Surprisingly, ethnic identity appears to also influence the kind of lawyers that politicians hire to litigate election petitions in the courtroom. According to Kimani (2018), there was a noticeable and —remarkable coincidence between the ethnicity of the individual parties in the main 2013 presidential petition (Raila Odinga v. IEBC, Isaak Hassan, Uhuru Kenyatta, and William Ruto) and their respective lead counsel (Kimani, 2018:13-14).

3.7. Gramsci and Subaltern

Green posits that the term 'subaltern' can be used to represent those groups in society that are marginalised by or subjected to the hegemon or dominant group. While it is not a concept that is systematically analysed in Gramsci's work (Green, 2002: 1-2). Gramsci is not necessarily simply referring to a single group in society. It is used to refer to non-commissioned military groups, those in positions of subordination, and finally to social class (Green, 2002: 1-2). In a discussion of the Catholic Church Gramsci refers to "the subaltern intellectual stratum (primary and secondary school teachers, priests, etc.)" (Gramsci, 2010:125-205). The subaltern is also implicit in Gramsci's references to rural masses and the popular masses (Gramsci, 2010:125-

205). Holliday maintains that, according to Gramsci, the role of the subaltern is fundamental in the process of revolution because without them revolution cannot take place (Holliday, 2016: 6). This is because the “national-popular collective will” cannot be achieved without the inclusion of the masses, the subaltern groups in society, which are to burst “simultaneously into political life” (Gramsci, 2010:132). Indeed, this awakening and development of a “national-popular collective will” exists when there is a ‘Jacobin force’ as there was during the French Revolution (Gramsci, 2010:130).

In the Military, the term “Subaltern” is a British word for someone of inferior rank and combines the Latin terms for “under” (sub) and “other” (alter) (Green, 2011: 387). The term, subaltern, refers to those groups in society who are subject to the hegemony of the ruling classes (Green, 2011: 388). “Subaltern” serves as a coded way of referring to classes such as the peasantry and the working class— social classes other than the ruling class (Green, 2011: 390).

3.7.1. Methodological Criteria for the History of Subaltern Classes

In Volume 3, §90, Gramsci distinguishes between the history of the ruling classes and the history of the lower classes. The history of the regions is the history of the ruling classes. Their history also comments on the interdependence of the ruling classes, and the history of the subdivisions has no personal affiliation but is connected with the history of society. In contrast to the ruling classes, the history of the subaltern classes is marked by a lack of unity. The unity of the ruling classes is found in the empire, and “their history is the history of the provinces. . . . In lower classes, merging does not take place; their history is intertwined with the history of the "community organization"; it is an unrelated history” (Gramsci, 2010: 91):

- 1) The objective form of the subaltern classes through the developments and changes that took place in the economic sphere; the extent of their diffusion; and their descent from other classes that preceded them;
- 2) Their passive or active adherence to the dominant political formations; that is, their efforts to influence the programs of these formations with demands of their own;
- 3) The birth of new parties of the ruling class to maintain control of the subaltern classes;
- 4) The formations of the subaltern classes themselves, formations of a limited and partial character;

5) The political formations that assert the autonomy of the subaltern classes, but within the old framework;

6) The political formations that assert complete autonomy, etc. (Gramsci, 2010: 91).

The six Gramsci counts show the development of a subaltern group from the old to the independent. In Gramsci, it could be "intermediate categories or a combination of several categories." The task of the historian is to record the development of the subaltern phase from the oldest to the complete independent. The history of the sub-party-political party is very complex as you consider the effect of party activities on all sub-classes as a group. There is usually one subaltern group that uses hegemony over other subgroups; "Between these stages, one will use heroism; this should be established by studying the progress of all other organizations, as they incorporate elements of the hegemonic phase or other sub-categories under its strength" (Gramsci, 2010: 91). Gramsci points to the growth of capitalism as a sub-category. The capitalists allied themselves with the state by fighting rival powers and obtaining the active or passive consent of other armies. Gramsci states that the Italian capitalists were unable to unite the people, so they were defeated and failed to reach the point of complete independence: "Even in Risorgimento, this little" egoism "prevented a rapid and powerful revolution similar to that of France. This is one of the most important problems and one of the causes of difficulties in producing a history of subaltern classes" (Gramsci, 2010: 91-92).

3.7.2. Epistemic Knowledge and Marginalization in Kenya

Vahabzadeh posits, in analysing the conditions of subalternity, "it is first necessary to discuss the relationship between marginalisation and epistemic knowledge. Marginalisation is always a by-product of claims to "authentic" hegemonic pieces of knowledge" (Vahabzadeh, 2008:101). Spivak (1987a) observes that "on the operation of marginalisation shows that the claims to authentic knowledge exist in any centre-margin relation. Of which she argues that the centre always tries to present itself as having super-knowledge about the Other such that the logic of appearance of this ontological privilege deters those out of the centre from scrutinising its "transcendental idealism"" (Spivak, 1987a: 103).

3.7.2. Understanding Gramsci's Concept of Collective Consciousness

Gnana, (2017) states that Gramsci identifies two levels of knowledge among young people: one, the one that exists among them, themselves, providing guidance or meaning in their automatic transformation of the world through their work, and the other, that they 'accept' — often at their own expense. who exploit, oppress, and dominate them. Thus, there is a layer of

traditional, free, independent, and free consciousness, and another layer of external consciousness, set apart. This results in a "contradictory understanding" in the subaltern mind (Gnana, 2017: 374). For example the rivalries between Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups. Kanyinga (2013) states that one of the reasons for the fall-out was that Oginga Odinga questioned Jomo Kenyatta's land (grabbing) policies (Kanyinga, 2013: 57). However, as Ogot argues, these ideological differences were turned into rivalries between Kikuyu nationalism (as represented by Jomo Kenyatta) and Luo nationalism (as represented by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga). Atieno-Odhiambo adds that this marked the beginning of an extension or imposition of the Kikuyu notion of civil society to the national political arena. According to Kenyatta and a good number of fellow Kikuyu politicians, Luos (including Oginga Odinga) were inferior citizens of the country (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002: 237; Ogot, 2012). This is because Luos, unlike Kikuyus and a majority of Kenyan tribes, were known not to circumcise. Circumcision marks the transition from childhood to adulthood in the communities it is practised. In addition, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga's KPU was labelled a Luo party by Jomo Kenyatta's regime (Ondigi, 2019: 22).

Gramsci always held the collective consciousness of society close. For Gramsci, it is the collective will that is revolutionary. The Will for Gramsci was always considered to be the collective will of the working class of political will, never the individual will (Hawley, 1980).

3.8. Tracing the Beginning of Ethnic Consciousness in Kenya

Kasika and Nyadera, posit that one of the most persistent aspects of colonial legacy in post-colonial Africa and Kenya, in particular, was the ethnic division that manifested itself both as a group identity and as a mobilising agent in the quest for economic and political gains. The intricate process of group and class configuration merged with the colonialists' attempt to handle traditional societies and their attempt to develop sophisticated capitalist economies in various colonies (Kasika, 2019:164-165). Therefore, according to Leys (1975), it would be "difficult to gain an understanding of the ethnic details in Kenya's political development unless we go back down memory lane to examine the impact of colonialism on ethnic groups' organization" (Leys, 1975:199).

Ethnic consciousness, as well as the intense ethnic rivalry in Kenya's political arena, derives somewhat from how the colonialist established local governments and administrative borders based on linguistic and cultural orientation (Ogachi, 1999:95-96). This was due to the

erroneous understanding of colonialism by Africans based on the idea that Africans organized themselves nationally (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 165).

Kasika and Nyadera (2019) point out that the effects of racial segregation have not had an immediate negative impact, at least on the continent since the catastrophe; it was these nations that worked together to form the liberation movements that drove the Europeans out of Africa. At the time of its establishment, Kenya had more than 40 separate tribes that were independent but now united to form the British Royal Colony under Sir William Mackinnon, and later a series of governors, commissions, and a series of kings. governors appointed by the queen of England take over (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 165).

Kasika - Nyadera observe that some of the ethnic groups under Sir William Mackinnon had already established mutual hostility between them but this did not manifest itself as a threat to the stability of the new nation-state. As such, conflicts are not solely based on cultural differences and cultural homogeneity is not a necessary condition for political stability” (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019:166).

Anderson notes that it was clear that the British exit from Kenya was inevitable, and that the country “was intended for independence, and began to disintegrate among the political elite. Their division played out openly in England during the third Lancaster conferences as the representatives of Kenya African National Union (KANU) which was dominated by the hegemonic ethnic groups, and those of Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) which was representing minority subaltern groups, differed on the post-independence political and economic structure of Kenya” (Anderson, 2005: 548).

Thus, hostility between the two ethnic groups that led to the 1992, 1997 international conflicts and the post-election violence of 2007/08 is a product of both political and racial discrimination, things that can be traced back to the colonial era (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 166). These traits were later acquired by post-colonial political leaders who “failed to instil nationalistic values in their pursuit of sectarianism and self-interest. The burden of racial competition and racial politics was later transferred to the people of their time who also failed in the nation-building project” (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 166).

Hornsby states that “Kenyan politics cannot be understood without understanding Kenyan ethnicity” (Hornsby, 2013: 1). Ethnicity has played a significant role in telling the story about the people as communities and their collective behaviour. It is not, however (and never was) a primordial constant, but instead, an area of conflict that stems from genuine differences of

languages, culture, and economic interests between peoples living within the boundaries of the nation-state (Hornsby, 2013: 1). This struggle for resources at the center has defined and structured ethnic identities. In Kenya, a certain form of ethnic conflict has been enduring despite various attempts to build a national identity (Ogachi, 1999:96). In essence, ethnicity has shaped the political system and has in turn been shaped by Kenya's politicians and the institutions they inhabit. Sometimes this struggle for national identity has been associated with violence. "The problem of ethnically focused political violence in Kenya has come to the world attention in 1969, 1991-1992, 1997 and 2007-8; each time worse than the last" (Hornsby, 2013: 1).

Tartarini posits that in many ways, "the post-colonial Kenya is merely a "child" of the colonial state." It imitated the colonial state in several ways. Firstly, the administration and the civil service became a powerful arm of the executive, which provided the state with legitimacy to enforce laws (Tartarini, 2015:154). The civil service was endowed with the task of safeguarding the interest of the colonial state, which was often equated with the interest of the political elite. To ensure the survival of the colonial state, the civil service engendered laws and policies which in turn choked political freedom and eliminated any form of threat including the formation of political parties. Secondly, the colonial state was formed for economic reasons. Kenya's colonial history supports a form of class-based society, wherein the state created conditions and policies that privileged the accumulation of wealth for a small minority—the colonial elite. The post-colonial state "inherited" these two features. The political elite or the petty bourgeoisie became the central actor. (Tartarini, 2015:154).

Tartarini contends that Kenyan political elites "view themselves as a "class" of their own with a distinct identity and social-economic interest. Unfortunately, the majority of Kenyan subalterns remain "excluded" from political power and state resources" (Tartarini, 2015:154). The new elites (petty bourgeoisie) inherited similar economic and political structures from the departing colonial administration. The coercive power encapsulated in the colonial state was later deployed by the post-colonial state to facilitate the process of primitive accumulation and to maintain law and order. This process continued to generate inequalities over the years (Tartarini, 2015:154).

The 2007 election campaigns started soon after the 2005 referendum. During this period, ODM and PNU both underwent characteristic political and ethnic alignments and realignments. According to Hornsby (2013), most Kenyan political parties "have been reduced to focusing

on the party leader's ethnic group" (Hornsby, 2013: 804). It is clear from the literature on ethnicity and voting that multiparty democracy has strengthened the belief that "to be a Luo was to support Odinga; and to be a Kikuyu was to support a Kikuyu leader such as (Kenyatta, Kibaki or Matiba); to be Kalenjin was to support Moi" (Hornsby, 2013: 804). This is true of the post-election results where 94% of Kikuyus voted for the Kikuyu candidate (Kibaki) and 98% of Luo's for the Luo candidate (Odinga). Kalonzo Musyoka, a Kamba, though he had a lesser chance of winning the election compared to his counterparts with strong voting pull, his ethnic group still backed him up as he received 85 percent of their votes –Machakos constituency (Hornsby, 2013: 804). For this reason, Hornsby observes that "once ethnic cleavages are established, they tend to become self-sustaining" (Hornsby, 2013:804). The Kikuyu-Luo "dichotomy did not exist before 1961 (Odinga versus Kenya); similarly, the Kikuyu-Kalenjin discourse was constructed in the Moi state. These discourses have been transported and manipulated by elites through ethnonationalism political ideology to produce a multiplier effect. Kenya's new generations have largely consumed these ideologies and demagoguery" (Tartarini, 2015: 154).

3.8.1. Subaltern Leaders aspiring for State Power in Kenya

Gramsci stated that the only way the working class can achieve hegemony is if it takes into account the interests of other groups and social forces and finds ways of combining them with its interests (Green, 2011: 388). In other words, the working class will need to build alliances with social minorities, taking into account their struggles against the capitalist class, thus strengthening the position of the working class. The labour process was at the center of the class struggle but it was the ideological struggle that had to be addressed if the mass of the people were to come to a realization that allowed them to question their political and economic rulers' right to rule. (Green, 2002, 2013: n.p.)

Hegemony is exercised in civil society which is a tangle of class struggles and democratic struggles (Gramsci, 2010: 91). Hegemony in civil society must achieve leadership in the sphere of production taken up by the bourgeoisie, controlling the production process and achieving state power. Those who have economic power have a strong link to political power and vice versa. Those who monopolize control over economic production, distribution, exchange, and consumption is the dominant class that has the most power (Green, 2013:119).

A change in hegemony may occur when the dominant class begins to break up, creating an opportunity for the subordinate classes to merge and build up a movement capable of

challenging the weakened dominant class and achieving hegemony (Oyugi, 1997: 46), But, if this opportunity is not taken, then the dominant class has the opportunity to reorganize new alliances and re-establish hegemony (Oyugi, 1997: 46),

Out of fear of the tactics of Matiba, Rubia, and Odingas, the state mobilized Members of Parliament to pass a resolution that undermined the idea of allowing multi-party politics in opposition to the plan to promote racism (Oyugi, 1997: 46). A few months later, as Moi himself attacked critics of the one-party system and threatened with imprisonment (Oyugi, 1997: 46), one-party rallies addressed by KANU MPs were held by non-Kikuyu and non-Luo MPs. places (Opondo, 2014: 64)

The imprisonment of Matiba, Rubia, and Raila instead of the historical pressure that had taken place on the part of the opposition, helped to intensify the state's attacks on civil society and political opposition. As the party grew stronger the idea of forming an opposition party became a reality, when Odinga announced the formation of his National Democratic Party (Wanyande, 2006: 72) which was immediately denied registration. This state response has forced some opposition parties to return to the drawing board. The result was the birth of a coalition of opposition groups (which is not a party in this regard) to motivate people to make changes. Behind the coalition was a group of 'young' professionals and intellectuals in the organization - later called the "Young Turks". Prominent actors include Gitobu Imanyara (lawyer-journalist) Kituyi (Social anthropologist); Paul Muite (lawyer, then chairman of the Kenya Legal Society); Anyang-Nyong'o (politician); James Orengo (attorney); Raila Odinga (Engineer, formerly imprisoned in politics), etc. It is this group that has turned to experienced and well-known politicians to lead the coalition. Interim leadership went to Oginga Odinga, Luo (Chairperson) Masinde Muliro, Luhya (Deputy Chairperson); Martin Shikuku, Luhya (Secretary General); George Nthenge, a Treasurer. Others were Gachoka, Kikuyu, and Bamaritz, a Kenyan of Arab descent.

Founded in July 1991, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy [FORD] in December of that year emerged as a national organization based on the cross-border racial boundaries - Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, Kisii, Meru, Embu (Oyugi, 1997: 46), At that time only the Kalenjin (and related tribes) and the Masaai still clung to KANU. With the establishment of FORD, state opposition is now an organization. Sponsors now also had the opportunity to decide whether to seek change rather than popular support (Oyugi, 1997: 47),

By ensuring that the need for change has the broad support that most people love, donors (both two countries and many countries) are actively involved in the multi-party policy campaign. The following are examples. About a month after FORD was formed, a visiting IMF official made it clear in Nairobi that the Fund preferred to do business with participating participatory governments (Oyugi, 1997: 47). The involvement of the US ambassador, Smith Hempstone, began to unfold. On several occasions, he had to intervene on behalf of arrested opposition politicians (Oyugi, 1997: 47), and when some opposition politicians were arrested in mid-November 1991, fourteen US Congressmen strongly condemned the arrest (Oyugi, 1997: 47). By this time even Britain, which is generally cautious, had begun to take strong action against the regime (Oyugi, 1997: 46),

In a BBC interview, Foreign Affairs Minister Lynda Chalker warned that Western donors would take drastic action (soon to be held by a Paris sponsors' meeting) to ensure President Moi ends one-party rule and respects human rights (Oyugi, 1997: 47). Indeed, when the conference was held, donors decided to withhold financial aid in Kenya pending political change. It was at this point that the relevant KANU structures met in early December 1991 to repeal Article 2 (a) of the Constitution of Kenya, thus effectively ending ten years of one-party rule. But the unity of the opposition parties that contributed to the change did not last long. As the country's constitution was amended to allow for the political restoration of many parties, FORD was registered as a political party. Suddenly personal preferences and racism began to influence the decisions and actions of the group. A month or so later, two new groups with a racial agenda were formed (Wanyande, 2006: 72).

During the 1992 elections, the Kalenjin (President Moi's tribe) believed that the state's operation by the opposition would mean the loss of the economic privilege they had enjoyed for more than a decade (Hornsby, 2013: 597-602). Similarly, every major subaltern character believed that winning their team would eliminate their limited needs. These ideas were contradictory in practice. Indeed, what Wolpe and Nelson say about the Nigerian experience is equally true in Kenya, i.e., the competition for tangible property and therefore controlling the situation that controls access to them accelerates social isolation (Oyugi, 1997: 46).

The 1992 competition was seen differently by actors of lower races. By the consortium of the ruling Hegemon-Kalenjin and their relatives in the Rift Valley, it involved protecting the existing structure of hegemon, right, on the one hand, and the opportunity to be reduced, on the other (Hornsby, 2013: 597 -602). The former rulers - the Kikuyu - provided an opportunity for

"political" economic recovery. For others (Luo and Luhya in particular), 1992 was their opportunity to "eat again" (Oyugi, 1997: 48). Luhya officials were quick to remind the nation of their numerical power (the second-largest post-Kikuyu party since 1969) and therefore their right to fight for the highest political position in the country. The Luo did not hide their leadership claim when the Kikuyu who considered them equal enemies had the opportunity, expecting the opposition coalition to support their claim without challenge (Oyugi, 1997: 48). At the same time, the opportunity to control the State House in the 1992 elections presented to various ethnic groups served as a barrier to good conduct. The rivalries within the opposition party quickly took on national dimensions as each nation gradually came closer to one of them. Contrary to the wishes of ordinary supporters of the opposition parties, reaching an agreement on the one person representing the opposition party to challenge the incumbent president because he is getting farther away over time. Nothing was finally agreed upon (Hornsby, 2013: 597-602).

3.9. "In and Against the State": Gramsci's War of Position, and Kenyan Census

While the idea of removing Moi and KANU from democratic elections became a reality, the FORD struggle also began in earnest. At the same time political officials began to calculate their wealth within the organization, wondering if indeed staying in it would serve their interests individually and collectively (Hornsby, 2013: 597-602). The FORD leadership structure has become a very interesting and troubling topic. Of these six interim leaders, only Odinga, Muliro and Shikuku are nationally known. Others were absent (Oyugi, 1997: 54). Therefore, as one might expect, the first group to develop a sense of concern and denial was the Kikuyu. Their concern was based on the fact that Luo and Luhya in FORD's interim leadership could use the opportunity to take over, and thus enter a leadership dispute during party registration and election (Hornsby, 2013): 597-602).

With the founding of the DP, the Kikuyu masses began to wonder if it was a sign that they had begun withdrawing their traditional FORD support. But the symptoms they were experiencing at the time were mixed. Some of their top FOD dissidents were still standing. These include Kenneth Matiba (a former cabinet minister who had been arrested during a multi-party operation (mid-1990), who was released from prison after suffering a stroke, and in early 1992 was recovering in London after being hospitalized there.) Former vice president J. Karanja, former MPs Charles Rubia, Andrew Ngumba, Maina Wanjigi, Matu Wamae, etc., and others

like Mungai Njoroge on the other hand were returning to KANU after receiving a cold welcome to the opposition party (Oyugi, 1997: 55).

What were the costs and benefits of joining this or that group? This seems to be the challenge that ordinary Kikuyus faced, especially when their leaders were divided between the three major factions - KANU, FORD and DP. Too many people in political Kikuyu cities, Matiba has been seen as their man. He was regarded as a courageous hero who remembered his decision to resign from his cabinet post on policy when he disagreed with the government over the conduct of the 1988 elections. It was also linked to their minds on 7th July 1990 mass disobedience in Nairobi which led to the so-called seven-year riots of that year (Oyugi, 1997: 47).

Meanwhile, the strategy was to push existing FORD leaders to take drastic measures that would tarnish their reputation in the community. One such act involved the instigation of a national strike in April 1992 demanding the release of all political prisoners. The strike was unplanned and failed. Another call to boycott Madaraka troops on June 1, 1992, was also ignored by Kenyans. Now it seemed that the FORD and the entire opposition party were beginning to lose KANU. The incidents have prompted Matiba's supporters at FORD who now see him as the only one who can get the opposition back on track. It was later revealed by secret envoys to Matiba that some of the Kikuyu elites in FORD were still at large. The Week-End Mail (18.2.93) named some of the people involved as Nyanja, Kimani Nyoike, Charles Rubia, Matu Wamae, and Bedan Mbugua. They aimed to prevent Odinga from becoming both FORD chairman and running for president. Matu Wamae on his return from one of his frequent visits to Matiba announced at a public meeting in Muranga town that he had recently visited London by ordering a section inside FORD to see Matiba and that he had found him healthy and well (Weekly Review). 21.2.92: 8). The statement came as Matiba was unable to read and write, according to subsequent revelations from one of the main characters, Nyanja (Kenya Times 30.9.92: 2) who revealed this in Kiambu District following a disagreement between him and Matiba over the FORD. -We do not have leadership. He also pointed out that a new group was formed after the split of the first FORD that took place after Matiba's return to London.

For the Kikuyu, the FORD struggle included directing Odinga; because earlier this year, he had declared his interest in the (regional) president when the Kenyans gave him a chance (Standard 23.1.92). He later reaffirmed his interest on the day Matiba was received as a hero by his followers on his return from London (Oyugi, 1997 :47). Odinga and his Luo supporters,

in particular, have been documented by reminding the Kikuyu that without Odinga's support, Kenyatta could not have been released from prison let alone a presidency (Kagwanja - Southall, 2009: 161). Odinga's Luoness has also been a joke. George Nyanja (later Limuru MP) publicly declared: "Odinga will not lead anyone because he is uncircumcised." It was these forces that defeated Matiba to announce his candidacy for the presidency in February 1992 while he was recovering in London. (Kagwanja - Southall, 2009: 161).

Kagwanja and Southall point out that the last split of FORD took place within two months of Matiba's return to Kenya. His return was arranged by Fiku Kikuyu nobles at FORD to make him more famous. It was hoped that the event would be used as a platform to challenge Matiba's leadership. Some FORD teams will not meet the arrangements and Odinga for example opted out of Nairobi on a day of materialism (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009: 161)

3.9.1. The Fragmentation of the Subaltern power elite and Electoral Crisis in Kenya

Although the previous multi-party elections in 1992, 1997, and 2002 were marred by racial slurs in many Kenyan communities, racial segregation reached a peak in the 2007 elections. Despite the initial unity and popularity of the NARC-led government, party divisions were soon overcome due to disagreements between the LDP and the NAK faction (Ajulu, 2008: 40). This conflict was exacerbated by Kibaki's failure to honour the MoU agreement between his NAK and Odinga's LDP which provided him with an equal share of cabinet posts and other high-level appointments, as well as consensus-based decisions - to form the basis of the NARC coalition.

Subsequently, the Kenyan constitutional referendum of 21 November 2005 divided NARC officials among those who included Kibaki and many government officials, who supported the government-sponsored constitutional framework, and their rivals in the LDP and KANU (Ajulu, 2008: 40). After voters rejected 58.12% to 41.88% of the constitution, (because the government had amassed the previous framework formed by a comprehensive consultation process to increase executive power), Kibaki fired LDP leaders from the cabinet. in a reorganization aimed at strengthening his political authority (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009: 267).

During the 2005-2007 interregnum, the LDP joined KANU to form an opposition coalition, the ODM, and NARC politicians loyal to Kibaki formed a new party, the NARC-Kenya. However, the ODM itself disbanded before the 2007 elections in August 2007 into two separate

factions, the Orange Democratic Movement Party of Kenya led by Raila Odinga and the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K) led by Kalonzo Musyoka (Ajulu, 2008, 40-41). The KANU party led by Uhuru Kenyatta joined the PNU, which was quickly built in September 2007 as a vehicle for Kibaki's re-election campaign (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009: 267). The disintegration of the NARC elite took place against a strong nationalist base based on the revival of racism which supported campaigning and voting during elections and prepared the ground for post-election violence. During the campaign, ODM built on the anti-Kikuyu rhetoric that confirmed its victory in the November 2005 poll (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009: 267). As Chege (2008) sees fit, the party campaign at the grassroots level turned the election into a "forty-one race against one" and "Kenya against the Kikuyu", in which the campaign highlights the strength of the Kikuyu government and the high economic status, which includes banking and trading, and blaming the Kikuyu success on discrimination against other groups (Chege 2008: 133).

In addition to nationality, however, there were aspects of the 2007 election that were different. Cheeseman classifies these four traits. First, Odinga's signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with representatives of the Muslim community for the first time in Kenya's elections turned the religion into a mobilization campaign, driven by the ODM and the PNU in their efforts to win the hearts and minds of both Christians and Muslims. (Cheeseman, 2008: 169). Second, by about 60% of Kenya's 36 million people aged 15 to 35, the growth in the number of young people increased the electoral register by 6 million to nearly 14 million voters. The increase in the number of young voters has turned the generic competition into an important platform for electoral politics, with many young voters favouring the ODM, which campaigned under the sign of 'change.' Despite this, politics continued to revolve around racism (Cheeseman), 2008: 169). Thirdly, the rivalry between the two presidential candidates combined with the recent growth of the private voting industry has seen voter turnout become a contradictory element of the campaign, with politicians challenging or authorizing voting depending on whether or not they stand. their kindness (Cheeseman, 2008: 169). However, as Tom Wolf (in this collection) rightly points out, by voting for opinion polls using different frames, different voting results may contribute to political instability. Finally, the 2007 contest was Kenya's first election to enter the information age, with the proliferation of communication technologies and new voters ensuring that the electoral war, then alive, was fought online via email, emails and especially SMS text. messages. While downgrading the state's ability to control information, new technologies have made the rapid spread of rumours a "reality".

“Never before have Kenyan voters shared so much information related to elections, and it has never been difficult to distinguish fact from fiction” (Cheeseman, 2008: 169).

3.10. Party Types and Indicators

Elischer states that political parties in Kenya are defined as the personal tools of their leaders. Although group constitutions follow complex organizational structures and structures with defined responsibilities, these structures have been described as more theory than true (Elischer, 2008: 6). Since the resumption of the multi-party regime in 1992, few parties have been able to make a living from one election period to another (Amayo, 2007: 2-3). This situation is even more interesting because many of the actors in the leadership positions of successive teams are the same.

Another issue facing Kenyan parties is the lack of internal democracy (Amayo, 2007: 4). Allegations and allegations about party leaders nominating candidates for controversial positions, as well as delegates to party conferences and conferences, respectively. Whether this is a sign of the originator syndrome or other related malaise, is under great controversy and requires further investigation. However, all of these indicators point to significant flaws in the organizational structure of Kenyan political parties (Elischer, 2008: 7-8).

The framework for analyzing Kenyan political parties in the context of this study includes three types of different parties, one race, one coalition, and a multi-ethnic group. These species are based on a typology developed by Diamond and Gunther (2001), designed to divide political parties around the world (Diamond and Gunther, 2001: 4-6). The typology used in this study is a limited edition version of the original Diamond and Gunther. The existence of other forms of the group in Africa, as a group of programs, is not disputed here; instead, the typology type provides only the beginning of the analysis of Kenyan political parties. If the physical evidence shows that the Kenyan political parties were not in line with our comparative framework, then other types of party development would be needed. However, as the discussion below will show, such considerations are not necessary. To distinguish between the three possible group types, the following indicators will be used:

1. Leadership formation: In this study, party leadership refers to senior positions in a political party including the chairman, vice-chairman (or vice-chair depending on the party's constitution), the Secretary-General, and where — where the data is available — the national treasury. Looking at different people at the top of the party brings the benefit of being able to

explain in detail the founding of the party rather than simply looking for a nominee for party president or chairman, as often happens in party manuals. African groups.

2. Group Teams: Teams exist in any organization. Whether groups form international groups, program ideas, productive groups, or powerful individuals emphasizes the importance of race in party politics.

3. National Story: The study measured the party's ability to achieve by comparing the number of parliamentary candidates in each country and province with the total number of constituencies in each country and each province.

4. Party Nationalization Scores (PNS) and Electoral Cleavages. The Party Nationalization Scores (PNS) provide useful ways to compare support for different parties across the country. This alone, however, cannot determine whether a party vote is held by a particular party, especially in situations where regions or provinces are overcrowded. Therefore, the PNS should be analysed in terms of regional racism and election outcomes. It is important to note that no single ethnic group or ethnic group of any kind should seek the full support or even the full support of the injured party. According to Horowitz, "it is the way a group support is distributed, not how a group support is distributed, what determines it" in determining a party character (Horowitz 2000: 293).

Elischer asks how differences between different types of the group can be identified in terms of strengths. He argues that one racist party promotes the interests of one nation and explicitly urges the party to unite politically under its national flag (Elischer, 2008: 8). So, in terms of its leadership structure, it is the same. All of its leading figures come from the same nation or ethnic group with similar cultural backgrounds. Thus, their factions do not represent racial divisions but rather generational divisions ("Young Turks" versus "Old Guard") or power struggles between certain individuals in the group (Elischer, 2008: 8). The ability of the candidate to place candidates is limited to the area (s) where the injured party is located. Equally, its PNS is relatively low; election results often quickly identify which races they represent (Elischer, 2008: 8).

Elischer emphasizes that, concerning the various ethnic groups, there is currently a growing tendency in the literature to look at many African political parties as such (Elischer, 2008: 8). In this study two types of multi-ethnic groups, the multi-ethnic group and the multi-ethnic group, will both be used to represent different ethnic groups. The main differences between the

two types of multiculturalism are their motivation and the level of internal stability: The nature of the alliance is in line with the logical thinking of Donald Horowitz's co-operatives for simplicity and commitment alliances. A coalition of self-interested activists is formed. Commitment unions show a very good relationship, yet the benefits expected on election day also provide significant impetus for social cohesion. Driven by such strategic considerations, the type of coalition makes extensive use of "racist statistics": It seeks to unite as many parties as necessary to achieve electoral victory. Therefore, these types of interdependence seem fragile within and last a short time. In contrast, the objectives of the integrated approach exceed the date of the election (Elischer, 2008: 8). This is in line with Horowitz's (2000) view of "eternal alliances of ethnic groups" (as stated in Elischer, 2008: 9).

An integrated party aims to build lasting political power through two contexts: First, it closes its country's deep divisions (past or present) by incorporating influential community leaders from both sides of the divide into its leadership structure. Second, an integrated party is formed long before election day and survives defeat in elections as well as leadership competitions without major changes (divisions and mergers) in the parties that make up the party. By living together as a united political party, it shows that it has overcome the divisive concept of racist statistics. Within an integrated group race, it no longer leads to exclusion; therefore, the party no longer represents the "racist group" as it is commonly understood in literature and as it is represented by a union of one race or many races. Given the diversity of African societies, Africa's lack of industrial transformation, and the limited continent's ability to design social policies, the integrated team is closer to the African group that finds a role model in Europe and the United States (Elischer, 2008: 9). Similarly, concerning the formation of team leadership, Elischer (2008) assumes that the alliance and the integrated nature are the same; yet in contrast to the form of alliance, the integrated party transcends the ruling national divisions of nations. According to party affiliates, the type of coalition is not very stable: It has a problem of fragmentation and consolidation in the forthcoming and next parliamentary elections, and party divisions coincide with leadership elections (Elischer, 2008: 10). As the type of alliance is made up of teams that act per the interests of each party and as the leadership election ultimately produces more losers than the winners, the type of alliance is constantly changing (Elischer, 2008: 10). Thus, the nature of the alliance is disintegrated by racial diversity, which has always had the power to destroy the party.

The integrated group is also made up of ethnic groups; however, it aims for equal representation of all the races that make up the party over time. In addition, while in a coalition of racial

groups, members of the ruling party often reach out to each other by reaching out to their communities — while avoiding excluding other communities from governing the party. In an integrated party, groups may come up with racial or ethnic divisions as is the case in a single national group. Within the nature of the alliance, such divisions are overshadowed by racial divisions. Both types of groups can run for office nationwide, although the type of coalition may focus on “local regions.” Election results also show that: the type of coalition has divisive barriers; integrated type support is evenly distributed. The PNS of both types is higher than that of the racial group, however, the PNS of the merger type can be expected to be higher than that of its allied counterparts (Elischer, 2008: 10).

3.11. Ethno-Politics Cleavage in Kenya in Historical Perspective

Kanyinga, amid others, argues, “ethnicity and its salience in politics have its origins in the colonial situation” (Kanyinga, 2013:53). Ajulu (2002) recounts how the colonial government, paranoid over purposeful African solidarity, put out any form of nationwide political activity; the colonial policy only encouraged tribal associations. The political parties which survived were only those within district borders. Not beyond. As a corollary, the activities of these district parties would only be confined to narrowly-defined tribal issues. “Consequently, the society became ethnicized. Each group undertook its activities without reference to others” (Kanyinga, 2013:53). Ajulu (2002) goes into detail:

Given the absence of a solid foundation for national political organisation, the already entrenched nature of regional (tribal) associations was bound to be the predominant feature of political organisations. Not surprisingly, the period leading up to the first independence elections in 1963 saw a proliferation of regional, ethnic and, at the very worst, clan-based political organisations... These district-based political organisations were to constitute the most effective recipe for the politicisation of ethnic cleavages. The settler community, intransigent and resentful of the prospect of a unitary state in which their small numbers would permit them very little say, soon took advantage of the possibilities for ethnic division. The burning question then was which group would secure control of the independent Kenyan state and what would they be capable of doing with this control. (Ajulu, 2002:257)

Kasika and Nyadera, point out that one of the continuing legacies of post-colonial Africa and Kenya, in particular, was the racial divisions that manifested themselves as a party and a motivating agent in economic and social struggle. social and political benefits (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 164-165). The complex process of party formation and class is integrated with

the colonial effort to manage traditional communities and their quest to develop a capitalist economy at the highest levels in the various colonies (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 164-165).

Elischer notes that in the run-up to Kenya's independence two major political parties emerged, the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) and its counterpart, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) (Elischer, 2008: 11). The first was led by Ronald Ngala (Coastal), Masinde Muliro (Luhya), and Daniel Arap Moi (Kalenjin) and was run by small Kenyan communities and large Luhya communities, whose leaders advocated the establishment of a party constitution (majimboism) to incorporate Kikuyu emptiness (Kasika - Nyadera, 2019: 166-167). The two largest Kenyan communities were eventually represented and led by Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu) and two Luos, Tom Mboya (Luo) and Oginga Odinga (Ajulu, 2002: 35) (Elischer, 2008: 11). After KADU lost Kenya's first national election it merged with KANU. Tensions between the small communities and the ruling Kikuyu faction in the Kenyatta "Family" area re-emerged during the succession struggle for the presidency in the last years of Kenyatta's life (Elischer, 2008: 12). In this presidential battle, the KANU faction surrounding Deputy President Daniel Arap Moi has successfully fought off attacks by the GEMA welfare organization (Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru); this made it easier for Moi to succeed President after Kenyatta's death. Following the failed coup against his government, Moi radically changed the formation of key cabinet positions in 1985 and filled them with members of the Kalenjin communities and minority communities (Widner, 1992: 165-166). Accordingly, from the earliest days of political activity, there have been divisions between large and small communities in general and among the Kikuyu and Kalenjin in particular (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 167). Further divisions between the Kikuyu and Luo arose during Kenyatta's reign (Meredith, 2011: 87). The assassination of Tom Mboya, one of Kenya's most prominent Luo leaders, who were considered Kenyatta's political successor, under mysterious circumstances in 1969 (Ajulu, 2011: 36) and the arrest of Oginga Odinga after his split with KANU under the umbrella of Kenya's People's Union (KPU) led to a feeling of betrayal among the political leaders of the Luo community (Geertzel, 1970: 7-11). Before independence, KANU's Luo elite boycotted the first African-led government until Kenyatta was released from prison. In their eyes, they had suppressed their political ambitions and thus helped Kenyatta take power in the late 1950s. By the late 1960s, their leaders had been arrested or victims of politically motivated killings (Ajulu, 2011: 36).

3.11.1. Political Parties and Ethnicity in Kenya

Wanyande states that there is consensus among Kenyan scholars; about racial influence in Kenyan politics (Wanyande, 2006: 70). According to Jonyo (2002) Kenyan politics refers to the racism seen as party politics (Jonyo, 2002: 96). Oyugi (1997), who has conducted numerous studies on racism and elections in Kenya, notes: “Many Kenyans believe that racism is as follows: cancer is deeply rooted in Kenya. On the contrary, the same people often hesitate to engage in dialogue within the borders of nations because of its dynamic power: it is always the problem of other people and not ours ”(Oyugi, 1997: 41). The impact of racial discrimination on voter morals and the outcome of elections is particularly evident in presidential, parliamentary, and urban areas. Since the return of multi-party politics in 1992 almost all major ethnic groups have fielded a presidential candidate and continue to vote for their own. This is largely due to the belief that being your president increases the chances of the community attracting public services to improve. As Jonyo, (2003) notes:

The ethnic elites from the president’s ethnic group are assured of plum jobs from which huge kickbacks are drawn and lucrative government contracts won. Moreover, these elites can borrow big loans from state-owned banks and other friendly banks without the threat of penalties for defaulting on the repayment, since they enjoy protection against drastic recovery mechanisms. (Jonyo 2003: 166).

This section will consider the types of Kenyan groups in detail. The timing of the split will be considered, including those important political parties between 1991 and 1997. During this time a variety of ethnic groups collapsed, leading to the emergence of different ethnic groups. The effective number of party indexes for this period ranges from (1992 election) to (1997 election). Key political parties include the Kenya Democracy Reform Forum (FORD-K); Indigenous Democracy Reform Forum (FORD-A); Democratic Party (DP); Kenya African National Union (KANU); and after the 1997 elections, the National Development Party (NDP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (Elischer, 2008: 12).

3.11.2. The Period of Fission: Kenyan’s Political Parties between 1992 and 1997

3.11.2.1 FORD-Kenya’s Long Decline

Since splitting from the FORD Reconstruction Forum (FORD), FORD-Kenya has had a steady decline, from a major opposition party in 1992 to a small one-party minority party in late 1997 (Kanyinga, 2013 :). Starting as a major part of FORD, it initially welcomed members of the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, Meru, and Somalis during its leadership (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019:

168). Soon, however, FORD-K followed in FORD's footsteps. In September 1993 Paul Muite and Gitobu Imanyara left FORD-K; they accused Odinga of kidnapping the party and running it into a Luo state. Muite's public support for the Kikuyu coalition and his constant call for his fellow Kikuyu leaders to unite politically to show the racial humiliation associated with the split of FOD-K (Kasika - Nyadera, 2019: 168).

With the Kikuyu faction of the party gone and the taking over of the party leadership by Kijana Wamalwa (Luhya) following the death of Odinga Oginga, the FOD-K leadership grew from Nyanza and Western Province (Kwatemba, 2008: 92). This, however, did not lead to a less controversial relationship. As Raila Odinga gradually emerged as a prominent political figure among the Luo, relations between him and Wamalwa deteriorated (Kwatemba, 2008: 92). In March 1995, FORD-K members withdrew Raila from the parliamentary executive committee of the Public Accounts Committee after the party headquarters was cleared of staff members who had joined him (September 2008: 98). At the same time, Raila continued to promote the Luo-Kikuyu coalition and challenged Wamalwa more than once to resign over allegations of leader involvement in the Goldenberg and Anglo-Leasing scandal (Kwatemba, 2008: 97). The party's infiltration into chaos did not stop at the end of 1995 when Raila failed to overthrow the government and declared himself chairman of FORD-K (Kwatemba, 2008: 98).

In January 1997 Raila's party left the party and defected to the National Development Party. Shortly after the dissolution of parliament in late 1997, all members of the Luo FORD-K Luo followed Raila (Ondigi, 2019: 25). This migration and the declining decline in national support are also reflected in FORD-K's ability to include candidates in parliament and its performance in elections (Ondigi, 2019: 25). Both indicators show the team's declining ability to reach any province other than Nairobi, Coastal, and Western in 1997. The decline of PNS underscores the increase in total racial bias in Luhya (Ondigi, 2019).

3.11.2.2. FORD-Asili: The Prisoners of Kenneth Matiba

In a time of multi-party integration, FORD-A, at least initially, posed a greater challenge to the Moi government than its FORD-K counterpart. Presidential candidate and party leader, Kenneth Matiba, not only displayed the struggle against Moi's heroism but also closed second in the presidential race. The formation of the party leadership is in line with how the Kenyan media portrayed FOD-A: a group that represents the interests of the Kikuyu and Luhya first and especially the “common man” interests between the two communities (Troup and Hornsby 1998: 136). Some Kenyan commentators even call it the “ghetto party.” But instead of taking

over KANU and President Moi, Matiba continued to boycott parliamentary debates, which hurt his party, which had no clear leadership during the 1993-2009 period.

In October 1994 Matiba closed down the FORD-A party headquarters and removed all documents and files without explaining his actions. His 1996 dignified cabinet did not include any sitting members of the FORD-A Parliament sitting (Oyugi, 2003: 85). His constant failure to hold party elections also tarnished the image of FORM-A, as well as his failure to attend meetings of the FOD-A National Executive Council (Oyugi, 2003: 85). This sometimes led to his being temporarily and later permanently suspended from the team. Although the party was sometimes plagued by Kikuyu and Luhya disputes, the main line of division was between Matiba and others (Oyugi, 2003: 85). The general lack of confidence in FORD-A and Matiba's decision not to run again as a candidate for the FORD-A presidential election outlined the party's destructive results in the 1997 election. Central Province, Western Province, and Nairobi were the strongholds of the party in 1992, both in terms of its ability to field candidates and its performance in elections. By 1997 the party no longer had political power and, except for Western and Nairobi, it could hardly have introduced a possible alternative to democracy.

3.11.2.3. The Democratic Party: The Beneficiaries of FORD-A's Collapse

While FORD-K and FORD-A withdrew from the main opposition party, the DP was formed by Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, former Moi -ally, and KANU's finance minister for a long time. As an independent advocate for political change within KANU, Kibaki, along with Cabinet Minister John Keen, one of Kenya's most outspoken Maasai activists, defected from the ruling party on December 24, 1991 (July 2008: 41-42). Although the formation of the DP party leadership extends beyond Kikuyu membership and includes the Kamba, Kisii, and Maasai, (Meredith, 2011: 266-267) most of its speaking members were senior members of GEMA, such as former GEMA leaders, such as Karume and party builder "Change-the-Constitution", by Dixon Kihika, former DP MP (Oyugi, 1997: 55). John Keen's revolt against KANU in 1996, which he defended by referring to the advice of the Masai elders and the importance of a united Maasai army within KANU, led to a decline in the breadth of the Central Party (Oyugi, 1997): 55). In 1993 and 1997 the split between Kibaki and Kamba DP MPs Agnes Ndeti (Kamba) and Charity Ngilu (Kamba) became apparent. In addition, small communities such as Meru, represented by Member of Parliament Benjamin Ndubai, have complained about being sidelined by the Kibaki Kikuyu delegation. A summary of the divisions between the DP between

1991 and 1997 presented in Table 8 shows that the DP grew racist, especially after Ntetei's KANU uprising in 1996 and Ngilu's take over the SDP in 1997 (Oyugi, 2003: 85).

The performance of the Democratic Party elections marks a change in its leadership structure over time. Like its opposition parties, the DP has not yet been able to field candidates in parliament across the country and as a result, has focused on its unique location, rich Kikuyu areas in the Central Province and Kikuyu living in the Rift Valley. The team benefited from the collapse of FORD-A, where it managed to prevent its loss elsewhere. Despite its decline in the number of votes (30% in 1992, 22% in 1997), the DP may increase its share of seats, while maintaining the same national party points (Oyugi, 2003: 85).

3.11.2.4. KANU: The Effects of Multipartyism

KANU entered the multi-party democratic arena as the ruling party, the top leadership comprising the Kalenjin, Luo and Kikuyu. However, the formation of party leadership does not give us an indication of how far the party has affected KANU as the party did not hold party elections between 1988 and 2001 (Oyugi, 2003: 85). The formation of Kenyan cabinets in 1993 and 1998 is an indication of the communities Moi is trying to achieve, both figuratively and legally (Meredith, 2011: 384). Most of the 1993 cabinet during the multi-party system went to Kamba, Luhya, and Kalenjin, taking four seats in each cabinet. The Maasai and Kisii receive two resources in succession. Luo and Kikuyu received one. A few cabinet positions have gone to small communities (Meredith, 2011). The 1997 Cabinet saw the departure of the last Luo minister, the decline of Kikuyu ministers from two to one, and the subsequent increase in the number of Luhya and Kalenjin ministers (Oyugi, 2003: 85).

Internally, KANU had less prejudice than a disagreement over whether to hold a party or not. This internal conflict was fuelled by Moi's departure from politics and the question of who would eventually take over. "KANU A," led by Cabinet Minister Simon Nyachae (Kisii) and ole Ntimama (Maasai), has called for internal reforms, while KANU B brings together party supporters such as Saitoti Deputy President (Masai) and Secretary-General Joseph Kamotho. . (Kikuyu), and Cabinet Minister Nicholas Biwott (Kalenjin) (Widner, 1992: 64).

Outside, KANU leaders, especially Moi, are pursuing a twofold strategy: On the other hand, the party has continued to emphasize the notion that multi-party democracy has the potential to promote racial hatred and genocide (Meredith, 2011: 384-385). On official occasions such as Kenyatta Day, Moi urged all political actors to refrain from political propaganda accused of

racism and called for national unity, often referring to the idea of Kenyan nationalism (Kagwanja and Southhall, 2010: 112). On the other hand, KANU strategically reached out to a select few communities to ensure its maximum value on election day. This was followed by strong cabinet ministers, who urged their communities to realize that their well-being was linked to the welfare of KANU. In May 1994 Joshua Angatia (Luhya) announced that the Luhya community would intensify its power of political dialogue if the Western Province allied itself with KANU (Meredith, 2011: 384-385). At the same time, Dalmas Otieno (Luo) declared that the only Luos regime in Kenya was KANU; urged the community to “return” to the group he founded.³¹ Others moved on. Kenya's Coalition Development Minister Munyi (Meru) has urged Meru people to vote for KANU if they want more government assistance.

After the sudden capture of FORD-K by Wamalwa (Luhya), KANU's status in one of its strongholds was put in jeopardy. The party's propaganda machines responded quickly: Cabinet Minister Masinde (Luhya) and Luhya members of KANU in Parliament urged their communities not to be deceived by FORD-K members who are members of Luo, according to KANU who were determined to deceive the Luhya community (Meredith, 2011: 385). Moi himself repeatedly warned against the revival of GEMA and told his Kalenjii community to be aware of the Kikuyu attacks on the president (Meredith, 2011: 402-403). After supporting the game of division and domination during the one-party state (Widner, 1992: 65), Moi applied this method to multi-party politics, which was successful. KANU was able to maintain its strongholds between the Kalenjins in the Rift Valley and the smaller tribes of the Coast Province (Widner, 1992: 65). It has misbehaved in Kikuyu and Luo communities, which is not surprising and is consistent with party rhetoric and the allocation of cabinet positions (Kwatamba, 2008: 97).

3.11.2.5. The Defected: NDP and SDP

The details of the 1997 elections, which are the only ones in the parliamentary elections between the two parties, confirm the nationality of the NDP and the SDP, as well as their leadership. The NDP leadership initially had racial equality; However, non-Luo members soon left the party, commemorating the end of the KPU in the 1960s. The formation of the SDP leadership is unknown, however many times Charity Ngilu announces the party to represent Kamba's interests first. Surprisingly, the NDP achieved excellent results in Nyanza Province, the home of the Luo, while the SDP won the majority of votes in the Eastern Province, which is home to many Kamba (Elischer, 2008: 14-15).

3.12. A Period of Fusion: Kenya between 1998 and 2003

Although it had won the 1997 election, KANU quickly suffered from internal divisions caused by the big question of who would replace Moi, whose only constitutional power was no longer a matter of fact. The majority of KANU at risk in parliament has led to the merging of KANU and the NDP into the New KANU (Bedasso, 2015: 376). Meanwhile, opposition parties joined the National Rainbow Alliance (NARC). This has had an impact on the number of key political parties since the 2002 elections (Kwatemba, 2008: 98).

3.12.1. The Formation of New KANU and Its Downfall

Despite its repeated election victory, KANU and President Moi reached a critical point shortly after the 1997 election (Kenga, 2014: 27). Criticism within KANU and repeated parliamentary defeats threaten the continuation of the Moi regime (Bedasso, 2015: 376). To protect political power, the ruling party engaged in parliamentary alliances with the NDP, which eventually led to the merger of the two parties in August 2001. After Raila and several other NDP members were promoted to the cabinet, the NDP formally joined the ruling party (New KANU) in March 2002 (Bedasso, 2015: 376-377). At the same time, KANU elected its national party officials for the first time in more than a decade. Its new leadership includes the Kalenjin, Kamba, Luhya, Kikuyu, small coastal tribes, and the Luo (Bedasso, 2015: 377).

Shortly after the party's new leadership election, Moi began campaigning for a new deputy chairman, Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu), in the 2002 KANU presidential election (Kenga, 2014: 35). The appointment of Moi Musalia Mudavadi (Luhya) as the new vice president of the pre-2002 constitutional election reflects KANU's strategy for the 2002 elections, in which it hoped to unite the Kalenjin, Luhya, and a large majority of Kikuyu voters (Bedasso, 2015: 378). The result of the Moi succession struggle and the outrage that erupted among KANU officials led to the formation of the Rainbow Alliance, a rebel party within KANU under the leadership of KANU Secretary-General Raila Odinga (Luo). They include former vice-president George Saitoti (Maasai), former KANU general secretary Joseph Kamotho (Kikuyu) and new KANU vice-chairman Katana Ngala (Coastal) and Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba) (Bedasso, 2015: 378). Two days before Kenyatta was officially elected president of KANU on October 14, 2002, the Rainbow Alliance formed the Liberal Democratic Party and, under the leadership of Raila Odinga, defected from the opposition party (Kwatemba, 2008: 99). Raila's revolt against the New KANU after his disappointment with Moi's bias against the Kikuyu shows that the New KANU cannot be seen as a unifying party, or that the formation of its party could lead to such

a conclusion (Bedasso, 2015: 378). The inclusion of the group in the Luo community was temporary and was fuelled by Moi's desire to win the "racist statistics" game again (Kwatemba, 2008: 99).

3.12.2. The Formation of NARC

From 1992, Kenyan politics had been pluralistic. The civil society, too, was vibrant. Nonetheless, to KANU's advantage, the opposition was still fragmented along ethnic lines. However, 2002 was to be the turning point in more than one way. First, President Moi committed to the constitutional amendment (of 1992) that restricted a president to two terms (Gifford, 2009:36-37). Second, ethnic elites from the opposition formed a broad-based coalition in the name of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) (Ajulu, 2008:40-41). Third, this new and broad ethnic alliance was to hand a defeat to KANU in the 2002 general and presidential elections. KANU had been in power since Kenya gained its independence, in 1963 (Ondigi, 2019:25). The 2002 elections gave Kenya its third president: Mwai Kibaki, NARC's candidate. According to Kanyinga (2013), there had been intense pressure from the civil society and religious groups for the opposition to unite and even develop a memorandum of understanding for fielding one presidential candidate (Kanyinga, 2013:63). However, as Kanyinga (2013) notes, though campaigning on a "reform platform", the winning alliance (NARC) "was not necessarily the result of ideological commitment but the result of a growing passion at that time to defeat Moi and KANU". Seeing off his presidential career, Moi had decided to throw his weight behind Uhuru Kenyatta, a son of his predecessor (Jomo Kenyatta), and a relatively political tenderfoot compared to other hopefuls in the New KANU (a merger between KANU and Raila Odinga's Liberal Democratic Party) such as Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka (Kanyinga, 2013:64). Raila Odinga is the son of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenya's first Vice President, and Jomo Kenyatta's eventual fiercest political nemesis. Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka – among others – were to join the NARC coalition. Many, thus, saw Uhuru Kenyatta as a symbol of the perpetuation of Jomo Kenyatta's and Moi's authoritarian legacies (Kanyinga, 2013:64).

3.12.3. Gramsci's "Intellectuals" in the Kenyan context

Refining commonplace distinctions among elements of the intelligentsia, Gramsci argued that there were two broad types of intellectuals, namely: i) traditional intellectuals such as members of the clergy, scholars, and teachers who served the status quo by allowing education to reproduce the existing social structures; and, ii) organic intellectuals whom every class

produces “naturally” and who serves its interests. While these categories are fluid and interdependent, Gramsci provided some means of conceptualizing and understanding the role of the intelligentsia in the creation and contestation of hegemony (Gramsci, 2011: 131). The difference between the two groups is based on their diverging positions within society. Gramsci frames the “traditional” intellectuals to be part of the educated, professional group of citizens while his explanation of “organic” intellectual is focused less on their actual profession and more on their role in stimulating and organizing ideas within the social class group that naturally belong to (O'Donoghue, 2020: 16). O'Donoghue conceives that, it is through this distinction between the two types of intellectual, that Gramsci stresses one of his signature features behind his theory of hegemony, a feature vital to the construction of revolutionary ideology in Kenya during the first and the second liberation periods (O'Donoghue, 2020: 16).

Gramsci sees the “organic intellectual” as an essential part in the “mediating” and organizing of struggle between class forces. For Gramsci, the “organic intellectual” has the means to form a relationship with the working class as well as the ruling class, in which they provide a sense of ideology and theory behind struggle, essentially creating leadership for those of whom are considered the “no-intellectuals” (Gramsci, 2011: 132). The “organic intellectuals” of the working class are defined firstly by their role in formulating and organizing a revolutionary ideology and secondly by their active role in leading and directing the revolutionary movement. A political party is formed assembling the “organic intellectuals” into a group that will then lead the rest of the people towards revolution (Gramsci, 2011: 150). Spivak (1988a) analyses a Gramscian turn by stating that “when the subaltern speaks he or she becomes the organic intellectual (Spivak, 1988a: 308).

Within this dissertation, the “organic intellectual” in Kenya during the colonial state, were the Nandi Rebellion (1905-1907), the MAU MAU leading to independence. Several organizations and associations were formed to aid the political transition. Prominent among these were trade unions, political parties, and various tribal associations such as the Kavirondo Welfare Association (Wanyande, 2009: 11), during Moi's state included NGOs and civil society organizations that have been the only exception. These include organizations such as the Law Society of Kenya (a body of qualified lawyers), the Students Organization of Nairobi University (SONU), the University (Nairobi) Staff Union, and the Catholic, Anglican, and Presbyterian churches (Wanyande, 2009: 11).

Gramsci emphasises the historical importance of ideology in “mobilizing the masses” and in creating a “psychological validity” among the people (Gramsci, 2011: 707). The sense of “psychological validity” is key in creating a “nation”, thus, the architects of the ideology that they people are organized en masse and through this, together they reach a consciousness in which they come of their position within society, catalysing a struggle that is fought by all (Gramsci, 2011: 707). According to Bates, (1975), what Gramsci wrote, “the foundation of a ruling class, is equivalent to the creation of a Weltanschauung” (Bates, 1975:352). In this argues Bates, “Gramsci refers to the similar point made by Karl Marx, in that the ruling class creates the worldview of ideas now”. Consequently, “Gramsci’s notion of hegemony relates to a political leadership that is based on the consent of the people and secured through the “popularization” of the world view of the ruling class” (Bates, 1975: 360).

Gramsci argued that all people are intellectuals; all can think even of a highly defined physical activity. But not all men are smart about social work. Some people use their intellectual abilities more than others. These people are the ones who called them intellectuals. These intellectuals include teachers, clergymen, philosophers, scientists, industrial engineers, and editors. There are two types of brains according to Gramsci, the older and the newer types (Tabugon, 2015: 79).

The notion of intellectuals has a very essential role in Gramsci’s overarching theories and particularly in his understanding of hegemony. By acting as political mediators, intellectuals are responsible for the production of continuity and change, that is to say, hegemony (Gramsci, 2000:39):

every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. (Gramsci, 2000:39)

Intellectuals arise as both functions and products, as well as interpreters, of the economic and social-political structure and the class it produces. The production of “homogeneity and awareness” is essentially through all cultural and social activity “by participating in... and contributing to sustaining or modifying a moral conception of the world”. Gramsci hypothesises therefore that “all men are intellectuals” even if they do not fulfil the function of intellectuals. He differentiates between traditional and organic intellectuals. The first grasp “a monopoly of many important services: religious ideology, that is the philosophy and science

of the age, together with schools, education, morality, justice, charity, good works, etc.” (Gramsci, 2000:302).

He distinguishes between traditional and organic intellectuals. The first hold “a monopoly of several important services: religious ideology, that is the philosophy and science of the age, together with schools, education, morality, justice, charity, good works, etc.” (Gramsci, 2000: 302). Femia (2010) speculates that this monopoly produces what he calls the “common sense” of the age. Gramsci is careful to not present a passive relationship between intellectuals and their given class, explaining that the relationship is “mediated in diverse ways by the entire social fabric, by the complex of superstructures” (Femia, 2010: 132). Though, traditional intellectuals often maintain this conservative form of common sense, and either through direct or indirect controls they serve to reflect the perspectives of the dominant economic classes. The process of hegemonic change, therefore, requires capturing or shifting the perspectives of traditional intellectuals who are capable of change (Femia, 2010: 132). Organic intellectuals are those who arise from a specific economic level. To bring about hegemonic change, working-class intellectuals must provide

To be considered a Gramscian “organic intellectual” in contemporary terms requires a degree of radicalism that limited numbers of academics possess. Indeed, contemporary neo-Gramscians complain about the overly liberal use of the term to describe those, who, while working towards international social justice, do not fundamentally challenge the linear, Eurocentric vision of “development” as it has always been.

3.12.4 Organic Intellectual in Kenyatta’s state

The Kenyatta era (1964-1978) is therefore said to form a solid foundation for the voluntary sector in Kenya through the government's NGO open door policy (see, inter alia, Barkan, 1992). However, it is important to note that most of the NGOs working in Kenya were more involved in development activities than political activism. The strong criticism of the Kenyatta regime remained limited to University studies and the University of Nairobi (SONU) firm student body. As previously argued, the role of development of NGOs and the voluntary sector as a whole may have created a deliberate attempt by the Kenyatta government to encourage itself to make additions to its government in the development program. However, most importantly his government did not make a deliberate and deliberate attempt to destroy NGOs and society (Morse, 2013: 108). The relationship between Church and State in Kenya during the quest for independence was one of cooperation and hegemonic control between the

missionaries and the colonial government (Rhodes, 2014: 52-53). This was the exception of a few missionaries¹.

In Kenyatta's time, although the congregation was under the leadership of white missionaries, it too was under tutelage. He had to learn to communicate with the African government. As Aboum (1996) observed that the African government expected the Church to be as faithful as it was in the colonial government. In general, during Kenyatta's time, church and state enjoyed good relations, except in critical times like 1966 and 1969 (Rhodes, 2014: 52-53). The relationship between Church and State in Moi's time has been closely linked by many scholars such as Gifford (1999, 1992, 2009); Throup (1995); Okullu (1979; 1988); Chacha (2010); and Parsitau (2008; 2011), among others. All of these studies have emphasized the conditions that lead to the closed political system and the Mainline Christianity emerging as the voice of the voiceless Kenyan intellectuals (Parsitau, 2012: 2-3).

3.12.5 Organic Intellectual in Moi's state

Because the Moi regime had become dictatorial and democratic and there were no legitimate political parties offering checks and balances, NGOs and civil society organizations became the sole voice of a different voice. These include organizations such as the Law Society of Kenya (a qualified legal entity), the Students Organization of Nairobi University (SONU), the University (Nairobi) Staff Union, and churches. However, due to state harassment, most NGOs end up taking a lower position in dealing with the state. However, the NGOs most active in criticizing the state were the churches (Matanga, 2000: 12).

The first period of the Moi period (1978 -1985), was the honeymoon period between Church and State (Githiga, 2001). From 1986 onwards the church began to criticize the situation of President Moi. From 1986-to 1992, the political debate centred on the misuse of human rights by changing the secret ballots included in the line system, as well as the chaos of the multi-party system (Parsitau, 2012: 2-3). The church through the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) and later the Catholic Church criticized the line-up system that allegedly violated the rights of citizens (Parsitau, 2012: 2-3). Church leaders continue to criticize the government's handling of the 1988 elections. In the early 1990s, the church began calling for constitutional reform as a requirement for multi-party democracy. During this time, the church contacted individual church leaders such as Bishop Alexander Kipsang Muge; Bishop David Gitari; Bishop Henry Okullu (all from the Anglican church in Kenya). Others are Rev. Timothy Njoya (Presbyterian Church of East Africa) Bishop Ndingi Mwana-Nzeki, (Catholic Church)

and Pastor Mutava Musimi (former NCCCK secretary), among others. All these Church leaders under the NCCCK as an umbrella organization became the voice of the voiceless people against the KANU dictatorship. In December 1991, the church's efforts bore fruit with the abolition of action 2A and made Kenya a multi-party state. Moreover, to protect political change, the church not only provided public announcements but also educated citizens about participatory democracy. Indeed, this is in line with Tarimo's (2009) observation that the social role of religion not only provides public declarations but, rather, contributes to the formation of a social conscience that affects social welfare (Tarimo, 2009: 5).

Perhaps the most iconic genius was Koigi wa Wamwere, who wrote an essay criticizing Moi and later fled to Norway, fearing for his life. The second example is of Boulangist Kenyan author Rok Ajulu, a political activist whose criticism of the government and the result of the undermining of the University Students' role challenged the social and political discourses of the post-independence era. According to the African context, contemporary “natural thinkers” include Seodi White (Malawi), Trevor Ngwane (South Africa) and Femi Aborisade (Nigeria). According to Gramscian terms, these scholars and activists are contributing to the hegemonic ideology of government institutions to rejuvenate African countries and to those groups of communities that live there.

In general, I argue that Raila Odinga is a Boulangist because he represents the aspirations of sub-Kenyan groups. In Raila Odinga, many Kenyans see liberation from the yoke of Kikuyu hegemony (Ondigi, 2019: 4). According to the Gramscian interpreting framework, I argue that the hegemonic order is the history of a state-functioning structure and an expanded region (non-national actors or community power) as a structural integration of economic, political, and social institutions that are naturally connected through ideas. Hegemony is used with consent and coercion controlled by state-conscious acts and support of public actors, or what Gramsci calls' living geniuses. Boulangist are members of a society that integrates with the social class of people and protects and promotes a hegemon in society (Monasta, 2000: 4).

3.13. Presidential Hegemony as Resistance to Counter-Hegemony in Kenya

A year after Kenya's independence, the only major opposition political party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), merged with the ruling party, the Kenya National African Union (KANU), paving way for the architecture of a despotic executive branch embodied in the authoritarian hegemonic presidency (Juma, 2008:12). This culminated in “unresolved political assassinations, politically engineered massacres under the pretext of ethnic clashes

and criminalisation of the freedom of expression and assembly under the one-party regime, to mention a few... In addition, police brutality was commonplace occurrence in dealing with real or imagined opponents of those who wielded state powers” (Juma, 2008: 12).

Nyong'o argues that, since “1990, African states have been going through diverse political changes. He maintains that the most dramatic was the collapse of the apartheid regime in the Republic of South Africa, resulting in the election of the African National Congress (ANC) government led by Nelson Mandela in” 1994 (Nyong'o, 2002: 5). Much earlier, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia saw his 27 years in power as “President and leader of the United National Independent Party of Zambia (UNIPZ) come to an end as the multi-party elections of October 1991” ushered into power the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by Fredrick Chiluba, “a trade unionist turned preacher, turned politician and finally turned president with an insatiable appetite for authoritarian rule” (Nyong'o, 2002: 5). Further north, the long-awaited political changes in Kenya were thwarted as the one-party regime of Daniel Arap Moi managed to maintain power in a controversial multiparty election of December 1992, with a repeat performance five years later (Nyong'o, 2002: 5).

Munyikwa postulates that it has always “been argued that it is difficult for authoritarian regimes to give in to pressures for political openings of a democratic nature. Being more or less “closed regimes”, pressures for political openings threaten their staying in power and tend to undermine the privileges that political, military and business elites enjoy under such hegemonic regimes” (Munyikwa, 2018:37-38). Nyong'o theorises that this may well explain the stubbornness of the rulers in Africa to give in to pressures for democratic change, or their cunningness to wear the robes of democrats and reinvent themselves into power even after so-called multi-party elections (Nyong'o, 2002: 6).

Nyong'o contends that, in former settler or plantation regimes like Kenya, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Cote d'Ivoire, the transition from the hegemonic regime has been more difficult to accomplish without the active and proactive cooperation of the incumbent president. According to him, this only happened in the case of South Africa where it can be argued that “enlightened leadership saw the writing on the wall and pre-empted long-drawn political paralysis by accommodating democratic political opening at the expense of losing presidential authoritarian power” (Nyong'o, 2002:7).

3.13.1 Intellectuals and the Revolutionary Party

Gramsci believed that the proletariat should be the highest authority in Italy and that they should destroy the capitalist state, and instead replace the working class. This, however, was a huge and complex task and he realized that biologists working alone could not achieve such a change in the social system (Gramsci, 2010: 456). What was needed were intellectuals tied together in a unit that would serve as a Gramsci collection that made this clear when he said “We are interested in the majority of intellectuals and not just intellectuals” (Gramsci, 2010: 456). He inspired the formation of a Transformation Group that would take on the role of integrated biological intelligence:

A historical act can only be performed by “collective man”, and this presupposes the attainment of a “cultural-social” unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world, both general and particular, operating in transitory bursts (in emotional ways) or permanently where the intellectual base is so well rooted, assimilated and experienced that it becomes passion (Gramsci, 2010:349).

The ‘historic act’ of the working class could be the creation of a new social system that Gramsci believed could only be achieved through a ‘cohesive person’, in other words, the Revolutionary Party. Gramsci knew that the people had different aspirations and objectives and saw the Revolutionary Party as having the power to create a united democratic and to achieve 'historic action'. Gramsci has referred to Machiavelli's *The Prince* as his inspiration for political change. He found in Machiavelli the importance of developing a popular foundation for the construction of a new empire. He used some of Machiavelli's ideas, which he adapted, to fit his time and context:

The Prince was a pure theoretical abstraction – a symbol of the leader.... The Modern Prince must be and cannot but be the proclaimer and organiser of intellectual and moral reform, which also means creating the terrain for a subsequent development of the national-popular collective will towards the realisation of a superior, total form of modern civilisation (Gramsci, 2010:132-133).

Gramsci, like Machiavelli, believed that the masses should undergo a radical change of mind and behaviour and that a well-known national collective will was essential for social change. However, unlike Machiavelli who saw one leader bring about these changes, Gramsci’s looks to the Revolutionary Party:

“Modern prince” – i.e., the communist party – must organise and express a national-popular collective will, in other words, must be a “Jacobin” force, binding the peasants

beneath the hegemony of the proletariat, and rejecting all forms of economic, syndicalism, spontaneous (Gramsci, 2010:123)

Gramsci viewed the Communist Party as a Revolutionary Party in Italy. He argued that just as the Jacobins were allied with the peasants and the capitalists, the Revolutionary Party should bind 'farmers under the hegemony of the proletariat' (Gramsci, 1971: 123).

Gramsci had always maintained in his writings that biologists were the organizers of hegemony in the classroom. In his remarks about the political party, he was very clear about the specific role the party would play in expressing interests and in organizing the ruling class. Perhaps, after failing a factory council test, he realized that he needed to be more specific and clearer about the activities of the Translation Team. He suggested that everyone who became a member of the Revolutionary Party should be considered a naturalist. Gramsci (2010) saw the Transformation Team in Italy as being formed to recruit people from the working class to establish links between group leaders and the masses:

For this reason, one can say that the parties are the elaborators of the new integral and totalitarian intelligentsia and the crucibles where the unification of theory and practice, understood as a real historical process, takes place (Gramsci, 2010:335).

He argued that for political parties an important process of integrating theory and practice as a 'real historical process' should take place. It meant that political parties' members should not only emphasize ideas and ideas but also apply ideas. Gramsci was concerned about the state of relations between the Revolutionary Party intellectuals and the masses. About this he wrote the following:

The intellectual's error consists in believing that it is possible to know without understanding and especially without feeling and passion ... that the intellectual can be an intellectual ... if he is distinct and detached from the people-nation (*popolo-nazione*) without feeling the elemental passions of the people, understanding them and thus explaining and justifying them in a particular historical situation, connecting them dialectically to the laws of history, to a superior conception of the world ... History and politics cannot be made without passion, without this emotional bond between intellectuals and the people-nation. In the absence of such a bond the relations between intellectuals and people-nation are reduced to contacts of a purely bureaucratic, formal kind; the intellectuals become a caste or a priesthood (Gramsci, 2010:418).

Gramsci has promoted a close relationship between the living geniuses of the group and the masses. He feared that if his naturalists were too far away from the masses, the Reformation would fail in its quest to represent the masses. Relationships between the masses and intellectuals can teach each other, while intellectuals impart knowledge and love of people.

While Gramsci emphasized the role that group intellectuals should play, he also emphasized that the relationship between the masses and the intellectuals should be instructive. In this, he said, if these natural intellectuals would represent the basis of plurality, they needed to be sensitive to the wishes and needs of the people:

If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion in which feeling passion becomes understanding and thence knowledge (not mechanically but in a way that is alive) then and only then is the relationship one of representation (Gramsci, 2010:418).

Gramsci has promoted a close relationship between the living geniuses of the group and the masses. He feared that if his biologists were too far away from the masses, the Reformation would fail in his quest to represent the masses. The relationship between the masses and the intellectuals can teach each other, while the intellect conveys the knowledge and love of the people. While Gramsci emphasized the role that group thinkers should play, he also emphasized that the relationship between the masses and the intellectuals should be instructive. In this regard, he said, if these natural intellectuals would represent the basis of plurality, they needed to understand the wishes and needs of the people.

Although Gramsci encouraged close working relationships between team intellectuals and the masses, he also wanted strong team discipline (Gramsci, 2010: 334-335). Pillay (2013) argues that this then raises the issue of how to balance consent and ethics as well as ethics and politics. If there is a free permit then there will be different opinions from individuals on any topic, which can threaten to disrupt the group. Therefore, there had to be a common will or agreement (Pillay, 2013: 92-93). To encourage more people to express their views while at the same time emphasizing consensus, Gramsci's response was to use "centralized democracy" within the party to reconcile consensus and consensus. This meant that issues could be discussed and different views put forward but a joint decision had to be made. It was leadership that would direct the position and influences the collective decision (Gramsci, 2010: 187).

Gramsci never imagined that the party would change the majority of the people and try to get their approval in the new government. He did not see the group and its leaders exploiting and equipping the masses. Instead, he believed that there should be a shared code of conduct and that the masses should always be included in all efforts (Gramsci, 2010: 187)

3.13.2 Hegemony in Kibaki's State: Passive Revolution Resurgence of GEMA Hegemony

Roccu, speculates that the change that takes place appears a few times in the Prison Books, but less so in the 'philosophy of praxis', hegemony, the structure-superstructures image, and other concepts commonly associated with Gramsci (Roccu, 2017: 3). Gramsci borrowed the term 'temporary transformation' from Vincenzo Cuoco (1771-1823), a Neapolitan historian who enjoyed great influence in the early stages of Risorgimento (Gramsci, 1971: 6, 59-63). Cuoco used the word to describe the victory of the middle class in the liberation of the city of Naples from the reign of Ferdinand IV in 1799. In this protest, the middle class rebelled and joined the masses. The struggle was a resounding success (Gramsci, 1971: 112). An important feature of this uprising was the limited use of violence. After their success, the rebels, according to Gramsci saw the power to create a republic based on the glorious ideas of the French Revolution (Gramsci, 1971: 112).

Gramsci explains his theory of hegemonic power by analysing a political movement during its development, with specific reference to the 19th Century Boulangist movement in France. In analysing the Boulangist movement Gramsci notes that “economism asks the question: “who profits directly from the initiative under consideration?” and replies with a line of reasoning which is as simplistic as it is fallacious: the ones who profit directly are a certain fraction of the ruling class” (Gramsci, 2011: 216). In a warning that is particularly useful in studying opposition movements that have stalled or failed to bring about the change they sought to effect, Gramsci writes: “until such movements have gained power it is always possible to think that they are going to fail” (Gramsci, 2011: 216), as Boulangism ultimately did. Gramsci proposed instead the following guidelines for research into a movement (Gramsci, 2011:217):

1. What is the social content of the mass following of the movement?
2. What function did this mass have in the balance of forces, which is in the process of transformation, as the new movement demonstrates by its very coming into existence?
3. What is the political and social significance of those demands presented by the movements' leaders which find general assent; and to what effective needs do they correspond?

4. To what extent do the means conform to the proposed end?

The hypothesis that such a movement will necessarily be perverted and will serve quite different ends from those which the mass of its followers expected, will be considered only in the last analysis and will be formulated in political, not moralistic terms (Munyikwa, 2018:41).

The broad questions listed above and the preceding concepts will direct the analysis of why Kenya's opposition to the NARC has not been able to bring about a positive democratic change in Kenya (Munyikwa, 2018:).

After twenty-four years of Moi, the most dramatic Luo-Kikuyu unity occurred in the 2002 Presidential elections. To remove Moi from power Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki, two leading politicians put aside their ethnic difference in 2002. For the time since multi-party politics began, Kenyan politicians united against KANU democratically defeating it as Kibaki who led National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) into victory took over as the new President in 2003 (Gachanga, 2012). Kibaki won easily, promised to reform the system and eliminate corruption, and was sworn in with great euphoria (Gifford, 2009: 16).

NARC was flagged together by Kibaki's Democratic Party (DP), the late Michael Wamalwa's Ford Kenya (FORD-K), and Raila Odinga's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The DP represented the hegemonic class of capital and property, which had its origins in Kenya's independent state under Jomo Kenyatta. This was the elite of the old Nyeri bourgeoisie and its Kiambu counterparts—predominantly, but not exclusively, the Kikuyu. This group, now referred to in Kenya's political discourse as the "Mount Kenya", remains the most powerful economic class in the country—Kenya's indigenous bourgeoisie par excellence (Ajulu, 2011:40). While it suffered considerable setbacks under the Moi's state it was not completely wiped out and has long experience of overlapping economic and political power. Significantly, it moved quite speedily to occupy the strategic positions vacated by Moi mass (Ajulu, 2011:40).

Raila's LDP and, to some degree, FORD-K represented the traditional petit-bourgeois leadership of Kenya's opposition. It lacked a firm economic base, was considerably impoverished and because its leaders had been in the political desert for a considerable time they had limited experience of exercising political and economic power (Ajulu, 2011:40).

After the 2002 election, the multi-ethnic coalition behind Kibaki and the NARC movement disintegrated. Kibaki was perceived by some to be reverting to the bad old ways of Kenyan politics by relying heavily on his power base of Kikuyu, Meru and Embu support (Kasika and

Nyadera, 2019:166). A new political force emerged, namely the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), headed by Raila Odinga, a Luo and son of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. The ODM gathered prominent leaders from the Luhya, Kalenjin, Maasai and other communities. In response, Kibaki formed a new party, the Party of National Unity (PNU). In the run-up to the 2007 elections, both ODM and PNU subtly appealed to ethnic identity and ethnic prejudice (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019:166).

In introducing the Gramscian method which this dissertation will be using, it is necessary to outline some examples of Gramsci's method in other African cases as well as the instances in which scholars have used Gramsci about Kenya. Though there is little evidence that Gramsci was concerned with Africa in his writings, his attempts to geographically limit his theories seem to take the form of a distinction between the "East" where he perceived the State as excessively dominant while "civil society was primordial and gelatinous" and the "West" where "a proper relation between State and civil society" existed (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019:166). This strategic, rather than methodological observation serves as a *posteriori* comparison of the success of the Bolshevik revolution while in Western Europe "when the state tottered, a sturdy structure of civil society was immediately revealed. The State was just a forward trench; behind it stood a succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements" (Gramsci, 2000:169).

It is important to note that the concept of hegemony has arguably been applied more to the case of Zimbabwe than any other African context including Kenya (Munyikwa, 2018:44). David Moore (1991) has engaged Gramscian concepts in analysing the ideological formation of the ruling class in Zimbabwe. Moore addressed the notion "whether or not the *petit bourgeois* leaders of the struggle for national liberation had the intention or were capable of transforming national liberation' into socialism, and whether or not the leading nationalists would be able to take the mantle of *organic intellectuals* and achieve what Femia termed "minimum hegemon." He argues that Zimbabwe's elites opted for elitism and capitalism over populism and Marxism and he argued that if the young socialists who remained in the national intelligentsia were to succeed in the difficult task of dislodging the present hegemony of the ruling class they would 'have to extricate their ideology from that of the state and its managers" (Moore, 1991: 495).

3.14. GEMA Capitalism History as Hegemonic Ideological Superstructure

What in Gramscian terms can be understood as the post-2000 historical bloc's hegemonic ideological superstructures correspond directly with what Terence Ranger has termed 'patriotic

history'. As Miles (2010: n.p.) emphasises, patriotic history asserts the centrality of Kenya's radical revolutionary tradition and is premised on four themes: land, race, a dichotomy between 'communism or socialism' and 'capitalists'; and the rejection of Western interference based on what are perceived as Western ideals such as human rights. It is specifically the connection between land ownership, a material reality, the superstructure of the Kenyan state and political institutions, and the ideological superstructures of PNU hegemony. From 2006 onwards PNU, with Kibaki as the party's chief public intellectual and increasingly hegemonic authority, implemented GEMA history. This was done by making full use of the institutional weaponry of state-controlled broadcast and print media as well as laws such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, which contracted the available space for critical coverage in the independent media (Gifford, 2009: 22-23). The use of these institutional tools to manage the ideological content to which citizens had access was coupled with the constant threat of violence, as one of the country's main independent newspapers, the Standard media was raided on 2 March 2006. The next day the Minister of Security admitted that he had authorised the raid. Immediately the opposition politician Raila Odinga claimed foreign mercenaries had participated in the raid and identified the house where the mercenaries were living (Gifford, 2009: 22-23).

3.15. From Hegemonic Structure of State to Grand Coalition Government (G.C.G.)

Munyikwa, theorises that Hegemonic change "is dependent on the 'relation of forces'; the measure of which rests firstly within the structure-superstructure relation, and secondly with the nature and character of the movements seeking to challenge the hegemonic status quo (Munyikwa, 2018:12). He emphasises that "By nature, and character here we refer to whether or not a movement is organic, meaning relatively permanent, or conjunctural which would designate an occasional, almost haphazard phenomenon" (Munyikwa, 2018:12).

In 2007-2008 violence engulfed Kenya following a dispute over presidential election results in December 2007. The violence spread fast and split the country along two main ethno-regional blocs. Not many expected Kenya to go up in flames that fast (Kanyinga, 2014: 2-3). The country had a history of political transition from one-party rule since the early 1990s and a tradition of regular elections. Kanyinga contends that, while violence accompanied both the 1992 and the 1997 elections that were held after the return of multi-party democracy in 1991, the violence following the December 2007 election was unprecedented. It pushed the country towards the edge of civil war (Kanyinga, 2014:3).

In general, the protests took place soon after Kibaki was declared the “winner” of the 2007 presidential election and was strongly opposed to the deliberate election fraud and Kibaki's swearing-in for a second five-year term (Murunga, 2011: 24). The outrage was driven by the fact that negative things including statistical fraud had been exposed, debated, and played out in the national media in the days following the actual vote. In addition, Kibaki's swearing-in took place in a very subtle way in the privacy of the Nairobi State House, which publicly suggested that he was hiding something (Murunga, 2011: 24).

Khadiagala posits that the power-sharing negotiations proved more intractable, consuming three and half weeks of the negotiation period. The strategy of the mediation team was to avoid what Annan referred to as a ‘who-won-who-lost’ mentality and the invocation of ‘reruns and recounts’, by focusing on the idea of sharing power between equals (Khadiagala, 2008:18). Annan believed that, given the close result, a coalition government would be the best way to restore calm and create a basis for future reforms. Furthermore, the mediation team expanded the range of constitutional issues about which the parties could negotiate to prevent the future recurrence of electoral crises (Khadiagala, 2008:18). The mediators’ approach was to allow the parties to make written representations stating their positions, to clear up misunderstandings, determine underlying interests or concerns, find areas of agreement, and, ultimately, to incorporate those areas of agreement into resolutions. Having presented a broad road map for power-sharing the mediation team faced the task of convincing the widely divided parties to move toward a common position. Having survived the outcry over the appointment of the Cabinet the government felt more legitimate and in control. Consequently, the Kibaki team dismissed the power-sharing proposal, claiming they could not sit in the same government as ODM leaders who had instigated violence (Khadiagala, 2008:18).

The ODM, for its part, tabled a seven-point proposal whose key pillars included the resignation of Kibaki to pave the way for a rerun of the presidential election and the installation of a transitional government based on the parliamentary strength of each party. The ODM team stated that because of evidence of alleged electoral fraud by the ECK and its “incompetence, partisan and reckless conduct” a re-tally or recount was untenable, as the integrity of the electoral material had been violated (Khadiagala, 2008:18). It further claimed that a presidential rerun was ‘necessary to restore the confidence of the Kenyan people in democratic elections. The parties articulated these contrasting positions in two days of talks starting on 5 February. The mediation team permitted them to present evidence to support their claims (Khadiagala, 2008:18).

The violence ended in February 2008 after mediation by the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities. The panel persuaded the two parties in the dispute, the Party of National Unity (PNU) of the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki and the main opposition, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) of Raila Odinga, to sign a National Accord committing to end violence and to share power in a coalition government. But the signs of this violence had shown early. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) had warned in 2006 that Kenya was so deeply divided along ethnic lines and that if the government did not address some of the reasons causing divisions, a conflict would occur. The violence indeed occurred as a result of the failure to respond to long-standing governance issues. It continued to threaten the consolidation of democracy and it constrained political participation. Among these issues were: the manipulation of ethnic identity by politicians, the lack of comprehensive constitutional reforms, centralisation of power in the executive, and the problems around the majoritarian electoral system (Kanyinga, 2014:3).

Muhula reasons that the ethnic and regional violence in Kenya after the controversial 2007 Presidential elections demonstrated the fluidity of ethno-regional cohesion, exposed the depth of historical grievances, and further polarized the country along ethno-regional lines. At the core of these grievances is the belief that political power provides the ethnic group of the President with exclusive advantages (Muhula, 2009:85). Not unpredictably, deep schisms resulting from inequality in access to political and socio-economic resources remain. Muhula, (2009), argues that, historically, the region that controls political power in Kenya also controls the direction and magnitude of the state's economic and political resources (Muhula, 2009: 85). The effect of the transition between regional access to political and socio-economic power has also exacerbated deep-seated grievances, sometimes creating the kind of conflict that erupted in early 2008 (Muhula, 2009: 85).

3.16. Structure of the Grand Coalition Government (GCG) Or Government of National Unity (GNU)

The GCG would be headed by Kibaki as president and Raila as prime minister. To maintain the ethnic representation agreed upon between PNU and ODM in the unity accord, two vice presidents were maintained. Two deputy prime ministers would be nominated by each ODM faction. While the president would chair the cabinet and the prime minister would chair the council of ministers, the agreement was particularly unclear about the exact exercise of executive power (Adar, 2008: 62-63).

The following aspects characterize the new Kenyan hegemony:

1. The imbalance in the correlation of regional development motivates the hegemonic ambition of the ruling elites.
2. To an extreme degree, Kikuyu and GEMA interests are placed above all. For the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, its interests have neither frontiers nor limits and spread all around the country. In reality, they are hegemonic interests.
3. The new Kenyan hegemony seeks a regional hegemony that takes up all aspects. In other words, a political, military, economic, cultural, religious and judicial hegemony.

Politically, the government intervenes in counties' affairs and attempts to impose its political system, ideology and values on counties. Economically, it seeks to direct the counties economic order through the Central Bank of Kenya and other institutions. Militarily speaking, by appealing to its military advantages, it threatens and attacks countries considered defiant and risky (Adar, 2008: 62-63).

The structure of the GCG illustrates how the counter-hegemonic party's failure to gain power over ministries related to state security (and therefore coercion) adversely affected their ability to bring about any conclusive change like hegemony. This particular outcome indicated the weaknesses in party negotiation strategies as they were unable to insist on control of these key coercive elements of the state (Adar, 2008: 63).

3.17. The Grand Coalition Government as a "Passive revolution" in Kenya

As with many other terms, the exact meaning of "passive revolution" remains ambiguous in Gramsci's writings. Gramsci took the term itself from the conservative Italian historian Vincenzo Cuoco, who used it to describe the unification of the modern Italian state, or the Risorgimento, as a revolution that he argued was carried out by the elite classes without active mass initiative (Gramsci, 2010; 59). In his terms, a "passive revolution" represented the contradictory concept of a " 'revolution' without a 'revolution'" (Gramsci, 2010: 59). Morton, (2003) theorises that in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, "the Risorgimento, the movement for Italian national liberation that culminated in the political unification of the country in 1860–61, and a series of other historical phenomena throughout nineteenth-century Europe were described by Gramsci as "passive revolutions" (Morton, 2003:634). Morton, (2003) argues that

the concept, is rooted in his writings analysing the crisis of the liberal state in Italy, was linked to the rise of bourgeois revolutions, with the history of Europe in the nineteenth century seen as a struggle of passive revolution (Morton, 2003: 634) see also (Gramsci, 1994:230-233). According to Gramsci, the French Revolution (1789) established a bourgeois state based on popular support and the elimination of old feudal classes yet, across Europe, the institution of political forms suitable to the expansion of capitalism occurred differently in a more reformist manner (Gramsci, 2012:119).

Morton, posits that in Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* “the “passive” aspect refers to the way challenges may be thwarted so that changes in production relations are accommodated within the current social formation (Morton, 2003:634). This might not be done in a “passive” way but refers to the attempt at “revolution” through state intervention or the inclusion of new social groups within the hegemony of a political order but without an expansion of mass control over politics. Morton, (2003) argues that a passive revolution may, therefore “unfold thanks to popular demands and entail a “progressive” element or fundamental change in the organisation of a political order” (Morton, 2003:635). However, it was more likely to result in a dialectical combination of progressive and reactionary elements described as “revolution restoration” or “revolution without revolution through state intervention or the inclusion of new social groups within the hegemony of a political order but without an expansion of mass control over politics” (Morton, 2003: 635).

The trajectory of hegemony in Kenya from 2008 would be determined by the ODM’s strategic decision to enter into the Grand Coalition Government after the election and Kibaki refused to leave power, the strategy of gaining power through elections was ultimately proving ineffective (Adar, 2008: 62-63). The following session will analyse the period of the Grand Coalition Government as a period of “Passive Revolution” in the Gramscian sense, as a tactical compromise made by the hegemonic power to reconsolidate its control over the historical bloc. Based on the outcome of the 2007 election in which PNU again won a majority in parliament, and ODM seemingly won a majority in the presidential election, this part argues that the ODM strategy within the Grand Coalition Government was a strategic miscalculation (Adar, 2008:63).

The Gramscian concept of passive revolution refers to the coming to power of a new historical situation of counter-hegemonic struggle in which social and economic relations become static (Gramsci, 2010; 59). Passive revolution is often the outcome of a war of position by the

dominant classes after a war of manoeuvre by the hegemonic classes (Gramsci, 2010; 59). In Kenya's case, the passive revolution represented by the inclusive government came about as a result of the overwhelming use of hegemonic coercion to subvert the results of the 2007 elections (Bedasso, 2015: 380-381).

After five weeks of unconvincing talks, Annan decided that the stalemate could be broken only if Kibaki and Odinga personally and directly negotiated an agreement. As he explained it:

Given the way the talks are going and the negotiators are relating to each other, I believe it is important that I suspend the negotiations, not as an act of desperation or giving up, but suspend the negotiations and take the matter with President Mwai Kibaki and the Honourable Raila Odinga. The leaders have to assume their responsibilities and become directly engaged and get them to give instructions or negotiate directly with me, the process might longer (Annan, 2008: 26th February).

Adar postulates that the decision to engage the two principals at this crucial point was momentous because the negotiators seemed unable of resolving the stalemate

Heeding Gramsci's warning, this dissertation has not interpreted passive revolution as historical defeatism; that is to say, it cannot suggest that by entering the inclusive government the ODM factions were destined for defeat. There was certainly sufficient potential for reforms and strategies in the GCG which the counter-hegemonic forces could have used to bring about an overall change in the country's power balance (Adar, 2008: 63-64).

The process of constitution-making during a period of passive revolution is central to the question of regime durability in a semi-authoritarian regime. The constitution-making process allowed the counter-hegemonic movement a role in drafting the rules of the political game. Given that constitution-making had been a central arena of contestation throughout the counter-hegemonic struggle in Kenya, the ability to manage the process of constitution-making signified a degree of progress in terms of setting the rules of the political game in the country. Constitution-making under the GCG, however, encapsulated the dilemmas of democratic counter-hegemonic struggle. Even the process of rule-setting was circumscribed by authoritarian power dynamics. This included intransigence in establishing the parameters of debate, the use of coercion to clamp down on free expression and ultimately ignored those contributions which did not suit hegemon interest. In the Kenyan case, a compromise acceptable to the counter-hegemonic movement was made. Checks on executive and term limits were instituted, the Bill of Rights was extended by including social and economic rights

as well as increasing the rights of women, an independent electoral commission was established and the right to dual citizenship was enacted (Ajulu, 2008: 39-40).

Therefore, Gramsci's concept of hegemony is adopted in this study to address the problems identified above in the following way: firstly, through the idea of 'the integral state' combining both "the apparatus of government" (i.e., political society) and 'the 'private' apparatus of 'hegemony' (i.e., civil society), there is the widening of the civil society discourse beyond the dominant liberal view of civil society that locates these actors exclusively within the democratisation movement in the post-colonial Kenya culminating to post-elections 2007 violence in Kenya (Kanyinga, 2013:85).

We can, therefore, begin to conceptualise groups like the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the Party of National Unity (PNU), the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and Pro-PNU activists as hegemonic civil society actors that remained organically attached to the state, in part out of envisaged benefits from the latter's patronage system and in part, and perhaps more fundamental, out of organically and genuinely societal rooted socio-economic justice grievances over the unfinished business of land restitution (Oucho, 2002b:18-19). Most fundamentally, the idea of the "integral state" allows a focus on civil society, which does not necessarily negate the state and even party politics hence avoiding "obscuring the bigger picture of Kenyan politics, or overwhelming the more mundane concerns of NGOs / civil society" (Dorman, 2001:4).

Secondly, the primacy that Gramsci put on ideology (or discourses) as informing 'all modes of thought and behaviour' (Femia, 1981:24) of social actors in the contest for hegemony informs the need for empirical work such as the present thesis to examine the role of discourse or ideology in influencing the function of the 'hegemonic civil society' and the "counter-hegemonic civil society" to legitimate and resist state hegemony, respectively. Ajulu (2008) classifies nationalism and democracy as two over-arching discourses that clashed in post-2007 (Ajulu, 2008: 39-40). Kenya accordingly created a "multiplicity of antagonisms" in and by way of the social relations of civil society" (Katz, 2006:45). Within this divided context different social actors defined and justified their politics and actions towards others (Chemengich, 2009:23). Furthermore, within the polarised context wars of position and manoeuvre were taken to advance different visions of social change, which explains why even at an academic level scholars are divided between "economism" and "narrow politicism" (Chemengich, 2009: 23).

3.18. Hegemony 2013 Elections

Ondigi posits that the 2010 constitution, “had been already compromised by the Selected Parliamentarians and Committee of Experts, would set the stage for a hotly contested election in March 2013 (Ondigi, 2019: 29). Kenyans went into the 2013 elections knowing that the risks were to be as high as those in the previous elections. It was all a zero-sum affair, as always (Ondigi, 2019:29). To continue joining the dots (by drawing on Ghai, since the then outgoing president (Mwai Kibaki) was Kikuyu, just like his now blue-eyed tribesman and prospective heir, Uhuru Kenyatta, this study suggests that if someone else badly wanted the presidency, the Kikuyus would also be desperate to retain their ethnic hegemony over the rest of Kenya. Ghai explains both the allure and the curse of the executive presidency in Kenya:

And so, the presidency remains the one big political prize that all communities covet (urged on by manipulation by politicians), for which people are willing to kill others (as most past presidential elections have shown). Already it is clear that the politics of accession to the presidency remain the major pre-occupation of politicians, the media and, to a lesser extent, the general public. The presidency will most likely remain the foundation of ethnic hegemony and exclusion (Ghai, 2013:102).

Informatively, the 2013 elections would be an interesting scenario. Considering the attraction of the executive presidency in a zero-sum democracy, President Kibaki’s fellow Kikuyu, Uhuru Kenyatta, would generally promise continued Kikuyu hegemony. Uhuru Kenyatta also clearly had the support of the state (President Kibaki had already joined hands with him). In addition to that, he had a Kalenjin running mate in William Ruto. It can also be said that William Ruto easily reminded Kenyans of Moi’s (another Kalenjin) reign, from 1978 to 2002. In other words, both Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, with the blended campaign name “*Uhuruto*”, brought memories of the hegemony of Kikuyus and Kalenjins. Interestingly, again, as has already been mentioned, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were also indicted at the ICC for their alleged roles in the post-election violence of 2007-8, in which their tribes were generally pitted against each other. And, as Kanyinga (2013) and Ghai notes, this allowed the duo to invoke “reconciliation” before their tribespeople. Their ticket, the Jubilee Party, suggested their hopeful emancipation from their ‘victimhood’ at the ICC. On the other hand, Raila Odinga (Uhuru Kenyatta’s rival) was a Luo and, therefore, symbolized a break from the past or even freedom from Kikuyu hegemony (Kanyinga, 2013:53; Ghai, 2013:102).

Cheeseman, et al. postulate that in 2013, the coalition between Uhuru Kenyatta (from the Kikuyu community and leader of TNA) and his running mate William Ruto (from the Kalenjin community and leader of URP) teamed up to form the Jubilee Alliance which was strengthened by the narrative that their on-going trials at the international criminal court at the Hauge was a

victimization of their respective ethnic groups. Therefore, they had a moral duty to vote for the duo to “save” them from the trials (Cheeseman, et al., 2014:2-4).

To campaign and prepare Kenyans for Uhuru Kenyatta victory in the 2013 elections, Mutahi Ngunyi, a Jubilee-leaning political commentator, coined the slogan “Tyranny of Numbers”, arguing that the number of the registered Kikuyus and Kalenjins (Uhuruto support base): ‘6 million, far outweighed the “2.5 million” for Raila Odinga (Cottrell and Ghai, 2013). This is an essentialist and shameless simplification and objectification of people as tribal voting automatons. However, drawing on everyday discourses on voting patterns, this study also suggests that elections are generally looked at as “censuses”. Uhuru Kenyatta was to downfall Raila Odinga in the elections, even though the latter had more widespread support. As expected, the presidential results were disputed by Raila Odinga. The Kalenjin and Kikuyu regions voted significantly for the presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta while they voted 90% of all aspirants on the TNA and URP parties in parliamentary and civic positions in their region (Cheeseman, et al., 2014:2-4). Cottrell and Ghai (2013) add that these results, as announced by the IEBC, have remained an “object of suspicion in the eyes of many Kenyans” (Cottrell, - Ghai, 2013:108). The dispute was terminated in the Supreme Court. Interestingly, again, though acknowledging irregularities and illegalities on the part of the IEBC, the Supreme Court decided that nullification of Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory was not warranted (Cottrel and Ghai, 2013:108).

On 4 March 2013 Kenyans voted in the fifth multi-party elections since the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1991. These elections were the first to be conducted under a new legal framework, defined by a new constitution (adopted by Kenyans through a national referendum in August 2010) and under the management of a new electoral management body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) (Eagan, 2013:1). It was also the first election to follow the deeply flawed 2007 general elections, which left more than 1 000 people dead and more than 600 000 internally displaced (Schulz-Herzenberg, et.al., 2015:1).

I argue that Kenyatta’s presidential candidacy in 2013 represented an attempt to regain the “national-popular collective will” and restore the GEMA hegemony through The National Alliance TNA’s legacy of subalternity following the 2007 presidential election. Subsequently, this reinstates the GEMA’s and Kalenjin’s populist credentials as well as its legitimacy (Olang, 2013:6). The notion of the “national-popular collective will” is crucial to understanding the relationship between the “rulers” and the “ruled”. Ultimately, this analysis of populism

advocates a bringing together of Laclau's populist discourse and Gramsci's "national-popular collective will". It is suggested that this combination can be used as a framework for looking at and deconstructing populism in 2007/08 situations. These are situations of post-subaltern hegemony where the legacy of subalternity justifies and legitimises the status of hegemony (Holliday, 2016:8).

While institutional and legal reforms helped push Kenya's electoral process toward a significant break from the past, there is still much that remains unchanged. For instance, political parties and coalitions remain electoral vehicles based on individual ownership and use ethnicity to rally voters rather than ideology or real platforms. This is a problem and continues to unnecessarily exacerbate tensions as seen in these elections (Eagan, 2013:3).

To understand the significance of Gramsci's 'national-popular collective will' in the case of Kenya, two particular historical moments need to be addressed: the 2005 referendum and the controversial 2007 presidential election. In brief, leading up to the 2007 elections ODM was successful in overturning the Kibaki regime, arguably because he managed to embrace the "national-popular collective will". After Kibaki and Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement brokered by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in early 2008. Known as the National Accord, the agreement created a 'unity government,' with Kibaki as president and Odinga occupying a newly created Prime Minister post (Eagan, 2013:3). Kenya's Unity government is an example of a process whereby the subaltern successfully overturned hegemony because of the presence of the "national-popular", the fourth presidential election was controversial because in December 2007 the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was re-elected for his second and last term amidst claims of electoral fraud (Ajulu, 2008:41).

3.19. Hegemony use of National Security Forces, coercive power, ideological Consent

After the grave announcement by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) on December 30th, violence erupted in many parts of the country. In Kisumu, the capital of Nyanza Province, groups of young men set up roadblocks and began burning tires in the slum areas. As the demonstrations escalated, a small section of protesters began to move into the city centre and started looting (Kanyinga, 2011:6). The police, with General Service Unit (GSU) reinforcements, countered by moving into the city center to evict the demonstrators. The police and GSU eventually stationed themselves on the outskirts of the slum areas in an attempt to thwart the demonstrators into the neighbourhoods (HRW, 2008: 28). According to Okia, they momentarily became overwhelmed, however, and began to use live ammunition to quell the

protesters (Okia, 2011: 260). The use of heavy firepower was effective. The police and GSU were able to contain the protests in Kisumu to the slum areas but with significant civilian casualties (Okia, 2011: 260). Some police were talking about the illegal ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy. In Kisumu, police stormed a shack and opened fire without warning to any group of people they thought were suspicious. The shooting pattern indicates that police shot dead men but the victims of women and children were caught with missing bullets (HRW, 2008).

Nevertheless, according to UNHCHR, the findings of the OHCHR Mission indicate that the State failed to take all appropriate measures to meet its obligations to protect the rights of its citizens to life and physical integrity, property, democratic rights, freedom of expression, assembly and movement. In most districts, the police were unable to maintain and enforce law and order. Most of the victims and witnesses recount that during the attacks, the police were often present but were either overwhelmed or passive. In some instances, police officers were even alleged to have taken an active part in the violence (UNHCHR, 2008: 4). The OHCHR Mission received detailed information from witnesses that in various places, most notably in the Kibera slum area of Nairobi, Eldoret, and Kisumu, the policing of demonstrations and crowds was conducted with excessive use of force resulting in death and injuries of many, including children. According to the Government’s figures, ten percent of the killings were carried out by the police. Also, the OHCHR Mission notes that the ban on both live broadcast and peaceful assembly was unconstitutional and illegally deprived Kenyans of important civil and political rights (UNHCHR, 2008: 4).

It should be noted that Moi worked very closely with the Kikuyu people, both during the Kenyatta era and the first few years of his presidency. On the contrary, he gradually became embroiled in a heated argument over his access to the Kalenjin community — at the expense of the Kikuyu — the party. Accordingly, in the late 1980s, the Kikuyu were a vicious sect that sought every opportunity to reclaim the land lost during the Moi era (Wanyande, 2006: 70-71). The Luo have been the leading subalternity group since the mid-1960s when they clashed with the Kikuyu. Therefore, before the election of the many parties, the smaller parties had formed a coalition to facilitate and because of the need to overthrow the Moi regime. Radicalized intellectuals from the Subaltern groups of Gusii and Luhya later joined them (Wanyande, 2006: 71).

Coincidentally, all these tribes benefited from the settlement of land in the Rift Valley and surrounding areas and thus became the victims of the “revenge” coalition of the Kalenjin,

Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (KAMATUSA) political regimes at the time. Expected that at the time they would be disappointed in the upcoming elections, the KAMATUSA party in KANU met and decided that those tribes that betrayed them should be taught a lesson. The study in question involved their expulsion, especially from the “Kalenjin Maasai lands” of the Rift Valley. Such expulsions will also put an end to the anti-KANU province, the anti-Moi voters; thus, rejecting the key opposition votes needed to achieve the 25% requirement. Nationalism was once used and politically motivated to unite the KAMATUSA faction throughout the Rift Valley to expel "foreigners" from the land of their ancestors (Gachanga, 2012: 2).

The unification campaign in Kenya was led by senior cabinet ministers speaking at rallies in major cities in the Rift Valley and urging their relatives to protect the "own" government. As elections approached, war-torn rhetoric became increasingly common. Cases of ethnic violence that erupted in late 1991 were directed at all non-KAMATUSA Rift Valley people (Oyugi, 1997: 44). Cases of people being killed here and there began to appear regularly in local newspapers. But the most widely used strategy was the destruction of homes and property of the victims in the hope that they would flee to "ancestral lands". Those who took refuge in mechanical centers became victims of vicious attacks (Oyugi, 1997: 44).

According to Gramsci, the intellectuals are the “deputies” of the dominant group—the functionaries, exercising the subaltern but important functions of political government and social hegemony. In particular, the organic intellectuals are most important since they are the ones who elaborate and spread organic ideology (Monasta, 2000: 560). The political importance of these intellectuals’ rests also in the fact that, normally, the organic intellectuals of a historically and realistically progressive class will be able to establish their “domination” over the intellectuals of other classes, and hence will be able to create a “system of solidarity” maintained so long as the progressive class remains “progressive” (Monasta, 2000: 560).

Kenyan politics largely thrive under a system of neo hegemonic patrimonialism, although to varying degrees (Oyugi, 1997: 45) Patrimonialism is defined as a type of government organised as an extension of the ruler’s household. The ruler makes no distinction between his private property and that of the state. His rule over the territory is personal and arbitrary, without recourse to law or administrative predictability, as the political authority is based on clientelism (Kwatemba, 2008:102).

Coincidentally, all these tribes benefited from the settlement of land in the Rift Valley and surrounding areas and thus became victims of the “revenge” coalition of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (KAMATUSA) political powers at that time. It was hoped that at the time they would be disappointed in the upcoming elections, the KANU KATATA party met and decided that those tribes that betrayed them should be taught a lesson. The study in question included their expulsion, particularly from the “Kalenjin Maasai lands” of the Rift Valley. Such expulsions will also put an end to the anti-KANU province, the anti-Moi voters; thus rejecting the key opposition votes needed to achieve the 25% requirement. Nationalism was once used and politically encouraged to unite the KAMATUSA faction throughout the Rift Valley to expel "foreigners" from their ancestral land (Gachanga, 2012: 2).

The campaign for unity in Kenya was led by senior cabinet ministers speaking at rallies in major Rift Valley cities urging their relatives to protect the "own" government. As elections approached, word-for-word talks spread. Cases of ethnic violence that erupted in late 1991 were directed at all non-KAMATUSA Rift Valley people (Oyugi, 1997: 44). Homicide cases have been making headlines in local newspapers. But the most widely used strategy was the destruction of homes and property of the victims in the hope that they would flee to "ancestral lands". Those who took refuge in mechanical institutions became victims of vicious attacks (Oyugi, 1997: 44).

In the period 2002 to 2007, Kenya’s economic growth was robust with a GDP average of 5.8% in 2005, a GDP average of 6.4% in 2005. In 2007 the real GDP 7.1% (KNBS, 2008:13). “There service sector, led by the tourism and telecommunications industry, was one of the main drivers of growth, indicating increased employment” Kitiabi, 2012: n.p.). “The economic growth momentum that started in 2003 was restrained by a number of both internal and external factors in 2009. These factors included the 2008 post-election violence, the global financial crisis, the high fuel and food prices among others. Though the post-election violence was experienced only in the first quarter of 2008, it spills-over effects were manifested throughout 2008 resulting to substantial declines in growths of most of the sectors of the economy” (KNBS, 2008:13).

3.20. Challenges to Effective Civil Society Participation in Transition Politics in Kenya

Wanyande reasons that it is generally accepted in Kenyan discourse on Civil society that the sector is in instability. Having contributed to the removal of hegemonic KANU from power with the hope that a new and more democratic system of governance would be put in place, several developments have had great implications for the role and relevance of civil society

took place (Wanyande, 2009: 16). Having discussed with several civil activists, Wanyande, claims that, there has have been revealed to him that the sector has several challenges. While some of these potential challenges are historical, others are related to the social structure of Kenyan society. Some are also contemporary (Wanyande, 2009: 16).

One of the problems that the civil society in Kenya has to deal with is the hostile political environment. This stresses its roots back to the colonial period, successive states have not been very receptive to civil society activities. This is particularly the case with CSOs that question the excesses of government and ruling elites. The media has been a target especially for exposing scandals involving government and powerful state officials(Wanyande, 2009: 16). It is authoritative to note that even when the space was finally opened and it appeared that civil society organization would freely play their watchdog role the hope was quickly ruined. The passing by parliament of a Media Bill that is likely to block the Media and its signing into law by President Kibaki in January 2007 is an example of how uncomfortable the government is a free media (Wanyande, 2009: 16).

Another challenge is the temptation by civil society leaders to join the government. Following the 2007 elections, the government took the deliberate move to incorporate some of the most vocal and committed civil society leaders into government. This was the case for example with Njoki Ndungu who was nominated to parliament and John Gthong of Transparency International-Kenya-Chapter—who was appointed Permanent Secretary and Presidential advisor on a matter of governance and corruption (Wanyande, 2009: 17). Others such as Kivutha Kibwana chose to join national electoral politics and became members of parliament (Gifford, 2009: 43). Major churches have been severely compromised and have been chosen as partners in the Kibak district administration. For example, Gifford illustrates how pastors of major denominations are placed in government by appointment. He cites as an example the NCCCK general secretary who spoke so far Rev. Mutave Musyimi who changed from "formal opposition" to Moi's position to "formal cooperation or strong criticism of formal cooperation with Kibaki" (Gifford, 2009: 43). Soon Rev. Musyimi was appointed head of the Ant-Corruption Steering Committee, "Parsitau's" appointment "(2012)," which seems to have seriously undermined his ability to independently condemn massive corruption in government especially during Kibaki's first term" (Parsitau, 2012: 5). The effect of this is that it robbed civil society of leadership. The general feeling of civil society activists is that since that was a government established with their support they had to support the regime at whatever cost.

They forgot that the two actors have different roles and the civil society has to constantly monitor activities and performances of the government to stop excesses (Wanyande, 2009: 17).

The decision by civil society whether by design or by default to work very closely with the NARC government was a major undoing as it gave the government confidence and courage to allow scandals such as the Anglo Leasing to take place (Gifford, 2009: 18-19). It is certainly affected the ability and freedom of civil society to effectively check on government excesses. The danger with this civil society may end up behaving as if they are part of the government (Wanyande, 2009: 17). As champions of democracy and good governance civil society organizations must practice democracy and be seen to do so, Civil society organisations must develop, practise, internalise and institutionalise internal democracy. Currently, the public believes that the sector lacks and does not practice internal democracy (Wanyande, 2009: 17).

Another major weakness exhibited by civil society is its tendency to take ethnic positions on major national issues. This is a weakness that has even taken root in faith bases organisations including the Catholic church. A good example was the position taken by the Catholic bishops regarding the Wako Draft Constitution. While some supported and campaigned for the adoption of the Wak Draft, others campaigned for its rejection at the 2005 referendum Catholic bishops from Central province went along with political leaders from the province and called for the adoption of the Wako Draft, while their counterparts from Nyanza province and other parts of the country campaigned for its rejection (Parsitau, 2012:2). As Mue (2011) explains that “the 2005 referendum became the new frontline for the forces aligned to President Kibaki and those coalescing around his former ally turned political foe, Raila Odinga, who was then the leading a group of rebel ministers who had been frustrated by the failure of Kibaki to honour a pre-election Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). These disgruntled politicians opposed the constitutional draft arguing that it was meant to consolidate power in the hands of the Kikuyu elite who wanted to maintain the status quo” (Mue, 2011: 182). This sector is in other words, unable to transcend ethnic and regional capture. This must be considered a weakness because the sector stands the danger of perpetuating values and practices that retard the development of this society into a modern nation. Adopting ethnic-inspired positions on major issues such as elections can also threaten the solidarity of oppositional civil society (Wanyande, 2009: 17).

3.20. Factors that contribute to the emergence of Gramsci’s “Organic Intellectual” in Kenya

3.20.1. Ethnic competition and Urge to Access to Political Power

Kenya is a multi-ethnic society, and many communities have lived in harmony for years. In recent years, however, the hegemonic ethnic groups have been at the forefront in fighting for political power. This situation has resulted in fighting to control the state (Tarimo, 2009: 1).

Kasika and Nyadera argue that public mobilization opposes racial competition and that as special politicians find themselves in control of such competitions, they are more likely to use racial mixing to succeed (Kasika, & Nyadera, 2019: 163). Achieving political power is an important reality in many African nations, including those in Kenya. This is because of the rights being taken along with political power. This view provides the impetus for individuals and races to seek control of the state (Opondo, 2014: 60). As a result, fewer hegemonic communities were playing card advantages. Many ethnic groups supported the armed struggle for independence in hope that they could regain their stolen lands. This expectation did not become reality. The situation has fomented to anger, resentment, lust for revenge, and aggressive competition that has overlooked the common good of the entire country (Tarimo, 2009: 1).

3.20.2. Economy

3.20.2.1. Increased youth unemployment

Oucho, contends that despite attaining exceptionally good education, “the Kenyan youth have been reeling from unemployment and poverty” (Oucho, 2002b:18). According to him, the problem is traceable, “back to the mid-1980s when the country began expanding university education which failed to absorb the growing band of secondary school-leavers produced in the independence era. Indiscriminate expansion of secondary and tertiary education without concomitant creation of employment opportunities defeated the very purpose of education in the country” (Oucho, 2002b:18). Oucho argues that promising “such youth employment, credit facilities, and other goodies, as happened in the 2002 electioneering by NARC, without ever fulfilling the promises, was, therefore, one of the greatest shortcomings of Kibaki’s first term” (Oucho, 2002b:18).

Accordingly, pledging to complete the stalled revolution, ODM no doubt became the party of choice for and by youth; a party whose failure to capture leadership on fraudulent grounds

never went down well with the youth. That the youth revolted was a predictable response (Oucho, 2002b:18).

3.20.2.2. Grand Corruption scandals

Another source of resentment and dissatisfaction among Kenya's subordinate groups is the resurgence of widespread corruption scandals. According to Kenya's anti-corruption commission, the country is plagued by corruption at the state level. Corruption is manifested through various forms including petty bribery and grand fraud. The embezzlement of billions of Kenyan shillings over the past two decades has fuelled the tensions among the rulers and the ruled. Most of the scandals were never resolved due to partiality in the justice system. The result has been giving leeway to those in power to amass public resources at the expense of the poor. Grand corruption scandals contributed to the post-election violence in 2007 (Tarimo, 2009: 1-2).

3.20.2.3. *Spiral cost of Living*

The spiralling cost of living had become unbearable for many Kenyan households who saw voting out the government in power as their only hope for a better economic climate. Unlike the past when bribes worked, the stakes were too high and voters would take bribes from one party or even several parties, but probably vote for the party of their choice. Increased poverty at individual, household, and regional levels, which ODM promised to eliminate by citing specific strategies, became an important campaign chip. The government's argument that the country was enjoying an economic upturn was a fact, but the ordinary citizens had not seen any positive changes to warrant voting for it hence voters' overwhelming support for the opposition party (Oucho, 2002b:18-19).

Although Kenya's economy is doing daily well in the region, the wealth distribution amongst the populace has been unevenly distributed, income distribution was heavily twisted, education unevenly distributed, and the medical services were existent in some districts and for some ethnic groups only (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 161). Kenya's challenges since independence, Gachanga contends that ethnic hegemony is also used as economic interests as ethnic groups compete in the market for wealth transfer and they employ violence take control of the government to redistribute benefits to their members. The violence involved youth who had little opportunity for employment despite Kibaki's 2002 election promise of job creation (Gachanga, 2012: 4-5)

Although steps are being taken to combat racism and tribal politics, nationalism has been and still is widely used to further political interests and to promote economic crime such as corruption (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 161).

3.20.3. The Land Question: An Unfinished Agenda

Still enduring as a colonial legacy is the contentious “land question” and well recognised intrinsic problems on which different commissions have prescribed recommendations that have never been implemented. Oucho (2002b) posits that Land “has been at the core of Kenya’s political evolution since the colonial period (Oucho, 2002b:4). In fact, the “land question” originated during the 1930s when the Kenya Land Commission (1932-33) – otherwise known as the Carter Land Commission – made recommendations that planted seeds of disharmony, among Kenyans: the rejection of the notion that Africans had any land rights in the former “White Highlands”; setting the stage for the Resident Labour Ordinance of 1937, which defined squatters as labourers; directing that the disaffected Kikuyu be awarded 21, 000 acres (8,500 hectares) of land and £2,000 as compensation for loss of land (Furedi, 1989:24-25 and Kanogo, 1987:122, note 33), quoted in Oucho, 2002a:80); and creation of conditions leading to the country’s administrative segregation into a “dual” economy and society by the colonial state (Gordon, 1986: 60, as quoted in Oucho, 2002a:80). The land settlement programme soon after independence seems to have steered clear of this unresolved agenda, which interested parties have addressed as best suits them even when it least suits other contestants (Oucho, 2002b:4). With time agitation began for recovery of the expropriated land, with the Mau Mau rebellion (1952-55) best known for accelerating the pace of land decolonisation if not the whole decolonisation process (Oucho, 2002b:4). Nonetheless, to this day, the Maasai, the Kalenjin, the Kikuyu, the Taita, the Taveta and the Mijikenda, who were most affected, have not had the situation redressed. If anything, much of their land has fallen into the hands of greedy individual Kenyans and corrupt land-buying companies (Oucho, 2002b:4).

In pre-colonial times, the land was communally owned and traditional rights and obligations ensured direct access to all. Colonialism disrupted these relationships. Colonial authorities assumed that all land to which private ownership could not be established by documentary evidence was ownerless (Tarimo, 2009: 2). The colonial government parceled out more than 7 million acres of land, including some of the most fertile lands in Kenya, and earmarked them

for cultivation by Europeans. These areas came to be known as the white highlands. Indigenous ethnic groups who had occupied these areas were relegated to marginal reserves and all land not in their occupation was declared crown land. This resulted in overpopulation in the reserves and, as a result, significant numbers of Luo, Kisii, Luhya, and Kikuyu migrated to the Rift Valley province as squatters and to provide labour on settler farms (Gachanga, 2012: 2-3).

In Kenya injustice occurred in the area of land ownership, when the land was confiscated from the indigenous people by British settlers and later taken by politically hegemonic personalities after independence in 1963. Instead of returning the stolen lands to the original owners, the politically connected personalities benefited the occasion of the departing white settlers to grab land, while relegating those who owned the land before the white settlers came to the category of the landless (Tarimo, 2009: 2).

Gachanga argues that, on the eve of independence, Kenyans had great expectations that poverty, illiteracy, and disease would be things of the past. They also hoped that land would be reverted to them and that there would be greater cohesion and integration (Gachanga, 2012: 2). This was never to be. On the contrary, Kenyatta used ethnic hegemonic to maintain power and to distribute resources (Omulo, 2017:17-18). Tarimo argues that reactions of discontent have been revealed in the land clashes of 1992, 1997, and 2007 (Tarimo, 2009: 2). These clashes display anger among those living in impoverished conditions (Tarimo, 2009: 2).

Conflict over land rights is often seen as being at the center of ethnic conflict in Kenya. 2007/2008 post-elections conflict, violence was directed at members of minority ethnic groups in specific regions of the country with the intent of expelling them from those areas (Gifford, 2009: 14-15, (Gachanga, 2012: 3). The primary result of these conflicts has been the displacement of people who had settled in parts of the country other than their ancestral land (Gachanga, 2012: 2). There is a common feeling among Kenyans, that Kenya's "land question" is the primary source of the ethnic clashes (Opondo, 2014: 65-66). Gifford, observes that violence resulted in the elite's appropriation of the land issue to fight those opposed to them by reactivating demands for territorial land claims in the Rift Valley and on the Coast (Gifford, 2009: 12-13).

The colonial hegemony, while creating white highlands, limited access to land rights but indirectly increased access to land. The outcome was to promote migration to the white highlands, radically expanding the range of Kikuyu settlements. Thus the Kikuyu settled outside the Central province. White settlers restricted the possibility of establishing land rights.

So, when independence was won, and power was seized by a conservative fraction of Kenya's rural society, the first order of business was to settle issues of investment and private property, including land rights. Sharp disagreement arose as to who would get reversionary interest in the highlands (Ajulu, 2011: 36-37; Gifford, 2009: 8-10).

These issues threatened to delay the speedy transfer of political power. In the end, political independence was once negotiated without resolving the land issue. At the second 1962 constitutional conference, all Kenyan ethnic groups renounced their claims to the land that had belonged to them in pre-colonial Kenya but had been alienated to Europeans. It was agreed that the Europeans could part with the land on a willing seller-willing buyer basis. The validity of colonial expropriation was accepted and guaranteed by the independence constitution. Many of the migrants, individually or collectively, subsequently bought land from white settlers and settled in areas outside their ancestral homes, principally in the Rift Valley province (Gachanga, 2012:2; Gifford, 2009:8-10).

The land issues were never fully addressed. British settlers' interests were safeguarded, and no effort was made to sort out the competing claims of that pastoral ethnic groups who had been ousted from the Rift Valley by the British and by squatters (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 163).

There was further migration into the Rift Valley and Coast provinces from Central, Western, and Eastern provinces in the period immediately after independence. The high inflows of people in the Rift Valley were attributed to settlement schemes that were initiated by the government soon after independence. In the Coast province, the largest number of immigrants came mainly from Machakos, Kitui, Kisumu, Kakamega, and Siaya. Immigrants in the Rift Valley came mainly from Central province, Kakamega, Bungoma, and all districts in Nyanza (Gifford, 2009: 12-13; Opondo, 2014: 63-64).

The post-independence settlement schemes designed to transfer land from settlers to Africans were similarly controversial. In a program known as the million-acre settlement scheme, the government bought some European farms ostensibly to settle the landless. There is evidence that the Kikuyu ended up being the main beneficiaries of the scheme (Omulo, 2017:17-18). As Kinyanga (2000) observes, they were the most "land-hungry" and, being the ethnic group best placed to raise capital, led the way inland purchase cooperatives— see also (Gachanga, 2012:2). Leys (1975) reports that, in a survey of 162 cooperatives, 120 were exclusively Kikuyu, and an additional 38 consisted Kikuyu with members of other ethnic groups. The Kikuyu could be found participating in faraway schemes in places such as Lamu, Kilifi, Trans

Nzoia, and Uasin Gishu, whose intended beneficiaries were from other ethnic groups. The resettlement schemes thus provided fertile ground for ethnic hegemonic and the emergence of subalternity which also led to the emergence of Gramsci's "organic intellectuals" in Kenya (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002: 86).

3.20.4. Regional inequalities

Kenya's hegemonic presidency has assumed the three arms of political governance, namely, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. During the Moi regime, the presidency played a triple role of having the prerogative to direct legislative, executive, and judicial matters of the state of Kenya (Kwatamba, 2008:101).

In his inaugural speech as President under the NARC government, Mwai Kibaki gave Kenyans the false yearend message that the country would accede to the rule of law and that his presidency would desist from "roadside announcements". But no sooner did the New Year dawn than the President embarked on roadside announcements and continued to play the triple role of being the de facto head of three arms of governance He appointed the cabinet without recourse to those who had made NARC victory possible; continued with the ethnic nepotism formula to appoint top civil servants and heads of state corporations, some of the appointees many years of retirement; and on the recommendations of the Ringera Commission, his new government fired judges who had served Kenya for decades, allegedly corrupt and incompetent but who had never been prosecuted. (Ajulu, 2008: 41).

The people of Kenya believe that the move was intended to make judges into goats to let the President appoint judges who will support his rule in any way. Some Kenyans suspect that the appointment of Judge Philip Waki as chairman of the Post-Election Violence Commission (formerly the Waki Commission) after challenging his dismissal and reinstatement was a way to comfort and compensate him. well for any loss he had made (Omulo, 2017: 17-18). Racial discrimination was marked by appointments to government positions. When the NARC came to power in 2003, it announced that the meritocracy would oversee all elections in Kenya. This has never happened and racism has worsened since the November 2005 referendum in which all people were elected confined to the Mount Kenya region (Omulo, 2017: 17-18). It is in the realm of the NARC that those aged 60 or older dominated high-level appointments and ensure that younger, better-trained, and more powerful Kenyans are kept at a distance, never to be seen near power lines. That the older generation still retains their positions is a great surprise

to the Great Unity government; they may still be close to their undisclosed assets once their appointment has been terminated (Kwatemba, 2008:102).

Kanyinga posits that on invocation of the “theory of ethnic nepotism” is inherent in his, analysis of public appointments confirms the consistency of ethnic nepotism (Kanyinga, 2006: 374-394).

Jomo Kenyatta’s cabinet appointments favoured the Kikuyu (Kanyinga, 2006: 374-394). Moi followed suit, even appointing people who were unqualified for the positions they encumbered, leaving the appointees with simple options, namely the embezzlement of public funds and grand corruption in high places (Kanyinga, 2006: 375).

Daniel Arap Moi’s state began with some modicum of equity in 1979, appeased the Kikuyu in 1982 and Kikuyu and Luo in 1985 and 1987, and thereafter favoured the Kalenjin, the Luhya, and the Kamba in 1994 and 1998 (Kanyinga, 2006: 375). Consequently, according to Kanyinga, (2006), This was an excellent piece of political approach, one of playing around with ethnic loyalty (Kanyinga, 2006: 375).

Mwai Kibaki appointed an equal number of Kikuyu, Luhya, and Luo to his cabinet at the onset of his first term in 2003 up to the referendum in November 2005 (Kanyinga, 2006: 377), but hurt by the referendum results, made his cabinet overwhelmingly a Mount Kenya region affair, with the Luhya benefiting substantially up to the time of the 2007 general election. Appointments of Assistant Ministers and in the public service, as well as parastatals, took more or less a similar pattern (Kanyinga, 2006: 377-378).

Kwatemba’s, insightful analysis of Kibaki’s appointments before and after the Grand Coalition government provides evidence of ethnicized political, civil service, and state corporation appointments reminiscing Jomo Kenyatta’s appointments in April 1974. Key institutions, among them the cabinet, security chiefs, and state corporations including financial institutions are headed by Kibaki’s appointees from the Mount Kenya region; appointees because in Kenya those are Presidential appointments, unlike true democracies where some vetting of candidates is employed. From Kwatemba’s analysis, the small discrepancy is that while Kenyatta’s appointees were from the slopes of the mountain excluding Nyeri and Meru and Embu areas, Kibaki’s encompasses the entire region (Kwatemba, 2008: 105).

3.20.5. Hegemony Electoral System: False Democracy in Kenya

It is doubtful that land and ethnic hegemony, singularly or together, could have led to the emergence of “organic intellectuals in Kenya. Public choice scholars have attributed ethnic hegemony in Africa and Kenya to be specific to the emergence of Gramsci’s “Organic Intellectuals” to the failure of political institutions to accommodate diverse interests. They argue that the lack of political models to deal effectively with diversity in centralized states where competition for resources and power is prevalent leads to the emergence of Gramsci’s “organic intellectuals and subalternity (Spivak, 1988a:308). Until 1991, post-independence Kenya has been characterised by one-party rule and hegemonic excessive centralization of power. In such a scenario, the leader and group who capture the state have control of an enormous amount of resources and thus can reward supporters, provide for group members, and create barriers to entry into political and economic markets (Gifford, 2009:35-37).

To this end, Wanyande first argues that in a political environment where the electoral playing field is even and facilitates free and fair elections the results may be regarded as an expression of the wishes of the voters. Second, when the elections are inefficiently and incompetently managed their validity and credibility are always contested. Indeed, poorly managed elections cannot pass the test of being free and fair. Finally, he argues that a combination of factors has shaped electoral politics and election outcomes in Kenya (Wanyande, 2006: 64-65).

The quality and outcome of Kenyan elections have been influenced greatly by how the entire electoral process was managed. The management of Kenya’s elections is the responsibility of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) (Eagan, 2013:1). The establishment of the ECK as a statutory body was premised on the assumption that an independent electoral body would ensure the conduct of free and fair elections. This assumption has, however, turned out to be false as complaints about election irregularities have continued under its aegis. The major complaint was that the election playing field was tilted in favour of the ruling party KANU and its candidates (Wanyande, 2006: 74-75).

Reports of administrative incompetence in the conduct of elections have also been common. In short, an independent electoral body is crucial for the conduct of free and fair elections; but it does not guarantee that the elections will at any cost be fairly managed (Eagan, 2013:1). An equally critical factor is the administrative competence of the electoral body itself. Competence is a function of several factors, including the level of training of election officials, adequate financial resources for the electoral body, and adequate administrative arrangements for

handling elections. In short, for the ECK to be efficient it must have adequate human and financial capacity (Wanyande, 2006:75).

Administrative inefficiency in elections have taken the following forms: late opening of polling stations, late commencement of actual balloting, mix up of ballot papers, insufficiency of ballot papers at some polling stations, missing names from the voters' register on election day, and mismanagement of election results (KHRC, 2018: 8). Part of the ECK problem stems from the fact that it relies heavily on the government to facilitate its work. It relies on the government to transport both electoral resources and some of the electoral officers. The Department of Finance is sponsoring its activities, including the conduct of elections and by-elections (KHRC, 2018: 8). The constant complaint is that the government does not provide ECK with adequate funding and should rely on provincial administrative staff to perform some of its functions. This raises doubts about the autonomy of the ECK, because the loyalty of those officials goes first to the president of the government, and second to the ECK. The ECK's reliance on the state police to maintain law and order and prevent election-related violence also raised concerns about its neutrality (Wanyande, 2006: 74-75).

Kenya has held presidential, parliamentary, and local/municipal elections since independence in 1963. During this election, the country also held by-elections caused by the loss of a seat by a Member of Parliament or councillor for various reasons. In 1966 for instance, the country went through what is referred to as the 'Little General Election', which was occasioned by the resignation of several MPs from the then ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), to form the first opposition party in independent Kenya, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). The then vice-president Jaramogi Oginga Odinga led the defections. 1963, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, and 1988 elections were conducted under one-party rule. 1992, 1997, and 2002 elections, on the other hand, were conducted under a multiparty regime (Wanyande, 2006: 65-66).

Wanyande, speculates that, under the one-party state, the ruling party sponsored all the candidates. The nomination of candidates was also controlled and conducted by a clique of hegemonic, powerful party politicians who ensured that only those politicians acceptable to the regime were nominated and subsequently elected (Wanyande, 2006: 66). Voters, therefore, did not have much influence on who was nominated and who became a candidate for election to parliament. There was the widespread belief that in some constituencies, the election was rigged in favour of pro-establishment candidates (Wanyande, 2006: 66). Consequently,

elections turned out to be a mere formality conducted periodically to serve three functions. First, they were instrumental in confirming ruling political elites in power and facilitating their bid to consolidate their hegemony. It must be admitted however that on the whole the nominated candidates always engaged in a fierce electoral contest. The elections were thus mainly a selection exercise in which individuals considered to be politically acceptable to the regime were given the mandate to represent the people. The choice was even more restricted in the case of presidential elections (Wanyande, 2006: 66). Only one presidential candidate was presented to the electorate. This was in line with the practice by which the party president would also be the party's presidential candidate. There were no primaries for presidential candidates. No wonder President Jomo Kenyatta was elected unopposed throughout his presidency and relinquished power only upon death in 1978 (Wanyande, 2006: 66). Second, one-party elections served to legitimise what was an authoritarian rule: the leaders used the elections to claim legitimacy. This point ought to be understood against the background that every government, irrespective of how it comes to power, seeks to gain some legitimacy in the eyes of both the domestic and international community. Third, the regularity with which Kenya held elections was often cited by the pro-establishment politicians as proof of how democratic the country was. It did not matter that the elections were neither free nor fair as they were managed by hegemonic civil servants on behalf of the government (Wanyande, 2006: 66).

Wanyande maintains that because of the undemocratic nature of elections under a one-party regime, voters did not use elections to determine the quality of their representatives in terms of their performance (Wanyande, 2006: 67). Accordingly, even though several politicians lost their seats in various elections, there is no clear evidence that this was caused by voters' voluntary decision to vote them out. Some of the losers may have been rigged out by the ruling party because they were considered no longer useful (Wanyande, 2006: 67). In this regard, Wanyande finds credible the observation by IED that "the use of the state's administrative apparatus introduced partiality into the electoral process, especially against those considered by the government to be anti-establishment' (IED, 1997: 11).

The KANU state's refusal to allow Oginga Odinga and his former KPU colleagues to contest the 1983 and the 1988 elections is a good example of how the voters' right to choose was limited under the single-party state. Yet these politicians were very highly regarded in their constituencies but were barred from contesting the elections on the pretext that they had been disloyal to the Kenyatta regime. This was so although Jomo Kenyatta had been replaced in 1978 (Wanyande, 2006: 67).

Electoral integrity depends on the character of governance leading up to an election, the quality of the process on the day, as well as mediated efforts to manage conflicts over contested processes and outcomes. Following the 2007 elections, the commission of inquiry into the conduct of the 2007 general elections (the Kriegler Commission)²⁵ recommended the establishment of a new electoral management body as a measure to strengthen the credibility of elections and ensure peaceful elections. Schulz-Herzenberg, et al. observe that the IEBC's predecessor, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) was considered to be a body that was biased towards the interests of the 2007 incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki, and this partisanship was widely regarded as an underlying cause of the 2007/8 post-election conflict (Schulz-Herzenberg, et al., 2015: 2).

Part of the ECK's problem stems from the fact that it relies heavily on the state to facilitate its work. It relies on the government to transport both election materials and some of the election officials. The Treasury funds its operations, including the conduct of elections and by-elections (Kagwanja and Southhall, 2010:270). The constant complaint is that the government does not provide ECK with adequate funding and should rely on provincial administrative staff to perform some of its functions. This raises doubts about the independence of the ECK because the loyalty of such officials begins with the president or the government, and second with the ECK (Wanyande, 2006: 77).

The ECK's reliance on the state police to maintain law and order and prevent election-related violence has also raised concerns about its neutrality. As evidenced by the numerous incidents of election-related violence and the inability of the police to take steps to prevent violence or to punish those involved in violence, the police have not always been able to maintain public confidence in the violence. law enforcement and order during elections (Wanyande, 2006:77).

UNHCHR understood its fact-finding mission to exclude the electoral process per se, which had already been subject to close monitoring by several national and international experts. The findings of various observation missions and independent reports, pointed out procedural irregularities in the vote tallying, casting serious doubts on the legality of the re-appointment of President Kibaki and therefore on the later formation of a new Government. Such findings suggest that Kenyan voters were indeed deprived of their basic democratic right to free and fair elections (UNHCHR, 2008: 5).

²⁵ Independent Review Commission: A Report on General Elections of 2007 in Kenya. Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2008.

At the heart of every electoral conflict in the country is an error or omission, or commission, by relevant state and non-state actors. State institutions tend to intensify electoral conflicts in the country (Kagwanja and Southhall, 2010: 270-271). For instance, the IREC (Kriegler Commission) observed that the commissioners and staff of the ECK were ill-prepared to manage the 2007 general election. Even after declaring the incumbent, president Kibaki, as the winner of the contest, the then Chairman, Samuel Kivuitu, confessed in the full stare of the media that he actually could not certainly confirm the candidate who won the election (Ondigi, 2019:4).

Kanyinga et al. safely explain the handling of the 2007 presidential elections:

Problems arose during vote count. Complaints of flawed counting and general irregularities in tallying of the presidential vote featured prominently at the central tallying point in Nairobi—the Kenyatta International Conference Centre. Notwithstanding the hotly-disputed presidential vote tallying, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced the incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki of PNU (Party of National Unity), as the winner (Kanyinga, et al. 2010:14)

The swearing-in of the president-elect at sunset in State House by then Chief Justice Evans Gicheru heightened tensions in the country and eventually occasioned electoral violence (UNHCHR, 2008:8).

In Kenya Key institutions that would assure peaceful transfer of power are increasingly being compromised by the ruling hegemonic elite. For instance, the electoral commission has on several occasions been accused of manipulating electoral results, thereby leading to violence in the country. In 2007, the ODM party's candidate Raila Odinga accused the ECK of rigging the elections in favour of the then incumbent, President Kibaki (Eagan, 2013:2-3). In the 2013 general elections, the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) accused the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) of rigging the elections in favour of Jubilee Alliance's candidate Uhuru Kenyatta (Ondigi, 2019:6). Subsequently, in the August 8 2017 elections, the National Super Alliance (NASA) accused the IEBC of rigging the presidential elections in favour of Jubilee Party's candidate and the then incumbent, President Kenyatta. Consequently, NASA filed a petition in the Supreme Court (Ondigi, 2019:6-7). The Court nullified the results citing IEBC's irregularities and illegalities in the transmission of the results and called for fresh elections that were held on October 26 the same year. It is by strengthening institutions and in particular the IEBC, that the country will be able to break away from the cycle of electoral conflicts and attain positive peace (Schulz-Herzenberg et al., 2015: 1-2).

3.21. What to be done to achieve National integration in Kenya

Firstly, to better transform the political system the citizen should flow approach where conflicts are addressed through institutional and constitutional measures. Each mandated institution and the citizens should be mobilized and participate in addressing particular issues, by converting them to policy agenda, participating in deliberations over policies development, while holding the State accountable. This may be done through local *baraza/indaba* the committee should be citizen inclusive of those who better understand the issue at hand and come up with a clear fair solution.²⁶

Secondly, most of the recommendations were drawn from all the Commissions conceived to find resolutions to the conflict. The National Peace Accord; Agenda Four Commissions like—the *Waki Report*, the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission among others, should have their mandate fully implemented and the effects of harmonious and cohesive existence among Kenyans be realized; sustained as well as their integration of each ethnic group in governance process and procedures (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009: 260).

Thirdly, the Government and the people of Kenya should try and address any kind of ethnic discrimination, negative addresses, and ethnic entrepreneurs pitching communities against communities through “hate speech” should be litigated successfully. It should thus take more of an objective approach rather than promoting impunity as it presently does. Fourthly, affirmative action for the marginalized and the minorities should be introduced and be amalgamated in the system to promote human dignity towards equal opportunities. Fifthly, the people together with the Government should appreciate and respect each other’s ethnic diversity while at the same time embracing and accommodating any other identities that may emerge as was the case of with stateless Makonde ethnic group—the Mozambicans who came into Kenya as labourers—and where the President gave directive orders for them to be naturalised and registered as Kenyan citizens by December 2016 (Gachanga, 2012; Njikang, 2017).

Conclusion

The idea of hegemony, though it can be found in Marxist literature, is commonly associated with Gramsci’s Selections from the *Prison Notebooks* (1971). The text was written and its idea

²⁶ The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and State. A Synthesis Paper Findings from ten years of DFID—funded research on Governance and Fragile States 2001-2010.

formulated while Gramsci was confined in Mussolini's prison between 1929 and 1935. Given the difficult conditions under which he wrote it, Gramsci avoided straightforward Marxist terminologies. In this situation, the tendency of those desiring hegemony, the hegemonic classes or hegemony-seeking classes, to use coercion and call it consensus often seems to be ineffective. We will return to this issue in the next section. Hegemony, thus, speaks of a power relationship between dominant and subordinate classes that involves "both" consensus and coercion. Furthermore, if we consider this relationship in the context of production relations, this power relationship might exist in various modes. Indeed, Gramsci's overwhelming theoretical interest lies in the uneven and incomplete development of capitalism in Italy and the continuing remnants thereof feudalism, landlords, and peasant relationships well into the early twentieth century. Gramsci emphasizes the peasant's belief and culture and calls for the need to understand them properly. Therefore, if we follow Gramsci's formulation of hegemony, we find that there are three main interrelated items: First, it is a historically specific power relation between dominant and subordinate groupings. Second, it involves both consensuses as well as coercion, depending on the changing relationship between the State and society. To put it differently, there is dialectical interplay within hegemony as "consent" and the state as "coercion." Third, different levels of development of production are related, which provides different modes of power relations between dominant hegemonic groups and subordinate categories. Gramsci always held the collective consciousness of society close. For Gramsci, it is the collective will that is revolutionary. The Will for Gramsci was always considered to be the collective will of the working class of political will, never the individual will.

South Africa and Kenya are among the countries in Africa with a strong civil society. In the case of Nigeria, civil society has not always been preeminent. The military rule has in the past suppressed democratization despite the presence of a vibrant civil society and independent media. Kenya is an example of a country that has been able to attain transformative reform of the state through a vigilant and strong civil society.

In Kenya, civil society organizations vary widely — from non-governmental organizations to non-governmental organizations. Working in this area are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) doing development work, community-based organizations (CBOs), religious or religious organizations (FBOs), trade unions, professional organizations. In Kenya, there is also a tendency to assume that civil society can perform better than the state in terms of catering to the interests of the citizens and in keeping the state in check.

The study sought to answer the question of why racism has influenced Kenya's politics and how it has contributed to the country's democracy and development since independence. Racial politics is strong in an area characterized by deception and exploitation of ethnic identity for personal gain. Although the beginnings of nationalism are traced back to the colonial era, the rise of racial identity is most evident in the post-colonial era. This is in part due to the perceived benefits that come with political power and the erroneous view that the rise of tribal chief to a high political position is equivalent to the rise of his entire society in this position. This, therefore, describes the intense political and racial tensions that have arisen over the years since the election and the tensions over race and voting patterns.

Taking advantage of the economic and political influence they had during the reign of Kenyatta, the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu groups, but mostly the Kikuyu took advantage of the situation and set up numerous land-buying companies. These companies, between the 1960s and 70s, will facilitate the settlement of hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu in the Rift Valley, especially in the arable regions especially Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Nandi Trans Nzoia, and Narok. However, the Kikuyu, the Embu, and the Meru were not the only ones to acquire land in the post-independence Rift Valley. Newcomers to the era of independence include the Kisii, Luo, and Luhya, who came to buy land on the border of these regions.

The study confirmed that all key political parties in Kenya represent the Horowitz coalition for facilitation or commitment. Similarly, all key political parties in Kenya between 1992 and 2007 represent racial groups. Although the world's major divisions were sometimes overcome, the times seemed to be short-lived and highly motivated. As a result, Kenya's multi-party democracy has intensified the divisions within the country, especially the Kikuyu and Luo factions. In addition, nationalism has always proven to provide a stronger meeting place for political activities than party structures. This is true of both the opposition and the government: The collapse of KANU, when it came out of power, and the NARC, when it came to power, shows this. The NARC case is particularly interesting in African political research as the literature on neopatrimonialism assumes that governments provide stability by building consumer power networks. The rapid decline of the NARC, however, proves that racism is strong in these two forces: access to state resources was not sufficient to overcome the centrifugal force of race.

The most frequently observed incidents of post-election violence in Kenya in 2007 and 2008 are the result of the kind of political party that pervades the country. Post-election violence in

the lower echelons also took place after the 1992 and 1997 elections. Thus, the peaceful and highly publicized 2002 elections represented a different and no change, as some have argued, in Kenya's election history. The fact that the 2002 election was won by a coalition (albeit temporarily) that closed all the country's past and present conflicts raises a causal link between electoral violence and the existing type of party. Once again, this has implications for research across African politics: While in Kenya the 2007 elections represent a backlash on political stability and electoral conduct, it also raises the question of whether there can be a peaceful election in a multiracial country. when nationalism dominates party politics.

The paper sought to answer the question of why racism has influenced Kenya's politics and how it has contributed to democracy and the country's development since independence. The theoretical aspect has provided a prism in which we can understand that racist politics is embedded in an environment symbolized by deception and exploitation of the national identity card for your benefit. Although the beginnings of nationalism are traced back to the colonial era, the rise of racial identity is most evident in the post-colonial era. This is in part due to the perceived benefits that come with political power and the erroneous view that the rise of a racial monarchy to a higher political position is equivalent to the rise of his entire society in such a position. This, therefore, describes the intense political and racial tensions that have arisen over the years since the election and the tensions over race and voting patterns.

CHAPTER FOUR

RELIGION AND SUBALTERN POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN CONTEMPORARY KENYA

4.0 Introduction

Orobator posits that complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty characterize the relationship of religion, state, and politics in Africa. According to him, the East African country of Kenya provides a perfect case study sample of the larger Africa profile. He argues that the limited literature contains three main lines that indicate an incompatibility of purposes in this relationship (Orobator, 2009: 182).

In the event of a conflict of interest between the parties or between the parties, an attempt is usually made to resolve the dispute between the parties. This will involve the further settlement of the matter and discussion and only in the final decision if the block cannot be terminated that power can be used by a legal arbitrator to resolve the dispute. This can only be done politically. Politics, therefore, comes from accepting the fact that the simultaneous existence of different cultures within a local unit under the same law.

The relationship between religion and politics in Kenya predates the formal establishment of the state (i.e., 1963). Religion forms the basis on which Muslims on the Coast attack people's homes from the interior as a call for an independent state in Kenya (Elephant, 2014: 7). Mwakimako and Willis (2014) reason that there are perceptibly different elements in the recent history of violence at the coast; differentiated sometimes by apparent ideology and rhetoric, but also by the precise nature of the violence, in terms of weapons, organisation and targets (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014: 7-8). They maintain that the Mpeketoni attack seems to signal the increasingly close interweaving of some of these strands. This interweaving has, ironically, been enabled and perhaps even encouraged by the lingering failings of the Kenyan state's security sector, as well as by a wider pattern of the instrumentalization of ethnic violence which has been a feature of Kenyan politics since the 1990s. It is a profoundly alarming development. (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014: 9). It also served as a pre-colonial colony from the coast as it paved the way for the English to conquer the southern islands, exploit their economic resources, eradicate human traditions and social norms, and establish a Christian religion (Ndzovu, 2014: 5- 6). Thus, Kenya became a religion before its integration into modern-day Kenya in 1920 by

the British (Ndzovu, 2014: 7). It should therefore be noted that in sharply divided societies, like Kenya where Islam and Christianity compete, ethnic sentiments are wielded and this invariably threatens the stability of the political system. Ndzovu (2014) postulates that it is important to understand that ethnicity has remained prevalent in Kenyan politics because of its composition as a multi-ethnic nation-state, with subnational identities based on language, common ancestry and religion (Ndzovu, 2014:7). He goes on to emphasise that, sometimes, religion and ethnicity combine to provide individuals with distinct identities. Ndzovu (2014) claims that there is a tendency in Kenya to associate one's ethnicity with a particular religion; this is why Islam, for example, is associated with "Arab," Digo, and Swahili ethnic groups living at the coast or the Somalis of north-eastern Kenya, while ethnic groups from the hinterland, such as the Luo and the Kikuyu, are viewed as Christians (Ndzovu, 2014:7).

Some studies have articulated the impacts of ethnicity and have exhaustively provided discussions on the topic of ethnicity. However, few studies have focused on the devolvement of ethnicity from within communities in Kenya and how this has continued to date. It is against this background this study provides an analysis of how ethnicity has been depicted in Kenya (Maisuria, 2016: 8). This chapter provides a critical assessment of devolved ethnicity in Kenya, by looking at the social, economic, and political perspective of the Kenyan society (Maisuria, 2016: 8). It addresses the forms of social, economic, and political exclusion that require effective and efficient inclusive policies to overcome exclusion. The social, economic, and political gains of development have not been shared equality by these excluded groups (Maisuria, 2016: 8).

This chapter presents the argument that history does not end and the struggle for the ideological and material phase continues, and in Kenya, this struggle for consciousness and praxis goes hand in hand with cultural production more than ever before (Maisuria, 2016: 8). This position is strongly influenced by the work of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and I begin this chapter by describing the role of religious leaders in post-colonial Kenya. This foundation includes the development of an important theme for subalternity groups and the class struggle with the Gramsci concept of hegemony (Maisuria, 2016: 8).

I will start by examining the role of the church in Kenyan politics

"For a hundred years or more in particularly every part of America, the Church, the media and the education system—the three huge organic entities that Gramsci identifies as fundamental institutions of the civil society—have been used to disseminate their dominant ideology among the social classes, including the popular ranks...We are

liberating the state because bourgeois civil society controlled the Venezuelan state as it wished.”²⁷

4.1. Role of the Church in Kenyan Politics

The role of religion or church in sub-Saharan Africa and post-colonial Kenya has been one of the most controversial issues in modern times due to important concerns such as political stability, dictatorship, human rights, democracy, society, justice, economic development, corruption, and public health. In Kenya, the predominance of the Roman Catholic churches and the Anglican churches, are still the two most influential religious organizations in the world (despite recent events as we shall see later). Despite its guaranteed existence, however, the Anglican Church has had a vague relationship with the state, since the last colonial period when the great Kenyan tribes, the Luo, the Kikuyu, saw the church as an extended arm of colonial oppression (Maisuria, 2016: 8).

4.2. Social Media and Post-Elections Crisis in Kenya

Gitile and King'oro, in their study *Politics of Ethnicity and Dominance in Kenya Universities* having explored the occurrence of hate speech by rural and urban areas and found out that hate speech occurs more in the rural areas (57%) than in urban areas (43%) (Gitile and King'oro, 2019: 606). According to Gitile and King'oro, this might be because most politicians convey hate speech to ‘their’ ethnic groups against other ethnic groups (Gitile and King'oro, 2019:606). In this regard, Gitile and King'oro maintain that the context should be favourable to the ethnic group in question (Gitile and King'oro, 2019: 606). The role of media is very critical in either fanning ethnic conflicts or preaching peace and bringing about cohesion. Evidence from the study demonstrates the respondent’s perceptions that the media has a role to play in promoting ethnic tolerance (Gitile and King'oro, 2019:606). Slightly less than one-half (47.1%) are confident that the media is responsible for promoting ethnic tolerance. The Kenyan media are reputed as the most sophisticated in the region and have over the past 10 years grown tremendously in terms of ownership diversity and coverage (Gitile and King'oro, 2019: 606).

In Kenya, the media have over the years played a critical role in the democratization process, especially concerning exposing corruption and checking government excesses as well as providing a useful platform for opposition and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Moreover, the growth of local language FM stations has in the past five years availed to ordinary Kenyans

²⁷ Hugo Chávez in Caracas on 2nd June 2007.

extra-ordinary platforms through which to air all manner of views (Gitile and King'oro, 2019: 606).

Gitile and King'oro acknowledge the place of laws that govern the media, such as the Media Act 2006 and the Communication Act, which clearly demand responsible media. They demand editing of content to ensure responsible reporting. Generally, key informant interviews reveal the following in terms of media lapses in the ethnic tolerance equation (Gitile and King'oro, 2019:606).

- a. Use of propaganda to further individual or group interests;
- b. Exaggeration and misinformation; and
- c. Biased reporting. Some of the respondents argue that the media has not been responsible for covering and reporting sensitive issues that could spur ethnic conflicts (Ogenga, 2019: 9).

Respondents especially feel the editorial policy should be such that those utterances that could spur ethnic hatred are edited out. Memories of 2008 media reporting following the botched 2007 presidential elections are still fresh in the minds of Kenyans who accuse the media of having irresponsibly reported at that time. The manner of reporting is perceived to have heightened tensions in the country during the post-election violence and especially in the universities where most youths are enrolled (Ogenga, 2019: 9).

Kenya has been embroiled in a series of political upheavals following a series of racially motivated elections, which have led to human rights abuses, deaths, property damage and economic stagnation. The root of the election violence, which was evident in 2007/8 and 2017, is the positive and negative role of the social media platform as used by citizens and politicians (Ogenga, 2019: 9).

Kenya's elections, like the elections in many other African countries, are often violent due to racial divisions and a winning political system (Ogenga, 2019: 3). Kenya introduced a new constitution in 2010, following the disputed 2007 elections (Khadiagala, 2008: 4-6) which led to the worst post-election violence in the country's history. More than 1,000 people died and a few thousand were left homeless, despite the high expectations, promises and hopes of peaceful elections (Ajulu, 2008: 33-34). Sadly, the country seemed to return to dictatorship in the wake of the State-sponsored media violence during the 2017 elections (Ogenga, 2019: 3).

Ogenga notes that, as in 2007, mainstream TV channels were shut down by the Kenyan Communication Authority to prevent Kenyans from watching live coverage of an opposition leader such as "The People's President," citing security issues (Ogenga, 2019): 3).

Ogenga argues that political competition that promotes racism, political extremism, and hates speech in the media and on social media has become more entrenched (Ogenga, 2019: 9). The study reveals that while social media is often exploited violently, social media also contributes to peace. Research requires a multi-stakeholder approach to education programs and awareness of the effective use of social media to incorporate democracy (Ogenga, 2019: 9).

Ogenga thinks that the concept of "People's Assembly" probably plays an important role in the field of political communication, social participation, and the integration of democracy. The idea was presented by a coalition of opposition parties, the National Super Alliance (NASA) after it annulled the results of the August 8, 2017 (Ogenga, 2019: 9) presidential election. He notes that "NASA clearly stated that the election results were used to give Uhuru Kenyatta a computerized victory with the help of the French company OT Morpho", which provided the Biometric Voter Register (Ogenga, 2019: 9). An important issue about the People's Assemblies is that they are always very visible, as much of what happened after their formation was at the regional level. Before the meetings were adjourned to open a discussion/handshake with the Building Bridges Initiative, more than 15 of the 47 Districts discussed and approved their Regional Meetings. However, the momentum of the People's Assemblies was particularly noticeable, enjoying universal acceptance ratings by people using the internet on social media platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp (Ogenga, 2019: 9).

This study argues that the media occupy a central role in the advancement of democracy and should be upheld as an institution that protects democracy. The paper cites the role the Kenyan media played in the election crisis, acknowledging its success but at the same time questioning its failure to protect various aspects of democracy such as the election process (Ogenga, 2008: 124). Ogenga reasons that it is well known that the media set agendas and use values such as prominence (journalists quoting renowned public figures when reporting news stories) to satisfy the interests of the public (Ogenga, 2008: 124). Before the 2007 elections, the media did a tremendous job covering campaigns and providing air time and space for candidates to reach the civil society. They also did well in releasing opinion polls that proved largely correct in predicting the outcome of parliamentary elections. One reason for the contested presidential

election is that the media carried extensive coverage of the voting process and released unofficial results in which Kenyans believed (Ogenga, 2008:124).

4.3. A Need for Social Political Education in Kenya

It has long been documented that education plays a particular role in supporting the development of the person's capacity to be an active member of a democratic society (Waiganjo, 2013:21). The importance of social and political education in addressing these aims has been highlighted by Lynch, who has noted that social scientific education plays a key role in informing people as to how social and political institutions operate and of the importance of political institutions in shaping our society (Lynch, 2001:396). She highlights that such an education plays a role in developing the skills of critical analysis that enable people to make an informed, considered, and effective contribution to their society, and also highlights the particular contribution that social science education can make in enabling people to understand issues of equality and inequality in areas such as gender and social class (Lynch, 2001: 396-397).

Otieno, contends that the vulnerability of the education sector to the risks of political instability became evident during the flare-up of violence following the disputed 2007 presidential elections in Kenya. Whereas universities especially in the developing world have often been seen as breeding grounds for radical political ideas and student activism, the post-election violence in Kenya directly affected university education, on a scale no other event has in the country's history. And, for the first time, the crisis facing education generally, and higher education specifically, showed clear ethnic manifestations (Otieno, 2008: 24).

This is because universities are located in geographical areas dominated by specific ethnic communities, professors perceived to belong to different communities other than the dominant ones saw their homes burned and were evicted or forced to flee. Their businesses were destroyed. Institutions remained closed for the fear that having students on campus would aggravate the situation by taking sides. The state dreaded such a spectre; yet, it had a pervasive desire to demonstrate a quick return to normalcy. Thus, institutions choosing to open had to come up with innovative measures to forestall any violence (Otieno, 2008: 24).

Waiganjo theorises that social and political education is not simply the function of curricula and classrooms but is embedded in the work of a range of bodies in civil and political society (Waiganjo, 2013:21). These include educational youth groups, often with a community education focus. Broadly speaking, the subject matter for social and political education in

contemporary society, with the term ‘contemporary’ often understood as meaning since the growth of democratic politics and industrialization in western countries in the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Waiganjo, 2013:21). Within this, social and political education has tended to address a range of topics/ themes, such as Power, Gender, Social Class, Ethnicity, Identity, Political Representation and Models of Democracy, Equality and Inequality, Conflict and Peace, Interdependence, Sexuality, Micro-politics and Interaction, Crime and Deviance, and Globalisation. Underlying these disciplines and interdisciplinary fields is also a set of skills that help to frame their nature as subjects (Waiganjo, 2013:21). These include the capacity to engage in contestation and debate the capacity to imagine the world as different, the capacity to recognize the social systems within which people act, the capacity to collect evidence and to use it carefully in coming to conclusions (Waiganjo, 2013:21).

In this study, concentration is given to the logical and epistemological issues that call for political reform, and are believed to critically form the basic need for political education in Kenya (Waiganjo, 2013:v). According to Waiganjo, in Kenya, there is an urgency for a call for political education that will liberate Kenyans from neo-colonialism, political manipulation tricks and enhance Kenyans’ development on political matters and issues is also given (Waiganjo, 2013: v). Even as educational policies highlight inclusion, human rights, and citizenship, the gap between the richer communities and the poorest gets greater as education itself gets more unequally distributed. In particular, formal education of the citizen, therefore, is often a privilege of the rich, leaving the poor without access to the knowledge which could help them form appropriate relationships with social institutions and navigate their way in civil society. Policymakers need to understand how young people living in poverty perceived their positions as citizens, how they relate to government, and the demands they make upon the state to reduce their marginalisation and exclusion (Kanyinga, 2014: 28)

Munene states that freedom of study is a fundamental right of university teachers to teach, research, and write in their fields of expertise without fear of being counted as an institution of power or political authority. (Munene, 2019: 2). He emphasizes that, in universities, freedom of study is desirable because their job is to search for truth, to convey information and, more often, to speak truth and power. The restrictions on this freedom jeopardize the context of the university's mission (Munene, 2019: 2). Central to academic freedom is independence: the ability of universities to make internal decisions without state control or to be controlled by any external agent. In general, this means that educational freedom cannot be separated from its financial base (Munene, 2019: 2).

It is so interesting to think that there is a notion of person in the past that affects and are broadly applied nowadays, especially when considering that one of that kind of person is Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), a well-known Italian journalist, Marxist theoretician and politician who died in the Prison. All too often, Gramsci's thoughts are importantly used and prioritized on false grounds and for wrong reasons, whether by both supporters and resisters (Buttigieg, 2009:25); for example, the modern importance of his judgements, inconsistently, made visible by the selective use and misuse of the ideas for politically instrumental purposes. The example stated above is partially interesting which happened in the summer of 2007 when the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez gave a speech at a mass rally supporting his refusal to renew the broadcasting licence of RCTV television station. For some who study Gramsci's concepts, it seems that it is not easy to disentangle the various threads of his thought that Chavez plucked out of context and put into his speech (Buttigieg, 2009: 26).

Kendie (2014) posits that, currently, a large number of people apply many judgements of Gramsci for their purposes. Therefore, Gramsci's concepts, to some extent, are still alive in the political world and are used as ideological tools for a particular reason as well becoming extremely influential in the academic civil society discourse (Kendie, 2014:4). According to Kendie, Gramsci's view about civil society, differed from Karl Marx's as the place of rebellion against the traditional and the construction of cultural and ideological hegemony, conveyed through families, schools and the media as well as voluntary associations (Kendie, 2014: 4-5). Since all these institutions are important in shaping the political dispositions of citizens (Edwards, 2014: 8), made him become the person who "may be single-handedly responsible for the revival of the term civil society in post-World War Two period" (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2003: xix). In this sense, Gramsci, subsequently, the man that should be cautiously studied as one of the major theoreticians of civil society; because of the popularity of his ideas today, it is necessary to look into his conception as Joseph Buttigieg said "maybe, this is the time to start re-reading Gramsci" (Buttigieg, 2009: 31) within the Kenyan context.

This section argues that horizontal inequality remains a single factor in the political turmoil in Kenya, which exacerbates many sometimes violent competitions during elections. As a result, the path to building a Gramscian view of hegemony is deepened by Kenya's brief history (Omulo, 2017: 136).

This section also takes a look at the impacts of religion on national integration. In doing that, some questions may arise. Thus, to what extent has religion promoted national integration? Has

religion had any meaningful impacts on a country's advancement and development or has religion been used as a tool of national disintegration to actualise the selfish aspirations of some Kenyans? Efforts shall be increased to answer these questions. It must be argued that religion has contributed unfavourably to the disintegration of Kenya. The first justification for this claim can be attributed to the regime of Moi when Muslims in Kenya decided to form their own political party Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) (Ndzovu, 2014:9).

Historians and political commentators have praised Gramsci's contribution to various fields of study. The British historian James Joll calls him a "true intellectual hero of our time" (Joll, 1977: 24). Schwarzmantel notices Gramsci as one of the most influential writers and thinkers in the area of "Western Marxism", which he describes as "a branch of Marxist thought which seeks to grapple with the complex characteristics of Western Europe and the prospects for revolution there" (Schwarzmantel, 2009:1). Buttigieg, in an introduction entitled 'Reading Gramsci' in Peter Ives's *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci*, denotes to Gramsci as "one of the most frequently cited and widely translated political theorists and cultural critics of the twentieth century" (Buttigieg, 2004: viii).

Nowadays, a large number of people apply many judgements of Gramsci for their purposes. Therefore, Gramsci's concepts, to some extent, are still alive in the political world and are used as ideological tools for a particular reason as well as becoming extremely influential in the academic civil society discourse. For example, Kendie (2006), in her review of *Existing Literature*, in which Gramsci's concepts have been used as tools for social research, speculates three main themes. First, there are those like Robert Fatton who are committed to learning hegemony and domination in the post-colonial African state. Second, there are those historians such as Ronald Robinson who have devised the theory, in this case, in cooperation, to investigate the hegemony of domination and domination, but not to limit themselves to the colonial era. Third, there are historians such as David Laitin and David Robinson who insist that both were read in an integrated manner as a coherent whole (Kendie, 2006: 4). His view about civil society, differed from Karl Marx's as the place of rebellion against the orthodox and the construction of cultural and ideological hegemony, conveyed through families, schools, and the media as well as voluntary associations, since all these institutions are important in shaping the political dispositions of citizens (Edwards, 2014: 8), made him become the person who "may be single-handedly responsible for the revival of the term civil society in post-World War Two period" (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2003: xix). In this sense, Gramsci, subsequently, the man that should be cautiously studied as one of the major theoreticians of civil society;

because of the popularity of his ideas today, it is necessary to look into his conception as Joseph Buttigieg said “maybe, this is the time to start re-reading Gramsci” (Buttigieg, 2009: 31) within the Kenyan context.

This section argues that horizontal inequality remains a single factor in Kenyan political infighting, which in turn sometimes fuels more violence. competitions during elections. As a result, the path to forming a Gramscian view of hegemony is deepened by Kenya's brief history (Buttigieg, 2009: 31). Building on Marx, Gramsci focused on capitalism as a historically distinct economic system in which the social and class relationships within the system were rooted in historical structures. What in Gramscian terms can be understood as the post-1992 and post-2007 historical bloc's hegemonic ideological superstructures correspond directly with what Gifford has termed “Disorder as a political instrument” (Gifford, 2009: 7). Gifford (2009) highlights, “disorder as a political instrument”, asserts the centrality of Kenya's radical revolutionary tradition and is premised on eight themes: Goldenberg, Land grabbing, Ethnic clashes, Political elite, Anglo-Leasing, Elite impunity, Security, and Failed state as a dichotomy between ‘sell outs’ and ‘patrons’; and the rejection of Western interference based on what are perceived as Western ideals such as human rights (Gifford, 2009: 11-32). In analysing the Kenyan political situation, it is fitting to adapt the supposition of Munyikwa, that it is, “specifically the connection between land tenure, a material reality, and the superstructure of Kenyan state” and political institutions and the ideological superstructures of Kenyatta, Moi, Kibaki and Uhuru hegemony (Munyikwa, 2018:140).

From 1992 onwards KANU, with Moi as the party's chief public intellectual and increasingly Caesarism-type authority, implemented KANU's hegemonic history. This was done by making full use of the institutional weaponry of state-controlled broadcast and print media as well as laws such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, which shrank the available space for critical coverage in the independent media. The use of these institutional tools to manage the ideological content to which citizens had access was coupled with the constant threat of violence (David and Katola, 2016: 46-47).

Early in his Socialist career, Gramsci rejected irrational opposition and encouraged contact with Church activists, noting that most Italians were religious. Similarly, the ‘Feature of the South Question’ raises the point that the Church of Italy itself was divided into regions. In the South, the priests often acted as a source of royal oppression, as they were middle-class landowners. In the North, however, the Church often played a different role, providing a kind

of democratic and moral-spiritual opposition to the state. We say the same idea is related to the Kenyan political situation during the KANU period (David and Katola, 2016: 46-47).

In December 2007, the intensely disputed presidential elections triggered nationwide violence and revived primeval ethnic animosity and unresolved historical injustice. The conflict also posed a serious challenge to Catholic ethics because of the dichotomy established by the warring parties between peaceful resolution and just resolution of the impasse. Orobator maintains that to plead for peace meant support for the status quo; to call for justice was perceived as supporting the opposition (Orobator, 2008:15). He remarks that “Peace” and “Justice” represented central themes of Catholic social teaching; the opposition between them mired church leadership in a political quandary (Orobator, 2008:15). Although a substantial monograph assessing the role of the church in Kenya during the post-election crisis has yet to appear, initial indications outline a spectre of a divided church with a severely eroded moral capacity “to challenge society and uphold principles of right and wrong, truth and falsity” (David and Katola, 2016: 47). The church’s role in the disputed elections has reinforced a perception of the “merger of interests” (Ogenga, 2008:1), between church and state, which muffles the church’s prophetic voice and provides cover for the state’s unethical machinations (David and Katola, 2016: 46-47).

4.4. Conceptualising Religion and Politics

Religion and politics are concepts that have been subjected to different definitions from various scholars of status. Emoghene and Okolies posit that religion as “the oldest discipline in human society is the most difficult term or word to define” (Emoghene and Okolies, 2020:29). They maintain that there is no clear consensus on the conception of religion by theologians and social scientists (Emoghene and Okolie, 2020: 29). This is not merely because scholars contend with the element of subjectivity, but largely because of the inherent difficulty in understanding the “inner essences” of religion (Egwu, 2001: 63). Different people understand religion differently or have different perspectives according to their disciplines. For example, sociologists regard religion as being of social rather than political significance while anthropologists view religion as a component of the cultural aspect of life (Barret, 2003: 135). Babatola contends that, to the Theologians, religion is the essence and centre of civilization and the sublime aesthetic expression and root of all decision, actions, and ultimate explanation of civilization with its invention and artifacts; its social, political, and economic system, its past and future, promises and history (Babatola, 2015: 3-4).

Kenya is a country blessed with a triple religious heritage. Her religious landscape has been dominated by three major religious groups. The adherents of the traditional religion, the Muslims and Christians. Indeed, by the period of Kenya's independence in 1963, the country was divided along religious zones of influence, notably, the largely Muslim North-eastern and the Christian Western (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014:12). The traditional religion as mentioned elsewhere in the study appears to be un-proselytised because it does go forth seeking converts neither does it pick offense when deserted by its adherents nor assume that its object of worship is superior. It has the rare quality of accommodation and tolerance to other religions (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014: 12-13). In conceptualising Kenyan politics, Gifford maintains that "politics is who gets what, when and how?" (Gifford, 2009:1-2). In examining the position of (Gifford, 2009: 2) by citing using Kenya's political experience, one can submit that the politicians have been using various means including religion to hold to power (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014:13). Politics in Kenya has therefore been used for the promotion of self-glorification in the name of who gets what, when, and how? Dell perceives politics as having to do with efficient organisation and judicious administration of the collective affairs of the organised human community (Dell, 2002: 8).

4.5. Religion Politics and National Integration in Kenya

4.5.1. Meaning of Nation

Before we begin the discussion on globalization, it will be helpful to understand its meaning. This name has two words: nation and union. What do we mean by the word nation? A nation is a country with an integrated socio-economic structure. It refers to a body of people with a sense of unity, built on the same history, society, culture and values. This sense of unity binds people together and makes them a nation. In general, this is the feeling known as world integration (Kenga, 2016: 4).

4.5.2. Definition of World Unity

National consolidation to raise awareness of common identities among the citizens of the country. It means that although people belong to different communities, races, religions, cultures and regions and speak different languages, they all recognize the fact that they are united. This type of integration is crucial to building a strong and prosperous nation (Kenga, 2016: 4).

National integration is essential to any nation with a wide range of social, cultural, religious, linguistic and geographical diversity. And in a country like Kenya, it is still very much needed

(Kenga, 2016: 4). As we know, Kenya is a very large country. Kenga postulates that a unique feature of our country is that all the major religions of the world are practiced here such as Christianity, Islam, African Traditional Religions, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Zoroastrianism (Kenga, 2016: 4). These religious groups have formed organisations that serve as their mouthpieces. They include The National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK), The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) and the Hindu Council of Kenya (HCK). The 2010 constitution states that there shall be no state religion and guarantees religious freedom and equal protection to all religions.²⁸ This implies that Kenya is a secular state. The 1961 Independence constitution also provided for the freedom of worship (Kenga, 2016:4).

Individual religious leaders have been vocal in demanding human rights of Kenyans be respected by the government they include: Sheikh Balala, Late (retired) Bishop David Gitari, The Late Archbishop (retired) Ndingi Mwana a’Nzeki, Reverend Timothy Njoya, the late Bishop Henry Okullu and the late Bishop Alexander Muge. With Christianity as the dominant religion, the church has played a key role in the politics of the country. However, not all Christian denominations in Kenya are involved in politics including The Seventh Day Adventists, Salvation Army, African Inland Church, and the Pentecostal Assemblies of God which have distanced themselves from the NCCCK. This lack of involvement in politics gives an impression that God is only concerned with the salvation of people’s souls and not their socio-economic welfare (Kenga, 2016:4-5).

I borrow Emoghene and Okolie's speculation about Nigeria (2020) and apply it to the Kenyan political situation; therefore, I think Kenya at the age of 58 is still looking for a new political system (Emoghene and Okolie, 2020: 26). The full realization of this goal has been made impossible due to the racial, religious, and political factors that have affected the survival of democracy and the development of the country in Kenya (Emoghene and Okolie, 2020: 26). The Federalism / devolved system is undoubtedly an appropriate framework for dealing with racial, cultural, and religious pluralism in complex societies such as Kenya (Nyaura, 2018: 18).

Rei reasons that integration, which means assembling parts into a whole, has been defined variously (Rei, 2019:41-42). The one employed depends on the observer’s perception of what constitutes national integration and the strategy for achieving social stability and social progress (Rei, 2019: 41-42). National integration refers to the process of bringing diverse cultural and social groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of national unity

²⁸ Establishment of Clause and Article 32 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya.

(Rei, 2019: 41-42). The term presumes the existence of an ethnically plural society in which each group is characterized by its language, or other self-conscious cultural qualities, which generate the problem of creating a sense of territorial nationality, which overshadows or eliminates subordinate parochial loyalties (Rei, 2019:44-45).

Mukwedeya states that nation-building is a common concept that can have different meanings in different contexts (Mukwedeya, 2016: 5). Namely according to Von Bogdandy, et al. is primarily understood as the process of creating a collective identity or national society through the political integration of members in a particular area (Von Bogdandy et al., 2013: 585). 'It is a traditional process that often draws on existing cultures, institutions, and cultures, redefining them as elements of the world to support the national claim of sovereignty and diversity' (Von Bogdandy et al., 2005: 586). In short, nation-building strategies attempt to create the highest national identity that must replace and/or sub-national identities and cultures (Stiftung, 2010: n.p.). Nation-building and empire-building are sometimes used interchangeably. However, state-building usually refers to the building of state-functioning state institutions, and nation-building refers to the building of important national identities and to effective integration defined by the government as continuous conflict resolution and reduction of cultural and regional decisions and differences in the process of creating a single political unit (Von Bogdandy et al., 2005. : 586).

From the foregoing, national integration refers to the process of building a just social unit that confers on every inhabitant within it a sense of belonging, a satisfactory level of participation in decision-making and development, and a chance to share from the resources of the society commensurate with decent and acceptable living.

The decision which was made by the people of Kenya before independence to become the Republic of Kenya from Britain required that the People of Kenya will be integrated for coexistence, co-sharing of resources, co-administering, and co-development of the nation. But this goal seems to be elusive in Kenya during the nearly 50 years of her existence as an independent nation. What seems to linger so much is the cries of marginalization; promotion of individualistic and ethnic interests such as ethnic resource control; propagation of exclusive religious ideologies; and the practice of sectional and tribal politics et cetera. Indeed, religion and religious organizations make up a minority of democracies, but the extent to which these functions are made is quite another matter. Because religion is a complex phenomenon, the social activities it performs are very different (Babatola, 2015: n.p.). Oshewolo and Maren state

that some religious activities are visible — sooner or later - and some are hidden - not immediately visible (Oshewolo and Maren, 2015: 4). It should be noted that if a function contributes to the collective functioning of an organization, then we call it functionality. Roles such as support for tolerance, peaceful co-operation, and love are promoted through missionary practice and obedience. Schaefer and Lamm (1997) identify the resources of religious democracy that include the integration of human societies made up of individuals and social groups with different interests and aspirations (Schaefer and Lamm, 1997: 273-275). In their view, the religious obligation exceeds this personal and divisive power (Schaefer and Lamm, 1997: 273-275). Another important function identified by the two authors is the ability of religion to legitimize the existing social order (Schaefer and Lamm, 1997: 273-275).

Ghai and Ghai posit that, according to the transcendental religious perspective, national integration in Kenya after independence is not a choice; rather, it is an ontological necessity (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 9-10). Therefore, the question of national integration should not be ignored, side-lined, or rejected in the name of any religious, political, or ethnic pretext/affiliation; rather, it should be encouraged, embraced, and put into practice by the people of Kenya to promote unity and development within and outside the nation (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 9-10).

Kenya is a multi-faceted, complex, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-ethnic religion (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996). This identity is played out by the way the country is divided by religion, language, culture, ethnicity, and regional identity (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005: 4).

Drawing on the work of the distinguished historian Bethwell Ogot, Abubakar explains that ethnic groups (such as the Luhyas, Kalenjin, Mijikenda, and Taveta) are colonial constructs, as is the whole idea that Kenya comprises 42 tribes. Ethnic purity and exclusive identity are new ideas, arising from politics and unequal access to power and resources. There are not so many differences between the Kikuyu and the Maasai, for example; in earlier times they would not have been seen as so distinct from each other as they are now. Similarly, the Swahili and the Digo have inter-married and are not so very different as cited in (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:9)

4.5.3. Colonialism and National Integration in Kenya

The problem of national integration in Kenya is not remarkably different from that of most of the nations that were colonized in Africa. The constitutional changes introduced by the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) in 1963 were designed to accommodate multipartyism.

The Kenya elites who were groomed by the colonial masters accepted modernization as development and displayed unbridled enthusiasm in importing Western values, institutions, technical manpower and policies. It was for this particular reason that it failed to institute an indigenous and independent economic base. Consequently, the transition from colonialism to independence made little economic sense because the vestiges of the colonial economy were left intact and transferred to the post-colonial political era.

Gitile and King'oro state that Kenyan administrative units were created near international borders by British colonial rulers, and still reflect the current ethno-geography of the country (Gitile and King'oro, 2019: 598). The British settlers invested and settled in more productive and economically viable areas. Therefore, they ploughed their efforts in developing those areas where they got economic returns (Gitile and King'oro, 2019: 598). Eventually, the British divided the Kenyan territory along ethnic lines into eight provinces; each province was subdivided into districts, often according to ethnic groups and subgroups. For example, the Luo are based mainly in Nyanza; the Luhya, in Western Province; the Kikuyu in Central Province, the Somali, in North- Eastern Province; and the Mijikenda, in the Coastal Province. The Rift Valley is dominated by the Kalenjin, but also contains the Maasai and other ethnic groups (Gitile and King'oro, 2019: 598).). The post-colonial government further consolidated this ethnopolitical structure by aligning parliamentary constituencies with ethnic boundaries, which has remained the style of Kenyan politics and provincial administration until today (Gitile and King'oro, 2019: 598). Conclusively, the ethnic groups that had first encounters with the British colonial government, the missionaries, and the settlers tended to have more chances of higher education because schools and other learning institutions were set up there (Gitile and King'oro, 2019: 598).

This section takes a look at the impacts of religion on national integration. In doing that, some questions may arise. Accordingly, to what extent has religion promoted national integration? Has religion had any meaningful impacts on a country's advancement and development or has religion been used as a tool of national disintegration to actualise the selfish aspirations of some Kenyans? Efforts shall be intensified to answer these questions (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014: 13).

According to Kasomo, it is one of the major problems in Africa today and in the world and is "so confusing as to the relationship that exists or should exist, between religion and politics" (Kasomo, 2009: 124). He expresses the view that many leaders today "declare their states

illegal. If this is to be accepted, it will create a major problem for religion” (Kasomo, 2009: 124). In this case, how can religion be a force for good in the nation, on the moral issues of the nation, and even on the part of a government that has failed in its God-given role? (Read, 2009: 124-125).

Kasomo states that those who are historically and spiritually formed under strong and exaggerated divisions and tensions between territories certainly find a major problem with this topic. For them, the dualism of the philosophy and theology, which strongly confuses body and soul, status and matter, spiritual and secular domination, domination and democracy, becomes a guiding principle (Kasomo, 2009: 124).

4.5.4. Social and Economic Contradiction

Stiftung states that ethno-regional inequality in Kenya, economic inequality, and discrimination can be explained by some perspectives: the diversity that each group lived in, and how the culture of each group influenced the entry of capitalists into the regions in which they lived (Stiftung, 2012: 6). The climate and weather conditions in the inhabited regions continue to play an important role. Thus each community settled in the right places to continue its practices (Stiftung, 2012: 6). Those who worked as pastoralists settled in large areas of pasture, where they could farm. Farmers settle in areas with fertile soil for their crops. Some communities settled in arid and desert areas and others settled in fertile areas. Fishermen live near rivers or lakes (Stiftung, 2012: 6). Equally, while some communities are located in resource-rich regions, others live in resource-poor regions. Thus, much of the discrimination and inequality have seen in Kenya has its roots in migration and settlement patterns in various societies (Stiftung, 2012: 6).

Kanyinga discusses the evolution of the Kenyan Political System and its relation to inequalities in the composition of governance structures and institutions in post-colonial Kenya: the executive, legislatures, judiciary, and other public institutions and analyses the actors responsible for the imbalances and reforms required to address the disparities (Kanyinga, 2006: 265). Kanyinga establishes how public resources, parliamentary seats, cabinet, and key civil service appointments are inequitably distributed among the main ethnic groups in power in favour of the incumbent, right from the Kenyatta regime, through Moi to President Kibaki (Kanyinga, 2006: 265). He argues that the ethnic minorities were not more represented in the legislative assembly than the numerically larger groups and thus rules out marginalization for minorities in defence of the underrepresented ethnic majorities. He, therefore, proposes

proportional representation to avoid ethnic politics and inequalities associated with it as the only remedy for providing opportunities and building governance institutions as was the case in South Africa during the deconstruction of the apartheid state. The African National Congress (ANC) and then the government of South Africa agreed on the principle of bringing on board all political parties and interest groups as the way forward for South Africa (Kanyinga, 2006: 265).

Shiundu posits that, although the country has at least 70 ethnic groups, two dominant groups—the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin—hold close to 40 % of civil-service jobs. Not coincidentally, only members of these two tribes have served as presidents of independent Kenya. Government officials are generally known to use their jobs to share the spoils with their respective communities (Shiundu, 2021:18-19).

If Kenya's leaders had done a better job since the British colonial power left in 1963, ethnicity would no longer be an issue today. Instead, ethnicity is today what racism was in pre-independence Kenya. It is held in place by informal structures, with networks making the system profitable for those in power (Shiundu, 2021:20).

Kenyatta himself admitted as much when he announced the constitutional reform proposal in October 2020. He said the system of incentives linked to tribalism will be difficult to change. "The fact of the matter is that we are a tribal society, and this is what divides us," he said. "We pretend that we are national leaders. But when the time comes, we switch to [tribal] vernacular and become what we are." He admitted that he was not an exception (Shiundu, 2021: 23).

When Ruto started mobilising his supporters in early 2021 in opposition to the new Kenyatta-Odinga alliance, the president, who has unlimited access to the national broadcast network, turned to radio stations that broadcast in his tribal language. He chose to address only the Kikuyu people – his people. He had done so before. His step immediately re-kindled resentment over "Kikuyu privilege" (Shiundu, 2021: 24-25).

In Kenya, ethnic strife, fuelled by feelings of prejudice and discrimination, has historically been a major factor in divisions. However, we are facing new challenges today such as rising economic costs, a society with no rights and no interest in the political class, and a growing number of young people who are constantly being laid off. As I write this study, the country is on the verge of another attempt to address the age of racial segregation through the Building Bridges Initiative. However, this has led to the emergence of new segments in our society (Nyaura, 2018: 18-19).

Ghai and Ghai reason that ethnic tensions and conflict have marred Kenya's modern history. However, as other national histories, including those of Canada and South Africa, attest, cultural diversity and political unity can co-exist (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:19). Ethnic conflict is a symptom rather than the root cause of division in Kenya. Differences have been politically constructed and perpetuated for narrow political ends. The new Constitution, with its broad commitments to respect for diversity and recognition of all Kenyans as equal citizens, has the potential to open a dynamic new chapter in Kenya's national development (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:19).

Muhula further demonstrates that socioeconomic inequalities in Kenya have led to disunity among the Kenyan communities since many people perceive the inequalities to be a result of a deliberate policy by those in power to marginalize some communities and regions or at least to perpetuate the regional inequalities that began with colonial policies. He further asserts that there are obtrusive socio-economic inequalities most of which have taken essentially ethno-regional dimensions and have thus had an effect of undermining national unity and at most a sense of common belonging (Muhula, 2009: 85).

The study sought to establish the inevitable connection between religion and politics. Further, it is very important to understand the concepts of religion and politics. The test was to find religion as a source of violence. The newspaper also examined the relationship between religion and politics. This is triggered by the African continent with many indicators living in the East African country of Kenya. The climax of the discussion suggests a way forward for religious and political co-existence (Emoghene and Okolie, 2020: 26).

Many people make up a political community and may be inclined to go along with it. Therefore, human authority is needed to control individual extremes and to direct human efforts to achieve the same good (Emoghene and Okolie, 2020: 27-28). As noted by Burner (2002), the term politics in Africa is poorly presented. Due to this people have different views on the subject. One category of people, politicians are associated with lies, corruption, complaining about issues, noisemakers, and all kinds of undesirable and derogatory references. According to such people, politics should not be associated with religious leaders. The second category of people thinks that what constitutes politics is that critical utterance towards the government.

According to Hansen, indeed a politician may criticise their government but politics entails much more than that. Politics refers to all the activities of the government and the governed. Politics is, therefore, the participation of the citizens for the welfare of the State. This implies

that the State cannot be left either into the hands of a few greedy politicians or into the mercy of some religious leaders. Politicians have various duties in a country:

- To promote the common good of all.
- To promote the right to life, to employment, to education, to medical care among others.
- To promote the right to living and facilities to ensure people live a healthy life.
- To promote the right to educate children in the faith one chooses or confesses and freedom of worship.

As Burner noted earlier that there are no fixed answers or solutions regarding the relationship between religion and politics.

Diprose and Ukiwo posit that decentralisation has gained increasing attraction among scholars and in policy circles as an appropriate institutional framework for diverse societies. This is in addition to the current development orthodoxy of reducing the power of national governments and bringing decisions closer to the populace (Diprose and Ukiwo, 2008:4). They argue that a recent survey suggests that since 1980 about 95% of all countries have conferred powers and responsibilities to sub-national units ‘with varying degrees of political, administrative and fiscal competencies’ (Diprose and Ukiwo, 2008:4).

Diprose and Ukiwo theorise that in many developing countries and especially Kenya to more specific, decentralisation is displacing centralisation which was pursued in the past with such vigour as a nation-building strategy (Diprose and Ukiwo, 2008: 4). For instance, a survey of African countries concerning decentralisation indicates that the question is no longer about the desirability of decentralisation but the degree of decentralisation (Diprose and Ukiwo, 2008: 4). This popularity derives in part from the perception that decentralisation helps to manage the multitude of demands of diverse groups in large nation-states. Decentralisation has the potential to deflate national-level inter-group conflict for power, resources, and control, particularly in nations with diverse ethnoreligious groups which are regionally concentrated. It can also improve contentious centre-periphery relations, particularly when there is a history of protest against centralised rule and forms of cultural hegemony as has been the case in both Kenya, the case study presented here (Diprose and Ukiwo, 2008: 4).

In Kenya, as in the rest of Africa, “political competition, through the electoral process, inevitably involves inevitably and inevitably, unbridled tensions between conflict and

consensus” (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). Violent ownership conflicts, since the 1990s, have been the catalyst for action by ethnic and religious groups participating in political power struggles. Outstanding in this conflict are those who have been at odds with Muslims and Christians over the dangerous mix of religion, race and politics (Kresse, 2009: n.p.).

Kenya is a country blessed with a triple religious heritage. Her religious landscape has been dominated by three religious’ groups. The adherents of the African traditional religion²⁹—African traditional religions exist for and because of the community—individuals do not choose their religious affiliation—in traditional African society all members of the community/ethnic group share in their community’s/ethnic’s religion (Espin, 2007: 24-25), the Muslims and Christians (Alio, 2015: n.p.). Before the advent of Christianity and Islam in Kenya, the religion of the people was the traditional religion.

Uwah posits that one of the ways by which religious rituals communicate in African society is by maintaining cohesion in the culture. They connect participants to richer meanings and larger forces of their community (Uwah, 2011:84). He maintains that, even in representational models, rituals create solidarity in the form of subjective experiences of sharing the same meaningful world which is attained by participants through the condensed nature of symbols used therein (Uwah, 2011: 84). Uwah speculates that African traditional religion is one ritual that despite the influence of westernization and scientific developments in Africa, still holds meaningful implications in people’s everyday life (Uwah, 2011: 85-86). Consequently, from daybreak to evening, people have religious rituals with which they communicate with their God or gods, deities and ancestors (Uwah, 2011: 85-86). Also, from weeks to seasons, months to years, there are festivals and rituals both in private and in public situations which the Africans still celebrate in connection with the ‘living dead’ or those in the “spirit world” (Uwah, 2011: 86).

This African traditional religion meant everything to the Kenyan people. Politics in African systems of governance was integrated with religion before the introduction of western-type systems of governments (Chepkwony, 2008: 18). In every structure, whether physical, human, or nation-building, foundations are very important. The historical forces that have shaped colonial Kenya and continue to shape the politics of contemporary Kenya, especially its religious formation and religious struggles, are grounded in colonial structures. It is useful to recall the disturbing socio-political situation that emerged at the time of Kenya’s independence

²⁹ According to Espin, (2007) in African society religion permeates all of tradition Africa’s life (Espin, 2007:24).

in 1963 (Kresse, 2009; Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). First, Kenya found itself in the capitalist world economy, which simultaneously generated a corresponding team of Christian as well Muslim office-holders-cum-bureaucrats. Second, the more widely educated Christians from Central and Rift Valley provinces dominated the civil service and the economic arm of the state (Kresse, 2009). Some scholars like Mwakimako and Willis (2014), Ndzovu (2012), Kresse (2009), and Nyaura (2018)) argue that the foundation for socio-religious and religious, and political instability in Kenya was to a large extent the work of the colonial masters. They argue that right from the formative stage of Kenya until independence, the various governments of Kenya at the National level had persistently and openly favoured the ethnic groups from Central and Rift Valley provinces in appointments, in employments, in education, in the national distribution of resources and in the promulgation of religious policies that were favourable to the Christians (Nyaura, 2018: 17, 22).

Kresse and Ndzovu allude that the effect of the unfriendly and unfavourable socio-religious and political situation in Kenya was master-minded by the British Colonial Masters. The amalgamation of the inland and coastal strip into East African Protectorates in 1920 was a ploy to deliberately enable Coastal people to serve the Christians (Alio, 2015). The event of Kenya's independence gave an appearance of the dawn of a united and indivisible nation. However, it was more of a carry-over from the colonial period of the divisions, fears, and animosities among the various segments of the national polity (Alio, 2015) see also (Gifford, 2009). At best, independence was nationalisation of factional groups, each of which saw itself first and foremost as defined through its respective ethno-religious basis, before other considerations (Ndzovu, 2012). It must be argued that religion has contributed adversely to the disintegration of Kenya. The first justification for this assertion can be attributed to the situation whereby religious groups and denominations are ethnic in their composition and leadership. Ethno Hegemony³⁰ exists in the churches³¹ as it does in the political sphere (Waruta, 1992:127). The situation is linked to methods of evangelisation given ethnic groups in isolation, "thus producing a largely one ethnic denomination. Ethnic religious crises in Kenya are deeply rooted and are threatening the very survival of the nation (Tarimo, 2009: 579).

³⁰ According to Waruta, (1992) Ethno Hegemony exists in Kenya Churches as it does in political sphere—a number of dioceses are created along ethnic boundaries. Christian churches are lured by the clamour for ethnic group to have its own bishop (Waruta, (1992:127-128).

³¹ In Kenya, after the general elections of December 2007, Kenyans stoop down to ethnic affiliations. Even the church leaders just as the Rwanda's case identified, campaigned and supported camps of their ethnic groups (Gumo, et. al. 2012:).

In the process of maintaining their dominance, such ethnic groups tend to conduct their worship services in their ethnic languages, thus keeping out all others (Waruta, 1992:128).

Another area where it is discovered that religion has devastated the integrative efforts of Kenya could be found in the perspective of administration, some ecclesiastical leaders are often appointed and assigned duties following the criterion of ethnic affiliation because “many dioceses are created along ethnic boundaries. Christian churches are lured by the clamor for each ethnic group to have its bishop. Sometimes these arrangements are justified by language and cultural consideration” (Waruta, 1992).

In addition, religious politics had been used in the past and present to undermine the unity and the integrative efforts of Kenya. Religious leaders have failed to play their prophetic role even in situations of severe human rights violations because they have taken sides by playing in the hands of partisan politics, and thereby fall into the trap of ethno-hegemony (Tarimo, 2009: 588).

4.5.5. Religio-Political identity in Kenya

4.5.5.1. Identity

Your identity is not just who you assume yourself to be or the ideals you nourish; it is who you are. Elebeke defines identity as a two-edged process that lays at the core of an individual and is pivotal to their communal beliefs (Elebeke, 2010: 22). Identity connotes the possession of distinctive identifying characteristics exclusive to an individual or a thing (Elebeke, 2010: 22). In other words, it is a typical denominator by which a person or thing is perceived (Elebeke, 2010: 22). According to Wonah, identity assumptions selfsameness and identicalness (Wonah, 2016: 4). When expounded, this signifies that an individual or an ethnic group may have defining features, qualities, cultural mannerisms, economic status, and realities, among other things, to which they are attached (Wonah, 2016: 4). These cursors tell a particular group apart from several other groups and, of course, become an underlying factor in the group’s identity projection (Wonah, 2016: 4).

Onyibor maintains that identity is a sense of individuality that becomes ingrained as a child distinguishes itself from its parents and family to assume a definite societal role. It refers to the consciousness of oneself and self-significance (Onyibor, 2016: 2). Identity emanates from class, sexuality, ethnicity, and nationality, among other things. Identity could as well be individualised or affiliated to social groups with whom the individual identifies (Onyibor, 2016: 2). Identity may be defined as a sense of belonging shared by a group of people having

common history, beliefs, and values exhibited towards attaining a common goal (Onyibor, 2016: 2). It is the notion of who we are, contrasted against who we are not. It is a sense of “us”, a sense of “they”, and a sense of “self”, often acquired at birth and exhibited throughout one’s lifetime, and amid several other identities (Onyibor, 2016: 2).

Ghai and Ghai reason that identity is often discussed in terms of religion or language or some historical bonding. Undoubtedly these are important, but they do not constitute the entire picture, nor are they perhaps even the most important elements (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:5). They maintain that identity is used to achieve objectives other than culture; recognition is often as material as it is psychological. It becomes the basis of negotiating social, political, and economic advantages for the community, and even more markedly, for its leaders to achieve personal goals (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:5).

Our discussion has so far concentrated on the recognition of diversity. Since a major problem in new states is the lack of political unity, it may be worth looking at the French position on diversity. It is well known that considerable coercion was used to create and consolidate the French state and nation. France was an earlier secular state, with little role for religion in public affairs. French, from being a dialect, was promoted to the national language and enforced as such. Today, faced with significant migrant groups, with their principal language and religion different from that tradition in France, the French response to the new situation is in terms of the old strategy—the emphasis on political and public spheres as the main, or even the sole, bases for identity and venue for participation. Citizenship and citizen rights are completely divorced from religion or culture. But democracy and participation of this kind cannot function without some sort of social solidarity. Where religious attachments of the immigrants are strong, and economic disparities are gross, that solidarity is hard to achieve (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 6).

4.5.5.2. Identity Politics in Kenya

Akinyetun posits that given that identity attracts the struggle for relevance, competition thus becomes an integral part of the relationship between various groups in society, with each group keenly pursuing its interests (Akinyetun, 2020: 116). These interests, when not managed and coordinated, are capable of disrupting the political system and jeopardising the mutual existence of the varied interest groups (Akinyetun, 2020: 116). Consequently, it is upon this premise that identity politics it engendered. Wonah speculates that identity politics is the deliberate attempt by a group to assert its identity and protect its interests above other

contending interests (Wonah, 2016: 5). Alubo claims that identity politics is used to signify the process in politics of grouping and classifying people into clusters given their shared and apparent parallels (Alubo, 2006: 65). According to Akinyetun, the point of vocalisation is that identity, apart from the collective trait, generally raises questions on the uniqueness of citizen-based communal values and dogmas because of its inclusive and exclusive nature (Akinyetun, 2020:116).

Although, it would be over unsophisticated to opine that in all cases, identity politics promotes selfish interest. Oni argues that, if properly managed, identity politics can be a stabilising force in a plural society by creating much-needed awareness and the objective conditions necessary for national integration (Oni, 2008: 330). Nevertheless, identity politics is a peculiar feature of Kenyan politics. This is mainly the result of inequity in terms of power and resource distribution in post-colonial Kenya. As put by Obi (2001: 14), in Kenya, the results of amalgamation have been precarious and exacerbated by socio-economic crises, dictatorship, and inequality, which characterises the unequal distribution of power in an ethnically plural, agriculture and touristic state. These constraints have not only fuelled identity politics but have knitted it with violence and conflict (Opondo, 2014: 62).

4.5.5.3. National Integration

Osimen et al. define national integration as the bringing together of people of different racial or ethnic groups into an unrestricted and equal association, as in society or an organisation (Osimen et al., 2013: 80). It is the process through which people living within the geographic boundaries of a country forget their difference of race, religion, and language and feel the spirit of unity and allegiance to their nation (Osimen et al., 2013: 80). National integration reduces socio-cultural differences or inequalities and strengthens national unity and solidarity, which is not imposed by any authority. People share ideas, values, and emotional bonds. It is the feeling of unity within diversity wherein a national identity is supreme. National integration in Kenya is the bringing together of the different ethnic, racial, religious, economic, social, and political groups into unhindered, equal, and balanced associations on national issues. According to Onyibor, national integration refers to the growth of an incorporated and lucid national identity and awareness in a mixed society in which all citizens are given a fair chance to achieve their maximum potential Onyibor (2016: 3). Members are given a sense of belonging, irrespective of where they come from. National integration enhances the chances of creating firmer loyalties that displace parochial loyalties to ethnic cleavages Onyibor (2016: 3).

National integration in a multi-ethnic society, theoretically, is a process of building a new society and social order based on justice and fair play to all its members, no matter their ethnic group, language, or religion. According to Ajulu, integration connotes the pre-existence of heterogeneity, whether ethnic, political, economic, sociocultural, or lingual; the lack of which can impede the process of building a sense of national homogeneity (Ajulu, 2008: 40). National integration describes a situation whereby the various ethnic groups understand the competencies and otherwise of the groups and are willing to put up with each other in a situation of compromise and reciprocity (Ajulu, 2008: 40-41). Therefore, national integration is the ability of the groups in Kenya to stay committed to the ideals of unity by guaranteeing equal opportunities and promoting the affirmation of the identities of the various groups (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:12).

4.6. The Kenyan Traditional Intellectuals and Conflicts of Identity Politics in Kenya: A Reflection on 2007 Elections Violence

Nearly two decades after Kenya's bloody 2007 Elections violence, identity politics have assumed the direction of ethnic agitations in Kenya. Gifford claims that one striking figure of the post-multiparty era in the 1990s is the frequent civil strives and crisis along and among ethnic and religious groups, identity politics, and attendant violence that have to assume unprecedented dimensions (Gifford, 2009: 25). The fact is that the increasing political relevance of identity-based politics that have continued to infrequent its ugly head in the Kenyan counties are by-products of the divisive mechanism of manipulative and corrupt political elites in Kenya (Gifford, 2009: 25). In fact, despite successive government efforts at quelling the agitations and finding the lasting solutions for fair elections results quest for a separate entity, the post-election violence of 2007 agitation have continually defeated all odds ascribed to it (Gifford, 2009: 25-26).

Opondo argues that the politics of identity are central to the Kenya democratization process and as such, a threat to the unity of Kenya (Opondo, 2014: 60). This is because the process and strategy of moulding and developing a nation-state is as intriguing as it is challenging when the components parts of the intended states are perhaps socio-politically diverse (Opondo, 2014: 61). Therefore, the agitations through identity politics by post-election 2007 violence and the continued silence of the elite has made many views the act by the subaltern elites as a sign of weakness and self-defeat condition (Kasomo, 2012: 36). By and large, the study, interrogate what factor account for continued subaltern elites silence in the face of mass killings of the post-election violence of 2007 and 2017 as well as investigate why despite these vicious

approaches of the Kenyan Police and the Government, the counties governors and representatives of the central and Rift Valley regions have failed to take proactive steps in tackling and presenting a uniform voice on the post-election violence of 2007 and 2017 (Kasomo, 2012: 36).

The point is that the governing and non-governing elites in Kenya believed that the actualization of the post-election violence of the 2007/8 agenda will fragment the hegemonic order of the two divided-the elites and the average citizen in Kenya. To neutralize the post-election violence of the 2007/8 agenda and the series of agitations by any group interest, the governing elite uses the state as an instrument of coercion to maintain and perpetuate their elite dominance. This point is that such an act serves as a principal point on the dominance of the political elite as argued by Branch and Cheeseman when they insisted that members of the elite act preserve their position within their societies (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008: 12). Therefore, to preserve their status and circulation in politics, the elite employs all forms of identities to create division in the minds of the people (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008: 12). This is central because the cultural identity to the political domain by the political elites in Kenya was to capture power by using identity as a prototype for condemnation, discrimination, and marginalization (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008:12).

Makokha contends that Kenya's postelection crisis also raised the thorny question of identity that continues to strain traditional Catholic social ethics. In Africa, one acquires identity by affiliation with an ethnic group, which guarantees cultural security and facilitates access to public resources (Makokha, 2018: 185). The assumption that "Christian" or "religious" values (e.g., solidarity) can forge a common identity remains unproven. If being Kenyan did not protect many during the post-election crisis, being Christian appears a weaker substitute for a deeply ingrained belief in the protective identity conferred by an exclusionary primary reference group (Makokha, 2018: 185).

Countries, where there is a tendency toward moderation and segregation, often fall victim to violent ownership conflicts. More importantly, the patterns of social division in any particular society are an important factor in the strength and discord of conflict. These could best be between the theoretical framework of patent politics, which investigates the origins of the patent building and its fundamental imposition, which includes their response to violent disputes (Ayantayo, 2009).

Akinyetun states that Identity politics is the political activity of different religious and cultural groups in the pursuit of greater economic, social and political rights or choice (Akinyetun, 2020: 114). It claims to represent and seek to advance the interests of certain groups, whose members often share and experience the same imaginary experience of social and economic injustice, related to the society in which they are a part and in which they are a part (Akinyetun, 2020: 114). This often lays the foundation for a political movement in which they can meet and begin to establish themselves in society (Akinyetun, 2020: 114-115). Identity politics means more than just recognizing religious or cultural identity. It seeks to further this ownership, without defining itself, in a political framework based on that identity (Akinyetun, 2020: 115).

Kenya articulates individual complexity and diversity of interests — the existence of diverse interests means that competing organizations can work to maintain social peace and democratic stability and rebellious identity where nationality, religion, region, and minority - nationality (surnames) are the most prominent and fundamental foundation. of violent conflicts in the country (Oshewolo and Maren, 2015: 5). This is both in terms of the common ownership of citizens "especially for political purposes and ownership often involved in day-to-day disputes over citizenship and competitions and disputes over resources and rights" (Oshewolo and Maren, 2015: 5).

4.6.1. Politics

Osaghae, argues that in Africa the issues of identity, independence, citizenship, equality, power distribution and rights seem larger than ever, due to the conflict of globalization, democracy, freedom and other economic and social processes at the same time. and the legitimacy of non-state and antitrust claims and claims (Osaghae, 2004: 164). Osaghae, (2004) emphasizes that this was a situation in which different forms of integration of nationality, religion, region, minority, gender and society were formed to define and redefine the problems of diversity or the so-called "National Question" (Osaghae, 2004: 164). The goals and objectives ranged from major regimes and the distribution of countries (such as states and states to the state in Kenya and Uganda respectively) to resource management (as demanded by the Niger Delta in Nigeria and the Bakweri people of Cameroon). two. In contrast to the past when, as Ottaway (1999: 305) stated, racist politics was 'miraculously defeated', a new wave of nationalism and commitment presented a completely different situation that put the state at great risk. The only way to survive and avoid destructive conflicts and the war was to face the full manifestation of racial prejudice.

Not surprisingly, one of the most significant responses to this challenge doubled as a state-of-the-art strategy because of the aforementioned developments, was the resumption of federalism as a tool to control diversity - a resurgence because federalism was so dominant in fragile reforms. of the recent post-independence era in which news of the possibility, stability and survival of the newly independent regions (Opondo, 2014: 62). The nature of the expression of diversity problems, in particular, makes federalism a legitimate consideration. First, since its rise to prominence in the post-apartheid era in Africa, the state's ideology has been respected by weak, despised, and excluded citizens of free power whose basic characteristics are guaranteed power-sharing, territorial independence and the supposed financial ownership (Opondo, 2014: 62).

Osaghae, states that the two methods used accurately capture the nature of Kenyan ownership diversity. Another notable difference between Geertz (1963) is that of old, written and based on the 'dedication' of life (race, kinship, race, etc.), and social relations, which focus on the classification of society as categories, political party mergers, membership of the interest group etc. According to Geertz, the proliferation of old relations in Africa and Asia has made it difficult, if not impossible, for a cohesive system, including the collapse of old social relations or Oommen defines it as “the transition from racism and inequality that results in the identification of nationalities and ethnicities to citizenship based on integration and equality” Oommen. (1997: 35). Many studies of identity-based disputes in Kenya, including those of competing citizenship and national unity, take their theoretical concepts to this structure (Alio, 2015; Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996; Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996; Gachanga, 2012; Gifford, 2009; Mwakimako and Willis, 2014, etc.).

Kanyinga argues that ethnicity or tribalism is not a problem by itself, but rather a symptom of deeper predicaments (Kanyinga, 2006: 264). How political power is created and distributed is the real issue in the country. Unfortunately, the Constitution does not tackle this problem because it leaves the electoral system largely untouched (Kanyinga, 2006: 264). He points to the work of historian John Lonsdale, whose examination of the “morality of tribalism” demonstrates the virtues of ethnic identity (Kanyinga, 2006: 265). However, through manipulation, the dominant view of tribalism in Kenya is now negative and divisive. Ethnic or tribal divisions affected the colonial struggle because political parties were formed on ethno-geographical bases (Kanyinga, 2006: 265). In more recent times, *Harambee* – which began as a movement for self-reliance and community solidarity – lost its character of community ownership after politicians hijacked community projects, turning them into resources for

patronage and cultivating political capital (Gifford, 2009: 34). The independence constitution reflected a fear of tribalism, and therefore emphasised ethnic separatism, regional autonomy, joint control of security forces, and limitations on powers (Kanyinga, 2006: 266-267). Ghai and Ghai (2013) posit that the 2010 constitution has tried to move away from tribalism toward an integrated and inclusive state underpinned by a more diffused form of regional autonomy (as far as its impact on tribalism is concerned) (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:12).

Opondo shows how politics and political parties have served the interests of ethnic elites, who for generations have negotiated deals without regard to principles to position themselves politically (Opondo, 2014: 62). This tendency was demonstrated early in the country's history when the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) dissolved in 1964 – ostensibly in the “public interest” – and joined the Kenya African National Union (KANU), its bitter rival in Kenya's independence era constitution-making process (Opondo, 2014: 62). As a reward, former KADU elites were appointed to senior positions in the KANU government and later awarded large tracts of land in the so-called “white highlands” (Opondo, 2014: 62). Certain ethnic groups have dominated politics and government, while other groups have been excluded from political advocacy. Ethnicity has thus both enhanced and constrained space for civic engagement (Opondo, 2014: 62). Historically, ethnic identity has facilitated the civic engagement of individuals and groups who share the same identity as state elites but functioned as a source of tension between the state and elites from other ethnic groups. For this reason, Kanyinga concludes that the space for political pluralism in Kenya has remained restricted (Kanyinga, 2006: 268).

The second approach is about or less, a conflict-oriented view in which only ownership forms the basis of political demand, motivation, and action, or so-called political identity, can be regarded as political significance (Ajulu, 2008; Gachanga, 2012; Balaton-Chrime, 2021; King 'oro, 2019 and Kanyinga, 2014) are some of the main supporters of political ownership. While this approach has the potential to focus on identifying working people, there is an error in the removal of non-essential political identities such as gender and occupation. This is because in many cases, ownership is more or less the same as volcanoes, which today may be active tomorrow (Stiftung, 2010: 5).

Therefore, it is clear that any Kenyan identity test will need to be integrated with all ownership, intermediate or primary and how they are closely related (Bedasso, 2015: 376-377). This is

necessary for us to establish a variety of identities, especially what you are active and the political prominence of your full, dynamic and repetitive content (Bedasso, 2015: 376-377).

The Coast, a province with a strong ethnic and religious affiliation, has experienced several forms of ownership-based conflict. It is the third most diverse province in Kenya after the provinces of Nairobi and the Rift Valley (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014: 8). Like anywhere in Kenya, this diverse population is seen as bearing two identities; indigenous and squatters (Wanyande, 2006: 72). There are also two major religions Islam and Christianity Ethnicity is also central to politics because of inequalities in ethno-regional development which stems from the colonial policy of developing areas occupied by the colonial settlers, namely the White Highlands ((Wanyande, 2006: 72). The settlers favoured central Kenya and the highlands in the Rift Valley (Wanyande, 2006: 72). These regional disparities in development also coincide with ethnic inequalities because the regional boundaries correspond to ethnic settlement patterns or territories. Groups in marginal and poorly developed regions blame successive governments for the failure to invest resources in their regions (Wanyande, 2006: 72). This intensifies conflicts because they view access to and control of political power as synonymous with access to development resources. There is the view that a region from which the president comes is favoured in terms of development resources allocation. Therefore, ethnic coalitions are formed on the promise of sharing power (Kanyinga, 2014: n.p.). In its contemporary situation, most of the so-called squatters (settlers) are Christians, while the supposed indigenous are mostly Muslims and traditional (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014: 8).

4.6.2. Overview of Identity Crises in Kenya

Since the 1990s, identity conflicts have become a recurring decade in Kenya, especially in the North-West and Western regions of the country (Wanyande, 2006: 72). This, ID problem is not found in the Rift Valley and Coast provinces. It has caused similar problems in Central, Eastern; Nairobi, Nyanza, and Western Provinces (Gachanga, 2012: 4-5) see also (Opondo, 2014: 65).

Although the roots of religious and other conflicts have been linked to “colonialism and the Cold War” (Machava, 2008: 2), some scholars, such as Agbu (2011: 7-8), Mezinwa, (2012: 219-220), attribute such conflicts to bad governance, political and religious politics, competition and political power struggles by ethnic and religious communities respectively (Wanyande, 2006: 72). Agbu states that racism is linked to identity as a manifestation of the tragedy of citizenship in Africa (Agbu, 2011: 9). Despite the strong hope that Kenya's

democratic establishment in 2002 will prevent or reduce violent ownership disputes, "the country has seen a resurgence of high-level racial, religious and social conflicts that have had a devastating effect" (Neubert, 2019: 3) see also (Kwaja, 2009: 105). One of the claims to the democratic establishment and consolidation in Kenya lies in the fact that as a major power, democracy is the only institutional arrangement that can ensure "a peaceful resolution or settlement of national, religious and other disputes" (Olayode, 2007: 134); see also Gitile and King'oro (2019) and Kanyinga (2014).

According to Akinyetun, Batatola (2015), Katola (2016) and Mkimako and Willis (2014), religious and social conflicts in Kenya, are linked to citizenship within the context of ownership, which is politically based on inclusion or exclusion (Neubert, 2019: 10-11). According to Neubert, these views are tied to claims and arguments about identity as a basis for determining who is not included in the decision-making process and access to the opportunities and rights under the term "we" against "them" (Neubert, 2019: 10-11). This conflict of ownership has had a profound effect on the government. According to Gifford and Gachanga, the results were; "the destruction of major human and material resources in response to ethnic and religious-related violence, conflict and even war, threats to the protection of health and property, the strengthening of economic and political stability" (Neubert, 2019: 10-11).

As a result, ethnic, religious, and community groups who feel discriminated against by the larger tribes (Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, and Kamba) are forced to use constitutional and other unconstitutional methods to challenge the sovereignty of major ethnic groups (Kanyinga, 2014: 6). Kanyinga states that the main cause of violence, the conflict of ownership in Kenya is that the majority of minority groups remain in the minority, while the majority of groups are permanent, which is a critical consequence of inter-ethnic relations between religions. racial and religious identity in Kenya (Kanyinga, 2014: 13-14). In this way, incentives for cooperation, compromise, and compromise have been undermined and thus posed a great challenge to the peacebuilding work, as the various races are forced to live together in a climate of mistrust, apathy and suspicion (Kanyinga, 2014: 14).

Nyaura theorises that Ethnicity helps enforce strong ties that lead to the dominance of one group over the other (Nyaura, 2018:19). As Mann puts it, ethnic hostility arises where ethnicity outdoes class as the main form of social stratification, in the process of "capturing" and "channelling" class-like sentiments toward ethnonationalism (Mann, 2004). The dividing of

regions in Kenya into “tribal units” happened in the Moi era (Kioli, 2012; Gifford, 2009: 8-9) Ethnic dictatorship and ethnicising government and politics in Kenya pervaded in the entire 24 years of Moi’s rule (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 160). Neubert notes that the increase of the dominant group gaining, and hence its incentive to seek conflict; but it also increases the incentive for the losers to pass into the dominant group, enhancing the dilution effect from infiltration, and thus reducing the incentive for appropriation by the prospective dominant group (Neubert, 2019:8-9). Hence, exploitation and conflict prevail for intermediate levels of the expropriable-resource share in total wealth (Neubert, 2019: 8-9). This further predicts the outcome of the intergroup distribution of wealth, the pre-conflict relative size of the groups, and the destructiveness of conflict (Neubert, 2019: 8-9). He further stresses that conflict will only arise in societies with deep ethnic divides (Neubert, 2019:8-9). If the benefits of conflict are large enough, a group aiming to exclude the rest of the population may arise even in relatively homogenous societies: this group will tolerate a certain amount of leakage and/or will be willing to pay relatively large costs to setup artificial methods to enforce membership or party affiliation (Opondo, 2014: 64). The example is that of the ethnic clashes in Kenya during the Moi era of 1992 and 1997. The Kalenjin leaders convinced their people that it was Moi who was under siege (Opondo, 2014: 64). If he was removed from power, then the Kalenjin were not going to continue eating (Opondo, 2014: 64). This further created social divisions among the various tribes in Kenya (Opondo, 2014: 64). A social exclusion means that people in the grassroots cannot access proper health care service, education among other crucial social services (Gifford, 2009: 8-9). Neubert (2019), further, demonstrates that socioeconomic inequalities in Kenya have led to disunity among the Kenyan communities since many people perceive the inequalities to be a result of a deliberate policy by those in power to marginalize some communities and regions or at least to perpetuate the regional inequalities that began with colonial policies (Neubert, 2019: 10). He further asserts that there are obtrusive socio-economic inequalities most of which have taken essentially ethno-regional dimensions and have thus had an effect of undermining national unity and at most a sense of common belonging (Neubert, 2019: 10).

Kanyinga posits that ethnicity has undermined efforts to hold the state accountable (Kanyinga, 2014: 14-15). He maintains that there has been active citizen engagement in public affairs, but with very little consequence for state accountability because the competition for power takes place on an adversarial ethnic platform (Kanyinga, 2014: 14-15). This, on its own, makes the state and its institutions fragile. Ethnic leaders tend to identify with parochial community

interests rather than the national good (Kanyinga, 2014: 15). And even when they do so, their communities are not able to hold them to account because the electoral system makes it difficult for ethnic leaders to be held accountable by voters outside their constituency (Kanyinga, 2014: 15).

Kanyinga postulates that the challenge of fostering citizenship as an impediment to Kenya's transition to democracy is tied to that of ethnicity (Kanyinga, 2014:17). The way ethnicity is utilised to advance or undermine socio-political interests has significant implications for the consolidation of citizenship rights (Kanyinga, 2014:17). Neubert posits that, indeed, the politics of belonging or being "insiders" or "outsiders" of a particular group in power, has been central in defining exclusion and inclusion in Kenya's politics (Neubert, 2019: 10). Generally, the twin issues of citizenship and rights have come to occupy a central place in Kenya (Kanyinga, 2014:17). The question of who is a member and who is not a member of an ethnic group plays perhaps the most important role in deciding how people vote and the type of rights they should enjoy at the local level (Neubert, 2019: 10). The status of 'outsiders', or those who are not indigenous to an area, and that of 'insiders', remains central to conflicts in different parts of the country. Hostilities between these identities manifest during elections (Kanyinga, 2014:17).

Ajulu argues that several factors account for the dominance of ethnicity in the practice of politics in Kenya (Ajulu, 2008: 36). First is the significance of centralised executive powers—over the years the constitution was amended to provide for a powerful executive (Kanyinga, 2014: 12-13). The amendments removed inbuilt checks and balances and weakened other organs of the government (Kanyinga, 2014: 13). The presidency evolved as the most important institution because without accountability checks, the president could use public resources to reward followers and punish dissenters (Ajulu, 2008: 37). The use of public resources for patronage purposes has, therefore, been widespread. Ethnicity is also central to politics because of inequalities in ethno-regional development, which stems from the colonial policy of developing areas occupied by the colonial settlers, namely the White Highlands (Gifford, 2009: 8-9). The settlers favoured central Kenya and the highlands in the Rift Valley (Gifford, 2009: 8-9). These regional disparities in development also coincide with ethnic inequalities because the regional boundaries correspond to ethnic settlement patterns or territories. Groups in marginal and poorly developed regions blame successive governments for the failure to invest resources in their regions (Ajulu, 2008: 36). This intensifies conflicts because they view access to and control of political power as synonymous with access to development resources

(Gifford, 2009: 8-9). There is the view that a region from which the president comes is favoured in terms of development resources allocation (Ajulu, 2008: 37-38). 'It is our turn to eat' becomes a mobilising slogan among groups during elections (Ajulu, 2008: 37-38). Ethnic coalitions are formed on the promise of sharing power (Kanyinga, 2014:13).

4.6.3. Ethnic Categorisation in Colonial Kenya

Osaghae asserts that it is true indeed, the colonial authors instigated and, in some cases, administratively created ethnic groups as we know them today (Osaghae, 2004: 165). The British authorities, for one, devoted time to labelling and classifying ethnic groups, and this strengthened and sharpened ethnic differences (Osaghae, 2004: 166). In Uganda, through this classification strategy, the British generalised and expanded the Ankole community by extending the authority of the pre-colonial state over many other principalities. Similar cases are seen in Buganda and Bunyoro (Osaghae, 2004: 165) and the Hausa/Fulani in Nigeria (Osaghae, 2004: 165). In contrast, in some areas, pre-colonial influence was reduced and a new national identity was demonstrated. An example of what happened in Kenya during the work of the famous historian Bethwell Ogot, Abubakar explains that races (such as Luhya, Kalenjin, Mijikenda, and Taveta) are colonial, as is the whole concept of Kenya. made up of 42 nations. The 1999 census was estimated at 28,686,607 people (Makoloo, 2005: 11-12).

The idea of these colonial structures was to promote nationalism, to promote 'internal' racial unity and to create 'modern' races as we know them today. The three main tools they used in this program were three. First, by using the work done by the missionary and colonial groups to bring the indigenous languages together, officials promoted the common languages that united the vernacular groups. To this day, language remains a major racial symbol in Africa (Nnoli, 1978). Second, they capture existing myths or compose, compose, or commonly use, genealogical tales or whatever (Osaghae, 2004: 165). There were called "charter myths" to promote a common future for people who could not apply for real reproductive relationships (Osaghae, 2004: 265). The Oduduwa (Yoruba) myth and the Bayajidda (Hausa) myth are examples of such constitutional myths. Oduduwa mythology was central to Egbe Omo Oduduwa's attempt to promote Yoruba unity (Osaghae, 2004: 165). Eventually, the dignitaries found little opportunity to fight the opposition, thus sharpening their awareness of their nationality and division— "we" against "them". This put an end to racial prejudice (Osaghae, 2004: 165).

The 1999 figure was adjusted to 23 million but recent analysis has proven that the figure has been exaggerated for political reasons (CBS, 2003: 205). The national population is estimated at 28.7 million and is expected to increase to 33.4 million and 36.5 million in 2010 and 2020 respectively (Makoloo, 2005: 11-12). An analysis of the history of the census reveals that although some tribes and/or tribes were excluded, others were created or emerged to form larger nations according to the existing political climate (Makoloo, 2005: 11-12). For example, sub-tribal districts were merged to form groups in Kalenjin, Luhya and Miji Kenda in 1969, 1979 and 1989 censuses. Therefore, ownership is an important question in Kenya (Makoloo, 2005: 11-12). It is estimated that the population of the country stands at 28.7 million and that ethnic cleansing and special identity are new ideas, emerging from politics and equal access to power and resources (Makoloo, 2005: 11-12). There is not much difference between Kikuyu and Maasai, for example; in the past, they would not have seemed so different from each other as they are now. Similarly, Swahili and Digo have been married and are very different (Opondo, 2014: 665).

Nevertheless, many communities are not recognised as Kenyans. Among these excluded communities is the Badala of Mombasa, who came from India 800 years ago. In addition, from South Asia, the Baluchis came to Kenya in the sixteenth century⁴ and fought against the Portuguese. But they are still not considered Kenyans. Swahilis, who have resided in Kenya for centuries and whose ancestors are central to the history of the Coast are marginalised despite the widespread adoption of their language and culture in the country. On the other hand, groups that were not here 80 years ago are accepted (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 9-10).

There is a host of false tales and myths about communities and languages in Kenya. People are given labels that are derogatory in other languages. The Dasnach community (Lake Turkana) is called “Shangila” (meaning rogue) by the rest of Kenyans. The Kenyan state declared war on the North-East, disregarding the results of a referendum in which Kenyan Somalis had voted to join Somalia. They called the Somali rebels “shifta” – an Oromo word meaning bandits (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:10).

Ghai and Ghai argue that a transformative approach to remembrance is needed. Old myths and misconceptions must be deconstructed to reconstruct the nation. Artificial memories need to be transformed so we can become one Kenya, with all Kenyans in our diversity contributing to the task of nation-building (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:10).

Balaton-Chrime states that British colonial rule in Kenya was based on African ideology as reflected mainly by their nationality. It was because of the racial culture that the English applied the indirect law and made it possible for 'immediate' rule by electing local leaders to implement the colonial policy (Balaton-Chrime, 2021: 46). He argues that the British desire for orderly segregation has become a recurring theme in postcolonial literature, as it has been increasingly acknowledged that control was always irrational and needed to be renewed every time it faced opposition to colonialism and resources and transport restrictions; and that colonial studies are often identified by the categories under which they are placed (Balaton-Chrime, 2021: 46). According to Balaton-Chrime the census, because of its two distinct functions of division and census nationwide, has been an important tool in the cultivation of this racist concept (Balaton-Chrime, 2021: 46).

The first tools for registration and census were to exploit African people as workers, to collect property taxes and voting taxes, and to control anti-colonial unrest by undermining the Pan-African system. Survey taxes were collected by district commissioners (DCs) who kept regional and local tax registers, regularly (more in some regions than others) and reviewed African "housing calculators" (Balaton-Chrime, 2021: 46).

The racial divisions introduced by colonialism have been enthusiastically welcomed by provinces and citizens not only for competitive reasons but also for integration. Although racial segregation can perpetuate racism and xenophobia, racial segregation can aid in national inclusion. As I have argued elsewhere, nationalism is not a barrier to democracy but can be an important vehicle for public health. (Balaton-Chrime, 2021).

Identifying party patrons through which Moi reached the various communities resulted in both deepening of political patronage and further ethnicisation of the society. First, Moi deconstructed the structures that owed their existence to the Kenyatta regime. The first to go in this respect was the Kikuyu numeric strength in the Cabinet and the executive in general. Beginning with about 30% in 1979 after the first general election of his regime, nine years later, in 1987, Moi had reduced the Kikuyu presence in the Cabinet to about 14%. The paring down of the Kikuyu in government continued. Their numbers reduced drastically in the 1990s after the re-introduction of multiparty politics (Opondo, 2014:665).

Other features of the Moi regime concerning political pluralism included the state's tendency to stifle the space for political associations, and open distaste for groups that were critical of the government. The space for civic engagement was so constrained that the government

introduced laws to regulate operations of nongovernmental organisations based on the argument that they received funding from outside governments but were critical of the government or were keen to overthrow the government (Opondo, 2014:665).

There were also fears that there could be "fraud" in the project, with people deliberately distorting calculations to increase their district figures "to benefit from a higher budget and get new districts and districts". It has been alleged that leaders in some parts of the country were preparing to import "foreigners" into their territories to increase population growth (Gifford, 2009: 34-35).

The School of Instruments provides another foundation for racial profiling and analysis. It believes that racism becomes a defining principle in which teams compete for values and a rare environment and resources (Gifford, 2009: 34-35). Nationalism is considered to be an important criterion that members of a racist group can use to gain national favour or use it to fight for recognition or to eliminate discrimination that is believed to be politically motivated. All of this is evident in the contest for political office. Achieving political power is an important fact for many African nations because of the perceived rights associated with political power. This vision inspires individuals and ethnic groups to seek control of the state (Mutua, 2008: n.p.). Because of the desire of the international parties to control the empire, from the instrumentalists' view that African politics is symbolized by the exploitation of nations for economic and political purposes (Osaghae, 2004: 166). and that racial politics is propagated by the fact that racism can be exploited and controlled at will by political leaders (Osaghae, 2004: 166). In addition, instrumentalists also argue that racism also provides a sense of belonging, especially in urban areas that favour individuals who tend to compete for scarce and insecure resources. Therefore, it provides much-needed social security services that reduce diseases such as poverty under difficult economic times (Gifford, 2009: 34-35).

Some of the tribes under Sir William Mackinnon had already created animosity between them but this did not seem to be a threat to the stability of the new national empire. Thus, conflicts are not simply based on cultural differences and cultural similarities are not a necessary condition for political stability. Ethnic hatred that led to ethnic strife in 1992 and the post-election violence of 2008 is a product of both political and ethnic discrimination, things that can be traced back to the colonial era. These traits were later acquired by post-colonial political leaders who failed to instil a national culture in their pursuit of sectarianism and self-interest.

The burden of racial competition and racial politics was later transferred to the people of their time who also failed in the nation-building work (Ajulu, 2008: 36-37).

With the clear divisions between the majority and the minority races that were evident during the liberation process and the many races, ethnicities, and religions that characterized the new Kenyan nation, the government embarked on a project to promote nationalism. President Jomo Kenyatta and second president Daniel Moi present a series of measures aimed at uniting the nation (Gifford, 2009: 9). Their strategy was to present development speech as a pillar of international unity. Development and national unity were seen as strengthening. This forms the basis for the establishment of a one-party state as President Jomo Kenyatta states that the multi-party system is a threat to national unity as it will support racist and ideological political parties (Gifford, 2009: 9). He, therefore, turned to disband the opposition political parties and KANU remained the party of all Kenyans. Swahili and English were also the official languages to avoid promoting any of the local languages. This was later followed by the suspension of the education system (Gachanga, 2012: 5).

Emphasizing the role of nationalism in party solidarity, whenever a leader of a particular nation is frustrated within a political party, his departure means that the party also loses the support of the racist party. Other examples of this include the departure of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga from KANU found the Kenya People's Union (Geertzel, 1970: 7-11), and Raila Odinga's departure from Ford-Kenya to form the National Development Party in 1997 where he was succeeded by all members of parliament from his Luo party (Daily Nation, November 13, 1997). John Keen's move to KANU made the Maasai community a success, with William Ruto's departure from the ODM to form the United Republican Party making 90% of the Kalenjin vote for the Orange Democratic Party in 2007 changing loyalty to the 2013 Jubilee Alliance. - their members who voted against them in 2007 (Cunningham, 2014: 13-14). This affects the development of Kenya and the transformation of democracy in two ways. First, it reduces political parties to just racial integration and not to an organization based on ideas on how the country can overcome the critical development challenges it faces. Second, it means that the collapse of political leaders is transmitted across the nation through systematic and targeted discrimination (Cunningham, 2014: 13-14). Kenya switched to a multi-party system in 1992 - an important step towards democracy (Cunningham, 2014: 13-14). Nevertheless, racist politics, as well as political nationalism, was a thorn in the flesh of Kenya's revolution. Racial incitement, deception, and exploitation continued to characterize the political arena. Although tensions have not escalated into bloody conflicts in recent years, in 2007, Kenya's

democracy was tested by post-election wars that erupted after tense national elections (Ajulu, 2008: 37).

The traditional voting bloc known as GEMA, consisting of the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru, has historically always preferred their own had a total of 4,356,161 registered voters. Their key political allies, the Kalenjin had 1,832,511 according to the IEBC Problem-based politics is part of national politics. This makes it difficult for Western countries to think of Kenya as a democracy. It also speaks of the expulsion of attempts to transform African societies into democracies as they are pursued by Western countries. Kenya and many other African countries are falling short of the goal of democracy as evidenced by this election. Indeed, it is tempting to think of it as anything other than an ethnic census where only ethnic votes are counted (Cunningham, 2014: 14-15). (Cunningham, 2014: 14-15). The more one ethnic group dominates a country's total population, the higher the likelihood of clinching the presidency. It seems as though Kenya is emerging as a "procreatorocracy," which I define as follows: a political system in which the capture, control, and maintenance of state power have become increasingly dependent on ethnic numerical superiority. The inclination towards this kind of system has deep historical roots dating back to Kenya's colonial history (Cunningham, 2014: 14-15).

The politics of numbers has been the preoccupation of various political interests since colonial times when the paltry population of white settlers worked to transform the country into a white man's land. Settlers encouraged European immigration into the colony. This was a race against time because the political consciousness of the African population, encouraged by Indian political activism in the inter-war years, was on the rise (Cunningham, 2014: 14-15). This preoccupation survived after independence when ethnicity replaced racism as the most important factor in Kenyan politics (Cunningham, 2014: 14-15).

4.6.4. African Traditional Religious Rights in Modern Kenya

Of the three religious identities in Kenya—Christian, Muslim and Traditional, the latter is the least politically active; numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and subgroups, villages, clans, and kin groups; and involving the worship of different gods and goddesses (Chepkwony, 2008: 16). On the other hand, Christian and Muslim identities have continued to be the backbone of religious disparity and conflict (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). This differentiation underlies the Inland-coast cleavage (Kresse, 2009: 20).

Chepkwony argues that African political leaders have ignored people's rights to political self-determination. In the sense that African continue to be ruled by their people using colonial

ideologies philosophies, political and spiritual worldviews, in disregard of their own culture (Chepkwony, 2008: 16). Not forgetting the fact that religion and politics can never be separated in the minds of the believers or their leaders. Kenya political leaders know too well the power of African spirituality in African politics. Any African political leader, therefore, recognises the sanctity of the African religious worldview in their society (Ayantayo, 2009). Kenyan politicians are thus aware that they do well to avoid violating traditional religious vitality. They also know too well how to resonate with echoes of African religious views in their daily encounter with the people. In that way, alert politicians exploit African piety to gain the attention and commitment of their constituents (Chepkwony, 2008: 19).

Despite this knowledge, in the majority of modern African states, African spirituality is not associated directly with politics. In other words, African governments have provided no political space for African spirituality to thrive. Ali Mazrui, for example, has lamented that African governments have not recognised the indigenous religion in their calendars, while they have acknowledged foreign faiths. He writes, “No African country has officially allocated a national holiday in honour of the gods of indigenous religions. All African countries, on the other hand, have national holidays that either favour Christian festivals (especially Christmas, Muslims such as Idd el Fitr) or both categories of imported festivals.”³²

Although some African constitutions include the right to African spirituality and culture, in practice constitutionally, no government machinery allows the expression and practice of such cosmology (Chepkwony, 2008: 19). What is clear in all this is that modern African states are openly hostile to African spirituality in public and to the individuals who adhere to these practices. In the words of Makau, “African constitutions and laws are generally either openly hostile to African religions and culture or they pretend that such religions do not exist. Such pretence is a tacit hope that African religions have either been eliminated or marginalised and so fundamentally delegitimised, that they warrant no attention” (Makau, 1999: 170).

The Draft Constitution of Kenya 2004, stipulates that: “1. State and religion shall be separate. 2. There shall be no state religion. 3. The State shall treat all religion equally.”³³ In practice, however, the Kenyan government is more favourable to Christianity and Islam as demonstrated in the place the government gives its leaders in national issues. Concerning African spirituality, it is assumed that it does not exist (Chepkwony, 2008: 19).

³² Mutua, Makau, ed., “Returning to my Roots: African ‘Religions’ and the State,” An-Naim, Abdulahi Ahmed, ed., *Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa*, New York: Orbis Books, 1999, p. 170.

³³ The Draft Constitution of Kenya 2004.

4.7. Ethnic Hegemonic Politics—Competing identities, Loyalties and Interests

There is no contradicting that in a multi-ethnic, multicultural, multi-religious, and multilingual state, such as Kenya, serious, and mostly unjustified, attention is paid to diversities such as where you hail from, what your beliefs are, and more ridiculously, what language you speak. These primordial affinities are often used as a basis for power acquisition, power consolidation, and, of course, power-sharing. Beyond this, there are also attendant factors that determine one's access to resources, and, in extreme cases, societal influence. This is not to suggest that plural identities, *inter alia*, are solely responsible for unhealthy power contestation and/or ethnic conflagration, neither does it berate the conscious efforts and progress made by states with multiple identities. For Bedasso, identities are unifying factors in society and are instrumental in fostering dynamism in social action (Bedasso, 2015: 20). They are used to direct political comportment and formulate political agendas as well as to influence political behaviour. Identities also serve as civil society tools used to check the intemperance of the state (Bedasso, 2015: 20).

Juma, theorises that, immediately after the collapse of colonial administration, two rather confounding processes of social mobilization emerged (Juma, 2002:487). The first was the claim to benefits of "Uhuru" (independence) based on ethnic glorification, while the second was the overwhelming and euphoric support for the establishment of the African majority government, which was seen by many as a triumph of nationalism (Juma, 2002:487). According to Juma, the two processes were important because they influenced normative formulations at the very highest levels, especially at the drafting stages of Kenya's independence constitution, and later defined the contradictory political approaches to legal reform in Kenya's post-independence era (Juma, 2002: 487). Be that as it may, there has never been an open and clear acknowledgement of "ethnicity" or the differentiated ethnic claim to political power, despite the same being a major influence on political activity since independence. That is what makes the 1963 Majimbo Constitution a unique landmark in the trajectory of the legal reform process in Kenya (Juma, 2002:487-488). The assertion by leaders, such as Daniel Arap Moi, that their ethnic communities needed a political framework to participate in government was remarkable and should have inspired a much more articulate constitutional arrangement than it did. However, the support that the majority of Kenyans gave to the KANU leadership and the thought that civic nationalism could only be achieved if ethnicity was eradicated, made nonsense of the minority claim. Nevertheless, currently,

Kenyans are all too aware of what the forty-one years of KANU rule have done to their country (Juma, 2002:487-488).

According to Kanyinga, when there is an assumption to power and control by the successive presidents in Kenya, the appointments to public service favour the regions of those in power (Kanyinga, 2014: 13-14). Therefore, during the presidential elections it is a winner takes all situation, and as Kanyinga puts it that the influential elites and the area where the president originates tend to benefit from the share of senior public-sector positions than those of other groups (Kanyinga, 2014: 14). This perception has been entrenched by the actions of the Kikuyu elites in power under President Jomo Kenyatta and President Mwai Kibaki and by the actions of the Kalenjin elites under Daniel Arap Moi (Opondo, 2014: 63). According to NCIC Report (2012), the members of the president's communities have been dominant in all senior and strategic positions in government ministries and departments (Owiti, 2015: 65). Moreover, the distribution of cabinet posts has been skewed in favour of the country's leadership communities. The norm is when the leader wins the elections, they share the spoils in terms of political appointments to powerful positions of influence thereby accessing the economic resources including land.

Scholars that include Norris and Mattes pointed out that ethnicity does play a key role in determining support for ruling parties (Norris, and Mattes, 2003: 45). Political elites tend to mobilize support on an ethnic basis. Scarrit and Mazaffar demonstrate that both ethnopolitical fragmentation and the geographical concentration of ethnic groups are important factors in explaining the number of political parties. The political shape of the country has been formed based on ethnicity; hence the citizens themselves have been ethnically polarized. Bedasso argues that voters tend to collect information on a candidate's background, and the intended end up costly, while ethnicity is readily observable. Hence, they use ethnicity as a noisy but low-cost signal of candidates' propensity to favour them in allocating public goods and transfers (Bedasso, 2015: 25). Given this behaviour by voters, it can be rational for parties to be organized along ethnic lines. As Ghai and Ghai (2013) put it that Kenyan politics have arguably become the politics of ethnicity (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 19-20).

Historically, colonial policies led to the current ethnicity as this is focal to the politics of inequalities in ethno-regional development (Kasomo, 2012; Kanyinga, 2014; Ghai and Ghai, 2013). The colonial settlers favoured central Kenya and the highlands in the Rift Valley which were fertile, thus improving agriculture in the region. Kanyinga (2014) further states that there

have been regional disparities in development that concur with the ethnic inequalities because the regional boundaries correspond to ethnic settlement patterns or territories groups (Kanyinga, 2014: 14). There has been also the tendency that after every election marginalized groups and under-developed regions blame consecutive governments for the failure to invest resources in their regions. This has intensified regional conflicts. As Kanyinga puts it that 'It is our turn to eat' becomes a slogan for bringing ethnic groups together with the view to gain access to and control of political power groups (Kanyinga, 2014: 15). Accordingly, leaders appointed to office are seen to be persons who will favour tribesmen and who will adequately share the national cake to the selected few who will in turn become wealthy. In some cases, ethnic blocks are formed based on sharing power and socio-economic development (Kanyinga, 2014: 15).

Juma contends that, when Kenya attained independence in 1963 and Jomo Kenyatta became President, "he sought to heighten *Kikuyu* hegemony. Studies have shown that Kenyatta consolidated his leadership by increasing members of his *Kikuyu* tribe both in the civil service and leading government parastatals (Juma, 2002:490). For example, in 1969, 1974, and even 1979, thirty percent of the cabinet members were *Kikuyu*" (Ajulu, 2008:33-34). Similarly, the *Kikuyu* private sectors were aided by the government. Scholars point to the *Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA) Holdings Limited* which was established in 1973 as one such enterprise" (Ajulu, 2008:33-34). The so-called policy of "Africanization" aided the entrenchment of *Kikuyu* capitalists into the economy, while excluding other ethnic groups." When it came to the allocation of land, especially within the white highlands formerly occupied by European settlers, the *Kikuyu* were given the utmost preference (Ajulu, 2008: 33-34). "The invasion of the *Kikuyu* into Rift Valley, a predominantly *Kalenjin* area, attracted opposition from local politicians at the time," and has over the years been the subject of a great deal of contention between the two ethnic groups. Political perception prevalent within the other ethnic groups was that of *Kikuyu* dominance. One Luo parliamentarian complained in Parliament that:

Today when we look at the top jobs in the government, we find that in most of the ministries, including certain cooperatives, practically all these have been taken over by people from the central province (i.e., *Kikuyu*). If one tribe alone can take over about seventy-two percent of Kenya jobs, and they are less than two million people, how can

you expect twenty-five percent of the jobs to go to more than eight million people who belong to other tribes."³⁴

Ajulu reasoned that to eliminate opposition to his regime by other ethnic groups, especially the Luo, Kenyatta outlawed opposition politics (Ajulu, 2008: 35). When Oginga Odinga, a maverick Luo politician resigned his post of Vice President in the Kenyatta government and announced his intention to form the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), the government hurriedly changed the constitution to require that MPs who seek to join the opposition party must first resign their parliamentary seat and face re-election" (Ajulu, 2008: 35). Other than law, the government resorted to political assassination to silence its critics. The unexplained deaths of Argwengs Kodhek, J.M. Kariuki, Tom Mboya, and perhaps Ronald Ngala had all been accredited to the Kenyatta government (Opondo, 2014:62).

Kenya's party politics has been characterised by ethnic hegemony. This is one of the major challenges confronting the advancement of liberal democracy in Kenya since independence. To the extent that ethnic sentiment is fully introduced in virtually all areas of the Kenyan political system. Indeed, low productivity and inefficiencies currently experienced in the country can be attributed to ethnic sentiment (Opondo, 2014: 62).

Ajulu reasons that the composition of the Kenyan state to a large extent has contributed to the degree of underdevelopment and improper integration of the different ethnic grouping in the nation (Ajulu, 2008: 35-36). This resentment is reflected in the political relationship among them, it is driven by contempt, rivalry, suspicion, hatred, and lingering fear of domination by the majority groups in the nation. This unwarranted situation is seen across nations in the African continent. There are confused with never-ending ethnic crisis and political violence (Ajulu, 2008: 35-36).

Uwaifo, posits that African politics is characterized by strong individuals rather than a strong institution, unsettle political culture, weak political parties with no clear-cut philosophy and ideology, only domineering individuals with selfish and greed motives and intention to ride on the back of the party for personal gains (Uwaifo, 2016:1). Uwaifo notes that African states are "largely colonialist in nature and formation, there are more or less a consuming rather than a producing nation, that is to say, "They have moved from a crop-producing state to a natural

³⁴ Oduya, G.F., *National Assembly Debates XIV, 6th Session Feb 22 1968*, quoted in Olurunsola, V., (1972) *The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa*.22.

resource” exploiter, weak and manipulated institution largely by the elites and strong personality (Uwaifo, 2016:1).

African states are also well-known, state that has constantly shown the movement of political power from pluralism to centralism, having strong individuals wielding so much political power on behalf of the political party instead of the party’s constitution or the party itself. It is a prism structure, with strong alliance and loyalty for the man on top. There is no party supremacy and authority, but a strong and powerful personality at the centre upon which everything rotates (Uwaifo, 2016:1).

The same is applicable in the Kenyan political environment; it is worse here because of the tendency of ethnicity, political parties are evolved based on ethnic considerations and affiliation (Uwaifo, 2016:1). The nature and meaning of ethnic identity are difficult to grasp unless we relate them to the changing conditions of life (Bayart, 1993). Here, Jean-Francois Bayart cautioned us because— one may continue using old answers for new questions if he (she) does not pay attention to such connection. According to Aquiline Tarimo (2010), one has to consider cultural, socioeconomic, and political changes that have been taking place and how they have continues to fashion ethnic identities, loyalties, and interests (Tarimo, 2010: 12).

Ethnic identities, from the African perspective, assume a triple history: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial. In the pre-colonial period, ethnic groups were more rural and homogeneous, and there was less competition between them for the scarce economic resources that it is today. In the pre-colonial period, notices John Lonsdale, there was a recognized art of living in a reasonably peaceful way without a state structure in the way it is understood today³⁵ (Lonsdale, 1981:139). Small ethnic groups, during the colonial period, were forced to merge (Kanyinga, 2006: 55)

Because of the ethnic competition for scarce economic resources and political power, each ethnic group tends to fight to have a president from their group. For them, the president will loot the state for his (her) ethnic group—the president is not for the state, but his (her) ethnic group. This is the root cause of the struggle to control the state. Ethnic strategies are often connected with the resources of the modern economy, such as in gaining employment, education, securing loans, and seizing appointments for lucrative offices. The competition for

³⁵ The main argument here is that the operative fore and validity of a particular model of social organization depends on the culture and historical background of a particular society. As such, the structure of nation-state in Africa and Kenya to be specific, has not received commitment and support from the ethnic models of political organization.

the limited economic resources within the state today, to a certain extent, has changed the meaning of ethnic identities

Ethnicity is one of the most difficult concepts to grasp, and one of the most essential in understanding Africa and particularly Kenya. David Lamb argues that:

African Leaders deplore ethnocentrism. They call it the cancer that threatens to eat out the very fabric of the nation. Yet almost every African politician, practice it, most African presidents are more ethnic chief than national statesman (woman), and it remains perhaps the most potent force in day-to-day African life. It is a factor in political struggles and distribution of resources. It often determines who gets jobs, who get promoted, who gets accepted at university, because by its very definition ethnicity implies sharing among members of the extended family, making sure that your own are looked after first. To give a job to a fellow ethnic member is not nepotism, it is an obligation. For a political leader to choose his (her) closet advisers and bodyguards from the ranks of his (her) own ethnic group is not patronage (matronage), it is a good common sense. It ensures security, continuity, and authority.³⁶

Those who benefit from ethnocentric politics, disorder, and status quo tend to deny the fact that ethnocentrism exists in their countries. Such attitude has to a certain extent retarded political development because it frustrates any effort geared toward resolving the basic problems related to a socio-political organisation—because of the colonial background we tend to blame the West for the problem caused by ourselves. The problem of ethnocentrism is real; and to simply wish it away, to condemn it without comprehending its roots and dynamics, or take no action to challenge it, only serves to strengthen it (Kwatamba, 2008: 86).

The challenge is how not how to overcome ethnic identities, but how to integrate them into social relationships and political processes (Osaghae, 2004: 166). The effort of promoting democracy cannot succeed without taking into account the challenge of appropriating ethnic identities into the structure of the nation-state (Osaghae, 2004: 166). Any project, be it political, economic, or religious, which involves the mobilization of people must take into account the cultural context in which individuals live, rather than those in which someone may think they ought to live (Osaghae, 2004: 166). The process of building democratic institutions will succeed insofar as it starts with what people are and from where they are (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002: 226).

The African political leadership puts an accent on “assimilation, rather than pluralistic inclusion and acceptance of difference as the only approach to unity” (Sharkey, 2007: 39). Because of such influence, many leaders think that ethnic identities will disappear as the

³⁶ Lamb, D., (1984), *The Africans*, New York: Vintage Books. 9.

process of urbanisation gains momentum (Osaghae, 2004: 166). One of the consequences of forced integration, emphasized by government-sanctioned programs of discrimination and inequality, has been a long history of struggle over the right to self-determination by 'ruled', 'oppressed', and 'discriminated' groups. form a special category. It is instructive, for example, that despite the many constitutional conferences proclaiming its independence, Kenya is still described by members of the aggrieved party as a "forced state," 1920's error (Osaghae, 2004: 166). colonialism — they followed the principles of racial and ethnic descriptions and segregation that strengthened lines of division and, in some cases, created unprecedented divisions (Osaghae), 2004: 166). Other tools include education for British people who make it a tool to strengthen tribal loyalty, indirect law, or a system of traditional authorities whose established local administrative system sets out the basic rules for class divisions and procedures. discriminatory policies such as a national heroes' policy to recruit soldiers. and policy. Thirdly, there are significant inequalities between the various co-operative groups in terms of development, service delivery, space size, and population. This has been one of the biggest sources of minor problems. Fourth, there is intense competition, competition, and conflict between groups over access to and benefit from scarce resources and public goods and services. Many of these are more of modern advantages and are based on the present than in the past, although some are historically deeper and go back to pre-colonial times.

4.7.1. Reasons as to why the Significance of ethnic identities has not diminished

The significance of ethnic identities has not diminished with the formation of nation-states for several reasons. First, family, clan, and ethnic groups are still the essential structures of social relationships (Moywaywa, 2018: 132). Second, one's identity is ethnic, not national. African leaders "have done very little to convince their people that nationhood offers more benefits than ethnicity" (Moywaywa, 2018: 132). Third, African leaders have failed to define the relationship between an ethnic group and nation-state for the common good (Moywaywa, 2018: 132). Fourth, African states have failed to appropriate inherited cultural traditions to help come to terms with the cultural realities of the times to emerge with the new vision for the future (Moywaywa, 2018: 132). Fifth, the approach of nation-building has not attempted to find a way of welding together several ethnic groups into a large cohesive political community, nation-state, intended to eliminate confusion and transfer ethnic loyalties to the larger political community (Moywaywa, 2018: 132). Sixth, there have been no efforts made to formulate contextualized ideologies for contemporary Africa (Moywaywa, 2018: 132). Seventh, there have been no effective ways of dealing with traditional moral standards that seem to crumble

in the wake of rapid socio-political change (Moywaywa, 2018: 132). Eighth, most governments do not respect the freedom of the judiciary and the rule of law, which results in a disregard for political morality and responsible leadership (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).

4.7.2. Factors that can prevent the emergence of the ethno political conflict

The emergence of the ethno-political conflict could be linked to the process of competing identities, loyalties and interests. In many parts of Africa, ethnic loyalties have risen above other loyalties because during the colonial era there were few incentives to do so (Tarimo, 2010: 47). Today, ethnic identity and loyalty may mean a quick promotion of one's status in places of work (Gachanga, 2012: 5). If that is the case, then, the question remains on how Africa can integrate ethnic identities, loyalties, and interests within the structure of the nation-state. To answer this question, we have to acknowledge that a leader has "commitments not simply too general values and ideals but concrete people" (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 163). The process of decision-making and the kind of common good that one is committed to be heavily dependent on the loyalty of persons and groups which claim one's loyalty (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 163). Loyalty can be influenced by interest group, cultural group, religious group, or self-interest, which uses others as a ladder to acquire power and wealth. Conflicts in public life can therefore be looked at as conflicts between concrete commitments to various identities, loyalties, and interests. (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 163). The analysis of Abner Cohen on the relationship between African cultures and modern politics in urban areas reveals that ethnic organizations cannot camouflage their existence in public and their members will adopt a low profile and attempt to fade into the general social landscape (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 163). At the same time, however, its members must know about one another and should be able to recognise one another as co-members to coordinate their activities in the interest of the group and avail themselves of the privilege of membership. They have to be visible to one another, but invisible as a group in public (Kasika and Nyadera, 2019: 163).

Maintaining the balance between competing identities, loyalties, and interests is possible by developing social structures founded upon the principle of overlapping loyalties. This is the only possibility that can keep leaders from becoming persons who advocate interests of a particular group (Bayart, 1993). This project entails "weighing competing loyalties and competing goods and acting in a way that attends to their rightful claims" (Cohen, 1981:79). The need to respect the diversity of ethnic identities is an important aspect of forming a cohesive political society. Consequently, the process of harmonizing competing loyalties must

be achieved by maintaining a balance between the state and ethnic communities (Gifford, 2009:8).

4.8. Ethno-Political Competition, Discrimination, and conflict

Agbu, states that there is little doubt that in particular, racism and democracy are intertwined in the context of African development (Agbu, 2011: 12). We cannot speak of democracy without considering the impact of racism on political morality, which includes voting patterns and high-level politics, while nationalism is only useful because of the inclusion of racist identity politics in power struggles or political competitions (Agbu, 2011: 12). It is also possible to argue that this situation is sometimes almost identical as the two perspectives seem to contradict each other in the process of nation-building in Africa. Attempts to suppress nationalism in the first decade of independence in many African countries have been unsuccessful (Agbu, 2011: 12). Instead, it is remarkable that in the face of the crisis of citizenship and nationalist activity in many African countries, as well as the increase in global trade, racism has risen, posing the challenges of democracy (Agbu, 2011: 12).

Kenya is a multi-ethnic society, and many ethnic groups have lived in harmony for many years. In recent years, however, ethnic hegemonic groups have been at the forefront in fighting for political power. This situation has resulted in fighting to control the state. (Alio, 2015; (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014). The “relatively less hegemonic communities have been paying the card of opportunism” (Omulo, 2017: 136). Many ethnic groups supported the armed struggle for independence in hope that they could regain their stolen lands. This expectation did become reality. The situation has fomented anger, resentment, lust for revenge, and aggressive competitiveness that has overlooked the common good of the entire country (Omulo, 2017: 136). Frustration among the subaltern groups, both in urban and rural areas, has created a growing tendency to use violence as a viable means to correct the situation. When strife reactions emerge, under the influence of ethno-political ideologies, tend to take the form of ethnocentrism, the ideology that animates the competition between ethnic groups (Omulo, 2017: 136).

“A section of the population was unhappy about the outcome of the elections of December 2007, but, to a certain extent, the occasion presented a chance to correct some of the historical wrongs committed against certain ethnic groups.”³⁷ The unequal development under colonialism was parallel and was marginalized by regional factors, race, and class. As a result

³⁷ Kipchumba Some, “How State Land Policy Shaped Conflict,” *Daily Nation*, Kenya (February 10, 2008) 9.

of their earlier and more intense infiltration of capitalism, the Central Province and parts of Nyanza developed much faster than the rest of Kenya (Stiftung, 2012: 9). With the declaration of the Emergency Situation and the development of the Kikuyu region declining, Luo capitalists and political leaders took over the leadership of the nationalist movement, which also immersed Luo in politics during independence (Stiftung, 2012: 9). However, due to disagreements between Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Kenyatta, who eventually left KANU and formed the Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU), the Luo were politically excluded and therefore could not control key state institutions. This explains their political discrimination, especially in the post-1970s (Stiftung, 2012: 9).

Ethno-political competition, which has been alive since independence, has finally degenerated into ethnopolitical competition, discrimination, and conflict.³⁸ Ethnic demarcation and regionalism, as promoted by ethnic leaders, revolve around the practice of ethnic discrimination. The phenomenon of ethnic discrimination comes into play when each region is identified with a certain ethnic group, and whenever political misunderstandings emerge those who are identified as foreigners are always forced to go to their ancestral land (Stiftung, 2012: 11-12).

The political crisis, under the of ethnic rivalry and violence, has in the past decade killed hundreds of people and destroyed property, including the burning of houses. Such crisis has erupted due to a lack of peaceful means to address grievances. The condition has been aggravated by the lack of the rule of law and constitutional reform since independence (Stiftung, 2012: 11-12).

4.9. Ethno-Regional Political Patronage and Horizontal Inequality

Ethno region patronage (matronage) remains a dangerous part of Kenyan politics. Decides to access political and economic services. The horizontal inequality that results is further exacerbated by electoral and administrative governance (Agbu, 2011: 13-14). Election districts sometimes consist of three to four administrative units led by a public servant. As many regions (electoral politics) and provinces (administrative) are mixed with a single ethnic group, policy decisions based on political considerations result in many horizontal inequalities (Agbu, 2011: 13-14). The central province received significant political and economic benefits under Kenyatta, and the Rift Valley became a major successor under Moi (Agbu, 2011: 13-14).

³⁸ Jeffrey Gettleman, "U. S. Envoy Calls Violence in Kenya 'Ethnic Cleansing,'" *The New York Times* (January 30, 2008) 1.

In all three post-independence states, this inequality has been reflected in the appointment of the Cabinet, the Office of Justice, the National Army, State-owned Companies, as well as the delivery of public services (Nyaura, 2018: 21-22). National poverty estimates show that the central and Rift Valley provinces make up 31 percent and 44 percent respectively as the richest provinces in the country (Nyaura, 2018: 21-22). Both regions have produced the President at least once (Nyaura, 2018: 21-22). Poverty indicators in Nyanza and Western provinces are 61 percent and 65 percent respectively (Nyaura, 2018: 21-22). These regions have never produced a President and are very poor (Stiftung, 2012: 11-12). Ruling officials use political power to direct resources to areas of interest (matronage). These group-based gains in the economic and political spheres provided benefits that make horizontal inequality an ongoing feature of Kenya's economic and political well-being. The result has been unequal access to education (Amutabi, 2003), health (Grab and Priebe, 2009; Nyanjom, 2006), water and sanitation, and the best quality of life in the provinces politically related (Alwy and Schech, 2004: np).

Ethno-political support is also a key factor in the horizontal inequality in land redistribution. The political origin of landlessness as a horizontal manifestation of the horizontal inequality "The Million Acre System". This land redistribution program soon after independence opened the Rift Valley, the traditional home of the Kalenjin, to foreign buyers from the central province who enjoyed great economic benefits during Kenyatta's time (Nyaura, 2018: 21-22). The land acquisition companies formed by the Central province elite during Kenyatta's time helped negotiate better prices for their members and as a result led to their unparalleled migration to the Rift Valley (Stiftung, 2012: 11-12).

More importantly, thanks to the political benefits from President Kenyatta's office, members of the Kikuyu tribe have more access to credit than any other nation. This difference in the allocation of state resources will continue from now on. For example, in 1966 approximately 64 percent of all industries and 44 percent of commercial loans provided by the government's Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation went to Kikuyu customers (Stiftung, 2012: 11-12). As a result, there has been the expansion of Kikuyu reserves to include Nakuru, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Eastern Nandi, Eastern Kericho, and Southern Uasin Gishu (Stiftung, 2012: 11-12).

The pressure on the land in the Great Rift Valley has increased the hatred of immigrants in the Central Province and other migrants from the region. This will be compounded by the imminent

loss of political power (Nyaura, 2018: 22). So in recent years, political disputes between officials have escalated into a full-blown civil war. It is no coincidence that these conflicts have always been the subject of national elections, as evidenced by the targeting of ethnic groups in the Rift Valley region after the 2007 elections (Nyaura, 2018: 21-22). Similarly, in both 1992 and 1997 ethnic conflicts occurred in the Rift Valley, Nairobi and Coast provinces (Stiftung, 2012: 11-12).

4.10. Subaltern Political struggles in Contemporary Kenya

Gramsci's concept of subalternity, according to Marcus Green, is competitive and shared (Green, 2011: 388). Gramsci's most famous analysis of subalternity is David Lazzaretti's millennial system and how capitalist journalists such as Bulferetti and criminal Lombroso deal with the group Gramsci sees as an example of "intellectual" attitudes towards subalternity (Green, 2011: 388).

In terms of strong politics, the Gramscian concept of subalternity applies to those groups in society that have no political power. By the time of Gramsci, these groups were easily identified, and much of the work on the concept of subalternity focused on groups such as farm workers and the working class. However, Gramsci also pointed out that inconsistencies existed on a much larger scale, including people from a variety of religions or cultures, or those present on the margins of society (Green, 2011: 388).

The term subaltern refers to “the people, who formed a statistical distinction between the total population and the elite, who operated in the private sector of the elite and characterized by proverbs, customs and values based on what happened. social work and exploitation” (Pouchepadass, 2000: 165). In Guha, people “are sub-classes and subgroups that include a large number of hard-working people and classes in urban and rural areas” (Guha, 1982: 4). Subaltern politics, according to Olarinmoye (2010), therefore, is an anti-revolutionary policy. Given the ubiquitous nature of hegemony, the subaltern agency can only take on, a critical opposition form. Since it is not allowed to speak freely within the structures of prominent hegemony, its expression will often be violent, and unusual. It can take the form of riots, strikes and demonstrations (Gramsci, 1971: 52-53).

When it comes to the representation of subalternity, Green argues, “Gramsci was concerned with how literary representations of the subaltern reinforced the subaltern’s subordinated position...In historical or literary documents, the subaltern may prove the contrary. Hence, the

integral historian has to analyse critically how intellectuals represent the conditions and aspirations of the subaltern” (Green, 2000:15). It is for this reason that the study of subaltern groups, in all their particularity, is of such importance for Gramsci. Thus, his interest in them is threefold: “he was interested in producing a methodology of subaltern historiography, a history of the subaltern classes, and a political strategy of transformation based upon the historical development and existence of the subaltern” (Green, 2000:3).

Borrowing heavily from the case of Mala and Aiyegboyin, religion performs six related functions, namely, to prevent or critique government behaviour, to promote political participation, to promote democratic values and values, to define and unite different public interests, to produce diverse public interests. ownership and provision of mechanisms for the development of leadership skills (Mala and Aiyegboyin, 1999: 33-41).

4.11. Subaltern and the Politics of Representation in Kenya

Lenin emphasized the socio-economic basis that determines social events. For Lenin, a revolutionary strategy cantered on the need for revolution and power. In analysing why and why the Russian Communist Revolution of 1917 failed to establish itself, Gramsci developed Leninism by emphasizing the traditional method, ensuring that the class struggle took place, and did so without losing significant economic transformation. (Strauss, 2012). Gramsci departed from a prominent idea, then commonplace production (Strauss, 2012). Gramsci moved away from the dominant idea, at the time. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony theorises that more than force or coercion is the foundation of social power, ruling groups in democratic societies work through seeking and establishing consent of among the population to their particular world-view, which is then given the impression of common-sense universality (Gramsci, 1971: 226). In the interpretation of Gramsci’s “Reworking ideology” by Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe, (1985), ideology does not identify with a “system of ideas” or with the “false consciousness” of social agents; it is instead an organic and relational whole, embodies in institutions and devices, which joins together a historical bloc³⁹ around some basic articulatory

³⁹ An historical bloc refers to an historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements Moreover, for a new historical bloc to emerge, its leaders must engage in conscious planned struggle. Any new historical bloc must have not only power within the civil society and economy, it also needs persuasive ideas, arguments and initiatives that build on, catalyse and develop its political networks and organization – not political parties such (Gill, 2002: 58).

principles (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:67). To be precise, power is exercised through the active and constant shaping of what is held to be “natural” or “the way things are” (Buttigieg, 2009).

Two crucial issues are raised here: firstly, the concept of hegemony undermines the notion that ruling ideas are imposed directly on the population. What is emphasized instead is a far more subtle process of maintaining a consensus through the shaping of the commonsense, everyday assumptions that contribute to the understanding of the social world (Buttigieg, 2009: 234). For Hall, Gramsci’s conceptualization of power brings him close to Foucault’s⁴⁰ “Gramsci’s notion was that particular social groups struggle in many different ways, including ideologically, to win the consent of other groups and achieve a kind of ascendancy in both thoughts and practice over them” (Hall, 1997: 48). This process in which consent and consensus are obtained is a continuing one. In other words, hegemony is never final, but an ongoing process, which allows for the emergence of alternative world-views, that is, struggles for hegemony, involving a constant process of negotiation regarding the legitimation and justification of particular ways of thinking about society (Green, 2002).

The second significant issue is that as Forgacs has argued, for Gramsci the site in which this ongoing process of establishing consensus takes place is culture: ‘ “Culture” in Gramsci is the sphere in which ideologies are diffused and organised, in which hegemony is constructed and can be broken and reconstructed’ (Forgacs, 1984:91). Institutions⁴¹ and practices such as education, religion, and the media play a vital role, establishing patterns of cultural leadership that are hegemonic. Implicated in this is the politics of representation (Buttigieg, 2009: 27-28).

One of the critical concepts that have retained prominence among scholars, particularly those interested in interrogating the historical and cultural aspects of colonialism, past and present, is the ‘subaltern’. Gramsci’s use of the term filled it with a special political significance as both a reference to a subordinate group within a society and an acknowledgment of its potential as an agent for socio-cultural transformation (Green, 2002). For him, a subaltern group is ‘deprived of historical initiative, in continuous but a disorganic expansion, unable to go beyond a certain qualitative level, which remains below the level of the possession of the State and the real exercise of hegemony over the whole society’ (Gramsci, 1971: 395-396). Subaltern groups are on the margins of society, denied their history in official historical narratives. Such groups,

⁴⁰ According to Foucault, Power is, “the ability of one entity to influence the action of another entity. Such relationships appear to exist across all scales” (Becermen, 2015: 28).

⁴¹Institutions such as, School, University, Church and Media

in other words, do not have a ‘voice’ in the constitutive history of a nation. Etymologically, ‘subaltern’ refers to a soldier who is below the rank of a captain and, therefore, occupies a lower rung in the hierarchy in the armed forces. In the study of social and cultural formations of colonialism, the term has been used to identify groups who are non-elite, refer to chapter three.

It is important to recognize, however, that the subaltern is a relational concept rather than a reference to an unchanging ontological condition—that is, its reference to the social hierarchy and subordination includes, for Gramsci and the scholars such as Gunder Frank, Emmanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin, Marcus Green, and others who have followed his conceptualization, the suggestion of resistance to and the potential overturning of established hegemonic relations, and is not an allusion to a fixed and unchallengeable social relation (Green, 2002: 1-3).

The realms of culture and politics come together in Gramsci’s arguments about what he saw as the failure of the modern Italian state, stemming from a weakness, installed by the bourgeois leadership’s unwillingness or inability to accommodate the ‘national-popular will’. The subaltern in this state was the peasant community, whose interests Gramsci argues, was not addressed in the form of agrarian reform and were consequently left out of the formation of the nation, thus providing a fertile ground for the growth of totalitarianism (Spivak, 2012: 35).

The critical element that provides the potential for transformation of subalternity is, for Gramsci, the self-awareness of the subaltern class, which is a necessary prelude in the move from serfdom to liberation, from the economic to the political. This is what he alludes to as ‘the passage from the “objective to the subjective”, and from “necessity to freedom”. Structure ceases to be an external force which crushes a human person, assimilates him (her) to itself and makes him (her) passive; and is transformed into a means of freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-political form and a source of new initiative ‘ (Gramsci, 1971: 367).

4.12. The Nature of Subaltern Transformative Resistance

Ranajit Guha identified six features of subaltern political action:

1. Negation, where the peasantry rejected the identity of subalternity that was imposed upon him (her) by other classes, caste, or official standing;

2. Ambiguity, whereby a peasant ambivalently engaged in criminal behaviour that serves an “inversive function,” a way of turning the tables on society, as a common form of insurgency;
3. Modality, where the peasant selectively chooses confrontation with his target, usually dominant superior;
4. Solidarity, or “corporate behaviour,” that finds strength in a unified approach against a common enemy;
5. Transmission, where the spread of peasant violence is, in a preliterate society, communicated through signs and symbolism; and finally;
6. Territoriality, where the peasantry seeks to defend their sense of territory—a construction of “the local”—a sense of belonging to a common lineage and habitat that give them a sense of advantage.

Six aspects of subaltern politics have also highlighted the activities of religious leaders and political parties in the second liberation struggle in Kenya (Kwatemba, 2008: 89). Among these are a political dialogue on the establishment of the Kenyan state, post-independence co-operatives formed to promote racial nationalism, and the subconscious mind of the post-independence elite (Kwatemba, 2008: 89). These historical features have been supported by the status quo of Kenyan political consumerism, as well as the result of the exclusion of powerless ethnic communities. Elections are therefore important vehicles for the control and transfer of state resources to popular areas. Election time disputes between the regions in 1992, 1997, and 2007 all have one thing in common: Determination to control the loss of power (Kwatemba, 2008: 89).

4.12.1. Negation

During the reign of President Moi (1978-2002), the Christian churches, especially the Protestant and Catholic churches, differed in their support of the opposition. On his rise to power in 1978, Moi gradually consolidated his rule under his famous Nyayo philosophy (Nyayo means "steps" in Swahili) and expressed Moi's determination to follow in the footsteps of the founding president of the Republic of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta. Over the years this philosophy, according to Gifford, changed into a demand for all Kenyans to adhere to this

philosophy. The mainstream churches were critical of this philosophy and, although attempted to unite the clergy, the mainstream churches opposed it. Terms such as “thugs and criminals” are used by those loyal to government and political officials to identify religious leaders and opposition leaders (Gifford, 2009: 35-36). Such words have resulted in criminalizing the Kenyan army and legitimizing their oppression (Ajulu, 2008: 38-39).

4.12.2. Ambiguity

About 1985, Moi placed power under one party, a party that had become more powerful than parliament and cabinet. His empire grew through democracy, characterized by greed, corruption, racism, bigotry, patriotism, human rights abuses, and injustice (Gifford, 2009: 34).

Civil society groups and various political parties seeking the democratic movement have called on Christian churches to lead the constitutional process because the Christian churches and individual clergy have always been the only reliable and orderly network to resist the growing dictatorship (Ndegwa, 2001: 75).

4.12.3. Modality

At best these churches have developed a critical theology of protest and participation in which they investigate state extremism (Gifford, 2009: 35). Therefore, religious organizations have greatly improved the constitutional review process as they played a key role in transforming multi-party democracy in Kenya. These churches undoubtedly articulate social and political discourse by bringing pressure on the Moi regime (Elephant, 2014: 23).

However, some of these clergies paid dearly for their criticism of the Moi regime, others at great personal cost (Gifford, 2009: 35-36). The outspoken Anglican bishop Alexander Muge was mysteriously killed in a car accident in 1990 in defiance of a warning from the Moi government that his life would be in danger if he visited a parish (Gifford, 2009: 35-36). In 1997, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the 1990 Saba Saba Massacre in which more than two dozen people died during a multi-party election, Rev. Timothy Njoya, then pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Saint Andrew, was peacefully trying to lead peace activists from All Saints. Cathedral church after the military police fired tear gas at the shrine (Gifford, 2009: 35-36). He was severely beaten until he fainted. This followed years of harassment and humiliation by the Moi government over Njoya's relentless demands for democracy in Kenya and his focus on human rights abuses. As if that were not enough, Rev. Njoya was dissolved by the Presbyterian churches (Gifford, 2009: 35-36). Yet he is still an activist and is not afraid to point out any forms of injustice in Kenyan society (Gifford, 2009: 36-37).

The Anglican bishop Henry Okullu, another major critic of Moi's government, also faced frustration and personal frustration with his criticism of the regime. The development of his political doctrine is well documented and enlightened us on the reason for opposing the political empire (Choge, 2008: 106-107).

4.12.4. Solidarity

It is clear that the actions of these churches and their pastors not only shaped the country's democracy but also helped to raise political and social awareness in Kenya. Their criticism of the secular authorities sometimes led to a strong reaction from several government agencies, some of whom viewed the clergy's actions as a failure to leave the country. Surprisingly, church and state relations at this time in history have been strained (Parsitau, 2012: 6)

On the other hand, even as individual bishops from major churches and the National Council of the Church of Kenya (NCCCK) and later the Catholic Episcopal Conference took over the Moi dictatorship, Moi closely associated itself with the Evangelical and Pentecostal churches. These evangelical and Pentecostal groups not only supported Moi's independent state but also continued to portray Moi as a God-fearing leader, guided by the principles of peace, love, and unity (Gifford, 2009: 37-38).

4.12.5. Transmission

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that mainline churches played critical roles in Kenya's public life particularly during president's Moi's rule, while Evangelical and Pentecostal Churches played less prominent roles but undoubtedly did not hesitate to come to Moi's side when he was facing increased pressure from mainline churches. Mainline churches, besides keeping Moi's government in check, also played significant civic and public roles particularly in civic education, monitoring and observing elections, and in some cases even documenting the outright electoral malpractices and abuses of human rights, pushing for constitutional reforms particularly in the early 1990s (Choge, 2008: 106).

4.12.6. Territoriality

In the 2002 national election, Moi considered but eventually decided not to challenge the third-term constitutional ban. Former vice president and later rival, Mwai Kibaki, was elected Kenya's third president. As a devout Catholic, Kibaki maintained close ties with church officials while opposing Moi's government. According to Gifford (2009: 40), the churches were less prominent, but no doubt on Kibaki's side during the 2002 general election. Even throughout

his reign, the major churches were on his side, and the Catholic Church truly viewed him as a prominent member of the church (Gifford, 2009: 40).

However, developments since Kibaki took over in 2002, show that the mainstream churches have shown a "disturbing trend" in terms of their prophetic word, public relations and community (Parsitau, 2012: 5-6). The Observance noted not only the initial silence but also the scepticism of these churches in criticizing Kibaki's government as the new NARC coalition collapsed under the weight of a pre-election memorandum of understanding, of allegations of racism and many other such injustices. (Parsitau, 2012: 5-6).

This disturbing practice of the clergy of the cathedral has a variety of meanings. Gifford (2009) points out that the new harvest of church pastors who took over the leadership of the larger churches after the 1980s and 1990s changes, which coincided with the election of President Kibaki in 2002, was mild (Gifford, 2009: 37-38). According to Parsitau (2012), in the mainstream churches, the election of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) ruling party, along with President Kibaki introduced a new issue and challenged them. As Oloo (2006) points out, the main churches have collaborated with the Kibaki administration (Parsitau, 2012: 5-6).

4.13. Can the “Subaltern groups Speak” in Kenya?

The concept of the subaltern was moved to a more complex theoretical debate by the Indian-American post-colonial feminist critics, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, through her essay, “*Can the Subaltern Speak? (1988)*” Here Spivak reconsidered the problems of subalternity with new historical development as introduced by capitalist politics to undermine the transformation of the voice and the fragmentation of the international workforce (Spivak, 1991: 66-67). He did not acknowledge Gramsci's first claim of independence for the lower divisions. Forgiveness of his disagreement with the Gramscian view was based on his view that this independence results in the inhomogeneity of the subaltern group and the subaltern subjective identity (Spivak, 1991: 68). Spivak, (2012) by revising a text originally drafted before her encounter with the Subaltern Studies project, Spivak argued that the subaltern was not only deprived of the capacity to speak by the dominant order but that the subaltern was defined by its exclusion from representation as such, in both political and aesthetic senses (Spivak, 2012:207). As an unrepresentable remainder or “limit” of forms of cultural, social, and political domination, “removed from all lines of social mobility,” (Spivak, 2012:207) the subaltern consequently appeared to be a category suited to analyse and to problematize the experiences of

marginalized, oppressed individuals and groups, particularly in colonial and postcolonial contexts specifically in Kenya (Spivak, 2012:207).

4.13.1. Deconstructive Criticism After Spivak

Steinborn, observes that under these above-mentioned considerations Spivak's attempt to rehabilitate deconstructive strategies for use in post-colonial analysis becomes visible. She emphasizes the importance of revealing assumptions, strategies, and rhetoric through which a given narrative is, politically, literarily, historically, and theoretically, grounded (Steinborn, 2018: 24). Power relations can be revealed by putting the reader at the center of the production of meaning (Steinborn, 2018: 24). Steinborn postulates that to read deconstructively is, according to Spivak, to read archives, historiography, and other works regarding what they cannot say (Steinborn, 2018: 24). Thus, one can trace back a collective ideological refusal that can be diagnosed for the codifying legal practices of imperialism (Steinborn, 2018: 24). Steinborn observes that Spivak borrows this formula for the interpretation of ideology from the French philosopher Pierre Macherey, who states: "What is important in the work is what it does not say" (Macherey, 1978)—as cited in (Steinborn, 2018: 24). Macherey, further, elaborates a method called "measuring silences" upon which Spivak bases her outline for the postcolonial intellectual to contribute to the production of the subaltern in a complicitous way. Between "standing in for" and "embody" the subaltern, the task of the intellectual, aiming to reintroduce the subaltern into the hegemonic discourse, is to assume a place of "inaccessible blankness" (Macherey, 1978)—as quoted in Steinborn (2018: 24). Any search for lost origins is accompanied by the risk to efface the 'inaccessible blankness' the subaltern space constitutes (Steinborn, 2018: 24). Conserving this space as inaccessible serves as a reminder of the limits of Western knowledge and reveals that there is nothing that can be developed independently from the colonial territorial and formal violence (Steinborn, 2018: 24). Finding the subaltern is not so hard, but entering into a responsibility structure with her, with responses flowing both ways, is (Steinborn, 2018: 24). Learning to learn to speak with the subaltern, instead of about or through him/ her, is to unlearn assumptions of cultural supremacy, and to speak in a way that he/she can answer back (Steinborn, 2018: 24). To bring the subaltern into the hegemonic discourse, not through cultural benevolence, but extra-academic work is to work for the subaltern (Steinborn, 2018: 24). This is the task of the intellectual aiming to reintroduce the subaltern into the hegemonic discourse especially in the Kenyan socio-political situation (Ajulu, 2008: 35-36).

As depicted above the subaltern cannot speak because he/she is either ‘stood in for’ or assumed to be able to embody herself in the dominant discourse (Steinborn, 2018: 25). Between keeping the status quo intact, by leaving the Other’s radical alterity untouched and attempting to open up to that Other, without assimilating it to one’s position, the task of the postcolonial intellectual is not an easy one (Steinborn, 2018: 24). Spivak continuously acknowledges the ambiguities of her position as a privileged Western-based critic. She points out that her decipherment of subaltern utterance, “must not be too quickly identified with the “speaking” of the subaltern”, as it is a ‘speaking for’ in the above-presented form (Steinborn, 2018: 25). However, as she argues, her complicity in the muting has to be acknowledged as an attempt to make subaltern utterance more effective in the long run (Steinborn, 2018: 25). To talk about the subaltern is to talk about representation and power. The hegemonic intellectual thinks of itself as transparent while he represents and hence constructs the subaltern subject. Any intellectual, that seeks to engage itself in critical praxis, must resist politics of representation and criticize any recognition of the Third World through mere assimilation towards the West (Steinborn, 2018: 25). Based on the above-portrayed notion, Steinborn (2018) tries to outline the following question of the subaltern within the issue of political representation (Steinborn, 2018: 25).

4.13.2. Perceiving Subaltern Voices in Kenyan Religio-Politics

Ajulu posits that the antagonistic fight between the civil-national elite and colonial hegemony did not leave any room for subaltern expression in its complex social constitution (Ajulu, 2008: 39). The story of the rise of national resistance to imperialism can only be told coherently as long as the indigenous subaltern is strategically excluded (Ajulu, 2008: 40). Spivak argues that between the civil-national elite and the state’s administration the subaltern is not able to voice his/her interests. He/she neither takes part nor does he/she find an interlocutor in the political discourse (Steinborn, 2018: 25).

4.13.3. Relevance of Spivak’s Reinterpretation of Subalternity in Kenya

The relevance of Spivak’s reinterpretation of subalternity to the religion-political situation in Kenya; is based on her argument that, “a core problem for the poorest and most marginalized in society (the subalterns) is that they have no platform to express their concerns and no voice to affect policy debates or demand a fairer share of society’s goods” (Steinborn, 2018: 24-25).. Applying this concept to Kenyan political situation, it means that Kenyan subaltern groups especially the Luo and Luhya are longing for “place” in the Kenya civil society and state.

Spivak's substantive contributions on this topic are helpful to further comprehend her understanding of the subaltern. She states: "In the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak" (Steinborn, 2018: 25). Similarly, I argue that Luo has been treated as ethnic without history or place in Kenya by all the regimes as if they don't have a history in Kenya and also through the politicised census and HIV/AIDS as means by which the government is trying to deny them an active voice in politics (Omulo, 2017: 56-57). This is because independent of the state subaltern groups in Kenya have been marginalized. A key theme of Gayatri Spivak's work is agency: the ability of the individual to make their own decisions. While Spivak's main aim is to consider ways in which "subalterns" – her term for the indigenous dispossessed in colonial societies – were able to achieve agency (Steinborn, 2018: 25).

Kenya was a protectorate of the British Empire from 1859 to 1963, when the country gained independence. While the country adopted a democratic system of government, the first administration under President Jomo Kenyatta engaged in preferential ethnic politics, disadvantaging several ethnic groups to the benefit of Kenyatta's Kikuyu ethnic group (Kwatemba, 2008: 98-99).

Katemba states that the settlement of British colonies in other parts of Kenya had two distinct effects. First, it has led to unequal infrastructure development in former immigrant areas. These areas often had better access to education, roads, water, and sanitation, as well as trade power (Kwatemba, 2008: 99). Secondly, colonial settlement in these areas led to the emergence of a class society based on access to land. In the process, three main classes emerged: The European settler farmers, the middle-class African farmers, and the landless Africans (Kwatemba, 2008: 99). These two outcomes continue to shape not only horizontal inequalities in land ownership but also other socioeconomic and political inequalities in the country. In this sense, much of the imbalances in the years immediately after independence and subsequent years are attributable to inherited conditions (Kwatemba, 2008: 99).

In addition, both colonial settlement and government policy on land have kept the original horizontal inequality sometimes with dire consequences. In addition, these actions created inequality in land ownership — making landlessness a political issue that can be used to mobilize voters to commit acts of violence (Kwatemba, 2008: 99). Not surprisingly, the Rift Valley has been a hotbed of violent conflict during elections. The need for fertile and cozy conditions for livestock and dairy farming has resulted in the dispossession of immigrant

farmers in Central Kenya and the Rift Valley provinces. In 1902 the colonial government set aside 3.1 million hectares to do this (Kariuki, 2004: 15). As a result of its ban on land redistribution, a class of landless and prosperous African farmers emerged from Indigenous Areas and European farmers in the White Highlands (Kariuki, 2004: 15). Post-independence African rulers not only replaced the immigrant farming sector but also maintained the inequalities in land redistribution and ownership (Kwatemba, 2008: 99).

Remedial measures such as the million Acres Schemel were initiated by the government to address landlessness make the situation worse. Through this program, the government housed thousands of families, most of them from the central province, the Rift Valley. Subsequent population growth and infrastructure development during Moi's presidency created global pressure (Kariuki, 2004: 15). More importantly, because of their newly acquired political power after the unification of the Moi dynasty, the indigenous communities of the Rift Valley were highly educated, long-lived, and extremely resilient in land rights. The settlements of British immigrants were much more developed than the rest of the country (Kariuki, 2004: 15).

As a result, by the time we gained independence, the Central Province was able to access education, health services and transport infrastructure. Thus, it followed that the Central Province produced a majority of national administrations during the independence period (Kwatemba, 2008: 99). The horizontal inequality that followed was based on these initial benefits not only in access to services but also in representation in the public and private sectors. These regional inequalities became critical in shaping the inequalities that followed, and they were not addressed by post-independence governments (Kwatemba, 2008: 99). Not only did they train to access education, but they also decided to access credit facilities, and ultimately the difference in individual income in the relevant administrative districts. Kwatemba (2008) insists that this inequality persists to this day, and is the basis of the inequalities that have followed in both the political and social spheres. More importantly, they have created a legacy of ethno-regional competition and protests that continue to have a political impact on Kenya (Kwatemba, 2008: 99).

This practice of racial segregation from the executive council has continued in the history of the country. Kenya's second president, Daniel Arap Moi, has changed many of Kenya's policies and favoured his nation, the Kalenjins over the Kikuyu (Ajulu, 2008: 41-42). During Moi's presidency, the state gained power and all opposition political parties were officially banned (Opondo, 2014: 64). In 1991, international pressure forced Moi to re-introduce multi-party

elections (Gifford, 2009: 35-37). Despite the introduction of opposition parties, Moi won the 1991 election. The election results were accompanied by international violence that claimed the lives of more than 1,000 people and left 250,000 people dead. 40-41). His re-election in 2007 was followed by another wave of national violence. More than 1,500 people were killed, and 700,000 were deported (Opondo, 2014: 64).

Gumo, et al. note that in Kenya, the church has played a significant role in world politics (Gumo et al., 2012: 33-34). In 1988, the Episcopal Conference of Kenya established the “Commission for Justice and Peace” which provided inspiration and support to promote peace and justice (Gumo et al., 2012: 33-34). Through this Commission, they spoke for the people during the elections. Assist them with the "National Ecumenical Civic Education Program" to monitor elections. To this day the program has played a key role in the process of the Constitutional Review. Some religious leaders speak up when human rights and freedoms are threatened. Notable among the religious leaders who speak are retired Archbishop Raphael Ndingi of the Catholic Church, retired Anglican Bishop David Gitari, and Sheik Balala, of Mombasa, a devout Muslim who remained silent for some reasons. community. Some religious leaders have political outbursts from time to time whenever there is a crisis even though it is not out of order (Gumo et al., 2012: 33-34).

Kwatemba posits that Moi used the ruling party, Kanu, to put his finger on the political rhythm and repress opposition or subaltern voices (Kwatemba, 2008: 96). Accordingly, the period between 1985 and 1990s was characterised by attempts to construct a state in which politicians settled scores by using the party to harass and intimidate their opponents and, in extreme cases, have their rivals expelled from Kanu, thus destroying their political careers (Kwatemba, 2008: 96).

The political elites, mostly from the Luo, Luhya, and Gikuyu communities, mounted and sustained opposition to Moi’s authoritarianism (Kwatemba, 2008: 96). However, they opposed Moi’s selfishness for different reasons (Kwatemba, 2008: 96). The Kikuyu elite was driven by nostalgia for the privileges they had enjoyed under Kenyatta, while the Luo and sections of the Luhya felt excluded under Moi, just as they had been under Kenyatta (Kwatemba, 2008: 96). These differences were nonetheless subsumed in a global quest for multiparty democracy (Kwatemba, 2008: 96). Their clamour for political change was so disparate that when Kibaki succeeded Moi some of Moi’s most ardent critics, most of whom had built their political careers

on attacking him, embraced the very structures Moi had exploited to abuse power (Kwatemba, 2008: 96).

Escobar postulates that the question of “place” has been newly raised in recent years from a variety of perspectives — from its relation to the basic understanding of being and knowing to its fate under globalization and the extent to which it continues to be an aid or a hindrance for thinking about culture and the economy (Escobar, 2001:139). This questioning, of course, is not coincidental; for some, “placelessness” has become the essential feature of the modern condition, and a very acute and painful one in many cases, such as those of exiles and refugees. Whether celebrated or decried, the sense of utopia seems to have settled in (Escobar, 2001:139).

Faced with the difficulty of specifying the realm of subalternity, she shifted her thoughts on reconsidering the problems of gender and particularly Indian women during colonial times. She reflected on the status of Indian women relying on her analysis of a case of Sati women practices under British rule. Sati women as a subaltern group, Spivak arguments were lost between two polarities: The British humanist discourse calling for individual freedom of Sati women and Hindu native policy calling for voluntary participation in the ritual (Escobar, 2001:139).

The conflict between these two positions produced two different discourses with no possible solution; one postulates that “white men [are] saving brown women from brown men,” the other maintains that, “the woman wanted to die (Spivak, 1991). At this point, it became clear that Hindu woman loses their voice in such a contradictory position between two antagonistic poles that constantly teases her to make a conscious decision (Louai, 2012: 83).

Based on this fact, I have chosen to apply the same concept to Kenyan politics in analysing the relationship between religion and politics in Kenya, especially after the 2002 elections. With the former opposition party in power, the mainstream churches had to resolve the issue of how to be the conscience of the nation without damaging good relations with the Kibaki government. This is because, for the great church leaders, the victory of the NARC was also their victory (Gifford, 2009: 59-61). According to Gifford, he equally condemns the insecurities of the clergy in the fight against racism, bigotry, and patriotism (Gifford, 2009: 59-61). He cited the example of Catholic bishops led by Cardinal John Njue who seemed to favour President Kibaki's rule (Gifford, 2009: 59-61). He also cites other examples where a group of Catholic bishops in the Central Province was considered a party sympathetic to Kibaki and Gikuyu Embu and Meru political ambitions (GEMA), especially in his early days (2003-2007)

(Gifford, 2009: 59 - 61). The reasons given for this serious silence by the Catholic clergy and according to Gifford that Kibaki is Catholic and from the Central Province and that, Anglo Leasing however, the Kibaki regime had a much better record than Moi's (Gifford, 2009: 59) - 61).

Consequently, the high moral conscience that the clergy of the church had in the community was not in the process of examining the extremes of the provinces especially during the presidency of President Kibaki (2002-2007). I conclude, therefore, that in comparison to the Moi empire, church-state relations during Kibaki's time changed dramatically. Therefore, the question is "Can lower groups speak?" Kenya (Gifford, 2009: 59-61).

4.13.4. Subaltern has no Voice: the Indifferent Role of Religion in Politics during Kenyatta Era

Spivak is also a scholar, and she is always aware of the difficulties and dangers of thinking she has "spoken" about the subalterns he writes about. Therefore, his work can be seen primarily as a critical work in the deep-thinking capacity of translation; he looks more closely at the meaning of the explanation, especially the true meaning of the available evidence, and his paper is an attempt not only to highlight the problems of the meaning but to clarify them. Interpreting, in this case, is a matter of difference between allowing the subalterns to speak for themselves, and setting a way to "speak" to them - no matter how well-intentioned - can be detrimental to the postcolonial world as an agency - to undermine the political structures of the colonial world itself. By removing, at the root of scholarly translation efforts, Spivak is taking a stand against some form of oppression and discrimination.

Though the relationship between religion and politics in Kenya generally varies in three earlier post-colonial political phases, the religious sector has had a privileged and cordial relationship with the state, lending credence to Kenya's reputation as a nation that respects the religious beliefs of its citizens (Gifford, 2009).

During the reign of the first president, Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), religion played a more indifferent role in politics. Kenyatta was focused on initiating development projects to aid the emerging nation, and as a result, the country prospered due to increased agricultural production, a flourishing tourist industry, emphasized macroeconomic policies, extensive investments in infrastructure, and education (Bakari, 2013; Peter and Kopsieker, 2006).

During Kenyatta's term, the influence of religion on politics was reduced to insignificance. In his interaction with the public. Kenyatta was cautious not to show an open predisposition

toward a particular religion (Choge, 2008). This interaction is aptly described by Mohamed Bakari:

Kenyatta never adopted sectarian position as the Head of State. He cared very little for religion or display of religious symbolism and went out of his way to treat all citizens with equality, in keeping with his earlier promise, when he came to power, to maintain political harmony by practicing the politics of inclusion.⁴²

During Kenyatta's state, the church was pro-establishment and did not have an active political voice—it could not speak against the injustices of the Kenyatta regime (Choge, 2008: 107). The Luo community's ties with the Kenyatta government were further eroded following the assassination of the charismatic Luo leader who had been pro-Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, and the banning of the KPU in 1969. Choge posits that it is one who was a non-Kikuyu to see through the injustices of the system. Bishop Okullu wrote against the killing of Mboya and also denounced the tribal oaths because they destroy the spirit of national integration (Choge, 2008: 107).

Though Kenyatta appeared not concerned himself with religion, this does not exclude the possibility that he understood the power of religion and its vigour in Kenyan Politics. This is exemplified by a statement Kenyatta made in 1964 where he praised the various religious bodies for their role in developing the country and requested that they continue acting as a unify the Kenyan population and by extension reinforce the legitimacy of the regime continued throughout the Kenyatta period (Ndzovu, 2012). Religious leaders were several times invited to major events and national celebrations days (Bakari, 2013:12). More so, various religious groups responded to Kenyatta's call to assist in development and nation-building. His appeal was consistent with the development projects of some of these religious bodies. The religious sector continued providing education, health, and other services as it had done under the colonial administration (Gifford, 2009). Kenyatta managed to create a relatively strong linkage between the rural masses and the state. The tools used for building and maintaining the link between the party elite and the ordinary citizen were (a) regular elections and (b) the proliferation of self-help organization—Harambee⁴³ (Hornsby, Charles and David Throup, 1992).

At the same time, Kenyatta realized that it was not prudent to allow religious bodies to provide services in all spheres of development. He was aware that if their influence was not checked,

⁴² Bakari, M., (2013) "A Place at the Table: The Political Integration of Muslims in Kenya, 1963-2007. Vol. 4 No 1. Pp15-48.

⁴³ Harambee is a Swahili word meaning "to pull together" it meant that citizens at the local level could arranged small projects to help their community. It was adapted by the First post-colonial government as the Kenyan Motto.

it could impede his efforts to consolidate power. Consequently, he began to limit their influence by declaring in his party's (KANU's) manifesto:

In the great task of educating our people, the continued participation of the missions and the voluntary agencies, who have served us so well in the past, will be welcomed...[But] the government...is bound to provide education and cannot delegate this responsibility to any other bodies.⁴⁴

It is clear that the field of education is a very sensitive one and Kenyatta wanted to limit the involvement of religious groups in this field (Choge, 2008: 105-106). He believed that the government had to assume a larger role in providing education for all Kenyans. To continue its development with minimum government control, the religious sector avoided conflict with the ruling authority (Choge, 2008: 105-106). As a result, the religious sector in Kenyatta's era was more of a partner in the social development of the new nation than a critical political voice (Choge, 2008: 105-106). This close cooperation prevented religion from speaking out against some socio-political issues such as corruption, nepotism, tribalism, and landlessness of the poor (Githiga, 2001: 24). The first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu—at the same time, the Assistant Bishop of the Anglican, Obadiah Kariuki, was a brother-in-law of Kenyatta. Kikuyu dominated the leadership in the Presbyterian Church (Githiga, 2001: 56). This could explain why the church was pro-establishment and could not speak against the injustices of the Kenyatta regime until things came to a head (Choge, 2008: 107).

In 1969, Tom Mboya⁴⁵ was assassinated at the hands of Kikuyu and many Kenyans saw this as a political assassination. This caused much unrest in the country. To consolidate the power of the government in the hands of the Kikuyu, tribal oaths to pledge loyalty to Kenyatta and his regime were administered to large numbers of Kikuyu people. This involved drinking raw goat blood and undergoing other secret tribal rituals. Christians who refused to participate in these activities were threatened with death (Githiga, 2001: 56-57).

It took one who was a non-Kikuyu to see through the evils of the system. Bishop Okullu wrote against the killing of Mboya and also denounced tribal oaths because they destroyed the unity of a nation. (Choge, 2008: 106-107). Another group that spoke against these oaths was the East

⁴⁴ KANU's Manifesto of 1965.

⁴⁵ Tom Mboya was a young upcoming popular politician from the Luo ethnic group. His leadership style and popularity became a threat to the ruling power at that time. He was shot down in the streets of Nairobi.

African Revival Movement,⁴⁶ a fellowship that transcended tribal boundaries. They argued that taking the blood of goats was tantamount to an occult (Githiga, 2001: 54).

The Kikuyu leadership responded to the hostilities by inaugurating mass oathing programmes among the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and also part of neighbouring Kamba (Oluoch, 2003: 20). The oath takers were forced to swear, “to keep the presidency in the House of Mumbi” the founder of the Kikuyu tribe (Oluoch, 2003: 20). It was Kikuyu tribalism pitched against Luo tribalism (Oluoch, 2003: 20). During the Emergency, Christian Kikuyus who refused to take the oath were savagely beaten (Choge, 2008: 107-108). Okullu (2003) wrote a hard-hitting front-page article protesting this in the Target September 1969 Newspaper entitled “Oathing is Killing our Unity” with pictures of the burial ceremony of a Kikuyu Presbyterian official who had declined to take the oath 2003: 19-20). This editorial took the lead in the fight against oathing 2003: 19-20). This was one of the first incidents, which brought Okullu into the public eye 2003: 19-20). The oathing went on for two months until it was called off in September shortly before parliament was due to assemble (Oluoch, 2003: 19-20).

Okullu was very brave in his denunciation of state power because during his time, African countries had recently become independent and Africans tended to believe that political power was the panacea for all evils (Oluoch, 2003: 20).

4.13.5. Subaltern has no voice: Christian Religion and Loyalty to the Political Leaders in Moi's Era

Kilonzo estimates that in Kenya, the history of the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta and Arap Moi provides ample evidence of the worst injustices, especially the assassinations of high and low political leaders who dared to expose the evils of government. Other injustices included harsh laws and restrictions on media freedom and academic freedom, electoral fraud, and corruption. This injustice occurred as religious groups and their leaders watched in silence, especially during the Kenyatta administration (Kilonzo, 2009: 101).

Kilonzo argues that with the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992, a few courageous church leaders became increasingly critical of the political establishment. These religious leaders include Bishop Henry Okullu, Alexander Muge and David Gitari of the Anglican Church of Kenya, Ndingi Mwana 'a Nzeki of the Catholic Church, Rev. Timothy Njoya of the

⁴⁶ The East African Revival Movement, was movement of renewal in the church in East Africa during the late 1920s and 1930s. It began on hill called Gabini in then Belgian Ruanda-Urundi in 1929. The Rival reshaped the Anglican church already present in East Africa and contributed to its growth from the 1940s into 1970s (Cantrell, 2014: 422).

Presbyterian Church of Kenya, and Rev. Mutava Musyimi of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), among others (Kilonzo, 2009: 101).

Owuoche posits that among the least influential factors that explain the absence of religious leaders in political activism in Kenya include: official recognition by the state as an important factor in the democratization process; reinterpretation of institutionalization of democracy; contradicting religious orders; fragmented religious organizations, and the re-emergence of the state as the main actor in the democratization process (Owuoche, 2015: 7). Owuoche (2015) reasons that there is some probability that at last, the religious organizations have received official recognition, thus a change in their political behaviour. The state has come to or been forced to realise that the religious organisation is an integral part of the democratization process and that they are closely connected with national life (Owuoche, 2015: 7).

It can also be argued that the religious are mainly adapting to the changing political fashions and ideologies, which have gone a long way in influencing the way religious organizations interpret institutionalization of democracy (Owuoche, 2015: 7). Their long involvement in institutionalising democracy may have made them realize that the confrontational approach (religious Organizations-State antagonism) is a flawed approach that is no longer fashionable. Antagonisms between the two, at best, lead to the target beneficiaries (the people) losing out in the democratic process. Further, Owuoche argues that religious organizations have sometimes been their own worst enemy when it comes to judging their effectiveness in the institutionalisation of democracy in Kenya (Owuoche, 2015: 7). Nothing better illustrates this point than the mixed signals they keep sending to both their followers and Kenyans in general (Owuoche, 2015: 7). There are times when they come out strongly to defend their position as legitimate contributors to the institutionalization of democracy in Kenya and yet at other times, they contradict this very same position. Many a time the religious leaders, priests, bishops, etc have been quoted in the print media as calling on their colleagues "...not take part in active politics", which includes not accepting positions in state corporations, not being members of the Constituency Development Funds (CDF) and not vie for parliamentary seats (Owuoche, 2015: 7). To better illustrate this point, the Kenya Episcopal Conference (a religious organization) issued a Pastoral letter in September of 2006 which was categorical in stating that:

“As the Vatican Council reminds us, the specific mission of the priests in the Church is not political (our emphasis) economic or social but religious. Nevertheless, priests can and must contribute to setting up a just social order, ...”⁴⁷

Interfaith institutions and religious councils are well established and widely respected throughout Kenya (Haider, 2016: 2-3). The National Council of Churches in Kenya regularly publishes its positions on important political issues, such as elections and institutional elections (Haider, 2016: 2-3). At the local level, there seems to be a very high level of willingness to engage in local religious discussions. Many religious institutions in Kenya are based on the grassroots and have the power to reach people and to communicate messages of peace (Haider, 2016: 2-3). During the recent period of post-election violence, 2007-2008, religious leaders and various religious organizations were divided into ethnic groups and failed to speak out against racial violence (Haider, 2016: 3). Religious actors, however, have since participated in peace-building efforts, and in preventing electoral violence in the 2013 and 2017 elections (Cheeseman et al., 2020: 18).

Given that religion and religious identity can be used to promote diversity, religious leaders and other religious actors can also play an important role in creation (Cheeseman et al., 2020: 18). Even in religiously divided households, religious leaders may play a vital role in promoting peace. Cheeseman et al. (2020: 28) argue that development actors should approach religious leaders to help involve local communities in political participation and to spread messages of national unity in communities (Cheeseman et al., 2020: 32).

Kenyatta had presided over a highly ethnicized regime whose consequences included a high level of ethnic superiority, social division, corruption, and several unresolved assassinations of presumed opponents. Before this, he had received overwhelming support to the extent of defeating the “Change the Constitution Movement – CCM” attempt to derail his succession ambitions. But as we shall soon demonstrate, these events were lost to him in the fog of history as he began preparing his exit. When the old man passed away in his sleep in Mombasa, the majority of Kenyans were fatigued by the 15 years of the near imperial (Peter and Kopsieker, 2006: 15).

When Moi came to power after the death of Kenyatta, the religious sector was already an integral part of social life in Kenya. Moi who was Kenyatta’s Vice-President took over power peacefully and promised to follow in Nyayo (footsteps) of Kenyatta, the loyalties and support

⁴⁷ Daily Nation, September 23, 2006:4.

of the church were transferred to without question.⁴⁸ The church was also endeared to President Moi because he openly professed his Christian faith and he was seen in church every Sunday. He also formulated his ruling motto of Nyayo with three Christian principles: love, peace, and unity (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002: 126). At this time the church did not see anything to denounce about the system. This humble, Bible-professing Christian blinded them, so they sang praises to Moi. There was such a close connection between the church and state to the point that the church was almost a religious department of the state (Choge, 2008: 98-99). This portrayal is clarified in the words of Bakari:

Moi cast himself as a Christian president and used public media to cultivate the classic Machiavellian image of a pious politician, and did this by a public display of religiosity through the use of government media to broadcast his Church attendances.⁴⁹

When Kenya has declared a *de jure* one-party state without much debate in parliament—it took forty-five minutes. The church leaders began to see the evils of the system. Then Moi began to consolidate power around himself and if you disagreed with him you were out of the party, detained without trial, or even killed (Gifford, 2009: 35).

This caused division in the church between those who were personally loyal to President Moi and those who spoke out against the system. It was only after the introduction of the multiparty rule in 1992 that people spoke openly against the President. But even so in a hushed manner (Choge, 2008: 98-99). The reason for this excessive leadership cult in most African countries—stems from the traditional system in which leaders were both religious and political; they were almost given divine authority so that no one dared question for fear of being cursed (Parsitau, 2012: 4-5). When Kenyans compared their leaders to those of neighbouring countries like Uganda that was plunged into utter chaos under the military dictatorship of Idi Amin, Moi's ills appeared harmless (Choge, 2008: 98-99).

During Kenyatta's time, the church leaders who were close to him were rewarded with wealth especially in the form of land that had belonged to settlers (Choge, 2008: 99).

During the rule of Moi, those churches that supported him received parcels of land to build church structures, schools, and hospitals. They were rewarded with positions as chaplains in the armed forces. The President contributed a lot of money in the form of Harambee

⁴⁸ Bishop Githiga terms the early part of Moi's rule (1978-1985) as the honeymoon period between the church and state, when they worked together very closely.

⁴⁹ Bakari, M., (2013) "A Place at the Table: The Political Integration of Muslims in Kenya, 1963-2007. Vol. 4 No 1. Pp15-48.

contributions so that the church could build many church structures. As a result, most church leaders did not speak against him (Gifford, 2009: 35-36). However, attempts to establish courtship with religion did not prevent the Anglican Church, Catholic Church, Presbyterian Church of East Africa, and some Muslim groups from criticizing the bad governance of the president (Ndzovu, 2014). Those who spoke against the government were considered as serving foreign masters or not submitting to the ruling authorities. Accordingly, they were denied gifts and handouts from the government. The church that supported Moi was predominantly from his ethnic group, the Kalenjin. In consequence, in Moi's time, ethnic hegemonic was reinforced by religious loyalties (Choge, 2008: 106).

With the establishment of a one-party regime from the mid-1960s, Kenya's politics stumble into crisis with an increasing degree of repression. The height of the crisis was reached in the late 1980s when President Moi abolished secret ballot voting and replaced it with a queuing system of election. Even after the establishment of a one-party state, Moi continued to be suspicious of his opponents and sought a mechanism that would allow him to detect party loyalists and dissidents. He hoped that could be achieved by adopting the queuing system as an election method. The queuing system required each voter to queue behind a candidate thereby allowing Moi to detect party loyalists and expel those perceived as dissidents (Peter and Kopsieker, 2006: 15-16). The system became unpopular and was widely criticized. Leading the protest against the new structure introduced by Moi were the church leaders (Choge, 2008: 106). However, government loyalists condemned the critics as unpatriotic and acting on behalf of foreign nations. The pattern of conflict that ensued during this period of political crisis had a lasting impact on the relationship between religious and political leaders (Tarimo, 2010: 6).

Nevertheless, opposition to Moi's government by church leaders was not unanimous; although the main church bodies opposed certain governmental policies, the evangelical churches supported the state. It was during this moment of wavering support that Moi found solace with the evangelical churches. There is no doubt that clergy in the evangelical churches hoped to gain privileges from the state by backing the Moi regime, thereby becoming an alternative support base loyal to his regime (Parsitau, 2012: 4).

According to Gifford, most of the evangelical churches in Africa have resolutely refused to challenge government authorities on their poor record. These churches include the Pentecostal and the U.S.—influenced churches. Though their numbers have grown over time, in Kenya

they include the Redeemed Gospel Church, African Church of Holy Spirit, Seventh-Adventist Church, African Inland Church, and the American-influenced churches under the umbrella of United Evangelical Churches of Kenya (UECK). As religious groups were condemning the government's unpopular policies the evangelical churches refused to join the protest, claiming that it would lead to political polarisation, which would ultimately undermine national unity (Choge, 2008: 106-107). Their approach to politics managed to divert attention away from the government deficiencies, and as a result, Moi embraced them in his bid to continue to stay in power. At a time when the Moi regime was under pressure to become more accountable, the evangelical churches offered their political. For instance, after the allegedly rigged elections of 1988, Bonnke's magazine described Kenya as privileged to be ruled by a born-again head of state (Ajulu, 2008: 42).

In Moi's era, Kenya's leadership had become characterised by corruption and maladministration to a magnitude that external benefactors refused to give further aid, awaiting the introduction of a system of accountability (Gachanga, 2012: 4-5). Not content with the government's response to their economic and political remedies, donors deferred aid payments in 1991 (Gachanga, 2012: 4-5). Amid widespread agitation for multiparty democracy as part of political reforms that Moi was resisting, an official of Potter's House (an American denominational organization) came to his support, as reported in a newspaper: "A Pastor said yesterday that Christians should be praying for the government instead of criticizing it. [He said,] 'As an American citizen who has lived in Kenya, I do not believe that a multiparty political system will work at this time in Kenya'" (Gifford, 2009: 35).

Having come from one of the smallest communities in Kenya, the Tugen, and Moi expanded their political base by embracing and favouring the Kalenjin group, and by portraying himself as a staunch Christian adherent (Gifford, 2009: 37). This strategy assured Moi of political supporters outside his Tugen ethnic group but did not stop other church leaders from criticizing his unpopular policies (Gifford, 2009: 37). Despite support from the evangelical churches, Moi eventually gave in, allowing multiparty politics, due to both local and international pressure that had made his leadership difficult (Gifford, 2009: 37). In 1991, Moi's government proclaimed that Kenya would now allow new political parties to register (Gifford, 2009: 37). This marked the beginning of a new chapter for Kenya, although Moi insisted that the system would not work. As the first multiparty election of 1992 approached, the United Evangelical Churches of Kenya (UECK) joined the group of supporters of Moi's leadership. The head of the parent body (United Evangelical Churches of America) led a delegation to Kenya for a

convention that occurred a month before the general elections. Before the convention, the delegation met President Moi who advised the church officials to have no antipathy to the state and to stay out of politics. Moi's patronage was not lost on the UECK, as the ensuing convention turned into the elevation of Moi, leading to a statement signed by UECK leaders challenging the critical remarks from other churches.²¹ It was at this point that the Protestant NCCK, the Catholic Church, and a section of Muslims (through IPK) made critical statements on his regime. Nevertheless, Moi was able to win the 1992 presidential election, which was flawed by voting irregularities. As the opposition and NCCK were consulting about whether they should challenge the results, the UECK leaders appeared again censuring the NCCK and urging the opposition to accept the results (Gifford, 2009: 37-38).

4.13.6. Subaltern has no voice: Islam Religion in Kenyatta's Era

There is a general view among the Kenyan public that Kenyatta was an agnostic, and as a result of this background, he had an indifferent attitude toward religion (Mwakimako, and Willis, 2016: 20-21). There is no evidence that Kenyatta tended to favour one Postcolonial Kenyan Attitudes to Religion and the Predicament of Muslim religious group to the detriment of the others (Mwakimako and Willis, 2016: 20-21). In dealing with the various religious groups, Kenyatta was considered balanced, respecting all the faiths, and in recognition of his commitment to them, his state funeral was officiated by a Catholic, a Protestant, a Muslim, and a representative of African religion (Mwakimako and Willis, 2016: 21-22). In his public conduct, he did not exhibit any religious inclinations, indicating that religion should be relegated to the private sphere (Mwakimako and Willis, 2016: 21-22). Kenyatta's attitude to religious matters was a blessing to Muslims in the sense that he did not appear to be a threat to their existence. In his policies, Kenyatta was more interested in ethnic balance than in religious equilibrium (Haider, 2020: 6). He was willing to enter into political partnership with any group including Muslims, but through their ethnic background (Haider, 2020: 6). The political culture Kenyatta initiated was intended to make the government appear inclusive in the public's view (Mwakimako and Willis, 2016: 21-22). In this regard, ethnic, racial, and regional criteria became important considerations in the formation of his government.

The concern of Kenyatta's government was ethno-regional balancing to the exclusion of other criteria. The politics of symbolism, where appointment to a national office signified political inclusion, became institutionalized during the Kenyatta leadership (Mwakimako and Willis, 2016: 23). It was in this context that some of the Muslim members of parliament such as Sheikh Salim Balala, Mohammed Jahazi, Mohammed Alamoody, Noormohamed Janhohamed,

and Kassim Bakari Mwamzandi were appointed assistant ministers (Mwakimako and Willis, 2016: 23). However, Muslims came to view the appointments of their coreligionists in religious terms by now regarding themselves as part of the Kenyan society (Mwakimako and Willis, 2016: 23). They viewed Kenyatta's decision as an act of honour to the community, yet Bakari has commented that in terms of appointments of Muslims the Kenyatta regime was unremarkable. This is because, during the Kenyatta era, no Muslim occupied a ministerial position nor were a sizeable number of them appointed to substantive administrative positions. This situation has been attributed to the lack of higher education of Muslim members of parliament as none had a university degree during this period (Mwakimako and Willis, 2016: 28). This educational deficiency was a major drawback for Muslim politicians that pushed them to the periphery rather than "the centre of power," Bakari observed. Despite their loyalty and proximity to the president, they failed to lobby for the benefit of Muslims. Their inferiority in education made them satisfied with the small gains the community had made. As a result of their loyalty to the state, Kenyatta's government acceded to the Muslims' request to declare *Idd-ul-Fitr* a national public holiday in 1971 (Bakari, 2013: 74).

It is important to mention that during Kenyatta's period a significant Islamic factor manifested itself in the form of a continuation of the campaign by Somalis to secede (Haider, 2020: 1-2). When this demand was not granted, the Somalis resorted to armed resistance to sabotage the Kenyatta leadership) (Haider, 2020: 1-2). As a result, the Kenyan government declared a state of emergency in the North-eastern Province (previously the NFD). Although the idea of Somali nationalism propelled chapter two Kenyan Somalis' agitation for secession and self-determination, the Islamic factor also mobilized the Northern Frontier District (NFD) residents to the Somali cause. This is because the campaign for secession also gained considerable support among Muslims of non-Somali backgrounds such as the Boran and the Rendille living in the NFD (Haider, 2020: 1-2). In rallying Muslims behind their cause, the Somalis called for jihad against the Kenyatta government. These developments demonstrated the significance of the role of Islam in the Somali politics of secession. The reference to the Somali cause as jihad was an example of the politicization of Islam (Haider, 2020: 1-2). The usage of Islamic symbols was intended to create sympathy for the Somali campaign by rallying other Muslims behind their cause. The Somali uprising, which came to be known as the shifta insurgency, was fought in sporadic ways throughout the region by employing a guerrilla tactic of warfare that concentrated on ambushing government convoys and personnel (Bakari, 2013: 75). They intended to make the region ungovernable so that Kenyatta would relinquish the region to the

Republic of Somalia (Haider, 2020:7). The shifta⁵⁰ rebellion demonstrated the desire for Somalis to resort to violence for attaining political goals. Since intelligence reports confirmed that the Somali shifta was obtaining weaponry and logistic support from the Republic of Somalia, the Kenyatta government detached diplomatic dealings with Somalia (Haider, 2020:7). Kenyatta's new government, with backing from British forces, engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign against the shifta, ensuring that centralization was imposed on the region since it was not willing to lose that part of the country (Haider, 2020:7). To downplay the Somalis' struggle for secession, the Kenyatta administration branded the Somalis' armed struggle as shifta skirmishes (Haider, 2020:8). The term shifta was used to portray the struggle as a banditry problem, and to invalidate its political rationale (Bakari, 2013: 75).

The armed conflict between the Somalis and the Kenyatta administration led to further social, economic, and political marginalization of the community. For many years, the Somalis lagged behind the rest of the country in terms of development (Kresse, 2009: 12). However, despite the prevailing challenges, the Somali community has succeeded in securing a place for themselves in Kenya. Two decades later, after centralization of the region was attained, the Somalis have reconciled to being Kenyan citizens as conditions in the country are better than in Somalia. Their reconciliation is illustrated by the unified response of the Kenyan Somali political elite to the pronouncement made by a Somali warlord, Husayn Mohammed Aidid. In 2002, Aidid was reported to have declared that his organization would also ensure that the Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya were brought under the one nation of Somalia (Kresse, 2009: 20).

The Kenyan Somali political elites criticized Aidid, reiterating that the North-eastern Province is Kenya's territory and the Somali community in the country does not support his idea (Bakari, 2013: 16). In contrast to the earliest year after independence, there emerged a Kenyan Somali political voice that publicly challenges a cause that at one time was embraced by the community (Bakari, 2013: 16). Even with their battle cry for jihad, Muslims from other parts of the country did not support the Somali cause. This is because when the Somali guerrilla activities spilled

⁵⁰ In 1962, a year prior to Kenya's independence, a majority of the people of Northern Kenya (then known as the Northern Frontier District) 'almost unanimously' preferred secession from the Kenyan state to Somalia, in a referendum organised by the British government. The British government ignored this result, however, and instead transformed the administrative arrangements of the Northern Frontier District into the North Eastern Province (NEP), comprising of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera. The first post-independence government made it clear it would maintain territorial borders, leading to insurgency across Northern Kenya. The insurgents formed by Somalis and their allies, with support from Mogadishu, called themselves the Northern Frontier District Liberation Front, but were labelled *shifta* ('bandit') by the state (Haider, 2020: 7).

over to the Lamu, Kipini Mpeketoni, and Tana areas, they inflicted suffering on the Muslim population in these areas (Gachanga, 2012: 6). As a result, whatever sympathy other Muslims had for the Somali cause was eroded. The non-Somali Muslims in the country assured President Kenyatta that they supported the government's effort to subdue the shifta threat and bring peace to the region (Gachanga, 2012: 6).

Consequently, through military action and diplomatic efforts, the Kenyatta government managed to keep the North-eastern Province in Kenya, bringing to an end the Somalis' agitation for self-determination. With counterinsurgency policies and international mediation, the shifting threat ultimately faded in the late 1960s, but sporadic guerrilla activities were patent in the 1970s, demonstrating that the desire for secession was still held by a section of the Somali community in Kenya (Bakari, 2013).

Another episode that caused concern among Muslims about their relationship with Kenyatta's government was the establishment of a commission to reform the succession laws in Kenya in 1967. The commission was charged with the task of reforming the inheritance laws in Kenya and thereby bringing Islamic law and other customary laws in harmony with English common law (Bakari, 2013). Kenyatta's government aimed to study the laws of inheritance practiced by the various ethnic and religious groups in Kenya to reconcile them by bringing equality and justice when it came to sharing inheritance among members of a deceased's family. From the moment of the commission's inception, Muslims took great exception to any attempts to tamper with what they considered divine law. As a result, Muslims were united in opposition against any efforts to introduce new legislation. Apart from Muslims, the proposed reforms were also opposed by the followers of African customary law. After the commission had accomplished its work, a bill was drafted in 1972 (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014: 27). The bill attempted to give men and women equal rights of inheritance and was, therefore, hailed as a milestone in ensuring equality between sexes (Haider, 2020: 20). Muslims lobbied against the reforms through various petitions until their position was acknowledged. Through their efforts and those of the defenders of the African customary law, the bill was not presented to parliament during Kenyatta's lifetime (Kresse, 2009: 23).

Kenyatta thought it prudent not to offend Muslim sensibilities as well as those of many Africans who, in matters of personal status, often observed African customary law. The reforms touched on sensitive African issues such as inheritance and polygamy that affected many Kenyans. It

is believed that Kenyatta and many of the parliamentarians during his time were polygamous, which contributed to their reluctance to adopt the bill (Kresse, 2009: 23).

4.13.7. Subaltern has Active Political Voice: Islam Religion and Loyalty to the Political Leaders in Moi's Era

As Mwakimako and Willis (2014) have noted, coastal Muslims' marginal status in the Indian Ocean world is echoed and redoubled by their relationship with the rest of Kenya (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014: 11). Kenya is nominally secular, but – as Thordsen, and others have argued – it is in practice a Christian state, its political culture infused with Christian language and imagery (Thordsen, 2009: 35-37). Since independence Kenya's political and administrative elite have been overwhelmingly Christian. While recent years have seen slightly more participation at senior levels by Muslims, that has been of little significance compared with a contrary trend, a profound pentecostalization of national politics that has gathered pace since 2008 (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014: 11). Politicians speak at churches; political rallies become prayer meetings; clergymen bless candidates for office, and incumbents; election winners insist that God chose them to win. While Muslims occasionally play a minor role in some of these public events, the tone is overwhelmingly that of Pentecostal Christianity – a Christianity which is at times overtly hostile to Islam (Gifford, 2009: 167-168).

Following the death of the first president, Kenyatta, on August 22, 1978, his longest-serving (1967–78) vice president, Moi, ascended to the presidency by a stipulation in the Independence Constitution, which states: Article 6 (1) If the office of the President becomes vacant because of the death or resignation of the President, or because he ceases to hold office under section 10 or section 12, an election of a President shall be held within ninety days immediately following the occurrence of that vacancy and shall be held in a manner prescribed by section 5(5) of this constitution (Kanyinga, 2014: 26). Therefore, according to the constitution, following Kenyatta's death, Moi was to assume power for ninety days. Moi's automatic accession to power was objected to by a certain section of Kenyan's powerful politicians. The opposition was led by an alliance of Kenyatta's family and the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA). Constitutionally, Moi was the successor, but in 1976, several politicians led by the GEMA-Kenyatta's family alliance initiated the Change the Constitution Movement to prevent Moi's automatic succession. As a result, the issue of succession became a major political debate during the last years of Kenyatta's rule. The first political leader to condemn the Change the Constitution Movement was a Muslim politician, Shariff Nassir bin Taib, who

gave Moi unconditional support in his struggle to assume the presidency in the face of opposition (Ajulu, 2008: 30).

Following Kenyatta's death and Moi's accession, Nassir urged KANU delegates to elect Moi unopposed as the chairman of the party. This strategy was to entrench Moi's powers in the party making his position uncontested. A few days after Nassir's statement, most politicians and community groups issued statements of allegiance to Moi, urging the need for continuity and stability (Bakari, 2013: 19). Following this cue, in December 1978 a delegation from the Muslim community led by SUPKEM met the president and expressed their loyalty (Mwakimako and Willis, 2014:). Therefore, as Moi was ascending to leadership, he already had loyalists among Muslims who distinguished themselves as staunch supporters of his regime (Ndzovu, 2012: 30).

For instance, the 1982 coup attempt against his government was put down by an army general, Mahmoud Mohamed, a Somali Muslim. As a general in the army, Mahmoud played a key role in foiling the coup. This incident is presumed to have changed Moi's attitude toward Somalis and Muslims in general. After the failed coup attempt, for the first time in Kenya, a Muslim, who happened to be Mahmoud's brother, was appointed as a cabinet minister in 74 chapters two in the Moi administration (Bakari, 2013:16). Mahmoud was later to occupy the office of the chief of general staff in the Kenya Armed Forces, with analysts interpreting Moi's gesture as a form of payback to the general (Kresse, 2009). Again, as a strong ally of Moi, Nassir is alleged to have spoken out at a KANU Special Delegates Congress in December 1991 against permitting the registration of opposition political parties. Based on this background, Moi became sympathetic to individual Muslims who had supported him at various crucial moments in his political career (Bakari, 2013: 17).

However, Ndzovu (2012) cautions that this attitude by Moi toward Muslims should not be perceived as being favourable to Islam, but maintaining power was the relevant policy. In cases where Muslims have felt discriminated against, this cannot be regarded as anti-Islamic policy per se, though he did not see much use in making alliances with Muslims as a community (Ndzovu, 2012: 28-29). However, the politics of inclusion that Moi exercised was received positively by a section of the Muslim population who came to believe that his regime had been more considerate to the community in terms of appointments than the previous government (Bakari, 2013: 25-26).

In addition, there are other Muslims who hold the view that Moi's interaction with his Muslim compatriots was pragmatic and for mutual convenience. His critics claim that Moi entertained Muslims only as a strategy for political survival, as demonstrated by the concessional amendment that was added to the Laws of Succession in the 1990s. The critics wonder why, despite supporting the ruling party, KANU, and Moi's government, in particular, Muslims' conditions have deteriorated instead of improving (Kresse, 2009: 78).

This explains why during his tenure, Muslims demanded justice and equal treatment, alleging that his regime favoured Christianity over Islam. Muslims cite the example of his government's provincial officers' sanctioning a major address by Reverend Bonnke of Germany in the town of Mombasa while preventing Muslim preachers from Tanzania from addressing Muslims of the same town. This apparent callousness on the part of the government led to Muslim demonstrations in October 1989 (Kresse, 2009: 83).

These demonstrations were indications of the community's frustrations and their determination to be treated equally as the country's citizens (Gifford, 2009: 167-168). One area where Muslims alleged discrimination was the issuing of identity cards, passports, and citizenship (Kresse, 2009:83-84). When it came to acquiring these national documents, Muslims, especially those of Somali, Arab, and Asian descent, claimed to be the most discriminated group during the presidency of Moi (Kresse, 2009:83-84). By the end of Moi's tenure in 2002, these Muslim groups were required to produce extra documentary evidence of citizenship when applying for these national documents. The policy was meant to identify genuine Kenyan citizens who deserved these important citizenship documents. Further, Moi's government singled out Somali Muslims as the only group whose members were required to carry an additional form of identification to prove that they were citizens (Ndzovu, 2014: 75).

4.13.8. Subaltern has no Voice: Census Politics to Silence Luo in Kenya in Moi's Era

Nyaura states that in Kenya high-ranking politicians often combine racial support (Nyaura, 2018: 23). Scarrit and Mazaffar point out that both racial and ethnic divisions are important factors in determining the number of political parties (Scarritt and Mozaffar, 2005: 92). The political landscape is based on race; hence the citizens themselves have been discriminated against based on race (Scarritt and Mozaffar, 2005: 92). Chandra states that voters tend to collect information about a candidate's background and that the target ends up being too expensive, while nationality is easily identified. Therefore, they use nationalism as a loud but inexpensive signal of the candidates' tendencies to favor them in the distribution of public

goods and transfers. Because of this behavior on the part of the voters, it would make sense that the parties were organized according to race. As Ghai and Ghai point out that Kenyan politics has undoubtedly become racist politics. Historically, colonial policies led to current races as this focused on the politics of inequality in regional development (Kasomo, 2012; Kanyinga, 2014; Ghai and Ghai, 2011).

Luhya is Kenya's second-largest nation, comprising 14% of the country's population. The word Luhya is a linguistic category that was placed in 15 different cultural groups by the English during the colonial period; the Luhya are comprised of the Bukusu, Dakho, Kabras, Khayo, Kisa, Marachi, Maragoli, Marama, Nyala, Nyole, Samia, Tachoni, Tiriki, Tsoto and Wanga (Rei, 2019: 34). Luhya lives in the Western Province and the vicinity of the Rift Valley. The Luhya were brought to the Rift Valley by the English as cheap laborers. The Luhya were again expelled from the village by the Kalenjin during Moi's presidency (Rei, 2019: 34). In 2002, the ruling KANU party was defeated by the National Rainbow Coalition, the Luhya were divided. Ever since it benefited the government, the Luhya have benefited from the overthrow of many of Moi's racist policies. Tensions are still raging between the Luhya and the Kalenjin, with land rights at the center of the conflict (Rei, 2019: 34). The Luo are the third largest tribe in Kenya, comprising 13% of the population. Most Luo lives in Nyanza province in the southwest of the country.

During the Moi presidency, the Luo, as well as the Kisii and Kikuyu and Luhya were forcibly evicted from the Rift Valley, where the English had been resettled decades earlier. Most of the displaced Luo have yet to return to the Rift Valley. Luo chief Raila Odinga led a large opposition party to Moi's government, with the Luo being a key NARC supporter, supporting Mui Kibaki as Moi's successor. Chief Odinga has been appointed to the cabinet under Kibaki. By the time Kibaki won the presidency, however, the Luo were ostracized as they had been under Moi. When a constitutional amendment to strengthen the presidency was rejected by a popular vote, Kibaki dissolved his cabinet and replaced it with a new one without Odinga. This increased resentment among the Luo community, and when Odinga ran for president in 2007, the campaign was sour (Omulo, 2017: 65-66). Although the campaign itself was not violent, controversy over the counting of votes resulted in widespread violence between the Luo and the Kikuyu when Kibaki was declared the winner. Disagreements between Luo and other races are now non-violent, however, there have been occasional protests and racial conflicts (Omulo, 2017: 65-66).

The colonial settlers favoured central Kenya and the highlands in the Rift Valley which were fertile, thus improving agriculture in the region. Kanyinga, further, states that there have been regional disparities in development that concur with the ethnic inequalities because the regional boundaries correspond to ethnic settlement patterns or territories (Kanyinga, 2014: 24-25). There has been also the tendency that after every election marginalized groups and underdeveloped regions blame consecutive governments for the failure to invest resources in their regions. This has intensified regional conflicts (Kanyinga, 2014: 24-25). As Kanyinga (2014) puts it that 'It is our turn to eat' becomes a slogan for bringing ethnic groups together with the view to gain access to and control of political power. Accordingly, leaders appointed to office are seen to be persons who will favour tribesmen and who will adequately share the national cake to the selected few who will in turn become wealthy. In some cases, ethnic blocks are formed based on sharing power and socio-economic development (Kanyinga, 2014: 24-25).

Kenya's census policy is linked to capitalist politics. Refers to the struggle between regions and/or ethnic groups with the increase in demographics for their benefit (Adeline et al., 2015: 48). Put another way, no issue has caused more controversy, heated debate, and racial tensions than the manipulation of national census statistics. This has undoubtedly cost the nation a lot of money (Adeline et al., 2015: 48). As a result, the people of Kenya have developed a systematic disregard for censuses and believe that no census can succeed in Kenya, whether by a citizen or by a government. It is the fulfillment of this lack of basic understanding and the great chaos that can result from small learning and "partial facts" about the census (Adeline et al., 2015: 48).

Kenya has carried out seven censuses; two pre and five post-independence censuses. These successful censuses have been held consistently every 10 years until the most recent of 2009, which recorded 38.6 million people (Adeline et al., 2015:48). All these censuses have shown some degree of incompleteness, and data quality seems to have declined over time, with the latest census 2009 raising serious concerns. According to Adeline et al. (2015), incomplete census coverage results partly from highly varied census questions and census politics (Adeline et al., 2015:48).

Cheeseman, et al., think that the old view of Kenyan politics as a census conducts something like this. First, the power is protected and used to exploit, the president's ethnic group (Cheeseman, et al. (2020: 2). This creates the concept of "winner-take everything" (Cheeseman, et al., 2020: 2).). Second, the notion that depletion means loss of access to resources exacerbates

political competitiveness and is therefore the intended force of international cohesion (Cheeseman et al., 2020: 2). Third, hot and controversial elections amplify divisions within the Kenyan community, which further strengthens racial identity. Parts of this story are true (Cheeseman et al., 2020: 3). Successive governments tend to favor one another. Voting patterns, which also reflect clear racial patterns, and keeping the three elections — 2007, 2013, and 2017, have been very divisive. However, the truth is very complex (Cheeseman et al., 2020: 4).

Mutuku, et al., posit that Kenya like most African countries is multi-ethnic and is perceived to be one of the most ethnically fragmented societies in Africa (Mutuku, et al. 2020:2). The 2009 Census found that there were more than 42 ethnic groups in the country (Mutuku et al., 2020: 2), in particular no less than 111 ethnic groups up from 42 in 1969 (Mutuku et al., 2020: 2). This is partly attributed to the success of the struggles by historically marginalized communities including the Endorois, Ogiek, and Sengwer, to be officially recognized by the state (Mutuku et al., 2020:2).

Ghai and Ghai observe that, notably, the increased number of tribes demonstrates enhanced awareness by certain sub-groups that they were treated as distinct from the larger groups into which they were subsumed during the colonial period (Ghai and Ghai, 2013:9). For example, the 2009 population census included statistics for the Marachi, Maragoli, Marama, and other groups that were previously counted as part of the Luhya ethnic group. It also included Mijikenda and Kalenjin sub-groups, such as the Boni, Choli, and Dahalo, and the Kipsigis, Marakwet, and Nandi, respectively (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 9). On the one hand, ethnicity has inherent richness in terms of knowledge, solutions and culture to mention a few positives. On the other hand, according to Neubert, it presents challenges that call for better management by the government to ensure diversity and inclusion in the different spheres of life, economic, social and political. Nonetheless, ethnic politics continues to be a part of Kenya's economic, social and political processes (Neubert, 2019: 4).

Census in Kenya has been, on several occasions, politicised by the Kenyan elites and ruling class. The politicisation of the subject matter has been directed toward the Luo people—who have been asserting themselves as active political voice for the rest of subaltern groups (Madut, 2020:15). Controversy has almost always accompanied the release of the official population figures of ethnic groups. The results of the 1989 census, for example, were bitterly disputed because it showed that the highest growth rates were amongst those ethnic groups aligned to

the government at the time (Kalenjin, Maasai and Luhya) (Hornsby, 2012: 452). A further bone of contention revolved around the fact that the Luhya had displaced the Luo as the second largest ethnic group and the Kalenjin had displaced the Kamba as the fourth largest ethnic group (Hornsby, 2012: 452). The census was conducted in August 1989 but the results were released four years later (1994), a fact that led many to believe that the government had adjusted the —true results for partisan political reasons. For the 1999 census, the government chose not to publish data relating to ethnic group nationality” is always inappropriate and is usually motivated by “social conflict and abuses.” Gracia’s argument is considered to have hindered the nation-building process as quoted in (Madut, 2020: 15-16).

Ethnic identity has long been regarded as —a powerful force in the politics of many countries (Biegon, 2018: 14). Across the world, and certainly in Africa, ethnic identity is frequently used or manipulated by political elites to achieve or pursue partisan ends. This practice is what is commonly referred to as —politicization of ethnic identity or simply as —ethnic politics. In the literature, Biegon (2018) offers a relatively good articulation of what politicisation of ethnic identity entails (Biegon, 2018: 14). He observes that politicization of ethnic identity is —a strategically rational behaviour involving the contingent (as opposed to the spontaneous) activation of objective ethnic markers by political elites to form groups, define group interests, and organize collective action to advance political goals (Biegon, 2018: 14). Ethnic politics is a sub-set of identity politics that may be organized around any of the following identity markers: race, religion, gender, age, ethnicity, and so forth (Biegon, 2018: 14). As Oloo (2010) puts it, ethnic politics is animated by the claim that it —represents and seeks to advance the interests of particular groups in society, the members of which often share and unite around common experiences of actual or perceived social and economic injustice, relative to the wider society of which they form part of and exist (Oloo, 2010: 31, 33).

Biegon posits that Kenya’s ethnic diversity and population disparities have far-reaching implications in a majoritarian system, providing both opportunities and challenges for those contesting for national office, especially the presidency (Biegon, 2018: 59). Candidates are forced to negotiate with leaders of other ethnic groups for support, resulting in ethnicity becoming an important agency of mobilization (Biegon, 2018: 59). As competition has increased, especially in the multiparty era, election outcomes have become increasingly more zero-sum, with the perception that Kenya’s political system favours large communities (Biegon, 2018: 59- 60). This has not only intensified the nature of negotiations undertaken but made them more complex. Further, according to Kanyinga et al. (2010), negotiation democracy

becomes inevitable because politics in Kenya is not viewed only in concrete material terms but also in symbolic terms—as an —esteem goodll for the community (Kanyinga et al., 2010: 6). This makes communities —feel good when one of their own controls state apparatus. This —feel-good factorll unifies communities against others and transforms elections —not into an instrument for consolidating democracy, but an instrument of enhancing their esteem as a group (Kanyinga et al., 2010: 6). This feel-good factor attracts communities to negotiate and make alliances with —strong presidential candidates and, under devolution, with strong ethnic patronage (Kivuva, 2018: 60).

Kivuva argues that another important phenomenon that has led to the convergence of majoritarian and negotiated democracy in Kenya is the hybridization of ethnic groups (Kivuva, 2018: 60-61). To consolidate their numbers, a systematic hybridization of ethnic groups has taken place in four key regions in Kenya—Rift Valley, Western, North-Eastern, and the Coast. In the Rift Valley, eleven ethnic groups that had separate existence⁵¹ united and hybridized to become the Kalenjin. In the multiparty era of the 1990s, threats from a united opposition to the Moi regime forced a further hybridization to form KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu).⁵² In Western Kenya, another 16 ethnic groups⁵³ hybridized and acquired the name Luhya (Kivuva, 2018: 60-61). A similar thing happened at the Coast, where non—upcountry peoples and the those of Arab origins united as —Coastal Peoples, while in the former North Eastern Province attempts were also made to unite peoples of Somali origin in demand for independence from Kenya or to join their cousins in Somalia (Haider, 2020: 27).

In the 1970s, hybridisation went a notch higher with the formation of community associations. To further unite the various groups, key political leaders spearheaded the formation of —cultural organizations to unite communities that considered themselves one (Kivuva, 2018: 60-61). Examples include, the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA), Luo Union of East Africa (LUEA), Abaluya Union, and New Akamba Union (NAU). The above established in Kenya a practice where ethnic groups had their spokesmen to be consulted for electoral help. These are the ones referred to above as ethnic hegemony who are consulted when presidential candidates need support. Jomo Kenyatta, Mwai Kibaki, and Uhuru Kenyatta have relied heavily on the GEMA communities to win and defend their presidency (Kivuva, 2018: 61).

⁵¹ They include, Kipsigis, Marakwet, Nandi, Pokot, Elgeyo, Keiyo, Sabaot, Dorobo and Turgen.

⁵² Though not part of this hybridized Kalenjin, the Turkan, Maasai and Samburu are closely related with Kalenjin (Biegon, 2018: 60)

⁵³ They comprised of Bukusu, Tiriki, Maragoli, Isuha, Marachi, Khayo, Kisa, Marama, Samia, Tachoni, Tsotso, Wanga, Kabras, Nyala and Nyore.

Just like the Kenyatta's, the Odinga's have also relied a lot on the unity of the Luo community, whose leadership they have controlled since before independence (Kivuva, 2018: 61). The failure of either Moses Mudavadi or Moses Wetangula and Kalonzo Musyoka to recreate either Luhya or Kamba unity respectively, and to control these communities partly accounts for their failure to rise to dominant positions in Kenya's politics (Kivuva, 2018: 61). This is because leaders of the various groups were instrumental in all negotiations that their communities engaged politically. As the hybridization described above was taking place, the ethnic group increasingly became the theatre for political mobilization, which elevated not just the importance of ethnicity, but these ethno-regional leaders (Kivuva, 2018: 61).

The hybridised ethnic groups became the basis for political mobilization. Initial political parties in Kenya were founded on and reflected these hybridized ethnic groups. They included the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA), Kenya African Peoples Party (KAPP), the Maasai United Front (MUF), the Coast Peoples Union (CPU), and the Somali National Association (SNA), which later became the Northern Province Peoples Progressive Party (NPPPP) (Kivuva, 2018: 61). The importance of both hybridized ethnic groups and political parties in Kenya, especially during the single-party rule (1969-1990), was enormous. Both Presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Moi negotiated with them to win support in key regions. In the 1990s, with the introduction of the multiparty system, many of them formed political parties to compete in the liberalized political space. These political parties and their founders became the basis for political negotiations in Kenya (Kivuva, 2018: 61).

4.13.9. Subaltern has no Voice: A Politicize Unfair Re-Ethnic classification of Luo-Abasuba in Kenya

Kwatemba posits that Kenya, like most colonies in Africa, was the invention of colonialists, an invention which seemed to have been flawed from the start and hence was a crisis in the making because the invented territory brought together different ethnic communities, some of which had little or nothing in common culturally (Kwatemba, 2008: 79). Other communities were mutually hostile. This does not mean that cultural homogeneity is a sine qua non for political stability (Kwatemba, 2008: 79). What can be said is that culturally diverse ethnic communities will clash unless those in authority make a deliberate effort to engender coexistence among them (Kwatemba, 2008: 79).

Kenya has more than 42 disparate ethnic groups. These groups per se do not pose a threat either to the stability of the nation-state or to themselves, since people do not fight one another simply

because they have different cultural and linguistic attributes (Kwatemba, 2008: 79-80). Recurrent animosity among ethnic communities in Kenya was the result of the politicisation of ethnicity. (Kwatemba, 2008: 79-80). According to Kwatemba, postcolonial leaders seem to have approached ethnicity with the same intent as the colonialists, failing to infuse a national civic culture within the country's body politic because those at the centre of power pursued insular, sectarian and self-serving interests (Kwatemba, 2008: 80). On the threshold of independence, it was a sense of nationalism, not ethnic considerations, that guided some of the decisions made by nationalist politicians (Kwatemba, 2008: 780). In 1961, for instance, Oginga Odinga and his fellow nationalists refused to enter independence negotiations with the British colonialists until Jomo Kenyatta was released from detention (Sunday Standard 4 2007: 17-18). The reasoning was that to enter negotiations while Kenyatta and others were still in detention would be equal to betraying the collective cause that was supposed to bind all freedom fighters irrespective of their ethnic origin (Kwatemba, 2008: 80).

Moi, who had served as vice-president for 11 years, ascended to the presidency after Kenyatta's death (Kwatemba, 2008: 81). He made no pretence of bringing in the socio-political and economic reforms for which Kenya was crying out after the bruises inflicted by his predecessor in the form of state repression, political assassination and the marginalisation of certain subaltern groups, particularly the Luo (Mutua 2008: 40-41).

Omulo discusses the evolution of the Kenyan Political System and its relation to inequalities in the composition of governance structures and institutions in post-colonial Kenya: the executive, legislatures, judiciary, and other public institutions and analyses the actors responsible for the imbalances and reforms required to address the disparities (Omulo, 2017: 26). Omulo tabulates how public resources, parliamentary seats, cabinet, and key civil service appointments are inequitably distributed among the main ethnic groups in power in favour of the incumbent, right from the Kenyatta regime, through Moi to President Kibaki (Omulo, 2017:). Kanyinga (2014) argues that the ethnic minorities were not more represented in the legislative assembly than the numerically larger groups and thus rules out marginalization for minorities in defence of the underrepresented ethnic majorities (Kanyinga, 2014: 2). He thus proposes proportional representation to avoid ethnic politics and inequalities associated with it as the only remedy for providing opportunities and building governance institutions as was the case in South Africa during the deconstruction of the apartheid state (Kanyinga, 2014: 27). The African National Congress (ANC) and then the government of South Africa agreed on the

principle of bringing on board all political parties and interest groups as the way forward for South Africa (Kanyinga, 2014: 27)

Madut commented on the dated migration of Luo ethnic groups to Central Uganda between 1500 and 1800, suggesting that some subsequently crossed to Kenya, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Luo assimilated into other ethnic groups and vice versa during their migration (Madut, 2020: 15-16). For example, the Luo-Abasuba (Bantus) of Kenya have adopted the Luo's Culture and Language and see themselves as part of the Luo people,⁵⁴ the Luo Kuman (Bantus) and Lango (Nilotics) in Uganda have adopted the Luo's culture and language, and the Dinka (Nilotic) in Southern Sudan became a major part of the Luo Chollo, who are known as Shilluk in the Upper Nile region, South Sudan (Madut, 2020: 15-16). During the same process of migration, some of the Luo people were assimilated into Luyha (Bantus) for example the Amarachi people of Mumias-Kenya are formerly Luos who were assimilated in Luyha ethnic group (Madut, 2020: 15-16).

The records of the peoples who are assimilated within the larger Ethnic groups in Kenya, as well as the rest of the African countries, were kept intact by elders through mystical oral stories. The distance and lack of communication among groups did not prevent them from understanding their roots and place of origin (Madut, 2020: 15-16).

Ogot and Ochieng posit that between thirty-forty percent (30-40%) of Luyha (Abaluyia) clans were original by Kalenjins. The best example is the Tiriki, Abatachoni of Ndivisi, and Kabras who, according to the traditional narrative, were originally related to the Bongomek and the Babukusu who had separated from their cousins, the Bagisu, as a result of the Teso invasion of the 18th Century (Ogot and Ochieng, 2000: 16-17).

Western Kenya is home to people from diverse social backgrounds. Though Luo speakers are predominant in the former Nyanza province, there are also Gusii, Kuria and Suba communities in the region. Similarly, while Luhya a-speakers are predominant in the former Western province, there are also Teso and Sabaot communities. Whereas the structural bases of social organisation among Luo and Luhya are similar and the clan, structured on strong patrilineal kinship ties, is the highest level of social organisation, there are no sub-ethnic groups among the Luo.⁵⁵ There are, however, 17 sub-ethnic groups among the Luhya, consisting of clans that

⁵⁴ Since the Late 1980s the Kenyan government have classifying them separate from the Luo people as why to reduce the strong active political voice of Luo subaltern group (Omulo, 2017: 136-137)

⁵⁵ Luo-Abasuba (Suba or Abasuba) were classified as the sub-ethnic group of Luo, however since the mid-1990s the Moi's state removed Abasuba as sub-ethnic group within Luo; (Ogot, B. A. and Ochieng, W.R., 2000)

share the same dialect, but have diverse origins as well as social and political organisation (Wanyama et al., (2013: 174-175).

Luhya-speakers were not a homogeneous political entity, for there was never a central authority. There was the collective authority in each clan, which jealously guarded its independence and sovereignty to such an extent that, in reality, every major clan was a sovereign state. This form of political organisation arguably contained a high degree of freedom and independence, which might have been extended to the political orientations of Luhya-speakers since independence (Wanyama et al., 2013: 175-176). Consequently, Luhya -speakers have tended to be politically heterogeneous and relatively 'liberal' in their political affiliation. Conversely, Luo-speakers have largely been politically homogeneous, but this is a recent development. Like the Luhya, Luo-speakers did not traditionally have a central authority. They had a segmented political formation, consisting of heterogeneous lineages and clans, with each clan having its own political, social-economic organisations high degree of freedom and independence (Ogot and Ochieng, 2000: 18-19).

4.13.10. HIV/AIDS Politicized towards Luo Subaltern Group

Otieno posits that he had to read the 2016 report by National Aids Control Council to look for the story behind the national prevalence figures. He also spoke to a few medical practitioners to find out how HIV/Aids prevalence has remained high in Luo Nyanza counties despite numerous national and international interventions. One reason (Otieno, 2018:11-12) got is that Kisumu is near Uganda, the epi-centre of the Aids epidemic in Eastern Africa in the eighties and early nineties. Consequently, Otieno possess a question for us, "So why is prevalence lower in Busia and Bungoma Counties which border Uganda?" (Otieno, 2018: 13).

According to Commission on Revenue Allocation, fourteen counties deemed marginalised, suffered historical injustices and had less access to basic amenities, and were therefore rated as deserving extra allocation of devolution funds for the 2018/19 financial year. These counties include Turkana, Lamu, Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, Samburu, West Pokot, Tana River, Narok, Kwale, Garissa, Kilifi, Taita Taveta and Isiolo. There is no "Luo county" on that list. The idea one gets is that, when it comes to politics, the Luo are poor but when it comes to distributing funds, they disappear from the top of the list (Otieno, 2018:15).

Otieno postulates that there are counties like Mombasa that receive hundreds of thousands of tourists and where the twilight industry is robust, but still, it ranks better than Luo counties in Aids prevalence (Otieno, 2018:16-17). Counties in Ukambani, with several towns and trading

centres bubbling with long-distance truck drivers who are known for promiscuity while plying the Mombasa-Great Lakes route still fall below Luo Nyanza. Turkana and Teso communities do not circumcise their men yet prevalence is lower (Otieno, 2018:16-17).

Ajulu reasons that the 1982 failed coup by a group of predominantly Luo junior Kenya Air Force officers led by Sr. Private Hezekiah Ochuka gave the state more ammunition to justify their propaganda (Ajulu, 2008: 36). Several Luos, including former US President Barack Obama's, father lost their jobs because of being perceived as being sympathetic to opposition forces then led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (Otieno, 2018:16-17). The Luo were kept in non-influential positions or if one held a powerful post like former Permanent Secretary Hezekiah Oyugi, then you had to prove your loyalty beyond the normal. Most influential positions are thereby their skills and abilities rather than political or social connections (Ajulu, 2008: 36).

Luos have a high affinity for academia. Prof. David Wasawo, a pioneer Kenyan educationist whom former Alliance High School head Carey Francis described as the "most intelligent student" he ever taught was bypassed, and Dr. Josephat Karanja, who was appointed Vice-Chancellor at the University of Nairobi in 1970. The first Luo to occupy that office at the most prestigious university in Kenya is Prof. George Magoha who got the job after an external professional body was tasked to conduct the interviews. He left a legacy that will be difficult to match during his tenure between 2005 and 2015 (Otieno, 2018:16-17).

4.13.11. Luo Subaltern is denied active Political Voice because they are Politically Conscious

We turn next to hegemony as a relation between classes, in which a dominant class presents its interests as the interests of all. We are here concerned with the three levels of class formation, as well as the way class formation is limited by the economic structure on the one side and the balance of patronage politics on the other. We will examine the potentiality of different classes – the peasantry, landed classes, bourgeoisie, working-class, the petty bourgeoisie – to achieve hegemony.

In reviewing and presenting a counter-racial point of view and providing an epistemological basis for acknowledging the failure of post-colonial Kenya protests to maintain their momentum, Kanyinga concludes that the Kenyan ruling class historically maintained its rule by developing structures and mechanisms that hid cultural inequality, K: 2014). Gramsci has identified ways in which it works in the social and cultural spheres to gain approval from the masses. He specifically noted the role of awards that work to make it appear that "good work

is rewarded” (Maisuria, 2016: 16). This means that those who deserved and rewarded received it, and it was a way for the ruling class to manage the obvious inequalities by trying to build an existing vision for the benefit of the people in the current situation. The concept played here is a reward for hard work (Joseph, 2006: 53), which works to get approval from the current situation by making society seem fair while hiding inequality. In this way, the dominant class “hid the controversy” and the controversy between classes to maintain order (Cunningham, 2014: 14-15).

Kanyinga, in his *Negotiated Democracy and its Place in Kenya’s Devolved System of Government: An Examination of the 2013 General Elections* maps the terrain of Kenyan politics in the wake of the devolved system of government. Kanyinga makes an impassioned case for the role of negotiated democracy, arguing in favour of its utility especially in highly competitive political systems such as Kenya’s (Kanyinga, 2014: 23-24). Most interestingly, Kanyinga presents fresh analyses on the role of negotiated democracy in Kenya, finding distinctions between ethnically diverse and ethnically homogenous counties as well as the —negotiations‖ between elites (as the —brokers of negotiated democracy) and the public. Whether negotiated democracy is still relevant as a way to —manage competitiveness and diversity within the context of the 2017 general election remains to be seen, but Kanyinga analysis remains relevant as a guide for future analyses on the particular idiosyncrasies of negotiated democracy in the country (Kanyinga, 2014: 23-24).

President Kenyatta’s second term is plagued by a crisis of legitimacy because of the election boycott of the opposition. Initially, reticent regarding dialogue to overcome the political stalemate, President Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga surprised the country when they announced plans to work together to address longstanding problems facing the country including ethnic discrimination and ethnocentrism, corruption, insecurity, and other development-related challenges. Whether this détente will lead to efforts to address longstanding challenges regarding inclusion and equal participation in decision-making as well as the equitable distribution of resources remains to be seen (Kanyinga, 2014: 23-24).

At the apex of Kenya’s independence, ethnicity was seen to be based on regionalism with the premise that devolution of power from the major ethnic groups to the various regions would devolve power that was concentrated on the two groups, that is the Kikuyu and Luo communities (Nyaura, 2018: 18). The resources especially the land that was confiscated from the British were granted to the Kikuyu for resettlement. This unequal distribution of resources-

built resentment and created infrastructure inequalities within the country and the initial victims became the perpetrators of the structural violence (Nyaura, 2018: 18). Furthermore, this aggravated alienation of the members of different ethnic affiliations has led to regional disparities in terms of distribution of resources, which have been further aggravated by negative ethnicity (Nyaura, 2018: 18).

Omulo posits that the Luo are the most politically conscious community in Kenya. This can be attributed to the crackdown and marginalisation from the government, but also to the general intellectual and social robust culture among them (Omulo, 2017: 55). The first Mayor of Eldoret and MP for Nakuru Town were Luos in A. N. Oloo and Achieng' Oneko respectively. To date, Luos led in holding elective seats outside Luo Nyanza. A Luo MCA is currently representing Kahawa Wendani in Kiambu County (Omulo, 2017: 55).

According to Omulo, the exclusion of Luo and other subaltern groups from any political power is a severe injustice that cannot be justified through a utilitarian principle. To him, political competition is enough of a safeguard to grant that no person who is not competent enough to hold political authority would enter the arena of public affairs (Omulo, 2017: 55). The difference of cultural practice is thus entirely irrelevant to political rights and an a priori exclusion of Luo and other ethnic groups depicts an artificial inequality (Omulo, 2017: 56-57). In his perspective, an expansion of the suffrage towards Luo would double the mass of mental faculties that are available for the higher service of humanity. Consequently, the general society as a whole would improve (Omulo, 2017: 56-57). This does not only erase unjustified social inequality, but it also further advances the national character (Omulo, 2017:58).

Kanyinga suggests that the privilege of voting should be only bound on conditions that can be influenced by the individual itself. As a representative of liberal thought, he is convinced that nobody should be excluded except through their default (Kanyinga, 2014: 26). Therefore, he suggests conditions, bound to the privilege of voting, that would exclude no one interested enough in the political process. He states: "I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage without being able to read, write, and, I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic", this would "leave the suffrage accessible to all who are in the normal condition of a human being" (Kanyinga, 2014: 26).

To guarantee every citizen an equal chance to compete, to be represented, and to be heard, Kanyinga calls for a national system of education (Kanyinga, 2014: 26-27). At the time he distinguishes carefully between opportunity for and kind of education (Kanyinga, 2014: 28).

The former must be, according to Kanyinga, guaranteed by the state, while the latter is not the state's business (Kanyinga, 2014: 28). He argues that general state education is a "mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another" and thus would establish a "despotism over the mind, leading by the natural tendency to one over the body" (Kanyinga, 2014: 30-31). All that has been said of the importance of individual liberty and diversity in opinions involves, to Ghai and Ghai, the diversity of education (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 19-20). Thus, in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education, the state's obligation would be to defray the expenses for those unable to afford it (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 19-20).

In a state that is conducted accordingly, the citizenry would consist only of those ready to acquire the necessary level of education and able to grasp its wider interests (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 19-20). A nation that incorporates the greatest amount of people would, according to Kanyinga, cultivate a citizenship that arrives at better decisions, there they argue for the expansion of the right to vote. For the same purpose, they suggest a system based on so-called plural votes (Kanyinga, 2014: 30-31). According to Ghai and Ghai, every person is ought to have a vote, but not an equal vote (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 20-21). To them not every voice is worth the same and the voice of the higher moral or intellect is worth more than that of the person inferior to it (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 23). More potential voters, who can better understand the subject at stake, should obtain two or more votes (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 23). The plural vote, as suggested by Ghai and Ghai (2013), is not installed to outweigh one part of the community, but should serve as a means of protection from class legislation, of the uneducated as well as of the educated (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 27). Hence, Kanyinga, emphasises that this plurality scheme should be equally open to the poorest individual as to the richest in the community. Everyone ought to be able to prove that he or she is entitled to the privilege of obtaining a plurality of votes through voluntary examinations (Kanyinga, 2014: 25). To be left out of a constitution is, according to Ghai and Ghai, a great discouragement to the individual as to a class (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 28). Nevertheless, their consideration of representative governments cannot claim universality (Ghai and Ghai, 2013: 28-29).

Due to the ethnic focus of Moi's regime and the opposition, Moi intentionally created violent ethnic clashes within the Rift Valley before and during the presidential elections. One method of suppressing the opposition was the intentional creation of ethnic clashes, using "Kalenjin warriors" to kill opposition voters and members of other ethnic groups in the Rift Valley before and during both presidential elections of the 1990s (Cunningham, 2014: 14). However, Moi

was forced to seek the support of opposition forces after the 1997 elections because KANU did not have enough power to be effective in government, due to the shrinking presence of his party in government. Odinga of the NDP party and Luo people, formally merged with KANU in 2002 to create the New-KANU. Moi created four new chair positions all held by different ethnic leaders, of the Abaluhya, Kamba, Mijikenda and Kikuyu ethnic groups (Cunningham, 2014: 14).

Otieno posits that the Luo is a problem to the Kikuyu elite (or the Kenyan elite in general) who see them as good labour but a possible threat as leaders of a revolution from the masses. They are also a pain to the corrupt kleptocracy (Otieno, 2018: 5-6). Kenya does not have a Luo problem; the government has a problem with the Luos. Luos have immensely contributed to the political development of the country (Otieno, 2018: 5-6). Otieno (2018) observes that the Luo ethnic group has been a key player in the Kenyan political scene since pre-colonial times (Otieno, 2018: 6). Under British colonial rule, the Luo people did not have their land taken from them, unlike some other Kenyan tribes. Some of its favoured sons in the pre-colonial and post-colonial periods include (Otieno, 2018: 5-6).

Opondo points out that one book from 1900 describes the Kikuyu as “the sooner they gained the value of the rupee”, while the text of the 1930s describes the Luo as “strong, arrogant and intelligent”. At the heart of the controversy, even today is a human rights movement called “foreskin politics” —as Luo do not practice circumcision in their circumcision ceremonies, which the Kikuyu and related communities do not recognize. male leaders “as men qualified to lead” (Opondo, 2014: 62).

The socio-cultural dynamics associated with the safeguarding of the social formation of capital, in the Kenyan context, have often revolved around “othering” centred, mainly, on the practice of male circumcision. “Othering”, according to Abdallah-Preteille, involves “objectification of another person or group” or “creating the other” (Abdallah-Preteille, 2003: 13). Staszak (2003) defines the “other” as a “member of a dominated out-group, whose identity is considered lacking and who may be subject to discrimination by the in-group” (Staszak, 2009:43). He contends that:

Otherness is the result of a discursive process by which a dominant in-group (“Us,” the Self) constructs one or many dominated out-groups (“Them,” Other) by stigmatizing a difference – real or imagined – presented as a negation of identity and thus a motive for potential discrimination (Staszak, 2009: 44).

Long after Kenyatta launched his “deculturation” (social death) technique, it continues to be claimed, in Kenyan political parlance, that leadership is the preserve of the circumcised. This

argument has often been used by Kikuyu (dominant) politicians of Central Kenya against their Luo (dominated) competitors, who culturally do not practice male circumcision. Atieno-Odhiambo observed that:

This Gikuyu notion of civil society was extended to the political arena of the state by Kenyatta from 1966 to 1969, when he accused the KPU opposition of being chameleons – definitely not part of civil society and therefore, by extension, not legitimate citizens of the Kenya state that he ran. The Luo were targeted for this rhetorical exclusion ostensibly because they did not practice male circumcision. This specifically central Kenyan discourse on being cut – “the narcissism of small differences”, as Freud once spoke of it, the tendency to think of ourselves as superior to others because of some laughably superficial and non-essential feature – resurfaced in 1992 as two Gikuyu barons, Kenneth Matiba and Mwai Kibaki, bid for the presidency against Oginga Odinga. It was widely asserted that Odinga should not be elected because he was not circumcised (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002:243).

On the Luo side, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga quickly took over. Both he and his main rival, Tom Mboya, saw that the political power they dreamed of depended on nationalism first (Ajulu, 2008: 39-40).

Opondo states that the major political dynamics of Kenya put mainly three communities in the ring: Kikuyu, Luo, and Kalenjin. Political power and opposition have surrounded the three, with alliances formed by other societies to strengthen "numerical domination." While the current Kenyan leadership is Kikuyu-Kalenjin, the opposition is Luo-Kamba and Luhya. It seems that, to some extent, 2017 is 1966 (Opondo, 2014: 62).

That was the year Jaramogi Odinga left the ruling party to establish his own. It was also the year that the attacks on Odinga and his supporters began. Increased over the next four years (Opondo, 2014: 62). The use of state power reduced Odinga's power as the Luo leader divided his followers. This was especially bad - when Kenya became a one-party state in 1969, which led to massacres, assassinations and imprisonment (Opondo, 2014: 62).

Omulo states that in recent decades, the Luo-Kikuyu conflict has defined Kenyan politics. In current segregation discussions, draft maps highlight areas of influence (Omulo, 2017: 56). Although the conflict is comprised of Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta, they are simply so different now that their testing, and solution, have been difficult (Kanyinga, 2014: 20). Odinga is the face of opposition groups, and his politics of Odingaism, inherited from his father and consolidated, are hated in central Kenya. Kenyatta is the face of an oppressive government, inherited and perfected by his father, and hated in Nyanza and the coastal regions (Kanyinga, 2014: 20).

On the face, the main issue is state power, which means access to resources. Luo is denied access to a few governments (Kanyinga, 2014: 21-22). The Kikuyu feel that they have a legitimate, if not divine, position and see the Luo as jealous of it. Devolution already provides an argument for balance in both positions. But this competition will continue to explain the political situation for a while, hiding under real problems affecting almost 50 million Kenyans (Kanyinga, 2014: 21-22).

Conclusion

The nation-building work can be particularly daunting in some countries with varying degrees of racial and religious error. This chapter has shown that post-colonial Kenya is largely built on colonial heritage. It succeeded in breaking away but at the same time discriminated against the state as the political party continued to unite citizens in racial political parties. It has also failed to establish democracy. Nationalism and religion, in themselves, do not burn or provoke violent conflicts. Rather, under the ever-present conflicts that are often regarded as religious, they are questions of limited access to power, of limited resources, and opportunities. In addition, the problems that create strong competition are those that are considered essential to the survival and reproduction of a country, where competing teams often resort to non-discriminatory, action-oriented methods. This includes control of government power, resource allocation and land.

In particular, factors such as poverty, socio-economic discrimination, weak state power, and a lack of good governance all contributed to the Kenyan conflict and contributed significantly to the political instability of racial, religious, and national identity, thus leading to their foundation and political prowess. Such ownership is often a problem when access to opportunities in the political system in terms of power and resources depends on the membership of a particular race or religious group and where the state is weak in its ability to protect its citizens and provide for them. for their welfare.

Subalternity refers to a specific type of constitutional title — that is, a constitution by being singled out or discriminated against. What is important, however, is that subalternity refers to situations in which the hegemonic-grounding failure of the lifeworld has failed.

According to Gramsci's analysis, subgroups should look beyond their sub-identities, circumstances, and circumstances; they must document the history of relationships that created their submission and try to transform relationships with the power systems that have created and maintained relationships.

In liberation, the people of Kenya have inherited a deeply entrenched, discriminatory, and divisive country built based on ethnic groups considered to be important, enumerated and geographically included. Among those major groups that are regularly counted are, the main function of the 42 (+) public opinion theory is numerical prediction. For them, the post-colonial era has been one of the most intense rivalries between nations and repeated conflicts. The term 'It's our food opportunity' is often used to describe the expected racial opportunity for public and private gain in government control. The position of president Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) made this statement, as he gave his relatives of the Kikuyu nation political affiliation, civil service positions, and land reform programs, creating a lasting impression under the current president, his son, Uhuru Kenyatta, that they are Kikuyu. have improperly benefited from the state treasury. Lonsdale describes this as political racism, which is reflected in the fact that "parties compete for public services' and that nationalism is used in 'political competitions with other parties. The exclusion of Luo and other parties under any political power is a gross injustice that cannot be excused by the effective policy. For him, political competition is enough as a defence to give that no one can.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

As noted in my introduction, Kenya's social, economic, and political challenge has been historically motivated by colonialism that cuts across racial, ethnic, and religious lines. When one brings politics into the equation, we are confronted with a myriad of problems that intersect with democracy (or lack of), regionalism, and the quest for equality and freedom in a political system that favours the powerful and elite. When one considers the impact of religion, we are further confronted with the challenge of corrupt political governments, whose leaders have historically used religion as a motivating factor to gain power and suppress those of a lower status. To a great extent, religious ideology has been used as a "weapon" to suppress the minds of citizens and foster civil obedience to a regime and leader justified along the lines of being religiously chosen or ordained. If one traces the use of religion as a tool to power, we can find elements resonating from the independence of Kenya in 1963. The issue of a "theology" that legitimates corrupt governments must be analysed, not so much the doctrine of politics but its hegemonic influence to keep those in power. To do this, I intentionally set out to investigate how religion, conflict, and politics intersect in Kenya through a Gramscian analysis of the "subaltern." My dissertation intends to provide an analysis of the marginalised voices through theoretical reflections on how the subaltern has been impacted by the historical trajectories of religion and power in Kenya. To do this, I crafted four key chapters, which I will briefly highlight below.

In Chapter One, I begin by providing a rationale for this research. I explore the hegemonic disparities and the exclusion of ethnic groups in power-sharing within a post-independence Kenyan society that has been historically plagued by resistance, violence, and political instability. I begin by foregrounding what I mean by issues of diversity in Kenya, with particular attention to religious diversity, which to some extent has been left out of the critique of politics and power. I follow this with an exposition of key concepts integral to the discourse I am putting forward. These include civil society, collective will, conscience, democracy, hegemony, and power. From the onset of this chapter, I seek to frame my critical concepts within a neo-Marxist framework by drawing on the intellectual scholarship of Antonio Gramsci. After that, I unpack the research problem by contextualizing the political challenges within Kenya stemming from its independence in 1963. I then define the problem statement

that hinders the political sphere as a place where leaders justify their regimes along social lines of religious and ethnic affiliation. Against this background, I state my research objectives, which are to identify the role of religious leaders in Kenyan politics, establish factors that seem to promote the subordination of subaltern groups and underline how religions common sense hinders the ability of subaltern groups to overcome political subordination in Kenya. I finally unpack my methodology, which is qualitative interpretism that draws on current literature as a basis for critique.

In Chapter Two, I begin the foundation of my critique by focusing on a literature review and conceptual framework for my discourse. To maintain a broad survey of the current intellectual trends, I have foregrounded the following areas of research: relations between religion and politics in Kenya; religion and politics in Africa; ethnopoltics in Kenya; tribal and political governance in Kenya; ethnoreligious politics in Kenya; Gramsci and community; religion, social cohesion and united politics in Kenya; and Gramsci's hegemony and subaltern. These sub-themes provide a lens through which we can understand the current discourses emanating from African scholarship. By further exploring the literature, I use this as a basis to unpack some of the critical debates within the Kenyan context that cannot be excluded from a critique on religion, state, and power relations. I then begin to unpack my conceptual framework by discussing my integration of Gramsci in this dissertation as a theoretical lens. Gramsci has emerged as one of those voices we cannot ignore in our current era. While the development of his thought is positioned within Italy, his ideas and framing have shaped neo-Marxist thought for decades. In this dissertation, I argue that if we want to understand the power relations in Kenya and its impact on the citizens, we need to understand Gramsci's framing of the subaltern and its intersections with hegemony. Through several pages in this dissertation, I draw on some critical Gramscian scholars to unpack and support my positioning of Gramsci as a lens in Kenya. Gramsci undertakes a critical analysis of subaltern groups by examining their conditions, factors contributing to their subordination, modes of thoughts, culture, and level of political organization. For me, these are critical factors in understanding the Kenyan context.

In Chapter Three, I start to analyse civil society and the state in Kenya through a Gramscian lens. Despite severe oppression of the subaltern in Kenya, the role of civil society in mobilizing the oppressed and resistance cannot be ignored. In my discussion of hegemony, I explore its origins and point out that other ideas such as the passive revolution, society, state, historic bloc, and organic crisis connect and relate to Kenyan society. In exploring the concept of intellectuals, I began by discussing the meaning and imaginary functions and Gramsci's

subdivision of intellectuals into natural, traditional, urban, rural, and collective categories. This chapter sees the contextualization of Gramsci to Kenya. By explaining how Gramsci frames the subaltern, I see how these ideas manifest in Kenyan society. I draw on the changing role of civil society in Kenya, tracing back to the colonial era in 1888. An analysis of civil society follows this in Kenyatta's state. After that, an analysis of civil society in Moi's state. After this critique, I begin to analyse the role of "hegemony" in Kenya, by exploring it as a manipulative social force steering consent and coercion. Using this framework, I start to unpack the notion of the "subaltern" in Kenya.

In Chapter Four, I start to unpack the complexity and ambiguity that characterises the relationship of religion, state, and politics directly impacting the subaltern. This chapter presents the argument that history does not end, and the struggle for the ideological and material phase continues; in Kenya, this struggle for consciousness and praxis goes hand in hand with cultural production more than ever before. Using my own strengths as a parish leader, I start to examine the role of the church in Kenyan politics. In Kenya, the predominance of the Roman Catholic churches and the Anglican churches are still the two most influential religious organizations. The Anglican church has had a vague relationship with the state despite this. The church has been historically perceived as an extended arm of the colonial oppressors to a great extent. While the role of religion in Kenya is undoubted, in this chapter, I begin to conceptualise and contextualise religion and politics in Kenyan society. A critical discussion within this chapter alludes to the role of religion in politics and national integration in Kenya.

Finally, while this dissertation seems exhaustive, it in no way claims to have a solution to the current challenges. Instead, I offer this as a critical discussion on the multifaceted complexities that must be considered if we want to fully engage with a critique of religion, politics, and the subaltern within Kenya. I offer this dissertation as a point of departure for future intellectuals to engage with the key factors that have historically plagued Kenyan society.

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