FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN NAMIBIA: THE DYNAMICS OF THE SMALLNESS OF A STATE

by

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submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the subject

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

SUPERVISOR:  Ms Jo-Ansie van Wyk

DATE: November 2008
I declare that *Foreign policy-making in Namibia: the dynamics of the smallness of a state* is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

___________________      __________________
S A P MUSHELENGA       DATE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my profound gratitude to all the people who assisted me during the process of conducting this study. I am indebted to Gerhard Totemeyer and Sackey Akweenda who provided guidance during the preliminary stage of the study. Lucia Iipumbu has been instrumental during the initial phase of the study, providing me with examples of drafting the research proposals. André du Pisani made critical comments during the initial phase of the study and generously provided me with enough academic literature on International Relations. Jo-Ansie van Wyk brought hope in my studies as she provided much valuable critical comments, encouragement and support.

I am indebted to Isak Hamata, who provided me with the information that I needed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He and Netumbo-Nandi Ndaitwah provided me with their personal study material on International Relations. I am grateful to the staff at the Namibian Parliament Library who provided me with unlimited access to library facilities and copies of the Hansards that I needed in conducting the study. I am equally indebted to the staff at the National Library, UNAM Library and the National Archives for making it easy for me to access the necessary materials for the study.

I would like to thank all the individuals that I interviewed, including former SWAPO and Namibian diplomats, members of the opposition parties and civil society organisations. They have all provided valuable information and enriched my study. My gratitude goes to former President Sam Nujoma and President Hifikepunye Pohamba for their personal encouragements. Hage Geingob and Theo-Ben Gurirab served as personal sources of inspiration and encouragement. Emilia Mkusa transmitted some of my enquiries to Theo-Ben Gurirab when I was unable to meet him.

I am grateful to Katrina Liswani for providing me with the relevant information from the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Officials from the Ministry of Defence provided me with information on the role of Namibia in UN peace-keeping missions, while officers from the Namibian Police provided me with information on the statistics of landmines.
deaths and injuries in Namibia. Officials from the Ministry of Trade and Industry provided me with information related to trade, which I needed as Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing on Economics, Natural Resources and Public Administration. Some of this information was relevant to my studies. My thanks go to Monica Nashandi from the Office of the President who also provided me with material relevant to the study.

I would like to express my appreciation to David Mushaandja and Ben Katjipuka who provided me with computer facilities when I was conducting my studies in northern Namibia and Geneva, Switzerland. Ndapanda Elifas provided valuable assistance. When my memory stick was damaged while I was working on the study in Geneva, she retrieved the study from my back-up system in Namibia and forwarded it to me. I am indebted to Kauna Mufeti, a computer expert at the University of Namibia who assisted me with drawing the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am sincerely grateful to my eldest sister, Taimi Kamati, who language-edited the final version.

My mother, Elizabeth Nashilongo Mushelenga (born Shihepo), has been a source of inspiration and she continuously encouraged me to pursue my studies. My wife, Eunike, has been supportive in my studies and excused me from household chores to enable me to finish my studies. My son, Panduleni, provided a sense of humour when the studies were stressful.
This study is about foreign policy-making in Namibia from independence, 1990 to 2008, which is based on Liberalism as an approach to the study of International Relations.

Namibia’s foreign policy has three main themes, namely the promotion of world peace, economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation. The domestic actors of Namibia’s foreign policy are the President, Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Government Ministries. Former President Nujoma is pragmatic and persuasive, while President Pohamba maintains a reserved approach. Other domestic actors such as the Parliament, opposition parties and civil society organisations have not been effective in influencing Namibia’s foreign policy-making.

Although Namibia is a small state her foreign policy is successful contrary to the traditional perspectives of small states’ foreign policies. Namibia has played an active role in regional and international organisations and maintained a wider scope of foreign policy. Namibia has 24 diplomatic Missions in Africa, Asia, Europe and America.
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<td>AAPC</td>
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<td>AAPSO</td>
<td>Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries</td>
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<td>AFD</td>
<td><em>Agencé Français de Développement</em> (French Development Agency)</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
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<td>APM</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mines</td>
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<td>Africa Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AWEPA</td>
<td>Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa</td>
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<td>AWEPA</td>
<td>Association of West-European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid</td>
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<td>CCN</td>
<td>Council of Churches in Namibia</td>
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<td>CCTV</td>
<td>China Central Television</td>
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<td>CFI</td>
<td>Canal France International</td>
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<td>CHOGLM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting</td>
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<td>CNY</td>
<td>China Yuan Renminbi</td>
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<td>CoD</td>
<td>Congress of Democrats</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CNTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>CNTBTO</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
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<td>DTA</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
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<td>EPZ</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>GSWA</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ISRI</td>
<td><em>Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais</em> (Higher Institute for International Relations)</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
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<td>FDA</td>
<td>French Development Agency</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td><em>Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique</em> (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común der Sul (Southern Common Market)</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
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<td>NAMPA</td>
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<td>NAMPOL</td>
<td>Namibian Police</td>
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<td>NANSO</td>
<td>Namibia National Students Organisation</td>
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<td>NDF</td>
<td>Namibian Defence Force</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NEPRU</td>
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<td>National Society for Human Rights</td>
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<td>NTB</td>
<td>Namibia Tourism Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODC</td>
<td>Offshore Development Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Operation in Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Owambo People’s Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPO</td>
<td>Owambo People’s Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano da Guine e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLISARIO</td>
<td>Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROPARCO</td>
<td>Société de Promotion et de Participation pour la Coopération Economique (Society for the Promotion and Participation in Economic Cooperation)</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern Africa Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>SADC-PF</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community – Parliamentary Forum</td>
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<td>SADR</td>
<td>Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>SAPEM</td>
<td>Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly</td>
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<td>SPAC</td>
<td>SWAPO Party Archive and Research Centre</td>
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<td>SWA</td>
<td>South West Africa</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
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<td>TCL</td>
<td>Tsumeb Corporation Limited</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>TNCs</td>
<td>Transnational Corporations</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAM</td>
<td>University of Namibia</td>
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<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission III</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNISA</td>
<td>University of South Africa</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td><em>União Nacional pela Independência Total de Angola</em> (The Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Assistance Group</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>VAT</td>
<td>Value-Added Tax</td>
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<td>WCG</td>
<td>Western Contact Group</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>First World War</td>
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<td>Second World War</td>
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<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<td>ZAPU</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Namibia is situated on the south western coast of the African continent. With an area measuring 824,268 sq km, Namibia’s west coast is dominated by the Namib Desert. Politically, the country is a unitary state, divided into 13 political regions. Major economic activities include mining, agriculture, fishing and manufacturing. Namibia’s major trading partners are the European Union (EU), Japan, the United States of America (USA), Switzerland, Member-States of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) (Van Rooyen, 2006: 7 – 8).

This study analyses and assesses Namibia’s foreign policy from the pre-independence period until 2008, which includes the presidencies of the first and the second democratically elected presidents. The study intends to analyse foreign policy-making and issues in Namibia, as a small state, within the domestic, regional and global context.

The study briefly refers to the traditional approaches of foreign policy study, namely Realism and Idealism (sometimes referred to as Liberalism or Pluralism), which will be applied to analyse Namibia’s foreign policy.

States adopt policies which regulate and guide their activities in various spheres of life. These policies are designed to achieve the set goals and standards of a given government. In order to guide their interactions towards other states, and to conformingly exist within the international political system, states formulate and adopt foreign policies. Foreign policy can be defined, for example, as a set of actions adopted by a state in relation to external situations and entities, which could be states, international organisations, individuals, or any other non-state actor (Reynolds, 1988: 13 – 14; 35 and Calvert, 1986: 1). This definition is adopted here as the study’s working definition of foreign policy.
In order to grasp the current Namibia’s foreign policy it is important to provide some historical context, which is followed by an outline of the study’s methodology and related aspects.

1.2 A politico-historical overview of Namibia: 1884-1960

1.2.1 The Berlin Conference to the First World War (WWI): 1884-1914

Namibia’s post independence foreign policy has deep historical roots. Following the Berlin Conference of 1884, which dealt with the partition of African countries as colonies of a number of European states, Namibia was placed under Germany and became known as German South West Africa (GSWA). Germany’s rule ended with the outbreak of WWII. In 1914, South African troops invaded German South West Africa on behalf of the Allied forces and defeated Germany. Subsequently, in July 1915, South Africa installed an interim military administration for the territory, marking the beginning of South Africa’s colonialism in Namibia (Mbuende, 1986: 64).

1.2.2 The Peace of Versailles until the outbreak of the Second World War (WWII): 1918-1939

At the end of the WWI, the Allied Powers convened the Peace Conference in Versailles, France. One of the outcomes of the Versailles Conference was Germany’s loss of her colonies to other European powers. A mandate system was instituted, where the newly established League of Nations mandated European powers to administer the territories formerly colonised by Germany, until the inhabitants of such territories are able to govern themselves. The state which has been entrusted to administer the mandate territory would present annual reports to the League of Nations regarding the administration of the territory. Mandate territories were classified in three categories

- A-Mandates were colonies which were about to become independent. These were mostly colonies of the Turkish Empire in the Middle East.
• B-Mandates were colonies that were to be administered as separate entities from the mandatory powers. These were mostly former German colonies in Central Africa.

• C-Mandates were colonies that were to be administered as integral parts of the mandatory powers (Du Pisani, 1985: 51).

German South West Africa became South West Africa (SWA) after the defeat of Germany and was placed under the British Crown as a C-Mandate territory of the League of Nations. South Africa was to exercise the mandate on behalf of Britain and did not want the ex-Germany colonies to be placed under the League of Nations mandate system. South Africa treated the decision on mandatory power as a mere confirmation of their annexation of the territory in 1915. South Africa passed the South West Africa Mandate Act No. 49 of 1919 to realise the mandate of South West Africa (Geingob, 2004: 36 – 39 and Mbuende, 1986: 69 – 72).

1.2.3 The collapse of the League of Nations and the establishment of the United Nations: 1945 onwards

With the outbreak of WWII, the League of Nations collapsed and was replaced by the United Nations (UN) on 24 October 1945. It was decided that the territories under the League of Nations mandate system should be placed under the UN’s Trusteeship Council, but South Africa refused to recognise the authority of the UN over South West Africa. In fact, by then South Africa had already violated provisions of the League of Nations’ mandate with its introduction of segregation policies in the territory, which was an extension of South Africa’s domestic segregation and apartheid policies. South Africa, which had been submitting annual reports to the League of Nations on its administration of the territory, refused to submit further reports to the UN. The UN sought an opinion on the matter from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled in 1950 that South West Africa was under the UN Mandate. South Africa, nevertheless, continued to refuse accepting the UN’s responsibility over Namibia (Geingob, 2004: 41 – 42).
1.2.4 The emergence of liberation movements: 1950s

In 1957, the Ovambo People’s Congress (OPC) was formed by migrant workers in Cape Town. The aims of OPC were to end the contract labour system introduced by the South African government and, ultimately, to fight for the independence of South West Africa. On 19 April 1959, OPC was renamed the Ovambo People’s Organisation (OPO), marking the launching of a more formal political organisation. OPO leaders were advised to rename the organisation the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), because that name would reflect the inclusion of all people of South West Africa, unlike the OPO which gave the organisation an ethnic orientation. The name ‘Ovambo’ was used by Europeans, hence it also became to be used in the English language. The correct name for the area is Owambo. The researcher of this study is familiar with this information, as he comes from that area. Owambo is the area lying in the northern part of Namibia inhabited by the Aawambo (plural of Omuwambo). Subsequently the OPO was renamed SWAPO in June 1960. However, 19 April on which OPO was formed was adopted as the official date of the formation of SWAPO (Katjavivi, 1988, 22 – 23). Discussions with founding members of SWAPO, too, confirm this aspect.

1.3 The formation of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO)

The formation of SWAPO on 19 April 1960 marked the beginning of almost 30 years of a protracted struggle for an independent democratic Namibia, including 23 years of an armed liberation struggle. From 1960, SWAPO members started leaving the country. From 26 December 1969 to 2 January 1970, the movement convened the Tanga Consultative Conference in Tanga, Tanzania, which brought together a large number of SWAPO members in exile (Nujoma, 2001a: 189). The liberation movement was reorganised, with departments headed by secretaries and their deputies. SWAPO’s Department of Foreign Affairs was established and tasked to execute the movement’s foreign policy and spearhead its diplomatic activities. Addressing the Parliament in the immediate months following independence, Theo-Ben Gurirab, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, elaborated on the organisation’s diplomatic activities during its liberation struggle and stated that,

“As a national liberation movement, SWAPO maintained some 27 foreign missions on all the continents except Antarctica. I was busy thinking about Antarctica then the [UN Security Council Resolution] 435-process commenced and I dropped the idea” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 203).

1.4 SWAPO’s international relations prior to Namibian independence

1.4.1 Establishing and maintaining diplomatic missions

From 1970, when SWAPO’s Department of Foreign Affairs was established, to 1990, when the process of transition to independence under the supervision of the UN was completed, the movement maintained 27 missions as outlined in table 1.

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<th>Africa</th>
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The SWAPO Mission in Finland was closed in 1972 and the responsibility resorted under the Mission in Sweden. However, physically, the office remained and was run by SWAPO students in Finland, which primarily dealt with students’ affairs.

1.4.2 Bilateral relations

SWAPO’s bilateral relations were not limited to the countries where the movement had missions. SWAPO also maintained diplomatic relations mostly with the former East Bloc
countries (in the context of Cold War politics), which, by 1984, provided 60% of the total funds donated to the movement (Leys & Saul, 1995: 172). In addition to students who were members of SWAPO in exile studying in countries where the movement had missions, there were students in Bulgaria, the then Czechoslovakia, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda (Angula, 2007: interview). Countries like China, for example, were among the countries of the East Bloc which provided military training for members of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of SWAPO. Humanitarian and material assistance were rendered from what independent Namibia’s first president, Sam Nujoma, termed “progressive organisations and people” from countries such as Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland (Nujoma, 2001a: 189). These assistances were in addition to similar assistance rendered by countries where SWAPO had missions.

1.4.3 Multilateral relations

SWAPO participated in and maintained high consideration for international organisations. The international community, including the UN, recognised the movement diplomatically. The United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) Resolution 31/152 of 1976 recognised SWAPO as the “sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people” (Leys & Saul, 1995: 173 and Katjavivi, 1988: 112). Consequently, the movement was accorded observer status in the UNGA. This status privileged SWAPO uniquely as the future Government of the Republic of Namibia.

SWAPO also maintained diplomatic relations with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU). Since 1963, the OAU’s Liberation Committee provided SWAPO with material and financial resources. In 1978, SWAPO was admitted as a full member of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). It also received support from the Commonwealth and the Frontline States, a body of independent states from southern Africa, which had played a role in the independence of the southern African region. Moreover, the President and senior leaders of SWAPO regularly attended and addressed high-level meetings of international organisations such as the UNGA and Security

1.4.4 Foreign policy decision-makers

Given the limited capacity and constraints of a number of the liberation movement sources, the President of SWAPO, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Observer to the United Nations were the primary actors in the movement’s foreign policy with the President as the major actor in the movement’s foreign policy-making. It is stated that,

“… [T]he President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, as the foremost champion of the then evolving national interest, was able to raise the movement’s international profile, thereby placing the country’s name on the world map. He trotted the globe, meeting and winning support of a wide range of the world’s historic figures” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2004: 23).

There were also other actors in the movement’s foreign policy process such as key members of the SWAPO Central Committee and Politburo who formed part of numerous delegations to the UNGA, the UN Security Council and other international conferences dealing with the independence of Namibia. These office-bearers influenced the position that SWAPO would take at a particular meeting.

SWAPO diplomats tried to lobby with the governments of countries where they were accredited for material, humanitarian and military assistance. Its Permanent Observer at the UN and members of the SWAPO delegations to the UN lobbied with UN Member-States sympathetic to the cause of SWAPO to sponsor and support resolutions condemning the illegal occupation of South Africa. From 1977 until the transitional period to independence in 1989, the Western Contact Group (WCG) comprising Canada, France, West Germany, UK and USA played a major role in negotiations between SWAPO and the South African Government. The WCG’s role will be discussed in greater details in Chapter Two.
1.5 The independence of Namibia and its foreign policy implications

When Namibia became independent on 21 March 1990, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established and the Government of the Republic of Namibia established formal diplomatic relations with countries around the world, continuing relations with all countries that had diplomatic relations with SWAPO, and acquiring new friends, among them Belgium, which was strategic because it hosts the headquarters of the European Economic Community (EEC), the forerunner of the EU. This then marked the beginning of Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, and as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, stated:

“… [T]he departure point of the foreign policy of the Republic of Namibia is 21st March 1990. There was no Namibian foreign policy before that date and there was no foreign ministry establishment in our country” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 201).

The SWAPO-led government also established diplomatic ties with former adversaries. By the time the Minister of Foreign Affairs motivated the Vote of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Parliament in June 1991, Namibia had opened 13 diplomatic missions, including four in Africa, six in Europe and three in America. A total of 156 agreements were signed with foreign governments, and with international, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 83 – 86), covering areas of health, economic and development cooperation, diplomatic relations, education and culture, scientific and technical cooperation, consular matters, and aviation. A list of selected agreements signed in the first financial year after independence is included in Appendix 1.

At the time of independence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set five objectives for Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, namely to:

- Promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity and ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands of Namibia;
- Promote Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid and colonialism;
• Promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities;
• Enhance peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and the
• Promote of world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU and NAM (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80 – 81).

Namibia’s foreign policy developed through the stages of the policy formulation and development, during the first five years, and the consolidation and entrenchment of policies thereafter. A White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management was adopted by Parliament at the beginning of 2004, setting out the principles, practice and priorities of Namibia’s foreign policy and diplomacy. The White Paper was formulated with the exclusive involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before it was tabled in Parliament, there was no broader involvement of stakeholders such as the SWAPO Central Committee or Politburo, Parliamentary Committees, academia, the business community, or any other form of public consultation. This could be attributed to the lack of interest in foreign affairs issues shown from these structures, as discussed in Chapter Three.

1.6 Literature review

Generally, theoretical research on the foreign policy and international affairs of African states are limited and restricted to the Realists’ analysis. Notable post-Cold War exceptions include Khadiagala (2001), Hey (2003) and Landsberg (2004).

Very little research has been conducted on Namibia’s foreign policy. A large part of the literature on Namibia’s foreign policy is found in the speeches of the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Government officials. Academic research on Namibia’s foreign policy is limited to four publications which were all produced by the same author, Andre Du Pisani, Professor of Political Science at the University of Namibia, who, accordingly, admitted that,
“...the study of the foreign relations and policy of small and new states, such as Namibia, is relatively new and under-researched aspect of the study of world politics” (Du Pisani, 2000: 298).

These four publications are:


However, a number of official documents are available. This includes A White Paper on Namibia’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management, which was introduced in Parliament only at the beginning of 2004. In addition to the White Paper, sufficient primary and other sources on Namibia’s foreign policy exist. The speeches of government leaders and officials on foreign affairs such as the former President, The Head of State, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Heads of Mission and former Heads of Mission serve as secondary sources. These documents were supplemented by a series of interviews as indicated below.

There is also literature available on foreign policies of small states and the traditional approaches of foreign policy. Among them are Calvert (1986), Hey (2003), McCraw (1994), Maurice (1973) and Vandenbosch (1944). This literature will be used to evaluate the settings of Namibia’s foreign policy. The research intends to explore the disjuncture between Realism and Idealism in Namibia’s foreign policy.

Du Pisani (1992, 1994, 2000 and 2003) focuses, inter alia, on the theme of small states’ foreign policies. He observed that Namibia has a firm conviction that the rule-governed international system guarantees the security of smaller and weaker states (Du Pisani
2003: 16). It is asserted that Namibia’s foreign policy is that of a small and a new state, and that the country has to devise a foreign policy that is sensitive to its smallness. The country has, thus, enhanced its interests and security by entering into bilateral and multilateral relations with regional neighbours and international organisations (Du Pisani, 1992: 58 and Du Pisani, 2000: 300).

Furthermore, Du Pisani also emphasises the fact that Namibia’s independence coincided with the end of the Cold War. This contributed to the country’s Idealist-oriented (Pluralist) foreign policy because the end of the Cold War and her independence from South Africa terminated Namibia’s emphasis on security (Du Pisani, 1992: 58 and Du Pisani 2000: 298), which is anchored in neo-realism. Realism and Idealism as theories of International Relations study will be discussed in section 1.8 of this chapter (analytical framework). Namibia’s pluralist foreign policy is further evidenced by the country’s joining of the regional and international organisations and institutions dealing with economic issues, including SACU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, UN specialised agencies and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Namibia joined SACU in 1991 and benefited from SACU’s common pool revenue, which, by 2003, provided 30 – 40 % of her gross domestic product (GDP) (Du Pisani, 2003: 18).

The literature accessed also covers Namibia’s stated commitment to international peace (Du Pisani, 2000: 301). This commitment is anchored in article 96 of the Namibian Constitution, which reads:

The state shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it:

(a) adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment;
(b) promotes international cooperation, peace and security;
(c) creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among nations;
(d) fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations;
(e) encourages the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 52 – 53).

As independent democratic Namibia emerged from a protracted liberation struggle, it was morally imperative that the country commits itself to world peace (Du Pisani, 2003: 16). Therefore, Namibia, for example, supported the peace efforts in neighbouring Angola and
the transformation of South Africa into a democratic and non-racial state (Du Pisani, 1994: 209).

Namibia also attempts to resolve bilateral disputes peacefully. When Namibia had a dispute with Botswana over the ownership of Kasikili Island, the two countries referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Du Pisani, 2000: 309 and Du Pisani, 2003:18). This is in line with Idealism’s assumption of mitigating conflicts through collective action. After the ICJ ruled in favour of Botswana in 1999, Namibia accepted the ruling of the Court, thereby abiding by Idealism’s assumption that international institutions should mitigate in conflicts.

Du Pisani (1992: 59 – 60 and 1994: 211 – 213) also presents another Idealism-rooted foreign policy approach, namely peace negotiations instead of war and conflicts, especially regarding Namibia’s relations with South Africa over the enclave harbour of Walvis Bay. When Namibia became independent, the South African Government maintained its claim of ownership of the Walvis Bay enclave harbour, which, Du Pisani (1992: 59) describes as “geographically, historically and economically a part of Namibia”. Namibia handled the reintegration of Walvis Bay to Namibia in a peaceful manner. Diplomacy, an Idealism-oriented tool of foreign policy, was used when Namibia initiated the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Joint Administrative Authority (JAA) of Walvis Bay, comprising officials from both Namibia and South Africa, and the subsequent reintegration of Walvis Bay and off-shore islands back to Namibia in 1994.

Namibia has also played a role in peace-making efforts in the Great Lakes region. From August 1998 to November 2001, Namibia provided military and material assistance to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). When the DRC was attacked by invading troops from Uganda and Rwanda which supported different armed factions in the DRC, Namibia, together with Angola and Zimbabwe provided assistance to the DRC Government to restore peace in that country. It should be noted that the intervention by these countries occurred after an invitation by the DRC Government. In
May 2000, Namibia formed part of the UN Security Council mission to the DRC and the region, which met with members of Congolese civil society, political parties and with the presidents of DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Du Pisani, 2003: 18).

The literature surveyed also focuses on Namibia’s economic diplomacy. Du Pisani (2000: 307) observes that in an attempt to enhance trade and investment, the Government sent trade envoys to big commercial capitals like Bonn, London and Brussels, and some Arab and Asian countries. As a member of the former Lomé IV Convention, which became restructured under the Cotonou Agreement, Namibia enjoyed a special economic relationship with the European Union. Accordingly, Namibia was granted a Least Developing Country (LDC) status for a period of five years (Du Pisani, 2000: 307; Du Pisani, 1992: 61 and Du Pisani, 2003: 17). The economic diplomacy trend in Namibia’s foreign policy presents a pluralistic foreign policy approach, where economic issues also become prominent in the foreign policy-making process.

Furthermore, the literature addressed the issue of South-South cooperation. Du Pisani (2003: 16) maintains that “South-South cooperation is a key to Namibia’s relations with other African and developing economies”. It is further stated that Namibia values participation in the international trading system, provided that it does not disadvantage countries of the south (Du Pisani, 2003: 19).

There are major gaps in the small body of existing literature on Namibia’s foreign policy. It, for example, falls short of mentioning what the researcher of this study terms as ‘domestic disagreement’ in the Namibia’s foreign policy. This refers to a lack of domestic consensus on foreign policy issues. Domestic views diverge on, for example, the situation in Zimbabwe where the Government adopted a non-confrontational approach. There are, however, different views in the radio call-in programmes, and statements made by other politicians in Parliament or at other public platforms. The problem of domestic consensus in the Namibian foreign policy could also be discerned by analysing conflicting statements from different Ministers on given topical issues. It is
important that such a position is subjected to academic research and fill the gap in the existing literature.

Furthermore, the literature does not refer to the important role that non-state actors play in foreign policy decision-making. Du Pisani (1992, 1994, 2000 & 2003) and the official government documents largely depict Namibia’s foreign policy as the exclusive domain of the state. They enumerate the role of the Head of State, Foreign Ministers and diplomats. Du Pisani (2000: 299) concludes that in the case of small states like Namibia the “President and executive often dominate aspects of their countries’ foreign policy”. Although Du Pisani (2003: 19) acknowledges the fact that the civil society and other actors have a role to play in foreign relations, he did not address elaborately on this matter and did not provide practical examples.

Shortly after independence, sentiments of exclusivity of state actors on foreign policy were also expressed by Theo-Ben Gurirab, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Namibia from 1990 to 2002, in his address to the Namibian Parliament, stating:

“The formulation, interpretation, analysis, coordination and implementation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Namibia is (sic) the responsibility of the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry… According to our constitution, therefore, it is the Head of State, the President of the Republic of Namibia, who is empowered to negotiate and sign international agreements and to delegate such power, and in this instance, to his Foreign Minister” (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1990: 202).

It is also important to note that although the Head of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs are the key role players in the foreign policy-making process, they do not enjoy exclusive monopoly in this respect. Article 63 (d) and (e) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia empowers the National Assembly to, *inter alia*:

(d) consider and decide whether or not to succeed to such international agreements as may have been entered into prior to Independence by administrations within Namibia in which the majority of the Namibian people have historically not enjoyed democratic representation and participation;

(e) agree to the ratification of or accession to international agreements which have been negotiated and signed in terms of Article 32 (3) (e) hereof (*Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 36 – 37*).

Because of the checks and balance system of governance, the Parliament has a constitutionally prescribed oversight role on foreign policy. Many other actors, who have
a role to play in influencing the foreign decision-making process include government Ministries, civil organisations, the business community, the academic community, and other influential members of the Namibian society. The literature on the Namibian foreign policy does not allude to these or only did so to a lesser extent. Given the themes of economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation in the Namibian foreign policy, the drive on these is likely to be successful, mostly with the involvement of other actors apart from the state. It is, thus, important that the role of these actors is appropriately reflected in the literature.

1.7 Statement of the research problem

Four assumptions guide this research.

First, Namibia is regarded as a small and relatively newly created state, and therefore restricted in her international relations and foreign policy.

Second, Namibia’s independence and SWAPO’s ascension to power marked the beginning of a new era in the country’s foreign policy. Whereas SWAPO’s pre-independence foreign policy was characterised by a mixture of Realism and Idealism, Namibia as a newly independent and small state, was immediately confronted with the Idealist (Liberalist) challenges brought by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the post-Cold War era, with new, and often uncertain agendas and environments in the regional and international political system. Mingst (2004: 64), states that the end of the Cold War period marked the achievement of credibility by Idealism.

Third, in the post-independent Namibia, state rather than non-state actors largely dominate the process of formulation and execution of foreign policy, and influence outcome of foreign policy decisions. This is typical of a Realist approach to foreign policy.

Fourth, very little research has been conducted on Namibia’s foreign policy.
For the purposes of this study, Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy is analysed within various levels of analysis. The first level addresses the domestic environment in the country. Here, the study analyses the role of foreign policy decision-makers, which mainly emerges from SWAPO as the ruling party, the country’s foreign policy institutions, and domestic context.

The second level of analysis includes the regional (including the continental) environment (southern Africa as well as the African continent) of the country.

The third level of analysis includes the international environment. International and regional organisations such as the UN, AU and its predecessor, the OAU, and SADC are external factors (i.e. second and third level analysis) that impact on the agenda and policies of a nation state. State and non-state actors of a given state respond to the international environment and set the agenda of their country’s foreign policy, steering its relations with other states of the world and adjust its positioning in the realm of world politics.

Therefore, this study:

- Analyses SWAPO’s foreign policy prior to independence and the ruling party after independence.
- Analyses various levels of analysis and the challenges these levels pose for Namibia as a small state.
- Analyses how foreign policy agents and structures respond to such challenges. These responses often vary between Idealism (Liberalism) and Realism, and sometimes contrary to the Namibian Government’s intention;
- Attempts to determine to what extent the objectives and goals of the country’s foreign policy have conceivably been achieved within the context of the traditional approaches to the study of International Relations, such as Idealism and Realism.
• Identifies the actors in the foreign policy-making process of Namibia as a small state, as well as their shortcomings and successes.

1.8 Analytical framework and research methodology

The development of International Relations as an academic discipline coincided with the emergence of various approaches to the study of the discipline. It is important to look at these approaches and use these to discuss aspects of the Namibian foreign policy, in order to understand the policy in the context of theoretical perspectives.

One of the oldest approaches to the study of International Relations is Realism. This approach calls for the explanation of states’ international behaviour in terms of national interests (Hollis & Smith, 1990: 10). According to Realists individuals are evil power-seeking entities, which explains the behaviour of all states. States are the actors in the international political system and are pre-occupied with the preservation of their national interests. Realism further developed into neo-realism, an approach describing the international system as structurally anarchical. This characteristic, according to neo-realists, gives rise to competition among states, resulting in fighting for their survival. According to neo-realists and similar to realists, states are also pre-occupied with national security (Webber & Smith, 2002: 11 – 12, 21, and 25).

Both classical realists and neo-realists are concerned with state power, its interests and, therefore, state survival. The main difference between realism and neo-realism is that realism asserts that states are the primary actors in world politics and they are powerful entities to whose decisions all sub-national actors submit. However, neo-realism asserts that the international political system in itself is a force, which constraints states’ behaviours, resulting in states’ inability to control the system (Mingst, 2004: 65 – 69). The anarchical nature of the state system, according to realists, is mitigated by the balance of power within the international political system. It advocates a bipolar structure, which ensures that there is hegemony in the power continuum of world politics (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1971: 66).
Idealism diverges from Realism’s claims. Idealists argue that human nature is generally good. Whilst acknowledging that the evil nature of humankind is inevitable, they, nevertheless, argue that such nature and desires can be mitigated through institutional reforms and collective action. For example, the League of Nations, established after WWI to maintain world peace, is anchored in Idealism. Idealists hold the view that states are not autonomous actors in world politics (Mingst, 2004: 62 – 65).

Sometimes also referred to as Pluralism (and is sometimes also referred to as Liberalism), Idealism’s major protagonists, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, believe that the relationship between states and other actors in world politics are modelled on reciprocity (Olson & Groom, 1991: 197). Pluralists perceive the world as:

“…[A] forest of actors and jungle of interconnections. These include trade, investment, technology transfers, as well as military, political and cultural linkages. Besides government, relevant actors include private participants, as well as international governmental and non-governmental organisations” (Bobrow and Chan, 1991: 124).

Pluralists also maintain that economic issues are as important as military issues. Thus, all actors, rather than only state actors, play a meaningful role in the international political system.

International Relations as an academic discipline also witnessed the development of studies regarding the foreign policies of small states.

This study analyses SWAPO’s foreign policy before independence in terms of Realism and Idealism, and its policy as the ruling party after independence from a Liberalist (Pluralist) perspective. Before independence, SWAPO was pre-occupied with liberating Namibia, and thereafter seizing state power. This was at the core interest of the movement and it corresponds to the second principle of political Realism by Morgenthau (1966: 5), who states “we assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interests defined as power”.
The period of the liberation struggle for an independent Namibia is marked by military confrontation between SWAPO and the South African colonial regime. During this period SWAPO was allied to the USSR, while South Africa was allied to the USA. The two superpowers (USSR and USA) represented a bipolar balance of power, which is one of the assumptions of Realism.

The disadvantage of discussing SWAPO’s foreign policy during the liberation struggle within the context of the Realism is that Realists recognise the state as the primary actor. Unlike South Africa, SWAPO was a liberation movement and not a state. What is important then is the objective of the liberation struggle, namely the seizure of state power.

The Namibian foreign policy after independence mirrors the assumptions of the Idealist (liberalist or pluralist) approach. Three themes, namely world peace, economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation feature prominently in Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, as it will be discussed in Chapter Three. It should further be noted that with the end of the Cold War Namibia’s foreign policy was conceived in an environment where the bipolarity of the international political structure ceased to exist.

The theme of world peace, especially Namibia’s advocacy for the democratisation of the South African state could be explained in terms of one of the strands of Idealism, rooted in President Wilson of USA, who believed that the spread of democracy was necessary for world peace, and that “democratic states were inherently more peaceful than authoritarian states” (Walt, 1998: 39).

The theme of economic diplomacy in the Namibian foreign policy is consistent with the Pluralism theory’s view of the prevalence of multiple actors in the international system. To achieve the objectives of economic diplomacy, Namibia needs to engage non-state actors, an acknowledgement currently lacking in the country’s foreign policy literature, and a gap this study attempts to fill. In filling the gap of non-state actors in the Namibian foreign policy it will be appropriate to discuss foreign policy from a Pluralist approach.
Both the themes of economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation could be explained in terms of the pluralists’ assumption which says,

“…[F]oreign policy has moved away from its traditional concern with military and security matters towards economic, social, environmental and other concerns. As a consequence links between governments have multiplied as new issues and areas of cooperation have emerged (Webber & Smith, 2002: 22).

In line with the peace and multiple issues assumptions of Idealism (Pluralism), the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management states that the challenge of the country is to seek friends around the world and build many partnerships. This will ensure that:

“(Namibia) diversify (her) options and create a web of political support linkages that give access to trade, investment, transfer of technology, and many other valuable inputs, like tourism inflow, that generate direct benefit for the people of Namibia” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2004: 52).

The assumption of Namibia’s post-independent foreign policy being Pluralist is also supported by Du Pisani (2000:305), who concluded that Namibia’s foreign policy is “strongly multilateral” given the number of international organisations the country has joined. This attribute relates to Pluralists’ assumption about the prominence of international governmental organisations in the international political system.

It is important to note that the principles of the Namibian foreign policy embodied in article 96 of the country’s constitution (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 52 – 53), and discussed earlier reflect the approach of Idealism. Namibia’s foreign policy principles emphasise peace and co-operation, unlike the Realist approach where the struggle for power is the main pre-occupation. Other evidence supporting the assertion that Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy does not correspond with Realism is derived from Du Pisani (2000:298), who reiterates:

“The death of the icons of the Cold War not only brought an end to ideological politics over security, but removed the new State’s potential ability to play on erstwhile ideological rivalries as well. With this came a more creative foreign policy posture, one that is strongly informed by domestic, developmental, regional and global economic considerations”.

This study attempts to analyse the set research questions pertaining to Namibia’s, as a small state, post independence foreign policy. As indicated earlier, very little scholarly
research and analyses have been conducted on the issue. However, by applying the study’s analytical tools and by accessing primary foreign policy documents, the study will attempt to make a contribution.

Having worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for two and half years (1996 – 1998) and as a Member of Parliament serving on the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security (since 2005), the researcher was in a position to access most of the primary sources. The researcher further serves as Secretary for International Affairs for SWAPO Party Youth League and has been in this position since 2000.

Between February 2007 and July 2008, interviews with key SWAPO and Namibia’s foreign policy decision-makers were conducted in and outside Namibia, making use of both structured and unstructured interview methods. Interviews were conducted with the following key foreign policy decision-makers prior and subsequent to Namibia’s independence:


- **Nahas Angula**, Prime Minister (since 2005), SWAPO Secretary for Education (1981 – 1989);

- **Hinyangerwa Asheeke**, Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (since 2003), Ambassador to Germany (1996 – 2003), Ethiopia and the OAU (1992 – 1996), Charge d’Affairs of Namibia to the UN and the US (1990 – 1991), and SWAPO Deputy Permanent Observer to the UN and Deputy Chief Representative to the US (1981 – 1989);
• **Hage Geingob**, Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economics, Natural Resources and Public Administration (2005 – 2008), Prime Minister (1990 – 2002), Petitioner and SWAPO Chief Representative to the United Nations (1964 – 1972);

• **Theo-Ben Gurirab**, Speaker of the National Assembly (since 2005), Prime Minister (2002 – 2005), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1990 – 2002), SWAPO Secretary of Foreign Affairs (1986 – 1990), SWAPO Permanent Observer to the UN (1972 – 1986), and SWAPO Petitioner and Associate Representative at the UN (1964 – 1972);

• **Tsudao Gurirab**, Member of Parliament (since 2000), Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (1990 – 1995);

• **Marco Hausiku**, Minister of Foreign Affairs (since 2005);

• **Wilbard Hellao**, Head of the Department of Regional and Bilateral Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (since 2006), High Commissioner to South Africa (2003 – 2006), Ambassador to Sweden (1999 – 2003), High Commissioner to Zambia (1991 – 1995), and SWAPO Chief Representative to Botswana (1987 – 1989);

• **Paul Helmut**, retired politician, SWAPO Chief Representative to Sweden and the Nordic Countries (1968 – 1971);

• **Tunguru Huaraka**, retired diplomat, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Namibia to the UN (1991 – 1996);

• **Nickey Iyambo**, Minister of Agriculture, Water and Forestry (2005 – 2008), SWAPO Chief Representative to Finland (1965 – 1972);

• **Marten Kapewasha**, High Commissioner of Namibia to India, Ambassador of Namibia to USSR (1999 – 2005), Deputy Minister of Lands and Resettlement and Rehabilitation (1996 – 1990), Deputy Minister of Youth and sports (1994 – 1996);

• **Moses Katjiuongua**, retired politician, Member of Parliament (1990 – 1999), SWANU Chief Representative to Tanzania (1960s);

• **Mburumba Kerina**, retired politician, Member of Parliament (1990, 1998 – 2003, 2005), first Namibian to petition at the United Nations (1957);

• **Gwen Lister**, Editor of The Namibian newspaper (since 1986);

• **Festus Muundjua**, Member of the Public Service Commission (1990 – 1995; and since 2000), SWANU petitioner at the UN (1960s);

• **Nickey Nashandi**, retired diplomat, Ambassador of Namibia to the Russian Federation (1991 – 1999 and former SWAPO Chief Representative to Libya (1977 – 1989);

• **Monica Nashandi**, Deputy Executive Director (equivalent to Deputy Permanent Secretary) in the Office of the President (since 2005), High Commissioner to the UK and the Commonwealth (1999 – 2005), Ambassador to Sweden (1996 – 1999);

• **Helao Ndadi**, Special Advisor to the Minister of Safety and Security (since 2001), SWAPO Chief Representative to Algeria (1985 – 1989), Egypt (1970 – 1975), SWAPO Deputy Chief Representative to Egypt (1966 – 1969);

• **Sam Nujoma**, President of the Republic of Namibia (1990 – 2005), and President of the SWAPO Party (1960 - 2007);

• **Hifikepunye Pohamba**, President of the Republic of Namibia (since 2005) and President of the SWAPO Party (since 2008);


• **Ben Ulenga**, Member of Parliament (since 2000) and Leader of the Official Opposition (since 2005), High Commissioner to the UK and the Commonwealth (1996 – 1998);

Questions posed in the structured interviews are included in Appendix 2.
The fact that former President Sam Nujoma (1990 – 2005), President Hifikepunye Pohamba (since 2005), and Ministers of Foreign Affairs Theo-Ben Gurirab (1990- 2002), Marco Hausiku (since 2005), Deputy Ministers Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah (1990 – 1997), Tuliameni Kalomoh (1998 – 2002), have been available for interviews benefited the study immensely. Contentious foreign policy questions have been discussed with the interviewees, which enriched the assessment of the policy in the study.

Most of the interviewees are diplomats or politicians. This is largely because the civil society such as the church for example, does not regularly pronounce itself on foreign policy issues, except during the Ken Saro-Wiwa issue in 1995 as discussed in Chapter Three. Some members of the civil society who were scheduled to be interviewed were eventually not available for the interviews. Trade Unions, too, are not active on foreign policy issues, as they rather concentrate on labour and economic issues.

Other important sources used are the Hansards of the National Assembly, which are in-house publications. The reference techniques for the Hansards used in the study are those that have been used in the publications of Du Pisani (2000).

1.9 Conceptual clarification

This section clarifies some of the key concepts applied in this study. Each of these concepts is defined in terms of Realism and Idealism perspectives.

1.9.1 Small state

A state is an institution comprising three basic elements, namely territory, government and population. A state’s territory establishes it as a sovereign entity and in this respect a state is able to make laws and make those laws applicable to all people living within the territory of such a state and without interference from other states (Heywood, 1994: 36 – 38 and Nnoli, 1986:16 – 17).
The state as an institution is vested with supreme power, which is exercised through different institutions of the state, such as government law enforcement agencies, foreign policy institutions and revenue services. A government is therefore an organ of a state. The state is a permanent institution, which all citizens should identify themselves with, while government is an elected institution operating within the state. The population is an important component of the state. In this respect, Keulder (2000: 2) reiterates that the state exists because of the people, and not vice versa.

Many scholars have used territory and people to define a small state. McCraw (1994: 7), for example, concludes that there is no generally accepted quantitative or qualitative definition of a small state, but generally states with a population of less than 10 million are regarded as small states. Another definition of a small state, notwithstanding the population, is its geographical size. This study applies Maurice’s Realist definition of a small state. He suggests that the smallness of a state is determined by one or a combination of predominantly four main empirical features, namely small land area, small total population, small Gross National Product (GNP) and a low level of military capabilities (Maurice, 1973: 557). Apart from these quantitative features, this study proposes that a state’s smallness can also be attributed to some of its qualitative features, such as its limited influence in its region and global affairs, and its lack of authority and legitimacy. This notion is explored by Hey (2003: 2 – 4) below.

When applying Maurice’s (1973: 557) definition, many states in Africa, especially in sub-Sahara will be defined as small states. The definition will also include developed states in Europe, Asia and the Caribbean. Countries like Switzerland, Belgium and Finland have stronger economies, but due to their small land size they will be regarded as small states. Cuba, for example, has a strong army and a large population, but her geographical location limits is to the category of small states.

Hey (2003: 2 – 4), for example, departs from the traditional definition of small states according to geography, population and economy. Arising from the said definition tradition, he proposes a threefold typology of:
“[M]icro-states with smaller population of less than 1 million … small states in the developed world … and small states in the so-called third world… and small states in the so-called third world, including former colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, many of which are larger than states in the first two categories” (Hey, 2003: 2).

Hey’s views differs from the criteria and standards used in defining small states which draw conclusions about foreign policy within, rather than across the criteria and standards stated. Hey’s definition of small states is based on perceptions, i.e. if a state perceives itself or is perceived by other states to be small, then such state is a small state. SWAPO never alluded to Namibia’s status as a small state during its liberation struggle. A different position has emerged since independence. Post-independent Namibia’s self-perception of a small state has often been referred to in statements by the Namibian president and other government leaders. Launching the first diplomatic training, President Sam Nujoma said to Namibian diplomats:

“You all must know it that Namibia is a small and poor country which came into nationhood less than three months ago. Namibia belongs to what is called the Third World” (Government of the Republic of Namibia (1999a: 14).

Addressing the 5th independence anniversary, Nujoma said:

“Mother nature is unpredictable, but it is possible for a small nation such as ours to be self-sufficient in food production, provided we make use of judicious use of the modest resources at our disposal” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 2).

Namibia is relatively a small state with a population of 1.8 million people. The characteristics of a small state’s foreign policy are also found in the Namibian foreign policy principles, which, inter alia, include the promotion of peace and security, non-alignment, international co-operation and the respect of International Law, as endorsed in Article 96 of the Namibian Constitution (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 52 – 53). These principles reflect those of a typical small state.

For the purpose of this study, and using an eclectic approach, ‘small state’ is here defined as states that have a combination of two or more of the features such as small geographical size, small population, small military capabilities and small economy.
1.9.2 Foreign policy

Policy refers to, *inter alia*, the output from a set of actions and decisions taken through a continuous process of information gathering and interpretation. These actions and decisions are taken to regulate a state’s relations with other states and non-state international actors, like international governmental and non-governmental organisations. It should be noted that foreign policy is traditionally perceived to be a Realist’s term for states. This could be determined from the assertion of Papp (1997: 133) about foreign policy’s state-centrism and that the external relations matters of other actors, like international organisations and multinational corporations, are not referred to as foreign policies.

Writing about the difference between foreign policy and diplomacy, Du Pisani (2000: 299) stated that foreign policy refers to the *matter* of conducting foreign relations, while diplomacy refers to the *manner* of conducting foreign relations.

Diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy and can be defined as an act of managing relations between a state and other states or actors. It can also be an act of negotiation or seeking a consensus on a particular subject by the actors concerned. Diplomacy is associated with, among other standards, pacifism, concurrence and friendliness. Diplomacy is, therefore, a tool used to further strengthen existing cordial relations or to resolve a crisis and disputes between two states or actors. Unlike foreign policy, diplomacy is not only a state-centric term, but diplomacy can be exercised by officials from one state to another state or institution, and vice-versa or between two institutions that are not states. During the liberation struggle, this technique was of particular importance to SWAPO. As indicated earlier, SWAPO maintained robust diplomatic relation prior to its ascension to power. Instruments of diplomacy are usually agreements signed between states or institutions concerned, which typically should comply with International Law. These agreements entail cooperation and other issues of mutual interests (Barston, 1997: 1-7 / Papp, 1997: 437). Diplomacy is traditionally not a Realist’s preference or activity as they prefer war as a conflict resolution mechanism and
the struggle for power as the main objective of actors’ actions. Power is therefore a key term for the Realists.

Diplomacy is predominantly associated with Idealism as a traditional approach to the study of International Relations. For Du Plessis (2006: 125), diplomacy is regarded as the “the most direct, traditional, conventional and peaceful instrument of foreign policy” where relations are managed through negotiations and goodwill which is in line with morality – an aspect of Idealism’s assumption of the international system and its actors. Even the definition of diplomacy as a “peaceful reciprocal instrument of foreign policy” (Du Plessis (2006: 125) is anchored in Idealism.

Whereas Realists regard foreign policy as the actions of a state in relation to other actors to, *inter alia*, preserve its sovereignty and national interests, Idealists reject the state-centric notion and regard foreign policy as the actions of state representatives interacting with other institutions, which could be states or international governmental or non-governmental organisations. Idealists also assert that international organisations and non-governmental organisations can have their own foreign policies (Du Plessis, 2006: 120 - 122). SWAPO’s pre-independence foreign policy can be included in this Idealist assertion.

For the purposes of this study, McCraw (1994: 7 – 8) offers insights into the foreign policy of a small state, which are applicable to Namibia. He writes that the foreign policy of small states has five characteristics:

- Low levels of participation in world affairs;
- A narrow scope of foreign policy.
- Participation in regional and international organisations
- Part of its foreign policy focuses on economic issues.
- A small state has a high level of support for the international legal system.
Maurice (1973: 557), among others, adds that small states also avoid using force as a technique of statecraft.

1.9.3 Foreign policy: policy-making and decision-making

Foreign policy-making refers to, *inter alia*, the entire process, which includes the identification of national interests, policy objectives and the ways these objectives could be achieved. Foreign policy-making includes the gathering and assessment of information, and proper planning resulting in decisions being taken. This means that the foreign policy-making includes the act of foreign policy decision-making. However, in the case of the foreign policy-making process, the stages go further than taking a decision. When a decision has been taken, that becomes a policy, which should then be implemented and articulated by the actors concerned. The policy is further monitored and evaluated to assess its effectiveness and shortcomings and make room for an improvement, where necessary (Cavert, 1986: 1 – 2 and Papp, 1997: 136).

Foreign policy-making, as process, is viewed by the Realists as the process largely dominated by state actors. The information gathering, planning, articulation and assessment of the foreign policy is done by government officials, in the name of protecting the sovereignty of the state. The objectives and goals setting are attached to the matter of securing national interests. Idealists contend this assumption as they believe that interests to be pursued are many and they do not only matter to states. These interests, which can be economic, also matter to other stakeholders, who would then be part of the entire process of foreign policy-making (Papp, 1997: 27).

Foreign policy decision-making can be defined as an act of deciding upon a policy, a course of action to be taken by the state regarding its external relations (Du Pisani, 2000: 298). Decision-making is preceded by information gathering analysis, and weighing the potential risks and advantages that may arise from a particular decision. Generally, policy-making involves, but is not limited to actors such as the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet, and Parliament. Diplomatic and Foreign Service officials are
mainly involved in the processes preceding decision-making, but they are not involved in the actual decision-making act. Their involvement, nevertheless, means that they can influence any decision based on a policy (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1989: 37 – 42, Said, Lerche and Lerche, 1995: 39 – 43).

For Realists, foreign policy decision-making, as an action, is also limited to state actors, which include prominent actors who carry out decisions. To Idealists foreign policy decision-making embraces a consultative process and when decisions are taken by all stakeholders.

1.9.4 Foreign policy analysis (FPA)

Here, foreign policy analysis refers to the analytical framework where foreign policy is subjected to empirical tests. FPA attempts to analyse important questions pertaining to the context of and rationale for a particular foreign policy statement, the decision-making approach, inputs, the implementation techniques, and the intended and unintended policy outcome(s) – all of which are addressed in this study (Du Plessis, 2006: 127 – 129).

1.9.5 State and official visits

Generally, a state visit is a visit by the Head of State, while an official visit is a visit by the Head of Government. In the Namibian context, the President is the Head of State and Government. In some countries, the position of Head of State is held by the President (King or Queen in case of a monarchy) while the position of Head of Government is held by the Prime Minister. Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab states that because of the situation of the Namibian President being both the Head of State and Government, there is a ‘thin line’ in distinguishing the visits and the Government uses its discretion in determining the nature of the visit, looking at the nature of bilateral issues that will be addressed and the position of a high-level visiting dignitary (Gurirab, 2008).
1.10 Importance of the study

Since Namibia’s independence in 1990, little has been published about the country’s foreign policy. Little is therefore known about her foreign policy. Currently, there are no published records on SWAPO’s pre-independence foreign policy. South West Africa’s foreign policy was determined by and subjected to South African foreign policy-makers (Du Pisani, 1985: 51; Katjavivi, 1988: 65 – 66 and Moleah, 1983: 27), which is not the focus of this study. Due to financial constraints there has been no library at the SWAPO Party Headquarters in Windhoek, which makes it difficult for researchers to access information related to SWAPO’s pre-independence foreign policy-making. In 2004, SWAPO established the SWAPO Party Archive and Research Centre (SPARC) to collect, process, and preserve the existing materials and conduct research. When the country became independent, materials from the SWAPO missions were transferred to Namibian embassies. The Centre is in the process of collecting materials from the Namibian missions.

It is important, however, to mention that some of the SWAPO materials, especially at the Namibian Mission in New York, were destroyed when part of that Mission’s Chancery burnt down in January 2004. Obtaining some of the information on SWAPO’s foreign policy will, therefore, depend solely on the institutional memories of the individuals involved. This poses several methodological challenges. First, there are problems related to accessing sources. In some cases, key decision-makers are no longer alive while in other cases, key decision makers will not be available for interviews. These situations apply to this study. For example, the first President of SWANU, Jariretundu Kozonguizi (1959 – 1968) and the first SWAPO Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Peter Mweshihange (1970 – 1986), who could be other primary sources died in 1995 and 1998 respectively. Some key decision-makers and civil society members kept on postponing appointments and eventually were not available for interviews. Others were sent questionnaires but did not respond.
Second, interviewees undoubtedly have some bias, which is typical of the interviewing process.

Third, key decision-makers may not want to divulge information.

Fourth, in some cases the political culture of an organisation may prevent the granting of interviews unless sanctioned by the party leadership.

In addition to Namibia’s unique history, the study is important as Namibia is a relatively new and a small state. Namibia became independent on 21 March 1990. Subsequent to independence, the Government of the Republic of Namibia established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations with numerous countries and inter-governmental organisations such as the UN and OAU. Immediately after independence the decision makers started the process of state formation and foreign policy setting. This included the structuring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and training of Namibian diplomats, as will be discussed in Chapter Three.

This study on Namibia’s foreign policy is important for a number of reasons:

- Namibia’s independence was the result of a long drawn out liberation struggle during the Cold War with numerous international actors such as the UN, South Africa, Russia, Angola and Cuba involved. Scholars are still attempting to fully understand and explain these events.
- As a newly established state, Namibia joined the international community at the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the USSR. As a result, most states were forced to adapt their foreign policy accordingly.
- The formative years of foreign policy-making in any country are significant as they lay the foundation for such a country’s international relations.
- SWAPO is a liberation movement-turned political party which had been governing Namibia since independence. Prior to independence, SWAPO
maintained significant international relations and held postures of both the Realist and Idealist approaches to international affairs. Elsewhere, most notably South Africa and Zimbabwe in Africa, liberation movements-turned-ruling parties have been analysed, as well as its effect on these states’ foreign policy. This issue has been neglected in the case of SWAPO and post-independent Namibia.

- The issues addressed here have not been covered in the available literature.
- Issues of domestic disagreement on foreign policy need to be researched. Domestic disagreement can be useful to improve the current foreign policy-making and outcomes.
- It is important to find out the theoretical approaches employed by different foreign policy actors, and the degree to which given actors have influence on foreign policy matters. The discussion of foreign policy actors in a broader context will also be important as it introduces the relevance and prominence of other actors, rather than state actors in the country’s foreign policy-making process.
- The study will also be useful to government leaders to understand the dynamics of foreign policy settings and enable them to comprehend the dynamics of the international political system. The study will also be useful to aspiring diplomats to learn and understand the daunting task lying ahead of them and the challenges of the nature of the environment within which they will operate.

Given the academic dilemma of foreign policy-making in Namibia raised under the hypothesis and assumptions, the study will be important to scholars and researchers, as it will cover the area that has not been previously exposed to academic researches. The thesis will be a groundbreaking study that would possibly raise interests to do further researches on Namibia’s foreign policy, thereby fully exposing the policy to academic discourses. This would also possibly encourage undergraduate students, especially at the University of Namibia, to take a keen interest on the study of Namibia’s foreign policy, since this is not happening at the present moment.
1.11 Scope and limitations of the study

This study focuses on the pre- and post-independence periods in Namibia. In the pre-independence period, the study reviews the processes and policies that preceded the process of foreign policy-making in an independent Namibia, thereby pointing at possible influences of such historiography to the current foreign policy of Namibia. For the purpose of this study, the post-independence period is identified as the period between 1990 and 2008. This includes the presidencies of Sam Nujoma (1990 – 2005) and Hifikepunye Pohamba (2005 – 2008).

President Nujoma’s first term represents the formative years of foreign policy agenda setting for the newly independent Namibia, whereas his second and third terms were periods of policy consolidation and further strengthening of bilateral and multilateral relations.

President Pohamba took office on 21 March 2005. At the time of writing this study (November 2008), no new foreign policy dimensions under his presidency were evident and the foreign policy under President Pohamba has, thus far, been a continuation and deepening of relations started during President Nujoma’s era with improvements in the expansion and growth of the Namibian diplomatic services.

There were limitations in conducting the research. Although economic diplomacy emerges as a theme in the study, no interviews were conducted with businesspersons as the study focuses predominantly on the political and institutional aspects of foreign policy-making, and the outcome of these.

Another limitation is the absence of a proper record system in the Government. Some of the bilateral and multilateral agreements that Namibia signed could not be traced at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is the custodian of all government agreements. The Ministry of Defence, too, does not have records of the cost of Namibia’s participation in some UN and AU peace-keeping missions.
There were limitations in respect of analysing the voting behaviour on foreign policy issues in the Parliament. Voting in the Namibian Parliament is only recorded to indicate the number of Members who voted in favour and against a given motion. It is not recorded which Members from which party voted in favour or against.

1.12 Chapters outline

Chapter Two includes a brief history of the country from the pre-colonial period and SWAPO’s liberation struggle. This chapter discusses various stakeholders in early diplomatic initiatives at the United Nations, and the growth of Namibia’s diplomacy under SWAPO and SWANU as the two old liberation movements. This chapter also reflects on how South Africa and the world responded to the diplomatic initiatives.

This chapter discusses the emergence of SWAPO as a strong pre-independence foreign policy actor. The chapter further discusses other pre-independence foreign policy stakeholders, such as the UN, OAU, the Frontline States (FLS) and the Western Contact Group (WGC). Because of the Realpolitik of the Cold War Era and at the same time the peace-making efforts of the UN, pre-independence foreign policy-making was a mixture of Realism and Idealism as approaches of International Relations study. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the breakthroughs of the pre-independence foreign policy, and how the pre-independence foreign policy impacted on foreign policy-making in an independent Namibia.

Chapter Three analyses the foreign policy settings in an independent Namibia. It is important to note that the founding of the Namibian state coincided with the period marking a turning point in the world history, namely the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War gave rise to new global and regional agenda settings that were no longer focused on the hostilities between the East Bloc led by the USSR and the West Bloc led by the US. This change from the bipolar international political system impacted on the entities in the international political system, including Namibia. It is, thus, in the context
of this post-Cold War politics that the foreign policy of a small state, Namibia, was formulated and this chapter looks at how Namibia responded to the post-Cold War epoch. Since foreign policies are influenced by international and domestic factors, the chapter does not only address the country’s positioning within the international political realm, but also its domestic environment, which provides the ground motives for foreign policy settings.

Here, the discussion of the foreign policy of a small state refers to the Namibian foreign policy themes of promoting world peace, economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation. The chapter further discusses ‘domestic disagreement’ on foreign policy, where the Government, the opposition parties and civil society organisations differed on some aspects of the Namibian foreign policy, such as the Ken Saro-Wiwa issue in Nigeria, Namibia’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe, and the involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict. The themes of Namibia’s foreign policy, including the status and role of foreign policy actors are analysed in terms of the traditional approaches to foreign policy studies and it is concluded that the foreign policy principles and issues of Namibia’s foreign policy are inclined to Idealism (Liberalism).

Issues of promoting world peace, economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation comply with Namibia’s foreign policy principles enshrined in the Namibian Constitution (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 52 – 53) and the five foreign policy objectives set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately after independence (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 80 – 81).

Chapter Four analyses Namibia’s foreign policy during the era of former President Nujoma. It addresses the resources available for foreign policy-making and its effects. The chapter analyses how the President as the Head of State and Government played a role in the foreign policy-making and how other foreign policy actors performed under his leadership. The chapter also discusses President Nujoma’s Pan-Africanism Doctrine. During President Nujoma’s term (1990 – 2005), Namibia played an active role in regional and international organisations, such as the UN and SADC. The chapter further
determines how foreign policy objectives and goals under President Nujoma were achieved and analyses the success and failures of foreign policy in view of the principles, purposes and issues discussed in Chapter Three.

Chapter Five analyses the era of President Pohamba (2005 – 2008), and the transition from Nujoma to Pohamba in terms of the country’s foreign policy posture and issues and resources. It further looks at the similarities and differences between the two Presidents as key foreign policy-makers. While President Nujoma is regarded as a straightforward foreign policy-maker who confronts issues head-on, President Pohamba is a cautious and reserved foreign policy-maker, who leans on consultations (Geingob, 2007: interview and Ulenga, 2008: interview). The chapter refers to the improvements and setbacks made during the term of President Pohamba, and analyses the general success and failure of the Namibian foreign policy.

Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, summarises the study’s main findings. The chapter concludes that Namibia as a small state recorded success in her foreign policy and pursued a foreign policy based on Liberalism. The study concludes that although Namibia is a small state, she has a broad scope of foreign policy and participated in the UN and the AU peace-keeping missions, contrary to traditional perspectives of small states’ foreign policy behaviour. The chapter points out the challenges to the Government in foreign policy-making and makes recommendations for further research on the subject.

1.9 Summary

The study of foreign policy in Namibia is relatively new, as this area has not been subjected to academic researches. There is a growing increase in studying the foreign policy of small states, as cited under section 1.6 of this chapter. Namibia is a small state and the study of her foreign policy contributes to the literature of small states’ foreign policies. It is important to analyse the contributing factors such as external and internal contexts, key players and institutions. Since the study is academic, the application of
theoretical perspective adds to the enrichment of International Relations as an academic discipline.
CHAPTER TWO
PRE-INDEPENDENCE FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN NAMIBIA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE POST-INDEPENDENCE FOREIGN POLICY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter gives a brief account of Namibia’s early diplomatic history and foreign policy actions. Mainly descriptive in its approach, the chapter refers to the initial diplomatic attempts by individuals such as the Herero chiefs and their representatives, and organisations such as, the OPC, OPO, SWANU and SWAPO from the then SWA to petition the international community, particularly the UN. This initial period saw the establishment of what became known as SWAPO’s first diplomatic relations and interest offices outside SWA. These petitions eventually resulted in the termination of South Africa’s Mandate, and the establishment of a UN Council to prepare the country for independence. The chapter also addresses the role of external actors such as the OAU, UN, NAM, and the outcomes of their involvement. Reference is also made to other instruments employed by SWAPO and the outcomes thereof.

The chapter also refers to the country’s post-independent government structure, foreign policy establishment, foreign policy issues actions and posture.

2.2 Instruments and issues of the formative years: petitions, diplomatic links and the early onset of the armed struggle

The period of South African colonialism (1915 – 1990) witnessed the birth of Namibia’s foreign policy-making.

2.2.1 Petitions and their results

In 1947, Reverend Michael Scott, an Anglican clergy who was working in South Africa met with Chief Frederick Maharero of the Hereros, who was living in exile in Bechuanaland (now Botswana). Reverend Scott came to alert the Chief about attempts by
South Africa, at the time a British colony, to incorporate South West Africa, at the time a UN Mandate, into South Africa as a fifth province. Chief Maharero sent Reverend Scott to Chief Hosea Kutako of the Hereros in South West Africa, where the Reverend met the Chief and the Herero Chief’s Council. Through Reverend Scott’s shuttle between the two chiefs a petition was drafted, objecting to South Africa’s incorporation of South West Africa into South Africa, and calling for South West Africa to resort under the UN Trusteeship Council. The South African Government tried, without success, to prevent Reverend Scott from petitioning the UN by labelling him as a “crank and follower of the left-wing causes” (Katjavivi, 1988: 38). From 1947, Reverend Scott was a regular petitioner to the UN for the cause of the people of South West Africa.

The early proponents of Idealism as an approach to the study of International Relations, such as President Woodrow Wilson of the US, were convinced that world conflicts are caused by the absence of appropriate laws and institutions to ensure peace. It was for this reason that he and others worked towards the establishment of the League of Nations, the forerunner of the UN. By the time the UN was established, the people of South West Africa recognised the UN in providing collective security to the people of the territory in their search for independence from the illegal occupation of South Africa. International institutions, including the UN,

“...[L]ie at the heart of the law and collective security perspective perceived as a way to draw states and people of the world into a community of peace and cooperation for collective mutual gain” (Woods, 1996: 17).

The people of South West Africa deemed it appropriate to follow the Idealism-inclined approach, petitioning the UN to mediate and draw both the occupied South West Africa and the occupying South Africa into a community of peace and cooperation.

In 1957, Mburumba Kerina, then a student at the Lincoln University in USA, became the first South West Africa national to petition before the UN for the termination of South Africa’s mandated power over South West Africa. Kerina was requested by Chief Kutako to act on the case of South West Africa after which he teamed up with Reverend Michael Scott in 1955 and appealed for an oral hearing, which was granted after the General
Assembly sought opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) whether a South West Africa native could petition at the UN. The ICJ responded in affirmative. Given the time spent on consulting the ICJ, Kerina was only able to petition in 1957 (Kerina, 2007: interview). More Namibians followed with petitions by correspondence, such as Johannes Dausab in the Hoachanas Native Reserve, Chief Hosea Kutako of the Hereros, Willem Heyn and Joachim Seergert, and Jacobus Beukes of the Rehoboth Community.

Beukes stated in his petition,

“I am kept awake at night by the thought that the Union Government is showing contempt for world opinion and that this attitude towards and treatment of the Natives may, it is to be feared, have repercussions for our people. We therefore feel that the United Nations should speedily come to our assistance so that there may be peace in our country under a social and democratic order” (Beukes, 1957).

Herman Toivo Ja Toivo and eighty other Ovambos petitioned the UN in 1957, where they stated,

“We very much feel annoyed by the false statements made to your organisation by the Union Government that we are in favour of the incorporation of S.W.A. into the Union…We also call upon Great Britain, America, France and Belgium even at this minute to reconsider their decision of handing over S.W.A. to the Union Government for she has failed to fulfil her promises or obligations and to comply with the covenant of the League of Nations as well as the United Nations Charter which is its legal successor” (Ja Toivo, 1957).

Petitions from the natives of SWA were considered by the General Assembly during the month of October 1957 and the UNGA adopted Resolution 1141 of 1957 on 25 October 1957, which inter alia,

- **Reiterates** … to the effect that the Territory of South West Africa be placed under the Trusteeship System

- **Asserts** that, in the present conditions of political and economic development of South West Africa, the normal way of modifying the international status of the Territory is to place it under the International Trusteeship System by means of a trusteeship agreement in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN, 1957).

In 1958, the OPC founder, Herman Ja Toivo (now Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo), sent a petition to the UN, through Kerina. The petition was sent in two forms, a letter and a message recorded on a tape recorder, hidden in the book *Treasure Islands* by Robert Stephenson. The letter was the first to reach Kerina who read it before the UNGA’s
Fourth Committee. The UNGA Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonisation Committee) deals with decolonisation and a number of political issues, excluding disarmament issues as these are dealt with by the First Committee. The petition requested the UN to terminate South Africa’s administration in Namibia and allow the UN to take over the administration of the territory (Nujoma, 2001a: 10). Ja Toivo would be instrumental in further petitions by SWAPO as he would be contacted by Hage Geingob, when he became a petitioner at the UN, to give briefings on the situations in South West Africa. Ja Toivo’s response was long and elaborative and, thus, strengthened Geingob’s presentation at the UN (Geingob, 2007a: interview).

Kerina requested the Herero Chief’s Council to send another person to New York to join him in petitioning. Subsequently, the Council sent Fanuel Jariretundu Kozonguizi, who petitioned in 1959. While at the UN, Kozonguizi was elected President of the newly established national liberation movement, the South West Africa National Union, (SWANU). The following year, 1960, Kozonguizi met with Sam Nujoma, President of OPO, in Liberia, after the latter escaped from South West Africa into exile. Nujoma was due to travel to New York to petition the UN (Kerina, 2007: interview).

In June 1960, SWAPO President (which by then had recently been renamed from OPO), Sam Nujoma, appeared before the Sub-Committee of the Fourth Committee of the UNGA, and in July 1960 appeared before the UN Committee of South West Africa. He stayed in New York until December 1960 and, thereafter, went to Africa to open the SWAPO office in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), 1961. This office served as the provisional headquarters of the movement. Other SWAPO members who subsequently joined Nujoma to petition before the UN were Emil and Putuse Appolus, Ismael Fortune, Jacob Kuhangua, Solly Mifima and Peter Mueshihange. From the beginning, Namibian petitioners from SWAPO and SWANU cooperated and petitioned jointly, joined by church leaders such as Reverend Michael Scott and Reverend Markus Koopers (Nujoma, 2001a: 102 – 103, 113, 118 – 119 and Nujoma, 2007a: interview).
From 1964, SWAPO had permanent petitioners based at the UN, when Hage Geingob was appointed as Chief Representative to America (covering countries in North and South America) and the UN. Together with Theo-Ben Gurirab and Hidipo Hamutenya, the three, who were at the same time studying at American universities, constituted a team of SWAPO petitioners. During this period of petitioning at the UN, petitioners received a day pass and had to leave after petitioning. Petitioners befriended security officials and were then able to access the UN premises with expired passes, as security were no longer strictly scrutinising the access period written on the pass cards (Geingob, 2007a: interview). At the time, SWANU’s petitioners were Zed Ngavirue, Charles Kauraisa and Festus Muundjua (Kerina, 2007: interview and Muundjua, 2007: interview).

The petitions and lobbying of the international community by South West Africa nationals resulted in the adoption of the UNGA Resolution 2145 of 1966, which terminated the mandate of South Africa to administer South West Africa as a C-Mandate Territory of the UN. In 1967, the UNGA Special Session by Resolution 2248 (S-V) established the UN Council for South West Africa to administer the territory and make the necessary arrangements for the independence of South West Africa by 1968 on the date to be determined by the people of the territory. The Council comprised 11 UN Member-States, namely Chile, Colombia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia. The executive and administrative powers of the Council were vested in the Commissioner for South West Africa. The Council acted like a Parliament as it was empowered to promulgate laws and decrees governing the territory (UN, 1967).

The petitions by Namibians at the UN were anchored in Idealism, as liberal (idealists) reformers promoted the idea of self-determination (Kegley, 2007: 28). Namibian petitioners had a sole purpose, namely to end South Africa’s occupation of South West Africa, and attain self-determination. It should be further noted that the repeated request for intervention by the UN was sought to minimise the potentiality of a conflict. The founder of OPC, the forerunner of SWAPO, Herman Toivo Ja Toivo, for example, was against any form of conflict and rather opted for a peaceful solution to the question of
independence, as evident in his statement from the court during the Terrorism Trial in Pretoria, 1968, following the launch of the armed liberation struggle at Omugulugwombashe, northern Namibia (Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO, 1981: 314 – 315). Ja Toivo stated:

“When some of my country’s soldiers came back…I tried to do what I could do to prevent my people from going into the bush. In my attempts, I became unpopular with some of my people… I had no answers to the question: “Where has your non-violence got us?” … Even though I did not agree that people should go into the bush, I could not refuse to help them when I knew that they were hungry. I even passed on the request for dynamite. It was not an easy decision… I was not, and I could not remain a spectator in the struggle of my people for their freedom” (SWAPO, 1981: 315).

The UN, where SWAPO and SWANU members were petitioning, was an institution that could resolve the issue and, thus, minimise conflicts. This is in accordance with one of the fundamental beliefs of Idealism, which asserts that war can be minimised by strengthening institutional arrangements that encourage the disappearance of war and conflicts (Kegley, 2007: 27). The petitions at the UN should also be understood in the context of a small state’s foreign policy, which manifests participation in international and regional organisations (McCraw, 1994: 7 - 8).

2.2.2 The establishment of diplomatic relations with governments and the results

Apart from petitioning the UN, SWAPO also started to establish diplomatic relations with several governments. The movement secured scholarships for some of its members in the USA and Europe. Some of these members were subsequently appointed as Chief Representatives of SWAPO in the countries where they were studying. In 1962, the first SWAPO Mission was opened in Cairo, Egypt. The Egyptian Government assisted SWAPO with the running cost of the diplomatic mission in Cairo and allowance of its officials. The then President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had a great understanding of the cause of liberation movements. Assistance was also received from the East Bloc (in the Cold War context). Apart from SWAPO’s Mission, there were also Missions in Cairo of other liberation movements from southern Africa such as the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique – FRELIMO), Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola –
MPLA), and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) (Ndadi, 2007: interview and Shipanga & Armstrong, 1989: 78).

In 1963, SWANU and three South African liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africa Congress (PAC) and the Indian Congress also opened an office in Cairo under the banner of the Southern Africa United Front. Eventually, the Front was disbanded as individual liberation movements grew larger and continued to operate as individual movements. The SWANU office in Egypt was funded mainly by the Egyptian Government (Katjiuongua, 2007a: interview).

In 1963, SWAPO opened an office in Algeria, and Solomon (Solly) Mifima, one of the founding members of OPC, the forerunner of OPO and SWAPO, was appointed Chief Representative. It was from Algeria that SWAPO received two sub-machine guns and two pistols, which would be among the ammunitions used at the first encounter between SWAPO guerrilla fighters and the South African Defence Force (SADF) on 26 August 1966, at Omugulugwombashe, northern Namibia (Nujoma, 2001a: 129 – 130 and Nujoma, 2007a: interview).

Following the independence of Zambia in 1964, SWAPO opened a Mission in Lusaka where Hifikepunye Pohamba, who later became Namibia’s second President, served as Deputy Chief Representative.

In 1965, Nickey Iyambo, who was studying in Finland at the time, was appointed as SWAPO Chief Representative to that and other Nordic countries. The office was his room in the dormitories. The Chief Representative had a challenge to maintain a balance between diplomatic assignments and his studies. The Finnish Government was opposed to SWAPO’s armed struggle which had now become one of its diplomatic instruments, making it difficult for SWAPO to access appointments with Finnish statesmen and women. Subsequently, SWAPO mobilised sympathetic students and trade unions, which lobbied for the boycott of trading with South Africa, especially the export of paper from Finland, at the time a major paper producing country. With the support of some trade
unions and students the Finnish Government finally agreed to meet with SWAPO, FRELIMO and MPLA in 1969. Diplomatic relations centred more on material assistance but excluded issues related to the armed struggle (Iyambo, 2007: interview). It could be said that the Finnish position towards the armed liberation struggle is anchored in the liberal theory on war and peace, which asserts that:

“...[U]nder certain domestic and international conditions and with appropriate strategies, the violent-prone character of world politics can be ameliorated and the levels of warfare significantly reduced” (Carlsnaes, 2002: 355).

In adopting an armed struggle, SWAPO intertwined its Idealism with elements of Realism, which was a departure from diplomacy to the use of violence as a means of achieving its objectives. In 1968, SWAPO opened a Mission in the UK and Peter Katjavivi was appointed as its Chief Representative. Gurirab (2007a: interview) states that as it was not always possible to contact other SWAPO missions, the Mission in New York constantly liaised with the Mission in London. This mission was, therefore, strategic as it was the mission that coordinated activities from some other missions to the mission in New York. Many SWAPO officials travelling to international meetings passed via London, and it became the centre where briefings on developing situations were exchanged.

In 1968, Paul Helmut, who was studying in Sweden at the time was appointed SWAPO’s Chief Representative in Sweden and other Nordic countries. Subsequently, the Mission in Finland concentrated solely on relations Finland while relations with other Nordic countries resorted under the Mission in Sweden. The Swedish political system of social democrats was particularly receptive towards and supportive of liberation movements. However, initially SWAPO experienced problems to establish its diplomatic standing in Sweden, because there were already SWANU students in Sweden who had particularly campaigned on behalf of SWANU. SWAPO’s standing was soon improved due to the fact that SWANU had no official diplomatic representation (Helmut, 2007: interview).

At the time SWAPO was not the only organisation that worked towards Namibian’s independence. SWANU, for example, too made some strides in early diplomatic
establishments. By 1960, SWANU joined multilateral organisations such as the All-Africa People’s Conference (AAPC), the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) and the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), based in London (Dobell, 1998: 33 – 34). During the early years of diplomatic establishments, the movement had also diplomatic representation in Ghana and Egypt.

2.2.3 The establishment of links with international organisations

In addition to petitioning at the UN and establishing diplomatic missions with sympathetic governments in the 1960s, SWAPO had joined international organisations to strengthen its position in the international political system. In 1961, the SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, attended the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Since then, SWAPO had been attending meetings of NAM and was eventually invited to become a full member in 1978 (Dobell, 1995: 173 and Nujoma, 2007a: interview). Subsequent to this, the SWAPO President also represented the movement at the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1963. Since then SWAPO attended various meetings of the OAU.

An informal organisation, the Africa Group of Ambassadors at the UN, was instrumental in linking SWAPO with various governments. During the early days of petitioning by SWAPO, the Tanzanian Representative to the UN and members of the African Group of Ambassadors at the UN, John Malecela (who later became Tanzania’s Foreign Minister and then Prime Minister) introduced SWAPO’s petitioners to other diplomats accredited to the UN. Malecela was a respected diplomat at the UN and it became easy for the SWAPO petitioners to be welcomed by diplomats accredited to the UN. Other diplomats such as Ambassadors Abdul Wahab of Egypt and Vernon Mwaanga of Zambia also played a great role in rendering assistance to SWAPO as it made its debut in international relations (Geingob, 2007a: interview).

By the time SWAPO convened the Consultative Conference that brought the exiled members of the movement together in Tanga, Tanzania from December 1969 to January
1970, the movement had resident diplomats accredited to the following countries and international organisations, namely Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Finland, Sweden, UK, UN, US, Tanzania (where the movement had also its provisional Headquarters) and Zambia.

2.3 The emergence of SWAPO as a pre-independence foreign policy actor

The previous section focused, inter alia, on the various instruments applied by various actors in SWA to achieve Namibia’s independence. SWAPO eventually emerged as the major actor in this process. This section outlines some aspects of its emergence as a foreign policy actor prior to and subsequent to independence, such as its diplomatic efforts and armed struggle.

Since 1962, SWAPO had been engaged in diplomatic activities and opening diplomatic missions. However, it was only after the Tanga Consultative Conference (1970) that it officially established its Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, more diplomatic missions were opened, especially in Africa and Europe. Since the establishment of the Department of Foreign Affairs, as former President Nujoma confirmed, SWAPO adopted a three-pronged strategy for the struggle to liberate Namibia, which included the political mobilisation of its peoples, an armed struggle, and a major diplomatic offensive against the Government of South Africa (Nujoma, 2007a: interview).

The foreign policy objectives of SWAPO, as a non-state actor, were not similar to that of a sovereign state. SWAPO’s main foreign policy objective was to rally the support of the international community to support its liberation struggle in Namibia and isolate South Africa internationally. Although the Nordic countries with whom SWAPO enjoyed fairly good diplomatic relations opposed an armed liberation struggle, SWAPO was determined not to compromise on the issue of the liberation struggle (Gurirab, 2007a: interview and Nujoma, 2007a: interview). Whereas the movement’s foreign policy towards the Nordic countries was embedded in Liberalism, SWAPO pursued a Realist approach to its liberation struggle. Although SWAPO is not a state, the determination of SWAPO not to
compromise on the question of the armed liberation struggle in its diplomatic approach
gave the movement’s foreign policy a leaning towards Realism, since one of its
assumptions is:

“The anarchical nature of the global system dictates that states acquire sufficient military
capabilities to deter attack by potential enemies and to exercise influence over others; hence states
should acquire arms and “prepare for war to keep peace”, and not to be hesitant to use arms since
“might makes right” (Kegley, 2007: 30).

The element of Realism in SWAPO’s foreign policy is echoed by Geingob (2007a: interview), who admitted that the foreign policy of SWAPO was modelled on Cold War
Realpolitik. Apart from those foreign policy objectives mentioned earlier, SWAPO also
stated its objective to remain non-aligned, addressing issues on an ad hoc basis and
associate with states and organisations that the movement deemed to be progressive.
Given the nature of Cold War politics characterised by a Realpolitik struggle between the
super powers, namely the USSR and USA, in their quest for maximisation of power, it
could then be stated that SWAPO’s foreign policy was influenced by a Realism-oriented
environment. This did not prevent SWAPO from pursuing multilateral and sometimes
bilateral diplomacy inclined to Liberalism.

Through diplomatic relations SWAPO, as outlined above, began to assert its role in the
foreign affairs of SWA and a future Namibia, which eventually resulted in its succeeding
over SWANU. The President of SWAPO and other senior leaders of the movement were
based at the provisional headquarters in Dar Es Salaam and only travelled to petition at
the UN, attend international conferences and lobby support from various governments.
SWANU’s President, Fanuel Kozonguizi, was based in London where he was pursuing
his studies. Other senior leaders of SWANU were also studying. This impacted
negatively on the broader liberation movement as it was felt that SWANU did not take
the struggle seriously and, in return, the SWANU representative in Tanzania, Moses
Katjiuonguia, had problems to be granted appointments, since he was competing with
relatively senior freedom fighters from other liberation movements in southern Africa,
including SWAPO (Katjiuonguia, 2007a: interview).
When the OAU was founded in 1963, it established the Liberation Committee in June 1963. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania provided buildings for the office of OAU Liberation Committee. The Liberation Committee was formed to provide financial support to, among others, liberation movements to achieve their liberation goals (Nujoma, 2001a: 152 and Katjiuongua, 2007a: interview). Katjiuongua (2007: interview) states that while SWAPO embarked upon an armed liberation struggle, SWANU did not. SWANU’s reluctance to embark upon an armed liberation struggle led to the OAU’s Liberation Committee to slow down on supporting the movement. SWANU’s reluctance to embark upon the armed liberation struggle reflects Idealism, which argues that external aggression by states is to be resisted non-violently (Couloumbis & Wolfe, 2007: 9).

Geingob (2004: 78) maintains that the OAU withdrew its support from SWANU after a blunder by the SWANU President, Fanuel Kozonguizi, when he criticised all African states as puppets and reactionaries who were receiving money from imperialist countries. This tirade was made in 1966 during the Afro-Asian-Latin American People’s Solidarity Conference (Tri-Continental Conference). This resulted in the OAU’s eventual withdrawal of its recognition of SWANU in 1968 and, thus, advantaged SWAPO to assert its standing on the African continent. Consequently, SWANU offices in Egypt and Ghana were closed.

According to Muundjua (2007: interview), as SWANU’s foreign policy developed, it was largely influenced by the NAM and guided by Pan-Africanism. Most of the foreign policy statements by SWANU emphasised the issue of peaceful co-existence. The notion of peaceful co-existence is anchored in Idealism, which asserts that there existed a global common interest in peace (Reynolds, 1988: 5).

The difference between SWAPO and SWANU was that, while SWANU was in a complacent approach to the struggle, awaiting independence from the UN, SWAPO became more pro-active, shifting from what Cliffe et al. (1994: 21) called “a party of protests, addressing the UN as well as its immediate overlords, to being people bringing about their own independence”.

Gurirab (2007a: interview) states that the OAU Summit held in Rabat, Morocco, 1972, which he attended, decided on the recognition of SWAPO as the sole representative of the people of Namibia. There were only three liberation movements which received the recognition of ‘sole representation’, namely SWAPO, FRELIMO and the *Partido Africano da Guine e Cabo Verde* (African Party for the independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands – PAIGC). From other African countries, more than one liberation movements from one country were recognised, such as the ANC and the PAC of South Africa, and ZAPU and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) from Zimbabwe. In 1975, the OAU Council of Ministers passed Resolution 433 of 1975, which, amongst others, “reaffirms that SWAPO is the sole representative of the people of Namibia”, and demanded that South Africa should also recognise SWAPO as such (OAU, 1975). Although available resolutions of the summit of 1972 do not record a decision regarding the recognition of ‘sole representation’ to SWAPO, the word “reaffirms” in the 1975 resolution could be an indication that there was a decision to that effect earlier.

In 1976, the UNGA adopted Resolution 31/152 of 1976 which recognised SWAPO as “the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people”. The UN’s recognition of SWAPO changed the international image of the movement and resulted, *inter alia*, in the movement’s New York office receiving financial assistance for its operations. Gurirab (2007a: interview) confirmed that from 1974, two years before the “sole and authentic” recognition by the UN, the SWAPO Mission at the UN started receiving funds from the UN, through the UN Council for Namibia. These funds largely served as the budget of the SWAPO office in New York. SWAPO’s representative at the UN became the movement’s Permanent Observer to the UN. As a liberation movement with an observer status at the UN, unlike other liberation movements such as the ANC and ZANU PF for example, SWAPO was in a better position to advance the cause of Namibia’s independence, using the UN platform.

Former SWANU’s leader Moses Katjiuongua maintains that after the UN’s recognition of SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of Namibians, SWANU was no
longer able to receive support from the international community (Katjiuongua, 2007a: interview). SWANU leaders could also no longer access the UN to make petitions. These views were echoed by the former SWANU petitioner at the UN, Festus Muundjua, who claims that the sole recognition of SWAPO disadvantaged SWANU significantly.

“It affected us to the marrow, through flesh, bone, to the marrow, because it brought to a standstill any activity by SWANU on any of the international platforms. You could not anymore appear as a petitioner before the UN, the platform of the OAU, or the Liberation Committee of the OAU, Non-Aligned Movement, Commonwealth – you name them, you will be told that SWAPO is the sole and authentic representative” (Muundjua, 2007: interview).

Before the UNGA resolved on the “sole and authentic” recognition, SWAPO had already started to assert its diplomatic standing at the UN. Since the establishment of the UN Council for South West Africa, later the UN Council for Namibia, SWAPO worked closely with the Council to rally international support for Namibia’s independence. In 1972, SWAPO’s Chief Representative at the UN, Hage Geingob, who became Namibia’s first Prime Minister, was appointed as Associate Political Officer at the UN Council for Namibia. In 1976, Geingob was appointed as Director of the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN), which was established to provide tertiary education to exiled Namibians, thereby guaranteeing professionals for the civil service of an independent Namibia (Geingob, 2007a: interview and Katjavivi, 1988: 112).

As SWAPO asserted its international standing, it was soon regarded and treated by some governments as a government-in-exile. According to Dobell (2000: 66), SWAPO, for example, also established relations with the Commonwealth. Although the movement was not a former British colony or a member of the Commonwealth, it had received assistance from the Commonwealth for the education of Namibians from 1975. In 1982, SWAPO opened its mission in India and three years later India accorded SWAPO a full diplomatic status. Here, SWAPO maintained an embassy and enjoyed all diplomatic privileges in terms of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which are enjoyed by diplomatic missions of independent sovereign states. The SWAPO Chief Representative was officially called Ambassador and visits to India by the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, were treated as official state visits. This was important to SWAPO’s standing within the NAM
because India is one of the active members of the NAM (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 168 and Nujoma 2007a: interview).

It should be noted that, although the USSR and China were major supporters of SWAPO, these permanent members of the UN Security Council established diplomatic missions with SWAPO relatively late. SWAPO only opened its diplomatic mission in the USSR in 1987 and had no diplomatic mission whatsoever in China. Nevertheless, SWAPO maintained strong relations with the Communist Party of China and had members of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s military wing, trained in that country. China also provided ammunition to SWAPO. SWAPO had also students studying in the USSR. Commenting on SWAPO’s relations with the USSR and China, Gurirab (2007a: interview) maintained that given the enormous support that the movement received from USSR and China, it was not necessary to have physical offices in those countries.

It was a significant achievement for SWAPO to maintain 27 diplomatic establishments, and also maintain sound diplomatic relations with other countries where the movement did not have resident diplomats. Writing about the success of SWAPO on numerous fronts, Leys & Saul (1995: 3) summarised the movement’s performance in international relations and diplomacy as:

“…‘[W]orking’ both sides of the Cold War…winning friends and neutralising enemies internationally in order to sustain a convincing presence at the United Nations…SWAPO’s achievements on all these fronts was by any standard substantial’.”

2.4 Namibia’s foreign policy actors and policy prior to independence

Prior to Namibia’s independence, external and internal actors operated in its foreign policy environment. The former were international and regional organisations, and the WCG, while the latter included SWAPO leaders, and diplomats and leaders of the Namibian churches which collaborated with SWAPO.
The UN was instrumental in influencing the international position on Namibia and SWAPO, especially after it recognised the movement as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people in 1976. For Nujoma (2001: 257), the UNGA’s recognition of SWAPO,

“...raised the status of Namibian representatives at every international conference as well as national level...Even Britain gave us some help, sending teachers to Zambia and Angola to work with our people in the SWAPO Health and Education Centres”.

The UNGA’s recognition of SWAPO also raised the interests of the US Government in the question of Namibia’s independence. The then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, started what was termed “shuttle diplomacy”. In 1976, Kissinger travelled to South Africa to meet with Prime Minister John Vorster to discuss issues pertaining to Namibia’s independence. In the same year, Kissinger also held discussions with the SWAPO’s President, Sam Nujoma, where SWAPO stressed the illegal occupation of Namibian by South Africa, and sought diplomatic and political support from the US to ensure the implementation of the relevant UN Resolutions, as their implementation will result in Namibia’s independence. Kissinger assured the SWAPO delegation of the US Government’s support (Nujoma, 2001a: 256). However, Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy came to an end by the end of 1976, when the Democratic administration under President Jimmy Carter took over the reigns of the US Government.

After President Jimmy Carter took office, his Ambassador at the UN, Andrew Young, invited Canada, France, German and the UK in 1977 to cooperate with the US in addressing the question of Namibia’s independence. Earlier, in 1975, the South African Government embarked upon what became known as the internal settlement for Namibia’s independence, by convening a conference of representatives of the 11 Namibian ethnic groups in Windhoek. The Conference, later known as the Turnhalle Conference, named after the gymnasium hall where it was held, resolved to draft a constitution for South West Africa within three years and denounced the use of force and the armed struggle to overthrow the existing order (Moleah, 1983: 180). This could be seen as a direct attack on SWAPO, which was engaged in a military confrontation with the South African Government over the illegal occupation of Namibia. Although SWAPO was not
prohibited from participating in the Turnhalle Conference, it refused to participate in what it perceived to be the circus of the South African Government (Katjavivi, 1988: 95 and Nujoma, 2001a: 254 – 256).

When the WCG comprising Canada, France, West Germany, the UK and USA was established, it informed the South African Government that they were opposed to the internal settlement the South African Government proposed at the Turnhalle Conference, and presented an aide-memoir outlining proposals for the independence’s settlement in compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976 (Katjavivi, 1988:114). Provisions of this resolution are enumerated under section 2.5 of this chapter.

From 1977 to 1978, the President of SWAPO led the movement’s delegation in its negotiations with the WCG (Nujoma 2001: 272). The WCG actions were interest-driven as most of these actors’ interests were based on their economic interests in Namibia. Rio Tinto, a company from the UK, for example, was mining at the Rossing Uranium mine. It is, therefore, not surprising that the UK Government was against the use of the phrase “South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia” in the UN resolutions and preferred “unlawful occupation” instead. Companies from the USA and Canada, the American Metal Climax and Newmond, respectively, were mining copper at the Tsumeb Corporation Limited (TCL) mine (Nujoma, 2007a: interview). The WCG’s involvement in the Namibian questions rested on its consideration of their economic interests, which is in line with the following pluralist assumption:

“Pluralists argue that international activity is not just a matter of behaviour of states but of other actors too… For example economic issues are issues in their own right” (Nicholson, 2002: 98).

For the Pluralists, there is room for accommodating the interests of economic actors in the international political system. It was, thus, imperative for the US, Canada, and the UK to strike a balance between efforts towards Namibia’s independence, and punitive measures towards South Africa, that may also impact on their commercial and economic interests.
At times, the economic interests of the WCG states compromised their judgments. Geingob (2004: 96) holds the view that the diplomatic initiatives of the WCG had failed to gain momentum and influence over South Africa as some members of the group, namely France, the UK and the United States, vetoed some resolutions in the UN Security Council. Most of these resolutions would have placed a heavy burden on South Africa and, accordingly, would have terminated its illegal occupation of Namibia.

Actors such as Henry Kissinger and the WCG during the Carter administration should be understood in the context of Realism as an approach to the study of International Relations. According to Geingob (2007a: interview), western countries were not initially convinced that SWAPO could succeed over South Africa on the question of its illegal occupation of Namibia. When the Portuguese colonial regime was overthrown in Mozambique and Angola in 1974 and 1975 respectively, western countries realised the potential of the USSR’s communist ideology to take root in southern Africa. To prevent that from happening, they became involved in the Namibian issue.

Nel (2006:30) asserts that the distribution of power between actors in world politics is one of the main assumptions of Realism. Accordingly, it could be argued that western countries did not want the USSR to exert its power of influence in southern Africa, but they needed a balance of power in the region. Realists’ balance of power assumption contends that alliances are formed to prevent any great power from achieving a hegemonic position over the international political system. Great powers would, therefore, strive for power equilibrium in the international political system (Carlsnaes, 2002: 354).

Ronald Reagan of the Republican Party was elected as the US President in 1981. His election initiated a paradigm shift in international negotiations vis-à-vis Namibia’s independence. Hage Geingob, who formed part of the SWAPO delegations during negotiations reiterated that, during the negotiations regarding Namibia’s independence, the Reagan administration excluded SWAPO and preferred to deal with state actors only (Geingob, 2004: 90) – a pertinent Realist approach. Hedley Bull (1989: 33), a strong
proponent of Realism, advocated that the cause of the world order should not be advanced by getting beyond state actors. Bull further suggested that the state shall be strengthened, rather than subverting its role. State actors are central to Realism’s assumptions, while Liberalism (Pluralism) recognise the role of non-state actors in international relations (Mingst, 2004: 62–70).

During the negotiations, the FLS, which included southern African states such as Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and Nigeria discussed the Namibian question with the WCG. In response to the US’ preference, SWAPO entrusted its representation in the hands of the FLS. The FLS and Nigeria were, therefore, among some of the external actors in the foreign policy-making of pre-independent Namibia. State actors’ concept was further maintained during the ceasefire negotiations when there were discussions between the Governments of South Africa, Angola and Cuba in 1988, where SWAPO was excluded. Subsequent to the ceasefire negotiations, SWAPO discussed its positions with the Cuban and Angolan negotiators (Gurirab, 2007a: interview and Nujoma, 2007a: interview).

Apart from the role played by external actors such as Cuba and Angola, the OAU was also involved in SWAPO’s pre-independence foreign policy. Since its inception in 1963, the OAU had played a prominent role in Namibia’s foreign policy historiography. For example, at the founding summit of the OAU, its members reaffirmed in Agenda Item II the right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination, and called for the breaking of diplomatic and consular relations between African states and South Africa (OAU, 1963a). Through the OAU’s Liberation Committee which was based in Tanzania, SWAPO was able to receive financial and material assistance. When Liberia and Ethiopia took the case of South Africa’s illegal occupation of South West Africa to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in November 1965, the OAU adopted Resolution 39, which reaffirmed the OAU’s commitment to render financial assistance in respect of the costs of the case.
In the *South West Africa Case*, Ethiopia and Liberia alleged that South Africa has violated the League of Nations Mandate for South West Africa. Ethiopia and Liberia brought the case against South Africa, having been members of the League of Nations. In the context of the theory of small states’ foreign policies, small states have a high level of support for international legal norms (East, 1973: 557). Accordingly, petitioners from South West Africa and the OAU, through Ghana and Liberia, filed the *South West Africa Case* at the ICJ.

In the Judgement delivered on 18 July 1966, the Court rejected the claims by Ethiopia and Liberia on the grounds that they do not have the legal right or interest in the matter (ICJ, 1966). SWAPO was disappointed with the decision of the ICJ. Having already trained guerrilla fighters inside Namibia, SWAPO decided to pursue the armed liberation struggle, as Ja Toivo stated in the Court, during the Terrorism Trial in Pretoria, 1968:

“Whilst the World Court judgement was pending, I at least had that to fall back on. When we failed, after years of waiting, I had no answer to give to my people” (SWAPO, 1981: 315).

Apart from the OAU, SWAPO also practised multilateral diplomacy through the NAM. Nujoma (2007a: interview) outlined SWAPO’s multilateral diplomatic strategy by explaining that issues which SWAPO wanted to bring to the attention of the international community were first discussed at the meetings of the OAU Liberation Committee, which met every January in Dar-Es Salaam, Tanzania. Thereafter, these issues were taken to the subsequent meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, and then to the following OAU Summit. After the Summit discussed and resolved on given issues, such issues were taken to the NAM. The reason for this was that Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NAM Member-States meet annually in New York at the beginning of the regular session of the UNGA. The purpose of that meeting was to focus on the items on the agenda of the General Assembly that were of major importance to the NAM. By the time that the General Assembly meet, issues which SWAPO wanted to bring to the attention of the international community had been discussed and adopted at the meetings of OAU and NAM, making it possible to pass the necessary resolutions in favour of SWAPO at the UNGA.
According to Gurirab (2007a: interview), SWAPO’s foreign policy actors operated in an environment similar to that of an independent state as the organisation’s President played a major role in foreign policy issues. SWAPO’s President represented the movement at high-level multilateral meetings such as OAU and NAM summits, and led SWAPO delegations at key negotiations with representatives of the South African Government. The SWAPO Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Peter Mweshihange (1976 – 1986) and Theo-Ben Gurirab (1986 – 1990), too, were major foreign policy actors. This view was echoed by Geingob (2007a: interview). The Secretary of Foreign Affairs presented reports to the SWAPO Central Committee, the policy making organ of the movement, and advised the movement on issues related to foreign policy.

Nujoma (2001: 282) reiterated the Central Committee’s prominence in foreign policy-making at the time by explaining that,

“The Central Committee took a position that we must negotiate, while at the same time intensifying the armed struggle until the conditions for the cessation of hostilities were created…On this basis, we decided to pursue political and diplomatic actions and the armed liberation struggle concurrently…We saw them as complimentary and not contradictory”.

Other SWAPO foreign policy actors were the movement’s heads of diplomatic missions, called Chief Representatives. Those who were interviewed, as listed under section 1.8 in Chapter One, stated that they saw their role as Ambassadors of Namibia to countries where they were posted. Writing about SWAPO’s foreign policy actors, Leys & Saul (1995: 45) stated:

“SWAPO continued to have political weight abroad, in large measure because of the increasing effectiveness of its ‘external loop’ of diplomatic representatives … Reinforced by Nujoma’s tireless presence on this world stage, these ‘SWAPO Ambassadors’ were increasingly able to deliver resources and ever enhanced credibility to the movement from networks they have established in their host countries and at the United Nations”.

For Nujoma (2007a: interview), the tasks of SWAPO’s Chief Representatives were also to inform the SWAPO leadership about the situation in their respective countries. This enabled the movement to formulate its policy towards a particular country. For example, the Chief Representative in Finland, Nickey Iyambo, advised SWAPO leaders to adopt a more liberalist (idealistic) foreign policy approach when dealing with Finland. This was
based on the assessment of the position of the Finnish Government on SWAPO’s choice to embark on an armed liberation struggle (Iyambo, 2007: interview).

Compared to other SWAPO diplomats, its Permanent Observer to the United Nations played a more prominent role, because the UN Mission served as a feeding centre for other diplomatic missions (Gurirab, 2007a: interview). Given his strategic positioning, the Permanent Observer participated in key negotiations at the UN, where most members of the international community annually converge in September to attend the General Assembly sessions.

2.5 The breakthrough and triumph of SWAPO’s diplomacy: UN Security Council Resolutions 385 of 1976 and 435 of 1978

As outlined in the previous section, SWAPO used diplomacy as an instrument of its foreign policy. For example, the movement lobbied for favourable resolutions at international organisations. Muundjua (2007: interview) conceded that SWAPO diplomats were competent in lobbying and negotiations, which was one of the reasons why the movement was the only Namibian political entity recognised by the UN. Muundjua credits SWAPO for the UN resolutions that paved the way for Namibia’s independence. Through SWAPO’s lobbying at the UN, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 385 of 1976, which stated that the Security Council inter alia:

- Condemns the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa
- Further condemns all attempts by South Africa calculated to evade the clear demands of the United Nations supervision and control in Namibia.
- Reiterates its demand that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal … of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations.
- Demands again that South Africa … accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment (UN, 1976).

Although the armed liberation struggle was parallel to diplomacy, SWAPO willingly allowed the UN to manage the transition to independence. Through such a process
conflicts could be minimised and war, which is central to Realism’s assumptions, could be mitigated peacefully. During that period, Angola and Mozambique, which just became independent, were in civil wars because other respective internal stakeholders were dissatisfied with the way in which the MPLA and FRELIMO Governments assumed power. The management of the election process by the UN in Namibia would be a precaution to the repetition of the Angolan and Mozambican experiences.

When the Carter administration came to power in the USA in 1977, it used Resolution 385 of 1976 as the basis to talk to SWAPO, Nigeria and the Frontline States (Gurirab, 2007a: interview). This resulted in diplomatic negotiations between the WCG, which resulted in the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. Among other provisions, UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 stated that the Security Council:

- **Reiterates** that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa’s illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976).

- **Decides** to establish under its authority a United Nations Transitional Assistance Group in accordance with the … report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by Security Council … namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

- **Welcomes** the preparedness of the South West Africa People’s Organisation to co-operate in the implementation the Secretary-General’s report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from its President of 08 September 1978.

- **Calls** upon South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution (UN, 1978).

The resolution was adopted with the abstention of the USSR and Czechoslovakia, both who were strong supporters of SWAPO. According to Gurirab (2007a: interview), the East Bloc countries were sceptical of the process leading to the adoption of Resolution 435, since the initiative was taken by the West Bloc countries. The involvement of the WCG would, in a way, give them prominence in the Namibian question. The East Bloc countries would, therefore, be expected to be averse towards such a move, which is in
line with Realism’s assumptions that a state should not let another or a coalition of states, take predominance (Kegley, 2007: 504).

The UN’s Resolutions pertaining to Namibia’s independence came as a result of the UN, SWAPO and the WCG’s diplomatic engagements, which also included South Africa as a party to the dispute over Namibia’s sovereignty. There is an Idealism assumption stating that in a peace-making process, third parties are often concerned about mutually acceptable conditions of dispute resolution (Carlssnaes, Risse and Simmons, 2006: 393). This Idealism-anchored assumption is reflected in the UN’s recognition of SWAPO as an important role-player and actor in conflict management and resolution, with regard to the Namibian question, unlike the Reagan administration, which excluded SWAPO from dispute settlement for being a non-state actor. It should be noted that when all disputing parties, state actors and non-state actors alike, are included in the negotiation process, the degree of mutual acceptance of the conditions of settlement advocated by idealists is likely to be high. When one party is excluded, it may accept conditions, merely for the sake of compromising and allow the process to go ahead, but the possibility may exist to violate such conditions.

Resolution 435 of 1978 was eventually implemented on 1 April 1989, 12 years after it was adopted. In November 1989, the UN supervised elections were held and SWAPO won with 57.3%, gaining 41 of the 72 seats of the Constituent Assembly that drafted the constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constituent Assembly adopted the constitution on 9 February 1990, and the independence of Namibia was declared on 21 March 1990. This marked the end of the period of pre-independence foreign policy-making and the beginning of foreign policy-making in an independent Namibia. Javier Perez De Quellar, the UN Secretary-General at the time, administered the oath to the SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, as the first President of Namibia. SWAPO insisted on receiving the reigns of power from the UN which inherited the trusteeship Mandate of Namibia from the League of Nations, rather than from South Africa, which SWAPO continued to regard as an illegal occupier of Namibia.
At its First Congress after independence held in December 1991, SWAPO was transformed from a liberation movement into a political party in an independent Namibia and adopted the name SWAPO Party. Therefore, in this study, references to SWAPO after independence will be SWAPO Party.

2.6 The impact of pre-independence foreign policy-making on the post-independence foreign policy

According to Gurirab (2007b: interview), the solidarity that SWAPO received from the international community, and the United Nations in particular, had some influence on Namibia’s post-independent foreign policy. This aspect will be discussed in Chapter Three. The Namibian Government displayed several principles and strategies which SWAPO had applied during its liberation struggle. SWAPO was familiar with the ugly face of war and its disastrous impact on the lives of ordinary people. Its government was, therefore, set to promote peace and disapprove war, advocated by realists as inevitable, if it is the only way through which states could achieve their goals (Jones et al., 2001: 7).

Theories of small states’ foreign policies assert that small states tend to have a high level participation in international organisations (East, 1973: 557). Some writers argue that this is attributed to the fact that multilateralism is cost-effective compared to numerous bilateral relations (Papadakis & Starr, 1991: 428). It should, however, be understood that membership of international organisations also provide a sense of collectiveness. When a state which is a member of various international organisations face threats, there is likely to be collective security provided by other member-states. When a state is faced with economic actions against it, its membership of international organisations is likely to be of an advantage, when, for example, there are social responsibilities programmes to be rolled out to member-states.

The SWAPO-led Government’s foreign policy continued with its pre-independence multilateral approach by joining organisations such as the UN, OAU, NAM and Frontline States. The Frontline States no longer exists as it was felt that the liberation of southern
Africa from colonialism has been achieved. Former Frontline States Member-States are members of SADC, whose membership includes other states in the southern African region, including Namibia. Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, reiterated the newly established country’s multilateralism when he stated that, “we believe in multilateralism as we believe in bilateral relations” (*Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 205*).

Independent Namibia established diplomatic relations with all countries where SWAPO had diplomatic missions, including the Western Contact Group countries, given its limited resources Namibia could not send resident diplomats to all these countries (SWAPO missions were financial sustained by host countries, but missions of an independent Namibia had to be sustained by the Namibian Government).

The Republic of Namibia established full diplomatic relations and opened diplomatic missions as indicated in table 2 below.

**Table 2: List of Namibian Missions by 2007**

*Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007a).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions in countries and organisations where SWAPO had Missions</th>
<th>Missions in countries where SWAPO had no Missions</th>
<th>Countries without Namibian Missions but had SWAPO Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola, Botswana, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Nigeria, Sweden, Tanzania, United Kingdom, United Nations, USSR (later Russian Federation), USA, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Austria, Brazil, Belgium, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa</td>
<td>Algeria, Australia, Congo, Finland, Iran, Libya, Romania, Senegal, Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the disintegration of USSR in 1991, Namibia continued to have a Mission in the Russian Federation. It should be noted that although Namibia had no missions in countries where SWAPO had diplomatic missions, Namibia has diplomatic relations with those respective countries.

The Mission in Austria was necessitated by the presence of the UN offices in Vienna. Further to that, the then UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, who later became President of Austria, played a role in Namibia’s independence during his tenure as the UN Secretary-General. His involvement was recognised by President Nujoma when he welcomed Dr Waldheim as a guest of honour at Namibia’s 7th independence celebrations. At the ceremony, President Nujoma stated that,

“As many of you know, Dr Waldheim, soon after he assumed office as Secretary-General of the United Nations on January 3, 1972, travelled to Namibia because of his interest in this country’s future. I recall how he facilitated the opening of many doors in the higher echelons of the United Nations system” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 209).

The Namibian Mission in Belgium too is a multilateral mission to the European Union (EU). Given the pluralistic nature of Namibia’s foreign policy, manifested by its pursuance of economic diplomacy, the Mission in Belgium, where the EU headquarters is located, is of strategic importance to Namibia. It has been stated in Chapter One that under the EU’s Cotonou Agreement, Namibia enjoys trade benefits and had been granted the Least Developing Country (LDC) status.

Although SWAPO had no diplomatic mission in China, the sound diplomatic relations between SWAPO and China had previously been alluded to. In 1995, five years after its independence, Namibia opened an embassy in China with Peter Mweshihiange, a former Minister of Defence, as its first Ambassador. Mweshihiange is regarded by his colleagues as one of the gurus of SWAPO’s diplomacy, having served as SWAPO Secretary of Foreign Affairs from 1970 to 1986 when he became the Secretary of Defence, following the death of Peter Nanyemba. At the funeral of Mweshihiange, held on 4 March 1998, President Nujoma stated,

“At the Tanga Consultative Congress held from December 27, 1969 to January 2, 1970, at Tanga, Tanzania, Peter Mweshihiange was elected SWAPO Secretary for International Relations. He held this position until 1986. During his term as Secretary for International Relations, he set up an effective diplomatic offensive through the Chief Representatives with a view to intensifying the
diplomatic mobilisation of the international community to enhance its support to the liberation struggle, led by SWAPO...Together with the National Liberation Movements of South Africa, Peter Mweshihange launched a successful campaign to isolate the apartheid regime, which was eventually denied its seat at the General Assembly, while SWAPO was accorded the Observer Status and participated in the General Assembly deliberations” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 342 – 343).

In the eulogy delivered by Theo-Ben Gurirab, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the memorial service held on 23 March 1998, Gurirab stated:

“The decade of 1960’s was an intense period of many transformations in Africa... Both internationalism and multilateralism opened new vistas for mutual support, tactical co-operation and for solidarity across international borders. These were challenges and opportunities that provided a playing field for Comrade Mweshihange’s political activism... During his tour of duty in China, he made great strides to further consolidate and enhance the long-standing relations between the two friendly countries...Trade and joint venture cooperation continue to increase between China and Namibia” (New Era, 27 – 29 March 1998: 9).

The origins of diplomatic relations with the DRC will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three, where Namibia’s role in SADC and the theme of peace in the Namibian foreign policy will also be discussed.

The foreign policy of the SWAPO-led government also focused on its relationship with South Africa. In his first statement after the 1989 elections, the SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, stated that the SWAPO-led government will not be in favour of withdrawing UN sanctions against South Africa and also made it clear that the Namibian Government will not work closely with the minority white regime in South Africa (Cliffe et al., 1994: 233). The Namibian position towards South Africa before the democratic election will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

With regard to internal actors, the President of SWAPO and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs who were among the key actors of the movement’s foreign policy continued in similar roles, as Namibia’s President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, respectively. This means that there was a continuity of actors, albeit within the changing environment of world politics. The experiences gained by these decision-makers as SWAPO foreign policy actors were instrumental in the execution of their duties in an independent Namibia. It could, therefore, be stated that such experiences has some influence on the foreign policy of Namibia.
SWAPO also redeployed its former diplomats in the diplomatic service of the Republic of Namibia. After independence, 24 SWAPO diplomats who by 1989 were SWAPO Heads of Missions were re-deployed as follows, as observed by the researcher of this study over the years:

Four Heads of Missions were appointed Deputy Ministers. Former Permanent Observer at the UN, Helmut Angula, was appointed Deputy Minister of Mines and Energy. Former Chief Representative to Tanzania and East Africa, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Former Chief Representative to the USSR, Phillemon Malima, was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence and former Chief Representative to Cuba, Peter Tsheehama, was appointed Deputy Minister of State Security.

Two Heads of Mission were appointed Permanent Secretaries who are administrative heads and accounting officers of government Ministries. Former Chief Representative to France, Eddy Amkongo, was appointed Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, while former Chief Representative to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Nghidimondjila Shoombe, was appointed Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (later renamed Regional and Local Government and Housing).

Nine Heads of Missions were sent on diplomatic missions as Ambassadors or High Commissioners. Former Chief Representative to Botswana, Charles Shihepo, was appointed High Commissioner to Zambia (he later changed his name to Wilbard Hellao). Former Chief Representative to Congo (Brazzaville), Leonard lipumbu, was appointed Ambassador to France. Former Deputy Permanent Observer to the UN and Deputy Chief Representative to the US, Hinyangerwa Asheeke, was appointed Ambassador to Ethiopia and the OAU (Asheeke acted as Permanent Observer to the UN and Chief Representative to the US during the transitional period to independence, when Helmut Angula came to Namibia to join the SWAPO election campaign team in 1989). Former Chief
Representative to Ethiopia, Ndeutapo Amagulu, was appointed High Commissioner to Nigeria. Former Chief Representative to Zambia, Veiccoh Nghiwete was appointed High Commissioner to the UK and the Commonwealth. Former Chief Representative to the UK, Shapua Kaukungwa was appointed Ambassador to Belgium and the EU. Former Ambassador to India, Tuliameni Kalomoh, was appointed Ambassador to the US. Former Chief Representative to Libya, Nickey Nashandi was appointed Ambassador to the USSR. Elia Akwaake, who acted as Chief Representative to Tanzania and East Africa, from 1986 to 1989, when Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah went for further studies, was appointed Ambassador to Cuba.

Former Chief Representative to Nigeria, Phillemon Kambala, became a senior civil servant in the Office of the President and appointed High Commissioner to Nigeria after some years. Former Chief Representative to Australia, Joel Kaapanda, joined the private sector and was sent on a diplomatic mission as High Commissioner to India, after some years. Former Chief Representative to Sweden, Niilo Taapopi, was sent on a diplomatic mission as a senior diplomat (but not as Head of Mission) and later appointed Permanent Secretary.

Three Heads of Mission remained in the service of SWAPO Party and joined the Government after some years as political office bearers. These are former Chief Representative to Iran, Titus Mwayilepeni, who was elected Regional Councillor for Ompundja Constituency in Oshana Region, during the first Regional Council Elections, held in December 1992. Following the same Regional Council Elections former Chief Representative to Yugoslavia, Billy Mwaningange, was elected Regional Councillor for Ondobe Constituency in Ohangwena Region, and was subsequently elected Governor of Ohangwena Region. Mwayilepeni and Mwaningange were SWAPO Party Regional Coordinators for Oshakati and Ondangwa Regions, respectively. After the delimitation of Namibia in 13 political regions in 1992, Oshakati and Ondangwa Regions were divided in four regions, namely Omusati, Oshana, Oshikoto and Ohangwena Regions. Former Chief Representative to Algeria, Vinnia Ndi, who was the SWAPO Party District Coordinator for Grootfontein and later became the Regional Coordinator for Oshikoto.
Region, was appointed Special Advisor to the Minister of Prisons and Correctional Services in 2001.

Former Chief Representative to the Germany Democratic Republic (East Germany), Shikwetepo Haindongo, was employed in a relatively junior position (below Deputy Director) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and left after one year, working his way up and became a senior civil servant, Chief Regional Officer (accounting officer) for Khomas Region in 2004.

Two former Chief Representatives died in accidents during the transitional period before independence. These are former Chief Representative to Romania, Bernard Kamwi, and former Chief Representative to Zimbabwe, Kapuka Nauyala, whom during his death was a Member of the Constituent Assembly, which drafted the Namibian Constitution.

Joseph Jimmy, who previously served in SWAPO’s diplomatic services as Chief Representative to Sweden, was appointed as High Commissioner of Namibia to Zimbabwe in 1993. Two SWANU members, Dr Tunguru Huaraka and Nora Schimming-Chase, who previously served in SWANU’s diplomatic services, were appointed as Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN and Ambassador to Germany, respectively. Two Members of Parliament, John Ya Otto and Joshua Hoebeb, with a background in the respective labour and education sectors were appointed as Namibia’s first Ambassador to Angola and High Commissioner to South Africa, respectively. Two other Members of Parliament from a religious background, Reverends Matti Amadhila and Heikki Ausiku, joined the team of first Namibian diplomats as senior diplomats, but not as Heads of Mission.

Two prominent figures in SWAPO’s foreign affairs moved to other fields. Nico Bessinger who acted as SWAPO Secretary of Foreign Affairs inside Namibia was appointed Minister of Wildlife and Nature Conservation (later renamed Environment and Tourism) and SWAPO Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs from 1976 to 1990, Aaron Shihepo, was appointed as a Member of the Public Service Commission.
Information regarding post-independence deployment of diplomats became known to the researcher of this study, as they were unfolding, having followed with keen interest the development of issues related to foreign affairs and through peer discussions, as a student activist, student of Political Science, SWAPO Party Youth League leader and Desk Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security.

2.7 Summary

SWAPO’s foreign policy principles, approach and activities dominated the foreign policy environment of pre-independent Namibia. One of the prevailing perceptions prior to independence was that the people of Namibia believed in the importance of the international community to resolve the question regarding their independence from South Africa. While many actors from the then occupied South West African territory engaged in diplomatic negotiations and lobbying for Namibia’s independence, it was SWAPO that eventually emerged and remained as a key foreign policy actor. Foreign policy was largely influenced by external factors and actors, giving the policy both Realist and Idealist inclinations.

SWAPO won the UN supervised elections, which enabled it to form a government at independence. Accordingly, pre-independence foreign policy-making, of which the major actors were SWAPO and the international community, has an impact on the foreign policy of an independent Namibia, taking into account the Cold War and post-Cold War environments during which the respective policies were conceived.
CHAPTER THREE
INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC SOURCES OF NAMIBIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

3.1 Introduction

The formulation and conduct of Namibia’s foreign policy is based on the set principles, purposes and issues, which come as a response to both the international and domestic environments. The way in which the international political system is structured has an impact on the foreign policy development of countries within the system. Subsequently, actors from a given country would steer the management of public affairs of their country to conform to international standards and norms and to be conventional to geo-politics. In order to fully grasp Namibia’s post-independent foreign policy it is imperative to focus on the sources informing it. This chapter applies a level of analysis approach to analyse the international, regional and domestic sources of Namibia’s foreign policy, as well as the actors who influence the foreign policy, to enable the readers to comprehend the underlying dynamics of the core establishment of foreign policy-making. The chapter also addresses a selection of contentious Namibian foreign policy issues including her stance on the Ken Saro-Wiwa saga, Zimbabwe, her involvement in the DRC, the ban on landmines and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Each of these issues cuts across international, regional and international levels. It is important to note the important role played by individuals, as well as institutions. Reminiscent of the agent-structure debate, this is particularly relevant to post-independent Namibia which whilst framing her new foreign policy was also building her foreign policy institutions.

As Neack (2003: 203) concludes, ‘Foreign policy is made and conducted in complex domestic and international environments.’ Grove (2007: 2) adds to this assumption, “The lines between domestic and international politics are increasingly blurred in the contemporary world. ‘Intermestic’, a combination of the words ‘international’ and ‘domestic’, communicates the idea that domestic and foreign issues are linked together.”
The chapter fills the gap in the literature on Namibia’s foreign policy by also discussing the aspect of domestic disagreement in foreign policy between the Government, opposition parties and the civil society.

This chapter reviews some of the international, regional and domestic sources of Namibia’s foreign policy. In all three levels, which almost amount to a ‘three level game’, elements of change as well as continuity are evident. As a small and recently independent state, Namibia entered the international arena at a time of great turbulence. This offered both opportunities, as well as constraints on its foreign policy and international relations. Small states can successfully use their smallness to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Often dismissed by Realists, small states require greater skills than large states to achieve these objectives. As Neack (2003: 158) reminds us, ‘The range of opportunities for independent, self-interested behaviour is more limited’ for small states than for powerful states. Neack (2003: 158) continues, ‘Small powers are boxed in by virtue of their relative weakness, but they are not powerless’ and that ‘this power is contingent on the opportunities present in the international system and the willingness of the leaders of small states to take advantage of these opportunities’.

### 3.2 Selected events and trends in world politics, which impacted on Namibia’s post-independent foreign policy

At the dawning of Namibia’s independence the world was undergoing a major shift in political settings. This section provides an overview of some of these selected events and trends, including the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the term of President George H. Bush’s presidency in the US, some new developments within the UN system, developments in the global trade regime and the rapid onset of globalisation. For pre-independent SWAPO and post-independent Namibia actors such as the US, UN and USSR were of particular importance and any issue affecting any of these actors had at least an indirect bearing on Namibia.
3.2.1 The US

Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, US President Ronald Regan, the second last US President to rule during the Cold War period, pursued a different foreign policy agenda – also towards the independence of Namibia. Reagan’s successor, George H. Bush’s term straddles the period leading to the end of the Cold War as well as the immediate post-Cold War period. Like President Reagan, President Bush too was from the Republican Party. According to Gurirab (2007b: interview), the Reagan Doctrine was confrontational, ideologically, politically and sometimes militarily. Gurirab further states that President Reagan perceived SWAPO to be a proxy of Moscow whereas George H. Bush’s administration was among the first governments to recognise the SWAPO-led government at Namibia’s independence. This shift could be attributed to two factors. The independence of Namibia came as a culmination of efforts by the international community, including the US Government and the UN, which resulted in the 1989 elections, universally accepted as having been free and fair. The hostilities of the Cold War era were subdued by the end of the Cold War and the US was also making new friends in the international political realm.

3.2.2 The collapse of the USSR

When Namibia attained her independence, a new global order was emerging. The term ‘New World Order’ which was coined by US President George Bush in 1989 in celebration of the victory of the West over the East in the Cold War is indicative of the acceptance of a new post-Cold War international system (Landsberg, 2004: 188). For Gurirab (2007b: interview), amongst others, the New World Order resulted from the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which could be seen as the victory of the US dominated West Bloc over the USSR dominated East Bloc and, thus, one of the symptoms of the end of the Cold War period. But it was the dissolution of the USSR, on 26 December 1991, which ended the bipolar international system which prevailed since the end of the Second World War. Although the signs of the USSR’s demise became increasingly evident towards the second half of the 1980s, the final process leading to the
dissolution of the USSR started in 1988. In the USSR’s Baltic republics, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, a growing democratic movement culminated in the end of the Soviet dominance. The trend continued in Georgia in 1989. By 1990, strong resentments of communism and calling for autonomy were observable in all Soviet republics. Prior to that, in November 1989, the Estonia Supreme Soviet declared that its laws take precedence over those of the USSR. In March 1990, Lithuania declared its independence, followed by Uzbekistan in June 1990. Other republics such as Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Armenia and Tajikistan followed. By 25 December 1991, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev resigned (Lowe, 2002: 424 – 437), which, *inter alia*, meant the termination of USSR political and military support for liberation movements receiving the USSR support. By then, Namibia was already independent.

Independent Namibia had to adjust herself to this New World Order, as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, states that foreign policy actors were sensitive to the changes taking place in the world and took these into consideration when formulating the foreign policy of an independent Namibia (Gurirab, 2007b: interview).

### 3.2.3 Developments at the UN

Du Pisani (2003: 16) maintains that the post-Cold War period brought a new agenda of peace, encompassing a broad range of issues such as South-South cooperation, re-defined North-South relations, multilateralism, peace, security and disarmament. In 1996, the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Inder Kumar Gujral, stated during his address to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York that the end of the Cold War brought some dramatic changes, which opened up a new landscape for foreign policies of some countries (Gujral, 1996). Huaraka (2007: interview) states that with the end of the Cold War, divisions imposed on the international political system were broken. One early trend was the shift towards multilateral diplomacy, peace-keeping and peace-making.

The immediate post-Cold War period was, *inter alia*, characterised by a series of world summits, including the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. At this conference
representatives of 172 countries and 2 400 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) discussed issues of sustainable development. Three major agreements were signed, namely the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, and Agenda 21 (Taylor and Curtis, 2008: 325). The UN was now moving in a new direction, positioned towards post-Cold War international relations. The emerging global agenda gave prominence to, for example, environmental and human rights issues. Issues such as these are compatible with Liberalism (and Idealism), which recognises the role of non-state actors to cooperate with governments in addressing environmental issues (Kegley, 2007: 366).

In 1992, Boutros Boutros Ghali, who assumed duties at the beginning of the year as the new UN Secretary-General presented a report, Agenda for Peace, to the UN Security Council. Three measures, namely preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping formed the substance of Ghali’s report. He suggested that the UN should be involved in preventive diplomacy, to subdue conflicts before they escalate into full scale war. Another important aspect is that of peace-making, involving negotiations and agreements. Ghali recognised the role of UN peace-keeping missions and suggested that they should be properly funded from defence rather than foreign affairs budgets. Ghali stated:

“At a time when nations and peoples increasingly are looking to the United Nations for assistance in keeping the peace - and holding it responsible when this cannot be so - fundamental decisions must be taken to enhance the capacity of the Organization in this innovative and productive exercise of its function. I am conscious that the present volume and unpredictability of peace-keeping assessments poses real problems for some Member States. For this reason, I strongly support proposals in some Member States for their peace-keeping contributions to be financed from defence, rather than foreign affairs’ budgets and I recommend such action to others. I urge the General Assembly to encourage this approach” (UN, 1992).

Mingst (2004: 85) stated that a new direction on international affairs in the 21st century is different from the Realists assumption which gives importance to issues of national security. Ghali wanted a coordinated effort to focus on peace-keeping and peace-making efforts.
The end of the Cold War also meant that resources that were meant for war were now diverted to peace. There was, therefore, a need for a different diplomatic approach. Given this scenario, Namibia’s first Ambassador to the OAU, Hinyangerwa Ashekee stated:

“… [W]e felt that we should shape a policy that promoted peace, peaceful conflict resolution, non-alignment and establish diplomatic relations with countries from both Blocs” (Asheeke, 2007: interview).

3.2.4 The global trade regime

At the dawning of Namibia’s independence, the GATT’s Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which had started in 1986, was already underway. Globally, states shifted their military focus to economic focus, especially on the issues of trade reforms and this resulted in the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994. This had a significant effect on Namibia as explained by Namibia’s first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, who stated that most of the SWAPO leaders were socialist inclined, but at independence they were faced with a new different environment, where they had to advocate for foreign investments as part of economic diplomacy (Nandi-Ndaitwah, 2007: interview).

The atmosphere of a unipolar international system produced an environment conducive for economic ventures. In this respect, Nickey Nashandi who served as Namibia’s first Ambassador to the USSR stated that if the Cold War had not ended, it could have posed some problems on Namibia’s foreign policy. This derives from the fact that some countries of the West perceived SWAPO to be more pro-East Bloc. This could have impacted on trade relations with Namibia (Nashandi, 2007: interview).

3.2.5 Globalisation

The post-Cold War politics also witnessed the growing trend of globalisation, which refers, *inter alia*, to the increase in the global integration of socio-economic activities such as finance, trade, communication, tourism, culture and information technology (Jones et al., 2001: 109). Predominantly, role players in globalisation are largely non-
state actors such as multilateral corporation and global social movements. Globalisation also relates to economic liberalism, which postulates that for the development and maintenance of markets and capital flow, states should exercise a limited degree of control and rather facilitate the free flow of trade of goods and services (Mingst, 2004: 239).

Addressing the *Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais – Higher Institute for International Relations* (ISRI), in Mozambique, 1998, the then Namibian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, admitted that he does not embrace globalisation, knowing that hegemony exists in international relations and unfair trade continues in the global system, as technology is monopolised by a few industrialised countries. Minister Gurirab continues that globalisation represents unjust competition between rich countries of the North and poor countries of the South (Gurirab, 1998).

When Minister Gurirab addressed the 55th Session of the UNGA, he said:

“Frankly speaking, globalisation is merely a new name for an old, cruel and unjust system which was willy-nilly imposed upon the peoples of the Third World in the past…As someone bluntly put it, ‘Globalisation is reformation of what we used to call capitalist imperialism’. That’s what he said. I think he has a point” (Gurirab, 2000).

Minister Gurirab’s stance against globalisation is embedded in the Dependence Theory of exploiting poor states. He supports Liberalism which supports poor countries to access the markets of rich countries and sell their products to yield economic returns (Nicholson, 2002: 163). Minister Gurirab was in concurrence with the assumption of Idealism that calls for Members of the post-Cold War world to obey the common code of moral conduct, and the resource base of the world economy to be plentiful and healthy (Knutsen, 1992: 244). He, therefore, contended that globalisation will only work efficiently if the countries of the Third World impart in it their vision, wisdom, sense of equity and fair play derived from the hard lessons learned in history.
3.3 Namibian post-independence foreign policy principles, issues and purposes

Gurirab (2007: interview) states that when Namibia’s foreign policy was formulated policy-makers were sensitive to the changes taking place in the international political system. During this period, Namibia largely relied on friends from Africa and Latin-America. Accordingly, Namibia adopted the philosophy of non-alignment and maintaining old friends and winning new ones.

The Namibian foreign policy principles are found in article 96 in the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, as discussed in Chapter One.

These principles are the core of Namibia’s foreign policy. It is on the basis of these principles that the objectives and goals of foreign policy are pursued. In pursuing these, there are issues which form the posture of the country’s foreign policy and have become themes in the literature on Namibia’s foreign policy. The principles of foreign policy are based on Idealism, for the mediation and arbitration in international disputes, respect of international legal norms, global cooperation, peace and security are all tenets of that traditional approach to International Relations studies.

In Chapter One, it is stated that three themes namely world peace, economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation, dominate Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy. These themes should be understood in the context of the role played by the international community to attain Namibia’s independence and the regional political agenda during the period of attaining independence. The UN played a crucial role during the period of transition to independence, including mediation between the warring parties to reach a permanent ceasefire, and supervision of the first democratic elections in 1989. The role of the international community has, thus, demonstrated the value for peaceful solutions to conflicts in the world. It is arguable, therefore, that a country that was born out of such course of events will espouse similar values that brought about its sovereignty.
It is important to note that since Namibia had attained its independence at the end of the Cold War, the momentum to desire peace and stability was high in world politics, as this is a prerequisite to economic development and prosperity, an agenda that many countries were pursuing.

3.3.1 Economic diplomacy

One of the themes in the literature on the Namibian foreign policy is economic diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004: 98 – 99). The theme of economic diplomacy was conceived at the formulation of Namibia’s foreign policy after independence. Although Namibia was a small state, she widened the scope of her foreign policy to include a number of themes, including economic diplomacy, contrary to the assumption that small states have a narrow scope of foreign policy. The third foreign policy objective that was spelled out by Minister Gurirab is “To promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80). This exercise entailed the search for new markets for Namibian commodities and enhancing the country’s ability to attract foreign investments and short and long-term trade.

In 1992, Minister Gurirab gave prominence to the concept of economic diplomacy, informing the Parliament that,

“Our motto for the year 1992, namely “Diplomacy with a Purpose – the Economic Development of Namibia” is an attempt at encapsulating our vision about the kind of diplomatic service, i.e. economic diplomacy we aspire to provide for our nation” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1992: 33).

Minister Gurirab further stated that economic diplomacy has been part of the Ministry’s agenda, to achieve cooperation with other entities in the international political system in the fields of investment, trade, tourism and development cooperation. Economic diplomacy is largely anchored in the foreign policy approach of Pluralism. Pluralists recognise the role of non-state actors, who contribute to inter-state relations. Among these are economic sectors such as tourism, communication and trade flows (Swatuk, 1991: 56).
In 1993, Minister Gurirab spelled out the following ten foreign policy objectives (Debates of the National Assembly, 1993: 86 – 87):

a) to promote Namibia’s prosperity;
b) to encourage national consensus on the formulation and conduct of Namibia’s foreign policy;
c) to consolidate our national security and territorial integrity;
d) to strengthen Namibia’s international standing and image;
e) to ensure African unity and solidarity;
f) to honour international obligations by, inter alia, making contributions to international and inter-governmental organisations;
g) to participate fully in the global quest for peace and security, as well as economic cooperation;
h) to protect rights and interests of our citizens abroad;
i) to continue the training and re-training programmes of Foreign Service personnel;
j) to be worthy representatives of Namibia and other governmental agencies abroad.

The objective related to economic diplomacy ranked on top. Minister Gurirab stated that although political issues remained important in international relations, economic and trade issues were becoming important, requiring a coordination of foreign policy between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries and institutions dealing with economic and finance matters (Debates of the National Assembly, 1993: 87).

The White Paper of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management discussed in Chapter One, the National Development Plan NDP 1 and speeches by the President and Foreign Minister highlight the importance of economic diplomacy. Addressing the Superior Institute of International Relations in Mozambique, 1998, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, defined economic diplomacy as the mobilisation of resources abroad and at home in the form of trade, investments, joint ventures, technology transfer, and securing loans and credits on favourable terms. Namibia’s multilateral economic diplomacy is reflected in her membership to international organisations such as COMESA, SACU, SADC, WTO and the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The essence of economic diplomacy is for Namibian diplomats to be able to grasp the state of their country’s economy and then promote investment opportunities and other economic activities in their country. Economic diplomacy entails adequate knowledge of both small scale and large scale economic activities, so that diplomats can easily market economic prospects that their country can
offer. With the evolution of diplomacy, diplomats are charged to engage high economic activities, such as ensuring technology transfer and analysing different sources of credit, in their efforts to attract foreign capital to their country. The import of knowledge is another fundamental aspect of economic diplomacy, as this enhances productivity and, thus, boosts economic outputs (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1995a: 55 – 56 and Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2004: 20 – 24).

According to Du Pisani (1992: 57), the end of the Cold War marked the constraints on African countries as donors and investors turned to Eastern Europe and the USSR. It was, therefore, necessary to strategise on economic diplomacy. Namibia had to gear herself towards securing economic opportunities in the region, through her membership of SACU. Namibia also needed to promote her economic opportunities in the world. In July 1990, less than four months after Namibia’s independence, industrialised developed countries met in Houston, USA and voted Namibia as a model country, encouraging business and financial institutions of those countries to invest in Namibia (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 204).

In pursuing economic diplomacy, Namibia lobbied for the Least Developed Country (LDC) status with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1990, which was granted, resulting in the country’s accession to the Lomé Convention, which opened opportunities for beef exports to the European market (Du Pisani, 1992: 61). The opening up of Namibian economic opportunities in the region and the world at large demonstrates the achievement of the country’s economic diplomacy. Export earnings would be important to the development of any country’s economy (especially the developing countries), due to high cash flow coming from the strong foreign currency. The diversification of markets also reduces risks of losses in export earnings because when one market becomes plagued by economic depression, other markets will continue to generate incomes.

Namibia has a record of success in economic diplomacy in a number of European countries, especially in the area of tourism. Many tourists come from Germany, where the
Namibia Tourism Board (NTB) has an office in Frankfurt, which is responsible for marketing tourism in Europe. Information from the Ministry of Environment and Tourism indicates that the number of tourists from Germany to Namibia were 61,222 in 2005, 68,214 in 2006 and 80,418 in 2007, representing the highest number of tourists from European countries. German tourists are prepared to attract investments to Namibia. However, the NTB office is weakened by financial constraints and lack of personnel resources. Consequently, Namibia teamed up with South Africa to market tourism (Rumpf, 2007: interview).

The Namibian Mission in Belgium is also a multilateral mission to the European Union (EU). Most of the activities of the embassy focus on multilateral issues. Namibia’s Ambassador to Belgium and the EU, who is concurrently accredited to Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Switzerland, Hanno Rumpf, stated that Namibia needs to explore more trade opportunities with Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg (the Benelux countries). This is especially relevant for Belgium as, currently, her interests in Africa are largely in the Great Lakes region where she had colonies. A cooperation agreement needs to be entered into between the Walvis Bay Port and the Rotterdam Port in The Netherlands, as the latter is among the largest ports in Europe and the Walvis Bay Port could benefit by tapping the high technology of Rotterdam (Rumpf, 2007: interview).

Walvis Bay is the centre of Namibia’s Economic Processing Zone (EPZ), administered by the Walvis Bay EPZ Management Company. In pursuing economic diplomacy, the Parliament passed the EPZ Act in 1995, as a legal framework for the export-oriented manufacture and investment incentives. EPZ companies are exempted from paying corporate income tax and duties and value-added tax (VAT) on machinery, and raw materials imported in Namibia for manufacturing purposes. However, like all other employees in the country, employees of EPZ enterprises pay tax on income while non-resident shareholders pay 10% withholding tax on declared dividends. Further, EPZ enterprises may hold foreign currency accounts at commercial banks and repatriate their capital and profits (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1995b).
The EPZ became operational in 1997 with five companies and have grown to 33 companies by 2004. According to the information available at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the EPZ has attracted investment in the areas of manufacturing automotive parts, plastic products, textile and garments, marine ropes and cordages, abrasive products, electronic equipment, assembling of motor vehicles, mineral processing such as zinc and copper refinery, sepiolite industrial mineral clay, and the cutting and polishing of diamonds and granites. Investors are predominantly from Belgium, Germany, India, Israel, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Spain, the UK, and USA. Total imports into the EPZ (raw materials and inputs) amounted to N$ 192 million in 2006 and increased to N$ 555.5 million in 2007. Exports recorded in the last quarter of 2006 amounted to N$ 1.3 billion, while in the third quarter of 2007, the figures stood at N$ 1.9 billion (ODC, 2007).

Namibia has pursued economic diplomacy with the Nordic countries with which she has a high number of cooperation agreements signed since independence. It is reported that by June 2003 Namibia has signed a number of cooperation agreements with the Nordic countries as follows: 33 with Finland, 44 with Sweden, 20 with Norway and 5 with Denmark. Economic agreements signed with Norway and Denmark cover fisheries and maritime affairs. Most of the agreements signed with Sweden and Finland are about development and economic cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007c). The agreements signed with the Nordic countries are included in Appendix 3.

Namibia’s economic diplomacy is further demonstrated in the trade relations with Spain, especially in the fishing sector. There are seven fishing companies which have entered into a joint-venture partnership with Namibians and they provide jobs to about 14 000 people. In 2003, Namibia and Spain signed the Promotion and Protection of Investment Agreement, a reciprocal agreement that enhances trade and investment promotion between Namibia and Spain (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

Namibia’s economic diplomacy has been successful in the bilateral relations with the French Republic. By the year 2002 a number of cooperation assistance from France
amounted to 60 million Euros, of which 51 million Euros were grants and 9 million Euros were loans. Namibia has a number of cooperation agreements with France, starting as early as 1990, mostly in the fields of economy, science and culture as indicated in table 3 below.

Table 3: Agreements between Namibia and the French Republic by 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007b.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Financing Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Namibia and the French Government, signed on 01 February 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Development Cooperation Financing Protocol, signed on 04 April 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agreement providing a legal framework for the Franco-Namibia Cultural Centre, signed on 31 July 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Financing Agreement for the pilot surveillance of fisheries, signed on 31 July 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financing Agreement: Installation of Ground Station for Canal France International (CFI) broadcast, signed on 07 November 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cultural Agreement, signed on 09 November 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Air Service Agreement, signed on 09 November 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financing agreement: Primary Health Care Project in Eenhana, signed on 09 November 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agreement on cultural, scientific and technical cooperation, signed on 22 March 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agreement establishing the French Development Agency (FDA) group, signed on 25 June 1998</td>
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</table>

During the term of President Nujoma, Namibia and South Africa held a Joint Cabinet Meeting, on the occasion of the inauguration of the 400kV transmission line from the Kokerboom Transmission Station in Keetmanshoop to the Auas Transmission Station near Windhoek, in 1999. As Executive Assistant to the Managing Director of NamPower, the power utility of Namibia, the researcher of this study observed this development. Subsequent to a Joint Cabinet Meeting, the annual Heads of State Bilateral Economic Meeting was regularised. Peer discussions with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and senior diplomats reveal that when President Pohamba assumed the office, he set to consolidate Namibia’s foreign policy towards South Africa by following up on the Heads of State Bilateral Economic Meeting. Bilateral meetings at the highest level between Namibia and South Africa were revived and during the term of President Pohamba Namibia and South Africa regularly hold the annual Heads of State Bilateral Economic Meeting. The
Meetings discuss issues related to trade, projectors in the economic sectors, SADC and SACU.

The significance of the Heads of State Bilateral Economic Meetings is that such meetings afford Namibia and South Africa an opportunity to discuss bilateral issues at the highest level and follow up on the issues of concern every year. This platform further advances the objective of Namibia’s economic diplomacy of increasing trade and investment and creating prosperity (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1991: 80).

Ulenga (2007: interview) maintains that economic diplomacy should be the cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy. He states that Namibia needs to be actively involved in the activities of the WTO. Katjiuongua (2007b: interview) concurs on this issue and states that Namibia needs to do more to yield the results of economic diplomacy so that the country could become more self-reliant and less reliant on imports from South Africa, especially for food supplies.

Motivating his motion on the performance of Namibia’s diplomatic missions, in Parliament on 5 October 2006, opposition parliamentarian, Mc Henry Venaani of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), stated that Namibia’s economic diplomacy does not accommodate the Middle East which, albeit a volatile region, has a wealth of oil. Venaani further argued that Namibia should move to Dubai, which has become a hub of African and Arab businesses. It has also been argued that Arab Banks grant considerable soft loans to many African countries and Namibia can make use of these institutions to fund some major capital projects in the country (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 2006a: 337).

### 3.3.2 South-South cooperation

South-South cooperation is another theme in the Namibian foreign policy literature. South-South cooperation as a foreign policy theme became more prominent in the Namibian foreign policy during the second and third term of President Nujoma, 1995 -
During this period, Namibia opened embassies in China, Malaysia and Brazil. Prior to that period, Namibia’s embassies in Asia and the Pacific were only in Cuba and India. The concept of South-South cooperation has an inclination to the liberal perspective called Interdependence (Jones et al. 2001: 9). In this context, states of the South like to maintain complimentary trade, where states and regions exchange trade of commodities among themselves. The White Paper of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management states,

“The Asian region offers bilateral and multilateral opportunities for stronger cooperation, particularly in terms of South-South cooperation …As a result, Namibia is actively building all-round and mutually beneficial relations with various Asian states…The focus is on strengthening traditional partnerships with India and China, by way of extending cooperation in the areas of industrialisation, human resource development, service sector development, technology transfer, tourism, trade and investment” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2004: 78).

3.3.2.1 Latin America and the Caribbean

The White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management discusses Namibia’s cooperation with the Caribbean and Latin America, with special emphasis on Brazil and Cuba (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2004: 79).

Namibia established diplomatic relations with Brazil in 2002. When the Brazilian Workers’ Party came to power in Brazil in 2002, it adopted a pro-active policy towards Africa. President Lula da Silva visited many African countries, including Namibia, in efforts to promote bilateral relations with African countries, putting an emphasis on the revival of cultural ties between Brazil and the African continent.

Brazil has trained the Namibian Navy and, thus, assisted Namibia in developing the Maritime Wing of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) into a fully-fledged Navy in 2004. In 2003, the Namibian embassy was opened in Brazil and the following year, 2004, Patric Nandago was commissioned as Namibia’s first Ambassador to Brazil (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a). Namibia and Brazil have signed cooperation agreements in the fields of off-shore hydro-graphic survey, naval and maritime, urban development, higher education, agriculture, sport, health, cultural heritage, geology and land reform as indicated in table 4 below.
Table 4: Agreements signed between Namibia and Brazil by 2006

*Source*: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a.

- Visa Agreement, signed on 29 October 1992
- Development Cooperation Agreement, signed on 29 October 1992
- Joint Commission Agreement, signed on 29 October 1992
- Scientific and Technical Cooperation, signed on 05 May 1994
- Naval Cooperation Agreement, signed on 04 March 1994
- Cultural and Educational Cooperation, signed on 07 March 1995
- Basic Agreement on Technical Cooperation, signed on 07 March 1995
- Naval Cooperation Agreement, signed on 03 December 2001

The Namibian embassy started a campaign to mobilise the private sector in Brazil for mutual benefit investments in Namibia. To supplement the embassy’s activities, an Honorary Consulate was opened in Sao Paolo. Business delegations from the two countries have paid reciprocal visits and Brazilian business persons have expressed interests to trade in the areas of tourism, general trading, hygienic products, project financing, reinsurance, information technology and telecommunications, car spare parts, civil construction, mineral screens, cement, pharmaceutics, furniture and the hospitality sector. By 2007, trade figures between Namibia and Brazil were over US$ 10 million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a).

There are similarities of interest in the Namibian and South African foreign policies with regard to the South-South cooperation diplomacy. It is stated that President Mbeki’s Government is serious on the issues of South-South cooperation and South Africa is viewed to be the spokesperson for Africa, which together with powers such as China, India and Brazil, articulates the agenda for the South in world politics (Landsberg, 2004: 185). Perhaps the significance of the similarities is the fact that the governing parties of Namibia and South Africa, SWAPO and ANC, respectively, had shared historical ties with India, China and Brazil.
3.3.2.2 Multilateral fora

Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, stated that Namibia supports unity and cooperation between poor nations. This includes participation in various fora, such as the G77 and China, Afro-Asia solidarity meetings and Tri-Continental (Africa, Asia and Latin America) meetings (Gurirab, 2007b: interview). These views are similar to those expressed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lempy Lucas, in the Parliament on 23 November 2007, when she stated that Namibia maintains a strong position on South-South cooperation. To strengthen her argument, she stated that Namibia participates in the NAM, the Group of 77 and China, the New African-Asian Strategic Partnership and the SACU-Mercado Común der Sul’s (Southern Common Market – MERCOSUR) Preferential Trade Agreement. The Deputy Minister stated that:

“Namibia has always maintained a strong position on South-South cooperation. This position dates back to the period before the attainment of our Independence … Government has adopted a pro-active foreign policy aimed at promoting practical engagement with other countries of the South to enhance political dialogue, trade and cultural co-operation” (Debates of the National Assembly, 2006b: 348)

These views were further echoed by the first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, who stated that the South-South cooperation trend in the Namibian foreign policy has its roots in the history of SWAPO as a liberation movement. (Nandi-Ndaitwah, 2007: interview).

3.3.2.3 China

As part of its South-South cooperation policy, Namibia established diplomatic relations with China in 1990, but it was only in 1995 that the Namibian embassy in Beijing was opened. The first Minister of Defence, Peter Mweshihange, was appointed as Ambassador to China. The dispatching of a senior political figure indicated the level of importance that Namibia attaches to China. Namibia benefits greatly from the South-South cooperation relations with China. In terms of the Agreement on Cooperation on Higher Education, signed in 1998, China provides five scholarships to Namibians every
year. Other cooperation agreements in the areas of health, culture and media have also been signed. These are the agreement on Health and Social Services Cooperation, signed in 1995, in terms of which China sends doctors and nurses to work at the state hospitals in Namibia; the Cultural Exchange Agreement, and the agreement on Television Broadcasting Cooperation, which saw the exchange of visits of the state media institutions and the re-broadcasting of the China Central Television (CCTV) programmes by the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). Twinning agreements have also been signed between Chinese towns of Shanghai, Maqiao and Zhengzhou and Namibian towns of Windhoek, Okahandja and Mariental, respectively. By 2006, Namibia has signed 30 technical and cooperation agreements with China, since independence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006b). A list of these agreements is included in Appendix 4.

Namibia supports the “One China policy” and does not have official contacts with Taiwan. At international fora, Namibia and China share many views in common like their preference for political and diplomatic solution to Iraq, rather than the military intervention by the UK and US forces and the peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflicts, among others. The US invasion of Iraq demonstrated a realist approach to international relations. It represents the administration of President George W. Bush’s fight against potential rival for power and Karle (2003:6) stated that it confirms the US foreign policy’s alignment to Realism.

3.3.2.4 India

Namibia maintains friendly relations with India, which dates from pre-independence. Namibia and India established diplomatic relations in 1990, and the Namibian embassy in New Delhi was opened in 1993. Two years later, the first High Commissioner of Namibia to India, Joel Kaapanda, was commissioned. It is stated that Namibia benefited from the South-South cooperation with India, especially in the field of education where a number of scholarships were offered to Namibians by the Government of India under the Indian Technical Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance
Plan (SCAAP). Other cooperation agreements in the areas of culture, defence, agriculture and health have also been signed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006c).

The current Namibian High Commissioner to India, Marten Kapewasha, states that India is advanced in the field of technology and Namibia stands to benefit from skills transfer. Kapewasha states that Namibia needs to be marketed in India as a tourist destination and recommended the opening of a tourist office in India. There are many people in India and China who could capture the Namibian market (Kapewasha, 2008: interview).

3.4 Regional trends and sources

At the time of Namibia’s independence, unresolved conflicts still raged in southern Africa. These are, for example, the civil war in Angola and the transition to democracy in South Africa. According to Du Pisani (2000: 199) regional conflicts such as the one in Angola “decisively shape Namibia’s foreign policy”. This assumption is supported by Gurirab (2007b: interview) who states that Namibia was aware of the conflicts in the region and thus one of the five foreign objectives formulated at independence was “enhancing peace in the region, like the end of civil war in Angola” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 80). Namibia undertook to play a role in the southern Africa region by making a meaningful contribution to conflict resolutions. The President used regional and continental platforms to address the question of peace in Angola. For example, at the SADC Heads of State Summit held in Zambia, in 1993, former President Nujoma stated,

“Namibia considers the situation in Angola as a matter of grave concern...Our collective and individual role should be to support the UN to secure a cease-fire, to urge the parties to the conflict to secure peace” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999: 332).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, too, has been pro-active on the question of Angola. Addressing the Parliament in 1990, Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab said:

“To the north of our country is Angola. We are deeply concerned about the suffering and bleeding that continues there. It really makes no difference at this time as to who was wrong and who was right at the beginning. There must be a way to bring to an end that suffering and bleeding” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: Vol. 3: 208).
The sentiments expressed by the Foreign Minister, in respect of concentrating on a peaceful solution rather than apportioning blame to either side, shows how Namibia had an immense aspiration for peace to come to Angola. Generally, if one party in the conflicts feels that it is being prejudiced, it could hamper the negotiation and mediation process.

When President Nujoma opened the Parliament in 1990, he stated that Namibia encourages the dialogue between President De Klerk of South Africa and the ANC (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 13). Meanwhile, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in the Parliament that Namibia will not have warm and friendly relations with South Africa, as long as apartheid and violence exist in that country (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 206). Namibia has, thereby, made her position clear that she will not tolerate her former coloniser perpetuating undemocratic administration in South Africa. President Nujoma’s persistent agenda to resolve conflicts in South Africa and Angola will be discussed in Chapter Four. This stand could be viewed in the context of Liberalism, which contends that,

“Democracies have an image of themselves as peaceful and rational; they project this image onto fellow democracies. Being democratic is interpreted as a valid marker for peaceful intentions” (Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons, 2006: 377).

It should further be noted that since SWAPO had fought against South Africa alongside the ANC, the Namibian Government will be inclined to a democratic South Africa, where the ANC could be given an opportunity to participate in the management of public affairs of that country. Thus, the Minister stated:

“We are looking forward, as everybody else does, to that day when we will all welcome in the Committee of Nations the new South Africa, rid of apartheid, where all people would be treated equally and then we will proudly embrace that South Africa as a good neighbour and extend warm friendly relations, but not now” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 206).

Namibia has, thereby, made her position clear that she will not tolerate her neighbour maintaining an undemocratic system that hinders peace and prosperity in the region. This aspect of the Namibian foreign policy is modelled on the approach of Idealism. This approach supports a democratic system of governance, because it sees democratisation as
means through which the pursuance of sinister interests could be prevented (Smith, 1987: 189). The system of governance in South Africa before democratic elections and the interest of the governing elite could be perceived to be sinister as they vindicate one race, while advancing the cause of another through its apartheid policy. Idealism supports virtues of fairness, equality before the law and the respect of the rights of others (Nel, 2006: 25).

After Namibia’s independence, the ANC of South Africa opened an office in Windhoek. The Namibian Government provided financial and moral support to the ANC and PAC of South Africa, as it regarded itself having an obligation to assist these liberation movements to attain peace in a neighbouring country. The Namibian Government leaders, having gone through the hospitality of the neighbouring countries before independence felt there was a need to assist liberation movements in South Africa to ensure the democratisation of the political system in South Africa and, thus, peace in the neighbourhood. During the campaign for the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the Namibian Government donated N$ 1.5 million to the ANC (equivalent to R 1.5 million) and N$ 500 000 to the PAC (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 405).

Despite the lukewarm relations between Namibia and South Africa prior to the democratic elections in South Africa held in 1994, Namibia’s foreign policy towards South Africa was, evidently, anchored in the Interdependence theory as it recognised the prominence of trade and investment issues. Theo-Ben Gurirab, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that Namibia has no choice but to deal with an undemocratic South Africa in trade (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 207). It should also be noted that by the time Namibia became independent in 1990 many countries have started softening their stance on sanctions against South Africa. The Nordic countries eased their sanctions against South Africa from 1990, followed by India in 1991. By 1993, the ANC had also started considering the need to end sanctions (Landsberg, 2004: 103 – 106). It was, therefore, pragmatic that Minister Gurirab would state that Namibia will deal with South Africa in trade.
Namibia did not limit her role on world peace to the southern African region, but she played a role in the world community at large. Addressing the meeting of the Heads of Missions in Namibia, in 1993, President Nujoma stated:

“Namibia has a definite stake in the search for peace in the former Yugoslavia, in the Middle East, in Somalia, Angola, Mozambique and Liberia ... and in the efforts aimed at peaceful co-existence among countries of the former Soviet Union” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999: 350).

Most of Namibia’s efforts in searching for peace were achieved through her participation in the UN peace-keeping missions, and this aspect will be discussed under section 3.5.3.

3.5 Selected international and regional themes and sources of Namibia’s foreign policy

This section addresses themes such as, sovereignty, solidarity and non-alignment in Namibia’s foreign policy, as well as Namibia’s relations with international and regional organisations such as the UN, the OAU and the Commonwealth.

Article 143 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia states that all international agreements binding upon Namibia on the date of independence shall remain in force until the National Assembly decides otherwise. The Assembly is empowered in terms of article 63 (2) (d) to consider and decide whether, or not, to continue with international agreements that were entered into by the pre-independence administrations in Namibia. Further, article 145 states that the Constitution does not recognise the validity of the authority of South Africa and its Administrator-General, who administered Namibia before independence (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 36 – 37; 71 – 72). As stated previously, SWAPO has recognised the UN Commission for Namibia as the only legitimate administrator of Namibia before independence.

In Chapter Two, the study discusses how Namibia’s independence came as a result of the efforts by the international community. It follows that the international community would have an influence on the foreign policy of an independent Namibia. President Nujoma acknowledged that role in his inaugural speech, on 21 March 1990, when he stated that,
“With regard to the international community, the achievement of Namibia’s independence today is, we believe, a welcome and laudable culmination of many years of consistent support of our cause. The world demand for our country to be allowed to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination and independence has been achieved. We express our most sincere gratitude to the international community for its steadfast support” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 2).

Namibia’s gratitude to the international community is evident in article 96 of the Namibian Constitution and the five foreign policy objectives stated in Chapter One, which emphasise, *inter alia*, the striving for world peace (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53 and *Debates of the National Assembly*, 1991, Vol. 14: 80 – 81). Idealism-inclined values are evident in Namibia’s foreign policy principles and objectives. Idealism, especially its perception of power and morality, supports the assumptions of respect of international law and settlement of international disputes (Magstadt, 2006: 554).

The fifth foreign policy objective set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to promote world peace through an active role in the international organisations, such as the UN, OAU and NAM (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1991, Vol. 14: 80 – 81). There are, however, opinions that this objective should have been the first objective, rather than the fifth and last, since Namibia was a child of the international community and without world peace there could be no development (Lister, 2007: interview).

### 3.5.1 Solidarity with and support of Palestine

According to Du Pisani (2003: 16), as a small state Namibia espouses multilateral diplomacy because she believes that she is only in an international system governed by rules and norms where weaker states will be secured and their interests taken care of. This argument also corresponds to propositions of the small state theories such as the presumption of high levels of activity in international organisations (East, 1973: 557). In this respect, Gurirab (2007b: interview) held the opinion that internationally, Namibia was determined to project a strong presence in international debates on issues of liberation and self-determination.
In 1998, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, presented a lecture on Namibia’s foreign policy to the Superior Institute on International Relations in Mozambique and stated that Namibia fully supports the creation of the state of Palestine under the then Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Yasser Arafat. He stated that the issue should be resolved peacefully (Gurirab, 1998). Gurirab repeated the similar sentiments when he told the Namibian Parliament in 2002 that Israel stands condemned by the international community because of the situation in the Middle East. He described the cause of the Palestinians under the leadership of Yasser Arafat as a sacred cause and they cannot be wrong when they fight for their just rights and self-determination. He further stated that the PLO deserves worldwide solidarity and material assistance to defend themselves from occupation by the “terrorist Israel” (Debates of the National Assembly, 2002: 105).

During Namibia’s membership of the Security Council, her Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Martin Andjaba, was vocal on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East. Addressing the Security Council on 20 October 2000, Andjaba accused Israel of derailing the peace process and condemned in the strongest terms the violence by Israeli soldiers against Palestinian civilians, including children (Andjaba, 2000).

### 3.5.2 Solidarity with and support of Cuba

Since 1992, the UNGA have passed resolutions, calling for ending the economic, commercial and financial embargoes (which Cuba regards as a total blockade) imposed by the US Government against Cuba. Namibia voted in favour of all these resolutions. This trend continued under the presidency of President Pohamba as it will be discussed in Chapter Five.

In 2001, a Member of Parliament from SWAPO Party, Ponhele Ya France, moved a Motion in Parliament calling for the condemnation of the economic embargoes imposed on Cuba by the US Government. Motivating his Motion, he said the US blockade against Cuba is,
“... [H]istorically shameful and politically and morally unacceptable. It must, therefore, be unconditionally and unequivocally lifted. It is unacceptable and a violation of international laws for a country to impose its own domestic policies against an independent and sovereign country” (Debates of the National Assembly, 2001a: 170)

Opposition parliamentarian, Ignatius Shixwameni of the Congress of Democrats (CoD), stated,

“The blockade is an antiquity of the age-old (sic) Cold War. More than that, it is a remnant of the age-old (sic) desire by the USA to expand over the Caribbean islands. There is no reason from our side why this blockade must continue now that we are in the 21st century...It is our hope that the USA and Cuba will engage in serious diplomatic talks to resume full bilateral relations, instead of the current low level diplomatic accreditation which they now have” (Debates of the National Assembly, 2001a: 171).

The motion received support from all parties in the Parliament and was adopted unanimously (Debates of the National Assembly, 2001a: 186).

Namibia has sound diplomatic relations with Cuba and by 2007 the Namibian Government has signed 11 agreements with the Cuban Government as indicated in table 5 below.

**Table 5: Agreements signed between Namibia and Cuba by 2007**

*Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007d.*

- Trade Agreement, signed on 21 March 1990
- Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, signed on 14 September 1990
- Cultural Agreement, signed on 14 September 1990
- Social Services Cooperation Agreement, signed on 06 March 1991
- Joint Commission Agreement, signed on 06 March 1991
- Visa Agreement, signed on 21 January 1994
- Health Cooperation Agreement, signed on 01 September 1994
- Merchant Shipping Agreement, signed on 09 November 1995
- Air Services Agreement, signed on 17 July 1996
- Technical Cooperation Agreement, signed on 02 June 2001
- Agreement on Cooperation between Namibia and Cuba, signed on 20 March 2000
3.5.3 The United Nations (UN)

In the preamble to the UN Charter adopted on 26 June 1945, it is stated that the UN is determined to, *inter alia*,

- Establish conditions under which justice and respect of obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.
- Unite our strength to maintain international peace and security (UN, 1945).

The second and fourth principles of the Namibian foreign policy in the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia dealing with international peace and cooperation, respect of international law and obligation to treaties could, therefore, be attributed to the influence of the UN, as well as Namibia’s compliance with the UN Charter. In fact, Namibia replicated the second UN principle stated above in her Constitution that the Namibian state shall endeavour to promote international cooperation, peace and security (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). Since joining the United Nations on 23 April 1990, Namibia has been committed to the UN’s purpose of maintaining world peace and security.

The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, informed the Parliament in 1993 that Namibia fully subscribes to the principles of the UN Charter and is prepared to contribute towards global peace and security. Namibia subscribed to the UN conventions and treaties aimed at promoting peace and stability in the world. On 15 January 1993, Namibia became a co-signatory to, for example, the UN Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits signatories from the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and calls for their destruction. Prior to that Namibia had ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1993: 92). The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention brings the relevance of a Liberalist approach in the Namibian foreign policy since disarmament is among the central indicators of this approach (Banks, 1985:15). Mingst (2004: 220) states that arms control and disarmament are central to the hopes of liberalists for many years. This follows the
argument that fewer arms means greater security as no actor with fewer weapons will be willing to engage in conflicts.

In 1996, Namibia signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT), which was adopted by the UNGA on 10 October 2006. The Namibian Parliament ratified the CNTBT in 2001. With limited resources, Namibia operates the infrasound equipment at her seismic station near the northern town of Tsumeb. Namibia has, thus, joined the international campaign and monitoring system against nuclear tests, and fully supports the activities of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CNTBTO). The ratification and signing of this agreement is significant because Namibia is the fourth highest uranium producing country in the world. Namibia thus ensures that her uranium is only to be used for peaceful purposes, such as generating nuclear energy, for example (Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2008). In this case, Namibia has realised the foreign policy principle of fostering the respect of international law and treaty obligations (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).

Although a relatively young country, Namibia was determined to make her mark on the world political platform. In line with the principle of promoting world peace, Namibia participated in the UN peace-keeping mission in Cambodia, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) three years after independence (1993). Members of the NDF escorted ballot boxes from polling stations to counting stations. In this mission, Namibia also contributed combat vehicles, which were deployed in strategic cities such as Batambang, Sisphon, Pnom Penh, Siem Reap and Kampon Cham (Ministry of Defence, 2007). Cambodia was undergoing a change towards democracy. Idealism stresses that human nature is inherently rational, that decision-makers would prefer to use peaceful means to manage change. War has ceased to be an instrument of policy (Smith, 1987: 191).

In 1996, Namibia participated in the UN Peace-Keeping Mission in Angola (United Nations Angola Verification Mission III – UNAVEM III), where the Namibian contingent verified more than 10 000 kilometres of road to be cleared for use by the UN
From 2004 to 2007, the NDF deployed a battalion of 860 soldiers, on a rotational basis, to serve in the UN Peace-Keeping Mission in Liberia (United Nations Mission in Liberia – UNMIL), whose aim was to oversee and facilitate the establishment of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly of Liberia. Namibia has also participated in the UN peace efforts by sending Military Observers and Staff Officers to various missions around the globe under the auspices of both the UN and AU in countries such as Burundi (Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi – United Nations Operation in Burundi – ONUB), Côte d’Ivoire (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire – UNOCI), Eritrea (United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea – UNMEE), Kosovo (United Nations Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK) and Sudan (African Union Mission in Sudan – AMIS, United Nations Mission in the Sudan – UNMIS and United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur – UNAMID) (Ministry of Defence, 2007 and Ministry of Defence 2008).

Peace-keeping operations could be defined in the context of a Liberalism approach of collective security. This liberal perspective follows the assumption that although war could occur in the international political system, it could be managed either by prevention or stopping the aggressor by restraint of military action. Liberalists believe that international law and international organisations, such as the United Nations, are important actors in the global political system as they reduce tensions and ensure world peace (Magstadt, 2006: 552 and Mingst, 2004: 219).

3.5.4 The OAU: non-intervention and sovereignty

Namibia joined the OAU in 1990, sending her first Ambassador to Addis Ababa at the beginning of 1992. The OAU is, accordingly, one of the international sources of Namibia’s foreign policy. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, informed the National Assembly during the budget debate in 1993 that the Namibian Government fully upholds the principles of the OAU and its objectives, and Namibia regards these as the means through which the interests of the African continent are to be realised (Debates of the National Assembly, 1993, Vol. 31: 90).
The influence of the OAU Charter is more evident in the fifth principle of the Namibian foreign policy (article 96 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia) which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). Among the OAU principles embodied in Article III of its Charter, the organisation is committed to “peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiations, mediation, conciliation or arbitration” (OAU, 1963b: 3 – 4). Namibia demonstrated adherence to this principle during the border dispute between Namibia and Botswana over the Kasikili / Sedudu Island. Namibia and Botswana had a dispute over the ownership of the Island. Namibia calls the island Kasikili, while Botswana calls it Sedudu. The two countries took the border disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which in 1999 decided in favour of Botswana. Both countries adhered to the decision of the Court. Du Pisani (2003: 18) states,

“Since the ruling of the International Court of Justice over rival claims to sovereignty in 1999, however, bilateral relations with Botswana have improved significantly. The two states co-operate in the domains of security and environmental and water management, among other”.

The Kasikili / Sedudu dispute had a possibility of triggering war between Namibia and Botswana, especially because the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) members had been shooting at Namibian civilians and fishermen who visited the island. Imminent war was avoided because of the adherence to the foreign policy principle derived from the fourth principle in Chapter III of the OAU Charter which advocates “Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or Arbitration” (OAU, 1963b: 4). This scenario could be argued in the context of Idealism, which argues that democracies embrace norms of compromise that bars the use of force against groups espousing similar principles (Walt, 1998: 39). Idealism further argues that states learn from previous mistakes of war and they would take cautions against war and rather enter into negotiations that would perpetuate peace (Swatuk, 1991: 24).

The Kasikili / Sedudu dispute could also be viewed in the context of the Neo-liberal approach, which recognises states as actors in the international political system, but whose guides are the established rules and institutions that would enhance the possibility
of mutual gain (Goldstein, 2003: 118). The peaceful conduct of Namibia and Botswana are clearly not conforming to Realism, which argues that when states pursue bargaining practices with equals they end up going to war rather than resolving disputes (Vasquez, 1991: 370). The conduct of Namibia and Botswana could further be explained in terms of the small state theory, which asserts that small states have a tendency to espouse moral causes and respect the international legal norms (Magstadt, 2006: 554).

The second principle in the OAU Charter states “The Member States…solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles…Non-interference in the internal affairs of States” (OAU, 1963b: 4). Tordoff (2002: 253) states that this principle led to the failure of the OAU to condemn the atrocities, which occurred in countries such as Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic under Bokassa and Uganda under Idi Amin. This principle, in the same manner, was the source of Namibia’s foreign policy towards Nigeria in 1995. There were demands from the civil society and opposition parties for the Namibian Government to condemn human rights abuses in Nigeria after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the Ogoni people, in November 1995 (The Namibian, 13 November 1995: 1, 14 November 1995: 7, and The Namibian, 15 November 1995: 1-2). Details on the Nigerian aspect will be discussed under section 3.7.

When Namibia joined the OAU, the organisation was dedicated to the total liberation of the African continent and had to provide assistance to the remaining liberation movements, especially from South Africa. Namibia joined forces with the OAU and UN to fight for the democratisation of South Africa and, accordingly, the ANC of South Africa had an office in Windhoek (Nandi-Ndaitwah, 2007: interview and Nujoma, 2007b: interview).

After the democratisation of South Africa in 1994, the agenda of the OAU shifted its focus from solely political issues to socio-economic development. Namibia played a role during the debates regarding the paradigm shift at the OAU. The Namibian Government upholds its international obligations towards the OAU and it has ratified the OAU
Protocols and Charters, such as, the Protocol on Human Rights and the Charter on the Rights of the African Child (Amkongo, 2007:). These Protocols have the Liberalism’s humanitarian cause which is motivated by “a compassionate ethical concern for the welfare and security of all people” (Kegley, 2007: 27).

The AU adopted the Protocol related to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council. The Protocol advocates ‘a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’ (AU, 2002). Chapter Five of this study discusses, among others, President Pohamba and Ambassador Mbuende’s support for Africa’s conflict resolution and management, and request for provision of resources to Africa’s standby force. Their position is anchored in the AU’s Protocol relation to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council.

3.5.5 The Commonwealth

The Namibian Government leaders recognise the contribution of the Commonwealth to the country’s independence. In this regard President Nujoma states,

“...[T]he Commonwealth has stood shoulder to shoulder with freedom fighters in opposition to all forms of colonial domination and has undertaken a pledge to use all means necessary to further the principles of self-determination and democracy…Namibia’s own independence is but the latest fulfilment of that that pledge” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 132).

Namibia’s decision to join the Commonwealth arises from her historical ties with Britain. Namibia was not a British Colony in the strictest sense but was placed under the League of Nations Mandate System and entrusted to Britain to administer the territory. Britain transferred the administration of SWA on her behalf to South Africa which, like Canada, Australia and New Zealand was a British dominion. History was not lost to the Members of the Commonwealth, and at the Commonwealth Summit held in 1975 in Kingston, Jamaica, the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting (CHOGM) decided to admit Namibia in the Commonwealth, should the Government of an independent Republic of Namibia decide to do so. At independence the Commonwealth was the first inter-governmental body which extended recognition to the independent Republic of Namibia (Gurirab, 2008).
Similar to the UN and OAU Charters, the Commonwealth Principles adopted at the Heads of Government meeting in Singapore in 1971 states that Member-States believe in international peace and order. The Commonwealth Principles also recognise the equality of all citizens irrespective of colour, race or creed (Commonwealth, 1971). These rights are also enshrined in Chapter 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 8). This is an indication that the Commonwealth is one of the sources of the rights of the Namibian Constitution. As President Nujoma stated during the visit of Queen Elizabeth II in 1991,

“We equally see in the Commonwealth Singapore Declaration, a viable framework for relating the noble objectives of democracy and good government…That Declaration reaffirms our collective belief in the liberty of the individual, equal rights for all citizens regardless of race, creed or political belief…In Namibia, too, we adhere to the principles of constitutional democracy, human rights, the rights of the individual, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, a free press, an open economy, and social justice” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999: 131).

The democratic values enshrined in the Namibian Constitution eventually translates into a foreign policy, as it will be discussed in the next chapter that Namibia’s foreign policy includes the promotion of democracy on the continent.

The Commonwealth has taken a stand against decolonisation. The Singapore Declaration states that the Commonwealth opposes all forms of colonial domination (Commonwealth, 1971). Arguably, this stand could be said to be one of the international sources of Namibia’s foreign policy, since Namibia, too, took a stand against forms of colonial occupation, for example the occupation of the Sahrawi Republic by Morocco. Namibia campaigned for the decolonisation of the Sahrawi Republic as it will be discussed in the next chapters. The President of the Sahrawi Republic, Mohamed Abdelaziz, attended the 10th independence celebration, in 2000. The invitation of President Abdelaziz to the Namibian independence celebration signifies the strong ties between Namibia and the Sahrawi Republic. It further demonstrates Namibia’s recognition of the Sahrawi Republic as a sovereign state, and it is therefore a rejection of colonial domination.

The Commonwealth promotes democracy and good governance. The Commonwealth Principles states,
“We believe in the liberty of individual…and in the inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic processes in framing the society in which they live. We therefore strive to promote in each of our countries those representative institutions and guarantees for personal freedom under the law that are our common heritage” (Commonwealth, 1971).

At the CHOGM held in Zimbabwe in 1991, former President Nujoma stated that the ideals and values of the Commonwealth correspond to those of the Namibian Government, which has put in place institutions promoting democracy and good governance (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 133). Democracy and good governance are leaning to Liberalism, especially to the call for domestic democratic institutions by one of the protagonists of Liberalism, President Woodrow Wilson of the US (Kegley, 2007: 27).

The Commonwealth is opposed to racial discrimination and the Commonwealth Principles state that Member-States will vigorously combat the evil of racial prejudice and discrimination (Commonwealth, 1971). The Commonwealth’s promotion of democracy and its opposition to racism has inspired Namibia’s foreign policy objective of enhancing the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic society (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80).

When the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, motivated his Budget Vote in the National Assembly in 1993, he stated that the foreign policy objectives of Namibia include the training and re-training programme of the Foreign Service personnel (Debates of the National Assembly, 1993: 86). After the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established, the Commonwealth sent an expert, Ambassador Ebenezer Moses Debrah, a Ghanaian diplomat to conduct diplomatic training and assist with the establishment of the Ministry. Ambassador Debrah compiled the training manual for Foreign Service Officers and conducted the diplomatic training for the staff of the Ministry. The training equipped Foreign Service officials with diplomatic skills to enable them to make contributions to foreign policy-making. Since the training was modelled on the Commonwealth Foreign Services, it could, therefore, be stated that the Commonwealth was one of the early sources of influence on the Namibian foreign policy.
It should, however, be noted that the Commonwealth as an organisation is more of a consultative organisation, whose Member-States are predominantly involved more in participating in programmes and meetings. Reynolds (1988:102) writes that the Commonwealth does not serve a specially defined purpose and has no military or economic agreements which exclusively link its Member-States. Former Namibia’s High Commissioner to the UK and Commonwealth, Monica Nashandi, stated that at the CHOGM, Heads of State interact at an informal level, discussing issues of democracy in the Commonwealth countries, human rights issues and pursuing development agendas (Nashandi, 2008: interview). This forum therefore presents Namibia with an opportunity to contribute to democracy and good governance and campaign for development assistance programmes.

3.5.6 Non-alignment

The first principle of the Namibian foreign policy (article 96 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia) states that the country shall adopt a non-aligned policy (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 52). This principle could be attributed to the influence from the NAM. SWAPO had been a member of the NAM since its admission in 1978. The NAM was founded during the Cold War and the intentions of Member-States were that they should not align with either the East or West. The principle of non-alignment is also enshrined in Article III of the OAU Charter (OAU, 1963b: 4). Unlike the UN, OAU and the Commonwealth, NAM does not have a permanent headquarter or full-time Secretary-General. Most of its activities are carried out by the Coordinating Bureau consisting of diplomats at the UN in New York.

In 1996, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, stated in the National Assembly that it is the Ministry’s objective to implement the decisions of the NAM Summit, especially the strengthening of the South-South cooperation (Debates of the National Assembly, 1996: 162). NAM Member-States recognise the importance of the South-South cooperation. Having noted that globalisation has largely benefited the industrialised countries, they stated in the declaration, The Call from Columbia, adopted
at the XI Summit, held in Cartagena, Columbia, 1995, that there was a need to ensure economic cooperation among the underdeveloped and developing economies to achieve collective self-sufficiency (NAM, 1995).

3.5.7 SADC

Namibia joined SADC in 1990, when it was still the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). The transformation of the regional body from a Coordinating Conference, SADCC, to a Community, SADC, was adopted at the Heads of State Summit held in Windhoek on 17 August 1992. In December 1993, Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development, Dr Kaire Mbuende, was appointed Executive Secretary of SADC and served in that position between 1994 and 1999.

When SADCC was established in 1980, its main objectives were to reduce the dependency of Member-States, especially from the apartheid South African Government; to implement programmes and projects with national and regional impact; to mobilise the resources of Member-States to ensure self-reliance; and to secure international understanding and support (SAPEM, 1991:2 and SADC, 1994: 4 – 5).

Cooperation among SADC Member-States occurs in the areas of transport and energy, among others, which is anchored in Interdependence as an approach to foreign policy studies. This approach is about the reciprocal relations between states, where they derive mutual benefits from such relations. One of the protagonists of Interdependence approach, Oran Young (in Swatuk, 1991: 62) cited areas of communication, transportation and military technology as development areas which encourage Interdependence.

One of the objectives of SADC is the achievement of sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment (SADC, 1992). A month later, after the adoption of the SADC’s Windhoek Treaty in August 1992, President Nujoma
informed the NAM Summit that Namibia was committed to environmental management and sustainable use of natural resources (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 234). In 2007, the Parliament passed a Bill on the Environmental Management showing the commitment of the Government to maintain the ecosystem and effective utilisation of natural resources. The principles of the Act are, *inter alia*, that “Renewable resources must be used on a sustainable basis for the benefit of future generations” (Parliament of the Republic of Namibia, 2007). This principle is in accordance with the SADC objective of sustainable use of resources stated earlier.

In 1996, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, stated in the Parliament that one of the Ministry’s foreign policy objectives was to expand areas of bilateral cooperation in the context of SADC with the European Union and other regional bodies (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1996: 161). This statement points to the acknowledgement of SADC as one of the country’s foreign policy sources. Another foreign policy objective spelt out by the Minister is the promotion of regional cooperation with Namibia’s neighbours on issues of conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, exchange of information as well as in the fields of trade, joint ventures and cultural exchanges. It could be argued that this objective has roots from the SADC objective which states that SADC will aim to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration (SADC, 1994: 6).

Following the land invasions in Zimbabwe, which will be discussed in details in the next sections, western countries mainly from Europe, North America and Australia, have been vociferous and even applied sanctions against Zimbabwe. Landsberg (2004: 172) confirms this state of affairs when he wrote about South Africa’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe amidst pressure from the western powers.

Namibia maintained cordial relations with Zimbabwe and this stance is arguably anchored in the SADC’s stance. The SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit held in Tanzania in March 2007 re-affirmed its support to the Government and people of Zimbabwe and
mandated the then President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, to facilitate the dialogue between the Government of Zimbabwe and opposition parties. The Summit further mandated the Executive Secretary of SADC to study the economic situation in Zimbabwe, with a view to come up with remedy measures. The Summit also called for the lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe and called for the UK Government to honour its land compensation obligations made under the Lancaster House talks held in 1979 between representatives of the Patriotic Front (PF) comprising ZANU and ZAPU and of the government of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) (SADC, 2007).

The position of SADC on Zimbabwe was the source of the position of delegates from SADC Member-States to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) – European Union (EU) Joint Parliamentary Assembly held in June 2007 during the debate on the situation in Zimbabwe. The researcher of this study was the Head of the Namibian delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. Delegates from Europe, some Caribbean and a few African countries made pronunciations about lack of democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe. Delegates from all SADC and many other African states argued that the SADC Initiative should be supported and SADC should be allowed ample time to address the situation in Zimbabwe without interference from other governments or international organisations. Eventually, the position of SADC Member-States prevailed in the meeting. At the time of writing, the SADC Initiative was still ongoing, with former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, mediating between the Zimbabwean Government and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) regarding the establishment of the 2008 post-election Government. Namibia supports the mediation efforts by former President Mbeki (Pohamba, 2008: interview).

SADC countries are cautious on the Zimbabwean issue, which could be attributed to the approach of Interdependence in international relations. Landsberg (2004: 173) maintains that the South African Government has been opposed to economic sanctions against Zimbabwe as these will have a spill over effect to the neighbouring countries. It could, therefore, be argued that because of the economic interdependence between the neighbours, many SADC countries will adopt a cautious policy towards a neighbouring
state and a member of the regional family. This become more evident in the analysis of McGowan (2006: 317), who wrote about Interdependence in the context of President Mbeki’s address to SADC states that the regional body need to be united and “sink or swim together”.

3.6 Domestic sources of Namibia’s foreign policy

The foreign policy of any country is a reflection of its domestic policy. The political and economic strengths of a given country will determine its relations with other states and its behaviours in the international political system. Addressing the National Assembly during his first Budget Vote motivation, Namibia’s first Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab stated,

“[The] foreign policy of a country is or ought to be a mirror-image of its domestic policy. One cannot profess abroad either on legal grounds, political, moral grounds, something that does not have its source here back home” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 202).

Macridis (1985: xiii – xiv) wrote about important foreign policy elements that have a bearing impact on the formulation and decision-making process of the country’s foreign policy. Geography, economic capacity and idiosyncratic resources (human elements) are influential factors in foreign policy-making, which will be applied here.

3.6.1 Geography

In respect of geography, a country would ideally avoid to be at war with its neighbours. In his first Budget Vote motivation, Minister Gurirab stated in the Parliament that “…[W]e will always strive to have warm, friendly and productive relations with our immediate neighbours to start with” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 205). The significance of Namibia’s geography was emphasised by the Minister’s use of the words “immediate neighbours”. Given geographic dynamics, trade partners of a given country will include its immediate neighbours. Accordingly, a country’s foreign policy towards its neighbours will be cordial. Ambassador Wilbard Hellao who served as the Head of Mission in Zambia, Sweden and South Africa states that comparatively speaking
Namibia’s trade relations with South Africa is much higher than with other countries, as it represents 75% of the gross import (Hellao, 2007: interview).

Namibia benefits economically from Botswana which, being a landlocked country, uses the Walvis Bay harbour as a transit point for its exports and imports. The Trans-Kalahari highway serves as a transport linkage between the two countries to transport goods and services. All these economic activities, which are based on geography, are taken into consideration in foreign policy-making. Earlier, it was stated that Namibia and Botswana avoided going to war over the Kasikili / Sedudu Island. In addition to international influence to settle international disputes through peaceful means, Namibia and Botswana are disposed to value their neighbourliness. Namibia and Botswana had signed agreements establishing Namibia-Botswana Joint Commission of Cooperation (July 1990) and Joint Water Committee. Cooperation agreements promotes trade between partners and, therefore, economic growth. It is therefore arguable that as neighbouring states Namibia and Botswana would consider the aspect of trade in resolving their dispute on the Kasikili / Sedudu Island.

3.6.2 Economic aspects

Economic factors are among domestic sources of Namibia’s foreign policy. Namibia’s economic activities include imports and exports of goods and services. These activities have an impact on the country’s bilateral relations with other states. Namibia is a beef-producing country and exports beef to the European Union in terms of the Lomé IV Convention. The trade figures for the beef export to the EU are cited in table 6 below.

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<td>N$</td>
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<td>351 897 839</td>
<td>294 286 774</td>
<td>262 031 046</td>
<td>293 556 381</td>
<td>300 149 448</td>
<td>323 305 521</td>
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By July 2008, Namibia has established diplomatic relations with all EU Member-States, except Malta. Malta joined the EU in 2004, after Namibia had long established
diplomatic relations with the EU. Namibia continues establishing diplomatic relations with other countries and, therefore, a possibility exists to establish diplomatic relations with Malta in the future. Immediately after independence, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, stated in the Parliament,

“We would want to sell beef to the European Community and benefit from it…this government must start realising that Namibia is a small, poor African country, whose fate and fortune are intertwined in so many ways with the one destiny of Africa” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 205).

The economic capacity of a state as a foreign policy factor has determined Namibia’s presence in foreign capitals. At independence, the Cabinet approved the establishment of 18 diplomatic Missions. Initially, only nine Missions were opened in Angola, Belgium, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sweden, the UK, US, USSR and Zambia (Debates of the National Assembly, 1990: 232, 237). This was an ideal situation, but it was due to the constrained resources. This was acknowledged by the first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, when she stated that it was inconceivable not to have Cuba among the list of the first missions to be opened, given Cuba’s role on the liberation struggle for Namibia’s independence (Nandi-Ndaitwah, 2007: interview).

3.6.3 Foreign policy decision-makers and institutions

Idiosyncratic resources that have an impact on foreign policy-making are the available human resources (agents) and institutions such as the foreign policy bureaucracy (structures) in foreign policy-making, including the Head of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs, other government Ministers, Heads of Missions and other diplomatic officials. Lerche & Said (1979: 41) maintains that the Head of Government, who is the President or Prime Minister, is the sole authority on foreign policy matters and exercises “ultimate authority in the area of foreign policy”. Gurirab (2007b: interview) repeats that in some countries, Heads of State exercise much influence on foreign policy matters, leaving Foreign Ministers to be mere messengers, a situation he said was different in the Namibian context. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in Namibia was given independence to drive foreign policy issues. The role of the President in foreign policy decision-making in Namibia is addressed in chapters four and five.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes three departments namely, Protocol, Bilateral Affairs, and Multilateral Affairs, and two directorates, namely Administration and Legal Affairs. The departments are headed by Under-Secretaries, in terms of the approved establishment of the Ministry (Office of the Prime Minister, 2005). But, this researcher as Foreign Relations Officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security observed over many years that the departments have been headed by former ambassadors whose rank of Deputy Permanent Secretary is one notch above that of Under-Secretary.

The Department of Protocol and Directorate of Administration are support units. The Administration directorate deals with finance, personnel and auxiliary services. The Protocol department deals with protocol activities such as arrangements of functions, accreditation of foreign diplomats, etiquette services to dignitaries, and visa processing.

The Department of Bilateral Affairs has three directorates, namely the Directorate of Africa and Joint Commissions, Directorate of Asia, Pacific Rim and the Middle East, and the Directorate of Europe, America and the Caribbean. The Directorates are divided into Divisions headed by Deputy Directors and sub-divisions, which are allocated Foreign Relations Officers, often called Desk Officers (Office of the Prime Minister, 2005). The Department deals with Namibia’s bilateral relations in the political, security, economic, education, cultural and social areas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, c. 2006: 7 – 23).

The Department of Multilateral Affairs has one directorate, the Directorate of International and Regional Coordination. This Directorate, too, comprises divisions headed by Deputy Directors, and sub-divisions run by Desk Officers. It deals with relations between Namibia and multilateral organisations. The Researcher of this study served as a Desk Officer in the then International Political Affairs sub-division, responsible for the United Nations for a period of two years from 1996 to 1998. Functions of this sub-division are currently divided among the sub-divisions of Political
and Disarmament, and General Assembly and Security Council (Office of the Prime Minister, 2005).

The Directorate of Legal Affairs deals with bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. The function of information dissemination in the Ministry is carried out by the Directorate of Information, which falls directly under the Office of the Permanent Secretary (Office of the Prime Minister, 2005). The structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is included in Appendix 5.

The actual work of foreign policy-making emanates from the desks of Desk Officers. These officers conduct research on international relations and draft memoranda to the Permanent Secretary through their supervisors, giving information on topical issues pertaining to countries and organisations under their Desks and recommending a course of action to be taken. Desk Officers also draft briefing memoranda for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, other Ministers and the President during bilateral engagements with their respective counterparts. As a former Desk Officer, the researcher of this study observed that the work of the supervisors (Deputy Directors, Directors and Under-Secretaries) in the Ministry has largely been to make topographic and grammatical corrections to the documents coming from the Desk Officers. In most cases supervisors did not add issues of substances to the documents.

Heads of Missions and other diplomatic officials are among human elements that are among sources of domestic influence on foreign policy. Heads of Missions send monthly reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that assist with foreign policy formulation. Foreign Service Officers at the Missions and the Ministry conduct research and make recommendations that are necessary in formulating policies. In order to play a meaningful role in diplomatic relations between Namibia and their countries of posting Heads of Missions need to be focused and persuasive in their approach to market their country. Heads of Missions are further required to understand the environments in which they are operating to be able to defend Namibia’s foreign policy and recommend policy positions and changes (Asheeke, 2007: interview and Hellao, 2007: interview).
It is stated that in some Missions staff are of assistance and they make valuable inputs on foreign policy matters, while in others staff members are not properly trained and do not take up studies to enhance their knowledge (Hellao, 2007: interview and Nashandi, 2007: interview). There are, however, no academic training programmes arranged for staff by the Ministry, apart from short courses. Many Heads of Missions, however, agree that there is insufficient staffing at the missions, especially at multilateral missions, due to financial constraints. Staff members at the Mission in New York, for example, are competent but they have to be complimented by the staff from the Mission in Washington during the UNGA sessions (Huaraka, 2007: interview). The shortage of staff at the diplomatic missions causes overburden and frustrations.

The researcher of this study was part of the delegation of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, which conducted a Mission inspection on the Namibian Mission in Cuba in May 2008, where Ambassador Grace Uushona stated that the Mission in Cuba is understaffed because it has only four officials, namely, the Ambassador, First Secretary, Second Secretary and Third Secretary. During the time of the Mission inspection, the Mission in Cuba was involved in multilateral activities because Cuba held the chair of the NAM. Because of the staff shortage, there is no official dealing with consular duties and sometimes the Ambassador has to attend to these duties herself.

While it is acknowledged that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the centre of foreign policy-making, other Ministers play a role in the coordination of the policy. The Minister of Trade and Industry, for example, plays an important role in driving economic diplomacy issues. The Ministry of Trade and Industry is the coordinating centre of SADC matters and this is also the Ministry which coordinates trade and investment issues with foreign counterparts, including trade negotiations with the EU. This brings the line Minister in the fold of foreign policy-making (Nandi-Ndaitewah, 2007: interview and Ulenga, 2007: interview). Accordingly, some of Namibia’s diplomatic Missions have commercial counsellors employed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Namibia’s first
Permanent Secretary of Trade and Industry, Tsudao Gurirab, stated that in some areas there is a thin line where the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Trade and Industry divide responsibilities (Gurirab, 2007c: interview). This is what the Interdependence approach argues that due to increasing multiple issues and areas of cooperation, cross-departmental and cross-national policy activities become possible (Webber & Smith, 2002: 22).

The Prime Minister has a role to play in foreign policy-making. Gurirab (2007b: interview) states that given the experience of Prime Minister Hage Geingob, he was consulted to make contributions. He had bilateral relations with other Heads of Government and he also received foreign envoys. The reporting channel for Heads of Missions is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but some Heads of Missions sent private copies to the Prime Minister, to influence consideration and action, when there was a delay from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Geingob 2007b: interview). Geingob’s role on foreign policy-making during high level bilateral visits will be discussed further in the next chapter.

When Theo-Ben Gurirab succeeded Geingob as Prime Minister he, too, was involved in foreign policy-making, given his experience in Foreign Affairs of about 40 years. The third Prime Minister, Nahas Angula, does not play much role in foreign affairs matters compared to his predecessors. Although he also receives foreign dignitaries he does not make statements on foreign policy matters. This could be attributed to the fact that Angula came from a different background, education, and has not been in the Foreign Affairs field. His interest on foreign affairs issues is, therefore, not to the same extent like that of his predecessors.

Other Ministers, too, play a role on a need basis. The Ministry of Defence has played a role in peace-keeping missions, as discussed earlier. The Energy Sector is also one of the domestic sources of foreign policy between Namibia and her neighbours. Currently Namibia has, in the field of energy, power supply agreements between its power utilities and the power utilities of Angola, Botswana South Africa Zambia and Zimbabwe
The transport sector has also played a role in integrating Namibia with her neighbours through major transport network projects linking Angola, Botswana and Zambia.

The human resources available at the Ministry and Missions are limited, typical of a small state. Traditional theories of small state maintains that small states have limited human resources, which then requires that the scope of the foreign policy is limited. It further maintains that decision-making officials depend on untimely or incomplete information that is controlled by outside sources (Papadakis and Starr, 1991: 427). While there are limited human resources in the Ministry and Missions, Namibia’s foreign policy covers a large scope and there are remarkable successes as it will be discussed in the next chapters.

One of the weaknesses of the idiosyncratic sources of Namibia’s foreign policy is that there are no official translators in the Ministry and mostly the Ministry depend on translators who form part of visiting delegations. The Ministry further depends on embassies for the translations of documents. This process takes a long time unlike when the Ministry had its own translators. The other weakness is that the Management of the Ministry spends time correcting topographic errors in the documents drafted by Desk Officers rather than carrying out research and formulate position papers on topical issues of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. The Management of the Ministry, chaired by the Permanent Secretary also does not regularly discuss major foreign policy issues, but mostly routine work of an administrative nature. The researcher of this study observed this problem as a Desk Officer attached to the Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the Management (from May – November 1998). Peer discussions with Foreign Service officers confirm that this trend continues.

3.6.4 Parliament

The Namibian Parliament has five Parliamentary Standing Committees, including the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Policy, Defence and Security, which has
an oversight function over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The researcher of this study serves as a member of this Committee. The Committee may receive and consider reports from the Ministry and even submissions from individuals related to the operations of the Ministry. It may summon officials from the Ministry, and conduct investigative or oversight hearings on any matter brought before it and make recommendations to the Ministry. The Committee may also monitor and enquire about related legislative programmes, policy formulation, budget and rationalising, and personnel functioning of the Ministry (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 34 – 35 and National Assembly, c. 1990: 34 – 35; 39 – 40).

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Policy, Defence and Security is one of the institutions that should play a role in foreign policy-making, but in the Namibian context this has not been happening. The first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, admitted that the Parliament was not given due recognition to handle foreign policy issues, apart from the ratification of Treaties. He contends that the Parliament ought to be involved more in foreign policy matters (Gurirab, 2007b: interview). The only major activity carried out by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs was to undertake inspections to Namibian hardship Missions. Hardship Missions are Missions in countries where basic necessities and medication are not readily available, or extremely expensive. The first Missions inspection were undertaken in 2004 and before all Missions could be visited elections were held and new Members of Parliament assumed duties in March 2005. New Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee continued with Mission inspection, which were only finalised in May 2008. This means for three years, the Committee was unable to come up with a tangible action or recommendation arising from its oversight function over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Committee has also not made an influence on foreign policy matters. It had not discussed important issues, for example like reviewing the implementation of the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management. The Committee does not also engage the Heads of Missions, or invite the Minister to brief and explain to the
Committee important resolutions passed by the UNGA, for example, and Namibia’s positions on those resolutions.

Geingob (2007b: interview) is of the opinion that the role of the Committee depends on the drive of the Chairperson. This argument is relevant, especially when it has been observed that the Chairpersons of the Committee on Foreign Affairs have not been active on foreign affairs issues. They have not participated in important debates on foreign policy, such as the motions on foreign affairs, the White Paper of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management and the Budget Votes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Other Members of Parliament outside the Foreign Affairs Committee show little interest during the debate on foreign policy motions in the Parliament. This lack of interest transcends to the mass public at large. The Namibian public has not been active on foreign affairs matters, as it had been on other matters such as HIV / AIDS, crime and human rights. Katjiuongua (2007b; interview) maintains that the academic community could contribute to foreign policy-making by organising debates around foreign policy issues. These views were echoed by Geingob (2007b: interview) who states that the University of Namibia should conduct research on foreign policy issues. These arguments are entrenched in Liberalism, which rejects the notion of the state to be the sole actor in international relations. Its assumption states that non-state actors, individuals, Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs), and International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) are vital stakeholders in international relations (Goldstein, 2003: 116).

3.6.5 The ruling party

SWAPO as a political party has not distinctively played a role in the foreign policy and as a political party it does not have a blue print on foreign policy. The party has a Secretary for External Affairs, whose duties are stated in the SWAPO Party Constitution that,

- The Secretary for External Relations shall be the spokesperson of the Party on foreign affairs and responsible for promoting friendship, co-operation and active solidarity with other progressive and democratic parties and movements throughout the world.
He or she shall be responsible for all foreign contacts of the Party (SWAPO, 1998).

From 2004, Ministers responsible for foreign affairs, Hidipo Hamutenya and later Marco Hausiku have also been the secretaries responsible for Foreign Affairs in the party. Their role on foreign affairs had been that of Ministers of Foreign Affairs than SWAPO Secretaries of Foreign Affairs. Before 2004, the SWAPO Secretary for Foreign Affairs was Kandy Nehova, Chairperson of the National Council, the second House of Parliament. The role of these Secretaries has been to forge relations with other parties and they have not played a role on government foreign relations in their SWAPO’s official capacities.

Unlike in the ANC which has a full-time Head of the Department of International Relations at its headquarters, SWAPO’s Secretaries of Foreign Affairs have been part-time office-bearers, as they are employed by the Government full-time. They concentrate predominantly on their government activities and carry out some party to party bilateral relations with the sister parties in the region such as, the ANC, MPLA, FRELIMO and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Foreign policy issues are left to governmental leaders and its bureaucracy. It is for these reasons that foreign policy issues are not included in the SWAPO Party Election Manifesto. The Manifesto deals mostly with domestic issues and issues related to trade and investments.

The effect of this state of affairs is that SWAPO as a party does not show its presence on foreign policy-making. Ideally, SWAPO ought to discuss foreign policy issues in its decision-making organs, such as the Central Committee. SWAPO’s decision-making organs need to be appraised with information of the Party’s position on major foreign policy issues, so that the Party can defend and articulate these issues among its members. This is necessary especially when there is a silence from the Government on foreign policy issues as it will be discussed in the next chapters. Ideally, foreign policy issues should also be included in SWAPO’s Election Manifesto to form part of the blue print that should be implemented by the Government.
3.6.6 Opposition parties, the media and civil organisations

The media reaches a wider national and international audience. Media institutions are, therefore, important agents of political socialisation. The Namibian media, such as The Namibian newspaper and civil organisation, such as the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN) and the Namibian National Students Organisation (NANSO, have been active on the issues of Namibia’s relations with the Nigerian Government in the wake of human rights persecution in 1995, the participation in the DRC war and Namibia’s bilateral relations with Zimbabwe, as will be discussed in section 3.7. The role of the opposition parties in foreign policy matters is further carried out through their participation in parliamentary committees and through introducing motions in the Parliament.

Tables 7 – 10 below indicate the representation of opposition parties in the Namibian Parliament since independence, 1990 (the ruling party is written in bold).

Table 7: First Parliament, National Assembly, Namibia (1990 – 1995)
Source: Hopwood, 2007:42.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>seats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action Christian National (ACN)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Convention of Namibia (FCN)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia National Front (NNF)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Patriotic Front (NPF)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Front (UDF)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Hopwood, 2007:42.

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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Coalition of Namibia (DCN)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor Action Group (MAG)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO)</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Front (UDF)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Source: Hopwood, 2007:43.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>seats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress of Democrats (CoD)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor Action Group (MAG)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO)</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>United Democratic Front (UDF)</td>
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Source: Hopwood, 2007:43.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress of Democrats (CoD)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor Action Group (MAG)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO)</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Front (UDF)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The media, civil organisations and opposition parties have not really made a great impact on Namibia’s foreign policy. Lister (2007: interview) stated that the impact made by individuals, media and civil organisations do no matter much, because foreign policy issues are not a decisive factor in elections, unlike for example, the Iraq war’s impact on elections in America. Lister further stated that there is lack or little interest in foreign policy matters caused by the fact that many people have no knowledge of foreign policy issues.

The Leader of the Official Opposition, CoD, Ben Ulenga stated that the role of opposition parties depends on the extent to which they are prepared to pursue foreign policy issues and the attitude of the Government. Ulenga stated that the Government may take a
complimentary or competitive approach. In the complimentary approach, opposition parties are likely to make some impact, while in the competitive approach, depending on the extent of the Government’s majority, opposition parties are not likely to make impacts on foreign policy-making (Ulenga, 2007: interview). The competitive approach of the Government could be discerned from the statement of Foreign Minister Gurirab, when he addressed the Superior Institute of International Relations in Mozambique, 1998, stating that,

“All election results have thus far consistently favoured SWAPO. It follows from this reality that, at the present time, the contribution of the parliamentary opposition has not been decisive in policy formulation and implementation. Public debate is, of course, another matter. We have not quite yet made a clean break with the recent ugly past and the people’s memories are still fresh about who did what, how, when and why” (Gurirab, 1998).

Another weakness of the opposition parties regarding foreign policy-making is that their respective constitutions do not state anything about foreign affairs. There is also no provision for the Secretaries responsible for foreign affairs in the constitutions of opposition parties. The effect of this state of affairs is that Namibian opposition parties have become ineffective and sometimes dormant in contributing to foreign policy-making. This is illustrated by their participation in the debate on the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management when it was tabled in Parliament in 2004. It was only the CoD and DTA that participated in the debate. The UDF and MAG did not participate in the debate, but the White Paper was adopted unanimously on 15 July 2004 (Debates of the National Assembly, 2004b: 350). It is important to note that in Namibia, after a White Paper has been adopted by Parliament, it continues to be referred to as a “White Paper”.

3.6.7 The business community

Namibia has established Joint Commissions of Cooperation with a number of countries such as Angola, Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. From time to time, members of the business community are invited to participate in the sessions of these Commissions and, thus, contribute to foreign policy-making, especially to issues pertaining to trade and foreign direct investment. At the inaugural session of the Namibia / Zimbabwe Joint
Commission of Cooperation and Trade in Harare in 1994, the then Foreign Minister Gurirab underscored the importance of the private sector’s role in trade, stating that the Namibian Government can only identify opportunities, but that it is the private sector that carries out the import and export of commodities. Minister Gurirab’s delegation to the session of the Joint Commission included executives from Namibia Breweries Limited, Meat Board, Profoods Holding, Namibian Horse Mackerel Group and TNP Fishing Company.

Business delegations are also included in the official visits of the President and Prime Ministers to accord businesspersons an opportunity to engage their counterparts from other countries. They serve as advisors to government leaders in whose delegation they travel. In this respect they can influence foreign policy-making, although not directly as diplomatic and other government officials.

The Namibian Agriculture Trade Forum (ATF), an independent organisation comprising agricultural producers and processors interacts with its members for inputs and comments pertaining to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between Namibia and the EU. ATF also interacts with the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economic, Natural Resources and Public Administration on the EPAs. The researcher of this study is a Chairman of this Committee. By the time of writing this study, the process of EPAs negotiations has not yet been completed.

3.7 Selected examples of domestic disagreement on foreign policy

Foreign policy-making in Namibia has not been a matter of consensus all the time. There were times when there has been domestic disagreement on foreign policy matters. Sometimes these disagreements occurred among government leaders, although not very strong, while in most cases it has been between the Government, and opposition parties and the civil society.
3.7.1 The Ken Saro-Wiwa issue

In November 1995, the first tangible post independence instance of domestic disagreement about Namibia’s foreign policy occurred. It related to the country’s quiet diplomacy towards Nigeria on the death sentence of Ken Saro-Wiwa, an activist from the Ogoni tribe. Saro-Wiwa was campaigning against environmental damages by oil companies in the Niger Delta and sought compensation for the Ogoni people in this respect. The Nigerian Government put Saro-Wiwa on trial together with eight other activists and sentenced them to death, causing international condemnation of their execution.

Following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists, the civil society in Namibia condemned the killings. Ngeno Nakamhela, the General Secretary of CCN, called on the Namibian Government to condemn the execution, recall the Namibian High Commissioner from Lagos and send the Nigerian High Commissioner in Namibia back home in protest of the executions (The Namibian, 14 November 1995: 1 – 2). Collin Kamehozu, Secretary for Information and Publicity of NANSO called for the breaking of diplomatic ties between Namibia and Nigeria stating that Nigeria should be regarded as “extremely hostile rather than friendly”. He called on the Government to take a firm stand against Nigeria, rather than expressing ‘sentiments of shock’ to the executions. Kamehozu further called on President Nujoma to publicly withdraw an invitation to President Abacha of Nigeria to visit Namibia. President Nujoma invited President Abacha to visit Namibia during his visit to Nigeria in May 1995 (The Namibian, 15 November 1995: 2 and The Namibian, 21 July 1995: 2).

SWANU, one of the oldest political parties discussed earlier condemned the execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists, calling it ‘barbaric’. It also called for the Government to withdraw an invitation to the Nigerian leader, President Abacha to visit Namibia. SWANU said it was ‘irresponsible’ for the Namibian Government to maintain a quiet diplomacy and refer to Nigeria as a friendly state, in the wake of executions. SWANU stated that it will not be ideal to propagate democracy at home, while “wining
and dining with a murderous, bloodthirsty dictator like Abacha” (*The Namibian*, 17 November 1995: 3).

The University of Namibia (UNAM), called on the military regime in Nigeria to restore human rights and the rule of law. UNAM stated that it has a moral obligation to condemn the suppression of the rights of dissidents and the loss of human rights and dignity. UNAM called on the Namibian Government and the international community to work towards the restoration of democracy in Nigeria (*The Namibian*, 21 November 1995: 3).

Other members of the civil society criticised the Government’s quiet diplomacy and called on the Government to follow the example of its neighbour, South Africa. The then South African President, Nelson Mandela, condemned the killings. In Johannesburg a demonstration was held, led by prominent government and ruling party leaders such as Tokyo Sexwale, the then Premier of Gauteng, Cheryl Carlous, the then Deputy Secretary-General of the ANC, and Charles Nqakula, the then Secretary-General of the South African Communist Party (SACP) (*The Namibian*, 20 November 1995: 3).

The civil society also demonstrated alignment to the approach of Idealism, which rejects the reduction of politics to deadly violence. Idealism advocates fair laws for all citizens and disapproves a state of affairs where actors in politics kill and torture in the name of personal, party or national interests (Couloumbis and Wolfe, 1990: 8 – 9). The actions of the church and civil society are further entrenched in the Liberal perspective of international relations, especially its assumption which recognises the importance of individuals and calls for their protection and promotion of human rights, even above national interests and state autonomy (Kegley, 2007: 28).

Mishake Muyongo, the then Leader of the Official Opposition, DTA moved an unopposed Motion on Nigeria. The motion called for the Assembly to condemn the regime of President Abacha for their brutality and the continued violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Motion also demanded the establishment of a democratic government in Nigeria without delay and the immediate release of all
political prisoners. The Motion further called for the suspension of all relations with Nigeria until a democratic government has been established in that country. Despite relatively widespread condemnation of the Government’s stance on this issue, the Motion was rejected because the ruling party voted against it (Debates of the National Assembly, 1995: 80 – 81).

Earlier, the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, stated that the Namibian Government was shocked by the execution and Namibia has supported the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth (The Namibian, 13 September 1995: 1). However, the Namibian Government refused to withdraw a standing invitation to President Sani Abacha of Nigeria to come to Namibia. The Government maintained by then that it would rather continue engaging Nigeria through consultations and dialogue to address the human rights abuses, rather than isolating Nigeria and recalling Namibian diplomats. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, argued that the Government disagrees with what was happening in Nigeria, but diplomatic relations should be maintained even when countries differ on policies. He argued that even during the Cold War, the USSR’s largest presence in the world was in the US and vice versa (Debates of the National Assembly, 1996: 216 – 217).

Minister Gurirab defended the Government’s position and referred to the important role of Nigeria in West Africa. Nigeria played an important role in peace efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Furthermore, Nigeria is also a market for the European and US products and she is an important oil-producing country. The Minister also pointed out that most of the countries that recalled their diplomats had gradually sent them back to Lagos and Abuja (Debates of the National Assembly, 1996: 217). Commenting on the impacts of events in Nigeria, Habib and Selinyane (2004:55) state that even South Africa, which led the campaign for Nigeria’s expulsion from the Commonwealth, revised its position when Western states changed their tough position towards Nigeria. Namibia, however, wanted
to maintain a consistent policy and recognise the role of Nigeria as a strong power in West Africa.

### 3.7.2 Involvement in the DRC conflict

In 1998, the Governments of Uganda and Rwanda, backing the rebels fighting against the Government of President Laurent Kabila, invaded the DRC. Subsequent to the invasion President Kabila sought assistance from his allies in the region, resulting in military intervention by Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe. Namibia’s intervention followed on her diplomatic relation with the DRC.

Within Namibia, there have been disagreements on the decision by the Namibian Government to send members of the NDF to the DRC to support government forces, against the belligerent forces. Members of the opposition parties complained that Parliament was not consulted prior to sending the NDF to the DRC and that President Nujoma acted alone in deciding on such an important matter (Katjiuongua, 1998a and Katjiuongua 1998b). During the debate on the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management in Parliament, in 2004, Elizabeth Amukugo, a member of the opposition party, CoD, stated,

“… [T]he clandestine involvement in the DRC conflict and Angola was not consistent with the policy of non-alignment or international settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. Since the fighting in the DRC was not a secret war, it was beyond our comprehension that the decision was taken to get involved secretly without informing Parliament or even informing the public whose tax money had to be spent without their authorization” (Debates of the National Assembly, 2004b: 8).

In contrast to Amukugo’s views, former Prime Minister Hage Geingob maintains that members of the opposition parties misunderstood constitutional provisions regarding Parliament’s approval of martial laws. The relevance of the opposition arguments in this respect is applicable only when martial laws and state of emergency are applied in case of civil war or threat to constitutional order, peace and stability (Geingob, 2007b: interview).
Article 27 of the Namibian Constitution requires the President to consult the National Assembly only when declaring the public emergency, state of national defence and martial law, in the event of threat to national defence and security due to either civil war or threat by another state. The Constitution states, *inter alia*, that,

- At a time of national disaster or during a state of national defence or public emergency threatening the life of the nation or the constitutional order, the President may by Proclamation in the Gazette declare that a state of emergency exists in Namibia or in any part thereof.

- The President shall have the power to proclaim or terminate martial law. Martial law may be proclaimed only when a state of national defence involving another country exists or when civil war prevails in Namibia; provided that any proclamation or martial law shall cease to be valid if it is not approved within a reasonable time by a resolution passed by a two-thirds majority of all the Members of the National Assembly (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 17 – 18).

The Namibian Constitution is silent on the issue of deploying the NDF to defend another state from aggression. This ‘grey area’ was resolved when Parliament passed the Defence Act, No. 1 of 2002. Article 32 (2) of the Defence Act states, *inter alia*, that,

> The President may, with the concurrence the Cabinet, deploy members of the Defence Force outside Namibia –

(a) in compliance with a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations or the African Union or the Southern Africa Development Community.

(b) in the execution of an obligation arising from a bilateral or multilateral agreement to which Namibia is a party,

for the purpose of maintaining, bringing about or restoring peace, security and stability in a country other than Namibia (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002).

A possibility exists that the arguments advocated by Amukugo during the debate on the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management in 2004 were based on the Defence Act. But, it should be noted that the Defence Act was passed by Parliament in 2002, four years after the NDF was deployed to the DRC.

In his address to the nation on the situation in the DRC and Namibia’s intervention, President Nujoma emphasised that Namibia sent the NDF to the DRC at the invitation of the Government of the DRC, which was faced by acts of aggression. Initially, President Kabila requested assistance from the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security,
which at that time was chaired by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. President Nujoma stated that the DRC Government has the right to ask for military assistance from other countries in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 415). Article 51 of the UN Charter states,

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN, 1945).

Rather than arguing the DRC war in the context of Realism which asserts that human nature is embedded in an evil disposition which then causes war, the participation of Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe could be explained in the context of Liberalism’s concept of collective security. This concept supports the formation of a broad alliance of major actors in an international system in order to oppose the aggressor as a joint force (Goldstein, 2003: 124).

The participation of Namibia in the DRC war demonstrates that although Namibia is a small state it can perform beyond the traditionally perceived capacities of small states. In Chapter One it was stated that small states generally has a low level participation in world affairs. This is attributed to, *inter alia*, lack of resources. Despite her limited resources, Namibia, a small state, participated in the costly war of the DRC. She deployed her troops abroad, although mostly on UN peace-keeping missions such as UNTAC, UNAVEM III and UNMIL. Namibia also pays her subscription to international organisations such as the UN. In 2001, for example, Namibia paid her subscription of US$ 72 400 in full and on time, while rich states such as the UK, India and Saudi Arabia were late with their payments (UN, 2002).

The involvement of the Namibian Government in the DRC conflict should be understood in the context of the foreign policy objective of enhancing peace in the region (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1995: 80). During the time when the foreign policy objectives were formulated, there was civil war in Angola where the armed conflict between the
Angolan Government and UNITA took place for many years. The fighting between the DRC Government and belligerents is arguably similar to the civil war in Angola. In armed conflicts there are options to use diplomacy as an instrument of conflict resolution. As it will be discussed in Chapter Five President Nujoma explained that Namibia sent the NDF to the DRC because the situation was of an emergency in nature and required a speedy remedy (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 416).

There are, however, other aspects of the involvement in the DRC that has created controversy in foreign policy-making. The manner in which information on Namibia’s involvement in the DRC conflict was communicated to the public does not augur well for foreign policy-making. When the issue came, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, denied that Namibia has sent troops to the DRC, only for President Nujoma to confirm this state of affairs within two days. Accordingly, an opposition politician, Moses Katjiuongua, stated,

“President Nujoma did not take his institutions and his people into confidence. We first had to hear from foreign news agencies. President Nujoma made Foreign Minister Gurirab a liar” (Katjiuongua, 1998b).

The above-mentioned state of affairs reveals a controversy on public relations in foreign policy-making and lack of proper coordination among key foreign policy-makers.

During the time when Namibia became involved in the DRC conflict in 1998, Namibia granted DRC a loan of N$ 25 million. Katjiuongua further questioned the wisdom of the Namibian Government to lend a loan to the DRC Government and expressed doubts whether this money will ever be paid back, especially when President Laurent Kabila leaves the office (Katjiuongua, 1998b). There were no feasibility studies made regarding the viability of the loan’s repayment and by the time of writing this study (November 2008), the loan has not been paid back. This issue, too, has created a controversy in Namibia’s foreign policy-making.
3.7.3 Quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe

Landsberg (2004: 172) used the term ‘quiet diplomacy’ referring to the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki’s non-confrontational approach towards Zimbabwe. This was in respect of the crisis which emanated from the land reform programme in that country. Quiet diplomacy, therefore, refers to a situation when a state does not adopt a tough stance against another state to address an issue of controversy. Namibia took a friendly stance towards Zimbabwe supporting efforts by former President Mbeki to wheedle the Zimbabwean Government into a negotiated peaceful settlement with the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Pohamba, 2008: interview).

In 1985, Zimbabwe passed the Land Acquisition Act, which provides for the expropriation of land through compensation, in accordance with the willing-buyer willing-seller principle. This principle was adopted at the Lancaster House talks held in 1979 during the pre-independence negotiations between the British Government and the Patriotic Front comprising ZANU and ZAPU. In 1992, the Parliament of Zimbabwe amended the Act, removing the willing-buyer willing seller-clause. This resulted in strained relations between Zimbabwe, Britain and the US as the latter two governments opposed the programme. The British and US Governments stated that they perceive the amended Act to be targeting white land owners only, while benefiting the Zimbabwean Government officials. Britain withdrew funds earmarked for Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. The US, Britain and EU Member-States also complained about human rights and good governance in Zimbabwe and they imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe (Blair, 2002: 180 and Human Rights Watch, 2002: 6 – 8).

In 2000, the land question in Zimbabwe became increasingly political as the Government of President Mugabe endorsed land invasions by war veterans resulting in some white farmers forced off their land (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 11 – 18). Many African countries, including Namibia, continued to maintain cordial relations with Zimbabwe. In 2000, when the US Senate passed the Zimbabwe Democracy Bill imposing sanctions on
Zimbabwe because of the land reforms, the AU Summit held in Lomé, Togo, passed a declaration AHG/St.1 (XXXVI) stating,

“We, the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity...received a report on the Bill recently adopted by the Senate of the United States of America, titled “Zimbabwe Democracy Act”...The Bill, *inter alia*, prohibits assistance or debt relief from being extended by the USA to Zimbabwe. It also opposes any assistance to Zimbabwe by any international financial institutions where the USA is a member. Furthermore, it prescribes the reform of land ownership Zimbabwe should adopt... We, the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity are dismayed by this report which amounts to interference in the internal affairs of a Member State by a foreign power” (OAU, 2000).

In 2001, the AU Summit (at this Summit the OAU was renamed AU) passed another Resolution AHG/Decl.2 (XXXVII), recalling the Declaration AHG/St.1 (XXXVI) of 2000 and further, *inter alia*,

“Reaffirmed that the resolution of the land issue is central to ensuring durable peace, stability and economic development in Zimbabwe;

Reiterated its demand for Britain to honour its colonial obligation to fund the land resettlement programme in Zimbabwe in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement;

 Called upon Britain to cooperate fully and enter into dialogue with the Government of Zimbabwe with the purpose of finding a final solution to this colonial legacy” (AU, 2001a).

Apart from recognising Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, Namibia showed solidarity with Zimbabwe on the land issue, as Namibia was also addressing post-colonial land issues. Despite this, Namibia’s stance towards Zimbabwe became another area of domestic disagreement in Namibia’s foreign policy. The Namibian Government was accused by opposition parties of adopting quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe. Mc Henry Venaani of DTA, one of a few opposition parliamentarians who takes keen interest in foreign affairs, states during the debate on the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management that,

“Government’s quiet diplomacy has failed our neighbour dismally and it questions whether no options are available, rather than the quiet diplomacy. Greater options existed for our government and SADC states ranging from diplomatic sanctions to economic sanctions, whose implementation could have sent an unequivocal message to Harare that we will no longer tolerate the abuse of human rights and the erosion of democracy in our important neighbour in the region” (*Debates of the National Assembly, 2004b: 58*).

In 2006, Venaani introduced a Motion in Parliament on the effectiveness of Namibia’s diplomatic missions. Venaani also addressed the relations between Namibia and
Zimbabwe. He argued that Namibia is in an advantageous position to address human rights issues in Zimbabwe, as the two governments have friendly relations. He bemoaned what he perceived to be the Government’s turning a blind eye to Zimbabwe under the guise of avoiding interfering in domestic affairs in another country (Debates of the National Assembly, 2006a: 330 – 331).

Ben Ulenga of CoD, another opposition Member of Parliament, also criticised Namibia’s stance on Zimbabwe. Ulenga made reference to the African Union Human Rights Report which condemns human rights abuses. He recommended that the Government applies its domestic policy of open and good governance to foreign relations and not look at the fact that the Zimbabwean Government is a ZANU PF Government (Debates of the National Assembly, 2004b: 198 – 200). SWAPO Party and ZANU PF maintain good relations. ZANU PF sends delegates to the SWAPO Party Congresses and SWAPO Party sends delegates to the ZANU PF Congresses. The researcher of this study observed the cordial relations between the two parties as a Member of the Central Committee of SWAPO Party. Following the arrests and physical assault of members of the opposition parties in Zimbabwe, Ulenga introduced another Motion on the situation in Zimbabwe, in March 2007. The Motion was rejected by the majority party in Parliament, the SWAPO Party, before it was motivated.

President Mugabe paid a state visit to Namibia in February 2007. During his visit, the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) organised a demonstration where the demonstrators carried posters calling for the respect of human rights in Zimbabwe and said that President Mugabe was not welcome in Namibia (The Namibian, 01 March 2007: 1 – 2).

Issues of human rights and democracy are inclined to Idealism. According to Couloumbis and Wolfe (1990: 8) Idealism supports good governance and Idealist leaders subscribe to the principles of justice, respect of fellow human beings both domestically and internationally.
In 2008, a SWAPO Party parliamentarian, Royal /Ui/o/oo, speaking in the National Assembly, commended the smooth transition from Namibia’s first president, Sam Nujoma, to the second president, Hifikepunye Pohamba, as a good example of democracy but regretted that the same was not happening in Zimbabwe. /Ui/o/oo states:

“What President Mugabe is doing to our fellow Africans forcing them to take refuge in other countries like Botswana, Namibia and South Africa is deplorable but we still support him. There is a saying in English that says “straight talk does not break any friendship”. We are very much biased because had the same been done by a white person we all would have teamed up against him or her” (/Ui/o/oo, 2008).

/Ui/o/oo was the first politician from the ruling party to condemn the Government’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, a few days later, the Secretary of SWAPO Party Youth League, Elijah Ngurare, held a press conference where he expressed support to President Mugabe and ZANU PF. Addressing a press conference on the Zimbabwe National Assembly Elections held in March 2008, Ngurare stated,

“Prior to these elections, the enemies of Zimbabwe orchestrated a campaign to effect regime change in Zimbabwe by any means necessary. They imposed racist sanctions on Zimbabwe which made life difficult for the ordinary person with a view to instigate a revolt against the government and the ruling party” (Ngurare, 2008).

Ngurare further called for the defence of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty against what he perceived to be the agenda for regime change spearheaded by western countries (Europe and the US).

Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tuliameni Kalomoh, stated that the Government, and not the public, takes responsibility for its behaviour and policies. Kalomoh said,

“There is value in maintaining a posture that is effective in any effort to mediate between two conflicting parties. If the Government of Namibia has concluded that it is important for them to maintain a certain posture, in order to make them effective, that position should not be condemned. However, Namibia should have a moral clarity. Namibia should always be identified with that moral clarity. In the face of right and wrong, Namibia should not be impartial. In terms of good and evil, Namibia should stand up on the side of good (Kalomoh, 2008: interview).
Kalomoh noted that there are people who condemn Namibia’s quiet diplomacy but maintained that there is value in maintaining quiet diplomacy. He added that such a situation should, however, not be confused with accepting situations that are indefensible.

As stated earlier, Namibia’s stance on Zimbabwe is more anchored on the SADC and AU stances. It could not be contextualised in terms of her foreign policy objectives or principles, as the objectives and principles are silent in respect of this scenario. This is typical of small states behaviour. In their discourse on small states, Papadakis and Starr (1991: 415) stated that the behaviours of states are to be understood in the environment in which they find themselves. They further maintain that “the environment may be seen providing the parameters, or constraints, on the range of actions available to the entity”.

3.7.4 NEPAD’s APRM

In July 2001, the OAU Heads of State Summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, the OAU was transformed into the AU. When the OAU was established in 1963, the focus in Africa was primarily on decolonisation and the founding Summit of the OAU adopted the Resolution CIAS/Plen.2/Rev.2 (a) in which the organisation, *inter alia*,

- declares that the forcible imposition by the colonial powers of the settlers to control the governments and administrations of the dependent territories is a flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate inhabitants of the territories concerned.
- invites the colonial powers to take the necessary measures for the immediate application of the declaration of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples; and insists that their determination to maintain colonies or semi-colonies in Africa constitutes a menace to the peace of the continent (OAU, 1963a).

By 2001, Africa has become independent from foreign occupation, except the Sahrawi Republic which is occupied by another African state, Morocco. African states, therefore, considered to look at a new agenda of economic cooperation. Accordingly they resolved to transform the OAU into the AU to “establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role the global economy and in international negotiations” (AU, 2001b).
The Summit further adopted the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as a socio-economic programme for Africa. In 2002, the AU held a Summit in Durban, South Africa. At the Durban Summit, NEPAD was supplemented with a Declaration on Democracy. In effect Member-States committed themselves to establish the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to promote democracy, transparency and good governance on the continent. Countries willing to subscribe to the APRM should deposit the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the APRM.

The purpose of the APRM is,

“...[T]o foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building” (AU, 2003).

The Review is carried out by a Panel of five to seven Eminent Persons nominated by countries participating in the APRM and appointed by the Heads of State and Government. Members of the Panel must be experts in the fields of political governance, public financial management, macro-economic policies and corporate governance (AU, 2003).

The mandate of the APRM is to ensure that participating states adhere to the democratic values embodied in the Declaration on Democracy, Economic and Corporate Governance. In terms of the Declaration, AU Member-states committed themselves to, inter alia,

- Ensure that our respective national constitutions reflect the democratic ethos and provide for demonstrably accountable governance;
- Enforce strict adherence to the position of the African Union on unconstitutional changes of government and other decisions of our continental organisation aimed at promoting democracy, good governance, peace and security;
- Ensure effective functioning of parliaments and other accountability institutions in our respective countries, including parliamentary committees and anti-corruption bodies;
- Ensure the independence of the judicial system that will be able to prevent abuse of power and corruption.
- Facilitate development of vibrant civil society organisations, including strengthening human rights institutions at the national sub-regional and regional levels (AU, 2002b).
There is a disagreement among government officials, opposition parties and members of the civil society on Namibia’s position vis-à-vis her subscription to the APRM of NEPAD. Linus Chata, then a parliamentarian from the opposition party, CoD, expressed concern over the Government’s contradictory approach during the debate on the White Paper of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management in Parliament, in 2004. He maintains that while the Government supports NEPAD, it distances itself from the APRM (Debates of the National Assembly, 2004b: 19). Similar views were expressed by Namibia’s first Prime Minister, Hage Geingob, who maintains that NEPAD is good for Namibia and that Namibia is compliant with the APRM standards, as the country maintains democracy and good governance. Countries who have subscribed to the APRM will be considered a priority for funding by donor countries and Namibia could forfeit the opportunity if she does not sign up for the APRM (Geingob, 2007b: interview).

Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, stated that during the time when he was serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs he held the views that there was no need to sign up for the APRM because Namibia has already, in any case, met the requirements of the APRM features. Some years later he admitted that it will be advisable for the Government to sign up for the APRM (Gurirab, 2007b: interview). Meanwhile, Namibia’s first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, holds a different opinion on the APRM. For her, the APRM is judgemental in its approach, dividing Africa between the so-called democratic and undemocratic states. She further stated that it is a waste of resources to subscribe to the APRM. She, however, stated that NEPAD is a good programme as long as it is driven by Africans (Nandi-Ndaitwah, 2007: interview). Her views are echoed by President Pohamba who expressed reservations about the APRM because it is only applicable in Africa and is not applied to other continents. Pohamba stated that it appears that African states are being pitched against each other, those that are perceived to be democratic and those that are perceived to be undemocratic (Pohamba, 2008: interview).

The Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tuliameni Kalomoh, who served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1998 to 2002, stated that the APRM would
assist Namibia to identify areas where there is a need for improvement, in respect of strengths and challenges. Kalomoh stated that while serving as the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, senior UN staff members conducted peer review among themselves and this exercise assisted them to improve on their work. Kalomoh asserted that Namibia is reasonably well-governed and there should be no fear for signing up for the APRM (Kalomoh, 2008: interview).

By 2008, when this study was conducted, the Namibian Government has not signed the MoU to accede voluntarily to the APRM. There are 29 countries in Africa that have acceded to the APRM of which 8 are from SADC as indicated in table 11 below.

Table 11: Status of accession to the African Peer Review Mechanism  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other African Countries</th>
<th>SADC Member-States</th>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sao Tome &amp; Principe</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Referring to the fact that government leaders do not have consensus on Namibia’s signing up for the APRM, former Member of Parliament, Moses Katjiuongua, stated that there appears to be a contradictory approaches to NEPAD, some of which are positive on one hand while others are negative and ambiguous on the other. He advised that the country should formally subscribe to the APRM (Katjiuongua, 2007b: interview).
Meanwhile, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lempy Lucas, told the Parliament in 2006 that the joining of the African Peer Review Mechanism is voluntary by nature and there is no deadline set for Member-States to join. She stressed that Namibia has passed all review mechanism standards (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 2006b: 348). The assertion of the Deputy Minister is arguably correct, as Namibia complies with the standards of democracy and good governance and maintains the independence of the judiciary and, respect of human rights. These standards are in accordance with the AU’s Declaration on Democracy, Economic and Corporate Governance (AU, 2002b).

The position of Deputy Minister Lucas regarding Namibia’s patience to sign up for the APRM was confirmed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marco Hausiku. Minister Hausiku indicated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has commissioned a study by the Namibia Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU), to be advised on Namibia’s readiness to sign up for the APRM. By the time when this study was conducted, the Minister was studying the report and consultations with other stakeholders were taking place. Minister Hausiku expressed hope that Namibia will eventually join the APRM in the future (Hausiku, 2008: interview).

Although, arguably, Namibia’s stance on the APRM does not directly contravene the Namibian foreign policy objectives and principles, it creates a controversy of contradictions in Namibia’s foreign policy as Namibia has a reputation of promoting democracy, human rights, good governance and Pan-African solidarity. Namibia’s other weakness on NEPAD is that the Government does not popularise NEPAD among the Namibian public. There is also no dedicated team in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to drive NEPAD, but issues related to NEPAD are dealt with as general AU issues. There is further no multi-sectoral team that includes business people to look at intra-Africa trade, as NEPAD calls for AU Member-States to,

“Promote intra-Africa trade with the aim of sourcing within Africa imports formerly sourced from other parts of the world” (AU, 2000).
The promotion of intra-Africa trade is not only in line with the foreign policy objective of promoting Namibia’s economic development and prosperity by working to secure better trade terms for Namibian commodities, but it advances Pan-African solidarity. The Pan-Africanism Doctrine is central to President Nujoma’s foreign policy, as it will be discussed ahead.

3.7.5  The ban on the use of landmines

Landmines have killed and maimed thousands of people in Namibia and her neighbour Angola during the wars of independence. Therefore, one may assume that the ban on the use of landmines should have received considerable support by Namibian foreign policy decision makers.

Table 12: Statistics of people killed and injured by anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in Namibia


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of persons killed</th>
<th>Number of persons injured</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>1995</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notwithstanding the situation of landmines in Namibia, one of the rare occasions where Namibian Government leaders differed openly on foreign policy matters was on the subject of banning the use of landmines. Towards the mid-1990s, a global campaign was instituted by the global civil society to ban the use of landmines in wars and conflicts.
During this campaign to ban the use of landmines, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, was vocal and supportive of this campaign, but a Cabinet colleague, the Minister of Defence, Philemon Malima, had a different approach on the issues. Minister Gurirab stated in Parliament,

“Namibia has, therefore, joined the crusade for the immediate and total ban of anti-personnel land mines… This is a noble cause. We must win it… Namibia encourages all other ongoing initiatives aimed at banning anti-personnel land mines as well as continuing de-mining both at home and abroad… Namibia has, or is going to sign all the Treaties, Conventions and Protocols in this and other related fields” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1997a: 364-365).

Minister Gurirab’s stance corresponds to Liberalism which supports the reduction of armaments. The reduction of these, it is argued, reduces and discourages war (Kegley, 2007: 537).

Philemon Malima, the Minister of Defence expressed a different view. He regarded the ratification of the Convention as untimely. Although he supported the banning on the use, trade and stock-pilling of landmines, he argued that Namibia should not ratify the Ottawa Treaty immediately. At the time Namibia was clearing mines fields planted during her liberation struggle. Minister Malima stated in Parliament that,

“Until now, however only 53 member-states have unilaterally supported a global ban on the use and production of anti-personnel mines…Given the sensitivity of this issue, I would like to state here that, though supporting in principle the ban of the use of APM mines, Namibia should not be rushed into signing and ratifying the UN Convention on land mines and anti-personnel mines…there is absolutely no hurry in signing the convention” (Debates of the National Assembly, 1997b: 12).

The reluctance by the Minister of Defence to speedily forgo arms is leaning towards Realism, especially its assumption that says due to the nature of the global system, states need to possess sufficient military capacity to counteract possible attacks from its enemies. Realists maintain that the purpose of keeping arms is, it is argued, to prepare for war in order to keep peace (Kegley, 2007: 30).

All positions expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence in principle supported a ban on the use of land mines, but there was disagreement on the timing to sign the Convention. The positions of the two Ministers posed a problem to the
Namibian delegation to the OAU’s First Continental Conference on Anti-Personnel Land Mines held in May 1997. The conference took place, a month after the Ministers expressed their views on the matter. The purpose of the conference was to advocate for the ban of landmines and the destruction of their stockpiles by the year 2000. The researcher of this study, then a Foreign Relations Officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was a member of the Namibian delegation to this Conference. The delegation comprised the researcher, Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Shivute from the Ministry of Defence, and Ringo Abed, First Secretary from the Namibian Mission in Pretoria. Delegations from several countries, including South Africa, expressed sentiments that countries should expedite the signing of the UN Convention on the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines. In the absence of a clear policy directive and unanimity among senior government Ministers, the Namibian delegation could not effectively participate in the Conference. The delegation opted not to participate in the debates.

The Conference adopted a Plan of Action, which called on OAU Members-States,

- to stress the need that the problem be addressed in a coordinated and multifaceted manner banning comprehensively anti-personnel landmines and intensifying efforts with regard to mine clearance and mine victim assistance;
- to adopt as a goal the elimination of all anti-personnel landmines in Africa and the establishment of Africa as an Anti-Personnel Landmine-Free Zone;
- all states should end all deployments of anti-personnel landmines and to establish national prohibitions such as those already adopted on the African continent, on their use, production, stockpiling, transfer and their destruction;
- urged all states to participate actively in the Brussels Conference, 24-27 June 1997, the Oslo Conference in September 1997, which are both integral to the process leading to the negotiation and signature of a legally binding international agreement to ban antipersonnel landmines in Ottawa in December 1997 (OAU, 1997).

Notwithstanding the absence of unanimity between Ministers Gurirab and Malima, Namibia signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines in Ottawa, Canada in December 1997. At the signing ceremony, Gurirab stated that landmines, chemical and nuclear weapon do not
build civilisation or global peace. He argued that land mines cause insecurity and threaten peace. They destroy the human resources needed for development and nation building.

Namibia’s accession to the Ottawa Treaty is in line with her foreign policy principle of promoting international peace and security (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). The ban on and destruction of landmine is a peace-making effort opposed to wars and conflicts.

3.8 Omissions and incompleteness

There are foreign policy omissions and incompleteness, in respect of issues that ought to have been addressed and the audience that the Namibian foreign policy actors ought to engage. Geingob (2007b: interview) stated that Namibian diplomats need to engage non-state actors, such as anti-apartheid movements, civil rights movements and the Black Caucus of the US Congress. These lobby groups had played a role in supporting the cause for Namibia’s independence.

The role of lobby groups in foreign policy issues was confirmed by former Namibia’s Ambassador to Sweden, Wilbard Hellao. Hellao stated that Sweden wanted to cut aid to Namibia, because of Namibia’s involvement in the DRC conflict and because of President Nujoma’s public criticism of the gays and lesbians. Hellao linked up with solidarity groups, which had supported the cause of Namibia’s independence, and these groups convinced the Swedish Government not to cut aid to Namibia (Hellao, 2007: interview). Pluralists consider the role of non-state actors on foreign relations. They recognise that states are not the only important actors, since there need to be a multiplicity of domestic and international influence on foreign relations (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999: 205).

Some issues in foreign relations are not fully exhausted and they are left incomplete. When President Nujoma visited Gabon in 1992, he informed President Omar Bongo that Namibia was going to open a trade mission in Gabon. At the time of writing (2008), 16
years after Nujoma visited Gabon, no trade mission has been opened in that country. Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, stated that diplomatic or trade missions are established when the Government decide to do so. Some overriding considerations are the cost of opening such trade missions, just as diplomatic missions are also closed for financial and or political consideration. Each case is looked upon its own merit (Gurirab, 2008).

Although Namibia has successfully completed the process of the reintegration of Walvis Bay in Namibia, there is still an unresolved issue of the demarcation of maritime boundaries between Namibia and South Africa along the Orange River. Currently the border is on the edge of the River on the Namibian side, and Namibia wants the border to be in the middle of the River.

There is omission and incompletion in the database and records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This Ministry is the custodian of all government agreements, but information on some of the agreements is not available. For example, some of the agreements on Namibia’s establishment of diplomatic relations could not be traced. This situation needs to be rectified, with agreements properly filed and stored for future reference both by foreign policy-makers and researchers.

3.9 Summary

This chapter applied a level of analysis approach to analyse the sources of Namibia’s foreign policy. It has also identified some of the most influential foreign policy decision-makers. It has addressed a selection of contentious foreign policy issues such as the Ken Saro-Wiwa issue, Zimbabwe, Namibia’s involvement in the DRC, the ban on landmines, and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development.

In view of the foreign policy being largely influenced by the history of SWAPO and international organisations such as the United Nations, OAU, Commonwealth, NAM and
SADC, it could be argued that the foreign policy-making of a new Namibia is anchored in Liberalism. The foreign policy of Namibia became focused on issues of peace, economic development, and South-South cooperation and these issues are within the framework of Liberalism as an approach to International Relations studies.

Namibia participated actively in the UN and the OAU’s peace agenda, contrary to the traditional perspectives that small states have a narrow scope on foreign policy (McCraw, 1994: 11). Namibia adopted quiet diplomacy in her relations with Zimbabwe. She supported SADC’s Initiative to promote dialogue between the Government and the opposition party, MDC. Namibia has, accordingly, achieved the foreign policy principles enshrined in the Namibian Constitution, such as the promotion of international peace and security and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). Namibia further achieved the foreign policy objectives of enhancing peace in the region and promoting world peace through an active role in international organisations (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80 – 81).

As part of her economic diplomacy, Namibia pursued economic bilateral relations with countries from Europe, Asia and America. Namibia further pursued multilateral economic diplomacy through her membership of COMESA, SACU, SADC, UNCTAD and WTO. As part of both economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation, Namibia pursued diplomatic relations with countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, China, India. Namibia has, thus, achieved the foreign policy principle of creating and maintaining just and mutual beneficial relations among nations (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). Namibia has further achieved the foreign objectives set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs such as the promotion of Namibia’s economic prosperity (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80).

The promotion of the South-South cooperation is also part of the NAM’s agenda (Debates of the National Assembly, 1996: 162). Namibia’s pursuing of this agenda and participation in other activities of the NAM is, arguably, an achievement of the foreign policy principle of non-alignment (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 52).
While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains the custodian of the country’s foreign policy, other government departments have an important role to play in foreign policy-making. The foreign policy principles in the Namibian Constitution largely guide foreign policy-makers on their decisions. The President as a Head of State is the key foreign policy-maker, who takes important decisions on major foreign policy issues, as President Nujoma did in the deployment of the NDF to the DRC.

Foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics. There are differences in opinions among stakeholders in a given country’s foreign policy, just as there are disagreements on domestic policies. The Namibian civil society demonstrated disagreement to the Government’s stance on foreign policy issues such as the quiet diplomacy towards Nigeria during the Ken Saro-Wiwa saga and Zimbabwe regarding human rights violations. Other stakeholders, such as the Parliament can influence the making of foreign policy, depending on their strengths. Otherwise, they can have a minimal impact and the Government, though its actors will be, to a larger extent, the exclusive centre of authority on the formulation and shaping of the foreign policy. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security has, however, been reduced to a ‘minor actor’ on foreign policy.

There is an assumption that perceptions about small states have changed over time as the international political system became more focused on cooperation rather than the use of force. Leaders of small states have a systemic role to advance the objectives of their states as the new environment presents them with ample opportunities and challenges. In this regard, Du Pisani (1992: 58) points out that the end of the Cold War presented Namibia with an opportunity to focus on a new foreign policy agenda. The post-Cold War agenda embrace more peace, environment and economic issues unlike the Cold War agenda that predominantly had a central concern over conflicts and security. This chapter has indicated that Namibia has indeed focused on a new foreign policy agenda, which had significantly affected her diplomatic relations.
CHAPTER FOUR
FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING UNDER PRESIDENT NUJOMA: TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the foreign policy under President Sam Nujoma, the first President of an independent Namibia from 1990 to 2005. Foreign policy-making during this period of transition from colonial to post-independence era was largely the establishment of Foreign Policy institutions of an independent Namibia, followed by the consolidation of that policy.

After independence, Namibia needed to mobilise human and capital resources necessary for foreign policy-making. The resources are invariably determined by the size of the country. The chapter analyses how the President as the Head of State and Government played a role in foreign policy-making and how other foreign policy actors performed under his leadership. At independence foreign policy goals and objectives were set, as discussed in the previous chapters. This chapter looks at how the set foreign policy objectives and goals were achieved under President Nujoma and further analyses the success and failures of foreign policy in view of the principles, purposes and issues discussed in Chapter Three.

4.2 The formative years of foreign policy settings in a post-independent Namibia (1990 – 1995)

In Chapter Two, it was stated that the making of foreign policy during the formative years of transition from colonialism to independence was largely influenced by the pre-independence foreign policy of SWAPO as a liberation movement. The President and Government leaders often referred to this aspect in their speeches. For example, President Nujoma told participants at the first diplomatic training programme held two months after independence that SWAPO had cultivated sound diplomatic relations with nations of the world, which created an enabling environment for an independent Namibia’s foreign
policy setting. He regards the foreign policy-making in an independent Namibia as a continuation of the SWAPO foreign policy (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 16).

Government leaders wanted Namibia to become economically independent. After Namibia’s independence, the UN Secretary-General initiated the Donors’ Pledging Conference for Namibia, which was held in New York, June 1990. At that conference, President Nujoma asserted the sovereignty of Namibia and the desire for economic independence. He stated that Namibia does not want to perpetually depend on foreign aid, but is looking for partnerships. He further informed the Conference that Namibia was exploring opportunities for joint ventures with multilateral institutions. Namibia recognises the assumptions of Liberalism which maintains that in international economics, states are no longer the only significant actors, but that they share some roles with Transnational (TNCs) and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) (Nel, 2006:34).

Subsequent to Namibia’s independence, the Namibian Government employed various diplomatic instruments to achieve its foreign policy objectives. These include multilateral diplomacy, hosting international conferences, undertaking high level visits to foreign countries, receiving high level delegations from foreign countries, promoting democracy and good governance and negotiating for the reintegration of Walvis Bay in Namibia.

4.2.1 Multilateral diplomacy

In his inaugural speech at independence on 21 March 1990, President Sam Nujoma alluded to the struggle between the international community and South Africa over the question of Namibia’s independence. The Namibian Government wanted to assure the international community that it is prepared to work with it. As a newly independent state Namibia wanted to make her presence felt in the international community and ensure that she does not remain a recluse state, isolated by the international community like her former coloniser, South Africa. Within the first two weeks of independence, Namibia joined SADCC and the Commonwealth, followed by the UN one month after
independence. Namibia’s belief in multilateral diplomacy is anchored in Liberalism, especially in its assumption that international institutions are necessary to enhance interdependence and mutual cooperation among their members (Kegley, 1995: 115 – 116).

When diplomatic missions were opened, Namibia indicated her preference for multilateral diplomacy by first opening a Mission to the UN in August 1990. In the same year, embassies were also opened in Addis Ababa, London, Lusaka, Moscow and Washington (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2004: 46). The Missions in London and Addis Ababa were accredited to multilateral organisations, namely the Commonwealth and OAU, respectively. Namibia, a newly independent small state wanted to make a remarkable debut in international politics by espousing a strong multilateral foreign policy. The Missions in Washington and Moscow were strategically placed as the host countries, the US and USSR, are permanent members of the UN Security Council, who divided the international political system in a bipolar world during the Cold War. The opening of the Missions in both the USSR and US, at an early stage of diplomatic establishments, was done in the tradition of non-alignment. Namibia did not want to appear leaning towards any of the two powerful states that represented different ideologies during the Cold War period.

Namibia also embarked upon sound multilateral relations with her neighbours. Within the first two weeks of independence, President Nujoma attended a SADCC Summit in Zambia, from 28 March – 02 April 1990. Namibian leaders did not want Namibia to be ‘just a newly independent state’ in the region, but the one that is playing a meaningful role to contribute to the regional agenda setting. Accordingly, at the SADCC Summit Nujoma expressed the wish for Namibia to contribute towards strengthening the aspirations of the governments of SADCC to achieve the goals of regional integration and economic independence (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 4). SADC maintained a liberal approach of Interdependence, which according to Holsti (1988: 73) supports cooperation of trade flows and rewards in the region that are carried out on equal terms by partners.
It could be argued that under President Nujoma, Namibia successfully established herself in multilateral diplomacy. Namibia joined international and regional organisations such as the UN, Commonwealth, OAU and SADC, which are renowned for the maintenance of world peace, economic development and integration. The significance of joining multilateral organisations is that Namibia needed to maintain her own national identity, as Namibia has been colonised by South Africa, which was isolated by the international community because of its apartheid policy and colonialism. Maintaining Namibia’s own national identity is one of the five foreign policy objectives set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately after independence (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80). This scenario is similar to South Africa, which according to Ngubentombi (2004: 201 – 204) started the process of pro-actively engaging international actors after the first democratic elections which were held in 1994. These engagements were undertaken to raise the profile of South Africa after many years of isolation by the international community. The fact that there are comparative successes between Namibia, a small state, and South Africa which is not a small state, it is arguable that Namibia has coped in multilateralism.

4.2.2 Hosting international conferences

In 1991, Namibia hosted two international conferences on the situation in South Africa, namely the Conference of the Association of West-European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid (AWEPAA), now the Association of West European Parliamentarians (AWEPA), for action against apartheid and the Africa Leadership Forum Conference on the impact of post-apartheid South Africa on Southern Africa in particular and Africa in general (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 117 – 118; 120 – 124). At the latter conference, Nujoma stated that the Southern Africa region should focus on the most effective utilisation of the political and economic institution. The new focus that Nujoma advocated relates to Liberalism, which maintains that as tensions in international relations decreases, the focus will be on economic matters (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 8).
On 17 August 1992 Namibia hosted an important SADCC Heads of State Summit, where it was decided to transform SADCC, the Conference, into SADC. In the Windhoek Treaty, Member-States of SADCC observed that there was a need to shift the focus from the coordination of development projects to a more multifaceted function of integrating the economies of Member-States. At the Summit, President Nujoma called upon Member-States to put regional interests above national considerations and pledged Namibia’s commitment and support to the regional organisation (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 227).

It is significant that after her independence Namibia which was colonised by South Africa had hosted two international conferences, fighting against South Africa’s apartheid policy and the future of the post-apartheid South Africa. Namibia has, thus, added her name to countries in Southern Africa and the world at large which fought for the end of the minority rule in South Africa. The hosting of these conferences is in accordance with one of the five foreign policy objectives set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Namibia will enhance peace in the Southern Africa region, including the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80). The conferences on South Africa were further in accordance with the foreign policy principle in the Namibian Constitution that Namibia will promote international peace and security. By the time when the conferences were held, there was no peace in South Africa. Although the ANC’s military wing MK had suspended its military operations, there were reports of violence in South Africa, due to demonstrations against the Government and protests by members of the liberation movements. The researcher of this study had followed these developments with keen interests as a student activist. It is an achievement that a small and newly independent state could take a lead in fighting for the democratisation of South Africa.

The significance of Namibia hosting the SADC Summit in 1992 is that this conference is historic as it marked the transformation of the organisation from a coordinating conference to a regional organisation striving for regional integration. President Nujoma’s call to Member-States to put the interests of the organisation first augments the
foreign policy principle of promoting international cooperation and maintaining mutual benefits among nations (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). If all Member-States equally respect SADC as a regional organisation, they will derive mutual benefits from each other through their participation in the organisation programmes.

The hosting of the two conferences on South Africa and the SADC Summit further demonstrates Namibia’s success in multilateral diplomacy.

4.2.3 Selected high level visits and bilateral relations

Namibian leaders undertook high level visits to foreign countries and received high level delegations from other countries. These visits were aimed at strengthening diplomatic and economic ties.

As part of promoting bilateral relations in the region, President Nujoma paid his first state visit to Zambia, in August 1990. Zambia was among the three countries, where SWAPO had its provisional Headquarter. The other two countries are Angola and Tanzania. President Nujoma addressed the Zambia Agricultural Show where he expressed the wish for the cooperation between Namibia and Zambia in the areas of agriculture, information technology and energy and water resources (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 32). A second state visit to Botswana followed in September 1990. Earlier, President Quett Masire paid a state visit to Namibia, in July 1990, making him the first ever foreign Head of State to pay a state visit to an independent Namibia. During President Masire’s visit, Namibia and Botswana signed agreements on the fields of Education and Culture, and on establishing a Joint Commission of Cooperation.

In August 1990, Prime Minister Hage Geingob visited Mozambique. According to the Communiqué issued by the Office of the Prime Minister in 1994, during Geingob’s visit Namibia and Mozambique signed a General Agreement on Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation. The Agreement spells out areas of cooperation to be fisheries, maritime transport, civil aviation and telecommunications.
Liberalism argues that states would promote various forms of cooperation among themselves. Cooperation means promoting prosperity and, therefore, creating an atmosphere of peace. This assumption was subjected to a debate, but eventually its relevance was confirmed by positive results from commercial cooperation (Kegley Jr., 1995: 138 – 139). The visits by President Nujoma to Zambia and Botswana and Geingob’s visit to Mozambique could, therefore, be conceivably understood to be in pursuance of a liberalistic foreign policy.

In March 1991, Namibia celebrated the first anniversary of her independence. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe was invited as the Namibian Government’s Guest of Honour. This was due to the fact that although President Mugabe played a role in the negotiations for Namibia’s independence as Chairman of the Frontline States, he did not attend the independence celebrations in 1990, as he was campaigning for elections in his country. In April 1991, a month after President Mugabe’s visit, President Nujoma paid a state visit to Zimbabwe where he addressed the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair and encouraged intensified trade relations between Namibia and Zimbabwe, and the elimination of trade barriers between the two countries (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 94). This aspect is reminiscent of Idealism (sometimes referred to as Utopia), which argues that the decline of the world of superpower predominance during the Cold-War has created a new world community which is more pluralistic and has diversified focus. Markets became to be considered as important and valuable mechanisms of influence. The shift was taken to the world economy, global division of labour and geo-economic issues (Knutsen, 1992: 244).

During September and October 1991, five bilateral engagements at the highest level between Namibian leaders and their counterparts from Africa, Asia, Europe and America took place. In September 1991, Prime Minister Geingob visited China where he held bilateral talks with the Chinese Premier, Li Peng. During this visit, China expressed interest to cooperate with Namibia on regional and international issues, and in
strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries (*The Namibian*, 10 September 1991: 1).

While Prime Minister Geingob was in China, the then US Vice President, Dan Quayle, visited Namibia and held bilateral talks with President Nujoma on US aid programmes to Namibia. President Nujoma and Vice President Quayle also signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in the fields of employment linked to natural resources, environment and ecological education and research. Vice President Quayle hailed Namibia’s democracy, stating that it could be the model for other African countries on moving towards democratic rules (*The Namibian*, 13 September 1991: 3). The synergy in environmental protection is embedded in Interdependence. Its assumptions promote cooperation on ecological issues and economic interdependence that are common problems (Kegley, 1995: 309).

In September 1991, President Collor de Mello of Brazil visited Namibia. He was the first non-African Head of State to visit Namibia after independence. Collor’s mission was to forge cooperation with countries in Southern Africa to create a south Atlantic zone of peace, and close the gap between the North and South. Collor and Nujoma signed a Protocol to set up a commission to explore possible cooperation in fishing, technology, agriculture, sport and education (*The Namibian*, 16 September 1991: 3).

The agreements signed between Namibia, China and Brazil underscore the Complex Interdependence assumption that several departments rather than the Foreign Affairs department, has a role to play in cooperation and various issues, in no hierarchical order, generate cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1999: 311).

In October 1991, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia visited Namibia, where he opened the Windhoek Agricultural Show. At the State Banquet held in his honour, President Kaunda told guests that Africa needs stronger regional and continental economic institutions, if it is to overcome underdevelopment and poverty (*The Namibian*, 7 October 1991a: 3). At the Agricultural Show, President Kaunda used the occasion to
warn Namibia on the danger of borrowing from multinational financial institutions, which resulted in the weakening of the Zambian economy. He further criticised developed countries for restricting imports from Africa, while trading their good in Africa’s free market economy (The Namibian, 7 October 1991b: 2). President Kaunda’s sentiments are inclined to the Dependency Theory. This theory argues that rich countries do not abide by free trade principles if it does not suit them. They adopt high tariffs barriers and protect domestic economic interests from competing with commodities from poor countries. Poor countries in return suffer, as their economies largely depend on foreign trade, the market in which they receive a raw deal (Ray, 1992: 305).

In October 1991, Queen Elizabeth II paid a state visit to Namibia to strengthen bilateral ties with the Namibian Government and multilateral ties with the Commonwealth. The Queen welcomed Namibia’s membership to the Commonwealth and pledged firm and lasting friendship between Namibia and Britain. The Queen expressed hope to the changes in Africa in respect of economic developments and the end of apartheid in South Africa. She underscored the role of Africans in driving these changes and stated that Namibia’s success at the centre of these changes will send a message of hope in the continent (The Namibian, 09 October 1991: 1, 3). The Queen’s visit came at a time when liberal democracy was taking roots in Africa. Zakaria (2000: 184 – 185) stated that a wave of liberal democracy came to Africa, from 1990, with constitutional liberalism and multi-party democracy increasing on the continent. It could, therefore, be argued that it was these changes that the Queen was referring to and it was Namibia’s constitutional liberalism that the Queen felt would send hope on the continent.

Namibia felt indebted to other countries of the world and set to thank them for their role in the liberation of Namibia. In February 1992, President Nujoma underscored Namibia’s appreciation to Ghana, Gabon, India and Iran during his state visits to these countries. In Ghana, he stressed the need to Africa’s economic cooperation, to increase trade and tourism among African countries (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 163). His message is inclined to the assumption of Idealism, which supports the growth of
nations through commerce focusing on economic growth through, the exchange of goods, services and ideas (Knutsen, 1992: 244).

In India President Nujoma gave assurance that Namibia would work with India in the economic, scientific, technical and cultural fields. In Iran, President Nujoma commended Iran’s neutrality in the Gulf War of 1991. He underscored the role of Iran and other countries in the Middle East to maintain peace in the region and not to leave this task to other big powers in the world (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 168 – 172).

In May 1992, President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria visited Namibia. President Nujoma thanked President Babangida and Nigeria’s role in conflict solution through peace-making envoys in Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda. In line with Idealism, President Nujoma was not supportive of war and conflicts and, thus, cherished efforts by Babangida to bring these plights to an end. Idealism states that war and conflicts only benefit manufacturers of weapons, while hurting able bodied persons, who are dragged in these clashes to fight and consequently face death (Ray, 1992: 77). Nujoma also further emphasised to President Babangida, who was by then Chairman of the OAU, the importance of regional economic institutions and inter-Africa trade (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 188 – 189).

In June 1993, President Nujoma became the first African Head of State to visit the US at the invitation of the Clinton administration. President Clinton indicated that he shared President Nujoma’s hopes for peace and stability in the southern Africa region (Clinton, 1993). Nujoma informed his US counterpart that the Namibian Government is committed to a market-oriented economy and there was a need to encourage private sector investment to produce tangible economic results (Nujoma, 1993).

From the end of October 1993 to the beginning of November 1993, President Nujoma visited the Nordic countries and France. Gurirab (2007b: interview) stated that in 1988, the Nordic countries convened a meeting with SWAPO and asked the movement to
indicate areas of cooperation on which the Nordic countries could assist when Namibia becomes independent. According to a media release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the visit to the Nordic countries was undertaken to thank them for their support to SWAPO during the liberation struggle and to renew priority areas of cooperation agreed between SWAPO and Nordic countries in 1988. During the bilateral talks between SWAPO and the Nordic countries, Norway chose cooperation with Namibia in the field of energy and, together with Iceland, they chose fisheries. Sweden concentrated on education, transport and communication. Finland chose health, forestry and geological survey. Denmark chose agriculture. After independence, the Nordic countries started working on their chosen areas of cooperation. The agreements were foreign aid to Namibia by the Nordic countries. Idealism supports foreign aid that it comes as a result of humanitarian concern, rather than actions driven by political and socio-economic interests (Nel, 2006: 33).

During President Nujoma’s visit to France, it was announced that the Société de Promotion et de Participation pour la Coopération Economique (PROPARCO) was authorised to provide guarantees for the French private sector investment in Namibia, and to grant soft loans to the Namibian Government and the private sector for development and industrial projects in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993a). PROPARCO is the private sector financing arm of the Agencé Française dé Développent (AFD). Financing is part of the Liberalism theory of international relations. Nicholson (2002: 158) stated that Liberalism is not only confined to trade, but also to capital flows, as the provision of funds enables production of further goods. PROPARCO brings in an element of the liberal perspective of Complex Interdependence in the Namibian foreign policy, which believes in multiple channels of communication between societies, including state and non-state actors (Brown, 2001: 38).

In April 1994, the Mozambican Prime Minister, Mario Machungo, visited Namibia. During this visit, Namibia and Mozambique signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Fishing Sector. According to the Joint Communiqué issued by the Office of the Prime Minister, the two Prime Ministers supported the role of the private
sector in the economic development and regional cooperation between the two countries. The Communiqué by the two Prime Ministers attached importance to Pluralism, which recognises economic issues as issues in their own rights and that the private sector could play a meaningful role, rather than leaving it to state actors alone (Nicholson, 2002: 98 – 99).

In May 1994, the then US Vice President Al Gore of the US visited Namibia. During his visit Vice President Gore commended Namibia for being a model in Africa in her commitment to the market economy, creating a liberal climate and transparent trade system. He further expressed admiration of Namibia’s environmental protection efforts that boosts her international trade in the field of tourism (Debates of the National Assembly, 1994: 393). The transparent trade system pursued by Namibia, which Gore referred to, is what Kant’s liberal perspective advocates, stating that free trade has positive effects to inter-state relations (Patomäki, 2002:39).

During the high level visits, Namibia signed agreements with other countries, mostly in the areas of economic cooperation. Namibia has, thus, achieved one of her foreign policy objectives to promote economic development and prosperity. During President Nujoma’s visit to France and Prime Minister Geingob’s visit to Mozambique, Namibia successfully pursued economic diplomacy, working to secure better trade terms for Namibian commodities and attract capital investment in Namibia. President Nujoma’s visit to the Nordic countries signifies the importance of the foundation laid by SWAPO’s diplomacy, as it was the movement that had earlier secured development assistance that Namibia and the Nordic countries agreed on during President Nujoma’s visit.

The visits by the Queen of England and two Vice Presidents of the US were significant as these leaders were from countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, which plays a pivotal role in the management of the international political system. It is an achievement for a small state like Namibia to attract visits from big powers and to note that both leaders from these big powers recognised Namibia’s contribution to democracy in the world. Namibia as a small state was also able to visit
other UN Security Council permanent members such as France and China and secure agreements aimed at the development of the Namibian economy and the strengthening of bilateral relations in general. Namibia was able to rise to the international stage at the formative years of post-independence foreign policy-making. The high level visits of President Nujoma to India and Prime Minister Geingob to China, and from the Brazilian President, indicate that Namibia was performing well in her South-South cooperation agenda.

President Nujoma’s message during the visit to the Middle East and Nigeria was in fulfilment of the Namibian foreign policy principle of promoting international peace, cooperation and security (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). It is an achievement that a small state engages different regions of the world on issues of international peace, contrary to the notion that small states have a narrow scope of foreign policy (McCraw, 1994: 11).

### 4.2.4 Democracy and good governance

Namibia’s democracy was hailed by the Nordic countries, when President Nujoma visited the Nordic countries and France from the end of October to the beginning of November 1993. It is reported that the Nordic countries applauded Namibia for the national reconciliation policy, democracy as manifested by the free press, free market economy and the rule of law (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993a).

Namibia set to use its example of democracy to other states in the world. In the aftermath of the coup in Nigeria by General Sani Abacha, the Namibian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement strongly condemning the coup and stated that the Nigerian military leadership has failed Africa. The statement further reads,

“Namibia believes that the situation is so serious and bodes ill for a speedy democratic transformation and prosperity in a friendly Nigeria, leaving us with no other alternative but to express publicly our outrage and disappointment in the strongest possible terms” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993b).
The stance taken by Namibia corresponds to Idealism, which supports democratic procedures, equality and liberty in governments and sovereignty of states supported by mass participation in governance to ensure people’s own self-determination (Knutsen, 1992: 253 – 254). Namibia’s stance is further inclined to democratic Liberalism, which supports pacific republic governance (Nye, 2004: 29).

On the occasion of Namibia’s fourth independence anniversary, in 1994, the then US President Bill Clinton sent a congratulatory message to President Nujoma hailing Namibia’s democracy as a model for the Southern Africa region. President Clinton expressed his country’s admiration for Namibia’s respect of human rights and the tolerance of divergent political views. President Clinton further expressed confidence in Namibia’s ability to lead the strengthening of democracy, free market principles and regional cooperation in the southern Africa region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994). The sentiments of President Clinton were echoed by his Vice President, Al Gore when he visited Namibia in 1994 and told the National Assembly that,

“For much as this century, democracy and development also appeared to vanish from southern Africa. There were those who said it is gone and will never return...You found the wellspring of free market democracy and created an oasis of your own, and now your neighbours to the South and East watching how you found the well spring are doing the same (Debates of the National Assembly, 1994: 396).

Kegley (1995: 230) contends that Liberalism advocates democracy and the protection of human rights, where government structures should promote individuals free interaction and expression of their views on the Government. Vice President Gore underscored that Namibia was at the centre of promoting these Liberalist values and serve as the role model for other states.

Namibia has established herself as a democratic state and endeavoured to promote democracy to other countries. There is an assumption that small states tend to avoid behaviour that alienate powerful states (East, 1973: 557). Although Namibia is a small state, her smallness did not limit her to be silent about a military coup in Nigeria, one of the powerful states in Africa. The praise of Namibia’s democracy by old democratic states such as the US and the Nordic countries attests to the fact that Namibia adhered to
the foreign policy principle in the Constitution, which calls for the respect of international law and treaty obligations (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). Democracy and the rule of law are principles that complement each other.

4.2.5 The reintegration of Walvis Bay in Namibia

The Namibian Government set to achieve one of the five foreign policy objectives stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, in his first budget speech after independence, namely the reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80).

Walvis Bay, a port on the western coast of Namibia was annexed by the British Government in 1878, and thereafter declared as part of the Cape Colony of South Africa, then a British dominion. After Namibia (then South West Africa) was placed under the Union of South Africa Government administration in 1920, the Union Government passed the South West Africa Act, in 1922, which empowered the Governor-General to administer Walvis Bay, as if it was a part of South West Africa. In 1977, the South African State President issued the Walvis Bay Administration Proclamation (R202) in terms of the South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act of 1977, stating that Walvis Bay should cease to be treated as part of South West Africa and that Walvis Bay will be administered as part of South Africa’s Cape Province (Berat, 1990: 36 – 37, 68).

From March 1991, Namibia held bilateral negotiations with South Africa and in November 1992, the Namibian and South African Governments installed the JAA comprising Namibian and South African officials to administer Walvis Bay until the reintegration of the territory into Namibia. The Namibian team was led by Secretary to the Cabinet, Nangolo Mbumba. On 1 March 1994, Walvis Bay and 12 off-shore islands were reintegrated into Namibia and ceased to be part of South Africa. This was largely seen as a diplomatic victory as the reintegration occurred in a peaceful manner. Namibia had always wanted the reintegration process to be concluded peacefully, as stated by President Nujoma during the state visit to Kenya, 1992, when he said that the Namibian
Government was dissatisfied with the slow progress on the negotiations and if the bilateral negotiations between Namibia and South Africa did not yield satisfactory results, Namibia would invoke the international community to handle the issue (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 199). This stance is in line with Idealism’s advocacy of reliance to international organisation and international law in the wake of conflicts and its assumption that supports the exploring of negotiations and peaceful settlements, to avoid war (Ray, 1992: 14).

The reintegration of Walvis Bay was the first foreign policy objective among the five objectives set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80). This objective was successfully achieved. A peaceful reintegration of Walvis Bay in Namibia indicates that although Namibia is a small state, she has the capacity to negotiate and emerge victorious. The peaceful settlement of Walvis Bay dispute indicates a success of the foreign policy principle enshrined in the Namibian Constitution, namely the settlement of disputes by peaceful means (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).

### 4.3 Consolidation of the foreign policy (1995 – 2005)

The second term of President Nujoma was about consolidating the foundations laid for the foreign policy during the first term. Namibia also asserted her influence in the international political system by assuming important responsibilities in the global political system and playing a meaningful role in regional politics.

#### 4.3.1 Major international roles and responsibilities

In September 1995, the UN convened the Fourth World Conference on Women. Prior to that, Namibia hosted a preparatory meeting for SADC Member-States. The documents adopted at this preparatory meeting served as the basis for drafting Africa’s common position in Senegal. At the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, was elected
Rapporteur-General, thus overseeing the coordination of the Conference. Liberalism-inclined feminist theories stretch out their concern for individual freedom to include women autonomy, equality and freedom. It could, therefore, be claimed that the Namibian Government’s decision to participate in an important international conference dealing with women issues was encouraged by a Liberalist perspective.

In 1997, Ambassador Tuliameni Kalomoh, Permanent Secretary in the Namibian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Liberia and ensured the holding of free and fair elections in Liberia. Ambassador Kalomoh was later appointed Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs in 2002 and he served in that position until 2007.

Ambassador Kalomoh advised the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, on a number of conflict management and resolutions, such as the mediation between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula. The peninsula has huge oil reserves and Nigeria had built a naval base there. In 1994, the Cameroonian Government filed the case at the ICJ, *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening)*. The ICJ delivered the verdict in 2002, stating that the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula rests with Cameroon. Nigeria was not happy with the outcome. In 2002, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, convened a Summit with the Presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon to sensitise them to implement the decision of the ICJ. Another Summit followed in 2004 and eventually Nigeria started to withdraw its troops from the Peninsula in 2006 (ICJ, 1994; ICJ 2002, and Kalomoh, 2008: interview).

In 2004 Kalomoh served as the Special Envoy of the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to Equatorial Guinea to discuss with the Government the situation in the country and its implications for peace and security in the region, after an attempted *coup d'état*. He also briefed the UN Security Council on developments in Africa’s troublesome regions and drafted a negotiation framework (Kalomoh, 2008: interview).
Namibia became a member of the UN Security Council and assumed its Presidency in August 1999 and October 2000, respectively. During that period, Ambassador Martin Andjaba led the Security Council missions to Indonesia and East-Timor in September 1999 and November 2000 aimed at resolving conflicts.

Namibia’s Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab was elected President of the 54th UNGA. As President of the General Assembly, he supervised, with the assistance of his Vice Presidents drawn from regional groupings and the back-up staff from the Office of the UN Secretary-General, the drafting and adoption of the Millennium Declaration (Gurirab, 2007: interview). Gurirab also sought to improve the services of the Office of the President of the UNGA. When he addressed the Millennium Summit, that was co-chaired by President Nujoma and Finnish President, Tarja Halonen, Gurirab emphasised the need to give due importance to the Office of the President of the UNGA and stressed paragraph 31 of the Millennium Declaration, which recognises the General Assembly as the central policy-making organ of the UN (Gurirab, 2000).

Table 13 below include the Eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) goals that were developed from the Millennium Declaration.

Table 13: The UN’s Eight Millennium Development Goals

- Eradicate extreme poverty
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) correspond to the goals of the Namibian foreign policy. The high level visits discussed earlier witnessed the signing of agreements
covering, *inter alia*, the areas of health and HIV/AIDS, education, trade and development. These agreements are aimed at making improvements on these fields. Environmental sustainability is one of the issues in Namibia’s foreign policy. Earlier, it was discussed that Namibia participated in the Earth Summit in Rio where the agreements on the Declaration on Environment and Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, and Agenda 21 were signed.

In 2004, Namibia’s Ombudsman, Bience Gawanas, was appointed AU Commissioner for Social Affairs, where she deals with issues related to women, children, education and health on the continent.

It is significant to a small state like Namibia that at the turn of the millennium the Presidents of the main UN bodies, the General Assembly and Security Council, were Namibians. This is a historic coincidence as Gurirab (2007: interview) stated. The magnitude of the UNGA was the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals. Namibia effectively used its membership and presidency of the UN Security Council to promote world peace, especially with regard to the independence of East Timor. This endeavour was successful because eventually, Indonesia relinquished control over East Timor in 2002. The Presidency of both the UNGA and Security Council was a success in Namibia’s diplomatic history.

The responsibilities given to Namibian leaders in the international political system are an indication that although Namibia is a young and small country, her leaders has the capacity to lead international organisations. It is further important to note that there is gender balance in the international role played by Namibians in international organisations, such as the roles played by Nandi-Ndaitwah and Bience Gawanas.

Ambassador Andjaba performed effectively as President of the UN Security Council. He coped as a President of the UN Security Council from a small country. Gurirab (2007b: interview) stated that one day, during the debate on a crisis in Kosovo, the UN Security Council adjourned and the then US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke,
impressed upon Ambassador Andjaba that President Clinton of the US wanted the UN Security Council to take a decision the soonest. Ambassador Andjaba reportedly informed Ambassador Holbrooke that although Namibia where he comes from is a small country, he is the President of the UN Security Council and would not accept threats from any country. Gurirab further stated that on another occasion, when Jesse Helms, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relation Committee addressed the UN Security Council he hailed the Reagan Doctrine of opposing influence from the East Bloc states. Senator Helms told Member-States off, stating that they could pack and leave the US. Ambassador Andjaba responded to Senator Helms and reminded him that the Reagan Doctrine had caused sufferings and deaths to Namibia during the war of liberation. Ambassador Andjaba was, therefore, an effective and indomitable diplomat who could not be intimidated by any of his colleagues from powerful states.

4.3.2 Strengthening SADC

Namibia played an active role in the establishment of the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF) in July 1996 and her first Speaker of the National Assembly, Dr Mose Tjitendero, became the founding Chairperson of SADC PF. The Forum was established to promote unity, democracy, integration, peace and economic prosperity in the region through elected representatives. The Namibian Government provided office facilities and other materials and moral support to the Forum and its Parliamentary Leadership Centre (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 240; 589).

In 1996, President Nujoma discussed with his Angolan counterpart, President Edwardo Dos Santos, during a state visit to Luanda that regional cooperation and integration, which is crucial for the region’s economic development, will only be attained through SADC. Here President Nujoma was promoting Interdependence, in the context of Anderson’s (1996: 19 – 20), concept of ‘global infusion’. Anderson expanded the concept as he felt that the definition of Interdependence does not sufficiently address state’s addressing of other states’ problems, without necessary creating dependency. He coined the term ‘global infusion’, which includes among others infusion of part or all sectors of
the economies of two or more states, and the values and practices of societies. This definition is arguably compatible with President Nujoma’s sentiments stated above.

After President Laurent Kabila assumed power in the DRC, Namibia spearheaded the campaign for the DRC to join SADC. President Nujoma expressed his hope that DRC would join SADC. During the official visit of President Kabila to Namibia in July 1997, Namibia pledged its support for the DRC to be admitted in the regional economic grouping (Government of the Republic of Namibia 1999b: 248). Namibian Foreign Minister, Gurirab, and his Zimbabwean counterpart, Nathan Shamuyarira, engaged the DRC Government and worked on the DRC to join SADC. During that time, Zimbabwe was chairing the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (Gurirab, 2007b: interview). The DRC was admitted in the SADC cluster in 1997. In response to this, President Nujoma stated,

“The normalisation of the political situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and its incorporation into SADC is a giant step forward. We are determined to work closely with the Government of President Laurent Kabila towards sustainable peace and economic development in our region” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 283).

In 2000, President Nujoma became the Chairperson of SADC. As Chairperson of SADC, he sought to forge links with other regional groupings on the continent. Addressing the Summit in 2001, he reported on his activities which included undertaking missions to discuss with his counterparts from ECOWAS and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) framework for cooperation between those regional groupings and SADC (Nujoma, 2001b).

The restructuring of SADC was initiated and implemented under the chairmanship of President Nujoma. This process saw the streamlining of the management of all institutions, including the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, which became coordinated at the level of Summit at the Troika level. The Troika comprises the outgoing, current and incoming Chairman. The Organ would be chaired on a rotational basis by the Chairman, who should not be the Chairman of SADC, for a period of one
year. Previously, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe served as the Chairman of the Organ and coordinated its activities.

Namibia’s contribution to regional integration and the development of SADC is enormous. Namibia did not only host the historic Summit that transformed SADCC into SADC in 1992, but she also hosted the conference which established the SADC PF. With the limited resources at its disposal, the Namibian Government had provided facilities to ensure the smooth running of the SADC PF administration. This is a success in Namibia’s foreign policy, as parliamentary institutions contribute to strengthening democracy.

President Nujoma’s commitment to regional economic development, as manifested in his speeches during the visits of Presidents Dos Santos and Kabila, is in accordance with the Namibian foreign policy theme of economic diplomacy. President Nujoma wanted SADC to prove that when small countries unite, they will be able to yield successful economic results.

4.3.3 The UN Reform

During the second term of the SWAPO-led Government, Namibia focused, among others, on the reform of the UN system. During the visit of President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland to Namibia in May 1995, President Nujoma stated that it was necessary for smaller countries such as Namibia and Finland to consult and coordinate on the aspects of the reforms of the UN system to ensure that the reforms are done in adherence to the principles of equity, democracy and efficiency (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 13).

During the visit of President Chiluba of Zambia in June 1995, President Nujoma spoke about the need for Africa to formalise its view and common position on the enlargement of the UN Security Council. He repeated similar sentiments during the visit of the Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia to Namibia in August 1995. Nujoma wanted
the UN’s 50th anniversary that was due in a month’s time not only to take stock of the achievements of the organisation, but to look at decision-making mechanisms and review institutions to correspond to world changes and challenges (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 62).

President Nujoma told the visiting Algerian President Liamine Zeroual, in September 1998, that Namibia wants the United Nations to be transformed into a true democratic parliament, where all regions of the world have equal voice of influence in world affairs. He said the UN should not be an organisation where the interests of stronger states supersede those of the weaker states. He referred specifically to the UN Security Council:

“We believe in particular that the UN Security Council needs to be reformed to reflect equable \textit{(sic)} representation of all geographic regions of the world. It is also important that outdated and undemocratic instruments of power, such as the veto power held by Permanent Security Council members, should be done away with and replaced by principles of consensus in decision-making” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 412).

Like President Nujoma, many countries, especially from the Third World feel that the UN is serving the interests of powerful permanent members of the UN Security Council, who use their veto rights on important world issues. This trend contravenes Liberalism, which believes that the rule of law is equally applicable to international systems and domestic regimes (Brown, 2001: 23). It should, therefore, be expected that countries such as Namibia, whose foreign policy is Liberalist (Idealist) inclined would be vocal on the UN reforms.

When Foreign Affairs Minister Hidipo Hamutenya addressed the UNGA in 2003, he alluded to the ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council to stamp the UN authority over the Middle East conflicts. He said that such failure underlines the need for reforms (Hamutenya, 2003).

Although Namibia has been vocal on the issue of the UN reform, this is one of the issues where success has not been realised. This should not, however, be attributed to the sole failure of the Namibian foreign policy. The UN reform is not a matter of interest to
Namibia alone, but an issue that affect many countries of the world and is therefore debated in regional and continental organisations. Namibia is constrained by the ‘agency-structure’ debate that she cannot have a position of her own, but follows the position of the AU for example. By the time President Nujoma left the office, the issue of UN Reform was an ongoing debate in the AU and it would therefore be discussed in the next chapter.

4.4 Women and foreign policy-making

Although the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women is part of the overall programme of the SWAPO Party, little has been done to include this issue in foreign policy, for example regarding the appointment of Heads of Missions. During the first term of President Nujoma, out of 17 Heads of Missions only 2 Heads of Missions were women. These are Ambassadors Nora Schimming-Chase and Tonata Itenge-Emvula who were appointed as Namibia’s first Ambassadors to Germany and Sweden, respectively. Their tour of duty ended at the beginning of the second term of President Nujoma. The trend of excluding women from senior diplomatic positions has long existed in SWAPO before independence. There was only one woman, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, who served as the SWAPO Chief Representative to East Africa. As discussed earlier Nandi-Ndaitwah became the first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at independence in 1990. There is no explanation to the exclusion of women in the foreign policy decision-making process in the Namibian context, as there were women who occupied senior positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Directors and Deputy Directors. The exclusion of women from senior positions of diplomacy is typical of the medieval theory which depicted women as incapable of taking part in the political process (Hoffman and Graham, 2006: 326).

During President Nujoma’s second term (1995 – 2000), the status quo with regard to women in foreign policy-making remained. In 1996, President Nujoma appointed Monica Nashandi as Ambassador to Sweden, replacing Ambassador Itenge-Emvula. Nashandi is a career diplomat who worked at the SWAPO Mission at the UN. At the time of her
appointment, she was the Under-Secretary and Head of the Department of Regional and Bilateral Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1999, Ambassador Nashandi was transferred to the UK as High Commissioner, becoming the first Namibian woman to head a multilateral Mission. In 1999, President Nujoma appointed Frieda Ithete as High Commissioner to Zambia. Ambassador Ithete, too, is a career diplomat having worked as the Director of International and Regional Organisations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Minister-Counsellor at the Namibian Mission in Zimbabwe. The researcher of this study served as a Desk Officer in the Directorate of International and Regional Organisation during the period that Ambassador Ithete served as Director.

During the last term of President Nujoma (2000 – 2005), there was an improvement with regard to the state of women in foreign policy-making. In 2003, President Nujoma appointed Theresia Samaria as High Commissioner to Botswana. Ambassador Samaria was the Mayor of Walvis Bay, a coastal town of Namibia. Although she is not a career diplomat, she has been involved in economic diplomacy, promoting trade and investment in Walvis Bay. Walvis Bay hosts the EPZ as discussed earlier.

In 2004, President Nujoma appointed Panduleni Shingenge as Ambassador to Sweden and Grace Uushona as Ambassador to Cuba. Ambassador Shingenge is a career diplomat, having served as the Director of the Middle East Directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Minister-Counsellor at the Namibian Mission in South Africa. At the time of her appointment, Ambassador Uushona was the Governor of Otjozondjupa Region, which has a largest numbers of farmers in Namibia and thus contribute largely to Namibia’s economic diplomacy through trading the Namibian beef in the EU market. Uushona had previously studied in Cuba through the scholarships offered to SWAPO members during the liberation struggle.

Unlike during the first term of President Nujoma where out of 17 Heads of Missions there were only 2 women, the situation improved slightly that during the last two terms of President Nujoma (1995 – 2005) 5 out of 21 Heads of Missions were women.
4.5 The President as the foreign policy-maker

Presidents as leaders of their countries are among the key actors on foreign policy matters. The extent to which they provide leadership on foreign policy depends on individual leaders. President Nujoma befits the description of a ‘Great Man’ charismatic leader in Grove (2007: 4), as his experience in international relations stood him in a good stead to influence the Namibian foreign policy and enabled him to play a role in the region, the continent and in the global political system.

4.5.1 President Nujoma’s relationship with his Foreign Ministers

Hill (2003: 61) presented three types of relations between Heads of State and Government, and their foreign ministers. The first relation is of equality, whereby a strong team is build on trust, ability and matching reputations. The second type of relation is of subordinate foreign minister, where the foreign minister is either personally or politically weak and the Head of State has more hands on running foreign affairs. The third type is of an established foreign minister, where it works well when there is a clear division of labour between the Head of State and foreign minister and works badly when there is either a lack of interest, but not necessarily incompetence on the part of the Head of State, or where rivalry may occur between the two key foreign policy actors.

The relationship between President Nujoma and Theo-Ben Gurirab, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was one of equality. President Nujoma was recognised as a key SWAPO foreign policy-maker during the pre-independence period. The Minister of Foreign Affairs recognised that the Head of State was the ‘real Foreign Minister’ but the two had a good working relations and the running of foreign affairs was a ‘Nujoma–Gurirab business’ (Gurirab, 2007b: interview).

Minister Gurirab is a respected guru of foreign policy and diplomacy, who served in that field since 1964. In 1994, an opposition parliamentarian, Chief Justus Garoeb of the UDF, commended Minister Gurirab that he has diplomatic abilities of world standards
At the Conference of Heads of Mission held in 1997, former Prime Minister Hage Geingob stated,

“I must congratulate Honourable Gurirab for having built up a pool of very decent Foreign Service cadres. The diplomatic skills of our Foreign Minister are well-known…Namibia’s diplomatic effort led by Honourable Gurirab won the day and Walvis Bay was reintegrated into Namibia with little pain”.

After Gurirab was promoted to the position of Prime Minister at the end of August 2002, Trade and Industry Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya, was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hamutenya, too, was not new to diplomacy and foreign policy fields. In Chapter One, it was stated that he worked with Geingob and Gurirab as SWAPO Petitioner and Associate Representative to the UN from 1964 to 1972. He formed part of an important SWAPO team involved in the talks at the UN, prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, and subsequent negotiation teams, especially when he became Secretary for Information and Publicity from 1981 to 1989.

The relationship between President Nujoma and Foreign Minister Hidipo Hamutenya continued on the same foundation of equality. Like Gurirab, Hamutenya too recognised the role of the President in foreign policy-making. He informed the Parliament that the President shapes the country’s foreign policy through his engagement with his counterparts, foreign envoys, and through his participation in international conferences. He further stated that the President constantly performs his foreign relations duties (Debates of the National Assembly, 2004a: 61).

President Nujoma and Minister Hamutenya’s relationship was severed due to issues not related to the foreign policy, but to the presidential succession. In May 2004, SWAPO Party convened the Extra-Ordinary Congress to elect the Party’s candidate for the Presidential Election that would be held at the end of the year (October 2004), since President Nujoma was no longer eligible for re-election, having served his third and last term. In terms of the internal SWAPO Party electoral regulations, three candidates could be nominated. President Nujoma nominated Hifikepunye Pohamba, Minister of Lands and Vice-President of SWAPO Party as his preferred candidate. Hidipo Hamutenya and
Nahas Angula, Minister of Higher Education, were also nominated at the SWAPO Party Central Committee and Politburo meetings held at the beginning of April. On 24 May 2004, three days before the Extra-Ordinary Congress started, Nujoma dismissed Hamutenya and his deputy, Dr Kaire Mbuende, citing their involvement in divisive political activities as a reason for their dismissal. Hamutenya denied such claims. Prior to his dismissal, Hamutenya had tabled in the Parliament the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management, which was drafted during the period that Gurirab was Minister of Foreign Affairs. The researcher of this study is a Member of SWAPO Party Central Committee, and is privy to this information, having participated in Central Committee meetings and closely followed developments around the Extra-Ordinary Congress.

After the dismissal of Hamutenya, Nujoma appointed Labour Minister Marco Hausiku as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hausiku came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the last week of May 2004, when the focus was on the Namibian General and Presidential Elections that would be held in October 2004. Thereafter, the focus was on handing over the power to the new President in March 2005. Nujoma used the period between elections and the end of his term to bid farewell to his counterparts in the southern African region and there were no major foreign relations programmes. Hausiku was reappointed by President Pohamba and their relationship as key foreign policy-makers will be discussed in Chapter Five.

The appointment of Hidipo Hamutenya as Minister of Foreign Affairs resulted in a focus on economic diplomacy. Lister (2007: interview) supports this view. Although economic diplomacy as a foreign policy issues has long existed, Minister Hamutenya gave prominence to the theme as he emphasised more about it during the Conference of Heads of Mission held in 2003, and when he motivated the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management in 2004.

The dismissal of Hamutenya and Mbuende did not cause destabilisation on the foreign policy. When Hamutenya introduced the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
in the Parliament, it went on a recess, during which time he was dismissed. When Parliament resumed, the debate on the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy continued. Former Deputy Minister Mbuende, who was then a backbencher, contributed to the debate in support of the White Paper. The White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy was passed by the Namibian Parliament on 15 July 2004 (Debates of the National Assembly, 2004b: 350).

4.5.2 The Nujoma Doctrine: Pan-Africanism

President Nujoma’s foreign policy doctrine was Pan-Africanism. According to the Office of the Prime Minister (2000: 15), it is stated,

“In the international fora, the President’s Pan-Africanist credentials are well recognized and he actively promotes Africa and Namibia in international and regional fora, such as, the United National, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), G77, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Southern Africa Development Community, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)”.

In 1993, President Nujoma commended the visiting Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, for being a proponent of Pan-Africanism. He further stated that Namibia and Uganda’s collective support of resolving African conflicts is embedded in Pan-Africanism, as the two countries regard a problem of one African country to be the problem of the whole African continent (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 261).

During his visit to Zambia in 1991, President Nujoma stated that Namibia and Zambia should consider themselves as one family, separated only by artificial boundaries. In that respect he advised that the vision of Pan-Africanism should be imparted among the youth and students who are the leaders of tomorrow (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 34).

President Nujoma pursued the Pan-African agenda vigorously during his second term of office. At a public rally held in Windhoek on 20 September 1998, attended by the researcher of this study, Nujoma spoke off the cuff choosing the theme “The world we
live in”. At that rally, he issued a directive that the OAU flag should be flown alongside the Namibian flag at all places where the latter is flown and whenever the Namibian national anthem is sung, it should be followed by the OAU anthem. Since then, the directive was implemented to instil the sense of Pan-Africanism among Namibians.

Pursuing his Pan-African doctrine, President Nujoma stated in 2001 during the State of the Nation Address in Parliament,

“Namibia is an African country and as such, our citizens are proud sons and daughters of Africa. Our destiny is closely tied to the fate of our neighbours and our continent as a whole. We must, therefore, be proud of our African heritage and our “Africanness”. Our children must be taught the African values of sharing, respect of authority, good neighbourliness and a sense of belonging to a larger community” (Debates of the National Assembly, 2001b: 127).

President Nujoma’s Pan-Africanism doctrine is echoed by his Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, who told Parliament that Africans should think, work and plan for their continent. Minister Gurirab further urged Africans to stop the contradictions caused by ideological confusion and lack of confidence in African cultural heritage and family cohesion (Debates of the National Assembly, 2002: 100).

President Nujoma’s Pan-African doctrine promotes values of unity, friendship, identity esteem and cultural heritage among Africans. He wanted Africans to identify themselves voluntarily with these values. These values would serve as a regime established to give order in the continent in manners close to those of the Interdependence theory of International Relations (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999: 215).

President Nujoma’s foreign policy doctrine of Pan-Africanism addresses the foreign policy objective of promotion of world peace, as it could be discerned from his sentiments during the visit of President Museveni in 1993. He advocated conflict resolutions in Africa in the name of Pan-Africanism. Because Namibia had received support from the OAU during the liberation struggle, President Nujoma believed in African unity as it makes smaller and weaker states stronger when acting as a group.
The significance of the directive to hoist the AU flag alongside the Namibian flag, and singing the AU anthem alongside the Namibian national anthem is that Namibia became the first African country to adopt this practice. It further indicates that Nujoma was pragmatic in pursuing the Pan-African foreign policy doctrine. It is notable that a lead in such a practice would be taken by a leader of a small state, amidst big powers on the continent.

4.5.3 Persistence, leadership and decisiveness

Gurirab (2007c: interview) stated that under the leadership of President Nujoma, Namibia became a respected member of SADC and President Nujoma’s opinions were often sought after in resolving the conflicts in Angola and DRC. President Nujoma is persistent when he pushes an agenda. He took a strong stance against the apartheid South African regime, campaigning worldwide for the end of apartheid and openly criticised President De Klerk for the violence in South Africa, during all his state visits to countries in Africa and Asia and when receiving foreign Heads of State in Namibia (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 30, 38, 66, 91, 95, 110, 158, 162, 169, 237, 298). This aspect was one of the key issues that he addressed when he undertook his first foreign trip, attending the SADCC Summit, a week after Namibia’s independence (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 4). When the Namibian Government provided funds to the ANC and PAC in 1993, President Nujoma stated that,

“We make no apologies for giving two million Namibia dollars or any other contributions to these two legitimate, former liberation movements recognised by the OAU as well as by the United Nations” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 405).

The emphasis on the recognition of the ANC and PAC by the OAU and UN gave a degree of legitimacy to the donation. Ulenga (2007: interview) maintains that President Nujoma can aggressively pursue a foreign policy. The persistent position of President Nujoma on fighting against a non-democratic South Africa therefore corresponds to the assumption of Liberalism which states that liberal democracies are as aggressive as any other type of state in their relations with non-democratic states (Dunne, 2008: 113).
President Nujoma also provided leadership at international fora where important decisions were made. At the CHOGM held in Cyprus in October 1993, President Nujoma proposed South Africa’s admission to the Commonwealth, after a non-racial and democratic government have been put in place. He further proposed a creation of a five year Special Enhanced Programme of Assistance for a democratic South Africa. Nujoma also called upon the international community to respond favourably to the Donors’ Pledging Conference on South Africa, which would be held after democratic elections in April 1994 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993c). President Nujoma persistently pursued a policy on South Africa, anchored in Liberalism, especially liberal democrats, which promotes democratic system and constitutional regimes (Brown, 2001: 23).

President Nujoma is a decisive leader who owned his foreign policy initiatives and defended them openly in the wake of critics. When opposition politicians accused President Nujoma for making a unilateral decision to send Namibian troops to the DRC, the President defended the decision by stating,

“...[I]t was decided to respond positively and timeously before the legitimate government was overthrown. Emergency situation require thoughtful and decisive action. This is what I did. In other words, as the Commander-in-Chief, I took the necessary action to come to the aid of an aggressed neighbour and a member of SADC...In helping the Congo and President Kabila, Namibia is securing her own peace, stability and democracy at home” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 416).

Nujoma tried to broaden the audience rallying behind him in the DRC issue, as Grove (2007: 5) stated that leaders would send messages that would identify the targeted audience with their decisions. Apart from sensitising the Namibian public, he firmly stood by the decision to send troops to the DRC and defended this decision as a consolidation of peace in the SADC region, at the NAM Summit in South Africa held in September 1998, and during the visit of King of Spain to Namibia in February 1999 (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 409 – 410; 457).

President Nujoma’s persistence on the issues of the end of the civil war in Angola and the democratisation of South Africa was in accordance with the foreign policy objectives of
promoting international peace and security and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1991: 80).

President Nujoma stressed the promotion of peace and security on the issue of sending Namibian troops during the DRC conflict. This is one of the foreign policy principles enshrined in the Namibian Constitution (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).

4.5.4 Assertive stance against big powers

Theories of small states’ foreign policies assert that small states tend to avoid behaviours that would alienate powerful states. For example, small states would not challenge big powers (Papadakis and Starr, 1991: 429). Nujoma could, however, be tough and confrontational towards leaders of powerful states. Geingob (2007b: interview) stated that Nujoma is forthright in addressing given issues. In July 1995, the Nigerian Military Tribunal sentenced 14 officers to death and former Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo and 10 others to life imprisonment, for alleged involvement in a coup plot. Earlier, President Nujoma went to Nigeria to advise President Abacha on the issue, where Abacha promised that justice would be done. After the decision by the Military Tribunal, President Nujoma was annoyed and he sent a strong worded letter to the Nigerian Head of State, General Sani Abacha, warning him that his actions will bring to Nigeria ‘wrath, indignation and isolation from the rest of the international community’. He further told Abacha,

“You hold the key in your hands. You have the power to show clemency to the accused by rejecting the sentences recommended by the Tribunal … show your presence of mind and sound judgement in this situation by sparing the lives and agony of the accused” (*The Namibian*, 1995a: 1 - 2).

President Nujoma urged President Abacha to implement transition to a peaceful democracy, which he promised the Nigerian people. He stated that the entire African continent, too, was looking forward to that peaceful epoch. Idealism believes in critical reasoning, which gives rise to moral political behaviour (Patomäki, 2002: 38). It was this
critical and rational thinking that Nujoma wanted Abacha to apply. The decision of the military tribunal and the behaviours of the Abacha regime at large amounted to what could be human rights abuses that are incompatible with liberal democracy (Zakaria, 2000: 185).

In 2002, President Nujoma confronted the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at the World Earth Summit held in South Africa, 2002. President Nujoma accused Prime Minister Blair for creating the situation of land problem in Zimbabwe. He said Britain should change her attitude towards Africa, as Africans were no longer slaves. President Nujoma bemoaned the fact that 78% of the land is owned by British to the exclusion of 14 million Zimbabweans and was disappointed that Europeans want land in Africa, while Africans do not have land in Zimbabwe. He further demanded that the EU should lift sanctions against Zimbabwe, immediately. As he spoke, he waged his index finger in the air (The Namibian, 3 September 2002: 1 – 2). The gesture of finger waging in President Nujoma’s culture (which is also the culture of the researcher of this study) is made when an elder is reprimanding a child for misbehaving.

President Nujoma’s attack on Prime Minister Blair is anchored in his foreign policy doctrine of Pan-Africanism. He was defending an African country, Zimbabwe, which was besieged by a European power. He could not stand aside as a spectator and let another country suffer at the hands of a European power. He further pointed out that Britain was responsible for the land problem in Zimbabwe. Britain has reneged on the promise to provide funds for the land reform programmes in Zimbabwe, which was made at the Lancaster House Talks as discussed earlier. President Nujoma’s attacks are, therefore, also anchored in the foreign policy principle of fostering the respect of international law and treaty obligations.

4.5.5 International statesman

Gurirab (2007b: interview) stated that President Nujoma is a historical personality who transformed himself into an international statesman of repute. During the liberation
struggle, he established himself the liberator that he became. It was, therefore, possible that after independence President Nujoma had fitted himself expediently in the global political system, leaving remarkable imprints on world podiums although he was a Head of State of a small and newly independent state.

According to Huaraka (2007: interview), when President Nujoma made a statement on sustainable development and the embodiment in the Namibian Constitution of the ecosystem management and environmental protection at the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, it earned him a reputation and Namibia gained respect among environmental lobbyists and the international community. Thereafter, the UN established a Committee on Sustainable Development with Namibia as a Vice President. This is an achievement to a small state like Namibia to be bestowed such an honour during the formative years of her foreign policy-making.

In 1993, the UN convened the World Conference of Human Rights in Vienna, Austria. The closing session of this conference, attended by Ministers responsible for human rights issues, was addressed by President Nujoma, the only Head of State in the world invited to address the conference. According to Huaraka (2007: interview) President Nujoma earned a reputation when he underscored the importance of NGOs at the world conferences. President Nujoma was disturbed by the exclusion of NGOs at international conferences. In Rio de Janeiro, NGOs were not invited and were wandering outside the conference hall. In Vienna President Nujoma said,

“The fact that, unlike in Rio, at the United Nations Conference on Environment, in Vienna, the NGOs participated in the deliberations of the conference and expressed their views, is a realisation that the NGOs are partners and allies of governments in the struggle to promote and protect human rights and that they cannot be left out” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 306).

President Nujoma’s sentiments correspond to Pluralism. Webber and Smith (2002:22) contend in their pluralistic arguments that pressure groups and interest groups can play a role in the shaping of foreign policy, particularly on economic and social issues. They further argued that since international relations affect a variety of population sections,
private and non-governmental organisations would have interest in foreign policy-making.

President Nujoma’s international statesmanship was further boosted when he co-chaired the historic Millennium Summit together with the Finnish President, Tarja Halonen, in 2000. Addressing the Summit as the Co-Chairman of the Summit, Nujoma condemned armed conflicts, civil wars and terrorism and called upon the international community to give renewed momentum to peaceful cooperation, development, and stability in the world. His arguments correspond to Liberalism, which argues that international institutions can establish mechanisms for conflict resolution, provide information on abiding to international norms and, therefore, help in preventing war (Nye, 2004: 37).

4.6 Summary

The foreign policy under President Nujoma portrayed a strong multilateral posture. This is illustrated by Namibia’s joining of the UN within a month of her independence, April 1990. Namibia also joined other international organisations such as the Commonwealth, OAU, NAM, G 77 and SADCC.

Although Namibia is a small state it hosted important international conferences such as the historic SADCC Heads of State Summit of 1992. It further hoisted international conferences aimed at promoting the peace in the Southern Africa Region. In addition to these conferences, Namibia campaigned for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Angola, and President Nujoma persistently pursued the issue of the democratisation of South Africa. This ensured the realisation of the foreign policy objective of enhancing peace in the southern Africa region, one of the five foreign policy objectives set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1991: 81).

Namibia maintained successful bilateral relations with the nations of the world. A number of high-level visits from Namibia and to Namibia have been recorded during the formative years of foreign policy-making. These visits confirm President Nujoma’s
explanation discussed earlier that Namibia wanted to maintain old friends and win new friends. Namibia was successful in this approach, following up on the agreements solicited by SWAPO as a liberation movement with the Nordic countries, and visiting countries which supported the cause for Namibia’s independence in Africa, Europe and Asia. The high-level visits also reflect a South-South cooperation approach in the Namibian foreign policy as it includes bilateral relations between Namibia and the three emerging powers of the South, namely China, India and Brazil. The South-South approach is further illustrated by the visit by President Mello of Brazil which highlighted, among other things the cooperation among countries of the South. The high-level visits also focused on economic cooperation like trade and investments in the economic sectors of fisheries, agriculture and finance. These issues bring prosperity and other benefits to Namibia, thus realising the foreign policy principles in the Namibian Constitution and foreign policy objectives set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1991: 80 – 81 and Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).

The reintegration of Walvis Bay in Namibia highlights the success of Namibia’s diplomacy. The setting up of the JAA requires resources, both human and capital, and Namibia’s smallness did not inhibit the process. The reintegration of Walvis Bay in Namibia was made in a peaceful manner in accordance with the foreign policy principle of settlement of international disputes by peaceful means (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).

Namibia consolidated her foreign policy during the second and third terms of President Nujoma. The assuming of international responsibilities by Namibian leaders in international organisations such as the AU and UN is an achievement for a small state like Namibia. Namibia’s concurrent Presidencies of the UNGA and UN Security Council should also be viewed in the context of the success of a small state’s foreign policy. This is illustrated by successful conflict resolution efforts in East Timor. This was a realisation of Namibia’s foreign policy principle of the promotion of world peace and security (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).
During the period of consolidating her foreign policy, Namibia recorded success in her foreign policy towards the Southern African region. She played an active role in the formation of a regional Parliament, SADC-PF and host the headquarters of this organisation. Namibia successfully campaigned for the admission of the DRC in SADC. The DRC is rich in natural resources and presents an opportunity for promoting economic diplomacy in the Southern Africa region.

As a ‘chief foreign policy-maker’, President Nujoma developed his Pan-African Doctrine to promote unity on the African continent and shape the Namibian foreign policy towards issues related to the continent. President Nujoma has met Africans living in the Diaspora, and he has lived in and visited many African countries during his 30 years of exile. He, therefore value the essence of being an African and the need for cooperation among Africans. President Nujoma’s Doctrine shaped Namibia’s foreign relations in support of the troubled Zimbabwe. President Nujoma distinguished himself as an international statesman, firm and resolute foreign policy-maker.

Two issues could be cited as contradictions and failures of the Namibian foreign policy under President Nujoma. The contradiction is in respect of the exclusion of women in the foreign policy decision-making, while the Government pursue gender representation in the Parliament as it will be discussed in the concluding chapter. During the first term of office of President Nujoma, there were only two women who served as Heads of Missions. This state of affairs differs with the Liberal feminists, as they are concerned with the place of women in global politics and international policy-making. They advocate the removal of obstacles that have denied women the same opportunities as men (Tickner, 2008: 266).

There was a failure with regard to resolving the issue of the Namibian borders with South Africa along the Orange River as discussed previously. By the time when President Nujoma left the office, negotiations which have started during his first term have not reached any successful solution on the matter. In this respect, the foreign policy objective of promoting the territorial integrity of Namibia has not been fully realised. But, it is
important to note that it was realised in respect of the reintegration of Walvis Bay in Namibia.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 Introduction


In 1997, at the Second Congress of SWAPO Party attended by the researcher of this study as a delegate from SWAPO Party Youth League, Pohamba was elected Secretary-General of SWAPO Party. In 2002, at the Third Congress of SWAPO Party which, too, was attended by the researcher of this study as a delegate from SWAPO Party Youth League, Pohamba was elected as Vice President of SWAPO Party. The nomination of Pohamba to the positions of Secretary-General and Vice President was done by President Nujoma. In 2004, President Nujoma nominated Pohamba, as one of the candidates to be elected by the SWAPO Party Extra-Ordinary Congress of 2004 to be the SWAPO Party Presidential Candidate for the 2004 Namibian Presidential Elections. Pohamba was by then the SWAPO Party Vice President and Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. As stated earlier, other candidates nominated by the SWAPO Party Politburo and endorsed by the Central Committee were Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hidipo Hamutenya and Minister of Higher Education, Training and Employment Creation, Nahas Angula. In the first round of elections, Minister Pohamba obtained 213 votes, followed by Minister Hamutenya with 166 votes and Minister Angula with 137
votes. A second round of elections between Ministers Pohamba and Hamutenya was necessary, because none of the three candidates had obtained more than 50% of the votes in the first round. In the second round of elections Minister Pohamba obtained 341, while Minister Hamutenya obtained 167, securing only one additional vote from the first round of elections. Information regarding the ascending of President Pohamba to the Namibian presidency is known to this researcher, as a Member of the SWAPO Party Central Committee and has, thus, participated in the Central Committee meeting and Extra-Ordinary Congress which managed the issue of presidential succession in Namibia.

During the 2004 Namibian Presidential Elections, Minister Pohamba won overwhelmingly with 76% against six candidates from opposition parties. He was sworn in as the second President of the Republic of Namibia on 21 March 2005. Presidential Elections were held simultaneously with the General Elections through which Members of Parliament, including the researcher of this study were elected.

This chapter addresses President Pohamba’s foreign policy agenda. It shows some similarities but also some departures from President Nujoma’s foreign policy agenda. It could be argued that the foreign policy of Namibia under President Pohamba is a continuity of the foreign policy under President Nujoma. Lister (2007: interview) stated that there is no much change in the foreign policy under the two Presidents. Concurring, Gurirab (2007b: interview) stated that Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba believe in the UN and other multilateral organisations (such as the OAU [later AU], SADC, NAM and the Commonwealth). Furthermore, both believe in Vision 2030, a policy document mentioned earlier. Geingob (2007b: interview) shares this view by referring to both Presidents’ membership of SWAPO Party and foreign policy issues under their respective presidencies are, therefore, the same. President Pohamba confirmed this position when he stated that there is no major policy changes, as he is leading a SWAPO Party Government like his predecessor, and that SWAPO Party directs the Government’s policies (Pohamba, 2008: interview).
Under President Pohamba, Namibia’s foreign policy agenda, principles and issues included, *inter alia*, continuity in addressing the reform of the UN, international peace and security, economic diplomacy and solidarity with Cuba and Palestine.

Meanwhile, other trends emerged in world politics. Some of these include the rise of environmental issues and climate change. Namibia as a member of the international political system had to embrace this aspect in her foreign policy.

There is also a change in style between the two Presidents as foreign policy-makers, as it will be discussed in section 5.6. President Pohamba emphasised that new issues, such as climate change and environmental sustainability, are a result of changes in the agenda of broader international relations, rather than changes in policy focus determined by the President (Pohamba, 2008: interview). President Pohamba reiterated the so-called two level game played by foreign policy decision makers, *i.e.* responding to national interests, whilst simultaneously affected by global dynamics.

### 5.2 Continuity of the selected foreign policy agenda, principles and issues

Empirical evidence suggests some continuity in Namibia’s foreign policy. This is also confirmed by the Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Tuliameni Kalomoh. Ambassador Kalomoh also served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Nujoma. He maintained that the foreign policy of Namibia under the presidency of President Pohamba represents a change of leadership but a continuity of the policy, as it continues to address the issues of peaceful co-existence in the global community and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Kalomoh, 2008: interview). The promotion of world peace through conflict resolution, reflected in Namibia’s foreign policy is central to Liberalism. One of Liberalism’s proponents, Immanuel Kant, stated that peace is an ethical duty, for under the conditions of peace people will treat each other as ends, rather than as means to an end (Doyle, 1999: 240).
5.2.1 International peace and security

In his inaugural address on 21 March 2005, President Pohamba stated that Namibia will continue to support the AU’s capacity for conflict prevention, resolution and management on the African continent (Pohamba, 2005a). This notion was repeated by Namibia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Kaire Mbuende, who stated during the UNGA debate on peacekeeping missions on 23 October 2006, that the maintenance of peace and security has been ‘a cardinal point of Namibia’s foreign policy from the very outset’. Furthermore, he stated that Namibia’s position is that the UN should work closely with regional and sub-regional groupings for their peacemaking efforts to succeed and there is, therefore, a need to provide resources for the AU standby force (Mbuende, 2006b).

These statements by President Pohamba and Ambassador Mbuende does not only embrace the advocacy by Liberalism that the international system should have a force which could be mobilised if non-violent conflict resolution fails, but it also heeded the call that a consciously devised machinery is necessary to ensure peace and prosperity (Dunne, 2008: 113).

More recently, in an address to the UN Security Council, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Zaya Shiweva, stated that the UN stands to derive maximum benefits from cooperating with regional organisations, if the capacities of these organisations are strengthened. He said:

“It is critical (sic) important for the United Nations and the African Union to enter into an agreement that would clearly stipulate that any AU or Sub-Regional led peacekeeping operations with the consent of the United Nations, would be transformed into United Nations Missions within a defined timeframe, preferably six (06) months” (Shiweva, 2007).

Shiweva recognised the importance of cooperation among international, continental and regional organisations just as liberalists argue that international regimes facilitate cooperation by sharing information and reinforcing reciprocity (Dunne, 2008: 116). Liberalism further argues that international institutions will enable states to manage
cooperation and stability in the international political system and provide a framework which minimises the danger of security competition among states (Baylis, 2008: 235).

During the UNGA debate on illicit transactions of diamonds and armed conflicts on 4 December 2006, Mbuende repeated that Namibia is committed to world peace and will not allow its diamonds to be used as “blood diamonds” – a reference to the use of revenue from diamonds to sustain conflicts (Mbuende, 2006d). Namibia is a party to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, a cartel of diamond producing countries which guarantees transparency in the marketing of diamonds.

The issue of international peace and security is part of the promotion of the world peace, one of the three themes developed during the presidency of President Nujoma. During the Presidency of President Pohamba, this theme continued to be pursued, not only theoretically through speeches, but that Namibia continued to participate in the UN peace-keeping missions as discussed earlier.

5.2.2 Solidarity with Palestine, Western Sahara and Cuba

Namibia’s colonial past and struggle for independence continue to inform some aspects of her foreign policy. SWAPO as a liberation movement had maintained sound relations with the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro – POLISARIO), the movement fighting for the liberation of the Sahrawi Republic, first from the Spanish colonial rule, and since 1979, from the occupation by Morocco.

Although POLISARIO declared the independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976 after the end of the Spanish colonial rule, and this name is officially used by the AU, the name Western Sahara will be used in this study, since this is the name that is officially used in the speeches of the Namibian leaders. Namibia recognises the sovereignty of the Sahrawi Republic and the use of the name Western Sahara by Namibian leaders could arguably be attributed to the fact the UN, too, uses the
name Western Sahara in its important documents, such as the resolutions of the UN Security Council and UNGA.

Since independence, Namibia has shown significant solidarity with regions, states and people still under some forms of colonial rule and unjust treatments. Namibia made effective use of the UN platform, for example, to highlight this matter. During his first address to the UNGA on 17 September 2005, President Pohamba stated that the decolonisation process was not complete as long as the people of Palestine and Western Sahara continued to suffer under foreign occupation. He called for the immediate and unconditional establishment of the independent State of Palestine and the implementation of the UN Settlement Plan for Western Sahara (Pohamba, 2005b). Pohamba repeated these sentiments during the state visit of President Edwardo Dos Santos of Angola to Namibia in October 2007:

“My government calls for the immediate and unconditional implementation of the UN Settlement Plan for Western Sahara, and all resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly, with the aim of holding a free and fair referendum in Western Sahara. Similarly, we are deeply concerned about the continued suffering of the people of Palestine under Israeli occupation. I wish to confirm our full and unequivocal support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including their right to establish a free and independent State of Palestine alongside Israel” (Pohamba, 2007a).

President Pohamba’s position on Western Sahara and Palestine corresponds to the assumptions of Liberalism. It could be argued that the rights of the people of Western Sahara and Palestine are subdued, as long as they do not enjoy self-determination. Heywood (2004: 29 – 30) stated that Liberalism seeks to establish conditions for individuals and group rights can pursue the course of life in accordance with the aspirations of the individuals concerned. Heywood underscored reasoning and toleration as propositions for Liberalism that embrace individual rights, reasoning and toleration.

To further demonstrate solidarity with the people of Western Sahara, President Mohamed Abdelaziz was invited to the 4th Congress of the SWAPO Party held in December 2007. As a Member of the Central Committee of SWAPO Party, the researcher of this study attended the Congress. The invitation of President Abdelaziz to a congress of Namibia’s
ruling party signify the continued relations between POLISARIO and SWAPO Party, and Namibia’s commitment to the cause of the people of Western Sahara.

On 02 October 2006, Namibia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Dr Kaire Mbuende, informed the UNGA that as long as the situation in the Middle East is not resolved, the UN peace-keeping and preventive diplomacy will remain an illusive goal (Mbuende, 2006a). A month later, on 07 November 2006, Mbuende expressed support to the cause of the Palestinian people, where he summed up their determination stating,

“It is important to realise that the will of the Palestinian People to self determination cannot be killed. No amount of killing, detention and torture will kill the yearnings for freedom and self-determination. For every Palestinian leader who is killed, there are thousand others who are prepared to carry on the task” (Mbuende, 2006c).

Mbuende further bemoaned the human crisis, the violation of the most fundamental human rights, the right to life, in the occupied Palestinian territory and said that there was no justification for the destruction of properties in the occupied territory. Mbuende’s reference to human rights brings in an element of liberalism-inclined arguments. Human rights are fundamental to Liberalism, which presuppose that human beings posses innate rights to life and property, which the state has an obligation to protect (Brown, 2008: 510).

In his first address to the UNGA on 17 September 2005, President Pohamba used the opportunity to call for the international community to demand the unconditional lifting of total blockade against Cuba (Pohamba, 2005b). His words were echoed by Ben Shingenge, First Secretary at the Namibian Mission at the UN, who on 08 November 2005 during the General Assembly debate on the ending of embargo against Cuba stated:

“My delegation has always maintained the view that the embargo against Cuba runs contrary to the letter and spirit of the UN Charter, the International Law and the Millennium Declaration. The unilateral blockade continues to cause irreparable damage to the economic, social and cultural development of the Cuban people as it deprives them of the opportunities and benefits emanating from free trade” (Shingenge, 2005).
Shingenge bemoaned the fact that, despite numerous resolutions by the UNGA, this body was still seized with the matter after 14 years and nothing has been done to lift the total blockade. This situation gives an impression that some powers in the world community get away with issues often contravening the International Law and global public opinion. The researcher of this study expressed similar sentiments during the Budget Debate in the Namibian National Assembly on 25 March 2008:

“Namibia has supported all United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling for the lifting of embargoes against Cuba. This august House too passed a motion to that effect a few years ago...We should persistently and consistently continue to pronounce our uncompromising support to the Cuban cause. The behaviours of some entities within the world community have spoiled the world agenda, riding on obsessive hegemonic supremacy, while compromising justice, objectivity and credibility in the international political system (Mushelenga, 2008a).

The continuity in foreign policy with regard to international solidarity with Palestine, Cuba and Western Sahara embrace the Liberalism-inclined concept of solidarity against aggression and just treatment of all people, which was once stated by the US President, George H. Bush (Dunne, 2008: 115). The irony in Bush’s statement is in respect of Cuba, which suffered economic embargoes by the US, which adversely affect the Cuban people.

Namibian-Cuban solidarity is clearly illustrated in the case of the Cuban Five. In 1998, the US Government captured five Cubans, Gerardo Hernández, René González, Antonio Guerera, Ramón Labañino and Ferdinand González (generally referred to as the Cuban Five) and sentenced them to a combined four year sentence for spying. Cuba maintained that the Cuban Five went to the US to infiltrate Miami based anti-Cuban organisations to prevent the terrorist activities against Cuba (New Era, 01 October 2007:1). Terrorism is associated with violence, although not all forms of violence are acts of terrorism. Liberalism is opposed to terrorism and its proponent Thomas Hobbes view violence to be negative to freedom (Hoffman and Graham, 2006: 488).

In September 2007, family members of the Cuban Five visited Namibia as part of their lobbying efforts for support from the international community for the release of their family members. SWAPO Party and the Namibia-Cuba Friendship Association mobilised Namibians to meet the family members of the Cuban Five at the Hosea Kutako
International Airport to express solidarity. The family members of the Cuban Five met with former President Sam Nujoma, Members of Parliament, church and women groups, and trade unions. During the meeting with President Nujoma, which was attended by the researcher of this study in his capacity as a Member of Parliament and Secretary for International Affairs of SWAPO Party Youth League, Nujoma assured the Cuban Five family members that Namibia will continue to support their cause.

During the Namibian 18th independence anniversary on 21 March 2008, Namibia conferred the Order of the Most Ancient Welwitchia Mirabilis to former Cuban President Fidel Castro for the immense support that President Castro and the people of Cuba had rendered to the people of Namibia during the liberation struggle and after independence. The Order is the highest honour that Namibia can bestow upon an individual. President Pohamba called Cuba’s support of Namibia an unparalleled example of selfless internationalism (New Era, 25 March 2008:1).

On 09 July 2008, a SWAPO Party Member of Parliament, Tommy Nambahu, moved an unopposed Motion that Parliament, *inter alia*,

“Call for the immediate and unconditional release of the Cuban Five,
Demand the lifting of the inhuman and unjustifiable economic blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba” (Nambahu, 2008).

During the debate on the Motion, the researcher of this study stated,

“…the General Assembly has passed resolutions condemning the embargoes against Cuba…each and every year the UN repeats the same resolutions, reiterating resolutions from 1992…Now that shows that somewhere, somehow, there is somebody that is not accountable to international law, international opinion, or the United Nations…International relations became characterised by unjust, aggressive pursuance of the interest of some member states, without due consideration to global harmony and justice to humanity” (Mushelenga, 2008).

Nora Schimming-Chase, a member of the opposition party, CoD, made a brief contribution to the debate, expressing support of the Motion. The Motion was passed unanimously.
5.2.3 Namibia’s role in the UN reform under President Pohamba

During his inauguration, President Pohamba stated that Namibia will continue to support UN reforms, including the restructuring of the UN Security Council. He further called for the need to reform international financial institutions to be more responsive to the practical needs of developing countries (Pohamba, 2005a).

Namibia’s position on the UN reform is derived from the common AU position on the matter. This position was formulated by a committee of 15 AU Member-States and agreed at Ezulwini, Swaziland in February 2005, thereby becoming the Ezulwini Consensus. According to the Ezulwini Consensus, Africa should be given two permanent seats in the UN Security Council, with all the privileges, including the veto right, and should also be given a further five non-permanent seats. President Pohamba became the Head of State a month later after the adoption of the Ezulwini Consensus and under his leadership the Namibian Government continued to pursue the issue of the UN reforms. In his first address to the UNGA as Head of State in September 2005, President Pohamba reminded the international community of the linkage between Namibia and the UN, especially the UN’s role on the question of Namibia’s independence. The President stated that the General Assembly is an important organ of the UN and should, therefore, play an important role in the UN reform process. He said,

“When we address the crucial issues concerning the reform of the United Nations system, we must be guided by the very principles of democracy, equity, justice and fairness for all. At the centre of this overdue exercise must be the compelling need to better serve all our peoples, regardless of their race, religion or status development.” (Namibia Review, 2006: 38).

President Pohamba further emphasised that genuine democratisation and reform of the UN Security Council will only be realised if all Council members are accorded the same privileges, including the right of veto. He maintained that some members were abusing the veto right, creating mistrust and resentment from other members of the world body. He stressed that without giving new Council members the veto right, the UN reform will be meaningless and cosmetic (Namibia Review, January / February 2006: 38). The views expressed by President Pohamba calls for equal opportunity in the decision-making
process. The principle of equality of individuals is central to Liberalism (Hoffman & Graham, 2006: 65 – 66). Equality of individuals extends to the equality of states because the assumptions of Liberalism state that primary actors in the international political system are individuals and groups acting in domestic and transnational society and the preferences of states are the aggregation of the preferences of individuals and group actors in a particular state (Slaughter, 1995: 6).

The Ezulwini Consensus was discussed at the AU 5th Assembly held in Sirte, Libya from 4 – 5 July 2005 and, subsequent to the discussions, the Assembly adopted a Declaration, Assembly/AU/Decl.2 (V), which states that the AU is determined to ensure:

“The allocation of two (2) permanent seats to Africa with all the privileges, including the right of veto, and five (5) non-permanent seats on the Security Council;

Strengthening the leadership of the United Nations General Assembly to enable it to fully play its role as the most representative and democratic organ of the United Nations System and world parliament;

Strengthening the UN General Secretariat in the sense of greater efficiency and increased representation for Africa;

The establishment of a Peace Building Commission for the consolidation of peace as recommended by the Secretary General of the United Nations;

Granting ECOSOC the status of a central coordination mechanism for the activities of the specialized agencies of the United Nations System and its subsidiary organs in the economic, social and cultural domains with a view to enabling it to better discharge its role in attaining the MDGs;

The establishment of a new Human Rights body, as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly based in Geneva, to replace the Human Rights Commission with the same composition on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, and with a new non-selective and less politicized mandate, while confirming the universality and indivisibility of human rights; and

The democratization of the Bretton Woods Institutions” (AU, 2005).

The second, third and last paragraphs of the Declaration stated above indicate that the position of Africa on the UN reform seeks to ensure democratic governance. Democracy is inclined to Liberalism, as stated in Hoffman and Graham (2006: 107) that democracy and liberalism are “alternative names for the same thing”.


The 5th AU Assembly reiterated the AU’s commitment to preserve Africa’s unity and solidarity in the selection, by the African Union, of its representatives in the Security Council to act in the name of the Union and on its behalf. President Pohamba was nominated to serve in the AU’s Committee of 10 comprising other Heads of State, and established to promote and lobby for Africa’s position on the UN reforms based on the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration (Namibia Review, January / February 2006: 39).

Africa’s, and particularly Namibia’s position on the UN reform is anchored in liberal approaches to international relations. Smith (2006: 157) stated that developed countries that wield power in the UN system want to maintain their power in the UN and their reform agenda includes only the reduction in costs and streamlining of the organisation’s operations, while developing countries want more power in the UN decision-making and focus on development issues. The agenda of developed countries in respect of the UN reform corresponds to the Realist assumption that powerful states in the international political systems shape institutions to ensure that they maintain power and maximise the influence in world politics (Smith 2006: 152). The non-developed countries are opposed to this hegemonic and unequal distribution of power and want equality in the international political system.

5.3 A new issue in the foreign policy agenda: climate change

Since 2005, environmental issues such as climate change emerged as prominent items on the world agenda. Namibia is no stranger to environmental issues. As a country, she has a long coastline, one of the earth’s oldest deserts, fragile eco-system, low rainfall and very little arable land. Most of her international borders are natural phenomena such as rivers or deserts. Moreover, Namibia has already been a victim of international environmental crimes such as illegal fishing on her coastal waters, which contributes to the depletion of her fish stock. Lastly, Namibia’s unique environment serves as a significant earner of foreign exchange through eco-tourism.
Climate change refers to global warming which is caused by the fossil fuel emissions. According to Vogler (2008: 361 – 362), it is expected that if this trend continues, by the year 2099 global temperatures will rise by 2.4 to 6.4%, resulting in the rise of sea levels and turbulent weather conditions. It is therefore necessary to reduce gas emissions in order to keep a low concentration of carbon dioxide. At the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, UN Member-States signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 Convention was signed, committing developed countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2%. The climate change issue represent a liberalist approach to international relations. Taylor and Curtis (2008: 325) stated that international conferences on climate change represented ‘a growing sense of interdependence and globalisation of human concerns’.

In October 2006, Namibia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dr Kaire Mbuende, during his address to the UNGA called on all countries which have not ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to ratify the Convention. He further pointed out that poorer states will be adversely affected by climate change unlike rich countries which have the knowledge and greater capacity to deal with the consequences of environmental disaster. This means that climate change poses a threat to humanity as it aggravates poverty and entrenches inequalities (Mbuende, 2006a).

In October 2007, President Pohamba stated at a state banquet, hosted in honour of President Dos Santos of Angola, that Namibia believes that all nations should cooperate and adopt environmental friendly policies that will contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions. This is necessary to address the climate change, which needed an urgent redress (Pohamba, 2007b). At the SADC conference on poverty reduction in April 2008, President Pohamba reiterated that poverty is worsened by unfavourable environmental factors such as drought and floods, which are cause by climate change. He further stated that the climate changes are a result of actions by other states but the impact is felt in the region through calamities such as flood, drought and pestilence. Climate change results in food shortage and mitigating these changes bring a strain on public resources (Pohamba, 2008).
5.4 The growth of the Namibian diplomatic service and consolidation of diplomatic relations

By the time when President Pohamba assumed the office in March 2005, Namibia had diplomatic missions at the UN Headquarters in New York and in 22 countries, namely Angola, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, China, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 2007, Namibia opened further two embassies in Egypt and the United Republic of Tanzania. In addition to the mission in New York, the missions in Austria, Botswana, Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Nigeria, and the UK are also multilateral missions as they are concurrently accredited, respectively, to the UN Offices, SADC, the EU, the AU, UNESCO and FAO, ECOWAS, and the Commonwealth. A list of the Namibian diplomatic missions with their countries of accreditation is included in Appendix 6.

President Pohamba explained that Egypt and Tanzania are important because of their history, having contributed to the liberation of Namibia. They are further strategically placed in terms of geographic locations. The Mission in Tanzania will serve the East African region, while the Mission in Egypt will serve the North Africa and Middle East region (Pohamba, 2008: interview).

Since his election, President Pohamba had to align Namibia to the changing international environment. One response relate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and another to the appointment of senior diplomats.

On 29 June 2005, President Pohamba commissioned Kakena Nangula as Ambassador to Zimbabwe. Nangula is a confidant of President Nujoma, having worked as his Senior Special Assistant (with a rank of Director) for about 10 years, before joining the Namibian staff at the UN attached to Theo-Ben Gurirab during his term as President of the UNGA. This was President Pohamba’s first appointment of a Head of Mission. On 2 August 2006, President Pohamba appointed four Ambassadors. Former Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Dr Kaire Mbuende, who also served as Executive Secretary of SADC was appointed Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN. Selma Ashipala-Musavyi, who served as a senior diplomat in New York and Washington was appointed Ambassador to Austria and the United Nations Offices in Vienna. Former Regional Councillor for Katutura Central in the Khomas Region, Tsukhoe //Gowases, was appointed High Commissioner to Botswana. Daniel Smith who served as Charge d’Affairs in Austria was appointed High Commissioner to Nigeria. At the same time President Pohamba also reshuffled 10 Heads of Missions.

President Pohamba opened new diplomatic missions to make some strides in the foreign policy. Noting the importance of the Arab states in North Africa and the Middle East, President Pohamba opened up a diplomatic Mission in Egypt. The Middle East region has oil reserves and has the potential for trade and investments as discussed earlier. It is therefore arguable that the opening of the Mission in Egypt is aligned to economic diplomacy. Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tuliameni Kalomoh, stated that the expansion of the Namibian diplomatic service should reflect the pursuit of economic development, ensuring that there are economic advantages accruing from Namibia’s new diplomatic missions (Kalomoh, 2008: interview). The Missions in Egypt and Tanzania are also aligned to historical solidarity. As discussed earlier, these missions played a role in the cause for Namibia’s independence.

The appointment of new experienced diplomats to the Missions in New York and Vienna signifies the importance that President Pohamba attaches to multilateral diplomacy. One of the five foreign policy objectives adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at independence is that Namibia will seek to actively participate in international organisations, in order to enhance world peace (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 81). Experienced diplomats in multilateral diplomacy whom President Pohamba appointed to the Missions in New York and Vienna will be able to live to the expectations of this foreign policy objective. There is therefore a link between the foreign policy vision of President Pohamba and the foreign policy during President Nujoma’s term of office. President Pohamba also started to play an active role in the foreign policy,
reshuffling Heads of Missions. The reshuffle of 10 Heads of Missions was more to make a change in the diplomatic contingency, rather than the deployment of skills for particular reasons. This is because some Heads of Missions moved from one multilateral mission to another and from one bilateral mission to another.

The significance of the appointments of Ambassadors Mbuende and Ashipala-Musyavi is that there is an indication that Namibia wants to strengthen her position in multilateral diplomacy. Ambassador Mbuende has an experience in multilateral diplomacy, having served as Executive Secretary of SADC from 1994 to 1999. It was during his tenure of office as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002 – 2004) that the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management was tabled in Parliament in 2004. The appointment of Ambassador Mbuende further demonstrated President Pohamba’s assertion of a new authority and independence in foreign policy decision-making. Ambassador Mbuende fell out of favour with President Pohamba’s predecessor, President Nujoma, who dismissed Mbuende as the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2004. Ambassador Ashipala-Musavyi is a seasoned diplomat in the field of multilateral diplomacy, having served at the Namibian Permanent Mission to the UN as Counsellor (1991-1995), Deputy Permanent Representative (1995 – 1999), and Under-Secretary and Head of the Department of Multilateral Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003 – 2004).

The new appointments further gave importance to multilateral diplomacy in the sense that the position of Charge d’ Affairs at the Mission in Austria was elevated to the position of a full Ambassador. This Mission was opened in November 1995 and had since been headed by Charge d’ Affairs, until the appointment of Ambassador Ashipala-Musavyi in 2006.

The appointment of Ambassador Smith, too, highlights another importance of multilateral diplomacy. The Mission in Nigeria is a multilateral mission as it is concurrently accredited to ECOWAS. President Pohamba saw the necessity to appoint an experienced diplomat such as Daniel Smith, having worked closely with President Nujoma as Under-
Secretary for Presidential Affairs and Charge d’ Affairs in the Namibian Mission in Vienna.

President Pohamba’s appointment of the new Heads of Missions was not without controversies. His appointment of Ambassador //Gowases was criticised widely as not adding value to the Foreign Service. In his reaction to the appointment, opposition MP, McHenry Venaani of the DTA, stated in Parliament on 5 October 2006 during the motivations of his Motion on the effectiveness of foreign missions and other diplomatic matters,

“I want to bemoan the quality of some of our Ambassadors and High Commissioners. I was worried when one of the new appointees was interviewed and asked by an NBC (Namibia Broadcasting Corporation) journalist “What are you going to do to promote Namibia and what measures would you deploy to strengthen the two countries' relationships?” She replied “No I do not know anything. They needed to tell me what I am going to do there”. Let me tell you that if the Foreign Service has come to the point of giving jobs to old serving colleagues and jobs for comrades…do not expose people. Botswana is the seat of SADC and a neighbouring country with diplomatic problems. I am criticizing (sic) that appointment – if you want me to come to that level…Let us not create a perception that the seat of SADC is a place for understudy diplomats”. (Debates of the National Assembly, 2006a: 338 – 339).

Subsequently, President Pohamba revoked the appointment of Ambassador //Gowases, replacing her with Hadino Hishongwa, former Deputy Minister of Higher Education, Training and Employment Creation. Ambassador Hishongwa has previously served in the diplomatic corps of SWAPO as Deputy Chief Representative to East Africa (1970 – 72), and Chief Representative to Senegal and West Africa (1973 – 76), Sweden and the Nordic countries (1976 – 82), and Australia and the Pacific (1985 – 87).

In January 2008, President Pohamba appointed Andrew Intamba, Director of the Namibia Central Intelligence Services (NCIS) as Ambassador to Egypt. In April 2008 President Pohamba appointed Japhet Isaac as High Commissioner to Tanzania. The appointment of Ambassador Intamba brings to the Namibian diplomatic contingency military and security expertise necessary in pursuing the foreign policy principle of promoting world peace and security, as enshrined in the Namibian Constitution (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). Ambassador Isaac is a career diplomat who has served as Deputy Head of Mission in the Namibian Missions in the US, UK and India. He is
well acquainted with issues of multilateral diplomacy, economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation.

During the term of President Pohamba, Namibia and South Africa intensified bilateral cooperation in the field of health, particularly with regard to the treatment of heart patients. Since independence, Namibian heart patients were sent to South Africa for operations and from 2002 they were also sent to Kenya. During the term of President Pohamba, Namibia and South Africa’s diplomatic relations in the field of health reached a milestone when the Cardiac Unit of the Windhoek Central Hospital was opened in June 2008. South African medical and health personnel performed the first open heart surgery on 29 June 2008. Namibia’s Minister of Health and Social Services, Dr Richard Nchabi Kamwi informed the Parliament that South Africa will assist Namibia with the capacity building. A team of cardio-thoracic surgeons, nurses and technicians from the Groote Schuur Hospital will be visiting the Windhoek Central Hospital after every 4 to 6 weeks to perform operations (Kamwi, 2008). The significance of the Cardiac Unit is that it saves Namibia from the costs of transferring patients from Namibia to South Africa. This serves the purpose of the foreign policy principle that Namibia will maintain mutual beneficial relations with other states (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marco Hausiku, stated that in order to effectively address foreign policy issues, a suggestion box has been introduced in the Ministry, where staff could suggest agenda items to be discussed at the Staff meetings with the Minister, which have been held quarterly since 2006. The Ministry had also decided to increase the frequency of Heads of Missions Conference every second year. This is meant to effectively address the current priorities, which are the promotion of trade and investment, making Namibia’s presence at the international platforms and strengthening relationship with old and new friends with the purpose of promoting trade and investment (Hausiku, 2008: interview).
5.5 The silence of foreign policy

Many people have expressed concern that foreign policy issues have been reduced to ‘low politics’ under the presidency of President Pohamba, as there is relatively little publicity on important foreign and international relations issues. This view is supported by Gwen Lister, Editor of The Namibian. She stated that the Government does not clarify its position on topical issues such as the US invasion of Iraq. She further recalled an instance when her media institution, The Namibian newspaper, learned about the visit by the President to a foreign country from foreign media when, in her view, Namibia’s media should have received such information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lister, 2007: interview). Lister’s views were echoed by opposition parliamentarian, Mc Henry Venaani, who introduced a motion on the effectiveness of the Namibian foreign Missions and other diplomatic matters stating,

“...[L]et me from the onset bemoan the way that we endure (sic) Foreign Affairs in this country…it is true that we are attending very important meetings. I have just learned that the Foreign Minister has left to attend another important engagement, but of course, this Legislature needs to be informed on important meetings that are taking place so that we can also move at par with our Ministry of Foreign Affairs…how can a foreign policy be a matter of secrecy. I really deplore such an attitude” (Debates of the National Assembly, 2006a: 332).

The Ministry does not issue statements on important topical issues, like during the visit of President Mugabe in February 2007 when some members of the civil society organised demonstrations or when Ben Uлежа introduced a motion on Zimbabwe in March 2007, which was rejected by the ruling party. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marco Hausiku, stated that he does not believe in publicity as proof that he is working. He said,

“I am a person who wants to do my job silently...Because I believe that government programmes and government policies, the ownership is that of the government and all the people...I should not try to create status on what I am doing as a servant of the people in promoting policies of the Government of the Republic of Namibia” (Hausiku, 2008: interview).

After the introduction of the motion by Venaani in October 2007, there was improvement in foreign affairs information dissemination. After attending the UNGA in 2007, Minister Hausiku tabled a report in Parliament. He also tabled a report on the AU-African Diaspora Ministerial Meeting held in South Africa in November 2007 and the SADC
Extra-Ordinary Summit convened in Zambia, April 2008, to discuss the post-election environment in Zimbabwe after the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission delayed the release of the presidential elections results. As a Member of Parliament, the researcher of this study observed this improvement.

In another small state, The Netherlands, for example, Members of Parliament complained about the lack of publicity about foreign policy and bemoaned the fact that foreign policy business was conducted in secrecy, and members learned about their country’s foreign policy from other countries. During the tenure of office of Foreign Minister de Marees van Swinderlen, after Members of Parliament complained about the low publicity of foreign affairs, he embarked upon publicity of foreign affairs among parliamentarians (Vandenbosch, 1944: 443 – 445). This shows that the trend of complain about low publicity on foreign affairs by parliamentarians has long existed.

Meanwhile, in June 2008, Minister Hausiku stated that he is working on the programme to explain foreign policy issues to the public, thus, bringing foreign policy in a public domain (Hausiku, 2008: interview). Rana (2007: 7) stated that the good system of foreign policy and diplomacy is reflected by the extent to which the foreign ministries are able to engage with the public on foreign affairs matters. This promotes pluralism, as it ensures public-private partnership on foreign relations matters.

Namibia had not adopted a pro-active approach to the post-election conflict in Kenya, which occurred after the presidential elections that were held in December 2007. Kenya had played a role during the transitional period of Namibia’s independence in 1989 and 1990. Brigadier-General Daniel Opande of Kenya was the Deputy Commander of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG). When the mandate of the UN came to an end in March 1990, President Nujoma requested President Moi to second the Kenyan Battalion of UNTAG to train the new Namibian Army. President Moi agreed to the request and the Kenyan Battalion was delayed with three more months, and only left Namibia in June 1990. During the farewell of the Kenyan Battalion President Nujoma stated,
“Kenya as a country and member of the OAU has played a significant role in the liberation struggle of Namibia. It assisted us and rendered all round political, diplomatic, moral and material support to our people over the years. In particular, I would like to single out His Excellency President Daniel arap Moi…for his personal commitment to the Namibian cause” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 22).

It was therefore expected that Namibia should play a role in the post-election conflict mediation like South Africa, which sent Cyril Ramaphosa as a peace-making envoy. Ramaphosa, a former Secretary-General of South Africa’s ruling party, the ANC, is a skilful negotiator and peace maker who led the negotiation team of the ANC with the South African Government during the negotiations to bring about a peaceful end to apartheid and lead South Africa towards her first democratic elections in April 1994. As a student leader, the researcher of this study observed developments around the transitional negotiations in South Africa. The researcher of this study stated during the budget debate in Parliament,

“Kenya was among the countries that contributed troops to the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), which supervised the peaceful transition to Namibia’s independence… The presumptions of academic perspectives suppose that small states have limited foreign policy scope. Yes, we cannot be everywhere all the times, but certainly we should be somewhere sometimes. We have an obligation derived from our history. When the occasion demands, we should respond to the call to provide stewardship in crisis management and conflict resolution, assisting our siblings on the continent to embrace a Liberalism-oriented agenda of good natured humans who strive for harmony and political decency” (Mushelelenga, 2008b).

In May 2008, a wave of attacks based on xenophobia started in South Africa. The Namibian Government did not pronounce its position on the issue. This resulted in the SWAPO Party Youth League’s Secretary for Information and Mobilisation, Clinton Swaartbooi to issue a statement stating that there was a ‘third force’ in South Africa inciting xenophobia in order for Zimbabweans in South Africa to go back to Zimbabwe to vote President Mugabe out of power. A Counsellor from the South African Mission, Petrus Coetzee, responded that Swaartbooi’s statement was “utter rubbish” (The Namibian, 30 May 2008: 1). This resulted in the SWAPO Party Youth League writing a letter to the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ngarikutuke Tjiriange, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting that Coetzee should be withdrawn from Namibia as he is not “able to defend the interests of the two countries” (The Namibian, 30 May 2008: 1). Coetzee later apologised to the SWAPO Party Youth League and a matter was put to rest.
Incidences like this one could be avoided, if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had shown its presence, stating the Namibian position on the issue of xenophobia and take a lead in the debates around the issue.

5.6 The President as the foreign policy-maker

Hermann, Hermann and Hagan (1991: 313 – 318) presents three types of foreign policy decision-making units, namely predominant leader, single group and multiple autonomous groups. In a scenario of a predominant leader, a single individual has the power to make decisions for the government and when such a leader has views on a given issue, others will not express differing views, for fear of reprisal. In a single group scenario, members of the group interact and take a position on an issue. This practice is observed when no individual leader has the capacity to make decisions or decline to exercise exclusive authority on foreign policy matters. In a scenario of multiple autonomous groups, there are more than one single group, and can commit the resources of the government without the support of the other. In this situation, one group may also veto the decision of another group.

Unlike his predecessor, President Pohamba had not been in the global foreign affairs and diplomacy circles compared to his predecessor. Pohamba’s general experience in foreign policy and diplomacy had been of SWAPO’s Deputy Chief Representative in Zambia (1964), Deputy Chief Representative in North Africa from 1970 to 1973 and Chief Representative in East Africa from 1973 to 1977. After that, he worked in the administration and finance fields until independence (Hopwood, 2007: 244 – 245). Unlike President Nujoma, President Pohamba was not involved in major negotiation teams with the UN or the WCG. He was, thus, not internationally known prior to becoming a President. It was, therefore, important that he should build an international image for himself and present himself to the international political system.
5.6.1 Differences in approach with the predecessor: reservations and hesitations

There is a general view that although the foreign policy agenda, issues and principles under President Pohamba remained the same similar to that of President Nujoma, there is a difference in the personalities of the two leaders. Geingob (2007b: interview) stated that President Nujoma is forthright in his approach to issues, while President Pohamba maintains a cautious approach. Ulenga (2007: interview) stated that President Nujoma was a foreign policy-maker to a larger extent, unlike President Pohamba. He stated that Nujoma could pursue policies aggressively, as it happened in the case of Namibia’s participation in the DRC war. These views were echoed by Katjiuongua (2007: interview), who further stated that President Pohamba is less vociferous in topical international issues.

The assertion by Geingob, Ulenga and Katjiuongua was manifested during President Pohamba’s State of the Nation Address to Parliament in 2007. President Pohamba avoided answering a question from the leader of the Official Opposition, Ben Ulenga of the CoD on the position of Namibia towards Zimbabwe. President Pohamba stated that he would not answer Ulenga in Parliament but is prepared to discuss the Zimbabwean issue with Ulenga in privacy at State House. President Nujoma would have stated publicly the government position with a sense of assertion. President Pohamba defended his reservations stating that President Mbeki briefed him on the progress he was making to mediate between the government and opposition parties and he felt that some of the issues that he was briefed on by President Mbeki should not be said publicly, but he was prepared to talk with Ulenga about them (Pohamba, 2008: interview).

5.6.2 Building an international image

During his first year in the office, President Pohamba undertook state and official visits to nine countries, namely Angola, South Africa, Botswana, United Republic of Tanzania, US, Mozambique, Germany and the People’s Republic of China, in that order. His predecessor only undertook two state visits to Zambia and Botswana during his first term
of office. Having been at the helm of SWAPO for 30 years and having attended and addressed a number of international fora, President Nujoma did not need to introduce himself to the international political system.

5.6.3 Consultations with foreign policy stakeholders

After assuming duties as President on 21 March 2005, President Pohamba re-appointed Marco Hausiku, and his deputy, Lempy Lucas, who had previously been in that position for 10 months, as appointees of President Nujoma. Both President Pohamba and Foreign Minister Hausiku are relatively new to modern diplomacy and foreign affairs. Their predecessors had the advantage of experience in foreign affairs. Hausiku’s experience in foreign policy and diplomacy started with his appointment to the position of Foreign Minister in 2004. However, as a Cabinet Minister since 1990, he had attended international conferences and held bilateral exchanges with his counterparts from other countries. The Deputy Minister’s background is in youth administration, having served in administrative capacity with SWAPO Youth League since 1980. She served as the Youth League Deputy Secretary from 1997 until 2002. She, however, has experience in foreign affairs as she served in the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security when she became a Member of Parliament in March 2000, until her appointment as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at the end of May 2004.

In 2008, President Pohamba appointed Ambassador Tuliameni Kalomoh as Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Kalomoh, discussed in the previous chapter is an experienced diplomat, having served in the SWAPO, Namibian Government and UN diplomatic services. Ambassador Kalomoh’s appointment would ensure collaboration with the Minister on important foreign affairs issues, assist in policy formulation and compliment the diplomatic expertise in the Ministry.

Minister Hausiku stated that President Pohamba has a close working relation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Minister advises the President on foreign relations and follows the statement by the President on foreign affairs, so that when the formulation of
a foreign policy issue is made, there is agreement on issues that the policy seek to address (Hausiku, 2008: interview).

In an interview, President Pohamba explained that decisions on foreign policy matters are taken in the Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities, which he chairs. This Committee advises the President on foreign policy issues. Depending on the impact on the foreign policy, some issues may be referred to the entire Cabinet for final decision. In the end, the President will issue foreign policy directives, but the decision was taken in the Cabinet or Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs picks up foreign relations issues that need the attention of the Government, he brings them to the Cabinet or Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities to analyse them and take a position. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, will then carry out the mandate from the Cabinet or Cabinet Committee, serving as the foreign policy conveyor belt (Pohamba, 2008: interview). It should be noted that emergency foreign relations issues do not necessarily have to wait for meetings of the Cabinet or Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities. For example, an interview with Ambassador Kalomoh was postponed once, as he had to leave to State House to attend to urgent matters related to the situation in Zimbabwe. This was an emergency that should be attended to promptly.

President Pohamba also consults Members of the opposition parties represented in parliament. Since he became the President in March 2005, he has been inviting opposition party leaders to the State House at the beginning of every year to discuss issues of national concern, including foreign relations. In President Pohamba’s views “sometimes oppositions advise but it is not that I should always rush to them asking for advice on the foreign policy” (Pohamba, 2008: interview). When President Pohamba attended the inauguration of President Armando Guebuza of Mozambique, he included in his delegation, Ben Ulenga, Leader of the Official Opposition, CoD. President Nujoma did not include in his delegation to foreign countries opposition politicians, although they were included by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, in the delegations to the UNGA (Gurirab, 2007b: interview). President Pohamba’s approach of consulting oppositions on foreign affairs differs from that of Nujoma, who stated that the role of
opposition parties on foreign policy issues is played through their participation in parliamentary activities and not through consultations (Nujoma, 2007b: interview).

The consultative process of the President goes further to junior officials who form part of the President’s delegation to foreign missions. Peer discussions with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that before the President goes on a foreign mission, he holds meetings with all officials accompanying him and asks them questions related to their roles and areas of responsibilities. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marco Hausiku, confirmed this when he stated that the briefings of President Pohamba includes junior staff members who deals with foreign affairs issues, compared to the briefing sessions of President Nujoma, which included only Ministers and senior officials (Hausiku, 2008: interview).

5.7 Summary

The foreign policy under President Pohamba is a continuation of the foundation laid by his predecessor, President Nujoma. Kalomoh (2008: interview) stated that President Pohamba is a long time serving leader of the SWAPO Party and the fundamentals of foreign policy under his presidency will, therefore, invariably reflect the position of the Party. It could, thus, be argued that principles and issues of foreign policy under the government of one party will not differ significantly. Like during the term of President Nujoma, the foreign policy during the term of President Pohamba was influenced by international organisations. Issues of international peace and security remained important, in line with the AU’s conflict resolution and the UN’s peace-keeping activities. During the term of President Pohamba, Namibia continued to participate in the UN Peace-Keeping Mission in Liberia. Namibia’s foreign policy agenda for the UN reform is guided by the AU’s Ezulwini Consensus.

The Namibian foreign policy during the term of President Pohamba continued to pursue the issue of solidarity with the people of Palestine, Western Sahara and Cuba, building on the foundation laid during the time of President Nujoma. During the term of President
Pohamba, Namibia moved a step further to award the highest award the *Order of the Most Ancient Welwitchia Mirabilis* to President Castro. Previous recipients of the Order during the term of President Nujoma were Presidents Nujoma, Edwardo Dos Santos of Angola, Quett Masire of Botswana and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe in 1995, and President Pohamba on 21 March 2005 the day that he took office. In 1995 and 2005 the Order was presented to the recipients at the independence celebrations attended by the researcher of this study.

A new departure on the foreign policy is the issue of climate change. This was largely caused by the dynamics of international relations as the issue of global warming becomes topical. Improvements were made on the foreign policy scope. Although Namibia is a small state with limited resources, it expanded its diplomatic missions to effectively focus on new areas in the Arab States and East Africa. This was done to promote economic diplomacy and link the foreign policy of Namibia to the SWAPO foreign policy by maintaining old friends. Thus, Namibia has achieved the foreign policy principle of maintaining mutual beneficial relations (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). Like his predecessor, President Nujoma, President Pohamba’s appointment of the Heads of Missions includes both career diplomats and people from other backgrounds.

It should be noted that although President Pohamba has appointed three women as Heads of Missions, the situation of women in foreign policy remained the same and even worse than as it was during the term of President Nujoma. During the term of President Nujoma, there were five women serving as Heads of Mission, while during the term of President Pohamba, there are five out of 24 Heads of Mission. The reality is that two of the five women who served as Heads of Missions during the term of President Nujoma completed their tour of duty towards the end of his last term. Further, of the three women whom President Pohamba appointed, Ambassador //Gowases never took up her appointment, as her appointment was revoked and replaced with an appointment of a male Ambassador, Hadino Hishongwa.
President Pohamba’s style of foreign policy-making differs from that of President Nujoma. President Pohamba consults widely, including Members of opposition parties. In this respect, he realises the foreign policy objective of encouraging national consensus on the formulation and conduct of Namibia’s foreign policy (*Debates of the National Assembly, 1993: 86*). President Nujoma did not consult Members of opposition parties on foreign policy issues. President Nujoma maintains that they have other platforms such as the Parliament, where they can make their contributions on the foreign policy. Although the two leaders differ in style, this had no impact on the substance of the policy, rather than how the policy should be executed.

One of the failures of the foreign policy under President Pohamba is the relegation of foreign policy to low politics. The Government remained silent on important issues on foreign policy such as Namibia’s relations with Zimbabwe. In many cases, leaders would say that Namibia’s position is guided by SADC, without further elaborating on the issue. This led to SWAPO Party Youth League to take a lead on the issue as discussed earlier. The SWAPO Party Youth League took an active role on this issue to fill the vacuum that exists in the Namibia foreign policy. As Member of Parliament and SWAPO Party Youth League Secretary for International Affairs, the researcher of this study observed this development.
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Introduction

The research question of this study is based on four assumptions. First as a small and relatively newly created state Namibia is restricted in her international relations and foreign policy. Second, Namibia’s was immediately confronted with the Idealist (Liberalist) challenges brought by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the post-Cold War era, with new, and often uncertain agendas and environments in the regional and international political system. Third, the process of foreign policy making in post-independent Namibia is largely dominated by state rather than non-state actors. Fourth, very little research has been conducted on Namibia’s foreign policy.

The research question was further to determine the objectives and goals of the country’s foreign policy have conceivably been achieved within the context of traditional approaches to the study of International Relations such as Idealism (Liberalism) and Realism. This means that the study should identify the shortcomings and successes of Namibia’s foreign policy, using the agency structure debate analysis. This analysis addresses the domestic environment in the country (individuals and institutions), the regional (SADC), continental (AU) and international environments (Commonwealth, NAM and the UN).

Namibia’s foreign policy principles are embodied in article 96 of the Namibian Constitution, which reads:

The state shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it:

(a) adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment;
(b) promotes international cooperation, peace and security;
(c) creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among nations;
(d) fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations;
(e) encourages the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 52 – 53).

Further, immediately after independence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set five objectives for Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, namely to:
• Promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity and ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands of Namibia;
• Promoting Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid and colonialism;
• Promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities;
• Enhancing peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and the
• Promotion of world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU and NAM (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80 – 81).

In Chapter One, it was stated that the small state theory rests, inter alia, on the assumption that small states have a narrow scope of foreign policy. This is not necessarily the case with Namibia. The discussion of foreign policy principles and issues demonstrates that Namibia has a larger scope of foreign policy interest, based on Idealism (Liberalism and Pluralism) perspectives through her multilateral diplomacy, the pursuance of economic diplomacy, the striving for world peace and South-South cooperation.

6.2 Pre-independence foreign policy-making

The official process of foreign policy-making in Namibia started at independence on 21 March 1990, but the post-independence foreign policy is rooted in the pre-independence epoch. In 1947, an Anglican clergyman working in South Africa, Reverend Michael Scott, started this process with petitioning the UN. In 1957, prior to the formation of nationalist movements in Namibia, Namibians started petitioning the UN. These early petitioners represented traditional authorities and regional political groups such as the Herero Chief’s Council, the Rehoboth Community and the OPC.
When nationalist liberation movements such as SWANU and SWAPO (its forerunners OPC and OPO having been formed in 1957 and 1959, respectively) were established in 1959 and 1960, respectively, petitioners acting on behalf of their movements regularly petitioned the UN. SWANU’s expansion was undermined by the movement’s reluctance to embark upon an armed liberation struggle, a course of action taken by SWAPO. This provided SWAPO with an advantage to garner support from the OAU’s Liberation Committee and the international community.

Consequently, SWAPO’s legitimacy increased as it secured recognition from the OAU and the UN as the ‘sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people’ (see OAU, 1975 and UN, 1976). This position advantaged SWAPO exceptionally, and left the movement with no formidable competitor on the platform of pre-independence Namibian politics. In the process, SWAPO established its own bi- and multilateral diplomatic relations. The movement opened diplomatic Missions in Africa, America, Europe, Asia and Australia and joined multilateral organisations such as, for example the OAU and NAM. The movement further established diplomatic relations with multilateral organisations such as the UN, Commonwealth and FLS. Through this, SWAPO consolidated its position in world politics. The diplomatic efforts of SWAPO and the WCG, culminated in the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 which mapped out a transitional plan leading to Namibian independence under the UN supervision. The WCG and the FLS and Nigeria played a significant role in the negotiation process to implement UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, which was finally implemented in 1989. Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in November 1989 where SWAPO won with 57.3% (Hopwood, 2007: 42). The Constituent Assembly drafted and adopted the Namibian Constitution, including article 96 which subsequently formed the basis of Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy.

6.3 Independence, foreign policy settings and institutions

Since 21 March 1990, Namibia’s Independence Day, the Namibian Government set to continue building on the foreign policy foundation laid by SWAPO during the pre-
independence period. This was confirmed by President Sam Nujoma at the opening of the first diplomatic training in 1990 when he stated,

“The ruling party represents a good example of continuity and change. The long, friendly and productive relations which SWAPO cultivated and maintained with nations, countries, peoples, organisations and peoples of the world put Namibia, as an emerging nation, in good stead as our country seek to play its proper role in the international arena. We will proceed forcefully to take full advantage of the relations we enjoy with all these instances and in so doing promote the interest of our citizens” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999a: 16).

The independence of Namibia occurred at a major turning point in the world history, namely the end of the Cold War. The Cold War polarised the world in the USSR-led East Bloc and US-led West Bloc countries, and SWAPO was seen as aligned to the East Bloc. Given the Realpolitik of the Cold War, foreign policy-making before independence was inclined to Realism. Although SWAPO had opened diplomatic missions from the East and West, the West regarded SWAPO to be a proxy of the East (Gurirab, 2007b: interview). Meanwhile, the post-independence foreign policy-makers recognised the new epoch arising from the end of the Cold War and, thus, adopted a Liberalism inclined foreign policy in the Constitution, based on non-alignment, promotion of peace and security, settlement of disputes by peaceful means and respect of international laws (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).

Prior to Namibia’s independence, South Africa determined and dominated South West Africa’s foreign policy. Once the country became independent, new foreign policy institutions were required to represent Namibia’s foreign policy objectives. In order to achieve this, the Namibian Government relied upon experienced SWAPO and SWANU decision-makers to establish state-to-state diplomatic relations and head Namibia’s diplomatic missions. The new Ministry of Foreign Affairs was structured to serve Namibia’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy goals and objectives. Training programmes were arranged for staff members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Apart from the first diplomatic training by Ambassador Ebenezer Debrah in Windhoek after the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as discussed earlier, subsequent diplomatic trainings attended by Foreign Service Offices in a number of countries were sponsored and the intake has therefore been limited. In 1999, another diplomatic training programme was conducted in Windhoek and was organised by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for the Heads of Missions who were appointed that year, since some of them were not career diplomats.

6.4 Namibia as a small state and her foreign policy successes

Namibia is not an island in world politics. Her foreign policy is determined by the regional and international environment. The UN, Commonwealth, NAM, AU, and SADC are some of the important organisations that Namibia has joined, and the country’s foreign policies are guided by the principles governing these multilateral organisations.

6.4.1 Participation in African and other international peace-keeping missions

With regard to the promotion of world peace, despite Namibia’s limited human and financial resources, she participated in a number of UN peace-keeping operations. Within three years of her independence, Namibia participated in the UN peace-keeping mission in Cambodia. From 1990 to 2008, as indicated in table 14 below, Namibia has participated in three UN Peace-Keeping Missions in Cambodia (UNTAC), Angola (UNAVEM III) and Liberia (UNMIL). In addition to this, Namibia participated in other peace-making efforts by deploying officers and observers in four UN missions in Burundi (ONUB), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Kosovo (UNMIK), and Eritrea (UNMEE), and one AU mission in Sudan (AMIS, UNMIS and UNAMID) (Ministry of Defence, 2007 and Ministry of Defence, 2008) (see table 14 in this regard). Namibia further played an important role in the DRC conflict from 1998 to 1999 by deploying her troops in the DRC at the invitation of the DRC Government to fight the DRC rebels and Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi armed forces (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1999b: 416).
Table 14: Namibia’s participation in peace-keeping missions from 1992 to 2008  
*Source: Ministry of Defence, 2008.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Mission</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Personnel contribution</th>
<th>Budget Namibian Dollar (N$) (November 2008: US$ 1 = N$ 9.5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC, UNAVEM III</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1992 – 1993</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Atlantic</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1995 – 1999</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1998 – 2003</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2000 to date (2008)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2004 to date</td>
<td>3 835</td>
<td>N / A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2004 – 2006</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>N / A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCI</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2004 to date</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>N / A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>Sudan (Dafur)</td>
<td>2004 to date</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>N / A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>Sudan (southern part)</td>
<td>2005 to date</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>N / A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2008 to date</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>N / A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Namibia’s contribution to world peace is further illustrated by her campaign for the democratisation of apartheid South Africa and the end of the civil war in Angola. In this way, Namibia attempted to achieve the foreign policy objective of enhancing peace in the region (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1991: 79 – 81). Namibia’s campaign for world peace extends beyond the Southern Africa region, and includes solidarity for peaceful solutions to the questions of Western Sahara and Palestine. Namibia’s participation in world politics is, therefore, arguably not low, and has realised the foreign policy principle of promoting world peace and security, enshrined in the Namibian Constitution (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).

### 6.4.2 Contribution to regional integration

Although Namibia is a small state, she played a role in strengthening SADC through her involvement in the creation and restructuring of SADC’s institutions and providing logistic support to the SADC Parliamentary Forum. Morgan & Webber (2002: 242) stated that Nigeria, for example, continues to play an important role in the political and economic integration of the West Africa region through its membership of the ECOWAS. Given the fact that Nigeria is a big state and Namibia is a small state, there is logic in maintaining that Namibia’s role in SADC reflects a successful foreign policy. In this
respect, Namibia has realised the foreign policy objective of active participation in multilateral organisations.

Namibia has provided leadership in multilateral organisations, for example SADC in the restructuring and streamlining of the organisation and the establishment of SADC. In the AU it is in respect of the UN reform.

Namibia’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe is largely guided by SADC. Namibian foreign policy-makers refer to the decisions taken by SADC on the problems in Zimbabwe as the guidelines that Namibia will follow in her diplomacy towards Zimbabwe.

6.4.3 Multilateralism

Through her membership to the UN, Namibia conducted her foreign policy in terms of the UN Charter’s principle of maintaining world peace and security. This is illustrated by Namibia’s participation in various UN and AU peace-keeping missions and operations. In this respect, Namibia has realised her objective of the promotion of world peace through an active role in the international organisations (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 81). Namibia further realised the foreign policy principle of promoting international peace (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53).

At the UN, Namibia provided leadership and earned a good standing during the term of Theo-Ben Gurirab as President of the UNGA from September 1999 to September 2000. Namibia further earned international reputation when President Sam Nujoma was co-chair of the Millennium Summit in 2000. Ambassador Andjaba played a role in the East-Timor (now independent Timor-Leste) peace-making process as President of the UN Security Council in 1999. Namibian nationals also occupied important positions in multilateral organisations and made a meaningful contribution to issues of peace and security, central to Liberalism’s perspectives. A notable example includes Ambassador Tuliameni Kalomoh who served as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General to Liberia in 1997 and UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs from 2002 to 2007. During the latter assignment, Ambassador Kalomoh played a role in peace-making efforts in West Africa.

6.4.4 Increased importance of economic diplomacy

Immediately after her independence, Namibia’s diplomatic relations predominantly focused on political affairs. Post-independent Namibia also pursued economic diplomacy, joining multilateral organisations such as the WTO and UNCTAD. She further attracts foreign direct investment through the Walvis Bay Export Processing Zone (EPZ) and concluded a number of trade agreements with other countries. In this way, Namibia has achieved her foreign policy goal of securing better terms for trade (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80). Namibia’s major trade partners are from Asia, the Caribbean, Pacific states, the US and Europe. This is contrary to the notion that small states’ foreign policy patterns reflect “a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities” (East, 1973: 557).

A link between SWAPO’s pre-independence foreign policy and the Namibian foreign policy took Namibia’s economic diplomacy to the Nordic countries resulting in the signing of a number of agreements. These agreements promote trade, investment and development, thereby realising Namibia’s foreign policy objective of promoting economic development and prosperity (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80).

6.4.5 South-South solidarity

Namibia pursues a South-South cooperation agenda in her foreign policy by forging ties with the emerging economic powers of the South, such as China, India and Brazil. Namibia’s South-South cooperation foreign policy towards Brazil has been successful, resulting in the development of the Maritime Wing of the NDF into a fully fledged Namibian Navy. Namibia has also signed a number of agreements with China, for example in the fields in education and health. Namibia has also established diplomatic
relations with India and benefited on education, agriculture, health, and science and technology skill transfer.

Namibia has longstanding relations with the NAM, which commenced after the formal admission of SWAPO as a member of the NAM in 1978. This aspect provides a link between pre- and post-independence foreign policy-making. At independence, the principle of non-alignment became enshrined in the Constitution. It is stated that “The state shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment” (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 52). Namibia’s aim was to establish diplomatic relations with countries from the former East and West Blocs.

In pursuance of her South-South foreign policy, Namibia participates in the multilateral fora such as the NAM, the Group of 77 and China, the New African-Asian Strategic Partnership and the SACU-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement. These fora discuss strategies related to the development of the countries of the South. Namibia realises her foreign policy principle of maintaining mutual beneficial relations (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53) through her South-South cooperation foreign policy agenda.

6.4.6 Promoting democracy and good governance

Although not a former British colony, Namibia’s membership of the Commonwealth played a role in the strengthening of democratic institutions at home and advocate issues of democracy and human rights, winning the admiration of leaders from old democratic states like the US and UK. In 1995, Namibia advocated these when President Nujoma wrote to the Nigerian military ruler, President Sani Abacha urging him to pardon General Olusegun Obasanjo who was sentenced to death by the military tribunal.
6.4.7 Upholding International Law and the peaceful settlement of international disputes

Namibia’s membership of the AU continues to guide its foreign policy in respect of peaceful settlement of international disputes. This is illustrated by the peaceful solution to the dispute over the Kasikili Island, where Namibia further demonstrated her respect for International Law and treaty obligations as enshrined in her Constitution (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990: 53). In this case, Namibia accepted the outcome of the ICJ verdict pertaining to the ownership of the island. After the verdict of the ICJ, there was no need for further mediation on the matter, unlike in the case of Nigeria which did not initially accept the verdict of the ICJ over the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula favouring Cameroon. Nigeria only agreed to abide by the ICJ decision after the UN convened two Summits with the Presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon in 2002 and 2004 to sensitise them to implement the decision of the ICJ (Kalomoh, 2008: interview).

6.5 Domestic determinants of Namibia’s foreign policy

6.5.1 Institutions

Apart from international determinants of its foreign policy, Namibia’s foreign policy is also influenced by domestic factors, most notably her size and, invariably, resources (capital and idiosyncratic). The President and Minister of Foreign Affairs are among key foreign policy-makers. However, in a foreign policy that embraces a Liberal and Pluralist approach, other Ministries, also play a role in the economy and have a stake in foreign policy matters. This is particularly the case with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which deploys commercial counsellors to Namibian Missions to attract trade and investment to Namibia, thereby contributing to the country’s economic diplomacy.
6.5.2 Personalities and their foreign policy doctrines

Apart from institutional and bureaucratic factors, personalities also continue to play an important domestic determinant.

6.5.2.1 President Sam Nujoma (1990 to 2005) and Pan-Africanism

During his terms as President, President Nujoma has been a key foreign policy-maker who provided stewardship and remained resolute in the process of foreign policy-making. His experience as a leader of SWAPO, a liberation movement, that grew to become a fully fledged government-in-exile proved to be significant. President Nujoma is a Pan-African who promoted African unity through his Pan-Africanism Doctrine, which promotes AU symbols like the flag and anthem.

President Nujoma established himself as a reputable foreign policy-maker who readily responded to topical issues, both in the region, the continent and the world at large.

As a foreign policy-maker, President Nujoma is compared to former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, who set the foreign policy agenda in South Africa on African Renaissance, articulated South Africa’s engagement in Africa and promoted the strengthening of regional and continental institutions (van Wyk, 2008: 16). In a similar manner, President Nujoma set the Namibian foreign policy on Pan-Africanism, articulated Namibia’s engagement in the Great Lakes region and advocated the strengthening of SADC and the AU.

6.5.2.2 President Hifikepunye Pohamba (2005 to 2008) and his evolving foreign policy doctrine

President Nujoma’s successor, President Pohamba, has a different approach to foreign policy. President Pohamba, for example, is more consultative in his approach. However, the substance of the foreign policy under the two Presidents remained the same, as both
are members of the SWAPO Party. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marco Hausiku, stated that the foreign policy objectives set during the term of President Nujoma remain to:

- Promote trade and investment; and
- Strengthen relationships with former diplomatic partners and acquire new ones (Hausiku, 2008: interview).

As stated earlier, these issues are inclined to Liberalism as a theory of International Relations. Further, they realise the foreign policy objective of promoting economic prosperity (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991: 80).

6.5.2.3 Namibian civil society and Parliament

Public participation in foreign policy is important. The Government drafted the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management without wider consultation. In South Africa, this process was made with a broader consultation of the civil society (Van Wyk, 2008: 11 – 12). While foreign policy has largely been dominated by state actors, there is a need to improve on the engagement with non-state actors, especially the business community, given the Liberalism inclined foreign policy issues that the Government has adopted, such as economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation.

Civil organisations and opposition parties are other stakeholders in the foreign policy-making process. Their role on domestic disagreement presents another posture of foreign policy dynamics. They have been vocal on, *inter alia*, human rights violations in Nigeria, Namibia’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe, Namibia’s participation in the DRC conflict and the Government’s reluctance to voluntarily subscribe to the Africa’s Peer Review Mechanism. The opposition’s effectiveness depends on the government’s willingness to listen. This is largely because foreign policy issues do not feature during elections (Lister, 2007: interview). This aspect was confirmed – and continues to be the case – by Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben-Gurirab, at the Superior Institute of International Relations in Maputo, Mozambique in 1998, when he stated,
“All election results have thus far consistently favoured SWAPO. It follows from this given reality that, at the present time, the contribution of the parliamentary opposition has not been decisive in policy formulation. Public debate is, of course, another matter. We have not quite yet made a clean break with the recent ugly past and the people’s memories are still fresh about who did what, how, when and why” (Gurirab, 1998).

The effectiveness of opposition parties also depends on their approaches to foreign policy issues. Namibia’s first Prime Minister, Hage Geingob, stated that opposition parties can make appointments with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss issues, rather than propagating in public to expose weakness and cause embarrassment to the Government (Geingob, 2007b: interview). Sentiments on opposition parties’ ineffective approach was also expressed by the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, when he stated in Parliament that,

“Opposition or minority parties in Parliament have nobody else but themselves to blame if they descent into a lower ebb of irrelevancy and into a shallow political balderdash. They should take a leaf from Helen Suzman’s political diary. This lady…used to be an effective parliamentarian and lone voice for justice and fairness, albeit in an all-white parliament of apartheid South Africa” (Debates of the National Assembly, 2001: 333).

The approach adopted by President Pohamba to consult with opposition parties bring them closer to the foreign policy-making process, in addition to the platform that they have in the Parliament. This is particularly important because when opposition parties travel outside Namibia, they defend the Government’s position to the outside world. This practice does not occur in all countries. For example, the researcher of this study observed when South African’s delegation at the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary meeting held in Germany in 2007 was divided on its position on Zimbabwe, based on the political affiliation of members of the delegation. The ANC MPs from South Africa supported the SADC Initiative on the solution to Zimbabwe, discussed earlier. But an MP from the Democratic Alliance was of the view that the SADC Initiative is a failure and radical measures should be taken against President Mugabe’s Government. All members of the Namibian delegation, whether from the ruling party or opposition parties, supported the SADC Initiative. Consultation between the Government and opposition parties should therefore be maintained for the purpose of confidence building and seeking a common position that would be articulated by all in the international political system. Consultation
between the Government and opposition parties realises the foreign policy objective of ensuring national consensus on foreign policy.

There are other stakeholders on Namibia’s foreign policy who are not effectively recognised and consulted in the foreign policy-making process. This could be attributed to lack of coordination from the side of the Government. Members of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security need to undergo an induction course on diplomacy and diplomatic practice. During such a course, the White Paper of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy and Management should be explained to the Members of the Committee by foreign policy experts so that Members can comprehend the principles, goals and objectives of the Namibian foreign policy. This will make it easy for Members to carry out their oversight function on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Members of this Committee should also undergo a general diplomatic training course to understand the dynamics of international relations and appreciate issues of diplomacy and diplomatic etiquettes.

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security need to adopt a pro-active approach to foreign policy issues. Its oversight function should further focus on the performance of Namibian diplomatic missions and monitor the implementation of agreements signed between Namibia and other countries as well as international organisations. Members of Parliament should also attend sessions of the UN General Assembly to acquaint themselves with major issues in world politics and how Namibia responds to those issues.

6.6 Instances of failure, contradictions and controversies in foreign policy-making and their significance

Just as there have been successes, there have also been failures and contradictions on some aspects of Namibia’s foreign policy, albeit the failures are not many and do not pose major threat to the overall success of the foreign policy. Failure refers to the situation when the Government has not achieved the foreign policy principles enshrined
in the Namibian Constitution or the foreign policy objectives set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Contradictions refer to the situation when the Government has not successfully adopted measures that will give commendation to issues, agenda and institutions, such as the gender balance, which the Government excels in parliamentary representation but not in the appointment of Heads of Mission for example. Controversies refer to the issue of granting the N$ 25 million to the DRC which has not been repaid and contradictory information from the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs on the deployment of the NDF members in the DRC.

Although Namibia is to be credited for negotiating the issue of Walvis Bay with South Africa within the formative years of foreign policy-making, Namibia has been unable to successfully resolve the issue of the borders on the Orange River as stated earlier. This issue has taken more than eighteen years to resolve and the Government has not given an explanation on this matter.

There is a contradiction that although Namibia has made improvements on gender equality in politics, having reached the SADC target of 30% women in Parliament in 2008, there is still much to be done to have gender equality reflected in the appointment of the Heads of Missions. By 2008, only 21% of Heads of Missions are women. It should be noted that it is easier to ensure gender equality in diplomatic appointments than in Parliament. Members of Parliament are elected and elections in their very nature do not necessarily guarantee gender equality. Heads of Missions are appointed by the Head of State, who has all the powers to ensure gender equality in appointing the Heads of Missions. Empirical evidence suggests that both Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba have not aggressively pursued the agenda of women in foreign policy-making as they have done with other agendas such as, for example the democratisation of South Africa and UN reform.
6.7 **Challenges to the Government**

The smallness of Namibia has an impact on the available resources in the country. There are omissions and incompletion in some areas of foreign policy. The omissions include non-engagement of influential associations such as the former Anti-Apartheid Movements in Europe and the Black Caucus of the US Congress. These institutions had played a role in the international campaign for Namibia’s independence. They could still be lobbied to influence foreign policy agendas by their respective Governments. There are incompletion of foreign policy issues, such as the promise made by Namibia to open a trade mission in Gabon during the visit by President Nujoma to that country in 1992.

The reduction of foreign policy to “low politics” does not augur well for Namibia. The Government has an obligation to explain, justify and be accountable to the Namibian public foreign policy issues and agendas. Regular briefings on major foreign policy issues will move foreign policy from “low- politics” to “high politics”. Namibia’s interests in the international political system have an impact on the country’s socio-economic position and these affects the Namibian people. Regular briefings require coordination. A lack of coordination on foreign policy issues results in what the researcher of this study calls ‘the anarchy of foreign policy’ in Namibia. This is a situation when there is no guidance on foreign policy issues, leaving Foreign Service Officers and other Government officials to take positions on major foreign policy issues on the basis of guessing and assuming. This could result in contradictions and reflects badly about the country’s foreign policy.

Accordingly, there is a need to maintain enough and well trained staff to make follow ups on some of the issues and improve the database and record system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make important documents and agreements traceable. Training and capacity building are crucial for efficiency and service delivery and the Government should pay attention to this aspect. Diplomatic training for Foreign Service Officers should be regularised and be linked to an intake of Foreign Service officials in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Heads of Mission who has no background on diplomacy should also undergo basic diplomatic training before they assume duties.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs to have multilingual officials to address the problem of translations, as this function is predominantly performed by officials in the visiting delegations. This state of affairs does not augur well, especially in the case of Joint Commissions or bilateral agreements. Foreign translators, typical of human nature, can show some bias towards translations. The Ministry should therefore recruit professional translators, or send some of its Foreign Service officers to language courses.

6.8 Recommended areas for further research

As indicated in Chapter One, this study’s scope is limited so clearly defined aspects of Namibia’s foreign policy. There are many other areas relating to Namibia’s foreign policy that require further research. A selection of some of these areas is included here.

6.8.1 Namibia’s economic diplomacy

A study primarily on Namibia’s economic diplomacy will contribute to academic discourses on Interdependence and Globalisation. In this study economic diplomacy is just one of the themes. Further, economic diplomacy needs to be researched in the context of the performance of Namibia’s trade missions, focusing on the failure and successes of these missions. This will assist the Namibian Government to improve its policies to improve investment to foster development and to determine whether there is a need for more trade missions and whether some of the current trade missions need to be closed.

6.8.2 SWAPO’s pre-independence diplomatic relations and foreign policy

SWAPO’s pre-independence foreign policy-making is another area that is under researched. A study on this aspect will provide an insight not only on the historiography of foreign policy-making in Namibia, but also to the study of Realism as a theory of
International Relations. Although there is a chapter on pre-independence foreign policy-making in this study, this aspect is not the main purpose of the study and therefore the chapter on this aspect just gives a synopsis of the subject.

6.8.3 Gender issues related to foreign policy

There is a need to conduct research on the role of women in Namibia’s foreign policy. This area has not been researched. Although this issue was briefly discussed in this research, it was not the main purpose of the study and empirical enquiry. A study on this issue will contribute to the academic discourse on feminist perspectives and provide empirical evidence on gender dynamics in Namibia’s foreign policy.

6.8.4 Public participation and the role of the media in foreign policy-making

Another area that requires research is the issue of public participation in foreign policy-making. It was stated earlier that the Namibian public has little interest in foreign policy matters. Commenting on the public participation on foreign policy in South Africa, Van Wyk (2008: 7) stated,

“[…]The challenge is to conceive modes of participation that would provide citizens with the necessary incentives to participate, would empower them to do so, and would provide the space within which they can discover what their real interests are”.

Namibia is equally challenged to provide incentives for foreign policy participation. This should be done based on the results of a study conducted nationwide, to find out from the public what are the issues that will bring them closer to foreign policy and how do they think they can participate in the foreign policy-making process.

Since the establishment of the University of Namibia in 1992, there have been no public lectures or debates on foreign relations at the university. The conduct of lectures, seminars and public debates on foreign policy will stimulate debates on a number of foreign relations areas and serve as a source of advice to policy-makers in the foreign policy formulation.
6.8.5 A review of Namibia’s foreign policy

A study reviewing foreign policy is relevant to the successes of Namibian foreign policy. It is important to assess Namibia’s bilateral and multilateral agreements and their outcomes. This research could look at the capacity of the Government, both human and capital. This would enable the Ministry to prioritise on the foreign policy agenda along the set goals and objectives of the agreements. It would further ensure the optimal use of resources, given their limited availability.

6.8.6 Improving the dissemination of foreign policy-related information

There is a need to conduct a research on how to effectively disseminate foreign policy-related information. Dissemination could be made through publications, countrywide meetings, annual yearbooks, public hearings, the release of policy documents and the regular revision of the Namibian foreign policy.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs to establish a think-tank on foreign policy comprising, among others, academics and retired diplomats. Retired diplomats are currently under utilised. They could be used in local diplomatic training for new recruits in the Foreign Service, and present papers and seminars on issues where they have expertise. Their expertise would help to shape the Namibian foreign policy and advice on the position to be taken by the Government of sensitive foreign policy issues, and further advise on the communication of the Government’s position to the public.

6.9 Concluding summary

Although Namibia is experiencing some setbacks in some areas, there is room for an improvement. Overall, with the limitations of a small state, for example human and financial resources, Namibia has successfully pursued the foreign policy agenda of promoting world peace and security, economic diplomacy and South-South cooperation.
in terms of the foreign policy principles enshrined in the constitution. Although there are some setbacks in some areas, there is an opportunity for change and improvement.

The dynamics of foreign policy-making in Namibia as a small state arise from the three levels of analysis, which were referred to in Chapter One.

This study has analysed SWAPO’s foreign policy prior to independence and as the ruling party since independence. It has also analysed how foreign policy agents and structures respond to domestic, regional and international challenges. The study concluded that these responses often vary between Idealism (Liberalism) and Realism. The study has also attempted to determine to what extent the objectives and goals of the country’s foreign policy have conceivably been achieved within the context of traditional approaches to the study of International Relations, such as Idealism and Realism.

In Chapter one, reference was made to McCraw (1994: 7 – 8) and Maurice (1973: 557), and their ideas on the foreign policy of a small state. This study contradicts some of McCraw’s characterisations of the foreign policy of a small state. It also supports some of his notions. As indicated in Chapters Two to Five it is concluded here that Namibia’s post independent foreign policy is not characterised by:

- Low levels of participation in world affairs;
- A narrow scope of foreign policy; and
- Limited participation in regional and international organisations and part of its foreign policy focuses on economic issues.

However, as suggested by McCraw (1994: 7-8), Namibia as small state evidently has high level of support for the international legal system.

Lastly, as argued in Chapters Two to Five, the study concurs with Maurice (1973: 557), in its conclusion that small states avoid using force as a technique of statecraft.
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APPENDIX 1
SELECTED AGREEMENTS SIGNED BETWEEN NAMIBIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES BY 17 JUNE 1991

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008 and Du Pisani, 2000: 302

1. Agreement on Economic Cooperation between Namibia and Finland, signed on 25 January 1990.

2. Agreement between Namibia and Finland on Budgetary Allocations, signed on 28 January 1990.


4. Agreement on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Sweden, signed on 10 February 1990.

5. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Zimbabwe, signed on 04 March 1990.

6. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Malawi, signed on 12 March 1990.

7. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Algeria, signed on 21 March 1990.

8. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Ghana, signed on 21 March 1990.

9. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Finland, signed on 21 March 1990.

10. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Iran, signed on 21 March 1990.

11. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Japan, signed on 21 March 1990.

12. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, signed on 21 March 1990.

13. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and USSR, signed on 21 March 1990.
14. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte Negro), signed on 21 March 1990.

15. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Romania, signed on 21 March 1990.

16. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and the United States of America, signed on 21 March 1990.

17. Trade Agreement between Namibia and Cuba signed on 21 March 1990.

18. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and China, signed on 22 March 1990.

19. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Hungary, signed on 22 March 1990.

20. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Congo, signed on 23 March 1990.

21. Agreement on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Sweden, signed on 26 March 1990 (signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab).

22. Agreement on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Sweden, signed on 26 March 1990 (signed by the Minister of Mines and Energy, Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo).

23. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Nigeria, signed on 28 March 1990.

24. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Cuba, signed on 02 April 1990.

25. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Barbados, signed on 06 April 1990.

26. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Venezuela, signed on 12 April 1990.

27. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Italy, signed on 20 April 1990.

28. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Switzerland, signed on 22 April 1990.
29. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Papua New Guinea, signed on 30 April 1990.

30. Agreement on Technical Cooperation between Namibia and Egypt, signed on 20 May 1990.

31. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Bulgaria, signed on 06 June 1990.

32. Agreement on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Argentina, signed on 31 June 1990.

33. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Peru, signed on 11 July 1990.

34. Agreement on Technical Cooperation between Namibia and Egypt, signed on 12 July 1990.

35. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Ecuador, signed on 12 July 1990.

36. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Maldives, signed on 25 July 1990.

37. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Botswana, signed on 26 July 1990.

38. Agreement on the Namibia-Botswana Joint Commission of Cooperation, signed on 26 July 1990.

39. Agreement on Cultural and Education Cooperation between Namibia and Botswana, signed on 26 July 1990.

40. Protocol of Understanding on Defence and Security between Namibia and Botswana, signed on 26 July 1990.

41. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Argentina, signed on 31 July 1990.

42. Agreement on the establishment of Joint Commission of Cooperation between Namibia and Botswana, signed in August 1990.

43. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Albania, signed on 02 August 1990.
44. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Greece, signed on 09 August 1990.

45. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and the Hellenic Republic, signed on 09 August 1990.

46. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Benin, signed on 13 August 1990.

47. Agreement on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Finland, signed on 17 August 1990.

48. Health Agreement between Namibia and Finland, signed on 17 August 1990.

49. An agreement on the establishment of the Joint Commission of Cooperation between Namibia and Angola, signed in September 1990.

50. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Cuba, signed on 14 September 1990.

51. Cultural Agreement between Namibia and Cuba, signed on 14 September 1990.

52. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Belgium, signed on 21 September 1990.

53. Agreement between Namibia and Norway on Budgets, signed on 25 September 1990.

54. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Afghanistan, signed on 03 October 1990.

55. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Austria, signed on 05 October 1990.

56. Agreement between Namibia and Sweden on Budgets, signed on 09 October 1990.

57. Agreement between Namibia and Sweden on Budgets, signed on 09 October 1990.

58. Agreement between Namibia and Norway on Budgets, signed on 15 October 1990.

59. Three Agreements on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Sweden, signed on 19 October 1990.
60. Agreement between Namibia and Sweden on Education, signed on 19 October 1990.

61. Agreement on Visas between Namibia and Sweden, signed on 19 October 1990.

62. Agreement between Namibia and Sweden on Volunteers, signed on 19 October 1990.

63. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Mongolia, signed on 30 October 1990.

64. Agreement establishing the Joint Water Committee between Namibia and Botswana, signed in November 1990.

65. Memorandum of agreement for the supply of water between Namibia and South Africa, signed in November 1990.

66. Two agreements on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Finland, signed on 19 November 1990.

67. Agreement between Namibia and Finland on Budgets, signed on 19 November 1990.

68. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Zambia, signed on 26 November 1990.

69. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and India, signed on 19 December 1990.

70. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Rwanda, signed on 21 December 1990.

71. Agreement on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Norway, signed on 25 December 1990.

72. Agreement on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Finland, signed on 29 January 1991

73. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Germany, signed on 01 February 1991

74. Health Agreement between Namibia and Finland, signed on 01 February 1991

75. Agreement on Assistance between Namibia and Sweden, signed on 01 February 1990
76. Agreement on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Finland, signed on 08 February 1991
77. Agreement between Namibia and Finland on Geological Mapping, signed on 08 February 1991
78. Three Agreements on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Norway, signed on 20 February 1991
79. Agreement establishing the Joint Commission between Namibia and Cuba, signed on 06 March 1991
80. Two Agreements on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Sweden, signed on 06 March 1991
81. Agreement between Namibia and Sweden on Banking, signed on 19 March 1991
82. Agreement on Visas between Namibia and Norway, signed on 22 March 1991
84. Agreement on Visas between Namibia and Sweden, signed on 05 April 1991
85. Agreement between Namibia and Finland on Budgets, signed on 22 April 1991
86. Agreement between Namibia and Sweden on Transport, signed on 24 April 1991
87. Agreement between Namibia and Sweden on Volunteers, signed on 24 April 1991
88. Three Agreements on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Sweden, signed on 24 April 1991
89. Agreement between Namibia and Sweden on Budgets, signed on 24 April 1991
90. Agreement between Namibia and Sweden on Personnel, signed on 24 April 1991
91. Agreement establishing the Joint Permanent Commission between Namibia and Egypt, signed on 02 May 1991
92. Agreement between Namibia and Norway on Culture, signed on 02 May 1991
93. Agreement on the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and the Sahrawi Republic, signed on 21 May 1991
94. Agreement on Development Cooperation between Namibia and Sweden, on 14 June 1991
APPENDIX 2

STRUCTURED OUTLINE OF QUESTIONS POSED DURING INTERVIEWS

SECTION A, PRE-INDEPENDENCE FOREIGN POLICY


1. Briefly give an account of how you started a diplomatic career in SWAPO.

2. What challenges, political and financial did SWAPO face in opening and maintaining a Mission in Egypt?

3. What were the obstacles encountered (visas, access to statesmen and women) during that time and how did you overcome those obstacles?

4. Was there any coordination between the SWAPO Mission at the UN with other Missions of SWAPO?

5. How was SWAPO’s armed struggle perceived by the host country?

6. What was the relationship between the SWAPO Mission and the South African Mission in Egypt (if there was any)? Did that relationship change with time?

7. What influence did the Mission have on the overall foreign policy of SWAPO during your term as a Head of the Mission, for example in terms of advising about resolutions to be sponsored at the UN and other international bodies?

8. As a Chief Representative of SWAPO, what did you regard your role to be in ensuring the success of the movement on the diplomatic front?

9. As one of the seasoned diplomats in SWAPO, to what extent were you involved in the setting of the foreign policy agenda and postures of an independent Namibia?
Interview with Dr Hage Geingob, Member of Parliament, former Prime Minister (1990 – 2002), former petitioner and SWAPO Chief Representative to the United Nations (1964 – 1972), Windhoek, 01 March 2007

Part 1: The formative years of petitioning

1. Briefly give an account of how Namibians found their way to petition before the UN Committees. Who were the leading petitioners during that time (major actors) and under which organisations they were petitioning (as members of the political movements or as South West Africa nationals)?

2. What were the obstacles encountered by the petitioners, in terms of obtaining US visas and access to the UN headquarters, and how did the petitioners overcome those obstacles?

3. In the 1960’s Namibians enrolled in American universities. Who facilitated their scholarships and study permits?

4. What challenges political and financial did SWAPO face in opening and maintaining an office in New York?

5. Was there any coordination between the SWAPO Mission at the UN with other Missions of SWAPO?

6. In 1976, the UN recognized SWAPO as the ‘sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people’.
   (a) Who were the key people in ensuring the adoption of this Resolution?
   (b) How did the Resolution enhance the movement’s standing in the international political system?
   (c) The UN strives for world peace. How was SWAPO’s armed struggle perceived by the UN?

7. What was the relationship between SWAPO petitioners and the South African Government diplomats at the UN in the 1960s? Did that relationship change with time?

8. What influence did the Mission at the UN have on the overall foreign policy of SWAPO?

9. As a Representative of SWAPO for Americas and UN, what did you regard your role to be in ensuring the success of the movement on the diplomatic front?

10. What was the mandate and role of the UN Commission for Namibia?
Part 2: The development of SWAPO’s foreign policy

11. Overall, what would you say were the external and domestic factors that influenced the foreign policy of SWAPO?

12. Who were the major foreign policy actors in SWAPO? Did the Central Committee and Politburo have a role or was foreign policy-making an exclusive domain of the Department of Foreign Affairs?

13. What were the successes and failures of the Geneva Conference of 1981?

14. The Western Contact Group drafted the blueprint for constitutional principle in 1982. What were the motives? Were there consultations with the stakeholders, for example SWAPO, before producing the blueprint?

15. Did the Western Contact Group influence the overall foreign policy of SWAPO?

16. How did SWAPO’s allies in Eastern Europe perceive the Western Contact Group’s involvement on the question of Namibia’s independence?

17. As one of the seasoned diplomats in SWAPO, and as Prime Minister to what extent were you involved in the setting of the foreign policy agenda and postures of an independent Namibia?

Interview with Dr Theo-Ben Gurirab, MP, Speaker of the National Assembly, former Prime Minister (2002 – 2005), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1990 – 2002), SWAPO Secretary of Foreign Affairs (1986 – 1990), SWAPO Permanent Observer to the UN (1972 – 1986), and SWAPO Petitioner at the UN (1964 – 1972), Windhoek, 01 March 2007

Part 1: The formative years of petitioning

1. Briefly give an account of how Namibians found their way to petition before the UN Committees. Who were the leading petitioners during that time (major actors) and under which organisations they were petitioning (as members of the political movements or as South West Africa nationals?)

2. What were the obstacles encountered by the petitioners, in terms of obtaining US visas and access to the UN headquarters, and how did the petitioners overcome those obstacles?

3. In the 1960s Namibians enrolled in American universities. Who facilitated their scholarships and study permits?
4. What challenges political and financial did SWAPO face in opening and maintaining an office in New York?

5. Was there any coordination between the SWAPO Mission at the UN with other Missions of SWAPO?

6. In 1976, the UN recognized SWAPO as the ‘sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people’.
   (a) Who were the key people in ensuring the adoption of this Resolution?
   (b) How did the Resolution enhance the movement’s standing in the international political system?
   (c) The UN strives for world peace. How was SWAPO’s armed struggle perceived by the UN?

7. What was the relationship between SWAPO petitioners and the South African Government diplomats at the UN in the 1960s? Did that relationship change with time?

8. What influence did the Mission at the UN have on the overall foreign policy of SWAPO?

9. As a Permanent Observer of SWAPO at the UN, what did you regard your role to be in ensuring the success of the movement on the diplomatic front?

Part 2: The development of SWAPO’s foreign policy

10. When the Department of Foreign Affairs was officially established in SWAPO?

11. What were the foreign policy objectives of SWAPO?

12. How did the Western Contact Group come to be involved on the question of Namibia’s independence? What were the motives?

13. What was SWAPO’s agenda in negotiations with the Western Contact Group?

14. Who were the leading negotiators between SWAPO and the Western Contact Group?

15. How did the Western Contact Group perceive the armed liberation struggle?

16. What were the success and failure of the Geneva Conference of 1981?

17. The Western Contact Group drafted the blueprint for constitutional principle in 1982. What were the motives? Were there consultations with the stakeholders, for example SWAPO, before producing the blueprint?
18. Did the Western Contact Group influence the overall foreign policy of SWAPO?

19. How did SWAPO’s allies in Eastern Europe perceive the Western Contact Group’s involvement on the question of Namibia’s independence?

20. How was the ceasefire agreement brokered between SWAPO and South Africa?

21. Much of the negotiations in the late 1980s included South Africa, Cuba and Angola. Why was SWAPO not included in these negotiations as a one of the major stakeholders?

22. Why was the withdrawal of the Cuban from Angola linked to Namibia’s independence?

23. Overall, what would you say were the external and domestic factors that influenced the foreign policy of SWAPO?

24. Who were the major foreign policy actors in SWAPO? Substantiate your response.

25. The USSR and China were great supporters of SWAPO and they are Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. Why did SWAPO open a Mission in USSR only in 1987 and why was there no SWAPO Mission in China?

26. How did the history of SWAPO’s foreign policy-making impacted on the foreign policy agenda and postures of an independent Namibia?

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*Interview with Honourable Dr Nickey Iyambo, Minister of Agriculture, Water and Forestry, and SWAPO Chief Representative to Finland (1965 – 1972), 02 March 2007*

1. Briefly give an account of how SWAPO opened a Mission in Finland. What challenges, political and financial did SWAPO face in opening and maintaining a Mission in Finland?

2. What were the obstacles encountered (visas, access to statesmen and women) during that time and how did you overcome these obstacles?

3. Was there any coordination between the SWAPO Mission at the UN with other Missions of SWAPO?

4. How was SWAPO’s armed struggle perceived by the host country?

5. What was the relationship between the SWAPO Mission and the South African Mission in Finland (if there was any)? Did that relationship change with time?
6. What influence did the Mission have on the overall foreign policy of SWAPO during your term as a Head of the Mission, for example in terms of advising about resolutions to be sponsored at the UN and other international bodies?

7. As a Chief Representative of SWAPO, what did you regard your role to be in ensuring the success of the movement on the diplomatic front?

Interview with Paul Helmut, retired politician and former SWAPO Chief Representative to Sweden and Nordic Countries (1968 – 1971), Windhoek, 03 March 2007

1. Briefly give an account of how SWAPO opened a Mission in Sweden. What challenges, political and financial did SWAPO face in opening and maintaining a Mission in Sweden?

2. What were the obstacles encountered (visas, access to statesmen and women) during that time and how did you overcome these obstacles?

3. Was there any coordination between the SWAPO Mission at the UN with other Missions of SWAPO?

4. How was SWAPO’s armed struggle perceived by the host country?

5. What was the relationship between the SWAPO Mission and the South African Mission in Sweden (if there was any)? Did that relationship change with time?

6. What influence did the Mission have on the overall foreign policy of SWAPO during your term as a Head of the Mission, for example in terms of advising about resolutions to be sponsored at the UN and other international bodies?

7. As a Chief Representative of SWAPO, what did you regard your role to be in ensuring the success of the movement on the diplomatic front?


1. As the first petitioner, briefly give an account of how you found your way to petition before the UN committees and how did other Namibians who followed found their way too?

2. Briefly give an account of how Namibians found their way to petition before the UN Committees. Who were the leading petitioners during that time (major actors) and under which organisations they were petitioning (as members of the political movements or as South West Africa nationals?)
3. What were the obstacles encountered by the petitioners, in terms of obtaining US visas and access to the UN headquarters, and how did the petitioners overcome those obstacles?

4. In the 1960s Namibians enrolled in American universities. Who facilitated their scholarships and study permits?

5. What challenges political and financial did SWAPO face in opening and maintaining an office in New York?

6. Was there any coordination between the SWAPO Mission at the UN with other Missions of SWAPO?

7. What was the relationship between SWAPO’s petitioners and the South African Government diplomats at the UN in the 1960s? Did that relationship change with time?

8. What influence did the petitioners have on the overall foreign policy of SWAPO?

9. As a petitioner at the UN, what did you regard your role to be in ensuring the success of the movement on the diplomatic front?

*Interview with Moses Katjiuongua, Member of Parliament (1990 – 1999) and SWANU Chief Representative to Tanzania (1960s), Windhoek, 19 March 2007*

**Part 1: Petitioning the United Nations**

1. When did SWANU members start petitioning at the UN? Were they petitioning as members of the political movements or as South West Africa nationals?

2. What were the obstacles encountered by the petitioners, in terms of obtaining US visas and access to the UN headquarters, and how did the petitioners overcome those obstacles?

3. What challenges political and financial did SWANU faced in keeping petitioners in New York?

4. Was there any coordination between the SWANU petitioners at the UN with the diplomatic Missions of SWANU?

5. What was the relationship with other Namibian petitioners, like from SWAPO?
6. What was the relationship between SWANU’s petitioners and the South African Government diplomats at the UN in the 1960s? Did that relationship change with time?

7. As a petitioner at the UN, what did you regard your role to be in ensuring the success of the movement on the diplomatic front?

Part 2: The development of SWANU’s foreign policy

8. Briefly give an account of how SWANU opened the Mission in Cairo. What were the challenges (political and financial) of opening and maintaining a Mission? Where was the source of funding?

9. What was the relationship between SWANU and SWAPO diplomats in Cairo?

10. What were the foreign policy objectives of SWANU, and who were the key foreign policy actors in SWANU?

11. What was the relationship between the SWANU diplomats and the South African diplomats in Cairo?

12. What were the major foreign policy issues during that time and how did the mission addressed them?

13. Overall, what would you say were the external and domestic factors that influenced the foreign policy of SWANU?

14. What was SWANU’s position on the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict? Did this disadvantage the movement?

15. In 1972 the OAU recognised SWAPO as the “sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people”. The UN repeated the same in 1976. How did the exclusive recognition of SWAPO by the OAU and UN disadvantage SWANU?

Interview with Dr Sam Nujoma, President of the Republic of Namibia (1990 – 2005) and President of SWAPO Party (1960 - 2007), Windhoek, 22 and 23 March 2007

Part 1: The formative years of petitioning

1. Briefly give an account of how Namibians found their way to petition before the UN Committees. Who were the leading petitioners during that time (major actors) and under which organisations they were petitioning (as members of the political movements or as South West Africa nationals?)
2. What were the obstacles encountered by the petitioners, in terms of obtaining US visas and access to the UN headquarters, and how did the petitioners overcome those obstacles?

3. In the 1960s Namibians enrolled in American universities. Who facilitated their scholarships and study permits thereof?

4. As President of SWAPO, you sent party members in the 1960s to open up diplomatic missions in various countries. What were the considerations for selecting such countries, for example Algeria, Egypt, and the Nordic countries?

5. In 1976, the UN recognized SWAPO as the ‘sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people’.
   (a) Who were the key people in ensuring the adoption of this Resolution?
   (b) How did the Resolution enhance the movement’s standing in the international political system?
   (c) The UN strives for world peace. How was SWAPO’s armed struggle perceived by the UN?

5. What influence did the SWAPO missions have on the overall foreign policy of SWAPO?

6. As a President of SWAPO, what did you regard your role to be in ensuring the success of the movement on the diplomatic front?

Part 2: The development of SWAPO’s foreign policy

7. When the Department of Foreign Affairs was officially established in SWAPO?

8. What were the foreign policy objectives of SWAPO?

9. The USSR and China were great supporters of SWAPO and they are Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. Why did SWAPO open a Mission in USSR only in 1987 and why was there no SWAPO Mission in China?

10. How did the Western Contact Group come to be involved in the question of Namibia’s independence? What were the motives?

11. What was SWAPO’s agenda in negotiations with the Western Contact Group and who were the leading negotiators between SWAPO and the Western Contact Group?

12. How did the Western Contact Group perceive the armed liberation struggle?
13. The Western Contact Group drafted the blueprint for constitutional principle in 1982. What were the motives? Were there consultations with the stakeholders, for example SWAPO, before producing the blueprint?

14. Did the Western Contact Group influence the overall foreign policy of SWAPO?

15. How did SWAPO’s allies in Eastern Europe perceive the Western Contact Group’s involvement on the question of Namibia’s independence?


17. How was the ceasefire agreement brokered between SWAPO and South Africa?

18. Much of the negotiations in the late 1980s included South Africa, Cuba and Angola (predominantly governments). Why was SWAPO not included in these negotiations as one of the major stakeholders?

19. Why was the withdrawal of the Cuban from Angola linked to the Namibian independence?

20. Overall, what would you say were the external and domestic factors that influenced the foreign policy of SWAPO?

21. How did the history of SWAPO’s foreign policy-making impacted on the foreign policy agenda and postures of an independent Namibia?

22. Any other SWAPO foreign policy issues (before independence) that His Excellency would like to speak about?

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**Interview with Festus Muundjua, Member of the Public Service Commission and former SWANU petitioner at the UN (1960s), Windhoek, 26 March 2007**

**Part 1: Petitioning the United Nations**

1. When did SWANU members start petitioning at the UN and who were the leading petitioners during that time? Were they petitioning as members of the political movements or as South West Africa nationals?

2. What were the obstacles encountered by the petitioners, in terms of obtaining US visas and access to the UN headquarters, and how did the petitioners overcome those obstacles?

3. What challenges political and financial did SWANU face in keeping and maintaining the petitioners in New York?
4. Was there any coordination between the SWANU petitioners at the UN with the diplomatic Missions of SWANU?

5. What was the relationship between SWANU petitioner and other Namibian petitioners, for example from SWAPO?

6. What was the relationship between petitioners in the 1960s and South African Government diplomats at the UN?

7. As a petitioner at the UN, what did you regard your role to be in ensuring the success of the party at the diplomatic front?

8. What were the foreign policy objectives of SWANU? Who were the key foreign policy actors in SWANU?

9. Overall, what would you say were the external and domestic factors that influenced the foreign policy of SWANU?

10. What was SWANU’s position on the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict? Did this disadvantage the movement?

11. In 1972 the OAU recognised SWAPO as the “sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people”. The UN repeated the same in 1976. How did the recognition of SWAPO disadvantage SWANU?
SECTION B, POST-INDEPENDENCE FOREIGN POLICY


1. Briefly describe activities at the Namibian Mission at the UN immediately after independence, when you were Charge d’Affairs. What were the foreign policy issues and agenda?

2. Briefly describe your first day, week and month in the office as the first Namibian Ambassador to Ethiopia and the OAU? What were your other concurrent accreditations?

3. Namibia’s independence came during the period of the end of the Cold War. How did this impact on the foreign policy-making of a newly independent and small state in the international political system?

4. How did the UN and OAU influence foreign policy-making in Namibia? Cite examples of specific cases or issues.

5. How did Namibia position herself in the international political system through her membership of the UN and OAU? What was Namibia’s foreign policy agenda at the UN and OAU?

6. Namibia being a small state, how did she position herself in multilateral diplomacy and in bilateral relations with great powers like the US?

7. How did Namibia generally address the question of world peace in at the UN and OAU?

8. What influence does a Head of Mission from a multilateral Mission and a bilateral Mission (similarities and differences) have on the country’s foreign policy-making?

9. What was the role of the embassy’s staff in foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the Headquarters’ staff? Does Ambassador Asheeke say that the Namibian Missions in Addis Ababa and Washington were adequately staffed during his term as a Head of Mission?

10. What are the important issues that a Head of Mission should do and not do to ensure the success of the country’s foreign policy?
11. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this proposition? Otherwise, who should be the other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

12. Would you say that the President and Foreign Minister have been key foreign policy-makers in Namibia and why would you say so?

13. What are the differences and similarities on your role on foreign policy, as a Head of Mission and as Deputy Permanent Secretary?

14. What would Ambassador Asheke say were the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy at the Commonwealth, during and after his term as a Head of Mission? Accordingly, which were the best and distressing days in the Ambassador's diplomatic career?

15. How did the mission in the US address the issue of economic diplomacy during your term of office as a Head of Mission?

16. What would the Ambassador say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

17. How will Ambassador Asheke describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

18. Are there any other issue that Ambassador Asheke would like to state?

Interview with Tsudao Gurirab, Member of Parliament (since 2000), Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (1990 – 1995), 08 June 2007

1. Addressing the National Assembly after independence, Hon. Theo-Ben Gurirab stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set five objectives for Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, namely: To promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity, to ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands of Namibia; Promoting Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid and colonialism; To promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities; Enhancing peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola in Angola and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and The promotion of world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU and NAM (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991, Vol. 14: 80 – 81). Would you say that these objectives were in order? Or what other objectives should have been added to these?
2. How does Hon. Gurirab briefly describe:

(a) Namibia in the United Nations
(b) Namibia in the Commonwealth
(c) Namibia in the Non-Aligned Movement
(d) Namibia in the OAU / AU
(e) Namibia in SADC

Has Namibia fully positioned itself in the international political system through its membership to these bodies?

3. Foreign policies, all over the world, are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your take on this? Otherwise, who should be the other major important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

4. As former Permanent Secretary of Trade and Industry, would you say that there is an overlap in responsibilities between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Trade, especially in respect of issues related to foreign trade?

5. Do opposition parties have a role to play on foreign policy issues? To what extent they should play a role?

6. Do the academic community and the civil organisations have a role to play on foreign policy-making? How can this be best addressed?

7. Would Hon. Gurirab say that there have been domestic disagreements on foreign policy and if so, around which issues? How could domestic disagreements on foreign policy be best mitigated?

8. It took some years before a blueprint on foreign policy (White Paper) was drafted. Do you think that this state of affairs had posed problems to foreign policy actors in any way?

9. What would be Hon. Gurirab’s evaluation of the Namibian foreign policy in respect of economic diplomacy?

10. What would be Hon. Gurirab’s evaluation of the Namibian foreign policy in respect of South-South cooperation?

11. What is Hon. Gurirab’s opinion on the Government’s position towards NEPAD and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism?

12. What would Hon. Gurirab say are the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy so far?

13. What would Hon. Gurirab say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?
14. How would Hon. Gurirab describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

15. Are there any other issue that Hon. Gurirab would like to state?

*Interview with Dr Sam Nujoma, President of the Republic of Namibia (1990 – 2005) and President of SWAPO Party (1960 - 2007), Windhoek, 08 June 2007*

1. Namibia’s independence came during the period of the end of the Cold War. How did this impact on the foreign policy-making of a newly independent small state?

2. Addressing the National Assembly after independence, Hon Theo-Ben Gurirab stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set five objectives for Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, namely: To promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity, to ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands of Namibia; Promoting Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid and colonialism; To promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities; Enhancing peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola in Angola and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and The promotion of world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU and NAM (*Debates of the National Assembly*, 1991, Vol. 14: 80 – 81). Who were the principal formulaters of these objectives and what were the reasons for setting each of these objectives?

3. Who were the external actors on independent Namibia’s foreign policy and how did they influence foreign policy-making in Namibia?

4. How did Namibia position herself in the international political system, during the first years of her independence, through her membership of the UN, the Non-aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, AU and SADC?

5. How did Namibia put pressure on a non-democratic South Africa at international fora?

**Actors**

7. What influence did the Minister of Foreign Affairs have on foreign policy vis-à-vis the Cabinet and what influence did the President have on the foreign policy vis-à-vis the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cabinet? Did the Prime Minister have a role in foreign policy-making? Explain the scenario during the terms of both Hon. Geingob and Hon. Gurirab.
8. What was the role of Ambassadors and the embassy’s staff in foreign policy-making?

9. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this proposition? Otherwise, who should be the other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

10. Do opposition parties have a role to play on foreign policy issues? To what extent they should play a role?

11. Sometimes, His Excellency The President delegates the Right Honourable Prime Minister to attend international meetings on his behalf. Is the Prime Minister constantly kept abreast on foreign policy issues?

The development of foreign policy

12. It took some years before a blueprint on foreign policy (White Paper) was drafted. What are the reasons for the delay and did this pose problem to foreign policy actors in any way?

13. When and why was the concept of economic diplomacy conceived?

14. What is Namibia’s foreign policy on South-South cooperation?

15. Would His Excellency say that there have been domestic disagreements on foreign policy and if so, around which issues? How could domestic disagreements on foreign policy be best mitigated?

16. What is His Excellency’s opinion on NEPAD, and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism in particular? Is His Excellency’s opinion also the official position of the Government?

17. What would His Excellency say were the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy during and after his term of office?

18. How does His Excellency briefly describe:

(a) Namibia in the United Nations
(b) Namibia in the Commonwealth
(c) Namibia in the Non-Aligned Movement
(d) Namibia in the OAU / AU
(e) Namibia in SADC

19. Would His Excellency say that there have been a shift on the foreign policy approaches and issues with the change of the country’s presidency or is it simply a continuation?
20. What would His Excellency say should be the foreign policy objectives, currently?

21. Are there any other foreign policy issues that His Excellency President Nujoma would like to state?


Formative years:

1. You were at the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at independence. Briefly discuss the process of staffing, training, and other related matters at the Ministry.

2. How will you describe your first day, week and month in the office as Namibia’s first Ambassador to the Russian Federation? What were your other concurrent accreditations?

3. What was the agenda (issues and approach) of Namibia’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation during your term as a Head of Mission?

4. Namibia’s independence came during the period of the end of the Cold War. How did this impact on the foreign policy-making of a newly independent and small state in the international political system?

5. Namibia being a small state, how does she position herself in bilateral relations with a great power like the USSR?

Actors

6. What influence does the Namibian Ambassador to the Russian Federation have on Namibia’s foreign policy-making? What are the important issue that the Namibian Ambassador to the Russian Federation should do and not do to ensure the success of Namibia’s foreign policy?

7. What was the role of the embassy’s staff in foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the Headquarters’ staff? Would Ambassador Nashandi say that the Namibian Mission in Moscow was adequately staffed during his term as a Head of Mission?

8. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your take on this? Otherwise, who should be the other major important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?
9. Would you say that the President and Foreign Minister have been key foreign policy-makers in Namibia, and why would you say so?

The development of foreign policy

10. What would Ambassador Nashandi say were the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, during and after his term of office? Accordingly, which were the best and distressing days in the Ambassador's diplomatic career?

11. What would the Ambassador say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

12. How will the Ambassador describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

13. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Ambassador Nashandi would like to state?


The formative years:

1. How will you describe your first day, week and month in the office as Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs?

2. Namibia’s independence came during the period of the end of the Cold War. How did this impact on the foreign policy-making of a newly independent and small state?

3. Who were the external actors on independent Namibia’s foreign policy and how did they influence foreign policy-making in Namibia?

4. How did Namibia position herself in the international political system during the first years of independence, through her membership of the UN, Non-aligned Movement, Commonwealth, AU and SADC?

5. Addressing the National Assembly after independence, you stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set five objectives for Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, namely: To promote Namibia’s security and
territorial integrity, to ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands of Namibia; Promoting Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid and colonialism; To promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities; Enhancing peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola in Angola and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and The promotion of world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU and NAM (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991, Vol. 14: 80 – 81). Would you elaborate on the reasons for setting each of these objectives? Who were the principal formulators of these objectives?

6. How did Namibia put pressure on a non-democratic South Africa at the international fora?

**Actors**

7. What influence did the Minister of Foreign Affairs have on foreign policy vis-à-vis the Cabinet and what influence did the President have on the foreign policy vis-à-vis the Foreign Minister and Cabinet? Did the Prime Minister have a role in foreign policy-making? Explain the scenario during both Hon Geingob’s and your term.

8. What was the role of the Heads of Missions and Missions’ staff in foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the Headquarters’ staff?

9. What are the important issue that a Foreign Minister should do and not do to ensure the success of the country’s foreign policy?

10. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this proposition? Otherwise, who should be the other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

11. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs leaves the country, another Minister is appointed to act. In most cases it has been the same person who acts. Is this person constantly kept abreast on foreign policy issues, or does it only happen when he acts? What are the limitations of the acting Minister?

12. Do opposition parties have a role to play on foreign policy issues? To what extent they should play a role?

13. How effective have the Parliament been involved in foreign policy issues, apart from ratifying treaties? Has there been any synergy between the Foreign Policy and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security?
The development of foreign policy

14. It took some years before a blueprint on foreign policy (White Paper) was drafted. What are the reasons for the delay and did this state of affairs pose problem to Foreign Service officers in anyway?

15. Was there a major impact on Namibia’s foreign policy-making as a result of Namibia’s membership to the UN Security Council and during Honourable Gurirab’s presidency of the UN General Assembly?

16. When and why was the concept of economic diplomacy conceived?

17. What is Namibia’s foreign policy on South-South cooperation?

18. Would Honourable Gurirab say that there have been domestic disagreements on foreign policy and if so, around which issues?

19. What is Honourable Gurirab’s opinion on NEPAD, and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism in particular? Is Honourable Gurirab’s opinion also the official position of the Government?

20. What were the core competencies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Honourable Gurirab’s term as Minister of Foreign Affairs?

21. What would Honourable Gurirab say were the milestones and failures of Namibia’s foreign policy, during and after his term as Minister of Foreign Affairs? Accordingly, what were Hon Gurirab’s best and distressing days at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

22. How does Honourable Gurirab briefly describe:

(a) Namibia in the United Nations
(b) Namibia in the Commonwealth
(c) Namibia in the Non-Aligned Movement
(d) Namibia in the OAU / AU
(e) Namibia in SADC

23. What would Honourable Gurirab say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

24. How will Honourable Gurirab describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

25. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Honourable Gurirab would like to state?
1. Addressing the National Assembly after independence, Hon. Theo-Ben Gurirab stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set five objectives for Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, namely: To promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity, to ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands of Namibia; Promoting Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid and colonialism; To promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities; Enhancing peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola in Angola and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and The promotion of world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU and NAM (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991, Vol. 14: 80 – 81). Would you say that these objectives were in order? Or what other objectives should have been added to these?

2. How does Hon Katjiuongua briefly describe:

(a) Namibia in the United Nations
(b) Namibia in the Commonwealth
(c) Namibia in the Non-Aligned Movement
(d) Namibia in the OAU / AU
(e) Namibia in SADC

Has Namibia fully positioned herself in the international political system through her membership to these organisations?

3. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this proposition? Otherwise, who should be the other major stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

4. Do opposition parties have a role to play on foreign policy issues? To what extent they should be allowed to play a role?

5. Do the academic community and the civil organisations have a role to play on foreign policy-making? How can this be best addressed?

6. Would Hon. Katjiuongua say that there have been domestic disagreements on foreign policy and if so, around which issues? How could domestic disagreements on foreign policy be best mitigated?

7. It took some years before a blueprint on foreign policy (White Paper) was drafted. Do you think that this posed problem to foreign policy actors in any way?
8. What would be Hon. Katjiuongua’s evaluation of the Namibian foreign policy in respect of economic diplomacy?

9. What would be Hon. Katjiuongua’s evaluation of the Namibian foreign policy in respect of South-South cooperation?

10. What Hon. Katjiuongua’s opinion on the Government’s position towards NEPAD and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism?

11. What would Hon Katjiuongua say are the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy so far?

12. What would Hon Katjiuongua say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

13. How would Hon. Katjiuongua describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

14. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Hon Katjiuongua would like to state?

Interview with Gwen Lister, Editor of The Namibian newspaper, Windhoek, 15 June 2007

1. Addressing the National Assembly after independence, Hon. Theo-Ben Gurirab stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set five objectives for Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, namely: To promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity, to ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands of Namibia; Promoting Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid and colonialism; To promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities; Enhancing peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola in Angola and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and The promotion of world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU and NAM (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991, Vol. 14: 80 – 81). Would you say that these objectives were in order? Or what other objectives should have been added to these?

2. How do you briefly describe:

(a) Namibia in the United Nations
(b) Namibia in the Commonwealth
(c) Namibia in the Non-Aligned Movement
(d) Namibia in the OAU / AU
(e) Namibia in SADC
Has Namibia fully positioned herself in the international political system through her membership to these bodies?

3. Foreign policies, all over the world, are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your take on this? Otherwise, who should be the other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

4. Do opposition parties have a role to play on foreign policy issues? To what extent they should play a role?

5. Do the academic community and the civil organisations have a role to play on foreign policy-making? How can this be best addressed?

6. Would you say that there have been domestic disagreements on foreign policy and if so, around which issues? How could domestic disagreements on foreign policy be best mitigated?

7. It took some years before a blueprint on foreign policy (White Paper) was drafted. Do you think that this posed problem to foreign policy actors in any way?

8. What would be your evaluation of Namibia’s foreign policy in respect of economic diplomacy?

9. What would be your evaluation of Namibia’s foreign policy in respect of South-South cooperation?

10. What your opinion on the Government’s position towards NEPAD and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism?

11. What would you say are the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy so far?

12. What would you say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

13. How would you describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

14. Are there any other foreign policy issues that you would like to state?

_Interview with Ambassador Dr Tunguru Huaraka, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Namibia to the UN (1991 – 1996), Windhoek, 15 June 2007_

1. How will you describe your first day, week and month in the office as Namibia’s first Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations?
2. Namibia’s independence came during the period of the end of the Cold War. How did this impact on the foreign policy-making of a newly independent and small state in the international political system?

3. Did the UN have an influence on foreign policy-making in Namibia? Cite examples of specific cases or issues.

4. How did Namibia position herself in the international political system through her membership of the UN? What was Namibia’s foreign policy agenda at the UN?

6. How did Namibia put pressure on a non-democratic South Africa at the UN?

7. How did Namibia generally address the question of world peace, particularly the peace in Angola, at the UN?

Actors

7. What influence do the Namibian Ambassador and Permanent Representative at the United Nations have on Namibia’s foreign policy-making?

8. What was the role of the Mission’s staff in foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the Headquarters’ staff? Would Ambassador Huaraka say that the Namibian Mission at the UN was adequately staffed during his term as a Head of Mission?

9. What are the important issues that the Namibian Ambassador and Permanent Representative at the United Nations should do and not do to ensure the success of Namibia’s foreign policy?

10. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this proposition? Otherwise, who should be the other major important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

11. Would you say that the President and Foreign Minister have been key foreign policy-makers in Namibia, and why would you say so?

The development of foreign policy

12. What would Ambassador Huaraka say were the milestones and failures of Namibia’s foreign policy at the UN, during his tenure of office and after? Accordingly, what were the best and distressing days in the Ambassador's diplomatic career?

13. What would the Ambassador say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?
14. How will Ambassador Huaraka describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

15. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Ambassador Huaraka would like to state?


1. Addressing the National Assembly after independence, Hon. Theo-Ben Gurirab stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set five objectives for Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, namely: To promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity, to ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands of Namibia; Promoting Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid and colonialism; To promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities; Enhancing peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola in Angola and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and The promotion of world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU and NAM (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991, Vol. 14: 80 – 81). Would you say that these objectives were in order? Or what other objectives should have been added to these?

2. How does Hon Ulenga briefly describe:

   (a) Namibia in the United Nations
   (b) Namibia in the Commonwealth
   (c) Namibia in the Non-Aligned Movement
   (d) Namibia in the OAU / AU
   (e) Namibia in SADC

Has Namibia fully positioned herself in the international political system through her membership to these bodies?

3. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this proposition? Otherwise, who should be the other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

4. Do opposition parties have a role to play on foreign policy issues? To what extent they should play a role?
5. Do the academic community and the civil organisations have a role to play on foreign policy-making? How can this be best addressed?

6. Would Hon. Ulenga say that there have been domestic disagreement on foreign policy and if so, around which issues? How could domestic disagreement on foreign policy be best mitigated?

7. It took some years before a blueprint on foreign policy (White Paper) was drafted. Do you think that this posed problem to foreign policy actors in any way?

8. What would be Hon. Ulenga’s evaluation of the Namibia’s foreign policy in respect of economic diplomacy?

9. What would be Hon Ulenga’s evaluation of the Namibia’s foreign policy in respect of South-South cooperation?

10. What Hon. Ulenga’s opinion on the Government’s position towards NEPAD and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism?

11. What would Hon. Ulenga say are the milestones and failures of Namibia’s foreign policy so far?

12. What would Hon. Ulenga say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

13. How would Hon. Ulenga describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

14. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Hon. Ulenga would like to state?

Interview with Dr Hage Geingob, Member of Parliament, former Prime Minister (1990 – 2002), former petitioner and SWAPO Chief Representative to the United Nations (1964 – 1972), Windhoek, 17 June 2007

The development of Namibia’s foreign policy:

1. You led the Namibian delegation to join the UN in April 1990? What were the issues that Namibia wanted the UN to address immediately?

2. Would the Right Honourable Geingob say that there have been domestic disagreements on foreign policy and if so, around which issues?

3. What is the Right Honourable Geingob’s opinion on NEPAD and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism in particular? Is the Right Honourable Geingob’s opinion also the official position of the Government?
4. What are the core competencies of Namibia in the foreign policy issues, in the region, continent and within the broader international political system?

5. What would the Right Honourable Geingob say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

6. How will the Right Honourable Geingob describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

Actors

7. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this proposition given the fact that sometimes the Prime Minister is delegated to attend international meetings on behalf of the Head of State? Otherwise, who should be the other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

8. What influence does the Minister of Foreign Affairs have on foreign policy vis-à-vis the Cabinet and what influence does the President have on the foreign policy vis-à-vis the Foreign Minister and Cabinet? Did the Prime Minister have a role in foreign policy-making?

9. Sometimes, both the President and the Prime Minister undertake foreign trips to forge and cement relations with other countries in the world. How are these trips coordinated to ensure that there is no duplications?

10. In 1998, the then recently commissioned Heads of Missions paid a courtesy call to the Right Honourable Prime Minister before taking up their assignments. Was the Prime Minister regularly kept abreast of Namibia’s bilateral and multilateral relations by the Heads of Missions?

11. Do opposition parties have a role to play on foreign policy issues and to what extent they should play a role?

12. How effective have the Parliament been involved in foreign policy issues, apart from ratifying treaties? Has there been any foreign policy coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security?

13. Are there some other issues regarding the Namibia’s foreign policy that the Right Honourable Geingob would like to state?
1. How does one, as Ambassador to Belgium and the EU strike a balance between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy?

2. What are the current issues and approaches for the relations between Namibia and Belgium?

3. What are the current issues and approaches for the diplomatic relations between Namibia and the EU?

4. Would you say that the Namibian Mission in Belgium is adequately staffed during your term as a Head of Mission?

5. What were the issues and approaches for the diplomatic relations between Namibia and Germany during your term as a Head of Mission?

6. Having served in both Germany and Belgium, which country would you say have stronger relations with Namibia and why?

7. What are the frustrations that a Head of Mission encounters in carrying out his diplomatic tasks?

8. During your term as a Head of Mission, what are the successes and failures of the Namibian foreign policy towards (a) Germany and (b) Belgium?

9. Any other foreign policy issues regarding foreign policy that you would like to state?


1. How will you describe your first day, week and month in the office as Namibia’s first High Commissioner to Zambia? What were your other concurrent accreditations?

2. What was the agenda of Namibia’s foreign policy towards Zambia during your term as a Head of Mission? Did the approach change with the change of the Government (from UNIP to MMD)?
3. What was the agenda of Namibia’s foreign policy towards Sweden during your term as a Head of Mission?

4. What was the agenda of Namibia’s foreign policy towards South Africa during your term as a Head of Mission?

5. What influence does a Head of Mission have on the country’s foreign policy-making?

6. You had the benefit of serving in three countries. Which of the countries in which you served had stronger bilateral relations with Namibia, and why?

7. What was the role of the Mission’s staff in foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the Headquarters’ staff? Would Ambassador Hellao say that the Namibian Missions in Lusaka, Stockholm and Pretoria were adequately staffed during his term as a Head of Mission?

8. What are the important issue that the Head of Mission should do and not do to ensure the success of the Namibian’s foreign policy?

9. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this assumption? Otherwise, who should be the other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

10. Would you say that the President and Foreign Minister have been key foreign policy-makers in Namibia, and why would you say so?

11. What are the differences and similarities on your role on foreign policy, as a Head of Mission and as Head of Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

12. What would Ambassador Hellao say were the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy towards Zambia, Sweden and South Africa, during his term as a Head of Mission? Accordingly, what were the Ambassador’s best days and distressing days in diplomatic career?

13. How did the Missions in Stockholm and Pretoria address the issue of economic diplomacy during your term as a Head of Mission?

14. What would the Ambassador’s comparative analysis be on the South-South cooperation approach of the Namibian foreign policy versus the South-South cooperation approach of the South African foreign policy?

15. How will the Ambassador describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?
16. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Ambassador Hellao would like to state?


1. What was Namibia’s agenda for her bilateral relations with Ethiopia and multilateral relations with the OAU? What were your other concurrent accreditations?

2. How did Namibia position herself in the international political system through her membership of the OAU and how did the OAU influenced foreign policy-making in Namibia? Cite examples of specific cases or issues.

3. What influence does a Head of Mission have on Namibia’s foreign policy-making?

4. What are the important issue that a Head of Mission should do and not do to ensure the success of the country’s foreign policy?

5. You had the benefit of serving in two countries, Ethiopia and DRC. Which of the countries in which you served had stronger bilateral relations with Namibia and why?

6. What was the role of the Missions’s staff in foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the Headquarters’ staff? Would Ambassador Amkongo say that the Namibian missions in Ethiopia and Kinshasa were adequately staffed during his term as a Head of Mission?

7. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this assumption? Otherwise, who should be the other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

8. Would you say that the President and Foreign Minister have been key foreign policy-makers in Namibia and why?

9. Namibia being a small state, how does she position herself in multilateral diplomacy?

10. How did Namibia generally address the question of world peace before the OAU?
11. What influence does a Head of Mission from a multilateral mission and a bilateral mission (similarities and differences) have on the country’s foreign policy-making?

13. What are the important issue that the Head of Mission should do and should not do to ensure the success of the country’s foreign policy?

14. Foreign policies all over the world are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this assumption? Otherwise, who should be the other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

15. Would you say that the President and Foreign Minister have been key foreign policy-makers in Namibia, and why would you say so?

16. What would Ambassador Amkongo say were the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy at the Commonwealth, during his tenure of office and after? Accordingly, what were the Ambassador’s best and distressing days in his diplomatic career?

17. How did the Missions in the DRC address the issue of economic diplomacy during your term of office as a Head of Mission?

18. What would the Ambassador say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

19. How will Ambassador Amkongo describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

20. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Ambassador Amkongo would like to state?


1. How will you describe your first day, week and month in the office as Namibia’s first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs?

2. Namibia’s independence came during the period of the end of the Cold War. How did this impact on the foreign policy-making of a newly independent small state?
3. Addressing the National Assembly after independence, Hon Theo-Ben Gurirab stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had set five objectives for Namibia’s post-independence foreign policy, namely: To promote Namibia’s security and territorial integrity, to ensure the return of Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands of Namibia; Promoting Namibia’s national identity and counter any vestiges of apartheid and colonialism; To promote Namibia’s economic development and prosperity, by working to secure better terms of trade for Namibian commodities; Enhancing peace in the region like the end of civil war in Angola in Angola and the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state; and The promotion of world peace through an active role in the international organisations, like the UN, OAU and NAM (Debates of the National Assembly, 1991, Vol. 14: 80 – 81). Who were the principal formulators of these objectives? Would you elaborate on the reasons for setting each of these objectives?

4. Who were the external actors on independent Namibia’s foreign policy and how did they influence the foreign policy-making of the country?

5. How did Namibia position herself in the international political system through her membership of the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, AU and SADC?

6. How did Namibia put pressure on a non-democratic South Africa at international fora?

Actors

7. What influence did the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Minister had on foreign policy vis-à-vis the Cabinet and what influence did the President have on the foreign policy vis-à-vis the Foreign Minister and the Cabinet? Did the Prime Minister have a role in foreign policy-making (I need the scenario during both Hon Geingob and Hon Gurirab’s terms)?

8. What was the role of Ambassadors and the Mission’s staff in foreign policy-making?

9. Foreign policies, all over the world, are regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your take on this? Otherwise, who should be the other major important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

10. Do opposition parties have a role to play on foreign policy issues? To what extent they should play a role?

11. How effective have the Parliament been involved in foreign policy issues, apart from ratifying treaties? Has there been any synergy between the Foreign Policy and the relevant Parliamentary Standing Committee?
The development of foreign policy

12. It took some years before a blueprint on foreign policy (White Paper) was drafted. What are the reasons for the delay and did this state of affairs pose problem to foreign policy actors in anyway?

13. When and why was the concept of economic diplomacy conceived?

14. What is Namibia’s foreign policy on South-South cooperation?

15. Would Honourable Nandi-Ndaitwah say that there have been domestic disagreements on foreign policy and if so, around which issues? How could domestic disagreements on foreign policy be best mitigated?

16. What is Honourable Nandi-Ndaitwah’s opinion on NEPAD and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism in particular? Is your opinion also the official position of the Government?

17. What would Honourable Nandi-Ndaitwah say were the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy, during and after her term as Deputy Minister? Accordingly what were Honourable Nandi-Ndaitwah’s best and distressing days at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

18. What would Honourable Nandi-Ndaitwah say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

23. How will Honourable Nandi-Ndaitwah describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

24. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Honourable Nandi-Ndaitwah would like to state?

Interview with Ambassador Monica Nashandi, Deputy Executive Director (equivalent to Deputy Permanent Secretary) in the Office of the President and former High Commissioner of Namibia to the UK and the Commonwealth to Sweden (1999 – 2005), and Ambassador of Namibia to Sweden, (1996 – 1999), Windhoek: 25 February 2008

1. What were the topical issues at the Commonwealth during the time that you assumed duties as Namibia’s High Commissioner? What was Namibia’s foreign policy agenda at the Commonwealth?

2. Would you say that President Nujoma have been among key foreign policymakers. What are specific issues that you can cite as President Nujoma’s foreign policy initiatives?
3. How does a Head of Mission relates to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and at the same time to the Head of State in the execution of her duties? What influence does a Head of Mission have on the country’s foreign policy-making? What things should the Head of Mission do and not do to ensure the country’s foreign policy?

4. What was the agenda (issues and approach) of Namibia’s foreign policy towards Sweden during your term as a Head of Mission?

5. What was the agenda (issues and approach) of Namibia’s foreign policy towards the UK during your term as a Head of Mission?

6. How did you, as a Head of Mission strike a balance between multilateral relations with the Commonwealth and bilateral relation with the UK?

7. What would Ambassador Nashandi say were the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy at the Commonwealth, during and after her term as a Head of Mission? Accordingly, what were the best and distressing days in the Ambassador's diplomatic career?

8. What would Ambassador Nashandi say were the milestones and failures of Namibia’s foreign policy towards Sweden, during and after her term as a Head of Mission? Accordingly, what were Ambassador Nashandi’s best and distressing days in Sweden?

9. How did the Commonwealth influence foreign policy-making in Namibia? Cite examples of specific cases or issues.

10. What are the key foreign policy issues for President Pohamba? What are specific issues that you can cite as President Pohamba’s foreign policy initiatives?

11. How do President Pohamba and his Foreign Minister share the foreign policy-making process?

12. How did President Nujoma and his Foreign Minister share the foreign policy-making process?

13. How will Ambassador Nashandi describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

14. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Ambassador Nashandi would like to state?

Russia

1. How will you describe your first day, week and month in the office as Namibia’s second Ambassador to the Russian Federation? When did you serve in this capacity and what were your other concurrent accreditations?

2. What was the agenda (issues and approach) of Namibia’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation during your term as a Head of Mission?

3. What influence does the Namibian Ambassador to the Russian Federation have on the country’s foreign policy-making? What are the important issue that the Namibian Ambassador to the Russian Federation should do and not do to ensure the success of the country’s foreign policy?

4. What was the role of the Mission’s staff in foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the Headquarters’ staff? Would Ambassador Kapewasha say that the Namibian Mission in Moscow was adequately staffed during his term as a Head of Mission?

5. What would Ambassador Kapewasha say were the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy towards the Russian Federation, during and after his term as a Head of Mission? Accordingly, what were the Ambassador’s best and distressing days in his diplomatic career?

India

6. What are the agenda (issues and approach) of Namibia’s foreign policy towards India during your term as a Head of Mission?

7. India is the emerging world economy. What lessons could Namibia learn from India? Would Ambassador Kapewasha say that the Namibian Mission in India is adequately staffed?

8. What would Ambassador Kapewasha say are the milestones and failures of the Namibian foreign policy towards India?

9. What would the Ambassador say should currently be the foreign policy objectives of Namibia?

10. How will the Ambassador describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?
11. Are there any other foreign policy issues that you wish to state?

_Hausiku M, 2008, Interview with Marco Hausiku, Minister of Foreign Affairs (since 2005), Windhoek, 13 July 2008_

1. What are the current priorities for Namibia’s foreign policy?

2. How does the Head of State and the Foreign Minister relate to each other in foreign policy-making process? How did President Nujoma and his Foreign Minister share the foreign policy-making process and how do President Pohamba and his Foreign Minister share the foreign policy-making process?

3. What would you say were your foreign policy initiatives, since you assumed duties as the Foreign Minister in 2004?

4. Would you say that President Nujoma have been among key foreign policy-makers. What are specific issues that you can cite as President Nujoma’s foreign policy initiatives?

5. Would you say that President Pohamba have been among key foreign policy-makers. What are specific issues that you can cite as President Pohamba’s foreign policy initiatives? What are his foreign policy priorities?

6. If we are to open new diplomatic Missions, where do you think we should open and why?

7. What would the Hon. Minister say are the milestones and failures of Namibia’s foreign policy?

8. When I interviewed Namibia’s first Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, he stated that previously, he thought we did not need to subscribe to the Africa Peer Review Mechanism, but admitted that by now he has changed his mind and would recommend that we should subscribe? What is your view on this?

9. How will the Hon Minister describe the foreign policy under Presidents Nujoma and Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?

10. There is a general feeling that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs is not fully involved in foreign policy matter, as the body with oversight function. What is your relationship with the current and previous Chairpersons of the Committee?
11. Are there any other foreign policy issues that the Hon. Minister would like to state?

Pohamba H., 2008, Interview with Hifikepunye Pohamba, President of the Republic of Namibia (since 2005), Windhoek, 09 July 2008

1. What are the foreign policy priorities for His Excellency and why these priorities?

2. Would His Excellency say that the foreign policy of Namibia during his term compared to the term of his predecessor, President Nujoma is continuity, continuity with changes, or major policy change?

3. What influence does the Minister of Foreign Affairs had on foreign policy vis-à-vis the Cabinet and what influence does the President have on the foreign policy vis-à-vis the Foreign Minister and the Cabinet?

4. Foreign policy all over the world is regarded as the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is your view on this assumption? Otherwise, who should be other important stakeholders in foreign policy-making?

5. Last year (2007), His Excellency was asked a question by the Leader of the Official Opposition, Hon. Ben Ulenga, about his views on Zimbabwe and responded that he would prefer to discuss the question with Hon. Ulenga at State House? What were the issues at stake that His Excellency could not respond publicly in Parliament?

6. Do opposition parties have a role to play in the foreign policy-making process?

7. The agendas of foreign polices world over are changing to embrace the issue of climate change. How does Namibia intend to make an impact in global politics with regard to this aspect?

8. Last year, Namibia opened embassies in Tanzania and Egypt. What were the considerations in opening these embassies? Otherwise, if there were enough funds where else would His Excellency want to have Namibian Missions opened?

9. On a scale of 1 – 10 (one being the lowest and 10 being the highest), how does His Excellency rate the performance of the Namibian diplomatic contingency, and why does His Excellency give them such rating?

10. There have been disagreements regarding whether Namibia should subscribe to the Africa Peer Review Mechanism. What is His Excellency’s position on this issue?
11. There are concerns that there are a few Namibians employed in the multilateral organisations, of which Namibia is a member, like the UN, Commonwealth, AU and SADC. What is the strategy of the Government to address this issue?

12. There were concerns expressed that Namibia ought to have played a pro-active role in the post-election violence in Kenya, this year (2008), given Kenya’s contribution to UNTAG and the assistance to train the new army after independence? What is His Excellency’s position on this?

13. What does His Excellency think are the successes and failures of Namibia’s diplomacy?

14. Any other issues on foreign policy and international relations which has not been asked, which His Excellency would like to state?


1. What would you say were your foreign policy initiatives, during your term as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998 – 2002)?

2. Would you say that President Nujoma have been among key foreign policy-makers. What are the specific issues that you can cite as President Nujoma’s foreign policy initiatives?

3. What was your major role at the UN during your term as Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs? (N.B. There could be follow up questions based on your answer to this question)

4. What is your view on the UN reform, especially the Security Council?

5. How does your current role compliment that of the Minister and the Head of State and in foreign policy-making?

6. Would you say that President Pohamba as among key foreign policy-makers. What are specific issues that you can cite as President Pohamba’s foreign policy initiatives? What are his foreign policy priorities?

7. How will Ambassador Kalomoh describe the foreign policy under President Nujoma and under President Pohamba? Are there major differences on issues and approaches or is it simply a continuation?
8. When I interviewed the first Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, he stated that previously, he thought we did not need to subscribe to the Africa Peer Review Mechanism, but he admitted that by now he has changed his mind and would recommend that we should subscribe? What is your view on this?

9. There have been domestic disagreements on Namibia’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe. What is your view on this?

10. If we are to open new foreign missions, where do you think we should open and why?

11. What would Ambassador Kalomoh say are the milestones and failures of Namibian’s foreign policy?

12. Are there any other foreign policy issues that Ambassador Kalomoh would like to state?
APPENDIX 3
AGREEMENTS SIGNED BETWEEN NAMIBIA AND NORDIC COUNTRIES OF ACCREDITATION, BY JUNE 2003

FINLAND

1. Agreement on Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and Finland, signed on 21 March 1990
2. Agreement on Economic Cooperation between Namibia and Finland, on 25 January 1990
3. Agreement on Budgetary Allocations, signed on 28 January 1990
4. Agreement on Health, on 17 August 1990
5. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 17 August 1990
6. Two agreements on Development Cooperation, signed on 19 November 1990
7. Agreement on Budgets, signed on 19 November 1990
8. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 29 January 1991
9. Agreement on Health, signed on 01 February 1991
10. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 8 February 1991
11. Agreement on Geological Mapping, signed on 8 February 1991
12. Agreement on Budgets, on 22 April 1991
13. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 19 June 1991
14. Agreement on Visas, signed on 12 July 1991
15. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 17 August 1991
16. Two Agreements on Development Cooperation, signed on, 13 September 1991
17. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 4 November 1991
18. Two Agreements on Development Cooperation, signed on 6 November 1991
19. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 19 November 1991
20. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 14 February 1992
21. Agreement on Water Conservation, signed on 10 April 1992
22. Agreement on Education, signed on 27 April 1992
23. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 27 April 1992
24. Agreement on Cultural Affairs, signed on 13 October 1992
25. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 27 November 1992
26. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 03 December 1993
27. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 02 December 1994
28. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 20 April 1995
29. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 06 May 1995

SWEDEN

1. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 10 February 1990
2. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 26 March 1990
3. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 26 March 1990
4. Agreement on Budgets, signed on 09 October 1990
5. Agreement on Budgets, signed on 19 October 1990
6. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 19 October 1990
7. Agreement on Volunteers, signed on 19 October 1990
8. Agreement on Education, signed on 19 October 1990
9. Three Agreements on Development Cooperation, signed on 19 October 1990
10. Agreement on Visas, signed on 19 October 1990
11. Agreement on Assistance, signed on 01 February 1991
12. Two Agreements on Development Cooperation, signed on 6 March 1991
13. Agreement on Banking, signed on 19 March 1991
14. Agreement on Visas, signed on 5 April 1991
15. Agreement on Transport, signed on 24 April 1991
16. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 24 April 1991
17. Agreement on Budgets, signed on 24 April 1991
18. Agreement on Personnel, signed on 24 April 1991
19. Three Agreements on Development Cooperation, signed on 24 April 1991
20. Agreement on Volunteers, signed on 24 April 1991
21. Agreement on Personnel, signed on 19 October 1991
22. Two Agreements on Development Cooperation, signed on 27 March 1992
23. Agreement on Consultations, signed on 27 March 1992
24. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 13 May 1992
25. Agreement on Draught Relief, signed on 26 March 1993
26. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 5 April 1993
27. Agreement on Personnel, signed on 14 June 1993
28. Agreement on Education, signed on 28 June 1993
29. Two Agreements on Development Cooperation, signed on 28 June 1993
30. Agreement on Service Cooperation, signed on 28 June 1993
31. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 30 June 1993
32. Agreement on Consultations, signed on 29 April 1994
33. Agreement on Personnel and Consultancy, signed on 18 May 1994
34. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 16 June 1994
35. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 30 June 1994
36. Two Agreements on Transport and Education, signed on 30 June 1994

NORWAY

1. Agreement on Budgets, signed on 25 September 1990
2. Agreement on Budgets, signed on 15 October 1990
3. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 25 December 1990
4. Three Agreements on Development Cooperation, signed on 20 February 1991
5. Agreement on Visas, signed on 22 March 1991
6. Agreement on Culture, signed on 02 May 1991
7. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 14 June 1991
8. Agreement on Economic Cooperation, signed on 24 September 1991
9. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed on 26 January 1992
10. Agreement on Energy Supply, signed on 17 October 1994
11. Agreement on Fisheries, signed on 28 October 1994
12. Agreement on Fisheries, signed on 16 June 1995
13. Agreement on Fisheries, signed on 17 July 1996
14. Agreement on Development cooperation with OXFAM, signed on 29 November 1990
15. Agreement on Health Issues with OXFAM, signed on 01 May 1992
16. Agreement on Technical Cooperation with OXFAM, signed on 25 August 1994
17. Agreement on Assistance to the Directorate of Maritime Affairs, signed on 17 December 1996
18. Agreement on Exportfinans ASA loan, signed on 30 October 2000

DENMARK

1. Agreement on Development Cooperation, signed in 1991
2. Agreement on Cooperation with DAPP, signed on 15 March 1995
3. Agreement on Fish Processing Industry, signed on 13 December 1995
4. Agreement on School Based Forest Awareness, signed on 13 December 1995
5. Agreement on Integrated Coastal Zone Management, signed on 13 December 1996
APPENDIX 4
NAMIBIA-CHINA BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BY 2006

1. Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation, signed on 05 September 1991
2. Loan Agreement, signed in 1995
3. Agreement to provide goods and materials, signed in 1995
4. Agreement to dig 30 boreholes, signed in 1995
5. Agreement on Health and Social Services Co-operation, signed in 1995.
6. Co-operation Agreement between the City of Windhoek and the City of Shanghai, signed in 1995
7. Agreement to provide financial assistance of 10 million China Yuan Renminbi (CNY), signed in 1996
8. Agreement on exports of Namibian ostrich meat to China, signed in 1996
10. Agreement to provide Namibia with credit worth 30 million China Yuan Renminbi (CNY), signed in 1996
11. Agreement on Co-operation in High Education, signed in 1998
12. Consultative Agreement between the Foreign Ministries of Namibia and China, signed in 1999
13. Agreement on the Establishment of China Space Tracking, Telemetry and Command Station in Namibia, signed in 2000
14. Agreement on Visa Exemption between Namibia and Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, signed in 2001
15. Visa Exemption Agreement between Namibia and Hong Kong Special Administration Region of the People’s Republic of China, signed in 1997
16. Lease Agreement between the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication (Namibia) and the China Manned Space Engineering Program office, signed in 2001.
20. Agreement providing a grant of 50,000,000.00 China Yuan Renminbi (CNY) for the construction of the Namibia’s State House, signed in 2003.
21. Cooperation Agreement between Namibia Press Agency (NAMPA) and the Chinese Xinhua News
22. Memorandum of Understanding between TransNamib Holding Ltd and Ziyang Locomotive Works (ZLW), Siyang Locomotives and Rolling Stock Co. Ltd (SLRC), signed on 14th October 2003.
23. Memorandums of Understanding between TransNamib Holding Ltd and Ziyang Locomotive Works (ZLW), Siyang Locomotives and Rolling Stock Co. Ltd (SLRC) were signed in Beijing, signed on 22nd October 2003.
27. Concessional Loan Agreement between Namibia and China, signed in December 2003
28. Extradition Treaty
29. China-Namibia Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement
Appendix 5

Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Source: Office of the Prime Minister (2005)
### APPENDIX 6

**TABLE 15: NAMIBIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND THEIR CONCURRENT ACCREDITATION**

*Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Mission</th>
<th>Concurrent accreditation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Angola</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
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<td>2. Austria</td>
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<td>Monte Negro</td>
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<td>Slovak Republic</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>3. Belgium</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>The Netherlands</td>
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<td>Liechtenstein</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>4. Botswana</td>
<td>SADC</td>
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<td>5. Brazil</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>Suriname</td>
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<td>6. China</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>7. Cuba</td>
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<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
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<td>St Kitts and Nervis</td>
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</table>
| 8. Democratic Republic of Congo | St Lucia  
|                               | St Vincent and the Grenadines  
|                               | Grenada  
|                               | Cameroon  
|                               | Central African Republic  
|                               | Congo  
|                               | Equatorial Guinea  
|                               | Gabon  
|                               | Chad  
| 9. Egypt                      | Algeria  
|                               | Eritrea  
|                               | Jordan  
|                               | Kuwait  
|                               | Lebanon  
|                               | Oman  
|                               | Palestine  
|                               | Qatar  
|                               | Saudi Arabia  
|                               | Syria  
|                               | Tunisia  
|                               | United Arab Emirates  
|                               | Yemen  
| 10. Ethiopia                  | African Union  
|                               | Djibouti  
|                               | Sudan  
|                               | Economic Commission of Africa  
| 11. France                    | Albania  
|                               | Italy  
|                               | Portugal  
|                               | Spain  
|                               | UNESCO  
|                               | FAO  
| 12. Germany                   | Poland  
|                               | Turkey  
|                               | Vatican  
| 13. India                     | Afghanistan  
|                               | Bangladesh  
|                               | Bhutan  
|                               | Myanmar  
|                               | Nepal  
|                               | Sri Lanka  
|                               | Maldives  
| 14. Malaysia                  | Brunei  
|                               | East Timor  
|                               | Fiji  
|                               | Indonesia  
|                               | Pacific Islands |
| 15. Nigeria              | Papua New Guinea  
|                         | Philippines       
|                         | Thailand          
| 16. New York            | Benin             
|                         | Burkina Faso      
|                         | Côte d’Ivoire     
|                         | Gambia            
|                         | Ghana             
|                         | Guinea            
|                         | Liberia           
|                         | Mali              
|                         | Mauritania        
|                         | Niger             
|                         | Senegal           
|                         | Sierra Leone      
|                         | Togo              
|                         | ECOWAS            
| 17. Russian Federation  | Jamaica           
|                         | Barbados          
|                         | Dominica          
|                         | Guyana            
|                         | Trinidad & Tobago 
| 18. South Africa        | Azerbaijan        
|                         | Belarus           
|                         | Georgia           
|                         | Armenia           
|                         | Kazakhstan        
|                         | Tajikistan        
|                         | Moldova           
|                         | Turkmenistan      
|                         | Ukraine           
|                         | Uzbekistan        
|                         | Kyrgyzstan Republic 
| 19. Sweden              | Comoros           
|                         | Lesotho           
|                         | Mauritius         
|                         | Mozambique        
|                         | Seychelles        
|                         | Swaziland         
| 20. Tanzania            | Burundi           
|                         | Kenya             
|                         | Somalia           
<p>|                         | Rwanda            |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Covered Directly from Windhoek</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21. United Kingdom</td>
<td>Uganda, Cyprus, Greece, Republic of Ireland, Malta</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. United States</td>
<td>Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Zambia</td>
<td>Madagascar, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following countries are covered directly from Windhoek:

- Australia
- Iran
- Iraq
- Israel
- Japan
- Libya
- Morocco
- New Zealand
- Sahrawi Republic
- Singapore