
***A comparison of the philosophical traditions of Neo-Casuistry
and Situation Ethics in the context of morality issues arising in
the 'Fourth Industrial Revolution'.***

By

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A comparison of the philosophical traditions of Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism in thte context of morality issues arising in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

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Personal, Christian tradition.**

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is through extensive examination to compare and contrast two very different ethical decision-making frameworks, both forged in the Christian tradition. An examination will be undertaken of Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism and their respective abilities to provide their practitioners with the tools for moral decision-making, moral resolution and ultimately moral truth that will serve to positively address moral dilemma and/or moral conflict resulting from the use of Fourth Order Technologies (4OT) in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR)

Neo-Casuistry falls within the Catholic tradition and Christian Situationism falls within the Protestant tradition and the abilities of both religious, ethical decision-making frameworks to provide moral truth in 4IR will be examined, assessed and compared within the contemporary context of 'privacy' and the 'personal'. The results of this research will support that an ethical decision-making framework that judiciously makes use of the 'best practices' from each of the traditions would appear to provide 4IR with the most suitable and practical means of finding moral truth in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict.

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“For God hath not given us the spirit of fear; but of power and of love and of a sound mind.” (2 Timothy: 1:7 King James Version).

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1 Preface.

“Then two harlots came to the king and stood before him. The one woman said, “Oh, my lord, this woman and I dwell in the same house and I gave birth to a child while she was in the house. Then on the third day after I was delivered, this woman also gave birth; and we were alone; there was no one else with us in the house, only we two were in the house. And this woman’s son died in the night because she lay on it. And she arose at midnight and took my son from beside me, while your maidservant slept, and laid it in her bosom, and laid her dead son in my bosom. When I rose in the morning to nurse my child, behold it was dead; but when I looked closely in the morning, behold it was not the child that I had borne” But the other woman said, “No, the living child is mine, and the dead child is yours.” The first said “No the dead child is yours and the living child is mine” Thus they spoke before the king.

Then the king said, “The one says”, ‘This is my son that is alive and your son is dead, and my son is the living one’ and the king said, “Bring me a sword.” So, a sword was brought before the king. And the king said, “Divide the living child in two and give half to one and half to the other.” Then the woman whose son was alive said to the king because her heart yearned for her son, “Oh my lord give her the living child and by no means slay it.” But the other said, “It shall be neither mine nor yours; divide it” Then the king answered and said, “Give the living child to the first woman, and by no means slay it; she is its mother”. And all Israel heard of the judgement which the king had rendered; and they stood in awe of the king, because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to render justice.” (1 Kings 3:16-28. RSV).

This familiar *Old Testament* story provides a vivid, historical example of a moral dilemma; that of rightful child custody; and the search and determination by King Solomon for moral truth and resolution in the case brought before him.

No doubt many of us who have read this story find ourselves wondering what would we have done if presented with this unusual and extreme dilemma? Do we possess the wisdom of King Solomon which we are told is a;

“... wisdom and understanding beyond measure, and largeness of mind like the sand on the seashore, so that Solomon’s wisdom surpassed the wisdom of all the people of the east, and all the wisdom of Egypt. For he was wiser than all other men...” (1 Kings 4: 29-31.RSV).

Would our moral reasoning be as refined as King Solomon’s? Would our moral reflection be as acute? Would our moral imagination encourage us towards authentic moral resolution and moral truth? Would our suggested moral action be as bold? But perhaps most importantly, we would have to ask ourselves would moral truth once uncovered prevail and provide the future with a suitable moral template or paradigm for use in similar cases of moral dilemma?

The process of moral reasoning undertaken by King Solomon and his subsequent actions, seem to be supported by Kuczewski (1997) who reminds us;

“The practical world demands answers and decisions and cannot wait for the arrival of the ultimate theory.” (1997:60).

However, to take such a position would seem to ignore the need for consistency of moral resolution and conduct for identical or similar moral dilemmas and/or moral

conflicts irrespective of the decision maker and their skills. Such is the axiomatic role played by theories of moral decision-making that help us to access moral truth which in turn actively help us in shaping morally consistent outcomes for moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts that present as similar if not identical.

Brown (1997) suggests that moral principles are the ethical tools needed to explain and uncover the concept of moral truth and proposes that indeed theories enshrining moral principles precede both our explanation and understanding of moral truth. His position is supported by Gula (1997) who proposes that to expose moral truth in a moral dilemma, we are charged to bring to bear our “*accumulated wisdom enshrined in a moral principle*” (1997:76) as arguably practised by King Solomon in the Old Testament story of child custody.

But surely Brown’s (1997) suggestion must prompt the enquiring mind to ask that if moral principles help us to determine moral truth, then which moral principles do we employ when trying to unravel and resolve a case of moral conflict and/or moral dilemma especially those resulting from the use of Fourth order technologies (4OT) in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR)?

However, perhaps the principal question we should be asking ourselves if we accept the proposition of Brown (1997) and the way in which it applies to the context driven child custody case brought before King Solomon, is; do moral principles have a ‘shelf-life’? If we find ourselves answering this question in the affirmative, then we are inherently accepting the ‘*organic*’ nature of moral principles; in other words, moral principles are subject to relativism and can change over time due to extrinsic forces.

If this is the case, then it stands to reason the moral principles used by King Solomon in his moral reasoning and search for moral truth and resolution in 970 – 931 before the common era, in the case of child custody, would be completely inappropriate for establishing contemporary moral truth in a case of child custody; let alone that for a moral dilemma posed by the full force of 4IR and its accompanying 4OT. Such a situation and opinion are the source for this research as it seeks to find contemporary moral truth in 4IR through the use of two ethical decision-making frameworks forged in the Christian tradition.

2 Background.

“This section should indicate what the general aims of the study are and to give reasons for studying this particular phenomenon.” (Mouton, 2001:48).

2.1 The Ascendance of Science.

The global ascendance of science and technology in the past century cannot be denied. What once seemed inconceivable, is now considered ordinary, even common-place, and its presence accepted and embraced in contemporary life. Communications, manufacturing, economic transactions, and medicine are just some of the cases in point where science has made life-changing strides in both our personal and professional lives and our expectations therein. Interestingly Geertz (1973) speaks for many when he suggests that;

“Scientific advancement commonly consists in a progressive complication of what once seemed a beautifully simple set of notions but now seems an unbearably simplistic one.” (1973:33).

However, despite this somewhat sardonic view of science and its effects, there is a general belief in the benefits that science can bring to wider society and the world in general, although scholarly consensus suggests that science and technology cannot do this in the absence of moral enquiry. The latter seeks to ensure that both our individual (*self*) and collective (*other*) sense of ‘*right*’ and ‘*wrong*’; ‘*good*’ and ‘*bad*’ and ‘*fair*’ and ‘*unfair*’ is not displaced by science to the extent that our ‘*flourishing*’, ‘*well-being*’ and Aristotelian sense of ‘*eudaimonia*’ are compromised.

Stehr (1994) amply expresses this view when he states;

“The hope that scientific knowledge will open up many, if not all, secrets of nature and the heavens and that such insights will prove to be instrumental in building a better world, based on nature’s design built for the benefit of mankind, is a dream long associated with the legitimization of scientific activity.” (1994:viii).

Such change it can be argued, has actively pushed forward both our individual and collective moral imagination, moral horizons and moral boundaries as existing moral truths have proved ineffective in solving the moral dilemmas and moral conflict arising from the application of 4OT and the prescient 4IR knowledge accompanying them. In short,

“Technology changes ethics, it challenges old beliefs, it upends institutions that do not grow and change.” (Enriquez: 2020:6.)

This observation of ‘new’ knowledge challenging existing traditional knowledge and its existing structures was also clear in earlier years to the philosopher Dilthey (2019) who pithily commented that;

“It may be that never before or since have the ultimate presuppositions of human life and action been subjected to such a degree of erosion.” (2019:295).

If this is indeed the case, then we are bound to ask; how do independent moral agents discover an appropriate and practical moral truth for the ‘new’ moral conflicts and dilemmas they might encounter in 4IR generated through their use of 4OT?

2.2 The Moral Realities of 4IR.

4IR has been heralded as bringing the world closer together, spreading democracy and changing the nature and face of business and production. However, its reliance on both science and technology has also simultaneously presented us with 'new' moral challenges and dilemmas (Block, 2013) and has arguably caused us to forget in the words of Fletcher (1966) that; *"Things are to be used; people are to be loved."* (1966:51)

Schwab (2016) recognises this position and whilst a staunch supporter of the progress that 4OT has brought globally to 4IR he confirms;

"The big challenge for most societies will be how to absorb and accommodate the new modernity, whilst still embracing the nourishing aspects of our traditional value systems." (2016:97).

In citing the lacuna between *'traditional value systems'* and the temporal moral challenges brought about in 4IR, Schwab (2016) is implicitly referring to the *'new'* moral conflicts and dilemmas that are often the consequence of the potential and oftentimes certain application of 4OT. These previously unexperienced and unimagined *'new'* moral dilemmas and conflicts occasioned in 4IR, often require us to review our existing values through an examination of our current moral consciousness for which it would appear our *'traditional value systems'* often seem to leave us ill-prepared and ill-equipped to undertake authentic moral reasoning. In short, these *'new'* dilemmas, seem to demand a radical review of both individual (*self*) ethics and collective (*other*) morals if moral truth is to be uncovered and used going forward in similar situations of moral dilemma and conflict.

This thought is echoed and built upon by Ruebhausen in his foreword to Westin's (1967) book *'Privacy and Freedom'* when he states;

"With our complex and dynamic society, however, the advent of new knowledge can be traumatic. Especially is this true when the pace of advance is rapid and the initial force of radical discoveries must be cushioned and accommodated in a relatively short interval of time. It is no surprise that our social and political institutions are now sorely pressed to find the flexibility to utilise new technology effectively while, at the same time, preventing its abuse." (1967: xii).

Ruebhausen's (1967) use of the word *'abuse'* would seem to drive straight to the heart of *'new'* moral dilemmas and the contemporary search for moral truth in 4IR where we often discover that *'uber-Capitalism'*, rational self-interest and even self-preservation is in direct and open conflict with reciprocal altruism and selflessness so often at the heart of moral truth at any time in Western history. Indeed, it is arguably moral truth, with its focus on partnership, empowerment, reconciliation and stewardship in the workplace, communities, the home and wider society that still has the power to etch the moral landscape in 4IR. (Block, 2013)

2.3 The Need for Ethics in 4IR.

The objective of this research is to investigate whether either of two historic, religious, ethical decision-making frameworks, namely Christian Situationism or Neo-Casuistry, can single-handedly provide the framework and tools for moral truth in contemporary moral conflicts and dilemmas in 4IR, or whether there is a case to be

made for '*e pluribus unum*' in which the '*best practices*' of both can be extracted and used to establish moral truth and resolution in 4IR.

Historically, both religious, ethical traditions have amply demonstrated their capability to push existing moral horizons and moral imagination to their limits, demanding us to review, re-assess and re-direct existing moral truth in such a way, the ethics of narrow self-interest is de-stabilised and a moral practicality, authenticity, and relevancy ascends from their judicious application, and rises-up almost phoenix-like from the metaphorical fires of self-interest and isolationism. In so doing, faith is often re-introduced into a predominantly secular context and recognised as having sufficient scope and capacity to provide moral truth and resolution in times of moral conflict and dilemma. Gustafson (1970) notes the task of Christian ethics is to distinguish Scripture as '*revealed morality*' from '*revealed reality*' and attributes the Bible as a source of ethical reflection which in turn he proposes lends a legitimate authority to Christians particularly in terms of their moral reasoning and decision-making in contemporary times.

Similarly, Holloway (2017), often associated with a humanist (secular) approach, writes that religious tradition must not be discarded or disregarded despite the increase in secularism in Western societies when seeking moral truth. Rather, he suggests it must compete for relevance with secular traditions which he asserts it does quite competently when engaged.

2.4 The Information Age.

Drucker (1992) predicted the 'Information Age' would be accompanied by rapid, social and economic change on a scale that would mirror and possibly overtake that

seen by the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century, arguably the most disruptive and progressive of modern times. The hallmark of all three preceding industrial revolutions has been *'progress'* and *'modernisation'* a fact of which Stehr (1994) reminds us. He chooses, like other scholars, to substitute the word *'information'* for *'knowledge'* and concurs with Drucker's (1992) opinion of the pervasiveness of *'knowledge'* in 4IR when he writes;

"Contemporary society may be described as a knowledge society based on the extrinsic penetration of all of its spheres of life and institutions by scientific and technological knowledge." (1994:2).

Scholars agree that *'progress'* has been achieved across all four industrial revolutions, but importantly the question that is rarely asked is; how, when and at what cost? The latter encompasses economic, societal, moral and spiritual costs. However, arguably these historically important traditions, often providing the glue that holds the social and cultural aspects of society together and which we ensure are so firmly in place, are neglected by Drucker (1992). His extensive work and research on the changes heralded by 4IR, bare no significant reference to the moral, ethical, spiritual, or theological traditions. Nor does he seem to acknowledge their fundamentally important central role and function in the West, of providing society with coherence, harmony, moral truth and moral certainty in times of moral conflict and dilemma. Neither does Drucker (1992) speculate in his research whether their influence in such areas would be retained or furthered by the expansion of science and technologies in 4IR.

2.5 The reality of 4IR and the Importance of Science and Technology.

Drucker's (1992) prescient, uber-type of 4IR, is endorsed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) which proposes the twenty first century is best viewed as the latest period in a continuum of industrial revolutions. They suggest we are currently living in 4IR which Klaus Schwab (2016), the Chairman of WEF, suggests is the result of rapid digitisation and is "*unlike anything humankind has experienced before*". He goes on to describe 4IR as;

"... the staggering confluence of emerging technology breakthroughs, covering wide ranging fields such as artificial intelligence (AI) robotics, the internet of things (IoT), autonomous vehicles, 3-D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials science, energy storage and quantum computing to name but a few." (2016:1).

Schwab (2016) like others, credits science with providing the technology and scientific discoveries to carve out new industrial landscapes. Particularly, it could be judged that 4IR has been;

"...anchored in rationalism, precision and calculation without reference to the subjective, moral, spiritual and normative ...there is no place for the relative, emotional and immeasurable." (Doherty 2021:216).

This would suggest that industrial progress and modernisation has been achieved without reference to their impact on ethics which is defined in Blackburn's (2008) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy as;

"The study of the concepts involved in practical reasoning: good, right, duty, obligation, virtue, freedom, rationality, choice." (2008:121).

Doherty (2021) indicates that;

“Implicit in this definition is the notion of human values, interests and relationality in terms of ‘self’ and ‘other’ compelled, ethicists would argue, by both the concept and reality of morality and independent moral agency.” (2021:218).

Arguably, in neglecting the moral and ethical impacts of 4OT, scientists have created moral conflict and moral dilemmas for those independent moral agents interacting and engaging with ‘new’ and emerging technologies in 4IR. To resolve the moral conflict that can arise from such interaction, moral reasoning and moral decision-making needs to be undertaken by moral agents, if a sense of moral cohesion is to exist between science and ‘human values’ so important for any industrial society. To optimise this moral decision-making and uncover a new sense of moral truth that could resolve the moral conflict and/or dilemma faced, the moral agent will turn to ethical decision-making paradigms and their guidelines, either consciously or unconsciously, to assist in the provision of moral truth and the resulting moral resolution for their eventual moral action and conduct.

2.6 The Purpose of this Research.

In undertaking research of this nature, it must be understood the scope of the subject matter is both extensive and complex and arguably stretches beyond the confines of this initial project which is perhaps best viewed as an initial ‘*toe in the water*’. The purpose of this research will be to ascertain if either the tradition of Neo-Casuistry or Christian Situationism possesses the sole means of providing their respective practitioners with moral truth that results in moral consistency and practical moral

appositeness and resolution. In so doing, the researcher will attempt to practise the Bertrand Russell tradition of adopting the Occam's razor approach defined by James Russell (2015) as;

“a historical theory which suggests that when there is a simple or complex explanation for the same thing, the simple explanation is to be preferred.”

(2015:4).

This sentiment has been endorsed by contemporary ethicists who have recognised the implicit tension existing between their theories and traditions contained in their oft lauded '*simple*' ethical pragmatism and those of their philosopher counterparts who indulge in the '*complex*' idealism of their philosophical theories. The latter has been known to suffer sometimes in practical translation when applied to real circumstances of moral dilemma creating controversy and reaction from practitioners (Singer 1993). Nevertheless, it is hoped this research can provide valuable insight into the current moral challenges occasioned by 4IR and the tools to be used for moral resolution if moral truth is to be gained both immediately and going forward when similar situations of moral dilemma arise.

Moral philosophy (ethics) is a wide range of study that can draw on several different disciplines. However, throughout this research process, what must not be forgotten or overlooked, is the practise of ethics is never '*simple*' and not without dissent, as the traditions of Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism will reveal. Moreover, both ethical problem-solving paradigms will be examined and compared in a way that will confirm the view of the historian Glover (2001) who proposes that in modern times;

“...many philosophers are sympathetic to a more pragmatic form of ethics where principles are put forward tentatively, in the expectation that they will be shaped and modified by our responses to practical problems.” (2001:6).

To this end, this research has been undertaken in the spirit of *‘philosophical evolutionary ethics’* which according to Joyce (2013) incorporates the fields of applied ethics, normative ethics and metaethics. He states that;

“At one extreme lies applied ethics, which may offer definitive practical advice on how to act in concrete scenarios (e.g. regarding euthanasia). Normative ethics is the enterprise of building a general theory of moral action that is applicable across all or a large range of cases (e.g. utilitarianism. At the other end of the spectrum lies metaethics, which is concerned with a number of interrelated theoretical matters...and the epistemological status of moral judgements.” (2013:124).

3 Introduction.

3.1 The Moral Landscape Created by the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Research has supported the proposition the post-modern world has become morally pluralistic (Sachs, 2018) and more secular Robinson, (2015); Turner, (2011); Russell, (1997) but it is perhaps Bonhoeffer (1972) who best foretold this ‘*eclipse of God*’ in modern times in a letter he wrote from a Nazi prison before his execution. He writes;

“Man has learned to cope with all questions of importance without recourse to God as a working hypothesis. In questions concerning science, art and even ethics, this has become an understood thing which one scarcely dares to tilt at anymore.” (1972:194-195).

The moral pluralism and secularism described by Bonhoeffer (1972) can arguably be seen to exist alongside rapid changes and advances in our physical world brought about by the prevalence of 4OT. Moreover, it appears that Bonhoeffer (1972) has unwittingly described the contemporary context and challenges of 4IR and its dependence on science that stands accused of marginalising the Christian faith in the West. When faced with situations of moral conflict and/or moral dilemma, that demand moral resolution through the accessing of moral truth, we typically turn to the three components of ethics, morals and faith, either singly or collectively, to assist in our moral reasoning and decision-making.

Whilst the component of faith is arguably less used in the West in contemporary times due to the rise in secularism, it does not negate its use by the faithful, neither

does it negate our urgent need to turn to moral philosophy in the form of ethics to find moral solutions to moral dilemmas created in and by 4IR.

Alexander (1914) supports us in this notion when he advises that;

“Ethics therefore, while dependent upon the philosophical sciences has its own distinct content and scope.” (1914:16).

He goes on to clarify the dominant role he believes ethics should take in assisting the uncovering of moral truth when he proposes;

“...ethics stands nearer to everyday life and deals with matters of practical conduct. Ethics also takes cognisance of beliefs as well as actions and is interested in judgements not less than achievements.” (1914:20).

Considering Alexander’s (1914) understanding that ‘beliefs’ form an important part of ethics, this research will seek to examine our ability to uncover moral truth in situations of moral conflict and dilemma created by the 4OT developed in 4IR, through an examination of two distinct ethical problem-solving paradigms, that embrace the Christian faith. Both paradigms, aim to achieve this through guiding and shaping our moral reasoning, moral conduct and moral resolution in a way that provides us with moral truth and certainty, ever mindful of the warning given by Jowett (1896) when he advised;

“It might be said: we cannot do one thing at one time and another thing at another, now be guided by another man’s conscience, now by our own.” (Kindle Loc:98).

4IR and its use of 4OT, has created contemporary situations of moral dilemma in which both ethics and morals and even our faith are not only subject to disruption but are actively challenged. These dynamics have arguably resulted in a tension between Christian ethics and values and those of the secular and material and created a moral landscape that supports questions concerning whether the former should transcend the latter in situations of contemporary moral dilemma in which moral truth is sought by moral agents. (Wogamon 2011).

Mitchell (2013) recognises the impact of 4OT on contemporary life and the moral dilemmas that can result from human interaction with technology. He reminds us there are no moral machines or virtuous robots; a position supported by Wallach (2010) and Danielson (1992) Their combined work supports the position of ethical tension arising in 4IR whereby 4OT has arguably marginalised faith and to some extent human relevance in daily life, in favour of science, machines and the cognitive, calculable and measurable.

3.2 New Technology and Moral Dilemmas Arising.

The introduction of 4OT has actively challenged our existing ethics and morals across a range of disciplines and contexts and created an historically unique complexity in our search for moral truth as faith and secularism collide as a means for ethical decision-making and moral resolution. 4OT in the forms of artificial intelligence (AI), virtual reality, the internet of things (IoT) 'big data', advanced machine learning (AML), 'smart design', quantum computing, bio-engineering, cyber physical systems (CPS) and information and communication technologies (ICT) have created radical shifts and changes in contemporary life and our existing

understanding of moral truth. Our search for moral truth in 4IR amidst the moral ‘*disruption*’ associated with 4IR and 4OT has according to Enriquez (2020) directly challenged and, in some instances, overturned the contextual and moral status quo. It has been suggested in some academic quarters, the scenario we are currently facing is redolent of Locke’s (1997) anthropocentric ‘*theory of abstraction*’ by which capacity he suggests we form ‘*new*’ ideas of morality that might be devoid of experience since; “...*it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings.*” (1997:55).

This view is supported by Kant (2018) in his seminal work ‘*Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*’ in which we learn of the ascendance of humankind above all other forms of life due to our unique rationality and ability to reason which in turn informs our sense of morality through an inherent understanding and acceptance of our duty, obligations and responsibilities. However, are we to deduce from the writings of Locke (1997) and Kant (2018) that a human’s unique capacity for understanding and duty anchored in our ability to reason results in a ‘*new*’ morality being adopted by ourselves when morally challenged by previously unencountered moral dilemmas or ideas? This would suggest our moral concern born out of reason is not limited to a direct moral experience, but that a moral concern can arise from an ‘*a priori*’ context. If this is the case, then surely the corollary to this scenario is which moral decision-making frameworks would we consider employing in our quest to reach an authentic moral truth through moral reasoning and eventual moral resolution when confronted with the possibility of moral dilemmas and moral conflict associated with the introduction and use of 4OT?

3.3 Christian Ethical Decision- Making Traditions for use in Moral Dilemmas.

Historically in the West, ethics has been about 'values' and rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition to the extent that Wogamon (2011) in his foreword proposes,

"...the task of the Christian community is not only the formation of persons of good conscience, but the careful framing of the issues and problems such people are called upon to address in the real world." (2011:ii).

Despite the rise of secularism in the West, it is at the urging of Wogamon (2011) above, that this research into the Christian decision-making frameworks, Neo-Casistry and Christian Situationism and their accompanying Christian principles has been undertaken. This research will attempt to examine whether either can provide a suitable means of establishing 'new' moral truth in 4IR, or have they become as redundant as the old technology that 4OT has replaced?

The approach of this research will be undertaken within the conceptual research framework of; problem – cause – solution (see Fig 1) In adopting this approach to the research question, the researcher will be mindful of relativism which can, if not tempered with equivalent rationality, provide more questions than answers in an essentially qualitative piece of research. Mindful of the liberal, normative, Christian traditions that form the thrust of this research, the researcher will employ the techniques of rational enquiry supported through and by an extensive array of source data to address the critical research question and provide interpretation and analysis through syntopical, textual analysis that will directly inform the research objectives.




Figure 1: Conceptual Research Framework (L. Doherty)

3.4 Pre-Suppositions Of ‘New’ Moral Truth in 4IR.

If we accept the presence of ‘new’ moral dilemmas arising from the introduction of 4OT and their application(s), then we must also accept the profound need to maintain a sense of moral objectivity as a means of providing balance and perspective as we attempt to uncover and even re-discover a universal notion of moral truth in moral dilemmas in 4IR and would be wise to heed the advice of Habermas (2007) who boldly asserts that in times of attempting to address moral conflict and disentangle moral difficulties and provide moral solutions, we must strive to ensure that;

“...rightness and truth come together...by way of argumentation and a rational consensus.” (2007:176).

However, to achieve this, we must also heed the advice proffered by MacIntyre (2002) who exhorts;

“Each of us therefore has to choose both with whom we wish to be morally bound and by what ends, rules and virtues we wish to be guided.”
(2002:259).

This researcher would propose the words of these two respected, modern, philosophers flow from one to another so that our relationships and faith can inform any and all attempts to uncover a universal sense of moral truth through collective moral reasoning with the aim of reaching a consensus for moral truth suitable for situations of ‘new’ moral dilemma and/or moral conflict in 4IR. For this to occur, there needs to be an implicit understanding in 4IR of the need to provide a universal moral injunction if moral conflict is to be resolved and framed by moral truth for situations of moral conflict and dilemma.

3.5 The ‘New’ Moral Dilemmas Occasioned by 4IR.

Industry and in particular the 4IR workplace has in many instances according to Brettel & Keller (2014) run the gauntlet of 4OT and a changing industrial and manufacturing landscape. Pereira & Romero (2017) confirm this position and their work details how employees and employers have been faced with and have experienced ‘new’ moral dilemmas in both manufacturing, systems and processes. To accommodate this, they suggest that employers have been required to embark on the acquisition of new capital equipment, to be used by their employees, that has oftentimes required active and urgent moral reasoning, resolution and action in order to overcome direct moral challenges in their workplace and ipso facto their working lives. There has been the domain of retrenchments, obsolescence and employee up-skilling in response to Orwellian machine intelligence that has been accused of

threatening human relevance and human employment and deployment in both the workplace and society at large. Indeed Feinberg & Feinberg (2010) support the claims of the dominance of science over human life made by Huxley (2006) in his dystopian novel *'A Brave New World'*. Huxley's (2006) description of the *'Bokanovsky's Process'* when originally authored, was relegated to the realms of science fiction, even science fantasy, but we are now familiar with the process he described as genetic engineering which is an accepted 4OT practice and carried out in laboratories with little fanfare and even less wonder.

3.6 The Two Ethical Problem-Solving Traditions of Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism.

Despite the passage of time, Locke (1997) aptly calculates our required moral response to the challenges we face in 4IR when he suggests that.

"...our business is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct." (1997:58).

and indeed, it is our moral response and moral action that give rise to our concern as we try to uncover moral truth through moral reasoning and decision-making as we navigate a moral path through the uncharted *'new'* moral conflicts and dilemmas in 4IR. Our conduct in this matter perhaps leaves us asking ourselves; How do we decide what is *'right'* and *'wrong'* and *'good'* or *'bad'* when presented with *'new'* moral conflicts and dilemmas resulting from 4OT? How can we ensure that justice, fairness and a collective understanding of *'well-being'* *'flourishing'* and *'goodness'*, (acknowledged theoretical pillars of moral philosophy) underpins our moral reasoning and decision-making and in turn informs our sense of moral truth? More

importantly should our newly acquired moral truth in 4IR, provide us with a moral template for future moral dilemmas of a similar nature? It is for exactly these reasons; this research will examine and compare the existing ethical problem-solving traditions of Neo-Casualism and Christian Situationism (both as conceptual and practical frameworks) as a means of providing their practitioners with the means to discern a 'new' authentic and practical moral truth in 4IR.

To this end, it has been suggested in some quarters, that both Neo-Casualism and Christian Situationism can be seen to offer the moral traditions and frameworks in which it could be said that;

"...principles are put forward tentatively, in the expectation that they will be shaped and modified by our responses to practical problems." (Glover, 2001:6).

and indeed, it is the practical problems arising in 4IR from the use of 4OT that require ethicists to urgently examine the capabilities of these two ethical problem-solving traditions as a means of discerning contemporary moral truth.

3.7 The Tradition of Casualism.

Casualism at its most simplistic is essentially best understood as case-based moral reasoning. Its method is 'analogous' and has been accurately described by Mercadante (2011) as 'principle-based reasoning'. Born out of the Catholic Church in the sixteenth century and commonly associated with the Catholic order of Jesuits, Casualism can be seen to be an 'aequitas' of theology, philosophy and law (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989). These three disciplines are used judiciously by the casuist in terms of

shaping their moral reasoning and as a direct means of establishing moral truth and moral certainty in cases presenting similar moral conflicts and dilemmas and qualify the approach as being based primarily on *'principlism'* accompanied by *'legalism'* and *'faith'*. The case for the importance of Casuistry and its successor Neo-Casuistry in ethical decision-making has been championed by Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) in their seminal work, *'The Abuse of Casuistry'* and its use has been extensive in recent times as a means of establishing moral truth in cases of moral dilemma particularly in the field of bioethics and is being viewed as a potential means of establishing moral truth in 4IR. Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) profess that;

"The most vigorous casuistry is typically generated by a confrontation between values that are thought of as long settled and emerging conditions that apparently challenge those values." (1989:158).

Its use can therefore be seen to be most apposite in moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts occasioned by the use of 4OT in 4IR where science is often accused of colliding and trying to overturn previously held values of both the individual and wider society.

3.8 The Tradition of Situation Ethics.

Christian Situationism is a distinctly normative, liberal, Christian, ethics problem-solving paradigm, developed by the protestant theologian Joseph Fletcher (1966) as a means of providing what he believed to be a contemporary *'new morality'*. Like its counterpart Neo-Casuistry, Christian Situationism seeks to establish moral truth in situations of moral conflict and dilemma; however, it does so strictly within the Christian tradition specifically using the method of *'Agape'* love as the key method of

moral reasoning and acknowledges the *'particularity'* in each and any situation of moral dilemma. In short, Situationism subscribes to the view that no two situations of moral dilemma are ever the same, even if their circumstances appear to present identically. This observation is not 'new' having been identified in both Greek and Roman times where deductive models for moral reasoning were used and the strength and limitations of a type of Situation Ethics recognised and understood in conjunction with those of the moral agent charged with assigning moral truth, resolution and certainty in circumstances of moral conflict and dilemma.

Inwood (2005) when writing about the Stoic philosophical position of how to provide moral truth in situations of moral dilemma, identifies that within the Stoic framework, moral resolution is invariably *'sensitive to context'*. He proceeds to explain that moral complexity in this tradition, is associated with types of moral dilemmas resulting in the question being asked of how to apply universal moral injunctions in a way that takes account of *'particular situations'*, circumstances and/or contexts of moral dilemma? The argument is made by the Stoics that exceptional circumstances can call for exceptional moral resolutions that are not to be used as a universal solution.

These observations of Inwood (2005) regarding Stoic philosophy, are not supported by Langlands (2011) whose paper reviews the thinking of Roman scholars in terms of moral resolution where *'core principles'* are consistently sought and used for moral reasoning, decision-making, resolution and conduct. Again, we are informed that situations of moral dilemma in Roman times are recognised as invariably being subject to *'situational variability'* which can extend to situational moral resolution. However, Langlands (2011) examines the Roman *'Exempla'* which she argues is

best understood as providing a means of moral development and education using moral tools that assist in mediating between the universal and the *'particular'* in situations of moral dilemma. Here the anecdotes of both Valerius Maximus and Cicero are shared in a way in which the *'Exempla'* (first century C.E.) discusses and explains the particularities of certain moral dilemmas and their subsequent interpretation. Langlands (2011) theorises the *'Exempla'* acknowledges the difference between abstract theory and particular circumstances, providing the reader with a series of practical solutions for described moral dilemmas. This ability to *'tailor'* moral resolution to the *'particular'* circumstance whilst adhering to certain core moral principles has been universally accepted as a consistent strength of what has subsequently been called classical Situation Ethics.

Langlands (2011) also identifies the importance of the *'persona'* or ethical agent assigned in this Roman tradition whereby; *'the particular nature and characteristics of the individual'* become paramount to successful moral reasoning and subsequent moral resolution and conduct. Whilst social and economic status was important in both Greek and Roman societies defining the social roles that individuals charged with discerning moral truth in situations of moral dilemma could occupy, fortunately this is not the case in modern Situation Ethics where social status is in large part redundant.

3.9 The Role/Need for Ethics in 4IR.

Drucker (1992) embraced and endorsed the notion of the *'Information Age'* and proposed the acquisition and application of *'knowledge'* in its broadest sense would not only define 4IR but would provide the means of business success. He argued

that global, open- access to information and what we now term 'big data' or 'meta-data' would accelerate the flow of information and knowledge and in so doing dismantle geographic, economic, social and cultural boundaries that constrained the existing industrial, professional and personal worlds.

As mentioned in the Background to this research, the former primacy of the Christian religious tradition in the West, is most certainly no longer the case in contemporary times as highlighted by Holloway (2017) who writes that secular humanists, can be seen to adopt many of the pre-supposed strengths of the Christian faith as they;

“...try to help men and women live good lives, not on principles imposed by religion but on principles humans have worked out for themselves.”
(2017:235).

This definition refers to two clearly different sets of principles, separated by their distinctive traditions; the one religious, the other secular. Dilthey (2019) in his work *'The Problem of Religion'* proposes that; *“religiosity can still inform the lived experiences in secular times”* (2019:295) a position with which Holloway (2017) concurs, as he too suggests that religious, ethical-solving paradigms have a place in modern times. Holloway (2017) proposes they offer but one of several ways of interpreting and resolving modern, moral conflicts and dilemmas in providing associated moral resolution and conduct for their faithful.

Against such a backdrop, this research arguably gains additional validity as the respective moral wisdom (born out of the religious traditions) of Neo-Casistry and Christian Situationism would seem to suggest that neither is out-dated, nor archaic as a means for providing moral truth in 4IR. Indeed, it could be argued the possible

consequences associated with 'new' moral dilemmas in 4IR are invariably value based which presents an ideal and suitable opportunity for faith to be used as a means of moral reasoning using the capabilities associated with the faith-based frameworks of Neo-Casualism and Christian Situationism as means for discerning moral truth.

3.9.1 4IR and its Moral Consequences.

The researcher would propose that many of us are familiar with these observations and would concur the reality of 4OT has indeed created situations of moral conflict and dilemma in which our moral decision-making, moral response, and moral conduct challenges the following;

- Our experience of both our physical and emotional world.
- Our cognitive knowledge and its basis and the way in which 4OT disrupts existing epistemology.
- Our existing morals and our ethics and in some instances even our faith.
- Our ability to recognise and adopt new moral truth for new moral dilemmas.

It can be seen from these moral challenges, that a sense of moral truth and resolution whilst presenting exceptional challenges for the moral agent is nevertheless urgently required in 4IR, as new moral conflicts and dilemmas present themselves in our daily lives.

3.9.2 The Moral Challenges presented by 4OT in 4IR.

Our understanding of the word revolution involves the notion of '*radical change*' and it appears that 4OT have already amply provided us with this in abundance, often accompanied by disruption. This thesis proposes 4IR continues to challenge our existing moral and ethical values and notions of; family, death, life, reproduction, identity, privacy and dignity and will continue to do so as '*new*' technology continues to directly implant and supplant itself upon the individual and contemporary society affecting the ways in which we go about our personal, spiritual and professional tasks, in addition to our personal reflections and meditations. The life tools, ethics and beliefs that we have inherited, learned and used as individual moral agents, are often inadequate for the '*new*' situations of moral dilemma that we encounter in 4IR and can do little to assist in our personal life journeys. This has resulted in us currently having to wrestle with '*new*' moral conflicts and dilemmas such as; Is it '*right*' that a woman (through genetic engineering) can give birth to her grandmother? Is it '*right*' that a woman is one year older than the 'child' to whom she gives birth? (<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55164607>) (Accessed 15/12/2020) A recent documented case study explains how a twenty-seven-year-old fertilised embryo was implanted successfully into the womb of a twenty-eight-year-old woman who carried the embryo to full term and was just twenty-nine-years old when she gave birth. Is it '*fair*' that paying patrons of a musical event/concert be subjected to crowd recognition software used by law enforcement agencies (without their consent) to identify criminals who have escaped detection? Is it '*right*' that a legal request of a partially transitioned transgender woman who identifies as a man but who gave birth to a child, be accepted and permitted by the court to be registered as

the father of the child on the birth certificate? Is it *'fair'* that the practise of human-cloning be routinely performed as a means of eugenics? Is it *'right'* to pursue the science that would provide humans with an external womb?

It would be reductionist in the extreme to accuse the *'new'* moral dilemmas of 4IR to have asserted the claims of the secular world on the lives of the faithful not least because the *'faithful'* are interrogating their faith for answers to contemporary moral dilemmas. However, despite this, we find our abilities in terms of moral reasoning, moral resolution, moral action and moral conduct often severely inadequate, even constrained, and our search for *'new'* moral truth never more elusive and important as we are forced to confront and ultimately resolve *'new'* moral conflicts and dilemmas in our contemporary personal, professional and spiritual lives. It is argued that only once we have done this, can we withstand and begin to overcome the moral challenges of 4IR. The purpose of this research will be to examine whether the moral traditions of Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism provides us with the means to do this either as unitary theories or as an amalgam.

3.10 Existing Philosophical Traditions Used as A Means of Moral Reasoning and Decision-making.

The philosophical traditions of Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism, whilst uniquely nuanced, stem from the liberal, Christian tradition. Langford (2014) defines the latter as;

"...a recognizable (sic) tradition in which there is a balance between religious faith and human rationality." (2014:1)

He proceeds to clarify this further when he shares the liberal Christian tradition demonstrates;

“...a profound respect for Christian Scripture coupled with a growing realization (sic) that the inspiration for the Bible does not need to be seen as verbal and literal” (2014:5)

Interestingly all three traditions namely the liberal Christian tradition, Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism, can be seen to embrace the normative, relative and social in theory and practice. Their respective success as a means of applied ethics is in large part, due to the corresponding abilities of their skilled practitioners who in turn use moral reasoning, personal, practical wisdom and their respective moral frameworks to ultimately provide the moral principles to shape and craft their moral decision-making, moral resolution and moral action. In both traditions, an acute understanding of *‘right’* and *‘wrong’* through engaging with practical wisdom (*phronesis*) should be extracted from situations of moral conflict and moral dilemma and their corresponding application informed beyond that of the narrow self-interest of their respective practitioners and thereby provide the means of moral truth.

The distinctive moral dilemmas born of 4IR and its associated technologies, challenges both ethical problem-solving traditions to expedite a process and outcome whereby a universal notion of moral truth, moral response and moral conduct can be fashioned and applied by both the individual and society and in so doing perhaps provide the answer to the perennial question posed by Locke (1997);

“...either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind (sic) hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.” (1997:56).

For the purposes of this thesis, the researcher will be rejecting a nihilist approach as they recognise and accept a particular set of universal moral values are required in 4IR if moral truth is to be obtained and practiced.

Methodologically both descriptive and normative ethics will be employed to examine the two conceptual ethical frameworks of Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism in an effort to establish whether singly or together they can assist in providing us with the ethical tools to establish a universal sense of moral truth in 4IR in its application. Meta-ethics will provide valuable assistance in achieving this as a method of establishing the meaning of 'ethical terms and concepts' and in addition the;

"...considerations concerning values and responsibilities of how ethical judgements can be justified or established." (Feinberg & Feinberg 2012:22).

3.11 Critical Research Question.

Robust debate has taken place in academic circles (both philosophic and theological) regarding the ascendancy of either the tradition of Neo-Casuistry or Christian Situationism as being able to provide '*concrete circumstance*' or '*broad visions*' in their respective search for moral truth in moral dilemmas. (Jonsen & Toulmin,1989)

The researcher has identified a critical research question that needs investigation and examination within the scope of this proposed research. It is;

Can a single Christian philosophical tradition be uniquely placed and moreover can it sufficiently embrace the moral complexity (context, act and consequence)

presented by 'new' moral dilemmas resulting from 4OT in 4IR and offer independent moral agents a front-line, universal, moral truth?

and the sub-questions that arise from this are;

1: Should the practitioners of either Neo-Casualism or Christian Situationism, operate strictly within the boundaries even confines of their unique philosophical Christian tradition? or

2: Should Neo-Casualists and Christian Situationist seek to incorporate other moral frameworks in their quest for moral truth and resolution?

It will be the aim of this research to provide cogent answers to both the critical question and sub-questions and to demonstrate the unique and practical wisdom (*phronesis*) gained through the 'lived' human experiences of the practitioners of these respective traditions in their solution-driven search for 'new' moral truth in 4IR when faced with 'new' moral conflict and moral dilemmas.

3.12 Privacy and the Personal: A Contemporary Moral Dilemma.

As a means of providing a practical angle to this research, the researcher has chosen to examine the topic of privacy and the personal and the way in which 'new' moral conflicts and dilemmas have arisen in 4IR due to the use of 4OT. The new moral dilemmas and conflicts arising in this arena have wide-ranging moral implications for each and every one of us in 4IR, irrespective of race, gender, age, faith or geographic location particularly with regard to our understanding of moral truth. They also prompt us to ask, 'what should be universally considered as personal and what should our moral response be to breaches of privacy?'

In undertaking research in this specified area and applying the paradigms of Neo-Casualty and Christian Situationism, it is hoped the researcher will be able to reveal how the use and application of 4OT has re-directed our notion and sense of moral truth as we seek responsibility and accountability for both privacy and what should or should not be considered personal. Perhaps it will lead us to ask questions such as;

1. Does the responsibility and accountability for privacy and the personal solely rest with ourselves, third parties, or governments and how responsive can it be?
2. Is there a modern notion of privacy and the personal that has replaced our historical understanding of the two?
3. What role and function does 'personal architecture' play in 4IR in terms of personal identity?

A thorough examination of the subject matter contained within these questions and the moral conflicts and dilemmas arising from them will hopefully and suitably address the critical research question and sub-question and will also discuss the wide-ranging impacts and consequences for Neo-Casualty and Christian Situationism as methods of providing moral truth. To fully appreciate the nature of the moral conflicts and dilemmas surrounding privacy and the personal in 4IR, the researcher will examine the way in which the existing binary relationship between privacy and security, anonymity and surveillance has been systematically disassembled, disrupted and in certain cases breached by 4OT and specifically the technologies of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Information and Communications Technology (ICT). Both have created concern and raised moral questions for the

individual, society and governments as they arguably represent a break with existing phenomenology. To achieve this, the researcher will examine how the boundaries of what was/is considered private and personal, confidential and secret have been moved, perhaps even dismantled (and in certain instances abused) by the introduction of 4OT. This will be undertaken in a way that exposes the critical need for a reliable and authentic universal understanding of moral truth as we regularly become the unwitting and unwilling victims of corporate and government interest and greed as they intrude upon the privacy of their consumers and citizens in their attempts to '*de-personalise*' the '*personal*' for their own political or economic gain.

4 Literature Review.


“The purpose of a Literature review is to; locate the research project, to form its context or background and to provide insights into previous work.” (Blaxter et al, 2010:14).

Much has been written about how to undertake a successful literature review and this researcher has taken note of the advice of several scholars in this field. It is, however, perhaps the advice offered by Ridley (2012) that has resonated the most when undertaking a literature review when she urges that it should ensure that;

“... connections are made between source texts....and where you position yourself and your research among these sources.” (2012:20).

Such advice supports the steps provided in the ‘*Literature Review Process*’ graphic provided by Machi & McEvoy (2009) in Fig 2 which can be seen to be iterative. This process has been followed by this researcher. Not least as a means by which to establish a direct need to explore and examine the epistemic and meta-ethics of relevant key concepts of the critical research question if an academically fruitful comparison between Christian Situationism and Neo-Casuistry as ethical decision-making frameworks is to be undertaken and the objectives of the critical research questions are to be met. In addition, there is an identified need for the researcher to examine and review key literature that establishes the conceptual differences between the two unique traditions that help to not only distinguish each, but also serve to explain their differences in both framework and in their application by their respective practitioners in situations of moral conflict and dilemma where a sense of moral truth is required.

The Literature Review Process



From *The Literature Review* (2009) by Machi and McEvoy

Figure 2: *The Literature Review Process* (Machi & McEvoy, 2009)

The nature of this research is qualitative owing to its heuristic and ontological nature and the researcher has chosen to undertake a systematic content analysis approach. Such an undertaking requires a rigorous and robust thematic literature review, that will examine and review themes from source literature drawn principally from the disciplines of moral philosophy, philosophy, theology and management and economic science.

To this end, this literature review will examine five broad areas of scholarly interest, identified by the researcher, as being able to provide this research with the required clarity and focus to respond to the critical research hypothesis. In addition, this Literature review will provide both the scope and epistemology required when

examining the ethical decision-making frameworks under examination and their potential use by practitioners in situations of moral dilemma caused by the use and application of 4OT in 4IR.

1. Literature examining and addressing the scope of 4IR.

- The current basis and understanding of 4IR and the realities of 4OT.
- The competing philosophical and economic theories of Industrial Revolutions, their length and purpose.
- Technology Ethics as a response (by moral philosophy) to 4IR and its place within the traditional Western moral philosophical tradition.

2. Literature examining moral dilemma and the role and function of conscience.

- The meaning of moral dilemma and conscience and the role it plays in moral decision-making and moral truth especially in terms of the secular and religious.

3. Literature examining and addressing the unique approach of Christian Situationism

- The Western concept of love and in particular '*Agape*' love and the role it plays as a crucial 'method' for the Christian Situationist.

4. Literature examining and addressing the meaning of truth.

- A broad examination of philosophical approaches to truth and in particular the meaning and role of moral truth for moral decision-making.

5. Literature examining and addressing the concept of privacy and the personal

- An examination of the historic definition of privacy and the '*personal*' and the way in which this informs '*new*' moral dilemmas of 'privacy' and '*the personal*' in 4IR through the increased use of 4OT.

4.1 Theories of Industrial Revolutions; their length and purpose.

The radical changes in industry heralded by 'new' engineering knowledge and the 'new' industrial technologies resulting in 'new' manufacturing processes and methods (Brettel, Keller et al 2014), has been interpreted as linear and the suggestion there is a distinct time span in terms of start dates and end dates of each of the preceding industrial revolutions continues to prove contentious.

Academic consensus and evidence suggests that innovative industrial processes and manufacturing methods are not only a consequence of 'new' scientific knowledge and discoveries (*epistemé knowledge*) and resulting technologies and scientific discoveries (*techné knowledge*) but their application and extension can be attributed to a keen and active use of practical wisdom (*phronesis*) and understanding by scientists and inventors and consumers serving to endorse the view that industrial revolutions are at the intersection of physical and social science to the extent that each have been inclusive, and their affects have extended beyond the workplace to the human experience as a whole (Doherty 2016:221-223).


Considering this, there have been many interpretations as to why, how and when industrial revolutions occur with both the sciences and the humanities attempting to offer and expatiate theories.

4.1.1 The Role & Function of Scientific Revolutions.

4.1.1.1 Kuhn's (2012) Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Kuhn (2012) in his seminal work *'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'* gave us much to ponder. Kuhn (2012) like others before him accepts that revolution is best understood as radical change. Importantly however, Kuhn (2012) proposes that scientific revolution is always accompanied by a change in worldview rather than just new theory replacing old theory and that scientists, as a result, are responding to and sometimes creating a *'different world'* or at least a different world perspective for society.

Kuhn (2012) opines this transformation can be quantitative and/or qualitative and submits that it marks the transition from one paradigm to another. He also advocates that scientific revolution is a hallmark of mature science without which science would degenerate. Moreover, he adds this scientific revolution is a cumulative and linear process that has its base in existing science or what Classical philosophy would term *epistemé* knowledge (See Fig 3)



Existing *epistémé* knowledge/science (and its paradigms) is best seen as a launch pad from which new *techné* knowledge in the form of scientific ideas/discoveries and 'new' technologies can launch themselves towards a 'new' future. This launch pad according to Kuhn (2012) is invariably in the guise of a; "...*rejection of one time-honoured scientific theory in favour of another incompatible with it.*" (2012:6). This view helps to explain the move away from Ptolemy's geocentric theory of the cosmos towards Galileo's heliocentric theories.

Hacking (2012) writing in the foreword of the fourth edition of Kuhn's (2012) work interprets this view as '*Kuhn's aphorism*' suggesting the scholar perceives the advancement of a revolution is;

"...away from previous conceptions of the world that have run into cataclysmic difficulties. This is not progress towards a pre-established goal. It is progress away from what once worked well, but no longer handles its own new problems." (2012:ii).

According to Kuhn (2012) this situation causes scientists to "...*see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before.*" (2012:111).

Inevitably some sort of crisis pre-empts the revolutionary process and an '*essential tension*' is seen to accompany it as scientists (whatever their discipline and knowledge type) can sometimes be seen to fail to reject paradigms when faced with anomalies or counter-instances. Kuhn (2012) opines this crisis;

“...simultaneously loosens the stereotypes and provides the incremental data necessary for a fundamental paradigm shift.” (2012:89).

Progress follows and revolution results bringing in its wake the dimensions of a ‘new’ world-order in the form of radical change.

4.1.1.2 Usher’s (1988) Science of Inventions.

In his book ‘A History of Mechanical Inventions, Usher (1988) develops his theory of how inventions occur and why. He establishes a four-step ‘*pattern*’ of the science of inventions that aligns with Kuhn’s (2012) theory of scientific revolutions. (See Fig 4) He proposes that inventions conform to an iterative process which lends further weight to successive industrial revolutions forged on the back of scientific discoveries and corresponding technologies and manufacturing processes. The first step in Usher’s (1988) four step ‘*pattern*’ of the science of inventions is when the inventor recognises there is an ‘*unfulfilled need*’. This results in the second step of the sequence taking place which Usher (1988) called an ‘*incomplete pattern*’. This occurs when the inventor recognises that something is absent or missing in the existing attempts to meet the first step of the ‘*unfulfilled need*’. The third step named by Usher (1988) as ‘*proposed pattern*’, arises from the insights and ‘*new*’ knowledge gained by the inventor to actively address the ‘*incomplete pattern*’ identified in the second step. The last step in Usher’s (1988) four step process he called ‘*complete pattern*’ in which a ‘*new*’ invention developed by a scientist that fulfils an identified but previously unfulfilled need.




Figure 4: Usher's (1988) 4-Step Iterative Process for the Science of Inventions (L Doherty)

The relevance of the paradigms of Kuhn (2012) and Usher (1988) when reviewing the causes and impacts of 4IR and industrialisation in general are clear. Both science, discoveries and technologies are implicit in the definition of industrialisation as highlighted in the abstract to Naude's (2017) discussion paper; 'Entrepreneurship, Education and the Fourth Industrial Revolution in Africa'. He suggests;

"The process of structural industrialisation of an economy away from dominance by the primary sectors, to an economy where manufacturing plays a more prominent role in output and employment." (2017).

This definition hinges on the importance of both science, inventions and technology and the connection made by modern science and technology in the form of 4OT and the impact this has on both society and in the workplace.

Schwab (2016) supports this view and advances;

“At a collective level, we must also ensure that the challenges technology throws at us are properly understood and analysed.” (2016:103).

This position would seem to recognise that 4IR will definitely present ‘new’ moral dilemmas and conflicts for contemporary society that will challenge our existing and ‘*traditional values*’ such as human dignity, collective responsibility, and our understanding and the reality of the ‘*common good*’. This view has been pursued by Anderson & Anderson (2019) who concur that 4IR is not only the result of; “...*new technologies fusing the physical, digital, and biological worlds impacting all disciplines, economies and industries*” but that it can be assumed to be “... *challenging ideas about what it means to be human.*” (2019:1,3).

However, it is perhaps Schwab’s predictions in his on-line work on Britannica that perhaps pulls together both our concerns for 4IR and 4OT and the way in which we can limit their negative impact upon us when he states that;

“The Fourth Industrial Revolution is therefore not a prediction of the future but a call to action. It is a vision for developing, diffusing and governing technologies in ways that foster a more empowering, collaborative and sustainable foundation for social and economic development, built around shared values of the common good, human dignity and intergenerational stewardship”. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Fourth-Industrial-Revolution-2119734>. (Accessed 04/03/2019).

According to Kuhn (2012) this situation resonates with scientists who are called to;

“...see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before.” (2012:111).

Inevitably some sort of crisis pre-empt a revolutionary process and an ‘*essential tension*’ is seen to accompany it as scientists (whatever their discipline) can sometimes be seen to fail to reject paradigms when faced with anomalies or counter-instances. Kuhn (2012) opines this crisis;

“...simultaneously loosens the stereotypes and provides the incremental data necessary for a fundamental paradigm shift.” (2012:89).

Progress follows and revolution results bringing in its wake the dimensions of a ‘*new*’ industrial order in the form of radical change. The relevance of both Kuhn’s (2012) and Usher’s (1988) theories when reviewing the causes and impacts of 4IR are clear and we can see the rejection of existing science, discoveries and technologies, have created the context and reality for 4IR and its accompanying 4OT.

4.1.1.3 Floridi’s (2014) Theory of Scientific Revolutions.

Floridi’s (2014) views on revolution are seen to fall once again within the purview of scientific advances and discoveries incorporating philosophy’s Classical approach to knowledge. However, his interpretation proposes the four industrial revolutions are a function of ‘*hard*’ and ‘*soft*’ science. He chooses to see each revolution as the consequence of radical ‘*new*’ scientific knowledge (*epistemé*) but the application of this *techné* knowledge does not always need to be in the form of ‘*new*’ technologies. Floridi (2014) also proposes that such ‘*new*’ scientific knowledge and discovery invariably brings in its wake a radical change of worldview best seen as a ‘*revolution*’. (See Fig 5)

Interestingly Floridi's (2014) model of four revolutions, spans five hundred years. This is considerably longer than the almost two hundred years ascribed to the four industrial revolutions we have traditionally assumed to represent the most radical changes to our contemporary world. However, in using the concept of 'new' knowledge, Floridi (2014) is adopting a non-consequential paradigm that is looking at the source from which the 'new' processes flow rather than the outcomes that such 'new' knowledge has birthed.




Figure 5: Floridi's (2014) Scientific Thought Accompanies/Precedes Scientific Revolution (L.Doherty)

Essentially the first two revolutions cited by Floridi (2014) used 'hard science' to gain and maintain their momentum. His concept of 'hard science' is best understood by the definition offered in the on-line dictionary which defines it as;

“...any of the natural or physical sciences, such as chemistry, biology, physics, or astronomy, in which aspects of the universe are investigated by means of hypotheses and experiments.”

<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/hard-science>. (Accessed 23/5/20)

The third revolution cited by Floridi (2014) was established and maintained through what he called ‘*soft science*’ which is best understood as representing;

“...any of the specialized fields or disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, or political science, that interpret human behaviour, institutions, society, etc., on the basis of scientific investigations for which it may be difficult to establish strictly measurable criteria.” <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/soft-science>. (Accessed 23/5/20)

Floridi’s (2014) proposed the fourth revolution reverts to ‘*hard*’ science again when essentially, he invites us to recognise applied mathematics, electronics and cryptology as providing the tools for computing and digitisation; the hall marks of this contemporary industrial phase.

4.1.2 Details of Floridi’s (2014) Four Revolutions.

Floridi’s (2014: 87-90) first proposed revolution is heralded by Copernicus’ heliocentric theory which was in direct contradiction to the existing Ptolemaic geocentric theory upon which Medieval Christian theology had depended in terms of its worldview. Copernican theory and reality based on astronomy, considered a ‘*hard*’ science, can be considered to conform to Kuhn’s ‘progress’ stage in his theory

of scientific revolutions and Usher's (1988) '*unfulfilled need*' in his theory of scientific inventions whereby revolution was inevitable at the time, albeit heretical. *Kuhn* (2012) even cites the Copernican revolution as being the first documented case of a scientific revolution.

Floridi's (2014: 87-90) proposed second revolution was heralded by the work of *Darwin* in his work '*Origin of Species*' published in 1859. Once again, the existing worldview was changed by a theory also considered to fall within the ambit of '*hard science*'. This time, the theory of evolution fell within the discipline of natural science and disregarded the existing Christian, Creationist theory rooted in the concept of '*Imago Dei*' in favour of one of evolution most particularly researching and perfecting the theory of 'natural selection'. Darwin (2003) describes his theory of natural selection as follows;

"As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it varies however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form." (2003:5).

Like its predecessor, the epicentre of this second scientific revolution was the challenge it presented to existing religious thought which directed the existing Western, Christian worldview for both individuals and society.

Floridi's (2014: 87-90) third revolution was precipitated by the 'soft' science of Sigmund Freud in 1915 and his theory of the unconscious that proposed that;

"...the unconscious mind is the primary source of human behaviour. Like an iceberg, the most important part of the mind is the part you cannot see. Our feelings, motives and decisions are actually powerfully influenced by our past experiences and stored in the unconscious."

<https://www.simplypsychology.org>. (Accessed 30/5/20).

Freudian psychoanalytic theory has been described by the philosopher/psychologist Peterson (2016) as a '*romantic analysis*' rather than a '*rational analysis*', but like Floridi (2014) he agrees that it radically changed our worldview in terms of our interpretation of human behaviour, and our understanding and expectations of the individual in both their personal and professional capacities.

Floridi's (2014) fourth revolution spearheaded by the mathematician, logician, cryptologist and computer scientist Alan Turing, once again returns us to the realm of 'hard science'. Turing's famous 1950 paper '*Computing Machinery and Intelligence*' was the forerunner for the concept and reality of the computer and artificial intelligence (AI) Turing (1950) proposed the computational capacity of the human brain could be simulated and even improved upon by the Turing universal machine, using early algorithms. Turing (1950) is attributed with developing 'machine thinking' now referred to as advanced machine learning (AML) which by implication proposed that 'machine intelligence' was to become the touchstone of the electronic computer through algorithms and digitisation. Turing's (1950) life work is encompassed by his wish that;

“We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men (sic) in all purely intellectual fields.” (1950:460).


Of note, is that whilst Turing (1950) specifically refers to the cognitive/intellectual function (consciousness) of humans, being replicable in the hard drive of machines where rationality, iteration and the fundamental principles of game theory could be duplicated by science, he was equally aware of the importance of emotions, feelings, morals and religion and the role they play in the ‘thinking’ and ‘feeling’ of a functioning human being. Indeed, it could be argued that Turing’s own personal life was a testament to this belief and his suicide proof that perhaps in the words of this researcher, *‘man cannot live by science alone’*.

4.1.3 The Kondratieff Long Wave (KLW). An Economists Interpretation of Industrial Revolutions.

In 1925 a Russian economist named Nicolai Kondratieff theorised that market prices in a capitalist society were subject to long-term economic cycles of growth that were believed to be the result of technological and industrial evolution. These periods of economic growth and up-turn were subsequently followed by periods of economic down-turn and recession. He graphed these cycles in periods of forty to sixty years starting in the year 1780. (See Fig 6)

Figure 1: Crises – The Power of Creative Destruction

Rolling 10-year returns on the S&P 500 since 1814




Not a forecast of future performance of a fund investment.

Source: Robert J. Shiller, Stock Market Data used in "Irrational Exuberance" Princeton University Press, 2005, Datastream; Allianz GI Capital Market Analysis.

Figure 6: Kondratieff's Long Wave Theory.

Kondratieff's initial work was the basis for the work of Schumpeter (2014) in which he paid tribute to their original author by naming these long economic cycles of fifty to sixty years, Kondratieff Long Waves (KLW). Schumpeter (2014) focuses on the historical role of technological innovation in accounting for the high degree of economic instability in capitalist societies. His use of history and statistical analysis makes a compelling case for economic growth to be precipitated by 'new' industrial technologies which is then followed by a period of economic recession before the next wave of economic growth occurs due to 'new' industrial technologies.

Schumpeter's (2014) interpretation of six 'Long Waves' can however be condensed into four, in line with current economic thinking of their being four distinct industrial revolutions to date coinciding with on-going cycles of innovation. (See Fig 7)



Source: <https://www.wamda.com/memakersge/2016/03/menas-fab-labs-fourth-industrial-revolution>

(Accessed 20/10/2019).

Figure 7: The Conventionally Accepted Four Industrial Revolutions and their Basis.

As can be seen (Fig 7) the basis of the four industrial revolutions is conventionally seen to be; steam; electricity; digitalisation/computers; cyber. From these key scientific innovations, new products and manufacturing processes were born that in turn created progress and modernisation, disrupting the existing status quo. 4IR is unique amongst its counterparts, due to its scope which is beyond that of the conventional workplace. Such is this scope, that it has given contemporary society a plethora of moral conflicts and dilemmas that require a new moral truth to emerge if moral consistency and a sense of 'flourishing' is to be maintained by humankind.

4.2 A New Branch of Moral Philosophy; Technoethics.

For those actively engaged in the discipline of moral philosophy, the introduction of 4OT has caused a revision of its tradition and heritage as they have recognised a direct causal relationship between the introduction and use of ‘new’ technology and the moral conflicts and dilemmas they give rise to. To this end a new branch of moral philosophy has been introduced, aptly named ‘*Technology Ethics*’ or ‘*Technoethics*’ to address these concerns. Brian Patrick Green director of Technology Ethics at the Markula Center at the University of Santa Clara puts forward his views in 2016 about the tension between moral philosophy and the accelerated use of technology when he insists that;

“As long as there is technological progress, technology ethics is not going to go away; in fact, questions surrounding technology and ethics will only grow in importance.” (<https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/tecnology-ethics/> (Accessed 04/03/2020)).

In saying this, Green (2016) could be interpreted as validating the view that our ‘*traditional values*’ and existing ethics are unable to positively and successfully address and resolve ‘*new*’ moral conflicts and dilemmas resulting from 4OT where people are often not fundamental to the process of progress. Instead, Technoethics will specifically address moral dilemmas born out of the introduction of ‘*new*’ technology and scientific discoveries and the moral conflicts and dilemmas directly arising from their use.

In the Preface to his latest work, Luppicini (2010) defines Technoethics as;

“...the interdisciplinary field concerned with all ethical aspects of technology within a society shaped by technology. It deals with human processes and practices connected to technology which are becoming embedded within social, political and moral spheres of life.” (2010: viii).

Not only is this definition succinct, but it could be argued the very origin of this new branch of moral philosophy would appear to endorse the view of F.W. de Klerk (1998) who encouraged that we must search for a; “...*balance and a perspective so necessary for a genuine attempt to find the truth.*” (1998:377). Even though the ex-President of South Africa was talking within the political context of a ‘new’ and democratic South Africa, his words are equally apposite for a ‘new’ period in industrial history in which our search for an active, relevant and practical ‘new’ moral truth in 4IR requires us to extend the ‘perspective’ of Technoethics in a ‘*genuine attempt*’ to address situations of moral dilemma and provide the ‘*balance*’ required in our moral decision-making and accessing of moral truth.

4.2.1 The Scope and Purpose of Technoethics.

Interestingly, Moore (2018) in his seminal work ‘*Principia Ethica*’ written at the turn of the twentieth century, defined ethics as a science and it would appear this new branch of ethics – ‘*technoethics*’ - would seek to draw a distinction between the ‘*hard science*’ of technology as opposed to the ‘*soft science*’ of ethics and draws upon this distinction and secures a direct causal relationship between the two. Moore’s (2018) work has been charged with setting a ‘new’ agenda for twentieth century ethics and interestingly some would argue that it remains the most well-known and well-read general approach to ‘modern’ ethics.

Moore (2018) chooses to use metaphysics, meta-ethics and an analytic approach to philosophy to interpret the 'peculiarity' of ethics. He proposes the '*peculiarity of ethics*' is;

"...not that it investigates assertions about human conduct, but that it investigates, assertions about the property of things which is denoted by the term 'good' and the converse property denoted by the term 'bad'."
(2018:23).

He then proceeds to advance that;

"...all assertions about its [ethics] relation to other things are of two and only two kinds; they either assert in what degree things themselves possess this property, or else they assert causal relations between other things and those which possess it." (2018:23).

However, whilst the work of Moore (2018) draws upon Classical moral philosophy theories to support his position of '*the subject matter of ethics*' using values, causal relationships and Classical conceptual frameworks, it is firmly based in the twentieth century. That being the case, we cannot deny that Moore's (2018) version of applied moral philosophy (ethics) falls somewhat short in providing an ethical roadmap for the resolution of '*new*' moral conflicts and dilemmas in the twenty-first century which are often the result of progressive twenty-first century science and technology unheard of in Moore's (2018) early twentieth century. Bearing this in mind, it is simple to see why there was a need for Technoethics to take up the baton and provide ethical and moral insight into ethical problem-solving in 4IR resulting from its

accompanying technologies. According to Enriquez (2020) it does this by responding to the reality that;

“Technology provides alternatives that can fundamentally alter our notion of what is Right and Wrong.” (2020:6).

Technoethics seeks to address ethical issues and challenges that are the consequence of machines and science & technology in the ‘technology age’ and was recognised as a specific discipline by Bunge (1977) who coined the phrase ‘technoethics’ which he envisioned as a new branch of moral philosophy that would address the ‘*responsible*’ use of technology in both the private and public spheres.

Jonas (1984) built upon this position in his seminal work in which he commented that;

“...the lengthened reach of our deeds moves responsibility with no less than man’s fate for its object into the center (sic) of the ethical stage.” (1984:x).

His position is supported in contemporary times by the works of Luppicini (2010) who also takes a keen interest in ethical issues associated with design, industrial research & development and technical innovation in general. Luppicini (2010) maintains that ethics has been essentially anthropocentric and views it as having been studied within the context of ‘*man dealing directly with man and himself*’. He then proceeds to propose that technoethics has supplanted this historic position, as it recognises that humans no longer deal solely with other humans and/or themselves. This initial/original position of anthropocentricity found historically in ethics, has been replaced by the interface of humans with machines and science &

technology – technoethics – that recognises the need for the traditional position of moral philosophy be extended to embrace both ‘man’ and machines in addition to accurate assessments of the moral consequences of the use of science & technology by humankind. There is the well-founded concern amongst scholars of moral philosophy that if this situation is not embraced timeously, we run the certain risk of continuing the existing position in which contemporary technology, is far ahead of contemporary ethics. Something upon which we can all agree is to be avoided at all costs if values, beliefs, accepted principles and behaviour are to have contemporary ethical and moral relevance and be the source of moral truth, so necessary for a universal sense of; order, harmony and expectations.

In support of this statement, Enriquez (2020) quite correctly proposes both the presence and reality of technology, “...*challenges old beliefs, it upends institutions that do not grow and change.*” (2020:8) and challenges us to view the ethics of the twenty-first century through the lens of technoethics which, if embraced, should provide us with an ethical approach that both responds to the relationship of humans with machines and science & technology and the ethical challenges and expectations this can create for the individual (*self*) and society at large (*other*).

Technoethics can also serve the purpose of alerting us to the potential ethical conflicts and dilemmas created by the introduction of new machines and prevailing science & technology that has been created by scientists who seemingly have an absence of consideration for the wider moral consequences they might cause. To this end, Beck (1992) urges us all to beware of our contemporary dependence on ‘*algorithms*’ if we seek to mitigate ethical and societal risk. He cautions that our

continued use and reliance on them, without a full understanding, is the equivalent of allowing the train to leave the station whether full or otherwise.

4.2.2 Technoethics And Science vs Values and Beliefs.

Interestingly when describing the importance of ethics and morality, Durkheim (1951) highlighted the duality of obligations (morality) and values or conceptions of *'the good'* (ethics) held by us. He writes that moral reality; *"...always presents simultaneously these two aspects which cannot be isolated empirically."* (1951:45).

Lukes (2008) suggests the distinction between morals and ethics *"...is between rules that implement and values that express morality."* (2008:120). Whilst this description could be accused of being somewhat poetic and too simplistic, it is nevertheless a fairly accurate description of the interdependence of ethics and morals and their respective applications. However, both Durkheim (1951) and Lukes (2008) neglect the third dimension of power and control, key to Foucault's (1980) writings. In his work, Foucault (1980) investigates the scope of power and control in social structures and institutions and the way in which the exercise of them can overarch both ethics and morals to the extent they can be directly impacted, often with negative moral consequences.

However, it is perhaps to Vardy & Grosch (1999:4-5) that we must turn if the distinction between the two terms ethics and morality and their corresponding reality and interdependence is to be properly understood. They inform that ethics comes from the Greek word *'ethikos'* which goes to the heart of human character and was to form the basis of Classical moral philosophy and given a very distinctive perspective in Aristotelian virtue theory. Presently, the term ethics encompasses and

presents as the personal and relative in the form of individual (personal) values and beliefs. These personal values and beliefs are instrumental in shaping our understanding of '*right*' and '*wrong*' '*good*' and '*bad*', '*fair*' and '*unfair*' and our actions arising from our interpretation of them.

Alternatively, the etymology of morals come from the Latin term '*moralis*' which refers to accepted norms and behaviour within a society which are often translated as duties. Mackie (1977) espouses there are no objective values and proposes that morals are human inventions that create reason and certainty – a sort of formalised and accepted societal value that in turn ensures order and stability.

From these explanations it is easy to see how the one hand of ethics washes the other hand of morals both in terms of their definitions and their application in society. Without their presence, there would be chaos and uncertainty as shared values and beliefs are how communities and societies forge a common identity, security and future. It is for this reason that technoethics has a place of vital importance in contemporary times as both our morals and ethics are being actively challenged by science and the technologies arising from its application. Technoethics seeks to actively address the moral conflicts and dilemmas arising from the use of 4OT and in so doing help us to re-shape and in some cases perhaps re-define our principles, values and beliefs (ethics) as individuals and our norms and accepted practices (morals) as a wider society as we search for a practical interpretation of moral truth in 4IR and beyond.

4.3 Moral Dilemmas.

4.3.1 The Exercise of Conscience.

Moral dilemmas have constantly and consistently accompanied human life and their starting point is judged to be when a moral agent is presented with a situation in which there exists moral confusion or conflict. This represents itself as a moral challenge for the moral agent who is expected to make the correct moral 'choice(s)' within the process of their moral reasoning and moral decision-making. The 'choices' the moral agent uses in making their moral judgement through invoking their free-will and autonomy in a situation of moral dilemma, are underpinned and driven by the values held by both themselves as an individual (*self*) and by society (*other*). In other words, a moral agent's understanding of '*right*' and '*wrong*'; and '*good*' and '*bad*' and '*fair*' and '*unfair*' and their applications and moral consequences in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict, will be the result of both their values and beliefs alongside the tools and principles used in their moral reasoning, decision-making and conduct as they seek to extract moral truth.

Therefore, a moral dilemma speaks to not just a conflict of values existing for the moral agent, but more importantly it speaks to the need for the moral agent to make the '*right*' decision through the exercise of their moral judgement from which moral certainty and moral truth will flow.

We are warned by Jowett (1896) the nineteenth century theologian, that exercising moral choice and judgement is not a simple exercise for a moral agent when he asks us;

"Is the mind of any person so nicely balanced that every one of 600 disputed propositions is the representative of his exact belief?"

(1896: Kindle Loc:77).

From this statement it is quite easy to understand how internal conflict can occur for the moral agent when exercising moral choice, especially when the religious or spiritual and secular, antagonistically and directly encounter one another and the moral agent must 'choose' between them. Bertrand Russell (1979) concurs with this view when he opines;

“The orthodox view is that, wherever two courses of action are possible, conscience tells me which is right, and to choose the other is a sin.”

(1979:190).

His view is perfectly echoed in the lyrics of the American country band, The Rascal Flatts (2012), who advise that moral dilemmas occur when *“the soul is lost and when lines get crossed”*. Evidence of this type of moral dilemma when Christian and secular values have been in direct conflict resulting in moral dilemmas, have often been observed in 4IR particularly when 4OT has provided new directions and capabilities in areas such as robotics, genetic and bio-engineering, weaponry, biometric identification, and pharmaceutical interventions in the areas of abortion, terminal illness, inherited disease and gender transition. In such instances where secular capabilities, challenge the faith of the moral agent, the onset of a moral conflict and/or dilemma is inevitable as the sum of choices available to a moral agent can be myriad and often conflicting.

4.3.2 The Human Conscience.

Arendt (1978:190) in her book 'The Life of the Mind' speaks of the incident when Socrates was confronted with the question; *How does a moral agent make moral*

choices in situations of moral dilemma? In response Socrates it is claimed spoke about his invoking and engaging with his '*inner voice*'. He further shared that his '*inner voice*' (which he suggests spoke to him) was possessed of '*daimon*' (a supernatural power) but was not always reliable and at times might lead him astray implicitly suggesting that when the wisdom of the '*inner voice*' is not '*listened to*' by the moral agent, then the '*wrong*' decisions can be made in situations of moral dilemma by the moral agent. In later work, (particularly 'Eichmann in Jerusalem') Arendt pursued this line of enquiry when she proposed that evil can be seen to be the consequence of not listening to and/or heeding one's '*inner voice*' causing one to make the '*wrong*' moral decisions.

If we accept the Socratic concept and notion of an '*inner voice*' we are bound to ask ourselves does this '*inner voice*' have form and if so, where does it reside?

Science once again cannot provide an adequate answer to this question, although the short answer to this question is the '*inner voice*' has no anatomical form and cannot be explained through biology. It is, however, distinctly human and as such would appear to have an expansive biography and its extent is built upon over a human lifetime. Neither does it seem that our understanding of an '*inner voice*' is solely cognitive, as Socrates admits it coincidentally embraces and incorporates the normative, expressed as the feelings and judgement(s) of the moral agent. In addition, we are bound to ask ourselves, if this '*inner voice*' is the subject of an internal, human dialogue then, what language does it speak? Science cannot provide an answer to this question either, although the general assumption is that it speaks the language of its host. Interestingly, Classical Greek philosophy and

theology informs us this *'inner voice'* is peculiarly anthropocentric and not present in any other living forms who cannot be *'troubled'* by their own behaviour. For this reason, Classical Greek philosophy advocates the *'inner voice'* is an integral part of their tripartite vision of the human soul that in turn can be seen to influence human behaviour particularly through the *'appetites and desires'* ascribed to one third of the Greek interpretation of a human soul, as shared in the theories of Plato and Aristotle.

4.3.3 The Role of Conscience in Moral Dilemmas.

The suggestion put forward by ethicists, is that our *'inner voice'* speaks to us in the language of values and morals and as such, can be construed as the ultimate and enduring guide for our moral reasoning and decision-making – a sort of *'personal moral compass'*. Jowett (1896) suggests that our *'inner voice'*; “... is to human nature what anatomy is to our bodily frame.” (1896: Kindle Loc:36).

However, it is to the Romans we must turn, if we are to understand the history of our *'inner voice'*, as they were the first to extensively examine it and chose to describe it as *'conscientia'* which can be interpreted as *'knowledge carried within us'*. Moreover, the Romans not only named our *'inner voice'*, but they judged it an essential component of the human form because of its ability to directly influence human behaviour. They quite correctly understood that it provided the moral agent with a reliable and proven source(s) of judgement, even practical wisdom, other than their subjective reflection. Subsequently, *'conscientia'* or conscience, as we now call it, has been the subject of extensive academic enquiry and is described by Strohm (2011) in the following way;

“The Romans identified it. The early Christians appropriated it. Reformation Protestants and loyal Catholics relied equally upon its advice and admonition... Today it is embraced with equal conviction by non-religious and religious alike....and is confidently cited by people in all walks of life as a basis for their actions.” (2011:1).

Even those who feel physically abandoned and alone such as Defoe’s (2008) *Robinson Crusoe*, still recognise their conscience will not abandon them; despite their active and conscious decision to abandon their conscience. Crusoe shares with the reader that he chooses to abandon his conscience after encountering a bad storm at sea;

“I had in five or six days got as complete victory over my conscience as any fellow that resolved not to be troubled with it could desire.” (2008:11).

However, once shipwrecked and alone on his desert island, *Crusoe* suggests that his conscience ‘finds’ him and speaks to him asking him to reflect on his ‘misspent life’ and what he has not done as he wrestles with the moral dilemma of turning his island ‘prison’ into his personal ‘kingdom’. *Crusoe* then reconnects with his conscience, especially when he finds a Bible amongst the shipwrecked items on the beach and begins to ‘listen’ to it.

4.3.4 The Secular and Religious Conscience.

Strohm (2011) can be seen to disassociate conscience from its traditional relationship with faith and can be judged to accommodate the view of humanists who advocate that conscience can be considered in the absence of faith especially when ‘right’ action vests in human dignity. If we were to adopt a wholly secular and

demand/supply transactional approach to the concept and reality of conscience, the following metaphor of a product transaction contrived by the researcher, could be used to describe the process adopted by the consumer (moral agent) to fulfil an identified need (moral dilemma) in a secular context.

The process could be explained quite simply using basic warehouse terms in which the ‘customer’ (moral agent) recognises their ‘demand’ for a product(s) (*ethics and morals*) to satisfy an identified ‘need’ (moral dilemma).




Figure 8: The demand/supply Transactional Process for Ethical Decision-making. (L. Doherty)

Fig 8: graphically shows the demand-supply chain using the transactional components of; ‘warehouse’, ‘picking list’, ‘manifest’ ‘pro-forma invoice’ and ‘final invoice’. In this scenario a moral agent (*customer*) encounters a moral dilemma which prompts them to place an ‘order’ for ‘merchandise’ which is selected from a ‘warehouse’ using a ‘picking list’. From this, a ‘manifest’ is drawn up. The ‘manifest’ which identifies the products (in this case values/beliefs, principles) ‘picked’, then creates a ‘pro-forma invoice’ itemising the products requested which results in the

'final invoice' being received by the *'customer'* who takes delivery and makes payment for the products that in turn fulfil their identified *'need'*. The demand and supply process begins once again for the *'consumer'* (moral agent) when a moral dilemma occurs and creates a *'demand'* for products (values) which are required to fulfil an identified consumer (moral agent) need. Such a process conforms quite neatly with the metaphor provided by Giubilini (2021) in his paper 'Conscience' which appears in the archive of the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy when he suggests that; *"Conscience is like an empty box that can be filled with any type of moral content."*

4.3.5 The Function of Conscience.

What is unclear from an initial examination of conscience is whether it is infallible. Churchland (2019) shares that; *"conscience is not fallible"* (2019:6) and Strohm (2011) extends this observation when he advises;

"... the characteristic habit of conscience is to goad, prick, wheedle, denounce and harass, rather than to mollify or assuage." (2011:2).

These scholars would appear to confirm that conscience actively engages with the moral agent to guide, encourage and inform moral reasoning and moral resolution and in so doing uncover moral truth. The moral philosopher, George Moore (2018) proposes that conscience stems from an abstract sense of *'rightness'* in the individual, eventually resulting in *'moral sentiment'*. He further extends this idea when he defines a *'conscientious man'* as;

"One who, when he deliberates, always has this idea in his mind, and does not act until he believes that his action is right." (2018:179).

Moore's (2018) views are supported by Fletcher (1966) albeit somewhat ungenerously when he exhorts that; "...*conscience is merely a word for our attempts to make decisions creatively, constructively, fittingly.*" (1966:53).

At this juncture, the researcher respectfully suggests that Fletcher's (1966) definition of conscience is not only sloppy, but inadequate. He neglects to include in his definition of conscience, the words moral or ethical as a preface to decisions. If we were to accept his definition of conscience, there would be no need for any moral agent to undertake an internal dialogue with themselves as decisions that are conscious, creative, constructive and fitting could be extracted by reference to quantitative means, such as hard data and observation without the need for an unconscious internal dialogue through which access to values and the normative become critical to moral reasoning, moral decision-making and ultimately moral truth. Aquinas on the other hand leaves us in no doubt about the meaning of conscience and its application which he saw as an extension of the Classical Greek knowledge type; '*synderesis*'. Glenn (2007) shares that Aquinas assigned a principally cognitive role to the latter and argued that human beings have an '*habitual knowledge*' or a '*fundamental grasp*' of what is '*right*' and '*wrong*'. In this guise, the notion of *synderesis* when associated with the writings of Aquinas dove-tail quite neatly into his Natural Law paradigm as he speaks of the '*innate ability*' of the human mind to '*know*' the '*first principles*' of ethics and moral reasoning.

To some extent it could be argued that Aquinas' interpretation of human conscience being innate and central to human ethics and moral judgement, is at the heart of the definition of conscience provided by the philosopher Barilan (2012) who defines it as;

“...the highest order of value judgement possible for a person, in real time.”

(2012:16). However, it is to St Jerome that we must turn if we are to extend what this researcher calls ‘*the persistent mystery*’ associated with the understanding and meaning of conscience. He refers to it as ‘*scintilla conscientiae*’ or the ‘*gleam of conscience*’ that would seem to endorse the notion of conscience having almost ethereal and mystical qualities. However, what must not be overlooked is the existence of a *reality* and *consequentialism* about the human conscience that guides and supports human behaviour and provides moral decision-making and moral truth in situations of moral dilemma for the moral agent.

4.3.6 Conscience Extends Beyond the Personal.

In contemporary times, it is perhaps Keenan (2016) who comes closest to explaining the existence of both a *personal* and a *collective* conscience that guides moral judgements that are made by moral agents when he advises that conscience is a; “*...source of responsible personal and social moral agency.*” (2016:14-18). The former speaks to personal (self) values (ethics) that are held by an individual moral agent, whilst the latter speaks to societal (other) norms (morals) that are collectively held and followed. What is important to note, is that a *collective conscience* speaks to a universality of values which is not to say that an individual conscience is to be viewed as singularly relative. Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) provide several instances where a collective conscience can be seen to be engaged in moral decision-making. They propose the establishment in the U.S. in 1974 of the *National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research* as a safeguard of human rights in medical experimentation is one such instance of the

exercise of a collective conscience, as were the discussions concerning the moral problems of a *'just war'* with regards to saturation bombing in the Second World War, the dropping of atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima by the U.S. in the Second World War and the American intervention in Vietnam. Such examples they argue can be seen to arise *"out of issues of social conscience."* (1988:306).

At this stage it seems apposite to turn to Lutzer (2016:1-5) who seems to successfully pull together the many aspects of conscience both personal and collective, secular and religious that we have touched upon when he appropriates his three rules for conscience which he suggests are the following;

1. Conscience is universal.
2. Conscience can be conditioned.
3. Conscience has power.

In devising these three laws, Lutzer (2016) speaks to the universality of conscience. In short, he suggests that all human beings have a conscience. Whilst this might be a contentious rule, especially if we were to speak with criminal profilers tasked to identify individuals involved in particularly heinous criminal activity, Lutzer's (2016) primary rule in this instance can be interpreted as; conscience exists only in human beings. Secondly, Lutzer (2016) is proposing that conscience consists of both personal and societal values which are products of existing traditions be they spiritual, societal, geographic, economic, political, legal, or technological. This second law recognises that conscience is therefore an amalgam of both individual and collective values and principles that come together to form what Wilson (1997) proposes is *'moral sense'*. Wilson (1997) extends this thought at a granular level

when he proposes that *'moral sense'* acknowledges *"the values of sympathy, fairness, self-control and duty among others"* (1997:4)

Lutzer's (2016) last law speaks to the power that conscience has both in its personal and collective capacity. Making the *'right'* moral decision in situations of moral dilemma is as potent as making the *'wrong'* decision that is invariably accompanied by both personal and collective guilt and shame. Wilson (1997) would probably define making the *'wrong'* moral decision as a *'lack of moral sense'* prevailing in a situation of moral dilemma and moral truth eluding the moral agent. Interestingly this *'lack of moral sense'* identified by Wilson (1997) was recognised centuries earlier by *John Stuart Mill (1980)* who wrote that a *'weak conscience'* caused *'men's desires'* and *'strong impulses'* to; *"...cause their energy to be turned to bad uses."* (1980:124).

Williams (2014) on the other hand, chooses to explain that moral reasoning requires critical judgement and an honest dialogue between agent and conscience if moral resolution and moral truth are to be uncovered. He further comments;

"But if I say that our moral decisions involve a risk, I do not mean by that to suggest that they have nothing to do with truth; they are risky precisely because we are trying to hear the truth." (2014:12).

This insight would seem to take us full circle in terms of ensuring that our *'moral sense'* in times of moral dilemma is gained by listening to our *'inner voice'*, not ignoring it and applying our critical judgement to both personal and collective values and principles (both secular and/or religious) in our quest for moral truth and resolution.

4.3.7 The Christian Conscience.

The Judeo- Christian faiths also describe conscience as an *'inner voice'*. Conscience has been described by Bonhoeffer (1995) as; *"the voice of God"* (1995:28) that implicitly suggests not only an internal dialogue between God and the faithful, but also suggests the act of listening to God is of importance too. Bonhoeffer (1995) recognises this and proceeds to explain that a sense of conscience is further reliant on an understanding of *'good'* and *'evil'* in an individual and concomitantly their unity and disunity with God and themselves. He simplifies this viewpoint when he pronounces;

"Jesus Christ has become my conscience. This means that I can now find unity with myself only in the surrender of my ego to God and to me. The origin and the goal of my conscience is not a law, but is the living God and the living man as he confronts me in Jesus Christ." (1995: 240).

Bonhoeffer (1995) further opines the reality of conscience in situations of moral dilemma is that;

"...responsibility is bound by conscience, but conscience is set free by responsibility. It is now clear that it is the same thing if we say that the responsible man becomes guilty without sin or if we say that only man with a free conscience can bear responsibility." (1995:244).

Whilst this vision might seem somewhat complex, we need only read Chapters Two and Three in the Book of Genesis, (the first book in the Old Testament section of the Bible) to gain a first-hand understanding of the conscience that Bonhoeffer (1995) is describing. The story told in the Book of Genesis speaks of a moral dilemma that

was presented to Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden and how a lack of surrender of their ego's (both jointly and individually) to God, bound their conscience and drove their irresponsibility to eat the apple from the *'tree of knowledge'*. This Old Testament story also provides a graphic illustration of the causal relationship that can exist between conscience and guilt and shame to which Lutzer (2016), Eckman (2004) and Bonhoeffer (1995) amongst others allude.

Neither Adam or Eve had a *'free conscience'* if we are to accept Bonhoeffer's (1995) account and therefore were not able to accept responsibility for their actions to such an extent it could be charged their personal and collective conscience was re-aligned and they experienced a unique sense of guilt and shame that overcame them once they had eaten the apple from *'the tree of knowledge'* to the extent that;

*"... the eyes of both were opened and they knew that they were naked and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons."
(Genesis.3:7 RSV).*

The reaction of Adam and Eve speaks to Bonhoeffer's (1995) description of conscience that suggests it; *"...presupposes disunion with God and with man."* (1995: 28) holds true in the familiar Old Testament story. To this end, it would be reasonable to assume the eating of the 'fruit' on the part of both Adam and Eve was unquestionably misinformed and the result of what is best described as a *'lack of conscience'*. Furthermore, their actions have been interpreted in the *Old Testament* as a blatant disregard by the two adults for the God-given instruction not to eat the fruit of the; *"...tree of the knowledge of good and evil."* (Genesis 2:17 RSV).

De Weese (2011) when writing on Christian ethics, interprets conscience in an equivalent way to Bonhoeffer (1995) His description of conscience once again speaks of the ability of a moral agent to discern 'right' from 'wrong' and 'good' from 'evil' and perceives an inherent bond between values and obligations when it comes to moral action for the Christian. He suggests that conscience should be viewed in the following light;

"Rational people, according to a Christian worldview, have a moral conscience - the faculty by which we discern moral properties and discriminate from immoral actions and states of affairs...Further, the conscience seems to be a faculty that delivers to us a sense of obligation...So for a rational person, the deliverances of conscience must play a role in a worldview." (2011:213).

Wogamon (1993) concurs but cautions that; *"When in doubt the informed conscience must be free to follow its own judgement."* (1993:135). In accepting that probabilism and the role it has to play on elevating freedom and subjective judgement in moral dilemmas, we are implicitly accepting its importance for ethical decision-making for the individual moral agent. Wogamon (1993) also records that its strength(s) can also lead to uncertainty in moral judgement. In such cases he counsels that;

"Conscience, then, is our inner guide to save us from such misery and ruin. In part, it is the natural sense of 'shame' that identifies shameful deeds." (1993:151).

What cannot be denied is that moral dilemmas are contingent and arguably defined by their situation or context (The story of Adam and Eve perfectly demonstrates this) but what scholarly work both secular and religious confirms is that incorrect or 'ill-

fitting' moral resolution resulting from critical thinking that is not robust and/or rigorous and which has ignored the voice of conscience, has undesirable consequences for the moral agent as it denies a sense of not only moral truth but its accompanying '*flourishing*' and '*well-being*'. In such situations, according to Arendt (1971) the sense of '*well-being*' is replaced by shame, guilt fear, unhappiness and ultimately contrition which are contrary to a sense and notion of '*flourishing*' if one does not follow the dictates of one's own conscience

Resolving moral dilemmas requires that moral agent and conscience '*speak*' the same language if moral wisdom and truth is to result. Glaser (1971) supports this view, when he alludes to the experience of guilt being proportionate to the degree of one's knowledge because conscience is oriented primarily towards value. Glaser (1997:11-40) refers to the Second Vatican Council's document "*The Church in The Modern World*" which advises that;

"Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, whose voice echoes in his depths." (GS.n.16).

4.3.8 The Ramifications of Conscience in Science.

The ascendance of science in the twentieth and twenty first centuries has been the touch paper for the introduction of 4IR and its accompanying 4OT. Churchland (2019) categorically states that; "*science itself does not adjudicate on moral values.*" (2019:12) even though its scientific 'breakthroughs' have created many moral conflicts and dilemmas for the world exposed to its discoveries. Churchland's (2019) statement contentiously suggests therefore, that science itself does not have a conscience which many scientists would argue from both an individual and collective

standpoint. However, the researcher suggests that perhaps what Churchland (2019) was trying to convey in her statement was that in many instances scientific discoveries/advances could be seen to be representative of the proverbial toothpaste which once squeezed from the tube, cannot be put back. Cases in point are the inventions of mustard gas in the First World War and the Atomic bomb in the Second World War. Both were purportedly used to hasten the end of the war, but non-scientists felt that it was at a severe moral cost as they could be used in the future without these assurances.

4.3.9 Conscience in 4IR.

In 4IR, the emphasis on machine learning and the replication of cognitive human functions in machines has absorbed scientists since Turing's (1950) work in which they have acknowledged that computing and machine learning are essentially based on the rational, cognitive, measurable and quantifiable. What has eluded scientists is the ability to replicate feelings, emotions and beliefs as found in human beings. Even Turing (1950) acknowledged that;

“Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain—that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants.”
(1950:445).

It therefore comes as no surprise that machines within 4IR are unable to be assembled with an inbuilt conscience especially if we accept the assessment of Giubilini (2021) who proposes in the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that;

“When we talk about conscience, we often refer to reflection about ourselves as moral persons and about our moral conduct. Through conscience we examine ourselves, as if we were our own inner judge.”

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/conscience/> (Accessed 16/8/2021).

Machines, robots and other 4OT at this stage, are unable to be their own *‘inner judge’* as they are not designed with an in-built capacity to self-reflect and self-examine as is the case in human beings. A machine’s ability to self-assess and judge is constrained by the existing science and technology used in its assembly. Technology configures the performance/conduct of machines and *‘machine thinking’* which is linked to pre-determined codification, algorithms and their associated programmes. In short the *‘mind’* of a machine bears no resemblance to a human mind as it lacks the dualism of thinking and feeling and instead is a product of physics and associated ‘hard science’(s). (Penrose 2016:3-30). This position is confirmed by Wallach (2010) who has written extensively about the way in which machines lack ethics and thereby also lack conscience which as we have previously stated could be described as an internal moral compass. This position is supported by Gula (1997) who suggests the;

“...contemporary approach to conscience focuses on the whole person and includes not only cognitive and volitional aspects but also affective, intuitive, and somatic ones as well.” (1997:18).

To date technology has not been able to provide machines with the ‘wholeness’ of a human as suggested in the words of Gula (1997). Moreover, in trying to expand upon his understanding of conscience, Gula (1997) perhaps provides us with the most enlightened description of what the ‘whole’ person should expect when they appeal to their conscience. Gula (1997) claims that if a person thinks conscience is a freedom from authority, they are severely mistaken. Instead, he shares;

“Conscience is not a law unto itself, nor is it a teacher of moral doctrine. To invoke conscience means to be subject to moral truth and to make practical judgements of what to do in the light of that truth. The freedom of conscience is the freedom to act in truth.” (1997:19).

If we accept this proposition, then scientists in 4IR, are even further away from replicating the ‘whole’ person in a machine than might first appear, let alone assemble a machine that can claim the freedom ‘to act in the light of truth’ through the invocation of conscience when a situation of moral conflict and/or dilemma demands.

4.4 The Concept & Reality of Love.

4.4.1 Background.

Definitions of love have presented complex challenges for scholars throughout the ages. Their research has been the domain of science, the natural, social and religious and a common issue encountered by all, is trying to define and understand something that is essentially fluid. Love has been considered by scholars as a primary relationship amongst family, friends and partners and it has also been recognised in its extended form in social relations and civil society. Oord (2005) has written about the potential relationship between love and science but to expand this contemporary view, he recognised the need to define his understanding of love. He proposed that love was an active bond which he defined as follows;

“To love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic response to others (including God) to promote well-being.” (2005:919).

However, even though he defends this somewhat insufficient definition of love, he admits that it is contentious and recognises that love is not so easily reduced to a definition wholly constrained by language, nor has science provided sufficient evidence to explain what is essentially relative in nature, especially when love is viewed as an emotion.

When investigating the nature and types of love we can experience or view, we must also examine our myriad relationships as they play a key role in the way in which love can be expressed. Both ourselves, the society in which we live, and the beliefs we have, help to shape our notion of the ‘value’ of love and the contribution it can play in terms of our moral reasoning and judgement. That our notion of love is relative there can be no doubt and as Appiah (2005) informs;

“...judgements about right and wrong are intimately tied up with the metaphysical and religious belief and with beliefs about natural order. And these are matters about which agreement may be difficult to achieve.”
(2005:253-54).

Such is the case when studying the subject of human love. Whilst agreement on the definition and nature of love might be elusive, an examination of the subject through history, philosophy, theology, sociology and psychology will go some way to discovering the scope and role it has played for both individuals and societies from Classical times to the modern-day.

4.4.2 The Basis of love.

To understand the underpinning of Fletcher’s (1966) ‘new morality’ and Christian Situationism, we are required to examine the definition, understanding and meaning of the concept of love which seems to actively resist objectivity and universality. Such murkiness it could be argued is in large part owing to its extreme dependence on context and relationship; in other words, who is doing the loving, who and/or what is being loved and where the loving is taking place.

In view of such relativism, it would be reasonable to view the concept of ‘love’ through the lens of contingency. However, it might be expected the nature and scope of Agape love defies the classic contingency approach because of its divine nature which helps to reserve a distinct, some would even suggest a special and unique place for Agape in the lexicon of love.

In this instance, we would do well to heed the words of C.S. Lewis (2016) who reminds us that; *“To love at all is to be vulnerable.”* (2016:147) suggesting that even

'self' and its associates 'id' and 'ego' can be pushed aside at times in favour of this powerful emotion and feeling that we call love. As mentioned earlier in terms of love, both its context and the type of relationship in which it resides, presupposes the vulnerability of both the one being loved and the one doing the loving whenever, wherever and however it might be happening.

To undertake a meaningful examination of 'love' specifically within the parameters of Christian Situationism, we must also try and establish how Agape love (as identified and used by Fletcher (1966) in his conceptual framework) differs from other types of love using epistemic and ontological approaches. This should assist our understanding and use of Agape love as the preferred 'method' of ethical problem-solving in the tradition of the practising Christian Situationist.

It is further hoped these new-found heuristics of love, will provide answers to such questions as;

- Is the concept of love culturally certain and/or bound?
- Can love adopt a universal character?
- Can relationships (be they personal or societal) exist in the absence of love?
- Is Agape love a distinctive and perhaps a superior type of love?
- Is there a link between Agape love and human dignity?
- Are human relationships defined by love-types?

It is hoped that an examination of love to include these questions will provide qualified reasons for Fletcher's (1966) decision to use Agape love as a universal

principle in the framework for his Christian Situationism. This examination of love and specifically Agape love, might also assist in defining its purpose as an applied, reasonable and pragmatic method of providing moral truth, moral resolution and moral action (in the form of a moral response and conduct) in ‘new’ circumstances of moral dilemma in 4IR for the dedicated, practising Christian Situationist.

4.4.3 The Concept and Meaning of Love in Classical Greek Philosophy.

At first glance, the theologians would seem to have the easier task of defining ‘love’ as it tends to form the basis of their academic tradition and epistemology. However, it is to Classical Greek philosophy that we must turn to discover the primary philosophical paradigm and definition of love, always mindful the latter must not constantly be interpreted as a positive, emotional, force. It must be remembered and acknowledged that love can also be a negative force and can even be judged to be ‘bad’ and/or ‘wrong’ in some circumstances as proposed by Freud (2006) in his writings on psychoanalysis.

Of importance in the understanding and meaning of love, is the epistemology of love shared in Classical Greek philosophy and hermeneutics of love (explained later in this section) and which interestingly continues to inform our contemporary understanding of the subject.

Classical Greek philosophy identified six ‘types’ of love namely; Eros, Philia, Ludus, Pragma, Storge and Philautia. (See Tab: 1)

Table 1: The x6 Classical Greek Philosophical ‘Types’ of Love (L. Doherty)

TYPE OF LOVE	IDENTIFYING TRAITS
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<i>EROS</i>	Sexual passion. Sexual intimacy. Romance. Erotic love arising from physical attraction. This is seen to be 'good' as a physical release of emotion(s); natural attraction, or 'bad' in terms of pornography where physical intimacy is the goal without initial physical attraction.
<i>PHILIA</i>	Deep friendship. Often accompanied by an overt sense of loyalty. 'Brotherly love' Companionship.
<i>LUDUS</i>	Playful love. Characterised by flirting and/or teasing or the banter amongst friends.
<i>PRAGMA</i>	Longstanding type of love. Often accompanied by tolerance and compromise.
<i>STORGE</i>	Familial love. Natural or instinctual love born out of familiarity such as that between a mother and her children or between siblings.
<i>PHILAUTIA</i>	Love of self. This can be 'bad' as in narcissism, or it can be 'good' when it takes the form of loving oneself / being comfortable in one's own skin to the extent thereafter of being able to love others.

These initial six 'types' of love identified in Classical Greek philosophy and literature, form the basis of our Western definition and understanding of love and even helps to explain its visible demonstration in our contemporary daily lives. It also suggests that

we can be the beneficiary or benefactor of more than one type of love. In other words, these types of love identified in Classical Greek philosophy can exist in isolation or collectively. For instance, the researcher might have a romantic partner, be a daughter, a mother, and a best friend. In this scenario, they would have Eros, Storge, Pragma and Philia loves in their life simultaneously and be both a beneficiary and benefactor of love. Interestingly, Greek philosophers endlessly debated the merits of love types, particularly those of Eros and Philia. Interestingly in some circles, it was Eros that was considered to be the highest form of love although the Agape love identified in the Christian tradition, (specifically the New Testament) was to supersede this opinion, due to its divine source and nature. Of importance, is that none of the six types of love identified in Classical Greek philosophy need diminish the power of the other. Rather these different 'types' of love exist independently yet can co-exist in harmony with each other as they each represent, demonstrate and refer to specific types of human relationships. (See Fig 9)




Figure 9: *Types of Love Relationships* (L. Doherty)

Of note here is the word relationship, which is implicit in each of the six ‘types’ of love identified by Classical Greek philosophy. Even Philautia speaks to a relationship, albeit one that is with oneself and is invariably self-serving and is often practised through extreme self-interest.

This recognition of ‘*relationship*’ being integral to the notion and sense of love, is profound and was to enter the Western epistemology of love and be carried through the ages ultimately becoming central to several social sciences that have also attempted to unravel the mysteries of love and relationships in their myriad forms, most notably psychology, history and sociology.

If we accept this Classical Greek philosophical interpretation of the six types of ‘love’ firmly rooted in relationships both with ourselves and with others, then we are required to accept it is a concept that escapes precise definition in a ‘*winner takes all*’ category. Rather Classical Greek philosophy is quite simply suggesting, in the words of a popular movie directed by Henry King (1955) that; ‘*Love Is A Many Splendored Thing*’. As such, love is perhaps one of the best exemplars of the challenges facing those who defend their position of relativism, as love really can be a case of what you want it to be, when you want it to be, with whom you want it to be and where you want it to be, supporting the author’s suggestion of the need to examine the concept and meaning of love through the lens of contingency. This approach to love mirrors Kipling’s (2012) approach to life outlined in his ‘*Just So Stories*’ when he shares with us his need to use his ‘*six honest serving-men*’ who, why, what, how, where and when; to assist him in solving life’s mysteries.

Nowhere is this relativism better demonstrated than in our efforts to defend our actions when exiting relationships where love has existed. We often resort to falling-back on hackneyed sayings such as; '*love destroys a good friendship*' and that '*love hurts.*' Are we saying in such communications that love is just as easily extinguished as it was ignited, or are we recognising the somewhat fickle nature of certain types of love and relationships and an existing causality? This can lead us to ask questions such as;

- Is love as easily lost as it is found?
- Can love and relationships be so neatly and precisely categorised as Classical Greek philosophy would have us believe, or are we deceiving ourselves?

What is perhaps worth considering is that of the six types of love identified by Classical Greek scholars, Eros, Philautia and Ludus might well fall into the category of '*fickle*' and may well be '*love-types*' that are neither dependable nor guaranteed arguably because of the relationships that serve to underpin them. These three '*rogue*' love-types also serve to demonstrate that love is not a stagnant emotion/feeling but rather organic in nature and practise. Furthermore, this triad of love types can be seen to highlight the momentum that often accompanies our experience of love whatever the type, further endorsing the reality of fluidity in many relationships. In short, what is evident in Classical Greek love theory, is that whilst love is essentially relationship based and all too often governed by context and/or situation, it is the strength or weakness of the specific relationship that remains the

chief determinant of the scope and longevity of the 'love-type' being experienced, shared, or witnessed.

Agape love however was incorrectly identified by C.S. Lewis (2013) as being a love type with its roots in Classical Greek philosophy. Agape love, as understood in modern times and within the context of this research, is rather a product of Hellenistic Judaism, (specifically the 4th century BC Septuagint) and the New Testament. As such it is interpreted as not constrained by time or context and is the result of a subversion of self-interest in favour of the greater good and needs of other(s) This unique nature has resulted in general agreement in theological circles that Agape adopts a primacy in terms of love type owing to its universal and divine nature. Agape love speaks to a unique love that remains non-judgemental, of limited physicality, and importantly self-less and freely given by the benefactor irrespective of person, or situation.

The Christian interpretation of Agape love speaks to 'reason' in inductive and practical terms through sensation, perception, feelings and desires as opposed to the later Agape and Enlightenment moral philosophical position of this type of love which arguably conceived '*reason*' in deductive terms best seen as demonstrating '*a priori*' principles formally grounded in universality and logic. This philosophical shift will be reviewed and examined in more detail later in this section.

Considering the above, it is hardly surprising that divine inspired Agape love, (as interpreted and identified in Christian theology and the New Testament in particular) was claimed to be in direct contrast with the earthly Eros love, which was viewed as personal, physical, (almost savage) and self-fulfilling. Unlike Agape love, Eros love

was deemed to be time and context specific and ultimately self-serving. In short as a 'type' of love Eros, assumed a love position diametrically opposed to that of Agape love. Not surprisingly an opposing tension was contrived between the two, supported by reality and which was to be exploited in Medieval theology and Enlightenment philosophy.

4.4.3.1 The Role and Function of Agape & Eros Love in Medieval Times.

Love and relationships in Medieval times were viewed in large part as binary. (See Tab:1) Agape literature and art represent these two love-types as being unreconciled and in conflict; in other words, their existence in human and divine relationships was deemed to be present in an either/or capacity but never together.

Fig:10 aims to graphically demonstrate the way in which Agape and Eros loves were expressed and recognised in Medieval times.




Figure 10: Medieval Agape and Eros Love-Types and Relationships (By L. Doherty)

Kierkegaard (1995) interpreted Eros love as an '*existence*' type of love whilst choosing to interpret Agape love as representing the '*essence*' of love. He saw a respective head and heart conundrum playing out in which Eros (head) was distinctly worldly, and Agape (heart) was best interpreted as coming from a divine space.

C.S. Lewis (2013) wrote of Agape love relationships in his work '*The Allegory of Love*' and particularly that of Eros love and how it revealed itself distinct from Agape love in the Middle Ages. He describes troubadour poetry as an artistic expression of Eros love in which love practically takes on the guise of a 'tragic madness' and thereby a unique physicality. In this guise he opined, Eros love manifests itself as a seemingly chivalric, noble and clandestine, passionate and stylised type of love with the central figure of a 'fair' lady being wooed, outside of the bonds of marriage. This was in direct contrast with the prevailing Christian concept of love in which marriage expectations embraced an authorised and sanctified holy union, in which constant fidelity, procreation and the fulfilling of God's Will were central. C.S. Lewis (2013) suggests that Eros love is perhaps best understood in this era as an almost '*feudalisation of love*' in which courtly beauty is the trophy of passionate and unrelenting, knightly, courting and love.

This diametric view of Eros love and Agape love articulated by C.S. Lewis (2013) is supported by D'Arcy (2019) who goes as far as to propose that Agape love is best viewed in Medieval times as representing the '*marrow*' of love, a view that perhaps still has some contemporary relevance. This view is confirmed in Kierkegaard's (1995) writings where the '*essence*' of Agape love is identified and can be seen to reveal itself through self-sacrifice whereas the '*existence*' of Eros love reveals itself

through self-centredness. Interestingly, Medieval Agape art chose to represent Eros love and Agape love in the symbolic forms of a Lion and a Unicorn respectively (see Fig 11). The rampant lion symbolised the earthly savagery and untamed and often sexual nature of Eros love, whilst the Unicorn symbolised the mystical, pure and almost ethereal nature of Agape love.

These two Medieval symbols of the lion and the unicorn were frequently used in illuminated manuscripts, paintings, heraldic signs and tapestries of the period as manifestations of these two very different types of opposing love and symbolically attempt to contextualise the continual tension that was believed to inherently exist between them.



Figure 11: The Lion and the Unicorn: (Musée Cluny Art Gallery of NSW Australia)

4.4.4 Agape Love in Medieval Theology.

4.4.4.1 Thomism.

The Medieval Catholic theologian St Thomas Aquinas supported the Medieval view of Eros and Agape loves. He also interpreted these two prevailing, love-types and concomitant relationship of tension as being each other's antithesis. He saw Eros as a concupiscence-type of Godless love typified by lust and demonstrated by sexual arousal and ardent longing. Further, he proposed that Eros love was to be interpreted as coming from the base instincts of the sinner, whilst Agape love came from the heart of a God-fearing, pious individual constantly seeking divine mercy and forgiveness.

In his work *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas (2007), helps to bridge the understanding and meaning of Agape and Eros loves in Classical Greek Philosophy and the Judeo-Christian tradition. He calls Agape love, '*charity*' which he proposes is a Christian virtue and defines in *Summa Theologica* (2007:11a 11ae, q.23) as a "*supernatural virtue*" and "*the friendship of man and God*" and discerns that as such, it "*directs the acts of all other virtues*". This is Agape love in Medieval theology at its most direct.

Aquinas (2007) further proposes that Agape love is indivisible and resides in the human soul and to this end, he views it as the result of a '*divine infusion*' and suggests that we have no control over our capacity for it. In other words, Thomism proposes that Agape is a love prompted by the divine and is without limits.

Aquinas (2007) attests that its presence, abundance and expansion in our lives is subject solely to the will of God and further proposes there are three steps or degrees of '*charity*' (love) in our earthly lives (see Fig 12).




Figure 12: Thomism's Degrees of Love (L Doherty)

In other words, Aquinas (2007) sees this 'virtue' or 'infusion' of Agape love as following a process during our life leading to perfection and a contemporaneous relationship with the Divine. Aquinas (2007) does not see this process abating unless venial or mortal sins are committed by ourselves which are by definition destined to destroy our '*divine friendship*' or relationship with God. This separation of the earthly from God and His love, is extended in Aquinas' (2007) writings to the 'fallen angels' who by virtue of their acts;

"...cannot share the 'fellowship of everlasting happiness' and therefore they are outside the scope of charity." (2007:25-11).

Ever mindful of human nature, Aquinas (2007) is sympathetic to the difficulties attached to the 'progress' of love. His view is that whilst love is in a state of continual activity, (flux) our earthly relationships can represent degrees of difficulty when trying to practise Agape love in our daily lives. To draw attention to this, Aquinas (2007) subscribes to '*an order of love*' which he believes to be a '*natural order*' (echoes of Natural Law) and of which we must always be aware in our earthly, loving

relationships. In this Aquinas (2007) concurs with St. Ambrose and believes love to have a natural, and God-given descending order. See (Fig 13)




Figure 13: Aquinas' Order of Love (L. Doherty)

In this Medieval view of relationships espoused by Aquinas (2007), we see the 'flow of love' best interpreted as the quintessence of Natural law. Moreover, the latter was to have the added function of pre-defining the construction of familial, social and economic responsibilities/duties and relationships throughout Medieval times in addition to helping determine the physical expression (moral response) and expectation(s) particularly of moral conduct from Medieval Christians.

4.4.4.2 Agape Love and Eros Love in 'The Age of Reason'.

As demonstrated above, the meaning and understanding of love in both the Classical Greek philosophy and Medieval theology, recognised its phenomenology

through relationships both earthly and Divine. Love was perceived to be an emotion/feeling that through relationships was to follow a process and serve a role and function for both the individual (self) and greater society (other) as the key means of providing well-being/flourishing, order, harmony and expectations.

4.4.4.3 Renaissance & Enlightenment.

Like its Medieval symbolic Agape counterpart, Renaissance symbolism consistently drew comparisons between earthly love (Eros) and heavenly love (Agape) The presumed existing tension between the two '*loves-types*' extended throughout art and literature of the time where it was proclaimed, examined, celebrated and censured. Bergman (1988) comments that over time Eros love gained a type of dignity in which the savage and the physical demonstration gave way to a more erotic and sensual.

However, during the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods, the meaning and understanding of love, that had previously been underpinned by Natural Law, was scrutinised by philosophers in a way that excluded the element of the Divine which was in turn replaced by the ascendance of reason and science. This signified a direct move away from the normative in ethical and philosophical thought, towards the descriptive. This in turn echoed the philosophical move away from the position of '*a priori*' to that of '*a posteriori*' culminating in a resultant epistemology that reflected a deduction from pure reason, towards a justification from experience or empirical evidence. In this regard, historians of philosophy caution against making a rigid contrast between Continental rationalism and British empiricism of the time even though both groups according to Wallace (2014) attempt to;

“...blend reason and experience, to combine the life of reflective mind with the scientific view of nature.” (2014:301-2).

However, the subversion of the Divine, in favour of reason and rationalism was to present an immense shift in philosophical thought as far as love and relationships were concerned. The concept of Agape love was marginalised from its former position of primacy and philosophers such as Hume, Nietzsche and Kant argued that scientific and cognitive enquiry could provide an alternate world view of moral philosophy without reference to the Divine. Holland (2019:250-251) succinctly calls this definitive shift experienced during this period as being from ‘*revelation to reason*’ with Baumer (1977:62) preferring to define it as a shift from ‘*faith to reason*’.

4.4.4.4 The Interpretation of Love in Enlightenment Philosophy.

Immanuel Kant is recognised for his association with the ascendancy of human reason as the foundation of ethics. In his pioneering book a ‘*Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*’ written in 1785, Kant (2018) proposes that as independent moral agents, humans, all have; “*common rational moral cognition*” (2018:G4:393) However, despite his theoretical adherence to the autonomy of moral agents vesting in their rationality, Kant (2018) nevertheless does not disregard feelings, choosing instead to recognise and retain an important place in his ethical constructs for ‘*moral feeling*’. He presumes they come from the direct influence of moral reason on our personal ‘*sensibility*’ which in turn supports a moral agent’s understanding of their duty within relationships.

Moral ‘feelings’ according to Kant (2018) are to be found in; respect, love (philanthropia) and conscience. However, he does remind us that we can be misled

and our moral judgement compromised by other *'feelings'* such as self-love and inclination which can adapt the demands of morality to our personal needs, desires and wishes (2018: G4:405) This formed the basis of his construct of his celebrated *'hypothetical imperative'*. Kant (2018) suggests this situation can be overcome through the means of embracing one's duty of *'moral constraint'* as a moral agent, which will in turn provide any and all moral agents with a *'standard of judgement'*. The latter he argues provides moral decision-making with a consistency that stands apart from *'feelings'* for any moral agent.

In short philosophers of this period did not see morals as being grounded in God and the principle of Agape love; rather they were a construct of reason and rationalism. However, this was not to say that in moments of doubt and/or mortality, human feelings were not recognised by philosophers of the time. The Scottish philosopher David Hume (2008) famously wrote;

"The feelings of our heart, the agitations of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all our conclusions and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian." (2008:6).

Perhaps in this instance, Hume (2008) once again can be accused of displaying the conceit too often associated with philosophers of his time who arguably seem to see themselves and their minds and theories as superior to that of any held by their fellow human beings.

4.4.5 A Brief Look at Agape and Eros Love in Psychology & Sociology.

4.4.5.1 Psychology.

Arendt's (1996) understanding of Agape love is more along the lines of love for love's sake. She writes;

“Love proved its strength precisely in considering even the enemy and even the sinner as mere occasions for love. It is not really the neighbour who is loved in this love of neighbour – it is love itself.” (1996:97).

The strength of relationships was recognised and taken up in the work of Sigmund Freud who according to Lear (1998(a)) recognised love as a basic force of nature and a force that makes us human and distinct from other living things. In this it seems that Freud was subscribing to a form of Natural Law where human love and relationships are considered fundamental to earthly beings and their nature can be considered pre-determined, even pre-conceived. In short, his work proposes that human relationships are based in some type of love or affection. Freud (2006) further maintained the love in which the relationship was grounded could present in a way that overarched a healthy or unhealthy relationship.

Bergman's (1988) journal paper, discerns that Freud, developed three psychoanalytic theories of love namely that;

1. Love and sexuality are inherently related;
2. We fall in love with people who are mirror images of our ideal self (narcissism).
3. There is a relationship between love and the object lost.

This researcher suggest that two of these three Freudian loves can be seen to have their origins in the Greek loves of Eros and Philautia, whilst the theory of a relationship between love and object lost lies more in the realm of tragedy. Freud (2006) introduces patient case studies as empirical evidence to support his theories. However, subjectivity has been used as valid criticism with regards to this work, as Freud's (2006) interpretation of patient consultations (psychoanalysis) are unfortunately self-acclaimed as providing positive results linking Freudian theory with human behaviour.

However, Freudian love theory is best remembered for the importance that is placed on sexuality in love relationships, with Freud (2006) even coining a novel word '*libido*' to explain the underlying sexual force in personal love relationships which he sees as originating from birth and our early primal relationship with our mother.

Furthermore, Freud (2006: 154-239) was aware that some of his patients when undergoing psychoanalysis, demonstrated psychological and concomitant behavioural dysfunction in and around love and relationships. In short, he identified unhealthy love relationships in patients who came forward for psychoanalysis. He noted this occurred when certain types of love, identified by Greek philosophy, opposed each other, or the boundaries set by society for these types of love and their relationships were crossed. This was to form the basis of Freud's theory of the '*Oedipus Complex*' in which he proposes that some sons may want to displace their father in terms of their mother's love relationship. In other words, Freud (2006:154-239) suggests that Storge love in the male child for his mother, is replaced with Eros

love to create an unhealthy and dysfunctional love relationship in direct opposition even contradiction to Natural Law.

4.4.5.2 Sociology.

Sociological discourses on love and relationships generally reflect trends within society. The academic discipline of sociology suggests that any society is grounded in relationships be they individual and/or familial or the relationship of any citizen with the State or those that govern. These relationships play a vital role in social architecture; a view expanded upon by the contemporary sociologist, Eva Illouz (2012) In her work, *'Why Love Hurts'*, Illouz (2012) proposes there is an *'architecture of love'* that speaks to societal rules at the intersection of the personal and social. She opines the rules for emotional engagement have changed in direct relation to the extension in choice and autonomy that exists in contemporary societal relationships. Such is the extent and nature of this change that Illouz (2012) proposes that it directly affects the way in which we view our contemporary selves and our identities. In short, her work advises the health and nature of these relationships directly impact upon each other and their corresponding social structures within a society.

Carter (2015) supports the view of Illouz (2012) and she suggests;

"...there has been a transformation in intimacy and that we live in an increasingly individualised, agentic and democratic world of personal relationships" however "...relationships and love still appear to be very important to people."

<https://thesociologicalreview.org/collections/interviews/the-sociology-of-love> (Accessed 26/11/2018).

It would appear from Carter's (2015) research that despite the changing nature of love and relationships, their importance remains significant for a healthy and robust society.

4.4.5.3 Agape Love in the Modern Theological Tradition.

The modern hermeneutics of Christian Situationism has tended to differ between theologians and philosophers as contextualism becomes the hand maiden of relativism and Scripture the precursor of faith and Divine values. The following definitions will attempt to demonstrate the differences that exist between philosophers and theologians in terms of defining Fletcher's (1966) 'new' morality and its universal principle of Agape love.

4.4.5.4 Theological Definitions of Agape Love.

The German theologian Bonhoeffer (1972) wrote extensively about love and expands upon the concept of Agape love as follows;

"Only he who knows God, knows what love is; it is not the other way round; it is not that we first of all by nature know what love is and therefore know also what God is. No one knows God unless God reveals Himself to him. And so, no one knows what love is except in the self-revelation of God." (1972:53).

Bonhoeffer (1972) leaves us in no doubt that Agape love is Christian love and that it is a revelation of faith. Quite simply Bonhoeffer (1972) takes the view that Agape love is God reflected in us.

The Danish philosopher/theologian Kierkegaard (1995) expands upon the idea of Christian love in his work the *'Works of Love'* in which he asks the question do we know love's origin, source, or place of abode from which it flows? To answer these propositions and thereby identify the dynamics of Christian love, which Kierkegaard (1995) deems eternal, he reflects on New Testament scripture and advises that even though love might be hidden in one's innermost being, it does nevertheless exhibit itself in our actions and relationships with God, self and others. Kierkegaard (1995) writes that;

"...only someone who abides in love can know love and in the same way, his (sic) love is known." (1995:16).

He goes on to endorse that Christian love (Agape love) is best viewed as non-preferential and a matter of attitude in which one cannot be selective or have favourites. If one adopts this position of Agape love being a matter of attitude, then Kierkegaard (1995) proposes that should Agape love be a matter of following Christ's commandment to *'love one's neighbour as oneself'* then maybe it is best interpreted as merely *'doing one's Christian duty'* with all that such a directive implies ipso facto no favouritism and non-selection. Moreover, in so doing Kierkegaard (1995) urges that one must never forget one's primary duty which is to; *"...love God unconditionally in obedience and love him in adoration." (1995:19).*

As can be seen, this Agape love is recognised in its outward demonstration and in reference to New Testament scripture Kierkegaard (1995) posits;

“But every tree is known by its own fruit and the love that Christianity speaks is known by its own fruit – that it has within itself eternity’s truth.”
(1995:8).

Renowned Christian philosopher, Paul Tillich (1960) puts forward the view there is a mutual relationship between these three *‘structural elements’* identified in the quote above from Kierkegaard (1995). Tillich (1960:107-115) interprets these three structural elements as; a tree of life; Christian love and eternal truth; that is universally significant. He also proposes that in the case of love, of key importance is the separation between a *‘loving subject’* and the *‘loved object’* which casts the relationship between God and humankind in a different light as it indirectly asks us to re-assess the *‘flow’* of love and the way in which this can directly affect our relationships. Perhaps Tillich (1960) is indirectly hinting at a relationship that recognises agency and power which some would suggest are the cornerstones of Christian faith with humans representing the agency and God the power. (Human beings are entrusted to do God’s Will on earth)

Quoist (1965) the theologian and Catholic priest has also written extensively about love. Like fellow theologians he sees the need to clearly define what is meant by love in both its secular and Christian contexts. He proposes that we need to separate *‘the emotion’* from *‘the gift’*; perhaps the former best understood as the secular and the latter the religious, specifically the Christian faith.

Quoist's (1965) writings, try to provide answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this section of love and love types and expands upon the reality of love being the subject of relationships and situations. He suggests that love (secular) as an *'emotion'* gives rise to feelings of *'admiration'*, *'lust'*, *'desire'*, and *'shirking responsibility'* whereas love as a *'gift'* (religious) is *'self-less'*, *'self-giving'* and *'self-forgetful'*. (Here, we can see the shades of the Medieval interpretation of Eros and Agape love types). Quoist (1965) further explains that love is not the result of an instinct but;

"...rather involves a conscious choice of the will directing us towards others and towards the gift of ourselves to them.....Love is a one-way street. It always moves away from self in the direction of the other."
(1965:109).

Quoist (1965) is surely defining Agape love here, when he refers to love as a *'gift'*. His persistence in equating love with the giving not of *'something'* but of *'someone'* is consistent with his suggestion that Agape love is self-less and provides us with a freedom that can serve to liberate us from both things; the material and self. His position clearly promotes attachment not detachment which once again attests to the real connection between love and relationships and the situations in which they are found as identified in Classical Greek philosophy.

Quoist's (1965) position is perhaps best summed up in his own words when he states that; *"He who loves most fully who gives himself most completely."*
(1965:111). He goes on to provide further insight in his position when he explains;

“True love, however, demands unqualified self-giving. In giving yourself to others you become rich in your poverty. It is love which brings us to fullness of life.” (1965:112).

4.4.6 Christian Theology.

The philosopher/theologian C.S. Lewis (2016) provides both definitions and examples of Classical love-types and their demonstration in the Bible. His book *‘The Four Loves’* re-ignited robust discussion and debate on its release on the merits of ‘Christian’ (Agape) love and posed a question as to its relevance in an increasingly secular world. Not surprisingly as his work was first published in the 1960’s, C.S. Lewis (2016) concluded that its presence and demonstration was urgently required in the turbulent 1960’s. In some way C.S. Lewis’ (2016) suggestion that Agape love was the gift that all Christians could bestow upon the world (universal love) was taken up by Russell’s (1962) call for a world filled with Christian love. However, surely this would in turn demand a world full of Christians ... hardly the hallmark of the multiculturalism that was to define the West in modern times.

McFadden (2014) supports C.S. Lewis’ (2016) view of Agape love as being a gift when she states that; *“Agape is established as a perfectly giving love”* and uses the works of Norton & Kille (1988) who write about the hallmarks of Agape love as being charity and *‘unconditionality’* to support her contention. The theologians Nygren (1932), Kierkegaard (1965) Niebuhr (1992) and Ramsey (1993) concur in viewing Agape love as providing the means of the ethic of self-sacrifice which once again pre-supposes the unimportance of *‘self’* in favour of a greater, divine influence. The apostle Paul defines love for us in the New Testament as follows;

“Love is patient and kind; love is not jealous or boastful; it is not arrogant or rude. Love does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice at wrong but rejoices in the right. Love bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never ends...So faith, hope, love abide, these three; but the greatest of these is love.” (1 Corinthians: 13:4-8,13, 14:1 RSV).

The same verses taken from the *Good News Bible* translation (2014) read as;

“Love is patient and kind; it is not jealous or conceited or proud; love is not ill-mannered or selfish or irritable; love does not keep a record of wrongs; love is not happy with evil but is happy with the truth. Love never gives up; and its faith, hope and patience never fail. Love is eternal...Meanwhile these three remain; faith, hope and love; and the greatest of these is love. It is love, then, that you should strive for.” (1 Corinthians: 13:4-8,13,14:1 GNB).

Whilst often providing priests and pastors with a useful point of reference for their marriage sermons, this scripture is an attempt at a Christian definition of the nature of Agape love. However, it is to the apostle John that we must turn if we are seeking a deeper and fuller understanding of the meaning and functionality of Agape love.

The apostle John instructs;

“Beloved, let us love one another; for love is God and he who loves is born of God and knows God. He who does not love does not know God; for God is love. In this the love of God was made manifest among us, that we might live through him. In this is love, not that we loved God but that

he loved us and sent his Son to be the expiation for our sins. Beloved, if God so loved us, we also ought to love one another. No man has ever seen God. If we love one another, God abides in us and his love is perfected in us.” (1 John: 4: 7-12 RSV).

From reading this, we are given to believe that we are mirrors reflecting God’s love for us, outwards towards others. In other words, we are a vessel for God’s love revealed. Put simply, His love is revealed through us in our daily lives through our relationships, our deliberations, meditations, contemplations and actions towards others. This ‘unique’ Christian love, despite the changing circumstances of history, speaks to ultimate altruism; and expresses a self-less, non-reciprocal, universal and unconditional love. C.S. Lewis (2016) calls it ‘*the highest love*’. For this reason, Agape love interpreted in this way, is not a love of self-interest, selfishness and egoism as this would lead us to a state of ‘*indifference*’ according to Daniel (2009) which is the antithesis of Agape love. Such Divine love, according to C.S. Lewis (2016) “*does not substitute itself for the natural.*” (2016:161). He proceeds to opine;

“But God can...awake in man (sic) towards Himself, a supernatural Appreciative love. This is of all gifts the most to be desired. Here, not in our natural loves, nor even in ethics, lies the true centre of all human and angelic life. With this all things are possible.” (2016:169).

It is hardly surprising then, that Fletcher (1966) saw the value and worth in Agape love as being absolute and a universal principle in his theory of Christian Situationism. He recognised that universally, Christians have developed and adopted a spiritual definition of Agape love incorporating the Divine that promises a love of

infinite possibilities prompted by the Christian faith in which the self-less replaces the selfish and servanthood replaces task master. It is no surprise therefore that Fletcher (1966) chose it as his 'method' of moral decision-making and the arbiter of moral truth in situations of moral dilemma and moral conflict.

4.5 Introduction To the Notion of Truth.

The metaphysics, notion, context and reality of truth has puzzled philosophers, theologians and political scientists throughout the ages and has the habit, in the words of Blackburn (2017) to occasion that;

“...perhaps more often than we think, truth hides itself and we have to put up with simplification, models, idealisations, analogies, metaphors and even myths and fictions.” (2017:5).

However, this does not deter those who genuinely seek truth, a point brought home by Dworkin (2011) who observes that; *“Morally responsible people may not achieve truth, but they seek it.” (2011:113).*

However, it is the contention of this researcher that philosophers have never tried to 'simplify' their theoretical positions or the metaphysics regarding the notion of truth and complexity continues to surround the subject. Reductionists might argue that *'simplex sigillum veri'* (simplicity is the sign of truth) but theirs is arguably a misplaced maxim. Oscar Wilde's (1980) main character 'Algy' in his play *'The Importance of Being Earnest'* would appear to support this view (and refute that of the reductionists) when he laments to his friend 'Jack';

“The truth is rarely pure and never simple. Modern life would be tedious if it were either.” (1980:326).

This position is supported by another literary character in the form of ‘*Professor Albus Dumbledore*’ created by J.K. Rowling (1997) in her book ‘*The Philosopher’s Stone*’ who in a discussion with Harry Potter about ‘the greater good’ laments;

“The truth is a beautiful and terrible thing and should therefore be treated with great caution.” (1997:216).

A confused cynic on the other hand, might concur with the observation of Sertillanges (1987) that; *“Truth serves only its slaves.” (1987:4)* which would seem to completely contradict the words of Jesus in the Gospel of John 8:32 which claims ‘*veritas liberabit vos*’ or ‘*the truth will set you free*’.

Truth then, it would seem both in its theoretical and practical context, would appear not to be constrained to theory and paradigms, but is to be both fashioned and experienced by everyday life. As such, it plays an important and essential role in our existence and some would argue is instrumental in what Classical moral philosophers propose is our ‘*flourishing*’ and sense of ‘*well-being*’ both as individual moral agents and collectively as a society. In short, truth is served by the elements of *“reason, justification and objectivity” (Blackburn 2017:5)* If this is applied, then arguably ‘truth’ when achieved, will not be vacuous and can be applied in terms of the judgement of the moral agent. In short it has been alleged by Dworkin (2011:120-22) that ultimately truth needs to be not only a sense of conviction, but it also needs to be internally consistent, coherent and useful if it is to be a mainstay of moral

agency. His position arguable re-iterates and re-focuses the one taken by Joachim (1906) in which it is claimed that;

“Truth in its essential nature is that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole.” (1906:76).

Truth has been examined by Classical philosophers, Medieval theologians, Enlightenment scholars and modern Ethicists and theologians, leading perhaps to the occasion where it has been claimed that in terms of understanding truth, philosophers seek a world of reason; theologians seek a divine world and ethicists seek a free world. It is perhaps through these three distinct theoretical positions or lenses of truth, the average person searches for a common theoretical and conceptual understanding of truth that will serve their daily reality in a way that brooks little to no dissent and provides them with clarity of mind and certainty of action.

4.5.1 Truth through the lens of Modern Philosophy.

The German philosopher Nietzsche (2010) wrote extensively on the notion and concept of truth and famously pronounced that; *‘Truth is ugly’*. However, despite this rather immature outburst, his views on truth were interpreted by Taylor (2010) in the foreword of Nietzsche’s (2010) work *‘On Truth and Untruth’* as having;

“...evolved and eventually became deeper, subtler and more sophisticated with time.” (2010: viii).

Whilst the jury is out on whether Nietzsche (2010) could ever be subtle, the subject of truth haunted him throughout his troubled life as evidenced by his pronouncement that *“...truth could drive him to despair and annihilation” (2010:13)* whilst

simultaneously and confusingly he proposed, "...*the drive to truth is a life-preserving power.*" (2010:59). However, this dichotomy attributed to the effect of truth on human life by Nietzsche (2010), has nevertheless been the driving force behind the philosophical study of truth and in this section of the literature review whilst the researcher acknowledges there are considered to be the five key recognised approaches to truth namely; Correspondence, Coherence, Pragmatism, Deflationism and Semantic the scope of this research demands that only theoretical approaches specifically associated with '*moral truth*' and the effect they have on human life and more particularly their ability to provide us with an understanding of '*new*' moral truth in situations of '*new*' moral conflicts and dilemmas in 4IR are required to be explored and examined. The researcher aims to achieved this in a way that will fulfil the expectations of Nietzsche (2010) when he pronounced;

"There is nothing more necessary than truth and compared to it, everything else has only secondary value." (2010:88).

To meet this burden of proof laid down by Nietzsche (2010), we would be wise to heed his call to be "*truthful enough about what 'truthfulness' is*" (2010:77) and the brief following review of theoretical approaches to truth will hopefully demonstrate where and how they add specific dimensions, explanations and understandings of the meaning and reality of moral truth in the moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts of 4IR.

4.5.2 Approaches to Moral Truth in 4IR.

Much discourse has taken place around the subject of moral truth. Moore (2018) urged us to consider that moral truth should be considered differently as it should

have a different root and branch from *'natural'* truths. He argued that since doubt is always possible, and can sometimes surround the notion of moral truth, (referring perhaps to the relativism that can be associated by some with moral truth) it warranted its own distinct study. Blackburn (2017) proposes that what Moore (2018) was failing to make clear, was that moral truth;

"...could not be simply identified with any natural, empirical or scientific truth." (2017:82).

This position with regards to moral truth has resulted in its notion and nature becoming the subject of polemics, critics, dissenters and assenters but in this section of the literature review, the researcher will take exception to Moore's (2018: 110-125; 193-200) view of moral truth and through an examination of a number of relevant theories and approaches to truth, attempt to achieve a broad overview and a level of cohesion in an understanding and meaning of moral truth, that defies Moore's (2018) position. This researcher in this section of the literature review, will try and present truth in a way that conforms with Dworkin's (2011:37-41) requirements mentioned earlier, but in a way that concurrently heeds the warnings of Foucault (2011:1-23) who challenges us to have the *'courage of truth'* and stresses the importance of *'truth telling'* as he proposes that false opinions and prejudices only arise from a *'lack of truth'*.

To this end the following generally accepted philosophical approaches to truth will be briefly reviewed as a means of providing both an academic understanding and practical understanding of the nature, manner and means of establishing moral truth. They are;

- Logical empiricism,
- Hermeneutics,
- Pragmatism
- Theological/Divine Command Theory

Each of these approaches will be briefly reviewed with the aim of determining how they can be employed within the context of providing the means of determining 'moral truth' in 4IR specific moral dilemmas.

4.5.3 Truth - Logical Empiricism.

According to Higgs & Smith (2010) logical empiricism or deflationism is a; *"philosophy that claims truth is found by looking at 'hard facts'"* (2010:1). It is associated with reason and sense experiences. Aristotle is credited with being the father of this approach (although Plato also spoke of it too) as he claimed that human knowledge begins with experience. He laid the foundations of what we now term the *scientific method*, that is based upon analytics and the classification of discernible facts, metrics, experiences and observations. Followers of this approach require an enquiring, disciplined and clear approach to thinking that uses hard facts and objectivity as a means of discovering truth. Locke's (2017) suggestion in the first book of his work *'Concerning Human Understanding'*. Refers to the human mind being a *'tabula rasa'* (blank slate at birth) that in turn was an important launch pad in modern philosophical thought for both our understanding and the nature of knowledge/truth within the logical empiricism paradigm. In his fourth book in the work, Locke (2017:283-289) suggests that it is *'the understanding of man'* that sets him above all other *'sensible'* beings and this unique facility ensures that our

knowledge is gained consciously and empirically. His work some would argue laid the modern foundations for an approach traditionally based in logic and mathematics, and that is arguably best understood as the '*scientific theory of truth*' but has subsequently been recognised in the twentieth century as '*analytic philosophy*'. It uses the instrument of the '*verification principle*' as critical to an understanding and demonstration of truth that requires testing and checking as integral to any result.

This approach regained ascendancy in the twentieth century through the work of Russell (1979), and Frege, whose work on analytic philosophy has been recorded by Kenny (2000) and through the works of academics such as Einstein, Gödel, Feigl, Hempel, Carnap, Neurath and Kraft who were members of the '*Vienna Circle*' with the internationally renowned philosopher Schlick (2002) as their leader. Their work on *logical empiricism* or *positivism* came at a time and was being driven by advances in science and technology which in turn seemed to seek and demand a more refined and unified understanding of knowledge and truth. The latter required that truth *be* '*provable*' and as such was in direct opposition to the metaphysical notion of truth. In short, these academics were examining the '*nature of scientific truth*'.

Higgs & Smith (2010) provide an excellent example of a '*scientific truth*'. This example conforms perfectly with the logical empiricists position adopted and supported by Schlick's (2002) positivist/analytic approach when they state that; "*One million people in South Africa have tuberculosis.*" (2010:5). This statement would be considered consistent as a '*scientific truth*' and therefore conforms to the logical empiricist approach as it contains both mathematical and therefore logical truth. It achieves this through the following sequence of thought;

- Scientists can witness the evidence of the disease in their patients.
- X-rays can be used to identify and confirm the disease in a patient.
- Addresses given by patients confirm their geographic location.
- These facts are used as components in a patient's medical records that can be consolidated and in turn confirm the statement.

In this example, it is evident that logical empiricists adopted the position that metaphysics was meaningless as it did not provide an adequate means of proving whether the knowledge contained within the statement was *'true'* or *'false'*. For example, the statement; *'The Bible is the word of God'* is meaningless to an adherent of *logical empiricism* because there is no definitive way of discerning whether this statement is true or false as it lacks the means of *'scientific truth'*.

Whilst *logical empiricism* has been explained by many, it is perhaps Richardson & Uebel (2007) who have provided one of the most encompassing and expansive definitions of this modern approach to knowledge and truth which they propose is;

"...a scientifically and technically informed philosophy of science in establishing mathematical logic as a topic in and a tool for philosophy and in creating the project of formal semantics. Logical empiricism provided an importantly new understanding of the nature of empiricism and a new rejection of metaphysics." (2007:1).

In conclusion what is apparent when examining *'truth'* through the lens of logical empiricism is best summed up by Higgs & Smith (2010) who propose those that follow this approach are firstly; *'very clear disciplined thinkers'* (2010:1) who believe they can *'discover truth'* and who perhaps most

importantly are prepared to admit when “...*they don't know something, or when they don't have an answer to a problem.*”(2010:1). Perhaps another point of consideration to which they do not allude, is that moral philosophy using or incorporating this approach when attempting to ascertain moral truth is invariably considered to be a deductive approach that denies any prospect of the interpretive which some would argue is the fountainhead of philosophy and more specifically ethics.

4.5.4 Truth: Hermeneutics.

In this interpretive approach to truth, hermeneutics views truth through the lens of understanding and/or interpretation. Its history stretches back to the mid 1700's and its function is to understand all forms of human expression in a quest for an authentic truth. In view of this, it is not surprising that Higgs & Smith (2010) suggest that it has been described somewhat confusingly by some as “*the science of understanding*” and concurrently by others as the “*art of understanding*” leading them to remind us that it is also considered by both scientists and philosophers alike as “*the science of communication*”.

Perhaps in view of the rather muddy waters surrounding the definition of this approach to truth, Higgs & Smith (2010:16-25), in trying to restore clarity, advise that hermeneutics is best viewed against the backdrop of the theme that;

“...*understanding is about transferring meaning from one person to another.*”

(2010:17). This as we know can be achieved using language (whether written or spoken, which in turn can be instruction or dialogue) and/or symbols, experiences and traditions.

George (2020) aware of the complexities surrounding the definition and meaning of hermeneutics, extends and clarifies its definition as a discipline, when he states that it concerns the;

“...meaning of human intentions, beliefs and actions, or the meaning of human experience as it is preserved in the arts and literature, historical testimony and other artifacts. Traditionally, disciplines that rely on hermeneutics include theology, especially Biblical studies, jurisprudence and medicine, as well as some of the human sciences, social sciences and humanities.” <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/>

(Accessed 3/9/2021)

From this, it is to be expected that hermeneutics enjoys a symbiotic relationship with education which was the subject of the initial work by the philosopher Gadamer (2006) who is perhaps most closely associated with the study of hermeneutics in modern times. He meticulously studied the works of his predecessor Dilthey (2019) that emphasised the positive implications this approach to truth has for practical life. In the Translator’s preface of Gadamer’s (2006) seminal work on hermeneutics, we are told that Gadamer (2006) speaks of hermeneutics as providing a validity which he describes as a ‘*shining light*’ that in turn brings ‘*enlightenment*’ or insight into our lives. Once again, we see from this, there is an implicit affirmation by Gadamer (2006:383-468) of the connection between education and learning and the hermeneutic approach to truth.

In his papers, Schmidt (2008:35-47) & (2012:35-48) has argued that Gadamer’s (2006) approach to hermeneutics also aligns particularly well with moral philosophy

in that it comprises an *'original ethics'* that in turn helps us to clarify the normative implications of any of our interpretive experiences. This position has been picked up by Rorty (1979) in his work *'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'* in which he states the case for characterising hermeneutics as an *'expression of hope'* and a form of *'mental mirroring'* that takes place in the space left behind by the demise of epistemology in post-modern situations such as 4IR and the inevitable search for moral truth that results.

The broad definitions associated with hermeneutics has led Grondin (1994) to comment that hermeneutics is perhaps best described as an *'auxiliary'* study and nowhere is this more evident than in Bible studies and jurisprudence where it seeks through the interpretive principles of the literal, moral, allegorical and anagogical to provide meaning and understanding for both spiritual leaders, judges and the judiciary, not forgetting the *'ordinary man'* in the process. Once again in these instances, we are encountering hermeneutics, within an educational framework in which meaning, certainty and clarity are the focus in the search for an authentic truth.

That hermeneutics is the cornerstone of the *'sociology of knowledge'* and *'aesthetic humanism'* is not in doubt, however, it is at its most powerful when in the hands of those who understand its contribution to a universal approach to truth and the way in which this can aid our understanding of changed circumstances such as those encountered in 4IR. In such situations, hermeneutics can provide the means for a revised and authentic sense of moral truth that has contemporary meaning for both the individual and wider society.

It has been suggested the ability of the modern hermeneutic tradition to provide a means of authentic truth through '*interpretation*' and '*meaning*' is best viewed as a '*circularity*' of understanding and knowledge rather than a '*vertical*' architecture of human knowledge. This approach forms a major part in the works of Dilthey (2019) whose work has been used extensively in German education and has come to be known as '*the humanistic theory of education*'. Higgs & Smith (2010) identify the hermeneutics of Dilthey (2019) as being,

"...based on a common human sympathy and common human experience...People help each other understand life better." (2010:19).

From this, there would almost seem to be a hint of the religious surrounding this approach wherein it could be interpreted that truth is a consequence of the 'Golden Rule' or;

"So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them."
(*Matthew: 7:12. R.S.V.*)

Therefore, it is not without purpose that the works of Dilthey's (2019) hermeneutic approach to truth can be seen to provide a means of establishing 'moral truth' for moral dilemmas in 4IR.

4.5.5 Pragmatism.

Spencer (2020) has proposed the pragmatic approach to truth has American roots and was developed during the time when the U.S emerged from colony to superpower. So cogent was its approach, the tradition of American pragmatism and its application has permeated modern moral philosophy.

Bacon (2012:1-15) considers the works of Pierce (1978) James (2000) and Dewey (1999) as seminal works covering the approach of classic pragmatism and their combined work is considered to have laid the foundations for not just his own work on pragmatism, but that of fellow modern pragmatists Royce (1982) Spencer (2020) and Rorty (1982).

In his recent work, Spencer (2020) suggests the tradition of pragmatism was *"...conceived of by Pierce, enriched by James and systemised by Dewey."* (2020:3). Both Bacon (2012) and Spencer (2020) have recognised the duality of theoretical positions that lie within the American tradition of pragmatism and Spencer (2020) refers to whether it is best viewed as a; *"theory of truth or method of experience."* (2020:2).

Pierce (1978) informs us in perhaps his most well-known maxim of pragmatism;

"Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." (1978:293).

Whilst James (2000) clearly communicates his developed views of pragmatism when he says that;

"A pragmatist turns his (sic) back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He (sic) turns toward concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards actions, and toward power." (2000:51).

He earlier adeptly describes the connection between a pragmatists vision of truth and utility as;

“Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor (sic); is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally. This is the ‘instrumental’ view of truth.” (1975:34).

He further argues that truth is a process of ‘validation’ and ‘verification’ and if this is undertaken when undertaking moral reasoning in a situation of moral conflict or moral dilemma, then moral truth is a consequence as it essentially provides concrete terms that agree with the reality. Arguably all three classical pragmatists considered the scientific and normative in their work in their efforts to create a theoretical framework that could address abstractions such as truth and meaning which they in turn linked with human action or conduct as a means of providing a practical response to moral dilemmas. This proposed human action (conduct) was to be spearheaded by a sense of belonging, purpose and values in a way that focuses on the practical difference(s) they can make in a situation of moral dilemma. Put simply the classical pragmatist adhered to the view that any normative notion could be reduced to a practical utility.

The seminal works on pragmatism of Pierce (1978) and James (2000) are best viewed as focusing their approaches largely within the realms of metaphysical disputes, in which they ask how truth and meaning can be linked to human response(s). Dewey’s (1999) work on pragmatism on the other hand, is considered

by many to be the most practical of the three and is best viewed as being grounded in Darwinian naturalism. His comprehensive approach to moral philosophy, provides us with a systematic attempt to apply inquiry, intelligence and practice in dealing with situations of moral dilemma in which a practical understanding of both truth, its meaning and its consequence is required if moral resolution is to result.

Fletcher (1966) perhaps because of his American roots was only too aware of the pragmatist tradition and adopted Dewey's (1999) practical stance which addressed 'concrete' situations to moral dilemmas. To this end, Fletcher (1966) informs that; *"Pragmatism is, to be plainspoken, a practical or success posture."* (1966:42).

However, it is perhaps to Baggini (2018) that we must turn for a succinct summation of the pragmatism approach, not just of classical pragmatists but their modern counterparts. He ignores the 'success posture' taken by Fletcher (1966) choosing instead to opine;

"...the pragmatist viewpoint is that many philosophical problems are not so much solved as dissolved." (2018:82).

It is for this reason the Pragmatism model of truth is well suited to the resolution of ethical dilemmas in which the need exists for not just an understanding of truth, but a practical way in which it can be demonstrated as providing the support for 'right' and 'wrong' and 'good' and 'bad' in terms of moral reasoning, resolution and conduct. Nowhere is this more pressing than in moral dilemmas resulting in 4IR.

4.5.6 Theological Truth/Divine Command Theory.

Theological truth is a Classical approach that interprets the notion of truth as having an architecture coming directly from the divine and its nature is associated with faith and the faithful. According to Austin (n.d) in his paper on Divine Command Theory on the Internet *Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP)* webpage, he confirms that whilst Divine Command Theory continues to be highly controversial, he nevertheless proposes that;

“...it provides an objective metaphysical foundation for morality. For those committed to the existence of objective moral truths, such truths seem to fit well within a theistic framework. That is, if the origin of the universe is a personal moral being, then the existence of objective moral truths are at home, so to speak, in the universe”. (<https://iep.utm.edu/divine-c/>)
(Accessed 27/9/21).

In this section of the literature review, the researcher will begin by investigating the arguably concertinaed view taken by Wierenga (1983) in which the presumption is made that;

- God determines what is moral.
- Moral obligations derive from God’s commands.
- These commands are interpreted as a revelation of divine will.

As evident, these theistic presumptions would appear to be not only grounded in God as a deity but would simultaneously seem to hold us solely accountable for all our actions to Him which in turn we undertake at His command. In this theistic framework, God occupies the role of a ‘divine arbiter’ of truth who dispenses both

judgement and justice in which the evil are punished and where the 'good' is seen to not only triumph but those who actively pursue it, are rewarded by Him. Furthermore, for those who seek the 'good', during their lifetime, it is invariably achieved through an element of self-sacrifice which is also commanded of them and approved of by God who will acknowledge their efforts and reward them eventually with eternal life.

Central to the success of this theistic framework, is control especially within the concept of reward and punishment dispensed by God, which has been quite justifiably criticised. This leaves us to ask; surely our motivation as humans to do the 'right' thing and encourage 'flourishing' and 'well-being' for both ourselves and others can vest in the divine; but if so, surely it should concomitantly confer in something other than the mere concept of reward and punishment? To this end it has been advocated theoretical refinements can be made to the original proposition wherein ultimate truth still vests in God, but not because those with faith want to avoid punishment from Him nor suffer the agonies of guilt through not following or choosing to ignore His commands, but because they want to reflect His love in the world around them.

Kent (2001) in her work on Saint Augustine develops this line of enquiry and interprets Saint Augustine's work on the subject in a way that puts the act of 'love' at the centre of this theistic framework for truth and the undertaking of the moral by us. Her work on Saint Augustine has led her to interpret the saint's work as encouraging us to still put God at the centre of our existence and faith as He is divinely worthy. However, she proposes that if we accept this divine status through faith, our relationship with the Divine, based on our supreme love for Him, will inform all our other relationships in a way that is proportional to their value and aligns them in a

sort of fountainhead concept from which 'well-being' 'happiness' and 'flourishing' will flow in turn, from our love for the Divine.

4.5.7 The Euthyphro Problem.

Plato (1981) informs us of the encounter between Socrates and Euthyphro in the king's court in which the former asks Euthyphro the now famous question which is best interpreted in two parts;

"Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" (1981:14).

Euthyphro was placed in a situation in which Socrates was challenging him to choose between these two positions which was of particular interest for Euthyphro who was in the process of prosecuting his father for the manslaughter/murder of one of the family's slaves. Euthyphro knew that he had to choose one of the positions presented by Socrates to help him explain the unusual moral position he had adopted with regards to his father because to do otherwise. i.e., to choose both positions; would yield a circular argument. It is upon this dilemma, commonly referred to as 'Euthyphro's Dilemma', that scholars across the disciplines of philosophy, ethics and theology have tested, rejected, and supported the Divine Command Theory of truth as we arguably see a conflation between our notions of God, love, divine commands and accepted morality.

Austin (1981) suggests the question posed by Socrates could be re-phrased as follows; Does God command this particular action because it is morally right, or is it morally right because God commands it? The ramifications of this conundrum have

far-reaching consequences for the Divine Command Theory and for the relationship between morality and the theism this paradigm assumes. In common parlance, it provides us with 'the horns of a dilemma'. Taken to its extreme, it could be argued that it justifies and supports cruelty and the inflicting of pain and distress on other humans because God commands it. But surely such an interpretation that supports pain, torture, murder, and cruelty as morally obligatory because God commands it, is at odds with the concept of a God of love and the master of our 'flourishing', 'happiness' and 'well-being' here on earth and ultimately in eternity? God is after all the eternal author and creator of 'goodness', isn't He? Michael Austin in his paper on Divine Command Theory in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy <https://iep.utm.edu/divine-c/> (Accessed 23 September 2021) suggests that such a position is in direct contradiction to the concept of human beings acting as independent moral agents as they remain dependent on God. Herein lie the proverbial horns of the dilemma!

Moreover, in mitigation of this position, many of God's commands, were written centuries ago and could be the subject of both 'bad' translations and subject to contemporary irrelevance e.g. the views expressed towards slavery and women. One could therefore adopt a position in which the faithful only follow those scriptural commands that coincide with contemporary life in which animal and human sacrifice no longer are common-place and are to be avoided as is the subjugation of women and minorities. In other words, there are those who still support a Divine Command Theory of truth but by way of what the researcher sees as a '*pick'n'mix*' version in which the inappropriate is left behind and we choose only the contextually appropriate and meaningful.

Notwithstanding, modern day pluralism and secularism in the West, have clearly carved a significant position in society that disputes the influence of God's commands within the context of faith and the faithful. Indeed, some would venture that contemporary pluralism and secularism have even managed to bridge the divide between morality and religion. To this end, there are those who propose that 'goodness' exists independently of God and religion and can be seen to exist and be dispensed largely as a function of legalism. The argument proceeds, that if the existence of God is a function of faith, which in turn cannot be confirmed through empiricism or science, then legalism instead can provide society with a universal morality which is objective, enforceable and not subject to individual whim or favour.

Some, such as Rachels (1986) would argue that Euthyphro's Dilemma presents us with the perfect storm between metaethics, normative ethics and applied ethics within a theistic framework. However, it has been argued the 'perfect storm' can be calmed if human dignity takes centre stage in the arena of morality and as such the value, worth and respect that flow from this notion and its modern-day reality will promote 'goodness', 'flourishing' and 'well-being' in the minds and actions of individual moral agents and in their roles and functions as decision-makers in both their private and possibly public capacities.

However, for the faithful, this does not deter from the position taken by Pollock (2007) in which he proposes God's Will can be encompassed in four assumptions that can be attributed to the Divine Command Theory. These are;

1. There is a God.
2. God commands and forbids certain acts.

3. An action is 'right' if God commands it.
4. People ascertain what God commands or forbids.

It is perhaps the last of these, which puts Divine Command Theory back into its rightful place as a truth paradigm, as it seeks to overcome its challenges. In fact, it could be argued that it leads us to the position adopted by Aquinas with regards to Divine Command Theory in which he rejected the paradigm in its absolute sense in favour of his interpretation of Natural Law in which human nature can be seen to determine what is moral and truthful through its interpretation of the Divine.

The shortcomings of Divine Command Theory within a modern context have been summed up as follows;

- The difficulties/challenges presented by translations of scripture.
- The relevancy of Divine Command Theory in terms of the prevailing Western culture and its intrinsic and extrinsic forces that seek to marginalise faith and religion.

Modern Western, liberal society seeks to overcome these shortcomings and provide a truth and morality that side-steps faith. Moreover, in so doing an attempt is made to provide solutions to the practicalities of living and practising an equitable truth accessible to all regardless of geography, race, gender, faith, and age. To this end, it has been recognised there is;

- The existing and future need for legalism in contemporary life in the absence of religion and faith to endorse truth and morality.
- The importance of independence and free-will for individual moral agency that must continue to be championed.

Such concerns speak to the need for a universal understanding of truth and morality in contemporary times. Whilst there are those who believe this is still achievable through faith and a practising religion, the revised model which has been outlined, recognises there is a growing secular understanding of truth and morality which can equally be served through legalism.

Those who consider that Divine Command Theory still has a significant role to play in both truth and morality in a secular world, would argue that at the core of the legal system in most countries, (despite their liberalism and growing secularism) is an understanding or a recognised 'soft-underbelly' of faith in judgement e.g. in American courts we see the statement above the bench 'In God We trust'. Arguably such a statement confirms that God is still in 'command' in terms of guiding our judgements and dispensing justice in a way ensuring that Divine truth will be sought above anything and everything else. However, in contradiction to this position, it could be argued that many of the accepted laws in modern, Western, liberal societies have been written and enforced without heed to religion or faith e.g. the laws surrounding abortion, euthanasia, divorce, organ transplants and in vitro fertilisation (IVF). Alternatively, Iris Murdoch (1970:70) argues for retaining a God centred morality as it is more feasible to entertain the notion of a 'loving God' than a 'loving Good'.

In conclusion, what this brief review of Divine Command Theory exacerbates with regards to faith, truth and morality, is that it calls upon the components of religion, faith and piety to serve as the impetus for its application and when in the hands of the faithful and enlightened it can serve as a means to establish moral truth and 'good' in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflicts. However, if this is

lacking and/or in short supply, the governmental and administrative processes of the law (both local and international) can interpret and dispense a universal moral truth that is both practical and meaningful for those facing moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts.

4.6 Privacy.

4.6.1 An Introduction to the concept, understanding and meaning of privacy.

In 1964 Packard (1964) remonstrated in his best-seller 'The Naked Society' that privacy was "...rapidly evaporating" (1964:12). Just over forty-five years later in 2010, Mark Zuckerberg the founder of Facebook is said to have remonstrated with a reporter questioning him on the position Facebook had adopted regarding personal privacy and according to Hoepman (2021) allegedly said in a fit of pique; "*You already have zero privacy. Get over it.*" (2021:31). It appears that time, has confirmed Packard's (1964) premonition.

In this section of the literature review, the researcher will be investigating both our historical and modern understanding of privacy and the multi-disciplinary interest arising from its use, misuse and even abuse and examine whether, according to several commentators, the world is becoming more public and less private as we grapple with the realities of 4IR. If we can agree to this being the case, due in large part to the omnipresence of AI and ICT, then we all have cause for concern with regards to our understanding of '*privacy*' in general and the unauthorised access by third parties to what is considered our '*personal*' information.

Evidence points to research in modern science and the humanities converging in a unique way in 4IR, as the notion and current reality of privacy demonstrates. Our

understanding of the concept and reality of privacy and personal begs re-definition via a more acute and authentic moral reasoning through the deployment of the extra dimension of 'moral imagination' defined by Johnson (1981) as;

“An ability to imaginatively discern various possibilities for acting in a given situation and to envision the potential help and harm that are likely to result from a given action.” (1993:185).

If we apply this as a source of inspiration in the examination of privacy and the personal, it will serve to shed light beyond the historical ontology of the two into a future where the definition, reality and practice of both still retains meaning and ascendance, but our expectations of either or both have been dramatically re-envisaged to accommodate the landscape of 4IR and its use of 4OT.

It is becoming critical to evaluate both the worth and importance of privacy in our lives as 4OT continues to disrupt our modern ethical landscape and social and personal architecture to an extent where there is ever greater importance being given to personal information and its accompanying requirement of privacy. In short there is evidence in 4IR of the need for effective control of the *private* and *personal* by those who wish it to remain secure and inaccessible to those who do not have permission. Hoepman's (2021) work acknowledges that when individuals interface with ICT, they have an unspoken expectation their personal data will be ring-fenced. If this is to become an everyday reality, Hoepman (2021) speaks of the need for programmers to ensure; *“privacy by design is first and foremost.”* (201:16). However, whilst software design might have this as a criteria, it cannot halt the way in which existing data is stored and accessed by governments and third parties and

programme privacy enablers such as block-chain networks are expensive and are currently only widespread within the domains of crypto currency and are rarely used as a means to protect digital identities outside of the digital banking and finance space.

Monti & Wacks (2019) suggest that our existing concept of privacy is most certainly confused and incoherent. Indeed, the researcher would advise the term and existing concept of privacy is best summed up in a quote from Baggini (2012) when he states;

“You know what a word means when you know how to use it, not what its definition is. That is why we can understand and use all sorts of words that we struggle to define clearly if we are put on the spot and asked to do so.” (2012:9).

This would appear to be supported by the whimsical, cynical and arguably dismissive observation of privacy provided by Franzen (2003) who comments;

“Privacy proves to be the Cheshire cat of values: not much substance, but a very winning smile.” (2003:42).

Research into privacy and the personal and their absence and protection is indeed something of ‘*substance*’ proving to be captivating and consuming due in no small measure to ‘its winning smile’ which serves to direct attention to the moral nuances and complexity which serve to confirm that whilst terms, concepts and meanings can seem to be adequately identified, it is only when they are experienced and lived, that consensus is achieved and they can serve to provide a capstone in the framework for moral truth and moral certitude in 4IR. This can in turn, serve to assist our

understanding and future expectation of privacy and the personal in our lives in 4IR and beyond in addition to a healthy regard being given of their significance to our well-being and flourishing both as individuals and within the scope of our governments, organisations and society.

4.6.2 Some Definitions of Privacy.

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (1981) defines privacy as;

“Being withdrawn from society or public interest; avoidance of publicity. attention.”(1981:671)

whilst Merriam-Webster’s alternative dictionary definition is *“freedom from unauthorised intrusion.”* (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/privacy> (Accessed 17/6/2020)).

In both definitions there is recognition of the very real physical boundaries the term privacy assumes and seemingly assures.

The etymology of the word privacy would appear to support these notions of privacy as it suggests; *‘the personal, yet unseen’*. This is in stark contrast to the definition of secrecy which has at its heart consciously hidden information and which the OED (1981) suggests is;

“...a state in which all information is withheld; the keeping of secrets as a fact, habit or faculty.” (1981:770)

a definition seemingly with much darker overtones and oftentimes a rock hard and sinister underbelly that in 4IR extends into the realms of the cybersphere with the likes of ‘big data’ and the ‘dark’ web offering both secrets for sale and their often-

accompanying, sinister overtures with regards to personal privacy and unethical practices, such as pornography (particularly child pornography) personal identity theft and cyber sales of personal identities, unauthorised financial transactions such as money laundering, corporate hacking, government espionage, terrorist plots and much more.

Often the private and the secret can collide, as the former can beget the latter in a relationship that can prove to be immoral and oftentimes unethical in a modern world that purports to prefer and strive for transparency, accountability and justice. In such cases, the '*intimacy*' implied by privacy has been breached or compromised but most importantly abused, as it has been accessed without permission. In addition, the '*personal*' has been used outside of its initial purpose and acceptable parameters.

4.6.3 The socio-historical background to our current understanding of privacy.

Floridi (2014) proposes the social history of industrialisation has played a leading role in both our past and current understanding of the term privacy and will shape our future understanding of its reality. He suggests it has directly impacted our expectations surrounding the current reality and future authenticity of privacy in 4IR and has helped define our continued quest for the qualified protection and security for what we consider to be private and the implicit moral truth this encompasses and embraces for what we consider to be personal.

It is a fact that pre-industrialised Western society was in the main agrarian, with workers living in villages and hamlets where neighbours were either related by blood or through the goods and services locally supplied and used. Within these societies,

all aspects of one's life were in large part common knowledge. Both the concept and reality of privacy was ill-defined. Whilst births, marriages, deaths and brushes with the law were matters of public record, the more personal some would say private aspects of one's life and personal architecture were observed and known by other villagers. This information was collectively known, shared and used within the ambit of pre-industrial village life. Villagers were aware of the far-reaching consequences of the information gained and shared from their personal details and its impact upon their personal architecture and relationships. They were aware it provided the means of entertainment, sanction, ostracisation, and even the possibility of social upliftment for themselves and their families. To this end, the understanding of privacy and its reality in pre-industrialised societies was at worst life-determining and at best life-changing as defined by the intrinsic elements of information, relationships, habits and identity. This situation Zuboff (2019) eloquently evokes as; *"...each life was foretold in blood, geography, sex and kin, rank and religion."* (2019:33).

If we move forward to the days of the first industrial revolution, we encounter a very different way of life for the industrialised worker which helped to shape our current understanding of the concept and reality of privacy and its direct impact on the scope of the personal.

Family and friends in this instance have been exchanged for strangers, as the massive human migration from the land to the cities and towns took place. Initially, those in charge of urban planning tried to replicate the historical social living conditions pre-industrialisation. However, their experiment was foiled by the lack of genealogy, shared geographic beginnings and economic traditions, current work

responsibilities and future aspirations between newly urban, physical neighbours. In turn, this social engineering experiment unknowingly encouraged a vastly different understanding and reality of the term privacy and the scope of the personal to take root in industrialised society which subsequently developed and intensified in the second and third industrial revolutions. To this end, numerous scholars attest to the triumvirate forces of Protestantism, capitalism and extended democratisation not only serving to drive the industrial revolutions in the West but also serving to radically change both our understanding and expectation of privacy and who should have access to the personal.

4.6.4 Current definitions, meanings and understanding of the term privacy.

It is clear the current terminology and articulation of privacy is inexact, but its concept and modern reality are arguably born out of post-modern, liberal traditions accompanying the age of enlightenment and is significant to citizens of liberal democracies who quite rightly see it as having not only intrinsic value but concomitantly embodying a fundamental, democratic, right.

Vincent (2016) confirms this view when he posits that our current understanding of the concept and reality of privacy is that it is; “...*an unofficial aspiration to a fundamental expectation.*” (2016:80). This is never more evident than within functioning democracies and the confines of the ballot box; where privacy is axiomatic to the political process for both the voter and the elected candidate.

Wacks (2015) on the other hand puts forward the view there is ‘...*little agreement on its (privacy) principal defining features*’ (2015:45) although it has been cogently argued the concept and practice of privacy can be seen as teleological. Indeed, over

two thousand years ago, some of the stories in the New Testament would seem to support this view of privacy as an end in itself and suggest that it comprises both the sacred and the vulnerable. For example, when we read about Jesus' actions after the feeding of the five thousand on the shores of the Lake of Galilee we are told;

"Immediately Jesus made the disciples get into a boat and go on ahead of him to the other side, while he dismissed the crowd. After he had dismissed them, he went up on a mountainside by himself to pray. Later that night, he was there alone." (Matthew: 14:22-23 NIV).

This account confirms Jesus' need to withdraw from both crowds and his disciples to be solitary and alone in his thoughts and prayers. In other words, he actively sought the telos of privacy during his earthly ministry.

We see Christ behaving in similar fashion in the Garden of Gethsemane before his crucifixion. Luke's gospel tells us; *"....and he withdrew from them about a stone's throw and knelt down and prayed."* (Luke: 22:41 NIV).

This scripture once again suggests the importance of privacy in both teleological terms and as a means of self-reflection, and personal meditation and contemplation within one's own physical space to access one's faith. The picture drawn for us in this Gospel account is a vivid outpouring of both the sacred and the vulnerable.

Within the secular world, Warren & Brandies (1890) writing for the Harvard Law Review, sought to establish a new legal right amidst the confusion of judgements and legislation in cases of privacy in courts at that time. Seen alongside the Gospel accounts, and arguably drawing from them, their writings appear to legitimise privacy as a solitary capacity whilst seeking to legally provide for the expectation of it. Their

submission to the Harvard Law Review was to be a seminal article in tort law in terms of an understanding of privacy in which they recognised *'the intensity and complexity of life'* and the requirement for *'the sacred precincts of private and domestic life'*. Indeed, Brandeis continued to champion the right to privacy and as Justice Brandeis prosecuting in the *Olmstead v United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) Supreme Court 1928 once again proclaimed privacy to be;

"...the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilised man (sic)." (1928:478).

This re-iteration of freedom from intrusion subsequently caused judges and magistrates in courts in Western liberal democracies, to use this understanding as a guiding principle when cases of privacy were brought before them and judgement and/or arbitration and relief from wrongful acts of intrusion were required and reparation(s) needed to be made.

Westmacott (2016) when referring to privacy suggests it is best interpreted as a *'hallowed veil'*; a term which would seem to conflate the secular and the religious. However, there are many who would cite current examples of situations where privacy is considered anything but 'hallowed' and the secrecy of the veil all too secular and transparent in its application. Such a case would be that of Edward Snowden's exposé in June 2013 of the practice of the U.S. government of copying and storing the personal information of its citizens, from the National Security Agency (NSA) without authorisation; or the case of the celebrity phone hacking scandal that heralded the demise of Rupert Murdoch's tabloid newspaper *'News of the World'* in the UK in 2012 when the phone calls of celebrities and people of

interest were hacked and listened to by journalists (without the consent of their subjects) who then salaciously reported the contents to their readers in the tabloid press.

Not surprisingly, Wacks (2015) suggests that such instances are invariably accompanied by mistrust and suspicion which in turn can cause citizens to conclude that “*when security is under siege, so inevitably is our liberty*” (2015:14) the latter being a fundamental building block in the Millsian rights tradition. In other words, when privacy is believed to have been compromised, the democratic rights associated with neo-liberal societies are also under siege as we witness the fragility of privacy; such is the tension-filled modern day relationships between privacy and security; liberty and democracy.

Interestingly, Wacks (2015) further suggests that our modern notion of privacy is intrinsically linked to our sense of ‘*a zone of intimacy*’ which speaks to the importance of the personal within our modern understanding of privacy and its physical reality, both key components of proxemics which will be looked at in a later chapter where an in-depth study of privacy and the personal occurs.

However, it is perhaps to Holtzman (2006) who has most effectively covered the subject of privacy in its modern context that we must turn if we seek clarity on privacy in 4IR. He seemingly draws upon a religious context when examining the subject of privacy to support its absence in contemporary life. In his work, he refers to the; ‘*Seven Sins Against Privacy*’ and draws upon modern examples that serve to conform and confirm his rubric for a lack of privacy in modern times. Holtzman (2006) names his sins as those of; intrusion, latency, deception, profiling, identity

theft, outing and lost dignity (See Table 2) He proposes that each of these sins address a way in which privacy can be seen to have been violated in 4IR often through the use and misuse of 4OT. Interestingly, Holtzman’s (2006) sins four, five, six and seven can be seen to fall not just within the context of privacy but, most importantly and specifically, within the realm of the personal over which we would choose to have control. However, this control is increasingly wrested from us through the existing and developing information technology (IT) of third parties as will be shared in a later chapter.

Table 2: A Brief Outline of Holtzman’s (2006) ‘Seven Sins Against Privacy’. (L. Doherty)

1: Sin of INTRUSION	Speaks to the; “...uninvited encroachment on a person’s physical or virtual space” (2006:5)
2: Sin of LATENCY	This occurs when; “...custodians of personal information keep information beyond an agreed-upon time” (2006:9)
3: Sin of DECEPTION	This occurs when personal information is used; “...in a way that was not authorised by the person involved.” (2006:14)
4: Sin of PROFILING	This occurs when; “Data derived from raw information is mishandled” (2006:17)
5: Sin of IDENTITY THEFT	Holtzman (2006) refers to this as a crime and describes it being the result of; “...easily accessible personal information disseminated by computers” (2006:23)
6: Sin of OUTING	This occurs when information is revealed; “...that a person would rather remain hidden” (2006:28)

7: Sin of LOST DIGNITY	This occurs when; “Information can easily dig up enough minute but embarrassing information ... to leave us exposed” (2006:35)
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5 Research Design.

In undertaking and conducting this research, the researcher is mindful of the insight given by Myers (2008) when he suggests that research is;

“.. a creative activity leading to the production of new knowledge. The knowledge produced is new in the sense that the facts, the interpretation of those facts, or the theories used to explain them, might not have been used in a particular way before in that specific discipline.” (2008:5).

It is the researcher’s sincere wish this research will reflect this sentiment in the fullest sense and that in the words of Myers’ (2008) ‘new knowledge’ might be brought to bear on the act of moral reasoning and the consequences arising from it in the search for moral truth in 4IR.

However, what must not be forgotten when undertaking such research according to Deacon & Parker (2009) is that however structured;

“The best research is first and foremost from the heart, and this personal commitment will be reflected in the quality of the research produced.”
(2009:11).

That said, there is still a need for a formal approach to research in order that it remains rational whilst simultaneously fulfilling the key objectives of providing academic interpretation and analysis that will add to the existing body of knowledge.

Galison (1987) contends the independent traditions of research lie in the theoretical, experimental and instrumental and it is the researcher's sincere desire this research will conform to these traditions.

To this end, the researcher will adopt a critical approach to this study, as the research material provides a social critique and will be used within the qualitative paradigm. The use of a qualitative paradigm for this research is driven by its nature of using words for analysis rather than numbers or measures. Essentially it will adopt the form of a systematic, content analysis.

In such a research undertaking, not only does the use of a qualitative paradigm offer a perspective of a situation, but it can also provide a richness and depth of exploration and descriptions, from which the researcher can draw whilst also providing details to help understand the idiosyncrasies of the situations under review. (Myers 2008) Such aspects of the qualitative paradigm also amount to its strengths that are ideally placed for providing the tools required to conduct this research that will compare and contrast Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism and their ability to provide moral truth both theoretically and within the practical context of '*privacy*' and the '*personal*'.

5.1 Research Methodology.

Broadly speaking the methodology for this research will embrace three orientations. The principal orientation will be inductive, whilst the epistemological orientation will be interpretivist and the ontological orientation will be constructivist.

The first of these research orientations, induction, is best understood as an '*ampliative argument*' and is characterised when something beyond the content of the premise is inferred as probable or can be supported by hard data or identified sources.

In choosing to adopt an interpretivist orientation, the researcher is cognisant that it relies heavily on hermeneutics and phenomenology, both of which are believed to be extremely important approaches when assessing and interpreting moral conflicts and dilemmas and their moral resolution in contemporary times. Moreover, interpretivism accepts there can be multiple realities and acknowledges that facts do not always speak for themselves; they require interpretation. The researcher proposes this is another principal factor when researching areas of applied ethics such as the one chosen for this research study.

The constructivist orientation, whilst similar to interpretivism, considers the meaning of relationships between things, people and events and has been described as offering an exploratory approach to qualitative research. The use of this orientation is seen as offering a complementary approach to strengthen and amplify the others (Bryman, 2004).

5.2 Research Tools.

The research tool that will be used throughout this research study will be textual analysis, also known as systematic content analysis. The researcher will be

choosing published sources and case studies based upon their historical, conceptual, ethnographic and phenomenological worth, to elicit understanding for the critical research question under review and its accompanying research objectives. The researcher will not only bring the function of analysis to the chosen published sources but will also undertake to bring the additional functions of synthesis and evaluation. The use of these three research tools in this order will hopefully bring clarity to the historical and current practical application of the moral traditions of Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism whilst concurrently providing an assessment of their success and authenticity both past, present and future as a practical means of establishing moral truth through moral reasoning, moral resolution and moral action in 4IR moral dilemmas specifically within the context of *'privacy'* and the *'personal'*.

In undertaking this research, the researcher will be mindful of the nine general criteria outlined by Leedy and Ormrod (2015) for qualitative research namely;

- 1) Purposefulness.
- 2) Explicitness of assumptions and biases.
- 3) Rigour.
- 4) Open-mindedness.
- 5) Completeness.
- 6) Coherence.
- 7) Persuasiveness.
- 8) Consensus.
- 9) Usefulness.

The researcher will attempt to address each one of these criteria in this research largely through syntopical reading and resultant textual analysis, synthesis and evaluation. In short, the researcher, in undertaking syntopical reading and textual analysis, will be following the advice given by Bullock (2006) who suggests the techniques of summary, attention to context, clear interpretation and support for conclusions are necessary if a thorough textual analysis is to be undertaken by a researcher.

In undertaking this research, the researcher is ever mindful of the enormous research task ahead of them which is beautifully expressed in the metaphor by Wogaman (2011) when he suggests the researcher will be;

“...selecting out of an immense sea, those buckets of fact and insight that seem to the writer to be particularly significant.” (2011: x).

capitalist liberal societies, caused society to socially and morally re-frame issues such as; conscription, peace, enforced parenthood, sexual monogamy, abortion, marriage, homosexuality, racial integration and the use of weapons of mass destruction and bio-warfare. It was a time charged with infinite possibilities both political (JFK was elected the 35th President of the United States and the first Catholic to hold this position) economic (consumerism reached new heights with the concept and reality of globalism) and scientific (the advent of the space race). Dylan (1964) was quite correct when he sang "*The Times They are a-Changin*" as the 1960's truly threw off the shackles and constraints of a post-war society and took steps into a 'new' future which some might even venture was poised to replicate the dystopian, 'Brave New World'. (Huxley, 2004).

The 'new generation' in the 1960's identified themselves primarily through their music, lifestyle, art, fashion, anti-materialism and a reconnection with mysticism particularly through the religions of the East. The Beatles (1967) recorded their hit song "*All You Need Is Love*" stating a position perhaps akin to and supporting that taken by the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1962) earlier in the decade when he had written; "*What the world needs is Christian love or compassion.*" (1962: viii).

Here, the term 'Christian love' could be substituted for the term Agape love without negatively changing the sentiment or meaning conveyed by Russell (1962) who was perhaps hinting at the emerging 'new' world order becoming more secular and less spiritual. His observation for the need for 'Christian love' it could be argued was also in response to the rise of self-interest and egoism in the 1960's spearheading existentialism and the onset of the 'uber-capitalism' (which still exists in

contemporary times) at the expense of the self-less and altruistic; the latter fundamental to the concept and reality of Christian Agape love. We only need to turn to the Burt Bacharach and Hal David (1965) hit song to confirm;

“What the world needs now is love, sweet love.

It’s the only thing that there’s just too little of.

What the world needs now is love, sweet love

No, not just for some but for everyone” (1965)

The suggestion of a ‘*universal love*’ was a call to individual action. It is hardly surprising therefore, that against this social backdrop, the 1960’s was a time when a sense of ‘collective’ or ‘universal love’, was touted by many sections of Western, liberal society as a panacea for its ills both real, imagined; presented and predicted. It was a concept ripe for the conflation of both philosophy and theology. Indeed, within this historical context, Fletcher’s (1966) Christian Situation Ethics was devised and for many answered the call of a generation who sought love and moral truth in a fast-changing world. His ‘new morality’ proposed the principle of Agape love as a method that could importantly not only heal but transform and translate ‘new’ situations of moral dilemma and imbue them with a ‘new morality’ for the ‘new’ times. Simply put, Fletcher (1966) proposed that Agape love, or God’s love revealed, provided the means through which authentic moral reasoning and moral truth could (upon reflection and using practical wisdom or phronesis) be revealed in moral resolution and moral conduct to address moral dilemmas situated in modern times.

6.2 Brief Theoretical Overview of Christian Situationism.

Whilst Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism was not unique, theologians Bultmann (2007) and Robinson (2015) had each previously put forward theories placing love above all other moral principles or rules as a means of discerning moral truth in situations of moral dilemma, Fletcher (1966) is considered the modern founder of this approach in which Agape love is central. Bultmann's (2007) exegesis of the New Testament, firmly placed love at the centre of authentic modern living and in particular our notion of human dignity and attempts to position Christian love (Agape) as the ultimate arbiter in any earthly situation of moral dilemma. Kant (1923) who notoriously placed his theories beyond Christian influence, observed that romantic love and friendship love could not be commanded, but that Agape could;

"It is only practical love (Agape) that is meant in that pith of all laws."
(1923:176).

Buber (1952) however, fundamentally disagreed with Kant's observation and adopted a contrary position that reminds us that;

"One cannot command that one feel love for a person but only that one deal lovingly with him." (1952:69).

Robinson (2013) considered the approach of using love to resolve ethical dilemmas to be a form of ethical relativism whilst Fletcher (1966) preferred to see it as a form of consequentialism, distinct from utilitarianism which aims at 'the greatest good' and not 'the greatest love'.

This is an important distinction made by Fletcher (1966), as Situationism has subsequently been undertaken in a non-religious capacity whereby his religious principle of Agape love has been ignored in favour of a humanist approach. This type

of Situationism has been referred to as 'Atheistic Situationism' and conforms with Singer's (2015) position of 'effective altruism'. It has been suggested this move from the religious to the nihilistic, is in line with the contemporary secularisation and legalism of Western societies in which human dignity, rooted in legalistic human rights rather than Christian love, has been the primary and preferred method employed for moral reasoning and in so doing has become the common method employed to discern contemporary moral truth in current situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict.

Stephen Law (2011) opines that humanism;

"...means little more than a system of thought in which human values, interests and dignity are considered particularly important." (2011:1).

and if we accept this somewhat reductionist definition of humanism, then it is easy to see how Fletcher's (1966) fears of the '*greatest good*' being applied as a means of moral reasoning instead of the '*greatest love*' as a means of leading to an understanding of contemporary moral truth in current situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict has endured.

The Humanist Manifestos 1&11 (1973) endorse the expression of atheistic situationism as a means of moral problem-solving using moral reason when they advise;

"We affirm that moral values derive their source from human experience. Ethics is autonomous and situational, needing no theological or ideological sanction." (1973:17).

Whilst some might argue the practicality of Situationism has been retained by the Atheistic Situationist and humanist approach in situations of moral dilemma, the researcher will attempt to expose how the richness and depth of moral truth via the means of moral reasoning, moral resolution and moral conduct afforded by Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism and its interpretation of Agape love is lost, especially if one considers that Agape love isn't concerned with feelings but is rather best viewed according to Robinson (2018) as a; "... *mind-set, an orientation of the will.*" (2018:105) that each and every practising Christian Situationist must possess in abundance if moral resolution is to be achieved.

Sittler (1958) provides yet another twist in our understanding of Agape love and its scope when he proposes that;

"...love is the function of faith horizontally just as prayer is the function of faith vertically." (1958:64).

However, his description of this special Christian love fails to mention that it is characterised by altruism, selflessness and freedom all three elements defining its ability to spread out (horizontally). Still, it is perhaps the French philosopher/theologian Blaise Pascal (nd) who best describes the difference between the positions of Atheistic Situation Ethics and Religious or Christian Situation Ethics and the extra dimension that Agape love brings to the moral decision-making of the latter when he wrote;

"It is certain that the mortality of the soul must make an entire difference to morality. And yet philosophers have constructed their ethics independently of this: they discuss to pass an hour." (n.d:790).

6.3 The Importance of Agape Love to Christian Situationism.

In developing his distinctive, Agape love- based theory, Fletcher (1966) believed he had the key elements of a '*New Morality*'; such was his theory of direct contextualism. He devised a method of uncovering moral truth that exists beyond self-interest that could nevertheless still be guided by the greatest human happiness and well-being which he saw as providing the highest good or '*summum bono*'. It is easy to see then how and why Christian Situationism and its moral decision -making capabilities is a subject worthy of research, especially when viewed against the dual backdrop of secularism and the ability of 4IR to present modern societies with previously unencountered moral dilemmas due to the existence and use of 4OT.

However, of importance and not to be forgotten, is that Fletcher (1966) did not set out to develop a '*system of ethics*'. He clearly states that his Christian Situationism or '*new morality*' is;

"... a method of "situational" or "contextual" decision-making, but system-building has no part in it." (1966:11).

In other words, Fletcher (1966) conceded that his theory was/is method-driven, in terms of moral reasoning and decision-making; meaning that any identified moral dilemma and/or moral conflict has its own unique set of unique circumstances (situations or contexts) accompanied by its unique particularities defined by him as '*contextual particularity*'. His Christian Situationism supports the method of using Agape love that leads us to discern moral truth and moral response and conduct in the particular circumstances of a moral dilemma where moral resolution vests in the '*highest good*' and by Fletcher's (1966) theoretical default; the '*greatest love*'.

Critical to Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism is his prescribed *'method'* of Agape love as being able to be used to discern the *'right'* and the *'good'* as opposed to the *'wrong'* and the *'bad'* in each *'particular'* situation of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. Christian Agape love serves to differentiate and underpin Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism from any other traditional, ethical problem-solving paradigm. Christian Situationism's *'unique method'* however, does not according to Fletcher (1966) preclude its application from being; "...*empirical, fact-minded, data conscious, inquiring*" (1966:29) although paradoxically he gives no indications or 'road-map' as to how this is to be achieved, used and/or applied by the Christian Situationist.

This universal, unconditional, *'Christian love'* can in colloquial terms be described as the business of loving the unlovable and is best understood as a giving type of love that is selfless and sets aside egoism and self-interest in favour of altruism in the form of self-sacrifice and love of one's neighbour accepting indisputably that; "...*for God is love*".(1John 4:8 GNB) However, it is perhaps Daniel's (2009) synopsis of Christian Situationism that provides us with the most succinct overview of Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism. He advises;

"Christian situation ethics must rely on God's grace; have the law of love as its absolute standard; ensure that there is full knowledge of the facts; and exercise careful, responsible judgement." (2009:20).

6.4 Details Of Fletcher's Situationism.

So, after reading Fletcher's (1966) theory, we learn that he does not subscribe to analogous moral certitude, but to *'contextual particularity'*. He theorised Agape love

was a *'source principle'* a universal; an absolute; to be applied in any and every moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. As such it becomes the lynch pin of Fletcher's (1966) paradigm in which he proposed it can be applied to establish moral truth in any such situations. In short, Fletcher (1966) attests that Agape love can provide moral truth as a telos when faced with the need for ethical decision-making and resolution in a situation of contemporary moral dilemma.

To emphasise this view, Fletcher (1966) defines his understanding of Agape love as;

"...the only principle that always obliges us in conscience. Unlike all other principles you might mention, love alone when well served is always good and right in every situation. Love is the only universal." (1966:60,61).

and so, we have the basis of a *'new'* ethical tradition in which the balance between antinomianism and legalism becomes key to projected and actual moral consequences. In short, Christian Situationism is best viewed as *'contextual appropriateness'* (sometimes referred to as *'fittingness'*) that provides a method and source of moral truth through a process that according to its theorist is;

"...antimoralistic as well as antilegalistic for it is sensitive to variety and complexity. It is neither simplistic nor perfectionist." (1966:29).

From this statement it can be reasoned that Fletcher's (1966) principal reason for adopting this approach is based on his core certainty that proposes the lack of replicability in and of any moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. In other words, he contends that no two situations are ever alike despite how they might present. Essentially Fletcher (1966) is maintaining in his work that every situation is unique, despite its contextual similarity. Quite simply Fletcher (1966) proposes that;

“Situation ethics puts people at the center (sic) of concern, not things.

Obligation is to persons, not things; to subjects, not objects.” (1966:50).

This thinking is best demonstrated in the following scenario of two female patients each diagnosed as being three months pregnant and each seeking terminations at a registered abortion clinic. The one is a 30-year-old, happily married professional female, with two children whilst the other patient is also a 30-year-old happily married professional woman, with two children. Whilst seemingly their situations present the same i.e. both are married, both are professional, both have two children and both are three months pregnant and seeking legal terminations, each situation when viewed using Fletcher’s (1966) Christian Situationism is *‘particular’*. In both ‘situations’ a medical recommendation for termination has to be given on the basis of the particularities (specifics) of each case

On investigation, the doctor discovers that one of the females has learned that a genetic condition has been detected in her three-month-old foetus who would be born with significant handicaps (both mental and physical) and have no prospect of leading a ‘normal’ life either as a child or adult. The other female has been put forward for a significant promotion at work that would not allow her time-off for pregnancy. Fletcher’s (1966) Christian Situationism which puts people at the centre of moral reasoning rather than objects, could be used by the doctor in the situations outlined above, as the women (people) rather than the termination (thing) would be seen as having a distinct and unique bearing on the outcome of moral truth for each situation. If examined through the lens of Christian Situationism then the doctor would use the method of Agape love to uncover the most *‘fitting’* moral decision-

making for both women in addition to providing the most 'loving' moral resolution. However, Fletcher's (1966) description of the role and function occupied by Agape love within his ethical decision-making framework is perhaps best understood as that of a 'tool' which the Christian Situationist must use to fulfil their remit when faced with resolving a moral dilemma; rather like a builder who needs a spirit-level to ensure the walls they build are always and irrefutably straight.

In short, the overarching mantra that can be used to define and isolate Christian Situationism from other ethical problem-solving theories, is that of Agape love and in Fletcher's (1966) words; "*circumstances alter cases*". This is evident in the 'particularities' of each situation described above in which the circumstances of the two women were different.

To ratify this view Fletcher (1966) opines that;

"The Situationist enters into every decision-making situation fully armed with ethical maxims of his community and its heritage, and he treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems. Just the same he (sic) is prepared in any situation to compromise them or set them aside in the situation, if love seems better served by doing so." (1966:26).

In other words, the Christian Situationist asks themselves; 'what would be the most loving and 'fitting' thing to do?' Whilst we know the ultimate method used in Christian Situationism is Agape love, then surely, we must ask what is it, that directs the Christian Situationist to resolve the moral dilemma in the first instance?

Vardy & Grosch (1999) re-look the role that conscience might play in Christian Situationism and they confirm that Fletcher (1966) does not view conscience as a

personal moral calibration, but rather that he interprets conscience very differently and proposes it is a term used for attempts to make appropriate moral decisions, when faced with circumstantial moral dilemmas. Indeed Fletcher (1966) suggests, rather short-sightedly in the opinion of the researcher, that conscience can only be truly exercised if done through the means and method of Agape love. He proposes this will provide the Christian Situationist with a more than adequate tool to assess the *'rightness'* or *'wrongness'* of a particular circumstance of moral dilemma. In short Fletcher (1966) proposes that in exercising conscience, the Christian Situationist is hard-wired to apply it within the context of exercising Agape love. This position is easily refuted if our conscience suggests that according to MacIntyre (2002);

"The choice of a form of life and the choice of a view of human nature go together." (2002:259).

6.5 The Christian Situationist Framework.

After studying the framework of Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism, the contemporary philosopher Thompson (2010) concurred with fellow philosophers when they put forward the view that Fletcher (1966) argues against a deductive method of ethics, choosing instead the single moral principle of doing whatever is the most *'loving thing'* in each and every circumstance of moral dilemma. In other words, Thompson (2010) is confirming and interpreting Fletcher's (1966) Agape love as a core principle in this ethical tradition and he goes a step further when he interprets Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism as a significant move away from the Natural Law approach to moral dilemmas, (typically used by Christians up until this period) towards an approach that is more flexible and cognisant of change and not given to

accepting pre-ordained outcomes. In short, Fletcher's (1966) approach can be deemed inductive and he proposes the Christian Situationist has complete freedom within their ethical decision-making to establish a *'fitting'* moral resolution. Fletcher (1966) it could be argued, further extends the notion of human beings as independent, moral, agents as they seek their own moral truth and resolution in situations of moral dilemma and/or conflict informed by Agape love. In common parlance this could arguably be interpreted as a person's moral destiny lying within the power and ability of the moral-reasoning and ethical decision-making of the Christian Situationist, through their use of Agape love.

6.6 The Theory of Natural Law.

Our understanding of Natural Law as cited in the Literature Review, is rooted in the writings of the Medieval Catholic theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas. At its most simplistic, Natural Law is best understood as *'eternal law'* as distinct from *'human law'*. It can also be understood as *'heavenly law'* as opposed to *'earthly law'*. Aquinas (1989) proposed that God is a Creator God and is eternal. In this regard, when creating the universe, God also created a natural order and plan for His creation which is most succinctly interpreted and communicated in Aquinas' (1989) work 'Summa Theologica' where he proposes that;

"God's wisdom, thought of as a plan by which he created everything, is a blueprint or model; thought of as the plan by which he directs everything to its goal, it is a law. The eternal law is indeed nothing else than God's wise plan for directing every movement and action in creation."

(1989:284).

If we accept this proposition, Aquinas (1989) continues that as part of this *'eternal law'* humans should as;

"Reasoning creatures following God's plan in a more profound way, themselves sharing the planning, making plans both for themselves and for others, so they share in the eternal reasoning itself that is imprinting them with their natural tendencies to appropriate behaviour and goals. This distinctive sharing in the eternal law we call the natural law, the law we have in us by nature. For the light of natural reason by which we tell good from evil (the law that is in us by nature) is itself an imprint of God's light in us." (1989:281).

It can be presumed then, that Natural law according to Thomism rests and vests in a pre-determined divine order that elicits a predictable moral code of *'right'* and *'wrong'* and a predictable Christian reasoning and moral response when confronted with situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict.

6.6.1 Christian Situationism: The Anti-thesis of Natural Law.

In seeming contradiction to Natural Law, Christian Situationism sees situations as unique and unrepeatable with the only universal law being Agape love. The very nature of the paradigm of Situationism eschews the concept of pre-determination as it proposes that moral reasoning and moral resolution and response is motivated by individual circumstance/situation, not by an unbending, pre-determined law. In short, Fletcher (1966) has created a theory with an assumed fluidity.

Thompson's (2010) observations of Situationism, being a contradiction to Natural Law is further established in Our Sunday Visitor's Catholic Encyclopaedia (1998) which defines Situation ethics as;

"A method of moral analysis which only considers concrete, historical circumstances as relevant factors in moral decision-making and does not acknowledge either the existence, applicability or binding nature of universal norms." (1998:389).

However, this definition would not seem to consider Agape love to have 'a *binding nature*' or indeed consider it to be a '*universal norm*' which is surely a significant oversight, as the framework of Christian Situationism quite clearly states it is both, as does the thrust of the New Testament message upon which it is based.

To this end it is perhaps Niebuhr (1963) who describes the method of Christian Situationism most succinctly and helps to distinguish it from Natural law describing it along the same lines as Fletcher (1966) when he proposes that;

"Situation ethics aims at a contextual appropriateness – not the 'good' or the 'right' but the fitting." (1963: 60-61).

However, in the view of the researcher, it is in adopting these reductionist approaches to Christian Situationism that both Niebuhr (1963) and Our Sunday Visitor's Catholic Encyclopaedia (1998) neglect the fundamental core principle and Christian Situationism's significant point of difference from other mainstream moral reasoning and ethical problem-solving paradigms; that of the over-riding importance of Agape love and its Christian terms of reference.

The philosopher Baron (2016) reminds us of the importance Fletcher (1966) attaches to Agape love when he declares that;

“...Fletcher would not want Situation ethics branded as a branch of existentialism, as it holds firmly to one moral absolute – Agape love.”
(2016:84).

Accordingly, Fletcher's (1966) world is not Heidegger's (2008) existentialist world of 'Dasein' which speaks of self and an ultimate sense of 'being alone'. Neither does it conform with Sartre's (1947) existentialist world in which there is no God and every individual is the creator of their own destiny. Yet, Fletcher's (1966) and Sartre's (1947) worlds do have a shared emphasis on freedom, liberalism, courage and choice for the individual. However, it is the presence of God in Fletcher's (1966) world that permeates his philosophy of Christian Situationism in terms of moral-reasoning, decision-making, action and conduct and this distinguishes it and distances it from existentialism which as a philosophy had gathered momentum after the second world war. Instead, Fletcher's (1966) worldview is best viewed through the lens of personalism and community rather than individualism and egoism. Fletcher's (1966) central themes of personalism, altruism and unconditionalism in the form of Agape love, serve to embed the importance of people within his ethical decision-making paradigm. This leaves us with no scope for misinterpretation as to the importance placed upon people and the personal in Fletcher's (1966) theory. They are unmistakably paramount.

Neither is there room in Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism for the pre-definition and pre-determination central to Natural law. Instead, the framework of Christian

Situationism vests in its fluidity and particularity. Prescription of any sort is not encouraged other than the prescribed use of Agape love which becomes the touchstone and the method (some would say arbiter) for moral truth and resolution in each and any situation of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict encountered and reviewed by the Christian Situationist. Indeed, such is the God-given and God-driven nature of Agape love, that in Fletcher's (1966) view it is supremely pre-disposed and indeed a more than adequate absolute principle in offering the Christian Situationist the pre-eminent method of moral truth and moral resolution that serves to sufficiently guide both moral response and conduct in contemporary situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict.

To understand why Fletcher (1966) developed the distinct method of Agape love within his new theoretical and ground-breaking construct for a 'new morality', the history and context of his writing and theorising needs to be explored and examined.

6.7 The Theoretical Framework for Situation ethics.

In developing the framework for Christian Situationism, Childress in his foreword to Fletcher's Situation Ethics (1966) says of Fletcher that he designed a;

"...straightforward approach to ethical problems and decisions in complex circumstances and in the process, challenged many assumptions in dominant moral traditions." (1966:1).

Childress (1966) went on to suggest that Situation ethics is best viewed as a;
"pragmatic, consequentialist approach." (1966:10) but the researcher thinks in so doing, Childress (1966) like others mentioned previously, is conflating Christian Situationism with Atheistic Situation Ethics and thereby unsuspectingly adopting a

reductionist position that arguably robs the method of Christian Situationism of its universality, matchlessness, richness, depth and rigour that is bound up in its singular Christian tradition.

Fletcher (1966) recognised in the 1960's that many of the ethical dilemmas that were presenting themselves were in fact 'value problems' and could in large part be traced back to a rise in secularism and the management of an industrial society (both private and governmental) in which technical and administrative problems demanded moral truth through materially sophisticated moral reasoning. In such circumstances, many moral dilemmas in the 1960's were charting 'new' moral territory, often within a secular context. In putting God back into situations of moral dilemma, the Christian Situationist according to Fletcher (1966) required not just faith but, 'intelligence' and 'sound information'.

Fletcher's (1966) theory of Christian Situationism represented a departure from existing ethical problem-solving theories, specifically Natural Law (explained and defined earlier in this research) and legalism (explained in detail later in this section of Christian Situationism) Fletcher's (1966) 'new morality' was bound-up in the distinctiveness of Christian Agape love bringing an extraordinary, some would argue uniqueness, to his theoretical construct. It was only the use of the principle and value of Agape love that Fletcher (1966) felt could fully address the moral dilemmas birthed in the times in which he lived, whilst coincidentally affirming that; *"Nothing is as complex and difficult as ethics, even Christian love ethics."* (1966:114).

In his work, *The Divine Imperative*, published just before Fletcher's *Situation Ethics* (1966) Brunner (1947) talks of the responsive fellowship with God. As a fellow

Protestant, Brunner (1947) opines this relationship is motivated and maintained through Agape love rather than by Natural law. He suggests that such love is; ‘...*free from all this predefinition.*’ (1947:60-61) simply conveying there are no constraints or limitations to its scope or demonstration. In other words, this work of Brunner’s (1947) would appear to support the Christian primacy of Agape love, whilst also acknowledging its applied extension as a means of discerning moral truth for modern, moral dilemmas often the result of ‘new’ technical and administrative processes.

6.7.1 Fletcher’s Theoretical Framework for Christian Situationism.

In developing a ‘new morality’ Fletcher (1966) was only too aware of the need for a meaningful and workable theoretical framework. When developing Christian Situationism, Fletcher (1966) assumed there were essentially three fundamental approaches available to uncover moral truth and direct moral resolution when confronting moral dilemmas and/or moral conflict(s). He proposed the three approaches were;

- 1) Legalism.
- 2) Antinomianism.
- 3) Situational.

6.7.1.1 Legalism.

The approach of legalism is best described and understood as ‘code morality’. It has a series of pre-fabricated (codified) rules and regulations (laws) used as a means to effect societal order, behaviour and consistency (universality) in moral resolution. In many instances it provides a bridge between the secular and the religious as it seeks

to extol a system of universality, equality and egalitarianism. Its strength lies in its strict conformity and application in which directives must be obeyed irrespective of the situation (moral dilemma). In short, it aims to provide a means for establishing 'moral truth' through laws and/or codes in situations of identical or similar moral dilemma.

Not surprisingly, legalism with its laws can stand accused on occasion, of being a web that can choke its weavers. It can accomplish this result, when its strict use can, in the words of Miller (1962) result in the *'immorality of morality'* (1962:92).

An example of this claim can be witnessed in the current laws regarding homosexuality on the African continent. Consenting sex between same-sex individuals in Mauritania carries the death sentence as it does in Uganda whilst in Botswana it carries a seven-year prison sentence; in Kenya a fourteen-year prison sentence and in Tanzania a thirty year to life prison sentence. However, for those living in South Africa, homosexuality between consenting adults is not deemed illegal or immoral, neither is it considered a 'criminal offence' has taken place.

As demonstrated by the case of homosexuality on the African continent, legalism subscribes to the view that moral truth can be ascertained through the judicious use of the law. However, detractors of this approach use the lack of its universalism in application due to its dependence on culture, religion and geography as is the case cited above of homosexuality in Africa. Moreover, detractors of the legalism approach also put forward the case that 'new' and unique moral situations can escape existing legal definition i.e., the law has not 'caught up' with the implications of the moral dilemma. (Such is the case with our understanding of privacy and the

personal discussed later in this research.) In short, there is often a time-lag. Indeed Sartre (1947) theorised that law cannot direct a moral solution nor establish moral truth or moral resolution because it could stand accused in the words of the modern idiom of '*always playing catch-up*'.

6.7.1.2 Antinomianism.

The antinomian approach is the opposite of legalism and speaks to an unprincipled approach that often results in lawlessness. To revert to the metaphor used for legalism, antinomianism cannot '*weave a web to choke the weavers*' as there are no laws, principles or maxims from which to weave the web. Antinomianism is the stuff of existentialism and incoherence in which Sartre (1947) proposes that any belief in coherence or generalities is '*bad faith*' and refuses to admit to any generally valid principles or universal laws. Sartre (1947) proposes that antinomianism like existentialism is best viewed as a radical discontinuity with unpredictable consequences. In short, antinomianism subscribes to the view that ethical action(s) is (are) determined independent of laws which are perceived to be 'wrong'.

In short, antinomianism can be seen to exist if and when one places reliance upon the situation (moral dilemma) itself, rather than laws, to provide the moral solution (truth). It is hardly surprising therefore, that adoption of such an approach places enormous responsibility on the skills, talents and wisdom of those seeking moral resolution in situations of moral dilemma i.e., the practicing Christian Situationist in the instance of Christian Situationism.

6.7.1.3 Situationism.

Not surprisingly, the situational approach has been accused of running the middle path between legalism and antinomianism. This accusation has probably arisen due to the dependence of Situationism on the use of universals, imperatives and method. In Fletcher's (1966) words, his theory of Christian Situationism is;

"...case-focused and concrete, concerned to bring Christian imperatives into practical operation." (1966:29).

To this end, Fletcher (1966) quite succinctly calls his theory *'the strategy of love'*. Situationism's atheistic version on the other hand is considered the secular, value theory approach. Value theory in this context is normative and given to mean conceptions of the desirable in which outcomes are considered 'good' consequences of action rather than the most 'loving' and 'fitting' proposed by Christian Situationism. Situationism in its secular tradition can therefore be seen to conform most readily to a utilitarian perspective whereby the *'greatest good'* is sought as the desirable consequence of moral reasoning and resolution in situations of moral dilemma. Atheistic Situationism also stands accused of leveraging the rights approach when trying to discern moral truth in situations of moral dilemma specifically using the notion of human dignity and its legal status as a core principle. The use of this principle would lead the atheistic Situationist to access moral resolution (and thereby moral truth) based on that which upheld or afforded the greatest human dignity in a situation of moral dilemma.

6.7.2 The Four Pre-suppositions of Christian Situationism.

When developing his theory of Christian Situationism, Fletcher (1966) assumed not only three fundamental approaches as outlined above, but also four pre-suppositions or working principles that would prevail in situations of moral dilemma demanding moral resolution and six fundamentals of Agape love. (See Fig 16) These pre-suppositions that formed his Situational framework were arguably prompted by his interaction with a St Louis cabbie whom he anecdotally cites as saying;

“...there are times when a man has to put his principles aside and do the right thing.” (1966:3).

In developing his theory of Christian Situationism, Fletcher (1966) formed the approach of the *‘right thing’* being *‘the most loving thing’* in terms of moral truth and resolution in situations of moral dilemma and one that might defy common principles/laws currently in use.

The pre-suppositions that he developed as part of his conceptual framework become working guidelines for the Christian Situationist and are to be used to ensure their moral reasoning, resolutions and conduct will work and can be employed to provide moral truth in terms of the *‘most loving consequence’* for the moral dilemma based on the precept that Christian Situation ethics is a matter of faith, driven by Agape love.

To this end, Fletcher (1966) presumes that each situation (moral dilemma) must be most importantly personally observed; be relative to love and must result in the most loving resolution as an outcome; always remaining cognisant of the need that people have primacy in ethical deliberations and outcomes. Fletcher’s (1966) four pre-

suppositions for his Christian Situationism he labelled as; pragmatism, relativism, positivism and personalism. Their functionality within his framework is outlined below.

6.7.3 The role of Pragmatism in Christian Situationism.

Fletcher's (1966) embraced the American school of pragmatism as a means of providing moral truth. For the course of moral action to be '*right*' Fletcher (1966) says it needs to be practical. He was continually aware of the need for pragmatism when developing his theory of Christian Situationism as it was his sincere belief that ethics and morality were to be 'lived and used', in other words, they needed to be applicable and not just a series of wishes and demands committed to paper and theories. Fletcher's (1966) dependency on the practical grew out of the philosophical tradition of pragmatism.

6.7.3.1 The Function of Pragmatism in Situationism.

It should therefore come as no surprise that Fletcher (1966) included pragmatism into his framework of Christian Situation Ethics where practical solutions to situations of moral dilemmas and/or moral conflict are sought. The importance of inquiry, intelligence and practice (Legg & Hookway 2020) is paramount in Fletcher's (1966) framework and he recognises the contributions of both classical and modern pragmatists in framing his 'new morality'. Arguably, these three elements of inquiry, intelligence and practice are seen by him as providing the means of 'dissolving' some of the constructs that exist within moral dilemmas, through the expeditious use of Agape love. It is the latter, in the view of Fletcher (1966), that helps to provide both 'truth' and 'meaning' to the modus of moral action and response within any

situation of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict under assessment through the method of moral reasoning using Christian Agape love.

Fletcher's (1966) goal in developing his theory of Christian Situation Ethics was to create not just a '*new morality*' from his theoretical construct, but most importantly a method of providing a practical solution to moral dilemmas resulting in the most 'workable' real-life solution(s).

However, both Bonhoeffer's (1962) and Fletcher's (1966) views on pragmatism within its Christian context can be condensed into the notion that the meaning of a doctrine, in this case pragmatism, should be the same as the practical effects of adopting it. It is reasonable to conclude therefore, that Fletcher (1966) concurs with this approach and the strength of his theory of Christian Situationism is that it is 'practical' or applicable and encourages 'lived' rather than 'theoretical' moral truth discerned from a theory of moral resolution and conduct for those involved.

In other words, Fletcher's (1966) pragmatism subscribes to the view that 'practical consequences' are the result of a fusion of knowledge, meaning and value revealed by the Christian Situationist through the application of Christian Agape love in each particular circumstance or moral dilemma and/or moral conflict under their review.

6.7.3.2 The Role of Relativism Within the Theory of Christian Situationism.

The case for and against moral relativism has been the subject matter of a vast amount of academic work in the tradition of moral philosophy, but what does it really mean? Scanlon (2000) quite succinctly states the position of moral relativism as; "*...there is no single ultimate standard for the moral appraisal of actions.*"

(2000:327). He then continues to examine the concerns this position of moral relativism leaves in its philosophical wake and takes the following three positions;

1. If we accept moral relativism, then we will also lack the motivation to accept basic moral principles.
2. Moral Relativism threatens to deprive us of moral confidence in situations requiring moral judgements.
3. Moral relativism removes the sense of conflict often found between moral judgements, as it suggests since they are relative to different standards, they do not really conflict.

Lukes (2008) after reading this work, was left to lament that moral relativism; “...seems to be a threat to intellectual certainties on the one hand, and to moral seriousness on the other” (2008:1). So why did Fletcher (1966) use it as a pre-supposition in his conceptual framework for Situation Ethics? Did the use of moral relativism provide reasons or alternatively did it present profound concerns?

Fletcher (1966) says of Christian Situationism that; “*It relativises the absolute; it does not absolutise the relative.*” (1966:45).

Essentially this leaves us to assume that for Fletcher (1966) rules do not automatically apply; they are contiguous to the situation and in the case of Christian Situationism become relative to the absolute principle of Agape love. This seeming tangle of positions presented by Fletcher (1966) has caused much confusion and polemics amongst philosophical purists. Lukes (2008) advises it was a circumstance of which Fletcher (1966) was only too well aware. Scanlon (2000) in his writings on moral relativism submits there are profound concerns surrounding the subject of

moral relativism which he has categorised. By incorporating the universal of Agape love, as overarching any other considerations in moral decision-making Fletcher (1966) is in essence providing the Christian Situationist with 'free-reign' in terms of their ethical decision-making if they can justify their entirely personal understanding, use and interpretation of Agape love in the situations of moral dilemma for which they are seeking moral resolution. Not surprisingly this leaves enormous room for a lack of consistency in moral decision-making as it is wholly dependent as mentioned earlier, on the relative skills, talents and wisdom of the Christian Situationist.

This situation has been addressed by Atheist Situationists who embrace Human Dignity as an absolute/universal not Agape as a relative as Wilson (1997) has subsequently endorsed. He proposes that every culture shares the values of sympathy, fairness, self-control, duty and a sense of virtue which surely are the pillars of a non-religious notion of human dignity and which can be applied universally without relativism?

Fletcher's (1966) theoretical pre-supposition of relativism can arguably be seen to acknowledge the views of Tillich (1963) who published his third volume of Systematic Theology at the time Fletcher (1966) was developing his theoretical framework for Christian Situationism and some might argue Tillich's (1963) influenced his eventual Christian paradigm of ethical decision-making. Tillich (1963) opines; "*Every moral law is abstract in relation to the unique and totally concrete situation.*" (1963:47). Importantly Tillich's (1963) position does not take the relative position of '*anything goes*' and turn it into the absolute of '*do whatever the situation demands*'. Rather his message caused Fletcher (1966) to demand of the Christian

Situationist they use the absolute method of Agape love for the purposes of moral reasoning to reach moral truth and resolution in each *'particular'* situation of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. In short, this approach is best interpreted as the *'particular'* situation/circumstance always 'relativises' the method of Agape love and not the converse.

Baron (2016) puts the presupposition of relativism as an approach used by Situationism for resolution quite succinctly, when he assesses the ability of Situationism as a tradition to adapt to the following conditions;

1. All laws have exceptions.
2. The exceptions are determined by the situation (moral dilemma/conflict).
3. In every situation (moral dilemma) we must consider consequences.
4. Therefore, all absolute laws are in fact relative to the situation (moral dilemma).

In ascribing these four abilities of Situationism to respond to moral relativism and the moral dilemma being considered, Baron (2016) is recognising and is mindful of the *'fruitful tensions'* that exist within Christian Situationism in which *'polarities'* are recognised and which moral relativism directs (according to Fletcher 1966) away from "...*prescribed conduct and legalistic morality.*" (1966:45) towards a *'loving'* but obvious relative solution. Contingency is perhaps the key to moral resolution for the Christian situationist with the seeming contradiction that Agape love is never contingent. In short Fletcher (1966) reinforces throughout his theory of Christian Situationism that it; "...*focuses upon pragma (doing) not upon dogma (some tenet).*"

(1966:52) and it is in the 'doing' or the how, where moral relativism resides for the Christian Situationist.

6.7.4 The Role of Positivism within Christian Situationism.

To appreciate the role and function of Positivism in Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism, it is advantageous to return to its historical roots with a view perhaps to interpreting his approach to Christian Situationism and moral truth as challenging and some would even venture resisting Comte's (1888) theory of societal development within the context of moral truth through moral resolution.

6.7.4.1 The Historical Roots of Positivism.

The positivist approach developed by Comte (1888) in the early nineteenth century is deeply rooted in science and mathematics and deals with objective truth. Comte (1888) proposed three basic stages of development for society (see Fig 15)



Figure 15: Comte's (1888) Three Basic Stages of Societal Development. (L. Doherty)

Essentially the positivist approach is based on empiricism and excludes 'a priori' or metaphysical speculations. It advances the approach of knowledge being the historical result of fact presiding over value. Comte's (1888) paradigm suggests a

process in which societal knowledge evolves from a value basis (theological and metaphysical) to an eventual scientific stage where reality is understood through the means of facts (empiricism) and scientific evidence and/or observation. This final stage according to Comte (1988) reveals the true nature of human behaviour. To this end, positivism proposes that a moral agent can uncover the 'right' course of action in a situation of moral dilemma only through direct, verifiable, observation and facts (science).

Whilst Christian Situationism relies on '*context particularity*' and the Christian Situationist uses observation and facts in their quest for moral truth, Christian Situationism does not subscribe fully to the positivist approach because it motivates that a moral agent has to start with a positive choice; in other words any moral agent needs to want to do 'good' in that particular situation/circumstance and use the method of Agape love (which is a value) to determine moral truth through moral reasoning and resolution in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. The Christian Situationist therefore approaches the reality of moral dilemma with the 'a priori' value of Agape love embedded in their method of moral reasoning and resolution. From this we can see conformation with Fletcher's (1966) pre-supposition of positivism in his theoretical framework through 'positive theology'. This can be interpreted as a direct contradiction to the empiricism and pure positivist approach of Comte (1988) in which facts and observation are used as the basis of knowledge and human behaviour, rather than values, and beliefs arising from faith.

Finally, in adopting the pre-supposition of positivism in his conceptual framework for Christian Situationism, Fletcher (1966) is acknowledging faith as supporting thinking,

rather than faith being supported by thinking. In a nutshell for Fletcher (1966) faith comes first and is instrumental to any moral or value judgements made by a Christian Situationist through the method of Agape love. This position supports his somewhat reductionist contention that ethics is a *'decision'*, not a *'conclusion'*. In support of this, he argues that moral reasoning is a choice that has not arisen due to force or logic but by the requirement of the Christian Situationist to discern moral truth in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. Fletcher (1966) can be charged with unravelling the positivist puzzle of moral philosophy as a pre-supposition for Situation Ethics when he attests that;

"Ethical decisions seek justification, whereas cognitive conclusions seek verification." (1966:48-49).

6.7.5 The Role of Personalism within Christian Situationism.

The theory of Situation Ethics (whether Christian or Atheistic) importantly puts people first. Vardy & Grosch (1999) attribute this unique characteristic of personalism to the fact that Christian Situationism was developed in a Christian context and that; "...*God is held to be personal, so morality should be person-centred as well.*" (1999:126). This observation is not only profound but assists in building a bridge between the Atheistic Situationism and Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism as it provides the vital link with human dignity in a way whereby the tradition of Situation ethics can be applied beyond its initial Christian framework. Both traditions place the highest value on people and the *'personal'* in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. The concept and reality of Human dignity for the Atheistic Situationist relies on personalism much in the same way as used by the

Christian Situationist, with the main point of difference being the fundamental principle for the Christian Situationist is faith exemplified through Agape love, whilst for the Atheistic Situationist it is 'human dignity' exemplified through the utilitarian and rights approaches.

For either of these approaches to be applied, the pre-supposition of personalism adopts the view that laws are for the benefit of people, and not vice versa. This in turn forces a Situationist in either tradition to ask; 'who is to be helped?' instead of 'what is the law and how is it applied?' thus stressing the importance of putting people first rather than the law (legalism). At its most simplistic, personalism is saying that people matter more than things and for the Christian Situationist, Fletcher (1966) propounds this further when he makes the distinction and insists that "*Things are to be used, people are to be loved.*" (1966:51). This leaves the reader in no doubt with regard to the people-centric approach of Christian Situationism.

Fig 16: illustrates how Fletcher's (1966) four pre-suppositions of pragmatism, relativism, positivism and personalism of his conceptual framework for Christian Situationism inform the six fundamental aspects of Agape love which in turn assist Christian Situationists in their ethical problem-solving and ethical decision-making.




Figure 16: The x4 Presuppositions of the Christian Situation Ethics Conceptual Framework and the x6 Principles of Agape Love Informing the Decision-Making of Christian Situationists. (L. Doherty)

6.8 The Six Principles of Agape Love.

Agape love is the fundamental principle or driving force behind Fletcher's (1966) 'method' of ethical decision-making and establishing moral truth. He views it as a universal/absolute within his ethical decision-making framework. It has such capabilities due to the following six principles he has identified as being intrinsic to its essence, reality and application by the Christian Situationist in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict.

6.8.1 Fletcher's (1966) First Principle: "Only one thing is intrinsically good; namely, love: nothing else at all" (1966:57)

Fletcher (1966) succinctly describes his first principle in the following way; "Men may be lovable and loving, but only God is love." (1966:63). This observation would seem

to relegate earthly/human emotions and values and seemingly disregard their importance in human relationships which would appear to directly contradict the people-centric position that Fletcher (1966) has been at odds to share as the thrust of his *'new morality'*. However, in an effort to ensure that Christian Situationism was not held accused of being individualistic and dominated by relativism, Fletcher (1966) draws on the words of Heineken (1959) who opines that; *"God is not reason but love and he employs reason as the instrument of his love."* (1959:168). This statement demonstrates the way in which Fletcher (1966) tries to juggle the positivist and interpretivist approaches in a way that tries to support the use of both fact and value in a way that provides moral truth in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict.

It has been argued by Fletcher's (1966) opponents that in adopting such an approach, it can lead to dubious moral reasoning and moral resolution and arguable *'fittiness'* resulting in situations of moral dilemma whereby according to Fletcher (1966); *"If a lie is told unlovingly it is wrong, evil; if it is told in love it is good, right."* (1966:65). This would appear the antithesis of ethics in which through the application of moral philosophy the *'good'* and the *'right'* are to be established rather than the *'bad'* and the *'evil'*. At best, Fletcher (1966) is suggesting the Christian Situationist is adopting *'love's lead'* in their moral reasoning, moral decision-making and moral resolution and in doing so, they are supporting the view of the apostle Paul shared with his church in Ephesus whom he urges to;

"Rather, speaking the truth in love, we are to grow up in every way unto him who is the head." (Ephesians 4:15 RSV).

6.8.2 Fletcher's (1966) Second Principle: "The ruling norm of Christian decision is love: nothing else" (1966:69)

Essentially, in Fletcher's (1966) second principle he is continuing to both justify and entrench the universal/absolute position he has imbued upon Agape love as a 'method' of moral decision-making in Christian Situationism. In so doing he effectively states that;

"... it treats all rules and principles and 'virtues' as love's servants and subordinates, to be quickly kicked out of the house if they forget their place and try to take over." (1966:78).

He fleshes out this view further by insisting that;

"The plain fact is that love is an imperious law unto itself. It will not share its power. It will not share its authority with any other laws, either natural or super-natural." (1966:85).

In so saying, Fletcher (1966) is leaning towards the Augustinian view of the Christian ethic which he quotes as being reducible to; *"Dilige et quod vis, fac (Love with care and then what you will, do)." (1966:79)* However, there are some such as Gleason (1957) a Jesuit, who provides vehement criticism of what he believes to be Fletcher's (1966) naïve Agape love approach as a touchstone (that flies in the face of law) for his 'new morality' by asserting that;

"While the motive of love is a noble one, it is not in the Christian tradition to present it as the exclusive motive for moral action." (1957:543).

Gleason (1957) objects to the position adopted by Fletcher (1966) who pronounces that legalism 'cheats' on love denying its commands in favour of replacing it with both individual and societal responsibilities that in turn serves as a means of "...forcing people to be good." (1966:80). Instead Gleason (1957) chooses to see legalism as providing an acceptable universal solution to moral dilemmas that can span resolution both within and more importantly outside of Fletcher's (1966) 'method' of Agape love.

6.8.3 Fletcher's (1966) Third Principle: "Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing else" (1966:87)

It is perhaps this third principle of Fletcher's (1966) that provides the most discussion as it seems the most misplaced and arguably fanciful. It would appear that in conflating these two very distinct notions, Fletcher (1966) is doing a disservice to the roles and functions of both 'love' and 'justice' within ethics. He states quite categorically that; "*Justice is nothing other than love working out its problems.*" (1966:95) and chooses to see this third principle as a 'coalition' between the love ethic and social policy. Fletcher (1966) tries to explain his position interpreting 'justice' as a moral principle and suggests that '*moral justice*' is distinct from '*legal justice*' which; "...threatens to suffocate and cheat moral justice." (1966:99). This seems to be a somewhat naïve distinction for a theologian/philosopher to make, as many would argue the two forms of justice identified, serve to support each other hence the definitive role of jurisprudence in both the legal profession and legal judgements passed down in courts of law.

Additionally, it would appear to the researcher that Fletcher (1966) is choosing to side-step the fact that some actions are intrinsically wrong in and of themselves. How can murder, theft, and torture, ever be considered *'right'* let alone justified (under the banner of Agape Love) and considered as the most *'loving'* thing to do and in addition exemplify moral justice? They have no place in a system of justice be it legal or moral and consequently cannot be supported or condoned.

6.8.4 Fletcher's (1966) Fourth Principle: "Love wills the neighbour's good whether we like him or not" (1966:103)

Fletcher's (1966) fourth principle strikes to the nature of Agape love in that it is not about *'liking'*. Rather it is according to Dodd (1951) *"...primarily an active determination of the will. That is why it can be commanded, as feelings cannot."* (1951:42). Here we are reminded once again of the divine nature of Agape love which according to Fletcher (1966) assures; *"It seeks the good of anybody, everybody."* (1966:107).

However, we have already learned how problematic it is for humankind to be able to demonstrate this *'holy'* or *'divine'* love in their daily lives and it is perhaps Buber (1952) whose acute knowledge of the human condition enables him to exhort that;

"One cannot command that one feel love for a person but only that one deal lovingly with him (sic)." (1952:69).

This suggestion speaks to a love that is not wholly disinterested, but rather one that is possible and practical to implement by those with faith but who are not necessarily religious. In the words of Waddams (1965) the exercise of Agape love by a Christian

Situationist; "...is a matter of choice, choosing to submit to the will of God." 1965:122) which serves to add a further dimension to Buber's (1952) observation.

6.8.5 Fletcher's (1966) Fifth Principle: "Only the end justifies the means; nothing else" (1966:120)

This fifth principle of Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationist framework has caused widespread dissension amongst ethicists as it can be interpreted as justifying the unethical. Thomist theory warns that '*means*' are '*proximate ends*' which in turn is telling us that '*means*' are neither neutral nor indifferent. This can be illustrated if one were to employ the analogy of birth control for prevention of unwanted pregnancy being 'better' than abortion. The '*ends*' in this example is non-pregnancy, the '*means*' either birth control or abortion. The '*means*' of a female being subjected to multiple abortions to deal with unwanted pregnancies, let alone the many instances of loss of life, is hardly justified by the '*ends*'. However, Fletcher (1966) is quick to remind us of the apostle Paul remarks; "*And why not do evil that good may come?*" (*Romans 3:8 RSV*). However Christian scripture does not condone the '*means*' of; lying, murder, idolisation, atheism and stealing to achieve acceptable '*ends*'. Miller (2011) in his work, 'The Renewal of Man' also provides a haunting example of the importance of '*means*' and '*ends*' when he relates the story of a Scottish woman who had a baby and three other young children whilst on the trail of the American frontier. Her baby was sick and crying and it betrayed her whereabouts and those of her family to marauding Native Americans who killed them all. Contrast this situation with that of a negro woman who also had a crying baby who threatened to betray the whereabouts of several settlers on their way to a fort and safety. She strangled her child with her

bare hands to ensure the settlers would not fall prey to Native Americans who were on their trail. These examples explicate and challenge the reality of *'means and ends'* and the justification thereof.

6.8.6 Fletcher's (1966) Sixth Principle: "Love's decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively" (1966:134)

This sixth principle speaks to the antinomianism of Christian Situationism which seeks moral truth in the particularity of each situation. It's framework and reality are not prescriptive which has been an accusation levelled at other ethical decision-making frameworks by Fletcher (1966). Instead, the flexibility and fluidity associated with Christian Situationism are lauded by Fletcher (1966) as setting his *'new morality'* apart from its theoretical rivals as it is authentically and currently responsive to each moral dilemma that it is called upon to discern. In this he concurs with Brunner (1956) who suggests the Christian ethic is best understood as a *'love ethic'* He further explains his position in terms of Christian love (or Agape love) as saying;

"By faith we live in the past, by hope we live in the future, but by love we live in the present." (1956:13).

His observation serves the pragmatism evident in Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism fuelled by the tool of Agape love.

6.8.7 Advantages & Disadvantages of Christian Situationism.

Having spent some time reviewing the; context, history, framework and the assumptions surrounding Fletcher's (1966) *'new morality'*, it is perhaps important to objectively assess his Christian Situationism as a reliable means for discerning moral

truth for moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts in 4IR. The most straight forward way to achieve this is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of this paradigm. (See Table 3 below) Nevertheless, there are nuances to this Christian framework of ethical decision-making that also need addressing which are explored below.

The problems or disadvantages identified within Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism are apparent in its application to real-life situations of moral dilemma and/or conflict. Considering the few examples given in this chapter, it is evident, that moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts are not easily resolved, hence the requirement that moral reasoning precedes any moral decision-making. The moral agent charged with this, if using the Christian Situationist framework will be aware of the problems levelled against it that are best summed up as;

- Inconsistency.
- Implementation.
- Interpretivism.
- Flexibility (associated with its particularity and the relativity and subjectivity arising)

However, what is considered by many to be an over-riding weakness of the paradigm is Christian Situationism's lack of prescriptivism, other than the '*method*' of Agape love. This identified critical weakness means that moral truth arguably lies solely within the ambit and skills, (particularly that of pragmatism) practical wisdom and experience of the Christian Situationist, which for many critics allows too much flexibility, relativism and a distinct lack of consistency within moral reasoning and decision-making in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict.

However, Kuczewski (1997) claims the converse when he opines;

“It is the case, rather than the theory that is seen to be the driver of the ethical course.” (1997:87).

and names this observation as *‘kinetic taxonomy’*. This viewpoint could be construed as recognising ‘adaptation’ and ‘dynamism’ as a strength of Christian Situationism’s tradition of *‘particularity’* which arguably provides an appropriate and fluid ethical resolution for the time in which the moral dilemma and/or moral conflict occurs. In other words, the case-by case practice adopted for moral resolution by the Christian Situationist typifies and conforms with Kuczewski’s (1997) observation of *‘kinetic taxonomy’*.

As identified earlier in this section, Fletcher’s (1966) fifth principle allows for what many would consider to be unethical moral reasoning, moral decision-making and moral resolution by the Christian Situationist in which acts of lying, deceit, murder, and torture, could be condoned as being *‘the most loving’* thing to do in the *‘particular’* situation of moral dilemma. The consequences of this line of thinking are highlighted if one were to consider the following *‘particular’* situations of moral dilemma;

- **Lying/Withholding the truth;** A patient who is terminally ill and is diagnosed with two months left to live, is not informed of their diagnosis because they are looking forward to their only daughter’s upcoming nuptials in one month’s time. It could be considered the *‘most loving thing to do’* in the situation.

- **Torture;** It could be considered the situation in which an identified terrorist suspect is consistently tortured acceptable, if it could provide information that could 'save' a vast number of innocent lives.
- **Deceit;** A job applicant is not informed of their lack of skill for a post for which they have applied as being the principal cause for their rejection, as it would be considered to speak directly to their self-esteem and would therefore not be the '*most loving way*' in which to resolve the applicant's jobless situation. They are told instead their application for employment will be kept on file for future consideration should the position or one similar become vacant at a future date.
- **Murder;** It could be considered that a husband who mistook a family visitor with access to their house, as an intruder and shot and killed them, was only protecting his wife and family from what he considered a potentially violent home invasion. The '*most loving solution*' would be considered to have a case of manslaughter not murder brought against him.
- **Flexibility;** A wealthy patient is advised they have early on-set dementia by medical specialists in order to ensure they get their financial affairs in order, Conversely the '*most loving thing to do*' in a similar situation for a financially challenged widowed artisan, is not tell them of their early on-set dementia as it could negatively impact upon their ability to access work contracts from which income earned would be necessary for the care of their physically challenged son who is not currently supported by the Welfare State.

What becomes apparent when considering these '*particular*' situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict is not only the relativism and interpretivism that

surrounds the ethical decision-making framework of Christian Situationism, but also that love and justice are not the same, although Fletcher (1966) insists they are in his third principle. Whilst some would argue that justice is love distributed, this is extremely difficult to prove as can be seen by the examples above, where justice would appear not to be served (either of the legal or moral type) and the outcome from the ethical decision-making of a Christian Situationist questionable in terms of delivering '*well-being*' and '*flourishing*' to the individual, so important to the ethics tradition, and to the discovery of moral truth in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. Moreover, we must not disregard the virtue of impartiality that often accompanies justice which is in turn considered a necessary bedfellow of moral truth whereby consistency in ethical decision-making is paramount. Consistency, we know, is not a tool in the toolbox of the Christian Situationist, who only recognises the '*particularity*' of the moral dilemma and/or moral conflict before them, requiring their independent and often unique moral resolution solely in terms of the specific case before them.

Using Agape love as a universal method of moral reasoning and resolution whilst admirable, has considerable shortcomings as can be seen by the potential practical interpretation of the situations of moral dilemma cited above. This becomes even more apparent in an increasingly secular world in which the dominance of science and rationalism is omnipresent and the meaning, understanding and use of Agape love as a moral instrument/principle is treated with both scepticism and disrespect because of its subjective and relative nature and its relationship to the Christian faith whose teachings and practise lie clearly outside of the boundaries of modern science. Whilst Fletcher (1966) might rile that;

“...philosophy is utterly useless as a way to bridge the gap between doubt and faith.” (1966:41).

many of the principles and traditions promoted and championed by philosophy lie firmly within the Christian tradition e.g. virtue, deontology, teleology, utilitarianism social contract and the ethical approaches of care ethics, liberation, and feminism to name a few. This would seem to suggest that philosophy can provide a bridge between doubt and faith and never more so than when faced with a moral dilemma and/or moral conflict in 4IR.

Table 3: Table of Theoretical Advantage/Strengths and Disadvantages/ Weaknesses of Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism.

THEORETICAL STRENGTHS	THEORETICAL WEAKNESSES
<p>Contextualism: Every situation of moral dilemma is sensitive to its own set of personal circumstances. Moral decisions are tailored to resolve each ‘particular’ situation that presents as a moral dilemma.</p>	<p>Lack of Consistency: No two situations of moral dilemmas are ever considered the same. Therefore, there is a lack of consistency of ethical decision-making as each situation is regarded as unique, requiring unique moral reasoning.</p>
<p>Universal Agape Love: Is an absolute method of ethical decision-making & moral reasoning in situations of moral dilemma. It provides the means of establishing the ‘fittingness’ of moral resolution in every situation of moral dilemma.</p>	<p>Lack of Measurability: The absolute ‘tool’ of Agape Love is both relative & subjective & open to individual interpretation. The ‘fittingness’ of any moral resolution is subject to individual interpretation & there is no certainty of the ‘sameness’ of ethical decision-making & moral resolution.</p>

<p>Theistic Personalism: Moral resolution is taken situationally with God and Agape love as central to moral reasoning & ethical decision-making in which the person is central as a recipient of God's love and in terms of reflecting it.</p>	<p>Utilitarianism: The absence of God & Agape love in ethical decision-making does not result in an outcome that does not have the 'greatest good' or the person at its core in the resolution of ethical dilemmas.</p>
<p>Pragmatism: Is a prime function of moral truth. Moral interpretation & resolution is subject to pragmatism and practical solutions in situations of moral dilemma. This is crucial to moral philosophy (ethics) as applied.</p>	<p>Consequentialism: Little difference exists between pragmatism & consequentialism in moral dilemmas/moral conflicts. A Christian situationist can only establish moral truth if all consequences of an action are thoroughly considered.</p>
<p>Authentic Moral Resolution: The ethical decision-making & moral resolution from Christian Situationism must be person-centric with an accompanying understanding of the divine through using the 'method' of Agape love. However, as such, it can condone 'bad' and/or 'wrong' acts as some of the examples of Fletcher's (1966) moral resolutions attest.</p>	<p>Legalism: Although geared to minimum standards, Human rights can provide a universal standard of human dignity that is not subject to personal interpretation or religion & actively prevents human abuse and 'bad' acts resulting from actively dispensed moral decisions in situations of moral dilemma/conflict.</p>

practical analysis in ethics.” (1989:16) and the researcher will argue that it’s rich if somewhat sprawling tradition has substantially contributed to their claim.

The psychologist Jordan Peterson (2021) when reviewing how we resolve moral dilemma suggests;

“A good solution to a problem involving suffering must be repeatable, without deterioration across repetitions – iterable in a word – across people and across time.” (2021:10).

and in essence this is how casuistry practically attempts to provide ethical resolution and moral truth to moral dilemmas and moral conflict.

The philosophical reductionist could suggest the aim of casuistry is to uncover a *‘locus of moral certitude’* but to accept this definition would not only rob the rich tradition of casuistry of the primal role and function it places upon the casuist(s) as a moral agent who according to Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) in the practice of casuistry ensure;

“...cases established the format: avoidance of speculative questions, succinct presentation of principles, acceptance of probable opinions and resolution by solid argument.” (1989:150).

but would concurrently rob its practice of the far-reaching consequences it can have for the individual and within the wider and larger context of society.

Detractors of casuistry and specifically the casuistic method, speak of its lack of flexibility, its dependence on legalism and principalism its assumption of an acceptable moral code; its rejection of antinomianism and finally its over-

dependence on the moral reasoning skills of the casuist(s) However, it's framework has been applied as a successful tool to discern moral truth in cases of moral dilemma and moral conflict for in excess of six hundred years and has certainly and consistently presented us with a process that has transcended time and place. In short, history confirms that casuistry and its recent derivation Neo-Casuistry has provided the means for moral reasoning and provided both moral truth and moral resolution in cases of moral dilemma, conflict and uncertainty. Moreover, it has also provided us with clarity and a certainty of moral outcome in future cases presenting similar moral dilemma and/or conflict.

The OED (1981) defines casuistry as directed towards '*casus conscientia*' or 'cases of conscience.' This succinctly describes both the sphere and scope of this method of moral problem-solving through which moral truth and moral certitude are sought by its practitioners (casuists). The strength of this ethical decision-making framework is that it does not attempt to undertake this in a vacuum and Toulmin (1950) aptly reminds us that casuistry does this in a way that; "*...reflects the nature of humans as communal and/or social animals.*" (1950:840).

This is confirmed by Kuczewski (1997) who proposes that Casuistry is applied ethics and is best viewed as;

"...a practical wisdom that discerns where ethics theory can be applied by reality in a way that puts value first to retain human dignity." (1997:121).

However, arguably one of the most succinct definitions of Neo-Casuistry is that provided by Schmidt (2009) who proposes that it is;

“...a method of case-based reasoning that uses settled cases, or paradigms, to solve new ethical quandaries.” (Schmidt.2009:1).

However, such a definition neglects the dimensions of faith, moral wisdom, discernment and moral reflection that are paramount in the tradition of Neo-Casuistry and which gifts it with both its power and the general acceptance that it has gained across a number of varying disciplines as it seeks moral truth and moral certitude in ‘cases of conscience’.

6.9.2 The History of Casuistry.

The roots of Casuistry can be seen to lie in several traditions which have in turn enriched its theory and influenced its methodology and practice through the ages.

To this end, there is evidence of Rabbinic Judaism, particularly in the codification of cultural practices and their consequences in terms of establishing a system of moral truth. There is also evidence of Greek philosophy via the works of Plato, Aristotle, Socrates and Cicero who propose three essential types of wisdom that should be accessed and present in the approach of Casuistry. Finally, there is evidence of the theology of the Christian church in the tradition and practice of Casuistry; most notably the Catholic tradition and its reference to Natural Law and Divine Will as espoused by Aquinas. Traditionally (especially in the approach of High Casuistry) there was also a dependence on Catholic Canon Law as providing a universal legalism for the West.

As such, Casuistry can be seen to have a rich tradition, but it is perhaps the persistence of the notion of human dignity that arguably remains the guiding principle by practicing casuists throughout the ages. Initially in Medieval times, the notion of

human dignity for the casuist(s) lay firmly within the concept of *'Imago Dei'*, but for the contemporary Neo-Casuist(s) it has begun to lean towards the humanist interpretation of human dignity as they persistently pursue a universal moral truth in societies where a pluralism of religions exists alongside increasing secular societies. However, faith has been and continues to be, a crucial element in casuistic practice as the moral reasoning required by moral dilemmas and/or conflicts under review in 4IR can arguably lean towards fact(s) rationality and the expected, at the expense of values, relativism and the unforeseen which faith can address. For example, in the field of bio-ethics, death has a new classification due to scientific advances. Robert Stevens (2017) a member of the Johns Hopkins Support Team when asked about the challenges of defining and diagnosing brain death spoke of precision medicine and how this has assisted both doctors and family members of patients understand that;

"...the line between life and death, once clearly perceptible in the form of a beating heart, is now sometimes harder to see because of advances in life-saving technologies."

He further clarifies say;

"The modern intensive care unit can keep a person with severe brain injuries alive but may also mask evidence that the person has died. The shift from a deep coma to brain death – permanent cessation of all brain function – may not be immediately obvious to the untrained observer".

<https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/articles/the-challenges-of-defining-and-diagnosing-brain-death> (Accessed 1/12/2021)

A patient can now present clinicians with a 'persistent vegetative state'; a 'coma' or as 'brain dead' with medical opinion and moral reasoning being forced to consider not just the physical condition of the patient, but their potential quality of life, and the possibility of claiming their organs for transplantation to improve the life of existing patients with chronic illnesses. However, for both Neo-Casuists and Christian Situationists, the 'spiritual' must form an equal function to science in moral reasoning and in cases such as those above, must not be neglected or forgotten, as it embodies and exemplifies the spiritually 'immortal' in opposition to the physically/scientifically 'mortal'. This distinctive spirituality is required for casuistic practice to inform moral reasoning and ethical decision-making especially when reviewing 'cases of conscience' that arise in the field of science in 4IR.

Nowhere is this better demonstrated than when the concept of a soul is evaluated in 'cases of conscience' associated with medicine and other fields benefitting from 4OT e.g. bio-engineering, genetic engineering, and AI to name a few. The soul was a subject covered extensively in Classical Greek philosophy in relation to human life, health and death. The trio of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle built upon each other's theoretical frameworks of the soul to provide a picture of an individual often used by the Christian religion. Gottlieb (2016) re-enforces this view when he shares that;

"Plato seems to have had few doubts about what would happen after death. He thought the soul was separable from the body, that it existed before birth and that it would definitely continue to exist after death."

(2016:152).

The same sentiment is provided for us in Christian scripture in the old and New Testaments. The Book of Jeremiah in the Old Testament tells us that;

“Now the word of the Lord came to me saying, “Before I formed you in the womb I knew you and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the nations.” (Jeremiah 1:4-5 RSV).

King David expands upon this interpretation of the soul in the Old Testament Book of Psalms when he shares;

“When my bones were being formed, carefully put together in my mother’s womb, when I was growing there in secret, you knew that I was there – you saw me before I was born. The days allotted to me had all been recorded in your book, before any of them ever began.” (Psalm 139:15-16 GNB).

However, if we turn to the New Testament, specifically the Book of Matthew, we are left in no doubt as to who possesses ultimate authority over both our body and soul;

“And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.” (Matthew 10:28 RSV).

These scriptural passages demonstrate the importance of the spiritual and sacred amidst the scientific and rational and serve to highlight the importance of this ‘pillar’ in the Neo-Casuistic process especially for cases that fall into the scientific fields mentioned above. The soul whilst unseen, and of an unknown location in the body, is nevertheless essential to Christian faith and thereby Neo-Casuistic practice as it is what this researcher would choose to call ‘God’s Hotspot’. It provides us with a

connection to God unlike any other in the physical world as it inherently brings to the faithful the benefits of introspection, extrospection, retrospection and foresight through God's grace.

6.9.3 Medieval Casuistry (High Casuistry).

Between 1050 and 1200 AD, knowledge in Western Europe resided firmly within the church in the form of clerics, ecclesiastics and cannon lawyers. '*Cases of conscience*' were invariably brought before the church which was seen by the laity as possessing the requisite tools to discern Divine Will as being distinct from their human frailty. In other words, moral conflicts and their dilemmas and their implicit need for moral truth through moral reasoning and resolution, were seen to fall within the ambit of theology and its reference to Natural law, Divine Law and Ecclesiastical Canon Law. As such, moral truth and resolution was a function of Christian faith and spiritual belief and was to be determined by the Catholic clergy who arguably were socially and religiously encouraged to stoke the fires of Catholic guilt and provide the means of personal atonement. The latter often came at a fee for which the payment supplemented the coffers of the Medieval Catholic church.

In this period of history, moral dilemmas were seen to reflect and demonstrate issues of faith which helps to further explain why ecclesiastical arbitration was perceived to be able to effectively discern 'sin', acknowledge repentance and restore grace to the 'sinner' through atonement and penance. It was reasonably assumed by the masses in the West, and those working within the Christian church where knowledge resided, only they could quantify and thereby assess the '*seriousness*' and '*extent*' of the sin in the moral dilemmas brought before them,

through a process that aimed to deliver; “...*justice tempered by the gentleness of mercy.*” (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989:116).

The ‘knowledge’ (in this instance perhaps best interpreted as knowledge of the divine and phronesis or practical wisdom) referred to the writings of the Catholic church both theological, ecclesiastical (in the form of Canon Law) and scriptural and served to address the challenges of Medieval life. The Catholic clergy applied this knowledge within the casuistic framework to ‘*cases of conscience*’ brought to them for discernment. In addition, they applied the Aristotelian wisdoms of *techné* and *epistemé* knowledge as and when appropriate. Interestingly, the process and methodology of Casuistry in Medieval times and indeed in modern times requires all three types of knowledge to be present and actively pursued by the casuist(s) when assessing the ‘*concrete circumstances*’ surrounding a moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. Classical Greek philosophy recognised that rarely do all three types of knowledge reside in one person, so the practice of Casuistry is often a collective process drawing together casuists with specific areas of expert knowledge whose task is to seek consensus through their collective moral reasoning using their varying knowledge as a means of unveiling moral truth and conduct in cases of moral conflict and dilemma. To this end, Kuczewski (1997) suggests that Neo-Casuistry is best understood when;

“Casuists become the arbiters of the proper scope, range and limits of the application of theoretical and ethical concepts.” (1997:81).

In other words, the critical reflection of 'knowledge experts' in cases of moral dilemma and/or conflict has always been recognised and Toulmin (1950) suggests their;

“Reasons can be ordered and justified in terms of their efficacy in bringing conflicting desires into harmony.” (1950: 83).

However, even though there might be several experts who are bringing their knowledge to bear as a means of establishing moral truth in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict, they must do so with one accord which according to the position taken by Kuczewski (1997) relies upon the understanding that;

“For the casuists the good attains priority over the right in producing consensus.” (1997:61).

6.9.4 The Historical Challenges to the Power of the Catholic Church.

However, after 1200 (CE), Western Europe experienced a sustained growth in urban living fuelled in large part by the increase in mercantile trade. This led to dramatic socio-political and geo-economic changes resulting in the extension of knowledge throughout the community reflected in part through increased literacy. Such changes greatly impacted the pattern of Western life and social customs not least because power no longer resided solely within the ambit of the Catholic church. There were now bankers, lawyers, scholars, philosophers and physicians who had wisdom (both practical and intellectual) and who occupied positions, not just of power, but more importantly authority and influence within Western societies. Such power expanded beyond Europe and was seen to extend to parts of the globe that first experienced Western colonisation.

The Catholic church responded to these changes by recognising the need to retain its power base and ability to shape both societal and spiritual behaviour. In addition, it wanted to maintain their role as being the universal arbiters of moral truth and thereby the residual of societal norms and laws. Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) suggest it was discerned this could be achieved through the creation of a centralised, universal, ecclesiastical organisation with prime responsibility for higher intellectual questions such as; “...*collective jurisprudence, mercantile propriety, political sovereignty and personal ethics.*” (1989:103). This notion of a universal, Christian church is perhaps best described and understood by the term ‘*transnational institution*’. This notion was honed and developed into the reality of the Roman Catholic church with a spiritual Holy See and headquarters in Rome. Its position was cemented and ratified in 1302 by Pope Boniface VIII who declared that; “*all temporal and spiritual power resided by Divine decree in the Roman pontiff.*” (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989:103).

In creating this Western, international, and far-reaching Christian monolith, the Roman Catholic church became the bastion of spiritual/theological knowledge as represented by Natural Law, Divine Law and Ecclesiastical and Canon Law whilst those ‘newcomers’ to the knowledge base were adjudged to be masters of temporal knowledge which resided in Christian belief, Roman jurisprudence and Greek philosophy.

6.9.5 The Influence of the Society of Jesus in terms of High Casuistry.

The Jesuit order was formed by Ignatius of Loyola in 1534 some say in recognition of the changing political, social and economic landscape explained above and as a

means of the Catholic church still retaining its presence, relevancy and to some extent its indirect control of Western societies. According to Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) members of The Society of Jesus (or Jesuits as they became known) were;

“...the first fully “worldly” religious community, bound by their traditional vows, but mandated to work among secular persons in secular institutions...Given their secular vocation, the Jesuits stressed the role of activity rather than contemplation, involvement rather than withdrawal, in the religious and ethical duties of the Christian.” (1989:147-148).

In short, their mission was to live amongst the people, experience life in the raw as it were and in doing so, be better equipped to apply the eternal and faith to the temporal/mortal and ephemeral. It is from these early beginnings, that contemporary Neo-Casuistry and its carefully constructed cross-fertilisation of theology, law and philosophy was born. Indeed, the judicious use of this triune of disciplines in which the; rational and practical; the systematic and standard and the universal and specific has fortunately prevented Casuistry from becoming a personal and reductionist approach. Indeed Kirk (1939) confirms that in general, Casuistry is most successfully understood when interpreted as being; *“...a just interpretation of the law with due reference to the circumstances of the particular case.” (1939:208).* To this end, Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) claim that Casuistry as an approach, chooses the *‘taxonomic and practical’* over *the ‘geometric and theoretical’* in its quest for moral truth. It is interesting to note, these advantages have been used within the scope of geo-politics by the modern Catholic church in which they have colonised and ministered to the previously *‘unfaithful’* in a way that has not only served Western,

capitalist needs, but has concurrently increased the number of the Catholic faithful and in turn the global power and finances of the Catholic church.

6.9.6 High Casuistry (Medieval) and Neo-Casuistry (Contemporary).

Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) give a detailed picture of the practice of Casuistry both pre and post Medieval times and choose to differentiate it as 'High Casuistry' and 'Neo-Casuistry'. They detail how the practice of High Casuistry became an abused tool in early Medieval times before the Reformation for the confession, atonement and penance of the laity using evidence from Pascal (1859) and his work '*The Provincial Papers*'. Pascal (1859) leaves the reader in no doubt the only way one can interpret the Medieval practice of Casuistry, is as '*abuse*' citing their somewhat secular objectives to increase monastic funds and assume greater power in the communities they served. This in turn subverted the process and methodology of High Casuistry to an economic exercise in which moral resolution and moral truth in cases of moral dilemma came with a clearly defined and '*justified*' price-tag with the monetary proceeds serving to enrich the Catholic church. However, with the advent of Jesuit theologians, there was a Catholic order that not only practically contributed to the discipline of moral theology, but also taught it as an academic discipline in their educational colleges. Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) propose they became; "*...not only the authors of casuistical books*" but by default "*...became its major and most prolific proponents.*" (1989:151). They further claim the education of Jesuits at this time and their students encompassed;

"...not only theology and philosophy which would teach principles, but the humanities, which taught discrimination and discernment." (1989:151).

To this end, they were perfectly placed to become the leading exponents of the casuistic method and system. Indeed, to this day, Catholic universities in the West, teach Human Dignity and the importance of casuistry as a foundation course for all students, interestingly often still facilitated by members of the Jesuit order.

The historical background and focus of High Casuistry has been overtaken by the practice and tradition of Neo-Casuistry which saw a significant movement away from Casuistry's strictly Catholic background in the mid 1800's. Some believe this coincided with industrialised society giving birth to cases of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict whose scope extended beyond the theological towards the scientific. The first Industrial Revolution as seen earlier in this research, is considered to be the result of radical changes in science and manufacturing in Protestant Britain which then extended beyond its borders into greater Europe and to some extent the Empire. Not surprisingly British Protestantism saw the opportunity to develop the practice of Casuistry beyond its historical High Casuistry Catholic beginnings to encompass a broader theological vision that would still enable it to discern moral truth in 'cases of conscience' for both the immediate moral dilemma and/or moral conflict and as a template for future analogous cases. Keenan & Shannon (1995) describe the thrust of this movement as follows;

“Continental Casuistry is considered sin and forgiveness. British reformed casuistry is focused on salvation and ordinary life.” (1995:223).

Interestingly, there remained the three pillars of Neo-Casuistry to assist its practitioners in moral-reasoning with Catholic Cannon Law, arguably being replaced by the Protestant faith which focused on New Testament scripture with its emphasis

upon eternal life, through Christ's sacrifice and resurrection. This 'new' approach recognised that a spiritual price has already been paid for our sins by Christ and as such, redemption does not have a monetary value, nor can it be bought by the faithful: it is rather earned through faith, both practical and spiritual.

6.9.7 The Three Pillars of Neo-Casuistry.

The three pillars of Neo-casuistry as mentioned previously are; philosophy, theology and law. This triune of disciplines with their differing approaches, when used for casuistic purposes, can be seen to incorporate principlism, nomianism and faith through a formal approach. Throughout history, faith remains the single most important ethic (value) for casuists when discerning moral truth in cases of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict as it is key in terms of guiding their conscience in their acts of moral reasoning, discernment and moral conduct and action.

Alexander (1914) a protestant, suggests theology provides a clear and workable understanding and reality of how to incorporate Christian ethics into everyday life and in so doing tacitly accepts the role that it plays in helping to discern moral truth in cases of moral dilemma and moral conflict. He proposes the Christian faith implicitly guides moral truth because;

"...the science of morals as conditioned by Christian faith and the problems it discusses are the nature, meaning and laws of the moral life as dominated by the supreme good which has been revealed to the world in the person and teachings of Christ." (Alexander 1914:17).

Hidden in this definition is a murky understanding of the concept and reality of human dignity as being central to the concept of Christianity, creationist theory and

the call to discipleship. As such, the fundamental importance of human dignity within the Christian tradition can lend weight to the moral reasoning of a casuist(s) when determining moral truth, resolution and conduct in cases of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict as it recognises the spiritual and the role it can and must play when confronted with the temporal and corporeal.

The practiced use of philosophy contributes to a casuist's use of logic and moral theory and context. In this way, the knowledge and practice of these two aspects of philosophy can equally provide law with the means of judgement and justice through the exercise of conscience. It can achieve this for the casuist, when applied in case-based or analogous moral reasoning, never forgetting that both the concept and reality of human dignity are central to these traditions. These three pillars of theology, philosophy and law, form the framework, process and reality which have underpinned and continue to underpin both the historical success of High Casuistry and the more recent success of Neo-Casuistic practice which has regained ascendancy particularly in the field of bio-ethics.

6.9.8 The Practice of Neo-Casuistry

The way in which Neo-Casuistry embraces this triumvirate of disciplines in its approach and method, ensures that its purpose goes beyond "...*a method of dealing with and resolving cases*" (Kuczewski.1997:71) focusing instead on the way in which it can provide "...*moral realism in the general sense.*" (Kuczewski.1997:75).

This researcher would argue that Neo-Casuistry is a recognised ethical decision-making framework that is a form of context dependent, applied ethics, using a basis of faith from which the moral principles of critical reflection and discernment, moral

imagination, moral resolution and moral action come together in a way that provides moral truth through the law in immediate 'cases of conscience'. Furthermore, Neo-Casuistry provides a moral template or system for reviewing future moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts of a similar nature. Against this backdrop, it is easy to see why Miller (1996) chooses to describe Casuistry as;

"Primarily a problem-solving endeavour, casuistry seeks to furnish answers to the tangible, practical questions." (1996:17).

which is in turn supported by the nature of a casuist whom he describes as follows;

"For casuists, having a strong character or firm integrity is morally insufficient. Indeed, cases of conscience arise not from a weak character, but from a thoughtful one." (1996:37).

Wogamon (2011) recognises this observation of the need for a casuist to possess a 'thoughtful character'. However, he proposes this should be a virtue in any moral agent and uses the Greek philosopher Socrates as a support for his position as he identified the role and function of a moral agent seeking moral truth as being one of;

"...subjecting attitudes on human values and virtues to relentless scrutiny confident that moral truth could be gained through critical reflection."
(Wogamon.2011: ix).

Wogamon (2011) interpreted the work of Plato as building upon this Socratic version of truth and truth-seeking whom he proposed maintained the idea that truth is 'universal and eternal' and is discovered by the human mind using reason. Implicit in this statement is the notion of the Christian faith which accepts God as being both

universal and eternal. Wogamon's (2011) statement also speaks directly to the vital role and function of a modern casuist tasked to establish moral resolution secure in the knowledge that; "... *casuistry can be prospective and retrospective.*" (Miller. 1996:37). In short this could be interpreted as the casuistic approach having to look backwards at previous cases, in order to be able to move forwards and resolve new cases of moral dilemma and/or conflict.

The work of Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) leaves us in no doubt of this position when it proposes that when cases of moral dilemma and/or conflict are reviewed by a casuist it is;

"...a connectedness among cases that emerges precisely through the circumstances themselves." (1989:223).

This implicitly acknowledges that review of past cases is required if the present and future cases of moral dilemma and/or conflict are to be discerned in a way suitable to achieve consistency in justice and moral truth. (Arguably this view could also be interpreted as being representative of the burden placed upon Christians who need to look back at sin and repent before they can look forward to eternal life.)

This '*connectedness among cases*' also speaks to the need for a system of archiving previous moral resolutions that can be reviewed, should clarity on a current case be required before an ethical decision is made and 'right' and 'wrong' morally defined. Initially, according to Keenan in his Foreword to Chan's (2013) book, 'cases of conscience' in Medieval times were assembled into an archive known as the 'Summa casuum conscientiae' which were later according to him;

“...developed into sophisticated textbooks, the Moral Manuals which began appearing at the end of the eighteenth century and served the Church until Vatican II.” (2013:x).

The cases recorded here were organised according to the Decalogue and as such, according to Keenan in his Foreword; *“provided the organisational structure for the Moral Manuals” (2013:xi)* although *“...they hardly informed those manuals.” (2013:xi)*. He goes on to share that no examination or investigation was undertaken into what;

“...stealing or killing actually meant. Basically, the commandments were no more than organizing structures that provided ten headings.” (2013:xi).

Not surprisingly this ‘organisational structure’ of concluded ethical decisions, needed to be expanded to include the secular and non-Catholic if Neo-Casualty was to have the same impact in terms of its ability to discern moral truth in modern times. The archive provided within the justice system, and in particular the precedence of case law was to provide this for the Neo-Casualty as a function of the legalism and principlism embraced by their ethical decision-making approach. Kuczewski (1997) confirms the need for such an archive as he too recognises the importance of the case-based, analogous approach adopted by Casualty when he informs;

“Jonsen finds the key to contemporary casualty in identifying a case as one of a type and then locating the most similar paradigm case among those of that type.” (1997:73).

In practical terms, this is best described by Kuczewski (1997) as;

“...the greater the similarity to a paradigm, the more fitting is the same solution.” (1997:76).

6.9.9 The Importance of Theology/Faith in Moral Discernment for the Neo-Casulist.

Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) affirm that casuists, in their moral reasoning, recognise that; *“...the principle codifies the agenda; the case breaks the agenda open.” (1989:223).* These notions of casuistry, namely the need for an organised archive of cases and the integrated use of moral principles, legalism and theology as a means to provide moral truth in cases of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict can arguably be seen to fulfil the demand Habermas makes of any philosophy in that it,

“...must find its home in and preserve its links with everyday life. Philosophical theories and concepts have to pay their way by making a difference to the lives and the experience of real people in the actual world.” (Finlayson.2005:18).

By contrast Alexander (1914) somewhat naively suggests that when looking at moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts associated with science (which is the case in 4IR) we must remain cognisant that;

“All science must be furnished with facts and its task generally is to shape its materials to definite end. The scientist does not invent. He does not create. He simply records what is already there.” (1914:27).

This assigns a definitive role to scientists, but not to those who have arguably become the victims of their *‘materials’* shaping their *‘definite end’* that can be seen to

produce moral dilemmas and/or conflicts for those either directly or indirectly involved. This has been the case with privacy and the personal in 4IR and the case in medicine where the tradition, discipline and practice of bio-ethics and genetic engineering has grown at the same rate as the technological and scientific advances in the medical tradition. The latter have helped to create previously unexperienced moral dilemmas and/or conflicts that have subsequently provided defining 'cases of conscience' where the need for moral truth and action has been discerned and the 'rightness' and 'wrongness' of a case decided with reference to human dignity as paramount.

A clear example of this is the 1973 American case of Roe v Wade that was directed towards the right to abortion, but which essentially hinged around the following two facts;

1. At which point does 'life' begin?
2. At which point can a foetus be legally protected?

In coming to their decision, the Supreme court in the United States undertook a casuistic process as they sought to determine moral truth for this case and similar cases in the future. Fleddermann, (2012) a scholar in the field of engineering, suggests they achieved this by incorporating a process in which science (facts), conceptual meaning and ethics/morals played an equal role and function. (See Fig 18)




Figure 18: Fleddermann's Interpretation of the Contemporary Casuistic Process (L Doherty)

Fleddermann (2012) adapted this process from fellow engineers Martin & Schinzinger (2005). However, he arguably ignored a key factor in his process that was identified by Martin & Schinzinger (2005) who recognised the importance of *'spiritual attitudes'* in moral reasoning and discerning moral truth. They propose this important aspect in the casuistic process falls within the area of conceptual meaning almost providing a buffer between science and ethics. They went as far to say that; *"Spiritual attitudes seek ways to allow aspects of the sacred into technology"* (2005:80) and go on to affirm that;

"Despite their diversity, religious beliefs can support morally responsible conduct in several ways." (2005:80).

This was most definitely present in the Roe v Wade case in which the spectre of the spiritual was never far from moral deliberations and considerations as the concept and meaning of life was central to establishing moral truth.

What is apparent is that as engineers, both Fleddermann (2012) and Martin & Schinzinger (2005) acknowledge they are often at the cutting edge of technology and

new manufacturing processes, however, especially in the case of Martin & Schinzinger (2005), they recognise the importance that faith/spirituality can bring to 'cases of conscience' possibly because the researcher respectfully suggests they accept that science deals with the finite, (quantitative; facts and data) but faith contracts with the infinite (qualitative; values and beliefs). This understanding speaks directly to the fact/value dichotomy often debated in philosophical circles and the relationship between the two. It requires the contemporary casuist to maintain a pragmatic balance throughout their moral reasoning between descriptive ethics (facts) and normative ethics (values). In so doing, they will aim to achieve the perfect balance, outlined in Montefiore's (1964) metaphor, of the wine taster who uses the facts of the vineyard, cultivar, year, vintner and method of winemaking to inform their palate on the taste and qualities of the wines which are in effect evaluative and serve to ultimately determine a 'vintage wine' for the wine-taster. From this example, it would be fair to posit that an accurate and fair interpretation of fact and value by the Neo-Casuist can positively contribute to the quality of moral reasoning and the discernment of moral truth in moral dilemmas and/or conflicts in 4IR. It could be argued that it is here, where we see the conjunction of descriptive and normative ethics at its best, particularly in terms of providing consistency and moral certitude in situations of moral dilemma and/or conflict. However, Kuczewski (1997) is quick to remind us that;

"The methods of casuistry must not presuppose a hard and fast fact/value distinction and must maintain a role for practical wisdom." (1997:62).

Moreover, Kuczewski (1997) is quick to alert us to the fact this phronesis or ‘practical wisdom’ exercised by the casuist;

“...should identify relevant circumstances and considerations and point(s) us in a general direction for action.” (1997:78).

It could be argued, the moral truth discerned in this way represents moral realism extracted from the use of moral reason. Kuczewski (1997) uses Toulmin’s (1950) observations of the judicious need for reason if ethical decision-making is to be successful. Toulmin (1950) suggests this can be achieved if the objectivist, subjectivist and imperative approaches to reason are incorporated through the practical wisdom of the casuist if successful moral and metaphysical realism in the Neo-Casuistry approach is to be achieved. (See Table 4 below)

Table 4: An Adaptation of Toulmin’s (1950) Types of Reason in Ethics Cited by Kuczewski (1997) (L. Doherty)

ETHICAL APPROACHES	CONTRIBUTION TO REASONING & MORAL REALISM
OBJECTIVIST	‘Goodness’ is a property that can be perceived along with other properties. It is a ‘non-natural’ property
SUBJECTIVIST	Here ethical statements are reflective of feelings of approval (emotivism)

IMPERATIVE	Ethical statements are attempts to 'persuade' others to certain courses of action and are indicative of volitional and rhetorical qualities.
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When these approaches are incorporated into the Neo-Casuistic process, through the means of a method of cross-fertilisation, it has been noted by Kuczewski (1997) that whilst disagreement might occur amongst the casuists when abstract principles are under review; “...*consensus quickly emerges when persons discuss moral actions.*” (1997:61). This observation further supports the view that moral realism should be the consequence of successful Neo-Casuistry. In addition, Toulmin’s (1950) three approaches to moral reasoning and moral realism are further proof that modern casuistry has according to Kuczewski (1997) “...*a need for tools to cope with cases in the grey area between paradigms.*” (1997:115) and speaks to the need for Neo-Casuistry to be morally authentic and relevant.

6.9.10 The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Neo-Casuistry Framework.

Scholars have been quick to criticise the Neo-Casuistic system of ethical decision-making choosing to view it as an historical, deductivist, (top-down) approach.

Beauchamp & Childress (1994) explain that;

“...*deductivism – holds that justified moral judgements are deduced from a pre-existing theoretical structure of normative precepts that cover the judgement.*” (1994:14).

Of importance is the term ‘*justified*’ that speaks to the understanding of these principles or rules being reached by a consensus of practicing casuists in the field of

expertise and are to be used and applied in all cases of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict under their review that seek moral discernment and moral resolution. The benefits of this approach are explained by Beauchamp & Childress (1994) in terms of resolving moral dilemma and conflict in bio-ethics in which the principles of; beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice are used by those tasked with ethical decision-making.

However, Beauchamp & Childress (1994) impress that an inductive approach (or bottom-up approach) whereby we use; *"...existing social agreements and practices as a starting point from which to generalize (sic)." (1994:17-18)* is also required in contemporary times when science is providing 'new' and previously unimagined moral dilemmas and moral conflicts from which we are required to discern moral truth. They proceed to expand upon this thought when they confirm that;

"A society's moral views are not justified by an ahistorical examination of the logic of moral discourse or by some theory of rationality, but rather by an embedded moral tradition and a set of procedures that permit new developments." (1994:18).

The work of Beauchamp & Childress (1994) confirms that Neo-Casuistry is not an inflexible and rigid ethical decision-making framework rooted in history and at the mercy of sophists. Rather they demonstrate and explicate how it has 'moved with the times' and continues to provide us with a proven system of ethical decision-making that provides us with a framework that encourages a thorough and comprehensive moral reasoning be undertaken by its practitioners from which an authentic and practical moral truth can be discerned.

Table 5: below provides a brief overview of the corresponding strengths and weaknesses of the Neo-Casistry framework.

Table 5: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Neo-Casistry Framework. (L.Doherty)

	STRENGTHS / ADVANTAGES	WEAKNESSES / DISADVANTAGES
FORMALISM	Provides a pre-determined framework that is not subject to personal whim or fancy. It provides a structure for ethical decision-making in which all x3 knowledge types can contribute.	The formality of the framework can prove to be restrictive & not provide the flexibility sometimes required in contemporary 'cases of conscience' in 4IR.
PRINCIPLISM	The framework makes use of a deductive approach, moving from cases to accepted moral principles to assist the casuist in critical moral reasoning, moral reflection & discerning moral truth. It helps to provide consistency in moral discernment across a range of moral dilemmas/conflicts.	The framework stands accused of being a 'tyranny of principles.' Principlism has been judged to favour the deductive approach that can preclude the use of practical wisdom in cases of moral dilemma/conflict in 4IR. How can 'old' principles be applied to 'new' cases?
LEGALISM	Provides an objectivity & certainty to ethical decision-making that can be enforced by the justice system for the moral dilemma/conflict under review & similar cases in the future.	The law can prove to be inflexible (both secular and ecclesiastical) & in addition can often lag-behind contemporary situations of moral dilemma/conflict in 4IR which are unique. This requires the casuist to use an inductive approach &

		advise the legal system to draft 'new' laws.
THEOLOGY	The Christian faith and biblical scripture, continues to provide a systemised process & method for casuists to discern dignity, justice and mercy through the exercise of an informed Christian conscience.	Neo-Casuistry provides a Christian approach to discerning moral truth in cases of moral dilemma/conflict. However, for 'cases of conscience' in 4IR in liberal, Western, secular, democracies the humanist approach to human dignity can be substituted as an additional or even alternate means for the provision of ethical decision-making that keeps dignity, justice and mercy at the forefront of moral truth. This humanist approach can also be the means to exercise/access a secular conscience.
HISTORIC	Consistency in ethical decision-making is achieved by a review of previous settled cases of moral dilemma/conflict. It provides casuists with a deductive approach to the moral reasoning.	The process of Neo-Casuistry relies too heavily on past cases as a means of discernment & ethical decision-making for current cases of moral dilemma/conflict in 4IR making it rigid & inflexible.

6.9.11 A Comparison Between Casuistry and Situation Ethics.

Perhaps before the researcher begins on a comparison between the two Christian ethical decision-making frameworks it would be wise to take heed of the reductionist synopsis provided by Schmidt (2009) when he proposes that,

“...Situation ethics stresses the uniqueness of each situation; casuistry seeks to identify similarities or continuities between different situations. And where Situation ethics firmly rejects or seriously modifies standing principles, casuistry respects and builds upon pre-existing cases or precedents.” (2009:3).

and the all-inclusive synopsis of Casuistry offered by Kuczewski (1997) who proffers;

“The casuist tries to chart the various subtleties of different areas of lived experience and arrange them in relevant cases according to the obligations, relationships and maxims that tend to dominate various branches. The resulting taxonomy provides a growing framework of agreement for ethical criticism and debate and reflection. The casuist can see when a single principle dominates widely and is aware of other limiting principles through experience and other branches.” (1997:87).

Not surprisingly the differences between these two respected ethical decision-making frameworks span a far wider range of paradigmatic elements, that when identified, help us to reach an informed decision on their exclusive ability to discern moral truth in moral dilemmas and/or conflicts arising from the use of 4OT in 4IR. Many of the accepted differences between the two ethical decision-making approaches can be identified through the elements of; language, interpretation and

relevancy and suitability. In the sections below, a comparison between the two approaches has been undertaken, using these three elements.

6.9.11.1 Language.

As has been demonstrated, both Christian Situationism and Neo-Casuistry can be considered successful, ethical problem-solving tools, in the hands of their respective experts. However, it is perhaps primarily in language that we see the first of the differences accentuated between the two approaches.

The broad tradition of Situation Ethics chooses to term moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts as '*situations*' whereas the broad tradition of Casuistry chooses to term moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts as '*cases*'. The researcher would suggest the use of the eponymous word '*situation*' for the one tradition, suggests that context is key to any moral conflict and/or dilemma within it, whereas the use of the word '*cases*' by the Casuist would seem to suggest the occurrence of both commonality and iteration in moral conflicts and/or moral dilemmas that can guide moral-reasoning and discernment of moral truth for the practitioner.

This distinction between the two ethical decision-making frameworks is also apparent in the use of Fletcher's (1966) word '*particularity*' which is critical to the Christian Situationists description and understanding of the scope and type of moral dilemma and/or conflict. In contrast, the committed Casuist chooses to see '*similarity*' as critical in their moral reasoning in moral dilemmas and/or conflicts that present themselves. Whilst this can leave the Casuist accused of being back-ward looking, in their use of past decisions upon which to base current and future decisions of moral

truth in 'cases of conscience', such an act can ensure both stability and continuity which can be useful stalwarts in providing moral truth.

Fletcher (1966) also sees the use of Agape love in the framework of his Christian Situationism as a '*method*' of unlocking moral-reasoning, discernment and action in moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts, whereas Neo-Casuistry chooses to see their framework of moral-reasoning, discernment and action as providing a '*system*' of moral reasoning and ethical decision-making. Kuczewski (1997) goes as far to say that;

"It is the genius of casuistry to notice that the vast majority of cases will be solved by discernment and respect for particular details." (1997:117).

Fletcher's (1966) '*method*' does not provide the '*consistency*' for discovering moral truth in comparative moral dilemmas/conflicts provided by the systemised framework of Neo-Casuistry. Rather it results in ethical decisions that can be '*inconsistent*' as the framework of Christian Situationism lacks the '*system*' and subsequent '*systemisation*' offered by Neo-Casuistry which seeks '*consistent*' judgements in analogous situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict. Thus, it has been claimed that Neo-Casuistry does not necessarily speak to '*rigidity*' in moral decision-making, but rather speaks to '*consistency*' which is an all-important distinction when trying through moral reasoning to ascertain moral truth. The '*flexibility*' that is often provided by Christian Situationism, as an advantage of the paradigm can unfortunately lead to '*inconsistency*' in terms of moral resolution that is in opposition to the notion of '*certainty*' that is so valuable to the provision of moral truth and moral realism when moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts occur.

There is also the importance of *'facts'* in a moral dilemma and/or conflict for a Neo-Casulist who will use them as the empirical basis for ethical decision-making where they will provide definition, scope and understanding of the moral dilemma and/or moral conflict under consideration in the case, in addition to perhaps providing direction in terms of accepted law and principles. Such facts can serve to provide the Neo-Casulist with a *'rational'* basis for the discernment of moral truth and would further serve to support the accompanying moral action/conduct. This Neo-Casuistic process is in direct contrast to the *'relativism'* and *'feelings'* extracted by the Christian Situationist from a moral dilemma and/or conflict that will assist in providing them with a *'person-centric'* ethical decision for moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts that will be tailored to address the specific *'situation'* under moral consideration. This is not to say the Neo-Casulist is not considerate of persons, as human dignity is at the forefront of their quest for moral truth, and approached and applied as a universal moral resolution.

Another word used by the Christian Situationist that clearly separates them from the Neo-Casulist is *'fittingness'*. The Christian Situationist will strive to reach a moral decision they consider *'fitting'* in the given situation of moral dilemma and/or conflict. Once again, both the language and its practical consequence, highlights the unimportance of iterativism for ethical decision-making and moral truth within the Christian Situationist paradigm and speaks to a creeping *'personalism'* that arguably bedevils this form of ethical decision-making making the charge of *'inconsistency'* both possible and probable in terms of their discernment of moral truth. Neither of these terms can be seen to have relevance for the Neo-Casulist although the Neo-Casulist does not dissuade *'ethical intimacy'* if it provides the gateway to equitable

treatment in analogous 'cases of conscience'. The Neo-Casuist(s) adopts a framework in which *'prescription'* is key to their ethical decision-making which in turn speaks to *'formalism'* and *'consistency'* of ethical decision-making and resolution in cases of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict in 4IR, which themselves can come with challenges if the ability for contextual changes to influence the authenticity and relevance of moral truth is not recognised and accepted.

Neo-Casuistry has been lauded for its legalism and principlism approaches which have provided the backbone and *'formality'* to its framework unlike the *'informal'* and *'antinomianism'* of its counterpart Christian Situationism where the *'longevity'* of ethical decisions only coincides with the specific moral dilemma and/or moral conflict that presents itself at that moment. By contrast the *'formality'* and *'retrospective'* nature of ethical decision-making in Neo-Casuistry, provides an ongoing sense of *'rightness'* for future ethical decision-making with clear and defined boundaries for moral resolution and conduct. However, if not undertaken carefully, according to Kuczewski (1997) the process/system of casuistry can become; "...*completely dependent on the facts of social, and institutional practice. What about if these facts change?*" (199:79) This speaks to the need for what Kuczewski (1997) has termed *'kinetic taxonomy'* which recognises Casuistry's dependence on social, political and ethical *'stability'* and its inability at times to be the catalyst for change in unique cases of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict.

6.9.11.2 Interpretation.

The Neo-Casuist uses the tools of theology, legalism and philosophy as the tools or means through which to engage moral-reasoning and *'judgement'* or discernment in

a moral dilemma and/or conflict presenting in 4IR. All three can be considered systems of knowledge (academic disciplines) that provide the Neo-Casuistic framework with '*prescriptive principlism*' that can be applied by those trained in their use as described by Beauchamp & Childress (1994) previously in this chapter. As such, subjectivity and/or relativism are minimised by the Neo-Casuist(s), as the personal is left to one side in favour of rationalism, empiricism, legalism and nomianism. This does not preclude the individual skills of a Neo-Casuist from being recognised nor their ability to adopt a humanist approach, but rather they are seen to reside within the '*system*' of Neo-Casuistry and are accessed and applied to the moral dilemma and/or conflict as appropriate by a skilled practitioner.

Christian Situationism however, arguably depends on the '*personal*' rather than the rational. Its antinomianism arguably rests and vests in the individual Christian Situationist charged with ethical decision-making in a '*situation*' of moral dilemma and/or conflict. The way in which the Christian Situationist '*personally*' interprets the scope of the moral dilemma and/or conflict, will arguably serve to direct and inform their use of Agape love as a method of moral resolution; not the use of any rules or laws. Their merits as a skilled Christian Situationist therefore tend to be directly linked to the extent of their faith and its praxis. This can be observed by the way in which both are used as a means of interpreting and discerning moral truth in their previous (latest) moral dilemma and/or conflict

Driver (2005) in her paper entitled "Moralism" proposes;

“... the three different varieties of moralism are; moral absolutism, excessive standards and demandingness and presenting non-moral consideration as moral ones.” (2005:137).

She argues that Casuistry ‘*evolved*’ to try and counter these three varieties of moralism to ensure the integrity and relevance of this centuries old ethical decision-making framework and to provide it with the interpretive consistency that is required in contemporary times. By contrast, it would appear that Christian Situationism could be viewed as being subject to ‘*demandingness*’ whereby the moral truth accessed can be seen to result from non-moral considerations owing to the way in which Agape love has been interpreted and applied by individual Christian Situationists to each ‘*situation*’ of moral dilemma and/or conflict. (e.g. even to the extent where lying and torture can be condoned)

Arguably another key difference between the two ethical decision-making frameworks is the way in which conscience is seen to inform not just the moral reasoning and discernment undertaken but also the moral truth that results especially for the Neo-Casuist(s). Conscience is axiomatic for the Neo-Casuist as it speaks to the spiritual which transcends the earthly and finite and speaks to the personal and infinite. Conscience for the Neo-Casuist also frames ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts within the framework of the Christian faith and its corresponding ethics. It guides and supports moral reasoning, discernment and conduct for the Neo-Casuist in a way that ensures an outcome of authentic moral truth and realism. However, for the Christian Situationist, conscience is not a primary concern as the absolute rule of Agape love is supreme in the method

of ethical decision-making and its corresponding moral truth. Arguably it could be deduced, the lack of moral realism often associated with the moral truth discerned by Christian Situationism is a direct result of not including conscience as a tool in their Christian ethical decision-making framework.

6.9.11.3 Relevancy and Suitability.

It is perhaps both terms that cut straight to the heart of the challenge of discerning moral truth in 4IR when comparing the two frameworks of Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism. A comparison of the relevancy and suitability of both ethical decision-making frameworks is required if ethical decision-making is to shape our understanding of what is '*right*' and '*wrong*' for the individual and society both now and in the future.

The history and background of Christian tradition in both Neo-Casuistry and Christian Situationism can be seen to impact their contemporary relevance, suitability and praxis in cases/situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflicts in 4IR. Whilst both paradigms seek moral truth, well-being and the common good, it is the way in which religion and the Christian faith are applied by each, that frames their suitability as a means to discern moral truth in 4IR and provide an authentic moral realism for those directly affected and impacted by moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts.

As discussed in the background to this research, the relevancy and impact of Christianity is becoming increasingly marginalised in the predominantly Western secular, liberal democracies of 4IR. In particular, this negatively impacts Christian Situationism which has the Christian religion at its core and Agape love as an

absolutist, principle in its method. However, supporters of Situation Ethics in general, argue their method of discerning moral truth can retain contemporary relevance and suitability if Agape love is replaced by a humanist interpretation of human dignity as a means for discerning moral truth in moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts in 4IR. For this to be successful, there would need to be a contemporary understanding (both notional and legal) of both the scope, meaning and application of human dignity. However, if this path is to be pursued as an arbiter for the '*right*' ethical decision(s) to be made, then the existing framework of Christian Situationism is under threat for the purist as the '*principlism*' of Agape love as a tool for discerning moral truth would be redundant. However, if the humanist approach of human dignity was adopted by Christian Situationism, it would preclude the immoral and amoral outcome occurring as moral truth, that has been a justified criticism of the moral realism resulting from an interpretation of Agape love by the individual Christian Situationist.

The use of human dignity as a key principle in ethical decision-making for the Neo-Casuist would present less of a theoretical problem because its framework is based upon the interdependence of legalism, formalism, and principlism, rather than being solely the domain of the Christian religion which seeks to inform rather than dominate the ethical decision-making process of the Neo-Casuist.

6.9.11.4 Practitioners.

The interaction of traditions and disciplines in Neo-Casuistry allows and supports a 'panel of experts' who can bring their specialised knowledge to the casuistic process and assist in the moral reasoning and ethical decision-making. There is a common

saying that advises; *'many minds are better than one'* and the science of 4IR requires specialised knowledge be brought to the ethical decision-making process if the moral dilemma and/or moral conflict is to be correctly understood and moral truth discerned. This specialised knowledge, harnessed within an inductive approach (often required for moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts resulting from 4IR) and practical wisdom has resulted in moral realism for the present and the future.

Contrarily, Daniels (2009) proffers the advice that;

"It is a mistake to believe that a list of ethical rules can offer relief from the burden of responsible moral decision-making." (2009:18).

which whilst short-sighted, helps explain the platform from which Christian Situationism wishes to be viewed. Ethical decision-making within this framework is rarely if ever a collaborative process with the burden of moral truth resting on the shoulders of a lone individual. The interpretative, intuitive and normative nature of this ethical decision-making framework precludes communitarian decision-making and consensus. Unfortunately, the reality is that it can stand accused of being held hostage by lone individuals with a personal Christian agenda whose decisions can never be replicated.

4. Offers an environment in which intimacies and confidences are shared via limited and protected communication.

It has been proposed that Westin's (1967) functions of privacy are informed by his interpretivist approach that defines privacy as;

"...a claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others." (1967:5).

Such a definition speaks to the phenomenology of privacy and the personal which is arguably of greater relevance when looking at the privacy dilemmas created by 4IR than those preceding it.

Holtzman (2006) pulls such definitions, understandings, meanings and expectations of privacy together under the three headings; seclusion, solitude and self-determination in a way that also incorporates the basic precepts of modern democracy further entrenching privacy as a *'right'* for the modern citizen. (See Fig 20 below)




Figure 20: The Components of Privacy. (L. Doherty)

Holtzman (2006) proposes the concept and reality of privacy in 4IR has acquired even greater importance owing to the existence, scope and potential uses of AI and ICT as we embrace a digital world in 4IR.

However, the researcher would suggest that it is in the collection of ‘big data’ and the inter-connectivity and storage capacities of AI and ICT, where the threat to our understanding and the reality of privacy and the personal truly lies. Westin (1967) predicted this when he observed;

“The more computers offer opportunities to simulate behaviour, forecast trends and predict outcomes, the more pressure is generated for personal and organisational information to be corrected and processed...this is one of the great challenges in modern society.” (1967:359).

However, whilst his observation is accepted and has proven to represent the reality of privacy and the personal in 4IR, Solove (2009) warns us that;

“Protecting individual privacy need not be at society’s expense. In fact, the value of safe-guarding people’s privacy should be justified by its social benefits.” (2009:91).

Solove’s (2009) warning is built upon Regan’s (1995) research findings into the subject of legislating privacy in which she notes;

“...the philosophical basis of privacy policy over emphasises the importance of privacy to the individual and fails to recognise the broader social importance of privacy.” (1995:212).

Whilst the researcher concurs with both Regan (1995) and Solove (2009), they would argue that it is not until individual privacy is understood and its lack in 4IR addressed, that its corresponding social benefits can be imagined and re-imagined and a sense of moral truth and realism emerge.

In 2018, the scandal of the dissemination of personal data for sale by Cambridge Analytica and the ‘WannaCry’ ransomware demands of hackers for the safe return of 50,000 personal medical files from several National Health facilities in Britain in 2017, provides evidence of the crucial role played by the inter-connectivity and storage capacities provided by big data through ICT. Such events are arguably what this researcher chooses to call the metaphorical ‘*tip of the privacy iceberg*’ and accompanying moral dilemmas and moral conflicts in 4IR. Such incidents only serve to highlight how the true size of the ‘*privacy iceberg*’ is distorted as a full 90% of its mass lies submerged in a cold, forbidding and unfamiliar IT terrain that is uncharted

and unseen by the naked eye and often only experienced when breaches of privacy and the personal take place. A similar incident occurred in 2018 in South Africa when a data leak was reported that exposed the; “...names, ID numbers, e-mail addresses and passwords stored in plain text of 934,000 South African citizens.”

(<https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/261197-data-leak-exposes>) (Accessed 24/05/2018). This only serves to highlight the problem that ... the ‘*privacy ice-berg*’ stands no chance of melting due to climate change!

7.2 The Physical Limits of Privacy.

In his book ‘The Hidden Dimension’, Hall (1990) an American anthropologist, developed a theory of proxemics, or humankind’s use of space, in which he proposes that people have a sense of defined physical space surrounding them which he calls a ‘*personal bubble*’. This ‘*personal bubble*’ is a space within which a person is comfortable to interact with others and can be seen to underpin the notion of relationships within the fundamental elements of privacy.

Arguably, this personal space can be seen to be a type of privacy whereby the action of a person breaching this ‘*personal bubble*’ could be interpreted as a threat, like that of an intruder. Hall (1990) proceeded to develop models which measured the physical size of such ‘*personal bubbles*’ only to find that culture plays a key role in determining how much ‘*personal space*’ is required. (Interestingly enough, the ‘*personal bubbles*’ of Americans were larger than that of their European counterparts)

Hall’s (1990) research into ‘*personal bubbles*’ has raised interest in other academic disciplines and has been further examined by psychologists and those in medicine

who concur and confirm their reality. They propose this required and ever-present '*personal space*' for humans can be traced back to the presence of amygdala which is a part of the brain (temporal lobe) that causes us to feel fear and is activated when a perceived threat to our personal safety is felt. This goes a long way to explaining the physical discomfort and mental anguish that can arise when one's physical space is breached, negatively altered, or perhaps redefined in situations such as imprisonment, or torture.

This theory of a '*personal bubble*' has arguably been extended in modern times (specifically in 4IR) to encompass that of cyber space. As in physical proxemics, there would appear to be cyber proxemics. We now have a '*digital footprint*' defined as;

"...an electronic trail knowingly or unknowingly left behind each time we access the internet or other electronic devices."

<https://study.com/academy/lesson/digital-footprint-definition-facts.html>

(Accessed 14/03/2020)

Such digital footprints can be categorised as '*active*' or '*passive*'. The former refers to those details we knowingly leave behind online, whilst the latter refers to;

"...details which are left behind unintentionally through our use of online services or those services we no longer access."

<https://study.com/academy/lesson/digital-footprint-definition-facts.html>.

(Accessed 14/03/2020)

The difference between Hall's (1990) '*personal bubble*' and that of a '*digital footprint*' is the latter is bereft of the dimensions of physical space, exchanging these for

assumed cyber dimensions that when breached, result in a similar sense of an invasion of privacy, to that of its physical counterpart. Dimensions, by definition, assume boundaries which in turn are usually put in place to provide security and certainty; the latter can be argued as implicit for our existing sense of privacy and the personal. The researcher would propose the only way we can begin to establish accurate boundaries and dimensions is to re-imagine moral truth in situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict caused by a lack of privacy or the personal in 4IR which in turn radically alters our expectations and values of both as individuals and as a society.

Brin (1998) in his work the '*Transparent Society*' proposes that our understanding of privacy was changing amidst a plethora of modern technology that continues to challenge and change its contemporary reality. Brin (1998) argued for societal acceptance of new technologies that facilitate personal surveillance, data tracking, data gathering, and data sharing and called for societal adoption of '*reciprocal transparency*'. His work refers and extends to developing a model demonstrating the necessity for a free flow of information i.e. those providing the data and those accessing the data are '*known*' to each other; inferring some sort of active relationship embedded in AI and ICT technologies. It is questions arising from this notion of an 'open' and 'active' relationship which continue to remain at the heart of any and all moral dilemmas and conflicts concerning privacy and the personal posed by 4IR. It has been argued the very binary nature of privacy and security has a strengthened relationship in 4IR arising from 4OT in AI and ICT. However, all too often we witness the negative outcomes arising from a breach in this incestuous relationship between data and security as its open and dynamic relationship directly

threatens our existing understanding and sense of the personal and what Hall (1991) calls our *'zone of intimacy'*.

Zuboff (2019) directly contradicts the position adopted by Brin (1998) in her book "The Age of Surveillance Capitalism" in which she identifies the strengths of companies such as Microsoft, Google, Apple, Amazon and Facebook (the acknowledged leaders in Silicon Valley) lying in their capitalist roots and the way in which they have purposefully driven the mass consumption of technology for corporate economic gain and power. She proposes their individual and collective business-models have driven the masses to form a Faustian pact with digital technology and in so doing often unwittingly permit, (some would argue even unknowingly facilitate) the open relationship between data and security without full knowledge of the potential personal consequences.

7.3 In Defence of Privacy and the Personal.

In many of the moral dilemmas concerning privacy, we are increasingly led to ask ourselves *'can something be intrinsically personal?'* and *'who should have access to the 'personal?'* When doing this we must also charge ourselves not to lose sight of Warren and Brandeis's (1890) *'right to be left alone'* which should surely have some traction and relevance in the moral maelstrom accompanying 4IR and personal data concerns.

Brin's (1998) somewhat radical model of *'reciprocal transparency'* seems naïve, particularly when considering the evolutionary and expansionary nature of AI and ICT. Brin's (1998) model seems even more wanting if we acknowledge Westin's

(1967) poignant lament that; “*The private personality is the last defence of individuality, the ultimate shield of individuality.*” (1967:360).

Perhaps however if we consider the two core questions raised by Brin (1998) in his work, it could assist us in this task of determining a modern sense of privacy both personal and societal. They are;

1. Should we attach so much importance to personal information?
2. Is such information the sole repository for who we are and where we ‘*fit*’ and ‘*sit*’ within our community?

The answers to these questions can help shed light on our current understanding and sense of privacy and the way in which legislated ‘*rights*’ associated with protection and/or security of information have been established and adopted in modern, liberal, societies. Central to the drafting of such legislation has been the identified need for a relationship (via permissions) between data provider and data accessor to ensure that personal information is respected as such.

In line with this new legislation, an international workshop was facilitated by UNESCO in 2013 entitled ‘*The protection of information and the right to privacy*’. Whilst seemingly broad in scope, the discussion parameters for this workshop were constructed in a way that recognised the challenge for liberal, democratic societies to find the balance between freedom of information, (understood as freedom of speech) security and privacy. The outcomes from this workshop were to charge its members to draft and adopt new legislation addressing identified concerns surrounding the protection of information and the individual’s ‘right’ to privacy. This activity recognised the new equilibrium that exists between information, relationships,

privacy and identity. In so doing, it tacitly accepted the '*Janus faced values*' of privacy identified by Lever (2012) This speaks to the requirement of the individual to provide personal information/data to third parties, whilst at the same time invariably expecting by virtue of this act to surrender control of this information. It also tried to harness what Lever (2012) has identified as the; "*...fuzziness of our concepts of liberty, equality and rights.*" (2012:4) in the notion and legislation of the Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA) and the protection of Personal Information Acts (POPIA) that have been developed, adopted and extended to address issues of privacy and the personal in the West.

The basis of this legislation could be seen to consider that in terms of our personal architecture, there are facts that are intimate (personal and private) and there are facts that are part of life's transactions. Westin (1967) provided a framework for this when he suggested that personal facts could be viewed as having the following features;

1. Private and non-circulating.
2. Confidential with limited circulation.
3. Public and freely circulating.

If we view our personal information through this lens, then it becomes evident the recent adoption of POPIA has been to provide in Westin's (1967) words our;

"...consent to reveal information for a particular purpose, but not to have that information circulated to all or used for other purposes." (1967:420).

South Africa's POPIA became effective from July 1st, 2020, whilst the official enforcement date for this legislation was July 1st, 2021. The purpose of this

legislation is to guarantee the constitutional 'right to privacy' for South African citizens as per Section 14 of the South African Constitution. It is viewed as being part of a;

"...wider global movement to codify international standards of the human right to privacy while promoting the free flow of information."

<https://www.comforte.com/resources/fact-sheet-popia> (Accessed 11/11/2021)

However, as to be expected, the success of the legislation is in large part dependent on compliance and whilst fines can be exacted on third parties for non-compliance, their size often represents a 'small price to pay' when capturing and storing personal data is the route for a successful and profitable business model. To this end, developing technology and the free flow of information and its access is constantly re-defining our existing notion of both the concepts and contexts of;

- Privacy in general.
- Personal privacy.
- Personal architecture (specifically in terms of personal identity).

Hitherto unimagined and unknown moral dilemmas and moral conflicts are beginning to present themselves within the contexts of the individual, the organisation and the community. These moral dilemmas centring on privacy and the lack thereof, often seem to embrace the ethical approaches of '*rights*', '*duties*' and '*human dignity*' and the ability of governments to legislate the terms and conditions of access to personal data both by themselves and other third parties. Whilst this in itself has provided ample challenges and disappointments in terms of enforcement, Francis & Francis

(2017) have extended this expectation of the right to personal privacy to include the question; *“Is privacy the right to be forgotten?”* (2017:13) They proceed to share that European privacy legislation (unlike its American counterpart) now recognises conversely *“the right to be forgotten”* as an additional element to our contemporary understanding of both privacy and the personal. This speaks to the requirement of personal digital records to be expunged and ‘de-linked’ from the results of web searches when their details serve no purpose. This became European Law in 2016 which Francis & Francis (2017) attest *“...incorporates the right to erasure”* (2017:14).

(Details of the legislation can be found at; https://ec.europa.eu/jusice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (Accessed 1/12/21)

Francis & Francis (2017) proceed to suggest this relatively new European law is best viewed as a direct response to the situation whereby;

People might quite rightly wish not to have libelous (sic) statements, errors about whether they have been convicted of crimes, gory details about accidents in which they have been victims, funerals of their loved ones, or reports of their having been raped, broadcast repeatedly in Internet searches about them.” (2017:15).

They continue to expand upon this ‘*right to erasure*’ by offering the law was deemed necessary in order that;

“...you should be able to outlive your youthful mistakes, which you cannot do if records such as expunged criminal convictions are republished and gain eternal life across the Internet.” (2017:15).

Such activity and legislation, directly impacts upon an accurate, contemporary, understanding of privacy and the personal, and serves to highlight the changing reality, of both personal privacy and personal architecture in terms of personal identity. So direct is this challenge, there is the very real prospect of the inherent relationship and subtle balance that has always existed between privacy and the elements of identity, information and relationships and the consequences arising thereof and therein, being undermined by 4OT in 4IR unless correctly identified and arrested through legislation and new IT privacy design legislation.

7.4 The Elements of Privacy at Work.

I feel sure that at some time in our lives we have all been told something '*in confidence*'? This speaks of the situation in which knowledge or information of a 'private' or 'personal' nature by one source, is actively and willingly shared with a third party '*in trust*' that privacy will be maintained.

Many of us who worked before the millennium will have seen envelopes marked '*Private and Confidential*' seemingly charging the reader with an extra duty of care when perusing the information contained within. This situation even now extends in 4IR to documents shared electronically which through password protection can similarly charge the reader with an extra care of duty. However, acts of shared '*confidence*' (the inclusion/involvement and dissemination of private information to a third party in trust) in modern times are invariably sanctioned by professional licences. Nissenbaum (2010) recognises this and designates it a 'contextual integrity' and recognises that it occurs in professional/client relationships. To this end, the designation of a professional role and function often flows from a professional

licence which in turn is governed by a regulatory, ethical code of conduct which attempts to define the nature and extent of any professional relationship undertaken by their members. However, professional/client relationships can extend far beyond that contained within the written word, a recorded telephone conversation or the computer screen.

7.5 Private & Confidential: The Realities.

Spiritual confession in the Catholic Church is a sacrament that has the *'private'*, *'confidential'* and *'personal'* at its core. The role of intercessor (between the sinner and God) is undertaken by the priest (spiritual advisor and licenced professional) who is willingly given information of both a private and personal nature *'in trust'* by the confessor in a *'sealed'* confessional. The *'sinner'* details both the type and nature of the sin(s) committed to the priest in the confessional, on the understanding that such information is only for the ears of God and those in the confessional and to no other party thereafter.

The act of confession demands that information of an intensely private and personal nature be shared willingly and in trust with a priest in a recognised and sanctioned relationship, in order that atonement can be undertaken and forgiveness and mercy received after an act of contrition and penance arrived at by the priests knowledge of both the tenets of the *'religion'* and the *'sinner'*. The *'sinner'* is then restored to a state of grace and can resume daily life without the spiritual burden of sin.

Confession remains a wholly personal act, physically unrecorded and the information stored within the domain of the memory of the priest and the sinner, the *'ears of God'*

and the physical confines of the *'sealed'* confessional. In other words, this inviolable relationship between priest, sinner and God is sacrosanct

Contrast this, with the secular relationship between lawyer and client; journalist and source; physician (doctor) and patient and financial advisor/banker and client. All are similarly rooted in trust and 'contextual integrity'. The former is supported by professional and state legislation with the expectation for those involved that information shared is done so in trust and its nature is both *'private and confidential'*. This 'professional relationship' is recognised, supported and upheld by both courts of law and professional bodies. If this 'professional relationship' is breached by the professional, then a licence to practice can be withheld and/or repudiated. However, in such instances of client/professional trust, it is the type of personal information shared, that can be seen to construct the privacy and the nature of the 'privileged' relationship.

7.5.1 Privileged Information.

In a further twist to our understanding of the notion and nature of privacy, *'privileged information'* is a modern term referring to sensitive information not for public dissemination. *'Privilege'* refers to the *'right'* or *'advantage'* of a pre-defined person or group whose credentials or relationship grants them access to this information. They would be the *'known'* parties suggested by Brin's (1998) *'reciprocal transparency theory.'*

The word privilege has its roots in the Latin word *'privilegium'* meaning; *"a benefit enjoyed by an individual or group beyond what's available to others"*

(www.vocubularly.com) (Accessed 2/5/21) However in modern times, discussion

surrounds who has the *'right'* to access *'privileged information'* and who grants it. The corollary to this question can arguably be viewed as being; when is personal privacy legally and socially endorsed and when is it sacrificed? The answer to this question often vests in both our understanding and the contemporary meaning of personal architecture and its emphasis on personal identity and its corroborating data.

7.6 The Current and Future Concept of Human Identity and its Relationship with Privacy and the Personal.

At its most simplistic, the meaning of the word identity is who, or what you are.

Broadly speaking it is acknowledged that it extends beyond the individual and can apply to the economic, technological, scientific, political and corporate. Insignia, logos, brand names and language assist in embedding identity, but it is perhaps data (information) and its access and tracking via AI and ICT that 4IR can be charged with defining personal architecture in a way in which according to Zuboff (2019) supports her view that *"...technology is a dominant form of information capitalism"* (2019:9) This speaks to her proposal that; *"... individualization (sic) is a consequence of long-term processes of modernization (sic)"* (2019:33) which she believes have been dominated by the process of surveillance capitalism which she proposes;

"Unilaterally claims human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioural data." (2019:8).

Furthermore, she accuses Microsoft, Apple, Google, Amazon and Facebook of being *"parasitic and referential"* (2019:9) driven by economics which upon closer inspection confirms that once examination takes place it;

“...strips away the illusion that the networked form has some kind of indigenous moral content.” (2019:9).

The word identity comes from the Latin word *‘identitas’*. It is best understood as the relation each thing bears to itself and within the context of modern persons it is fraught with ontological pluralism. Reid (1785) suggests that;

“Identity....is the foundation of all rights and obligations and of accountableness and the notion of it is fixed and precise.” (Reid:1785:12).

Whilst philosophers such as Descartes, Locke and Hegel have questioned whether identity is fixed and precise and developed theories to suggest quite the opposite, their philosophies do little to help us understand the notion and reality of personal identity in its fullest sense in current times as we progress in 4IR. To this end, it is perhaps to Appiah (2005) that we must turn to present the most pragmatic view of contemporary, personal identity. He writes; *“To adopt an identity, to make it mine, is to see it as structuring my way through life.” (2005:24)*. He continues *“...many values are internal to an identity.” (2005:24)* and proceeds to propose these values are universal and should include solidarity and expectations. However, what must not be forgotten within these competing definitions of personal identity, is they form an essential ingredient to one’s personal architecture and arguably are a fundamental mixture of both *‘biography’* and *‘biology’* and have always been so.

However, uniquely in 4IR, the reality of our human identity has been extended to include and encompass the *‘cyber’*. The latter speaks directly to 4OT and the cyber identities many have. Users of social media often ‘give’ themselves ‘handles’ or ‘Usernames’ which can be comical e.g. fatBatman; hogwartsfailure; JuliusSeizure or

sometimes aspirational e.g. lamamillionaire; Supermodelbooty; IQoffthecharts. They invariably bear little or no resemblance to the registered names of their users, but in terms of personal architecture, these cyber identities should be considered alongside their users biological and biographical identities if for no other reason than to provide an even more intimate account of who and why 'we are' using our digital footprints and our personal interface with 4OT to provide third parties with a sense of our personal identity.

As demonstrated, the way in which we shape a contemporary personal architecture expressed through our personal identity can be seen below in Fig 21. Here we can see the way in which biology, produces bio-metrics; biography, produces public-records and cyber, produces a digital footprint and how all three complement and serve to complete the framework for personal architecture through personal identity in 4IR.




Figure 21: The Three Elements of Personal Identity in 4IR (L Doherty)

(The researcher has also listed the types of personal information within each of these personal identity components in Table 6 below).

Table 6: Types of Personal Information Available. (L. Doherty)

BIO-METRICS	Fingerprints, retina identifications, DNA, hospital records, dental records, genome, voice print, blood type, face recognition (software) ear lobe recognition.
PUBLIC RECORDS/DOCUMENTS	Birth certificate, death certificate, marriage certificate, land & property deeds, divorce decree, academic/professional qualifications, club/society membership, credit rating, executed wills, criminal records, driving licence, road fund licence, passport, identity documents, court documents e.g., custody orders,
DIGITAL FOOTPRINT	Passwords, Personal identification number (PIN), authentication processes e.g. one-time pin (OTP), Bluetooth, Access control systems (ACS) Closed circuit television (CCTV), Global positioning system (GPS), Mobile phone records, Barcodes, Cloud storage systems e.g. OneDrive, Firewalls, Personal digital assistant (PDA), Dashcams, Bodycams, Search histories, Internet service providers (ISP) Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) Social media

	(e.g. Google, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter, WhatsApp) Internet provider (IP) address, Usernames.
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No doubt each of us can testify to how the biology, biography and cyber blends and collides in our daily life to build our personal architecture. To create a metaphor for this, Hoepman (2021) developed his *'mosaic theory'* in which he likens individual data points to mosaic stones (2021:4) He suggests that individual data points can come together (like mosaic stones) through design to complete a picture of an individual for a third party. In short, our personal identity however we may have constructed it, can be crafted by unseen third parties, unknown to us, who draw their data from varying sources across the internet.

However, what remains undisputed is the permanency of the bio-metric and cyber aspects directly associated with 4OT in 4IR. They cause and continue to cause us, the greatest personal distress with regards to privacy and the control of the personal and its sensitive information when unauthorised monitoring and access takes place.

Contemporary 4IR moral dilemmas in this area are often associated with the way passwords are stored and our personal data can be accessed and the way(s) in which our physical movements can be tracked via CCTV or GPS. The latter can leave us with a diminished sense of being able to actively orchestrate a situation in which we can escape to a private physical space in which we can be sure that we are *'left alone'*. Hoepman (2021) uses an example of the license plate of his car appearing on a parking ticket at his local hospital (2021:1-4) and how he felt personally violated by this intrusion into an ordinary and required activity for visiting a

family member sick in hospital. CCTV at the entrance and exit of the car park 'tracked' his movements and took pictures of the licence plate of the car he was driving and the time he entered and left the hospital car park.

7.6.1 Identity And It's relationship to privacy.

The forward linear projection of AI and ICT has arguably created indivisibility between the private and personal domain and that of the public domain. In so doing, it has dispensed with any barriers/boundaries, real or imagined, that precluded unknown persons or groups access to information which we consider to be of a private and sensitive nature. Such groups have moved to legitimate their data and monitoring activities. An example of this can be seen in terms of third parties calculating our credit ratings through transactions concluded by ourselves which in turn are shared with their prospective third parties when we want to make future credit transactions. It can also be seen in terms of banks who contact us to '*share*' (a euphemism for sell) their other financial offerings with us.

7.6.2 The Ontology of a Modern Identity.

Tangible resistance occurs from individuals in lobbying groups demanding a block on access to data detailing our biography which provides crucial components for a modern identity. Not surprisingly we would like to believe that what we earn, our favourite food, our most visited restaurant, how we spend our spare time and with whom, our preferred hobbies, our state of health, where we shop, where we park, what clothes we wear, our sexual encounters (past, present and future; real and imagined) the holidays we take, the celebrations we take part in, our preferred retailers and the music we listen to, remain personal and private pieces of

information, despite the role they might play in our biography which helps to complete, shape and determine our overall personal architecture and the relationships arising from it. As previously mentioned, Hoepman (2021) considers this information to be ‘*mosaic stones*’ or identifiers which serve to ‘*draw*’ a picture of a specific individual. He proposes this is achievable through the collection and use of personally identifiable information (PII) which he opines takes three forms (2021: 7-8) He does not however, endorse it in Table 7 below.

Table 7: Three types of PII Collected Through Interface with ICT By Individuals. (Adapted from Hoepman (2021) by L. Doherty)

LOOKUP IDENTIFIERS (PERSONAL)	Recognisable identifiers that single out individuals from registers, directories, data bases.
CLASSIFYING IDENTIFIERS (PERSONAL)	Classifies individuals as belonging through the use of filters such as; language preference, age, affluence, gender, education, car ownership.
SESSION IDENTIFIERS (NON-PERSONAL)	Short-lived individual data associated with site cookies and associated with web sites.

Many of us would assume our personal information/data is only to be actively shared and accessed by ourselves or with our permission by a third party; meanwhile it has become well-known the content of our personal information has become valuable data for prediction models and behaviour modification which holds its economic value for both those who collect and those who extract such data.

However, the rapid pace of technology pre-empting and heralding 4IR, has resulted in a hugely expanded sense of personal architecture and corresponding personal identity which has shared knowledge and information at its core. Brin's (1998) proposed model of '*reciprocal information*' has taken on a form hitherto unimagined. This is seen to present serious challenges for our current understanding and sense of '*privileged*', '*confidential*', '*personal*' and '*private*' whilst creating a real sense of uneasiness for our future understanding of the 'trust' that permeates client/professional relationships. Such concerns also serve to overarch the difficulties encountered for those attempting anonymity in industrialised societies. Such is the nature of modern life that a data record (data/information) will exist for us somewhere, either in an on-line administrative system or in cyberspace in a '*cloud*'. In other words, our personal identity in 4IR is often contained within the records of such Silicon Valley giants as Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Amazon often without our knowledge or permission. Zuboff (2019) speaks of an individual's "*...right to be forgotten*" (2019:27) which unsurprisingly, is something that would appear to be impossible both now and going forward into our 'networked' digital future as Information technology (IT) continually develops and designs improved search engines and data mining software that fuels the corporate profits of tech giants. Hoepman (2021) alludes to; '*privacy by design*' (2021:16) whereby for a price, an individual can, as this researcher would colloquially allude, '*go off the grid*' or '*fly beneath the digital radar*' in an attempt to elude detection and collection of personal information by third parties adept in the use of IT (information technology) and ICT.

7.7 The Challenges posed by 4IR for our understanding of privacy and its moral truth.

As can be seen, the growth in AI and ICT and its pervasiveness in daily life via 4OT has been key to changing our control over our personal architecture. Our existing digital world and its dependence on IT and the need it has to be constantly designing, developing and upgrading sophisticated computer software and advanced machine learning (AML) predictive models which are repositories for data collection and its cross referencing and tracking is becoming almost accepted practice. Indeed, the plethora of search engines and relatively easy access to data mining programmes, has presented challenges for both legitimate data collection and personal profiling and its access and security, versus the unauthorised '*hacker*' and the Dark Web, whose ability to illegally access data is often richly rewarded by those who want to use it maliciously and for monetary gain. However, perhaps one of the most worrying consequences of such data collection is the negative affects this has for our self-determination. Are we the person the world thinks we are, or do we differ significantly? Is our own sense of identity accurate and within our own purview or has it become muddied through the data collected by AI and ICT and the relationships it then proceeds to have (invariably unsolicited on our behalf) with third parties?

Solove (2009) has categorised contemporary privacy problems as creating '*harms*' both for the individual and society. Table 8: below outlines the privacy problems he identified in 4IR and their impact and/or harm.

Table 8: 4IR 'Privacy Problems' and their Individual and Societal Impact. (Adapted from Solove (2009) by L. Doherty)

PRIVACY PROBLEMS	INDIVIDUAL & SOCIETAL IMPACT / HARM
PHYSICAL INJURY	Physical pain and impairment are not usually directly associated with issues of privacy. However, they can be the tragic result of a loss of personal privacy e.g. suicide.
FINANCIAL LOSSES & PROPERTY HARMS	Fraud & theft of personal identity and leaked personal data can result in financial loss. Leaked corporate data and/or access to private corporate figures and the future activities of corporates can also lead to financial losses on/in the market. Trespass & interference with personal property can negatively affect an individual's personal enjoyment of it & leaked corporate future planned activities especially in the areas of mining & fracking can result in harm to corporate property by activists.
REPUTATIONAL HARMS	Speaks to issues of personal esteem and/or personal image that can result from a lack of privacy.
EMOTIONAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL HARMS	Issues with privacy very often create feelings of emotional distress, outrage & humiliation in individuals.
RELATIONSHIP HARMS	This speaks to trust & expectations & how disclosure of information & lack of privacy can

	destroy both in terms of a personal and/or professional relationship.
VULNERABILITY HARMS	This speaks to insecurity & risk specifically with regards to personal identity theft and/or fraud. This often results in a victim mentality & fear.
CHILLING EFFECTS	Inhibits individuals from engaging in certain activities e.g. free speech & free association can be inhibited directly & indirectly through privacy issues. Arguably we see the result of this in whistleblowing & the reluctance by some to 'blow the whistle'.
POWER IMBALANCES	These can be witnessed when privacy issues affect/impact the individual & their societal structure via government seeking increased power.

7.8 4IR Privacy Issues.

The tracking of the personal and private is not confined to our laptops and desktops. Even our movements captured on CCTV arguably prevent our *'right'* to be *'left alone'* and impinge upon our sense of personal privacy even though their installation is invariably credited to be an unequivocal means of crime protection by governments. The UK stands accused by of being the most *'surveilled nation on earth'* with the number of CCTV cameras in 2013 estimated to be 5.9 million of which 1 in 70 is government owned. <https://theconversation.com/ai-driven-cctv-upgrades-are->

[coming-to-the-worlds-most-watched-streets-will-they-make-britain-safer-157789](https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-157789)

(Accessed 25/11/2021)

This has taken Bentham's 'invention' of the panopticon to an unprecedented level. What he initially designed to be a central observation tower for use in prisons by prison personnel/guards to 'see' all the prison cells without individual prisoners knowing if they were the ones being watched, has instead treated the un-imprisoned in the twenty-first century to the equivalent treatment of those imprisoned.

Old cameras are now being replaced with '*smart cameras*' that are difficult to identify by the '*surveilled*'. Smart cameras have been developed to capture anti-social, criminal, or suspicious behaviour(s) in public places and their footage is constantly monitored. Face-recognition software can be installed in this technology as a further means of identifying criminals, undocumented individuals or those displaying suspicious behaviour(s) and their current movements and behaviours will be monitored by the state, and/or security forces and private security companies based on those previously observed.

A darker side to the consequences of using CCTV and the resulting privacy issues arising has also been experienced in the U.K as reported by Solove (2009). He tells of a BBC prime time show called 'Crime Beat' that nationally broadcasted CCTV footage of an attempted suicide in which a man was shown "*...slitting his wrists with a knife on a public street*" (2009:195) Viewers wrote in to the programme to share their feelings of shock and distaste at being witnesses to what is ultimately viewed as an intensely private act and one that is still disapproved of by large sections of Western societies and faiths. There was definitely a grubbiness, indifference and

heartlessness associated with the airing of this footage rather than the protective, caring and wholesomeness that authorities would have us believe is associated with surveillance activity.

7.9 Surveillance: Theory and Practice.

Vincent (2016) suggests there are five sequential events associated with personal surveillance as practiced by CCTV which this researcher proposes culminates in what is best described as a surveillance process. (See Fig 22:)




Figure 22: The Personal Surveillance Process (L. Doherty)

In another act of surveillance, we can now not only view our own houses but those of friends and strangers via Google maps. This researcher remains convinced that both themselves and the readers of this research, have at no time given Google our

permission to undertake this activity. To take this analogy further, we could be somewhat obtuse and say we have doors to control access to our home (which is after all arguably our most private and intimate space) and they have not been opened or unlocked to permit Google maps access. Moreover, it could be argued that our physical security is compromised by this Google activity as it provides thieves, who are not acquainted with our home, accurate information of all the entry and exit points to our homes and property.

7.9.1 Can Christian Situationism and/or Neo-Casuistry Provide Moral Truth in Moral Dilemmas Concerning Privacy and the Personal?

The moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts presented by 4IR particularly in the area of privacy and the personal, tax not just our moral character but our moral understanding and moral horizons simultaneously. As we have seen when examining the contemporary concept and reality of privacy and the personal, 4OT is often at the root of moral dilemmas/conflicts. Schwab (2016) recognises the unique moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts arising due to 4OT in 4IR and states the;

“Approach to problems, issues and challenges must be holistic, flexible and adaptive continuously integrating many diverse interests and opinions.” (2016:108).

Whilst this might seem to some to be stating the obvious, if one looks beyond the words of Schwab (2016) to the sentiment he embraces, we can deduce that for his position to be relevant, there must be the presence of consensus, and common measure and consistency for those discerning moral truth in moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts presented by 4OT in 4IR. In so doing, we must be mindful of

Vincent's (2016) warning that we must encourage the means of 'informational self-determination' in a way that recognises;

"The distinction between a positive privacy as the deepest form of intimacy and a negative privacy as a desolate isolation." ((2016:138).

If we are to accomplish this, then we must be mindful of key words in Schwab's (2016) statement namely; 'holistic', 'flexible' and 'adaptive.' These must become the standards used and must address; the scope; the opportunity; the challenge and the moral frontiers presented by the moral dilemmas and/or conflicts presented by the use of 4OT in 4IR. Schwab (2016) further advises that if all three of these elements are to be addressed, then moral agents must demonstrate and use four very specific types of intelligence (See Table 9: below)

Table 9: Schwab's (2016) x4 Types of Intelligence that need to be Engaged to Discern Moral Truth in Moral Dilemmas/Conflicts in 4IR. (Adapted by L. Doherty)

CONTEXTUAL (The Mind)	How we understand & apply our personal knowledge to moral dilemmas/conflicts in 4IR.
EMOTIONAL (The Heart)	How we process & integrate our personal thoughts & feelings & relate them to ourselves & to one another when undertaking moral - reasoning in situations of moral dilemma/conflict in 4IR.
INSPIRED (The Soul)	How we use a sense of individual & shared purpose, trust & other virtues to discern moral truth & act towards a 'common good' when confronted with moral dilemmas/conflicts in 4IR.

PHYSICAL (The Body)	How we cultivate & maintain our personal health & well-being & that of those around us, to apply the physical energy required for both individual & systems transformation as required for moral truth & resolution in moral dilemmas/conflicts in 4IR.
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Interestingly, Schwab’s (2016) four intelligence types can be seen to be incorporated in both the framework of Christian Situationism and Neo-Casuistry and their practitioners seeking moral truth. Despite the fundamental differences in these two distinct ethical decision-making frameworks, their moral agents, arguably engage all four intelligence types cited by Schwab (2016) as practical wisdom (phronesis). This wisdom is practised through the specific requirements and skills of their respective ethical decision-making frameworks. In view of this, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that a moral agent who demonstrates all four intelligence types identified by Schwab (2016) be considered ‘wise’.

If we embrace this verdict, then we are faced with moral agents who will in all probability conform to the observations made by Barry Schwartz (2014) in his TED lecture;

https://www.ted.com/talks/barry_schwartz_using_our_practical_wisdom?language=en

[n](#) (Accessed 25/11/21)

Schwartz (2014) suggests that wisdom (especially practical wisdom or phronesis) helps moral agents to not only do ‘*the right thing*’ but also to discern moral truth

when confronted with moral dilemmas and moral conflicts. He unequivocally states that;

- A wise person is made and not born.
- A wise person knows when to make an exception to a rule.
- A wise person can improve as the situation demands.
- A wise person demonstrates both a moral will and a moral skill.

It could be argued this leads us full circle to the '*wisdom of King Solomon*' shared in the Preface to this research. King Solomon's moral truth born out of exceptional and celebrated wisdom in this famous case of rightful child custody, was arguably the culmination of his ability to engage, mind, body, heart and soul in a way that referred to and embraced the four factors critical to making ethical decisions. (See Fig 23:)




Figure 23: x4 Important Factors Impacting Moral Decision-Making. (Adapted from Fletcher (1966) & Daniels (2009) by L Doherty)

7.9.2 Can Christian Situationism Provide Moral Truth in Situations of Moral Dilemma and/or Moral Conflict in Privacy and the Personal in 4IR?

Daniel (2009) qualifies both the wisdom required and the moral resolution resulting from moral agency when he shares;

“Ethical choices cannot be proved, verified or validated, only vindicated by their success in practice.” (2009:8).

To this end, the researcher respectfully proposes the success of a Christian Situationist in discerning moral truth in 4IR situations of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict concerning privacy and the personal, will not be the result of employing Agape love as a moral principle or *‘method’* in their moral decision-making. Its subjectivity and relativism does not provide the universality required for moral resolution in situations of moral dilemmas in 4IR (caused by using 4OT) for either the individual or society. However, it could be argued that it is vital, even crucial, that Agape love be dispensed by the Christian Situationist to the victims who have suffered intrusion of their privacy and the agonies of personal information falling into the hands of unknown and unauthorised third parties. In such instances, Agape love does not become an arbiter for moral truth, but rather assists the Christian Situationist to assuage the sense of personal assault and harm felt by those who have suffered loss of privacy and personal identity through a form of non-judgemental comfort, support, strength and care. Agape employed in this way serves

its purpose, as previously defined in the literature review, as being self-sacrificing, freely given and universal.

Neither in this instance would Agape love be capable of dispensing *'justice'* as Fletcher (1966) theorises that Agape love and justice are the same. Evidently, they are not, as justice in the case of 4IR moral dilemmas and/or conflicts is invariably provided by and dispensed by the legal system in its laws, not by one's faith in a secular context.

Considering this, an Atheist Situationism in which human dignity replaces Agape love as the first principle of moral reasoning in situations where privacy has been breached and personal identity has been accessed by unauthorised third parties, is arguably more suitable and more effective as a means of discerning moral truth for the Situationist as it has a universal understanding and application through the legal system. Concurrently it could also be the means to dispense justice as privacy laws are designed to provide this to citizens.

Scholars of privacy often mention it's *'evolving'* nature and this perhaps leads to the key strength of Situation Ethics in moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts concerning privacy and the personal in 4IR i.e. the *'particularity'* attached to a situation by a Situationist. The very nature of 4IR and 4OT is such that a moral dilemma/conflict concerning privacy and the personal can be the *'sui generis'* and as such, there is no history of moral truth having been discerned or applied. In such instances, focus would be accorded by the Situationist to the *'particularity'* of the situation of moral dilemma rather than its *'similarity'* to any previous situations. The resultant moral reasoning used by a Situationist would in turn be a combination of their wisdom and

the four factors employed in their moral decision-making identified by Fletcher (1966) in Fig: 23 using human dignity as the key principle or 'method'. Moreover, the antinomianism of their moral framework alongside its positivism could also prove to be the strengths of this approach which when faced with previously unencountered moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts would be able to assess and discern the dilemma and/or conflict in isolation without recourse to similarities.

7.9.3 Can Neo-Casualty Provide Moral Truth in Situations of Moral Dilemma and/or Moral Conflict in Privacy and the Personal in 4IR?

A Neo-Casualty however, faced with the same case of moral dilemma as the Situationist, would be seeking an analogous situation where privacy and the personal had previously been denied, and the resulting moral truth had caused it to be legally defined and a precedent ruled. Their focus would be upon the similarities between the cases of moral dilemma and/or moral conflict in terms of privacy and the personal and the moral truth discerned. A deductive approach would be their tool of choice, but if the case before them was the first of its kind, Neo-Casualties are familiar with an inductive approach in such instances.

A Neo-Casualty would also use human dignity as key to their moral reasoning. This could be achieved through accessing a sense of conscience which can practically assist in the discernment of moral truth as demonstrated in the literature review. The exercise of conscience in terms of human dignity, would have the benefit of being both defined and defended in law and would also help the Neo-Casualty conclude when it has been directly attacked, denied, or compromised. Moreover, the law is

used by society as a means to govern and define and defend the limits of 'right' and 'wrong'; 'just' and 'unjust'; 'fair' and 'unfair'

The principlism adopted by Neo-Casuistry is according to Jonsen & Toulmin (1989) rooted in; "...*generally moral psychology and metaphysics.*" (1989:135). These authors go on to clarify that such principles are;

"...related to particular cases, not because any particular conclusion could be deduced from them but because they provided a context for all deliberation about the case." (1989:135).

When combined with legalism the results of Neo-Casuistry can be powerful. This is demonstrated by the FOIA that have now passed into legislation in Western, liberal democracies and which clearly define and protect individual and corporate expectations of privacy in addition to recognising and defining what is considered to be quintessentially personal using the lens of human dignity. These laws depend largely on context and potentiality and probabilism both of which can be seen essential to the Neo-Casuist in their moral deliberations in 'cases of conscience'. The area of personal identity and one's 'right to be left alone' are becoming more clearly defined as new breaches take place often the result of 4OT that in turn cause both the law and principlism to be used to assist in helping provide the consistency and pragmatism so essential in helping to discern moral truth.

8 Conclusion.

Interestingly, Tillich (2001) reminds us that;

“If faith is understood as what it centrally is, ultimate concern, it cannot be undercut by modern science or any kind of philosophy.” (2001:147).

This statement is pivotal in terms of this research as it provides a further reason for faith being an instrument of ethical decision-making despite the demands of rationality and science accompanying 4IR. Taken further, Tillich’s (2001) observation unquestionably puts the human being and God back into the front and centre of the science versus religion debate. It could be argued this implicitly provides a further rationale for faith-based, ethical decision-making frameworks and their inherent abilities to discern moral truth when faced with moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts when practiced by their respective practitioners.

This research has demonstrated that moral dilemmas and/or conflicts in 4IR are invariably the result of a collision or tension between human beings (either individually or in community) with technology in the form of 4OT. What has also become evident is the quantitative and the rational, (essential elements of the scientific) are not suitably equipped in isolation, to provide authentic moral truth in which precedence needs to be given to the qualitative, (often immeasurable) values and beliefs if it is to be discerned in the present and going forward into the future.

Tillich’s (2021) observation speaks not just to the importance of the spiritual, but also to the value of positive concern which is implicit within the Christian faith and is practised by Catholic and Protestant religions alike not just in their liturgies and ministries, but within their respective ethical decision-making frameworks of Neo-

Casuistry and Christian Situationism. Even leading scientists such as Turing (1950) recognised the limitations of science and machines and the importance of values, feelings and beliefs to enhance the quality of human life as he quoted Professor Jefferson Lister in his paper who said;

“Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machines equals brain – that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its success, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants.”
(1950:445).

These words seem to provide the backdrop to Westin’s (1967) observations of the; *“...potentials and limitations of science”* (1967:xi) and speak to what this researcher has referred to as the ‘finite’ nature of science as opposed to the ‘infinite’ nature of faith. Murdoch (1970) alerts us to this distinction when she muses;

“Human beings are far more complicated and enigmatic and ambiguous than languages or mathematical concepts.” (1970:88).

A further explanation of the importance of faith and God is given by Geschwindt (2006) who reminds us the decline in the authority of the church does;

“...not reflect decline in the belief of God, but in the belief that the church could explain the workings of the universe, or should be the moral authority to guide ethical action.” (2006:313).

He goes on to confirm that in 4IR there is still a; “...*deep human need for ritual, a sense of otherworldliness and for spirituality.*” (2006:313). Tillich (2001) no stranger to explaining the importance of faith in terms of life and reason, suggests that;

“He (sic) who enters the sphere of faith enters the sanctuary of life. Where there is faith there is an awareness of holiness.” (2001:14).

Both scholars reassure us that a place for faith and religion is still required in modern life, despite the pervasive onslaught of science, technology and accompanying secularism. Whilst their words might be accused of only ‘speaking to the faithful’, what cannot be denied as this research has shown, is the procession of 4IR has arguably attacked existing values (ethics) and faith in addition to undermining the prevailing notions of duty, personhood, dignity and virtue despite the earlier warnings by Asimov (1950) that came to be known as ‘Asimov’s Laws’. These laws (devised for robots) spoke to the need for machine ethics in a machine dominant world that sought according to Doherty (2021) to maintain; “...*the mastery of humans over machine technology.*” (2021:217). In fact, Asimov’s (1950) ‘*Zeroth Law*’ spoke to the rule that ‘*a robot may not harm humanity or by inaction allow humanity to come to harm*’ which would appear to have been neglected in the areas of privacy and the personal which formed a vital part in this research. The use and upgrading of existing AI and ICT and the development of new systems for both would seem to confirm Westin’s (1967) prediction that;

“Survival it is clear, depends on the rapidity with which such new knowledge is mastered.” (1967:xi)

His prophecy seems glaringly accurate as we battle the codification and algorithms of computer technology that can prevail directly and negatively upon our privacy and aspects of personal identification and simultaneously result in consequences that cause moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts by fundamentally disempowering the individual whilst empowering unseen and often unknown third parties and governments.

Geschwindt (2006) recognises the importance of both phronesis and pragmatism in ethical decision-making in 4IR as he proposes that;

“Another way of judging the rightness and wrongness of the technology is to look at the consequences of using it.” (2006:195).

However, whilst this observation might seem self-evident; how many of us are truly conversant with the capabilities of the 4OT we are using? Do we ever ask ourselves of their limitations and how they might impact upon our ethical decision-making and our sense of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and our notion of moral truth? Often, we are only made aware of this when faced with the experience and consequences of its use after the proverbial ‘toothpaste is out of the tube’.

Westin (1967) tries to answer this question further for us when he asks; *“Will the tools be used for man’s (sic) liberation or his (sic) subjugation?” (1967:427).* His question directly addresses the limitations and expectations of science and technology in 4IR and the use of 4OT specifically. Moreover, it touches on the question of the battle for supremacy of man versus machine. Is the former destined to become an unwitting slave of the latter?

Using the case study of privacy and the personal, this research has demonstrated how and why, this question posed by Westin and its daily reality, have given cause for moral conflict in addition to creating moral dilemma(s) for both the individual, corporates and communities. Surveillance tools, as has been shown, have hardly served to liberate human beings in the areas of privacy and the personal.

Interestingly, Enriquez (2020) makes a vital observation in his work when he suggests that;

“Usually religions and technology are seen as opposites. But sometimes they are symbiotic.” (2020:131).

This would seem to suggest that science and faith are not mutually exclusive, but conversely can at times be seen to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship that does not exclude one at the expense of the other, but rather serves to foster each.

What is undeniable, is the science of 4IR and its accompanying 4OT has created a contemporary, technological, landscape significantly changed from any of its predecessors. It is indeed a period of new horizons both moral and scientific that in addition has asked questions of us not only with regard to the extent of our scientific frontiers, but also those of our faith and religion.

Moreover, despite the expansion of these scientific frontiers into all aspects of modern life, what cannot be denied is the ‘loveless’ nature of science and technology and accompanying secularism. Machines, technology and science have an inability to create or extend love, compassion, empathy, mercy or forgiveness which as Turing (1950) noted above, is and remains a critical weakness. It is arguably only faith that can bring these necessary ingredients for human well-being and flourishing

into the contemporary 4IR setting as this research has shown. The application and functions of faith has been shown in this research to be fundamental in discerning moral truth in moral dilemmas and/or moral conflict in 4IR not just for the present, but going forward into the future.

This research has shown that both Christian frameworks under review namely; Christian Situationism and Neo-Casuistry have their strengths and weaknesses in respect to their being able to provide the means of moral truth in 4IR moral dilemmas and/or conflicts. In examining both frameworks, it would be reasonable to say their individual ability to provide the '*summum bonum*' is questionable due to the inherent weaknesses in each approach. In short, this research has revealed that neither has been discovered to be 'e pluribus unum'.

Furthermore, this research has uncovered the nature of Agape love transcends the logical positivism associated with science and 4IR. With its roots in selflessness, altruism, and dignity and its non-preferential and transformative nature, it has the power to inspire those tasked to discern moral truth in situations of moral dilemma and/or conflicts. The consequences of successful, faith-based ethical decision-making in 4IR, often seems to conform to a utilitarian approach (the greatest good for the greatest number) in which faith has been the conductor of a secular orchestra. To expand upon this metaphor, the musical score can be seen to be the faith-based ethical decision-making framework used, whilst the faithless orchestra, have a duty to play their part in the musical score, if the symphony is to maintain its integrity and musicality for the audience.

This research has highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the two faith-based ethical decision-making frameworks of Christian Situationism and Neo-Casuistry both in the Christian tradition. Whilst the strict application of Fletcher's (1966) Christian Situationism has been shown to lack consistency, moral realism, is subject to inflexibility, and does not depend on consensus, it nevertheless alerts us to the power of Agape love as an instrument in ethical decision-making and as a panacea for those victims of moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts in 4IR. That Neo-Casuistry with its dependence on legalism, principlism and faith is the more used and practical in 4IR, there can be no doubt. However, the researcher would argue that in both frameworks the success and integrity of the process of moral reasoning and discernment lies principally in the skills and wisdom of their respective practitioners leading to issues of their suitability, sympathy, understanding and willingness to confront the dilemma and seek authentic moral truth and acceptance of the accompanying moral realism. The moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts brought about through the use of 4OT in 4IR, have in many instances stretched our moral imagination to its limits. However, evidence suggests that human beings have not become surplus to requirements, or side-lined in terms of developing appropriate, practical and consistent ethics, but rather have retained their importance as arbiters of justice and accompanying moral truth in 4IR.

Geschwindt (2006) states the obvious when he says that;

“Ethicists regard technology as a double-edged sword – with enormous potential benefits, but still open to abuse.” (2006:199).

Arguably It is the abuse meted out on humans by 4OT in 4IR, that creates the moral dilemmas and/or moral conflicts that we are encountering. That we have ethical decision-making frameworks in these ethically turbulent times is of comfort. That Neo-Casuistry is the framework of choice for moral dilemmas and/or conflicts across several disciplines is encouraging as it provides the means of an ethical decision-making framework based in the Christian tradition and which affords the world with an ethical template that encourages well-being, flourishing, consistency, peace, justice and dignity not just now, but in the future. That its ethics can lie in the Christian faith with its emphasis on Agape love and Christian duty is testament to the continued importance of something that extends beyond the boundaries of science, yet still speaks to the person on an individual basis. Such frameworks confirm the need for phronesis or practical wisdom by its practitioners if moral realism is to result, in addition to encouraging a real and living faith.

There is an equal need for practical wisdom in its broadest sense to be present not just in the consumers of technology but in its designers too. Tech companies are beginning to realise the importance of ethics in their designs and upgrades as they become more aware of the consequences that can arise not just from the abuse of their technologies by consumers, but by their intended use too. We have learned how techno-ethics has arisen in response to the ethics that science requires, if it is to accept that it must have principles and consequences and responsibility and accountability as touchstones for its 4OT. Science must be emboldened by a sense of 'right' and 'wrong', 'good' and 'bad' rather than ruined by a reluctance to accept the fundamentals of dignity, independent thinking (autonomy) justice and rights that must prevail if control of 4OT is to be maintained by user and designer.

In closing, the words of Geschwindt (2006) seem most apt in summing up both the sentiment of this research and its findings;

“If the world is to become a more peaceful place, it is vital that ethical decision-making becomes an integral part of life for us all. The ability personally to make the right ethical decision in difficult circumstances and under pressure, taking account of all concerned, is a necessary ingredient for a good life – a flourishing, decent life, for whomever, wherever, whenever.” (2006:316).

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