ASPECTS OF DISCOURSE REFERENCE IN VENDA

by

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for

the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the subject

AFRICAN LANGUAGES

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

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DATE SUBMITTED : JUNE 1983

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DECLARATION

I declare that ASPECTS OF DISCOURSE REFERENCE IN VENDA is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

Linguistics, Unisa.

This dissertation is dedicated to the following:

My mother Muḓangawe (née Ṋetshiozwi)
My father Frans Maswuba Sengani (Mbambale)
My uncle Samson Maanda Sengani (Mbambale)
My grandmother Mulayo (née Matika).

SUMMARY

The study of discourse is primarily concerned with discourse
participants, referring expressions as well as referents in the
linguistic and extralinguistic contexts.

Chapter 1 is concerned with the concept discourse with specific
reference to the elements of coherence and topic. Various kinds
of discourse topic are analysed.

In chapter 2 it is illustrated that discourse referents are
established by the discourse participants. These are either
specific or non-specific and are referred to by means of
indefinite and definite expressions (including proper names).

As explained in chapters 3 and 4, the use of these expressions
in discourse to refer to referents, establishes the antecedent-
anaphor relationships such as coreference in which there is a
one-to-one correspondence between antecedent and anaphor and
interreference where a part-whole relationship exists between
the two.

Referents in the extralinguistic situations are referred to by
deictic expressions and these are discussed in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE OF DISCOURSE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The term discourse is usually used in (certain) linguistic
literature alternatively with the term text as if they were
synonymous.[1] These two terms are related, and the differences
between them are rather slight and more a matter of emphasis.[2]
Discourse is always associated with sequences of utterances which
involve action and interaction between discourse participants,
i.e. speaker(s) and hearer(s) or addressee(s), while text is
associated with sequences of sentences which have to do with
non-interactive monologue or dialogue which may be spoken aloud
or not.

Although these differences are often ignored by linguists such
as Halliday and Hassan, Sidner, Kinneavy, Werth and Widdowson,
etc.[3], Stubbs inter alia feel that they should be considered as
their use is often ambiguous and confusing.[4] Halliday and Hassan
say that text,[5]

> "...... refer(s) to any passage, spoken or written
> of whatever length, that does form a unified whole."

They continue

> "A text may be spoken or written, prose or verse,
> dialogue or monologue. It may be anything from a
> single proverb to a whole play, from a momentary
> cry for help to an all-day discussion on a committee."

Kinneavy defines discourse just as Halliday and Hassan define
text, and he writes,[6]

> " ..... discourse ..... can be a poem, a conversation,
> a tragedy, a joke, a seminar discussion, a full-length
> history, a periodical article, an interview, a sermon,
> a TV ad."

According to these linguists, the terms text and discourse mean
one and the same thing. To them both terms refer to communication
between speaker and addressee(s) or audience, and/or writer and
reader. The same idea is held by Sidner although he is more
concerned with the spoken discourse. He says,[7]

> " ..... a discourse may be defined as a connected piece
> of text or spoken by one or more speakers. If there
> are several speakers, it must be assumed that they are
> trying to communicate with one another and not talking
> at once."

Sidner's emphasis, as stated earlier, is mainly on spoken discourse,
but he also refers to discourse as being a text.

All these linguists indicate that discourse or text can be either
spoken or written. Louwrens[8] too refers to the spoken language
in his definition of discourse although he also notes that
discourse refers to communication between the writer and reader.
It should be noted that the terms text and discourse supplement
each other in various ways.

For instance, one can read a paper to an audience at a seminar.
Reading is normally done aloud so that the written text eventually
becomes a spoken text. Normally people who read papers go on to
elaborate on what is in the paper and add what is not necessarily
written in the text. Then utterances are added to sentences.
This means that discourse can either be written or spoken. A text
is always written but can also be a written story about people
speaking. Keenan and Schieffelin are more concerned with the
spoken language when defining the term discourse,[9]

> ".... we take discourse to be any sequence of two or
> more utterances produced by a single speaker or by
> two or more speakers who are interacting with one
> another (at some point in time or space)."

Although there may be some relatedness between discourse and text, it is clear that there is a distinction that cannot be ignored. It is of course difficult for some scholars to make a clear-cut dichotomy between the two terms, since scholars too have their own approaches and tend to define terms to suit their purpose. It was stated earlier on that a discourse consists of a sequence of utterances which are spoken and text consists of sentences which are written. Hurford and Heasley define an utterance as,[10]

> "..... any stretch of talk, by one person, before
> and after which there is a silence on the part of
> that person."

They also define a sentence as "a string of words put together by grammatical rules of language."[11]

Although some scholars distinguish between sentences and utterances, in this dissertation these two will be used interchangeably as they serve the same purpose in discourse. Besides, a host of other scholars ignore this distinction. Discourse and text are in fact two sides of the same coin.

For instance Hurting says that in linguistic literature discourse is regarded as being a unit beyond the sentence.[12] He remarks that the sentence in this case is taken as being a structural equivalent of an utterance. Hence Werth defines discourse as,[13]

> "..... the linguistic level above the sentence
> (which ... T.M.S.) denotes a unified set of one
> or more sentences connected semantically and
> ideally."

Edmondson writes that, "Text linguistics was and is centrally concerned with the functional use of stretches of language", and for this reason he is not surprised that sentences and utterances are often used interchangeably.[14] Widdowson defines discourse as follows:[15]

> "Discourse consists of utterances, with which sentences can be put into correspondence, and these combine in complex ways to relate to extra-linguistic reality to achieve a communicative effect."

The aim in this dissertation is to deal with written discourses which consist of sentences and utterances. These types of discourses take into account para- and extra-linguistic features of the language as well. Linguistic features are words or expressions that occur in sentences or utterances. Paralinguistic features are formal patterns of speech that characterise an individual speaker of a language such as a giggle, creak, staccato voice quality, etc.[16] These are normally behavioural patterns that are uncontrollable. They can occur in utterances or sentences. The extra-linguistic features are communicative cues or devices such as facial expressions, gestural and postural systems. These are important communicative devices that make discourse effective.

According to the above opinions, a discourse or text can be a story, a monologue, dialogue or multiperson interaction between the several speaker(s) and addressee(s), writer(s) and reader(s), etc.

1.2 DISCOURSE COHERENCE

For a discourse to be accepted it should be coherent, in other words, it should have a logical or topical structure and the content should be relevant. A coherent discourse should either

have elements such as cohesion, collocation and connectors, or
there should be co-operation between the discourse participants.
Coherence has to do with the wellformedness of a discourse. This
is the notion of connectivity. There has been a tendency by some
scholars such as Widdowson to distinguish between discourse
coherence and textual cohesion.[17] Cohesion is a semantic-
pragmatic process or relation which deals with elements that share
meaning in a discourse. In line with the text-discourse
distinction, Mclaughlin believes that, "Coherence at the level
of text is usually called cohesion..."[18] This is not acceptable
as it has been indicated above that cohesion deals with referential
elements which form ties or chains in a discourse whereas coherence
deals with the relationship between sentences or utterances in
which cohesive ties occur, this indicates that cohesion is an
element of coherence.

Coherence is seen as an all embracing or umbrella term under which
cohesion, collocation and connectors are subsumed. Mclaughlin
says that it is a property of relatedness between sequences of
sentences or utterances that make it a unit or whole.[19] Coherence
is therefore a superordinate term with cohesion, collocation and
connectors as its subordinates. Cohesion deals with the semantic
and pragmatic relationship between referential expressions,
collocation deals with the semantic and pragmatic relationships
between lexical items and connectors are words which link various
sentences or utterances in discourses into a unit.

A discourse that is coherent, should have a logical or topical
structure. This means that the various sentences and or
utterances should be able to build up a unit whole of which the
content is relevant. The topicality of a coherent discourse is
constituted in terms of what Van Dijk calls the macroproposition
or proposition which is able to sum up a story and tell what it
is all about.[20] Macroproposition is a proposition which expresses
a discourse topic and is also called "theme" in literary studies.

Keenan and Schieffelin explain the coherence of a discourse in terms of what they call 'a primary presupposition' which is the same as a discourse topic.[21] It has been mentioned earlier on (in 1.1) that relevance is part and parcel of a coherent discourse. If the successive utterances or sentences are relevant to the discourse as a whole, then they will be able to constitute a topical structure. Werth says relevance is "... a relation between the current proposition and a common ground".[22]

In other words what is being said must be related in one way or the other with the prevalent topic.

"A proposition is that part of the meaning of the utterance of a declarative sentence which describes some state of affairs" say Hurford and Heasley.[23] In other words the proposition sums up whatever is being discussed. According to Keenan and Schieffelin one is relevant in a discourse if one is addressing a question of immediate concern.[24]

Therefore whatever is said by any of the discourse participants should contribute to the prevailing discourse topic. In turn-talking for example relevance would refer to the relationship of an utterance to a preceding one.

In the words of Mclaughlin,[25]

> "It seems that the relevance of an utterance is
> largely a matter of its fitting in with the whole
> of some discourse context, such that its
> pertinence both to an immediately prior utterance
> and to the conversation-to-date is apparent."

This then means that each discourse participant should adhere to the co-operative principle, i.e. co-operate with his interlocutor or speak topically. In this way whatever is discussed will contribute to a coherent discourse. The following are some of

the elements of coherence which will be discussed in this
research, viz. cohesion, collocation and connectors.

1.2.1 Cohesion

Cohesion is an element of coherence and a discourse that has
cohesive ties or links of reference i.e. meaning sharing
expressions is found to be coherent if there is relevance in it.
Textlinguistics scholars such as Halliday and Hassan, Pikering,
Coleman, inter alia see cohesion as consisting of elements such
as reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunctives and lexical
cohesion.[26] Yule also agrees with Halliday and Hassan and their
exponents on cohesion but goes on to remark that coherence deals
with the relationship between sentences.[27] He sees coherence as
a superordinate term.

Stubbs concurs with the cohesion-coherence distinction but further
holds that both cohesion and coherence can operate in a given text
or discourse.[28] It has been stated earlier on (in 1.2) that
coherence is a notion of connectivety which deals with successive
utterances that form a logical or topical structure whereas
cohesion deals basically with elements or referring expressions
that form ties or links of reference in utterances or sentences.
Although according to Halliday and Hassan[29] cohesion involves
aspects such as reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunctions,
lexical cohesion, etc., in this research it is considered as a
relation in which elements share reference i.e. anaphoric
reference. It is therefore taken to be a relationship in which
expressions or elements in different or the same sentences refer
to the same or related referent(s). Halliday and Hassan explain
this as follows:[30]

> "Cohesion occurs where INTERPRETATION OF SOME element
> in the discourse is dependent on that of another. The
> one presupposes the other, in the sense that it cannot
> be effectively decoded except by recourse to it."

In this case then, when two referring expressions refer to the same referent, they form a cohesive tie or a referential chain. The sentences or utterances in which the referring expressions occur are thus bound together by virtue of the fact that they refer to the same element. For instance in

1. *Takalani o da mulovha. <u>Ene o swika vhusiku</u>.*
   'Takalani came yesterday. He arrived in the evening.'

Ene 'he' and *Takalani* above form a cohesive tie. *Ene* 'he' here presupposes *Takalani* and, as explained above, they form a cohesive tie or referential chain. In the discourse above, *ene* 'he' is said to be anaphoric or refers to *Takalani*. Of importance here is the term <u>anaphora</u>.

The term <u>anaphora</u> is, according to Lyons derived from a Greek term <u>anapherein</u> which is a translation of the Latin <u>referre</u> and it means to refer, recall or repeat.[31] In other words, the anaphor or anaphoric expression *ene* 'he' in the case above refers, recalls or repeats *Takalani*. *Takalani* here is called the antecedent. The antecedent is an NP or noun phrase that introduces information into a discourse. Usually it occurs or comes first and it is then referred to, recalled or repeated by the anaphor later in the discourse. Lyons says that,[32]

> "The antecedent of an anaphor expression which as the
> term antecedent implies normally precedes the correlated
> anaphoric (expression ... T.M.S.) in the text."

The anaphor is an expression that does not have independence, but takes its reference from the antecedent which may or may not be linguistic.[33]

It may be noted here that there are cases where the antecedent may also follow the anaphor, as illustrated below:

2. *O ri u swika Tondani a sea.*

    'When <u>he</u> arrived, <u>Tondani</u> laughed.'

Although the concord *O* 'he' precedes its antecedent *Tondani* it
is in fact its anaphor, i.e. it refers to it. This relation is
called cataphora but it is seen as a form of anaphora and hence
it is called anticipatory anaphora by Lyons.[34]

Antecedents and anaphors in discourse form cohesive ties or
referential links. There are a number of anaphoric relations
such as co-reference, interreference and ellipsis, in which
elements or expressions form cohesive ties or referential links.
Deictic expressions too form cohesive ties with the visible or
non-visible referents in the extralinguistic situations.

Co-reference is an anaphoric relation where there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the antecedent and the anaphor, as in the
case above between the antecedent *Takalani* and the anaphor *ene*
'he'.

Both refer to the same referent and are thus said to be co-
referential. These two expressions make up a cohesive tie in
discourse. Halliday and Hassan[35] discuss substitution separately,
but this is really an aspect of co-reference, for instance, in:

3. *Takalani o da mulovha, mutukana o ri u swika a sa
    vhuye a dzula.*

    'Takalani came yesterday; the young fellow had
    just arrived when he decided to leave.'

In the discourse above, the anaphor, *mutukana* 'the young fellow'
substitutes *Takalani*, the antecedent. As in the case of *ene* 'he'
in the other discourse, *mutukana* 'the young fellow' is anaphoric
or refers to *Takalani* and both the antecedent and anaphor co-refer
to the same referent. They too form a cohesive tie in the discourse.
Besides co-reference, there is also another anaphoric relation
called interreference.

In the case of interreference, the antecedent and anaphor are not
in a one-to-one relationship but in a part-whole relationship.

In the following sentence:

4. *Ndi bva Unisa, rekitha o vha a tshi khou fhululedza
    matshudeni.*

    'I am from <u>Unisa</u>, the <u>rector</u> was congratulating the
    students.'

Unisa is the antecedent and *rekitha* 'the rector' is the anaphor.
The two do not refer to the same referent but are closely related
and form a cohesive tie in the discourse.

Ellipsis is also an anaphoric relation where something said or
referred to can still be left unsaid in the discourse because it
is understood, as in the following example:

5. *Takalani: Ndi khou ya doroboni.*
    'Takalani: I am going to town.'

    Lena   : Na nne ndi khou ya.
    'Lena   : I too am going.'

In the discourse above, the expression *doroboni* '(to) town' has
been left unsaid by the second speaker because it is understood.
Halliday and Hassan call ellipsis 'substitution by zero'.[36] In
other words, the zero anaphor is the same as the expression it
has substituted. There is therefore cohesion in the utterances
because of the expressions *doroboni* '(to) town' and the zero
anaphor i.e. the unmentioned part.

Deixis is a reference relation which is not basically anaphoric
as in the cases above. For instance in:

6. *Takalani: Ndi mini tshila?*
    Lena   : Ngafhi?

    'Takalani: What is that?
    Lena   : Where?'

The deictic expression *tshila* 'that' refers to a referent in the
extralinguistic or visible situation and they form a cohesive tie
in the discourse.

It is clear from the discourses given that cohesive ties are made
up of expressions with similar or related reference. Furthermore
it is also clear that cohesion has to do with elements or
expressions in the same or different utterances or sentences.
This helps to build up a coherent discourse as the successive
sentences or utterances prove to be about the same referent.
Halliday and Hassan state that a,[37]

"Cohesive relation is set up only if the same word or a word
related to it ..... has occurred previously" as shown in examples
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Cohesion should not be looked at as a syntactic process. The
statement by Hartmann and Stork that cohesion is,[38] "The degree
to which two or more words .... seem to belong together in a
syntactic structure" can easily mislead if it is not substantiated.
It should be noted again that cohesion uses linguistic forms in
sentences such as noun, noun phrases, pronouns, etc., which are
grammatical elements. This to some extent makes cohesion a
syntactic process of interconnecting sentences into a text or
discourse according to Werth.[39] But it can be argued that
cohesion is a semantic relation which deals with the relationship
of referring expressions that share meaning or reference in the
same discourse, "... but like all components of a semantic system
it is realized through a lexico-grammatical system ..." say
Halliday and Hassan.[40] It is however a fact that the effects of
syntax appear in this semantic-pragmatic relation. Werth
further notes that the linguistic forms or referential expressions
that are used in sentences follow structural or syntactic rules,
but the requirements of their connectivity are basically semantic
and pragmatic.[41]

1.2.2 Collocation

A coherent discourse also has collocational links i.e. lexical items which enter into semantic or pragmatic relationship because they are mutually related. Hartmann and Stork define the term collocation as a relation in which "Two or more words, considered as individual items, (are ... T.M.S.) used in habitual association with one another in a given language."[42]

Halliday and Hassan hold that collocation is a cohesive relation which is achieved through the association of lexical items that co-occur.[43] They further write "... any two lexical items having similar patterns of collocation in the discourse will generate a cohesive force, if they occur in adjacent sentences."[44] This idea is also held by Coleman.[45] It is true as Hartman & Stork, Halliday, Hassan and Coleman state that lexical cohesion is realised through some form of association which could be semantic or pragmatic, but this case is different from that of the case discussed in (1.2.1) where referring expressions form a tie i.e. where the anaphor presupposes the antecedent. Collocation involves the study of lexical items which are not necessarily referring elements but are elements which can form ties or links. For this reason, collocation is dealt with separately from cohesion. Nevertheless the two complement each other in a coherent discourse.

Collocational items enter into semantic relationship by their mutual expectancy.[46] Antonyms form collocational links in a discourse. For instance, the following pairs of lexical items would form collocational links e.g. *vhanna* 'men' - *vhasadzi* 'women', *vhakalaha* 'old men' - *vhakegulu* 'old women', etc. These lexical items are related though opposites. They are related in that they are complementary. Days of the week such as *Mugivhela* 'Saturday' and *Swondaha* 'Sunday' would form a collocational link because they are parts of a whole i.e. a week. Their occurrence together is always acceptable and expected. Some lexical items

tend to form collocational links because they usually occur in the same environment e.g. *mudededzi* 'teacher' - *matshudeni* 'students', *dokotela* 'doctor' - *mulwadze* 'patient'.

It can be noted that the occurrence of collocational links is not bound to adjacent sentences only as Halliday and Hassan suggest[47] but they may occur far apart from each other, although their occurrence near each other may be more effective. The occurrence of these collocational items, in the same/adjacent sentences, or far apart from each other indicates merely that the discourse is coherent i.e. one is able to see that they form a link or chain.

1.2.3   Connectors

In a discourse, sentences or utterances do not just follow one another arbitrarily, but they are linked or connected logically in various ways so as to express the relationships between them. In other words, sentences or utterances should satisfy certain sequential constraints in order to be acceptable. In this case speakers use connectors (or conjunctions) to link sentences or utterances. Werth says that connectors are employed in discourse to show the intersentential relationship i.e. in essence propositional relationships.[48]   Brown and Yule observe that,[49] "They relate what is about to be said to what has been said before."

The following are examples of connectors in Venda:

(a)   additive   :   *u engedza* 'furthermore', *kana* 'or'
(b)   adversative: *fhedzi* 'but'
(c)   causal   :   *huno* 'so', *nga hei ndila* 'for this reason'

For instance, when the additive *kana* 'or' is used to join two utterances, the speaker gives the hearer/addressee a choice as in

7. *Ni ḓe kana ni dzule.*
   'Do come or stay if you so wish.'

It also adds more information and the addressee can still require more information.

The adversative *fhedzi* 'but' is used where the two utterances/ sentences bring forth contrasts as in

8. *Ndo mu rwa, fhedzi ho ngo lila.*
   'I beat him, but he did not cry.'

The causal *huno* 'so' can be used to link two utterances/sentences but the last one is usually a conclusion as in e.g.

9. *No fhedza u ḽa? Huno ni mbo ḓi ya tshikoloni.*
   'Have you had your meal? So, you must go to school.'

The speaker here draws a conclusion from the first statement.

It is clear from the examples above that connectors link various sentences/utterances to form a coherent unit or whole. Another important aspect or coherence is that a discourse may lack cohesion, collocation and connectors and still be relevant, topical and, of course, coherent.

For instance, in the example below the discourse lacks the elements mentioned above, but the discourse participants continue to speak topically, e.g.

10. *Khotsi a Odaho:*   *Ṅwana u khou lila!*
    Mme a Odaho   :   *Ndi kha ḓi bika!*
    Khotsi a Oḓaho: *Ndi zwonȇ!*

    'Oḓaho's father: The child is crying!
    Oḓaho's mother: I am still busy cooking!
    Oḓaho's father: O.K.!'

The discourse participants are communicating topically in the discourse above and this means that there is connectivity and relevance in what they are talking about. The fact that the first speaker uses a definite NP to refer to the child means that he presupposes that his interlocutor shares knowledge with him about the referent. Furthermore, in her response, the second speaker does not refer to the child but her utterance contributes to the same discourse topic. This indicates that the discourse above is coherent.

This further proves that cohesion, collocation and/or connectors are not necessary and sufficient conditions for coherence. For instance, in turn-talking as in the case above, the coherence of the discourse is enhanced by the use of conversational implicatures. According to Werth conversational implicature is "... the pragmatic connectivity between one utterance and another in discourse."[50]

Brown and Yule add that for discourse participants to be able to speak topically together, they should appeal to the co-operative principle.[51] The co-operative principle was propounded by Grice, who explained it in terms of conversational conventions or maxims such as quantity, quality, relation and manner. In order not to violate these maxims, a speaker is advised to "... Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."[52]

In other words, a speaker should be informative (maxim of quantity), be precise or tell the truth (the maxim of quality), be relevant and be brief (the maxim of relevance) and be orderly (the maxim of manner). If this is the case, the discourse participants will talk about the same thing i.e. speak topically and meaningfully to enhance the conversation, which shows that they are drawing information from the same pool or have the same common ground. This makes their contributions relevant and

topical and it suggests that the discourse is coherent and thus acceptable.

1.3 DISCOURSE TOPIC

The coherence of a discourse depends on the topic framework which is an organising principle for features in the story or conversation. In a discourse, participants talk about something that is of interest or importance to them. This becomes the centre of attention and the 'aboutness' of this element of concern is called the discourse topic. If they decide to shift their attention to something else, then they will have changed the topic. Mclaughlin views the notion discourse topic as "... One of the fundamental ways in which a conversation shows signs of structure in that it appears to be about something."[53]

Van Dijk adds that,[54]

"A topic of discourse ... may be further characterized
as the most important or summarizing idea that
underlies the meanings of a sequence of sentences in
a discourse"

and continues to say, "It (i.e. the discourse topic ... T.M.S) defines the 'gist' or upshot of such an episode, and at the same time assigns global coherence to such an episode."

From the views expounded above it is clear that the discourse topic links the ideas in the various sentences/utterances and as Van Dijk indicates, assigns global coherence to the story or episode.

In syntactic studies, topic is associated with an NP, especially the initial one in the sentence. In such cases the subject NP or noun phrase is the topic of the sentence while the predicate

comments on the topic as in

11. *Takalani u tamba bola.*
     'Takalani plays football',

where *Takalani*, the subject NP, is the topic of the sentence.

At discourse level i.e. segments of text longer than the sentence,
the topic is associated with a proposition or set of propositions
which carry the central idea or gist of the story. Hurford and
Heasley define a proposition as follows:[55]

> "A PROPOSITION is that part of the meaning of the
> utterance of a declarative sentence which describes
> a state of affairs."

It should be noted that propositions are declarative sentences.
Interrogatives and imperatives do have propositions but they do
not assert them as do declarative sentences. Propositions
correspond to facts, they carry the global meaning of a sentence,
story or conversation. For instance in:

12. *Ndi funza Tshivenḓa Navenḓa.*
     'I teach Venḓa at Navenḓa'

the proposition would be almost equal to the declarative sentence
given above or such as any of the ones below.

> *U/Ndi (Takalani u) funza Tshivenḓa Navenḓa.*
> 'He/I (Takalani) teach(es) Venḓa at Navenḓa.'

But in

13. *Ni funza Tshivenḓa Navenḓa?*
     'Do you teach Venḓa at Navenḓa?'

and

14. *Takuwa/Takuwani'*.
'Stand up!'

The propositions are asserted by declarative sentences, e.g.

(Itani) ni funza Tshivenḓa Navenḓa.
'You (Itani) teach Venda at Navenda.'

and

Iwe (Itani) takuwa/Inwi (Itani) takuwani.
'You (Itani) (must) stand up.'

There are two approaches that scholars use to define a discourse topic viz. the referent and the propositional approaches. According to advocates of the referent approach, among them Sidner, Brown and Yule, the discourse is about a referent or referents (features) in a particular discourse context.[56] In normal discourse a speaker introduces a referent into a discourse, which his addressee or interlocutor registers into his/her memory. When he re-introduces it or refers to it anaphorically later in the discourse, his interlocutors are able to identify it as the one referred to earlier in the discourse. When the referent in focus appears in subsequent sentences or utterances, the addressee or interlocutor is able to see the link between the utterances or sentences, and this further enables them to know that the speaker is talking about that particular referent. Other referents that might be referred to besides the one in focus could be those that support the one in focus. However, if the discourse participants decide to shift the discourse topic, then focus would be directed to another referent. This being the case, the repeated occurrence of a referent indicates that the topic is about it or that it constitutes the discourse topic. In extralinguistic situations i.e. in visible

and non-visible situations, the speaker maintains the topic or
discourse topic by referring to referents that he can see or
knows to exist and accompanies his expressions by pointing or
gesturing towards them.

The discourse below illustrates the occurrence of repeated
referents so as to determine the topicality of the passage.

15. D1   *Vhege yo fhelaho Takalani na Sandani vho vha vho ya
         ha 'Muanewa'.*

    D2   *Avha vho vha vno u divhisa vhaeni.*

    D3   *O vha o diitela munyanya wa mabebo.*

    D4   *Ene o vha o ramba khonani dzawe.*

    D5   *Khomba yo vha yo dzhavhela lwa ntha.*

    D1   'Last week Takalani and Sandani were at Muanewa's.

    D2   They (lit. these) had to introduce the guests.

    D3   She had thrown herself a birthday party.

    D4   She had invited all her friends.

    D5   The young lady was immaculately dressed.'

In the discourse above, in D1 Takalani and Sandani and Muanewa
are antecedents introduced for the first time.   In D3 Muanewa
is re-introduced by the anaphor *O* 'she' and the reflexive *di-* in
diitela 'do it for oneself' which contains the underlying form
Muanewa.

In D2 Takalani and Sandani are re-introduced by the demonstrative
anaphor *avha* 'these' and the anaphor *vhaeni* 'the guests' is
closely related to Muanewa i.e. *vhaeni vha Muanewa* 'Muanewa's
guests'. This last expression is understood interreferentially
(see 1.2.1).

In D4 *ene* 'she' refers anaphorically to Muanewa while *dzawe* 'hers'
is dually anaphoric to Muanewa and her friends.

The cohesive ties formed by co-referring expressions and those
that are closely related i.e. elements that show interreferential
relationship, such as the anaphor *vhaeni* 'the guests' and <u>Muanewa</u>
the antecedent etc., show that the sentences are more or less
about the same thing. It is clear again that the referent
Muanewa occurs repeatedly in the discourse by being re-introduced
by various anaphors. Such repeated occurrences in a way
determine that the discourse is about the same thing or referent.
On repeated occurrence of referents Sidner writes,[57]

> "When the speaker uses anaphoric expressions to
> indicate discourse connectedness, s/he also
> highlights what is of concern over the whole
> discourse. When an entity in focus is rementioned
> anaphorically, the hearer also knows that the
> element of the discourse corresponding to that
> entity plays a more central role in the discourse."

According to proponents of the propositional approach the
discourse topic is explained in terms of a proposition or
macroproposition (defined earlier in 1.2) which takes into account
the important elements (points) about the referent in the story
or episode. Keenan and Schieffelin use the propositional approach
in analysing discourse and define a discourse topic in the
following words,[58]

> "... a discourse topic is a proposition (or set of
> propositions) expressing a concern (or set of
> concerns) the speaker is addressing."

In a conversation, whatever is uttered is a response to what
might have happened or what might have been said or done by any
of the discourse participants or possibly that which they might
have witnessed. Utterances are directed to this concern and
contribute towards it. This concern becomes the rallying point
around which everything centres. Keenan and Schieffelin further
call this main concern towards which every utterance or sentence
is directed a primary presupposition or a discourse topic and

further explain that it is expressed by a proposition.[59]

In the discourse referred to earlier (15), the referring expressions about Muanewa occur in almost every sentence. In this instance, according to the propositional approach a proposition would be used to sum up facts in all the sentences so as to get a global meaning or the gist of the passage. The gist of the story or summary is carried by the proposition or the sentence which carries the proposition or meaning. The various sentences i.e. D1, D2, D3, D4 and D5 are, according to Van Dijk, mapped by macro-rules which have reductive and subsumptive functions.[60] These rules are able to select relevant facts and reduce irrelevant ones, they are able to generalize, abstract and embrace concepts and then organise information into a meaning carrying statement which is a proposition. In this case the topic of the discourse referred to would be *Muanewa u pembelela u bebwa hawe* 'Muanewa celebrates her birthday'. Besides, this is made simpler by the fact that the sentences are not only linearly-coherent, but they are also relevant to the topic. This further displays the element of coherence in the discourse. The proposition above therefore makes explicit the global meaning of the discourse, in other words, it expresses what the whole discourse is about, i.e. the referent Muanewa in a nutshell, but further it explains the circumstances that surround Muanewa in the whole discourse without giving details. This means that a proposition explains what a discourse is about or gives the gist, or summary of the whole story. It is clear from the look of things that these two approaches complement each other.

The advocates of the referent approach put their emphasis on the referent in focus and/or those related to it, and those who favour the propositional approach are more concerned with the facts about the referent in the discourse.

It is obvious that the repeated occurrences of a referent lead to a discourse topic. In other words, the discourse topic is

expressed in terms of this referent. Whatever surrounds this referent will have to be expressed by a proposition as shown above. In other words, a proposition carries meaning or global meaning about a particular referent or referents. In order to determine a discourse topic, it would be necessary to look at the element/referent(s) in focus and then link the various facts which concern it. Once the facts have been established, then it is easy to apply the macrorules intuitively and then organize the information into an embracing sentence or proposition, which is the discourse topic.

1.3.1   Types of discourse topics

There are four kinds of discourse topics that have so far been discussed, mainly by Keenan and Schieffelin.[61]   These are the collaborating discourse topic, the incorporating discourse topic, the introducing discourse topic and the re-introducing discourse topic.

1.3.1.1   The collaborating discourse topic

In the continuous discourse, sequences of utterances are usually sustained more than once as discourse participants contribute information towards the discourse topic. When sequences are sustained over two or more utterances, they form a collaborating discourse topic,[62] e.g. the discourse below:

16.   A   *Takalani:*   *Ni khou bva vhengeleni?*
　　　B   *Sandani :*   *Ee, ndi khou bva hone vhengeleni.*
　　　C   *Takalani:*   *No vhuya na vhurotho.*
　　　D   *Sandani :*   *Hai vhurotho ho fhela.*

> A Takalani: 'Are you coming from <u>the shop</u>?
> B Sandani : Yes, I am coming from <u>the shop</u>.
> C Takalani: Did you buy <u>bread</u>?
> D Sandani : No, <u>the bread</u> is sold-out.'

In the discourse above, information by (A) Takalani has been sustained by (B) Sandani. Besides, the referent, *vhengele* 'the shop', is mentioned in both cases. Likewise information in (C) has been sustained by Sandani in (D). The referent *vhurotho* 'the bread' is also mentioned by both speakers. It is clear that the discourse participants are speaking on the same topic. Of importance again is that the first two sequences A and B collaborate with C and D; these sustained sequences have formed a collaborating discourse topic. From the co-operation of the participants and the relevance of the discourse participants, it is clear that they are drawing information or discourse referents from the same presupposition pool and as a result, they are able to speak topically. This case is illustrated in *Madima*,[63]

17.   *Maluṱa, "A si <u>vhasidzana</u> hafhano shangoni ḽa haṋu."*
      "A ni a thu u <u>vha (1)</u> vhona," Ndi Masuwa, "Ni ḓo
      <u>vha (2)</u> vhona zwavhuḓi madekwana, na matshelo
      ḓavhani ḽa ha Ntsieni." Tshibalo, "Zwaṋu, ni songo
      pfa, <u>vhasidzana</u> vha hone a si swili ...."

      'Maluṱa, "There are so <u>many girls</u> here in your area."
      "You haven't seen <u>them</u>," said Masuwa, "you will see
      <u>them</u> better this evening and tomorrow at Ntsieni's
      <u>work-party</u>." Tshibalo, "Do not be fooled, <u>the girls</u>
      he is talking about are very cheeky ...."'

In this discourse, stretches of sequence are uttered by various discourse participants. The first speaker Maluṱa makes a reference to *vhasidzana* 'the girls' in his utterance and this is sustained by Masuwa in the following utterance, when he refers to them by using referring expressions *vha* 'them' (1) and *vha* 'them' (2). Tshibalo too, sustains the stretches of sequence when he refers to referent(s) in focus as *vhasidzana* 'the girls' in his

utterance. This discourse is continuous and the repeated
occurrence of the same referent in all the utterances indicates
that the discourse is about the same topic.

1.3.1.2 The incorporating discourse topic

Keenan and Schieffelin have noted that "discourse topics may take
some presupposition of the immediately preceding discourse topic..."[64]
and use it in a new discourse topic. Consider for example the
following discourse:

18.   A   *Takalani:*   *Itshi tshifanyiso ri do tshi fhahea hani?*
      B   *Vusani   :*   *Ri fanela u shumisa zwibigiri.*
      C   *Takalani:*   *Hoo, zwibigiri zwino zwi ngafhi?*
      D   *Vusani   :*   *Zwi nga vha zwi giratshini.*

      A   Takalani: 'How do we hang this <u>picture</u> up?
      B   Vusani   :   We'll have to use <u>nails</u>.
      C   Takalani: Yes, but where are <u>the nails</u>?
      D   Vusani   :   I think <u>they</u> are in the garage.'

In this discourse a topic is established in (A) (viz. we need
something to hang the picture). In (B) *zwibigiri* 'nails' are
introduced, which are related to the preceding discourse topic
which has to do with the hanging up of the picture. The discourse
then continues in (C) and (D) with reference being made to *zwibigiri*
'nails'. As Keenan and Schieffelin note, a topic that uses the
preceding utterance in this way is known as an Incorporating
Discourse Topic.[65]

1.3.1.3 Introducing discourse topic

Discourse participants may within a discourse context introduce
for the first time a discourse topic that has no link with any

other. Such topics are called introducing discourse topics.
What usually occurs is that a discourse participant may
discontinue a topic and introduce an entirely new one by first
alerting his co-participants with such utterances such as,
"... *ndi sa a thu u hangwa* ..." '"... before I forget ..."',
"*Imani ndi ni vhudze hezwi* ..." '"Let me tell you this ..."',
"*ni divhe* ..." '"(lit.) You must know/By the way ..."', etc.,
and thus discontinue with the prevailing one, as in *Madima*.[66]

19. *"Germiston hone ndi havhudi ngauri a hu na Vhavenda
    vhanzhi vhane vha nndivhā. Na zwino vha pfa muhwe
    wa vhala vhathannga a tshi mbudzisa, vha mu vhudze
    uri ndi vho shuma mabulasini Rositembere. A thi tsha
    funa u tangana navho. Vha na zwitshele. Zwenezwo ri
    tshi do di ita ri tshi tangana hayani ndi khwine."*

    *Vha tshi swika Germiston, Vho-Rahwane vha ri, "Maluta,
    ni divhe uri do vha na munyanya wa u vhingisa Thavhani,
    muthannga wawe ndi mabalane hangei phirimaini, hayani
    hawe ndi Isitutu." "Ene ndi a mu divha o vha a tshi
    di ita a tshi da hezwila nne ndi nā livi."*

    '"Germiston is a good place because there are very few
    Venda people who know me. If you hear any of those
    young men asking about me, tell them that I have found
    employment out in the farm-areas around Rustenburg. I
    no longer want to see them, they gossip a lot. As long
    as we shall always meet at home."

    When they arrived at Germiston, Mr Rahwane said, "Maluta,
    by the way we shall be having a wedding, Thavhani will
    be getting married, her boyfriend is a clerk at Premier
    mine; he is from Eastwood." "I know him, he used to
    come that time when I was on leave."'

In the discourse above, a new topic is introduced by Rahwane who
does not continue with the original discourse about the work
situation. He introduces a new one about the marriage of his
daughter Thavhani. Earlier on Maluta had been speaking about
his problems of finding suitable employment. The new topic is
unrelated to the preceding one, hence it is called an introducing
discourse topic. Rahwane alerts Maluta by saying *"Maluta, ni
divhe ...."* '"Maluta by the way you should know ...."' which
indicates that he is about to introduce new information.

1.3.1.4   The re-introducing discourse topic

In the course of a conversation on a particular topic, the
speaker may discontinue with it and re-introduce another one
which had been discontinued earlier on in the discourse history.
Such topics are not linked to the immediately preceding utterances
i.e. there could be others between the new topic and the one to
which it is linked.   In such cases the speaker can always alert
his addressee(s) by uttering such constructions as "... *ndi sa
athu u hangwa* ..." '"... before I forget ..."' and then re-
introduce the discontinued topic.   The discourse below illustrates
this:

20.   *Madima*[67]

> *"Nne (Maluṱa) ndi uri a thi na mushumo na muthu a
> dzulaho mudini wa hawe. Ndi mala ane a fusha mato
> anga, na ane mbilu yanga ya mu takalela. Aridi-vho
> zwenezwo arali ndo no ḓi kundwa. U salela a hu
> vhalwi."*
>
> *A tshi ralo u khou funga (pferula) mulilo a funga
> segereṱe yawe a daha o ḓi mu lavhelesa.*
>
> *Adziambei a tshi ṱoḓou kanganyedza, "Zwino zwenezwi
> zwa segereṱe zwi ḓifhelafhi-vho? Ndi tshi fa hu u
> fhisa yone tshelede."*
>
> *"Yone mushumo wayo ndi wa ni? Na vha re nayo hafhu
> vha tshi ḓi fa vha i sia! Kha ri ambe ri pfane kha
> haya mafhungo (a u malana) ..."*

> '"I (Maluṱa) have nothing to do with a person who wants
> to stay at her home. I marry the one who satisfies
> my eyes (needs), in fact one that I love dearly with
> all my heart. Well, I would not mind if I had failed.
> There is no hurry."
>
> In the process he took out a cigarette and lit it and
> started to smoke looking at her.
>
> Adziambei tried to interrupt him, "But where is the
> taste of such things as cigarettes? It is as good as
> burning money itself."
>
> "What is its use? Even those who have a lot of it, will
> die and leave it behind! But let us talk and agree on
> this matter (marriage) ..."'

In the discourse above, the discourse participants are speaking about a love affair between them. The speaker Maluṭa is doing his utmost to convince Adziambei that she and she alone is the one he loves and not the girl who prefers to stay at her home. Adziambei in turn introduces a new topic about smoking when Maluṭa lights a cigarette. This new topic is the introducing discourse topic as discussed in (1.3.1.3) above. Maluṭa on the other hand, decides to reintroduce the discontinued discourse topic about their love affair. He alerts Adziambei that they are reverting to the earlier discourse topic when he says, *"Kha ri ambe ri pfane kha haya mafhungo ..."* '"Let us talk and agree on this matter ..."' (i.e. marriage). This eventually leads them to the re-introducing discourse topic and they go on to discuss their love affair; i.e. the discourse topic discontinued earlier.

1.3.2 Speaking topically

When both discourse participants i.e. the speaker and his addressee or interlocutor draw their contributions i.e. discourse information, from the same presupposition pool, then it means that they are adhering to the co-operative principle. The term co-operative principle was introduced by Grice to refer to, "a tacit understanding of just how much the speaker should actually say, how much leave unsaid, and how meanings are to be "implicated" beyond what is actually said."[68] People often leave certain things unsaid because they know each other and tend to presuppose that their interlocutors share knowledge of what they are talking about. Whenever there is this kind of common ground between discourse participants, then they tend to speak topically. Brown and Yule have the following to say on speaking topically,[69]

> "a discourse participant is 'speaking topically' when
> he makes his contribution fit closely to the most
> recent elements incorporated in the topic framework."

In this instance, their utterances always follow from what has
just been uttered by the previous speakers. The topic framework
guides them, so that they do not deviate but remain relevant to
it. If, however, they decide to shift their topic, they always
alert each other as shown in (1.3.1.3) with the introducing
discourse topic when Rañwane decided not to pursue the topic on
Maluţa's unemployment and introduced a new topic on the coming
wedding of his daughter Thavhani. The same case is seen in
(1.3.1.4) with the re-introducing discourse topic, when the lovers
Maluţa and Adziambei were trying to tie the knot. The initial
topic was their love affair, but Adziambei decided to introduce a
new topic, i.e. an introducing discourse topic, when she started
to speak about the uselessness of cigarettes and later on Maluţa
re-introduced the discontinued discourse topic of their love
affair by alerting Adziambei, when he said, *"Kha ri ambe ri pfane
kha haya mafhungo ..."* '"Let us talk and agree on this matter ..."'

For discourse participants to be able to speak topically,
everything that they contribute should follow from what has just
been uttered. Brown and Yule further add "... each participant
'picks up' elements from the contribution of the preceding
speakers and incorporates them in his contribution."[70]

From the above, it is clear that if discourse participants share
the same presupposition pool, the two-way-traffic type of
conversation enables them to speak topically. However, an
important aspect to be noted with regard to speaking topically
is that of relevance. When the discourse participants are
relevant in their conversation, they somehow agree, thus making
speech, what Clark and Haviland have called, 'a social contract'.[71]
The whole question of speaking topically can be clearly seen in
the question and answer type of conversations and, inter alia,
interviews. In this case the speakers are bound to respond to
what they are being asked of. Another avenue open for speaking
topically is the debating platform. Usually a debate is based

on some topic framework and participants are bound to speak
topically, whether they agree or disagree. Opponents usually
do not dwell much on what others have said but adhere to the
co-operative principle, as they all draw information from the
same presupposition pool. What normally happens in such cases,
as Brown and Yule see it, is that,[72]

> "... a speaker will treat what he was talking about
> in his contribution as the most salient elements and
> what the other speaker talked about, though most
> recent, as less salient."

On the whole, such a speaker adheres to the co-operative
principle. The fact that he could dwell much on his own
contribution, thus making it more salient at the expense of his
interlocutor, whose contribution is often ignored and taken as
being less salient, could be viewed as a violation of the co-
operative principle deliberately. People often become irrelevant
in conversations for a purpose. Such deviations do not really
discourage the addressee(s) or mislead him as he still realizes
that the speaker is still contributing to the discourse topic.

When speaking topically, each speaker contributes to the
conversation in terms of both the existing topic framework and
his/her personal topic. Since they are all contributing to the
same topic, there is always a degree of relevance in whatever
they say.

Keenan and Schieffelin write,[73]

> "... a listener assumes that a discourse topic is
> some proposition relevant to the ongoing talk,
> because the listener assumes the speaker is following
> the conversational norm of relevance."

When the discourse participants are being relevant to the topic,
they can make use of conversational implicatures i.e. suggest or

imply certain things without mentioning them. Each becomes
aware that his interlocutor will be able to build inferences
from what he knows already, or use his knowledge to build from
scratch.

The notion of speaking topically fits well into the following
discourse topics; the collaborating discourse topic in (1.3.1.1)
where utterances are sustained between speakers A and B (and)
(C) and (D); the incorporating discourse topic in (1.3.1.2) where
the participants can introduce new but related information for
example *zwibigiri* 'nails' which presupposed certain information
in the preceding discourse topic, thereby linking the topics.
Zwibigiri 'nails', as explained, is closely related to *tshifanyiso*
'the picture'.

When a new topic is introduced, i.e. the introducing discourse
topic, the discourse participants can speak topically if they
agree to adhere to the co-operative principle. This has been
illustrated in (1.3.1.3) where Rañwane introduced the topic of
his daughter's wedding and Maluṭa contributed to it by speaking
topically. It should be noted that Rañwane had alerted Maluṭa
of his digression from the topic of job seeking, hence their
co-operation in the new topic of the wedding. In the case of
the re-introducing discourse topic, the new topic is linked to
one that had been discontinued earlier on. The speaker, in order
to speak topically, alerts his interlocutor of his digression
from the prevailing discourse topic as indicated in (1.3.1.4)
when Maluṭa alerted Adziambei that they should pursue the talk
of their love affair. This then lead them to relate everything
to the discourse topic discontinued earlier which shows that in
their conversation they were speaking topically.

It has been indicated earlier that the discourse participants
speak topically because they are drawing information from the
same presupposition pool. They are also able to link the topics

within the discourse context because they use the discourse
history as their source of information and of course above all
they become relevant by speaking topically.

1.3.2.1 Speaker's topic

When discourse participants are conversing, speakers sometimes,
instead of being relevant and speaking topically, become
irrelevant and speak on their own unrelated and unlinked topics.
Each speaker decides to speak on his personal topic instead of
contributing towards the main topic framework. What occurs in
such cases is that a speaker ignores or violates all the maxims
or speech conventions i.e. he decides deliberately or purely out
of unsolicited negligence not to co-operate. Each discourse
participant introduces new information or, perhaps, even a
discourse topic not linked to either the preceding utterance or
discourse topic contributed by his co-participant. It is however
very practical for speakers to disagree in a dialogue or
conversation. Brown and Yule maintain that such discourse topics
are usually 'negotiated' in the process of conversing.[74] Such
conversations lead to communication break-down as no one is ever
co-operative. Brown and Yule, noticing this parallel
conversational development, point out that,[75]

> "Throughout a conversation, the next topic of
> conversation is developing. Each speaker
> contributes to the conversation in terms of
> both the existing topic framework and his or
> her personal topic."

This is the case in the following discourse.

21. *Takalani:* *Hei Sandani, ndo pfa mafhungo.*
    Sandani : *Nga nnyi? Namusi ḽi ḓo fhisa.*
    Takalani: *Ndo pfa u pfi ni khou malwa.*
    Sandani : *Fhano-vho hu dina buse.*
    Takalani: *Ndi ene Vusani ane a khou ni mala?*
    Sandani : *Hemmbe yanu yo tswukesa.*

    Takalani: 'Sandani, I've heard some news.
    Sandani : From whom? It is very hot today.
    Takalani: I learn you are getting married.
    Sandani : This place is very dusty.
    Takalani: Is it Vusani that you are getting married to?
    Sandani : Look, your shirt is so red with dust.'

In the discourse above, each participant makes contributions to
his personal topic, and ignores that of his co-participant or
what should be the discourse topic. From the look of things,
there is no co-operation, and therefore there cannot be any
successful communication. Although there is some sort of
interaction, it is not related, and it further lacks coherence.
There is no co-operation between the discourse participants,
they are not relevant to a specific topic and do not seem to be
drawing information from the same presupposition pool. Each
speaker is speaking on his own topic. Such conversations need
co-operation from the discourse participants. Usually in such
cases as the above discourse, one of the participants would
interrupt the conversation and appeal for sanity. To add to
this Brown and Yule say,[76]

> "What typically happens is that, in the negotiation
> process, one speaker realizes that his version is
> incompatible with what the other appears to be
> talking about and makes his contribution compatible
> with, what I think you (not me) are talking about ..."

A discourse participant will act in this manner to avoid conflict,

since for them to speak topically depends on adhering to the
co-operative principle, so that they can draw discourse
information from the same presupposition pool. In this case then,
they can link topics, and also reconstruct the question of
immediate concern with ease.

1.4 DISCOURSE CONTEXT

Whenever words are used, they refer to various things depending
on the contexts in which they are used. Difficulties are always
encountered when people try to interpret the meaning of words in
isolation. Wittgenstein emphasises that words should be used in
contexts which will determine their meanings.[77] He thus
propounded the use theory to explain his case. According to
this theory Akmajian et.al. write, [78] "The meaning of an
expression is determined by its use in the language community."
Wittgenstein's slogan has been "Don't look for the meaning of a
word, look for its use."

Lyons reiterates Wittgenstein's view when he says, "Give me the
context in which you met the word, and I'll tell you its meaning."[79]

However, it is true that every word has its basic or core meaning
which is relatively stable, but this will always change when
used in various contexts. For instance the noun *munna* 'man' has
three different meanings in the discourse below:

> 22. *Ndo ri u swika nda vhona munna, ndi tshi sendela
>   tsini nda wana e munna wa Sandani. Ndi tshi sedza
>   mudi we a fhaṭa nda ri, "Ngoho ni munna!"*
>
>   'When I arrived I saw a man; on nearing the place
>   I realized that it was Sandani's husband. When I
>   looked at the house he had built I said, "Yes,
>   indeed you are a man."'

The noun *munna* 'man' denotes (basically) a male human being.

In the discourse *munna* 'man' has been used thrice and differently.
In the first instance it refers to a male human being, in the
second to a husband and in the last it has been used metaphorically,
here the man is being portrayed as a brave person, i.e. he is not
just an ordinary man, but he is also brave or courageous. It is
therefore clear in the cases above that although *munna* 'man' has
its basic meaning, i.e. that of a male human being, this meaning
can shift or refer to something else depending on the context in
which it is being used.

Antal refutes the contextual theory and holds that words have
basic meanings which remain constant and he maintains that,[80]

> "In our speech, the words do not follow each other
> accidentally but according to their meaning."

He continues to argue that,[81]

> "From this it obviously follows that, if we use the
> words according to their meaning, then the meaning
> precedes the use of the word, just as the use of a
> language presupposes knowledge of the language. And
> if the meaning precedes the use of the word, then
> the meaning is not determined by the context but
> according to the meaning we put in the word in
> different contexts."

Antal's views are refuted by Mokgokong who notes that Antal's
conception of meaning is farfetched and that it does not apply
to languages like Northern Sotho and other African languages.
He also refers to figures of speech which shift in meaning
because of the contexts in which they are used.[82] The discourse
given earlier on in this connection also corrects Antal's views
on the meanings of words. As has been indicated, the same word
as in the case of *munna* 'man' can mean different things when
used in various contexts. Hayakawa also corrects Antal's views
when he says,[83]

> "To insist dogmatically that we know what a word
> means in advance of its utterance is nonsense.
> All we know in advance is appropriately what it
> will mean. After the utterance, we interpret what
> has been said in the light of both the verbal and
> physical contexts, and act according to our
> interpretation."

Context according to Lyons, is a matter of pragmatics.[84] There
are various contextual factors, including the verbal and physical,
which influence the meaning of words, such as cultural,
psychological, behavioural, etc. A few definitions of context
will illuminate how the meaning of words may be determined.
Mokgokong defines context as follows:[85]

> "By contextual theory of meaning we understand that
> words vary in meaning according to the context in
> which they are used, in other words the context
> provides a clue to the particular meaning with
> which a word is intended to be associated."

Lyons writes,[86]

> "Context ... is a theoretical construct, in the
> postulation of which the linguist abstracts from
> the actual situation and establishes as contextual
> all the factors which by virtue of their influence
> upon the participants in the language-event,
> systematically determine the form, the appropriateness,
> or the meaning of the utterance."

Hurford and Heasley say of context,[87]

> "The CONTEXT of an utterance is a small subpart of
> the universe of discourse shared by speaker and
> hearer, and includes facts about the topic of the
> conversation in which the utterance occurs, and
> also the facts about the situation in which the
> conversation itself takes place."

From the opinions given above it is evident that a word cannot
precisely have the same meaning in various contexts. Although

a word could still show remnants of its basic meaning, the
context will display a particular meaning associated with the
new environment, as has been the case with *munna* 'man' in the
given discourse, where in each case the noun *munna* 'man' shifts
in meaning because of contextual factors associated with it.

The use of words in the various contexts above show that they
can function differently and counters Antal's opinion that "a
word maintains exactly the same meaning in each and every
environment, since, when it develops a different meaning, it
ceases to be the same word."[88]

The point is that a word does not necessarily become new but
it tends to function differently because of the context in which
it has been used. If words remain the same in all environments
then there will never be any normal communication between people.
Besides, "If the hearer knows in advance that the speaker will
inevitably produce a particular utterance in a particular context,
then it is obvious that the utterance gives him no information,
when it occurs, no communication takes place", says Lyons.[89]

Venda like some of its related languages, among them the Sotho
languages, do not have articles as is the case in English,
Afrikaans and other Germanic languages. The definiteness and
indefiniteness of noun phrases is determined by the context in
which they are used. Note such cases in the discourse below:

23. *Ndo ri u swika, nda wana ho ima munna, ndi tshi
     ri ndi a shavha munna a mbo di mpfara.*
     'When I arrived, I found <u>a man</u>; when I was
     about to run away <u>the man</u> got hold of me.'

In the discourse above, the noun phrase *munna* 'a man' is indefinite
and it refers to an unidentifiable referent, i.e. the addressee
has no knowledge of the referent but the speaker does, and the
second noun phrase *munna* 'the man' is definite in that both the

speaker and addressee share knowledge of the referent, in other
words, the referent is identifiable.

It is also universally accepted that every human being has a
name. It is also the case that many people bear the same name
say for instance the name Mathivha in the discourse below.

24. *Vho-Dokotela Mathivha vha tshi khwathisa vhuhulu*
na vhushaka ha Tshivenda na dzihwe nyambo dza Afurika kha
Semina ya nyambo dza Afurika vho ri, "Tshivenda ndi
lwone luambo lwa muratho kha nyambo dza Afurika dzine
dza ambwa devhula na vhurwa ha Vhembe."

    'When Dr Mathivha emphasised the importance of
    Venda in relation to other languages of Africa
    at the Seminar of African languages he said,
    "Venda should be looked at as a bridge language
    between languages spoken north and south of the
    Limpopo."'

In the discourse-context above, the bearer of the name Dr Mathivha
is none other than Professor Doctor M.E.R. Mathivha who is the
former head of the department of Venda and vice-rector of the
University of the North (Turfloop). Although there are three
other Mathivha's who are doctors (his children), the context
determines and identifies their father as the intended referent.
His children are medical doctors.

Summing up some of the views expressed above we may say that
people are able to use the same words in various contexts and
agree because they tend to share a large territory of beliefs,
implications, presuppositions and topics with the speech community
to which they belong. In addition the use of words depends on the
speaker, hearer, place and time.

For a proper investigation of the use of language in context, by
the discourse participants, the discourse analyst will need to
look into the use of concepts such as reference, presupposition,
inference, implicatures and reference repairs.

1.4.1 Reference

A referent is identified by means of a referring expression in discourse. Reference is therefore the relationship that holds between the two i.e. the referent and the referring expression. Two kinds of reference have been distinguished, namely the speaker's reference and linguistic reference. In terms of the speaker's reference, it is the speaker who does the referring and in terms of linguistic reference it is the expressions or words that refer.

Lyons states that there are no differences between these two types of reference and this will be the viewpoint adopted in this dissertation. He writes that "... according to the view of reference adopted here, when we ask: "What does the expression 'x' refer to?", we are asking the same question as we would ask. "What is the speaker referring to by means of 'x' (in uttering such-and-such a sentence)?"[90] Linsky disagrees with Lyons for to him the question "To whom does the phrase 'the President of the United States' refer?" is odd but it is acceptable to ask 'To whom are you referring?' or 'Who is the President of the United States?' He maintains that it is the language user who refers or uses referring expressions to refer to referents. It is clear that Linsky does not accept linguistic reference but he nevertheless further indicates that one can ask, 'To whom does the pronoun "he" refer?' if one is analysing the use of a referring expression in a text. He finds such questions as the one above senseless unless they are analysed in contexts like the one he has indicated.[91]

Lyons's explanation further corrects scholars such as Linsky as he shows the technical differences and he writes,[92]

> "It is terminologically convenient, however to be
> able to say that an expression refers to its referent
> (when the expression is used on some particular
> occasion and satisfies the relevant conditions)."

1.4.2 Presupposition

In normal conversations, speakers often use referring expressions
to refer to referents which they assume their addressee(s) share
knowledge of, and in such cases it is said that they presuppose
knowledge (shared) between themselves and their interlocutor(s)
i.e. the addressee(s). Should the interlocutor respond positively,
by being co-operative i.e. contribute to the same discourse topic,
then they will speak topically. On the other hand, the speaker
can lack relevant information or overestimate the knowledge which
he believes he shares with his addressee. In such instances the
speaker will experience a presupposition failure. For instance
refer to the question below:

> 25. *"Takalani no mu vhona?"*
>   '"Did you see Takalani?"'

The use of the proper name Takalani presupposes that the speaker
believes or takes for granted that the addressee or interlocutor
can identify the person referred to. On the other hand if the
interlocutor should fail to identify the referent, or has no
knowledge whatsoever about the referent, then there will have
been a presupposition failure on the part of the speaker.

The term presupposition was first introduced in the philosophy
of language and linguistics by Frege at the turn of the century
who, according to Garner, held that if anything is asserted in
an assertion then there is a presupposition that the referring
expression used designates something.[93] For example note in the
sentence below:

> 'Kepler died in misery.'

In the assertion above he holds that there is an obvious
presupposition that Kepler designates or refers to something.

In this regard he states:[94]

> "If anything is asserted there is always an obvious
> presupposition that the simple or compound proper
> names used have a reference. If one therefore
> asserts 'Kepler died in misery', there is a
> presupposition that the name 'Kepler' designates
> something."

However, with reference to a sentence such as the following,

'Kepler did not die in misery',

Frege says that Kepler here has no designatum or reference, in
other words it fails to refer and he concludes that since it
lacks truth value, there is no referent involved.

Russell[95] questions some of the views expressed by Frege and
maintains that if a referring expression used in a statement has
no reference then the statement becomes insignificant or
meaningless; for instance in,

'The King of France is wise'

the statement asserts three things (i) that the king of France
exists (ii) that there is at least one person who is the king
of France and (iii) whoever is the king of France is wise. If,
however, the referring expression the King of France has no real
reference in real life then the statement in which it occurs is
insignificant or meaningless. For Russell whatever is asserted
should correlate with reality and facts.

Strawson in his discussion of presupposition has concentrated on
logical presuppositions which deal with statements or propositions.
These are defined in terms of truth and logical consequences. He
defines the relation by saying that "a statement S presupposes
a statement S' if, and only if, the truth of S' is a precondition

of the truth or falsity of S."[96] His views may be illustrated in examples such as the following which are provided by Leech:[97]

> 'The blonde he married was an heiress' presupposes 'He married a blonde.'
>
> 'The blonde he married was not an heiress' presupposes 'He married a blonde.'

1.4.2.1 Discourse or pragmatic presupposition

In discourse or pragmatics, presuppositions are made by people i.e. the discourse participants, and not by statements or propositions. Stalnaker writes,[98]

> "To presuppose a proposition in the pragmatic sense is to take for granted, and to assume that others involved in the context do the same ... One has presuppositions in virtue of the statement he makes, the questions he asks, the commands he issues."

In this dissertation the concern is with presuppositions that are made by people rather than sentences, statements or propositions, in other words the objective of this dissertation is discourse or pragmatic presupposition. Pragmatic or discourse presupposition has to do with what is said by the discourse participants and what they assume to be known by their interlocutors. Discourse or pragmatic presupposition can be defined as a relationship whereby utterances convey more than they say, in other words, the speaker takes it for granted that the interlocutor is capable of understanding what has been said. Brown and Yule write the following on presupposition:[99]

> "What a speaker assumes is true or is known by the hearer can be described as presupposition."

Leech defines pragmatic or discourse presupposition as follows:[100]

> "A speaker S, by virtue of uttering X, presupposes Y."

Of importance here is what the speaker believes to be acceptable
to the addressee by saying what he says. When a speaker makes
an utterance within a particular context, then he assumes that
his interlocutor knows what he is talking about.

Stalnaker and, to some extent Leech, do not see any conflict
between logical and discourse or pragmatic presupposition. Leech
holds that pragmatic presupposition is both person oriented and
language oriented. He sees it as trying to interpret the
relationship between semantics and pragmatics i.e. between meaning
and use.[101] On the relationship between logical (semantic) and
discourse or pragmatic presuppositions Stalnaker says,[102]

> "... they are explications of related but different
> ideas. In general, any semantic presupposition of
> a proposition expressed in a given context will be
> a pragmatic presupposition of the people in that
> context, but the converse does not hold."

The main concern of this dissertation is discourse or pragmatic
presupposition where the conversation between discourse
participants hinges on assumptions made by both of them. In
the example given earlier about Takalani, it has been stated
that its use by the speaker presupposes that he believes his
addressee(s) or interlocutor knows who Takalani is.

Suppose a co-worker from Unisa were to say to me,

26. *"Ndo pfa u pfi rekitha u khou ya Japani"*
    '"I have just learnt that the rector is going to Japan."'

The use of the definite expression *rekitha* 'the rector' by the
speaker presupposes that he assumes that his co-worker at the
same University knows who he is referring to. In other words he
expects me to know that he is referring to Prof. Theo Van Wijk at
the time of writing, 1987.

In terms of the visible aspect of the situations, a speaker
usually refers to referents which his interlocutor can see and
he often refers to them without pointing at them because he
presupposes that they can be seen or are known to be there. If
we are seated in a room and one person says,

27. *"Valani vothi."*
     '"Close <u>the door</u>."'

The use of the definite expression *vothi* 'the door' as part of
the visible or extralinguistic situation presupposes that the
speaker is instructing the addressee to identify and to locate
the door, i.e. the door is there or it is visible to him.

It is also possible that in conversations, speakers overestimate
the knowledge they share with their addressee(s) or interlocutor(s)
or, due to lack of correct information, the speaker may fail to
refer successfully (as shown earlier on with the use of the proper
name <u>Takalani</u>).

In such cases, there is a presupposition failure as in the
discourse below: (An American Professor meets a gardener at
Unisa and asks him for information)

28. *Muprofesa: Hu ita hani?*
     Mushumi   : Ri hone.
     Muprofesa: Ndi khou ʈoda ofisi ya <u>mupresidende</u>, i ngafhi?

     Prof.   : 'How are you?
     Gardener : I am fine.
     Prof.   : I am looking for the office of <u>the president</u>,
                   where is it?'

The American professor here uses the definite expression
mupresidende 'the president' to refer to the rector or principal

of the University. What could be baffling to the gardener in
this case is who *mupresidende* 'the president' is at the university.
It is possible that the professor might get little, if any help
until he uses an expression such as *rekitha* or *phirisipala* 'rector'
or 'principal' because the expression used above is not used in
the same sense in this part of the continent. The discourse above
illustrates a case of a presupposition failure on the part of the
speaker.

When speakers make statements, ask questions, issue commands,
they expect positive answers from their addressees or interlocutors
because they assume that they share the same knowledge of referents
with them. In other words they expect them to co-operate and be
relevant.

1.4.2.2 Presupposition pool

When discourse participants continue to talk in turns, the
continuation of their conversation depends on their being topical.
They thus speak as if there is a pool of information common to
them both, from which they are able to take information. The term
presupposition pool is used in this case to refer to a common
ground which consists of knowledge that is known by both discourse
participants. In simple terms, a presupposition pool consists of
presuppositions from both discourse participants. It is a pool
of knowledge shared by both participants. Givon defines a
presupposition pool as,[103]

> "The bulk of background, presuppositional knowledge,
> (information) (that ... T.M.S.) is shared by all the
> members of a social unit."

This definition helps to clear the distinction between
presupposition and presupposition pool in that with the former,
it is the speaker who assumes that the addressee or interlocutor

shares knowledge of what he is talking about with him, whereas
with the latter both discourse participants do not assume but
know that they share information or knowledge of what they are
talking about. Venneman maintains that there is no need for
them to ascertain if they share knowledge in this case.[104]

What happens is that, as the discourse participants continue in
their conversation, their mutual knowledge expands, new information
that is introduced by the use of antecedents is referred to later
by the use of anaphors and so it becomes old or given information,
i.e. information shared by the discourse participants or knowledge
that is known to them. Venneman says of a presupposition pool,[105]

> "The information contained in this pool is constituted
> from general knowledge, from the situative context of
> the discourse, and from the completed part of the
> discourse itself."

Such information is referred to by proper names, definite
expressions, deictic expressions and specific indefinite
expressions, and, to some extent, non-specific referring
expressions.

As stated above, whatever is known or assumed to be known, becomes
part of the information pool and, when it is used, the addressee
is able to accept it without any challenge, as he too shares the
knowledge or information. The dynamic character of presupposition
pool is explained further by Venneman when he says:[106]

> "Each participant of a discourse is operating with
> his presupposition pool. His pool grows as the
> discourse proceeds. Each utterance made by
> another participant adds information to the pool."

Refer to the discourse below:

Madima[107]

29. *Ho no fhela tshifhinganyana, Maemu a ri, "Muhanelwa, ni vhona uri u vho swika 'fhi zwino?"*

"U ha Madonoro!"

"Ha Madonoro fhano-fhano?" ndi Maemu.

"Inwi ni vhona uri u khou swika 'fhi?" Ndi Adziambei a vhudzisaho.

"U vho fhira ha Mabonyane!"

"Nothe ni khou sokou amba", ndi Ndiambani, "nne ndi nga tou ri Tshilapfene-vho ha athu u swika, hune a vha hone ndi nga si hu divhe ndi hafhano." Vhothe vha sea.

'After a while, Maemu said, "Muhanelwa, where do you think he could be at this moment?"

"He is at Madonoro!"

"At Madonoro just here?" said Maemu.

"Where do you think he could be by now?" asked Adziambei.

"He is passing Mabonyane's!"

"All of you are merely guessing", said Ndiambani, "I think he has not reached Tshilapfene, but I cannot say with certainty where he can be now." They all laughed.'

In the discourse, participants are speaking about Maluta. In other words, the discourse topic is *Vhasidzana vha amba nga Maluta* 'The maidens/girls are speaking about Maluta'. In this case, there is shared presupposition or a presupposition pool from which they can draw discourse referents.

Maemu, who is the first speaker, draws Muhanelwa to a discourse referent Maluta whom he refers to with the concord *u* 'he' and also makes reference to where he could be at that time i.e. *ha Madonoro* 'at Madonoro'. Maemu too sustains the topic and refers to the place of reference *ha Madonoro* 'at Madonoro' as being at her or their deictic centre i.e. where she/they are, with the reduplicated demonstrative *fhano-fhano* 'here where we are/I am'. (To her *ha Madonoro* is as good as being at their own

village, i.e. where they are at the moment of speaking). When
Adziambei joins in the discourse, she too contributes to the
same discourse topic and still uses the anaphors u 'he', u 'he'
to refer to Maluṭa. Ndiambani, one of the maidens/girls, jokes
about Maluṭa's whereabouts and also refers to him with the anaphors
ha 'he', a 'he'.

It is very interesting to note that in the case above, each
speaker seems to be drawing information from the same pool and
adds to what has been said by the previous speaker.

Although presuppositions are always believed to be true, they
can also be untrue, for instance in cases where the speaker could
be telling lies or deceiving his interlocutor. On the other hand,
presupposition pools or shared presuppositions as illustrated
above always depend on the co-operative effort between the discourse
participants. The discourse participants operate from the same
common ground. The conversation proceeds as if tailored to reach
a certain goal. According to Brown and Yule,[108]

> "Each participant ... behaves as if there existed
> only one presupposition pool shared by all
> participants in discourse."

Normally, participants who know one another or come from the
same area or have the same interests tend to share a large pool
of information, hence their co-operativeness in discourse.
Besides, they are always guided by the discourse topic.

1.4.3 Inferences

In most discourses the addressees rely on inferences to arrive at
interpretations of certain utterances. This is because some
referents are not directly introduced. In such cases the
addressees have to bear in mind the context of situation in which

the referring expressions are used. Inferences are in fact
presupposed knowledge/information. Scholars seem to agree that
people make inferences from what has been conveyed by speakers
in order to understand or arrive at the same conclusion with them.
Brown and Yule maintain that,[109]

> "inferences are connections people.make when attempting
> to reach an interpretation of what they read or hear."

There are a number of types of inferences and in all of these
cases, inferences are made differently. Van Dijk and Kintch
maintain that inferences pose a problem and they write that,[110]

> "The biggest problem with discourse inferences is to
> determine when they are made."

They suggest that it is necessary to first find out whether they
are part of the comprehension or whether they occur optionally
after comprehension.

Brown and Yule indicate that inferences are 'missing links',[111]
and De Beaugrande maintains that they are gaps to be filled with
information.[112] This means that, in the cases above, the
information missing in the gaps is the link that is necessary
for successful communication.

Refer to the examples below:

30.(a) *Takalani o hwala zwiambaro zwawe.*
        .'Takalani carried his clothes.'

   (b) *Hemmbe a yo ngo ainiwa.*
        'The shirt has not been ironed.'

   (c) The clothes mentioned include *hemmbe* 'the shirt'.

Brown and Yule indicate that in the case above (c) can be looked

at as the missing link between the statements.[113]

De Beaugrande sees inferences in almost the same light as Brown
and Yule and he writes, "Inferencing is done whenever GAPS are
noticed among points in a knowledge space".[114]

This, according to Stein and Glenn makes inferences either omitted
or deleted information in an incomplete discourse. For
communication to be successful, these empty spaces should be
filled with categories that are generated by the discourse topic.
The generated categories are not supposed to change the subject.[115]
They write, "the inferential information should be of the same
categories as the deleted informations, this is the most obvious
way of maintaining the logical sequence."[116]

The gaps referred to above are not gaps in the literal sense but
are connections that are usually understood by the discourse
participants as shown by example (c) in the case above.

Brown and Yule as mentioned above, explain inferences in terms of
missing links. They say that,[117]

> "... the missing link expresses a type of a generally
> true relationship which might take the form of a
> universally quantified proposition such as every x
> has a y."

They further maintain that these missing links are formally
identifiable categories which could provide connections in
discourses. On the whole Brown and Yule, despite giving cases
of missing links, have reservations with the concept. They hold
that,[118]

> "the missing links are already part of the knowledge
> representation (e.g. frame, scheme) activated by one
> part of the text."

This means that what Brown and Yule have shown in example (c) is already part of the knowledge representation.[119] From the opinions above, it is quite clear that the concept 'missing link' is misleading and the same goes for De Beaugrande's gaps which need to be filled with information. After all, whenever something is left unsaid by the speaker, he assumes that his addressee will be able to bridge or add information. For this reason Havilland and Clark believe inferences are bridging assumptions.[120]

Brown and Yule are concerned with discourse inferences, i.e. anaphoric inferences which are triggered by first mentioned NP's or situations of utterances[121] or, in Hawkins's words 'triggered off by the mentioning of the first expression to which they are related';[122] Sometimes they are activated by the situation of the utterance. These expressions are context-dependent. They are called anaphoric expressions by Hawkins,[123] and inferrables by Prince who defines these inferrables as,[124]

> "... entities which the speaker assumes the hearer
> can infer from a discourse entity which has already
> been mentioned."

These inferrables are thus activated by the first mentioned or implied referring expression. Hawkins states that the mention of an indefinite expression in a particular discourse context can trigger off a series of other related associates[125] i.e. inferrables or anaphoric expressions as in the discourse below:

31. *Vhusiku nda lora ndo farwa nga munna,*
     zwanḓa zwi zwi ngafha, thoho yo tshena ...
     'During the night I dreamed of being gripped by a man,
     the hands were this big, the head was white ...'

In the discourse above, the definite anaphoric expressions *zwanḓa* 'the hands' and *thoho* 'the head' have been activated, or

triggered off, by the mention of the indefinite expression *munna*
'a man'. These anaphoric expressions are inferrables. The
referents denoted by the anaphoric expressions are parts of the
whole, i.e. the man or human being. Definite expressions can
also trigger off related associates as in,

32. *Nndwa yo ri u thoma nga 1939, maswole a thoma*
    dzinyonyoloso.

    'When the war started in 1939, the soldiers
    started with exercises.'

The definite expression *maswole* 'the soldiers' is related to the
definite expression *nndwa* 'the war' i.e. the soldiers who were
involved in the war.

On the other hand, anaphoric expressions can be activated or
triggered off by the situation of utterance. Suppose that on
arrival at home I say to my wife Salome,

33. *"Ñwana u ngafhi?"*
    '"Where is the child?"'

The expression *ñwana* 'the child' is definite here and specific.
Because I am speaking to my wife at our home, *ñwana* refers to our
own child i.e. *Oḓaho*. The definite referring expression *ñwana* 'the
child' has been activated by the immediate situation of utterance
and of course the identity of my addressee. The use of the same
expression to somebody other than my wife, would refer to some
other child unless the context in which it has been used makes
Oḓaho the only referent. For the addressee in both cases to
arrive at the correct interpretation of *ñwana* 'the child' it is
necessary to rely on the presupposed knowledge i.e. shared
information.

When the discourse participants decide on a topic framework, they
establish a common ground called presupposition pool which contains

shared information. As they continue conversing, they tend to add knowledge to the presupposition pool. The topic framework guides the speaker to be relevant. When he mentions an expression, it activates, evokes or triggers off other related or relevant expressions from the same presupposition pool in which both of them draw information. The meaning of these activated expressions is determined by the discourse context in which they occur.

The discourse below provides an illustration:

34. *Vho ri u swika hodelani ya Blue Waters, vha ya kha vhaṯanganedzi, aiwa, vho no fhedza avha vha vha isa ha minidzhere u bva afho phothara a vha dzhia.*

   'On their arrival at the Blue Waters hotel, they went to the receptionists; when they had finished, these took them to the manager and later on the porter took them away.'

The people spoken of in the discourse above have a hotel as their situation. It is generally assumed that hotels have receptionists, porters, managers, etc. In this discourse, therefore, the referring expressions such as *vhatanganedzi* 'the receptionists', *phothara* 'the porter' and *minidzhere* 'the manager' are associates or parts of the main referent *hodela ya Blue Waters* 'the Blue Waters hotel'. The mere mention of *hodela* 'the hotel', will always activate or trigger off other related expressions which are inferred from it.

In conclusion Brown and Yule simplify this case as follows,[126]

> "Given one particular situation such as a restaurant scene, the writer/speaker should not have to inform his reader/hearer that there are tables and chairs in the restaurant, or that one orders and pays for food consumed therein, knowledge of this sort about a restaurant is generally assumed."

Perhaps this case can be strengthened more by stating that inferences are context-dependent and are presupposed knowledge.

1.4.4 Conversational Implicatures

For any conversation to be purposeful and have direction, the discourse participants should look at it as a social contract, in other words, they should co-operate. It is possible in normal discourse for a speaker to use words in order to convey a message which will be understood by his interlocutor. For instance, at a funeral, somebody reading an obituary of the deceased can say, *"O vha a sa fhiri muthu."* (Lit. "He used not to pass people", i.e. "He used not to ignore people", or "He used to be helpful wherever there was a need.") This would be held to imply that he was generous, kind or helpful to people, but not that he would not pass people in the street or avoid them. In the case above, the speaker has used words to imply or suggest generosity or kindness which is totally distinct from the literal utterance. For the addressee or interlocutor to understand this, he should infer from the information he shares with the speaker. This is the social contract referred to above into which the discourse participants should enter.

Grice introduced the term "implicature" in his 1967 William Jones Lectures to explain the cases above.[127] He uses the term "to account for what a speaker can imply, suggest, or mean, as distinct from what the speaker literally says."[128] Levinson adds that,[129]

> "... the notion of implicature ... provides some
> explicit account of how it is possible to mean
> (in some general sense) more than what is
> actually 'said'..."

This would mean that any talk exchange needs a co-operative effort from the discourse participants so that there can be a purpose or set of purposes and direction.

He spoke of two types of implicatures viz. conventional implicatures and conversational implicatures. Conventional implicatures, according to Grice, are determined 'by the conventional meaning of the words used.'[130] For instance,

35. *Ndi Muvenda, ndi ngazwo a tshi konda.*
'He is a Muvenda, that is why he is difficult.'

In reality, being a Muvenda does not necessarily mean that one is difficult or vice-versa, but in the example above it conventionally implicates that.

In this study the emphasis will be on conversational implicatures. These are derived from a set of more general principles which regulate the proper conduct of conversation. In this connection, Grice[131] maintains that people should be co-operative in their discourse.

This co-operation is a purposive social interaction which is governed by the principle of co-operation usually called the co-operative principle. The co-operative principle can be looked at as a general agreement to co-operate between the discourse participants. The fact that the discourse participants adhere to the co-operative principle implies that whatever is implicated is shared by them.[132]

The co-operative principle has further been defined by Allerton as,[133]

> "... a tacit agreement understanding of just how much
> the speaker should actually say, how much leave
> unsaid, and how meanings are to be implicated beyond
> what is actually said."

The conversational implicatures are thus derived from this co-operative principle which has a number of maxims or conventions

which discourse participants should observe if their conversation
is to have a purpose or direction. The maxims discussed by Grice
are quantity, quality, relation and manner. These maxims are
explained as follows by Grice:[134]

(a)   Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is
                  required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
                  Do not make your contribution more informative
                  than is required.

(b)   Quality :   Try to make your contribution one that is true.

      Under this maxim he includes two other more specific ones.

      1.   Do not say what you believe to be false.
      2.   Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

(c)   Relation: Be relevant.

(d)   Manner   :   The super maxim is "Be perspicuous."

      and this includes other maxims such as:

      1.   Avoid obscurity of expression.
      2.   Avoid ambiguity.
      3.   Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
      4.   Be orderly.

Grice further indicates that there could be more than four, for
instance he mentions one as being, "Be polite." A number of other
scholars among them Kempson, Lyons, Brown and Yule and a host of
many others discuss the four maxims given above,[135] but Hurford
and Heasley have reduced them to three, viz. informativeness,
relevance and clarity.[136] Brown and Yule further note that all
these maxims can be summed up into one, the maxim of relevance.[137]

Looking at the maxims, it appears quite possible that they can be
applied either consciously or unconsciously. It has been indicated
that their application needs a co-operative effort. This helps the
discourse participants to speak topically and subsequently it

implies that they could be drawing information from the same
presupposition pool. In such cases then, they would be able
to share knowledge e.g. general knowledge, knowledge of the
situative context and/or that of the completed part of the
discourse. For instance people who know each other, or come from
the same area share such a large pool of information that the use
of implicatures will not be a problem.

When the speaker violates the maxims overtly, he does so because
he is trying to convey some information which he believes the
addressee will be able to interpret successfully. On the other
hand Kempson says that if the addressee is aware that the speaker
is flouting a maxim deliberately but observing the co-operative
principle, then she would reason it as follows:[138]

> "If he (the speaker ... T.M.S.) is observing the
> Co-operative Principle and if he is flouting
> a maxim in such a way that I shall notice the
> breakage, then he is doing so in order to convey
> some extra information which is in accordance
> with the Co-operative Principle, and moreover
> he must know that I can work out that information."

It is this extra information which is the implicature in any
conversation. In certain cases if a maxim has been unintentionally
flouted, the speaker can still get his message across. If he can
tell lies consciously or unconsciously the addressee may feel
mislead and will protest, but if the latter is not aware that he
is being mislead, the conversation can still proceed. The examples
below serve merely to show how implicatures are arrived at between
discourse participants who share information in one way or the
other:

36. *Odaho   :   Ndi tshifhinga de?*
    Lufuno: Watshi kheila!

    Odaho   :   'What time is it?
    Lufuno: There is the watch!'

The implicature used indicates that the maxim of relevance has been adhered to, in other words Odaho should check the time on the watch on her own.

The same can be said of the implicature in the discourse below:

37. *Bono   : Vho-Phirisipala vha hone?*
    Lindelani: Goloi i tshee hone.

    Bono   : 'Is the principal in?
    Lindelani: The car is still there.'

The presence of the car presupposes that the principal is still around.

In the discourse that follows the maxim of manner or clarity is observed:

38. *Unariṋe: Uyu ndi ene hwana waṋu?*
    Nduvho : Ndi wa mukomana wanga!

    Unariṋe: 'Is this your child?
    Nduvho : He is my brother's.'

The child is not hers. There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the implicature, besides it is brief and orderly.

Note how the maxims of quality and relation or relevance are deliberately violated in the discourse below:

39. *Mudededzi: He murathu, ndo fhelelwa nga piṯirolo, ndi nga thusea ngafhi?*
    Mutukana : Kha vha tse hafho mulamboni, hu na damu!

    Teacher : 'Hey brother, I am out of petrol, where can I get help?
    Boy   : Go down the riverside, there is a dam!'

The implicature here is that he will get help or petrol at the river/dam. The speaker is not being helpful in any way. He is rather misleading in his response. In other words he is not obeying the maxim of quality. Besides, whatever he is saying is not related to the request by the teacher. The boy is also irrelevant, he has not obeyed the maxim of relevance or relation.

Suppose a young man were to write a letter to a young girl declaring love to her and requesting a reply should the young girl approve, and the latter replied as follows in a telegram:

40. *"Ndo wana vhurifhi, ndi do fhindula."*
    '"I have received the letter, I shall reply."'

It has been stated earlier on that implicature is a concept related to utterance meaning. The reader should relate the answer above to the letter he had written. It is clear in the case above that there is very little information in the letter from the girl. The maxim of quantity has been flouted or violated deliberately. The implicature in this case implies that she is accepting his proposal. She still could have indicated this clearly on a whole page or more. All the same, the writer has obeyed the maxim of clarity or manner, she has been brief and to the point. There is no obscurity or ambiguity as both the young girl and young man share knowledge about the state of affairs. The maxim of quality has been observed too as the writer is not misleading or telling lies, the same can be said of the maxim of relevance. The writer has observed the co-operative principle.

What the reader i.e. the young man should do in order to understand and interpret the message successfully, is that he too should be co-operative. If he does this then he will be able to make out the extra information not contained in the linguistic content. Besides, the writer i.e. the young girl, knew when she wrote the letter that she was flouting the maxim of quantity and that the reader would be

able to make out what she had implied or suggested. Kempson explains that implicature should be seen as:[139]

> "assumptions over and above the meaning of the sentence used which the speaker knows and intends that the hearer will make, in the face of an apparently open violation to the Co-operative Principle, in order to interpret the speaker's sentence in accordance with the Co-operative Principle."

If a speaker were to tell lies in a conversation, then his interlocutor has the right to protest whether the speaker is doing it consciously or unconsciously. This can happen if the interlocutor has knowledge about the discourse topic. Telling lies or misleading the interlocutor is a violation or flouting of the maxim of quality. If the interlocutor shares knowledge of the topic with the speaker on the topic as indicated above, there can be a communication breakdown the more so because of the protest by the interlocutor and if none of the discourse participants decides to be co-operative. On the other hand, if the interlocutor does not share knowledge with the speaker the conversation will carry on as the former would not have any reason to protest for being mislead. The discourse below illustrates the point:

Magwabeni[140]

41. *Ndi tshi tou swika vhengeleni, ndi tshi kha ḓi tou ri zwino ndi a ḽi fhira, Mashudu, muhwe wa zwisidzanyana zwe nda vha ndi tshi zwi dededza, nda wana khoyu a tshi khou bva ngomu vhengeleni. U tou vhona fhedzi uri ndi vhothitshere vhawe nahone vha tou nga vha lwendoni, maipfi awe a u tou thoma u nthesha ngao a vha. "Vho-Thitshere, vha mbuele na malegere vha tshi vhuya ḓorobini." A si vhanzhi vhana vhe vha vha vho nḓowela sa ene Mashudu, ndi ngazwo o amba nga u ralo, (Ḓoroboni) o vha a tshi khou amba Gambani. Ndi tshi fhindula nda fhindula nga maipfi a vhulenda: "Ndi ḓo mu vhuela nao." Ndi tshi tou ralo nda vha ndo sima luimbo kha izwo zwine zwisidzanyana zwe a vha na zwo: "Na nṋe ... Na nṋe ... Na nṋe-vho." "Nṋe vha mbuele na maguwinya." Kha zwothe nda sokou ri "Ee," fhedzi mbiluni zwi siho. Zwe zwa vha hone zwi zwa uri arali midzimu ya tshimbila na nṋe yo ntsedza nga ḽito ḽivhuya, ndi khou vhonana navho lwa u*

fhedzisela u swikela wonoyo hwaha vha tshi vho tou gri
vhomme a vhomukene. Ndi sa athu tshimbila muvhundu
mungana ndo vha fhira, nda sokou pfa hanengei he vha
vha vha hone, "Musundwa uri u a vha funa." Nga ipfi
ḽi tshi khou tou vhidzelela. "Nne ni songo nzwifhela."
Ndi muhwe, na ene a tshi kho tou vhidzelela. "Zwavho
o amba." Nga maipfi oṱhe, nga nnda ha ḽa Musundwa.
Muhwe a fhedzisela nga u ri, "A thi ri no tou amba na;
na ita na uri vha ḓo ni fha tshelede, o!"

'On arrival at the shop before I could go past, Mashudu,
one of my students, appeared from that direction. When
she realized that her teacher was on a journey, she said
to me "Sir, please bring me sweets from the city."
There were very few students who were used to me except
for Mashudu, that is why she was very free with me.
(By city she was referring to Sibasa Camp, i.e. Sibasa).
I was very polite in answering her. "I shall bring you
some." My answer drew a chorus from the other little
girls around and they started to chant, "Me too ... me
too ... me too ..." "Please buy me some cakes." To all
these my answer was "Yes" and yet I was not serious. I
was busy praying to my gods to guide me as I was seeing
them for the last time until such time when they would
be mothers to their children. Before I could go very
far, I heard a voice, "Musundwa says she loves you!"
"Do not tell lies about me!" said another voice.
"Yes she has said it." This was said by the girls in a
chorus except Musundwa. Another one added, "But you've
said it and claimed that he would give you money!"'

In the discourse above some little girls saw their teacher passing
by and started asking for sweets and out of the blue one of them
claimed that Musundwa had expressed her love for him which according
to Musundwa was a lie. Musundwa here protests because she claims
it is a lie which indicates that the maxim of quality has been
deliberately violated and subsequently they were locked in a clash
as none of them refused to back down. This further led to a
communication breakdown as Musundwa decided to keep quiet and not
pursue the subject any longer. Musundwa in this case has flouted
the maxim of quantity deliberately for she should have given him
more information on the issue. (She felt that the teacher was
being misled). On the other hand it is possible that she might

have said it hence her friends protested seeing that she was
deliberately violating the maxim of quality.

The maxim of relation as Grice[141] calls it or relevance as
referred to by Hurford and Heasly[142] seems to be the cornerstone
of any purposeful communication. The violation of this maxim
consciously or unconsciously brings about a communication
breakdown especially where both the discourse participants share
knowledge.

Once a speaker is irrelevant in a conversation, the interlocutor
will always protest when he notices it because he will have
realized that the former has not observed the co-operative
principle. Sometimes the talk-exchange can continue with each
speaker contributing to his own topic until one of them decides
to negotiate that they co-operate together for their conversation
to be purposeful and have direction.

In discourse (21) in a conversation between Takalani and
Sandani the maxim of relevance is flouted by Sandani deliberately.
Takalani is proposing love to her but instead of contributing to
the previous utterances she contributes towards her own topic.
In other words, she becomes irrelevant and remarks about the
weather. Although Takalani is aware of this he ignores it in the
hope of a positive answer. There is therefore no co-operation
between the two discourse participants. The case in the discourse
below is different. Although Adziambei decides to be irrelevant
by introducing her own topic, Maluta calls her to order and
negotiates for sanity in their conversation.

Madima[143]

42. *"Na hezwi ndo ni fara ndi pfa na mbilu yanga i tshi
tou tshina nga dakalo." "Zwino hafhu na dzina ni
tshi tou pfi Maluṱa, ri ḓo anḓana naa? Nne zwa u
itwa Matshinyise a thi zwi funi. Hone ni^nga mala
ri vhavhili na ri takula?" "Ni a ḓivha a zwi ni*

faneli u amba nga u ralo: Nna arali inwi no vha ni
nne, nne ndi inwi, ndo tou rali sa zwenezwi zwine na
vha zwone, no vha ni tshi do itani? No vha ni tshi
do litsha zwithu zwo ni fanelaho nga hone u ofha uri
vhathu vha do ri mini? Nne ndi uri a thi na mushumo
na muthu a dzulaho mudini wa hawe. Ndi mala ane a
fusha mato a nga na ane mbilu yanga ya mu takalela.
Aridi-vho zwenezwo arali ndo no di kundwa. U salela
a hu vhalwi." A tshi ralo u khou pferula mulilo a
funga segerete yawe a daha o di mu lavhelesa.

Adziambei a tshi todou kanganyedza, "Zwino zwenezwi
zwa segerete zwi difhelafhi vho? Ndi tshi fa hu u
fhisa yone tshelede." "Yone mushumo wayo ndi wani?
Na vha re nayo hafhu vha tshi di fa vha i sia. Kha
ri ambe ri pfane kha hayo mafhungo ..."

'"Even now that I am feeling the warmth of your skin I
feel contented deep in my heart." "I really understand
everything you are saying", said Adziambei, "But do
you ever think we shall be able to go on together;
mind you, your name spells it - Maluta, (one who causes
quarrels). I do not want to be labelled as the
destroyer. Do you think you will manage us, being two
(lit.)?" "You know, it does not befit you to speak
like that. What would you do if you were me and I were
you, being what you are? Do you think you would leave
what suits you because you fear what people might say?
I do not want to have anything to do with someone who
prefers to stay at (her) home. I marry the one who
satisfied the look in my eyes, in fact the one I love.
Well. I know I might fail, but there is no need to
hurry." Then he lit a cigarette and started smoking
whilst looking at her.

Adziambei tried to interrupt him, "But where is the
taste of such a thing as a cigarette? It is the same
as burning money itself." "Oh well, what is its use?
Even those who have it will die and leave it behind.
Let us talk and agree on this matter ..."'

Like in the case referred to earlier on between Takalani and
Sandani, Maluta is also proposing love, in his case to Adziambei.
At first Adziambei unlike Sandani is co-operative as she listens
attentively, but as the conversation proceeds, she flouts or
violates the maxim of relevance by introducing her own topic,
i.e. she remarks on the uselessness of cigarettes after Maluta

had lit one, saying, *"Zwenezwi zwa segereṱe zwi diphelaphi-vho?"*
'"Where is the taste in such things as cigarettes?"' instead of
responding to his proposal. The introduction of the new topic
here has been done without warning the interlocutor and is as
such a violation of the maxim of relevance and leads to the
violation of the co-operative principle. The implicature implied
by Adziambei's response could be held to be, "Let's change the
subject" or "I am so overwhelmed let me think about it." Maluta
here does not want to fail, he calls her to order, i.e. alerts
her and negotiates to take up the discourse topic of their love
again and says, *"Kha ri ambe ri pfane kha haya mafhungo (a u
malana) ..."* '"Let us talk and agree on this matter (of our
marriage) ..."' In other words he is appealing to her to be
relevant to their main topic.

Grice has according to Levinson been criticised by other scholars
who view his approach as 'a philosopher's paradise'.[144] They
maintain that it is impossible for people to apply the maxims
as stated, but Grice has pointed out that the maxims are not rules
to be learned, internalized and followed like table manners,
instead according to Levinson,[145]

> "Grice suggests that the maxims are in fact not
> arbitrary conventions, but rather describe
> rational means for conducting co-operative
> exchanges."

If conversational implicatures are to be successful in any form
of communication, the discourse participants should recognise and
observe the co-operative principle and the maxims. Shared
knowledge at various levels plays an important role as it determines
the progress of the conversation. It should be noted further that
each addressee would have his/her own interpretation of what the
speaker has implied. Furthermore anything uttered depends on the
context in which it has been said - after all, "What one says
depends on to whom one says it."[146]

1.4.5 Reference repairs

In any discourse, the flow of information is controlled,
questioned and corrected if there is something wrong. Although
the discourse participants are guided by the topic framework to
draw only relevant information or referents, they often pick out
inappropriate referents (information) and these are corrected so
that they can speak topically. The correction/replacement of
referring expressions is called repairing or reference repairing.
Ochs uses the terms replacement and reference repairs, while
Du Bois speaks of reference editing.[147] The term reference
repairs is used in pragmatics by most linguists among them Clark
and Marshall and Keenan and Schieffelin, inter alia.[148]

When one of the discourse participants realizes that an
inappropriate referring expression has been used he repairs it
or his interlocutor may do so. On repairing expressions Ochs
says,[149]

> "The speaker may replace one term with another
> because the initial term is inappropriate."

The place where the repairing is effected is called the troubled
source. When the repairing is done by the speaker, it is called
self-initiated repair and if it is done by the addressee/hearer,
when his turn as a speaker comes, it is called other-initiated-
repair. If the repairing is done in the same utterance by the
speaker, it is said to be a same-turn repair. If the speaker
decides to have his say and wait for his turn to repair a trouble
source or inappropriate referring expression, then we speak of a
next-turn repair.[150]

Usually repairing takes place in unplanned or spoken discourse
and is said to be unlikely in planned discourse. It should be
noted that the reason for repairing expressions is in one way or

another a way of clarifying it. Ochs explains the above as follows,[151]

>"When we speak of features as characteristic of
>relatively unplanned discourse, we mean that
>either the communicator has not planned his
>communication prior to the individual's speech
>act ...."

When the trouble source or inappropriate referring expression has been repaired, then the new referring expression offers more information about the referent i.e. the referent is made more conspicuous.[152]

This further explains that the referent can be located and be identified uniquely.

The following discourse illustrates the case:

43. A. *Sandani:*   *Ndi hone ni tshi swika?*
     B. *Funzani:*   *Ii, ndo da na Takalani, Takalani wa Thohoyandou.*
     C. *Sandani:*   *A thi ri ri fanela u ya miziamu u vhona phukha?*
     D. *Funzani:*   *Ri khou ya zuu.*
     E. *Sandani:*   *Hai, miziamu, tsini na zuu.*

     A. Sandani: 'Have you just arrived?
     B. Funzani: Oh yes, I have come with Takalani, Takalani of Thohoyandou.
     C. Sandani: Aren't we going to the museum to see the animals?
     D. Funzani: We are going to the zoo.
     E. Sandani: Oh no, to the museum, next to the zoo.'

In the above discourse, Funzani (B) uses the proper name *Takalani* to refer to an individual of whom his interlocutor knows of, but realizing that the interlocutor will confuse the referent, i.e.

because *Takalani* is less appropriate, she uses a self-initiated repair within the same sequence called same-turn repair and adds *"Takalani wa Thohoyandou"* 'Takalani of Thohoyandou'. Sandani (C) uses the definite expression *misiamu* 'the museum' and Funzani (D) finds it inappropriate and effects the other-initiated repair and use of the definite NP *zuu* 'the zoo', i.e. she did not cause the trouble source, but Sandani (C) is still not satisfied, according to her it is still inappropriate and she repairs it by using *misiamu, tsini na zuu* 'the museum next to the zoo'. Sandani's reference repair in (E) is called a next-turn-repair because she had to wait until her turn (second) came in order to effect a reference repair. If she were to wait again for her interlocutor to say something and then wait for another turn, it would be her third turn and we then would speak of a third-turn repair.

The fact that the discourse participants effect both self-and other-initiated repairs, shows that they are being co-operative i.e. they are adhering to the co-operative principle in order to speak topically. Furthermore, it indicates that they are aware of the topic framework which guides them to draw the relevant discourse referents from the same presupposition pool. Speech has been said to be a social contract by Clark and Haviland[153] so that when a mistake is committed by the speaker, his interlocutor who is under an obligation to be co-operative, is bound to correct him or else the speaker corrects himself.

SUMMARY

A discourse may be in the form of a monologue, dialogue or multiperson interaction between speaker(s) and addressee(s), writer(s) and reader(s), etc. For a discourse to be acceptable it must be coherent and relevant. A coherent discourse has to be topical in that, as has been alluded to, the repeated occurrences of discourse referents and co-operation of the participants hinges on the notion of relevance. It has further been shown that the discourse participants share the same presupposition pool, they are able to speak topically. In cases where there is communication breakdown, the participants alert each other or 'repair' the reference.

CHAPTER 2

REFERRING EXPRESSIONS AND THEIR REFERENTS

Referring expressions are expressions that are used in discourse
to refer to referents i.e. objects, events, people, states of
affairs, etc. To refer is to make known what the speaker is
talking about in the universe-of-discourse. Discourse participants
use definite and indefinite expressions to refer to either specific
or non-specific referents in linguistic or extralinguistic
situations. A definite expression is one that enables the addressee
to pick out or identify the referent that is being referred to. A
typical type of a definite expression is the definite noun phrase
which in for example English is characterised by the definite
article the 'the man' *munna* , others are pronouns such as *ene* 'he',
hoyu 'this', qualificatives *wawe* 'his', the reflexive *ḍi-* and
the subject and object concords. It should be noted that Venda
and some of its sister languages do not have articles such as the
found in English but the definiteness of noun phrases is determined
by the contexts in which they are used (as is also the case with
English). Indefinite expressions are those which are characterised
by for example the English indefinite article a(n) 'a man' *munna*,
quantified noun phrases such as *vhanna vhoṱhe* 'all men', *vhaṅwe*
vhana 'some children', pronouns *tshiṅwe tshithu* 'something', etc.

Referring expressions are used to refer to either specific or
non-specific referents in the universe-of-discourse. Specific
referents are those that can be identified uniquely in either
linguistic or extra-linguistic situations and non-specific ones
are those that cannot be identified uniquely in the situations
above but which can be indirectly associated with them, in other
words they can be talked about in discourses. The following
discourse illustrates:

1. *Andani* : *Vhophirisipala vho renga goloi; vha ri
   idani (inwi) na Itani.*

   Takalani: *I ngafhi?*

   Andani : *Kheilaa!*

   Takalani: *E, na nne ndi toda u renga goloi.*

   Andani : 'The principal has bought a car; he says
   you must come with Itani.

   Takalani: Where is it?

   Andani : There it is!

   Takalani: Oh, I too would like to buy a car.

In the discourse above, the definite and indefinite expressions
used refer to both specific and non-specific referents. For
instance the definite noun phrase *Vhophirisipala* 'the principal',
the proper name *Itani*, the concords *i* 'it', and *vha* 'he', the
deictic expressions i.e. pronouns *inwi* 'you' in *idani* 'you must
come', demonstrative *kheilaa* 'there it is' and the indefinite
noun phrase *goloi* 'a car' (as used in the discourse by Andani)
all refer to specific referents in the linguistic and the extra-
linguistic situations, but the indefinite noun phrase *goloi* 'a
car' as used by Takalani in the discourse refers to a non-specific
referent i.e. it is not identified. If on the other hand Takalani
had a particular car in mind, then he would be referring to a
specific one. In such a case therefore, it would be appropriate
to note that there is a would-be or potential referent.

The term referring expression is not acceptable to all linguists
and is not always used in the same sense as it is being used in
this dissertation. Cooper holds that a referring expression is
one that refers to a specific or particular referent only, which
implies that the expression which refers to a non-specific referent
is a non-referring expression.[1] The same opinion is held by
Hurford and Heasley.[2] Thrane prefers the term referential
expression to referring expression because to him the latter
carries the implication that there is a referent for any referring

expression.[3]

To Thrane, the term <u>referential expression</u> is more of a superordinate term which includes the terms <u>referring</u> and <u>non-referring</u> expressions[4] and he defines it as follows:[5]

> "I shall call every occurrence of an NP a referential
> expression, and I shall define a referential
> expression as an expression by the employment of
> which we may speak about objects, persons, substances,
> occurrences, emotions, persons, etc."

Thrane's use of the term <u>referential expression</u> is on a par with the use of the term <u>referring expressions</u> in this study. There are other scholars among them Bhat and Searle who use the term as Thrane does,[6] but since the distinction between the two is rather technical, the term <u>referring expression</u> will be used instead.

The question of when an expression is a referring expression and when a referent is a discourse referent has been an ongoing problem in the philosophy of language and linguistics. It has been indicated in (1.4.2) that according to Frege an assertion is made, when a referring expression in that assertion designates something.[7]

On the whole, the issue among certain philosophers and linguists is that an expression is referring or refers if its referent really exists. This has always presented scholars with problems. It has been the practice of certain linguists when writing on reference to concern themselves with how speakers use language to refer to referents in the universe-of-discourse. In other words, in discourse the concern is not with correct but with successful reference. This further indicates that although discourse participants should use referring expressions to refer correctly, they should note that these are being used in both the real and the imaginary or fictional world. For this reason the referents

in the universe-of-discourse are either real or imaginary and the question of truth and existence is not an issue. In this instance therefore the linguist has before him referents in this world which include the stars, continents such as America, Asia, Africa, etc., the fictional world of Shakespeare with fictional characters as Romeo and Juliet, Hamlet, etc., the world of Bernard Shaw with Higgins, Eliza Dolittle, etc., the world of E.S. Madima, T.N. Maumela, O.K. Matsepe and their characters Maluta and Adziambei, Vele and Elelwani, Mphoka and Taodi and many others. Such fictional referents include those that can be created by any writer, speaker, etc., in any discourse as long as their existence has somehow been established in the universe-of-discourse. Bhat says,[8]

> "As far as natural languages are concerned, even imaginary and would-be referents are existing."

One may also use a denoting expression which is non-referring, for example consider the negative sentence below:

2. *A tho ngo vhona <u>ndau</u>*
   I saw no <u>lions</u>

The expression *ndau* 'lions' as used in the above example is non-referring as it does not refer to a referent.[9]

The specific and non-specific dichotomy of referents based on their existence in the real world, has led some scholars to believe that referring or referential expressions refer to specific referents only, and that non-referring or non-referential expressions refer to non-specific referents only. This has led these scholars to believe that only the so-called specific referents are discourse referents and the non-specific ones are not, and that, as a result, their reference in discourse has caused some problems. For instance, the coreferentiality between the antecedent "a girl" and the anaphor "her" in the discourse below is puzzling to

scholars such as Lyons:[10]

3. John wants to marry <u>a girl</u> with green eyes and
   take <u>her</u> to Ireland <u>with him</u>.

Lyons is puzzled by such coreferentiality and he writes,[11]

> "The fact that, under certain circumstances, a pronoun
> can have an antecedent used non-referentially is
> troublesome for any straightforward theory of
> pronominalization which is based on the notion of
> co-referentiality. Two expressions cannot have the
> same reference if one of them is not a referring
> expression at all."

Lyons is, however, aware of such occurrences of antecedents and
anaphors but fails to account for their coreferentiality. To him
the indefinite noun phrase "a girl" is non-referring or non-
referential because the referent to which it refers does not exist
and is thus non-specific which implies that it is not a discourse
referent. The occurrence of the anaphor "her" is thus puzzling.
Lyons is not alone in this case, most of those who believe that
referring expressions refer to specific referents only have the
same problem. In this study both real and imaginary or would-be
referents exist and therefore they can all be discourse referents,
be introduced into discourse by antecedents and be referred to by
anaphors and thus display relationships such as coreference,
interreference, etc., whether they are specific or non-specific.

2.1 THE INDEFINITE EXPRESSIONS

Indefinite expressions, as indicated earlier, are, for example,
in English characterised by the indefinite article <u>a(n)</u>; and
their indefiniteness in Venda, as also in English, is determined
by the context in which they are used. Besides, there are
indefinite pronouns, quantified expressions and classified

expressions which are used in discourse to refer to either
specific or non specific referents. They are basically used to
introduce referents into the discourse. Louwrens has this
to say to strengthen the point above.[12]

> "The referents of indefinite noun phrases ...
> are not presupposed to be uniquely.
> identifiable by the addressee, even though
> such noun phrases may refer to a particular
> referent within specific contexts."

This is the non specific use of indefinite expressions. Whenever
an indefinite expression is used, the addressee is not expected
to identify any referent in any context but he should rather
register the new referent in his memory.

It has been indicated earlier that indefinite expressions are
used to refer to specific or non-specific referents. Although
some philosophers believe that they are used to refer to non-
specific referents only, this is not always the case. Specific
referents can be referred to by the use of indefinite noun phrases
such as *munna* 'a man', *ñwana* 'a child'; qualified expressions such
as *vhanna vhavhili* 'two men', *vhañwe vhasidzana* 'some girls', and
classified expressions such as *vhathu vha si vhanzhi* 'a number of
people', etc. Non-specific referents can be referred to by the
use of indefinite noun expressions such as *munna* 'a man', generic
and attributive expressions such as any of the non-specific
indefinite expressions given above.

The discourse below illustrates the case:

4. *Takalani:*   *Odaho, ndi pfa u pfi Andani o renga <u>goloi</u>.*
    Odaho   :   *Eya, zwino na inwi ni toda u renga <u>goloi</u>.*
                   O i renga ngafhi?
    Takalani: *O rengiselwa nga <u>muñwe munna</u>.*
    Lena   :   *<u>Goloi</u> i dina petirolo.*
    Phumudzo: *Andani ndi <u>mudededzi</u> u do vhonana nazwo.*
    Odaho   :   *Lena idanu u <u>nnekedza peni</u>.*

Takalani: 'Oḓaho, I learn Andani has bought <u>a car</u>.

Oḓaho : Is that so, do you also want to buy <u>a car</u>? Where did he buy it?

Takalani: It was sold to him by a <u>certain man</u>.

Lena : The problem with <u>a car</u> is petrol.

Phumudzo: Well, <u>Andani</u> is a <u>teacher</u>; she will be able to cope.

Oḓaho : Lena, please pass me <u>a pen</u>.'

In the discourse above, both specific and non-specific indefinite expressions have been used. The indefinite noun phrase or expression *goloi* 'a car' used by Takalani refers to a specific car, i.e. one that the speaker has knowledge of, but *goloi* 'a car', as used by Oḓaho, has an attributive reading (i.e. there is a potential car) and has been used to refer to a non-specific but potential or would-be referent (this is deduced from the context). The quantified expression *muħwe munna* 'a certain man' refers to a specific man but *goloi* 'a car' as used by Lena is a generic expression and has been used in this context to refer to a car in general which is obviously not a specific one. The indefinite expression *mudededzi* 'a teacher' is a predicative noun phrase and does not refer to any referent at all; it predicates the proper name *Andani*, in other words it is a non-referring indefinite expression. The indefinite expression *peni* 'a pen' has been used here to refer to a referent that could be in that situation of utterance but it is not a specific one, instead, it refers to any pen.

2.1.1 Generic indefinite expressions

It was indicated earlier in (2.1) that generic expressions do not refer to specific referents. Bhat holds that they are used to refer to characteristics that are connected with the use of the expressions. For instance, he maintains that in,

5.   <u>An elephant</u> likes peanuts

the characteristic of liking peanuts is asserted as in some way connected with the set of characteristics underlying the use of the expression <u>an elephant</u>.[13]   Hartmann and Stork define a generic term as follows:[14]

> "A word which denotes a whole range of members of
> a given subclass."

In this way, when a generic referring expression is used, it represents a class and not a specific referent.   According to Bhat, a generic referring expression is used to refer to the characteristics which are connected with the referent.[15]   The generic referring expression is thus used to refer to "a concept".

Generic referring expressions occur as indefinite noun phrases, plural noun phrases and definite noun phrases.   But we are here more concerned with the indefinites only, i.e. generic indefinites and plural generic indefinites.

The generic indefinite referring expression is used to refer exclusively i.e. to one member of a class or set.   The indefinite referring expression *ħwana* 'a child' in:

6.   *Ħwana u funesa zwiḻiwa*
     '<u>A child</u> likes food'

has a generic or non-specific interpretation. Generically, it does not refer to a specific child, but to a child in general. The identity of the referent is, according to Hawkins, random and arbitrary to both the speaker and hearer.[16]

2.1.2 Plural generic indefinite referring expressions

Plural generic referring expressions are used to refer to every member of a class or set. The generic plural referring expressions *vhadededzi* 'teachers' and *vhana* 'children' in:

7. *Vhadededzi vha funesa u imbisa vhana*
   'Teachers like conducting (school) children'

have been used to refer to anyone who is a teacher or child, who has been and who will ever be a teacher or child.

2.1.3 Attributive indefinite expressions

Indefinite expressions can also be used to refer to imaginary or would-be referents as has already been indicated above in (2.1). Attributive expressions, as will be shown later on, refer to non-specific referents, in other words their use does not presuppose shared knowledge of referents between the discourse participants.[17] However, their occurrence in discourse makes them read ambiguously, as in the case below:

8. *Ra swika u do ri thavhela khuhu*
   'If we visit him he will slaughter a chicken for us'

is ambiguous i.e. it has both a specific and non-specific reading. It refers to a specific referent if the speaker has one in mind, perhaps a chicken that he had been promised or shown to him earlier.

It should be noted that in this event, the referent would be specific to the speaker but not to the addressee. However, if the reception of the would-be host had been that of hospitality to his long-time friends, the speaker can deduce from the situation that "a chicken" would be slaughtered for them, although they may

be given another sort of food, not necessarily chicken.

The referent in this case is imaginary, and therefore non-specific to both discourse participants.

2.1.4 Predicative noun phrases

There are indefinite expressions which often occur as predicative nominals. These expressions basically have a function of predicating certain properties of the individuals or objects that are referred to by the subject noun phrase.[18] For instance, consider the example below:

9. *Takalani ndi mudededzi.*
    'Takalani is a teacher'

In the above case, the indefinite expression *mudededzi* 'a teacher' has been used predicatively, it does not refer to any discourse referent but merely predicates the proper name Takalani. *Takalani* and *Mudededzi* 'a teacher' are but one and the same referent, but do not co-refer to the same referent. The indefinite expression *mudededzi* 'a teacher' is merely stating some of the essential characteristics found in *Takalani*. Thus this expression *mudededzi* 'a teacher' does not refer to a specific referent.

In this dissertation whether a referent is specific or non-specific, as long as it can be talked about, will be introduced into the discourse by an indefinite expression which will serve as an antecedent and this means that it will have been established in the universe-of-discourse and can then be referred to later on by means of anaphors. It has been alluded to earlier on in (2.0) that the objective of reference here is successful but not necessarily correct reference.

For instance, the indefinite expression below has non-specific
referents i.e. ñwana 'a child' (generic) in (10) and *khuhu* 'a
chicken' (attributive) in (11) can be referred to by anaphors
such as in the two discourses below:

10. *Ñwana u funesa zwiḽiwa, a sa fhiwa u a liḽa.*
    Ene u ṱoḓesa u ḓzuḽa o bebiwa.

    'A child likes food, if s/he is not given, s/he
    cries. S/he likes being (s/he be) carried by
    someone (on her back) always.'

11. *Ra swika u ḓo ri thavheḽa khuhu. I ḓifhesa arali*
    ni vhanzhi. Do tou humbuḽa wo fara ṇama yayo.

    'If we visit him he will slaughter a chicken for
    us. It is more tasty when you are many. Just
    imagine enjoying its meat.'

Note in the two discourses above that both the generic and
attributive indefinite expressions occurring as antecedents,
ñwana 'a child', and khuhu 'a chicken', occur with their anaphors
and the discourse topics continue to make sense. The non-specific
referents referred to above do "exist" in the universe-of-discourse
established by the speaker. The anaphors a 's/he', u 's/he', ene
's/he' and o 's/he' refer to the indefinite generic expression
ñwana 'a child' i.e. the antecedent and i 'it' and yayo 'its'
refer to the attributive indefinite expression khuhu 'a chicken'
i.e. the antecedent respectively. Note that the possessive yayo
'its' refers dually i.e. the concord ya- refers to the possessee
ṇama 'meat' and the stem -yo to the possessor khuhu 'a chicken'.
In the same manner any other indefinite expression that refers to
a non-specific referent can establish an antecedent-anaphor
relationship.

Lyons says in conclusion:[19]

> "Whether an indefinite expression --- is being used with
> specific reference or not, the speaker can go on to say
> something more about the referent and, in doing so, he
> can subsequently refer to it by a demonstrative or
> personal pronoun or a definite expression."

2.2 DEFINITE EXPRESSIONS

The use of definite expressions has been discussed in many works
of linguistics. Definite expressions are used to refer uniquely.
Definite NP's familiarize the referent and scholars have always
referred to their use in context.

Hurford and Heasley write that,[20]

> "DEFINITENESS is a feature of a noun phrase selected
> by a speaker to convey his assumption that the hearer
> will be able to identify the referent of the noun
> phrase, usually because it is the only thing of its
> kind in the context of the utterance, or because it
> is unique in the universe of discourse."

Allerton writes the following on the use of the definite
expression:[21]

> "... the listener's task (is...T.M.S) to identify the particular
> referent that the speaker has in mind."

This idea is discussed at length by Hawkins in his location theory
of definiteness. Hawkins further maintains that once a definite
noun phrase is used, then the discourse participants share knowledge
of the referent.[22] Vennemann broadens the scope of this definition
by stating that the discourse participants will always use definite
expressions if they are drawing information from the same
presupposition pool.[23] Chafe adds that when a definite expression
is used, the referent is categorized, i.e. individualized,
particularised or specified.[24]

Donnellan writes extensively on the use of the definite expressions
and he says,[25]

> "... a person who uses a definite description referentially
> believes that what he wishes to refer fits the description.
> Because the purpose of using the description is to get the
> audience to pick out or think of the right thing or person..."

The right thing or person that is often referred to as the
referent, is or can be identified uniquely. To add to the above,
Chafe says that when we use a definite NP then we presuppose that,[26]

> "the speaker knows about a certain subset or instance ...
> he assumes that the hearer also had such knowledge,
> and ... he assumes that the hearer knows that he is
> presently talking about this subset or instance."

Chafe's view involves co-operation between the discourse
participants. In this case, they continue to communicate on a
specific discourse topic and whatever is introduced in discourse
is referred to again with full knowledge that there is co-operation
on the part of the hearer.

Searle emphasises that the essence of definite reference presupposes
the existence and uniqueness of the referent.[27] It is clear, in
this instance, that whatever is unique is known to exist. It could
be there in the environment or have been mentioned earlier; some
definite expressions are made definite by entailment, in other
words, they are activated by the first mention of certain indefinite
expressions.[28] Some are, however, activated by the situation of
utterance.

We share knowledge in one way or the other of referents that exist.
Whenever we refer to them in discourse we are reviving them.
Lyons, reviewing Hawkins' location theory, writes that the definite
expression is used,[29]

> "to indicate that the reference is being made to the
> object the identity of which is known to both speaker
> and hearer; this may be because the referent has been
> previously mentioned in the discourse, because its
> identity is made clear by the context of utterance, or
> because speaker and hearer have a certain shared
> knowledge which serves to make the reference unambiguous."

It can be deduced from the above that whenever speakers realize

that they have a shared knowledge of a referent, they use
definite expressions. Shared knowledge is information that is
common to both discourse participants. This is information which
they are able to draw from the same presupposition pool. When
information is introduced into the discourse by means of
indefinite or definite expressions, it is then registered or
stored in the memory of the addressee(s), and this is referred to
later on by means of anaphors which are usually definite
expressions.[30] Although indefinite anaphors are also used, their
use is on a very small scale.

Although definite expressions are basically used as anaphors in
linguistic contexts, they also have a deictic function, in other
words they are used to refer to referents in extra-linguistic
situations. Definite expressions are used in discourse to refer
to specific and non specific referents. It has been explained
that specific referents are those that can be identified by the
discourse participants and non-specific ones are would-be,
imaginary or potential referents which are, of course,
unidentifiable, as such.

2.2.1   Specific definite expressions

Specific definite expressions are used to refer to identifiable
referents in the universe-of-discourse. Such referents are
familiar because they may be inherently specific such as *ḓuvha*
'the sun', *ṅwedzi* 'the moon', etc. or they could have been
mentioned in a prior discourse or are triggered by the situation
of utterance so that they can be revived by the use of anaphors
i.e. in the linguistic context, or they could be in the extra-
linguistic situation where they can be seen by the discourse
participants.

2.2.1.1   Referents in the linguistic context

In a discourse, speakers introduce referents by means of
indefinite expressions i.e. new information, and then refer to
them later by means of definite expressions or anaphors. Anaphors
are of various kinds;   among these are definite noun phrases,
pronouns, qualificatives, the subject and object concords and the
reflexive *ḍi-*.

The discourse below illustrates:

> 12. *Ndo ri u swika nda vhona munna nda pfa ndo tshuwa*
> *vhukuma. Ḽiboho ḽa ndavhelesa nda sokou ho. Ndo*
> *no sedza hoṱhe ene a ima tsini na nnḍu nda mbo ḍi*
> *zwi vhona uri ndi yawe. O ri u ntsedza hafhu, a*
> *ḍisungusedza a mbo ḍi dzhena fhaḽa nne- vho nda*
> *mbo ḍi ṱuwa.*
>
> 'When I arrived I saw a man, and I was so frightened.
> The bulldozer looked fiercely at me but I kept quiet.
> After I had looked around, he went to stand next to
> a hut and I then realized that it was his. He then
> looked at me again and he straightened himself up,
> and then entered (there) and I took my own direction.'

In the discourse above, the indefinite noun phrases *munna* 'a man'
and *nnḍu* 'a hut' introduce referents into the discourse. They
provide new information and refer to specific referents. The
other expressions are all definite and anaphoric and they have
been used to refer to their antecedents in the discourse. The
definite noun phrase *ḽiboho* 'the bulldozer' is anaphoric to the
antecedent *munna* 'a man', so are the personal pronoun *ene* 'he',
the concord *o* 'he', the reflexive *ḍi-* in *ḍisungusedza* and the
possessive *yawe* 'his' which refers dually. The possessive concord
ya- refers to the possessee *nnḍu* 'a hut' and the possessive stem
-we refers to the possessor *munna* 'a man'. The demonstrative
pronoun *fhaḽa* 'there' is anaphoric to its antecedent *nnḍu* 'a hut'.
Note further that in the discourse above the first person concords
nd-o 'I', *nda* 'I', *nda* 'I', *nd-o* 'I' and *n-* 'me' in *ndavhelesa*,
nda 'I', *nd-o* 'I', *nda* 'I', *n-* 'me' in *ntsedza* 'looked at me' and

nda 'I' have been used by the speaker to refer to himself. They are basically deictic but do in fact function as anaphors, albeit indirect anaphora; they are interpretable in a text. All these definite expressions used above refer to specific referents i.e. their knowledge is shared by the discourse participants.

In a discourse such as the one below (13), not all definite expressions which function as anaphors have antecedents, as in the case above. Instead they are made definite by entailment or are triggered off by the situation of utterance. The mention of one referent as being at a particular place activates a series of other related ones depending on the context. These expressions are used to refer to referents that are parts of the first mentioned referents. These expressions are called associative anaphoric expressions.[31] Prince calls them inferrables.[32] Consider the discourse below.

13. *Ndo swika nda vhona nndu, fasitere lo vha lo vulwa, vothi lo ...*

  'On arrival I saw a hut; the window was open and the door was ...'

In the discourse above, the indefinite noun phrase *nndu* 'a hut' is the first mentioned expression and introduces a referent into the discourse. Although they do not refer directly to their antecedents as in the cases above in (12), the expressions *fasitere* 'the window' and *vothi* 'the door' are definite and have been triggered off by the mention of *nndu* 'a hut'. These anaphors or definite expressions refer to specific referents which can be identified within that particular universe-of-discourse.

Some definite expressions are triggered off by the situation of utterance i.e. in the immediate and non-immediate situations.

Consider the discourse below:

14. *Muṱa u ṱafulani hu khou ḽiwa*

   Sandani : *Vusani no vala gethe?*

   Vusani : *Goloi i tshee nnḓa ndi ḓo vala.*

   Andani : *A ni sa vali a ḽo ngo kovhela?*

   Vusani : *Ndi khou shavha mmbwa!*

   Takalani: *Nandi..., ndi pfa u pfi no vha ni
               Thohoyandou, no vhuya na ya hodelani.*

   Vusani : *Ro ṱwa yunivesithi.*

'The family is at table enjoying lunch

   Sandani : Vusani did you close the gate?

   Vusani : The car is still outside, I shall close (it).

   Andani : But why didn't you close (it), is it not
              already dark?

   Vusani : I am afraid of the dog!

   Takalani: By the way, I understand you were at
              Thohoyanḓou, did you go to the hotel?

   Vusani : Well, we spent the whole day at the university.'

In the discourse above, the definite noun phrases *gethe* 'the gate',
goloi 'the car' and *mmbwa* 'the dog' have been triggered off or
initiated by the situation of utterance. They all refer to
referents which can be found within that immediate situation of
utterance, and are thus specific. On the other hand, the definite
noun phrases *hodela* 'the hotel' and *Yunivesithi* 'the University'
have been triggered off by the mention of *Thohoyandou* which refers
to a non-immediate situation. The use of these definite expressions
presupposes that the discourse participants involved share knowledge
of the referents in question and that they can identify them. Such
referents are specific or particular.

2.2.1.2 Referents in the extra-linguistic context

Certain referents may be in the extra-linguistic or utterance
situation where they can be seen by both or by one of the discourse

participants. In this case then, the speaker uses a deictic
expression so as to draw the attention of his interlocutor towards
the intended referent.

Deictic expressions that are used in Venda are demonstratives,
personal pronouns, definite noun phrases, subject and object
concords and possessives. These deictic expressions are definite
and are used to refer to specified referents in the extra-linguistic
situation. Consider the discourse below:

15. *Sandani* : *Inwi! Vhudzani hoyo a de (hafha).*
    Takalani: *Ni khou amba nne? (U ralo a tshi disumba).*
    Vusani : *(Takalani u sumbedza u tshuwa).*
    O ita mini murathu?
    Takalani: *(A tshi khou dzhena) A thi divhi.*
    Vusani : *Kha vale vothi. Ndi bugu yanu?*
    (A tshi khou mu sumbedza)

    Sandani : 'You! Call that one to come (here).
    Takalani: Are you referring to me? (He answers while
              pointing at himself)
    Vusani : (Takalani appears frightened).
             What did you do young brother?
    Takalani: (Entering) I don't know.
    Vusani : Close the door. Is this your book?
             (Showing him)

In the discourse above the referents are visible to both discourse
participants. The personal pronoun *nne* 'I' and concord *thi* 'I',
and the second person pronoun *inwi* 'you' refer to the speaker and
addressee respectively. The concords are not inherently deictic
but can function deictically. *Ni* 'you' and *o* 'you' have been used
to refer to the addressee Sandani in both cases. Their pronominal
counterparts are *inwi* 'you' and *ene* 'you' (the concord *o* 'he' has
been used for the second and not third person singular in this

context). The demonstrative *hoyo* 'that one' has been used to refer to a person who is in the second point of reference or in the vicinity of the addressee. *hafha* 'here' has been used by the speaker Sandani to refer to where she is i.e. the deictic centre. It is also interesting to note that definite noun phrases can also be used deictically too. In this case, *vothi* 'the door' refers to one which is in the vicinity of the addressee Takalani. The possessive is always used to refer to two referents simultaneously. In this case, *yaṇu* 'yours' as in the case of anaphora refers dually (see 12), the possessive concord *ya-* refers to the possessee, *bugu* 'the book' and the stem *-ṇu* refers to the possessor *Takalani*. The speakers can, if they choose, accompany their use of deictic expressions by pointing or gesturing. Chafe has the following to say on deictic expressions as definite expressions.[33]

> "Words like <u>this</u> or <u>that</u> include the status of
> definiteness in what they convey, but they also include
> an indication of why the speaker expects the
> addressee to be able to identify the referent:
> its closeness to the speaker or to this point in
> the discourse, its distance from the one or the
> other or the like."

2.2.1.3 <u>Proper names</u>

Proper names are definite expressions that are used in discourse to refer to people, places, and objects, that are specific.

Proper names have a conventional meaning according to Bhat.[34] As soon as a person is assigned a name, then he/she is known by that name. Whatever he does or says constitutes what he is, in other words all his characteristics are tied up to his name. For this reason, proper names have a conventional meaning. Whenever they are used in a discourse, the speaker has a specific individual or place in mind which he believes the hearer will be able to identify uniquely. Besides, whenever they are used, the discourse

participants share the same presupposition pool. If, however,
they disagree in the course of the discourse, they are obliged
to repair the reference so that they can speak topically.

2.2.1.3.1   The view of scholars on proper names

There have been controversies over whether proper names have
meaning or not. This has given rise to various schools of thought,
with many scholars postulating their own theories. To date there
are two major schools of thought, viz. one which proposes that
they have meaning, i.e. the pro-meaning proponents and one which
claims that proper names are meaningless. Proper names have been
called "meaningless marks" by Mill, "disguised descriptions" by
Russell, "rigid designators" by Kripke, etc. Mill has been
severely criticised for maintaining that proper names are
meaningless and Russell for holding that names are disguised
descriptions.[35]

The answer at which the proponents of meaningful proper names
arrive is that proper names should be used in discourse to display
their meaningfulness and informativeness and thus refer uniquely
to their bearers or designata.

Mill claims that they are mere marks of identification which have
no meaning. He holds that we name the idea of an object and not
the object itself.[36] To him there is a one-to-one correspondence
between a name and an individual. In criticising Mill, Sørensen
illustrates their informativeness by using what he calls a word-idea
game to show that proper names have meaning.[37] Sørensen says
that, for instance, one can find a number of attributes which can
build up a girl-idea such as female, child, etc. Sørensen says
that in the same manner we can play a name-game so as to determine
its meaning. He uses the name Paris to illustrate that name-idea
and he gives the following characteristics:[38]

(a) The largest city on the Seine.

(b) The capital of France.

and he states,[39]

> "We have an idea of something which satisfies the
> necessary and sufficient conditions to be
> satisfied by something in order that it may
> correctly be said to be denoted by Paris."

Following Sørensen's game, one can determine the meanings of
people's names and of places e.g.

Johannesburg-idea

(a) The largest city in RSA.

(b) The metropolitan city of RSA.

(c) The city of gold.

Tutu-game

(a) The Archbishop of the Anglican church in Southern Africa.

(b) The former general secretary of the S.A.C.C.

(c) The 1984 receiver of the Nobel Peace Prize.

The cases above indicate that names have individual meanings,
i.e. each name has its own characteristics.

Russell too holds that proper names have meanings and that they
designate individuals.[40] At first Russell, writing in 1900, had
according to Tapscott, divided proper names between those of
existing individuals which he called bonafide names, and those of
non-existing individuals which he claims are disguised definite
expressions.[41] However, Russell later changed his opinion of
fictional characters or individuals who are non-existing. In this
regard he wrote:[42]

"There is only one world, the "real" world of
Shakespeare's imagination is part of it, and
the thoughts that he had in writing Hamlet are
real. So are the thoughts that we have in reading
a play."

It is clear, therefore, that non-existent bearers have bona fide
proper names like living beings. For instance, the names of
fictional characters like Hamlet and Julius Ceasar have individual
meanings just like Russell, etc. Russell continues,[43]

"... to maintain that Hamlet, for example, exists in
his own world, namely, in the world of Shakespeare's
imagination, is just as truly as, (say) Napoleon
existed in the ordinary world, is to say something
deliberately confusing ..."

The idea that fictional characters are part of our own world is
also held by Tapscott. He illustrates through his name-game to
show that their names have characteristics like those of existent
bearers. These characteristics or moves/statements as he calls
them, help to determine the identity of the bearer of a name.[44]

For instance, Adziambei is a fictional character in Madima's
novel *A si ene*. One can still play a name-game with characteristics
or statements that identify her, like any person, say E.S. Madima,
the author or T.M. Sengani, the writer of this dissertation.

Adziambei
(a) The most beautiful girl in *A si ene*
(b) The daughter of Mukona and Nyadzanga
(c) The wayward girl who passed from one man to the other
(d) The much talked about girl in *A si ene*

Although Adziambei is a fictional character, the statements above
are able to identify her in the same way as existing human beings.

Tapscott is among the scholars who advocate that proper names have meaning. He too says that each name is associated with characteristics that are linked with the name bearer.[45] He, like Sørensen, plays a name-game with the characteristics or statements associated with a name so as to determine the name bearer. He also notes that there could be statements which are not acceptable in the name-game and calls them misfits.

Tapscott displays the simplicity of the name-game as follows,[46]

> "To learn a name-game is to learn a body of acceptable
> statements involving the use of that (proper) name.
> What we learn, in learning the correct use of (i.e. the
> "permissible moves with") such proper names as 'Aristotle'
> and 'Thames', are such statements as "Aristotle lived
> over two thousand years ago," and "The Thames is a river."
> We learn these as accepted statements involving these
> proper names,..."

Bhat maintains that proper names have individual meanings and that they are also conventional. This means that as soon as a person is assigned a name in the community he is then known by that name. He too associates names with characteristics that are linked with their bearers. These help the addressee to identify the person in question. Whenever they are internalized, then there is no need to recall them. He further indicates that even if more than one person share a certain name, the criterion of identifying name bearers will always be different as each name is associated with unique characteristics.[47]

Bhat illustrates the above case as follows.[48]

> "For example, if we are to provide identity criterion for
> the proper name Peter, and if there are ten different
> individuals referred to by that name in the speech
> community under consideration, we would need ten different
> and distinct sets of criteria to be associated with that
> name. If an eleventh individual is added to this set of
> referents at a later date, we would have to associate one
> more (eleventh) identity criterion to the name in order
> to make it usable in the speech community."

Searle maintains that proper names have individual meanings which are used to refer to people or objects.[49] He, like Tapscott, Bhat and Sørensen, associates them with identifying descriptions or characteristics which help to identify their bearers. Searle for example enlists the following statements or characteristics about Aristotle:[50]

(a) the teacher of Alexander,
(b) the great Greek Writer,
(c) an inhabitant of Stagira.

These statements according to Searle can be forgotten when names are being used in discourse as referring expressions. It is thus not necessary to read them out as they are part and parcel of the name.[51] Furthermore Searle adds the following on the use of proper names as referring expressions,[52]

> "But the uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience
> of proper names in our language lies precisely in the
> fact that they enable us to refer publicly to objects
> without being forced to raise issues and come to an
> agreement as to which descriptive characteristics
> exactly constitute the identity of the object."

The agreement here between the speaker and hearer, depends on the presupposition pool i.e. common background as stated earlier, and it confirms that when the discourse participants use proper names to refer to individuals who carry them, then they are speaking topically.

2.2.2.2 Proper names and discourse referents

Taking into consideration the views of the various scholars on proper names, it is clear that they have individual meanings. They all show that when names are used in context, they are used to refer to specific individuals who are known to the discourse

participants. Tapscott puts it in simple terms when he says that
if we know how to refer to individuals by using proper names,
then we know who we are referring to; in other words, people
consciously or unconsciously play Sørensen's object or name-idea-
game, or become aware of the essential characteristics which
according to Russell, Searle, Lyons and Bhat are associated with
the proper name or its bearer.[53]

Since names have individual meanings, people do not anticipate
any problems when they are used in context. As indicated earlier,
the use of a proper name is like making a move in a name-game and
Tapscott says,[54]

> "A name-game is a collection of move-utterances which
> contain the same proper name, and which go together
> to form a unit."

So, when a name carried by more than one individual bearer is
uttered the moves are able to distinguish the one from the other
bearer. Tapscott adds,[55]

> "Referring to an individual by name is equivalent to
> making a referring move in that individual's name-game."

Tapscott discusses four cases in which proper names can be used
as referring expressions to refer to discourse referents viz. the
intention of the speaker i.e. in cases where he refers to the
bearer of the name and no one else, the relative fame of the bearer
of the name, the direction of the discourse antecedent and the
nature of the statement.

2.2.2.2.1   The intention of the speaker

When the speaker uses a proper name in a discourse, he has a
specific referent in mind, and is aware that the addressee will

be able to identify the referent. If the speaker were to use the name Takalani, as in the discourse below, the hearer would be able to identify the referent.

16. *Ndo vhona Takalani mulovha. O ri u mmbona a mbo ḓi shavha.*
    'I saw Takalani yesterday. When he saw me, he immediately ran away.'

In this discourse, the name Takalani refers to a specific referent. This referent bears the name because it was assigned to him and when the speaker uses it he has that specific referent in mind and no one else, despite the fact that there could be many other people who carry the name Takalani. This point is further strengthened by Tapscott who observes that,[56]

> "one cannot refer to an individual by a name if one
> does not know that he goes by that name."

However, it is possible that one can mistakenly believe that some person goes by a certain name when in fact he does not, but even in this case, he will have incorrectly though successfully referred to him by means of that name.

People are assigned names or nicknames through various performative nominations. The names become theirs and are associated with everything in their lives and, when people use them, it is because they have (us) their bearers in mind, in other words, they know who carry those names. Tapscott adds,[57]

> "... the designation of the occurrence of the proper
> name is established by the scope of the speaker's
> acquaintanceship, i.e. by the fact that he only
> knows one individual of that name, and so must be
> talking about one ..."

It is possible in this case that only the speaker would be able to play the name-game correctly if he depends on his intention.

Although it is agreed that a speaker uses a proper name to refer to a particular individual, he should also take into account the position of his addressee, i.e. he should not overestimate or underestimate the knowledge he shares with his addressee. The speaker should use a proper name to refer to a particular individual because he is aware that he shares the same presupposition pool with the hearer or, in simple terms, that they share the same common ground about the referent and the discourse topic, otherwise there may be a breakdown in communication.

2.2.2.2.2 Relative fame of the bearer of the name

Tapscott distinguishes between two species of fame, the "general fame" and the "in-group fame".[58]

General fame

By "General fame" he refers to world-wide fame. People who are famous world-wide are always associated with their field of interest more than anyone else in that field. They are so well known that the mention of certain proper names immediately triggers moves or statements or characteristics associated with their names. They become the most likely referents irrespective of anyone's intentions and regardless of how many others of that name there are.[59] Refer to the discourse below:

17. *Vhaṅwali ndi vhavhonetsheli na vhaporofita. Vha ri sumbedza uri muthu u zwithihi na mavu a hawe, ndi zwine Chinua Achebe a ri zwa sa ralo hu wa mitsheṭo.*

    'Writers are lightbearers and prophets. They show us that a person is one with his soil i.e. country, that is why Chinua Achebe says if not so, then things fall apart.'

The use of the name Chinua Achebe in the discourse above indicates

that the speaker has a possible referent namely the famous
Nigerian novelist. The use of the name refers to him unless
further specified.

The use of the name Mphahlele, in Literature, for example, would
refer to Professor Eskia Mphahlele, the well-travelled and
distinguished African Scholar of "The Wanderer" fame. There are
a number of Mphahleles, who are distinguished in their fields,
such as Professor M.C.J. Mphahlele of the University of the North;
Dr. Dick Makgaledisa Mphahlele, the former headmaster of the well
known one time Mecca of music i.e. Mamelodi High School in Pretoria
and long time president of the teacher's organization TUATA and
now a Secretary of education in Lebowa; the late Dr. Machupe
Mphahlele, a medical practitioner trained in England and former
Secretary for Health and Social Welfare in Lebowa, etc. Consider
now the following example:

18. *Hu pfi Elvis o ri u imba, London vhananyana vha huvha
     mihuvho.*

     'It is said that when Elvis sang in London, girls
     cheered and shouted.'

The name Elvis reminds many people of the Legendary King of rock
and roll. There are many people who have been imitating Elvis
and others who carry his name, but when this name is uttered, the
designatum that comes quickly to mind is usually Elvis Presley.
The point is that the name is more closely associated with him
than with anyone else. On the other hand, if the name Frank can
be used instead, the hearers might scratch their heads trying to
identify the bearer of the name. It may take some time before the
bearer of the name is identified as being Frank Sinatra.

In-group fame

By in-group fame, Tapscott refers to fame that stretches from the family to a territory in relative terms.[60] In this case, the bearer will not be a world famous figure. For instance, if the name Takalani is used in the community where it may be carried by a boy, the possible candidate will always be the one who is well known in the community, rather than the boy in a family or at a school. Consider the case where people are gathered in a hall and are discussing a crisis in the community. If one member of the community were to stand up and say,

19.   *"Takalani ndi ene ane a nga thusa."*
      '"Takalani is the only one who can help."'

In this instance, irrespective of the intention of the speaker (see 2.2.2.2.1) the referent would be the one famous in that community rather than the boy of a particular family or at a certain school unless he happens to be the same person in all these cases. It should be mentioned, however, that the discourse context plays a disambiguating role, as is explained below.

2.2.2.2.3   The direction of the discourse antecedent

The discourse itself can determine who the bearer of the name is. If for instance students are discussing Venda literature of the modern era and then mention the name Maumela, the discourse will show which Maumela is being referred to. There are two Maumelas who are writers namely T.N. Maumela and his son E.T. Maumela. The direction of the discourse below shows how it determines the intended referent.

20.   *Mahwalwa a Tshivenḑa a si kale o thoma, muhwali a no*
      nga Maumela ri a mu bvulela muhadzi, o ri u gweḑa
      roṱhe ra mbo ḑi fara-vho nga matungo.

> 'Venḓa Literature is still in its infancy. A writer
> of Maumela's calibre should be respected; when he
> started, all of us were spurred to write.'

In the discourse above, the possible candidate is T.N. Maumela,
the prolific Venda author, even though another candidate, his
son E.T. Maumela may be thought of. The direction of the
conversation in this instance shows that the one designated is
the former rather than his son who too is a Maumela. There may
be arguments, as Tapscott sees it, since, as has been shown, the
name is carried by many other people who are potential referents.
Tapscott allays our fears in these words,[61]

> "This is simply an adaptation of the general linguistic
> principle that you cannot change horses in mid-stream
> without getting off the one and onto the other."

In the same manner, if people are talking about politics and
the dawn of independence in Africa, the mention of the name Jomo,
will refer to Jomo Kenyatta and not to Jomo Sono, the South
African Black Soccer Star. In the same way, if later on they
decide to talk about soccer in South Africa and mention the name
Jomo, then the designatum would be Jomo Sono, the soccer star and
not Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya. To show that it
is rarely possible to confuse the referents, Tapscott concludes,[62]

> "If the direction of the conversation has been such
> that it would be appropriate for one individual of
> a given name (but not another) to be mentioned, then
> if his name is uttered then he is mentioned."

The argument above coupled with Tapscott's explanations, confirms
that proper names have individual meanings and that the history
of the bearer is associated with his name.

2.2.2.2.4 The nature of the statement

Tapscott observes that certain names are more closely associated
with certain statements than others. When a name is used in a
certain statement, the bearer becomes specific irrespective of
others who might bear the same name. Tapscott adds,[63]

> "In general, if a statement (or other utterance) is
> more appropriate to one bearer of a name than
> another then, other things being equal, the hearer
> has the right to suppose that the speaker means the
> appropriate individual ..."

Consider the following discourse.

21. *Charles u do vhewa lini vhuhosi?*
    'When is Charles to be enthroned as king?'

All things being equal, the hearer who is informed on world affairs,
has the right to identify Prince Charles, the Prince of Wales as
the bearer of the name or designatum. His name is more closely
associated with this "nature of statement" because, as heir to the
throne, everyone is awaiting news of his enthronement, should his
mother Queen Elizabeth II abdicate. Charles is not the only bearer
of the name Charles, but be that as it may, the nature of the
statement above determines in many ways who the bearer of the name
is.

It has been illustrated that proper names have individual meanings
despite the fact that one can be carried by many people. As shown
in (2.2.2.2) when a name is used in a discourse, characteristics
or statements associated with it are conjured up in various ways
in the minds of the addressees. These characteristics are
informative as they are able to help the hearers identify the true
bearer of the name.

There are possibilities in cases where speakers may presume to
know the name of the bearer when they do not; in normal discourse
such references are repaired by either the speaker himself i.e.
self-repair or by any of the addressees i.e. other-repair as
illustrated in (1.4.5).

Usually when a speaker employs a proper name to refer to its
bearer, he knows that his interlocutor will be able to identify
the bearer. This means that if I want to use a proper name to
refer to a particular person or bearer I will always use it in a
context which will determine who the bearer of the name actually
is.

2.2.3 Non-specific definite expressions

Non-specific definite expressions are those noun phrases which
are used to refer to unidentifiable referents. Among non-specific
definite expressions are the generic and attributive noun phrases
or expressions. Generic expressions are used to refer to the
whole class of entities.

2.2.3.1 Generic definite expressions

Generic definite expressions are used to refer to the whole set
of objects. Although their use presupposes knowledge on the part
of discourse participants, the intended referent is only in the
form of a representative as in the following discourse.

22. *Sesi:* *Namusi zwithu zwo vhifha, a sa shumi a songo ḽa,*
Fhedzi-ha, mutshudeni u fanela u shumesa vhukuma.

Taki: *Vha khou amba zwone, nga ndila ine zwa konda*
ngayo, mudededzi u fanela u fara zwa khwatha.

'Sesi: These days things are bad, whoever does not work
should not eat, however, the student must work very hard.

Taki: You are right, things are so bad that the teacher
must add more effort in his work.'

The definite expressions *mutshudeni* 'the student' and *mudededzi* 'the teacher' are being used generically here. Their definiteness presupposes that the discourse participants share knowledge about the referents, but they are being used as representatives here i.e. they refer to *mutshudeni* 'the student' and *mudededzi* 'the teacher', of today or these days.

Mutshudeni 'the student' and *mudededzi* 'the teacher' in the above discourse are people found and living in our time and possibly in our village, our town, our schools or our world (perhaps including you who are a teacher or student) during these challenging days.

No one can identify the student and the teacher mentioned above; they are therefore non-specific referents. Consider also the following sentence:

23. *Ndau ndi ḽivhanda ḽi ofhisaho.*
    'The lion is an endangered species.'

The definite expression *ndau* 'the lion' does not refer to any specific referents but it refers to the whole class of lions. It has been used here collectively or as a representative. In other words, it represents all other lions all over wherever they can be found. Following Hawkins the referent is being located associatively and situationally i.e. it is being located in every place where they can be found and he writes,[64]

> "A generic interpretation (as in the case above ... T.M.S.) involves a multiple location process in which the location takes place as many times as there are instances of association set in question."

2.2.3.2 Attributive definite expressions

Certain referring expressions refer to imaginary or would-be referents. Attributive definite noun phrases are generally used to refer to non-specific referents, but they often appear to function just like specific definite noun phrases. On this similarity, Donnellan has this to say:[65]

> "Both the attributive and referential use of definite descriptions seem to carry a presupposition or implication that there is something which fits the description."

but he continues to show the difference,[66]

> "... But the reasons for the existence of the presupposition or implication are different in the two cases."

The attributive noun phrases or expressions are used to refer to unidentified or non-specific referents and so-called referential definite noun phrases or expressions are used to refer to identifiable or specific referents.

Say on arrival at home, on opening the refrigerator Mulanda finds all the beer gone and remarks:

24. *"Muthu we a pwasha nndu yanga o fanela u vha e tshidakwa."*
    '"The person who burgled my house must be a drinker."'

The definite noun phrase *muthu* 'the person' has an attributive reading. In this case the speaker has no particular referent in mind i.e. the referent is not specific. The speaker Mulanda has, in this instance, a non-specific, but would-be referent. Although he cannot point at any person, at least there is a person who has burgled his house.

The description fits some person. The speaker, therefore, could, from the kind of theft committed, use the definite referring expression as in the above case. Stealing is after all bad, but for one to find all the bottles of beer stolen would imply that the thief is a drinker or one who associates with drinkers. The person concerned, though unidentified, is made to fit the description by the context in which the noun phrase or expression *muthu* 'the person' has been used. On the other hand, this definite noun phrase can be used to refer to a specific referent, as in the case above, if the speaker knows the culprit but does not want to identify him, perhaps for fear of being beaten up.

Suppose, on arrival at the scene of a terrible accident where people were run-over by a car as they waited for a bus, one discourse participant were to say,

25. *"Ḍiraiva u fanela u vha o vha o kambiwa."*
'"The driver must have been drunk."'

The definite expression *ḍiraiva* 'the driver' would have been used to refer to a non-specific but imaginary referent. In other words, it would fit the description because of the context in which the expression has been used though he (the driver) cannot be identified uniquely.

On the use of definite referring expressions used attributively Bhat says,[67]

> "When a definite noun phrase is used attributively,
> however, the unique object can be identified with
> the help of the characteristics referred to either
> directly or indirectly through that noun phrase
> (and also with the help of any additional
> characteristics obtainable from the context) would
> only be an imaginary or "would-be" object."

These characteristics are associated with the noun phrase or referent.

2.2.3.3 Definite expressions involving general knowledge

Often people use definite expressions to refer to referents
about which their knowledge is general. They are associated with
the first mentioned definite expression or situation of utterance
which is able to activate them. The referents that are activated
in this case are not specific. For instance, even if a person
has never been to London, upon mentioning it, he can go on to use
definite expressions such as *vhukavhafulaimatshini* 'the airport',
phalamennde 'the parliament", etc. by merely inferring from
general knowledge that in a big city like London such referents
can be found.

In the various discourses that will follow, real and imaginary
referents will be referred to by various referring expressions.
It has been shown in this chapter that referring expressions can
be used to refer to the above referents successfully.

SUMMARY

Discourse referents are established by the discourse participants.
The referents may be either specific or non-specific and are
referred to by means of either indefinite or definite expressions,
the choice being determined by the context in which they occur.
It has also been shown that proper names have a conventional
meaning and that each name is associated with certain identifying
characteristics. It has also been illustrated that as long as
discourse participants can establish the existence of a referent
in their discourse, then such a referent, be it real or imaginary,
becomes a discourse referent.

CHAPTER 3

COREFERENCE

Coreference is an anaphoric relationship, where a one-to-one
correspondence exists between the antecedent which may be an
indefinite or definite expression (including proper names), and
an anaphor which can be a definite noun phrase, a qualificative,
pronoun, concord or reflexive $\underset{\sim}{d}i$- 'self'. The antecedent and
anaphor co-refer to the same or identical referent. The term
anaphora according to Lyons originates from the Greek word
'anapherein'[1] which means 'to re-fer'. In other words the anaphor
recalls, repeats, or re-identifies the word or expression mentioned
earlier on in the discourse. The word or referring expression
mentioned earlier is the antecedent. Lyons writes,[2]

> "The antecedent of an anaphoric (expression ... T.M.S.)
> is an expression which as the term 'antecedent'
> implies, normally precedes the correlated anaphoric
> pronoun in the text or co-text."

Stenning says of this relationship,[3]

> "... some antecedents and anaphors share reference.
> These NP's refer to the same referent, hence they
> are coreferential."

De Beaugrande writes as follows on coreference:[4]

> "If REFERENCE is the relationship between expressions
> and objects, events and situations in a world these
> expressions designate ... the use of alternative
> expression in a text, for the same text- world
> entity would be termed CO-REFERENCE."

As stated earlier, when an anaphoric expression is used, it refers
back to its antecedent; it is for this reason that Hlongwane
believes that,[5]

> "Co-reference in discourse can be seen as a kind of
> re-identification of the subject."

Anaphors are always definite expressions and are of various forms, among these are definite noun phrases, pronouns, qualificatives, concords for example subject and object concords, and the reflexive *ḓi-*, etc. The anaphors used in any discourse do not have an independent occurrence but always take their reference from other referring expressions in the discourse and the latter are always antecedents. Kempson observes,[6] that,

> "The function of ... (the definite expression ... T.M.S.) is a linguistic coreference indicator to some noun phrase previously occurring."

and she further simplifies by stating that,[7]

> "... the function of the definite expression is to establish anaphoric coreferentiality."

Consider the discourse below:

1. *Vhathannga vha tshi sokou ima, Takalani a ri u sea, vha(1) sokou mangala, ene o vha a tshi mangadza. Mutshena i tshi u setshelela vha(2) sokou mu dono.*

   'The young men would just stand there, and Takalani would laugh and surprise them, she was indeed a wonder. The beautiful one would so laugh that t h e y   w o u l d   be left gazing speechlessly at her.'

In the discourse above, Takalani is the antecedent and the anaphors *ene* 'she' (pronoun), *Mutshena* 'the beautiful one' (adjective) and *mu* 'her' (object concord) relate to this antecedent. Note that the concords *vha* 'them' (1) and *vha* 'they' (2) refer to the antecedent *vhathannga* 'the young men'.

In all cases in the discourse above, the anaphors follow their antecedents.

There are, however, cases where the anaphors may also precede their antecedents in discourse. This use of anaphors, according to Lyons

is not frequently found and is referred to as anticipatory anaphora or cataphora.[8] In this regard Langendoen provides the following sentences:[9]

2.(a) As soon as <u>he</u> got home, <u>John</u> ate supper.
  (b) The fact that <u>he</u> has no chance of winning the election does not discourage <u>the candidate</u>.
  (c) Boys who date <u>them</u> say that <u>blondes</u> are fun.

According to Langendoen it is possible that a pronoun can refer to a following statement if it is included in a subordinate clause which does not include the antecedent.[10]

In the above sentences, the pronouns occur in subordinate clauses which do not include the antecedents, and they further refer to the following antecedents, in other words, the pronouns are anaphoric to the antecedents, that follow them later in the discourse.

Again Langendoen illustrates that a pronoun can refer to a following antecedent even though it is not in a clause subordinate to the one which contains the antecedent as in the examples below.[11]

3.(a) <u>His</u> portrait doesn't do <u>the old man</u> justice.
  (b) It was <u>his</u> accent that betrayed <u>Gustave</u>.
  (c) Near <u>him</u>, <u>John</u> discovered a wasp's nest.
  (d) John still refuses to speak to <u>her</u>, although <u>Mary</u> has admitted that she was at fault.

Langendoen agrees that in the cases above, the relationship between the pronouns and anaphors is governed by general conditions that govern the general form of surface structures.

Perhaps the closest we can get to anticipatory anaphora in Venda, would be in a situation such as the one illustrated below where the

concord *vh(o)* 'they' occurs before the antecedents Maluṱa and
Adziambei. In this example the speaker appears to use the so-
called antecedents as an afterthought in order to eliminate any
doubt that may exist on the part of the addressee in identifying
the referents. The example below illustrates the point.

4.   *Vho no swika kale, Maluṱa na Adziambei.*
      'They have already arrived, Maluṱa and Adziambei.'

Anaphoric coreferentiality is always tied up with the notion of
discourse topic. As indicated in (1.3) the discourse topic is
about a referent that is being focussed on. The discourse topic
sums up all the facts related to these topical referents, thus
strengthening the antecedent-anaphor relationship. Furthermore,
in the Bantu languages which are class system languages, there is
always generally speaking agreement between the antecedent and the
anaphor in terms of person, number and class. There are also
morphological similarities between the prefixes of the antecedents
and the concords of the anaphor in most cases, which are important
cues towards the recognition of the antecedent-anaphor relationship.
The discourse below illustrates:

5.   *Vhasidzana vho takuwa Mangondi ḓuvha ḽi tshee lo ṱavha,*
      vha tshi swika Thohoyanḓou ndi musi ḽi tshi vho
      kovhela. Vhoṱhe vho mbo ḓi lala honê.
      'The girls left Mangondi at midday when the sun was
      still bright; when they arrived at Thohoyanḓou, it
      was about to set. All of them slept there.

In the discourse above, there are morphological similarities
between the antecedents and the anaphors. For instance the
concord *vha* in *vha tshi swika* 'when they arrived' is similar in
form to the noun prefix *vha-* in *vhasidzana* 'the girls'.

Note again this similarity between the prefix *vha-* of *vhasidzana*
'the girls' and the quantitative concord *vh-* of *vhoṱhe* 'all of
them', and the one between the prefix *ḽi-* of *(ḽi) ḓuvha* 'the sun'

and the concords *l(o)* 'it' and *li* 'it'. Note further the relationship between the antecedent *Thohoyandou* and the anaphor *hone* where morphological agreement is obscured, one needs to follow the discourse topic in order to detect the coreferential relationship between them.

In the following subsections and discourses, it will be illustrated and explained how anaphoric coreferentiality takes place between indefinite NP's and definite NP's and between definite NP's (including proper names) and other definite NP's.

3.1 DEFINITE NOUN PHRASES AS ANAPHORS

As indicated in (2.1) the indefinite expression introduces the referent in the discourse, and the definite expression revives or refers to it again. Only indefinite expressions will be used as antecedents and the definite expression as the anaphors in this section.

3.1.1 Identical coreferring expressions

In Venda two co-referring expressions can be lexically identical i.e. the antecedent and anaphor as *khuhu* 'chicken/the chicken' as e.g. in the discourse below:

6. *Nga Swondaha Takalani o ri u do nthavhela khuhu. Musi ndi tshi swika, aiwaa, nda wana nangoho khuhu yo no vha tshivhasoni.*

   'On Sunday Takalani told me that he will slaughter a chicken for me. When I arrived, oh well, I found that indeed the chicken was already in the pot.'

Here both referring expressions, the indefinite expression (the antecedent) and the definite expression (the anaphor) are lexically identical. The anaphor *khuhu* 'the chicken' refers to *khuhu* 'a

chicken' the antecedent. They both co-refer to the same referent
and are coreferential.

3.1.2 Synonyms

Coreferentiality can also be expressed by synonymous referring
expressions as in the case of the antecedent indefinite expression
feisi 'a fist' and *vili* 'the fist'. Consider the discourse below:

> 7. *Nndwa yo vha yo vhifha vhukatini ha vhalwi. Muhammad*
>   *Ali a posa feisi Joe Frazier a dzinginyea. Ha! ngoho*
>   *vili (helo) lo mu dzungudza.*
>
>   'The struggle was on between the fighters. Muhammad
>   Ali threw a fist, Joe Frazier staggered. Gosh! indeed
>   the fist had shaken him.'

In the above discourse, the indefinite expression i.e. the
antecedent *feisi* 'a fist', and the definite anaphoric expression
vili 'the fist' are synonymous, they are co-referring expressions
and refer to the same referent. The addressee in this discourse
will have no difficulty in recognizing that the anaphor *vili* 'the
fist' refers to its antecedent *feisi* 'a fist'.

3.1.3 Hyponyms

Coreferentiality can also be expressed by using hyponyms, more
specifically the subordinate term and superordinate term.
Mokgokong defines hyponymy as follows:[12]

> "By hyponyms is meant the grouping together of words
> which, while together they do not have the same
> meaning, nevertheless refer to objects and actions
> of a similar kind."

Lyons says that the term hyponymy is understood as inclusion. He

maintains that it is used to illustrate a relationship which shows the inclusion of a specific term i.e. a <u>subordinate term</u> and a more general superordinate term.[13] Hartmann and Stork simplify this definition of hyponymy in the following words,[14]

> "By hyponym is meant "A word the meaning of which may be said to be included in that of another word."

In the following discourse, the subordinate term which is the antecedent is included in the superordinate term which is the anaphor.

8. *Ro vha ro ya u zwima ḑakani. Ha mbo bvelela ndau, hei vhone, tshipuka tsha ḑa tsho tou ri livha, riṋe ra mbo ḑi dzhena ḑaka nga thoho.*

   'We had gone hunting in the jungle. Then <u>a lion</u> appeared, my! <u>the animal/beast</u> crashed towards us and we disappeared into the jungle.'

In the discourse above, the definite expression, in other words, the superordinate term *tshipuka* 'the animal/beast', refers anaphorically to the subordinate term *ndau* 'a lion'.

Stenning notes this in these words,[15]

> "Subordinate phrases are not eligible anaphors of their superordinate antecedents."

It is thus obvious that in the above discourse the indefinite expression *ndau* 'a lion' and the definite expression *tshipuka* 'the animal/beast' are coreferential i.e. they co-refer to the identical referent.

3.1.4 Non-noun phrase antecedents and definite anaphors

Hawkins and Lyons have shown that it is possible to have a non-nominal antecedent and a definite anaphor, in which case the latter

refs back to the antecedent in a coreferential relationship,[16] as in the case of *o livha Tshakhuma* 'he set out for Tshakhuma' which is rather a state of affairs and *lwendo* 'the journey' which is a definite anaphor in the discourse below:

9. *Ro ḓo pfa nga mafhungo a sa takadzi, Takalani o livha Tshakhuma, nazwino uri lwendo a lwo ngo mu ḓifhela.*

   'We heard the bad news, Takalani then set out for Tshakhuma and in fact he says that the journey was not quite interesting.'

In this discourse, the definite anaphor *lwendo* 'the journey' refers to *o livha Tshakhuma* 'he set out for Tshakhuma' which in this instance functions as the antecedent.

3.2 PRONOUNS

Traditional grammarians have defined pronouns as categories which are used as noun or nominal substitutes. Lyons states that:[17]

> "... the term pronoun owes its origin to the view that there are certain forms of expressions whose function is to operate as substitutes for nouns."

Most grammarians have always spoken of pronouns as substitutes, for instance, Jespersen writes that "(a) pronoun stands instead of a name of a person or thing."[18]

Furthermore Jespersen states why pronouns are used as substitutes of nouns or nominal expressions. He says, "... a pronoun is a substitute for a noun and is used partly for the sake of brevity, partly to avoid repetition of a noun."[19]

Many Bantuists, though not all, have defined pronouns in the same way that traditional grammarians have in Germanic languages.

They stress that pronouns are used in the place of nouns.
Fortune, for example, writes of pronouns in the following words:[20]

> "While the pronoun signifies a thing without being
> its name, it does so, generally, in context which
> includes the noun, expressed or implied."

According to Fortune, pronouns can occur with nouns in the same
context and thus signify those nouns i.e. expressed nouns, or if
the nouns have been implied they can still signify them.

Wilkes and Louwrens have offered a different explanation regarding
the relationship between the pronoun and its antecedent or head
noun.   Following their view, pronominalization involves a deletion
process.   The so-called pronouns are in fact determiners in
underlying structure which obtain pronominal status only in cases
where their antecedents have been deleted.[21]   Consider the
following examples:

10. (a)   *Vhanna vho vhuya.*

   'The men have come back.'

   (b)   *Vhone vho vhuya.*

   'They have come back.'

   (c)   *Vhanna vhone vho vhuya.*

   'The men, they have come.'

   (d)   *Vhone vhanna vho vhuya.*

   'They, the men have come.'

A clear semantic difference is discernible between examples (a)
and (b).   In the meaning of example (b) a semantic feature of
emphasis is observed which is absent in the meaning of example (a).
Wilkes and Louwrens argue that if *vhone* 'they', substitutes *vhanna*
'the men', how can the mere substitution of a noun by a
corresponding pronoun give rise to such a difference in meaning.[22]

They then explain that the deletion hypothesis assumes that a
sentence such as (b) is not derived from a sentence such as (a)
but rather from (c) or (d). This derivation assumes the form of
the deletion of the antecedent or head noun *vhanna* 'the men'
and as such one can say, that since example (c) and (d) exhibit
a semantic feature of emphasis in their meaning, the deletion
hypothesis enables us to explain the presence of the same semantic
feature i.e. emphasis in the meaning of example (b).

Whatever the derivation of pronouns might be, in a discourse
situation one may adopt the view that pronouns are used to refer
back to nouns or nominal expressions, which have been mentioned
earlier in the discourse.

The nouns or nominal expressions are called antecedents and
pronouns are anaphors. The pronouns are thus said to be anaphoric
to their antecedents, in other words, they revive or re-introduce
the antecedents in the discourse. The antecedent always introduces
referents into discourse as according to Lyons and Huddleston the
term antecedent means "comes first". There are cases where
anaphors are said to come first, in which case such a pronoun would
be explained in terms of cataphora i.e. anticipatory anaphora.[23]

When a pronoun is used in a discourse, Brown and Yule say,[24]

> "The relationship between the full nominal expression
> and the pronominal expression is ... described as
> antecedent-anaphor relation."

Lyons ties up the antecedent-anaphor relation in these words,[25]

> "The antecedent of an anaphoric pronoun is an expression
> which, as the term implies, normally precedes the
> correlated anaphoric pronoun in the text or co-text."

The antecedents and anaphors in a discourse share reference, they

co-refer to the same or identical referent or are said to be coreferential.

In the paragraphs that follow the concern is with the relationship between antecedents i.e. nominal expressions and their anaphors i.e. pronominal expressions in the form of absolute/personal pronouns, concords, demonstrative pronouns and quantitatives, possessives, and the reflexive di-.

3.2.1 Absolute pronouns

As indicated already, most Bantuists, among them Doke, Cole, Ziervogel, Fortune and Lanham, indicate that absolute pronouns can stand alone as subjects or objects in sentences.[26] According to Fortune,[27]

> "The absolute pronoun is used in apposition to an
> expressed noun and in reference to a noun, unexpressed
> but understood."

It should be noted that when they occur as subjects in discourses, they refer to nouns or substantives which have either been unexpressed or understood at the time of speaking i.e. having been mentioned earlier on in that discourse or some other discourse engaged in by the discourse participants but which could be related to the prevailing one. When these pronouns are used, as in the above case, they function as anaphors i.e. they refer back to their antecedents i.e. the nouns or substantives, and therefore, they co-refer with their antecedents to the same referents. When absolute pronouns are used as stated above, then they satisfy the brevity of the language, as, according to Kantor, "The use of absolute pronouns as coreferring elements helps to satisfy the brevity of language."[28] As anaphors or co-referring elements, absolute pronouns are definite expressions since they express old or given information. Whatever referent they refer to can be

uniquely identified, since it has already been entered into the memory of the discourse participants. Besides being anaphoric elements, absolute pronouns are also deictic elements i.e. they can be used to refer to referents in the extra-linguistic situations or visible situations. Nkabinde observes both their anaphoric and deictic function when he says,[29]

> "The absolute pronoun can, however, only have
> semantic relevance if the noun it replaces is
> present in the linguistic or non-linguistic
> context, and it has a referential tie with it."

Although he mentions these functions, Nkabinde does not give examples to illustrate their anaphoric function in contexts.

Radford says of their dual function:[30]

> "Pronouns (absolute ... T.M.S.) have two uses.
> (i)   a proximate use in which they take their
>   reference from some other NP which they are
>   considered with; and
> (ii) an obviate use in which they have independent
>   reference."

Radford's proximate use is what is called the anaphoric use and his obviate use is what is called the deictic use. In this dissertation, particularly in this chapter, the main objective is to illustrate the anaphoric function of absolute pronouns. (Their deictic function will be treated in chapter 5).

Kunene, writing on the pronouns in Zulu discourse, says that the absolute pronouns are used to show contrast besides being anaphoric. The same view is held by Louwrens.[31] Where absolute pronouns are used for contrast, they focus the attention of the reader on specific referents, in which case they may be either deictic or anaphoric. This is called the focus use of absolute pronouns.

As indicated earlier, when an absolute pronoun is used in discourse, it refers back to a substantive. In other words, its use presupposes that the speaker is aware that the addressee shares knowledge of the referent in question. It has been mentioned earlier that personal or absolute pronouns express old or given information, i.e. information which is shared by the discourse participants. Consider the example below:

11. *Takalani o ṱuwa na vhadededzi, ene o vha a sa funi...*
    'Takalani left with the teachers, but he was not
    interested ...'

In the example above, the personal pronoun *ene* 'he' is an anaphor, it refers to the antecedent Takalani. Both expressions co-refer to the same referent i.e. they are coreferential. It will be noted that in most grammar books only the third person pronoun has been used in the anaphoric sense. Most scholars do not commit themselves on the anaphoric nature of the 1st and 2nd persons pronouns. They concentrate on their deictic function. However, it will be illustrated that they can function deictically.

In most research done thus far, as will be indicated, they rarely if ever use the 1st and 2nd persons pronouns in this regard, except for Halliday and Hassan. The 1st and 2nd person pronouns are said to be inherently deictic and cannot be used anaphorically according to some grammarians.[32] Zandvoort writes,[33]

> "The personal pronouns of the third person are chiefly
> used anaphorically i.e. to refer to an idea in the
> speaker's mind, usually expressed by a preceding noun."

It is clear here that the 1st and 2nd person pronouns have been excluded; as Zandvoort shows, the third person pronoun has been singled out as being anaphoric. Close states,[34]

> "No doubt the best-known pro-forms are the personal
> pronouns he, she, it and they ..."

It is significant in this case that the 1st and 2nd persons
nne 'I', *rine* 'we' and *inwi* 'you', *ene*, *vhone* (singular) 'you',
vhoinwi, *vhoiwe* (plural) 'you' are not included among the
anaphoric ones. Dekeyster *et al.* state, like Close and Zandvoort,
that it is the third person pronoun which can be used anaphorically,
but they further indicate that the 1st and 2nd person pronouns are
used in situational reference only i.e. as deictic expressions.[35]

Thrane also holds that the third person pronouns are used
anaphorically.[36] Kantor is not specific, but merely says,[37]

> "Personal pronouns function as replacements for
> co-referential noun phrases ..."

On the whole, he too does not use all the personal pronouns in
context but, like Radford, he uses the third person pronoun as
being anaphoric to its antecedent. However, to claim that
personal pronouns can function anaphorically without specifying,
presupposes that even the 1st and 2nd person pronouns are included
and that they can function co-referentially with their antecedents
in discourse.

Among all these linguists only Halliday and Hassan are more
specific. They indicate that the pronouns have an anaphoric
function, but further state and illustrate that the 1st and 2nd
person pronouns are basically deictic, although they do indicate
indirect anaphora and they write,[38]

> "In written language they are anaphoric when they
> occur in (direct) speech ..."

and continue[39]

> "These are instances of anaphora, albeit indirect anaphora;... they
> still refer to the speaker,... (and addressee ... T.M.S.)
> but we have to look in the text to find out who the
> speaker ... (and the addressee are ,... T.M.S.)"

In this case therefore, the coreferentiality between the
antecedent and its anaphor which will be a first or second person
pronoun viz. *nṋe* 'I, me' (singular), *riṋe*, *vhoriṋe* 'we, us'
(plural), *iwe*, *inwi* 'you' singular and plural, *vhoinwi*, *vhoiwe*
'you' will have to be interpreted from the discourse. The discourse
analyst must trace the antecedent from the text. As stated earlier
this is indirect anaphora in which the emphasis is to interpret
coreferentiality from the written text. It is obvious here that
this aspect has not received attention in research circles. The
third person pronoun is basically anaphoric while the 1st and 2nd
person pronouns are deictic except that they can be used
anaphorically in direct speech.

Without committing himself, Radford states,[40]

> "For the time being ... let's assume that this class
> comprises what are traditionally called 'personal
> pronouns' - i.e. the forms; I, me; you, he, him; she,
> her, it, we, us; they and them. Semantically speaking,
> pronominals can fulfil either two functions in
> English: they can either take their reference from
> some other NP (this is called their anaphoric or
> proximate use,) or they can refer independently (this
> is their deictic or obviate use.)"

It is clear that although Radford speaks of the anaphoric and
deictic function, he does not indicate which ones are anaphoric
and which are deictic. According to him, all pronouns (personal)
can be used either deictically or anaphorically. Radford seems
to say that even the 1st and 2nd person personal pronouns can
function anaphorically, a view which is acceptable provided these
are used in direct speech as Halliday and Hassan have indicated.

On the whole, the third person pronoun is prominently used
anaphorically in Venda discourses.

In the discourses that follow, it will be shown that all personal
pronouns can be used anaphorically. It should be stated further

that the subject and object concords have the same function as
the pronouns i.e. as anaphors, but these will be dealt with in
(3.5).

Of importance in the coreference of absolute pronouns is the
question of anaphora and agreement as stated earlier in this chapter. There
is a clear relationship between the pronominal concords and the
various noun class prefixes. Morphologically these elements show
similarities and syntactically the pronominal concord of the
anaphor displays agreement in class, number and person with the
antecedent to which the anaphor refers.

3.2.1.1 Absolute pronouns as given information/anaphors

When personal/absolute pronouns are used in a discourse, they
express old or given information i.e. they are used to refer to
entities mentioned earlier in the discourse. Information thus is
introduced by a full NP which could either be an indefinite NP, a cleft
construction, the indefinite concord *hu-* and a passive structure. Information
can also be introduced by definite NP's (plus proper names),
etc. When the personal pronoun is used, the hearer matches the
anaphor with an antecedent which he has entered into his memory
earlier in the discourse.

Fellbaum states that information is always introduced by a
full NP but not by a personal pronoun ... and writes,[41]

> "... a full NP is interpreted by the hearer as new
> and a pronoun as old information."

Note in the example below:

12. *Takalani o do vhuya a ya doroboni. Ene ho ngo lenga.*
'Takalani eventually went to town. He did not stay long.'

In the discourse above, the full NP Takalani introduces
information in the discourse and the personal pronoun *ene* 'he' is
the anaphor which expresses old or given information. It is
clear therefore that the anaphor *ene* 'he' refers to the antecedent
Takalani mentioned earlier in the discourse. The same can be seen
in the following discourse:

Madima[42]

13. *Zwenezwo muhwe muthannga wa mueni e khilikhithi na*
    lwawe. Ene o vha e nambi nahone o u tshina a nga a
    sa dzhena fhasi.

    'In no time a <u>certain visiting young man</u> jumped up
    singing his (song). He was a real singer and danced
    as if he could get underground.'

In the discourse above the new information is introduced by the
indefinite expression *muhwe muthannga wa mueni* 'a certain
visiting young man', which functions as the antecedent and *ene*
'he' the personal pronoun expresses given or old information i.e.
it refers anaphorically to the antecedent mentioned. Both
expressions co-refer to the same referent.

In the discourses above only the third person pronouns have been
used anaphorically, but it has been stated that the first and
second person(s) pronouns can also be used anaphorically in direct
speech. This type of anaphora has been termed indirect anaphora
by Halliday and Hassan as, in order to interpret it, one has to check
in the written discourse itself as to who the speaker or addressee
is to whom the anaphor refers.[43] Consider the discourse below:

14. *Mafhungo zwino a vha o no ima nga ihwe ndila, Andani*
    a tshi ri ene(1) u toda u mala Andisani. Vho-Ungani
    vha lingedza u mu khuthadza a ri, "Vhone(2), ngoho
    Andisani ndi wanga ndi ene(3) ane nda do mala. Nne(4)
    hoyo ndo tou nanga." Vho-Ungani vha ri, "Ndi(5) khou
    zwi pfa murathu inwi(6) pfanani na mukalaha!" Ha
    bvelela mukalaha. "Mini! Iwe(7) u a nndivha(8)
    zwavhudi, u vhona unga rine(9) ri khou tamba!"

'Things had now taken a different turn, Andani was
determined that he(1) would marry Andisani. Mr
Ungani tried to cool and console him, "(you)(2),
Andisani is mine, she(3) is the one I would like
to marry. I(4) have made my choice. Mr Ungani
then said, "I(5) understand that brother, but
you(6) must first agree with the old man." Then
the old man appeared. "What! (You)(7) do (you)
know me(8) well, do you think we (9) are playing!"'

In this discourse, the third person pronouns *ene* 'he'(3) and *ene*
'she'(1) refer anaphorically to Andani and Andisani. It is clear
also that the first and second person pronouns have antecedents
to which they refer too. For instance, *nne* 'I'(4) refers to the speaker
Andani; the forms of respect *vhone* 'you'(2) to the addressee Vho-Ungani, and *inwi*
'you'(6) to the addressee Andani; *riṇe* 'we'(9) to the speaker
mukalaha 'the old man and his associates' and *n* (*nṇe*)(8) in *nndivha*
'know me' refers to the speaker *mukalaha* 'the old man'. All the
same, this type of anaphora needs more explanation. The first
and second person pronouns are not inherently anaphoric but are
deictic because they are given by the situation as in the discourse
above. (Note that they have been used anaphorically in the
discourse above). They usually occur in direct speech. Halliday
and Hassan, who see this kind of anaphora as a kind of indirect
anaphora, also agree that the anaphoric nature of these pronouns
is not inherent and they write that[44]

"First and second person forms do not normally refer
to the text at all; their referents are defined by
the speech roles of speaker and hearer, and hence
they are normally interpreted exphorically, by
reference to the situation."

As shown in the discourses above, when absolute pronouns function
as co-referring expressions in the neighbouring sentences and
clauses, the reader always finds it easy to identify it and its
antecedent. The question of the discourse topic is more
challenging when such an anaphor occurs deep in the discourse or
if there is more than one antecedent. Halliday and Hassan

vhanda-vhanda. Na Muhanelwa, naho o vha e na phoṅi,
zwa vhonala uri na ene o takala. Vho no ḽa ṱhoṱhi
o dodziwaho na dzidzhamu, vha ḽa na ṋuimuṋe-ṋuṋe, vha ḽa
ngā malalo. Maluṱa a sala na ṁme awe vha kha ḓi amba
nga khombo ye a vha itela a tshi shavha na uḽa Adziambei.

"Nyamuvhuya ha shayi thando, ṅwananga! Ni sokou
ḓiseisa zwaṋu nga shango ḽothe nga mulandu wa phiranawe?"

"Mmawe, ndi uri a vha mu ḓivhi. Hafhu ndo vha vhudza
uri o(1) tou tswiwaa!"

"Izwo ndo zwi pfa, ene muthu a na maṱo awe a nga tou
tswiwa hani?"

"Fhano Venḓa khamusi a zwi itei. Ngei makhuwani a si
ene wa u thoma u tswiwa. O(2) vha a tshi mpfuna, zwo
sokou ḓi ita-vho."

'Then Maluṱa arrived home. All were delighted. His
youngest brother who had already gone to bed, came
out running and came to admire him as he circled
around touching him here and there. Even though she
was shy, Muhanelwa was also happy. After they had
enjoyed bread and other delicacies, they then had
some sweets and later went to bed. Maluṱa remained
with his mother discussing about the misfortune into
which he had fallen when he eloped with Adziambei.

"It is not all gold that glitters my child. Look at
how you've made a laughing stock out of yourself
because of <u>a street girl</u>."

"Mother, it's because you do not know <u>her</u>. I told you
that <u>she</u>(1) had been kidnapped!"

"I heard about that, but is it ever possible that a
person who can see can ever be kidnapped?"

"It is unheard of in Venḓa. In the city <u>she</u> is not
the first one to be kidnapped. <u>She</u>(2) was however in
love with me, all this just happened."

In the discourse above the discourse participants continue to speak
topically about Adziambei who is not mentioned by name but is
referred to as a street girl. The fact that they all continue to
contribute to the same discourse topic presupposes that they are
drawing information from the same presupposition pool. Maluṱa and
his mother are speaking topically in the discourse above. When
Maluṱa's mother accuses him of being careless by eloping with
phiranawe 'a street girl', Maluṱa refers to this antecedent with

the object concord *mu* 'she', subject concords *o* 'she'(1) and *o* 'she'(2) and
pronoun *ene* 'she'. He is co-operative in the discourse. Furthermore,
Maluṭa uses the third person singular pronoun *ene* 'she'
anaphorically to refer to *phiranawe* 'a street girl'. From the
discourse it is not easy to know the referent by name unless the
reader has read the book. The discourse topic is about Adziambei who
Maluṭa's mother calls *phiranawe* 'a street girl'. It is therefore
appropriate to say that *ene* 'she' refers anaphorically to Adziambei.
The case above is unlike the use of *ene* 'he' in the discourse
below:

Madima[48]

16. *Maluṭa a elekanya a pfa nangoho zwo mu vhifhela.*
    Vha amba vhasinḓi vha vhuya vha vuwa. Musi o no
    vha nḓuni a elekanya. "Arali vha mpfara ndi ḓo
    sokou ri, Adziambei o ṭahela linzula ndi phiranawe,
    o thanyela thungo. Nnè mafhungo awe thi a koni."

    Khofhe na maneto zwa tou nga zwo mu langana. A
    edela vha vhuya vhanga vha sa vhea dzikhali midini.
    Ene iṭali u tamba khofheni ho mbo ḓi vha u la.
    Zwo vha zwi tshi ralo kha magaraba othe na vhaselwa.

    'Maluṭa tried to think and found himself in real hell.
    When he was in his hut he thought seriously. "If
    they arrest me, I shall say "Adziambei eloped with a
    Zulu man, she is a street girl, she is too permissive, I
    cannot understand her."

    He was so tired that he fell asleep whilst thinking.
    He even overslept until midday. He in fact woke up,
    washed and then had his lunch. This had become a
    custom among men from the city who had brides at
    their homes.'

The third person singular pronoun *ene* 'he' in the discourse
above, is anaphoric to the antecedent Maluṭa. The topic above
is about Maluṭa. He is thinking hard about Adziambei. He had
just arrived from the city and was still tired, hence this
practice of oversleeping which made him wake up at midday.
Although Adziambei's name also appears, the pronoun *ene* 'he'

would not refer to her because, though she is a third person too, she is less part of the topic. Maluṭa's position makes him the only candidate, even though in Venḍa pronouns do not distinguish between sexes, as is the case in English for example.

In the discourses above, it has been noticed that it is easy to identify the antecedent-anaphor relationship where there is cohesion between referring expressions or where there is one antecedent to which the anaphor refers. It has been illustrated further that where the anaphor occurs deep in the discourse and there is no cohesion within the nearest sentences/utterances, the discourse analyst should always keep in mind what the discourse is about. Of course this is also important even in the cases mentioned above.

3.2.1.2 Agreement and pronominal anaphora

It has been stated elsewhere that there are morphological similarities between the noun prefixes and the pronominal concords. Doke speaks of some concordial colouring displayed by the pronominal concord and the noun prefix. Syntactically, however, there is agreement between the antecedent and the anaphor in terms of number, person and class and, as most scholars have observed, the agreement is displayed by the noun prefix and the pronominal concord.

The agreement stated above leads him to observe the dominating power of the antecedents, hence he says that

> "... one can say that the form of the pronoun is
> regulated by the form of the noun prefix."[49]

In the discourses below, antecedents and anaphors will be used

to illustrate how agreement takes place. It should be noted again that personal pronouns usually occur in either subordinate clauses, neighbouring sentences and also deep in the discourse itself. It is through the discourse topic , agreement and anaphora that the relationship between an antecedent and anaphora can be correlated in longer discourses.

Consider the discourse below:

17. *Vhathu vho ri u pfa phosho, vha ḓa ngau tou gidima. Vhone(1) vho vha vho ḓa u vhona leneli zhalinga. Zwiambaro zwe zwa vha zwo ambarwa, zwone(2) zwo vha zwo rungwa nga murungi makone. Andani o vha o phema mavhudzi Andisani a tshi nga ṋaledzi, ha, vhone(3) vho vha vha tshi tou nga vharuhwa na kavhili.*

   'When <u>people</u> heard the noise, they came down running, <u>they(1)</u> in fact had come to witness that joy and happiness. <u>The clothes</u> they had on <u>(they(2)</u> had been tailored by an expert. Andani had permed his hair, Andisani was like a star, my, <u>they(3)</u> were like angels indeed.'

In the discourse above, there is agreement in class, number and person between the anaphors and the antecedents to which the anaphors refer. For instance, the pronominal concord *vh-* in *vhone* 'they'(1) agrees in class, number and person with the antecedent *vhathu* 'people'. Note also the morphological resemblance between the pronominal concord *vh-* of *vhone* 'they'(1) and the noun class prefix *vha-* of the antecedent *vhathu* 'people'. The same relationship is found in the case of *zw-* of *zwone* 'they' and the antecedent *zwiambaro* 'the clothes'. An interesting case occurs with the anaphor *vhone* 'they' and its antecedents Andani and Andisani. Even if the subject(s) Andani and Andisani are disjointed, they form a plural subject or antecedent *Andani na Andisani* 'Andani and Andisani' (i.e. joined here by an associative adverbial morpheme *na* 'with') which agrees in class, number and person with the concord of their anaphor *vhone* 'they'(3).

Because of the discourse topic, even though there are two similar anaphors, *vhone* 'they'(1) and *vhone* 'they'(3), it is clear that *vhone* 'they'(1) refers to the antecedent *vhathu* 'people' at the beginning and *vhone* 'they'(3) to Andani and Andisani.

It should be noted that in all cases, whether the anaphor occurs in a subordinate clause, neighbouring sentence or deep in the discourse or whether there is more than one antecedent to which it can refer, the question of agreement should always be linked with the discourse topic. On the other hand, there should be coherence between utterances or sentences. It has been stated in chapter 1 that anaphora is easy to interpret if expressions are within the same or neighbouring sentences i.e. where the discourse is able to display cohesion. Of course, if there is cohesion between the referring expressions in the discourse as a whole, the task will become easier. In case the discourse does not have such aspects, the discourse analyst will depend on what has been called conversational implicatures (1.4.4). This in a way would indicate that the discourse topic has linked those utterances or sentences and related them to the topical referent.

3.3 QUANTITATIVES

When the quantitative is used together with the antecedent to which it refers anaphorically, both of them co-refer to the same referent in discourse, hence they are said to be coreferential. The quantitative is either used as a qualificative or pronoun, but in both cases it functions as an anaphor just like absolute pronouns and demonstratives.[50] As stated above, the quantitative has an anaphoric function when used in a discourse. When quantitatives are used alone in the discourse, they replace certain antecedents mentioned earlier in the discourse or even implied i.e. not stated or mentioned antecedents. In this case, they co-refer with such antecedents

to the same referents.

The question of coreference involving the quantitatives also
involves agreement between the anaphor i.e. the quantitative and
their antecedents in discourse. For this reason, it is very
important to understand the form of the quantitative and how it
is related to that of its antecedent. Note the following:

Noun class prefix	Quantitative concord	Quantitative
2 *vha-*	*vh-*	*vhothe*
6 *l̯i-*	*l̯-*	*l̯othe*
7 *tshi-*	*tsh-*	*tshothe*
10 *dzin-*	*dz-*	*dzothe*

In the case above, there are clear morphological resemblances
between the noun class prefixes and the quantitative concords.
The quantitative concords in use display syntactic agreement
between the anaphors of which they are elements and the antecedents
to which the anaphors refer.

3.3.1 Quantitatives as anaphors

Quantitatives occur in discourse as anaphors of their antecedents.
As has been indicated above, there is always agreement between
the anaphor i.e. the quantitative, and the antecedents they refer
to as is manifested by the quantitative concords. The relationship
between the two referential expressions is also regulated and
guided by the discourse topic which runs through the discourse.
Consider the discourse below:

Madima[51]

18. *Seani: Tshisibe tshanu asitsho. Zwa u sea ndi*
zwa u sea; fhedzi Maluta o vhuya. Rine ro pfa
nga havha vhasidzana vha vhaeni, kani a ni zwi
divhi uri vha bva Tshilapfene? Ha havho ndi
tsinitsini na vhuhadzi hanu, arali inwi no vha
ni munna wa Maluta, ndi musi vhe vhone vhane vha
ni bikela no ya u sela.

"Nandi vhoinwe", hu vhudzisa Adziambei.

"Ngoho Maluta o vhuya?"

Vhothe, "A si ula wa ngei ha Biana kani-ha. Arali
e ene o vhuya nga lavhuvhili la yeneino vhege!"

'Seani: There is your soap. We are merely joking
but Maluta is back. We have been told by these
visiting girls, don't you know that they are from
Tshilapfene? They are in fact very close neighbours
to your in-laws, if you were Maluta's boyfriend,
they would be the ones to prepare food for you when
you visited there.

"Is that really true (you)" asked Adziambei.

"Is it true that Maluta is back?"

All,"Is he not he of the Biana's. If he is the one,
then he came back on Tuesday this week."'

There are many possible antecedents to which the anaphor *vhothe*
'all' can refer in this discourse; however, the discourse topic
leads us to see a coreferential relationship between the anaphor
vhothe 'all' (another anaphor is the second person pronoun *vhoinwi*
'you' i.e. plural of *inwi* (indirect anaphor)) and the antecedents
havha vhasidzana vha vhaeni 'these visiting girls'. Seani at
first refers to the antecedent as *havha vhasidzana vha vhaeni*
'these visiting girls' and Adziambei uses a second person pronoun
(plural) *vhoinwi* 'you' to refer to it. The personal pronoun
vhoinwi 'you' here is anaphoric to the antecedent. Later the
author uses the quantitative *vhothe* 'all' anaphorically to refer
to the same antecedent. The *vh-* in *vhothe* 'all' is the concordial
morpheme which is similar to a subject concord and agrees in
number, class and person with the class prefix of the antecedent

havha vhasidzana vha vhaeni 'these visiting girls' and the
concordial element *vh-* in *vhoinwi* 'you'. *Vhothe* 'all' and
havha vhasidzana vha vhaeni 'these visiting girls' refer to the
same referents and are as a result coreferential.

It should be noted that the anaphor can still occur deep in the
discourse and still be comprehended as being co-referring with
its antecedent to the same referent, as has been illustrated with
the absolute pronouns. Another interesting case is with conjoined
subjects i.e. the antecedent, where a plural subject will always
be in agreement with its anaphor, be they structurally separated
or conjoined. Consider the discourse below:

Madima[52]

19.   *Maluta na Ntsieni vha edzisa u mu vusa vha sokou*
      dovha vha mu litsha henefho fhasi. Ndi hone vha
      tshi langana uri vha tou mu dedengedza vho mu fara
      vhothe.

      'Maluta and Ntsieni tried to help her stand up but
      in vain and eventually they left her on the ground.
      They all then decided to help her walk with each
      holding on each side.'

Here the anaphor *vhothe* 'all' refers to the antecedent *Maluta na*
Ntsieni 'Maluta and Ntsieni'. The two expressions, the antecedent
Maluta na Ntsieni 'Maluta and Ntsieni' and *vhothe* 'all' are
coreferential i.e. they refer to the same referent. It is very
clear again that there is agreement between the antecedent *Maluta*
na Ntsieni 'Maluta and Ntsieni' and the anaphor *vhothe* 'all' in
terms of class which is class 2, number which is plural and person
which is third. Maluta and Ntsieni form a conjoined subject which
takes on a plural concord i.e. of class 2. There is correspondence
between the class 2, prefix *vha-* and the concordial morpheme of
the quantitative *vh-* in *vhothe* 'all'. As a result, there is no
doubt that *vhothe* 'all' is the anaphor of the antecedent *Maluta na*
Ntsieni 'Maluta and Ntsieni'.

Quantitatives are, therefore, co-referring expressions with their antecedents, they both refer to the same discourse referents. As has been indicated, coreference is not just arrived at because two referring expressions can be said to refer to the same referent, but there should be questions such as that of agreement between the anaphor and its antecedent and, of course, that of the discourse topic, which always indicates how such expressions are related to each other.

3.4 DEMONSTRATIVES

Most scholars in Bantu languages refer more to the deictic function of the demonstratives than their anaphoric function. Though this seems to have been a trend, demonstrative pronouns do have an anaphoric function as well i.e. they can be used to refer back to their antecedents in discourse.[53] This further indicates that they, together with their antecedents, co-refer to identical referents in discourse, in other words, they are co-referential.

Besides the fact that many scholars have written on deictic demonstratives, a few have made mention of the anaphoric function of demonstratives. Nesfield, writing on the English demonstratives, has this to say about them,[54]

> "A Demonstrative Pronoun is one that points to
> some noun going before and is used instead of it."

The "noun going before" the demonstrative is the antecedent and the occurrence of the demonstrative re-identifies it. Usually when demonstratives occur in this fashion, they are termed substitutes by Doke. These substitutes are called anaphors. In this instance the antecedent and the anaphor, co-refer to the same referent and are thus coreferential. Doke and Mofokeng, like other grammarians, argue that demonstratives can

be used as subjects or objects in sentences or discourse, which
is their anaphoric function, in addition to their deictic one.[55]

They continue to write that demonstratives can be used as subjects
or objects "instead of the noun referred to" as in *"Bao" ba tlile*
'Those have come'. *Bao* 'those' in this case, is anaphoric to an
implied antecedent (possibly *Batho* 'people'). These referents
are known by the discourse participants. Another scholar of note,
Cole, agrees with Doke and Mofokeng and Nesfield on the anaphoric
function of demonstratives when he says,[56]

> "... in conversations they often refer to something
> which has been previously mentioned."

It is clear from these words that the demonstratives are used as
anaphors i.e. to refer to antecedents mentioned earlier by either
of the discourse participants and, as shown in the case of Nesfield,
Doke and Mofokeng, demonstratives are co-referring elements or are
coreferential with their antecedents. Harries writing on the
demonstrative in Swahili observes that,[57]

> "... demonstrative(s) serve to particularize the
> nominals ... indicating that it refers to previous
> mention or mutual understanding of the nominal
> concerned."

It is obvious in this instance that Harries is reiterating points
mentioned by Nesfield, Cole, Doke and Mofokeng. Harries makes
mention of an important aspect concerning the use of anaphoric
elements, that of the mutual understanding of the nominal concerned
or, as he further indicates, "of the previous mentioned ...
nominal concerned". Once the discourse participants mention a
particular referent in their discourse, then it becomes shared
knowledge. As they continue with their conversation, they will
tend to share the same presupposition pool, in which case, when
the referent is referred to again by a demonstrative, this as an
anaphor becomes a co-referring element. A discourse participant

will be able to notice that the anaphor used refers to an
antecedent mutually known by both of them. In other words the
use of coreferential elements involves shared knowledge between
the discourse participants.

It is important to understand the forms and position of the
demonstratives in order to understand how to use them. There are
four forms of the demonstratives which can be used anaphorically
in conversations i.e. referring to what has been mentioned earlier
in discourse hence Cole states,[58]

> "Each of the four types may be used instead of
> the nouns to which they refer, i.e. as subject
> in the sentence ..."

Although demonstratives are basically deictic in function, they
can be used anaphorically as Cole indicates. It is possible,
however, that the deictic element will be realized even in their
anaphoric use. It is therefore necessary to study the form of
various demonstratives before using them in discourse. The form
of the demonstrative in Venda differs from the other pronouns.
Although there are some morphological differences from the pronouns
in the sister languages, it however is similar to that of Shona.
There are basically three positions or points of reference and
four forms in Venda.[59] Consider the following examples of three
classes:

	1a	1b	2	3
cl.1	*uno* this one here	*uyu* this one	*uyo* that	*ula* that one yonder
cl.6	*ano* these ones here	*aya* these ones	*ayo* that	*ala* those yonder/ that yonder
cl.8	*zwino/izwi*	*izwi* this/these	*izwo* that	*zwila* those ones yonder

The first position or point of reference has been divided into
two i.e. 1(a) and 1(b). 1(a) consists of a demonstrative concord
which is similar in form to the subject concord and a demonstrative
marker -no and 1(b) consists of a characteristic vowel and a
demonstrative element which is similar in form to the subject
prefix for all classes. These forms are used anaphorically in
discourse to refer to what is being talked about at the moment of
speaking, usually they refer to what the speaker is saying although
they can also refer to what his interlocutor is saying too. To
some extent, they can refer to what has just been said at that time
of utterance. The difference between them is more one of emphasis,
with 1(a) referring more to the immediate present.

Following Zandvoort this (for Venda 1(a)+(b)) and the plural form
these are used to refer to what has just been said. "This (these)
is used to refer back to what has just been mentioned or is coming
nearer."[60]

Halliday and Hassan observe that this can be used to refer to what
is being said at the present moment but that it can also be used
to refer to what is to follow.[61] On the whole, even if these
forms 1(a)+(b) for "this", "these" can be used for what has just
been said or what is to follow, everything else is regarded as
being within the present i.e. at the moment of speaking.

The form II in Venda is the same as that of 1(b) except that the
terminative vowel has been replaced by an - o e.g. ayo 'that',
izwo 'that' etc. This form is used to refer to what has been
said before the speaker could say anything, usually it refers to
what has been said by the interlocutor.

According to Zandvoort that and those (for the Venda position II)
are used to refer to what has been said earlier.[62] Halliday and Hassan add,
in agreement with Zandvoort, that that (for Venda position II) is
used to refer to what has been said by the previous speaker.

They give the following example to illustrate their point.
"I've just been on holiday in Tahiti." to which according to
them the second speaker would say, "<u>That</u> must have cost a lot of
money." <u>That</u> in this case refers to what has been said by the
previous speaker. It can also refer to 'the holidaying in Tahiti'.[63]
There is coreferentiality between the anaphoric demonstrative <u>that</u>
and what was said about holidaying in Tahiti by the first speaker.
Furthermore Halliday and Hassan write as follows to emphasise
their findings,[64]

"... proximity is interpreted in terms of time; ..."

and continue to observe that,

"... <u>that</u> tends to be associated with a past - time ..."

and stress that whenever that (those) is used, they are used
to refer back, in other words further away or getting further
away.[65]

The fourth form cl.1 *uĺa* 'that' (which was said some time ago)
has a demonstrative concord which is similar in form to the
subject concord and -*ĺa* which is a demonstrative marker for this
point of reference.

This form is used to refer to what has been mentioned some time
ago. The utterance could have been made at the beginning of the
conversation i.e. after some period or any other time before the
conversation.

The demonstrative concords in use always show agreement in class
number and person with the antecedents to which their anaphors
refer. Refer to the discourse below:

20. *Ho vha ho no fhela vhege mbili Takalani na Sandani*
vho funana vha tendelana na u malana, huno tshe
tsha vho do dina ho vha u tuwa ha Takalani. Sandani
a vhudzisa a tshi khou sea-sea "Ndo pfa u pfi no vha
ni tshi khou ntoda." "Ee, hafhu ndi khou ya seli ha
lwanzhe Japan u guda hone, fhedzi (ha)ano mafhungo(1) a
songo vhudzwa muthu." "Ee, aya mafhungo(2) ndi mahwe,
zwino nne ni khou ntsia?" Sandani a ralo a songo
tsha takala, a dovha a ri, "Zwino ala mafhungo(3) ni ri
mini ngao kani a ni tsha mpfuna ni do mala henengei?"
Takalani a fhindula o khwathanyana. "Izwo zwi songo
ni dina ni wanga wa u fa na u phila. Ni khou amba
uri ndi nga ni shavha, ndo ri mini zwila ndi tshi ni
ambisa?" Sandani a ri, "Hezwo ndi khou zwi pfa, ndi
uri vhathannga vha ano maduvha vha a u shandukela
ngoho."

'It was after two weeks that Takalani and Sandani had
fallen in love and agreed to marry when they were
disturbed by the news of Takalani's pending departure.
Unknowingly Sandani asked her boyfried with a face
full of smiles, "I understand you were looking for me?"
"Oh yes, by the way I am supposed to go to Japan for
my studies but this news should not be told to anyone,"
answered Takalani. "Gosh, this news is really
discouraging, so you are leaving me behind?" Sandani
said looking discouraged and continued, "Now what about
that (matter), or don't you love me anymore, are you
going to marry there?" Takalani looked encouraging as
he answered, "That should not worry you, you are mine
for life and death. Do you think I can really run
away from you, what did I say (that time) when I
proposed to you?" Sandani said, "I understand that,
it is because young men of these days can be unfaithful."'

Sandani uses the third point of reference demonstrative *ala*
mafhungo 'that matter' to refer to their marriage agreement
contracted two weeks earlier and Takalani refers to the same time
with the anaphor *zwila* 'that' (time). These forms are basically
used for what has been said relatively further back in the past.

It should be borne in mind that time in this case is not fixed
but depends on the user's interpretation. For instance, Sandani
would have been correct had she said the following at the end of
their talk or even in the course of their conversation, *"Takalani*
mara izwi/izwo/zwila zwe na amba zwa u ya Japan." 'Takalani but

this/that (what you've said) about going to Japan.', where the
anaphors *izwi* 'this', *izwo* 'that' and *zwila* 'that' all refer to
what was said at the beginning of the conversation. As it has
already been alluded to, it is the speaker who decides on the
proximity of time in discourse and there are various pragmatic
factors that lead to this.

As for agreement and anaphora, the demonstratives in the discourse
above agree with their antecedent in class, person and number.
It has been indicated earlier that there is a morphological
resemblance between the prefixes of the antecedents and the
demonstrative concords. This can be seen between the prefixes
ma- of the antecedents *mafhungo*(1), *mafhungo*(2), *mafhungo*(3) 'the
news', *maduvha* 'days' and the demonstrative concord *a* in *ano*
'these', *a* in *aya* 'these', *a* in *ala* 'that', and *a* in *ano*
't h e s e' ; as well as between the class 8 prefix *zwi-* of the
implied antecedents *zwithu* 'things' i.e. the news you have told
(are telling) me and the concords *zw-* in *izwo* 'that', *zw-* in
zwila 'that' and *zw-* in *-zw-* of *hezwo* 'that'. In this discourse,
all the demonstratives are functioning as anaphors to their
antecedents. Takalani uses the demonstrative *(ha)ano* *(mafhungo)*
'this news' anaphorically to refer to what he is telling Sandani.
Sandani too refers to the news as being *aya* 'this' i.e. what she
is hearing from Takalani at the time of speaking. As has been
indicated earlier, both forms *(ha)ano* 'this' and *aya* 'this' are
1(a) and 1(b) forms and refer to the same point of reference,
hence they have been classified under one category.

(Ha)ano 'this here' is focussing on a time closer to them than
aya 'this'. All in all, they overlap in use, in other words,
they can be used interchangeably. Takalani goes on to refer to
what has been said by Sandani with *izwo* 'that', the same is done
by Sandani's use of *hezwo* 'that' to refer to what Takalani has
said, both these anaphoric expressions refer to what has been
said by the previous speakers i.e. in the past. It is interesting

that Sandani used *aya-mafhungo* 'this news' instead of *aya mafhungo* 'that news' to refer to what has been said by her interlocutor. Her use of this expression may be attributed to the fact that she was still shocked by the new developments. Besides, the use of these expressions depends on how the discourse participants interpret the proximity of time in their conversation and the prevalent discourse topic.

3.5 CONCORDS

Concords are also used in discourse as anaphoric expressions. In this section, only the subject and object concords will be dealt with as others, such as those of pronouns, have been treated within their categories.

In the Bantu languages, concords, also called agreement markers or morphemes, have important functions as linking and referential elements. The definitions of these two morphemes as given by various scholars are similar. Doke defines the concords as follows:[66]

> "There are two types of concord used with the verb,
> the subjectival and objectival concord. The former
> shows agreement with the subject of the verb, and
> the latter shows concordial agreement with the
> object of the verb."

From Doke's definition, it can be observed that there is agreement between the subject of the verb and the verb brought about by the subject concord, and also agreement between the object of the verb and the verb brought about by the object concord. In both cases, the concords are linking elements.

Adding to what Doke has stated, Ziervogel has this to say on the subject concord, "The subject concord always shows agreement with the class prefix of the noun as the subject of the sentence"[67] and further says, "... In most cases the subject concord is

identical with the corresponding class prefix."[68]   Kunene adds that,[69]

> "... an agreement between a verb and its subject noun is
> expressed by a morpheme called a subject-verb- agreement
> and between a verb, and its object is expressed by a
> morpheme called an object-verb- agreement."

Hlongwane says,[70]

> "The subject concord (s.c.) is in many instances the indication
> of the subject with which it is in restricted relationship."

Note the example below:

21.   *Vhanna vha(1) la vhuswa vha(2) lala.*
      'Men (they)(1) eat porridge and (they)(2) sleep.'

Note the similarities between the noun class prefix *vha* of *vhanna*
'men' and the two concords *vha* 'they'(1) and *vha* 'they'(2).

It is the similarities between the class prefix and the subject
concord, as Doke and Ziervogel observe, that display the
agreement.   Bosch adds,[71]

> "The concord or agreement morpheme represents
> the subject noun and links it with the verb."

Adding to the agreement aspect of the subject concord, scholars
further observe another aspect, as Bosch above indicates, that of
representing the subject of the noun.   In other words, the subject
concords also represent or refer to the subject noun whether
expressed or not i.e. as anaphors.   Poulos puts it as follows,[72]

> "The subject prefix shows agreement with the subject
> of a finite verb irrespective of whether the subject
> is substantivally expressed or not."

Refer to the example below:

22.   *Vhanna vha(1) la vhuswa vha(2) ya mushumoni.*
      'Men they eat porridge and they go to work.'

23.   *Vha(3) la vhuswa vha(4) ya mushumoni.*
      'They eat porridge and they go to work.'

In the first sentence, there is agreement between the subject noun *vhanna* 'men' and the verb brought about by the subject concords *vha* 'they'(1) and *vha* 'they'(2). It is obvious again in this case that there are similarities between the prefix of the subject noun phrase *vha-* in *vhanna* 'men' and the subject concords *vha* 'they'(1) and the *vha* 'they'(2). In this sentence, the subject concord *vha* 'they'(1) is adjacent to its subject NP and functions only as an agreement morpheme but not as an anaphor, but *vha* 'they'(3) is anaphoric to it. In other words if the concord is adjacent to the NP then it has no anaphoric function but a concordial one only. In the second sentence, the subject noun phrase has not been expressed but there is still concordial agreement between it and the two concords. Both concords further refer anaphorically to the unexpressed subject noun or antecedent. To support the above, Ziervogel says,[73]

> "The concord, whatever form it assumes, always refers
> to a noun phrase actually named or only understood."

To add to the above, the subject concord has been found to be an obligatory morpheme in finite verbs. Fortune further says,[74]

> "In agreeing with the subject, either expressed or
> implied, it relates the verb to the noun concordially;
> at the same time, it signifies the subject, both in
> itself and <u>quo</u> subject."

This then shows that the subject concord is restricted to the subject noun and also bound to the verb stem. Therefore, the concord links the verb with its subject and further represents it. From the discussion above, there is evidence that the subject concord refers to or is anaphoric to an antecedent in the discourse besides being an agreement marker.

The object concord has, according to Doke, also a linking and referential function.[75] On the whole, the object concord is an

optional element unlike the subject concord which is obligatory. Wherever it occurs, the object concord agrees with the object NP and there are similarities between the prefix of the object noun phrase and the object concord.[76] When used, the object concord refers to the object noun phrase and agrees with it in terms of class, number and person.

24. *Vhanna vha a vhu la vhuswa.*
    'The men eat it the porridge.'

25. *Vhanna vha a vhu la.*
    'The mean eat it.'

26. *Vhanna vha la vhuswa.*
    'The men eat porridge.'

In (24) the object concord and object NP occur together and there are similarities between the object concord and the prefix of the object noun phrase. In (25) the object concord *vhu* 'it' occurs alone, even though it represents or is anaphoric to the object noun phrase, which in this case is understood. There is therefore agreement between the object concord *vhu* 'it' and the prefix of the object NP which in this case is *vhu* 'it' of *vhuswa* 'porridge'. In (26) the object NP occurs without the object concord. It is clear in this instance, therefore, that the subject concord refers to its antecedent or is anaphoric to it. Bosch has indicated too that the object concord presupposes old or given information i.e. it is anaphoric to its object NP.[77]

It should be noted that concords are always restricted to their noun phrases whether they follow them or not, besides, they always display agreement in class, person and number with them. In this dissertation concords are used as anaphoric expressions just like pronouns but are not called pronouns or bound pronouns as they are called by scholars such as Ashton, Brown, Givon, etc. It should be noted that whenever they are translated into the Germanic

languages, they become pronouns but this does not make them pronouns in Venda and other related languages.[78]

In most of the examples that will be used in discourses, the concords that follow their noun phrases immediately will not be considered as anaphors, as these are basically agreement markers (i.e. in such positions) but wherever they occur as, for example, in subordinate clauses, neighbouring sentences and deep in the discourse as a whole, they will be considered as anaphoric to their antecedents, mentioned or implied as shown in the examples hereunder.

3.5.1 Agreement and concordial anaphora

There is always agreement between the antecedent and the anaphor in terms of class, person and number brought about by the agreement morpheme or marker i.e. concord. It has been stated earlier that the subject agreement marker is an obligatory element unlike the object agreement marker which is optional, so that if it occurs in the same sentence with the antecedent, the addressee or reader is able to notice it easily. In cases where it occurs alone as indicated earlier, it will still show that it is representing an understood antecedent since agreement morphemes or concords are,

> "Morphemes that the hearer uses in order to retrieve information about the deleted noun."

says Kunene.[79] The NP or antecedent in this case, governs the agreement even if it is not explicitly present. Kunene writes that these anaphors are

> "... agreement markers ... that present a certain noun that has been mentioned earlier in a discourse or earlier in a sentence."[80]

Therefore, from the occurrence of the concord can be predicted the number, class and person of the antecedent, if it is not mentioned. Refer to the discourse below:

Madima[81]

27. *"Tshibalo, nazwino ni tou vha na mafhungo aṇu,"*
    ndi Adziambei a raloho a tshi khou vhea khavho
    fhasi.

    '"Tshibalo, indeed <u>you</u> have news to tell me," said Adziambei while putting the calabash on the floor.'

In the discourse above, <u>Tshibalo</u> is the antecedent and it is the second person singular, i.e. the hearer, the anaphor *ni-* 'you' is the subject concord or agreement marker for the second person pronoun (singular) *inwi-* 'you'. There is agreement between <u>Tshibalo</u> and the anaphor *ni-* 'you' in terms of person and number. The subject agreement morpheme *ni-* 'you' is anaphoric to the antecedent <u>Tshibalo</u>.

Note the agreement with a third person in the discourse below:

28. *Vhasidzana vha tshi vhona ḓuvha ḽo kovhela, vha*
    mbo ḓi ṱuwa, ii, ho vha ho no vha vhusiku.

    'When <u>the girls</u> realized that it was already late (it was already dark), <u>they</u> decided to leave, oh yes, it was already dar<u>k</u>.'

The antecedent *vhasidzana* 'the girls' has the class prefix *vha-* 'they' which is plural and so is the anaphoric concord *vha-* 'they'.

Harries states, on the similarities between these morphemes,[82]

> "The co-referent of the subject prefix is a nominal group of the same class as the subject prefix (or concord ... T.M.S.)."

There is therefore anaphora and agreement between the antecedent *vhasidzana* 'the girls' and the concord *vha* 'they'. Note again

that *vha* 'they' is anaphoric to the antecedent *vhasidzana* 'the girls'.

There are cases which appear complicated mostly with conjoined subjects. When such subjects are linked by the associative adverbial prefix *na-* 'and', Poulos says,[83]

> "The subjects are then represented within the verb by a plural subject prefix which may vary according to whether the subjects are personal or impersonal."

Consider the discourse below:

29. *Mafhungo o vha o no vhifha ndo halifhelwa lu vhaisaho. Huno mukalaha na mukegulu ḽo no kovhela* vha(1) *dzhena* vha(2) *dzula fhasi,* vha(3) *mmbudzisa.*

   'Matters had reached boiling point. When <u>the old man and the old woman</u> in the evening, <u>they(1)</u> entered and <u>they(2)</u> sat down. <u>They(3)</u> asked me.'

The agreement morpheme or subject concords *vha* 'they'(1) and *vha* 'they'(2), *vha* 'they(3) all agree with the conjoined or co-ordinated subject NP or antecedent. Both nouns *Mukalaha* 'the old man' and *Mukegulu* 'the old woman' form a plural subject and thus belong to class 2 third person which is plural so that the relevant plural subject concord or agreement morpheme *vha* 'they', which corresponds with the class prefix *vha-* of class 2, and agrees with the plural subject above.

There are cases, however, in the spoken language, where the nouns which form the antecedents are disjointed, and are not even linked by the associative adverb prefix *na-* 'with' as in the case above, but they are able to generate and govern a proper agreement morpheme as in *Madima*.[84]

30. *Maluṱa zwino u a mu beba-vho. Ntsieni a fhira*
    phanḓa o hwala mufaro. Vha tshi swika fhala
    muedzini Ntsieni a ri, "Ni vhone ni sa ḓo wiṣa
    hwana wa vhathu.

> 'Then it was <u>Maluṱa</u>'s turn to carry her on his
> back. Ntsieni then led the way. When <u>they</u> reached
> the donga <u>Ntsieni</u> said, "Be careful not to hurt
> her (the poor child)."'

In the discourse above, there are two subject nouns, Maluta and
Ntsieni which, though disjointed, form the antecedent. The
antecedent or subject noun phrase is plural i.e. it falls in
class 2 in which the prefix *vha-* is plural. The subject concord
vha- 'they' agrees with and is anaphoric to the subject noun
phrase or antecedent *Maluṱa na Ntsieni* 'Maluṱa and Ntsieni' even
though they are disjointed.

It will be noted that in most discourses, concords occurring
immediately next to their subject noun phrase as in *Maluṱa na
Ntsieni vha mu beba* 'Maluṱa and Ntsieni carried her', concords
such as *vha-* 'they' above have more the nature of agreement
morphemes than anaphors, but when they occur in subordinate
clauses, neighbouring sentences and deep in the discourse (as in
the discourse above), are anaphors which still display agreement
with their antecedents.

It is interesting to note that in most cases the subject or object
NP's can generate and govern the agreement morpheme even if such
an object NP does not appear i.e. having been mentioned earlier on
or implied. Kunene adds that,[85]

> "In a discourse, the noun that governs the agreement
> might have been mentioned earlier and is, thus, not
> present in the sentence, in which case the agreement
> markers are the only means of retrieving the information
> concerning number, gender and grammatical function and
> relations of the deleted noun."

Consider the discourse below:

Madima[86]

31. *Nga madekwana a lenelo duvha vho no lalela, mbilu*
   ya Muhanelwa ya tou khathu. Ndi musi Tshamato yo
   u vhea. I u huvha, ya gidima i tshi da munangoni
   wa tshitanga. Naho vho i kaidza a yo ngo tenda u
   fhumudzwa helo duvha. Yo di tandazela i tshi ya
   henengei murahu ha nndu, ...

   'Late in the evening that day after they had had
   their dinner, Muhanelwa was shocked when Tshamato
   (lit. pitched) it. It barked retreating towards
   the kitchen door. Even though they tried to calm
   it, it charged furiously. It went on huffing and
   puffing, going behind the hut, ...'

In the discourse above, the agreement morpheme *vh-o* 'they'
refers anaphorically to an antecedent that has not been stated.
As shown earlier, this subject concord or agreement morpheme
agrees with the subject NP or antecedent which, in fact, is *vhathu*
'people' in terms of class, person and number. The antecedent,
vhathu 'people' is the third person plural, and is in class 2 and
so does the past-tense subject agreement morpheme *vh(o)-* 'they'.
According to Hlongwane, the use of the concord in this manner
expresses what he calls lean semantic content or lean coreference.[87]
It should be stated that concords are used in discourse to
retrieve given information and, when it occurs without its subject
or object noun phrase or antecedent in that very discourse, the
hearer is guided by the discourse topic to establish the antecedent-
anaphor relationship between the two. The opinions advanced by
various scholars indicate that there is agreement among them on
the concord as agreement usually takes place between the subject
or object noun phrase and the verb through these agreement morphemes.
An important clue, as shown in the discussion, has been the
similarities in most cases between the prefixes of the subject or
object noun phrases and the concords. Furthermore, the agreement
is displayed in class, person and number between the antecedents
and concords.

3.5.2 Discourse topic and anaphoric concords

In any discourse, the entities are linked or chained together by
the discourse topic. Clark and Sengul state that the discourse
has a thematic continuity.[88] This is further stressed by Kantor,
who maintains that in a discourse the topic helps the hearer to
identify the relationship between the antecedent and the anaphor.[89]
Werth speaks of intersentential relationship which makes the
discourse one unit i.e. rallying around one particular topic.[90]
For this reason, when a concord occurs in the discourse, be it
relatively near its antecedent or far from it, the addressee is
able to identify it as being the one that co-refers with it to the
same referent. Clark and Sengul further observe that,[91]

> "Topics tend to be taken up one at a time, with
> each new sentence adding further information to
> the topic that has been introduced."

So, when an antecedent occurs in a sentence and later its anaphor
is found in the second sentence, then the two sentences are bound
together because the topic has been extended. Besides, the
occurrence of entities in this manner displays the aspects of
cohesion and relevance. As indicated earlier in (3.5), concords
are like definite noun phrases and pronouns, they presuppose old
or given information and they too, according to Clark and Sengul,
show the relevance of sentences in a discourse "for they can bind
the facts now being put forward to entities that have already been
mentioned."[92]

When a speaker uses a concord, be it subject or object, he
presupposes that his interlocutor will be capable of identifying
its antecedent. It is clear again that wherever the concords
occur, they include the discourse topic and other factors which
presuppose that the discourse participants share knowledge.

Clark and Sengul further observe that,[93]

"Referents mentioned in (the same sentence ... T.M.S.)
are easy to pick out, whereas referents mentioned
further back are relatively hard to pick out."

They note that if the antecedent is the only one in the discourse
and occurs two or three sentences back, the hearer has no
difficulty in identifying the referring expression he comes across
as anaphoric to the antecedent mentioned earlier. Note in the
following discourse the relationship between the antecedent
uyo munna ane vhe ndi Fanyana 'that (the) man who is called
Fanyana' and the anaphoric concord *mu* 'him' which occurs deep in
the discourse.

Madima[94]

32. *Mafhungo aya a farisa vhathu khakhathi i sa konadzei.*
Na vhala vhe vha vha vhe kha tshililo vha pfa vho tou
thafha^vha tshi gadabiswa hu si na tshine vha ḓivha.
Ẵdziambei o vha o no rindila, o no tou ḓiñala a tshi
hu u fa kha a fe zwawe. Iṱali o no neta nga mbilaelo.

Vha tshi vho sengiswa, Matshaya a sokou ima kha ḽa uri
ha na tshine a ḓivha nga lufu lwa uyo "munna ane^vhe"
ndi Fanyana. Nḁ hone ha athu u vhuya a fara tshigidi
tsha volovolo tshee a bebwa. Vhahatuli vha sengulusa
mafhungo aya vha dovha; zwa kunda. Vha mu rwa vha mu
shanduledza, a sokou ḓi ima kha ḽeneḽia ḽa u thoma.
Vha mu sinḓa vha sokou neta.

Vhasa wawe a mu ambelela nge' a vha o mu fhulufhedza.
Hafhu ndi zwiḽa kale Vhatshena na vhone vha sa athu u
wana vhuṱali vhu ḓivhaleaho ha u fanyisa zwigevhenga
musi zwo^no shavha. Ya sokou vha shinga-shinga.
Matshaya ene zwino o vha o no vha na muambeleli
vhukuma, Vho-Sandarson nga dzavho. Ala mafhungo a
piringanyiwa na vhahaṱuli vha vhuya vḁa tenda uri
dziḽa mmbwa dzi nga vha dzo khakha.

Adziambei ene vho mu sengisa vha tenda. Vha mu
vhudzisa tshithu tshithihi vha tshi dovha a pfa o
dzielwa. Henefha he vha vho tou nga vha sa ri ndi
ene o mu vhulayaho. Vha mu vhudzisa arali a tshi
ḓivhana na Matshaya. Ene a ḓi dovha a fhindula o
tungufhalela Fanyana wawe a^ri, ha athu u ḓivhana
ña vhathu vha Benoni ngauri hu si kale of funana na
Fanyana. A tshi khou amba a tshi ralo a vusa tshililo
tshihulu, na u fhindula a si tsha kona. La takuwa
ḽiisa ḽa ningo ndapfu ḽa mu dodza mpama ḽi tshi
khamusî u do tshenuwa ḁ fhumûla. Miṱodzi ya sokou
tevhukana, tswimila a vhuya a pfeledza. Muhatuli a
wana zwi tshi mu tomola mbilu.

'This case had now become too difficult to handle.
Even those who were mourning had become conditioned
to the ups and downs of such matters though they
had no evidence of the case as such. Adziambei
was also (had become) tired and wished she could
die. After all she had had enough.

When they were tried, Matshaya stuck to his defence
and claimed that he knew nothing of (that) the man
(who is lit.) called Fanyana. In fact, he indicated
to them that he had never handled a gun since birth.
The judges went over the case now and again but in
vain. They beat him up but he never changed his
evidence. They continued until they were tired.

His employer spoke on his behalf as he trusted him.
It all happened when whites had not yet developed
cameras to photograph criminals after they had
escaped. The case had become a hot potato. Matshaya .
had by then an attorney, Mr Sandarson in person.
After some time, the case was upheld and the judges
believed that those dogs might have sniffed out the
wrong culprit.

Adziambei was questioned time and again until they
had nothing to ask her. They repeated the same
question over and over, but she came up with the
same answers. One would even think that they suspected
her for having killed him. They even asked her if
she knew Matshaya too. She told them that she had not
as yet got used to people in Benoni as it was not long
that they had fallen in love with Fanyana. As she
spoke, she broke into tears and cried aloud and could
not answer questions. Then a tall big white man with
a long nose stood up and slapped her and she kept quiet.
Tears flooded down her cheeks as she cried painfully.
The judge was even touched.'

As can be noticed, the antecedent *uyo munna ane vhe ndi Fanyana*
'that/the man (who is lit.) called Fanyana' is at the beginning
of the discourse and the anaphor *mu* 'him' appears deep in the
discourse, but the reader is able to see that the two are related
i.e. they are coreferential.

In the first place, a discourse topic has been said by Werth to
be a thread that cuts through the whole discourse, linking
utterances or sentences together.[95] In this discourse, the
discourse topic can be summed up by the proposition *Tsengo ya*

lufu lwa Fanyana 'The trial of Fanyana's death'. The suspected
killers are Adziambei and Matshaya. Whatever is said about
Fanyana has to do with his ambush which led to his death, and,
whenever the other two are mentioned, they are referred to as
the killers. For this reason, when the anaphor *mu* 'him' is used,
here, it is linked with the victim Fanyana and not the culprits
Matshaya or Adziambei. As a result, this anaphor, though
occurring deep inside the discourse, refers to the antecedent
mentioned i.e. *uyo munna ane vhe ndi Fanyana* 'the/that man who
is called Fanyana.'

Ehrlich says that topics of a text always act as a major cue to
the reference of an anaphor. After all, he believes, an anaphor
will always be relevant to a particular story. The use of the
concords in the discourse above clearly displays this point.[96]

Although scholars differ in the terminology they use, such
differences are rather technical. Doke and his followers simply
call the concords verbal prefixes or agreement morphemes or
markers, while another school of thought, comprising among others
Ashton, Givon and Brown, call them bound pronouns.[97] Concords or
agreement markers are bound to verb stems, hence Doke et.al. call
them verbal prefixes while the other group calls them bound
pronouns. It has been illustrated that they are called pronouns
because when they are translated into Germanic languages, they
become pronouns, in those languages and not in Venda and other
related languages. All the same, although other scholars, among
them Givon, Brown, etc., state that concords become pronouns by
a transformational rule i.e. pronominalization, one can see that
approaches such as that of Ashton and others, are based on
translation. Both schools of thought agree, however, that concords
or agreement morphemes have an anaphoric function. It has been
illustrated that the concords appear deep in the discourse but,
bearing in mind the discourse topics, it has been possible to
detect the relationship between them and their co-referring

antecedents mentioned earlier in the same discourse. Many other
scholars have reiterated along with Kunene that,[98]

> "... agreement markers are morphemes that present
> a certain noun that has been mentioned earlier in
> a discourse ..."

As stated earlier, Poulos, Ziervogel, Hlongwane, Kunene etc. have
further indicated that these anaphoric elements i.e. agreement
markers, can refer unambiguously to antecedents which have not
been mentioned i.e. such antecedents are understood through the
discourse topic as illustrated in various discourses. To end this
discussion, it has been proved beyond doubt that concords function
as agreement morphemes or markers and also refer to antecedents
mentioned earlier or implied in the discourse. In the words of
Mkude[99]

> "Concordial morphemes (are ... T.M.S.) those morphemes
> referring to subject (or object ... T.M.S.) nouns in
> construction(s) with the verbal, either concordially
> or anaphorically."

3.6   THE ANAPHORIC REFLEXIVE $\underaccent{\dot}{d}i$-

The reflexive prefix $\underaccent{\dot}{d}i$- is used to refer back anaphorically to
the subject noun phrase in a sentence or discourse. In this case,
the reflexive $\underaccent{\dot}{d}i$- functions as an anaphor which refers to the
antecedent i.e. the subject noun phrase. The subject noun phrase,
in this case the antecedent, and the reflexive $\underaccent{\dot}{d}i$- are co-referring
elements, since they corefer to the same referent.

The reflexive prefix $\underaccent{\dot}{d}i$- is often grouped together with the object
concord. Linguists or grammarians of African languages have shown
that it is not an object concord. Lanham writes,[100]

> "This formative is not a concord in the strict sense
> of the word, but its combinatory characteristics are
> sufficiently close to those of objectival concords
> for treatment of it under the heading of "Predicative
> concords" to be satisfactory."

Poulos, writing on the verb in Venda, says,[101]

> "Closely allied in function to the object prefix is
> the reflexive, which, however is not concordial i.e.
> it has only one form for all persons and classes
> namely ḓi-."

Poulos's view had earlier been expressed by Cole with reference
to Tswana.[102] The point is that although it occurs in the
predicative like the object concord, it functions differently
from the object concord as will be shown later. Doke also notes
the difference between the object concord and the reflexive *-ḓi-*
and he says,[103]

> "There is a prefixal formative, akin in use to the
> objectival concords, which is used immediately
> before active verb -stems to give the verb
> reflexive force. This is sometimes called "the
> reflexive pronoun," but it is not a pronoun as it
> never constitutes a separate word. Unlike the
> objectival concords, this formative -zi- is
> invariable for all persons and classes ..."

The reflexive *ḓi-* is the equivalent of the English -self, which
is why Ziervogel speaks of it as being like the reflexive pronoun.[104]
Fortune adds to Doke's point and states,[105]

> "... it refers to the self as a term of the action and
> is of the same form whatever be the noun class of the
> subject of the verb ..."

In the words of Lanham,[106]

> "The prefix indicates that the subject of the verb
> directs the action indicated by the verb towards
> itself."

Poulos adds to Lanham's view as follows:[107]

> "It indicates that the action denoted by the base
> radical is directed back upon the subject of the
> verb."

The reflexive   expresses myself, yourself, ourselves,
themselves, etc., hence most of the abovementioned scholars
equate it with the reflexive pronoun in, for example, English.[108]

In a more recent work, Dembetembe puts it more clearly when he
says that it is identical with the subject noun phrase and that
the two often occur in the same simple sentence and the former
constitutent is obligatorily reflexivized.[109] He goes on to give
the following examples in Shona:

33. *Mombe iye ya zwikuvadza.*
     'That cow hurts itself.'

He shows the occurrence of the two noun phrases in an underlying
structure:

(Mombe iye) yakuvadza (mombe iye)
'That cow hurt that cow.'

According to this analysis, this sentence has two noun phrases.
The first is the subject noun phrase or antecedent i.e. *mombe
iye* 'that cow' and the second underlying NP is *mombe iye* 'that
cow' contained in the reflexive *zvi-*. This second noun phrase is
the object noun phrase and thus serves as the anaphor.

The following is another example by Dembetembe

34. *Mwana achazviruma rurimi.*
     'The child bites his tongue.'

It is analysed as follows:

> *(Mwana) acharuma (mwana) rurimi.*
> 'The child (will) bite the child the tongue.'

As in the earlier case, there are two noun phrases in the sentence, i.e. the subject noun phrase or antecedent and the object noun phrase or anaphor, and in both cases the expressions refer to *mwana* 'the child'.

The object noun phrase is the underlying form of the reflexive *zvi-*. The two noun phrases are similar and co-refer to *mwana* 'the child', in other words, they are coreferential. The following examples are in Venda.

35. *Takalani o ḓivhaisa.*
    'Takalani has hurt herself.'

is analysed as follows:

> *Takalani o vhaisa Takalani.*
> 'Takalani has hurt Takalani.'

The sentence above has two identical noun phrases i.e. the subject noun phrase or antecedent Takalani and the object noun phrase or anaphor Takalani which is the underlying form of the reflexive *ḓi-*. Dembetembe says that "... the first NP is the subject and is reflected in the reflexive ... form."[110] As illustrated earlier, the subject NP is identical with the object NP which leads to their coreferentiality. Dembetembe has a point to make on the interpretation of this kind of coreference,[111]

> "For an object NP to be reflexive it must be strictly identical with the subject NP in that sentence."

The coreferentiality of the subject noun phrase and the reflexive *di-* does not only occur in the same single sentence as shown earlier, but it also occurs in longer stretches or discourses.

The following extract is from E.S. Madima's novel A SI ENE:[112]

36. *Muhanelwa u hevhedza Maemu, "Zwa u vhingwa zwi tshee kule na nne. Ndi nga tou vhingwa nga mavhuyahaya zwanga; ndo no fhedza u umbula nduhu dzanga." "Khamusi nne ndi tshi da fhano ndi u shaiwa mushumo. Inwi mukololo; ni songo vhuya na difhura ri tuwa rothe. Ndi bva kule nga maanda."*

'Muhanelwa whispered to Maemu, "I cannot be married now, it is too early. I had better get married in the autumn, after I have harvested my peanuts." "Maybe my coming down here is sheer laziness. You princess, do not deceive yourself, we are leaving together. I come from far."'

In the discourse above, the noun phrase or referring expression *inwi mukololo* 'you princess' is the subject noun phrase and the reflexive *di-* in *difhura* 'deceive oneself' refers anaphorically to it. The reflexive *di-* has an underlying form which is identical to *inwi mukololo* 'you princess'. The two noun phrases are supposedly identical and corefer, hence they are said to be coreferential. In the above discourse, the two expressions are close to each other.

The reflexive *di-* 'self' remains the same for all classes and person, but still manages to refer uniquely to the specific referent. In discourse however, the discourse topic plays an important role for the participants to be co-operative i.e. to speak topically.

3.7 THE ANAPHORIC POSSESSIVES[113]

Possessives are qualificatives which can be used in a discourse
as co-referring expressions together with their antecedents. In
other words, possessives are anaphoric expressions which refer
back to their antecedents in a discourse. Their reference in the
Germanic language and also in Venda and its sister languages is
dual. In English, for example, their anaphoric aspect is by
reference and ellipsis, while in Venda it is by reference only.
The possessive concord refers to the thing possessed and the
possessive stem to the possessor. Halliday and Hassan have the
following to say on the English possessives:[114]

> "There is, however, one respect in which possessive
> pronouns differ from other personal reference items
> as regards their anaphoric function. Whereas the
> other personals require only one referent for their
> interpretation, possessive pronouns demand two, a
> possessor and a possessed."

Dekeyster makes the same observation and states:[115]

> "Possessive pronouns differ from the other personal
> pronouns in two respects: (a) They involve two
> referents, a possessor and 'possessed'."

Note in the discourse below:

37. Could you give <u>Maisi</u> this Cassette?
    <u>Hers</u> has got lost.

<u>Hers</u> is the possessive and here it anaphorically refers to the
possessor Maisi by reference and to the possessor by ellipsis.
It is necessary to indicate what is meant by both terms, reference
and ellipsis. Hartmann and Stork define reference as "The
relationship between a referent ... and the symbol which is used
to identify it."[116]

Halliday and Hassan say,[117]

> "Reference is presupposition at semantic level. A
> reference item signals that the meaning is
> recoverable ... the reference to it may require
> an item of a different function in structure."

Ellipsis is also an anaphoric relation. It is, according to
Hartmann and Stork,[118] "The process or result of omitting some
part or a word or sentence. The words missing are often said
to be 'understood' or necessary to make the construction
grammatically complete."

Halliday and Hassan say,[119]

> "An item is elliptical if its structure does not
> express all the features that have gone into its
> make-up - all the meaningful choices that are
> embodied in it."

They illustrate their claim in the following discourse:

38. Is he coming?
    Yes!

Yes, as the answer, may suffice for the addressee, who can easily
realize that some constituents have been omitted.

e.g. Yes he is coming.

The omitted constituents 'he is coming' are understood or
presupposed. They further maintain that in English ellipsis is
almost the same as substitution, the difference is that in
substitution an item can be replaced by another while in the case
of ellipsis nothing new replaces any missing or omitted item.
The omitted item is understood because in ellipsis whatever is
omitted is always presupposed. However, ellipsis is also an

anaphoric relation because the anaphor is used just as in reference to refer back to its antecedent.

The case of Venda is almost the same but rather different. First of all the possessive refers dually i.e. the possessive concord and possessive stem refer to the possessee and the possessor respectively.

When possessives are used as anaphors in a discourse, there is agreement between them and the antecedent to which they refer. There is an explicit relationship between the anaphors and the antecedents because the possessive concords show some morphological similarities to the various noun class prefixes of the antecedents e.g.

class	Prefix	Poss Conc	Poss stem
2	*vha-*	*vha*	sing. *-nga* Pl. *-shu*
3	*ḽi-*	*ḽa*	2nd sing. *-u, -ṋu, -we, -vho* Pl. *-ṋu*
7	*tshi-*	*tsha*	3rd sing. *-we, -vho* Pl. *-vho*

As indicated above, there is a morphological resemblance between the noun class prefixes and the possessive concords, it is for this reason that the concords in the possessives as anaphors can bring about agreement between these anaphors and the antecedents to which they refer.

3.7.1 Possessives as anaphors

Wherever possessives occur, they express old or given information i.e. they are used to refer to referents that have been mentioned earlier in the discourse, but they also refer to implied referents

i.e. referents which are not explicitly mentioned. This
indicates that whenever a speaker uses a possessive, then the
addressee tries to match it with a referent that has been
entered into memory earlier in the discourse or in some other
discourse that had been discontinued.

Refer to the discourse below:

Madima[120]

39. *Duvha ilo Maluṱa ho ngo vhuya a lenga u ya nḓuni.*
    Vhusiku vhuhulu a karuwa a si tsha ṱavhanya o dovha
    a eḓela, a tshi humbula Muhanelwa na Adziambei wawe (1),
    na uḽa Mukhuwa wawe (2) *wa u luga.*

    'On that day Maluṱa went to bed very early. Deep in
    the night he woke up and could not fall asleep again
    for a longer period as he thought of Muhanelwa and his (1)
    (beloved) Adziambei and also his (2) good employer.'

In the discourse the possessives *wawe* (1) 'his' and *wawe* (2) 'his'
consist of the possessive concord *wa-* and possessive stem *-we*
in each case. Both the concords and stems refer to the possessees
and possessors respectively. In the case of the possessive *wawe* (1)
wa- 'his' refers to Adziambei the possessee, and *-we* to Maluṱa
the possessor and in *wawe* (2) *wa-* 'his' refers to Mukhuwa 'the
white man' (his employer) and *we-* refers to the possessor Maluṱa.
There is coreferentiality between the antecedents and the anaphors
above, in other words they refer to the same referents. The
possessives in both cases express old or given information.

3.7.2   Discourse topic and anaphoric possessives

The discourse topic has been defined in chapter 1 as an organizing
framework. Whenever discourse participants are conversing upon
a particular discourse topic, both of them are found to co-operate
and speak topically. In other words, they will draw entities
from the same presupposition pool. In such cases, even if some

antecedents are not explicitly stated, anaphors can still be used to refer to them.

The discourse below indicates that it is possible to use anaphors to refer to implicitly mentioned antecedents:

Madima[121]

> 40. *Ha vuwa malende. Vhathannga vho u fhufha vha tou dithakha -ha. Vhasidzana na vhone vhe a ri saleli. Ha takuwa Adziambei na khonani yawe, vha tou vha sumbedza ... Zwenezwo muhwe muthannga wa mueni e khilikhithi na lwawe. Ene o vha e nambi nahone o u tshina a nga a sa dzhena fhasi.*
>
> 'They started to sing and dance. Young men jumped sky-high. The young maidens displayed their skill. Then Adziambei and her friend took the stage and swung their bodies to the delight of all. In no time a certain visiting young man jumped up singing his (song). He was a real singer and seasoned dancer and danced as if he could get underground.'

In the discourse above, the discourse topic is dancing and singing. When people dance *malende*, they also sing. The young man who was a visitor is said to have been a *nambi* 'an excellent singer or dancer'. The scene was so enchanting that people ululated. Madima uses the possessive *lwawe* 'his' to express old or given information. It is used to refer dually to antecedents in the discourse. The possessive stem *-we* here refers to the possessor *muhwe muthannga wa mueni* 'a certain visiting young man'. Since these young people were singing *u imba* it is consequential that this 'certain young man' started his own song *luimbo*, to which the concord *lwa-* refers. It is the discourse topic that leads the reader to accept that the possessive concord refers to the possessee *luimbo* 'a song', even though it is not explicitly stated. The possessor *yawe* 'hers' refers dually too. The possessive concord *ya-* 'hers' refers to the possessee *khonani* 'friend' and the possessive stem *-we* refers to the possessor *Adziambei*. A possessive as anaphor, as indicated earlier, can occur in discourse,

be it long or short and can still be identified by the addressee as being related to its antecedent.

3.7.3   Agreement and possessive anaphora

The possessive has been defined largely by Doke[122] as a word that qualifies a substantive and it is brought into concordial agreement by the possessive concord. This means that wherever the possessive occurs, there is a form of agreement between it and its antecedent.

It has further been indicated elsewhere (3.7.1) that the concord agrees with and refers to the possessed, and that the stem agrees with and refers to the possessor.

In discourse (40) the possessive concord *ya-* agrees with the possessee *khonani* 'friend' and the possessive stem *-we* agrees with the possessor *Adziambei*. There is thus agreement between the antecedents and anaphors in the discourse above. It is to be noted that agreement takes place by implication in the following discourse:

Madima[123]

41.   *Duvha ḽo no mbwanda. Madzena na ene o vha o no neta,*
      o no dovha a welela seḽi kha ḽa hawe, a tshi khou
      lidza miludzi yawe.

      'The sun had already set. Madzena too, was already
      tired and had crossed the river to his side of the
      country, loitering and whistling his tunes.'

In the discourse above, the possessive *yawe* 'his' has two anaphors which refer to two antecedents with which there is agreement. The possessive concord *ya-* refers to the possessee *miludzi* 'whistles' with which it agrees and the possessive stem *-we* refers to the possessor *Madzena* with which it agrees. The possessive *hawe* 'his' also has two anaphors i.e. the possessive concord *ha-* and the

possessive stem -*we*. The possessive stem -*we* refers to the possessor *Madzena* as does the stem -*we* of *yawe* 'his' above. The possessive concord *ha-* refers to an antecedent that has not been explicitly mentioned. The possessive concord *ha-* is a locative possessive concord and, from the discourse topic, the implied antecedent is *shango* 'the village/country' with which the possessive concord *ha-* agrees. The subject concord *ẕa* 'his' therefore anaphoric to it.

It has been pointed out that possessives refer dually i.e. they are used to refer to two referents at once unlike other referring expressions which refer to one referent. An intricate case of the possessives, as illustrated, is how its two aspects i.e. the possessive concord and stem are able to refer to and agree with their antecedents i.e. the possessee and possessor respectively.

It has also been shown that when it comes to anaphora and agreement, the basic function is carried by the possessive concord and not so much by the stem, although it too shows agreement with its antecedent. Of course, there can never be a case where the concord will agree with its antecedent whilst the stem disagrees. This makes it clear that, even though both the antecedents and anaphors appear to be two (i.e. in each case) functionally, they are still structurally one entity (i.e. in each case).

SUMMARY

It has been stressed that it is the discourse topic that makes the whole discourse interpretable. It further links the relationship between the referring expressions and the utterances and, as a result, agreement and anaphora, be it within the same sentence or neighbouring sentences, and or the discourse itself, is based on the discourse topic. It is for this reason that there is always sense, even if some antecedents are not mentioned but implied, the anaphors are still able to refer to them.

CHAPTER 4

INTERREFERENCE

Anaphors enter into various relationships with their antecedents.
In Chapter 3 it was illustrated that anaphors can refer to their
previously mentioned or implied antecedents in a one-to-one
correspondence. This relationship, as indicated, is known as
coreference. In this case both the antecedent and anaphor refer
to the same or identical referent(s).

Coreference is, however, not the only type of anaphoric
relationship. There are cases where, instead of a one-to-one
relationship between the antecedent and the anaphor, there is a
part-whole relationship.

The anaphors are in this case triggered, entailed or initiated
by the first mentioned expression or a situation of utterance.
This case is different from that of coreference. In this case
the first mentioned referring expression or situation of utterance
and the anaphor do not refer to the same or identical referent(s)
but closely related referent(s).

Referents referred to by the anaphors are called associates by
Hawkins.[1] He holds that these anaphoric expressions are triggered
by the first-mentioned noun phrase or situation of utterance which
he calls the trigger. Maratsos says that the anaphoric
expressions are made specific by entailment, in other words
they are entailed by the first-mentioned noun phrase or situation
of utterance to which they are closely related. He further states:[2]

> "The works of entailment follow from the fact that simply
> mentioning some referents or situations necessarily
> entails the existence of other, immediately specified
> referents, which can themselves become discourse referents."

Chafe holds that such anaphoric expressions are initiated or activated by the antecedent which he calls the initiator.[3]

Although these scholars hold that the relationship between the antecedent and anaphor is not coreference, they do not state what this anaphoric relationship is, except to say that the referring expressions are related by association and according to Maratsos they are related by entailment.[4]

Jansen introduced the term interreference to describe this associative relationship in the following words:[5]

> "Apart from coreference of NP's, where the referents are identical, a relation between NP's must be assumed where the referents are non-identical, but closely related. The relation between such NP's will be called 'interreference'!"

Jansen observes that interreference and coreference have similarities although he emphasises that they are two different types of anaphoric relationships.[6] For instance in,

1. The book has a spot on it.
2. The book has a spot on the binding.

he notes that the first sentence is ambiguous. In the first reading it refers to the book i.e. they are coreferential, in other words, they refer to the same or identical referent and in the second reading it may refer to the binding mentioned earlier in the discourse. In this case, the two do not refer to the same or identical referent but they refer to a closely related referent, in other words, they are interreferential. In the second sentence, the book and the binding refer to closely related referents, so that they are interreferential. He further shows some similarities and differences in the following sentences:

3. <u>Peter</u> has <u>a child</u> with <u>him</u>.
4. <u>Peter</u> has <u>a child</u> in Canada.

In the first sentence <u>him</u> is anaphoric to <u>Peter</u> i.e. they are coreferential, and in the second sentence <u>a child</u> is interpreted as being <u>Peter's child</u>, so that the two are closely interrelated and are thus interreferential. <u>A child</u> in (3) may or may not be his. For this reason, in interreference the antecedent and anaphor refer to closely interrelated referents.

4.1 <u>PART-WHOLE RELATIONSHIP - A RELATIONSHIP BY ASSOCIATION</u>

In the part-whole relationship, there is an association between what Hawkins calls 'the trigger' or in the words of Chafe 'the initiator' which is the first-mentioned noun phrase or situation of utterance, and the anaphor.[7]

As soon as the trigger is mentioned, a series of associates or parts of the whole are conjured up, triggered off or activated. In other words, the speaker is able to continue to refer to parts or associates of a whole with definite expressions as in the discourse below:

5. *Ndo fhaṱa nndu Mamelodi, <u>mavoṱhi</u> ndi madenya, <u>mbondo</u> ndi tshena, ṱhanga ndi ya zwileithi ngeno <u>mafasiṱere</u> e malapfu.*

'I have built <u>a house</u> in Mamelodi, <u>the doors</u> are thick, <u>the walls</u> are white, <u>the roof</u> is made of tiles but <u>the windows</u> are long.'

In this discourse, the indefinite expression *nnḓu* 'a house' introduces a referent into the discourse. This referring expression refers to a 'whole' and is called the trigger or initiator. All the other definite expressions, viz. *mavoṱhi* 'the doors', *mbondo* 'the walls', *ṱhanga* 'the roof' and *mafasiṱere* 'the windows' are anaphors which have a referent closely related

to the antecedent *nndu* 'a house'. Both the trigger or initiator
and the anaphors refer to closely related referents, hence they
are said to be interreferential.

For the discourse participants to be able to speak topically in
this case, they should in one way or the other share the same
knowledge of the entities being mentioned. Hawkins observes that,[8]

> "A general knowledge use of the definite (expression ...
> T.M.S.) will be one which is made possible on the basis
> of an associative relationship between the generic
> expression which corresponds to the specific trigger
> and its associates."

People in different walks of life generally share a large pool
of knowledge of referents in their environments. Whenever one
uses definite expressions, as in the case above i.e. when a
discourse referent has been introduced, then the addressee has
no need to ascertain as to which referents the speaker is
referring to because whatever is referred to is presupposed i.e.
it is given or old information.

General knowledge of referents and their use is better explained
by Minsky's theory which suggests that our knowledge is stored
in our memory in the form of data structures which he calls a
frame and he writes,[9]

> "A frame is a data-structure for representing a
> stereotyped situation, like being in a certain
> kind of living room or going to a birthday party.
> Attached to each frame are several kinds of
> information."

These 'kinds of information' are the inherent features or
associates of the whole parts. Minsky further says,[10]

> "When one encounters a new situation (or makes a
> substantial change in one's view of the present
> problem) one selects from the memory a structure
> called a frame. This is a remembered framework to
> be adapted to fit reality by changing details as
> necessary."

From this, it is clear that a frame is characteristically a
fixed representation of general knowledge about the world.[11]
Frames are of various kinds, there can be object-frames, event-
frames, etc., or to be more specific e.g. house-frames, car-
frames, etc. In this instance, therefore, if one were then to
come across a car for the first time, then he would learn that
it has parts or associates such as wheels, doors, windows, an
engine, etc. On observing different cars, one might come across
additional or other parts or associates such as a cigarette
lighter, an automatic gear, an air conditioner, a roof carrier,
etc. With this observation in mind, we may distinguish between
obligatory and optional parts.

4.1.1 Obligatory parts

These are parts which Chafe claims are inherent features.[12]
Hawkins says that they are defining features of the 'whole' that
co-occur with the whole with sufficient frequency.[13] He sees
these as necessary parts of a whole. For instance, the parts of
a house given earlier in the discourse are obligatory parts. It
is generally known that houses have *mavothi* 'doors', *mbondo* 'walls',
thanga 'a roof' and *mafasitere* 'windows'. The same can be said
of the obligatory parts of *modoro* 'a car' as given above, namely
mavhili 'wheels', *inzhini* 'engine', *mavothi* 'doors' and *mafasitere*
'windows'.

4.1.2 Optional parts

These are parts or associates which are non-defining features.
They are, rather, non-inherent parts, and do not necessarily co-
occur with their 'wholes' with sufficient frequency i.e. they
are not always found with or attached to them. Refer to the
discourse below:

6. *Takalani o renga goloi eneano maduvha, fhedzi tshiṅwe
    tsha khou dina ndi eekhondishina na gere ya
    othomethiki. Tshiṅwe hafhu ndi uri kheriana a ŋo
    ngo dzula zwavhudi.*

    'Takalani bought a car recently but unfortunately
    there is a problem with the airconditioner and
    the automatic gear. Furthermore the roof carrier
    does not fit well.'

In the discourse above, *eekhondishina* 'the airconditioner',
gere ya othomethiki 'the automatic gear' and *kheriana* 'the roof
carrier' may be regarded as optional parts of *modoro* 'a car'.
These are not necessarily inherent features of a car and as such
do not co-occur with sufficient frequency with their main whole
part i.e. *modoro* 'a car'.

4.1.3 Fluctuation of parts

Chafe has made an interesting observation concerning obligatory
and optional parts within a part-whole relationship. He has
observed that,[14]

> "Obligatory and optional parts are subject to
> considerable variation in time and space."

According to Chafe, certain parts that may have been regarded as
obligatory in the past have become optional and vice-versa. He
observes for example that 'running boards' used to be obligatory
parts of cars (in the American context) but today they have
become optional, and that heaters and cigarette lighters seem to
have moved from optional to obligatory in recent years. It
should further be noted that obligatory and optional parts or
associates may vary from country to country, from one culture to
the other, from community to community, from organization to
organization, etc.[15]

One may note this type of fluctuation for example with regard to
occasions or functions such as weddings where the obligatory
occurrence/non-occurrence of for example flower girls, white
bridal gowns, wedding receptions, wedding cakes and music may
vary from community to community.

4.1.4 Attributes

Some features of objects appear to be attributive rather than
obligatory in nature. Such attributes are so closely associated
with the object that they have been referred to as 'obligatory
attributes'.[16] In Hawkins' words, they "co-occur with sufficient
frequency" and are thus very closely related to the object, or
trigger in discourse.[17] Thus, for example, attributes such as
muvhala 'colour', *vhulapfu* 'length' and *tshileme* 'weight' may be
considered as being anaphoric to *goloi* 'a car'. This type of
relationship may therefore be considered as being one of
interreference.

In conclusion therefore, it can be briefly stated that associates
may be related to the main object in various ways, either as
obligatory or optional parts and/or attributes thereof.

4.2 SPECIFIC CASES OF THE PART-WHOLE RELATIONSHIP

In this case, reference is made to specific referents which are
found in specific environments. These referents need not be
visible, but the discourse participants share knowledge of them.
Hawkins speaks of two important uses of definite expressions
which involve specific knowledge i.e. the immediate and larger
situation uses.[18] By immediate situation he refers to an
environment that is shared physically by the same discourse
participants, such as the same house, institution, factory, etc.,

and by larger situation he refers to wider environments such as the same village, town, country, etc. The use of these terms is relative as, for instance, the same village or country can be interpreted as involving an immediate situation. Cases in both situations will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Immediate situations

In the immediate situation use of definite expressions, referents need not be introduced by an indefinite expression as they are part of the knowledge shared by the discourse participants. The speaker uses his immediate situation of utterance as the trigger and then continues to refer to associates or parts with definite expressions.

Karttunen explains further on how the immediate situation or environment is able to trigger off associative referents, and he writes,[19]

> "In every discourse, there is a basic set of referents which are known to exist although their existence has neither been asserted nor observed during the discourse itself. The set is determined by the common understanding the participants believe they share with regard to their environment."

The specificity of the referents discussed by Karttunen is determined by the common or specific knowledge shared by the discourse participants. Chafe illustrates the case above as follows:[20]

> "Suppose you and I are in a room which has a prominent blackboard on one wall. If I want to talk about the blackboard, I am at liberty to assume you know what blackboard I mean. That is, I can treat blackboard as definite on the basis of the presence of this particular blackboard in the environment of our conversation."

Following Louwrens, the definite expressions such as the blackboard, express given information i.e. knowledge which both the discourse participants share.[21] The definiteness or blackboard has been entailed by the situation of utterance i.e. the immediate situation or the same room.

The use of definite expressions in the immediate situation seems to refer to unique particulars as shown above and Karttunen observes when she writes,[22]

> "Some noun phrases are definite because there can be
> no doubt as to what their referent is in the situation
> in which the sentence is uttered or example there is
> only one object of the kind present."

For instance consider the discourse below:

7. *Munna*   :   *"No vala khishi?*

     Mufumakadzi: *A, nne ndo hangwa, tenda mmbwa i hone.*

     Munna   :   *Nne ndi giratshini ndo vhona unga no vala.*

     Mufumakadzi: *Tenda gethe lo valwa."*

'Husband   :   "Did you close the kitchen (door)?

  Wife   :   Oh, I have forgotten, but as long as the dog is there.

  Husband   :   When I was in the garage I thought you had closed it.

  Wife   :   Well, the gate is locked."'

In the discourse above, the discourse participants are referring to referents in the same house i.e. their own house. That is what Hawkins calls the immediate use of definite expressions.[23] The discourse participants share knowledge of the referents in question, and the definiteness of the expressions is due to this fact. Their immediate situation of utterance is the trigger in this case so that when the husband refers to referents with definite expressions such as *khishi* 'the kitchen', *giratshi*

'the garage' the wife is able to identify them as those of their
own house. In the same manner, when the wife refers to referents
with definite expressions such as *mmbwa* 'the dog', *gethe* 'the gate',
her husband is able to identify them as those of their house too.
The referents are specific and in a physically shared environment.
Even in this case, the referents referred to by definite
expressions, are parts or associates of the whole i.e. the same
house or house which is the situation of utterance. Furthermore,
the definite expressions are anaphoric to the situation of
utterance but they refer to closely related referents, in other
words, they are interreferential. Hence this is also a part-whole
relationship.

As in the case above, pragmatic factors will make it possible for
people in the same school to refer to referents with definite
expressions e.g. *phirisipala* 'the principal', *ofisi* 'the office',
laibulari 'the library', etc. Students from the same university
can use definite expressions, such as *rekitha* 'the rector',
khantsela 'the council', *sinethi* 'the senate', etc. to refer to
those referents that are parts or associates of their university
or the one in question.

Karttunen observes that,[24]

> "in one way or another the speaker takes it for granted
> that the listener realized what the referent is
> without it having been introduced explicitly in the
> discourse."

For instance, in the discourse above, none of the referents is
ever introduced with an indefinite expression. The co-operation
that is seen between the discourse participants is due to the
fact that they share the same presupposition pool so that, as
Hawkins sees it, when the definite expression is used, "... the
hearer is being instructed to locate the referent in the
immediate situation of utterance."[25] All these actions presuppose

that the discourse participants share knowledge. Therefore, the definite expressions used above are all anaphoric to their situation of utterance i.e. in the case of Chafe's example the blackboard is anaphoric to the immediate situation i.e. the same room. *Phirisipala* 'the principal', *ofisi* 'the office', and *laibulari* 'the library' are all anaphoric to their situation of utterance i.e. the same school and, in the case of the last example, *goloi* 'the car', *giratshi* 'the garage', *mmbwa* 'the dog' and *khishini* 'the kitchen' are also anaphoric to their situation of utterance i.e. the same house or the same family. All the anaphors are thus interrelated with their situation of utterance, the antecedents of which are not explicitly mentioned. Therefore, these antecedents i.e. the situations of utterance and their anaphors are said to be interreferential.

In the immediate situation use of definite expressions, the hearer, as Hawkins has indicated, is being instructed to locate the specific referent in an immediate situation of utterance which is specific i.e. the actual physical environment where the speech act is taking place. The referent can be visible or invisible, but the discourse participants will always share specific knowledge of these referents, in other words, both can identify the referents uniquely. Because of the specificity of both the immediate utterance situation, there can never be a problem of ambiguity. In the words of Karttunen,[26]

> "Anything in the immediate environment of the speaker
> and the hearer towards which their attention is
> directed becomes a discourse referent whether it has
> been explicitly mentioned or not."

Larger situations.

In the case of the 'larger situations' reference is made to referents in a non-immediate situation and these are inherently

not visible. Hawkins observes that,[27]

> "When people from, for example the same (village or
> suburb, town ... T.M.S.) country meet ... (even though
> away from such places ... T.M.S.) they will share a
> pool of knowledge of various entities existing in
> that (village or suburb, town ... T.M.S.) country and
> they will be able to start talking about them without
> a preceding indefinite description."

In this case, both discourse participants are familiar with the
entities in the same situation of utterance, and they can always
refer to them as if they are in the immediate environment,
because, as Hawkins sees it, they share a pool of knowledge.[28]
Thus, in their discourse, they will continue to draw relevant
and specific referents from this presupposition pool and speak
topically. The specific definite expressions are triggered or
entailed by the situation of utterance.

In the discourse below, reference is made to referents which are
in a non-immediate situation and inherently invisible. The two
discourse participants share knowledge of the referents and the
situation of utterance.

Let us assume two Zimbabweans meet in S.A. and start to discuss
their home country and their conversation continues as follows:

8.   *"Ndi pfi Mutendwahothe u khou ya u a vhelwa i hwe
      digirii ya vhudokotela vhege i daho. Muphuresidende
      u khou ya u tangana na Muhatuli muhulwane Mitshetoni
      kana Mahovholani."*

      '"I understand the Prime Minister is going to be
      awarded another doctoral degree next week. The
      President will be meeting with the Chief Justice
      either at the Ruins or the Waterfalls."'

The addressee will have no difficulty in identifying these
referents because he shares knowledge about them with the speaker.
According to Hawkins,[29]

> "In this case, the situation of the interlocutor's
> (addressee's ... T.M.S.) origin acts as the focal
> point for defining the (non-immediate ... T.M.S.)
> set, rather than the situation in which the talk
> exchange is taking place."

As a result, the referents the addressee would identify are, at
the time of writing, Mr. Robert Mugabe for *mutendwahothe* 'Prime
Minister', Rev. Canaan Banana for *muphuresidende* 'president',
Mr. Justice Dumbutshena for *muhatuli muhulwane* 'the chief Justice',
the Zimbabwe ruins for *mitshetoni* 'at the ruins' and Masvingo
Waterfalls for *mahovholani* 'waterfalls'. However, Hawkins
observes that the situation of utterance can be a potential source
of confusion because, if the addressee is not on his guard, he
might think of the referents as being those of the physical
environment in which the speech act is taking place, the more so
if they have been in that place for any length of time.[30]
Suppose two Zimbabweans who happen to be staying in Britain for
some period meet at Trafalgar square and one of them says to his
interlocutor:

9.　　*"Ndi pfa u pfi <u>Mutendwahothe</u> u khou ya u awela."*
　　　'"I understand the <u>Prime Minister</u> is going to retire."'

The possible candidate entailed from the situation of utterance
would be <u>Mrs. Margaret Thatcher</u>, but if they are mere students there
or one has just been home i.e. the speaker or the hearer, the
possible referent would be Mr. Robert Mugabe. On the whole, if
they are conversing on a specific discourse topic, there should
not be cases of ambiguity.

The definite expressions in the discourses above, have been
triggered or initiated by the situation of utterance. They are
thus anaphoric to them. The anaphors refer to the specific parts
or associates, while the triggers refer to the situations of
utterance.

4.3   GENERAL CASES OF THE PART-WHOLE RELATIONSHIP

Some of the referents of which knowledge is shared, although
inherently invisible, might not be specific.   In real life we
share knowledge that is general about things/referents in the
world.   It is therefore possible to infer the existence of certain
referents in various places e.g. homes, churches, institutions,
towns, countries, etc.   Consider the discourse below:

10.   *"Takalani: Sandani, ndi pfa u pfi ni khou ya u dzula
           Nairobi.*

      Sandani :   Ee ndi zwone.

      *Takalani: Ni tshi swika vhukavhafulaimatshini, ni ye
           ofisini dza vhapfulutsheli nga bisi ya
           vhukavhafulaimatshini.*

      Sandani :   Ndi do thoma u ya ofisini dza vhaendi."

'Takalani: Sandani, I learn you are going to stay in
             Nairobi.

Sandani :   Yes, that is true.

Takalani: On arrival at the airport, you must go by the
            airport bus to the immigration offices.

Sandani :   I shall first go to the tourist office.'

In this discourse, the referents *vhukavhafulaimatshini* 'the
airport', *ofisi (ni) dza vhupfulutsheli* 'the immigration offices',
bisi ya vhukavhafulaimatshini 'the airport bus' and *ofisi(ni)
dza vhaendi* 'the tourist offices' are inferred from general
knowledge.   The speaker knows that Nairobi is a big city, and, as
such, it should have an airport, even if he had once heard of the
airport, the rest would be, as Prince calls them, inferrables.[31]
In the same manner, after speaking of London or New York, one
can still speak of such referents as *meyara* 'the mayor', *kilaka
ya dorobo* 'the city clerk', *holo ya dorobo* 'city hall', etc.   It
should be noted, however, that some of these referents may be
there and others not depending on the place and time.

Note another case in the discourse below between Takalani and
Sandani. Takalani had just arrived from Kenya, where he had
been studying for five years, when he sees people at a wedding
party. He goes nearer and finds Sandani and they start to
converse as follows:

11. *Takalani:* *A ṇṇa ni fhano?*
    Sandani : *Ee!*
    Takalani: *Zwino muselwa ndi nnyi?*
    Sandani : *A thi tou mu divha zwavhuḓi.*
    Takalani: *Oo! Zwi a pfala, mukwasha?*
    Sandani : *Na ene!*
    Takalani: *Na dzipheletshedzi a ni dzi ḓivhi?*
    Sandani : *Ndi ḓivha muthihi wavho!*

    'Takalani: So you are here too?
    Sandani : Oh yes!
    Takalani: By the way, who is <u>the bride</u>?
    Sandani : I do not know her.
    Takalani: I see, and the <u>bridegroom</u>?
    Sandani : I can't tell too!
    Takalani: You don't even know <u>the bestmen/the bridesmaids</u>?
    Sandani : I know one (of them)!'

From the explanations above, and the discourse itself, it is
obvious that Takalani has no specific knowledge about *muselwa*
'the bride', *mukwasha* 'the bridegroom' and *dzipheletshedzi* 'the
best men and bridesmaids', in other words he does not know who
they are, but he is able to refer to them with definite
expressions because he is acquainted with the situation in which
they can be located i.e. *munyanya* 'the wedding' (but not
specifically this one), and he shares with Sandani the general
knowledge that weddings have *vhaselwa* 'brides', *vhakwasha*
'bridegrooms', *dzipheletshedzi* 'best men and bridesmaids', etc.
The entities or parts are as Hawkins notes, "well known" entities

associated with weddings.[32] In the discourse, when Takalani uses definite expressions to refer to these associates or inferrables, Sandani, his interlocutor, is co-operative and he too speaks topically, because in this case they share the same general presupposition pool. The definite expressions *muselwa* 'the bride', *mukwasha* 'the bridegroom' and *dzipheletshedzi* 'the best men or bridesmaids' are all anaphoric to the situation of utterance i.e. *munyanya* 'wedding' which is the trigger. The relationship between them is that of interreference.

It is obvious from the discourse above that people do not always depend on specific knowledge in order to refer with definite expressions. What is important for the discourse participants is, as Hawkins puts it,[33]

> "... to have general knowledge of the existence
> of certain types of objects in certain types of
> situations."

Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the range or pool of general knowledge shared among discourse participants varies from person to person. It is possible for a speaker to use a definite expression to refer to an associate which the addressee will find strange with regard to some typical trigger. In such cases, therefore, any of the discourse participants will be at liberty to repair the reference. Hawkins confirms this in these words,[34]

> "Some entities will be particularly known, others
> less so, and others not at all apart from their
> role in some typical situation."

All the same according to Karttunen,[35]

> "What one says depends on to whom one says it."

4.4   SPECIAL CASES OF IMPLIED ANTECEDENTS/TRIGGERS/INITIATORS

It may be observed that in conversations, triggers or initiators are often implied by the use of verbs or verb roots which appear to trigger off the associates of the whole part. Karttunen and Chafe have shown instances where they claim verbs/verb roots appear to be the triggers or initiators of definite anaphoric expressions.[36] However, it is convincing that it is not the verbs that are the triggers or initiators but that their use implies that the triggers are 'understood' indefinite expressions.

Karttunen illustrates this by giving an example in which the definite expressions the engine, the car, the hood, the radiator, etc. appear to be triggered off or initiated or entailed by the verb 'drive'. She, however, like Chafe, says that there are difficulties in explaining the definiteness of such definite expressions.[37]

Karttunen illustrates how the verb 'drive' triggers off a set of associates in the discourse below:[38]

12.   "I was driving on the freeway the other day when
       suddenly the engine began to make a funny noise.
       I stopped the car and when I opened the hood, I
       saw that the radiator was boiling."

He maintains that the speaker is aware that the hearer shares general knowledge about cars and their components with him. He also argues that the speaker would not be so naive as to talk about things that his interlocutor will find incompatible, and she states,[39]

"In starting a discourse, the speaker must take account
of the extent to which the intended listener is likely
to share his knowledge and frame of orientation."

If both discourse participants share knowledge, even though
generally, the hearer is not expected to ask questions such as
"which engine?" or "which radiator?" because these are components
of cars. In this instance, the hearer is instructed to determine
the relationship between the verb root and its associates by
implication. Following Karttunen, "driving on a freeway entails
that there is a car which he (the speaker ... T.M.S.) is
driving ..." and there is therefore no reason for him to first
introduce each referent with an indefinite expression and then
later to refer to it with a definite expression such as a car -
the car, an engine - the engine, a hood - the hood, a radiator -
the radiator.[40]

In the case above, the use of the verb 'drive', implies that there
is a car involved, so that the implied trigger is an indefinite
expression 'a car' as in,[41]

    13.   "I was driving a car on the freeway the other day.
           There was an engine in the car. Suddenly the engine
           began to make a funny noise. The car had a hood and
           a radiator. I stopped the car and when I opened the
           hood, I saw that the radiator was boiling."

Certainly people do not speak as in the case above. Karttunen
concludes by stating that verb roots, like nominal expressions,
can entail definite expressions which are closely associated with
them. He does not, however, speak of them as parts of verbs
but rather as entities that can be entailed by verbs.

It is again true here that Karttunen has a problem as to whether
verbs can entail, trigger or activate definite anaphoric
expressions.

Chafe's treatment of verb roots as initiators or triggers is
almost the same as Karttunen's.[42] Consider the example below:

14. "She decided to sell the cow and buy a sheep with the money."

He, like Karttunen, says that the definiteness of the definite expression, 'the money' presents problems because possibly it is not being initiated or triggered off by a nominal expression, but he sees the solution just like Karttunen when he states, "selling involves money" which explains that verbs or verb roots involve or entail definite expressions when used as Karttunen and Chafe have shown. It was indicated earlier that, according to Chafe, 'large objects' or 'whole parts' have inherent features which he says are either obligatory or optional parts, and that Hawkins too speaks of associates as being parts of the triggers.[43] The question here is whether it is possible to speak of verbs or verb roots as having parts i.e. obligatory or optional. In connection with the example given above, Chafe says, "we can posit that involving money (or something of that sort) is an inherent feature of sell ..." In other words, according to Chafe, verbs or verb roots have inherent features, but he further avoids associating verbs or verb roots with parts instead he says they have accompaniments, results and causes.[44]

The term 'accompaniments' will be used in this case as it is more embracive. Looking at Chafe's example then, money is an accompaniment of the verb or verb root, sell. All in all, Chafe agrees with Karttunen that verbs can initiate or trigger definite expressions, as shown in the examples above.

Chafe then illustrates how verb roots can entail, initiate or trigger off a set of closely related accompaniments in the following example:[45]

15.(a) My neighbour's house burned down last night.
   (b) The cause was some defective wiring.
   (c) The flame could be seen for miles.
   (d) The damage was extensive.

In the examples above, Chafe states that the occurrence of 'burn down' allows the use of the definite expressions <u>the cause,</u> <u>the flame</u> and <u>the damage</u>, and further states that "a verb root has (or may have) a cause, various accompaniments, and various results",[46] and in conclusion, Chafe gives a distinction between the inherent features of nominal expressions or noun roots and those of verbs or verb roots in the following words.[47]

> "It would appear, in short, that while noun roots
> have parts inherently associated with them (as
> well as, often dimensions and the like), verb
> roots have accompaniments, results, and the single
> item cause."

The case above explains that verbs, like nouns or nominal expressions, as shown by Karttunen and Chafe, do in conversations or discourses trigger off, entail or initiate the occurrence of definite expressions. The definite expressions which in this case are anaphors, would not be said to be anaphoric to the verb or verb roots, but to the situation of utterance i.e. of driving, selling or burning down, etc.

Consider the discourse between Takalani and Sandani:

16. *Sandani :* *Khezwi ndi songo ni vhona nga Mugivhela.*

    Takalani: *Ndo vha ndi tshi khou mala, muselwa o vha*
                a tshi nga murunwa, mufunzi a honga ipfi
                la fhelela a ...

    Sandani : *Khekhe yo tshewa henefho?*

    Takalani: *Ee, mutshimbidza-mushumo o ri u toda uri*
                zwi nakelele, vhafodi na vhone vha
                nkwengweledza ...

    Sandani : *U tanganedzwa?*

    'Sandani : Why were you absent on Saturday?

    Takalani: I was <u>getting married</u>, <u>the bride</u> was so angelic, <u>the minister</u> shouted at the top of his voice and ...

Sandani : Was <u>the cake</u> cut there and then?

Takalani: Oh yes, <u>the master of ceremonies</u> wanted it
to be more glamorous and the <u>photographers</u>
encouraged me to ...

Sandani : And <u>the reception</u>?

In the discourse above, the definite expressions *muselwa* 'the
bride', *mufunzi* 'the minister, *khekhe* 'the cake', *mutshimbidza-
mushumo* 'the master of ceremonies', *vhafodi* 'the photographers',
u ṱanganedzwa 'the reception', have been entailed or initiated
or triggered by the verb *u mala* 'getting married'. All these
associates are what Chafe calls inherent features of a whole part
and in this case they are inherently tied to the infinitive verb
u mala 'become married' and could be called obligatory
accompaniments in Chafe's terminology. These accompaniments are
the results of the event of *u mala* 'become married', or they are
caused by *u mala* 'become married'.

Since *u mala* 'become married' implies *munyanya wa mbingano* 'a
wedding', the implied antecedent would be *munyanya wa mbingano*
'a wedding' which in this case is the situation of utterance. In
this case, therefore, the definite expressions mentioned above
are all anaphoric to the implied indefinite expression. In the
same manner, had the discourse trigger of the definite anaphoric
expressions been *munyanya wa mbingano/munyanya* 'a wedding' then
all those associates or parts triggered or activated upon its
mention would be looked upon as its parts.

It is very important to understand the terminology used in this
case. If the trigger or initiator is taken to be a verb or verb
root, then the triggered associates would be its accompaniments.
If, on the other hand, one decides to speak of the verb as having
implied a noun phrase, which would be an understood antecedent,
then the trigger would be said to be such an antecedent by
implication. The associates would be said to be parts of the
whole and not accompaniments. Furthermore, if the antecedent or

trigger is an expressed noun phrase i.e. not an implied one, then the associates are parts of a whole, as in the case of the implied trigger.

4.5 SOME ANAPHORIC AND NON-ANAPHORIC INDEFINITES

All along it has been indicated that indefinite expressions are used to introduce referents into discourse, and that they are not used to refer to referents in shared environments. Hawkins indicates that indefinite expressions can also be used to refer to parts of or associates in discourses.[48] In this case, then, one can, upon mentioning *nndu* 'a house', continue to refer to its associates with indefinite expressions as in the discourse below:

17. *Ndo fhaṱa nndu Mamelodi, ndi tshi dzhena nda wana fasiṱerè lo pwashea, vothi lo wa luvhondo lwo tswuka ...*
    'I have built a house at Mamelodi; when I entered, I found a window broken, a door fallen and a wall dirty ...'

In the above case, it is quite convincing that the indefinite expressions are anaphorically associated with the antecedent *nndu* 'a house'. In other words, those referents are parts of the whole *nndu* 'a house'. In this instance, it would be appropriate to speak of this anaphoric relationship as interreference. However, such uses of indefinites as anaphors are very complicated.

Note cases of ambiguity in the discourse below:

18. *Duvha ḽo vha ḽi tshi vho ṱoḓou kovhela musi hu tshi swika vhahwe vhasidzana vhe vha dzhena vha ṱanganedzwa nga Andani. Hu si kale nda mbo di vhona hu tshi bva musidzana wa manakanaka henefhaḽa nḓuni.*

'It was just about sunset when some girls who were
welcomed by Andani arrived. In no time a very
beautiful girl came out of that very house.'

The use of the indefinite expression *musidzana wa manakanaka* 'a
very beautiful girl' above is ambiguous, in that the referent can
either be one of the group or not.

Hawkins writes as follows,[49]

> "Indefinite referents may be locatable in these share
> sets, but whether they are or not depends on the
> pragmatics of the remainder of the sentence."

The case above may be disambiguated by the continuation of the
discourse as in the case below:

19.   *Hoyu musidzana o ri u bva vhaḽa vhaṅwe vha sala vha*
      tshi mu ṱoḓa.

      'After this girl had left those others remained
      searching for her.'

The anaphor *huyu musidzana* 'this girl' is closely related to the
antecedent *vhaṅwe vhasidzana* 'some girls', i.e. they are
interreferential and it is coreferential with *musidzana wa*
manakanaka 'a very beautiful girl'.

On the other hand, in the discourse below *huyu musidzana* 'this
girl' is not anaphoric to either *musidzana wa manakanaka* 'a very
beautiful girl' or *vhaṅwe vhasidzana* 'some girls'.

20.   *Hoyu musidzana o vha o dzumbana musi vha tshi dzhena.*

      'This girl had been hiding when they entered.'

Hawkins also speaks of vague uses of indefinite expressions,
especially in cases where the discourse is not completed.[50]
Refer to the discourse below:

21. *Maluṱa o mala musadzi a dzhia vhana a vha isa ha
     vhomakhulu.*

  'Maluṱa married <u>a woman/a wife</u> and took <u>the children</u>
  to his in-laws.'

In the case above, it is not clear whether the definite expression
vhana 'the children' has been triggered off by the indefinite
expression *musadzi* 'a woman'/'a wife', or Maluṱa. The children
can be either of the married woman or of the divorced one. If
they are of the new woman, the two expressions are
interreferential, and if they are not, *vhana* 'the children' and
the antecedent <u>Maluṱa</u> are interreferential i.e. the children
belong to <u>Maluṱa</u>. However, should the discourse continue, the
status of the indefinite expression can be clarified, as in the
case of *musidzana wa manakanaka* 'a very beautiful girl' above.

Although it is possible for a speaker to use indefinite
expressions, as in the cases above, it all depends on who his
interlocutor is, but Hawkins is critical of such uses as he
writes,[51]

> "The speaker cannot just intend which ever referent he
> likes according to his latest whim, anymore than he
> can pretend that a particular construction has a
> meaning which it cannot in fact have according to the
> rules of the language."

Such uses of indefinite expressions as those illustrated in the
discourses above, may lead to a breakdown of communication, or
else the addressee will keep on asking questions about the
identity of the referent(s). In a talk exchange, a lot of
reference editing or repairs could be engaged in as either the
speaker or addressee may come across numerous troubled spots i.e.
where the identity of the referent is questionable. On the other
hand, the cases above do show that indefinite and definite
expressions do overlap in their anaphoric use. On the whole,
it all points to the importance of a discourse topic in a

conversation of any kind.

SUMMARY

Both the parts and their triggers refer to closely related referents and as such they are interreferential. As Hawkins has stated, both discourse participants share knowledge of the generic relationship between the trigger and its associates to continue conversing topically, because in each case each discourse participant will contribute towards the topic, as if saying 'I know what you are talking about'. On associates and their co-occurrence with the trigger, Hawkins writes,[52]

> "The notion part-of seems to play an important role
> in defining the number of possible associates. The
> trigger must conjure up a set of objects which are
> generally known to be part of some larger object or
> situation."

He continues to state,[53]

> "So we see that associative presupposes not just
> knowledge of some part of relationship, it reflects
> also both the importance (in some sense) and the
> frequency of this part of relationship."

The overriding consideration in this case then is that discourse participants should share knowledge of the generic relationship between the main object as the trigger and the associates.

CHAPTER 5

DEIXIS

In chapters 3 and 4 we dealt mainly with anaphoric relationships where anaphoric expressions showed a one-to-one correspondence or part-whole relationship with their antecedents. These anaphoric expressions may, however, in addition to their pure anaphoric function, take on a deictic function in certain cases as well. The relationship between anaphora and deixis is not very clear. Though they tend to overlap in their usage, they may be distinguished in certain instances. Following Lyons, deixis is the source of reference which implies that even anaphora as a reference relationship originates from it.[1] Lyons further stresses his point that anaphora originates from deixis and argues that,[2]

> "... deixis is both ontogenetically and logically prior to anaphora. By this I mean that the deictic use of pronouns and other such expressions precedes their anaphoric use in the earliest stages of language-acquisition and, furthermore, that anaphora, as a grammatical and semantic process, is inexplicable except in terms of having originated in deixis."

According to Lyons deixis precedes and is basic to anaphora; and this could be the reason why anaphora may in certain cases be accompanied by an element of pointing or some other form of gesture.

In this chapter particular attention is given to the deictic function of certain expressions. Before dealing with these expressions, however, we may consider some of the views expressed by numerous linguists on the concept, deixis.

The term deixis originates from Greek and means 'pointing' or 'indicating'. Lyons maintains that this term is used to describe the function of demonstratives i.e. to refer to referents in the extralinguistic situations.[3] Hartmann and Stork say the following on deixis,[4]

> "A word, the function of which is to point out or specify an individual, person, thing or idea."

The definition above is too limited, because it has to do with a deictic word and a referent only but ignores the discourse participants i.e. speaker and hearer/addressee and the spatio-temporal region or utterance situation in which they are found. Hartmann and Stork's approach is rather not discourse orientated. In the words of Lyons,[5]

> "By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context - created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee."

Hurford and Heasley reiterate Lyons' words as follows,[6]

> "A deictic word is one which takes some element of its meaning from the situation (i.e. the speaker, the addressee, the time, and the place) of the utterance in which it is used."

The definitions above by Lyons, Hurford and Heasley are more elaborate. They are more pragmatic, in that they present before a reader or discourse analyst, the discourse participants i.e. the speaker and addressee, the referent(s) and the spatiotemporal context created by the act of utterance. The analyst is thus able to read and understand the various relative distances between all the participants and the different uses of the various deictic words, as they are used to refer to various

referents at the points within the situation created by the act of utterance.

Fillmore is also pragmatic in his approach and according to him,[7]

> "Deixis is the name given to uses of items and
> categories of lexicon that are controlled by
> certain details of the interactional situation
> in which the utterances are produced. These
> details include especially the identity of the
> participants in the communicating situation,
> their locations and orientations in space,
> whatever on-going indexing acts the participants
> may be performing, and the time at which the
> utterance containing the items is produced."

Huddleston summarises deixis as follows,[8]

> "We say that an expression is used deictically when
> its interpretation is determined in relation to
> certain features of utterance act, the identity of
> those participating as speaker and addressee
> together with the time and place at which it
> occurs."

The points above are clarified by Lyons in the following words,[9]

> "Every language-utterance is made in a particular
> place and at a particular time: it occurs in a
> certain spatio-temporal situation. It is made by
> a particular person (the speaker) and is usually
> addressed to some other person (the hearer); the
> speaker and the hearer, we will say, are typically
> distinct from one another (there may of course be
> more than one hearer) and moreover are typically
> in the same spatio-temporal situation. (There are
> many common situations of utterance which are
> 'untypical' in these respects: it is possible to
> to 'talk to oneself'; and, if one is speaking on
> the telephone, the hearer will not be in the same
> spatio-temporal situation.) We will further assume
> that the typical utterance includes a reference to
> some object or a person (which may or may not be
> distinct from the speaker and hearer.)"

One would in relative terms say that the speaker chooses a
situation of utterance in which he uses deictic words or
expressions to refer to various referents at various points.
The situation in which the utterance takes place is called the
utterance situation. Thrane defines a situation in the following
words,[10]

> "A situation, in the relative sense, is a delimited
> static organization of concrete phenomena which
> stand in specific relationship to each other."

The situation of utterance is created by the act of utterance.
Thrane goes on to indicate that the utterance situation is a
situation in which these relationships are concerned with
communication. When the speaker at a certain point decides to
use various deictic expressions to refer to various referents
in the utterance situation, then, the very act of utterance
creates an utterance situation.

In other words, it is the speaker who decides on the size of
the utterance situation and the relative distance between various
referents. The speaker is always the focussing point in the
situation of utterance.

5.1   DEICTIC EXPRESSIONS AND POINTS OF REFERENCE

Deictic expressions that are used to refer to referents in the
utterance situation are demonstratives i.e. demonstrative pronouns,
and locative adverbs, definite noun phrases, personal pronouns
and subject and object concords and possessives.

Examples of some deictic expressions:

		1a 1b	2	3
Demonstratives		cl.1 *uno/uyu* 'this one'/ 'this over here'	*uyo* 'that'	*uḽa* 'that one yonder'
Locative adverbs[11]		cl.16 *fhano/afha* 'Here (where I am)'	*afo* 'there'	*fhaḽa* 'there yonder'
Personal pronouns	sg.	1st pers *nṇe* 'I, me'	2nd pers[12] *iwe* (*inwi/ene/vhone*) 'you'	3rd pers *ene* 'he/she/him/ her'
	pl.	*riṇe/vhoriṇe* 'we, us'	*vhoiwe/vhoinwi* (*iwe/inwi*) 'you'	*vhone* 'they/them'
Concords (subj. & obj.)	sg.	1st pers *ndi/n-* 'I, me'	2nd pers *u* (*ni/vha*) 'you'	3rd pers *u* 'he/she/him/ her'
	pl.	*ri* 'we, us'	*ni (vha)* 'you'	*vha* 'they/them'
Possessives	sg.	1st pers (*wa*) *-nga* 'mine'	2nd pers (*wa*) *-u* (*-ṇu/-we/-vho*) 'yours'	3rd pers (*wa*) *- we* 'his/hers'
	pl.	(*wa*) *-shu* 'ours'	(*wa*) *-ṇu(-vho*) 'yours'	*-vho* 'theirs'

Deictic expressions are used by the speaker in discourse to refer to referents in the various points of reference in the utterance situation. By point of reference is meant a spatio-temporal region occupied by a referent to which the attention of the addressee is directed.[13] In Venda, three points of reference are recognized.[14] The first point of reference is occupied by the speaker, the second by the addressee and the third by the person spoken of. It is possible that there could be other referents at all the points occupied by the speaker, addressee, and person spoken of, or the person spoken of could be with the speaker at the same point or that of the addressee. Of importance here are the points of reference occupied by the speaker, the one by the addressee or any other referent whether the addressee is there or not and the third point of reference occupied by the person or referent spoken of.

In the utterance situation,[15] the speaker always occupies the deictic centre also called the zero point or origo.[16] This point is the same as the first point of reference. The utterance originates from this point and whatever is at this point is referred to by the deictic expression in the first column.

Note that the plural forms of the first person pronouns *riṋe/ vhoriṋe*, 'we, us', concord *ri* 'we, us', possessive *washu* 'ours', etc. are called the editorial forms[17] i.e. these forms are used by the speaker but they also include his associates. In use they can be inclusive of the addressee in which case the addressee is included in the speaker's deictic centre or is exclusive of the addressee, where he is taken to be not in the deictic centre with the speaker.

The various deictic expressions above are used to refer to what is at the point occupied by the speaker i.e. relatively in the vicinity of the speaker or deictic centre. The deictic centre is not a fixed or actual point. Thrane says that "The deictic

centre ... is not a mathematical point, but a point in actual space where things may be located."18

As stated earlier, this point is determined by the speaker who decides on the utterance situation. The deictic centre can be a point in a room, a car or bus, a football ground or a town, a continent, etc. In other words, a speaker can refer to all the points mentioned above with *fhano/afha* 'here where I am/here'. The speaker in this case is the focussing point.

Any other point of reference in the utterance situation is called the point of orientation.

As in the case of the other deictic expressions, whatever expression is used by the speaker to refer to the addressee and his possessions, is taken to be a point removed from the deictic centre in relative terms, in other words, it is at the point of orientation and the addressees' attention is orientated towards that position.

The utterances that originate from the deictic centre are oriented towards the receivers i.e. points other than the deictic centre occupied by other referents. The points of orientation can be the addressee, the place he has occupied or any other referent in his vicinity i.e. the second point of reference which is referred to by the deictic expressions in the second column.

It should be noted, however, that even in the case of the point of orientation, the relative distance between the speaker and the addressee or referent is determined by the speaker. This point of orientation, like the deictic centre, is not a mathematical point or a fixed point. *Afho* 'there' can be used to refer to 'there on my knee', or at the door or in London (when the speaker is on the telephone (in the last instance) for example when I

the speaker could be in Mamelodi, Pretoria). All the same, whenever one uses the deictic expressions above, the addressee is the focussing point and not the speaker.

The speaker can also use deictic expressions to refer to referents which are relatively far from him and the addressee, but the referent need not be far from the addressee. All the same, the focussing point is this referent and not these discourse participants. This point of orientation, far from the discourse participants, is the third point of reference and is referred to by the use of the deictic expressions in the third column.

It should also be noted that most of these deictic expressions can be reduplicated or occur with others, so as to focus the attention of the addressee on the exact spot or referent e.g. demonstratives cl. *uno/houno* 'this very one here', locative adverb cl. *fhano-fhano* 'this place here', personal pronouns *nne-uno* 'I this very one', *inwi-inwi* 'you, this very you, *ene-uḽa/houḽa* 'him that very one', *ene Takalani uḽa* 'him Takalani, that very one yonder'.

In a discourse, the speaker and the addressee keep on changing their roles which explains that the various points of reference, be it the deictic centre or point of orientation, will always be changing depending on who is the speaker or addressee. On this issue Lyons writes:[19]

> "The canonical situation-of-utterance is egocentric in
> the sense that the speaker, by virtue of being the
> speaker, casts himself in the role of ego and relates
> everything to his viewpoint. He is at the zero point
> of the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of what we will
> refer to as well as spatial, since the role of the
> speaker is being transformed from one participant to
> the other as the conversation proceeds, and the
> participants may move around as they are conversing:
> the spatio-temporal zero point (the here and now) is
> determined by the place of the speaker at the moment
> of the utterance."

Tanz agrees with Lyons and states,[20]

> "The fact that the point of reference for the deictic
> expressions of proximity and distance is always the
> speaker has an important corollary; the point of
> reference shifts back and forth as the speaker(s)
> take turns in a conversation ... it allows the
> location here to be in any number of places at once."

The cases discussed above indicate that deictic expressions
function differently when they are used by the various speakers
to refer to various points of reference in the various utterance
situations. Suppose that a conversation takes place between
Odaho and Tinae who are some distance apart from each other, and
deictic expressions are used as follows:

1. *Odaho:*   *Nne ndo ima fhano hu si na mvula, afho i khou
              na?*

    Tinae: *Hai, na nne fhano fhasi ha thanga a thi i pfi
              lini, afho i khou na nga maanda?*

    'Odaho: I am standing here where there is no rain. Is
             it raining there?
    Tinae: No! I am standing here under the roof and do
             not feel it. Is it raining hard there?'

In the discourse above, the deictic centre shifts back and forth
between Odaho and Tinae as they take turns in their conversation.
When Odaho uses the first person pronoun (singular) *nne* 'I' and
locative adverb *fhano* 'here i.e. here where I am', then she is
at the deictic centre, and she is the speaker and Tinae is the
addressee. Odaho refers to where Tinae is as being *afho* 'there'.
Afho 'there' refers to the point of orientation i.e. where the
addressee Tinae is. The deictic centre and point of orientation
change as Tinae's turn to speak comes. When she uses the first
person pronoun (singular) *nne* 'I' and locative adverb *fhano*
'here where I am', she is now the speaker and is at the deictic
centre. Odaho has now become the addressee and is at the point

of orientation referred to by the use of *hafho* 'there, where you are'.

It is therefore clear that the various deictic expressions function differently as the discourse participants change roles in their conversations in the utterance situations.

It has been indicated earlier in (5.1) that deixis involves pointing. In a discourse, deictic expressions are accompanied by some paralinguistic movements; it could be a hand, a nod or eye-gesture which should draw the attention of the addressee to the place or referent in the spatio-temporal situation. Pointing usually takes place in a visible situation where the discourse participants can see each other. Karttunen explains that:[21]

> "Pointing is simply one way of directing attention, and the same result could be achieved by nodding with the head or turning a spotlight on the man. Under fortunate circumstances, say, the listener is already looking in the right direction; all gestures can be dispensed with."

Lyons states that, "We may think of deictic, as meaning something like "Look!" or "There!"" This case involves pointing, since the speaker draws the attention of the addressee to a particular referent/place.[22] In any visible situation referents/places are perceptible, so that the discourse participants can see them, but if they are many, the use of expressions deictically without pointing might not be sufficient as the addressee can mistake the one for the other. In this case, pointing or indicating serves to disambiguate between referents. Pointing or indicating therefore instructs the addressee to identify a specific referent or focusses his/her attention on the intended referent.

As indicated elsewhere here, the deictic expressions used are demonstratives i.e. demonstrative pronouns and locative adverbs, definite noun phrases, personal pronouns and concords and

possessives.

5.1.1 Demonstratives

Demonstratives are inherently deictic as they are naturally used
to refer to what is in the situation of utterance. They can be
looked upon as being pointer pronouns because they are basically
associated with pointing. Some deictic words such as definite
articles and the third person pronoun, for example, in the
Germanic and Romance languages have their origin in the
demonstrative.[23] This further shows why the two deictic aspects
mentioned above can be used alternatively with the demonstratives
and elicit the same response with very little difference as will
be illustrated in (5.1.1.1) and (5.1.2).

Scholars tend to agree on the definition of the demonstratives
as deictic expressions, although there are differences of emphasis.
According to Sweet, demonstratives are definite pronouns which
also function as adjectives (i.e. in English), and he writes,[24]

> "Demonstrative pronouns point to something in space or
> time."

Most scholars of Bantu languages have defined the demonstratives
in similar terms as Sweet. Doke says that a demonstrative is:[25]

> "A term denoting the situation occupied in time, space
> or conception of an object to the person referring to it."

Fortune says:[26]

> "The demonstrative qualificative is a word that expresses
> the property of position in space, time or conception as
> possessed by a substantive to which it is concordially
> related."

In line with other grammarians, Makhado defines the demonstrative as follows,[27]

> "... The demonstrative pronoun indicates the various positions occupied by persons, animals, objects or things relative to the speakers."

All the definitions given above are speaker based. While the speaker has an important position in Doke and Makhado's case, Sweet and Fortune merely characterise the demonstratives as pointer pronouns, and it is clear that the speaker is implied as a word cannot function without a user. Doke and Makhado indicate that when demonstratives are used, each of the following are involved - the speaker, the positions the objects occupy and the objects or referents. This idea is also held by other grammarians, among them Cole, Ziervogel, Nkabinde, etc.[28]

A number of scholars add the addressee to the elements mentioned above in connection with the use of demonstratives as deictic expressions. Cole in his discussion of the demonstrative indicates that the referent referred to by the demonstrative occupies a point which is determined in relation to both the speaker and the addressee.[29] Nkabinde has this to say on the demonstrative in addition to Cole's point,[30]

> "... the demonstrative may have a bearing upon visible objects and abstract things which are related to the speaker and the person addressed."

Demonstratives are not only used in visible situations as Nkabinde states. Although he agrees with Nkabinde to some extent, Kotzé emphasises that,[31]

> "Deictic demonstratives are nominal qualifiers referring to objects that are present in the physical reality in which one or both of the interlocutors of a specific speech act is presented."

Most of these scholars are concerned with the use of the
demonstrative in visible situations i.e. where the referents can
be seen. This is, however, not always the case as pointed out
by Kotzé who maintains that it is not necessary for both
participants to be present in the physical environment in which
the referents are.

A definition of the demonstrative should take into account the
discourse participants i.e. speaker and addressee within a certain
utterance situation, where there are various referents at different
points of reference. Such a definition should note that the
demonstrative will always assume new meanings as the speakers
use them differently to refer to the different referents. On top
of this, the discourse participants always change roles as speaker
or addressee as the conversation progresses. Another important
point is that demonstratives are not only used to refer to
referents in a visible situation, it is possible that one of the
discourse participants might not be able to see the referent, but
for instance, the speaker can refer to it with a demonstrative.
In such a case, a speaker can use a demonstrative to refer to a
referent that is in the immediate or non-immediate but invisible
situation thus instructing the addressee to first locate and then
identify or find it. On this issue Hawkins explains that:[32]

> "The demonstrative instructs him (i.e. the addressee ...
> T.M.S.) to identify the object itself, and thus it
> actually has a visibility requirement built into it
> as part of its meaning."

If a referent is not visible to either discourse participants, as
mentioned above, then one of them, expecially the addressee,
should look around and find it. Kotzé above also alludes to this
fact.[33] After all, if one is on the phone at Unisa speaking to
somebody who is far away in London or Tokyo, he can still use a
demonstrative to refer to a referent that he knows to be in that
vicinity; the place occupied by the addressee, be it near or far,

is part of the utterance situation in relative terms. The use
of the demonstratives in this fashion presupposes that the
discourse participants need to have shared knowledge of the
utterance situation and the point of reference occupied by the
referents in question.

As stated in (5.1), demonstratives are used to refer to referents
at various points of reference in the utterance situation.

There are basically three points of reference that are recognized
in Venḍa (although some grammarians mention four) and four forms
of demonstratives.[34] The demonstratives of two classes are
repeated here for the sake of convenience.

	1a 1b	2	3
Dem. pronouns cl.1	*uno/ uyu* '(this) here/ this'	*uyo* 'that'	*ula* 'that yonder'
cl.16	*fhano/afha* 'here (where I am)'	*afho* 'there'	*fhaḽa* 'there yonder'

The demonstratives in 1a and b refer to the same point of
reference, but those in 1a point to a more precise point or focus
attention on the referent more exactly than those in 1b. The
demonstrative pronouns are used to refer to persons and in the
case of some classes to refer to place(s).

As illustrated in (5.1), the demonstratives in the first point of
reference *uno/uyu* 'this one here' (this one) and *fhano* 'here where
I am'/ *afha* 'here' are used to refer to whatever is in the deictic
centre i.e. where the speaker is or in his vicinity. This point

has been defined in relative terms by Thrane[35] in (5.1.1). Tanz
tries to argue in abstract terms so as to define the locality
referred to by the demonstratives above. For instance, he argues
that, "here is as general, or as vague, as the scope of the noun
place ... Here (can) mean anything, "from at this point" (to)
"in this galaxy."[36]

Whenever a speaker decides to use either of these demonstratives,
he takes into account the utterance situation and perhaps the
topic of the discourse. *Fhano/afha* 'here' can mean in this room,
this university, town, country, continent, etc. Whenever the
speaker is on the floor, he is the one who determines the relative
size of the utterance situation and the relative distance between
the various points of reference. In this manner it is the speaker
who is the point of focus.

Any other point besides the deictic centre to which the speaker
orientates his utterance is the point of orientation, see (5.1.1).
The point of orientation can be at the second or third point of
reference. The second point of reference is always occupied by
the addressee and the speaker uses the demonstratives *uyo* 'that'
(demonstrative pronouns) and *afho* 'there' (locative adverb) to
refer to the referents at this point. These are used to refer to
either the addressee (any referent) or the place he has occupied
or in his vicinity. As in the case of the deictic centre, these
points of reference are defined in relative or abstract terms.
Tanz argues that,[37]

> "There is some other place, which may be near the
> speaker or far from the speaker in absolute terms,
> but which is being treated in some sense as not in
> the location of the speaker."

In other words, if the discourse participants are in a room and
the speaker is at one corner and the addressee at another, then
the corner occupied by the addressee will be referred to with

afho 'there'. On the other hand, if the speaker is in a bus, train or aeroplane and the addressee is outside, then he will refer to where the addressee is as being *afho* 'there'. If, however, the speaker is on the phone in Mamelodi in Pretoria and is speaking to a friend in London, New York or Nairobi, then such a place would still be referred to by *afho* 'there'.

However, whatever the circumstances, *afho* 'there' or *uyo* 'that' can only be defined in terms of the place occupied by the addressee. In this case, therefore, the addressee and not the speaker is the focussing point.

In an utterance situation, certain referents or people are found at the third point of reference. This is a point of orientation which is relatively far from both the speaker and addressee. It may not be far from the addressee but it is viewed as relatively far from the speaker. The speaker uses the demonstrative pronoun cl.1 *ula* 'that one yonder' and locative adverbs cl.16 *fhala* 'there yonder' to a person or place at the third point of reference (respectively). As in the other two cases, this point can be anywhere far from the discourse participants (as long as it is relatively far).

Note the use of demonstratives in the discourse below:

2. *Tinae* : *Una, danu u vhona avha vhasidzana uri vho nakelela hani.*

Unarine: *Ni khou amba avho.*

Mulanga: *Hoyu ngoho u do ri rwisa, ni songo tou sumba.*

Odaho : *Una, vhidzani hoyo (Dembe a lavhelesa) a de hafha.*

Dembe : *Ni khou amba nne, hafho a thi khou da. Inwi i dani hafha.*

Mutali : *Ai! Dembe, a ni yi fhala?*

> 'Tinae : Una, just look at <u>these</u> girls, they are so beautiful.
>
> Unariṇe: Are you referring to <u>those</u>?
>
> Mulanga: <u>This one</u> will land us in trouble; don't point (at <u>them</u>).
>
> Oḓaho : Una, call <u>that one</u> to come <u>here</u> (looking at Ḓembe).
>
> Ḓembe : Are you referring to me, I am not coming <u>there</u>, you must come <u>here</u>.
>
> Muṱali : Gosh Ḓembe, why don't you go there?'

In the discourse above, all the speakers are at their deictic centres or first point of reference when their turn to speak comes. All the addressees (plus referents or others) and the person spoken of (plus other referents) are at various points of orientation i.e. the addressees or referents in their vicinity are at the second point of reference and persons/referents spoken of are at the third point of reference. The first person to speak, Tinae, uses the demonstrative pronoun *avha* 'these' to refer to girls who are in her vicinity i.e. where she is at the deictic centre or first point of reference.

Unariṇe refers to the same people with the demonstrative pronoun *avho* 'those' which indicates that the people spoken of could either be at some place removed from where she is, or she could also be some way from Tinae or even in her vicinity.

If she is in the vicinity of her addressee, then her utterance situation would be taken to be different from Tinae's i.e. they see the same people at the same place from different angles.

Furthermore, Mulanga uses the demonstrative pronoun *hoyu* 'this very one' to refer to Unariṇe which indicates that this deictic expression refers to one who is in her vicinity i.e. at the deictic centre or first point of reference. Oḓaho uses *hoyo* 'that very one' to refer to Ḓembe who is at a point of orientation which is relatively far from her. In other words if Ḓembe were at the

deictic centre i.e. where Oḓaho is, she would be referred to by means of *hoyu* 'this very one', as Mulanga has done with Unariṋe. Ḓembe is nearer or in the vicinity of Oḓaho's addressee Unariṋe, hence the use of *hoyo* 'that very one'.

In the same utterance situation, Oḓaho refers to where she is as being *hafha* 'here where I am' but when Ḓembe assumes the role of the speaker, he refers to where Oḓaho is with the locative adverb *hafho* 'there where you are' and refers to her deictic centre with the locative adverb *hafha* 'here where I am'. Mutali refers to where Oḓaho is as being *fhaḽa* 'there'/'there yonder'. This deictic expression indicates that Oḓaho is relatively far away from the speaker Muṱali and his addressee Ḓembe. In other words, Ḓembe is at the second point of reference while Oḓaho is at the third point of reference.

It is therefore clear from the above discourse and discussion that as the discourse participants change roles in their conversation, so does the deictic centre change, as is evident in the use of the different positions of the demonstrative.

5.1.1.1   The relationship between demonstratives and definite noun phrases

It was indicated in the preceding chapters that the definite article in English, for example, particularizes a referent. When it is used with a nominal, the resulting noun phrase is used to refer to a referent, knowledge of which is shared between the discourse participants. In this case, then, the definite noun phrase is used anaphorically. Definite noun phrases can also be used deictically like demonstratives i.e. they can be used in the utterance situations by discourse participants to refer to referents at various points. They have a specifying function, in other words, they inform the addressee that there

is a specific referent which he should locate and identify in
the utterance situation.

The definite article which is part of the noun phrase, for
example, in English and other languages, shares certain similarities
with demonstratives. Jesperson maintains that it is a form of
weak demonstrative that and he further states that: "A remnant
of the t is seen in the dialectical form the t'other (originally
that -other)."[38]

He continues,[39]

> "As 'the' is phonetically a weaker 'that', its meaning
> is also weakened, instead of pointing out, it
> designates or singles out."

This point further shows or reveals the specifying function
referred to earlier. In fact, Christopherson holds the same view
as the above scholar that the definite article has its origin in
the demonstrative pronoun and further notes that it is said to be
a continuation of the Indo-European pronominal stem to.[40]

Lyons makes the following observation on the point above:[41]

> "The pronominal component in the definite article ...
> has exactly the same function as has the same component
> in the other forms of the demonstratives ... that of
> informing the addressee that a specific individual
> (or group of individuals) is being referred to which
> satisfy the description."

It is again interesting to note that Christophersen had earlier
made the same observation as Lyons that both the definite article
and the demonstrative are used to refer to referents that are
definite i.e. specific, although to some extent in different
ways,[42] as will be shown later on.

The demonstrative instructs the addressee to identify the referent in the utterance situation, whereas the definite article instructs him to first locate and then identify the referent.

Perhaps discussions on the differences between the definite article and the demonstrative can shed light on how they are used to show where the historical similarities are between the two. Christophersen says they can alternate in the immediate or visible situation for,[43]

> "The difference between the two ... in this point is very slight, and even in the modern language they are often rivals."

It could be this rivalry that has prompted scholars to see the definite article as a weak demonstrative. Venda does not have definite articles as in English, Afrikaans, or the Germanic languages in general, but, like them, does have definite noun phrases. Since the demonstratives can be used deictically in the utterance situation, so, in the same manner, the speaker can use the definite noun phrases. Hawkins notices this similarity between the demonstrative and the definite article (definite noun phrase in Venda) and stipulates that:[44]

> "If an object is visible to both the speaker and the hearer in the situation of utterance, and is furthermore unique, this permits the use of the definite article."

It has been indicated earlier that Venda and some of its sister languages do not have articles but have definite noun phrases which are equivalent to those found in, for example, English, Afrikaans and German.

Whenever a speaker uses a definite noun phrase to refer to a referent in the utterance situation, he takes into account the points occupied by the addressee and other referents. In

addition, the volume of his voice, his gaze and topic of
discourse are able to lead the addressee to locate and then
identify the referent in question.

It is always assumed, as Lyons notes, that the use of a definite
noun phrase, say in,

3.   *Takalani, disani bugu.*
     'Takalani, please bring the book.'

presupposes or implies that there is only one referent which fits
the description in the situation of utterance.[45]   However,
pragmatically, this is not always the case, since definite noun
phrases are always used deictically to refer to referents which
are-similar to others in the same situations successfully.
Somehow, there is information which is not always in the context
which both the discourse participants know will help them locate
and then identify the referent.   On this issue Lyons has this to
say:[46]

> "When the speaker refers to a specific individual
> (or any other referent ... T.M.S.) by whatever
> means, he tacitly accepts the convention that he
> will provide any information (not given in the
> context) that is necessary for the addressee to
> identify the individual (referent ... T.M.S.) in
> question."

It could be that there is only one referent that satisfies the
description used, in such a case, the addressee will find it
easier to identify it i.e. there may be only one *bugu* 'book' on
the table.   The addressee will not be expected to ask questions.
However, if it is in a classroom and the teacher is talking about
planning an essay, his use of the definite noun phrase *bugu* 'the
book' would mean that Takalani should bring the essay book,
although he may not have mentioned which book he is referring to.
There is some truth in the claim that the expression used refers

to a unique referent, but other factors like those mentioned
above play a role. If the teacher merely said to <u>Takalani</u> upon
entering a classroom where there are many books in front of him,

4. *Takalani, ḓisani bugu.*
    'Takalani, please bring <u>the book</u>.'

the poor student would have to ask first what (kind of) book is
wanted, because he must first locate and then identify it, unless
he is aware which book is being referred to and furthermore, the
student's response could depend on which subject the speaker
teaches. The use of the definite noun phrase, as in the case above,
is ambiguous but can be disambiguated by accompanying the deictic
definite noun phrase with a gesture i.e. either pointing with a
finger or nodding with one's head in the relevant direction etc.
This is, however, possible in a visible situation, but these
deictic expressions are also used deictically to refer to
referents which are out of sight of either both the discourse
participants i.e. the speaker and the addressee, or just one of
them. In this case, however, the speaker knows that both share
knowledge of the referents or that he alone has knowledge. All
in all, the speaker presupposes that whenever he uses a deictic
expression, then he is appealing to the addressee to locate and
then identify the referent. Refer to the discourse below:

5. Vusani: *Ee! Hu rothola hani, Lusani valani <u>vothi</u>!*
    Lusani: *Iḽi?*
    Vusani: *Ii, nnekedzeni <u>lufhanga</u>.*
    Lusani: *Ehe! Na inwi valani-vho <u>fasiṱere</u>!*
    Vusani: *E Lusani, valani <u>vothi heḽo</u>!*

    'Vusani: Oh! It is so cold, Lusani please close <u>the door</u>!
    Lusani: You mean <u>this</u> one?
    Vusani: Yes, and give me <u>the knife</u> also, please
    Lusani: Oh my, it is cold, would you close <u>the window</u>
             as well?
    Vusani: Lusani, did you not hear me - I said close <u>the door</u>!'

Consider also the discourse below where Vusani and Itani happen
to be in two different rooms and Vusani calls out to Itani.

6. *Vusani:* *Ee! Itani, danu u nnekedza rula!*
    Itani : *Ai thi zwi pfi ni ri mini?*
    Vusani: *Ndi ri nnekedzeni heyo rula ntha ha dafula.*

    'Vusani: Oh! Itani won't you bring me <u>the ruler</u>!
    Itani : I can't hear you, what did you say?
    Vusani: I said please bring me <u>the ruler</u>, <u>that</u> one
             that is on the table.'

In the first discourse above, Vusani uses a definite noun phrase
vothi 'the door' to refer to a referent in the utterance situation.
The use of the definite noun phrase in this manner presupposes
that the speaker knows that the addressee will be able to locate
and identify it. Having located and found it, Lusani refers to
the referent *vothi* 'the door' with the demonstrative *ili* 'this
one'. The use of the demonstrative in this case could imply that
there is more than one door in the vicinity and that the one
referred to is in the vicinity of the addressee, since it has
also a qualificative function besides the deictic one. If,
however, there is only one referent which satisfies the description,
there will be no need to use the demonstrative. On the other hand,
even if there are many other referents of the same kind, she can
use a definite noun phrase un-ambiguously i.e. she can do so by
looking in the direction of the addressee which would imply that
the referent in question is in her vicinity.

Furthermore, Vusani uses a demonstrative *helo* 'that' to refer to
the same door, which implies that the door is in the vicinity of
the addressee or that that door is being isolated from the others.
The use of the demonstrative pronoun *helo* 'that' can also mean
that there is only one referent of its kind, but that the speaker
is emotional because the addressee has not been responding as

expected. The use of the definite noun phrases *luṱhanga* 'the knife', and *fasiṱere* 'the window' by Vusani and Lusani respectively, presupposes that the speaker is appealing to the addressee to first locate and then identify the referent. As in the case above, if there is only one referent that satisfies the description, the addressee will not question which referent is being referred to, but if there is more than one referent, the speaker will either look in the direction of the addressee so as to indicate that the referent in question is the one in his/her vicinity or accompany the deictic expression with a gesture. Interestingly, the deictic function of the definite noun phrases serves to enable the speaker to refer to referents which are out of his sight but within the sight of his addressee. In the second discourse above, Vusani uses the definite noun phrase *ruḽa* 'the ruler' to refer to a referent which is out of his sight but in the visible situation of the addressee Itani. The speaker, Vusani in this case, knows about the ruler on the table and is aware that his addressee will be able to see it. It is not surprising that when Itani asks Vusani to repeat what she said, the speaker refers to it with a demonstrative *heyo* 'that one' although it is out of his sight.

Definite noun phrases, as illustrated in the discourse above, function like demonstratives deictically. It has been indicated that definite noun phrases can be used to refer to referents in both the visible and non-visible situations. However, if the speaker uses a definite noun phrase to refer to a referent in the non-visible situation, then it implies that he has knowledge about such a referent as illustrated with *ruḽa* 'the ruler'. In such a case the addressee is expected to locate and identify the referent. Definite noun phrases have been said to be expressions that are used to refer to referents that satisfy the description, but as Lyons has indicated and as has further been shown in the discourse, it is not always the case.[47] In an utterance situation where there may be more than one referent that satisfies the

description, the speaker can accompany the expression with a
gesture towards the intended referent or look towards the
addressee to imply, "The one in your vicinity." In a nutshell,
definite noun phrases are understood in the sense of demonstratives
deictically.

5.1.2 Personal pronouns and concords

Personal pronouns, like demonstratives and definite noun phrases
may also have a deictic function, i.e. they can be used by
discourse participants to refer to referents or to people at
various points of reference in utterance situations. Dekeyster et.al.
have the following to say on personal pronouns as deictic
expressions,[48]

> "Personal pronouns have a deictic function, i.e. they
> are used to refer to identifiable items either in the
> actual speech situation or in the context."

When discourse participants are in the utterance situation or
extralinguistic situation, they can either see the referents
they wish to refer to or know where they are located so that
the deictic use of the personal pronouns can help their addressees
to identify them. In visible situations, it is however simple
because the use of the deictic expression can be accompanied by
a gesture so as to focus the attention of the addressee on the
person concerned, or merely refer to them as they are obviously
in the open. Although opinions are divided as to which personal
pronouns are deictic and which are not, there seems to be a
measure of agreement that all three persons viz. the first,
second and third person pronouns can be used deictically.

Once again, there are certain forms such as concords which are
not inherently deictic but which can, however, be used deictically
in the utterance situation.

Table of 1st, 2nd and 3rd personal pronouns.

	1st Person	2nd Person	3rd Person
sg.	*nne* 'I, me'	*iwe (inwi/ene/vhone)* 'you'	*ene* 'he/him/she/her'
pl.	*rine/vhorine* 'we, us'	*vhoiwe/iwe/inwi* 'you'	*vhone* 'they/them'

In Venda, the first person singular pronoun is *nne* 'I, me', the plural forms are *rine/vhorine* 'we, us'. The first person occupies the deictic centre in the situation of utterance. He uses the above expression to refer to himself, and can accompany the expression by pointing to himself. The plural form too is usually employed by one speaker who occupies the deictic centre to refer to himself and his associates, and these can still exclude or include the addressee depending on the topic of the conversation. Zandvoort has this to say on the first person plural pronoun:[49]

> "The pronoun of the first person plural may be used to denote the speaker or writer and those associated with him, his audience, readers, etc."

Although the expression is used by one person, he does so to include others. Quirk et.al. explain the case above as follows:[50]

> "The so-called 'editorial' we, now formal and somewhat old-fashioned, is used by a single individual, as in "As we have shown a moment ago", ... said by a lecturer instead of "As I have shown a moment ago"... This use of we is prompted by a desire to avoid I, which is felt to be a little egoistic."

It should be noted that *rine/vhorine* 'we/us' can be either inclusive or exclusive of the addressee.[51] An interesting case

here is that, as Thrane has indicated, the deictic centre and
even the point of orientation are not mathematical points that
remain fixed somewhere, but they are abstract points in space
where referents may be located.[52] In this case, therefore, if
rine/vhorine 'we, us' is inclusive of the addressee, he could
be where the speaker is or very far away i.e. physically but be
included in the expression. In the same way, if *rine/vhorine*
'we, us' is exclusive of the addressee, the speaker could be
alone at the deictic centre and include anyone of his associates
who could be in Harare, Tokyo, London, etc., and at the same time
exclude the addressee who could either be right next to him or
at a visible distance from the deictic centre. The deictic
centre is therefore determined by the relative point that is
occupied by the speaker and not a fixed point in space.

This further explains that whoever is included, be he physically
present or not, he is understood in abstract terms to be at the
deictic centre. On the other hand, if a person is excluded,
whether he is in the vicinity of the speaker or not, he is not
at the deictic centre.

As stated above, the speaker is always at the deictic centre and
the addressee is always at the point of orientation in the
situation of utterance. The point of orientation, like the deictic
centre, is understood in abstract terms as a point occupied by
the addressee or any other referent to which the attention of the
addressee is directed. In Venda, the addressee, who is the second
person, is referred to by the pronouns *iwe/inwi/ene/vhone* 'you'
singular and *vhoiwe/(iwe), vhoinwi/(inwi)* 'you' in plural.

Refer to the discourse below:

7. *Zwoitwaho:* *Nne ndi ṱoḓa mmepe wanga, ndi inwi ne na u ḓzhia?*

    Bono   : *A u pfi, ndi nne, nṋa inwi khezwi ni ṱshi ḓi sumba nne?*

    Oḓaho   : *Zwawe muzwala wanga (a ralo a tshi amba na Zwoitwaho), ene a songo vhilaela ri ḓo vhala mmepe roṱhe, riṋe ri khou tou swaswa.*

    Zwoitwaho: *Vhoiwe ni dina zwenezwi.*

    Bono   : *U ḓo dovha wa hangwa mmepe haḟhu?*

    Zwoitwaho: *Hai ndi nga si tsha dovha ngoho.*

    Lindelani: *Ndi nnyi ane a khou amba aḟho nnḓa?*

    Tinae   : *Ndi Mulisa (o ṱolela nga fasiṱere) ndi ene ngoho, u ṱongiṧa hani rokho yawe.*

'Zwoitwaho: I am looking for my map, is it <u>you</u> who has taken it?

Bono   :   Listen to that, <u>me</u>, why are <u>you</u> always blaming <u>me</u> (like that)?

Oḓaho   :   Never mind my dear cousin (speaking to Zwoitwaho); <u>we</u> shall read the map together; <u>we</u> are merely joking.

Zwoitwaho: You people are never serious.

Bono   :   Will <u>you</u> forget your map again?

Zwoitwaho: Oh no, <u>I</u> promise I won't.

Lindelani: By the way, who is talking so loud out there?

Tinae   :   It is Mulisa (she peeps out through the window). It is <u>her</u> indeed, <u>she</u> is bragging about her new dress.'

In this discourse, the speakers Zwoitwaho and Bono refer to themselves by means of the first person pronoun (sing.) *nne* 'I, me'. As addressees they are referred to by means of the second person pronoun *inwi* 'you'. The speakers in every case are at their deictic centres or first point of reference and refer to their addressees who are at various points of orientation i.e. the second points of reference.

The plural first person pronoun form *riṋe* 'we' used by Oḓaho refers to herself and her associates i.e. excluding the addressee

Zwoitwaiio. In other words, it is exclusive of the addressee. This form is the editorial *riṇe* 'we' which is used by a speaker to refer to herself/himself and those who are in her/his party.

The form *vhoiwe* 'you' used by Zwoitwaho is the second person plural pronoun and refers to more than one person or addressee. In this case *vhoiwe* 'you' has been used by Zwoitwaho to refer to his addressees i.e. the students in class who are discourse participants.

Some of the personal pronouns used in this discourse refer to third persons or persons spoken of. These are at a point of orientation which is regarded as the third point of reference whether they are physically nearer the speaker(s) and addressee(s), or not. For instance, Tinae refers to Mulisa by using *ene* 'him'. Mulisa is in this case relatively far from Tinae and her addressees. The use of *(ndi) ene* 'him' in this context, has the same deictic force as that of the demonstrative *khouḻaa* 'there he is'. This indicates that the referents spoken of or referred to need not be visible to everyone of the discourse participants.

Both the discourse participants or only one could be out of sight of the referent in question, but usually it is the speaker who has knowledge of the referent in question.

Besides, concords have been used deictically on a par with their pronominal counterparts to refer to various discourse referents. For instance *ndi* 'I' used by Zwoitwaho refers to himself as the speaker, it is the first person singular subject concord. The first person plural concord *ri* 'we' used by Oḍaho is the editorial *ri* 'we' just like its pronominal and possessive counterparts *riṇe* 'we, us' and *washu* 'ours'. *Ri* 'we' used in this context refers to Odaho the speaker and her addressee Zwoitwaho. It is inclusive of the addressees i.e. including Zwoitwaho.

The second person subject concord *u* 'you' too has been used deictically by Bono to refer to the addressee Zwoitwaho. Its pronominal counterpart is *iwe* 'you'.

The concord *u* 'him' used by Tinae is the third person singular concord and refers to the person spoken of i.e. Mulisa. Like its pronominal counterpart *ene* 'him', it has been used to refer to a referent who is only visible to the speaker and not to the addressee. As indicated in the case of the pronouns, concords too have a deictic force like demonstratives. In other words, this third person concord can be used deictically with the accompanying gesture of pointing at the referent in the utterance. On the other hand, a speaker can use concords to make the addressee aware of the presence of the referent which he can see or knows to be in the vicinity of his interlocutor even if it is not within his sight or that of the latter.

However, it is possible to use them to refer to referents that are out of sight of both the discourse participants. For instance suppose that the students heard their teacher Mr Tamani speaking outside, one of them could still have said, *"Ndi vhone fhumulani"* 'It is him, keep quiet' or *"Vha khou da fhumulani"* 'He is coming, keep quiet', as if to say, "You will see him very soon".

5.1.3 Possessives

Possessives, like demonstratives, definite noun phrases and personal pronouns, can be used deictically in utterance situations. In fact, possessives are used on a par with personal pronouns. Sweet says that the use of possessives exactly parallels that of personal pronouns and, further, indicates that every personal pronoun has its own possessive.[53] Zandvoort is of the same opinion.[54] Dekeyster cites a historical fact and writes that,[55]

> "Historically speaking, possessive pronouns are
> genitive forms of the personal pronoun."

All these scholars indicate that in their use, possessives
specify the referents at various points. The speaker can use
possessives to refer to referents at various points of reference
in the utterance situation. He can, if he likes, accompany the
deictic expression with a gesture, so as to focus his attention
on the intended referent.

Just as in the case of the personal pronouns, there are three
persons involved i.e. the first, second and third persons (the
speaker, the addressee and the person spoken of). The possessives
in use are governed by the same considerations as the personal
pronouns, but it should be noted that they refer dually i.e. to
the possessor or/and possessee unlike other deictic expressions.

Some possessive pronouns:

	1st Person	2nd Person	3rd Person
Sing.	*wanga* 'mine'[56]	*wau, (wanu, wawe, wavho)* 'yours'	*wawe, wavho* 'his/hers'
Pl.	*washu* 'ours'	*wanu, wavho* 'yours'	*wavho* 'theirs'

Very little information about the possessive as a <u>deictic</u>
expression appears in most Bantu grammars. A speaker can use a
possessive expression deictically, drawing the attention of the
addressee, with some gesture, to either the person (i.e. the
possessor) or his possession. The person and his possession are
generally tied up together. Whenever one sees the possessor or

the possession, their assocation comes to the fore, in other
words, he sees one entity. However, it is not necessary for both
referents to be present when the possessive deictic expressions
are used. The speaker can use a possessive expression *yawe* 'his'
deictically and point at the possessee alone e.g. *ndi yawe* 'it
is his i.e. referring to the car' as long as both the discourse
participants have knowledge of the possessor (or he can use it
to point at the possessor as it could mean that they have been
speaking about the other referent not mentioned or seen in that
utterance situation).

Refer to the discourse below:

8.   *Vho-Masia*   :   *Nndaa, Vho-Prinsipala, ri a dzhena?*

     Vho-Lindani: *Ndaa, vha a dzhena ... ndi ene wavho uyu*
                      (vha ralo vha tshi khou sumba Lisani).

     Vho-Masia   :   *Ee, ndi ene wanga.*

     Vho-Lindani: *Ndi zwone, zwe a khakha vho zwi pfa, fhedzi*
                      a ri lati ṅwana nga phadi, na nne ndi
                      mubebi ṅahone kha tou ri ndi washu.

     Vho-Masia   :   *O nkhakhela vhukuma.*

     Vho-Lindani: *He muthannga ndi yau?   (vha ralo vha*
                      imisela ila bugu ntha).

     Lisani   :   *Hai!*

     Bono   :   *U khou zwifha ndi yawe!*

     Vho-Lindani: *Vha khou sokou ita, hei bugu ndi yavho.*
                      A zwi dini tshithu, ni nga di bva zwanu
                      vharathu, mafhungo ndi ashu ri do sala
                      ri tshi a tshea.

     Vho-Masia vha a bva hu dzhena Vho-Arina.

     Vho-Arina   :   *Ndi ṅwana wa nnyi ene ula?*

     Vho-Lindani: *(Vha sumba Vho-Masia) Ndi wavho.*

     'Mr Masia   :   Hallo, Mr Principal, may I come in?

     Mr Lindani   :   Hallo, sure come in ... is this one <u>yours</u>
                       (i.e. your child, pointing at Lisani).

     Mr Masia   :   Yes, he is <u>mine</u>.

Mr Lindani	:	All right, you have heard about his misbehaviour; but we cannot expel him because of bad deeds, I am also a parent, in fact let me say he is <u>ours</u>.
Mr Masia	:	You know, he has really misbehaved.
Mr Lindani	:	Hey, young man is this <u>yours</u>? (showing him the book).
Lisani	:	No!
Bono	:	He is lying, it is <u>his</u>!
Mr Lindani	:	They are wasting our time, this book is actually <u>theirs</u>, nevermind, you can go young <u>fellows</u>, the matter is <u>ours</u>, we shall decide.

Mr Masia leaves the office and Mrs Arina enters.

Mrs Arina	:	(Pointing in the direction that the child had gone) Whose child is that one?
Mr Lindani	:	(Pointing at Mr Masia) It is <u>his</u>.

As was indicated earlier, deictic possessives refer dually. The possessive concord refers to the possessee and the stem refers to the possessor. In the discourse above, the possessive *wanga* 'mine' refers to the possessee (Lisani) and the possessor (Mr Masia). The expression is used by the speaker at the deictic centre. The plural possessives *washu* and *ashu* 'ours' too have been used by speakers, for instance, *washu* 'ours' has been used by Vho-Lindani as a speaker. This deictic possessive is the editorial *washu* 'ours' just like its pronominal counterpart *riṋe* 'we, us'; it has been used by the speaker to include the addressee Vho-Masia and also refers to their possessee Lisani. *Ashu* 'ours', used by the same speaker, is also an editorial possessive but as used here, unlike *washu* 'ours', it is exclusive of the addressees. In other words, it has been used to include the speaker Vho-Lindani and Lisani's father Vho-Masia but not the addressees Lisani and Bono. *Ashu* 'ours' includes Vho-Masia because he is in the principal's company; besides, *vharathu* 'young brothers' used by Mr Lindani refers to the students or the boys and not Vho-Masia, and *ashu* 'ours' refers here to the possessee *mafhungo* 'news' and the possessors Lindani and Masia.

Furthermore the possessive *wavho* 'yours' has been used by Vho-
Lindani to refer to Lisani i.e. the possessee and Vho-Masia the
possessor; *yau* 'yours' has been used by Vho-Lindani to refer
to the possessee *bugu* 'the book' and the possessor Lisani.

Yawe 'his' as used finally here by Bono refers to the book and
Lisani. Lisani is in this case the third person or person spoken
of.

It is possible to refer to the referents in the visible situation
without any problem, but one can still refer successfully with a
possessive if either one i.e. the possessee or the possessor is
out of sight, provided both discourse participants have mentioned
this referent earlier on. For instance, in the discourse, Mrs
Arina saw the boy Lisani and after he had gone out of sight, she
referred to him with the demonstrative *ula* 'that one' which is
both anaphoric and deictic. When Lindani responds, he refers to
Lisani i.e. the possessee and his father i.e. the possessor, with
the expression *wavho* 'his', pointing or gesturing towards Mr
Masia, the possessor. In this case, the participants know about
the possessee Lisani who is part and parcel of the possessor
Mr Masia.

SUMMARY

Deictic expressions are used by various discourse participants
to refer to referents in the extralinguistic situations. Such
referents can either be visible or invisible to either of the
discourse participants. These expressions function differently
as speakers change roles in their conversations which further
explains that it is context that determines the meanings of words.
It has been illustrated that when demonstratives are used
deictically the addressee is instructed to identify the referent
in the extralinguistic situation and yet when definite noun

phrases are used, the addressee must first locate and then
identify the referent. Personal pronouns have also been used
as deictic expressions. Although the concords are not inherently
deictic, it has been shown that they can be used deictically
just as their pronominal counterparts. Deictic possessives
refer dually as is the case with anaphora; the possessive
concords refer to the possessor and the possessive stems refer
to the possessee. All in all deictic expressions can be
accompanied by pointing or any other form of gesture when referring
to referents at the various points of reference. It has also been
realized that the utterance situation is determined by the speaker
so that the relative distance between the speaker, addressee and/
or any other referent is at the disposal of the speaker.

CONCLUSION

Any study of discourse analysis involves pragmatics in various
ways. Pragmatics is concerned with how people use language.
Any analysis of a discourse will therefore be concerned with how
language users use language in various contexts. Discourse has
been defined as being a monologue, dialogue or multiperson
interaction between speaker(s) and addressee(s), writer(s) and
reader(s), etc. This further explains that the term discourse
as used in this dissertation embraces the term text. The
differences between the two terms have been ignored, as they are
often used interchangeably in linguistic literature. On the
whole, both written and spoken discourses have their own elements
which make various demands on both language producers and language
practitioners. However, the communicative purposes displayed by
both types of discourses, provide the language practitioner with
valuable material for human understanding.

For a discourse to be acceptable, it must be coherent and
relevant. Information contained in it should be so linked that
it should tell what the discourse is all about. In other words,
a discourse should have a logical and topical structure. Such a
structure can have focussing elements within or between sentences
or utterances, thus forming a thread of discourse that runs
through it linking all available material into a unit. The
connectivity could be brought about by referential elements or
cohesive ties which are either semantic or pragmatic. Furthermore,
lexical items form collocational links whereby they enter into a
semantic or pragmatic field by reason of their mutual expectancy.[1]
The various sentences or utterances do not follow each other
arbitrarily, but are logically joined by connectors in order to
express the relationships between them. Besides, the coherence
of a discourse could be brought about by conversational
implicatures whereby the discourse participants adhere to the

co-operative principle, and thus speak topically.

It has also been stated in (1.3) that any discourse referent may be relevant to the discourse topic. The discourse topic has been defined as the repeated focussing element in the discourse, or as a proposition which sums up the gist or summary of the story. This main proposition, also called macroproposition or macro-structure, has mapping-rules which help a person to generalize, select, reduce and organize information into a global representation of a story called the discourse topic.[2]

For discourse participants to speak topically, they must thus contribute to the same topic framework and, if one of them intends digressing to another topic, the discourse thread is not disorganized if he alerts his interlocutor of his intentions; after all, discourse topics differ, and people talk about many things in life.

Information or focussing elements are context-dependent and, as a result, discourse participants need to share knowledge of referents in order to speak topically. The various referring expressions assume new functions as they are used in various contexts.

Referring expressions can be either definite or indefinite, but this in Venda is determined by the context in which they are used.

On the whole, referring expressions are used to refer to either specific or non-specific referents. Of importance, as indicated, is successful but not necessarily correct reference. For instance, it has been illustrated that, as long as the discourse participants can establish the existence of a referent in their discourse, such a referent, be it real or imaginary, becomes a discourse referent.

It has also been pointed out that proper names have a conventional meaning and that each is associated with characteristics which identify it - these differ from person to person, as every human being is understood and perceived differently by different people. When proper names are used in discourse, they refer to specific referents and there are various pragmatic factors which determine the designata of each name.

Coreference has been referred to as an anaphoric relation where there is a one-to-one correspondence between the antecedent and the anaphor. The antecedent comes first thus introducing information into the discourse and the anaphor follows it, in which case it recalls, repeats or re-identifies the antecedent. A case of cataphora has been referred to where anaphors precede their antecedents in discourse, but this case has been clarified as being anticipatory anaphora.[3]

An interesting relationship between the antecedent and anaphor is that of agreement and anaphora. There is always agreement between the antecedent and anaphor in terms of class, number and person and the morphological similarities between prefixes of certain antecedents and concords of certain anaphors serve as cues in this relationship. However, the antecedent-anaphor relationship can also be traced through the discourse topic. Since the topic focuses on a particular referent, this particular referent is always referred to or re-identified, and this serves as another identification cue in this anaphoric relationship, whether the anaphor is relatively near the antecedent or not.

Interreference has been defined as a relationship in which the antecedent and anaphor are not in a one-to-one correspondence, but in a part-whole relationship. The definiteness of certain referring expressions may be entailed or triggered by a first-mentioned indefinite expression or situation of utterance.

Reference has also been made in (4.5), where certain anaphoric indefinite expressions can be entailed from the first-mentioned indefinite antecedent NP's. It has been illustrated that, although such cases display the interreferential relationship between antecedents and anaphors, such occurrences are rare and depend on the course and continuation of the discourse topic.

It has further been illustrated that in the part-whole relationship, parts or associates can either be obligatory or optional. Obligatory parts are those which are defining features of the "wholes" and optional parts are non-defining parts of the "wholes". Furthermore, some parts fluctuate between obligatory and optional depending on the time, place, culture, etc., in which the "wholes" are found. In certain cases as illustrated in (4.4) some parts are implied by verbs/verb roots and these have been referred to as accompaniments. Again some anaphors in this relationship, refer to attributes which are tied up with their "wholes".

Certain referents are found in extra-linguistic situations in which case they are visible either to both the discourse participants or to one of them. It has been indicated further that in certain cases such referents may be out of sight of both discourse participants but known to them. In such cases, as illustrated, discourse participants use deictic expressions which may or may not be accompanied by gestures of various kinds depending on the referents and the interlocutors.

In conclusion, referring expressions are used by discourse participants to refer to various referents which are either specific or non-specific. For the discourse participants to be able to identify the intended referents, it is important that they share the same presupposition pool, this in turn helps them to be co-operative and thus speak topically.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1

1. The terms 'discourse' and 'text' have been used synonymously
    in much of the linguistic literature but the term 'discourse'
    is preferred in this dissertation.

2. See Stubbs (1983:9) in this regard.

3. Many linguists, among them Halliday and Hassan (1976),
    Sidner (1983), Werth (1984), Widdowson (1979), use both terms
    i.e. discourse and text as they deal more with written text
    and written discourse and, as such, they apparently do not
    see the need to go into details of distinguishing the two.

4. Stubbs (1983) is aware of the demands made by both aspects
    and advocates the distinction.

5. Halliday and Hassan (1976:1)

6. Kinneavy (1980:4)

7. Sidner (1983:108)

8. Louwrens (1979:6)

9. Keenan and Schieffelin (1976:107)

10. Hurford and Heasley (1984:15)

11. Ibid:10

12. Hurting (1977:90)

13. Werth (1984:10-11)

14. Edmondson (1981:4)

15. Widdowson (1979:116)

16. Edmondson (1981:34-5) illustrates these features. It may be noted that paralinguistic features can be produced or gestured but they can also be explained by sentences. This shows that utterances and sentences complement one another in discourse.

17. Widdowson (1979:117)

18. Mclaughlin (1984:89)

19. Ibid:38-9

20. Tne term macroproposition is mainly used by van Dijk (1977), (1980), (1981), (1983) and it refers to the global representation of all the facts in a story, and has been used repeatedly by Mclaughlin (1984).

21. Keenan and Schieffelin (1976:72)

22. Werth (1984:58)

23. Hurford and Heasley (1983:19)

24. Keenan and Schieffelin (1976:72-3)

25. Mclaughlin (1984:37)

26. Both Pickering (1980) and Coleman (1980) follow Halliday and Hassan (1976) on cohesion. They discuss reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunctives and lexical cohesion as elements of cohesion.

27.   Yule (1983:105-6)

28.   Stubbs (1983:9)

29.   Halliday and Hassan (1976:4)

30.   Ibid:4

31.   Lyons (1977:660)

32.   Ibid:659

33.   The linguistic antecedent is one that occurs in the actual
      context while the non-linguistic antecedent is the one from
      which discourse participants are able to infer presupposed
      or given knowledge. Such antecedents are called triggers by
      Hawkins (1978) and initiators by Chafe (1972).

34.   This phenomenon is discussed further by Lyons (1977).

35.   Halliday and Hassan (1976:88)

36.   Ibid:142

37.   Ibid:5

38.   Hartmann and Stork (1972:40). It should be borne in mind
      that syntax is of importance in any discourse, but the
      meanings of words are determined semantically and
      pragmatically.

39.   Werth (1984:60)

40.   Halliday and Hassan (1976:6)

41.   Werth (1984:60-1)

42. Hartmann and Stork (1972:41). There seem to be similarities between cohesion and collocation, but note that cohesion deals with the referential chain, while collocation deals with lexical chains some of which could still be said to be cohesive.

43. Halliday and Hassan (1976:289)

44. Ibid:486

45. Coleman (1980:30-1)

46. See Werth (1984:24)

47. Halliday and Hassan (1976:55)

48. Werth (1984:69)

49. Brown and Yule (1983:6)

50. Werth (1984:128-9). See Grice (1975)

51. Brown and Yule (1983:229)

52. Grice (1975:45)

53. Mclaughlin (1984:45)

54. Van Dijk (1982:56)

55. Hurford and Heasley (1983:19)

56. Sidner (1983:108) and Brown and Yule (1983:27) maintain that the focussing element or discourse subject is the one that determines the discourse topic.

57. Sidner (1983:112)

58. Keenan and Schieffelin (1976:72)

59. Ibid:72-3

60. Van Dijk (1981:188)

61. See Keenan and Schieffelin (1976:71)

62. Keenan and Schieffelin (1976:71)

63. Madima (1984:11)

64. Keenan and Schieffelin (1976:71)

65. Ibid:71

66. Madima (1984:47-8)

67. Ibid:20-1

68. Grice (1975:45)

69. Brown and Yule (1983:84)

70. Ibid:84

71. Clark and Havilland (1977:2)

72. Brown and Yule (1983:85)

73. Keenan and Schieffelin (1976:76-7)

74. Brown and Yule (1983:83)

75. Ibid:83

76. Ibid:90

77. See Richardson (1976:45-77)

78. Akmajian et al (1984:244)

79. Lyons (1968:410)

80. Antal (1963:51-2)

81. Ibid:52

82. Mokgokong (1975:7)

83. Hayakawa (1971:61)

84. Lyons (1977:572)

85. Mokgokong (1975:10)

86. Lyons (1977:572)

87. Hurford and Heasley (1983:68-9)

88. Antal (1963:52)

89. Lyons (1968:413)

90. Lyons (1977:177)

91. Linsky (1971:76-7)

92. Lyons (1977:177)

93. In Garner (1971:27-8)

94. Frege (1952:69)

95. See Levinson (1983:170)

96. In Garner (1971:29)

97. Leech (1983:279)

98. Stalnaker (1972:387)

99. Brown and Yule (1983:29)

100. Leech (1983:281)

101. Stalnaker (1972:387) and Leech (1983:280-1)

102. Stalnaker (1972:387)

103. Givon (1979:288-9)

104. Venneman (1975:314)

105. Ibid:314

106. Ibid:314

107. Madima (1984:17)

108. Brown and Yule (1983:80)

109. Brown and Yule (1983:265)

110. Van Dijk and Kintch (1983:49)

111. Brown and Yule (1983:257)

112. De Beaugrande (1980:228)

113. Brown and Yule (1983:257)

114. De Beaugrande (1980:228)

115. Stein and Glenn (1979:117)

116. Ibid:113

117. Brown and Yule (1983:258)

118. Ibid:258

119. Ibid:258

120. Havilland and Clark (1974:514)

121. Brown and Yule (1983:236)

122. Hawkins (1978:123)

123. Ibid:123

124. Prince (1981:236)

125. Hawkins (1978:123)

126. Brown and Yule (1983:236)

127. Grice (1975: 41)

128. As quoted in Brown and Yule (1983:31)

129. Levinson (1983:97)

130. In Brown and Yule (1983:31)

131. Grice (1975: 45)

132. See Lyons (1981:212)

133. Allerton (1979:266)

134. Grice (1975:45-6)

135. Grice discusses four maxims but, as has been shown, some scholars condense them to three, whereas Brown and Yule (1983:32) believe that they can all be summed up in one maxim of relevance.

136. Hurford and Heasly (1983:282)

137. Brown and Yule (1983:32)

138. Kempson (1977:70)

139. Ibid

140. Magwabeni (1983:6-7)

141. Grice (1975:46)

142. Hurford and Heasley (1983:282)

143. Madima (1984:21)

144. Levinson (1985:103)

145. Ibid

146. See Karttunen (1969:57)

147. Ochs (1979:71); Du Bois (1980:284)

148. To repair is to correct what is not acceptable or does not fit the reference.

149. Ochs (1979:71)

150. Ibid

151. Ibid

152. Clark and Marshall (1981:47)

153. Clark and Havilland (1977:2)

Chapter 2

1. Cooper (1979:7)

2. Hurford and Heasley (1983:35)

3. See Thrane (1980:39)

4. Thrane (1980:39) uses the term 'referential expression' instead of referring expression, because to him the latter carries an implication that there is a referent for each expression. This idea is held by Cooper in 1; Hurford and Heasley in 2.

5. Thrane (1980:39)

6. Bhat (1979:125), Searle (1979:144), see Thrane (1980:39)

7. See Levinson (1983:97)

8. Bhat (1979:147)

9. On non-referentiality Givon (1978:293-294) has the following to say:
    "if a nominal is 'non-referential' or 'generic', the
    speaker does not have a commitment to its existence within
    the relevant universe of discourse. Rather, in ... (this case
    ... T.M.S.) the speaker is engaged in discussing the <u>genus</u>
    of its <u>properties</u> but does not commit him/herself to the
    existence of any specific individual member of that genus."

10. Lyons (1977:191).

11. Lyons (1977:191). Givon (1979:293) too is aware that
    whenever a speaker uses a referring expression, his aim is
    to refer to a referent that "'exists' within a particular
    universe-of-discourse." This refers to either a real or
    even imaginary or would-be referent.

12. Louwrens (1983:27)

13. Bhat (1979:138-9)

14. Hartmann and Stork (1972:94)

15. Bhat (1979:123, 138-9)

16. Hawkins (1978:215)

17. Donnellan (1971:102). Attributive referents are determined
    by the context in which the expressions are used and
    according to Bhat (1979:133) imaginary or would-be referents
    are the same as potential referents.

18. See Kuno (1969:350). Such expressions in fact are non-
    referring.

19. Lyons (1977:191)

20. Hurford and Heasley (1983:71)

21. Allerton (1966:268)

22. Hawkins (1978:109)

23. Venneman (1975:316)

24. Chafe (1975:39)

25. Donnellan (1971:106)

26. Chafe (1972:56)

27. Searle (1979:142)

28. See Maratsos (1977:4)

29. Lyons (1979:81)

30. Information is usually introduced into a discourse by an
    indefinite expression. This is then stored in the memory
    of the interlocutor and is revived, repeated, recalled or
    re-identified by the uses of anaphors from their 'storage'.

31. See Hawkins (1978:123)

32. Prince (1981:236)

33. Chafe (1975:39)

34. Bhat (1979:23). There is some sort of agreement amongst a
    social unit or group on the use of a particular name that is
    used to refer to a particular person, place, etc.

35. See Tapscott (1968)

36. See Tapscott (1968:80-9)

37. Sørensen (1963)

38. Ibid:44

39. Ibid:44

40. Russell (1971:168)

41. See Tapscott (1968:93)

42. Russell (1971:168)

43. Ibid:168

44. Tapscott (1968:152)

45. Ibid:144

46. Tapscott (1968:144)

47. Bhat (1979:83)

48. Ibid:97

49. Searle (1969:171)

50. Searle (1969:172)

51. Searle (1969:172)

52. Ibid:172

53. Tapscott (1968)

54. Ibid:198

55. Ibid:201

56. Ibid:224

57. Ibid:225

58. Ibid:231

59. See Tapscott (1968:231)

60. Ibid:231

61. Ibid:232

62. Ibid:233

63. Ibid:234

64. Hawkins (1978:220)

65. Donnellan (1971:106)

66. Ibid:106

67. Bhat (1979:135)

Chapter 3

1. Lyons (1977:660)

2. Ibid:659

3. Stenning (1979:172)

4. De Beaugrande (1980:144-5)

5. Hlongwane (1983:288)

6. Kempson (1979:103)

7. Ibid

8. Lyons (1977:660-1)

9. Langendoen (1970:117). Langendoen is seemingly concerned with sentences, specifically with complex sentences, in which the main aim is the linearity of constituents rather than with discourse as defined in this dissertation.

10. Ibid

11. Ibid. Cf. also Lyons J. (1977:660-1). Lyons gives such examples, but further states that the antecedent must have been mentioned earlier.

12. Mokgokong (1975:52)

13. Lyons (1968:453)

14. Hartmann and Stork (1972:106)

15. Stenning (1979:168)

16. Hawkins (1978:107) and Lyons (1980:84)

17. Lyons (1977:657)

18. Jespersen (1924:82)

19. Ibid

20. Fortune (1948:249)

21. Wilkes (1976:60-83) and Louwrens (1981a:36-57)

22. Wilkes (1976:60-83)

23. Lyons (1977:659) and Huddlestone (1984:277)

24. Brown and Yule (1983:214-215)

25. Lyons (1977:659)

26. Most Bantuists among them Doke (1927, 1935, 1954, 1955,
    1957, 1980, 1984, 1985),   C o l e (1955, 1982),
    Ziervogel (1972), Fortune (1948), Lanham (1955) indicate
    that the pronoun is used instead of a noun or substantive,
    or that it can stand alone as a subject or object of a
    sentence.

27. Fortune (1948:254)

28. Kantor (1977:36)

29. Nkabinde (1975:149)

10. Radford (1981:379)

1. Kunene (1975:172-9). When pronouns are used to show contrast,
    they focus attention on the intended referent. See also
    Louwrens (1979:17-18)

.   Halliday and Hassan (1976: 49). These scholars are the only
    ones quoted who show that the 1st and 2nd person pronouns
    can be used anaphorically.

33. Zandvoort (1957:130)

34. Close (1978:102)

35. Dekeyster et al (1979:152)

36. Thrane (1980)

37. Kantor (1977:36)

38. Halliday and Hassan (1976:48)

39. Ibid:49

40. Radford (1981:364-5)

41. Tellbaum (1980:109). Usually, whenever a pronoun occurs in
    a discourse, there is an antecedent which could either be
    in the same sentence, subordinate clause, neighbouring
    sentence, etc. or else it could have been implied.

42. Madima (1984:15)

43. Halliday and Hassan (1976:48)

44. Ibid

45. Ibid:55

46. Kantor (1977:51)

47. Madima (1984:78-9)

48. Ibid:79

49. Doke (1980:88). The pronominal concord pronoun has been
    taken to be as follows e.g. *vhone*: *vh-* concord, *-ʲ-* root
    and *-ne* pronominal suffix and differs slightly from Doke's
    approach. All the pronominal concords show morphological
    similarities with the prefixes of their antecedents, and
    anaphora and agreement is displayed between the antecedent
    and the anaphor. In discourse, however, pronouns do occur
    far away from their antecedents, but the discourse topic
    is able to determine the antecedent-anaphor relationship
    between them.

50. Some traditional grammarians (e.g. Doke), classified the quantitative as
    a pronoun while others (e.g. Fortune) treated it as a qualificative.

51. Madima (1984:5)

52. Madima (1984:26)

53. Lyons (1979:88)

54. Nesfield (1939:34)

55. Doke and Mofokeng (1957:110)

56. Cole (1982:130)

57. Harries (1968:115)

58. Cole (1982:130). The four types of demonstrative that
    are used to refer to various points of reference i.e.
    deictically (see 5.1 and 5.1.1) can also be used
    anaphorically to refer to various times of reference.

59. Various scholars have their own approaches towards the
    demonstrative forms and their points of reference. Amongst
    the Venda grammarians, Maumela (1967), Makuya (1983) and
    Milubi (1984) have four forms and four points of reference,

but Mathivha and Makhado have three forms and three points
of reference. Westphal (1946) and van Warmelo (1937) have
four points of reference and four forms, whereas Ziervogel
(1972) and Makhado (1976) have three basic forms with the
first one having been divided into 1a and 1b, which in turn
gives three basic points of reference instead of four.

60. Zandvoort (1957:147)

61. Halliday and Hassan (1976:60)

62. Zandvoort (1957:147)

63. Halliday and Hassan (1976:33)

64. Ibid:60

65. Ibid:60

66. Doke (1980:126)

67. Ziervogel (1972:15)

68. Ibid:15 .

69. Kunene (1979:269)

70. Hlongwane (1976:31)

71. Bosch (1985:1-2)

72. Poulos (1975:77)

73. Ziervogel (1959:132)

74. Fortune (1948:515)

75. Doke (1980:125)

76. See Kunene above:269

77. Bosch (1985:70-1)

78. Doke and his contemporaries claim that the concords or
    agreement markers or morphemes can be used instead of
    nouns, which makes them anaphoric expressions. These
    expressions are called bound pronouns by scholars such as
    Ashton (1954) and Brown (1972). It would appear that these
    scholars are influenced by the Germanic translations of
    these concords as they become pronouns. Samarin (1967:
    140-1) says that most scholars call concords which function
    as anaphors bound pronouns to convenience their Germanic
    translations. Taylor (1985:63) says that similar elements
    are found in Latin i.e. suffixes. He notes that in Latin
    they are called third person singular inflections and not
    subject suffixes, e.g. see notes -
    Caesar ab-i-it.   Postea red-i-it
    Caesar go- "perf" -he later return- "perf" -he
    "Caesar left. He returned later."
    If this interpretation is valid, then we can regard the
    suffixal concord -it as pronominal. However, most linguists
    would not allow this in Latin. But it seems that in Bantu
    linguistics we have been influenced by our understanding of
    the grammar of European languages, hence the Nkore-Kiga
    prefixes have been regarded as "subject prefixes" and
    "pronominal prefixes".

79. Kunene (1979:269)

80. Kunene (1979:246)

81. Madima (1984:13)

82. Harries (1968:6)

83. Poulos (1975:83)

84. Madima (1984:26)

85. Kunene (1979:269)

86. Madima (1984:7)

87. Hlongwane (1983:286)

88. Clark and Sengul (1979:36)

89. Kantor (1977:95)

90. Werth (1984:17)

91. Clark and Sengul (1979:36)

92. Ibid:36

93. Ibid:40

94. Madima (1984:68)

95. Werth (1983:17)

96. Ehrlich (1980:253)

97. See 78

98. Kunene (1979:240)

99. Mkude (1974:76)

100. Lanham (1975:153)

101. Poulos (1975:88)

102. Cole (1982:232)

103. Doke (1980:159)

104. Ziervogel (1972:51)

105. Fortune (1948:533)

106. Lanham (1955:153)

107. Poulos (1975:88)

108. See Ziervogel (1972)

109. Dembetembe (1976:190)

110. Ibid:191

111. Ibid:191

112. Madima (1984:14)

113. Of the qualificatives, only the possessive will receive special attention in this study, because of its unique dual anaphoric nature. The adjective and the relative manifest a straightforward anaphoric relationship with their antecedents - their concords showing agreement in class with the antecedents, as in the case with subject and object concords, e.g. (mutukana) ... muhulu 'the big one, referring to the boy'; (mutukana) ... o swikaho 'the one who has arrived, referring to the boy'.

114. Halliday and Hassan (1976:55). Possessives in Venda also refer dually but differ somewhat as to their use, from their English counterparts. In both cases, the possessive refers to the possessor and possessee i.e. in English, a possessive refers anaphorically to a possessor by reference and to a possessee by ellipsis and in Venda the possessive concord refers to the possessee and the possessive stem refers to the possessor.

115. Dekeyster et al (1979:153)

116. Hartmann and Stork (1972:76)

117. Halliday and Hassan (1976:145)

118. See Hartmann and Stork (1972:76).

119. Halliday and Hassan (1976:144)

120. Madima (1984:23)

121. Ibid:15

122. Doke (1982:115)

123. Madima (1984:22)

Chapter 4

1. Hawkins (1978:123). Associates are those referents which
   are said to be parts of the main ones or "wholes".

2. Maratsos (1978:4)

3. Chafe (1972)

4. Chafe (1972:59) and Hawkins (1978:123) use the terms
   'initiators' and 'triggers' respectively for antecedents
   which may be linguistic and these give rise to anaphoric
   expressions which, according to Maratsos (1978:4) are made
   definite by entailment. The referents referred to by the
   anaphoric expressions are the ones which are linked to their
   wholes by association.

5. Jansen (1979:67). The term 'interreference' is due to him.

6. Ibid:70

7. Hawkins (1978:123), Chafe (1972:59)

8. Hawkins (1978:124-5)

9. Minsky (1975:1)

10. Ibid:10

11. See Brown and Yule (1983:239)

12. Chafe (1972:61). Inherent features are associates. See
    Hawkins (1978:124).

13. Hawkins (1978:124) - defining features which co-occur with
    their wholes with sufficient frequency are what Chafe calls
    obligatory parts.

14. Chafe (1972:63)

15. See Hawkins (1978:124)

16. Chafe (1972:64)

17. Hawkins (1978:110-121)

18. Hawkins (1978:114). Hawkins speaks of the immediate and
    larger uses of definite expressions to refer to use in
    immediate and non-immediate physical environments. No
    distinction between the two is given as the differences
    between the two are relative.

19. Karttunen (1969:57)

20. Chafe (1972:58)

21. Louwrens (1983:31)

22. Karttunen (1969:50)

23. Hawkins (1978:114)

24. Karttunen (1969:51)

25. Hawkins (1978:114)

26. Karttunen (1969:64)

27. Hawkins (1978:115)

28. Ibid

29. Ibid:116

30. Ibid:116

31. Prince (1981:236)

32. Hawkins (1978:118)

33. Ibid:119

34. Ibid:119

35. Karttunen (1969:57)

36. Although definite expressions appear to be triggered by verbs/verb roots, (see Karttunen (1969:57-8) and Chafe (1972: 64) , Chafe explains that the resulting actions/events are not parts but accompaniments. Furthermore it is rather clear that the real initiators or triggers in this instance are implied or 'understood' indefinite expressions.

37. Karttunen (1969:57-8), Chafe (1972:64-5)

38. Karttunen (1969:57-8)

39. Ibid:58

40. Ibid:58

41. Ibid:59

42. Chafe (1972:64)

43. Hawkins (1978:123)

44. Chafe (1972:64)

45. Ibid:64

46. Ibid:64

47. Ibid:65

48. Hawkins (1978:173). Hawkins holds that the occurrence of indefinite anaphoric expressions in discourse is possible but indicates that speakers should take into account the knowledge they share with their interlocutor.

49. Ibid:175

50. Ibid:174

51. Ibid:177. For any discourse to progress successfully, discourse participants should share presuppositions or lead each other into the information pool.

52. Hawkins (1978:123)

53. Ibid:124

Chapter 5

1. Lyons (1975:61)

2. Lyons (1979:88)

3. Lyons (1977:636)

4. Hartmann and Stork (1972:60)

5. Lyons (1977:637)

6. Hurford and Heasley (1983:63)

7. Fillmore (1982:35)

8. Huddleston (1980:282)

9. Lyons (1968:275)

10. Thrane (1980:192)

11. Demonstratives - The class 16 demonstrative pronouns are
     usually referred to as locative adverbs.

12. The bracketed forms are generally used to indicate respect.

13. These are places   to which   the   attention   of
     the addressee is directed i.e. where referents are located

14. Although three basic points of reference are recognized, for instance by Ziervogel (1972), Makhado (1976) and Mathivha and Makhado (1966), other grammarians, among them van Warmelo (1937), Westphal (1946), Maumela (1967), Makuya (1983) and Milubi (1985) recognize four.

15. The utterance situation is not restricted to where the discourse participants are i.e. to the visible situation only, but it includes wherever other invisible but known referents are located.

16. Fillmore (1982:38)

17. Editorial forms are also called 'royal forms'.

18. Thrane (1980:195)

19. Lyons (1977:638)

20. Tanz (1980:76)

21. Karttunen (1969:54)

22. Lyons (1975:65)

23. Lyons (1977:646-647)

24. Sweet (1960:83)

25. Doke (1935: 86)

26. Fortune (1948:310)

27. Makhado (1976:22)

28. Most grammarians among them Cole (1982), Ziervogel (1972)
    and Nkabinde (1975) are here concerned with the speaker,
    the referent and point of reference, although deixis is not
    dealt with pragmatically, as is the case in this thesis.
    Furthermore, they always use deictic expressions to refer to
    referents in the visible situations only, whereas the
    situation of utterance as defined in this thesis includes
    both visible and invisible referents in immediate and non-
    immediate situations.

29. Cole (1980:130-131)

30. Nkabinde (1971:152)

31. Kotzé (1984:82). See situation of utterance in 23 above.

32. Hawkins (1978:115)

33. Kotzé (1984:82)

34. The demonstratives for the first point of reference have
    been divided into two categories i.e. 1a and 1b by Ziervogel
    et al (1972) and also by Makhado (1976). They are, however,
    used to refer to the same point of reference i.e. the deictic
    centre and the differences between them are more those of
    emphasis. Other grammarians, among them van Warmelo (1937),
    Westphal (1946), Maumela (1967), Makuya (1983) and Milubi
    (1985), ignore them and have four points of reference and
    four basic forms. Mathivha and Makhado (1966) adhere to
    three points of reference and to three basic forms.

35. Thrane (1980:195)

36. See Tanz (1980:71-2)

37. Ibid:72

38. Jespersen (1933:161)

39. Ibid:161

40. Christophersen (1939:84)

41. Lyons (1977:655)

42. Christophersen (1939:84)

43. Ibid:85

44. Hawkins (1978:110)

45. See Lyons (1977:655)

46. Ibid: 655

47. Lyons (1977:655)

48. Dekeyster (1979:152)

49. Zandvoort (1957:129)

50. Quirk R. et al (1972:208)

51. See Levinson (1984:69)

52. Thrane (1980:195)

53. Sweet (1933:75)

54. Zandvoort (1957:138)

55. Dekeyster (1979:156)

56. The possessive concord may also occur with the full pronouns
of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd persons, e.g. *wa ṇne, wa inwi, wa ene*.
These forms are more emphatic in significance.

Conclusion

1.   Werth (1984:24)

2.   Van Dijk (1981:188)

3.   Lyons (1977:659)

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