SOUTH AFRICAN POLICING IN TRANSITION: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS ON THE FAMILY VIOLENCE, CHILD PROTECTION AND SEXUAL OFFENCES UNIT

by

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Title: South African policing in transition: Evaluating the impact of the restructuring process of the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit

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Promoter: Professor HF Snyman
Department: Criminal Justice (Policing)
Degree: Doctor of Literature and Philosophy

SUMMARY

The primary goal of this study is to promote knowledge and understanding of the restructuring process of the Family Violence Child Protection and Sexual Offences (FCS) unit in the South African Police Service (SAPS) through impact evaluation. Many evaluation programmes provide blueprints and methods to manage and help solve organisational transformation. They, however, lack dealing with the unique organisational transformation process characterised in the South African Police Service (SAPS). Given this importance, there appears to be potential value in evaluating the impact of the restructuring process in the FCS.

During the research extensive panel studies and individual interviews were conducted in the West Rand policing district with FCS members, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) directly involved with family violence, child protection and sexual offences, Senior Public Prosecutors involved with cases concerning the FCS and researchers at a security research institute. Furthermore, a descriptive literature study was conducted to acquire relevant information and perspective from available national and international literature.
Various objectives were fulfilled in this study:

- The impact of the restructuring process in the FCS, to assess the internal and external climate on service delivery, was identified and described.
- It was determined whether the restructuring process in the FCS is achieving its proposed objective.
- Feedback to help improve the effectiveness of the restructuring process and improve future strategies was provided.

Moreover, this study and its results provide a framework to the SAPS as an organisation that is currently going through an extensive transformation process. As a result, the management of the SAPS will receive first hand information on the areas to specifically focus on during the restructuring of the FCS, or utilised this impact evaluation as a learning curve and an opportunity to rectify shortcomings and also systematically be guided through this process in realisation thereof. Consequently, this impact evaluation could act as a management tool to support and further develop the transformation process in the SAPS.

Finally, this study contributes to the baseline of knowledge, with regard to structural transformation in the specialised field of policing.

**KEY TERMS:**

restructuring process; programme evaluation; impact evaluation; South African policing in transition; family violence; child protection; sexual offences; organisational restructuring; police reform; transformation
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSA</td>
<td>Amalgamated Banks of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired immune deficiency syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>Automated Teller Machine</td>
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<tr>
<td>BANKFIN</td>
<td>ABSA Vehicle and Asset Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGD</td>
<td>Center for Global Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
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<td>COPS</td>
<td>Community Oriented Policing Services</td>
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<td>DCS</td>
<td>Department of Correctional Service</td>
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<td>DPE</td>
<td>Department of Public Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>G&amp;A</td>
<td>Governance and Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFB</td>
<td>General Freight Business</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMP</td>
<td>Growth Monitoring and Promotion</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEG</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFPRI</td>
<td>The International Food Policy Research Institute</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSE</td>
<td>Johannesburg Stock Exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDRC</td>
<td>Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation</td>
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<td>MORE</td>
<td>Making Officer Redeployment Effective</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
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<td>NBIU</td>
<td>New Business and Innovation Unit</td>
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NCF - Negotiation Consultative Forum
NEP - National Extension Projects
NGO - Non-governmental Organisation
NPA - National Prosecuting Authority
NRPP - National Reassurance Policing Programme
NYP - New Yorkshire Police
OHR - Office of the High Representative
POPCRU - Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union
PROGRESA - Programmea de Educación, Salud y Alimentación
PSA - Police Service Area
PSCBC - Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council
PWV - Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging
ROC - Regional Operations Commands
ROCE - Return on Capital Employed
ROE - Return on Equity
RS - Republic Srpska
SAA - South African Airways
SAPS - South African Police Service
SAPU - South African Police Union
SASBO - South African Society of Bank Officials
SHELL - Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies
SLP - Sierra Leone Police
SOE - Stand-alone Entity
SSD - Special Service Division
SSSBC - Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council
TB - Tuberculosis
TINP - Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Project
T&V - The Training and Visit system
UK - United Kingdom
UNAMSIL - United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UN - United Nations
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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CHAPTER 1  OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the study. It follows that the research problem is identified and presented. Subsequently, the aims and objectives of this study are delineated and the reason for the research problem is defined. Consequently, an explanation of the scope and demarcation of the field of study - including geographical and time limitations - follows. Theoretical definitions central to this study then follow, for explanation. Additionally, problems encountered during this study are identified and the ways in which they were overcome, are explained.

This chapter, furthermore, pays attention to the research approach and design, the sampling of the population, methods of data collection, data analysis procedures and a description of the measuring instrument. Finally, methods to ensure validity and reliability are also incorporated into this chapter.

1.2 Problem Statement

During the past decade, numerous countries in transition across the globe have been working on transforming their police organisations to meet new challenges. The growing number of organisations carrying out police transformation proves its increasing significance. These countries have realised that police organisations are no longer the established, hierarchical structures they previously were to endure change, and as a result, are involved in rethinking their roles, restructuring their organisations and changing their cultures in order to adjust to the changing conditions.

Similar to these emerging democracies, the face of the policing sector in South Africa has – as with many other aspects – changed dramatically over the past decade. After South Africa had become a democracy in 1994, the South African Police Service (SAPS) also underwent
substantial organisational transformation. New organisational forms have emerged within the organisation. For example, the bureaucratic nature and style of South African policing has drastically shifted to a total community-conscious and people-oriented approach. Human rights issues have also significantly emerged in this process and played a key role in facilitating and supporting democratic policing in South Africa. At the same time, new managerial structures have been developed and introduced. Furthermore, new government guiding principles have aimed to transform the police force through the incorporation of affirmative action, professionalisation, the introduction of a new type of recruit and voluntary retirements. In addition, an entire new organisational culture had to be established.

In addition, Rossi and Freeman (1989:228) regard the assessment of impact as critical throughout the life course of social programmes, and, furthermore, consider it foolish to implement a new programme without some knowledge of its impact. Simpson, Hamber and Stott (2001:9) furthermore emphasise that comparisons cannot stop at the level of policy making and therefore have to be measured against the hard impact assessment of deliverables. In other words, it is about an ability to evaluate what policies worked in a country and why they worked, and then to evaluate the transferability of these policies to different contexts. Moreover, Schraeder (2004:332) also emphasises the potential value and importance of evaluation during organisational change. He believes that since it is in an organisation’s competitive best interest, and since human resources play such a vital role in the success of organisations, it seems prudent to evaluate these human reactions by evaluating employee attitudes and perceptions in the midst of change. Schraeder furthermore considers that the findings of such evaluations can provide organisational leaders with valuable information regarding the efficiency of the change efforts, thus prompting necessary adjustments to implementation strategies and avoiding potential catastrophes.

Fifteen years into transition, the SAPS is still understandably experiencing difficulty in dealing with the challenges of democratic policing and in completely gaining South African society’s confidence. Numerous transformation initiatives have been implemented at many levels since democratising the SAPS, resulting in different uniforms, a demilitarised rank structure, a new promotion policy, amended training curricula, the revision and introduction of its legislative
framework and operational services, and new policing priorities and objectives. Progress has been achieved, but in many cases the process has been uneven and incomplete. As a result, some initiatives have been implemented more successfully than others. Newham and Bruce (2000), however, regard these initiatives of police transformation as primarily structural in nature, and which have not significantly led to changes in police behaviour. Stated differently, state change and changes in legislation, policy and Constitution alone do not give rise automatically to police transformation (Marks, 2000:559).

In affirmation to the difficulties experienced by the SAPS, Ivkovic and Haberfeld (2000:194) confirm that the problem of changing a police force which used to be a militia, characterised by a secretive and abusive nature, into a professional police service accountable to the public, is by no means a simple task. Moreover, Bass (2000:148) maintains that the fundamental function of policing makes it a particularly difficult institution to change. Das (1995:624), however, is of the opinion that the nature of the challenges faced by the police in different societies depends on the level of democracy – that, perhaps, makes a difference in the degree of the seriousness of some of the challenges, and the availability of responses to confront them.

Ahn, Adamson and Dornbusch (2004:115), in support of Ivkovic and Haberfeld, are of the opinion that the high failure rates of change management initiatives indicate the difficulty and complexity entailed in the successful realisation of any process of change. Agreeding with the above authors, LaClair and Rao (as quoted by Karp, 2005:87) are of the opinion that the recent past years’ track records of change initiatives have not often demonstrated much success. Given the fast pace and wide scope of police reform activities, it is understandably difficult to assess experiences and draw out lessons from the wide range of initiatives being conducted (O’Neill, 2005:1). As a result, many initiatives nominally supposed to manage change are either ineffective in their original formulation or rendered so by the process of implementation. Studies indicate that 50% to 70% of change management initiatives fail to make any lasting impact on the organisation they claim to reform (LaClair & Rao, as quoted by Ahn et al., 2004:113).
In support of the abovementioned authors’ findings, it was found in a study of 40 major change management programmes, that 58% failed and 20% captured only a third or less of the value expected (LaClair & Rao, as quoted by Ahn et al., 2004: 115). In addition to the difficulty and complexity of change initiatives, Hart (1996) suggests that theories of change management are far from complete and the phenomenon of change management is generally poorly explained – this being especially apparent in respect of police organisations. On the other hand, Newham and Bruce (2000) are of the belief that police reform is a difficult process, however, not impossible.

Simpson et al. (2001), however, believe the challenge to policy making in countries in transition, is to conduct international comparisons. Consequently, such countries can learn valuable lessons that could potentially assist them to develop improved impact assessment tools. However, the real power of cross-country comparisons is not just an understanding of the policy making process and its relationship to delivery, but in the strategic endeavour of developing tools for evaluation and impact analysis. Global international comparisons tend to take place at the level of policy comparisons, without actually looking at the impact of policy innovations – that is, the relationship between policy and delivery, what is being delivered, how effectively is it being delivered. Is the non-delivery about flaws within the policy paradigm or is it about other criteria and practice such as state institutions’ resistance, failure to recognise the magnitude of the transformation agenda inside the state, or failure to build popular support for policy interventions?

Although these initiatives, among others, have undoubtedly brought about significant organisational transformation in the SAPS, it is vital to reconsider current restrictions and shortcomings not successfully implemented to restore the equilibrium in the transformation process of this diverse organisation. Despite the successful introduction and implementation of various transformation initiatives, a range of concerns have presented themselves.

It follows that, during recent findings in Van Graan (2005:186-198), it became clear that the SAPS top management were unable to effectively communicate the urgency of transformation to the members at ground level. As a result, these members do not realise the urgency of
transformation that in turn created confusion, uncertainty, negativity and anxiety among members who had no idea about the effects of a complex change process. Consequently, members focused on self-preservation rather than organisational transformation.

Furthermore, it is evident that the top management of the SAPS experiences problems with specifying the necessity for change and establishing a clear vision for the future. In addition, the implementation of the transformation process in the SAPS appears to be vague and impulsive rather than a planned action.

Effective communication is one of the cornerstones, perhaps the most important system, for the effective functioning of any organisation during a process of transformation, since it promotes the circulation of the information that is vital to the effectiveness of a transformation process. Nevertheless, it furthermore emerged in Van Graan (2005:190) that the internal communication and information management of transformation in the SAPS appears to be unreliable, confusing and uncertain. This ineffective communication thus leads to the exclusion of members at ground level, concerning participative decision making, a culture of involvement, as well as consulting and interaction with members. Moreover, the lack of creating recognition and reward systems has also been identified as a bureaucratic obstacle that may have a negative effect on the transformation process in the SAPS. Additionally, changes introduced into the SAPS, such as a new insignia and uniform, as well as a new name, are regarded as superficial and not meaningful enough to members at ground level. Furthermore, it emerged that SAPS members at ground level are not as energised and motivated to push change forward as the SAPS management would like them to be, since they feel they are negatively influenced by transformation in the organisation. The deeply embedded police force culture is also regarded as a major force to reckon with during the process of transformation in the SAPS.

From the above it is thus clear that the SAPS has taken enormous steps forward during the transformation process thus far. However, it is equally evident that various shortcomings and challenges exist and are still facing the organisation in future, during this complex process.
In addition, the researcher has found, after consultation with various senior officials at the SAPS Head Office, that previous transformation initiatives in the SAPS have not been evaluated, despite the organisation’s industrious efforts to transform.

The SAPS is currently systematically implementing another transformation initiative in the form of a restructuring process in each province, in order to streamline the organisation’s management (Steenkamp, 2006:2). The organisation has, after careful consideration of its consistent challenge to improve service delivery, identified the existence of many layers of command and control within the organisation, which often leads to duplication of functions as the key blockage to service delivery. Currently, the SAPS has four levels of command, i.e. national, provincial, area and station level. These four levels present the organisation with the challenge of a deep structure that result in a lack of accountability and, among other things, communication distortion and the restriction of efficient and effective service delivery (Communique on the restructuring ..., 2006).

This restructuring process therefore strives to provide the SAPS with a flatter organisational structure than is currently in place. However, to achieve this, the SAPS has to reorganise itself and root out unnecessary duplication of functions and activities by reducing the current four levels to three. In order to achieve a flatter structure, station commissioners need to have the necessary powers and decision making authority within their precinct. As a result, this approach renders the existence of area level superfluous. The restructuring process attempts the following advantages for the SAPS (Communique on the restructuring ..., 2006):

- With fewer levels there will be more policing members at station level.
- Authority will be developed downwards to enable police officials to have more responsibility when they perform their functions, thus enabling them to respond quickly to the needs of the SAPS clients.
- Police-community trust will be enhanced.
- Higher morale will be generated.
- Capacity at station level will be strengthened with sufficient resources through training, skills transfer and adequate authority.
- The station commissioners will be held accountable for the results of precinct policing.
In addition, according to police spokesperson Director Selby Bokaba (as quoted by Mkhwanazi, 2006:6), specialised units in the SAPS such as the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences (FCS) Unit are to be closed down as a result of the low conviction rate and the strengthening of expertise at local police station level. According to De Beer (2006) the long-term objective of the redeployment of the FCS Units is to ultimately ensure that every member at every police station has the necessary skills and expertise to professionally assist and advise child victims and their guardians and to expedite the investigation procedures. On the other hand, police officers are of the opinion that the restructuring would have a huge impact in terms of losing skilled officers who specialise in dealing with cases of violence against women and children. A senior police official is of the opinion that this restructuring is taking the fight against child and woman abuse back ten years, and the restructuring occurred at a time when the FCS was gaining a lot of experience in handling cases of serial rapists. In addition, child protection, welfare and gender organisations are of the belief that, as major role players, they were never consulted by the SAPS about the restructuring of the FCS units.

Detectives performing duties with these units will be redeployed to police stations in their areas, to continue their specialised investigations at local level. Police stations in adjacent areas will be clustered in groups of seven or eight that will share information on crime and crime patterns. Mr. Anthony Altbeker, a former senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies is of the opinion that the SAPS needs a centralised capacity to investigate high profile crimes, and this management model could easily fail if it is not implemented discreetly. Altbeker is also of the view that the station commissioners’ management expertise will be of critical importance, since certain police stations are already poorly managed. Additional responsibility on such managers will therefore be an added burden on them. Director Bokaba, however, believes that the restructuring process will enhance service delivery considerably, since expertise will then be deployed on local level, the allocation of resources will be simplified and the bureaucratic bother will also be removed (Steenkamp, 2006:2).
This research thus seeks to overcome shortcomings in practice through evaluating the impact of the restructuring process in the Family Violence, Sexual Offences and Child Protection Unit (FCS), with the aim of identifying the impact and effectiveness of the restructuring concerning the functioning of the FCS. The combination of a series of existing forces, such as the lack of evaluating the impact of previous transformation initiatives in the SAPS, the shortcomings identified during previous transformation initiatives, as well as the diverse workforce of the organisation in terms of race, language, educational background, culture and political orientation, has increased the need to evaluate the restructuring process in the FCS.

It follows that the study will concentrate on the evaluation of the impact of the restructuring process in the FCS. This study is of importance, as an impact evaluation of the restructuring in the FCS could provide the SAPS management with valuable information regarding the effectiveness and impact of the organisation’s efforts to improve accountability, communication and service delivery through the implementation of restructuring. Such an impact evaluation will, in addition, provide information on the following:

- the SAPS’s progress regarding restructuring efforts, in comparison to international best practices.
- prompting essential adjustments to implementation strategies and processes and avoiding potential and future shortcomings.
- could serve as a planning instrument used to guide similar or other change initiatives in the SAPS, as well as a problem-solving instrument to assess similar or other change initiatives

1.3 Value of the Study

Once an impact evaluation of the restructuring process in the FCS has been completed, the study and its results will, firstly, benefit the SAPS as an organisation that is currently going through an extensive transformation process. As a result, the management of the SAPS will receive first-hand information on the areas to specifically focus on during the restructuring of the FCS, utilise
this impact evaluation as a learning curve and an opportunity to rectify shortcomings, and also systematically be guided through this process in realisation thereof. Consequently, this impact evaluation could act as a management tool to support and further develop the transformation process in the SAPS.

Subsequently, the SAPS management could have an improved understanding of the obstacles and uncertainties they are experiencing as a result of the restructuring process in the FCS. Recommendations will also be presented that will provide guidelines on how to rectify such shortcomings towards the successful restructuring in the SAPS, which may have a significant impact on transformation in the organisation. Furthermore, through evaluating the impact of the restructuring process in the FCS, weaknesses and possible adjustments and solutions could be identified for implementation in the organisation, and could also be an essential step towards the overall improvement and effectiveness of this process. As a result, the SAPS could have an excellent opportunity for organisational learning. Such an impact evaluation could, in addition, assist the SAPS to reflect on where it is heading and how it is accomplishing its transformation objectives.

Secondly, the study and its results may benefit individuals or organisations that are responsible for developing and implementing programmes of democratic police reform, since this impact evaluation could increase awareness and also be used as a guide for such reforms. Furthermore, it could provide practical advice to democratic police reformers, as well as assistance to foreign police organisations undergoing similar transformations.

Thirdly, the South African community could also benefit from the study and its results, since such an impact evaluation could contribute to the realisation of a truly professional and accountable, democratic police service. In addition, the academic community could also benefit from the study and its results, as such a programme evaluation could be used in related studies, research and included in learning material.
Lastly, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and other government departments could also benefit from the study and its results, since it could provide these organisations with practical advice that in turn could enhance organisational learning.

1.4 Goal and objectives of the study

This section indicates the general aims of the study and gives the reasons for studying the particular phenomenon. A clear and unambiguous statement of the research objectives is also indicated (Mouton, 2001:48). Mark (1996:364) adds that the objectives of the study should be specific, clear and achievable. In addition, De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport (2002:118) state that the researcher must explicitly delimit the focus of the study and discuss the research goals and objectives.

1.4.1 Goal

The goal of this study is to promote knowledge and understanding of the restructuring process of the FCS in the SAPS through impact evaluation. Many evaluation programmes provide blueprints and methods to manage and help solve organisational transformation. However, they lack dealing with the unique organisational transformation process characterised in the SAPS. Given this importance, there appears to be potential value in evaluating the impact of the restructuring process in the FCS, to assess whether this process has been successful and to what extent, and to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and progress of the restructuring process in order to direct and, if necessary, redirect the SAPS in this process to improve the results of transformation.
1.4.2 Objectives

The primary objectives of this study are:

- To identify and describe the impact, that is, the overall long-term effects – positive or negative, intended or not – of the restructuring process in the FCS, in order to assess the internal and external climate on service delivery.

  ● If the restructuring process in the FCS is identified and described then the internal and external climate on service delivery can be assessed.

- To determine whether the restructuring process in the FCS is achieving its proposed objective, according to the extent and manner in which the beneficiaries’ (victims of FCS-related crimes as mentioned in paragraph 1.7) situation has changed as a result of this process.

  ● If it is determined that the set objective of the transformation in the FCS has been met, then its impact on the changed beneficiaries’ situation can be determined.

- To provide feedback to help improve the effectiveness of the restructuring process and improve future strategies.

  ● If the effectiveness and impact of the restructuring process can be determined, then recommendations can be made to improve future restructuring strategies.

- To make a contribution in the study of policing – especially the use of impact evaluation in transforming organisations.
1.5 Demarcation of the field of study

This study restricts itself to the FCS in the West Rand policing area. The population of the study will be described in detail in paragraph 1.10.3. Nine panel studies were conducted with the FCS members at the various decentralised units. Additionally, six semi-structured interviews were conducted with Childline and the Teddy Bear Clinic, NGOs directly involved with family violence, child protection and sexual offences. In addition, six semi-structured interviews were conducted with Senior Public Prosecutors in the jurisdiction of the West Rand involved with cases concerning the FCS - which is attached to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). These panel studies and semi-structured interviews were conducted at three points in time over a period of one year, with six months intervals. Additionally, one semi-structured interview was also conducted with the Head: Efficiency Services at the SAPS Head Office and two researchers at the Institute for Security Studies. The South African Police Union (SAPU) was also approached for its views on the restructuring of the FCS. Electronic correspondence was received from SAPU. A comparative study with five international police organisations regarding restructuring processes in police organisations, was also conducted. In addition, the snowball sampling technique was adopted, as the interviewer was referred to other experts who added value to the study. The saturated sampling method was additionally used, since the researcher collected data until it reached saturation point. Saturated sampling was also applied in this study, since demographic characteristics were also taken into consideration in the sample.

1.6 Key Theoretical Concepts

According to Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:35), the main functions of concepts are, firstly, to facilitate communication among human beings. Secondly, concepts are to aid in the classification of the elements of reality and their generalisation. However, for these concepts to be useful, they must be defined in a clear, precise, non-ambiguous and agreed-upon way. Definitions also concretise the intended meaning of a concept in relation to a particular study (De Beer, 1999:15). In addition, operational definitions will be presented after explaining the key theoretical concepts. The aim of operational definitions is to identify the “indicators”, the specific events or
phenomena that truthfully represent an abstract concept (De Vos et al., 2002:35). Stated differently, Mouton (1996:189-190) clarifies that theoretical definitions specify the connotation of concepts, while operational definitions make the denotations of a concept explicit. In other words, a theoretical definition spells out what is meant or intended by a certain concept, whereas operational definitions link a concept with certain clearly identifiable “objects” in the social world.

The following concepts are central to this study and are clearly defined, so that there is a common understanding of their meaning in the study.

### 1.6.1 Programme Evaluation

Programme evaluation is a management tool. It is a time-bound exercise that attempts to assess, systematically and objectively, the relevance, performance and success of planned, ongoing or completed programmes or projects, or some aspect thereof. Evaluation is undertaken selectively to answer specific questions to guide decision-makers and/or programme managers, and to provide information on whether underlying theories and assumptions used in programme development were valid, what worked and what did not work, and why. Evaluation commonly aims to determine the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a programme or project (Programme Manager’s Planning …, 2004:1).

Rossi and Freeman (1989:18) furthermore describe evaluation as the systematic application of social research procedures for assessing the conceptualisation, design, implementation and utility of social intervention programmes. In other words, evaluation researchers use social research methodologies to judge and improve the ways in which human services policies and programmes are conducted, from the earliest stages of defining and designing programmes, through their development and implementation.
For the purpose of this study, programme evaluation can be regarded as the application of research methodologies to judge and improve the restructuring process in the FCS in the West Rand policing area, prior to or immediately after implementation, during the restructuring process and after the process was implemented.

1.6.2 Impact Evaluation

Impact evaluation is the systematic identification of the effects – positive or negative, intended or not – on, among others, institutions caused by a given development activity such as a programme or project as a whole (OED and Impact Evaluation ..., 2005). In other words, impact evaluations investigate longer-term and broader effects of change initiatives. Regalia (1999) explain impact evaluation as an indispensable tool to assess whether a programme is achieving its objective, how the beneficiaries’ situation changed as a result of the programme and what the situation would have been without the programme. An impact evaluation gauges the extent to which a programme causes change in the desired direction (Rossi & Freeman, 1989:49).

Impact evaluation in this study can be considered as the systematic investigation and identification of the long-term effects, positive or negative, of the restructuring process in the FCS, in order to assess whether this process is achieving its objective and how the situation of the members of the FCS has changed as a result of the restructuring process.

1.6.3 Transition

According to the Oxford Dictionary for the Business World (1993:880), transition is the passing or change from one place, state, condition, etc., to another.

In addition, transition is an act, process or instance of change in structure, appearance or character, or, transition can be described as a conversion, revolution, makeover, alteration or renovation (Transformation, 2007).
For the purpose of this study, transition in the SAPS is mainly the change from the previous militaristic, autocratic and bureaucratic policing approach of the South African Police (SAP), to the new democratic, service orientated and community conscious SAPS.

1.6.4 Restructuring Process

According to the *Longman Business English Dictionary* (2000:414), if a company restructures, or someone restructures it, it changes the way it is organised or financed. Moreover, restructuring is the general term for major corporate changes aimed at greater efficiency and adaptation to changing markets. Restructuring is therefore a significant modification made to the operations and structure of a company (*Restructuring*, 2007).

For the purpose of this study, the restructuring process of the FCS entails the redeployment of members of the FCS from their separately based offices to station level, where these members will, while performing their functions as FCS detectives, train police officials at police station level to render a skilled service to victims of family violence and sexual offences. The SAPS has identified the existence of many layers of command and control within the organisation, which often lead to duplication of functions, as the key obstacle to service delivery. As a result, the four levels of command are reduced to three. The long-term objective of the redeployment of FCS units is therefore to ultimately ensure that every member at every police station has the necessary skills and expertise to professionally assist and advise victims and their guardians, and to expedite the investigation process. It follows that the functioning of the FCS is being changed.

1.6.5 Triangulation

Konstantinos and Efrosini (2003:16) explain triangulation as the use of different data collection techniques and different research strategies to study the same programme. Patton (as quoted by Konstantinos & Efrosini, 2003:16) describes the term triangulation as derived from the geometric shape “triangle”. The triangle is the strongest of all the geometric shapes and triangulated evaluation designs are aiming at increasing the strength of any evaluation.
Patton (as quoted by Konstantinos & Efrosini, 2003:16) furthermore describes triangulation as a powerful solution to the problem of relying too much on any single method and thereby undermining the validity and credibility of findings, because of the weaknesses of any single method. In addition, the author is of the opinion that triangulation is the recognition that the evaluator needs to be open to more than one way of looking at the programme. In addition, Patton (as quoted by Konstantinos & Efrosini, 2003:17) describes triangulation as one way of increasing methodological power, while a second way is to borrow and combine parts from pure methodologies, thus creating mixed methodological approaches.

However, the concept of triangulation is sometimes used to designate a conscious combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology (De Vos et al., 2002:365). On the other hand, according to Mouton and Marais (as quoted by De Vos et al., 2002:365), triangulation refers mainly to the use of multiple methods of data collection, with a view of increasing the reliability of observation, and not specifically to the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. It is therefore essential for a researcher to state clearly what is meant when using this term within a particular study.

Triangulation in this study is the application of different data collection techniques, such as a literature study and interviews. In addition, different research strategies will be applied in this study by means of a non-experimental research design in the form of a pretest-posttest design, panel studies, and a comparative study. Through the application of these various data collection techniques and research strategies, the validity and credibility of the findings in this study will therefore be improved.

1.7 Geographical Limitation

This study is restricted to the FCS unit in the West Rand policing area in Gauteng. The findings from this study can not be generalised, due to the qualitative nature of the study, but can be transferred to similar contexts. The transferring agent should however ensure the applicability of these findings to the similar setting (De Vos, Stydom, Fouche & Delport, 2002: 352). The need
to establish a unit within the SAPS to prevent and combat crimes against children was identified during 1986. As a result, the Child Protection Unit was established. In past years the need for the expansion of the sensitive service rendered to children and adult victims of family violence and sexual offences, was identified. This led to the establishment of the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS). The establishment of the FCS was approved by the Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng, on 18 March 1995. The first Child Protection Unit to be transformed into a Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit was the Braamfontein (Johannesburg) branch, on 18 March 1996, and the second one in July 1996 in Benoni. Other units have also since been transformed. Members attached to the FCS have already completed the basic police training at one of the Police Colleges, and have already gained some experience in general policing. Most of these members have already attended a Basic Detective Training Course.

Crimes policed by members of the FCS are:

- **Family Violence** (intra-familial, victims of 18 years and older)
  - assault with the intention to do grievous bodily harm
  - attempted murder

- **Child Protection** (victims under the age of 18 years)
  - rape
  - incest
  - indecent assault
  - attempted murder
  - assault with the intention to do grievous bodily harm
  - common assault (only if there were three or more incidents over a period of time – intra-familial)
  - kidnapping
  - abduction
crimes with regard to the sexual exploitation of children, under the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957, as amended
Child Care Act 74 of 1983, as amended
Films and Publication Act 65 of 1996, with regard to child pornography

- **Sexual Offences** (victims of 18 years of age and older)
  
  rape
  incest
  indecent assault

crimes with regards to the sexual exploitation of adults, under the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957, as amended


Gauteng was formed from part of the old Transvaal province after South Africa’s first all-race elections on 27 April 1994. It was initially named Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (or PWV) and was renamed Gauteng in December 1994. Situated in the heart of the Highveld, Gauteng is the smallest province in South Africa with only 1.4 percent (17 010 square metres) of the land area, but it is highly urbanised and has a population of 8 837 178 (2001 South African National Census), growing at around 100 000 people every year. The name “Gauteng” comes from the Sesotho phrase meaning *Place of Gold*, referring to the thriving gold industry in the province, following the 1886 discovery of gold in Johannesburg. Gauteng is divided into 3 metropolitan municipalities and 3 district municipalities (which are further divided into 8 local municipalities). This province, furthermore, has a diverse population that consists of 73,8% blacks, 19,9% whites, 3.8% coloureds and 2,5 percent Indians/Asians. In the province, 14,4% of residents speak Afrikaans at home, 12,5% English, 1,9% IsiNdebele, 7,6% IsiXhosa, 21,5% IsiZulu, 10,7% Sepedi, 13,1% Sesotho, 8,4% Setswana, 1,4% SiSwati, 1,7% Tshivenda, 5,7% Xitsonga, and 1% of the population speaks a non-official language at home. The capital of Gauteng is Johannesburg. *(Gauteng, 2007).*
It follows that the entire province is not included in this study, as a result of the large geographic area of the province. The researcher aims to obtain a comprehensive viewpoint of the research problem.

The West Rand is the name for the urban western part of the Witwatersrand that is functionally merged with the Johannesburg metropolis. The West Rand extends from Randfontein in the west to Roodepoort in the east, and includes the town of Krugersdorp. The areas of Carletonville and Westonaria are sometimes included as being part of the Far West Rand. The areas are economically linked to the city through the gold mining industry. The following ethnic groups are found in the area:

Black African (population of 586 665 (78.84%)
White (population of 132 849 (17.85%)
Coloured (population of 17 531 (2.36%)
Indian/Asian (population of 7123 (0.96%)
(West Rand District Municipality, 2007).

As a result, the FCS in the West Rand was chosen, attributable to its diverse population that includes the 4 race groups in South Africa. The province has 7 policing areas with 127 police stations. In addition, Gauteng has 24 735 sworn police officers (excluding civilians) with the police-population ratio equalling one police officer for every 385 citizens. The Gauteng Provincial Police Headquarters is situated in Johannesburg (Profile: SAPS Gauteng, 2007).

1.8 Time Limitation

This study was conducted between August 2007 and December 2008. As a result, the data collected has remained relevant. Individual interviews and panel studies were conducted during the periods August 2007, February 2008 and August 2008, respectively.
1.9 Difficulties Encountered During the Study

Some complexities outside the researcher’s control were encountered during the study and included the following:

The researcher experienced enormous difficulty in obtaining approval for this study, from the SAPS. As a result, various SAPS Provincial Commissioners were approached. It followed that one SAPS Provincial Commissioner did not approve the study in the particular province, since the restructuring of the SAPS was, at the time, in the implementation phase and of a sensitive nature. Consequently, this study was not approved, due to the concern of additional negative publicity. Two other provinces’ Provincial Commissioners, on the other hand, failed to reply to the application to conduct research in their provinces. However, final approval for the study was obtained in Gauteng province.

Additionally, the inaccessibility of information with reference to the restructuring of the FCS also proved to be challenging. The Head: Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit were telephonically approached for an interview, however, the researcher was referred to the Head: Efficiency Services for commentary (The Head: Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit, 2009). Various attempts including a telephonic conversation and e-mail messages to obtain the views of the Police and Prisons Civilian Rights Union (POPCRU) regarding the restructuring of the FCS have also failed (Communications Officer: POPCRU, 2009).

1.10 Research Methodology

The research methodology adopted by a study refers to the exact steps that are taken to address the research problem. According to Rudestam and Newton (1992:60), the goal of the research methodology is to provide a clear and complete description of the specific steps to be followed in addressing the research problem.
Stated differently, Silverman (2001:4) is of the opinion that methodology refers to the choices one makes about cases to study, methods of data gathering and forms of data analysis in planning and executing a research study. In other words, the research methodology defines how one will go about studying any phenomenon.

1.10.1 The explorative characteristics of the study

The purpose of exploratory research is to gain insight into a situation, phenomenon, community or person. The need for such a study could arise from a lack of basic information on a new area of interest (Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995:42). Babbie (2004:87-88) explains that exploratory studies are most typically done, among other purposes, to satisfy the researcher’s curiosity and desire for better understanding to familiarise themselves with a topic. According to Welman and Kruger (1999:19), the purpose of exploratory research is to determine whether or not a phenomenon exists, and to gain familiarity with such phenomenon.

This study aims to gain insight into the restructuring process in the FCS as well as the difficulties and challenges experienced by members on management and ground level, regarding this process. In addition, the study aims to evaluate the impact of this process characterised in the SAPS, to assist and guide the organisation in this complex process, as the goal in paragraph 1.4.1 states.

1.10.2 Research approach and design

During the research design, the researcher must decide how to measure the two main variables in the hypothesis and on what group of people to test the hypothesis. This involves deciding not only how many people will be used as subjects but also what their particular characteristics should be and under what circumstances the data will be gathered (Bailey, 1987:14). Stated differently, Welman and Kruger (1999:46) regard the research design as the plan according to which one obtains research participants and collects information from them.
It describes what the researcher is going to do with the data, with a view to reaching conclusions about the research problem. Rubin and Babbie (2001:107) furthermore refer to research design as all the decisions the researcher makes in planning the study in its broadest sense. This refers to all the decisions the researcher makes in planning the study – decisions not only about what overall type of design to use, but also about sampling, sources and procedures for collecting data, measurement issues and data analysis plans.

De Beer (1999:24) also mentions four research questions that give structure to the research design:

- How will the design connect to the paradigm being used?
- Who or what will be studied?
- What strategies of enquiry will be used?
- What methods or research tools will be used for collecting and analysing empirical materials?

A combination of methodological approaches was applied for the research design in this study, through triangulation. Firstly, a non-experimental research design in the form of a pretest-posttest design was used, given the fact that no provision was made for control or comparison groups as part of the evaluation plan. Non-experimental designs do not use control or comparison groups, and the pretest-posttest design is commonly used when the researcher does not have a control group and also does not have pre-intervention data (Adamchak, Bond, MacLaren, Magnani, Nelson & Seltzer, 2000:79,81). Babbie (2004:222) explains pretesting as the measurement of a dependent variable among subjects, whereas posttesting is the measurement of a dependent variable among subjects after they have been exposed to an independent variable.

In this study, data was collected shortly after the programme was implemented, as the programme progressed, and at the completion of the programme.

Secondly, panel studies, as mentioned in paragraph 1.10.4.2, were conducted as part of another study design. Babbie (2004:104) describes panel studies as being when data is collected from the same set of people at several points in time.
Panel studies were used to obtain an in-depth understanding of the programme as a distinct whole, and the impact the programme had on its efforts. The purpose of a panel study is to study intensely one set of something – programmes, cities, counties, worksites, etc. – as a distinct whole, in its particular context.

A panel study was conducted of the FCS in the West Rand policing area, in order to obtain an in-depth understanding of the effects that the restructuring process has had on the FCS.

Lastly, a comparative study was carried out, in this study, with five international police organisations, comprising developed and developing countries, as well as two multinational and two national non-policing organisations, respectively, to search for explanations for similarities and differences, in order to generalise from them or to gain a greater awareness and a deeper understanding of processes, such as restructuring, in different national contexts.

Hantrais (1995) explains the benefits of cross-national comparisons as follows:

● When researchers from different backgrounds are brought together on collaborative or cross-national projects, it can enable them to capitalise on their experience and knowledge of different intellectual traditions and to compare and evaluate a variety of conceptual approaches.

● Comparisons can lead to fresh, exciting insights and a deeper understanding of issues that are of central concern in different countries. They can lead to the identification of gaps in knowledge, and may point to possible directions that could be followed - and about which the researcher may not previously have been aware. They may also help to sharpen the focus of analysis of the subject under study by suggesting new perspectives.

● Cross-national projects give researchers a means of confronting findings, in an attempt to identify and illuminate similarities and differences, not only in the observed characteristics of particular institutions, systems or practices, but also in the search for possible explanations in terms of national likeness or unlikeness.
Cross-national comparativists are forced to attempt to adopt a different cultural perspective, to learn to understand the thought processes of another culture and to see it from the native’s viewpoint, while also reconsidering their own country from the perspective of a skilled, external observer.

1.10.3 Sampling of the population

According to Reid and Smith, as well as Sarantakos (as quoted by De Vos et al., 2002:199), the major reason for sampling is feasibility. A complete coverage of the total population is seldom possible, and all the members of a population of interest cannot possibly be reached. Even if it were theoretically possible to identify, contact and study the entire relevant population, time and cost considerations usually make this a prohibitive undertaking. The use of samples may therefore result in more accurate information than might have been obtained if one had studied the entire population. With a sample, time, money and effort can be concentrated to produce better quality research – better instruments, more in-depth information and better-trained interviewers or observers.

Given the fact that not all the FCS units in Gauteng were included in the study, a non-probability sampling method through convenience sampling was used in this study - which ensured validity and reliability (all FCS members in the West Rand policing area happened to be with their respective units at a particular time, and were readily available for research purposes).

According to Welman and Kruger (1999:62), convenience sampling or accidental sampling is the most convenient collection of members of the population that are near and readily available for research purposes. In addition, the researcher took the race, rank, gender, length of service, diverse backgrounds and geographical areas of members into consideration. In conjunction with the various unit commanders of the restructured FCS units in the West Rand, the researcher attended a number of the units’ meetings. During these meetings the researcher conducted panel studies, as mentioned in paragraph 1.10.4.2.
Furthermore, a snowball sampling method was applied in this study, as stated in section 1.5. Babbie (2001:180) explains that researchers collect data on the few members of the target population they can locate, and then seek information from those individuals that enables them to locate other members of that population. In addition, saturated sampling was also used in this study, as mentioned in paragraph 1.5.

Stratified sampling was also applied in this study since demographic characteristics were also taken into consideration in the sample. Stratified sampling designs are frequently used in demographic and socio-economic surveys. It may be possible to divide a heterogeneous population into sub populations each of which is internally homogenous. Geographical regions are generally used as strata in most of the stratified sampling surveys. If each stratum is homogenous, a precise estimate of any stratum parameter can be obtained from a small sample in that stratum. These estimates can then be combined into a precise estimate for the whole population (Satharasinghe, Ranjith, De Silva, Thattil & Samitha, 2003: 1&2).

1.10.4 Methods of data collection

Welman and Kruger (1999:129) state that one has to consider which data-collecting method is the most appropriate in the light of the research problem and the particular population in question. For the purposes of this study, the following methods will be utilised:

1.10.4.1 Literature study

The literature review must clarify the theoretical context of the problem under investigation and how it has been studied by others (Singleton & Straits, 1999:547). In support of Singleton and Straits, Babbie (2004:113) suggests that the literature review should answer the following questions: What have others said about this topic? What theories address it and what do they say? What previous research exists? Are there consistent findings or do past studies disagree? Are there flaws in the body of existing research that you think you can remedy?
The research design of this study is presented in the form of a literature study composed of material such as official SAPS documents, library sources, media and newspaper reports, research reports and international best practices regarding the impact evaluation of restructuring initiatives in organisations. In addition, the researcher conducted extensive database searches during the entire study, in order to be assured that the most relevant and up to date sources were consulted.

1.10.4.2 Panel Studies

Nine panel studies were conducted with FCS members at the three newly established decentralised FCS units in the West Rand policing district. These panel studies were conducted shortly after the restructuring process was implemented, as the process progressed and after the completion of the process.

According to Rossi and Freeman (1989:260) panel studies are based on repeated measures of exposed targets of which the results are more credible than the pretest-posttest design through the addition of more data collection points. The authors also stresses the importance of the additional time points that could, when properly carried out, allow the researcher to begin to specify the processes by which an intervention has impacts among targets. Consequently, data will be collected from the same participants at two or more points in time in order to measure changes in some indicators more precisely.

The purpose of a panel study is to study intensely one set (or unit) of something - programmes, cities, counties or worksites – as a distinct whole. A panel study is particular useful for evaluating programmes when programmes are unique, when an established programme is implemented in a new setting, when a unique outcome warrants further investigation, or when a programme occurs in an unpredictable environment. The rich detail of a panel study provides good information about the design of a programme and the context in which it is delivered, thus allowing others to determine its appropriateness for their areas. In addition, a panel study evaluation allows greater latitude in seeking out and assessing programme impacts.
The FCS in the West Rand policing area was studied intensely in order to gain rich detail concerning the impact of the restructuring process. The placing of members of the FCS unit in Krugersdorp at different police stations were monitored carefully by the researcher in conjunction with The Provincial Coordinator, Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences, Provincial Head Office, Gauteng. As a result, the data collection process was enhanced and therefore bias was also limited.

1.10.4.3 Individual Interviews

Interviewing can be described as data collection in face-to-face settings, using an oral question-and-answer format, which either employs the same questions in a systematic and structured way for all respondents, or allows respondents to talk about issues in less directed but discursive manner (Payne & Payne, 2004:129).

Stated differently, Seidman (as quoted by de Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport, 2002:292) states that one interviews because one is interested in other people’s stories. Every word that people use in telling their stories is a microcosm of their consciousness. Manning (as quoted by Holstein and Gubrium, 1995:3,4) furthermore regards all interviews as interactional events and interviewers are deeply and unavoidably implicated in creating meanings that ostensibly reside within participants. As a result, both parties, the researcher and the participant, are thus necessarily and unavoidably active and involved in meaning-making work.

One semi-structured interview was conducted with the Head: Efficiency Services at the SAPS Head Office and two researchers at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Electronic correspondence (e-mail message attached as Annexure E) was also conducted with SAPU (Machakela, 2009). Furthermore, six semi-structured interviews were also conducted with the Teddy Bear Clinic and Childline, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) directly involved with family violence, child protection and sexual offences. In addition, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with Senior Public Prosecutors of the National Prosecuting Authority involved with cases concerning the FCS. The number of interviews was determined by the time
that the data collection reached saturation level. It follows that a firsthand comprehensive perspective was obtained internally (ground level, middle management of the SAPS) and externally (example ISS, NGOs and senior public prosecutors) in order to gain a holistic and better understanding of the restructuring process in the FCS.

The Efficiency Services Component of the SAPS develops and maintains efficient functional structures, procedures, systems and methods. It assists with organisational development in the SAPS. The component also assists the SAPS management with certain managerial responsibilities (Support Services, 2009).

The ISS is a non-profit regional human security research institute operating across sub-Saharan Africa and is one of the largest strategic studies/peace research institutes in Africa, which among other, conduct research on security sector transformation (History of the ISS, 2005).

The South African Police Union (SAPU) was established in November 1993 and has an extensive membership within the policing cluster which includes the South African Police Service (SAPS), Department of Correctional Service (DCS), Metro Police Departments and Traffic Departments. SAPU is a participating union in the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) and the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC) where transverse and sector employee issues are negotiated (South African Police Union, 2009).

As indicated by Welman and Kruger (1999:167) one may consider semi-structured interviews when:

- the topics are of a very sensitive nature
- the respondents come from divergent backgrounds

Taking the above two points into consideration, semi-structured interviews were therefore conducted, since transformation in the SAPS is of a sensitive nature as a result of South Africa’s political history. Members of the SAPS also have divergent backgrounds and educational levels.
As a result, the researcher used probes with the intention of clearing up vague responses, and/or asked for elaboration of incomplete answers through the application of semi-structured interviews.

The objective as mentioned in paragraph 1.4.2 was explored and described in response to - and the interpretation of - semi-structured interviews and panel studies conducted at the FCS in the West Rand, with unit commanders and members on ground level, in the jurisdiction of the Gauteng policing area. Additionally, a comparative study with two international police organisations was conducted in order to gain a deeper understanding of similar restructuring processes in such organisations.

This section presented the reader with a discussion on how this study was approached and designed. Stated differently, details were presented on how the researcher obtained participants and collected information from them, and what the researcher did with the data.

1.10.5 Data analysis

Data analysis involves breaking up the data into manageable themes, patterns, trends and relationships. The aim of analysis is to understand the various constitutive elements of one’s data, through an inspection of the relationship between concepts, constructs or variables, and to see whether there are any patterns or trends that can be identified or isolated, or to establish themes in the data (Mouton, 2001:108). De Vos et al. (2002:339) give a less complicated explanation, stating that data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data.

Individual interviews and panel studies were conducted, and a comprehensive body of literature, including international best practices, were studied to further validate the findings. This research used a triangulation of methods to ensure validity of the findings. Interviews were conducted to determine the impact of the restructuring process of the FCS, and a comprehensive literature review studied.
1.10.5.1 Qualitative data analysis

Qualitative methods produce detailed and non-quantitative accounts of small groups, seeking to interpret the meaning people make of their lives in natural settings, on the assumption that social interactions form an integral set of relationships best understood by inductive procedures (Payne & Payne, 2004:175). Williams (2003:5) regards qualitative research as the qualities things have. The essential characteristic of qualitative research is that it is about interpreting and coming to understand the social world at a micro-level. One of the basic approaches to qualitative research is ethnographic summary, which relies on direct quotation of discussions. Qualitative data uses words as basic tools. The eventual analysis of the information obtained from focus groups is based on the interviewer’s records. The researcher took notes of the focus groups’ responses, with a view to writing a more complete report afterwards. The interviews and focus group interviews were tape recorded, with the view to having them transcribed. The transcribed interviews and focus group interviews formed part of the qualitative data.

The application of Guba and Tesch’s (Tesch, 1990: 142-145) techniques formed part of the qualitative data analysis, which included grouping the data according to categories, themes and codes.

1.10.6 Description of the measuring instrument

In order to collect data, some form of measuring instrument has to be used. In the human sciences, “measuring instrument” refers to such instruments as questionnaires, observation schedules, interviewing schedules, etc. (Mouton, 2001:100). Welman and Kruger (1999:146) state that the constructs in the human behavioural sciences often involve human attributes, actions and artifacts. It may appear to a layperson that these can be appropriately measured by merely asking research participants directly about them. For example, a layperson might argue that participants should simply be asked whether or not they are dominant by nature. However, for several reasons, the reliability and validity of the measurements obtained in this fashion would be highly suspect. On the one hand, participants may have insufficient knowledge about
themselves, or they may be unable to verbalise their innermost feelings. On the other hand, participants may deliberately provide incorrect answers with a view to putting themselves in a positive or negative light.

The measuring instrument for this study is thus data received from the interviews, focus group interviews and panel studies, that were validated and contextualised in terms of the literature study.

1.10.7 Methods to ensure validity and reliability

De Vos et al. (2002:166) consider validity and reliability two of the most important concepts in the context of measurement. As a result, to obtain valid and reliable data, one must ensure, before implementing the study, that the measurement procedures and the measurement instruments to be used have acceptable levels of reliability and validity.

Validity is concerned with the effectiveness of the measuring instrument. According to Welman and Kruger (1999:138), the instrument must measure what it is supposed to measure. In other words: how accurately does it measure? De Vos et al. (2002:166) similarly describe validity in two parts: the instrument actually measures the concept in question, and the concept is measured accurately.

Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions (Silverman, 2001:225). Welman and Kruger (1999:142) explain reliability as the extent to which comparable measurements indicate similar results. Validity and reliability will be ensured by using the following methods:

In terms of sampling, the convenience sampling method was used, which ensured validity and reliability. All unit commanders/members would be at their respective police stations at a particular time and readily available for research purposes.
An experienced qualitative researcher assisted the researcher in the application Guba and Tesch’s (Tesch, 1990: 142-145) techniques, by grouping data according to categories, themes and codes.

The panel – and interview schedule were developed from the relevant literature whereafter it was piloted by experienced researchers before implementation and adapted where necessary.

1.11 Ethical Considerations

According to Mouton (2001:238), the ethics of science concerns what is wrong and what is right in the conduct of research. Because scientific research is a form of human conduct, it follows that such conduct has to conform to generally accepted norms and values. The term “ethics” also refers to the values by which we morally evaluate the character or conduct of a person (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1999:57). In addition, Robson (2000:29) states that evaluations deal with issues which affect people’s lives. There are different stakeholders, each with an interest in an evaluation. As a result, these interests must be recognised and respected if the evaluation is to be carried out in an ethically responsible manner. Therefore, evaluations should be conducted legally, ethically and with due regard for the welfare of those involved in the evaluation, as well as of those affected by the results. The researcher adhered to the ethical principles valued by the University of South Africa.

1.11.1 Informed consent

In support of moral and legal reasons, subjects were not coerced into participating in this research project. Not only must subjects understand that their participation is voluntary, they must also be given enough information about the research to make an informed decision about whether to participate or not (Singleton & Straits, 1999:517). Stated differently, De Vos et al. (2002:65) are of the opinion that emphasis must be placed on accurate and complete information, so that subjects will fully comprehend the investigation and consequently be able to make a voluntary, thoroughly reasoned decision about their possible participation.
Kutchins (1991:111) goes further, stating that the researcher remains obliged at all times to give a complete explanation of the total investigation, without pressure or unnecessary interference, in clear and intelligible language.

Each participant was informed of the reasons for the research, and the principle of voluntary participation was also emphasised. As a result, no participant was forced to participate in the study and their voluntary consent was obtained.

1.11.2 Influences

Given the sensitive nature of transformation in the SAPS, measures to prevent researcher influence were implemented and adhered to. As a result, a letter of permission and a cover letter explaining the objective of the study were implemented in the qualitative data analysis, to prevent researcher influence in the meaning participants presented to their experience and behaviour of transformation in the SAPS.

Respondents in the individual interviews and panel studies were assured that the researcher was acting totally independently and impartially, and also not acting on behalf of the SAPS.

1.11.3 Preserving anonymity and confidentiality

Babbie (2004:65-66) regards the clearest concern in the protection of the subject’s interests and well-being, as the protection of their identity. Two techniques however assist researchers in this regard – anonymity and confidentiality. The author explains that a research project guarantees anonymity when the researcher – not only the people who read about the research – cannot identify a given response with a given respondent. On the other hand, a research project guarantees confidentiality when the researcher can identify a given person’s response, but essentially promises not to do so publicly.
Anonymity and confidentiality are two mechanisms that acted as safeguards in this study, in order to protect participants’ identities. The participants were assured that neither their names nor locations would be revealed. Transformation in the SAPS can be regarded as a sensitive issue among members; therefore, the participants were furthermore assured that any information they provided would not be made available to anyone who was not directly involved in this study.

1.12 Summary

This chapter provided an overview of the study. The motivation for the study as well as the significance thereof was presented. The focus of the study was highlighted by the goal and objectives, and the introduction of key theoretical definitions provided additional clarification. Moreover, time and geographical limitations were presented to clarify where and when the study was conducted.

This chapter provided hypothetical information on the research methodology, and accentuated the particular steps that were followed to address the research problem and also to reach the goal of this chapter – namely, to present a transparent and comprehensive explanation of the steps to be followed. These steps included the research approach and design, the sampling of the population, methods of data collection, data analysis procedures, a description of the measuring instrument, and methods to ensure validity and reliability. The goal of this study is to promote knowledge and understanding of the restructuring process in the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS) through impact evaluation by making use of a literature study, panel studies and individual interviews. The research is of a qualitative nature. Additionally, the methods to ensure validity and reliability were also enlightened. Ethical considerations were then outlined.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of impact evaluations in organisations. This overview presents a review of the literature on impact evaluations in organisations, and elucidates the relationship between this study and previous research conducted on the topic.
CHAPTER 2  AN OVERVIEW OF THE USE OF IMPACT EVALUATION IN ORGANISATIONS

2.1 Introduction

A comprehensive body of literature on impact evaluation in organisations as well as international illustrations of public sector –and policing organisations’ - impact evaluation processes provides the foundation of this chapter.

A strategic contextualisation of programme evaluation will follow for discussion, in order to contextualise programme evaluation in this study.

2.2 Strategic Contextualisation of Programme Evaluation

Programme evaluation is the systematic study conducted to assess how well a programme is working, typically focused on achievement of programme objectives. Programme evaluation can help managers and staff find out what is working well and what is not. It can be used to identify areas needing improvement, strategies for better achieving established goals, and ways to improve data collection or measurement of programme results (What is programme evaluation? ([s.a.])).

Nagel (1990) subsequently clarifies the meaning of policy evaluation, explaining that other concepts that are often used to mean the same thing as public policy analysis, include policy evaluation, policy studies, programme evaluation, public management science and policy science. One could make distinctions between those concepts as follows: policy evaluation emphasises evaluating alternative public policies, in contrast to describing them or explaining why they exist.

A summarised history of programme evaluation follows.
2.3 Brief History of Programme Evaluation

In order to present the reader with background on the origin and development of programme evaluation that includes impact evaluation (Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman (2004:8-12), a brief history of programme evaluation in both the social sector and government department, is provided. Although its historical roots date back to the 17th century, widespread systematic evaluation research is a relatively modern 20th century development. The application of social research methods to programme evaluation coincides with the growth and refinement of research methods themselves, as well as with ideological, political and demographic changes.

The systematic evaluation of social programmes first became commonplace in education and public health. Prior to World War I, for instance, the most significant efforts were directed at assessing literacy and occupational training programmes and public health initiatives to reduce mortality and morbidity from infectious diseases. By the 1930s social scientists were using rigorous research methods to assess social programmes in a variety of areas. Lewin’s pioneering “action research” studies and Lippitt and White’s work on democratic and authoritarian leadership (as quoted by Rossi et al., 2004:8-12), for example, were widely influential evaluation studies. From such beginnings, applied social research grew at an accelerating pace, with a strong boost provided by its contributions during World War II.

Following the war, numerous major federal and privately funded programmes were launched to provide urban development and housing, technological and cultural education, occupational training, and preventative health activities. It was also during this time that federal agencies and private foundations made major commitments to international programmes. Expenditures were very large and consequently they were accompanied by demands for “knowledge of results”. By the end of the 1950s, programme evaluation was commonplace. Programme evaluation studies were undertaken not only in the United States, Europe, and other industrialised countries but also in less developed nations.
Increasingly, evaluation components were included in programmes - among others, agricultural and community development in Africa. Expanding knowledge of the methods of social research made large-scale, multisite evaluation studies possible. During the 1960s the number of articles and books about evaluation research grew dramatically. Hayes’s monograph, published in 1959, on evaluation research in less developed countries, Suchman’s review of evaluation research methods (1967), and Campbell’s call for social experimentation (1969) a few illustrations. By the late 1960s, evaluation research had become a growth industry.

In the early 1970s, evaluation research emerged as a distinct specialty field in the social sciences (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12). A variety of books appeared, including the first texts - critiques of the methodological quality of evaluation studies, and discussions of the organisational and structural constraints on evaluation research. The first journal in evaluation, Evaluation Review, was launched in 1976 by Sage Publications. Other journals followed in rapid succession, and currently there are at least a dozen devoted primarily to evaluation. During this period, special sessions on evaluation studies at meetings of academic and practitioner groups became commonplace, and professional associations specifically for evaluation researchers were founded.

By 1980, Cronbach and his associates were able to state that “evaluation has become the liveliest frontier of American social science” (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12). Evaluation is now sustained primarily by funding from policymakers, programme planners and administrators, who use the findings, and by the interest of the general public and the clients of the programmes evaluated. Evaluation may not make front page headlines, but it is often a matter of intense concern to informed citizens, programme sponsors and decision makers, and to those whose lives are affected, directly or indirectly, by the programme at issue. (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12).

According to Rossi et al. (2004:8-12), evaluation has now become a political and managerial activity that contributes significant input into the complex mosaic from which emerges policy decisions and resources for starting, enlarging, changing or sustaining programmes to better the human condition. In this regard, therefore, evaluation research must be seen as an integral part of
the social policy and public administration movements. It follows that social programmes and the associated evaluation activities have emerged from the relatively recent transfer of responsibility for the nation’s social and environmental conditions, and the quality of life of its citizens, to government bodies. Indeed, government – particularly the federal government (United States) – was comparatively small before the 1930s. Correspondingly, there was little demand for social and economic information. Even in the late 1930s, federal expenditure for social science research and statistics was only $40 - $50 million, as compared to many times that amount today. All this began to change in the 1930s, however. Human services grew at a rapid pace with the advent of the Great Depression, and so did the government. During this period, scholars with social science training began to investigate the political, organisational and administrative decisionmaking that took place in executive departments and other government agencies. In part, their interests were purely academic – they wanted to understand how government worked (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12).

However, individuals in leadership positions in government agencies, who were investigating ways to deal with their large staffs and full coffers of funds, recognised a critical need for orderly, explicit ways to handle their policy, administrative, programme, and planning responsibilities. As government became increasingly complex and technical, its programmes could no longer be adequately managed by people hired as intelligent generalists, or because of their connections with political patrons, relatives, or friends. The importance of evaluation is now widely acknowledged by those in political and administrative roles in government (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12).

Many federal agencies have their own evaluation units, as do a large number of their state counterparts. In addition, federal, state and local agencies regularly contract for programme evaluation with university researchers or research firms and consultants. Although evaluation research continues to have an academic side oriented toward training, methodology, theory, and study of the nature and effects of social programmes, it is now generally practised in a context of policymaking, programme management or client advocacy. Thus, not only is its history intertwined with the social policy and public administration movements, but its practice typically occurs in the same political and organisational arenas as policy analysis and public administration (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12).
Themes and subcategories that emerged from the literature on impact evaluation in organisations, are now presented.

2.4 Impact Evaluation in Organisations

In this age of global capitalist ascendency, knowledge has become “intellectual capital”. During the agricultural age, land tenure emerged as the dominant form of wealth. In the industrial age, financial capital moved the world. Now, in the knowledge age, corporations are focusing on “intellectual capital”. In the endlessly hyped knowledge age of the new millennium, evaluators are being asked to generate lessons learnt and best practices. As a result, the demand for knowledge acquisition, which demonstrates membership in the elite ranks of learning organisations, has crescendoed into an organisational development and programme evaluation mania. It follows that evaluation has moved from merely generating findings about specific programmes, to generating knowledge (Patton, 2001:329,332).

Successful programmes to improve, among others, health, literacy and learning conditions, are an essential part of global progress. Therefore, when opportunities to learn are seized, the benefits can be large and global (Savedoff, Levine & Birdsall, 2006:1). In recognition of these authors’ statements, Blomquist (2003:1) stresses that there is increasing acknowledgement among many government departments and donor organisations, that rigorous evaluation of public interventions should feature in the social policy decisionmaking process. It follows that as pressure worldwide increases to reduce the size of governments and expand private sector and non-governmental involvement in social services, it becomes increasingly important to justify public spending and ensure that the funded interventions are achieving intended objectives.

In support of the abovementioned authors, Clements (2001:1) confirms that in recent years funders have started asking for reports on impacts or outcomes – actual benefits for participants during or after their involvement with a programme. Furthermore, funders want to know what changes their money is making, and how people’s lives have changed. In addition, most community organisations also want to know: Is what we’re doing worthwhile? In order to
highlight the importance of impact evaluations, Blomquist further explains that countries from Chile to Indonesia to Sweden have embraced evaluation as a crucial element of good public sector management. In addition, the international community has also turned to more systematic evaluation of its own programmes in order to make aid and assistance more effective.

2.4.1 Impact evaluation in non-policing organisations: International examples

Examples of international non-policing organisations are now described, to highlight the significance of impact evaluation. A summarised overview of non-policing organisations in Mexico, Kenya and India are presented, to illustrate these organisations’ impact evaluation efforts.

The first international public sector organisation to be presented is Mexico.

2.4.1.1 An impact evaluation of Mexico’s PROGRESA programme

The International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) in-depth evaluation of Mexico’s PROGRESA (Programmea de Educación, Salud y Alimentación) indicated that anti-poverty programmes that combine education, health and nutrition interventions in one package, can be quite successful in improving the capacity of families to extricate them from the poverty that often ensnares generations. In collaboration with the Mexican government, IFPRI rigorously reviewed PROGRESA’s impact on education, nutrition, health and rural poverty, as well as the programme's overall operation. The evaluation was based on repeated surveys of individuals from 24,000 households in 506 localities in randomly assigned PROGRESA and non-PROGRESA areas. Formal surveys, structured and semi-structured interviews, focus groups and workshops were held in seven states where the programme was first implemented on a pilot basis. As a result, the research asked a series of questions about PROGRESA’s effectiveness (Breaking the silence on poverty. Mexico PROGRESA, 2002:1).
It followed that the results of PROGRESA’s impact on poverty showed that PROGRESA interventions reduced the number of people with income levels below the poverty level by about 10%. The depth of poverty was reduced by 30%, and the severity index was reduced by 45%. For comparison, an untargeted transfer was found to reduce the depth of poverty by 28% and the severity of poverty by 36%. Given that these indicators put greater weight on the poorest of the poor, the simulation results suggested that PROGRESA’s largest reductions in poverty were being achieved in the poorest population (Skoufias, in *Breaking the silence on poverty. Mexico PROGRESA*, 2002:2).

Additionally, PROGRESA’s impact on education, concluded, after an exhaustive series of statistical tests, that in all cases PROGRESA had a positive enrolment effect for both boys and girls in primary and secondary schools. At primary school level, where enrolment rates before PROGRESA were already between 90% and 94%, statistical methods that control the age and family background of children as well as community characteristics, revealed that PROGRESA succeeded in increasing the enrolment rate of boys up to 1.07% and girls up to 1.45%. At secondary school level, where the initial enrolment rates before PROGRESA were 67% for girls and 73% for boys, the increase in enrolment effects for girls ranged from 7.2% to 9.3% and for boys from 3.5 to 5.8 percentage points. This represents a proportional increase of above 8% for boys’ enrolment and 14% for girls’ enrolment (Schultz, in *Breaking the silence on poverty. Mexico PROGRESA*, 2002:3).

Moreover, PROGRESA’s impact on health, nutrition and health care use indicated that improved nutrition and preventative care in PROGRESA areas made younger children more robust against illness. PROGRESA children aged 0–5 had a 12% lower incidence of illness than non-PROGRESA children. In addition, adult members in beneficiary households were found to be significantly healthier. On average, PROGRESA adult beneficiaries had 19% fewer days of difficulty with daily activities due to illness, than non-PROGRESA individuals, 17% fewer days incapacitated, and 22% fewer days in bed. Adult PROGRESA participants were able to walk about 7% more than non-beneficiaries, without tiring (Gertler, in *Breaking the silence on poverty. Mexico PROGRESA*, 2002:5).
The second public sector organisation’s impact evaluation to be presented is Kenya’s agricultural extension services.

2.4.1.2 Evaluating the impact of Kenya’s agricultural extension services

The Training and Visit (T&V) system of agricultural extension sought to strengthen links between research and extension, and get these results to farmers through frequent visits by extension workers to farmers – at least monthly and often more frequently. The approach was widely adopted in the 1980s, with much World Bank support. However it began to attract critics. It was known to be costly and there was scant evidence of any impact on agricultural productivity. As a result, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group study entered this debate in 2000 in order to provide such evidence for the case of Kenya. Consequently, the study suggested that agricultural extension has a potentially important role to play: the data showed that farmers who were aware of improved practices usually put them into effect. This suggests that lack of knowledge was indeed a constraint. However, the Bank’s two National Extension Projects (NEP I and II) were not seen as having alleviated that constraint, and so had had no discernible impact on production. As a result, the report pointed clearly to changes which needed to be made (White, 2006:36).

In its current form extension services were having little impact and so by definition were inefficient. Impacts were discernible for poorer areas: extension services had played a role in allowing less productive areas to catch up. However, delivery had been concentrated in the more productive areas where they had least impact. The IEG study thus recommended a re-targeting to poorer areas. It also pointed out that messages had to be better tailored to the needs of farmers, rather than a uniform package being delivered to all farmers. One way to achieve this was to become less top-down and more responsive to farmer demands. Finally, the rate of innovation did not support such an intensive delivery system: a leaner extension service with broader coverage would be more efficient (White, 2006:36).

The impact evaluation of India’s Integrated Nutrition Project follows.
2.4.1.3 The impact of India’s Integrated Nutrition Project

The Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Project (TINP) operated between 1980 and 1989. The overall objective of the project was to improve the nutritional and health status of pre-school children, pregnant women and nursing mothers. The intervention consisted of a package of services, including nutrition education, primary health care, supplementary feeding, administration of vitamin A, and periodic deworming. The project was the first to employ Growth Monitoring and Promotion (GMP) on a large scale. The evaluation is concerned with the impact of the project on the nutritional status of children. It follows that the study used three cross-sectional rounds of data collected by the TINP Monitoring Office. Child and household characteristics of children participating in the programme were collected in 1982, 1986 and 1990, each round consisting of between 1000 and 1500 observations. The study used before-after comparisons of means, regression analysis and charts, to provide evidence of the following: frequency of project participation, improvement in the nutritional status of participating children over time, differential participation and differential project impact across social groups. Data on the change in nutritional status in project areas is compared to secondary data on the nutritional status of children outside the project areas. With some assumptions, the use of secondary data makes the findings plausible. Consequently, the study concluded that the implementation of Growth Monitoring and Promotion programmes on a large scale is feasible, and that this had a positive impact on the nutritional status of children of Tamil Nadu (White, 2006:43).

The impact evaluation of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants in large cities within the United States, follows, for discussion as an example of impact evaluation in police organisations.
2.5 Impact evaluation in police organisations: International examples

International examples of police organisations’ impact evaluation processes follow, to illustrate the value of impact evaluation efforts in these organisations.

2.5.1 Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) in America

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 authorised the creation of an intergovernmental grant programme within the U.S. Department of Justice to fund the hiring and redeployment of 100,000 additional community policing officers on America’s streets. The programme that administered the grants was the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). By encouraging community policing, COPS grants were expected to reduce fear of crime, increase the quality of life, promote social control and boost citizen satisfaction with police services, while improving information sharing between citizens and the police. Two sets of regression analyses are used for this evaluation. To determine the impact of COPS grants on city police expenditures, the first set of modelling estimates a police expenditure function with police expenditures as the dependent variable. The police expenditure function is specified with variables that are thought to predict police spending. The second set of models estimates the relationship between COPS grants and crime rates. In the crime models, the dependent variables are crime rates for murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft. COPS administered three general types of grants. First, the hiring grants paid for 75% of the salaries of newly hired officers over three years. Second, the Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE) grants provided funding for technology, officer overtime and civilian staff salaries. The MORE grants were intended to redeploy veteran officers from administrative tasks to community policing. Third, the innovative grants provided funding for addressing specific problems such as domestic violence, gangs, and youth firearms violence. Two questions were asked in this paper: Do COPS grants stimulate local police department spending in large cities? Do COPS grants deter crime in large cities? In recent years, new impact evaluations estimating the effect of COPS on crime rates have been produced. However, these evaluations have produced conflicting findings and conclusions.
The Heritage Foundation published the first impact evaluation of COPS, which found that the relationship between COPS hiring and MORE grants and county violent crime rates was statistically insignificant, while innovative grants were associated with small reductions in violent crime. A COPS-funded evaluation found that the innovative grants were associated with reductions in both violent and property crime rates in cities and towns with populations above 1,000 residents. The hiring and MORE grants did not have a statistically significant relationship with crime rates. However, when the analysis was limited to cities above 10,000 residents, the innovative and hiring grants were associated with reductions in violent and property crime rates. Two other studies of cities with populations over 10,000 residents indicated that COPS grants were associated with reductions in crime. The results of this study indicate that COPS grants awarded to large cities did not stimulate local spending and that the cities may have used the grants to supplant local police expenditures. This finding was supported by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General audits of COPS grants.

Whether or not community policing is an effective crime reduction strategy, this evaluation found that federal funding for community policing was associated with small reductions in crime in large cities. However, the monetary impacts produced by the three grants were not equal. The innovative and MORE grants produced positive net benefits, while the hiring grants produced negative returns. A stronger emphasis on oversight by COPS may improve the effectiveness of the grants (Muhlhausen, 2006).

An example of an impact evaluation initiative of England’s police organisation follows.

2.5.2 The National Reassurance Policing Programme: England

This report sets out the key findings of an impact evaluation of the outcomes achieved by the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) in England between 2003/04 and 2004/05. The main aim of the study was to fill a gap in the research evidence in England, on the impact of a package of local policing activities. The evaluation covered all 16 sites in eight forces which formed the NRPP. The report presents results from the six sites where it was possible to match control areas (Tuffin, Morris & Poole, 2006).
Neighbourhood policing has become a central part of the Government’s police reform programme. The basis of a neighbourhood policing model is to have dedicated police resources for local areas, and for police and their partners to work together with the public, to understand and tackle the problems that matter to them most. International evidence showed indications that this type of local policing could serve to reduce both actual and perceived levels of crime and disorder, as well as improve the public’s perceptions of the police. The development of a UK evidence base dealing with the impact of this type of local policing activity, is critical to the success of the reform programme and to sustained investment.

The evaluation reported here is one of the most robust tests of a neighbourhood policing model ever completed, and therefore marks a key step in building the evidence base. The results presented in the report show that the NRPP delivered positive changes in key outcome indicators, such as crime, perceptions of antisocial behaviour, feelings of safety after dark and public confidence in the police. This type of policing seemed to have less impact on neighbours being prepared to intervene to prevent anti-social behaviour. The findings of this study show that the public not only noticed increased police foot patrol, they also noticed the efforts that the police put into engagement and the effects of properly targeted problem solving designed to reduce anti-social behaviour. All these elements appear key to a successful approach to neighbourhood policing (Tuffin et al., 2006).

Reassurance policing is a model of neighbourhood policing which seeks to improve public confidence in policing. It involves local communities in identifying priority crime and disorder issues in their neighbourhood, which they then tackle together with the police and other public services and partners. Reassurance policing was developed in Surrey to address the gap between the public perception of rising crime and the falling crime rate. The idea grew from collaborative work between Surrey police and the University of Surrey, drawing on the “signal crimes” perspective developed by Martin Innes. This perspective held that some crimes and disorders were more important to members of the public than others. These would act as signals which the police needed to target to reduce feelings of risk and increase perceptions of safety.
The NRPP grew out of trials of reassurance policing by Surrey police and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). The NRPP later expanded its objectives to examine whether local schemes could address antisocial behaviour, in addition to public perceptions and feelings of safety. The evaluation covered all 16 sites in eight forces that took part in the NRPP.

The outcomes sought by the NRPP were:

- reduced antisocial behaviour and improved quality of life
- reduced fear of crime and improved sense of safety
- increased public satisfaction with, and confidence in, the police
- improved social capacity - that is, the ability of a community to help itself

(Tuffin et al., 2006).

This report considers only those six sites which were matched with a control site in order to provide a clear standard of evidence. Outcomes were measured using police statistics, and principally through a telephone survey in each site, where the same respondents were interviewed at the outset and one year later. A sample of 300 respondents was selected randomly, with a panel sample of approximately 200 achieved in each site. The baseline survey was conducted between November 2003 and January 2004, with the follow-up survey one year later, between November 2004 and January 2005. Across the sites, the programme had a positive effect on self-reported victimisation, according to the survey. The decrease in victimisation was five percentage points greater for respondents in the trial sites, compared to those in the control sites.

Two of the six sites had significantly greater reductions in total recorded crime than their control sites, while individual crime types reduced in three sites. Across the pair-matched sites, the programme had a positive effect on perceptions of five of the eight types of antisocial behaviour measured in the survey. Three of the six trial sites showed reductions, compared to their control sites. Analysis of antisocial behaviour incidents was only possible for one site, and there was no data available for the control site. The total number of incidents fell significantly, as did the number of criminal damage incidents. There was an overall effect on the public perception of
change in the crime rate over the previous 12 months. There was an increase in the percentage of respondents who thought crime had reduced in the trial sites. The percentage of people who thought crime had increased over the previous 12 months did not change (Tuffin et al., 2006).

Across the sites, there was a positive effect on feelings of safety after dark. The number of people who felt very (or fairly) safe walking alone in the area after dark rose by one percentage point for respondents in the trial sites, and fell three percentage points for those in the control sites. There was no effect on feelings of safety during the day, with the vast majority of respondents to the baseline survey feeling fairly or very safe. There was a limited effect on fear of crime, which is measured by asking respondents how much they worry. For the majority of these indicators there was no effect attributable to the programme; they fell in all sites, trials and controls. Only one of the eight indicators improved: worry about being physically attacked by strangers. Taking sites together, there was a positive effect on perceptions of risk of seeing graffiti or experiencing property damage, with no effect on the perceived likelihood of being a victim of burglary, vehicle crime or robbery. Four of the six sites improved on one or two of the indicators. Across the sites, there was an overall positive effect on public confidence in the police. The percentage of people who thought the police in their area were doing an excellent or good job increased by 15 percentage points compared to only three percentage points in the control sites. Four of the six sites experienced positive improvements, compared to their control sites. There was no overall effect on the satisfaction of those contacting the police for any reason other than as a victim. There was a positive effect on one of the social cohesion indicators. The percentage of people saying they trusted many or some of the people in their area increased by three percentage points across the trial sites and fell by two percentage points in the control sites. The result for one site was significant, compared to its control. There was no overall effect on other indicators of efficacy or cohesion, although one individual site showed an effect on whether respondents agreed that theirs was a close, tight-knit community. The programme had no effect on involvement in community or voluntary activity (Tuffin et al., 2006).
2.5.3 The Boston Gun Project

The Boston Gun Project was a problem-oriented policing initiative expressly aimed at taking on a serious, large-scale crime problem—homicide victimisation among young people in Boston. Like many large cities in the United States, Boston experienced an epidemic of youth homicides between the late 1980s and early 1990s. Boston youth homicides (ages 24 and under) increased from 22 victims in 1987 to 73 victims in 1990. Youth homicide remained high, well after the peak of the epidemic. Boston averaged about 44 youth homicides per year between 1991 and 1995. A new understanding of the city’s youth violence problem was created by the Boston Gun Project research activities. The research findings were discussed and analysed within the working group problem-solving process and were instrumental in the development of an operational strategy. The research findings and the working group process thus led to the “Operation Ceasefire” intervention. Operation Ceasefire included two main elements: a direct law enforcement attack on illicit firearms traffickers supplying youth with guns, and an attempt to generate a strong deterrent to gang violence (Braga, Kennedy, Piehl & Waring, 2000:2-4).

Braga et al. (2000: 8-12) furthermore explain without the support of a formal evaluation, Operation Ceasefire has been hailed in the media as an unprecedented success. The well-known large reduction in yearly Boston youth homicide numbers certainly suggests that something noteworthy happened after Operation Ceasefire was implemented in mid-1996. As discussed earlier, Boston averaged 44 youth homicides per year between 1991 and 1995. In 1996, this number decreased to 26, and then further decreased to 15 in 1997. Although these numbers demonstrate that there was a sudden large decrease in Boston youth homicide, they do not provide a rigorous assessment of whether Operation Ceasefire was associated with the decrease. Consequently, the impact evaluation focused on four key questions:

- Were the significant reductions in youth homicides and other indicators of non-fatal serious gun violence associated with the implementation of Operation Ceasefire in Boston?
- Did the timing of Boston’s significant reduction in youth homicide coincide with the implementation of Operation Ceasefire?
Were other factors responsible for Boston’s reduction in youth homicide?

Was Boston’s significant youth homicide reduction distinct, relative to youth homicide trends in other major U.S. and New England cities?

It follows that the time series shows a 63% reduction in the mean monthly number of youth homicide victims from a pretest mean of 3.5 youth homicides per month to a posttest mean of 1.3 youth homicides per month. Analyses suggest that the Ceasefire intervention was associated with statistically significant reductions in all time series, including:

- 63% decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides in Boston
- 32% decrease in the monthly number of citywide shots fired calls
- 25% decrease in the monthly number of citywide gun assault incidents

(Braga et al., 2000: 8-12)

This simple analysis suggests that Operation Ceasefire was associated with a large reduction in Boston youth homicide. Although the time series analyses revealed that the implementation of Operation Ceasefire was associated with a significant reduction in youth homicide, the time series models do not establish whether the reduction actually started before or after the commencement of the programme. As a result, a model that checked for significant changes in the entire time series for each successive month. These analyses suggested that the maximal significant decrease in the Boston youth homicide time series occurred in June 1996 - about the same time Operation Ceasefire was fully implemented. These results reinforce the observation that the implementation of the Boston programme was associated with significant reductions in youth homicide. The youth homicide and gun violence reductions associated with the Ceasefire intervention could have been caused or meaningfully influenced by other causal factors. We therefore controlled for changes in Boston’s employment rate as measured by the Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training, changes in Boston’s youth population aged 14 to 24 as measured by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, changes in citywide trends in Violent Index crimes as measured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports, changes in homicide victimisation among older victims (ages 25 and older), and changes in youth involvement in street-level drug market activity as measured by Boston police
department’s arrest data. Admittedly, these controls are far from ideal, but these variables represent the best available information on these alternate explanations for Boston decrease in youth homicide. When these control variables were added to our models, our findings did not substantively change (Braga et al., 2000:12-15).

In order to compare youth homicide trends in Boston relative to youth homicide trends in major U.S. and New England cities, a model that maximised the ability to control for the various trends, seasonal variations and random fluctuations in the time series of each city, was introduced. As a result, these models revealed that only Boston experienced a significant reduction in the monthly count of youth homicides, coinciding with the implementation of the Operation Ceasefire programme. It follows that the principal intervention, Operation Ceasefire, was likely responsible for a substantial reduction in youth homicide and youth gun violence in the city (Braga et al., 2000:16-17).

The reasons for performing impact evaluations are now briefly discussed.

### 2.6 Reasons for Conducting Impact Evaluations

Information generated by impact evaluations informs decisions on whether to expand, modify, or eliminate a particular policy or programme and can be used in prioritising public actions. In addition, impact evaluations contribute towards improving the effectiveness of policies and programmes by addressing the following questions:

- Does the programme achieve the intended goal?
- Can the changes in outcomes be explained by the programme, or are they the result of some other factors occurring simultaneously?
- Do programme impacts vary across different groups of intended beneficiaries (for example males, females, and indigenous people), regions and over time?
- Are there any unintended effects of the programme, either positive or negative?
- How effective is the programme in comparison with alternative interventions?
- Is the programme worth the resources it costs? (Impact Evaluation – Overview, 2006:1)
Stated differently, Regalia (1999:1) explains the reasons for evaluating a programme, policy or project’s impact as an indispensable tool to assess whether a programme is achieving its objective, how the beneficiaries’ situation changed as a result of the programme and what the situation would have been without the programme. Moreover, if an impact evaluation is carried out at an intermediate stage of project execution, very important lessons can be learnt on how the programme design and/or the project execution can be modified to improve the effectiveness of the intervention. In addition, members of the policy community are confronted daily with questions for which they seek meaningful answers, such as the impact of a particular reform programme on development or peace building (Bowden, Humphreys & Mack, 2006).

2.7 The significance of impact evaluations

“If we lived in a world of complete certainty and perfect administration there would be no need for evaluation” (Hogwood & Gunn, as quoted by Taylor, 2005:602). According to Savedoff et al. (2006:13-14), the value of impact evaluation is best understood as part of a broad scientific enterprise of learning, in which evidence is built over time and across different contexts, forming the basis for better policymaking and programme design. This type of knowledge is in part a public good, in the sense that once the knowledge is produced and disseminated, anyone can benefit from it without depleting it or excluding others from its benefits. As a result, in this way, investments in building knowledge can have tremendous and unpredictable returns. For example, the discovery in the late 19th century that cholera was transmitted through contaminated water, has saved untold lives around the world. When a developing country or development agency learns what works (or not), that knowledge can be invaluable to others facing similar problems. The replication of impact evaluations in similar programmes in different places builds an ever-expanding base of evidence and is the most systematic way of improving public policy and spending public money well.

On the other hand, although the value of the information from impact evaluations may be very great, the suggestion that more such evaluations are required is often met with skepticism – if not outright rejection. The main objections are that good impact evaluations are not appropriate for answering questions of importance to decision-makers and also cannot be ethically implemented.
Additionally it is furthermore argued that impact evaluations are too costly and produce results too late to be of use to decisionmakers. Moreover, it is claimed that impact evaluations do not provide important information about how programmes operate, are too complex and also do not influence policymaking.

These objections are, however, not supported by the facts. As a result, Savedoff et al. (2006: 21-23) provide valuable information regarding the significance of impact evaluations. It follows that current impact evaluation methods can indeed answer questions that are important to decision-makers. Although it is difficult to design high quality impact evaluations that can answer policy questions such as “Under what circumstances should a country have a fixed exchange rate?”, the range of questions that can be answered by well-designed impact evaluations is nevertheless much wider than is generally recognised. This implies that, for example, studies aimed at learning the best way to assist individuals can be relatively easy to design, but still require time and money. For instance, certain questions can be easily studied by comparing participants and non-participants – who have been randomly assigned to a “treatment” and “control group” – because they relate to how individuals respond to specific interventions. As per illustration, these questions can include similar questions as follows: Do vitamin A supplements reduce infant mortality? Do textbooks increase students’ learning? Do microfinance programmes improve child nutrition?

However, Savedoff et al. (2006:22) continue to accentuate the ability of impact evaluations to answer questions that are significant to decisionmakers. Consequently, questions regarding the best ways to “produce” services – requiring comparisons across classrooms, facilities or districts – can also be addressed in a relatively straightforward fashion. It follows that impact evaluation can, for example, effectively address questions such as: does hiring an additional teacher in non-formal schools improve attendance and performance? Or, what are the most effective ways to reduce provider absenteeism in schools and government clinics? In addition, it is also still feasible, though more resource-intensive, to use randomised assignment to assess programmes that have externalities – that is, to measure the net impact on a person (or community) from a programme that was delivered to a neighboring person or community.
This implies that impact evaluation can also effectively provide answers to questions such as: does agricultural extension have effects beyond the farmers who are directly affected through the diffusion of their learning to their neighbours, or does school-based mass treatment of children for intestinal parasites, in a high prevalence area, improve health and schooling, even for those not receiving the treatment?

In other cases, measuring the impact of a national programme delivering new social services is also possible by contrasting changes across districts or municipalities, as they are introduced in successive waves. Moreover, impact evaluation can therefore provide answers to questions such as: do cash transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and utilisation of preventative health care services, improve children’s health and schooling? Even questions that might be considered quite difficult to answer – such as the impact of gender on political decisionmaking – can be rigorously studied; for example, do quotas for women’s participation in political decisionmaking improve allocations of public funds? (Savedoff et al., 2006:22).

In addition, Savedoff et al. (2006:23) furthermore advocate that the ethical challenges of impact evaluation can be successfully managed. However, some argue that impact evaluations that rely on collecting data from control groups are unethical, because they exclude people from programme benefits. This criticism only applies when resources are available for serving anyone as soon as the programme starts. In fact, whenever funds are scarce or programmes need to be expanded in phases, only a portion of potential beneficiaries can be reached at any time. Furthermore, whenever one has a reasonable doubt of a programme’s efficacy, or concerns with unforeseen negative effects, it is not only ethical, but an imperative responsibility, to adequately monitor and evaluate the impact. It is also argued that impact evaluations are too costly or difficult. This argument is often made by comparing the cost of an evaluation to the programme that is its subject. However, the appropriate comparator is not the programme cost, but the value of the knowledge it would produce. For example, evaluations of demonstration training programmes in the US and Latin America have sometimes exceeded a third of the initial programme costs, but the evaluation results affected decisions regarding the rollout of much larger national programmes.
In these cases, the value of scaling up programmes that worked and avoiding or redesigning those that were ineffective, was extremely high. To the degree that these findings were generalisable, they yielded benefits to other countries as well. Thus, a few well-selected impact evaluations can generate knowledge that influences the design and adoption of an entire class of interventions around the world.

Furthermore, Savedoff et al. (2006:24) continue explaining that at times the additional cost of doing a good impact evaluation is actually quite small. When projects are results-orientated and require baseline data, an intelligent design for data gathering can determine whether or not an impact evaluation will be feasible – sometimes without any additional cost of data collection. Costs are also likely to be lower in studies of developing country programmes, because the field costs of surveys and local researchers is generally lower than in high-income countries. The principal cost of a random assignment study is the cost of data collection; and the cost of collecting data for a bad study is just as expensive as collecting data for a good study. For example, a large primary education programme in India spends millions of dollars collecting data on all the districts in which the programme was implemented.

However, as noted above, this kind of data collection does not lend itself to a proper impact evaluation. A proper data collection strategy might have cost less and, most importantly, would have provided useful information about the programme’s impact. As a result, critics must recognise that the cost or difficulty of good impact evaluations is not a universal fact, but rather, one that has to be judged for particular questions and contexts. Another critique of the need for impact evaluation studies is that the results are not useful for decisions, because they take too long to produce results. However, the time taken to produce results greatly depends on the questions being studied. Some rigorous impact evaluations produce results within a matter of months. Others take longer, but are still available in time to affect important policy decisions. For example, the initial findings of Mexico’s impact evaluations of its national conditional cash transfer programme were available in time to convince a new administration to preserve it.
In addition, it is also possible to design impact evaluations that generate useful feedback during implementation. For example, a multi-year study of the impact of HIV education in Kenya was designed to not only monitor the long-term impact, but also to assess the intermediate outcomes, such as the accuracy of knowledge about HIV transmission. The transfer of knowledge is only a necessary, not sufficient, condition for the programme to have an impact; but measuring the success or failure of reaching such intermediate goals can help programme managers make necessary adjustments to improve implementation. More fundamentally, however, it is more important to have accurate information about what programmes work, even if it takes some years to acquire, than to have inaccurate information generated quickly. (Savedoff et al., 2006:24).

In addition, critics sometimes claim that impact evaluations only inform whether or not something has an impact, without saying why and how. Conversely, Savedoff et al. (2006:25) are of the opinion that a good impact evaluation can provide reliable evidence about the mechanism by which the outcome is achieved, when it simultaneously collects information on processes and intermediate outcomes. This implies that impact evaluations are not a replacement for sound theories and models, needs assessments, monitoring, and operational evaluations. All of these elements are nevertheless necessary to complement the analysis of impact. On the other hand, it is equally true that the knowledge gained from impact evaluations is a necessary complement to these other kinds of analyses.

Another critique of Savedoff et al. (2006:25-26), is that such studies are too complex to be understood by policymakers and do not influence policymaking. In fact, good impact evaluations, and randomised evaluations in particular, are relatively easy to present to policymakers, with a little work. For example, the MDRC, formerly known as the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, conducted randomised control trials of numerous state welfare programmes in the United States. Because the findings were readily conveyed to policymakers, MDRC’s studies had a significant impact on U.S. welfare reform legislation in the mid-80s. In addition, other cases where impact evaluation affected subsequent policy can be found in Latin America. In the 1980s, evaluation of radio-assisted education programmes in Nicaragua led to widespread replication of this promising intervention. Most important of all, if impact evaluations are not started today, then we will never have access to the information
needed for evidence-base decisions. This point has been made in recent declarations associated with the creation of the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria, the replenishment of World Bank and African Development Bank concessional funds, and the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals. In each case, attention to the measurement of results makes it imperative to lay down the foundations today so that we can learn about the effects of our actions in future. Any investment takes time to yield benefits, and building the kind of knowledge generated by impact evaluations is one of the best investments we can make today.

Moreover, in support of Savedoff et al., the significance of impact evaluations is furthermore emphasised in *Assessing results using impact evaluations* (2007). This paper advocates that impact evaluation is essential to making aid more effective. This implies that impact evaluation is about understanding what works in development, under what circumstances, and why. They are, however, not about simply measuring inputs – such as, for example, how many school meals were delivered in a school feeding programme. Instead, they are about assessing impacts on key development objectives, such as children’s nutritional status. As a result, by determining who gains from a programme and by how much, impact evaluations are a key to making aid effective. Additionally, this paper argues that impact evaluations contribute to a culture of accountability. It follows that impact evaluations help foster a culture of accountability within governments of developing countries. They cannot be used to evaluate the effects of every programme or intervention – especially where a policy is economywide. Credible impact evaluations should, however, gradually become a central input to the design of effective policies.

Moreover, impact evaluations are essential for creating a “knowledge bank”. The number and quality of impact evaluations are gradually improving. More research is needed, however, but research also needs to move onto bigger questions. These include understanding why the same intervention can be successful in some circumstances and settings but not in others, and how to make policies more effective. It follows that gaining this understanding will require making cost-effectiveness comparisons across policies. Similarly, impact evaluations also improve knowledge of policies. Credible, rigorous impact evaluations have large returns, because they advance our knowledge about the effects of policies, have lessons for the design of interventions, and help ensure the political sustainability of successful programmes.
Some examples to illustrate the abovementioned statements are as follows:

- In Bangladesh, families who own more than one half-acre of land are ineligible for most group-based microcredit programmes. This rule was used to compare the outcomes of families with “just under” and “just above” the maximum amount of land holdings. The evaluation showed large, positive effects of microcredit on household welfare. The results underscored the negative effects of credit constraints in developing countries and the potential of microcredit programmes as a way of alleviating these constraints.

- In Argentina, matching techniques were used to estimate the impact of a programme that provided support to families that had become unemployed during the severe economic crisis of 2002. The evaluation showed that the programme reduced aggregate unemployment and extreme poverty. Together with earlier research of the impact of welfare programmes, this impact evaluation has helped governments develop appropriate policies during macroeconomic shocks.

- The rigorous nature of the PROGRESA evaluation, a conditional cash transfer programme in Mexico, was one of the reasons for the administration of President Fox to support a programme inherited from the previous administration – an unusual outcome. The name of the programme was changed, but the design was essentially left unchanged. It follows that the programme has now continued with the administration of President Calderon. Much the same happened in Colombia, where a rigorously evaluated cash transfer programme survived an administration change – in part, because of the results of a credible impact evaluation (Assessing results ..., 2007).

In support of the abovementioned literature, international leaders committed their support during a global meeting for the creation of an independent entity to sponsor rigorous impact evaluations of social programmes in developing countries. Consensus was reached among participants from developing countries, international organisations, bilateral donors and private foundations, that such studies were crucial to learning about what works in development, and there was a call for developing country governments to play a central role in the new entity. Furthermore, meeting
participants agreed that this newly created entity – with members drawn from developing
countries, bilateral and multilateral agencies, foundations, and NGOs – should be established to
channel funds to high-quality, independent impact evaluations around key questions that
confront policymakers in both donor agencies and developing country governments (A major
step forward ..., 2006).

In addition, there is a growing appreciation within the development community that an
important aspect of public sector management is the existence of a results or performance
orientation in government. Such an orientation – in effect, an “evaluation culture” – is considered
to be one avenue for improving the performance of a government, in terms of the quality,
quantity and targeting of the goods and services which the state produces. In support of this
objective, a number of countries are working to ensure results orientation through building or
strengthening their monitoring and evaluation systems. Evaluation specialists have a strong
advocacy that monitoring and evaluation systems are a “good thing” and have intrinsic merit. On
the other hand, this kind of argument is a “hard sell” to skeptical or overstressed governments in
the developing world (Mackay, 2006:1).

In accordance with the abovementioned literature, the South African government also realised
the importance of the role evaluation has in government. During his presentation at the National
Guiding Principles and Standards for Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Sector Policies and
formally adopted a resolution in support of the development framework. Subsequent to this
resolution, the President, in his State of the Nation address furthermore emphasised and
entrenched the importance of monitoring, evaluating and reporting for government. As a result,
the Governance and Administration (G&A) cluster was mandated with the overall responsibility
of designing and implementing a governmentwide Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. The
South African government has, over the past ten years, recognised the challenges arising from
having to transform the state into a developmental one, while simultaneously attempting to
deliver and redress the legacy of the past social imbalances.
As a result, to ensure that tangible results are achieved, there is an increasing recognition of the attendant and urgent need for greater effectiveness in the way that Government monitors, evaluates and reports on its policies, projects and programmes.

Furthermore, the United Kingdom (UK) government, for example, uses a wide range of evaluations methods, including impact evaluation, to ensure that policies, programmes and public services are planned and delivered as effectively and efficiently as possible. It follows that the impact evaluation approach to policy evaluation is used extensively by the UK government and is at the heart of their performance management system. Consequently, governments of any country need to know at the outset of policy development, and after policies have been implemented, their likely and achieved impacts, in terms of both the positive and negative outcomes (Davies, 2004:2,4). Additionally, the need for good analysis and sound evaluation to be at the heart of policymaking has been recognised in a number of UK government publications (Owens, 2003:2). Similarly, Pollit (as quoted by Sandberg, Stensaker and Aamodt, 2002:44) argues that one of the most distinctive characteristics in European state steering during the past decade has been the overwhelming interest in new public management ideas resulting, inter alia, in an evaluative state. It follows that a central aim of the evaluative state has been to link up routine evaluation with evaluation for strategic change - in other words, linking evaluation closer to the overall policy steering and to important management issues (Neave, as quoted by Sandberg et al., 2002:44).

International examples of the establishment of programme evaluation follow.

2.8 The Institutionalisation of Programme Evaluation: International Examples

International examples of countries’ efforts to institutionalise evaluation, including impact evaluation, illustrate the link between evaluation and the larger mandate of improving public sector management. These countries were used as examples to illustrate the realisation of the international community’s efforts to improve public sector management through programme evaluation.
2.8.1 Programme evaluation in Sweden

Evaluations were first undertaken in the 1950s by public commissions preparing policy decisions. The commission system combined the views of stakeholders, and introduced research findings into decisionmaking. As a result, from the 1960s evaluation began to be viewed as an activity that could continuously provide decisionmakers with information. Consequently, specialised research bodies and agencies were then founded with evaluation as their main task (Blomquist, 2003:24).

2.8.2 Australia’s programme evaluation

Evaluation became an integral part of Australia’s public management reform process in the mid-1980s, when the government’s evaluation strategy was launched. It follows that evaluation has been systematically integrated into corporate and programme management and planning. As a result, all public programmes, or significant parts thereof, are reviewed once every three to five years. All major new proposals include an evaluation strategy. Ministries are currently required to provide an annual evaluation plan, and results of major evaluations are expected to be made public (Blomquist, 2003:24).

2.8.3 Programme evaluation in Chile

The first initiative involved developing a system of performance indicators for government programmes. By 1994 the Budget Directorate requested indicators on performance from all government agencies. The second component was programme evaluation, focusing on cost, timelines and feedback to decisionmaking. Hence, there has been political agreement to evaluate all programmes in Chile. This clear target has helped to deal with initial resistance by agencies (Blomquist, 2003:24).
2.8.4 Evaluation of programmes in Québec

As part of its far-reaching initiative to modernise the management of their public service, the government of Québec has granted a very special status to the evaluation function. By its nature, this function has become the primary mechanism for applying the basic principles of reforms that include the development of targeted results, the achievement of concrete results, and the measurement of results achieved and reporting thereof. In addition to the increased involvement of professionals in the evaluation of government programmes, Québec’s legislators proposed, through legislation, that the relevance, effects and performance of these programmes be evaluated more extensively (Dubois, 2002).

The expectations of the future of programme evaluation are presented next.

2.9 The Future Predictions of Programme Evaluation

Additionally, in agreement with the abovementioned authors, Worthen (2001:410) visualises a number of predictions for the future of programme evaluation, in the next decade or two, that furthermore emphasise the importance of the evaluation profession. The author signifies his faith in the importance of programme evaluation, judging that evaluation will become an increasingly useful force in our society, in improving both public programmes and policymaking, aiding in corporate “quality improvement” efforts in improving society through its various institutions, and even improving itself. Furthermore, the author is confident about the future role of programme evaluation. As a result, there will be more, not fewer, evaluations in the public, private and non-profit sectors in the U.S. and other developed countries, as evaluation becomes increasingly institutionalised because of pressure for accountability brought about both by economic challenges and intervention of courts and legislative bodies concerned with social justice, and also increasing recognition that evaluation is often the gatekeeper to meaningful programme improvements.
In addition, the demand for programme evaluation is also predicted to increase. As a result, evaluation will continue to spread rapidly around the globe until there are few countries where programme evaluations are not an occasional occurrence, at least, and the number of national and multinational professional societies for evaluation will increase. In turn, the progression of programme evaluation is also believed will develop, since evaluation will expand slowly beyond its present (and in some cases respected) role in health, education, psychology and other social sciences and services such as family welfare and criminal justice, to become important in the natural sciences and other fields as yet less touched by programme evaluation. Moreover, evaluation (and evaluators) will become more politically sophisticated as evaluators increasingly recognise that their studies are both technical and political endeavours, requiring them to struggle with new conceptualisations of how evaluations can serve their political role well without being discounted by skeptics as merely another political (and hence non-credible) activity (Worthen, 2001:410).

As a profession, Worthen (2001: 410) perceives that programme evaluation will grow slowly but steadily in the next two decades, but it will not, during that period, acquire all the hallmarks of a matured profession such as medicine, accounting or the law. It will continue to lack means for certifying or licensing evaluators, although some interim style of “credentialing” evaluators (based on factors such as training and experience) may emerge in that time span. Consequently, as demands for evaluation pervade deeper into society, opportunities for evaluation careers will gradually increase, although the number of university graduate programmes for training evaluators will increase slightly, if at all, not attaining the numbers to warrant systems for accrediting evaluator preparation programmes. The author is furthermore of the belief that evaluation training will become increasingly applied, and will shift gradually from training doctoral level evaluators to producing more evaluators prepared at masters degree level. The author also envisages that internal evaluation will become more common because of its benefits, despite its frequent threat to objectivity. Creative involvement of both internal and external evaluators to optimise the advantages of both perspectives will, unfortunately, continue to be rare.

Myths concerning programme evaluation are now presented.
2.10 Myths about programme evaluation

Regardless of the significance and increasing demand and awareness of impact evaluations, illustrated above, McNamara (2007:2) identifies various myths that exist about impact evaluations. Firstly, evaluation is perceived to be an inappropriate process producing worthless outcomes. That may have been a problem in the past, when programme evaluation methods were chosen largely on the basis of their ability to achieve complete scientific accuracy, reliability and validity. That approach would often generate extensive data from which very carefully chosen conclusions would be drawn. Generalisations were avoided. As a result, evaluation reports tended to reiterate the obvious, and left programme administrators disappointed and skeptical about the value of evaluation in general. However, more recently, evaluation has focused on utility, relevance and practicality at least as much as scientific validity. Secondly, the myth exists that evaluation concerns the demonstration of programme achievements or failures. Consequently, this myth assumes that success is implementing the perfect programme and never having to hear from employees, customers or clients again – the programme will now run itself perfectly. That doesn’t happen in real life. Success involves remaining open to continuing feedback and adjusting the programme accordingly. Evaluation gives one continuing feedback. Lastly, evaluation is perceived to be an exclusive, complicated and inflexible process relying on external assistance. It follows that many people believe that they must be completely conversant with concepts such as validity and reliability. They don’t. They do have to consider what information they will require in order to make current decisions about programme issues or needs. In addition, they have to be willing to commit to understanding what is really going on. People regularly undertake some form of programme evaluation – they just don’t do it in a formal fashion, so they don’t get the most out of their efforts or they draw conclusions that are inaccurate.

Factors that could influence programme evaluation follow.
2.11 Resistance to Programme Evaluation

In addition, Posavac and Carey ([s.a.]:40-46) identify a number of potential sources of resistance to programme evaluation. The authors regard these sources as political and psychological factors that can undermine an evaluation project. Some factors are based on legitimate concerns, while others are based on the misunderstanding of evaluation. One such factor is the appearance of self-appointed subjective evaluation specialists. This implies that programme personnel have had some experience working on a research project. Because of this experience, they may feel attached to a specific evaluation design. For example, they may insist on testing subjects prior to a treatment or new programme, when the evaluators feel that a pretest may artificially sensitise the subjects to the treatment to be evaluated.

As a result, self-styled experts may also want to use their own favorite measurement instrument, even when the professional evaluators feel that it will needlessly lengthen a questionnaire that they judge to be adequate for measuring the goals of the programme. Consequently, evaluators are advised to take the time to listen to such suggestions carefully and with an open mind, because they may have some merit. If the suggestions seem counterproductive or not feasible, they are well advised to be gentle but firm in adhering to the design and measures that they feel are appropriate. Subsequently, if evaluators give in to pressure, against their better judgment, they will have no one to blame but themselves if the project is poorly executed.

Another source of resistance to programme evaluation is the misconception that evaluation does not promote innovation. This implies that personnel in human service organisations may be concerned that evaluation will interfere with innovation, by inhibiting them from experimenting with new techniques. The staff may feel that evaluation permits absolutely no variation in the programme during the period of data collection. However, the need for retaining programme identity does not mean that clinicians or programme personnel cannot be flexible in the day-to-day operations of the programme within broad structural boundaries. Each programme will have variability built into it; therefore, evaluation will not limit this.

An additional myth is the fear that an ineffective programme will be terminated. It is true that an evaluation could result in the restriction or elimination of a programme in those instances in which results demonstrate that a given approach is not working out as expected. However, before
sponsors can completely eliminate a programme designed to meet a specific problem, they are ordinarily under some pressure to decide what to put in the place of the terminated programme. It is therefore more likely that an evaluation will result in the reassessment of a programme, rather than its elimination.

Nevertheless, evaluators will not be able to eliminate anxiety completely in people who are basically insecure or who have doubts about their own competence. In a good programme these persons will be in the minority. Moreover, the fear that information will be abused represents another myth about evaluation. This implies that there may exist some concern that information gained about the performance of staff may be abused. Past experience may have taught them to be cautious of evaluators who have overstepped the boundaries of programme evaluation or who have been careless about maintaining confidences. Being trusted is critical in calming these suspicions. The reputation for trust is very fragile, and hard to regain once it has been lost. Effective evaluators will not only explicitly try to convey the idea that programme evaluation is distinct from individual performance appraisal, but they will carefully avoid speaking or acting in such a way that might even give the appearance that they are engaged in individual performance appraisal (Posavac & Carey, [s.a.]:40-46).

Furthermore, accusations that evaluation methods are insensitive is also regarded by Posavac and Carey ([s.a.]:40-46) as a source of resistance. In addition, there is the accusation that evaluation designs are insensitive to the details of human services. Programme objectives are often varied and complex. For example, a hospital program for psychiatric patients presents a very difficult evaluation project. This is true because it is very difficult to find many persons with the same diagnosis. The severity of the problem often varies widely. However, there is a good deal of merit in the charge of insensitivity. Evaluators will gain the confidence of managers and staff not only by being aware of such a problem, but also by articulating this awareness in such a manner that programme staff members are reassured that the details of human services have been appropriately addressed. Early in the planning stage, the programme personnel can be assured that the evaluation will not begin until they have had the opportunity to carefully review the evaluation proposal and feel comfortable that their concerns in this area have been addressed properly.
Another objection is that programme evaluation drains money that could be spent on direct service. As the statement stands, it is true. However, the main question is whether or not it can improve service. As a result, the alternative to spending money on evaluation is to risk spending money on services that are of doubtful value. Those who present this objection fail to face the reality that the day of accountability has arrived. Today, it is hard to find a programme funded either by government agencies or private foundations, that does not carry the stipulation that a certain amount of money in the grant be spent on the evaluation.

An additional argument of those who are totally opposed to the concept of evaluation is that evaluation has had very little impact on programmes. There is a good deal of validity to this objection. It follows that evaluators have often been frustrated by seeing their reports set aside and disregarded. However, the frustration of evaluators should be eased when they reflect on the hard reality that evaluation research is not a sympathetic social science activity, but rather a political decisionmaking tool. Because evaluation researchers work in a political context, the results of their work must be timely and appropriate for decisionmaking. Well-designed and carefully executed studies are worthless, if they do not contribute to the decisionmaking process.

In some instances, evaluators cannot put all the blame on policymakers if reports are not used. In spite of the apparent validity of complaints about the lack of impact, there is also evidence that these complaints are overstated. Firstly, evaluation studies have had an accumulative effect in certain areas. For example, the common finding that class size has marginal effects on learning may at first persuade one to set aside class size as being of minimal importance. However, as more research was done on schools in other countries, it became clear that the marginal effect of class size was true only within the range of class size customarily found in American schools. As a result, it sometimes takes time before the significance of evaluation research can be put into perspective. Secondly, evaluation research has some long term value insofar as it challenges conventional wisdom; for example, evaluation research illustrated that schools made smaller contributions to the learning of children than did family background. Lastly, another source of resistance to evaluation is the fact that programme personnel are generally enthusiastic and confident about the potential effects of their programme.
As a result of their enthusiasm and maximum effort, they expect their new programme to have dramatic results – a “slam-bang” effect. It follows that these personnel will have a tendency to feel betrayed if evaluators are able to demonstrate only a moderate improvement over the old programme.

The difficulty can arise when the programme that was replaced was already achieving its goals reasonably well, and the new programme is expected to improve on the replaced programme. One way to handle the high level of expectation is to help programme personnel arrive at some rule of thumb for improvement that can reasonably be expected. For example, if a previous system for admitting patients to a hospital received a favourable or satisfactory response from 75% of patients admitted, the sponsors of a new programme for admitting patients should be satisfied if they raise the percentage of satisfied patients to 80% or 85%. Anything beyond that is unrealistic (Posavac & Carey, [s.a.]:40-46).

The breach that exists in impact evaluation follows.

2.12 The Breach in Impact Evaluation

According to Savedoff et al. (2006:2-3), the missing puzzle piece in learning about what kinds of social interventions can succeed is impact evaluations - studies that document whether particular programmes are actually responsible for improvements in social outcomes, relative to what would have happened without them. An “evaluation gap” has emerged, because governments, official donors and other funders do not demand or produce enough impact evaluations, and because those that are conducted are often methodologically flawed. Correspondingly, Chen and Rossi (1980:106) were earlier of the opinion that a source of one of the more serious problems of evaluation research is the typical finding that evaluated programmes have little or no effectiveness. Recently, claims have been made that the problem of no effect may be attributed to the inadequacy of current evaluation methodology. Furthermore, in one field after another, evaluation researchers found that the programmes in place, or contemplated, have few or no effects of the sort intended by their designers.
In addition, Savedoff et al. (2006:2-3) believe that too few impact evaluations are being carried out. Documentation shows that United Nations (UN) agencies, multilateral development banks, and developing countries’ governments spend substantial sums on evaluations that are useful for monitoring and operational assessments, but do not put sufficient resources into the kinds of studies needed to judge which interventions work under given conditions, what difference they make, and at what cost. Even when impact evaluations are commissioned, they frequently fail to yield useful information because they do not use rigorous methods or data. For example, a systematic review of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that 15% of all its reports included impact assessments, but noted that “[m]any evaluations were unable to properly assess impact because of methodological shortcomings”. Similarly, a review of 127 studies of 258 community health financing programmes found that only two studies were able to derive robust conclusions about the impact on access to health services. In support of Savedoff et al., donor countries committed US$34 billion to aid projects addressing health, education and poverty in the developing world. In addition, developing countries themselves spend hundreds of billions more on similar programmes. However, surprisingly few studies rigorously measure the impact of the spending (A major step forward ..., 2006).

Savedoff et al. (2006:2-3) are furthermore of the opinion that an impact evaluation gap exists, because there are too few incentives to conduct good impact evaluations – and too many obstacles. These obstacles include technical, bureaucratic, and political challenges. While impact evaluations generally have to be designed as an integral part of a new programme, politicians and programme managers are focused in the early programme phases, on design and implementation. However, the same people who would like to have good evidence today about the impact of earlier social programmes, are unlikely to make the efforts necessary to design and implement the kind of impact evaluation study that would benefit those who follow. In support of Savedoff et al., Chen and Rossi (1980:107) estimate that the problem of “no effects” of programmes rather lies in the extent to which programmes have been properly interpreted in the designing of evaluation researches.
According to Savedoff et al. (2006:29), concern about the evaluation gap is widespread, as demonstrated by the many ways that public agencies, intergovernmental commissions, NGO networks, research centres and foundations are addressing it. As a result, many initiatives are under way to:

- increase access to existing information through reviews, searchable databases, and policy pamphlets and newspapers
- improve regular data collection by developing both country governments and aggregate indicators
- promote specific evaluations with grants and other kinds of funding
- conduct research and demonstrate good evaluation practice

Tolerance for the evaluation gap is weakening, however. Developing countries’ governments are demanding better information about the efficacy of social spending. As an example, during 2001 Mexico passed legislation requiring that impact evaluations be conducted on a variety of social programmes, explicitly recognising the value of learning what works and why, as a guide for future budget decisions. In addition, NGOs have collaborated with leading academic institutions to evaluate the impact of their programmes, with the goal of identifying what does and does not work. As a result, this is seen as vital for better programmes and more effective fundraising. Moreover, donor countries are increasingly concerned that international financial assistance should generate results (Savedoff et al., 2006:3).

Additionally, a growing number of examples show that good impact evaluations can be feasible, ethical, timely and useful. The capacity to conduct impact evaluations at research institutions around the world is greater than ever before, using a range of proven methods to measure impacts that can be attributed by a particular programme or policy. The technology and networks for sharing information have increased dramatically. Impact evaluations have, for example, played critical roles in helping NGOs modify education programmes in India to improve student achievement, protected and expanded national conditional cash transfer programmes in several Latin American countries, and demonstrated the impact of inexpensive health interventions in improving school attendance in Africa.
Building this knowledge requires that governments and agencies take a strategic view and conduct impact evaluations in projects that can yield important information on what is effective and what is not. It also requires that evaluations use methods that measure the net impact of programme activities in a valid way. Better coordination of impact evaluations across countries and institutions would make it possible to cluster some studies around common thematic areas and improve the ability to generalise findings.

2.13 Reasons why good impact evaluations are limited

Amid growing demand for knowledge about what works, the resources and attention devoted to impact evaluation are still limited. When a new program is being designed is precisely when an impact evaluation can most easily be developed to provide useful answers about the program’s impact. That is the moment when program designers want the benefit of prior research, however have few incentives to invest in a new study (Savedoff et al., 2006:26-27). These authors furthermore present the following reasons why good impact evaluations are limited.

2.13.1 Demand

Amid the growing demand for knowledge about what works, the resources and attention devoted to impact evaluation are still limited. A central cause of the shortfall is the nature of the benefits of impact evaluations. The benefits of the knowledge generated by impact evaluations go well beyond the organisation or place in which they are generated. That means that the collective interest in seeing that a body of impact evaluation research gets built, reviewed, disseminated and improved, is greater than the individual interest of any particular group, agency or country. Because knowledge from impact evaluations is a public good, the incentives for any individual organisation to bear the costs are much lower than the full social benefits would justify. In support of Savedoff, Duflo ([s.a.]:35,37) is correspondingly of the opinion that the benefits of credible impact evaluations extend far beyond the organisation conducting the evaluation. Rigorous and systematic evaluations have the potential to leverage the impact of international organisations well beyond simply their ability to finance programmes. Credible
impact evaluations are international public goods: the benefits of knowing that a programme does or does not work, extends well beyond the organisation or country implementing the programme. Savedoff et al. (2006:26) furthermore explains that because the knowledge from impact evaluations is not a “pure” public good – there are often substantial benefits to the country or agency that commissions the study for learning about its own programmes - such studies do get done, but not in the numbers or with the quality justified by the potential global benefits.

The situation is complicated by the fact that impact evaluations are not regular, ongoing activities of most organisations, but are applied strategically to programmes from which important knowledge can be gained. Structures of decisionmaking generate diffuse demands for knowledge from impact evaluations, not synchronised with the time frame required by such studies, forcing them to compete for resources and attention with programme implementation, and even, at times, discouraging the gathering of information that could be potentially constraining or embarrassing. Thus, the general problem created by the public good nature of impact evaluations can be further elucidated by looking at some particular obstacles to conducting impact evaluations – those related the structure of demand, the absence of timely funding, and the patterns of incentives (Savedoff et al., 2006: 27).

Demand for the knowledge produced by impact evaluations tends to be spread out across many actors and over time. Demand arises every time someone in government, an NGO, a multilateral development bank or a bilateral agency asks: “What programmes are effective at …?” This can occur when a new programme is being designed, when additional funding is being requested, or when internal reviews of institutional performance are being conducted.

The time that a new programme is being designed is precisely when an impact evaluation can most easily be developed to provide useful answers about the programme’s impact. That is the moment when programme designers want to benefit from prior research, yet have few incentives to invest in a new study. If they do not invest in a new study, the same programme designers will
find themselves in the same position four or five years later, because they missed the opportunity
to learn whether the intervention had an impact. Other institutions and governments that might
have learnt from the experience also lose when these investments in learning about impact are
neglected (Savedoff et al., 2006: 27).

2.13.2 Funding and incentives

Consequently, it is in such circumstances that timely availability of funding can make a huge
difference. Despite a lack of incentives to conduct impact evaluations, many programme
designers and managers still have an interest in measuring the impact of their programmes.
When funding for impact evaluation studies is not readily available, it makes it more difficult to
act on their interest. Other incentives exist at the institutional level to discourage impact
evaluations. Government agencies involved in, for example, social development programmes or
international assistance, need to generate support from taxpayers and donors. Since impact
evaluations can go any way – demonstrating positive, zero or negative impact – a government or
organisation that conducts such research runs the risk of findings that undercut its ability to raise
funds. Policymakers and managers also have more discretion to pick and choose strategic
directions when less is known about what does or does not work. This can even lead
organisations to pressure researchers to soften or modify unfavorable studies or simply to
suppress the results – despite the fact that knowledge of what does not work is as useful as
knowledge of what does work.

When such pressure holds sway, a noticeable bias appears in the body of published findings.
Studies which demonstrate that programmes are successful are more likely to be publicised by
the participating institutions and also are more likely to be published in academic journals. A
publication bias emerges that provides an unfairly positive assessment of programmes. One way
to counter this publication bias is to establish a prospective registry of impact evaluations - that
is, to record impact evaluations when they start. It follows that future literature reviews can
better assess whether published findings are representative or not (Savedoff et al., 2006: 27).
In line with the abovementioned authors, Dubois (2002) is of the opinion that despite positive developments in the evaluation of government departments, the measuring of impact in these institutions are no easy task to achieve. Thus, various obstacles are identified that may impede the development of impact evaluation in our government institutions. Firstly, there has been a lack of debate, even within the evaluation discipline, as to what impact evaluations should entail. In anticipation of the evaluation discipline establishing clear theoretical foundations, we will not be able to take full ownership of our professional tasks, such as designing research questions, variables, indicators, etc., which currently are often performed by programme managers.

The second obstacle is the way the term “results” has been used in official government documents, without any indication as to whether it refers to outcomes (services) or impacts (effects). Consequently, as a corrective measure, the evaluation discipline should design accurate definitions of “impact” and “results”, in order to establish clear guideposts.

The third obstacle relates to the new forms of production of public services. More specifically, the question arises as to how effectively one can evaluate impacts, when a growing number of programmes come under the responsibility of various kinds of partners. These actions should be controlled more closely, through rules requiring tighter accountability and through performance and evaluation measures that would be legally binding on these various partners.

The last obstacle concerning the obstruction of the effective evaluation of impacts in government organisations, is their failure to allocate sufficient financial, human and physical resources to the evaluation function. This implies that governments need to make a sincere investment in the development of this function. As a result, such an investment could be earmarked in partner programmes that have small budgets and thus do not have enough resources to conduct impact evaluation exercises individually.

2.14 Closing the Evaluation Gap

Savedoff et al. (2006:28) are furthermore of the opinion that the time is right for a major push to close the evaluation gap. Why? Firstly, there is a clear personal commitment from a growing community of professionals who recognise the value of impact evaluations, many of them employed by governments and international agencies. Secondly, the capacity around the world to
collect data and conduct research, is growing. Many more people than ever before are trained in impact evaluation methods and in fields that allow them to interpret the findings of such studies, and technological advances have reduced the costs and time of collecting and processing data. Thirdly, there appears to be a growing recognition in many agencies of the need to measure results. This cannot be done well without complementary studies that address the issue of attribution. In addition, as befits a profession that keeps up with the times, evaluation has moved from merely generating findings about specific programmes, to generating knowledge (Patton, 2001:332).

Finally, skepticism about the use of funds for development assistance puts pressure on agencies to measure impact. When the overriding risk is closure of a programme or severe reduction in funding, then the downside risk of negative findings is less problematic. Both managers and project designers see greater benefit in measuring the impact of their programmes in the hope that they can demonstrate that the programmes should continue. Beyond these initiatives, policymakers in developing countries have expressed interest in gaining access to better information, building knowledge and incorporating evidence in policy decisions. During interviews, surveys and meetings, officials in developing countries have requested more support for systematic production and the use of impact studies. For the international community, too, demand for knowledge about impact is growing, as a consequence of commitments to substantially increase aid flows in novel ways, efforts to hold agencies accountable for the use of public funds, and emphasis on results and performance. International commitments, such as the Millennium Development Goals, create both a challenge for impact evaluation and an opportunity to learn (Savedoff et al., 2006:29).

2.15 Guiding Principles for Impact Evaluation

How can we expand the knowledge base of “what works” in social development programmes? Since 2004, the Center for Global Development (CGD) has been asking this question of leaders, officials and researchers from developing countries, bilateral agencies, development banks, NGOs and private foundations, and has found strong demand for increasing the evidence base
with rigorous studies in health, poverty reduction, education and other social sectors, as a way to guide and improve social policy decisions. In an attempt to overcome the breach in impact evaluation, the CGD formulated guiding principles as a guide to action, as presented in *Communique: Improving social development through impact evaluation*, 2006. As a result, this paper philosophises that impact studies are beneficial, and therefore argues that impact studies should be an integral component of the programme from the design stage. Impact studies are therefore essential complements to programme monitoring and process evaluation, to know if public resources are being used effectively to promote social development. However, reviews have demonstrated that too few impact studies are being conducted with the requisite reliability and validity to provide the evidence base needed by public and private decisionmakers and programme designers in developing countries. Such impact evaluations are also essential to efforts to improve accountability of government social spending.

Moreover, another principle this paper advocates is that knowledge is a public good. This implies that though countries may recognise the value of impact studies, these countries - and organisations generally - do not have incentives to invest sufficiently in the implementation of such studies relative to the global value of the information that would be generated. It follows that once impact studies are completed and disseminated, many countries can benefit by using their findings with adaptations to local contexts. Hence, there is a larger collective demand for impact studies than from any single organisation or country. Therefore, collective action by multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies, developing countries’ governments, private foundations, NGOs and research centres, is necessary to assure that sufficient investment in impact studies occurs, that findings are widely disseminated and data is made public, and that studies address questions of enduring importance and relevance to policymaking.

As an additional guiding principle, this paper proposes that a collective initiative is required to promote impact studies. This entails that the abovementioned stakeholders should work together to implement an initiative, with the appropriate institutional structure, to promote, finance and stimulate the use of reliable and valid impact studies that address questions of enduring
importance, provide models of good practice for emulation and for going to scale, provide opportunities for capacity building through collaboration, and promote methodological innovation and high evaluation standards.

Additionally, supplementary guiding principles are recommended to accomplish the breach that exists in impact evaluation. It follows that the quality of impact evaluations is essential. As a result, it is suggested that any collective action to promote and finance impact studies should make the quality of those studies its top priority. This means endorsing and promoting studies that reliably measure the impact that can be attributed to a specific programme or policy, draw valid inferences from the evidence, are appropriate to the particular policy questions that are being asked, correspond to operational realities and are appropriate to the social, cultural, economic and political context.

These guiding principles furthermore propose that impact evaluations should be promoted if and when they address relevant questions. This means that increasing the number of impact evaluations that use high quality methods should not be the aim of a collective enterprise. The aim should be to promote good impact evaluations that address questions of major significance, either because of the scale and quality of the programme, the opportunity for influencing a public policy decision, or the potential contribution to answer a question of enduring importance. What is more, any effort to increase the quality and quantity of impact evaluations should provide opportunities for building capacity at local level, through collaboration and the creation or strengthening of professional networks at both national and international levels. Besides the abovementioned recommended principles, it is further proposed that any initiative should be designed with the recognition that monitoring and forms of evaluation other than impact evaluation, are integral to sound implementation and generation of knowledge about key processes. This implies that although functions such as developing the capacity for good programme monitoring may be outside the scope of an international initiative on impact evaluation, the same parties should attend separately to this important concern. Lastly, it is advised that the initiative should be complementary, strategic, transparent, inclusive and independent.
In other words, organisations and governments are pursuing a wide range of activities to improve the evidence base, including conducting process and institutional evaluations, establishing evaluation standards, and, inter alia, introducing or improving impact evaluation work within specific institutions.

The programmes and studies promoted by this new initiative should complement and bring added value to existing activities. The initiative should promote the relevant use of impact evaluations for select programmes that are, inter alia, strategically important because of their potential scale and impact on important social problems. Furthermore, the initiative should be transparent in all its activities, as well as inclusive, recognising developing country partners, both in governments and NGOs, as full partners. Finally, the initiative has to have substantial independence from the agencies and organisations that it is involved in evaluating, and all information gathered through this process should be available in the public domain, with free access to all. Communique: Improving social development ..., 2006).

2.16 Ethical and Political Considerations of Evaluation

Robson (2000:28-29) is of the view that evaluation is inextricably linked to ethical and political issues. Evaluations in public services are linked to social policies and priorities, at root deriving from party political (Politics with a large P) initiatives, as well as within-service uses of power. James (as quoted by Robson, 2000:42) is of the opinion that policymakers will always find reasons to ignore, or be highly selective of, evaluation findings, if the information does not support the particular political agenda operating at the time when decisions have to be made. An important consideration when agreeing to carry out an evaluation, is the existence of an intention to use the findings in some way. Typically, the intended use is for policymakers when making decisions about the programme being evaluated. The author furthermore argues that policy-making is by definition political. Evaluations in public services are linked to social policies and priorities. An evaluation of these services is obviously inherently tangling with extremely sensitive ethical and political issues. The ethical issues of impact evaluation follow.
2.16.1 The ethics of evaluation

Evaluation deals with issues which affects people’s lives. It is therefore a minimum requirement that it should be carried out to a high standard. It follows that there are different stakeholders each with an interest in evaluation. As a result, these interests must be recognised and respected if the evaluation is to be carried out in an ethically responsible manner. Consequently, there are more specific safeguards to be addressed for the clients or the users of the programme or service, as well as for staff and other participants directly involved with its running. Three main aspects therefore need to be considered – namely, consent, privacy and confidentiality. It is a general ethical principle not to seek to evaluate, or have take part in an evaluation, anyone who either does not know they are involved or does not wish to take part. This is usually referred to as voluntary informed consent. Additionally, privacy is concerned with respect for an individual’s wish to have control over access to themselves and information about themselves.

While people are likely to have a clear idea about what they wish to keep private, and what would be a violation of that privacy, it is more difficult to judge this in relation to others. This is particularly so when participants differ from the interviewer in gender, sexual orientation or ethnic background. The voluntary nature of participants’ involvement acknowledges a right to privacy which can be exercised by refusing to take part in the study. It follows that if the principle of voluntary informed consent is honoured, the related issues of confidentiality and anonymity can and should be covered. Moreover, confidentiality concerns information about a person (such as interview transcripts, notes, or video or audio cassettes) and an agreement about how this information will be treated so as to respect participants’ privacy. On the other hand, anonymity refers to ensuring that a person’s name, or other unique identifier, is not attached to information about that person (Robson, 2000:29-32).
2.16.2 The politics of evaluation

According to Robson (2000:41), an evaluation is inevitably linked to policy and to political decisions. Should a programme or service be stopped or continued? Should its budget and personnel be increased or cut back? There is a fundamental difference between the concerns of evaluators who evaluate other people’s programmes, and administrators and other personnel whose careers depend on their implementing and running successful programmes. Administrators and politicians are not noted for taking an objective, scientific view, even though researchers have long urged them to do so. James (as quoted by Robson, 2000:42) is of the opinion that policymakers will always find reasons to ignore, or be highly selective of, evaluation findings, if the information does not support the particular political agenda operating at the time when decisions have to be made.

In support of Robson, Rossi et al. (2004:19) agree that evaluation is a rational enterprise that takes place in a political context. The authors are furthermore of the opinion that political considerations intrude in three major ways, and the evaluator who fails to recognise their presence is due for a series of shocks and frustrations. Firstly, the policies and programmes with which evaluation deals, are the “creatures” of political decisions. They were proposed, defined, debated, enacted and funded through political processes, and in implementation they remain subject to pressures - both supportive and hostile - that arise out of the play of politics. Secondly, because evaluation is undertaken in order to feed into decisionmaking, its reports enter the political arena. As a result, the evaluative evidence of programme outcomes has to compete for attention with other factors that carry weight in the political process. Thirdly, and perhaps least recognised, evaluation itself has a political stance. By its very nature, it makes implicit political statements about such issues as the problematic nature of some programmes and the unchallengeability of others, the legitimacy of programme goals and programme strategies, the utility of strategies of incremental reform, and even the appropriate role of the social scientist in policy and programme formation.
In correspondence with Robson and Rossi et al., Taylor (2005:601-602) is of the opinion that recent years have seen an “evidential turn” in the political language of public policy that, as a result, has generated increased attention to policy and programme evaluation. From being a contingent instrument of administration, evaluation has become a central legitimating device for a new form of politics. As a result, a political critique emerged from within governments in the 1990s, which saw much academic research as driven by dogma. Taylor is furthermore of the opinion that political values should be stripped out in favour of “objective scientific” evidence of “what really works”. In addition, along with audit and performance management, evaluation has become a key entry in the lexicon of new public management and the quest of what politicians increasingly frame as “value-free policy”. This increasing role of evaluation as a political phenomenon can be traced in Britain to the rise of neo-liberalism, public choice theory and new managerialism over the last two decades of the 20th century. These movements created a drive towards “evidence” as a basis for consumer choice.

Stated differently, Bovens, ‘t Hart and Kuipers (2005:319) are of the opinion that policy evaluation is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means. This is most conspicuous in the assessment of policies and programmes that have become highly controversial, (a) because they do not produce the expected results, (b) because they were highly contested to begin with, (c) they are very costly and/or inefficient, or (d) because of alleged wrongdoings in their implementation. Consequently, the relation between governments and evaluation is not without complications. In a democratic society, evaluation results are open to the public, the political party in office, and politicians in opposition. It follows that if a programme is not doing well, a chance arises for criticising the government. Politicians who stipulate both the scope and the types of information they need, are probably the most decisive parties for evaluation success (Sandahl, as quoted by Mathison, 2005:73).

As a result, when public policies are adopted and programmes implemented, the politics of policymaking do not come to an end. The political and bureaucratic controversies over the nature of the problems to be addressed and the best means by which to do so that characterise the policy formulation and policy selection stages of the policy cycle, do not suddenly subside when “binding” political decisions are made in favour of option X or Y. Nor do the ambiguities,
uncertainties and risks surrounding the policy issue at stake, disappear. They merely move from the main stage, where political choices about policies are made, to the less visible arenas of policy implementation, populated by (networks of) bureaucratic and non-governmental actors who are involved in transforming the words of policy documents into purposeful actions. Subsequently, at one time or another, the moment arrives to evaluate what has been achieved (Bovens et al., 2005:318).

2.17 Summary

This chapter provided an overview of impact evaluations in organisations. A comprehensive body of literature on impact evaluation in organisations, as well as international illustrations of public sector and policing organisations’ impact evaluation processes, indicated the movement and direction of evaluating the impact of programmes.

Chapter 3 presents an overview of the literature on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations.
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW ON RESTRUCTURING PROCESSES IN BUSINESS AND POLICING ORGANISATIONS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the literature on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations. The literature review presents the reader with a synopsis of the knowledge base upon which the present study is built. As a result, this study acknowledges findings previously published about the topic and what has been discovered in the present research. As a result, such a literature review enables the researcher to accurately illustrate where the current research fits in. The literature review can therefore be clarified as a journey to discover what other researchers have accomplished on the topic, how it has been researched, and also what the primary results have been, in order to obtain a detailed perceptive of the topic and, additionally, to evaluate it with the present study. The literature review in this study is, in fact, a comprehensive study of the literature published on restructuring processes in organisations. An extensive body of literature on restructuring processes in organisations nationally and internationally, in addition to the literature within the SAPS, provides the foundation for the current study. Literature such as official SAPS documents, journal articles, library sources and media and newspaper reports were consulted. This chapter thus elucidates the search process through examining the literature. Subsequently, a presentation and discussion of the literature review follows.

3.2 Historic and Present Overview of Restructuring Processes in Organisations

“If you or some part of your organisation is involved in restructuring, you are not alone. Changes in the marketplace and drives toward efficiency demand organisational flexibility, and restructuring is one of the most common strategies. There are many reasons that businesses change their structure – some reasons better than others” (Cooper, [s.a.]:1). Stated differently, Douglas Engelbart, the American inventor, already experienced restructuring in 1970 as follows: “Today’s environment is beginning to threaten today’s organisations, finding them seriously
deficient in their nervous system design... The degree of coordination, perception, rational adaption, etcetera, which will appear in the next generation of human organisations will drive our present organisational forms, with their clumsy nervous system, into extinction”. This observation may shed some light on the cycle of restructuring that most companies find themselves in. Consequently, change has meant one thing for most of the time – organisational restructuring (Organisational Restructuring, 2006).

3.2.1 Motivational aspects for organisational restructuring

Lee and Teo (2005:25) emphasise that companies are faced with more competitive markets and greater demands on cost controls, and thus are taking the fast track cost-cutting by, among others, reorganising their divisions and streamlining their operations. Hence, organisational restructuring has been and will continue to be used as a turnaround strategy to control costs and to realign internal structure to meet changing environmental conditions. Correspondingly, structural change is stimulated by rapid environmental change, increasing complexity and uncertainty, and the predominance of loosely coupled organisational components (Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:831). In support of the abovementioned authors, Palmer et al. (as quoted by Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:830-831) also emphasise that organisations of all kinds have to deal with regulatory, cultural, economic, technological and physical environments that are potentially changing more rapidly than the organisations themselves. Consequently, the pressure on organisations to adapt and change their structures is immense.

Savery and Luks (2000:309) furthermore also believe that if it were not for change, a manager’s lot would be an easy one, planning could be accurately based on historical events and the issue of organisational design would be resolved. However, today’s environment is full of uncertainty, market changes, changing workforce demographics, social and political pressures and, not least of all, technological advances, making today’s organisation one of constant changes. One change which has occurred regularly in many companies is known as downsizing, rightsizing or re-engineering. This has occurred alongside the removal of managerial levels - known as delayering (Savery & Luks, 2000:309). The critical nature and reasons for change must, however, be
clearly, consistently and regularly communicated to employees – this being an area in which many organisations face tremendous challenges (Savery & Luks, 2000:309). In line with the abovementioned authors, McKinley and Scherer (2000:740) believe restructuring implies that the environment is changing and thus denies that the environment is stable or that the environment is similar to past environmental states. In fact, the interpretation that environments are rapidly changing and the restructuring that underpins that interpretation, appears to have acquired the status of an order-creating ideology among some top executives in recent decades.

Ogbonna and Harris (2003:512) correspondingly believe that the generation of an organisational structure capable of coping with the needs of modern businesses, has been one of the most problematic issues facing organisations and their managers, and therefore argue that organisational structural change has been one of the most topical issues in management and organisational studies over the past two decades. As a result, recent research interest has moved away from the evaluation of merits and problems of traditional forms of organising to the investigation of new ways of structuring organisations. Consequently, both European and Japanese organisations are increasingly adopting innovative structural practices, although there were significant differences in the rate of change in the two regions. In short, the review of the literature on innovative organisational forms shows that this topic has attracted widespread interest over the past few years. Academics and practitioners appear to agree that the increasingly turbulent business environment requires organisations to adopt innovative ways of organising their activities in order to maintain an advantage in the market place.

Various symptoms indicate the need for organisational restructuring. It follows that organisational restructuring occurs when new skills and capabilities are needed to meet current or expected operational requirements. In addition, another symptom of the need for organisational restructuring is when the accountability for results is not clearly communicated and measurable, resulting in subjective and biased performance appraisals. Moreover, parts of the organisation could be significantly over- or understaffed, which in turn necessitates organisational restructuring. Another reason for organisational restructuring is that organisational communications are inconsistent, fragmented and inefficient. Furthermore, technology and/or innovation are creating changes in workflow and production processes that prompt restructuring.
Organisational restructuring could, in addition, take place when significant staffing increases or decreases are contemplated, when personnel retention and staff turnover is a significant problem, workforce productivity is stagnant or deteriorating, or when personnel morale is deteriorating (*Organisational Restructuring*, [s.a.]:1).

According to Bergh and Ngah-Kiing Lim (2008:594,600), most research to date has portrayed restructuring as a purposeful response to governance, strategy, and industry pressure. Some authors have argued that firms use restructuring to improve internal efficiency, in response to active takeover markets (Jensen, 1993:831). In support of Jensen, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992:107) also argue that organisations implement restructuring to improve efficiency. On the other hand, others have posited that shifts from weak to strong internal governance have led to the use of restructuring to refocus corporate strategies (Chatterjee, Harrison & Bergh, 2003:87-96). Another explanation proposes that restructuring reverses excessively diversified strategies to more optimal levels (Bergh & Lawless, 1998:87-102). As a result, information asymmetries between managers and owners will be reduced (Bergh, Johnson & DeWitt, 2008:133-148).

Additionally, most theoretical perspectives depict restructuring as a response behaviour, used for quickly improving the firm’s economic and strategic conditions. Moreover, restructuring is often driven by uncertainty and can be a punctuated and fast action rather than a continuous and evolving process. As a result, restructurings that occurred in recent years are frequently integrated with ensuing actions which collectively represent a strategic reaction to resolving the matter that drove the restructuring. It follows that restructuring in more distant years may not be as pertinent or applicable. Therefore, even numerous restructurings spread over several previous years could play a weaker role, since they may not be part of the response that was created for resolving the motivating factor. Schwarz and Shulman (2007:831) similarly agree that structural change is offered as a means to help the organisation evolve. However, limited structural change occurs in organisations. As a result, several possible reasons why specific limited structure patterns occur follow.
3.2.2 Reasons for limited structural change in organisations

Schwarz (as quoted by Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:832) argues that during times of high uncertainty, limited structural change can occur, because of a default homeostasis position skewing the organisation towards maintaining existing structures and networks. Similarly, much like change theory’s presumption of equilibrium states, the organisation strives for linearity (Meyer, Gaba & Colwell, 2005:456-473). This reasoning draws on the strength of the standardisation and the formalisation dimensions of an organisation’s existing structure. It thus emphasises that the impact of change on organisations is characterised by limited, subtle or gradual alterations to existing structures.

Additionally, Schwarz and Shulman (2007:832) believe that limited structural organisational change occurs, since organisations engage in a process of introspective self-renewal. It follows that organisations reinforce or recreate established structures, since organisational members lack critical reflexiveness. More specifically, Nelson and Winter (1982) explain that members do not create new structural representations, instead selecting among those that they either already identify with or store in their memory. As per illustration, Gavetti (2005:599-617) uses Polaroid’s transition to digital imaging. Once a strategy and structure have been decided, the organisation fleshes out this template by modifying its current practices to make them consistent with this choice, thereby embedding a structural routine.

Moreover, Schwarz and Shulman (2007:832) trust that another possible reason for limited structural change could be due to the way organisational members anchor their judgments on prior experience, to reflect on change. The authors argue that limited change becomes a personalised experience as organisational members selectively draw on and reinforce perceived safe social order. As a result, they enact change around their lives, habits and perceptions, based on social reminders derived from their experience (Ocasio, 1997:187). In this manner, individuals and groups can choose to resist, manipulate, or possibly even ignore change (Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:832).
What is more, Carlopio (2003) is of the opinion that limited structural change occurs, due to the location and pattern of the initial dispersion of change within an organisation. Changes are usually introduced into a limited area, rather than across the entire organisation. As a consequence, change is bound to specific self-contained spheres of the organisation, creating an artificial internal barrier to change (Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:832).

In addition, Scott (2001) notes that limited structural change is a reflection of well known regulative, normative and cultural institutional pillars. It follows that these powerful internal constraints and external pressures restrict change, in order to help the firm gain legitimacy, leading to structural similarity (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999:653-683). Schwarz and Shulman (2007:832) are therefore of the sentiment that organisations are compelled to manage such dependencies in order to survive or preserve any market advantage; since the organisational environment is not dependable, they face the prospect of attempting to control structural conditions instead.

3.2.3 Phases of organisational restructuring

Cooper ([s.a.]:4) suggests a number of key elements that should be followed and addressed during the implementation of a restructuring process:

3.2.3.1 Phase I: Planning and design

A significant factor during the planning and design of organisational restructuring is to remain focused on the reason for the new design. Additionally, efforts to make the restructuring process work should be intensified, and consciousness that support process changes take time and sustained energy, should also be created. It follows that communication should be sustained as people adjust to the new organisation. Another important factor during organisational restructuring is to have a clear and compelling business case that is tied to stakeholder needs. Agreement on key criteria for the new design that addresses the business case, is imperative. On the other hand, the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed structure, as well as the resultant
changes through the organisation, must be understood. It is thus recommended to involve key
stakeholders to design the best structure. Consequently, appropriate information should be
communicated as soon as possible to prepare people for change (Cooper, [s.a.]:4).

In the light of the gap that exists between the cognitive order experienced by top managers and
the cognitive disorder experienced by their subordinates, as explained by McKinley and Scherer
(2000:736), Furnari ([s.a.]:1) suggests that when restructuring a company, it is critical that key
people are involved with all aspects of the planning, developing and execution stages of “the
plan”. By seeking input from employees, greater acceptance and buy-in will emerge, and support
for change will materialise. Revitalising a company becomes a major strain on its people and the
organisation. Discontent can be a common factor within the management team, and will often
permeate throughout the company.

Since there is a natural resistance to change, it is crucial to approach the effort in the appropriate
manner. Thus, when recommending changes it is important that the benefits of the change are
clearly communicated. Furnari ([s.a.]:1) identifies the following as common mistakes that can
jeopardise a successful restructuring:

- lack of a detailed strategic business plan that establishes the framework for the
  company’s objectives and time lines
- collapse of constructive communication throughout the organisation
- lack of accountability and effective incentive programmes
- lack of analytical tools and timely information to track and monitor the company’s
  progress to effectively adjust strategies when required
- cost reductions that are too severe and do not provide the necessary resources to support
  the core needs of the operations
- implementation of short-term solutions that do not address the long-term needs of the
  company
In support of Cooper’s phases of organisational restructuring, Furnari ([s.a.]:1) correspondingly notes suggestions to improve communication at all levels when instituting a major restructuring aimed at revitalising an organisation. The author suggests that the general objectives and expectations of the restructuring should be clearly communicated to all employees of the company. In addition, a schedule for regular employee meetings to facilitate continuous dialogue at all levels of the organisation, should be established. Procedures to ensure that key information and operational metrics are reported on in a timely fashion, and applicable steering committees to include various levels of management, should also be developed. Another suggestion to improve communication at all levels when instituting major restructuring, is to survey various levels of employees, to obtain feedback and provide a channel for communication.

3.2.3.2 Phase II: Implementation

Cooper ([s.a.]:4) advocates continuous discussion of the reasons and business case during the implementation of restructuring. This implies that an organisation’s capacity for change should be kept in mind, and feedback to adjust as the process progresses should also be invited. Moreover, the rationale and business case of the restructuring must be communicated continuously and transparently to employees. The implementation of such a process must be planned thoroughly, taking into account the many process changes required to support the new structure. Furthermore, people should be involved in open dialogue during implementation, to invite suggestions and feedback to determine needed modifications as the restructuring process progresses.

McKinley and Scherer (2000:741-743) pose this question: Do middle managers and employees at the technical core of the organisation make sense of organisational restructuring in the same way that the organisation’s leadership does? The authors believe that the answer to this question is likely to be “no”. It follows that since top executives are charged with managing the relationship between the organisation and its environment, organisational restructuring in a turbulent environment will appear to resolve problems and create order. Nevertheless, in contrast, employees below the top executive levels are more remote from the rhetoric and the
reality of fundamental environmental transformation than are executives at the apex of the organisation. Consequently, those subordinates will not place as high a value as their superiors do on the alignment of internal structure with the changing condition of the environment because it disrupts established business processes and opens up alternatives to established ways of getting the work done. In other words, a gap exists between the cognitive order experienced by top managers and the cognitive disorder experienced by their subordinates during organisational restructuring.

Moreover, Lee and Teo (2005:26-37) caution that many top managers do not realise that massive changes in organisational relationships could result from reorganisation. Subsequently, restructuring inadvertently cause dramatic changes in the deep-seated, informal organisation that can easily block communication and create opposition to change. Additionally, there are potentially negative consequences to the work environment in the immediate term, after organisational restructuring. If work satisfaction and trust in the organisation continue to be depressed well beyond the end of the restructuring, and well beyond an apparent improvement in some aspects of the work environment, the productivity of the organisation could be in serious danger. Therefore, a key ingredient necessary to sustain effective change is high morale. It follows that employees must “buy in” to the management strategy of change. In other words, employees must align their interests with those of management, and they must become involved and committed to bring about genuine, lasting improvements in the organisation, otherwise this may set back the organisation’s efforts to achieve the anticipated goals of restructuring.

Stevenson, Bartunek & Borgatti (2003:244) are of the opinion that sometimes planned restructuring efforts involve attempts to get people and groups within organisations to work together more effectively. When this is the aim, the change agent often attempts to increase formal structural connections between people and groups under the assumption that information will flow more freely, barriers and conflict between work functions will break down, and innovative activities will diffuse more effectively in a dense network. At the same time, however, organisation members who stand to lose influence and/or structural autonomy if barriers are broken down, may work against efforts to increase formal connections in ways that weaken their influence. Stated differently, Skogan (2008:27) is of the opinion that specialised
units such as detectives are often threatened by department-wide programmes that require them to change their ways. For example, detectives may be required to actually exchange information with uniformed officers, and not just to “suck it into their black hole”, and they might find debate opening about their effectiveness.

In addition, Baruch and Hind (2000:29) describe the management of organisations today as dominated by the experience and consequences of change. Changes, be they business re-engineering processes, restructuring, flattening, etc., bring innovation - but also chaos and uncertainty - to the management of people in the workplace. It follows that many such changes have involved the reduction of employee numbers and a limitation in career opportunities. Not long ago a desired image, for many firms, was to be seen to offer a secure place to work. Now, the whole concept of a lifelong career in a company, or even an industry, has become exceptional rather than expected. Beyond merely downsizing, it is entirely plausible that over the course of an individual’s working life a given firm may cease to exist (at least independently), and any given industry may shrink through a process of cutbacks and mergers. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly well documented that employees who remain in an organisation after significant downsizing or delayering often experience the adverse effects of change as profoundly as those who have left. In addition, it is acknowledged that “survivors” of restructuring may become demotivated, cynical, insecure and demoralised. This might be as a result of stress and anxiety, based on fear of further downsizing or restructuring, or due to diminishing trust between employees and management – or, indeed, a combination of these factors.

Johnson (1994) is furthermore of the view that any plan for change should allow for incremental implementation, encourage employee participation, and provide continual communication and education on the project. Organisational change puts strain not only on the organisation as a whole, but also on individual employees within the organisation. In fact, if an organisation is to successfully implement change, a change strategy must be developed that takes the employee’s psychological processes into account. Implementing a change initiative without attending to such processes can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the potential to reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation and motivation (Elias, 2007:2).
Kouzes and Posner (as quoted by Elias, 2007:2) furthermore indicate that successful change requires employees to be intrinsically motivated, able to see change as a learning opportunity, and feel as though they have control over the change process.

3.2.3.3 Phase III: Follow through

Attentiveness to the reason for the new design should also be created. As a result, efforts to make it work should be invigorated and organisational members should realise that support processes’ changes take time and sustained energy. Dialogue should furthermore be kept open as people adjust to the new organisation. Furthermore, the reason for the new structure, as much as making it work, should be the focus of the process. As a result, this will energize people to focus on customer needs. Consequently, the process changes that must take place should be followed through. However, enthusiasm and employee involvement should be sustained until the support processes are fully in place. Sufficient time should then be allowed for employees to function and experiment within the new structure, whereafter communication with stakeholders should be maintained to plan important adjustments (Cooper, [s.a.]:4).

On the other hand, Hannan and Freeman (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993:11) propose that restructuring in general is disruptive, and thus, that it thus increases the rate of corporate failure. Hannan and Freeman argue that the selection pressures of population ecology reward organisations for being reliable and accountable. As a result, the attempt to adapt to environmental changes, particularly through corporate overhaul, increases the firm’s probability of failure *ceteris paribus* [Other things being equal: used to indicate that something would be the case if everything else under consideration remains the same]. In support of Hannan and Freeman, Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993:11) argue that change is hazardous because it destroys, by definition, some of the firm’s existing practices. This destruction, Amburgey et al. (1990:160-164) argue, must therefore be accompanied by a loss of corporate competence, due to the abandonment of familiar routines. Another proposition in this regard is that reorganisation may disrupt relationships with external actors that organisations need to survive (Anderson, as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993:11).
On the other hand, Swanson and Power (2001:161-162) are of the view that organisational change, frequent restructuring and downsizing have become accepted features of work in modern occupational environments. Although many changes may have positive long-term outcomes, the prevailing view in the literature suggests that the change process itself engenders tensions and insecurities, which lead to distress in both “victims” and “survivors” of the process. For the “victims” of restructuring, the fact of losing one’s job may rate as a major life event or stressor, which may or may not be cushioned by short-term financial gains in the case of redundancy. However, the “survivors” of organisational restructuring also experience job insecurity in the lead up to the changes, and increased job demands after reorganisation, which have been shown to have a negative impact on physical and mental health. Role stressors, including ambiguities, conflicts of interest and increased workloads may all contribute towards lowered morale for surviving workers post-restructuring. Such increases in workload may occur as a result of coming to grips with new or unfamiliar structures, new responsibilities or technologies, or may be due to reduced manpower resources and support from managers or colleagues. However, Bergh and Ngah-Kiing (2008:598) are of the opinion that firms having more experience with restructuring are likely to have higher post-restructuring performance than those having less.

There is variation in the way authors view the negative effects of restructuring on performance. Amburgey et al. (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993:11), for example, claim that “like a powerful elixir, organisational change may be deadly – but if survived may promise good health”. In other words, they suggest a greater hazard of failure in the near term following organisational restructuring, but good performance if the hazardous period is successfully weathered by the organisation. Conversely, Zajac and Kraatz (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993:11), in their study of the restructuring of colleges in response to environmental changes show that restructuring is, in fact, beneficial to organisations. As a result, Zajac and Kraatz conclude that restructuring is a common and predictable response to radical changes in the environment. Moreover, examples of companies involved in restructuring programmes are evident throughout all markets and industries.
Organisations are redefining their strategy by focusing their attention on their customer base and re-engineering their business processes accordingly. It follows that restructuring often leads to the breakup of an organisation into focused businesses, which is seen as the only mechanism to ensure competitiveness within the organisation (Chaharbaghi & Nugent, 1994:47).

In agreement with Zajac and Kraatz, Fay and Luhrmann (as quoted by Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:829) are of the opinion that the dominant position is that change is essential and that organisations are always changing. About thirty years of research support this axiom, often illustrating the strategic advantages of restructured organisations (Dunbar & Starbuck, as quoted by Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:829). McKinley and Scherer (2000:737) are of the opinion that although organisational restructuring certainly has consequences, they are outside the domain of the restructuring construct itself. This implies that since the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of organisational restructuring has to be judged by restructuring’s consequences and the implication of those consequences for different organisational constituencies, there is no good or bad restructuring in our definitional repertoire. Therefore, organisational restructuring might have good or bad outcomes, but it is not in itself good or bad. Stated differently, restructuring can be managed effectively, but there can be significant negative consequences associated with poorly managed restructured programmes (Bowman & Singh, 1993:7).

However, the contemporary organisational realities of restructuring, among others, have not only changed organisational systems. They have had a major effect – mostly negative - on workers in them, and continue to take their toll on employees at all levels (Burke & Nelson, 1997:328,333). In addition, Ford (2007:321) is of the view that effective leaders do not merely prepare an organisation prior to a change effort. They must have the patience to constantly build the capacity for change among organisational members throughout the various stages of the change effort. Leading-edge organisations are deriving ever increasing value by tapping into employee and stakeholder expertise and capability.

Business and police organisations worldwide are increasingly faced with challenges to their increasingly complex environment. Consequently, these organisations are obligated to review and adapt their organisational structure in order to address these challenges and to meet the needs
of the communities they serve. Once again, it has to be emphasised that it is not the goal of this study to deal with, in particular, restructuring processes in national and international business and police organisations, but to lay emphasis on the significance of restructuring in such organisations, as well as to recognise the importance for business and police organisations to endeavour in restructuring processes. Furthermore, this study will identify lessons that can be learnt from these organisations’ restructuring efforts for change in the SAPS, in order to substantiate the significance of such changes for policing organisations.

Examples of multinational and national non-policing organisations’ restructuring processes follow.

### 3.3 Organisational Restructuring: Multinational and National Examples of Non-Policing Organisations

As the organisational environment becomes increasingly complex and more subject to changes, the need to reformulate the organisation’s structure and/or to adjust elements of the existing structure becomes more frequent. As a result, senior managers are challenged with the demand to incorporate various changes in the implementation of the modified structure. It is not the aspiration of this study to embrace, in particular, restructuring processes in international and national organisations, but to lay emphasis on the significance of restructuring, as well as to acknowledge the importance for national and foreign organisations to endeavour in restructuring processes. Additionally, this study will subsequently identify lessons that can be learnt from the international and national organisations, for change in the SAPS.

This literature review, therefore, presents a brief overview of the organisations of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Vodafone, Transnet and Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA), and points out some of the restructuring efforts that have already been carried out or identified for implementation in these organisations.

The first multinational non-policing organisation to be presented is the Royal Dutch/Shell Group.
3.3.1 Organisational Restructuring: The Royal Dutch/Shell Group

At the beginning of 2000, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies (Shell) was emerging from one of the most ambitious and far-reaching organisational restructurings of its 93-year history. However, this restructuring was introduced before 2000. Consequently, the restructuring had involved the shift from a geographically-based to a primarily business sector based structure, the elimination of over 1,000 corporate positions, the sale of much of its London headquarters, and the redesign of its systems of coordination and control. The restructuring had been precipitated by the realisation that Shell would need to change the way it did business if it was to retain its position as the world’s largest energy and chemicals company and offer an adequate return to shareholders in an increasingly turbulent industry environment. By the end of 1999 it was clear that the changes were showing results. Head office costs had been reduced, and the increased coordination and control that the new sector-based organisation permitted were helping Shell to control costs, focus capital expenditure and prune the business portfolio. Return on capital employed (ROCE) and return on equity (ROE) for 1999 were the highest in ten years (Grant, [s.a.]).

The reorganisation that had begun in 1994 under the chairman of the committee of managing directors, Cor Herkstroter, and continued under his successor, Mark Moody-Stuart, had transformed the organisational structure of Shell. From a decentralised confederation of over two hundred operating companies spread throughout the world, a divisionalised group with clear lines of authority and more effective executive leadership had been created. However, Shell remained a highly complex organisation that was a prisoner of its own illustrious history, and where corporate authority remained divided between The Hague, London, and Houston (Grant, [s.a.]).

Faced with growing evidence of suboptimal financial performance and an over-complex, inward-looking organisational structure, Herkstroter called a meeting of Shell’s fifty top managers in May 1994. The outcome was the appointment of a high-level team to study Shell’s internal organisation and come up with options for redesign. The driving force behind the redesign was the desire to have a simpler structure in which the reporting relationships would be
clearer, and thus to allow the corporate centre to exert more effective influence and control over the operating companies. A simpler structure would help eliminate some of the cost and inertia of the head office bureaucracies that had built up around Shell’s elaborate committee system. There was also a need to improve coordination between the operating companies. This coordination, it was felt, should be based upon the business sectors rather than on geographical regions (Grant, [s.a.]).

The central feature of the reorganisation plan of 1995 was the dismantling of the three-way matrix through which the operating companies had been coordinated since the 1960s. In its place, four business organisations were created to achieve closer integration within each business sector across all countries. It was intended that the new structure would allow for more effective planning and control within each of the businesses, remove much of the top-heavy bureaucracy that had imposed a costly burden on the group, and eliminate the power of the regional fiefdoms. The new structure would strengthen the executive authority of the committee of managing directors by providing a clearer line of command to the business organisations - and subsequently to the operating companies - and by splitting central staff functions into a corporate centre and a professional services organisation (Grant, [s.a.]).

As Royal Dutch/Shell approached the second century of its corporate life, there was a clear consensus within the company that the organisational changes made during 1995–9 had created a structure that was much better able to respond to the uncertainties and continuous changes that affected the oil industry. Outside the company, Shell-watchers both in the investment community and in other oil companies had little doubt that the 1996 reorganisation had contributed substantially to the efficient and effective management of the group. The stripping away of much of the administrative structure in the group’s head offices in London and The Hague, the elimination of the regional coordinating staff, and the closure of some of Shell’s biggest national headquarters not only reduced cost, but seemed to be moving Shell towards a swifter, more direct style of management. The restructuring of chemicals and downstream businesses revealed both a tough-mindedness and a decisiveness that few had associated with the “old” Shell (Grant, [s.a.]).
It follows that the SAPS could learn valuable lessons for change in its organisation, that can be learnt from the restructuring of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. The extensive nature of this group’s viable restructuring initiative, and the sustainability thereof, could be a significant indicator to the SAPS’s restructuring efforts in terms of identifying practicable and achievable solutions to their change efforts. Moreover, Shell’s character to take their shareholders’ interests into consideration during their change initiative, reflects an organisation that values external partnership and interaction with its clients. It follows that the SAPS could also learn from Shell’s attributes by interacting more closely with its clients, namely, the South Africa community, during its change initiatives. The involvement of a large number of Shell’s top structure in the decisionmaking process, furthermore, features it as an organisation that values participative decisionmaking. The SAPS could apply participative decisionmaking in its change efforts, by involving its members. The simplified organisational structure adopted by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group could be to the advantage of the SAPS, if the organisation similarly embraced a simplified organisational structure by becoming more sub-divisionally - rather than divisionally - structured. In addition, a simpler structure for the SAPS could also facilitate the eradication of the organisation’s administrative bureaucracies that, in turn, could enhance internal communication.

As a result, the SAPS’s structure could encourage a more outward-looking structure, thus improving service delivery, rather than focusing inwards towards the organisation’s internal shortcomings. The simplicity of such a structure would, in turn, remove much of the top-heavy bureaucracy characterised in the SAPS. Moreover, the introduction of uncomplicated coordination and control mechanisms by the SAPS, similar to the Royal Dutch/Shell Group during its restructuring process, could result in improved managerial control benefits on the lower hierarchical levels of the organisation, as well as attention on the focus of its primary functions. As a result, a more direct style of management - and thus a clearer line of command - would result in the strengthening of authority on the lower hierarchical levels in the SAPS. In addition, decisionmaking and vertical communication in the SAPS would benefit from the direct style of management.

The second multinational non-policing organisation to be presented is Vodafone.
3.3.2 Restructuring Vodafone

The mobile giant Vodafone replaced its current structure - which was based largely on specific countries - and instead took a more consolidated, regional approach, in addition to creating a unit focused solely on creating new businesses. The three new business units are Europe, including such markets as Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom; Central Europe, the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and its affiliates; and New Businesses and Innovation. The company did, however, point out that the restructuring should allow for more cost cuts, particularly in more mature markets in industrialised countries, and make operations in emerging markets more profitable. Chief Executive Arun Sarin said: "This new structure is an important step forward for the group as it is aligned with Vodafone’s evolving strategy and addresses the different priorities across the group. It will enable us to continue to outperform our competitors as the changes deliver a streamlined and simple structure with a clear focus" (Vodafone's restructuring ..., 2006).

In addition, Vodafone had created the New Business and Innovation Unit (NBIU) earlier in 2006 in a restructuring process that also included dividing the business into two geographic regions. Under the terms of the latest initiative, the NBIU’s responsibilities in developing the mobile plus strategy would be devolved to the operating companies and to the European region. A group strategy and new business function would identify new business opportunities and key partners. However, Vodafone had announced that it was axing its NBIU division, and as a result of this restructuring, the unit’s CEO, Thomas Geitner, would quit the company. Vodafone had said that its NBIU would be absorbed back into the structure of the company (Vodafone axes innovation division, 2006). Meanwhile, Vodafone had also restructured, realigned business units and reshuffled personnel, although not entirely with a great deal of coherence. The NBIU is a good example. Set up six months ago, it was heralded as a crucial element in a revised structure that would reinvigorate the organisation and halt slowing growth. It was given the task of heading up the convergence strategy (Vodafone's diversion, 2006).

Moreover, Vodafone Italy began a strategic partnership with a customer care company, Comdata Care, in November 2007. Consequently, approximately 900 back office and credit management employees were outsourced to the partner company, with no redundancies as a result. Vodafone
Italy agreed that these employees would be protected from redundancy for the duration of its seven-year contract with Comdata and there would be no change to the current employment terms. These agreements were developed in consultation with trade unions and the Italian government. To facilitate a smooth transition, selected managers were trained in how to support people affected by this change.

Furthermore, Vodafone Germany restructured its sales function in 2007/08, affecting 1,600 employees. Around 2,000 call centre employees in Germany were given training to adapt to new management structures. These changes were made in agreement with the Works Council. Additionally, in March 2008, Vodafone UK announced a reorganisation to improve customer service and respond to new market challenges. This was likely to affect 450 existing employees, as well as creating new jobs in customer service roles. Vodafone UK consults with employees through one-to-one meetings with managers and through a Collective Consultation Forum of employee representatives. Affected employees are offered redeployment and outplacement support (Organisation and change ..., 2007).

In addition, the SAPS could furthermore learn significant lessons from Vodafone’s restructuring. Firstly, changes in the SAPS should similarly be simplified with a clearer focus, in order for members to have a comprehensive understanding of such changes. Secondly, Vodafone’s consultative interaction during the company’s restructuring with its employees could act as a valuable lesson for the SAPS during its change processes. Consultation with employees during change acts as a powerful communication tool. Thirdly, Vodacom’s support structure for affected employees of the restructuring process during the company’s restructuring efforts has to most certainly be considered as an important lesson to be learnt by the SAPS. Lastly, Vodafone’s initiative to involve employees during its restructuring, in the form of employee representatives, should be clearly noted by the SAPS. Employee representation and participation in the SAPS during change processes would create a sense of involvement by members and could reduce resistance to change.

The first national organisation to be presented is Transnet.
3.3.3 Transnet Restructuring

Transnet is a large South African rail, port and pipeline company. It was formed as a limited company on 1 April 1990. The majority of the company’s stock is owned by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) of the South African government. The company was formed by restructuring into business units the operations of the then South African Railways and Harbours and other existing operations and products. (Transnet, 2008).

It follows that this state logistics and transport giant Transnet is undergoing a makeover, in order to help South African businesses become more globally competitive. Writing in the 2003/2004 annual report, group chief executive Maria Ramos indicated that the current structure of Transnet does not provide the platform necessary to maximise the growth and competitiveness inherent in the South African economy. Transnet has shown an increasing inability to respond to the demands of its business environment. According to Ramos, Transnet’s structure and size do not facilitate the ability to provide a competitive and integrated transport and intermodal service. In addition, inadequate corporate governance and lapses in financial discipline and risk management have resulted in poor operating performances and substantial financial impairments in many businesses within the group. Moreover, inefficiencies, low margins, investment backlogs, aged assets and infrastructure, as well as the maintenance costs of underutilised rail networks and port infrastructure, are undermining operational returns. In response, Transnet developed a strategic plan designed to meet the challenges posed by globalisation and to integrate the needs of the company’s First and Second Economy. Transnet’s core port and rail operations play a pivotal role in South Africa’s First Economy and its increasing global exposure. It follows that Transnet will be focusing on its rail and harbour operations and divesting itself of other interests, such as South African Airways.

As has been done with the National Ports Authority and the South African Ports Operations, Transnet intends to separate the operational and infrastructural elements within Spoornet. Consequently, Transnet intends, with this vertical separation, to sharpen the company’s focus and allow them to introduce, inter alia, public-private partnerships more readily into the group. Transnet’s strategy will therefore have a strong focus on service levels (Transnet restructuring ..., 2005).
In addition, the Minister of Public Enterprises indicated that Transnet will be streamlined to focus on freight and pipeline transportation and that the company will exit from a range of non-core assets, which will still primarily remain in the hands of Government. Passenger rail services will be combined and placed under the direction of the Minister and Department of Transport and the South African Airways will become a stand-alone SOE (South Africa, 2006).

Moreover, according to South Africa (2000:7-8) the above restructuring plan of Transnet is likely to have the following impacts:

- The restructuring of Transnet’s debt will enable the enterprise to operate on commercial principles. As a result, it will enable the various divisions to operate as independent business units without cross-subsidising each other’s contributions towards the debt. Transnet and its various business units will therefore be able to make market decisions.
- The concessioning of Coallink, Orex, LuxRail and LinkRail will mobilise private sector capital and expertise (both locally and internationally).
- The commercialisation of Spoornet’s general freight business (GFB) will ensure that it operates on market principles. This should enable it to offer more efficient and effective services.
- Because of the high levels of over-employment in Spoornet, the current transformation process and the envisaged restructuring will result in job losses. Where possible, alternative job opportunities are being investigated.
- The restructuring of ports is likely to improve their service levels, as well as ensuring that South Africa has ports that are able to meet the needs of a growing economy.
- The separation of the ports into a ports authority and port operations will separate the landlord function from the operation of the ports.
- The privatisation of port operations should improve the level of service and the competitiveness of the ports.
- The restructuring of South African Airways (SAA) has already shown benefits in terms of the airline’s efficiency.
- The incorporation of Petronet will ensure that it offers a cost-effective service.
• The disposal of non-core units within Transnet will ensure that it focuses on its core business and improves its effectiveness.

According to the article *Transnet takes a new road* (2007), Transnet launched its new corporate brand identity, signalling the culmination of a three-year transformation from a diversified conglomerate into a focused and integrated bulk freight transport company. The new brand’s role is multifaceted to (a) co-ordinate and differentiate the portfolio of port, rail and pipeline businesses, each having built their own varying degrees of brand affinity and recognition; (b) to reflect Transnet’s global appeal; (c) to differentiate the parastatal among other parastatals and global South African businesses; (d) to signal a new era in the transformation and restructuring of Transnet; and (e) to communicate the “one company, one vision” platform for Transnet going forward, while becoming a rallying point for building a new Transnet culture internally. As a result, the implications of the re-brand means there is now one dominant, overarching brand with the various sub-brands identified only descriptively in relation to the parent brand. It follows that this has necessitated a name change for some of the familiar Transnet operating divisions. While Transnet Limited’s corporate brand remains, Spoornet has become Transnet Freight Rail, South African Port Operations is now Transnet Port Terminals, National Ports Authority is now Transnet National Ports Authority, Transwerk becomes Transnet Rail Engineering, and Petronet becomes Transnet Pipelines. Consequently, Transnet’s three-year turnaround strategy has worked well to create a strong foundation for the transport utility’s new four-point growth strategy the group chief executive indicated. In addition, an era of upheaval marked by low profitability is now a part of the company’s history (*Transnet says ...*, 2008).

An over-complex organisational structure does not foster effective service delivery, growth and competitiveness in any organisation. Firstly, this is one important lesson to be learnt by the SAPS from the restructuring process of Transnet. Secondly, Transnet’s vertical separation of the operational and infrastructural elements of one of its businesses could furthermore act as a lesson for the SAPS. It follows that the SAPS’s operational and infrastructural components could also be vertically separated, in order to enhance the focus on service delivery and crime prevention.

The second national organisation and last non-policing organisation to be discussed is Amalgamated Banks of South Africa.
3.3.4 Restructuring: Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA)

Absa is based in Johannesburg and is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited (JSE). It is the largest consumer bank in South Africa and also one of South Africa’s largest financial services. Business is conducted primarily in South Africa and on the Africa continent, where it has equity holdings in banks in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. As at June 2006, Absa had assets of R466 billion, more than 720 physical outlets, 8.1 million customers, 6256 automated teller machines and 34 688 permanent employees. ABSA was formed in 1991 through the merger of the United, Allied and Volkskas Groups. This was followed in 1992 by acquisition of the Bankorp Group (which included Trust Bank and Bankfin). The banks each traded under their own names until 1998. The name was changed to Absa Group Limited in 1997. In 2005 Barclays Bank of the United Kingdom purchased a 56.4% stake in Absa, which represents the largest foreign direct investment in the country (Absa Group ..., 2008).

It follows that during late 2001 Absa informed Sasbo (the Finance Union (formerly the South African Society of Bank Officials) that it intended restructuring some of the functions of its Delivery Channel Services. At that time, Absa made it clear that Project Galaxy, as the process was named, would have a major impact on staff numbers. Project Galaxy, said the bank, had been devised to re-engineer its back-office branch processes to free branches to concentrate solely on customer service and sales. Consequently, the re-engineering would be achieved by centralising and automating the functions of its processing centres. As a result, an objective of the streamlining process would be to identify and remove non value added and duplicated services from the branches. An impact of the exercise would be that some processes would migrate from the branches to the central processing units (Group Administration) and call centres (Absa Direct). Absa’s restructuring plan resulted in continuous consultations between the bank, with the union being kept informed of progress each step of the way. They also involved its core Negotiation Consultative Forum (NCF) in all consultations - except where emergency meetings had to be held to sort out problems - and kept its regional offices fully informed on the project’s progress.
During one of the consultations, after in-depth deliberations, the parties agreed that the bank would restructure on a regional - as opposed to branch – level, to allow staff more scope to apply for vacancies at the bank. At the last consultation meeting, which took place on 20 September 2002, Absa provided Sasbo with an estimate of the number of staff affected by the re-engineering process. Although it was still premature to assess the exact impact on jobs, the outcome of the exercise looked promising. Absa gave the union its assurance that new positions would be created at Group Administration and Absa Direct. Natural attrition and redeployment would further combine to keep job losses to a minimum. In addition, despite the impact of Project Galaxy, some employees would remain in the branch back office to perform selected control activities and provide branch support. Staff not affected by the re-engineering process were switchboard operators, hosts, inquiries clerks, ATM custodians and front-line staff, i.e. tellers. The bank also indicated that some back-office branches in rural areas would not be affected by the project. Once the roll-out process has been completed at each branch, staff would be given a three-month reassignment period to seek employment elsewhere in the Group, or externally. The bank foresaw the project being completed by around July 2003 (Clearing ABSA confusion ..., 2002).

As a result, according to Personal Banking ... (2008), the successful absorption of new functions flowing from Project Galaxy added a new dimension to Group Administration’s scope of services. Consequently, internal service excellence and customer centricity have become interwoven in operational functions. This has therefore transformed Group Administration from a support function to an integral link in the delivery chain. Group Administration thus aims to be the sole administrative service provider in the ABSA Bank through the successful integration of Project Galaxy, process integration, optimisation and re-engineering, as well as in/out/co-sourcing opportunities. This will therefore improve the cost-to-income ratio and enable true customer centricity. However, the implementation of the new business model of Project Galaxy and ABSA Vehicle and Asset Finance (Bankfin) substantially reduced employee numbers in ABSA. Only 991 of the total reduction of 2 927 employees were actual retrenchments. Most of the affected employees were successfully reassigned within the ABSA Group, with a minimal effect on employee morale. Retrenched employees interested in self-employment were helped to prepare for its challenges by the ABSA Foundation (Employees ..., 2008).
ABSA’s continuous consultation efforts regarding its restructuring process are a valuable lesson to be learnt by the SAPS. The SAPS could thus also engage in constant consultation with its members during change initiatives. As a result, members would remain informed of each step of such a process.

A presentation and discussion of the literature review on restructuring processes in police organisations are presented below.

3.4 Restructuring Processes in Police Organisations

During the past two decades, governments in the major industrialised countries have sought to achieve greater efficiency in public sector expenditure. As a result, new management techniques, derived primarily from the private sector, have been introduced to restructure public sector agencies along broadly corporate lines, but with the important added dimension of accountability. These main catalysts for change have been common between western nations (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000:154). In recognition of Fleming and Lafferty, Neyroud (2007:16) is also of the opinion that the public sector is under pressure to prove itself and deliver its remit, and also produce demonstrable improvements that benefit the public and achieve value for money. Consequently, the public sector is constantly changing, with the creation of new start-up bodies and the merging and restructuring of departments and agencies as a result of this pressure.

In addition, Campbell (1996:23) is also of the belief that there can be hardly a government department or agency which has not experienced, or continues to experience, restructuring. It follows that policing is also being transformed and restructured in the modern world, and, as a result, has entered a new era characterised by a transformation in the governance of security. In other words, policing is undergoing a historic restructuring believed to be worldwide (Bayley & Shearing, 2001:vii,1). The explanations for the current restructuring of policing involve shortcomings of the public police, an increase in crime, the nature of economic systems, the character of government, and the social structure, ideas and culture.
In agreement with Bayley and Shearing, Maguire and King (2004:20) also confirm that several transformations in goals have reshaped the policing industry in recent years, and promise to continue doing so in the future.

In addition, Bayley and Shearing (1996:585-591) furthermore confirm the restructuring of policing, stating that over the past decade, police throughout the developed democratic world have increasingly questioned their role, operational strategies, organisation and management. This is attributable to growing doubts about the effectiveness of their traditional strategies in safeguarding the public from crime. In other words, the public police are going through an intense period of self-questioning - indeed, a true identity crisis. Public police are thus no longer confident that they are either effective or efficient in controlling crime, and they are anxiously examining every aspect of their performance – objectives, strategies, organisation, management, discipline, and accountability. As a result, these movements amount to the restructuring of policing in contemporary democratic societies. Stated differently, Bayley and Shearing (2001:17) describe the restructuring of policing under way in the world today as involving more than changes in the types of people who are involved in it. The character of policing – meaning its practices and activities – is also changing. As a result, the authors call these elements the “mentalities” of policing, because how policing is conducted reflects distinctive ways of thinking about it.

Bayley and Shearing (1996:585-591) furthermore argue that the police are also beginning to recognize that the traditional, quasi-military management model, based on ranks and hierarchical chain of command, may not accommodate the requirements of modern policing. As a result, several forces have recently eliminated redundant supervisory ranks, and almost all are talking about the value of participative, collegial management. This involves decentralising command and allowing subordinate commanders to determine the character of police operations in their areas. It follows that the restructuring of policing, which is already well advanced, has profound implications for public life, especially on the level and distribution of public safety, the vitality of civil rights, and the character of democratic government.
In support of the abovementioned literature, the organisational structures of large municipal police departments in the USA, for example, have changed substantially throughout the 20th century. Over the past two decades, community policing reformers have urged police executives to revamp their organisational structures and administrative practices in a number of ambitious ways. As a result, police executives have been implored by reformers to reduce the size of their administrative components, to decentralise (both territorially and administratively), to despecialise, to reduce the depth of their hierarchies, and to civilianise, replacing sworn officers with civilians in a variety of occupational specialties. However, police organisations have become more functionally differentiated throughout the 20th century, adding new bureaus, divisions and specialised units to perform separate functions as the need (or perceived need) arises. Under community policing, police organisations are supposed to become less functionally differentiated. Community policing officers are thus encouraged to become “uniformed generalists” responsible for developing customised responses to a wide variety of situations, rather than frequently referring citizens to other more specialised “cubbyholes” within the organisation. In addition, community police reformers have urged police agencies to reduce the depth of their hierarchies to improve the flow of communication throughout the organisation. This recommendation flows from a broader movement in both the public and private sectors to “flatten” or “delayerise” the organisation (Maguire, Shin, Zhao & Hassel, 2003:251,255-266).

However, King (as quoted by Maguire et al., 2003:266) argues that the existing research base is insufficient to support the conclusion that reducing the depth of the hierarchy will improve communication or other characteristics of organisations. In accordance with Maguire et al. (2003:251), Carter and McGoldrick (1994:63) similarly emphasise the significance of restructuring police services through illustrating restructuring in the police service of the United Kingdom (UK). For example, the UK police service has found itself undermined by the same problems as other state monopolies: high and rising costs, top-heavy bureaucracy, a lack of flexibility, and a propensity to favour ever greater increments in resourcing. As a result, new working practices and methods are slow to be implemented because of the inherent conservatism of the structure. Consequently, considerable pressure has mounted to review performance in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and value for money, while providing a quality service. In other words, the structure of Britain’s police - last reformed in 1964 - does not fit the demands of
the 1990s. Maguire et al. (2003:268) are furthermore of the view that organisational reformers in the 1990s hailed the benefits of decentralisation for both business firms and public agencies. Police reformers followed suit, as the community policing reform rhetoric began to embrace concepts such as “participatory management” and “empowerment” of lower level employees, supervisors and administrators, and “shared” decision making. It follows that research on police innovation has shown that decentralisation is viewed by experts in policing as one of the most important administrative innovations of the 1990s.

Viewed historically, Bayley and Shearing (2001:1-2,35) are furthermore of the opinion that what is happening to policing is not unprecedented. It could be argued that the monopolisation of policing by government is an aberration. The authors then question if the current restructuring of policing is, then, simply a return to the past, another cycle in the historical ebb and flow of policing power between governmental and nongovernmental agencies. It follows that the restructuring of policing that is taking place today is, however, taking a different form than in the past, because contemporary societies are organised differently from previous ones. Indeed, the concepts and terminology inherited from the past are inadequate for understanding what is happening today. As a result, for policymakers to comprehend, and possibly deal effectively with the current transformation in policing, it will be necessary to examine contemporary developments with a fresh intellectual eye. However, the current transformation of policing has not yet attracted the sustained scholarly attention it deserves. Although researchers have “nibbled around the edges” of the topic, the extent, nature and impact of police restructuring have yet to be determined. Although the authors believe the restructuring of policing is worldwide, it remains for new research to document its extent across the globe. Yet, it is known that the change is occurring across the divide of economic development, with developing democracies participating along with developed ones.

Examples of restructuring in policing organisations internationally, are succinctly presented below.
3.4.1 Restructuring police organisations: International examples

Police organisations worldwide are increasingly faced with challenges to their growingly complex environment. Consequently, these police organisations are obligated to review and adapt their organisational structure in order to address these challenges and to meet the needs of the communities they serve. Once again, it has to be emphasised that it is not the goal of this study to deal with, in particular, restructuring processes in international police organisations, but to lay emphasis on the significance of restructuring in such organisations, as well as to recognise the importance for international police organisations to endeavour in restructuring processes. Furthermore, this study will then identify lessons that can be learnt from these international police organisations’ restructuring efforts for change in the SAPS, in order to substantiate the significance of such changes for policing organisations.

This review of the literature, therefore, presents a concise summary of the restructuring efforts in the police organisations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Australia, Turkey, Sierra Leone and England and Wales, and indicates various restructuring efforts that have been implemented in these organisations or identified to be implemented.

The first police organisation to be presented is the Bosnia-Herzegovina police.

3.4.1.1 Police restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The 1992-1995 war left Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) with three police forces: Bosniak, Croat and Serb, each with its own jurisdictions (Bosnia’s stalled police reform ..., 2005:3). During and immediately after the war, the police were organised in parallel structures along ethnic lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croats controlled the Western parts which they called the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna. The Serbian police had their headquarters in Pale, while the Bosniak police force was based in Sarajevo and controlled the districts of Central Bosnia. The police were further under the influence of the intelligence services and operated as a tool in the service of the political regime via the respective Ministers of Interior (Wisler, [s.a.]:140).
Furthermore, according to Muehlmann (2007:37-40), the police restructuring efforts in Bosnia, driven by the international community, using in particular the leverage of European integration, attempted to achieve a reform that would transform a very fragmented police system into a depoliticised single structure. Once the discussion was initiated in early 2004, police restructuring increasingly dominated the political life and public debate in Bosnia during 2004 and 2005. The Bosnian political system was built on a complex, decentralised, multi-layer and mainly ethno-political power-sharing model. It followed that most competencies were vested on the level of two entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Federation). While the Republika Srpska, a more centralised entity, created one unified police body that was regionally subdivided, the fragmented Federation entity created eleven different and independent police forces, all commanded under different regulations. All these police forces were very different in size and had different legal bases, preventing the formation of one single security area within Bosnia.

In addition, the total number of serving police officers was excessive - 16 800 police officers in 2004 (a number proportionate to most Western European countries would be 11 000). This, along with similar overstaffing in all other parts of the administration system, led to an excessive financial burden, raising fears of bankruptcy at both entity and state levels. Another downside of the system was that the boundaries of police districts had been drawn according to front lines during the war, rather than on technical policing criteria. While the division made sense in some areas, the system created was totally dysfunctional in others. This fragmented system encouraged a tendency of non-cooperation among different police elements and a lack of willingness to create institutional frameworks. As a result, it allowed for ethnically composed policing elements, which acted largely independently from one another and remained under the influence of their wartime political masters. In addition, there was an unhealthy political interference in operational policing – a legacy of the war and also of the country’s communist past.

Almost ten years of international policing in Bosnia, under the leadership of the United Nations-led International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) (which took over from the IPTF in early 2003), tried to cope with the challenges of the Bosnian policing system and to increase its effectivity and efficiency. Furthermore, taking the initiative in
2004 to trigger the restructuring of the Bosnian police was based on a variety of very sound reasons. Politically, it was necessary to create a modern police force, without political interference in operational police work, within an efficient political and legal framework. Economically, it was necessary to make the system sustainable and viable in the long run. From a policing perspective it was also necessary, in order to create a single security space for the country, sub-divided according to technical policing criteria, fit to fight crime and organised crime in particular. Considering these police restructuring discussions as a “case study” for internationally-led negotiations in the area of security sector reform, the case of Bosnia is a very telling one. It started from a valid point – an insufficient police structure – but it was an internationally imposed discussion, including imposed timelines that fitted the main international proponents, but were not compatible with the importance that such fundamental changes to the security sector (at the very heart of every political system) – signified for the political elite of Bosnia.

After numerous discussions, political agreement on police reform was reached on 7 November 2005, which called for implementation to begin without delay. Police reform, however, entered a different dimension, as it was the most far-reaching reform envisaged by the international community up to that point in time. Police reform was not a technical undertaking, merely about improving security and policing; it also meant decisive changes in the political and constitutional landscape of Bosnia (Muehlmann, 2007:53).

In no other country of the region has the international community spent more money on police reform, and fielded larger police reform missions, than in Bosnia. However, no other country has faced a similar crisis over this issue. As a result, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) offers ten arguments in favour of police restructuring in Bosnia:

- Police restructuring will make police accountable to the citizen first not to politics.
- Police restructuring will make BiH safer for citizens, tougher for criminals.
- Police restructuring will get rid of barriers that help criminals and hinder the police.
- Police restructuring will cut bureaucracy and beef up crime fighting.
- Police restructuring will rationalise the use of scarce resources.
• Police restructuring will provide the police with modern equipment to fight crime.
• Police restructuring is a European Union requirement.
• Without police restructuring, there will be no change in European visa requirements for BiH citizens.
• Police restructuring will mean new career opportunities for police officers across BiH.
• Police restructuring will mean that a police officer will receive the same salary for the same job anywhere in BiH (The worst in class, 2007:9).

The SAPS could furthermore learn valuable lessons from the shortcomings experienced by the BiH police restructuring. At first, the excessive employment of administrative personnel placed an unnecessary financial burden on the restructuring efforts of the BiH police. As a result, the SAPS has to ensure that it has a streamlined administrative system that justifies the magnitude of the organisation, in order to simplify change efforts with the emphasis on higher operational personnel turnover. Secondly, the restructuring effort in BiH indicates the incorrect identification and implementation of police districts, and signifies the importance of the appropriate demarcation of police districts based on technically operational policing criteria. More specifically, the SAPS could learn that policing districts cannot be set on political or emotional orientation during change efforts, but rather on concrete operational and technical policing grounds, within an efficient political and legal framework.

The second police organisation, the Australian police follow.

3.4.1.2 Restructuring Australian police organisations

During the 1980s, in response to government demands for cost-effectiveness and administrative accountability, the Australian public sector endeavoured to apply the private sector solution to the public sector problem. New managerial practices were implemented, with a view to changing the internal culture of organisations, increasing operational performance, efficiency and cooperation.
In a relatively short period of time these managerialist techniques came to dominate public and police administration in Australia and in most English-speaking countries (Dixon et al., as quoted by Fleming & Lafferty, 2000:155).

Through an examination of police organisations in Queensland and New South Wales, the impetus for organisational change, particularly in the context of employment practices, has largely been driven by revelations of entrenched corruption and police misconduct. As a result, organisational goals of accountability and cultural change have been the critical influences on the restructuring agenda (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000:154).

Australia’s policing system has one federal, six state and two territory jurisdictions. Before the 1980s, these police services were structured on authoritarian, paramilitary lines, and regulated through strict organisational rules and legislation. Recruitment, training and disciplinary processes were conducted internally, with little regard to merit or aptitude. Senior officers preferred this system, and although there were some misgivings within police organisations regarding its effectiveness, there was considerable resistance to change at all levels. However, the move to reconstruct police services as corporate entities was resisted vigorously by senior police officers, rank and file police and their unions. Nevertheless, the restructuring of police organisations was initiated in several police jurisdictions during the 1980s, with the introduction of such managerial practices as strategic planning, performance management and performance-based contract employment for senior executives (Palmer, as quoted by Fleming & Lafferty, 2000:155).

Budgetary considerations forced police organisations to adopt programme management schemes and to decentralise command. As responsibility for planning and budgeting was devolved to frontline managers, budgetary practices, once concerned solely with the management of police numbers, were refocused on the distribution of limited financial resources and operational outcomes.
Furthermore, in line with administrative trends, a process of “regionalisation” developed responsibility, authority and control in order to reduce overlap and duplication, improve efficiency and strengthen accountability. As a result, greater local accountability, autonomy, delegation and discretion replaced strong centralisation (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000:156).

The restructuring of the Australian police organisations furthermore signifies important lessons to be learnt by the SAPS. The introduction by the Australian police organisations of a business oriented management practice, as opposed to the undemocratic, top-down management style in these organisations, improved aspects such as managerial control, local accountability and decisionmaking at the lower hierarchical levels. The command structure is thus streamlined and “user-friendly” - which in turn develops improved responsibility and control of managers at these lower levels. As a result, strategic planning, communication and the management of performance at these lower hierarchical levels are furthermore improved. The SAPS could therefore learn significant lessons during its restructuring process, through the rationalisation of its management approach and command structure, with the impetus on greater local accountability, autonomy, delegation and discretion.

Thirdly, the Turkish police is presented.

3.4.1.3 Turkish police restructuring

According to Aydin (1996:39-53), although a certain amount of development and change has continuously taken place, the most rapid changes affecting the nature and context of policing in Turkey have been seen during the past few decades. During the 1960s and 1970s the change was towards more centralisation and militarisation, but, since then, this police organisation has attempted to become a more decentralised and democratic system. Currently there is a slow trend towards decentralisation from the existing highly centralised system, and there are some proposals for further organisational changes in the near future. Regarding Turkey, the idea that the introduction of the modern police was as a result of economic development and more specifically capitalism, or that it was a response to class struggle or changes in the class structure.
of a society, can be challenged. It is difficult to assert that the introduction of the professional police in Turkish history is related to the development of capitalism. The increase in the rate of crime and criminals and social and political disturbances in Turkey, which required reorganisation towards a modern professional police, is also the result of not only rapid urbanisation and industrialisation but also changes in the social and economic situation.

The “public police” consists of three separate national forces: the civil police and two military police forces (the gendarmerie and the coastal security guards). All the functions performed by the police and other military forces are the same, but normally the police are responsible for policing within the municipal boundaries of cities and towns, the gendarmerie work in rural areas, villages and small towns, and the coastal security guards are responsible for security of coasts and territorial waters. The organisations of all three forces have duplicate structures and facilities, such as separate budgets, central headquarters, provincial units, training schools and communication systems. The territorial organisation of the Turkish national police force corresponds to the administration subdivisions. There are three kinds of units or departments within the central organisation or headquarters: the principal, assistant and advisory units. The principle units are those which are responsible for main police work such as general security, and public order. Examples of this kind of unit are the departments of security, anti-terror, and traffic. Assistant units such as the departments of personnel affairs, health, and training deal with jobs which support and help the main units for a more effective policing service. Finally, advisory units like the inspection board, and the department of law, work directly under the command of the Director-General concerning their specialties to advise or inform the Director-General or other interested departments or offices. Below the large central organisation (Headquarters), there are police departments in 76 cities as sub-divisions of the central organisation. Each city police organisation also has sub-divisions in districts or small towns. At the final level of the national police there are local police stations, attached to the district police commanderates. Despite this large territorial distribution a vast majority of the police are clustered in the larger cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.

The Turkish police organisation has been highly centralised since its foundation and no demands have been made for local police organisations. Centralisation has been a traditional feature of the general political and administrative system in Turkish history. Turkey’s long tradition of civil
disorders has also been one of the factors which produced a police organisation as a public order force through a highly centralised and militarised system. Turkey’s centralised and militarised style of policing came from the centralised soldiery tradition of France. Therefore, the Turkish police system at present resembles that of the French with regard to tasks, national structure, nature of control, and internal organisational structures. Not only are regulations, standardisation and procedures identical throughout the country, but also the Ministry of the Interior has the authority to direct, control and fund the police force (Aydin, 1996: 39-53).

Currently, however, there is some evidence of a slow trend towards decentralisation, and the issue of decentralising the police is being discussed. Partly because of socio-economic and political development, and partly because it is becoming difficult to tackle some local problems from the center, there is a tendency towards localisation or regionalisation of policing. Although the slow trend towards decentralisation of the Turkish police is a development of the past decade, the most satisfactory efforts to change the system have been seen during the 1990s. In the move towards decentralisation, some police departments or services have been regionalised or localised, and the municipal police forces and the provincial departments of the police organisation have been given more power and responsibilities (Aydin, 1996:39-53).

The Turkish police organisation still needs significant changes, and it is likely that further restructuring in the police service will continue to take place. The service shows a great willingness to change. During the last few years there has been a stronger debate concerning further changes and there are a number of proposals for police organisational change. First of all, there are some proposals to change policing at the level of the local police stations. According to statistics issued in 1993, the total number of police stations in Turkey was 1185. It is generally argued that this number of local police stations is more than enough, and as a result, the number of police stations, especially in the major cities, is being decreased. It is also argued that the police should go to the people, rather than taking them to the police station to take statements and to collect evidence. The other important proposal which has been put forward for organisational changes in public policing in Turkey, concerns the abolition of the dual policing system: the civil and military police forces. As a result, the role of the gendarmerie should be redefined and its position clarified either as part of the military, or as part of the police under the
The restructuring of the Turkish police also holds lessons for the SAPS to learn. The fragmented Turkish police force, characterised by its separated police forces with duplicated structures, is a clear indication that the SAPS with its one national police service has more value through the elimination of duplicated functions and a clearly defined role.

The Sierra Leone police is now presented.

3.4.1.4 Restructuring the Sierra Leone Police

By the time Sierra Leone’s civil war was officially declared over in January 2002, more than 70 000 people had been killed, 10 000 maimed and more than half the population had fled the country or were internally displaced (Abrahamsen & Williams, [s.a.]:5). Meek (2003:105) describes the story of policing in Sierra Leone as not the most pleasant of tales. Distrusted and chased out of conflict zones during the war, the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) are challenged on multiple levels. Moreover, they are reasserting control for internal security in the country; building up a credible and effective police force, and re-engaging with local communities throughout Sierra Leone to build the trust of the local citizenry in the ability of the police to provide internal security. As a result, the need for developing a policing methodology that would meet these challenges was recognised at an early stage by both the Sierra Leone government and the members of the United Nations and the Commonwealth assistance team. Consequently, some of the key challenges facing the SLP included early questions about the size and structure of the revitalised police force, the type of policing it should engage in, and how policing could be exerted in the country, in the face of the widespread collapse of the criminal justice system.
It has become common wisdom to shift attention to police reform and issues of criminal justice, once the military threat recedes. Post-war societies tend to become plagued with high levels of criminality in the aftermath of armed conflict. Moreover, in many war-torn African countries, Sierra Leone being no exception, the boundaries between crime, corruption and conflict have become blurred during the course of the civil war. Britain supported the SLP transformation long before the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), by deploying an experienced United Kingdom top police officer Mr. Keith Biddle, to assist the government of this country. Such support was overdue for a police department that had been run down by years of war, and undermined by a culture of corruption, exacerbated by the neglect of successive governments which had systematically starved the police of the most basic resources. After a period as Commissioner of Police, Mr. Biddle took over as Inspector-General (IG) of Sierra Leone’s police force in July 1999. One of the IG’s first tasks has been to root out corruption. Consequently, a number of senior officers have been removed or retired, and a major effort has gone into training and a complete revision of rules, regulations and procedures. National standards and guidelines on discipline rank and structure, and a programme to raise police awareness in areas such as spousal and child abuse, are being instituted (Malan, Rakate & McIntyre, 2002).

The pre-war strength of the SLP was 9 317, comprising a majority of unarmed general duties officers and a paramilitary Special Service Division (SSD). By the time Sierra Leone’s civil war was officially declared over in January 2002, approximately 900 members of the SLP had been killed in the ensuing ten years of war, and a considerable number had suffered the amputation of limbs by the rebels. The SLP’s strength was reduced to a low 6 600, after which it has seen a slow build-up to the present strength of some 6 900. The exact desired and affordable level will be determined by a thorough review of the policing requirements for Sierra Leone. The requirement will probably be assessed at more than 9 300 police officers (Malan et al., 2002).

In discussions on reform of the police, the government of Sierra Leone and its international partners all recognised that building a new police force in Sierra Leone would require a dramatic departure from old-style policing in the country. The SLP needed to become a transparent and accountable service that was trusted by local citizens as much as by the national government. As
a result, the SLP was launched on a course of development with the “aim of creating a community police service, which is accountable to the people and is not an organ of the government”. It follows that this approach requires decentralising the police force to local level and bringing in the support of local communities, including the paramount chiefs, youth organisations and local organisations, as well as members of the public. Moreover, in terms of structure, the SLP is top heavy, with more supervisors than operational members of the force. As a result, many officers have been reassigned from traffic duty to criminal investigations (Meek, 2003:106-108).

In addition, and in support of Meek (2003:106-108), Gbla (2007) states that these recommendations and suggestions culminated in the Sierra Leone police restructuring programme. The government also released its Police Charter, which, among others, outlines the role of the police force in relation to the government and the people, with emphasis on equal opportunity, professionalism and local needs policing. Subsequently, the police force released its Mission Statement. It follows that various activities have been undertaken by the police restructuring programme to realise the principles and values of the Police Charter and Mission Statement, such as the operationalisation of the local needs policing concept. The concept stresses the need for involving people in a partnership with the police to maintain law and order. A community relations department at police headquarters is tasked to work in concert with all divisional commanders to promote local needs policing, develop and implement various crime prevention strategies with local unit commanders, and provide an efficient link between the police and the community. Additionally, a complaints, discipline and investigations department has been established that deals with complaints from the public about issues of police discipline and corruption and takes appropriate corrective action. Moreover, a change management department was also established, which among others aims at improving the efficiency and productivity of police force members, especially with regard to management of its affairs. It also seeks to groom Sierra Leonean police officers for leadership positions. The former special security department has been transformed into an operational support group, whose functions include controlling internal upheavals and performing all operational duties related to security.
Finally, the restructuring programme has put in place oversight mechanisms to watch over the police. One such mechanism is the police council, the highest police body, with power to provide civilian oversight of policing in Sierra Leone. The restructuring programme also makes provision for the appointment of women in senior positions in the force.

The force structure presently provides for four provincial commands, coinciding with the administrative provinces of Western Area, Northern Province, Southern Province, and Eastern Province, each under the command of an Assistant Commissioner. At the next level of organisation are the police divisions at district level (five of which have been established in the wake of successful disarmament). The idea is to expand the police divisions to twelve districts as the peace process progresses. The SLP is furthermore considering establishing approximately 30 community-level policing units. Like any police agency, the SLP also has specialist branches, such as a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and traffic police. The SSD will not, however, be disbanded, but is going to be “repositioned” to act in support of community policing, rather than being used, as it was in the past, as the armed wing of the ruling party (Malan et al., 2002).

Furthermore, according to Meek (2003:109,114), in its current policing approach the SLP is focused on working with communities, and not engaging in aggressive behaviour or policing tactics. It follows that by engaging with communities, traditional rulers and the district councils, the SLP should also start to meet its service delivery objectives and implement crime prevention measures. As a result, commanders have started to work with communities to identify issues of concern and possible remedies, while local rulers have been consulted to work out systems of cooperation between traditional methods and 21st-century policing. According to the Acting Inspector General, the largest challenge facing the SLP is personnel management – after years of neglect and infiltration of corrupt practices, a culture of management needs to be rebuilt. This includes increasing funding for the police, as well as decentralising the police force away from the capital, Freetown.
It follows that the SLP’s restructuring process could add valuable lessons for the SAPS’s change efforts. The SLP’s newly adopted focus on an improved community-based orientation, and engagement with such communities, emphasises the significance of the continuous communication, consultation and interaction with all role players during change efforts.

Lastly, the police services of England and Wales are presented.

### 3.4.1.5 Restructuring police services in England and Wales

- During 1998, Police Chief Charles H Ramsey announced a sweeping restructuring of the England and Wales Metropolitan Police Department that eliminates the top-heavy system of organisational bureaus, replacing them with a more streamlined organisation that puts more police resources in the community, cuts bureaucracy and holds department managers accountable for addressing crime and disorder problems in their geographic areas of responsibility. According to Ramsey, his restructuring plan would strengthen community policing by placing a wider range of police resources in the seven police districts, where they are more accessible to the community, and by focusing those resources on reducing crime and solving problems in the city’s neighborhoods. This restructuring would not alter the current boundaries of police districts or police service areas (PSA). In addition, Ramsey is of the opinion that this new structure represents nothing short of the wholesale transformation of the Metropolitan Police Department from a bureaucratic, incident-driven agency to a streamlined customer-driven service organisation (*Chief Ramsey announces...,* 1998). This restructuring plan constitutes the following:
- **Eliminate bureaus:** The current structure creates excessive bureaucracy and makes coordinating across units cumbersome. Consequently, the four existing bureaus (Patrol Services, Support Services, Technical Services and Human Resources) are being eliminated. It follows that they are being replaced by a more efficient organisation that promotes teamwork, communication and accountability.
- **Establish geographic accountability for fighting crime:** The new structure organises
police districts into three Regional Operations Commands (ROCs) - North, Central and East. Each ROC will be led by a regional assistant chief, whose office will be located in the community, not at Police Headquarters. The regional assistant chief will be accountable for managing resources and coordinating crime-fighting efforts throughout the region.

- **Create full-service police districts:** The role of the seven police districts is being dramatically expanded from a narrow focus on patrol to the full range of police services needed to solve crimes and address neighborhood problems. In addition to PSA patrol services, the districts will include violent and property crime investigations, focused mission teams, and operational support and customer service units. By placing violent and property crime detectives in the districts, the over-specialisation of personnel who only investigate one type of crime, is being eliminated.

- **Streamline business operations:** Administrative and technical functions are being consolidated under a new corporate support structure. Led by an assistant chief, this single structure will better coordinate the delivery of services in four key areas: human services, business services, training services and operational support services (*Chief Ramsey announces...*, 1998).

Furthermore, in September 2005, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) published the report “*Closing the Gap*”, which examined the police service’s capacity and capability to deliver protective services. The report concluded that the current structure of 43 police services across England and Wales was no longer fit for purpose. Consequently, the report promoted the position that larger strategic forces would be better placed to deliver services, and that such forces could offer significant savings in organisational support costs (Flett & Collier, 2005:1). As a result, Government concluded that police forces needed to have a minimum of 4 000 police officers, or 6 000 police officers and staff combined, to provide effective protective policing services covering terrorism, major crime and civil emergencies (Paterson, [s.a.]:1).

Subsequently, according to Loveday (2005:339-340), the 43 police forces of England and Wales would be replaced with 12-15 regional strategic police forces. However, one consequence of the report and the Home Secretary’s response to it, was the request made to all police authorities and
forces to present a business case to the Home Office by the end of 2005, identifying the future structure of policing in the region and the pattern of amalgamation they might favour. In the course of this exercise it was found that alternatives to amalgamation, collaboration and federation had both been closed down by the Home Secretary, who concluded that only the option of amalgamation was now acceptable to his department. In what proved to be almost unprecedented in terms of speed of implementation, the Home Secretary gave deadlines for all forces to provide him with plans for future amalgamations on a regional basis. However, as currently constituted, many police forces were unable, in terms of manpower and resources, to support a range of protective services, and this had to be addressed with some degree of urgency. In response to this, many police authorities agreed, albeit reluctantly, to draw up business plans for restructuring. On the other hand, it also became apparent in the short period within which this exercise was conducted, that there were significant differences of opinion between tripartite members as to what form the eventual outcome of reform was likely to take.

As a result, the following restructure proposals are examples of police restructuring in England and Wales:

3.4.1.5.1 North Yorkshire Police Authority

According to the article *Restructuring proposals for North Yorkshire Police* (2006:12) the Home Secretary intended to seek parliamentary approval later that year to amalgamate North Yorkshire Police (NYP) with the three other police services in the Yorkshire and Humber region, to create a regional police force from 1 April 2008. As a result, this new Force would have approximately 12 000 police officers, 8 000 police staff and a budget of just under £1 billion. This strategic amalgamation of existing forces could produce the necessary scale of organisation to address the existing deficiencies of the majority of forces in England and Wales in tackling serious crime. The issue was all about creating the necessary specialisms within police forces, to be able to effectively tackle major crime and public order incidents, serious and cross-border crime and counter-terrorism – the “protective services”. It was furthermore anticipated that by pooling the existing protective services capacity within the region and then re-allocating them - even without
investing further resources- it should be possible to make significant improvements to effectiveness. However, this would be a very large organisation in terms of geographical coverage and resources. In addition, many people felt that local people would lose control of policing, and that as a result, resources currently spent in this area would be allocated to high-crime areas elsewhere in the region. It was furthermore argued, on the other hand, that whenever there was a major crime incident in the area, police officers from communities throughout the force needed to be utilised to deal with such incidents. Consequently, this took officers from the very areas where they were most valued by communities – close to the communities. Objections to those proposals had to be lodged with the Home Office by 11 August 2008.

3.4.1.5.2 Police forces in the East Midlands

According to Coleman and Birkin (2006), the Home Secretary was proposing to merge Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and Northamptonshire, to form a single East Midlands “Force” from April 2008. Alongside the proposal was a commitment from the Home Office to strengthen local policing. As a result, community policing teams were being established across the Country to deal with local problems such as antisocial behaviour. The Home Secretary pledged that there would be such teams in every area in the country by April 2008. The merger process has therefore been driven by the need to improve what has become known as “protective services” across the region, both now and in the future. It follows that the five forces in the East Midlands were assessed as unable to meet the required standard in both level and range of protective services, due largely to funding issues, and recognised the need to reconsider how protective services are delivered.

However, as a major turning point, Tendler and Webster (2006) announced that government plans for the £ 1 billion merger of police forces across England and Wales had collapsed. As a result, this decision marked the end of the biggest police reform for 40 years, which was proposed after concern that smaller forces were failing to cope with high profile investigations and counter-terrorism operations. In addition, there were concerns about bills which could include millions in IT costs, redundancies and pensions. One of the biggest areas of concern was
that different forces required different levels of precept, the section of the annual tax bill for policing. Consequently, if merged forces took the precept of the force with the highest level, that would be unfair on thousands of council tax payers. On the other hand, if the lowest level was set – suggested by ministers – the new forces would run into cash crises.

Similar to the England and Wales Metropolitan Police Department, the SAPS also recognised the importance of a flattened police structure, through the elimination of many layers of command. The elimination of bureaus in the England and Wales Metropolitan Police Department by replacing these bureaus with one efficient unit, could act as a valuable lesson for the SAPS in order to improve communication and interaction between various units within the organisation.

3.5 Summary

This chapter presented a review of the literature on restructuring processes in organisations. The purpose of this chapter was to explain what other researchers have discovered about the restructuring processes in organisations, in order to obtain a detailed perceptive of the topic and to compare it with the present study. In addition, examples were provided of the restructuring processes that national and international organisations, including policing and non-policing organisations, have embarked upon to emphasise the significance and the relevance of restructuring in organisations, as well as the trends such organisations pursue to reformulate the organisation’s structure and/or to adjust elements of the existing structures.

Moreover, the lessons identified, that can be learnt from the international and national organisations, for change in the SAPS, thus explain how and where restructuring has taken place. In other words, the identified lessons that can be learnt thus substantiate the significance of such changes for policing organisations.

Chapter 4 provides a presentation and discussion of the results. The presentation, analysis and integration of the qualitative data are presented and discussed, according to emergent themes and subcategories.
CHAPTER 4  PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter the presentation, analysis and integration of the qualitative data (semi-structured individual interviews and focus group interviews, as discussed in paragraph 1.10.4 of chapter 1) are presented and discussed by means of emergent themes and subcategories, to categorise patterns or trends that can be identified or isolated in order to indicate the realisation of the goal and objectives of this study, as mentioned in paragraph 1.4 of chapter 1. Initially, and to realise these goals, nine semi-structured individual and focus group interviews were conducted with different stakeholders directly involved with the FCS. In-depth discussions were held with an independent qualitative researcher, to substantiate on the emergent themes and subcategories, with the aim of triangulation of the data analysis.

In order to promote the trustworthiness of the study, the research methodology, as discussed in paragraph 1.10 of chapter 1, was implemented and adhered to in the gathering and analysis of the data. The demographic particulars of the research participants are presented in Annexure B.

During the process of data collection (i.e. the semi-structured individual and focus group interviews) the objectives and resultant questions, reflected in Annexure A, were used as a guideline to structure the discussion. From the participants’ answers to the aforementioned questions, the resultant processes of data analysis by the researcher and independent coder and the consequent consensus discussion, the following main themes, reflected in Annexure C, emerged. In this table an exposition is provided of the themes and sub-themes.

The results of the individual interviews and focus group interviews follow.
4.2 The Outcome of the Individual Interviews and Focus Group Interviews

In the next section of this discussion, each of the main themes and accompanying subcategories (where applicable) are presented and confirmed or underscored by direct quotes from the transcripts of the interviews.

Initially, an explanation of each theme is given, followed by the responses to the questions. In addition, direct verbatim reflections of the respondents’ responses are also presented, in order to enrich these responses. Finally, subsequent to the presentation of each theme and its subcategories, a critical reflection is presented, which concludes each theme.

The first theme to be discussed explores how participants understand the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS.

4.2.1 Exploring the awareness of the motivation behind the restructuring of the FCS

Any change initiative is a complex process that may lead to confusion and insecurity, if not properly understood by all the relevant stakeholders. As a result, each member has to be familiar with all the aspects of the restructuring process in the FCS, in order to prevent any uncertainty that may cause confusion, and also to streamline the restructuring process. The liability to create awareness among members on ground level, to familiarise and empower them with knowledge of the restructuring process is, however, the responsibility of the SAPS management. Consequently, this theme presents the respondents’ degree of understanding and familiarity with the restructuring process in the FCS.

The answers to the question “Do you have an understanding of why the restructuring of the FCS has been undertaken and what it involves”?, gave rise to this theme.
On closer analysis of the answers given by the participants to this question, it was evident that a small number of participants had an understanding of why the restructuring of the FCS had been undertaken (though in some instances a limited understanding), while the majority of participants (through their utterances) indicated a complete lack of understanding as to why the FCS had to be restructured.

Focus group interviews with participants, referred to in Annexure B, employed at the various FCS cluster units, revealed their understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS to be diverse and also of a limited degree. One participant indicated his limited understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS, by saying it was primarily to bring the services of the unit closer to the clients and vice versa: “... the only reason I understand”. However, the dilemma that FCS detectives faced was the fact that they needed to cover a large geographical area to attend to complaints, which resulted in victims not being attended to timeously, and thus increasing these detectives’ understanding of why they had to be restructured: “... dit vat ons nog steeds ‘n hele ruk om daar uit te kom ... nadat ons in kennis gestel is van ‘n voorval ... ons weet nog steeds nie hoekom hulle dit gedoen nie.” [“... It still takes us a while to arrive there... after we are informed of an incident ... we still don’t know why they did it ...”]. In addition, participants explained their limited understanding of this process to be as a result of inadequate communication and consultation regarding this process. However, members of the FCS were expected to comply with the restructuring: “... it was not communicated ... we have to take an instruction and comply with ...”, as a result, “... there is a whole lot of uncertainties about some issues”. A serious concern raised was the fact that members did not understand their role in this process: “... what is our role in this restructuring ...” However, when the restructuring process was eventually explained, it slightly improved his understanding thereof, but this process did not indicate a clear view of the future: “... later when it was explained it has got a direction ... it doesn’t show exactly where we are heading to ...”.

The participant moreover described his limited understanding of this process to train general detectives at station level in FCS-related investigations, to enable these detectives to investigate such cases at their respective stations. However, the training never materialised, as a result of a lack of human resources at these stations: “... we have to ... train them from their respective stations ... they don’t have enough manpower ... that we train them ...”.

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Explanations that were, furthermore, given of the rationale behind the restructuring process were to bring the services of the FCS closer to the community “… people had to travel far to raise complaints …”, thus improving service delivery to the community, through the placing of FCS experts at station level: “… the restructuring is to benefit the people [referring to the public]. As a result, the community would be more at ease and content to raise complaints. However, another participant did not experience changes in service delivery to the community “… it is still the same service that we are giving …”, but regarded the rationale of the restructuring process only as relocating from one office to another “… the only change is that we are moved from that place to this place …”. Another participant shared a similar view and raised his concerns that increasing service delivery had not transpired; nevertheless, the unit’s standard of service delivery had depreciated: “… that was their [referring to the SAPS management] main change … better service delivery to get expertise down to station level … nothing has materialised everything have deteriorated”. One participant, furthermore, imagined that the restructuring of the FCS had the goal to familiarise FCS detectives with investigating all aspects of crime and not specialising in a specific field: “… they want each and every police official to investigate all the stuff …”.

In contrast to the abovementioned participant’s views, a number of participants evidently held negative reactions to the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS, revealing their uncertainty and confusion surrounding their understanding of the restructuring process of the FCS. These participants indicated that they had a complete lack of understanding of the restructuring of the FCS. One participant firmly portrayed, by means of a comparison, his uncertainty about the rationale behind the restructuring: “… I felt like a puppy … We didn’t understand what was going on … where we were going what we are supposed to do, nothing …”. Moreover, another participant summarised his confusion and uncertainty regarding his primary functions, the completion of the restructuring process and confirmation of his newly adopted station: “… we are not sure if we are still going to do FCS cases … how long are they going to take to finish up this whole thing … we are still quite in the dark …”. However, a few participants indicated that they make an effort to understand this process and the direction they are heading towards: “… we try to understand … where is it heading …?”. Besides, one participant described the restructuring of the FCS as a drawback, not only to police officers, but to the community as well:
“... this thing is a disadvantage not only for the police officers, but for everybody ...” resulting in questioning the continuation of a positive attitude towards the restructuring of the FCS when there is no reward for them in return: “... why should we sustain anything if it don’t bring anything good to us, why?” One participant suggested direct communication by the SAPS management, explaining the motivation behind this process, would have improved their understanding of this process: “… the management ... must call all of the FCS members ... explain all this to them but they didn’t do it up to now ...”.

Correspondingly, another participant summarised the reasons why he did not understand the rationale behind the restructuring process, by referring to the fact that they are still working in the same manner as before: “... it is still the same, nothing has changed”. He furthermore indicated that the communication about the restructuring process was poor, as they were told that the restructuring is a temporary arrangement, called a “duty arrangement” which would have been evaluated within six months, but “it is now almost two years no evaluation has been done no feedback has been given to us”. This viewpoint was shared by another participant. He voiced the feelings of neglect, cynicism, and lack of acceptance as “I feel I am being used ... now I really do not know where I belong”. Very often the officials who were relocated were not accepted and incorporated into the new station, and he expressed this observation as follows: “… we are being discriminated here at the station because every time anything is said we are always excluded and isolated so I don’t know exactly where do we belong”. Another serious concern that was raised was the fact that these relocated officials carried out their specialised duties as before, but were not compensated as before: “... yet now it is worse because we are not even paid for the standby duties .... We are the ones who bring in the most of the convictions ... but yet we have not been motivated. “. Another serious dilemma experienced by these relocated officials, was the fact that they were relocated without being provided with similar office facilities, sufficient equipment and other resources. They were now expected to deliver the same outputs as before, but without the resources.
One of the participants summed this up as follows: “... we were situated in perfect offices friendly environment for women and children ... everything to our disposal ... then our offices were hijacked from us ... we ... sit without any facilities two to three officers in one small room ... not adequate to ... interview abused women and abused kids. We use to have cars like the combi to transport ... the victims in a very nice way, now we can’t. It is just terrible it is demoralising us”.

In addition to the abovementioned examination, it furthermore became apparent that participants and representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGO), comprised of social workers, psychology interns, play therapists and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes, similarly had a limited understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS.

Participants justified their restricted understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS as a result of the lack of communicating this process to them and by means of unconfirmed reports. These participants explained their limited understanding of this process was the doing away with the FCS as a specialised unit, thus dividing the unit’s knowledge and skills by means of placing FCS detectives at various police stations where they would perform duties as normal detectives: “... didn’t want a specialised unit ... each station will have a little bit of expertise ... and work pretty much as a normal, a non-specialised unit cop, not in their expertise”. Another participant confirmed that she experienced confusion about the restructuring process “...I don’t have an understanding why in the first place it was initiated...” and, in addition, did not experience any changes since the process was implemented: “I don’t think there is any difference...”.

Another participant justified her restricted understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS as a result of a lack of consultation with important role players: “... lack of consultation with the stakeholders ... there was no discussion around this it was just a top down thing ...” and suggested dialogue between her organisation, as an important role player, and the police, in order to inform these role players and to clarify this process: “... information sessions where they must inform us that there is going to be some changes ...”.
A contributing factor to the deficient understanding of this process was the confusion of clearly defined roles among police members: “... even the police personnel themselves they were still confused as to what is happening and what are they expected to do ...”.

Moreover, the Manager Therapeutic Services of another non-governmental organisation NGO was also of the view that the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS was to bring the services provider (in this case the FCS) and the client systems closer together. “... my understanding was to bring the police out in the community and to make the police more accessible to the community”. However, she questioned the feasibility of this process for practical reasons, that in turn increases the lack of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS: “... I am not sure if that is feasible and workable because ... this [referring to abuse] is done under a shadow of secrecy so that still doesn’t make sense to me”. In agreement with other participants, this participant also experienced the absence of consultation and communication regarding this process, as a major contributing factor to the lack of understanding the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS “... lack of consultation ...” and describes this process as enforced upon members and other role players: “... it was just a top down thing ...”. It came to light that this process was sudden and unexpected without contingency plans in place: “... there were no measures to put into place to address the shortcomings ...”.

A senior researcher of a regional human security research institute’s Crime and Justice Programme communicated his understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring, stating that the reasons for restructuring the FCS units were to bring these units closer to communities and to flatten the organisational structure, in order to enhance service delivery: “... closing down of the area offices and ... decentralise FCS units to bring them closer to communities”.

It furthermore emerged from the individual interviews with senior public prosecutors (prosecuting in cases of domestic violence, child abuse and sexual offences), that these prosecutors also have a limited understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS. However, not all the prosecutors were equally familiar with this restructuring process. As a result, the majority expressed their uncertainty and negative sentiment towards the restructuring.
A senior public prosecutor voiced his understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS, as an effort by the SAPS to introduce every police official to investigate the entire spectrum of crime and, as a result, do away with certain crimes only investigated by certain specialised officials “... gepoog word om alle polisiemanne te laat werk met alle tipe misdrywe - dat daar nie veronderstel is om sekere beamptes te wees wat net met sekere misdrywe werk nie” [“... efforts are being made to involve all the SAPS members with all kinds of crimes preventing members from handling only certain cases”]. Consequently, it will also increase sufficient human resources in all areas in order to enable police officials to investigate all types of crimes. “... genoeg mense ... in elke omgewing te hê wat met alle tipe misdrywe kan werk” [“...to have sufficient members in all areas to handle all types of crimes”]. Additionally, this senior public prosecutor explained his understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS as an endeavour by the SAPS to provide a more accessible service to the community through the training of general police officials at station level by the FCS detectives at their newly designated stations. This understanding by the participant was communicated to him through FCS detectives and not by means of official SAPS channels at a higher level: “... vaardighede ... oor te dra aan ander lede in die betrokke stasies ... om meer toeganklik te wees vir lede van die publiek ... wat die lede basies aan my verduidelik het” [“...members explained to me that it is to transfer skills to members at the stations ... in order to be more accessible to the public”]. It came to light that the severe lack of communication and consultation with role players mainly contributed to the lack of knowledge about why the FCS was restructured. It follows that this participant became aware of the rationale behind the restructuring, in the media: “... daar was nie vooraf enige motivering rērig gekommunikeer oor hoekom dit sou plaasvind ... Die enigste kommunikasie ... was maar wat ‘n mens in die media gesien het ... Twee jaar na die proses ... uhm ... is daar nog steeds geen duidelike motivering ...” [“... there was no prior communication why this process was taking place ... the only communication was in the media ... two years after the implementation of this process there is still no clear motivation ...”].

This participant emotionally conveyed her uncertainty about the rationale behind the restructuring. As a result, the participant expressed her concerns about the practicality of the restructuring process as “... onlogies ... ondeurdag en wat dit behels is dat alles nou chaos is ... prakties verstaan ek dit glad nie”. [“... illogical ... not thought through properly therefore
everything is chaos ... practically I definitely don’t understand it”). The participant furthermore questioned the success of what she was made aware of, through the grapevine, as to what the rationale behind the restructuring was, with the following remark: “... uit gesprekvoering was dit gewees om hulle meer beskikbaar te maak vir die mense wat hulle bedien ... As dit die doelwit was ... dan is dit in elk geval nie bereik nie ...” [“... through conversation it became known that it is implemented to make members more available to the public ... if that is their objective ... it is not achieved ...”]. It became apparent that the total lack of communication about the reason for this process mainly contributed to the participant’s unfamiliarity with the motivation to implement this process: “... geen kommunikasie van enige party af ... jy het nie regtigwaar enige inligting oor waarom dinge is soos wat dit is ...” [“... no communication from any party ... you don’t really have information as to why it is like it is...”]. It also appears that the restructuring created increased complexity in the judicial procedures that emphasise the rationale behind the introduction of this process “... as jy moontlik op ’n verhoordatum sien dat die ondersoekbeampte het byvoorbeeld nie die subpoenas ingedien aan getuies nie ... dan word daar vir jou gesê ... ek is uitgeplaas ... dit is nou deel van die herstrukturering ... nou het jy geen waarborg nie dat dieselfde persoon wat gehandel het met die ondersoek aanvanklik huidiglik met die ondersoek handel nie”. [“... you possibly only notice on the trial date that the investigating officer did not furnish witnesses with subpoenas ... you are then informed that the official is placed at another component due to restructuring ... now you don’t have any guarantee that the initial investigating officer will presently handle your case”].

From this utterance by the participant one also gets an idea of how the restructuring of the FCS impacted on the level of service delivery. This aspect will be presented as a separate theme, as discussed in paragraph 4.2.4 of chapter 4.

Correspondingly, another senior public prosecutor admitted to being unsure about the rationale behind the restructuring, and simultaneously questioned the goals, objectives and strategy of this process, as well as the management level on which the decision to restructure the FCS was made, since no communication thereof was received. : “... weet nie werklik op watter vlak is hierdie besluite geneem nie ... lees maar in die koerante dat hierdie eenheid gaan ontbind ... nie veel gekommunikeer wat die doel daaragter is ...” [“... are not really aware at what level these
decisions were made ... I read in the newspaper this unit is disbanding ... not much was communicated what the objective is ...”]. Moreover, the participant probed the method the SAPS utilised in approaching the restructuring. As a result, the participant’s vagueness was enhanced through confusion of the whereabouts of the FCS detectives and their commanders who previously rendered service in a particular jurisdiction: “... jy weet nie waar om hierdie mense in die hande te kry nie ... jy weet nie noodwendig waarheen al die lede uitgeplaas is wat lopende dossiere by jou het nie en jy weet ook nie presies watter bevelvoerder moet jy kontak ...” [“... you don’t know where to get hold of these people ... you don’t know where all these people are now placed that still have dockets with you and you also don’t know which commander to contact ...”].

In an e-mail message (Annexure E) as stated by Machakela (2009), the Manager: Communication and Marketing and the National Negotiator of SAPU explained this union’s understanding of the restructuring of the FCS: “It was intended to address functional problems within the SAPS, including duplicity of functions, weak command and control, and poor service delivery. The restructuring process also sought to eliminate the area level management that had come to be viewed as an unnecessary level of authority. This meant that the SAPS management would now operate on a national, provincial and station level, in line with the requirement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (South Africa, 1996: sec.40 (1)). However, in practice, this union’s understanding was that only the area offices would have to close down and members affected would then be placed at police stations closer to their place of residence. It follows that this process was never aimed at closing down specialised units such as the FCS. On the other hand, what was supposed to happen was that the command and control of the FCS would have to be re-arranged in order for the unit to at least report to the provincial office thereby keeping the expertise and resources which were utilised by the unit”.

The Head: Efficiency Services in the SAPS, referred to in Annexure B, confirmed the reasons why the restructuring of the FCS had to take place. This senior officer conveyed that the main reasons for restructuring the FCS were that the general public did not have easy access to the services of the FCS: “…die publiek het nie toegang gehad tot die dienste van die GKS nie...” […]the public did not have access to the services of the FCS...].
It follows that the SAPS utilised a strategy to empower police stations to improve service delivery with regard to FCS functions. The officer also emphasised that the functions of the FCS were not discontinued, however, the capacity of the unit’s functions were enhanced at station level: “...om stasies te bemagtig... dienslewing aan die publiek te verbeter... GKS funksies is nie gestaak nie, dit bestaan nog steeds... kapasiteit van stasies is verhoog...” [“...to empower stations... to improve service delivery to the public... FCS functions are not suspended... the capacity of stations is increased...”].

On the other hand, a minority of participants expressed a positive outlook towards the restructuring of the FCS being expectant of this process. A senior researcher and representative of a regional human security research institute was of the opinion that a number of reasons the SAPS announced for restructuring the FCS is an indication of good judgment; however, the process needs to be executed appropriately. “... there is a lot of positive things one can say about their [referring to the SAPS] intentions ... but then it needs to be done properly”.

In addition, one of the participants from one of the focus group discussions and a representative of an NGO (comprised of social workers, psychology interns and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes), positively demonstrated an attitude of ownership in collaboration with the FCS in order to take responsibility towards improving the circumstances surrounding the restructuring of the FCS. “... as the community we should all take responsibility ... we can’t blame all of them [referring to the FCS] because they don’t make the decisions”.

From this storyline, the “absence” of the FCS restructured unit can also be deduced, which will impact on their level of service delivery. This statement must also be read in conjunction with the theme focusing on participants’ views about the effect of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery, as discussed in 4.2.4 of chapter 4.
From the above, it is evident that participants seem to have valid concerns about the lack of feedback to them around their future, of being treated as outsiders by the stations they were relocated to, not receiving the same compensation as before, and being expected to carry out their work with less - and inferior - resources.

It became apparent that the participants’ understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS units was heterogeneous. The respondents’ degree of understanding and familiarity with the restructuring process in the FCS, however, remains the responsibility of the SAPS management. The complete ambiguity of a large number of participants’, opposed to a minority of participants’ familiarity with the process concerning the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS, might be the result of the failure or lack of ability of the SAPS management to effectively communicate the motivation and underlying principles of the restructuring process to members and other stakeholders at the lower hierarchical levels, in order to familiarise and empower them with knowledge of this process. This contrasting appearance among participants might also refer to the doubtful communication style in which internal and external communication is taking place in the SAPS. In addition, the high level of uncertainty among respondents firstly illustrates the inability of the SAPS management to successfully communicate the importance of the restructuring of the FCS internally to its members at the lower levels, and secondly, to other relevant stakeholders externally. The lack of communication from the SAPS might explain why a number of participants have negative attitudes (referring to the thoughts or feelings that prevail among them) towards the restructuring process, being pessimistic, disapproving or critical towards the process. These pessimistic attitudes and uncertainties that prevail among a number of participants might be as a result of the undemocratic and dictatorial way in which this process was enforced upon them. On the other hand, these negative attitudes of participants raise the question about their enthusiasm to understand the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS, and the appearance among them of expecting rewards as a precondition to understanding or accepting this process.

The theme to be discussed next evaluates participants’ perceptions and experiences of the implementation of the restructuring process.
4.2.2 Evaluating the implementation of the restructuring process

The implementation of any change initiative should be executed with the necessary diplomacy, consultative communication and transparency. Participants’ perceptions and experiences of the implementation of the restructuring process refer to what the participants’ thoughts, feelings and assessment are of the way in which the restructuring process in the FCS was carried out and enforced upon them. In other words, how do participants’ evaluate, judge and interpret their dealings in the execution of the restructuring of the FCS to which they were compulsorily subjected? Participants’ interpretation and assessment of the implementation of the restructuring process can take the form of a clear, well executed and understood process carried out gradually. Conversely, participants can also experience the implementation of the restructuring process characterised by confusion, uncertainty and unconfirmed reports that are executed instantaneously.

The answers to the following questions gave rise to this theme: “Do you have an understanding of why the restructuring of the FCS has been undertaken and what it involves?” and “From your experience, has the SAPS management clearly communicated and consulted the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS? In other words, did the SAPS management interact with you?”

The storylines presented under this theme will serve as testimony that the majority of the participants perceived and experienced the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS as a process shrouded in confusion, characterised by a lack of consultative communication with stakeholders, from the SAPS management side. This process lacked transparency; it was viewed as a one-sided, top-down approach.

It prominently transpired from focus group interviews conducted with members employed in FCS units (referred to in Annexure B) that the vast majority of participants experienced and perceived the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS as a process characterised by confusion, uncertainty and unconfirmed reports that were executed instantaneously.
The participants vocalised their perceptions and experiences on the implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS as follows:

During focus group interviews conducted with participants employed at the FCS units, the majority of the participants declared that they had been made aware of the restructuring of the FCS in the media and not through official SAPS communication channels: “... we didn’t even read it [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] in the document [referring to official SAPS document] ... I heard from the restructuring on the National Television ... no one ever told you why and what it is about.” Another participant similarly learnt of this process “... from the newspaper and I did not believe it”. A number of participants similarly voiced their resentment towards the authoritarian manner in which the implementation of this process was eventually communicated to FCS detectives: “... [the SAPS management] just told us that you are going to that police station. We were not professionally informed about the restructuring”. One participant described the implementation of the restructuring process by comparing it to chaos “... ‘implementation’ is actually a good word for chaos ... there was no implementation thereof”, as a result of the initial indecision of the SAPS management to restructure the unit, as well as the uncertainty of members’ new placements, to which they were subjected: “... they told us that the FCS unit ... is not going to close down. The next morning they ... gave us letters for reporting a week later to a different station ...”.

Participants furthermore correspondingly echoed what other participants had said about the lack of consultative communication from the SAPS management’s side concerning the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS. One of the other participants stated that they were informed of the restructuring of the FCS by phone: “We received a telephone call quarter to five in the afternoon ...”, whereafter another participant correspondingly confirmed that FCS detectives at their particular unit were belatedly informed of this process: “... the next morning at 8 o’clock and we received all the letters” [referring to official letters communicating that members of the FCS had been restructured and thus placed at other stations.] One participant passionately summed up his sentiment towards the implementation of the restructuring process as a dreadful experience that was not conveyed to the FCS unit he was then attached to: “... it was terrible first of all it was not communicated”. Another concerning issue that was raised was
the fact that the implementation of the restructuring process was shrouded in uncertainty: “... nobody still is telling us exactly what it is [referring to the restructuring process] so there is a whole lot of uncertainties about some issues”. An additional concern that was mentioned was that the implementation of this process was enforced upon members and, in addition, lacked participative decisionmaking: “... the members did not have any say or choice with the restructuring”, and labelled the restructuring as a “negative experience”. Moreover, another participant suggested that the SAPS management should have consulted members on the lower hierarchical levels, in order to gain firsthand experience prior to implementation of this process: “... hulle kon ons ‘input’ gevra het ... in hoofkantoor of ‘wherever’ besluite neem ... geen rêrige idee van wat se impak dit gaan hé ...” [“... they could have asked our input ... Head Office or wherever decisions are made don’t really have an idea what the impact would be ...”]. It came to light that this process was implemented under false pretences, since the SAPS management did not divulge all the steps and extent of this process to the FCS detectives: “... they say we are here for duty arrangements ... it is now nearly 2 years being in this duty arrangement ...”.

Once again the lack of consultative communication from the SAPS management side about the implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS, and the goals and objectives of this process, became apparent.

A detective from the FCS dejectedly explained his experience of the implementation of this process, that led to the lack of consultative communication from the SAPS management, as an uninformative meeting where instructions, rather than information concerning this process, were given: “... it was just a meeting ... and we were just been told ... not like a communication”. Moreover, another participant also experienced the implementation of this process as a sudden process that was enforced upon participants, lacking consultation “...it [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] was not properly conveyed to us it was just implemented, whether we like it or not we have to comply ...”. An additional participant was of the opinion that the implementation of the restructuring process was not comprehensively premeditated, thus leading to numerous predicaments: “... when we were moved to the station we have to sit in the passage because there was no office ... if it was thoroughly planned, I don’t think we would encounter so many problems. We needed time to thought it through ... and explain to the community as well”.

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In addition, another participant experienced a complete lack of consultation; consequently, FCS members were ordered to report for duty at their new stations: “... didn’t even come and ask our opinion they just told us on that day you have to report by that police station”.

Besides the abovementioned feedback from FCS detectives, it noticeably came to light during focus group discussions with NGOs (comprising social workers, psychology interns, and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes) that the majority of participants perceived the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS as a process covered with confusion, uncertainty and characterised with a lack of communication and unconfirmed reports. Participants also agreed that the implementation of the restructuring process was abrupt and unanticipated.

A participant and representative of an NGO portrayed her experience of the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to be initially mystified, in disorder, and characterised with unconfirmed reports and gossip: “… it was a bit confusing ... there were rumours then they [referring to the FCS] are closing, then they are not”. Consequent to these rumours then, only the police liaised with stakeholders to shed light on the implementation of this process: “... after that I think the police had a few meetings where they got role players together and then they explained the process”. Similarly, an additional participant initially experienced the restructuring process to be confusing to herself, to members of the SAPS, as well as to members of the community, since the previously established cooperating network had failed after the implementation of this process. However, this participant currently had an improved understanding of the process, as a result of applying her sole discretion and creativity to improve her understanding: “… it was confusing because for instance the person [referring to FCS detective] who we used to contact ... was no longer the one responsible and we didn’t know who is the new person to contact ... at the police station they didn’t know what to do with those kind of cases ... my experience has been confusion to both myself, my clients and the police themselves ... I had to use my own creativity in terms of establishing network in staying [in touch with] the police station ...”.
Another participant, furthermore, without hesitation indicated that she was completely unfamiliar with the restructuring of the FCS: “I don’t understand the process ... I don’t know what it is”. Another participant followed up, expressing her ambiguity concerning the implementation of this process, stating that the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS was not a thoroughly executed process, and, in addition, questioned the whereabouts of FCS detectives after the implementation of this process that, in turn, led to a lack of information: “I still find it very confusing ... because we don’t know who to speak to. Where did these experts go?”

The researcher then enquired about the factors contributing to the lack of understanding of the restructuring process. A number of participants similarly agreed that there was no appropriate communication. That, in turn, led to vagueness and doubt concerning the whole restructuring process: “I think people were not really clear what it was about when it was happening and what to do”. Another participant also confirmed that SAPS management did not clearly communicate and consult the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS. He express this observation as follows: “In my experience there has never been any communication between my organisation and the SAPS during the restructuring process in actual fact you [referring to the researcher who is a member of the SAPS] are the first person from the SAPS who came to have a discussion with us”. It also became evident that a large number of these participants were also made aware of the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS through the media: “We saw everything [about the restructuring] on television”. On the other hand, a large number of the participants became aware of this process through unconfirmed reports and hearsay: “Word of mouth I would say. It would be somebody telling something ...”.

Another participant did not only confess to confusion amongst themselves as an NGO working closely with the FCS, but pointed also to confusion in the FCS itself, relating to the restructuring: “... there were even confusion amongst the people in the unit [referring to the CFS unit]... there was confusion on our side ... on their side as well”. The vast majority of participants furthermore expressed the view that the SAPS executed the restructuring process without consulting role players at the lower levels, thus not preparing them for this process that resulted in disorder: “... they just implemented it. They didn’t involve anybody - key people who are working on ground floor level ... not preparing the market for it”.

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It was chaos”. You know the one day you spoke to a person [referring to FCS detective] and the next day ... nobody can tell you where you can find a person ...”.

What’s more, another participant experienced that members of the community who are in need to access the services of the FCS, are also negatively affected by the implementation of this process and the lack of communication thereof: “... it was difficult especially for members of the community ... where would they report their cases and ... the cases that they reported ... nobody knew about those cases and it was confusing to us”.

Moreover, the Therapeutic Manager of another NGO (rendering counselling services to victims of violence and abuse) comparably voiced her experiences about the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to be a sudden and unexpected order from the SAPS management that came as a surprise: “... it was very sudden and unexpected ... implemented without any forewarning or consultation ... a top down policy ... It was just a decree, an order declared ... We were just told overnight there is no longer going to be a FCS unit”.

It also emerged during this interview that the SAPS management had not clearly communicated and consulted the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS to the NGO sector. As a result, the lack of communication and consultation created ambiguity and uncertainty among the NGOs and members of the FCS. “Having spoken to many FCS Officials ... there is a lot of confusion and lack of clarity around the restructuring process... To date there has been no... reach out to us as partners in the process.” It also came to light that the implementation of the restructuring process had been a one-sided process that was not given the appropriate attention it deserved from the SAPS: “I don’t think this was a thought out process ... it was planned ... uhm ... at the top excluding people that are involved hands on.” This participant described her awareness of the restructuring as a discourteous disruption of her organisation’s daily functions, since a number of FCS detectives unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of their services to NGOs: “... such a rude interruption ... a few officers said they can no longer assist us ... suddenly all of this just came to an end ... it was just a sudden interruption”.

Moreover, in line with the aforementioned storylines, an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security research institute’s crime and justice programme, confirm what the other participants had experienced during the implementation of the
restructuring process of the FCS. One researcher stated that they are in the initial phases of conducting an investigation into the restructuring of the FCS unit. From their initial discussion with members of the mentioned units it became clear that there was a definite lack of consultation and communication from the SAPS management “... there was no proper consultation from the Police Management...”. Although there was some sort of communication from the SAPS management, it, however, only materialised after the implementation and criticism towards this process: “There were communication send out but these were out when the decisions were already taken ... communication only held after criticism”. The participant pointed to the fact that this mode of operation [referred to above] “... is indicative of the way in which management [referring to SAPS Management] handle the fault - members were send to police stations, senior members, without proper consultation”.

Additionally, this participant also remarked that no stakeholders were consulted, however; the SAPS could have consulted the NGOs: “... nobody was consulted but they [could have] consulted NGOs regarding this restructuring process and that was the biggest ... no consultation ....” The participant expressively stated that there was an evident lack of consultation and communication of the restructuring process by the SAPS management. However, the SAPS only started communicating this process after public criticism, and explaining this communication rather as damage control “... police management were then forced to start communicating but the process was already on the way. It was more a question of damage control than communicating ... especially in terms of public criticism. In some cases [members] were already transferred and then they received communication in terms of the reason for this whole restructuring process”. It also transpires that the police union was misinformed about the goals and objectives of the restructuring process in order to gain their support “... later on it became clear that the way in which this was communicated to the unions was interpreted by the unions to mislead them just to get them on board”.

It furthermore prominently emerged from the individual interviews with senior public prosecutors (prosecuting in cases of domestic violence, child abuse and sexual offences) that they widely considered the implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to be categorised as an abrupt process lacking consultative communication, resulting in uncertainty and confusion.
During individual interviews with senior public prosecutors it became apparent that the goals and objectives of the restructuring of the FCS were not communicated to and consulted with them. One participant expressed his perceptions and experiences in relation to the implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS, by questioning the consultation and involvement of all the other relevant role players: “... in die eerste plek weet ek nie of al die rolspelers wel geken is ...” [“... in the first instance I don’t know if all the role players were actually known ...”]. This participant, however, experienced no consultation regarding this process in his department, and, in addition, also questions the relevance of the objectives of this process in relation to the objectives of other important role players: “... van ons kant af is die Nasionale Vervolgingsgesag op grondvlak was daar nooit enige konsultasie ....”. Ek weet nie presies hoe pas dit in die hele strategie van polisiëring en die bekamping van misdaad van die polisie nie ... ek weet nie rërig of pas dit in by ook die oogmerke van ander rolspelers ...” [“... from the National Prosecuting Authority at ground level there was no consultation ... I don’t exactly know how it complements the whole strategy of policing and the prevention of crime ... I also don’t really know if it complements the objectives of other role players...”]. It furthermore surfaced that this participant’s lack of knowledge about the implementation of the restructuring process is contributable to the absence of proper communication, consultation and the practical implementation thereof: “... daar was geen kommunikasie ... daar was geen behoorlike konsultasie ... in die implementering daarvan nie”. [“... there was no communication ... no proper consultation with the implementation thereof”]. It furthermore emerged that the media played a greater function than the SAPS management in communicating this process: “... die eerste bewuswording van so ‘n moontlike herstrukturering was maar bloot in die media gewees” [“... the first awareness of a possible restructuring was in the media”].

The participant, furthermore, anticipated the restructuring process. However, this process was then already implemented without additional information or prior warning: “Jy het basies geweet dit gaan kom en die volgende wat jy sien is dit het reeds plaasgevind ...” [“You basically anticipated it and then next it already occurred ...”]. Should consultation and communication of the restructuring process have transpired, it would then have decreased existing dilemmas and also increased cooperation between roleplayers: “... as dit dan nou wel hulle doel was en dit is goed oorgedra dan sou dit baie meer vlot kon verloop ... en veral die ander rolspelers en net hulle terugvoer gekry het … ek dink probleme wat nou bestaan sou dalk moontlik ondervang kon
word”]. [“... if it was their objective and it was properly carried over it would have been more streamlined ... especially the feedback of other role players ... I anticipate challenges that now exist would have been minimised”]. The practical and logistical difficulties experienced after the implementation of the restructuring process were also questioned. As a result, it indicates and reflects the rapid manner in which this process was implemented: “... is daar rêrig aan die praktiese en logistieke probleme gedink ... en die implementering daarvan? Dit is maar net weer eens 'n aanduiding dat daar nie ... baie dink daaraan gegaan het van moontlike probleme wat kan ontstaan”. [“... was there really any thought given to the practical and logistical problems ... and the implementation thereof? It is once more an indication that challenges that might occur were not thought through properly”].

In correspondence with the aforementioned senior public prosecutor, another senior public prosecutor indicated the lack of communication and consultation from the SAPS management about the goals of the restructuring of the FCS. This participant also vocalised that she perceived and experienced a lack of understanding of the restructuring process, due to the lack of communication, since this process was never discussed with personnel on ground level: “... ons wat in die howe geopereer het is nooit gekontak en gevra of dit nou enigsins 'n invloed gaan hê op ons werksvermoë of niks nie ...” [“... we who operate in court were never contacted and asked if it would have an influence whatsoever on our working ability ...”]. She therefore regarded the implementation of this process as a top-down, one-sided approach: “... ‘n ondeurdagte eensydige besluit ...” [“... an incoherent one-sided decision ...”].

The participant was, additionally, of the sentiment that the SAPS management did not realise the significance and advantage of communicating this process to the National Prosecuting Authority, since the SAPS was too actively involved in internal challenges, and therefore neglected communication with other role players: “Ek dink nie die SAP verstaan dat hulle dalk met ons moet kommunikeer nie en dat dit dalk net tot hulle voordeel gaan wees nie... hulle is so aangewese op hulle eie sake”. [I don’t believe the SAPS realise they have to communicate with us and that it possibly could be to their advantage ... they are too involved with their internal agendas”].
The participant furthermore described her perceptions of the implementation of the restructuring process as problematic “Dit is problematies…” [“It is problematic…”] and questions the SAPS management for the reasons for restructuring the FCS “… hulle het dit net besluit en nie geweet hoekom hulle dit implementeer nie” [“… they have only decided it without knowing the reasons for implementing it”], since the service delivery of this unit has deteriorated as a result of the restructuring: “… ondersoek word nie gedoen nie, dossiere kom nie hof toe nie, getuies word nie gedagvaar nie, mense kom nie hof toe vir borgaansoekte nie, want ons kan hulle [verwys na SAPD lede] nie kontak nie dit is ‘n problem … geen kommunikasie ten opsigte van hierdie proses”. [“… investigations are not done, dockets don’t reach court, witnesses are not summoned, people don’t arrive for bail applications because we cannot contact them [referring to SAPS members]. It, furthermore, emerged during this interview that the participant experienced the implementation of the restructuring process negatively and also questioned the advantages this process held for the SAPS: “Behalwe vir ’n paar individue … is dit vir my asof niemand verder meer omgee nie … ons ervaar dit glad nie positief nie en ek glo ook nie dat dit vir hulle enigsins tot voordeel gestrek het nie.” [“Except for a few individuals it seems to me as if nobody cares any longer … we don’t experience it positively and I believe that it also was not to their advantage either”].

Another senior public prosecutor expressed her experience of the complete lack of communication and consultation about the goals of the restructuring of the FCS. It follows that the sole communication this public prosecutor received was via the “grapevine” from investigating officers: “… daar is geen kommunikasie ten opsigte daarvan aan die howe … gekommunikeer anders as wat ons maar hoor by die ondersoekbeamptes wat hier kom” [“… there was no communication thereof to the courts … other than what we heard from contact with investigating officers”].

This utterance by the participant also paints a word picture of how the restructuring has impact on the level of service delivery. This aspect is addressed as a separate theme, as discussed in paragraph 4.2.4 of chapter 4.
It furthermore emerged in an e-mail message (Annexure E) that SAPU also perceive the implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to be categorised as a process lacking consultative communication, resulting in uncertainty and confusion. “The SAPS management informed the SSSBC that in terms of the restructuring, areas would be abolished and area commissioners re-deployed to stations. It was decided that a model of accounting stations, with stations clustered around them, would be followed. It was also agreed that implementation of the restructuring would begin in April 2006 and be completed in February 2007. In April 2006 the SAPS gave the SSSBC an overview of the new organisational structure that has already been approved by the SAPS management. However, the new structure did not address the concerns we had raised. In addition, SAPU disputed the SAPS’s claim that extensive consultation had taken place about the new structure, and argued that such consultation was still needed. SAPS management denied that they had not answered all the unions’ questions on the framework. They also denied the claim that there had not been extensive consultation on the restructuring process, stating that a number of workshops were held to discuss the process. As SAPU we were adamant about the point and placed on record that in terms of the law there was never a meaningful consultation process on the matter. The SAPS then agreed that a workshop would be held at the end of April 2006 for further discussion. This meeting never took place”. Moreover, SAPU’s confusion about the restructuring of the FCS was enhanced through vague and confusing reports by the SAPS: “…the SAPS management did an about-turn on the restructuring. They told us that they no longer ‘restructuring’ because the process would take a long time (14 moths), but said they would continue the ‘strengthening of police stations, in the various provinces. At this point the lines between what was restructuring and what was redeployment were becoming blurred, and unions raised additional concerns about the process. In response the SAPS management claimed that the restructuring and the strengthening of police stations were two separate processes that should not be confused. We remained adamant...we needed clarity regarding the two processes...”. SAPU furthermore accentuated the absence of sufficient consultation between the SAPS and labour unions regarding the restructuring process and also signified the negative impact the insufficient consultation had on the relationship between the SAPS and the labour unions: “The queries raised by unions at the SSSBC remain unanswered, as do their objections about the lack of proper consultation. This did not bode well for further negotiations between the labour and police management”.

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On the other hand, the Head: Efficiency Services in the SAPS is of the opinion that the SAPS communicated the restructuring of the FCS to all the relevant role-players through all the communication mediums utilised in the SAPS: “...herstrukturering was gekommunikeer aan alle relevante rolspelers deur alle mediums tot beskikking van die SAPD byvoorbeeld formele aanbiedings by byvoorbeeld die ISS, Pol tv en interne dokumente...”[...restructuring was communicated to all relevant role-players through all the mediums available to the SAPS for example formal presentations at the ISS, Pol tv and internal documentation...]. This senior officer also explained that the communication of the restructuring process to members and the implementation of the process was the responsibility of the various Provincial Commissioners: “Die Provinsiale Kommissarisse was verantwoordelik vir die kommunikasie van die herstrukturering proses... die Provinsiale Kommissarisse was verantwoordelik vir die implementering van die proses in hul provinsies”. [“The Provincial Commissioners were responsible for communicating the restructuring process... the Provincial Commissioners were responsible for the implementation of the process in their provinces”].

It significantly emerged from the interviews and focus group interviews that participants predominantly perceived and experienced the implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS as a process primarily characterised by mystification, ambiguity and insecurity. In addition, the doubtfulness of participants concerning the goals and objectives of this restructuring process might be explained by the vague and instant implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS, and also as a direct result of the failure of the SAPS management to successfully communicate the importance of this restructuring process to its members at the lower levels, as well as to other role players involved. The lack of knowledge among participants concerning the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS, furthermore, bring up the question of the degree of openness, clearness and unambiguousness applied by the SAPS management during the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS in order to set a clear vision of the restructuring. On the contrary, the SAPS advocates transparency in the organisation, opposed to the evasive and vague manner the restructuring was enforced upon members and other role players. Moreover, the abrupt and unanticipated implementation of the restructuring of the FCS raises the question of the implementation style resorted to by the SAPS, as a new democratic service.
The participants not only shared how they perceived and experienced the way in which the restructuring process of the FCS was implemented, but also provided indicators, guidelines and recommendations about how they would have preferred the communication about - and the implementation of - the restructuring of the FCS to have been handled. As a result, proposals about the preferred communication and the way of implementation of the restructuring of the FCS, are presented.

4.2.3 Proposals on the communication style and implementation method of the restructuring process

While the quotations from the transcribed interviews in the previous theme, as discussed in paragraph 4.2.2 of this chapter, paint a word picture of how the process regarding the restructuring of the FCS was communicated and implemented, this subcategory provides insight into how the participants would have preferred the communication and implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to have taken place. The preferred communication about, and the way of the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS, refers to the ideal style, approach or method participants would have selected, with reference to the communication and execution of this process. Pertaining to this sub-theme, participants furthermore provided their advice, proposals and course of action that would have been an ideal approach of communicating and implementing the restructuring process.

This sub-theme was deduced from the following question the researcher posed to the participants: “In your view how would you have preferred the communication about and the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to have taken place?”

The pointers, tips and recommendations concerning the preferred communication and implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS, as proposed by the participants, is presented next in the form of direct quotations from the transcribed interviews, as answers to the aforementioned question.
It became evident in the focus group interviews with NGOs (comprising social workers, psychology interns, and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes), that all the participants would have preferred the communication of the restructuring of the FCS, and the implementation thereof, to have been more transparent and media-driven, as opposed to the way it was done, in order to educate and appropriately inform not only FCS and other SAPS members, but also other relevant role players and the broader community.

Participants from a focus group interview, and representatives of a NGO, dually proposed alternative methods and approaches on how the restructuring of the FCS could have been informatively and effectively communicated to all role players, by suggesting the use of technology to reach and inform numerous people. In addition, a number of participants also suggested one-on-one discussions, initiated by the SAPS, to convey information concerning this process. Furthermore, it strongly emerged that a large number of participants regarded the media as a crucial communication medium, and it therefore would have been an appropriate course of action to communicate and execute the process: “I would say by the way of television and over the radio for those that don’t go to the police station”. Another participant recommended that the SAPS should have implemented and conducted direct dialogue, as a method of communication and consultation, with all the relevant role players. “Also like proper meetings that are taking place in the local communities ... a information session or workshops which involved all the stakeholders ... If I didn’t attend this meeting [referring to focus group interview with researcher] I would still be in the dark ...”. This would have resulted in an improved understanding of the process and contributed to participative decisionmaking: “… we would have gained an understanding of why is this restructuring needed and ... also get input from us ...”.

Prompted for another response on the issue as to how participants in this interview would have preferred the communication and the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to have taken place, another participant implied that the SAPS failed to take advantage of an opportunity to inform and educate the greater community about FCS functions, as a large number of the community were not adequately informed about the unit’s services: “That would have been a perfect awareness opportunity ... but still people don’t know ...”.

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In agreement with the aforementioned participants, a Therapeutic Manager of an NGO rendering counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, would have preferred prior detailed orientation with relevant roleplayers concerning the restructuring. However, this process was forced upon members and other roleplayers without the necessary communication: “... to have been discussed and workshopped and brainstormed around ... it would have been imperative for them to discuss it with us before ... making any decision ...”. The latter part of this statement made by the participant also refers to the impact of service delivery on the service provider, and also on the client systems they serve. These aspects are focused on, as discussed in paragraph 4.2.4 of chapter 4. A consultative forum where this process had to be contemplated, thus placing emphasis on the importance of role players’ participation, was also suggested: “... certainly to have had a stakeholders meeting ... a consultation forum to get all the stakeholders together to discuss ...”. Consultation with role players at the lower hierarchical levels was also highly regarded; however, it appeared that the SAPS management opted rather for a coercive approach: “... at grass root level discuss their challenges and the way forward ... it has been a top-down policy ... instead of making a unilateral decision”.

Similar to the aforementioned feedback from NGOs, participants from the focus group discussions conducted with members of the FCS units concurred that they would have preferred the communication and implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to be executed with prior consultative communication, by means of orientation discussions. Participants emotionally declared their desire for the communication and the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to have been executed collectively and transparently, in order for them to have been conversant with this process. As a result, ambiguity among participants would have been alleviated, and buy-in into this process would have been increased: “... explain to them what is going to happen ... it would be better if we [were] called in and explained to us ...”. Another participant strongly suggested that the SAPS management should have furnished members with a detailed explanation of the restructuring process: “Why is it done what are they expecting out of it. How is it going to benefit us let alone our victims ...?”

In order to emphasise FCS members’ sensitivity towards the preferred way in which the communication and implementation of the restructuring of the FCS should have taken place, a
senior officer from one of the restructured FCS units firmly suggested that collective dialogue with the entire FCS would have been appropriate, since senior commanders were also unaware of this process: “... all the members could have been called ... not even our National Head of the FCS knew about the restructuring ...”.

Moreover, participants also would have preferred participative decisionmaking during the implementation and communication of this restructuring process. As an example, participants compared a previous change initiative, characterised by proper consultation and communication, with the restructuring of the FCS. As a result, participants would have been content with a similar and more liberal approach from the SAPS management: “They called a meeting with the people; they explained to them what is going to happen ... there were meetings with the members ... all were happy”.

Additionally, during an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security research institute, these participants similarly emphasised the importance of devoted consultation and communication of the restructuring process of the FCS. The respondents would have preferred prior internal and external consultation and communication as well as the opportunity for all role players to participate in the decisionmaking process: “Everybody inside the police and outside the police should have been made fully aware of what they [referring to SAPS management] intended to do, and how they intended to do this ... prior to the presentation stage ...” As a result, participants would have taken ownership of the restructuring process, thus reducing existing dilemmas. However, role players were withheld the opportunity to participate and facilitate in the process, as a result of the lack of efficient consultation and communication: “They would have then at least had the idea that they were given the opportunity to participate in the planning of this process ... the lack of communication, consultation ... took away opportunities for members and other role players to make an impact on this whole process”.

In addition to the aforementioned participants’ perspectives, interviews conducted with various senior public prosecutors correspondingly revealed their preference for the manner of the communication and implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to have taken place. These participants also emphasised the significance of prior consultation, and thus would have preferred consultative communication with all role players. “Dit is tog belangrik ... om eers die
ander rolspelers te ken ... voordat jy iets implementer ...” [“It is certainly important to consult with other role players prior to implementing something ...”]. It surfaced during these interviews that participative decisionmaking was also highly preferred among these participants, in order for them to take ownership of this process “... as hulle dit ook net aan die lede geëmmunikeer het sodat die lede daarin kon inkoop sou dit nie so skielike impak gewees het op ... lede nie”. [“... if they had communicated it to the members so that they could buy into this process it would not have had such a sudden impact on them”]. However, participants were of the opinion that these important factors had not been adhered to by the SAPS management. Consequently, current dilemmas concerning the restructuring of the FCS could have been minimised: “... probleme wat nou bestaan sou dalk moontlik ondervang kon word ...” [“... problems that currently exist could then possibly have been decreased”].

Another participant equally shared the sentiment of other colleagues: “... as hulle byvoorbeeld die idee wat hulle gehad het met die wederkeurige Openbare Vervolging in elke divisie bespreek het ...” [“... they should have discussed their idea with the National Prosecuting Authority ...”]. However, the participant was of the opinion that prior consultation and communication would have, nevertheless, revealed the significance of a specialised FCS unit: “... dan sou jy in elk geval gehoor het dat die NPA se idee is dat ‘n spesiale eenheid soos hierdie wat ‘n prioriteitmisdaad ondersoek is nodig ...” [“... then you would have anyhow noticed that the National Prosecuting Authority considers it necessary that a unit such as this that investigates priority crimes is necessary ...”]. Consequently, the SAPS then would have been prompted to reassess the restructuring process of the FCS: “Dan sal hulle ... die besluit herdisk het ...” [“They would have reconsidered their decision ...”]. Prior communication from the SAPS regarding the organisation’s intended strategy towards the implementation of the restructuring process would have been welcomed, in order to adapt specialised working methods: “... vir ons ten minste moes gesê het van hulle planne en dat ons ... uhm ... miskien met die mense wat dan betrokke sou wees daarmee ten minste kontak kon behou maar daar was geen kommunikasie nie”. [“... at least they could have informed us of their intentions, to enable us to keep contact with them; however, there was no communication”].
An additional participant similarly suggested an informative convention stipulating the details of the restructuring process of the FCS: “… om ‘n vergadering te belê wat al die aanklaers [insluit] …” [“… to organise a meeting that includes all prosecutors …”]. As a result, state prosecutors would then be empowered to inform and advise the community concerning their enquiries, that in turn would have simplified this process: “… om hierdie mense darem net in te lig …” [“… to inform these people …”].

Moreover, this state prosecutor also emphasised the significance of a meeting between all the relevant role players in order to discuss future processes: “… ten minste die rolspelers bymekaar roep …” [“… to at least call all role players together …”].

The Manager: Communication and Marketing and National Negotiator of SAPU, in his e-mail message (Annexure E) implicated that the SAPS used misleading tactics and methods to communicate the restructuring process to all the relevant role-players: “As SAPU we were and are still of the firm opinion that the unions were misled... The different terminology used by the SAPS to define the process: beefing up stations, restructuring, strengthening of police stations and re-organisation was confusing to the labour, the bargaining council, members and the general public...It can, in fact, be interpreted as an inventive method to gai approval of the restructuring process...”.

The Head: Efficiency Services in the SAPS suggested that in order to achieve success of restructuring the FCS a number of actions should be strictly adhered to. Firstly a clear strategy should be defined: “…strategie moet duidelik gedefinieer wees...”. [“...strategy has to be clearly defined...”]. Secondly, the officer recommended that a comprehensive implementation plan should be set up: “… ‘n omvattende implementering plan moet opgestel word...”. [“...an inclusive implementation plan has to be set up...”]. Moreover, the strategy has to be communicated effectively to obtain buy-in from all the role-players: “…strategie moet behoorlik gekommunikeer word om alle rolspelers te laat inkoop...”. [“...the strategy has to be communicated effectively to obtain buy-in from all the relevant role-players...”]. Additionally, the process has to be effectively monitored and the impact thereof should be evaluated: “…die proses moet behoorlik gemonitor word en impak moet geevalueer word...”. [“...the process has to be effectively monitored and the impact thereof should be evaluated...”].
Lastly, the officer suggested regular feedback of the process to make the necessary amendments and corrections: “...terugvoer vir aanpassings en korreksies deurgaans...”. [“...regular feedback to initiate adjustments and improvements...”].

From the above reactions, it appears that the perceptions of the respondents illustrated that the communication style and the approach to the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS, which the SAPS management applied, are disputed. This might explain the ambiguity among participants, and the reason why these participants suggested a more transparent approach as an alternative to the autocratic style the SAPS has drawn on. It furthermore raises the question of the management style of a democratic police service. This could also act as an explanation why participants failed to buy into this process and take ownership thereof. In addition, the perceptions of participants could indicate that the communication and implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS was inefficient, and impacted negatively at ground level. Furthermore, the perceptions of participants could indicate that the internal and external communication around the restructuring of the FCS, is questionable. A contributing factor to the respondents’ perception that communication of the restructuring process of the FCS has been inefficient could be that the SAPS focused too much on their internal communication structures and permitted no opportunity for creativity and innovation. In addition, participants’ pessimistic perceptions of the management of information in the organisation, could reflect on the SAPS’ failure to take advantage of opportunities to inform and educate their members.

The theme discussed next explores the participants’ views of how they experienced the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery.

4.2.4 The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery

Effective service delivery is a fundamental factor to the successful continuation of any organisation. As a result, organisations’ efficiency is directly measured according to their adequate service provision levels. The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery refers to the effect, positive or negative, that this process had on the internal and external service
delivery provided by the FCS, that was prompted by the restructuring process. Stated differently, it points to the consequences brought about by the restructuring of the FCS on the unit’s service delivery to its clients. The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the unit’s service delivery could take the form of improved service delivery through the implementation of a flatter command and control structure, which, according to the SAPS management, often leads to the duplication of functions, as the key blockage to service delivery, capacity building at station level, training and the transfer of skills. On the contrary, service delivery could also take the form of unsatisfactory and inadequate services rendered to victims, clients and perpetrators.

The answers to the following questions gave rise to this theme: “According to you, do you think the FCS’s functionaries will benefit as a result of the restructuring? What effect will this restructuring have on aspects such as service delivery?”

Participants representing an NGO (comprising social workers, psychologists, and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes) sensitively shared their experiences and presented numerous examples to illustrate how the restructuring of the FCS negatively impacted the unit’s service delivery.

It emerged from these discussions that the standard of service delivery in the FCS has plummeted after the implementation of this process. One participant illustrated the pessimistic emotions of the community, with whom she interacted on a daily basis, regarding the standard of service delivery in the FCS, by means of their statements: “... they feel ‘ag well they are not there for us, why should we even worry reporting’”. It came to light that a part of the community had no faith in the ability of the SAPS’s service delivery in FCS related cases, even before the implementation of the restructuring process. As a result, these members of the community were even more sceptical about the service delivery of the restructured FCS units, and were thus of the opinion that this process has had an increased negative impact on them: “... they were not helpful before so now they will even be less helpful”. In agreement with the aforementioned participant, the cynical attitude of victims of FCS-related crimes was furthermore accentuated as a result of inefficient service delivery in a number of jurisdictions. It follows that victims of FCS-related crimes would
be reluctant to report cases to the SAPS, as a result of inexperienced SAPS members and confusion among members: “... the women they are not motivated to report their cases because they said they’ve been pushed from pillar to post ... they don’t know their procedures ...”.

In addition, it appeared that general police officers at station level did not have any knowledge regarding procedures and regulations that had to be followed when dealing with an FCS-related victim. Consequently, victims of these crimes were exposed to secondary victimisation, as a result of the inability of the SAPS to render efficient services to these victims: “... there is nothing we can do about this ... that is one example of the police station that haven’t any clue how to deal with a child that is in need and what the procedures were”. It also transpired that members at police station level were not trained or equipped - and also not sensitised to render an efficient service to these victims. In addition, another participant’s experience further illustrates the inconsiderate approach of officials at station level: “... I’ve got a call from a 13-year-old boy. He went to the police and the police chased him away ... the Captain told us that they don’t attend to foreigners ...”. In support of the response to the aforementioned participants, one participant adamantly considered prescribed procedures, practice and the code of behaviour that was abided to prior to the restructuring of the FCS to have disappeared after the implementation of this process: “The whole protocol management of child abuse just diminished ...”.

It also transpired from these focus group discussions that participants regarded FCS detectives to be physically exhausted, as a result of insufficient specialists in this field, thus negatively impacting service delivery: “... they are maybe overworked. Because they obviously are and one specialist is not enough for one area.” Moreover, participants anticipated FCS-specialists to be dispensed with totally; as a result, service delivery to the public would thus become inaccessible: “The specialist will disappear and ... The services are not going to be available to the public”. Another concern is the fact that a number of participants currently experienced the FCS detectives to be already inaccessible: “... they [referring to FCS detectives] are very difficult to phone. Their cell phone is off and they are certainly not in their office. They don’t seem to get their messages. When you follow up the rails, nothing happens there either ...”.
Besides the aforementioned participants’ experiences, a participant, and Therapeutic Manager of another NGO rendering counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, correspondingly gave her experiences on how the restructuring of the FCS impacted on service delivery.

It also became apparent during the focus group interviews that the level of service delivery of the FCS unquestionably decreased after the restructuring of the FCS. It furthermore came to light that FCS detectives “vanished” as a result of this restructuring process. Consequently, the general SAPS officers were mainly performing these related functions, however the officers lack training and experience in FCS-related functions: “Our general involvement currently is with the SAPS officers at the moment”. Subsequently, victims of these crimes have been negatively influenced and furthermore exposed to secondary trauma since they have experienced difficulties accessing counselling services. These victims previously relied mainly on the services of the FCS in order gain access to counselling services: “…this [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] obviously delayed services and did not meet the best interest of the child … A lot of the children were brought in previously [by] FCS officers and now there [is] nobody to bring these children … because the FCS said the offices were unable to offer this any longer”. The inefficiency of general police officers was furthermore highlighted, since “… the police then came to the safe house they took the child from the safe house and there was a car parked outside with suspects whom the child was expected to identify … this is not only secondary victimisation … the system traumatising the child even further …”.

On the contrary, it became known that FCS officers were intensely involved with NGOs before the restructuring of the FCS, and to a great extent also committed to service delivery: “Before the restructuring … there was a deep commitment and assistance in service delivery …”. However, it appeared that this state of affairs changed for the worse. A contributing factor to the significant deterioration in service delivery of the FCS was the fact that the general SAPS officers were obliged to become involved with these crimes; however, these officers lacked the necessary affection, drive, training and passion concerning crimes against women and children, in order to efficiently perform these tasks: “Many of them [referring to the general police officer] don’t want to be in this position … They find the work very challenging and very traumatic … certainly does not have the training … skills … and the knowledge …”.

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Another serious concern raised was the fact that the investigation process was also significantly negatively affected: “I think it [referring to the restructuring] delayed the process of investigation ... and as a result this impacts on the criminal justice system as well”.

With reference to the quality of the FCS investigations, another dilemma experienced by the SAPS was the fact that non-FCS detectives were too inexperienced to effectively investigate related cases: “… a lot of the officers don’t actually knows [the] processes of what needs to be done or even know how a statement need to be taken or written, so it has affected the quality ... because they don’t know any better”. Another participant furthermore illustrated the general SAPS officer’s lack of knowledge regarding the correct practice and procedures when dealing with these crimes. It follows that effective service delivery to victims of these related crimes were inadequate: “... the SAPS officer is not aware of all these things or they are not sufficiently trained ... people do not know what to do”, therefore the participant cynically predicted a grim future for victims of FCS-related crimes, thus emphasising the importance of training SAPS officials in order to direct these officials to render effective services to the community: “... the way things are moving right now I see a very bleak future unless strict measures are taken ... to offer lots of training and develop protocols ... around the future process”.

Moreover, it notably came to light during focus group interviews with participants from the various FCS units, that participants, to a great extent, agreed on the negative impact the restructuring of the FCS had on the functions and the service delivery of the unit.

One participant regarded the lack of sufficient specialised detectives as a major impediment in providing an adequate service to victims of FCS-related crimes. A serious concern that came to light was the fact that there are not sufficient FCS detectives to investigate these cases, therefore they regularly have to work very long hours without extra remuneration: “… because you are not enough ... so the members have to work every second day 24 hours without any remuneration”.

In addition, another participant questioned whether the influence of the restructuring process of the FCS would have a beneficial impact on the unit’s service delivery over the long term. “No I can’t see how they are going to improve the service delivery... I don’t think in the long term or 2009 there is going to be any results ...”
Another participant highlighted the absence of sufficient human resources as a major drawback to providing an efficient service to the community: “... they must give us more resources ... we are 6 or 7 but we are serving ... 3 stations you cannot do that”.

What’s more, one more participant emotionally and sympathetically referred to the restructuring of the FCS as a disadvantage to providing an efficient service to the community. As a result, members experienced a sense of eradication for failing the community: “... the restructuring kill us as members of the FCS ... lastly to the community that we have served ... we don’t have ... enough time to make time for their matters”. In support of the aforementioned reactions, another participant sincerely questioned the resemblance of the restructured FCS units with the centralised FCS unit, referring to the harmonised and consistent service delivery provided to the community: “... I just think nothing will be the same again ... you can’t do the investigation as you use to”.

On the other hand, another participant sensitively summarised his emotions regarding the substandard service delivery. He regarded his disheartening service delivery as a result of low spirits: “We are still serving the people but not with ... a willing heart that kind of attitude. The morale story”. In addition, the following storyline summarises another participant’s view on how the restructuring negatively impacted the service delivery of the FCS. It emerged that low morale, the lack of consultation with these members, and the large geographical area to be serviced, contributed to the substandard service delivery: “It really have a negative impact ... we are negative towards our job ... service delivery is no longer like before you know everything has been disturbed ... they deteriorated service delivery because they did not consulted with the members now the time ... to and from the scene is almost double that it was in the past ...”. Another participant presented a similar view, since “... service delivery never has been as poor as now”. An additional participant made a comparison of the quality of the service rendered before the implementation of the restructuring, and thereafter. As a result, this participant concluded that the services rendered before the restructuring were of a higher quality, and therefore regarded this process to be responsible for the declining service: “... back then we could be three best performers in a row ... we don’t performing like then before ... something is not right so I think it is a result of that [referring to the restructuring process]”. 163
Furthermore, the participants painted a word picture of the uncertainties, challenges, problems and realities they faced as a result of the restructuring of the FCS, and the impact thereof on their level of service delivery. It came to light that, apart from the lack of human resources, physical resources were an additional constraint that the restructured FCS units had to encounter to deliver an efficient service to the community. As a result, victims of related crimes were negatively impacted: “... we are piled up in one office while in the past everybody has his or her own office [and] was able to make proper interviews with the victim or complainant. In this case you cannot”.

On the other hand, it emerged that the uncertainties, challenges, problems and realities members of the FCS faced as a result of the restructuring of the FCS, contributed to members’ physical and mental health, that in turn impacted on the quality of their service delivery: “... you become depressed like me ... I was hospitalised last year November because of this work ... Depression and stress ... they placed me far away ... my home is maybe say 52km to come to work ... I don’t get a time to rest that is why I end up landing in the hospital”.

Another participant illuminated uncertainties, challenges, problems and realities regarding the provisioning of efficient service to the community. It appeared that participants from the decentralised FCS units were regarded as “orphans” by the various police stations where they were placed, since these stations do not want to take responsibility for the FCS members. As a result, participants experienced a lack of acceptance and recognition within their internal ranks. Consequently, victims of FCS-related crimes were negatively influenced as a direct result of the restructuring of the FCS: “... we are sitting at one police station, while we are serving three police stations. All three stations are fighting; we don’t have the budget for FCS so we are not going to buy it for them and at the end of the day wie word benadeel? Dit is die klaagsters.” Members furthermore experienced nepotism practiced by station commissioners of the accounting stations where FCS members were stationed, and this contribute to inefficient service delivery. The following verbatim quotations attest to this statement: “... you are being forced to do the dockets which they want at the station which you are stationed ... you must go and do that docket ... and you’ll leave others station dockets ...”.
Additionally, during an interview conducted with two participants from a humanitarian security research institute, one participant firmly emphasised the significance of a specialised unit, in order to focus on a specific crime and thus maintain high levels of service delivery. It transpired from this interview that pride in and loyalty to a group were significant factors, and consequently gave rise to satisfactory service delivery: “... they develop an “esprit de corps” that is extremely important for any specialised unit ...”. It follows that specialists continuously received exclusive and valuable in-service training and skills through the constant interaction and collaboration among these specialists: “... they can share their experience with all the investigators ... they learn from each other ... new members who are recruited ... benefit from the combined expertise that you find in these units ... they receive in-service training that you will or can no way replace with any other type of training ...”. This implies that the service delivery of the FCS was constantly enhanced. Moreover, the likelihood of involving these specialists with unrelated investigations was also excluded: “... if they are centralised in that way chances [of] involving them in the investigation of other cases are very small ...”.

On the other hand, the participant concluded that the restructuring of the FCS deprived the unit of its individual character. Therefore, pride in and devotion to the FCS unit as well as the opportunity to share and transfer combined knowledge and skills vanished: “... where you have a single unit that is now decentralised the spirit is removed ... they lose their esprit de corps and they lose the opportunity to share their experience ...”. It follows that members of the FCS unit were gradually becoming involved with other investigations not related to FCS functions. As a result, these members lose their competence to specialise, thus affecting service delivery negatively: “... you will find members of FCS units carrying cases with dockets with other types of crimes ... they loose the ability to produce new investigators because they are not a self supporting unit anymore so they loose ability to provide in-service training”.

The participant was, furthermore, concerned about the effect of the restructuring of the FCS on the emotional and psychological state of these members, and therefore envisaged the depreciation of this unit’s service delivery becoming more evident in the medium and long term:
“... on the medium and on the longer term the damage is going to show much more clearly ... they will loose that specialised skills the expertise. So what they done now is a short term gain for a long term lost in terms of expertise.”

This storyline also refers to the loss of expertise and must be read in conjunction with the theme and the participants’ views about the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS, as discussed in paragraph 4.2.7 of chapter 4.

Furthermore, during an interview with a senior public prosecutor, it clearly emerged that the SAPS was increasingly finding it demanding to provide an efficient service to the community and other role players, regarding FCS related functions: “Chaos daar word [nie] dienste meer gelewer nie ... geen beheer oor wat hulle doen nie ...” [“Chaos, services are not rendered anymore... they have no control of what they are doing ...”]. The participant was also experiencing a significant negative impact on the services of the FCS: “… swakker skakeling swakker ... uhm ... dossiere swakker alles”. [“... inferior communication, sub-standard dockets, everything is sub-standard”]. In line with other participants, this participant also confirms the vanishing of FCS detectives. The participant was furthermore of the opinion that the FCS no longer had control over their functions, as a result of the decentralisation of the unit.

Additionally, the participant questioned the decentralisation of the FCS units and the impact thereof on the delivery of services by the FCS. It follows that the participant experienced members of the FCS to be, in effect, removed further away from the court, although the decentralisation of these members had indeed brought them closer: “… die lede het net van kantoor verskuif en weggeraak ... in effek verder weg beweeg want nou is daar nie meer mense wat jy weet net hierdie sake ondersoek nie. So hulle het in die niet verdwyn as’t ware”. [“... these members just relocated their offices and vanished ... in effect they are less accessible now since there are no longer members that you are aware of that only investigate these cases. They actually just vanished”]. As a result, the FCS members’ level of service delivery did not reflect their decentralised status.
The participant furthermore illuminated uncertainties, problems and realities regarding the provisioning of efficient service by the FCS to the community, by referring to uninformed investigating officers: “... ‘n ondersoekbeampte ... nie geweet het van die inwerking trede van die nuwe wet [verwys na nuwe Wet op Seksuele Misdrywe] ... hoe gaan hy dan nou ‘n diens kan lewer aan die individue wat slagoffers van die misdade is as hy nie eers verstaan waaroor dit gaan nie”. [“... an investigating officer was not aware of the implementation of the new law [referring to the new Law on Sexual Offences] ... how will he be able to render a service to victims of related crimes if he does not understand what it is about”].

It, furthermore, came to light that junior investigating officers with little or no experience were utilised to investigate FCS-related cases, that in turn negatively impacted on service delivery and the judicial processes: “... ‘n konstabel wat aangestel is by GKS wat ‘n groot klomp dossiere ondersoek het met baie baie min ervaring en sy is nou weer in die tussentyd weggeplaa ...” [“... a constable with little experience was appointed at the FCS, handled numerous cases and she has in the meantime already been transferred...”]. On the other hand, the participant also experienced a small number of FCS detectives who were prepared to provide quality service to the public: “... daar is etlike speurders wat baie hard probeer... bereidwillig is ... wat etlike jare diens het in dieselfde GKS eenheid maar hulle is baie min en dun gesaai ...” [“... there are numerous detectives that attempt their utmost best ... enthusiastic ... who have had many years service in the FCS; however they are very scarce ...”]. Additionally, it became apparent that as a result of inadequate service delivery by the FCS, other role players were also negatively impacted. “Ons sukkel om sake van die grond af te kry ... instruksies word nie nagekom nie ... dossiere word hof toe gestuur sonder dat dit behoorlik nagesien is deur ‘n offisier ... dit lei tot terugtrek ...” [“We struggle to get cases of the ground ... instructions are not adhered to ... case dockets are sent to court without proper perusal by officers ... it leads to the withdrawal of cases ...”]. Another serious concern raised was the fact that a number of investigating officers did not follow correct procedures, that hampered service delivery: “[mense word] nie gedagvaar nie, mense word nie hof toe gebring nie, ons kry nie dossiere nie. Ons kan nie behoorlik voorberei nie ...” [“... people are not summoned, they are not taken to court, we do not receive case dockets. We cannot properly prepare ...”].
It furthermore emerged from an interview with a senior public prosecutor that various uncertainties, challenges and problems regarding the provisioning of efficient service to the community and to other relevant role players, surfaced as a result of the lack of interest and training of general non-specialised detectives, previously responsible for investigating less serious crimes, now being responsible for investigating FCS-related cases. It follows that investigations were substandard, that in turn impacted negatively in court hearings: “... hierdie mense nie weet waarvoor om te soek nie ... ondersoek beamptes daag nie op met dossiere by hulle nie hulle weet nie hoe om te getuig by borgaansoeke nie hulle weet nie watter spesifieke getuienisse moet hulle bewaar ...” [“... these officials are not aware of what they have to search for ... investigating officers arrive without case dockets, and they are unfamiliar with how to provide witness at bail applications; they do not know what specific evidence they have to preserve ...”].

Moreover, this participant accentuated the significance of specialisation in the field of FCS investigations, therefore the need for specialised and experienced investigation officers contributed to the existing challenging circumstances: “... jy sit met ‘n persoon wat nog nooit ... met hierdie tipe van goed gewerk het nie ... dit maak ‘n situasie wat alreeds baie moeilik is nog moeiliker”. [“... you have officials that have never worked with these types of cases ... it makes a difficult situation even more challenging”].

In accordance to the abovementioned participants’ views, the Manager: Communication and Marketing and the National Negotiator of SAPU, Bernard Machakela (2009) in his e-mail message (Annexure E) is also of the opinion that service delivery has been negatively affected by the restructuring process: “…the process has taken place at the expense of members and of policing...The result is members’ inattention to duty, which hampers effective policing”.

While the aforementioned storylines mostly pointed to the negative impact the restructuring of the FCS had on levels of service delivery, and in some instances already explained how it affected the victims of violence and abuse, one senior public prosecutor was, on the other hand, of the opinion that the restructuring of the FCS had indeed positively impacted on the levels of service delivery.
It emerged during this interview that this participant experienced an improved level of service delivery by the FCS. It follows that the decentralisation of the unit resulted in the service of the unit being more accessible as opposed to its service prior to the restructuring process: “... hulle ook meer toeganklik moontlik is vir slagoffers en getuies op hierdie stadium”. [“... they are currently possibly more accessible to victims and witnesses”]. The participant was furthermore of the opinion that the lack of resources experienced by the FCS were also minimised as a result of the restructuring, since the decentralised units were situated closer, thus improving service delivery: “... was goed in daardie sin dat jy mense het wat nou basies twee blokke weg van die hof af sit ... die mense en die kantoor self nader is ...” [“... it is beneficial that officials are situated two blocks away from court ... the officials and their offices are closer...”].

In addition, from this participant’s experience it appears that the quality of investigations by the FCS after the restructuring process was equivalent to the quality of investigations of this unit prior to this process: “Die kwaliteit van die ondersoekwerk is nie anders as wat dit in die verlede was nie”. [“The quality of the investigations is not different than previously”]. However, the possibility exists that this unit’s standard of investigation may have improved since the accessibility of the FCS members has improved: “... ondersoek dalk beter is omdat die ondersoekbeamptes nader aan die slagoffers en aan die howe is ... die afhandelingstempo dalk ’n bietjie vinniger is” [“... investigations have possibly improved since the investigators are closer to victims and to the courts ... the tempo at which cases are finalised is possibly faster”]. Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish from statistics if the restructuring of the FCS had any effect on the service delivery of this unit, since the total of FCS-related crimes were constant: “Dit is moeilik om te sien uit statistiek ...” [“It is difficult to gauge from statistics ...”]. Contrary to other participants’ experiences, this participant did not experience the services of the FCS to be executed by general SAPS officers: “So ons werk nie met gewone polisiemanne wat nou skielik daardie tipe werk voor uitgedeel is nie ... diehoeveelheid misdrywe bly maar konstant”. [“We do not work with normal police officials ... the number of cases remain constant”].
From the above it appears that the restructuring of the FCS had a detrimental effect on the service delivery of the unit, as well as on the client system it served. A contributing factor to the deteriorated service delivery of the FCS could have been the lack of physical and human resources experienced by the FCS. Furthermore, it appears that additional causative factors contributing to the unsatisfactory service delivery by the FCS may be the revolution in the unit’s primary functions, thus involving these detectives with non-FCS-related investigations and the compulsory involvement of inexperienced general SAPS members with FCS-related functions. This might explain the fading of the “esprit de corps” [a feeling of pride in belonging to a group and a sense of identification with it] after the restructuring process, that was characterised in the FCS prior to this process that resulted in high levels of service delivery. In addition, the lack of acceptance by general SAPS members, experienced by FCS detectives at their decentralised stations, raises the question of the degree of the alliance and cooperation within the internal structures of the SAPS. This might explain the inadequate service delivery of the FCS. On the other hand, the internal climate on service delivery in the SAPS is therefore also questioned. Moreover, participants’ perception that the community had no faith in the SAPS and were even more skeptical about the abilities of the FCS after the restructuring, questions the SAPS’ external climate on service delivery.

The next theme focuses on participants’ perceptions of the effect of the restructuring process of the FCS on the morale and productivity of the members.

4.2.5 The effect of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of FCS members

Change in any organisation, such as the restructuring of the FCS, brings with it certain concerns among members, that in turn have an effect on their daily functioning. The morale and productivity of the members refer to their self-esteem and spirits with which they have to deal, with that, in turn, having an effect on their service excellence and effectiveness. Stated differently, morale and productivity is the drive and self-confidence members have in order to perform their functions optimally.
The morale and productivity of members can take the form of a lack of purpose and direction, or a feeling of senselessness that, resultantly, has a negative influence on member’s productivity. On the other hand, morale and productivity can also take the form of a positive and meaningful mindset among members, creating a sense of worth to fulfil their functions with the necessary productivity, drive and passion.

This theme resulted from the answers given by the participants to the following question: “According to you, what effect will the restructuring of the FCS have on the morale and productivity of the members?”

Focus group interviews conducted with members of the FCS, overwhelmingly agreed that the restructuring of the FCS negatively influenced their morale - and therefore their productivity. Respondents strongly expressed their negativity towards the restructuring process and the effect this process has had on them. Consequently, these FCS members did not predict an improvement in their low morale; in fact, they foresaw their morale to worsen. “I don’t think it will get higher ... it will just get lower and lower and lower”. Respondents furthermore felt that they had been negatively affected by the restructuring process. More specifically, respondents’ negative morale was mainly as a result of inadequate physical and human resources, the absence of overtime remuneration, and adverse working conditions that often resulted in conflicting opinions with other colleagues at station level. Respondents’ feelings of rejection by other members at station level was a contributing factor to their low self-esteem and effectiveness. “The morale is definitely down ... productivity is down because the way that we were treated ...we [are] shunt into one office ... I am working more hours than before that is why my morale is still low ... there is no overtime money”. Another participant similarly shared the same experience. He described his low self-esteem as: “... we are demoralised ... we were on a pedestal doing good work ... we were special we did our job and we had our right to exist once we were disbanded we were treated very bad at this place ...”.

In support of the aforementioned participants, another participant also admitted the decrease in his morale to be as a result of the uncertainty brought about by the restructuring process: “Morale is low. Because you don’t know where you stand”. On the other hand, it emerged
during these focus group discussions that the commander of a FCS unit experienced that not only his spirits but also those of the victims had been negatively impacted by the restructuring. “... even our victims, their morale had been dropped and even our Commanders morale has dropped and mine also”.

Additionally, in order to emphasise the low self-esteem and spirits of FCS members, the aforementioned commander of an FCS unit gave a number of examples to illustrate the extent of this behaviour. It follows that a number of FCS members called for reassignment to other units within the SAPS “Some of the members have already applied for transfers because they don’t want to work like this ... they don’t like to work in these conditions”, whereas another FCS member was on sick leave for nervous tension related matters, as a direct result of the restructuring process: “Already got one [member] of stress ... I don’t blame those who is going on stress ...” Interestingly, this commander expressed his understanding and sympathy towards members who could not continue their functions at the FCS, due to stress-related conditions resulting from the restructuring. On another occasion this participant furthermore described the effects of the restructuring on some members’ psychological and general well-being, that consequently influenced their morale and productivity. It once again came to light that members developed nervous tension related conditions, and as a result, were more often absent from work: “... two members now here at the unit ... has got the high blood pressure ... he could not handle this cases anymore ... one member which is of stress and the rest of the members I won’t say they book sick as usual because why you can see they are tired ...”. Correspondingly, other participants also voiced their low self-esteem by comparing the morale of members before and after the restructuring process. These participants came to the conclusion that although FCS members were negative prior to the restructuring, the morale of these members had never been in a lower state: “Daar was negatiwiteit [voor die herstrukturering] maar dit was nie so erg as wat dit nou is nie”. [“There was negativity [prior to the restructuring]; however, not to the current extent”].

Moreover, a number of participants painted distressing pictures of their experiences, in support of their low morale and productivity. It became apparent that these participants experienced significant difficulties and challenges during their daily functioning, as opposed to before the
restructuring, which, in turn, ought to have had a negative effect on their morale and productivity. Often officials had no means of transport, which forced them to walk to their appointments: “... we are battling with the old vehicle ... I had to walk to go to court. I have to ask a lift to go to the meeting ... ons loop waar ons wil wees. Ek het al geloop van hier af tot by [naam weerhou agv anonimiteit] [approximately 15km] [“... we walk where we need to be. I once have walked from here to [place withheld to preserve anonymity] [approximately 15km]. These officials occasionally worked very long hours without overtime remuneration or rest days: “Ons werk twee naweke 'n maand wat ons nie betaal word nie ... soms werk jy van agtuur in die oggend [tot] die volgende oggend agtuur”. [Dan] “... begin jy jou normale dag ...”. [Daar’s] “... nie een wat in hierdie eenheid werk wat nie negatief is nie”. [“We work two weekends per month without remuneration ... occasionally we work from eight o’clock in the morning to eight o’clock the next morning ... then you start with your normal day again ... there is not one official in this unit who is not negative”].

Similarly, another participant, the commander of the unit, presented practical examples of members’ experiences, as motivation for members’ low morale and productivity. These illustrations include work overload and far distances to travel to attend to complaints: “... a member is carrying about 50 dockets ... up to 80 dockets ... it is a disaster”.

Supporting the aforementioned participants’ negative sentiments regarding their morale and productivity, a few participants explained the motivation behind their unenthusiastic behaviour as being a result of the lack of support systems after the restructuring was implemented and no recognition for members’ services under difficult circumstances: “... you are dealing with your stress alone ... and the cases that we are doing are so stressful ... no one is giving us some motivation ... The failure from the side of who ever implemented this not giving us enough support and recognition”.

Furthermore, participants shared their experiences of how the restructuring of the FCS impacted their productivity. On the one hand, one participant experienced a decrease in productivity, and as a result, questions the motivation of victims to report cases: “... the cases I still have are not so many as like we used to have maybe it is because of this restructuring people are not coming
On the other hand, one participant experienced an increase in cases to investigate, compared with before the restructuring. However, it appears that this increase was as a result of coercing from officers at the accounting station where the FCS members was now situated, in order to give preference to that particular station’s cases. As a result, other stations’ cases were unintentionally neglected, and productivity was therefore negatively impacted as a result of the restructuring: “Myself I am getting more cases ... you are getting more time for the station you are working at because of the pressure you are getting ... the productivity is not like before”. Another participant experienced a decrease in productivity, referring to the reduction in the conviction rate of perpetrators: “... productivity is not the same as it used to be ... I mean the conviction rate is very low...”.

Correspondingly, another participant shared his sentiment towards the productivity of FCS members: “It [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] makes the productivity very very low for me”. Another participant experienced the productivity of the FCS unit to be similar to before the restructuring process; however, she was of the opinion that members had to increase their efforts with lesser resources: “... die produktiwiteit van die eenheid is nog steeds dieselfde ... ons moet harder werk met minder resources ...” [“... the productivity of the unit remains the same ... we have to work harder with fewer resources ...”]. In support of the aforementioned participants, another participant also experienced a decline in his productivity by making a comparison with how it was before this process was implemented. It emerged that although members were trying their utmost to deliver a quality service, physical and human resources, as well as support from other non-specialised SAPS members, were a contributing factor to the decline in productivity: “... not to say that the people are not doing their best... just that the resources ... makes the conviction very very poor...”.

Contrary to the cynical emotions experienced by the majority of the FCS members towards the morale and productivity caused by the restructuring process, a minority of the participants were attempting to remain confident and devoted, despite their initial low self-esteem and unfavourable circumstances.
It follows that these few members realised they had to adapt their mindset in order to continue their passion for their profession. However, new challenges were emerging regularly with which they had to deal: “… my morale is very low but I had to lift myself up because I love this job … I’m making the best out of it”.

It also emerged from the focus group discussions with FCS members, that some of these members had a sympathetic feeling of guilt and remorse towards the community they served and other roleplayers they were actively involved with, for the decrease in services from the FCS: “… we are very very sorry to leave the FCS … we are now far from our other people … even the NGO and other organisations that were helping us … there is nothing that we can do”. Another participant did self-investigation for his feelings of guilt and low-self esteem, questioning his own ability: “… you forever complain sometimes you are blaming yourself sometimes you think you are not good enough … my morale is low very very low … I love doing what I am...”.

During an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security research institute, one participant confidently expressed that the restructuring of the FCS had a significant impact on the morale of the unit’s members: “… this [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] of course had a very negative effect on the morale of members”. The participant furthermore judged the SAPS to be presently categorised by a military character. As a result of this antagonistic character, the organisation concentrated more on internal dilemmas rather than on external challenges when confronted with low self-esteem and spirits of the workforce: “In any organisation, especially an organisation with a sort of a military character, and the police without any doubt still has a very clear military character … but the moment you have a negative or a morale that is negatively affected … You start focusing inwards instead of outwards … you are more concerned about your own problems than you are with the problems of those that you are suppose to be serving”. It furthermore came to light that the low morale of FCS members created by the restructuring process, in turn negatively affected their service excellence: “… an unhappy official is certainly not going to provide an efficient and effective service …”. The participant also emphasised the insensitivity of the SAPS management towards the objections of these members: “… it seems like police management is very unsympathetic to the complaints they received from these members …”.

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During an interview with a senior public prosecutor it correspondingly appeared that the restructuring of the FCS brought about major administrative shortcomings, accompanied by a notable lack of resources: “… dit het definitief ‘n impak op hul moraal in die sin van dat hulle effens negatief staan teenoor … uhm … die herstrukturering … aanvanklik het hulle ‘n gesentraliseerede kantoor opset gehad … administratiewe middele … uhm … tot hulle beskikking…” [“… it definitely impacted their morale since they are pessimistic towards the restructuring … previously they had a centralised office with administrative resources available …”]. In addition, it appears that the restructuring also created the discontinuation of sustained support and camaraderie among FCS members, since they currently function as a dependent unit. As a result, these constraints had a low-spirited effect on the morale and productivity of FCS members: “… maar ook bystand van mede kollegas en moontlik ander offisiere waar hulle nou geskuif het ... losstaande is …” [“… they had support from colleagues and officers … since decentralising they are dependent …”].

In support of the adverse effect of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of FCS detectives, another senior public prosecutor presented a practical example of detectives’ low self-esteem and productivity. It follows that the fragmentation of the camaraderie of these detectives, as a result of the restructuring, proved to impact the services and productivity of these members in a negative light: “… jy het kameraderie wat ontstaan tussen die mense omdat hulle met sulke ernstige sake werk … so die mense wat hulle saam mee werk en hulle kollegas is geneig om vir hulle half belangrik te wees … daar nog ‘n kollega verloor word … die ervare kollega moet dan die onervare kollega oplei …” [“… camaraderie develops between these officials since they are involved with serious crimes; therefore, their colleagues are important to them … if another colleague is lost, the experienced colleague has to train the inexperienced one…”].

While the aforementioned storylines mostly pointed to how the restructuring of the FCS had negatively impacted on the morale and the productivity of the FCS’ members, one senior public prosecutor perceived the morale to be negative, but the productivity as improved: “... die afhandeling van die sake kan moontlik vinniger wees ... die hele ondersoekwerk kan vinniger ... borgaansoeke kan vinniger afgehandel word ... in daardie sin is die produktiwiteit vir my beter
hulle hulpbronne nou meer bietjie beperk is ... en dat hulle moraal waarskynlik nie is soos wat dit veronderstel is om te wees” [“... the finalisation of cases, investigations and bail applications have possibly improved although their resources are restricted as well as a decline in their morale”]. However, the participant experienced a decrease in the specialisation of cases in the court due to a lack of prioritisation: “Ek glo nie 'n mens het die effek in die hof van iemand wat spesifiek met hierdie dossier werk nie, want dit is nie meer prioriteit nie.” [“I doubt the specialisation of cases in court since it is no longer a priority”]. The participant, in addition, had the impression that the restructuring of the FCS indeed had a negative effect on the morale of members of this unit, as a result of the lack of consultation with these members, the disregard of members’ personal circumstances and insufficient resources: “... ek weet nie of hulle ook rêrig behoorlik gekonsulteer is ... baie van hulle moes noodgedwonge ... uhm ... skuif waar hulle moontlik ... uhm ... aanvanklik huisvesting gehad het naby die gespesialiseerde eenhede ... die ander ding wat dit meer negatief ... hulle hulpbronne nou meer beperk is ...”. [“... I suspect they are not properly consulted ... a number of officials had no choice to decentralise from where they probably were accommodated close to their specialised units ...”].

The participant also believed that other practical and psychological aspects had a detrimental consequence on the FCS members’ morale and productivity. These aspects included the integration of FCS members with non-specialised detectives: “... jy nie nou meer gesien word as 'n gespesialiseerde persoon nie ... uhm ... jy word nou geag om moontlik 'n gewone speurder te wees ...” [“... you are no longer regarded as specialised, however, regarded as a normal detective ...”], and the sharing of resources as well as the relegation of the FCS’s status as a specialised unit. It emerged that the participant experienced these aspects to reflect negatively on the quality of investigations: “... jy moet hulpbronne met hulle deel ... uhm ... jy moet kantoor spasie met hulle deel ... dit het definitief 'n praktiese invloed ... daar is sekerlik niks wat 'n persoon so demoraliseer as die feit dat niemand jou expertise as as sulks wil erken nie” [“... you have to share resources and office space with them that definitely has a practical impact ... the fact that one’s expertise is not recognised has to be demoralizing ...”].

The participant was furthermore of the sentiment that the lack of continuous training of the FCS members evidently demotivated these members, since it was perceived that they were indeed specialised and therefore did not need additional training: “... dat daar nie volgehou ... uhm ...
Consequently, these members let go of the aspiration to be specialised - that was then reflected in the substandard quality of investigations: “... dat daar niks is wat hulle meer dryf om ekstra moeite te doen om meer gespesialiseerd te wees nie” [“... there are no aspirations any longer to improve their specialty”].

Another participant similarly echoed what the aforementioned participant experienced with regard to the morale and productivity of the FCS members. This participant expressed that inefficient facilities hampered effective service delivery to victims of FCS-related crimes, and this, in turn, affected members’ morale negatively: “... hulle het nie meer al die fasiliteite wat hulle nodig gehad het ... hulle moraal is laag ...” [“... they lack resources... their morale is low ...”]. Additionally, the participant sketched a practical illustration of the negative impact that the restructuring process of the FCS had on the productivity of members. It follows that the participant experienced the investigation process to be more time consuming as a result of inexperienced investigating officers: “... dinge vat miskien nou bietjie langer... hulle is nie spesifiek opgelei vir die taak ... hulle verwag die aanklaer moet al die opdragte gee terwyl hulle tog vanself moes geweet het dat hulle daai ondersoek vinnig moes doen ...” [“... currently the process takes longer... they are not specifically trained for the task... they expect the prosecutor to provide instructions while they are aware they had to rapidly finalise the investigation ...”].

In agreement with the abovementioned participants, another participant correspondingly described FCS members’ drive, self-confidence and productivity to be at a low level. The participant presented the disregard for members’ expertise and specialised skills, “... hulle voel dat hulle spezialiste is en nou word ek stasie speurder ... dis baie moeilik ...” [“... these officials regard themselves as specialists, suddenly they are normal detectives ... it is difficult ...”], as well as relinquishing time and effort invested in investigations, to non-specialised detectives, as the main drivers for these members’ low morale and productivity: “... dat hulle hulle lopende sake aan ’n ander persoon moet oorgee wat hulle natuurlik baie tyd en ondersoek werk en en moeite in belê het...” [“... they had to carry over their incomplete cases that required time,
investigation and effort, to other members ... ”]. Contrary to the negative experiences of other participants regarding the morale and productivity of the FCS members, this participant, however, experienced continuous constructive productivity from a small number of these members: “... daar is 'n paar goeies dit is nie net swart nie daar is lig aan die einde van die tunnel ...” [“... there are a number of good officials, there is light at the end of the tunnel ...”]. Moreover, this participant experienced a decline in the majority of members’ productivity, and also admitted that the productivity of FCS members was not remarkable before the implementation of the restructuring process, possibly as a result of the high degree of difficulty to properly investigate such cases: “... dit was nooit “great” nie ... dis vir my asof daar ‘n afname is ... mense is nie so gemotiveerd om voort te gaan met dit waarmee hulle mee besig is nie” [“... it never was extraordinary, it seems if there is a decline ... officials are not as motivated to continue their functions”].

A participant from one of the focus group discussions, a representative from an NGO (comprising social workers, psychologists and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes), shared her speculation about how the restructuring of the FCS might have affected the morale of the members of this unit. The participant reasoned that the lack of communication and consultation with members of the FCS about the restructuring might have had an appalling effect on their morale: “... a lack of communication ... have a terrible impact on their morale and their passion”.

The participant furthermore demonstrated her speculation by illustrating the low self-esteem and spirits of one of the senior members of the FCS: “... the Provincial Coordinator of the FCS, one minute we hear he is going to another unit, the next minute he is back ... their passion is gone”. In addition, another participant conveyed her thoughts about how the restructuring of the FCS might have affected the morale and productivity of the members of this unit. The participant similarly experienced a decline in the morale and productivity of FCS members, and conveyed the rationale behind the negativity to be confusion about the restructuring among the SAPS themselves: “... their morale... deteriorate ... because there was a royal confusion the police themselves ... there are a lot of confusion now because ... of the new structure ... it affect their morale and your motivation to do your work”.

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In contradiction to the pessimistic experiences of the aforementioned participants, this participant, however, continued to experience productive service from a few members: “… not all the police are like that some are giving us a good service …”.

Additionally, the Therapeutic Manager of another NGO (providing counselling services to victims of violence and abuse) similarly shared her perceptions about the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the morale and productivity of the FCS members. The participant emphasised the importance of factors such as the passion, devotion and the unique character a member requires in executing FCS-related functions. It follows that general SAPS officers now dealing with FCS related cases, revealed they were forced into this position and also did not have the unique characteristics required of them to perform these functions, as opposed to FCS members: “… some of them [referring to general SAPS members] have indicated that they have been forced into these positions. It is not out of choice … The FCS members have a different work ethic. … they are very committed … very passionate about what they do … Absolutely, it definitely impacted on their morale”. As a result, members’ morale and, therefore their service delivery and productivity were without doubt negatively influenced. On the other hand, the participant similarly experienced the morale of the community to be adversely affected as a result of inefficient service delivery by general SAPS members, as opposed to the devotion and loyalty of FCS detectives prior to the restructuring: “… the general community … are not … we get lots of distressed calls from people the way they’ve been treated … the morale is not positive … not in favour of the police officers … previously … there was a high level of dedication and commitment …”.

It furthermore appears that the uncertainty that prevailed among FCS members, as well as the decentralisation of these members, contributed to a decrease in productivity: “… productivity suffered … many people did not know what the future entails … This makes them very resentful and as a result will not able to deliver the goods”. It additionally transpired from this interview that the productivity of investigating officers who handled FCS related investigations was unsatisfactory and also hampered the judicial processes, which often lead to frustration for the other role players involved and to the benefit of the perpetrators: “… there is such frustration … it is delaying the process … cases gets thrown out of court …”. 
From the above it is evident that the restructuring of the FCS had a negative effect on the morale and productivity of participants. A contributing factor to the low spirits and productivity of participants might be the inadequate physical and human resources, the absence of overtime remuneration and adverse working conditions that participants experienced, created by the restructuring process. In addition, the rejection of FCS detectives by their counterparts at station level, and the internal conflict between these members, as opposed to the solidarity that prevailed among members in the FCS prior to the restructuring, might explain the low self-esteem of these detectives. Furthermore, this might also explain why a number of FCS detectives called for reassignment to other units within the SAPS, while others could not continue their functions at the FCS, due to stress-related conditions resulting from the restructuring. Moreover, the appearance of coerciveness among certain station commissioners towards FCS detectives stationed at these station commissioners’ stations, created the impression that these commissioners take advantage of FCS detectives, to the detriment of other police stations in their jurisdiction. It therefore raises the question of the sincerity of these senior officers in facilitating the improvement of service delivery of the FCS as the primary goal of the restructuring of the unit. It also appears that the SAPS management was not sensitive towards the low self-esteem of its members and their client system. This might also have been a contributing factor to the decrease in FCS detectives’ low morale and productivity.

The perceptions from participants furthermore indicate that the SAPS management concentrated on internal dilemmas when confronted with low self-esteem and productivity of its members. As a result, external challenges were neglected. On the other hand, the attempt of a few FCS detectives to remain confident and devoted, despite their low morale and unfavourable circumstances, illustrated their calling and determination to deliver an efficient service to the community. On the contrary, it appears that general SAPS members that are forced to investigate FCS related cases, do not comprise similar characteristics as these FCS detectives, that consequently negatively affects their morale and productivity as well.

Participants’ opinions regarding the feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS, now follow.
4.2.6 Outlook on the feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals of the FCS restructuring

It is imperative for an organisation to have long-term goals, in order to set a clear vision for the future. These goals should, however, be clearly communicated to the entire workforce, to gain understanding and buy-in among them. Participants’ opinions about the feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS, referred to participants’ views on the achievability and practicability of the long-term aspirations envisaged by this process and the maintaining thereof. In other words, the question of how participants assessed the probability of preserving and the perseverance of these long-term goals, comes to mind. Participants’ outlook on the feasibility and sustainability of these long-term goals could demonstrate an optimistic view of attaining and upholding the envisaged long-term goals. On the other hand, participants could also express negative sentiments towards the feasibility and sustainability of these goals, perceiving them to be neither viable nor maintainable.

The answers provided by the participants on the following question gave rise to this theme: “In your opinion, will the restructuring of the FCS meet its long-term goals/objectives? How feasible and sustainable will this process be?”

It came to light that members of the decentralised FCS units (ranging from a superintendent to constables) considered the long-term goals envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS to be ambiguous, and that they did not know what these long-term goals were, and therefore had major reservations about the feasibility and sustainability of this process: “… Well I don’t know … actually there is no long-term goal or objectives for the FCS …”. Participants interestingly did not regard the FCS as a specialised unit any longer and were thus of the view that this unit, in addition, did not have long-term goals: “… we are not a unit anymore … There is no specialised unit out there …”. Similarly, a number of participants expressed their ambiguity towards the goals and objectives of the restructuring process, by declaring their unfamiliarity with the entire process as a result of the lack of consultation and communication: “… we don’t know why this is done … we are still in the darkness … we don’t know what the short terms or the long term goals are ….”.
Correspondingly, another participant articulated his suspicions about the accomplishment of the goals and objectives of the restructuring process: “I doubt it ...”, illustrating his current disbelief, until changes occur: “… if I see an indication that there are improving ... I would have a little hope ... but at this case ... there is no light at the end of the tunnel”.

Conversely, one participant appropriately identified the goals and objectives envisaged for the restructuring process: “… we’ll need to educate most of the SA Police service’s members to be able to deal with this cases ...”. However, this participant had his reservations about these goals and objectives being accomplished, since this task was one not every member was capable of performing, and he therefore presented critical features investigating officers must have to investigate FCS related cases: “… the problematic situation not most of the people are interested on working with this cases ... they come here without the knowledge ... they turn negative ...”.

In addition, one participant was of the opinion that the SAPS management would continue to enforce the goals and objectives envisaged by the restructuring upon FCS members, therefore it would be sustainable: “… they have made up their mind ... they will sustain.”

Another participant sturdily remarked that the restructuring process would by no means be viable, since the expertise, knowledge and skills of FCS members could not be replaced with the training of general police officers, with regard to FCS-related crimes: “No it will never be, never ... you can’t give that guy the experience of ten years. It would never be feasible ... you have to train them all again ...”. In support of the aforementioned participant, another participant questioned the feasibility of the restructuring process since no additional proficiency had been acquired, as had been stipulated by the SAPS management as one of the major objectives of this process - even though this process had been implemented a while ago: “None whatsoever, because they are [not] educating the detectives whom they indicated they will do it is a year down the line. No expertise has been gained at the detective’s branch”.

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In contrast to the aforementioned participants, another participant perceived the restructuring process of the FCS to be feasible and sustainable by initiating the creation of a long-term strategy among the FCS detectives, the broader community and the victims of these related crimes: “... it might take long but ... we need to come up with a strategy ... referring to our community ... referring to our victims ... it will make a positive impact ...”.

In addition, it also emerged from the focus group interviews with the FCS units, that participants greatly questioned the benefits of this process for the community and the FCS members, and therefore cross-questioned their responsibility in sustaining the restructuring process: “Why should we sustain anything if it doesn’t bring anything good to us? ... this thing is a disadvantage not only for the police officers but for everybody”.

In face-to-face interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors, it transpired that the long-term goals of the restructuring of the FCS could be feasible and sustainable, on condition that the SAPS management gave sincere attention to the problems currently experienced by all the role players: “... dit kan volhoubaar wees, dit kan effektief wees as die probleme wat daar [is] aandag [aan] gegee word en dit uitgestryk word ...” [“... it could be sustainable and effective if attention is given to existing problems ...”]. Participants were of the opinion that the SAPS management had to create increased awareness among FCS members and other role players, in order for them to be completely familiar with the aims and objectives of this process: “[daar moet] gekyk word na die lede, om hulle positief te kry rondom die doelwitte ...” [“... members have to be inspired towards the objectives ...”]. Stated differently, FCS members and other role players would have had to buy into this process and thus take ownership thereof in order to make this process sustainable: “... as die lede eers gewen kan word in hierdie herstrukturering dink ek kan dit volhoubaar wees” [“... members first have to buy into this process in order for it to be sustainable”]. In addition, participants believed that the SAPS management demonstrated a lack of support for the restructured FCS units, and did not adequately empower FCS members to effectively deal with the difficulties experienced during this process. These participants therefore raised the question whether the restructuring of the FCS would indeed be feasible and sustainable: “... daar’s te min gedoen ... Dit is asof daar nie ondersteuning is om dit wel volhoubaar en wel effektief te maak nie” [“... not much was done ... it is if there is not sufficient support to make it sustainable and effective”].
Conversely, a few participants indicated that they completely lacked an understanding of what the goals and objectives of the restructuring process were, and were therefore not in a position to comment on the achievability, feasibility and sustainability of this process: “… ek verstaan dit glad nie. ... ek weet nie hoekom hulle afgeskaf is nie ek verstaan dit nog steeds nie”. [“...I completely do not understand it, I do not understand why they are disbanded”].

One participant, furthermore, provided recommendations on how the SAPS management could improve the sustainability of the restructuring of the FCS. It was proposed that the SAPS management reconsider the goals and objectives of the restructuring process, in comparison to the current achievements of this process: “… hulle sal na hele doelwit weer moet gaan kyk in die sin van wat hulle bereik het” [“... they should have to reconsider the objective in accordance to their achievements”]. It follows that the main goal of the restructuring process, namely, to bring the services of the FCS closer to the community they serve in order to improve service delivery, has not been met: “As dit was dat hulle die mense nader aan die slagoffers, nader aan die howe en die aanklaers wil bring dan sal hulle dit weer in die eerste plek moet gaan verander in die sin van die mense is nie daar nie”. [“If their objective is to bring the FCS officials closer to the victims, courts and prosecutors, they should consider changes since these officials are not more accessible”].

In correspondence with the abovementioned statements concerning the feasibility and sustainability of the envisaged long-term goals of the restructuring process of the FCS, another participant emphasised the significance of the empowerment of the FCS units, by means of physical and human resources, to practically enable them to uphold this process: “... hulle [sal] hierdie eenheid (as ‘n mens dit nog so kan noem) behoorlik moet bemagtig in die sin van voertuie en personeel” [“... they should sufficiently empower this unit (if you can still call it that) with vehicles and personnel”]. It once more came to light that the restructured FCS units were experiencing significant resource deficiencies; therefore, unless these shortcomings were not appropriately addressed, the restructuring of the FCS could not be sustainable.
However, this process was currently considered not to be feasible: “Dit gaan nie gebeur as hulle nie behoorlik bemagtig word nie. So, dit kan nie volhoubaar wees nie. Eintlik [is] dit op die oomblik nie uitvoerbaar nie ...” [“It will not happen if they are not properly empowered. Therefore, it cannot be sustainable; currently it is not practicable ...”].

Similarly, the Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, clearly shared her perceptions about the feasibility and sustainability of the envisaged long-term goals of the restructuring process of the FCS. It surfaced that the restructuring of the FCS had failed the needs of the community, and service delivery by the FCS had also deteriorated. As a result, this process was believed not to be feasible: “It is not feasible ... it is not working ... it is not meeting the needs ... the very understanding I have ... meeting the needs of the community. That objective is not been met, it is actually failing that objective”.

It also emerged that the low self-esteem of SAPS members might have a significant impact in hampering the feasibility and sustainability of the restructuring process: “... many of the SAPS officers that I have spoken to or worked with ... indicated a need to step down or to leave their job ... I can’t see this as being feasible ... I can’t see it being sustained either”. This participant also spoke of the morale of the SAPS members, as discussed in paragraph 4.2.5 of chapter 4.

From the above reactions, it appeared that participants regarded the long-term goals and objectives of the restructuring of the FCS to be ambiguous, and therefore had their reservations about the feasibility and sustainability of this process. Participants’ perceptions that expertise, knowledge and skills of FCS detectives had been lost, without acquiring new expertise, might explain their suspicions about the feasibility and sustainability of this process. Participants furthermore gave the impression that the SAPS management did not support and empower the restructured FCS units in order to facilitate the feasibility and sustainability of this process. This might explain FCS detectives’ reservations pertaining to their responsibilities, in order to sustain the restructuring process.

A discussion of participants’ views about the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS, follows.
4.2.7 The impact of the restructuring process on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives

The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS, relegate to the effect of the restructuring process on the detectives’ particular competence and their unique proficiency as FCS investigators. In other words, the expertise and specialised skills of detectives in the FCS also refers to their exclusive and exceptional ability and specialised training to investigate FCS-related cases. The impact on the expertise and these specialised skills can be affected positively, for example, through skills transfer, or it can have a negative impact - for example, work overload or a divergence in their primary functions.

This theme was derived from the answers given by the participants on the following question posed to them: “According to you, will this restructuring process have an impact on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS?”

It evidenced from the focus group interviews conducted with participants employed at the FCS units, referred to in Annexure B, that these participants undoubtedly anticipated their expertise and specialised skills to be negatively affected by the restructuring of the FCS. More specifically, it came to light that participants predicted their expertise and specialised skills to be inadequately impacted by a transformation in their primary functions, thus resulting in the exhaustion of their expertise and specialised skills: “… these guys [referring to FCS detectives] who has got experience and expertise … is not only going to deal with [specialised] cases... [they] are going to lose all your experience in the long term ...”. Another significant dilemma that influenced FCS detectives’ expertise and specialised skills, was the large geographical area these officers needed to serve. This participant motivated his viewpoint as a result of time constraints due to the geographical area that needed to be served, that in turn hampered proper investigation of these technical cases: “Because of time ... we need to rush ... some of the other things you know you put a blind eye ... you sacrifice you do quick quick stuff”.

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Furthermore, it became apparent that FCS detectives were regarded as general detectives investigating non-specialised cases, thus confirming the alteration in these detectives’ functions. As a result, in the event of the investigation of FCS-related cases, FCS detectives experienced time constraints in fully applying their expertise and specialised skills. Consequently, these detectives’ exclusive and exceptional abilities to investigate FCS-related cases were significantly hampered: “I think the man with the expertise and the experience [referring to FCS detectives] ... is working on the same level [as the general detective]... you don’t have enough time to specialise ... you are definitely not investigating your case hundred percent”.

It also came to light that FCS detectives considered their knowledge and skills not to be acknowledged after the restructuring of the FCS, since they were now used for less important functions: “Our expertise are not being recognised. We are a bunch of monkeys here and since the restructuring the only thing we became is taxi drivers and collecters. The only thing we do is taxi the person [referring to victims] from the police station to the hospital and collecting the docket”. On the contrary, another participant experienced supporting and inspiring gestures from an NGO, at his particular FCS unit, working closely with FCS detectives, in the form of awards, in order to highlight these members’ unique proficiency as FCS investigators: “... we’ve got people from the non-governmental organisation those who encouraging the FCS to explore their skills ...”.

On the other hand, one participant was of the opinion that expertise and specialised skills could be sustained, on condition that general police officers were primed to gain knowledge of and become skilled at FCS-related investigations: “Unless the people [referring to the general police officer] are prepared to learn about it [referring to FCS-related cases] ... the expertise won’t be lost ...”. However, the question remains as to who will be responsible for educating these general officers, since FCS detectives cannot perform this function, as they are experiencing time constraints: “... who are going to teach those people?”

In correspondence with the aforementioned participant, one participant shared similar views about how expertise and specialised skills of these FCS detectives could be sustained, emphasising the active involvement and cooperation of the entire SAPS organisation: “... it will depend if the entire detectives are willing to learn from us if they are ... it will have a positive impact ...”.
Moreover, during individual interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors, it came to light that participants, to a fair degree, agreed that the restructuring of the FCS might have had a detrimental impact on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS. On the one hand, one participant did not foresee a significant effect on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives, though the participant did predict the stagnation of these exclusive and exceptional abilities to investigate FCS-related cases: “Ek glo nie dit het het rêrig so ‘n verskriklike impak nie ... Ek wil amper sê dit gaan stagneer”. [“I don’t believe it has such a great impact ... I am predicting that that it’s going to be idle”]. However, if these detectives were uninspired, they would, in turn, not be encouraged to further develop their own knowledge and proficiency: “… wanneer jy iemand het wat gedemotiveerd is dan is hy gedemotiveer om sy eie vaardighede en kundighede wel op te bou ...” [“... when someone is demotivated, he is also demotivated to improve his skills and expertise ...”]. As a result, detectives’ preparedness to develop their expertise and specialised skills would deteriorate. In addition, the transfer of knowledge and experience of FCS detectives to general police officers would contribute to their lack of inspiration: “... hulle dan nou veronderstel is om [kundigheid] oor te dra na hierdie gewone lede ... gaan dit hulle net meer demotiveer ... geen elite meer daarin nie ... wat homonderskei van ‘n ander gewone polisielid nie ...” [“... if FCS officials are supposed to carry over their expertise to normal SAPS members these FCS members would become demotivated since there is no longer any speciality that distinguish them from a normal official ...”]. Moreover, these FCS detectives were not equipped to provide training to general officers: “Hy moet nou ‘n opleidingsrol vervul ... waarvoor hy nie toegerus is nie...” [“... they now have to fulfill a training role that they are not equipped for ...”]. It follows that FCS detectives would not be regarded as unique any longer.

In addition, the participant emphasised the importance of the negative effect of discouraged FCS members on their expertise and specialised skills. It once again came to light that members of the FCS were not consulted about the planning and objectives of the restructuring process that was thus enforced upon them: “… persone wat nie deel was van die beplanning nie ... bloot iets wat op hulle afgedwing is”. [“... people that were not part of the planning process ... only something that was enforced upon them”].

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As a result, these members had to take it upon themselves to yet again motivate themselves “… wat hulle self op hierdie stadium moet motiveer …” [“… that ought to motivate themselves at this stage …”] in order to perform specialised services since they lacked sufficient resources to perform their tasks optimally, and also did not receive any support in this regard: “… ‘n probleem dat daar geen hulpbronne rêrig is of ondersteuning vir hierdie lede om hulle werk te kan doen nie …” [“… it is a problem since there are no resources or support for these detectives to perform their duties …”]. As a result, the participant also experienced a detrimental effect on the judicial process: “… op die ou einde lei die slagoffer daaronder asook die hele hofproses …” [“… in the end the victim is negatively impacted as well as the entire court procedure …”]. Another damaging impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS was the increasing questioning of standard procedures by these officials instructed by prosecutors, that in turn reflects on their expertise: “… wat ek al meer ondervind het is dat hulle spesifieke opdragte sal begin navraag … standaard ondersoek werk … dit wil vir my lyk asof … uhm … hulle kundigheid besig is om af te neem inteendeel” [“… I have increasingly experienced that they question specific instructions … standard investigation procedures … It seems if their expertise is starting to decrease”].

On the other hand, another participant similarly concurred that the restructuring of the FCS might have had a negative impact on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives. However, this participant measured the effect of the restructuring on expertise and specialised skills, against the method of implementing this process. As a result, it was emphasised again that police officers have to have the required interest and affection in order to investigate FCS-related cases: “… mense het ‘n spesiale belangstelling daarin …” [“… people have a special interest therein …”]. It appears that general police officers might not have these required characteristics to effectively deal with related cases. Consequently, the FCS detectives might, on the one hand, suffer the loss of being experts in their field, resulting in an exodus of these detectives: “… ons gaan ervaring verloor, want mense gaan nie meer daar bly nie …” [“… we are going to lose experience since officials are not going to remain there…”].
On the other hand, sustainable interest from other members in the functions of the FCS might therefore disappear as a result of the eradication of specialisation: “... op stasie vlak weet ek nie of daai mense meer so as ‘n spesialiseenheid gesien word nie ... mense sal nie meer hulse om aansoek te doen nie, want dan is hulle op die einde van die dag net ‘n gewone speurder ...” [“... I doubt if those officials are regarded as specialised at station level ... other members would be discouraged from applying at this unit since they are at the end of the day only normal detectives ...”]. It therefore surfaced that the restructuring of the FCS might have a harmful impact on the specialised skills and knowledge of FCS detectives. Another serious concern mentioned was the fact that a drastic decrease in the number of FCS detectives investigating FCS-related cases was experienced. A number of FCS detectives have been lost to the specific jurisdiction “... baie lede verloor ... toegewyde ondersoekers ...” [“... numerous members were lost ... dedicated investigators ...”], resulting in a gap in the expertise to investigate such cases, since general detectives now responsible for investigating these cases critically lacked training and experience: “... ons sit met konstabels met ‘n paar maande ondervinding wat niks weet nie ... wie gaan hulle lei ...? ... groot gaping tussen die outies wat nou net ingekom het ... geen spesifieke opleiding ontvang nie” [“... we have constables with a few months’ experience who know nothing ... who is going to lead them ...?... a big gap exists between the new appointees ... they received no specific training”]. This viewpoint is shared by another participant. He experienced that the fragmentation of the FCS unit brought about a significant shortfall of experienced FCS detectives who were replaced with inexperienced general detectives - that, in turn, created difficulties for the judicial system: “... mense wat die die ervaring gehad ... is na ander eenhede geplaas ... met mense wat onkundig is ... wat aangestel is ...” [“... detectives who had the experience are placed at other units ... members that are inexperienced were appointed ...”].

Additionally, the Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, correspondingly shared her perceptions about how the restructuring of the FCS would impact on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS. It emerged from this discussion that specialisation in the field of FCS-related investigations had been substituted by a universal approach: “... it stopped the work into further specialisation. The restructuring had move into generic work ...”.
As a result of this collective approach, it appears that, on the one hand, the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives were not utilised appropriately. On the other hand, general SAPS officers, beyond doubt, lacked expertise and specialised skills in order to perform FCS-related functions: “... because of the lack of skills, knowledge, training they [referring to general SAPS officers] are not going to be effective ...”. This participant also anticipated that the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives would vanish as a result of the decentralisation of FCS detectives, culminating in the variation of these detectives’ primary functions and the inaccessibility of their services. It follows that these detectives’ expertise and unique skills would not be applied in line with their primary functions as FCS detectives: “... it [referring to skills and expertise] will be lost ... these people are placed all over ... we are not going to always be able to access that expertise and specialised service because they ... have been restructured into various areas ... Some of them will be getting involved with other work ... so the skills that they have will not be holding in with those skills”. Moreover, the participant regarded the decentralisation of the FCS members to have taken the edge off their expertise, thus creating the message that FCS-related investigations were of lesser importance: “... it is diluting their expertise because they are just posted off to some SAP unit ... and it also saying to them ... that they diluting their importance of work with children ...”.

Another participant, a representative from an NGO (comprising social workers, psychologists and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes), confirmed the sentiment of the aforementioned participant about how the restructuring of the FCS would impact on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS. This participant raised a question mark as to how FCS detectives would acquire and further develop their specialisation if they were exposed to other functions outside their framework: “... how do you get specialised in something if you have to be Jack of all trades and master of none? If you specialise in something ... you only do that ... your experience level go up ... That is not what is happening at the moment ...”.

It appears from the above reactions that participants perceived the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives not to be acknowledged after the restructuring of the FCS. This might explain the participants’ perceptions that FCS detectives’ preparedness might deteriorate in developing
their expertise and specialised skills. It once again appeared that a significant lack of resources distracted these detectives from specialising in their field. It thus raises the question on how the SAPS deal with the allocation of policing resources such as vehicles, personnel and specialised equipment.

The following theme to be presented and discussed is the participants’ views on whether the restructuring of the FCS was necessary to ensure its continued functioning.

4.2.8 A review on the necessity to restructure the FCS

Participants’ views on whether the restructuring of the FCS was necessary to ensure its continued functioning, referred to the question if it was indeed fundamental to restructure the FCS in order to guarantee the unit’s sustained operation. Stated differently, the question that comes to mind is: How essential was it to restructure the FCS to ensure that the unit continued to carry out its functions optimally? Participants’ opinions could take the form of firmly and emotionally questioning the necessity of restructuring the FCS, while it could also be presented as suggestions on how to ensure this unit’s continuation and effective functioning.

This theme was deduced from the answers provided by the participants on the following question: “Is the restructuring of the FCS necessary for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit?”

It was evident that all the participants from the restructured FCS units, referred to in Annexure B, overwhelmingly and indisputably concurred that the restructuring of the FCS was unjustified for the continued functioning of this unit. Participants expressed that the community had not experienced difficulties accessing the services of the FCS prior to the restructuring of the unit: “I don’t think it was a problem (especially for the community) to reach the FCS ...”. To the contrary, victims of FCS-related crimes experienced added complications reaching the detectives of the FCS after the restructuring: “... the victims did not have to come to us. Now ... they don’t know how to get the FCS member on call ...”.
In agreement with the abovementioned participant, one participant also viewed the necessity for the restructuring of the FCS as unwarranted: “It was not, I don’t see the reason behind it …”, adding suggestions on how the SAPS could have communicated the necessity to restructure this unit.

Similarly, another participant emotionally considered the restructuring of the FCS to be pointless for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit. More specifically, this participant compared the decentralisation of the FCS as the fragmentation of parts of a larger structure that had to function in unison, in order to be optimally effective. It follows that the breakup of this previously united structure had adverse consequences for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit, thus denouncing the deterioration of the functioning of the FCS as a hoax: “… ons is besig om uitmekaar te val … ons was ’n kool gewees wat saam met klomp ander kole ..., maar dan vat jy daai kool weg hy raak koud hy gaan dood ... en dit is presies wat hulle met ons nou gedoen het. Ons is ’n kootjie wat weggevat is uit ’n warm vuur uit, ons brand nog steeds ... maar ons gaan dood gaan”. [“... we are in the process of falling apart ... we were like a hot coal together with other coals ... then you take away that coal, its gets cold and die. We are like that hot coal that is taken away ... we are still burning ... however, we are dying”]. Another participant shared similar views, saying: “… It is a big big joke. We were functioning a 110% before the restructuring now we were not even functioning 10%”.

It furthermore became apparent that participants foresaw a bleak future regarding the FCS and their functions. It follows that participants predicted the further deterioration of the unit’s functions if they are merged with the already overloaded general detectives at station level: “Not at all, not at all. They are destructuring it actually ... GKS gaan nie meer bestaan nie ... dit gaan soos ’n gewone docket behandel word in ’n speurtak waarvan die mense honderde op hand het”. [“… FCS will not exist anylonger ... cases are going to be handled as normal cases at the detective branch of which these detectives have hundreds on hand”]. An additional participant also revealed negative emotions surrounding the necessity to restructure the FCS.
It came to light during this discussion that the unfamiliarity with the goal of this process contributed to members’ pessimistic sentiments regarding the essentiality to restructure this unit: “If I knew what their goal is then they can restructure so that we can reach for something better ... I don’t know what is sitting there at the end of the day so I can’t say”.

During an interview conducted with two researchers from a regional human security research institute’s Crime and Justice Programme, one participant, in agreement with the aforementioned participants, also regarded the restructuring of the FCS to be futile for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit: “I don’t think that this type of restructuring is necessary at all ...”. However, this participant suggested an alternative approach, as opposed to the restructuring of the FCS.

It was recommended that another option could have been to maintain the FCS in its previous centralised structure, though FCS detectives could then have been empowered in a tutor capacity, providing training to members at station level: “… instead of dispersing them in the way that it is happening now, they should have ... given them ... the responsibility to train members at police stations ... and in the same time obliging these units to provide in-service training on a continuous basis to members at the police stations”. As a result, these members would have gained firsthand knowledge of FCS-related functions, without negatively affecting the functionality of the FCS unit. Nevertheless, this participant foresaw increased difficulties ahead for the FCS: “… they could have manage it differently without having to resort to a decentralisation of our FCS units ... in the medium and long-term ... we will have more problems ...”.

In interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors, it appears that participants had diverse reactions about the necessity of restructuring the FCS to effectively continue its functions. One participant had not so much a view about whether the restructuring of the FCS was necessary for its continued functioning, but rather provided suggestions on how to ensure this unit’s continuation and effective functioning. In brief, the participant imagined the ideal situation to be the duplication of the previously centralised unit at every cluster unit where FCS detectives are
currently placed, providing that these cluster units receive adequate support from the SAPS management: “... ideaal kan wees ... soos wat hulle aanvanklik was as hulle daai net kan dupliseer in elke distrik ... sodat hulle omstandighede dan nou dieselfde bly en hulle dan nou effektief kan funksioneer” [“... the ideal would be the duplication of the previous FCS units at all the districts ... their circumstances would remain similar and thus function effectively”]. As a result, these cluster units would have the capacity and resources to function effectively.

The participant furthermore questioned the necessity of this process, since although the FCS members were now more accessible, their quality of investigations and the completion rate thereof were also questioned: “... hulle is naby hulle is toeganklik ... maar ek weet nie of hulle ... kwaliteit nou beter is nie en dat daar 'n beter afhandeling syfer van sake is nie”. [“... they are close and accessible ... I doubt if their quality have improved and if there is a increase in the finalisation of cases”]. It follows that the participant suggested the intensification of resources at the previous centralised unit, in order to improve effectiveness, as opposed to the restructuring thereof: “... ek kan nie sien hoekom daar wel 'n herstrukturering plaasgevind het ... as hulle moontlik gevoel het dat hulle nie so effektief was nie kon hulle bloot net hulle hulpbronne uitgebrei het ... steeds gespesialiseerd gebly het”. [“... I do not see the reason behind the restructuring ... if they thought they would not be as effective, they could just have increased resources and remain specialised”].

On the other hand, another participant expressed her unfamiliarity with the necessity to restructure the FCS in order to ensure its continued functioning, since this unit provided an efficient service to the community: “... hulle was besig om 'n spesialisidiens aan die gemeenskap te lever, glad nie 'n idee hoekom hulle nodig gehad het om te verander nie ...” [“... they provided specialised services to the community, have no idea why they changed ... why change it if it is not broken”]. In agreement with the aforementioned participant, this participant similarly questioned the need to restructure the FCS, since “… dit het hulle niks goeds in die sak gebring nie dit is nie asof ons beter ondersoeke het en gouer sake afhandel nie...” [“... They have not gained anything, it is not that we now have improved investigations or that cases are more rapidly finalised ... ”].
Another participant also expressed the need to have the FCS unit restructured, in a negative light, posing the question as to why processes that are effective need to be altered? In addition, this participant also anticipated that the decentralisation of FCS members would bring about total disorder in the system, unless the SAPS invested in intensive training of members, the appointment of expert and dedicated personnel in this field, and participative communication regarding FCS affairs between all role players: “... huidige stelsel kan tot nikks anders aanleiding gee as as totale chaos ... tensy daardie mense intensiewe opleiding gaan ontvang en ... om mense aan te stel wat ... kundigheid op daai spesifieke vlak het ...” [“... the current system could only give rise to total chaos, unless these members receive intensive training and to appoint members who have expertise on that level ...”].

The Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, also expressed her disagreement with the necessity to restructure the FCS for the continued functioning of this unit. It emerged that the FCS was indeed functioning effectively before the restructuring: “I do not think it was necessary ... things that were ... working well was done away with ...”. As a result, it was recommended that instead of restructuring the existing structure of the FCS, the SAPS management should have strengthened this unit: “… rather than sharpening that existing structures I think those structures were just taken away”. Accordingly, the participant regarded the prospects of the FCS as grim, thus calling on the SAPS to recall the centralised FCS unit: [The future of the FCS looks] “... truthfully very bleak. We would like, ideally, to have the FCS reinstated like it was previously”.

Another participant, a representative from an NGO (comprising social workers, psychologists and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes), correspondingly shared similar reactions stating that “… everything is the same”. Likewise, another participant also could not figure out the essentiality why the FCS had to be restructured: “I don’t see any necessity why it has to be restructured ...”, due to insufficient communication and consultation from the SAPS management.

From the above response it appears that participants perceived the restructuring of the FCS to be unjustified for the continued functioning of this unit. A contributing factor to participants’
negative reactions might be their perception that victims currently experienced increased difficulties reaching the FCS. Participants furthermore gave the impression that the fragmentation of a previous interrelated unit may have had adverse consequences for the effective functioning of this unit.

The theme to be discussed next explores how participants view the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the victims of crime.

4.2.9 The impact of the FCS restructuring on the victims of related crimes

Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the victims of crime, questioned how, if any, victims of FCS-related crimes would be affected - directly, indirectly, positively or negatively - as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. Participants’ outlook could take the form of, for example, confused victims negatively influenced by the restructuring of the FCS.

This theme was derived from the answers given by the participants on the following question posed to them: “From your experience, how will the restructuring of the FCS impact on family violence, child protection and sexual offences investigations? On the one hand, what does the future hold for victims of these crimes?”

During the focus group interviews with participants employed in the FCS, referred to in Annexure B, it came to light that these members were currently experiencing substandard services provided to victims of FCS-related crimes and, in addition, predicted that these victims’ needs would, furthermore, be adversely neglected as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. Participants foresaw an unpromising future for women and children falling victim to FCS-related crimes, owing to the failure of general police officers to manage them with the necessary consideration and care. Moreover, participants experienced the deterioration of services to victims shortly after the implementation of the restructuring process. It also became known that victims experienced difficulty accessing the services of the FCS because these victims were not aware of the whereabouts of the FCS:
“… I don’t know where to reach them they are really gone ...”. As a result, victims lost trust in the FCS: “… they don’t even trust us anymore ...”. On the other hand, when victims did gain access to the FCS, unfavourable conditions made it difficult for them to receive adequate attention: “... we are working with the general detectives and abused victims has been holding in the same room as you have to interview a child’’.

It also surfaced that a number of victims were convinced that the FCS did not exist any longer, and therefore confusion was created among them: “Victims don’t know exactly where to go because they’ve got that feeling that the FCS has closed down”. However, when these victims learned that the FCS had only decentralised and still existed, they suffered great inconvenience trying to communicate with investigating officers who were attending to their cases prior to the restructuring. In addition, it appeared that the lack of knowledge of general police officers contributed to victims’ misery. Another participant correspondingly expressed that victims were experiencing secondary victimisation: “... slagoffers word net twee keer slagoffers ...” [“... victims again become victims ...’’], as a result of the inefficient service delivery of the SAPS: “... dan praat ek van die polisie se swak dienslewering ...” [“... then I’m referring to the inefficient service delivery of the SAPS ...”]. The participant was furthermore of the opinion that victims were totally neglected, as a direct result of the restructuring of the FCS: “... het ek myself gesien slagoffers word totaal en al in die steek gelaat deur ... die restructuring in geheel” [“... I have witnessed that victims are totally failed by the restructuring as a whole’’]. On the contrary, victims were regarded as a priority, prior to the restructuring. In addition, one participant experienced that victims of these related crimes were adversely affected as a result of the restructuring process. It emerged that insufficient manpower and the larger geographical area (contrary to before the restructuring) that needed to be serviced by these officers, significantly affected victims negatively, since attendance to these victims was delayed and investigations were therefore also delayed. Another worrying factor participants mentioned was the fact that “the conviction rate is low very low ...”. A serious lack of human and physical resources encountered by the FCS members, as opposed to the situation prior to the restructuring, contributed to the adverse impact this process had on victims of related crimes: “… if you need a vehicle the vehicle was there ... every car was there for every need ... now at this office we got only two cars ...”.
On the other hand, another participant experienced the demands and prejudice of station commissioners, at the accounting stations where FCS detectives were based, as detrimental to the needs of victims in other areas. It surfaced that these station commissioners put pressure on FCS detectives to give priority to cases in their jurisdiction, thus resulting in the neglect of victims in other areas: “... you received a docket with the hope that you will make time ... to investigate but you forever postpone postpone postpone you think tomorrow I’ll definitely go to ... [name withhold] and do ... [name withhold] cases ... they want you to do stuff in ... [name withhold] area. They [referring to victims] are frustrated ... they have to wait a long time before you can assist to the complaint ...”.

During an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security research institute, one participant believed that the restructuring process created a few short-term benefits for victims of FCS-related crimes: “... in the short term I think they have made some efforts for victims of these types of crimes ...”. However, the participant was of the opinion that these benefits might be lost to victims during the medium- to long-term as a result of the vanishing of expertise in the FCS: “… in the medium- and long-term ...they also may lose these short-term benefits because ... FCS ... will loose some of their expertise ... Victims ... will certainly ... relatively [be] affected ...”.

Interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors revealed diverse reactions to the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the victims of crime. One participant pointed out that the restructuring of the FCS would in future impact positively and negatively on the victims of FCS-related crimes. On the one hand, the participant was of the opinion that the restructuring of the FCS had had a negative impact on the victims of FCS-related crimes. Prior to the restructuring, victims received user-friendly and specialised services at the FCS, which currently have deteriorated: “... as ek dit nou gaan aanmeld het, dan sou dit waarskynlik beter vir my gewees het om dit drie jaar terug te gaan aanmeld in die sin van die omstandighede waarin dit waarskynlik dan aangemeld sou gewees het” [“... if I currently would have reported a case, it would have probably been better to report it three years ago since the circumstances would have been better”].
On the other hand, the participant trusted that the restructuring would be, to a certain extent, to the advantage of victims. It follows that victims would be closer to the investigating officer and the presiding court where they had to appear. In effect, accessibility and support to victims would be improved: “… as ‘n slagoffer dan nou hof toe moet kom ... kan dit egter tot my voordeel ... ek is nader aan die ondersoekbeampte ... nader aan die bepaalde hof ...” [“... if victims need to visit the court, it would be to their advantage since they are then closer to the investigating officer and the specific court ... “]. Conversely, another participant raised her concerns about the importance of sufficient training, characteristics and emotional aspects an investigating officer must have, in order to successfully deal with victims. On the contrary, the participant was of the view that general detectives did not possess these qualities, which, in turn, would be to the detriment of victims: “... as ‘n mens nie behoorlik opgelei is of empatie het met hierdie tipe van slagoffers nie en verstaan hoe en wat so ‘n persoon deurgaan nie dan gaan jy nie weet hoe om daai getuie te hanteer ... Hulle gaan nie vertroue hé in jou nie ... Gewone speurders het net ‘n tipe van [houding] ... hulle hoef nie ‘n verhouding met die persoon te hê nie ... as dit nie daar gaan wees met opleiding en beskikbaarheid nie ... gaan die slagoffers tweede kom” [“... if one is not properly trained or does not have the necessary empathy towards victims and also does not understand their circumstances then you won’t be in a position to correctly handle the victim ... they won’t have faith in you ... normal detectives feel they do not have to have a relationship with victims ... if it is not put in place through proper training and availability, then victims will play second fiddle”]. It once again became known that these participants experienced challenging factors that included a significant lack of trained SAPS members, the need for emotional affection towards victims, insufficient communication between SAPS members handling FCS cases and prosecutors, the deficiency of SAPS members to prepare victims prior to their court proceedings, and a lack of physical resources experienced by detectives.

During focus group discussions with NGOs, it furthermore came to light that these participants also did not foresee a promising future for victims of FCS-related crimes after the restructuring process. The Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, predicts an unpromising future for victims as a result of a deficiency in
training, compassion and understanding among general police officers - thus promoting further distress to these victims: “... the future is very bleak for victims ... because of the lack of training and the lack of sensitivity. Victims are not given the treatment they deserve; as a result [they] are already suffering secondary victimisation and secondary trauma ...”.

In support of the participant’s negative outlook, she furthermore illustrated, by means of a comparison, how victims of these related crimes were affected. It became apparent that the FCS detectives played a significant role in providing comprehensive services to victims of these crimes: “... previously with the FCS unit ... it was very integrated and comprehensive all the services ... the FCS officer played a perfect role ...”, as opposed to the inconsistent and disorganised service provided by them after the restructuring: “... whereas now it has become so fragmented and disjointed ...”. Another concern raised was the experience of victims experiencing feelings of unsupportiveness and confusion relating to their cases. It emerged that these victims experienced disorder with the investigation of their cases: “... they would phone ... to find out about the feedback of their case and nobody knew who was the investigating officer and they felt helpless and we would phone from one police station to another ...”.

One of the participants from a focus group discussion, a representative from an NGO (comprising social workers, psychologists and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes) correspondingly agreed that victims were negatively affected by the restructuring of the FCS. It also appeared that victims were hesitant to report cases after the FCS had been restructured: “They won’t report ... they are already doubtful to report”, “... they are negatively impacted by incompetence”. Similarly, it surfaced that victims experienced feelings of hopelessness and were discouraged from reporting cases, as a result of the failure of the police to render support and protection: “... clients experience a form of helplessness and discourage ...”. Moreover, it seemed as if the victims had lost faith in the police after the restructuring of the FCS, and therefore rather drew on the services of NGOs which rendered related services: “They don’t go to the police anymore. They come to the NGOs ... They don’t have trust in the police anymore ...”.

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From the above perceptions of participants it appears that victims of FCS-related crimes were negatively impacted, as a direct result of the restructuring of the FCS. The perception of participants that victims experienced difficulty in accessing the services of the FCS, since they were unaware of the whereabouts of these units, illustrates victims’ added misery and secondary victimisation. The despair of these victims might explain why they lost trust in the FCS and rather resorted to NGOs, ahead of reporting cases to the FCS. A contributing factor to the negative impact of the restructuring process of the FCS on victims of FCS-related crimes, might be the disappearance of the expertise of FCS detectives and the lack of expertise and training of general SAPS members attending to these investigations.

Isolated cases in which participants experience improved service delivery to victims might illustrate isolated advantages of the restructuring process on victims.

Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the perpetrators of crime, follow.

4.2.10 The impact of the FCS restructuring on the perpetrators of related crimes

Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the perpetrators of crime question how, if any, perpetrators of FCS-related crimes were affected - directly, indirectly, positively or negatively - as a result of the restructuring of the FCS.

This theme was derived from the answers given by the participants to the following question posed to them: “From your experience, how will the restructuring of the FCS impact on family violence, child protection and sexual offences investigations? On the other hand, what will the impact be on the perpetrators of these related crimes?”

During focus group discussions with various FCS units, it emerged that detectives from these units envisaged that the restructuring of the FCS would be to the advantage of the perpetrators of related crimes in the future, since these perpetrators would be uncontrolled, with no sufficient protection to victims: “... they are going to have a royal time because they are going to be free
and there is nobody to protect victims. You don’t have a proper investigating officer to protect them. And they are going to know the expertise is gone”. In confirmation with the aforementioned participant, one participant, furthermore, experienced the perpetrators to be advantaged as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. It emerged that FCS detectives found it challenging to rapidly respond to crime scenes that, in turn, favoured the perpetrators due to a lack of evidence: “They are enjoying themselves. And they are having enough time ...”.

In addition, it appears that perpetrators were familiar with the restructuring of the FCS. Consequently these perpetrators would realise that the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives were inadequately impacted, and would thus use it to their advantage by committing additional crimes: “... they know what is going on inside the police. And they know that now is the time [to commit crimes]... die ekspertees is weg” [“... the expertise is gone ...”].

In agreement with the aforementioned FCS detectives, a senior researcher from a humanitarian security research institute’s Crime and Justice Programme also anticipated that the restructuring of the FCS would be to the advantage of perpetrators, since there was no longer an effective FCS capacity, as opposed to the authoritative FCS unit prior to the restructuring: “... I can only imagine criminals stand to gain a lot because where ... in the past they were constantly looking over their shoulders because they knew there were a bunch of dedicated expert police officials working on them and now these units are in the process of being phased out ...”.

During interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors, participants had diverse reactions to the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the perpetrators of crime. One participant, on the one hand, viewed that the restructuring of the FCS could be a drawback to perpetrators, since the services of the FCS were more accessible to victims, and thus discourage perpetrators from committing these offences: “... aan die een kant kan oortreders dank dink maar hier is nou mense wat [as ek so ‘n misdryf gaan pleeg] my gaan ondersoek, of moontlik gaan arresteer, of dit vir my [moeiliker gaan] maak...” [“... on the one hand, perpetrators could imagine they would be investigated or arrested if they commit such a crime ... ”]. On the other hand, perpetrators could be advantaged as a result of the restructuring process, sensing that investigating officers have low self-esteem and therefore do not investigate cases efficiently: “Aan die ander kant kan ‘n oortreder ook eenvoudig sê ... ‘dit is dalk makliker om misdrywe te pleeg’, want jy sit met lede
Another participant experienced that perpetrators were currently at times negatively affected by the restructuring of the FCS, since investigating officers, from time to time, did not attend perpetrators’ bail applications in court: “... as hulle wil borgaansoek doen en ons kan nie die ondersoekbeampte in die hof kry nie ...” [“... when they apply for bail and the investigating officer does not attend court proceedings ...”]. However, the participant expected perpetrators to be advantaged by the restructuring of the FCS if investigations were not performed adequately. Currently, statements taken from victims and perpetrators were not up to standard - that could be to the advantage of perpetrators as a result of inexperienced investigating officers now investigating these cases: “... verklarings word so swak geneem. Hulle gaan voordeel trek ... as die ondersoek nie behoorlik voltooi word nie gaan hulle gouer vrygelaat word, of onskuldig bevind word ...” [“... statements are substandard ... perpetrators would be advantaged ... if investigations are not investigated appropriately they would be released earlier or founded not guilty ... ”].

The Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, also expressed her negative thoughts regarding the advantage that perpetrators gained after the restructuring was implemented. It came to light that the unsupportive conduct and service of SAPS members regarding these cases, suggests to perpetrators that they have complimentary access to these crimes without any adverse consequences: “... perpetrators get away with it the message given to them is ... you know I can do it again nothing has happened. The law is not serious”.

It furthermore surfaced during focus group interviews conducted with NGOs (providing counselling services to victims of violence and abuse) that participants were not optimistic about the advantages the restructuring of the FCS held for perpetrators of related crimes.

It appeared that the empowerment of victims had been totally neglected after the restructuring, and therefore benefitted the perpetrators: “... FCS officers previously brought child victims for the court preparation programme ... to testify effectively in court ... this no longer happens. The
SAPS members are not longer able to offer their service ...”. It also appeared that prompt service delivery provided by general police officers was not up to standard, as opposed to FCS detectives’ punctual services, resulting in perpetrators not being apprehended: “... the FCS officers they would go out immediately and arrest the perpetrator ... clients have come back and told us that they know where the perpetrator is and the SAPS member has not been successful in reaching out in arresting the perpetrator ...”. Another concern raised was the fact that the substandard investigation and control of these cases, as well as the inaccessibility of FCS detectives, were favorable to perpetrators: “... because of the restructuring some of the cases are not follow through as a result because of ... lack of other information ... lack of the control so ... the system have empowered the perpetrators more than our victims ... can’t get hold of the investigating officer”.

The experiences and perceptions of participants from the above storylines gave the impression that the restructuring of the FCS impacted favourably on the perpetrators of FCS-related crimes. The substandard investigations by inexperienced investigating officers might explain why perpetrators were advantaged by this process. A contributing factor might have been the neglect to empower victims after the restructuring, that led to the benefit of the perpetrator. It furthermore appeared that perpetrators were negatively affected by the restructuring; ironically this occurred when investigating officers failed to attend to perpetrators’ bail applications.

Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to the client system serviced by the FCS follow.

4.2.11 Examining the impact of the FCS restructuring on the associated networks

Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to the client system serviced by the FCS, referred to the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the joint venture, collaboration, relations and operational arrangements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to victims of FCS-related crimes. The impact on the partnerships,
interaction and working agreements could take the form of agreements amongst the internal clusters of the FCS and between the FCS and external stakeholders.

This theme was derived from the answers given by the participants to the following question posed to them: “According to you, how will this restructuring process affect the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS, non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, and other government departments?”

On closer scrutiny of the collected data, it became clear that the participants spoke about the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders, and also about the partnerships, interactions and working agreements amongst the internal clusters of the FCS.

For this reason, this theme is divided in the following two sub-themes: firstly, the impact of the FCS restructuring on the external networks, and secondly, the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements internally among the FCS cluster units.

4.2.11.1 The impact of the FCS restructuring on the external networks

During focus group interviews conducted with detectives at the FCS units, as mentioned in Annexure B, it became apparent that the affiliation between the FCS and the external stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS, deteriorated to such an extent after the restructuring process that communication and interaction between these organisations were virtually non-existing. “... We had quarterly meetings with the social workers ... community based members ... and those are no more. We had lectures with the schools ... at the moment if you go there only a few people will turn up to attend the meetings. The community here are up in arms ... They have lost their trust in the police because they know that there is no more experience ...”. One participant explained the deterioration of partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and these external stakeholders to be appalling: “Absoluut haglik” [“absolutely appalling”].
Participants experienced the interaction between these external role players and the FCS as of greater quality prior to the restructuring. It became known that a number of FCS detectives did not perceive the necessity of sustaining high-quality partnerships, interaction and working agreements with these external stakeholders any longer, since these detectives were of the opinion that their primary functions were going to be done away with in future: “... because with our morale that is so low you don’t even want to want to get into a relationship with the NGOs anymore, because for what reason? In the long run we are not going to deal with these cases anymore so why do you have to build a relationship with the NGO?... There is no communication whatsoever between any NGO department with the police or the FCS unit”.

A number of FCS detectives sincerely regretted not having been in a position to maintain adequate interaction and working agreements between the FCS, the community and external role players rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS: “... we are very sorry to leave the FCS ... because we are now far from our other people. We use to be together with even the NGO and other organisation that were helping us, but now we are very sorry, but there is nothing that we can do”. It also emerged that certain FCS clusters succeeded in sustaining the high-quality partnerships, interaction and working agreements with these external stakeholders, despite the restructuring: “... they are so supportive ... Some of them they have got channels up to our Provincial office where they know who to consult who to speak to ... they come to our rescue ... we feel comfortable about them ... to work together with them it is a jolly thing ...”. Another participant shared similar views: “... we are still working together as if normal ... we are still having a good working relationship ...”.  

During an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security research institute’s Crime and Justice Programme, it correspondingly became apparent that the partnership and interaction between the FCS and NGOs rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS, were significantly hampered as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. As a result, new relationships had to be established between these organisations: “... the FCS units and the NGOs, to a large extent is very negatively affected by this whole restructuring process ... now that it is all broken and gone and you must build up new relationships now”.

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Individual interviews with senior public prosecutors, on the other hand, revealed that these participants had diverse reactions about the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS. One participant speculated that the relationship between these role players would probably continue and not be affected by the restructuring: “... verhoudinge wat daar dan nou tussen ... die eenheid is en dan nou ander rolspelers het ... net voortgegaan ...” [“... relationships between this unit and other role players only continued ...”]. As a result, the impact of the restructuring of the FCS might have had a positive effect on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and other (external) stakeholders rendering services to the client-systems serviced by the FCS: “... op die oog af is dit dalk positief ... dit lyk asof die werk vinniger gedoen word en dat daar beter samewerking moontlik is tussen die verskillende rolspelers” [“... initially it appears to be positive. It seems if the work is done faster and possibly improved cooperation between different role players”]. However, the lack of motivation among FCS detectives as a result of the restructuring might have hampered the relationship between role players: “... die ander kant van die “coin” waar jy sit met ouens wat ... ongemotiveerd [is] en dan kanselleer die twee mekaar nou weer uit” [“... on the other hand, members are demotivated, thus, these two cancel each other out”].

On the other hand, it also appeared that the FCS did not create opportunities for liaising with NGOs and other departments in order to develop a strong partnership: “Daar is ‘n probleem van samewerking tussen ons ... Hulle is nie beskikbaar nie. Dit gebeur net nie - ‘n helse probleem hoe hulle nou deesdae inskakel met NGOs”. [“There exist challenges to cooperating with one another. They are not available … it just doesn’t happen any longer … a huge challenge how they cooperate with NGOs these days”].

One participant interestingly explained the virtual disappearance of the interaction between the FCS and other role players, as a result of an identity crisis “… hulle het ‘n identiteitskrisis ... hulle skakel nie rërig met ons nie ...” [“... they have an identity crisis, they don’t really interact with us ... ”] which these detectives had to deal with after the restructuring of the FCS, since they lack a sense of belonging. Consequently, it appeared that these detectives were experiencing
difficulties to come to terms with their circumstances: “Hulle probeer hulleself net vind ...n hoe hulle moet funksioneer”. [“They are attempting to find themselves and how they have to function”]. Participants also compared the majority of FCS detectives to strangers, as a result of barely any direct communication between them and state prosecutors. Consequently, the importance of communication and interaction between these role players was emphasised, especially with sensitive cases investigated by the FCS: “... daar is min, nie veel ondersoekbeamptes, sommige sal nog spesifiek individueel hulle dossiere inbring maar meeste gee dit vir die skakelbeampte van die stasie so dit breek ook daar kommunikasie ... ons is vreemdelinge vir mekaar” [“... few investigating officers would still individually bring their case dockets, however; the majority hand it over to the representative of the station; as a result, communication is broken down ... we are strangers to one another”].

On the other hand, participants were of the view that the level of cooperation and communication between the FCS and public prosecutors was greater prior to the restructuring process, that resulted in the enhanced relationship and understanding between these role players: “Daar was meer samewerking ... Daar was meer kommunikasie in die sin van jy het geweet met wie het jy te doen ...” [“... There was increased cooperation and communication since knowing with whom you are dealing with ...”].

It also emerged during focus group discussions with NGOs providing counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, that the restructuring of the FCS had had a negative impact on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS. It came to light that the interaction and professional practice between these role players had decreased to such an extent that NGOs had to rely on the personal commitment and support of FCS detectives. On the contrary, it surfaced that prior to the restructuring of the FCS, NGOs had an excellent relationship with the FCS: “... we had forged a working relationship with them ... It worked swiftly”.

It furthermore came to light that this NGO took the responsibility and initiative upon itself to establish a new relationship and working agreement with the SAPS, in order to alleviate the widespread confusion at the time: “... created and establish our own network ... while the SAPS
is trying to get their house in order”. On the other hand, these participants were experiencing continued and constructive partnerships, interaction and working agreements with other NGOs after the restructuring of the FCS: “With other NGOs yes certainly I think it is very positive ...”. Participants viewed the collapse of collaboration and interaction between the FCS and NGOs as a direct result of the restructuring of this unit, and therefore held the SAPS management accountable: “[The lack of cooperation between ourselves and the FCS] ... can [be] contribute[d] to the restructuring process ... and the powers that be”.

In contrast to the negative sentiments and experiences of participants, it emerged that a few participants were optimistic about the probability that circumstances surrounding the failure of interaction and partnerships between the FCS and NGOs could be recovered. However, the SAPS management had to be prepared to enter in dialogue with the NGOs in order to restore the situation cooperatively: “... it can improve ... provided there is discussion and collaboration.”

From the above perceptions of respondents it appeared that the restructuring of the FCS had resulted in the virtual collapse of the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS. An identity crisis and the lack of a sense of belonging experienced by FCS detectives might have been a reason for this deterioration of the partnership, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders. On the other hand, it might also explain a number of FCS detectives’ views that they did not perceive the necessity to sustain high quality partnerships, interaction and working agreements, since they foresaw their primary functions to be done away with. This, in turn, questioned the commitment of these detectives to fulfil their obligations towards external stakeholders and the community. On the other hand, a number of FCS detectives expressed their regret and sympathy towards these external stakeholders for not being in a position to maintain adequate interaction. This positive outlook may illustrate a number of FCS detectives’ commitment and responsibility towards the external stakeholders.

The next sub-theme to be presented and discussed explores the impact of the FCS restructuring internally on the FCS clusters.
4.2.11.2 The impact of the FCS restructuring internally on the FCS clusters

During focus group discussions with members from FCS units, referred to in Annexure B, it disturbingly came to light that the partnerships, interaction and working agreements internally amongst the FCS clusters were also non-existent after the implementation of the restructuring process. It appeared that the low self-esteem of detectives and difficult positions these detectives found themselves in were major contributing factors by these FCS cluster units did not interact: “... each and every person’s morale is so down you don’t even want to communicate with the colleagues at a other station because you don’t want to hear his problems ... you’ve got a lot of problems of yourself”. As a result, partnerships between these units were also significantly damaged: “At this stage your working relationship went down you don’t want to speak to a colleague at another station there is no communication with other units anymore”.

Another disturbing factor that became known was that the restructured FCS units were occupied with their own internal complexities and were therefore apathetic to other cluster units’ problems: “Nobody is interested to listen to other because they are concentrating on their work. I am concentrating on my cluster ...”. Another participant similarly experienced that these clusters functioned completely individually: “... we must have meetings amongst each other ...”.

Another participant, in contrast, shared positive experiences about the interaction, partnerships and working agreements between the FCS clusters. It appeared that the FCS clusters assisted one another if the need arose, emphasising the camaraderie and mutual interest between these clusters: “If they got something that I don’t have then I can easily phone them ... We share the same feeling so we can’t turn our backs on each other now”.

It seems from the above reactions that the interaction and working agreements internally among the FCS clusters were significantly hampered as a direct result of the restructuring of the FCS. It also appears that the low self-esteem of FCS detectives and unfavourable working conditions these members found themselves in might explain why these units lost interest in interacting with one another. A contributing factor might also be that these units concentrated on their individual inter-departmental challenges and therefore neglected to interrelate with one another.
4.3 Summary

This chapter provided the presentation, analysis and integration of the qualitative data [the semi-structured individual interviews and focus group interviews with members of the FCS at the lower hierarchical levels and other relevant external stakeholders directly involved with the FCS, as discussed in 1.10.4 of chapter 1]. The respondents’ reactions to the individual interviews and focus group interviews were presented and discussed by means of emergent themes and subcategories, to explore the outcomes of these interviews. An explanation of each theme and subcategory enhanced the contextualisation of such themes and their subcategories, and furthermore provided the reader with a clear understanding of these themes and their subsequent subcategories. Moreover, participants’ responses to the questions were furthermore enriched by direct verbatim reflections from participants. In order to further improve contextualisation in this chapter, tables, as presented in Annexures A and B, provide background information of the respondents. A deeper understanding of how participants experienced the restructuring process of the FCS, and how prepared they were for this process, thus emerged. A critical reflection of each theme acted as conclusion thereof.

Chapter 5 presents the interpretation of the findings.
CHAPTER 5  INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the interpretation of the findings. The data is interpreted and measured according to the emergent themes and accompanying subcategories, as discussed in chapter 4. Firstly, an overview of each theme and subcategory is presented, which is accentuated and complemented with literature sources, as well as examples of national and international police and non-policing organisations and the lessons that could be learnt from these organisations’ restructuring efforts. Subsequently, management and ground level perspectives from individual interviews and focus group interviews are incorporated to form a comprehensive interpretation of the findings.

5.2 Overview of Emergent Themes and Subcategories

It is imperative for all members of the FCS and other role players to understand the reasoning behind the restructuring of the FCS, in order to avoid any ambiguity that may lead to perplexity among them. The implementation of the restructuring process should be conducted in a way that respects the involved members’ and other role players’ thoughts and feelings. It follows that participants proposed guidelines on how they would have preferred the communication and implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to have taken place. In addition, participants also expressed their opinions of the effect that this process has had on service delivery in the FCS. It is also accentuated that change in an organisation affects members’ spirits and self-confidence either positively or negatively. The feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS then came under scrutiny. Moreover, the impact of the restructuring process on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives were also examined. The necessity to introduce the restructuring process in the FCS and the impact thereof on the victims and perpetrators of FCS related crimes, also received attention.
Change in an organisation, such as the restructuring of the FCS, can, furthermore, also affect internal and external collaboration, relations and operational arrangements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to victims of FCS-related crimes. The emergent themes and accompanying subcategories are discussed in more detail in paragraph 4.2.

The first theme, “Exploring the awareness of the motivation behind the restructuring of the FCS”, has, as its main challenge, for the SAPS management to create awareness and knowledge among FCS members and other relevant role players, of the motivation for restructuring the FCS, in order to create transparency, and simultaneously avoid uncertainty among everyone involved.

The series panel studies and individual interviews delivered similar results. It follows that participants’ perceptions remained unchanged. The researcher explored for developments in participants’ perceptions regarding the restructuring process; however, these perceptions remained constant over this period.

5.2.1 Exploring the awareness of the motivation behind the restructuring of the FCS

Change initiatives are complicated processes that may cause mystification and lack of confidence if not properly understood by those affected by these change initiatives, as explained in paragraph 4.2.1. This theme has, as its central challenge, to involve all those affected by changes in their organisations and their being empowered by management with sufficient knowledge of the change initiatives in order to familiarise them with all aspects of such changes. It follows that confusion and insecurity which might exist among those affected by these changes, will be, to a great degree, overcome.

The significance of this theory is also accentuated in the brief history of programme evaluation, as discussed in paragraph 2.3. During the 1930s, individuals in leadership positions in government agencies then already recognised a critical need for orderly, explicit ways to handle their policy, administrative, programme and planning responsibilities. As government became increasingly complex and technical, its programmes could no longer be adequately managed by
people hired as intelligent generalists. As a result, the importance of evaluation is now widely acknowledged by those in political and administrative roles in government. Many international federal agencies have their own evaluation units, as do a large number of their state counterparts (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12). Programme evaluation is thus a valuable tool in achieving knowledge and an improved understanding of change initiatives. In addition, the significance of knowledge about - and understanding of - change initiatives is, furthermore, emphasised in paragraph 2.4.

The demand for knowledge acquisition, which demonstrates membership in the elite ranks of learning organisations, has crescendoed into an organisational development and programme evaluation mania. Evaluation has moved from merely generating findings about specific programmes to generating knowledge. In this age of global capitalist ascendency, knowledge has become “intellectual capital”. Moreover, the significance of impact evaluations, as presented in paragraph 2.7, also values the importance of creating knowledge, and thus advocates that investments in building knowledge can have tremendous and unpredictable returns. Additionally, the impact evaluation of Mexico’s PROGRESA program, in paragraph 2.4.1.1, furthermore illustrates the significance of creating knowledge through impact evaluation. In order to emphasise understanding and knowledge of change initiatives impact evaluation, policymakers in developing countries have furthermore expressed interest in gaining access to better information, building knowledge, and incorporating evidence in policy decisions, as discussed in paragraph 2.13.

The literature review on restructuring processes in business and police organisations, as presented and discussed in chapter 3, further highlights the significance to completely understand change initiatives implemented in organisations by those affected. Furnari ([s.a.]) values this theme, as presented in paragraph 3.2.3.1, suggesting that when restructuring a company, it is critical that key people are involved in all aspects of the planning, developing and execution stages of “the plan”. By seeking input from employees, greater acceptance and buy-in will emerge, and support for change will materialise. Revitalising a company becomes a major strain on its people and the organisation. Since there is a natural resistance to change, it is crucial to approach the effort in the appropriate manner. Thus, when recommending changes, it is important that the benefits of the changes are clearly communicated. Baruch and Hind (2000), as presented in paragraph 3.2.3.2, in addition acknowledge that changes in an organisation, be they
business re-engineering processes, restructuring, flattening, etc., bring not only innovation, but also chaos and uncertainty to the management of people in the workplace. Johnson (1994), as discussed in paragraph 3.2.3.2, illustrates the importance for employees to understand change initiatives, and therefore values the view that any plan for change should allow for incremental implementation, encourage employee participation, and provide continual communication and education on the project.

Organisational change strains not only the organisation as a whole, but also individual employees within the organisation. In support of Johnson, Elias (2007), as presented in paragraph 3.2.3.2, also emphasises the importance of empowering employees with sufficient knowledge of change initiatives, thus advocating that implementing a change initiative without attending to such processes can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the potential to reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and motivation. In fact, if an organisation is to successfully implement change, a change strategy must be developed that takes the employee’s psychological processes into account. Kouzes and Posner (as quoted by Elias, 2007), also presented in paragraph 3.2.3.2, furthermore emphasise the need for employees to understand change processes, and are therefore in favour of the theory that successful change requires employees to be intrinsically motivated, able to see change as a learning opportunity, and feel as though they have control over the change process.

Cooper ([s.a.]:4), in 3.2.3.3, also draws attention to the importance of this theme, supporting the value of keeping the energy and employee engagement alive until the support processes are fully in place, and also allowing time for people to function and experiment within the new structure, as well as keeping open dialogue with stakeholders to work out important adjustments. Ford (2007), as presented in paragraph 3.2.3.3, furthermore accentuates the importance of management to empower employees with sufficient knowledge of change processes, thus supporting the view that effective leaders do not merely prepare an organisation prior to a change effort. They must have the patience to constantly build the capacity for change among organisational members throughout the various stages of the change effort. Leading-edge organisations are deriving ever-increasing value by tapping into employee and stakeholder expertise and capability.
Examples of multinational non-policing organisations’ restructuring initiatives, presented in paragraph 3.3, furthermore accentuate the significance of creating awareness, through consultation, among employees on the lower levels, to familiarise and empower them with knowledge of change initiatives, in order to minimise confusion and uncertainty. The example of the restructuring effort of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, as presented in paragraph 3.3.1, furthermore underlines the significance of involving employees during change processes, in order to familiarise the employees with such processes and thus avoid uncertainty created by the changes. In line with the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Vodafone’s simplified restructuring effort, as well as its consultative interaction during the company’s restructuring effort with its employees, as presented in paragraph 3.3.2, furthermore accentuates the necessity of a clear focus during organisational change, in order for members to have a comprehensive understanding of such changes so as to minimise uncertainty. Moreover, Vodafone’s initiative to involve employees during its restructuring, in the form of employee representatives, additionally creates a sense of participation that could enhance employees’ understanding of such changes and also reduce resistance to change. Furthermore, ABSA’s restructuring initiative, as presented in paragraph 3.3.4, sets an example of the significance of continuous consultation efforts with employees regarding restructuring processes, to ensure that employees remain informed of each step of such a process.

In addition, the literature review on restructuring processes in police organisations, as well as international examples of police organisations’ restructuring efforts, presented in paragraph 3.4, furthermore value the significance to familiarise employees with restructuring efforts in the organisation through a consultative approach. It follows that Maguire et al. (2003) (in paragraph 3.4) draw attention to the approach of police organisations to embrace concepts such as “participatory management” and “empowerment” of lower level employees, supervisors, and administrators, and “shared” decision making. The restructuring process of the Sierra Leone Police, as presented in paragraph 3.4.1.4, furthermore is a classic example of the value of the continuous consultation and interaction with all role players during change efforts.
From the participants’ of the various FCS cluster units perceptions, as presented and discussed in chapter 4, it appears that the SAPS management has neglected to efficiently empower employees of the FCS at the lower hierarchical levels, and other role players, with sufficient knowledge and consultation regarding the restructuring of the FCS that, in turn, resulted in large-scale confusion and uncertainty about the rationale behind this restructuring process. “... I felt like a puppy ...
We didn’t understand what was going on ... where we were going what we are supposed to do, nothing ... we are not sure if we are still going to do FCS cases ... how long are they going to take to finish up this whole thing ... we are still quite in the dark ...
”.

Participants were furthermore of the opinion that they undoubtedly did not understand the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS, although they made efforts to understand this process and the direction towards which they were heading. Additionally, it strongly emerged that members from the FCS had a limited understanding of the restructuring process, as a result of inadequate communication and consultation regarding this process: “... nobody of us, the members on the floor doing the work weren’t informed what was the reason for the restructuring ...
”. Participants furthermore drew attention to the importance of the responsibility of the SAPS management to have familiarised employees with the restructuring of the FCS: “... the Management ... of the SAPS ... must call all of the FCS members and then explain all this to them but they didn’t do it up to now”. It was additionally made known that FCS detectives had feelings of neglect, cynicism and the sense of no acceptance and affinity, since the justification for this process was not communicated to them. It follows that these members were only given an order to restructure, with no clear indication of the grounds for it. As a result, insecurity, aggravation and apathy were created among these members.

Moreover, participants and representatives of non-governmental organisations, presented in chapter 4, similarly had a limited understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS. These participants justified their restricted understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS as a result of the lack of communication of this process to them and by means of unconfirmed reports. As a result, confusion about the restructuring process was created: “... I don’t have an understanding why in the first place it was initiated ...”.
Participants were therefore of the opinion that their restricted understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS was as a result of a lack of consultation with important role players. The participants additionally suggested that dialogue between important role players and the police would have been a viable option to inform these role players of the rationale of restructuring the FCS, in order to clarify the process: “... lack of consultation with the stakeholders ... information sessions where they must inform us that there is going to be some changes ... even the police personnel themselves they were still confused as to what is happening and what are they expected to do ...”. Another participant also experienced a lack of understanding as to the reasons why the FCS restructured, and regarded the absence of efficient communication and consultation, as well as the enforced style the SAPS management exercised during the implementation of the restructuring process, as a major contributing factor towards the lack of understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS: “... lack of consultation ... there was no discussion around this it was just a top down thing ... without any consultation”.

From the experiences of senior public prosecutors it once again appears that that the SAPS management failed to convey the underlying principles behind the restructuring of the FCS to other role players. It follows that not all the prosecutors were equally familiar with this restructuring process. As a result, the majority of these prosecutors expressed their uncertainty and negative sentiment towards the introduction of the restructuring and also questioned why the FCS had to be restructured: “... prakties verstaan ek dit glad nie ... onlogies en ondeurdag en wat dit behels is dat alles nou chaos is ...” [“... illogical ... not thought through properly therefore everything is chaos ... practically I definitely don’t understand it”]. In addition, participants confirmed the shortfall of the SAPS management to effectively convey the reasons of the FCS restructuring, since these participants learnt of this process through the media: “... weet nie werklik op watter vlak is hierdie besluite geneem nie ... lees maar in die koerante dat hierdie eenheid gaan ontbind ... nie veel geëmmunikeer wat die doel daar agter is ...” [“... are not really aware at what level these decisions were made ... I read in the newspaper this unit is disbanding ... not much was communicated what the objective is ... ”].
For the restructuring of the FCS to be distinguished as a process characterised by adequate consultation and communication, the SAPS management should have, ahead of implementing the restructuring of the FCS, effectively communicated the motivation and underlying principles of the restructuring process to members and other stakeholders at the lower hierarchical levels, in order to familiarise and empower them with knowledge about all aspects of the process. In this way, uncertainty and confusion about the restructuring among those affected could have been minimized. The significance of knowledge about and understanding of change initiatives among employees, as presented in chapters 2 and 3, is well documented in the literature, and practiced by national, multinational, police and non-police organisations. However, the SAPS management neglected to empower its employees and other role players with sufficient knowledge to comprehensively understand the restructuring of the FCS to which they were subjected, and were also expected to execute the process successfully. The failure of the SAPS to communicate and consult its employees and other role players regarding the restructuring of the SAPS, constituted a critical breakdown to the process. Although restructuring is a worldwide phenomenon practised in order to adapt to organisational changes, adequate action was not taken by the management of the SAPS to educate and prepare its members for this restructuring process. It follows that the top structure of the SAPS solely focused on the rapid implementation of the process, while ignoring the fears and uncertainty of employees. Consequently, members of the FCS and the other relevant role players did not have the knowledge and motivation to successfully implement the process. As a result, the restructuring effort of the FCS was, to a great extent, adversely affected, since the management of the SAPS failed to create understanding and the know-how among employees on the lower levels. This literature also indicates the negative consequences of organisations that fail to provide its employees with enough information of change initiatives – which, in turn, should act as a precautionary measure to the SAPS not to follow similar actions.

The next theme to be interpreted is “Evaluating the implementation of the restructuring process”.
5.2.2 Evaluating the implementation of the restructuring process

Well executed implementation of organisational change is characterised by the necessary subtlety towards employees, consultative communication and transparency, as explained in paragraph 4.2.2. The core challenge of this theme is thus to communicate the importance of the change initiative to employees in a clear and unambiguous way, in order to empower these employees with the necessary knowledge concerning the goals and objectives of the change initiative. It follows that employees would experience the implementation of the change process as a well executed and understood process, thus improving the effectiveness of the change initiative.

The value of well-executed implementation processes is also acknowledged as one of the reasons for conducting impact evaluations, as presented in paragraph 2.6. It follows that this reason suggests that if an impact evaluation is carried out at an intermediate stage of project execution, very important lessons can be learnt on how the programme design and/or the project execution can be modified to improve the effectiveness of the intervention. In addition, the importance of an effective implementation process is furthermore highlighted in the significance of impact evaluations, as discussed in paragraph 2.7, by making provision for conducting impact evaluations that generate useful feedback during implementation. As a result, measurement of the success or failure in reaching such intermediate goals can help programme managers to make necessary adjustments, in order to improve implementation. White (2006) additionally signifies the importance of impact evaluation during program implementation referring to Kenya’s agricultural extension services, in paragraph 2.4.1.2, and the knowledge arising from such an evaluation. Moreover, White (2006) also highlights the impact of India’s Integrated Nutrition Project, in paragraph 2.4.1.3, and the significance of impact evaluation during program implementation. Davies (2004: 2,4) furthermore draws attention to the significance of impact evaluations in order to improve implementation, as presented in paragraph 2.7. It follows that the government of any country needs to know at the outset of policy development, and after policies have been implemented, what their likely and achieved impacts - in terms of both the positive and negative outcomes – will be. The United Kingdom (UK) Government, for example, uses a wide range of evaluations methods, including impact evaluation, to ensure that policies,
programmes and public services are planned and delivered as effectively and efficiently as possible. In addition, McNamara (2007:2), as discussed in paragraph 2.9, values the use of impact evaluation to improve implementation processes, by referring to the fact that success involves remaining open to continuous feedback and the adjustment of programmes accordingly.

The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as presented in chapter 3, furthermore supports and highlights the value of persistent and unambiguous communication during the implementation of change initiatives. Savery and Luks (2000:309), in paragraph 3.2.1, recognise the difficulty organisations have to implement changes in a clear and well understood manner, and therefore emphasise that the critical nature and reasons for change must be clearly, consistently and regularly communicated to employees – this being an area in which many organisations face tremendous challenges. Cooper ([s.a.]:4), in paragraph 3.2.3.1, additionally recognises the significance of consultative communication, participative decisionmaking and employees’ readiness for change during the implementation of change initiatives. Johnson (1994), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, furthermore suggests that any plan for change should allow for incremental implementation, encourage employee participation, and provide continual communication and education on the project. Organisational change strains not only the organisation as a whole, but also individual employees within the organisation.

Moreover, Elias (2007:2), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, emphasises the well-being of employees during the implementation of change, by suggesting if an organisation is to successfully implement change, a change strategy must be developed that takes the employees’ psychological processes into account. Implementing a change initiative without attending to such processes can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the potential to reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and motivation. Kouzes and Posner (as quoted by Elias, 2007:2), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, furthermore place high value on employees’ interests during the implementation process, indicating that successful change requires employees to be intrinsically motivated, able to see change as a learning opportunity, and feel as though they have control over the change process.
Examples of multinational non-policing organisations’ restructuring initiatives, presented in paragraph 3.3, furthermore highlight the importance of consultative interaction with employees and participative decisionmaking during the implementation of change initiatives. The example of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies’ (Shell) restructuring process, in paragraph 3.3.1, highlights the importance of participative decisionmaking with employees during implementation. Additionally, Vodafone’s restructuring process, in paragraph 3.3.2, furthermore accentuates the value of consultative interaction with its employees throughout the implementation process.

From the participants’ of the various FCS cluster units experiences, presented in chapter 4, it became known that the vast majority of participants experience and perceive the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS as a process characterised by confusion, uncertainty and unconfirmed reports that were executed instantaneously: “... we didn’t even read it [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] in the document [referring to official SAPS document] ... I heard from the restructuring on the National Television ... no one ever told you why and what it is about ... nobody still is telling us exactly what it is so there is a whole lot of uncertainties about some issues”. In addition, respondents experienced that the media played a greater role when the implementation of this process was made known to members of the FCS than official SAPS communication channels. As a result, participants then also signified their antagonism towards the authoritarian manner in which the implementation of this process was eventually communicated to FCS detectives. As a result, one participant described the implementation of the restructuring process by comparing it to chaos: “... implementation is actually a good word for chaos ... there was no implementation thereof”.

It follows that these participants then highlighted the SAPS management’s lack of consultative communication pertaining to the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS. The absence of participative decisionmaking then surfaced, through participants’ experiences, during the implementation of the restructuring process, and as a result, this process was enforced upon them: “... the members did not have any say or choice with the restructuring ... didn’t even come and ask our opinion they just told us on that day you have to report by that police station”. A major concern that this process was implemented under false pretentions, was also raised by
participants, since the SAPS management did not clearly reveal the extent of the restructuring process to them. Participants, furthermore, then came to the conclusion that the implementation of this process was not carefully studied prior to implementation, and therefore gave rise to numerous dilemmas: “... when we were moved to the station we have to sit in the passage because there was no office ... if it was thoroughly planned, I don’t think we would encounter so many problems. We needed time to thought it through ...”.

Participants from non-governmental organisations, as discussed in chapter 4, additionally experienced the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS as a process covered with confusion, uncertainty and characterised by a lack of communication and unconfirmed reports: “… it was a bit confusing ... there were rumours then they [referring to the FCS] are closing, then they are not”. Participants experienced the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to be a sudden and unexpected order from the SAPS management that came as a surprise: “… it was very sudden and unexpected ... implemented without any forewarning or consultation ... a top down policy ... It was just a decree, an order declared ... We were just told overnight there is no longer going to be a FCS unit”. It follows that a number of these participants experienced the restructuring process not only to be confusing to themselves but also to members of the SAPS, as well as to members of the community, since the previously established cooperating network had failed after the implementation of this process. As a result, participants need to apply their own discretion in order to obtain a better understanding of the implementation of this process. Consequently, participants voiced their reservations about the degree to which the implementation of this process was studied. Once again, it became evident that the media fulfilled a significant role in creating awareness among these participants towards the implementation of the process, as opposed to official police channels: “We saw everything [about the restructuring] on television”.

As a result, the lack of communication and consultation created ambiguity and uncertainty among the NGOs and members of the FCS. Moreover, informal communication channels such as unconfirmed reports and hearsay also contributed to participants’ awareness regarding the implementation of the restructuring process: “Word of mouth I would say. It would be somebody telling something...”.
As a result, it was made known that widespread confusion had been created among NGOs and the FCS itself. On the other hand, participants also experienced the implementation of this process to have a negative effect on the community, also as a result of the lack of communicating the restructuring to them.

A senior researcher from a humanitarian security research institute’s Crime and Justice Programme furthermore revealed that there was a definite lack of consultation and communication from the SAPS management, concerning the implementation of the restructuring process. Communication only materialised after the implementation of and criticism towards this process: “There were communication send out but these were out when the decisions were already taken…communication only held after criticism”.

It furthermore prominently emerged from the discussions with senior public prosecutors, presented in chapter 4, that they widely considered the implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to be categorised as an abrupt process lacking consultative communication, resulting in uncertainty and confusion. It follows that these participants experienced no consultation regarding the implementation of this process in their department. As a result, participants viewed the implementation of this process as top-down one-sided approach: “... ‘n ondeurdagte eensydige besluit ...” [“... an incoherent one-sided decision...”].

Participants’ explained that their lack of knowledge about the implementation of the restructuring process was contributable to the absence of proper communication, consultation and the practical implementation thereof: “... daar was geen kommunikasie ... daar was geen behoorlike konsultasie ... in die implementering daarvan nie” [“... there was no communication ... no proper consultation in the implementation thereof”]. In contradiction to the best practices on the implementation of organisational change, as advocated in chapters 2 and 3, participants revealed that the SAPS did not realise the importance of communicating the implementation of this process, since they were too actively involved in internal challenges, and therefore neglected communication with other role players. Consequently, the media once again acted as the communication medium in order to communicate the implementation of this process to these participants.
It furthermore also surfaced that unofficial communication channels such as the “grapevine” functioned very strongly as a result of ineffective communication during the implementation of this process: “... daar is geen kommunikasie ten opsigte daarvan aan die howe ... gekommunikeer anders as wat ons maar hoor by die ondersoekbeamptes wat hier kom” [“... there was no communication thereof to the courts ... other than what we heard from contact with investigating officers”].

Moreover, participants revealed that the implementation of the restructuring process brought about practical and logistical difficulties, which is indicative of the rapid manner in which this process was implemented. As a result, participants experienced the implementation of the restructuring process negatively, and also questioned the advantages this process held for the SAPS: “Behalwe vir ’n paar individue ... is dit vir my asof niemand verder meer omgee nie ... ons ervaar dit glad nie positief nie en ek glo ook nie dat dit vir hulle enigsins tot voordeel gestrek het nie.” [“Except for a few individuals it is sensed if nobody cares any longer ... we don’t experience it positively and I believe that it also was not to their advantage as well’”].

For change processes to be implemented successfully they should be carried out with the necessary subtlety, consultative communication and transparency. The implementation of well-executed change processes, and the value thereof, is widely documented in the literature and also practiced by national, multinational, police and non-police organisations, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3. However, the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS was considered as a process not categorised by these important characteristics. The SAPS should have implemented this process with the necessary sensitivity towards its members and other role players, in a gradual, clear and explicable way, and also with sufficient consultative communication. In this way the mystification, ambiguity and insecurity that prevailed among participants could have been overcome. The failure of the SAPS to adhere to these best practices was a significant drawback to the successful implementation of this process.

The next theme to follow for interpretation is: “Proposals on the communication style and implementation method of the restructuring process”.

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5.2.3 Proposals on the communication style and implementation method of the restructuring process

Successful organisational change efforts are characterised by transparency, effective communication and consultative decisionmaking. Consequently, in this theme participants provided insight into how they would have preferred the communication and implementation of this process to have taken place. The main focus of this theme, as presented in paragraph 4.2.3, points to the indicators, guidelines and recommendations participants presented after being subjected to the implementation of the restructuring process. In other words, a first-hand ground level perspective is captured of the preferred manner participants would have welcomed the communication and the implementation of this process to have taken place.

The literature review on impact evaluations in organisations, as presented in chapter 2, highlights the importance of effective communication and participative decisionmaking during the implementation of change initiatives. The myth about programme evaluation, as presented in paragraph 2.10, stating that success is about implementing the perfect programme and never having to hear from employees, customers or clients again, since the programme will now run itself perfectly, is invalidated by the fact that success involves remaining open to continuing feedback and adjusting the programme accordingly. The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, in chapter 3, furthermore supports and highlights the importance of transparency, consultative communication and participative decisionmaking during the planning, design and implementation stages of change. It follows that the planning and design phase of organisational restructuring, presented in paragraph 3.2.3.1, as well as the implementation phase, in paragraph 3.2.3.2, furthermore make provision for sustained and transparent dialogue between management and employees, a transparent and convincing strategy recognising the needs of all those affected, the recognition by management of consequential changes, participative decisionmaking, as well as premature communication to prepare employees for change. Furnari ([s.a.]), in paragraph 3.2.3.1, also values the abovementioned views and therefore emphasises the importance that it’s critical that key people are involved with all aspects of the planning, developing and execution stages of “the plan”. It follows that by seeking input from employees, greater acceptance and buy-in will emerge, and
support for change will materialise, since revitalising a company becomes a major strain on its people and the organisation. It is thus crucial to approach the change effort in the appropriate manner. Thus, when recommending changes, it is important that the benefits of the change are clearly communicated. In support of the above literature, Furnari ([s.a.]) moreover suggests that when recommending changes it is important that the benefits of the change are clearly communicated, and therefore highlights various common mistakes that can jeopardise a successful restructuring. These errors include the lack of a detailed strategic business plan, the collapse of constructive communication throughout the organisation, and the lack of analytical tools and timely information to track and monitor the company’s progress to effectively adjust strategies when required.

Additionally, Furnari ([s.a.]), in paragraph 3.2.3.1, draws attention to the importance of improving communication at all levels when instituting a major restructuring aimed at revitalising an organisation. The author suggests that the general objectives and expectations of the restructuring should be clearly communicated to all employees in the company. In order to emphasise the significance of this theme, Furnari also suggests that a schedule for regular employee meetings, to facilitate continuous dialogue at all levels of the organisation, should be established, the development of procedures to ensure that key information is reported on in a timely fashion, and applicable steering committees to include various levels of management, as well as the survey of various levels of employees, to obtain feedback and provide a channel for communication. In support of Furnari, Johnson (1994), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, also draws attention to the importance that change initiatives should allow for incremental implementation, encouraging employee participation, and providing continual communication and education on the project. Elias (2007) moreover suggests, in paragraph 3.2.3.2, taking the employees’ psychological processes into account. Implementing a change initiative without attending to such processes can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the potential to reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and motivation.
Moreover, the example of the restructuring effort of The Royal Dutch/Shell Group, presented in paragraph 3.3.1, is indicative of the value that interaction and participative decisionmaking with all role players has on the communication and implementation of a restructuring initiative. Furthermore, Vodafone’s restructuring process, presented in paragraph 3.3.2, additionally accentuates the significance of a well-executed restructuring process and the communication thereof. The company’s consultative interaction with its employees during its restructuring process, its support structure for affected employees and the involvement of employees in the form of employee representatives, highlights the importance of employee representation and participation, effective communication and the acknowledgement of employees’ well-being. In addition, ABSA’s restructuring initiative, as discussed in paragraph 3.3.4, also gives emphasis to the importance of sustained consultation with employees during change. What’s more, international examples of police organisations’ restructuring processes, presented in paragraph 3.4, furthermore accentuate the importance of this theme. It follows that the SLP’s restructuring process, in paragraph 3.4.1.4, emphasises the significance of continuous communication, consultation and interaction with all role players during change efforts.

From the participants’ of the various FCS cluster units reactions, as discussed in chapter 4, it appears that the communication style and the approach to the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS, that the SAPS management has applied, are disputed. As a result, participants concurred that they would have preferred the communication and implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to be executed collectively and transparently, with prior consultative communication by means of orientation discussions, in order for them to be conversant with this process. As a result, ambiguity among participants would have been alleviated and buy-in into this process would have been increased: “... explain to them what is going to happen ... it would be better if we [were] called in and explained to us ...”. Moreover, participants also placed high emphasis on participative decisionmaking during the implementation and communication of this restructuring process.
It also emerged during an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security research institute, that they similarly emphasised the importance of devoted consultation and communication of the restructuring process of the FCS. As a result, the respondents would have preferred prior internal and external consultation and communication, as well as the opportunity for all role players to participate in the decisionmaking process: “Everybody inside the police and outside the police should have been made fully aware of what they [referring to SAPS management] intended to do, and how they intended to do this ... prior to the presentation stage ...”. As a result, participants would have taken ownership of the restructuring process, thus minimising existing dilemmas. On the other hand, one researcher was of the opinion that role players were instead withheld the opportunity to participate and facilitate in this process, as a result of the lack of efficient consultation and communication: “... the lack of communication, consultation ... took away opportunities for members and other role players to make an impact on this whole process”.

Furthermore, it was revealed during interviews with senior public prosecutors, that high emphasis was placed on prior consultative communication with all role players, in order to adapt specialised working methods: “Dit is tog belangrik ... om eers die ander rolspelers te ken ... voordat jy iets implementer ...”. [“It is certainly important to consult with other role players prior to implementing something ...”]. In addition, participative decisionmaking was also highly preferred among these participants, in order for them to take ownership of this process. Participants were, however, of the opinion that these important factors had not been adhered to by the SAPS management. Consequently, current dilemmas concerning the restructuring of the FCS could have been minimised. Moreover, participants suggested direct dialogue as the preferred way of communicating the implementation method of this process, stipulating the details of the restructuring process of the FCS: “… om ‘n vergadering te belê wat al die aanklaers [insluit] …” [“... to organise a meeting that includes all prosecutors ...”]. As a result, state prosecutors would then have been empowered to inform and advise the community concerning their enquiries, that in turn would have simplified this process.
The way in which any change initiative is carried over to employees, and the approach to the execution of such changes, greatly depends on whether employees will accept these changes and take ownership thereof. Although the literature in chapters 2 and 3 broadly draw attention to the significance of effective communication and consultative decisionmaking during the implementation of organisational change, the SAPS management instantaneously implemented this process without sufficient communication. As a result, employees’ and other role players’ feelings were ignored. This is a crucial failure in the restructuring process of the FCS. It follows that the SAPS should have drawn on a communication style and implementation method that was in line with the characteristics of a democratic police service. Consequently, participants failed to buy into this process and take ownership thereof, thus making legitimate restructuring non-viable. As a result, the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS was, to a great extent, negatively affected, since the SAPS management failed to effectively communicate every step of this process to all those involved, and also neglected to appropriately execute this process while keeping the feelings of employees and other role players in mind.

“The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery” follows.

5.2.4 The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery

Effective service delivery is a fundamental factor in the successful continuation of any organisation, as explained in paragraph 4.2.4; therefore, organisations’ efficiency is directly measured against their levels of providing adequate services. The core challenge of this theme is therefore to assess the impact, positive or negative, on the internal and external service delivery provided by the FCS consequent to the introduction of the restructuring process, and the impact thereof on the victims and perpetrators of these related crimes.

The overview of impact evaluations in organisations, as presented and discussed in chapter 2, acknowledges the significance of providing effective service delivery. Tuffin et al. (2006) illustrates the impact of efficient service delivery of a study performed in the England police
organisation in paragraph 2.5.2. This illustration signifies the positive impact of a package of local policing activities on service delivery in England policing. The findings of this study show that the public not only notice increased police foot patrol, they also notice the efforts that the police put into engagement and the effects of properly targeted problem solving designed to reduce anti-social behaviour. All these elements appear key to a successful approach to neighbourhood policing and subsequently to service delivery. Moreover, Muhlhausen (2006) and Braga et al. (2000) also illustrate the significance of impact evaluation on service delivery during two separate impact evaluations in American policing, as discussed in 2.5.1 and 2.5.3. Davies (2004) values the importance of efficient service delivery, as discussed in paragraph 2.7. It follows that the UK Government, for example, uses a wide range of evaluation methods, including impact evaluation (which is at the heart of their performance management system), to ensure that policies, programmes and public services are planned and delivered as effectively and efficiently as possible. Davies (2004) furthermore believe that the government of any country needs to know at the outset of policy development, and after policies have been implemented, what their likely and achieved impacts in terms of both the positive and negative outcomes, will be. In addition, Blomquist (2003) illustrates the increased awareness among organisations of improved service delivery, as presented in paragraph 2.7. It follows that Australia’s public management systematically integrated programme evaluation into corporate and programme management and planning. As a result, all public programmes, or significant parts thereof, are reviewed once every three to five years; all major new proposals include an evaluation strategy, and ministries are currently required to provide an annual evaluation plan. Moreover, Dubois (2002), in paragraph 2.8.4 also acknowledges organisations’ quest to improve their services, by referring to the government of Québec’s initiative to apply programme evaluation as the primary mechanism, including the development of targeted results, the achievement of concrete results and the measurement of results achieved - and reporting thereof.

Moreover, the literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as presented in chapter 3, furthermore accentuates organisations’ efforts to foster best practices in service delivery. It follows that the example of Transnet’s restructuring process, as discussed in paragraph 3.3.3, further illustrates the realisation created among organisations to promote and cultivate efficient service delivery. Additionally, Bayley and Shearing (1996), in paragraph
paragraph 3.4, similarly draw attention to organisations’ improved consciousness to adapt their strategies in order to achieve healthier results. It follows that police organisations throughout the developed democratic world restructured their organisations, in the realisation that they were not effective or efficient in controlling crime, and they are thus anxiously examining every aspect of their performance. Carter and McGoldrick (1994), as presented in paragraph 3.4, furthermore highlight this theme by illustrating that the police service of the UK that was subjected to a review of its performance in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and value for money, while providing a quality service. Muehlmann (2007: 37-40,53) also indicates the significance of promoting efficient service delivery through restructuring initiatives referring to police restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as discussed in paragraph 3.4.1.1. Moreover, Aydin (1996: 51-54), in paragraph 3.4.1.3, furthermore highlights the importance of the Turkish police efforts to foster efficient service delivery through restructuring in this organisation.

From the participants of the various FCS cluster units’ perceptions, as discussed and presented in chapter 4, it appears that the restructuring of the FCS had a detrimental effect on the service delivery of the unit, as well as the client system it served. It follows that participants considered the lack of an ample number of specialised FCS detectives as a major hindrance to the provision of a satisfactory service to victims. As a result, these detectives frequently had to work extended hours without additional remuneration: “... because you are not enough ... so the members have to work every second day 24 hours without any remuneration”. Consequently, another participant questioned the long-term benefits of this process on service delivery. Moreover, a number of participants highlighted the absence of sufficient human resources as a major drawback for providing efficient service to the community. As a result, members experienced remorse for failing the community, since they were now overloaded with investigations: “... the restructuring kill us as members of the FCS ... firstly to the community that we have served ... we don’t have ... enough time to make time for their matters”. It follows that participants sincerely compared the restructured FCS units with the centralised FCS unit, referring to the harmonised and consistent service delivery provided to the community prior to implementing this process.
Furthermore, participants considered their low morale, the lack of consultation and the large geographical area to be serviced as contributing factors to the substandard service delivery. Additionally, participants were confronted with uncertainties, challenges, problems and realities, as a result of the restructuring of the FCS, which thus impacted negatively on their level of service delivery. Subsequently, except for the lack of human resources, physical resources were additional constraints that the restructured FCS units had to encounter in delivering an efficient service to the community. As a result, victims of related crimes were negatively impacted. It follows that these uncertainties, challenges, problems and realities members of the FCS face as a result of the restructuring of the FCS contributed to members’ physical and mental health that in turn impacted on the quality of their service delivery. Participants furthermore revealed that they experienced a lack of acceptance and recognition within their internal ranks, since they experienced a lack of responsibility from their newly adopted stations towards them. Consequently, victims of FCS related crimes were negatively influenced as a direct result of the restructuring of the FCS. Moreover, participants also experienced nepotism practiced by station commissioners of the accounting stations where FCS members were stationed, thus contributing to inefficient service delivery: “... you are being forced to do the dockets which they want at the station which you are stationed ... you must go and do that docket ... and you'll leave others station dockets...”

Referring to the impact of the FCS restructuring on the victims of related crimes, it appears that participants were currently experiencing substandard services provided to victims of FCS-related crimes, and in addition, these participants predicted that victims’ needs would, furthermore, be neglected as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. Moreover, these participants forecasted an unpromising future for women and children falling victims of FCS-related crimes, owing to the failure of general police officers to manage them with the necessary consideration and care. Furthermore, participants were of the belief that the deterioration of services to victims came about shortly after the implementation of the restructuring process. These participants were further of the opinion that victims experienced difficulty accessing the services of the FCS, because these victims were not aware of the whereabouts of the FCS. On the other hand, when victims gained access to the FCS, unfavourable conditions made it difficult for them to receive adequate attention. As a result, victims lost trust in the FCS.
The participants were also of the sentiment that victims were totally neglected as a direct result of the restructuring of the FCS, since they were experiencing secondary victimisation as a result of the inefficient service delivery of the SAPS: “... slagoffers word net twee keer slagoffers ... dan praat ek van die polisie se swak dienslewering ... het ek myself gesien slagoffers word totaal en al in die steek gelaat deur ... die restructuring in geheel”. [“... victims again become victims ... then I’m referring to the inefficient service delivery of the SAPS ... I have witnessed that victims are totally failed by the restructuring as a whole”].

Participants additionally believed that insufficient manpower and the larger geographical area, as opposed to before the restructuring, that needed to be serviced by these officers, significantly affected victims in a negative way, since attendance to these victims was delayed and investigations were therefore held up. Participants also regarded the serious lack of human and physical resources encountered by the FCS members, as opposed to the situation prior to the restructuring, as a contributing factor to the adverse impact this process had on victims of related crimes. These participants were, moreover, of the opinion that station commissioners put pressure on FCS detectives to give priority to cases in their jurisdiction, thus resulting in the neglect of victims in other areas. On the other hand, it emerged that the restructuring would be to the advantage of the perpetrators of related crimes in the future, since these perpetrators would be uncontrolled, with no sufficient protection to victims: “... they are going to have a royal time because they are going to be free and there is nobody to protect victims. You don’t have a proper investigating officer to protect them. And they are going to know the expertise is gone”. It furthermore emerged that FCS detectives found it challenging to rapidly respond to crime scenes, that in turn favoured the perpetrators, due to a lack of evidence. What’s more, participants were also of the belief that perpetrators were familiar with the restructuring of the FCS. Consequently, these perpetrators would realise that the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives were inadequately impacted, and would thus use it to their advantage by committing additional crimes.

It additionally emerged, from discussions with NGOs, that the standard of service delivery had unquestionably decreased after the implementation of this process. It was also revealed that the community had distrustful sentiments towards the FCS’s standard of service delivery. On the other hand, it was made known that a part of the community had no faith in the ability of the SAPS’s service delivery regarding FCS-related cases, even before the implementation of the
restructuring process. As a result, these members of the community were even more sceptical about the service delivery of the restructured FCS units, and were thus of the opinion that this process had an increased negative impact on them. It follows that victims of FCS-related crimes were reluctant to report cases to the SAPS, as a result of inexperienced SAPS members and confusion among members. It furthermore came to light that FCS detectives had “vanished” as a result of this restructuring process. Consequently, the general SAPS officers were mainly performing these related functions; however, these officers lacked training and experience regarding FCS-related functions, since they were neither trained nor equipped - and also not sensitised - to render efficient service to these victims. Consequently, victims of these crimes were exposed to secondary trauma as a result of the inability of the SAPS to render efficient service to them: “... there is nothing we can do about this ... that is one example of the police station that haven’t any clue how to deal with a child that is in need and what the procedures were”.

On the contrary, it became known that FCS officers were intensely involved with NGOs before the restructuring of the FCS, and to a great extent also committed to service delivery. However, it appeared that this state of affairs had changed for the worse. In addition, participants were also of the opinion that a contributing factor to the significant deterioration in service delivery of the FCS was the fact that the general SAPS officers were obliged to become involved with these crimes; however, these officers lack the necessary affection, drive, training and passion concerning crimes against women and children, in order to efficiently perform these tasks: “Many of them [referring to the general police officer] don’t want to be in this position ... They find the work very challenging and very traumatic ... certainly does not have the training ... skills ... and the knowledge ...”. As a result, the investigation process also is significantly negatively affected. Consequently, participants cynically predicted a grim future for victims of FCS-related crimes, thus emphasising the importance of training SAPS officials, in order to direct them to render effective services to the community.

Additionally, it emerged that these participants predicted an unpromising future for victims, as a result of a lack of training, compassion and understanding among general police officers, thus promoting further distress to these victims. It also became known that the FCS detectives had
played a significant role in providing comprehensive services to victims of these crimes, as opposed to the inconsistent and disorganised service provided by them after the restructuring. As a result, these victims experienced disorder with the investigation of their cases. It surfaced that victims experienced feelings of hopelessness and were too discouraged to report cases, as a result of the failure of the police to render support and protection, and therefore rather drew on the services of NGOs who rendered related services. On the other hand, participants also considered that the empowerment of victims had been totally neglected after the restructuring, and therefore benefitted the perpetrators: “... FCS officers previously brought child victims for the court preparation programme ... to testify effectively in court ... this no longer happens. The SAPS members are not longer able to offer their service ...”. Participants also revealed that the substandard investigation and control of these cases, as well as the inaccessibility of FCS detectives, are favourable to perpetrators.

Additionally, the significance of a specialised unit, in order to focus on a specific crime and thus maintain high levels of service delivery, was accentuated during interviews with participants from a humanitarian security research institute. It follows that pride in and loyalty to a group were significant factors, and consequently gave rise to satisfactory service delivery: “... they develop an “esprit de corps” that is extremely important for any specialised unit ...”. As a result, specialists continuously received exclusive and valuable in-service training and skills through the constant interaction and collaboration among them, resulting in the service delivery of the FCS being constantly enhanced. The participants were of the opinion that the restructuring of the FCS deprived the unit of its individual character; therefore, pride in and devotion to the FCS unit, as well as the opportunity to share and transfer combined knowledge and skills, vanished. Moreover, participants stated that the FCS unit had gradually become involved with other investigations, unrelated to FCS functions. As a result, these members lost their competence to specialise, thus affecting service delivery negatively. The participants also expressed concern about the effect of the restructuring of the FCS on the emotional and psychological state of these members, and therefore envisaged the depreciation of this unit’s service delivery to become more evident in the medium- and long-term.
Moreover, these participants also believed that the restructuring process had created a few short-term benefits for victims of FCS-related crimes, referring to the impact of this process on victims of related crimes. However, these benefits might be lost to victims during the medium- to long-term, as a result of the vanishing of expertise in the FCS: “... in the medium- and long-term ... they also may lose these short-term benefits because ... FCS ... will loose some of their expertise ... Victims ... will certainly ... relatively [be] affected ...”. On the other hand, one participant anticipated that the restructuring of the FCS would be to the advantage of perpetrators, since there is no effective FCS capacity any longer, as opposed to the authoritative FCS unit prior to the restructuring.

Furthermore, it evidenced from the perceptions of senior public prosecutors, as presented in chapter 4, that the SAPS was increasingly finding it demanding to provide efficient service to the community and other role players regarding FCS-related functions: “Chaos daar word [nie] dienste meer gelever nie ... geen beheer oor wat hulle doen nie ...”. [“Chaos, services are not rendered any longer ... they have no control of what they are doing ...”]. As a result, a significant negative impact on the services of the FCS was experienced, since the FCS no longer had control over their functions, as a result of the decentralisation of the unit. It follows that the participants experienced members of the FCS to be, in effect, removed further away from the court, although the decentralisation of these members had indeed brought them closer. Consequently, participants regarded these members to have disappeared; however, a small number of FCS detectives were continuously prepared to provide quality service to the public. As a result, junior investigating officers with little or no experience were utilised to investigate FCS-related cases, that in turn negatively impacted on service delivery and the judicial processes. Accordingly, the inadequate service delivery by the FCS resulted that other role players were also negatively impacted. “Ons sukkel om sake van die grond af te kry ... instruksies word nie nagekom nie ... dosiere word hof toe gestuur sonder dat dit behoorlik nagesien is deur ’n officier ... dit lei tot terugtrek ...”. [“We struggle to get cases off the ground ... instructions are not adhered to ... case dockets are sent to court without proper perusal by officers ... it leads to the withdrawal of cases ... ”]. In addition, participants experienced various uncertainties, challenges and problems, regarding the provisioning of efficient service to the community and to other relevant role players, that surfaced as a result of the lack of interest and
training of general non-specialised detectives previously responsible for investigating less serious crimes, and now responsible for investigating FCS-related cases. It follows that investigations were substandard, that in turn impacted negatively in court hearings. Participants furthermore highlighted the need for specialised and experienced investigation officers who could contribute to the existing challenging circumstances.

One participant was, in addition, of the opinion that the restructuring of the FCS had had a negative impact on the victims of FCS-related crimes, since victims received user-friendly and specialised services from the FCS prior to the restructuring, that had now deteriorated. On the other hand, this participant anticipated that the restructuring would, to a certain extent, be to the advantage of victims, since these victims would be closer to the investigating officer and the presiding court where victims would have to appear. Conversely, another participant anticipated that the restructuring of the FCS could be a drawback to perpetrators, since the services of the FCS were more accessible to victims, and thus demotivate perpetrators from committing these offences. On the other hand, this participant believed that perpetrators could be advantaged as a result of the restructuring process, sensing that investigating officers had low self-esteem and therefore did not investigate cases efficiently. Similarly, another participant was also of the opinion that perpetrators would be advantaged by the restructuring of the FCS, if investigations were not performed adequately. Currently, statements taken from victims and perpetrators were not up to standard - that could be to the advantage of perpetrators, as a result of inexperienced investigating officers now investigating these cases.

The main driver for restructuring the FCS is to improve the service delivery of this unit by bringing FCS services closer to the community. However, the reality is that the SAPS management has been unsuccessful in accomplishing this objective, since this process had a detrimental effect on the service delivery of the unit as well as on the client system it served. Effective service delivery is widely valued and practised by policing and non-policing organisations, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, though it did not materialise at the lower hierarchical levels of the FCS and the client system it serves. It follows that FCS members could not act appropriately in order to improve service delivery, since they experienced numerous obstacles, that in turn hindered them from acting on this vision.
This implies that the restructuring of the FCS could be considered to be unsuccessful, since an organisation’s efficiency is directly measured against its level of providing effective service to the client system it serves.

“The effect of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of FCS members” as an additional theme follows.

5.2.5 The effect of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of FCS members

Change in any organisation, such as the restructuring of the FCS, brings with it certain concerns among members that, in turn, have an effect on their daily functioning, as explained in paragraph 4.2.5. The main focus of this theme has, as its core challenge, to assess the impact of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of the FCS members, referring to their self-esteem and spirits which they have to deal with, that, in turn, have an effect on their service excellence and effectiveness.

The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as presented in chapter 3, makes provision for maintaining high standards of morale and productivity in organisations. The stagnation or deterioration of workforce productivity, or the weakening of personnel morale, are regarded as some of the motivational aspects prompting organisational restructuring, as presented in paragraph 3.2.1. However, Schwarz and Shulman (2007), in paragraph 3.2.2, reveal that limited structural change may occur as a result of the fact that organisational members anchor their judgments on prior experience to reflect on change and, therefore, can choose to resist, manipulate, or possibly even ignore change. Moreover, Lee and Teo (2005), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, recognise potentially negative consequences on the work environment in the immediate term after organisational restructuring. As a result, the authors caution that if work satisfaction and trust in the organisation continues to be depressed well beyond the end of the restructuring, and well beyond an apparent improvement in some aspects of the work environment, the productivity of the organisation could be in serious danger, and
therefore suggest that a key ingredient necessary to sustain effective change, is high morale. Stated differently, Stevenson et al. (2003) furthermore emphasise the significance of this theme, in paragraph 3.2.3.2, explaining that sometimes planned restructuring efforts involve attempts to get people and groups within organisations to work together more effectively. When this is the aim, the change agent often attempts to increase formal structural connections between people and groups under the assumption that information will flow more freely, barriers and conflict between work functions will break down, and innovative activities will diffuse more effectively in a dense network. However, organisation members who stand to lose influence and/or structural autonomy if barriers are broken down, may work against efforts to increase formal connections in ways that weaken their influence. Stated differently, Skogan (2008), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, is of the opinion that specialised units such as detectives are often threatened by department-wide programmes that require them to change their ways, and therefore they might find debate opening about their effectiveness.

Baruch and Hind (2000), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, additionally draw attention to the fact that employees who remain within an organisation after significant downsizing or delayering, often experience the adverse effects of change as profoundly as those who have left. In addition, it is revealed that “survivors” may become demotivated, cynical, insecure and demoralised, and therefore suggest this might be as a result of stress and anxiety, based on fear of further downsizing/restructuring, or due to diminishing trust between employees and management, or indeed a combination of these factors. Johnson (1994), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, is furthermore of the view that organisational change strains not only the organisation as a whole but also individual employees within the organisation, and therefore suggests that a change strategy must be developed which takes the employee’s psychological processes into account. In support of Johnson, Elias (2007), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, also values the importance of this theme, emphasising the fact that implementing a change initiative without attending to such processes can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the potential to reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and motivation. Cooper ([s.a.]), furthermore draws attention (in paragraph 3.2.3.3) to focus on the reason for the new structure, as much as making it work, since this will energise people to focus on customer needs. In addition, energy levels and employee engagement should be kept alive until the support
processes are fully in place. Similarly, Swanson and Power (2001), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, additionally emphasise that the change process itself engenders tensions and insecurities, which lead to distress in both “victims” and “survivors” of the process, which has been shown to have a negative impact on physical and mental health. It follows that role stressors, including ambiguities, conflicts of interest and increased workloads may all contribute towards lowered morale for surviving workers post- restructuring. Such increases in workload may occur as a result of coming to grips with new or unfamiliar structures, new responsibilities or technologies, or due to reduced manpower resources and support from managers or colleagues. In addition, Bayley and Shearing (1996), in paragraph 3.4, also draw attention to the significance of this theme. It follows that the authors confirm the restructuring of policing, since police organisations throughout the developed democratic world have increasingly growing doubts about the effectiveness of their traditional strategies in safeguarding the public from crime.

From the participants of the various FCS cluster units’ perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it appears that the restructuring of the FCS had a negative effect on the morale and productivity of participants: “I don’t think it will get higher ... it will just get lower and lower and lower”. Respondents’ furthermore revealed that their negative morale was mainly contributable to inadequate physical and human resources, the absence of overtime remuneration, and adverse working conditions that often resulted in conflicting opinions with other colleagues at station level. Participants were of the opinion that contributing factors to their low self-esteem and effectiveness were their feelings of rejection by other members at station level and the internal conflict between these members, as opposed to the solidarity that prevailed among members in the FCS prior to the restructuring. As a result, this might explain the low self-esteem of these detectives. Additionally, participants revealed that a number of FCS detectives called for their reassignment to other units within the SAPS, while others could not continue their functions at the FCS due to stress-related conditions resulting from the restructuring: “Some of the members have already applied for transfers because they don’t want to work like this ... they don’t like to work in these conditions ... Already got one [member] of stress ... I don’t blame those who is going on stress ...”. Participants were also of the belief that the SAPS management was not sensitive towards the low self-esteem of its members and their client system, and also gave no recognition for members’ services under difficult circumstances.
Additionally, a minority of the participants revealed that they were attempting to remain confident and devoted, despite their initial low self-esteem and unfavourable circumstances. It follows that these few members realised they had to adapt their mindset in order to continue their passion for their profession. However, new challenges were emerging regularly which they had to deal with: “... my morale is very low but I had to lift myself up because I love this job ... I’m making the best out of it”. Participants, furthermore, indicated that some of these members had a sympathetic feeling of guilt and remorse towards the community they served and other role players they were actively involved with, for the decrease in services by the FCS, and therefore questioned their own ability.

From the participants of a humanitarian security research institute’s perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it appeared that the restructuring of the FCS had a significant impact on the morale of the unit’s members, that in turn negatively affected their productivity: “... this [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] of course had a very negative effect on the morale of members ... an unhappy official is certainly not going to provide an efficient and effective service ...”. Furthermore, one participant was firmly of the opinion that the SAPS had a military character, and therefore concentrated more on internal dilemmas rather than on external challenges, when confronted with a low self-esteem and spirits of the workforce. As a result, the SAPS management was also insensitive towards the objections of these members towards this process.

From the senior public prosecutors’ perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it seemed as if the restructuring of the FCS had indeed had an adverse effect on the morale and productivity of its members. It furthermore became known that these members’ morale was negatively affected, as a result of the lack of consultation with these members, the disregard of members’ personal circumstances, insufficient resources, disregard for members’ expertise and specialised skills, as well as relinquishing time and effort invested in investigations, to non-specialised detectives. It follows that the fragmentation of the camaraderie of these detectives, as a result of the restructuring, proved to impact the services and productivity of these members in a negative way. One participant, however, perceived the morale to be negative, but the productivity had improved, though he experienced a decrease in the specialisation of cases in the court, due to a lack of prioritisation. Participants also believed that other practical and psychological aspects had a detrimental consequence on the FCS’s members’ morale and productivity. These aspects
included the integration of FCS members with non-specialised detectives: “… jy nie nou meer gesien word as ‘n gespesialiseerde persoon nie … uhm … jy word nou geag om moontlik ‘n gewone speurder te wees …” [“… you are no longer regarded as specialised, however, regarded as a normal detective …”] and the sharing of resources as well as the relegation of the FCS’s status as a specialised unit. As a result, the quality of investigations was also negatively influenced. Moreover, participants believed that inefficient facilities hampered effective service delivery to victims of FCS-related crimes, and, in turn, affected members’ morale negatively. It follows that participants experienced the investigation process to be more time consuming as a result of inexperienced investigating officers, with adverse consequences for the productivity levels.

From the respondents’ (representing NGOs) perceptions, as presented in chapter 4, it surfaced that the lack of communication and consultation with members of the FCS about the restructuring, as well as confusion about the restructuring among the SAPS themselves, had had an appalling effect on their morale and productivity. In addition, participants furthermore made known that general SAPS officers now dealing with FCS related cases revealed that they were forced into this position, and also did not have the unique characteristics required of them to perform these functions, as opposed to FCS members: “… some of them [referring to general SAPS members] have indicated that they have been forced into these positions. It is not out of choice … The FCS members have a different work ethic … they are very committed … very passionate about what they do … Absolutely, it definitely impacted on their morale”. Consequently, members’ morale, and therefore their service delivery and productivity, were without doubt negatively influenced. On the other hand, participants similarly experienced the morale of the community to be adversely affected as a result of inefficient service delivery by general SAPS members, as opposed to the devotion and loyalty of FCS detectives prior to the restructuring. Participants were also of the opinion that that the uncertainty that prevailed among FCS members, as well as the decentralisation of these members, contributed to a decrease in productivity: “… productivity suffered … many people did not know what the future entails … This makes them very resentful and as a result will not able to deliver the goods”.

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Without a positive and meaningful self-esteem among employees, high levels of productivity are not likely to happen. The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as presented in chapter 3, accentuates the maintenance of high standards of morale and productivity among employees during organisational change. However, the SAPS allowed the morale of FCS members, and therefore workforce productivity, to deteriorate, since the organisation was not sensitive towards the self-esteem of its members and their client system. It follows that FCS members and other role players did not have sufficient moral support from the SAPS. As a result, these members could not perform their functions optimally; therefore, their productivity was also negatively impacted.

5.2.6 Outlook on the feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals of the FCS restructuring

It is imperative for an organisation to have long-term goals, in order to set a clear vision for the future. These goals should, however, be clearly communicated to the entire workforce to gain understanding and buy-in among them, as set out in paragraph 4.2.6. This theme has as its main challenge to ensure the feasible implementation of these long-term goals envisaged by this process, and the maintaining thereof by the organisation’s employees.

The literature review on impact evaluations in organisations, as presented in chapter 2, supports the significance of understanding and realising the achievability and practicability of programmes. Savedoff et al. (2006) draws attention to the fact, in paragraph 2.11, that developing countries’ governments are demanding better information about the efficacy of social spending; for example, Mexico passed legislation requiring that impact evaluations be conducted on a variety of social programmes, explicitly recognising the value of learning what works and why, as a guide for future budget decisions. In addition, NGOs have collaborated with leading academic institutions to evaluate the impact of their programmes, with the goal of identifying what works and what does not.
Additionally, the literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, presented in chapter 3, furthermore accentuates the value to communicate the long-term goals and objectives to employees, in order to realise a feasible and sustainable change effort. It follows that Cooper ([s.a.]), in paragraph 3.2.3.1, places high value on clear and frequent communication of the purpose and business case, constructive communication throughout the organisation, as well as the importance of remaining focused on the reason for the new structure, as much as making it work, and also cautions that the collapse thereof could jeopardise a successful restructuring. Moreover, Ford (2007), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, also draws attention to the fact that effective leaders do not merely prepare an organisation prior to a change effort, and therefore believe they must have the patience to constantly build the capacity for change among organisational members throughout the various stages of the change effort. The example of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies’ (Shell) extensive nature of its restructuring initiative, presented in paragraph 3.3.1, additionally indicates the significance of identifying practicable and achievable solutions for change efforts. Furthermore, Vodafone’s restructuring process, presented in paragraph 3.3.2, highlights the importance of a clear focus, for members to have a comprehensive understanding of such changes, and to enable these members to make the change effort feasible and sustainable. In addition, Carter and McGoldrick (1994), in paragraph 3.4, draw on the UK police service to emphasise the importance of reviewing performance in order to enhance the feasibility of change efforts.

From the respondents of the various FCS units’ perceptions, as presented and discussed in chapter 4, it came to light that these participants considered the long-term goals envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS to be ambiguous, and that they did not know what these long-term goals were and therefore had major reservations about the feasibility and sustainability of this process: “… ‘Well I don’t know ... actually there is no long-term goal or objectives for the FCS ...’ ”. Participants were of the opinion that their unfamiliarity with the entire process was as a result of the lack of consultation and communication. In addition, participants interestingly did not regard the FCS as a specialised unit any longer, and were thus of the view that this unit, in addition, did not have long-term goals. It follows that participants furthermore expressed their suspicions about the accomplishment of the goal and objectives of the restructuring process, until proven otherwise.
A few members appropriately identified the goals and objectives envisaged for the restructuring process; however, they had their reservations about these goals and objectives being accomplished, since this task was a calling not every member was capable of performing, and therefore presented critical features investigating officers needed to have, in order to investigate FCS-related cases. Moreover, some participants were of the opinion that this process would indeed be sustainable, as a result of the SAPS management that would continue enforcing the goals and objectives of this process upon members: “... they have made up their mind ... they will sustain.” On the other hand, a number of participants believed that the restructuring process would by no means be viable, since the expertise, knowledge and skills of FCS members could not be replaced with the training of general police officers, with regard to FCS-related crimes. It follows that no additional proficiency has been acquired, as was stipulated by the SAPS management as one of the major objectives of this process, even though this process was implemented a while ago. Another participant believed that the restructuring process of the FCS could be feasible and sustainable by initiating the creation of a long-term strategy among the FCS detectives, the broader community and the victims of these related crimes. In addition, participants greatly questioned the benefits of this process for the community and the FCS members, and therefore cross-questioned their responsibility of sustaining the restructuring process: “Why should we sustain anything if it doesn’t bring anything good to us? ... this thing is a disadvantage not only for the police officers but for everybody”.

From the perceptions of senior public prosecutors, it appeared that the long-term goals of the restructuring of the FCS could be feasible and sustainable, on condition that the SAPS management gave sincere attention to the problems currently experienced by all the role players: “... dit kan volhoubaar wees, dit kan effektief wees as die probleme wat daar [is] aandag [aan] gee en dit uitgestryk word ...” [“... it could be sustainable and effective if attention is given to existing problems ...”]. Participants were, however, of the opinion that the SAPS management had to create increased awareness among FCS members and other role players, in order to be completely familiar with the aims and objectives of this process. As a result, FCS members and other role players would have to buy into this process and thus take ownership thereof, in order to make this process sustainable.
Participants were furthermore of the belief that the SAPS management demonstrated a lack of support for the restructured FCS units, and did not adequately empower FCS members to effectively deal with the difficulties experienced during this process. It follows that participants raised the question as to whether the restructuring of the FCS would indeed be feasible and sustainable. A number of participants indicated that they completely lacked understanding of what the goals and objectives of the restructuring process were, and, therefore were not in a position to reply on the achievability, feasibility and sustainability of this process: “... ek verstaan dit glad nie ... ek weet nie hoekom hulle afgeskaf is nie ek verstaan dit nog steeds nie” [“...I absolutely do not understand it. I do not understand why they are disbanded’”]. Participants also believed that the restructured FCS units were experiencing significant resource deficiencies. Therefore, unless these shortcomings were appropriately addressed, the restructuring of the FCS could not be sustainable; however, this process was not currently considered to be feasible.

From the perceptions of NGOs, it surfaced that the restructuring of the FCS had failed the needs of the community and service delivery by the FCS has also deteriorated. As a result, this process is believed not to be feasible: “It is not feasible ... it is not working ... it is not meeting the needs... the very understanding I have ... meeting the needs of the community. That objective is not been met, it is actually failing that objective”.

Without the creation of long-term goals, organisations are bound to lose sight of their purpose. The literature review in chapters 2 and 3 accentuates the value of communicating the long-term goals and objectives to employees, in order to realise a feasible and sustainable change effort. However, the SAPS failed to communicate the long-term goals and objectives of the restructuring process to the FCS members and other external role players. This is a critical aspect of the failure of the restructuring of the FCS. It follows that these members did not understand what the long-term goals and objectives were, and therefore could not take action to make this process feasible and sustainable. This implies that the restructuring process of the FCS was indistinct and as a result could not be sustainable. As a result, the restructuring of the FCS had to a great extent been negatively affected, as the management of the SAPS neglected to communicate the long-term goals and objectives of this process.
5.2.7 The impact of the restructuring process on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives

The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS refers to the effect of the restructuring process on the detectives’ particular competence and their unique proficiency as FCS investigators, as presented in paragraph 4.2.7. This theme has as its central focus to assess the effect that this process had on FCS detectives’ exclusive and exceptional ability and specialised training, to investigate FCS-related cases.

The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as presented in chapter 3, acknowledges the influence of change on expertise and specialised skills. It follows that Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993), as presented in paragraph 3.2.3.3, believe that change is hazardous because it destroys, by definition, some of the firm’s existing practices that are, in turn, accompanied by a loss of corporate competence due to the abandonment of familiar ‘routines’. Ford (2007), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, furthermore draws attention to his belief that leading-edge organisations are deriving ever increasing value by tapping into employee and stakeholder expertise and capability. On the other hand, Bayley and Shearing (1996) are of the opinion that community policing officers are encouraged to become “uniformed generalists” responsible for developing customised responses to a wide variety of situations, rather than frequently referring citizens to other more specialised “cubbyholes” within the organisation.

From the respondents of the various FCS units’ perceptions, as presented and discussed in chapter 4, it appears that these participants undoubtedly anticipated their expertise and specialised skills to be negatively affected by the restructuring of the FCS. Participants foresaw their expertise and specialised skills to be inadequately impacted by a transformation in their primary functions, thus resulting in the exhaustion of their expertise and specialised skills. In addition, participants were furthermore of the belief that FCS detectives’ expertise and specialised skills were influenced by the large geographical area these officers needed to serve,
resulting in time constraints that in turn hampered proper investigation of these technical cases: “Because of time ... we need to rush ... some of the other things you know you put a blind eye ... you sacrifice you do quick quick stuff”. Participants, furthermore, considered their knowledge and skills not to be acknowledged after the restructuring of the FCS, since they were now utilised for less important functions: “Our expertise are not being recognised. We are a bunch of monkeys here and since the restructuring the only thing we became is taxi drivers and collecters. The only thing we do is taxi the person [referring to victims] from the police station to the hospital and collecting the dockets”. Moreover, a few participants were of the opinion that expertise and specialised skills could be sustained, on condition that general police officers were primed to gain knowledge of and become skilled at FCS-related investigations. However, participants posed the question of who would be responsible for educating these general officers, since FCS detectives could not perform this function, as they were experiencing time constraints.

In addition, from the senior public prosecutors perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it came to light that the restructuring of the FCS might have a detrimental impact on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS. It follows that one participant did not foresee a significant effect on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives, though the participant predicted the stagnation of these exclusive and exceptional abilities to investigate FCS-related cases. This participant was of the opinion that if these detectives are uninspired, they would, in turn, not be encouraged to further develop their own knowledge and proficiency. As a result, detectives’ preparedness to develop their expertise and specialised skills would deteriorate. In addition, the transfer of knowledge and experience by FCS detectives to general police officers would contribute to their lack of inspiration: “... hulle dan nou veronderstel is om [kundigheid] oor te dra na hierdie gewone lede ... gaan dit hulle net meer demotiveer ... geen elite meer daarin nie ... wat hom onderskei van 'n ander gewone polisielid nie ...” [“... if FCS officials are supposed to carry over their expertise to normal SAPS members these FCS members would become demotivated since there is no longer any speciality that distinguish them from a normal official ...”].
It once again came to light that members of the FCS were not consulted about the planning and objectives of the restructuring process, and it was thus enforced upon them. As a result, these members had to take it upon themselves to yet again motivate themselves in order to perform specialised service, since they lack sufficient resources to perform their tasks optimally, and also did not receive any support in this regard. Another participant similarly concurred that the restructuring of the FCS might have a disadvantaging impact on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives. However, this participant measured the effect of the restructuring on expertise and specialised skills against the method of implementing this process. As a result, it was emphasised again that police officers had to have the required interest and affection in order to investigate FCS-related cases. The participant believed that general police officers might not have these required characteristics to effectively deal with related cases. Consequently, the FCS detectives might, on the one hand, suffer the loss of being experts in their field, resulting in an exodus of these detectives: “… ons gaan ervaring verloor, want mense gaan nie meer daar bly nie …” [“… we are going to lose experience since officials are not going to remain there…”]. On the other hand, sustainable interest from other members in the functions of the FCS might therefore disappear as a result of the eradication of specialisation. It furthermore became known that participants experienced that the fragmentation of the FCS unit brought about a significant shortfall of experienced FCS detectives who were replaced by inexperienced general detectives, which in turn created difficulties for the judicial system: “… mense wat die die ervaring gehad … is na ander eenhede geplaas … met mense wat onkundig is … wat aangestel is …” [“… detectives that had the experience were placed at other units … members that are inexperienced were appointed …”].

Moreover, from the perceptions of NGOs, as discussed in chapter 4, it surfaced that specialisation in the field of FCS-related investigations had been substituted by a universal approach: “… it stopped the work into further specialisation. The restructuring had move into generic work …”. As a result of this collective approach, participants believed, on the one hand, that the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives were not being utilised appropriately. On the other hand, participants were of the opinion that general SAPS officers, beyond doubt, lacked expertise and specialised skills in order to perform FCS-related functions. In addition, these participants were of the sentiment that the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives
were going to vanish as a result of the decentralisation of FCS detectives, resulting in the variation of these detectives’ primary functions and the inaccessibility of their services: “... how do you get specialised in something if you have to be Jack of all trades and master of none? If you specialize in something ... you only do that ... your experience level go up ... That is not what is happening at the moment ...”. It follows that these detectives’ expertise and unique skills would not be applied in line with their primary functions as FCS detectives. As a result, participants judged that a message was created that FCS-related investigations were of lesser importance.

Expertise and specialised skills are essential factors in the effective continuation of an organisation. Members of the FCS’ expertise and specialised skills were not acknowledged after the implementation of this process. As a result, these members had feelings of disempowerment. This implies that the SAPS failed to create structures in order to preserve these members’ exceptional ability and specialised training. This was a significant drawback to the restructuring of the FCS.

Consequently these members were discouraged from participating in the restructuring process. As a result, the restructuring of the FCS is impacted negatively, as members distanced themselves from this process.

5.2.8 A review of the necessity to restructure the FCS

Change in any organisation is inevitable. However, the central challenge of this theme is to examine the question of the essentiality to have restructured the FCS, in order to ensure that the unit continued to carry out its functions optimally, as presented and discussed in paragraph 4.2.8.

The literature review on impact evaluations in organisations, as presented in chapter 2, acknowledges the importance of conducting impact evaluations in order to answer similar challenges.
The article *Impact Evaluation – Overview* (2006), in paragraph 2.6, draws attention to, among others, one reason for conducting impact evaluations is to establish how effective the programme is in comparison with alternative interventions? In addition, Regalia (1999), in paragraph 2.6, similarly highlights the rationale of conducting impact evaluations since it assess whether a programme is achieving its objective, how the beneficiaries’ situation changed as a result of the programme and what the situation would have been without the programme. Moreover, if an impact evaluation is carried out at an intermediate stage of project execution, very important lessons can be learnt on how the programme design and/or the project execution can be modified to improve the effectiveness of the intervention. In support of Regalia, Savedoff et al. (2006), in paragraph 2.7, also draws attention to the significance of impact evaluation. It follows that the necessity or effectiveness of a change initiative could be determined prematurely by utilising impact evaluations since it could generate useful feedback during implementation. Davies (2004), in paragraph 2.7, moreover illustrates the significance of conducting impact evaluations, referring to the UK government, to guarantee that programmes are planned and delivered as effectively and efficiently as possible and, thus, clarifying the necessity of such a programme. Blomquist (2003) furthermore illustrates, in paragraph 2.7, the link between evaluation and the larger mandate of improving public sector management, referring to successful international examples.

Additionally, the literature review on restructuring processes in business – and policing organisations, as presented in Chapter 3, draws attention to organisational restructuring. Lee and Teo (2005), in paragraph 3.2.1, acknowledge the reality of organisational restructuring and, thus, believe that organisational restructuring has been, and will continue to be used as a turnaround strategy to control costs and to realign internal structure to meet changing environmental conditions. In support of Lee and Teo, Schwarz and Shulman (2007), in paragraph 3.2.1, believe that structural change is stimulated by rapid environmental change, increasing complexity and uncertainty, and the predominance of loosely coupled organisational components. In addition, Palmer *et al.* (in Schwarz and Shulman (2007), as presented in paragraph 3.2.1, furthermore
draws attention to the fact that organisations of all kinds have to deal with regulatory, cultural, economic, technological and physical environments that are potentially changing more rapidly than the organisations themselves. Consequently, the pressure on organisations to adapt and change their structures is immense.

Similarly, Savery & Luks (2000), in paragraph 3.2.1, also acknowledge that today’s environment is full of uncertainty, market changes, changing workforce demographics, social and political pressures, and, not least of all, technological advances, making today’s organisation one of constant changes. Moreover, Ogbonna and Harris (2003), in paragraph 3.2.1, furthermore highlight the necessity for organisations to restructure, and are of the opinion that organisational structural change has been one of the most topical issues in management and organisational studies over the last two decades. As a result, recent research interest has moved away from the evaluation of merits and problems of traditional forms of organising to the investigation of new ways of structuring organisations.

The article *Organisational Restructuring* ([s.a.]), in paragraph 3.2.1, additionally provides various reasons for the need for organisational restructuring. It follows that organisational restructuring occurs when new skills and capabilities are needed to meet current or expected operational requirements. In addition, another symptom of the need for organisational restructuring is when the accountability for results is not clearly communicated and measurable, resulting in subjective and biased performance appraisals. Moreover, parts of the organisation could be significantly over- or under-staffed, that in turn necessitates organisational restructuring. Another reason for organisational restructuring is that organisational communications are inconsistent, fragmented and inefficient. Furthermore, technology and/or innovation are creating changes in workflow and production processes that prompt restructuring. Organisational restructuring could, in addition, take place when significant staffing increases or decreases are contemplated, when personnel retention and staff turnover are a significant problem, workforce productivity is stagnant or deteriorating, or when personnel morale is deteriorating.
Fay and Luhrmann (as quoted by Schwarz & Shulman, 2007), presented in paragraph 3.2.3.2, believe that the dominant position is that change is essential and that organisations are always changing. Bowman and Singh (1993), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, however, caution that there can be significant negative consequences associated with poorly managed restructuring programmes. On the other hand, Burke and Nelson (1997), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, believe that the contemporary organisational realities of restructuring, among others, have not only changed organisational systems; they have had a major effect on workers in them – mostly negative - and continue to take their toll on employees at all levels.

From the participants of the FCS units’ perceptions, as presented and discussed in chapter 4, it appears that all the participants from the restructured FCS units overwhelmingly and indisputably concurred that the restructuring of the FCS was unjustified for the continued functioning of this unit. It follows that participants were of the belief that victims of FCS-related crimes experienced added complications in reaching the detectives of the FCS, after the implementation of the restructuring. One participant compared the restructuring of the FCS as the fragmentation of parts of a larger structure that have to function in unison in order to be optimally effective. It follows that the breakup of this previously united structure had adverse consequences for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit, thus comparing the deterioration of the functioning of the FCS as a hoax: “... ons is besig om uitmekaar te val ... ons was ‘n kool gewees wat saam met klomp ander kole ..., maar dan vat jy daai kool weg hy raak koud hy gaan dood ... en dit is presies wat hulle met ons nou gedoen het. Ons is ‘n kootjie wat weggevat is uit ‘n warm vuur uit, ons brand nog steeds ... maar ons gaan dood gaan” [“... we are in the process of falling apart ... we were like a hot coal together with other coals ... then you take away that coal, its gets cold and dies. We are like that hot coal that is taken away ... we are still burning ... however, we are dying”]. In addition, participants predicted the further deterioration of the unit’s functions if they were merged with the already overloaded general detectives at station level. These participants were of the opinion that the unfamiliarity with the goal of this process contributed to members’ pessimistic sentiments regarding the essentiality to restructure this unit.
From the perceptions of two researchers from a regional human security research institute’s Crime and Justice Programme, discussed in chapter 4, it surfaced that these participants regarded the restructuring of the FCS to be futile for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit: “I don’t think that this type of restructuring is necessary at all …”. It follows that participants recommended that another option could have been to maintain the FCS in its previous centralised structure, though FCS detectives could then have been empowered in a tutor capacity, providing training to members at station level. As a result, the participants were of the opinion that these members would have gained firsthand knowledge of FCS related functions, without negatively affecting the functionality of the FCS unit. Nevertheless, these participants foresaw increased difficulties ahead for the FCS: “… they could have manage it differently without having to resort to a decentralisation of our FCS units … in the medium- and long-term … we will have more problems …”.

What’s more, it became known from the perceptions of senior public prosecutors, discussed in chapter 4, that these participants were unfamiliar with the necessity to restructure the FCS in order to ensure its continued functioning, since this unit provided an efficient service to the community prior to the restructuring: “... hulle was besig om ‘n spesialisdiens aan die gemeenskap te lewer, glad nie ‘n idee hoekom hulle nodig gehad het om te verander nie …” [“... they provided specialised services to the community, have no idea why they changed …”]. “Why change it if it is not broken”. As a result, participants anticipated the decentralisation of FCS members to bring about total disorder in the system, unless the SAPS invested in intensive training of members, the appointment of expert and dedicated personnel in this field and participative communication regarding FCS affairs between all role players.

From the perceptions of NGOs, as discussed in chapter 4, it appears that participants believed that the FCS indeed functioned effectively before the restructuring. As a result, participants recommended that instead of restructuring the existing structure of the FCS, the SAPS management should have strengthened this unit: “I do not think it was necessary ... things that were ... working well was done away with ... rather than sharpening that existing structures I think those structures were just taken away”.

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It follows that participants predicted a bleak future for the FCS and called upon the SAPS management to reinstate the previous centralised FCS units.

Organisational restructuring occurs continuously and for different reasons. For organisational restructuring to be embraced, employees should realise the necessity of such a process. The literature in chapters 2 and 3 highlight the essentiality for organisational restructuring, and also provide various reasons for it. However, the need to embark upon the restructuring of the FCS was not communicated to FCS members or the external client system it served. It follows that the increased challenges and obstacles members and the external clientele encountered, raised serious questions about the necessity to restructure the FCS. Consequently, members of the FCS and the external client system perceived this process to be unjustified.

“Examining the impact of the FCS restructuring on the associated networks” follows.

5.2.9 Examining the impact of the FCS restructuring on the associated networks

Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to the client system serviced by the FCS, refer to the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the joint venture, collaboration, relations and operational arrangements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to victims of FCS related crimes, as discussed in paragraph 4.2.11. It follows that the participants spoke about the partnerships, interactions and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders, and also about the partnerships, interactions and working agreements among the internal clusters of the FCS.

As a result, this theme is divided into two sub-themes: firstly, the impact of the FCS restructuring on the external networks, and secondly, the impact of the FCS restructuring internally among the FCS clusters.

The first sub-theme to be presented is “The impact of the FCS restructuring on the external networks”.
5.2.9.1 The impact of the FCS restructuring on the external networks

The literature review on restructuring processes, as presented in chapter 3, acknowledges the significance of continuous communication with stakeholders. Cooper ([s.a.]), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, also values constant interaction with stakeholders, by referring to continuous dialogue with stakeholders in order to work out alterations to the newly implemented structure. Additionally, Anderson (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, cautions that organisational restructuring may disrupt relationships with external actors, that organisations need to survive. Moreover, the illustration of The Royal Dutch/ Shell Group’s restructuring initiative, an organisation that values external partnership, as discussed in paragraph 3.3.1, furthermore accentuates the importance of external role players.

From the participants of the various FCS units’ perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it appeared that the affiliation between the FCS and the external stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS, deteriorated to such an extent after the restructuring process, that communication and interaction between these organisations were virtually non-existent: “... We had quarterly meetings with the Social workers ... community based members ... and those are no more. We had lectures with the schools... at the moment if you go there only a few people will turn up to attend the meetings. The community here are up in arms ... They have lost their trust in the police because they know that there is no more experience ...”. Moreover, participants indicated that they did not perceive the necessity of sustaining high-quality partnerships, interaction and working agreements with these external stakeholders any longer, since these participants were of the opinion that their primary functions were going to be done away with in future. As a result, participants experienced the interaction between these external role players and the FCS to have been of higher quality prior to the restructuring. In addition, a number of participants sincerely regretted the fact of not being in a position to maintain adequate interaction and working agreements between the FCS, the community and external role players rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS. On the other hand, certain FCS clusters succeeded in sustaining the high-quality partnerships, interaction and working agreements with these external stakeholders, despite the restructuring.
Similarly, from the perceptions of two researchers from a humanitarian security research institute’s Crime and Justice Programme (in chapter 4) it furthermore emerged that the partnership and interaction between the FCS and NGOs rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS, were significantly hampered as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. Consequently, new relationships had to be established between these organisations.

From the perceptions of senior public prosecutors, presented in chapter 4, it appears that the FCS did not create opportunities for liaising with NGOs and other departments, in order to develop a strong partnership: “Daar is ‘n probleem van samewerking tussen ons... Hulle is nie beskikbaar nie. Dit gebeur net nie - ‘n helse probleem hoe hulle nou deesdae inskakel met NGOs”. [“There exist challenges to cooperate with one another. They are not available ... it just doesn’t happen any longer ... a huge challenge how they cooperate with NGOs these days”]. Additionally, one participant interestingly explained the virtual disappearance of the interaction between the FCS and other role players, as a result of an identity crisis which these detectives had to deal with after the restructuring of the FCS, since they lack a sense of belonging. Consequently, it appears that these detectives were experiencing difficulties in coming to terms with their circumstances. These participants furthermore revealed that there were barely any direct communication between them and the state prosecutors, and therefore compared the majority of FCS detectives to strangers.

Participants were also of the view that the level of cooperation and communication between the FCS and the state prosecutors was higher prior to the restructuring process, that resulted in the enhanced relationship and understanding between these role players. On the contrary, one participant speculated that the relationship between these role players would probably continue and not be affected by the restructuring. As a result, the impact of the restructuring of the FCS might have a positive effect on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and other (external) stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS.
From the opinion of NGOs, discussed in chapter 4, it seems that the interaction and professional practice between these role players decreased to such an extent that NGOs had to rely on the personal commitment and support of FCS detectives. On the other hand, it surfaced that prior to the restructuring of the FCS, NGOs had an excellent relationship with the FCS. It furthermore became known that certain NGOs took the responsibility and initiative upon themselves to establish a new relationship and working agreement with the SAPS, in order to alleviate the widespread confusion at the time: “... created and establish our own network ... while the SAPS is trying to get their house in order”. Conversely, these participants were, however, experiencing continued and constructive partnerships, interaction and working agreements with other NGOs after the restructuring of the FCS. As a result, participants viewed the collapse of collaboration and interaction between the FCS and NGOs as a direct result of the restructuring of this unit, and therefore held the SAPS management accountable for it. Furthermore, it also emerged that a few participants were optimistic about the probability that circumstances surrounding the failure of interaction and partnerships between the FCS and NGOs could be recovered. However, the SAPS management would have had to be prepared to enter into dialogue with the NGOs, in order to restore the situation cooperatively: “... it can improve ... provided there is discussion and collaboration.”

The significance of partnerships and working agreements with external role players in an organisation may not be ignored. The literature in chapter 3 accentuates the significance of maintaining continuous communication and constant interaction with external stakeholders, after organisational restructuring. On the contrary, adequate action was not taken by the SAPS in order to maintain these partnerships. As a result, partnerships and interaction with these role players were almost non-existent after the implementation of this process. This was a critical challenge to the restructuring process.

Consequently, the critical question must be posed: Why did a democratic police service, which focuses on effective service delivery and partnerships, allow the deterioration of its external networks?

The second sub-theme, “The impact of the FCS restructuring internally on the FCS clusters” follows.
5.2.9.2 The impact of the FCS restructuring internally on the FCS clusters

The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as presented and discussed in chapter 3, draws attention to a few objectives of restructuring on the internal functioning of the organisation, as well as some of the impacts such a process could have on the employees, internally. Stevenson et al. (2003), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, acknowledge the intentions of organisational restructuring internally, and also point to the challenges that may occur within the organisation. These authors are therefore of the opinion that sometimes planned restructuring efforts involve attempts to get people and groups within organisations to work together more effectively. When this is the aim, the change agent often attempts to increase formal structural connections between people and groups, under the assumption that information will flow more freely, barriers and conflict between work functions will break down, and innovative activities will diffuse more effectively in a dense network. At the same time, however, organisation members who stand to lose influence and/or structural autonomy if barriers are broken down, may work against efforts to increase formal connections in ways that weaken their influence.

On the other hand, Skogan (2008), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, portrays the internal impact of organisational restructuring among employees, and is thus of the opinion that specialised units such as detectives are often threatened by department-wide programmes that require them to change their ways. For example, detectives may be required to actually exchange information with uniformed officers, and not just “suck it into their black hole”, and they might find debate opening about their effectiveness. Moreover, Baruch and Hind (2000), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, point to the internal difficulties that could arise from restructuring an organisation. As a result, these authors are of the opinion that it has been acknowledged that “survivors” of restructuring may become demotivated, cynical, insecure and demoralised. This might be as a result of stress and anxiety, based on fear of further “downsizing/restructuring”, or due to diminishing trust between employees and management, or indeed a combination of these factors. In addition, Johnson (1994), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, highlights the internal impact of restructuring on employees and therefore suggests that a change strategy must be developed that takes the employee’s psychological processes into account.
In support of Johnson, Elias (2007), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, thus cautions the implementation of a change initiative without attending to such processes that can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism - each of which has the potential to reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and motivation.

Swanson and Power (2001), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, furthermore, draw attention to various disturbances employees could experience after the implementation of a restructuring process. It follows that “survivors” of organisational restructuring also experience job insecurity in the lead up to the changes, and increased job demands after reorganisation - which has been shown to have a negative impact on physical and mental health. Role stressors, including ambiguities, conflicts of interest and increased workloads may all contribute towards lowered morale for surviving workers post-restructuring. Such increases in workload may occur as a result of coming to grips with new or unfamiliar structures, new responsibilities or technologies, or due to reduced manpower resources and support from managers or colleagues. Burke and Nelson (1997), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, additionally accentuate the impact of restructuring on employees, and is of the view that the contemporary organisational realities of restructuring, among others, have not only changed organisational systems; they have had a major effect on workers in them – mostly negative - and continue to take their toll on employees at all levels. On the other hand, the example of Vodafone’s restructuring process, in paragraph 3.3.2, illustrates the value of an efficient support structure for affected employees to effectively deal with the internal impacts of such a process.

From the respondents of the various FCS units’ perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it surfaced that the partnerships, interaction and working agreements internally amongst the FCS clusters were non-existent after the implementation of the restructuring process. It follows that participants indicated that the low self-esteem of detectives and the difficult position these detectives found themselves in, were major contributing factors to the reason why these FCS cluster units did not interact: “... each and every person’s morale is so down you don’t even want to communicate with the colleagues at another station because you don’t want to hear his problems ... you’ve got a lot of problems of yourself”.

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As a result, partnerships between these units were also significantly damaged; therefore, these units functioned individually. In contrast, one participant indicated that the FCS clusters assisted one another if the need arose, emphasising the camaraderie and mutual interest between these clusters.

For organisational restructuring to be successful, internal organisational challenges should be adequately dealt with. The literature in chapter 3 highlights the importance of internal interaction among employees, and also draws attention to internal challenges during organisational restructuring. However, the SAPS failed to a great extent to maintain and foster cooperative behaviour between the various FCS clusters, after the implementation of the restructuring process. In addition, the organisation also neglected to create structures to address employees’ challenges of functioning as individual clusters, thus losing their “esprit de corps”. In other words, the management of the SAPS focused exclusively on the implementation of this process, while ignoring the internal consequences and feelings of employees. As a result, members of the FCS did not have the necessary motivation and self-esteem to overcome these internal challenges, thus complicating the impact of this process on the internal network.

5.3 Summary

This chapter interpreted the findings and measured the emergent themes and accompanying subcategories. In addition, literature in support of each theme and accompanying subcategories was also presented, to emphasise the significance of these identified themes. Furthermore, examples of national and international police and non-policing organisations, and the lessons that could be learnt from these organisations’ restructuring efforts, were presented, to draw attention to the impact of organisational restructuring, as well as to enrich the explanation of the findings. Additionally, the impact of each step on the restructuring process of the FCS was explained to present a holistic interpretation of the findings.
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the thesis from chapter 1 to chapter 6, whereafter the interpretations made in this chapter are examined and conclusions drawn. Recommendations are also made, based on the findings of the identified themes, in order to address the impact of the restructuring process on the FCS.
6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a summary of the thesis from chapter 1 to chapter 6, whereafter the interpretations made in chapter 5 are examined, and conclusions drawn. Recommendations are made, based on the findings of the identified themes, in order to address the impact of the restructuring process on the FCS. Providing that the SAPS management commit themselves to the recommendations presented in this chapter, there may be a significant progression in the management and further development of the restructuring process of the FCS.

6.2 Summary

Chapter 1 commenced with an introduction to the rationale for the research that was undertaken - namely, to evaluate the impact of the restructuring process on the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS). A problem statement was provided, explaining the purpose and importance of this research. Attention was drawn to the value of this research and its results. The presentation of the goals and objectives followed, that provided the aspirations and rationale for the study, as well as a clear and unambiguous summary of the research objectives. The primary objectives of the study were to identify and describe the impact - that is, the overall long-term effects, positive or negative, intended or not – of the restructuring process in the FCS, in order to assess the internal and external climate on service delivery, to determine whether the restructuring process in the FCS is achieving its proposed objective according to the extent and manner in which the situation of the beneficiaries (victims of FCS-related crimes, as mentioned in section 1.4) has changed as a result of this process, and to provide feedback to help improve the effectiveness of the restructuring process and improve future strategies.
Moreover, the demarcation of the field of study focused on how the study was narrowed in scope. Consequently, key theoretical concepts fundamental to this study were defined to provide a common understanding of their meaning in the study. Geographical and time limitations then followed for discussion, whereafter difficulties encountered during the study were acknowledged. Subsequently, the research methodology was presented and discussed, which clarified the particular steps that were taken to address the research problem, and consisted of the explorative characteristics of the study, the research approach and design, methods of data collection and analysis, and methods to ensure validity and reliability, as well as ethical considerations.

Chapter 2 presented a comprehensive overview of impact evaluations in organisations. A discussion of a variety of authors’ views on the topic of impact evaluation provided the conceptual perspective necessary to acquire a complete understanding of the topic. An overview of emergent themes was additionally presented in support of the literature. The focus of this chapter was on impact evaluations in national and international police and non-policing organisations, for a discussion on the best practices of these organisations that led to the movement towards conducting impact evaluations. Illustrations of impact evaluations were furthermore presented, to explain the importance thereof for organisational restructuring.

Chapter 3 provided a holistic literature review of existing publications on the specific problem that was researched, to present the knowledge base upon which the study is built. The viewpoints of a wide variety of authors, that relate specifically to the key concept - namely, organisational restructuring - were discussed, to place the current study within the conceptual and theoretical perspective, as well as to obtain an in-depth understanding of the topic. In support of the literature, an overview of the emergent themes was also presented and discussed. Additionally, a summary of examples was presented of organisational restructuring processes in national and multinational police and business organisations, to indicate similarities to, and differences from, restructuring efforts in the SAPS. The chapter concluded with lessons that could be learnt by the SAPS from these organisations’ restructuring initiatives.
The aim of the analysis presented in chapter 4 was to understand the various elements of the data obtained, through an analysis of the relationships between concepts, constructs and variables, to identify and also isolate patterns and trends, as well as to establish themes and subcategories that emerged in the data. The data collected was described and illustrated by means of individual and focus group interviews with members at the lower hierarchical levels of the FCS, as well with various external role players serviced by the FCS. Questions relevant to the restructuring of the FCS were asked. In addition, the research design and approach were triangulated to ensure the richness of the data. In support of triangulation, in-depth discussions were held with independent qualitative researchers to corroborate on the emergent themes and subcategories. Each theme was initiated with an explanation, which was furthermore enriched by direct verbatim reflections of the participants’ responses. The chapter concluded with a critical reflection on the themes and subcategories that rounded off each of these themes.

In chapter 5, the results of the analysis presented in chapter 4 were interpreted and measured against the comprehensive body of literature as presented and discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The structure of this chapter was based on the identified emergent themes and their subcategories. These themes were: exploring the awareness of the motivation behind the restructuring of the FCS; evaluating the implementation of the restructuring process; proposals on the communication style and implementation method of the restructuring process; the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery; the effect of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of FCS members; the outlook on the feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals of the FCS restructuring; the impact of the restructuring process on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives; a review on the necessity to restructure the FCS; examining the impact of the FCS restructuring on the associated networks; the impact of the FCS restructuring on the external networks; and, the impact of the FCS restructuring internally on the FCS clusters.

An overview of each theme was presented, which was supported by the inclusion of various literature sources, as presented in chapters 2 and 3, to emphasise the significance of these themes for organisational restructuring.
The chapter then concluded with the perspectives of participants from the individual and focus group interviews, that were integrated to form a comprehensive interpretation of the findings. Lastly, the impact of each of these themes on the restructuring of the FCS was elucidated, to round off the holistic findings of the interpretations.

6.3 Recommendations originating from the findings

The findings made in this study necessitate recommendations on how restructuring in the SAPS can be improved. The recommendations are based on the responses received from the individual interviews and panel studies, and are directed at how restructuring in the SAPS should be approached, implemented and followed through.

6.3.1 Recommendations on the planning and design of restructuring in the SAPS

The planning and design phase of organisational restructuring generally commences when an organisation’s current organisational structure is ineffective. The planning and design of a restructuring initiative is a management function, of creating and sustaining actions required to create a desired organisational structure, with the intention of producing the framework and tools required to create an effective organisation. The planning and design of a restructuring process should, however, be realistic and structured according to the requirements of the organisation. It follows that the planning and design phase of organisational restructuring supports the management to elucidate and focus on the rationale of the restructuring process. As a result, the planning and design of a restructuring initiative is significant, to avoid error or even identify opportunities for further growth. The planning and design process furthermore enables management to have an improved understanding of what they want to achieve with the restructuring initiative, how and when they want to achieve the restructuring, and who should carry out this process.
Organisational restructuring is used by many organisations as a strategy to improve their efficiency. However, an organisation should only engage in such a process if it is fundamental to guaranteeing its optimal operation. It is therefore imperative to ensure that employees realise the necessity of such a process being embraced by them. As a result, the essentiality to restructure an organisation should be communicated to employees. When members of an organisation do not understand the need for restructuring, they may regard the necessity of the process as unfounded. As a result, it is inevitable for the management of an organisation to focus on the rationale for the new design. Moreover, the management team should energise efforts to make the restructuring successful, and realise that changes take time and sustained energy.

Another significant factor is to create and maintain open dialogue with employees as they adjust to the new organisational structure. It is also crucial to have an unambiguous and convincing business case that is driven by the needs of stakeholders. It is, therefore, essential for the management, employees and other stakeholders to agree on criteria for the new design that address the business case. Moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed structure must be understood, as well as the resultant changes throughout the organisation. As a result, the involvement of key stakeholders to design an unsurpassed structure, is advantageous to the organisation, since greater acceptance and buy-in of the process will emerge, and support for change will materialise. In addition, information regarding the restructuring process must be communicated timeously, to prepare employees and other relevant stakeholders, for change.

One of the first steps towards creating successful organisational restructuring is to empower the employees with sufficient knowledge about the rationale for the change, to eliminate mystification and ambiguity. When employees do not comprehensively understand the reasons why organisational restructuring is taking place, and also do not understand the strengths and weaknesses of the process, widespread confusion and uncertainty will prevail among them, that in turn could create increased challenges to the success of the process. It is therefore imperative to agree on principal criteria for the new design, that address the new organisational structure.
A democratic organisation such as the SAPS is expected to apply a user-friendly style of communication that promotes transparency and accountability. Such an organisation is furthermore characterised by a diplomatic approach to the implementation of its change processes, that in turn promotes participative decisionmaking and consultation and the involvement of key stakeholders. Effective communication is the cornerstone to familiarise members with the change process, to create understanding among them and encourage acceptance. It then follows that the implementation of change processes may be executed with fewer complications. It is, additionally, imperative that the communication effectively addresses members’ fears and uncertainties. Moreover, efforts to make the restructuring work must be intensified, and consciousness and sustained energy should be created by the management.

The outcomes of this research indicate that the management of the SAPS failed to communicate the motivation and underlying principles of the restructuring process to members and other external role players at the lower hierarchical levels, in a timely fashion, in order to familiarise and empower them with knowledge of this process, to prepare them for change. As a result, these members did not understand the motivation behind the restructuring of the FCS, which in turn created pessimistic, disapproving and critical sentiments towards the process. The SAPS also neglected to energise and motivate employees to make this process a success. Consequently, instead of focusing on the reason for the restructuring and taking ownership of the process, members distanced themselves from it. As a result, members were captured in an uncertain and confusing environment, and therefore could not focus on organisational restructuring - which may have had a contributing effect on members’ pessimistic attitudes. Moreover, it appears that the internal and external communication and information management of the SAPS was unreliable and confusing, since the SAPS also failed to maintain open dialogue between management, employees and other role players, as employees endeavoured to adjust to the new structure. Additionally, the organisation appears to have placed more value on an autocratic style when implementing change, as opposed to the discreet approach practised by a democratic organisation. It follows that the SAPS also did not place high value on the involvement of key role players to design the most appropriate structure.
The recommendations presented in this study are based on the three phases of organisational restructuring acting as key guidelines during restructuring processes, as discussed in paragraph 3.2.2.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended that, in order to achieve transparency, knowledge and ownership in the restructuring process of the SAPS, the organisation should:

- Clarify reasons for restructuring prior to process initiation

The SAPS management should remain focused on the reason for the restructuring, and therefore timeously and unambiguously communicate the motivation, necessity and underlying principles of the restructuring process to members and other external role players at the lower hierarchical levels. Additionally, the management of this organisation should provide the members and the external role players with detailed particulars of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS, through consultation and information sharing, to comprehensively acquaint them with this process and thus prepare them for change. This implies that the SAPS must continue to engage in dialogue and participative decisionmaking with its employees and other important role players. As a result, the organisation will have an improved understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed structure, as well as an enhanced understanding of the ensuing changes in the SAPS.

- Formulate a detailed restructuring strategy

It is imperative that the SAPS has a realistic, transparent and comprehensive strategy in place that addresses the needs of all those involved.

- Communicate the restructuring strategy

Additionally, the SAPS management should design strategies to ensure that the organisation’s internal and external communication - as well as the management of information - is reliable and transparent. Furthermore, the management of the organisation should apply a more diplomatic
communication style and implementation method during the restructuring process. The SAPS should have detailed strategic initiatives in place, to warrant effective internal and external communication and information management. It is also recommended that the SAPS adapt its communication style and method of implementing change processes, to be more in line with democratic institutions. It follows that the SAPS should resort to a premature consultative communication style, characterised by transparency as well as participative decisionmaking, during change processes. Explicit time lines should be created to set a clear view of the future and to direct the restructuring process.

- Obtain buy-in for the restructuring process

The SAPS, its employees and other role players have to principally agree on the main aspects for the new structure.

- Clarify roles to ensure success

Moreover, the SAPS should energise efforts to make the restructuring process a success. The role of employees and external role players in this process should also be clearly defined and explained, to eliminate ambiguity as well as to streamline the process.

- Timeous notification of forthcoming restructuring drives

Communication and consultation of the rationale behind the restructuring process should be timeously implemented in a clear and explicit way, ahead of the implementation of the process, to prepare employees for the envisaged change.
6.3.2 Recommendations on the implementation of restructuring in the SAPS

The implementation of a restructuring process refers to the execution or the realisation of such a process’s new plan and design to fulfill the desired goal and objectives of the restructuring initiative.

6.3.2.1 Creating an understanding of executing restructuring in the SAPS

In a democratic organisation such as the SAPS, change processes cannot be implemented without sufficient consultative communication and transparency. It is therefore imperative to continuously communicate and discuss the rationale and importance of the change initiative to employees in a clear and unambiguous way, in order to empower these employees with the necessary knowledge concerning the goals and objectives of the implementation of the change initiative. It is also essential to engage employees in open dialogue during implementation, and invite feedback from them, to make the necessary adjustments to the implementation of the restructuring process. As a result, employees would experience the implementation of the change process as a well-executed and understood process, thus improving the effectiveness of the change initiative.

When a change process is not implemented in a gradual, clear and explicable way with sufficient consultative communication, mystification, ambiguity and insecurity may prevail among employees. It follows that the implementation of a restructuring process must, therefore, be planned thoroughly, taking into account the various process changes required to support the new structure. On the other hand, the management of the SAPS must pay attention to the organisation’s ability to change.

In order for the restructuring process of the FCS to be beneficial for the SAPS and to be accepted by members, the implementation thereof should be understandable, realistic, gradual and transparent. From the perceptions of the participants, it is evident that the SAPS management neglected to implement the restructuring process of the FCS in a clear, gradual, well-executed
and understood manner. It follows that the implementation of this process was instantaneous and also characterised by mystification, ambiguity and insecurity, rather than a well-executed process distinguished by transparency. Additionally, when the morale of members in an organisation is upheld during organisational restructuring, it simplifies the process for these members to create a positive and meaningful mindset to fulfil their functions with the necessary productivity, drive and passion. However, when these members are confronted with a lack of purpose and direction, or a feeling of senselessness, their productivity is without doubt negatively impacted. It is therefore imperative for the management of an organisation to remain sensitive towards the self-esteem of its employees and external clients during the implementation of organisational change, to promote productivity.

Moreover, in order to set a clear view for the future, it is essential for an organisation to have long-term goals. However, these goals should be clearly communicated to the entire workforce to gain understanding and buy-in among them. On the other hand, these goals should also be practical and achievable. When an organisation’s long-term goals are not communicated effectively and transparently to all its employees, without sufficient support from management to facilitate these goals, employees may not realise the vision of the organisation, and therefore lose interest in accomplishing and maintaining these long-term aspirations. It follows that when employees do not realise what these goals are, it is impossible to achieve or maintain them.

From the outcome of this study it transpired that the SAPS management failed to implement the restructuring of the FCS in a gradual, transparent and understandable way to encourage employee and external role player participation. Additionally, the SAPS management should have engaged in persistent communication and consultative decisionmaking with its members and the external role players regarding the reasons for the restructuring, to create readiness among the participants concerning the implementation of the process. More specifically, the SAPS should have committed itself to continuous participative dialogue with members, to educate them in the implementation of the restructuring process and to invite frequent feedback to make necessary modifications as the process progressed. Knowledge concerning the goals and objectives of implementing the restructuring process should also have been carried over to members and external role players.
Moreover, the practical implications of the implementation process regarding the restructuring of the FCS, should also have been explained to all those involved. On the other hand, the SAPS management should have paid attention to the organisation’s ability for change, taking into account the many process changes needed to support the new structure. Additionally, it became apparent that the SAPS considered it unnecessary to invite feedback and suggestions from its employees and external role players.

It follows that the SAPS management should also have developed a strategy to take members’ psychological well-being into account during the implementation process.

Furthermore, the outcome of this study indicates that the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS had a detrimental effect on the self-esteem, service excellence and effectiveness of FCS members and their external client system. It follows that the management of the SAPS was not sensitive towards the low morale of FCS members and their clients, created by this process. As a result, these members’ productivity levels were also negatively impacted. It follows that the organisation failed to develop strategies to address employees’ and their external client system’s psychological interests during the implementation of the restructuring process. Moreover, it appears that the SAPS management rather concentrated on internal dilemmas when confronted with low self-esteem and productivity of its members. As a result, the organisation’s external challenges were neglected.

From the perceptions of the participants it is furthermore evident that the SAPS management failed to effectively and unambiguously communicate the long-term objectives of the restructuring of the FCS to its members and the external client system. As a result, these members were unable to realise these goals in order to make an effort to accomplish them, which in turn created negativity towards the process. Consequently, these members and the external client system had major reservations about the feasibility and sustainability of this process. Additionally, it appears that the SAPS management neglected to provide support to these members to achieve and sustain these goals.
**Recommendation:** It is recommended that in order for the restructuring process in the SAPS to be executed effectively, the organisation should

- Emphasise the rationale and strategy

The SAPS should continuously engage in persistent communication with its members and the external role players, accentuating the reasons for the restructuring, to create knowledge and readiness among these participants concerning the implementation of the process.

- Create realistic time lines for process implementation

The SAPS should create anticipated time lines for the implementation of restructuring initiatives. The implementation of restructuring processes in the SAPS should allow for their gradual execution.

- Prioritise communication and participative decisionmaking

The SAPS should, moreover, implement restructuring processes in a transparent manner, creating knowledge among members. Moreover, it is recommended that timeous and constant communication and consultative decisionmaking with members and external role players regarding the implementation of the restructuring should be put into practice. Education by the SAPS management to members and external role players on the implementation of the restructuring process also needs priority.

- Monitor progress and create support structures

It is also essential for the SAPS to engage employees and external role players in open dialogue during implementation, to monitor progress and invite feedback and proposals from them, in order to make the necessary adjustments to the implementation of the restructuring process. In addition, the SAPS should create strategies and support processes to address members’ psychological welfare during the implementation of a restructuring process.
Additionally, the SAPS should sensitise itself towards the low morale of its members that in turn give rise to their low levels of productivity. As a result, the SAPS should create and maintain high standards of morale and productivity in the immediate term, after the implementation of the change initiative and well beyond. The SAPS should, furthermore, develop and maintain trust between its employees, external role players and itself to simplify the initiation of restructuring initiatives.

6.3.3 Recommendations on how to accomplish restructuring in the SAPS

This phase entails that organisational restructuring is pursued until the goals and objectives of the restructuring initiative is a reality. In other words, managers should not discontinue pushing change forward or withdrawing from the restructuring process until the changes are embedded and well-established in the organisation.

6.3.3.1 Creating awareness to realise restructuring in the SAPS

Additionally, managers should also create increased awareness of the reason for the newly adopted structure. It follows that managers should revive efforts to realise successful restructuring, and employees should realise that changes take time and persistent energy. The focal point of the restructuring process should be the reason for the new structure, as much as making it work, that in turn will energise employees to focus on improved service delivery. However, enthusiasm and employee involvement should be sustained until the change is completely realised. Subsequently, adequate time should be permitted for employees to function and experiment within the new structure. Moreover, communication with employees and other role players should be maintained to plan important adjustments.

From the perceptions of the participants it became known that the SAPS management prematurely withdrew from the restructuring process before this process could be well-established in the organisation. It follows that this organisation’s management also did not create
increased awareness for the rationale of the new organisational structure. As a result, efforts to encourage the realisation of successful restructuring were neglected. The outcomes of this research additionally indicate that the SAPS management failed to create structures in order to preserve members of the FCS’s exceptional ability and specialised training, after the restructuring of this unit was implemented. It follows that a shift towards the transformation of the primary functions of FCS detectives as well as major time and resource constraints significantly contributed to the negative impact on these members’ expertise and specialised skills. As a result, these members were discouraged from participating in this process and therefore distanced themselves from it. This also implies that members were not encouraged to adopt the restructuring. Consequently, these members focused on self-preservation instead of organisational restructuring.

It furthermore transpired that the reason for the new structure, namely, to improve the service delivery of the FCS, on the other hand created increased challenges. From the perceptions of the participants it is evident that the restructuring of the FCS had a damaging effect on the internal and external climate of service delivery of the FCS. Consequently, the SAPS management failed in its effort to improve service delivery of the FCS through the restructuring of the unit. As a result, service delivery provided by the FCS deteriorated after implementing this process. It follows that the SAPS neglected to effectively pay attention to major contributing factors, resulting in the depreciation of the services delivered by the FCS, such as the lack of physical and human resources, a shift in the unit’s primary functions, the doubtful alliance and cooperation within the internal structures of the SAPS, and the fading of the *esprit de corps* of the unit.

Moreover, it also surfaced from the perceptions of participants that the SAPS management ignored sustainable employee and other role player involvement in the restructuring process. Consequently, employees and important role players significantly lacked enthusiasm and commitment towards the restructuring process. On the other hand, although sufficient time was permitted for employees to function and experiment within the new structure, the management of the SAPS failed to communicate with employees and other role players to outline significant adjustments to the restructuring process. The results of this research signify that the restructured
FCS units failed to maintain adequate partnerships and working agreements with external role players after this process was implemented. As a result, a virtual collapse of these partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS, transpired. It follows that the management of the SAPS did not encourage these members to uphold these partnerships, and therefore overlooked the importance thereof.

It furthermore emerged that the SAPS failed, to a great extent, to maintain and foster continuous dialogue and cooperative behaviour between the various FCS clusters, after the implementation of the restructuring process. It follows that no structures were created to promote partnerships, interaction and working agreements among the FCS clusters. Moreover, it appears that these units concentrated on their individual interdepartmental challenges and therefore neglected to interrelate with one another. This implies that the management of the SAPS focused exclusively on the implementation of this process, while ignoring the internal consequences and feelings of employees. As a result, members of the FCS did not have the necessary motivation and self-esteem to overcome these internal challenges, thus complicating the impact of this process on the internal network.

**Recommendations:** It is recommended that, to effectively follow through the restructuring process in the SAPS and to accomplish the end result of this process, the following is necessary:

- Persistent management involvement

The management of the SAPS should remain actively involved in all the phases of organisational restructuring and should not distant itself prematurely from the restructuring process. This implies that the SAPS management should pursue organisational restructuring until the goal and objectives of the restructuring process are entrenched in the organisation.
• Emphasise increased awareness of the reason for the new structure

The SAPS should create increased consciousness among its employees and its external role players of the reason for the newly adopted structure. It follows that managers of the organisation should encourage efforts to realise successful restructuring.

• Maintain interest and involvement after process implementation

The SAPS should preserve employee involvement and enthusiasm, in anticipation of the total realisation of the restructuring process. It follows that the SAPS should allow adequate time for employees and external role players to function and experiment within the new structure.

• Sustain effective and timeous communication

The SAPS management should persist in communicating with employees and external role players to discuss and plan necessary modifications or improvements, until the anticipated outcome of the restructuring process is achieved.

6.4 Procedural framework for implementing structural transformation in the SAPS

As mentioned in paragraph 6.3, the management of the SAPS failed to timeously communicate the motivation and underlying principles of the restructuring process to members and other external role players at the lower hierarchical levels, in order to familiarise and empower them with knowledge of this process, to prepare them for change. Moreover, the SAPS management failed to implement the restructuring of the FCS in a gradual, transparent and understandable way to encourage employee and external role player participation. It also became known that the SAPS management prematurely withdrew from the restructuring process before this process could be well-established in the organisation. Consequently, various shortcomings were identified that influenced the effective management of the restructuring in the FCS.
Figure 6.1 below illustrates how these shortcomings in the structural transformation of the SAPS could be corrected. This figure demonstrates that structural transformation is not an isolated process. However, it is a continuous flow of processes intertwined and interrelated with one another. More specifically, this figure places emphasis on the timeous and effective communication of the restructuring strategy during the planning and design of the restructuring, to empower and familiarise all role players with such an initiative. In addition, knowledge and understanding of the implementation of restructuring in the SAPS should be created among all role players.

In other words, role players should have sufficient knowledge of the process, and the implementation thereof should be realistic, gradual and transparent. In order to follow the restructuring process through and to successfully accomplish restructuring in the SAPS, active management, as well as role player involvement, interest and enthusiasm should be sustained through the application of timeous, effective and sustainable communication. Lastly, it is recommended that the SAPS consider the possibility of transferring the proposed procedural framework in figure 6.1 to similar organisational transformation initiatives that are implemented in the SAPS.
FIGURE 6.1 PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK FOR STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
6.5 Conclusion

This chapter summarises chapter 1 to chapter 5 whereafter recommendations were made on how restructuring in the SAPS can be improved. It is evident that if the SAPS management commit themselves towards the recommendations made in this chapter there may be a significant progression in the management and further development of the restructuring process of the FCS. Consequently, it will impact positively on restructuring initiatives – and total transformation – in South African policing.

This study is important since the impact of the restructuring process in the FCS is identified and described. Consequently, this impact evaluation indicates the existence of various areas of contradiction between policy and practice as the emergent themes and subcategories indicated. Besides optimism from the SAPS management about the restructuring of the FCS, this self-assurance of the management structure of this organisation is met with a discouraging picture of pessimism by its members. It follows that the overwhelming majority of practices implemented during the restructuring of the FCS do not reflect the intentions of the restructuring policy. It emerged that the restructuring of the FCS was implemented abruptly and was thus not a proper initiated process. Although a number of directives on transformation in the SAPS have been implemented over the past 14 years it appears that the mechanisms to address restructuring in the SAPS have been problematic to put into practice. Restructuring initiatives that have been implemented such as the redeployment of FCS detectives at station level are superficial changes since restructuring has focused mainly on strengthening capacity at station level, thus neglecting total service delivery. Despite progress in restructuring policing in South Africa much remains to be done as the recommendations suggest.
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ANNEXURE A

OBJECTIVES AND RESULTANT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Objective 1:
To identify and describe the impact, that is, the overall long term effects – positive or negative, intended or not – of the restructuring process in the FCS in order to assess the internal and external climate on service delivery.

Questions:

1) Do you have an understanding why the restructuring of the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS) has been undertaken and what it involves?

2) From your experience, has the SAPS Management clearly communicated and consulted the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS? In other words, did the SAPS Management interact with you?

3) According to you, do you think the FCS’s functionaries will benefit as a result of the restructuring? What effect will this restructuring have on aspects such as service delivery?

4) According to you, what effect will the restructuring of the FCS have on the morale and productivity of the members?

Objective 2:
To determine whether the restructuring process in the FCS is achieving its proposed objective according to the extent and manner in which the beneficiaries’ (victims of FCS related crimes as mentioned in section 1.7) situation has changed as a result of this process.

Questions:

1) In your opinion, will the restructuring of the FCS meet its long-term goals/objectives? How feasible and sustainable will this process be?
2) According to you, will this restructuring process have an impact on the expertise and specialized skills of the detectives in the FCS?

Objective 3
To provide feedback to help improve the effectiveness of the restructuring process and improve future strategies.

Questions:

1) Is the restructuring of the FCS necessary for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit?

2) From your experience, how will the restructuring of the FCS impact on family violence, child protection and sexual offences investigations? On the one hand, what does the future hold for victims of these crimes? On the other hand, what will the impact be on the perpetrators of these related crimes?

3) According to you, how will this restructuring process affect the partnership, interaction and working agreements between the FCS, non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, and other government departments?
ANNEXURE B

Table 1: DEMOGRAPHIC PARTICULARS OF THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS WHO PARTOOK IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Method of data collection</th>
<th>Post description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FCS Unit</td>
<td>Focus group</td>
<td>FCS Detectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS Unit</td>
<td>Focus group</td>
<td>Unit Commander and FCS detectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS Unit</td>
<td>Focus group</td>
<td>Unit Commander and FCS detectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head: Efficiency Services, SAPS Head Office</td>
<td>Individual interview</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magistrates Court: Children and Domestic Violence</td>
<td>Individual interview</td>
<td>Senior State Prosecutor</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Individual interview</td>
<td>Senior State Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
<td>Individual interview</td>
<td>Therapeutic Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
<td>Focus group</td>
<td>Head of Department-Childrens Services; Social Workers; Psychology Interns; Play Therapists; Training Coordinators and Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent, non-profit applied policy research organization</td>
<td>Individual interview</td>
<td>Senior researcher and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Police Union</td>
<td>E-Mail</td>
<td>National Negotiator/Manager: Communication &amp; Marketing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEXURE C

### Table 2: OVERVIEW: THEMES AND SUB-THEMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>SUB-THEME</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants’ perceptions and experiences of the implementation of the restructuring process</td>
<td>The preferred communication about and way of implementation of the restructuring of the FCS: Participants’ pointers, tips and recommendations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ views about the effect/impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ perceptions on the restructuring of the FCS on the morale and productivity of the members</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants’ opinions about the feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants’ views about the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and specialized skills of the detectives in the FCS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants’ views on whether the restructuring of the FCS was necessary to ensure its continued functioning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the victims of crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the perpetrators of crime</td>
<td>The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders rendering services to the client-systems serviced by the FCS, and The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements internally amongst the FCS-clusters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INFORMATION NOTE

Ref: 25/7/12/1(1)

The Provincial Commissioner
SA Police Services
GAUTEN 3


1. The above mentioned member is currently stationed at the Electronic Surveillance Unit, Technical Support Unit, Gauteng.

2. The member is registered at UNISA for the Dlitt at Phil in Police Science.

3. The topic for the member’s study is, “South African policing in transition: Evaluating the impact of the restructuring process”.

4. The study will be confined to the Serious and Violence Crime Investigation Unit (SVC), Krugersdorp, West Rand. Semi-structured interviews would be conducted with Station Commissioners where the members have been placed due to the restructuring of the Serious and Violence Crime Investigation Unit. Panel interviews will be conducted with members that were formally at the unit.
5. The research seeks to overcome shortcomings in practice through evaluating the impact of the restructuring process in the SVC with the aim to identify the impact and effectiveness of the restructuring concerning the functioning of the SVC.

6. The study is further of importance as an impact of evaluating of the restructuring process in the SVC could provide the SAPS management with valuable information regarding the effectiveness and impact of the organization’s efforts to improve accountability, communication and service delivery through the implementation of restructuring.

7. The proposed research is a long term study (approximately 3 years) and the object is not to discredit the SAPS.

8. This study is a continuation of the member’s previous study (Masters Degree), Obstacles impeding the transformation process in the SAPS.

9. Attached find documents from the member:
9.1 Application from Insp Van Graan
9.2 Research proposal

Comments
Recommended/ Not-Recommended

Provincial Head: Management Services: Gauteng
WA Venter
Information Note Compiled by: Snr Supt PS Naicker
011-274 7566 (office)
011-274 7565 (fax)
082 405 5373 (cell)
Insp JG van Graan

RE: RESEARCH PROPOSAL: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS

1. Your request to conduct research at the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit, Kugersdorp was approved.

2. Letter signed by Snr Supt Schnettler is attached.

[Signature]

HEAD: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

C J Joubert
APPLICATION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH: POSTGRADUATE STUDY: 0468811-2
INSPECTOR J G VAN GRAAN; ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNIT: TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICE: CRIME INTELLIGENCE: GAUTENG

Telephonic conversation between S/Supt Naicker, Supt Joubert and Insp van Graan on 11 April 2007 refers.


2. In my application for the research this study will confine itself to the Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (SVC) Krugersdorp in the West Rand policing area. However, I would prefer to conduct the study at the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS), Krugersdorp in the West Rand policing area since I have initially compiled a research proposal and a large body of literature with regard to the FCS. In addition, I have also previously made contact with relevant NGO’s who’s responses were optimistic. As a result, members of the FCS unit will be used as the target population and not the Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (SVC).

3. Nevertheless, the goal and objectives of this study will not be influenced.

4. Hope this application will meet your favourable response.
***************

B1. For your information

0460811-2 INSPECTOR

J G VAN GRAAN

TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICE, CRIME INTELLIGENCE,
GAUTENG

Snr. Orde
Snr. Smit
Snr. Schneller
2007/04/17.
The South African Police Union

The Impact of Restructuring in the Police Service

As a union we have an obligation to represent our members' interests against the employer, especially when the employer is proposing major structural changes. When the changes do not accord with what has been agreed upon, and when there appears to be mistrust, a breakdown in communication is imminent. Ultimately, while police members may suffer as a result of this breakdown, the general public has to bear the brunt of the poor policing that is the inevitable consequence of disquiet and disorder in the organisation.

The members were angered and frustrated by the apparent lack of support they had received from management and went to an extend of blaming their unions with regard to the restructuring process.

When the SAPS wish to undertake any organisational change that will inadvertently affect its members, the process is brought before the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC) and the labour unions. Once the parties are satisfied with the process, the outcome culminates in an agreement.

In 2005 the proposed restructuring process was brought before the SSSBC and unions so that consensus could be reached regarding the process.

The restructuring was initiated by the SAPS Career Management Division. It was intended to address functional problems within the SAPS, including duplicity of functions, weak command and control, and poor service delivery. The restructuring process also sought to eliminate the area level management that had come to be viewed as an unnecessary level of authority. This meant that the SAPS management would now operate on a national, provincial and station level, in line with the requirement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The restructuring was intended to strengthen police stations and improve service delivery to the public.

In practice, in our understanding this meant that only the area offices would have to close down and members affected would then be placed at police stations nearer to their place of residence. This process was never aimed at closing down specialized units such as the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS), the Serious and Violent

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1 Section 40 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.
Crimes Unit (SVC), and the Area Crime Combating Units (ACCU), however what was supposed to happen was that the command and control of these units would have to be re-arranged so that they could at least report to the provincial office thereby keeping the expertise and the resources which were used by these units.

**What happened then?**

Discussions on the restructuring process between labour and the SAPS management started in mid-2005 in the bargaining council (Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council). The SAPS management informed the SSSBC that in terms of the restructuring, areas would be abolished and area commissioners re-deployed to stations. It was decided that a model of accounting stations, with stations clustered around them, would be followed. It was also agreed that implementation of the restructuring would begin in April 2006 and be completed in February 2007\(^2\). We raised concerns about how the restructuring would affect our members and the police service as a whole.

In April 2006 the SAPS gave the SSSBC an overview of the new organisational structure that had already been approved by the SAPS management. However, the new structure did not address the concerns that we had raised. In addition, SAPU disputed the SAPS’s claim that extensive consultation had taken place about the new structure, and argued that such consultation was still needed\(^3\).

SAPU questioned why it was necessary for the entire police service to be restructured, if the intention was to close down only the area offices. We also expressed concern about the following:-

- the reason for the closure of the specialized units;
- the number of employees that would be affected by the restructuring;
- the available grievance procedures for members at area bargaining councils;
- the lack of agreement on transfer costs for members should they be redeployed;
- matching and placing of members at stations as per a skills development audit;
- the resource establishment plan regarding members’ choice of where to be placed, and
- dispute mechanisms in place for members\(^4\).

SAPS management denied that they had not answered all the unions’ questions on the framework. They also denied the claim that there had not been extensive consultation on the restructuring process, stating that a number of workshops were held to discuss the process\(^5\).

\(^3\) Minutes of the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council of April 2006 page 19.
As SAPU we were adamant about the point and placed on record that in terms of the law there was never a meaningful consultation process on the matter. The SAPS then agreed that a workshop would be held at the end of April 2006 for further discussion. This meeting never took place.

The Usage of terminology Unknown to Police officials

In August 2006 the SAPS management did an about-turn on the restructuring. They told us that they were no longer ‘restructuring’ because the process would take a long time (14 months), but said that they would continue the ‘strengthening of police stations’ in the various provinces6.

At this point the lines between what was restructuring and what was redeployment were becoming blurred, and unions raised additional concerns about the process. We were quite clear about a number of things:-

- that too many police members would be affected by the proposed transfers and therefore the transfer policy could not be utilised,
- that management should first resource stations in order to place employees at well-equipped stations,
- that management should not use ‘transfers’ as a method of strengthening police stations, and
- that labour and the SSSBC should continue to be a part of the restructuring process7.

In response SAPS management claimed that the restructuring and the strengthening of police stations were two separate processes that should not be confused8.

We remained adamant that our members’ interests were of paramount importance in both processes, and that we required clarity on dispute mechanisms and representations. We further said we needed clarity regarding the two processes and discussions on the way forward. We also stated that the SAPS needed to respond urgently to our concerns before starting the process of transferring members to strengthen police stations9.

With disregard for the concerns of the unions, Divisional Commissioner Nchwe of SAPS Career Management made a presentation to the SSSBC on 7 September 2006. She spoke about the extent of the problem of crime in the country and proposed a way to address it through redeployment of police members10.

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6 Minutes of the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council of September 2006 page 9
7 Minutes of the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council of September 2006 page 9
8 Minutes of the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council of September 2006 page 10
9 Minutes of the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council of September 2006 page 10
10 Minutes of the Special Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council of September 2006 page 21
A draft agreement on the ‘Performance and Reduction of Crime’ that involved putting the best people at the right places, was circulated at that meeting. Divisional Commissioner Nchwie was vociferous that the redeployment referred to in the agreement was not the same as the restructuring, despite there being little difference in terms of the effect the process would have on members of the SAPS.

SAPU reiterated that it was necessary to put a mechanism in place for members to raise their concerns about the transfers. In response the SAPS management made a commitment that members would be deployed within reasonable traveling distances, and that the transfer policy would include a dispute mechanism. SAPU also asked SAPS management to clarify issues of radius, relocation and skills, in writing so that they could get a mandate for the agreement. We signed agreement 3/ 2006.

The terms of SSSBC Agreement 3 of 2006 were as follows:
- Identified employees will be redeployed to the identified police stations.
- The principles embodied in the transfer policy will be adhered to in the redeployment process.
- Employees will as far as possible be redeployed within reasonable distances from their current workplaces. Only in exceptional cases will redeployment entail a physical relocation of an employee, in which case the employer will implement the relocation policy.
- All employees identified to be redeployed in terms of the needs of the organisation and the skills that they possess will be treated fairly and equitable.

SAPS management and the unions agreed that members would not have to travel more than 30 km from their homes.

Upon signing, the agreement (Agreement 3 of 2006), it was sent from the National Commissioner to the Ministry of Safety and Security, all managers at the national office, and all provincial commissioners.

Labour unions asked for a task team to be established to monitor the process of strengthening police stations. SAPS management agreed to this but indicated that ‘the focus should be on the monitoring of agreement 3 of 2006 and not the breaches of agreement.

The SAPS management further indicated that phase one of the implementation of strengthening police stations had already been undertaken in Gauteng and rolled out in the other eight provinces, and that members were deployed to workplaces in terms of service arrangements. They explained that they were evaluating the achievements of strengthening the police station process. The establishment of a task team as agreed to between the parties was also imminent; its task was to monitor the implementation of agreement 3 of 2006, and to address any complaints with regards to deployment.

\[1^{12}\] Minutes of the Special Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council of September 2006 page 22
A sub-committee meeting of the newly appointed task team regarding Agreement 3 of 2006, which took place April 2007. We indicated that we wanted a list from SAPS management of the number of members that were deployed, where they had been placed, and how far the new placements were from their previous positions. They said that they had found that members were being transferred to components where their skills were not needed. Also, most employees who received notices were told that they would have to make representations only after they had been transferred.

We also stated that the issue of service arrangements was never agreed to in terms of agreement 3/2006. This factor is pertinent in that in police management terminology, a service arrangement is a temporary movement of a member from a currently held position to another position for any period of time. It is defined as a temporary measure and can therefore be rescinded at any time. In terms of Agreement 3 of 2006, members were meant to be ‘transferred’ to their new positions. The implication of a transfer, according to SAPS policy, is that it can be undertaken by a member him- or herself, or may be conducted by the employer in the interests of the service. If a member is then opposed to the transfer, s/he is allowed to put in a grievance.

**The effect of this agreement 3/2006**

The queries raised by unions at the SSSBC remain unanswered, as do their objections about the lack of proper consultation. This did not bode well for further negotiations between the labour and police management.

As SAPU we were and are still of the firm opinion that the unions were misled by the signing of SSSBC Agreement 3 of 2006. It is not difficult to follow our reasoning. Events following the signing of the agreement attest to the fact that Agreement 3 of 2006 was used to further the initial plan of the SAPS management, namely to proceed with the restructuring process. In practical terms all the changes required by the proposed restructuring process have been implemented: the closing down of the area level offices, the closing down of specialized units, and the deployment of members to police stations.

The SAPS however has refuted the fact that the restructuring process, the strengthening of police stations and Agreement 3 of 2006 are part of the same process. The restructuring was started, then stopped, because of the Minister’s (Ngakula’s) report on the impact of violent crime. The focus had to be placed on the strengthening of police stations. The model used to place members was the model that was available; it is the same model that is used to do the restructuring.

The different terminology used by the SAPS to define the process: beefing up of stations, restructuring, strengthening of police stations and re-organisation was confusing to the labour, the bargaining council, members and the general public.
SAPU supported the closing down of area offices and the movement of members to stations in the immediate vicinity. We however, never supported a restructuring of the whole SAPS, and we emphasized that the process of restructuring must be properly consulted with organized labour.

**The effect of the confused messages has been dramatic.**

Unions and SAPS management, lost credibility with members and the relationship between union leadership and police management has weakened.

The SSSBC agreement 3 of 2006, an agreement purporting to reduce the state of crime in the country, and appealing to unions’ sense of sympathy, was and is understood as a deliberate attempt by SAPS management to mislead labour into agreeing to the restructuring. The agreement refers to the National Commissioner’s constitutional obligation to prevent, combat and investigate crime, and forces an obligation on unions to agree to the conditions. It can, in fact, be interpreted as an inventive method to gain approval of the restructuring process which had been stalled by objections from the unions.

However, the process has taken place at the expense of members and of policing. Issues close to members’ hearts, like transfer costs, travel distances and placement, have not been given due consideration and failure to recognize this; smacks of disregard for member well-being. The result is members’ inattention to duty, which hampers effective policing.

*Compiled by Bernard Machakeja  
National Negotiato- SAPU*